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Emotion in Dialogic Interaction

EDITED BY
Edda Weigand

EMOTION IN DIALOGIC INTERACTION

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Emotion in Dialogic Interaction
Advances in the complex

EMOTION IN DIALOGIC INTERACTION

ADVANCES IN THE COMPLEX

Edited by

EDDA WEIGAND
University of Münster

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Foreword

This volume contains a selection of papers given at the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop on "Emotion in Dialogic Interaction: Advances in the complex" held at the University of Münster in October 2002. Well-known experts in the field were invited from different European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Sweden) and from abroad (Canada, Israel). An interdisciplinary approach which goes beyond academic boundaries was guaranteed by combining different linguistic disciplines such as descriptive and historical comparative linguistics, general linguistics, linguistics of different languages and related disciplines such as psychology and philosophy.

In the literature, the complex network of 'emotion in dialogic interaction' is mostly addressed by reducing the complex and isolating individual aspects which are analysed from a specific, for instance, psychological perspective. The innovative claim of the workshop was to analyse *emotion as an integrative component* of human behaviour in dialogic interaction as demonstrated by recent findings in neurology. Human beings are purposeful beings, and they try to negotiate their positions in dialogic interaction. They cannot separate their abilities such as speaking, thinking, and perceiving, and they are inevitably influenced by emotions. The challenge of the workshop therefore was to address the complex on the basis of a model which is able to deal with the complex, such as the model of the Dialogic Action Game. Approaches which separate emotions or those which define emotions by means of simple artificial units were, as a result, not taken into account.

Human behaviour is in part culturally dependent. In this respect, the focus was on identifying a specifically European way of expressing emotions and dealing with them in dialogue. The issue of identifying 'Europeanness' necessitates comparing different languages and cultures insofar as it is the diversity of cultures and languages which makes up the general concept of Western culture.

The workshop was structured according to three thematic parts which form the structure of the present volume. Part I deals with the theoretical

issue of "Addressing the Complex". My own paper on "Emotions: The simple and the complex" highlights the modern view of addressing the complex object of dialogic interaction by starting from the natural object-of-study and deriving an appropriate model from it. The model of the Dialogic Action Game sets up a new paradigm which is not restricted to rules but based on principles of probability. The focus is on human beings acting and reacting in complex ever-changing surroundings on the basis of their abilities. The minimal communicatively autonomous unit is considered to be the cultural unit of the Dialogic Action Game which integratively comprehends the essential components of interaction such as language, perception, cognition, and emotion, and includes variables of different kinds which influence human behaviour, among them cultural conditions. The key concept for opening up the complex of human behaviour is considered to be specific interests, in the end survival needs, and communicative, i.e. interactive or dialogic purposes.

The papers by František Daneš on "Universality versus Culture-Specificity of Emotions" and Světla Čmejrková on "Emotions in Language and Communication" share this view of emotions as complex integrated phenomena and focus on specific cultural dependencies. Carla Bazzanella in her paper on "Emotions, Language, and Context" addresses the complex dependency of emotions on contextual, especially cultural variables. John E. Joseph in his paper on "Body, Passions and Race in Classical Theories of Language and Emotion" outlines the historical background from a comparative point of view and emphasizes the interrelationship between language, body and culture.

Part II focuses on "Communicative Means for Expressing Emotions". True to the integrating point of view the verbal means were not isolated, for instance, as single words but analysed as means-in-use, words or grammatical categories within the utterance, or the whole utterance as means for a speech act. Karin Aijmer, in her paper on "Interjections in a Contrastive Perspective", analyses minimal verbal units such as interjections as expressions for complex functions in different languages. Wolfgang Teubert poses the question "When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?" and deals with the specific emotion of 'guilt' from a corpus-linguistic and discourse-analytic point of view. A corpus-based comparative analysis of the vocabulary of "Joy, Astonishment and Fear in English, German and Russian" is given by Valerij Dem'jankov and his group. Maxim Stamenov, in his paper on "Ambivalence as a Dialogic Frame of Emotions in Conflict", deals with ambivalent emotions in intercultural communication with reference to Turkish loanwords in Bulgarian.

Part III is devoted to "Emotional Principles in Dialogue", i.e. cognitive means and the issue of how emotions influence the sequence of dialogue without being explicitly expressed. Michael Walrod emphasizes cultural differences in expressing emotions and, in particular, deals with "the role of emotions in normative discourse" among the Ga'dang people of the Philippine. In this way, the difference between European and non-European cultures is highlighted. The paper by Jörn Bollow on "Anticipation of Public Emotions in TV Debates" aims at emotional strategies in political media dialogues. Elda Weizman and Tamar Sovran interpret "Emotions in Literary Dialogue", and Christian Plantin addresses the "strategic use of emotion in argumentation" by focusing on "The Inseparability of Emotion and Reason".

Even if the workshop had a clear theoretical conception and was structured according to thematic guidelines, it goes without saying that not all papers completely follow the same lines. In a vivid exchange of opinions, many proposals and evaluations are brought forward. In general, however, the position of addressing the complex and of describing it by means of an open model such as the model of the Dialogic Action Game has been approved and accepted.

Concerning the issue of 'Europeanness' the starting assumption has been confirmed, namely that Europeanness is characterized by internal cultural diversity and that some sort of unity becomes evident only from outside. The general view of European identity as emerging from diversity gains more concrete profile. European identity however is only partly grasped by a view which looks at existing attitudes and features. As a great step forward it has to be created, not only politically but also by decisions in other areas, for instance, in the area of European law or management. As a result of the discussions it can be considered necessary to create and develop a joint European interest. The importance of interests which underlie all human behaviour is a crucial feature of the model of the Dialogic Action Game. They should be highlighted as a point of orientation for future research on human behaviour.

Finally, there remains the pleasant duty to thank all those who helped to make the workshop and the publication of the papers possible: first of all, the European Science Foundation which accepted and supported the project as an Exploratory Workshop. Additional financial support was generously provided by the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster and the "Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster e.V.". Moreover, I would like to extend cordial thanks to Jörn Bollow, the assistant coordinator, and to a group of students, among them Stefanie Schnöring, Andreas

Kurschat, Didem Özan, and Jana Köchling. I am especially grateful to Stefanie Schnöring and Jörn Bollow who formatted the papers and produced a unified volume. Last but not least I would like to express my thanks to E.F.K. Koerner and John Benjamins Publishing Company for accepting the volume for publication.

Münster, March 2004 Edda Weigand

Part I

Addressing the Complex

Emotions

The simple and the complex

Edda Weigand
University of Münster

1. The challenge of the complex

When we consider the history of modern linguistics in the 20th century, we can distinguish two opposite trends: *the search for the simple* and *the challenge of the complex*. I remember quite clearly the fascination exerted in the 70s by the question as to what are the simplest so-called atomic predicates which were supposed to make up the whole of meaning. We indeed believed we could embrace the whole range of linguistic meaning if we only were able to find out about 30 atomic predicates such as BE, BECOME, CAUSE, NOT, ALIVE from which to construct, for instance, the meaning of *kill*. The situation has completely changed in recent years. Quite different key terms now attract our attention: individuality, probability, principles, and performance have replaced the terms of generality, fixed codes, rules, and system. We are *on the track of adventures in the complex* which is a track that *crosses academic boundaries* from biology, neurology, psychology to anthropology, philosophy, linguistics and cultural studies. In his staircase model Gell-Mann (1994: 111f.) considers the different disciplines as "part of a single connected structure" even if they "do occupy different levels":



Figure 1

For the humanities, I would however prefer a structure in which the different disciplines of the humanities all concentrate on roughly the same object-of-study: human behaviour while having a different primary scientific interest. As linguists, who are aware of the challenge of the complex, we are, in my opinion, interested in *language as an integrated part of human behaviour*.

Thus at least we seem to know the complex, namely effective language use by human beings. The characteristic of 'effective use' means we have left the traditional separation of two levels of competence and performance and have arrived at competence-in-performance as the complex goal of our description. *But where to begin?* What can count as the simple? Here again the adventures begin. One might think of the title of Gell-Mann's book *The Quark and the Jaguar* which identifies the simple in physics with the elementary particle 'quark' and the complex with the perfect wild cat 'jaguar'. Having grasped the complex in the humanities with human beings effectively interacting within dialogue, we might suggest the '*neuron*' or the '*qualia*' as a candidate for the simple.

I do not want to tackle the philosophical issue of qualia as simple sensory qualities insofar as they seem to be based on the duality of mind and body (cf. Levine 1983) which in my view can no longer be taken for granted. Reflecting however on the much discussed mirror neurons, we discover an interesting phenomenon: when we examine them more and more in depth, they continue to display even more complexity. Complexity does not come to an end, there is no simple level of one substance 'matter' versus 'energy' but a complex integrated whole from the very beginning:

the mirror neuron (biological-physiological matter
cognitive function
perceptual function)

Figure 2

When we trace the path of evolution of brain and language back to the beginnings, there do not seem to be simple units at the very outset insofar as there are no units without a contextual function, no matter without energy. Neurology tells us that there is no living brain without a mind, no mind without a brain. What we find basically is a network of billions of neurons, firing and exchanging signals, no separable simple pieces such as the alleged quarks, no separable areas such as rationality, emotion and language. It seems to be the case that while trying to find the simple we arrive at the complex. It is as if you

are looking for the smallest possible points and they are always the universe. *There is no simple at the beginning.* If we want to use one term, I would say, at the beginning we find 'function' which is the integrated unity of function and matter, of mind and brain which makes up life.

The picture radically changes if we follow another path in our search for the simple: *the path of abstraction* which has been taken by Western thinking for over two millennia. Via abstraction we leave the natural phenomenon of performance and arrive at theory. It is the way of defining the complex in terms of simple, in my view, artificial units such as atomic predicates or semantic primitives in lexical semantics. Now we seem to have what we want to have: separable simple units from which we can allegedly build up the complex according to rule-governed patterns or fixed codes. We seem to be justified in doing so by requiring that a theory has to reduce the complex to rules via abstraction. It does not seem to bother us that in doing so we have totally left our complex object, abstracted away essential features which can never be brought back. We now have a theory but have forgotten what our theory is about.

Let us have a brief look at a few orthodox theories of emotion and their techniques of description. There is the technique of *ontological claims* for the simple. Wierzbicka (1996), for instance, constructs a semantic metalanguage, i.e. an artificial language consisting of semantic primitives such as SAY, THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, GOOD, BAD, and claims ontological existence for these primitives insofar as she considers them as "innate human concepts" (p. 16; also Enfield/Wierzbicka 2002: 17). Semantic primitives of this type strongly remind me of generative semantics in the 70s: the desire for the simple seems to live forever.

Next, there is the traditional technique of *metaphorical explanation* applied, for instance, by Kövecses (1990) which seems closer to performance insofar as it refers to the motive of the speaker for using a metaphorical expression. There is a special affinity between emotions and metaphors. Kövecses' primary interest however is not to describe how emotions are expressed but how emotions are talked about (p. 3), emotions as a discourse topic, and to explain why they are talked about by means of metaphors. The question of the motive of the speaker might be interesting for creative language use. Dead metaphors, however, such as, *I was overwhelmed by fear, fear came over him, she was carried away by fear* (p. 78) are conventional ways-of-use. For language use the question of why we say in English *to fly into a rage* and in German *in Ärger geraten* misses the point. The conventions of use do not follow cognitive configurations nor deep grammatical rules, they are simply there. Thus Kövecses (1988: 42) in emphasizing that we speak of "deeply felt emotions" cannot

explain why we have to say *with high seriousness* or *with great seriousness* and cannot say **with deep seriousness*.

Another technique pursued, for instance, by Harré (e.g., 1986) is based on the thesis that emotions are *socially constructed*. In the light of recent neurological findings, however, the exclusive emphasis on the social construction of emotions can – as we will see – no longer be maintained.

All these techniques and reference points, the linguistic, the psychological and the social, are techniques which highlight and even isolate a special point, a special compartment of the complex whole. If you, on the contrary, stress the necessity of starting from the whole from the very outset, you have to be prepared to face the criticism of academic imperialism by orthodox scientists of different academic provenance. Rising to the challenge of the complex, however, is quite different from taking up the stance of academic imperialism. It is simply acknowledging that "human nature is indeed hard to describe and full of contradictions" (Damasio 2000: 64f.). What we are attempting in our 'beyond enterprise' (Dascal 1996) is *a radical change in the concept of a theory*. I do not think that we have to give up the concept of a theory. There are not only the two extremes: a rule-governed theory versus no rules, no theory at all. There is a possibility in between, the possibility of mediating between order and disorder. Human abilities allow for this possibility insofar as human beings are endowed not with an abstract competence restricted to rules nor with being totally subject to chance but with the ability to deal with the complex, i.e. with competence-in-performance, which is an ability to start with the attempt to discover order and being able to adapt to disorder. Human beings in this sense are 'complex adaptive systems', to take up a term introduced by Gell-Mann in his physical explanation of the complex.

If we want to rise to the challenge of the complex in the humanities, we have to focus on the way human beings orientate themselves in complex surroundings. The different techniques they use – rules, regularities, conventions, inferences, suggestions, suppositions, associations – are all techniques which in the end are based on probability. Competence-in-performance can be executed only on the basis of *principles of probability*. In order to understand this complex ability of competence-in-performance we need to find a *key to opening it up* and we need to *know the whole framework* within which competence-in-performance with all its components works. The key concept in my opinion are interests, needs, expectations which as a general drive are innate to human beings. According to Damasio (2000: 24f.), it is "the organism's advantage" or "the service of the interests of a particular organism" from which all attempts at explaining human behaviour have to start. This innate drive of human be-

ings is influenced and shaped by their social and cultural surroundings. The framework for investigating human communicative behaviour therefore has to include all possible variables, social, cultural, personal, which have the power to influence human actions. I call this framework the *Dialogic Action Game* (Weigand 2000, 2002). In coining the term, a few fundamental assumptions were crucial which I can only briefly mention here having dealt with them in detail elsewhere:

– Communication is considered to be action, more precisely dialogic interaction.
– Human dialogic interaction is considered to be a game, not a closed game like chess but an open game which allows for different ways of playing, for individual ways as well as for well-trodden paths and conventional routines.

In my attempt to study language use from a linguistic point of view I consider the dialogic action game to be a cultural unit, taking the term culture in a broadly-based comprehensive sense:

cultural unit of the dialogic action game

human beings interacting via principles of probability
mediating between order and disorder

order → principles → disorder

Figure 3

Human beings, dependent on their own innate abilities as well as on cultural conditions, represent the complex in various respects. In this complex network there is nothing simple at all, everything is interconnected. From the very beginning *integration* is the name of the game (M. Dascal, personal communication; cf. Harris 1998).

2. What emotions really are: New findings, new questions

Scientific studies on emotion are usually characterized by the fact that we have to come to grips with varying, even controversial assumptions not only in different disciplines such as psychology, biology, or anthropology, but even in the same discipline. Now with recent findings in neurology the situation seems to

have changed. We seem to be on the right track of getting to know what emotions really are. New findings, especially those presented by Damasio (2000), confirm that there is no simple at the outset but a complex network of functions and matters ordered in the sequence of time. Damasio gives a very differentiated and partly experimentally proven picture of human nature and specifically of emotions as internal states. He distinguishes "*three stages of processing along a continuum*" (p. 36f.): first, emotions which are outwardly directed responses of the organism caused by internal or external events, second, feelings of these emotions which are inwardly directed and private, mental experiences, and third a state of feelings made conscious, i.e. known to the self. "This perspective on emotion, feeling, and knowing is unorthodox. [...] The inescapable and remarkable fact about these three phenomena – emotion, feeling, consciousness – is their body relatedness." They all "depend for their execution on representations of the organism. Their shared essence is the body" (p. 283f.).

Moreover, Damasio clarifies the puzzle of what emotions, feelings, moods, drives, motivations, affect really are, mainly by distinguishing between primary, secondary and background emotions. Primary emotions are innate emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust; secondary emotions are social emotions such as embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, or pride. Third there are background emotions "such as well-being or malaise, calm or tension" (pp. 50ff.). "Background emotions do not use the differentiated repertoire of explicit facial expressions that easily define primary and social emotions." The features of being 'tense' or 'edgy', 'discouraged' or 'enthusiastic', 'down' or 'cheerful' are detected "by subtle details of body posture, speed and contour of movements, minimal changes in the amount and speed of eye movements, and in the degree of contraction of facial muscles". What is important for us is the fact that all these different internal states are ordered along a continuum. It was Descartes' error to separate emotion and reason, whereas it is now experimentally proven that reason is influenced by emotion (for a somewhat modified evaluation of Descartes' position cf. Rorty 1992).

According to Damasio (2000: 57), it is simply wrong to maintain that emotions are totally shaped by culture. Emotions are biologically determined processes. Nevertheless, "regardless of the degree of biological presetting of the emotional machinery, development and culture have much to say regarding the final product [...]: first, they shape what constitutes an adequate inducer of a given emotion; second, they shape some aspects of the expression of emotion; and third, they shape the cognition and behavior which follows the deployment of an emotion."

We now have to pose the question what these new neurological findings can tell us concerning our linguistic research and in general concerning research in the humanities. The processing which takes place from the organism's reactions to conscious feelings is not the core issue for linguistics. If we focus on language use, on what human beings do with language in dialogic interaction we have to take account of the fact that they are inevitably influenced by emotions. Emotions are a human condition which cannot be abstracted from. In my view, however, it is not so important for linguistics to differentiate the neurological stages of emotion, feelings, and consciousness. A broad concept of emotion which does not distinguish between emotions as the organism's reactions and feelings of emotions might be sufficient. We might differentiate between *conditions of emotion*, i.e. the inducing internal or external situation, and *emotions as an ability*, i.e. having feelings which might be conscious or unconscious. Thus we have arrived at the fundamental *concept of human abilities* which in my view is central for our understanding of the world insofar as we cannot go beyond the filter of our abilities (Weigand 1998). We perceive and reason in a way that is preset by our abilities. Having emotions or feelings is one of these abilities.

Accepting that we cannot go beyond our abilities highlights once again that any ontological claim for an independent world structure, i.e. for absolute truth, must be futile. We can understand and structure the world or the universe of meaning only through the filter of our abilities. It is however not so easy to give a list of our abilities. As a first preliminary attempt I propose the following:



Figure 4

All these abilities are necessary for the species; even emotions serve human beings' survival (Damasio 2000: 54; Darwin 1892). They are not superfluous; a

clear example is fear: we need to know what fear means in order to understand what danger means.

The next question to be tackled is the question how these abilities are interconnected. How do they participate in the process of human dialogic interaction? I will come back to this question when dealing with the relationship between emotion and language.

Let me now summarize the points which in my view are essential for dealing with emotion in linguistics:

- First, we can distinguish a wide range of internal states at the neurological level, emotions, feelings, moods, background emotions, etc. which we can comprehend in a first step simply as *emotions*. In a second step we can distinguish between *primary innate* emotions, *secondary social* emotions and *background* emotions.
- Emotions in this wide sense as internal states are based on *expectations and needs* in relation to the world or to other human beings. Thus, for instance, ANGER, SURPRISE, JOY are feelings which precisely correspond to certain expectations.
- Human abilities including emotions are based on survival needs. In this sense, FEAR, for instance, indicates the need for protection. In the end, it is the *interests and advantages* of human beings which induce and guide human behaviour.
- Emotions are *indeterminate concepts*. They are describable to some extent, but cannot be defined. Here I think we have to come to grips with a fundamental principle of the complex: basically there are no fixed, strict definitions, only approximations, continua, probabilities, approaches to determinateness within indeterminateness.
- Emotions are *always present* and cannot be switched off. They are *integrated* with other abilities, for instance, emotions with rationality and learning, as a German proverb tells us: "Der Wunsch ist der Vater des Gedankens." Emotions are integrated with the body perhaps in a deeper sense than we can nowadays imagine. The mind at a deeper level seems to be "nature's most complex set of biological phenomena" (Damasio 2002: 9).
- Emotions are *not totally controllable by reason*, if at all, only in part. They are strong enough to cancel rationality whereas the "controlling power of reason is often modest" (Damasio 2000: 58).
- Emotions are *in part innate and universal* and *in part culturally and socially shaped*. Insofar as they are grounded in the innate characteristics of human

beings' having needs and expectations, emotions belong to some degree to universal human conditions. As is the case with most innate features, they can be shaped by education, by cultural conditions and modified or transformed by societal traditions.

– Finally, emotions in my view have a very specific quality which is connected with indeterminacy: they *resist being explicitly described.* They are to some degree the inexpressible. This is why they are often talked about by means of metaphors or symbols (Weigand forthc.a). Emotions thus reach the limits of language, arrive at communication above and beyond language, at comprehension without words.

On the basis of these new findings on emotions, new questions arise. In my view, it is mainly the feature of interconnectedness which confronts us with new issues: first, interconnectedness between innateness and culture or between biology and sociology; second, between the various human abilities, i.e. between emotion, language, rationality, action, social behaviour; and third, interconnectedness between emotion and the body. Being in part a physiological phenomenon emotions have a bodily expression which becomes manifest without the intention of human beings. Bodily expressions of emotion can therefore be an essential indication in situations where we follow emotional principles such as "hide your emotions". I will however not focus on this causal interconnectedness between emotions and the body but on the interconnectedness between emotions and language, and this includes the way emotions are shaped by social, cultural factors.

3. Emotions and language

My question is not as Wierzbicka (2002: 4) or Kövecses (1990: 3) put it 'emotion talk' or how we talk *about* emotion which is a question analogous to how we talk about nature, about the body, about teaching. Just as talking about the body will not necessarily inform us about real essentials of the body, talking about emotion will not necessarily tell us essentials of emotion. Talking about is quite different from expressing, doing, understanding. The question *how emotions are related to language* is the question how they are expressed by human beings in language.

To tackle this question we need to know the complex *framework* in which emotions as well as language play their part. This framework, in my view, is the cultural unit of the dialogic action game in which language plays its role

as an integrated part of human behaviour (Weigand 2000). The key question to be posed is the question why human beings use language. Here I start from the previously mentioned point that human beings normally use their abilities in their own interest, to their advantage. They use language integrated with other communicative means in order to fulfil communicative, and that is dialogic purposes and needs. Thus we have arrived at a view of communication as dialogic interaction insofar as the correlation of means and purposes constitutes action.

Action can be initiative or reactive. The basic minimal structure of the action game is constituted by the sequence of action and reaction which can be extended by sequencing principles of negotiation. The expected reaction is functionally and rationally determined by the initiative action. Contrary to orthodox speech act theory, interaction does not result from single illocutionary acts complemented by conversational principles. The speech act itself has to be changed. *Interaction* is from the very beginning based on two intensionally different acts: the initiative and the reactive act, i.e. an act which makes a communicative claim and an act which fulfils this very claim. Interaction is thus the negotiation of the positions of the interlocutors which takes place in the discourse between making and fulfilling a claim:



Figure 5

Interaction happens in different action games which belong to four basic types: representative games which make a claim to truth and accept or reject it, directive games which make a claim to volition and consent to or refuse it, explorative action games which make a claim to getting knowledge, and declarative action games which make and fulfil the claim to changing the world by the utterance (Weigand 1991, 2003).

Having thus sketched the framework in which the components work and which as a whole is communicatively autonomous, we can now pick out *the utterance* as a component. I take the term utterance not in the sense of verbal utterance or utterance form but in the sense of the communicative means human beings use when acting. Language is part of the communicative means human beings have at their disposal. These means are integrated means: verbal means, cognitive means such as inferencing and having cultural knowledge,

and perceptual means based on the ability of perceiving insofar as interlocutors rely on what they can see and perceive in the situation. Human beings cannot separate these abilities even if they wanted to.

The issue of the relationship between emotion and language can now be put more precisely: it is the question where and how emotions enter the utterance and influence the sequence of utterances which makes up dialogic interaction. An utterance is functionally constituted by an action function and a related state of affairs or proposition. Emotions enter or influence both parts: the action function and the propositional function:



Figure 6

Moreover, they influence the dialogic sequence without being explicitly expressed (for examples and sample analyses of dialogic sequences cf. Weigand 1996; Daneš 1999).

3.1 Words and concepts

Let us first address the complex area of emotional vocabulary and language comparison and highlight a few particularly problematic points. One might think we would find an example of the simple with the lexical means of single words. Words or signs are traditionally considered as the correlation of an expression with a concept, emotion words as the correlation of one word with one emotion. A clear example of such an approach to the simple is Wierzbicka's semantic primitives approach (e.g., Wierzbicka 1996: 178ff.). In trying "to establish what the meaning of a word is" Wierzbicka arrives at the conclusion that it is a definition "and, ultimately, a definition, too, has to stand on its own" (p. 183). I think the artificial constructionist view of this approach becomes immediately obvious. It is an approach which is unable to deal with competence-in-performance. In language use, it is not the word which has a meaning by definition but the speakers predicate with words how they perceive and construct an image of the world. Lexical items in general are means for predicating, not only within the propositional function but also within the action function insofar as by using a speech act verb in an explicit performative utterance the speech act verb predicates what type of action is meant (cf. Weigand 1998: 28f.). Concepts thus are not ontological entities but are dependent on the speakers' abilities to perceive and understand the world.

Isolated words are often considered to be polysemous. Polysemy however is a problem of theory not of language use. When asked for the meaning of an isolated word, native speakers will not be immediately aware of all the different meanings the word might have in use. They have in mind a very rough complex meaning which is in principle indeterminate. Thus, for instance, picking out the seemingly simple verb *fall* we correlate it with some complex of meaning which has to do with an object falling down but also with other events such as hair falling on one's shoulders, with an argument falling down, with losing balance or collapsing, etc. and perhaps even with the the phrase *falling in love*. The multiple other usages of *fall* do not immediately come to mind (cf. Weigand forthc.b). We are able to use the word but we do not know all possible usages. In this sense, the isolated word has a complex indeterminate meaning which might be considered a prototype that includes different uses but is not polysemous.

However communication is not the same as a configuration of prototypes. It is based not on single words but on a network of multi-word units or words-in-use (Sinclair 1998; Weigand 1998). *Words-in-use are phrases,* and it is the phrase with which we predicate. The phrase normally makes up one use, i.e., its meaning has become more precise. The specific conventions of use or collocations often become evident only in *language comparison*.

Let me demonstrate the basic lines of this approach of a network-of-use with the example *sich freuen/to be pleased* in a first preliminary analysis. The first question of the emotion expressed by this verb is already a difficult one. Is it JOY, PLEASURE, HAPPINESS? Damasio conceives of happiness as a basic emotion. Pleasure, however, according to him is like pain "a constituent quality of certain emotions" (Damasio 2000:76). In a first attempt, I think, we can put joy and happiness together and conceive of them as one basic emotion. This basic emotion might occur as slightly different internal states for which the individual languages have different sets of expressions such as

HAPPINESS

joy	Freude	gioia	joie
happiness	Glück	felicità	bonheur
pleasure	Vergnügen	divertimento	plaisir
....	....	....	....

Figure 7

These expressions, *joy, happiness, pleasure*, etc., do not denote exactly separable and definable emotions. We might consider them as language-specific sets based on family resemblances, the whole family being some sort of a prototype HAPPINESS. Thus we take account of the fact that these expressions are verbal communicative means not God-given signs for ontological internal states. In language use they can lose their specific meaning and can be used as approximate equivalents. For instance, in German,

(1) es ist mir eine Freude, es ist mir ein Vergnügen

are different ways-of-use, even with a difference in meaning which however is difficult to grasp. As conversational routines they are often used as approximate equivalents. The same is valid for the English ways-of-use

(2) it gives me a great pleasure, I am happy, I am delighted, etc.

Examples like these tell us that we have to distinguish on the one hand different internal states which are expressed by different words such as *happy, delighted, pleased*, and on the other hand ways-of-use which are again made up of different words but with equivalent uses. The conventions of use would have to be checked by a corpus linguistic analysis based on frequency of use. Artificial premises such as "meaning is defined" and "can be explicitly indicated" are without relevance for a theory of performance. In my opinion, it is of little help to contrast the meaning of "X feels happy" and "X feels joy" as Goddard (1998: 92) does by contrasting "something good happened to me. I don't want other things now" for *happy* and "something very good is happening now" for *joy*.

Now let us go into a bit more detail and compare the different ways of use in different languages. In German we have an interesting usage of the verb *sich freuen* which is usually not taken into account by cross-linguistic analyses: *sich freuen* may relate to a present or to a future state of affairs:

(3) *sich freuen auf* versus *sich freuen über*

There is also a special derived noun *Vorfreude* correlating with *sich freuen auf*. It seems to me that this way-of-use *sich freuen auf* has no precise correlate in meaning either in English or in Italian. In English we need to take a quite different verb, *to look forward to* which according to its literal meaning does not denote an emotion. The noun *Vorfreude* would have to be translated into English by *anticipation*. Whereas the verb *to look forward to* is always used in a positive sense like *sich freuen auf*, *anticipation* in contrast to *Vorfreude* lacks the positive aspect and is used in a neutral way. The situation in Italian is sim-

ilar to English. There are compound nouns *gioia anticipata, gioia dell'attesa, attesa gioiosa* which have a component denoting emotion but there is no verbal phrase like *sich freuen auf*. Other stems are used such as *essere in attesa, essere contenti*. One might think of the use of different prepositions: *essere contenti per* versus *essere contenti di* but this formal difference does not seem to make a clear difference in meaning. Again a comprehensive corpus analytic analysis would be needed.

In French the situation seems similar to Italian insofar as other verbal phrases such as *attendre avec impatience, être content* are used. However, there is also the possibility of adding *d'avance: qn se réjouit d'avance.*

From examples like these it becomes evident that comparative analyses are needed not only for translation purposes but also for knowing better how our own mother language works. The presumed conventions-of-use we find out must be verified by corpus linguistic analyses and the criterion of frequency of use. For conventions-of-translation however the cross-linguistic gap will remain and cannot be closed by parallel corpora, which in the end rely on the competence of native and quasi-native speakers.

3.2 Utterances and speech acts

Now let us take as our next example the whole utterance as a communicative means for carrying out speech acts. I think there are *three speech act types referring to emotions*: we can state the emotion we feel in CONSTATIVES, we can emphasize an overwhelming emotion in EXPRESSIVES and we can create social relationships by declaring emotions to exist in DECLARATIVES such as:

(4) I love you. DECLARATIVE

(5) I regret it (at court). DECLARATIVE

The declaration of an emotion, in my opinion, has to be distinguished from a statement:

(6) I love him. STATEMENT

(7) I regret it (in everyday talk). STATEMENT

(8) I am surprised. – I can believe it. STATEMENT

By declaring love the social relationship has changed (for the history of the speech act of declaration of love cf. Schwarz 1984). By declaring regret at court the circumstantial conditions of the case are changed.

The statement of an emotion, in my view, does not represent an expressive speech act. It is a representative speech act about an inner state of affairs. The interlocutor has to believe it because there is no possibility for him to verify it (examples 6, 7 and 8). I use the term expressive for speech acts which differ from statements in that the emotion is expressed in an overwhelming manner. Expressives, the genuine speech acts of emotion, aim at a reactive speech act of empathy by the interlocutor (example 9):

(9) What a surprise! – Indeed. EXPRESSIVE

Now we might ask for the verbal means which, as components of the utterance, can serve as speech-act-indicating devices. In general, it is the grammatical structure of the utterance including intonation and not the lexical means which constitutes action. Thus we have the pattern of the explicit performative utterance for the declarative speech act *I love you* which contrasts with the representative speech act *I love him*. We have the specific sentence type of an exclamatory sentence with a specific intonation contour *What a surprise!* which contrasts with the representative speech act *I am surprised*. These grammatical means however are integrated means, i.e., they are dependent on other means and variables of the action game.

Besides these types of speech acts for declaring, stating, and emphasizing an emotion, there is another type in which the emotion is only *an accompanying feature* of the action. We might make a statement which does not refer to any emotion at all but nevertheless the statement is accompanied by a feeling. The feeling might be positive in the sense of joy or pleasure, or it might be negative in the sense of anger. Thus the statement, for instance,

(10) You are playing the piano again.

may be intended as a confirming and encouraging speech act or as a reproach or accusation. Intonation is an important means for expressing this difference. Unfortunately, intonation is often not expressed in a sufficiently clear way.

Examples like this clearly demonstrate the need to open up the orthodox model and to allow for a theory dealing with uncertainty. The interlocutor first follows the technique of rules and identifies the grammatical structure of the sentence type which indicates a statement. At this point however he/she has to ask him-/herself what to do with this statement in this situation insofar as intonation is not sufficiently clearly expressed and therefore of no great help. That is the point where order, rules and generalizations come to an end. Individual conditions and particularities of the specific unrepeatable situation have to be accounted for. Principles of probability, inferences and suppositions

of what might be the reason for the utterance have to be used which inevitably open up the risk of misunderstanding. Meaning and understanding have to be negotiated in the complex interplay of order and disorder. In the end, the interlocutor has to rely on suppositions insofar as the speaker alone knows what he/she meant. Thus it becomes clear that in trying to arrive at a theory of performance we are forced to include chance and individuality in order to describe the human ability of competence-in-performance (cf. Weigand 1999).

3.3 Principles of emotion

Finally, let us analyse a complex example which is a whole action game based on a speech act which seems to demonstrate culturally dependent principles of emotion. We thus arrive at the fundamental issue of 'Euroversals' of emotion. Possible Euroversals become evident in contrast, in this case, to presumed Americanisms.

Let me first describe the background situation of this extraordinary action game. It was in New Orleans during a conference held over several days, on the Saturday before Easter. With a few colleagues we left the building, a conference centre, where we lived and were confronted by a striking sign skilfully painted which was posted right in front of the entrance. On the sign we read (names changed by E. W.)

(11) MIRIAM does still LOVE LARRY unconditionally.

My colleagues and I, from Northern Europe, were surprised and looked and studied the sign. Larry was the name of the head of the conference centre, a reserved type who was rather reticent. Apparently, it was he who was meant. What struck us most was the fact that this was a declaration of love. A very private individual love story had been deliberately made public. The sign was intentionally installed at the entrance so that everybody noticed it and connected it with the head of the conference centre. The writing was an explicit performative speech act, however, very interestingly in the 3rd person.

Now we might reflect on universal versus culturally shaped emotions. There is undoubtedly an emotion called love in America and in Europe and everywhere else. But what is love? Is this a linguistic question at all? What is the meaning of the verb *love* on the sign? It is not at all a defined concept but a concept which varies and is indeterminate and different for every speaker. In different cultures different principles are used to express it. Whereas in Northern Europe we often follow a principle such as "Hide your emotions in public",

such a principle does not seem to be pervasive in America. Love, a very private emotion, is deliberately and without any reservation made public. We must however admit that even in Europe teens declare their love by openly and publicly writing *I love you*, however, at least partly in an anonymous way. In this specific American action game Larry was a man in his fifties.

Even if we were always to be cautious in drawing general conclusions from a single event, it seems to indicate that Americans deal differently with private emotions. This is confirmed by other experiences during our stay in New Orleans. For instance, while walking in a park, we passed a man sitting on a bench phoning. 'Hi', he addressed us, 'I am talking with my brother', and then followed the whole private story of his brother. Such behaviour is quite unusual to people from Northern Europe who would never start a conversation with complete strangers by telling private stories except perhaps in a pub after a few glasses of beer. The question has to be asked as to what remains private for Americans.

The sign in front of the conference centre contains other very interesting details which confirm the integrational view. Not only verbal means but also perceptual means are used: different types of writing, capital letters, underlining, different colours, and mainly the painting of a heart above the word LOVE thus combining feelings with the body according to folk understandings of emotion. All these perceptual means stress the urgency of the feeling and expose privacy once more to the public.

Moreover, there is another intriguing point in the writing to be reflected on. While standing around and wondering about it, a colleague from Britain commented: "There must be a *sad story* behind it." How do we know this? Nothing is expressed explicitly. The fact that love still persists is expressed. We could try to construct inferences which might lead from the declaration of love to the sad story. We follow paths of probability and even only possibility in order to grasp the complex we are confronted with. The way the declaration is made must contain some hint of a story which is waiting to be fulfilled or worse which seems to be unable to be fulfilled. Again we wonder why Miriam declares her love in public, on the street, and not personally towards Larry himself. Why does she use *does love* and not simply *loves*? Moreover, *still* might be a means which expresses the fact that she is still waiting for her love to be fulfilled. Also *unconditionally* is full of possible meanings and points to problems and hindrances of a sad story.

In this way, by bringing different variables together and integrating them, we try to make sense of a complex action game which only consists of one single utterance. The problems of understanding this utterance as a component of the

action game are increased by the fact that we are only observers of the action game. Naturally, Miriam and Larry could tell us more. But not even they as speakers seem to be able to deal with their emotions in a satisfying way. Words and communicative means come to an end, and the inexpressible remains.

4. Conclusion: From patterns to adaptive human behaviour

With this last example, we completely left behind us the view that we might discover the simple and build up the complex by combining simple units. We are a long way from a view of language as a sign system. The complex cannot be dealt with by adding item to item, neither can the jaguar be built up by adding quarks. For a theory of performance, there is no simple item, only integration of different phenomena from the very beginning.

Human beings have the ability to symbolize or to create and use signs. It is however completely off the point to isolate this ability and to base the image of the species on it. What is needed first is to come to grips with the type of adaptive behaviour human beings demonstrate when mediating between order and disorder. Scientific research which crosses academic boundaries is needed in order to achieve a broadly-based understanding of the complex (cf. Toulmin 2001: ix). Symbolizing has to be integrated with other abilities as part of human adaptive and constructive behaviour. Only thus can we arrive at an understanding of how human beings negotiate meaning and understanding in dialogue, an ability which defines the species as the dialogic species.

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Universality vs. Culture-Specificity of Emotion

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1. Man and emotion

From the phylogenetic and even ontogenetic viewpoint, emotions represent the most initial and elementary psychical apparatus, closely linked with the physiology of the human organism and serviceable to its behavior. In Rost's book on emotions (1990) we find a witty remark that the 'emotional brain' evolved and functioned earlier than the 'rational brain'. Robert de Beaugrande (1996: 553) rightly reminds us that the essential functions of the human organism make emotions a universal, all-penetrating factor for survival and physiological well-being. Nevertheless, in spite of the universal character of the phenomenon of human emotion, we have to take into consideration that the contexts which trigger emotions can vary from culture to culture (or subculture) so that the theme of cultural specificity comes to the fore.

The plausible general statement that emotion holds a strategic position between instinct (or drive) and cognition opens the rather complicated and discussed topic of the relation between the two subsystems. In the relevant literature we find a number of more or less different formulations; nevertheless, all of them have a common denominator, namely a close relationship, complementarity, cooperation or interaction, or even unity of the two subsystems.

As early as in 1927, E. Sapir (1927: 413) stated that these two things "are never completely sundered except by a process of abstraction". A similar formulation we find in the *Thèses* of the Prague Circle (1929: 14), and a quite similar stance can be found in Piaget (1961: 11) emotions and intelligence "in no case represent two independent faculties". Mowrer (1960: 308) also claims that "the emotions do not at all deserve being put into opposition with 'intel-

ligence'"; in fact, they are themselves "a higher order of intelligence". Similarly Izard (1977) finds that "some emotion is always present in ordinary state of consciousness", although "it is not always cognized or symbolized". The recent movement to elaborate integrative models of the 'whole man' ascribes to emotions a quite extraordinary importance in the total economy of living organisms and shows that the emotions in consciousness influence all perceptions, cognition, and behavior. (Some years ago, I called this state of affairs "the ubiquity or omnipresence of emotion" and consequently assumed that any utterance and discourse unit of higher orders bears an "emotional value" (cf. Daneš 1990: 169).) Edda Weigand, in elaborating her concept of the Dialogic Action Game, came to the concurrent conclusion that "emotions are a constitutive component of human beings' actions and are inseparably intertwined with the other components" (Weigand 1998a: 47).

2. Emotion vs. cognition

It appears that one of the crucial points in the 'emotion vs. cognition' discussion is the interpretation of the term *cognition*. The approach that treats 'cognition' in the sense of abstract conceptual entities appears as narrow and one-sided. This propositional mode of cognitive structures is, in fact, neither the only issue of human cognizance nor the only content of language signs and speech utterances. As Dascal (1991: 161) pointed out, this mode of language use should not even be regarded as the dominant and primary one. In fact it derives from a more basic use, since "an utterance is naturally embedded in the wholeness of concrete experience and it is immediately understood as such". He argued for a "pragmatic" conception of knowledge and cognition, "where the relevant criterion is not accuracy of representation, but the ability of the 'knower' to play successfully the social game of justification".

Let us preferably take up the complex basic notion of *experiencing*. Man is always in a process of experiencing something in space and time, which involves various modes of experience (be it perception, imagination, phantasy, thought, etc.), and one of its essential characteristic properties is *emotional involvement* with the object being experienced (cf. Hermans 1974: 14). From this fact follows that emotion and cognition in no case represent two independent faculties. Again, the said distinction appears rather as a heuristic device.

Thus we can conclude that emotion exerts, *inter alia*, a double function in our experience. On the one hand, it brings forth a special kind of cognizance

of relevant information about the things we are confronted with, and on the other hand, it takes an active part in the formation of our conceptual net.

Our assumption finds relevant support in some findings in neuro-psychological research. H. Maturana (1982: 28) stated that the neurological equivalents of thoughts and feelings are neither functionally, nor hierarchically organised. Rather, "they can be likened to an endless dance of internal correlations in close network of interacting elements". Is this not an excellent argument for the interactive approach? Consequently, we have to expect that in speech (discourse), the cognitive and emotional activities will also be complexly related at some levels of its organization (cf. Arndt & Janney 1991: 529).

Since there is no commonly accepted determination and classification of the vast field of emotion, I will subsume a set of more or less cognate phenomena under this label which appear in psychological and other literature with labels like *feeling, affect, emotion, mood, passion, sentiment, emotional attitudes, personal traits, relational dispositions,* as well as some other features relevant to interaction. Emotions could be briefly characterised by the following set of properties, contrasting with those of cognition (cf. also the contrastive parameters of the two domains in de Beaugrande 1996: 555f.):

– Emotions are diffuse and variable, "hard to describe and harder to differentiate and classify" (Simon 1982: 336).

– Emotions permeate the other domains of human experiencing.

– Emotions change, for the most part, continuously and are susceptible to continuous gradation.

– Their gradual 'more or less' nature bears upon the fact that they are coded in analogous terms (iconically), and consequently they are primarily manifested in speech by means of prosodic and non-verbal features. This fact calls for the necessity of specific decoding, evaluating, and inferencing procedures on the partner's side.

– Emotions are experienced (lived through) much more immediately, deeply, and intensively than cognitive processes.

– Emotions have a personal character, and they are primarily spontaneous and unintentional.

– In different societies and cultures there may be partly different norms regulating the expression and manifestation of certain emotions. To what degree there are also socio-cultural differences in the set of emotions itself is an open and difficult question.

As for the interaction of emotion and cognition, two facts are of general validity: cognition evokes emotion (it is 'emotiogenic'), and emotion affects cognition. They interact at all levels of cognitive processes, even in scientific

research. Clearly, we are experiencing various emotions at the stage of discovery procedures and sometimes even when formulating our findings and presenting them to others. After all, one might agree with Maturana's somewhat radical formulation that "we search constantly for the rational bases of our rational systems, but it is finally very difficult for us to fully grasp the fact that every rational system goes back to some irrational beginning" (1982: 31).

3. Operating of emotions

In their *catalytic* (non-informative) function, emotions may promote, or, in turn, inhibit or damp down cognitive and other discourse processes, both on the producer's and recipient's side. In different languages, one finds locutions telling that fear or joy can paralyse a person's tongue or speech. After all, the influence of emotion on the speech behavior of participants in all kinds of dialogue, debate, or conversation is evident and often of significance. The same holds, in a way, for contact between a speaker or actor and his/her audience, and the like. In all such instances we have to do with mutual influencing, with feedback – and let us add that these emotional functions often occur simultaneously, though in different dominance relations.

In the above list of characteristic features of emotion, I have mentioned its spontaneity. But this simplified statement needs a significant modification. Besides spontaneous manifestations of emotions we also have to reckon with their *strategic employment.* This distinction goes back to Anton Marty's (1908) distinction of *emotional* communication and *emotive* communication. According to him, the emotional one is a type of spontaneous, unintentional leakage or bursting out of emotion in speech, whereas emotive communication influences the partners' interpretations of the situation. It has no automatic or necessary relation to the speaker's real, actual affective state and is rather related to self-presentation, aiming at the partner, and has a persuasive character.

Marty's dichotomy later appeared in the Prague School *Thèses* from 1929 and was further elaborated and refined by Mathesius (1937). Along his line, I arrived at the following conclusion:

Seen from the producer's side, we might reckon with the following possibilities. First, the speaker shows (pronounces) his/her emotion automatically, fully spontaneously. Second, the speaker wants to conceal his/her emotion and tries to suppress it; nevertheless he involuntarily lets it out (the emotion will then be revealed by various features of the speaker's utterance and/or by other communicative behavior). Third, emotion is manifested by the speaker inten-

tionally (communicated in the true sense). In this case the emotion may be either genuine, really experienced by the speaker, or merely performed. In this case, the speaker may want to influence the hearer or a third person in order to achieve a desired effect or to present him/herself in a certain light. A special and typical emotional strategy is the producer's endeavour to evoke a certain emotional state or attitude in the recipient, or to change his/her current state. In languages we find a set of expressions labelling such changes (*enrage*, *horrify*, *soothe*, etc.).

4. Classification of emotion

The very crucial problem of any research in the field of emotion, having practical research consequences, is the lack of a satisfying and currently accepted classification, connected with the basic relevance of their metalinguistic labels. In any language there exists a large set of such labels designating those emotions that the members of a given culture recognize as particularly salient. But these labels are rather imprecise, vague, overlapping in part, and in no case do they map the field systematically. Moreover, a contrastive cross-cultural analysis of emotions in different languages is severely hampered by the fact that the meanings of many alleged equivalents do not fully agree.

There has been presented, to date, a number of different classifications of emotion, using diverse criteria of division. As an eligible sample let us briefly survey, at least, Izard's (1977) well-known scheme of 'basic' emotions, based on the primary criterion of motivation, which seems to me relatively convenient and hence preferable:

1. *Event-triggered* emotions, lasting for a shorter time. They are either ameliorative (*interest, excitement)* or neutral (*surprise, startle*), or pejorative (*contempt, fear, disgust)*.
2. *State-triggered* emotions, lasting for longer terms (how the self is assessed by others): *happiness, sadness, distress*.
3. *Action-triggered* emotions (agent's attitudinal assessment of his/her own actions: *pride, shame, guilt*).

There are also *complex (combined)* emotions: *anxiety, depression, love, hate, envy*.

Mees (1991) also proposed a relatively similar division. He, too, established three classes: 1. emotions based on events, 2. emotions based on an act or ac-

tivity of the bearer of emotion, 3. emotions based on a person or an object (so-called relational emotions).

Such classifications, though serviceable, fail in cases when a certain emotion may be provoked by more than one of the triggers. Let us take the label *to be angry* in the following phrases: *he was angry with his brother, with himself for having been late, he was angry at her for accusing him, people often got angry about many foolish things, she was angry at being kept waiting, she will be angry to learn that...* The following definition quoted from the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary prompts a clear semantic analysis of the term: "Someone who is angry feels or shows strong emotion about an action or situation which they consider unacceptable, unfair, cruel or insulting, and about the person responsible for it" (underlined by F.D.). (A contrastive analysis of 'anger' in three European languages was proposed by Weigand 1998b.)

5. Dimensions and culture-specific aspects of emotion

It is a truism that the universal human property of emotion occurs in various modifications, alterations, variations, depending on specific conditions. But it is not self-evident and apparent how to identify and characterize these variations. Since emotion is a rather complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, we have to search for them along particular dimensions.

The possible dependent variables operate on dimensions such as the type of the bearer of emotion (individuals, or groupings of various types and their position on the diatopic, diastratal, diachronic, and some other axes), further, varying responses to a particular target, emotional vs. emotive communication, the context of situation, and last but not least the particular emotion unit or its type. Of course, also the ways and means how people disclose, show or demonstrate their emotions vary according to the said circumstances. (Naturally, the issue of the inner experience of emotions is hardly accessible to our sociolinguistic research.)

The phenomenon of emotion has its historical dimension. The cultural determinants could foster new emotions or rather new responses to them, they might change their interpretation, of course, with differences in diverse cultures, as well as in one and the same culture in different periods.

Let us dwell, for a moment, on the topic of the changes and differences in emotional behavior. The situation of present-day Western Societies is characterised by rapid changes, and our approach to the study of emotion needs to take into account this dynamic movement: The value standards and hierarchy,

as well as the systems of attitudes are under reconstruction, the social norms are, in turn, under deconstruction and are losing their obligatory power, many of the older taboos are no more valid, and an inclination to laxity begins to prevail. These tendencies concern the use of words and locutions, the choice of themes or topics in many kinds of written and spoken discourses. It also concerns the optical sphere of pictures and video materials, as well as further aspects of human behaviour, not last emotions, to be sure. We might say that 'showing' is becoming a favourite phenomenon.

There appears a marked tendency to show emotions openly and without discrimination in public, and to respond even to various triggers of 'unclassical' types. We might perhaps say that a new *emotional atmosphere* or *climate* is arising. To be sure, the climate does not involve the given society as a whole and in the same manner, rather we might reckon with a number of 'climatic zones' and 'sub-zones'. One of such sub-zones could be, for instance, the domain of various talk shows. The entertainers often tell jokes and anecdotic stories, mostly with a sexual topic, freely using expressive words that have not been acceptable, so far, in a 'polite society', being evaluated by its members as indecent, lascivious, or wanton. As for the talk-show audience, they evidently enjoy it and respond with laugh and applause. On the other hand, some other people, watching such TV-performances, may be shocked by them. They clearly live in another emotional (sub)zone.

Now back to the classical sociological or anthropological treatment of emotion. The social life of humans in the context of a certain cultural environment creates life conditions that differ in particular cultures and thus generates specific needs and emotional response to them. For example, members of different cultures have to learn to be afraid or to enjoy different things. This fact issues in the existence of different cultural behavioral patterns, standards, and certain norms that admit, demand, or prohibit expressing this or that emotion in a certain way. The psychological and sociological study of the cultural determination of emotional behavior mostly paid attention primarily to this normative aspect. But this approach seems to be somewhat narrow and simplified and takes into account rather the globalization view, neglecting the tendencies to diversification, fractalization, and individualization.

Let us start with an example. There exists a trivial conviction that in the Italian culture a free and loud or noisy expression of emotions belongs to its characteristics, whereas the Englishmen are said to be reserved and cool in their emotional behavior. One speaks of two different types of temperament (the notion of temperament also belongs to the rubric of 'emotion', in the broad sense). Classical examples of the English coolness may be found, for instance,

among the personages in Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga*. (The figure of Soams is especially interesting.) But what is also interesting is the rather hot emotional behavior of English football fans, of the visitors of disco-clubs, of the excited crowds of people in various stadiums listening to popular singers, as well as of the very lively debating members of the Parliament.

Two pieces of knowledge may be drawn from these observations. Firstly, Galsworthy's presentation may hold good for a special class of the society in a certain period only. Secondly, the social differences between emotions should be sought for not only between cultures as wholes, but also between sub-cultures, people categories and various groups in one and the same culture, as well as between sub-cultures and the like within different cultures. It seems to me that it is just this 'sub-cultural' research what could represent a very interesting and rewarding field of study.

The sub-cultures, categories or groups are, of course, of diverse character, the differentiation takes place on diatopical, diastratal, diachronical, and other levels. I am well aware of the fact that we could find out a vast number of possible particular groupings, established according to various features, in a given society. And the number of things that are able to trigger an emotional response is simply immense. It is evident that such detailed microanalyses inevitably presuppose a threshold of termination, practically, a reasonable choice of significantly relevant social categories and of the kinds or types of particular emotion triggers.

6. "No word – no feeling?"

Finally, let us return to the basic problem of classifying and labelling emotions. In the relevant literature we often find attempts to identify a set of fundamental human emotions, universal, discrete, and presumably innate. Such candidates I have listed above in Izard's classification: mostly it will be reckoned with items such as *interest, joy, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame/shyness, guilt.* I will leave aside here the problem of identifying criteria employed in the establishing of such sets (cf. Weigand 1998b); instead I will point at the fact that the authors identify the emotions by employing English words.

As the well-known Australian scholar (of Polish origin) Anna Wierzbicka (1985) critically remarked in her article "Human emotions: Universal or culture-specific?", the English terms of emotion constitute, in fact, a mere folk taxonomy. Such folk taxonomies may be found in the vocabularies of any lan-

guage and they reflect more or less diverse empirical differentiations and conceptualizations of the particular domain of the real world. Thus Wierzbicka came to the true conclusion that even English words are language specific and culture specific. But "if we want to posit universal human emotions we must identify them in terms of a language-independent semantic metalanguage, not in terms of English folk terms", she says (Wierzbicka 1985: 585). The solution Wierzbicka proposes is a semantic and lexicographic one, namely to analyse the semantic content of language specific labels in terms of semantic features that she calls 'semantic primitives'. She takes for granted that English words such as *say, want, good, bad* express universally valid concepts and may represent those 'primitives', and she believes that by means of the suggested analysis one could establish, at least, hypothetical universals or near-universals. We can only speculate about the feasibility of a large-scale implementation of the proposed procedure, of course with the proviso that the semantic content of those English words does really represent universally valid 'primitive concepts'.

One can agree with the statement that "there are countless emotions that can be perceived as distinct and recognizable" (Wierzbicka 1985: 587). But I have doubts whether the differentiation into individual units of particular emotions is a satisfying representation of the structure of the component of the human organism called 'emotion'. Perhaps it would be more adequate to use the metaphor of a field or space of fluctuating fuzzy elementary emotional states, i.e. a "diffused continuum" (to use Trudgill's (1986) wording) with relatively "condensed islands", more or less different in various cultures and identified by them by means of particular labels. To the question brought up by Wierzbicka "No word – no feeling?", I only find a negative answer.

7. The envoy

Let me conclude by expressing my genuine view on emotion in the social as well as individual life: The recent trend toward 'anti-emotionism' is incompatible with cultures and societies that foster the ideal of humanism. Emotions, being one of the most elementary human abilities, are inseparable from our personal life and social interaction. Nevertheless, to be sure, they should not be left growing as wild plants. They need to be pruned and cultivated as beneficial flowers.

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Emotions in Language and Communication

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1. Introduction

The fact that in everyday communication we also express emotions, feelings and attitudes has always been acknowledged in linguistics. However, linguistics has focused on language as a code and studied those linguistic meanings that are discrete and recurrent, and reflected as such in linguistic consciousness. Even in this perspective, emotions, feelings and attitudes have not been omitted by linguistic descriptions. It has been suggested that emergence of linguistic meanings and establishment of a sign system in linguistic consciousness involves the thetic phase, i.e. identification of the object and its differentiation from other objects, and the qualification phase, producing evaluations of the object from the viewpoint of the subject.

These two phases have been related to the semantic dichotomy of denotation and connotation or the objective and subjective components of language. The relation between cognition and emotion figures not only in the entangled complex of problems of denotation and connotation of a language sign but also in the dichotomies of neutrality and markedness, explicitness and implicitness, said and unsaid, text and subtext, language and paralanguage, words and gestures and other dichotomies formulated in theoretical reflections on language.

Though the dichotomies just mentioned do not coincide, there is one feature they share. One of their poles is considered the primary one while the other is treated as additional. Thus, in traditional semantics, connotative meaning is a secondary, usually weakly (socially) coded meaning which a sign may have in addition to its primary, standard, essential denotative meaning which

is mandatory, i.e. strongly coded. However, what is supplementary and even peripheral may become central and crucial under specific circumstances.

2. The study of emotions in poetics and stylistics

The study of emotions as well as that of connotations has always been the domain of stylistics, poetics and aesthetics. These disciplines have shown that any separation of primary and secondary components of meaning is only arbitrary. In more holistic and semiotic reflections on meaning in stylistics and poetics, connotations are not regarded as supplementary values attached to denotations, and analogously, emotions are not viewed as supplementary values attached or added to cognition. Difficulty connected with the distinction between primary and secondary aspects of meaning has led many semioticians to reject the denotation-connotation dichotomy altogether (Nöth 1990: 102). Barthes, in his later writings, saw nothing but one of its many connotations in the denotation of a sign. Also, it has been claimed that the connotation of a symbol is essential in contrast to its denotation meaning.

The relation between emotion and cognition must be approached differently across text types, genres, styles, periods of intellectual development and respective cultures. For example, it is well known that the Romantics claimed primacy of the heart over the mind and of the irrational over the reason and consequently considered poetry the primary form of emotive expression. However, in poetics, stylistics, aesthetics, and literary theory, the relation between cognitive and emotive components of the text has been studied not only with respect to such genres as lyric poetry (in Goethe's opinion, lyrics is "a natural form" for the expression of emotion) but with respect to other genres – both written and spoken – as well. These theories have always recognized that the whole in which cognitive and emotive elements are intermingled is superior to its parts, and claimed the primacy of suprasegmental phenomena over the segments, intonation over notional elements and gestures over words.

Can linguistics accept such a holistic approach to meaning or is it obliged to study discrete elements only? An attempt to study emotions through linguistics presupposes to define the recurrent meanings of their vehicles. This is possible when emotions are named. An attempt to treat emotions linguistically as discrete and recurrent semantic primitives can be found in Anna Wierzbicka's article (1973: 499) on expressions of emotion where she makes a componential analysis of such words as *joy, sorrow, regret, fear* or *irritation*. When Wierzbicka discusses emotions described by Tolstoy in Anna Karen-

ina, she analyzes their direct formulations, such as *They were happy, He felt depressed* or *She felt almost ashamed*.

But literature gives us also more variegated examples of rendering emotions, e.g., the expression of emotions through indirect means. Correspondingly, poetics provides us with examples of their more complex analysis. In *The Overcoat*, one of Gogol's grotesque Petersburg stories (Gogol 1952), emotions of the hero are not described explicitly but rendered by features of his speech, motions and gestures. The narrative structure of *The Overcoat* is created by a distorted, nearly aphasic language doubting the competence of the hero to give things their proper names and, consequently, to give them their proper place in his life. While his ability to speak clearly is destroyed, his ability to keep things under control and to influence actively the course of events fails him, too.

> Out on the street, Akaky Akakievich walked along as one in a dream. "What do you know?" he said to himself, "I really didn't even think that it could turn out, you know... " And then after a short silence: "So there you are! Look how finally turned out, and really, I couldn't even have supposed that that's how it would be." After this another long silence ensued; then he said aloud: "So that's how it is! There is a really unexpected one for you, I mean... there's one you couldn't have... What a situation!"
>
> (Gogol 1952: 139f., English translation quoted from Fanger 1967: 118)

This is how the hero muses over the tailor's statement that his old overcoat is beyond repair. His speech consists mostly of interjections, particles, deictic pronouns, empty words, unfinished and incoherent utterances, pauses and exclamations. This text was called a masterpiece of inarticulateness, of hemming and hawing, of timid stammering. As Fanger (1967: 117–118) states, English does not have so many equivalents for the numerous prefixes, suffixes and infixes on which the Gogolian effect depends, nor for the particles that can give a sentence phonetic bulk while leaving it semantically weightless. Gogol first captures the hearing of a Russian reader, and the analysis of his prose is connected with the attempts at acoustic linguistics.

The story was analyzed by one of the outstanding Russian formalists Boris Eikhenbaum (1924) in his brilliant essay "How Gogol's 'The Overcoat' Was Made". He identified the role of intonation in this prose and called this kind of stylistic device based on typical acoustic features of oral narration a 'sound gesture'. Today, we would probably use the term 'paralanguage', i.e. the term for an index of personality traits and affective states. The concept of vocal gesture has later also been used by Sapir (1949: 535) to refer to the expressive function of language in general. In poetics, a theory of language as a gesture has been

developed by Blackmur (1952: 3), based on the argument that "when the language of words most succeeds it becomes gesture in its words". And in a still broader sense, gesture has been used by some authors as a fundamental term for any act of communication.

