World Peace, Mass Culture,
and National Policies

Recent Titles in
Civic Discourse for the Third Millennium
Michael H. Prosser, Series Editor

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William Over

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For Terry

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Preface

A study that attempts the daunting task of connecting the varieties of
war and peace notions implicit in cultural institutions and national
policies must inevitably answer to the charge of neglecting certain im-
portant areas. While this study does attend to a standard of
comprehensiveness, at least so far as identifying what I feel must be the
salient influences on peace and war issues in the new century, it does
not claim to present all areas of the cultural life of the United States as
they influence and are affected by attitudes within the wide populace
of this most heterogeneous society. In the same way it does not attempt
to offer a full analysis of the influences on the corridors of power within
the Washington geopolitical establishment. U.S. policymakers have
made no secret of their theory for unilateralist and, now more com-
monly, weak multilateralist approaches to peace and war issues. Their
official interpreters regularly publish books and articles in well-known
journals such as *Foreign Policy* and *Foreign Affairs*. George W. Bush ad-
ministration theorists, some of whom are high officials, intend such
writings for the purpose of clarifying their political positions, if not for
the public at large at least for an influential readership. Moreover, pub-
lic speeches, addresses, forums, and book presentations that concern
foreign policy are often aired on American and foreign television and
radio. My intent in this volume is to uncover approaches to war and
peace issues within the general culture, discovering the attitudes to-
ward war and peace and the current state of political activism and

critical consciousness in both popular and more elite spheres. While I attend mostly to the context of the United States, to a certain degree I also compare mainstream American cultural attitudes with other First World and Third World perceptions of peace and war policy.

This study was originally approved for publication before the incidents of 9/11 changed profoundly American attitudes toward international conflict and domestic security. For that reason I have tried to orient my chapter topics to this heavy shadow, aware that all of the cultural institutions and thought patterns I originally identified in my book prospectus continued after the terrorist attacks. In many cases these institutions accurately anticipated the responses of both the terrorists hijackers and Washington punitive actions. A fuller discussion of the peace with justice versus peace with power argument, of democratic peace versus hegemonic pacification, remains beyond this volume. Still, the just war debate leads inevitably, I feel, to discussions of just peace. Other areas of discourse, for example, feminist discussions uplifting paradigms of caring versus justice, are also beyond the scope of this study, although again democratic standards for just war and just peace imply just such caring and conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution.

The timely issues of this study invite a certain rhetorical character. Since these chapters recognize that, by and large, American cultural forms lend support to current Washington foreign policy attitudes, other models of peace and war need to be considered by a public often confused or overwhelmed by the magnitude of geopolitical issues. If Hollywood films, for example, continue to project a warrior code of absolute right and wrong, alternative approaches to world peace will be less likely to enter public discourse or occupy private thoughts. So also if the mainstream media offers only false spectra of opinion on news and analysis programs generally considered cutting edge and fair, then approaches to peace and war not sanctioned by mainstream institutions cannot hope to enter the consciousness of the broad populace. Thus, the realization of more conciliatory and multilateral approaches to international relations remains problematic, and solutions are by no means assured in the future. Nonetheless, these chapters seek to identify, though not develop, those positive forces within the international public sphere that give promise of progressive change.

I would like to express my ongoing gratitude to the series editor, Michael Prosser, for his support. World peace was, in fact, his original suggestion to me after my two previous books—on the discourse of

human rights, and on social justice in film and theater—were in print. His own pluralistic orientation to social and political life has been the inspiration for many of us who have been involved in the intercultural communication conferences at the Rochester Institute of Technology organized by Michael and K. S. Sitaram.

This study is intended for both public and private reading. It can be used as a text in undergraduate intercultural communication and political science courses, as well as in graduate film, media, and cultural studies courses. Since its topic is perhaps even more relevant after the events of September 11 than before, it offers a much needed exploration of the connections between cultural and communication studies and social and political issues.

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Introduction:
War and Core
American Values

*We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further
into the future.*

—Madeleine Albright

THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER

A Brief Clarification of Terms

Use of the words *war* and *peace* in this study are to some degree rhetorical, that is, they are meant as terms of opposition for purposes of argument. This does not imply that the variety of meanings for war and peace identified in these chapters are always binary opposites. Indeed, often cultural institutions and policy theorists assume their complementarity. Identifying the salient influences on peace and war issues in the new century requires the examination of a wide diversity of cultural forms, worldviews, agendas, sensibilities, and social perspectives. For that reason definitions of war and peace must remain somewhat fluid, but, it is hoped, not arbitrary. Instead, they are based on the particular cultural and political perspectives of the various actors and sufferers concerned. While final definitions of these two ideas may not be possible in this study, a better discernment of what motivates the government of the United States and American culture more broadly is

possible by a close interpretation of their patterned responses within the international public sphere.

The Status of Moral Argument

When America's leaders attempt to justify war along strategic or economic lines, public opinion remains unconvinced. What usually persuades is the moral argument. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, it was Iraqi war crimes against Kuwaitis that turned Americans in favor of armed intervention. Similarly, American G.I.'s remain generally committed to peacekeeping operations and constabulary duties when human rights or democratic goals are in contention. A survey in Kosovo of American troops found that 86 percent thought their peacekeeping duties were worthwhile and did not negatively affect their combat skills (Moskos, 2001). American culture more broadly has viewed the case of war as fundamentally derived from moral consideration. At the same time, American culture since World War II has relied on a strong military to enhance its claim as leader of the free world. The disparity between these two basic orientations has led to a general ambivalence toward American military agency, motivating among Americans a reluctance to assume the full mantle of world guardian. This study explores this reluctance through its various aesthetic and rhetorical permutations. It attempts to clarify the cultural roots of American perspectives on superpower identity and agency, thereby contributing to a prognosis for the future of global war and peace agency.

Commenting on recent histories of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Jim Russell (2001) notes the disparity between the reception of the Civil Rights Movement as an exemplary social movement, enshrined by the media and schools, and the Vietnam Antiwar Movement, which is either ignored by the same institutions "because it is still controversial—both in terms of whether citizens should have protested that war and, most important, for the 'dangerous' example it set for how citizens might respond to present and future wars engaged in by this country" (p. 32). Certainly, most Americans remain ambivalent toward their country's considerable military endowments in the post–Cold War era and even after the events of September 11, 2001. This circumstance derives in part from the persistent ethos of traditional liberalism in American culture, wherein the waging of international war must include a progressive ethical intent at the same time as it must protect those same progressive values at home from what is perceived

as retrogressive forces from outside. In the past century, these latter include secular totalitarian ideologies (Stalinism, fascism, tribalisms) as well as religious totalitarian ideologies (most recently Islamic traditionalisms, but also Christian forces of divisionism, as in Serbia and Lebanon). Put simply, for most Americans, "war represents a primary means to lasting peace even as we denounce violence in our schools and on our streets" (Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles, 2000, p. 433).

This study will explore current popular conceptions of war and peace, both as they influence and are influenced by, the rhetoric of geopolitical policy at the national and international levels from the Cold War period through the first post–Cold War decade. These chapters show that peacemaking notions suggested or specified in mass cultural forms are nearly always congruent with the particular sources of knowledge that formulate official geopolitical policy and strategizing. Only occasionally do mass cultural forms present oppositional responses to hegemonic power. Thus, popular channels of communication and artistic forms usually define themselves—consciously or unconsciously—as either supportive of official policy or, far less frequently, critical of it. Mass culture by implication is both symptom and creator of societal trajectories, becoming foremost a responsive, at times even pathological, cultural complex. On the other hand, official policymaking for globalization and foreign policy, aware by necessity of "public opinion" in its most quantifiable forms (for example, public opinion polling, legislative attitudes), is also to a degree responsive to the tenor and direction of mass culture.

WAR AND PEACE AS MORAL CAUSES

Citizens for a (Quick) Moral Cause

Popular culture commonly takes its cues from those official institutions of national planning that fundamentally determine international agency—institutions that articulate issues, vocabularies, military movements, foreign aid distribution schemes, peace accords and venues, and so on. Through its characters, story lines, and settings, Hollywood films and television dramas have consistently reproduced a professional warrior ethos, one that reflects the long-standing American ideal of the citizen warrior. Such commercial dramas accurately reflect the predominant U.S. military policy criteria of minimal-risk for its citizen-soldiers and low-level involvement with nation building, as a rule preferring

state building to nation building (Boot, 2002). Counterparts to the professional warrior ethos appear in advertising, popular novels, and current affairs best-sellers. With some contradiction, at the same time as Hollywood promotes a warrior elite, it strives to present such characters as typical democratic citizenry, whose underlying values confirm a society free from the war culture of other national traditions.

The American film industry has used a relatively wide variety of artistic genres to reflect both American fears of international threat and the triumphant solutions to such danger. This has usually taken the form of a united and professionally accomplished citizen-soldier. Discerning analyses of such film forms have been attempted by such cultural studies critics as Fredric Jameson (1991), whose study of the Hollywood film *Jaws* acutely relates the fictional search-and-destroy mission of a hidden general menace to official and unofficial Cold War attitudes and general moods. However, the terrorism of September 11 motivated an immediate and nearly universal desire within the United States to confront international terrorism more directly. Congruent with such nationalistic defensiveness, commercial films have offered even more pointed struggles between foreign aggressors and national defense efforts. This has occurred even as popular opinion desired more multilateral alternatives to foreign policy, along with a stronger interest in utilizing such intergovernmental institutions as the United Nations (see, for example, Hiro, 2001).

Certainly, current American security science has favored the sort of quick and overwhelming response most clearly evident in the 1991 Gulf War, which favored safe and relatively distant engagement with the enemy, always with the priority placed on an absolute minimum of American combat deaths. Given the advanced technology and superior budgetary capacity of the U.S. military, the reality of wars fought with a minimum of direct human participation from the First World side against relatively primitive weaponry that relies on a "labor-intensive" use of Third World armies, notions of fighting war may change radically in the near future. Where a sole superpower can wage war with relatively little threat of great loss among its own citizenry but great potential loss, both civilian and military, among its enemies, the ethos of war could change from heroic ideals of self-sacrifice and fighting for a cause. Given this reality, it would seem that staying alive and fighting for one's comrades-in-arms—the buddy system—would become the more common motivations for the individual in war. However, the majority of Americans still insist on waging only necessary wars, for

self-defense, dire economic necessity (for example, oil shortages), and most especially for such moral considerations as human rights and democratic nation building. These demands persist, despite the low casualties and brief duration of recent American conflicts.

Other global realities are altering traditional notions of peace. When only a few First World nations were responsible for weapons sales worldwide, developing countries remained somewhat accountable to such geopolitical suppliers for aggressive or defensive actions within and outside their borders. However, beginning in the 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s and 1990s, Third World countries have been producing their own arms, including artillery, warplanes, and even relatively high-tech systems. This has proven bothersome to leading First World countries, who rightfully perceive the proliferation of arms manufacture as destabilizing, increasing the "level of status inconsistency" between nations. Of course, American policymakers throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War eras have tended to equate the current "international hierarchy" with "world order" (see, for example, Katz, 1986, pp. 284–295). Thus, new weapons production within nations with hitherto weak military capabilities threaten the current world order. Iraq and North Korea were two obvious examples during 2002. U.S. mass cultural forms, particularly Hollywood action films (including the popular *Patriot Games*, 1992, and *Clear and Present Danger*, 1994), have been quick to present Third World "rogue" states with advanced weapons in need of control through quick and relatively uncomplicated U.S. punitive strikes.

The Moral Language of the Strategic Defense Initiative

The ultimate defense against rogue states and large, sophisticated international terrorist organizations is the Star Wars space technology, named by the Reagan administration the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which promised a virtual U.S.-defended world from outer space (Lyons, 1981). First introduced officially during the Reagan administration, development and procurement of the advanced laser aerospace technology was revived in earnest by the George W. Bush administration in 2001 (Hitchens, 2001). While this weaponry possibility presents much futuristic material for a revived Hollywood science fiction genre, questions remain about the relative global instability that may result should Washington achieve such a unilateral military capacity. Already, China, Russia, and European NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries have reacted to the potential destabilizing effects of these

Washington actions: China because it threatens a "balance of terror" (Eckholm, 2001, p. 4); Russia because it violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; and European states because it threatens "to re-launch the arms race" (Gordon, 2001a, p. 8). Still, Washington may succeed in reducing the road to war in the future by offering to include these and other nations in such outer space ventures, a policy that would increase rather than decrease multilateral decision making.

Movements to ban U.S. development of space missile programs began as early as 1981 among member-states of the United Nations (United Nations, 1981). The George W. Bush administration responded by verbally encouraging the European Union's own development of a missile shield while discouraging the EU's proposed ground-based peacekeeping force independent of a Washington-headed NATO. Expert opinion since the early 1980s has been divided over Star Wars as a possible irreversible inducement to nuclear expansion (Bogdanov, 1982; Hafner, 1982). However, in the ethos of the citizen-soldier of a liberal democracy, even the futuristic missile shield strategy must come with ethical justifications. Recently, for example, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used morally based language to make the missile shield more acceptable to the American public (see Gordon, 2001b, p. 8).

Unilateralism as Moral Cause

Washington's desire for a more assertive stance worldwide, following from its general insistence on a unilateral role in global military actions, is clearly reflected in certain areas of mass culture, particularly in Hollywood commercial films and in media news reporting and commentary. Various genres of film in recent decades have tended to reflect the general cultural urge for moral justification in war efforts, downplaying other motivations, such as the economy of oil and transnational manufacturing. Washington policy has typically insisted on a U.S.-directed peacekeeping effort, with the United Nations in a supportive and limited role, placing that institution on "a more even keel in its peacekeeping responsibilities" (Bolton, 2001, p. 145; see also Kaplan, 2000). This insistence derives more from a fear that intergovernmental organizations will dilute or derail traditional moral imperatives derived from Enlightenment tenets: free trade, individual rights, religious freedom, minority rights, and so on. However, Washington's turn to the United Nations and regional authorities for cooperation in the wake of the September 11 terrorist actions may begin a bridge-building

process whereby Western democratic values enlist common action among a much wider range of nations. Such international cooperation would extend the basic values Americans cherish, obviating the need for the unilateral approach hitherto preferred by Washington foreign and military policy

A significant variation of the American war-as-ethical-cause philosophy is evident in the policy of the U.S. government's War on Drugs, now several decades old, which has fostered a growing resistance movement, especially at such local levels as state government legislation that favors treatment over mandatory hard-time sentencing. The Steven Soderbergh film *Traffic* (2001), although uneven artistically and subject to overgeneralization and oversimplification, nonetheless has generated renewed public discussion about the wisdom of approaching the social problem of drug consumption in martial terms, no matter the moral sincerity. At the end of the film, the character playing the U.S. government drug czar posits the question, "How do you make war on your own families?" While not always analytical and lacking comprehensiveness, the film does manage considerable verisimilitude in its depiction of major problems and issues within current federal drug enforcement and prevention policy. Soderbergh suggests that a preference for quick solutions and violent confrontation over treatment and rehabilitation characterizes a government project that has become morally and intellectually misguided by a social problem worsened by militaristic solutions.

Antiwar as Moral Agenda

American antiwar movements, periodically revived since the 1960s, have been motivated by a liberal ethical character that would protect the traditional Enlightenment values of freedom, fairness, equality, and individualism. Accordingly, peace activists remain motivated not only by the fear of war's material destruction but also by the threat from a general moral and social lassitude brought on by an increasingly commodified culture that subsumes both high-brow and low-brow traditional forms. Indeed, the latter perception, at times vaguely sensed, at times finely articulated, has helped define postmodernism as a broad cultural development (see Clarke, 1996; Eagleton, 2000; and Gitlin, 1995). The discourse of such peace endeavors as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain in the late 1950s and 1960s, the Nuclear Freeze Movement of the 1980s in the United States, and recent revivals that focus on the government's renewal of the SDI are generally

accompanied by a plethora of beliefs in the moral integrity of the individual over ideologies of social coercion.

The Moral Turn of Recruitment

The peace with justice vision, long an expression of secular and religious aspiration since before the Hebrew prophets and evident alike in American Protestant biblical preachment as well as Catholic and Jewish social activism, has influenced American attitudes toward war. Notions of the moral correctness of war, as serving the general social good, appear consistently throughout commercial film genres and across the broader culture, though often upstaged by entertainment elements within these forms. Throughout the Cold War period, military recruitment posters and television commercials have stressed the social benefits of a strong military as often as they have fashioned military service as protector of freedom. After 9/11, however, recruitment promotion has turned decidedly toward military service as social and political cause, competing now alongside the most common previous inducement: career training and "choice not chance." The military buildup in the Persian Gulf during the Axis of Evil strategy was named Operation Enduring Freedom, a title that reflects war as the protector of core American values, in contrast to the 1991 Gulf War's apolitical official name, Operation Desert Storm.

RIVAL BENEFITS OF WAR AND PEACE

War as Reluctant Cause

Students of U.S. history may look on the emergence of the United States as the world's sole superpower with some sense of paradox, since the United States was, until 1941, a decidedly nonmartial nation, whose isolationism prevented much needed aid to its allies, Britain and France, and nearly sabotaged its own North American defense before it finally passed a draft bill in 1941 by one vote (Doenecke, 2001; Zinn, 1998). The rapid transformation of this relatively irenic and isolationist culture into a world-policing superpower uncertain about the cooperation of other nations in such projects has contributed to an uncertainty among Americans toward their country's considerable military muscle. American culture retains vestiges of an older nonmilitary orientation where war

making is viewed as a reluctant defensive aim rather than as an assertive moral force. Such tensions are clear in popular box office films like Steven Spielberg's trendsetting *Saving Private Ryan* (2000), which represents a decidedly unmartial chief of staff, General George Marshall, concerned about home-front values rather than immediate military strategy. The film's citizen-soldiers reflect a long-standing Hollywood tradition of depicting common and personable G.I.'s from various ethnic backgrounds. Its protagonist, a compassionate infantry captain, who in civilian life is a schoolteacher from Pennsylvania (played by Tom Hanks), rejects the traditional braggadocio stage-warrior identity. Instead, he is a reluctant citizen-soldier caught in the ethical dilemma of killing others for the common defense. Spielberg represents common soldiers, but not war itself, as heroic by virtue of their awareness of the human cost of the American way of life.

War as Social Discipline

War as reluctant cause is today counterbalanced by an equally strong sense of the value of martial discipline for American society. This move away from America's traditional minimalization of military values is evident among commentators such as Robert D. Kaplan, whose *The Coming Anarchy* (2000) argues that U.S. culture is morally, aesthetically, and intellectually bankrupt. Whereas earlier moralistic observers of U.S. culture commonly blamed such corruption on popular music, or the turn away from religious teachings, or, from the Left, on the rise of conformist culture (for example, Marcuse, 1964), Kaplan locates the cause of such dissoluteness in the general condition of peace, that is, in the absence of war. Arguing for a strong, U.S.-controlled NATO and a United Nations wherein Washington has renewed its influence, Kaplan finds in unilateral global assertiveness the means to revitalize national culture, quicken social morality and individual discipline among youth, and even encourage a sense of history in a society of instant gratification. He equates a strong society with military preparedness and incorporates ethical arguments similar to those promoting SDI technology by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (see Gordon, 2001a, p. 8).

Kaplan connects progressive mindfulness as core American values with war and national conscription. Paraphrasing the American philosopher George Santayana, he finds that U.S. culture has forgotten history and is bound to repeat it: "Peace . . . leads to preoccupation with presentness, the loss of past and a consequent disregard of the future"

(p. 172). Kaplan considers the cultural virtues of the United States an exemplum for all other UN states. This exceptional status demands that America come to its right mindfulness by managing the world in its own image, that is, by overcoming current multinational consensus, which Kaplan associates with weakness, irresolution, and mixed motives. Commenting on what he considers the United Nations's misguided adage: "seek a peaceful world, worship consensus," Kaplan argues for a more unified world order: "the ability to confront evil means the willingness to act boldly and ruthlessly and without consensus, attributes that executive, national leadership has in far more abundance than any international organization" (p. 178).

Kaplan associates his perspective with that of the prominent pre–World War II theorist E. H. Carr, whose *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (1939) argued that international goals are best realized through national self-interest. These diplomatic assumptions are broadened by Kaplan to construct a theory that equates peace with cultural disintegration and war with progress. Thus, after years of relative peace, U.S. society "is beginning to suffer from the deformities of domestic peace" (p. 181). These conditions, according to the author, can only lead to more social disruption and nonconformity, and, most of all, to a valorization of "consensus" at the cost of social discipline and respect for authority, virtues that mass involvement in wartime activities would restore.

Peace as Productive

Peaceful pursuits, of course, do not always lead to undisciplined inaction and self-centered retrograde intolerance. In fact peacetime culture can encourage thoughtful commitment for peaceful conciliation and progressive activism. Thus, the interwar years in Europe encouraged intellectuals like George Orwell to become involved in organizations like the Peace Pledge Union, an antimilitarist rather than a purely pacifist society (Crick, 1980). After World War II, the peaceful prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s nurtured both the U.S. civil rights and the Vietnam War protest movements, creating a vision of progressive change (see Kluger, 1975; Raines, 1977). Today, this American understanding of the social virtues of peace contends with Kaplan's advocacy of an assertive military culture that fosters progressive change.

The premise that war creates progressive ideas and behavior must be balanced by war's obvious disadvantages. War has been a major factor

in the spread of disease, along with the other obvious negative effects of huge civilian and military casualties, mass dislocation, and general malnutrition (Diamond, 1998, p. 197). Far from encouraging human progress, wars have often proven costly and wasteful in both human and material capital. The occasional "good war" that has occurred in history, such as the American Civil War, would have become futile expenditures of humanity and essential goods if it were not for the redeeming progressive ideas behind them. Abraham Lincoln endowed the Civil War with a progressive cause when he acknowledged the inherent evils of slavery and its corrupting influence upon master and slave alike. His decision in 1862 to abolish slavery was greatly influenced by the decades of agitation by abolitionist groups such as the American Anti-Slavery Society and leaders such as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips, who were largely pacifist in their orientation and came to support the war effort only when it took on the cause of freedom (Mayer, 1998).

For many Americans, the Civil War demonstrated that when mass armies of citizens are given a moral cause, losing wars can be turned to victory. In contrast, the other tendency in current American thought would place world order over such moral causes as human rights and democratic change (see, for example, Haass, 1997; Huntington, 1996; Reich, 1992). Along with Kaplan, theorists like Richard Reich find intrinsic value in military culture, uplifting its disciplinary function at home and the maintenance of international order abroad. These two fundamentally contrasting viewpoints—reluctance and enthusiasm for world military leadership—contribute to the ambivalence of contemporary American military culture, reflected clearly in mass culture's ambivalent views of its citizens in uniform.

Militarizing Culture

Hollywood, television, and other mass cultural forms have not as yet begun to argue explicitly for the expansion of unilateral militarism in space and on the world's surface. Still, a martial and nationalistic orientation in popular culture exists alongside an equally popular ethos that mistrusts Washington's involvement in small wars, prefers negotiation and boycotts to forceful intervention, and prioritizes funding of domestic problems over foreign operations. Moreover, both tendencies appear in other American cultural institutions. The martial orientation appears in popular cops-and-robbers programming. Under the premise of live or documentary television coverage, city and state police forces

across the United States are increasingly presented in martial fashion. Using military-style combat tactics, state-of-siege domestic police forces battle unnamed and unidentified individuals rather than using conciliatory or community methods. In such popular television programs as *Cops*, *Road Pursuit*, and *The Real LAPD*, the camera represents armed conflict as continuous and pervasive, rather than the exception to the rule of daily policing and community work. Even in *The Real LAPD*, only the police are fully portrayed as individuals, with families, community interests, and human responses, while the "crooks" are consistently presented as vague and other, functioning as generic threat to the social order. In America, police officers wear chest ribbons identical to campaign ribbons of military personnel, further associating their social function in martial, rather than civic, terms.

Science and War

A general ambivalence toward military expansionism in postwar America has long existed in other areas of the wider culture. The vast technological knowledge and productivity of the arms industry has been unsettling to many Americans, contributing to a general paranoia toward the much promoted Cold War binary opposition of East versus West. These often inchoate fears were reflected in such popular film genres as the science fiction thriller—*The Night of the Living Dead* (1968), *The Invasion of the Body Snatchers* (1956), their equally popular remakes, and many other popular menace movies. Here modern war technology comes into the local American community when friends and neighbors are transformed through superhuman means into slaves obedient to threatening unknown powers.

However, concern about a destructive military-industrial complex have not been confined to the average citizen. Writing about the American nuclear physicist community, James Gleick (1992) comments on the nature of the government/science connection: "The public would find that knowledge created by scientists was a commodity requiring special handling. It could be stamped CLASSIFIED or betrayed to foreign enemies. Knowledge was the grist of secrets and the currency of spies" (p. 210). The thesis that all scientific defense research will eventually contribute to a social good was severely tested during the Cold War period and lingers on into the new century. Many prominent scientists involved in high-tech defense research have acknowledged, both individually and in groups, the misguided pursuit of the arms race over half a century (see, for example, Oppenheimer, 1945/1980, p. 315).

After the Los Alamos project brought a quick end to the war, President Harry Truman initiated the large endowments in research for what was being called "national security" through "organized science." In a speech, he proclaimed the value of science not for peaceful endeavors but for arms development: "The events of the past few years are both proof and prophecy of what science can do" (Truman, 1945). What followed underscored the "guns over butter" approach to scientific development, wherein science itself became an institution tied to government geopolitical policy. Scientists were perhaps most fully aware of their profession's transformation from a prewar disinterested pursuit with humanistic presuppositions (along with individual career ambitions) to an ideological race for global dominance through financial and career ties to Washington. In addition to Los Alamos, which continued its expansion, postwar Washington soon established such institutions as the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, and the soon-to-be famous national laboratories at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Argonne, Illinois; Berkeley, California; and Brookhaven, Long Island. When noted scientists began to speak out against nuclear proliferation through scientific research, a wide assortment of clergy, foundation heads, and congressmen responded by presenting an ideology of national security through advanced scientific knowledge. Some of these defenders were scientists themselves, most notably Edward Teller. Teller in particular among the physicists called for more government spending on the type of knowledge that expands arms capabilities at the expense of such human-centered projects as infrastructure/mass transit, education, medical research, and city planning. Drawing on the Cold War contention that Russian science was making prodigious advancements after Sputnik, he proclaimed that the United States lagged dangerously behind in science and technology: "Scientific and technical leadership is slipping from our hands" (quoted in Gleick, 1992, p. 341).

War as Overwhelming Capacity

The superpower arms race created its own cultural momentum, so that when presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1956 urged a ban on nuclear tests, President Dwight Eisenhower attacked him for advocating "a moratorium on ordinary common sense" (quoted in Kevles, 1977, p. 383). By the Vietnam War era, the broad U.S. populace was so convinced of such permutations of the arms race as the domino theory in Asia that President Lyndon Johnson had little opposition in Congress or among

his voters when he contrived the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution to allow "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against" U.S. forces. His pretext allowed the wider U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither the populace, Congress (House vote: 416 to 0; Senate: 88 to 2), nor most U.S. policymakers, foremost Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (but not Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles), questioned Johnson's motives or policy (Langguth, 2001). Later, official criticism of the war, generally followed by mainstream journalism, critiqued only the strategic and tactical waging of the war, not its underlying moral presuppositions. Here, purely utilitarian arguments substituted for moral persuasion, ignoring the American penchant for ethical justifications in war. Still, in the 1990s, McNamara's apologia for the war he personally waged on a daily basis reflected only this limited analysis (McNamara, 1995).

By the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. populace would hear, without critical commentary from the mainstream media, a tactical commander (General Norman Schwarzkopf) waxing humorous on television over the purported precision bombing of civilian targets: "There goes the luckiest truck driver in Iraq!" In fact the gross disparity between the enemy's and Washington's military and technological capabilities seemed to lend credence to the view that quick wars could be waged with impunity for the superpower. The universe of discourse that allowed such a war-centered ethic developed from a mass culture that seemed to prefer speedy armed resolution over longer, nonmilitary approaches. However, with the War on Terrorism and the Axis of Evil agendas of the George W. Bush administration, the news media and the public—as voiced through call-in programs on such public interest television channels as C-SPAN, C-SPAN2, and the PBS channels—began to demand the sort of nation-building policies toward democratic goals usually ignored in previous American military interventions. This was quite apparent on these and other channels throughout the autumn and winter of 2002–2003 with the dispute over the invasion of Iraq.

MILITARY POLICY AND AMERICAN IDENTITY

America as World Mentor

In the 1990s, optimism about the moral character of American culture has been reconfirmed by such commentators as Denish D'Souza and Francis Fukuyama. Both express an exceptionalist understanding

of national destiny that posits the moral uniqueness of American culture and affirms an assertive Washington foreign policy supported by "technological capitalism." Fukuyama (1995) defines a nationalistic approach that would encompass the globe as a project of what he and D'Souza term elsewhere the "American Dream": "liberal democracy works because the struggle for recognition that formerly had been carried out on a military, religious, or nationalist plane is now pursued on the economic level. . . . The desire for recognition is satisfied through the production of wrath rather than the destruction of material values" (pp. 359–360). Such statements assume the traditional American exceptionalist argument that, unlike all previous empires in history, the American version of power occurs voluntarily, by virtue of an egalitarianism so self-evident that military interventionism is seldom deemed necessary.

Writing and speaking with similar arguments, D'Souza (2000), like Fukuyama, tends to ignore the substantial military culture of America, evident both in specific terms—huge Defense Department and related intelligence budgets that dwarf other countries' expenditures—and in broader social areas, such as popular entertainment forms. Both uphold the historic uniqueness of U.S. culture, prescribing its generally fair meritocracy as the exclusive pathway for the rest of the world: the "recipe for prosperity and the freedom to shape the rest of your life is America's gift to the world" (D'Souza, 2000, pp. 231, 254). For both advocates, transcending the long economic and military struggles of world history is at last possible through an "end of history" grounded on American interpretations of human society and individual needs. Within these parameters, peace with justice is assumed without vigorous argument. A just peace depends on a kind of popular boosterism that associates with the traditional optimism long evident in American culture. However, such assumptions fit awkwardly in the same social history with the equally pervasive penchant for swift and violent solutions to complex problems. Missing is a more critical analysis of the "gift" to the world from Washington's post–Cold War strategic planning, which, regardless of its relative correctness for the world's future, has consistently emphasized unilateral decision making over intergovernmental and grassroots consensus in recent decades.

American Innocence Abroad

Accompanying a kind of traditional American optimism accepted a priori by Fukuyama and D'Souza is an equally common cautionary

argument insisting that the ethic of good intentions is too naïve for the world. In this view, American culture is continually tripped up by more cunning cultures (nations) that are more cynical about geopolitical realities. Nascent forms of this feature of American self-identity can be found at least as far back as the antebellum period. The well-meaning but bumbling Yankee-type character from the nineteenth-century theater was one popular embodiment of this belief. During the Cold War and after, the presupposition of the well-meaning but naïve American—embodying an innocence abroad, to use Mark Twain's famous title—has generally lent support to less-activist, more-isolationist foreign and military policy orientations. This belief in American innocence and minimalist involvement has stood alongside its opposite reality, that of well-planned and orchestrated projections of unilateral power.

Typifying the innocence abroad viewpoint is *New York Times* UN correspondent Richard Bernstein (1984, pp. 42–46), who attributes the willfulness of UN nations to avoid agreement with Washington norms to "the very structure and political culture" of the United Nations and the lack of political skills among the naïve U.S. delegation, whose simpleminded forthrightness contrasts with the Machiavellian maneuvers of many other member states. Nostalgic for the first decades after World War II, when an "automatic majority" confirmed U.S. interests at the United Nations, Bernstein can only lament the more independent United Nations of today and remains suspicious of further American involvement in that organization (Mallison and Mallison, 1985, pp. 477–479).

America's "Way of War"

The persistent notion that American policy is too naïve and simpleminded for its own good sits uneasily with the equally common notion that Washington policy is innately superior to those of all other countries. Thus, for international conflict resolution and peacemaking, "U.S. involvement . . . is vital to future intervention success. Why? The United States has a unique 'way of war,' or way of intervention, that gains its credibility from its consistency with Western moral and ethical prescripts—all codified in the rule of law" (Wilson, 2001, p. 107). Thus, because of its moral and intellectual superiority, Washington's "way of war" must be viewed as a paradigm for the rest of the world. "The West and the rest," as common stand-in for "the U.S. and the rest," becomes in this view a more or less closed universe of discourse with a delimited

range of possibilities for intervention and peacemaking. Such overviews of military policy instance Kenneth Burke's well-known understanding of power arrangements: "agency" as institutional force controls all "agents" on a globe where instrumentality controls all values as an unquestioned power (Burke, 1969; also see Anderson and Prelli, 2001). Accordingly, the reification of one form of Washington foreign and military policy substitutes for more cooperative and multilateral approaches (as, for example, in Bolton, 2001, and Wilson, 2001).

