DEVELOPMENT AND DREAMS

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THE URBAN LEGACY OF THE 2010 FOOTBALL WORLD CUP

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The backdrop to this book is a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) research project, initiated in 2005, to look into the urban development impacts of the 2010 World Cup. Alongside the research programme, the HSRC collaborated with the Centre for Built Environment Studies and the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and on occasion with the South African Cities Network and the Goethe-Institut in Johannesburg in the staging of colloquia and other events.

This book was included as an intended output of the research programme and was initiated in late 2006. The book is intended for all readers – including the general public as well as policy-makers, 2010 stakeholders and academics – interested in more than the 2010 gloss portrayed in the media. The contributors include practitioners whose contributions are valued as highly as those of well-referenced academics.

The process of preparing the book involved contacting obvious potential contributors and circulating a request among colleagues for suggestions regarding other potential contributors. The intention was to match persons to topics according to their expertise, while trying to ensure a representative mix of contributors. Topics were discussed with potential contributors and refined at two workshops, one hosted by the South African Cities Network and the other held at the HSRC. Thereafter, the contributors endured the feedback, questions and requests of the editors. We are most grateful for their forbearance.

The book describes the build-up to the event, assesses the development impacts of the 2010 World Cup while focusing on urban impacts, and debates the probable African legacy. Three key themes emerged: development impacts, aspirations and dreams, and the focus on the legacy of the event. Hence the title, *Development and Dreams: The Urban Legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup*.

The HSRC would like to thank and acknowledge the Development Bank of Southern Africa as a sponsor of this book. As was the case with an earlier book, *Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa*, the HSRC has benefited both materially and intellectually from its engagement with the Development Bank.

A note on names and locations

The names of a number of South African cities have changed since 1994 and the stadium names may still be changed by FIFA for the duration of the World Cup. These changes can cause confusion. Therefore, in Tables 1 and 2, the status of these names as at the time of writing (November 2008) has been set out.

Note that some cities have become known by the name of the wider metropolitan area in which they are located, for example, Durban falls under the eThekwini Municipal Area and is often simply called eThekwini, while Port Elizabeth is located within the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, but refers to itself as Nelson Mandela Bay. For ease of communication, Table 1 provides the previous name and the name in common current usage, even though the latter may not be formally correct. Table 2 lists the cities in which the stadiums are located, the present stadium names and the names used by FIFA as at November 2008, while the map opposite shows where in South Africa the cities and stadiums are located.

Table 1 South African city name changes

Before 1994	2008
Bloemfontein	Mangaung
Durban	Durban (or eThekwini)
East London	East London (or Buffalo City)
Kimberley	Kimberley (or Sol Plaatje)
Nelspruit	Mbombela
Pietersburg	Polokwane
Port Elizabeth	Nelson Mandela Bay (or Port Elizabeth)
Pretoria	Pretoria (or Tshwane)

Table 2 Cities and the names of stadiums

City	Current stadium	FIFA name for the stadium
Cape Town	Green Point	Green Point Stadium
Durban	Moses Mabhida	Durban Stadium
Johannesburg	FNB (First National Bank)	Soccer City
	Ellis Park (Coca-Cola Park)	Ellis Park Stadium
Mangaung	Vodacom Park	Free State Stadium
Mbombela		Mbombela Stadium
Nelson Mandela Bay		Port Elizabeth Stadium
Polokwane		Peter Mokaba Stadium
Pretoria	Loftus Versfeld	Loftus Versfeld
Rustenburg	Royal Bafokeng	Royal Bafokeng Stadium

South Africa and the 2010 World Cup: Host cities and stadiums

LIMPOPO

GAUTENG

■ POLOKWANE
🏟 Peter Mokaba Stadium

RUSTENBURG
Royal Bafokeng Stadium 🏟

PRETORIA
🏟 Loftus Versfeld

■ MBOMBELA
Mbombela Stadium

NORTH WEST

JOHANNESBURG ■● Ekurhuleni
Ellis Park Stadium 🏟
Soccer City 🏟

MPUMALANGA

FREE STATE

Sol Plaatje ●

KWAZULU-NATAL

■ MANGAUNG
Free State Stadium

Msunduzi ●

● DURBAN
🏟 Durban Stadium

NORTHERN CAPE

EASTERN CAPE

● Buffalo City

WESTERN CAPE

CAPE TOWN ■
Green Point Stadium

■ NELSON MANDELA BAY
🏟 Port Elizabeth Stadium

Acronyms and abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
B&B	bed and breakfast
CAF	Confederation of African Football
CALS	Centre for Applied Legal Studies
CBD	central business district
CBO	community-based organisation
CEO	chief executive officer
COHRE	Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
DA	Democratic Alliance
DEAT	Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (South Africa)
DFB	Deutscher Fußball Bund (German Football Association)
FASA	Football Association of South Africa
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GEPD	Greater Ellis Park Development (project)
HEDC	Hunter Economic Development Corporation
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDP	integrated development plan
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMC	Inter-Ministerial Committee
ITP	Informal Trading Policy
JDA	Johannesburg Development Agency
JOSHCO	Johannesburg Social Housing Company
LOC	Local Organising Committee
MSA	Metropolitan Statistical Area
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	non-governmental organisation
PMU	Project Management Unit
PVA	public viewing area
SAFA	South African Football Association
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SASF	South African Soccer Federation
TCC	Technical Coordinating Committee
WTP	willingness to pay

THE BUILD-UP

1 *Introduction*

Richard Tomlinson, Orli Bass and Udesh Pillay

The FIFA World Cup is the world's largest sporting and media event.[1] FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) has more member nations than both the International Olympic Committee and the United Nations. The 2006 Football World Cup 'had a total cumulative television audience of 26.29 billion' viewers and the 2010 mega football event is assured of an even greater number of television viewers, not including the increasing use of other media such as the internet and mobile telephones (FIFA 2007). World Cups are extraordinarily profitable for FIFA through the sale of television rights and through its ongoing corporate partners and events-based sponsors. By 2008, these had already ensured that the 2010 World Cup will be 25 per cent more profitable than the 2006 Football World Cup.[2]

The same, however, cannot be said for host countries and cities. Economic projections are invariably erroneous, overestimating the benefits and underestimating the costs, and there is considerable debate regarding whether World Cups benefit or harm the host country's economy. In the light of the South African government's intention to leverage the World Cup to assist in promoting economic development and halving unemployment by 2014, and taking into account potential alternative uses for the projected R30 billion South African spend on the World Cup (as of March 2008) (*Engineering News* 18 March 2008),[3] the debate and the uncertain benefits are issues of some consequence.

Notwithstanding this, the greater potential benefit to the host country and, equally, the greater risk, is less tangible. Germany benefited considerably from hosting the 2006 World Cup insofar as it helped to alter previously somewhat negative international perceptions of Germany to one of the country being perceived as hospitable and welcoming. The World Cup also assisted with nation building in relation to the divisions between East and West Germany, and legitimised patriotism in a manner hitherto viewed as too reminiscent of the Nazi era.

The significant opportunity for South Africa lies in contradicting commonly held representations of Africa by utilising the mega-event to project a contemporary, reinvigorated image of Africa, and through celebrating African culture and identity. Moreover, there is much potential to destabilise notions of Afro-pessimism through demonstrating that Africans can successfully manage the World Cup. One must, however, be circumspect in one's expectations. While FIFA and South Africa present the 2010 World Cup as an 'African' World Cup, it is South Africa and its host cities – rather than the continent of Africa – that will be on the global stage. This is an

important point to bear in mind as the reputations of the country and its cities can be considerably enhanced and considerably damaged.

This book explores all these issues, with particular emphasis on the urban aspects of the World Cup. The approach has been to write a text accessible to an informed readership, including academics and students but also officials, practitioners, 2010 World Cup stakeholders and others with an interest in the event. Furthermore, a feature of the book lies in its interdisciplinary nature and its ability to synthesise a wide range of theoretical perspectives. The book has three sections: 'The build-up', 'Development' and 'Dreams'. The three parts are united by an underlying concern for the legacy of the World Cup. Mega-events such as the World Cups and the Olympics are now viewed more in terms of the post-event legacy than in terms of the benefits, or otherwise, of the event itself (Evans 2007).

Certainly South Africa's hosting and winning of the 1995 Rugby World Cup is generally accepted to have had a cohesive effect on identity and a positive impact on the image of the country. Yet, in some ways this remains a transient moment and its legacy is mythical rather than practical. Many similar narratives emerged when South Africa again won the Rugby World Cup in 2007, but these were fairly quickly eclipsed by a worsening economic outlook, inflation, rising interest rates, fuel hikes and xenophobic riots. Notwithstanding these caveats, opportunity does exist to mobilise the World Cup in order to tell different, more meaningful and contemporary stories about African life and experience. If a legacy is to be left in this regard, the potential to destabilise common stereotypes about Africa and Afro-pessimism should not be underestimated.

There is, in addition, an expectation of a personal legacy, to which the South African government contributes when pronouncing on the anticipated economic benefits of the 2010 World Cup. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) conducts a survey of public perceptions and attitudes to the 2010 World Cup as part of a broader annual longitudinal survey on South African social attitudes. In the 2007 survey round, 50 per cent of respondents perceived economic growth and job creation to be the two main benefits of hosting the 2010 World Cup. Approximately a third of the population indicated that they expected to *personally* benefit from job opportunities and about 50 per cent believed that the economic benefits would be 'lasting' (HSRC 2008).

One trusts that enthusiasm for the World Cup and hospitality will persist even if the South African team, Bafana Bafana, is not competitive and personal expectations are dashed. It is important to eschew complacency and pay attention to managing expectations in the lead-up to the 2010 World Cup. There is a fine line between realism and disillusionment and, at present, the information presented to the public is often misleading. Despite the urgent need for, and indeed importance of, transparency and sharing of information, the organisation of mega-events has been dominated by the opaque interests of a 'sports–media–business alliance' (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006: 3) and government.

Mega-events, the sports–media–business alliance and the lack of transparency

The FIFA World Cup, the Summer Olympics and World Fairs or Expos are mega-events at the top of a hierarchy of events. There are various formulations of the hierarchy, as indicated in Table 1.1 (adapted from Roche 2000). Roche bases his differentiation on the scale of media interest. In the case of FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, a defining feature is the emergence of a sports–media–business alliance – made possible by new technologies of mass communication – centred on television rights and sponsorships (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006). For example, the sale of television broadcasting rights generates more than half their revenue, with partnerships and sponsor contracts contributing most of the balance. In this and many other respects they are very different from Expos.[4] With few exceptions, the biggest events are sporting in nature and they are carefully staged in order to ensure there is a sporting mega-event every two years – the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, the 2012 London Olympics, the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, and so on – with special events such as the Euro 2008 football championships falling between the World Cups.

The significance of the alliance is evident in payments by US broadcasters increasing from US$25 million for the 1976 Montreal Olympics, to US$72 million for the 1980 Moscow Olympics, to US$225 million for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics and, jumping ahead, US$1.18 billion for the upcoming 2012 London Olympics (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006: 4). In the context of FIFA earning US$2.77 billion from television and marketing rights from the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter 4, this volume), FIFA is clear that:

> FIFA offers sponsors solutions that go beyond the traditional media opportunities offered by other sports competitions. An official association with FIFA represents a two-pronged approach – sponsors can promote their brand on a global basis and, at the same time, target

Table 1.1 Hierarchy of mega-events

Type of event	Example	Media interest
Mega	Summer Olympics	Global
	Football World Cup	
	World Fair/Expo	
Special	Euro 2008	International and national
	F1 Grand Prix	Specialist media
	Commonwealth Games	
	Trade fairs, e.g. cars	
Hallmark	NFL Super Bowl	National
	Big city festival, e.g. Edinburgh Festival	Regional and local
Community	Sponsored events, e.g. 'charity big walk'	Local

local markets. Together with the official broadcasters who deliver worldwide TV and radio coverage of the events, the sponsors and licensees are the pillars that support the staging and promotion of a FIFA event. (FIFA n.d.)

To this one has to add the intense competition between countries and cities to host FIFA World Cups and the Olympics. In the case of cities, the objectives primarily constitute opportunities for urban imaging and urban regeneration. In the case of developing countries, the events provide the opportunity for what is often irreverently referred to as a 'coming out party' that enables a country to project itself on the international stage.

The outcome of winning the right to host a mega-event is considerable pressure to deliver the stadiums, infrastructure and other facilities needed to host the event. This pressure provides a rationale for overriding traditional participatory planning processes and, while the corporate sports–media–business alliance has never been open, countries and cities themselves often operate in a covert manner. Horne and Manzenreiter (2006: 13) write that 'considerable secrecy and lack of transparency continue to pervade the undemocratic organizations that run mega-events' and that individuals who challenge the secrecy 'may become *persona non grata* to the mega-event organizers', losing access to information and, in some cases, consulting opportunities.

The lack of clarity is so pronounced that five years prior to the 2012 London Olympics questions were being asked about a possible deliberate misrepresentation of costs and benefits (Evans 2007). One hesitates to say the same thing about South Africa, but costs have escalated remarkably and the Bid Book that contains the initial estimates is difficult to obtain.

This pervasive attitude of secrecy affected some of the research underlying this book and the selection of its chapters. The impact was evident in one city's 2010 World Cup manager requesting that an editor obtain the permission of the Local Organising Committee (LOC) prior to granting an interview, which the LOC freely provided. In another case the intended interviewer was required to write a letter to the city's council requesting permission to obtain an interview. In that case the Department of Sports and Recreation intervened to enable an interview. There were further such difficulties, one of which led to the chapter focusing on transport not being included in the book. The LOC itself found it difficult to find time to be interviewed. In one sense one can understand these misgivings. The media foster an 'atmosphere of crisis' (Gold & Gold 2007: 6) – Athens not making construction deadlines in 2004, xenophobia and 'no-go' areas in Germany during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, cost overruns for the London 2012 Olympics – which fades when the games begin. Of course, the same is true in South Africa with constant alarm bells sounded regarding the state of readiness, crime and the competitiveness of Bafana Bafana. The media sells the negative. However, the contributors to this book had no such preconception or intent.

Host cities and stadiums

The contributors nevertheless paid particular attention to providing as full a narrative as possible about various aspects of the preparations of host cities for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Mega-events require close management of expenditure in order to avoid losses after the event (Metropolis 2002; Rahmann & Kurscheidt 2002). This includes minimising expenditure on stadiums and undertaking large-scale infrastructure investment only if it is part of a broader citywide urban regeneration programme.[5]

In embarking on hosting a FIFA World Cup, there are two competing pressures. The first concerns the selection of host cities. Governments competing for the football mega-event are under intense political pressure from provinces and cities to be included in the bid submitted to FIFA. South Africa proposed 13 cities to FIFA, less than sought to be included. FIFA wanted nine host cities and 10 stadiums and agreement was reached on this. The map on page ix shows the host cities, the stadiums in the cities, other large and secondary cities that were not included and the national roads joining the host cities.

The second pressure concerns the stadiums. Governments are under simultaneous and sometimes competing pressure from FIFA and the cities regarding the stadiums. For example, the FIFA inspection committee found that both Durban and Cape Town had 'suitable' stadiums (FIFA 2004), yet both cities are constructing new ones. In the case of Cape Town, the city wanted to construct a new stadium in the suburb of Athlone, believing that it would contribute to the development of that part of Cape Town. Ignoring Newlands Stadium, which it had considered suitable, FIFA strong-armed Cape Town and central government to construct a stadium for which there is no demonstrable need other than that its location shows the city to its best advantage, situated as it is between the sea and the mountains and alongside the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront development. Durban had different motives. With an economic development strategy that includes sports tourism, the city wanted to construct a stadium to Olympic standards in anticipation of a potential future Olympic bid.

The upshot of the politics and FIFA's insistence is that the Port Elizabeth, Peter Mokaba, Mbombela, Green Point and Durban stadiums are all being newly constructed and the others are being refurbished. Of course, the stadiums will not actually have these names during the World Cup as FIFA has the right to name them according to the interests of its sponsors.

The host cities, cities that sought to be and were not included as host cities, and many other centres are now competing to serve as base camps and to provide training venues. In addition, FIFA has ruled that countries within 90 minutes flying time of Johannesburg can compete to serve as base camps. Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe meet this criterion, with the decision described in Malawi – which is just too far away – as a 'body blow' (*People's Daily Online* [China] 17 May 2007).[6] In the light of there being 32 teams and it being the

prerogative of the team manager to select a base camp, southern Africa is providing, at some cost, a generous number of options.

In this context, it is apposite to delve into the development prospects, expectations and legacies associated with the FIFA Football World Cup.

Building development and dreams

The first section of this book, 'The build-up', provides the backdrop for the narrative; it describes Football World Cups in the context of mega-events. It outlines the evolution of football in South Africa, past racial divisions in the organisation of the sport, the unification of football and South Africa winning the bid for the 2010 World Cup. This section also explains the institutional arrangements for managing preparations for the event and provides a framework in which to situate the key themes of the book: the material and intangible implications of the 2010 mega-event on South Africa's cities.

The second section of the book, 'Development', explains and questions the more tangible development impacts of the World Cup. The first chapter compares Germany and South Africa. Thereafter, the contributors repeatedly express various concerns about the uncertain economic benefits and the potential for poverty reduction. The final chapter in this section considers how to protect residents from being displaced by development in the neighbourhood of Gauteng's Ellis Park Stadium.

The third section of the book, 'Dreams', explores the less tangible hopes and aspirations associated with the 2010 World Cup. Approaching the subject from social and cultural perspectives, the chapters in this section consider expectations of benefit, African identity and gender. The dreams, hopes and expectations associated with the Football World Cup are myriad. The section offers a pertinent slice of these in order to give voice to often neglected – but certainly no less important – intangible aspects related to the World Cup.

One cannot divorce the development aspects of the World Cup from their corresponding impact on individuals and society. While all four chapters in the third section speak to this theme, the first two privilege the role of the urban in these deliberations. The first chapter examines street traders' expectations of economic benefit. Identity and the urban are integrated in the second chapter, which explores the projection of identity in one host city in the approach to the 2010 World Cup. Thereafter, the last two chapters broaden out questions of identity both in spatial and gendered terms. The penultimate chapter of the third section considers the relationship between gendered identities and football while the concluding chapter points out the possibilities that the 2010 event holds for actively creating new understandings of African images, history and time.

Turning to the contributions of each author, Chapter 2 documents the racial history of football in the country. Van der Merwe documents the formation of the all-white

Football Association of South Africa (FASA) in 1896. This was followed by the South African Indian Football Association in 1903, the South African Bantu Football Association in 1933 and the South African Coloured Football Association in 1936. These associations mirrored South Africa's apartheid racial divide. FASA, however, was a member of FIFA and it was only in 1964 that FASA membership of FIFA was suspended. The integrated South Africa Football Association (SAFA) was created in 1991 and readmitted to FIFA in 1992. Initially, Bafana Bafana did rather well, making it into, but not out of, the 1998 and 2002 World Cups. The high point for the team was winning the 1996 African Cup of Nations, but since then, and only a few years prior to hosting the 2010 World Cup, Bafana Bafana has had a dismal record.

SAFA and the South African government were expected to host the 2006 World Cup but, under dubious circumstances described by Van der Merwe, South Africa lost the bid by one vote. It was after that vote that FIFA (temporarily) decided that a rotational system should be introduced and that the country selected to host FIFA World Cups would be located on a different continent every year. Despite determined competition from Morocco, South Africa was all but assured of winning the 2010 World Cup. It is in this light that the 2010 World Cup has come to be called the African World Cup, although perhaps Morocco and the other countries that put in bids feel differently.

Immediately after winning the bid, Germany offered technical assistance and many German companies, as well as companies from other countries, sought business opportunities. A steady flow of South Africans involved in the organisation of the 2010 World Cup visited Germany and many Germans also visited South Africa proffering advice. While valuable, the advice tended to highlight the differences between Germany and South Africa. For example, Germany has an excellent public transport system and information and communication technology. Required by FIFA to meet the standards of a developed country as best it can, South Africa has embarked on a nationwide capital investment programme that, in the midst of other major civil projects, has led to a scarcity of skills and materials. Costs have risen phenomenally.

Du Plessis and Maennig (Chapter 4) describe many of these differences, alert the reader to the uncertain economic projections and provide surprising statistics – like a decline in hotel occupancy in Berlin and Munich, where most matches were played, but also an increase in profits due to the high cost of accommodation. They provide a good example of the 'crowding-out' effect, where World Cup tourism displaces other tourism. They then consider the economic impacts and, after documenting how benefits are overstated, nonetheless find that there were particular local benefits, for example an increase in beer sales. They attribute this in part to the hot weather, which draws us to climatic differences between Germany and South Africa. The 2010 World Cup is to be played in the middle of the South African winter and temperatures, while balmy in Durban, can fall below freezing in Johannesburg and Mangaung. Winter in Cape Town is the rainy season. The prospects for attendance at fan parks and the sale of beer…one wonders.

Davies describes the organisational and funding arrangements to prepare for the World Cup (Chapter 3). In fact, here lies another difference between Germany and most former host countries. FIFA ordinarily contracts directly with the cities and, while this is again the case, South Africa's national government is playing a far greater role in preparations for the 2010 World Cup than other national authorities hitherto, not least because it is bearing so large a proportion of the costs of stadiums, infrastructure and so on. The management arrangements are daunting and point to the complexity and expense of hosting a FIFA World Cup in a developing country.

FIFA and the financial success of World Cups are not similarly constrained. The reason is that the location of a FIFA World Cup is to some degree independent of all but a few essential requirements. There has to be adequate information and communication technology. FIFA requires the protection of the interests of its partners and sponsors; legislation specifically for the event has to ensure this. Especially important are world-class stadiums, transportation infrastructure and public transport systems. Accordingly, if tourism falls short of expectations, perhaps due to a fear of crime, ticket sales are a small source of FIFA's income. There are only a few developing countries – such as South Africa, China and Brazil – that are in a position to afford FIFA's requirements.

Despite this, many countries on the periphery are clamouring to host mega-events. However, as Pillay and Bass (Chapter 5) point out via an overview of the international literature, there is little to suggest that poverty amelioration is a significant outcome of hosting mega-events. In this light, they consider whether the 2010 World Cup can be mobilised to reduce poverty, especially in urban areas. Their view is that the benefits stemming from the mega-event in South African cities are likely to be tightly bound in time and space. Implicit in their discussion is that a pro-poor approach cannot be independent of pro-growth considerations, and that the legacy of the event must be realistically defined.

Tomlinson (Chapter 6) provides a harsh assessment of the probable economic impacts of the 2010 World Cup. He is concerned that the event might harm the national economy and promote inequality. This is because there are many possibilities for displacement of investment from more productive uses to less productive uses, for example, upgrading Cape Town's harbour versus the construction of a stadium in Mbombela. Moreover, in a context of scarce resources and the lack of skills, might it be the case that investment is steered to the host cities and to those parts of the host cities where officials, the teams and tourists are likely to stay and play? The question is whether the consequences promote regional inequality, disparities within host cities and a diversion of resources from the needs of the poor. Despite these misgivings, Tomlinson suggests that the tangible economic issues are less important than intangible legacy opportunities. In particular, he focuses on Afro-pessimism and images of dismay in Africa. A successful World Cup will do much to reduce the pessimism and enhance South Africa's pride and identity with, he argues, far less significance for the rest of Africa. This parallels Du Plessis and Maennig's

assessment that the 2006 World Cup had considerable intangible benefits for Germany, including a change in image and nation building. Yet, at the same time, the failure to host a successful World Cup holds tremendous risks.

Tomlinson also conducted interviews with representatives of all the host cities and with a few provincial governments. When he asked the host cities why they wanted to host the World Cup, he obtained an unexpected answer: 'free money to do what we wanted to do anyway'. Most often the reference was to transportation improvements, although occasionally there was a plaintive 'we need a stadium' from some of the smaller host cities. He found that the host cities were surprisingly pragmatic. The literature on mega-events refers to place marketing, urban imaging, urban renaissance, urban spectacles, entertainment destinations and so on; really a list of intangible attributes. Instead, the host cities were aligned with Jeremy Cronin, who heads the transportation portfolio committee in Parliament, who suggested that transport infrastructure will be the foremost legacy of the 2010 World Cup (*Daily News* 21 November 2007).[7] If this is the case, it should be kept in mind that most of the investment was already planned and the 2010 World Cup has caused it to be expedited.

Cornelissen (Chapter 8) focuses specifically on tourism and draws attention to the fact that most tourism occurs in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. It is these cities that are developing sports precincts that can serve long-term sports tourism ends. She notes that the other host cities are mostly focused on the construction of the stadiums and meeting their FIFA requirements. Cornelissen also expresses the need for caution regarding tourism projections, as the 2010 World Cup may not increase tourism to any marked degree. Instead, what often happens is the displacement of other forms of tourism, especially business-related tourism. Of course, this will not be a great concern to Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay, whose tourism is geared to summer – rather than winter – vacations and visitors. Nonetheless, after assessing the tourism benefits in Germany, instead of pointing to numbers of tourists, jobs created and so on, the greatest tourism benefit she identifies for Germany is the improvement in the country's international image.

Cornelissen further draws attention to the fact that tourism reinforces the segregated structure of South Africa's cities. This links to the two chapters on Cape Town, where the focus is on the spatial impacts of the World Cup. Swart and Bob (Chapter 7) describe the manner in which the city's government viewed the construction of a stadium in Athlone as a major opportunity to promote development in a low-income part of the city and to improve transport connections from low-income areas to employment centres. They describe FIFA's reaction to this proposal and the process that led away from Newlands Stadium, which FIFA had earlier deemed suitable, to Green Point, where no stadium was needed. Indeed, the limited spectator popularity of professional football relative to professional rugby and cricket in Cape Town suggests that the only means through which the stadium can become viable is if the Western Province and Stormers rugby teams relocate to Green Point.

Swart and Bob present complications, like a change from an African National Congress government to a Democratic Alliance government, all of which played up the location debates and slowed the start of construction on the stadium. Anxiety regarding the completion of the stadium on time is overplayed, especially by FIFA. The location of the stadium in Cape Town is certainly one of the most striking stories of the 2010 World Cup.

In the second Cape Town chapter, Haferburg, Golka and Selter (Chapter 10) address public viewing areas. They distinguish between FIFA fan parks, official municipal public viewing areas, local formal public viewing areas such as in shopping malls, and informal places of public viewing such as when people congregate around a television set on the street. The fan park phenomenon in Germany drew considerable attention and it is expected that, in Cape Town for example, there will – for the more significant matches – be as large a crowd on the Grand Parade in front of the City Hall as in the stadium itself. However, it is exactly this that worries the three authors, in that it reinforces pre-existing differences and fails to draw crowds to the urban, low-income periphery. They acknowledge that the Cape Town government recognises this issue and seeks to address it. Thus, the contribution of the three authors is to explain the phenomenon and to suggest how public viewing areas whose location is controlled by local government can be used as a network of interventions within the urban fabric. Their view is that the benefits will be as much social as spatial in bringing together people from very different backgrounds and creating 'a space for mutual knowing and recognition'.

Returning to the fact that metropolitan areas have more advanced tourism promotion strategies than the smaller host cities, Atkinson (Chapter 9) takes this a step further and considers tourism impacts in rural areas. She notes that tourism has always been biased to the cities, the game parks and the beaches. Might the 2010 World Cup provide spillover benefits to towns and rural areas? One obvious potential is that more attractive towns and cities can compete to provide a training venue and be the base for a national team – an example is Sol Plaatje Municipality,[8] which is close to Mangaung. Of course, there are only 32 participating teams and many towns competing to host them and provide training venues, so Atkinson wonders about the potential for rural tourism, especially in the arid hinterland. The difficulty she finds is that there has been little research and also that government agencies have done little to promote rural tourism, let alone seek to maximise potential benefits from the 2010 World Cup. She suggests a number of opportunities, including regional centres providing fan parks and area tourism. However, local government jurisdictions inhibit coordinated planning and action, and she therefore proposes what might be done to promote rural tourism and to obtain benefits from the 2010 World Cup.

In contrast to these chapters that consider how best to promote development, Bénit-Gbaffou (Chapter 11) addresses the consequences of development on the neighbourhoods adjacent to the Ellis Park Stadium in Johannesburg. Ellis

Park will be the venue for major matches but is located in a run-down part of the city characterised by low-income residences, many migrants, overcrowding and numerous derelict buildings. Bénit-Gbaffou documents the desire of the Johannesburg local government to displace the 'unwanted' residents, to promote regeneration and to use private investment to achieve this end.

Displacement has become a common theme in critical reviews of the effects of mega-events on low-income households (COHRE 2007), although more for the Olympics than for FIFA World Cups. Bénit-Gbaffou's work is located within this theme, but in a sense is more interesting due to her questioning of the place of local residents in the regeneration strategy and the governance of the strategy, especially in a context where development is being expedited for the 2010 World Cup. Sadly, she is not optimistic that local residents and civil society organisations will be allowed a voice.

Czeglédy (Chapter 12) continues the conversation on Johannesburg, focusing on personal expectations of benefits associated with the World Cup. He eloquently points out that these 'lie between the sleepy realm of dreams and…waking hopes' and thus introduces the themes of the latter part of the book. Intangible legacies and their importance are acknowledged by FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, and the 'Dreams' section of this book foregrounds the nature of such legacies, pointing to expectations, identity and gender.

Czeglédy, for his part, examines the manner in which the property market promotes anticipation of economic accumulation. He explores the manner in which language invoking the World Cup has entered into the promotion and advertising of property and accordingly creates the impression that the event will result in profit gains in this sector. He mirrors these expectations against the aspirations of inner-city informal traders. Czeglédy draws attention to the precarious nature of trading on the streets of Johannesburg, gives voice to traders' hopes that the 2010 World Cup will improve their situation, and highlights the continuing tenacity of their dreams.

From another perspective, Bass (Chapter 13) considers aspirations of urban identity coupled with the 2010 World Cup. She explores divergent nuances in the figuring of Durban's identity in the 2010 discourses and strategies of the local and provincial governments. The versions of Durban's African urbanity and identity mobilised in relation to the event are not necessarily new; nevertheless, the 2010 World Cup potentially means exposure at a far greater scale. While local government conceptions of African identity and urban life are more attentive to the realities of contemporary life in the African city, the provincial interpretation tends to emphasise rural notions of African and Zulu identity. These tensions and indeed positions are not fixed; however, they do have material impact on the urban landscape – particularly in the new Moses Mabhida Stadium – and implications for 2010 strategies which seek to promote inclusion among residents.

Bass makes the argument for representations of identity and urbanity to be grounded in urban African life. There is indeed much benefit which could potentially accrue to host cities if, rather than privileging representations and versions of identity which are focused on stereotypical conceptions of Africa, attention is drawn to the contemporary nature of African identity.

Chapter 14 considers another angle of identity by focusing on the relationship between the 2010 World Cup and gender. Rubin tackles this subject by considering the relationship between gender, sport and football. She gives particular emphasis to the manner in which the FIFA mega-event is constructed as a space of masculinity. In this context, she interrogates the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan and the 2006 World Cup in Germany in order to reveal how women are perceived as either acceptable or transgressive. Rubin questions whether the 2010 World Cup will give rise to similar attitudes. Certainly despite South Africa's constitutional respect for gendered rights, there have been some worrying moments en route to the World Cup, including ill-conceived statements by government officials about prostitution and the abuse of a woman over her clothing choice. Rubin observes that this is not solely a story of oppression and some positive aspects are discernible; nevertheless, she is clear that these do not disturb the firmly entrenched gender roles associated with the FIFA World Cup.

Czeglédy, who opened the 'Dreams' section, returns to close it (Chapter 15). He explores the meaning and symbolic capital of the 2010 World Cup for Africans and Africa. Czeglédy approaches his material from a continental, postcolonial perspective in order to explore the potential of the mega-event to reposition Africa in the social imagination. He begins by exploring the social construction of Africa via an understanding of the manner in which colonialism was complicit in creating images of an Africa divorced from time and space and associated with underdevelopment, wild nature, disease, famine and warfare, among others. Czeglédy suggests that hosting the event offers the opportunity to reject such imagery and destabilise the hegemonic project of colonialism. He proposes that the 2010 event is a material and active demonstration 'of competence and achievement meant to act as a contra-experience to those provided by the international media factory'.

Linking the 2010 World Cup to former president Thabo Mbeki's notion of the African Renaissance and to the agendas of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Czeglédy asserts that hosting the event indicates the 'arrival of Africa'. If any legacy is to accrue from the 2010 event, perhaps it will be the intangible one that Czeglédy suggests we should hope for. In this framework, '2010 for South Africans, and for Africans in general, is about relegating pervasive images of the past conjured from outside *to the past*'. And, relating to Bass's argument, Czeglédy suggests that such a relegation can only occur through lived experience.

In the midst of a differentiated discussion, four main viewpoints emerge from the chapters. The first is that the contribution of the 2010 World Cup to economic development, including tourism and reducing unemployment and poverty, has almost certainly been overstated. There is even the possibility that it may retard

economic development and exacerbate inequality between and within cities and regions. This is worrisome for the additional reason that so many people expect personally to benefit from the 2010 World Cup.

The second is that – taking into account the distinction between capital investment in the stadiums and associated infrastructure, and capital investment that was already planned for and was expedited for 2010 – the host cities and the economy generally may benefit considerably from expedited investment in transport and information and communication technology. Statements regarding the benefits and costs of the 2010 World Cup should therefore always be alert to the different types of expenditure undertaken. In particular, in the midst of a large countrywide capital infrastructure programme including a new harbour at Coega close to Nelson Mandela Bay, a rapid rail system in Gauteng, and electricity generation capacity and other projects, the economic and social costs of expedited investment may lie mostly in the increase in the price of materials and labour throughout the construction sector.

The third viewpoint expresses some doubt regarding the value of the investment in the stadiums and their subsequent financial sustainability. This is a common problem for mega-events throughout the world and it will certainly be present in a number of cities.

The latter three viewpoints refer to the build-up to the event, the event itself and the legacy of the event, and they all have to do with the material consequences of South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup. It may be that these features of the 2010 World Cup are less significant than the intangible legacy – the fourth viewpoint to emerge. If the 2010 World Cup is viewed as a success, then the impact on reducing Afro-pessimism may be significant. The other side to this potential is that if the 2010 World Cup is not viewed as a success or, worse still, if FIFA embarks on 'Plan B' and for some reason relocates the 2010 World Cup, the damage will be immense. Also, there is the possibility that the 2010 World Cup will be broadcast alongside what may be an ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe and this may cast a shadow over the World Cup in a manner similar to that of Tibet and the 2008 Olympics.

It is, however, important to keep sight of the notion that the 2010 World Cup presents an opportunity to rethink the manner in which African culture, gender and identity are experienced and represented. For Africa, the measure of success will lie not only in being seen to manage the 2010 World Cup to world-class standards, but also in the ability to assert and embrace a contemporary African culture and identity both at home and on a global stage.

Notes

1   We would like to acknowledge and thank Fazeela Hoosen for the research assistance and support provided during the writing of this chapter and in the final stages of preparing the book for publication.

2   'FIFA World Cup 2010', available at http://www.oleole.com/fifa/competitions/
      fifaworldcup/2010/facts/cfa7.html, accessed in June 2008.

3   'SA to spend more than R30 billion on 2010 World Cup', available at http://www.
      engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=129452, accessed in March 2008.

4   In the case of the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE), there is no equivalent
      revenue from the sale of television rights. The BIE also benefits from sponsorship contracts,
      but then crucially depends on '2% of the gate money of an exhibition and the amount is
      calculated at the end of the exhibition' (email from Marlène Hocke, personal assistant to
      the Secretary General of the BIE, to Fazeela Hoosen, 19 June 2008). The FIFA World Cups
      and the Olympics last, respectively, for a month and 16 days. Expos last for six months and
      occur every five years. There are no defining moments, such as World Cup matches or the
      Olympics marathon, and there is no equivalent of a winner of the World Cup or a gold
      medallist. Instead, Expos are intended to 'promote the exchange of ideas and development
      of the world economy, culture, science and technology, to allow exhibitors to publicize
      and display their achievements and improve international relationships' (http://zhidao.
      baidu.com/question/13823188.html?si=2). Expos are defined more by the number of
      participating countries and visitors than by the television audience. The number of visitors
      has been quite extraordinary. The most recent Expo was in 2005 in Aichi, Japan; it had 121
      participating countries and attracted 21 million visitors (http://www.bie-paris.org/main/
      index.php?p=-132&m2=292). Seventy million visitors are projected for the 2010 Shanghai
      Expo (http://www.dfat.gov.au/tenders/DFAT08-SWE-017/RFT_DFAT08-SWE-017.doc).

5   The Barcelona Olympics is often used as a model of 'linking city-wide and strategically
      oriented urban regeneration with the hosting of the Olympics' (Coaffee 2007: 157).

6   'Malawi not to host 2010 World Cup teams', available at http://english.people.com.
      cn/200705/17/eng20070517_375337.html, accessed in June 2008.

7   Jasson da Costa, '2010 holidays may ease traffic jams', available at http://www.iol.co.za/
      index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20071121103007945C189996, accessed
      in June 2008.

8   Sol Plaatje is the municipal area in the Northern Cape of which Kimberley is the
      main centre.

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2 The road to Africa: South Africa's hosting of the 'African' World Cup

Justin van der Merwe

The FIFA 2010 Football World Cup hosted by South Africa will be the first World Cup to be held on African soil. It presents a historic opportunity to import the World Cup to areas on the periphery of world football and to further broaden the cultural, political and socio-economic base of the game. The 2010 World Cup hosted in Africa is therefore illustrative of a growing trend in the international governance of football to expand the game outwards from its traditional power bases (Europe and South America) in an attempt to further globalise the sport. Behind the project for an African Football World Cup is a steady and concerted attempt by various protagonists – situated both within football's centre and on the periphery – to reconfigure the broader inequalities not only within the footballing world, but also between Africa and the developed world more generally.

This chapter reflects upon this process from a historical viewpoint, outlines the main actors involved and illustrates how this happened, whilst paying particular attention to the role played by South Africa. Accordingly, the history of the World Cup and the tenuous position of African states in international football are discussed. South Africa's role and participation in international football and Football World Cups is discussed from a historical and inevitably apartheid-based perspective. Also covered is South Africa's hosting of large sporting events, leading up to the bidding process for 2010. This is prefaced by a brief outline of the politics of international football, as it has a bearing on how events leading up to 2010 unfold.

The politics of international football

Britain was the world's first industrialised nation and it was on the British mainland where the game of association football, in its modern form, was first developed. It was therefore mainly the British who were responsible for transporting the game to many of the countries and regions where it is played today (Wagg 1995a). If it was the British who invented the game, then it was the European mainland – particularly north-western Europe – that was the first and primary importer of the game. This is underscored by the fact that most of the founding members of FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) in 1904 were from north-western Europe and Spain. The spread of the game throughout Europe closely paralleled the mushrooming of European cities, as football became synonymous with an emergent urban industrial middle class (Wagg 1995b). Oddly, in America, despite being one

of the oldest football-playing nations and having great potential for commercial growth, football never really managed to permeate the national consciousness. This is largely attributed to the 'unAmerican' status of football, with its historical roots steeped in exclusive British schools, and having to live in the shadow of baseball and American football (Waldstein & Wagg 1995). However, in more recent times, football has gathered momentum in America, partly due to the success of the national team having risen to the twenty-first place on FIFA's world rankings in 2008 and given the hype around David Beckham's joining of Major League Football's LA Galaxy.

Within the colonial world, the game took on a more complex and varied nature. The themes of domination, accommodation and resistance feature prominently in the histories of football-playing nations in the former colonies (Darby 2002; Stuart 1995). While most colonies assimilated this aspect of English culture within their own, not all took to football in the same manner. The cultural, socio-economic and racial landscape of each colony played a role in the broader societal significance attributed to the sport.

In South America the game took on various sub-dimensions due to the diverse sporting and socio-economic conditions. When the Spanish and later the Portuguese and other Europeans arrived on the continent, they found the locals were already playing ball games. However, it was only when the British arrived in the latter part of the nineteenth century that football itself was introduced. With the increasing industrialisation of South America, the urban centres began to attract workers and an urban industrial middle class was created. It was in these multicultural cities that street football took root and the unique, flamboyant playing style characteristic of South American teams developed, at odds with the white pastime of the migrant amateurs – the amateur athlete who embodied aristocratic sporting values (Del Burgo 1995). On the other hand, although Asia and Oceania account for almost half of FIFA's registered players and have vast commercial potential, particularly in the densely populated Indian and Chinese cities, by popular-appeal standards these areas remain some of the more unaffected regions in the world (Murray 1995).

In most parts of Africa, much like in South America, football is considered the national sport and holds great influence over the people. Football came to Africa through the colonists. It was only really at the end of the colonial era that football gained momentum as the chosen sport of the black majority, due largely to the colonialists' lack of investment in educational institutions, thus not allowing for the institutional setting of school sports to take hold (Stuart 1995). Yet, in spite of the political transition to majority rule, African football continues to be plagued by problems carried over from the colonial era – problems which have often seen it competing on an uneven basis in terms of resources and opportunities.

Although limited, the success Africa has enjoyed on the international football stage can be largely attributed to West African states. Nigeria, in many instances, has come to represent the quintessential African football team. In Nigeria, the game was introduced by British colonists yet developed to promote a Nigerian identity,

particularly in the postcolonial period, while being patronised by the Abacha regime (Boer 2004). However, possibly the most successful team on the African continent is the Indomitable Lions of Cameroon. Although Cameroon's colonial experience saw no fewer than three European countries pursuing their interests there, French colonial rule proved to be the most culturally, politically and economically pervasive and can still be found through footballing ties today (Vidacs 2004).

On the other hand, their southern African counterparts have been far less successful in garnering international attention. This is largely because states have struggled to develop the appropriate institutions and infrastructure necessary to compete consistently at the top level, and have also suffered from continual talent migration largely due to a lack of funds. In states such as Zimbabwe, although showing promise and despite being kept out of the hands of the powerful elite, the country's football infrastructure has been badly affected by poor governance and economic mismanagement (Giulianotti 2004). Although relative newcomers to the international footballing scene, some believe South Africa to be the big southern African hope ahead of more seasoned teams such as Zambia, largely because of its strong infrastructure and relative wealth in the region.

South Africa is a prime example of how football developed and took hold within an African society. Football was initially seen as a means to socialise the locals into a British way of life but later developed into an area for resistance (Alegi 2004). In South Africa, as elsewhere in Africa, socialisation into football was primarily aimed at traders, soldiers, missionaries, schools, formal and informal sporting associations linked with various industries – such as the mines – and the various amateur clubs which popped up in the fledgling urban areas. Spurred on by the economic boom resulting from the discovery of natural resources and the associated demand for labour, urban centres became the hub of footballing activity. Football formed part of the broader social fabric of everyday life and was influenced by the prevailing power relations in society. It therefore played a prominent role in the formation and reinforcement of the racially and ethnically plural communities which were developing in South Africa's cities.

Over time, different sports found their support base within a particular segment of the community and allegiance was often reinforced through class, ethnicity or race. It is interesting to note that cricket and rugby developed as largely white sports in South Africa, while football developed as a predominantly black sport. This is largely attributed to the strong influence of indigenous sporting traditions on black South Africans' acceptance of British football, fostering a perception of football as plebeian (Alegi 2004), and also because exclusionary boundaries – based on race, class, culture and gender – were generally easier to maintain in rugby and cricket (Nauright 1997), an exception being the development of black rugby in the Eastern Cape.

Even today, sport in South Africa is largely divided along racial lines, making it no real surprise that football is the most popular sport in the country. Since the attainment of democracy in 1994, football has come a long way in terms of undoing

the structural inequalities of apartheid – a feat largely attributed to increased sponsorship, marketing and broadcasting rights coupled with the sport's attachment to big brands, so making it fertile ground for extending the global consumer culture of world football. The popularity and success of the sport among the black majority is partially why the Football World Cup is proving to be such a politically momentous event for South Africa, especially when compared to the country's hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups in 1995 and 2003 respectively, both of which enjoyed a narrower, white, elite support base. The Football World Cup therefore signals the successful reconfiguration of the South African political system under a black majority government (Van der Merwe 2007).

Having briefly outlined the politics of international football, the chapter now turns to a discussion of Africa's involvement in World Cups from a historical perspective.

History of the World Cup

In terms of the developing world bidding for and successfully hosting World Cups, Africa remains far behind South America and, to a lesser extent, Asia. South America has hosted the Football World Cup four times and was instrumental in the development of the tournament in the twentieth century, whilst Korea/Japan were the first host countries of the twenty-first century. Besides pointing to the fact that sport is not a highly lucrative venture in Africa – leaving the best African players to ply their trade elsewhere – Africa's peripheral status within the World Cup circuit is largely attributed to the broader trajectories of inequality and power as evidenced by the international relations of African countries, and is ultimately reflective of Africa's global marginality (Cornelissen 2004a, 2004b). Africa remains the most impoverished continent in the world, with sub-Saharan Africa being one of the poorest regions in the world, ravaged by AIDS, poverty and human rights abuses.

The steady inclusion of African states within World Cup processes is perhaps most clearly demonstrated through the structural changes implemented in the format of the tournament in the twentieth century. These trends are paralleled by cultural, political and socio-economic forces which form part of a broader drive towards a more equitable global system. Although one cannot underestimate the extent to which the globalisation of football and the World Cup is largely a result of economic forces and FIFA's desire to increase its profits, the political and socio-cultural corollaries are equally important in telling the story of how Africa acquired its first World Cup. Today, over 200 nations compete for one of 32 places in the World Cup finals, more nations than compete in the Olympics or are members of the United Nations.

Table 2.1 details host nations in the history of the World Cup, the winner of each tournament, the number of teams participating and which African teams participated. Apart from an initial showing by Egypt in 1934, African teams were allowed to participate only from 1970 onwards. In later contests, as a result of the

lobbying efforts of African teams and the gradual democratisation of international football governance structures, changes in the format of the tournament occurred and five African teams were included. This is compared to the average three or four South American teams fielded per tournament from as early as 1930. South America has won more than half the tournaments, ahead of Europe.

The idea for the World Cup was first mooted by two Frenchmen: Jules Rimet, who later became president of FIFA, and Henri Delauney, the man tasked with organising French football. In lieu of the rising professionalism of football and its gathering popularity globally, the idea was originally conceived of as an attempt to stage a football world championship independent of the Olympics, which it had hitherto been part of. FIFA's first meeting took place in 1904 and it was there that the decision

Table 2.1 World Cup host nations and participating teams

Year	Host	Winner	Number of teams participating	African teams participating
2010	South Africa	?	32	Five teams plus South Africa as the host country
2006	Germany	Italy	32	Angola, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Tunisia
2002	Korea/Japan	Brazil	32	Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia
1998	France	France	32	Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia
1994	USA	Brazil	24	Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria
1990	Italy	West Germany	24	Cameroon, Egypt
1986	Mexico	Argentina	24	Algeria, Morocco
1982	Spain	Italy	24	Algeria, Cameroon
1978	Argentina	Argentina	16	Tunisia
1974	West Germany	West Germany	16	Zaire (DRC)
1970	Mexico	Brazil	16	Morocco
1966	England	England	16	
1962	Chile	Brazil	16	
1958	Sweden	Brazil	16	
1954	Switzerland	West Germany	16	
1950	Brazil	Uruguay	13	
1938	France	Italy	15	
1934	Italy	Italy	16	Egypt
1930	Uruguay	Uruguay	13	

Source: See endnote 1.

to host such an event was taken. The meeting was held without Britain. It was only 26 years later that the right to host a football world championship was exercised. Similar to the modern-day acrimonious bidding processes, Uruguay lobbied hard to host the first ever Football World Cup, beating four European competitors. The four European countries withdrew and did not take part in the tournament. Thus Uruguay hosted 13 teams in 1930 – seven from South America, four from Europe and two from North America (Glanville 1993: 15–16).