3. Premises following the stylistic analysis

A. *An adequate account of emotive communication needs to pay equal attention to verbal, nonverbal, vocal and kinetic aspects of vehicles of communication.*

The introduction of the notion of 'sound gesture' and the relation between 'sound gesture' and 'motoric gesture' is the first reason why I used the example of Gogol's device and its stylistic analysis made by Eikhenbaum. Emotions are not named in the story but alongside the hero's distorted speech and its sound gestures they have another vehicle – the motion of the hero. The state of the hero's mind may be inferred from his motions and from his motoric gestures that become symptoms of his emotions.

B. *An adequate account of emotive communication displayed in the 1st person behavior needs to pay equal attention to its effect on the 2nd person as well as on the 3rd person who may be an observer to the given communication act. The display of emotion can easily serve as material for play and become subject to caricature or destruction.*

Another reason why I used the example of Gogol's story is to show that the effect of emotions is less predictable than we would expect. The range of potential meanings of emotions and their interpretations by different people is rather wide. As addressees and observers, we depend on assumptions about what emotive signs in fact signify and we can evaluate them differently. In literary texts, apart from the voice of the hero, there is also the voice of the narrator, the author and the reader. And for them, the emotions displayed may have different significance. It may come as a surprise that in *The Overcoat*, emotions of the hero do not become an object of the author's empathy but rather the object of his irony. Although there are several traces of humanistic strain in *The Overcoat*, the relationship between the author and his hero is rather that of romantic, grotesque irony (Schooneveld 1973: 481n). Through the narrator, of course, Gogol applies his ironical destruction of the hero, verbally constructed as a speaking mute from the very outset of the narrative, to the poor, grotesque end of Akaky Akakievich, to his death. As the narrator himself notes, "Akaky

Akakievich explained himself for the most part in prepositions, adverbs, and, finally, such particles as have absolutely no significance" (Gogol 1952: 37). The hero's sound gesture is a device that deflates him (Fanger 1967: 117).

C. *An adequate account of emotive communication needs to pay attention to the notion of norm.*

The third reason why I used the introductory example was to mention the phenomenon of deviation from the norm. Both notions of the norm and a deviation from this norm play an important role in Russian formalism and Czech structuralism. It was also the experience of Russian formalism with the analysis of literary texts that was significant for Jakobson's view of language developed later in the period of Prague structuralism. Jakobson incorporated the study of poetic works into the science of language. To Bühler's (1934) model, recognizing three functions of language (cognitive or referential; appellative and expressive), Jakobson added three more: phatic, metalinguistic and poetic functions. Similarly to Bühler, Jakobson saw message as dominated by one or another language function. Thus, our literary example is featured by the domination of the emotive function that overrides the representative function of the hero's message and distorts its structure, signaling deviation from accepted norms: the lack of sense, non-semantic words, incoherence.

D. *An adequate account of emotive communication needs to consider the balance with cognitive requirements of a genre.*

If we consider appropriateness of the text and observation of the norms, it is necessary to take into account requirements of the genre and linguistic functions expected to be met in this genre. For example, there is a difference in the amount of emotion allowed in the inner speech and outer speech, in private speech and public address. It is often claimed that classic functionalist models of language, and the Prague model among them, were mainly content-oriented (Caffi & Janney 1994: 336). It is necessary to admit that this is true. Interesting distinctions in accents had already been made by older scholars who had inspired the Prague functionalist thought. Bühler remarked that whereas Wundt concentrated on language mainly as *Ausdruck* (emphasizing emotional expressivity), and Husserl, in his strong opposition to Wundt, focused mainly on language as *Darstellung* (emphasizing the referential function), Marty dealt with the *Ausdruck* (emotional) and *Appell* (emotive) functions but ignored aspects of language related to *Darstellung* (cf. Caffi & Janney 1994: 336).

In Bühler's and also in Jakobson's definition of the expressive-emotive function, as well as in Mathesius' definition of emphasis, emotive choices are

viewed as being centered around '*Satzinhalt*', and are equated with speaker's attitudes toward 'what they are speaking about', i.e. toward the content. (This does not concern Jakobson's and Mukařovský's view of the work of art dominated by the poetic function of language.)

Jakobson is sometimes accused of not making a distinction between emotive and emotional communication (Caffi & Janney 1994: 336), though both Karl Bühler (1934) and Anton Marty (1908) had made this distinction, i.e. the distinction between intentional and unintentional expression of feeling. Thus, emotive communication is the intentional, strategic signaling of affective information in speech and writing in order to influence partners' interpretations of situations and reach different goals, while emotional communication is regarded as a type of spontaneous, unintentional leakage or eruption of emotion in speech. The distinction made between the two notions stresses that emotive communication has no automatic or necessary relation to 'real' inner affective states. Rather, it is related to self-presentation, and it is inherently strategic, persuasive, interactional and directed at the other by its very nature.

Obviously, Jakobson was aware of the distinction between inner emotional states and the notion of outward emotional performance. He speaks of emotions – whether real or pretended – but he does not seem to be interested in psychological phenomena, neither on the speaker's, nor on the addressee's side, including the phenomenon of influencing the partner psychologically. What Jakobson focuses on is the message and its structure under the domination of some of the language functions. How can we know whether the emotions are real or not, intended or unintentional? Do symptoms of our inner states, such as intonation or gestures, not affect the addressee of our messages and function as signals for him? They do – since they are present in the message.

At the discourse level of genres, it is important to clarify the relation between emotions and interaction types, since genres may put constraints on the kind and amount of involvement allowed. Taking into account the requirements of genre, we face the problem of the margins of freedom of choices (Caffi & Janey 1994: 348). It seems evident that there is an inverse relation between the strictness of the conventions that are expected to be met in any given interaction-type and the speaker's freedom of emotive choices.

In the following part of my paper, I will discuss the question of emotions in the genre of political debates and interviews. I will address the premises outlined in this section of the paper in my analysis.

4. Emotions in political debates

In her article "The Dialogic Action Game" Edda Weigand (2000) discusses the metaphor of the chess game which is often referred to in attempts to elaborate on essential features of language use, conceived as a joint activity. Are we playing chess when we use language? Not in natural dialogues, of course. But institutional interaction in general involves a reduction in the range of interactional practices compared to those deployed by the participants in a casual dialogue. This concerns also the expression and interpretation of emotions in media political debates.

Recently, the metaphor of a chess game, in connection with acceptability of emotions in political negotiations, appeared in a Czech newspaper article evaluating the behavior of Czech politicians:

> *Emotions like a figure in a Czech game of chess*
> *Karel Hvíž´ala*
>
> We have a governmental crisis and it is good that it happened so soon. It reminds us of traditional mistakes. Just like we are able to mistake dreams for facts, we also mix up rational political moves with emotional categories with which other disciplines work. Words of intolerance, betrayal and honor make this clear. Claims of almost all participants work with notions that do not belong to politics as a game of chess. Imagine that Kasparov should get up in the middle of the game and announce: "I would never consider playing with the horse for a single second!" Our politicians partly distribute emotions and partly engage in a serious game, which makes them weaker and hard to comprehend. Thus: both remind us of chess players who have not considered their moves beforehand. Instead of a rational analysis of a particular situation, they keep spreading emotions around themselves like a mist which should cover their lack of readiness for their next moves.

Emotive words such as *spreading emotions around themselves* suggest that the presentation of political attitudes is seen as a rule-governed play, where there is no place for emotions. I have selected an example which shows possible choices available to participants in political debates.

> 7 or Seven days – June 9th, 2002
> Moderator: JB – Jana Bobošíková
> Participants in discussion: VK – Václav Klaus, VŠ – Vladimír Špidla

(1) JB: Good afternoon (.). Will the elections be perceived as a clash between a left oriented social state and right oriented responsibility of a person for his or her own fate? I would want to welcome Václav Klaus, the Chairman

of the Chamber of Deputies and ODS here in our studio. Good afternoon.
VK: Good afternoon.
JB: And Vladimír Špidla, the Deputy Prime Minister of the government of the Czech Republic and Chairman of ČSSD. Good afternoon.
VŠ: Good afternoon.
JB: Gentlemen, before we start, I would want to ask one basic question. Could you briefly describe what this year's elections will be about. Mr. Chairman –
VK: *Well they will be about everything, I mean whether (.) whether we are going to continue this way, the way we have taken for the past four years (.) or whether we start moving more and more toward socialism, which means backward, m: if we are going to walk bravely toward the future or toward the past.*
JB: In your opinion, Mr. Chairman, what will the elections be about?
VŠ: *Whether an outdated conception of a minimal liberal state without social responsibility will eventually win or a modern conception of a social state of the twenty-first century.*

The different involvement styles are anticipated already by the introductory statements of both politicians: *The high involvement style* of the first speaker, Václav Klaus, will have conspicuous features of affective discourse. It will contrast with the *low involvement style* of the second speaker, Vladimír Špidla. The term 'low involvement style' is, however, only a label. It does not mean at all that the speaker is detached; he is rather moderate. I will define his style first.

Špidla's answers represent *a content-centered discourse*, dominated by the *representative communicative function*. Content requirements stand in the foreground, the topic tends to determine the course of his replies and the choice of register. The content organization and presentation is clear, condensed and specific. He states the principality of the subtopics he mentions. He uses concise, often short slogans and refers to statistical data in most of his turns. He shows that he is well-prepared and focused. His intonation is that of assertion. The metatextual comments he employs intensify this orientation of his style.

The introductory statement in Example 2: *I believe that all my quotes are clear,* introduces Špidla's list of the main issues of the program: *educational system without tuition; health care without direct payment; Labor code.* He stresses the essential importance of these claims and contrasts them with the claims of his opponent. He uses very simple and, so to say, basic rhetorical strategies:

(2) VŠ: *I believe that all my claims are clear.* The (.) government must be based (.) on a program agreement and this agreement results from things that

are of essential importance: *an educational system without tuition fees – and ODS speaks of tuition fees; health care (.) without direct payment – and (.) ODS speaks of direct payment in health care; Labor code – and Vaclav Klaus calls the Labor code a brutal invasion of the sphere of private business interests.*

Špidla prefers simple positive statements and his argumentation is based on statistical data. He draws attention to these numbers calling them *interesting*:

(3) VŠ: *It is interesting that the unemployment of young people – under twenty five years of age – is at its lowest since nineteen ninety five. It is interesting that more (.) that long term unemployment has started to drop. It is interesting that investment possibilities created fifty one thousand new jobs and that through our active employment policy we managed to create another fifty thousand new job openings* (.) if it were not for ODS, practically tying our hands (.) preventing us (.) from a more active use of the active employment policy by limitations and nonsensical pressure (.) about the budget, I must say that these results would be better. Anyhow, I am happy that we managed (.) to stop (.) the peaking unemployment rate, (.) the way of Václav Klaus (and that unemployment is slowly dropping.)
VK: [But no. Really. This is way too much. No it doesn't make any sense.] ((short laughter))

In contrast to Klaus, Špidla addresses his opponent very rarely, but when he does, he is short, firm and sharp as in Example 4. When interrupted, he insists on coherence of his words and aims to stress the final point:

(4) VŠ: *I think that it is correct to give voters necessary information so that they can (.) make a decision. You (.) have not given this information.*
VK: I told the voters what they pay on average (.) tangibly I am afraid we do not have more time to go into further details.
JB: No.
VK: Fifteen thousand for health care and you lie to them claiming that health care is for free. [In case the voter heard this, he would... so he would I hope that ...]
VŠ: *[Health care is financed from general health insurance and our conception is such (.)] [to preserve it so that everybody would have]*
VK: [I hope that they had understood]
VŠ: *equal chances and that the care he or she is getting should not be influenced by (.) his or her social standing.*

Špidla evokes the impression that he is keeping the situation under control. He gives no signs of feeling uncomfortable either with the questions or with his partner in communication. Though he is constantly interrupted by his partner, and though the partner constantly comments on Špidla's speech with his indications of disagreement, irony and contempt (as already in Example 3), Špidla pays no attention to this and goes on, trying to remain coherent and topic-focused. He does not speak about himself. Only rarely he refers to himself in the 1st person, and it is only in short metatextual statements, such as *I must say, I must state, I must not forget, I want to say, I think that it is correct*.

The second speaker, Václav Klaus, is mainly *oriented towards the addressee*. He comments on his opponent's discourse employing nonverbal signals, various more or less articulate vocal signals, facial gestures and body movements, mostly shaking his head ironically: Example 5 shows his ironic signals *yes, yes, yes, yes, well, hmmm*, and interruptions. He pounces on everything Špidla says, despite the fact that he can gain nothing by using the weapon of irony (as in Example 5); he just cannot resist the temptation:

(5) VŠ: I must say that the wages of teachers went up by [thirty percent on average (.) under our government]
VK: [*Yes, with inflation. Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes*]
VŠ: [That these wages were growing (.) faster] than other wages in the sector of public [employment]
VK: [*Well*]
VŠ: of the public employment. Thus (.) we did support teachers significantly. And I must say, too, as I have already mentioned, that these (.) numbers are sixty one to ninety two billion, and this is the way (.) we want to continue. If I wanted to get into evaluation of your (.) [your (.) your (.) wages]
VK: [*Mr. Chairman, can I just say one word to you?*]
VŠ: I must say that (.) during the (.) long period (.) of your government, the growth of real wages was between (.) two and three percent because you (.) keep forgetting (.) the drastic drop of real wages by some [thirty percent]
VK: [*Hmmm*]
VŠ: With which you (.) you (.) were starting (.) I mean playing with numbers [in various ways].
VK: [*Yes, yes.*]
VŠ: I think that we both can (.) [Really, I]
VK: [*Hmmm*]

VŠ: That both of us can do that very well and here [I must say that you]
VK: [*No, you cannot do it that well, excuse me really, you can't*]

The vocal symptoms of Klaus' affective involvement show the degree of his confusion and being thrown off balance by what his opponent asserts. Klaus' favorite responsive signal is *nééééé*, and he employs this signal whether he expresses disagreement or agreement. Špidla is reserved and chooses a moderate and rather formal register: e.g., he even chooses the slightly archaic word *Nikoliv* "No, not really", a sign of formal withdrawal, when he is asked whether he wants to comment on his partner's words.

(6) JB: Before we start talking about pensions, *would you want to react to what Mr. Chairman here said?*
VŠ: *No, not really.*

Klaus' discourse is less dominated by its orientation to the topic and more dominated by his orientation toward the second person and toward the first person, toward himself. I will start with his orientation toward the topic using Example 7. The issue debated here is that of a small city of Rokytnice that fell into debt. Klaus, first of all, *avoids using definite terms* as if uncertain; second, he *widens the topic, making it less distinct*. He provides the listener with all kinds of contexts instead on focusing on the main issue only. Špidla focuses on tangible data, mostly on numbers. Klaus is *not clear* in his speech (notice his starts *I don't know, or [Excuse me] I just don't know (.) if this is true. I'd very much doubt if really (.) if it really happened like that, really, like that (.) and I tend to think that (.) probably not*. To this hesitance Špidla replies: *It did happen like that.*

Klaus relates the topic of the city in debt to *his personal responsibility* (*First of all, neither of us, and I believe that this goes for Mr. Špidla, too, got Rokytnice in debt* ...). The characteristic feature of his discourse is that he does not want to accept the question showing that his view of reality, i.e. *his structuring of reality is different* (*but I think (.) that there is a different lesson to be learned from this case* ...).

We can observe conspicuous features of high involvement style on the level of lexical and syntactic features, such as *repetition, parallelisms, and emphatic, hyperbolic means* (*I know some desperate letters of many representatives of cities that are reaching that have reached me, that have probably reached the government, too, and have reached other places, too I even have I even have some of these with me here* ...).

(7) JB: The Czech State Consolidation Agency so far keeps in secrecy how it's going to deal with the Krkonoše city of Rokytnice nad Jizerou that got into debt...

VŠ: First I must point out that (.) debts of such cities came into being in the years of (.) conservative government. Here you can check that in nineteen ninety four this column here was very small, something like thirty I mean eight billion and (.) toward the end of the government of Václav Klaus it was already thirty nine billion which means that (.) the debt just escalated horribly [Here in this column (. . .) About forty]
JB: [Nowadays, (.) how much is it? Some forty-eight, I believe].
VŠ: Eight. In this column you can see that we managed to stop it. We prepared a bill which would make it impossible (.) for cities (.) to get into debt more than fifteen percent of their past budget and the conservative fraction in the senate is trying (.) to refuse (.) this regulative measurement...
JB: I would like to ask Mr. Chairman...
VK: [I don't know] *First of all, neither of us, and I believe that this goes for Mr. Špidla, too, got Rokytnice into debt . . . I (.) I must insist that I have always fought very hard against cities getting into debt and I have repeatedly warned of it (.) and the cities did not want to listen to that, they wanted independence and and I think (..) I think that (.) there are thousands of jokes circulating about us, connected with "tightening of our belts", about thousands of such issues so I would say (.) that it is (.) absolutely clear* and to blame it on us (.) for the past year, the mayor has been your man, (.) a socialist, so I'd prefer not to be getting into it any deeper. *but I think (.) that there is a different lesson to be learned from this case. here we have some six thousand three hundred cities and we are very fortunate that so far there has been only one Rokytnice. what is important is that this country should not become one big Rokytnice (.) and the case of Rokytnice pointed it out to us what our country might look like if the government of these people continues, people who do not care that they are getting into debts, debts that are growing every year, the debt of our country is constantly growing. so Rokytnice, a warning to the country, warning to the people, warning to the citizens, against such government of people [like Mr. Špidla here]*
JB: [Yes but nevertheless], vice prime minister Špidla mentioned that those were your representatives in the Consolidation Agency who were against this particular sanation, against the particular solution of the Rokytnice case (.) So, you would simply (.) [sell]
VK: [Excuse me] I just don't know (.) if this is true and I cannot confirm it. *I know some desperate letters (.) of many representatives of cities that are reaching (.) that have reached me, that have probably reached the government, too, and have reached other places, too (.) I even have (.) I even have some of these with me here (.) I'd very much doubt if really (.) if it really hap-*

pened like that, really, like that (.) and I tend to think that (.) probably not.
JB: Yes, Mr. Deputy [Prime Minister].
VŠ: [It did happen like that].

Klaus' discourse has many other features of *emotive ego-centered narrative discourse* in which he e.g. refers to his personal experience:

(8) VK: It was Spartak Rokytnice that got into this debt for (.) *I I know it well, the skiing there, I know every (.) every spot on the ski tracks there*, and because Spartak could not get such a credit, so (.) the city of Rokytnice, I think, and I believe that was wrong, nodded (.) and so on...

Even when asked about a possible solution, he is *evasive* and *unfocused* as Example 9 shows:

His discourse is talkative, he uses many *generalizations and exaggerations* and his speech suffers from a great amount of metatext and *repetition of empty words* such as *some* and *so on*, while Špidla offers exact numbers. When asked about money (How much would you forgive?), Klaus shows his disrespect for such a question.

(9) JB: Your solution, [Mr. Chairman].
VK: [First I would say]First pre-solution (.) *I hope this is a very powerful, major signal for all (.) that one simply cannot live on credit and I hope that people everywhere hear this signal, in each village, in each county, that all voters can hear this because this concerns the whole country. Second, I think that Rokytnice has a chance to sell some of its property and...*
VŠ: = Our first aid would be to remit them some hundred and twenty, hundred and twenty from the debt which is let's say about (.) four hundred. With this (.) the city would get into a situation which can be managed.
JB: How much would you forgive?
VK: *Let's not argue like this. I think that they should sell something first, then we can find out how much it is worth, how much remains (.) and so on.*

When Špidla uses exact numbers, Klaus tries to discredit these numbers, using even *interjections of ironic surprise* (*jéjej*), as in Example 10:

(10) VŠ: I cannot forget the fact that in nineteen ninety four the debt was five billion and that we managed to stabilize it only in nineteen ninety eight when social democracy took over responsibility arising from its [constitutional role]

VK: [(((laughter)))] *Oh-oh. I could show you a different chart right here. Good. I guess we might not be able to persuade...*

Actually, both partners are aware of the fact that numbers and statistical data can be played upon, as even Špidla admits and gives away in Example 5 where he mentions *playing with numbers in different ways* and that *they both can play with numbers.* Whereas this was just a small self-ironic remark in Špidla's speech which is thoroughly based on numbers as we have seen, and Špidla keeps the mask of their reliability in the course of his argumentation, Klaus tries to discredit statistical data throughout the whole debate.

As Example 11 shows, Klaus' speech acts mostly *address the 2nd person*, the partner, sometimes in a desperate way. The emotional eloquence of his words contrasts with Špidla's final short and firm *It is not evident:*

(11) VK: *[No, (.) you can...] you can protest against this chart here, you can change it right here in front of the viewers, [yes, go ahead, (.) please, change it, change it, (.) I can give it over to you, you did not have it before, so]*
VŠ: *[I think that I feel* <u>*no need*</u> *to be changing any chart because*, dear sir, because the unemployment rate, (.) the unemployment rate at the time] when we took over constitutional responsibility, was seven and a half percent and nowadays it is (.) eight point eight
VK: *[No, look, Mr. Chairman, I have] it is a fact that I have been earning my living through statistics for some fifteen years and I could explain this chart to you in case you do not understand it, in case it is not clear to you.* It is simply <u>not true</u> and we <u>do not lie</u> about such things. When I was in office, when I was in the Straka academy, the unemployment rate ... the unemployment rate was four point seven percent and now it has doubled. *But I think that (.) this is really below the level (.) of this debate to be discussing issues in this manner. I find it offensive, really, I really miss dignity in this because (.) it does not make any sense, to be juggling here with these extra numbers when it is so evident. So simple. It almost does not make any sense, it is almost in vain.*
VŠ: *It is not evident.*

Klaus threatens his partner, accusing him of lying:

(12) VK: *I (.) promised that I was not going to use any offensive words and (.) I (.) really don't (.) want to abuse such words as (.) to lie and lies. So I will wait with it to use it only* <u>*once*</u> *in this (.) debate today* but (.) if we want to talk in detail about the case, some of the ODS representatives in the city hall of Rokytnice protested <u>openly</u> against the third debt which eventually

broke the back of Rokytnice and they resigned in protest against what had happened. *You cannot lie about this fact, you cannot be telling people such things now, really, I am not going to settle for (.) such manners and these types of discussion.* We all know that the ODS representatives resigned in protest against what had happened.

Klaus *questions the sense of the debate* several times, *referring to the situation and to his own feelings evoked by the discussion*, and he actually gives up:

(13) VK: *That you, that under you... you introduced valorization. [No, I can't... really, I can't... not even the TV can... no, not yet.]*
VŠ: *[Regular, regular valorization, dear sir.]*
VK: *Mr. Chairman. No. Really. Not even TV (.) can put up with this and I think that a person always has to consider what the very... the very air.. air around us can put up with. I think that people... that people see it, they understand it, they know what was growing and what was not growing (.) So, I think, [let's not deceive ourselves] and them at the same time, and that's it. It's quite clear.*

Klaus' emotive discourse is oriented not only to the partner in discussion but toward the viewers, too. He attempts to get the viewers on his side, and he does so very explicitly. We can observe this strategy in the previous examples, when Klaus talked about all people and everybody, e.g. in Example 13 (*I think that people... that people see it, they understand it, they know what was growing and what was not growing (.) So, I think, [let's not deceive ourselves] and them at the same time, and that's it. It's quite clear)*.

Example 14 shows that Klaus is too strongly convinced that everything is clear to the viewers and that they share his view and that everything goes without saying and he does not have to explain anything, that he can just doubt his partner (*our citizens and voters will all hear it and they will think carefully about what they should do and I think it is good that we are saying these things openly here clearly...*). However, while he is delivering this affective speech full of repetition and desperate gestures, his opponent prepares a strong attack (*you as a prime minister, [in a critical situation] you failed and (.) partial failures are your fate. I hope that [these won't become the fate of the Czech Republic, too.]*. After such a severe frontal attack, Klaus loses face completely and looks for help or sympathy from somewhere, maybe from the moderator, maybe from the viewers:

(14) VŠ: We have dealt with the crisis and we keep growing and we stabilize the state both socially and economically.

VK: *Ehhhm... Mr. Chairman, this is such an offense to thinking people, to ten millions of thinking people of this country but... please... really, don't tell such things to us, the ten million thinking people of this country, nobody believes this, really, nobody...* and I think that, after all, it is the aim of politicians to create a certain harmony of opinions in their country, to look for some highest common denominator of thinking and if you want to break this country, if you want to destroy the country again, socialists and communists have done it once in nineteen forty eight and if you want to do it again today so I hope...this is what these elections are about... *our citizens and voters will all hear it and they will think carefully about what they should do and I think it is good that we are saying these things openly here clearly... [clearly]*
VŠ: *[I must say] that you, I am quoting again, you allowed an improper state budget, this is the prime responsibility of a prime minister and you as a prime minister, [in a critical situation]*
VK: *[What? What he is saying]*
VŠ: *you failed and (.) partial failures are your fate. I hope that [these won't become the fate of the Czech Republic, too.]*
VK: *[Mister, mister... mister mister Špidla], I beg you, do not lie. Now I am restricting the verb "to lie", to once an hour. You know very well that a budget which threatened with deficit, that we had prepared this budget as a balanced one.* Due to the bank measures it eventually turned out that the economy had been growing more slowly and thus that we would not get the income we had expected. So, we introduced so called packages to stabilize the budget quickly and still, we were facing the possibility (.) of a much lower debt and lower deficit than the one (.) you are merrily accumulating – in a moment when economy is growing by three and half percent. Even you with your Keynesian economy should learn that when economy is growing, it should be paying off its debts and when it has problems, it can eventually start accumulating debts. I don't agree even with this opinion but you keep getting into bigger and bigger debt, you are making a Rokytnice out of the whole Czech Republic, and . . . this already is the road to hell and I think that....

Klaus relies on the viewers and people who see this correctly, addressing them repeatedly:

(15) VK: *Above all, I would want to point out that people probably see this correctly*, that social securities have not grown, I think it is evident. It is not enough to speak of solidarity, it is necessary to do something. *People always know how things are, they don't want to be lied to.*

Finally, Klaus even appeals to God for help:

(16) VŠ: Our government led to the stabilization...
VK: *Mister, mister Chairman, may God not, may God not allow...*
VŠ: of the country and I hope that we will have the opportunity to continue this stabilization and development.
VK: *may God not allow the voters to give you this chance. It would be a tragedy for this country.*

It is only in the last moment when Klaus recovers and starts speaking seriously as is documented in Example 17. However, it seems to be too late to rectify what has happened in the discussion and to remedy the impression:

(17) VK: No, don't, don't, don't say, don't say, Mr. ... Mr. Chairman these untruths. We, unlike you, unlike you... *and now I think it is necessary to get serious*, unlike you who arrived when things were fixed and this country had made it through the vast majority of substantial steps toward reform, we came after communism and, if you lived here, you know what the first year or the first two years looked like, what was going on here. And if you want to compare this to what you inherited, most issues solved, what you inherited in nineteen ninety eight, this is not dignified enough for this talk, it's not worthy of TV Nova and this, this... probably decent program in which we are participating today.
VŠ: We inherited a country in crisis. After you.
VK: Ridiculous. Childish.

5. Discussion of emotional choices: Are there emotionless dialogues?

After the duel, newspapers headlines commented "Špidla – Klaus 2:0". The position of the stronger partner in the debate was constructed rhetorically, through the choice of a matter-of-fact style, content-centered and coherent. Whereas Špidla relied on a *content-oriented discourse*, Klaus, though he stated at the beginning that *everything was at stake*, relied on *emotive means of persuasion*. He tried to show how this discourse affected him; he informed the viewer about his feelings evoked by his partner's speech; how the discourse disturbed and hurt him – using vocal signals, including interjections, but particularly intonational symptoms of his inner states, as well as facial signals of losing temper, irony and contempt. These marks were, however, apprehended as marks of the defeated partner who gave up because he was not able *to settle for (.) <u>such</u> manners and <u>these</u> types of discussion*, – to play such a game of chess, to quote

the newspaper article. As his speech was full of emotive signals to the partner, to the viewers, to the voters, we can ask: Did he move them? Did he become an object of their empathy or subject to irony? I think both.

As Deborah Tannen (1984: 30) claims, conversation, like literature, seeks primarily to *move* an audience by means of involvement. And so does media discourse. (A parallel between motion and emotion, motionless and emotionless face is very interesting and very true.) However, emotions may move an audience in different ways. There will be people moved by the emotions displayed in Klaus' discourse and those who will state that Klaus has harmed his party. He tried to dishonor his partner in a dialogue but such a strategy oriented toward a partner may easily turn into its very opposite – a self-destructive effect.

Though any TV debate has its rules and preserves certain rituals, it represents above all the encounter of two people who have different emotional competences and try to manage the course of the debate in different ways.

Klaus was a debater who climbed back very stubbornly. Using this metaphor, I refer to the brilliant Erickson's (1986) simile of listening and speaking: "Talking with another person is even more tricky than climbing an actual tree. It is like climbing a tree that climbs back." This metaphor illustrates what we often find in political (and not only political) debates: the effort to skillfully climb the partner in a discussion and to make him or her a subject to this effort, and on the other hand, the other partner's evasiveness and resistance. Thus, Klaus' replies were evasive, as if neglecting the question asked, and offensive. *He manifested his resistance and his being different*: his structuring of reality was different, he saw reality in a different way; the moderators' questions and opponents' arguments did not fit his own view, the questions were posed in a wrong way, etc.

On the other hand, *Špidla was surprisingly obedient*, he did not evaluate the questions and negotiate the way they would be answered. *He manifested his willingness to answer directly, not responding to possibly challenging aspects of questions.*

This salient – detached, abstractive, emotionless – feature of Špidla's dialogical behavior can be best illustrated by the following example; it will make the question of adequate emotional reacting even more conspicuous:

September 30th, 2002 Radioforum

Two moderators, Jan Pokorný and Jana Klusáková, are interviewing the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Vladimír Špidla. He had been a Prime Minister for only three months and in the meantime, the Czech Republic had been affected by serious floods that caused damage of billions of crowns, both on

public and private property. The moderators are asking questions concerning the government's participation in repairing this damage. Besides, they are asking the Prime Minister about his planned journey to Afghanistan and the Prime Minister explains the purpose of this visit: to support the newly elected Karzai government, to renew business relations, to participate in restoration of buildings and eventually to win new contracts.

Prime Minister Špidla answers in a matter-of-fact way, to the point and without emotions. The moderators seem to respect his sense for this down-to-earth manner of acting and speaking. Anyhow, the program also allows for listeners to call in and ask their questions directly:

> P: *I would want to ask the Prime Minister how much the state is going to pay for his trip to Afghanistan and if it would not make more sense to use this money, in our situation after the floods, maybe for building new houses for those who had lost their homes.*
> S: *The trip is going to cost some two million crowns, which is approximately the price of two newly built houses in the countryside.*

The question of the listener had a great challenging potential; the politician, however, *leaves the possibility of emotive interpretation of the question completely aside* (reminding us of Bühler's principle of apperceptive relevance) and concentrates on the matter-of fact part of his answer. We can, nevertheless, also ask: Did he understand the emotional potential of the question, its challenging character? Wasn't there a communication gap between the speaker and the hearer? Was the question taken up, if its emotional potential was not answered, or, at least, taken into account? Should we answer the question of adequate emotional reactions, we can only address our intuition: in the debate analyzed above, Václav Klaus was above the norm of emotional reacting while Vladimír Špidla was below that norm.

6. Conclusion

A political debate as any kind of exchange may be dominated either by a referential function or by emotional and expressive functions. Against the background of Bühler's (1934: 8) sign theory we can see that processing the discourse, both the speaker and the addressee are involved in the interplay of principles of *abstractive relevance* and *apperceptive enlargement.* The sensibly given (the particular sound, utterance, question) can be raised to the rank of sign in different ways, i.e. from the point of view of three variable moments: it

can be focused from the point of view of its representation function, expression function, and appeal function. Any of these moments may be either partially suppressed (the principle of *abstractive relevance*), or accented (the opposite principle of *apperceptive enlargement)*.

To some extent, it depends on the decision of the speaker and the addressee and their dialogical negotiation whether they will play the card of content-centered, speaker-centered or addressee-centered discourse. Beyond their own choice, there *are requirements of the genre* and *relevance of the accepted communication norms*. In some genres, an abnormal display of emotions may be more dangerous and destructive than in others. Analyzing the particular political debate, we emphasized the self-destructive effect of emotive discourse. Nevertheless, we also questioned the appropriateness and acceptability of emotionless behavior and indicated the possibility of its mask-like character. While in literary texts we as readers should be aware of masks assumed by the author or the narrator (as in Gogol's text introduced in the first part), in ritual communication of political debates we should be aware of ritual masks determined by institutional roles of their participants. In addition to the premises formulated in the introductory part, my analysis encompassed also the following: *An adequate account of emotive communication needs to consider that at the discourse level of interaction, emotional as well as unemotional choices can be interpreted as masks*.

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Emotions, Language, and Context

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1. Introductory remarks

How relevant is context for the emergence of emotions, and in which forms does it affect/constrain their expression? As we know, emotions vary according to culture, age, sex, individual parameters and the given 'emotional situation' (cf., among others, Elster 1999, 2000; Kerbrat Orecchioni 2000; Magri 1999; Damasio 1994; Weigand 1998; Bazzanella & Kobau 2002).

In this paper, the complex issue of emotions will be related to an 'integrated' view of context (cf. Akman & Bazzanella 2003), and the wide range of its linguistic devices, encompassing several levels, will be analysed.

2. The complexity of emotions

2.1 Mixed features of emotions

The complexity of emotions and their multifarious dimensions emerge at several levels: the nested interplay with mind/language/behaviour/culture, the lexical and semantic problem, the number of correlated physiological and neurological features, their universality or relativity, etc. (cf., in the past, Spinoza, Hobbes, Darwin, William James, and, more recently, Plutchick 1984; Bazzanella 2002a).

Even in everyday life it is difficult to distinguish one emotion from another, given both their 'compositional' nature (see 1.1.2) and their *ambivalence/ambiguity*[1] (see Joseph, also Stamenov, both this volume).

With regard to the lexical categorisation of emotions, the fuzziness and/or 'non-discreteness' of this class has been pointed out by Wierzbicka (1992),

who has subsequently proposed to adopt a prototype framework (Wierzbicka 1996:180): "La définition d'un terme d'émotion prend la forme d'un scénario prototypique qui ne décrit pas une situation externe, mais une structure cognitive hautement abstraite". We will see below that a prototypical approach is more adequate when describing an emotional word, i.e. 'shame' (see 3.2.1).

With regard to the class of 'emotional' words in general, it is important to distinguish them, as Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) do, from:

1. other words that denote external manifestations of emotions, such as laughter or crying;
2. physical states that are associated with emotions, such as tiredness and stress;
3. mental states that are associated with emotions, such as confusion, uncertainty, meditation.

As everybody knows, emotions are expressed not only linguistically: alternative modalities of expressions (such as paralinguistic, mimo-gestural, postural) and various other – very significant – communicative means, such as picture and music, are often resorted to, and have been analysed in their complexity, i.e. their non-uniqueness and their interlacing with other parameters (cf. Bodei 1999 for aesthetic experience in relation to emotions).

To quote an example of a complex non-linguistic emotional device, smiles can convey emotions, consciously and unconsciously, and perform a range of functions which can differ from one society to another (cf. Walrod this volume). Even silence and implicitness in general are used for a wide range of emotions.[2]

2.2 The 'compositional' nature of emotions

Emotions are characterised by a 'compositional' nature[3] in the sense that each of them involves several parameters playing together in a dynamic and often unstable configuration which is extremely sensitive to several sources of variation and interaction (see 2).

Among the various phenomena that are correlated to given emotional states – in a mostly unconscious and uncontrollable way – at least the following are worthy of being mentioned here:

1. physiological modifications, such as sweating, increased heart rate, or high blood pressure (cf. Izard et al. 1984; Frijda 1986, particularly Chap. 3, Pareti 2002);

2. phonetic and prosodic variations which change according to cultures (cf. Scherer 1986; Magno Caldognetto 2002);
3. facial expressions which are said to be universal (cf. Darwin 1872; Ekman 1989);
4. behavioural variations (cf. D'Urso & Trentin 1998; D'Urso & Riccardi 2002).

I will not discuss the different proposals for defining and distinguishing[4] emotions here; instead, I would like to underline the need to consider them as a complex configuration in which external features are also to be taken into account. Even what has been labelled *emotive competence* by D'Urso & Riccardi (2002) (i.e., the essential interface of every other psychological skill, particularly significant in making the individual adequate to interact with others and able to motivate her/his social and personal experiences) is compositional in its nature and involves three different levels: analytic, taxonomic/lexical, interactional.

3. The interlacing of emotions and context

3.1 *Local* and *global* context

The significance of context in relation to emotions has been repeatedly referred to (cf., among others, Oatley & Jenkins 1996; Plantin 2000, see also the references to context in several contributions to this volume). As Frijda (1986: 268) says: "[...] so often the context is decisive for emotion: the possibilities for coping or avoidance, the whole history of interaction with the object or event concerned."

The problem is to know what we are referring to by 'context': "As with other widely used notions, which are commonly referred to in everyday activities without much hesitation, *context* is difficult to analyse scientifically and grasp in all its different demeanours. [...] If its complexity makes context a powerful device both in knowledge and cognition, the same complexity and dynamism makes context difficult to define and study formally" (Akman & Bazzanella 2003: 321).

Several components have been focused on over the years by scholars in various theoretical frameworks, mainly following two apparently opposing traditions: one which considers context as *a priori* (mainly the sociolinguistic approach, cf. Hymes 1974), the other which sees context as *activated* (such as in

psychology, cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986; pragmatics, cf. Mey 1993; and Artificial Intelligence, cf. Bouquet et al. 1999; Akman et al. 2001).

An 'integrated' view of context (cf. Bazzanella 1998; Akman & Bazzanella 2003), which aims to conciliate the two different views, will be referred to here. In this perspective, the parameters relevant to both the *a priori* context and the *activated* context are taken into account, by proposing two levels of context: the *global*, i.e. the static and (partly) foreseeable, and the *local*, i.e. the dynamic and (partly) unforeseeable. More specifically, the *global* level refers to the given external components of the context and corresponds to *a priori* features, i.e. sociolinguistic parameters such as age, status and the social roles of participants; it includes cultural norms, 'encyclopedia' knowledge and beliefs, i.e. the general experience resulting from the interplay of culture and social community (cf., among others, Levy 1984, Sovran this volume, Weizman this volume).[5]

The *local* level corresponds to the parameters that are selected because of their relevance to the space/time/person localisation and to the linguistic interaction itself (e.g., the kind of action being performed, gestural deixis, focusing, etc.); it is activated and constructed in the ongoing interaction as it becomes relevant (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986).[6] The local level of context, in the case of emotions, corresponds to what has been labelled "la situazione emozionale" (Calabi 1996: 122), meant as experience of interaction with the environment, among which the speaker's intentions and their recognition by the interlocutor[7] are to be taken into account.

The local/global distinction of context somewhat mirrors Savan's (1991: 151f.) distinction between 'natural' and 'moral' emotions: while 'natural' emotions are strictly related to the emotional situation, 'moral' emotions heavily depend on the social and cultural context, i.e. the set of beliefs of a given community.[8] The global level of context refers to the cultural norms of a given group, and to the shared lexicalization of experience. As Levi (1975) says:

> Emotional reactions occur in response to every major environmental change. They further powerfully condition our behaviour and thus are important determinants of man-made elements in our environment. They are decisive elements in and determinants of our quality of life. They accompany a great number of somatic diseases and are thought to be part of the pathogenic mechanisms of a great number of psychiatric and psychosomatic disorders.[9]

All the relevant parameters of both global and local context appear to be crucial not only in order to understand the emotional situation, but also for its interactional development. Given the *fuzziness* of the notion of *context* (cf. Givón

1989), the distinction is not meant to be rigid, but is provided for the sake of analysis. In everyday life the two levels are of course strictly intertwined.

A possible analysis of the complex interlacing of emotions and contextual parameters will be proposed in the following section.

3.2 Correlation and variables

In cases where the emotional meaning of events is inscribed on them in an absolute and perpetual manner (cf. Frijda 1986: 293), and the "scénarios déclencheurs" (Eggs 2000: 16) correlate with determined emotions (cf. Aristotle in *Rhetorics II* with respect to anger and/or fear), the *a prioriness* of context prevails.[10] Of course the specific parameters, i.e. the individual affected by fear, the kind of fear, the cause of fear, may change, but the correlation between the context and emergence of a given emotion is very strong. Frijda (1986: 6) specifies:

> Different emotions – that is, different action tendencies or activation modes – are evoked by different stimulus constellations, as they are appraised by the subject. Relevant variables in those constellations regard both what the stimulus event may do to the subject (relevance evaluation) and what the subject may do to the event or is (or is not) allowed to do by the entire situation concerned (context evaluation).

The individual variables may sometimes limit, if not cancel, the causal effects of given situations. The *local* context in general may affect individual behaviour in a given time: the same person may react differently, at different times, to the same – or similar – external inputs. Every emotion is in fact related to others, and modified both by diachronic and synchronic parameters, i.e. in its development and 'compositionality'.

According to Frijda (1986: 194)

> *Situational meaning structure* [...] can be considered to comprise three kinds of elements: cognitions of what the situation does or offers to the subject, or withholds from him, or might do or offer or withhold; cognitions of what the situation allows him to do, prevents him from doing or invites him to do; and evaluations of whether the various outcomes are desirable or not.[11]

The *local* context, in its being dynamic, will affect the possible insurgence of a given emotion, its intensity, its duration, also in relation to the interactional development (see 2.4).

It is also important to stress that not every emotion is elicited by a stimulus. According to Frijda (1986: 284), some emotions, such as

> anxiety attacks, and states of joy or distress appear to come spontaneously. A second possibility is that emotion or mood is of internal origin, as in 'fundamental distress'. As a third possibility, emotions could occur for reasons of emotional metabolism or internal regulatory processes.

In addition to the three dimensions generally referred to in the psychological literature in order to contextually evaluate the expression of emotions – *evaluation*, *potency*, and *activity* (see Osgood et al. 1957; reproposed by Caffi & Janney 1994; Caffi 2002), there are three other internal parameters, i.e. related to *local* context, which seem to be useful in order to better identify the kind of emotion:

1. static/dynamic, which distinguishes between emotive states such as depression and emotions such as sudden fear;
2. intensity, which is referred to in distinguishing between emotions and other emotive states such as *passions*, especially in the European tradition (cf. Bazzanella & Kobau 2002, see also Shakespeare's "senses, affections, passions" quoted by Joseph, this volume);
3. duration: according to Elster (2000), the duration of emotions is related to social and cultural norms and differs, e.g., in the length and form of mourning in different cultures.

Although some *a priori* contexts are in general likely to trigger given emotions and establish their 'normativity' (cf. Eggs 2000), emotions vary both on an intracultural level (i.e. codifying expected behaviours, stereotypes, i.e. at the level of *global* context) and an individual level (i.e. in relation to the cognitive, and psychological variables of the given subjects, i.e. at the level of *local* context).

In the following section, cross-cultural and intra-cultural variations will be briefly distinguished.

3.2.1 *Cross-cultural variations*

Are emotions universal or culture-specific?

Cross-cultural differences in both categorising and expressing emotions have been studied by linguists, psychologists, and anthropologists (see also Daneš and Joseph, this volume).[12]

I will not go into methodological problems such as the wide topic of translation, but only refer to what seems to be two different ways of conceptualising emotions.

In my opinion, Wierzbicka (1992b: 130, 134) is right in stating:

> Different systems of emotion terms reflect different ways of conceptualising emotions, and, conversely, any cross-cultural similarities in the conceptualisation of emotions will be reflected in the ways different societies converge in the labelling of emotions.

To quote an example, according to Wierzbicka (1992b: 132) in a prototypical framework the Aboriginal concept corresponding to the English word *shame* is

> more closely related to avoidance, and therefore to fear, than the English concept of shame. In a prototypical situation of 'shame', something 'wrong' has already taken place. The Aboriginal concepts such as 'kunta' or kuyan' seem to evoke a situation where nothing 'wrong' has taken place, yet might happen and is to be avoided.

Interestingly enough,

> in older English the word *shame* had (as the German word *Scham* still does) a meaning rather different from the one it has now and apparently closer to the concepts encoded in present-day Aboriginal languages. [...] Consider, for example, the following line from Shakespeare [...]: '*Have you no modesty, no maiden shame, no touch of bashfulness?*'. Clearly, in this passage the word *shame* does not imply anything *shameful* in the modern sense of the word, i.e., anything 'bad'. A maiden's 'shame' is a feeling which should protect a maiden from something bad, rather than a feeling resulting from something bad.
> (Compare Teubert's in-depth analysis of *shame* in this volume.)

In cases like these, we are referring to the *global* context, a socially shaped and dynamically transmitted culture. The specific cultural construction of a given society may meet and conflict with other different cultures, not only in general on a political and ideological level but also on a *local* level, i.e. in the interaction, and possibly in the understanding (or 'coming to understanding', cf. Weigand 1998; Dascal 1999) between individuals sharing different cultures and living and meeting in the same place.

3.2.2 *Intracultural variations*

Intracultural variations refer to psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic parameters that cause variations inside the same socio-cultural group, i.e. mainly individual features, age, sex, and social role.

I will not go into the analysis of these parameters, which have been studied in depth mainly by sociolinguists and psychologists: individual differences in the development of emotionality are clearly presented by Oatley & Jenkins (1996: Chap. 7), with particular regard to emotion regulation, attachment, temperament, and affective biases, i.e. responses to the environment.

A priori contextual components which are activated or not activated in a given interactional context by mirroring or not mirroring the expected behaviour are at issue here, for example, the stereotypes on the correlation between sex and emotions (cf., among others, Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000), and the parameter of *genre* (see Čmejrková this volume, for a clear example). According to Chabrol (2002: 121), the

> pathémisation [...] produit ses effets en fonction des catégorisations des situations et des schématisations de genre. Elle se module selon la charge émotionelle accordée aux événements ou aux questions pris comme objet des propos. Ceux-ci doivent être bien distingués de leur mise en discours et en langue, et c'est l'interaction de toutes ces dimensions qui doit être analysée.

In real data, the two levels of context, local and global, work together, but distinguishing them may be useful for the sake of analysis.

3.3 The range of linguistic devices for expressing emotions

It should be underlined, as recent research in pragmatics has done, that emotional words are only one way of grammatically codifying emotions in language. As Ochs & Schieffelin (1989: 22) state: "Affect permeates the entire linguistic system. Almost any aspect of the linguistic system [...] is a candidate for expressing affect."

Expressive forms linked with emotions have been analysed – more or less in depth – at all levels of language description. Let us list the levels, and also mention some of the forms[13] for the sake of exemplification, without any claims of being exhaustive:

1. phonetic, such as pitch: F_0 mean, F_0 range, F_0 variability, F_0 contour; intensity: mean, range, variability and contour of energy; rhythm: rate of articulation and rate of speech; tempo: length of sound and silent period; number of words, disfluency (cf. Scherer 1986; Magno Caldognetto 2002);

2. graphic, such as exclamations marks and capital letters in written texts, smileys and emoticons in *irc* (i.e. INTERNET RELAY CHAT),[14] etc.;

3. phonological, such as intonation, prosody, etc. (cf., among others, Daneš 1997, Magno Caldognetto 2002, with specific regard to onomatopoeia, see Joseph this volume);

4. morphological, e.g. in the use of diminutives (cf. Dressler & Merlini Barbaresi 1994) and augmentatives; deictic 'empathetic' forms such as *this/that* (see "I like *this* guy" vs. "I don't like *that* boy"); personal pronouns (e.g. first

person, both singular and plural, as marked by involvement and commitment; allocutivity related to the second person), and social deixis (cf. 'address inversion' in Romanian and Italian,[15] see 2.4.1 for an example). Less typically, even tenses can be used to express different emotive states (cf. Bazzanella 2000) as well as lexical means, i.e. adjectives and verbs of inner state (such as *sad, happy, scared*; *I hope, I'm afraid, I'm sorry*), 'amuse verbs' (such as *please*, *gratify*, *reassure*; *disconcert*, *humiliate*, *perturb*, *scare*),[16] 'admire verbs' (such as *enjoy*, *love*; *detest*, *hate*, etc.), 'marvel verbs' (such as *approve*, *delight*, *rejoice*; *hurt*, *wonder*, *worry*), and 'emotional words' in general. Bertuccelli Papi (2000) exemplifies the latter by swear words, terms of endearment and abuse, epithets, idioms, metaphors, but also sentence adverbs like 'fortunately' or 'regrettably'. The bulk of evaluative lexical triggers is however represented by 'loaded words', that is, nouns and verbs with positive or negative connotations, like 'hero' or 'bandit'.

Routines and collocations can also be considered here as a conventionalised way of lexicalising emotions;

5. syntactic, in particular expressive sentence-types like exclamations, emphatic constructions (such as cleft and pseudo-clefts), topicalisation processes such as left dislocation (cf. Bazzanella 1994), and marked word order (see the direct object, *my father*, markedly preceding the verb in fragment 7 of Weizman, this volume), etc.;

6. sociolinguistic, i.e. variations in register and 'subcultures' (see Daneš this volume);

7. textual, i.e. the use of *dispositio* and textual perspectives such as metrics in poetry; phenomena such as mono- and allo-repetition (cf. Johnstone 1994, Joseph and Weizman, this volume, Bazzanella 1996), etc.;

8. pragmatic, in the form of 'functional units' such as *discourse markers* (cf. Aijmer about interjections, this volume, Bazzanella 1990, and forthcoming), explicit performatives, speech acts on both the utterance-[17] and discourse levels (e.g. irony, metaphor), relevant attitudes such as involvement (cf. Tannen 1989) and, on the other hand, detachment (see Weizman, this volume, and her proposed indices: "reasoning patterns, matter-of-fact style, and explicitation"). As Weigand (1998:36) recalls: "In orthodox speech act theory, we have three different categories that deal with emotions: an illocutionary force, a psychological state, and non-conventional effects on the side of the hearer."

All these levels are of course intertwined in real linguistic production (let alone non-verbal performances, cf., among others, Maury-Rouan 2000), but, once again, distinguishing them is of some analytical use. In the same vein,

Bazzanella, Caffi & Sbisà (1991: 67), who state in general: "[...] all illocutionary acts can express inner states", have proposed one specific dimension[18] of illocutionary force which is labelled the "expressed inner states":

> They may express very general propositional attitudes such as belief or intention, or affectively coloured inner states such as hope, desire, and the like. We say that the expression of inner states is upgraded when the speech act foregrounds the speaker's inner states, sometimes emphasising their intensity. The expression of inner states is downgraded if linguistic and textual devices hinder the foregrounding of the speaker's inner states where the context and/or the discourse topic would make it appropriate to expect its occurrence.

The modification of illocutionary force, both in weakening and in strengthening directions, has also been studied in a cross-cultural perspective (cf., among others, Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 1989).

3.4 The interactional development of emotions

3.4.1 *Interacting with emotions*

Emotions perform a crucial role as an interactional device, and permeate all our lives. 'Emotional dynamics' links us to others, regulates our interactions, and affects them.

Let us think about the acquisition and socialisation of emotions as an essential step in becoming a member of a given community/group/society (cf., among others, Lewis & Saarni 1985; Oatley & Jenkins 1996). Here again (see 2.2), the norms are constrained by the specific cultural and social apparatus (see also Čmejrková this volume, Daneš this volume).

Recently emotions have been granted what Tito Magri (1999: 10) has called "la loro piena cittadinanza entro il sistema concettuale degli stati mentali, delle rappresentazioni e delle ragioni" "their complete citizenship in the conceptual system of mental states, representations and reasons"; in other words, the normality of emotions has been assessed, in contrast with the traditional view, which opposed emotions to reason, and has respectively condemned the former and assigned a central role to the latter.[19] At this level, we are speaking about the global context, the one responsible for setting rules, norms, and shared behaviours.

On the other hand, the influence of local context, too, is crucial in the interactional development of emotions since other participants in the emotional situation may increase or decrease the emotional 'reach' in various ways: by mak-

ing it linguistically or non-linguistically explicit, by providing other 'triggers', by boosting its effects.

As Weigand (1998: 36) says:

> In dialogic interaction [...] emotions cannot be isolated. They are on the one hand dependent on the interlocutor and on how he or she sees and evaluates the world, and on the other hand, they influence the sequence of actions.

Also the local linguistic and paralinguistic context (or co-text, i.e. what both verbally and non-verbally proceeds and follows the expression of emotion at issue) plays a role in establishing the emotional value, as is clear in the argumentative use of emotions, which is strictly contextual (see Walton 2000: 296, Plantin, this volume). The local context, i.e. the rhetorical *dispositio* and the strategic use of emotive devices, cannot be separated from the analysis of global context, i.e. the historical background and the different addressees of the discourse. In other words, the emotional values come both from their 'internal' features (their complexity/compositionality) and from external factors (i.e. the local/global context).

In order to better understand the interactional development of emotions, it is necessary to resort to data taken both from ordinary conversations and different kinds of dialogues and interaction, as several contributors to this volume rightly do (cf. also Plantin 2002).

I will limit myself here to quoting a particular 'emotional' device in a particular setting – 'address inversion' (see note 15) – and analyse how some contextual features affect its use. The setting is a so-called entertainment TV-program: the Italian talk-show *Amici di sera.*[20]

As Weigand (1999: 39) says, "dialogues on television are always *dialogues on stage*. 'On stage' means 'to be seen, to be known." The emotional 'charge' which is usually displayed in media discourse is emphatically searched for and amplified in this particular program, where

> real (or supposedly real) problems are 'exposed' by someone who writes to propose herself/himself and her/his family, not so much in order to solve the conflict, but in order to appear in public and to play the central character [...]. (Bazzanella 1999: 165)

The global context here is affected *a priori* by the need to display emotions and by the high involvement of both the interlocutors and the audience. With regard to the local context, let me quote the fragment where the host introduces the topic to be discussed in a specific evening episode (*Does my father love me?*) with an intimate 'teknonymy word',[21] (*papà* "dad"), which the host uses by putting herself in the daughter's perspective):

(1) Host: Allora Samantha↑ (--) dove sei↑ (--) sedici anni↑ figlia di genitori separati (--) rapporto però con tuo padre eh vivi con la mamma (-) tu hai telefonato a questa trasmissione perché ti senti (--) non sai se tuo papà ti vuole bene davvero (-) **papà** te lo dice sempre però di volerti bene↓
Samantha. Sì [...]
Host: Tu vuoi fare una serie di domande a tuo padre per capire se lui realmente ti vuole bene o no↓
"Host: Well Samantha↑ (--) where are you↑ (--) sixteen years old↑ daughter of separated parents (--) you are in touch with your father eh you live with your mother (-) you called this program because you feel (--) you don't know if your father really loves you (-) but **dad** always tells you that he loves you↓
Samantha: Ya [...]
Host: You want to ask your father some questions to find out whether he really loves you or not↓"

In the rest of the program, 'address inversion' is used more than once; not surprisingly, since it is a means of showing involvement, intimacy, affection – exactly what the father was supposed to show in order to persuade the audience, besides his daughter, that he *really* loves her.

However, more surprisingly, in fragment 2, the address form referring to himself is a tender one (*dear daddy*), a very unusual form of 'address inversion', an *apax*, to my knowledge:

(2) Father: Io se c'ho un problema **caro papà** (-) se c'ho un problema mio (-) lo vado a sfogare a una persona di famiglia (-) a un caro amico
"Father: If I have a problem **dear daddy** (-) if I have a problem (-) I go and talk it over with a member of the family (-) with a dear friend"

The crescendo of emotional involvement, both verbal (there is no room here for a complete analysis of the text) and non-verbal devices (cries, sobs, head movements, etc.), moves the man to refer to himself as he would like not only his daughter, but the whole audience to consider him. He presents himself as a 'mask' (see Čmejrková this volume), and portrays himself as both 'speaker' and 'father'. The setting, i.e. the particular form of talk-show (there are some people on the 'stage' with the host, father, and daughter, who participate in the interaction by asking questions and reacting with exclamations), and the kind of topic (father's love) are both strongly emotional potentials, which affect the interaction a priori, on a global level. On a local level, verbal expressions, together with talk-in-interaction, are amplified in order to involve the audience in a reciprocal exchange of emotions.

In a nutshell, in situations such as talk shows, emotions are *displayed* rather than expressed. A scalar continuum could be drawn from *expressed* emotions (i.e. actually felt in a given, everyday situation) to *displayed* (i.e. shown more than felt, such as in the above analysed talk show), to *reproduced* (such as in theatre, where the actor behaves as if he really feels the emotion), to *fictitious* (i.e. pretended emotions), up to various degrees of *lying/deceiving*. The "sincerity condition" varies according to the different kinds of emotion, and the interaction involved is of course affected by it (cf. Searle 1969, Weizman, this volume, for a proposal relevant to emotions).

3.4.2 *Change in emotions and context*

Emotions change in time, being sensitive to the cultural environment (compare the "invention of a new feeling, that is, *guilt*, in the late 19th century, see Teubert this volume, compare the different values of *shame* in old and modern English, and *mobbing* in our present times).

'New' models of emotions are becoming widespread at various levels (media, social group, and family, cf. Daneš this volume), and the problem we have to face in the near future is to get to know, if not to share them.

To conclude, if we agree with Dik's (1983: 3) following statement,

> In the Functional paradigm, the basic assumption is that linguistic expressions are not arbitrary formal objects, but that their properties are sensitive to, and co-determined by, the pragmatic determinants of human verbal interaction.

emotions seem to be a very good example.

The problem, given its complexity, is how to handle emotions, both by resorting to other, interdisciplinary, approaches, and by making one's specific approach more useful to the overall picture. As Weigand (2002: 57) rightly states: "It is now time to reconstruct language as a complex integral phenomenon".

Notes

1. Warm thanks go to Sue Eerdmans, Martina McLoughlin, Lucia Morra, and to the participants of the ESF Exploratory Workshop on Emotions in Dialogic Interaction (Münster, October 2002) for discussing a previous version. In some cases the ambivalence/ambiguity and complexity of emotions make their recognition difficult which almost always depends on the specific context (see below).

2. Cf., among others, Tannen & Saville-Troike 1985; Jaworski 1997; Bazzanella 2002b; for the various forms and functions of silence, in relation also to different kinds of emotive expression.

3. According to Elster (1999: 56), emotions are grounded on six components: i.e., "bodily arousal, physiological expressions, cognitive antecedents, intentional objects, valence (pleasure-pain), and action tendencies".

4. Cf. Bazzanella & Kobau (2002) for a cursory treatment of the distinction between 'passioni', 'emozioni' and 'affetti' in Italian.

5. Compare Givón's (1989: 74) '*generic focus*': "Knowledge of (and beliefs concerning) the so-called real world (including society and culture), assumed by the speaker to be held by the hearer, as member of the same speech community ('culture'), and manifest first and foremost in the commonly-held lexicon."

6. Compare both Givón's (1989: 74) *deictic focus* (i.e. "Shared speech situation, which includes deixis, socio-personal relations, and Speech-Act Teleology"), and *discourse focus* (i.e. "Shared prior text, which includes overt and covert propositions, and meta-propositional modalities"). While Givón separates these two *foci*, I see their commonality, in contrast to the global level.

7. "None of these expressions can be understood outside the social context of their intentions and recognition by others" (Oatley & Jenkins 1996: 120).

8. In this perspective, Charaudeau (2000: 132) defines emotions as "des état intentionnels qui s'appuient sur des croyances".

9. Here I will not enter the wide domain of 'abnormal' emotions and their social sanctions/treatment (cf., among others, Oatley & Jenkins 1996), which are again strictly related to the specific culture/society.