In fact, Washington policy planning has habitually preferred its own solutions to those of intergovernmental instrumentalities, such as the United Nations, the World Court, and, more recently, the war and genocide tribunals. In 1967, for example, President Johnson deliberately misled Senator Mike Mansfield into seeking UN intervention for a peaceful resolution of Vietnam, placing his hope instead on a continuous bombing campaign of North Vietnam to win the war unilaterally (Mann, 2001, pp. 563–564). This unilateral, single-standard approach to global decision making has long drawn comment, though usually humorously, in the American popular press—for example, President Ronald Reagan in a cowboy suit holding six-shooters over the globe. Nevertheless, the renewed advocacy of geopolitical leadership—rather than the tendentious isolationism apparent through much of American culture—is evident throughout prestigious foreign policy journals (for example, *World Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, *National Interest*), as much as in such promotional publications as *NATO Review*.

Defying isolationist orientations, the Washington policymaking establishment remains committed to a worldwide military interventionism, such as efforts to expand a U.S.-led NATO potentially to all continents rather than solely Europe (see Huntington, 1996). Consideration of alternative approaches to military policy and arguments for the criminalization of aggressive war through international courts are seldom presented to the broader public, either in such traditional forms as Hollywood formula films or in the talk media. Advocates for such efforts are seldom presented. On the epistemic level, mainstream American geopolitical theory often rests on a form of radical relativism that substitutes mere official versions of the truth for global realities. Thus, Hans Morganthau (1964), founder of the realist school of foreign policy, contended that actual history is only "the abuse of reality," while "reality itself" is obtained through "the evidence of history as our minds reflect it." In this subjectivist approach, when the community of nations opposes the version of reality underlying official Washington policy, the

problem lies with multilateral thinking, not with the trajectories of American power, which become, a priori, "reality itself." This intellectual stance is a far cry from long-standing innocence-abroad notions, both counterviews reflecting the ambivalence of American opinion toward the exigencies of superpower status.

CONCLUSION

American culture as the moral exception is not a novel historical notion of national identity. It was presupposed in the expansive aims of Manifest Destiny and in the widespread belief in America as a chosen people. In fact such exceptionalist thought was hardly unique in the nineteenth century, when First World societies hastily demarcated the remaining portions of the globe, creating new colonial territories. Today, conceptions of the moral and economic superiority of the United States remain in the reinvigorated Cold War claim to Leader of the Free World and in reconfigured notions of God's Country (Bellah, 1975; Halberstam, 1993; Pakenham, 1991).

Now presented as sole superpower exceptionalism, official statements have at times presented attitudes reminiscent of the 1950s. So for example, the common Washington attitude toward the rest of the world since the fall of the Soviet Union is epitomized in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's self-definition: "We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future" (quoted in Traub, 1998, p. 80). Such supersessionist notions may recall British justifications for its own expanding empire during the Victorian period (see Lewis, 1978). The tendency to adopt a moral and behavioral exceptionalism has been common in world empires throughout colonial history. In that respect, Washington and its intellectuals follow a clear tradition of discourse that presents largely nonexploitative justifications for empire building.

If U.S. policymakers and theorists promulgate a New World Order that combines the language of self-congratulation with grave pronouncements of worldwide responsibility, they reconfigure similar visions begun in earlier centuries by European empire builders. This assertive discourse is counterpoised to an older, isolationist penchant that mistrusts foreign interventions and eschews such intergovernmental authority as international criminal courts, world courts, and ad hoc tribunals. Falling through the cracks of this mainstream binary opposition are cultural formulations that uplift multilateral, local, and democratic

approaches to peacemaking and peacekeeping that prioritize human rights standards as much as economic concerns. At the grassroots level, such pluralistic thinking remains popular among Americans. However, in the contentions of interventionists and anti-interventionists, human rights as motivation for foreign and military policy is used by interventionists to gain support for its main policies, which also include national security and economic concerns. At the same time, within American culture lies the capacity to direct military and foreign policy more in the direction of cooperative, multilateral approaches. This is due to the diverse, open nature of its culture, a feature that this book will examine in subsequent chapters.

Part One

War as Cause

Chapter 1

9/11: Wars Abroad,
Heroes at Home

NEW COMPLEXITIES

Attack from Without

Two hours after the hijacking attacks in New York City and Washington,
DC, Curt Weldon, a Republican from Pennsylvania, proclaimed the new
spirit of the post–September 11 age: "The number-one responsibility" of
the federal government is the "security of the American people" (quoted
in Corn, 2001). Overnight, the priorities of the first-year Bush adminis-
tration changed from a campaign agenda of education, social security
reform, and the missile shield to domestic security and its demands. It
began a new international assertiveness in pursuit of terrorists who until
then for most of the U.S. populace had remained vague and distant. By
October 2001, the Bush administration's constituencies, weary of the
gruesome video coverage of body parts in central receiving areas where
human remains were matched, like parts of a jigsaw puzzle, were pre-
pared for a major refocus on an imperiled world economy. In the event
the Republican administration would have its way on defense spend-
ing—billions extra as add-on to an already increased defense budget, in
addition to more start-up money for the long-heralded Strategic Defense
Initiative, which Bush had carefully nurtured throughout the summer
by courting problem states such as North Korea, China, and Russia. By
this time the loyal opposition that had hastily united behind the presi-
dent during the early period of the crisis had begun to distance itself

from his new military and domestic agendas, questioning the failures of the defense establishment and spy agencies (the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency [NSA], and so on), and rebutting the apparent abandonment of domestic priorities.

Nonetheless, Attorney General John Ashcroft's proposals to tighten domestic security through measures designed to extend surveillance beyond the Clinton administration's 1996 Terrorism Act passed quickly through Congress. The new Mobilization Against Terrorism Act included extensive wiretapping freedom and up to a week's term in detention without legal explanation for any immigrant suspected of terrorist proclivities. Civil liberties scholar Frank Donner's distinction between surveillance as a "mode of governance" rather than a delimited and regulated tool of criminal investigation seemed to have become more operative in the fall of 2001 than when it was first written in the 1970's (see Shapiro, 2001, p. 22). Moreover, the government pondered the use of national identification cards, and the legal residency expectations of many recent immigrants were dashed by September 11 (Sterngold, 2001; Wakin, 2001). American media commentary began to express doubt about the reliance of U.S. allies in the geopolitical struggle. Was the Northern Alliance of resistance fighters in Afghanistan any better on human rights issues than the Taliban? Was Washington conceding too much to its decidedly undemocratic and retrograde client states? Would Pakistan receive what it wanted from Washington regarding its decades-long struggle with India over the Kashmir region by virtue of its assistance during the Afghan intervention (Crossette, 2001)?

Although many Americans have misgivings about its nation's war on terrorism in the form of punitive bombing attacks on the Taliban regime for harboring Al Qaeda terrorists, most sought punishment. Opinion polls throughout September and October overwhelmingly favored military retaliation, yet fears of further terrorist responses and doubts about the economy continued to preoccupy large portions of the populace (Kahn, 2001). In general, however, signs and bumper stickers asserting that "America will rise again" from the "second Pearl Harbor" of September 11 accurately demonstrated that general fear and grief had followed nationalistic orientations.

Hollywood Anticipations

Few Americans expected the sort of heroic individualism of popular actor Harrison Ford when he single-handedly took on and defeated

terrorists on London streets in the Hollywood formula film *Patriot Games* (1992), directed by Phillip Noyce. Most remained disturbed by a persistent if now less vague paranoia toward the alien presence that threatened homeland security. In fact, the U.S. film industry accurately anticipated in *Patriot Games* the complicated nature of the American response to a foreign terrorism now come home. The film's plot quickly moves beyond the melodramatic juxtapositions of good and evil, black and white, instead presenting ambiguities that suggest the moral complexities of international terrorism. In the film, character identities and motivations switch back and forth so that political demarcations are blurred, much as the post–Cold War, pre–9/11 world had left Americans uncertain about recognizing clear enemies and friends.

However, after September 11, America was undergoing an inner struggle that juxtaposed its strong tradition of ethnic and religious tolerance and minority rights against an equally strong insistence on unilateralism and exceptionalism in world affairs. For instance, in the weeks following September 11, while the more immediate concern of punitive attacks against Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks dominated the media, arguments for tolerance was also consistently presented on media talk shows and news hours. Washington's decision to help fund direct relief efforts for the starving Afghan populace revealed a willingness to act cooperatively through the United Nations. However, such humanitarian concern was also motivated by anxieties that missile and bombing attacks would bring more terrorism to home as retaliation. Such complexities of motivation began to appear as a disturbing element within the stock melodrama of the Hollywood action film genre, which, like the trendsetting James Bond series of earlier decades, hitherto had gained its popularity in part from a simplicity of character motivation within a world where good and evil were clearly marked. Thus, in *Patriot Games*, but even more in its sequel, *Clear and Present Danger* (1994) also directed by Philip Noyce, lines separating the cause of Free World defense against totalitarian ideologies become blurred. In the later film, Washington politics and CIA meddling place the protagonist in mortal danger. At the same time, the stock villains—drug traders and political insurgents—appear less as bumbling ideologues of a misguided communist system, as in the early James Bond series, or hedonistic drug lords, but instead reveal more complex characterizations. They are divided morally in ways similar to their Washington adversaries. Thus, Noyce's title, derived from the Tom Clancy best-seller, belied its underlying meaning, an irony suggesting

that in the post–Cold War world, the clear and present danger was in fact unclear and unanticipated.

Immediately after the 9/11 hijacker attacks, American television networks could offer reruns of such airplane disaster films as *Airplane!* (1980), a parody of the hugely popular but overblown, wide-screen *Airport* (1970) and the earlier *Zero Hour* (1957). Such entertainment-based films provided escape from the complexities of worldwide security and intervention issues and the anxieties of domestic menace from unseen forces. The national anxiety immediately before 9/11 was more clearly defined by the widely promoted film *Pearl Harbor* (2001), which in fact initially proved disappointing at the box office but came with a general revival of interest in the Pearl Harbor phenomenon. The Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet demonstrated America's lack of preparedness in 1941, its oblivious isolationism and unwillingness to rebuild militarily. The nonfiction classic by Gordon Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (2001), packaged in a new deluxe sixtieth anniversary edition, was prominently displayed alongside a plethora of other books on the Pearl Harbor event in bookstores throughout the summer of 2001, just before the terrorist attacks.

Foreign Policy as Moral Exceptionalism

Parallels between December 7, 1941 (the Day of Infamy) and September 11 were quickly drawn by the media, but also by ordinary citizens. Underlying the analogy was the long-standing exceptionalist belief that American culture included a certain optimistic naïveté when confronting the diplomacy and double-dealing of other countries. The land of freedom and promise, so the caveat ran, came with an oblivious isolationism that too quickly granted the good intentions of other nations. This cautionary aspect of American self-image persisted into the George W. Bush administration. Its discourse of innocence abroad fashioned an American befuddlement with the Realpolitik machinations of other nations. Congruent with such notions was a belief in the moral exceptionalism of American foreign policy. Thus, George W. Bush at times presented human rights and social justice issues, usually in the abstract, as a positive feature of U.S. exceptionalism within a sustained *Pax* Americana. Thus, concern for human rights as interventionist cause was offered by the president in a context that would struggle to gain the attention of other nations more interested in complacent self-interest:

There is resentment on the part of many foreign leaders when they deal with the United States, a notion that we arrogantly consider ourselves perfect while they still have far to go. Indeed, we often do seem to lecture and confront other nations publicly on issues such as human rights. For that reason I went out of my way to be careful in questioning foreign leaders or diplomats about their countries' internal affairs. I had no hesitancy in telling them of our commitment to human rights, but I tried to avoid becoming the pedantic lecturer. (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, p. 7)

Such discourse, common in pre– and post–Cold War Washington, uses references to the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights alongside economic and geopolitical justifications. Accordingly, faced with the often selfish pursuits of other national governments, America would be forced to follow in the same direction. The message to the public is clearly cautionary. Just as America was deceived into a complacent optimism before the Pearl Harbor attack, so it would correct its past mistakes by maintaining a guarded perspective diplomatically and a war posture strategically. War preparedness, which after Pearl Harbor was more commonly termed, both officially and unofficially, "defense" preparedness, would become the general remedy for America's penchant for a certain oblivious isolationism, overoptimism, and innocence abroad. In the *Pearl Harbor* film, immediate punitive action is taken against an aggressor Japan when Jimmy Doolittle leads a secret air raid against Tokyo, a denouement that righted the wrong of moral lassitude, equated in the film with lack of military readiness. That military preparedness, even to the point of massive nuclear retaliatory capacity, became linked early in the Cold War period with maintaining homegrown American virtues is evident in military slogans: "Peace Is Our Profession" for the Air Force's Strategic Air Command and "Operation Enduring Freedom" for the 2002–2003 Iraqi military preparations.

Pearl Harbor as National Emblem

Made with the full cooperation of the U.S. Navy and Defense Department, Jerry Bruckheimer's *Pearl Harbor* opened on Memorial Day weekend, 2001, with full fanfare. The $140 million film accompanied television specials, memorial services, and festivities honoring the sixtieth anniversary of the Japanese attack. The patriotic impact of the film

confirmed a certain state-of-siege political orientation that had helped sustain military budgets into the post–Cold War era. In the film, the brave soldiers defending the foreign "sneak attack" would anticipate the heroic firemen and policemen who became, in the image of a prominent post–September 11 New York City poster, "The New Twin Towers of New York." Their rescue of fellow sailors trapped in the hulls of battleships and their quickly awakened response to foreign attack were underscored by a highly orchestrated musical soundtrack featuring patriotic melodies. The heroic proportions of *Pearl Harbor* went well beyond Bruckheimer's previous films, *Con Air* (1997), *Armageddon* (1998), and *Enemy of the State* (1998), which were more straightforward action melodramas exploiting a general post–Cold War paranoia for a vague and nonpoliticized enemy who attacked usually from the skies. Bruckheimer's *Pearl Harbor* was an emblem for the cause of freedom and other American values that evoked earlier historical associations. John Gregory Dunne (2001) would remember a verse posted above World War II recruiting offices after Pearl Harbor: "Let's remember Pearl Harbor / As we go to meet the foe / Let's remember Pearl Harbor / As we did the Alamo" (p. 47). The sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor would reaffirm a military establishment that became the chief protector of cultural values in the postwar decades. By December 7, 2001, the Bruckheimer film would prove a Hollywood "sleeper," a film that gained popularity gradually after its initial release (before 9/11).

In *Pearl Harbor*, the reaffirmation of American democratic values is underscored throughout, but perhaps most explicitly in the historically correct scene where an African American ship cook earns the Medal of Honor by manning an antiaircraft gun. Here, traditional combat courage is transformed into an instance of egalitarian opportunity and the overcoming of residual racism, an institutional condition that would not be officially corrected in the U.S. Navy until after Pearl Harbor. The black sailor's heroism and initiative thus functions proleptically, as a foreshadowing of the civil rights consciousness of the following decades, a point that strengthens the film's message of the virtue of the American culture of diversity, where all groups recognize the need for common defense.

In contrast to the heightened military glory of *Pearl Harbor*, military heroism was less accessible to Americans during the 2001 Afghan War. While bombing from a distance with high-tech rocketry, smart bombs, and advanced planes continued in Afghanistan, media coverage gave Americans their heroes not on the new battlefield, but at

home—among New York firemen and policemen. Perhaps the one-sided nature of the military campaign in a far-off country discouraged the public from finding heroic figures in the Afghan War; perhaps that war's punitive association with the recent domestic hijacking attacks troubled the American psyche. On the other hand, "The New Twin Towers" of New York were identifiable in terms of individual and collective heroism, representing physical courage not in military engagement but rather in lifesaving actions. This form of heroism was less controversial and disturbing, at the same time closer to home, involving only American lives.

THE STRUGGLE OF SYMBOLS

Symbols of Freedom Threatened

If the American public found symbols of freedom and democracy reaffirming within its own society, these traditional American virtues seemed threatened or nonexistent globally, as journalism reported Washington's greater involvement with human rights and social justice issues in other nations. The destruction of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, long a center of multiethnic culture within a warring region of formerly united peoples, became emblematic of a general abandonment of social tolerance during the 1990s. Slobodan Milosevic was first to be tried, followed closely by other Serbian associates implicated in the killing of perhaps 200,000 Bosnian Muslims (Halberstam, 2001, pp. 95–96). While the destruction of the Berlin Wall poignantly symbolized abstract notions of democracy, boundary crossing, and wider tolerance, the Balkans cross-cultural conflict cost many human lives and challenged facile notions of human rights progress. The degree of ethnic and religious hatred evident in Milosevic's career, that of Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman and other Balkan strongmen, left a disquieting sense that feudalistic cultures continued to thrive in the new century alongside pluralistic orientations. A faithful apparatchik of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Milosevic quickly discerned the potential intensities of Serbian nationalism and exploited age-old hatreds and unsettled scores. Robert Kaplan (1994) observed that he was "the only European Communist leader who managed to save himself and his party from collapse . . . by making a direct appeal to racial hatred" (p. 40).

Like the federal office building in Oklahoma City; the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas; and the Buddhist monuments in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, the city of Sarajevo stood in the way of destructive forces that preferred the war ethic of first-strike and nonnegotiation to open dialogue for conflict resolution. In each case the forces engaged represented different ideologies and lifestyles, but all included an absolutist orientation, or, in the case of the FBI, an unquestioned governmental priority that seemed to prefer careerism and state-of-siege bureaucratic rigidity to direct contact with the other. To essentialist, religious inerrantist Osama bin Laden, New York's Twin Towers represented an unacceptable Tower of Babel that defied God's law, a monolith that had obtruded into the lifeblood of Muslim culture. All of these vanquished structures, large and public, stood between cultural mandates at the turn of the millennium. They represented the current power configurations lying behind the clash of religious traditions.

Samuel Huntington's seminal essay in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993), presented the future of geopolitical conflict in the post–Cold War era as a struggle between nation-states with different civilizations. More fundamental still was the clash between divergent cultural and epistemic orientations: a struggle between, on the one hand, pluralistic and progressive worldviews, and, on the other hand, essentialist, triumphalist, and exceptionalist perspectives. Noted Islamic scholar Eqbal Ahmad, writing for a Muslim audience, noted that the recent religious fundamentalist movements within his tradition remain "concerned with power, not with the soul; with the mobilization of people for political purposes rather than with sharing and alleviating their sufferings and aspirations . . . a very limited and time-bound political agenda." For Ahmad, Islamic absolutists today seek "an Islamic order reduced to a penal code" (quoted in Said, 2001, p. 13).

The systematic destruction of Sarajevo represented the collapse of the tensive truce between Christian (Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic) and Muslim cultures in the twentieth century. In a similar way, the dynamiting of the large Buddhist statues in Bamiyan by the Taliban government evinced the willful elimination of the other through an agenda of aggressive war. Herbert Muschamp (2001) observed that the Bamiyan destruction revealed "an historical truth: some peoples, living a twisted, murderous version of their history, are driven to vaporize the history of others" (p. 1). In America, the attacks

of September 11 swept away public complacency about the dangers of such intolerance. Naomi Klein (2001) observed that for Americans the illusion of distant war without casualties has been forever shattered. Certainly, Washington defense strategy throughout the 1990s aimed for a high-tech approach to deterrence diplomacy and small-wars tactics: the use of sophisticated and usually airborne weaponry allowing minimal loss of life for its forces. On the other hand, Third World terrorist groups have sought the opposite: a low-tech willingness to sacrifice lives for an unquestioned faith. While U.S. military and espionage policy in the post–Vietnam War era has sought the substitution of technology for human contact, Third World terrorism discovered that the human factor, the willingness to sacrifice lives against the faceless technology of war, could, at least initially, win in the struggle for world recognition.

However, at Bamiyan, the low-tech, human-factor terrorist method backfired. Unlike the World Trade Center attack, symbols only were destroyed, not human lives. Nonetheless, the world saw gratuitous destruction of a centuries-old religious and artistic monument under the guidance of a narrow and literalistic interpretation of religious law. News reports circulated that fragments of statue heads were being sold on the world market to buy more guns for the jihadi cause. Instead of furthering the cause of Islam, the event confirmed worldwide opposition to the Taliban and its prescriptive Muslim society. Thomas L. Friedman's comment after September 11 would also apply to the Bamiyan action: "The real clash today is not between civilizations but within them—between those Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Jews with a modern and progressive outlook and those with a medieval one" (quoted in Muschamp, 2001, p. 36).

Opposing Voices

Within the United States, the intense nationalistic fervor evident soon after the September 11 period of grief and outrage was followed by an equally strong sentiment for tolerance and understanding. In fact, much of the latter had come from the Bush administration, which learned early in the crisis that conciliatory language was needed—often alongside directly provocative rhetoric—in order to win over other Islamic nations and populations to the antiterrorist cause but also with the hope of discouraging more terrorist acts at home. In addition, the number of cautionary responses from various grassroots

sources added to the public argument for a more pluralistic and reasonable outlook. Television talk shows and news analysis programs, such as the *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* and *Frontline*, featured noted Islamic scholars and historians that corrected widespread misconceptions of Islam as a largely intolerant religion (Lehrer, 2001). One month after the hijackings, an ambitious documentary on the history of Islam appeared on public television. Broadcast over three days, *Islam: Empire of Faith* presented, despite the provocative nature of its title, a pointedly positive historical study of the religion, often using the intolerance and backwardness of Christian Europe for comparative purposes. It presented the Muslim general Saladen, notorious among medieval Europeans, as a tolerant leader who treated his defeated Crusader prisoners kindly and allowed Christians to worship in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher after he recovered Jerusalem (Gardner, 2001). Similarly, in the New York theater, a multimedia version of *The Conference of the Birds* by the twelfth-century Sufi mystic, Farid al-Din Attar Nishaburi, opened in October 2001 to critical acclaim. Produced and performed by Iranians who fled both the repressions of the shah and the Islamic Republic, their version, called *The Logic of the Birds*, emphasized the special tolerance that comes when individuals examine their own lives (Wallach, 2001).

Such instances of broad-mindedness within the United States accompanied the strident xenophobia and reductionism channeled through much of the media: American schoolchildren were shown on television reciting songs about the U.S. flag; and bumper stickers reduced what was described in the American media as the "Attack on America" to an attack on freedom itself. Nationalistic fervor often combined with a religious exclusivism—God Bless America—that represented the September 11 terrorism as solely an attack on the United States, an equation that President Bush continually repeated at news conferences. In context, the exclusivist language emphasized the isolation of America, despite a variety of critical voices from Europe, including British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who reminded audiences that the events were an attack on other countries as well. Accordingly, the new unilateralism of the Clinton and Bush administrations, for instance, the circumvention of the United Nations in favor of an expanded NATO under Washington leadership, could not escape its worldwide detractors after September 11. As American leaders demanded international support for the War on Terrorism, other world leaders began to offer more critical voices.

THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY APPROACH

Advanced Knowledge and the Varied Unknown

Advanced scientific research in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gained significant support from military design and procurement aims, starting in Revolutionary France at the end of the eighteenth century and spreading to Great Britain, Germany, Holland, and finally the United States. The Cold War era accelerated the connection, creating an exclusive and mutual dependency that would continue into the post–Cold War period (Pyenson and Sheets-Pyenson, 1999). Scientific research and development was accompanied by the paranoia of communist threat: "Knowledge was the grist of secrets and the currency of spies" (Gleick, 1992, p. 210). Spilling over into such associated national pursuits as the aerospace industry's commitment to the "space race" with Soviet science, and advanced electronic spying, U.S. science gained greater public attention, contributing to the acceleration of mass higher education beginning in the 1960s.

The traditional culture forms were also profoundly changed by government's rapid investment in science. Science fiction novels and then motion pictures were moderately popular before the 1950s. However, the decades following the East–West confrontation witnessed the expansion of science fiction culture, perhaps best instanced by the broad popularity of the commercial film and television series *Star Trek*. The latter proved perhaps the "sleeper" of all time for network producers, remaining in rerun status for decades after its initial, and rather lukewarm, reception in the late 1960s. The considerable Trekkie following included even casual viewers, and its influence on popular culture was enormous, if somewhat ambivalent.

The weekly plots of *Star Trek* involved confrontations with "new and strange" worlds in intergalactic, "deep" space, where thoughtful trust or impulsive reaction proved decisive in dramatic crises. American viewers learned that other cultures may or may not be harmful or generous, but certainly the knowledge gained from intercultural contact enlightened the earthlings of the starship *Enterprise*. Such encounters brought knowledge of the universe, but also changed the self-image of the earthling crew members. In contrast, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, or National Missile Defense System, validated the cautionary approach to other

cultures—always evident among the *Enterprise*'s human and Vulcan crew members—but without bringing a positive sense of intercultural contact and cooperation. Trying to convince Russia, China, and U.S. NATO allies of the value of SDI, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, insisted on the need for defensive and offensive systems. When pre–September 11 critics pointed out, prophetically, that future threats may come from other nonconventional sources—terrorism, cyberwarfare—rather than from a petty dictator's rockets, Rumsfeld responded that space missiles would deter rogue states from building such missiles, but could not deter all forms of terrorism, which would demand other means ("Cannon to Right," 2001). Like the multicultural crew of the *Enterprise*—a starship name that associates with free market capitalism—America would learn to use its sense of commonality and cooperative resources to combat threats from the varied unknown. After 9/11, the threat from unknown forces with different values would derive from numerous sources, not solely one source—international communism—which had threatened American values when the early *Star Trek* episodes were produced.

Threats in Congress to reduce the missile defense plan during the summer of 2001 were largely forgotten after September 11 (Dao, 2001). Instead, heightened concern from terrorist attacks in the air and anthrax contamination on the ground allowed the passage of larger defense and security system budgets. Still, the September 11 events gave Russia, Washington's chief opponent of the SDI program, greater cause to object to its implementation. "The shield would never have protected the United States from this [9/11] attack," warned Dmitry Rogozin, Russian head of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs (quoted in Uzelac, 2001, p. 22). By the spring of 2002, many thoughtful Americans were aware that multilateral approaches to fighting terrorism and the Axis of Evil states would require the cooperation of the United Nations, the European Union, and other global power sources (Solana and Brzezinski, 2002). This cooperative vision of science-based warfare parallels the cooperative ventures of various nationalities of Earthlings as well as Vulcans on the starship *Enterprise*. *Star Trek*'s futuristic technology is manned by heterogeneous crews with an open, pluralistic approach toward the strange worlds of deep space, a paradigm reflecting both the ethnic diversity of America and the multilateral necessities of a shrinking world in the twenty-first century.

Representing Enemies Without

President Bush's campaign to convince the world of the wisdom of SDI met strong opposition in Europe by June 2001. French president Jacques Chirac found the missile shield "a fantastic incentive to proliferate" weapons because terrorists and hostile states would build more arms in an attempt to trump the new defenses. Moreover, preserving the ABM treaty helps "preserve strategic balances" (quoted in Bruni, 2001, p. 1A). Many other European leaders were less blunt, but hardly receptive. Earlier, in May, Bush seemed to accept the strategic program of Mutual Assured Destruction along with SDI, thus preserving the Cold War notion of a balance of terror as main deterrence (Schell, 2001b). Still, the post–September 11 fear of ground and air terrorism and the realization among many Americans that much of the Third World disliked America's world presence led to new perceptions that the world was dangerous. Moreover, such recent developments as the nuclear and missile capabilities of Pakistan and India, which President Bill Clinton had categorized as "the most dangerous place[s] in the world today" (quoted in Kumar, 2001), added to the sense of war threat. Nonetheless, only two months after the 1998 nuclear test in India, an opinion poll found that 72.8 percent of the American public opposed the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons (Bidwai and Vanaik, 2001). Global antinuclear activists forged links. For example, South Asian feminists joined First World demonstrators in associating nuclear proliferation and militarism with the denial of women's rights. Antiwar sentiment grew on university campuses, leading to large off-campus demonstrations in London, Washington, and other capital cities during 2002 and again in 2003.

THREATS TO NATIONAL VALUES

Government as Threat

Western cultural forms presented the struggle of order over chaos through Hollywood films and science fiction literature even before the Cold War period. Their plots reflected a general modern tendency to find advanced industrial society threatened by its own prodigious technological powers, a fear in part inspired by H. G. Wells's seminal *The War of the Worlds* (1898). Recent films such as *Armageddon* (1996) and *Independence Day* (1996) portray the sudden and unanticipated

attack of an alien culture on a peaceful society of typical, usually sub-urban, Americans. John Milius's *Red Dawn* (1984) shows local teenagers organizing into guerrilla fighters when communist troops land from the sky. In such entertainment-oriented films, the average civilian takes part in the repulsion of the threat, reviving the Revolu-tionary War minuteman tradition enshrined as national myth and given a young, pop-cultural identity. A similar story of teenagers over-coming an outside social menace occurs in the earlier Irvin Yeamouth film *The Blob* (1958).

Popular American film thrillers and science fiction novels before the 1960s typically presented cultural threats as alien, outside forces within a melodramatic genre where the moral landscape is clearly de-marcated in black and white, good and evil. However, after the 1960s, many Hollywood science fiction thrillers began to locate the source of evil from within rather than without. For example, in the 1988 sequel to *The Blob* (with the same name), the evil source is the U.S. govern-ment, which produces an alternative life form that got out of control. Space agency feds, wearing white protective suits reminiscent of the evil Darth Vader commandos in *Star Wars* (1977), devise a diabolical scheme to capture the townsfolk. Only the stubborn resistance of a teenage misfit is able to defeat the space agency contingent and its monstrous creation. The 1988 *The Blob* demonstrates a decided shift in popular attitude toward national authority, wherein the Washington government, instead of defending the public, as in earlier science fic-tion thrillers, itself becomes the menace. The same shift in public attitudes can be seen during the ten-year span separating *The Silence of the Lambs* (1991) from its sequel, *Hannibal* (2001). Whereas in the first film, the FBI is presented as a benevolent and forthright force for de-feating social menace, in the sequel, the same federal agency is portrayed as corrupt and secretive, with unappealing characters as agents. The Bureau's Special Agent Clarice Starling is no longer naïve and idealistic, but instead jaded by self-serving institutional compro-mises and double-dealing. In fact, the Thomas Harris (1999) novel goes further in its critique of the FBI, having Clarice willingly escape with Hannibal Lecter in the denouement. The decade separating both films saw the FBI's deliberate destruction of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, on national television. Other dubious reports about the FBI reached mainstream audiences, including the public castigation of the agency by a new national hero, New York Mayor Rudy Guiliani, for its refusal to share vital information on the Osama bin Laden network.

A growing mistrust of governmental power appears in the popular Hollywood action film genre. Ambivalence toward the activities of the national government is apparent in such straightforward action films as Andrew Davis's popular *The Fugitive* (1993), where federal agents appear with little feeling for the unjust plight of the fleeing protagonist. Although not without character appeal, the agents value institutional procedures and career conveniences over interpersonal contact with the innocent fugitive. In such films, Washington hegemony is configured in less-than-benign terms, as at best an intrusion or complication preventing basic individual and group freedoms, at worst part of the menace of Big Brother government. Correspondingly, military, paramilitary, and gendarme forces were increasingly represented as inhibiting rather than protecting basic rights, in some cases becoming complicit in the evil threat itself.

Threats More General

In such works as Stanley Kramer's film *Judgment at Nurenberg* (1961) and Robert Shaw's stage play *The Man in the Glass Booth* (1967), evil is derived from forces neither solely outside nor solely inside the society but rather from a universal complicity. Shaw's accused character is condemned as a Nazi by an allied court, but his moving speech asks the question whether the general public in other countries are not following the Nazi mentality of predatory nationalism. He mentions Jews specifically, implying the actions of the state of Israel. Though less explicit, and less controversial, Kramer's *Judgment at Nurenberg* presents a similar former Nazi (played by an empathetic Bert Lancaster) whose basic goodness and intelligence proves unable to resist the social and career pressures to conform to the policies of German National Socialism. Both works more directly and cogently present the psychological and social nuances of radical evil, implying that the threat from without often is a displacement of the threat from within, in other words, that military policies can become uncontrollable.

A similar insight, early propounded in Hannah Arendt's influential political essay, *The Burden of Our Time* (1951), has been represented with greater detail and specificity in Daniel Goldhagen's widely read *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (1997). Ian Kershaw's two-volume *Hitler* biography (1999, 2001) also makes the case that national leaders such as Adolf Hitler could not have achieved their goals without the willing complicity of the broad majority of ordinary

Germans. In these dramas and nonfiction studies, war becomes a pathway toward radical evil and social corruption at all class levels. Their authors argue that future wars need to be avoided by working toward a wider understanding of human rights standards, and urge that individual career goals, demagogic appeal, and unquestioned ideologies are continually tested according to such values.

The Threat of Military Culture

Alongside Hollywood mainstream and independent films that express indirect or understated themes questioning the Cold War arms race have been popular works that more specifically critique militaristic orientations. In *Harold and Maude* (1972), the blood lust of military cultures, specifically identified in the uncle of the protagonist in a U.S. Army uniform, is parodied. When Harold is interviewed for a military school by his mother, he goes berserk, shouting death to all enemies of America in vivid terms. The uncle is a caricature of military stiffness and routine. In the film classic *National Lampoon's Animal House* (1978), college ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) instruction is mocked; however, the implications of military training during the Vietnam War era are not pursued. The more recent *Men in Black* (1997) ridicules blind obedience as a virtue among federal agents who will accept covert assignments in blind duty and risk the lives of themselves and others without knowing the political reasons. Such recent commercial film critiques of governmental and military institutions are typically limited to passing or indirect references. The war mentality is parodied for entertainment but not seriously scrutinized in such films.