More South American teams took part in this tournament due to geographical proximity, but from 1934 to 1966 Europe strengthened its grip on the World Cup, hosting the event six times during this period – pausing only during the 1940s due to World War Two – with the exception of Brazil in 1950 and Chile in 1962. In response, South American teams boycotted the event in protest. This was particularly after they had been given the impression that FIFA would rotate host status between the two continents. In order to avoid further controversy, FIFA implemented a rotational policy between Europe and the Americas in the late 1950s. This policy continued until 1998. From 1934 to 1966 the number of teams participating in the finals increased only marginally from 13 to 16 countries, although FIFA membership expanded rapidly, reaching 30 nations in 1921 and 85 nations in 1955. The tournament steadily gathered in momentum and became a regular fixture on the international football calendar.

From 1966 to 2006 the World Cups expanded further and more rapidly as more and more teams were brought into the fray of international football, with significant penetration in terms of new host nations and regions towards the end of the twentieth century. In 1982 the finals underwent substantive revisions, growing from 16 to 24 participating countries and then to 32 countries in 1998, the number which it is today. There were a few reasons for the steadily widening reach of the tournament. First, the increasing commercialism of world football had led to further penetration of African, Asian and American markets, with the development of the tournament paralleling these shifts. More than half of FIFA's revenue comes from broadcasting, and then marketing and sponsorship rights – the globalisation of football follows directly from the self-interest of FIFA and the sponsors. Second, a wave of nationalism swept through the newly independent states of the developing world. This created an eagerness to assert notions of nationhood through sport in the hope of creating and asserting new national identities. This was also influenced by political changes taking place elsewhere in the world, as when FIFA membership increased by 14 nations due to the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia. This in turn led to a greater diversification of world football with more competitive bidding processes.

The increasing political awareness of developing nations in general and African states in particular manifested itself through international football governance structures – as demonstrated through their lobbying efforts against apartheid South Africa. As the political mandate and scope of football governance steadily changed in

order to cater for the evolving face of modern football, so the structural imbalances in the make-up of the tournament were also questioned. Thus the 1960s saw further controversy when the African and Asian nations withdrew from the tournament in protest against having only one qualifying place for the finals allocated to the regions of Asia, Oceania and Africa.

The 1970s to 1990s saw the tournament continue to go back and forth between Europe and the Americas, with North America playing a much more prominent role – Mexico hosted the event twice and the USA hosted in 1994. The 1990s will partly be remembered for the successes of the Cameroonian team, which reached the quarter-finals – a first for an African team. Their performance at the World Cup gave hope to many aspiring African teams and signalled the prowess of especially West African teams as a force to be reckoned with, particularly after a succession of disappointing performances by their southern African counterparts. This achievement was further cemented by the relative success of first-timers Nigeria.

By the turn of the century the World Cup was leading the democratisation of world football, with substantive gains being made by Korea/Japan's successful bid for 2002, South Africa's failed 2006 campaign – losing by one vote to Germany – and its successful 2010 campaign. FIFA's 2002 penetration into Asian markets – where, relatively speaking, much ground was still to be covered – was seen as a shrewd business move.

In 2010, 80 years after its inception, the nineteenth FIFA World Cup will be hosted in Africa. It will be the most profitable ever for FIFA. Since its inception in 1930, the tournament has expanded from just a handful of teams to include 32 teams competing in the finals. Africa, which until relatively recently had never progressed as far as the quarter-finals, has now been afforded five places in the finals.

South Africa's exclusion from international football

Since first being introduced into South Africa and until the end of apartheid, football was affected by the politics of the country, and in particular its system of racial subjugation. The all-white Football Association of South Africa (FASA) was formed in 1892, while the South African Indian Football Association, the South African Bantu Football Association and the South African Coloured Football Association were founded in 1903, 1933 and 1936 respectively. South Africa did not take part in the World Cup from 1930 to 1962, and from 1966 to 1992 the country was banned from FIFA.

Although there had always been an informal policy of segregation within South African sport, with the formal realisation of apartheid in 1948 divisions on the playing field were further entrenched through legislation. Sporting activities had to comply with the broader policies of so-called 'separate development' and there was to be no interracial mixing in sport. So-called 'non-white' teams were barred from competing against white teams. Visiting teams were also expected

to respect South Africa's laws and customs. These developments were out of step with what was happening in most postcolonial football-playing countries – a tide of independent football associations swept through FIFA from the 1950s onwards, as affiliate countries started to come into their own as both independent political entities and as football-playing nations. Given the surge of nationalism and self-determination, particularly among the increasingly influential African bloc, the Confederation of African Football (CAF), South Africa's membership became increasingly untenable.

During the height of apartheid in the late 1950s and early 1960s, FIFA was divided on whether to grant membership to the white-controlled FASA or to the non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF), which was an umbrella body representing the interests of non-racial football. FASA had already been excluded from CAF after it refused to send a mixed team to compete in the first African Cup of Nations in 1957. In the late 1950s, the SASF began lobbying FIFA to allow it to replace the white-controlled organisation as South Africa's representative in the world body. The SASF succeeded in getting FASA suspended in 1961, but the all-white association was given one year to prove itself as a non-racial body. An investigative commission was established to assess the possible reinstatement of FASA. On the recommendation of the then FIFA president, Stanley Rous, FASA was readmitted into FIFA. Yet the general sentiment, particularly from the African bloc, was that FIFA had acted in a way that endorsed apartheid policies and CAF was determined to push the issue further. At the FIFA congress in 1964, acrimonious exchanges led to FASA's suspension from the world body. Despite mounting pressure to abandon his support of FASA, Rous continued his support (Darby 2003).

Although for a large part of the twentieth century FIFA had been biased towards Europe, this trend changed in the 1970s when Brazilian business magnate João Havelange took over the presidency of FIFA. Havelange observed the confrontations between Rous, FASA and CAF with much interest and learned how to woo the increasingly influential African bloc within FIFA. He skilfully wove the status of FASA into his campaigning for president by stating that as long as FASA continued to apply segregationist policies, their suspension would apply (Darby 2003). Havelange became president of FIFA in 1974 and his term was characterised by the increasing inclusion of the voice of African countries in the governance structures of world football, as the balance of power within FIFA was steadily evened out between the north and the south (Darby 2003; Wagg 1995c).

Although by the 1970s South Africa's race policies had led to its isolation in the football world, domestically the 1970s saw the apartheid regime's forceful imposition of subjugation on the field of play. A black National Professional Soccer League emerged with the backing of the government and South African Breweries. Corporate sponsorship of black football increased after state television was launched in 1976, as companies looked to exploit the game and gain access to the black consumer base. The watershed 1976 Soweto uprising set in motion a series

of events that ultimately led to a gradual deracialisation of professional football. School and amateur football, which comprised more than 95 per cent of players, remained strictly segregated until the 1980s. In the latter half of the 1980s the ANC and the National Party started laying the foundations for a negotiated settlement, with anti-apartheid activists lobbying for a non-racial football body to be established (Alegi 2004). Many changes were in store for the early 1990s.

South Africa re-enters international football

With movements towards unity already afoot in the early 1990s, a non-racial football association was established. The divisions within the administration of football finally came to an end when the four different associations, representing black, white, Indian and coloured players, were merged into the South African Football Association (SAFA). Consequently, FIFA granted South Africa membership status in 1992 at its congress in Zurich. Football was mooted as being a forerunner in signalling the 'new' South Africa, given its popular black support, and South Africa's re-entry into international football prefaced the wider political negotiations. South Africa beat Cameroon 1–0 in its first game after re-entry and the initial success of Bafana Bafana – translated literally as 'the boys' – partly transcended the fractious history of the sport in the country.

Carried by the wave of democratisation and spectacular early feats in different sporting codes, the early to mid-1990s heralded a golden era for South African sport and for football in particular. The football team's achievements, often attributed to 'Mandelamania', included being champions of the African Cup of Nations. According to FIFA's world rankings, South Africa was ranked as high as sixteenth in the world during the mid-1990s.

Despite various problems with the formation of a non-racial football body, the foundations were being laid for South African football to undergo steady change on a national level consistent with the broader societal changes. The chief custodians overseeing the transformation of football were the Department of Sport and Recreation, SAFA and the South African Sports Commission.[2] Unlike the other major sporting codes in South Africa, football had an abundance of black talent. Yet rapid progress needed to be made in terms of the upgrading of existing and the building of new football facilities and infrastructure. Importantly, under-21 leagues and supporting structures needed to be established in order to ensure a continuous stream of good black players through the ranks.

Despite the many contradictions that emerged in the new South Africa, sport's role in helping to strengthen a still fragile national identity was undeniable. South Africa had successfully negotiated the tricky transition period and averted a civil war. Football's role in helping to strengthen and mould this malleable national identity was clearly evident. However, after the honeymoon period of democratisation, some of the initial good work came undone. Not unlike most other sporting codes in

South Africa, football was plagued by a number of issues both on and off the field. Amongst them were issues related to the overall competence and racial composition of SAFA, South African players' lack of patriotism, and issues around sponsorship and ownership.

By late 2008, South Africa had dropped to eighty-fifth place in the world rankings and did not even qualify for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. Part of the problem was that when South Africa re-entered world football, the game was a very different entity to what it had been before isolation. Having been ostracised from World Cups and the African Cup of Nations tournaments – and also not having been allowed to play friendly matches with FIFA members – South Africa, black and white, had maintained tenuous links with the organisational, technical and economic changes that had revolutionised world football in the 1970s and 1980s (Alegi 2004). These changes were perhaps most acute in the World Cup itself, as the commercialism and marketing of the spectacle started to eclipse the game. States were increasingly awarded the event based on their ability to woo FIFA delegates and to further the economic goals of the organisation. The mega-event had become bigger than the game.

Crucial political developments took place within the governance of the game, developments which would later play directly into South Africa's favour as host nation. Rather fortuitously for South Africa, the political changes occurring within world football in the latter half of the twentieth century happened to coincide with the political changes taking place in South Africa. A gradual democratisation took place within the governance structures of world football in the latter half of the twentieth century and South Africa re-entered international football in the 1990s, just in time to capitalise on the steadily mounting pressure for an African-hosted World Cup. Although South Africa struggled to convince its African counterparts of its suitability to represent the continent after years of white rule under apartheid, the country sought to project itself as a significantly reformed, modern, industrialised African state, ideally situated to further the cosmopolitan ideals and development of world football. Eager to shake off its former pariah image and consistent with various initiatives adopted by state and corporate elites in the early 1990s, South Africa was quick to read the mood in world football circles and did not waste any time trying to seize the initiative. Because of its largely peaceful transition and relative success in overcoming a history of racial discrimination, South Africa was also steadily being viewed as an ideal candidate to further the increasingly developmental focus of world football, particularly on the African continent. For a complex set of political and economic reasons, and arguably also through sheer luck and timing, South Africa managed to wrest the ascendancy from other, more established African contenders who, in purely footballing terms, were perhaps more deserving of host status.

Despite what was happening in football and parallel to this, sport – in particular major sporting events – took on increased importance for the post-apartheid South

African government. Having outlined the nature of the role played by South Africa in international football, the next section looks more closely at the recent history of post-apartheid South African state and corporate elites' drive to host sports mega-events, leading up to the decision to enter the bidding process for 2010.

South Africa enters the bidding process

During the early phases of democracy, sporting events were central to the statecraft exercises of state and corporate elites. Thus winning the rights to host the 2010 World Cup was a direct consequence of concerted and sustained efforts by state and corporate elites to attract sports mega-events for predominantly two reasons. Firstly, bid protagonists usually stressed the crucial economic and developmental corollaries such events would bring, fusing conventional political discourse with a developmental philosophy. Secondly, and related, is the promotion of a particular notion of Africa and the idea of an African revival consistent with the rhetoric propagated through more conventional political initiatives like the African Renaissance (Cornelissen & Swart 2006). Therefore, it was not long before the South African government sought host status for the 2006 and later the 2010 Football World Cups, having already successfully hosted the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 1996 African Cup of Nations, the 1999 All African Games and the 2003 Cricket World Cup.

Buoyed by the early success of South Africa's political transition and wanting to project the image of an engaged and evolving society to the international community, South Africa participated in the Barcelona Olympics and the Cricket World Cup, both in 1992, whilst on the brink of its political transition. South Africa's proclivity to both participate in and host sports events was on the rise, and through a rekindling of old 'imperial' ties South Africa secured the rights to host the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 2003 Cricket World Cup, even before its first democratic elections (Van der Merwe 2007). This was largely due to an accepting international community and the marketing prowess of Nelson Mandela's iconic appeal, which overrode the various practical constraints to South Africa's actual capacity to host major international events.

The 1995 Rugby World Cup proved cathartic for South Africa at a time when the nation was galvanised through the 'one team, one nation' slogan. The slogan, which extended into the identity building of the 'Rainbow Nation', became a cornerstone of Mandela's presidency. However, closer inspection suggests that the lustre of the event was quick to dissipate, largely in light of ongoing transformation squabbles as a result of rugby's pervasive image as a white, Afrikaans sport (Black & Nauright 1998; Booth 1996; Grundlingh 1998; Steenveld & Strelitz 1998). After successfully hosting the Rugby World Cup, South African political and corporate elites strategically seized the opportunity of hosting various pan-African events, such as the African Cup of Nations and the All African Games, to recreate some of the country's mega-event glory, for which the Rugby World Cup had set high standards. These events

were also supposed to signal South Africa's emergent African identity, following years of white rule under apartheid. South Africa won and successfully hosted the 1996 African Cup of Nations with the kind of euphoria which had marked the Rugby World Cup. However, setbacks were also to follow: South Africa lost the bid for both the 2004 Olympics and the 2006 Football World Cup.

The idea of hosting the 2006 Football World Cup was first mooted in the early 1990s. It was envisioned that the event would have three primary objectives. Firstly, it would encourage capital construction and heighten the country's international visibility for the purposes of attracting tourism. Secondly, it would elicit national pride, and thirdly, it would offer local power brokers in government, sport, media and business an opportunity to renegotiate or consolidate their role in the 'new' South Africa. The 2006 bid also relied heavily on an emotive posturing of Africa similar to that used in the 2010 World Cup bid, by appealing to the socio-economic marginalisation of Africa. South Africa lost the bid to Germany by one vote after Charlie Dempsey abstained from voting (Alegi 2001). South Africa came under criticism for not doing all in its power to secure enough votes. The presence of President Mandela at the final voting round would also have helped. However, in hindsight these setbacks were learning curves for the country, and should the event have been awarded at that stage, it could have proved logistically problematic (Cornelissen 2004a, 2004b; Griffiths 2000).

South Africa's decision to co-host the 2003 Cricket World Cup with Zimbabwe and Kenya went one step further in affirming South Africa's African identity, whilst also being consistent with a pattern of foreign policy initiatives by President Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki. The event was tied into Mbeki's vision to rejuvenate the African continent socially and economically through the African Renaissance. The overall 'African Safari' motif of the tournament, which became the strategic marketing approach of choice, sought to stamp a uniquely 'Africanised' version of a game bequeathed on former colonies by British imperialism, as well as to broaden the cultural base of the game. What made the Cricket World Cup all the more interesting was the implicit attempt to undo a sport which had associated itself with the 'civilising' mission of the British Empire. By 'Africanising' the Cricket World Cup, South Africa was implicitly trying to reconfigure not only the hegemonic order of international cricket, but also the broader inequalities between the Anglo-Saxon world and Africa (Van der Merwe & Van der Westhuizen 2007).

Although South Africa's choice of Zimbabwe as co-host produced unnecessary political tensions – it contradicted the overarching theme of the African Renaissance, exacerbated tensions between the Afro-Asian and Anglo-Saxon contours within the cricket-playing Commonwealth, and highlighted the weaknesses of South Africa's overall foreign policy towards Zimbabwe – on a technical level South Africa was quite successful in dispelling the 'myth' that Africa was not suited to hosting such events (Van der Merwe & Van der Westhuizen 2007). South Africa's appropriation of the event, coupled with the manner in which the event was punted by the state,

corporate elites and the media, revealed the country's continental and international aspirations. These aspirations were well capped by South Africa's successful bid for the 2010 Football World Cup. The bid was largely motivated as an 'African' bid and tied into the '10 years of democracy' celebrations just after the April 2004 general elections. After failing the first time, South Africa rejuvenated its quest to host 'the beautiful game' by appealing fervently through the well-publicised slogan 'It's Africa's Turn'.

What made this round of bidding truly unique in the history of the World Cup was the rotational system introduced by FIFA, which induced a continent-wide scramble for the rights to host the event. The sentiment was that FIFA had done something for Africa that it had never before done in the history of the World Cup. It had levelled the bidding playing fields. Africa had to compete with Europe and South America only on the field of play – and not against their beautiful cities and strong infrastructure. After Brazil was awarded the 2014 event the rotational system was revoked (in 2007), adding to the exceptional nature of the decision for the African continent.

From the outset, the 2010 event was always going to be hosted by an African nation – just which nation was to articulate this vision remained contested. Although there were moments when South Africa was unsure whether it would secure host status – followed closely as it was by an aspirant Morocco that managed to secure 10 of the final votes, and by an equally buoyant yet shy-on-votes Egypt – for the most part South Africa was self-assured after having successfully hosted a string of sporting events. With South Africa having arguably the strongest sporting, transport, media and hospitality infrastructure and facilities in Africa, partly a legacy of its apartheid past, the country had good reason to be confident.

Despite the structural problems due to apartheid and the almost 30 years out in the political wilderness, South Africa seemed an old favourite and a relatively known quantity, largely because of the stature and moral authority it had accrued within the international community in a relatively short period since readmission. From the viewpoint of FIFA, hosting the World Cup in Africa provided an opportunity to further globalise the sport and had an explicit political edge.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to reflect upon the historical significance of the first 'African' World Cup. By placing Africa at the centre of international football and exploring the nature of the role played by African states in the development of international football, this chapter has outlined the steady democratisation and globalisation processes which took place within international football and how these came to be reflected through the World Cup. This chapter also explored the role played by South Africa in this process and its increased significance because of its apartheid history. Although the steady inclusion of African states in international football and

World Cups is perhaps most clearly demonstrated through the structural changes implemented in the twentieth century, these trends have been strengthened and paralleled by broader cultural, political and socio-economic forces. An African Football World Cup not only forms part of a broader drive towards a more equitable international footballing order, but also towards a more equitable realignment between Africa and the developed world more generally. Hosting the 2010 Football World Cup therefore promises to be a crowning achievement of not only South Africa's re-entry into the international community, but also for Africa's journey towards a more equitable and just global order.

Notes

1   'Formats of the FIFA World Cup final competitions 1930–2010', available at http://www.fifa. com/mm/document/fifafacts/mcwc/ip-201_04e_fwc_formats_slots_8821. pdf, accessed on 1 January 2008. See also www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/

2   The South African Sports Commission (SASC) was established in 1998. The organisation that was the precursor to the SASC in the period under discussion was the National Sports Council.

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3 *Managing the alchemy of the 2010 Football World Cup*

Glynn Davies

This chapter identifies and describes the institutions responsible for the FIFA 2010 Football World Cup as well as their roles in preparing for and managing the event itself.[1] The chapter provides a backdrop and to some degree is more a 'who's who' of the organisational and management structures for the 2010 World Cup than a description of the management and decision-making processes. This is a reflection of the limited transparency that has prevailed during these processes, which is typical of planning for mega-events (Horne & Manzenreiter 2004).

The institutions and their roles described in this chapter are FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), the Local Organising Committee (LOC), the South African Football Association (SAFA), various national government ministries that are members of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC), the IMC's Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) and the Project Management Unit (PMU) within the Department of Sports and Recreation. This list is just a beginning and these organisations, together with host city governments mentioned later in the chapter, are those considered most important for preparing for and managing the event.

The chapter has four sections followed by some concluding comments. The first section provides a description of FIFA, the LOC and the financing of both. The second records FIFA's requirements, preparations for the event, the timelines and the interventions by FIFA. The third describes government institutional arrangements (three spheres: national, provincial and local government) for the event. The fourth considers the funding arrangements for the stadiums and associated infrastructure.

The FIFA Football World Cup

Enhancing and extending the reach of football globally is the business of FIFA. Its key product is synonymous with its brand – the quadrennial FIFA Football World Cup. This has been very successfully marketed to the point where only the World Cup and the Olympics are classified as sports mega-events, with the only other event so classified being the World Fairs or Expos (for example the Shanghai 2010 Expo) (Roche 2000).

FIFA's role in organising the World Cup tournaments is evident in the fact that countries 'host' the World Cup, with the event itself being 'owned' by FIFA. FIFA, in collaboration with a local counterpart, the LOC, oversees preparations for the World Cup and manages the event. Whereas FIFA undertakes to provide the *entertainment*,

it is necessary that the host country and, in particular, the host cities provide all the necessary infrastructure and services. Thus there are two distinct broad roles and categories of costs and requisite budgets: those that cover the logistics for and management of the event, and those roles and costs related to investment in the stadiums and other infrastructure. This latter includes, inter alia, transport and broadcasting/telecommunications infrastructure, safety and security, health services and other undertakings pertaining to protecting the rights and interests of global partners and international and national sponsors.

FIFA's costs are covered and paid for by television broadcasting rights, corporate partners who fund FIFA on an ongoing basis, and global corporate sponsors and national corporate supporters for the event itself, and the marketing rights assigned to them. Table 3.1 provides a 'picture' of FIFA funding for the period 2003–2006. The funding projections for the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup proved not to be readily available. As can be seen from Table 3.1, more than half of the revenue arises from the sale of broadcasting rights. The marketing rights confer the sole right to market a variety of goods – with the cameras being positioned around the designated FIFA Football World Cup areas, including playing fields and surrounding precincts, to feature the advertisements – and to sell the sponsoring organisation's goods, for example the American Budweiser beer rather than South African beer, within designated areas. Only a small proportion of the total revenue comes from the sale of tickets, which is why mega-events can be located in developing countries that have adequate stadiums, transport and broadcasting infrastructure, and accommodation. FIFA uses the funding to pay for its own expenses and those of the LOC, as well as to pay FIFA members around the world and other costs. By December 2006 the LOC had received R155.4 million from FIFA (South African Sports Commission 2006a).

Table 3.1 FIFA revenue, 2003–2006

Revenue stream	(CHF million)*
Television broadcast rights	
USA	176
Europe	751
Rest of the world	733
Marketing rights	714
Hospitality rights	260
Licensing rights	92
Accommodation and ticketing	31
Profit share LOC 2006 FIFA World Cup	79
Other	22
Revenue (total)	2 858

Source: FIFA (2007)
Note: * Swiss Franc (CHF) = US$0.90764 (19 January 2008)

By October 2007 Danny Jordaan, LOC CEO, was able to state that the 2010 FIFA World Cup had generated more revenue than any other 'World Cup in the past 100 years'; contracts valued at US$3.2 billion had been signed and it was anticipated that this would quickly increase to between US$3.5 and US$4 billion (*Engineering News* 11 October 2007).[2]

There is often confusion between observations that a mega-event is profitable and what this might mean for the capital expenditure undertaken by the host country and cities. Profit accrues to FIFA and represents revenue in excess of its commitments to the LOC, FIFA members and so on. The country and cities' costs are not covered in any similar fashion and differ among countries. For example, the stadiums used in the 2006 FIFA World Cup belonged to prominent football teams, whereas in South Africa this is not the case: two stadiums are privately owned – Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria and the Royal Bafokeng Stadium in Rustenburg; a further two are subject to long lease agreements, namely Ellis Park Stadium in Johannesburg and Free State Stadium in Mangaung; and Soccer City in Johannesburg was previously owned and managed by SAFA and has now been returned to the state and will be managed by the City of Johannesburg.[3] Notwithstanding the ownership pattern, because of the financial guarantees given by national government, it is in the end the taxpayer who is funding the greatest proportion of the costs of construction or alterations to stadiums.

Finally, FIFA is also concerned about ensuring the legacy of the World Cup. During the preliminary draw – it was decided here in which groups the countries would play to qualify for 2010 – held in Durban during November 2007, FIFA launched its Football for Hope – 20 Centres for 2010.[4] Each of the centres will have a mini-pitch, classrooms and healthcare facilities, thus providing young players with a place to play as well as access to counselling, health and educational services. During the qualifying rounds, for each goal scored FIFA will donate US$500 to be used towards constructing the 20 Football for Hope centres across the African continent. Five of the centres will be in South Africa, while Kenya, Rwanda, Mali and Ghana will also be beneficiaries. A further 15 countries were at the time still being assessed. During the 2010 event it is planned that these centres be used for live screening of matches (*Sunday Times* 25 November 2007).[5]

Preparing for the 'greatest show on earth'

SAFA, as the South African affiliate member of FIFA, was jointly responsible with the South African government for putting together the bid for the 2010 Football World Cup. This section discusses what FIFA required once South Africa had been awarded the right to host the World Cup.

FIFA oversight, requirements and timelines

FIFA draws no distinction between developing and developed country hosts in respect of compliance and requirements. In this regard there is a wide range

of undertakings that need to be given by the host country and cities, including timelines for the construction of the stadiums, legislation that safeguards the rights of FIFA and its partners and sponsors, and numerous other items pertaining to security, accommodation and so on. The requirements place a much heavier burden on developing country hosts such as South Africa than they do on hosts in developed countries.

Regarding the timelines, Table 3.2 provides specific milestones that must be met. During the initial phase, nominally mid-2005 to mid-2006, South Africa needed to demonstrate compliance with the FIFA requirements and deliver on the undertakings and guarantees given in the Bid Book. This had to be demonstrable in terms of both legislation and the processes envisaged for ensuring the stadiums and infrastructure would be completed on time. To ensure compliance, FIFA maintains its own monitoring capability and on a regular basis assesses the situation with regard to all the elements of the tournament.

Since South Africa was awarded the right to host the World Cup, there have been several instances where FIFA's 'iron fist in a kid glove' has come to the fore. For example, in November 2004 FIFA indicated to the South African Preparatory Committee that it would not accept the proposed organogram outlining the way in which South Africa wished to organise and manage the tournament. FIFA's attitude might have resulted from their experience of the organisation of the 2002 World Cup held in Japan/Korea. After incurring substantial financial losses, FIFA concluded that it could not afford to leave host countries solely in charge of the preparations and running of future events. Thus FIFA's desire for capable individuals with international track records to be in charge of the 2010 World Cup (South African Sports Commission 2004).

During 2005, as the Bid Book was worked up in greater detail, FIFA disagreed with the number of venues as well as with aspects of the organising structure suggested by the South African Preparatory Committee. The original number and spatial disposition of venues suggested in the South African Bid Book attempted to

Table 3.2 Milestones to be met for the 2010 World Cup

Date	Deliverable
December 2005	Final selection of tournament stadiums
December 2006	Stadiums and transport infrastructure planning complete
January 2007	Commencement of construction of new stadiums and renovations to existing stadiums and supporting infrastructure
September 2008	FIFA inspection team reviews state of readiness
December 2008	Construction work on selected stadiums complete
June 2009	South Africa hosts Confederations Cup
October 2009	Handover of all stadiums to FIFA; supporting infrastructure complete
11 June to 11 July 2010	FIFA Football World Cup

Source: 2010 website[6]

equitably spread the event and the anticipated benefits across the country. There was much debate as to why some of the lesser developed regions of the country were not being more 'enthusiastically' supported. This needed to be viewed against the objective of FIFA wanting a global event and putting the maximum number of fans in the stadiums; smaller stadiums in towns with limited accommodation would not serve this purpose. Thus the final figure of 10 stadiums – down from South Africa's wish for 13[7] and up from FIFA's 8.[8] Negotiations between South Africa and FIFA dragged on past the deadline date of December 2005 and it wasn't until February 2006 that a final decision was taken on the number and location of venues.[9]

In September 2006 FIFA strengthened its local oversight by appointing Horst Schmidt – the general secretary of the German football association, who had also been the first vice-president of the German LOC for the 2006 FIFA World Cup – to the position of FIFA coordinator of the 2010 World Cup. In fulfilling this coordinating role, Schmidt will spend seven days a month using his experience to serve as FIFA General Secretary Jerome Valcke's 'extended arm' in South Africa and Zurich on the day-to-day management of preparations for the tournament.[10]

In early December 2006, after pressure from FIFA, the LOC warned Cape Town that it would be deprived of any role in the tournament if there were any further delays in starting construction of the stadium at Green Point.[11] Again in April 2007 FIFA and the LOC jointly announced that they would be closely monitoring construction progress of the five new stadiums to ensure no loss of momentum (*Engineering News* 3 April 2007).[12] This came after the then current budget overruns had been resolved and construction started on all the stadiums by the LOC's March 2007 deadline.

In November 2007, during the previously mentioned preliminary draw, Valcke made it clear that should stadium construction not meet the required deadlines, which included select stadiums being ready for the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2009, those cities that defaulted would be left out of the event – this was particularly pertinent to Durban, Cape Town and Mbombela, all of which had had to deal with lost construction time due to strikes. If this were to happen, it is probable that the stadiums in Gauteng province would benefit the most. During this same meeting concern was also expressed about safety and security (*The Star* 23 November 2007).[13]

Aside from the stadiums, the FIFA requirements for transport and information and communication technology are also very stringent. Each host city will have to demonstrate that they have a transport system in place that will provide high-quality, reliable, efficient and safe transportation to cater to the needs of various users. These include the general public and spectators as well as teams, their officials and the media. It is expected that a media representative, for instance, should not have to wait more than 10 minutes for a scheduled bus trip between a media centre, a place of accommodation and a stadium (CoJ 2006). This is one area that has necessitated close cooperation between the spheres of government, both in terms of planning and establishing the funding framework. Unlike the stadiums, progress

on the ground with regards to transport is still at an early stage (*Engineering News* 9 April 2008)[14] – except for the Gautrain linking Johannesburg to Pretoria and the international Oliver Tambo Airport – and FIFA oversight can only take anticipated planned outputs into account.

The FIFA broadcasting and telecommunications standards to be met by South Africa are accelerating the country's programme for enhancing its information and communication technology capability.[15] An example is the switch-over from analogue to digital television transmission and the infrastructure required for that. In particular, the host cities have to provide compliant broadcast centres and the country is partnering with a range of entities in the implementation of new undersea and terrestrial data cables, which will expand broadband capacity and enhance international connectivity (*Engineering News* 20 June 2008).[16]

One area where FIFA obliged South Africa concerns tourist accommodation, which also has to meet stringent requirements. The South African government was resolute that to meet its own developmental goals, the tourism and hospitality sectors present very specific small business opportunities. In this regard, South Africa successfully made its case and the 2010 World Cup is the first time that FIFA is considering accommodation that is not based on hotels as part of its accepted package for accredited accommodation (*Shoot* 22 June 2007).[17] This should open the path for many smaller providers of accommodation, such as bed-and-breakfast establishments, to benefit. To facilitate this process an organisation and grading system has been put in place and, once on the system, the provider of accommodation has access to the FIFA website as an official service provider (*Engineering News* 26 November 2007).[18]

South African compliance

The South African national government undertook to ensure that the FIFA conditions would be met. The undertakings require that legislation in South Africa will have to be changed and that other spheres of government will not operate or behave in ways that are at variance with FIFA's requirements. This also extends to ensuring that the private sector, as well as civil society organisations operating in South Africa during the tournament, will be equally compliant. In this regard the South African government was obliged early in the bid process to provide a series of guarantees and undertakings to FIFA. Examples are:[19]

- exempting FIFA personnel from work permits, guaranteeing visas and guaranteeing priority immigration procedure treatment;
- guaranteeing customs and other tax, duty and levy exemption, as well as importing and exporting of foreign currency and indemnification of FIFA against claims;
- guaranteeing safety of FIFA delegation;
- guaranteeing telecoms infrastructure, specifically for the international broadcast centre;

- guaranteeing that all transport services will have sufficient capacities to accommodate the event;
- guaranteeing certain media and related rights, and undertaking to promulgate new laws if necessary to accommodate the event;
- guarantees pertaining to the provision of health infrastructure for the organisers and competitors, which also permits foreign health practitioners connected to the tournament to practise in South Africa; and
- guaranteeing that FIFA's intellectual property rights (and by extension those of its partners and sponsors) are protected against, for example, ambush marketing.[20]

These responsibilities have been allocated to various ministries in order to expedite the undertakings. The IMC (discussed below) ensures that this takes place in a consistent and coordinated way. The ministries include Foreign Affairs making sure no country is excluded; Home Affairs taking care of visas; Finance providing for guarantees regarding tax and other financial issues; Safety and Security ensuring a safe environment; Communications providing in particular for international broadcasting; Transport ensuring sufficient capacity; Trade and Industry guaranteeing privileges of the sponsors; and Health providing for adequate infrastructure and temporary accreditation for foreign medical personnel (South African Sports Commission 2006b).

In order to facilitate these guarantees, the South African government had to introduce new legislation and amend existing legislation to remove obstacles impeding or hindering their implementation. In terms of new legislation, two Special Measures Bills were designed to give effect to the guarantees in terms of venues, access control, logistical support, ambush marketing and how FIFA's corporate partners would operate in South Africa.[21] These Bills were refined and introduced as two new Acts and two amended Acts. The new Acts are the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act (No. 11 of 2006) and the Second 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act (No. 12 of 2006).

These Acts are the primary pieces of legislation and govern issues such as national anthems, safety and security, exclusion zones, alcohol, health and medicines. The amended Acts are:

- The Merchandise Marks Act (No. 17 of 1941) and the Merchandise Marks Amendment Act (No. 61 of 2002), which together provide the basis for protected event status, guarantee FIFA's intellectual property rights and prevent ambush marketing. This specific designation will be in force from date of publication of the *Government Gazette*[22] until six months after 11 June 2010, the commencement date of the World Cup.
- The Revenue Laws Amendment Act (No. 20 of 2006), which gives effect to the guarantee that FIFA would be assured of a supportive financial environment and covers customs and other taxes and exemptions from certain duties and levies. It also allows certain FIFA officials to import to and export from South Africa foreign currency linked to the tournament.

These requirements placed pressure on all three spheres of the South African government as well as on the LOC to review plans, refine costing and put in place systems, processes and procedures for enhanced coherence and coordination. All are aimed at facilitating the efficient implementation of the event and ensuring compliance and, in particular, meeting the critical intermediate deadlines so that the tournament successfully opens as scheduled in June 2010. Notwithstanding variable performance throughout this period, both the national government and the LOC have been emphatically optimistic that, handled creatively but carefully, the event would offer the possibility of opening up opportunities for accelerating development and creating a sustainable legacy.

Confirming venue readiness

The stadium locations are shown on page ix. The host cities were obliged to develop detailed business plans for stadiums and also for all supporting infrastructure necessary to ensure that the stadiums formed elements of the cities' Integrated Development Plans. Together, these are intended to deliver not only the World Cup experience but also the envisaged infrastructure, especially transport, legacy. These proposals were reviewed by the LOC, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the National Treasury and the national Department of Sports and Recreation. On the basis of these assessments, initial budgets were 'finalised' and in the 2006 mid-term budget policy statement it was indicated that National Treasury had allocated R8.4 billion towards the cost of building and upgrading stadiums.[23]

However, it is not only match venues which are required – for every match stadium there are on average another four or five high-quality pitches necessary for training and other purposes (Department of Sports and Recreation 2006). All of these in turn require appropriate and adequate infrastructure and services to be available. In short, a comprehensive and integrated package of infrastructure and services is necessary which links the match venues to satellite venues and all other necessary services if the World Cup experience is to be successful. Although much of this depends on the ability of the host (and other) cities to plan and manage the execution of such integrated programmes, they will not be doing so in a vacuum. All three spheres of government should be working in concert to ensure the overall success. As indicated, FIFA will also be involved on a regular basis in the review of progress on the stadiums and infrastructure construction and provision.

Making it happen

As can be deduced from the preceding sections, hosting the FIFA 2010 World Cup is undoubtedly the biggest, most complex and challenging but, equally importantly, the most prestigious, opportune and rewarding event the country has ever attempted to undertake. To ensure successful outcomes for both South Africa and FIFA, there

needs to be exemplary leadership, clear focus and sound technical management across all spheres of government. All of this needs to be complemented with credible communications if the required unity of purpose is to be attained. The description below of implementation institutions established by the South African government has been abbreviated from the government's 2010 website.[24]

> First, various government organs have been formed to oversee 2010 preparations – namely the IMC, the TCC and the 2010 PMU within the Department of Sports and Recreation. Second, the LOC unites South African football administrators, the government and representatives of business and labour. Finally, the Host Cities Forum brings together the government and the LOC in managing the host cities' preparations.

> *Government bodies*
> Because of the sheer scale of the World Cup – and because of the guarantees the government has had to give FIFA – almost every government department is playing a part in ensuring South Africa stages a successful tournament that promotes the country's growth and development. The government's overall World Cup effort is driven by the IMC, chaired by Deputy State President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The IMC comprises heads of the ministries responsible for delivering on the government's guarantees to FIFA or important for government's World Cup-related programmes. The committee meets and reports to President Thabo Mbeki on a monthly basis. In addition to the deputy state president, the IMC comprises the ministers of sports and recreation; safety and security; home affairs; health; foreign affairs; trade and industry; environmental affairs and tourism; communications; transport; justice; provincial and local government; agriculture; arts and culture; the minister in the presidency; and the minister and deputy minister of finance.

> *Technical Coordinating Committee*
> The TCC is chaired by the deputy minister of finance, Jabu Moleketi, and reports to the IMC. The TCC consists of senior officials from the departments whose ministers sit on the IMC. It has to ensure that:
> * government's guarantees to FIFA are fulfilled;
> * government's major investments for 2010 support its own overall priorities;
> * government hosts 2010 in a way that leaves a lasting legacy for development, nation building and African solidarity.

> Its tasks are organised into functional rather than sectoral clusters, each of which works with the LOC's counterpart structures. The clusters are:
> * integrated infrastructure, including stadiums;
> * security and disaster management;

- economic benefits;
- social and political legacy, including marketing and communication.

Sports and recreation's PMU
The 2010 PMU has been formed to manage all government projects in an integrated way. The PMU falls under the minister of sports and recreation and is responsible for coordinating all government preparations for 2010. The unit is headed by Director-General Joe Phaahla.

All projects – from infrastructure and stadiums, to arts, culture and sports development – have been consolidated in a 24-point project plan. The government has put in place the capacity to manage and implement World Cup projects through:
- establishing dedicated coordinating units in those national departments that have a key role to play in 2010, as well as in host cities and provinces;
- introducing management and coordination structures spanning the three spheres of government and linking to other stakeholders;
- establishing a 2010 office within the National Treasury to ensure sound financial management of World Cup projects.

Organising committee
The LOC is officially named the 2010 FIFA World Cup Local Organising Committee. It brings together people from SAFA, the government, labour and the business community. The LOC, a non-profit company, was registered on 29 August 2005. It is responsible for the organisation of the World Cup tournament and works in collaboration with FIFA and the government.

The LOC board comprises 19 members, 13 of whom are drawn from the fields of business, labour and sport. These include Danny Jordaan, who heads the LOC. Five Cabinet ministers and one deputy Cabinet minister sit on the board of the LOC. They come from the departments of provincial and local government, finance (deputy minister), safety and security, the presidency, transport, and sports and recreation.

Host Cities Forum
The Host Cities Forum is a joint government and LOC structure that manages all aspects of the host cities' preparations and commitments. The forum, a grouping at the coalface of the 2010 work, meets monthly. The state segment of the forum is chaired by Minister of Provincial and Local Government Sydney Mufamadi, whose department is also responsible for coordinating work for 2010 across the three spheres of government (local, provincial and national) and for providing technical assistance to the host cities.

*Political oversight and technical implementation*

Further to the above, constitutionally South Africa's three spheres of government each have specified roles and functions, all of which are implemented through a system of cooperative governance. Thus, although the organisational detail for delivering on the FIFA World Cup requirements might differ from province to province and host city to host city, the underlying organisational structure is very similar – it reflects a parallel but interrelated structure of both political and technical realms in each sphere. For cities, political reporting and accountability vests with the mayor, whereas for provinces it is with the premier. Similarly, for technical issues cities have task teams reflecting functional areas and are accountable to the city manager. For the provinces, task teams covering similar functional areas are accountable to a director-general. Using Cape Town as an example, Figure 3.1 illustrates the institutional arrangements between the Western Cape province and Cape Town, and Figure 3.2 elaborates on the structures and responsibilities falling under Cape Town's Director: 2010, as shown in Figure 3.1.

In summary, the nine host cities will each need to ensure completion of all the planning, programming, budgeting for and implementation of the stadiums, infrastructure and other related developments for which they have a legal responsibility within their areas of municipal jurisdiction. The cities also need to

Figure 3.1 Project structure between the Western Cape province and the City of Cape Town

Source: City of Cape Town (2006)

Figure 3.2 City of Cape Town 2010 Project Team

Executive Director: Service Delivery Integration	Director, Mayor's Office • Oversight • Governance • Risk management

Director 2010: Coordination • Process management • Communications • Stakeholder management • Funding • Legal • Administration	Director 2010: Technical • Stadium • Green Point Precinct • Infrastructure • Transport	Director 2010: Operations • Events • Economic development • Safety and security • Disaster management • Practice venues • Sports development

Source: City of Cape Town (2006)

ensure that programmes delivered by other spheres of government – transport, health and security – are consistent with the city vision and, conversely, that the city vision is consistent with the provincial development strategy.

The ability to cover both establishment and long-term operational and maintenance costs is crucial to the long-term sustainability of infrastructure, in this case including stadiums. This is equally applicable to all other municipalities where infrastructure is being extended or improved. At the end of the World Cup tournament, all these municipalities are responsible for ensuring the ongoing operational sustainability and maintenance of the infrastructure. Cities are approaching the sustainability issue in different ways. For example, Cape Town is seeking to reduce the direct cost burden to the city by entering into a partnership with a private sector operator who would bear the burden of ongoing maintenance and operations. Revenue would also be generated, for example through the sale of naming rights to the stadium (*Cape Business News* 28 November 2007).[25]

The provincial government, in turn, is responsible for providing certain infrastructure and services as well as facilitating, monitoring, coordinating and providing support to ensure that the province as a whole benefits from the 2010 tournament. Examples would be ensuring that neighbouring towns are appropriately used and integrated for training purposes and that province-wide tourism attractions are promoted. One province where an integrated and coherent approach has been adopted is the Western Cape. A joint business plan was developed between the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape provincial government to leverage off the 2010 opportunities (City of Cape Town 2006).

Notwithstanding this example, there is a marked absence from the World Cup website description with respect to the role of the provinces. Compared to national and city governments, the role of the provinces is less clear. In terms of the Constitution they are, for example, responsible for the provision of most forms of

healthcare and certain categories of roads. Provinces also seek to play a coordinating and developmental role, which is self-evident in the case of, say, Polokwane and Limpopo province. Polokwane itself is short on tourist attractions but the province has many. If the potential for tourism is to be realised, then the province needs to be engaged. Notably, the provinces are also responsible for ensuring effective governance by local governments. In the case of Mbombela, procedural irregularities, alleged corruption, the construction of the municipal stadium on land allegedly not owned by the municipality, and delays have caused the Mpumalanga province to assume responsibility for the administration of the host city government. Here the provincial government is playing a very direct role.

However, despite what appears to be a comprehensive inter- and intra-governmental framework, this does not mean that planning, programming, budgeting and implementation have been without problems. Besides the issue of rapidly escalating costs, a problem that arises consistently across most of the cities, is that of inadequate or no participation in the process by citizens and stakeholder groupings. As examples: in Johannesburg this led to inner-city housing problems (*Business Day* 13 October 2007);[26] in Cape Town, conflict over the choice of site for the stadium (*Cape Business News* 23 April 2007); in Mbombela, conflict over the status of land on which the stadium is being constructed together with a general breakdown in the municipality, leading to the provincial government stepping in and taking over the roles and responsibilities for running the town (Bothma 2004); and in Durban, not communicating sufficiently and running into conflict with small traders and the informal sector (*The Star* 23 November 2007).[27]

Funding arrangements

In order to fully understand the funding of the World Cup, it is necessary to distinguish between financing required which is directly related to the tournament, for example the host city stadiums and some related infrastructure; financing that would have occurred anyway and has been expedited for the World Cup, for example much of the transport infrastructure; financing of social services for the event, such as safety and security and emergency medical services that, if maintained, will have long-term benefits; and, lastly, financing that complements and supports the event and the economy in general, for example tourism and hospitality infrastructure. It is therefore apparent that there are infrastructure investments for the event as well as investments that serve the purposes of the event, but are not intended specifically for it. In addition to expenditure by government, other state-owned, parastatal and private investment is involved, including by the South African Rail Commuter Corporation/Metrorail, the Airports Company of South Africa and Sentech (information and communication technology).

The ensuing presentation of host city stadiums and associated infrastructure costs focuses on those to be funded by national government. However, because of the significant and repeated cost overruns, separating out national government costs

from others is proving problematic and an impediment to the determination of the final cost of and funding for the World Cup. Amongst other things, these overruns result from competition for scarce materials and construction capacity, especially when considered in the context of the bigger, more ambitious programme of accelerated infrastructure development which the South African government is promoting. With these considerations in mind, the following 'picture' is provided regarding the funding of capital investment.[28]

In the process of finalising project budgets, the National Treasury played a central role in compiling funding protocols for all spheres of government. National Treasury's 2010 tournament funding protocol prioritised spending which would leave a legacy. Thus budgets and investment of public money were guided to achieve not only a successful tournament, but also government's developmental objectives.[29] The protocols were there to guide city investment.

An evaluation of all city 2010 World Cup business plans and budgets by the National Treasury-led expert technical review panel created the base for decisions taken on government funding and expressed in the national Budget. The National Treasury's Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) guides the expenditure of public funding and in this context the 2007–2010 MTEF ending March 2010 covers the bulk of government investment for the tournament. To ensure prudent financial management, the spending of these budget allocations has to comply with the provisions of either the Provincial or Municipal Financial Management Acts. The fact that a transfer against an approved budget is only made after acceptance of a tender is proving problematic – many, if not all, stadium tenders are coming in higher than anticipated. This is clearly placing host cities in a very difficult situation. Even though it has always been anticipated that funding from national government would be supplemented by contributions from provincial and local governments, as well as from other partners, it was not foreseen for this purpose.

Table 3.3 highlights this rapid escalation of costs from the time of the 2003 bid to when all the host city business plans were completed and submitted to the National Treasury for budget support. The last column indicates the budget approved by National Treasury and to which cities need to conform.

Comparing the Bid Book budgets and the requested 2006 budgets is not a simple matter of comparing like with like. In the intervening period cost parameters changed dramatically, some specific to the tournament and others related to the national economic context. With regard to the former, final site selection (e.g. both Cape Town and Durban originally planned to upgrade existing stadiums but are now constructing large new iconic stadiums), FIFA seating capacity and other requirements (in excess of what some of the smaller cities can likely sustain after the tournament) had significant impacts on planning, programming and budgeting. For various reasons, including severe time constraints, costing of the projects relied more on broad-based estimates than on explicit prices. These estimates have been

Table 3.3 Cost escalation for the 2010 stadiums (amounts in rands)

Location	Bid document estimates 2003[a]	Status	Requested budget August 2006[b]	Status	Approved budget October 2006[c]
Durban	53 750 000	Existing	1 893 607 000	New	1 800 000 000
Cape Town	14 375 000	Existing	2 961 473 000	New	1 930 000 000
Mbombela	300 000 000	New	904 452 970	New	855 000 000
Nelson Mandela Bay	250 000 000	New	963 040 125	New	895 034 525
Polokwane	150 000 000	Existing	699 637 572	Existing	696 776 897
Johannesburg (Soccer City)	195 000 000	Existing	1 565 752 100	New	1 530 000 000
Johannesburg (Ellis Park Stadium)	34 375 000	Existing	267 052 632	Existing	229 000 000
Rustenburg	11 250 000	Existing	141 700 000	Existing	147 431 064
Mangaung	37 500 000	Existing	283 408 896	Existing	219 066 285
Pretoria	15 000 000	Existing	89 047 612	Existing	97 691 229
Total	1 061 250 000		9 769 171 907		8 400 000 000

Source: DBSA (2006).
Notes: a = Bid Document (2003); b = Budget requests based on city business plans; c = City allocations from approved 2006 national Budget

seriously exceeded in the tendering process, and were overtaken by inflationary pressures in the construction sector. Much of this is driven by supply-side constraints and exacerbated by excessive demands emanating from government's accelerated infrastructure development programme.[30]

Thus, in light of the fact that the South African government had committed itself to ensuring a successful 2010 tournament through providing funding for infrastructure, logistics, communications and security, and based on the review and refinement of plans and business cases prepared by host cities, and in recognition that there was a range of drivers rapidly escalating the construction costs, the government in the 2006 medium-term budget policy statement approved a budget of R8.4 billion for stadium construction and upgrades. The R8.4 billion was to be allocated as follows:

- R7.62 billion for stadium construction and upgrading;
- R0.58 billion for the supply of utilities and services to the stadiums;
- R0.20 billion for overlay items (FIFA requirements immediately outside the turnstiles) at each stadium.