10. "Emotions are elicited by constellations consisting of an event and of some satisfying or aversive state of affairs that the event appears to advance or harm" (Frijda 1986: 277).

11. Appraisals result from the interaction between appreciation of what the event can do or offer (primary appraisal) and appraisal of one's coping potential with respect to that event (secondary appraisal; see Frijda 1986).

12. Also in a pragmatic perspective, cross-cultural variations have been pointed out: "[...] illocutionary modification strategies are always language and culture-bound, with respect both to their linguistic means and to their interactional goals (politeness, face-work, expression of affective relations or of social roles)" (Bazzanella, Caffi & Sbisà 1991: 74).

13. I partly follow the Italian exemplification of the scalar dimensions of illocutionary force proposed in Bazzanella, Caffi & Sbisà (1991), as well as Marcella Bertuccelli Papi's (2000: 240) list.

14. See also the phenomenon of *flaming* in irc, cf. Pistolesi (2002).

15. By *address inversion* we mean "the use of a term, usually a KT [=kinship] term, which does not (as would be usual) express the addressee's, but the speaker's role in the dyad; e.g. a mother addressing a child as *mama*" (Braun 1988: 12).

16. Note that this category of verbs, similarly to the following ones related to psychological states, includes both a positive and a negative side.

17. See Austin's (1962: 159f.) *behabitives* and *expositives.*

18. The other dimensions are: 1. propositional content, subdivided into: indeterminacy/precision and diminution/augmentation; 2. 'modal roles' of the participants, subdivided into: power (authority, capacity, ...) that entitles the speaker to perform the illocu-

tionary act, obligations assigned to the addressee, speaker's commitment); 3. perlocutionary goals, subdivided into: strength of the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary object, avoiding/intensifying conflictual perlocutionary sequels (cf. Bazzanella, Caffi, & Sbisà 1991).

19. The picture is more complex than it appears in the text, see Bodei (1991), Garcea (2002), Sciuto (2002), Kobau (2002), Mori (2002) for a historical analysis of emotions in the Western tradition, from the Greeks to modern philosophy.

20. *Amici di sera* used to be broadcast in 1995 once a week, from 8.50 p. m. to 11 p.m., that is, at peak viewing time. Before that, the same host conducted *Amici* on Saturday, from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.; given its success, the new program was started.

21. 'Teknonymy' is related to baby talk: "[...] in a family, when one speaks to a child, one refers to the members of the family with the name which the child would use. [...]. In other words, another member of the family adopts the child's point of view, and the child constitutes a stable deictic center, which is not subject to the conversational deictic shift." Bazzanella (1999: 162–163).

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Body, Passions and Race in Classical Theories of Language and Emotion

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1. Introduction: Shylock's questions and Wollock's argument

In *The Merchant of Venice* (3.1.52–58) Shylock famously asks

> Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions, fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is?

It is not obvious that Shakespeare's audience would have unanimously answered 'yes' to Shylock's questions. The passage I have quoted is a rhetorically deceptive one, combining as it does some seemingly easy questions about the physical body with harder ones about the 'affections and passions', which are attributes of mind as well as of body. Shylock wants our 'yes' to the easy questions to compel the same answer to the hard ones. But the mind-body problem does not usually let itself be so easily glossed over, including in this play, which dwells often on the conflict between mind and heart.

Various answers that might have occurred to Shakespeare's audience can be reconstructed if we consider the history of ideas about language, mind, body and race that form the context of the play's writing and reception. Each answer one gives to Shylock's questions has implications for one's understanding of language as well, though this is not obvious. Wollock (1997) argues that Descartes' centralising of mind has instituted a great divide between medicine on the one hand and philosophy and linguistics on the other, with the former as the science of the body and the latter two as sciences of the mind. Although this division began in the 17th century, it took until the start of the 20th for it to approach completion. Since then we have tended to project this divide

anachronistically back onto *pre*-Cartesian thought. By ignoring the vast medical literature on speech and its defects, much of it written by the very people whose thoughts on the mental aspects of language form the core of the accepted canon of the history of linguistics, Wollock believes we have distorted the overall picture of ancient and medieval linguistic thought into appearing as though it too approached language as an essentially mental phenomenon rather than one in which the operations of both body and mind are centrally important.

Shylock's references to disease and healing, warming and cooling, remind us of the inseparability of the passions and affections from the context of medicine.[1] The ancient theories on the passions of the mind developed in close connection with treatment of their pathology – a word which itself means the study of the passions. Whereas for Aristotle the passions had meant courage as much as fear, and joy as much as sorrow, those which Galen concentrates on four centuries later in his treatise on *The Diagnosis and Cure of the Passions of the Mind* are the passions of unhealthy excess, "anger, wrath, fear, grief, envy, and violent lust" (Galen 1963:32). Although he considers them physical disorders, his cure is morally or 'psychologically' based: one should find a friend honest enough to speak the truth about any excessive aspect of one's behaviour, then overcome it by force of will.

A less effective treatment is to shift the balance of the bodily humours by dietary means. Like Chinese medicine, traditional Greek medicine combines the use of physiologically and psychologically based treatment. Modern Western medicine continues to debate the balance between drug-based therapies and talking cures for various forms of schizophrenia. From Aristotle and Galen also derives the long tradition, chronicled by Wollock, of treating speech disorders as imbalances in the distribution of the humours – for instance, stammering and stuttering as being due to an excess of moisture in the head, causing excessive thickness in the tongue.

I intend to take a look at how theories of language and mind have intersected with medicine and the idea of the ethnic body, using *The Merchant of Venice* as a point of departure. I hope to show that the intersection is a significant one not just for the history of linguistics, but for contemporary views on language and identity, and the role of the emotions in dialogic interaction.

2. The passions in *The Merchant of Venice*

Especially in the wake of the Holocaust, Shylock's speech reads as an impassioned plea for common humanity that transcends race. In a way, that is how

it functions in the play, though it is the base passion for revenge that Shylock says unites Christians and Jews and justifies his taking the pound of flesh from Antonio. The speech continues:

> – if you prick us do we not bleed? if you tickle us do we not laugh? if you poison us do we not die? and if you wrong us shall we not revenge? – if we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that. (3.1.58–62)

The revenge is for Antonio's repeated, unprovoked abuse of Shylock, which the latter recalls when asked for the loan for which the pound of flesh becomes the bond:

> You call me misbeliever, cut-throat dog,
> [...] Well then, it now appears you need my help:
> [...] You that did void your rheum upon my beard,
> And foot me as you spurn a stranger cur
> Over your threshold, moneys is your suit.
> What should I say to you? Should I not say
> "Hath a dog money? is it possible
> A cur can lend three thousand ducats?" [...] (1.3.106, 109, 112–117)

At 2.8.12 Solanio says of Shylock, "I never heard a passion so confus'd, / [...] As the dog Jew did utter in the streets" (2.8.12, 14). Later, preparing to exact his revenge, Shylock tells Antonio, "Thou call'dst me dog before thou hadst a cause, / But since I am a dog, beware my fangs" (3.3.6–7).

The Merchant of Venice is one of a group of Shakespeare's plays from the mid-1590s in which the passions and affections figure most prominently. Others include *Romeo and Juliet* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. It opens with the title character, Antonio, musing on his own present passion of sadness.

> In sooth, I know not why I am so sad:
> It wearies me; you say it wearies you;
> But how I caught it, found it, or came by it,
> What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born,
> I am to learn;
> And such a want-wit sadness makes of me,
> That I have much ado to
> know myself.

To this, Salerio replies that he is distracted with worry over his ships, which sail in constant danger of sinking and ruining him:

> Your mind is tossing on the ocean;
> There, where your argosies with portly sail,
> Like signiors and rich burghers on the flood,
> Or, as it were, the pageants of the sea,
> Do overpeer the petty traffickers,
> That curtsy to them, do them reverence,
> As they fly by them with their
> woven wings.

Solanio then says that were he in Antonio's situation, "The better part of my affections would / Be with my hopes abroad [...]" (1.1.16–17). After this use of the medical term of art *affections*, Salerio introduces the role of the bodily humours: "My wind cooling my broth, / Would blow me to an ague when I thought / What harm a wind too great might do at sea" (1.1.22–24). Just as the wind at sea is destructive, the excess of wind as a bodily element is connected with the imbalance of humours that produces ague; or the black bile, *melancholy* in its Greek form, believed to be produced by the spleen.

When Antonio denies these explanations, Solanio says, "Why then you are in love", to which Antonio replies merely "Fie, fie!" (1.1.46). By Brown's (1955) reading, "the ambiguous nature of Antonio's answer (it is an exclamation of reproach rather than a clear negative) might indicate that Solanio has got close to the real cause of the melancholy", namely that Antonio is sad because about to lose his loving companion Bassanio to Portia. Indeed, exclamations such as "Fie!" were (and are) viewed as having a more direct link to the passions than words do – they were believed not merely to spring from excesses of humour in specific parts of the body, but to relieve them. In a later note (1.1.79–81) Brown says that "Sighs and groans were thought to drain blood from the heart; Clarendon compared *M*[*idsummer*] *N*[*ight's*] *D*[*ream*], III.ii.96–97: 'pale of cheer, / With sighs of love, that costs the fresh blood dear'".

It may be too that Antonio's melancholy affects his non-exclamatory language. The contrast between his opening speech and Salerio's, quoted above, could not be more stark. Antonio's monosyllables occasionally rise to a disyllable but never more; every word is Anglo-Saxon, and they are repeated over and over, *I* five times, *it* six and a half (including '*tis*); there is but one adjective, *sad*; the syntax too is undemanding and full of repetition. Salarino's magnificent second period flies by Antonio's petty speech with woven wings, complete with argosies, signiors and pageants. Antonio continues in this vein until finally acceding to his friends' attempts to cheer him and announcing that "I'll grow a

talker for this gear". Thereafter his language becomes more like the others', with trisyllabic and Romance-derived words and complex sentences.

Scene 2 opens with Portia, like Antonio, ruminating about her sadness: "By my troth, Nerissa, my little body is aweary of this great world" (1.2.1–2). She though can locate it in her body and even identify its cause – the constraint placed by her late father on the selection of a husband for her, not by her choice, but by his choice from among three caskets. Portia too alludes to the humours: "the brain may devise laws for the blood, but a hot temper leaps o'er a cold decree" (1.2.17–19). This shows a sophisticated understanding of psycho-physical theory, expressed in metaphors modern enough sounding that it is hard to tell whether 'hot temper' is here literally connected with the theory of the humours. Portia is in control of her passions, and she emerges as the hero of the play, undoing Shylock, saving Antonio and winning the husband of her desire.

Antonio is a man driven by passion rather than reason. Perhaps his unprovoked denunciations of the Jew as a dog are the cause of all the troubles, and Shylock's actions, like his speech, are aimed at establishing his humanity. That is an attractive modern reading, and indeed there is a good case for seeing both Antonio and Shylock as ambiguous figures, mirror images of one another, as Portia insinuates when she asks "Which is the merchant here? and which the Jew?" (4.1.170). But Shylock is not hapless like Antonio; his passions drive a powerful faculty of reason – or *is* it reason? – through which he twists the law to his own purpose. That raises an interesting question about Shylock's questions: why does his list of "senses, affections, passions" etc. not culminate with *reason*, if it is his common humanity he means to establish? Why does it omit what seems to us like the most obvious evidence of his humanity, the fact that he possesses language?

3. Aristotle and Epicurus on the passions and language

Clues toward an answer can be found in the opening of Aristotle's *On Interpretation*, where 'voice' (*phōnē*) is defined as the sign of passions (*pathēmata*) of the mind.

> The voice is the sign of passions of the mind; written words are the signs of 'voices'. As with writing, so too are 'voices' (articulated vocal utterances) not the same for all men. But the mental passions themselves, of which these words are primarily the signs, are indeed the same for all, as also are the objects of which these passions are the images. These points however have been

> discussed in my treatise on the soul (*De Anima*); they belong to a different investigation from that which lies before us.
>
> (ibid., translation from Wollock 1997: 7)

In O*n the Soul* i.1, Aristotle says that the *pathēmata* (or *pathē*, the two words being used interchangeably) always involve the body:

> A further problem presented by the affections [*pathē*] of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking [*to noein*] seems the most probable exception, but if this proves to be a form of imagination [*phantasia*] or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.
>
> (*De Anima* 403a3–10, translation by J. A. Smith)

Further on he gives a list of the passions of the mind that includes emotions of both a positive and a negative sort, and he concludes that all of them do involve the body:

> It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body – passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. (ibid. 403a 16–19)

In the passage from *On Interpretation*, Aristotle takes a 'universalist' view of these mental-bodily passions: they "are the same for all, as also are the objects of which these passions are the images". Thus, environment and experience do not differ in any significant way among human groups, and neither does the way their minds-*cum*-bodies react to and make images of the things they experience. In fact the universality extends even further. A number of Aristotle's treatises, including *On the Soul*, *History of Animals* and *Politics* state explicitly that *phōnē*, voice, is produced not only by human beings but by animals that possess lungs. *On the Soul* ii.8 makes clear that even the basic actions by which the 'organic parts' produce voice, physically and mentally, are the same in humans and non-humans, and among groups of humans. Nevertheless, as *On Interpretation* states, their 'voices' differ. It is in the details of the motion of the organic parts whereby the common *pathē(mata)* are signified as voice, sound in the windpipe, that distinctions in voices occur among species and among people.

Language, for Aristotle, begins when sense perceptions, or thoughts alone (*noesis*), produce sense imagery, or *phantasia*. This in turn triggers appetite or

desire, and it is from this that the bodily affections (*pathē*) are produced, that then cause the movement of the organic parts whereby voice is produced. Then, at a second stage of the motion of organic parts when voice leaves the throat and reaches the tongue, it can undergo a further change in human beings only. Both humans and animals can use the tongue and other organs (lips, teeth etc.) to 'articulate' voice in the sense of giving it aurally distinctive shape. But only in humans can voice becomes *dialektos* 'speech', when it is articulated by the tongue and other organs to distinguish consonants from vowels (*History of Animals* iv. 9). This is the point at which *grammata*, the articulated elements of voice, appear (see *Parts of Animals* ii.16). Thus we might retranslate the opening sentences as follows, with additions drawn from other Aristotelian texts in brackets (see further Joseph 2000a, Chap. 4):

> What is in the [unarticulated] voice [uttered by humans and animals] symbolizes the passions of the mind/soul [*viz.* passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving and hating, in all of which the body too is involved]. Articulated words symbolize what is in the [unarticulated] voice. Just as articulated speech is not the same for all people, neither are [unarticulated] voices the same. But what these things are primarily the signs of, the passions of the mind/soul, are indeed the same for all people. Likewise, the objects [which provoke the passions, and] which [therefore] the latter are images of, are the same.

In subsequent centuries, two aspects of Aristotle's formulation would give rise to dissatisfaction. The first was its failure to account for the origin of 'mind' (as *psychē* or *noēsis*), and why it differs between humans and other animals. Secondly, it fails to answer the question of why different languages exist. If the passions of the mind/body are universal, why then should men arrive at different conventions for signifying them?

Widely remembered as the philosopher who put the body at the centre of his moral considerations, Epicurus articulated a view that does not directly contradict Aristotle but draws out certain possible readings of his texts on language. It is that words originate bodily, hence naturally, but that subsequently they are refined by social convention. In both dimensions, his explanation makes crucial use of the concept of *ethnos*, nationality or race:

> And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men's natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.
>
> (Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus* 75–76, translation by Bailey 1926)

According to Epicurus, the exhalation of voice takes different form, on the one hand because of ethnic differences per se, on the other because *pathē* "feelings" and *phantasmata* "impressions" (or "images" or "imaginings") vary by *ethnos*.

Epicurus does contradict Aristotle's account on one point, when he says that "men's natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings [*pathē*] and received their peculiar impressions [*phantasmata*]", as against Aristotle's view that the mental-bodily passions, the *pathēmata*, and everything leading up to them, are "the same for all". When Aristotle says that *phōnē* is not the same for all people, any more than conventionalized *dialektos* is, but that the *pathēmata* which it signifies are the same for all, he creates a certain imbalance:

pathē(ma)	is pre-rational	arises 'naturally'	is the same for all
phōnē	is pre-rational	arises 'naturally'	is not the same for all
dialektos	is rational	is made by art	is not the same for all

The imbalance is that *phōnē*, while sharing the other two features with the *pathēmata*, agrees instead with *dialektos* on the matter of whether it is the same for all people. Epicurus restores the balance by making the *pathēmata* non-universal as well, in effect positing a shared distribution of feelings and impressions, unarticulated voice, and rational language. The result of this alignment is a sudden dramatic increase in explanatory power, at what may seem a small cost, but what in fact is an enormous one. For what it gives up is nothing less than the notion of a common humanity.

4. Aristotelian, Epicurean and Christian answers to Shylock

We should expect that a follower of Aristotle in the 1590s would have answered 'yes' to all Shylock's questions. The hardest bit to assent to might be "fed with the same food", since from early in the scene which introduces Shylock, the matter of what Christians and Jews eat and drink is prominent.

> *Bass.* If it please you to dine with us.
> *Shy.* Yes, to smell pork, to eat of the habitation which your prophet the Nazarite conjured the devil into: I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following: but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you. (1.3.29–33)

Talking is held by Shylock to be on a plane with buying and selling – intercourse among men. Praying – intercourse with God – is on a plane with eating and

drinking, something essential rather than contingent. However, "fed with the same food" can also be construed as 'sustained with food, just as a Christian is', justifying an Aristotelian 'yes'.

Epicureans, in contrast, would be obliged to answer 'no' to some parts of the question, and 'maybe' to others. In the case of eyes, hands, organs, dimensions and being hurt with weapons, they might have said 'yes', but on the other hand someone who believed that people "each in their own way emitted air [. . .], according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode" might have questioned whether their body parts and reactions to injury could really be the same. For food and climate (winter and summer) the Epicurean answer might well have been 'no', and possibly also for diseases and cures. What matters most, however, is that for senses, affections and passions, Epicurus demands an emphatic 'no'. For from the bodies of the members of a race there arise racially distinct feelings and impressions, in his view.

So it seems that Aristotle gives the non-racist answers we would prefer. But there is one problem. Aristotle would answer 'yes' to Shylock's questions not only for a human being of whatever race, but also for an ape, or indeed a dog. Dogs too have the organs and attributes named; the *OED* extends the meaning of 'hand' to the 'forefoot of a quadruped'. The closest Shylock comes to a distinctively human feature is laughter. Aristotle, in *On the Parts of Animals* 3.10, says that the fact that "man alone is affected by tickling is due firstly to the delicacy of his skin, and secondly to his being the only animal that laughs" (Ogle translation). As Screech (1997:1–5) reminds us, from antiquity through Renaissance the majority view was that laughter is the defining property of humans. However, no less a figure than Erasmus (5.922BC) disputed this, arguing that the ability to laugh is shared by dogs and monkeys,[2] and that the unique property of man is the ability to speak. Screech (1997: 56, 57n.) points out too that throughout the Renaissance laughter was treated as a medical problem, associated with base humours. This led easily to an interpretation of laughter as a sign of the animal nature within humans, and no doubt aided the residual existence of a worry that never enjoyed much theological support, namely that laughter might be intrinsically evil. Finally, I might mention that the English language gives support to the idea that laughter crosses species, since the word laugh itself appears to be etymologically cognate with Indo-European words for 'cluck'.

So for an Aristotelian, all that rescues Shylock's humanity is a weakness linked to base humours; and this coheres with the culmination of his series of questions in the shared passion for revenge. But there was still another definition of the human available, expressed for example by Lactantius Firmianus

in his *Divine Institutions* (3.10): "The property of Man is to know and worship God". Even this one was not watertight; Screech (1997: 3) notes that it "in turn was challenged: it was widely thought that elephants worshipped God". But there is no question of Shylock being an elephant, only a dog; and Lactantius Firmianus' position becomes a dominant one in Renaissance Christianity, as faith and worship become ever more pressing issues with reformation. Now, somewhat ironically, it is in this Christian view, which most of Shakespeare's audience would have accepted without question, that can be found the 'modern' answer to Shylock's questions, a 'yes' that transcends race but not species. I say 'somewhat ironically' because we are not used to associating Christianity with either modernity or equality, modern racism having so frequently been bound up with religion and even driven by it, while secular science has led the charge for racial equality.

Yet since St Paul Christianity, and later Islam, have defined the people of God as a community of faith transcending ethnic divisions. In *The Merchant of Venice*, such transcendence is embodied in Jessica, Shylock's daughter, who becomes a Christian and the play's second heroine. She is an ambiguous character, to be sure, displaying a certain comic rapaciousness when stealing money and jewels from her father's house and in the reports of her recklessness in spending them. In recent years the trend among actresses playing Jessica has been to emphasise her callousness and callowness, making her into a sort of Shylock Junior. But the text suggests a much more positive characterisation, and insists strongly on the differences between her and her unbaptised father. At 2.3.18, Jessica says of Shylock, "But though I am a daughter to his blood, / I am not to his manners [...]". At 2.4.34 and again 2.6.51, there are significant uses of the word gentle in opposition with Jew, and read by Brown (1955) as puns on gentle/Gentile. In both cases it is Jessica who is described as 'gentle', in the second instance precisely as "a gentle, and no Jew" – showing that in this play, being a Jew is a moral condition essentially, a racial one only contingently.

Shortly before Shylock's series of questions in 3.1, the theme of whether Shylock and Jessica are of the same 'race' is revisited:

> *Shy.* I say my daughter is my flesh and blood.
> *Sal.* There is more difference between thy flesh and hers, than between jet and ivory, more between your bloods, than there is between red wine and Rhenish [...] (3.1.33.–36)

What does this mean for the questions which Shylock is about to ask? If Jessica is a Jewess, can a general answer about Jews be given? And if her 'gentleness' has made her Gentile, perhaps the answer is that a Jew who experiences all the

same passions, affections and so on as a Christian is actually a Christian. Antonio suggests as much in his remark at 1.3.174: "The Hebrew will turn Christian, he grows kind". The answer this suggests to Shylock's hard questions would be 'no', but a tautological 'no' in which the condition of being a Jew is precisely that imbalance of human passions and affections whose cure comes with conversion. In Jessica's case, conversion seems to be the effect, not the cause of her Christian passions. As for Shylock, he finally consents to conversion at Antonio's insistence and under threat of execution by the Duke (4.1.389), but thereupon quits the stage for good, leaving the audience to assume that baptism will reform his character.

Shylock's conversion is disturbing to modern audiences, who value religious freedom as a civil right. But few Christians in Shakespeare's time, even the tolerant ones, would have seen the conversion that way. Thomas Wright, in his book *The Passions of the Minde*, written at about the same time as *The Merchant of Venice* and dedicated to Shakespeare's one-time patron the Earl of Southampton, says:[3]

> The law of Christianity correcteth the errors of corrupted Nature, and directeth men, assisted by God's grace, to love their enemies, and show goodwill to them who bear ill will to us. Herein we are commanded to imitate our heavenly Father, who stayeth not the beams of his Sun from lightening and heating his most obstinate enemies, as Pagans, Jews, Turks, heretics, and obstinate sinners. (Wright 1986 [1601]: 265)

By enabling Shylock to receive God's mercy for all eternity, Antonio has given him the ultimate return on his loan, even if Shylock fails to appreciate it and departs with the complaint that "I am not well" (4.1.392). He has taken over Antonio's melancholy from the beginning of the play, and it is manifested linguistically, as before with Antonio, by a retreat into one-syllable Anglo-Saxon utterances with no trace of rhetorical flourish or passion.

For the Christian believer at the turn of the 17th century, non-believers are in the same spiritual, which is to say mental, condition as animals. Their passions and affections cannot be under the control of divine Reason, because such Reason demands the acceptance of Christ. This partly explains the problem I raised at the end of §2: why it is that Shylock's questions do not culminate with *Hath not a Jew reason?* But it does not entirely account for his failure to ask *Hath not a Jew language?* The fact is that 'infidels' are dangerous in a way dogs are not, just because they *do* possess language, and so can persuade Christians into the way of sin, just as a serpent endowed with speech persuaded Eve to disobey God's commandment. The body of the serpent was possessed by

the Devil; the Jew is suspected of being a similar sort of demon. In the *Summa theologica* 58.2, Thomas Aquinas insists that Christians must not doubt the real existence of devils, spells and witchcraft, since it is established on "the authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over men's bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means wizards can work certain signs". There are numerous textual clues that Shylock is so possessed, including two direct references to him as a (or the) devil:

> 2.2.21–26: *Laun*[*celot Gobbo*]. – to be rul'd by my conscience, I should stay with the Jew my master who (God bless the mark) is a kind of devil; and to run away from the Jew, I should be ruled by the fiend, who (saving your reverence) is the devil himself: certainly the Jew is the very devil incarnation [...]

> 3.1.19–20: *Sol*[*anio*]. "Let me say 'amen' betimes, lest the devil cross my prayer, for here he comes in the likeness of a Jew. *Enter Shylock.*"

Demons are routinely illustrated in medieval iconography as physical combinations of human and animal, and Shylock is a non-human creature in human form in Salerio's remark at 3.2.272: "never did I know / A creature that did bear the shape of man / So keen and greedy to confound a man". In 4.1 Gratiano goes still further, suggesting that the soul of a wolf infused itself into Shylock when he was still in his mother's womb – but noting that such transmigration of souls is a pagan idea incompatible with his Christian faith:

> O, be thou damn'd, inexecrable dog!
> [...] Thou almost makest me waver in my faith
> To hold opinion with Pythagoras,
> That souls of animals infuse themselves
> Into the trunks of men: thy currish spirit
> Govern'd a wolf, who, hang'd for human slaughter,
> Even from the gallows did his fell soul fleet,
> And, whilst thou lay'st in thy unhallow'd dam,
> Infused itself in thee; for thy desires
> Are wolvish, bloody, starved and ravenous.

The reference to the 'wolf' has been linked to the surname of Ruy Lopez, the Queen's physician hanged for treason, at whose trial the fact of his being a converted Jew was remembered relentlessly by the prosecutor (see Mahood ed. 1987: 7, 19). Empson (1995 [1951]: 167) finds a *devil-dog* link in the

> brief sixteenth-century fashion of swearing by Dog's wounds instead of God's [...] the dog is God's opposite in sound so you can swear by him as the scape-

> goat [...]. So far as the dog is connected with God by sound it is easy to make him a devil, as in the black dog of care and the black dog of Newgate [...].

There is also external evidence of Shylock being imagined as a devil with animal passions in a human form, such as this passage from Silvayn's *Of a Jew, who would for his debt haue a pound of the flesh of a Christian* (1596), included in Brown's Arden edition:

> [T] hat he should be willing to be paied with ma*n*s flesh [...] is a thing more natural for Tigres, then men, the which also was neuer heard of: but this diuell in shape of a man, seeing me oppressed with necessitie propounded this accursed obligation vnto me.

Wye Saltonstall's *Picturæ Loquentes* (1631) includes the following portrait (p. 37):

> *An Vsurer.* Mvst be drawne like to those pictures that have a double aspect, which if you behold one way seemes to be a man, but the otherway a divell. Hee grounds the lawfulnesse of his vsury from the Parable, wherein the servant was not approv'd of, that had not inprov'd his talent [...].

It would not be surprising if this were a direct commentary on Shylock, who does indeed give Biblical justifications for his usury.

Wright (1601) gives a physiological explanation of possession by the Devil:

> [T]he Devil [...],being a spirit, by secret means can enter into the former part of our brain, and there chop and change our imaginations. He can [...] make us slothful in the way of god by stirring the humours, altering the blood, which cause a tedious loathsomeness in us. (Wright 1986 [1601]:324–325)

Baptism will cleanse the Devil from Shylock's brain. This explains why the sincerity of the conversions is never questioned in the text of the play. Conversion to Christianity begins with a human choice, but the sacrament of baptism which it entails is the act of God. To question the sincerity of a baptised convert would be to imply heretically that Satan is more powerful than God. There is a further possibility: that the mysterious cause of Antonio's sadness, which he says he is to learn, is the result of a spell cast by the demonic Shylock, out of his hatred. Still, Christians are always subject to unruly passions, also known as sin – hence the undeniably correct conclusion of Shylock's questions, that revenge is not a passion from which Christians are exempt.

The traditional account of body, mind and language derived from Aristotle would lead us to expect that Shylock's disturbed passions would manifest themselves linguistically. Shylock's dialogue is distinctive, containing for instance an inordinate amount of repetition, as in this extract:

> *Shy*. Gaoler, look to him, – tell me not of mercy [...]
> Gaoler, look to him. [...]
> I'll have my bond, speak not against my bond, –
> I have sworn an oath, that I will have my bond: [...]
> I'll have my bond. I will not hear thee speak,
> I'll have my bond, and therefore speak no more. [...]
> I'll have no speaking, I will have my bond. (3.3.1, 3, 4–5, 12–13, 17)

Repetition will continue to mark out the speech of characters whose minds and actions are in the grip of passion rather than reason at least down to Dickens (Joseph 2000b examines how, in *Little Dorrit*, the madness of the title character's father is manifested in his repetitive speech). Shylock possesses some of the qualities of a *changeling*, that peculiar word that survives down through Locke, and that means someone so devoid of control over themselves as to appear to be halfway between man and beast. The overall answer this picture of Shylock suggests to his questions is essentially the Aristotelian one – by the criteria you set out, it is only by your basest passions that I can tell you from a dog – recast in Thomist terms – until you accept Christ. The difference between a Jew and a Christian is not sinfulness, that weakness of mind which lets the body rule itself, but the desire for salvation, denied to those who do not seek it, and to animals.

5. Later answers, from Descartes and Locke to Renan

The conception of mind and language as directly connected to the body, regulating and regulated by its passions and affections understood as internal physical movements, would not weaken as the 17th century progressed, but would come ever more to the fore. Although Descartes is widely remembered as having instituted an absolute division between mind and body,[4] and between human and animal, his late work *Passions of the Mind* (1644) is based upon the express belief that

> the mind is in fact joined to the entire body, and cannot properly be said to be in some one of its parts to the exclusion of the others [. . .]. (Art. 30, ibid. 88)

The bodily humours here give way to the central role of the *esprits animaux* 'animate-mental spirits', the most minuscule, fluid and fast-moving particles of the blood. Rarefied by the heat of the heart, they can enter into the narrowest passages of the brain and nerves where other blood particles cannot (Art. 10). Always in motion, they flow between the brain and the bodily organs and

back again. Sensory perception is produced by the flow of the animate spirits from the perceptual organs to the brain via the nerves, and in muscular movement, they are sent from the brain to stimulate the flow of blood that causes the muscles to expand and contract (Arts. 7–16, 34–35). Thus the whole process of hearing something said, interpreting it, reacting to it – e.g., with embarrassment, where a movement of blood to the cheeks causes one to blush – and formulating and uttering a reply, is explained by Descartes in these mechanical terms. What differentiates humans from other animals is the pineal gland, the seat of the mind (Art. 31), where reason and will come into play. Other animals are, in effect, machines.

Passions of the Mind was less widely read than other works of Descartes which emphasise his belief that certain conceptions are innate in all human beings, since we cannot learn them by experience – his cardinal example being the idea of God. The reaction against innateness was led by Pierre Gassendi in the name of Epicurus and bodily experience, as opposed to what he lumped together as the Aristotelian philosophy. This reaction had less of an impact on the continent than in Britain, where the ground for an empiricist alternative to Cartesian rationalism had already been laid by Francis Bacon. The development of 17th-century corpuscularianism, so influential on John Locke (see McCann 1994), is the heritage of Gassendi's neo-Epicureanism. For Locke (1690), all our ideas come to us through our senses, which is to say through our bodies. Simple ideas, corresponding directly to sensory objects and qualities, are therefore shared by all. But our most important ideas are complex ones, produced through a compounding of simple ideas, with no guarantee that each person will put them together in the same way. Thus it is that we may talk about 'justice' using the same word but having very different understandings of what this complex idea consists of. Locke finds both the cause and the remedy for this problem in language.

To Shylock's questions about a Jew, Locke might have answered that he does have the same eyes, hands, organs, dimensions, and senses as a Christian; but as for the affections and passions, they represent such complex combinations of and abstractions from sensory input that there is no sure way of knowing whether *two Christians* have them in the same form. Locke's life was after all shaped by religious struggle among Christians in Britain, and while he recognises a certain unity in principle among "*Jews*, *Christians*, and *Mahometans*, who acknowledge but One God", not even among them has

> this Doctrine [...] prevailed so far, as to make Men to have the same, and true *Ideas* of Him. [...] Talk but with Country-people, almost of any Age; or young

> People, almost of any condition, and you shall find, that though the name of GOD be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions they apply this Name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that no body can imagine, they were taught by a rational Man; much less, that they were Characters writ by the finger of God Himself. (I.iv.16, 1975: 94)

Locke is noteworthy for the deist rather than specifically Christian references in his work. His 18th-century follower the Abbot of Condillac would develop his philosophy in a direction consonant with this and with Epicureanism. Early in his 1746 *Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines* Condillac proposes a biblically-based compromise between the Cartesian view of mind as possessing innate ideas and controlling the senses, and the Lockean view of it as a *tabula rasa* entirely dependent on the senses for the knowledge it acquires. Condillac believes that the Cartesian view is true of the *pre-lapsarian* mind, the state of Adam and Eve before original sin, and to which we will return when we die; while the Lockean view is true of the post-lapsarian mind, the state of all living human beings since the Fall. Crucially, the break is not between Christian and non-Christian; it is entirely historical. Condillac on the pre-lapsarian origin of language is effectively an elaboration on Epicurus's account of it arising directly from the body; the fact that he associates this period with the Cartesian picture of mind shows how slippery any attempt is at aligning modern conceptions with ancient ones.

When Condillac's Epicureanism meets German Romanticism in the writings of Friedrich von Schlegel and Wilhelm von Humboldt, the ground for 19th-century nationalist accounts of language is laid. I want to have a glance at just one person from this period, the most famous linguist of mid-19th-century France, the Semiticist Ernest Renan. Believing that "The mind of each people is in the closest connection with its language [...]" (1858: 190), Renan alludes to the 'sensitivity' of certain races, by which he means their greater reliance on the senses than the intellect.

> Thus onomatopoeia is by no means found in all languages to the same degree. Almost exclusively dominant among the sensitive races, as among the Semites, it appears much less in the Indo-European languages. (p. 144)

> Isn't the religious and sensitive race of the Semitic peoples painted stroke by stroke in these totally physical languages, in which abstraction is unknown and metaphysics impossible? (p. 190)

Dominated by the direct sensory imitation of onomatopoeia, wholly physical and devoid of abstraction, and therefore suited for irrational religion but not for the rational philosophy that "metaphysics" means for Renan, the Semitic

languages (and by implication the Semitic peoples) are made into the direct 'other' of the Indo-European. Hebrew in particular "represents a very ancient state of language" (p. 124), close to the primitive state, as Renan elaborates with a quotation from Herder's *On the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry:*

> Everything in it [the Hebrew language] proclaims: I live, and move, and act. The senses and the passions, not abstract reasoners and philosophers were my creators [...T]he language was moulded and uttered with a fuller expiration from the lungs, with organs yet pliable and vigorous, but at the same time under a clear and luminous heaven, with powers of vision acute, and seizing as it were upon the very objects themselves, and almost always with some mark of emotion and passion. (Herder 1833 [1782]: 1.30, 33)

Remember that these are elegies of Hebrew, not criticisms. The superiority of concrete over abstract language owes something to Locke's view that human understanding is impeded by the existence of complex ideas, and will reach its apex in the mid-20th century with Ogden & Richards (1923) and in the essays of Orwell (1946, 1947; see Joseph et al. 2001, Chap. 3).

It seems obvious what Renan's answer to Shylock would be where "senses, affections, passions" are concerned, except that so much else in the religious-racial context has changed. Renan's most famous book was his *Life of Jesus* which denies the divinity of Christ; he proclaims his racial affinity to be 'Celtic' in a time where Celtic-Hebrew unity was widely believed in. So the 'Jew' as non-believer is not an issue for him, but race is in a way it was not in an Elizabethan England that for all official purposes took converts at their word, while never forgetting their distinct identity, especially when trying them for treason.

6. Conclusions

To conclude, I have tried to reconstruct a few of the answers that might have been given to Shylock's questions in Shakespeare's time and after, based in particular on how the "senses, affections, passions" were understood in relation to mind – human and animal – and to language. The late 20th/early 21st-century inclination to answer 'yes' to all the questions would not have been shared by everyone in Shakespeare's audience, who would have taken much more seriously the textual hints that this non-believer in Christ is a devil figure whose animal passions and affections are unconstrained by divine reason and the charitable affections it alone can engender, notably mercy. Shylock's best

moments come when he reminds the hypocritical Christians that by their own account they too have animal passions, which they call sin.

Today's audiences struggle with the fact that he does this as the embodiment of mercilessness, in the name of Judaism. The play is therefore accused of anti-Semitism, which inappropriately uses a racial term that covers Arab Christians as well as converted Jews, and anachronistically suggests racial views of the sort held 250 years later by Renan. If there is anti-Semitism in the play, its victim is not Shylock but the Prince of Morocco, who, when he selects the wrong casket, is dismissed by Portia with the words: "Let all of his complexion choose me so" (2.7.79). As if to defend her, Brown glosses *complexion* thus: "originally used of the constitution of 'temperament' of a person; the proportion in which the four humours (choler, blood, phlegm, and melancholy) were combined. 'Complexion' was first used of the skin (as in modern usage) because its appearance was thought to indicate this 'temperament'". Again, the sympathetic treatment of Jessica and the final rescue of Shylock by conversion argue strongly for a religious rather than a racial motive in the characterisation of the Jew. Whether that makes any difference morally is debatable, but it is crucial for the underlying conception of mind, language and humanity.

There remains much work to do in recovering such conceptions from the past, and rewriting the history of linguistics within their context. Take the case of Locke. If you want to read about his corpuscularianism, you can go to certain sources, about his theory of language, to different sources, or about his theories of government and law, to still others. Yet all these theories – and they are just a sample of the areas with which he was seriously concerned – coexisted within the same mind, and were not cut off from one another, even if in any one of Locke's work a particular one is at the fore. I think that Wollock's argument concerning our reading of pre-Cartesian work, in which we anachronistically project modern-day specialisations back onto their authors, needs in fact to be extended well beyond Descartes, indeed at least to David Hume, whose subjugation of the passions to a generalised 'desire' was the next critical moment in the modern divorce of mind from body, and perhaps the decisive one; but even so, the divorce is far from final until well into the 19th century when, with some help from German Romanticism and evolutionary theory, 'scientific racism' develops its own particularly unpalatable version of Epicureanism.

There is potentially much to be gained, too, from situating present-day 'body'-oriented linguistics within this historical context. The bibliography to this paper includes a selection of the recent explosion of work on language and emotions, carried out mainly in the framework of cognitive linguistics, and

quite oblivious to its distinguished pedigree (Fries 2000; Grabois 1999; Kövecses 2000; Kövecses & Palmer 1999; Schiffman 1999). Philosophy and psychology too are in the midst of rekindling of interest in the emotions – again a few pertinent references are in the bibliography (Dalgleish & Power, Eds., 1999; Evans 2001; Nussbaum 2001; Panksepp 1998; Stocker & Hegeman 1996; Wolheim 1999), where you will also find a book on cursing by Jay (2000) that bills itself as a 'neuro-psycho-social theory of speech', which is nothing more nor less than what Aristotle and Galen had.

Many of the cognitive linguists, including those in Palmer & Occhi (1999), follow Lakoff (1987) in believing that emotions are *learned from language*, especially from the metaphors a particular culture constructs around each emotion and passion. I remain somewhat sceptical about this notion, and nervous because of the lack of concern about how it might be taken as tying in with the proto-racist discourses discussed earlier. But I do find very interesting the way in which the language of traditional medicine, the humours and so on, survives as metaphor, leading us in some cases to read remarks such as Portia's about a 'hot temper' figuratively when they might be taken as literal or ambiguous in the 1590s. Perhaps there is a general tendency for today's science and religion to become tomorrow's metaphor? Certainly the literalness or metaphoricity of other characters' references to Shylock as 'dog' and 'devil' have been central to my enquiry, and one might argue further that both the main plots of the play hinge on similar issues. Shylock offers his flesh-bond as a jest, then reinterprets it as a literal contract; and the riddle of Portia's three caskets requires the suitor to see past the conventionalised meanings of gold, silver and lead, and past the literal meanings of the words inscribed upon them.

Another area where there is a good deal to be teased out is the Renaissance conception of eloquence as directly connected to the passions, both as a cause and a cure of their excess, and how the perceived effects of different kinds of eloquence, Ciceronian and Senecan for example, may have helped to shape the role each played in the formation of standard European languages in the 16th and 17th centuries (see Joseph 1987). We have seen some of the equations Shakespeare makes between the passions and eloquence, or the lack thereof, in the play. There is also the matter of eloquence and gender; the woman humanist Isotta Nogarolas pointed out that although eloquence was generally praised, in women it could be taken as a sign of unchastity (Kermode 2000: 10–11, citing Grafton & Jardine 1986: 37–40).

Returning again to present-day concerns, the principal focus of applied linguistics in the last decade has been the spread of English as a world language (see Joseph 2001 and forthcoming a, b). Implicitly or explicitly, the applied

linguists who have lined up to decry English 'linguistic imperialism' have done so on the grounds that English is wiping out indigenous languages which are intimately bound up with the perceptions and feelings of their speakers. Views such as the following are widely shared:

> Our language is shedding tears all over
> because its own children are deserting it,
> leaving it alone with its heavy burden.
> Those who speak it are labeled out-of-date,
> although it runs faster than the eagle.
> This tongue of mine I use to appreciate taste;
> how can one taste with someone else's tongue?
> (From a Wolof poem by Useyno Gey Cosaan, in Fishman 1997: 292)

It is true that if one generation ascends economically while losing their traditional language, their children and grandchildren risk growing up without a sense of belonging, more alienated than a Jew in medieval Venice. Such alienation is tragic, not comic, and potentially disastrous for individual and society alike. These are vexed questions, and we cannot make progress in sorting them out until we have a richer understanding of language and identity, which means working through the massive accumulation of assumptions about how language is tied to what we feel – senses, affections, passions – and therefore to who we are.

Notes

1. On Shakespeare's knowledge of medicine, see Bucknill (1860), Simpson (1959). Relevant studies of *The Merchant of Venice* include Cohen (1982) and Normand (1991). Overviews of the scientific and philosophical treatment of the emotions in the 17th century can be found in James (1997) and Gaukroger (1998). Erickson (1997) studies their lexical manifestations from the 17th century to the present.

2. Recent research by Simonet et al. (2001) purporting to bear out the fact that dogs laugh has been highly publicised (e.g., in *The Times* of 8 August 2001), but it does not appear to deal seriously with the fact that what constitutes 'laughter' is not just a physical production of sound (which can be identical to 'sobbing') but an interpretation of the intention of the person laughing. Although this research sits within a modern tradition to which no less a figure than Charles Darwin contributed (Darwin 1872), it remains difficult to see how observations of canine 'laughter' can be rescued from the charge of methodological anthropomorphism.

3. Other works of the period which are of interest in this context are Huarte (1594), Lemnius (1576).

4. This has been reinforced by the popularity of Damasio (1994). For a better informed view than Damasio's, see Rorty (1992).

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Part II

Communicative Means for Expressing Emotions

Interjections in a Contrastive Perspective*

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> They [interjections] form a significant subset of those seemingly irrational devices that constitute the essence of communication. (Ameka 1992: 107)

1. Introduction

Emotions have been dealt with by philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and linguists. They can be expressed by gestures, behaviour, intonation or verbally by interjections, exclamations, stereotyped phrases like *oh God* and by (other) expletives. Although interjections and related words play an important role as overt signals of emotions and affect, there seems to be little to say about them from a linguistic point of view. However when we study them more closely we find that they are not only natural signs resulting from an overflow of feeling but linguistic signs which are culturally specific and associated with linguistic conventions with regard to prosody, grammar, meaning and use (cf. Andersson 1984; on expletives and swearing see also Stenström 1996). It is clear that we need both a description of what we mean by interjections and studies of particular interjections.

In a special issue of *Journal of Pragmatics* (1992) dedicated to interjections, a call was made for more empirical research on interjections in different languages (Ameka 1992: 116). In this paper I want to take up this challenge and look at interjections from a cross-linguistic perspective. The emphasis will be on interjections in English, and their correspondences in other languages (particularly Swedish) will be used as a method to say something about the meaning and use of interjections in general. It will be claimed that interjections should not be treated as primary notions or as 'response cries' (Goffman 1981) but that they have social meaning and express affective attitudes or reactions.

A general problem when one wants to look at interjections is that there is little agreement about what to include in this class. Any study of interjections in English would mention *oh* and *ah*, and these are frequent both in authentic speech and in literary dialogue. For example, in the London-Lund Corpus *oh* occurred 2028 times and *ah* 275 times. These high frequencies are reflected in the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus where *oh* was found in 178 examples and *ah* in 22 examples. Besides *oh* and *ah,* Biber et al. (1999: 1096) mention *whoops, oops, ooh, aah*,[1] none of which occurred frequently in my material. In Swedish *oj, o, aj, fy, ojojoj* have been found to be the most frequent interjections in authentic spoken discourse (Allwood 1999: 245).[2] In Swedish translations of *oh* and *ah* other interjections were more frequent (see Appendix 1).

The method used to study interjections involves translations. The translations of interjections into another language result in semantic paradigms rather than single translations. We therefore get some indication of how wide or narrow the meaning of the source item is. For example, if *oh* is translated by both *åh* and by *ja* in Swedish we can conclude that its meaning includes (parts of) the meanings of *oh* and *ah*. Interjections should also be studied with regard to their collocations and semantic prosodies (positive or negative semantic preference; cf. Louw 1999).

Another perspective to be taken into account is what interjections are doing in the course of the communication. Interjections can be used interactively to receive information and textually as 'frames' at boundaries in the discourse when speakers want to mark a connection with preceding discourse and say something new.

The discussion in this paper will be organised as follows. Section 1 is devoted to a definition and delimitation of the term interjection against the background of previous work. In Section 2, it is claimed that interjections are expressions of affective stance which are indexically focussed on speakers, hearers and texts. Section 3 discusses methods and data. The picture which emerges from translations will be discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 6. Section 7 contains the conclusion.

2. Definition and delimitation of the term interjection

We need a definition of interjection which is useful for the contrastive analysis. Interjections have been described in many different ways. Not surprisingly the description of interjections begins on the prelinguistic level. Interjections have a gestural origin and probably still carry gestural associations (Bolinger

1989: 266). Bolinger, for instance, associates *oh* with a vocal gesture of surprise, in other words its articulatory form is associated with a particular emotion. *Ah*, although a close relative of *oh*, would have a different meaning since "if the speaker intentionally rounds an [o] or drops the jaw further to produce an [a], it should be for some purpose" (Bolinger 1989: ibid.). Interjections are also similar to non-verbal behaviour. An interjection expressing pleasure can be compared with a nonverbal device such as a smile which depending on the context in which it is placed can receive several interpretations ranging from an expression of happiness to a marker of politeness.

Interjections have a large semantic potential:

> You can fill it [= an interjection like *oh* or *ah*] like a carrier bag with twenty different senses and a hundred different shades of meaning, all dependent on context, emphasis and tonal accent. It can express anything from indifference to comprehension, incomprehension, query, rebuttal, rebuke, indignation, impatience, disappointment, surprise, admiration, disgust and delight in any number of degrees. (Smidt 2002: 197)

Schourup refers to interjections as 'quasi-linguistic' vocal gestures used to 'portray' the speaker's mental state rather than as 'full-fledged words' linguistically encoding information about that state (cf. Schourup 2001: 1045). According to Schourup, interjections mediate between covert thinking and explicit conversational activity: "Such interjections [like *oh*] are understood as reflecting the mental state of the speaker at the very moment at which the interjection is produced" (Schourup 2001: 1046).

Some interjections are more interjection-like than others. This is clear when interjections contain sounds not found in ordinary language or if the combination of sounds cannot be explained by regular morphological rules (*tut-tut, psst, hmm*; cf. Biber et al. 1999: 1082). Schourup therefore suggests that there is a scale of "increasingly word-like gestural forms". On this scale, *oh* is word-like and more easily linked to the ensuing utterance than *ouch* (Schourup 2001: 1049). On the other hand, *oh* is more gesture-like than *well* which has a lexical origin as a manner adverb and therefore lacks any inherent emotive quality (Schourup 2001: 1042).

Not surprisingly, considering their gestural origin, interjections have often been treated in a stepmotherly way as "peripheral to the 'real' concerns of language" and "placed, so to speak, into that wastebasket labelled 'paralinguistic phenomena'" (Wilkins 1992: 119f.).

In traditional research on interjections (e.g. Jespersen 1968 (1924): 90) a common definition is that they can stand alone as complete utterances (cf.

Bloomfield 1933 'minor utterances'). Another characteristic feature is their emotive or exclamatory function. *Ouch* and *whoops* would in this respect represent prototypical interjections. In work on interjections which has appeared recently (e.g. Andersson 1984; Fischer 2000; Kryk 1992), more attention has been given to their description on the sentence level and their pragmatic and discoursal functions. Interjections like *oh* and *ah* can, for instance, also stand at the beginning of an utterance turn as an initiator (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 444, 853) with discourse management functions: "Interjections are sometimes used to initiate utterances: *Oh, what a nuisance*; *Ah, that's perfect*" (Quirk et al. 1985: 853).

Although routines and particles (modal particles such as Swedish *ju* or *väl* or focus particles such as *only* or *even*) are sometimes regarded as interjections they will be regarded as distinct or as subclasses of some larger form class such as 'inserts' (Biber et al. 1999: 1082). The term interjection will be applied here to a category of words which can be defined by certain grammatical, structural, semantic and prosodic criteria (cf. Biber et al. 1999: 1082):

- they may appear on their own, i.e. not as part of a larger grammatical structure
- they rarely occur *medially* in a syntactic structure
- they are morphologically simple
- they are not homonyms of words in other word classes (cf. the discussion of primary and secondary interjections)
- semantically, they have no denotative meaning: their use is defined rather by their pragmatic function
- they have indexical meaning, i.e. their use is defined by their ability to index features in the communication situation

Interjections are more difficult to identify prosodically. They can, for example, be stressed and a particular pitch contour can be associated with disappointment or a high degree of surprise. On the other hand, they may sometimes be unstressed and appear attached prosodically (indicated in the transcription by absence of punctuation) to a larger structure which may be a clausal unit or a non-clausal unit (cf. Biber et al. 1999: 1082). Other criteria will be added below. Interjections are, for instance, usually translated unlike modal particles and discourse particles.

According to this definition, *oh* and *ah* are interjections just like *ouch*, *oops*. In Swedish we have *åh, äh, oj* as well as reduplications *håhåjaja, ojojoj. Yes* and *no* are response signals (reaction signals) rather than interjections. Since *oh* and *ah* are the most frequent interjections I will concentrate on these (and

their combinations such as *oh god, oh yes*). Lexical words (*God, Jesus, damn*) which are used with emotive function are excluded because they have lexical homonyms which are not used emotively. In both English and Swedish there are stereotyped phrases 'of peculiar construction' such as *dear me, goodness me, oh dear* which could be seen as secondary or less prototypical interjections (cf. Ameka 1992: 104).[3] The combinations *oh God, oh Jesus* are more tricky to analyse. If they can be translated by a bona fide interjection (or expletive) or if *oh* can be omitted in the translation this suggests that they are interjective phrases. If *oh* can be analysed as a vocative it is an interjection.

We also need to characterise interjections in terms of function. Interjections like expletives can be defined functionally with regard to their position in the local and global context (cf. Stenström 1996) and with regard to their pragmatic functions. There has been comparatively little discussion of the relationship between the expression of emotion and other pragmatic functions which interjections can have. Interjections have sometimes been identified with discourse markers and with discourse management functions. Heritage focuses on the use of *oh* to "propose that its producer has undergone some kind of change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, information, orientation or awareness" (Heritage 1986: 299). Schiffrin (1987), on the other hand, recognises two types of speaker orientation expressed by *oh*: objective receipt of information and subjective orientation or evaluation which includes intensification. It is important to realise that only certain interjections can have such functions (Ameka 1992: 114). Moreover many different elements in language can be used as discourse markers (pragmatic markers) besides interjections. Fischer suggests, for example, that at the sentence level interjections should be treated as a subclass of discourse markers which also includes segmentation markers like *well, yes, okay* or hesitation markers such as *uh* or *um* (Fischer 2000: 15). However there are no clear boundaries between these sub-classes which is in fact indicated by translations as I will show below. Interjection as a word class is also related to routines (*thank you, good bye*) and to mild or serious swearing (*good God*, *bloody hell*). Other categories sometimes regarded as a subclass of interjections are alarm calls (*help*) and attention getters (*hey*).[4]

In the discussion below I will use translations to show the degrees of affinity between interjections and other categories such as routines, discourse markers (*well*), reaction signals (*yes, no*) or hesitation markers (*hm*).

3. Interjections and indexicality

Interjections are 'evincives' giving the hearer access to the speaker's thoughts, emotions or attitudes (cf. Schourup 1985). Following Carlson (1984: 93) I prefer not to regard emotion as a primitive notion but as a reaction (which can be bodily manifested) which results when a person encounters something which was unexpected and therefore experiences conflicting attitudes. *Oh*, for instance, seems to imply 'I now observe, realize something which I had not expected'. It also has meanings such as disappointment (a mixture of surprise and unfulfilled desire), pity and sympathy.

Interjections are also vague in the sense that they leave it to the hearer to make precise who the emotion is directed at, who the speaker and hearer are, what social actions they perform. In order to explain the relationship between interpretation and context it has been suggested that interjections have indexical meaning (cf. Wilkins 1992, 1995; Schiffrin 1987). For example, Schiffrin (1987: 322f.) points out that *oh* focuses on or indexes the speaker, and Wilkins observes that interjections have in common with other deictic words that they must be indexically tied to the situation of the utterance before their interpretation can take place (Wilkins 1992: 132). This does not necessarily mean that interjections contain indexical components such as *I, you, here* as part of their meaning as claimed by Wilkins[5] but rather that the meaning of an interjection is underspecified with regard to the particular situational constellation in which it is used (who the speaker is, who the hearer is, the relationship between them, what has come before, etc.). Although Schiffrin (1987), for example, includes a large number of situational coordinates in her description of *oh* (and of discourse markers in general), it is still an impoverished description of the social situation in which interjections are used.

Instead we have to take our inspiration from the situation in the social sciences, pragmatics, discourse analysis and functionally oriented linguistics where the focus is on language as a social and cultural phenomenon. In this perspective language is regarded as a function of how members of society use it in the course of their social conduct 'variably according to the social situation'. Ochs, for instance defines social situation in terms of variables such as social identity, social act (goal-directed behaviour such as requests), activity (e.g. disputing), affective and epistemic stance. Affective stance, which is what interests us here, "refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern" (Ochs 1996: 410).

Interjections index affective categories such as negative and positive affect, evaluation, and degrees of intensification or feelings. Interjections can also be

"socio-culturally linked to certain social acts" (Ochs 1996: 420). An example would be if we focus not only on how *oh* and *ah* are used as indexes of mental states but as elements to complain, show pity or to sympathise with the hearer.

The functions of interjections can also be seen as outcomes of their orientation to the preceding and following text. For example, interjections can have speech management functions (functions related to formulation and text production such as recognizing and receiving information, signalling clarification, facilitating planning). Their appropriateness for such tasks is a natural consequence of the fact that they make overt a mental process (affective stance) which is then open for different pragmatic and discoursal interpretations depending on the context (cf. Schiffrin 1987; Heritage 1986; Fischer 2000).

However the functions of interjections do not only relate to the exchange of information and knowledge as seen from the diversity of uses in conversation. Interjections also have a strategic function to change a state or a context if this contributes to the conversational goal (the achievement of harmony, persuasion in argumentative texts). For example, interjections may express a reorientation or reperspectivization when speakers discover a discrepancy between their own and others' evaluation of a situation.

To summarise, speakers can react by shock, surprise or disappointment to what happens as indicated by the use of interjections. Interjections can also be used consciously or strategically by speakers for a number of speech-management uses. We will discuss below the use *oh* and *ah* to receive information as new and unexpected. Although *oh* has the core meaning 'surprise', i.e. the speaker is unprepared, *oh* and *ah* can be used to mark a pause in the discourse as well as for other speech management tasks.

Another function I want to draw attention to is the use of interjections to introduce a new perspective on what has been said by rejecting an assumption which is implicit only in the context.

4. Methods to study interjections

Can we study interjections on the basis of literary texts? Sometimes we do not have a choice. Taavitsainen (1995) was interested in studying interjections in early Modern English and the emotions they were associated with. In her study the frequency and the function of interjections served as a diagnostic of the spokenness of certain genres in the absence of authentic spoken data from that period.

Written texts are our only choice if we use translations as data. Translators generally make an effort to translate interjections which makes them good informants about the meanings of interjections. A rich source of data for studying the functions of interjections is therefore translations. My material for the present study comes from the English-Swedish Parallel Corpus (ESPC). The corpus consists of almost three million words and includes both fiction texts and non-fiction texts. There is an equal number of English original texts translated into English and Swedish original texts translated into English which makes it possible to establish translation equivalents. (For additional information on the ESPC, see Altenberg & Aijmer 2000.)

The translation method which I will use involves several steps. To begin with, the meanings of *oh* and *ah* can be mirrored in their 'translation image' (in this case translations from English into Swedish).[6] The translation image in Tables 1 and 3 (Appendix 1) contains coded meanings (routinised uses) as well as pragmatic effects or implicatures of the coded meanings. What is interesting about this method is that empirical data rather than intuition is used to study meaning and multifunctionality.

By looking at sources as well as translations we 'correct' the image that we get from looking at translations in one direction only. An additional step involves the use of back-translations (a second translation image). This procedure is needed to establish that *oh* is closely related to *ah* as well as to *yes, hm, really, is that so* which are not interjections but are functionally similar (see Appendix 2, back-translations). As I see it, the value of translations is in the possibility to test a theory of what interjections are doing. The translations provide us with a detailed but unanalysed map of the semantic space of surprise or unexpectedness. To complete the picture we should describe how the different (routinised and temporary) uses are related to surprise (the core meaning of *oh* and *ah*).

Although nouns are usually translated by nouns, verbs by verbs,[7] the picture is more complex when we look at interjections or discourse particles. In the translations of interjections into Swedish we do not always find a cognate interjection. The translations show, for instance, that there is a close relation between interjections and 'reaction signals'[8] (such as *yes, yeah*), between interjections and discourse particles (such as *well*) and between interjections and conjunctions (*but*). In the following sections I have therefore looked in more detail at examples where *oh* (and *ah*) have interjective correspondences (Section 4), the subgroup of examples where *oh* (and *ah*) correspond to 'reaction' words (Section 5). The argumentative *men* "but" belongs to emotional contexts but is treated separately from interjections (Section 6).

5. Interjections in English – interjections in Swedish

The translation may be a cognate of the interjection in the source language. Both *oh* and *ah* have, for instance, cognates in other languages which are therefore good candidates for translation equivalents. For example, the English *oh* and *ah* correspond to German *oh* and *ach* (Fischer 2000). Cognates may however also differ in meaning although the differences are sometimes small. According to Wierzbicka, the 'all-purpose' interjections *och* and *ach* in Polish are similar but (semantically and phonetically) 'louder' than the English correspondences *ooh* and *aah* respectively (Wierzbicka 1992: 187). Scottish *och,* on the other hand, is not only perceived as louder than English *oh* but as pointing to regret or sorrow (OED *och*).