While the important Vietnam War films made by Hollywood have often presented compelling profiles of U.S. servicemen confronting the violence and disillusionment of the war, they have included few representations of the Vietnamese, avoiding three-dimensional character treatments of them entirely. Much like the fleeting glimpses of African characters in Joseph Conrad's *The Heart of Darkness* (1902), Vietnamese characters in popular films are seldom depicted, as in Oliver Stone's *Platoon* (1986) and *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989) and Stanley Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket* (1987). When they are represented, they often appear in the most extreme physical and emotional states. Similarly, in perhaps the most critically acclaimed literary work to come out of the Vietnam War experience, Michael Herr's *Dispatches* (1978), brief images of Vietnamese children, farmers, mothers, and soldiers, are represented in

circumstances so unusual or impersonal that their humanity is denied or diminished. This ability to distance the cultural and racial other in war and conquest situations contributes to an oversimplified ideology where good and evil are rigidly demarcated, thereby distorting the complexities of real conflict situations.

Religious Tradition of Tolerance

Both Western cultural institutions and officially approved works in communist nations have often supported such minimalist representations in the service of mainstream political ideology. However, other cultural traditions within Western societies have sought, to varying degrees, to move beyond a destructive approach toward the other, recognizing the commonality of all humanity. In a discussion of what constitutes a "just war" within the circumstances of world terrorism, Richard Falk (2001a) alludes to the substantial religious traditions within the West that have in the recent past resisted the Manichean divisionism that fosters world conflict. However, he finds, perhaps prematurely, that in the new period of terrorism "antiwar and pacifist stands possess little or no cultural resonance with the overwhelming majority of Americas" (p. 12). Nonetheless, Falk is optimistic toward the cultural resources of America, finding in its great demographic diversity and pluralistic notions of governance a variety of means to avoid monolithic and totalitarian nationalisms of the past.

Similarly, Scott Appleby (2000) finds that the internal pluralism of the world's major religious traditions enables adherents to develop social and political strategies that further the cause of human rights and social justice worldwide and between cultures. "The implications of such evolution of popular religious attitudes for conflict resolution are significant, to say the least" (p. 277). Still, he finds that current religious and secular private institutions have not sufficiently developed consistent and effective voices that question the geopolitical policy of large governments. Certainly, in the new century, pluralistic and cooperative approaches to conflict resolution are most effective within official Washington rather than from outside it. In the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell represents powerfully the more cooperative approach to conflict resolution, a voice that is not matched by nongovernmental institutions of whatever stripe. The inability of most Americans to gain a direct voice in geopolitical military strategy may have contributed to the sense of frustration and paranoia

reflected in popular representations of evil menaces from within and
without during the past few decades.

CONCLUSION

American cultural representations of large conflicts have reflected
general fears of powerlessness and alienation from sources both within
and without the society. Still, American notions of struggle between
nations and peoples is informed by a multicultural and cooperative
approach, a generally tolerant and positive view of confrontation with
the other and the unknown. While the American public sphere has
consistently demanded a moral, that is, a human rights, cause for wag-
ing war, even comparatively small ones, at the same time, Americans
remain wary of the human and economic costs of prolonged interven-
tion. This double vision may derive in part from traditional urges for
isolationism and unilateralism, and from the equally strong opposing
tradition of diversity, minority rights, and pluralism within American
society. The reluctance to assume fully the mantle of "world super-
power" in geopolitical military strategy springs both from a
democratic desire for pluralism and cooperative security and from a
general political urge to limit military power as an element of a large
centralized government.

Chapter 2

Causes Lost and Found

A BRIEF HISTORY

Hallowed Ground Yesterday

Alone at the end of a long grassy field in Gettysburg National Battlefield Historical Park stands an imposing white granite monument named *The Eternal Flame Peace Memorial*. Dedicated by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1938 for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the battle, its words in the stone call for unity among the people of the North and the South after the Civil War. An open gas flame burns constantly as emblematic of that unity, and an art-deco stone relief of two large female figures in classical gowns embrace each other as they look forward toward a progressive future. *The Eternal Flame Peace Memorial* evolved through a grassroots movement of veteran's organizations, which first proposed the idea to various state legislatures in both the North and the South. The memorial's tribute to peace demonstrated not merely the cessation of armed struggle but also the reuniting, if not the assimilation, of former bitter enemies. However, nowhere is there mention of the root cause of the divisiveness of the two peoples, the institution of slavery, nor is there any reference to human and civil rights. Instead, quotations reproduced alongside the memorial from Roosevelt's dedication speech stress strength in national unity, a message common in political parlance beginning soon after the Civil War and later associated with the Progressive era at the end of the century.

Renewed nationalism, rather than the cause of freedom and equality, was a major theme in Roosevelt's dedication speech for *The Eternal Flame Peace Memorial*. When in the late 1930s, the United States reluctantly found itself a world power, isolated geographically and culturally but threatened by powerful forces in Europe and the Far East, a peace memorial to the unity of peoples inevitably became a memorial to national unity for strength, a strength that would keep the peace of nonalliance and isolation.

Another Gettysburg example of the strength-in-unity theme is a battlefield sculpture entitled *Friend to Friend*, which memorializes the widely known story of Union Captain Henry Harrison Bingham's battlefield assistance to Confederate General Lewis Addison Armistead, a leader of Pickett's Charge on the final day. The commemoration of foes reuniting ignores the war's cause in favor of a personalized expression of tragedy. The tendency at Gettysburg to memorialize the reconciliation of peoples while ignoring their issues of difference is further evident by a dearth of memorials to the cause of freedom and equality for all Americans.

The willingness to alter or expunge the original motivations for particular wars has a long history within American history. Roosevelt's Gettysburg dedication address calling for national unity had with it an implied tolerance message: the coming together of former foes through the forgiveness of past regional hatreds. However, absent from his speech was reference to the separatism remaining in his nation—most relevantly the Jim Crow Laws of legal segregation throughout the South and parts of the North. In fact, African American veterans, now aging along with their white comrades-in-arms, were among the audience for the seventy-fifth anniversary dedication. Even at such an interracial occasion, the goal of peace with justice was never stressed, even less the cause of freedom of the Civil War and the Reconstruction periods that preceded the years when legal segregation gradually returned throughout the South, as if the war had never happened.

Around Gettysburg, the 1,400 official memorials to regiments, states, commanders, and local civilians include very few references to the cause of freedom. The abolition of slavery is almost completely unmentioned, giving place to such martial virtues as valor, courage, endurance, watchfulness, dedication, and unit loyalty. Perhaps the veteran's memory has more often favored the experiential details of common endurance in war, rather than the causes of war, which may appear too abstract and removed in the dynamic of social memory. Such sentiment may prefer comradeship to ideology, and loyalty to unit

commanders or perhaps certain political figures. Concise descriptions of troop movements and engagements at Gettysburg were written on metal plaques produced by the War Department in the late nineteenth century. Written in precise, elevated language using military terminology removed from the immediacy of emotion, they convey a certain dignity in armed struggle that evokes more than nostalgia for the "hallowed ground" of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Lincoln's famous speech, delivered during the first year of his Emancipation Proclamation, specifically associated the Union cause with freedom, yet the peace for which the Gettysburg struggle was decisive is seldom associated with political freedom at the National Battlefield. Instead, the memorials, plaques, statuary, and tour information remain oriented toward the tactical and strategic aspects of the conflict, circumventing political issues, including the cause, emancipation, that Lincoln proclaimed legally after the 1862 Union victory at Antietam.

With the prospect of the war becoming the moral cause of freedom, beyond the defense of the Union, noted abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips rethought their categorical pacifism and then regarded the conflict between the states as worthy of support (Mayer, 1998). In this way did the hallowed ground that Lincoln envisioned for the cause of freedom become a proving ground for a fundamental change in American culture, challenging the nation to recognize the unrealized ideals invested in the Declaration of Independence (see Donald, 1995; Jaffa, 2000). All the same, by the turn of the twentieth century, Lincoln's vision of freedom as national cause was being overshadowed by a general sentiment for regional nostalgia and martial glory in Civil War memory. Regarding the culture of war and peace within American history, Michael Kammen's (1991) succinct observation seems apt: "Memory is more likely to be activated by contestation, and amnesia is more likely to be induced by the desire for reconciliation" (p. 13). Through most of the post–Civil War period, America seemed to prefer the memory of battlefield courage to the greater and more immediate challenge of the reconciliation of black and white in civic and private life. The commemoration of America's greatest war lost its cause (see Linderman, 1987).

Regenerating the World

When Congress in 1899 debated the treaty ending the Spanish-American War, giving the Philippines over for American governance,

debate in the Senate heated as two sides argued over the purpose of American war. Imperialists such as Albert Beveridge argued for war as acquisition: "We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustees under God, of the civilization of the world. . . . God has marked us as his chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world." Responding, Senator George Hoar affirmed that governing another country was "trampling on our own great Charter" (the Declaration of Independence). Hoar reminded his colleagues that the moral cause of America was missing in such global adventuring: "The words Right, Justice, Duty, Freedom were absent from Beveridge's speech." Henry Cabot Lodge replied in turn that the point was "the Philippines meant a vast future trade and wealth and power" (Byrd, 1993, pp. 360–362). The argument over the meaning of armed conquest would continue down to the beginning of the next century: the "Duty" of moral and democratic agendas versus the right of conquest, wealth, and empire.

Hallowed Ground Today

During the Clinton presidency, armed conflict became a distant undertaking, its moral cause not obfuscated by public nostalgia, as in public memory of the Civil War, nor rejected for empire acquisition, as in the Spanish-American War treaty, but by the possibilities of high technology and an unwillingness to risk losing the support of the electorate by human rights intervention. To many, it seemed that the reluctant superpower had retreated from its commitment to leadership of the free world. Or, to alter Kamman's statement, amnesia was less likely to be induced by a desire for reconciliation than by an unwillingness to assume global governance. Americans had retreated from their higher moral cause before. The search for an appropriate response to ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which by the mid-1990s had become systematic and genocidal, tested the Clinton administration's resolve to challenge human rights violations. At the end of the twentieth century, justification for war and armed intervention seemed to demand a human rights commitment that Washington would face only with reluctance, and then only with half measures. Clinton's belated decision to bomb with no investment of ground troops ultimately left Bosnian factions dangling. The Clinton administration's war-from-a-distance followed the precedent of the Gulf War of 1991, which was generally perceived as a quick and pain-

less (for the West) engagement made possible by a reliance on high-tech weaponry and aerial surveillance.

Concealing Cause

The tentative nature of Washington foreign policy, its refusal to involve itself long term in the political struggles of the countries in which it intervenes, is reflected in the popular Hollywood action film *Behind Enemy Lines* (2001). It concerns a rescue mission of American fliers who have landed in the remote mountains of Bosnia. One pilot remarks cavalierly early in the mission, "If it's Tuesday, it must be Bosnia." His comment reveals a certain indifference to the military cause that the film is based on. It also reflects both America's short-term interest in overcoming humanitarian problems and the frustration of many Americans—represented by the low-ranking pilot—with the lack of vision in foreign policy. The film's plot also reflects a narrow concern with saving American military personnel and a lack of interest in the society that lies within enemy lines. Few Bosnians are shown, none are given three-dimensional characterizations. The American characters and their Serbian adversaries seem to be fighting in a social vacuum, with the drama's action focused in an extensive conifer forest away from any social or cultural context. In fact, lack of social and, hence, political context characterizes the popular Hollywood action film genre as a whole (other recent examples include *Black Hawk Down*, 2001, *Patriot Games*, 1992, and *Clear and Present Danger*, 1994). Audiences are not given the issues involved, America and NATO reasons for intervention, or even why the bad guys are bad, all background that would in fact add greater drama—and entertainment value—to the film's reception. Loss of context in these films parallels the loss of cause in these wars, an uncertainty as to how America should respond to issues of intervention—operations other than war and sustained war.

INTERVENTION FROM A DISTANCE

The Balkans

When the Serbians took the city of Srebrenica in Muslim Bosnia, with reports of atrocities mounting each day, President Clinton realized that action needed to be taken lest inaction against obvious aggression

damage his presidency. His solution, conveyed to the European allies by Charles Perry and John Shalikashvili, was massive, high-tech bombing. Such carpet bombing was considered necessary to turn the morale of the Serbian army, which continued to escalate war crimes with its mounting military success (Halberstam, 2001). In the end, a negotiated alliance between Croatian and Bosnian Serbs—Muslims and Roman Catholics—along with American and European military assistance, turned the tide in Bosnia. In the United States, popular response for Washington involvement was only moderate, but enough for Clinton to be concerned. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's reply to the threat of NATO involvement intimidated German foreign minister Joschka Fischer: "I can stand death—lots of it—but you can't" (*Frontline*, 2000). Milosevic correctly understood that it was not only Washington that would be reluctant to lose many of its own citizens in ground combat on alien land. However, Washington's decision to begin massive, rather than pinpoint, bombing would eventually vindicate the U.S. Air Force's contention, as opposed to that of the Army and Marine Corps, that they alone could do the job, and from a comfortable distance. This no-muss/no-fuss approach would prove prophetic of future success in the Balkans. Soon after the heavy bombing policy began in late August 1995, triggered by a brutal and pointless attack on Sarajevo by Milosevic's ally Ratko Mladic and his Bosnian Serbs, Milosevic asked for a peace conference, which was held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

The imperfect peace that resulted committed 20,000 U.S. ground troops as peacekeepers, a circumstance that kept Clinton worried. Later he sought to have them removed after one year, a plan noticed by Milosevic, who knew the reluctance of NATO, especially Washington, to involve itself too closely in regional strife for any length of time. Washington remained more concerned about keeping its citizens at a distance in the war, following the by now familiar U.S. foreign policy pattern of supporting other nations' forces on the ground to fight its enemies. Thus, the Croatian-Bosnian ground assault timed with the massive NATO bombing included such leaders as Croatian hate-monger Franjo Tudjman, a significant force at the Dayton peace conference, who spouted neo-Nazi ideology throughout his career (Doder and Branson, 1999). The pattern would repeat yet again during the post–9/11 era in 2001 when Washington would back a congeries of ethnic forces termed the Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban government of Afghanistan.

Behind such military strategies lay Washington's refusal to make sustained, developed contact for democratic goals with the country in question. In 1999 "Balkans Two" renewed debate in the Clinton administration over war-from-a-distance versus ground troop involvement. On both sides, the stakes were somewhat higher in Kosovo than in Bosnia. For Milosevic, the Kosovo region was much more vital to his version of nationhood than was Bosnia. He would be willing to put up much more of a fight using a Serbian army more confident and more accomplished than it had been in Bosnia. However, Milosevic underestimated public opinion in the West, which frowned on his aggressive actions against Muslim populations, where he used clean-and-sweep missions through entire regions. In response, NATO commander U.S. General Wesley Clark began a state-of-the-art bombing strategy. Although America's high-tech weaponry would eventually prove more accurate than that of any previous conflict, NATO nations were generally far more reluctant to bomb strategic sites in Belgrade than the United States had been in Baghdad. This may have been due in part to ethnocentric orientations but also because the Balkans were closer geographically than the Middle East. At first NATO planes were not effective. At 15,000 feet the planes were safe, but so was the Serbian army. At the sight of hundreds of thousands of Albanians being driven from their homes, Western public opinion demanded greater results. Now motivation and capability were increased. B-2 bombers, brought in from their home base in Missouri, successfully began daily bombings of multiple sites. Other advanced weaponry, such as the Air Force's Hedgehog plane, quickly reduced Serbian armor. Global positioning bombs proved accurate in any weather. By the time Clinton cautiously called in ground troops, later than Great Britain and other NATO allies had preferred, the war had decidedly turned in favor of the West. This strategy of intervention-from-a-distance was not so feasible as it had been in the Bosnian campaign, but in hindsight it was recognized as having a decisive political effect on Serbian public opinion, which would eventually demand the overthrow of the Milosevic government (Judah, 2000).

The World's 911

The easy-in/easy-out approach to foreign policy, undertaken in post–Vietnam Washington, generally has placed low priority on

"humanitarian" causes such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Both George W. Bush's most vital cabinet members, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and State Department Secretary Colin Powell, resist the label "interventionist." Neither liked Clinton's Kosovo campaign; Rice in particular demanded a return to the "national interest" through a refocusing on the "big powers," meaning former Cold War nemeses China and Russia (Rice, 2000). She has described military involvements in the Balkans and Southeast Asia as mere "police actions," advocating instead an expanded military budget chiefly to counter former geopolitical foes. Although Rice has criticized the previous Democratic administration for lacking such "a national vision," in fact Clinton's reluctance to intervene militarily in democratic and humanitarian concerns followed the same rationale. For example, his advisers' response to the East Timor rebellion of the late 1990s was "let Asians handle it." In the event, when it seemed that China would intervene, Clinton allowed an Australian intervention while keeping one step removed.

Washington geopolitics from a diplomatic and military distance had its beginnings in the early Cold War period (Cumings, 2001). After half a century of U.S. ground troop occupation, Korea remains a tentative diplomatic and military settlement, and recent attempts to move South Korea toward greater democratic reforms has found little encouragement from Washington. In short, Colin Powell's solemn maxim of diplomacy—"have a clear exit strategy"—does not prioritize serious and sustained development of democratic aims within countries where economic disparities have prevented social justice causes, and transnational corporations partner with local elites for governance. Prioritizing exit strategies is one more element of war-from-a-distance, directly analogous to Washington spy agency policies, where high-technology-from-a-distance has been preferred to traditional on-the-spot information gathering, a methodology that suddenly fell under intense scrutiny after the September 11 events.

Rice's succinct strategy remark that the United States cannot be "the world's 911" (quoted in Cumings, 2001, p. 18) has explicit meaning. As in the Gulf War and the Afghanistan conflict before then, the U.S. military presence has little staying power after battles are won or geopolitically favorable regimes are installed. Here again, lack of a clear moral cause has prevented Washington from fully assuming the mantle of world guardian of social justice and human rights. With the George W. Bush administration's call for a second major invasion of

Iraq in 2003, many public voices in the homeland again have called for military strategy to be tied to democratic nation building.

COOPERATIVE HUMANITARIANISM

Early Precedent

Cooperation between nations specifically for human rights and social justice causes goes back at least to the early nineteenth century, when Britain's new act abolishing the slave trade encouraged other European powers to do the same. The general purpose of the Royal Navy after Waterloo was understood to be economic security—keeping the sea-lanes open for worldwide trade within and without the newly extended British Empire. Nevertheless, the abolition act led to a policy whereby Britain would encourage other nations to inspect cargo ships for slaves on the high seas. The mutual right of search for slaves on the high seas was established by Viscount Castlereagh, first with the Netherlands, then with Portugal, France, and Spain (Johnson, 1991). The policy gained much popular support in Britain, although the United States declined to participate, chiefly because of its small navy.

Today, the renewed interest in cooperative human rights endeavors is spurred by a few Third World governments, such as South Africa and India, but also by the European Union, which has begun to take seriously its own human rights enactments. On the other hand, the Bush administration's plan for a globalized NATO would create a two-tiered functionality whereby European members are responsible for peacekeeping and "nation building" in the Balkans, while the United States acts outside the region to police would-be enemies or to maintain common interests in the Persian Gulf and East Asia (Schwenninger, 2001). The September 11 events prompted, at least in part, cooperative language from the White House, wherein Islamic nations would be enlisted in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, European ground troops would fight alongside American forces, and Russia would agree to support the war in exchange for allowing its own involvement in Chechnya. The significance of this new cooperative trajectory remained uncertain. Key figures in the Bush administration, such as Rice and Powell, have given low priority to "humanitarian" endeavors, wishing instead to return to a Cold War balance of power perspective.

Material Wealth as World Propaganda

Ronnie Lipschutz (2000) finds that the old morality of the state inherent to the East–West dichotomy has recently been replaced by "the morality of the *market*." Thus, "economic competitiveness fuses the social Darwinism of geopolitics with the social Darwinism of the market: as always, only the fittest will survive" (pp. 150–151). In fact, however, the idea of the virtues of the marketplace as positive influence on world order appeared early in Cold War Washington thinking. The President's Materials Policy Commission (1952), which assumed the moral superiority of the free enterprise system, sought to convert the noncapitalist, non-Western world to free market thought in part by demonstrating the superior material production of the West. "In defeating this barbarian violence moral values will count most, but they must be supported by an ample materials base" (p. 1). The inclusion of the productive and economic power of advanced capitalism in the geopolitical ideology of the West is now half a century old. During this time Washington has sought not only humanitarian peacekeeping but also economic promotion and protection, buttressed by a guardian military of highly mobile capability.

A clear interpretation of this kind of peaceful warfare on the popular level is presented in the popular Hollywood comedy *Moscow on the Hudson* (1984) in which Russian tourists and defectors alike rush to Bloomingdale's and other New York City stores to buy American-style jeans and designer clothing. At the end of the film a former commissar is shown selling hot dogs from a sidewalk cart, happy in his newfound freedom as a street-level enterpriser. Thus, the material abundance of the West, particularly of the United States, is capable of seducing even anticapitalist ideologues. The film's message underscores the moral superiority of capitalist materialism, its enormous global propaganda potential that renders even military might less effective.

Vietnam in Memory

The demonstration of America's material wealth to the world was taken seriously as a peaceful adjunct to the Pentagon's balance-of-terror policy by Washington policymakers throughout the Cold War period. For some geopolitical thinkers, this peaceful approach to winning souls away from Communism became a preferred geopolitical alternative. However, the war-from-a-distance perspective gained

prominence in Washington after the early 1970s. Much of the citizenry looked increasingly on America's high-contact, boots-on-the-ground warfare in negative terms. One reason for the rise of the Vietnam War protest movement was the perceived inhumanity of that conflict. Waging war impersonally, from a distance in the skies on largely civilian populations, took away the honor, courage, and devotion of the traditional Western martial ethos, leaving what appeared to domestic critics of the war as a one-sided romp over relatively defenseless people on their own land (Skolnick, 1969). Moreover, the cold, almost clinical manner in which the war in Vietnam was waged by the U.S. military was reported widely—even by military institutions—and disturbed many with a moral conscience. The following example of such insensitivity was typical of media reportage of the time:

> It was fortunate that young pilots could get their first taste of combat under the direction of a forward air controller over a flat country in bright sunshine where nobody was shooting back. . . . He learns how it feels to drop bombs on human beings and watch huts go up in a boil of orange flame when his aluminum napalm tanks tumble into them. . . . He gets hardened to pressing the fire button and cutting people down like little cloth dummies, as they sprint frantically under him. (Harvey, 1967, p. 102)

Frank Harvey's reports of air combat, written with the cooperation of U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots, appeared in the magazine *Flying* and attracted immediate critical commentary. These reports were subsequently included in his 1967 book *Air War—Vietnam*. Many Americans, uneasy with the continued growth of a military culture in a society that had been decidedly unmartial, even suspicious of military institutions, before World War II, reacted strongly against such attitudes. Here the war was not fought for a democratic cause, for a people with whom one sought affinity, but rather as a brutal conflict, a "war of attrition," as Pentagon strategists repeated dispassionately. It was at the time in its reporting and official commentary, the clearest example of war where the moral cause had been lost or ignored.

Cooperative Strategy—À la Carte or Long Term?

While the mainstream media and military establishment waged an increasingly unpopular war, at home the second edition of J. R. R. Tolkien's fantasy trilogy *The Lord of the Rings* (1965) was widely read,

especially by the young and college educated, the group that began the Antiwar Movement. Writing during World War II in a besieged Britain, Tolkien took his story as an allegory of the evil that arises in human history when, in his own words, "power is used to fight power" (quoted on National Public Radio [NPR], 2001). In the trilogy, evil forces must be overcome with human understanding and the recognition of a universal humanity, a commonality that overcomes the considerable differences of race and culture in the journey of life (Crabbe, 1981). To the 1960s war protest generation, Tolkien's young hero, Frodo, learns through struggle that violence only leads to more violence, a message that appeared fundamentally in contradiction to a war policy where high-powered weaponry was being used to subdue another culture. The first part of the much heralded film version of the *Rings* trilogy did not appear until December 2001, and was quickly applied by critical observers to the Bush administration's War on Terrorism against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (see, for example, NPR, 2001). While top-level Bush administration officials remained lukewarm about involvement with what they considered geopolitically insignificant states, the broad American opinion favored peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts that encouraged democratic "nation building." This was especially true after the September 11 events made foreign policy a front-burner issue. Also, public opinion was turning in favor of greater UN involvement in such efforts. This was in great part due to media coverage of the "quiet revolution," begun within the United Nations by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which sought greater and more skillful negotiating efforts among troubled nations as well as friendlier relations with a previously hostile and dues-negligent United States (Ruggie, 2001).

Washington's approach to peacekeeping and punitive military action remained somewhat ambivalent at the turn of the new century, especially as it preferred other forms of global guardianship to human rights interventionism. On the other hand, the Bush administration realized after September 11 that more multilateral and cooperative approaches were necessary in a world of conflicting cultures and power arrangements. As State Department policy planning chief Richard Haass put it with some irony, Washington wanted an "a la carte [*sic*] multilateralism," at least for the near future (quoted in Ruggie, 2001).

Citing UN efforts to keep peace with justice "at the forefront," the Nobel Committee awarded Kofi Annan and the United Nations the Centennial Nobel Peace Prize in December 2001. Certainly, Washington's newfound appreciation of the United Nations during the 2001

Taliban–Al Qaeda interventions in Afghanistan reflected in part its own interest in remaining one step removed from "nation building" and peacekeeping duties in general. It preferred to use the troops of European NATO states and even those of Muslim nations rather than its own troops for long-term peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan. It also accepted Annan's newly appointed UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, to negotiate among the Afghan factions for the future governance of the country. The possibility remained that intergovernmental decision making would expand during the new century, promising more cooperative approaches toward peace with justice issues. The challenge of forging universal standards of social justice and human rights while maintaining pluralistic and open methods of enforcement and legality remained a stumbling block for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) quite as much as for intergovernmental institutions and sovereign states. In Western academe, normative and intercultural scholarship remained at odds, even in established journals like *Foreign Affairs*. Moreover, within American culture, "[t]he realities of hot and cold wars, an ugly civil rights struggle, and the impossible irresolution of the Vietnam War had made the possibility of civic discourse seem increasingly remote, adding a sense of urgency to efforts to find a reliable new foundation for ethical public discussion" (Cyphert, 2001, p. 384).

Powerful Economy and Military Assertiveness

Condoleezza Rice (2000) spoke for many in the Bush administration when she proclaimed a new triumphalist interventionism based on retaining U.S. influence throughout the world: "Great powers do not just mind their own business" (p. 49). Her basic premise is an optimistic faith in the positive influence on the world of a powerful American economy with military assertiveness. In this scenario, America's material wealth, buttressed by a military arm with impressive new weaponry, becomes an imposing paradigm for democracy, individualism, and freedom. Her view is an accurate rearticulation of the early Cold War strategy of world peace through the material production of wealth and the establishment of "free markets," but with a more straightforward emphasis on military activism for enforcement: "America's pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace" (p. 47). Her argument depends on the comprehensive goodness of Washington foreign policy assisted by a generally cooperative American corporate culture. The question of

whether NAFTA-style (North American Free Trade Agreement) free markets is beneficial for Third World majorities has been challenged by some (for example, Bethell, 1998; Twentieth Century Fund, 1998). The equation of Washington-supported transnational corporatism with democratic trajectories in the Third World seemed naïve to some observers. Benjamin Barber's (2002) comment on Rice's reliance on corporate globalization raised genuine concern: "This mercandiser's dream is a form of romanticism, the idealism of neoliberal markets, the convenient idyll that material plenty can satisfy spiritual longing so that fishing for profits can be thought of as synonymous with trolling for liberty" (p. 17). In fact, however, Rice's pragmatic method of using America's very strengths to persuade the world peacefully of the virtues of material freedom was hard to reject, especially when faced with a world of conflicting values and angry resentment. Her long-term method was at least nonmilitary and avoided war per se as a means to turn the rest in favor of the West.

Ethical Instruction over War

Although Washington's reliance on advanced weaponry with a minimum of ground-level troop presence has proved politically successful at home during the post–Vietnam War era, its foreign policy limitations are obvious. Actually, the use of air power has tended to alienate the populace of destabilized countries, who have not only experienced firsthand Washington's war-from-a-distance through air bombing but have witnessed little American interest in sustained nation building, in overcoming ethnic disputes, and in peacekeeping duties, as the unfortunate political eventualities in Afghanistan since the 1980s have demonstrated. Moreover, creating a more cooperative, pluralistic world discourse beyond Washington's desire for multilateralism à la mode would require more intergovernmental and NGO support worldwide. This would involve greater commitment from powerful economic consortia such as the European Union, which has only recently begun to act on its impressive human rights conventions. Most of all, it would involve a wider enlistment at the grassroots level. Ethicists like Martha Nussbaum would place emphasis on moral education rather than the threat of arms to bring a peaceful and more cooperative society.

Nussbaum (2001) laments the effects of U.S. geopolitical actions on the populations of southern Asia, which often drives them in frustra-

tion toward fundamentalist *madrassahs* (religious leaders). She notes narrow governmental thinking that would look only to perceived national interests in a world increasingly interdependent: "we basically thought in terms of cold war values, ignoring the real lives of people to whose prospects our actions could make a great difference." Her solution is only partial:

> Since compassion contains thought, it can be educated. . . . We can take this disaster [September 11] as an occasion for expanding our ethical horizons. Seeing how vulnerable our great country is, we can learn something about the vulnerability that all human beings share, about what it is like for distant others to lose those they love to a disaster not of their own making, whether it is hunger or flood or war. (p. 12)

Nussbaum places particular emphasis on broad educational goals within the United States, demonstrating "the equal worth of humanity, demanding media and schools that nourish and expand our imaginations by presenting non-American lives as deep, rich and compassion-worthy" (pp. 12–13). Such grassroots motivational solutions are long overdue. It is true that the American educational system and mainstream journalism alike have turned away from international knowledge (for example, foreign language programs, geography) and international news reporting in a country that is the most powerful foreign policy and world trade player. However, general educational reorientation is not enough if institutions remain attached to narrowly defined, nationalistic trajectories.

Filling the Power Vacuum

Rice's emphasis on America-as-model-for-the-world is a common view among Washington power theorists. In the wake of September 11, similar positions have been adumbrated and rushed to the press. For example, Robert Kaplan's book with the startling title *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos* (2002) reproduces an America-as-model agenda complete with the benefits of world economic power that will trickle down to better human rights and social justice world-wide, although admittedly not right away. His language harks back to imperial Rome, using Tiberias as a model because that emperor successfully stabilized the diverse cultures of the Western world through consistent demonstrations of military power and the adroit policing of

borders. Kaplan is clear about the global significance of *Pax* Americana: "for American power to endure, it will need to be impelled by a more primitive level of altruism than that of the universal society it seeks to encourage" (p. 146). Hence, progressive democratic development can only be achieved through strong and unambiguous global control, using the archetype of strong and unambiguous leadership initiated by Caesar Augustus and perfected under subsequent Roman emperors. "American patriotism must survive long enough to provide the military armature for an emerging global civilization that may eventually make such patriotism absolute" (p. 146). Thus, although organizations such as the United Nations and the new international criminal tribunal in The Hague may eventually become useful, thus far they have only produced a cacophony of voices with weak global reach and poorly disciplined military backing. Therefore, the United States must continue to fill the vacuum of power and commitment in a diverse world. Kaplan's orientation follows several other influential policy theorists, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (1993, 1997) and Richard Haass (1999).

These and similar views from influential theorists tend to ignore Washington's negative position regarding many international human rights enactments, such as the abolition of land mines and the UN economic justice convention. Although military actions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces during 2001 and 2002 prompted calls for more international cooperation—even, by late December 2001, the sending of Arab troops (Syria) to join other peacekeepers in Afghanistan—the relegation of the United Nations to certain diplomatic and inspection functions seemed the preferred stance of official Washington and a wide range of its theorists. Thus, David Rieff (2002a) finds the two-tiered geopolitical orientation preferred by Washington acceptable: Europe providing humanitarian assistance while America focuses on military action (2002b).

Mutual Interest over Nation

Long-term alternatives to a reformulated *Pax* Americana have been proposed, albeit all too often in overly generalized terms. Ronnie Lipschutz (2000) proffers a multilateralism beyond nationalism and member-state actions, loosely modeling such interlocking responsibilities, surprisingly, on medieval social praxis, where "clients and patrons were enmeshed in a web of mutual rights and duties that bound them together and that could be called upon in specific situa-

tions." She would avoid global domination by one or a limited oligarchy of privileged nations by establishing single networks and group consortia based on need rather than particular "patriotic" logics. "In a global system of the future, we could imagine many political communities, some based on place, others on affiliations, but linked relationally rather than through domination by or loyalty to a single power" (p. 181). In this worldwide system, conceptions of community and public service would involve aims directed across, rather than limited to, state borders. Indeed, notions of sovereignty would be reconfigured along ecological, human rights, social justice, and other democratic and needs endeavors.