The total R8.4 billion was to be spread over a four-year cycle as follows:
- R600 million for 2006/07 financial year;
- about R1.2 billion for 2007/08 financial year;
- R3.6 billion for 2008/09 financial year;
- about R2.9 billion for 2009/10 financial year.[31]

In the 2006 medium-term budget policy statement a further R6.7 billion for 2010 World Cup supporting infrastructure, including transport, was also allocated.[32] This direct investment of R15.1 billion (R8.4 billion + R6.7 billion) by government is part of a much larger spending programme between 2006 and 2010 on accelerated infrastructure development. During this period, government will be investing in excess of R400 billion in the country's infrastructure requirements, including rail freight services, energy production, communications and ports.

In the 2007/08 national Budget (announced in February 2007), the government's total contribution to infrastructure and stadiums was noted as R17.4 billion: R8.4 billion for stadiums and R9 billion for transport and infrastructure.[33]

By November 2007 the National Treasury pointed out that there were growing indications that due to ongoing cost escalations the 2007 budgets could be exceeded by as much as 20 per cent, between R2.8 and R3.4 billion (*Engineering News* 20 November 2007).[34] Rising input prices for materials such as steel and cement were identified as the main culprits (*The Star* 2 May 2007).[35] Technical teams appointed by the government were tasked with a thorough evaluation of the veracity of the situation. A possible consequence of the speed with which the whole process of planning through to implementation had been put in place may have been that much of the cost – some 60 per cent – was assigned to provisional sums as opposed to specified items being accurately quantified and costed (*Engineering News* 20 November 2007).[36]

In conclusion to this section on funding, and with reference also to government guarantees, it is apposite to draw attention to the electricity crisis. Power generation capacity and certainty of sustained electricity supply have proven to be major challenges. New capacity is in the process of being brought on line; however, electricity usage needs to be carefully managed into the future – and this will include for the 2010 World Cup, where an uninterrupted power supply has to be guaranteed. Eskom, which is responsible for electricity generation and bulk distribution, will embark on a project known as '2010 Virtual Power Station' in order to make an extra 2 010MW of electricity available. 'The VPS [virtual power station] involves a number of initiatives that will each add a certain amount of electricity to cater for the demand during the event' (*Engineering News* 11 October 2007).[37] It will include, for example, utilising municipal load control (e.g. switching off geysers at select sites), using on-site generators and a dedicated demand-side management. These initiatives should together make 2 010MW available, which is over and above the national planned-for consumption and will be available in 2010.

Conclusion

In order to enhance the appeal of football, FIFA is in the business of promoting mega-events – it provides entertainment in the form of football extravaganzas while host countries provide the venues and other necessary infrastructure. The bulk of FIFA revenue is derived from the sale of broadcasting rights and from partnerships and

sponsors. This revenue is used to cover FIFA's, the LOC's and other costs. This does not include providing for venues and infrastructure. Thus, although the tournament might be highly successful and profitable for FIFA, it says nothing of the potentially debilitating effect the need for massive host country investments can have on the local economy.

FIFA compliance requirements are the same for all countries – developed or developing. To guarantee compliance, the South African government was obliged to promulgate new and amend existing legislation, inter alia to protect FIFA business rights and interests. The economic burden of complying is potentially much greater for a developing country, where the availability of capital, human and other resources might be seriously constrained. As part of its risk management, FIFA maintains an oversight role and actively intervenes in local project management to ensure its requirements are met.

To provide consistent and coherent strategic guidance and sound management, the South African government introduced a system of interrelated committees operating in tandem across all spheres of government. These committees represent both the political and the technical realms and should provide unifying leadership as well as sound management. For government, clearly the biggest challenge remains achieving a balance between distinctly different motives: FIFA's business and South Africa's developmental interests. Whether or not a successful compromise is reached and adequately managed will only be measurable once the tournament is over.

The event is so big and so complex that no single stakeholder can possibly undertake it alone – it has to be a partnership of and collaboration between all stakeholders to achieve mutual interests. However, because government has guaranteed a successful tournament, this chapter has reflected on government investment. Nonetheless, even in this context, understanding funding for the tournament is not straightforward. Funding can be broken down into finance requirements directly related to the tournament; financing that would have occurred anyway but is being brought forward because of the tournament; and financing that complements and supports the tournament.

Lastly, it can be suggested that the way the tournament has been managed is the way government should under normal circumstances approach development – there should be focus, commitment and urgency. However, under routine circumstances these conditions do not necessarily prevail in practice. The World Cup has created extraordinary conditions which unified leadership and management around a (R8.4 billion and R6.7 billion) vision, and provided a context for driving resources to its achievement. The competencies and capabilities for obtaining these results are being enhanced, deepened and extended through immediately gained experience and will stand the country in good stead in years to come. Thus, it is not only projects which will be a legacy – the improved transport, electricity networks, communications and logistics – but, importantly, the skills and technological transfer gained during the management of the process.

Notes

1   I would like to thank Richard Tomlinson for his assistance with the chapter.

2   Olivia Spadavecchia, '2010 World Cup already raking in more money for FIFA than 2006', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=118871, accessed on 10 October 2007.

3   'South Africa 2010 stadiums', available at http://www.sa2010.gov.za/southafrica/stadiums. php, accessed on 7 February 2008.

4   This is the official social upliftment campaign of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. According to FIFA, the campaign aims to raise US$10 million to fund the construction of 20 Football for Hope centres across Africa (http://www.southafrica.info/2010/20centres.htm).

5   Bareng-Batho Kortjaas, 'Countdown 2010 supplement: Football for hope'.

6   See http://www.sa2010.gov.za/government/planning.

7   2010 Bid Book lists the 13 venues as follows: Eastern Cape, Nelson Mandela Bay, Port Elizabeth Stadium – new; Free State, Mangaung, Free State Stadium – exist; Gauteng, Johannesburg, Soccer City – exist; Gauteng, Johannesburg, Ellis Park Stadium – exist; Gauteng, Pretoria, Loftus Versfeld – exist; Gauteng, Johannesburg, Rainbow Junction – new; KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, Durban Stadium – exist; Limpopo, Polokwane, Peter Mokaba Stadium – exist; Mpumalanga, Mbombela, Mbombela Stadium – new; Northern Cape, Kimberley, Sol Plaatje Stadium – new; North West, Klerksdorp, Oppenheimer Stadium – exist; North West, Rustenburg, Royal Bafokeng Stadium – exist; Western Cape, Cape Town, Newlands Stadium – exist.

8   Development Bank of Southern Africa, '2010 Soccer World Cup host cities comparative review', 2005, unpublished.

9   'Stadiums for 2010 World Cup named but not by Jordaan', available at http://www. worldcup2010southafrica.com/content/view/315/92/, accessed on 26 March 2007.

10 'FIFA send in Schmidt to sort out South Africa ahead of 2010 World Cup', available at http://www.worldcup2010southafrica.com/content/view/395/92/, accessed on 26 March 2007.

11 'World Cup 2010 draw to take place in Durban next November', available at http://www. worldcup2010southafrica.com/content/view/408/92, accessed on 26 March 2007.

12 Marion Olivier, 'FIFA World Cup LOC keeping close eye on stadium progress', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=106848, accessed on 8 May 2007.

13 Colleen Dardagan and Lebogang Seale, 'Let's get the 2010 ball rolling'.

14 Mathew Hill, 'Radebe insists World Cup transport infrastructure will be in place', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=130946, accessed on 10 April 2008.

15 Budget Vote Speech, National Assembly, 3 June 2008, minister of communications.

16 Terrence Creamer, 'IDC to inject R500 million into Broadband Infraco ahead of super-cable roll out', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=136120, accessed on 23 June 2008.

17 Lebogang Seale, 'Non-hosting cities will also profit'. Special insert to Independent Newspapers: *The Star*, *Pretoria News* and *DFA*.

18   Olivia Spadavecchia, '28 000 rooms already contracted for 2010 Cup', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=122121, accessed on 27 November 2007.

19   'South Africa 2010 stadiums', available at http://www.sa2010.gov.za/southafrica/stadiums. php, accessed on 7 February 2008.

20   The Merchandise Marketing Act of 1941 and its amended Act of 2002 have been used to designate the World Cup as a protected event. This prohibits the use of a trademark in relation to it in a manner that is calculated to achieve publicity for that trademark and thereby derive promotional benefit without the consent of the event organisers, i.e. FIFA. Thus the advertisement and/or marketing of any brand in association with the 2010 FIFA World Cup without the invitation of FIFA as a commercial affiliate amounts to abuse of trademark. In this context ambush marketing takes two forms, namely 'association' or 'intrusion'. In the first instance the ambush marketers, by means of association, lead the public into thinking that they are authorised sponsors or contributors, for example through using similar titles, insignia, etc. In the second instance, marketers are more proactive, do not necessarily seek association but actively seek to position their products on the back of the event without incurring any of the costs of sponsorship. It could be argued that this special events designation potentially makes inroads into some of the rights enshrined in the South African Constitution: free commercial speech (section 16) and the freedom of trade of companies (section 22).

21   Garikai Matarirano, '2010 FIFA World Cup: The proverbial own goal', available at www. bowman.co.za/LawArticles/Law-Article.asp?id=1554103715, accessed on 30 March 2007.

22   Notice 683 of 2006 published on 25 May 2006.

23   'South Africa 2010 stadiums', available at http://www.sa2010.gov.za/southafrica/stadiums. php, accessed on 7 February 2008.

24   See http://www.sa2010.gov.za/government/structures.php#hcf.

25   Cape Town's bidding process for naming rights.

26   Chantelle Benjamin, 'World Cup cities await ruling on fate of Joburg squatters'.

27   Colleen Dardagan and Lebogang Seale, 'Let's get 2010 ball rolling'.

28   'South Africa 2010: Funding', available at http://www.sa2010.gov.za/government/funding. php, accessed on 17 August 2007.

29   'South Africa 2010: Funding', access details as above.

30   World Cup 2010 host cities on alleged funding crisis for stadiums: Briefing. Sports and recreation portfolio committee, Parliament, 23 January 2007. Available at http://www.pmg. org.za/viewminute.php?id=8579, accessed on 30 March 2007.

31   'South Africa 2010: Stadiums', available at www.sa2010.gov.za/southafrica/stadiums.php, accessed on 7 February 2008.

32   Medium Term Budget Policy Statement and Adjustments Appropriation Bill 2006. Address to the National Assembly by the minister of finance, 25 October 2006.

33   'South Africa 2010: Funding', available at http://www.sa2010.gov.za/government/funding. php, accessed on 17 August 2007.

34   Mathew Hill, '2010 Infrastructure costs could rise by as much as 20%', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=121628, accessed on 21 November 2007.

35   Anna Cox, 'Gauteng running out of building materials'.

36   Mathew Hill, '2010 Infrastructure costs could rise by as much as 20%', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=121628, accessed on 21 November 2007.

37   Olivia Spadavecchia, 'Eskom targets additional 2010MW in time for the World Cup', available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print_version.php?a_id=118904, accessed on 12 October 2007.

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DEVELOPMENT

4 South Africa 2010: Initial dreams and sobering economic perspectives

Stan du Plessis and Wolfgang Maennig

Hosting the World Cup promises not just the excitement of the event and media exposure for the host nation, but also the expectation of a positive return on the considerable investment associated with hosting this type of event. This is especially true for South Africa, the host nation for the Football World Cup in 2010.[1]

This chapter examines the 2006 World Cup experience in Germany and offers comparisons and contrasts with the plans for the South African World Cup. In addition to the analysis of effects on usual macroeconomic indicators, we also attempt to open a discussion on 'intangible' effects, like the 'feel-good' effect and a better international perception of the host country (the 'image' effect), as well as long-term effects in general. The chapter also touches on the issue of potential urban development effects of sport infrastructure investments.

Untangling the financial structures associated with the World Cup

From an economic point of view, and under present institutional arrangements, hosting a Football World Cup can be viewed as a right which (the football federation of) the host country buys from FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association). FIFA and the host nation sign a contract that regulates the flow of benefits associated with the tournament. In South Africa, the 'price' paid for hosting the World Cup has only recently entered the public debate. Most of the contractual obligations are similar to those enforced in Germany in 2006, where these were also the source of public discontent. For example, one obligation concerned advertising, which within a one-kilometre radius of the stadium and along all major access roads is restricted to FIFA-endorsed enterprises, with all profits channelled to FIFA. Other requirements include the provision of dedicated lanes on highways for FIFA officials and teams, offices with unlimited telephone and internet access, catering services, etc.

FIFA

The major revenue stream of the World Cup (US$2.77 billion[2] for the 2006 World Cup) is the television and marketing rights, to which FIFA lays claim. Other revenue sources include the sale of tickets (US$260.5 million in 2006), which was used to finance a US$260.5 million contribution to the German organising committee (see below). Major expenditures by FIFA include payment to 32 participating

teams in the form of prize money and compensation for travel and preparation costs (US$340 million). In sum, FIFA's reported costs for the 2006 World Cup were about US$811.5 million (*Neue Züricher Zeitung* 15 September 2006), while the organisation earned a profit of some US$2.19 billion.

Host country

The potential benefits for the host country include direct pecuniary benefits associated with activities at the time of the tournament, such as expenditure by tourists,[3] teams, the media and the organising committee; long-term benefits from the capacity constructed for the tournament and the benefit from accommodating, transporting and entertaining future visitors; possible technological and human capital spillovers from this investment; and, finally, non-pecuniary benefits associated with hosting the tournament, including political gains, public image effects (Jasmand & Maennig 2008) and a potential feel-good factor.

Hosting a World Cup tournament requires investment in facilities and infrastructure, and organisation expenditure. In the case of the 2006 World Cup, the German organising committee budgeted for a sum of US$659 million, a breakdown of which is provided in Table 4.1.

The organising committee made a profit of US$237.5 million, partly due to the near-capacity sales of match tickets that resulted in US$31.1 million of unexpected and additional income.[4] After taxes on the profit (US$70.3 million)[5] and a partial payback of the contribution from FIFA (US$75 million), a surplus of US$92.2 million could be distributed from the organising committee to the German Football Association (DFB), the German Premier League and the German Olympic Sport Federation.

While the corresponding financial information relating to the 2010 World Cup is emerging only gradually, one problem is becoming obvious – the concern that domestic football fans in South Africa will not be able to afford tickets at prices starting at US$128 (R1 000) and averaging an expected US$272 (*dpa-report*

Table 4.1 2006 World Cup organising committee, budget in million US$

Revenue		Expenditure	
Contributions from FIFA	260.5	General organisation	153.3
Ticket sales, minimum	306.6	Technical infrastructure	122.2
Marketing	92.2	Media and image	76.1
		Transport and logistics	38
		Security	38
		Volunteers	31.1
		Other	200.6
Total	659.3	Total	659.3

Source: *Financial Times Deutschland* 13 April 2006
Note: €1 = US$1.329

Table 4.2 Stadium investments for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa

City	Expenditure (US$ millions)	Capacity season 2010	Inhabitants (2004)
New stadiums			
Cape Town	366.3[a]	68 000[b]	2 984 885
Durban	334.2[c]	70 000[d]	3 129 298
Mbombela	105.4[e]	45 000[e]	484 245
Polokwane	92.0[f]	45 000[f]	532 673
Nelson Mandela Bay	154.2[g]	48 000[g]	1 054 359
Upgraded stadiums			
Mangaung	39.3[h]	48 000[i]	655 332
Johannesburg: Ellis Park	10.4[j]	65 000[j]	3 225 407
Johannesburg: Soccer City	200.5[k]	94 700[k]	
Pretoria	25.7[l]	55 000[l]	1 531 954
Rustenburg	18.9[m]	45 000[m]	405 554
Total	1 346.9	583 700	

Sources: See endnote 6 for details of notes a to m.

4 July 2006).[7] With a South African unemployment rate of about 27 per cent and median monthly incomes of some US$260, these ticket prices are ambitious. The entrance fees at South Africa's premier league matches are usually about US$2.6 (Maheri interview).

FIFA and the Local Organising Committee have tried to address this concern through an ambitious attempt at market segmentation: tickets will be sold in four categories, with categories one, two and three priced in US dollars and category four priced in rands and reserved for South African citizens.[8] Category four tickets will range in price from US$20 for a first-round match to US$150 for the final. This category will comprise 15 per cent (405 000) of the total ticket supply, while a further 120 000 will be given away free of charge to South Africans (*Sunday Tribune* 25 November 2007).

In addition to the expenditure listed in Table 4.1, the host country has to finance a number of other major expenditure items, which in the case of the 2006 World Cup included security at a cost of about US$138 million, which was wholly financed from public funds; the image campaign 'Land of Ideas', which had a budget of about US$15 million and was co-financed by public and industrial funds; and the cultural programme associated with the World Cup at a cost of some US$46 million,[9] which was financed by issuing a World Cup gold coin.

Turning to investment in the host country, around US$2.2 billion (€1.4 billion) was spent on stadiums in 12 World Cup locations in Germany.[10] Table 4.2 shows the planned expenditure on the 10 stadiums that will be used in South Africa in 2010. It is important to consider the source of finance for this investment, as the type of financing might have direct and indirect economic effects.[11] In this regard,

more than 60 per cent of the expenditure on the 12 World Cup stadiums in 2006 was financed by the clubs and other private investors.[12] This low share of public contribution stands in sharp contrast to the previous FIFA World Cup in Germany (in 1974), when all of the stadium investment was publicly financed. The South African financing situation is closer to that of the 1974 World Cup.

German clubs have become more willing to invest in stadiums due to their encouraging experience of 'novelty effects' – that is, the increase in comfort, the improved view and the better atmosphere in new or renovated stadiums regularly lead to significantly higher spectator attendance figures for the clubs, at least for a certain period after these improvements. In Germany, the novelty effect for the 1974 and 2006 World Cups translated into an average growth of some 10 per cent (and maximum growth of more than 30 per cent) in spectator numbers for about five years (Feddersen et al. 2006).

The income effects of the clubs should be even larger than the increase in attendance, since new stadiums lead to higher average price levels, especially in the VIP and business seat areas. In addition, there is (increased) naming rights income, and income from other events – like concerts and business firm presentations – which could not take place in less modern and prestigious stadiums.

In addition to the US$2.2 billion invested in stadiums, around US$2.3 billion was spent on World Cup-related infrastructure in Germany (Buettner et al. 2007). It is significant that these costs exceeded the stadium costs despite the fact that the infrastructure needed for large-scale sporting events already existed to a relatively high degree in Germany. There is thus every reason to pay primary attention to infrastructure costs, which are not likely to be any lower than stadium investments.

For the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, Table 4.2 indicates a total investment of US$1.35 billion on stadiums, for which the government is almost exclusively accountable according to presently available information. This is much higher than the US$105 million (R818 million) which the South African delegation budgeted for stadium investment at the time of the tournament bid in 2004 (FIFA 2004: 65).

Since 2004, the South African government has substantially increased the budgeted amount for investment in stadiums and related infrastructure. In the February 2008 Budget, the minister of finance allocated US$1.85 billion (R14.4 billion) to finance World Cup-related investments over the period 2007 to 2011, of which US$1.23 billion (R9.6 billion) is earmarked for stadiums and US$0.62 billion (R4.8 billion) for infrastructure, excluding the US$1.54 billion (R11.98 billion) earmarked for the Gautrain rapid rail link over the same period (National Treasury 2008). Though these budgeted allocations are higher than previously allowed, they fall short of the minister of transport's recent claim that transport infrastructure to the amount of US$2.07 billion would be required leading up to the World Cup (though presumably not all of this would be directly associated with the tournament) (*Business Day* 23 October 2006). Furthermore, the total amount

officially budgeted for remains smaller than the costs for the stadiums as reported in the South African media.

Economic benefits: Ex ante *dreams and* ex post *realities*

Income, employment and tax income

One of the first scenario studies for the 2006 World Cup in Germany (Rahmann et al. 1997) was commissioned by the DFB and reported a positive economic impact of US$2.31 billion (€1.5 billion) as their 'best guess'. The German Hotel and Catering Association and the Postbank calculated even more optimistic scenarios. The former proposed a figure of US$5.2 billion based on the assumption of 3.3 million foreign visitors spending an average of US$231 to US$307 per day (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 10 March 2006: 10–11).[13] The Postbank, a major sponsor, was even more upbeat, predicting an overall effect of US$13.8 to US$18.4 billion (or 0.5 per cent of German GDP), with US$9.2 billion being the result of investment, US$3.1 to US$4.6 billion due to spending by residents, and US$1.5 billion as a result of spending by the 1 million foreign visitors assumed (Postbank 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b).

An even greater net effect followed from a scenario analysis by Ahlert (2001). Building on an assumption of constant spending by foreign visitors of around US$2.8 billion, and modelled under various scenarios for the level of state investment, the type of financing and possible displacement effects, Ahlert calculated a positive net effect of up to US$12 billion.[14]

These figures can be contrasted with surveys of decision-makers, where a volume of investment of US$7.3 billion was expected (GfW Nordrhein-Westfalen 2004), though it was unclear whether that meant 'additional' investment. In the survey undertaken by the Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammertag (German Association of Chambers of Industry and Commerce), 15 per cent of the members replied that they expected positive effects for their enterprises, 83 per cent expected no net effects and 2 per cent expected negative effects (DIHT 2006).

For the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, Grant Thornton[15] (2004) calculated a net economic gain of US$3.0 billion (R21.3 billion) for the South African economy, based on 230 000 foreign tourists arriving for the tournament and staying for an average of 15 days, and construction costs totalling US$1.8 billion, that is, a 1.5 per cent increase in GDP.[16] In 2008, Grant Thornton[17] released an even more optimistic assessment in a press release of the total economic impact of the 2010 World Cup based on direct expenditure of US$3.9 billion (R30.4 billion), which they amounted to a total impact of US$6.58 billion (R51.1 billion) after a presumed multiplier effect.

Based on an assumed 10 per cent addition to the capital stock of the construction and transport industry, a capital-augmenting technological change in construction of 5 per cent and a capital-augmenting technological change in the transport

industry, Bohlmann and Van Heerden (2005) calculated a (long-term) positive impact of 0.94 per cent of GDP and the creation of some 50 000 jobs. Though these *ex ante* forecasts for both the German and South African World Cups are modest when compared with predictions for other tournaments,[18] they still seem optimistic when compared with the economic impact calculated by *ex post* studies of large sports events.

In a study of the income and employment data after the 1994 Football World Cup, Baade and Matheson (2004) used data on 75 metropolitan areas representing the largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the USA by population to estimate income growth for host cities for each year from 1970 to 2000. This was then compared to the actual income growth that each MSA experienced in 1994. They came to the conclusion that the actual growth for 1994 in most host cities fell short of the expected growth from this model. Nine of the 13 host cities suffered declines in growth. Overall, the 13 locations suffered losses on balance of over US$9 billion.[19] Similarly, Hagn and Maennig (2008a) find that the 1974 World Cup in Germany had neither significant short-term nor long-term effects on employment. Szymanski (2002) collected data on the 20 largest economies measured by current GDP over the last 30 years, many of which have hosted the Olympic Games or the World Cup at least once during that period. Using a simple regression, he came to the conclusion that the growth of these countries was significantly lower in World Cup years.

This kind of pessimism is evident not only for the Football World Cup, but also in many multivariate econometric studies relating to other major sporting events or venues. The majority of these studies suggest that the sporting events or stadiums have little or no significant impact on regional income and/or employment (Baade 1987, 1994; Baade & Dye 1988; Baade & Matheson 2002; Baade & Sanderson 1997). A number of works, particularly those of Coates and Humphreys (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b) or Teigland (1999), even arrive at significant negative effects.

To our knowledge, very few studies find significant positive effects of sports facilities and sports events *ex post*. Baim (1994) found positive employment effects for Major League Baseball and Football for 15 cities in the USA.[20] Hotchkiss et al. (2003) found significant positive employment effects on regions in Georgia (USA) affiliated or close to the Olympic activities of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, but no significant wage effects. Jasmand and Maennig (2008) found positive income effects for German regions which hosted the 1972 Olympic Games. Tu (2005) found significant positive effects of the FedEx Field (sports field in Washington) on real estate prices in its neighbourhood, as did Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2008) for three arenas in Berlin, Germany. Finally, Carlino and Coulson (2004) examined the 60 largest MSAs in the USA and found that having a National Football League (NFL) team allowed the cities to 'enjoy' rents which were increased by 8 per cent,[21] but not higher wages.

A first *ex post* analysis of the 2006 World Cup in Germany seems to support this sober view. Businesses that have reported positive impacts of the World Cup are in sectors that are of fairly low importance to the German economy: beer breweries (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 29 June 2006),[22] producers of table-top football (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 5 July 2006),[23] money exchange offices, aviation services which fly small private aeroplanes (*Berliner Zeitung* 11 July 2006)[24] and producers of soccer merchandising. The case of beer illustrates that some of the exogenous effects (like the hot weather in June/July 2006 in Germany) might not have been correctly isolated from the World Cup effects in the businesses' reports.

Businesses and industries in sectors of greater economic significance also reported positive effects. For example, the Frankfurt airport reported a 1.7 per cent increase in the number of passengers from July 2006 compared to the year before (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 11 August 2006). The national railway company Deutsche Bahn and local transport enterprises reported higher turnover (*Der Tagesspieggel* 8 July 2006; *Berliner Zeitung* 19 July 2006[25]). Data on taxi drivers' income vary from '+80% on match days in Munich' to '−20% during the WC [World Cup] period in Berlin'.[26]

The number of overnight stays of foreigners in Germany did not differ significantly from the trend from 2000 to 2007 (Allmers & Maennig 2008). Possibly because of capacity enlargements, German hotels experienced a decrease of 2.7 percentage points in occupancy in June 2006 compared to June 2005. In Berlin the occupancy rate dropped by 11.1 percentage points and in Munich by 14.3 percentage points (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 3 August 2006), illustrating the hazard of crowding-out effects on 'normal' tourism. However, hotel managers were able to compensate for the decline in occupancy by raising prices, on average by 4.8 per cent compared to June 2005 prices (see Figure 4.1). The combined effect of a lower occupancy rate and higher prices left 41 per cent of hotel managers satisfied that they had fulfilled their World Cup expectations. In contrast, only 20 per cent of restaurant managers claim to have had their expectations fulfilled (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 1 July 2006).

Concerning merchandise sales, Figure 4.2 shows the raw and seasonally adjusted data for national merchant sales from January 1997 to August 2006 and demonstrates that it is difficult to identify any World Cup increments. Statistical testing indicates no significant changes on a monthly basis,[27] which might be interpreted in two ways: either the additional spending of foreign consumers was not significant, or it was significant but was compensated for by a negative spending effect of domestic consumers (the 'couch potato effect').

The limited effects of the 2006 World Cup on German sales data and on the number of overnight stays of foreigners in Germany fits well with the finding of Hagn and Maennig (2008b) that the 2006 World Cup did not have any short-term effects on unemployment.

Figure 4.1 Percentage difference in hotel prices in Germany (incl. breakfast), 2000–2006

Source: http://www.destatis.de/indicators/d/vpigraf07.htm (accessed 3 Nov 2006)
Note: The graph shows the development of an absolute index, with index = 1 at the time of the World Cup.

Figure 4.2 Merchant sales, Germany, 1997–2006

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany: Data series on domestic trade, hotel and restaurant industry, tourism
Notes: Name of the original data series: Real sales, without petrol stations and car sales; 2003 = 100

Quantifying 'intangible' benefits

Quantitative *ex ante* and *ex post* studies on large sports events have often neglected the benefit of experiencing the World Cup – the feel-good effect on the population in the host country. Heyne et al.'s (2007) attempt to measure the feel-good factor for Germany in 2006 is a recent exception. They followed Johnson and Whitehead (2000)[28] by investigating the willingness to pay (WTP) for public (or 'non-use')

benefits, using an *ex ante* and an *ex post* contingent valuation method. This entailed asking 500 people about their WTP to stage the World Cup in Germany.[29]

The average *ex ante* WTP, for those individuals with a strictly positive WTP, was US$35. However, because less than 20 per cent of Germans had a positive *ex ante* WTP, the average was only around US$6.52. For 82 million inhabitants in Germany, this resulted in the feel-good factor having an economic value of about US$535 million.

By contrast, after the event 42.6 per cent of the population reported a positive WTP. The average *ex post* WTP for the whole sample was US$15.4 per person, which gave a total mean WTP of US$1.3 billion. The average *ex post* WTP of test persons with a positive WTP was US$36, which is equivalent to a relatively small change of US$1.1. The substantial increase in overall WTP can thus be attributed to persons reporting a zero WTP before the event and a positive WTP after it. Primarily residents of eastern Germany and the less educated changed their WTP after the tournament. Heyne et al. (2007) used their findings to interpret large sports events as 'experience goods' – those for which consumers cannot assess use value in advance, but only upon consumption or from past experience (Nelson 1970).

To summarise the feel-good effect, *ex post* WTP for Germany stands at US$1.3 billion, which, compared to the other economic effects described above, is among the most significant. Although this might encourage South African attempts to quantify the feel-good effect by *ex ante* polls, one should bear in mind that *ex ante* WTP might be substantially biased downward.

A further 'intangible' effect is the potential enhancement of the international perception of a World Cup host country. One possibility for assessing such image effects is provided by the Anholt Nation Brands Index, which evaluates the nation's brand image. Both developed and developing nations are classified quarterly in a worldwide poll regarding their cultural, political, commercial and human assets, investment potential and tourist appeal. The results are combined to produce an aggregate ranking.

The Nation Brands Index, which was started in 2005, shows a clear rise in the international perception of Germany associated with hosting the World Cup. The erstwhile image abroad of Germany as 'hard and cold…not a nation much associated with warmth, hospitality, beauty, culture, or fun' (Anholt & GMI 2006) was improved through the World Cup in all criteria that constitute the Index. The greatest increase in approval was scored by the statement 'This country excels in sport'. Figure 4.3 shows the trends in selected questions that were presented, with a scale of 6 (very good, complete agreement) to 1 (poor, no agreement). After the World Cup, Germany moved to second place on the Nation Brands Index ranking, having ranked, on average, fifth prior to the World Cup (Allmers & Maennig 2008).

Such results demonstrate the potential for image gains through hosting a major sporting event.[30] However, the image gain is not automatic. Rather, it is heavily

Figure 4.3 International perceptions of Germany

Source: Anholt & GMI (2006, 2007)

influenced by the success with which the host is presented publicly as likeable, hospitable, progressive and as a capable (business) location. Various factors such as smooth operations during the event, security and appropriate PR and marketing activities (Maennig & Porsche 2008) will therefore influence the image effects of subsequent World Cups.

Challenges and opportunities for South Africa

Among the obvious challenges for South Africa in wishing to optimise the long-term benefit of hosting the World Cup is the apparently modest scope for post-tournament usage of the new stadiums.[31] The exceptions are Ellis Park Stadium in Johannesburg and Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria, both of which are home to some of the largest football and rugby teams. The future of the new Green Point Stadium in Cape Town remains unclear if the provincial rugby team is unwilling to relocate from their present venue at Newlands Stadium. These high costs of building the stadiums, together with potentially low post-tournament usage, lead to problematic cost–benefit ratios.

A further factor that might unexpectedly raise the cost of hosting the World Cup is the state of the business cycle and the property market in South Africa at the time

when the various construction projects were initiated. The South African economy is presently experiencing its longest post-war expansion, but in recent months imbalances both domestically (large and rising household debt and rising inflation) and externally (a large current account deficit) have grown more acute and policy-makers at the South African Reserve Bank have begun tightening monetary policy. Furthermore, the result of this long upswing and the associated property boom is that building costs have risen sharply, even dramatically, in some parts of the country (see for example Funke et al. 2006), with capacity constraints becoming binding in electricity generation and distribution, leading to widespread and disruptive blackouts.

While the state-owned utility company Eskom has undertaken not to disrupt the construction works for 2010 World Cup stadiums, they are unable to provide similar guarantees for the auxiliary facilities that are also in construction. Finally, there have been highly disruptive labour disputes on some of the major building sites, such as those in Cape Town and Durban, leading to strikes and causing construction to fall behind schedule (*Business Day* 12 November 2007). In these circumstances, there is realistic concern about the ability of the local construction industry to manage the construction of stadiums, the Gautrain, the King Shaka Airport in Durban, and the De Hoop Dam on the Steelpoort River in Limpopo province (*The Herald* 9 October 2006).

A further two conditions are likely to cause particular problems in South Africa, where the economy is currently growing at a rate of 5 per cent per year: during the entire period of the tournament, no construction work is permitted in the host cities. And the cities have to provide reserve capacity for electricity generation to compensate for any capacity shortfalls, a considerable challenge given the supply constraints mentioned earlier.[32]

But there are also opportunities to hosting the World Cup which might turn out to be positive in the case of South Africa. We identify six specific opportunities: firstly, the above-mentioned couch potato effect may be absent in South Africa. Due to customs of hospitality and public socialising by soccer fans in South Africa – customs that contrast with those of their German counterparts – spending might be higher instead of lower if they stay at home and invite friends to watch televised matches together. This is due to the festive nature of these gatherings in South Africa: groups are invited to watch a sporting event at a private residence, but this is combined with a meal and often lasts many hours. The hosts, and even the guests, tend to spend considerable amounts on food and alcoholic beverages for these gatherings.

A second opportunity arises from the economic expansion mentioned above, which, coupled with a decline in overall inequality since 2000, has allowed measured poverty to decline rapidly. For example, the headcount poverty rate declined from 50.8 per cent in 2000 to 46.9 per cent in 2004, while average incomes also rose (Van der Berg et al. 2007: Table 4) – and this happened before the acceleration in economic growth experienced during 2005 and 2006. Higher incomes for poor South Africans are

auspicious for World Cup-related activities, as the majority of the country's soccer fans are poor. The income effect on spectator demand, in addition to the novelty effect, might well lead to an unforeseen increase in the use of the stadiums' capacities.

Thirdly, the usual negative crowding-out effect on tourism of large sports events might not occur because the World Cup happens during the low season for tourism in South Africa. This opportunity should not be overstated though, as tourist seasons across the South African provinces do not overlap completely. Especially in the northern provinces, the tournament will overlap with a period of higher tourism, both for South Africans and for international tourists.

Fourthly, Germany and many other industrialised countries (on which the studies in this chapter are based) have ample sports facilities. In Germany, for example, there are 127 000 sports venues, including 400 multi-purpose sports halls each with a spectator capacity of at least 3 000. Sports stadiums are also subject to the law of diminishing returns. This includes the possibility that – given a correspondingly high level of provision – (additional) sports venues may display a negative social marginal productivity. The reasons for this may be, for example, the follow-up costs of running and maintaining the venues, which represent a considerable burden to local authorities. For countries such as South Africa that do not have a comparable provision of sporting facilities, these costs are probably not directly transferable.

Fifthly, South Africa seems to have an even greater potential to improve its international reputation than, for example, Germany in the run-up to the 2006 World Cup. In the latest publicly available Nation Brands Index (Anholt & GMI 2007), South Africa ranks 33 out of 38 nations, coming ahead of (only) Turkey, Malaysia, Estonia, Israel and Indonesia. In the World Economic Forum's (2008a) Global Competitiveness Index rankings, South Africa ranks 45 out of 125 countries.

In a similar vein, in the World Economic Forum's (2008b) Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index, South Africa ranks 60 out of 130. Given South Africa's endowment of a multi-ethnic population, natural beauty, cultural attractions and warm climate, the tourism ranking is, perhaps, the most surprising. Crime is a major concern limiting more extensive international tourism to South Africa (Bob et al. 2006). However, if the World Cup is hosted without many major criminal incidents involving tourists, the country's international image will stand to gain immediately and significantly. The medium- to long-term consequences of an improved international profile are especially important compared with the modest (and possibly negligible) short-term effects on tourism of hosting the World Cup. With more international tourists experiencing the rapid improvements in South Africa's infrastructure, education system (evident in language skills, etc.), business climate and so on, tourism stands to benefit even over the longer term. The arrival of more tourists, both for leisure and for business, will help to create a more positive image of South Africa in the developed world to counter the widespread Afro-pessimism about sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, it has to be considered that the sport venues built or reconstructed for past World Cups hardly stimulated any positive effects in the regional economy because they were not built with this aim in mind. The aim during planning was usually to maximise the profit margins of the professional clubs, rather than urban development.[33] In South Africa, there is evidence that the World Cup might be used as a vehicle to attempt to induce positive urban economic effects: the new Durban Stadium is being designed as an 'iconic' building with a 30-storey arch stretching its entire length (*The Natal Witness* 26 July 2006). The design is not limited to the stadium only, but is embedded in a design concept for the entire urban region, with the aim of enhancing the economic viability of an entire district of Durban. Not just in Durban, but also in other World Cup host cities, the architectural plans (published so far) do indeed seem different from the functional stadium projects of former World Cups (Maennig & Schwarthoff 2006). The strategies at least partly follow the wisdom that stadiums have to be built where they are best able to anchor development (Nelson 2001, 2002; Rosentraub 2006; Rosentraub et al. 1994; Santo 2005). With iconic or 'signature' architecture, some of the South African host cities – which are large, dynamic and important but not yet internationally prominent – will attempt to 'get their name on the world map'.

A clear definition of iconic or signature buildings does not yet exist, but consideration of examples of this kind of building (e.g. the Sydney Opera House, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the Munich Olympic Stadium) reveals certain common design characteristics: they display an architecture that, at least at the time of planning, was regarded as highly innovative, often apparently impractical and non-functional, but which was nevertheless unique and striking. The planning is often so unconventional that citizens unite in their resistance to it, resistance which, however, gradually gives way to a feeling of regional pride, inspiration and identification. In every case, the innovative design helped the building to succeed in becoming a landmark and part of the memorable character of the city, which, in turn, succeeded in achieving the desired image effect (Maennig & Schwarthoff 2006). Iconic buildings provide an aesthetic focal point for a city and could become a springboard for other urban developments and recreational facilities which are attractive for locals as well as international tourists.

While the direct economic impact of hosting such events has often been muted, as discussed above, there is potential for exploiting the opportunity offered by large sporting events to create an architectural legacy via ambitious stadium architecture, with lasting external effects for the regional economy.[34]

Conclusion

The organising committee of the 2006 World Cup in Germany had an operating budget of US$659.3 million, on which it was able to produce a surplus of some US$237.5 million. In addition to the costs incurred by the organising committee, public funds financed a US$2.2 billion investment in sports stadiums and

US$2.3 billion for the related infrastructure. This investment created infrastructure for which there is a demand, and the projects are economically sustainable. For this reason the capital layout can be regarded as costs of the World Cup only to a limited extent, which is indeed covered by the rent payments from the organising committee to the clubs.

South Africa's current investment plans for the 2010 World Cup budget US$1.35 billion for stadiums and US$0.62 billion for infrastructure, well above the US$105 million which the South African delegation budgeted for stadium investment at the time of the tournament bid. Private financing is hardly available due to the weaker financial position of the local soccer clubs.

A first analysis of the economic impact of the 2006 World Cup shows that some sectors of fairly low importance to the German economy profited from having the World Cup in Germany. The evidence is mixed for the hotel and tourism sector, which is usually expected to be among the main beneficiaries of such an event. National occupancy rates declined by 2.7 per cent compared to occupancy rates in June 2005, and in Berlin and Munich – the two cities with the largest number of matches – occupancy rates dropped by 11.1 and 14.3 per cent respectively. However, hoteliers were able to compensate for the lower occupancy to some extent by raising prices.

On an aggregated level, neither merchant sales nor employment showed significant positive effects, which agrees with former empirical findings on the effects of large sports events. Nevertheless, we are less sceptical than other academics about large sports events, for two reasons: first, the event benefit or feel-good utility is often omitted from the cost–benefit analyses; yet, compared to the other economic effects described earlier, the feel-good utility is among the most significant, though it might be difficult to estimate it correctly *ex ante*. Large sports events like World Cups and Olympic Games might be 'experience goods', where demand or the WTP increases after a first consumption, which reduces uncertainty. The potential downward bias of WTP assessments has to be taken into account for future assessments.

Second, stadium construction has often been driven by the need for financial return at the club level, and only rarely has it pursued the target of positive effects for the region. Future projects that draw on the insights from urban economics, with the aim of a more effective integration of stadiums with urban needs, hold the promise of enhanced externalities.

Notes

1   This chapter draws on Maennig and Du Plessis (2007). We are grateful to Brad Humphreys and two anonymous referees on behalf of Contemporary Economic Policy for their helpful comments. Remaining errors are our responsibility.

2   If not explicitly noted otherwise, all amounts are expressed in current US$ terms. The exchange rates used are: 1.532 US$/€; 7.78 R/US$ as of 11 March 2008.

3   Tourist expenditure is primarily centred in the accommodation and catering sectors, transport and retail (merchandise and souvenirs). In a macroeconomic analysis of the additional impulses for the World Cup region, with correct use of a with-and-without analysis, the expenditure of the local World Cup spectators ought not to be included, since they would pursue other activities involving expenditure if the World Cup were not taking place. To date, no indication exists that the local population spends more during the World Cup than it would otherwise spend.

4   Compare with DFB (2006). It is worth mentioning that the national marketing programme, which included six national partners, yielded no more than US$92 million. The FIFA marketing programme and its exclusivities left little room for national sponsors.

5   In addition to taxes on profits, more than US$61 million of value added tax out of the sales of tickets had been transferred to public authorities.

6   a = City of Cape Town, available at www.capetown.gov.za/wcmstemplates /FIFAworldcup.aspx?clusid=472&catparent=6500&IDpathString=6497-6500;
b = *Cape Argus* 20 July 2006;
c = *The Times* 5 November 2007;
d = *The Natal Witness* 26 July 2006;
e = *Business Day* 22 February 2008;
f = *Beeld* 27 November 2007;
g = *The Herald* 18 December 2007;
h = *Volksblad* 6 September 2007;
i = *Daily Dispatch* 19 January 2007;
j = *SouthAfrica.info The Official Gateway* (a private sector initiative that spreads information about business opportunities in South Africa) 12 March 2008;
k = *The Star* 18 January 2007;
l = via email from the Pretoria Local Organising Committee;
m = SABC News 21 February 2007.

7   G Deister, 'Joseph Blatters Sorge um die Südafrika-WM'.

8   To preclude a secondary market in these (and other tickets), the tickets will be issued with the ticket-holder's name imprinted and the ticket-holder will have to provide proof of identity to use the ticket. Additional restrictions will limit to four the number of tickets to any given game that a South African family might buy in category four, as well as the number of games they might attend in the entire tournament (7 games out of 64) (*Sunday Tribune* 25 November 2007).

9   See also *Financial Times* (13 April 2006) for the expenditure estimates for the rest of the paragraph.

10 See Maennig and Büttner (2006), www.stadionwelt.de and www.fc-hansa.de. For the 2002 World Cup, South Korea spent nearly US$2 billion and Japan at least US$4 billion for the stadiums (Baade & Matheson 2004: 345).

11 Ahlert (2001), in a study of the German case, finds that an increased share of private investment increases the multiplicative income and employment effects of stadium investments. Note that the studies for American cities mentioned earlier generally do not find any statistically significant regional economic effects of stadium investments, although a substantial private finance is involved.

12   The share of direct public finance is further reduced to 25 per cent if Berlin and Leipzig are excluded. The federal government wanted to ensure that a second eastern German city would be a host and decided to contribute US$78.2 million to Leipzig in that regard. In Berlin, the Federal Republic owned the run-down Olympic stadium of 1936, and the city of Berlin refused to take over possession of the stadium before it was renovated. Rebiggiani (2006) emphasises that in addition to direct (and easy to calculate) public subsidies, significant 'conspicuous subsidising' as a form of debt guarantees has to be taken into account. He also elaborates on innovative income forms and financing techniques that might help to ensure the financial stability of the German soccer stadiums.

13   FP Unterreiner, 'Fußball-WM und Olympia: Profit und Prestige für den Gastgeber'

14   More recently, the same author offered a much lower estimate of around €624 million for the multiplicative effect on German GDP (Ahlert 2006).

15   Grant Thornton International is a global organisation of accounting and consulting member firms which provide assurance, tax and specialist advisory services to privately held businesses, public interest entities and public sector entities. For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grant_Thornton_International.

16   These values are in 2004 prices.

17   The economic impact of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Unpublished mimeograph received via email on 30 March 2008 from Gillian Saunders, Principal, Grant Thornton Strategic Solutions.

18   For the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan, the Dentsu Institute calculated *ex ante* that the Japanese share of the World Cup would generate a combined total of ¥1.400 billion (at that time around US$11 billion) to produce a long-term boost to the economy of ¥3.300 billion, equal to 0.6 per cent of Japan's GDP. The Korea Development Institute even calculated the total impact for the Korean GDP at 2.2 per cent (Szymanski 2002). For the 1994 World Cup in the USA, an additional income of more than US$4 billion had been calculated (Goodman & Stern 1994).

19   Based on *ex post* World Cup analyses, Kim and Petrick (2005: 37) found that Seoul residents' perceptions of the impacts of the 2002 World Cup three months after the event were 'diluted'. For similar results, see Kim et al. (2006).

20   The positive long-term effect on international tourism has to be contrasted with significant negative crowding-out effects of large sports events like the Olympic Games on tourism arrivals in the event year (McKay & Plumb 2001).

21   Many non-economists would interpret such rents as a case against sports. By contrast, Carlino and Coulson (2004) used the economist's idea of compensating differentials to interpret their findings as an argument for Major League Sports: the NFL presence makes the cities so much more attractive that the inhabitants are ready to pay higher rents (without having higher incomes). Taking the criterion of compensating differentials to the extreme, some of the findings of negative income effects, for example by Coates and Humphreys, could be interpreted as a sign of the positive effects of sport.

22   NN, 'Ein Land im Bierrausch'.

23   J Ritter, 'Flach spielen, hoch gewinnen'.

24   M Klesmann, 'Flugverbot zum WM-Finale'.

25   P Neumann, 'Warmer Geldregen fuer die BVG'.

26   Seventeen taxi federations in World Cup cities or (in the case of small World Cup cities
      where no city federation exists) in World Cup regions were contacted by email on 15 July
      2006. Four federations answered by email; one with a telephone call. One did not have any
      information, one thought the effects to be insignificant, and one thought the effects to be less
      than 5 per cent. Though not representative, our data are in line with other more pessimistic
      reports (see NN, 'Die Berliner Taxifahrer…', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 10 July 2006).

27   The data were adjusted using the X-12 programme. Regressions including a constant, a
      time trend, an AR(1) term for countervailing serial autocorrelation, and dummies for
      the months May to August 2006 indicated no significant effect of the World Cup, nor did
      dummies for the combination of June and July or for May until July 2006; compare with
      Allmers and Maennig (2008).