In the majority of examples an interjection was translated by a cognate or near-cognate interjection in the other language (Appendix 1, Table 1 and 3). *Oh* and *ah* are closely related since they have the same interjections as correspondences (Appendix 1, Tables 1 and 3). There is however a broader range of items corresponding to *oh* than to *ah. Oh* was translated by *åh, oj, å, oh, äh, äsch, håhåjaja, ojoj*, *ack* and *ah* was rendered by *ah, åh, aha, äh.*

Our data come both from translations and from sources. *Oh* or *ah* in English translations had many more interjections as sources in Swedish. This suggests that English has a few interjections with a wide meaning, while Swedish has a larger number of interjections with more specific meanings. This was confirmed by back-translations: the Swedish interjections *åh, å, ack ja, oh, åhå, oj då, ah, åh, aha, äh* were translated back to *oh* or *ah.*

Oh and *ah* both mean surprise but can be distinguished by their collocations and semantic preferences (cf. also James 1978; Bolinger 1989: 282f.). *Oh*, for example, occurred with an exclamation expressing a positive evaluation such as *oh how wonderful, oh how perfectly lovely*. It was also found with phrases containing 'God' and similar phrases for mild swearing: *oh* (*my*) *God, oh dear*. *Ah* was used for more serious swearing as seen from its collocates (*ah the hell with it*, *ah gick*) and to express emotions like pity (negative semantic preference) as in *ah a pity in a way.*

Interjections can be intensifying as well as exclamatory. Intensification occurs when a speaker wants to strengthen an argument (or an attitude). The translation into Swedish also uses an interjection with intensifying meaning. In (1), *åh* is used to strengthen the speaker's feelings of anxiety:

(1) "Oh, I do hope she wasn't *raped*," said Violet.
"I couldn't bear it if they'd raped her." (MW1)[9]

"Åh, jag hoppas verkligen att hon inte blev *våldtagen*", sade Violet.
"Jag står inte ut med tanken att de kan ha våldtagit henne."

The Swedish interjections in the translation may have a specific emotional meaning corresponding to meanings such as disappointment, pity, sympathy, resignation (cf. Teleman et al. 1999: 748f.). For example, *oj* and *nämen* express surprise; *å(h)* is conventionally associated with disappointment; as a symptomatic reaction rather than a linguistic expression it also expresses longing; *o(h)* has appreciation as its meaning or as an exclamation it is a spontaneous reaction of joy. *Äsch* and *äh* make light of an event.

In (2) the Swedish translation *ack ja* shows that there is surprise mixed with nostalgic longing:

(2) "We sort of got talking. And we sort of got on."
Ah, that 's my Stuart. Do I hear Tristan? (JB1)
"Vi kom liksom att talas vid. Och vi kom liksom på samma bog."
Stuart, min Stuart – ack ja. Hör jag ett eko från Tristan?

Emotion is quite clearly involved in (3) where *oh* has a vocative function and is translated by an interjection in Swedish:

(3) Brother Sonny's furtive visits; crumpled banknotes thrust in their mother's hand when Dedda is out to sea. Oh, Cape Town, Cape Town! (BR1)
Bror Sonnys förstulna besök, skrynkliga sedlar som stoppas i händerna på mor när Dedda är till sjöss. Å, Kapstaden, Kapstaden!

In the vocative function *o* is also used:

(4) O Gud, detta andra, sydliga land!
My God, that other, distant South! (BR1)

Although *åh* and *oh* are cognates they are not good equivalents because of their different frequencies. The English *oh* occurred in 178 examples to be compared with *åh* (3 examples). So this raises the question what the translator does with *oh* in the original text when neither *åh* nor another interjection is used. In 28% of the examples the *oh* has disappeared in the translation. *Oh, my God* could be translated either as *åh Herregud* or *Herregud* with no interjection in the translation.

(5) "Oh, my God," he breathed. (FF1)
"Herregud", viskade han.

A criterion for the interjection is that it cannot be omitted. When *oh* is only intensifying it is redundant and can be omitted in the translation. In (6) the translator has rendered "Ah, the hell with it" with "vi ger tusan i det här" without translating the interjection:

(6) "Ah, the hell with it," Macon said.
"Come on, Edward. "(AT1)
"Vi ger tusan i det hä", sade Macon.
"Kom, Edward. "

Another example of omission is "Ah, John. I'd never dispute any facts presented by you" translated as "John, jag skulle aldrig betvivla fakta som kommer från dig" (FF1). However *oh* and *ah* were always translated when they occurred alone as reaction signals.

Åh is chosen in the translation also when it would be unnatural in Swedish (cf. Gellerstam 1986, Aijmer forthcoming). In still other cases the translator's best choice is a reaction signal instead of an interjection.

6. Interjections in English-reaction signals in Swedish

In the Swedish translation of *oh* and *ah* we find *hm, jaha, visst, jaså, jaså jo, jaså jaha, ja, javisst, javisst ja, jodå, jo, joo, jadå, tja, nåja.* These are 'reaction signals' rather than interjections. The corresponding reaction signals in English are, for instance, *yes, no, yeah, yep, m, hm, mhm* (Quirk et al. 1985: 444). There is however a close relationship between reaction words and interjections since both can occur alone. In English *oh* and *yes* do not have identical meanings. On the other hand, the best translation of *oh* or *ah* into Swedish may be a reaction signal, for example to mark clarification. In (7), *jo* signals the moment when the speaker suddenly sees something and therefore corrects himself:

(7) Det är väldigt giftigt. – Jag ser inte riktigt. – Jo, nu ser jag.
It's highly poisonous. – I can't see –. Oh, now I do. (RDO1)

'Reaction signals' and interjections have above all been discussed from the point of view of their function to integrate information into common ground (Jucker & Smith 1998). According to Jucker and Smith, information which is easy to process and to integrate because it is already familiar is received by *yes* (*yeah*). Utterances introduced by *oh* contrast both with utterances introduced by *yes* and with *really* as a reception marker. *Really* indicates even greater surprise at information which is unexpected or remarkable than *oh* does. It is obvi-

ous that there are many more ways in which speakers can indicate how well the information has been integrated although it is often difficult to use intuition to show this. Translation might be of help here. In examples (8)–(9) we find response words rather than interjections in the Swedish translations for different speech management tasks. In (8), *ah* was translated by *jaha* indicating the speaker's reaction to the newness of the message:

(8) "Caroline will bring him."
"Ah". (AT1)
"Caroline kommer strax med honom."
"Jaha. "

Jaha marks clarification after a preceding other-initiated correction:

(9) "I didn't mean *your* chairs, I mean for visitors."
"Oh. They don't know quite how to react."
He is still Mr New Broom, slightly feared. (DL1)
"För besökare."
"Jaha" De vet inte riktigt hur de ska reagera.

Jaså in the Swedish source has translations like *ah so* and *oh so* and very often the simple *so* reacting to something in the previous context.

(10) "Let her go!"
"Ah, so you've seen it at last," said Lovis.
"It would have happened long ago if I'd had my way." (AL1)
"Släpp henne lös!" "Jaså, du har äntligen förstått det", sa Lovis.
"Det skulle ha skett för länge sen, om jag hade fått råda."

While the simple *ja* would simply express acceptance of the truth of the message, *jaha* and other combinations react to the newness of the message. *Jaså* can occur alone or be followed by an explanation for the reaction as in (10).

Yes and *no* are reaction signals only. In Swedish the situation is more complicated since *ja* and *nej* can occur both as reactions signals and for speech production tasks. A problem is therefore to distinguish between reaction signals and speech management signals. *Ja* (like *yes*) is a reaction signal receiving old, familiar information. When *ja* is used as a correspondence of *oh* in the answer to a question it expresses a reaction followed by a specification of the missing information:

(11) "Tio tunnland gladiolous?"
"Ja din svåger Pete pratade om det innan du kom.
Åttiotusen lökar per tunnland."

"Ten acres of gladiolus?"
"Oh, your brother-in-law Pete was talking about that before you came. "(JSM1)

Ja and *jo* reflect the affirmative or negative polarity of the preceding sentence. *Ja* is used when the preceding clause is positive, *jo*(*då*) when it is negative. *Jodå* in the translation expresses a weak contrast with what has come before.

(12) You can't play Juliet six months pregnant, Jack, which is what she would have been when the run started. Oh, I did my bit, suggested she talk it through with you... (MW1)
Man kan inte spela Julia när man är i sjätte månaden, Jack, och det skulle hon ha varit lagom till premiären. Jodå, jag gjorde vad som på mig ankom, jag föreslog att hon skulle tala igenom det hela med dig...

Because in (12) a break is initiated through the use of *oh* it serves as a frame(r) (cf. Fischer 2000: 147).

Another type of speech management task is illustrated in the translation of *ah* by the hesitation marker *hm*:

(13) "Has the hotel, ah, changed ownership?" he asked.
The manager seemed unusually sensitive. (AT1)
"Har hotellet, hm, bytt ägare?" frågade han.
Hotellchefen verkade ovanligt ömtålig.

This function seems to be incompatible with the core meaning 'surprise' and its implication of unpreparedness. When a mind is unprepared, there is no "premonitory consciousness of coming moments" (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986: 164). However the translation (*hm*) shows that the speaker uses the interjection because he is aware of the necessity of delicacy in expression (it appears from the context that the food which is served is not to the speaker's satisfaction).

Summing up, as shown by the translations *oh* and *ah* perform different speech management tasks all of which can be derived from the core meaning 'surprise'. *Oh* and *ah* are not the only items performing this task although they served as the starting point for the investigation. Appendix 2 shows how back-translations of some Swedish reaction signals ('the second translation image') make it possible to arrive at an inventory of items related to *oh* and *ah* which can perform different speech management tasks. Some examples are: *is that so, oh is it, oh yes*?, *was there* (more surprise), (*ah oh*) *so* (receiving information by inference), *I see*, *that's right, OK* (clarification).

7. Interjections in English-conjunctions in Swedish

Although translations with *men* "but" are few they are interesting because they show that *oh* is potentially argumentative: it can be used to take up an interpersonal stance to a stated or implicit assumption which diverges from a point of view explicitly expressed before or implicated from the preceding discourse. In (14) this implicit assumption is more general (one invites a neighbour into the house if they want to borrow something). *Men Macon* ("but") conveys that something else would have been expected.

(14) "No," Macon said, "I just handed her the double boiler.
Also that gadget that unscrews bottle tops."
"Oh, Macon. You might have asked her in." (AT1)
"Jag bara gav henne ångkokaren.
Och den där mojängen man tar bort kapsyler med".
"Men Macon, du kunde väl ha bett henne stiga in."

In (15), *oh* marks a shift to a new topic. The translation *men äh* conveys that the preceding topic has been pursued for too long:

(15) "[...] pay a lot of property tax. Oh, can't we talk about something else?"(JG1)
"Jag betalar en del förmögenhetsskatt, det är därför det blir 120 procent av min magra lön, men äh, kan vi inte tala om något annat."

8. Conclusion

Quirk et al. (1985:444) compared interjections to the adverb class since they must be positioned initially attached to a larger structure. The fact that they occur initially 'bracketing' a discourse unit has also been used as an argument for regarding them as discourse markers. In other functions *oh* and *ah* were minor utterances (closely related syntactically but not functionally to *yes* (and *no*)). These are features which need to be explained by our definition of interjections. The importance of defining what we mean by interjections has been illustrated mainly with regard to *oh* and *ah* which require a different analysis from the traditional word class definition of interjections.

In the present analysis, *oh* and *ah* have been given the core meaning surprise (reaction to something unexpected). Interjections are indexical which explains their function to express affective stance, their social meaning and dis-

course functions. Their indexicality also explains that they can be used strategically to establish or change the preceding text or assumptions and beliefs which have been expressed in the preceding context. As discourse strategies they can, for instance, be used for different speech management tasks depending on what speakers want to achieve.

Interjections are not unique to English. We can assume that in all societies there are linguistic forms indexing situational dimensions such as speakers, hearers, time and space but also emotions and feelings as well as beliefs. Functionally they are complex which is apparent when one looks at their correspondences in other languages. The methodology which has been explored in this article involves translations and the establishment of translation paradigms in English and in Swedish showing the wide functional spectrum of interjections.

Depending on the translations we could make certain observations. When *oh* and *ah* were translated by an interjection in Swedish they had an emotive (exclamatory, vocative or intensifying) use. The translations with reaction words in Swedish illustrate the strategic use of interjections to receive and integrate information. The translation with *men* "but" showed that interjections can be used in argumentative contexts when speakers want to change their positions or perspective on a situation in addition to their purely emotive (exclamatory, vocative) uses.

Notes

* I wish to thank Göran Kjellmer for constructive comments on this article.

1. *Wow, oops* and *whoops* are more frequent in American English; *ah, aha, ooh* had higher frequencies in British English (Biber et al. 1999: 1097).

2. *Oj* occurred in four examples, *aj aj* in one example, and *fy* twice in the expletive *fy fan*.

3. Ameka makes a distinction between primary interjections (*oh*, *gosh*, *whoops*, etc.) and secondary interjections (*my God, please, thank you*, etc.) (Ameka 1992: 104).

4. In this context it is interesting to mention Ameka's classification of interjections based on the functional typology suggested by Bühler (1932) and Jakobson (1960). According to this classification, interjections are not only expressive (emotive or cognitive) but can also be conative (i.e. expressions directed at an auditor with an attention-getting function) or phatic (e.g. backchannelling or feedback expressions signalling vocalizations such as *hm*). Teleman et al. (1999) also regard onomatopoeic words as a sub-class of interjections (cf. Kryk 1992). However as Ameka points out, this is perhaps the result of the confusion between phonological class and a grammatical class.

5. Wilkins (1992) proposes Natural Semantic Metalanguage definitions for a range of definitions from many languages.

6. Cf. Dyvik (1988: 51) on the use of translations and translation corpora to bring "a desirable multilingual perspective into the study of linguistic semantics".

7. With some obvious exceptions. Cf. 'Attention please' with the Swedish translation *Hör upp* ('Listen') and 'Keep out' *Tillträde förbjudet* ('Admission forbidden').

8. The term comes from Quirk et al. (1985: 444)

9. The abbreviations used in the article refers to the text from ESPC (cf. the primary sources at the end of the article).

Primary Sources (from ESPC)

The abbreviations used in the article are given in parentheses.

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Brink, André (1985). *The Wall of the Plague*. London: Flamingo/Fontana Paperbacks. (BR1)
Doyle, Roddy (1993). *Paddy Clarke ha ha ha*. London: Secker & Warburg. (RDO1)
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Lodge, David (1988). *Nice Work*. London: Secker & Warburg. (DL1)
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Appendix 1

Table 1. Translations of *ah* into Swedish

	Type	Number
interjection	ah	4
	åh	3
	aha	2
	ack ja	2
	äh	1
	nämen	1
		13
reaction signal		
	hm	1
	jaha	1
	visst (nej) ('certainly no')	1
		3
expletive		
	skit också ('shit')	1
omission		
	ø	5
Total		**22**

Table 2. Sources of *ah*

jaha	2
ja	1
jaså	1
o	1
ack	1
Total	**6**

Table 3. Translations of *oh* in the ESPC

	Type	Number
interjection		
	åh	54
	å	10
	ack (ja)	3
	oh	3
	åhå	2
	oj då	1
	ah	1
		74
reaction signal ('ja-words')	jaså (jaså jo, jaså ja, jaså jaha)	9
	ja	8
	javisst (ja)	6
	jodå	4
	jo (o)	2
	jaha	2
	jadå	1
	nåja	1
	just ja	1
		33
other reaction signals		
	minsann ('indeed')	1
	för all del ('by all means')	1
	visst ('certainly')	1
		3
conjunction		
	men	7
	nej men ('no but')	1
		8
adverb		
	nej förresten ('no by the way')	1
	faktiskt ('actually')	1
		2
other		7
omission		50
Total		**178**

Table 4. Sources of *oh* in the ESPC

	Type	Number
Interjection		
	åh	5
	oj	3
	å	3
	oh	2
	äh	2
	äsch	3
	håhåjaja	2
	ojoj	1
	ack	1
		22
reaction signal		
	jaså	4
	jaha	2
	nåja	2
	jo då	1
	nej då	2
	jodå	1
	jo	1
	javisst ja	1
	tja	1
		15
conjunction		
	då så	1
	så	1
	men	1
		3
phrases		
interjection + reaction signal	å nej	3
conjunction + interjection	men oj	1
		4
zero correspondence		11
Total		**54**

Appendix 2

Translation image 2. Back-translations of some Swedish reaction signals

Swedish *jaså*: English translations in the ESPC (19 examples)
so (5), oh so (3), really (2), ah so, I see so, I see, oh is it, was there, well yes, yes yes, oh yes, 1 omission

Swedish *jaha*: English translations in the ESPC (12 examples)
oh yes? (3), well well (so) (2), ah well, ah is that so, I see, yes now, that's right, OK, ah

When Did We Start Feeling Guilty?

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1. Introduction

In this contribution, I intend to substantiate my claim that guilt as a feeling has not been part of the Western discourse before roughly the second half of the 19th century. This does not necessarily imply that people did not have guilt feelings before these feelings became a discourse topic. It depends very much on what we mean by *having a feeling* how we have to answer this question. If *feeling jealous* means that I have to be aware that I feel jealousy then I am only jealous when I think I am jealous. However, such a position would imply that if I lived at a time or in a place where the words *jealousy* or *jealous* are not part of the discourse of the discourse community, then its members (including myself) could not have the feeling because they don't have the word. They could still "feel angry or bitter because they think another person is trying to take a lover or friend, or a possession, away from them" (Cobuild 2001). But is *feeling angry* or *bitter* really the same as *feeling jealous*? On the other hand, we could also say that people can have feelings without being aware of them. Then people could have had feelings of guilt before this feeling had become a discourse topic.

Firstly, I will have a closer look at the expressions denoting 'guilt' as a feeling. These expressions appear to be, in various ways, ambiguous. Because I will later argue that one of the origins of the modern concept of 'guilt' as a feeling was in the German language, I will compare English expressions and their meanings to their German counterparts. I will present evidence from several dictionaries concerning the meaning of *guilt*. Shame has always been closely related to guilt, and therefore it is useful to analyse occurrences of *shame and guilt* before 1850 in terms of their meaning.

Secondly, I will discuss, in greater detail, the question if and how our concept of what we call feelings is related to consciousness or awareness. How do I know what I feel? How can other people know what I feel?

In the third section, we will throw a glance at the discussions of psychologists and cultural anthropologists concerning the concepts of 'shame' and 'guilt'. How convincing is their distinction between the two feelings? Do they know better what I feel than I myself? Are guilt feelings universal? And is there evidence that Japan is, unlike Western societies, a shame culture and that the Japanese are unable to feel guilt?

In the fourth section, I will argue that guilt feelings were not a discourse topic before 1850. I shall do so by looking at Shakespeare's *Macbeth* and Milton's *Paradise Lost* which have both been referred to as paragons of early modern guilt literature. If I can show that these claims are unfounded then it would seem that the contemporary audiences had no reason to assume that these texts were about guilt feelings. I will also search for evidence of guilt feelings in two Victorian novels, George Eliot's *Middlemarch* and Elizabeth Gaskell's *Sylvia's Lovers*. They were written at a time when guilt feelings were about to emerge.

The core section will deal with the emergence of *Schuldgefühl*, first in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and then in the oeuvre of Sigmund Freud. It seems to have been largely Freud's accomplishment to have made 'guilt' a household concept in Western self-conceptualisation. In the sixth section we will see how guilt becomes a key theme in Western writing in the 20th century. The final section will look at contemporary corpus evidence for *guilt*, and it will attempt to extract the meaning of these words from the Bank of English corpus.

2. Dictionary evidence

2.1 *Guilt* and what it means

Guilt is an old word. It has been part of the English language for a very long time. Does this not contradict my claim that guilt is a feeling that was not a discourse topic before 1850? This is not necessarily the case. In Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones*, which appeared first in 1749, we read the following sentence (Project Gutenberg, www.promo.net/pg/):

> In a word, she was convinced of her husband's guilt, and immediately left the assembly in confusion.

It is obvious that this is not about a feeling her husband may have had, but about some offence she thinks he has committed. In the dedication of this book, on the other hand, we read (www.promo.net/pg/):

> For this purpose I have shown that no acquisitions of guilt can compensate the loss of that solid inward comfort of mind, which is the sure companion of innocence and virtue.

Would not the juxtaposition of *inward comfort of mind* and *acquisitions of guilt* indicate that *guilt* here refers to a feeling? I rather think not. The narrator/author is talking, it seems, of the rewards of unlawful actions, and not about acquired guilt feelings: nobody in their sane minds would prefer gnawing guilt to a comfort of mind. Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence in the accessible literature before 1850, I take it for granted that guilt is to be understood as "the fact of having committed a specified or implied offence or crime", and not "the feeling of having committed wrong or failed in an obligation" (New Oxford Dictionary of English, henceforth: NODE). *Guilt* today is ambiguous, and that makes it so hard to realise that before the second half of the 19th century it did not refer to a feeling. I will show below that the common practice of contemporary dictionaries to assign the two senses shown here to the word *guilt* is questionable. In today's discourse we find many instances where it is more or less impossible to decide between the two options; somehow, in a fuzzy way, they seem to have merged.

Initially, things seem much simpler in German. There has been and still is the word *Schuld*, meaning either "the fact of having committed an offence or crime" or 'debt', and there is *Schuldgefühl*, meaning "the feeling of having committed wrong", to use again the NODE paraphrases. *Schuld* has been a word of the German language forever, while *Schuldgefühl* was first recorded in the seventies of the 19th century. German compounds, though, are inherently tricky. Is *Schuldgefühl* an *ad hoc* compound, created on the spot according to the rules of word formation, meaning in principle all what *Schuld* and *Gefühl* can mean together, or is it a lexicalised word with a specific meaning which cannot be automatically derived from the meaning of its elements? Is *Schuldgefühl* indeed the *Gefühl von Schuld*, the *feeling of guilt*, or is there more (or less) to it? In the *Salzburger Nachrichten* of 14.08.1995 we read (Österreichisches Zeitungskorpus, www.ids-mannheim.de):

> Schuldgefühle können auch den Soldaten quälen, der seinen Kameraden sterben sah, oder die Mutter, die ihren Sohn verloren hat.
> "Feelings of guilt can also torment the soldier who has seen his comrade die, and the mother who has lost her son."

Here it seems that *Schuldgefühl* is less 'the feeling of having committed wrong' than the feeling as if one had committed a wrong. Thus, in German it is not *Schuld* that causes a problem of ambiguity, but *Schuldgefühl*. It is the compound that can be read either as an *ad hoc* compound or as a lexicalised item. To complicate matters further there is (or was) a parallel term, namely *Schuldbewusstsein* (literally *consciousness of guilt*) which is often used as a genuine synonym of *Schuldgefühl*, but which can also be used to mean 'feeling (in the sense of awareness) of having committed wrong' as opposed to 'feeling as if one had committed wrong'. In the early years of the 20th century, it was more frequent, while today it has largely lost out to *Schuldgefühl*.

In English, we have *guilt*, and we have the collocations *feeling of guilt*, *guilt feelings* and *guilty feelings* (rarely in the singular), which seem to be fairly synonymous (discounting *guilt* as 'committed wrong'). None of the collocations is found in the Oxford English Dictionary (henceforth: OED) before 1850, which is another indication that guilt, before that date, was not seen as related to emotional substance. Continuing our investigation into the meaning of guilt, corpus evidence makes us aware of the fact that the NODE definition cited above 'the feeling of having committed wrong' is also inadequate, in view of citations like this, taken from the Bank of English corpus (titania.cobuild.collins.co.uk):

> You feel as though it's a betrayal of the child you lost. There is this terrible guilt that if you are feeling happy again you've ceased to care.

Again this citation is about feeling as if one has committed a wrong while one actually has not. So, is *guilt*, when it refers to a feeling, ambiguous, or does it always imply *as if* rather than *that*? Corpus evidence makes a strong case in favour of ambiguity. Just like *Schuldgefühl*, *guilt* can also refer to the feeling of having actually committed wrong, for instance in this case (Bank of English corpus):

> [She put] him down in his cot and left the house after thinking "I don't like you" – only to be haunted by guilt and remorse.

Guilt and remorse is a binominal of the type where two nouns of similar meaning reinforce themselves. The Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (henceforth: Cobuild) tells us that *remorse* "is a strong feeling of sadness and regret about something wrong that you have done", and most of us would agree that this act of desertion on the part of the mother is considered a genuine wrong in contemporary Western culture. Therefore *guilt*, in this instance, can hardly mean 'a feeling as if one had committed something wrong'.

There is also the collocation *sense of guilt*. It is older than the collocations mentioned above. In the OED, we find altogether 17 occurrences of this collocation (two of them twice), 7 of which are from before 1850. None of these early citations refer to a feeling as if one had committed wrong. These are typical examples:

> 1769 (Junius Letters xxxix): When the mind is tortured, it is not at the command of any outward powers. It is the sense of guilt which constitutes the punishment, and creates that torture.
>
> 1839 (J. H. Newman): All these laxities of conduct impress upon our conscience a vague sense of guilt.

Thus it seems that *sense of guilt* can be paraphrased as the "awareness or realisation of the fact that one has committed something wrong", and as such it is entirely decomposable into its lexical elements; it is not an atomistic unit of meaning in the way *feelings of guilt* or *guilty feelings* commonly are. But is this still true today? Indeed it seems as if the majority of citations in the Bank of English refer to some real wrong, cf.:

> Barrister Harvey Walters told the court that Giannikos had an "absolutely overwhelming sense of guilt and remorse".

The context makes it absolutely clear that this is about a real and not an imaginary wrong, and this understanding is reinforced by the conjunction with *remorse*. But there are also instances like this:

> Your article explored feelings I know well, such as the sufferer's sense of guilt and terrible isolation – despite the fact that miscarriage is a very common experience.

To have a miscarriage is a tragedy, and not an offence one commits. The writer of this sentence is feeling as if she had committed something wrong. Here, then, *sense of guilt* is synonymous with the standard meaning of *feeling of guilt*.

What I want to explore in this contribution is this modern sense of *guilt* as a 'feeling as if one had committed something wrong'. This usage of *guilt* seems to have entered the discourse as an abbreviation of *sense of guilt*, *feeling of guilt* or *guilt feeling*. The OED considers it as a questionable innovation. We find this usage described close to the end of the very detailed exposition of other usages of *guilt* none of which refer to emotional substance:

Sense 5

- The state meriting condemnation (and reproach of conscience) of having wilfully committed crime or heinous moral offence
- An instance, kind or degree of guilt. *Rare*
- Conduct involving guilt; heinous sin or crime
- *Misused for 'sense of guilt'* [my emphasis]

In the whole new OED edition there are only 142 instances of the prescriptive notion of *misused for.* In this case, the remark was simply carried forth from the 1933 edition, when this usage was indeed just beginning to surface. This is corroborated by a look at the 1913 edition of Websters's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (henceforth: Webster, www.bibliomania.com):

> Probably originally signifying, the fine or mulct paid for an offence, and afterward the offence itself
>
> 1. The criminality and consequent exposure to punishment resulting from wilful disobedience of law, or from morally wrong action; the state of one who has broken a moral or political law; crime; criminality; offence against right. *Satan had not answer, but stood struck With guilt of his own sin.* (Milton)
> 2. Exposure to any legal penalty or forfeiture. *A ship incurs guilt by the violation of a blockade.* (Kent)

This is all there is about *guilt* in the old sense, and *guilt* as a feeling was not yet introduced noticeably into the discourse. Even in the 1998 NODE the new meaning was still only awarded second position, after *guilt* as "committed wrong". Cobuild however, based on corpus evidence and therefore acknowledging frequency, re-arranges the two usages, while paying tribute to the ambiguity of *guilt* as a feeling:

(1) Guilt is an unhappy feeling that you have because you have done something wrong or think that you have done something wrong. *Her emotions had ranged from anger to guilt in the space of a few seconds... Some cancer patients experience strong feelings of guilt.*

(2) Guilt is the fact that you have done something wrong or illegal. *The trial is concerned only with the determination of guilt according to criminal law... You weren't convinced of Mr Matthew's guilt.*

2.2 *Shame* in the context of *guilt*

That guilt as a feeling came to be the more frequent usage in the course of a few decades may have been supported by the fact that it always had been part of a well-established binominal *shame and guilt* or *guilt and shame*. This phrase was certainly used a long time before 1850. The OED cites seven examples of *shame* in the close context of *guilt*, three of which are:

> 1667 (Milton: *Paradise Lost* x, 113) Love was not in their looks, [...] but apparent guilt, And shame and perturbation, and despaire
>
> 1802 (E. Parsons Mystery Visit ii, 9): Neither did she consign him over undoubtingly to guilt and shame
>
> 1814 (Southey: *Roderick* xv, 250): A feeling uncommixed with sense of guilt and shame [...] thrilled through the king

The context makes it, I think, rather clear that *shame* in these citations does not refer to a feeling but means 'disgrace'. The 1933 OED maintains, though, that *shame* from early on was used to denote the "painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one's own conduct or circumstances", and it cites, among others, Steele (1711): "Shame of Poverty makes Laertes launch into unnecessary Equipage." In a subdivision of the entry for this sense, we then find: "*sense of shame*: the consciousness of this emotion, guilty feeling; also, the right perception of what is improper or disgraceful". Among several other examples there is this quote from Tennyson's *Princess* (1847): "and full of cowardice and guilty shame, I grant in her some sense of shame, she flies". The second sense of *shame* forwarded by the OED is: 'Fear of offence against propriety or decency, operating as a restraint on behaviour', and one of the examples cites Bentham (1780): "Where robberies are frequent and unpunished, they are committed without shame." *Shame* as 'disgrace, ignominy, loss of esteem or reputation' is the third sense in the OED. While *shame* in the citation of Steele might arguably rather mean 'disgrace' than 'painful emotion', it cannot be denied that Tennyson's Lady Psyche is said to be actually experiencing shame as a feeling, namely shame for having committed a wrong. Whether this feeling should be called a *guilty feeling* (which itself is ambiguous, as we have seen above) is rather questionable. *Shame* as a feeling is usually understood to refer to the embarrassment of having been found out to have done something wrong or ridiculous or indecorous, or to the fear that one is to be found out.

In the 1913 Webster we read in the entry *shame*: "A painful sensation excited by a consciousness of guilt or impropriety, or of having done something

which injures reputation, or of exposure of that which nature or modesty prompts us to conceal." The word *reputation* brings in the people as onlookers who have become aware of the impropriety, as the usual but not always necessary condition of feeling shame. As the second sense of shame we find: "Reproach incurred or suffered; dishonor; ignominy; derision; contempt", i.e. what has been called *disgrace* in the OED.

The NODE entry for *shame* is highly unsatisfactory. It does not list *shame* in the sense of 'disgrace', and *shame* as a feeling is defined without reference to (real or imagined) on-lookers: 'a painful feeling of humiliation or distress caused by the consciousness of wrong or foolish behaviour'. Cobuild as well does not refer to on-lookers: "Shame is an uncomfortable feeling that you get when you have done something wrong or embarrassing, or when someone close to you has." The reference to *embarrass* is of no help, as *embarrass* is defined by *shame*. Also it does not mention *shame* in the sense of 'disgrace'. Perhaps we are to assume that this sense of *shame* has become so infrequent in current usage that it escapes the lexicographers' attention.

For my investigation it is necessary to look at *shame* for three reasons. One I have given above. *Shame* frequently co-occurs with *guilt*. In google, we find 2.2 million hits for *shame*, 1.5 million hits for *guilt*, 16,400 for *shame and guilt* and 27,300 for *guilt and shame*. Today, it seems, the two words in connection seem regularly to refer to feelings. These are the first items offered by google for the two binominals:

> Patient self-motivated personal recovery can convert excessive *shame and guilt* into true self respect, acceptance, and forgiveness over time
> (www.sfhelp.org/01/shame.htm)

> *GUILT AND SHAME*. by Pamela Brewer MSW, Ph.D, LCSW-C Banner 13. *Guilt and shame* - among the most complex and exhausting experiences known to humankind. (www.myndtalk.org/htm/guiltand.htm)

2.3 *Guilt* and semantically related words

It is useful to have a look at words which have a similar meaning. If I claim that guilt feelings were not a topic of the pre-1850 discourse, I must show that what we today mean by *guilt feelings* was not expressed by a different word then. The two lexical items I am concerned with are *bad/evil/ill conscience* and *remorse*.

The OED lists *bad/evil/ill conscience* with the definition 'an accusing or condemning conscience, a consciousness of having done wrong, or being in

a wrong moral state', and it quotes, among others, T. Powell (1631): *Tom of all Trades*: "There is no coward to an ill conscience". The German equivalent is *schlechtes Gewissen*, before 1900 usually *böses Gewissen*. Just as in the OED quote, this expression used to denote a strong fear, even fright, in expectation of divine (and also secular) punishment for a wrong committed. An *ill conscience* is something to be afraid of, and cowards would certainly try to avoid it. This is not our modern *guilt feeling*. We feel guilty because we decide to leave our spouse for a new lover, but we do not expect divine punishment for this act. But what about *remorse*?

It seems that *remorse* (in German: *Reue*) has not changed its meaning since early modern times. The definition in Cobuild tells us: "Remorse is a strong feeling of sadness and regret about something wrong that you have done". This definition falls short, though. The OED definition is more to the point: "a feeling of compunction, or of deep regret or repentance, for a sin or wrong committed". If someone feels remorse, they want to *repent*, which is defined in the OED as "to feel contrition, compunction, sorrow or regret for something one has done or left undone; to change one's mind with regard to past action or conduct through dissatisfaction with it or its results". In the Deutsches Universalwörterbuch, *Reue* is defined as:

> *tiefes Bedauern über etwas, was man getan hat oder zu tun unterlassen hat und von dem man wünschte, man könnte es ungeschehen machen, weil man es nachträglich als Unrecht, als falsch o.ä. empfindet*
> "deep regret about something one has done or left undone and of which one wishes one could undo it because one feels it wrong"

For *remorse*, the wish to make amends, to repair the damage, and not to do whatever it was again, is essential. It is interesting to note that in German texts before 1850, we find *Reue* often close to *Scham*, just as in English texts we find *guilt* in the context of *shame*. Thus we read in E.T.A. Hoffmann's novel *Die Elixiere des Teufels* (1816):

> Bruder Medardus, Bruder Medardus, falsch ist dein Spiel, geh hin und verzweifle in Reue und Scham.
> "Brother Medardus, brother Medardus, your game is up; go away and despair in remorse and shame."

As an aside, in Oscar Wilde's *Importance of Being Earnest*, we find *shame* contrasted not by *remorse* but by *repentance*:

- Gwendolen: The fact that they did not follow us at once into the house, as anyone else would have done, seems to show that they have some sense of shame left.
- Cecily: They have been eating muffins. That looks like repentance.

Do we feel *remorse* or do we feel *guilt*, when we leave our spouse for a new lover, or when we consign our old parents to a nursing home? It depends. If we feel *remorse*, if we repent, we bring our parents home again, or we return to our spouse. If we feel *guilt*, we leave things as they are. Guilt is a feeling that does not commit us to any action. It is an unpleasant and sometimes even painful feeling; yet being aware that we feel guilt also reminds us (and lets us find satisfaction in the fact) that we have a conscience, that we have moral convictions. So even if we feel that there is nothing we can do to change things, we are deeply unhappy about the grievances we have inflicted upon others. In this sense, guilt is unique among all the words with related meanings. So far, this description of the meaning of *guilt* is offered only as a hypothesis. Later, we will have a look at the corpus evidence to see if this hypothesis is valid.

2.4 Words and terms

The other reason for the necessity to look into *shame* is the discussion of shame vs. guilt in psychology, psychotherapy, and, most importantly, in psychoanalysis. This dichotomy emerged in the English-speaking world; it is absent from Freud's own writing. It did not exist in the German language at that time. It seems that this opposition that we find in psychotherapy in the English-speaking world reflects the *shame – guilt* binominal that has always been part of the English discourse. Thus it seemed perfectly natural to scrutinise the behaviour of individuals in terms of a shame-guilt axis. This discussion was, from very early on, i.e. from the 1940s, taken up by ethnologists and cultural anthropologists, particularly in America where Freud's paradigm of psychoanalysis was being adapted to its new social and linguistic environment. Now the question was not whether individuals but whether societies were more prone to shame or to guilt.

It is extremely important to realise that the disciplines I have mentioned here employ *shame* and *guilt* not as words of everyday language but as terms. There is a fundamental difference. What words (or, rather, any kind of expressions) mean is the result of a never-ending negotiation between the members of a discourse community. People do not have to (and indeed often do not) agree on what a word such as *globalisation* means. Some texts may explain the same

word quite differently from other texts. Meanings may change over shorter or longer periods of time. In theory, every member of the discourse community can try to change the way a word is being used. They are successful if other members follow their example. Therefore, if we want to know what a word means we have to look at a large enough sample of citations, and we must be aware that each new citation may contain a new facet.

Terms are different. Experts define what a given term means, and we are not allowed to use the terms differently from their agreed definition. So if the psychoanalysts agree that the term 'shame' means this and the term 'guilt' means that, this is what we have to accept even if it does not agree with the way in which we use the words *shame* and *guilt*. So while we may think we feel guilt, if the expert's opinion is that we feel what in their terminology is called shame we have to accept it. This is, in principle, true for all cases where a word is also used as a term. Word and term, though identical in appearance, may denote different things. We may think a primrose is a rose; but gardeners know better. In the next section I will explore whether it makes sense to distinguish terms from words when it comes to feelings.

3. Feelings as first-person experiences

Sometimes we talk about our own feelings. We might tell a friend that we feel sorrow or grief because we lost a close relative. We are able to communicate our feelings because we are aware of them. Can we feel something and not be aware of it? Sometimes it seems like it. When a niece of mine was still quite young, say five years old, she seemed to have no sense of hunger. She used to become increasingly restless and misbehaved, but she would not ask for food. But once she had been made to eat something, her restlessness would subside and she would be a friendly, loveable person again. Was she feeling hunger or was she feeling nothing? Her parents used to say that she was hungry. Did they know better what she felt than she herself?

Can we have a feeling and wonder what it is we feel? Can we be uncertain about our feelings? In Mozart's *Magic Flute*, Tamino, on seeing a painting of Pamina, exclaims:

> Ich fühl es, wie dies Götterbild mein Herz mit neuer Regung füllt. /Dies etwas kann ich zwar nicht nennen, doch fühl ich's hier wie Feuer brennen; /soll die Empfindung Liebe sein?

> "I feel how this divine picture fills my heart with a novel rising. I can't name it, yet I feel it burn here as fire. Should this emotion be love?"

Is this a realistic scenario? Could someone be in love and not know it? It is not uncommon to hear someone say they thought they had loved someone but now they knew that they had been mistaken about what they felt. Do they really refer to the feeling 'love'? Do they remember what they have felt two years ago, and, recalling that feeling, become aware that they have given it a wrong label? Perhaps they are talking less about a feeling than about a more holistic concept 'love' which is made up from a plethora of different attributes of which feeling is only one. True love, we may think, is a feeling that lasts, if not forever, at least two or three years, and if it vanishes before that, it wasn't love after all. True love, we may think, is reciprocal, and if we find out we haven't been loved equally, it can't have been true love. True love, we may think, has to express itself in a certain unselfish way of acting, and if we come to the conclusion it was no more than a sexual frenzy we might well decide it had nothing to do with love.

Most, if not all, of the words we use to denote our feelings are ambiguous. We use them quite regularly also as expressions denoting a certain kind of behaviour when we talk about someone else's feelings. If we say of someone that this person is jealous, or contrite, we mean that they behave in a way that we have come to associate with jealousy, or contrition. Contrition, as we know from innumerable courtroom dramas, can be acted without being felt. In these cases we say the feeling is not genuine or authentic. But if someone acts or behaves towards a certain person for year after year in the unselfish way that we associate with love we would not refrain from calling it by that name even if they confided to us they weren't really quite sure what they felt exactly.

If we say that feelings are first-person experiences, we imply that people have to be conscious of them. I can only experience the differences in taste between two cheeses if I am savouring them consciously. If I just gulp them down without thinking I would not experience the difference. Awareness is a precondition of experience, and if I am not aware of my jealousy, I would not experience jealousy. Would it make sense to say *I felt jealous?*

John Searle has dealt with this conundrum. He writes (Searle 1998: 42f.):

> One consequence of the subjectivity of conscious states is that my states of consciousness are accessible to me in a way that they are not accessible to you. I have access to my pains in a way you have not access to my pains, but you have access to your pains in a way I do not have access to these pains. By access, in the preceding sentence, I do not simply mean epistemic

> access. It is not just that I can know my own pains better than I can know your pains. On the contrary, for some feelings, such as envy or jealousy, other people are frequently in a better position to know that the agent has the feeling than the agent who is experiencing the feeling. For many such states, we sometimes know about other people's feelings better than we know about our own. The sense in which I have an access to my states that is different from others is not primarily epistemic. It is not just how I know about them, though subjectivity has epistemic consequences; rather, each of my conscious states exists only as the state it is because it is experienced by me the subject.

For Searle, it seems, on the one hand feelings are conscious states because for them, in order to exist, we have to experience them. Yet on the other hand, feelings such as envy or jealousy also can exist, not as conscious states of the agent, but through observation by outsiders.

If Searle, as an expert on the philosophy of mind, cannot settle the issue, what can we learn from psychology? In his famous treatise which was seminal in spreading the novel notion of guilt feelings in the Western world, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* "Civilisation and Its Discontents", Sigmund Freud (1929: 120/1982: 72) speaks several times about *Schuldbewusstsein* "sense/feeling of guilt" and the question of awareness:

> Die Kranken glauben uns nicht, wenn wir ihnen ein "unbewusstes Schuldgefühl" zumuten; um nur halbwegs von ihnen verstanden zu werden, erzählen wir ihnen von einem unbewussten Strafbedürfnis, in dem sich das Schuldgefühl äußert.
> "Our patients do not believe us when we attribute an 'unconscious sense of guilt' to them. In order to make ourselves at all intelligible to them, we tell them of an unconscious need for punishment, in which the sense of guilt finds expression."

In this quote, Freud uses *sense of guilt* (in the original: *Schuldbewusstsein)* as a term, and not as a word of the ordinary language. The expert knows what the patient really feels, regardless of what they think they feel. This is not at all astonishing. Freud conceived his psychoanalysis as a science, not as an art. Just as biochemists can identify hormones in an objective way, psychologists should be able to determine the feelings of their patients. With hormones, however, comes along their chemical formula, and this can be verified independently of the symptoms a patient who has too much or too little of a hormone displays. What would be the equivalent of such a formula for feelings? Could there be anything beyond the symptoms that could be used to define the term *sense of*

guilt? Freud's hope was that some objective foundation for the psychological states he was concerned with would eventually be found. For him, it was up to the expert to uncover what people felt. They themselves, without such expert advice, might well be unconscious of their real feelings. As he sees it (Freud 1929: 120/1982: 72f.):

> Es ist sehr wohl denkbar dass auch das durch die Kultur erzeugte Schuldbewußtsein nicht als solches erkannt wird [und] zum großen Teil unbewußt bleibt.
> "It is very conceivable that the sense of guilt produced by civilisation is not perceived as such, and remains to a large extent unconscious."

Freud was never more wrong. Guilt became the fashionable, all-pervasive feeling of the day and a preferred discourse topic. As the analysis of one's feelings grew to be the favourite pastime of the leisure class, everybody was constantly on the lookout for guilt. Whoever felt guilt took part in the sorrows of mankind. It swiftly became impossible not to be conscious of one's guilty feelings. But what exactly were they feeling?

4. Shame and guilt in psychology and cultural anthropology

The history of the enquiry into shame and guilt still remains to be written. It seems that the first psychological books appeared in the fifties, some years after Ruth Benedict's fundamental 1946 work on shame and guilt in cultural anthropology *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. Gerhart Piers' and Milton B. Singer's *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study* (1951) is the first book to conjoin psychology and anthropology; it became very influential and was reprinted several times. A search in the catalogues of the Library of Congress and the British Library reveals about twenty book titles for the last fifty years in which both keywords co-occur. Most recently, in 2002, we find the latest (?) book with the title *Shame and Guilt*, by June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing. The Internet is full of webpages on shame and guilt, some more research-oriented but most falling into the category of therapeutic advice for self-help. The most basic task the more serious authors undertake is to elucidate the difference between the two feelings. This is what they have typically to say about *shame*:

> The down-side [of *shame* culture] is the license it appears to give to engage in secret wrong-doing. (www.doceo.co.uk)

> With *shame*, there is just painful feelings of depression, alienation, self-doubt, loneliness, isolation ... (www.noogenesis.com)

> *Shame* is an extremely painful and ugly feeling that has a negative impact on interpersonal behavior. (Tangney/Dearing 2002: 3)

The three examples show that to admit to shame is likely to put a person at a disadvantage. It is not a feeling to be proud of. The typical conception of 'guilt' is radically different:

> Only *guilt* is considered the appropriate reaction to moral failure. It's the right kind of emotion because it is concerned with the victims; shame, by contrast, is thought to primarily involve concern with oneself. (http://humanities.uchicago.edu)

> With *guilt*, the response is a desire for atonement, to make amends, to correct a mistake, or heal a hurt. (www.noogenesis.com)

> *Guilt* is internalized experience of personal wrongdoing [...] Usually, *guilt* is seen as a more sophisticated and efficient means of controlling behavior, and *guilt* cultures [...] are regarded as more 'advanced'. (www.omega.cohums.ohio-state.edu)

> The positive aspect of *guilt*-culture at its best is its concern for truth and justice and the preservation of individual rights. Psychologically, guilt is proclaimed to be a more "advanced" emotion than shame: Ericson's popular model [...] sees the emergence of shame as part of the second stage in the growth of the ego, but *guilt* as third. (www.doceo.co.uk)

These descriptions leave no room for doubt that it is much better to feel guilt than shame. Shame is selfish, leads to isolation and even gives license to secret wrongdoing. It is an ugly feeling. If, on the other side, you feel guilt, this shows that you are an altruistic person, someone working hard to heal hurts. It entitles you to sophistication. It tells you that you are more advanced than those who feel only shame. The claim that the capacity to feel shame develops earlier than the capacity for guilt is frequently repeated, e.g. by Daniel Goleman, who states that shame may occur at the age of 18 months, while guilt does not occur before the age of three to four years. Given the patriarchal constitution of the community of psychoanalysts until quite recently, it does not astonish us that women are said to "be more prone to shame than men" (Lewis 1971: 402). I am aware of only one dissenting voice, Helen Merrel Lynd, who published her *On Shame and the Search for Identity* as early as 1958. Not only does she dispute that shame develops before guilt, she also describes shame in words that her male colleagues usually reserve for guilt: Shame is "con-

cerned with the over-all self" and "involves a total response that includes insight". "Transcending of shame may lead to a sense of identity, freedom." (Lynd 1957: 208f.) June Tangney (2002: 13) maintains also that another author, Helen Lewis, "has argued that [...] Freud (like many contemporary psychologists) may have mislabeled his patients' shame experiences as guilt experiences".

In the texts quoted here *shame* and *guilt* are used as terms, not as ordinary language words, even if the authors are rarely aware of the difference. It is up to the experts to decree what their patients are feeling. But the experts have no agreed formula they can rely on. Thus they discuss and evaluate their patients' behaviour and their attitudes in terms that defy objective validation. In the end, *shame* and *guilt* become labels applied to forms of individual and social behaviour in accordance with the experts' (often unconscious) prejudices. This is particularly evident in the discourse of cultural anthropology. Now it is not women who are more prone to the backward feeling of shame but those societies to which we feel superior. On the pacific front of World War II, Japan was the intimidating enemy of the United States. Cultural anthropologists were employed to explain the Japanese psyche to the American public. Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* had an enormous impact on ethnological studies in general and on our views of the Japanese society in particular still very noticeable today. At the time she wrote the book, Benedict had not been to Japan, and the sole basis of her investigation were interviews with Japanese-Americans. It is no wonder that Japanese authors were not always enthusiastic about Benedict's claim. In 1997 Murakami Katsutoshi's *Gaikokujin ni yoru Sengo Nihonron: Beikuto kara Uofuren made* "Postwar Theories of Japan by Foreigners: From Benedict to Wolfren" was published. A year earlier Shohei Koike published on the Internet his *Rational Japanese: A Guide to Understanding Ordinary Japanese Behaviour*. In the preface we read:

> Ruth Benedict was one of the pioneers who tried to explain the psychological and behavioural differences between Japanese and Westerners by using dichotomous classifications. By labelling Japan as a "shame culture", and the West as "guilt culture", Benedict focused her documentation on the uniqueness of Japan, but failed to make a comparative analysis of the shame and guilt psychologies together, as they are both found in Japan and other cultures. (www2b.biglobe.ne.jp)

There is still hardly an (English) book about Japan that does not refer to Ruth Benedict. Thus we read in the Introduction to Geraldine Sherman's *Japan Diaries: A Travel Memoir*, published in 1999:

> In 1944, the US government commissioned Dr Benedict, a cultural anthropologist, to study the Japanese so that the Americans could better understand their enemy. She defined the differences in terms of guilt and shame. She argued that we in the West are guided by strong personal standards, and when these are violated we feel guilt. In the East, the principle concern is maintaining appearances. If one errs, the appropriate feeling is shame.

Are there guilt societies and shame societies? Again, we are confronted with a linguistic problem. Do the Japanese have words co-referential with the English words (not terms) *shame* and *guilt*? Everyone seems to agree that there are no close equivalents. Benedict identifies *tsumi* as the equivalent of *guilt* (according to her, not to be found in Japanese culture) and *haji* as the equivalent of *shame*. In their contribution to Tangney (1995), Kazuo Miyake and Kosue Yamasaki maintain (Miyake & Yamasaki 1995: 502): "Benedict's theory that *haji* as experienced by the Japanese is solely situationalistic and particularistic does not hold." Others disclaim the appropriateness of the suggested translation equivalents. Japanese speakers claim that *tsumi* denotes the act itself (like the English word *offence*) rather than 'the fact of having committed a wrong'.

This is not the place to settle the argument. What is important to me is that when the Japanese express themselves in English they have no problem in confessing to guilt feelings. Here are two examples:

> Born in Tokyo, Mr [Kobo] Abe grew up in Manchuria. 'I was forced to live as a coloniser', he says. 'Living on the side of the rulers had an abstract evil. The sensitive individual still feels guilt, remorse, shame.'
>
> (Bank of English corpus)

> I heard that Dr Koshiro's claims about his role in the war had been exposed [as untrue]... Unless he felt guilt that he should have been fighting [instead of studying], he had no reason to reproach himself. His brother, who had been on [our] trip to [British war memorials], was so ashamed of this deception had not attended his father's funeral. [...] Perhaps Dr Koshiro is an example of what can happen if a culture internalises its guilt.
>
> (Hideki Matsuoka, letter to the London Review of Books, 25.04.2002)

Apparently the Japanese do not only talk about guilt when they speak English; they also display what can be interpreted as guilt feelings in their behaviour:

> Why have 14 Japanese Army veterans gone on camera to catalogue in harrowing detail the acts of barbarity they carried out during Japan's war with

> China? [...] If they are telling the truth, was Ruth Benedict totally wrong about the absence of guilt? (Guardian 06.09.2001)

Neither psychology nor cultural anthropology is helpful when it comes to finding out what is common for *shame* and *guilt* and what is different. This is mostly due to the fact that the linguistic issues are not properly dealt with. Helen Lynd (1957:25) is not atypical when she is astonished that "Shakespeare uses shame about nine times as often as guilt". She is unaware of the fact that, at Shakespeare's time, *guilt* did not denote a feeling.

Insofar as these words refer to first-person experiences, we wholly depend on what we are told by people who say they experience these feelings. No psychologist can know better than I what I feel. As terms, as well, *shame* and *guilt* are not very useful either. Different psychologists define them in almost opposite ways, in a language so vague that it is impossible to objectively verify any claims. Cultural anthropologists seem to assume that, as concepts, *shame* and *guilt* can be posited as language-independent, and that, therefore, we can find, or not find, as the case may be, *shame* and *guilt* in a society irrespective of the vocabulary of the language spoken. On the whole, the distinction between *shame* and *guilt* tends to be interpreted as a deontic notion. Good, reasonable, responsible, advanced and sophisticated people feel guilt; backward habitual wrongdoers feel shame.

5. Guilt feelings before 1850?

It is now time to investigate my claim that we do not find *guilt* denoting a feeling in texts roughly before 1850. This does not necessarily mean the feeling did not exist then. I have said that *guilt*, as a word of the ordinary language that we use, can refer not only to a feeling but also to a behaviour that we take to be an expression of that feeling. If we describe this behaviour in concise terms, we may find that this kind of behaviour was also described then, but was given no name at all or a different name.

However, as described above, I was not able to find a word in use before 1850 that may have had the same meaning as *guilt* today, even though there are some words with a similar meaning, such as *bad conscience* or *remorse*.

I will first look at Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. This drama has been said to focus on guilt as a feeling. Indeed, google lists 5,640 hits for 'guilt shakespeare macbeth'. Among the first twenty hits we find:

– His intense feelings of *guilt* before and after the regicide
– Mere symbols of Macbeth's inner *guilt*

– And afterwards he stews in *guilt* and paranoia
– To show the terrible effect that ambition and *guilt* can have on a man

A self-help webpage on mental illnesses (www.members.tripod.com/ ¬jehu/ macbeth.html) uses *Macbeth* as the key illustration. We read:

> After the murders are committed, Lady Macbeth and her husband are immediately consumed with guilt. Yet their guilt does not stop them from committing more murders. If anything, this guilt seems to facilitate further sinful deeds. [. . .] Lady Macbeth chides her husband, "you do unbend your noble strength to think so brainsickly of things. Go get some water and wash this filthy witness from your hand." She thinks everything will be okay if Macbeth will just stop feeling guilty and hide the facts which might expose his guilt.

Under (www.shakespeare-online.com/sources/macbethsources.asp) we read:

> But the changes [to Kenneth's story] also enhance the thematic content of the play, blurring the line between the two extremes of good and evil in Macbeth himself. His commiseration in the play, and his intense feelings of guilt before and after the regicide clash with his 'passion or infatuation beyond the reach of reason' that propels him to commit the murder.

The text of the play itself does not support the claim that Macbeth or his wife feel guilty. This is the total inventory of *guilt* and *shame* occurrences in the play (www.bibliomania.com):

– Lady Macbeth: Who shall bear the *guilt* of our great quell?
– Lady Macbeth: I'll gild the faces of the grooms withal for it must seem their *guilt*.
– Lady Macbeth: My hands are of your colour, but I *shame* to wear a heart so white.
– Ross: It's night's predominance, or the day's *shame*, that darkness does the face of earth entomb, when living light should kiss it?
– Lady Macbeth: Oh, these flaws, and starts - impostors to true fear – would well become a woman's story at a winter's fire, authoriz'd by her grandam. *Shame* itself!
– Lady Macbeth: Fie, for *shame*!

Neither of the two *guilt*-quotes nor any of the four *shame*-quotes vindicates a sense of feeling. *Guilt* means the fact of having done a wrong, and *shame*, if not part of an exclamation, means disgrace. There is, in the play, not a single occurrence of words with a similar meaning, such as *remorse*, *repentance*,

compunction(*s*) or *bad/evil/ill conscience*. The play is neither about the feeling of having committed a wrong nor about the feeling as if one had committed a wrong. *Macbeth* is about fear. There are 43 occurrences of *fear*.

Another classical text supposed to be a paragon of descriptions of guilt feelings is Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Google gives us 5,400 hits for 'guilt milton paradise'. Among the first twenty we find:

- Milton's characterization of [...]love, evil, and *guilt* are timeless
- Make one [...] almost forget the *guilt* and shame of sin.
- John Milton provides the bridge between a shame culture to a *guilt* culture
- John Milton's Paradise Lost represents a shift to a *guilt* culture

Under (web.ics.purdue.edu/¬felluga/battleexam.html) we read:

> As we move farther away from an oral society to a written society, the reader notices vast changes in the handling of narrative. John Milton provides the bridge between a shame culture to a guilt culture in his profound work known as *Paradise Lost*. While Milton does not cross the bridge fully to a guilt culture, his work paves the way for such thought. In addition to witnessing the psycicalities of such an awful place, Satan feels the "hell within him" wherever he goes, suggesting that he has also internalized his punishment as we will see in a guilt culture.

At (open.durhamtech.org/british/milton.html) we read:

> Books IX–X: [...] When Eva and Adam awake, they feel guilt and shame

Again, the actual textual evidence hardly supports these claims. These are all the citations for *guilt* and *guilty* in the text (www.bartleby.com):

- Chapter 3: Without thee none his crime makes *guilty* all his sons
- Chapter 4: Then was not *guilty* shame
- Chapter 9: But with such gardening tools as Art, yet rude, *Guilt*less of fire had formed, or Angels brought
- Chapter 9: Back to the thicket slung the *guilty* serpent
- Chapter 10: Love was not in their looks ... but apparent *guilt*, and shame, and perturbation, and despair, Anger, and obstinacy, and hate
- Chapter 11: He fled, not hoping to escape, but shun The present-fearing, *guilty*, what his wrauth Might suddenly inflict
- Chapter 12: the sign Of washing them from *guilt* of sin to life Pure

The first four and the last of these citations offer no problem at all. It is *guilt* denoting the fact of having committed wrong. I feel much more ambivalent about citations 5 and 6, both from Chapter 10. Citation 5 conjoins *guilt* with words clearly denoting feelings: *despair*, *anger*, *hate*. This can be seen as an indication that *guilt* here means a feeling, as well. However, if we focus on 'apparent guilt was in their looks', we have no difficulty in interpreting this phrase as 'it was obvious from the way they looked that they were certainly aware of having committed a wrong'. The adjective *apparent* modifies only *guilt*, and neither of the words unambiguously denoting feelings: *despair*, *anger* or *hate*, or any of the ambiguous words *shame*, *perturbation* and *obstinacy*, which might denote more a form of behaviour than a feeling. *Apparent guilt* is 'guilt that shows on the surface', like a mark that cannot be erased. Therefore, in the end I would not count this citation as counter-evidence. But what about *fearing, guilty, what his wrauth might suddenly inflict*? Here, too, I am convinced, *guilty* does not indicate the state of feeling guilty, but rather the state of (being aware of) having committed a wrong. It might have been different if Milton had used the adverb *guiltily* and not the adjective. But as it stands, the phrase should, I think, be paraphrased as 'in his guilt, he is afraid of what his wrath might suddenly inflict'. Milton's *Paradise Lost*, it seems, is no more a text on guilt feelings than Shakespeare's *Macbeth*.

Finally, let us throw a glance at the Victorian novels which are set in the transition period when guilt feelings first emerged. I will look at two novels, George Eliot's *Middlemarch* and at Elizabeth Gaskell's *Sylvia's Lovers*. In spite of Eliot's well-earned fame, her *Middlemarch* (1871) is disappointing from the point of view of guilt. It seems her frame of mind was not perceptive of the changes that were afflicting the mentality of our Western societies. There are three instances of remorse (www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext94/mdmar10.txt):

– [Waiting for Death] like the tooth of *remorse*. Curiously enough, his pain in the
– [The Dead Hand] or the pang of *remorse*. Nay, it may be held with
– [Sunset and Sunrise] a vitriolic intensity for *remorse*. Dorothea's nature was of that

There are four occurrences of *repent*, another six of *repented*, and three of *repentance*. Here is a selection:

– [Waiting for Death] things you might *repent* of, Brother, for want of speaking
– [Two Temptations] I dare say you *repent*, you would like to go back

– [Sunset and Sunrise] Still, she never *repented* that she had given up her position
– [The Widow and the Wife] Sir James, glancing at her, *repented* of his strategem
– [The Widow and the Wife] He had long poured out utterances of *repentance*.
– [Old and Young] dear Dorothy who with *repentance* is not satisfied

Shame is even more popular; there are 19 occurrences of it, plus many more of ashamed and other derivatives. Shame is mostly used to denote a feeling. Here is a sample:

– [Sunset and Sunrise] an instant of scorching *shame* in which she felt
– [Sunset and Sunrise] is inevitable that the *shame* is felt to be the worst
– [Sunset and Sunrise] held it the greatest *shame* as well as sorrow to him
– [The Widow and the Wife] shudders and bitter flavours and the tinglings of a merited *shame*
– [The Widow and the Wife] and the scorching approach of *shame*

In *Middlemarch*, there are six occurrences of *guilt* and 16 occurrences of *guilty*. Most of them clearly denote the fact of having committed a wrong, like these:

> Hence, in spite of the negative as to any direct sign of *guilt* in relation to the death at Stone Court, Mr. Hawley's select party broke up with the sense that the affair had "an ugly look".
>
> She knew, when she locked the door, that she should unlock it ready to go down to her unhappy husband and espouse his sorrow, and say of his *guilt*, I will mourn and not reproach.
>
> But at the very least, I could say that you have made all the circumstances clear to me, and that I know you are not in any way *guilty*.