Absent from Lipschutz's pluralistic citizenship system is the means to its realization. With nationalistic sentiment rife throughout the world, and religious and ethnic allegiances crowding public discourse, the type of universally acknowledged humanistic agenda presupposed in her alternative system seems far from a given. Nevertheless, there are universal standards of social justice and democratic aims that are at least ascribed to by UN member-states as well as such regional international organizations as the European Union, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. These existing alliances and their legislative and legal arms cannot be so easily dismissed.

Standards for War

Other promising avenues for alternative global polity are offered by NGOs and various international grassroots sources. The Just War Movement, for example, has gained vitality in the 1990s. Richard Falk (2001b) recognizes "the urgent need for some normative framework of limitations that enjoys widespread support" (p. 24). This framework would also clearly define the differences between the violence of terrorism and that of its victims. Falk is realistic about the present relative powerlessness of such intergovernmental bodies as the United Nations, international law courts, and other authoritative frameworks, finding them too dependent on the will of national governments. He nevertheless finds hope among the majorities within the present borders of these same states, since it is ultimately in the interests of these peoples to live together peacefully within an increasingly interdependent and shrinking world. For Falk, war must come under the dock of a global venue:

> What just-war theory . . . demands is that contested policy provide jus-
> tifications, essentially by providing convincing reasons to overcome a
> general and significant bias against those who rely on war to solve
> problems and resolve conflicts. Analysis along these lines must ad-
> dress recourse to war, the means by which it is conducted and the
> ends pursued. Each dimension deserves brief discussion in the con-
> text of the evolving response to the September 11 attacks. (p. 24)

Just war thinking is negative in its approach to conflict resolution: bringing the instigators of war to account in an international venue. It presupposes a pluralistic structure of activism that functions through the standards of universal human rights. This is a well-articulated alternative to the unilateralism of the past, promising a more democratic and comprehensive approach to conflict resolution. Nevertheless, it must compete against the more received wisdom of Washington geopolitical theory, which desires the same ends but through radically different means, and uses the threat of war through military preparedness as a necessary good rather than an absolute evil.

CONCLUSION

The long-standing receptiveness of American culture to moral cause as a necessary ingredient in foreign and military policy continues to compete with other motivations. The inevitable ambivalences of civil war, the material seductions of worldwide empire building, and the cultural and material arguments for isolationist orientations have in the past divided Americans over war as moral cause. Although America was not the first country to include such moral issues as human rights and democratic aims in its prescriptions for empire—Victorian Great Britain being the most obvious predecessor—American thought has demonstrated a broad-ranging reluctance to fully own either the moral dimensions of globalization or, on the opposite end, the material benefits of empire. In part, this derives from enduring nativist isolationism, but also from a variety of competing worldviews and political perspectives that emphasize an internationalist pluralism and similar consensual approaches to problem solving.

Moreover, the question of whether war is feasible and moral has received systematic attention by recent political theorists, who would scrutinize instigators of war much more closely, relying on the emer-

gent international courts and human rights authorities to implement charges against individuals who initiate war. Finally, the heterogeneous and open nature of American culture projects a strong relativistic moral stance that questions such extreme measures as armed conflict with other nations. These often-conflicting arguments have pushed American political thought toward what may be called a "makeshift war-from-a-distance" and short-term intervention policies, which hitherto have largely circumvented the final aims of moral cause—the betterment of the circumstances justifying war.

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Chapter 3

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Warriors Against Drugs

WAGING WAR ON OUR FAMILIES

Violence Outwardly Directed

Steven Soderbergh's film *Traffic* (2001) suggests that a preference for
violent confrontation over treatment and rehabilitation characterizes a
government project that has become morally and intellectually bank-
rupt. In the headquarters jet, the new drug czar discovers that the
treatment representative was not even invited on the plane with his
staff. The connection between perceived enemies of a culture and the
will toward destruction directed outwardly usually takes a nationalis-
tic turn in modern history. Such trajectories involve the vilification of
the foreign, a penchant for reifying social loss and corruption as a par-
ticularly well-organized other. The Bush administration's commitment
to bombing the infrastructure of Taliban Afghanistan as punitive ac-
tion for the September 11 attacks despite mounting international and
domestic opposition underscores the psychological need—regardless
of its actual validity in this case—to locate sources of evil on a partic-
ular nation (see Gordon, 2001b). President Bush's maintenance of
punitive action was in part encouraged by high ratings in opinion
polls and the popular imagination, which associated the attacks with
such epochal, instigating events as Pearl Harbor, where an innocent
and underprepared America was raided in a "sneak attack" by a
predatory nation.

Like his predecessor Bill Clinton, who authorized attacks near civilian centers in Somalia in retaliation for terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, and Ronald Reagan, who approved air strikes on heavily populated urban areas in Lybia for similar actions, George W. Bush affirmed that solutions to violence involve more violence directed outwardly. This Washington orientation carried over into related areas of national governmental enforcement. In the Washington authorized "drug war," national forces are enlisted to overcome a long-standing social problem that gives no indication of subsiding, except on the demand end, where domestic drug use went down slightly in the 1990s. The national culture has hitherto embraced the War on Drugs as entertainment value while remaining skeptical of its results. On the other hand, films and stage plays, art exhibits, and television dramas have profiled individuals who have strived to overcome their drug addictions, often showing the difficulties of remaining in such programs and the social and interpersonal challenges an addict experiences within a cultural environment where instant gratification and pleasure as commodity are preferred pursuits.

The Culture of Drugs

A widely viewed television documentary on the biography of Robert Downey Jr. depicts a contemporary celebrity who unsuccessfully struggles with drug addiction, despite numerous stays in first-class rehabilitation centers and even jails (Arts and Entertainment Network, 2001). Amid a culture of radical individualism and commodity permissiveness, none of Downey's friends and associates report their successful intervention. Only the judge, a state official authorized to render judgment in court, reprimands and instructs Downey on his problem. While those giving peer testimony in the documentary express sympathy for his circumstances, and at times regret, none disclose their own attempts to argue with him against his drug use or their willingness to encourage his rehabilitation. In such widely viewed television programs, drugs are presented within a certain context of inevitability. Procurement presents little problem, and the sociality of the drug culture dominates the isolated individual in a way where usage is ubiquitous and acceptable, often carrying a certain social cachet.

Drugs on Stage and Screen

Stage drama in the United States has drawn on the human effects of the drug culture in subject matter that often takes a decidedly nega-

tive stand on its procurement and use. However, although politically oriented playwrights such as Tony Kushner, Suzan-Lori Parks, Mac Wellman, and Naomi Iizuka have often included addictive individuals in their dramatis personae, few producing playwrights in either the regional or New York theaters have written pieces that directly challenge the national trajectories of the War on Drugs. Tony Kushner, perhaps the leading spokesperson for political drama in the United States, prefers attempts at creating new mythologies of American culture—with ambivalent patriotic overtones—to accurate disclosures of America's social ills. Still less does he show interest in engaging institutional agendas such as Washington's War on Drugs or its involvement in U.S. foreign policy.

Lacking in the American theater are socially oriented undertakings that directly uncover, for instance, the Washington connection in the Latin American drug trade, or the flawed policies of the War on Drugs at the institutional level. Una Chaudhuri (2001) has recently envisioned such a national theater movement: "The theatre I dream of would create a space outside the melodrama of good and evil. . . . It would be a searching theatre rather than a cathartic one, a wounding rather than a healing one, a theatre willing to question all those towering twin monoliths—East and West, artist and critic, terrorism and war, us and them—that dwarf our humanity" (p. 65). What Chaudhuri leaves out is a theater of polemic that would challenge the dominant commodification of pleasure within a privatized society. Such standpoints remain beyond the stagecraft of such "political playwrights" as Kushner, Naomi Wallace, and others. The critical and social perspectives needed for the high culture of regional and New York theater have yet to appear substantially in an artistic climate still enthralled by the apolitical ironies and identity shifting complexities of postmodernism.

The American film industry has done a better job along these lines. In addition to the trend-breaking *Traffic*, the independent film movement has engendered works in recent decades that present the reality of drug addiction on the demand side with a degree of verisimilitude, if not always free from Hollywood glamorization. Glenn Gordon Caron's *Clean and Sober* (1988) uncovered the addictive lifestyle undergirding the fast-track culture of corporate America. A materialistic young urban professional remains in denial about his addiction, even after he is required by the court to undergo a rehabilitation program. His rehab confrontation group includes a spectrum of personalities representing varied ethnicities and classes. As the main character struggles against the group's rules for behavior and self-disclosure, he

realizes that others have also undergone similar denial problems. His reform in the end brings an epiphany for the audience as well, since the demand side of the War on Drugs is uncovered on microcosmic and intimate levels.

Earlier mainstream Hollywood films, such as Fred Zinnemann's *A Hatful of Rain* (1957), based on the stage play by Michael V. Gazzo, reveals the secrecy and anguish undergone by the former star athlete turned addict, who lives an isolated life amid his loved ones and admirers. The film depicts urban drug dealers as unglamorous and ungenerous, a detail that would be lost in later Hollywood formula films, such as the blockbuster *Scarface* (1983). The latter represents drug dealers as alluring, wealthy, and even socially respectable, until the dramatically obligatory punishment at the end. Another older film, *Monkey on My Back* (1957), reveals the bleakness of narcotic addiction while presenting a positive message of overcoming the habit in order to lead a fulfilling life. In the world of *Clean and Sober*, the main character does not attempt to hide his addictive lifestyle—as in *A Hatful of Rain*— except under the regulations of the rehabilitation program. This openness reflects a shift in social norms that has accommodated drug consumption, making it, if not fully respectable, at least commonplace with a certain attractiveness.

Deeper Explorations

Caron's *Clean and Sober* presents an ambivalent moral position toward the drug culture of consumption, implying that glamorous yuppies are simply following the commodity culture to its digestive extreme. *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), by contrast, successfully resurrects the 1950s portrait of the addict in Hollywood filmmaking, where drug addiction is secretive, ugly, unglamorous, and shameful. As in *A Hatful of Rain*, the characters of *Requiem* live an existence isolated from family and friends, unable to cross the addictive barriers that both control their lives and mark them as unacceptable within the communities that surround—one might say envelop—them. In both the 1957 and the 2000 films, communities are close and neighborhoods remain restricted ethnically and morally. While narrow codes of conduct define social behavior, determining when individuals should find fulfillment and where pleasure should be confined, the characters hiding addictions defy such strictures, but only covertly, in a way hidden even from themselves.

As the aging widow affirms her pipe dream of appearing on a local television game show in order to gain the love and respect of her past and present loved ones, her obsession for becoming a contestant parallels her largely unconscious drug addiction. Her fellow senior citizens have become distant bench sitters on a boardwalk, removed from the inner life of her character. Her son, also addicted, keeps her at arm's length. His visits to her are brief frenetic encounters without intimacy, where nothing is revealed and no comfort is given. The son and his girlfriend begin a slow descent while constant injections have turned their forearms into swollen black holes. Escaping their neighborhood through a frantic highway journey, their plight is narrated in parallel editing with the mother's downfall as in desperation she attempts to break into the television studio for an uninvited appearance.

While *Requiem* received high praise from discerning critics, its box office appeal remained moderate. With no conventional glamour and no action scenes—only real moments of violence that do not function as entertainment—its terror and despondency overwhelms, forcing the viewer to reconsider the connection between the easy fix of consumerist culture and the magnitude of the drug trade as national problem. Nowhere in either film are enforcement agencies shown to be effectual, nor are they validated through appealing characterizations. Especially in *Requiem* the inner lives of the drug users are fully revealed as pursuers of an American dream devoid of reality and moral purpose. The futility of their pursuit of selfhood ultimately derives, the film suggests, from a broader social myopia, rather than from the failure of individuals. Their false values come from a consumerist orientation and social isolation that denies their own self-worth. This perspective transcends the conventional melodrama of the cops-and-robbers action film, wherein drug addiction is an attractive warlike struggle between good and evil forces waged across an international landscape. *Requiem* rejects such Manichean perspectives by focusing on the cultural institutions that undermine more genuine forms of fulfillment.

Traffic uncovers the War on Drugs as inept, misguided, overly bureaucratized, and corrupted by political sloganeering and grandstanding. Soderbergh's innovative approach to representing the drug problem is to focus on the enforcement and supply-side aspects, critiquing the social institutions that have permitted and possibly encouraged the trade. The preference for military style solutions to the trade suspends other, more multinational and cooperative forms

of problem solving, such as diplomatic and economic pressures, and most especially demand-side treatment, rehabilitation, or the political agenda of legalization. Although the film avoids more controversial issues, such as the Washington involvement in the trade through use of drug dealers in foreign policy endeavors and corporate high-level involvement, it presents for the first time a critique of federal drug policy that moves beyond the action film genre. The popular action film formula typically presents U.S. government action in Latin America as a melodramatic struggle between good special military units and evil guerrillas involved in drug dealing. At the end of *Traffic*, the new enlightened drug czar challenges his audience with the query, "Do we really want to declare war on our own families?" While no alternative solutions are offered in the film, its straightforward criticism of the War on Drugs broke new ground and motivated a new degree of social discussion on the wisdom of using military models for social problems.

THE WAR BEYOND HOLLYWOOD FORMULA

Plan Colombia

Washington involvement in the drug war has been grossly misrepresented and underreported domestically. Colombia, now the third-greatest recipient of U.S. foreign aid—mostly in the form of military procurement and training—remains the largest theater of struggle. U.S. nationals advise Colombian operations. They and their Colombian army leaders are trained at such stateside institutions as The School of the Americas and the intelligence training program at Lakeland Air Force Base, and directed by such federal agencies as the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section. The Colombian antinarcotics police, commanded by General Gustavo Socha, provided with Black Hawk attack helicopters, the most advanced technologically, wages a bloody war in the coca fields of southern Colombia. The charge that such large-scale funding of military weaponry is used to keep the pro-business government of President Andres Pastrana in power rather than to fight the drug war remains entirely credible (Chomsky, 1994; Cooper, 2001). Certainly, Plan Colombia's violent orientation has led to mass killings of villagers over several years. Meanwhile, the national peace process has dragged on with little

interest on the part of the Colombian government, despite millions of citizens marching in the streets supporting new peace policies. The militaristic solution to the drug trade with North America is almost universally condemned by the Colombian citizenry. As Ombudsman Eduardo Cifuentes observed, "What we have in Colombia isn't a civil war. What we have is a war of the armed actors against civil society" (quoted in Cooper, 2001, p. 14). Washington official policy has ignored popular appeals in Colombia under the anachronistic Cold War rationale of pervasive communist threat.

Popular culture has drawn a different picture of U.S. involvement in the Latin American drug war through its formulaic action films and occasional attempts at statement films, the latter often ambivalent or compromised, such as Oliver Stone's *Salvador* (1985). Certainly, the actual Plan Colombia offensive defies the personal policy statement of Colin Powell, secretary of state under George W. Bush and former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Many of my generation, the career captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support" (Powell, 1995, p. 148). The U.S. public is seldom presented with the contradictions of the Colombian drug war campaign on mainstream television or in the print media. Debate over the issues of just cause and appropriate peacekeeping policy methods are usually avoided. Instead, issues that avoid scrutiny of the presuppositions supporting the international drug war are substituted, such as the effectiveness and "winability" of Plan Colombia.

Limitations of the Action Film

Hollywood's version of the War on Drugs in Latin America sidesteps the broader policy issues of the drug war to present action-packed conflict between Washington warriors, nefarious drug dealers, and "rebels" whose political roots remain vague or nonexistent. Conflict appears through the corruption of local officials in the use of drug policy money, but the tenets of the War on Drugs are never challenged, nor are alternative voices heard, such as dissonant characters, human rights workers, or critical Pentagon officials. The conventional action films *Patriot Games* (1992) and *Clear and Present Danger* (1994), popular at the box office, depend on alluring scenes of

violence in the Hollywood tradition, but bring with them unquestioned presuppositions of the *Pax* Americana. In these films by Phillip Noyce, the suspenseful adventures of a CIA agent push aside the possibility of interpersonal contact between Washington agents and local people. The charm of Harrison Ford displaces all other character interactions, just as outdated Cold War assumptions of the evil empire of communism, personified stereotypically and improbably by rural guerrilla groups, remain in place.

Stone's *Salvador*, although purporting to be an exposé of Washington support for a tyrannous client-state in Central America, in fact prefers entertainment and formulaic suspense over political substance. Political dialogue does occur in the film, but, significantly, only between U.S. nationals. The protagonist Boyle, a U.S. Army adviser, and a State Department official exchange points over the rationale for Washington involvement in El Salvador. However their argument goes no further than to underscore the glib premise of the film: that the brutalities of the U.S.-led government must be tolerated because the other side is worse. Boyle, who as an iconoclastic photojournalist could presumably argue for the other side, responds with a defense typical of the "opposing view" on American public television: the methods used by the U.S.-backed government are ineffectual and therefore driving the people closer to communism. Rather than allow Salvadoran characters (and actors?) to speak for themselves, Stone reduces their political insights to a debate among three out-of-place Anglo-Americas, delivered around a lawn table at the U.S. embassy. The debate scene is further weakened as a *raisonneur* (argumentative) element by the interweaving of Boyle's private story, since he begins the discussion by giving the U.S. adviser photographs of the resistance's campsite, which he does in order to secure a U.S. passport for his Salvadoran girlfriend Maria.

Traffic as Documentation

While debate about the costs and benefits of the drug war increased in the Clinton second term, Colin Powell's caveat about knowing the nature and consequences of violent action went largely unheeded in public discourse. Soderbergh's *Traffic* was a thinly veiled critique of the Clinton administration's drug policy under Barry McCaffrey. Like McCaffrey, the film's drug czar is a retired military man. Also as in the film, Washington's Office of National Drug Control Policy has been transformed to offer military and law enforcement priorities. In fact, the U.S.

administration remained preoccupied with stopping drug trading from Latin America to the United States (Massing, 2000). Soderbergh was granted access to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S. Customs Service properties for filming locales. Although access to information often leads to co-optation in political filmmaking, Soderbergh allowed only a few changes to his film upon government request. In effect, advice and location support from federal agencies actually increased the film's argument by creating greater verisimilitude (Massing, 2001).

Traffic's plot clearly reveals the futility of current federal methods of drug interdiction. The traders have more advanced telecommunications equipment than the government and even in some cases the military. For every shipment stopped, far more get through. Moreover, when traders are arrested, others take their places in the same locations, usually before the first ones are convicted. Despite its groundbreaking exposition of the War on Drugs, the film proved disappointing in its representation of domestic drug use. The subplot involves the daughter of the drug czar, who inexplicably changes from a personable high school student to an addict and prostitute in an inner-city environment. Only white middle-class users are featured, not African American or Latino, implying a greater importance to the former's fall into addiction. Perhaps the director could not trust his audiences to empathize with nonwhite cocaine addicts. Still, the film often cogently reveals the bankruptcy of Washington drug policy, as when the drug czar asks his staff for new ideas and is met with silence. Such scenes critique governmental policy with a clarity lacking in previous Hollywood films.

Other commercially based films have ridiculed the unthinking careerism and institutional mind-set common to military and law enforcement agencies. *Men in Black* (1997), for example, presents government agents enthused about committing to a mission with an unclear purpose and motive. But such moments were brief if not fleeting, allowing no time for coherent arguments or alternative discourse. In contrast, Soderbergh's pioneering film not only offers a comprehensive analysis of the War on Drugs but proposes coherent alternative solutions.

Other Demand-Side Exposés

Commercial films that treat domestic drug addiction have usually involved a formula-film cocktail of action, sex/romance, and

stereotypical street characters. In this delimited form, deeper and more comprehensive psychological studies of individual characters and the sociology of group dynamics have been sacrificed to the "well-made play" of the action genre. Underlying social structures supporting the drug culture are left unexplored in favor of dramatic suspense, calculated plot reversals, and alluring characterizations. During perhaps the worst period of domestic crime-related drug activity, the early 1970s, one film set a standard for verisimilitude and urban analysis. Although it had no immediate influence on the subject matter and treatment of mainstream filmmaking, it presented an uncompromising image of the dangers of heroin addiction. *The Panic in Needle Park* (1971) presents two well-defined characters whose relationship leads to a descent into serious addiction, homelessness, and prostitution. Director Jerry Schatzberg circumvented the conventional Hollywood aesthetic standards: surface glamour, a parade of easily categorized street characters with comforting appeal, and a fast-paced story and rapid filming style that avoids thoughtful and nuanced exposition. Instead, he chose to develop the characters relatively slowly, presenting their lifestyle choices and family struggles clearly, so that the drug culture of New York City is understood in its complexity and bleakness. The young man and woman, one from a working-class the other from a middle-class background, find little help from municipal institutions that ignore or brutalize them.

The urban environment of *The Panic in Needle Park* appears equally inhuman. Schatzberg's mise-en-scène is filled with monolithic warehouses and factories, dirty diners and subway platforms, harsh urban sounds, and unwashed clothing that is out of (Hollywood) fashion and utilitarian. The tragic descent of the couple is uncompromised by sentimentality, and death from overdose brings no consolation. The film's starkness is unrelieved by a conventional denouement that would offer a complacent confirmation that things will get better.

Influenced perhaps by the well-publicized deaths from drug overdoses of the important music figures Janis Joplin and Jimi Hendrix, *The Panic in Needle Park* refused to compromise its message of the human destructiveness of drug dependency and the violence inherent to the organized drug trade. The general acknowledgment that drug use had spread from inner-city minority neighborhoods and alternative communities to the suburban white middle class was underscored by such popular pioneering films.

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE WASHINGTON WAR

Policies Compromised

Over the past decade, the federal government's current $12 billion-a-year antidrug program (some estimates as high as $25 billion) has increased, indicative of a growing awareness of its misguided methods and presuppositions. Before leaving office, President Clinton openly questioned the basic tenets of the current drug policy and spoke out against jail terms for possession. Drug reform measures have passed in several states with none defeated. In November 2000, California voters approved a referendum to treat rather than incarcerate nonviolent drug offenders. Nationwide, university campuses have taken up the cause for the abolition of draconian possession sentencing. NGOs have uncovered the connection between "counterinsurgency methods" within Third World states and the U.S. War on Drugs, or "antinarcotics operations." The NGO Nuevo Amanecer Press-Europa established the close connection between programs for the War on Drugs and the war against political assent ("Campus Mexico," 1998). Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA), head of the Congressional Black Caucus in Washington, asked President Clinton to investigate the connection between Carrillo Fuentes, reputed head of the "Juarez Cartel," and possible money laundering through Citibank, the second largest U.S. commercial bank (*Weekly News Update*, 1998). Similar investigations domestically and internationally have broadened public awareness beyond the highly tendentious and misleading plotlines of Hollywood action films and network television dramas.

Clearly Washington has been losing the War on Drugs, in both areas of supply confiscation and drug demand. Heroin use skyrocketed during the second half of the 1990s. In 1999, there were 208,000 users, compared with just 68,000 in 1993. The Drug Enforcement Administration reported that a comparable increase of heroin entered the United States during that time (Lee, 2001). Clear evidence suggests that users were switching from cocaine to the more lethal heroin. The Taliban government in Afghanistan had reportedly dumped its heroin crop on its main supplier—Europe, with a growing market in North America—to raise cash for its endeavors after 1996. The Bush administration has been quick to associate terrorism after September 11 with the drug trade, although its ally in Afghanistan during 2001, the Northern Alliance, reportedly relied on heroin funding as well. Representative Bob

Portman (R-OH), cochair of House Speaker Dennis Hastert's antidrug task force, stated, "By Americans spending money on their drug habits, we are helping to support the Taliban government, which supports terrorism" (quoted in Lee, 2001). Thus, the War on Drugs can be waged at home through the arrest and incarceration of drug users, a validation of the current controversial criminalization policies, and perhaps a harbinger of the much debated military tribunals for terrorists in the United States.

Ending the War

On the other hand, progressive voices have suggested that keeping street drugs illegal supports the Taliban funding of terrorism abroad and repression within its borders. Other advocates have advised something closer to wise regulation rather than legalization of drugs, pointing out that in Switzerland registered users receive heroin and clean equipment. Such policies seem to reduce violent crime and other negative side-effects of illegality. Along similar lines, there has been a growing university student movement beginning in the late 1990s to overthrow the draconian sentencing laws for possession. The so-called Rockefeller Laws introduced in New York State mandate sentences from fifteen years to life for simple possession. During 2001, New York Governor George Pataki called for a drug program "reform" that actually sought to increase the sentences for drug possession under certain circumstances. Recognizing the futility and injustice of such laws current in several states, Students for a Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP) have worked with responsible members of Congress to alter harsh and counterproductive laws, and to eliminate a provision of the Higher Education Act of 1998 that denies university financial assistance to convicted drug users. Such laws would be counterproductive, SSDP finds, since addicts need rehabilitation and job training, not incarceration (Students for a Sensible Drug Policy, 2001).

The growing movement for drug reform began in 1993 when the Drug Reform Coordination Network (DRACNet) was established. It was preceded by theorists, such as Mark Kleiman (1992), who questioned the basic assumptions of the drug war. Part of DRACNet's agenda derives from the recognition that militaristic approaches to antinarcotics programs and the whole notion of "winning a war" does not bear scrutiny. As a monitor and advocacy group, it has questioned the political consequences of the Patriot Act, as it was named in 2001, which

called for closer surveillance of dissenting groups within the United States and in countries of particular geopolitical interest to Washington, such as Colombia, Somalia, and Indonesia. The grassroots movements raised a significant degree of public awareness. In the fall of 2000, California Proposition 36 passed, which mandates that all those convicted of drug use or simple possession be sent to treatment centers rather than prison. A wave of ballot measures and state laws soon followed. Medical marijuana laws passed in several states, following the 1996 initiatives in California and Arizona. Laws liberalizing sterile syringe use passed. Perhaps most important for human rights, reduced jail sentences for possession were introduced.

Less intrusive, more humane policies were needed abroad as well, but here other cultural institutions came into play, of a higher status and respectability, harder to change and with less direct access to the public. The state-of-siege perspective, common among municipal police forces, also pervades the military, which often keeps its own community distinct from the civilian population, and uplifts the martial concepts of honor, duty, and courage, often ignoring more immediate and adaptable approaches to conflict resolution.

To transform the War on Drugs into an effective treatment, education, and rehabilitation consortium of policies would not be easy, given the massive bureaucracies now in place around current programs (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Moreover, altering current approaches raises difficult political issues. Peter Schrag (2001) points out that political, not philosophical or analytical, standards are engaged when alternative methods are proposed. "And that standard is quite protective of the status quo. The combination of high uncertainty about the outcome of any change; the partial irreversibility of any bad outcomes; and a pervasive tendency for any decision makers to favor the status quo pose steep barriers for reformers" (p. 48). What can be said of domestic programs also applies to military-led campaigns. However, massive weaponry procurement for the Colombian government and its paramilitary support groups involves foreign policy revision, not domestic security and lifestyle issues where U.S. citizens are directly involved. The public is more likely to change its mind about policies effected outside its borders than about broad programs close to home, in neighborhoods and schools. Public wariness of U.S. military involvement in other lands for reasons not fully understood follows the thinking of Colin Powell. The Pentagon, aware of the public's lack of confidence in this area, has been reluctant to directly involve its own soldiers in foreign campaigns for

any length of time. The demilitarization of antinarcotics policies may in this regard be easier to manage than decriminalization domestically. Still, foreign policy exigency remains tied to military operations, logistics, and intelligence gathering. This connection may not be so easily broken, especially when such policies and institutions are supported by a compliant press.

Identifying the Enemy

The notion of a War on Drugs can in itself justify a vast military apparatus that wages the "war." This idea in turn may derive indirectly from the earlier conception of an "organized" drug trade, monolithic in structure and vast in scope. As has been suggested, government organizations have helped perpetuate this perception in order to further bureaucratize, that is, to restructure and expand, their own existing institutions and to create new ones (Dorn, Murji, and South, 1992). Despite Washington's—and Hollywood's—projected image of a mafia-style monolith, with huge interlocking cartels controlling markets, research points to the existence of a collection of individual participants in the drug war, united only by their determination to gather, transport, and sell drugs. This is the reality of "disorganized" crime with less box office and voter appeal (see Reuter, 1983). Speaking before a conference organized by the Police Foundation of Cambridge, England, Commander John Grieve questioned the metaphor of war as an ongoing institutional term (Dorn et al., 1992, p. 202). What concerns other First World countries such as Britain is not the organized drug trade per se but the threat of expansion from the high-consumption U.S. market to other countries with lower rates of consumption (Home Affairs Committee, 1985). In this regard the overwhelming influence of American mass culture around the world—movies, television, promoted music, information systems, fashions, lifestyles—may help spread indirectly the culture of drugs. This is an aspect of the cultural monolith not recognized by the purveyors of popular culture and governmental ideology.

In 1989, an investigation of the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, commonly called the "Kerry Report," found a sustained and involved connection between the operators of U.S. foreign policy and the drug trade. Although the report was broadly based and source oriented, little of it reached the American public in any detail; much of it was altered to perpetuate status quo

notions of the transparency of a War on Drugs in which one side was clearly demarcated morally and motivationally from the other (Scott and Marshall, 1991, chap. 1).

Foreign Policy and the Drug Trade

"We're not going to let a little thing like drugs get in the way of the political situation. And when the Soviets leave and there's no money in the country, it's not going to be a priority to disrupt the drug trade" (quoted in Scott and Marshall, 1991, p. 177). The administrative official attached to Afghanistan who made this statement to the *New York Times* in 1988 remained committed to foreign policy directives that gave the War on Drugs little if any consideration. The covert CIA activities in Afghanistan are repeated in Indochina, as they have been for longer periods throughout Latin America. Indeed, the dependence of such federal agencies on international drug networks for its covert operations may be considered Washington's addiction to drugs. To change the institutional direction of U.S. presidential administrations may be difficult but not impossible, provided that sufficient grassroots activity gains mainstream media attention, and such mass cultural institutions as the television and the film industries raise enough concern for the consequences of foreign policy methods. In times of war, when many state operations are determined by a chief executive with the assistance of a compliant media, military leaders are not likely to defer to stateside armchair theories. Aware of this, Congress has usually deferred to the executive office during armed conflict.

Often conceding decision-making powers to the president, Congress has tended either to support executive directives that indirectly support the illicit narcotics trade or have discovered such activities after the fact. While journalists such as Alfred McCoy (1972) and Ralph Blumenthal (1989) have documented in detail the systematic encouragement of the opium trade in Southeast Asia by Washington agencies, showing the latter's careful diplomacy to keep the drugs away from U.S. domestic users for public relations reasons, the general public still remained unaware of such corruptions. In fact, the widespread conception remained that the U.S. military guards "the Free World" and therefore performs a kind of altruistic service. Although public opinion of such covert agencies as the CIA, the FBI, the DEA, and the NSA may be somewhat more ambivalent, to date the mainstream media's damage repair efforts in this direction have remained successful (see

Herman, 1988). As long as the majority remains unaware of the polit-
ical entanglements of the War on Drugs, little can be changed. What
appears among the broad populace is a general unformed suspicion of
the inadequacies of the drug war, a fact apparent to both established
political parties, which chose to ignore the War on Drugs during the
2000 presidential campaign.

Easy Solutions and Rigid Bureaucracies

Contributing to the general reluctance to change warlike policies
toward the drug war may be a more generalized cultural preference for
institutional management that assumes commandlike management for
problem solving and concerted action. In contrast to other forms of
leadership, more consensual and less authoritarian, the American cor-
porate model remains hierarchical with an inflexible, uncompromising
top-level structure: "the corporate world still has a strong male context,
not far from the military model, including the prescription that leader-
ship means command" (Hacker, 1999, p. 28). However true such
general observations may be, more is needed to explain the specific mil-
itary preference developed for much of antinarcotics policy in the
United States. Perhaps a combination of decades of growing drug con-
sumption, public alarm at the violent crime increases among the sellers,
and a general propensity for the quick-fix solution traditional to Amer-
ican society has contributed to the validation of military force in this
area. The assumption has been that such methods, perceived as over-
whelming and irreversible, could in fact bring quick results. The
obvious failure of such an approach has not been represented in popu-
lar cultural forms, until the flawed but cogent film *Traffic* renewed
serious public discussion. However, since neither main party sought to
reform or eliminate the War on Drugs during the 2000 national elec-
tions, the promise of alteration seems slim within the near future. Both
political parties seem to limit their rhetoric to photo-op sessions at the
White House with noted teenagers who have shaken or helped others
beat the drug habit. Such individualistic approaches reflect a facile un-
derstanding of a broad social problem and do not offer serious response
to the drug and crime problem, which demands focused, cooperative,
and systemic solutions. Although such high-profile programs initi-
ated under Nancy Reagan's apparent guidance as the "Just Say No"
publicity approach of the 1980s may positively affect some young
teenagers whose socioeconomic backgrounds place them at a fair dis-

tance from the social environment of most consumption situations, they do nothing about social and political contributory causes, nor do they acknowledge supply-side influence on the demand side.