28   Johnson and Whitehead (2000) evaluate the WTP for two stadium projects in Lexington,
      Kentucky. They subdivide the WTP into use value (the portion of WTP motivated by the
      revealed behaviour of attending games) and non-use value (the portion of WTP motivated
      by behaviour such as talking about sports with friends and family) and thus arrive at a
      conditional WTP.

29   Because not more than 1 million of the World Cup 2006 tickets were sold to the 82 million
      Germans, the WTP evaluated by Heyne et al. (2007) might be interpreted as non-use value.
      However, public viewing (with some 30 million attendants at the 2006 World Cup) might
      call into question a strict delineation between use and non-use values, at least in the case of
      mega-events.

30   Due to the available data, it was not possible to test statistical significance.

31   Although there is considerable local interest in soccer, especially among black South
      Africans, the attendance at soccer matches, even in the first league, is comparatively low, at
      around 5 000 on average (Maheri interview). In the German Bundesliga, average attendance
      in the season 2005/06 was 41 000 per match. It should be noted that the 20 stadiums built
      for the 2002 World Cup in South Korea and Japan today are mainly used for informal
      markets and so on, as there is little use for them by the Japanese and the Korean premier
      leagues (see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 10 March 2006; Horne 2004).

32   The additional consumption of electricity by the stadiums, media centres and hospitality
      areas was calculated at about 13 million KW (Bundesminister des Inneren 2006: 15).

33   It should be emphasised that the club managers bear less responsibility for these
      developments than the local authority decision-makers.

34   Compare with Maennig (2007). For an econometric analysis of the effects of sport arenas
      on the regional economy, see Tu (2005) and Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2008).

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5 Mega-events as a response to poverty reduction: The 2010 World Cup and urban development

Udesh Pillay and Orli Bass

The decision in May 2004 by soccer world body FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) to award South Africa the right to host the 2010 Football World Cup has shifted the spotlight onto South African cities and their ability and readiness to cope.[1] This occasioned much subsequent analysis of infrastructure and service delivery readiness. While informed opinion has increasingly suggested that South African cities will, indeed, be in a position to successfully host the tournament in 2010, widespread consensus also suggests that much still needs to be done between now and then. South Africa is the first African nation to host such a mega sporting event, prompting then President Thabo Mbeki to pronounce that this is not a South African event but an African one. Much is expected from a host nation and global attention has focused on the opportunities and threats that come with such an ambitious undertaking, especially for a transitional democracy recovering from years of spatial, racial and political fragmentation.

The developmental impacts of mega-events in the periphery are frequently touted, although there is little guarantee that the actual effects contribute to poverty reduction specifically. In situating mega-events as a response to poverty alleviation, as many scholars, political commentators and observers have been inclined to do, careful consideration is required in order not to over-inflate their legacies as a panacea to a country's developmental challenges. In outlining this notion, the chapter contextualises this issue within the broader literature concerning mega-events in the developing world. Paying close attention to the relationship between growth and equity, the overall aim of the chapter is to provide insight into the 2010 World Cup in relation to development prospects for South Africa and, in particular, its major urban areas.

In this regard, the chapter seeks to overcome some of the euphoria associated with the benefits mega-events like the 2010 World Cup are presumed to generate, and pays particular attention to assessing the actual developmental impacts. These can be quite circumscribed and, as evident from the international literature, there are at times long-term costs associated with hosting mega-events that have serious consequences for the national economies of host countries. For example, while there may be low- and intermediate-skilled job creation opportunities in the construction and built-environment sectors ahead of 2010, these are likely to be mostly short-term and/or temporary employment opportunities involving finite numbers. In effect, this does little to help appreciably reduce unemployment rates, and has only

a marginal spin-off impact in communities living in conditions of poverty and squalor hoping to benefit from remittances. On the other hand, the legacy that the 2010 World Cup is likely to leave behind should not be articulated solely in pro-poor rhetoric. We will advance this latter argument in due course.

Urban development

Urban development and renewal has been identified by the government as a key national imperative. As such, assessing the development implications of hosting the World Cup in 2010, especially at a time in which government's urban renewal strategy is (eventually) gaining momentum, becomes critical. With high urbanisation rates projected, with the major metropolitan economies currently contributing the majority of the national GDP, and with service, infrastructure and income disparities widening in urban areas, initiatives aimed at stimulating economic growth and job creation need to be carefully nurtured and sustained (Pillay 2004; Pillay et al. 2006). In 2006, it appeared that the hosting of the World Cup in 2010 had the potential to do precisely this.

At that time, it seemed that the event presented South Africa with a unique opportunity to fast-track the development impetus in cities and larger towns. If a programme of action was well conceptualised and formulated, the spin-offs for cities could be immeasurable. Developments since then, at both national and local level, have however not been insignificant.

The national government has outlined its blueprint for how the rollout of this massive public works undertaking should commence, and the host cities have begun planning in earnest. A lack of communication, both vertically and horizontally, has been a problem, but much attention has been given to this recently. The signs are therefore encouraging, and the debate over policy and process has given way to a reasonable amount of consensus, with the actual business of construction and development now proceeding apace. Decisions around stadium upgrading and infrastructure development seem, to an extent, to have been subject to democratically based decision-making processes, with growth, equity and sustainability principles seen as mutually reinforcing, if not finding necessary expression in the plans themselves. As the literature reminds, excluding such principles often has very harmful consequences for cities and their long-term future.

Having said this, mega-events are often used as 'spectacles' that can best be understood as either instruments of hegemonic power, or as displays of urban 'boosterism' by economic elites wed to a particularly narrow-minded, pro-growth vision of the city. As such, these events are often seen as no more than public relations ventures far removed from the realities of urban problems and challenges. 'Welfarist' and equity-based considerations tend to be conspicuously absent.

South African planners did, however, even if just at the bid stage of the 2010 event, draw on the experiences of countries in which significant opposition was generated

from marginalised and powerless communities who saw little material benefit accruing from such events. Taking important lessons from the Cape Town Olympic bid experience into account, planners considered two elements to be vital.

First, the tournament needed to be conceived as providing a catalyst for improving the life conditions of the historically disadvantaged and, second, redesigning the apartheid city in order to create new functional linkages needed to become a central thrust, with a series of action plans convincingly illustrating how this was likely to be achieved. An integrated public transport system came to mind here.

However, these elements would remain no more than a blueprint unless the essence and spirit underpinning its key pillars were enforced in a programme of development that talked to the twin, and often competing, demands of what was required in terms of FIFA's technical specifications, and what the broader development imperatives of a host nation were. At this stage, what was required among scholars and practitioners was the start of a robust debate that ensured that the work of the Local Organising Committee (LOC), and all the other major players, considered these factors. There need not have been anything intrusive about such a public engagement with the work of the LOC and the cities, as it is well documented that appropriate checks and balances are always a necessary prerequisite to desirous outcomes. A well-functioning and confident LOC, and industrious and hard-working cities, may indeed have welcomed such debate, despite their contractual obligations and responsibilities. Some of the key questions informing such debate included the following:

- What were the current capabilities of, and what was the state of readiness among, South African cities to host this event?
- In the run-up to the event, could urban development and renewal – especially in the six major urban conurbations – be fast-tracked, and how?
- Was it possible that growth and equity issues could become truly reinforcing concepts in a sustainable programme of urban development and renewal preceding the event?
- How could a well-grounded programme of urban development (initiated well before the event) take root and be sustained into the future, with multiple spin-offs for all city dwellers, in particular the poor and marginalised?
- What were public perceptions of the impact hosting the event was likely to have on their livelihoods?
- How could the potential of the event to place South African cities among a global hierarchy of competitive metropolitan economies be measured?

The list was not exhaustive, but the start of a process of constructive and responsible engagement at some level needed to have begun. Vigorous public debate would provide direct insight and a nuanced, multidimensional understanding of the development consequences of hosting a mega sporting event. The process of debate, dialogue and reflection on the one hand, and the then immediate business of construction and infrastructure upgrading on the other, were not mutually exclusive processes, and necessarily needed to inform each other. They were processes that

needed to run in parallel, with both providing an important set of checks and balances, despite deliverables that were cast in stone and time frames that simply had to be met. No doubt politics and constituency-based agendas would intersect with the above processes, but this too was a healthy development provided it did not impede progress.

If all of the above happened, the basis for proactive planning to ensure maximum benefit for all South Africans, especially the poor and marginalised, was likely to take root. Unique opportunities to fast-track the urban development impetus in cities and larger towns were likely to ensue, with significant policy implications for how government needed to start thinking about citywide renewal, development and regeneration strategies. It was even possible that South African cities would be able to recreate their personalities in this process, allowing them to compete in an increasingly homogenised world, and enhancing their image and aesthetic status on the global stage. South African cities could potentially become 'must see, must visit, must invest' places, as Speake (2007: 3) reminds in her influential essay on the creation of 'sensational cities', occasioned by the increasing need in a globalised world for cities to become 'distinct' and 'different'.

If this all came together as planned, South Africa was likely to see close to 200 000 visitors here in 2010, a boost to the economy to the tune of R60 billion, and the creation of 150 000 new jobs. The boost to national pride and the potential to nurture a true South African identity, while intangible benefits, were also likely to be significant.

Getting the basics right for 2010

As time passed, while remaining enthusiastic about the event itself, it became clear that there was less reason to be optimistic about the associated development prospects. As mentioned, the 2010 World Cup presented South Africa with a unique opportunity to fast-track the urban development impetus. Yet, a close reading of the international literature on the hosting of mega-events – especially the significant portion that is cautionary in its tone and vocabulary about the benefits that may accrue to host nations – heightened awareness around not inflating development expectations.

But there was an additional set of reasons that motivated this hypothesis, one more rooted in what was – or was not, as the case may have been – happening on the ground among the host cities. These became clear after posing some cautionary reminders worthy of consideration by those involved in the process, especially those directly responsible for getting cities ready to host the event. They included, inter alia, local government practitioners, property developers, members of the construction industry and others involved in the service sector.

Firstly, and rather urgently, it was argued that a national development framework needed to be established in collaboration with the LOC, relevant line ministries

in government and the host cities. While individual cities may well decide on the specific mechanics of implementing development plans, a core, non-negotiable set of development principles needed to be subscribed to. This was absolutely critical and one way of ensuring that the necessary synergy was realised was by building this into the terms of reference for the many tenders that were about to be advertised, and for adjudicators to subsequently scrupulously evaluate submissions to make sure bidders complied with the development criteria.

Secondly, it was important that cities align their development strategies with the infrastructural and other development imperatives outlined in the bid. This was potentially not too difficult since South Africa's larger cities had, in the recent past, developed a set of regeneration strategies that in most cases corresponded with the development principles outlined in the bid. Indeed, planners and scholars were at pains to highlight the pre-existing development trajectory of South African cities, arguing that hosting the World Cup would give renewed expression to a holistically grounded set of urban renewal and regeneration plans.

The problem, though, was that at that stage some cities aspired to do other things as well, like becoming world-class and globally competitive. Unfortunately, (most) proponents of this idea subscribed to a formulaic, economic growth-centred model of urban development, in which benefits to the poor and marginalised (eventually) accrue through 'trickle-down' effects. Embracing an almost exclusively neoliberal, market-oriented approach, the idea here among advocates was to position cities like Johannesburg among a global hierarchy of competitive metropolitan areas. In light of this, what had to happen at the planning stage of the World Cup was that the underlying principles of this strategy needed to be renegotiated, and a balance struck between the development imperatives that evolved as a result of winning the bid and the important need to make South African cities globally competitive, but with new ideologies and discourses of development at the core of the strategy.

Thirdly, as difficult as this was, South African cities needed to start cooperating, and the impulse to compete (albeit then in a highly competitive environment in which the host cities were still not chosen) needed to give way to an understanding that the potential benefits that accrue are national public goods. In other words, job creation, economic growth, improved service delivery, infrastructure development and the forging of a collective identity needed to be realised and felt throughout the country and not just in particular locales. While South Africa's cities are, indeed, engines of growth and the World Cup did present South Africa with unique opportunities to fast-track urban development, it also provided the country with a glorious chance to help reconstruct underdeveloped and peripheral areas. The aforementioned development framework needed to incorporate this. The South African Cities Network could also play a useful brokering role here among overzealous cities.

Fourthly, one needed to tease out the nature of the relationship between FIFA and the LOC more carefully and with greater scrutiny. As representative of South Africa's interests (by overseeing the activities of the various agents that will deliver

the World Cup), the LOC needed clarity from FIFA on what exactly its role was, what it was mandated and entrusted to do, on whose behalf such a mandate was being undertaken, and how much autonomy it had in making decisions. As 'owner' of the event, and with profit generation very much in mind, FIFA could well dictate the nature of business arrangements, commercial partnerships and other economic transactions, which could have significant consequences for the kind of development agenda pursued. At the time, the LOC would have done well to sketch out the parameters of its role upfront with FIFA.

Finally, while public participation in the decision-making process was important, the impact of this was best realised if one understood what the public was thinking. Public perceptions vis-à-vis a range of World Cup issues needed to be constantly measured and analysed and then used to inform the development agenda, especially that part speaking to the benefits that could potentially accrue to the poor and marginalised, in particular measures to mitigate poverty. Stadium construction and transport infrastructure upgrades needed to continue in earnest as time was running out, but the type and nature of development intervention – especially in disadvantaged communities – needed to evolve as perceptions were canvassed and public behaviour scrutinised.

These, then, were some of the more immediate cautionary pointers that were considered critical at the time in ensuring that the 2010 World Cup serve as a catalyst in fast-tracking urban development in the country and, if conceptualised according to the parameters sketched above, benefiting peri-urban and rural communities as well. None of these materialised to the extent that it was envisaged, or at least hoped for, and a unique moment was lost.

Reinforcing this more attenuated position with regard to the benefits that the 2010 World Cup event could deliver is a synthesis of the international literature, which is then contextualised. It is to this that the discussion now turns.

Development impacts of mega-events

The international literature reveals a growing scepticism over the extent to which hosting mega-events potentially results in economic growth or significant developmental impacts (Baade & Matheson 2004; Black & Van der Westhuizen 2004; Burbank et al. 2002; Emery 2001; Higham 1999; Horne & Manzenreiter 2004, 2006; Humphreys & Prokopowicz 2007; Jones 2001; Matheson & Baade 2004; Owen 2005; Whitson 2004; Whitson & Horne 2006). A host of scholars conclude that while there are some positive economic and legacy impacts (Lee & Taylor 2005; Ritchie 2000), the urban economic impact is variable, intangible and ambiguous at best (Andranovich et al. 2001; Gratton et al. 2000, 2001; Gratton et al. 2006). The purported legacy of mega-events (including social and economic legacies) has a lot to do with the 'element of the attraction' occasioned by the event, and to an extent has been achieved in some cases (Ritchie 2000). Yet, it also forms 'part

of the "known unknowns" of the sports mega-events' (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006: 9). Part of the reason for this ephemeral quality is that post-event analyses seldom occur as organisers disband and governments focus their attention on other activities (Hiller 1998; Horne & Manzenreiter 2006).[2] Nevertheless, the gap between actual and predicted impacts remains a key concern of academics and the source of a burgeoning literature (Cornelissen 2004a; Horne & Manzenreiter 2004, 2006; Whitson & Horne 2006).

There are three categories of scholarly consensus concerning the exaggeration of benefits linked to mega-events. The first suggests that 'the increase in direct spending attributable to the games may be a "gross" as opposed to a "net" measure' (Matheson & Baade 2004: 1090). This fails to account for the consequences of mega-event spending resulting in the displacement of regular spending. Secondly, mega-events may crowd out regular business travellers in a particular region. In this regard, regular business travellers may avoid host cities for the duration of the event. Thirdly, the notion of the multiplier effect (which suggests that further spending is stimulated by initial, direct spending on mega-events) is criticised in the sense that the multiplier for a mega-event 'will be lower than the multiplier for spending on many other local goods and services' (Matheson & Baade 2004: 1091).

Hence, in the context of the developed world, the impacts of mega-events are not uniformly positive. The Montreal Olympics had highly problematic long-term economic outcomes for the city. An analysis of the more recent 1994 World Cup in the USA revealed that, opposed to the expected US$4 billion gain, host cities experienced losses ranging between US$5.5 and US$9.3 billion (Baade & Matheson 2004; Matheson & Baade 2004). Non-host cities can also experience reductions in their revenue which may be long-lasting. Long-term gains in employment in Lillehammer (host of the 1994 Winter Olympics) in Norway were counterbalanced by drops in non-host cities after the Olympics. Indeed, mega-events are transient events and long-term economic impacts in Lillehammer were minimal (*Business Day* 8 August 2006;[3] Spilling 1998). Moreover, while the Olympics in Barcelona is widely regarded as having been particularly successful, associated rises in the costs of services, transportation and food should serve as a warning signal, particularly to the developing world (*Business Day* 8 August 2006). Furthermore, job creation in Barcelona centred around low-paid, temporary employment as opposed to any meaningful long-term job creation (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006).

In addition to these experiences, as Matheson and Baade (2004) suggest, displacement of public funds is a key area of complaint. Public spending on projects and maintenance often means that budget cuts are made in other areas – a problem which is exacerbated if costs escalate. These cuts affect those 'who were least likely to enjoy benefits from the mega-events (or even to attend them): the urban poor…and people in country districts a long way from the city' (Whitson 2004: 1227–1228). In this regard, there are significant social costs stemming from the diversion of public funding associated with closure of facilities and the failure to provide services

(Whitson 2004; Whitson & Horne 2006). The social impacts attached to mega-events are important and the international literature highlights that negative social impacts are not restricted to the developing world.

In this regard, Andranovich et al. (2001) argue that urban regeneration projects in Atlanta (host of the 1996 Olympics) did not improve conditions for urban residents and that hosting a mega-event does not necessarily provide opportunities for these goals to be met. Indeed, 'providing festivals when people need bread is a dubious use of public resources' (Andranovich et al. 2001: 127). This argument is extended in the context of Australia by Lenskyj (2002), who considers the social impacts of the Sydney 2000 Olympics. She argues that the Olympics aggravated the existing housing gap. Moreover, she contends that homelessness and housing social problems increased in the run-up to the Olympics. Furthermore, job creation was mainly temporary. Lenskyj contends that 'in the streets, low-income neighbourhoods, homeless refuges, and Indigenous communities – there was indisputable evidence that the staging of the Olympics served the interest of global capitalism first and foremost while exacerbating existing social problems' (2002: 227–228). This is a point which developing countries should take note of.

Clearly, a model is needed which takes into account the effects of residential displacement and rising property values in neighbourhoods adjacent to stadium precincts (Hiller 1998). It has been estimated that the 1988 Seoul Olympics resulted in the eviction of 700 000 people; 300 000 were displaced for the Beijing Olympics. Furthermore, evictions are expected in London before that city hosts its Olympics in 2012 (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006). Problems in this regard were also experienced in Barcelona and Sydney, reminding one that 'increased social polarization also remains one of the major legacies of mega-events' (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006: 12). It seems that there are 'few social benefits for those unable (or dis-inclined [*sic*]) to present themselves as consumers' (Whitson & Horne 2006: 86).

Having broadly considered the impacts of mega-events through a discussion of the international literature, the argument now turns more directly to an examination of the impacts of major events in the developing world, with an emphasis on their implications for poverty reduction.

Mega-events: A mechanism for poverty reduction in the periphery?

The developing world, in particular Asia and South America, has played host to a number of mega-events. In addition, there are many upcoming mega-events scheduled to take place in developing or peripheral countries. These include the 2010 FIFA World Cup, to be hosted by South Africa; the 2010 Commonwealth Games, to be hosted by India; and the 2012 UEFA Football Championship in Poland and Ukraine (Cornelissen 2007; Humphreys & Prokopowicz 2007). Yet, Humphreys and Prokopowicz suggest that 'mega-events may not be effective regional economic development vehicles in transition economies' (2007: 496). In this context, it is

increasingly important to assess the impacts of mega-events on the periphery, with specific reference to poverty reduction. Again, the literature is hampered by a lack of sufficient longitudinal studies. Nevertheless, the existing literature does not offer much evidence that hosting mega-events has a direct effect on poverty reduction.

Research into mega-events and developing nations has been centred on questions of development, place promotion, signalling, identity building and human rights and political liberalisation (Black & Bezanson 2004; Black & Van der Westhuizen 2004). While attention in this chapter is focused mainly on developmental impacts related to poverty reduction, it is pertinent to note that, as evidenced from the case of Malaysia and its hosting of the sixteenth Commonwealth Games, mega-events may prompt nefarious outcomes in the form of strengthening authoritarian regimes (Van der Westhuizen 2004). Another point worthy of consideration centres on the notion that in seeking to project positive images of themselves, developing nations often have to work against stereotypical media images. Developing countries are generally projected in a negative light and media outlets tend to perpetuate rather than challenge these images. The 1996 Cricket World Cup in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka serves as an example of this (Dimeo & Kay 2004). This is particularly relevant in the South African context, where the international and local media have already cast doubt internationally over the ability of South Africa to successfully host the World Cup and have publicly touted potential alternative host countries. Finally, one should not neglect the intangible benefits in terms of image enhancement, nation and identity building, publicity and the indirect impacts these might have on poverty reduction (Matheson & Baade 2004). Yet, Whitson and Horne (2006) warn that history suggests that the long-term place promotion of peripheral cities has transient impacts.

For developing countries, the primary motivating reason for hosting a mega-event is the unsubstantiated 'promise of an economic windfall' (Matheson & Baade 2004: 1085). However, 'claims that sports mega-events provide a substantial boost to the economy of the host city, region, and country have been strongly criticized' (Matheson & Baade 2004: 1089). Reviewing the consequences of mega-events in the periphery, Matheson and Baade (2004) point out that spending on infrastructure is considerably higher in developing countries. Yet evidence suggests that the construction of stadiums associated with the 2002 World Cup in Japan (co-hosted with Korea) may rather have been 'steroids, bloating rather than strengthening the economy' (McCormack, cited in Horne 2004: 1242). The event failed to live up to the organisers' expectations (Cornelissen & Swart 2006). In addition, similar to the after-effects of the Nagano Winter Olympics in 1998, stadium maintenance costs continue to be borne by taxpayers. After the conclusion of the 2002 World Cup, facilities created in Japan were used for professional sport and concerts (rather than for facilities for the public), and social goals 'that might follow from high-quality public infrastructure for sport and recreation, are still far from being accomplished' (Whitson & Horne 2006: 75).

The perception exists that some trickle-down effects occur and that benefits may accrue from spending on infrastructure that is not sports related. For example,

it was suggested that, in the case of Beijing, sport facilities would account for a mere fraction of the US$22 billion allocated to improvements in infrastructure (Matheson & Baade 2004). Nevertheless, in parallel to the situation in the developed world, Matheson and Baade suggest that the:

> opportunity cost of capital may also be particularly high in developing nations. From an economic point of view, the cost of building a new stadium is not best described by the amount of money needed to build the facility but rather the value to society from the same amount of capital spent on the next best public project. (2004: 1092)

Cornelissen concurs, observing that mega-events 'may involve infrastructural and other developments, the legacies of which may be to the disadvantage, rather than the advantage of the broader populace' (2007: 5). There is widespread agreement that for the urban poor, the value or legacy of stadiums and other facilities remains debatable (Whitson & Horne 2006). In this regard, there is not an undisputed link between infrastructure and facilities development and poverty reduction.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to address whether mega-events contribute to poverty reduction in terms of employment. It is important to assess whether local residents will benefit from earnings associated with the mega-event and whether these earnings will remain after the conclusion of the event. The literature indicates that claims of job creation associated with mega-events need to be treated cautiously (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006; Matheson & Baade 2004).

Tourism benefits are also provisional in the developing world context. Korea did not receive the expected boost in tourism post-Olympics or post-World Cup (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006; Whitson 2004). Indeed, during the World Cup, South Korea received approximately the same number of visitors as it had the year before; Japan experienced an additional 30 000 visitors (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006). Furthermore, as Horne and Manzenreiter (2004) point out in their study of the Japan/Korea World Cup, a gap between actual and forecasted impacts is to be expected. Thus, claims resulting from poverty reduction linked to tourism strategies need to be carefully considered in the context of the developing world.

Hence, the literature on development and mega-events suggests that there is little to corroborate – in terms of political liberalisation, place promotion, infrastructure and facilities development, job creation and tourism impacts – the notion that poverty will be addressed in a significant way.

The World Cup and development prospects for South Africa

If the international literature is heavily cautious regarding the developmental benefits of mega-events and their ability to alleviate poverty in the developing world, it is apposite to address the development prospects for South Africa associated with its hosting of the 2010 World Cup.

Mega-events have become prominent in the South African context due to the perceived benefits of nation building, international profiling and economic and developmental gains (Cornelissen 2004b, 2005, 2007; Cornelissen & Swart 2006). Rhetoric by the then Gauteng premier, Mbhazima Shilowa, supports the notion that the South African 'vision remains that of halving poverty and unemployment by 2014, and the 2010 World Cup provides an opportunity to fast-track development towards attainment of this vision' (*The Star* 27 June 2007).[4] Certainly, the notion of a developmental agenda has become a key feature of South Africa's mega-event strategy (Cornelissen 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Cornelissen & Swart 2006; Swart & Bob 2004). Hiller (1998, 2000) highlights the kind of development agendas associated with bidding for mega-events in the South African context. These include a commitment to construct facilities in areas that are disadvantaged; the notion that facilities development stimulates further initiatives; the enhancement of disadvantaged communities' sport programmes; job creation; provision of affordable housing; small business support; provision of an integrated transport system; and community consultation. Poverty reduction strategies are therefore centred around black economic empowerment initiatives, job creation, transportation integration and township regeneration. Such agendas remain prominent in connection with the World Cup. Despite this, there is a paucity of research that evaluates the likelihood of South Africa achieving social and economic gains from hosting mega-events (Cornelissen 2004b).

While the 2010 World Cup does offer South Africa the opportunity to deliver on the social and political promises associated with its mega-event strategy, it will be a vast challenge to balance investment with the socio-economic needs of the populace (Cornelissen & Swart 2006). Furthermore, as Swart and Bob indicate (in the context of the failed Cape Town Olympic bid), it 'is doubtful whether the global intervention promise of alleviating the poverty trap via the hosting of mega-events in South Africa will be realized' (2004: 1322). Such an insight is particularly relevant to the hosting of the World Cup. In addition, as Cornelissen (2004b, 2005) suggests, the opportunity costs associated with hosting mega-events may be too high for South Africa and questions must be asked about whether the benefits will be greater than the costs.

While proponents of mega-events position them as 'pro-growth strategies for long-term economic development and job creation' (Hiller 2000: 439), it is the link to pro-poor agendas that becomes particularly relevant in the South African context. Crucial questions remain regarding the distribution of benefits and the balance between growth and redistribution imperatives (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006). In South Africa, the tension between pro-growth and pro-poor agendas is particularly acute, given the twin priorities of international growth and redistribution. Consistent with this economic balancing act, pro-growth mega-events are often linked to notions of the public good. Yet, despite assertions in the popular domain to the contrary, development linked to the World Cup is not pro-poor (*Business Day* 8 August 2006). As with the Olympics, the World Cup can 'only be developmental

to the extent that there…[is] a deliberate will to make it so. Embracing principles and putting them in operation are two different things – constantly endangered by finances, time constraints and politics' (Hiller 2000: 454). Given the international uncertainty that surrounds the economic benefits of hosting mega-events, it is problematic to assume that income will materialise to advance the pro-poor agendas of service delivery and social redress.

It is particularly questionable if mega-events are able to assist in addressing poverty by assisting with housing provision in South Africa – an insight which should inform 2010 World Cup planning. Firstly, the type of housing which needs to be provided would likely exceed entry-level requirements and the associated costs would serve to exclude the poor (Hiller 1998). In the context of the assertions of the failed Cape Town Olympic bid, it was suggested that:

> the enormity of the housing problem in relation to the type of housing that would be built suggested that housing expectations would not be realized at all. The quantity of housing needed for the Olympics was nowhere near what was needed in the city and in that sense created unrealistic expectations. (Hiller 1998: 54)

In addition, it is important to bear in mind that stadiums or training facilities situated in disadvantaged communities could alter (as the international experience suggests) the value of property in the adjacent areas, thus changing the character of the area. The unintended consequences could include a transformation of the social class and an escalation of rents beyond the affordability of renters. Instead of benefiting, the urban poor might be negatively affected by the upward movement of property markets (Hiller 1998, 2000; Whitson & Horne 2006). Thus, while urban regeneration associated with stadium precincts may stimulate property prices, higher rents and gentrification are likely to displace the poor from adjacent residential areas (*Business Day* 8 August 2006). Perhaps a significant warning to those espousing developmental gains is that projects initiated in relation to the failed Cape Town Olympic bid have failed to be incorporated into, or contribute to, further development initiatives or other mega-event strategies (Cornelissen & Swart 2006).

The benefits associated with infrastructural provision also require careful examination. The 'debate on the infrastructural and economic legacies, the distribution of these, and access to opportunities, has also started to intensify' (Cornelissen & Swart 2006: 118). Closely linked with Matheson and Baade's (2004) three categorisations of complaints is the warning that spending on infrastructure could displace public funds and perhaps delay other projects in the public interest (*Business Day* 8 August 2006). Moreover, Matheson reports that 'independent work on the economic impact of mega-sporting events has routinely found that the effect of these events on host communities is either insignificant or an order of magnitude below the figures espoused by the sports' promoters' (2002: 2). Consequently, the literature points to the fact that infrastructure provision does not benefit local

residents and is often not significantly used post-event. Furthermore, the expected 'under-utilization of the facilities built will mean that not all localities will obtain the benefits promised' (Horne & Manzenreiter 2006: 14). A longer-term view of the stadiums, facilities and infrastructure must be considered so as to mitigate against potential negative consequences (Cornelissen 2004a). As such, vigorous debate currently exists around the benefits and legacies of major infrastructural projects, notably the Gautrain – linking Johannesburg to Pretoria and the international airport – and the King Shaka International Airport in Durban, and their potential to reduce poverty. It is to be expected that the long-term job creation effects associated with these projects will not be high and questions have been asked about the ability of the Gautrain to benefit the urban poor (McKenzie 2007). It is likely that improvements in transportation, infrastructure, service provision and the quality of the urban fabric will be highly centralised and their benefit for marginal urban areas, rural areas and non-host cities limited.

Literature on the impacts of mega-events on non-host cities and rural areas is minimal. Deccio and Baloglu (2002) offer some treatment of the subject, while Kim and Petrick's (2005) and Jones's (2001) commentary is more oblique. Arguably, the potential impact of the World Cup is not confined to the host country. Indeed, impacts on the participating teams' countries can include economic, political and historical effects and the odds of a country winning the tournament. In fact, based on a combination of these factors, it is evident that the 1998 French World Cup had the greatest impact in Brazil (Anonymous 1998). Notwithstanding this, Deccio and Baloglu's (2002) study reveals that non-host communities do not anticipate that mega-events will have an impact on their local community, although it is thought that some opportunities will arise. Bearing this in mind, it is apposite to briefly assess the potential impact of the 2010 World Cup on the areas beyond host South African cities.

The rhetoric swirling around 2010 tends to suggest that benefits could be widespread. Fan parks and public viewing areas, for example, are planned for non-host South African cities and unofficial parks are planned in other parts of Africa (*City Press* 24 June 2007; *Reuters UK* 21 August 2007).[5] It has also been suggested that neighbouring countries such as Swaziland and Mozambique will form the bases and practice locations for foreign teams, thus dispersing economic and supporters' benefits (*City Press* 24 June 2007).

In addition, tourism benefits beyond host city boundaries are often cited. Indeed, as Lee and Taylor observe, 'mega sport events such as the FIFA World Cup… draw significant numbers of domestic and international tourists' (2005: 595). Despite Horne and Manzenreiter's (2006) contention that South Korea received a similar number of visitors during the World Cup as it had the year before, Lee and Taylor (2005) calculate that during the World Cup in South Korea, 57.7 per cent of foreign tourist arrivals were either direct or indirect World Cup tourists. The expenditure, per capita, of these tourists was approximated at US$2 242, which

represented a figure 1.8 times greater than that for regular tourists. In total, foreign tourist expenditure was estimated at US$522 million. Based on these figures, 'it was calculated that the World Cup generated an economic impact of US$1.35 billion of output (sales), US$307 million of income, and US$713 million of value added for South Korea' (Lee & Taylor 2005: 595). While the general mega-event hope is to attract these visitors to other areas of the country, it is questionable whether sports tourists will sample the larger tourism product (Higham 1999).

Thus, one must be cautious of overstating the benefits to be obtained from tourism. It is not only South Africa that should heed this advice. Neighbouring countries such as Mozambique are also hoping to profit from increased tourism stemming from the 2010 World Cup.[6] Tourism impacts are as yet untested and claims should not be accepted at face value. While the World Cup will provide key tourists, Doreen Atkinson suggests that tourism planners have not properly examined the potential of tourism corridors between host cities (Atkinson interview). In addition, any thinking about tourism and the 2010 World Cup in South Africa thus far tends to be compartmentalised into provinces, instead of a more holistic cross-provincial strategy (Atkinson interview). Hence, there is little evidence to support the notion that the impacts of the World Cup will flow out of the host cities and contribute to poverty amelioration on a broader scale.

The general perception that mega-events will benefit impoverished communities is based on the assumption of a trickle-down effect. This may not be accurate, as growth might create difficulties for the poor and job creation is temporary and low paying (Hiller 2000). It is expected that during the construction phase and the 2010 World Cup event itself, employment will rise and attract migrants from rural areas. However, due to the temporary nature of the employment created, post-2010 urban unemployment is consequently expected to swell. Moreover, food and transportation prices are anticipated to permanently rise in South Africa (*Business Day* 8 August 2006). These results would hinder rather than enable the daily strategies of marginalised communities. Mega-events can thus become symbols of 'economic growth through anticipated inward investment and job creation – even if it…[is] unproven and perhaps wishful thinking' (Hiller 2000: 454).

Nevertheless, some constructive suggestions are offered regarding how to avoid these pitfalls in the South African context (*Business Day* 8 August 2006). Importantly, a sense of realism must prevail and there should be a commitment to ensuring that new developments and stadiums are designed to incorporate a variety of activities. Furthermore, infrastructure and tourism developments should not merely be urban based but should focus attention on other areas as well. Incentive grants could be provided to communities to establish curio stalls and refreshment stands which might attract tourists and, in such a manner, contribute to poverty reduction. Such long-term, integrated development 'could help make the World Cup a genuine economic boon to SA, rather than a hard lesson in mistaken enthusiasm' (*Business Day* 8 August 2006).

Conclusion: Legacy matters!

This review of the international literature, including a contextual location as it applies to South Africa's preparation for the 2010 World Cup, has left much concern about the benefits that could accrue from a fast-tracked programme of urban development, with potential spin-offs for the country as a whole. In addition, the cautionary reminders that were posed some time back, and which needed to be taken seriously in order to advance the principles of proactive planning that would (hopefully) result in benefits accruing to all South Africans, have not materialised.

Having said this, it is overly tempting to see the legacy that 2010 needs to leave behind in terms articulated exclusively in a 'pro-poor' language. In other words, there is a body of thought that posits that for the 2010 World Cup to be deemed successful, the primary beneficiaries must be the poor, marginalised and impoverished. The argument is that in the run-up to 2010 and, indeed, after the event, the value of the spectacle must be measured by, inter alia, the number of jobs created (particularly in the so-called 'second economy'); the extent to which services to the poor have been accelerated; how the public transport system has been enhanced to cut, and make safer and more reliable, commuting time between place of residence and work; the net contribution to the GDP to allow redistribution and social grant programmes to gain momentum; and whether other reconstruction, development and 'welfare-based' AsgiSA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa) objectives can be fulfilled. Indeed, a recent Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) attitudinal survey measuring public perceptions of the 2010 World Cup – to be conducted annually – revealed that one in three South Africans expect to benefit personally from a job creation opportunity linked to the World Cup, presumably through some sort of large public works programme (HSRC 2008).

This chapter has argued that it is crucial for issues of growth and equity to be seen as mutually reinforcing concepts if the 2010 World Cup is to meet with the kinds of successes hoped for. It has also argued that the success of the event will be measured not only in terms of how South African cities are made more competitive globally, but also in terms of how an undertaking to the poor and indigent can be fulfilled.

Given this, and despite somewhat pessimistic conclusions about the event's development prospects, what has been of concern most recently is the framing of this debate in mutually exclusive terms. To use two examples representing polarised ideological positions: either jobs are created through the 2010 World Cup and the plight of the poor improved, or focus is given to the opportunities created by the event to attract foreign direct investment that will help grow the economy to 6 per cent per annum. It is not possible, so the argument goes, to do both. This is where South Africa may be getting it wrong. These goals (and a whole subset beneath them) are not contradictory, and had a debate started around these issues soon after the event was awarded to the country, the World Cup could have been conceived as one truly beneficial to all South Africans.

What was required was a consensus-driven understanding by all stakeholders and constituencies. If these stakeholders had worked together, pooled resources, aligned visions, collectively charted processes and conjointly identified targets, the end result could have benefited the whole country and not just specific sectors. Competing discourses on development were important as the planning and rollout of large programmes required to make 2010 a success began. However, this should not have come at the expense of a collective vision, one based not just on consensus – which, after all, is often about compromise – but on a recognition of what was truly best for the country given its enormous challenges.

This potential meeting of minds would have agreed that not all South Africa's urban 'ills' would be solved by the 2010 World Cup, nor would the country immediately join a global hierarchy – an elite list, as it were – of competitive national economies. It would also have agreed that the World Cup would create jobs, but not solve unemployment problems; that it would improve the public transport system, but not solve the public transport problem; that it would help accelerate service delivery in some urban townships, but only marginally; that it would position the country more competitively, but not before getting more of the basics right – like crime and industrial policy; that South Africa would have world-class facilities to attract mega-events in future, but for the large part these are likely to be underutilised in future; that there was likely to be a positive net contribution to the GDP, but that the 2010 World Cup itself was unlikely to deliver a 6 per cent growth rate.

This is not necessarily a new argument but rather a positing that South Africa's 2010 legacy should have been broadly defined at the outset. This did not happen. If 74 per cent of South Africans are optimistic about the combination of job prospects, economic growth and international standing that may result from the 2010 World Cup (HSRC 2008), surely policy-makers, practitioners, civil society and scholars had an obligation to make sure that in the many 2010 meetings, round tables and forums participated in over the past few years, a consensus was negotiated about anticipated benefits and prospective costs. It has become increasingly evident that there is a current disjuncture between what people on the ground are saying and feeling about 2010 (the HSRC survey again reveals illuminating insights), and the way this is being articulated by their leaders and representatives.

Perhaps this is overstating the cracks and not sufficiently highlighting reasonable consensus that may have already been reached on these issues. But if recent debates and much unpleasantness around the Gautrain, the Green Point Stadium and the N2 Gateway Project in Cape Town, and the new airport outside Durban are anything to go by, consensus was only partly and ephemerally reached. The words 'trade-off', 'trickle-down' and 'best practice' are not ones which inspire fondness. Additionally, in a crudely defined 'rich/poor' continuum, especially as development agendas took root ahead of 2010, necessary checks and balances were needed to avoid outcomes that create tension and unnecessary conflict. But, more critically, somewhere in between all of this a national consensus should have been arrived at, driven by South

Africa's leaders, on what kind of legacy 2010 was realistically and practically likely to leave behind. Legacy outcomes, after all, are not zero-sum games.

In sum, though, the evidence from the international literature unequivocally suggests that more widespread development benefits are not a direct consequence of spending associated with mega-events. Inequality may even be exacerbated by the hosting of the World Cup. Past experience suggests that there is no proof that the hosting of mega-events will result in meaningful job creation, a significant contribution to the GDP, or infrastructural, service and facilities provision that is appropriate beyond the lifespan of the event. South Africa needed to be acutely aware of this notion if it was to balance the pro-growth and pro-poor imperatives of its mandate. Despite the government's assertions that 2010 will 'deliver', widespread and sustained poverty alleviation – as the argument above has articulated – is unlikely to be a significant outcome of the 2010 World Cup. Nor is urban development, beyond the immediate requirements of the event itself.

Notwithstanding this, it is still argued – even at this late stage – that the definition of legacy be expanded and opened up to public and popular debate, and informed by rigorous scholarly research.

Notes

1   This chapter was first published in Pillay and Bass (2008) under Springer's Open Choice licence. The version republished here has been updated.

2   For an exception to this trend, see Metropolis (2002).

3   V Tilley, 'Scary economics of the mega event', available at http://www.businessday.co.za/PrintFriendly.aspx?ID=BD4A194528, accessed on 20 June 2007.

4   LL Gonzalez, 'Poor can rise on the back of 2010'.

5   *Reuters UK*, M Phillips, 'World Cup looks good for Africa, apart from on the pitch', available at http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleID=UKL2065790520070821, accessed on 21 August 2007; *City Press*, 'Province mobilises fans ahead of 2010 World Cup'.

6   'Mozambique invests in tourist sector in run-up to World Cup 2010', available at http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/93262.html, accessed on 16 August 2007.

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Interview

Doreen Atkinson, Visiting Professor: Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State, telephonic interview with O Bass, 17 August 2007.

6 *Anticipating 2011*

Richard Tomlinson

South Africa was awarded host country status for the FIFA 2010 Football World Cup in May 2004. The Bid Book submitted to FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), which by 2005 had become unavailable and, from the point of view of the host cities approached, embargoed, addresses the key requirements for hosting 2010: stadiums, transport, sponsorship rights, ensuring the profitability of the event for FIFA, and so on. There is no attention to the potential legacy of 2010 for the host cities.[1]

It is widely recognised that individuals and institutions planning for mega-events understate the costs and overstate the benefits, and often have a vested interest in doing so (Broudehoux 2007; Metropolis 2002; Szymanski 2002; Tribe 2005). Indeed, it is rumoured that, despite requests, the reason for the Bid Book not being made available is because the numbers are so 'out'. The understated costs are already evident in the cost escalation of the stadiums, from R818 *million* to R10 *billion* (Maennig & Du Plessis 2007), with further increases no doubt on their way. The overstated benefits are also evident: 'In his 2006 State of the Nation address, President Thabo Mbeki said the World Cup would make a huge contribution, not only to South Africa's socio-economic growth, but to the development of the continent as a whole.'[2] This despite a three-day economic modelling workshop at the National Treasury in 2005 that led to the three local and international consultants who were undertaking the modelling to conclude that 'the best we can hope for is that 2010 does not hurt the economy' and that the consequences for income distribution will be negative.[3] Indeed, over a 30-year period, Szymanski (2002) found that economic growth was significantly lower in host countries in World Cup years. In effect, the often repeated claim that the 2010 World Cup will help government to achieve its goals of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014 is ill-informed, mistaken and perhaps knowingly a misrepresentation.

One concern in 'the best we can hope for' scenario is displacement effects. For example, in the Bid Book it was estimated that the World Cup would give rise to many foreign tourists, but during the 2002 World Cup tourism decreased in South Korea (Horne & Manzenreiter 2004) and during the 2006 World Cup hotel occupancy rates in Berlin and Munich, where most matches were played, dropped by 11.1 per cent and 14.3 per cent respectively (Maennig & Du Plessis 2007). However, profits increased due to higher prices (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 3 August 2006).[4] In the context of South Africa's reputation for crime, can tourism projections be more than a guestimate and, even if fairly accurate, should one not expect displacement effects?[5] Similarly, in the build-up to the event, will investment in 2010 infrastructure

create jobs rather than increase the cost of scarce professional expertise and displace jobs that would have been created in other sectors?

Another concern in 'the best we can hope for' scenario arises from efficiency trade-offs. Will a stadium in Mbombela contribute more to the economy than infrastructure upgrades in Cape Town harbour? Should we anticipate that the allocation of capital and scarce capacity from more productive to less productive uses will enhance economic growth and employment creation?

This is not to forget equity considerations. For should one not expect that 2010 will concentrate national investment and scarce capacity in the host cities to the disadvantage of other cities and the rural areas; increase resource costs and lead to less or postponed investment in education, health and services infrastructure (as is already being claimed in the health and housing departments); and, indeed, even lead to South Africa draining engineering and other skilled personnel from other African countries (*Project 2010* No. 18, December 2006)?[6]

This concern for equity initially also included a concern for the displacement of people. For example, the 1988 Olympics in Seoul displaced approximately 700 000 people (Horne & Manzenreiter 2004) and, according to the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions, the 2008 Beijing Olympics was expected to displace up to 1.5 million people (O'Rourke 2007). However, here one should draw a distinction between, on the one hand, the Olympics and the creation of an Olympic Village and many varied sports facilities and, on the other, the World Cup, which is hosted in many cities, does not require the construction of special accommodation and generally uses existing stadiums. The World Cup, unlike the Olympics, is less given to the abuse of human rights. That being said, little displacement is anticipated for the 2012 London Olympics, where large-scale urban regeneration is viewed as the foremost objective (Newman 2007). Happily, in South Africa's case there will be little displacement associated with the 2010 World Cup (but see Chapter 11, this volume).

However, the economic modelling and equity considerations obviously do not reflect on potential intangible benefits and damages. The current focus on economic benefits seems to miss the point that, from the standpoint of countries, cities and sponsors, mega-events provide an opportunity to present a specific image of the country and its cities. I later argue that then President Thabo Mbeki's primary concern around hosting the World Cup was less with economic returns than with reducing Afro-pessimism by showing that Africa 'can do it', with all the attendant risks if problems arise. One example of positive image enhancement is the image created by the 2006 World Cup of Germany as a welcoming and hospitable country. A contrary example is the negative media speculation 'about Atlanta's performance as a host city [of the 1996 Olympics] and its status as a world class city' (Andranovich et al. 2001: 126). As much as desired intangible benefits may appear to justify expenditure, so too might unforeseen problems make the expenditure seem wasteful, even foolhardy.

Yet, if all these questions raise doubts, most occur at the national level. What are the trade-offs within the host cities? For example, will increased investment and improved policing and services – such as electricity, which is significant in the light of the outages that will continue beyond 2010 – in areas where the players, officials and tourists stay and play, routes to the stadiums, and urban upgrading in the vicinity of some of the stadiums divert resources and services from other areas of the city and lead to the relocation of those living in areas to be upgraded (Jones 2001)? In an interview, the mayor of Durban, Obed Mlaba, claimed that the city has the capacity to invest in and manage 2010 and that the World Cup will not compromise the city's ability to, say, deliver housing and services (Mlaba interview). Despite the ban on construction in any of the host cities during the World Cup, the claim is credible and is probably also true of Cape Town, but it is unlikely to be true of all nine host cities. The question is, after all these equivocations, can the host cities anticipate specific legacies for their cities that are not diminished by faulty national economic claims and by concerns over equity?

This chapter supposes that national concerns need not be reflected in the host cities and that the host cities, or at least some of them, may experience long-term benefits from hosting 2010 that justify the cost of doing so. The chapter sets out to identify the legacies that host cities anticipate and, if there is planning to achieve these legacies, what it involves.

The initial approach to the chapter was based on two rounds of interviews with host city 2010 managers and others, the first round mostly conducted in late 2005 and early 2006 and some additional interviews conducted in mid-2007.[7] The interview process did not prove to be a straightforward exercise as there was a considerable turnover of officials and, in most cities, the answer in 2005 and 2006 was that 'we have not got that far'. In addition, officials differed markedly in their willingness to meet, let alone to discuss issues. In the case of Johannesburg, I was asked to write a memo to the council seeking approval for interviews. In the case of Rustenburg, I was asked whether the interviewee had the permission of the Local Organising Committee (LOC) to talk to me.[8] In other cases, there was a reluctance to be interviewed. This may have been because the prospective interviewees felt too insecure about the accuracy of what they knew or because of unwillingness to provide information that might benefit other host cities. In hindsight, it seems that a reluctance to be interviewed may sometimes also have arisen from nefarious dealings (see for example Chapter 3, this volume). Indeed, except for three host cities, the interview process was characterised either by a lack of transparency or by knowledge on the part of the interviewer that the story being told was a story. Subsequently, these host cities have put their 2010 business plans on their city websites, but the depth of information contained varies quite a bit.