There are some citations where doubt is allowed:

> To have reversed a previous argument and declined to go out would have been a show of persistent anger which Dorothea's conscience shrank from, seeing that she already began to feel herself *guilty*.
> Perhaps she was conscious of being tempted to steal from those who had much that she might give to those who had nothing, and carried in her conscience the *guilt* of that repressed desire.

There is only one citation where *guilty* unambiguously denotes a feeling:

> She felt almost *guilty* in asking for knowledge about him from another, but the dread of being without it – the dread of that ignorance which would make her unjust or hard – overcame every scruple.

This citation refers to the new concept of guilt feelings. Dorothea thinks that asking about Ladislaw is probably morally wrong, and that makes her unhappy, but it does not keep her from asking. She does not repent her wish to ask; instead she goes ahead with her plan. The citation shows that the concept of the new feeling was already available to George Eliot. Obviously it meant little to her, for she hardly makes use of it. Perhaps it has to do with the timeless quality of her novels that she preferred to downplay the latest intellectual fashions of the society she lived in.

Elizabeth Gaskell was more open towards the change of times. In her *Sylvia's Lovers* (1863) we find, besides four citations of the older usage of *guilty*, six rather straightforward instances of *guilt/guilty* denoting the novel feeling. Here they are (taken from www.promo.net):

– For an instant Hepburn felt *guilty* of his death, he said to himself he had never wished him dead, and yet in the struggle he had kept aloof, and now it might be too late for ever.
– 'But how do you know he was drowned?' said Philip, feeling *guiltily* disappointed at his aunt's story.
– Bell Robson leant forward towards Philip, misinterpreting the expression on his face, which was *guilt* as much as sympathy, and checked the possible repentance which might have urged him on that moment to tell all he knew, by saying, 'Lad! it's for t'best.
– All sophistry vanished; the fear of detection awakened Philip to a sense of *guilt*.
– But the very longing, having to be repressed, only made him more beside himself with *guilt*, anxiety, and rage.
– Philip's heart boiled within him; as any man's would under the circumstances, but he had the sense of *guilty* concealment to aggravate the intensity of his feelings.

Of course, there is still some reason for doubt. Normally, when *guilty* is modified by an *of*-phrase, we have the meaning of a committed wrong. Here, however, it seems Hepburn feels the moral responsibility which makes him unhappy, while at the same time he exonerates himself from any real guilt. The relevant phrase in the second citation might be paraphrased as 'he felt he was guilty of being disappointed'; but we can also read it as 'he was disappointed, and that gave him guilty feelings'. The third example is truly ambiguous, and

the paraphrase 'his misdemeanour showed clearly on his face' is probably more appropriate than 'on his face one could see that he was feeling guilty'. Sentences 4 and 5 seem to be rather unambiguous. The last citation is similar to the second citation.

Whenever we think we have found an indication for new concept of guilt feelings in Victorian novels, we also have the impression of a fuzziness that makes it impossible to distinguish clearly between the two meanings of the word *guilt*. Guilt feelings, as expressed by the word *guilt*, were not introduced into the English discourse as something new which had to be explained (like *globalisation* one hundred years later); rather the new concept emerged gradually without people being aware of this development. While in German discourse there is a strong tendency to distinguish, in each case, between the fact of having committed a wrong (*Schuld*) and the feeling as if one were guilty (*Schuldgefühl*), there is no such distinction for English. As we will see later, there are many instances of *guilt* where it is impossible to decide which of the two concepts is enunciated.

Perhaps it needs to be said once more that it does not make sense to speculate whether it is or was possible to have guilt feelings in spite of the absence of a word for it. If we say that to feel something does not entail being aware of what we feel, we define feelings not as first-person experiences but as constructs which can only be verified within a theory. Then we are talking about terms and not any more about ordinary language words. If we talk about feelings as first-person experiences, then people who have guilt feelings are aware of them and therefore can describe and communicate them. They can either use a word, or, in lieu of it, they can describe what they feel in one or more sentences. Thus, in Mozart's *Nozze di Figaro*, Cherubino asks Susanna and the Countess whether what he feels should be called love:

> Voi, che sapete che cosa è amor,/donne vedete s'io l'ho nel cor. /Quello ch'io provo, vi ridirò, et per me nuovo, capir nol so./Sento un affetto pien di desir,/ ch'ora è diletto, ch'ora è martir./ Gelo, e poi sento l'alma avvampar, /e in un momento torno a gelar. /.../ Sospiro e gemo senza voler,/palpito e tremo senza saper;/non trovo pace notte, né dì,/ma pur mi piace languir così.
> "You who know what love is, see whether it's in my heart. What I experience I'll describe for you; it's new to me. I don't understand it. I feel an emotion full of desire, that is now pleasure, and now suffering. I freeze, then I feel my soul burning up, and in a moment I'm freezing again. ... I

> sigh and moan without meaning to. I find no peace night or day, and yet I enjoy languishing so."

In this case, the word *amor* is available to Cherubino; yet he pretends he does not know what it means, and therefore describes what he feels in other words. Would he have been able to do that without having the word *amor* available? Not quite, probably. Cherubino (or, rather, Lorenzo da Ponte) refers to a well-established syllabus of things to say about love. His description is by no means original. In the case of guilt feelings before 1850 the paraphrase would have to be something for which there was no precedent, at least not a common one. Only rarely we come across these untimely sentences. In Karl Philipp Moritz' *Anton Reiser* (1785/1979: 405), we read:

> Denn keine größere Qual kann es wohl geben als eine gänzliche Leerheit der Seele, welche vergebens strebt, sich aus diesem Zustand herauszuarbeiten und unschuldigerweise sich in jedem Augenblick Schuld beimißt.
> "For there cannot be a greater pain than a complete emptiness of the soul striving in vain to pull itself out of this state, and at any moment blames on itself, though innocent, guilt."

This is surely the description of a feeling, and it is not dissimilar to what is later called *Schuldgefühl* "feeling of guilt". But was it, for Anton Reiser, or for Moritz, also *Schuldgefühl*? If some of Turner's paintings evoke the notion of impressionism in modern viewers, should we label Turner as an impressionist? Neither he nor his contemporaries saw him as one. The same, I think, applies to Shakespeare, Turner and Karl Philipp Moritz.

6. The emergence of Schuldgefühl

As I have shown, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when guilt feelings were introduced into the English discourse. This is because of the ambiguity of the expression *feeling of guilt* and *feel guilty* and also because, as it seems from our perusal of Victorian novels, the concept of guilt as a feeling emerged gradually by a process of internalisation of the original social concept of having committed wrong, for which public sanctions were to be expected. Now, when people came to realise that there were no public sanctions for many moral wrongs (like cruel behaviour) it increasingly was one's own conscience that demanded an awareness of one's guilt, a guilt, though, that did not require one to make amends because it was sensed to be, in the absence of public condemnation, a

merely imaginary guilt. What we see here is the furtive process of metaphorisation. Once the aspect of social sanctions is taken away, which forms an essential part of the meaning of literal *guilt*, we are left with a quasi-*guilt*, with a state of mind as if one were guilty. The members of a discourse community usually do not recognise, and therefore do not negotiate, such metaphorisation processes.

It is different for German. Here the word *guilt* did not acquire the metaphorical meaning of its English counterpart. This may have to do with the productivity of compounding nouns in German. The typical way to introduce a new compound involves three steps. First there is a proposition with a verb phrase. Then this proposition is referred to by a noun phrase with a genitive modifier. The final step is to refer to this noun phrase by the compound. The achievement of this procedure is that it defines the meaning of the compound. This is necessary, as, in principle, the relation between two elements of a German *ad hoc* compound can be understood in an almost infinite variety of ways. The historical *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Grimmsches Wörterbuch) gives as the first occurrence of *Schuldgefühl* a citation from Otto Ludwig's novel *Zwischen Himmel und Erde* "Between Heaven and Earth" (Ludwig 1855/1891: 353f.). Here we find exemplified what I have said about the introduction of new compounds. First we have a proposition:

> Er fühlte in der Heirat eine Schuld.
> "He felt, in the marriage, a guilt."

Half a page down we find:

> [...] und dachte er sich die Heirat entschieden, so lastete wiederum das Gefühl von Schuld auf ihm
> "[...] and when he thought of the marriage as decided the feeling of guilt again weighed heavily on him."

One page later we read:

> Bis jetzt hatte er den Druck des dunklen Schuldgefühls, der sich an den Gedanken einer Heirat knüpfte, zu schwächen vermocht.
> "Until now he had been able to weaken the pressure of the sombre guilt feeling attached to the thought of the a marriage."

And finally, again one page further on, we find another citation:

> [...] und will er wiederum das Glück ergreifen, so schwebt das dunkle Schuldgefühl von neuem wie ein eisiger Reif über einer Blume, und der Geist vermag nichts gegen seine vernichtende Gewalt.
> "[...] and wanting to seize his fortune once again, the sombre guilt feeling

> hovers once more like an icy ring on top of a flower, and the spirit can do nothing against its destructive might."

However, this first occurrence of *Schuldgefühl* remained inconsequential. Ludwig soon fell out with his audience, and nobody, it seems, picked up on the new word he had entered into the discourse. The credit for making *Schuldgefühl* a part of the German language is deserved by Friedrich Nietzsche, who, in his *Genealogie der Moral* "Genealogy of Morals" (1887) extolled this feeling as the apex of modernity, a notion later echoed by Sigmund Freud.

Still in agreement with his close friend from earlier days, the now mostly forgotten Paul Rée, he starts out by battling the traditional concept of the bad conscience (in German *schlechtes* or, originally, *böses Gewissen*), widely seen, in the context of fear of actual or expected punishment, as the precondition of repentance or penitence. But while Rée sees the *strafendes* "punishing" *Gewissen* as resulting from the recognition of having overstepped the norms of the society, Nietzsche (1980: 297–325) discerns in it a primordial aggressive instinct which, in the course of developing civilisation and the growing regulation of norms of conduct, became more and more turned against oneself:

> Die Feindschaft, die Grausamkeit, die Lust an der Verfolgung, am Wechsel, an der Zerstörung – Alles das gegen die Inhaber solcher Instinkte sich wendend: das ist der Ursprung des schlechten Gewissens.
> "Enmity, cruelty, the lust to persecute, to attack, to twist, to destroy: turning all this against the owner of these instincts: *that* is the source of the bad conscience."

In his introduction of *Schuldgefühl*, Nietzsche paraphrases it as a *Bewusstsein der Schuld* "consciousness of guilt":

> Aber wie ist denn jene andere, düstere Sache', das Bewusstsein der Schuld, das ganze, schlechte Gewissen' auf die Welt gekommen?
> "But how then has this other 'sombre thing', the consciousness of guilt, the whole 'bad conscience', come into existence?"

In the subsequent paragraph, we then find two occurrences of *Gefühl der Schuld* "feeling of guilt". This is the second one:

> Die Strafe soll den Wert haben, das *Gefühl der Schuld* im Schuldigen aufzuwecken, man sucht in ihr das eigentliche *instrumentum* jener seelischen Reaktion, welche, schlechtes Gewissen', ‚Gewissensbiss' genannt wird.
> "Punishment is said to have the purpose of awakening the *feeling of guilt*

> in the culprit; in it, we identify the real instrument of this psychological reaction called 'bad conscience' or 'pang of conscience'."

The compound *Schuldgefühl* occurs three times. In the last of these citations, Nietzsche conceives this new concept as the consequence of a specifically Christian moral which had, as he saw it, reached its climax in his times:

> Die Herauskunft des christlichen Gottes, als des Maximalgottes, der bisher erreicht worden ist, hat [...] das Maximum des Schuldgefühls auf Erden zur Erscheinung gebracht.
> "The emergence of the Christian god, as the maximum deity achieved so far, has given rise [. . .] to the maximum of guilt feeling on earth."

Here we also find this strangely hovering valuation of guilt feelings which declares them both a psychological disturbance in need of therapy and the very foundation of all great achievements of our civilisation:

> Man hüte sich, von diesem ganzen Phänomen deshalb schon gering zu denken, weil es von vornherein hässlich und schmerzhaft ist. Im Grunde ist es ja dieselbe aktive Kraft, die in jenen Gewalt-Künstlern und Organisatoren großartiger Schöpfungen am Werke ist und Staaten baut [...] Diese heimliche Selbst-Vergewaltigung, diese Künstler-Grausamkeit, diese Lust, sich selbst als einem schweren, widerstrebenden leidenden Stoffe eine Form zu geben [...], dieses ganze *aktivische* ‚schlechte Gewissen' hat zuletzt auch eine Fülle neuer befremdlicher Schönheit und Bejahung ans Licht gebracht und vielleicht überhaupt erst *die* Schönheit.
> "One should be wary of thinking lowly of this whole phenomenon just because offhand it is ugly and painful. Basically it is the same active strength you find with power-artists and organisers of great creations and which is building states [...] This secret self-assault, this artist-cruelty, this lust to give oneself – heavy, resisting, suffering matter – a shape, this whole *active* 'bad conscience' has, at the end of the day, brought to light [...] a plethora of new, outlandish beauty and assertion, perhaps even beauty itself."

How is Nietzsche's *Schuldgefühl* related to what I have described above? It is the internalisation of retribution, which is at the core of it. We have always reacted aggressively towards society's demands on us (which we often deem unreasonable). But while we were used to expect punishment for these transgressions, we have now come to realise that much of what we consider to be a moral offence has become accepted behaviour. Greed used to be a capital sin, but now we are told it is the motor of industrial development. We have also ceased to fear punishment in the next world. Thus we have to resort to punishing our-

selves, by feeling deeply unhappy, by denying ourselves joy. We may not be guilty in the eyes of the world, and we may even come to realise that we had no real alternative to what we did and therefore are unable to make amends, but we still feel we did wrong and deserve punishment. The deep sorrow we feel may lead to the passivity of a depression. But it can also beget a powerful act of deliverance, an act that would not have been possible without the depth of this unquenchable feeling.

It seems that the new concept of guilt feelings was taken up rather slowly in the German discourse. Perhaps this perception will change once we have adequate corpora covering the turn of the century at our disposal. At least the major authors whose texts are available online in the laudable enterprise of the Projekt Gutenberg seem not to have taken to it before the turn of the century (see www.gutenberg2000.de).

On Sigmund Freud, however, the new concept made a deep impact. Did he read Nietzsche? His assertion to the contrary is not very credible. In the course of the discussion on Eduard Hitschmann's lecture (April 1, 1908), on the third treatise of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* (from which the citations above were taken) Freud stressed (*Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung* 1976: 338):

> sein eigentümliches Verhältnis zur Philosophie, deren abstrakte Art ihm so unsympathisch sei, dass er auf das Studium der Philosophie schließlich ganz verzichtet habe. Auch Nietzsche kenne er nicht, ein gelegentlicher Versuch, ihn zu lesen, sei an einem Übermaß von Interesse erstickt.
> "his peculiar relationship to philosophy, whose abstract way was so much to his dislike that he, in the end, gave up to study philosophy at all. Neither did he know Nietzsche; an occasional attempt to read him was suffocated by an excessive fascination."

It may be more than a coincidence that up to this lecture we find only the word *Schuldbewusstsein* (literally "consciousness of guilt", better translated as "sense of guilt") in the *Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung* "Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society", but that from then on consistently only *Schuldgefühl* was used. Freud himself uses *Schuldgefühl* (often in the collocation *neurotisches Schuldgefühl*) only from 1911 onwards, until 1921 alongside *Schuldbewusstsein*, but afterwards almost exclusively (cf. Teubert 1991: 454). Freud's goal was (Freud 1895, cited from Kris/Bonaparte/Freud 1950: 305):

> eine naturwissenschaftliche Psychologie zu liefern, d.h. psychische Vorgänge darzustellen als quantitativ bestimmte Zustände aufzeigbarer ma-

> terieller Teile, und sie damit anschaulich und widerspruchsfrei zu machen.
> "to develop a scientific psychology, i.e. to represent psychological processes as quantitatively determined states of demonstrable material elements, and to make them graphic and free of contradiction"

This seems to be the clue to Freud's notion of guilt feelings which remains ambiguous throughout. On the one hand, he sees them as objective phenomena, as mental states that can be verified, by scientific methods, independently of any co-operation by a patient. In this sense, Freud uses *Schuldbewusstsein/Schuldgefühl* as a term. Yet he does not proffer a final definition. Somehow, it seems as if his *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* "Civilisation and its Discontents", where he sums up what he has been thinking about this feeling, breaks off without a real climax. In the final chapter, Freud (1929: 120/1982: 73) is obviously concerned about the vagueness of the terms with which he has been operating. He writes:

> Es kann nicht sehr wichtig werden, mag aber nicht überflüssig sein, dass wir die Bedeutung einiger Wörter wie: Über-Ich, Gewissen, Schuldgefühle, Strafbedürfnis, Reue, erläutern, die wir vielleicht oft zu lose und eines fürs andere gebraucht haben. [. . .] Das Schuldgefühl, die Härte des Über-Ichs, ist also dasselbe wie die Strenge des Gewissens, ist die dem Ich zugeteilte Wahrnehmung, dass es in solcher Weise überwacht wird, die Abschätzung der Spannung zwischen seinen Strebungen und den Forderungen des Über-Ichs. [...] Reue ist die Gesamtbezeichnung für die Reaktion des Ichs in einem Falle des Schuldgefühls, [...], ist selbst eine Strafe und kann das Strafbedürfnis einschließen.
> "Though it cannot be of great importance, it may not be superfluous to elucidate the meaning of a few words such as 'super-ego', 'conscience', 'sense of guilt', 'need for punishment' and 'remorse', which we have often, perhaps, used too loosely and interchangeably. [. . .] The sense of guilt, the harshness of super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demand of the super-ego. [. . .] Remorse is the general term for the ego's reaction in a case of sense of guilt. [. . .] It is itself a punishment and can include the need for punishment."

In his endeavour for precision Freud gets entangled, I think, in a maze of rather ill-defined terms, and what was thought of as a contribution to clarity only adds to the confusion. What guilt feelings are about, for Freud, could be phrased, in contemporary medical terminology, as a disorder of the emo-

tional immune system, with the emotions attacking one's own mental balance, instead of maintaining the balance with the social environment. This is the conclusion of *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (Freud 1929: 128/1982: 82):

> Die Schicksalsfrage der Menschheit scheint mir zu sein, ob und in welchem Maße es ihrer Kulturentwicklung gelingen wird, der Störung des Zusammenlebens durch den menschlichen Aggressions- und Selbstvernichtungstrieb Herr zu werden.
> "The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction."

Freud wrote these lines a few years before the Nazi ascension to power, and he was deeply aware of the destructive force that guilt feelings could set free. He was not alone there. Thus it was less the position of the *Schuldgefühl* in Freud's theory of psychoanalysis that brought about the immediate success of this new discourse item than an obvious need to label the mood of the European middle classes who were experiencing and felt threatened by social change of unprecedented magnitude. Freud (1929: 119/1982: 71) saw this clearly; it is his intention, he says:

> das Schuldgefühl als das wichtigste Problem der Kulturentwicklung hinzustellen und darzutun, daß der Preis für den Kulturfortschritt in der Glückseinbuße durch die Erhöhung des Schuldgefühls gezahlt wird.
> "to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization and to show that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of a sense of guilt."

However, ambivalent as Freud was about guilt feeling, he was also ambivalent about the merits of his text. In a letter to his friend of long standing, Lou Andreas Salome, dated 28.7.29, he announced the book with these only half-ironic remarks (Freud/Salome 1985: 181, German text):

> Heute habe ich den letzten Satz geschrieben, welcher, soweit möglich ohne Bibliothek, das Werk abgeschlossen hat. Es handelt von Kultur, Schuldgefühl, Glück und ähnlichen leichten Themen, und es kommt mir, zweifellos zu Recht, als sehr überflüssig vor.
> "Today I have written the last sentence, which – so far it is possible without a library – finished the work. It deals with civilisation, sense of guilt, happiness and similar lofty topics, and strikes me, no doubt rightly, as very superfluous."

How did it come that guilt feelings were replacing the traditional feeling of remorse in Western societies? For Freud (1929: 117/1982: 68), remorse was the feeling one had if one was aware of actually having committed a wrong:

> Wenn man ein Schuldgefühl hat, nachdem und weil man etwas verbrochen hat, sollte man dieses Gefühl eher *Reue* nennen.
> "When one has a sense of guilt after having committed a misdeed, and because of it, the feeling should more properly be called *remorse*."

Remorse implies the wish to undo what one has done, or, if that is impossible, at least the resolution not to do it again. It presupposes a situation where two courses of action are available, and where it is possible to know which one is good and which one is evil. The question of good and evil has always concerned the middle classes more than the rich who were well aware of the value of greed and other vices, and the poor, who often had to struggle too hard for survival to be concerned about the finer details of universal ethics. Thus, when, in the second half of the 19th century, capitalism and free market mentality reached the middle classes, they found themselves caught between two opposite sets of values, the traditional moral system offered by the Church, and the new morality demanded by professional life. The situation called for action. The ruling class became concerned about the dramatic drop in Church attendance, and it was increasingly feared that social order could be in jeopardy. On their behalf, the establishment's two traditional think-tanks, Cambridge and Oxford, were on the lookout for systems of thought which could complement, if not replace, traditional Christian religion. The solution was found in the invention of two new subjects, which were instantly added to the canon of disciplines taught at universities. In Britain and on the continent, the first chairs for moral philosophy were established. They served the purpose of regulating, but also of vindicating as morally acceptable, the social behaviour of the middle classes. At the same time, the first chairs of economics were set up to justify social injustice by the immutable and sacrosanct laws of capitalism. In a short time, the middle classes realised that while it might be wrong from a Christian viewpoint to exploit their servants it had to be done for the prosperity of the country at large. They could and should not feel remorse; for raising the living conditions of the poor would have meant undoing the social, economic and spiritual progress leading rapidly to a new golden age (Skidelski 1983: 25–50) They could feel guilty, though. Embracing guilt feelings meant accepting spiritual pain, deep sadness and regret as the price to be paid for doing what reason told them was both necessary and economically advantageous. Feeling guilty also proved that one was, after all, morally superior to those who lacked this feeling.

7. The emergence of guilt feelings in European literature

While guilt feelings engineered the social catharsis necessary to deflate the danger of public disorder, they could also torment people beyond what is bearable. By denying children affection without pointing to a concrete misdemeanour one also refuses them the chance to feel remorse, to repent or atone. They are left with their guilt feelings, and unlike adults, they cannot easily turn them into aggression against their social environment. A striking document of the debilitating impact that guilt feelings can have on the mind of a young person is Franz Kafka's *Brief an den Vater* "Letter to his Father" (1919). In this short text of no more than 13,000 words we find occurrences of the word *Schuldbewusstsein*, and three occurrences of the word *Schuldgefühl*, both used synonymously:

- das ausschliessliche Schuldgefühl des Kindes ("the child's exclusive sense of guilt")
- hat mein Schuldbewusstsein vergrößert ("brought about an increased sense of guilt")
- Vergrößerung des Schuldbewusstseins ("increase in the sense of guilt")
- Beschämung, Müdigkeit, Schwäche, Schuldbewusstsein ("humiliation, weariness, weakness, and a sense of guilt")
- hatte sich zu viel Schuldgefühl angesammelt ("too much accumulated sense of guilt")
- mit Liebe, Trotz, Zorn, Widerwille, Ergebung, Schuldgefühl ("in affection, defiance, anger, revulsion, submission, consciousness of guilt")
- ein grenzenloses Schuldbewusstsein ("a boundless sense of guilt")
- noch ein tieferes Schuldbewusstsein ("an even deeper sense of guilt")
- Schuldbewusstsein durchlief mich ("I was penetrated by a sense of guilt")
- durch Angst und Schuldbewusstsein ("by fear and by a sense of guilt")
- Mein Schuldbewusstsein stammt ja eigentlich von dir ("my sense of guilt actually originates in you")

It is worth reading the second citation (Kafka 1919/1989:131) in a wider context:

> Du hast auch eine besonders schöne, sehr selten zu sehende Art eines stillen, zufriedenen, gutheißenden Lächelns, das den, dem es gilt, ganz glücklich machen kann. Ich kann mich nicht erinnern, dass es in meiner Kindheit ausdrücklich mir zuteil geworden wäre, aber es dürfte wohl

> geschehen sein, denn warum solltest Du es mir damals verweigert haben, als ich Dir noch unschuldig schien und Deine große Hoffnung war. Übrigens haben auch solche freundliche Eindrücke auf die Dauer nichts anderes erzielt, als mein Schuldgefühl vergrößert und die Welt mir noch unverständlicher gemacht.
> “You have a particularly beautiful, very rare way of quietly, contentedly, approvingly smiling, a way of smiling that can make the person for whom it is meant entirely happy. I can’t recall its ever having been expressly my lot in my childhood, but I dare say it may have happened, for why should you have refused it to me at a time when I still seemed blameless to you and was your great hope? Yet in the long run even such friendly expressions brought about nothing but an increased sense of guilt, making the world still more incomprehensible to me.”

As said above, in the absence of a corpus covering the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, the history of *Schuldgefühl/Schuldbewusstsein* in the general discourse still remains largely unchartered territory. To me it would seem improbable that Kafka was more than superficially acquainted with the early texts of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, the new gospel will have been discussed widely in the feuilleton pages of Prague’s German language newspapers, and as an ardent reader he must have come across such articles. Yet so far Kafka’s sources remain obscure. His text, with its unique density of references to guilt, is a singular event.

In Britain, we find James Joyce an early advocate of guilt feelings. The *Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man* (1916) (quotes taken from www.bibliomania.com) contains these occurrences:

- he multiplied his *guilt* and his punishment
- a restless feeling of *guilt*
- he becomes *guilty* of all
- the joy of *guilty* confession
- appeared before the *guilty* pair
- of which they were *guilty*

It is the second citation, drawn from Chapter 4, that draws our attention. Embedded in a larger context, it reads (pd.sparknotes.com/lit/portraitartis/section4.html):

> Often when he had confessed his doubts and scruples [...] he was bidden by his confessor to name some sin of his past life before absolution was given him. He named it with humility and shame and repented of it

> once more. It humiliated and shamed him to think that he would never be freed from it wholly, however holily he might live or whatever virtues or perfections he might attain. A restless feeling of guilt would always be present with him: he would confess and repent and be absolved, confess and repent and be absolved again, fruitlessly.

The sequence shows nicely that remorse and repentance have ceased to be the solution for the transgressions of the new age. The morality of religion did not any longer provide comfort. No matter how often one repents, "the feeling of guilt would always be present". It is not difficult to imagine where Joyce had been instilled with this new notion. Before the Great War he had lived, for over a decade, in Trieste, a close friend of Italo Svevo. Like the rest of the Triestine coffeehouse intelligentsia, Svevo was quick to absorb psychoanalysis. His *Coscienza di Zeno*, conceived in the year before the turn of the century even though published much later (1923), gives testimony of Freud's great impact. However, Svevo wrote the book before Freud had fully developed his concept of guilt feelings. In the book, the new concept occurs only once (and it never recurs in his later writings). In the chapter *Moglie e amante* "The wife and the lover" we read (www.intratext.com/IXT/ITA1071/P6.HTM):

> Le dissi che mi sentivo debole e colpevole e, visto che a questo punto essa mi guardò domandando delle spiegazioni, subito ritirai la testa nel guscio e, gettando nell folosofia, le raccontai che il sentimento della colpa io l'avevo ad ogni mio pensiero, ad ogni mio respiro.
> I said I felt weak and guilty but, seeing that she had looked at me inquiringly at this point as if in need of an explanation, I drew in my horns again and began talking about the sense of sin which I had in every word I spoke or breath I drew in. (English translation: Svevo 1958: 220)

The translator uses, wrongly, *sense of sin* instead of the literal *feeling of guilt*. What becomes evident is that the narrator (and, in view of Svevo's whole oeuvre, presumably the author himself) renounces guilt feelings, referring to them only in ironic distance, trying to assuage his wife's suspicion. This does not mean that Svevo, with his lasting appreciation of psychoanalysis, did not discuss this notion with his friends. Still, the pages of the project *Lessico intelettuale europea* which will elucidate the dissemination of the notion of guilt feelings across Europe still remain to be written.

8. Guilt feelings in contemporary discourse

In the final section of this essay it is now time to turn to the evidence we can glean from the discourse in a more systematic way. The empirical basis of my investigation is the Bank of English, a general language corpus of British and American English with a focus on the late nineties of the last century. This corpus contains about 420 million words. All the following quotations are taken from the Bank of English corpus. There, we find 8184 occurrences of *guilt*. This figure includes 247 citations of *sense of guilt*, 196 citations of *feelings of guilt*, 76 citations of *guilt feelings*, 57 citations of *guilt feeling*. There are also 76 citations of *guilty feelings* and 11 citations of *guilty feeling*.

Guilt is, as we have seen, fuzzy and ambiguous. In order to separate those occurrences where *guilt* refers to a feeling from those where it refers to a committed wrong, my colleague Andrius Utka and I identified the most significant words (excluding grammatical words) in the immediate context of *guilt* (five words to the left and to the right) for all the occurrences of *feeling(s) of guilt* and *guilt(y) feeling(s)*. We then gauged each occurrence of *guilt* against this list of 16 words. This procedure resulted in 4114 occurrences of *guilt* with a presumed meaning of 'guilt feeling'. We then used a similar procedure to set up a list of occurrences of *guilt* with a presumed meaning of 'committed wrong'. This list contains 2318 entries. This leaves us with 1751 occurrences where our statistically based context analysis could not predict the meaning.

These are the most relevant context words for occurrences of *guilt* as a feeling (the assigned rank in brackets): *inferiority* (16), *remorse* (15), *inadequacy* (14), *shame* (13), *intense* (12), *terrible* (11), *anger* (10), *failure* (9), *stress* (8), *self* (7), *deep* (6), *parents* (5), *strong* (4), *burden* (3), *release* (2), *painful* (1).

Here are the citations with the highest value for *guilt* as a feeling:

- Anger because nobody understands. Anger because you hurt. Anger, anger, anger – which breeds *guilt, guilt, guilt.*
- Despairing, filled with remorse, *guilt* and self-pity, Kevin could not forgive himself.
- as a defence armour or carapace against inner feelings of inadequacy, *guilt* or anger
- The profound disruption in basic trust, the common feelings of shame, *guilt*, and inferiority
- profound feelings of failure, *guilt*, self-loathing, and shame for having given in

- development of trust versus mistrust, autonomy versus shame and doubt, initiative versus *guilt*, industry versus inferiority intimacy versus isolation
- an abuser will take on board fear, shame, remorse, *guilt*, channelling all her energies into trying to remedy
- Peggy's shame, *guilt* and remorse were as real as the off-licence's bills.

At first sight, it is surprising how little we can learn from these citations about the finer details of the meaning of *guilt*. Most occurrences, with the possible exception of the second and the last example, seem to come from popular or self-help therapy texts. They scatter words denoting feelings like salt over the sentences, giving no indication how the feelings they denote differ from each other. These texts are obviously not concerned with first-person experiences; they are written by people who regard themselves as experts who know why and when someone is feeling what without have to negotiate with them. What we find are not ordinary language words but sloppily applied terminology. It is only when we go further down to those citations that contain but few of the statistically significant context words that we find cases of ordinary language usage. Far more than 95% of all citations of guilt as a feeling betray their origin in more or less popularised versions therapeutic literature, or in texts whose authors use arguments borrowed from psychotherapy.

I did not find any useful definitions of the term *guilt* in the citations. This might be an oversight on my part; but it could also mean that it is not so common for these texts to define their key terminology, indeed that some authors think that definitions are unnecessary because they are unaware that they use terms and not ordinary language words. On the whole, the semantic content of *guilt* in these citations seems to be as unspecific as that of *angst* or of *depression*. If we find *guilt* conjoined with *shame*, *remorse*, *self-loathing* and the like, the purpose seems to be less a differentiation of these feelings than an intensification of the overall effect. All we can extract from the citations is that *guilt* is some kind of psychological disorder (in the same way as lumbago is a physiological disorder) and that there are a number of therapies to get rid of it. In the citations given above, guilt is caused by anger, by being unable to forgive one-self, by a disruption of basic trust; for giving in when one should not have. Guilt is said to be the opposite of initiative, and guilt can be real instead of imagined.

Here are some more causes for guilt (the citations are abbreviated where appropriate):

- when they fall into debt they often feel *guilt*

- most females who are unable to control their eating behavior feel intense *guilt*
- false *guilt* can also arise out of not accepting the forgiveness which God offers
- Oedipus-like conflict with parent of same sex may lead to *guilt*
- these novels turn on feelings of *guilt* and inferiority
- *guilt* results when we betray an internalized model of behavior
- the crimes committed against Jews did not evoke remorse or *guilt*
- having battered her and her husband to death, he became filled with *guilt* if not remorse
- *guilt* over having been aggressive is eminently more tolerable than shame
- faced with a youngster using drugs may parents react with fear, anger or *guilt*

Here are a some citations which talk about the consequences of guilt, which are, incidentally, quite rare (abbreviated where appropriate):

- *guilt* and shame torpedo self-respect
- shame and *guilt* are stuff that makes us hide ourselves
- passions can be aroused by liberation from these *guilts*
- it's the terrible *guilt* as well as the terrible grief which is crucifying me
- shame, *guilt* and self-disgust may make them reluctant to admit the problem
- the feelings of loss, *guilt*, failure and anger will take quite a while to work through
- feelings revolving around *guilt*, failure and humiliation need to be brought to the surface
- she never had time to profit by the experiences of love, of *guilt* or remorse

Here are some more terminology-oriented citations:

- the relationship of shame and *guilt* to gender is still under investigation
- *guilt* arises later than shame in a developmental sense
- shame and *guilt* are the self-conscious emotions
- internalised and repressed reservoirs of *guilt*, shame and anger contribute to depression
- *guilt* contains more cognitive content and less affective arousal than shame

Finally there are some citations which apparently do not come from therapeutic literature:

- Theirs had been a marriage of emotional convenience and I feel very strongly I was adopted out of *guilt*.
- They were with wonderful people and I'm still on good terms with them. If I do feel *guilt*, it is that my parents don't have a grandchild yet.
- And her husband, the handsome European impresario. Then the man talks about a lifelong sense of *guilt* about his parents. Because he didn't repeat their lives?
- With each purchase, hundreds and hundreds of them over the years, I feel a little rush of daring and *guilt*, as though decorating my body were a frivolous act.
- It was absurd for me, I realized, to try to tap some reservoir of feminist *guilt* that she clearly did not possess.

The common denominator of these non-therapeutic citations is that the guilt feelings mentioned here do not provoke the resolution to change things or to make amends. It is definitely guilt, and not remorse, that is at stake. It is also remarkable that in these citations *guilt* is not one element of an enumeration of related feelings; it is only *guilt* which is mentioned and nothing else.

It might not be superfluous to have a look at some of those citations where it seems almost impossible to set apart the two core meanings of guilt we have established in this investigation. In up to 20% of all the 8000 occurrences it seems to be impossible to decide if *guilt* indicates a feeling or a committed wrong. Perhaps in half of these cases the wider context would enable a tentative distinction. But for the rest it seems as if we can observe the emergence of a new, a conflated concept. Before I give examples, here are some citations for *guilt* clearly denoting a committed wrong:

- details of the admission of *guilt* by the Soviet Union
- my *guilt* lies in obedience
- the spectre of US *guilt* over CIA training of Islamist terrorists
- the imputation of *guilt* is appropriate
- willingness to question bin Laden's *guilt*

This is *guilt* in the criminal sense, in the sense of having committed a wrong. One has to account for one's crimes to the social institutions set in place. What the perpetrator feels is irrelevant. Not quite. Demonstrating appropriate feelings may have a positive effect on the jury:

> Barrister Harvey Walters told the court that Giannikos had an 'absolutely overwhelming sense of guilt and remorse'. 'My client is possibly the most remorseful person who has stepped through these doors.'

What the jury is interested in is less a feeling of guilt than true repentance. Yet if it is not guilt feeling itself, it is, since the early 19th century, one's ability to know about one's guilt. If a person is, due to their mental condition, incapable of being conscious that they committed a wrong, they cannot be tried. Thus, the mental notion of *guilt* is related to the social notion of *guilt*. In this new concept of conflated *guilt*, they become indistinguishable. This mental notion of *guilt* is still a long way away from the feeling of *guilt* that was the focus of this study. But it may have been instrumental for the emergence of the new, conflated concept of *guilt* that we find in these citations (abbreviated where appropriate):

- I think that there used to be a kind of white liberal *guilt* over all the world's problems, like somehow we're responsible by the virtue of the color of our skin
- All three of them looked weary, unshaven, hunched-shouldered. But Kathryn was out there somewhere. The *guilt* swung back into visibility like a returning comet, bright and huge.
- In London, Rivers tends the other wreckage of the war: the officer whose *guilt* and horror make him smell putrefaction on his own body.
- We consummated the relationship just before I left. When I got back, *guilt* got the better of me and I told Andrew.
- She knew that she would be unable to find peace without first knowing the truth about Bella. Simply, she could never live with her *guilt*.

Guilt feelings are not an invention of Christianity. The Catholic Church does not endorse them. In Catholic doctrine, the proper reaction to the original sin we are born with, and to the capital and venial sins we keep committing, is repentance. Still, in the Bank of English, we find 29 occurrences of *Catholic guilt*, and again we wonder whether this concept is more a feeling, or more the fact of having committed a wrong or some conflation of the two. Here are some citations (abbreviated where appropriate):

- he suffers from deep-seated *Catholic guilt*
- to inflate the two lovers' *Catholic guilt* about their adultery
- wrapped in great loads of *Catholic guilt* and insatiable lust
- I have a lot of *Catholic guilt* about money
- and a conspicuous lack of *Catholic guilt*

I have now come to the conclusion of my investigation. The deeper we dig, it seems, the less secure are our findings. *Guilt* is going to remain a puzzle. Colin McGinn has presented irrefutable arguments that consciousness, as a first-person experience, will always be an irresolvable mystery (McGinn1991:125). That may be equally true of feelings. It seems to be ultimately impossible to reconcile our notion of feelings as first-person experiences which are singular and defy communication with our other notion that feelings are legitimate objects of discourse. And so we keep talking about them. As ubiquitous as guilt feelings have become over the last century, we still disagree whether it is good or bad to have them, whether we should accept them or fight them:

– I respect guilt. It is a dangerous but sometimes useful beast.
(Penelope Leach 1977: *Your Baby and Child*)
– Good guilt is a product of love and responsibility. It is a natural, positive instinct that parents have.
(Jean Marzollo 1989: *Your Maternity Leave*)
– Guilt: this petty, miserable, malodorous feeling
(Tahar ben Jelloun 1965: *L'enfant de sable*)

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Joy, Astonishment and Fear in English, German and Russian

A corpus-based contrastive-semantic analysis

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1. Introduction

In this paper we are going to propose a research program rather than ultimate results. This program may be called 'linguistic psychology'. Linguistic psychology is considered to be a discipline that studies linguistic aspects of psychologically relevant concepts. Like the Oxbridge variety of linguistic philosophy, linguistic psychology investigates the use of folk-psychological terms of ordinary language such as consciousness, mentality, perception, emotion, attention, etc. The task of linguistic psychology is to clarify the semantics of the terms of human mentality. Linguistic psychology therefore is not the same as psycholinguistics.

Following the proposal put forward by Edda Weigand (1998: vii) to study lexical items not just in a dictionary but in use, we base our study on a corpus of classical fictional literature. We thus document non-professional psychological usage of the concepts in question. This helps us to get to know the opinions of average speakers concerning immaterial objects, on the one hand, and the list of concepts in common currency at a particular stage of development, on the other. From a purely linguistic point of view, the results may demonstrate to what extent the terms in question are essential to everyday language. This extent characterizes the level of involvement of emotions in human mentality at a certain cultural stage of society. Besides, the immediate object of investigation in our study are emotions as they are reflected by language use and not

by psychological mechanisms of human emotional life proper. The results of studying tendencies in common currency may show us, among other things, if and how far modern scientific psychology has outclassed folk psychology.

In this paper we are going to describe some results of a pilot contrastive-semantic investigation of *joy*, *astonishment* and *fear* in Russian, German, and English fiction of the 19th and the 20th century.

Our starting point is that emotions are culturally relevant feelings and depend on the cultures they are embedded in. Cultural dependency can most clearly be seen in the way people belonging to different socio-cultural strata

– *experience* emotions, which is the object of psychology proper and
– *express* emotions in their discourse, this is the task of 'linguistic psychology'.

In speech, emotions are referred to either directly (explicit naming), or indirectly or in a mixed manner. To the indirect type belong the cases in which symptoms of emotions (*raising brows*, *tears*, etc.) are mentioned without naming emotions themselves. The mixed type refers to cases which combine direct and indirect mentioning, e.g., *tears of joy, etc.*

Culturally relevant values of emotions are manifested by syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic behavior of the lexical items in question. Different literary traditions exploit different aspects of such values. But, besides differences, there are also universals of language use, and Euroversals in particular, concerning emotions. For example, the restricted use of performatives expressing emotions may be one of the realizations of 'pragmatic Euroversals'.

In this paper we are going to demonstrate a schema of description for direct and mixed mentioning of emotions in texts, leaving indirect mentioning for future research.

2. Astonishment in German and Russian: E. T. A. Hoffmann vs. N. Gogol

German: *Staunen*, *Erstaunen*, *Verwunderung*, *Überraschung*, *Verblüffung*, etc.
Russian: *udivlenie, izumlenie, potrjasenie, nedoumenie, ozadačennost'*, etc.
English: *amaze, amazement, astonishment, surprise, wonderment, wide-eyed, gaze, wide-mouthed, open-mouthed, marvel, wonder, amusement, stupefaction, admiration, agape* (with wonder), *rapture; X's mouth formed an O; struck* (with *amazement*), etc.

In the whole corpus of Hoffmann's writings we encounter over 450 uses of lexemes denoting 'astonishment' (*Staunen*, *Erstaunen*, *Verwunderung*, *Überraschung*, *Verblüffung*). The corpus of Gogol's texts contains about 400 occurrences of: *udivlenie, izumlenie, potrjasenie, nedoumenie, ozadačennost'*, etc. These ways-of-use can be classified in both languages according to three kinds of parameters: (1) figure vs. ground, (2) emotion clustering, and (3) types of emotional scenario.

2.1

In the first framework, we distinguish between *focused mentioning* and *background mentioning*. Focused emotions are emotions that stand in the focus of an utterance and constitute its main point. Examples of focused mentioning are:

(1) Alle *waren ganz erstaunt* über Exters seltsames Begehren. (Hoffmann, Nachtstücke)

(2) Some of the names greatly *astonished* our hero, so, still more, did the surnames. (Gogol, Dead Souls, translated by D. J. Hogarth)

In these sentences, the seme 'astonishment' is contained in the meaning of the predicate, although we may also encounter focused subjects, etc.

The following sentences are examples of background-astonishment:

(3) 'Wie', *erwiderte* ich *mit freudigem Erstaunen*, 'wie, du kennst mich, süßes Wesen?' (Hoffmann, Lebensansichten des Katers Murr)

(4)) "But what should *I* want with your colt?" said Chichikov, genuinely *astonished* at the proposal. (Gogol, Dead Souls, translated by D.J. Hogarth)

Here neither the predicate (*erwiderte* "said") nor the subject alone imply astonishment.

Emotions in sentential focus are analogous to close-ups in movies; the author wants the reader to empathize with the agent of the sentence, and the respective feelings of the interpreter are, ideally, the same. This is not the case with the background emotions. That is, the focused emotion may be a manipulative means, whereas background emotions are not necessarily manipulative, at least not openly manipulative. But when do people focus on the emotions and when do they not? This is a question that still remains to be answered by linguistic psychology.

2.2

Astonishment is often mentioned, both in Russian and in German, in coordination with names of other feelings in what can be termed 'emotional clusters', e.g., astonishment + despair, astonishment + consternation, astonishment + dread, etc.

Particularly interesting examples of clustering can be encountered in Hoffmann's works:

(5) Erstaunen + Schreck, Erstaunen + Furcht, höchste Verwunderung + freudiger Schreck, freudiges Erstaunen + freudiger Schreck, Staunen + Grausen, Staunen + Schreck, Staunen + Schrecken, Erstaunen + Schrecken + Schmerz, verwundert + erschrocken, Erstaunen + Bewunderung + Entzücken + Furcht + Entsetzen, Verwunderung + Ehrfurcht, Staunen + (tiefe) Bewunderung, erstaunt + von Mitleid durchdrungen, Erstaunen + Entzücken, staunende Bewunderung, Erstaunen + Bewunderung, frohes Erstaunen, Erstaunen + Überraschung, Verwunderung + Erstaunen, (ganz) verwirrt vor Erstaunen, freudig verwundert, Bewunderung + höchstes Erstaunen, Verwunderung + Freude, ganz verwundert + voll Mißtrauen; ganz verwundert + voll banger Erwartung, etc.

Hoffmann's astonishment combines more often with admiration or delight than with fear or dread, for example:

(6) Sein Emporsteigen hatte die Familie *in eine staunende Bewunderung* gesetzt, die nicht nachließ. (Hoffmann, Lebensansichten des Katers Murr)

In Gogol's texts, astonishment clusters less frequently together with other emotions; we encounter only occasionally pairings such as:

(7) *izumlenie* + *blagodarnost'* (astonishment + gratefulness or appreciation), *užas* + *izumlenie* (dread + astonishment), *izumlenie* + *radost'* (astonishment + joy), *nedoumenie* + *neterpelivoe ljubopytstvo* (perplexity + impatient curiosity)

For example:

(8) Kakov že byl užas I vmeste izumlenie Kovaleva, kogda on uznal, čto ėto byl sobstvennyj ego nos! (Nos)
lit. "Imagine Kovalev's fear and astonishment when he recognized his own nose walking in the street!" (Mr. Nose)

Let us now compare Hoffmann's and Gogol's types of clustering.

Hoffmann's astonishment combines with fairly heterogeneous emotions, whereas the combinations of *udivlenie/izumlenieu/potrjasenie* (astonishment/commotion/amazement) in Gogol's texts are less unusual. Common to both writers are the clusters: *astonishment* + *fear* and *astonishment* + *joy*. We can therefore put forward the following hypothetic *Euroversal-1*:

> The concepts of fear and joy have a special relation to astonishment and demonstrate some sort of family resemblance.

From the information-processing perspective we can say that in combining amazement with curiosity and astonishment with appreciation, Gogol stresses a subject's lack of information and as a result the need of information supply which corresponds to what we usually call curiosity.

On the other hand, Hoffmann's astonishment combines with admiration and delight. The emotional inner world of Hoffmann's heroes is outward-oriented, demonstrating care for what is going on outside. In contrast to him, Gogol's curiosity is less emotional and possesses a rather moderate emotional facet. Gogol's astonishment is sometimes more intensive than that of Hoffmann but does not cluster in such an extravagant way. Hoffmann very often refers to astonishment in paradoxical combinations and with detailed nuances (cf. *freudiger Schreck*, Russian *radostnyj užas)*.

Hence, the hypothetic *Euroversal-2*:

> Later stages of cultural development show increasingly extravagant clusters. What earlier generations considered as contradictory feelings, later generations may consider as fairly normal.

'Fear' can form clusters in Hoffmann's texts together with 'delight', resulting into something like 'delightful fear'. Hoffmann was one of the first to use the motif of 'comic fright', which is very frequent in his novels, for instance:

(9) Doch wer schildert *mein frohes Erstaunen, ja, meinen freudigen Schreck*, als ich wahrnahm, daß ich mich auf dem Hause meines wackern Herrn befand. (Lebensansichten des Katers Murr)

In Russian culture, this motif is encountered only in the 20th century, e.g.:

(10) Uletaja, Margarita videla tol'ko, čto virtuoz-džazbandist, borjas' s polonezom, kotoryj dul Margarite v spinu, b`et po golovam daže džazbandistov svoej tarelkoj i te prisedajut v *komičeskom užase*.
"As she floated away Margarita caught a glimpse of the virtuoso bandleader, struggling against the polonaise that she could still hear behind her, hitting the bandsmen on the head with his cymbal while they

crouched in comic terror." (Mikhail Bulgakov, The Master and Margarita, translated by Michael Glenny)

In the translation by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (1997) we read: "[...] was beating his jazzmen on the heads with the cymbal while they cowered in comic fright". The English translation in both cases does not quite render the same meaning, which is fairly close to the German *freudiger Schreck*. In the 20th century, the same cluster occurs in K. Tucholsky's book *Revolution beim preußischen Kommiß:*

(11) Das ist erst später aufgekommen, als Ludendorff in *freudigem Schreck* erkannt hatte, daß er seinen Hals noch hatte.

In this case there is a double perspective: from the speaker/hearer's point of view, the way frightened participants show their emotions looks funny; from the participants' point of view: experiencing a mixed emotion, half-fright and half-delight, so familiar from our childhood, when we sprang with an umbrella from a chair or even from the roof of the house. These two perspectives may be found in different combinations, e.g., from the point of view of the speaker who is also a participant in the described events.

2.3

In the framework of the next methodological schema emotions are considered as a link in causal connections contained in the text. Here we have what Heider (1991:6) calls 'flow-of-emotion scenario'; comments on this notion may be found in Radden (1997:47) and Dirven (1997:55–83).

The basic causal chain is: (1) emotion-causing event, (2) the emotion itself, (3) result of the emotional reaction. Realizations of this basic chain may be called 'emotional scenario'. The study of texts has shown that there are four dominant types of scenarios that are not equally frequent.

– ***event → emotion → reaction***, Hoffmann: 51 contexts, Gogol: 61 contexts of astonishment and the like.

For example:

(12) Ich bemerkte, daß die Leute, welche mir begegneten, still standen und mir verwundert nachsahen, ja daß *der Wirt* im Dorfe *vor Erstaunen über meinen Anblick kaum Worte finden konnte*, welches mich nicht wenig ängstigte. (Die Elixiere des Teufels)

Here the scenario looks like this: my look → astonishment → impossibility to express oneself properly.

Cf. also:

(13) On povorotilsja tak sil'no v kreslax, čto lopnula šerstjanaja materija, obtjagivavšaja podušku; sam Manilov posmotrel na nego v nekotorom nedoumenii. (Gogol, Dead Souls)

In the English translation by D.J. Hogarth, the sentence mentioning the astonishment is preceded by the following sentence:

(14) Indeed, grave and prudent a man though Čičikov was, he had much ado to refrain from executing a leap that would have done credit to a goat (an animal which, as we all know, finds itself moved to such exertions only during moments of the most ecstatic joy).

It is only after this sentence that we read:

(15) Nevertheless the guest did at least execute such a convulsive shuffle that the material with which the cushions of the chair were covered came apart, and Manilov gazed at him with some misgiving.

The chain looks like this:

Manilov executed a convulsive shuffle; the material with which the cushions of the chair were covered came apart → Manilov's astonishment → Manilov gazed at him with some misgiving.

– Often we encounter a shorter scenario, lacking any explicit mention of reaction: ***event*** → ***emotion*** (Hoffmann: 176 cases, Gogol: 116):

(16) In der Nähe erblickte er zu seinem Erstaunen, daß aus den Löchern des zerrissenen Mantels, den die Gestalt trug, Flaschenhälse hervorguckten. (Hoffmann, Die Elixiere des Teufels)

Here, the scenario looks like this: *aus den Löchern des zerrissenen Mantels, den die Gestalt trug, guckten Flaschenhälse hervor* → ***Erstaunen***.

(17) Kak tol'ko Ivan Ivanovič upravilsja v svoem xozjajstve i vyshel, po obyknoveniju, poležat' pod navesom, kak, k neskazannomu udivleniju svoemu, uvidel čto-to krasnevšee v kalitke
"As soon as Ivan Ivanovitch had arranged his domestic affairs and stepped out upon the balcony, according to his custom, to lie down, he saw, to his indescribable amazement, something red at the gate."
(Gogol, How The Two Ivans Quarrelled)

Here we have the following chain: ***he saw something red at the gate → to his indescribable amazement.***

– There is another variant of shorter scenario which is encountered in texts by Hoffmann much more frequently than in Gogol's writings: ***emotion → reaction*** (Hoffmann: 100 contexts, Gogol: 32).

  For instance, in (18) we have: ***Verwunderung → stand das Maul offen***:

(18) Aber dem *Lehrburschen stand das Maul offen vor lauter Verwunderung* (Meister Floh).

(19) Vpravdu? Celyx sto dvadcat'? – voskliknul Čičikov i daže razinul neskol'ko rot ot izumlenija.
"Indeed? Upon a hundred and twenty souls in all!" And Chichikov's surprise and elation were such that, this said, he remained sitting open-mouthed (Gogol, Dead Souls, transl. by D. J. Hogarth),
i.e.: ***surprise and elation → he remained sitting open-mouthed.***

– A subtype of this kind is emotional transition, change-over: astonishment changes into a different emotion (Hoffmann: 20, Gogol: 9). For instance:

(20) Sein Erstaunen ging aber in Angst über und Entsetzen, da er erfuhr, daß schon seit langer Zeit eine Verschwörung wider die Signorie gereift [...]. (Die Serapionsbrüder, Die Bergwerke zu Falun)

In (20), astonishment changes into fear; in the following example "fearful astonishment" changes into anger:

(21) Im plötzlichen Schreck der Überraschung drehte sich Antonio rasch um, aber wie er nun der Alten in das abscheuliche Gesicht starrte, rief er zornig [...]. (ibid)

– The shortest scenario, in which only the emotion is mentioned, is least frequent for both writers (Hoffmann: 22 contexts, Gogol: 15). In this case the emotional state lies in the focus of the utterance. For example:

(22) Ich *versank in das hinbrütende Staunen* der begeisterten Andacht, die mich durch glänzende Wolken in das ferne bekannte, heimatliche Land trug, und in dem duftenden Walde ertönten die holden Engelsstimmen, und der wunderbare Knabe trat wie aus hohen Lilienbüschen mir entgegen und frug mich lächelnd: "Wo warst du denn so lange, Franziskus?" (Die Elixiere des Teufels)

The following scene, which is similarly organized, sounds rather theatrical and insincere in Russian:

(23) Izvinite, ja, priznajus', privedena v takoe izumlenie (Revizor)
"Excuse me. I must say I'm greatly astonished."
(The Inspector-General, translated by Th. Seltzer)

In general, saying in Russian that you are astonished, amazed, etc., without giving the reason why sounds artificial. Such expressions may be called anti-performatives, i.e., they hardly admit 1st person subjects and present tense predicates.

– 'Potential emotion', i.e. a characteristic of an event that could evoke an emotion but not necessarily does (Hoffmann: 52; Gogol: 125); for example:

(24) Der Anblick war in der Tat seltsam und *überraschend*. (Hoffmann, Des Vetters Eckfenster)

(25) Krasota proizvodit soveršennye *čudesa*. (Gogol, Nevskij prospekt)
"Beauty may sometimes astonish."

In such cases we have to do only with a potential astonishment, not with an actual state of a person. The author proposes to evaluate a situation as worth wondering, as really wonderful, as unexpected and therefore amazing, as a surprise, etc.

– 'Post-emotion': this very seldom type (Hoffmann: 4, Gogol: 3) characterizes the processes of recovering from astonishment or of overcoming astonishment, but not astonishment itself:

(26) Julie, *ihrem Erstaunen nicht einen Augenblick Raum gebend*, tat schnell, wie ihr geheißen. (Lebensansichten des Katers Murr)

(27) *Als Giglio sich einigermaßen von seinem Erstaunen erholt*, wollte er seine Gegenwart kundtun. (Prinzessin Brambilla)

(28) Izumlennaja ne menee ix, ona, odnako ž, nemnogo očnulas' i sdelala dviženie, čtoby podojti k nim.
"Astonished no less than them, she came out of her reverie and made a movement towards them." (Gogol, Evenings)

As we see, astonishment and amazement are self-replicating in some contexts, i.e., the emotion as a reaction to a certain perception causes a need for additional information concerning the object that created this feeling. Most characteristic in this respect is the fact that emotions accompanying the action are

mentioned. The scenario of such cases looks like this: ***look* → *astonishment* → *gazing with astonishment*.** For example:

(29) Immer mehr drängte sich das Volk zu, und mich dicht umringend, gafften sie mich an **mit dummem Erstaunen**. (Die Elixiere des Teufels)

(30) S čuvstvom nevol'nogo izumlenija sozercali znatoki novuju, nevidannuju kist'.
"The critics regarded this new hitherto unknown work with a feeling of involuntary wonder." (The Mysterious Portrait)

That is, the emotion engendered by a stimulus lasts while accompanying this stimulus, thus feeding its intensity and duration. From this point of view, the concept of astonishment (*udivlenie*) is closer to ***joy*** and opposes ***fear***. Fearsome events repel, whereas rejoicing and astonishing events attract, as we all know from everyday experience.

Comparing Gogol and Hoffmann, we note, firstly, that Hoffmann pays much more attention to various nuances of astonishment. Secondly, Hoffmann represents clusters of emotions more freely than Gogol and uses entire complexes of emotionally laden concepts to describe feelings. Thus in his texts, emotions very frequently construct the figure, while the situation that triggers the emotions is the background, a kind of landscape filled with music of emotions. Thirdly, Gogol much more often combines an emotional scenario with a characteristic of an event, and emotional clusters are not as frequent and multiple in his texts as they are in Hoffmann's. Gogol focuses on the situation that brings astonishment to life, while the emotion itself in most cases is only part of a scenery in his 'theatre of circumstances'.

Yet despite the differences in their methods, astonishment is a basic principle of the dialogue between author and reader for both Gogol and Hoffmann. Hoffmann's romantic mystification and Gogol's irony (which also goes back to Schlegel's romantic irony) are based on situations and events that are unusual, extraordinary and therefore astonishing.

Hoffmann aims at surprising the reader with his symphonies of emotions, rushing away suddenly, hiding, then jumping out from behind the corner and again narrating of mysterious, enigmatic, both frightening and funny, i.e. amazing events. Gogol concentrates on *showing* astonishment rather than on *provoking* it. Gogol's astonishment is that of an actor, it is like a mask that can be put on and off and therefore seems alienated. As a result, astonishment in Gogol's interpretation is often perceived as tragic and sometimes even histrionic. With his astonishment, Gogol tries to take hold of life by stopping it for

a moment in order to perceive it and show it to his readers in more detail, like in the final scene of *The Inspector-General*. In contrast, Hoffmann's astonishment is in perpetual movement, rushing ahead and carrying the reader into the whirlpool of life.

Astonishment is, consequently, not an elementary concept. Amazement can petrify, and, on the other hand, stimulate apprehension, the learning of new information and the exploration of the world. Such kind of astonishment is a component of cognition. It is paradoxical, antinomic, self-contradictory, and heterogeneous. Therefore, the term *astonishment* (Russian *udivlenie*, etc., German *Staunen*, etc.) is applied to very different emotions arising out of situations in which something 'rocks the boat' and contradicts the expectations of a normal course of events.

The range of the scenarios may be a realization of the following *Euroversal-3,* which we formulate as a maxim:

Wherever possible, try to give motivation to astonishment in the sentence in which you mention it. Therefore, start the description with mentioning the event which gave rise to the emotion and only then mention the emotion itself.