Media Compliance

Despite official rhetoric against the drug culture during the 1980s and 1990s, the mainstream media remained generally supportive of foreign policy priorities as they related to the drug trade, or were somewhat critical—without being oppositional—when respected individuals within journalism or government went public with their findings. Such situations occurred, for example, in the 1970s when a U.S. narcotics agent admitted that there was no evidence for the accusation, made by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics head Harry Anslinger, that Communist China supplied a significant proportion of the world opium trade (McCoy, 1972). Only when Washington changed its official attitude toward China under the Nixon administration was the official feed to the media altered. Similarly, in the 1980s the Reagan administration's charge of a Sandinista cocaine trade was perpetrated by Oliver North and other operatives, only to be denied by the DEA soon after, perhaps because of possible embarrassment from the *San Francisco Examiner's* breaking story about the Nicaraguan Contra's connection to the drug trade in American inner cities. Even so, the *Washington Times* attacked DEA official spokesman Robert Feldkamp for failing to support the president (Shannon, 1988). Often one government branch effectively silences another when the general public has become aware of top-level actions that contradict its official ideology. This happened when congressional investigators for the Iran–Contra committee were countered by the determined efforts of the Reagan administration. In the end, House and Senate Republicans prevented publication of the committee's chapter on the domestic side of the scandal (Parry and Kornbluh, 1988).

The general passivity of the mainstream media toward questions of fact and policy within the federal government derives from various circumstances. Washington maintains significant powers over the domestic, and to a certain extent the international, press. Besides determining air space for radio and television channels, the federal government is by far the largest provider of information in most fields, but especially in international affairs. Either as official releases or leaks, individuals within government provide detailed facts of news events,

along with their inevitable spin. Jargon within journalism terms the imitative nature of news organizations, the propensity for simply reflecting official Washington perspectives, "pack journalism": by repeating official claims of reality, future access is assured. In fact, high-status corporations such as The New York Times Company and The Washington Post Company may be under greater compulsion than most news organizations to present official views uncritically (Bernstein, 1977). Moreover, media executives and editors identify with Washington policymakers and senior officials, as one powerful establishment recognizes and desires the respectability afforded another (see Scott and Marshall, 1991, p. 184). Thus, the mainstream media are at times open to criticism of Washington's War on Drugs but do not challenge the validity of institutions accused of systematically breaking their own laws. By and large, commercial film and television leadership takes a similar posture, presenting "reality-based" dramas that either represent government agencies as committed, but flawed in methodology, or containing a few "rotten apples" within a system that remains well grounded and effectual. Like media executives, film studio producers, cable network producers, and even independent film directors are dependent on government and military assistance for production values and verisimilitude.

The War on Drugs remains popular as action film subject matter in part because of the readiness of popular culture to objectify its own predilections and compulsions as creations of an Other, alien and threatening. When drug sellers are entirely separable from drug users, they become the enemy, categorically distinct. Ambrose Bierce's (1994) Civil War observation about the gulf of separation between perceived friend and foe may apply to the objectifications of the War on Drugs: "The soldier never becomes wholly familiar with the conception of his foes as men like himself; he cannot divest himself of the feeling that they are another order of beings, differently conditioned, in an environment not altogether of the earth. . . . He is somewhat in awe of them" (pp. 47–48).

CONCLUSION

While the entertainment value of the War on Drugs remains high within commercial industries, and a certain mystique and glamour follows the imagined world of drug dealers and users, the government

paradigm of war ultimately inhibits its efforts to reduce the domestic drug problem. By emphasizing the struggle of detection, arrest, punishment, source elimination, and forceful confrontation over peaceful means of problem solving, the official war has led to a worsening addiction problem and widespread unfairness within the criminal justice system. While rehabilitation and education programs have been undervalued as methods, a costly and unproductive prison system has grown significantly.

The war paradigm depends on oversimplified notions of right and wrong, the criminality of addiction, and punishment for illness. Further questions, such as the illegality of drug use and the meaning of rehabilitation, are seldom explored when a warlike model of problem solving is used. Although war has been officially declared on drug use and trade, a strange acceptance of the culture of drugs pervades American society, with the result that victimhood and antisocial behavior function merely as adversaries in a war left largely unquestioned by the opinion media.

Chapter 4

Justifying War

PURPOSES UNCLEAR

Military Nomenclature

Contemporary Washington military policy reflects perhaps more than ever a desire to endow military operations and preparedness with the particular moral ideals most commonly associated with the founding of the United States. If anything, the conscious promotion of such standards has increased since the 1991 Gulf War. Military nomenclature alone reflects the new heightened consciousness. Whereas the Gulf War action was officially given the apolitical name Operation Desert Storm, in 2002 and 2003 the Iraq watch actions were named Operation Enduring Freedom. Throughout the 1990s other U.S. interventions were given similar names reflecting moral endeavors: the operations Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, Provide Promise. This chapter will consider those elements of discourse that identify moral justifications for war within the American global vision. It will also consider those forces within American culture that prompt an inhibitive approach to war as moral cause. The latter include military intervention policies that advocate purely nationalistic, vital economic, or transnational corporate justifications, or that tentatively fall short of moral justifications for reasons of uncertainty or tentativeness.

"That's all it is."

Fredric Jameson (1990) dismisses attempts within the First World to produce "compensatory structures"—alternatives to the injustices of the dominant social structure—by recognizing the ability of mass culture to co-opt such structures through the substitution of its own "imaginary resolutions" and the "projection of an optical illusion of social harmony" (p. 26). Jameson perhaps overstates his case, applying in absolute terms the illusion of social harmony to complex cultural structures for a diverse citizenry. However, his notion of imaginary resolutions as compensatory to the perplexities of contemporary global conflict may have some validity when applied to the recent trend toward the glamorization of World War II, the nostalgic reflection on a war where the moral cause was triumphant and, perhaps even more seductive for today, clearly defined.

There was no debate over the evils of fascism or Japanese imperialism during "the good war." Along with a clear moral cause, America's existence as a nation and culture was truly at stake during World War II The best-selling author Stephen E. Ambrose has made his career from such heroic books as *Band of Brothers* (1992) and *Wild Blue* (2001), where men fighting for a just cause demonstrate comradeship and self-sacrifice. Anthony Giardina (2002) offers a motivation for such interest today: "The 'citizen soldier' was the perfect foil for a generation of baby boomers newly bent on self-examination, guys who had begun to wonder if, without having been in a war, they'd ever been truly tested" (p. 52). More than that, however, America seemed to possess a unity lacking in an era of identity politics and relativistic values. Filmmaker Steven Spielberg would produce *Saving Private Ryan* (2000) and bring World War II nostalgia to an even wider audience. For television, Spielberg and Tom Hanks produced the HBO miniseries *Band of Brothers*, which brought comradeship and sense of purpose into the living room. Even Vietnam was given World War II heroic proportions in the equally popular *We Were Soldiers* (2001). What makes this cultural development congruent with Jameson's "illusion of social harmony" is the nearly complete absence of moral struggle grounded in the ambiguities of international conflict. By choosing World War II as subject matter, these re-creations of moral cause can forego such debate with dramatic verisimilitude, since cause was not commonly a subject for debate by fighting men during that war.

However, films about the American fighting soldier in more recent conflicts, such as *Black Hawk Down* (2001), also focus on comradeship-

in-arms rather than moral cause and military policy. In the Delta Force intervention in Somalia, ambiguities abounded. Still, at the end of that film, one soldier says to another, "It's about the man next to you. That's all it is." Similarly, in the popular *We Were Soldiers*, the protagonist reminds his comrades, "We fought for each other." Taking Ambrose's theme of the reluctant fighting citizen in a distant era of clear moral delineations and applying it to every American intervention since then avoids the realities of political context at the same time as it proffers a contemporary social harmony that does not exist. More significant, however, the popularity of Ambrose's books demonstrates a determined desire within American culture for a vision of the community united in moral struggle. On the governmental level, however, locating a moral cause for war was only just beginning to be formulated by the Bush administration during 2002.

Strength for Human Rights

In his National Security Strategy statement of September 2002, President Bush moved in the direction of applying moral issues to his Axis of Evil and War on Terrorism projects. This was a decided departure from recent Washington military and diplomatic policy. Usually underreported by the press, an American president's National Security Strategy statement typically is a restatement of the broad international policies of the United States. Bush's discourse was something beyond that. His language reflected a new melding of American unilateralism with human rights policies. Even more, it spoke in no uncertain terms about the need for democratic values on a global level:

> People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children, male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. (Bush, 2002)

The power of the speech derived not solely from the enlistment of moral cause for global purpose—such had been done before throughout the Cold War period and indeed as far back as the McKinley and Wilson administrations—but also from the sustained nature of Bush's

moral rhetoric, its clear and detailed exemplifications of what has long been held as the American ideal at home.

Bush's document took a new course by justifying American unilateralist approaches to the cause of international human rights and social justice. By doing so, he pointedly answered those critics who had dissociated the American form of unilateralism from the multilateralism of the United Nation: "We do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom." The new National Security Strategy seemed to resurrect a Wilsonian approach to American foreign policy, whereby the ideals of individual freedom and nonaggression between nations would be applied through well-articulated ideals of behavior (Moravechic, 2002). The ethical universalism of Bush's statement cogently responded to Western relativists who seemed to permit tyrannies to stand without interference or even critical comment: "In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people." Also, by placing America in the position of world leader, Bush was careful not to claim thereby an ethical exceptionalism for his own country: "No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them." The universal validity of his ideals did not detract from an insistence on national security against terrorism or aggressor states, since the cause of freedom was the responsibility of strong nations that must remain strong for that purpose. It was a clear justification for moral purpose in war.

Hollywood Overlooks Cause

Meanwhile, and now in contrast to the Bush administration's new discernment, the American film industry remained a barometer of the erstwhile Washington drift toward a reluctant military interventionism, one that until quite recently had demonstrated an uncertainty toward the cause of human rights and democracy in other lands. Ridley Scott's *Black Hawk Down*, produced before and rushed into distribution after 9/11, clearly represented this trend. Ridley's drama of the 1993 invasion of Somalia by elite U.S. forces includes no major Somali characters. Rather, the story focuses almost entirely on U.S. soldiers. The characterization and dialogue among both officers and enlisted men stress the ethos of military professionalism—duty, honor, loyalty to small combat units—rather than moral cause. In fact, the one

soldier who attempts to defend the cause of the invasion, a young private, is teased into silence by his comrades soon after he timidly mentions his personal desire to help the Somali people. Moreover, the cause he mentions is so vague as to be unidentifiable. The only black U.S. soldier in the film immediately rebuts his expression of concern for the Somalis by reauthorizing a narrowly focused military ethos: "I came here only to *fight*!" Thus, the American tradition of innocence abroad, embodied in the young idealistic soldier, is presented only to be ridiculed out of consideration.

Contact between the American soldiers and the Somalis (who are abusively referred to as "Skinnies" throughout the film with no sense of irony) is rare. When individual contact does occur between American soldiers and Somalis, silent stares usually follow. During one American pilot's capture, the Somali leader, who typically remains unidentified, remarks to him caustically that violence in Somalia is inevitable and everlasting. His fatalistic pronouncement underscores the written quote from Plato presented during the film's opening credits: "Only the dead see the end of war." This absolute statement confirms the enduring futility of war without acknowledging the possibility of its moral justification. All the same, the focus on the American fallen in the film reflects a strong warrior code, with extended scenes of dying American soldiers, accompanied by orchestrated musical scores of heroic proportions

Black Hawk Down valorizes a patriotic military professionalism at the expense of revealing the social and political context of the mission. Absent is a picture of the Somali people, the political background of the ongoing conflict, and even the geopolitical motivations of the United States. Still, its plotline accurately reflects the shortcomings of the prevailing Washington military strategy. When the commanding general learns that a helicopter has gone down, he immediately realizes his vulnerability: "We just lost the initiative." The easy-in/easy-out approach to intervention demanded by current Washington political thought renders the overly specific and brief interventions of the American military ineffective, despite its overwhelming firepower and high-tech mobility. In this respect, *Black Hawk Down* reveals perhaps more than Ridley Scott and its producers realized.

The American theater has similarly avoided the presentation of war as cause. Plays engaging current Washington military theory are seldom produced on professional stages. As with the film industry, the New York commercial theater and the regional theaters avoid

international war and peace themes, despite an abundance of recent material for dramatization. Popular plays about the Vietnam War, such as *The Basic Training of Pavlo Hummel* (1973) by David Rabe and the musical collaboration *Miss Saigon* (1990) by Claude-Michel Schoenberg paralleling the Hollywood trajectory, have, like their Hollywood counterparts, focused entirely on the lives of American soldiers, leaving issues of cause and Vietnamese political and cultural contexts unexplored. With little interest in either classical just war theory or the more recent abolition of war trajectories, the American theater over the past few decades generally has remained disengaged from both the official ideology of Washington foreign policy and its alternatives, such as priority given to human rights, democratic aims, and multilateral consensus methods.

THE WIDER DEBATE

Multilateralist Beginnings

Countering a heroic cult of military professionalism in the broad culture, certain strains within traditional American thought have worked against the type of glorified warrior cult evident in, for instance, German culture over the past two centuries. It may be forgotten that the unilateralist approach favored in the current professional military ethos was itself an outgrowth of an extreme isolationist position demanding a small military up until U.S. entry into World War II. In fact, the draft bill of 1941 passed by only one vote in Congress. Even after Pearl Harbor, Washington insisted that the commitment of American ground troops to the European theater of operations, which had first priority, would be through American overall command under General Dwight Eisenhower (Jenkins, 2001).

This cooperative sensibility, a willingness to participate fully in a revitalized multilateralism, would involve something in the direction of the European Union's recent human rights initiatives, but on a much larger, and more effective, scale (see Held, 1995). However, the unilateralist urge of official Washington has been sustained over several decades, driven in part by a bureaucratic satisfaction with the familiar and in part by a persistent isolationism and lingering Cold War distrust of intergovernmental agency. Bringing out the more cooperative aspects of American society will require public education in a variety of

spheres to remind the citizenry that democratic ideals require consensual methods no less on the international as on the national levels. Kenneth Bruffee (2002), like Martha Nussbaum, believes that this new awareness requires an educational approach that stresses connectivity rather than atomistic individualism and nationalistic triumphalism. "It requires teaching the 'something that doesn't love a wall': our inescapable interdependence. The core of this enterprise lies in teaching the craft of mutual dependence and civil compatibility among diverse cultural communities" (p. 13). Accordingly, Bruffee urges a movement beyond good-feeling multiculturalism, which he views as a facile approach that stops at mere tolerance. Rather, "Practicing this craft demands not just understanding but *negotiating* difference, and grasping the nettle of cultural change" (p. 13). This would require new conceptions of community and solidarity, redefinitions of "the consciousness of kind" that would extend notions of community (p. 14). While Bruffee has in mind primarily the domestic American community, such views also can be extended to international issues.

Rules over Power

Currently existing cooperative methods assume a pluralistic approach to world peace that predicates a rules-based rather than a power-grounded orientation. Robert Kagan's recent article in *Policy Review*, "Power and Weakness" (2002), has defined the prevailing U.S. rejection of cooperative and rules-based approaches among nations, such as those envisioned by the European Union. Challenging cooperative approaches, Kagan cites European countries directly: they are "moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation" (p. 1). On the other hand, the United States, discerning threats to its superpower status everywhere, is "exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might" (p. 1). According to Kagan's scenario, only when Europe decides to project military power in areas where it shows concern, in the Balkans and perhaps in the Middle East, will Washington take it seriously as an international player.

The Washington approach of unilateralism has stirred wide debate among European governments and the European Union, challenging presuppositions held since the end of World War II. Francois Heisbourg,

head of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, strongly disagrees with Kagan and the Washington consensus. Questioning Kagan's reading of history, he argues that multilateralism is not for the weak. On the contrary, it has helped build strong alliances and clear foreign policy, not least for the United States: "America became a superpower through multilateralism and the Atlantic Charter in 1941. It is a superpower not by its military and economic weight but by virtue of sustaining permanent alliances, and multilateralism is at the heart of those alliances" (quoted in Erlander, 2002, p. 3). Adding to this view, Josef Joffe, chief editor of the German publication *Die Zeit*, points out that the use of multilateralism by Europe to restrain a powerful United States is not new, but goes back to the 1960s. Other European policy observers agree, citing major "Atlantic rift" issues occurring in every decade since the 1960s, from differences over the Cuban missile crisis to President Reagan's military escalation policies in the 1980s (Peters, 2002). In sum, the new thrust of the George W. Bush administration since 9/11 has stirred new debate even as it has alarmed and alienated its First World allies. Such transatlantic disputes may be the prelude to more cooperative and pluralistic global military policy.

In 2002, Washington's new homeland security reconstructions met with opposition across the political spectrum. Rejected by libertarians, liberals, and many conservatives, the greatly broadened powers given the federal government would alienate much of the citizenry. More important for world peace, the new domestic measures would encourage bitterness toward American power among targeted groups at a time when security against terrorist acts most needs the help of citizens from other cultures. The strictures of such official conformism would discourage, say, Muslims from helping Washington's intelligence community. David Harris (2002) warns that profiling alienates the very people who could assist the government most—including translators and informants. Rather than push people with special knowledge and connections away, Washington should encourage affinity. Harris lays the blame on a counterproductive Washington security policy "[t]hat takes away a relationship of trust and of people feeling they are part of America" (quoted in Solomon, 2002, p. 53). Moreover, many conservative Republicans, including the religious Right (which in America has held a long-standing suspicion of government and supports, at least in general terms, the separation of church and state), found Attorney General Ashcroft's new domestic powers troubling, especially those involving issues of privacy and

governmental intrusiveness. Grover Norquist, president of the conservative Americans for Tax Reform, remarked, "If there hadn't been the big government problem, Ashcroft would have been talked about as the Bush successor. Instead, the talk is, 'Too bad we pushed for him'" (quoted in Lewis, 2002, p. 1). Domestic cooperation on security issues, such as international multilateralism, will encourage the intelligence gathering needed for true security. However, when Washington believes its military strength, bolstered by America's impressive economic track record since World War II, can police the world without substantive involvement in international institutions and task forces, the hope for a war standard based on human rights and democratic principles remains problematic if not impossible.

War Realism or Just War?

Classical just war theory's distinction between the moral validity of decisions whether to enter into war *(jus ad bellum)* and the moral validity of actions in war *(jus in bello)* have been debated only in limited channels of discourse within the public sphere. Excepting occasional reports in major U.S. newspapers, the mainstream media avoided war debate that included the full spectrum—as opposed to false spectra—of opinion. Secular and religious sources have opened relevant dialogue and expository essays on the Internet (for example, The Faith and Reason Institute, Breakpoint.org, and Progressive.org). These sources have the potential of reaching much wider audiences than traditional advocacy journalism, but whether such debate would widen to include features on network news programs remained uncertain. These and other sources argued that Washington's Axis of Evil agenda, specifically its invasion of Afghanistan and the following confrontation with Iraq, violated the classic criteria for entering into war.

A central just war issue is whether the overall good for entering a war exceeds the overall harm done during war. This criterion, generally known as the proportionality argument, could be applied to the Bush administration's various Axis of Evil trajectories. Whether, for example, on-site reviews of bombing sites in Afghanistan would fall within acceptable standards of the proportionality argument regarding harm to civilian populations. Some reports reveal that flaws in the U.S. air war left hundreds dead, while other preliminary reports show a relatively low number of such incidents (Filkins, 2002). Although Bush administration officials relegate such eventualities to accidents and

minor "collateral damage," critics have pointed to fundamental flaws in the *jus in bello*. They argue whether war policies where large numbers of civilians die from aerial bombing can be simply dismissed as accidents: "Even if you grant that the intention is not to kill civilians, if they nevertheless become victims, again and again and again, can that be called an accident?" (Zinn, 2002, p. 3). What seems disputed here is the semantics of war policy. If a warring nation plans a war where heavy civilian casualties will result, can such broad strategies be dismissed under the "few rotten apples," or weaponry anomaly, approach to justification?

Can such war policy be attributed to accident and not intention? Just war theory would question such perceptions. Duane Cady (1989) points to the basic dishonesty of war making that separates means and ends in such a cavalier manner: "Can means and ends be sufficiently distinct, one from the other, to admit such disregard for consistency? At what point does disparity between means and ends manifest hypocrisy rather than exemplify commitment to moral action?" Cady then reminds his readers that the perception that ends and means must be integral to one another applies to such issues (p. 46). When Washington continues a Cold War policy of absolutizing the evils of the opponent, attributions of misconduct in war by the wholly "good side" tend to be given less scrutiny by the government(s) involved during wartime. Long before President Reagan's "evil empire" of communism speech, American presidents had discovered the rhetorical device of absolute moral statement to combat the absolute evil of what was taken as a world communist conspiracy. Thus, President Kennedy's famous Inaugural Address in January 1961 proclaimed an essentialized warlike policy that justified, within a generalized hortatory discourse, any means for victory: "Let every nation know, whether it wished us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty" (Kennedy, 1963, p. 3). The Cold War legacy that enshrined an absolute good—advanced Western capitalism signified as "democracy," "the Free World," and other monikers—continued through the post–Cold War period down to the George W. Bush administration.

The absolute good versus absolute evil worldview implies a unilateralist approach to war making, since multilateral approaches toward negotiation and other forms of nonviolent persuasion would assume circumstances less transparent than the clear black-and-white

issues of a Manichean worldview. A nation or people cannot negotiate with absolute evil, nor can it invite allies to participate in compromise with such forces. Such reductionism is rife within the Washington consensus. Thus, one month after September 11, Scott Simon (2001), prominent commentator of National Public Radio, declared in a major newspaper headline that "Even Pacifists Must Support the War." Simon claimed the classic pacifist cause of self-defense, affirmed as a basic requirement for nation membership in the 1948 UN Charter (Walzer, 1977). His article justified the bombings in Afghanistan and urged a unified wartime stance throughout the nation. Simon's argument articulated a commonly voiced response to the 9/11 terrorism attacks, justifying a gross military response without reference to the classic pacifist criterion of proportionality, the just or equal response to an aggressor. Self-defense or some form of national survival has been claimed throughout history—truthfully or as some degree of pretext—for instigating international aggression, as Hitler's notorious justifications for invading the smaller nations of Europe and then the Soviet Union in the late 1930s attest (Herzstein, 1974). Throughout the final months of 2002 and the early months of 2003 public debate over whether Iraq constituted a direct threat to other countries or to the United States alone grew in detail and intensity.

Washington foreign policy theory commonly assumes—sometimes with acknowledgment—the classic "realism" approach to war, as opposed to a just war rationale, which is often dismissed as naïve or utopian. The war realist simply dispenses with moral issues and criteria during (and often before) war on the grounds that war is an extreme state beyond ethical consideration. War realism has strong roots in Greek and Roman thought, finds famous adherents in the early modern era (Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes), and is today most famously voiced by the nineteenth-century German historian Carl von Clausewitz (1976). Akin to the Manichean perception of absolute good and evil, realism assumes an uncompromising position toward war conduct and peacemaking issues through its grounding in an extreme position "beyond morality." Realism has gained some of its persuasive power by its theoretical rigidity, its clear distinction between moral and amoral, and its outright rejection of moral decision making in the war context. In the Realpolitik of global power, war realism has been an important rationale to justify war; so, however, have moral concerns. America's interest in locating a moral cause for war, common to other democracies as well, may often produce elaborate heights of discourse.

For instance, in the rhetoric projected by the Bush administration justifying war with Iraq in 2002, contradictory justifications were so rife that even Defense Secretary Rumsfeld cautioned against confusing the American public "by treating war plans like paper airplanes and tossing them around" (quoted in Marquis, 2002, p. 1). Quite often official justifications for war can be presented simply as saber rattling to threaten or bully a nation into surrender or, as in the case of Iraq, to encourage opposition parties within the country to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Such relatively complex attempts at task-specific justifications by world powers may also, as in the case that Rumsfeld laments, have the disadvantage of confusing the general public in a democracy.

HOLLYWOOD AND JUST WAR STANDARDS

Avoidance

The American cultural response to validating war typically avoids both the just war and the war realism positions. In the latter instance, Hollywood productions project an attitude consonant with the ancient adage "all's fair in love and war," a statement that gains more specificity from the inclusion of obligatory sex/romance scenes along with the war action in conformity to studio formula film requirements. Even peacetime military films, such as *Top Gun* (1986), *An Officer and a Gentleman* (1982), and *A Few Good Men* (1992), strive to avoid issues of justification almost entirely. When references are made as to why their characters are preparing for war, the remarks are parenthetical and terse. The soldiers in these films never feel a need to ponder the moral significance of their training.

Equal Response to Equal Cause?

The first two films concern the training of military strike aircraft, the sort of warfare that technological pacifists have pointed to as violating the just war criterion of equal response to equal cause. This requires that the degree to which harm is inflicted on an adversary must be in proportion to the degree of that enemy's violation of international human rights and/or just war criteria. In this regard, the technological pacifist holds that modern war tends to be total war by virtue of the advanced killing potential of the weaponry. For example,

writing on the effects of "obliteration bombing" during World War II, John C. Ford (1944) doubted whether such warfare could be "waged within the limits set by the laws of morality" (p. 15). Today, technology has advanced to the point where aerial obliteration, or carpet bombing, has been supplanted by smart bombs and a variety of complex guided explosives. The widely regarded "video game" or "Nintendo" war against Iraq in 1991 was upgraded by American technology in Afghanistan after 9/11. In both instances, the war powers claimed that such tactics were humane, given the advanced guidance capability of the weaponry. However, as we have seen, subsequent inspections in both Iraq and Afghanistan have proven such claims overly optimistic. Thus, Ford's evaluation may apply to the far more sophisticated guidance weaponry of today quite as much as to the carpet bombing of World War II. Carpet bombing tactics did trouble Allied air personnel during the latter war, especially in the early stages (Crane, 1993). However, Hollywood military characters seldom appear concerned with just response or cause; the amoral conditions of war, or potential war, remain for them a given. Popular perceptions of the heavy bombing of Kosovo under the Clinton administration supported the success of just such "relentless" airpower. However, as Elliot Abrams (1999) notes, Milosevic gave in only under the threat of ground troops.

Just War Basic

Alongside such straightforward reproductions of war realism, Hollywood films and television dramas include a kind of just war ethos, but often in the bare-bones form of an eye for an eye. This category of conflict resolution fulfills the need of American audiences for moral satisfaction through an avenger of wrongs, one who operates outside the law, particularly outside the ethics of consensus decision making. Thus, such cultural icon films as *Dirty Harry* (1972) and its sequels present a rogue police detective who circumvents the law to bring swift, Old West justice to the liberal (and degenerate?) urban landscape of post–hippie San Francisco. While many audience members may carry over the ethics of cowboy justice into superpower foreign policy, such transparent equations are probably less common. Instead, considerable ambivalence—and often anguish—may accompany just war theory. For many Americans just peace remains an important goal, despite attempts by the mainstream media to ignore social justice standards when its country is on the point of war.

American private organizations, both secular and religious, are troubled by violations of just war standards by any country, and remain cognizant of Howard Zinn's (2002) observation that "[w]ar, by its nature, is unfocused, indiscriminate, and especially in our time when technology is so murderous, inevitably involves the deaths of large numbers of people and the suffering of even more" (p. 4). In short, the sheer brutality of war must call into question its justifications. Hence, the classic requirement of proportionality—the harm caused by the response to aggression does not exceed the harm caused by the aggression itself—has been used to make contemporary warfare categorically unethical. Contemporary just war organizations, among them Breakpoint and the Center for Public Justice, see proportionality as the standard most likely to be violated in current advanced technology warfare (Budziszewski, 2001).

Consequentialism

In much the same way, consequentialists and act utilitarians—those who believe that if war is declared, then all methods should be undertaken for victory to assure a minimum of expense and time—offer what amounts to a perilous open-ended model in real war. For instance, if more can be gained by breaking the rules—a common circumstance in military strategy and tactics—consequentialists will soon accept whatever the war-making power defines as "military necessity" (Moseley, 2001). Also, Immanuel Kant's famous criterion of "good intentions" for any human behavior runs into difficulties when applied cross-culturally, in actual disputes between peoples and nations. The distinction between good intent and self-serving interests, or too narrowly defined "universal" standards, soon becomes blurred as nations and factions engage in conflict.

Human Rights as Standards

Human rights standards applied in a reasonably universal manner seem to offer the most assured method for just war theory. This approach looks for discrepancies between, on the one hand, what particular nations or groups claim as just cause or good intentions, and, on the other hand, the historical and contextual eventualities of war behavior. Thus, Desmond Tutu and Ian Urbina (2002) point to Israel's security, or self-defense justifications, as obfuscating what

amounts to territorial ambitions. A similar argument can be used to critique the Palestinian methods of terrorism used to justify its life-threatening cause.

What all just war and just peace movements require are strong, enduring, and widely supported international legal authority to point to and enforce human rights and just war standards. However, when substantial resistance to such widely acknowledged authority occurs, the achievement of international human rights and just war standards remains doubtful. This occurred in 2002, for example, when President Bush refused to attend the World Summit of nations, citing strong disagreement with its agenda and his own pressing scenario, which involved the Axis of Evil strategy against Iraq.

New paradigms for war strategy would only change ideologies, since, as William James observed nearly a century ago, the personal virtues of militarism are also those of a peaceful world—courage, disregard for hardship, discipline and focus, dedication, and a concern for the greater good (James, 1970). Such a broad-based aim will require the willing participation of mainstream cultural institutions and grassroots organizations alike. The American commercial film industry, for example, needs to offer protagonists in their dramas who value cooperative approaches to war and peace and consensual modes of interaction for problem solving, rather than go-it-alone "cowboy" approaches. Such personal qualities require no less ethical stature than those required for heroic physical courage in war, as William James reminds us.

CONCLUSION

Within the broader American culture, certain powerful traditional strains compete with one another for authority in military policy and war theory. A strong native sense of isolationalism finds a modern counterpart in international unilateralism during the era of the sole superpower. Influential cultural and institutional forms, such as commercial cinema and much of mainstream Washington policymaking, typically support such views. However, equally strong are the American traditions of diversity and egalitarianism, which tend to move American thought toward more consensual and multilateral approaches to diplomatic and military policy. These opposing perspectives account in part for the tentative nature of much of American thinking throughout the post–Cold War era.

The Bush administration's recent turn toward a justification for military intervention based on moral arguments deriving from the American cultural tradition of individual freedom, secularism, historical progressivism, and decentralized authority has helped raise public consciousness. Consequently, the hitherto strong insistence on an economic- and business-driven foreign policy has been modified, at least in official theory, to include a forceful and well-articulated concern for human rights and democratic aims. The defense of Western moral values thus becomes the chief motive for war. Even the oil-as-natural-resource motive can be explained as necessary to maintain a strong Western influence on future globalization, since only a strong West can assure the eventual realization of the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and secularism.

Washington's new bearing is also consciously predicated on universal values, whereby all countries without exception are bound to move toward progressive ideals in their communities and for their individual citizens. The Bush administration's new direction may in part reflect a dialogue that has already begun in the domestic and international public spheres, which has been increasingly concerned with the lasting effects of U.S. interventions in countries denying such standards for their citizenry. Thus, television and print journalism has increasingly alluded to such key aims as nation building and state building, looking much more skeptically on the Cold War history of U.S. foreign policy, which has left most countries it has invaded bereft of the means to move toward general democratic agendas. In this regard, President Bush's new direction may constitute a response to domestic criticism as much as a boldly originative policy perception. The question of whether the United States can overcome its resistance to multilateralism in order to further its moral aims in a diverse and conflicted world depends on the extent to which American governments and the public can locate appropriate allies that willingly support a strong universal vision evolved from Enlightenment values.

Part Two

Peace as Cause

Chapter 5

Debating Global Peace

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: WASHINGTON SIGNALS HUMAN RIGHTS

The question of whether the U.S. government and its people were willing to abandon their traditional reservations about international activism for the sake of human rights and social justice issues was in part answered by the clear change of trajectory of the George W. Bush administration favoring humanitarian intervention. President Bush's speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002, explicitly invoked human rights values for intervention against Iraq. This important address, together with his recent National Security Strategy statement, gave priority to human rights. On one level, Washington's new position showed affinity with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's activist stance toward moral cause for intervention. In 2002, his speech before the UN Millennium Summit paralleled Bush's strong position on human rights over national sovereignty: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" (quoted in Williams, 2002, p. 25). If important leaders of international institutions were sharing common perspectives with the sole superpower on moral cause, the global

public sphere was not entirely in agreement on significant issues of humanitarian policy; nor were the actions of national governments.