The overall lack of transparency that pervades South Africa's preparations for 2010 is not unusual. Horne and Manzenreiter write that 'considerable secrecy and lack of transparency continue to pervade the undemocratic organizations that

Table 6.1 The sports–business–media alliance

FIFA partners	FIFA World Cup sponsors	National World Cup supporters
Adidas	Budweiser	FNB
Emirates	Continental	Telkom
Sony	MTN	
Coca-Cola	Castrol	
Hyundai/Kia	McDonald's	
Visa	Satyam	

run mega-events' (2006: 13). As reflected in Table 6.1, a 'sports–business–media alliance' provides the material base for the World Cups and this does not lend itself to local democracy. Indeed, it seems that some host cities are fearful of incurring the wrath of FIFA and the LOC. This leads one to wonder about the timidity of some newspaper and academic reporting, where those who challenge the secrecy 'may become *persona non grata* to the mega-event organisers', losing access to both information and consulting opportunities.

Besides information from interviews, this chapter is also based on available documentation, including the host cities' integrated development plans (IDPs). Understandably, though, given the time frames involved, local governments tended to retrofit 2010 into their IDPs. An unanticipated result of this was that it often fast-tracked investments that had already been planned over a longer period in the IDP. In other words, a consequence of 2010 was often simply to prioritise specific projects within existing investment programmes, with transport investments being a common example provided in the interviews. The same retrofitting exercise is evident in those cities that have prepared strategic plans with longer time frames than the five-year planning period of IDPs.

Indeed, documents such as IDPs and longer-term strategic plans have proven less informative than the 2010 sector studies made available by some of the host cities. However, it was such material that exacerbated misgivings about writing a chapter that included all the host cities. Some cities have elaborate World Cup plans; others seem to be stumbling. A rush to judgement would be inappropriate, but the possibility certainly exists that the reputations of some cities will be enhanced more than others as a result of hosting the 2010 World Cup.

Caution needs to be exercised, though, in using this material, due to what might be termed 'legacy politics'. When cities use labels such as '2010 legacy projects' and apply them to, for example, the upgrading of a workers' hostel that has nothing to do with 2010, then what stands out is politicians' apparent need to be seen to be spreading the benefits of hosting 2010. It would be a mistake to treat with any seriousness some of the cities' 2010 legacy projects. Indeed, the contrary impression created by these projects is that some cities anticipate that 2010 will benefit already affluent areas and that gestures of this sort are politically necessary.

This phenomenon of 2010 legacy projects that have nothing to do with 2010 reflects, at least in part, a lack of guidance from national government and the LOC regarding potential legacies. At the time of writing (2007) there was still little guidance. Indeed, at times the government has suggested what can charitably be described as rather impractical ideas. For example, how can a director-general in central government possibly claim that the primary beneficiaries will be in rural Transkei and, taking into account a global audience, how can government entertain serious discussion around the spiritual legacy of 2010 arising from the role of sangomas (traditional healers) and the slaughtering of oxen?[9] Again, at the time of writing the LOC was talking about hosting a legacy conference from which guidance for host cities might emerge.

Benefits anticipated by host cities

So what benefits do the host cities anticipate? The question was approached with preconceptions created by the academic literature, namely that mega-events essentially provide cities with opportunities for place marketing, for 're-imaging', for creating a 'spectacle' with a view to the city becoming a tourism destination, for 'branding' the city, as well as opportunities for infrastructure development. Except for infrastructure development, these preconceptions were unfounded. Instead, three themes emerged: 'free' money, the 'big' idea (the location of the stadium and related development) and the expected marketing of the city.

Free money

When host cities were asked why they wanted to host 2010, the answer in every instance was legacy. Then, when asked what they meant by legacy, the first answer was 'free' money – the 2010 World Cup provides free money to invest in and expedite infrastructure projects already identified as necessary:

> Free money to do what we wanted to do, sooner.
> Get money to do it quicker.
> Catalyst to get things going and it provides momentum.
> We get the roads and transport infrastructure we need.
> We intend to create a public transport system.
> Free money for infrastructure. Infrastructure will be the legacy.
> 2010 gives impetus.
> Opportunity to get infrastructure the city cannot afford.

Well versed in the international literature of overstated benefits, the interviewer was sceptical of these claims and had a 'well, what did you expect?' response when the additional comment was made, 'Of course, it was only later that we realised that we would have to contribute R180 million for bulk infrastructure to the stadium.'

However, as it turns out, from the point of view of the cities there is, indeed, free money. For example, Mangaung envisages a contribution of R1.4 billion from central government, R21 million from the province, and itself expects to contribute

only R127 million (Mangaung Local Municipality 2006: 5–8). Mangaung is lucky in that it already had an excellent stadium and the costs will largely be for transport infrastructure improvements and information and communications technology. Even more advantageously, Cape Town expects to contribute only R73 million to the R3 billion transport infrastructure investments funded by grants from central government, the Airports Company of South Africa and South African Railways, as well as expenditure by the provincial government (City of Cape Town 2006: Table 1).

The situation is decidedly less clear when the free money is for a stadium. Certainly 2010 is giving rise to an outbreak of multifunctional sports and retail facilities, as well as concert and conference venues. However, all the 2010 officials interviewed were aware of the Japanese/Korean experience of stadiums that were imploded after the 2002 World Cup due to the limited demand for the facilities and the high cost of maintaining them. Although Cape Town, for example, will contribute only R400 million to its new R3.5 billion stadium, the city will carry the subsequent operating and maintenance expenditure. Interestingly, and disturbingly for those who are preparing 2010 stadium business plans, multi-purpose stadiums have been disparaged as out of date and as 'cookie-cutter, flying-saucer, multi-use stadiums of the 60s & 70s' (Narcowich 1998: 1).

This emphasis on free money is not what the academic literature would lead one to expect. The discrepancy probably arises from the fact that it is only recently that mega-events are being held in developing countries. In Germany, for example, individual football clubs that owned stadiums were responsible for paying 60 per cent of the cost of upgrading the stadiums for the 2006 World Cup and there was already a comprehensive public transport system in place (Maennig & Du Plessis 2007). The same is not true in South Africa, with government assuming a considerable financial burden. Similarly, Beijing spent over US$40 billion on staging the 2008 Olympics and this money largely came from central government (Broudehoux 2007). Free money to expedite the achievement of infrastructure investment programmes is a real boon, although in the case of the stadiums also a potential cost.

The 'big' idea

Before describing some of the host cities' 'big' ideas, a brief summary of the political backdrop is necessary. The African National Congress initially controlled the local governments of all the host cities and aimed to use the World Cup in part to restructure the apartheid cities and to enable development in disadvantaged parts of the cities. The first strategic impulse of the city governments seems genuinely to have been to promote development, with the point being made partly as a contrast to the Beijing Olympics, where an authoritarian government unashamedly broke from serving the interests of the poor (Becker 2000; Broudehoux 2007) and created recreational and other facilities that, after the Olympics, only the rich would be able to afford. In other words, if mega-events in developing countries depend on considerable subsidy from central government, it is unclear who will benefit from this free money. Unlike in China, in South Africa there was attention to the poor.

One 'big' idea was Cape Town's desire to construct a stadium in Athlone, a low-income part of the city, since 'it was thought that the most developmental impact would be at Athlone [and that] it is symbolic of building up where communities have been disadvantaged'. In addition to the construction of a stadium, the development impact would have been felt in transportation improvements and in economic development in the area of the stadium, which would be associated with urban upgrading.

FIFA summarily dismissed the Athlone option. One might have thought this was because there is already an adequate stadium in Cape Town, namely Newlands Stadium, which was included in the Bid Book. 'In the opinion of the Inspection Group, if the 2010 FIFA World Cup were to start on the date of submission of this report, three stadiums in South Africa would easily be suitable for the 2010 FIFA World Cup' (FIFA 2004: 68). However, with the construction of the R3.5 billion Green Point Stadium in a moneyed area of the city, cost and urban development impacts were clearly not a concern for FIFA. Cape Town was offered a quarter-final at Newlands or a semi-final at Green Point. One truly hopes that this was not a serious consideration when deciding to build Green Point Stadium. FIFA reportedly wanted a stadium located between the ocean and the mountain and adjacent to the upmarket Victoria and Alfred Waterfront development (see Chapter 7 in this volume for an explanation of the rationalisation of the Green Point site). This is not to denigrate Newlands Stadium. With its mountain backdrop, Newlands is considered one of the world's most beautiful rugby and cricket venues.

Another 'big' idea was Pretoria's desire to construct a stadium at Rainbow Junction, north of the city. Pretoria's City Development Strategy divides the city into different regions. The area to the north of the city, especially beyond the northern Magaliesberg (mountain range) where black people were forced to live under apartheid, is defined as a 'zone of choice'. There are few jobs there and transport infrastructure systems south to Pretoria are underdeveloped. The idea was to use a stadium at Rainbow Junction to build an intermodal transport facility to open up the area north of the city for development. Further, despite the fact that Rainbow Junction would be a completely new stadium, interviewees stated that, 'It is our responsibility to build a legacy stadium…'. I was informed that FIFA emphatically rejected a stadium at Rainbow Junction as a match venue, but not as a possible training venue. Of course, in the case of Pretoria, the alternative stadium was Loftus Versfeld, already a world-class stadium in an attractive part of the city.

The last 'big' idea was Durban's desire to use funds made available for a stadium to construct one that would meet Olympic standards and enable an Olympic bid. This stadium is being built.

Marketing

It was in later questions – 'free money, OK, but anything else?' – that the expected strategic answers were sometimes forthcoming:

- 2010 locates a platteland town [Mbombela] on the national stage.
- 2010 positions Johannesburg as a global player.
- 2010 provides an opportunity to market the city [Cape Town] to the world.

Contrary to expectations, the strategic features of 2010 did not most interest the cities. This is not to belittle the foremost legacy articulated by all the cities, namely improvements in transportation infrastructure and systems. As an African host city 2010 manager said, 'Africa is a pretext. We will get the transport system we want.' The transport legacy will be substantial for the cities, although 2010 appears most often not to have led to new transportation projects so much as expediting pre-existing projects, with central government providing considerable grants to this end. The earlier Cape Town example illustrates how comparatively small the city's transport infrastructure investments will be. Then, too, there is the additional advantage that the cities are not responsible for operating and maintaining many of the transport operations, such as airports and railways.

Free money for infrastructure investments and strategic considerations parallels the 2010 National Communication Partnership's[10] distinction between 'obligatory terrain' and 'optional terrain'. The obligatory terrain comprises the investments in infrastructure, safety and security and so on which the host cities are required to undertake. The optional terrain has to do with the 'soft stuff', at its worst evident in a deputy minister claiming that, 'An African World Cup captures Africanness [and will be] authentic African'.[11] During a discussion at the Goethe-Institut in 2006, Gerd Kolbe, a senior official in the implementation of the 2006 World Cup in Germany, observed that, prior to the event, cartoons in some European newspapers portrayed Germany with World War Two imagery (Kolbe discussion). After the World Cup, Germany and Germans were portrayed in a far more sympathetic light. Thus:

> Although Germany failed to win the Cup, the tournament was considered a great success for Germany in general. The stadiums and transportation systems were state-of-the-art, and the German people were lauded for their hospitality and enthusiasm and gained new friends worldwide. Germany also experienced a sudden increase in patriotic spirit, with flag waving, traditionally frowned upon by German society since World War II, whenever the German team played.[12]

In a sense South Africa faces a similarly weighty burden – Afro-pessimism, the international perception of a continent characterised by starvation, disease, war, dictators and lions. The country and the cities have a historic opportunity to counter these images of dismay. This emphasises the role of the cities, for they are the hosts. In a developing country carrying the burden of Afro-pessimism, however, failures in a few cities will reflect on the country and, since the World Cup is touted by FIFA as an African World Cup, on the continent as well. In turn, if Afro-pessimism is reduced and a positive impression created, this will be the essential legacy contributed by the cities. The extent of grant funding to the cities should be understood in these terms.

This suggests a difference between legacy contributions *of cities* and legacy contributions *in cities*. It is the author's view that the former, the national and international intangibles, is what matters most. Despite the cost of hosting 2010, if the legacy of 2010 can be respect for South Africa and to some degree also Africa, and if there can also be a celebration of African culture, then the extravagance will have been worth the cost. The potential benefits of 2010 are less tangible than the calculations of economists and prospectively far more important.

Indeed, Durban's city manager and 2010 manager make exactly this point when they claim that 2010 provides Durban with the opportunity of 'Showcasing our identity as Africans; Showcasing African excellence' (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007: Slide 40). However, they then seek to dissociate Durban from responsibility for the African legacy. They observe that the 'LOC has the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Legacy Program' and that '…a steering committee, co-chaired by the South African government and the A[frican] U[nion] Commission, will be established to oversee the roll out of the Legacy Program…' (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007: Slide 41).

And, indeed, it seems that there is such a programme. FIFA has allocated US$70 million to, inter alia, Nigeria and Kenya:

> Nigeria is to benefit from FIFA's decision to spend $70m on projects to improve African soccer while the *continent* prepares to host the 2010 WC [World Cup] finals. *This Day* [Nigerian newspaper] reports that the installation of artificial pitches, introduction of professional leagues and administration and training of coaches and doctors form part of the 'Win with Africa in Africa' initiative launched last year. 'There is a strong feeling that this World Cup should leave a legacy throughout the African continent, not only for 2010 hosts SA,' said FIFA's director for international relations, Jerome Champagne. (*Project 2010* 4 December 2007; emphasis added)

We return to legacy contributions in cities; what the cities anticipate. As mentioned, transport is identified in all the cities as the primary legacy. This emphasis on transportation reaches to the top. Jeremy Cronin, head of the transportation portfolio in Parliament, has said the country 'needs to make transport its legacy just as 2002 co-hosts Korea and Japan had made broadband their legacy' (*Project 2010* No. 61, November 2007).

Tourism comes next, albeit with different levels of emphasis. Mangaung observes that it is not a tourist destination but does attract sports tourism. Durban has sports tourism as a central feature of its economic development strategy. Cape Town depends on tourism. After tourism comes a mix of references to urban upgrading and information and communication technology. Urban upgrading refers to making inner-city areas more attractive (e.g. pedestrianising), user-friendly (e.g. transport improvements) and safer (e.g. CCTV cameras), or to using the upgrading of hoped-for practice

venues such as Athlone and fan parks as a means of upgrading infrastructure and improving commercial opportunities in the areas.[13] Information and communication technology is, like transport, an investment that will primarily involve other agencies, such as Sentech's investment in infrastructure, and the rollout of fibre-optic cables and broadband to all host cities.[14] This reinforces the point that it is the host cities rather than other cities in the country that will benefit from these investments, the costs of which will only partly be borne by the host cities themselves.

Cities' World Cup expectations

The chapter now turns to each of the host cities and briefly reviews how they articulate the benefits of hosting the World Cup. Over time, the cities are refining their perception of the benefits and this text reflects circumstances when the chapter was written.

Cape Town

> Hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup gives the City of Cape Town a unique opportunity to improve its infrastructure and market itself to the world. By harnessing the funds made available nationally for 2010-related facilities, including a new stadium, transport and other upgrades, the City expects post-2010 Cape Town to be a more desirable destination for leisure and business travellers, investors, and of course, its residents. This will be the lasting legacy of hosting the event.[15]

Transportation, tourism and, with misgivings, a stadium are what Cape Town anticipates. The World Cup gives effect to the city's existing tourism strategy and, especially beneficial for Cape Town, the event occurs in winter, the city's off season for tourism.

Durban

Durban's economic strategy has long included sports tourism. In this light, 2010 can be viewed as an especially prominent continuation of ongoing sporting events. Indeed, despite the title of its 2006 IDP, '2010 and Beyond: eThekwini's IDP', 2010 is listed as 'Programme 7', which contains only four paragraphs. These mention the construction of a stadium and investment in infrastructure to create higher-value land uses, together with passing reference to transport and tourism.[16] This is not to say that 2010 is not a 'big deal' for Durban. Instead, the impression created is that it is at the same time 'part of the deal' – an aspect of how Durban has long viewed itself.

Of course, Durban does have specific 2010 plans such as a fan zone, but again it seems the impetus is towards expediting, in this case, 'the long-awaited "People Mover" inner-city public transport system'.[17] In fact, based on interviews, 2010 represents a vehicle for investing in infrastructure and the stadium necessary for an Olympic bid. Durban's hoped-for 2010 legacy is especially ambitious.

Johannesburg

Johannesburg seems to be at a bit of a loss when it comes to talking about the 2010 legacy. On its website[18] most attention is given to transport. This includes the ongoing development of an already planned bus rapid transport system; continuing investment in the province's Gautrain, which will run from Johannesburg to Pretoria and also connect to the Oliver Tambo Airport, but which will bypass all the stadiums and not be ready in time for 2010; and various upgrading projects. The existing Joburg Broadband Network Project is the next legacy project mentioned on its website.

The website notes that, 'Some R1-billion has been set aside for legacy projects, identified by the City, that will ensure Joburg continues to benefit from the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup long after the final whistle has been blown'. The projects are 'street furniture in the inner city; greening of underdeveloped soccer fields; an indoor sports centre; upgrading of Diepkloof Hostel; greening of Klipspruit River; Bus Rapid Transport system; and Soweto Theatre'.[19] Mayor Amos Masondo says, 'The 2010 FIFA World Cup gives Johannesburg the impetus to create an infrastructure whose legacy will outlive the actual event.'[20]

Neighbourhood upgrading facilitated by the Johannesburg Development Agency is also mentioned in a city publication (City of Johannesburg 2006). This will probably lead to limited displacement (see Chapter 11, this volume).

Mangaung

Mangaung's 2010 business plan mentions legacy objectives, but does not suggest what they might be beyond reference to transport and CBD improvements. However, during an interview with a number of officials in Mangaung, five themes were repeated:
• Sports development: Mangaung has a Professional Soccer League and an internationally prominent rugby team.
• An enhanced sports precinct.
• Mangaung is not a destination for tourists, but it does attract visitors for sports and other events. Upgrading sports facilities is part of the city's local economic development strategy.
• The 2010 World Cup provides an opportunity to obtain funding for, and to fast-track, investments in infrastructure.
• The World Cup provides the impetus to engage in programmes to upgrade tourism services standards.

While there was mention of 'putting us on the map', there was only passing mention of marketing Mangaung to potential investors. Perhaps realistically, 2010 is in the first instance seen as an opportunity to enhance the city's infrastructure and potential for sports tourism.

Mbombela

Mbombela has a 2010 website. It contains a page on the stadium, but legacy is not mentioned. However, during an interview conducted in the city, the following were cited as anticipated World Cup benefits: changing the perception of the city from a platteland (rural) town and putting the city on the national map. There was not much idea regarding what to do with the stadium, as the city does not have any prominent sports teams. It was mentioned, though, that Mbombela hoped to lure a rugby team away from another town. In this instance, it is of concern that the costs of operating and maintaining the stadium may exceed the income it generates.

Since the interview, it was reported that:

> The Mbombela municipality, which includes Nelspruit, has agreed to be placed under administration by the Mpumalanga provincial government.

> This follows the municipality's failure to develop infrastructure and improve service delivery at an acceptable pace.

> Local government MEC Candith Mashego-Dlamini was expected to take away executive powers from the municipal council and appoint an administrator by today.

> Mbombela executive mayor Justice Sibande said the council met on Monday and accepted the MEC's proposal to put the municipality under administration.

> *Mashego-Dlamini's move is an attempt to save 2010 infrastructure projects. The province is expected to host some 2010 World Cup matches at the Mbombela stadium, now under construction.* (*Business Day* 18 January 2008, emphasis added)[21]

Concern regarding Mbombela successfully hosting and then benefiting from the 2010 World Cup seems well founded. This is especially the case given some of the alleged corruption occurring in Mbombela (see Chapter 3, this volume).

Nelson Mandela Bay

The Nelson Mandela Bay 2010 website does not include material on legacy, but the consulting engineer responsible for managing the 2010 investment was unequivocal about the legacy being the infrastructure investment and city upgrades, and nothing else. Nelson Mandela Bay is one of South Africa's six metropolitan areas, but the city's economy and population are not growing. Here again, it is of concern that the costs of operating and maintaining the stadium may exceed the income it generates. One waits to see the city's 2010 business plan.

Polokwane

In mid-2007 Polokwane had an acting 2010 manager and the position was being advertised. The acting manager appeared fully in command of the infrastructure and other capital expenditure and viewed the city's legacy primarily in these terms. Polokwane, like Mangaung, is not a tourist destination, but it is located in a province that has rich tourism resources.

The city's anticipated 2011 benefits of hosting the 2010 World Cup differ from those of the other cities in that, following references to transport, information and communication technology and sports development, the anticipated benefits include the 'little' things that arguably matter just as much for future development. These include an improved standard of tourism services, a more attractive environment, better traffic management, medical emergency and disaster management systems, upgrading municipal services, management of the taxi industry (this is not so little), and so on.[22] Intending no disrespect, it may be that this relative emphasis on municipal services is a response to the current status of such services in Polokwane.

Rustenburg

Rustenburg is a little like Mangaung in that it is not a tourist destination and it already has a good stadium to which only alterations are needed. Of course, Rustenburg is close to Sun City, one of the country's largest tourist destinations, but the design and operation of the casino and related activities do not encourage visitors to spend time in Rustenburg. Rustenburg is also unique among the host cities in having a strong and growing minerals-based economy and being the destination of an exceptionally high level of migration and burgeoning slums on the city's expanding periphery. It is no wonder that an interviewee in Rustenburg focused so strongly on transport legacy.

Pretoria

Interviews in Pretoria merely reinforce what one finds in the City Development Strategy, namely that, 'The hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup matches in Tshwane will accelerate the improvement of the public transport links in all modes: rail, road and air'. This is so much the case that, aside from the history of the Rainbow Junction idea, it does not appear that there is much else to write about. As the Pretoria website notes, 'FIFA events are being used as conduits to fast-track the City of Tshwane's infrastructural developments for 2010 and beyond.'[23]

This story of what cities anticipate threatens to become boring. As noted, the critical legacy of the cities, as hosts to the World Cup, will be to contribute to the effective management of the event, security and visitors having fun. If this is the case, then the cities will have contributed to a changing international perception of capacity in Africa and, arguably, this will do more for investment in the cities than the branding efforts they undertake. The issue is to 'get the basics right'. City legacies have become

a mantra and instead of anticipating what 2010 will bring for the cities specifically, the cities should anticipate what they can contribute to the global impression of South Africa in 2011.

It is perfectly understandable that the host cities should identify the essential legacy as the infrastructure projects occurring within the framework of the obligatory terrain. The cities should stop struggling with the optional terrain. While they should certainly engage in marketing their city, they should resist so-called '2010 legacy projects' that have little to do with 2010.

The conclusion is that 2010 may have profound intangible benefits, in particular decreasing Afro-pessimism (Cornelissen & Swart 2006) and celebrating African culture, as well as perhaps enhancing the visibility of some cities. However, in economic terms, it may well be that 2010 will be to the disadvantage of most South Africans and exacerbate and contribute to inequality, both regionally and within cities. It is for these reasons that legacy politics will become ever more pronounced and that what cities plan for 2011, their 2010 legacy programmes, will become increasingly meaningless.

If a defining image of the 2006 World Cup is a million people partying at the fan park at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, might one hope that Johannesburg could convey the iconic image of the 2010 World Cup as a celebration of football and African culture at a fan park in Newtown, an inner city so feared by foreign tourists and their travel agents?

Notes

1   I would like to acknowledge and thank Scarlett Cornelissen and Orli Bass for their comments.

2   '2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa', available at http://www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm.

3   National Treasury modelling workshop, Kievitskroon, Pretoria, 28–30 November 2005. The comment was made during an informal discussion at which the author was present.

4   NN, 'Hotels mit positiver Zwischenbilanz'.

5   In interviews with government officials planning for 2010, the 'visitor' projections were reported as up to a stunning 3 and once even 5 million.

6   See 'Skilled labour heads south for 2010'. Project 2010 (available at http://www.project2010.co.za/) is a specialised service providing comprehensive media coverage of South Africa's preparations to host the 2010 World Cup.

7   Most interviewees are listed at the end of the chapter. Some interviewees preferred to remain anonymous. Where interviewee comments are quoted, the interviewee is not identified, as this was most often a precondition for 'free discussion'.

8   Tumi Makgabo at the LOC confirmed that there was no need for city officials to obtain permission from the LOC to speak to the author.

9   Department of Sports and Recreation, 2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy Workshop, 27 June 2006.

10   'The 2010 National Communication Partnership was formed by Government
      Communications and the International Marketing Council. Its purpose is to provide
      strategic vision and promote coordinated local and international communication, so that
      the many communication agencies and role-players speak with one powerful voice to
      maximise the benefit of hosting the FIFA World Cup™ for the country and continent' (2010
      National Communication Partnership Newsletter, May 2007, Volume 1, Number 1).

11   Department of Sports and Recreation, 2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy Workshop, 27 June 2006.

12   See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_FIFA_World_Cup.

13   The reason for writing 'hoped-for' is that it is the decision of national coaches which
      practice venues to select and, in the midst of considerable competition, team managers will
      be able to choose between Athlone (located in a low-income township) and Stellenbosch
      (university town, vineyards and mountains).

14   Dr Mokone Matabane, Sentech, commenting at the Department of Sports and Recreation,
      2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy Workshop, 27 June 2006.

15   See http://www.capetown.gov.za/wcmstemplates/fifaworldcup.aspx?clusid= 472&IDPathStri
      ng=6497&catparent=6497.

16   See http://www.ethekwini.gov.za/durban/government/munadmin/policy/idp/ IDP_0708.PDF.

17   See http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/invest-durban/building-the-future/people-mover.

18   See http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=
      view&id=654&Itemid=167.

19   See http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/662/2/.

20   See http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=
      view&id=654&Itemid=167.

21   'Mpumalanga steps in at failing Nelspruit Municipality', available at http://allafrica.com/
      stories/200801180512.html.

22   See http://www.til.co.za/2010/Status%20of%20Polokwane's%20preparations%20&%20
      Operational%20Plan%20-%20Mayor%20Makunyane.pdf.

23   See http://www.tshwane.gov.za/fifa_office.cfm.

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7 Venue selection and the 2010 World Cup: A case study of Cape Town

Kamilla Swart and Urmilla Bob

Since South Africa's readmission to international sport more than a decade ago, it has increasingly used sport tourism events, and mega-events in particular – such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 2003 Cricket World Cup, the 2004 Cape Town Olympic bid and the 2010 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup – to signal international recognition and to serve as a socio-economic catalyst. However, the economy of sport mega-events 'has developed to such an extent internationally, that events have gained a self-perpetuating dynamic of their own, characterised by distinct coagulations of interests and the predominance of certain corporate and political actors' (Cornelissen & Swart 2006: 108).

Mega sport events have increasingly become highly sought-after commodities for both developed and some developing countries as they move towards event-driven economies. The infrastructural benefits associated with the FIFA World Cup are deemed to be some of the tangible, long-term outcomes and legacies of hosting this mega-event. Football stadium upgrades are central to South Africa's 2010 sport infrastructural improvement and expansion programme. The City of Cape Town (2007a: 1) specifically states: 'The 2010 World Cup Soccer Tournament is the single biggest catalyst that will help trigger major infrastructure investments in Cape Town.' The building of stadiums is also a component linked to achieving the social development imperatives of hosting the World Cup. This has led to a great deal of debate and contestation over the location and role of the proposed and existing stadiums during the World Cup, especially in the Western Cape. Green Point and Athlone in particular received considerable attention and aptly illustrate the issues raised above (see Figure 7.1).

This chapter critically reviews and examines the debates and discussions pertaining to venue selection and use, especially in relation to Green Point and Athlone, in the context of city legacies, including who the key stakeholders are and what the emerging interests and concerns are. Alignment to the city's integrated development plan (IDP) is also discussed. Additionally, the chapter presents findings from primary research that was undertaken in Athlone and Green Point to examine the perceptions of the residents towards the proposed stadiums. The highly contested stadium debate in Cape Town is indicative of the balancing act required to meet the needs of government, the international sporting federation (in this case FIFA) and local residents.

Stadiums and legacies

Sport tourism in cities has received increasing attention in recent years due to recognition given to the role of mega-events in shaping the national and local tourism product and the way sport has been utilised as part of tourism's role in urban regeneration (Weed & Bull 2004). Thus there is intense competition amongst nations to host these prestigious events. Governments are willing to help finance these bids and fund the building of stadiums and related infrastructure (Weed & Bull 2004). It is important to note, as indicated by Page and Hall (2003), that the concept of regeneration includes both physical and social dimensions. This implies issues pertaining to infrastructural development as well as to improvement in the quality of life of people living in a designated area. It is often assumed that the latter accompanies the former and is therefore often neglected in urban regeneration projects. The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE 2007) argues that although the staging of mega-events can have a range of positive impacts, it can also

Figure 7.1 Map of Cape Town

have the opposite impact, especially in relation to infrastructural projects which can result in human rights violations in the form of forced evictions. In relation to the World Cup, COHRE (2007: 29) states that despite FIFA's attempts to 'embrace socially responsible ideals and its commitment "to protecting and promoting human, social and economic development", FIFA World Cup events have had a significant negative impact upon housing rights'. COHRE in particular illustrates how 'clean-up' programmes associated with World Cup events have led to the displacement of homeless people, especially near stadium venues. Thus, the hosting of mega-events can have serious implications for the residents, especially the poorer segments in society.

Several researchers have indicated that well-planned, implemented and executed sport tourism events can have lasting economic, social and other positive impacts on the host nations (Hall 2004; Hiller 1998; Page & Hall 2003). However, they caution that due cognisance must be taken of the potential economic and social counter-costs of hosting these events. Whitson and Horne (2006: 73) specifically raise concerns regarding 'public debt and opportunity costs when public money is spent on architecturally dazzling stadia and other spectacular infrastructure'. Furthermore, COHRE (2007: 24) asserts:

> Our studies show that, whatever the nature of the mega-event, they are not used by their promoters as opportunities to unite the community over a sporting or cultural occasion, but are primarily instruments of economic development, modernisation, and an opportunity to re-engineer the image of a city. Yet the benefits of this process are rarely reaped by all, and the negative impacts that are inflicted upon many, before, during and after the event, are not merely undesirable – in many instances, they constitute violations of human rights law, in particular to adequate housing.

The distribution, actualities and types of legacies and benefits have received much attention from scholars who have questioned whether expected benefits are realised. In developing countries such as South Africa, the extent to which benefits positively impact on the lives of the general populace and on the transformation imperatives becomes particularly relevant. The 2010 business plan (City of Cape Town 2006) states that the FIFA World Cup provides an opportunity to mount productions that showcase different facets of South African cultural identity, including cultural diversity, thus fostering national identity and pride. Furthermore, the event is viewed as being a potential catalyst to change perceptions, enhance South Africa's national profile, and improve citizens' sense of pride and unity across the racial and class divides. It is important to note that the IDP, the usual vehicle for planning, is a considerably less substantive source of information pertaining to 2010 infrastructural development than the 2010 business plan. Therefore, a significant proportion of the information used in this study is derived from the 2010 business plan.

The City of Cape Town (2007b: i) views its participation in hosting the 2010 World Cup as both a challenge and an opportunity:

> The City's participation in the hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup events is concentrating unprecedented public sector investment and stimulating new momentum amongst private sector role players. But, on the other hand, the City faces real infrastructure provision and capital funding challenges and institutional capacity problems.

In terms of the Green Point Stadium and Precinct development, the objectives are (City of Cape Town 2006: 29):

- to enable Cape Town to prominently host and play a major role in the 2010 World Cup;
- improved sports quality, development, professionalism, patronage and integration;
- to contribute significantly to the city's profile;
- to generate additional economic impact;
- to improve the quality of life of the city's citizens.

The above objectives illustrate that the city viewed the construction of the competition venue as having several positive impacts on a range of stakeholders.

The investments in infrastructure development specifically are often justified in relation to long-term tangible benefits to the general populace. The construction of infrastructure in particular is expected to generate local economic development and contribute to the re-imaging of a location. The FIFA (2004: 8) Inspection Group for the 2010 World Cup reported that 'the legacy compared to the investment needed will be a great contribution to the country'. In fact, it has been government's consistent position that investments in 2010 are part of the state's development plans and the hosting of the World Cup provides the ideal impetus to kick-start massive infrastructural development (Cornelissen & Swart 2006).

A key expectation in South Africa associated with the hosting of the World Cup is that jobs will be created for locals, in particular during the stadium construction phase. With the exception of the transport infrastructure development projects, the upgrading of existing and the construction of new stadiums are undoubtedly the largest investment programmes associated with the 2010 World Cup. It is here that the general population, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds who are identified as key beneficiaries, is expected to derive opportunities for employment. The creation of jobs and the wider positive economic impacts are generally used to justify to the broader public the massive state commitments and investments associated with hosting mega sport events. The extent to which this will be the case in South Africa remains to be seen. Matheson (2002) indicates that independent research on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sport facility construction and economic development. The need for rigorous and continuous

research is critically important in South Africa, where resource expenditure in relation to 2010 has already emerged as a politically contentious issue.

In Cape Town, City Manager Achmat Ebrahim (City of Cape Town 2007a) indicates that Green Point Stadium and supporting infrastructure projects for 2010 are the biggest capital projects the city has ever undertaken. He specifically highlights that the Green Point Stadium is projected to cost R2.85 billion, with the City of Cape Town's contribution restricted at R400 million and a further R100 million for contingency funds. These funds will be utilised from existing reserves and therefore, according to Ebrahim, the Green Point Stadium is debt-free and stadium contributions will not affect other services provided by the city. The majority of the contribution (R1.93 billion) for the stadium is dedicated funding from national government. Ebrahim also argues that it is pointless to debate whether the funds should be used for housing or other infrastructural development purposes, since the city has a binding legal agreement with FIFA and the national government's contribution cannot be used for any other purposes.

According to the City of Cape Town (2007a), transport infrastructural development is closely linked to 2010 investments in the city and is one of the key objectives of the city's IDP. This demand for increased and improved transport infrastructure is linked to the rapid increase in the population of the city, with an estimated population growth of 80 000 persons per year and a deterioration in existing public transport (City of Cape Town 2007a). Ebrahim further elaborates on the link between 2010 infrastructural development and transport expansion in the city: 'It is not just about the construction of the stadium. Nor is it just about soccer. It is an unprecedented opportunity for the City to overhaul its public transport system, upgrade major road networks and other facilities' (City of Cape Town 2007a: 1).

The 2010 business plan indicates: 'A high level strategy is presented for developing a fully integrated Transport Plan to implement a fully integrated transport solution for the City of Cape Town and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape to deliver a successful FIFA World Cup in 2010' (City of Cape Town 2006: 34). The Transport Plan, which includes FIFA's requirements for elements such as the location of fan parks and viewing sites as well as security considerations, was not specified in the business plan. However, the business plan did propose that the aim was to achieve a zero probability of failure and provide a public transport system that is FIFA compliant and addresses the issues of legacy and linkage with the event.

The City of Cape Town (2006: 8) asserts that the focus on new and upgraded infrastructure and services in preparation for the 2010 World Cup creates an opportunity to 'make Cape Town a happier, better functioning home, with more economic opportunities for its residents and a desirable destination for travellers and investors'. Thus, the investments in infrastructure are viewed as having a positive impact on residents as well as promoting tourism in the city.

The 2010 World Cup is also envisaged to contribute significantly to improving the social conditions of South Africans. For example, the construction of training venues in appropriate locations to promote sport and development in disadvantaged communities is viewed as a key outcome (Athlone Stadium is a case in point and will be discussed later). This is supported by the Bid Book submitted to FIFA:

> The training ground upgrade programme forms a crucial part of the overall strategy to leave a lasting legacy. SAFA (South African Football Association) is firmly resolved to provide facilities that meet every FIFA requirement and, when the tournament is over, continue to have a positive relevant impact on local communities for decades to come.[1]

It is worth recounting experiences from Japan's hosting of the Nagano Winter Olympics and the co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Whitson and Horne (2006) argue that the Olympic Games were partly justified on the grounds that a modern sport infrastructure would have positive impacts on the quality of life of local populations. However, as Whitson and Macintosh (1996) note, often these facilities are required for elite sports and are too large and too sophisticated for general community use. Whitson and Horne (2006) illustrate that the legacies of these facilities are of debatable value to low-income residents. They show that the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup as an opportunity to create infrastructure for sport development purposes was unsuccessful, as the infrastructure was rarely used by local communities.

Venue selection

Bayette Development Consulting's (2006) study evaluating competition venues in Cape Town that had the potential capacity to host 2010 World Cup matches was limited to a two-kilometre radius around the stadiums. The background information presented in that study for Athlone and Green Point is summarised below. The primary data source used by Bayette Development Consulting was the 2001 Census conducted by Statistics South Africa. Athlone is located approximately 10 kilometres from the city centre, towards the east of central Cape Town. The designated area for the study comprises four wards with a population of 128 484. It is a historically coloured residential area and the unemployment rate is 18 per cent with a 22 per cent poverty rate.[2] The average monthly income is R4 718. Green Point is a historically white residential area located in close proximity to the city centre. The designated area under study has two wards with a population of 63 473, almost half the population size of Athlone. The unemployment rate is 6 per cent and the poverty rate is 12 per cent. The average monthly income in Green Point is R16 478. The data indicate that Green Point is a relatively better-off residential community in comparison to Athlone.

The Bid Book presented Newlands Stadium as the competition venue for Cape Town and Athlone as a practice stadium. Although Newlands is regarded as the home of

rugby in the region, it has hosted national and international football matches. The multi-purpose Athlone Stadium is generally regarded as the home of football in the Western Cape and has also hosted national and international football matches. In terms of the Bid Book, Newlands would host up to the quarter-finals – Cape Town was not identified as a semi-final venue.

In written communication[3] between Danny Jordaan (CEO of the 2010 Local Organising Committee [LOC]) and Rob Wagner (Managing Director of Western Province Rugby) in relation to the Newlands Rugby Stadium on 3 February 2006, Jordaan noted that the stadiums identified in the Bid Book were not definitive as the FIFA requirements had not been completely defined at the stage of submission of the Bid Book. He added that FIFA inspection visits to South Africa enabled FIFA to assess the city and the stadiums from the perspective of FIFA's requirements. In presentations to FIFA, the city made its intentions clear that Cape Town's 2010 plans had to address development and strategic imperatives aligned to Cape Town's IDP (*Contact* 17 June/July 2005). In this regard, the upgrading of Athlone Stadium would fast-track infrastructural development projects in an area which has historically higher levels of unemployment and poverty than Newlands. Thus, after political intervention, Athlone was proposed as the city's preferred venue (*Mail & Guardian* 12 January 2007).

Press articles in 2005 indicated that while city officials still favoured Athlone as a competition venue, local football authorities countered this proposal with a plan to upgrade a stadium in Blue Downs on the Cape Flats (*Weekend Argus* 22 October 2005). The SAFA-Western Province (n.d) argued that this development should be supported as it is close to the football base in the Metro Cape Town area and fits within the SAFA 2010 legacy plan, which denotes that the game of football and its structures must be the primary beneficiaries of the 2010 World Cup. However, this stadium development proposal was not supported by the city.

In October 2005, a financial and socio-economic analysis of three potential venues (Athlone, Green Point and Newlands) was commissioned in order for the city and the Western Cape government to make informed choices and to present the 2010 World Cup LOC with a coherent argument for Cape Town match venues (Standish 2005). Green Point Stadium was an existing multi-purpose stadium situated close to Cape Town's (and South Africa's) most popular tourist attraction, the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront. The options explored included two 45 000-seater stadiums, one in Athlone and one in Green Point; a 48 000-seater stadium in Newlands; and a 60 000-seater stadium in Green Point. The 60 000-seater option was not explored in Athlone and Newlands as physical constraints prevented these options from being considered (Standish 2005). The 60 000-seater stadium in Green Point was considered as it would possibly attract more – and more important (such as a semi-final match) – games in 2010, as well as other high-profile sporting and other events in the future. These findings were presented by the city and province 'to representatives of the LOC, the President's Office, provincial government and the

city, upon which a decision was reached that the case for Athlone as a quarter-final venue will be presented to FIFA on 18 October 2005' (Bam interview).

However, in a joint media statement by the Western Cape government and the City of Cape Town on 7 February 2006, Green Point Stadium was announced as the competition venue for Cape Town, to be developed alongside the Green Point Common. The Green Point Stadium and Common will be established as an upgraded inner-city sport and cultural precinct on a par with Hyde Park in London and Central Park in New York. It was argued that the stadium and Green Point Common development would assist with efforts to lobby for FIFA to host its congress in Cape Town, as well as to host the 2010 opening and semi-final matches. The joint media statement further noted that Athlone Stadium would serve as a Western Cape 2010 Legacy Project and be used to host international warm-up matches. According to the City of Cape Town (2006), it will have a final spectator capacity of 30 000 and be a training venue for World Cup teams based in Cape Town.

Despite Green Point being announced as the competition venue in February 2006, the City of Cape Town undertook a study to evaluate alternative venues for the 2010 World Cup in July 2006 (Bayette Development Consulting 2006). The study highlighted socio-economic issues relating to the alternative venues and compared the costs and benefits of constructing a FIFA-compliant stadium in Cape Town. The venues evaluated included Athlone, Newlands and Green Point, among others. The study concluded that each venue offered a mix of strengths and weaknesses. In relation to Green Point, it noted that it had high costs and low developmental impact but its multi-purpose concept design and the potential for private sponsorship could raise its rank. However, the study cautioned that when assessing the potential income the Green Point venue could generate, cognisance should be taken of the displacement of income from other functioning venues (Bayette Development Consulting 2006). It should be noted that this study was commissioned at a time of leadership change within the city, when the leading political party, the ANC, was toppled by the Democratic Alliance at the local level. It was also apparent that the new mayor was initially not in favour of Green Point Stadium being the competition venue. After much heated debate and political discussion, the city officials (including the mayor) recognised that decisions had already been made and had to be upheld. National government also intervened to ensure a speedy resolution of the impasse. City and provincial politics played a central role in framing the issues linked to the debates pertaining to venue selection. The instability related to changes in political parties during the period when decisions were taken further exacerbated the situation. This was particularly prevalent when the ANC mayor was replaced by the Democratic Alliance mayor. The decision-making process in Cape Town regarding venue selection was therefore highly complex and steeped in a range of challenges underscored by Ebrahim (City of Cape Town 2007a: 1):

> We [the City] had to go through a host of statutory approval processes and major obstacles over many months. These included an environmental

impact assessment, rezoning, consent use and building plan approval. We also had to overcome legal challenges and funding crises.

While Green Point Stadium appeared to be the chosen competition venue from a city and province perspective as per the joint media statement, media reports highlight the central role FIFA and the LOC played in this decision. The *Mail & Guardian Online* (12 January 2007) claimed that, according to a confidential document – Draft Strategic Plan for the Provincial Government of the Western Cape and the City of Cape Town – in October 2005 FIFA delegates objected that the low-cost housing around the Athlone Stadium would not form a suitable background for television viewers and that Green Point was the prime location to profile South Africa. The Plan further confirmed that the LOC advised the provincial and city leadership that they should consider expanding Green Point Stadium if they wanted to benefit from the substantial gains of hosting a semi-final match (*Mail & Guardian Online* 12 January 2007). The choice of Green Point Stadium was also linked to strict FIFA time frames. As Ebrahim (City of Cape Town 2007a: 1) states: 'Even after the decision to build it [competition venue] in Greenpoint, the City still commissioned an alternative site study looking at possible alternatives and measuring them all against set criteria. Greenpoint became the only viable alternative within the non-negotiable timeframes.'

FIFA's preference for Green Point as a competition venue mirrors the thinking expressed by Fredline (2004: 166) that since events are positioned as part of the respective destination's tourism attraction mix, and 'in an effort to maximise the benefits of the "showcase effect" induced by media coverage, there is an expressed desire to stage events in attractive locations'. Green Point's location close to a national and international tourism hub is likely to enhance the viability and sustainability of the stadium after 2010, given existing tourism infrastructure. Fredline (2004) indicates that facilities built for specific events that require a large initial investment, such as the building of the stadium, need to be developed in a way that ensures they can be used for other purposes. The location of such facilities is a critical factor in this regard. The Green Point Stadium is arguably better suited than Athlone to maximise return on investment and has the potential to have multiple uses. This is in part due to its location in close proximity to central Cape Town and the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in particular. However, a key concern is resident perceptions and anxieties. Green Point is a middle- and upper-income residential area and large-scale events which a stadium the size of Green Point is likely to attract are often associated with traffic, noise and other disruptions. If not managed and planned properly, resident discontent will be a major issue in Green Point. Disgruntled residents can form protest groups or take legal action (Fredline 2004), as experienced in Green Point where members of the local community represented by the Green Point Common Association were at the forefront of objecting to the upgrading of the stadium for 2010 on the grounds of negative environmental impacts, among others (*Mail & Guardian Online* 12 January 2007).

Resident perceptions

This section of the chapter highlights key findings pertinent to issues under discussion derived from a resident survey undertaken in Athlone and in Green Point. Residents of host localities, especially those residing close to the event stadiums, are stakeholders who are directly impacted by events. However, as Ritchie and Adair (2004) have argued, sport tourism event research has tended to neglect local community perceptions and concerns. Fredline (2004) specifically highlights that events have a differential effect on individuals within a community, which is illustrative of differing and often contested interests. Moreover, the hosting of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa is embedded within a broader national developmental agenda which highlights the importance of ensuring that social and economic legacies are realised at the local level. Cornelissen and Swart (2006), however, raise concerns about how these laudable intentions will be met and how the benefits will be distributed.

Fredline and Faulkner's (2002) study on resident reactions to the staging of two recurring motor sport events, the Indy Gold Coast and the Australian Formula One Grand Prix, indicates that the way residents feel about an event is affected by both their direct experience with the event and by personal and societal values. Moreover, the study revealed that those who live in areas closest to the hub of the event are likely to be most affected. Thus consideration should be given to reducing inconveniences associated with the event. Fredline (2004) argues that a range of factors inform residents' reactions to events. These include anticipated direct benefits, such as financial opportunities through employment or ownership, as well as residents' perception of justice in the distribution of costs and benefits. Additionally, identification with the event theme, contact (physical proximity to the event and involvement in event activities) and residents' perception of their ability to participate in the planning process are influential. Furthermore, the social and political values of residents as well as their level of attachment to the community are deemed to be important.

A study on the impact of the 2002 World Cup amongst residents of Seoul revealed that residents' excitement after the event was less compared to their impassioned feelings during the event (Kim & Petrick 2005). The authors add that this change of perception over time could be explained by residents' concerns regarding the public costs associated with the major investments in stadium development and the future utilisation thereof. The above-mentioned studies appear to indicate that residents' perceptions of the impacts of mega-events vary over time. In addition, residents from different socio-economic groups evaluated and perceived the consequences differently within a dynamic social setting (Fredline & Faulkner 2002; Kim & Petrick 2005; Waitt 2003). The results underscore that planners and managers of mega-events should be better equipped to address the complexities of residents' perceptions, as well as to allocate more resources to effectively increase residents' perceived positive impacts and reduce their perceived negative impacts (Kim & Petrick 2005).