3. Joy in Russian and in English: F. Dostoevsky vs. Ch. Dickens

Here we consider only the occurrences of the lexical items *rad* in Russian and *joy* in English, their synonyms are left for future research.

However strange it may appear, *joy* is two times less frequent in Dickens' works (over 600) than *radost'* "joy" in Dostoevsky's (more than 1165 times). One of the reasons lies in the fact that in Russian *rad* is often used in clichés corresponding to the English *glad*, cf. *Rada vas videt'* and *It is a great pleasure for me to see you*.

3.1 Clichés

In the formulae of courtesy *joy* and *radost'* are used differently in Russian and in English. For example, Dickens writes:

(31) *I wish you joy*, I'm sure! (Barnaby Rudge)

(32) Joy to you both! (Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit)

In Russian, it is more usual to wish happiness, pleasure, etc.:

(33) *Rad*(*a*) *vas* *videt'*
Glad+fem.sg. you (acc. sg.) to see
"It is a great pleasure for me to see you."

The wish of *mnogo radosti* "much joy" is less formulaic (singular or plural, not simply "joy"). But a calque of the English *Joy to you both* would sound rather unnatural in Russian.

3.2 Clustering

3.2.1

In Dickens' writings, *joy* is combined with feelings such as *gratitude, ecstasy, pride, love, sorrow, hope*, or *disappointment*, especially with *pride*, e.g.:

(34) She had not been prepared for such passionate expressions, and they awakened some natural sparks of feminine pride and joy in her breast. (Our Mutual Friend)

3.2.2

Dostoevsky's clustering of radost' is rather unusual, e.g.:

(35) *radost' obidy*
"joy of dudgeon"

(36) *Ona onemela ot radostnogo izumlenija*
"She was inarticulate with mirthful amazement."
(Crime and Punishment)

(37) *radostnoe smuščenie*
"mirthful bewilderment, perplexity"

(38) *radostnoe izumlenie*
"mirthful amazement" (Netochka Nezvanova)

(39) *izumlenie, radostnyj ispug*
"mirthful fright" (The Dream of a Ridiculous Man)

(40) *bessoznatel'naja radost'*
"unconscious joy" (Demons), etc.

Dostoevsky likes such and similar unusual combinations of radost'.

3.3 Most frequent types of contexts of use

3.3.1

Dickens uses the lexeme *joy*

– first of all, to describe actions accompanied by this emotion (185 cases), e.g.:

(41) In her joy and gratitude she kissed his hand. (Little Dorrit)

In such cases, *joy* is mentioned in the background.

– Joy is less frequently used as subject in descriptions of 'pleasant situations' (160 cases), e.g.:

(42) But the Jamaica rum, and the joy of having occasioned a heavy disappointment, by degrees cooled Mr. Quilp's wrath [...].
(The Old Curiosity Shop)

– And least frequently *joy* is emphasized in the description of certain states (89 cases), e.g.:

(43) *The mad joy* over the prisoners who were saved, had astounded him scarcely less than the mad ferocity against those who were cut to pieces. (A Tale of Two Cities)

3.3.2

The frequencies of Dostoevsky's contexts of the lexeme *radost'* are quite different:

– joy being the focus of certain states (455):

(44) Tol'ko čto goluboj ekipaž uspel vyexat' za vorota, kak Gospodin Goljadkin sudorožno poter sebe ruki i zalilsja tixim, neslyšnym smexom, kak čelovek veselogo xaraktera, kotoromu udalos' sygrat' slavnuju štuku I kotoroj on sam *rad-radexonek* (Dvojnik)
"As soon as the light-blue carriage dashed out of the gate, Mr. Golyadkin rubbed his hands convulsively and went off into a slow, noiseless chuckle, like a jubilant man who has succeeded in bringing off a splendid performance and is as *pleased* as Punch with the performance himself."
(The Double: A Petersburg Poem, transl. by C. Garnett)

– joy accompanying an action (211):

(45) [...] počti *radostno* podxvatil Porfirij. (Prestuplenie i nakazanie)
"[...] Porfiry Petrovitch quoted gaily."
(Crime and Punishment, transl. by C. Garnett)

– joy in descriptions of 'pleasant situations' (191 cases):

(46) Ėto byla minuta polnoj, neposredstvennoj, čisto životnoj *radosti*. (Prestuplenie i nakazanie)
"It was an instant of full, direct, purely instinctive joy."
(Crime and Punishment, transl. by C. Garnett)

As we see from the examples, Dostoevsky's joy is something like an acting entity capable by itself to change the state and the actions of people that are normally considered as bearers of this emotion. Dickens's joy is a 'normal' emotion; he does not exaggerate its role in the mental world.

3.4 Epithets of *joy* and *radost'*

3.4.1

Dickens' joy is distinguished by a fairly rich set of epithets, e.g.: *mad, lazy, boundless, mingled, great, unutterable, evident, savage, secret, excited, wildest, laughing*, *wild, intoxicated, overcome, half blind, bounded*, etc. Dickens' joy is often mixed with weeping, which we hardly encounter in the works by Dostoevsky; e.g.: *weeping, half joyfully, half sorrowfully; cf.:*

(47) Still weeping, but not sadly – joyfully!; she was not crying in sorrow but in a little glow of joy; I did cry for joy indeed; (to) cry with joyful tears; with tears of joy in her bright eyes, etc.

For Dickens, but not for Dostoevsky, tears were a typical realization of joy. Today, this feature seems to be old-fashioned for the younger generation in Russia.

3.4.2

The most characteristic feature of Dostoevsky's use is the co-occurrence of *radost'* with modifiers such as *pochti* "almost", *otchasti* "partly", and even *narochno* "deliberately". For example:

(48) Nastas'ja, kuxarka I edinstvennaja služanka xozjajkina, otčasti byla rada takomu nastroeniju žil'ca i sovsem perestala u nego ubirat' i mesti, tak

> tol'ko raz v nedelju, nečajanno, bralas' inogda za venik.
> (Prestuplenie i nakazanie)
> "Nastasya, the cook and only servant, was ***rather pleased*** at the lodger's mood and had entirely given up sweeping and doing his room, only once a week or so she would stray into his room with a broom."
> (Crime and Punishment, transl. by C. Garnett)

The phrase *rather pleased* in the English translation does not contain all the nuances of Russian *otčasti byla rada* "was partly pleased".

4. Conclusion

Psychologists have not yet demonstrated that the feeling of emotions is equal for all people in the world, nor can we be sure that the list of emotions is the same everywhere. The data of ordinary language use attest differences in certain aspects of emotions and even different emotions to a certain degree. However, we can state convergences of different emotional cultures.

Our program consists in extending the framework exposed in this paper, i.e.:

– exploring contrastive linguistic psychology in width, contrasting the material of different languages, epochs, literary genres, fashions, literary movements, etc., and studying not only these emotions but also all human mental states, as far as possible;

– exploring linguistic psychology in depth, trying to gain a deeper insight into the psychology of emotion and into the semantics of the languages contrasted, based on more extensive material;

– the methodological dimension of the program consists in refining the notions used in this paper rather informally, as a first approximation. Following the advice of Carnegie: "Criticize yourself before others do it", we would like to stress the provisional character of notions such as focus vs. background, clustering, emotional scenario, etc. It is also possible to combine a linguistic-psychological approach with psycholinguistic experiments in order to elucidate the readers' reactions. One of the methodological directions may consist in preparing text corpora of different languages in a unified format, where sentences are classed according to different emotional scenarios, with the perspective of further theoretical insight and as a database for elucidating Euroversals.

The study of emotions itself is emotionally relevant because it helps people from different cultures to understand each other better. There is also a practi-

cal aspect of such a study, because, as a by-product, we can learn how to negotiate with people from different emotional cultures. For instance, the use of 'emotional formulae' in negotiations is efficient to different degrees in different European and non-European societies. This study may therefore be relevant to practical spheres such as international affairs, cultural exchange and economics.

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Ambivalence as a Dialogic Frame of Emotions in Conflict

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1. What it looks like being ambivalent: A pair of examples

Ambivalence is one of the very few words in English that has an inventor. The 'father' of this word, the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1857–1939), coined it (the German *die Ambivalenz* [*Doppelwertigkeit*]) in an article discussing the nature of the emotive-affective experience of schizophrenic patients: "The synchronous laughing and crying are a partial manifestation of schizophrenic ambivalence" (Bleuler 1930: 382).

This kind of pathological emotive-affective experience seems to be an extreme expression of a phenomenon that one can find in everyday life with normal persons. Thus the German world record holder in 200m freestyle swimming Franziska van Almsick states her attitude to what she is doing as follows: *Wenn meine Karriere zu Ende ist, gehe ich nie mehr ins Wasser* "When my career comes to an end I will never go into the water again." (from an interview in the press; *TCM Magazin*, 31.8-6.9.2002). The object of her *Hassliebe* "hate-love" is the environment in which she performs as the best in the world.

There are, however, more challenging examples of what it looks like to become ambivalent. The 'father' the of A-bomb, Robert Oppenheimer, having witnessed the first nuclear detonation commented in an enchanted way in a quasi-religious language: "I have become Death, the destroyer of worlds" (cf. Weart 1988: 10). Apparently, what he experienced and tried to put into words fits quite well the religious flavor of witnessing a modern likeness of the religious *mysterium tremendum* (in the function of God as the destroyer of worlds). With this utterance, Oppenheimer identified himself as a destroyer of worlds with the ambivalent emotion of both horror and fascination. This

example shows that ambivalent states can lead to socially unpredictable consequences.

2. Emotion and ambivalence

The proper treatment of ambivalence requires to consider the nature of emotion in general and its functions in the mind's economy. In this respect, it is important to point out that the primary function of emotion is not to call attentional focus to itself in a reflective act of self-conscious categorization: "What exactly am I feeling right now?" This is a secondary requirement that is imposed if emotions are to be communicated; in order to do that one must become aware of them.

The primary function of emotion is, however, to signal to the organism in an unmediated way where it finds itself on the road which leads from a desire for some object stimulus to its gratification. Emotion basically motivates the organism to go ahead or to try something else with respect to a selected target. For example, the pair of *approach-avoidance* antonyms name a broad class of possible behaviors with respect to desired objects vs. objects and situations to be avoided. The class in question can be further restricted, depending on the nature of the stimulus, by specifying the nature of the appropriate behavior as either *fight-flight* or *attraction-repulsion* or something else. These classes of behavior become associated with appropriate emotions. Thus, it may very well be true, to quote William James, that a man does not cry because he is sad, but is sad because he cries. The point is that the classes of emotions are rather straightforwardly related in a reciprocal way to some classes of behavior toward certain sets of objects. This directly mediating role of emotions in matching pairs of stimuli and behaviors is usually not dealt with in the approaches that study the relationship between emotion and language. They tend to concentrate on the relationship between language and cognition that comes to the fore only if one intends to communicate emotions (to others and/or to oneself).

The behavior-grounded approach to emotion avoids the danger of representing emotion as inescapably cognitive and stresses the independence of the psychological system of emotion that aims at a better accommodation of the individual to the physical and social environment. The excessive cognitivism is dangerous because it confronts us with the following problem: if we have cognition and emotion and emotion is cognitive, this begs the question why we need it at all – just to duplicate the function cognition is supposed to serve anyway?

The consideration of emotion as an autonomous functional system, however, is not without problems. The main one, in my view, refers to the existence of ambivalent emotions. In experiencing an ambivalent emotion, e.g., *Hassliebe* "hate-love", one cannot select between two contradictory behaviors that are associated with the two opposite emotions – one cannot fight and flee at the same time. One's response is effectively blocked. Being ambivalent means first and foremost being behaviorally in trouble. Thus, the possibility of having ambivalent emotions significantly complicates the problem of the purported functional value of emotions as such. Any model of emotion that claims general validity must, correspondingly, face the problem of ambivalence, its structure and functions.

To summarise, emotion does not need cognition. As a matter of fact, the opposite – i.e., cognition cannot function without emotion – seems much more plausible. Emotion makes sense, from a functional point of view, if and only if it can form a circuit of its own mediating between a stimulus and the organism's behavior. Even if this is the case, there are problems associated with the ascription of a functional status to it.

3. Ambivalence as a psychological phenomenon

3.1 Feeling, emotion and ambivalence: The phenomenon of mixed emotions

Ambivalence or *ambivalency* is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 2nd ed., XX vols., 1989) as a word coming in analogy to words like *equivalence*, *equivalency*: "The co-existence in one person of contradictory emotions or attitudes (as love and hatred) towards a person or thing". In addition, commenting on different uses of this word, this dictionary adds the following characteristics: "A balance or combination or coexistence of opposites; oscillation, fluctuation, variability, etc." of the ambivalent feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes.

In the psychology of emotions the problem of ambivalence is seldom considered (for example, in the new representative state-of-the-art volume by Mayne & Bonanno 2001, it is not considered at all). Especially in the English literature it appears in the garb of 'mixed emotions' ('mixed feelings') which are considered as a folk synonym of the opaque from the point of view of its inner form 'ambivalence'. 'Mixed emotions', however, seem to be used in a broader and vague sense. The term means any sort of possible mixing of emotions, e.g., mixed emotions in the sense of non-primary and/or non-basic emotions. The

mixed emotions result from the combinations of basic emotions or from a basic emotion and some 'derivative' one. It is clear that these mixtures should consist of 'components' capable of mixing, i.e. just the opposite to the ambivalent ones that are supposed to contradict each other. Furthermore, these mixtures can happen not only at one and the same time; they might follow each other in predictable patterns in time series. Izard (1971: 6), for example, speaks about the possibilities of interaction between emotions and takes as criterion their intensity, pointing out that their interaction may lead to intensification, blockage or diminishment. None of these interactions seems to fit the way the emotional opposites coexist in an ambivalent frame.

In cognitive psychology there have also been attempts to develop 'a cognitive theory of emotions'. In some of the models available the possibility of having 'mixed emotions' is taken into account, but on a different basis. Thus Ortony et al. (1988) considered the possibility of parallel appearance of two emotions in response to a single stimulus. In the cognitivist framework, the emotions are expressions of the subjective value of some situation for an individual. For Ortony et al. the basic criterion for the evaluation is desire vs. avoidance of the object or situation in question. Mixed emotions become possible if a situation can have more than one value (meaning), i.e., there is a discrepancy between two of the evaluations. Thus ambivalent emotions are triggered by situations and objects that have both desirable and undesirable aspects. In other words, ambivalent emotions may be triggered, for example, by ambiguous situations (e.g., snake/rope dilemma). On the one hand, one is curious to dissolve the ambiguity of whether it is a snake or a rope; on the other hand, one is ready to run away if it turns out that the object in question is indeed a snake.

Regarding the phenomenon of ambivalent experience proper, Weigert (1991: 88) differentiates as follows:

i. Ambivalence can consist of experiences of mixed feelings, a vague and diffuse sense of being pulled in two directions, a sense that defies clear statement because the experiential state in question includes unformulated feelings. It seems clear that these undefined feelings along the scale of most general *push-pull* dimensions are pre-linguistic (although this *push-pull* reaction can already be considered as a nascent ambivalent feeling *par excellence*). Probably, the *push-pull* feelings are, as a matter of fact, the experiential correlates of uncertainty/uneasiness and incapacity to decide what one feels and what-to-do. In this sense, the uncertainty (felt at the beginning frequently as uneasiness) is the matrix from where ambivalent emotions spring forth in experience;

ii. Ambivalent can be a situation of feeling pushed or pulled, even though we have a defined and normal emotion pulling in a different direction. The latter is defined and can be named linguistically. The other feels like an aura of uneasiness surrounding the purportedly positive and definitive emotion. The example Weigert (1991: 88) offers is that of a groom-to-be 'knowing' for sure that he loves his wife-to-be. Indeed, he is able to avow to her and himself just that, even if he feels twinges of deeper opposing feelings that he is unable to express in words to himself, to her, to anyone else;
iii. Ambivalence can also be found in situations where two verbally definable contradictory emotions, experienced at the same time, push and pull a person toward mutually exclusive courses of decision and action. According to Weigert (1991: 88), this is ambivalence in its 'strict' sense, i.e. *Hassliebe* and *Schadenfreude*.

This classification of the possible kinds of structure of the ambivalent experience at the interface between bodily feeling, cognitive (named and nameable) emotion and ambivalence seems quite appropriate, but there are problems with it from a linguistic point of view. There are linguists, like Wierzbicka (1996: 244), who rightly point out that not all feelings (definable or not) have something to do with emotion. In English, the meaning of *feeling* includes both 'feeling of emotion', as well as 'feeling of a bodily state in general'. Thus while the feeling of pain is by definition a feeling, it is by no means an emotion. We have all sorts of kinaesthetic feelings, too, that do not necessarily lead to an emotional state in a straightforward fashion, except in the very generalized sense of feeling at ease with or feeling uneasy with one's body. Thus the issue of the nature of the relationship between feeling and emotion is itself far from being unproblematic.

3.2 The internal structure of ambivalent emotions

In the psychology of emotion, there have been different attempts to model the structure of ambivalent emotions (for a short overview, see e.g. Hascher 1994: 167–183). According to the first basic possibility of having two opposite and mutually contradicting emotions that are expressible in language (e.g., with the collocation *mistrustful dependence*), one actually activates two independent scales in the emotive-affective space (but not just members of a single dimension or scale, e.g., *dependence-mistrust*): *trust-mistrust* and *dependence-independence*. The product of the two-dimensional activation is then linguisti-

cally expressed as a combination of the positive member of the one scale and the negative member of the other.

According to the second alternative, the different scales (dimensions) of emotional evaluation do not become activated completely independent of each other (i.e., are not orthogonally positioned in the modelled emotive-affective space). In this case, we have a sort of mixing of the scales where one of them dominates and incorporates the other(s). For example, one can claim that the feeling of *mistrustful dependence* is due to the *dependence-independence* scale dominating and assimilating to itself the scale of *trust-mistrust*. The opposite would be the case, at least on linguistic grounds, if we have an emotion corresponding in its structure to an expression like *dependent mistrust* (as far as one can make sense of it). In studying different European languages it may turn out that some of them are more flexible and permissive in mixing and reversing the relationships between corresponding antonymous emotions compared to English. And that may matter for the way one experiences and conceptualises emotions in different cultures.

3.3 How can I ascribe to myself two mutually contradictory emotions at one and the same time (and remain an identical I)?

If we define emotion functionally as a biological predisposition (independent of naming, becoming aware of it, etc.) for a meaningful cathexis (binding-together) of the executive psychological agency to a class of objects, e.g., ones to be approached vs. ones to be avoided, it may seem well-nigh impossible to become ambivalent to a single object during a single moment of consciousness. In other words, we face, at least with a two-scales-theory of ambivalence, a situation where we must make a forced choice between the following two alternatives:

a. In an ambivalent emotion the self oscillates sequentially between two perspectives toward the same object – the first being 'positive' while the second being 'negative'. The speed of oscillation makes it look like as if we had a single self which adopts two different perspectives simultaneously and falls victim to a mixed feeling; or
b. There are possibilities for a single psyche to react with different 'agencies' within itself in a potentially dissociative way to a single object or situation. This means an acceptance of the possibility of dissociative, mutually conflicting splits in the structure of the self itself. In experiencing mixed feelings one is frequently unable to choose between two candidate execu-

tive selves with whom to identify. This blockage is experienced as a mixed feeling. Problematic in this case is not the experience of the negative feeling behind the positive one but its combination with an incapacity to choose between them in order to act and in many cases the additional emotion of shame and/or guilt due to the awareness that one pretends to be better than one really is.

Here, I think, Freud's idea how to model the functional structure of the psyche comes as quite a helpful orientation. His 'cut' is specifically oriented toward identifying the points of incision and potential conflict formation in the 'internal dialogic action games' among the mind's three agencies (for the concept of dialogic action game cf. Weigand 2000). Freud's functional model of the psyche consists of three executive mechanisms:

i. The id (the instinctual aspect of the psyche) that is permanently looking for immediate gratification of its desires. The id is always longing for "sex, drugs, and Rock-and-Roll" here and now, to put its worldview in modern garb. In the id we find the place for the primary (or instinctual) ambivalence. Thus the mother's breast is the source for both gratification and angry embarrassment for the infant (Freud 1915).
ii. The ego (*I*) is the planning- and looking-for-satisfaction agency of the longer term motivations and concerns. It is individualistic, it looks like a lonely marathon runner, both proud of its unique unity and enslaved in its endless daily routine of manipulating the postponed gratification (championed at its limit by the ascetic who negates his/her life until her/his death and expects to gain eternal life in return) – thus "pride and daily marathon", to use a slogan-like title of a book, points at the ambivalent (narcissistically routine) function of the ego.
iii. The superego (*me*, *to me*) is the structure that amounts to 'how do I look in the eyes of the others' and what sort of a mask (including appropriate emotions) do I have to experience, express and/or feign in public according to my social status, roles, etc. (Freud 1923).

If we consider the dynamics of the possible relationships between the ego and the superego (the public persona or personae, as a matter of fact), we can appreciate how I (ego) can be proud of myself while experiencing guilt (through superego). The famous example cited to make this point is Freud's experience of both pride and guilt when visiting Acropolis. The pride was associated with the evaluation of his own life achievement and guilt was felt in relation to his

father (superego embodiment), for certain reasons related in the final resort to his 'Oedipus complex'.

If ambivalence is interpreted according to such a functional model, it turns out to display a regular way of processing certain types of subjectively significant information in a potentially dissociative way.

4. Language and ambivalent emotions

As mentioned above, the 'correct' identification of ambivalence depends at least partly on the use of language, especially on expressions of antonymy, but also on the proper consideration of other language-specific phenomena like ambiguity, polysemy, and homonymy. We will discuss this set of problems in a brief overview.

4.1 The meaning and use of the word *ambivalence*

Ambivalence is considered to be a binary emotion based upon the psycho-logic of emotional opposition. This means that the correct evaluation of the nature of an ambivalent feeling requires a proper identification of the opposites in emotional experience. I am not aware of any single work where the relation between emotion and language was considered from this vantage point, namely with respect to the relation between ambivalent emotions and psych-antonyms.

Ambivalence, as a word, is not frequent in everyday use neither in English nor in German. One rarely comes across utterances like the following ones in informal conversations:

(1) a. *Ich fühle mich ambivalent.*
b. *I feel ambivalent (about this or that).*

If you happen to hear an utterance like this, you are very likely somewhere on a university campus hearing two professors talking to each other. People usually tend to express an ambivalent feeling, as Hascher (1994: 180) points out, with "implicitly-ambivalent" words like *komisch* "funny", *mittel* "middle" or *gemischt* "mixed" in German. The same is the case in English where one speaks of *mixed feelings*, for instance, if one is aware of both emotions and wants to express both of them at the same time. On the other hand, we have situations where a person claims that the lecture he/she has just heard was *fascinating* while the 'devil's advocate' in him/her whispers privately to her/him that

it was actually *boring*. Here we deal with euphemisms, face-saving etiquette, hypocrisy and their relationship to ambivalence proper. But I will not address here the troublesome topic of their mutual determination.

4.2 Ambiguity, polysemy, antonymy, homonymy, and ambivalent meanings: An example

Ambiguity in linguistics is the phenomenon that an expression has more than one meaning. Two different types of ambiguity can be distinguished on the basis of what is the cause for it: lexical ambiguity, i.e., a word has more than one meaning, and structural ambiguity, i.e., a string of words can be attached to more than one syntactic structure. Lexical ambiguity is the type of ambiguity that arises when a word has multiple meanings. The word *bank* is often cited as an instance of lexical ambiguity which is quite evidently related to polysemy. Polysemy is defined as the phenomenon that a word has several different meanings which are closely related to each other. The ambiguity of *church* (either a building or an institution) is an instance of polysemy.

It seems that at least in some cases the development of mutually contradictory polysemic meanings of a single word is interpreted by lexicographers (as well as native speakers) as two different words. In cases like these, we do not have polysemy but homonymy based on antonymy (or at least incommensurability) of meaning. For example, the word *keleş* in Turkish is described in many vocabularies as a polysemous word with the following meanings:

keleş – 1. (dial.) schön, hübsch, nett, gut aussehend; 2. (abusiv) s. *kel* [2. grindköpfig; 3. kahle Stelle am Kopf; 4. kahlköpfig, haarlos ...]; 3. mutig, tapfer; 4. dumm, idiotisch (Steuerwald 1988);
keleş – handsome; attractive; ringswormy, bald; dirty (Hony & Iz 1984);
keleşlik – handsomeness (Hony & Iz 1984);
keleş – (partly) bald; bald-head; (fig.) idiot (Moran 1971);
keleşlik – (fig.) idiocy (Moran 1971);
keleş^1 – 1. scabby, mangy; 2. bald; 3. idiot (Baskakov et al. 1977);
keleş^2 – (dial.) 1. beautiful; 2. brave (Baskakov et al. 1977).
kelesh – (in Bulgarian) 1. conceited puppy; squirt; 2. (for a child) brat (Atanasova et al. 1993).

Steuerwald (1988) juxtaposes four different meanings of this polysemous word: 1. handsome, attractive, beautiful; 2. ringswormy, bald; 3. brave; and 4. idiotic. Hony & Iz (1984) identify an additional meaning, that of 'dirty'. Baskakov et al. (1977) distribute the five meanings they identify to two homonymous entries.

The reason for this distribution seems to be that the editors of this dictionary considered the scope of polysemy involved to be intolerable. For this reason, the meanings signifying positive referents went into one entry; the ones signifying negative referents into another. This solution looks quite logical, yet one can go even further in this direction and claim that we do not have two but four homonyms under *keleş*: 1. handsome, attractive; 2. scabby, mangy, bald, dirty; 3. brave; 4. idiot. The opposition between being *handsome* and being *scabby*, *mangy*, *dirty* and *bald* seems to be easily acceptable. The case of an antonymous-like (opposite) relationship between 'bravery' and 'idiocy' is more controversial, but these meanings cannot be simply subsumed under the general rubric of incommensurability either.

The peculiar semantic structure of *keleş* in Turkish was further developed and exploited in Bulgarian after it had been borrowed. Apparently, the point of departure is the meaning related to 'scabby, mangy; bald', which is, according to Burov (2000), still available as an archaic meaning of this word. In Bulgarian, however, this word underwent further metamorphoses. It acquired several meanings that are not available in Turkish (according to the consulted vocabularies): 1. puffed up, insolent, wayward person; 2. unripe, inexperienced, unskilled person; 3. short (physically), undersized person; 4. bald person. The first three of the cited meanings are not registered in Turkish.

On the basis of these four negatively connotative meanings, out of the blue, a fifth, an admirative meaning, appears in Bulgarian. This meaning is marked as 'rare; ironic' and codes the opposite of the negative meanings given above – that of 'an unripe, unskilled, inexperienced person'. In the admirative meaning, *kelesh* means 'as if unripe and puffed up man that displays an unexpected sagacious, quick-witted and deft behavior'. The use of this meaning implies a sort of an attitude on a par with *envious irony* (or *ironic envy*, if this makes more sense). Here we have a reversal of an ambivalently negative evaluation into an ironically envious one: "I can't believe it that this unripe insolent bloody bastard managed to do/achieve X!". Should we consider this sort of meaningful configuration still as a case of an ambivalent frame or perhaps as its opposite (as a gestalt)? This is a difficult question that requires further explorations. In any case, this example shows how complicated the metamorphoses of both the cognitive and emotive-affective meaning in a single culture and even more in an intercultural transfer can be.

4.3 Further exploration of antonymy as a linguistic phenomenon vs. ambivalence as a psychological phenomenon

If ambivalence amounts to the experience of two mutually contradictory emotions or bodily states at the same time, one should be able to name both of them, e.g., *pleasure* vs. *pain* (or uneasiness or anxiety), *love* vs. *hate*, *sympathy* vs. *antipathy*. Linguistically, this amounts to naming the correct antonyms provided by the corresponding language and culture. Antonymy is standardly defined as the relation between lexical items that are binary opposites in meaning (e.g. *alive* and *dead*), complementary opposites (e.g., *dependent* and *independent*), gradable opposites in meaning (e.g. *young* and *old*), or converse opposites (e.g. *buy* and *sell*).

As mentioned above, there is no single linguistic work that deals with the relationship between ambivalence as a psychological phenomenon and antonymy as a linguistic phenomenon – not to mention the possible differences in the available linguistic means in different languages and cultures for naming the opposites in experience. Thus Mettinger (1994) in an extensive and carefully researched book (including a discussion of the contributions of Charles Osgood) does not even mention ambivalence as a potential psychological correlate of antonymy. In order to give the reader some orientation, let me list here some scales from Osgood et al. (1957) that name psych-antonyms:

> *kind-cruel*, *sociable-insociable*, *grateful-ungrateful*, *harmonious-dissonant*, *happy-sad*, *hopeful-hopeless*, *jubilant-plaintive*, *selfish-unselfish*, *affectionate-hateful*, *friendly-unfriendly*, *merciful-merciless*, *repentant-unrepentant*, *congenial-quarrelsome*, *approving-disapproving*, *assenting-dissenting*, *willing-unwilling*, *voluntary-compulsory*, *graceful-awkward*, *refined-vulgar*, *soothing-aggravating*, *intelligible-unintelligible*, *attracting-repelling*, *pursuing-avoiding*, *honest-dishonest*, *vigorous-feeble*, etc.

The relationship between different types of antonymy and ambivalence remains to be studied, especially, for example, in the case of 'converse' opposites (according to Lyons 1977: 279; Cruse 1986: 231ff.; cf. Mettinger 1994: 177):

> *buy-sell*; *keeper-prisoner*; *master-servant*; *dupe-receiver*; *lend-borrow*

There is also the problem of how to define 'true' antonymy (according to a set of explicit linguistic criteria) and of how these criteria depend on and influence the conceptualisation of ambivalence, and vice versa. In this respect, the work of Charles Osgood and his associates (cf. Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957; Osgood 1980) on the Semantic Differential Technique is still the most

appropriate one for the study and comprehension of the psycholinguistic and psychological correlates of antonymy.

4.4 Ambivalent frames juxtaposed to converse antonyms (buy-sell)

Two simultaneously activated opposite emotions are not necessarily experienced as a composite ambivalent emotion. An ambivalent frame of two opposite emotions is not a symmetric and 'reversible' one, as it may appear from its verbalization. In language, it doesn't matter whether we express the pair of antonyms in the sequence *Hass-Liebe* or *Liebe-Hass*. In both cases the pair remains identical. In the German *Hassliebe* we simply have a conventionalized pattern of lexicalization of the component structure of an ambivalent emotion; *Liebehass* could have served the same function perfectly well (as a way to name the ambivalent emotion as a whole).

This is not the case with ambivalence from a psychological viewpoint. In taking stance toward the NP *lazy athlete* one can indeed oscillate between two interpretations:

(2) a. *athlete, but lazy*; vs.
    b. *lazy, but athlete*

But the two configurations are not both ambivalent. (2)b does not express a mixed emotion. In other words, ambivalence is not simply cotemporal experience of a combination of positive and negative emotion. It is a certain configuration (frame) of a positive-cum-negative one. This configuration is flagging a positive emotion on the surface, while a 'truer' opposite negative emotion toward the object or situation is lurking behind, as in (2)a. (2)b, on the other hand, may be considered as an attempt to sympathize with or to constructively criticize a person who happens to be a lazy athlete.

I would add that while the prototypical converse antonymy is expressed by two verbs (*buy* vs. *sell*) the frame of an ambivalent emotion seems best coded by a NP consisting of an adjective and a noun (indicating the psychological asymmetry discussed above). The difference seems to boil down to the opposition between NP vs. basic clause structure in terms of grammatical structure. The tendency for ambivalence to become lexically fixed (coded), i.e., playing between two meanings of the same lexical-entry format, is worth while remembering. This seems to be one of the features that distinguishes ambivalence from its close relative – irony.

5. The social psychological determinants of ambivalence

Weigert (1991: xiv) points out that modern life is characterized by contradictory structures, imperatives, and experiences for which today's culture has only weak, if any resolutions: "The modern person must undergo ambivalence cold turkey, as it were." Modernity as such (and even more so post-modernity) is characterized by the depth and pervasiveness of a 'dilemmatic' either-or attitude because of structural contradictions within the societal organization that have an effect on the cognitive and emotional level. This situation calls for explicit consideration and development of a social psychology of emotions (cf. Weigert 1991: 9, for further orientation).

5.1 Socially motivated opposites in experience

Linguistic antonymy is established with the standard research techniques of linguistic lexicology and lexicography. On the other hand, in developing scientific models of ambivalent experience, different authors introduce antonymous-looking oppositions related to basic aspects of human existence in society:

a. *the human condition*: life-death; society-nature; culture-self;
b. *structural cultural contradictions*: meaning-absurdity; means-ends; multiple status sets (e.g., a woman as doctor and wife); professions, bureaucracy, service, occupations (the requirements for each of them may contradict those of the other);
c. *situational contradictions*: active-passive; instrumental-expressive; role conflict in single status, e.g., doctor as healer and business person;
d. *self contradictions*: fate-freedom; I-me; private-public; norm-counternorm; contradictory expectations related to a single role, e.g., concern *and* detachment; detached loyalty; biased disinterest among doctors, lawyers, bureaucrats, and scientists (cf. Merton 1976; cf. Weigert 1991: 53).

The ways of social determination of ambivalent experience remain to be explored (as well as the way they map the language-specific conventional patterns of antonymy). For example, *mistrusting dependence* seems to describe the ambivalent attitude each of us has toward a bureaucrat, lawyer or a medical doctor ('S/he is supposed to heal me for money (!) while everybody knows that money cannot buy health and compassionate care'). Thus, in this ambivalent experience we a have sort of amalgamation of two conventionalized antonymic

relationships in English – of *trust-mistrust* and *dependence-independence*. It remains to be proven that:

i. either the ambivalent experience is primary and holistic while the conventional antonym patterns in language make it look sometimes like a compositum of two different scales like *trust-mistrust* and *dependence-independence*;
ii. or, *vice versa*, the psych-antonyms can faithfully represent the basic opposites of an ambivalent emotion that can form higher-level ambivalent mixtures in the complex cases of socially relevant experiences;
iii. or the relationship is not that of privileged access neither from the side of emotions nor from the side of antonyms. There is a restricted set of ambivalent emotive scales. If one becomes activated by the use of some word in a subjectively important associative chain, the whole complex emotion (including many non-ambivalent emotions that have no emotional-affective opposites) becomes 'contaminated' by ambivalence. It would be enough for one of the *n*-tuple of currently activated emotive-affective components to become ambivalently marked in order to 'infect' the whole.

5.2 The ambivalence-creating multiculturalism

Bauman (1991) in a popular monograph suggests that the postmodern condition of human existence is characterized by heightened multiculturalism that is destined to become a self-perpetuating catalyzer of the wide distribution of ambivalent emotions and attitudes due to the common experience of not truly belonging to any of the cultures in a multicultural society (despite its hypothetical 'common denominator' in the EU – the European culture). One possible way to avoid ambivalence while living in a multicultural society is to make the best potpourri from the set of cultures and states of which it consists (and also possibly borrow from other cultures of Europe, too): thus, in the future EU culture the police will be British-like, the cooks will be Spanish-like, the mechanics German-like, the lovers Italian-like and everything will be organized in a Swiss-like way.

It is an interesting question, though, why this should happen spontaneously in the way mentioned above but not in the following one: in the future EU culture the cooks will be British-like, the mechanics Spanish-like, the lovers Swiss-like, the police German-like and everything will be organized in an Italian-like way. [The two scenarios are taken from a postcard advertising the isle of Ibiza.] If the latter scenario seems more feasible, the door is widely

open for all possible combinations of ambivalence (probably many more than currently available in the context of nationally-based societies and states).

I am now going to discuss the consequences of one of the worse possible real-life scenarios for intercultural impact in the European context.

6. Representing the 'other' with Turkish loan words in Bulgarian

The number of Turkish loans with negative or ambivalent emotive-affective connotation in Bulgarian is impressive. It is important to acknowledge from the very beginning that all of the loans cited have counterparts in native Bulgarian words with the same or very close to isomorphic conceptual content. It remains to be seen why the loans were kept in Bulgarian although there are native synonyms serving the 'same' cognitive function.

Studying the available vocabularies of foreign words in Bulgarian I found 145 Turkish loans with the afore mentioned connotation (that amounts to 12,32% of all 1201 Turkish loans listed in Milev et al. 1978). The list is not complete as it depends on the way different vocabulary compilers and editors selected their lexical material. As a basic source for the current count and analysis I used Milev et al. (1978) which is relatively neutral in its coverage of this stratum of words (the coverage of Turkish loans in Milev et al. 2001 after cross-checking appears identical). In the recently published vocabulary of abusive words in Bulgarian (Ganchev & Georgieva 1994) with about 3450 entries, 215 are Turkish, i.e., approx. 6,23%.

6.1 The styles and social registers of language and the position of negatively and ambivalently loaded Turkish loan words

The high style since the time of Latin grammarians is associated with elite, high morals, ethical and/or religious values, etc.; the low style is associated with low class, asocial and antisocial groups. The stylistic position (high vs. low style) of Turkish loan words among their synonyms, quasi-synonyms and associations in Bulgarian is unmistakable. Invariably the last links in the associative chains of synonyms are Turkish loan words, and their usage is limited to colloquial or jargon usage and expresses a negative or ambivalent attitude to the referent:

a. *sram* – shame, disgrace, shyness; *smushtenie*, *boyazân*, *nereshitelnost*, *stesnenie*, *svyan*, *neprilichie*, *izlagane*, *skandal*, **rezil**, **maskarlâk**;

b. *smel* – bold, brave, daring, plucky; *tvârd*, *bezstrashen*, *neustrashim*, *mâzh-estven*, *sârcat*, *hrabâr*, *dârzâk*, *drâznoven*, *nepokolebim*, *geroichen*, *yunachen*, *voynstven*, *buen*, *predpriemchiv*, *deyatelen*, *iniciativen*, *samonadeyan*, **serbez**;
c. *mâka* – pain, anguish, agony, misery, torment; *bezpokoystvo*, *zagrizhenost*, *ugrizhenost*, *gorchivina*, *terzanie*, *mâchenie*, *iztezanie*, *stradanie*, *izmâch-vane*, *pokrusa*, *tegoba*, *gnet*, *tormoz*, *teglo*, *gorest*, *nostalgiya*, **sâklet**, **zor**, **kahâr**;
d. *naslada* – enjoyment, pleasure, treat; *udovolstvie*, *dovolstvo*, *zadovolstvo*, *zabava*, *razvlechenie*, *zabavlenie*, *veselba*, **kef**.

The 'common denominator' behind all these chains of quasi-synonyms is the fact that the Turkish loan words are used with the strongest possible negative connotation that can be associated with the corresponding 'object of thought'. This chaining effect works with no exception, expressing ambivalence, irony, denigration, contempt up to the strongest possible versions of verbal hostility.

The general rule seems to be as follows: If the concept to be named is positive, e.g., *naslada* "enjoyment", the Turkish loan word expresses ambivalent aspects of the concept of 'enjoyment'. If, however, the concept to be expressed has a negative content, e.g., as in *ubiez* "killer", the Turkish loan *katil* means the most negative sort of the entity in question – 'a cold-blooded brutal serial killer'.

6.2 Ecce homo or imaging psychological types in Turkish loans

Even a cursory overview of the list of human qualities and types named by Turkish loans reveals a quite peculiar set of traits and characteristics. They do not pile up to a single *Gestalt* but arrange themselves into a set of partially overlapping *imagos*:

1. **Fierce killer, robber and oppressor**: *dushman(in)* – 1. enemy; 2. cut-throat; *derebey* – (brutal) autocrat; *dzhelat(in)* – 1. executioner, hangman; 2. leech; *yankesedzhiya* – skilled highwayman; *kesedzhiya* – cut-throat; *katil* – (brutal) killer;
2. **Potpourri of miserable human traits**: *abdal* – fool; *aylak* – 1. unemployed; 2. idler, dosser; *balâk* – a man easy to fool; *bunak* – dotty, doddery person; *divane* – wrong-headed, crotchety; *kalpazan(in)* – rascal, scamp; *maskara* – stinker, scoundrel; *marda* – 1. waster; 2. loafer, idler; *ursuz(in)* – nasty, crusty fellow; *temerut* – impudent, brazen man; *hairsâz(in)* – 1. a one who does not bring luck; 2. curmudgeon; *haylaz(in)* – idler, loafer; *hayvan(in)* –

fool, dullard; *filan-kishi* – thingum-bob; *haymana* – scapegrace, loose fish; *shashkân(in)* – rascal; *shupeliya* – frightened or suspicious man;

3. **Reverse or less of what someone pretends to be**: *babayit(in)* – 1. hero; 2. stalwart (practically in use only in the second meaning; the first is only used as a 'ground' for comparison); *babanka* – 1. strapping youth; 2. a man pretending to look like a strapping youth (in use almost exclusively in the second meaning); *pehlivan(in)* – wrestler (mostly figuratively: displaying physical strength which is dubious or showing vainly off); *serbez* – 'brave' (but the quality is suspect, often 'blustering', etc.; never in use for naming straight the quality of being brave);
4. **Person of suspicious moral and/or business qualities**: *sheyret(in)* – sly-boots, crafty fellow; *tarikat* – wise guy, sly fellow [a person capable of cheating in society and yet getting along successfully]; *hayta* – ne'er-do-well, scapegrace; *sersem(in)* – quarrelsome, cantankerous person; *pezevenk* – procurer, pimp; *miskin(in)* – bastard, bugger; *mekere* – stooge, toady; *fi-tildzhiya* – instigator (of quarrels, etc.); *dzhenabet(in)* – scoundrel; *kodosh* – 1. pimp; 2. banterer, tease; *kopile* – bastard (used as a honorific term of address in school gangs, etc.); *keleme* – scoundrel, rotter; *batakchiya* – a man who doesn't pay his debts; *dalaveradzhiya* – a ducker and diver, a wheeler-dealer;
5. **Derogatory names for ethnic identities**: *chengene* – (*derisive*) gyppo; *chifut* – (*derisive*) tid; *manaf* [from Turkish *manav* "fruits salesman"!] – 1. (*arch.*) Anatolian Turk; 2. (*arch.*) asian; 3. homosexual; 4. (*derisive*) Turk; *chitak* – 1. uncouth, coarse man; 2. insolent man; 3. (derisive) Turk; *anadolec* – from Anadol; (*derisive*) Turk;
6. **Female traits**: *Dzhadiya* – 1. witch; 2. prostitute; 3. evil or ill-tempered woman; *Kaltak* – 1. loose woman; 2. (through partial re-etymologizing of *kal-tak* from Bulgarian *kal* 'filth'?) blackguard, scoundrel, scamp.

The set of traits becomes a caricature of the human predicament and potential. It forms a sort of a 'low world' double of the human nature. It is well-known that the strongest means for creating ambivalence is by vulgarization in representing and interpreting a phenomenon of the human and social world.

It is also instructive to note that the list is predominantly 'masculine' in its orientation. The only aspects of female behavior that feature in this list are associated with 'loose' sexual behavior, bad temper and, whenever available, 'old age'. However, the absence of negative Turkish loans for female psychological types does not mean that Bulgarian does not have enough native words that serve the function to describe the negative female traits and behavior.

6.3 The Freudian unconscious in Turkish loans

It is well known that one of the most ambivalent aspects of human relationships is related to love affairs (romantic or not) and sexual relations. Quite a number of Turkish loan words were and are in use at the 'low' slang level expressions for amorous feelings, behaviors and attitudes:

> *gyuvendiya* – prostitute; *kodosh* – 1. pimp; 2. tease; 3. banter, fun; prank; *koch* – 1. ram; 2. stud; *kopile* – bastard (used as a honorific term of address in school gangs, etc.); *manaf* – 1. (*arch.*) Anatolian Turk; 2. (*arch.*) Asian; 3. homosexual; 4. (*derisive*) Turk; *merakliya* – 1. desirous of; 2. lusting after (especially after someone 'unsuitable' because of age, social status, etc., as in the case of an old man desirous of young girls); *pachavra* – 1. rag; 2. slut (the second meaning is the one in use today); *pich* – 1. (*arch.*) branch growing out directly from the trunk; 2. bastard; 3. layabout (esp. supposed to be skilled in seducing women; used as a honorific term of address in gangs, antisocial groups, etc.); *pusht* – debauchee; *gadzhe* – girl-/boy-friend (the only one rather neutrally used in spoken low-register conversation); *sevda* – fated love; (*arch.*) lover (the only one that once entered literary use); *tek* – a fuck; *frenga* – (*arch.*) the clap; *chapkân(in)* – debauchee; *zempare* – womanizer.

6.4 The vanity fair of communicative interaction in the mirror of the Turkish loans

A number of Turkish loan words were and partly continue to be in use in colloquial speech and in slang and jargon for aspects and circumstances of (informal) social interaction and especially for some of its crowd associated or scandalous aspects. They thus portray the vanity of communication and interaction rather picturesquely:

> *boshlaf* – idle talk; *vryava* – uproar, hullabaloo; *gyurultiya* – hullabaloo, racket; *dandaniya* – racket, to-do, fuss; *Dzhumbush* – merrymaking (of a noisy debauchee type); *kavga* – quarrel, squabble; *kalabalâk* – (communicating and entertaining itself) crowd; *zevzek* – clown (in life, not as a profession); *kandârma* – persuasion (in an informal company for partly suspicious, partly ambiguous reasons; the derivative verb *kandârdisvam* fits the situation of seducing a girl until the time she potentially *kândisvam* "agrees, lets herself being seduced"); *komshiya* – neighbor; *lakârdiya* – idle word, idle talk; *maytap* – joking (esp. as based on (vulgar) anecdotes);

masal – funny story (of the type to be narrated in exclusively male companies in pubs); *muhabet* – chat; *palavra* [from Spanish through Turkish) – gossip; *pataklama* – 1. noise (from not very friendly social interactions); 2. fight; 3. jostle; *peltek* – stutterer; *seir* – spectacle, show; *selyam* – hello (to and from a company talking with this sort of words); *tayfa* – gang, informal group of people spending their spare time together; *tarapana* – 1. mint; 2. galore; *teferich* – picnic; *tupurdiya* – uproar.

The lexical material in 6.1. to 6.4. demonstrates that the previous intercultural conflict survived in the Bulgarian language (Bulgaria was under the Ottoman yoke for about 500 years). It was internalised in the Bulgarian culture as a clash between elite and the low class and anti-societies within the society. This clash kept and keeps the use of the Turkish loans going 125 years after the end of the Ottoman rule in Bulgaria.

6.5 Patterns of ambivalence in intercultural transfer

In this section I will illustrate in more detail the possibilities of borrowing and appropriating positively and ambivalently marked words from Turkish into Bulgarian. It should be noted that the accommodation of the Turkish loans with emotive-affective overtone led to a formation of a specific stratum of words that serve their function primarily (although not exclusively) within the anti-societies in the contemporary Bulgarian culture. These words, correspondingly, are characteristic of the discourse of criminals, soldiers, school gangs, inmates and at the lowest level of social interaction in informal groups, i.e., they were step by step appropriated as a part of the anti-language, to use a term coined by Halliday (1978: 171–181).

6.5.1 *From positive words in Turkish to ambivalent ones in Bulgarian*

In the examples provided below, some positive human traits in Turkish become re-interpreted ambivalently in Bulgarian (with certain changes of cognitive meaning, too). Especially prone to such a re-interpretation are words that express characteristics of manhood such as physical strength, intelligence, fearlessness, etc. All the lexical entries below are from the Turkish language and are excerpted from bilingual dictionaries; only the last entry for the corresponding word set is in Bulgarian (as explicitly marked in each individual case):

babacan – 1. hero, manly guy, dare-devil; 2. sincere, open (Romanski 1952);
babacan – (for a man) good-natured, good-humored, charming, likeable (Baskakov et al. 1977);

babacan – kindly, good-natured, easy going (Hony & Iz 1984);
babacan – 1. väterlich, wohlwollend, jovial, gutmütig; ungeniert, ungezwungen (Steuerwald 1988);
babadzhan – (in Bulgarian) 1. good-humored, rather overweight boy (or youth); 2. a person of impressive physical appearance (because of his overweight, not because he is muscular) pretending to be brave and manly.

erbap – competent, capable (Romanski 1952);
erbap – 1. experts; 2. specialist, expert, master (Baskakov et al. 1977);
erbap – expert (Hony & Iz 1984);
erbap – 1. sachkundig, Fachmann; 2. wer mit etwas beschäftigt ist oder in e-m best. Beruf tätig ist; besitzend, innehabend (Steuerwald 1988);
erbap – (in Bulgarian) 1. pretending to be capable, bold; 2. a know-all. [The most important feature in this case is the presumptuous display of one's potential but unproven capacities, which are suspect exactly as in the English *know-all*. An especially appropriate example for Burov (2000) is *erbap zhena* "bold, daring, capable woman".]

zavalli – 1. poor, wretched; 2. (fig.) helpless (Romanski (1952);
zavalli – 1. poor, miserable; 2. unhappy, pitiful (Baskakov et al. 1977);
zavalli – unlucky, miserable; poor fellow (Hony & Iz 1984);
zavallilik – unluckiness, misery (Hony & Iz 1984);
zavalli – 1. arm, unglücklich, bedauernswert; 2. kraftlos, hilflos, schwach (Steuerwald 1988);
zavaliya(ta) – (in Bulgarian colloquial usage) the poor fellow (with lurking *Schadenfreude*). [Because of the implied ambivalence this word is not appropriate to use when commiserating with a second person as it could be interpreted as irony or even as insult.]

babayiğit – 1. hero, dare-devil; 2. brave man (Baskakov et al. (1977);
babayiğit – full-grown, strong young man; 'stout fellow'; (*adj.*) brave, virile (Hony & Iz 1984);
babayiğitlik – bravery, virility (Hony & Iz 1984);
babayiğit – 1. kräftiger, junger Bursche o. Mann; 2a) mannhaft, mutig, tapfer; 2b) keck, kühn; 3. ehrenhaft, lauter (Steuerwald 1988);
babayiğitlik – 1. Mannesalter; 2a) Mut, Tapferkeit; 2b) Keckheit, Kühnheit; 3. Ehrenhaftigkeit, Lauterkeit (Steuerwald 1988);

babayitin – (in Bulgarian) a person ostentatiously pretending to be brave while the actual status of his/her courage is highly suspect; the opposite should be expected in case of a real challenge or danger.

pehlivan – 1. wrestler, athlete; 2. vigorous man (Baskakov et al. 1977)
pehlivan – wrestler; strongman; (*fig.*) hero (Hony & Iz 1984);
pehlivanlik – wrestling, bravery (Hony & Iz 1984);
pehlivan – 1. Ringkämpfer, Ringer; 2. (*fig.*) großer, starker Mann, Riese, Hüne; 3. (früher) Meister im Bogenschießen (Steuerwald 1988);
pehlivan – 1. Tätigkeit oder Beruf e-s Ringers; 2. Ringen; 3. (*fig.*) Kraft, Stärke (Steuerwald 1988);
pehlivanin – (in Bulgarian) 1. wrestler as a participant in a senseless, ugly and sometimes brutal show for the crowd; 2. person pretending to be strong and brave;
pehlivanlâk – (in Bulgarian) a vain display of brute force to the crowd.

serbaz – fearless, intrepid (Baskakov et al. 1977);
serbaz – bold, fearless (Hony & Iz 1984);
serbaz – audacious, reckless (Moran 1971);
serbaz – (*veraltet*) tollkühn, verwegen (Steuerwald 1988);
serbaz – audacious, fearless, bold, daring (Romanski 1952);
serbez – (in Bulgarian) 1. audacious, bold, daring, fearless; 2. insolent, presumptuous, arrogant; 3. (coll.) cocky (Atanasova et al. 1993); [esp. appropriate example for Burov 2000: *serbez zhena* "audacious, daring woman".]
dârzâk – (the straight synonym of *serbez* in Bulgarian) 1. audacious, bold, daring, fearless; 2. arrogant insolent, presumptuous.

At this point the reader may ask for the difference between *serbez* and *dârzâk* in Bulgarian. This question is a most instructive one and has never been addressed in the psychology of emotion, lexicology, or lexicography. In the case of *dârzâk*, depending on the context of use, one is supposed to choose **either** the meaning 1 **or** the meaning 2 of the entry. In the case of *serbez*, on the other hand, one is supposed to consider **both** meanings 1 and 2 as appropriate. This is what creates the ambivalent frame online.

6.5.2 *Re-interpreting ambivalent Turkish words as ambivalent ones in Bulgarian*

Even more interesting changes are involved in adopting ambivalent Turkish words in Bulgarian. Especially suggestive is the case of *marifet* as it shows how

a concept from the very heights of Islamic mysticism can become re-interpreted as "skill or trick for entertainment and/or embarrassment of fools, novices and naïve people". The study of words of this type, as described in different vocabularies of the Turkish language, also shows significant variations in the way of treatment of the corresponding lexical entries (as one can also see from the discussion of *kelesh* above). Part of the problem is due to the troubles the lexicographers had when they tried to describe the availability of an ambivalent connotation that is attached to some word on a permanent basis.

açikgöz – alert, deft (Romanski 1952);
açikgöz – 1. dexterous, neat-handed; 2. spendthrift, rascal, trickster (Baskakov et al. 1977);
açikgöz – wide awake, sharp, cunning (fellow), cagey (Hony & Iz 1984);
açikgöz(lü)lük – alertness, sharpness, cunning; being wide awake (Hony & Iz 1984);
açikgöz – 1. klug, schlau, pfiffig; Schlaukopf, Pfiffikus; 2. (*vulgar*) rundes Loch der türk. Abortes (Steuerwald 1988);
açikgöz – (fig.) open-eyed; vigilant; shrewd; clever, dexterous (Moran 1971);
achigyoz – (in Bulgarian) a person displaying intelligence in some practical activities and/or tricks. [*Einstein beshe achigyoz chovek* 'Einstein was an *achigyoz* man' implies being ambivalent or ironic about Einstein's intellect.]

pişkin –1. well boiled; well baked; 2. ready, ripe; 3. (fig.) experienced, skilful (also in trickery and fraud); sharp (as in sharp practices) (Romanski 1952);
pişkin – 1. boiled, baked; 2. ripe, ready; 3. impudent, brazen-faced (Baskakov et al. 1977);
pişkin – well-cooked/-baked; ripe, mature; (*fig.*) 'hard-baked', hardened, experienced (Hony & Iz 1984);
pişkinlik – a being well-cooked; ripeness, maturity; assurance, experience, knowledge of the world (Hony & Iz 1984);
pişkin – genügend, gekocht (gebacken usw.), gargekocht, gut durchgebraten; 2. (*ziemlich veraltet*) reif (z.B. Obst); 3. (*fig.*) unbekümmert, ungeniert; 4. (*fig.*) gewöhnt (an etw.), erfahren, routiniert; 5. abgebrüht, dickfellig (Steuerwald (1988);
pişkin – well-baked; (well-done); (*fig.*) mature; ripe; (hard); callous; (well-) hardened, experienced; (*slang*) (deliberately) insensitive or unfeeling (Moran 1971);
pişkinlik – (state of) being well-baked; (hardness); (*fig.*) (affected) insensitiveness; (feigned lack of understanding or feeling) (Moran 1971);

pishkin – (in Bulgarian) skilled, self-confident, 'well-baked' up to brazen-faced in everyday behavior and interaction, also in 'sharp' activities.

marifet – 1. knowledge, cognition; 2. skill, dexterity; 3. trick, stunt; 4. secret, special quality; 5. strangeness; 6. mischief (Baskakov et al. 1977);
marifet – knowledge, skill; ability, talent; craft (Hony & Iz 1984);
marifetli – skilful, talented; cleverly done/made (Hony & Iz 1984);
marifet – 1. Geschicklichkeit, Fertigkeit, Kunst, Kunst-, Meisterstück; 2. besonderer Vorzug; 3. (*pej. o. spöttisch*) Tat, Handlung, Leistung; 4. Kenntnis, Wissen; 5. Mittel, Vermittlung, Hilfe; 6. (*isl. Mystik*) Gotteserkenntnis mittels der Sinne (nicht des Verstandes) (Steuerwald 1988);
marifet – knowledge, talent; art, skill; (science); (*fig.*) artifice, trick (Moran 1971);
marifetli – skilled, talented; artful, dexterous; (mechanism, etc.) ingenious, intricate (Moran 1971);
murafet – (in Bulgarian) a (relatively) skilful trick, skill or performance by which an attempt is made to influence an audience which definitely does not consist of experts and connoisseurs [In Baskakov et al. 1977, it is a mixture of the Turkish meanings (2-6), which blocks the most 'respectable' meaning (1) and thus sacrilegiously profanes *Gotteserkenntnis mittels der Sinne]*.

7. Turkish ambivalent loans as internalization of a previous intercultural conflict

Let me emphasize once again the main point of the last sections that dealt with the fate of the Turkish loan words in Bulgarian which demonstrate an emotive-affective connotation in general and ambivalence in particular. Their use is due to the exploitation of the previous intercultural conflict between the Bulgarian and the Ottoman Turkish language and culture. During the last century, the 'otherness' of the Turkish words, especially those naming human traits and behaviors, was projected onto the 'others' in one's own society – the anti-societal groups within the Bulgarian culture. However, there is a caveat that should be kept in mind. The very existence of these loans, which are identified as 'sounding Turkish', prevents the formation of a completely unprejudiced attitude toward the neighbors. In this way, for an extended period of time the conflicts from the past can survive in language through different metamorphoses. One cannot exclude such scenarios also in other multicultural societies

like the future European if they do not join together and optimize themselves spontaneously from the very outset.

8. Conclusions

The study of ambivalence, in my view, is of crucial importance for our understanding of the nature of emotion in general. It offers a way to identify the 'real' opposites in emotional experience, i.e. the ones that matter in experience not just from a logical point of view, as well as the critical differences between emotional opposites and undifferentiated feelings. In modelling the structures of emotion, we must take care not to become a victim of the words which are available for expressing them in our own language or in other languages.

Facing ambivalence we have to distinguish between:

i. feeling and emotion – the relation between bodily states and emotion-colored experiences;
ii. dimensions of opposition and coherence in the paradigmatic and syntagmatic structure of emotion;
iii. the structure of emotion and the logical structure of cognition (the language of thought), e.g., the role of ambiguity, negation, the specificity of contrary and contradictory concepts, vagueness, etc.;
iv. the lexical, syntactic and semantic means of language for expressing emotion, e.g., antonymy, polysemy, homonymy, the specificity of NP structure vs. clause structure, etc.

The investigation of ambivalence sets the stage for the study of opposition and conflict at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, social, cultural, and intercultural levels of analysis:

a. What is the way of formation and functioning of ambivalent experiences in the mind of the individual (along the lines i-iv provided above)?
b. What are the dimensions of social and cultural specificity of the formation and conceptualisation of ambivalent experience?
c. What is the 'transcendence' of ambivalence supposed to mean if it turns out to be possible at all, at the levels mentioned above – from intrapersonal experience to intercultural dialogue?

The inner emotional experience becomes conceptualised and communicated depending on a vast array of psychological, linguistic, social and culture-specific factors. The way these factors combine with each other in forming co-

herencies vs. oppositions in the languages of Europe has never been studied, as far as I know.

Culture, including the representation of its conflicts with other cultures, is part of the language we speak. If Bulgarian is our native language, we have internalized the meanings of the Turkish loan words discussed above. We cannot get rid of this knowledge by declarations of disavowal. Neither can we get rid of it by simply excluding the corresponding lexical entries from the vocabularies. The intercultural conflicts of the past remain with us in the words of our language; these conflicts can become re-interpreted in the way the conflict between society and anti-society is expressed in the corresponding culture. What can be done in order to resolve them in a multicultural context remains to be explored. Otherwise we will pretend that we are multicultural and remain with our own prejudices. The door will be widely open for more and more not 'feeling at home' with others in the multicultural context, and ambivalence will flourish.