In practice, "peace and security" issues remained the decisive motivation for actual interventions over the past few decades. For example, interventions in Haiti and Kosovo in the late 1990s were decided by the legal justification of peace and security for the region. Humanitarian reasons were viewed only as add-ons. Hence, the debate between global security and democratic aims was not fully resolved in the new century. A dispute of equal importance involved the often-heated discourse among humanitarian interventionists. One faction felt that human rights and humanitarian aid was an entitlement for all, irrespective of whether particular groups or nations were harming their own or other peoples (for example, Ignatieff, 2002). The other faction held that international aid and peacekeeping should distinguish between the innocent and the complicit, that is, between those groups on the inflicting end and those on the receiving end (for example, Rieff, 2002a). In both these basic disagreements, President Bush was clearly on the side of humanitarian intervention for selected groups only, those groups that were harmed by the other group or groups. On the issue of whether security and peace or humanitarian concerns should have priority in foreign policy, Bush was not fully on one side or the other. In that debate, his administration tended to merge both outlooks, believing that what was best for America and the West generally was also best for the rest of the world, with respect to humanitarian conditions. From the perspective of his administration's (Rice and others) presupposition that America's value system was its own best argument in a contested world, the either/or question of national security or international human rights was put too narrowly. For Washington in the new century, human rights and social justice issues were in the main congruent with American security and economic prosperity.

President Bush's insistence on Western standards of individual and social well-being placed him among the universalists of international human rights. Although contradictions existed within this forceful position—for example, whether the United States would be willing to conform to its own standards for freedom, democracy, limited governmental interference, and so on—Bush's notion of global governance, as might be expected, drew much praise and blame (see Habermas, 2002). It is necessary to consider the international arguments for and against Washington's new policy for world peace.

WASHINGTON'S NEW PEACE POLICY

The Sum of All Security

A century-long movement toward human rights over national sovereignty in international concerns is evident in recent intergovernmental orientations. The United Nations, for example, began to question the notion of absolute national sovereignty for its members with the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Geneva Conventions that followed. With the prospect of the sole superpower moving more noticeably along similar lines, or at least in the same general direction, the promise of human rights progress seemed to brighten.

During the months following 9/11, issues of protection and surveillance of the domestic population gained priority in ways unprecedented in American history. Although earlier attempts at state security, such as the notorious Palmer Raids to confine "anarchists" and the Alien and Sedition Act following the threat of war with France in 1798, were at times harsher and violated the Bill of Rights more deeply, the George W. Bush administration's agenda would be far more comprehensive and costly. Perhaps the greatest phobias presented to the public resulted not from the threat of political groups vowing the overthrow of the national government, but from the technological capability of such terrorist groups. Al Qaeda claimed to have access to nuclear devices—"dirty bombs" of various sizes and types—which under the circumstances seemed entirely plausible to the experts (Keller, 2002). In fact, government-led investigations of the risk of nuclear terror date back to the 1970s. However, with the collapse of Soviet communism in the early 1990s, Washington became more concerned with worst-case scenarios of such weapons or their ingredients falling into terrorist hands. President Bush's Moscow meeting in May 2002 would address this issue more fully. As a *New York Times* senior writer remarked, "When terrorists get around to trying their first nuclear assault, as you can be sure they will, there will be plenty of people entitled to say I told you so" (Keller, 2002, p. 24). Quite apart from whether such devices—able to be planted and set off using very basic technological capability—would actually cause mass destruction on the order projected by theorists of Mutually Assured Destruction, merely the perceived possibility of such a scenario among the public could cause panic on a vast scale.

Suddenly, Hollywood movies about alien aggression against middle-class suburbanites moved from metaphors of Cold War paranoia to actuality, or at least to the realm of possibility. The once-popular and much-discussed *The Invasion of the Body Snatchers* (1956) and *The Night of the Living Dead* (1968) revealed America's vague phobias toward the communist threat of nuclear annihilation or, just as disturbing, destruction from within due to moral lapse or social failure. In contrast, the post–9/11 mainstream film *The Sum of All Fears* (2002) was presented as actual documentation of a future possibility brought about by terrorist nuclear attack. Rather than functioning as metaphor or subtext of general Cold War anxieties, as in the earlier thrillers, *The Sum of All Fears* responded to the specific anxieties of mass culture generated by 9/11. While the Bush administration prepared the public for a long war against terrorism, it offered reassurance that security was under control in Washington. At the same time, it increased national allegiance—and anxieties—by reporting an America surrounded by "enemies of freedom." Accordingly, when former President Jimmy Carter visited Cuba in 2002, the administration sought to undercut the event's political significance by presenting Cuba as a military threat. For example, Undersecretary of State John Bolton declared, "Cuba's threat to our security has been underplayed" and suggested that Castro had biological weapons to sell to rogue states and terrorist groups (quoted in Kornbluh, 2002, p. 6). In such instances, Washington's allusions to the homeland security issue defined the dimensions of the threat while reminding the public of its ongoing existence.

That the dimensions of Bush's war would be extremely broad was evident in a series of White House statements defining the aims of the conflict. Thus, no distinction would be made, the president warned, between those who perform terrorist acts and those who support them. This hard geopolitical stand toward terrorism implied the use of a wide-ranging peacekeeping force to be used when political pressure failed. Moreover, there would be no limit to the expansive force's operative cost. Almost immediately after 9/11, Republican Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania declared that the first responsibility of the federal government would no longer be education or health care—the main standards of the Bush presidential campaign—but rather national security (Corn, 2002). Across the board, federal agencies that showed great lapses in security were demanding more money, this despite evidence that seemed to indicate that the problems of detecting and enforcing security issues were more

bureaucratic than fiscal. The FBI's response to wide criticism of its ineffectiveness in detecting the 9/11 hijacking plan was to demand a greater budget for itself (Johnston and Natta, 2002).

New Moral Turn

Still, perhaps in part because of a puritan strain deeply rooted in American public life, Washington could not simply focus on national security, even to the detriment of social services, without also calling on Americans to adopt a new moral discipline. At the West Point commencement in June 2002, President Bush associated the moral goodness of each individual with national security. In doing so he also sought to co-opt the argument made by critics of his administration that the best defense against terrorism is not high-tech warfare waged against other countries, but a new, fairer foreign policy. In Bush's rebuttal, a kinder, gentler U.S. geopolitical policy would eventually eliminate poverty and offer a just peace: "We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace by replacing poverty, repression and resentment around the world with hope of a better day" (quoted in Bumiller, 2002, p. 1). Freedom is sought, Bush told the graduating cadets, in every country in the world, replacing, at least in part, oil and other economic concerns as motivations for policing the world. American military culture seemed further altered by the new recruiting advertisements, which now emphasized the defense of the political virtues of democratic individualism; this altruistic argument was clearly distinct from the traditional recruitment appeal to youth for training, travel, and adventure. An instance of the new approach is the Campbell–Ewald advertisement page for the U.S. Navy, which shows a scene of navy ship hulls with the titles USS Freedom of Speech, USS Freedom of the Press, USS Freedom to Assemble, and USS Freedom to Vote painted across their bows. The caption asserts, "It's a free country. And for over 200 years we've been helping to keep it that way" (*Cablevision TV Guide*, 2002).

Critical voices grew in some circles for more substantive change in foreign policy approaches. Annan's words made the front page of the *New York Times*: "Polls show strong American support for the [United Nations] at the grass-roots level regardless of what is said and done on Capitol Hill" (quoted in Kleinfield, 2002, p. 1). Public perceptions of the failures of Washington institutions, specifically the ineptitude, bureaucratic rivalries, and general myopia of national security agencies, demanded a general reassessment of unilateralism. Despite regular

media coverage of America's great military prowess against such inaccessible countries as Afghanistan, it seemed to many that national security demanded more than a quick and well-ordered intervention in distant lands. If a costly $40-billion-a-year security and intelligence apparatus could not prevent large-scale terrorism, perhaps its basic aims were misguided. Could America really do it alone and ever hope to be successful? Could America afford to continue to view itself as a geopolitical exception without help from the rest of the world?

Natural Resources as Guarantor of Core Values

Certainly, an important motivation for U.S. foreign policy was consistently brought into the public debate: assured access to natural resources. Michael Klare's (2002b) historical study of Washington's urge for control over vital natural resources clarifies the significance of this discussion in public discourse. In fact, "resource wars" have been broadening in scope recently to include other areas of the world, in part because of the breakup of the former Soviet Union, in part because of the growing desire to tap previously pristine world regions for oil. Thus, the Caspian Sea basin and the South China Sea were fast becoming territory for competition between Pacific Rim countries, Russia, and the United States.

Such competition followed along traditional nationalistic lines and inspired much of the strategy of the national security doctrine. As for Washington, foreign policy position papers commonly supported "rapid development of Caspian energy resources" for purposes of "Western energy security" (U.S. Department of State, 1997, p. 1). Accordingly, Caspian oil—and most certainly in the near future South China Sea oil—has been sought as a hedge against possible disruptions of traditional oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region. While not denying these scenarios, the Bush administration often preferred to talk in terms of rogue states, the Axis of Evil, and America's renewed moral commitment for peacekeeping, a rhetorical tack that can be understood within the democratic context of broad public opinion, which looks warily on wars inspired solely by economic, even natural resource, motives. Bush's rationale melded both the economic and the moral arguments. Maintaining the peace would both stimulate trade and assure the flow of vital resources such as oil and natural gas, allowing America and the West generally to assure the social and individual values of the Bill of Rights.

TESTING THE NEW SECURITY SYSTEM

Homeland Security

While President Bush projected an ethical cause through which individual Americans could offer their allegiance, his administration undertook a transformation of national security institutions. Introduced amid much critical commentary from both within and without official Washington, it would create a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, which would amalgamate and improve existing agencies and services across a broad expanse of federal bureaucracy. Tom Ridge, the newly appointed NSA director who would head the new department, assured the public that the president had thought about the new restructuring before 9/11 (MSNBC, 2002a). Ridge's words attempted to rebut widespread criticism that the Bush administration had planned the restructuring belatedly. Its proposed budget of $37 billion was also contested by the Democratic opposition, which proposed even more money for the new consortium department. The new government intrusiveness in the lives of Americans would be received with ambivalence by most and regret by many, as the domestic threat of growing governmental power began to alter the traditional binary positions of Republican and Democrat, rich and poor, religious and secular, black and white.

Tightening the Security State

"[A] seamless web" must unite local and federal law enforcement along with the more specific intelligence community, according to Attorney General Ashcroft (quoted in Dreyfuss, 2002). To meet the monolithic danger of terrorism, America needed an equally monolithic security system at home. Under the 2001 USA Patriot Act, passed soon after 9/11, the FBI and the CIA were required to train state and local police in national security. Before, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 had allowed law enforcement in general to work with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and receive information from Washington. Even school officials came under pressure to report immigration violations among their student bodies, a responsibility often rejected by school administrators (Bach, 2002).

Laws sponsored in Congress throughout 2002 would further restrict even ordinary forms of civil protest. In Pennsylvania, Republican

State Senator Joseph Scarnati's proposed bill (SB 1257) included a crime described as "environmental terrorism" that could be widely interpreted to include "preservationists" of the state's national forests. Labeling such conservationists as "eco-terrorists," "violence" could be defined broadly as "negative impacts on business" (Pell, 2002, p. 20). States such as Florida considered deputizing local police officers as INS agents in order to close the seams in the new security homeland to illegal aliens. Critics charged, however, that such moves may discourage illegal immigrants from reporting crimes against them. Washington's preference for technology over human contact in international surveillance was paralleled domestically in a comprehensive program to increase closed-circuit television throughout American cities and suburban malls. Spokespeople for Washington, DC's, Metropolitan Police Department predicted that such monitoring of the general population would increase rapidly over the next few years. It would be presented to the public, in somewhat Orwellian tones, as the "community extension" of the new surveillance system (quoted in Parenti, 2002, p. 24).

Heretofore outcast whistle-blowers, censured by their institutions, gradually gained center stage in the public sphere. FBI Agent Coleen Rowley, who had given early warnings of the 9/11 attacks to FBI headquarters, met with the Senate Judiciary Committee in early June 2002. Her negative assessment of the agency—its narrow careerism, institutional rivalries and rigidities, its inability to promote the best and the brightest, and its myopia toward terrorism—was presented before attentive Washington politicos and the mainstream media (MSNBC, 2002b). At the same time, Democratic Party spokespeople became increasingly critical of the Bush administration's restructuring of the security bureaucracy. "The culture of the federal bureaucracy"—a new phrase now being used frequently by electronic journalism—was found inadequate if not hidebound and unresponsive. On this even Republican voices added to the chorus. Ronald Kessler's timely book, *The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI* (2002), was deeply critical of the FBI's inability to adapt, its bureaucratic irrelevancies, and its stubborn refusal to update its computers and telecommunication systems at all levels. Kessler was eagerly read, and his negative assessment was further detailed in an influential C-SPAN2 Booktv lecture (2002; see also RonaldKessler.com). Other dissident voices, such as British rock star Billy Bragg, whose songs for the new global justice movement, "NPWA—No Power without Accountability," gained considerable

public response, further instanced a more critical turn against the Bush administration's moral leadership (Bragg, 2002).

Weighing these ponderous developments, public uncertainty toward the security state continued to run deep throughout the culture at large. Official reaction to Representative Cynthia McKinney (D–GA) was negative after she became the first in Congress to point to the myopia of the intelligence community in predicting the 9/11 events. However, public support grew for her courageous stand in the face of almost universal deference to the Bush administration's homeland security agenda (Nichols, 2002). Even within the federal bureaucracy, opposition to extreme measures for national security grew. For example, the State Department criticized secret military tribunals, affirming that just results come from openness rather than government repression (Klaris, 2002). Also, the Supreme Court ruled in June 2002 that door-to-door solicitors could not be barred from local communities or be required to register with the police (National Public Radio, 2002). While not directly related to the terrorist threat, the ruling nonetheless showed an unwillingness to surrender individual and group rights to a national cause, no matter how well publicized. Some think tanks of the Washington and world financial continuum revealed an independent course as well. For example, Joseph Stiglitz, recent Nobel Laureate and former chief economist at the World Bank, proposed an independently controlled organization for Third World development policy. As planned, his Initiative for Policy Dialogue would bring together economists for ad hoc planning sessions on a variety of labor and economics issues, an action that defied current World Bank and International Monetary Fund domination of globalization programs. In fact, such alternative thinking has already taken place in a few countries. For Stiglitz, terrorism and violence result when large numbers of males without jobs and widespread poverty are allowed to persist. His alternative would question the unilateralist approach of the Washington consensus, undercutting the official War on Terrorism by offering a pluralist, participatory multilateralism that more directly engages individual citizens (Stiglitz, 2001).

Although the new security state and the proposed Axis of Evil interventionism abroad remained broadly popular during the first year after 9/11, the Bush administration no longer enjoyed the near-universal support—or deference—it received during the earliest months following the hijacking attacks. By June 2002, Washington was forced into an effort of damage control. President Bush devoted more time

visiting institutions such as the National Security Agency in order to reassure intelligence personnel and to offer moral support, as it was explained in the mainstream media (*BBC World News*, 2002b). But interpreted another way, Bush's institutional visits sought to press home an executive message of better performance from the intelligence community. Despite these negative developments, President Bush's moral appeal for a new civic consciousness, enlisting moral issues for war and peace, seemed more than an afterthought to most Americans. It was taken seriously by most.

Hollywood Reimages Government Power

Even before 9/11, the reputation of the FBI, along with other federal enforcement and intelligence agencies, had suffered greatly. Throughout the 1990s, the American public grew increasingly wary of institutions previously regarded with a degree of patriotic admiration. Mass culture's growing suspicion of institutions such as the FBI can be seen in the two Hollywood blockbusters straddling the 1990s decade: *The Silence of the Lambs* (1991) and its sequel *Hannibal* (2001). In the first film, the FBI is presented uncritically. Agent trainee Clarice Starling hunts down the serial killer within an institution that supports her with understanding and even mentoring. In the opening scenes of *Lambs*, the agency is presented positively, promoting its social worth and idealism. At the FBI training grounds at Quantico, Virginia, Clarice's boss is congenial and takes her criticism gratefully. In contrast, the 2001 film shows a much darker FBI, one where corruption is rife and agents are unappealing, jaundiced, sexually aggressive, and disrespectful of the citizenry, with sinister SWAT teams in the background. No longer the enthusiastic initiate, Clarice's character has become jaded by the calculating careerism of the FBI, an ambition she cannot fully disown herself. Interestingly, Thomas Harris, who wrote both novels, gave an even more disaffected ending in the novel *Hannibal* (1999). In the book, the transvaluation of values is so complete that Clarice and Hannibal secretly leave the world of government intelligence to begin a romantic relationship together. Filmmaker Ridley Scott softens Harris's criticism of government agency with a conventional Hollywood ending in which the crime fighters triumph, leaving out the elopement of the two principals. Still, the later film remains decidedly suspicious of government law enforcement, reflecting a widened credibility gap among the public following events such as the

FBI handling of the Branch Davidian defiance at Waco, Texas, and similar revelations of misguided government power at home.

Even standard Hollywood fare glamorizing the U.S. military with stars in officer uniforms, such as *A Few Good Men* (1992) and *Courage Under Fire* (1996), became in the post–Cold War years films tinged with suggestions of corruption and cover-up within the U.S. military. These were clearly a departure from earlier, more straightforward films of military glory. They offered relatively transparent ideals, evident especially before the loss of the Vietnam War in such blockbusters as *Strategic Air Command* (1955), *A Gathering of Eagles* (1963), and *The Green Berets* (1968). In the earlier popular films, an unquestioning martial ethos combines with a vaguely articulated but assumed patriotism to produce a global melodrama based on the domino theory of communist aggression. The evil empire of communism motivates ordinary men to take up the cause of righteous guardianship of the Free World. In *Strategic Air Command*, the James Stewart character is called up from civilian life to train pilots for a new generation of strategic bombers. His self-sacrifice of family and career is done in the name of maintaining the peace, according to the official slogan of the agency the film is named for: "Peace is our profession." A similar desire motivated President Bush's call to all Americans to fight against a threat from without by maintaining a global peace. Once again, self-sacrifice and vigilance is needed as defense against the Axis of Evil—a designation that attempts to associate certain enemy states with both the Axis Alliance of World War II and "the evil empire" of President Reagan's communist enemies.

Representing Fear

For most Americans, the post–9/11 threat to peace was taken seriously. For every expression of government corruption and abuse of power, post–Cold War American culture also evoked worst-case scenarios where the terrorism of the few would substantially affect the lives of the many. Perhaps the purest example was the post–9/11 action film *The Sum of All Fears* (2002), based on the Tom Clancy (1991) novel by the same name, where vaguely defined neo-Nazis capture a misplaced Israeli nuclear weapon and blow up Baltimore, Maryland. Such a catastrophic disruption of the peace was indeed the sum of all phobias in the now well-defined War on Terrorism. Earlier Hollywood films about nuclear attack, most especially *The Day After* (1983)

and *Testament* (1983), show the horrors, large and small, of nuclear holocaust; or deride the governmental propaganda of nuclear preparedness—*The Atomic Café* (1982); or reveal the effects on the individual psyche of nuclear buildup—*Desert Bloom* (1986). By contrast, *The Sum of All Fears* presents a worst-case scenario designed to excite newfound anxieties, much as the special effects films about killer asteroids had done a few years before. This fear was more immediate than earlier anxieties about outside attack because it was associated with the actual terrorism of September 11.

Public memory after 9/11 took the form of earlier film revivals that questioned the wisdom of overreliance on weapons of mass destruction among geopolitical rivals. A television revival of Stanley Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (1964) drew a telling comment from film critic Michael Scheinfeld (2002): "Four decades later, this audacious masterpiece remains the definitive Cold War time capsule" (p. 33). In fact, statements such as *Dr. Strangelove*—and Sidney Lumet's more documentary *Fail-Safe* (1964)—were hardly time capsules after 9/11. Rather, they accurately represented current fears. Much could be said for the far less serious but even more relevant James Bond blockbuster film *Thunderball* (1965), which concerned the theft of a NATO nuclear bomb by the terrorist organization SPECTRE (Special Executive for Counterintelligence, Terrorism, Revenge, and Extortion). Although Ian Fleming's terrorist organization was comfortably dissociated from any real international alliance of its day, its language seemed chillingly relevant thirty-five years later, when secret cells of peace disrupters replaced the traditional East–West Cold War dichotomy. In the Bond films, in fact, Soviet KGB agents are ineffectual clods, the butt of Bond's suave maneuverings, while SPECTRE agents are truly dangerous and fanatical. The continuing popularity of the Bond films and Fleming's books may be due to just this concern about a sinister third force that works beyond East–West bureaucracies.

Even as President Bush reassured the nation that 100 agencies would soon be devoted to fighting terrorism at home and abroad, national opinion polls found other domestic issues of greater concern (National Public Radio, 2002). During this time a major television docudrama, *Path to War* (Frankenheimer, 2002), presented the presidency of Lyndon Johnson as a tragic instance of excessive government interest in defeating evil empires abroad. The earnest concern for civil rights and the up-building of Johnson's Great Society domestic program was defeated before their full realization by the increasingly obsessive mil-

itary commitment to the Vietnam War. Using the justification of national security, premised on the domino theory of communist expansion in Southeast Asia, Johnson made the fatal decision to expand the war Kennedy had begun with military advisers. Johnson's lifelong wish for the elimination of poverty and injustice at home gave way to an insistent demand for victory at any cost. At one point, knowing he had forever lost his vision as a statesman and national leader, in bitterness Johnson demanded from his speechwriters that "there will be no mention of the Great Society." The willingness of Washington officials and policymakers to continue a war when its cause could no longer be affirmed, even by the White House leadership, was a chilling reminder of the compulsions of national power. Bush, like Johnson during the Vietnam War, was, within a few months of 9/11, facing a domestic cacophony of voices demanding better accountability and more interest in human-based services.

Security on the Slippery Slope

As the general public expressed mixed responses to the official War on Terrorism and the emerging homeland security culture, rulings by courts of law paralleled such ambivalence. Several state and federal judges refused to hold suspected immigrants for charges that were vague or unspecified. Also, local police authorities often defied federal enforcement authorities by refusing to arrest suspects on flimsy charges (Cole, 2002). After 9/11, even the New York Police Department continued to uphold their own "Special Order 40," which prevented police officers from reporting the immigration status of arrestees (Cooper, 2002a). At universities, many student organizations offered help and moral support to Arab students and their organization, the Muslim Students Association. These instances of defiance by the lower judiciary, police, and private groups revealed the heterogeneity of American public debate, its strong sense of individual rights as against state authority.

On the other hand, the respected criminal lawyer Alan Dershowitz (2002), who usually sided with liberal lifestyle issues, drew much public attention with a book that justified the state use of torture under certain emergency conditions. Citing a post 9/11 poll showing that 45 percent of Americans approved the torture of known terrorists if they knew details about forthcoming terrorist attacks, he presented what, under circumstances of general fear and uncertainty, seemed strong arguments to some progressives and conservatives alike. Still, many

Americans felt uneasy about the new drift toward police-state legality. The question of where such police permissiveness would stop on the slippery slope of homeland security troubled the farsighted: "The ticking time bomb scenario in its purest form is a fantasy of 'moral' torture all too easily appropriated by tyrants as an excuse to justify the more mundane variety" (Schulz, 2002, p. 26). The same agenda of removing basic rights on the grounds of homeland security could be applied to any group of whatever political or ideological persuasion that attempted to circumvent general principles of the law. Thus, Dennis Fox (2002) notes in another context, "The justice-based left must seek analyses and solutions built on general principles, and reject those that make new forms of oppression inevitable" (p. 2). Despite a strong slippery slope argument against the introduction of state torture, most felt that some degree of government torture would continue with or without the approval of either ethical theorists or the general public. This unhappy circumstance made Dershowitz's argument compelling to some "realists" who would rather live with legal than illegal torture. The inevitability of state torture in the new security state remained a disturbing possibility for the public whether "torture warrants" would in fact make a society more secure.

WARRING ALLIES, OIL, AND PEACE POLICY

Allies of Concern

While America was redesigning its national government for security, Washington foreign policy continued its expansion in new directions, furthering the dialogue about U.S. commitments internationally. A clear instance of such new involvements was the historic joint diplomacy between Russia and the United States over the crisis in Kashmir. Bush cautioned his new ally against terrorism, Pakistan, against more military incursions over the disputed territory with India (Sanger and Wines, 2002). Such peace diplomacy confirmed the new Indian Ocean region as vital territory for Washington policy at the same time as it revealed Washington's new interest in south Asian allies for the cause of antiterrorism. The new diplomatic arena found the United States between a rock and a hard place as evidence grew of Al Qaeda involvement in Kashmir (Pacifica Radio, 2002). Moreover, the presence of vast energy resources in the region—in the South China Sea and by

the Caspian Sea—only complicated the U.S. president's vision of American-led world peace. In south Asia the nuclear threat loomed not because of terrorist organizations but because of the advanced technology of UN member-states applied to a contention half a century old. The American public was reminded that more was involved in world peacekeeping than the War on Terrorism and the Axis of Evil.

Middle East Oil

The Carter Doctrine, first articulated in 1980, held that Washington would not tolerate a hostile group that sought to stop the Western flow of oil in the Middle East region. Invoked throughout the 1980s and 1990s to justify a U.S. military presence in the Gulf, the doctrine continued to be operative under George W. Bush. With certain knowledge that U.S. domestic oil reserves would be depleted by 2010, Washington felt unable to abandon its unilateralist position in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia's existing wells and vast quantities of yet untapped reserves would make it the greatest oil producer for many decades to come. Persian Gulf oil supplies were predicted to increase to a staggering 39 percent of worldwide supply by 2020. At the same time America remained the world's largest energy user. Moreover, America's oil dependence could only increase as the century advanced (Klare, 2002b). Its consumption of petroleum had increased in recent years due in part to a fondness for gas-guzzling sports utility vehicles and pickup trucks as family transportation. Accordingly, Anthony Zinni, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a military consortium that watched the Gulf, assured Congress in 1999 that America would continue to keep a military presence in the region to assure the continued flow of oil reserves. This is possible because of military technology alone: "the ability to project overwhelming and decisive military power is key to CENTCOM's theatre strategy as well as our ability to shape the battlefield (quoted in Klare, 2002b, p. 62).

The unilateralist approach in the Gulf, where high-tech weaponry and elite commando units would police a region of the world growing in both population and economic wealth, had roots in the World War II era. President Roosevelt established diplomatic relations with the Saudi state specifically because of the realization that the West would become dependent on Gulf oil during the postwar period (Stoff, 1980). But an overreliance on military solutions for peace in a generally hostile region of the world associated with a certain arrogance of power, which

argued that the best military in the world could defeat a Third World country of poverty and desert emptiness (see Fitzgerald, 1989).

Democratic Warriors for Peace

Certainly, Hollywood action films of U.S. military incursions in Third World countries accurately represented Washington's overreliance on military hardware and elite forces. Films such as *A Few Good Men* (1992), *Courage Under Fire* (1996), *Black Hawk Down* (2001), and *Clear and Present Danger* (1994) gave instances of corruption in the U.S. military. Nonetheless, their perception of the threat to the vast American empire from vaguely defined but pervasive evil empires, axes, and rebels-in-the-bush conspicuously avoided the political contexts for maintaining humanitarian peace agendas. When the Jack Nicholson character in *A Few Good Men* points across the fence dividing the U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay from the rest of Cuba, he angrily reaffirms the thin line that protects Americans from a sinister and largely unknown world of communism.

In such films and best-sellers (such as Tom Clancy's many books) of the 1990s and the new century, Washington geopolitical peace strategy was a given, supported by traditional notions of American exceptionalist virtues. Widely read authors such as Clancy specialized in valorizing peacekeeping efforts in all branches of the service through his use of the term *warriors*—a moniker that gained prominence throughout popular culture during the same period. In such literature, the traditional personal virtues of the warrior class, such as unquestioning duty, physical courage, and comradeship, reflect a professional military culture that had replaced the citizen-soldier ethos of earlier literature and film. Thus, G.I. Joes from Brooklyn, New York; Cincinnati, Ohio; and rural parts of Kentucky who embodied the democratic obligation of citizens in films of World War II vintage are replaced by dutiful and professionally trained "warriors" who reflect only an elite military ethos—no family but a military of the buddy system.

In Clancy's novel *Every Man a Tiger* (1999), praise for commanding generals flying their own fighter planes reflect more the warrior cult of Spartan lifestyle and a narcissistic attention to individual heroics (or at least adventurous lifestyles) than a selfless devotion to cause. Still, elements of the citizen-hero appear at moments. For example, Gulf War commander General Norman Schwarzkopf is described as "very intelligent and amazingly softhearted" despite his gruff moments (p. 11).

Also, a certain intercultural understanding accompanies such warriors in distant theaters of war, upholding the openness toward the other integral to American values. Thus, Air Force General Chuck Horner, the novel's protagonist, has both a Bible and a Koran on his office coffee table at Ninth Air Force headquarters. Clancy's description of the intercultural sociability of Horner demonstrates an empathy for the peacekeeping effort:

> [H]e had discovered that he had a second home in the Gulf region. Over the years, he had made many friends there, especially with other airmen, and as he'd grown more familiar with them, both professionally and as a guest in their homes, his respect for them had increased. He'd come to admire their ways, their differences from westerners, their pride in their own nations, and their reverence for God. In time he'd also come to love the nations that had given them birth, with their rich history, culture [*sic*], and scenic beauty; he found himself devouring whatever books on them he could find. (p. 3)

Most striking about this passage is its complete isolation in a book otherwise devoted to military planning, strategy, leadership charisma, and chain-of-command politics. Clancy's vague references to Middle Eastern culture—"their ways . . . their own nations . . . their homes"—includes no names of individuals, place names, particular countries, or even religion(s). Although intercultural contact here is nugatory and superficial, Clancy's inclusion of it demonstrates the intrinsic American desire toward inclusiveness and moral concern for tolerance and equality in foreign policy.

PEACE ALTERNATIVES

Countering High-Tech Overreliance

While American culture has long possessed an abundance of private organizations interested in safeguarding individual rights at home—so-called negative rights—internationally, NGOs have grown significantly in number, influence, and credibility. International NGOs (INGOs) can pull their resources and work together for progressive change in ways that governments cannot. For example, in 1997, the international treaty banning land mines was passed as the direct result of hundreds of NGOs applying pressure on their individual governments

in ways that officials within those same governments could not. As the number of trouble spots has grown throughout the world in the past few decades—from thirty-six in the early 1960s to fifty-five in the 1970s to sixty-two in the 1980s to seventy at century's end—INGOs have increased their influence as governments have come to rely on their expertise and relative impartiality to offer peacekeeping, nation-building advice, and humanitarian assistance (Dunnigan, 1999).

The question remains whether such forward-looking and relatively independent organizations can work successfully with the more human rights–oriented INGOs—especially the International Criminal Court, the European Union's human rights agencies, and the UN Commission on Human Rights. In the new century, the Nuclear Disarmament Movement revived. It had been a private sector response to the Cold War policy of Mutual Assured Destruction by the two superpowers. At its height in June 1982, one million people assembled in Central Park, New York, demanding a nuclear weapons freeze. With the end of the Cold War and the reduction by half of superpower warheads, the movement went into a freeze. Then, after the formal withdrawal of the Bush administration from the ABM treaty in June 2002, and the advent of the Nuclear Posture Review, with its policy of "offensive deterrence," advocates of just peace joined with former nuclear freeze activists for a new nationwide campaign against aggressive unilateralism.

Offensive deterrence would use preemptive attacks against any nation that threatens to use—or even acquire—nuclear weaponry. Many critics, however, were wary of its consequences: "force is more likely to incite proliferation than to end it" (Schell, 2002, p. 14). Others questioned Washington's punitive attitude toward suspected terrorists and countries designated as harboring terrorist organizations (see Teitelbaum, 2001). Still others found ineffective Washington's techno-optimism evident in the planned "all-source intelligence fusion." This involved armchair analysts inspecting a melange of data in order to improve relations with dissident and independent-minded nations. Such overreliance on nonhuman contact would be ineffective and would only increase world resentment toward American foreign policy, so the argument ran (see Cole, 2001).

Politicians responded to popular wariness of Washington security policy. Representatives James McGovern (D–MA) and Dennis Kucinich (D–OH) have called for a radical change in U.S. policy toward the nuclear threat and the terrorist security risk. Kucinich led a public forum to consider how best to build a broad movement around the Urgent

Call, a nuclear disarmament movement that replaced the older Nuclear Freeze Movement, demanding a turnaround in Bush administration dismantling of nuclear reduction agreements. In Congress he presented a motion that challenged the legality of the Bush administration's withdrawal from the ABM treaty (Khatchadourian, 2002).

These organizations recognize that true security comes only when power is willing to be shared on all levels and for all purposes, most especially for the basic needs of humankind as a whole. From this way of thinking, pluralistic thinking, cooperative problem solving, and multilateral institutional praxis must become the methods of choice in a shrinking world with different cultures but one technology. Accordingly, homeland security cannot be divided from world peace, and the face-to-face pursuit of intercultural accord cannot be replaced by a singular reliance on advanced technology and military power.