In terms of the resident surveys that this study draws on, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 200 households, 100 each in Athlone and Green Point, during December 2005. A spatially-based random sampling approach was used in both communities to select households within a one-kilometre radius from the venue precinct. In terms of the demographic background of respondents, the majority in both Athlone (76 per cent) and Green Point (73 per cent) were male. The average ages of the respondents were 38.4 years in Athlone and 35.4 years in Green Point. In terms of the historical racial categories of the respondents, in Athlone the majority were coloured (85 per cent) followed by Indian (10 per cent) and black (5 per cent). In Green Point the majority of the respondents were white (46 per cent) followed by black (33 per cent), coloured (20 per cent) and Indian (one respondent). The dominance of coloured people in Athlone and white people in Green Point reflects the historical context of the Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950), which designated racial residential neighbourhoods during the apartheid era in South Africa.

The results indicate that more households in Athlone than in Green Point are established in the area, since 21 per cent of respondents have lived there for 16 to 20 years and 44 per cent for more than 20 years. In Green Point, 36 per cent of respondents have lived in the area for less than 5 years and 24 per cent for 6 to 10 years.

Eighty-one per cent of respondents in Athlone and 84 per cent in Green Point indicated that they were aware that a dedicated soccer venue was being planned as a 2010 soccer legacy. A significant proportion of respondents in Athlone (46 per cent) identified Athlone as a competition venue; 29 per cent identified Green Point and 5 per cent stated both Athlone and Green Point. In Green Point, the majority of respondents (73 per cent) identified Green Point as the competition venue. Eighteen per cent of the respondents in Athlone and 21 per cent in Green Point indicated that they were not sure or did not know where the Cape Town competition venue would be located. In terms of the legacy stadium, in Athlone 33 per cent of respondents identified Athlone and 41 per cent identified Green Point as the proposed legacy stadium. In Green Point, 51 per cent identified Green Point and 18 per cent identified Athlone as a legacy venue. Twenty-four per cent of the respondents in Athlone and 29 per cent in Green Point indicated that they were not sure or did not know where the legacy venue would be located in Cape Town. It is interesting to note that the surveys were conducted at the time when the decision that Green Point would be the competition venue and Athlone the legacy stadium was imminent. The above results illustrate that many of the residents appeared to be unclear about the location of 2010 World Cup stadiums in Cape Town. The responses also reflect confusion among residents about the distinction between a competition venue (for example Green Point) and a legacy stadium (for example Athlone). Legacy stadiums are to be built or upgraded in appropriate locations to promote sport and development in disadvantaged communities. It appears that key decisions regarding 2010 stadium developments are not adequately communicated to residents whose lives are likely to be impacted by activities taking

place near their homes. The results raise concerns regarding the communication and dissemination of information about 2010 World Cup plans and decisions.

There was strong support for stadium development in both areas by resident households living in close proximity to the venues, with 90 per cent of respondents in both communities stating that they were in favour of a 2010 stadium being located in the area where they reside. The main reasons given for this were that it will:
- bring them an exciting/lifetime event;
- assist in improving soccer in the area and contribute to sport development;
- create job opportunities and boost the local economy;
- provide an opportunity to watch matches live.

Ten per cent of the respondents in both communities objected to the 2010 stadium being located in their area. A few respondents gave reasons for this: the event would increase crime in the area (6 per cent in Athlone and 2 per cent in Green Point) and there would be traffic congestion during the event (2 per cent in each community). One respondent in Green Point stated that the current Newlands Stadium should be upgraded. Furthermore, among the 10 per cent of respondents who objected, 3 per cent in Athlone and one respondent in Green Point stated that the stadium should be located in another location in their community, while 7 per cent in Athlone and 4 per cent in Green Point felt that the stadium should be located in another location outside their community. Five per cent of the respondents in Green Point did not provide a response. None of the respondents interviewed stated that stadium development in Cape Town for the 2010 World Cup should be discontinued. This again illustrates positive attitudes among residents to 2010 stadium development specifically and the World Cup more generally.

Ninety-five per cent of respondents in Athlone and 88 per cent in Green Point indicated that they would like to be updated on 2010 stadium developments in their area. Respondents indicated a preference for multiple types of communication strategies: television (61 per cent each in Athlone and in Green Point), newspapers (31 per cent in Athlone and 38 per cent in Green Point), radio (26 per cent in Athlone and 22 per cent in Green Point), SMS (17 per cent in Athlone and 14 per cent in Green Point), community meetings (17 per cent in Athlone and 12 per cent in Green Point), internet (10 per cent in Athlone and 13 per cent in Green Point), posters (10 per cent in Athlone and 13 per cent in Green Point) and email (9 per cent in Athlone and 12 per cent in Green Point). The responses indicate that organisers and officials must consider a range of communication strategies. It is also important that information is presented in a manner that is easily accessible to local residents.

As indicated earlier, the venue selection debates in Cape Town have also centred on the hosting of a semi-final match. The results from the survey show that 91 per cent of respondents in both Athlone and Green Point indicated that Cape Town should host a semi-final match, irrespective of event location. This indicates strong local support for Cape Town being a key host city during the 2010 World Cup.

In order to determine the perceptions and attitudes of the residents towards 2010 venue selection and stadium development in Cape Town, respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with a range of statements. Selected responses are presented in Table 7.1. The responses show that most residents interviewed have a positive impression with regard to legacies that will accompany the hosting of the 2010 World Cup. Most residents believe that the 2010 event will result in economic opportunities at the local level. Most also associate the 2010 event generally, and the stadium development in areas where they reside more specifically, with a range of community benefits.

However, while most residents generally support the 2010 event, a significant proportion questioned the use of public monies. Misperceptions and resistance can be minimised and managed if citizens are informed about how taxpayers' monies are being spent (for what purposes and by whom). The use of public funds has emerged as a particularly thorny issue in the South African context, where social and economic demands on financial resources are immense and widespread poverty remains a key concern. The debt burden or limited economic gains of several cities (see Whitson & Horne 2006 for illustrative examples) after mega-events are hosted could also be a political bombshell that South Africa will have to face. Addressing concerns relating to the use of public funds will be paramount before, during and after the 2010 event.

An almost equal proportion of respondents in Green Point supported and disagreed with the statement regarding the disruption to local residents during the 2010 World Cup. Also, the majority of the residents interviewed are concerned about the impact of the event on local prices.

The findings reveal that despite the socio-economic and historical differences, similar perceptions and attitudes towards the 2010 event and stadium development are noticeable in Athlone and Green Point. Most respondents generally expressed positive attitudes towards the 2010 World Cup and stadium development in their areas. The undertone of the responses also indicates that residents have high expectations and perceive the event to create both social and economic opportunities. The 2010 World Cup business plan (City of Cape Town 2006) indicates that objections to the development of the stadium in Green Point related to acoustics, visual impact, financial sustainability and parking.

It is worth noting that the business plan incorporates residents' concerns and various attempts were made to consult with locals, as was the case in the development of the five-year IDP. In relation to venues, an example derived from the business plan indicates that the construction of the Green Point Stadium includes covering the exterior with noise-reducing cladding. This was a demand from residents and stakeholders to reduce noise levels from events held at the stadium. The roof is also designed to contain light and noise, which are reflected back into the bowl. The roof, the business plan indicates, makes up 35 per cent of the total construction costs. Furthermore, additional costs for mechanical air circulation will be incurred since the roof design and

Table 7.1 Level of agreement with key aspects of the 2010 World Cup, percentage

	Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	
	A	GP	A	GP	A	GP	A	GP	A	GP
2010 legacies: The 2010 World Cup will be the best ever and leave positive legacies for South Africa	4	–	3	10	13	9	29	44	41	37
Public money: Too much public money will be spent on the 2010 event that could be spent on other activities	27	26	23	30	13	10	25	19	12	15
Economic benefits: The event will be a major boost for economic development in the areas where stadiums are located	2	3	3	4	6	12	50	35	39	46
Community benefits: The standard of living for communities located close to the stadiums will increase as a result of the 2010 World Cup	5	7	7	9	17	17	49	41	22	26
Disruption to local residents: The 2010 event will disrupt the lives of local residents and create inconvenience	28	11	14	36	15	13	33	23	10	17
Price: During the 2010 event period, the overall cost of living will increase around the stadium locations	6	6	5	7	14	22	41	36	34	29

Note: A = Athlone; GP = Green Point

the external cladding enclose the stadium space, which restricts natural air circulation. Additionally, the business plan illustrates that stadiums and infrastructural improvements more generally will be designed in such a way that opportunities for criminal activities are prevented or reduced. The system will be integrated to ensure favourable security conditions for both visitors and local residents.

The business plan also indicates the social impacts on the immediate area linked to the construction of the Green Point Stadium and Precinct. These include the loss of public open space on the Green Point Common, commercial development on the Common and the impact on an existing 'sense of place'. In terms of the loss of public open space, the business plan indicates that this could be minimised through the careful design of public spaces and good integration of elements within the Precinct. Impacts of noise, traffic, access to residential and other areas, increased crime and antisocial behaviour on match days were also noted. The business plan also states that there are likely to be considerable impacts during the construction phase, such as noise, dust, traffic delays and a potential increase in crime and antisocial

behaviour linked to construction workers. The business plan articulates that these problems could be mitigated through good construction planning, management and communication.

Conclusion

Smith and Fox (2007) underscore that ensuring a successful event as well as a positive legacy necessitates effective coordination between the event organisers, regeneration agencies, different levels of government, local businesses and community representatives. They add that opportunities for regeneration are often reduced due to the different foci of event organisers and urban authorities. Event organisers are generally more concerned with compliance while urban authorities tend to focus more on regeneration and legacy issues. FIFA and the LOC are clearly key drivers of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. As Jones (2001) indicates, negotiations between the host authorities and the world organising body often have major implications for the success and impact of an event but are rarely in the public domain. In addition, local authorities are unwilling or unable to mitigate since these events are usually controlled and organised by international sport federations outside of the region (Hiller 1998). Swart and Bob (2007) assert that the realisation of the expectations to deliver on wide-scale social and economic benefits, including jobs and an improvement in residents' quality of life, is unlikely to occur at the level anticipated given the context outlined earlier.

One of the key debates emerging in the literature as well as in the data analysis is the building and upgrading of stadiums and local job creation. The political and economic significance of geographic location in relation to the hosting of the 2010 World Cup has also emerged as central to the debate. While it is recognised that large-scale urban regeneration strategies, such as mega sport events, often exclude broad participation from local communities (Page & Hall 2003), it is important to portray the voices of these communities, as high levels of discontent among the local population may lead to behavioural responses – such as protests, strike action or unfriendly behaviour towards sport tourists – that could potentially jeopardise the long-term success of such events (Fredline 2004).

The survey results indicate that while the vast majority of respondents support the hosting of the 2010 World Cup and infrastructural development associated with the event, respondents have high expectations in relation to realising social and economic benefits. Additionally, community concerns that were raised included disruptions to local residents, an increase in the cost of living during the event and economic benefits being unequally distributed. There is also evidence that information pertaining to 2010 developments that are likely to impact on local residents is not being adequately communicated to community members. A telling example emanating from this study is the confusion that prevails among the respondents regarding the decisions taken in relation to the development of competition (Green Point) versus training (Athlone) venues. Since South Africa

is still grappling with the challenges of transformation, the neglect of community concerns is likely to heighten existing tensions. It is imperative that effective communication strategies and consultation mechanisms are implemented by event organisers and government officials to inform residents of 2010 developments and to promote realistic expectations.

Notes

1   South Africa 2010 Bid Company, *South Africa 2010 Bid Book*, p. 10.

2   The poverty rate is an estimation of the proportion of a given population living below a level of income necessary to maintain a household.

3   Made available to the author while working on the project for the City of Cape Town.

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8 Sport, mega-events and urban tourism: Exploring the patterns, constraints and prospects of the 2010 World Cup

Scarlett Cornelissen

As part of the increased importance that has become attached to the hosting of the world's major sport or hallmark events, such as the Olympic Games or the World Cup of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and amid the various claims regarding purported economic effects, tourism development is usually singled out as one of the more significant and longer-lasting impacts to be yielded from a successful tournament. This is usually presented in three sets of arguments: first, that increased exposure afforded by media coverage before and during an event will raise the tourist visibility of a host location, an effect which could extend well beyond the duration of the event; second, that the event itself will provoke a growth in the usual number of tourist visitors, with attendant increases in tourist spending; and third, that anticipatory planning toward the hosting of an event, be it of an infrastructural, economic or social nature, could have offsets by which the wider tourism sector could draw long-term gain (e.g. Chalip 2002; Euchner 1999; Hiller 1998; Jones 2001; Madden 2002).

However, as with all other aspects of pre-event estimation and given the broader context of controversy surrounding impact and cost projections of major sport events (see Wagner 1997 and Tribe 2005 for an overview), the tourism dimensions and spin-offs of such events have often also tended to be subject to vague approximations. In a perceptive account, Crompton (1995) cautions about the political rationale which underlies most impact projections by the proponents of planned event hosting, even if they are on the surface independent consultants. The politicised nature of event boosterism has, according to Crompton (1995, 2006), led to a chronic 'science of overestimation' which has come to typify general assessments of the potentials of events, characterised by the often deliberate misapplication of foundational indicators such as multipliers. For tourism specifically, it is often difficult to draw inferences on the impacts of major events because of the hybrid nature of the tourism sector, consisting as it does of many different industries (Britton 1991; Smith 2000). Furthermore, evidence from previous sport mega-events suggests that their hosting may displace usual tourist markets. A strong displacement effect was, for example, seen during the 2002 FIFA World Cup held in Japan and South Korea (Horne & Manzenreiter 2004), while there are some indications that arrivals to Germany in key market segments saw a reduction or diversion during this country's hosting of the 2006 World Cup (Preuss et al. 2007). Finally, while

events may create net tourism benefits for a host, this often accrues some years after the event was hosted. Few pre-event assessments take this time lag for tourism into account (see for instance Cashman 2006).

A further challenge in gauging the tourism effects of sport mega-events pertains to the distinctive nature of the activity underlying these events and the particular market – sport tourists – upon which such events are founded. As a field of study, sport tourism focuses on how sport events may stimulate tourism activities or, alternatively, how the existence of tourism infrastructure or sites could provide a foundation for sport development (e.g. Gibson 1998; Higham 2005; Weed & Bull 2004). While this field has seen extensive development over the past number of years (see Weed 2006 for a comprehensive overview), a clear delineation of the sector and a common definition of the sport tourist – i.e. whether it is a traveller with a primary motivation to participate in sport activities, or a person who is travelling to partake in tourist activities with sport as an incidental form of consumption – has not yet arisen. Moreover, with a few exceptions (e.g. Weed & Bull 2004), the intersection between sport and mega-events and their tourism impacts has tended to remain under-explored.

South Africa's preparations toward the hosting of the nineteenth FIFA World Cup have been characterised by tentative prognoses about the impacts of the event on a tourism sector which has seen some level of advance over the past decade. At national and sub-national levels, various sets of policies, planning objectives and strategies have been developed toward anticipated tourist visitation, infrastructure requirements and expected costs. Incorporating projections on increased tourist demand (and yields) into existing planning processes has become an important feature of the preparations undertaken by the nine host cities. In all, bolstering tourism development through the processes tied to the hosting of the FIFA event is seen to be a common and crucial objective (City of Cape Town 2007; DEAT & South African Tourism 2005a).

By way of assessing the likely tourism impacts of the 2010 World Cup, and set against the broader complexities surrounding research on major sport events and their tourism dimensions, this chapter takes stock of the principal elements underpinning sport mega-events and tourism development; reviews the experiences of other recent hosts of the FIFA finals; and appraises the policies and strategies for the 2010 tournament. The focus is on the emerging plans toward tourism development arising in national and urban contexts in South Africa, and the prospects and implications of such developments for urban tourism legacies beyond the 2010 finals. The first part of the chapter reviews the context and principles by which sport mega-events have bearing on urban tourism development. Here the discussion centres on the nature of sport tourism as a distinct sector of international travel, and the manner in which sport tourism relates to major events. Examples are drawn from previous World Cup tournaments. The second part provides an overview of the contours of urban tourism in South Africa and reviews the main

processes of urban tourism planning – evident in policy formulations, development projects or public and private investments – that are geared toward the 2010 World Cup. The final section outlines the emergent trends and broader legacies that are implied by such policies and strategies. The analysis draws from a varied methodology, consisting of reviews of event reports and studies from international cases, examinations of policy documents and urban programmes in South Africa, and interviews conducted with tourism and urban authorities.

Sport, mega-events and urban tourism: Some principles

Discussions on the immediate and longer-term impacts of sport mega-events are of particular relevance for cities. Most sport mega-events are either explicitly urban, or cities constitute the most 'natural' site for these events due to the magnitude of the latter and their logistical and organisational requirements. It is in general urban sites that provide the location for the stadiums and other elements of consumption around an event, contain the geographical and other space to accommodate spectators and participants and, of significance for tourism development and planning, provide the infrastructure (accommodation, leisure and retail facilities) to host visitors and other stimulated travel flows. Further, in the context of the shift toward post-industrialism which many cities in the advanced economies of the north have seen, the hosting of sport events has become a widely used, if not undisputed, component of urban rejuvenation strategies (e.g. Fainstein & Judd 1999; Schimmel 1995).

In part this lies in the way in which both the international sport and the tourism sectors have witnessed changes over the past two decades. Sport's steadfast commercialisation due to factors such as extended international media coverage and the growth of sport corporate sponsorships (see Amis & Cornwell 2005 and Slack 2004 for reviews), as well as the expansion of incentive, specialist and business travel, have prompted the development of niche markets that straddle both tourism and sport. As a sector, sport tourism has grown in size and significance and has had attendant impacts on the manner in which urban policy-making has adapted to lure capital tied to this activity (Essex & Chalkley 2004; Gratton et al. 2001).

In a general sense, sport tourism involves participation in physical activities for enjoyment (sport) and the travel to locations to partake in those activities (tourism) (Gibson 1998; Standeven & De Knop 1999). The precise parameters of the sport tourism sector have, however, been more difficult for scholars to establish, and have had a bearing on how policy approaches to sport tourism development have taken shape. Jackson and Glyptis (1992) encapsulate the duality of the sector and its difficulties when they designate two types of sport-related tourism – where sport is used as a deliberate strategy to develop a tourism profile and where tourism could be seen to have emerged as a contingent of sport activities. In a like vein, Higham (2005) provides a set of questions that ought to be considered by tourism and sport planners in order for the overlay between sport and tourism activities to

be exploited. This involves how established sport resources in a given destination could be developed to augment the tourist offer; how sport events could be used as means to offset some of the negative externalities of tourism, such as seasonality; how sport events could bolster tourist arrivals; how a destination image could be supported by or (re)fashioned on a well-established sport image with which a destination tends to be associated; how destinations could establish niche markets around sport activities or events; how sport events may play a role in generating or drawing commercial activities to a destination; and finally, how resources, facilities or sites that are underutilised could be used for sport activities.

From this, the ways in which the hosting of major sport events could be used for urban tourism development are clear. These include creating tourism employment; stimulating the development of tourist-related infrastructure; encouraging the development of new or ancillary industries that depend on intangible factors such as reputation or image (so-called 'creative industries' such as film production or fashion industries – see for example Zukin [1995]); and defining urban management policies around the goals of inter-regional competition based on the sectors of sport, events and tourism. Finally, the use of major sport events to help establish new destination brands has become commonplace (Chalip et al. 2003). Smith (2006) provides examples of some recent sport destination brand enterprises, such as Perth's 'City of Sporting Events' and Edmonton's 'City of Champions'. Such brand projections are intended to entrench a given city's international prominence around its hosting of an event of some consequential scope, the effect of which is meant to support tourist imaging and development into the longer term.

However, in the kinds of participation they generate and in the tourist flows linked to them, sport mega-events carry with them some distinctions which set them apart from sport events that are of smaller scale, of more regular occurrence or organised for amateur competitions or social and/or recreational purposes. First, mega-events involve elite sport participants with specific sets of infrastructural and sport requirements. While most pronounced in the Olympic Games, it is also a feature of multi-site events (such as the FIFA World Cup) that elite sportspersons and the organisers and administrators accompanying them reside in compounds or make use of facilities (such as training venues) put up for their sole use, and often for the sole purpose of the event competition. Apart from raising the question of the likelihood of the full utilisation of such facilities post-event, the consumption needs of elite sportspersons are very particular. Many scholars are hence of the opinion that elite-driven sport events could deviate from, rather than enhance, a given location's conventional tourism market, to the extent of harming it (e.g. Gratton et al. 2001; Higham 1999). Second, mega-events commonly involve symbolic activities which are based on the emotional associations tied to these events (e.g. opening and closing ceremonies or, in the case of the Olympic Games, the extended ceremony which is part of the transportation of the Olympic flame to the host city). While these activities constitute promotional or branding opportunities for host locations, and while they may stimulate consumption that may also flow into

tourism, such consumption is directed by the symbolic contours of the event. Spaces of representation are specific and defined within the context of the event.

Third, tied to this, sport mega-events are spatially and temporally well regulated. In part this derives from the magnitude of these events and the necessity to maintain taut control over locations where competitive participation occurs. In the contemporary era, moreover, the maintenance of security control at stadiums and other venues has become increasingly important (see for example Taylor & Toohey 2007). In addition, with media coverage generally being the greatest immediate capital output, and given the high level of investments made by publicity and broadcasting firms, the timing at which competitions take place becomes increasingly determined by such firms, in pursuit of the greatest volume of broadcasting spectatorship. In the case of the World Cup and the Olympic Games, this has progressively meant the scheduling of competitions according to targeted television viewer times in large markets in Europe, North America and, increasingly, Asia (Slack 2004; Sugden & Tomlinson 1999). The latter points to a fourth distinction of sport mega-events – that in today's context sport tourism consumption tied to such an event is largely of a visual and geographically distant nature. A very large zone of mega-event consumption exists; the fact that immense volumes of revenue are generated by such consumption does not negate the fact that this consumption is virtual. This kind of consumption cannot be translated into the immediate physical use of infrastructure or resources by tourists or visitors to the location (Wright 2007).

FIFA World Cups and tourism

The aspects outlined above have complicated assessments of the impacts of previous major events on the tourism economies of host cities. Other factors have added to this. One of the most important is the difficulty in properly profiling sport event tourists (Crompton 2001). Most impact studies do not differentiate between sport tourists generated by the event itself (i.e. spectators and participants) and those whose visit coincides with the event. This has import for how tourism planning can be done around major events, if the intention is to target event-specific tourists (Ritchie et al. 2002). Further, it is often overlooked that the development of tourism infrastructure as part of event hosting could invite hidden costs, in that supporting resources may need to be drawn from regions contiguous to the host city (Kirkup & Major 2007). Finally, tourism is interlocked with many other economic sectors such as transport, construction, gastronomy and retail, which makes gauging the net tourism impact of an event an intricate process. Discerning a legible tourism imprint from previous sport mega-events has therefore been a difficult endeavour.

Within the Olympic Movement there has been more advance in establishing knowledge about the effects of the Olympic Games than has been the case thus far with FIFA World Cups. The Olympic Games Global Impact project sets out to assess the economic and other impacts of the Games from their initial conceptualisation, through to the bidding processes and their hosting (a period of 11 years), with the

aim of evaluating the costs, legacies and yardsticks yielded by the experiences of Olympic host cities. A similar mechanism does not yet exist within the international football fraternity.

On balance, however, the experiences of recent World Cup hosts have been mixed. Positive assessments about the impacts of tournaments contained in the official post-event reports of local organising committees and the FIFA federation have tended to be offset by more muted reporting about externalities. Tourism flows have tended to be a significant casualty. While the 1998 World Cup evoked voluminous increases in tourist arrivals for France in the year of the event (WTO 2000), the tournament held in Japan and South Korea witnessed an important decrease in tourism (Horne & Manzenreiter 2004). Lee and Taylor (2005) suggest that for South Korea, actual tourist arrivals may have fallen short by more than one-third of predictions, and were much lower than the number of arrivals in the same month the previous year. This diversion effect could be attributed to the prolonged consequences of the terror attacks on the USA in 2001 and to the two host countries' distant location from the large traditional football countries. The fact that usual tourist markets in South Korea and Japan were displaced, however, points to the manner in which sport events of that nature could have important deflationary effects on established tourism markets.

Preliminary assessments of the 2006 tournament in Germany are also varied. The event drew a very large number of spectators (3 407 000) and was in this second only to the 1992 World Cup hosted in the USA, which had a larger stadium capacity (FIFA 2006). In the four-week period during which the event took place, Germany received 2 million foreign visitors (Organisationskomitee Deutschland 2006: 1). According to the German government, World Cup-related activity will contribute €3 billion until 2009. In the year of the tournament, 50 000 new employment opportunities were estimated to have been created, and receipts from incoming tourism were said to have expanded by €2.7 billion (GNTB 2006: 3). These boisterous official impact calculations, however, underplay the fact that capital expenditure for the event totalled €6 billion (GNTB 2006: 3), more than double the estimated gains. In tourism, moreover, some early indications are emerging that important market segments such as business tourism experienced significant reduction during the World Cup year (Preuss et al. 2007).

It would seem as if the principal gain for Germany in hosting the tournament was a greatly improved international image. This relates partly to the degree to which the event served to buoy tourism branding efforts. Surveys conducted by the German National Tourist Board, for instance, yielded positive responses among citizens of the teams which participated in the final part of the tournament and would suggest that the Board's pre-tournament branding campaign of 'Destination Germany' bore fruit (GNTB 2006). Of greater significance, however, is the extent to which the tournament also enabled deep-seated and very negative attitudes about Germany – stemming from factors such as the country's twentieth century war history – to be attenuated. Shrewd tournament sloganeering by the German Local Organising

Committee, invoking values of international amity and goodwill, appears to have yielded dividends. Positive imaging campaigns also seem to have produced beneficial effects for German host cities, with post-event surveys indicating a high recall factor among international respondents (e.g. GNTB 2006).

One of the main aspects of distinction at the 2006 tournament, and a factor which is likely to have an important effect on the way in which planning around venue siting and designs for tourism impact will take shape at future World Cup finals, is the successful creation of large-scale public viewing areas – or fan parks – in all of the host cities. These fan parks, covering large tracts of urban space either contiguous to match stadiums or sited in areas of public significance (such as major city parks), were initiated to absorb overflow spectators. An estimated 18 million viewers visited the 15 public areas which were set up (FIFA 2006: 34). As social spaces, however, these parks had two important features. The first is that they comprised temporary zones in which sentiments of shared enjoyment and heightened emotive experiences could arise (see e.g. Bale 1998). This may have contributed to the eventual overall positive assessments by visitors to the tournament. The second, related feature was that the fan parks constituted one of the main sites where spectator consumption took place. The large-scale sale of food and beverages but, more significantly, the use of these locations for promotional and other corporate actions by FIFA's approved partners and sponsors, were key activities of production. While therefore sites of 'virtual fandom' (e.g. Weed 2007), such public viewing areas could also be tailored toward specific marketing or tourism planning objectives. The concept of fan parks adds to an increased orientation among planners and policy-makers toward the creation of positive event legacies of an infrastructural or social nature (see for example Weed & Bull 2004), but does pose other sets of requirements around enhanced security, safety and surveillance which could become costly for event organisers.

Urban tourism economies in South Africa and the 2010 World Cup

Broad characteristics of urban tourism development

Tourism is one of the sectors which has seen the most meaningful advance in South Africa since 1994. Its significance lies not only in the way in which economic outputs have flowed from the continuous rise in international and domestic tourist arrivals (to a current market of approximately 8 million international arrivals), but also in the extent to which key activities around foreign investment promotion have tended to hinge on the accomplishments of tourist branding and imaging in primary international source markets (see Cornelissen 2005a for an overview). Successful tourism growth has therefore been an important component of overall economic expansion. Its worth has, however, only belatedly been acknowledged by the national government, with a recent spurt of policy documents such as the Department of Trade and Industry's Integrated Manufacturing Strategy and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa identifying tourism as a 'priority economic sector' (Rogerson 2006: 230).

In the build-up to the 2010 World Cup the tourism sector is also viewed as one which can draw significant momentum from the tournament. Predictions vary, but the country's tourism authorities estimate that the event will involve 3.5 million participants and will draw up to 475 000 foreign visitors. It is expected that tourism revenue of approximately R11 billion will be generated during the event (DEAT & South African Tourism 2005a: 9).

Organisers expect a great deal of this to accrue to most of the cities which will host the tournament matches, receive the elite footballers and their respective entourages, and accommodate the anticipated spectators and visitors. Urban tourism is an important constituent of South Africa's overall tourism economy, although it has been a neglected element of national policy focuses. It is only in the form of local economic development strategies at the scale of individual cities that tourism has received more attention (Rogerson 2006).

Nonetheless, cities are important pillars of the national tourism sector. This founds on three components: first, cities constitute nodes for transportation (air, rail and road) that help direct tourist flows. Second, cities provide a ready stock of accommodation and other means of infrastructure to absorb and supply the leisure, travel, retail and business needs of tourists. Third, in some of the larger cities the presence of certain industrial functions has enabled the development of distinctive market segments. In this way transportation, which is a key element of the urban economy in Johannesburg, for example, and has facilitated the development of that city into a hub in the wider southern African subsystem, strengthens the commercial appeal of the city. Johannesburg's proximity to other African centres and its overall commercial dominance causes the city to draw a large component of the country's African visitors (mainly from neighbouring countries). Shopping tourism and business tourism are two key market segments in that city (South African Tourism 2005a). Cape Town draws a comparatively larger proportion of overseas leisure tourists than any other city in the country – approximately 60 per cent of the 1 million visitors to the city are overseas travellers (South African Tourism 2005a). Another niche market that has developed in Cape Town over the past few years has been the gay and lesbian or so-called 'pink tourism' market (Visser 2003). Convention tourism has also developed strongly in Cape Town and Durban (Rogerson 2006). Indeed, in 2005 these cities were two of the three African cities (the other was Cairo) listed in the World Tourism Organisation's international convention list. Cape Town was ranked as the thirty-eighth most significant convention destination in the world, while Durban was ranked sixty-fifth (WTO 2005).

In all, the portrait which emerges of urban tourism in South Africa is one in which there is a concentration of tourist activities in the three prime cities, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Table 8.1 shows the proportion of visitors to these cities. The table indicates visitation by foreign tourists although the patterns for domestic tourism would not differ markedly.

Table 8.1 Urban distribution of foreign tourism to South Africa, quarterly percentage, 2004

Gauteng		KwaZulu-Natal		Western Cape	
Johannesburg	85.5	Durban	86.8	Cape Town	78.9
Pretoria	24.8	Pietermaritzburg	21.1	Stellenbosch	27.2
				George	21.3
				Knysna	23.2

Source: South African Tourism (2005b)
Note: Figures add up to more than 100% since more than one city was visited in each province.

Each of these cities has a different primary tourist function and captures specific niches. Rogerson and Visser (2006: 207) note the 'distinctive geographies' that characterise tourism to South Africa's main cities, with overseas tourists, most of them leisure seekers, predominantly finding their way to Cape Town and Johannesburg, and tourists of African origin travelling to Johannesburg and, to a lesser extent, Pretoria. Other smaller urban centres, however, do claim a proportion of the African tourism market to South Africa. Proximity is an important factor in this regard, as remarked by Rogerson and Visser (2006), with the Free State drawing a significant number of visitors from Lesotho, Mpumalanga constituting a key destination for travellers from Swaziland, and the Northern Cape being a destination for visitors from neighbouring Namibia. Making use of the retail and shopping facilities in South African cities appears to be a key motivation for short-term arrivals from other parts of Africa, and shopping tourism has grown as a distinct market segment among African visitors (South African Tourism 2005a). Neighbouring states provide a major part of this market segment, and the volume of the daily cross-border flows testifies to the extent to which shopping tourism to South Africa has grown in significance. Indeed, arrivals from Africa, making up approximately three-quarters of all international arrivals, far outnumber the volume of overseas visitors to South Africa. The travel and tourism behaviour patterns of African arrivals, however, still differ significantly from those of overseas (and mainly leisure) visitors. While growing in size, therefore, the yields off shopping tourism are mediated by the short-term nature of the visits (Grant Thornton 2004). Nonetheless, shopping tourism conceivably constitutes an important and growing source of income for many of the country's cities.

In addition to the broad depiction of tourist market patterns in South Africa's cities, it is also important to draw attention to the general spatial make-up of cities' tourism economies, with respect to the location and spread (or concentration) of tourism infrastructure and attractions, and patterns of tourism developments and investments. This is due to two reasons. The first is that the underlying spatial structure of a given city's economy sets the parameters by which the framing of growth targets can be made. In this regard, it is significant that the spatial patterning of tourism in all of South Africa's cities has tended toward the geographical concentration of tourist activity and impact. Historically derived, post-apartheid patterns of infrastructure development and investments have been inclined to reinforce this tendency (Visser 2004). The patterns of tourism development in Cape

Town are a case in point: the metropolitan area has seen substantial expansion in tourism stock and infrastructure, with a high degree of new public and private investments. In the period 1996–2002, for instance, more than 40 new hotels were built, a factor which considerably pushed up the available number of tourist beds in the city (Cornelissen 2005b). Most of this development has, however, been in the city's commercial and more affluent parts.

Using the hosting of the 2010 World Cup to change the skewed nature of resource allocation, employment opportunities and economic ordering within South Africa has been a key objective for the event's proponents from the start.[1] As will be discussed in greater detail below, however, in the case of tourism, such aims are bound by existing features of development.

Second, while a very specific activity, the advance of sport tourism relies on the expansion of existing sets of infrastructure – accommodation and transportation in particular – upon which a tourism economy has developed. Internationally, it has become a prevailing feature that in the planning for a sport mega-event, aspects such as the post-event multifunctional utility of facilities such as stadiums are emphasised. International guidelines therefore emphasise adapting sport tourism facilities to the existing contours of tourism, rather than the other way around.

Tourism projections, parameters and policies in host cities

Broad projections and guidelines

An enduring problem of elite-driven sport events such the FIFA World Cup is the difficulty in forecasting visitor numbers (Wright 2007). Current projections of expected tourist visitation during the 2010 World Cup derive from indicators such as the volume of match tickets sold and the number of tourist arrivals at previous World Cups. Most projections are based on the 2006 World Cup although, given certain features of similarity with the 2002 World Cup – in particular that Japan and South Korea constituted long-haul destinations for the key European football tourist markets – visitor statistics to the Asian tournament are also used to estimate the volume of visitation during the 2010 World Cup. In this, attempts are made to differentiate between visitors with and without match tickets, as shown in Table 8.2. The tournament is expected to draw a flow of cross-border movement from other African countries. However, estimates about the extent of this movement (as for example shown in Table 8.2) can at best be conjecture.

Table 8.2 Predicted visitor numbers for 2010 World Cup

Total number of international visitors with tickets	400 000
Total number of international visitors without tickets	75 000
Cross-border visitors from other African countries	300 000
Number of South African residents travelling regionally to attend matches	85 000

Source: Western Cape Department of Transport and Public Works (2007)

There are a number of presently unresolved factors which will have an effect on eventual visitation during the 2010 tournament. The first of these is the manner by which match tickets will be sold internationally and the formula by which tickets will be apportioned on a worldwide basis. The second is the origin of qualifying teams and the composition of the competing groups during the early phases of the tournament. With regard to tickets, broad principles on the regional allocation and the costs of tickets are set by the ticketing subcommittee within FIFA's executive committee, and are determined by the national make-up of teams participating in the month-long finals. The sale and distribution of match tickets is managed by FIFA's subsidiary, MATCH AG. In November 2007, MATCH launched a programme by which world ticket distribution will occur for the 2010 finals. Through this, MATCH aims to sell 3.1 million tickets for the tournament, of which the bulk will be distributed through the firm's website and approximately 10 per cent will be allowed to be sold by accredited tour operators (FIFA 2007). The intended total volume, and the procedure by which tickets will be sold, differ significantly from the 2006 World Cup. For the latter, tickets were released for retail in five tranches over an 11-month period. In total, 2.93 million tickets were available for sale. An important development for the 2010 World Cup is the intention by MATCH to offer tickets in bundled packages, to which accommodation and air travel will also be tied. Other active interventions by the firm will include the launching of a hospitality programme, the securing of an accommodation inventory of up to 100 000 beds, and the accessing of vehicle fleets and aircraft to provide transport to visitors and fans (FIFA 2007). These measures, as noted by the executive chairman of MATCH, are aimed at 'ensuring high attendance' at the tournament (FIFA 2007). Conceivably, however, they will also enable MATCH to have a large influence in the provision of tourist accommodation and other supply.

Host city processes and policies

The drawing of the final teams and the finalisation of the match logs toward the end of 2009 will be the point at which other planning processes could be completed, particularly at host city level. As an independent process, arrangements around ticketing will establish many of the parameters upon which final preparations for the tournament will be contingent. Of specific relevance for tourism planning, however, are also factors such as the selection of training venues by qualifying teams. The decision by a given team to base itself in a particular location before and during the tournament will impose a number of preparatory requirements on that location. This also presents lucrative opportunities for destinations, and vying to host national teams and their entourages will become a marked feature of competition among the smaller non-match cities and towns in South Africa once group draws have been completed.

At a national level, tourism objectives around the 2010 tournament lay emphasis on using the event to brand and promote South Africa as a tourist destination, and on enhancing the country's international competitiveness. It is acknowledged, however,

that the adequate supply and management of aspects such as visitor attractions, security, transport and information are vital (DEAT & South African Tourism 2005b). Indeed, tourism supply-side deficiencies in all of the host cities have been identified as a vital constraint by national tourism authorities. Early approximations of the shortfall in accommodation supply, for instance, suggested an upper range of more than 180 000 tourist beds, with the disparity between expected demand and supply estimated to be particularly pronounced in cities such as Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay and Polokwane (DEAT & South African Tourism 2005a).

Alarmist estimations about supply deficits probably account for FIFA's announcement in November 2007 that it will secure an own accommodation inventory in South Africa for the tournament, to be managed by MATCH, and that the federation strongly supports the development of 'satellite accommodation' zones in non-host cities (FIFA 2007). Attempts within host cities to ensure adequate accommodation and other supply-side provision have greatly shaped the direction which planning processes have taken in these cities. Table 8.3 on pages 144–145 summarises the main tourism and other focuses of host cities in their policies and preparations for the 2010 tournament.

From the table a sense can be gained of the major tendencies that are emerging with respect to the placing of capital investments and the aspects which are emphasised by host city planners. Table 8.3 reflects a perceptible concern over the nature and adequacy of principal infrastructure such as road and other transportation supply and the state of preparedness of competition venues. Large-scale capital spending by urban governments on the development and upgrading of roads, ports and support infrastructure has been buttressed by the major capital expenditure programme embarked on by the national government in 2006, by which R400 billion would be drawn from the fiscus. This presents significant challenges, mainly due to the intricacy of assimilating the design of transportation plans specifically for the 2010 World Cup with established urban programmes and policies. At a national level the impulse to accelerate major projects such as the Gautrain rapid rail has jarred with other development priorities. Also, transport bureaucracies have had difficulties in aligning existing programmes with 2010 focuses. Thus, while the Department of Transport in 2006 committed up to R1.8 billion for improving the national road network, most of this was absorbed by backlogged developments and used for shoring up the management of taxis and buses nationally.

Accommodation is a core component of the tourism sector. Given the high level of projected accommodation deficits for the 2010 World Cup, the provision of a sufficient number of tourist beds is the other major component of infrastructure investment which should receive some emphasis. The attempt by FIFA and its subsidiary, MATCH, to secure an inventory of available beds which will be sold to tournament visitors may go some way to relieving the pressure on cities. However, city planners still face the problem of assessing the full scale and nature of demand during the tournament and avoiding overcapitalisation within the

accommodation sector. While there would be a peak in demand shortly before and during the tournament, this is likely to decline rapidly and significantly thereafter. The chief challenge with respect to accommodation, therefore, is that as yet vague parameters of demand estimation need to be used to guide developments in a sector for which the nature of demand subsequent to the hosting of the tournament will be significantly different. The construction of accommodation units, moreover, is capital-intensive, and here urban governments can only seek to facilitate appropriate types of investments. A major difficulty facing smaller and outlying host cities such as Rustenburg and Polokwane is that they may not be able to lure the requisite levels of private sector investments in accommodation development. The risk that large-scale investments in the accommodation sector before the World Cup could lead to an over-saturation of the market in the wake of the tournament is, however, common to all the host cities.

A further aspect which will influence the way in which the accommodation shortfall is managed is the pace and manner in which the accreditation of accommodation establishments is done. This is a task primarily performed by MATCH AG, with the assistance of South Africa's grading authorities. While this does provide an opportunity for non-corporate accommodation owners – such as those operating guest houses, bed and breakfasts and smaller lodges – to draw benefit from projected World Cup visitation, the rules and processes by which accreditation occurs are complex and have thus far proven to be an impediment. The shortage of adequately graded accommodation establishments in all of the host cities adds to the problems which this sector, so vital to a successful tournament, faces.

A great proportion of capital investments made have been on the 10 competition stadiums. High standards for compliance set by FIFA and strict scheduling partly account for this. Yet, stadiums are elements which tend to leave the greatest physical imprint from the hosting of major events. In the international arena, an emerging approach to the heightening of event legacies lays emphasis on the need to link the development of event infrastructure with broader urban objectives and set spatial forms. Often it is very challenging to merge these aspects. Smith and Fox (2007: 1127) depict this when they comment:

> Perhaps the most obvious opportunity for event regeneration is the associated investment in new venues. Locating new facilities and associated infrastructures in brownfield sites allows such areas to be reclaimed as integral urban zones. But if sustainable regeneration is to be achieved, an important consideration is to plan for the effective post-event use of such facilities. This helps to translate physical changes into genuine regeneration…(Several international) cases highlight the dilemma faced by host cities; wanting to bequeath physical legacies, whilst ensuring that money is not wasted building and operating new venues…Even if venues are used in the post-event era, they may render existing facilities redundant.

Table 8.3 Major tourism development thrusts in South Africa's 2010 host cities

Host city	Tourism attractions and planning around tournament stadium	Public viewing areas
Mangaung	Upgrade of Free State Stadium to capacity of 40 000. Other tourism-related developments unspecified.	Planned but as yet unspecified.
Cape Town	Reconfiguration of Green Point Common; development of golf course and sporting facilities next to new Green Point Stadium; development of pedestrian network across stadium precinct.	Planned Grand Parade fan park and fan mile. Planned development of up to eight third-party public viewing areas in metropolitan sites and district municipalities.
Durban	Development of multifunctional sport arena as part of newly refurbished Kings Park Sport Precinct. Durban Point Waterfront: revitalisation of beachfront and theme park. Africa Square: revitalisation of International Convention Centre precinct.	Planned fan park around Durban beachfront.
Johannesburg	Nasrec Urban Development Precinct, including exhibition centre, tourism and sport facilities. Upgrading of facilities at Ellis Park Stadium. Newtown: tourism-focused revitalisation of CBD. Revitalisation and development of fashion district in eastern inner city.	Planned in Newtown Precinct.
Mbombela	Construction of new stadium and development or upgrading of nine other smaller stadiums and sport facilities.	Unspecified.
Polokwane	Upgrading and expansion of World Cup stadium.	Planned although as yet unspecified.
Nelson Mandela Bay	Construction of new multi-purpose stadium with capacity seating of 48 000.	Planned fan park at site of historical school in city.
Rustenburg	Upgrade of Royal Bafokeng Stadium. Upgrade of Olympia Park Stadium as practice venue. Development of Platinum City Theme Park with focus on mining and technology.	Money allocated but unspecified site.
Pretoria	Upgrade of World Cup stadium. Approximately R245 million to be spent on development of tourism themes, events programmes and other tourism projects.	Unspecified.

Sources: See endnote 2.
Note: ACSA = Airports Company of South Africa

	Accommodation	Transport and capital investments	Branding campaigns
	Projected supply deficit: ± 14 700 beds. An airport hotel with capacity of 300 to be constructed by ACSA. Plan to secure additional tourist beds from surrounding towns.	Approximately R2.1 billion to be spent on road upgrade and public transport.	Unspecified.
	Projected supply deficit: none. Construction of at least six new hotels.	Approximately R6.92 billion to be spent on road, airport and public transport upgrade, including construction of airport rail link to CBD.	Consolidation of existing provincial and urban tourism brand and marketing campaign by destination marketing organisation. 2010 logo launched. Launch in November 2007 of programme to sell naming rights to Green Point Stadium.
	Projected supply deficit: none.	Approximately R2.9 billion to be spent on upgrade of electricity, roads and potage.	Suggested: 'Durban, KZN'. 2010 logo launched.
	Projected supply deficit: ± 31 100 beds. New airport hotel with capacity of 1 000 to be constructed by ACSA. Construction of up to three new hotels by foreign investors.	Construction of Gautrain and upgrade of other road and public transport infrastructure. Planned development and improvement of road linkages to main World Cup stadiums and venues.	'Johannesburg Buzz'. Existing brand: 'Joburg 2030'.
	Projected supply deficit: ± 13 200 beds. Unspecified attempts to reduce current accommodation deficit.	Upgrade of main national access routes by South African National Roads Agency.	Municipal 2010 logo launched.
	Projected supply deficit: ± 17 300 beds. Unspecified attempts to reduce deficit.	Upgrade of three provincial airports, including international airport at Polokwane.	2010 logo launched November 2007; theme: 'Naturally progressive'.
	Estimated supply deficit: ± 21 000 beds. Construction of up to two new hotels, one of which will be a Radisson.	Approximately R500 million to be spent on upgrade of transport infrastructure, including development of bus rapid transit system and upgrade of airport.	Unspecified.
	Projected supply deficit: ± 5 800 beds. Construction of one hotel.	R400 million to be spent by provincial government for upgrade of roads.	Unspecified.
	Projected supply deficit: ± 19 000 beds. Unspecified efforts to reduce accommodation deficit.	Pretoria linked into Gautrain network. Upgrade of city's bus transit system.	Two logos – intended to reflect city's current and former name.

It is in this regard noteworthy that only some of the host cities have sought to attach a wider set of objectives around their stadium developments which interlink with existing urban programmes. Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban are attempting to develop major sport and tourism precincts, available for future usage, around the World Cup venues. Similar planning is in the main absent from the stadium designs of other host cities, where the emphasis is squarely on providing sites with the required seating capacity. Internationally, strategies aimed at integrating stadiums with their surrounding urban areas as a way to optimise the tourism usage of such venues have carried mixed results (Schimmel 1995; Smith 2006). Factors such as infrastructural density, the nature of sport tourism demand in a given location, and the extent to which tourist management could strengthen linkages among related tourist market segments have influenced the degree to which multimodal event competition sites could later function successfully as tourism venues (e.g. Higham 2005).

Further supply-side aspects which host cities should focus on are the development of tourist attractions, the expansion of existing tourist products and the use of the World Cup tournament to deepen destination brands. The degree to which this is occurring, however, varies significantly across the host cities. More progress has been made in this regard in the major metropolitan regions. In part this is due to the existence of economies of scale and the depth of the tourism sector in these locations. Tourism in most of the smaller and more distant host cities has in the main developed to support very specific functions, such as providing a temporary base for flow-through tourism to other destinations. Mbombela's tourism economy, for example, is designed at capturing tourism spin-offs from the surrounding game parks, and Rustenburg draws tourism impact from its proximity to Sun City. These distinctive developments in the smaller host cities will to some extent limit the possibilities for tourism product extension. In the case of Rustenburg, a major investment by provincial authorities will see the construction of a theme park, organised around the platinum mining industry in the province. Similar projects are notably absent from other smaller host cities.

Finally, the opportunity to cultivate durable destination brands upon which new tourism developments could be founded is one of the significant ancillary gains for host cities. This has been a noteworthy outcome for Germany's hosts during the 2006 World Cup. In the case of South Africa, few advances seem to have been made in the development of city brands built around the 2010 tournament. Only some of the host cities, notably the larger ones such as Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban, have initiated their own World Cup logos or have to this point developed distinctive destination marketing slogans drawing on their status as host cities. Weakly administered branding endeavours on the part of other host cities or fragmented marketing bureaucracies are some of the reasons for this lack of city branding. At the same time, however, city branding opportunities are subject to the conditions set by the contracts between FIFA and its main corporate sponsors and partners. Experiences by the European hosts of some other football tournaments show that

sponsorship agreements between a body such as FIFA and external corporations can constrict the ability of host cities to image their destination in specific ways, or to source investments from other corporations to this objective if they conflict with the interests of the FIFA partner or sponsor (e.g. Nash & Johnstone 2001). Any urban branding opportunity arising from the 2010 tournament will be circumscribed in the same way.