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Part III

Emotional Principles in Dialogue

The Role of Emotions in Normative Discourse and Persuasion

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1. Introduction

It is clear that human communication involves not only verbal behavior, but also non-verbal behavior. Some have estimated that 60% of what is communicated in human dialogic interaction is non-verbal. Especially in the area of our beliefs, attitudes and emotions, we augment our verbal communications with intonation, voice quality, gesture, and body language. A written statement that may appear to be unambiguous can in fact mean the exact opposite when uttered verbally with the intonation of irony or sarcasm.

Not only is our research in discourse analysis complicated by the fact that communication is made up of much more than the verbal or lexical symbols, but the challenge is even greater because the inventory of linguistic and paralinguistic communicative devices is to a significant degree culture-specific (Palmer & Occhi 1999). Our work is to explore and describe these complexities.

To this complex milieu of communication we must add another variable, the interplay of language and emotion. The fact of the interconnectedness of language and emotion in communication is not under question. The works of Lamb (1999) in neuro-cognitive linguistics, Cook (2002) in neuropsychology, and both Weigand (1998) and Maynard (2002) in conversation and discourse analysis, explore the relationships between language, intonation, emotion, and cognition.

Perhaps nowhere is the interconnectedness of language and emotion more evident than in instances of normative discourse and persuasion. This genre of discourse is called 'behavioral discourse' in Longacre's work (1988: 3–5). Longacre lists 'hortatory discourse' as one sub-type. The term 'normative dis-

course' is preferable as a generic term for the broad category of discourse (Walrod 1988), since it covers all sub-types based on norms, such as evaluative, prescriptive, argumentative, and persuasive discourse.

2. The role of emotions in paralinguistic communicative behavior

Some understanding of the role and expression of emotions in paralinguistic behavior is of value, in order that we can comment more accurately on their role in dialogic interaction.

2.1 The uniqueness of communicative events

In oral communication, or face-to-face dialogic interaction, the participants are not entirely governed by the resources of the lexicon, or the so-called rules of the grammar. Communication is an activity that relies on similar past experiences of the participants (i.e., they must share, at least partially, a language and worldview or cognitive grid). However, communication is not absolutely restricted to reproducing what has previously been experienced. In fact, each new utterance is distinct in certain ways from every preceding utterance.

A basic tenet of the integrational approach to linguistics (Harris 1998) is that every utterance is situated or integrated in a complex contextual milieu. Malinowski (1935) referred to this phenomenon as the 'context of situation'. Toolan referred to it as the "inevitable contextual embeddedness" of language (Toolan 1996: 3). Weigand uses the term 'complex', and discusses how we use language in a 'dialogic action game' (Weigand 2000). There are features of this complex, this *communication situation*, that are distinct and unique for each new utterance, such as speakers and hearers, cultures, social relationships and settings, as well as the interests, attitudes, and emotions of the people who are communicating (Fleming 1988: 4–5).

2.2 Non-verbal communicative conventions

There is a saying in English that "a smile is universal". This is at best an exaggeration. The norm for smiles in North America is "the bigger the better". But, as I was told by Ken Pike, in Australia, people do not normally smile in such an unrestrained manner. And in a Mandayan community that I visited in Eastern Mindanao, smiles were normally covered by one's hand. This may be related to

the fact that the Mandayans had a custom at that time (30 years ago) of filing off their teeth. Teeth were considered unsightly.

In Japan, eye contact is avoided much more than in the West, and it is courteous in public places to avert one's gaze (http://anthro.paloma.edu). Different societies have different levels of tolerance for eye contact. In North American society, eye contact is expected in dialogic interaction. In some communities in New Guinea, it is strictly forbidden in conversation between members of the opposite sex. In fact, conventions of appropriate communication between the sexes are highly culture-specific.

In North America, expressing exuberance with unusual behavior is tolerated. People may engage in many sorts of antics such as face-painting, placard bearing, and creative dances at football games. Conversely, a maxim in Japanese expresses a negative evaluation of eccentric behavior, i.e., "the nail that stands up gets hammered". A similar sentiment is expressed in a First Nations (indigenous) community in British Columbia, Canada: "The blade of grass that stands up (above the level of the lawn) will get cut off."

How do we express anger paralinguistically? For some societies, it may be a contorted face and hands on hips, as well as loudness in speech. In addition to increasing the volume of one's voice, anger and aggression may be communicated by decreasing the distance between oneself and the person being addressed.

Loudness is not necessarily the norm in Mongolia, where anger may be expressed in very even tones (as explained by Oyuka Sambalhundev, one of my graduate students). In some societies, anger is expressed with raised eyebrows. For North Americans, raised eyebrows typically express surprise or delight.

There are norms that prescribe where one should be in certain social contexts. Many westerners are accustomed to certain unspoken norms for being seated in a restaurant or coffee shop. If one is the first customer, one is likely to select a seat in a corner, as opposed to the middle of the room. The next customer is likely to sit in the opposite corner. It would be very unusual to take a seat at the very next table, and rather startling or disconcerting to take a seat at the same table as the first customer. There are similar norms for choosing seats on buses or trains.

Of course, there are explicit rules about where vehicular traffic should be, and how it should move around a community. Perhaps less explicit are rules about where bicycles and pedestrians should be, and how they should stop, start, make turns, or yield right of way. But generally there are at least implicit norms governing these situations as well.

Disregard for many of these conventions will result in miscommunication of one's attitudes, intentions, or emotions. This may in turn result in humorous or uncomfortable situations. However, there is a greater danger, which is that someone may provoke anger and even violence because of such inadvertent miscommunication. Whether one has provoked anger inadvertently or intentionally, it may lead to a dispute, which in turn may lead to dispute resolution or normative discourse. Of course, this may be the case with or without the complication of cross-cultural miscommunication brought on by gaps in cultural knowledge.

3. The role of emotions in normative discourse and social control

Normative discourse is the genre of communication that is used in order to influence the behavior, opinions, or beliefs of others. We employ normative discourse to influence and persuade, or in other words, to exercise social control. In order to influence or persuade, we utter evaluations and prescriptions, and we support them with reasons or justifications. We expect that these statements will be judged as relevant and valid reasons or justifications by the hearer or reader.

We may expect our reasons and justifications to be judged relevant and valid if they are statements of, or necessarily imply, the *cultural values and norms* of the community. In other words, there are norms (standards and rules) of any particular community that need no further justification. They are accepted without question. They are the most basic presuppositions, or the 'articles of faith' of that community.

Because these norms are at such a foundational level in our worldview, and are accepted uncritically, they are also for the most part subconscious. Nonetheless, at least in the area of our beliefs (ideals), if not our behavior, these norms are adhered to scrupulously. If the norms are breached in someone's speech or behavior, or if there is the perception that the norms have been violated, then there is usually a strong emotional reaction. What follows may go as far as physical confrontation and violence, but in most cases the result is some form of normative discourse such as a scolding, a grievance, or an argument. The form of the argument will depend upon the social setting. Mild disagreements may be settled by two people in an informal setting. At the other extreme, major crimes against society will likely result in formal court cases (Black & Mileski 1973; Black 1976). Such cases are often discussed in an ad-

versarial context. Each party in the litigation hopes to win, even if (or perhaps especially if) it means that the other party will lose.

In some societies, there may be a middle ground between mild disagreements and formal court cases, which is a group discussion or an informal litigation. In such cases, the style of conflict resolution may be conciliatory rather than adversarial. Such is the case in the Ga'dang society, which provides the data for this study (Walrod 1988).

3.1 Normative discourse is based on concepts of should and ought

Normative discourse springs from the concepts of 'should' and 'ought' or 'must'. All cultures and languages have such concepts, which are tied to their system of value. The philosophical study of value is Axiology. In linguistics, our entry point to this study is that of normative discourse.

There could be no normative discourse, and no concepts of 'should' and 'ought', if there were not values or norms. This is axiomatic. Norms are of two kinds: standards and rules. According to standards, we can evaluate things as being good or bad, better or worse. According to rules, we can evaluate things as being right or wrong, correct or incorrect (Taylor 1976, Chap. 1).

3.2 Evaluation and prescription in normative discourse

We employ a system of value, and the norms that comprise the system, when we perform the cognitive process of evaluation. We may utter an evaluation when we express our opinion that something is good or bad, right or wrong. Such an evaluation tends to imply a prescription, i.e. an implicit 'ought'.

The utterance of a prescription, or imperative, makes explicit what is implicit in an evaluation. A prescription is an explicit 'ought' or 'must'. Every prescription necessarily implies an evaluation.

4. The role of emotions in normative discourse

4.1 The macrostructure of normative discourse

There are many subtypes of normative discourse, such as preaching, scolding, or arguing. There are also some that are intended to simply reinforce cultural norms and values. Our focus here is on dispute resolution, since that is where we most regularly observe strong emotions in dialogic interaction.

I recorded and studied (with permission) several dispute settlements or informal litigations among the Ga'dang people. These events were called *tarabbag* (literally, "answer-answer", i.e. discussion/dialogue). It became apparent that there was a notional constituent structure for such communicative events. This notional structure has correlations or realizations in the surface structure (Walrod 1988), but that is not in focus in this paper. Rather, the focus is on the interplay of emotions and language within the normative discourse.

The discourse structure or macrostructure included the following notional constituents:

> 1. Initial State, 2. Grievance, 3. Conciliation, 4. Evaluation, 5. Prescription, 6. Consensus, 7. Final State.

4.1.1 *Initial State*

The *tarabbag* is the vehicle used to go from the undesirable initial state of social fragmentation and disharmony to the desirable end state of consensus and social harmony. In the initial state, a moderator states what is obvious to all, namely that there is a problem and that the present gathering is for the purpose of discussing the matter.

4.1.2 *Grievance*

The Grievance constituent includes a statement of the problem by the moderator, as well as the expression of the points of view of both (or all) parties involved in the dispute. Since it is the first opportunity for the two individuals (or sides) in the dispute to air their concerns and feelings, and since it precedes the constituents of Conciliation and Consensus, it is the point of highest emotion in the total discourse.

One particular dispute was between an older and younger man who were related to each other as uncle and nephew. This dispute took several hours to resolve. It was recorded and transcribed, and consisted of 39 utterances by various people involved in the matter. The total number of sentences was 715. The first two sentences set the stage, describing the Initial State.

The first utterance of the Grievance constituent was sentences 3 to 28, where the moderator elaborated on the nature of the problem, and encouraged the litigants to resolve it. Then the uncle was given the floor initially, in deference to the fact that he was much older. He expressed his point of view in very emotional terms, elaborating on how his nephew had offended him (sentences 29 to 165). He used strong and direct language, even starting his statement by saying "I have something very direct to say". The entire speech,

over one half hour in duration, was sprinkled with interjections, evaluations, prescriptions of what should or should not be done or said. It was an extremely emotional diatribe. The pitch was higher and the volume much greater than in normal speech.

This Grievance constituent has an internal discourse structure which is clearly marked. Sentences in normative discourse can be very long. Typically there is a three part semantic interpropositional relationship which we may describe in this way:

Circumstance – Evaluation – Justification
Prescription

The Circumstance may be hypothetical, conditional, or actual historical. The evaluation may be a simple evaluation, or a prescription. And the justification typically invokes certain norms or themes that are accepted uncritically as valid proofs by members of the community.

Frequently this three-part relationship is realized as a single sentence. Thus the sentences are longer than normal. There are some sentences of over 50 words in Ga'dang normative discourse. An average sentence in this genre is at least 20 words. And yet in the peak part of the Grievance constituent of a normative discourse, the sentences may be extremely short. One could analyze this phenomenon by positing that the point of highest emotion in the whole dispute settlement has the shortest sentences. An acceptable alternative analysis would be to posit that in the Grievance constituent, there is likely to be embedded narrative discourse, since the participants are likely to recount actual events they experienced in real time and space. As such, we would expect that the typical marking of the narrative discourse peak or climax would also be found in embedded narrative text in the Grievance constituent of a normative text. Such discourse marking I have described as 'Maximum Deletion' (Walrod 1979: 23–29). This phenomenon is achieved by eliminating all but the most obligatory constituents of each sentence in the peak. The effect is that of high-tension, rapid-fire communication.

The Grievance constituent of the uncle-nephew *tarabbag* has its own peak (sentences 96 to 100), which is not the primary peak of the entire discourse, but is certainly the emotional peak of the uncle's diatribe. This section has an average of 2.6 words per sentence, as compared to about 20 words per sentence for the overall average in the normative text.

(96) *Naprobaran-da.*
Approved they
"They approved it"

(97) *"Dama-na yan," kun-da kena.*
Okay it that said they really
"'That's fine', they said, really"

(98) *Udde "Amme-na yan.*
But reject it that
"But 'That's no good!'"

(99) *Ka "atatal so dilod- ira," nekun-nu.*
Shameful to downstream pl. said you
"'It's shameful to the ones downstream!' you said"

(100) *In-amme-k.*
past reject I
"I was incensed!"

Here in a nutshell is the reiteration of the grievance. These are the shortest and highest tension sentences in the uncle's entire speech. Sentence number 100 was uttered with intense emotion, such that the larynx was tense and constricted, and laryngealization affected the whole sentence.

In this particular dispute settlement, the uncle was so eloquent, and he seemed to clearly have the weight of the community's norms on his side, that one might expect that the nephew would be 'steamrolled' by the weight of his arguments, and the weight of public opinion. However, the nephew had a great deal to say in reply, and his reply was delivered with high emotion and great conviction. The uncle's initial statement of his case had been 137 sentences long (Walrod 1988, Appendix s. 29–165). The nephew's response was 141 sentences long (not included in Walrod 1988), and was even more emotionally charged than what went before. At times the nephew was shouting, and at times weeping, and for most of the utterance, his voice was trembling.

4.1.3 *Conciliation*

The notional constituent of Conciliation follows the Grievance constituent. These notional constituents may not always be sharply demarcated in the surface structure; there may be a little back and forth between one constituent and the next at the boundaries. But it is quite clear in the uncle-nephew dispute settlement that the Conciliation constituent begins in s. 166 (Walrod 1988), uttered by the moderator Sanggoon.

(166) *Antu ino nakasalaman nu a kalolowan o nakam I litag*
That the error yours that hurt the mind of uncle
nu Andits sikwam alle.
yours Andits to-you man.
"That was your error, that wounded the heart of your uncle Andits, man."

This is a signal of the transition from the Grievance to the Conciliation, and it is immediately followed by a very conciliatory utterance by the nephew. He admits making an error, and encourages his uncle to teach him, not just to ignore him as though he were from another group of people. Already the tensions and emotions have ebbed noticeably.

4.1.4 *Evaluation and Prescription*

Following the utterances by the uncle and the nephew, other participants in the *tarabbag* offered their Conciliation (conciliatory remarks) and Evaluation, and then the moderator delivered his Evaluation and Prescription. It was during this part of the discourse that the normative peak occurred. It is interesting to note that this did not occur at the point of highest emotion in the discourse. That point was reached back in the Grievance constituent. But the normative peak is that point when the moderator feels free to abandon the conciliatory remarks and mitigation, and speaks most directly, even using direct imperatives. One might expect that this would be the point of highest tension, but not so. Emotions have already been vented. Conciliation has occurred. Thus the evaluations/prescriptions with the greatest normative force may be uttered without fear of exacerbating the disagreement.

4.1.5 *Consensus and final state*

The closure of the *tarabbag* is reached when all participants buy into the summation of the moderator, and express their agreement. Emotions are assuaged, and consensus is achieved. Social harmony is restored, at least for the moment. When the discussion is drawn to a close, they all retire to a nearby home to drink coffee and visit.

4.2 Invoking norms or themes of high emotive content

There are points in the normative discourse where one expects to encounter high emotions. In the Ga'dang informal litigation, the Grievance constituent is where the highest tension and the most emotion is encountered. Litigants are expected to vent their anger, frustration, hurt, and misunderstanding.

In addition to the venting of negative emotions in the Grievance constituent, there is also a feature of Ga'dang normative discourse that inspires and activates positive emotions. This feature is the invoking of norms or themes of high emotive content. The American equivalent of this phenomenon is to invoke themes such as 'apple pie' and 'motherhood'.

To invoke a theme is to refer to some sphere of experience within a culture that is governed by a set of norms. There are a number of themes that can be invoked in support of good relationships in the community and group solidarity. For example, the age-differential theme is frequently invoked in the uncle-nephew dispute settlement. At least two norms are called up by invoking this theme. One is that the younger person must respect the older. This theme can be invoked by using the terms *lakay* "old man" and *abbing* "child". The use of both terms occurs often in the uncle-nephew discussion, emphasizing and exaggerating the age difference between them.

Another way of invoking the age theme is with the word *kabaw* "senility". This may sound entirely negative, but in Ga'dang society the effects of old age are treated lightheartedly. Furthermore, in normative discourse, this theme is often invoked in order to provide an excuse for the behavior of an older person who has offended someone else.

Another theme that has some relation to the age theme is that of *atal*. This is perhaps the strongest norm or value in Ga'dang society. It can be used with many affixes and many senses, relating to shyness, being ashamed, showing respect, etc. The common thread is that of having an appropriate sense of reserve and respect. Respect is due to those who are older, or who hold elevated positions in society. But at least a reasonable degree of respect is due to one's peers as well. To accuse someone of having no *atal* is one of the harshest judgments one can make in Ga'dang society.

4.3 Lexical choice in discourse

There are sets of lexemes in English and Ga'dang, and likely in all languages, which refer to the same or similar things, actions, or attributes in the real world. In such cases, there is often a continuum of positive to negative connotations associated with the synonyms. The emotions that are activated in dialogue will depend on which lexemes are selected.

For example, depending on our attitude toward a person who is free-spirited and non-conformist, we might describe the person as: creative, unique, one-of-a-kind, imaginative, innovative, different, strange, odd, iconoclastic, aberrant, deviant, bizarre, insane.

Referring to deceptive communication, we have the options of describing it less negatively or more negatively: fooling; fib, white lie, prevarication, deceit, falsehood, lying. There are also euphemisms such as "I misspoke myself" and "hostile disinformation". The latter was uttered by a news reporter recently. One wonders if there could be such a thing as non-hostile disinformation.

In Ga'dang, there are also semantic domains for discussing one's cognitive states and emotional states. There are certain adjectives that can describe physical realities, but which may also be used metaphorically for mental and emotional states. Some of these are:

> *nadammat* "heavy", *nalampaw* "light", *nasiyanak* "calm, peaceful", *nakungkul* "disordered, chaotic", *nalawad* "good", *narakkat* "bad", *malo* "painful", *natattaddan* "tamped down", *nataggat* "hard", *nalu'mag* "soft", *napatu* "hot", *nala'bat* "cold", *makatal* "itchy".

The use of these terms to describe cognitive or emotional states is as follows:

(The term *nakam* is one of those 'untranslatable words' that Malinowski (1935) refers to. The best equivalent in English is *heart,* although it could also be translated as *mind, will, character, center of one's being.)*

> *nadammat a nakam* "heavy hearted, sad"
> *nalampaw a nakam* "light hearted, happy"
> *nasiyanak a nakam* "calm, peaceful frame of mind"
> *nakungkul a nakam* "chaotic, confused, upset"
> *nalawad a nakam* "good mind, happy, pleasing personality"
> *narakkat a nakam* "bad mind, angry, mean"
> *malo a nakam* "painful mind, sad grief-stricken"
> *natattaddan a nakam* "tamped down mind, i.e. of exceptionally fine character"
> *nataggat a nakam* "hard mind, stubborn, cruel"
> *nataggat a ulu* "hard head, stubborn, obstinate, obtuse, unteachable"
> *nalu'mag a ulu* "soft head, intelligent, teachable"
> *napatu ada* "hot blood, fierce, easily angered"
> *nala'bat ada* "cold blood, cool-tempered, unflappable"
> *makatal ada* "itchy blood, covetous"

These terms and metaphors are used extensively in Ga'dang normative discourse and persuasion. If a person claims to be in a very negative cognitive or emotional state, this is disturbing for the whole community. The community strives for social harmony, and abhors disturbance, confusion, unrest, and disagreement. Negative states provide the incentive for people to utter evaluations

and prescriptions, in order that unacceptable behaviors in the community will be modified, and consensus and harmony will be restored.

5. Conclusion

The research presented here provides some interesting insights on the relationship of emotions and language in dialogue, particularly in normative discourse. However, it is preliminary and tentative, since there are many variables in dialogue that could not be isolated in this study. Most of the examples here were drawn from a relatively small corpus of data. Even a few hours of recorded data is a small sampling for such a complex issue.

We have established an inextricable relationship between dialogue and emotions. It is clear that emotions are closely tied to certain discourse constituents, and to certain cognitive schemata in normative discourse. These schemata involve evaluation and prescription, as well as the norms and themes that are invoked as justification.

The culture-specific variables need further study. Other variables, such as gender, age, social settings and social relationships, may also influence who feels emotions, how strongly they are felt, and whether or not people feel free to express the emotions, and how.

The question of whether or not there is some supra-cultural standard of evaluation of human behavior is not addressed here. Comparative studies would show whether norms are entirely culture-bound, or whether there is a significant degree of universality in human emotions and cognitive states, and the linguistic references to these states.

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Anticipation of Public Emotions in TV Debates

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1. Introduction

In this paper I want to investigate the impact emotions have on the communicative strategies of politicians in a pre-electoral TV-debate. I will show that there is a dialogic relationship between politicians' communication of emotions and anticipated emotions on the viewer's side. This relationship, I argue, influences the way politicians develop their respective argumentations.

The TV-debate I have chosen for analysis is the first of two debates that were broadcasted live a few weeks before the parliamentary elections on September 22nd.[1] It was designed as a duel between the then – and, as we know, new – present chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his rival Edmund Stoiber. This was the first time in German history that a TV duel similar to the well-known American presidential debates was conducted, and therefore the public attention was immense.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to give an exhaustive analysis of the debate here. Therefore I will restrict myself to a selection of sequences that illustrate the impact of emotions on the participants' communicative strategies. The analysis will be based on a model of dialogic interaction as developed by Weigand (2000), in which emotions are considered one constitutive feature of dialogue. However, before I come to these theoretical premises, the concept of emotion as supported in this paper needs to be clarified.

2. Emotions as orientations in dialogic interaction

Our intuitive conception of emotions is that there is a set of universal feelings, which lie largely beyond our control: Emotions occur and fade. They are private. They may contradict logic. They are separate from reason. They are inaccessible. They are not learned but innate. This fuzzy concept has caused the widespread exclusion of emotions from linguistic pragmatics (Fiehler 1990) because it does not seem to fit into a concept of language use as a purposeful and goal-oriented activity. However, nobody will seriously deny that emotions have a crucial effect on the ways people communicate. Consequently, the study of language use has to integrate emotions, which is a big challenge for most existing theories.

Research in psychology, neurology and sociology during the last decade has provided valuable insights into the nature and function of emotions. Although there has been a lasting controversy concerning the question whether emotions are a product of either evolution *or* socialization, I think that there is considerable evidence that both processes had and have their effect on what we experience as emotions. It seems reasonable to assume that biological evolution and cultural socialization are not mutually exclusive forces but that they combine and interact to produce emotional communication (Andersen/Guerrero 1997: 50). However, this does not mean that it is impossible to concentrate primarily on one perspective as a starting point for an analysis. In this paper, I refer to emotions as socially shaped phenomena. According to Fiehler (2002: 81), one way of examining emotions is to view them as "public phenomena in social situations of interpersonal interaction." This means that emotions in fact evolve in the course of a conversation. More important, however, is the assumption that emotions serve specific purposes. Functional approaches conceive of emotions as "adaptations to the problem of social and physical survival" (Keltner/Gross 1999: 470). Although this conception can be traced back to Darwin (1872), who regarded emotions as rudiments of once-serviceable actions that now, if at all, serve secondary communicative functions (Keltner/Gross 1999: 470), functionalist approaches claim that emotions still serve functions for which they originally evolved in the course of socialisation. The dynamics in the evolution of emotions are even more stressed within the field of cultural psychology. The assumption here is that emotions to a considerable extent construct and are constructed by cultural practices and institutions (Keltner/Haidt 1999: 506). This assumption seems to be true for our political culture, as I will outline in this paper. In a first tentative definition, I would like to describe emotions as orientations in the decision making pro-

cess that are not secondary to cognition, but a complementary human ability. Thus, in a dialogue, the interlocutors, who cooperate in order to achieve a super-ordinate communicative purpose, do not act solely on the basis of rational considerations but according to their respective emotional judgements. These emotional judgements are part of the evaluative judgements interlocutors constantly make about the extent to which their communicative goals have already been reached or about the success their communicative strategies seem to promise. Depending on this evaluation, interlocutors decide how to proceed in the dialogue. Cognition and emotions are thus intertwined and therefore cannot be separated.

Those who insist on a strict distinction between cognition and emotion do certainly not share this view. A reflection upon this long and ongoing controversy is not within the scope of this paper. However, reductive approaches have proven to be problematic in many scientific fields. Lazarus (1999: 13) formulates the problem of reductive approaches for the cognition/emotion-debate when he states that to separate cognition and emotion is to "create arbitrary scientific categories that don't exist in nature" because "reduction distorts the way phenomena operate naturally". This applies also to the study of language in use, for which a model is needed that integrates all relevant aspects of human interaction.

3. Political TV-debates as dialogic action games

A political TV-debate is a complex communicative event as it comprises not only the immediate participants, the journalist(s) and, as in this case, the politicians who participate. It takes place primarily for an audience that is indirectly present. We thus find a doubled dialogic structure: there is a dialogue taking place between the immediate participants and at the same time we have a dialogic relationship between these immediate participants and an audience that has chosen to follow the programme. Communicative claims are being negotiated on both levels. However, although the interviewers' questions are directed at the politicians, their answers do not only fulfil – to a varying extent – these communicative claims but, more importantly, with their answers politicians establish communicative claims directed at the audience. They try to convince the audience of their respective positions in order to win in the eye of the public and to present their opponent in a negative light. In order to do that, politicians have to anticipate preferences and needs, background knowledge, expectations and, not least, emotions on the side of the viewers. These factors are not objec-

tively accessible to anyone, they can only be determined with a certain degree of probability, which is why politicians do rely so heavily on opinion polls and creations of images through the media.

The question is, however, how to take this into account in an analysis. The model of the dialogic action game as developed by Weigand (2000) offers a starting point as it conceives of interaction as taking place in cultural units (action games), in the centre of which we have "different human beings with different cognitive backgrounds and different personal experiences, which inevitably imply different understandings" (p. 5). Action games are defined by a super-ordinate purpose. The most important notion of this model is that it is an open model which allows for rules and conventions of language use, but which regards principles of communication as constitutive features of dialogic interaction. Principles in this context are "techniques of orientation in complex and open surroundings" (p. 7). This means, for example, that the communicative function of an illocutionary act is not fixed. Although the speaker knows what claim he or she establishes with the performance of an illocutionary act, it is negotiated between the interlocutors in order to arrive at a shared understanding. This negotiation process depends on the situation, which means that the interlocutors' actual knowledge, their premises and abilities of visual, cognitive and emotional perception have to be considered. On the basis of these factors meaning arises in the course of interaction.

4. Politics, the media society and emotions

If the analysis of a TV-debate like the one chosen for this paper is based on these theoretical premises, the cultural framework in which the show is taking place has to be accounted for. We live in a media society in which the boundaries between politics and the media are not only blurred but increasingly fading. Choi (1994) has coined the term 'interview democracy', which implies that original political decisions are so strongly influenced by their potential and actual perception through the media that one can hardly tell where these decisions are actually being made. Political dialogues on TV therefore do not only have an informational character, they are not in the control of the politicians on stage, but they are "in the grip of the media" (Weigand 1999). The media, however, are not independent but adjust themselves to the expectations of their target audience. This is, rather briefly described, the reason why *infotainment* has become the key concept in our modern media society. Politics are increasingly

reduced to talking heads, personalization and, in Germany, *Americanisation*, are the key words.

Consequently, the two pre-election debates between the chancellor and his rival were considered to be of crucial influence for the outcome of the parliamentary elections. Although in retrospect this impact has been said to be relatively low – a conclusion which still lacks justification – the two debates represent the importance of personalisation in our political culture through the media.

If interviews, TV debates and other media formats provide the stages for the political discourse, one can ask to what extent emotions play a role here. I disagree with Fiehler (1990: 22) who claims that in our culture there is a "precept of emotional neutrality" which guides most types of institutional talk, among them TV debates. According to Fiehler, the participants here argue objectively and goal-oriented. I cannot discuss the problematic notion of objectivity in detail, yet I agree with Schmidt (1994) that reality only exists as a construction in the eye of the observer, which means that a shared objectivity in the strict sense does not exist as soon as two people enter into a conversation. Goal-orientation, however, does not contradict emotionality. As I have explained already, goal-orientation on the one hand and emotions on the other are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they are intertwined and interdependent. Emotions may not be expressed explicitly – we rarely see politicians fly into an uncontrollable rage or burst into laughter – yet they do exist on a subtle level and politicians often try to hide them. If hiding emotions is one guiding principle for politicians on screen, one cannot conclude that they do not exist and therefore fall out of the scope of analysis. On the contrary, it proves that emotions do play a role, although the way they function is rather difficult to determine in many cases. This, however, does not only apply to the specific genre of political discourse but to language use in general.

An example taken from an opinion poll that was carried out after the TV-debate shows the effect emotions seem to have on the voters' decisions: Immediately after the debate, viewers were asked to tell:

a. whom of the two politicians they find more credible,
b. with whom of them they have more sympathy,
c. to whom of them they would ascribe a higher competence in economic issues and in the creation of new jobs,
d. whom of them they would like to be the next chancellor.

The following two charts illustrate the results of this opinion poll:[2]



Figure 1



Figure 2

Interestingly, although people assigned a much higher competence to Stoiber when it came to questions concerning issues of economy and unemployment, a vast majority wanted to see the current chancellor Schröder as the new chancellor. This observation is remarkable in view of the fact that both parties, including their protagonists, regarded economy issues as key issues in their election campaigns. In fact, a majority of voters shared this priority. The reason why Schröder was the preferred chancellor by 56 to 39/42% cannot lie in his credibility either because Stoiber scored only insignificantly lower there. However, 51% said that they have more sympathy with Schröder compared to only 23% for Stoiber. Sympathy, however, is largely based on an emotional judgement: it is sometimes hard to explain, but has an enormous effect on our general attitude towards a person. As we know, the Social Democrats with Schröder as chancellor won the election on September 22nd with a very slight majority. It is certainly not far-fetched to say that this victory was to a great extent due to the 'sympathy-bonus' on the chancellor's side.

If it is so obvious that the people's favour for one or the other politician depends largely on an emotional judgement, it would be naïve to assume that politicians would not take this into consideration when they present themselves in a TV debate. The personalization process in politics even enforces the politi-

cians' efforts to address potential voters on an emotional level, as one could clearly observe during the last election campaign in Germany.

Politicians are usually well trained for their performance in the media; their advisers elaborate rhetorical strategies with respect to the effect the performance is likely to have on the public. Therefore, if emotions are displayed, they are not necessarily authentic. They may be feigned for various reasons. Displayed anger at an opponent may only have the function to put pressure on him or her, the manifestation of emotions like grief or sadness may create solidarity, positive emotions may be displayed in order to convey an optimistic attitude (cf., e.g., Rafe 1991). It all depends primarily on the expected or intended public effect with respect to anticipated emotions on the viewers' side. However, the way these strategies can be put into practice is influenced by the format of the programme, which is why my analysis starts at that point.

5. Sample Analysis

5.1 The format of the debate

In the opening sequence, the two journalists (J1 and J2) introduce the basic rules for the debate:

(1)

001	J1	This, ladies and gentlemen, is not an ordinary interview, but a debate, a duel
002		of words. Together with the candidates we have agreed upon rules and we as
003		moderators will have to make sure that these rules will be abided by. Now,
004		what do these rules look like?
005	J2	In brief: Each of the candidates gets a lead-in question, he then has ninety
006		seconds time to answer it. Peter Kloeppel and I then have the opportunity to
007		ask four follow-up questions. Each question then has to be answered within
008		sixty seconds. We will, of course, keep track of time, and if one candidate
009		goes over time, you will see that by a small light on your screen [...].

According to J1, the format deviates from the traditional format of interviews. In the press, the event was usually referred to as *the TV duel*, implying a win/lose-outcome. Like in ancient duels, the rules had been agreed upon in advance, the conditions and chances were the same for both duellists. The equality of chances was also ensured by the fixed given time limits, which were even under constant notarial observation. As one can tell from these rules, a face-to-face exchange between the chancellor and his rival was not intended. It was rather designed like two parallel interviews in which each of the interviewees

gets more or less the same questions. Although both politicians in the course of the debate challenged this formal concept, the rigid corset was later criticised by a majority of people who had watched the duel. Their main argument was that the strict limitations had caused the debate to be 'emotionless'. This impression is certainly due to the rare direct exchanges between Schröder and Stoiber. One effect of this formal rule was, however, that both politicians had to address the viewers more explicitly than they would have done otherwise. Consequently, they rarely looked at each other, but rather focused the camera directly, which sometimes created an atmosphere of detachment.

5.2 Emotions and evasion

At first sight, the debate appears to be an organized exchange of arguments, of entire sub-monologues, well rehearsed in advance and delivered sometimes even without regard to the question. Take, for example, the initial stage of the debate:

(2)

010	J1	The first question – upon this we have agreed – goes to the chancellor. Mr.
011		Chancellor, the Germans do not have a very high opinion of their politi-
012		cians at the moment. There are empty election promises; there are empty
013		public coffers, there are political theatrics in the Bundesrat. We have a num-
014		ber of ministers of scandal, campaign funding scandals, corruption, and air-
015		plane affairs and that is why our first question is aimed not at facts, govern-
016		ment's end results or election programmes, but at each of you personally.
017		Why should the people trust you personally to keep your election promises?
018	Ch	I think credibility has to do with the fact that one does what one says, that
019		one stands behind one's actions. Only if one is convinced can one convince
020		others. Incidentally, any judgement one passes on oneself lacks distance and,
021		therefore, objectivity. In this respect, this is rather a question to the view-
022		ers. I think that we proved through the last four years of reform, which
023		we initiated and carried through successfully, that we deserve confidence.
024		We carried out a reasonable tax reform. We created a solid foundation for
025		the pensions system. Concerning issues like immigration, we have provided
026		ourselves with possibilities of restriction and regulation. All this, I think, to-
027		gether with what we have done for families. In the past four years, we have
028		spent almost twenty Billion Euros on families alone. This, I think, creates
029		confidence and makes us confident that the people will say "they should go on".
030	J2	Mr. Prime minister, why should the voters trust you, why should they trust
031		you as a person?

032 PM I always try to act according to the principle "There is no difference between
033 talk and action". I think that this is one of the greatest accusations people
034 keep directing at politicians, that the difference between talk and action is
035 too great. I try – and within the limits of my responsibility I have been time
036 and again committed within the last years, within the last decade – to keep
037 to that which I have promised, thus as prime minister of Bavaria to achieve
038 a good educational system, a high level of domestic security, and, particu-
039 larly, to create jobs. To generate the conditions for new jobs to be created
040 so that unemployment is reduced, and on the whole I think the balance is
041 certainly something to be proud of. We are among the states with the lowest
042 unemployment rate in Germany. In the last ten years every fourth new job
043 was created within the bounds of my responsibility. And this is surely also
044 one reason why a high degree of competence in the creation of jobs and in
045 economic policy is being assigned to the CDU and the CSU and especially
046 to me personally. And what I did for Bavaria I want to do for Germany for
047 the next four years with all passion and commitment.

The initial question is introduced by a representative speech act (010–012), establishing a claim to truth that is supported by an enumeration of reasons why the people "do not have a very high opinion" of their politicians (012–015). The list of reasons that support this claim, however, is very likely to induce or revive negative emotions like disappointment or anger in the viewers. The generalization *their politicians* (011–012) includes both the Chancellor Schröder (Ch) and the Prime Minister Stoiber (PM) into the negative stereotype of politicians. In this light, the question why the chancellor and his rival should personally deserve confidence is a tricky one. The claim to truth established by the introducing representative speech act offers the possibility to either accept or to reject it. A rejection is impossible because it would even enforce potential negative emotions by calling up yet another negative stereotype, namely that of politicians being oblivious to their failures. An acceptance, on the other hand, is very likely to trigger follow-up questions concerning personal failures or consequences. Thus both politicians are caught in what psychologists might call an avoidance-avoidance conflict (Bull 1998; Hamilton/Mineo 1998): any possible answer has potentially negative consequences. Interestingly, both Schröder and Stoiber choose the same strategy to get out of their dilemma by avoiding a reaction to the claim made in 010–017. Schröder simply gives his own definition of credibility and then declares that the entire question is one that should be directed at the audience, displaying modesty at the same time (020–021). Stoiber substitutes the accusations raised in the question by another accusation that he declares to be "one of the greatest" (033–034), having cleared himself of any suspicion in advance by calling the principle he is referring to his guiding principle. Both politicians continue with an enumeration of political merits that

ends in a conclusion why they deserve the confidence of the voters. They have thus avoided a reaction to the claim in 011–012.

What is striking, however, is the different use of personal pronouns. While Schröder uses the pronoun *we* seven times, Stoiber uses the pronoun *I* eight times. While Schröder refers to merits as merits of his government, Stoiber refers to merits only as his own. As I will show later, the choice of personal pronouns plays a crucial role in the communication of emotions. The difference here reveals one aspect of the politicians' respective strategies. Again, it is necessary to take into consideration the situation in which the duel takes place. At the time of the duel, Stoiber's conservative party lies ahead in the opinion polls while his personal scores do not come up to those of his party. He therefore tries to strengthen his individual position by promoting himself, using *I*. Schröder, who is far ahead of his party's figures, consequently tries to strengthen his party, using *we*.

5.3 Strategic hiding of emotions

Schröder implicitly admits the unsatisfactory situation of his party in (053–054):

(3)

048	J1	Mr. Chancellor, we noticed already during the past weeks and months that you
049		went after your rival a little more aggressively than we had actually expected.
050		One year ago, you yourself said that you are practicing politics with a gentle
051		hand. Has your gentle hand started to tremble in view of the opinion polls?
052	Ch	Well, when I look at the latest opinion polls I actually don't have a reason to
053		tremble, not only as far as the party figures are concerned – which can still
054		improve – but also above all as far as my personal figures are concerned. [. . .]
055		By the way, as for my aggressiveness, it is quite limited, as one will notice time
056		and again.
057	J2	We will see that in the course of this programme, ladies and gentlemen.

The chancellor is obviously concerned not to show even a trace of the aggressiveness that J1 insinuates in his question (048–049). He tries to convey that he is in control of the situation by playing down the insinuated aggressiveness with a droning voice (055–056). Had he displayed any signs of aggression, viewers might have taken that as an indication that J1's presupposition – Schröder is in fact not confident about winning the election – is true. In 057, J2 challenges Schröder's apparent confidence with a comment that casts doubt on the chancellor's capability to suppress aggressiveness for the rest of the programme, challenging the confidence displayed by Schröder.

5.4 Polarization vs. appeal to solidarity

Before I can come to the analysis of the next sequence, some introductory remarks have to be made in order provide the basis for an understanding. In brief: In August 2002, especially the East of Germany was hit by a tremendous flood catastrophe, which caused damages at a level of approximately 10.000 Million Euros. During the weeks of the flood, Schröder and his party improved their figures in the opinion polls considerably because of the immediate measures they took. However, there was a controversy with the opposition concerning the question how to pay for the damages. Schröder's suggestion was to postpone a reduction on taxes that was to begin in 2003. He explains that the grounds for his proposed measure rest predominantly on the solidarity among the Germans after this catastrophe. He argues that the Germans are willing to do without the tax reduction in order to pay for the damages. Schröder explicitly supports his argumentation by relying to an anticipated public emotion of solidarity.

Stoiber, who is against the postponing of tax reductions, now counters this appeal to solidarity by arguing from an economic viewpoint, which does not, however, mean that he is not trying to argue emotionally:

(4)

058	PM	Mr. Limbourg, we have the flood catastrophe, yet we have another national
059		catastrophe as well, that of the extraordinary high unemployment rate. More
060		than four million people out of work this summer. We are at Europe's tail end
061		as far as economic growth is concerned. [...] Moreover, on The first of Jan-
062		uary of this... of next year we will have a threefold tax increase in a disastrous
063		economic situation. The people no longer spend, the economic situation is
064		bitter. The middle class no longer invests, and, in such a period, a threefold
065		tax increase – on the income tax, the tax on oil, and, thirdly, even the tax on
066		corporations – this I regard, if you pardon my saying so, as a serious mis-
067		take, and the chancellor tends to increase taxes immediately in times of crisis.
068		When after September Eleventh more needed to be done for domestic and
069		foreign security, the tax was increased again immediately. The tax on insur-
070		ance has been increased; the tax on tobacco has been increased. This is exactly
071		what takes money from people's hands and we then lack that money for our
072		economic situation.

Stoiber starts his turn with an adroit move in which he transports the negative concept of *catastrophe* from *flood* to *economy* in order to change the subject while preserving the emotional load (058–059). As we have seen in figure 1, when it comes to the issue of economy, Stoiber is regarded the more competent politician. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that he is eager to score in this

domain. He enforces the negative picture of the current economic situation by using adjectives like *extraordinary*, *disastrous*, *bitter*, or *serious*. Stoiber explicitly makes the chancellor responsible for the economic situation by claiming that it is a characteristic of Schröder's policy that money is taken from peoples' hands (71). It is conspicuous how he uses the personal pronoun *we* only in negative contexts, implying a communal concern and at the same time making himself the advocate of the ordinary people. The effect is that while Schröder only *relies* on an anticipated public emotion of solidarity, Stoiber tries to convey the emotion of solidarity, of empathy with the people's economic concerns. At the same time, he displays a feeling of responsibility in the face of the government. He thus polarizes on the issue of flood damages by raising economic issues in which he appears to defend the people's needs against wrong government policies.

The chancellor apparently notices this strategy and interferes, breaking the formal rules of the duel by taking the initiative without having waited for a question:

(5)

073		[...]
074	Ch	You should allow me just one remark now. [...] And the alternative the
075		Union offers is to run up debts. That means in plain language that we would
076		shove onto future generations the damages this generation has to settle. The
077		people don't want that because they say we have enough power and the
078		strong will to settle with our own means that which the flood has destroyed,
079		with the means of our generation, and we don't want to burden our children
080		and grandchildren with that [...] Today's generation is powerful enough to
081		say we pay for the damages the flood has caused us with our own means and
082		*we will not shove that upon future generations*.
083	PM	*May I...* *May I make a reply*?
084	J2	*Excuse me, Mr. Chancellor*, you have anticipated my
085		question, as it were. You may, of course, make a reply.

The chancellor has developed an argumentation that is again based on the presupposed solidarity among the people, apparently sacrificing short-term economic interests for a higher level of communal responsibility, namely responsibility for future generations. As his rival had just done, he demonstrates closeness to the people's needs. However, Stoiber tries to interrupt in 083 and is given the floor by J2.

(6)

086	PM	I simply regard it as a serious mistake to believe that one can push aside the
087		national problem, the national catastrophe of unemployment like that. Mr.
088		Chancellor, you promised that after your period of office, after four years,
089		we would have a rate of unemployment of less then three point five mil-
090		lion. We now have more than five... more than four million unemployed.
091		For each one hundred thousand unemployed, this costs us, the taxpayer, the
092		public, two point three thousand million Euros. This means five hundred
093		thousand more that is eleven point five thousand million Euros that we cur-
094		rently have to spend because of your wrong policy. And if you now enforce
095		this policy by passing on tax increases to the middle class, to the ordinary
096		people... Because what is your consequence? Those, especially the ordinary
097		people, who would be happy to pay only seven percent tax on the entry level,
098		have to keep paying nineteen point nine percent. This means the emphasis
099		of your measures hits especially the ordinary people, creates less spending
100		and, of course, creates an ongoing bad level of domestic economic activity.
101		I cannot go down this path with you and I will not go down this path and I
102		say very clearly that we will go down another path.

He basically repeats his argumentation, enforcing it by citing the chancellor's election promise of 1998 to reduce the unemployment rate, which he did not keep. Again, he uses the personal pronoun *we* only in negative contexts. Especially in 095–102 his tone is very pronounced, his use of language persuasive (e.g. 100–102), he assumes the role of the ordinary people's advocate again.

It is obvious that Stoiber tries to shift the subject to issues of economy again. He knows that the government's reputation has improved due to its management of the flood catastrophe. He also knows the emotional load this topic has accumulated through the media, and he is aware that the chancellor is the beneficiary in this field.

6. Violation of the formal rules

As the duel proceeds, one notices that both politicians increasingly violate the strict rules that were agreed upon before the duel. The verbal exchange has become more aggressive and it seems that the conservative Stoiber can score on grounds that traditionally belong to the social democratic core domains, namely social justice. Like in the sequences we have already seen, he tries to argue that the government's economic policies put the ordinary people at a particular disadvantage. The chancellor now tries to expose his rival as someone who does not reveal his true intentions:

(7)

103	Ch	You promise everybody everything,
104	PM	No...
105	Ch	You finance that with the cutting of
106		the night-shift bonuses, with the cancellation of advertising-*related expenses.*
107	PM	*That is nonsense.*
108	Ch	Of course, that's how it's written in your election *programme.*
109	PM	*No, that's not written that*
		way in the programme.
110	Ch	*Other... you have to...*
111	PM	*Mr. Chancellor, I have to correct you here.*
112	Ch	*Otherwise you have to correct it here*. Let me
113		finish speaking.
114	PM	*Gladly.*
115	Ch	*Otherwise* you have to deny it here. This means redistribut-
116		ing from those at the bottom to those at the top [...] and that's why this is
117		a field in which I like arguing and in which it becomes obvious that in or-
118		der to give tax breaks to the very top you want to burden those people who
119		work, who go to the factories and to their management jobs and do their
120		duty there. Especially those who work night shifts, who get holiday bonuses,
121		you want to burden in order to lower the top rate of taxation [...]

Schröder tries to re-establish the traditional distinction between the Social Democrats as the party of the ordinary workers and social justice by apparently revealing and attacking plans that he claims to be part of his rival's election programme. He implies that Stoiber's engagement for social justice is deceitful (105–106). As Stoiber's credibility is at stake now, he interrupts the chancellor frequently. This violation of the agreed formal rules shows that it is difficult for Stoiber to suppress his anger at the chancellors' strategy. In 107, he throws in that Schröder is telling nonsense; his tone, however, becomes more moderate in 111. The chancellor, however, uses his advantage of having the floor by reprimanding Stoiber for his interruptions in 112–113. Stoiber's cynical reply in 114 proves the subtle hostility that is perceptible to anyone. In 122–123, J1 takes up and even enforces this hostility in his next turn:

(8)

122	J1	Now we have heard the Chancellor talking about nonsense, lack of reason
123		and other things, and he has directed it to you.

J1 allocates the next turn to Stoiber not by asking a question, but by making a statement that takes up mainly the emotional impact of Schröder's turn. At the same time, he re-establishes the format of the debate, although the direct emo-

tional involvement of both politicians makes the maintenance of this format increasingly difficult as a further analysis would show.

7. Conclusions

Although only a few sequences of this 75-minute long debate could be examined here, it has become obvious that emotions do play a crucial role in political debates. In the last sequence, one could observe that direct emotional involvement between the immediate interlocutors does take place, however, the main function of emotions in the action game of political debates concerns the dialogic relationship between the politicians on the screen and the audience. Politicians adjust their communicative strategies to anticipated emotions on the side of the viewers. It is these emotions I am referring to when using the term *public emotion*. Furthermore, the format of the debate has shown to be influential for the ways these emotions can be accounted for by the politicians. In order to avoid possible negative emotions in the viewers, politicians use different strategies. One is evasion, which both politicians used in the communicative dilemma of an avoidance-avoidance conflict. Another way is, of course, to hide emotions. An important objective of politicians is to display empathy with the people's needs in order to show solidarity. The use of personal pronouns was shown to be crucial here. Another way of making use of anticipated emotions is to base an argumentation on it, as the chancellor did with regard to the flood catastrophe.

I am aware of the fact that this paper is only an attempt to integrate emotions into the analysis of media dialogues. Many questions do remain. For example, the effect TV debates like this have on the public does not only depend on the viewers' immediate perception. The TV duel I dealt with was taken up and interpreted by the media in many successive interviews and comments, and it is very likely that in this post-duel stage people decided which of the candidates had actually won. As mentioned above, the debate was generally said to have been rather unemotional, which is a judgement that has been proven wrong in the analysis. The fact that this judgement exists, however, shows that emotions often do affect language use on a subtle level that one might not be aware of when being involved in the action game. It is this peculiarity that makes emotions so influential in judgements that we like to call objective. The integration of emotions into models of language use is certainly a difficult task, even though research on emotions has advanced and taken new directions. One starting point might be the investigation of emotions in different types of ac-

tion games in order to find similarities that allow generalizations about the functioning of emotions in language use.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Constanze Lohff for her kind help with the transcriptions and Alyssa Lonner for doing the proof-reading.

2. Politbarometer (ZDF) on Sunday, September 22nd, after the debate.

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Appendix

J1 Dies ist, meine Damen und Herren, kein gewöhnliches Interview, sondern ein Streitgespräch- ein Rededuell. Wir haben uns mit den Kandidaten gemeinsam auf Regeln geeinigt und wir Moderatoren werden dafür sorgen und sorgen müssen, dass diese Regeln auch tatsächlich eingehalten werden. Wie sehen sie aus, diese Regeln?

J2 In Kürze: Jeder der Kandidaten bekommt eine Einstiegsfrage, da hat er dann neunzig Sekunden Zeit, diese zu beantworten. Der Gegenkandidat bekommt dann auch neunzig Sekunden Zeit. Peter Kloeppel und ich haben dann beide die Gelegenheit bis zu vier Mal nachzufragen. Innerhalb von sechzig Sekunden muß dann diese Frage beantwortet werden. Wir werden diese Zeit natürlich messen und wenn ein Kandidat überzieht, werden sie das anhand eines kleinen Lichtes auf ihrem Bildschirm sehen.

J1 Die erste Frage, darauf haben wir uns geeinigt, geht an den Bundeskanzler. Herr Bundeskanzler, die Deutschen haben im Moment keine allzu hohe Meinung von ihren Politikern. Es gibt leere Wahlversprechen, es gibt leere Kassen, es gibt Polittheater im Bundesrat. Wir haben Skandalminister teilweise, Spenden-, Korruptions- und Flugaffären und deshalb zielt unsere erste Frage auch noch nicht auf Sachthemen, auf Regierungsbilanzen oder Wahlprogramme, sondern ganz persönlich auf Sie beide. Warum sollen die Menschen Ihnen persönlich vertrauen, dass Sie das auch alles einlösen, was Sie vor der Wahl versprechen?

BK Ich glaub' Glaubwürdigkeit /äh/ hat zu tun mit /äh/ der Tatsache, dass man macht, was man sagt, dass man hinter dem steht, was man tut. Nur wenn man selber überzeugt ist, kann man andere überzeugen. Im übrigen, jedes Urteil über sich selbst /äh/ entbehrt der Distanz und damit natürlich der Objektivität. Insofern ist das auch eine Frage an die Zuschauerrinnen und Zuschauer eher. Ich denke, dass wir in den letzten vier Jahren bewiesen haben mit dem Reformprozess, den wir eingeleitet und erfolgreich durchgesetzt haben, dass wir Vertrauen verdienen. Wir haben eine vernünftige Steuerreform gemacht. Wir haben /äh/ das Rentensystem auf /äh/ ein vernünftiges Fundament gestellt. Wir haben bei Themen wie Zuwanderung uns Begrenzungsmöglichkeiten, Steuerungsmöglichkeiten verschafft. Wir haben ein modernes Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht gemacht. Das alles denke ich, mit /äh/ dem zusammen, was wir für Familien getan haben. Wir haben allein fast 20 Milliarden Euro mehr für Familien ausgegeben in den vier Jahren. Das denke ich, schafft Vertrauen und /äh/ das macht uns zuversichtlich, dass die Menschen sagen werden "die sollen das weitermachen".

J2 Herr Ministerpräsident, warum sollen die Wähler Ihnen vertrauen, warum sollen sie Ihnen als Person glauben?

MP Ich versuche immer nach dem Prinzip zu handeln, keine Unterschiede zwischen Reden und Handeln. Ich glaube das ist /äh/ eines der größten Vorwürfe, die die Menschen an die Politiker immer wieder richten, dass zwischen Reden und Handeln ein zu großer Unterschied ist. Ich bemühe mich und habe mich in meinem Verantwortungsbereich /äh/ in den letzten Jahren, im letzten Jahrzehnt /äh/ immer wieder /äh/ engagiert, /äh/ das /äh/ zu halten, was ich versprochen habe, also als Ministerpräsident /äh/ in Bayern eine gute Bildung, ein hohes Maß an innerer Sicherheit /äh/ /äh/ in besonderem Maße natürlich auch /äh/ Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen, die Voraussetzungen zu schaffen, dass neue Arbeitsplätze entstehen, dass die Arbeitslosigkeit gemindert wird und /äh/ insgesamt glaube ich, kann sich die Bilanz sehen lassen. Wir sind /äh/ mit das Land, das die geringste Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland aufzuweisen hat. Wir haben es erreicht, dass eigentlich in den letzten zehn Jahren jeder vierte neue Arbeitsplatz in Deutschland in meinem Verantwortungsbereich /äh/ geschaffen worden ist. Und sicherlich ist das mit auch ein Grund, warum /äh/ CDU und CSU und im Besonderen auch mir persönlich ein hohes Maß an Kompetenz /äh/ in der Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen in der Wirtschaftspolitik zugemessen wird und ich möchte das, was ich für Bayern getan habe, die nächsten vier Jahre mit aller Leidenschaft und mit allem Engagement für Deutschland tun.

J1 Herr Bundeskanzler, wir haben in den vergangenen Wochen und Monaten schon gemerkt, dass Sie etwas aggressiver auf Ihren Herausforderer losgegangen sind, als wir das eigentlich erwartet hätten. Vor einem Jahr haben Sie selber davon gesprochen, dass Sie Politik mit der ruhigen Hand machen. Hat Ihre ruhige Hand angesichts der Meinungsumfragen begonnen zu zittern?

BK Ach, wenn ich mir die neuesten Umfragen anschaue, habe ich eigentlich keinen Grund, davor zu zittern, sowohl was die Parteiwerte angeht, die noch besser werden können, als auch vor allen Dingen was die persönlichen Werte angeht. [...] Im übrigen, was meine Aggressivität angeht, die hält sich durchaus in Grenzen /äh/, wie man immer wieder merken kann.

J2 Das werden wir noch im Verlauf der Sendung dann sehen, meine Damen und Herren.

[...]

MP Herr Limbourg, wir haben die Flutkatastrophe, aber wir haben noch eine andere nationale Katastrophe, das ist die außerordentliche hohe Arbeitslosigkeit. Über vier Millionen Arbeitslose im Sommer. Wir sind, was das wirtschaftliche Wachstum anbelangt /äh/, in Europa Schlusslicht. [...] Und am 1.1. diesen, des nächsten Jahres haben wir dann praktisch eine dreifache Steuererhöhung in einer desaströsen konjunkturellen Lage. Die Leute verbrauchen nichts mehr, die konjunkturelle Lage ist bitter. Der Mittelstand /äh/ investiert nicht mehr und in einer solchen Phase, dreifache Steuererhöhung, also Einkommenssteuererhöhung, Mineralölsteuererhöhung und zum Dritten auch noch die Körperschaftssteuer zu erhöhen, das halte ich mit Verlaub für einen schwerwiegenden Fehler und der Bundeskanzler neigt dazu, bei Krisen sofort die Steuern zu erhöhen. Als /äh/ nach dem 11. September mehr für die äußere und innere Sicherheit zu tun war, ist sofort wieder die Steuer erhöht worden. Ver-

sicherungssteuer /äh/ erhöht worden, Tabaksteuer erhöht worden. Das ist genau das, was den Menschen das Geld aus der Tasche zieht und das fehlt uns dann für unsere konjunkturelle Situation. [...]

BK Sie sollten mir jetzt mal eine Bemerkung gestatten. [...] Und /äh/ die Alternative, die die Union anbietet, sind Schulden. Das bedeutet im Klartext, dass wir daran gingen, die Schäden, die die heutige Generation ausgleichen muss, auf die künftigen Generationen zu verschieben. Das wollen die Menschen nicht, denn sie sagen, wir haben Kraft genug und den festen Willen, das, was die Flut uns zerstört hat, mit eigenen Mitteln, mit den Mitteln unserer Generation auszugleichen und wir wollen damit nicht unsere Kinder und Enkelkinder belasten[...] Die heutige Generation ist kraftvoll genug zu sagen, die Schäden, die uns die Flut geschlagen hat, die werden wir mit eigenen Mitteln ausgleichen und das werden wir
nicht verschieben auf künftige Generationen.

MP *Darf ich...? Darf ich eine Replik machen?*

J2 *Entschuldigung, Herr Bundeskanzler*, Sie haben meine Frage sozusagen vorweggenommen. Sie dürfen gerne eine Replik machen.

MP Ich halte das einfach für einen schwerwiegenden Fehler, zu glauben, dass man das nationale Problem, die nationale Katastrophe Arbeitslosigkeit so an die Wand drücken kann. Herr Bundeskanzler, Sie haben versprochen /äh/, dass /äh/ nach Ihrer Amtszeit nach vier Jahren wir eine Arbeitslosen, eine Arbeitslosigkeit haben von unter dreikommafünf Millionen. Wir haben jetzt über fünf, über vier Millionen Arbeitslose. Hunderttausend Arbeitslose mehr, das kostet uns, den Steuerzahler, den öffentlichen Händen zweikommadrei Milliarden Euro. Das heißt also fünfhunderttausend Arbeitslose mehr, das sind elfkommafünf Milliarden Euro, die wir gegenwärtig aufzubringen haben auf Grund Ihrer falschen Politik. Und wenn Sie diese Politik jetzt noch verstärken, indem Sie Steuererhöhungen auf den Mittelstand gerade auch auf die kleinen Leute übertragen. Denn was ist denn Ihre Konsequenz? Diejenigen, gerade die kleinen Leute, die sich freuen würden, nur noch /äh/ siebzehn Prozent Eingangssteuersatz zu zahlen, müssen weiterhin neunzehnkommaneun bezahlen. Das heißt der Schwerpunkt Ihrer Maßnahmen trifft gerade die kleinen Leute, schafft natürlich weniger Verbrauch, schafft natürlich eine weitere schlechte Binnenkonjunktur. Ich kann diesen Weg nicht mitgehen und ich werde ihn auch nicht mitgehen und ich sage sehr deutlich, dass wir einen anderen Weg gehen werden.

[...]

BK Sie versprechen ja allen alles.

MP Nein.

BK Das finanzieren Sie mit Streichung der Nachtarbeitszuschläge, mit dem Wegfall der *Werbungskosten.*

MP *Das ist doch Quatsch*.

BK Natürlich, das steht so in Ihrem *Programm drin*.

MP *Nein, das steht so nicht in dem Programm drin.*

BK *Sonst... sonst müssen Sie's hier...*

MP *Herr Bundeskanzler, ich muß Sie hier korrigieren.*

BK *sonst müssen Sie's hier korrigieren.* Lassen Sie mich ausreden.
MP *Tu ich ja gerne.*
BK *Sonst* müssen sie's hier dementieren. Das heißt, Sie machen eine Umverteilung von unten nach oben. [...] und deswegen ist das ein Feld, auf dem ich gerne streite und /äh/ wo klar wird, dass Sie für die Steuergeschenke ganz oben die Menschen, die zur Arbeit gehen, die in die Fabriken und Verwaltungen gehen und dort Ihre Pflicht tun, insbesondere diejenigen, die nachts arbeiten /äh/ die Feiertagszuschläge bekommen, die wollen Sie belasten, um den Spitzensteuersatz zu senken. [...]
J1 Jetzt haben wir den Herrn Bundeskanzler über Unsinn, über Unvernunft und andere Dinge sprechen hören /äh/ und hat es auf Sie bezogen.