CONCLUSION

The Bush administration's new interventionism has merged national security issues into human rights and social justice spheres. In the prevailing Washington view, security and peace are linked with human rights worldwide through a strong universalism that associates Western values with human rights and democratic aims. Keeping America strong and protected functions as a model for the non-Western world, leading to a globalization that takes account of both economic prosperity and social progress. Nevertheless, some significant doubts remain as to whether the Enlightenment presuppositions of Washington—equality, freedom, secularism, intellectual openness—can or should be realized among non-Western cultures and within the United States. Moreover, further questions remain as to the methods used to achieve these democratic goals: Is activist military interventionism an effective persuasive method, winning the hearts and minds of those subdued or saved, or merely a cause for further resentment? Is the current unilateralism of Washington a contradiction of the global goals envisioned, given that a strong tenet of Enlightenment values is diversity of viewpoints and governance by consensus? Can unilateralist approaches succeed in a large and diverse world without the wider participation of other nations in multilateral operations?

Chapter 6

Advocating Peace

PEACE WORLDWIDE

Diverse Voices

Movements for world and regional peace, such as the recent Just War
Movement, the "Citizen of the World" Movement of the early Cold War
period, the Nuclear Freeze Movement of the past few decades, and
the antiglobalization activism of the present have thus far garnered
small but influential portions of the general populace in First World
countries. Similarly, in Third World countries, regional peacekeeping
movements—most notably that initiated by Nelson Mandela for sub-
Saharan Africa (Onishi, 1998); religiously based movements, such as the
peace consciousness example offered by the Dalai Lama; and countless
women's initiatives throughout south Asia and indigenous Latin Amer-
ica—hold forth the promise of wider appeal. This is particularly true of
those tied either to traditional grassroots bases (the various women's
political programs) or to official state governments (the South African
peacekeeping agenda). Still, formidable alternatives to the unilateral-
ism of the United States as the sole world superpower have yet to
emerge. While anti-Western consciousness is significant within Third
World Islam, to date such movements have not revealed themselves
as either consciously nonviolent in their tenets or as articulate in the
cause of peace with justice. While individual Muslim artists and intel-
lectuals have often expressed through their art and ideas variations on

universal ideals of equality, democracy, and peace with justice, Islam has not yet succeeded in enlisting mass culture for these aims.

The challenge of transforming the moral consciousness of the general world populace does not depend on realizing yet-undiscovered universal notions of peace with political justice. There has been no shortage of such ideologies in the past century alone. For example, the philosopher Karl Popper, in response to his colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein, who believed philosophy was about language, famously proclaimed the affinity between rationality—science—and democratic structures. The sign of a scientific theory, he believed, is that it be open to the possibility of falsification. Similarly, what makes a good society is its openness toward systemic change without bloodshed (Edmonds and Eidinow, 2001). At the beginning of the Cold War, Garry Davis enlisted major intellectuals, including Albert Einstein, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus, in his much publicized effort to begin a new world government where world peace could be realized beyond partisan nationalisms and dominant ideologies (Davis, 1961; see also Buchwald, 1996). His identity as a "citizen of the world" was not embraced by the majority in any country. However, his activism did not pass unremembered in diverse intellectual communities.

Of course, the moral high ground has been articulated many times by national leaders no less than grassroots activists. British Prime Minister Tony Blair's outspoken condemnation of terrorism subsequent to the September 11 events had about it a certain evangelical fervor: "The starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of North Africa to the slums of Gaza to the mountains of Afghanistan: They too are our cause" (quoted in Guttenplan and Margaronis, 2001, p. 21). His deliberate geographical inclusion of social injustice within Islamic countries seems to have been calculated both to point out the unfinished business of social evils in the societies of religious fundamentalists who charge the West with social indifference and to present a universal standard of social justice and human rights.

At the same time, as many as 100,000 peace demonstrators in London demanded a stop to the Bush administration's bombing campaign in Afghanistan. Even more attended the worldwide demonstrations against the planned Iraq invasion in late 2002 and early 2003. While the vast majority of Americans remained committed to the war against the Taliban government throughout 2001 and the beginning of 2002, there was also a decided reluctance to pursue the war-from-a-distance beyond a limited commitment of ground troops over a short time period. This irenic sentiment was perhaps due as much to general anxieties over terrorist

retaliation within North America as to the altruistic belief that war waged by a geopolitical power has inherent moral and practical shortcomings.

Uncertain Peace

Nonetheless, domestic public opinion remained divided, if not yet divisive, over the wisdom of waging what amounted to a punitive expedition against Afghanistan's government during 2001 and early 2002. A poll conducted in mid-October 2001 by Harvard University's Institute of Politics found that almost four-fifths of American college students favored Washington's bombing strategy in Afghanistan. Even the radical cooperative at the University of Michigan, the Eugene V. Debs House, included vocal war supporters (Featherstone, 2001).

On the other side, numerous peace conferences were organized at the most influential U.S. universities during the last months of 2001. "Peace camps" were also formed as consortia to the new consciousness against the war. Critical sentiments were not confined to elite schools. The newly founded National Youth and Student Peace Coalition included the youth division of the Black Radical Congress and the Muslim Student Association. Antiwar organizing was also strong at traditional African American colleges, hitherto noted for their political caution. The respected INGOs Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam, and the International Committee of the Red Cross found in October 2001 that the U.S. bombing had worsened the living situations of the Afghan people. Many of these critical voices made historical reference to the questionable foreign policies of Washington, which throughout the Cold War and the post–Cold War eras supported regressive and even predatory regimes as long as they functioned geopolitically as anticommunist (see Chapter 1). Similar observations appeared implicitly if not often explicitly in the mainstream media. Dana Brown of Cornell University's Antiwar Movement noted, "None of us are pro-Taliban, but we know how they came to power. We see the footage of the Northern Alliance dragging people out of their homes and executing them. If we're not extra careful, we could end up supporting another repressive regime" (quoted in Featherstone, 2001, p. 20). During the same period, U.S. Representative Barbara Lee (D–CA) associated Congress's post–September 11 blank check to the Bush administration with Congress's willing relinquishment of its responsibility in 1964 for the Vietnam War to President Johnson after the Gulf of Tonkin incident (see Peace Action, 2001).

Although Washington's ambivalent attitude toward international human rights issues has been reported by a few domestic critics in the

mainstream media, American journalism's concern for social justice was overshadowed by widely held security phobias. The retreat from altruism to national suspicion—for instance, the domestic anthrax scare, all the more threatening because sporadic and of uncertain provenance—may in part be explained as a traditional preference for solving more immediate and particular needs (or fears) than for upholding abstract universal norms predicating social justice issues. As the mathematician Jurgen Moser observed succinctly in the 1990s, "People aren't universalists. They're horse trading" (quoted in Nasar, 1998, p. 225). In fact, advanced capitalist culture did prove vulnerable to terrorist actions, especially when perpetrated by well-organized fanatical groups whose members were not afraid to die—in direct contradiction to the presuppositions of commodity-based value systems. The absolutist idealism of such groups successfully defy the security logic of capitalism's materialist culture. The most immediate instance of this has been the airline industry, which was all too willing to surrender its responsibility for passenger security to the federal government, citing its need to cut corners in a highly competitive industry. In regard to quarterly earnings versus domestic security, a *New York Times* front-page headline spoke volumes: "Rules Will Allow Airport Screeners to Remain in Jobs. In Shift, U.S. Agency Decides Experience Could Replace a High School Diploma" (Firestone, 2001). Thus, profit will trump better-educated security personnel in a competitive business that apparently attracted a large percentage of high school dropouts with its low pay scale. On the other hand, airlines are making desperate attempts to circumvent security measures for its first-class passengers by offering them separate—minimal?—security checks. The general populace may well have sensed the relative vulnerability of corporate power in its extreme privatized form throughout American culture. While many other First World countries have considered airport security a governmental or military responsibility, such perspectives remained alien to the aim of privatization in the United States.

DEVELOPING THE TACTICS OF PEACE

Diverse Views

The notion that popular movements—political action from below—remain efficacious in fundamentally democratic societies has a long history in the West, a common tenet Popper drew on in his rebuttal to

Wittgenstein. However, while today the efficiency of popular human rights movements is not doubted—whether through officially established NGOs or short-term, ad hoc grassroots activism—what is questioned is the commonality of norms by which standards may be applied across cultures. Conflicting norms of behavior often arise, even among First World advocates in international conflict. For example, Jamie Fellner of Human Rights Watch criticized the U.S. military's confinement of Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners of war in small cages with no protection from the elements for extended periods of time. The response of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was not to dispute the conditions Fellner describes, but to insist that their manner of treatment does not violate the Geneva Convention articles because such inmates are not legally "prisoners of war" but rather "criminal combatants" (*BBC World News*, 2002a). This semantic issue involves distinctions between terrorists and military agents, an interpretive ground under debate by just war theorists as well as intergovernmental bodies such as the new international courts established for war crimes (for example, the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in The Hague).

Like the disputes between human rights NGOs and the U.S. government, the uncertain ground of grassroots antiwar sentiment, evident in the plethora of divergent views expressed over Washington's conduct of the Afghanistan military expedition among antiwar student groups after September 11, has a long history. In this respect, the conflicting motivations and aims of the 1960s Student Antiwar Movement may function as a helpful analog for understanding the domestic resistance to Washington's military policies of 2001–2002. Both movements originated among university students and faculty. In the critically acclaimed documentary on the 1960s Free Speech Movement, *Berkeley in the Sixties* (1990) by Mark Kitchell, various anti–Vietnam War activists express their misgivings and uncertainties about the methods used to protest Washington's conduct of the war. In what proved to be an important learning experience, Berkeley protesters attempted to confront busloads of draftees as they entered induction centers. In retrospect, the activists interviewed in the film could discern no positive results from their street dialogue with the recruits, who seemed to them either to ignore the protester's remarks or respond defensively by insulting them. In this respect the retrospective views of the activists may have underestimated their own method of political agitation. Raising the general consciousness of a society does not depend on the immediate conversion of individuals such as draftees who are

temporarily "part of the system." The very power of grassroots move-
ments lies not in their methods of protest, their on-site verbal
arguments, or even their understanding of antiwar objectives and aims.
Rather, the success of organized dissent largely depends on the per-
ceived democratic character of the movement. This has much to do
with the motivation and organization of a critical mass of the citizenry
as they are presented to the public. The relative sincerity of the 1960s
Vietnam War Protest Movement was judged mainly through television
and the periodical print media. The same channels of mass communi-
cation exist today for the Anti-Afghanistan War Movement, although
through 2001 and early 2002 on a much smaller magnitude, indications
of such protests being generally unknown to the broad U.S. public.
Until then the Internet public space does not appear to have affected
broad popular opinion about the Bush administration's War on Terror-
ism, although e-mail and Web sites have been commonly used among
the protest communities as bulletin boards for antiwar/bombing rallies
and demonstrations (for example, Pro-Democracy, 2002).

The Civil Rights Precedent

The student Peace Movement of the 1960s and early 1970s differed
fundamentally from its older cousin, the Civil Rights Movement, of the
1950s and 1960s. In the latter, grassroots organizations depended for
success on winning the trust and friendship of the same disenfran-
chised group their struggle aimed to help. When young Freedom
Workers established close community relationships with African Amer-
icans in target cities such as Greenwood, Mississippi, and Birmingham,
Alabama, their efforts to organize these groups for mass voter registra-
tion marches and commercial desegregation efforts were greatly
enhanced (Raines, 1977). Hence, the very people who would benefit
from civil disobedience strategies were enlisted into the movement's
ranks, often becoming its future leaders. Such group solidarity had a
personal character, a moral and psychological intimacy that further sus-
tained the movement by assuring ongoing support between outside
protesters and local community members. The veteran movement
leader, Fannie Lou Hamer, describes such successful tactics, which
depend on close sociality and mutual trust:

> Nobody never come out into the country and talked to real farmers and
> things . . . because this is the next thing this country has done: it divided

us into classes, and if you hadn't arrived at a certain level, you wasn't treated no better by the blacks than you was by the whites. And it was these kids [the civil rights workers] what broke a lot of this down. They treated us like we were special and we loved 'em. . . . We didn't feel uneasy about our language might not be right or something. We just felt like we could talk to 'em. We trusted 'em, and I can tell the world those kids done their share in Mississippi. (quoted in Raines, p. 217)

In fact young student freedom workers (most notably those in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) often had even greater success relating to the most disenfranchised of the local community than did African American clergy of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference because of their informal approach and ability to enter into community benevolence projects. As local civil rights worker Amzie Moore remembered, "[T]hey always had a smile and was always ready to try to do something" (quoted in Raines, 1997, p. 221). Such close community building depended on learning local social codes and personal courtesy and regard, and a willingness to enter into neighborhood activities in unassuming ways. Similar strategies were used for desegregation purposes as early as World War II, when the Congress of Racial Equality staged nonviolent sit-ins in Chicago, Baltimore, and St. Louis, and also against the American Red Cross, which insisted on segregating blood donations for the war effort (Kluger, 1975).

American Antiwar Movement

In contrast, the American Peace Movement had no such local community base to draw on. Dependent on altering the consciousness of an entire nation, antiwar demonstrators often met with stiff opposition from a pro-war—or at least status quo—majority that resented what is perceived as ideological, lifestyle, and class orientations alien to its own traditional cultural values. While similar differences were often discerned between rural southern African Americans and northern black and white civil rights workers, in such situations divisive feelings often could be overcome by the recognition of commonly shared values, as well as the common disenfranchised status of many protesters and the local victims of Jim Crow structures. With no direct and open contact to build trust on personal levels, peace activists had to rely on the mainstream media to present their relatively abstracted and decontextualized arguments against a war far from home.

Nonetheless, antiwar leaders could gain relatively high levels of credibility from their local peace support groups and much of the wider university communities. Mario Savio's noted speech preceding the Free Speech Movement's sit-in occupation of Sproul Hall on the Berkeley campus in December 1964 is an instance of how the early Antiwar Movement followed very closely the persuasive rhetoric and spirit of the Civil Rights Movement. In both cases, more was expressed in the confrontational language with authority than the goals of public desegregation and an end to U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Savio, like Martin Luther King Jr., Ralph Albernathey, Malcolm X, and Stokely Carmichael, probed what they regarded as the more comprehensive dehumanization of America in its costly pursuit of global power arrangements in the Cold War era. Savio's specific target as local authority figure for this hegemony was Berkeley's President Clark Kerr, whom he associated with these dehumanizing forces: "But we're a bunch of 'raw material' that don't mean to have any process upon us, don't mean to be made into any product, don't mean to end up being bought by some clients of the University, be they government, be they industry, be they organized labor, be they anyone! We're human beings!" (quoted in Free Speech Movement, 2002). Plainly more was involved than the end to the Vietnam War. Widespread draft resistance was merely one immediate symbol of the general moral and intellectual bankruptcy of superpower America, which Savio and other activists connected with the general *dehumanization* and *alienation*—two familiar words of the protest movement—of mainstream First World culture.

Thus, the Free Speech Movement's targets were at once more abstract and more comprehensive than those of the southern civil rights activists. General lifestyle issues were involved, even basic philosophical and religious orientations that would later find more articulate—and less confrontational—expression in the frequently voiced "greening of America" sentiment of 1970s intellectuals and regional ecologists (for example, Reich, 1970). But in the 1960s such expressions were often nebulous, difficult to communicate to a conventional and diverse majority through public demonstrations alone. In the end, public opinion was swayed by the proliferation of antiwar sentiment, first articulated within academe but influencing wider sections of the society as the long war dragged on. Like the earlier Civil Rights Movement, the Antiwar Movement's critical alternative to establishmentarian agendas eventually won the conscience of influential

groups through its long-term presence, however unorganized and erratic, in the mass media. Whereas the Civil Rights Movement generally sustained a quite well-organized and focused agency, the Antiwar Movement stumbled and fumbled its strategies and tactics, experimenting often without forethought. In the end, however, it too succeeded in presenting a credible argument against war actions, despite the general lack of veneration it would receive in subsequent decades from the general public. The much-publicized flag burnings—recently deplored as a strategy for success by Richard Rorty (1989, 1992)—violent confrontations with hard hats, Hells Angels, and other ad hoc representatives of the right wing, outshadowed the movement's rational discourse, so that today few American's know of yippies (the political wing of the youth alternative culture) but all know of hippies, an overly determined stereotype that included an apolitical kind of hedonism and naïve romanticism.

By the early 1970s the idealism of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Antiwar/Free Speech Movements was being replaced by a kind of cynical ennui, as crime rates soared throughout the inner cities during the decade. Both groups found a commonality of rejection and disengagement, which commonly turned the spontaneity of the flower children and the commitment of the civil rights workers to an inwardly directed resentment (Farber, 1972). While thoughtful criticism of the contradictions in mainstream American values continued to be voiced, organized public demonstrations reduced sharply after the Nixon/Kissinger peace negotiations and Johnson's Great Society legislation saw marked improvements in the legality, if not the economics, of equality.

From Solidarity to Disunity

The interracial makeup of the Civil Rights Movement affirmed by Martin Luther King Jr. and other older leaders was, in the late 1960s, superseded by a general turn toward separatism. This change was a general retreat from broad-based outlooks toward identitarian politics with particularistic urges. This reorientation resulted not so much from an early form of postmodern relativism, which would gain prominence in later decades, as from a general wariness toward heterogeneous consortia and divergent trajectories. White activism found in the Anti–Vietnam War Movement a rallying locus for the more general Cold War disaffection that included a rejection of corporate business

values and notions of *Pax* Americana. Certainly, Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference ended their southern campaign after the 1965 Voting Rights Act to move concurrently along lines similar to the Peace Movement—their Poor People's Campaign reflected economic dissatisfaction with Cold War America. Also, King recognized the injustice of the Vietnam War as it disproportionately affected people of color (Frady, 2001). However, in the main, African American social awareness began an Afrocentric affirmation that in practice, if not always in preachment, tended to exclude whites of all orientations. Whether these partings of the way represented early developments of postmodern relativistic perspectives or merely the logic of competing responses to different areas of disaffection and injustice, or both, remains open to question.

The Student Nonviolent Coordinatng Committee expelled its white militants while Stokely Carmichael proclaimed "Black Power!" which was at once an expression of solidarity with the Third World nonwhite disenfranchised and a counterpart to the emerging White Ethnicity Movement in mainstream America (see Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). After the assassination of Malcolm X—a figure who had lately considered an integrationist approach to civil protest—and the 1965 Watts riot, separatist protest grew more forthright, while progressive solidarity became less clear. Black activist Julius Lester called for a flat rejection of American values, which he interpreted in completely negative terms. He expressed a Manichean approach to black and white America that called for noncooperation across racial lines for activism. Peace and nonviolence were rejected in favor of armed defensiveness and a suspicion of white progressives: "To die in the attempt to humanize America is preferable to being an American as America is now constituted" (Lester, 1969, p. 91).

Going its separate way, the Nuclear Freeze Movement of the early 1980s was predominantly white and secular, while the remnants of the African American Antiracism Movement retained its separatist character and close association with Protestant evangelicalism. For example, African American campus religious organizations such as the Seymore Society of Harvard University explicitly rejected nuclear freeze aims in favor of domestic justice issues. In fact, separatist, anti-accommodationist tendencies among African American intellectuals and activists (for example, Marcus Garvey) existed long before World War II. Still, there were singular but cogent voices affirming universalistic, intercultural commonality. Lorraine Hansberry's anticolonialist play *Les Blancs*

(1965/1970) sought to reawaken interracial cooperation for just peace worldwide (Over, 2001). The vision of two freedom fighters, black and white, uplifting intertwined arms at the end, proclaimed a new era of racial solidarity. However, Hansberry remained a lone voice among a growing activist movement that divided races and aims throughout the remaining years of organized protest for social change. By 1992, Spike Lee's biographical drama *Malcolm X* represented the African American leader in largely separatist and religious terms, as a personal struggle, while downplaying his integrationist movement away from the Nation of Islam's original separatism. Although the film's impact on popular culture, particularly in the inner cities, was significant—its marketing contributing to the eventual designation of "X-generation" for all youth of the time—no direct activist movement derived or became associated with it.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

"The mad dream of universal peace."

While identity politics contributed to the factious state of progressive activism throughout the 1980s and 1990s, artists and writers either avoided peace and foreign affairs realities, or took cautious, distant, and even accommodatist perspectives. This was true of widely respected "political playwrights" such as Naomi Wallace (1996) and Tony Kushner, who seemed to write more about the effects of social justice on isolated individuals than about social movements. Their avoidance of political and social perspectives seemed to reflect a general diffidence toward commitment to particular ideologies or even standards of peace and human rights. These playwrights were perhaps influenced by dominant postmodern orientations that presupposed relativistic and highly atomistic approaches to human identity.

The movement away from wider social analysis in Kushner's highly praised play sequence, *Angels in America* (1994), closes avenues for positive social commitment (see Over, 2001; Reinelt, 1997). Content to remythologize America for contemporary tastes—a sort of reversal of New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann's noted "demythologization" of Christian beliefs—the play actually assumes American exceptionalist notions of moral and political superiority while admitting a reluctance to engage in real political issues. Kushner (1994, p.

153) expresses a reluctance to use direct political commentary. The theme of *Angels* has been described as "the idea of defining America" (Borreca, 1997, p. 254). However, as a grand query, it reframes its discourse to a delimited, familiar nationalism rather than striking forth in new directions as promised in its revolutionary millennial posture. A similar reluctance for political analysis occurs in Kushner's 2002 New York production of *Homebody/Kabul* (2001), which purportedly concerns the war-torn conditions of Afghanistan after the 1998 U.S. retaliatory bombings of "terrorist camps," but instead focuses on the inner lives of individual European characters in the First World, in the same vein as *Angels*. Overly dependent on caricatures, the relevant setting becomes background for what Elizabeth Pochoda (2002) describes as "a dutiful twitch of political concern" (p. 35). The character of the guide in Afghanistan speaks Esperanto, which he describes as "a refugee patois. The mad dream of universal peace. So suitable for lamentation" (p. 36). While Kushner's wit reminds audiences of the threat from a vaguely referenced unilateral militarism, *Homebody* is aptly titled as armchair regret over the inevitabilities of war and the elusiveness of peace.

A film released after September 11 that fully engages the realities of wartime Afghanistan is Mohsen Makhmalbaf's *Khandahar* (2001). Like *Homebody*, it involves a journey into Afghanistan, but the main characters are Afghani, and their interaction with war victims reveal fully developed and varied characters who have altered both their outward and their inward lives to survive. Stunningly visual, the image of prosthetic legs parachuted down from planes into the desert amid the scramble of amputees, who have waited months and years for artificial limbs, is moving. Makhmalbaf avoids preachment, instead defining the reasons why normal human relations are not possible when basic human needs are paramount. Such dramas are far more politically based than the distant, indirect perspectives taken in the plays of Kushner and Naomi Wallace, which tend to push audiences away from active involvement or take perspectives so oblique that relevant political themes are never considered.

Nonviolent protests for peace with justice revived during the 1990s from various public spaces, involving small but influential antiwar protests during the George H. W. Bush years, especially over the 1989 U.S. military invasion of Panama, which produced the Oscar-winning documentary *Panama Deception* by Barbara Trent (1992). Although such ad hoc critiques of America's military projects in the Third World

achieved minimal access through the mainstream media to the majority of Americans, antiwar protest gradually grew during the Clinton years. This was true particularly after the ill-advised and costly (especially to populations in the countries of intervention) operations in Somalia and the missile firings in response to terrorist strikes against U.S. embassies in Africa. After September 11, various international peace movements gained more mainstream attention, perhaps because of the enormity of the terrorist strikes within the U.S. mainland and the psychic shock that forced many Americans to reconsider the effects of Washington foreign policy operations on Third World populations. Though these peace organizations often contained mostly white members, their international character and access to the Internet and other global telecommunications channels assured a wider audience for a now more receptive First World public willing to reconsider Washington foreign policy assumptions.

PEACE IN REPRESENTATIONAL FORMS

Peace Minimized

Hollywood studio productions throughout the 1980s and 1990s produced films that either ignored nonviolent civil protest entirely or presented antiwar protest as ineffectual, misguided, or of nugatory influence. This treatment of civil protest characterized the few films made about the American Civil Rights Movement, and its progeny the American Peace Movement. Thus, Alan Parker's popular *Mississippi Burning* (1988) presented a tepid and even retrograde version of the 1960s Freedom Workers' "southern strategy" wherein no freedom marchers or protesters appear as main characters—are in fact represented only in fleeting glimpses as background characters. Instead, the FBI—which in actuality was at best politically neutral in the era—single-handedly brings justice to the Old South. The film's avoidance approach paralleled the orientation of much of the mainstream media that covered the civil rights mobilizations at the time. As Steven Kasher (1996) notes, "Movement organizations courted press photographers and staged media events. But the pictures made by outside photographers were not sufficient—too sparse and too superficial—so movement photography was fostered" (p. 16). Confronted early on by an often hostile or self-serving journalism, activist organizations

learned to create their own images, largely in still photography but also in news copywriting. This self-fashioning of nonviolent disobedience was eventually picked up by the mainstream media, often because of the poignancy of the images.

Mainstream still photography and video recording proved invaluable in the effort to turn the conscience of the broad public toward the highly organized, overwhelmingly nonviolent demonstrators. Many movement photographs appeared regularly in *Life*, a photojournalism magazine viewed by half of the American public at the time. Dramatic videos of the violent police actions representing white supremacy were also featured nightly on network news programs. However, the protest leaders soon realized that the mainstream television media was more interested in the sensational aspects of violent clashes with police than with the everyday, intimate—and far more significant—interactions between freedom workers and the disenfranchised. John Lewis's comment on television coverage is telling: "Any time there was some violence, we would get a story on television. But when we were involved in in-depth experiences, when people gathered to express feeling, spirit, like the nonviolent workshops, there was no press. There was seldom an in-depth story on things like when white people really did change" (quoted in Watters, 1971, p. 70).

Hollywood films also avoided the more intimate and everyday efforts of freedom workers to organize local African Americans for voter registration, boycotts, and civil protests. There has yet to be a major Hollywood production dramatizing the nonviolent movement as a collective response to white supremacy. *The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman* (1974), which won critical acclaim for John Korty's direction, Tracy Keenan Wynn's adroit scripting of Earnest J. Gaines's epic novel, and Cicely Tyson's acting, represented the life of a 110-year-old former slave from plantation bondage to participation in the Civil Rights Movement. However, the television film avoided depiction of nonviolent group activism and the successful solidarity of freedom workers in favor of a heavily sentimentalized depiction of an individual whose life was isolated from organized protest. It seemed that the commercial film industry could not trust its public to appreciate the particular heroism of nonviolent protest as a social movement.

A similar posture was taken toward the Peace Movement. Once again, Hollywood remained content to avoid feature films that dealt with domestic resistance, such as the Free Speech Movement in the universities or the Poor People's Campaign. Popular films such as Michael

Cimino's *The Deer Hunter* (1978), about a group of Pennsylvania steel workers whose lives are disrupted by their Vietnam War participation, keep the realities of war at a distance by focusing solely on the negative effects of the experience on the American veterans at home and circumventing war action in Vietnam altogether. The exceptional Vietnamese scene that proves the rule includes a Russian roulette game of formula Hollywood action film machismo in a prisoner-of-war camp. Nowhere are Vietnamese depicted, nor is the strategy and tactics of the war engaged or even represented. The Vietnam War experience of Forrest Gump in the tremendously popular film by Robert Zemeckis (1994) is similarly devoid of Vietnamese characters and locale. Moreover, the negative depiction of antiwar protest in that film includes a violent war protester who beats his girlfriend—Forrest's lifelong sweetheart—an instance of a peace advocate becoming violent. When Gump is invited to give his view of the war before a huge—and anonymous—audience of antiwar demonstrators, the electronic speakers suddenly and unaccountably go dead just before he renders his opinion. Hollywood's avoidance of the Peace Movement, its unwillingness to take on the debate for or against the war, extended even to comment about the war.

Antiwar Films

In the mid-1980s, commercial film dramas began to offer themes that challenged the legitimacy of the war, most notably the critical and box office successes: Oliver Stone's *Platoon* (1986) and *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), and Stanley Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket* (1987). These works, however, centered on the psychological and behavioral reactions of U.S. soldiers to the violence of combat and militaristic callousness. The brutality of the war is shown, but, as in *Platoon*, the cruelties of American soldiers are presented merely as small-scale, ad hoc retaliations for Vietcong atrocities. The representation of village "passification programs" and the systematic "neutralization" of Vietnam's infrastructure, policies that would eventually kill millions, were never attempted. Nor was the high-level control of South Vietnam's national government by Washington exposed in these oblique critiques (for a generally accurate history of U.S. policies, see Fitzgerald, 1989). Ignored by both films are the consequences of a large-scale war of attrition, predicated on the domino effect of Washington's containment theory for communism. A similar pattern appears in later commercial

film and video documentaries about the war, which, despite promotional assurances that accurate histories of the war are at last disclosed, focus only on American soldiers and military strategies, avoiding the grassroots realities of the war of resistance from Vietnamese perspectives (see Historychannel.com, 2002).

Good Wars without Protest

The dearth of films about the Vietnam Peace and Free Speech Movements contrasted sharply with Hollywood's preoccupation with films that glorify war and self-sacrifice out of political context. Such films, however, professed an apolitical heroic militarism only until the prelude to the War on Terrorism began under the Clinton administration. Steven Spielberg's widely acclaimed *Saving Private Ryan* (2000) nostalgically presented "the good war." Its universal acceptance of duty and self-sacrifice conveys an American culture safely distanced in the World War II period. In that film, a compassionate and liberal Pennsylvania schoolteacher willingly dies under fire knowing he will never see his wife and children again. Issues of war and peace never complicate the story, set in a war that projected clear boundaries of good and evil. Spielberg's mythic perspective fulfilled the desire for a war with a moral cause, one for which a peace movement would be irrelevant and nonexistent.

Following *Saving Private Ryan*, several mainstream commercial films paid straightforward homage to the martial virtues of group loyalty, physical courage, and fighting expertise. Films such as Oliver Stone's *Born on the Fourth of July*, HBO television's *Band of Brothers* (Richmond, 2001), Randall Wallace's *We Were Soldiers* (2002), and Ridley Scott's *Black Hawk Down* (2001), the latter based on the widely read nonfiction work by Mark Bowden (2000), avoided geopolitical issues in favor of a simplified story of individual and group glory under fire, a theme somewhat diluted by a Hollywood formula film emphasis on military hardware and special effects weaponry. Their straightforward machismo associates with earlier war films, most notably the *Rambo* series (Cosmatos, 1985; Macdonald, 1988). The *Rambo* plot of rescuing long-held American prisoners of the Vietnam War tapped the war's lack of closure for many Americans, whose anxieties the widespread display of black POW/MIA flags could not fully erase. Moreover, like the black flags, the *Rambo* films served to deflect deeper anxieties about the moral character of the "war of attrition," its systematic aerial bomb-

ing, and its lack of support for the Washington side from the Vietnamese populace. However, whereas the *Rambo* films appealed to revenge fantasies—one-man invasions that somehow prove successful—*Black Hawk Down* represented a historic incident from the Clinton administration. *Rambo*'s bare-shirted macho appeal is replaced by a more disturbing film that ignores the actual 2,000 Somali casualties from the raid, instead representing as tragic the loss of 18 American commandos. A similar distortion accompanies *Behind Enemy Lines* (2001), which purports to depict an incident during the 1990s from the U.S. involvement in Bosnia. Instead, the plot focuses almost completely on American personnel who must be rescued, ignoring the people in whose name the actions were undertaken and sidestepping the systematic genocide and other war crimes for which Slobodan Milosevic was being tried in The Hague while the film was screened.

The original books upon which two films were based, *Band of Brothers* (Ambrose, 1992) and *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young* (Moore, 1992), were in fact quickly republished shortly before and after 9/11, in anticipation of the new militarist trajectories as the War on Terrorism gave way to the Axis of Evil cause. Both films proved popular after wide distribution and promotion, and both reflected directly the new interest in nostalgia for a war of moral cause.

A Few Bad Men

During the Cold War and the post–Cold War eras, Hollywood films did in fact represent a U.S. military establishment not entirely devoted to the traditional martial virtues of gravitas and uncorrupted duty. Films such as Roger Donaldson's *No Way Out* (1987), Rob Reiner's *A Few Good Men* (1992), and Edward Zwick's *Courage Under Fire* (1996) uncover a military bureaucracy with a few bad men, both civilian Pentagon administrators (*No Way Out*) and hardened combat veterans (*A Few Good Men* and *Courage Under Fire*). However, while the depiction of military corruption suggested a public somewhat suspicious of military entanglements and undemocratic orientations—in contrast to the transparent and uncritical representation of military power in such orthodox Cold War films as Anthony Mann's *Strategic Air Command* (1955) and John Wayne's *The Green Berets* (1968)—the films offer only superficial critiques. Edward Dmytryk's *The Caine Mutiny* (1954) ends by compromising its critical depiction of the tyranny of military command by representing the main instigator of

the mutiny as cowardly and overly cynical. The gratuitous speech at the end by the prosecutor of the ship's captain upholds the honor of the U.S. Navy, and the written statement before the credits appear, that the U.S. Navy has never had a mutiny, undercut the critical perspective. Although Barry Sonnenfeld's *Men in Black* (1997), offers a pointed critique of the uncritical acceptance of military duty among American military and government personnel, its criticism is incidental to the main plot of comic bravado and stylish wit.