Conclusion

The initial euphoria of being awarded the rights to host the 2010 FIFA finals – and rather robust expectations of what the event may portend for South Africa's economic and other futures – have made way for more balanced assessments of the impacts and possible costs of the event. In the main, a more sober stance characterises urban planning for the tournament. A keen sense that the programmes committed to today will shape urban and broader developmental outcomes for a significantly long time has shifted the discourse among policy-makers and planners to international examples and lessons of 'leveraging event legacies'. Despite this, the broad perimeters of such legacies and the means to effect impacts that are in the interests of the greater citizenry remain vaguely understood. In the case of tourism, this is complicated by the fact that a number of factors central to the estimation of impact (including the eventual number of visitors and their movements) remain generally indeterminable. Preparatory programmes and policies can therefore at best be notional.

Emergent tendencies regarding tourism planning suggest a significant differentiation in the types of planning and levels of progress, with the country's metropolitan regions having drafted more coherent tourism development programmes and exhibiting more advance in their implementation than the smaller host cities. This derives from the varied manner in which tourism economies have historically expanded in the host cities and the fact that major metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, and to a lesser extent cities such as Pretoria and Nelson Mandela Bay, have been able to nurture distinct tourism advantages vis-à-vis smaller counterparts. Should apposite policies not be adopted by the smaller host cities, there is a risk that this geography of differentiation will be reinforced rather than ameliorated by the hosting of the 2010 World Cup. Tourism growth gains from the tournament, therefore, could be unequally distributed. The adoption of a regional approach to tourism promotion, where host cities draw upon tourism resources in neighbouring towns and rural areas, could constitute one means of offsetting this. The linkage of tourist products in different locations through the use of routes and themes could be one of the mechanisms used. As a general approach, the themed promotion of all host cities in the form of suggested travel itineraries by the national promotion agency, South African Tourism, could help to strengthen tourism gains.

An enduring challenge facing urban tourism authorities relates to the unique nature of the sport mega-events traveller market and the different tourism behaviour

exhibited by this market. In contrast to general tourist markets, where demand is cyclical, continuous and more or less predictable, major sport tournaments are marked by peaks in demand for specific tourist infrastructure around the time of the event, and a decline in such demand shortly thereafter. Overcapitalisation in aspects such as accommodation or tourist facilities and attractions could be a very probable outcome of the 2010 tournament. An additional concern lies in the composition of tourist visitation and usage for the tournament. It is expected that up to three-quarters of tourists will be from international source markets. While meeting the requirements and needs of these international visitors during the event will be important, it will be more critical for tourism authorities to consider how tourism investments could carry sustainability after the event. This means the crafting and early implementation of strategies to nurture current and potentially new international source markets by bodies such as South African Tourism.

Finally, one of the most important aspects is the need to judiciously integrate planning around the 2010 World Cup with wider urban development priorities. To some extent, much tourism planning is disconnected from existing city programmes and projects, some of which have seen extended processes of implementation. Continuing in this vein could be detrimental for tourism development in the longer term, and could add to a not inconceivably long list of '2010's missed opportunities'.

Notes

1   See for example the South Africa 2010 Bid Company's *South Africa 2010 Bid Book*.

2   City of Cape Town (2006, 2007); City of Johannesburg (2006); City of Tshwane (2006); DEAT and South African Tourism (2005b); eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (2006); Free State Department of Public Works, Roads and Transport (2007); Limpopo Department of Roads and Transport (2008); personal communication, host city officials; Province of the Eastern Cape (2007); Western Cape Department of Transport and Public Works (2007).

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9 *The 2010 World Cup and the rural hinterland: Maximising advantage from mega-events*

Doreen Atkinson

In this chapter, regional tourism in non-host areas is considered as one of the potentially positive consequences of mega-events. What can such areas expect from a mega-event such as the 2010 Football World Cup?

The answer is a combination of unintended spillover effects and conscious strategies to maximise beneficial spin-offs. There is, potentially, a wide range of such strategies, whether at community or at governmental level. The latter can also be a complex amalgam of different official agencies, such as provincial governments, regional authorities or municipalities. In effect, a mega-event opens the door for numerous social and economic actors to become involved and to maximise their slice of the tourism windfall.

The chapter first examines the possible spillover effects on local communities, as understood in the international literature. Secondly, it reflects on the possible responses to mega-events by municipal governments, focusing primarily on some Australian case studies. Thirdly, we turn to the South African case and highlight the problem of regional inequality in tourism development – a problem that characterised South Africa for almost a century. The case study addresses a historically neglected area, namely the arid hinterland in South Africa, which includes the Karoo, the Kalahari, Namaqualand and the Little Karoo.

The chapter considers the possible spillover benefits for the arid hinterland, and the current level of planning to maximise advantages for the Karoo. This raises the question of the broader developmental impacts of rural tourism, how these can be maximised by a more holistic regional approach, and what actions municipalities may undertake to promote regional benefits in non-host areas.

By early 2008, the lack of government initiative to maximise spillover benefits raised some doubt as to whether such potential benefits would be actualised. But this negative assessment should be tempered by the fact that non-host areas have several advantages over host cities: they do not have to invest in major and expensive infrastructure; unlike the host cities, they are unlikely to have displacement effects and, in fact, their tourism demand may increase; and their improvements do not require a long lead time for major infrastructural projects such as stadiums.

In sum, non-host areas, particularly those situated near host cities or on main transport routes, have little to lose and a fair amount to gain in terms of bed occupancy and marketing visibility. This chapter will show that non-host areas can

benefit from tourism, as sports fans travel from one host venue to another, as well as from tourist excursions and even fan park events, where games are watched on big-screen television.

It is up to the towns to market themselves and to put themselves on the radar screen of 2010 World Cup travellers. The main difficulty is that smaller towns lack the planning and marketing capacity of the large cities.

This study faced some challenges. Internationally, very little research exists that examines the perceptions and actions of non-host communities. Also, at the time of writing (March 2008), the South African 2010 World Cup is still more than two years away. Government officials are beginning to gear up for the event, but many officials did not respond to requests for information. In addition, many variables are still unclear, such as the selection of the participating teams. Some of the findings are therefore rather speculative. However, this chapter does provide a framework to predict, understand and assess the reactions of non-host communities, and it argues the case for timeous, strategic and innovative planning to maximise spillover benefits to rural regions.

Possible spillover effects on non-host communities

According to Burbank et al. (2002: 183), 'Mega-events are large-scale, high-profile occurrences of limited duration intended to attract attention and visitors to a host city.'

Much of the literature on mega-events concerns the impacts on host cities (Burbank et al. 2002) and on national economies (Jones 2001). Mega-events are one-time events that draw a lot of attention to the affected area and bring in a huge influx of money. The hosting of mega-events increases a country's capacity to attract international tourists (Cornelissen 2005). Increased economic activity and enhanced international awareness of the region are among the profound long-term effects created by a mega-event. Mega-events can bring benefits and costs at various levels – economic, social and environmental. Positive spin-offs can be financial multiplier effects in the local economy, community pride, international recognition, strengthening of regional values, and heightened awareness of public policy issues which need attention (such as strengthening tourism and environmental programmes). Negative impacts created by a major event may include price inflation, tax burdens for the event, and mismanagement of public funds by organisers (Deccio & Baloglu 2002). The challenge, particularly in the context of less developed countries, is to maximise the positive spin-offs.

Curiously, people in non-host communities are likely to be more favourably disposed to mega-events than are people in host cities (Deccio & Baloglu 2002). The reason is that non-host communities are likely to be less affected by the negative spillovers of mega-events, such as crowding, congestion, traffic, crime and high prices. In fact, non-host communities may actively benefit due to the 'displacement

effect'. This happens when people who *would* have spent a holiday in a host city are deterred from such a locality due to the mega-event, and prefer to take their holidays in quieter areas away from the bustle of the host city. Outlying areas may therefore benefit from long-term spillover impacts, which could be maximised by well-placed advertisements and news stories (Deccio & Baloglu 2002). It is also likely that many harassed residents of host cities may decide to escape their cities during the World Cup and take the opportunity to rent cheaper accommodation in non-host towns and villages.

Responses by local governments in non-host cities

Support for a mega-event by public opinion is one thing; strategising and managing effective support is quite another. It requires far-sighted, dynamic and innovative public leadership.

A study of non-host cities during the Australian Olympics of 2000 provides valuable examples of how such cities can maximise their role in a mega-event (O'Brien & Gardiner 2006). In the period leading up to a hallmark or mega sport event, athletes and coaches usually arrive in the host country well ahead of the event to undertake a period of training and to become familiar with local climatic, cultural and living conditions. Often, this period of final preparation is carried out in the context of pre-event training camps. In the selection process for pre-event training venues, sports managers shop around for optimal locations. Crucial variables include optimal and easily accessible sporting facilities where their athletes can train, appropriate accommodation and support services (food, transport, medical facilities), and a location sufficiently close to the match venues.

An interesting feature of the Australian non-host cities was their implementation of different kinds of networking initiatives and relationship-building activities (O'Brien & Gardiner 2006). Three cities were studied and each managed the process differently. Firstly, Canberra regarded the issue primarily as a sports question. It created a managing committee called Sport 2000, which was based in the Bureau of Sport and Recreation of the Australian Capital Territory. The city outsourced the Olympic management function to a private event company, which failed to invest any resources in building lasting relationships with the visitors.

Secondly, the city of Gold Coast convened a community-representative group, which included representation of sport, tourism and business. While the ostensible purpose of the task force was to maximise benefits for the city, the unofficial objective was to use the Olympics to secure better facilities for local athletes. Like Canberra, the issue was delegated to the municipality's Community and Recreation Facilities Branch. Consequently, the coordination of the pre-Games training was located in the regional sport portfolio, rather than with tourism or economic development. The major strength of Gold Coast's approach was the creation of a media centre, which promoted tourism marketing of the area (O'Brien & Gardiner 2006).

A third approach was that of the Hunter Valley region. It promoted pre-Games training as a central part of its *business* development strategy (not primarily its sports development strategy). The Hunter Olympic Business Taskforce was located within the Hunter Economic Development Corporation (HEDC), the local economic development agency, which was comprised of representatives from the 13 local government councils in the region. Members of the task force included members of local chambers of commerce, media agencies, tourism, hospitality, education and, of course, sport organisations (O'Brien & Gardiner 2006). Spending by visiting Olympic teams was viewed as one aspect of a much more integrated and long-term economic strategy. The HEDC appointed a full-time staff member to build relationships with Olympic teams and business representatives. The task force collated intelligence on the sporting delegations, media agencies, Olympic sponsors and foreign dignitaries planning visits in the lead-up to the Games. This enabled task force members to 'stage-manage' the visits of important actors as they arrived in the region, and to build business relationships.

These varying approaches by non-host cities suggest that municipal governments and other stakeholders have a wide spectrum of choices to make. They can approach the issue as a purely sporting one, or as an opportunity for business networking and for cementing twinning or business relations between their city or town and similar localities in the sportspeople's countries of origin. The responsibility for managing the teams' training activities can be lodged within a variety of departments, task forces or special-purposes entities. The impact of mega-events on non-host areas is not a foregone conclusion – it can be managed strategically to serve a range of developmental purposes.

In South Africa, it is not yet clear which towns will be selected as training sites. But the Australian example shows that the impending 2010 World Cup will present many local governments in South Africa with a potential tourism or business windfall. What they do with this windfall is up to their own creativity and entrepreneurial imagination.

Regional inequality in South African tourism

Historically, tourism has been unevenly distributed amongst different regions in South Africa. As early as 1936, Arthur J Norval wrote:

> South Africa has in the past not made the most of her [*sic*] visitors…
> overwhelmed by the vastness of the country, they find it difficult to
> orientate themselves and are like a flock without a shepherd. The
> inevitable result is that they are inclined to concentrate around the
> Cape Peninsula, where the majority of them spend a few weeks and
> return home having seen and enjoyed very little of the bounteous gifts
> South Africa has to offer…The tourists have to be induced to visit the
> hidden corners. (1936: 130)

Some dimensions of rural tourism have always been popular in South Africa. Wildlife tourism has always been a major component of South African tourism (Briedenhann & Wickens 2004). To many overseas visitors, rural tourism has always meant going 'on safari'. But rural tourism can mean much more than wildlife tourism. There are many other economic niche markets, such as adventure tourism, farm tourism, and small town culture and architecture.

Furthermore, governments can do a great deal to promote rural tourism creatively. In Malaysia, for example, government introduced agri-tourism centres to promote education and recreation in rural areas (Viljoen & Tlabela 2006). In South Africa, little has been done to 'package' and market the many small towns and farms in the rural hinterland. It has always been up to the private sector to develop these tourism products, and due to the great inequality in economic skills throughout the country, there has been a divergence between those towns 'that got it right' and those 'where nothing happens'. In the Karoo, for example, towns such as Prince Albert, Graaff-Reinet and Victoria West are maximising the benefits of their architectural heritage, whereas towns such as Loxton and Aberdeen, with fewer entrepreneurial resources, are being left behind.

It is becoming generally accepted that governments have a prima facie task to promote tourism in rural communities in order to promote rural economic diversification. In South Africa, the White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Tourism in South Africa explicitly stated as one of its economic goals, 'To facilitate balanced tourism development in South Africa'. According to section 3.2.vii of the White Paper:[1]

> Tourism brings development to rural areas…Many of the prime tourism attractions are not located in the city centres but in the rural areas. Tourism allows rural peoples to share in the benefits of tourism development, promoting more balanced and sustainable forms of development. Tourism provides an alternative to urbanisation, permitting people to continue a rural family existence, enfranchising both women and the youth.

As the White Paper also notes, tourism can also play a strategic role in 'dynamising other sectors of the economy – the agriculture sector that benefits from the tourism industry (increased demand for new agricultural products and services such as organic agriculture, farm tourism)'.

A key priority of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) has been to place new emphasis on projects that are located in disadvantaged areas, and on areas that have the potential to develop into tourism growth points or corridors. Thus far, government's focus has been on community-based tourism projects, such as creating local crafts centres, training tour guides and establishing tourism information offices. However, these have encountered many difficulties, such as the long and time-consuming processes of negotiating these projects in communities, as well as the difficulties of community management (Viljoen & Tlabela 2006). The

process of involving working-class groups and traditional communities, who have very little experience of tourism, has been fraught with misunderstandings and poor management. Consequently, once again it has been the local private sector in the small towns that has stepped into the breach and developed marketable tourism products.

National governments can also change the way in which non-host regions are brought into the mega-event experience, and the benefits that they might gain. National governments, together with tourism operators, are responsible for projecting 'images' of places and peoples. Scarlett Cornelissen has studied the 'political economy of South African international tourist representation' (2005: 677). 'Destination imaging' is a social and political issue because it creates images, narratives and desire-instilling myths to draw people to a destination. Various actors participate in this image-creation process – coordination tour operators, travel agents, state destination marketing organisations, hotel operators and airlines. The way that 'places' and 'people' are produced and couched in tourist images has an important effect on how they are consumed and packaged. The myths that dominate tourism to Africa tend to highlight landscapes, wildlife and exotic cultures. Africa is generally represented as 'the archetypal other', 'a place where Western tourists can attempt to refashion lost bonds with nature and the environment' (Cornelissen 2005: 679). By analysing promotional material on South Africa (mainly via a content analysis of brochures), Cornelissen (2005) provides an overview of the main destinations sold by overseas tour operators. In order of prominence, the most popular venues are Cape Town, the Kruger National Park, Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay, Mpumalanga game parks, the Garden Route, Oudtshoorn, Durban, the Winelands, Zululand, the Drakensberg, Hlhuhluwe National Park, Sun City and the Northern Cape.

The South African government has taken some steps to develop a more inclusive tourism brand as part of the government's larger nation-building project. 'Brand South Africa – Alive with Possibilities'[2] depicts the geographical, historical and social distinctiveness of the country and its unique heritage. Economically, the assumption is that a more inclusive tourist image will help bring about a more equitable sharing of the developmental benefits of tourism (Cornelissen 2005). To some extent this is indeed taking place in rural areas, where public and privately owned game parks are now including the concept of involving and benefiting local communities (Viljoen & Tlabela 2006). The DEAT has attempted to alter the travel patterns of international tourists in an effort to geographically diffuse tourism's economic impact. The 'routes-and-themes' strategy seeks to disperse tourist flows throughout the provinces, away from key attractions to lesser visited areas in the hinterland where the tourism impact is much lower (Cornelissen 2005). But these efforts have not yet made a major impact on the overarching destination imaging. The international marketing of smaller towns, remote rural areas and commercial farms remains few and far between.

In effect, many non-host rural areas are still off the international tourism map. Whether the DEAT's efforts to broaden the image of South Africa will counter the conventional images portrayed by private sector tour operators remains to be seen.

Yet, in many areas along the coasts and in the hinterland, such as the Karoo, many local towns are spontaneously investing in tourism. These include guest farms, bed-and-breakfast (B&B) establishments, restaurants and local activities such as game drives, hunting, stargazing and river-rafting.

The question now arises: in the two years before the 2010 World Cup, can non-host areas be defined, 'imaged' and marketed successfully, in such a way that some of the benefits of the mega-event can be shared more equitably across the country? Cornelissen (2005) is fairly positive – she suggests that mega-events may offer new political opportunities to host countries. Municipalities, communities and tourism operators need to accept the challenge of publicising their wares timeously, long before the World Cup takes place.

In the rest of the chapter, the possible fortunes of one such area will be examined – the arid areas of the Karoo, the Kalahari, the Klein Karoo and Namaqualand.

The arid areas in South Africa

The arid areas extend throughout the south-western parts of the subcontinent (see Figure 9.1). The Karoo stretches about 600 kilometres from west to east and from north to south. There are three main sub-regions: the Nama-Karoo (central-northern parts of the Karoo), the Klein Karoo (southern parts) and the False Karoo (in southern Free State). The Karoo straddles four provinces (the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape, the Northern Cape and the Free State). These areas have different climatic features, which has led to different agricultural and population profiles.

The Karoo shades into other arid areas, notably the Kalahari, Bushmanland, Namaqualand and the Richtersveld. These arid areas are sparsely populated and in some areas the population density is less than one or two people per km^2. This has contributed to the political insignificance of these areas, as the various provincial and national governments have invariably given more attention to their more populous regions. Economic planning for the arid areas has been bedevilled by the fact that they straddle four provincial jurisdictions, because provincial planning documents never address any cross-border commonalities.

The arid areas have important economic and social assets. Infrastructure in the towns is generally good and represents a great deal of 'sunk capital', or previously invested capital expenditure, in housing, water, sanitation, roads and other infrastructure. The game industry is becoming an important foreign exchange earner in the area. Agricultural expertise is high, with skilled and experienced commercial farmers who are often eager to become involved in ecotourism. Social services are generally good and include clinics, schools, banks, post offices and retail facilities. Some of the towns have developed significant tourism potential, with niche attractions and activities. Many towns have a large and growing number of accommodation establishments – country hotels, B&Bs and self-catering cottages. The mystique of Karoo architecture (small, square houses with the characteristic white walls

and green roofs) is becoming iconic. There is a growing phenomenon of 'reverse migration', whereby middle-class city dwellers are moving to the rural areas, and this brings in new sources of capital, expertise and developmental initiative.

Tourism in the Karoo has escalated dramatically in the last few years. This has been associated with a new generation of city residents who have moved to the Karoo, as well as a greater level of investment in tourism infrastructure by long-established Karoo farmers and townspeople. This process has been accompanied by a rapid rise in property prices as well as widespread efforts to renovate existing housing stock.

In the bigger Karoo towns, a surprisingly large number of visitors can be accommodated. Some towns, such as Colesberg, Graaff-Reinet and Beaufort West, already have more than 1 000 beds available. Upington has about 850 beds and Gariep Dam has 400.

Figure 9.1 The arid areas in southern and South Africa

Source: Charles Barker, Department of Geography, University of the Free State

Positioning the Karoo as a non-match destination

What impact could the 2010 World Cup have on this context of picturesque little towns, vast distances and desert landscapes? Will the World Cup pass the Karoo by, or can this region be drawn into the urban heartbeat of a sports mega-event?

The World Cup may potentially cause an increase in the number of tourist visits to South Africa, as well as widespread media exposure (DEAT 2005). The DEAT has drafted a detailed plan for the 2010 World Cup. Estimates of visitor numbers vary, and may be exaggerated. It is estimated that there will be about 3.5 million participants in the World Cup (1.8 million with tickets and 1.5 million without tickets); of these, 1.3 million are expected to be tourists, of which a third are expected to be foreign visitors (DEAT 2005). According to Shannon Moffett, a tourism planner commissioned by the Eastern Cape government, it is expected that about 300 000 people will visit each host city and, of these people, about 150 000 will have to access overnight accommodation (Moffett interview). The remainder will presumably make day trips to host destinations.

A major factor is the likelihood that these visitors may spend a longer time in the country, due to the offer of attractive tourism products (DEAT 2005). Improving geographic spread is one of the key strategic focus points of the DEAT's *Tourism Organising Plan*, which proposes several initiatives of possible relevance to the Karoo: engaging with key stakeholders to package products for 2010, increasing the number of graded establishments, identifying existing and alternative accommodation for short-term spikes in demand, developing products and packages to sell, and cooperating with tour operators. Marketing and branding of functional areas is an important focus.

At the time of writing, the Eastern Cape was one of the provinces which had made the most progress in compiling an overarching strategy for 2010. In June 2007, the Eastern Cape Department of Tourism held a conference entitled '2010 Tourism Readiness'. The conference report highlights areas with tourism potential within 1.5 hours' drive from Nelson Mandela Bay, East London and Mthatha, as well as the Gariep Dam (situated on the boundary between the Eastern Cape and the Free State). However, the report does not recommend the Karoo as an area for strategic interventions for the World Cup – an unfortunate oversight. Furthermore, the Eastern Cape tourism authorities have subsequently become moribund as far as tourism planning is concerned, apparently due to institutional difficulties within the Tourism Board. At the time of writing, these problems were being addressed.

The following host cities are located near the periphery of the Karoo: Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay and Mangaung. The Karoo may experience four types of impacts:
- visitors may travel through the Karoo from one venue location to another;
- Karoo towns and game farms may experience increased tourism as visitors explore specific sub-regions;

- towns can market themselves as satellite towns; and
- towns may offer fan park facilities.

These factors are discussed briefly.

Through travel

Some calculations of possible tourist numbers have been done in the Eastern Cape. It is estimated that the World Cup will draw about 4 800 domestic travellers and about 22 600 international visitors to the Nelson Mandela Bay area (Eastern Cape DEDEA n.d.). Many of these visitors will travel by road from one match venue to another, and will drive across the Karoo along the N1, N9, N10 and N12 highways. These visitors will require overnight accommodation and may be enticed by local advertising efforts. Even though the number of overnight visitors may not be that large, it could have a major impact – albeit short term – on the local tourism trade of these Karoo towns.

The Eastern Cape Department of Transport has acknowledged the importance of road maintenance for the 2010 World Cup. The department's Transport Framework has identified the 'Karoo Agro-tourism Belt' as one of the four major tourism regions in the province. In addition, the Framework highlights the 2010 World Cup as a significant potential contributor to tourism in smaller towns, because spectators will want to watch their favourite teams practising in those towns, and then travel to Nelson Mandela Bay for the matches. There is scope for promoting tourism in the Karoo and for 'keeping people for a few days' – an argument also made by Camdeboo Local Municipality in Graaff-Reinet (Eastern Cape Department of Roads and Transport 2007).

Area tourism

When tourists stay on in a location for a few days, they may make day trips to attractions in the vicinity. Factors such as a high standard of accommodation, transport facilities and an internet presence will facilitate such bookings (Eastern Cape DEDEA n.d.). Towns with natural, cultural or relaxation attractions would be at an advantage. In this context, Karoo towns located within a driving radius of about three hours from major cities (Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay and Mangaung) may benefit. In these towns, tourists may require the services of tour guides and translators.

Furthermore, the marketing of tourism routes in the Karoo may well attract visitors to explore less known towns (Briedenhann & Wickens 2004). Routes such as the Owl Route (Graaff-Reinet to New Bethesda), the Mohair Route (Aberdeen/Jansenville) and the Horizons Route (Philippolis/Jacobsdal) should position themselves to attract self-drive visitors for short excursions.

Under the banner of the African Dream Project,[3] the concept of tourism routes criss-crossing the country has presented exciting new opportunities for rural

communities. By 2004, Open Africa had created 32 tourism routes involving 80 towns in four southern African countries.

Satellite areas

The host venue cities are likely to provide insufficient accommodation for the thousands of visitors who want to attend matches. This means that 'satellite areas' further afield need to be selected and marketed. Many tourists and fans will most likely be stationed in these satellite areas and will have to travel to different cities where matches take place. The key organisation responsible for arranging accommodation bookings is MATCH,[4] which will also put in place transport to ferry fans to and from matches in different cities.

MATCH is actively negotiating with local accommodation operators to select satellite areas. There are certain requirements for an area to be chosen as a satellite area (Van Rooyen interview). The area can be located anywhere in the country as long as it offers a minimum of 200 rooms and has a good road infrastructure. The rooms also need to be assessed and graded by the Tourism Grading Council of South Africa, with which MATCH has a partnership. Proximity to tourist attractions is not a prerequisite. The availability of an airport would be an advantage, as it will allow the area to serve as a spectator base camp – fans who are accommodated in that area would be able to fly in and out to matches in different host cities.

MATCH is holding sessions in various towns to inform accommodation owners of the MATCH accommodation contract. At these meetings, MATCH explains the contracting process to tourism associations and encourages them to assist in communicating the system to the accommodation owners in their areas.

At the time of writing, Upington and Springbok in the arid areas had been identified as possible satellite areas. However, their satellite status will only be confirmed once they have individually contracted to MATCH a minimum of 200 rooms, and MATCH has confirmed that their road infrastructure is sufficient to allow for efficient transporting of fans to and from matches.

Fan parks

Provincial governments are likely to contribute towards the capital costs of the fan parks, which will be large areas with massive TV screens. Such venues will require significant traffic and road planning in the local vicinity. At the time of writing, there was not yet clarity about the selection of sites for fan parks (Langenhoven interview).

The advertising pitch of the town of Somerset East (150 kilometres from Nelson Mandela Bay) illustrates the kind of marketing towns can devise for the more off-the-beaten-track type of traveller:

Somerset East could be a centre for overseas tourists coming to South Africa for the 2010 Soccer World Cup to WATCH IT WITH US! The potential exists for smaller towns to offer an experience where the visitors could watch the matches they are not attending on a widescreen TV with the local people, and stay in local homes or B&Bs. The area has over 160 graded beds already, with at least 54 which will be graded in time for 2010. There is potential, in the time before 2010, to help develop and grade Township HomeStays, and some of the international visitors will be interested in this REAL experience. This same concept could be developed by CACADU [District Municipality in the Eastern Cape] as a whole. In Somerset East, WATCH IT WITH US could be staged on a local soccer field, with the experience of watching with the soccer-loving community; or it could be staged in one of the hangars which will be available at the newly recommissioned Somerset East Airfield. Somerset East and the Blue Crane Route is an area of great natural beauty, is safe and secure, and offers a wide range of cultural and outdoor experiences. (flyer)

The potential downside: Budgetary reallocations

There is a potential negative consequence of mega-events for non-host areas. This is the reduction of capital expenditure in these areas, because capital is diverted to host cities (Madden 2006). It is very difficult to estimate whether this will take place, because budgeting decisions are often very obscure and trade-offs may not be clearly specified (and may also not be admitted by officials).

Municipalities in host cities have benefited from additional budgetary allocations. In 2005 the government created a Public Transport Infrastructure Systems Grant for passenger transport services to facilitate movement of people for the 2010 World Cup. In particular, the development of Bus Rapid Transit schemes offers exciting opportunities to improve municipal public transport systems. To ensure that the World Cup leaves South Africans with a legacy of better public transport, the government is adding a further R2.3 billion to this programme. The South African National Roads Agency and the Rail Commuter Corporation will receive a further R1.7 billion to upgrade roads and stations in areas critical to the World Cup. In total, over R9 billion will be allocated by national government for municipal transport, roads and precinct upgrading related to the 2010 FIFA World Cup (IDASA 2007).

The provincial governments have appealed to central government for additional funding for 2010, but while they are getting funding for stadiums, it is unlikely that they will get sufficient funding for capital projects such as roads and neighbourhood rejuvenation. This means that provinces will have to utilise their existing funding strategically (Langenhoven interview). The sectors which are most likely to be affected are transport, roads, health, sport and culture. The provincial departments of health,

for example, will have to provide emergency medical services. The emergency health services have received some additional funding from central government, but this is for emergency services generally. Once the World Cup takes place, these emergency services will be applied more strategically to assist at specific events.

The importance of the World Cup is definitely revealed in the priorities chosen for the years leading up to 2010 (Langenhoven interview). For example, departments of transport will evaluate projects in the light of the contribution that they can make to manage traffic flows in host cities, and departments of economic development will focus on specific projects, such as tourism and marketing. Some non-host areas might also benefit from government investment if certain towns are identified as potential base camps, because specific issues need to be addressed to deal with traffic bottlenecks.

For non-host areas, the budgetary implications of the 2010 World Cup are likely to be mixed. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, the mega-event has caused road expenditures to be diverted from rural areas to host cities. In the budget speech for Transport, Safety and Community Liaison, the MEC, Bheki Cele, said that the original estimate for the road network was calculated at R3.9 billion for the 2007 financial year. This needs assessment excludes provision for the backlog of pedestrian bridges and access roads throughout the province, which needs to be managed within the R2.3 billion budget allocated to the programme. 'Whilst inundated with this huge demand for road networks, we should also take cognisance that our road network must also respond to the rapid and easy execution of activities for the success of the FIFA 2010 World Cup,' according to Cele (*Engineering News* 18 May 2007).[5]

In the Eastern Cape, R250 million was allocated for the upgrading of the 2010 sports stadiums in Nelson Mandela Bay, East London and Mthatha (Nel 2008). Without the World Cup, this money could have been spent in the rural areas, where there is a great need for infrastructure.

On the other hand, the 'spirit of the 2010 World Cup' caused renewed allocations for rural sports facilities in KwaZulu-Natal: an additional R128.9 million over the Medium Term Expenditure Framework was allocated to sport and recreation programmes and to finance the construction of sports facilities in underprivileged areas.[6]

From mega-event to rural development

The expansion of the impact of the 2010 World Cup to non-host cities is part of a larger set of issues. It is possible that the World Cup may promote tourism in previously under-marketed areas. But the danger exists that this may be of short-term benefit, lasting only for the duration of the event – unless other measures are taken to multiply the longer-term impacts.

Already in 1936, Norval argued that South Africa's tourist traffic can, if well directed, play a most important part in the future economic and industrial development of

the country – it can act as a 'spearhead…for the introduction of capital, and for the creation and development of foreign markets' (Norval 1936, cited in Ingle 2006: 84).

Tourism has the potential to generate growth and development because it brings financial resources into an area (either as capital investment or as the spending power of tourists), and because it encourages governments to provide infrastructure in the form of roads, transport systems, water provision and electricity. Governments can select tourism as a growth area by identifying sites and injecting public and private investment into the areas, possibly in the form of subsidised facilities and infrastructure. Furthermore, it is important that tourism agencies and economic development officers understand the existing linkages between firms in each locality, so that investment in one sector, such as tourism, is matched by investments in other sectors, such as water provision, street lights, museums or parks. Eventually, economic growth in the area becomes self-sustaining and diversifies to include non-tourism activities. The growth of the residential population means that additional products and services are required, thus stimulating a wider range of markets (Telfer 2002).

Rural tourism is eminently suitable to promote small-scale, locally owned development. The defining feature of rural tourism is the opportunity to give visitors personal contact with the physical and human environment of the countryside and, as far as possible, to allow them to participate in the activities, traditions and lifestyles of the local people (Petric 2002, in Viljoen & Tlabela 2006). In countries such as Italy, France and the United Kingdom, rural tourism is becoming a major draw card, with significant economic and financial impacts in the rural areas. In developing countries such as South Africa, rural tourism includes wildlife, ecotourism, game ranching and hunting; but it also opens the way for a new appreciation of small towns, working farms and rural lifestyles.

Tourism has certain benefits and disadvantages as a lead sector. It is beneficial because it is labour-intensive and stimulates a wide range of entrepreneurial activities, and it is often based on rural and natural amenities which are available anyway. Tourism can promote local economic multipliers.

But there are many difficulties in promoting rural tourism (Briedenhann & Wickens 2004). Local areas often lack sufficient skills, finance, entrepreneurship, marketing expertise and reliable market information. Lack of tourism awareness and understanding amongst rural communities is a significant constraint to effective participation, communication and decision-making. Local economic multipliers are eroded by the purchase of goods and services from businesses external to the areas (and often located in the cities). Many rural tourism businesses struggle to identify appropriate promotional and communications programmes and do not have effective booking systems, particularly through travel agents. Furthermore, rural tourism enterprises, like any others, have to survive in a tough business environment. A mega-event creates opportunities for tourism in rural and small-town areas, but it will require assertive, dynamic and innovative leadership and support by provincial and municipal governments.

A fully fledged developmental response to 2010 should go beyond the promotion of accommodation opportunities in rural localities. For effective long-term rural development, rural areas need at least two major support strategies. Firstly, tourism should form part of a wider economic diversification strategy (Briedenhann & Wickens 2004). Rural tourism can assist rural areas to diversify from agriculture to adventure tourism or cultural tourism.

Secondly, rural tourism needs to move beyond a supply-led strategy and begin to promote tourism demand, increasing tourist volumes and escalating market volume. The 2010 World Cup offers an opportunity to do this, but only if government promotes the marketing of rural areas in ways that attract many more visitors to these out-of-the-way places (Briedenhann & Wickens 2004). Thus far, the government's attempts to market the non-host areas remain patchy at best.

Marketing a tourism region: The state of the art

Rural tourism can be promoted as a type of *regional* tourism. The creative marketing and branding of regions is required to attract teams and tourists to more remote and unconventional localities.

A useful concept is that of a 'tourism destination zone'. Such a zone needs several characteristics to be a meaningful developmental unit (Smith 1995, in Telfer 2002): the region should have a set of cultural, physical and social characteristics that create a sense of regional identity; it should have adequate infrastructure; it should be larger than just one community or one attraction; it should be capable of supporting a tourism planning agency and marketing initiatives; and it should be accessible – by various means of transport – to a large tourist market.

Borders have emerged as a 'new frontier' in international tourism research (Rogerson 2003). Cross-border cooperation can be significant, whether at the level of districts, provinces or national governments. Cross-border cooperation situates entire regions more strongly in the tourism market, because tourists will often have a regional rather than a specific destination in mind. It enables an ecological biome (e.g. the Karoo) to be marketed and branded. 'Desert tourism' is a potential new option on the tourism menu – and deserts often cross borders.

Promoting regional tourism can also allow the rationalisation of investments in tourism infrastructure by encouraging the sharing of facilities, such as airports. Furthermore, cooperation amongst governments can lead to different features from each of the countries being combined to provide complementary tour circuits (Cleverdon 2002).

The key strategic question is: to what extent can provinces and municipalities synchronise their tourism promotion efforts across borders, in order to promote a region (such as the Karoo) in a holistic way?

Specific policy measures for regional development could be concentrated on three different aspects (Smallbone et al. 2007):

- developing the supply base (skills, education, innovations, communications);
- developing the demand side of regions by finding new markets (including mega-events);
- developing the institutional framework (development agencies, business associations, political representation).

Significantly, this can be done in areas that are economically underdeveloped:

> In less favoured regions, initiatives that seek to build a sense of pride and regional identity may be a helpful tactic, when introducing new policies and in seeking to gain support for them. Moreover, in a cross border context, where border regions artificially divide cultural regions, with common traditions and a common language, developing this regional identity could well benefit from a cross border element. (Smallbone et al. 2007: 136)

This has huge relevance for a remote arid area such as the Karoo; in Australia, the efforts of Desert Knowledge to promote the regional advantages of the Outback illustrate the potential success of such initiatives (DKA 2005).

Such government intervention would create a vision for the region, using symbols accepted by the regional community to create a regional brand. It could also assist small enterprises to upgrade their operations by means of bridging loans and specialised services, and provide training to increase human capacity (Smallbone et al. 2007).

According to Deccio and Baloglu (2002), mega-events create opportunities for regional mobilisation. A marketing plan for such events should be initiated with an emphasis on working with local residents and state tourism officials: 'Leaders should present the plan for the Olympic [in this case World Cup] period and generate interest – perhaps through volunteer activities, events and committees' (Deccio & Baloglu 2002: 54). Effort should be put into community tourism education, discussion forums and other consultation activities. By working with state officials, local governments can join tourism campaigns and special promotions designed for mega-events.

Another approach of relevance to the arid areas is 'route tourism', which brings together a variety of activities and attractions under a unified theme and thus stimulates tourism entrepreneurs to provide ancillary products and services (Lourens 2007). The concept of rural trails or heritage routes has been used in several parts of the world, particularly for promoting rural tourism and less explored areas with valuable cultural resources. In particular, it can appeal to specific niche markets. Routes vary considerably in length and scale (local, regional or international).

Local governments can play an important role in regional development, particularly in providing and facilitating social and physical infrastructure (Smallbone et al. 2007). But such strategies will require institutional innovation. As shown by the examples of the Australian cities, described earlier, municipal governments can

make choices about how to position themselves to capture a potential windfall. They can entice World Cup managers to use their town as a base camp, or they can mobilise accommodation facilities to serve as a satellite area, or they can attract local and regional visitors to a fan park. Regional and municipal governments can be entrepreneurial and use the mega-event to attract business to their localities.

Cross-border tourism planning in the Karoo: New directions

As yet, there is no multi-provincial approach to promoting tourism in the Karoo. But provincial governments are beginning to think in this direction. For example, the Western Cape's *Integrated Tourism Development Framework* asserts the need for collaboration across regions:

> We believe that the hinterland regions should look beyond their own boundaries and link products across previously discussed frontiers in order to build collective strength and a sustainable product. Such co-operation would enable these areas to capitalise on the growing trend of tourists travelling into hinterland areas seeking more diverse and unique experiences. (Western Cape Provincial Government 2006: 6)

At a more practical level, a promising initiative is the Lake !Gariep[7] tourism route, centred on the Gariep Dam area in the southern Free State. It is a cooperative venture between the provincial governments of the Free State, the Northern Cape and the Eastern Cape, because the dam is at the very point where the three provinces meet. It is surrounded by three provincial game reserves, which will be joined in due course to create a conservation area in excess of 85 000 hectares.[8] The game reserve will offer ecotourism activities such as game drives, walking trails, angling and bird watching. In addition, the huge Gariep Dam offers opportunities for yachting, sunset cruises, power boating and water-skiing. The key role-players are three district municipalities: Xhariep (in the Free State), Ukhahlamba (in the Eastern Cape) and Pixley ka Seme (in the Northern Cape). However, the project has suffered a range of bureaucratic delays, which are apparently being remedied in the light of the impending 2010 World Cup.

The Free State, in particular, is now attempting to fast-track the Lake !Gariep project. The province has created a 2010 Hospitality Committee, which is investigating accommodation options within a vicinity of 200 kilometres from Mangaung. Lake !Gariep is located about 180 kilometres from Mangaung and is earmarked as a MATCH satellite town. The province is urging all accommodation establishments to become officially graded by the Tourism Grading Council in order to qualify for MATCH status. To speed up the process, the Free State Department of Tourism is training additional grading assessors (Motsohi interview).

The Free State has also launched a 2010 World Cup website, in which the Xhariep region features prominently. Even though this region is very undeveloped, the website manages to spin a positive image for the potential 2010 tourist:

> As one of the five districts in the Free State, the Xhariep District covers basically the south-western Free State, an arid region with typical Karoo characteristics. The main economic sector is stock farming, supported by limited horticulture based on irrigation infrastructure from the Orange, Caledon and Riet rivers. However, with this region having the lowest population density, highest unemployment rate and smallest GDP in the Free State, tourism is the sector with the best chance to unlock its developmental potential.[9]

Such initiatives offer a useful starting point to marketing the arid areas. There is a major potential opportunity to market the Karoo holistically (Firfirey interview). But there is, as yet, no inclusive 'Karoo brand' on offer, in comparison to Australia's Outback which is aggressively marketed as a joint effort of several state governments. Organisations such as Desert Knowledge Australia promote research, development, businesses, technological investment and tourism marketing in the Outback. As yet, South Africa lacks such cooperative regional institutions in the arid hinterland, although Lake !Gariep is the first tentative step in this direction.

The challenges for municipalities in South Africa in 2010

In South Africa, municipalities are likely to play a key role in determining their approach to the 2010 World Cup. For those towns which are located within 120 kilometres of match venues, there is a major opportunity to function as a base camp. FIFA will assess these facilities, although the ultimate choice will depend on the preferences of teams, team managers and coaches. Such localities will need sophisticated training facilities and will have to provide four-star or five-star accommodation for at least 50 to 80 people; these teams may also be accompanied by hundreds or even thousands of supporters (Neumeier interview).

District municipalities are becoming involved in assessing their own role in promoting the benefits of the World Cup experience. For example, the Cacadu District Municipality in the Eastern Cape has held stakeholder meetings with a view to creating a 2010 Cacadu District Municipality. The committee includes the Department of Sports and Recreation, the Department of Arts and Culture, the South African Football Association, sports councils and community services officers.

Due to its close proximity to Nelson Mandela Bay, the Cacadu District Municipality intends attracting soccer teams to the Eastern Cape to establish base camps (*Graaff-Reinet Advertiser* 26 October 2007). In the Western Cape, several municipalities are considering bidding to be selected as base camps (Langenhoven interview).

At this stage, provincial governments are promoting consultation amongst municipalities and providing municipalities with information. The Eastern Cape, for example, has a 2010 Steering Committee, bringing together various government departments. Similarly, the Western Cape has monthly forum meetings, attended

by government departments and municipalities. However, the fruits of these discussions remain to be seen.

A successful response to the 2010 World Cup will require an effective marriage of the public and private sectors. Government, at all levels, can only provide frameworks and promote discussion and facilitation. It is up to the private sector to respond dynamically to these opportunities, because such a response will require entrepreneurship, investment, innovation and, of course, a degree of risk. Each locality will require a 'driver' – an enthusiastic person or organisation which will galvanise local energies to provide accommodation and tourism opportunities. With such initiative, the World Cup can enable previously marginalised areas to place themselves on the world map. The 'driver' will need to undertake an active media strategy to 'fight to get noticed' (Neumeier interview). Local communities need to link up with travel agents and tour operators, they need to lobby overseas teams or FIFA, they need to assess their own assets and stimulate improvements where necessary.

Conclusion

The 2010 World Cup will be a mega-event, but it will be transient. Once the event is over, the dust has settled and the visitors have departed, the key question will be whether the World Cup had lasting developmental impacts.

The international literature shows that innovative thinking, creative branding and assertive marketing can bring non-host areas into the mainstream for the duration of the mega-event. Localities have to organise and sell themselves. Governments, at all levels, are strategically placed to create and maintain strategic infrastructure, and to facilitate the networking of local players. The private sector needs to take the opportunity to invest in tourism infrastructure. Local entrepreneurs need to seize the new market windfall.

Even areas which are not selected as host cities have a range of options to position themselves to benefit from this windfall. Smaller towns can function as satellite areas and can maximise tourism activities in the hinterland around the cities. Towns which are located further afield, on main highways, can entice travellers to stay a night or two en route to their next match venue. Towns can also entice residents in the vicinity, as well as domestic tourists, to enjoy the matches in a fan park setting.

For this to happen, the major ingredients are entrepreneurship and networking. Rural tourism operators need to be very creative to put their areas on the radar screen of tourists and teams. Regional players need to network amongst themselves to brand their region (or sub-region) as a tourism destination zone. Government agencies need to broker these relationships – this is a major role for provincial, district and local governments. The Australian case studies show how innovative municipalities can rise to the occasion. South Africa has been given a potential windfall; it will require local dynamism to spot the opportunities and to make them a reality.

Notes

1 Available at www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/tourism.htm, accessed in October 2007.

2 See http://www.southafrica.info/.

3 The African Dream is a non-profit organisation which has launched thousands of unemployed South Africans into successful businesses and promotes the creation of vibrant local economies in marginalised areas. See www.openafrica.org and www. africandreamtrust.co.za.

4 MATCH Event Services (Ltd) Pty is the service provider managing the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ Tour Operator Programme on behalf of FIFA. See http://touroperator.match-ag. com/.

5 B Naidoo, 'Transport department reduces KZN transport budget', available at http://www. engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=108233, accessed in March 2008.

6 'KZN pumps millions into 2010 World Cup', available at http://www.sa2010.gov.za/ news/080229_kznbudget.php.

7 The word '!Gariep' is pronounced with a distinctive tongue click.

8 See http://www.gariepdam.com/news2_sept2004.htm, accessed on 8 October 2007.

9 See http://www.freestate2010.com/region_xhariep.php.

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10 *Public viewing areas: Urban interventions in the context of mega-events*

Christoph Haferburg, Theresa Golka and Marie Selter

A new focal point for the reflection on mega-events and urban development has evolved since the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany: the huge success of various public viewing facilities has shown that at least for the near future, the extension of the event into the cities represents vast opportunities not only for marketing, but also for the promotion of a new public sphere, social interaction and the (re)creation of urban spaces. For South Africa, the next host of the most popular mega-event in sport, this opportunity is set against a background of much greater challenges: the persistent fragmentation of post-apartheid cities and of wider South African society as well. In this chapter, we focus on the question of whether the event – and especially its representation through public viewing areas (PVAs) – can help to address the problem of persisting social and spatial disparities. Consequently, the concepts of social and spatial capital represent two lines of thought when approaching this problem. Following them, we identify critical factors linked to PVAs and discuss how they might contribute to socio-spatial integration.[1]

Social and spatial dimensions of public viewing

Public viewing facilities share a number of social interdependencies with the implementation of every large-scale sporting event. Particularly in the case of football, they generate a high degree of social mobilisation and provide occasions for common experiences which form a backdrop for social identification. In South Africa, football plays an important role due to its status as the most popular 'black' team sport.[2] This lends an additional symbolic dimension to it in a context that has a long history of delegitimising black people's taste and lifestyle. Thus in terms of the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup, PVAs have much potential to link the event to all spheres of post-apartheid society. Based on the examples of Berlin, one of the host cities in 2006, and Cape Town, a future host in 2010, the chapter explores how urban interventions such as PVAs can be placed to create local benefits and places of possibility.

Public viewing: The expanded event as a success story

The PVA is essentially a facility providing a live broadcast of any major sporting event (in this case the Football World Cup) and offering sufficient space for a number of people to watch the game. For the purposes of this chapter, we distinguish between,

first, the FIFA fan park (which occupies the most prominent place next to the stadium in the city centre); second, the official municipal PVAs; third, other formal (local) PVAs (e.g. commercial events in shopping malls); and fourth, informal places of public viewing (e.g. when people congregate around a television set on the street). All of these are public in the sense that there is no general restriction of access and no registration is necessary, although in some cases a fee may be charged (or, as in a pub, the placing of an order is expected). The size of the crowds attracted by PVAs ranges from a handful of spectators in a street café to tens of thousands of fans at bigger sites. All of these public viewing facilities are interesting when debating the potential of urban interventions. However, since our conceptual frame is defined by the question of how the spatial and social dimensions of public viewing can be transformed by planning, we focus on the larger public viewing facilities. Consequently, in this chapter the term 'PVA' refers to the FIFA fan park and other large formal PVAs. When smaller events are drawn into the discussion, this is made explicit.