Interpreting Emotions in Literary Dialogue

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1. Introducing the problem

In the introduction to his "Traité de Stylistique Française" Charles Bally underlines the predominant nature of affect in the life of the "average person" ("l'homme moyen", and posits two types of affective constituents: those which reflect the pure self, and those which are modified by the social conditions pertaining to the presence of other participants in discourse ("tantôt ceux-ci reflètent le moi dans toute se pureté, tantôt ils sont modifiés socialement par les conditions tenant à la présence d'un où de plusieurs autres sujets", Bally 1951 [1909]: 12). However, deeply aware of the omni-presence of the other in communication, he underlines the social nature of affect as it is realized in language:

> Si nous tenons compte de la constitution fondamentale de l 'homme moyen', qui fait le langage et le transforme, nous comprendrons que ce langage, qui exprime aussi des idées, exprime avant tout des *sentiments*. Notons cependant [...], que le langage, étant un fait social, ne peut exprimer des mouvements de l'être individuel que la face accessible à la connaissance des autres individus; autrement dit, on ne peut montrer ce qu'on pense et ce qu'on sent soi-même que par des moyens d'expression que les autres peuvent comprendre.
> (1951 [1909]: 6).

The duality of the supposedly pure vs. the social, and hence the distinction between the personal and the public, or better yet the duality of inner faculties and their external manifestations, is of the outmost importance in pragmatics, mostly when we try to unfold implied meanings and to uncover the path taken by interpreters in their search for implied meanings. As far as human emotions are concerned, assuming there *is* a pure state altogether free of its

manifestations, the question whether this state may be accessible at all, given the social-dependent mediation of language, has amply been discussed (and see, for example, the feelings/emotions distinctions, Frijda 1986; Besnier 1990; Damasio 1999).

In everyday life, part of the assignment of emotional meanings via discourse involves another question: are the manifested emotions genuine? This question presupposes the possibility of a *strategic manipulation* of emotions so as to achieve interactional purposes. Based on an integrated overview of previous discussions, Arndt & Janney propose to view this type, labeled *emotive communication*, as culture-dependent, volitional, and resulting from the need to meet others' expectations and influence their behavior, whereas *emotional communication* is expressed through spontaneous, physical reactions, is nonvolitional and results from the need to adapt physiologically to strong emotions (1991: 531; cf. also Caffi & Janney 1994). Weigand (1998: 40), speaking about "the strategic use of emotions", argues that any expression of emotions has a communicative purpose, which is "to get a feeling of empathy and understanding from the other" (1998: 40). And Daneš (1994) distinguishes between spontaneous manifestations of emotions and their strategic employment, and, following Mathesius, further proposes the possibility that "the speaker wants to conceal his/her emotion and tries to suppress it, but nevertheless involuntarily lets it out (the emotion will then be revealed by various features of the speaker's utterance and/or other communicative behavior)" (1994: 261).

The question I propose to ask in this paper is a mirror-reflection of this last possibility. It argues for the possibility that a speaker may want to express emotions, or at least talk about them, and nevertheless involuntarily lets out his or her inability to genuinely feel them. The question, from a pragmatic point of view, would then be: what are the textual patterns liable to indicate this discrepancy? This, of course, is just one aspect of a wider question, i.e.: can a given piece of emotional discourse, under given circumstances, pave the way for the interpreter to reveal the speaker's inner feelings?

My purpose in this paper is indeed to explore the assignments of emotions to speakers in literary context. The analysis presupposes an interpretation process whereby an utterance may be assigned an emotional value depending on its textual features, co-textual links and the context in which it is embedded. The literary text is conceived of as a complex dialogic action game (Weigand 1998, 2000), whereby manifold relations hold between dialogic purposes and communicative means, and a multi-layered texture of participants with different communicative worlds is brought into play. The notion of participants, whether referred to as addresser and addressee, or speaker and hearer, is in-

herently complex in any discourse. For instance, the variety of potential roles a speaker may undertake at any given moment (Goffman 1983) and the status of the hearer in terms of ratification (ibid) or designation (Clark & Carlson 1992) has important consequences in any discourse type. Literary discourse is different at least in as much as one would further assign meanings to implicit characters and to an omnipotent implied author (Booth 1961; for a pragmatic exploration of these issues, see Dascal & Weizman 1990; Weizman & Dascal forthcoming). Hence, when examining how emotional values are assigned to speakers in literature, three major questions present themselves: how characters assign emotions to each other, how readers assign emotive values to characters, and whether the implied author may also be assigned emotions.

The discussion which follows will focus on the second question and suggest some thoughts about the third one, drawing on a textual reading of the first chapter of the novel *Michael Sheli* "My Michael" by the Israeli writer Amos Oz. *Michael Sheli* is the story of a young family in Jerusalem in the 1950s, narrated in the first person by the wife and mother. The text is given below in its published English translation.[1] The examples are translated literally, whenever the published translation exhibits a shift from the original Hebrew in a way that might obscure the discussion. Given the potential culture-dependence of some emotions and their namings (e.g. Wierzbicka 1992, 1999), it should be emphasized that the textual analysis here focuses on the ways the Hebrew reader assigns values to the Hebrew text.

As will be shown, in this particular literary piece the narrator is highly concerned with the events as well as the emotions she experiences. At the most explicit level, then, emotions are explicitly named. A closer look at the text indicates that the semantic range of meanings attached to the namings is further enhanced by the co-text, and that culture-dependent connotations further enrich the emotional value of the narration. In Section 3, then, I will consider the assignment of emotional values to utterances as a scalar continuum, in which the degree of explicitness is evaluated in terms of reliance on text. Hence, the scale ranges from explicit namings of emotions, through co-textual gap-filling, to context-dependent connotations. I will show how, based on these three indices, the speaker is conceived of as constantly preoccupied by her own emotions as well as those of others, and highly oriented toward them. If, however, the reader interprets this preoccupation as attesting to her inner feelings, textual patterns pertaining to features at higher discourse levels may cast doubt on this initial interpretation (Section 4). Finally, I will argue for the need to introduce a sincerity condition into the analysis of meta-talk about emotions, determined in terms of degrees of involvement.

2. The text

I am writing this because people I loved have died. I am writing this because when I was young I was full of the power of loving, and now that power of love is dying. I do not want to die.
I am thirty years of age and a married woman. My husband is Dr. Michael Gonen, a geologist, a good-natured man. I loved him. We met in Terra Sancta College ten years ago. I was a first-year student at the Hebrew University, in the days when lectures were still given in Terra Sancta College.
This is how we met:
One winter's day at nine o'clock in the morning I slipped coming downstairs. A young stranger caught me by the elbow. His hand was strong and full of restraint. I saw short fingers with flat nails. Pales fingers with soft black down on the knuckles. He hurried to stop me falling, and I leaned on his arm until the pain passed. I felt at a loss, because it is disconcerting to slip suddenly in front of strangers: searching, inquisitive eyes and malicious smiles. And I was embarrassed because the young stranger's hand was broad and warm. As he held me I could feel the warmth of his fingers through the sleeve of the blue woollen dress my mother had knitted me. It was winter in Jerusalem.
He asked me whether I had hurt myself.
I said I thought I had twisted my ankle.
He said he had always liked the world "ankle". He smiled.
His smile was embarrassed and embarrassing. I blushed. Nor did I refuse when he asked if he could take me to the cafeteria on the ground floor. My leg hurt. Terra Sancta College is a Christian convent which was loaned to the Hebrew University after the 1948 war when the buildings on Mount Scorpus were cut off. It is a cold building; the corridors are tall and wide. I felt distracted as I followed this young stranger who was holding on to me. I was happy to respond to his voice. I was unable to look straight at him and examine his face. I sensed, rather than I saw, that his face was long and lean and dark.
"Now let's sit down", he said.
We sat down, neither of us looking at the other. Without asking what I wanted he ordered two cups of coffee. I loved my late father more than any other man in the world. When my new acquaintance turned his head I saw that his hair was cropped short and that he was unevenly shaven. Dark bristles showed, especially under his chin. I do not know why this detail struck me as important, in fact as a point in his favor. I liked his smile and his fingers, which were playing with a teaspoon as if they had an independent live of their own. And the spoon enjoyed being held by them. My own finger felt a faint urge to touch his chin, on the spot where he had not shaved properly and where the bristles sprouted.
Michael Gonen was his name.
He was a third-year geology student. He had been born and brought up in Holon. "It's cold in this Jerusalem of yours." "My Jerusalem? How do you know I'm from Jerusalem?"
He was sorry, he said, if he was wrong for once, but he did not think he was wrong. He had learned by now to spot a Jerusalemite at first sight. As he spoke he looked into my eyes for the first time. His eyes were gray. I noticed a flicker of amusement in them, but not a cheerful flicker. I told him that his guess was right. I was indeed a Jerusalemite.
"Guess? Oh, no."

He pretended to look offended, the corners of his mouth smiling: No, it was not a guess. He could see that I was a Jerusalemite. "See?" Was this part of his geology course? No, of course not. As a matter of fact, it was something he had learned from cats. From cats? Yes, he loved watching cats. A cat would never make friends with anyone who was not disposed to like him. Cats are never wrong about people.
"You seem to be a happy sort of person", I said happily. I laughed, and my laugh betrayed me.
Afterwards Michael Gonen invited me to accompany him to the third floor of Terra Sancta College, where some instructional films about the Dead Sea and the Arava were about to be shown.
On the way up, as we passed the place on the staircase where I had slipped earlier, Michael took hold of my sleeve once again. As if there were a danger of slipping again on that particular step. Through the blue wool I could feel every one of his fiver fingers. He coughed drily and I looked at him. He caught me by looking at him, and his face reddened. Even his ears turned red. The rain beat at the windows.
"What a downpour", Michael said.
"Yes, a downpour," I agreed enthusiastically, as if I had suddenly discovered that we were related.
Michael hesitated. Then he added:
"I saw the mist early this morning and there was a strong wind blowing."
"In my Jerusalem, winter is winter", I replied gaily, stressing 'my Jerusalem' because I wanted to remind him of his opening words. I wanted him to go on taling, but he could not think of a reply; he is not a witty man. So he smiled again. On a rainy day in Jerusalem in Terra Sancta College on the stairs between the first floor and the second floor. I have not forgotten.

3. Constructing emotional values from meta-talk

An essential feature of the examined piece of discourse is that the reader is faced with a first-person narration about past events and past emotions. Many of them include the naming of emotions. They are therefore considered here as explicit in the sense that the *emotions talked about are spelled out*, whereas in the two other categories, emotional values are reconstructed via co-text and context. Note that it is *not* claimed here that this type of explicitness entails direct access to the narrator's genuine emotional state. This issue will be further discussed in Section 4, where other textual patterns will be taken into account, including the fact that meta-talk about emotion is embedded here in statements in the past tense.

3.1 Naming emotions

Telling the story of her first meeting with Michael, Hanna speaks about her emotions as well as about Michael's. Through a self-conscience meta-talk, she assigns emotional value to events (her falling down, ex. 2), to facial expressions (his smile, ex. 1 & 3) and to gestures (his fingers, ex.1), thus making her own emotions and her interpretation of his emotions explicitly accessible to the reader:

(1) I *liked* his smile and his fingers, which were playing with a teaspoon as if they had an independent life of their own.

(2) I *felt at a loss*, because it is *humiliating* to slip suddenly in front of strangers: searching, inquisitive eyes and malicious smiles.

(3) He smiled. His smile was *embarrassed* and *embarrassing*.

(4) "In my Jerusalem winter is winter", I replied *gaily* [...]

But more than anything else, she is concerned with love. Sadly, love is associated with death from the outset (ex. 5). Surprisingly, it is related to the past, explicitly referred to as fading (as far as other people are concerned, ex. 5), and conventionally implicated (Grice 1975) as non-existent (as far as Michael is concerned, ex. 6):

(5) I am writing because *people I loved* have already died. I am writing because when I was young I had a lot of *power to love* and now *my power to love is dying*. I do not want to die.

(6) My husband is Dr. Michael Gonen, a geologist, a good-natured man. *I loved him*.

Note, that in Hebrew, the first-person pronoun *I* (Hebrew "ani") is non-obligatory in the past tense. Hence, the use of the pronoun in *I loved him* (Hebrew "ani ahavti oto") is marked for emphasis, and plausibly lends itself for the interpretation: I did (love him), he did not (love me). This emphasis acquires an additional value when compared with her statement about her love to her father. There, the verb *loved* is not preceded by the first-person pronoun, and the direct object *my father* markedly precedes the verb, thus acquiring an accentuated value:

(7) *et avi hamanoax ahavti yoter mikol ish axer baolam*.
My-father loved more than-any person other in-the-world
"I loved my father more than any other person in the world."

The full range of the emotional value of *love* in this extract is yet to be interpreted through its relations with co-text, and mostly with the word *death*, as will be made clear in the next sub-section.

3.2 Constructing emotions through co-textual gapfilling

In textual analysis, explicit naming does not in any way exclude gapfilling. Here, it is the co- occurrence of the connotative words *love* and *death* in the first paragraph (ex. 5), which enriches *the emotive contours* of both of them. The emotional value inherent in *death* is enhanced through its association with the fading of love. The emotional value of *love*, in turn, is boosted when conceived of in its relations with death. Love is implicitly equated with life itself, thus acquiring a metonymic value. This emotional contours is text-specific, and its ascription at the very beginning of the narration casts a cloud of sadness over the story to come.

While so far we have seen how semantic connotations are *enhanced* through co-text, gapfilling may also guide the reader towards the *assignment* of emotional values. The adjectives *warm* and *cold* are a case in point.

The adjective *warm* occurs a few times in the chapter, usually associated with Michael's hand and fingers. At the level of utterance meaning, then, it may be interpreted as carrying a referential meaning pertaining to temperature. This reading is further supported by the co-text, for example when this warmth is associated with the weather:

(8) And I was embarrassed because the young stranger's hand was broad and *warm*. As he held me I could feel *the warmth* of his fingers through the sleeve of the blue woollen dress my mother had knitted me. It was *winter* in Jerusalem.

(9) On the way up, as we passed the place on the staircase where I had slipped earlier, Michael took hold of my sleeve once again with his *warm* hand. (four last words omitted in translation)

The cohesive links between the various occurrences of the word, however, may suggest a metaphoric meaning pertaining to the semantic field of emotions. This interpretation requires a multi-directional reading. Following the first encounter between Michael and Hanna, Michael blushes when he touches her:

(10) He caught me looking at him, and his face *reddened*. Even his ears *turned red.*

She, in turn, "could feel everyone of his five fingers", and is highly attracted to him ("My own finger felt a faint urge to touch his chin"). The warmth of the hand is thus endowed with a moderately erotic meaning. This is in contrast with the restraint attributed to his warm hand when he first touches Hanna in an attempt to stop her from falling:

(11) A young stranger caught me by the elbow. His hand was strong and *full of restraint*.

Warmth now seems to invite a metonymic interpretation related to the sexual attraction between them, and is introduced into the semantic field of emotions, implicitly associated with *passion*.

Against this background, the adjective *cold*, which, when qualifying a building and associated with the architecture of the corridors, is read as referential, can plausibly be interpreted as emotional, conveying the narrator's solitude and sadness.

(12) Terra Sancta is a Christian convent which was loaned to the Hebrew University after the 1948 war when the building on Mount Scopus were cut of. It is a *cold* building: the corridors are tall and wide.

The *gapfilling claim* suggests that the assignment of emotive values to the adjectives *warm* and *cold* is made plausible only through its co-textual links with other textual constituents as well as with each other.

3.3 Culture dependent connotations[2]

(13) "In my Jerusalem winter is winter", I replied gaily, stressing 'my Jerusalem' because I wanted to remind him of his opening words.

The opening words, which made Hanna so happy, were:

(14) It's cold in this Jerusalem of yours.

Indeed, she repeats them a few times:

(15) "My Jerusalem? *How do you know I'm a Jerusalemite*?"
[translated: *from Jerusalem*]
[...]
I told him his guess was right. *I was indeed a Jerusalemite.*
Guess? Oh, no.
[...]
No, it was not a guess. He could see that I was a Jerusalemite.

Obviously, Hanna is proud of having been taken for a Jerusalemite, and is most content to talk about "her" Jerusalem. Far from being equivalent to an adverbial group (e.g. *from Jerusalem*), and adjective or a noun coined after a name of place conventionally carries some connotations, as is manifest in John Kennedy's famous words: "Ich bin ein Berliner!". In addition, names of places and their derivatives are liable to acquire their emotive meanings by virtue of the cultural background underlying them. These emotions will only be felt by those who share the same cultural experiences, since their interpretation draws on extra linguistic clues. In the case of Hanna's narration, the co-text makes it evident that the words *your Jerusalem* and *Jerusalemite* carry some emotional value for her, but the nature of this value is known only to readers who share the same culture.

4. Questioning the narrator's sincerity

As suggested earlier, the extensive meta-talk about emotions as well as the emotional values implied by co-textual and contextual information lend themselves to an interpretation which views the narrator as highly concerned with emotions, be they hers or other peoples', mostly Michael's. Had this narration been in the *present tense*, the reader would plausibly have asked herself to what extent this concern sincerely reflects Hanna's inner feelings. This is because the sincerity condition of "I am embarrassed", for example, is: the speaker *feels embarrassed*, and its essential condition is: the utterance counts as an *expression of embarrassment*. The same utterance, if formulated in the *past tense*, would have a different sincerity condition: "the speaker *believes (at present) that* she was embarrassed", and would therefore count as an *expression of belief* that she was embarrasssed.

Along this line of thought, since, as we have seen, in the novel we examine the narrator explicitly talking about past emotions, the question is *not* whether she genuinely feels them. Rather, it is whether, taken in its entirety, this constant meta-talk about emotions reflects a deep orientation towards them. In other words, we do not ask ourselves whether the narrator feels the specific emotions she talks about, but rather whether she is capable of having emotions at all. An answer to this question requires, I suggest, a recognition of the interplay between *meta-talk about emotion*s and *involvement*.

The notion of *involvement* has captured the attention of sociolinguistics mostly in the context of the distinction between oral and written discourse and of face to face interaction, and it is in these contexts that discourse fea-

tures were identified as characteristic of *involvement* vs. *detachment* and *integration* (Chafe 1982), and of *high involvement* vs. *low involvement* (Tannen 1984, 1989). Katriel & Dascal's (1989) view of *involvement* and *commitment*, on the other hand, is not confined to specific contexts and posits an important distinction between two types: *topical involvement*, "which refers to the speaker's cognitive orientation to a shared discourse topic", and *interactional involvement*, "which refers to the speaker's orientation to the speech situation and to the participants in it" (Katriel & Dascal 1989: 285). The point I am making is that given the interplay between emotions and involvement (Tannen 1989: 12; Lakoff 1990: 49; Daneš 1994: 256), *explicit and implicit expressions of emotions are liable to be interpreted as genuinely emotional if, and only if, they are embedded in discourse manifesting a certain degree of interactional involvement.*

The narration we analyse here illustrates this claim: Hanna's is embedded mostly in a discourse of emotional detachment, which undermines its credibility. The indices of detachment here, I suggest, are reasoning patterns, matter-of-fact style, and explicitation.[3]

4.1 Reasoning patterns

More than anything else, the narrator seems to be preoccupied by the need to provide reasons for her thoughts and emotions, as indicated by the frequent use of *because* in many of the examples discussed above, repeated for convenience. Note that the story begins with a rather elaborated piece of reasoning (cf. Sovran, this volume):

(5) I am writing because people I loved have already died. I am writing *because* when I was young I had a lot of power to love and now my power to love is dying. I do not want to die.

(2) I felt at a loss, *because* it is humiliating to slip suddenly in front of strangers: searching, inquisitive eyes and malicious smiles.

(12) And I was embarrassed *because* the young stranger's hand was broad and warm.

(4) "In my Jerusalem, winter is winter," I replied gaily, stressing "my Jerusalem" *because* I wanted to remind him of his opening words'.

(16) I wanted him to go on talking, but he could not think of a reply, *because* he is not a witty man.

This procedure has several effects: not only does it enhance the non-spontaneity of the narration, it further attests to the narrator's underlying presupposition

that emotions are the direct consequences of events, and that they regularly lend themselves to rational analysis. Furthermore, the recourse to explicit reasoning manifests a high degree of orderliness, and is thus opposed to fuzziness, which is typical of involvement (Chafe 1982).

4.2 Matter-of-fact style: information and rhythm

The emotional value of prosodic features is of the utmost importance (for a discussion, cf. Arndt & Janney 1991; Selting 1994). Obviously, a written narration can hardly lend itself to a prosodic study the way spoken discourse does. However, in a narration, syntactic structures and punctuation may provide the reader with some hints as to the prosodic quality of the text. And the hints in this text point to short, staccato, matter-of-fact formulations. Note how, in (6), Hanna's evaluation of Michael's character and the surprising statement about her past love to him are juxtaposed to his academic title and his profession, in a style reminiscent of curriculum vitae. This juxtaposition cancels the potential dramatic effect of the implicature conveyed by "I loved him". Similarly, the cataphoric statement "this is how we met" and the cataphoric column, characteristically preceding enumerations in formal written discourse, convey the formal and non-spontaneous tone of a report:

(6) My husband is *Dr. Michael Gonen, a geologist, a good natured man. I loved him.*

(17) We met in the Terra Sancta building ten years ago. I was a first-year student at the Hebrew University, in the days when lectures were still given in the Terra Sancta building. *This is how we met: [...]*

(2) I felt at a loss, because it is humiliating to slip suddenly in front of strangers: *searching, inquisitive eyes and malicious smiles.*

(18) It is a cold building: the corridors are tall and wide.

4.3 Explicitation

Close relations between speakers are characterised, to a large extent, by assumptions about shared knowledge, and hence by omissions of all kinds. Tannen, for example, delineates the way a sense of involvement is heightened by unstated meanings (Tannen 1989: 23). Hence, explicitation of contextual clues signals distance and possibly detachment. The following is a case in point. Here, the speaker's consciousness of her role as narrator, reflected in the expla-

nation of historical facts, blocks the way to the formation of bonding between her and the reader:

(19) Terra Sancta building is a Christian convent which was loaned to the Hebrew university when the buildings on Mount Scopus were cut off.

5. Coda

In his collection of critical papers *The Story Begins*, Amos Oz, the writer of *My Michael* states:

> Any beginning of a story is always a kind of contract between writer and reader. There are, of course, all sorts of contracts, including those that are insincere. Sometimes the opening paragraph or chapter works like a secret pact between writer and reader, behind the protagonist's back. (Oz 1999: 7)

Indeed, I believe that in the opening of *My Michael*, Amos Oz signs a secret pact with the reader: he lets the protagonist talk about emotions, analyse emotions, even express emotions. At the same time, he whispers to the readers: not only did Hanna lose the power to love, as she is well aware of; Hanna lost the power to genuinely feel emotions. This sad secret is shared with us behind the narrator's back.

One personal comment. The day I finished writing this paper, I got a message from Ms. Stefanie Schnöring, a participant in the Münster symposium. With her permission, I quote her words:

> Fortunately I have more time for reading now and have also read *My Michael*. I must admit that it is strange for me because I cannot identify with the narrator. She seems to me rather heartless.

6. Concluding remarks

In her critical overview of the vast field of linguistic research on emotions, Kerbrat-Orrechioni (2000) delineates some of the problems with which linguistics is presented when studying emotions, and which pertain to the fuzziness of both *siginifié* and *signifiant*. This could be one of the reasons why, within the large literature on emotions, there are only few attempts to analyse full texts. In the discussion above I analysed the interpretation path which may lead the reader of a literary text to the interpretation of meta-talk about emotions.

I found the beginning of *My Michael* particularly relevant, precisely because it provides us with the opportunity to delineate the discourse patterns which make it possible to distinguish between *meta-talk about emotions* and *expressions of emotions*. I maintain that although we know that one can speak about emotions without feeling them, interpreters are still willing to know whether the emotions talked about are genuinely felt. In other words, I argue for the need to apply the concept of 'sincerity condition' to the study of emotional discourse by incorporating into the analysis the notion of involvement as it is manifested in texts.

Notes

1. My thanks go to Dr. Tamar Sovran for an insightful discussion of this novel, and to the participants of the Münster workshop on 'Emotion in Dialogic Interaction – Advances in the Complex', for their stimulating input. Please note that in Sovran's analysis (this volume), she quotes the published English translation, whereas I give a more literal translation of the discussed examples.

2. For a discussion of this issue, see Sovran, this volume. Please note: Sovran refers to the way culture-dependent connotations appeal to the reader, whereas I focus on the reader's assumptions concerning the way they appeal to the narrator.

3. It is important to note that the genre-specificity of indices of involvement previously discussed (for a discussion see Besnier 1994) makes some of them irrelevant to my analysis. For example, first- person references and reference to speaker's mental processes) (Chafe 1982, Tannen 1984, 1989) are part and parcel of the narrator's style, and are therefore taken as unmarked for involvement discourse.

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The Author-Reader-Text Emotional Bond in the Literary Action Game

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1. Preface

This paper will approach some of the features of the 'literary action game' through the opening pages of Amos Oz's (1972 [1968]) novel *My Michael*. I shall examine the application of Weigand's claim that "an approach to language as it is used in Dialogic Action Games has to be based on authentic texts", and that "what is going on in the action game can be fully explained only by insiders of the action game" (Weigand forthcoming). I will investigate the status of insiders in the literary action game and the nature of the emotional bond between the author and the reader. I consider the text to be the main factor in creating this bond, but not the only one;[1] I will dwell on the evasive equilibrium between universal and culture-bounded features of this bond.

2. From sensations to emotions – language games and action games

The philosopher and psychologist William James (1948: 375) states his view about the relation between body sensation and emotion as follows: "The bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, our feeling of the same changes as they occur in us IS [sic] the emotion." Such a view leaves very little to the analysis of emotions in a literary text. On the other hand, several themes in the later Wittgenstein help to justify such an analysis. The first theme can be found in his analysis of the notion of 'pain' as a counter argument to the solipsist idea of 'private language' (Wittgenstein 1953: 269, 275). Another notion of Wittgenstein's, that of 'language games' can be considered as related

to the more recent notion of 'action game' (Weigand 1998, 2000, forthcoming) and thus to the justification of treating the literary text as a component of a specific type of action game. Wittgenstein, as opposed to James, acknowledges the conceptual richness of emotions (Wittgenstein 1980) and the role of language and conceptualization in their formation. However, the ties between emotions and body sensations explain their intensified affective nature as opposed to pure cognitive states. Following Wittgenstein we may say that emotions such as love, humiliation, embarrassment etc. are formed on the basis of past experiences and of generalized conceptualizations which involve our perspective of the world and of our place in it. This idea may be seen as a version of reconnecting the broken link between mind and body which has prevailed in western philosophy since Descartes (see the contribution by Joseph this volume). Wittgenstein's and Weigand's ideas provide the reason and the justification for probing into the 'emotional literary language game' in an attempt to study its nature via its underlying structure of conventions, rules and function.

3. The emotional plot

In this section I follow the line of the psychological constructionist attitude toward the language of emotions. Edwards and Potter (1992: 142) argue: "In natural discourse talk about events and happenings is designed to allow inferences about mental life and cognition." Psycholinguistics in adopting such a constructionist approach to the language of emotions deduces people's (especially children's) understanding of emotions and their mastering of the language of emotions from their verbal reactions to narratives and picture books (Bamberg 1997). In using clear-cut cases referring to fear, anger or shame situations, researchers adhere to the underlying presuppositions that such emotional states are identifiable in certain simple situations and that the emotional reactions of the informants are reflected through the varying roles they assign to the participants in the scenarios. The described participants in a scenario are supposed to behave differently if they are angry, shameful or sad. I believe that such a constructionist approach is even more suitable for recognizing and analyzing emotions in literary texts. However, one has to keep in mind the particular complications and challenges offered by the literary action game.

In the case of Oz's novel, the narrator, the heroine Hanna, tells the story in the first person singular. She is reconstructing the details of past events from a present distant perspective, in a reflective mood, in an attempt to make sense of the course of events, including her own behaviour. These are the opening lines

of the novel (Oz 1968: 1): "I am writing this because people I loved have died. [...] when I was young I was full of the power of loving, and now that power of loving is dying. I do not want to die." This is an emotionally loaded passage. The relation between the three successive sentences is odd, although they are expressed in a quasi logical inferential manner. We are led to believe that the episode that follows, the encounter with the future husband, will manifest this past emotional state of being 'full of the power of loving'. Yet the shadow of the present sad emotional state colours the misty reports of past events. And although the narrator is supposed to be the best source for reporting the actual course of events, if not for understanding them, the reader realizes very early that Hanna is perhaps not fully aware of the events, and is not very clear about their interpretation. As we will see from what follows it will not be clear to what conceptualized 'script' the episode might belong. Is it a shy romantic encounter? The reader, as well as the heroine herself, does not have a clear affirmative answer. The difficulty to identify and to tag the 'script' stems from the way the events are narrated, as will be seen below. The lack of a recognized 'script' or pattern of behavior makes the task of the reader as a decoder of actions and motives more complicated but perhaps adds to the attractive power of the novel. There is an air of unconsciousness around the narrating heroine (see details in Weizman's analysis of indirectness, in this volume). She does not appear to have a clear picture of her own emotional state, let alone of the man she is describing. The reader gets to know this young man through the narrator's emotionally ambivalent interpretative description. We as readers are therefore invited, perhaps forced, to be active interpreters in this complex 'picture book test' made of words. We are drawn into a course of trivial events and are tilted between references to emotional poles such as love and death, attraction and reservations. This tension is one of the accelerators of the reader's emotional involvement.

There are several internal components in the text which help increase the emotional involvement. One of them is the restlessness and the unexplained shifts that characterize the narrator's way of reporting the course of events. Three sorts of shifts create this atmosphere of instability:

– the shift from trivial external facts to inner thoughts and emotions: *pale fingers* (p. 1), *spoon enjoyed being held* (p. 2), *bristles* [...] *not shaved properly* (p. 2), *a faint urge to touch (p. 2);*

– the shift from reporting mainly trivial facts to evaluating them positively and negatively: The metonymic spoon "*enjoyed* being held" by the "*not properly shaved*" man, and this particular personal shortcoming arouses the urge to

touch and at the same time the reflection (p. 2): "I do not know why this *detail* struck me as *important*" (my emphases, T.S.). The reader, like the child facing the psycholinguistic story book test, has to make sense of this mixture. He/she is invited to deduce the emotions from a mixed and complicated testimony;

– the third kind of shift combines the two former, adding to the reader's difficulty by unexpected associative leaps from present trivial events to past emotional recollections (p. 2): "[...] he ordered two cups of coffee. I loved my late father more than any other man in the world." What can explain the leap from describing a young stranger ordering coffee to the admittance of a daughter's love to her father? The additional, somewhat childish, Freudian note "more than any other man in the world" provides perhaps a faint hint at an unconscious reference to the ability to love, which was explicitly mentioned in the novel's opening lines. I believe that these factors together with other discourse strategies (Weizman, this volume) increase the degree of the reader's emotional reactions to the text, the willingness to take part, to make sense, to resolve the unresolved, and to clear the surrounding emotional fog. In Weigand's (1998) terms the reader is gradually 'coming to understand' the events and the motivations of the acting personae.[2]

4. Three external components of the literary action game

I would now like to point out some external components of the literary action game concerning emotions. Some of these characteristics are shared with other forms of artistic experience. I will divide them into three sections: the universal component, the particular component and the ongoing external relationship between the author and the readers.

4.1 The universal factor

The well-known formula 'encounter–falling in love–departure' encapsulates the universality of romance and of the expectancy of some rough outlines of human emotional behaviour. It is also a commonplace that opera audiences, book readers, or movie spectators react to, judge, and evaluate the specific artistic setting against the background of their own past experience of love, attraction, embarrassment, excitement, erotic arousal, shame, guilt, etc. Plato inherited from the Pythagoreans the view that 'the soul is harmony' (Phaedo 85.e). The soul reflects and is responsive to other modes of harmony in the world: of

numbers, of the celestial constellations, and of music. Modern as well as ancient ways of healing by art, storytelling, music therapy, biblio-therapy, etc. share the idea that an individual soul is responsive, perhaps by echoing, to certain settings of events, stories, pictures, landscapes, sounds, images, etc. It seems that this is one of the reasons why universal semanticists such as Wierzbicka (1995, 1996, 1999) looks for assumed basic semantic primitives that underlie emotion words in many unrelated languages, and cognitive linguists (Kövecses 1995) look for the figurative embodiments of such emotions. Again the literary action game poses a challenge to the study of the language of emotions. In many dramatic and lyric literary texts emotions are expressed rather than named. In a sophisticated linguistic configuration the literary language and the fictional discourse have to convey emotions implicitly through the mimetic dimension, imitating and constructing 'real life' situations, rather than through the semiotic dimension of constructing a lexicon of emotion names, expressions, and metaphors.

Reactions to the opening pages of Oz's novel, which has been translated into many languages, are those of involvement, sympathy and sadness. The success of the translations shows once more that a complex emotional situation described in a particular language can be conveyed to readers in distant surroundings and can touch, cause excitement and encourage participation as 'insiders' in the emotional dialogic action game. It shows that although the linguistic-literary configuration of the events and emotions is complex and sometimes very particularized, it has a certain nucleus of meaning which refers to a universal emotional setting common to all humanity.

4.2 Particular and indexical factors

The first episode takes place in winter at Terra Sancta (Oz 1972: 1):

> My leg hurt. Terra Sancta College is a Christian convent which was loaned to the Hebrew University after the 1948 war when the buildings of Mount Scopus were cut off: It is a cold building; the corridors are wide. I felt distracted as I followed this young stranger who was holding on to me.

I said above that the text is replete with suggestions of universally recognized emotional states. I would now like to argue that the setting, the time and especially the place, add to this emotional impact. For a European reader there is nothing very strange about a university course taking place in a Christian convent. This is not the case in western Jerusalem.

The convents constructed in modern western Jerusalem follow various European stylistic traditions and suggest a distant, perhaps mysterious, cultural world likely to arouse ambivalent reactions of attraction, curiosity, and suspicion in a young and unstable mind.

The events take place around 1955, that is between 1948 and 1967, when Jerusalem was divided by a wall not very far from the Terra Sancta building. The university, founded in 1925 and built on Mount Scopus, was then located in various temporary accommodations, thus keeping alive the memory of the recent war, and of the reason for studying in an adapted convent and not in the original building.[3] Political tension in the divided city and the memories of a past when Jews and Arabs lived as close neighbours in various parts of the city are further referred to in the novel in Hanna's memories about two handsome neighbor Arab twins, and her later erotic fantasies in which they appear in a mixture of repulsion, fear and quasi-masochistic attraction. Terra Sancta as the decor of the first episode evokes a whole set of emotional reactions that stem from this fragile political situation. The place adds to the air of detachment and gloom. The translated novel is capable of evoking an intensive emotional reaction, but it should be kept in mind that personal experience of this sensitive time and an acquaintance with the emotion-laden place will amplify the emotional effect of the novel in general and of the opening page in particular.

4.3 Beyond the novel: The author-as-person's external role in the action game

In the theory of literary criticism, especially in the 'new criticism' approach, a deliberate effort was made to separate the actual author form the narrator (here a male author vs. a woman's narrating voice, which on the surface seems to make this effort easier). The 'intentional fallacy', the allegedly mistaken reference to the writer's 'intentions' was a target for various attacks (for example Beardsley 1958: 25–26). The work of art was not supposed to be interpreted according to the author's guessed intentions. Present literary theories have turned in other directions, emphasizing the role of multiple particular points of view, and the absence of any authoritative interpretation (Fish 1980). Without committing myself to any of these views, I shall argue that in the particular case of Amos Oz the personality of the author and his intended role in his audience's awareness play a part in creating at least part of the emotional value of his works. He takes his role as a very conscious writer in the literary action game as well as in the wider socio-cultural game involving media reporters and producers, publishers, critics, institutions, prizes, etc. Oz is a very eloquent speaker

and an agreeable looking man. He has very clear moral and political ideas and does not hesitate to make them publicly known in articles and interviews. He was the only child of two highly educated immigrants from Eastern Europe. Oz was born as Amos Klausner[4] in Jerusalem in 1939. *My Michael* was published when he was twenty seven years old, and was his first long novel after a volume of short stories about kibbutz life: *Where the Jackals Howl* (1965).[5] The novel was finished in May 1967 and was published a year later. It sold 25.000 copies. This was a huge number in a population of less than two million, many of them unable to read Hebrew. The second impression came out in September 1968 and a further 7.000 copies were sold. Oz was one of the young writers who helped to create a shift in the tendencies of new Israeli literature. The novel is still very popular and has been translated into over a dozen languages.

A glance at some of the titles of Oz's other works shows his awareness of the emotive reaction they might evoke: *Elsewhere, Perhaps* (1967), *Unto Death* (1971),[6] *The Hill of Evil Counsel* (1976),[7] *Black Box* (1987), *To Know a Woman* (1989), *Don't Call it Night* (1994), and others. Even his non fiction works incorporate emotional words in their titles: *Under this Blazing Sun* (1988), *All our Hopes* (1979), and *The Silence of Heaven* (1993).[8] In 2002 Oz published a large scale autobiographical novel: *A Story of Love and Darknes*s. It portrays the author's childhood in Jerusalem prior to, during, and after the 1948 war. This is a sensitive, honest, loving but critical portrait of his family and of Jerusalem before and after the 1948 war. It contains many references to the circumstances and motivations of some of his other books. The emotional and dramatic climax, towards which the whole book leads, is the painful process of his mother's suicide, which took place before he turned thirteen. There he states explicitly that the image of Hanna in *My Michae*l has certain characteristics in common with his beautiful, talented, frustrated, tragic mother. The whole novel *My Michael*, as Oz admits, was an attempt to detach and free himself from his painful childhood recollections of Jerusalem and his personal tragedy.[9] Readers of *My Michael* can perhaps sense the air of tragedy without knowing the deep personal pain from which it emerged. The case of Oz, perhaps not a representative one, is a clear instance where the author as a person collaborates with the author as an imagined hidden figure which has no reality but his voice.

5. Conclusions

I hope to have shown the fruitfulness of applying the notion of 'language games' and 'dialogic action games' in the context of literature. The literary ac-

tion game is embedded in the wider socio-cultural action game. The reader of a literary work of art is called to interpret and react to emotions formulated in words and phrases. Both the author and the reader use their own experience and conceptual framework in this two-fold process of conveying and reacting to emotions. Detecting what underlies emotional interactions in real life situations is not an easy task. The literary text, as reality made by words, adds to this complexity. My claim is that the literary interaction between the author and the reader via the literary text has internal as well as external factors which override the limits of the text itself. Successful translations of literary texts preserve much of the emotional impact of the original work, due to universal features of emotions as well as to inherent structures of language and the author's unique style and talent. However the wider action game, namely the socio-cultural action game, where the writer as a person and time and place coordinates play their role, increases the emotional impact beyond the limits of the text. The effect of a literary text stems both from the literary action game as well as from the wider socio-cultural action game. Hence the varying levels of emotional participants and involvement.

Notes

1. See the detailed pragmatic text-oriented analysis of this text in Weizman (this volume). I wish to thank Professor Elda Weizman for arousing my interest in the subject. I also thank the participants of the ESF workshop on 'Emotion in dialogic interaction – Advances in the complex' held in October 2002 at the University of Münster, for helpful remarks, and especially the organizer of the workshop, Professor Edda Weigand.

2. People from the ESF workshop who had only read the first two translated pages of the novel showed a high degree of empathy and involvement, which led, at least in one case, to the immediate buying of the book. I will come to this point later when speaking on the universal vs. particular factors which arouse emotional reaction to a translated text.

3. Mount Scopus was for 19 years an isolated Israeli secluded outpost in east Jerusalem, surrounded by Jordanian territory. The hospital and the university were deserted after an attack on a convoy, in which 72 professors, students, doctors, and nurses were killed.

4. His father was a nephew of the eminent historian and professor of literature, one of the founders of the Hebrew University, Joseph Klausner.

5. A successful collection of short stories portraying kibbutz life from a critical and not very flattering angle.

6. A passionate historical novel about Crusaders crossing Europe on their way east toward the Holy City.

7. A story about a young couple who leave their little boy with their neighbors, and go to a ball at the British High Commander's mansion, situated in Jerusalem on a hill called the Hill of Evil Counsel. At the end of the short novel the young woman is swept into a dance with a high-ranking British officer and runs away with him, abandoning her child and her husband. The effect is strengthened after reading the gradual renunciation of life of Oz's young mother in *A story of love and darkness*.

8. An interpretive reading of Agnon's works.

9. A short time after his mother's death Amos Oz left Jerusalem and went to live on a kibbutz (Hulda), where he married and remained for a long time. This move, like changing his surname, was a radical shift away from his family background, a change in lifestyle and in political orientation. The motives, the difficulties and the success of the move are reflected in many of his writings and are described in detail in the autobiographical novel (2002).

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On the Inseparability of Emotion and Reason in Argumentation

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1. Introduction

A profane approach to emotions runs two symmetrical risks. The first one could be dubbed the 'alexithymic' stance, that is, the reification of emotion. The analysts claim a totally non-participant stance, in other words, they try to observe emotions as an astronomer would observe a galaxy. They posit that they are able to free themselves from all the transfer/counter transfer ties, that is, from all empathic ties with the situation under analysis. The symmetrical risk is the 'empathic stance', that is the fusion or confusion with its object. Being completely taken into the emotion allegedly analysed, the pseudo-analytic discourse is a mere pseudo-participation in the event. The corpus is no more than an inkblot design, and the analysis a variant of a Rorschach exercise. This risk is particularly clear in the analysis of emotions in interactions (Kleinman & Copp 1993).

This paper presents some tools that can be useful to describe the semantico-textual dimension of emotive discourse, with an example taken from an argumentative genre. Argumentation is currently defined as an interactive process taking place between competing points of view. In argumentative situations, people are deeply involved in what they say, experiencing doubt, uneasiness, impatience, certainly irritation (against the competing possibility, embodied in the opponent's speech), and, finally, feelings of triumph or humiliation – or still anxiety: am I really sure that the right choice wasn't the other one? This is true not only for arguments such as disputes but also for the most elaborated, highly intellectual verbal forms of argumentation.

2. Emotion, passion, mood, affect, sentiment

2.1 Passion, mood, affect, sentiment

Emotion episodes are relatively well-defined and easy to observe. Passions, feelings, affects, moods are other encompassing phenomena, partly overlapping with emotion, partly specific. All these concepts are linked with a specific genre in which they have undergone a specific semantic evolution. *Mood* (fr. *humeur*) originates in medicine. *Passions* are linked with a lay or religious ethic of life; philosophers have elaborated theories of passion. Classical art and literature aim at forms of æsthetic expression and control of passions; romanticism has turned to *sentiment* (fr. *sentiment*). *Emotions* are the favorite concept of psychologists, whereas psychoanalysts refer to *affects*. Affects can be unconscious whereas emotions can not, and, as secondary phenomena, must be accounted for. Semiotics uses the French term *éprouvé*, a noun deriving from the past participle of *éprouver* 'to experience, to feel' (Hénault 2000).

All these concepts jointly define a field and can contribute to build a better understanding of the language of emotion. *Emotion* is probably the mostly used expression in everyday life, and the most field-independent term. *Sentiment*, in French, can have the very intellectual meaning of *opinion* or be a mere synonym of emotion. This word, in French, also seems to have the capacity to focus on the psychological content of any event or situation when it designates the intuitive perception of an inner or outer state as in *un sentiment de fatigue* (feeling tired) or *un sentiment d'incompréhension* (feeling a lack of understanding). *Mood* (fr. *humeur*) is a stable, long-lasting disposition, a preference for a certain emotional orientation. Moods are said to originate in the physical disposition of the person, unrelated to an external, definite stimulus. To be 'in a good mood' is to be ready for joy, just waiting for an adequate stimulus, even ready to create one. It may be the trace of a preceding joy, that is, a mood secondary to a positive emotion. *Passion* can be a mere synonym of *emotion*; or, the representative of the prototypical emotion, love. Specifically, passion is a tendency of the person towards an object, cars or cats, whereas moods are object-independent. Following the current view, emotions are passive, secondary to an arbitrary emotion-inducing event, provoking an emotional state that fades away more or less quickly. Passions define and organize emotions, actively collecting the adequate emotional stimuli; they can rightly be conceived as forms of life.

2.2 Emotions: state and process

Our working definition will be a consensual view of emotion which is widespread in psychology (Cosnier 1994; Battachi, Suslow & Renna 1996):

– In a background *situation*, a foreground *event* occurs and triggers an emotion. *Surprise* appears to be a necessary component of typical emotions.

– An emotion is a *syndrome*, that is, every specific emotion has components, or facets. The core of emotion is a certain *psychological, internal state* (which is the basic referent of the emotion term). This internal state goes with:

– *physiological*, internal transformations;

– transformations in *postures, gestures, mimics, behavior* and *action*.

This 'emotional syndrome' appears relatively sudden and fades out. Emotion is an *episodic* phenomenon, at its best in the first moments of the episode.

Subject-centered analyses of emotion focus on the moved person (all but the first characteristics), whereas pragmatic analyses include the situation (first characteristic). Interaction analyses add observations on group emotions.

The following reservations must be made about the preceding definition:

– Second-level emotions: an emotion can stimulate an emotion of a different kind in the same individual. These second-level emotions are reactions to emotions. To take a classical example: first, I'm afraid or angry; then, or even simultaneously, I'm ashamed of my fear or anger. Psychoanalysts provide less stereotyped examples: it is possible to feel simultaneously joy and shame; and second-degree shame can make me ashamed of my first reaction of shame ("it is a shame to be ashamed of one's low social origins").

– Emotions without stimuli: in an ancient, but clear and conclusive criticism of James' theory of emotions, Janet (1975/1926:II, 24) mentions occurrences of emotions without stimuli, such as " the bliss of the idiot or the demented, the joy of exhausted people after severe hemorrhage, the joy of dying people ".

– Complex emotions: the same event can be the source of multiple, heterogeneous, and contradictory emotions. In France, snow in April can provoke forms of elation ("snow is wonderful") or forms of concern ("Will my magnolia survive?"). These affects can be induced in different persons, according to their respective values and interests, or just in one and the same person, if she likes snow and owns a blooming magnolia. Excitement and depression, positive and negative affects, can coexist, whatever their physiological support may be.

– Some situations or events are indeed intrinsically perceived as 'emotional', dangerous or fearful. The young duck is said to be innately frightened by the shadow of the sparrow hawk. The perception of a big truck sud-

denly appearing just in front might be a good example of such a one-way emotional stimulus.

– Some emotions are the result of a sophisticated interplay between values and cognitions, as shown by the occurrence of disputable emotions. Such situations are particularly interesting. When arguing their emotions, people have to make explicit their concept of the situation in which their feelings are grounded as well as their system of values and interests as revealed by this situation. In the following schematic exchange:

(1) A: *I'm afraid!*
B: *Me too!*

B assents to A's utterance and shares her feelings. The temptation here is to consider that these two people agree just because the situation is frightening in itself: they share the situation, they have the same perceptual system, a causal process takes place, producing fear in these two persons; so their common fear seems to be perceptually/physically induced by the situation. However, this is not necessarily the case; this fear can be the focus of an explicit dissent:

(2) A: *I'm not afraid!*
B: *You should be!*

Disagreement is linguistically richer than agreement. B's dissenting utterance opens up a justificatory sequence: now B has to explain why she disagrees. In other words, B has to argue for her emotion, or, in a more general way, to display a verbal construction of her emotion. Speakers can account for their emotions; they give reasons for what they feel and for what their partner should feel:

(3) A: *Let's rejoice, the tyrant is dead!*
B: *Let's cry the death of the Father of our Country!*

3. Four ways to emotions

The method advocated here is grounded in different works in psychology, linguistics, rhetoric and discourse analysis. It has been developed and illustrated in Plantin (1998) as a model of the semantico-textual counterpart of the cognitive component of emotions. It aims at a reconstruction of emotions through their verbal expression. The basic concepts are (3.1) emotion sentences, (3.2) stereotyped emotional states (functioning as signposts pointing backwards to

an emotion), (3.3) emotional axes structuring the emotion-inducing situation, and (3.4) emotional scenarios. When an emotion is claimed, the surrounding discourse has to be coherent with the emotional claim; if no particular emotion is claimed, any of the components may be sufficient to create a more or less well-defined emotional atmosphere.

(3.1) An *emotion sentence* asserts or denies that a particular individual or *experiencer* is in the grip of a particular emotion or psychological state. In linguistic terms, an emotion sentence is defined as a sentence connecting an experiencer to an *emotion term* (who feels what?). Prototypical *experiencers* are human beings. The first move when investigating the emotional dimension of a text is to list the potential experiencers and to see which emotion is attributed to whom, if his or her emotions are stabilized or evolving. The enunciator must be considered as an implicit experiencer. The emotional value of the sentence *Moses was abandoned* has been discussed by Ortony, Clore & Foss (1987). *To be abandoned* is not an emotion expression: Moses can be abandoned and feel really happy, floating on the Nile (at least at the beginning). Anyway, we must attribute to the speaker a form of emotion, complementary to abandonment, i.e. *pity*. *Emotion terms* can be defined or listed. Simple lists of terms of affect are very good instruments to start with. They largely correspond to the lists provided by psychologists who pay attention to the vocabulary of emotions (Galati & Sini 2000). Such lists probably include some hundreds of terms. Naming emotions can be considered as a first step towards controlling, manipulating or elaborating emotions. At this point, research on the explicit mention of emotions can be firmly grounded in a set of classical grammatical essays on emotion sentences, psychological verbs and constructions (Balibar-Mrabti 1995).

(3.2) In other cases, emotions are not designated, that is, no clear emotion term is present in the discourse. Still, the verbal material can contain indications allowing a *backward derivation of an emotion* from the description of physiological emotional states or typical actions, as far as they are identified in the discourse through *stereotypes* (Kövecses 1988, 1990). For example, in French *red cheeks* are stereotypically associated with embarrassment, shame, joy, or mere physical excitement, but *red-in-the-brow* (fr. *le rouge au front*), specifically with shame. From the use of such a stereotype it is possible to infer an emotional state by a backward derivation.

(3.3) The construction of emotions based on the complex situation and event in which they originate can be systematically investigated according to the same principle. The following set of facets is compiled from various proposals made by Scherer (1984a, 1984b), Caffi & Janney (1994), Caffi (2000) and Ungerer

(1997). These proposals could be traced back to ancient rhetoric (Lausberg 1960). If the discourse is emotionally coherent, constructed emotion and diagnosed emotion coincide in their orientation towards the asserted emotion (Plantin 1998). The following 'emotional lines' are the main organizers of emotional ambiences:

– *pleasant/unpleasant*; *excitation/depression*. Emotions are roughly organized according to two dimensions, euphoric/dysphoric (*joy* vs *anger*), and the dimension of excitation (*joy* vs *sadness*). The verbal material can be coherently organized along these two lines. Direct evaluation of the event is possible: *this is unpleasant, arousing, interesting*. . . .

– Kind of *event*; kinds of *people* or *principles* involved in the event. In our culture the maximal emotional involvement is with children: *children/ordinary citizens have been killed* is emotionally more productive than *adults/militiamen have been killed*. Value concepts such as *justice* are systematically emotionally loaded.

– *Causes and agents*. The same road accident can be framed as a consequence of fatality or as a consequence of a systematic public policy. The first description causes *sadness* and *resignation*; the second description causes *political indignation*.

– *Consequences*. Events are moving when their consequences affect the (potential) experiencer's interests, norms and values. Emotions can be induced simply by showing that a certain a state of affairs will have positive or negative consequences.

– *Analogy*. An event provokes emotions if it can be linked with domains that are socially or personally connected with emotions. For example, if in a context of war *camps* are mentioned, everyone will be inclined to infer death camps with the accompanying feeling of *horror*.

– The *distance* towards the event can be constructed and manipulated as *far* vs *near*, favoring respectively a 'cold' or a 'hot' emotional evaluation of the event.

– The dimension of *control* is essential. A dangerous perspective induces *fear*. If it can be controlled through action, we become *ashamed* to be *afraid* and decide to act. The same negative event, without the possibility of control, creates *panic*.

(3.4) Finally, and more specifically, situations can be framed in accordance with the basic stereotypical features considered as producing a specific emotion. The first definition of such situations has been given in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and this line of investigation has proven fruitful. The emotional orientation of the

situation is marked in the discourse describing the situation. This will be the case in the following example.

4. Cursing the government

In some speech situations and genres, feelings must be controlled and hidden; in others, disclosing one's feelings is quasi compulsory. In France, when something serious occurs, be it a football triumph, a victory in the elections, or a terrible road accident, the President must speak, and first of all express his feelings. This is not true for political discourse on the whole. A victory or defeat in a close-fought negotiation, particularly with friends or allies would be disclosed with more sober feelings. After the Bali terrorist attack, the French President Jacques Chirac spoke of a 'vile' attack. 'Vile' (*vil* in French) is not an emotion term, it is a moral qualification. But this moral qualifier cannot be used without making an emotional claim that is displaying a correlative attitude of *contempt* (*mépris*): *A says B is vile* ↔ *A despises B*. This emotion is etched in the semantic genes of the word *vile*. The same emotional proclamations are found in a number of polemical letters to the editor. The following one is a variation on the theme "shame on France":

(4) A bitter taste
Shame on France, shame for France for not keeping her word. The extradition of Persichetti, secretly, on a Monday morning in the summer, leaves a bitter taste in the mouth. A "terrorist" sentenced to 22 years of jail for moral complicity in attacks, a "clandestine" living in the open in France for many years, teaching at a university, paid by the French State, has been delivered to "the justice of his country". Do our ministers know that those who, willing to prove their good faith, like Toni Negri and others, have, of their own free will, returned to Italy, have now been waiting for many years for a fair trial? Oh yes, they certainly know, but collaboration between the police comes before justice, in these times of France in blue uniform.
(Christine Cuegnet (e-mail) *Télérama* 2748, 14–20 Sept. 2002)

I suppose that in another culture, the speaker would spit on the ground to punctuate this conclusion. Different strategies of shame are available in political discourse; the best-known one is shaming the government, or the person in charge, into reacting in a specific way. Our case is different. The speaker is arguing after the decision has been made and considered as irrevocable. Per-

sichetti has been extradited, and there's no call to action in this letter as it was published.

4.1 Experiencers

A person (*Persichetti*) and a group (*our ministers*) are mentioned in the text. Emotions are allocated directly to the ministers and the speaker. No emotion is attributed to Persichetti himself; it could have been the case, for example, by describing Persichetti's feelings when he had to leave his friends, home, and maybe family, or his anguish when facing an unfair trial. This would be another genre of political discourse.

4.2 Emotions embedded in the situation

A two-level argumentative dialogue can be reconstructed from the text:

– First level discourse: the official discourse describes the event as: *Persichetti is a clandestine, a terrorist sentenced to 22 years of jail. He's been delivered to the justice of his country*.

– Reply: this discourse is refuted by oxymoronic sentences: first, there is a disproportion between the motive (*moral complicity*), the qualification (*a terrorist*) and the sentence (*22 years of jail*); second, a person *living in the open in France for many years*, *teaching at a university*, *paid by the French State* is not a *clandestine*.

– Second level: the official discourse can provisionally accept this reply, without changing the decision: "maybe the sentence was unjust; anyway; if he wants to prove his good faith, he'll have the opportunity to do so during his trial in Italy".

– This second-level discourse is refuted by the reference to a precedent, framed in a defying rhetorical question: *Toni Negri and others have now been waiting for many years for a fair trial*.

From the writer's point of view, this conclusively shows that the government should have let Persichetti live in peace in France. But the speaker's good reasons have been flouted, she has lost the argument, now she expresses 'the vision of the defeated'. The letter culminates in a typical enthymematic outburst, combining good reason, emotions and style, explaining the reasons for the defeat: *police comes before justice*. This sentence constructs *police* vs *justice* as an antonymic pair, with antagonistic argumentative orientations. At the same time, it refers to the ultimate backings of the two competing discourses: one is grounded in the (positive) principles of *justice*, the other one in the (nega-

tive) principles of *police*. In the end, all the arguments, as well as the correlative emotions, are related to moral principles and hierarchies.

Without more information, specific feelings transpire from such a situation: *pity* for the innocent (as mentioned above, this line is not elaborated), *indignation* for the speaker, and *blame* towards the rulers.

4.3 Allocated emotions

The text begins with a kind of emotional preface, an exclamation, an insult, even a curse. The emotion term *shame (on France)* marks explicitly the emotional tone of the text.

Shame. The feeling imposed on the government is shame. Saying "shame on you" is not necessarily sufficient to make you ashamed. This emotion sentence is motivated by a description of the situation and supplemented by a 'backward signpost'.

– The allocation of shame is grounded in a situational feature, the mention of an unkept promise made by the former French President, François Mitterand. This is an instance of a derivational rule for a specific emotion: *if A has a commitment towards B, and if A does not keep his/her word, A is ashamed/shame on A!*

– Moreover, a backward signpost leads to the same emotional attribution: the expulsion of Persichetti was carried out *secretly, on a Monday morning in the summer*, that is in the typical, stereotypically stealthy way people are supposed to act when they do feel ashamed (cf. 3.3).

4.4 Rage

The letter does not contain any form of self-attribution of emotion. Nevertheless, accomplishing such an emotional speech act as 'shaming' or 'cursing' supposes a complex emotional state, which could be disentangled and ascertained only by a psychologist. A minimal attribution of emotion to the speaker could be a feeling of 'rage', according to the principle *A curses B* ↔ *A is fuming with rage against B*, or *A hates B*. This is a case of symmetrical emotions.

The speaker's emotional state is complex. A slightly different layer of emotion is indirectly expressed by the backward signpost *a bitter taste in the mouth* "goût amer dans la bouche". "A bitter taste" is stereotypically associated with emotional states of the kind 'rancour, resentment', that is a form of *grief*, consecutive to *disappointment*.

The same emotional orientations towards the field of *rage*, *indignation* are marked in the specific framing of the reported event:

– Kind of people and concepts: the letter is about justice, and, precisely, a denial of justice towards a specifically named individual who is a *persecuted innocent*. Such embodied value concepts are intrinsically loaded with emotion. As shown above, this essential line is carefully argued.

– Excitation/depression: the letter is clearly on the animated side (curse, exclamations, questions, accusations of felony).

– Proximity: the speaker totally adheres to her position; no hedges or mitigation, no doubts are expressed. This means that her emotion is to be classified as an emotion of high intensity.

– Control: the decision has been taken, and the sentence executed. The further developments of the negative situation cannot be influenced. The emotional state is therefore tinged with a feeling of powerlessness, helplessness.

– Agent: an agent responsible for the negative situation is designated, namely *our ministers*; this determines the object of *hatred* or *rage*.

Note that the analogy line is not exploited; it could have been, for example, by referring to resistance fighters delivered to fascist regimes.

The coherence of declared emotion, emotional orientations embedded in the argumentative description of the situation, and emotional manifestations give the text its unique emotionally complex tonality, which is not amenable to any elementary emotional labeling.

5. Conclusion

Exhibiting the emotional strategy of a discourse can always be suspected of unfair intentions. The antonomy rational/emotional is so deeply grounded that characterizing a discourse as 'emotional' practically amounts to implying that it is not rational. Such an interpretation should be strongly rejected. Persichetti may very well be an innocent persecuted in a shameful manner. Emotions are grounded in cognition, that is, basically, in the cognitive framing of the situation itself. It was the aim of this paper to demonstrate that deeply felt emotions are combined with most rationally argued conclusions.

We must take this into account when discussing the problem of 'emotional manipulation'. It is impossible to linguistically shape an event without, in the same gesture, displaying an emotional attitude towards this event. Emotional manipulations/constructions are not distinct from rational manipulations/constructions.

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