Particular individuals comprising a few "rotten apples" cover the extent of military misconduct in these films. The fundamental dangers of military power and nuclear exchange uncovered in such iconoclastic films as John Frankenheimer's *Seven Days in May* (1964), based on the Fletcher Knebel and Charles Bailey novel (1962); Sidney Lumet's *Fail-Safe* (1964); and Stanley Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove* (1964) have not been repeated at the end of the century. After the 1960s, Hollywood exploited a military ethos within American culture, frequently documenting its martial glory and global interventions while avoiding analyses of its geopolitical purposes. This celebration of military power has its roots in the post–World War II era of large military spending and the permanent draft, but became more widespread after the memory of the Vietnam War's failures receded.

CONCLUSION

Peace movements have sought to gain majority support with varying results. When antiwar protest manages to gain mainstream media attention for sustained periods and achieve credibility from its broader audiences, public attitudes toward war can change. This happened during the Vietnam War protest era, which paralleled the similar success of the Civil Rights Movement a few years previously. In the post–Cold War era, the context of war and peace issues have changed to international "small wars" wherein national security and humanitarian concerns compete for public acceptance. The tendency to avoid or minimize issues of war and peace has continued in such popular American cultural forms as films, television dramas, and nonfiction. Nonetheless, indirect criticism of military policy does appear in these forms. At issue is whether popular culture will turn toward a more analytical approach to war and peace issues. To achieve this, the moral cause of war must be confronted through a verisimilitude of relevant subject matter.

Also at issue for the Peace Movement in its various forms is the degree to which multilateral and cooperative approaches to intervention are willing and able to replace the current dominance of the sole superpower's unilateral approach. Ronnie Lipschutz's (2000) description of a global system of the future wherein "we could imagine many political communities, some based on place, others on affiliations, but linked relationally rather than through domination by or loyalty to a single power" remains at present only an ideal, not a reality (p. 181). Divergent perspectives and proclaimed differences continue to engage—and frequently hinder or delay—international peace efforts. It remains to be seen whether America's sense of moral mission within a global context can link with a truly international order of law to form a peacemaking and peacekeeping entity based on human rights, physical and economic security for all. This will come about only when mainstream cultural forms—entertainment, news journalism, fiction, and nonfiction—directly address real issues of war and peace for today.

Chapter 7

Opening Peace:
An Outlook

SLOW BEGINNINGS

The United Nations Tries Harder

At the end of the 1990s, the United Nations took a decidedly more ac-
tivist role in human rights concerns after a decade of apparent
indifference or ambivalence. When that organization failed to enlist its
member-nations quickly enough to prevent ongoing mass atrocities in
Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, the case for a new inter-
ventionist policy for genocide and war crimes became more
compelling. The result was the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and, finally, the permanent status of the International Criminal Court,
created in Rome in 1998. UN urgency came only after repeated media
exposure of the genocidal incidents in these regions. The influential
NGO Human Rights Watch (1994) severely censured the United Na-
tion's dilatory behavior in blunt language: these crises showed the
"moral vacuum in the halls of the United Nations." Moreover, the
United Nation's continued position of neutrality and the seeming in-
difference of its influential member-states were culpable: the "failure of
leadership, eagerly abetted by the Security Council's permanent mem-
bers, led to a squandering of the United Nation's unique capacity on
the global stage to articulate fundamental human rights values and to
legitimize their enforcement" (p. xiv).

Hollywood Foreign Policy

The new progress toward the final realization of the criminal status of war encouraged optimism for a concerted international effort toward meaningful human rights standards. Despite these developments, American popular culture seemed preoccupied with mediated forms that valorized nationalism, military intervention, and unilateralist solutions. Hollywood producer Jerry Bruckheimer, creator of the $200 million blockbuster *Pearl Harbor* (2001), about a sneak attack on an unsuspectingly innocent America by a culture alien to Western values, would produce a film, so the rumors went, called *World War III*. In the former film, a character during the attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base exclaims in bewilderment, "I didn't even know the Japanese had anything against us!" Such overtly expressed innocence marked the oblivious optimism of much of the American public, as much in 1941 as today. However, in the new century, a growing fear of involvement with other cultures also pervaded the mass culture Bruckheimer's popular *Black Hawk Down* (2001) was hastily completed in time for Christmas after 9/11. Even way before the War on Terrorism, Hollywood had discovered in the landmark genre creator *Top Gun* (1986) that Hollywood heartthrobs in uniform could garner large audiences (Suid, 1996). The status of Hollywood action films as official art was underscored by special screenings for Washington top officials, arranged by Hollywood producers and the national political leadership. *We Were Soldiers* (2001), a nostalgic treatment of World War II idealism and self-sacrifice, was previewed for such notables as George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Karl Rove, and various military brass. In the same way, *The Sum of All Fears* (2002) had its premiere in Washington, where its promoters stressed the close cooperation of the CIA and the Pentagon in making the film (Hoberman, 2002).

The enlistment of the mass market is hardly new for the American military and Hollywood. For example, the nuclear buildup during the height of the Cold War inspired Air Force General Curtis LeMay to promote Paramount Picture's *Strategic Air Command* (1955) and *Bombers B-52* (1957), which displayed the latest jet bombers and other impressive hardware at their premieres in various cities. To be sure, during that period Hollywood also produced films that questioned the buildup of nuclear arsenals against a presumed evil empire and challenged the widely known motto of the Strategic Air Command—"Peace is our profession." In the new century, however, alternative viewpoints

were not so evident within the film industry. Critical films with the cultural reach and cogent verisimilitude of *Dr. Strangelove* (1964), *Fail-Safe* (1964), and *The China Syndrome* (1979) were not being made. The lack of interest in questioning Washington strategic policy derived in part from the sudden and unanticipated nature of the 9/11 terrorism attacks, a fear reaction that formed quite aside from the question of whether the American intelligence community should have better anticipated the hijacking attacks.

The Guarantor of "Trade and Other Pursuits of Peace"

On a deeper cultural level, however, it seemed evident that the American public at large remained convinced not only of the value of their country's military power but also, more recently, of the more activist posture formulated by the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11. The robust preemptive position of the new doctrine set forth what has been termed an "anticipatory self-defense" program by the administration. In this strategy, Washington would authorize quick military action against any country that either harbored perceived terrorists or threatened in various ways to use nuclear weaponry. Such a policy would assure American leadership in the world, offering continued security for vital natural resources as well as population centers. Sympathetic policymakers suggested that this tactic "may enhance deterrence against misbehavior by at least the more rational of the world's villains" (Rivkin, Casey, and Bartram, 2002, p. 19). That political villains today or throughout history have usually operated according to rational agendas, or straightforward agendas, remained an assumption for many in Washington who affirmed the new approach. However, the intuitive caution of the general populace expressed less certainty toward the age of terrorism, as evident by the lackluster stock market performance, which in July 2000 reached the lowest point since 1997 on the Dow and the NASDAQ. Moreover, opponents of anticipatory self-defense pointed out that the UN Charter of 1945 prohibited a country from attacking another unless an attack had already taken place (United Nations, 1999). Still, the broad public continued to accept agendas for a stronger security state, including an increasing reliance on the unilateral assertiveness of military solutions.

In July 2002, Washington vetoed an item for the new International Criminal Court (ICC) that would make peacekeeping forces as responsible for human rights violations as other military mission groups (*BBC*

World News, 2002c). The veto sent a message that the Bush administration would continue to fight the ICC, which held the presupposition that the practice of war should be subject to human rights standards. Moreover, the "Pinochet principle," that former heads of state, including their chief advisers, should no longer lack immunity for human rights violations, remained a sticking point with Washington, as it was reminded of the Nixon/Kissinger tolerance, even encouragement, of politically motivated torture in Chile (Cooper, 2002b). Washington's opposition to the ICC derived in part from fears that the world superpower would, in the future, be especially targeted for such violations. The more theoretical reason for Washington's refusal to support the ICC and other war-as-crime initiatives was its new vision of a borderless empire arbitrated and policed by a massive military of matchless technological capacity. The groundwork for this new global strategy was laid throughout the 1990s as America found itself with no comparable military opponent in the world. Strategists such as Stephen Biddle, Condoleezza Rice, and Eliot Cohen expressed typical views of the new monolithic approach to global hegemony: "in the twenty-first century, characterized like the European Middle Ages by a universal (if problematic) high culture with a universal language, the U.S. military plays an extraordinary and inimitable role. It has become, whether Americans or others like it or not, the ultimate guarantor of international order" (Cohen, 2002, p. 41). Rice and Biddle confirmed the belief in the "inimitable role" of the U.S. military, believing that it should only concern itself with major adversaries, rather than "policing to secure second- and third-tier interest" (Biddle, 2002, p. 140).

President Bush encapsulated the new approach in his West Point commencement address in June 2002, after a caveat assuring the cadets that their country desired no empire or utopian vision. "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace" (quoted in Falk, 2002, p. 11). The address's argument presented his administration's unilateral military expansion not as a destabilizing action, inciting both fear and anger in many other First and Third World countries, but rather as an irenic effort that would avoid all military competition between nations. Bush's logic avoided the question of whether to escalate militarily at all, either by one all-powerful nation or by many. If the binary arms race of the Cold War tended toward destabilization, as he admits, then might the isolated buildup of one national power do the same? Cer-

tainly, powerful leaders throughout history have commonly posited peaceful motivations for their aggressive international actions. Thus, Nazi Germany spoke of the international threat from communism to justify its invasion of Poland and then Russia itself, downplaying the aggressive doctrine of *Lebensraum* (living space) consistently preached to the German people throughout the Nazi era (Kershaw, 2000). Furthermore, during the past few centuries, European colonizers commonly used altruistic arguments for their invasions of non-Western countries—on behalf of religion, education, morality, and even needed policing services (Mutua, 2002).

Similar arguments were used by Washington to keep the Native American populations under control for white settlements on the Western frontier. Thus, President Ulysses Grant's "Peace Policy" actually sought to disarm uncooperative prairie and high plains groups, Christianizing through forced education to bring them "in close proximity" to European American culture (quoted in Wilson, 1998, p. 290). Grant's "humanitarian generals" supported his peace policy with special emphasis on eventual assimilation (quoted in Smith, 2001, p. 532). Similarly, President Bush's assumption of the mantle of world policeman and arbiter of trade closely associated with a long Washington tradition that combined economic interest with altruism and moralistic imperative. To that end Bush dropped the policy moniker New World Order that was introduced by his father when he was president, perhaps because it seemed too ambitious for the present decade of terror and defensiveness.

Certainly, intergovernmental treaties that would prevent America from doing what it might wish to do in the future have long been disparaged by many Washington policymakers and pundits—as well as much of the general populace holding isolationist or nativist sentiments. What is new is that the current Washington consensus has moved more conscientiously and comprehensively in that direction Examples of the new orientation abound. The Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, and President Bush stated that he would not resubmit the bill. His rationale was that the treaty would inhibit the United States from keeping its advanced weaponry current, well ahead of all other nations' military capabilities, While over seventy nations had already ratified the ICC by 2002, the United States remained opposed, wary of future entanglements with war-as-crime legal actions against the Pentagon and its foreign policy leadership. Europeans sensed Washington's turn away from NATO expansion and

feared its relatively reduced status within the new geopolitical mappings of post–9/11. Although the tendency to relegate NATO to a mere regional marginality, or even abandon it altogether, has appeared periodically in the post–Cold War years, the War on Terrorism and the Axis of Evil raised higher than ever the issue of NATO's future. With the Bush administration appearing increasingly blasé about NATO's future—Colin Powell remarking offhandedly, "It's very hard to close down [NATO] when people are standing in line to get in"—European leaders were increasingly worried that their own populace would not respond sufficiently to the Washington military buildup to remain politically viable in the future. German Parliament member Friedbert Pfluger lamented, "Our fear is that the U.S. could use NATO to keep a foot in Europe, but make it militarily irrelevant, and use it as some kind of toolbox from which to take the parts you want for any mission" (quoted in Erlanger, 2002).

Peace through Military Supremacy

Bill Emmott (2002) summarized the ideological justification behind Washington's calculated reliance on military power to secure its preeminent global position:

> Treaties and other quasi-legal arrangements restrain the autonomy of the United States undesirably. This is buttressed by the argument that efforts to implement such treaties as if they were laws, through international courts and the like, are unconstitutional, illegal and politically dangerous, for the only legitimate laws and judicial systems are those rooted in and held accountable by national constitutions and parliaments. (p. 21)

How could a society that professes individual freedom, at times even over social duty, also favor a large centralized state necessary to support such an advanced and formidable military and expensive telecommunications-oriented intelligence consortium? The answer may lie in the plethora of exceptionalist notions toward the American nation (see Introduction and Chapter 1), now grown stronger and more engaging as a result of America's status of sole superpower.

Andrew Moravcsik (2002) traces currently operative notions of exceptionalism back to original constitution-era documents and options, which found America both separate and different from the rest of the Western world. He adds to this the more recent explanation of super-

power thinking, together with a more politically and theologically conservative general outlook compared to other First World societies. To this may be added the relative geographical isolation of America, a constant from the time of the earliest English settlements in North America, and a particular emphasis on the Puritan city-on-a-hill social vision. In fact, religious righteousness has always factored into American exceptionalist dogmas, beginning with the Founding Fathers' use of Protestant thought to confirm an atomistic understanding of the destiny of the nation. Thus, early patriots as theologically diverse as Tom Paine, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams found the need to enlist religious piety in the cause of cultural and moral uniqueness (Novak, 2002). Today, organized religion in America remains nearly as strong as it was in the high church-attending days of the 1950s, with a shift away from more learned forms of religious praxis and understanding toward a kind of patriotic evangelicalism. This new subcultural development—commonly labeled the "religious right" by the media and the "moral majority" by the group itself—has exploited puritanical notions of Divine Destiny, but more and more identified with a militarily strong culture. Nevertheless, what may stay the hand of the new global military assertiveness is an equally strong tradition of isolationism and suspicion of big government endemic to both secular and religious forms of American exceptionalism. This form of nativism runs deep and may in fact contribute to a moderating effect on the turn toward a more resolute and unilateralist interventionism.

Washington's move from a "threat-based strategy" toward a "capabilities-based approach," to use the current terminology, would guarantee a "permanent military supremacy" made possible by the supersessionist status of America after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Capabilities-based thought posits the maintenance of the absolute supremacy of American military capacity, its status without rival far into the future. Thus, *Defense Planning Guidance*, written in 1992 by Pentagon strategists, would preserve sole-superpower status indefinitely: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union" (quoted in Klare, 2002a, p. 12). Given America's staggering technological advancement together with its still capacious economy, education, and research institutions, such military trajectories would seem logically consistent with Washington's geopolitical and geoeconomic aims. However, uncertainty about the need for such

expensive military procurement remained. As Michael Klare (2002a) observed, "the new technological systems, developed at great expense by the U.S. economy, and to the disadvantage of more socially productive domestic investments, such as basic education, infrastructure, rehabilitation, and so on, would be created in absence of any real danger for which such systems would be needed" (p. 15). Moreover, emphasis on high-tech weaponry from a distance with an easy-in/easy-out policy of temporary involvement in the countries where terrorism or state aggression exists may be counterproductive. America's huge military may have already shown itself to be overdeveloped in the Afghan war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. U.S. officials admitted afterward that that war could have "complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across a wider geographic area" (Johnston, Natta, and Miller, 2002, p. 1). Under such circumstances, the huge expense of the U.S. arms buildup may exist more as a form of national—and corporate—prestige, good for global markets but otherwise inadequate or even tempting greater terrorism from more disaffected groups.

Is America "Like Any Other Country"?

The traditional isolationist and nonmilitary predisposition of Americans may eventually balk at its government's displays of military power worldwide. Certainly, September 11 turned Pentagon policy planners toward at least a partial investment in "brush wars," the type of military engagement necessary for the War on Terrorism. Even more, the Bush administration's military preparedness for the Iraq invasion of 2002 and 2003 may qualify as more than a brush war display. Hence, the future of the permanent military supremacy endeavor remains problematic. Peace also remains traditionally a powerful attractor in American culture, if only because it is at bottom a land of business opportunity that demands secure periods of peace for success. On the other hand, the American public may become accustomed to, large portions even desiring, an undisputedly powerful nation. A few days after the ICC came into being in July 2002, President Bush threatened to block any future UN peacekeeping missions due for renewal unless U.S. peacekeepers were granted immunity from prosecution. James Dao (2002), writing in the *New York Times*, relayed the State Department justifications for such unilateral actions on the familiar ground of U.S. exceptionalism: "As the world's lone superpower, the United States is

increasingly the main guarantor of global security and economic well-being. . . . To treat it like any other country would defy reality." Furthermore, "The [United States] plays a role in the world unlike any other Therefore this affects us unlike any other nation" (p. 1). Elements within American academe have endorsed the fact of U.S. dominance in the world, arguing that existing status alone were sufficient justification for unilateral attitudes (see Wohlforth and Brooks, 2002). Dao also cites Thomas Jefferson's caveat in his 1801 Inaugural Address against "entangling alliances," commenting on the long American tradition of wariness toward foreign treaties as justification for a retreat from multilateral approaches to peace

Once again, other American traditions would argue against these perspectives of world primacy The long-standing belief in the separation of church and state, maintained by a cherished pluralistic orientation, may also moderate any simple equations of theological absolutism and military dominance The 2002 ruling of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals banning "under God" in the school pledge of allegiance represented such cautionary thinking (see Hentoff, 2002). While 9/11 has turned Pentagon policy planners toward at least a partial investment in brush wars and second-tier wars as the type of military engagement deemed necessary for the War on Terrorism, the future of the permanent military supremacy conception remains yet unrealized politically if not militarily.

GROUPING TOWARD PEACE

Public Displays of Peace

Whether or to what extent the American public will associate peace agendas with multilateral, cooperative approaches, rather than with Washington's current unilateral orientation, remains unclear. To understand current promoted perceptions of international peace within American culture, a look at the public presentation of international peace parks can inform. Whereas peace memorials on national hallowed ground, such as Civil War battlefield parks and Revolutionary War sites, may express a certain desire to overcome regional differences or to reconfirm national unity, international peace parks may represent other expressions of international relations, thoughts reconfigured in more approachable ways removed from current intergovernmental politics.

Peace parks and memorials have retained a significant place in American experience. They express a variety of ideologies and sentiments and contain hidden as well as overt agendas. The International Peace Garden (IPG), on the border of North Dakota and Manitoba, represents such a mixture of motives While created for international and domestic tourism, the local ski industry, and nearby summer festivals, the IPG devotes certain portions of its visitor presentation to the ideology of world peace. There is an "Interpretive Center" enshrining noted quotations from national leaders on the advantages of peace and the evils of war; formal gardens on the international borderline expressing the connectivity of Canada and the United States as countries possessing "the longest peaceful border in the world"; and several more tourist-oriented attractions, such as playground areas for children and food concessions, that as a whole underscore the theme of peace between nations (International Peace Garden [IPG], 2002). In the "Director's Presentation" to the Boissevain Community Foundation, Rob Schultz quoted what he described as "[t]he greatest promise ever in the history of mankind," the original stated purpose at the garden's founding in 1932: "To God in His Glory, we two nations dedicate this garden and pledge ourselves that as long as man shall live, we will not take up arms against one another" (IPG, 2002, p. 1). These superlatives commemorate the peace between Canada and the United States—in effect since the 1845 presidential campaign of "Fifty-four-Forty or Fight," when the U.S. Democratic Party briefly demanded the raising of the border farther north.

The IPG's vision of international peace remains abstract, avoiding the particularities of current American geopolitical policies and recent international controversies and conflicts. The garden's dedication associates the treasured American ideal of freedom with world peace in religious tones: "And this is a sanctuary where we celebrate human life and the spirit of freedom and peace. May God watch over this place now and forever more" (IPG, 2002, p. 1). The close juxtaposition of theological language and irenic generalization appears throughout the garden's official discourse, lending high ideals to the endeavor of world order Still, little of current world realities appear in the official discourse of the IPG. Issues of democracy, free trade, ethnic rivalries, and economic inequities are conspicuously absent. A similar orientation motivated the founding of the Waterton/Glacier International Peace Park, founded the same year as the North Dakota/Manitoba Peace Garden (Waterton/Glacier International Peace Park, 2002). Both peace

parks avoid wider issues of current import, maintaining a North American (exclusive of Mexico) focus where serious conflict remains a nonissue. Three other peace parks exist on the borders of the United States and Canada: Peace Arch (Blaine, Washington–Douglas, British Columbia); Campobello (Maine–New Brunswick); and Gold Rush International Park (Alaska–Yukon). These present similar orientations. International peace parks bordering the United States present a means to reconfirm ongoing alliances between close international trading partners. In this context, dialogue about current peacemaking and just war concerns remains prohibitive. The abstractness and transhistorical orientation of these parks preclude engagement with present peace issues through the circumvention of particular realities.

Public Peace More Closely Engaged

A second type of peace park or monument expresses a closer relationship with the aims of worldwide peace, antiwar, and conflict-resolution issues. Such sentiments, coming from grassroots organizations and individuals, indicate a broad recognition of the need for just war and peace standards in the new century. In Japan, several monuments dedicated to peace have attracted visitors for decades. The sites in Hiroshima, city of the first atomic bomb exploded in war, commemorate the horror and widespread civilian casualties of nuclear warfare. Atomic Bomb Dome, the standing shell of the Hiroshima Prefecture Industry Promotion Hall, was the largest building left standing near ground zero. Before the war, it was noted for a distinctive modern design using brick structure and a high dome. Surrounded by the urban wasteland created by the explosion, it remains a symbol in Japan of the destructive power of modern war (Atomic Bomb Dome, 2002). Like the burned-out Reichstag building in Berlin, Atomic Bomb Dome has been incorporated into the postwar cityscape as a solemn reminder both of the false values underlying the policies of aggressor nations and of the universal destructiveness of the martial mentality. Similarly, the Hiroshima Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims, located near the dome, expresses the human cost of technological warfare. The large cement arch represents a clay figure of an ancient house, which protects the souls of those who died in the atomic bomb blast. Below the arch rests a large stone coffin containing the registry of victim names (Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims, 2002). Both the cenotaph and the dome, which can be seen

through the arch when standing by the coffin, pointedly present an antiwar theme and urge a renewed commitment to alternative forms of conflict resolution.

In the same way, the Children's Peace Monument in Hiroshima memorializes the thousands of children killed by the bomb and its aftereffects. Featuring a large modern tower with metal sculpture, it was dedicated on Children's Day, May 5, 1958 (Children's Peace Monument, 2002). Begun and financed by a local organization, the Hiroshima Children's Association for Peace, the monument was inspired by Sasaki Sadako-san, a three-year-old girl who died of leukemia brought on by radiation. She folded paper cranes believing that whoever folds 1,000 will be granted a wish. Since then, paper cranes have become a worldwide symbol of peace, thrown in the air at university graduations and street protests.

The second type of peace park/monument seems more effective as antiwar statement, both in the overall focus of the messages and in the specificity and cogency of the thematic presentations. The "museums" and display facilities attached or soon to be added to the second variety of peace parks allow the possibility of supporting the detailed messages with substantive arguments and descriptive visions of alternatives to the option of war. Nevertheless, the general significance of such antiwar and peace statements within the contemporary public sphere must be considered relatively slight, despite the obvious appeal to more influential—upper-middle-class—tourist clientele, whose influence on the marketplace of opinion within the international public space would be relatively greater than their numbers. In other words, such comparatively cogent presentations of peaceful alternatives to militarism must be considered insufficient to change the tide of world opinion toward more progressive, less power-based formulae of foreign policy grounded on a might-makes-right disposition. Really effective alternatives to the latter must develop not from tourist sites, no matter how sincere or reality based, but rather from grassroots organizations; relatively independent organizations such as NGOs (always growing in number and importance in the international public forum); college and university communities; and, finally, from existing venues of global opinion, especially the intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations, the World Court, and the newly established International Criminal Court. Peace parks, museums, and memorials—like the artistically powerful equestrian sculpture of St. George defeating the (nuclear missile) dragon in the United Nations

Park in New York City—may force thoughtful moments that challenge prevailing notions of security through massive military retaliation However, without the organization and focus of numbers of people, effective solutions remain problematic.

COALITION BUILDING

A Whole World of Democracies

More promising politically—for direct political agency—are general mobilizations, ad hoc NGOs gathered to oppose particular warring conflicts, and ongoing NGOs, general movements, and information broadcasting institutes, often online. Singly or organized into consortia, these have tremendous persuasive capacities, both to turn public opinion toward nonmilitary solutions and to raise awareness of critical standards for military engagement. Moreover, such public discourse can potentially change intergovernmental and national governments profoundly. An example of the first, organizations that oppose particular conflicts, is the JIPF (Jews for Israeli–Palestinian Peace). Founded in Stockholm in 1982, the JIPF originally sought to influence Swedes about alternatives to the mainstream media coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Since then, it has extended its range to include all Jews worldwide who look toward a settlement for lasting peace. Its channel of communication is primarily a news bulletin on the Internet, and it attempts to meet with governmental officials in the Middle East and throughout the First World. Its discourse involves historical analysis, critical argument, and a clear program for peace. The latter includes three main points: first, both sides must recognize each other's national rights; second, the Israeli government must recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as representative of the Palestinian people, and the Palestinians must recognize the Israeli government as representative of the Israelis; third, Israel must withdraw from all lands occupied since 1967, and the status of Jerusalem must be defined separately (Jews for Israeli–Palestinian Peace, 2002).

Although the ultimate success of such advocacy organizations depends on the particular circumstances of changing public opinion, governmental and intergovernmental realignments, and the actions of the aggressors, these organizations lay the groundwork for change by offering thoughtful opinion and presenting petitioned manifests to

relevant authorities, including the media. Even private individuals can gain the attention of the international public sphere in the cause of human rights and peace, as Jody Williams did when she led the campaign to remove and ban land mines, an achievement that brought her the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.

Nevertheless, peace objectives remain quite broad and varied, comprehending a complexity of needs, issues, and dilemmas. Such prodigious undertakings require more than private organizations and individuals for success. Even intergovernmental organizations cannot be expected to succeed without comprehensive and consistent policies that are consistently applied throughout the world. In this regard, the United States in the post–Cold War era has accurately discerned both the magnitude and the ideological base of strategies for world peace. It must be a grand strategy requiring will and commitment, a focus not so easily achieved by a diverse democracy. In his second inaugural address, President Clinton succinctly offered the Washington plan for peace among the world's peoples: "The world's greatest democracy will lead a whole world of democracies" (quoted in Carothers, 1999). While this general strategy does not necessarily presuppose the end of history that Francis Fukuyama (1995) originally envisioned, a world where liberal democracy would be realized by all cultures and nations, ending conflict and eventually unjust inequities, it does require steadfastness and resolve within democratic boundaries. What Clinton meant by "lead" would of course be contested by both America's allies and the rest of the world. In early 2003, as Secretary of State Colin Powell presented his argument for the invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq to a divided United Nations, it was evident that world leadership would involve more than a simple definition, one posited on the primacy of one nation alone, albeit a sole superpower. Even the George W. Bush administration policymakers acknowledged that leadership in any project—the Axis of Evil operations, the ongoing campaign of the War on Terrorism, and much more—must include multilateral approaches, or at the very least general international support.

Galvanizing Peace

To be sure, strong leadership is required if general peace is to be realized worldwide. It will require adherence to ways of thinking that are often rebutted in higher spheres of thought, such as universal notions of human rights, democratic standards, concepts of justice, the evenly

applied rule of law, and a general openness toward the perceived other. While postmodern thought structures have challenged all these ideals, positing the incommensurability of intercultural communication and ways of comprehending the world, there is nonetheless general agreement in the American public on these notions as general guidelines and even to a great extent on the particularities of these values, which may seem only delimited to "Western" thought because they are often presented by Western powers for self-serving reasons, for example, in the service of colonialist and neocolonialist aims. As the sole superpower, the United States will have to discipline itself to realize in fact its often assumed exceptionalist status as world leader. As history makes clear even at a cursory glance, world empires have often flattered themselves by assuming exceptionalist moral postures in pursuit of nationalistic or even oligarchic agendas. At the same time, cure-alls and other facile notions of the ideologue, although attractive because of their simplicity, cannot succeed in the long term. On this issue, Amy Chua (2003) would challenge those many American theorists who ground their world peace strategies in one compelling conception of the good.

Chua agrees to a great extent with the many advocates of free market democracy, such as Bill Emmott (2002) and Michael Mandelbaum (2002), who give qualified endorsement of its long-term efficacy. However, she finds that free markets in politically open societies do not always lead to conditions of equality, the rule of law, and peace. In fact, she finds that, contrary to common assumptions, free market democracies have often led to tension between ethnic and cultural groups, often to civil strife. This has been the case, she affirms, in nations and regions where ethnic market elites control disproportionate areas of the economy. She cites Chinese ethnic groups in Indonesia and Malaysia, Israeli Jews in the Middle East, Indians in Kenya and other areas of East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, and many other instances. Far from democratizing and enfranchising majorities in these areas, ethnic economic divisionism has fostered antidemocratic agendas and intranational strife. Moreover, she challenges those strategists who would allow a benign neglect of these situations under the assumption that the free market will eventually adjust socioeconomic and political differences. Under such circumstances, President Clinton's scenario of a great democracy leading other democracies would require more than the sort of simple one-size-fits-all approach to world stability.

In point of fact, much of the world is at present either not motivated for democratic change or clearly against such cultural change, at least

as defined by Western notions of democracy and social justice. More-over, many countries are unable to move toward democratic institutions, no matter how much they may accept such social aims, because of widespread poverty and technological underdevelopment. According to the 1999 Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme, 1.3 billion people in the world make less than $1 a day (see Friedman and Ramonet, 1999). In countries where extreme poverty is rife, small groups of local elites control civil and military institutions, cooperating with transnational corporations and local wealth for business exploitation. Under such inequitable conditions, democracy remains illusive. It then is a matter of opinion whether free market liberalism will arrive not at all or in the distant future (see Friedman and Ramonet, 1999).

On the other hand, much of the world would rather pass on democracy, making the George W. Bush administration's professed scenario for turning the Arab Middle East into "a lush garden of democratic liberalism" doubtful. Richard Haass, director of State Department policy planning, would give democratization a priority in that region. But many critics counter that most Arab nations show little interest in democracy, a perspective that follows across the Muslim world, with the exception of Turkey. Moreover, Muslim societies generally tend to define truth in essentialist terms, as unchanging and fixed by a higher power (see Bacevich, 2003). Theorists of Andrew Bacevich's persuasion would instead limit war aims in the Axis of Evil and War on Terrorism operations. By minimizing the final goals of intervention, focusing instead on more traditional objects such as security, assuring the flow of vital natural resources, and maintaining free trade, the United States would project a stronger and more easily understood global presence, one that would gain if not the respect of disaffected countries, at least their appreciation of the American geopolitical position. Accordingly, President Kennedy's challenge to a more idealistic America in his 1961 Inaugural Address, "to bear any burden, no matter how heavy, to ensure freedom's survival," would be modified to a position of assured security for First World nations at the expense of a reduced involvement in global political change.

Such minimalist views run opposite from that of Douglas Hurd, former British foreign secretary, who would expand rather than reduce agendas of just peace. In his view, the West must change priorities, seeking humanitarianism over the narrower aims of any single nation. By showing the world that America and Britain are as much interested

in justice for Palestine and security for Israel as for Western security, terrorism can be isolated and reduced: "to galvanize the peace process and separate terrorists from the majority of Arabs who still want peace" (quoted in Massing, 2003, p. 20). Like Chua, Hurd would appeal to the conscience of economic elites throughout the world to narrow the differences between the haves and have-nots, finding in social justice and democratic trajectories the only hope for lasting peace. As both recognize, such policies will not be easy and will require unflagging devotion to a long and often thankless task.

OUTLOOK

The choice between humanitarianism and more traditional foreign policy aims—security, free trade stability, national prestige—may express a binary opposition only useful in argumentative discourse. In fact these two foreign policy perspectives have more in common than their respective advocates would initially affirm. Security and free trade are guaranteed by a strong global military presence wisely administered. However, these goals are also enhanced significantly, perhaps decidedly, by meaningful attention to the standards set forth in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its subsequent conventions. As more prescient observers have insisted, long-term peace and security will occur only when basic inequalities are overcome worldwide. This rather straightforward truth can be realized by following various paths, as long as there is a general acknowledgment that the hitherto opposing factions must work sincerely and consistently for both general approaches. This effort must include broad public participation of a magnitude evident by the millions of antiwar protest marchers in the world's cities during February 2003 demanding further inspections rather than an invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Popular thought in America must continue to engage global issues in ways consistent with the core values set forth and interpreted over the two centuries of American political history. Foremost among these are a general openness toward diversity, a basic free market orientation, a tolerant separation of religion and government, and a healthy suspicion of both totalitarian control and militaristic culture. These core values can appreciate and develop cooperative approaches to human rights and social justice issues—over large military and advanced technology unilateralism—thereby assuring long-term just peace aims.

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