PVAs bring to mind squares filled with people in front of huge screens, watching the course of a football match in full momentum. The atmosphere is intense, every foul against one's own team met with exclamations of indignation, every free kick greeted with approval and, of course, every goal celebrated to the full. Everything in this virtual arena takes place as if the match were happening right there. However, the differences are still remarkable: in the stadiums, the circular architecture creates a unique atmosphere which draws its character from the arrangement of the seats, which focuses all eyes on the ball and echoes spectators' voices. Interaction between the spectators takes place, however weak the bond may be. In contrast, arrangement and atmosphere are less orchestrated at the PVAs. The players on the pitch are merely flat representations on a screen and are thus removed from the interaction. This detachment makes public viewing very different from being present at the event itself – and more 'laid-back' as well.

Therefore, although public viewing may be perceived as a surrogate for the live event, it nevertheless creates a reality in its own right. The detachment appeals to the more relaxed football fans and watching a game can be more like a pub experience or even a picnic with some entertainment in the background. This is not to say that the choice of whether or not to watch the match in the stadium is based exclusively on such preferences – limited availability of tickets and ticket pricing are important factors too. Still, the spin-offs generated through the replication of reality (made possible through evolutions in broadcasting) are unique, and the PVAs at the 2010 World Cup will have an important impact on public space and life during the event and, depending on their design, afterwards as well. Vitalisation of vacant land, density of traffic, variation of uses of specific sites, and mobilisation of citizens and visitors are just a few of the elements relevant in this regard. PVAs are also part of the motivation to host the World Cup, beyond the expected economic gains. They are stepping stones in both directions – they contribute to the popularity of the event and to the (forecasted) economic gains.

The economics of PVAs and its limits

From an institutional perspective, economic capital is very much involved in the FIFA World Cup: professional sport is based on the billions of dollars at stake. FIFA and private sector companies, especially in marketing, are very aware of this. The issue of where this money comes from places the fans at the centre of the equation. Public viewing as an extension of the spectacle represents a broadening of the economic base of something that is already quite extensive. For example, even though the official FIFA fan parks in Germany in 2006 did not charge any entrance fees, the money generated through the profits from commercials and advertising was related to the number of spectators. People who would otherwise never have visited a stadium were drawn into the game via public viewing. In Germany, the share of female fans among the visitors to the PVAs was 44 per cent, much higher than in the stadiums (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 2006: 82). General participation in the event was wider than in past World Cups elsewhere and the potential target groups were larger than ever before.

However, the monopolised selling of drinks and snacks at the PVAs through the official sponsors (mostly global companies like Budweiser) generates an extra profit for FIFA (since it increases the market value of international sponsorships) and limits possible benefits for the local economy. Additionally, the huge investments required to host the event are prohibitive and often the hosts do not benefit from it immediately (see Horn & Zemann 2006; Maennig 2007; Maennig & Du Plessis 2007). Thus, there must be something else to gain: sport is a social event and any kind of social formation can benefit from the unifying potential of this type of tournament. The hosts of the World Cup expect positive social effects beyond a purely financial logic. Based on this idea, we can analyse the wider effects and implications of the event by referring to perspectives which make the structural dynamics of societies in general accessible to theoretical reflections. These perspectives are represented by the various concepts of social differentiation.

The mega-event as a social experience

The discussion of PVAs so far indicates that their social significance is quite relevant, for example regarding national cohesion. The question is, what role can PVAs play in South African cities as urban interventions? To answer this, and to find a starting point to identify the main societal dimensions involved, we rely on ideas developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1989). We can then assert – speaking conceptually – that the event will differ in its significance for the different inhabitants of the host cities. The World Cup will be consumed by different individuals and social groups according to their ability to relate to it. The same applies to their relation to other spectators. To understand the replication and variation of social dynamics, Bourdieu developed a model of the social space which is built on economic, cultural and social capital. Grand-scale changes, especially in cultural and social capital, are difficult to reach even for economic achievers. This means that the circumstances that lead to the

reproduction of social division have a tendency to form persistent patterns. So the differentiated distribution of the types of capital contributes to the shaping of a society, and the relative position that each of its members holds is based on the size and structure of their portfolio of capital. Subjects with similar portfolios find themselves in similar positions. They usually share tastes and ways of interacting. But when people meet in a context that differs from their daily routines, they can start to make new choices.[3]

It has been commented, though, that not all aspects of the game (in a societal sense) are represented in this picture, and Bourdieu himself – being aware of this – suggested some possible extensions of the model. Still, we can make a preliminary assumption that the 'production of sport' is a field constituted by all the types of capital Bourdieu mentioned. Regarding the expected returns on investment generated from the World Cup, social capital may be more important for South Africa than anything else.[4] And by putting it this way – referring to South Africa rather than to South Africans – we are not only relying on Bourdieu but also drawing on Coleman's (1988) and Putnam's (1995) interpretations of social capital. The focus is no longer on how the subject interacts with society and whether he or she can benefit from the individual assets, but rather on the benefits that the sum of individual contributions creates for the wider community. Thus, for the discussion of PVAs in their urban context, social capital is our main concern. However, we also discuss the role of the spatial attributes of PVAs and their relevance for the residents of the respective cities.

The argument so far has suggested that, due to the embeddedness of the World Cup in the hosting countries' social representations, the qualities of its reception can be discussed in line with concepts that have been developed to analyse societies in general. The glue that forms social relations is highly relevant; the same applies to the places where they are lived. We will specify both of these with regard to PVAs.

Social capital, interaction and social cohesion

To understand how PVAs might strengthen social capital, a short definition of the concept is required. Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995) state that social capital is the mortar that holds societies together by creating mutual benefits of social interaction within families and communities. Bourdieu defines it as a network of relationships of mutual knowing and recognition. He stresses the importance of group membership, but also acknowledges the material basis of this relationship: the exchange of goods and services. Here, social capital is discussed as a resource that can be used individually, whereas Putnam sees it as a collective resource that provides a measure for how well societies perform – or can potentially perform (a critical comparison is given by Landhäußer and Micheel [2005]). Bourdieu (1983) shows that social capital can be institutionalised in societies through its material and symbolic aspects, and he stresses that it is not just an effect of spatial or social proximity; it requires effort to acquire it. This effort may be cast in the form of rites

and this applies even to seemingly accidental relations. This is why occasions, places and practices (such as PVAs) become so important (Bourdieu et al. 1993).

In spite of the authors' different concepts of capital in a broader sense, all three have quite a similar notion of social capital. Even if the empirical evidence of Putnam's application is debatable (McCoy 2002), the common elements of the concept (including Bourdieu's interpretation) still offer a perspective that allows a comparison between different social arrangements. Building on this, we can distinguish between effects of interventions regarding social cohesion and stability. This is not to say that stability is necessarily always desirable. Nevertheless, we can attribute some positive effects to scenarios that are opposed to violent and destructive constellations that we find, for example, in a number of Cape Town's neighbourhoods.

Based on the results of a research project[5] (Haferburg 2007; Haferburg & Oßenbrügge 2003), we have tried to evaluate differences in the amount of social capital in various neighbourhoods. When looking at the sample in Figure 10.1, one sees the formerly segregated quarters of the apartheid city, from white Kenilworth via coloured Hanover Park, Manenberg and Sherwood Park to black Guguletu and Phola Park.[6] Social relations are formed in neighbourhoods, which represent locally specified patterns of individual societalisation. The survey results show that strong communities may just as easily exist in coloured middle-class areas (Sherwood Park) as in informal settlements (Phola Park). On the other hand, stable social relations are not necessarily found in townships, as Guguletu, for instance, demonstrates. Nevertheless, these milieus sometimes exist within specific environments which can generate a high degree of social capital based on trust, cohesion and knowing one's neighbours. They are, of course, not limited to townships. Local events that attract a broad range of people can contribute to strengthening these assets.

In the context of PVAs, this perspective is relevant because it is linked to ownership of places and the range of people who might feel attracted to a specific site. Figure 10.1

Figure 10.1 Perceived strength of the sense of community in residents' own neighbourhood

Source: Haferburg (2007), sample areas in the Wetton–Lansdowne Corridor cf., own survey 2000

Note: *Numbers in brackets denote the number of respondents in each area.

indicates that even in the closest proximity (Manenberg and Sherwood Park), huge differences can be found in the respondents' perceptions of their neighbourhoods (and crime levels tend to reflect this) (Haferburg 2007). In Sherwood Park, social capital is generated around mosques and churches, crèches and committees, schools and sports clubs. It is not only the presence or absence of buildings and institutions where people come together which makes a difference; the location of potential places of social interaction, such as PVAs, is also critical. This is especially true in South Africa, where the inherited pattern of neatly divided urban space can either be reproduced or challenged. Thus, interventions in the built environment could attempt to create new centralities *in between*, like the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin that attracts people from both sides of the divide.

Social capital has to be carefully evaluated in its specific societal context. Sport has an important role to play here. Its unifying potential can be brought into play during the FIFA World Cup through the way in which public viewing is planned and managed before and during the event. An integrated planning strategy for public viewing forms one of the steps to achieving this. The City of Cape Town has already developed such a strategy, which we refer to in the last part of this chapter together with a scenario that presents our case study of what the integration of social and spatial capital by means of PVAs could look like.

Social capital and urban space

During the four weeks of the World Cup, the host country will receive wide media coverage. Of importance here, though, is the way in which the symbolic dimension amalgamates with the material structure through particular spatial arrangements. The location of the PVAs is one of these arrangements (the location of the stadium in Cape Town has its own history – see Chapter 7, this volume). Every society seeks to create its special places and all city leaders dedicate much of their efforts to urban design. Apartheid's unique spatiality partly lasts because of the retarding effects that arise from the material nature of the built environment. Thus we have to include spatial capital in our concept as well.

These remarks point to the relevance of the location and the spatial representation of PVAs. In the context of fragmented and divided cities, any intervention in the spatial arrangements can be discussed regarding its possible contribution towards a transformation of this fragmentation. Even in societies where the division may be less obvious, or less systematically driven by the authorities in power than in apartheid South Africa, some link exists between the patterns of the built and the lived environment and its inhabitants. From an urban planning perspective, this link represents an opportunity: by trying to create a better environment and better living conditions, society in general will benefit. Mayer (2005), however, cautions against too much optimism in this regard, pointing at the peril of exploitation of civil engagement by neoliberal agendas.

On the other hand, from an individual perspective, the personal assets that a home represents contribute to every actor's chances of enhancing their position in society. According to Bourdieu et al. (1993), one's own neighbourhood has enabling and disabling effects. Developing this idea further, the French geographer Jacques Lévy has suggested conceptualising these assets as a spatial capital, in line with the other types of capital mentioned earlier. He states that it might be possible to boost one type of capital at the expense of another, that is, to pay a (financially) higher price for a home in order to achieve a more socially profitable place of residence (Lévy 2003).

In the context of our argument, this idea gains relevance when we conceive post-apartheid urban development as an exercise in levelling the playing fields. Of course, this is not a strategy to counter the structural effects of the relative inequalities in an abstract social space. However, when looking at the persisting structures in Cape Town more than a decade after the official end of apartheid, positive change to the built environment would have to be considered as no small achievement.

We can even interpret Putnam's (1995) version of social capital through a spatial lens and try to provide enabling spaces for the broader society, or at least judge possible interventions against this measure.[7] Regarding PVAs, the German experience demonstrated the relevance of finding suitable places to make them work. It must be recognised, though, that in most cases lasting effects were not intended.

A specific link to open spaces is obvious in the South African context, especially in the townships, where they are often perceived as crime hot spots. This is due to the fact that they are not public (in the sense that everyone shares a responsibility for them as commons), but rather neglected transit zones or persistent buffer strips. Various attempts have been made by urban planners to change this (discussed inter alia by Beall et al. 2002; Harrison et al. 2003; Robinson 2006; Watson 2002), and an integration of these places into a PVA concept might prove to be a valuable investment in South Africa's spatial capital. The City of Cape Town's concept relies on these open spaces, as does the scenario sketched out in the last part of this chapter.

In summary, PVAs are linked to a number of societal interdependencies: they generate high degrees of social mobilisation and, possibly, interaction. Their potential to attract all kinds of visitors gives them a special role in contributing to overcoming social fragmentation on some level. The location of PVAs within the urban fabric and their role as elements of the built environment will determine their potential to either spur or hamper development. Together with questions of target groups, social ownership and possible future uses after 2010, these are crucial points for evaluation when looking back at past experiences, as we do using the example of the 2006 World Cup in Germany, but also regarding the plans and prospects for the World Cup in South Africa in 2010.

Past experiences: PVAs during the 2006 World Cup

The previous section argued that social and spatial capital are relevant concepts in relation to the effects of public viewing. We thus investigate how public viewing was organised during the 2006 World Cup in Germany. The capital city Berlin serves as a case study to reveal the impact of PVAs.

The 2006 World Cup was the first of its kind offering huge PVAs located throughout cities in Germany. Public viewing developed to dimensions beyond expectations, attracting far more spectators than anticipated. Approximately 18 million (City of Cape Town 2007) people visited the nationwide FIFA fan parks in 12 host cities – almost double the expected number (Marwedel 2006). Many more were present at the other types of PVAs mentioned earlier. In Berlin, about 20 different PVAs (*Berliner Zeitung* 5 June 2006)[8] across the city mobilised residents and visitors and contributed to a strong (re)vitalisation of public space, as well as to an increased pedestrian flow and socio-spatial dynamic within the urban sphere.

Challenges and opportunities in Berlin

To evaluate the impacts of public viewing in Berlin, it is necessary to consider the challenges which the city was facing, as well as the general changes in public space and life related to the event.

The main infrastructural challenge was transport. Although public transport in German cities is of a high standard, new temporary schedules and links had to be introduced to ensure adequate transport and sufficient capacity at peak times, at night and between the various PVAs. Part of the provision of an unobstructed flow in the transport network was the completion of the main train station just before the event started, which was essential to transport fans from abroad and from all over Germany.

A societal challenge for Berlin was the discussion surrounding no-go areas. Recent xenophobic conflicts in Berlin and beyond meant that media discussions of racism and integration problems were prolific. The reaction to this was the possible introduction of so-called 'no-go areas' for fans from abroad to keep those who looked foreign out of specific areas to protect them from racist assaults. In the end, several no-go areas were identified but not especially assigned. The discussion lost its impact in the festive atmosphere during the event, and the local press changed its focus to football and public viewing. Nevertheless, the example shows how a social discourse of fear may lead to practices of spatial exclusion, which in this case would have made the potential victims appear to be the problem.

The creation of the PVAs was probably the most relevant intervention regarding urban space, defining and transforming it according to the requirements of the event. Through design, marketing and appropriation, some urban places were shaped by the event and have subsequently gained a new character and image in

citizens' minds. The example of the area around the main train station, which was influenced by the biggest surrounding PVAs, is explained in detail later in the chapter.

In fact, in most cases people experienced a very hospitable and friendly atmosphere. A feeling of cohesion and identification emerged among citizens of all cultural backgrounds, and the more casual use of the German flag can be regarded as its symbolic manifestation. Many Germans used to feel ambivalent about national symbols due to the nation's fascist history. But the World Cup led to a sudden boom in fan accessory shops, with mass sales of small banners depicting the national colours for display on cars, balconies and windows. What is considered normal in other countries, for example wearing national colours and sporting the flag, became common in Germany too.[9]

The main reasons why public viewing became the most popular leisure activity during the 2006 World Cup included the warm weather, limits to the number of stadium seats available, the high prices of stadium tickets and the success of the national football team. But people's readiness for communication and companionship also played a major role. The dynamics described above had an impact on social capital. Considering the debate on xenophobia mentioned earlier, the official FIFA 2006 World Cup slogan – 'A Time to Make Friends' – seems almost to have been a strategic one to promote an untroubled outcome to the event.

Character and impacts of PVAs in Berlin

What was socially and spatially planned by World Cup organisers and municipalities within the urban context and what were the actual socio-spatial processes that took place during the event? The World Cup organising committee ensured free public broadcasting, so that in every city it was possible to organise public viewing free of charge. This was applied to so-called 'non-commercial' PVAs. Those asking an entrance fee or being sponsored were considered commercial events and therefore had to pay licence fees.[10]

The strategy with regard to PVAs in Berlin was to locate the biggest ones – i.e. the FIFA fan park, the Adidas-Arena and the ZDF Arena (Sony Centre) – within the city centre, close to significant sites and landmarks and within walking distance of the main train station in order to be easily accessible to everybody. Tourists and citizens switched between the different PVAs, which complemented each other with their activities and atmosphere and provided enough space to ensure sufficient capacity for the fans. Other PVAs were created throughout the city in obviously popular locations. Most of the official PVAs and especially the FIFA fan park were well promoted and represented through the media and leaflets to attract and inform a high number of people. Besides the public viewing strategy implemented by FIFA and the municipality, businesses and other locations also offered public viewing facilities on a more local and non-official scale. People's experiences of public viewing were thus affected by the specific location, the surrounding area, issues

Figure 10.2 Spatial distribution of public viewing facilities in Berlin

Source: Data compiled by the authors; cartography by T Golka and M Selter

of access and urban embeddedness, that is, the connectivity of the place with the urban fabric.

The PVAs during the 2006 World Cup in Berlin can be divided into three basic types, beginning with the FIFA fan park between the Siegessäule (Victory Column) and Brandenburg Gate. The FIFA fan park concept was jointly developed by FIFA, the World Cup organising committee and the city of Berlin, and access control and security were high on the agenda. It was financed by FIFA together with the official World Cup sponsors and the municipality. In contrast to the four types of PVAs mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in Berlin there were no PVAs organised by the municipality alone. Instead, the second type was the official PVAs, with fencing and access control (e.g. the Adidas-Arena, Sony Centre and PopKick.06). These were mostly organised on a grand scale by large companies or supported by sponsors. The local PVAs, representing the smallest scale, were mainly managed by medium- and small-sized businesses, cultural centres, clubs, cafés and bars, and did not form part of the official strategy. In this case, the organisers benefited not only in a commercial

way, but also from the promotion of their location and an increased awareness of the venue. Many of them differed in character from the official PVAs because the atmosphere was more personal. Together, the official PVAs and the biggest local PVAs meshed very well to form a net covering an approximately five-kilometre-wide corridor from east to west across the capital (see Figure 10.2). They included a wide range of locations, specifications, sizes and providers within the city.

The FIFA fan park and the official PVAs attracted a broad audience, including tourists and locals from all groups, ages and backgrounds, giving the venues a multicultural spirit. There were approximately 9.5 million visitors at the FIFA fan park in Berlin over the duration of the event (Berlin Tourismus Marketing GmbH 2006). The fan park in particular was strongly commercialised through souvenir shops, entertainment facilities, food and beer stalls. Reasons to avoid the fan park included restricted admission and long queuing times.

Some PVAs were combined with cultural highlights and a comprehensive additional entertainment programme, including concerts, shows – varying from performances and talks to public games – spatial installations such as sculptures, and exhibitions. In some cases these were even more important than the public viewing event itself. One popular attraction of this kind was the 'streetfootballworld championship'.[11] These kinds of events had the positive effect of catching the interest of people who were looking for activity but were not that interested in the football tournament itself.

Different security precautions were also taken. Access control was implemented at the official PVAs, though it was handled in a flexible manner. It included checking bags, controlling the number of people admitted and limiting entry to the spaces to appointed times. The FIFA fan park was also secured through camera surveillance. These measures were not only intended to solve the problems of crime, rioting, alcoholism and drug dealing; bringing in one's own drinks and snacks was not allowed either. The challenge lay in keeping the checks moderate without discriminating against or excluding anybody.

The positioning and conception of the PVAs influenced the sense, experience and structure of existing public spaces, and possibly catalysed spatial capital.

Figure 10.3 2006 World Cup PVAs in Berlin

FIFA fan park   An official PVA   A local PVA

Photographs: M Selter and T Golka

Regarding design, PVAs in Berlin were either constructed from scratch, such as the 'streetfootballworld championship' in Kreuzberg and the Adidas-Arena, or existing locations were extended, such as the Sony Centre. A third alternative was the installation of the required equipment at the venue without any further design efforts. The extent to which PVAs adapted and responded to their urban surroundings was thus optional.

The following examples stress the importance of the spatial dimension of PVAs. In some cases, PVAs represented (temporary) interventions into the public space, restricting its normal use, defining and activating new links or hampering the usual connections. Fencing, for example, created new local spaces, but at the same time restricted and redefined the surrounding public space, so affecting people's usual behaviour and movement within that space. These kinds of impacts were usually only evident during the event itself, though, and may not have left any lasting consequences.

However, in other cases, changes in the urban fabric occurred and may even have been intended. For example, a critically located PVA, temporarily serving as a citywide centre of attraction, may create new linkages and help to activate them for possible adjacent developments. The cluster of official PVAs around the main train station could be considered an example of this. Temporarily, the whole area gained newly frequented pedestrian links. Previously, there had been hardly any frequented spaces or facilities other than tourist visits to the parliament building. With the World Cup and the implementation of the FIFA fan park and other official PVAs in close proximity, the place underwent a transformation. Pedestrians moving between the city centre, the several PVAs and the main train station automatically crossed these spaces. The new centrality of the location, and the PVAs and event-related functions linked to it, led to a high number of visitors relaxing in the space and sitting on the steps in front of the parliament; the newly designed space in front of the train station was intensively used for the first time. Though not intended, the PVAs contributed to the revitalisation of these public spaces through, for example, spontaneous gatherings and the reinterpretation and adaptation of space, which in turn stimulated urban development.

The creation of PVAs resulted in a net of activities across the capital. The distribution throughout the city (see Figure 10.2) was the answer to the challenge of Berlin's size and its urban structure of multiple centres. People were encouraged to travel within the city because of the wide spread of events on offer. This citywide diversity meant that at any given time there was at least one activity and space offering something of interest. Economic, social and spatial impacts generated by the event were spread throughout the whole city.

Although the PVAs were well connected through public transport, people also took to the streets on foot and moved in crowds to the venues, blocking the motorised traffic (see Figure 10.4).[12] Due to these spontaneous fan parades, street barriers had to be erected to prevent collisions between pedestrians and motorists.

The vitalisation of public space was obviously reflected in this appropriation of the pavements and roads. These spontaneous and peaceful gatherings were widespread during the World Cup. The gatherings ranged from small groups collecting around shops with televisions to individuals and private households putting their television sets in their courtyards or in front of their houses to watch matches in public with friends, neighbours and pedestrians, so turning the private activity into a small open-air attraction. This kind of informal contribution to the mega-event was unanticipated, but it contributed to the remarkable atmosphere of the event. The living room was extended onto the pavement and the boundaries between the public and private spheres merged (see Figure 10.5). As Sußebach (2006) put it, 'The true World Cup takes place on the street.'

The mass of people in the city encouraged creativity and helped to facilitate the modification of buildings and vacant spaces. Many new locations evolved as a result of the impetus of the event. One example of a project of this kind was a vacant old swimming pool which was transformed into a successful camping site cum PVA.

Event-related hot spots and the forecourts of the PVAs provided a platform for spontaneous activities like gatherings, trading, street art and performance. Street performers were attracted by the mass of people and took the opportunity to profit from the audience and to use the available space as a stage. This attracted even more people and increased the activity in the space. In this way, individuals contributed to the mega-event by enriching it with their creativity.

Figure 10.4 Spontaneous street parade in Berlin

Photograph: M Selter

Figure 10.5 Informal public viewing on the pavement during the 2006 World Cup

Photograph: T Golka

As the example of the street parades, gatherings and other spontaneous activities demonstrates, the 2006 World Cup in Germany turned the mega sporting event into a commonly celebrated event beyond the actual sport of football itself. It brought people, activity and economic input into the public domain. The main benefits of public viewing lay in the physical and social mobilisation of citizens. This mobilisation of people had the effect of vitalising and activating public spaces; at the same time, this interaction and communication required a physical base provided by the PVAs. Their distribution across the districts of Berlin increased people's awareness of the city and allowed access to a large number of people. Social capital has its place, and spatial capital has its moments. But the problematic aspects – which have not been elaborated on here in detail – include the danger of excluding people from PVAs or even from public spaces through excessive controls, insufficient capacity or exclusive localisation and design.

Keeping in mind the public viewing experiences in Berlin during the 2006 World Cup, we now consider the impact of PVAs as urban interventions in South African cities.

Future expectations: Public viewing during the World Cup in South Africa

In 2010, South Africa will be the first African host country of the FIFA World Cup, a role that carries both opportunities and risks. In many respects, the planning prerequisites differ when comparing Germany and South Africa. For a number of reasons, the 2006 World Cup cannot be used as a benchmark of 'best practice' for the

2010 event. Firstly, the positive course of the World Cup in Germany and its impact on urban space was not predictable. Some factors were simply beyond the control of the organisers, like the good weather.[13] Similarly, the dynamics created by the social activities during the event could not be predetermined in quality and intensity. Also, differences in conditions and challenges – especially regarding urban fragmentation, the extent and availability of infrastructure, and security considerations – require a distinct approach for PVAs in South African cities. But the experiences during the 2006 World Cup give some idea of the potential social and spatial impacts of the event, as shown in the example of Berlin. Public viewing is crucial if everybody is to participate in and experience the collective celebration that accompanies the World Cup.

Sporting events often create celebrations across social barriers,[14] which is why they are so popular as nation-building exercises. In South Africa during the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the African Cup of Nations in 1996, people of different backgrounds celebrated the winners together (Kuper 2007). These common experiences encourage a sense of identification with the new post-apartheid society. Now, the symbolic act of bringing the World Cup – conceived by many South Africans as a 'black' sport – to Africa is especially significant because football constituted a vital part of the social networks in the time of struggle against apartheid (Alegi 2004) .

Challenges of PVAs in South Africa

Given that urban fragmentation is one of the main concerns in South Africa, it is interesting to speculate what impacts PVAs might have in this regard. Obviously, a transformation of the modes of using urban space through event-related activities cannot be determined, but only encouraged and supported by physical and social interventions. The observations from the World Cup in Berlin in 2006 point to some key factors that may serve to inform future public viewing strategies. For example, offering a widespread and eclectic range of activities and functions, though not exclusively PVAs, can attract various groups of people and therefore enhance the mobilisation of people throughout a city. The example of Berlin illustrated that accessibility is an essential requirement for PVAs. Since public transport was a challenge in Berlin during the 2006 World Cup, transport in South African cities requires a great deal more attention. Proper links between all PVAs are essential, and from Berlin we know that informing people about access, the location of PVAs and programmes on offer is useful when attracting visitors to new locations. In South African cities this can help to encourage residents and tourists to visit places they would not otherwise have visited. Similar to the spontaneous street parades in Berlin, South Africa's cities can expect high pedestrian traffic, not only close to the stadium and in the city centre, but in marginalised areas as well. Security measures must be balanced and should not constrict positive activities – a difficult task to achieve. As in Berlin, the provision of space for micro-processes can promote small businesses or spontaneous events at a local level, and PVAs can serve as a platform for interaction, communication and identification amongst people of different backgrounds.

The socially integrating effects that public viewing can promote need an appropriate spatial foundation to carry them. In this respect, mega-events can be a catalyst for transformations in a broader context and PVAs should be part of citywide socio-spatial development strategies. But critical urban interventions are required to make use of this potential. To create platforms for the various activities during the event against the background of a fragmented post-apartheid city is a special challenge, and the choice of locations for PVAs is a critical component of any integrated planning strategy. Remembering the distribution of PVAs in Berlin and their spatial impact, it is evident that the many large vacant areas and former buffer zones within South African cities can play an important role and require special attention in this regard. Issues to be addressed include the impact on surrounding areas, the compatibility with the facilities of the specific place, its accessibility, taking into account user groups, the connection with other PVAs and interventions, as well as time factors. Urban interventions can link up with local stakeholders to enrich the city as a whole. Furthermore, the choice of sites relates directly to the increase or reduction of traffic problems, economic input and other urban issues.

PVAs in Cape Town: Strategy and possible impacts

The socially segregated and spatially fragmented urban structure, developed and tightened during the apartheid era, dominates Cape Town to this day. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the city centre is not located at the geographical centre of the city. Cape Town's well-developed central business district (CBD) is situated in the City Bowl, bordered by the ocean, the harbour and Table Mountain. This means that the functional primacy of the city centre (regarding municipal and provincial authority, administration, business and social services, cultural events, and access to work) is even more exclusive than it would otherwise have been in a city founded on a spatial planning policy of segregation. Transport into the city centre takes long and is expensive. As a result, access to the city's economic opportunities and recreational facilities is difficult for many residents of the townships (Rospabe & Selod 2007). In its dense and urban shape of multi-storey buildings, the City Bowl (with the exception of District Six) represents a considerable contrast to the rather monotonous picture of the vast Cape Flats. Here, the townships dominate with their small houses, shack settlements and hostels. They are bordered by the wealthy suburban areas to the north along the N1 highway and to the west on the slopes of Table Mountain. The past segregation of different population groups within Cape Town goes along with this differentiation. The City Bowl and the suburbs along the coast and the mountain slopes are still predominantly white residential areas, whereas most black and coloured neighbourhoods are situated on the Cape Flats.

Today, since the official end of the policy of apartheid, socio-economic differences remain the major cause of segregation. Especially in Cape Town, the transformation of this situation after more than a decade of democracy is marginal (Marks 2005; Rospabe & Selod 2007). Another dimension is the division of social activities and

movement patterns by the functional fragmentation of the urban fabric. The urban space of the Cape Flats is fragmented through derelict land, walls, fences, highways, railway tracks, industrial areas and neglected public space. Highways like the N2, lined with open grassland – planned and used as former buffer zones between different townships during apartheid – still form gaps in the urban matrix. These fragmentary elements hinder people from easily moving between areas.

What does this mean for Cape Town in 2010? How can the impulse of the World Cup be translated into processes that create social capital? First of all, the decision to build the new Green Point Stadium and upgrade its urban surroundings (next to the harbour and the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront) concentrates all the main attractions of the mega-event within the central zone of Cape Town. The official FIFA fan park is proposed for the Grand Parade in front of the City Hall, close to the main station. The management of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront is planning to expand its premises in preparation for the expected 'stampede' of visitors. Looking towards 2010, the City of Cape Town is placing much of its energy into upgrading infrastructure to link the several attractions, especially Green Point Stadium, with one another. Connections between the CBD and the stadium and the periphery are also being upgraded. However, this could consolidate the one-sided development by focusing on the City Bowl, which is not in line with existing strategies for socio-spatial integration (as described, for example, in the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework).[15] Therefore, improving connections between the townships and the city centre will play an important role in balancing the impact on the City Bowl. During the event, PVAs will play a major role in mobilising people and advancing social interaction. By focusing on non-ticket-holding persons, PVAs are the crucial link between the event, local residents and the less-privileged areas.

Three possible metro-organised PVAs (see Figure 10.6) have been planned by the City of Cape Town, each accommodating 25 000 people (City of Cape Town 2006).[16] Athlone Stadium, for example – about halfway between the CBD and the airport – will be upgraded to serve as a training venue for a national team during the World Cup, but for public viewing it will presumably only open for the big matches, meaning the semi-final, the final and home team matches. For this reason and since its current links to the main attractions within the city centre are rather weak, it is debatable whether the integrative effects will be strong here. Nevertheless, Athlone used to be quite a busy commercial hub and might benefit from this economically. Bellville in the north-east is well developed in comparison to the majority of the socio-economically weaker areas. Thus the possible PVA near Philippi on the Cape Flats, in the south-east, might be the most relevant of the three metro-organised PVAs. During the World Cup the people of Philippi and surrounding areas would have access to the event in the form of a PVA without having to pay high transport costs. It might even be possible for them to generate some income through informal trade, especially if the venue is promoted as an attraction for foreign visitors. Infrastructure investment in connection with the new site will last beyond the event.

Figure 10.6 Spatial distribution of the proposed PVAs in Cape Town

FIFA fan park   Metro-organised PVAs   Community viewing areas   Urban development

Source: Urban Design Department, City of Cape Town; cartography by T Golka and M Selter

All these aspects represent appreciable improvements in a marginalised area like Philippi, and even more so since its location 'in between' various old group areas and townships could attract people from many backgrounds.

The City of Cape Town is also considering establishing approximately 19 community viewing areas all around the metropolitan region.[17] They are mostly located in the centre of existing neighbourhoods and will basically serve the immediately surrounding areas. The sites have been chosen on the basis of various criteria, such as access to communities, infrastructure services, capacity for 2 500 to 5 000 people, and so on. This approach is aimed at promoting public places on the Cape Flats, predominantly for the 2010 World Cup but possibly also beyond. It will provide facilities for residents of several communities to watch the games together, and link the event and its preparations to urban development on the Cape Flats. Urban spaces could be upgraded and become activity zones[18] during the event.

All in all, the host city's public viewing strategy is not only trying to ensure access to the event, but suggests a specific role for each type of public viewing facility. The FIFA fan park is meant to 'create an opportunity for Cape Town residents to come together

in a central area and mix with international visitors and fans' (City of Cape Town 2006). The metro-organised PVAs will be themed (arts and culture) and only operate on special days. The other PVAs (not represented in Figure 10.6) will be operated either by private companies (after accreditation only) or, in the case of the community viewing areas, will be part of the Dignified Places Programme.[19] The strengthening of local identification as well as economic benefits are among the objectives here (budget constraints may pose the biggest risk of failure) (City of Cape Town 2006).

These ideas go well with the more abstract considerations regarding social and spatial capital made in the first part of this chapter. In view of our starting point, to reflect on how the World Cup could contribute in a larger sense to promoting integration, we would like to present a model that takes the strategic ideas a little further and might have wider effects on social and spatial capital.

An integrated planning strategy for PVAs in Cape Town

Against the background of the concept of social and spatial capital in the context of mega-events, and considering the observations on the influence of socio-spatial processes made in Berlin during the 2006 World Cup, we now turn to a discussion of what a broader strategy of PVAs as urban interventions might look like. The focus here is on the interchange and mobilisation of all groups of citizens and visitors potentially present in the city during the event. This mobilisation could be facilitated by the creation of a citywide network of attractive and accessible places. The strategy[20] would be intended to work against possible future segregation and fragmentation.

Since major preparations are already under way around the City Bowl, this strategy would link the mega-event to the Cape Flats, guided by the idea of connecting urban parts to each other. With these interventions, the World Cup's potential would be steered towards neglected spaces in order to activate and vitalise them. They could thus create new public centres of attraction on the Cape Flats, so drawing Capetonians, South Africans, Africans and overseas tourists to the south-east metro. This network of PVAs and other event-related attractions (similar to the City of Cape Town's strategy, but on a more permanent scale) would stress the links between the disadvantaged areas and the City Bowl. The network would be connected by an important and already established traffic route, thus assuring the accessibility of the spaces. This connection is represented by the city's spine, the N2 highway (see Figure 10.7). Since most people in Cape Town travel by car or by minibus taxi, they could be guided from the freeway to the localities. The N2 links the city centre with essential parts of the city, with Cape Town International Airport and with the hinterland, but it also separates neighbouring districts from each other and forms a barrier within the city. The N2 could therefore be utilised as a distributor to the various places of the network. In this way, a dividing element could be turned into a contact zone. To support this, an integrated navigation system could be established together with a bus or shuttle service to guide residents and visitors from the freeway

Figure 10.7 PVAs creating a network of critical urban interventions in Cape Town

PVAs as critical interventions   Other PVAs and attractions   N2   Other main roads   New bus line   Railway lines   Urban development

Source: Cartography by T Golka and M Selter

to the places within the network, for example from Green Point to Khayelitsha. In addition to the usual security measures like fencing and access control for the PVAs (City of Cape Town 2006), the defined route and the shuttle service would ensure safer mobility and accessibility.

The PVAs as nodes of the network would be situated on vacant land, on edges or in between different urban areas, or close to sub-centres that urgently need an encouraging factor for their further development. They would be places identified for upgrading based on an assessment of their fragmentary effect in the urban fabric and their existing potential. Examples are the free area around the Oliver Tambo Hall entering Khayelitsha (see Figure 10.8) from the N2, and the green field on the way from the Athlone CBD to the N2. Each viewing area draws its character from its specific locality and is located on a significant plot within the urban structure. These plots often come with a landmark, which would help visitors to orient themselves. The landmarks could also evolve into objects of identification for the local people. The specification of PVAs of different sizes and prominence could contribute to

an understanding of the urban fabric as a system of spaces that are hierarchically structured and interrelated.

Alongside the spatial criteria, the social ones would be important for enhancing the attractiveness of the places of intervention. A social network comprising different actors and institutions and the relevant departments of the City of Cape Town could cooperate to organise the PVAs. Developing the PVAs together with existing community activities would avoid a purely technical intervention like the Dignified Places Programme (Ley 2006). In this way individual participation in the development and implementation of the interventions would be encouraged. Along with public viewing, some additional event-related functions (e.g. an exhibition about South African soccer) could be implemented and developed using the local characteristics of the place. This could create different kinds of interactions and attract a wide range of people, probably at various times of the day. Vitalised urban space and cooperation with community initiatives and facilities might thus work as a catalyst for social capital (Thomas 2002).

Developments induced by the mega-event – such as the opening of bed-and-breakfast establishments, small businesses or informal trading – could be integrated into the proposed strategy of PVAs. Support such as business counselling may enable at least some individuals to benefit from the increased purchasing power. In this respect, a network of information and consultation should assist inhabitants who are looking for employment or for opportunities to invest.

Figure 10.8 Example of a PVA cum open-air theatre in Khayelitsha, Cape Town

Photograph: Collage by T Golka and M Selter

Adopting a perspective that looks beyond 2010, it is conceivable that the PVAs could be converted to new uses which may in the long run provide a wider range of options for activities of urban life. Developed from the existing potential of the locations, they could provide an accessible range of leisure facilities in the Cape Flats areas along the N2 that have been previously disadvantaged in this regard.

Conclusion

With the arrival of large public viewing screens a few years ago, the urban impact of mega-events has gained a new dimension. PVAs have an impact on social life during these events, and this chapter has suggested conceptualising these impacts in terms of social and spatial capital. The discussion of these perspectives identified – by contrasting Bourdieu's interpretation with those of his Anglo-American counterparts – two points of access: types of capital can be understood either as individual assets or as a measure of specific attributes of societies. This distinction is in line with contributions by other authors. To grasp the effects of public viewing fully, we have to address its spatial dimension more thoroughly. If we rely on spatial capital to do this, it helps us to do justice to the planning challenges that come with the task of developing a strategy for PVAs. At the same time, we acknowledge this extension of Bourdieu's concept by Lévy, who has accommodated the spatial turn from a geographer's background. Building on these ideas, we can assess the various challenges of PVAs and at the same time conceptualise their potential.

The example of Berlin in 2006 demonstrates that PVAs can indeed have a critical influence on catalysing the immediate effects of a mega-event. These range from economic and social effects to impacts on the physical infrastructure. In some of the examples given, the location and design of PVAs had direct and immediate effects on the surrounding public space, thus influencing the wider urban fabric. Through PVAs we can steer capital and people within the city and stimulate or even start processes to activate urban culture.

The case of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa provides a different context for our considerations. The problems of segregation, fragmentation and monofunctionality result in a dearth of active public spaces and centres of attraction. Based on the idea that public viewing has the potential to influence social and spatial capital, it can then also stimulate it within the context of South Africa and in light of the country's background. The outcome of the event and the impacts on socio-spatial development cannot be foreseen in detail or planned in advance like a blueprint. It is possible, though, to provide a base that increases the chance of directing development in a desirable way. PVAs can therefore be places and occasions which create a space for relationships of mutual knowing and recognition. The City of Cape Town's current plans for PVAs are in line with this, and it is from this common starting point that our concept leads us to an integrated strategy, in which PVAs work as a network of critical intervention(s) within the urban fabric. Whichever shape and form the placement of the PVAs takes, it is clear that they represent a

strong factor in channelling the social and spatial effects of hosting the event. Any strategy for PVAs will benefit from an inclusion of the social and spatial potentials, aimed at diminishing its deficits and creating lasting effects beyond 2010.

Notes

1   We would like to thank Stefanie Baasch for valuable comments on the subject, and Jahsa Wiles, Holger Petersen, Kai Brenke, Rob Smales, Cordula Hagedorn, and especially Orli Bass and Richard Tomlinson for providing feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter.

2   This chapter uses the South African terminology of population groups, as per local custom (cf. Alexander 2002). Since South Africa's other two big team sports, rugby and cricket, have historically been constructed as 'white', many South Africans regard football as a 'black' sport.

3   Bourdieu's position is much more complex than can be described here. For a discussion of habitus and identity in post-apartheid South Africa, see Haferburg (2003, 2007).

4   Maennig and Du Plessis (2007: 586) refer to a 'feel-good effect' as one of the most important outcomes of the 2006 World Cup in Germany (which they translate into monetary benefits).

5   The project was part of the research programme SFB 520 at the University of Hamburg on transformations in African societies and was completed by C Haferburg in 2003.

6   The picture is more complex, though. In this case, Hanover Park refers to a newly developed infill within an old coloured area, and the informal settlement Phola Park, although located in a black group area, was never subject to apartheid division either: it was illegal anyway, irrespective of the population group of its inhabitants.

7   In a recent study, Putnam focused on the embeddedness of social capital in communities. The findings are subject to a heated debate in the USA (cf. Jonas 2007). Putnam states that diversity in neighbourhoods may hamper social trust. He argues in relation to socio-economic diversity (not, for example, in relation to skin colour), thus rejecting assumptions of both contact and conflict theory (Putnam 2007, quoted by Jonas 2007). Still, communities are central to his approach, which creates some ambiguity, especially since the sense of place is under-represented here.

8   'Public viewing: Keiner bleibt allein', available at http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/spezial/dossiers/heimspiel_das_wmmagazin /060605_1/index.php, accessed in December 2007.

9   This phenomenon was possibly a partially generational effect; the shifting mindset of a younger generation perhaps only needed a reason to be uncovered.

10 Because organising PVAs and equipment required investments in the localities and sponsors were hard to find due to complicated FIFA regulations (stating that only local sponsors unrelated to the official World Cup sponsors were allowed), it turned out to be difficult for some municipalities to provide public viewing (Hallberg 2006).

11 The 'streetfootballworld championship' was carried out at the Mariannenplatz in Kreuzberg, Berlin, by around 180 youths in international teams. Streetfootballworld is a global network with about 60 organisations worldwide following the idea of development through football, and working against violence, drugs and racism by giving young players a way to escape marginalisation.

12 The movement of persons to the PVAs was one of the greatest logistical challenges for the city and for public transport.

13 The tradition of having the World Cup in June and July creates a specific disadvantage for places like Cape Town, since those are the winter rainy season months.

14 The authors are aware that this is an optimistic way of describing the gathering of different people, especially regarding its intensity and its relevance in the long run, but we believe that in this context it is a starting point which is worth working with.

15 See http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/sdf/Documents/MSDF%20REDRAFT%202001%20v2.pdf.

16 The city's considerations about the sites and number of PVAs were still in process at the time of writing and may change in response to financial constraints. See also http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/MediaReleases/Pages/CITYINVITESPUBLICINPUTONUPGRADING OFMAYNARDVILLEPARK.aspx.

17 Urban Design Department, Cape Town: map of dignified public places for community viewing, in a presentation by Cedric Daniels, 2007.

18 This is not occurring naturally in the young history of upgrading programmes of public places on the Cape Flats (cf. Ley 2006).

19 The Dignified Places Programme is a programme of the City of Cape Town for the design of public places, mainly in previously black areas. The aim is to upgrade urban spaces to advance social interaction and commercial activities.

20 This strategy is a compendium of the diploma thesis 'World Cup 2010 in Cape Town: A Chance for New Urban Space' by Theresa Golka and Marie Selter, including broad information about the observation of the 2006 World Cup in Berlin and a detailed analysis of the socio-spatial development of Cape Town. The thesis was accepted by the architecture department of the Technical University Berlin in 2006.

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11 *In the shadow of 2010: Democracy and displacement in the Greater Ellis Park Development project*

Claire Bénit-Gbaffou

Mark Purcell (2006), in a stimulating paper on urban governance and the 'local trap', comments on urban renewal and mega-projects. He argues that 'urban justice' and 'democracy' are not about giving local residents the final decision-making powers over a project which, in its scope, impacts on the metropolitan area as a whole and not only on the local residents. Therefore, looking for 'just' and democratic governance principles does not necessarily mean engaging in the fight against displacing the poor[1] from the inner-city neighbourhood that is to be redeveloped for the benefit of the city as a whole. He warns us about the 'local trap' – the incorrect assumption that the local scale is the preferential scale of participation and democracy, whilst other, broader scales (such as the metropolitan or the national) are not as relevant in this regard. Purcell (2002) points out that the Lefebvrian 'right to the city' requires that all stakeholders (not only those at the local level) who will be affected by the project should be included in the decision-making process.

This view could be that of the City of Johannesburg in its current policy of urban renewal around one of the major sports facilities to be used in the 2010 Football World Cup, the Ellis Park Stadium. This stadium, within a 'sports precinct' that also includes the Johannesburg Stadium and the Standard Bank Arena, will host the 2010 World Cup semi-final. Ellis Park Stadium is an exception in the South African sports venues developed for 2010, as it is not a 'greenfield' development.[2] It is located to the east of inner-city Johannesburg, surrounded by the neighbourhoods of Doornfontein and New Doornfontein (dense residential and industrial areas), and the more peri-central, less densely built and more residential areas of Bertrams, Judith's Paarl, Lorentzville and Troyeville (see Figure 11.1). These areas are extremely derelict and house a number of very low-income households, many of them being migrants (from South Africa and elsewhere), in affordable but degraded slums (see the Appendix to this chapter on p. 219, and Figure 11.2 on p. 204). The Greater Ellis Park Development (GEPD) project, initiated in 2004 to prepare the stadium and the area for the 2010 Football World Cup, goes beyond the 2010 event, since it is part of the broader strategy and longer-term policy of the Johannesburg inner-city regeneration process. However, the 2010 event provides the city with political impetus and financial resources to lead the urban renewal policy in an area that has so far been marginal in the Johannesburg inner-city policy.

Figure 11.1 Map of the Greater Ellis Park area, Johannesburg, 2008

Source: Bénit-Gbaffou (2008)

The 2010 World Cup is first and foremost regarded as a national project and only secondarily as a metropolitan one. The local scale, and more precisely local residents, are seemingly seen by the state as insignificant and even considered a nuisance, as they are held responsible for the crime and grime around stadiums – offering international visitors an image of South Africa that the government would prefer to avoid. The so-called 'imperatives' of the 2010 World Cup provide the city with an opportunity to fast-track democracy and inner-city renewal. This fast-tracking approach avoids necessary public debate on the disruptive effects of regeneration strategies, especially on local residents living in the vicinity of the stadium.

This chapter documents and questions the place of local residents in this urban regeneration strategy, and in particular in the governance of the GEPD project.[3] While I agree with Purcell about the danger of the local trap, the risk of parochialism and the need to have a multi-scalar approach, I argue that the local scale, particularly in low-income areas, is precisely the one that is always ignored both in current 'third-wave'[4] urban renewal policies (Hackworth & Smith 2001) and in mega-event urban planning in general (Olds 1998). It is as if the nature of the event and the urgency of the deadlines exclude the relevance and legitimacy of a debate on the fate of the poor in the city. I do not suggest that it is democratic and just to halt the project because it affects the urban poor residing in its vicinity. However, I argue that what *is* democratic and just is to debate publicly the opportunities afforded by such a mega-project, as well as the uses of public funding for the initiative. Such public debates should take place in the light of a broader question: 'The city for whom?' Especially in the South African context, heavy with memories of forceful evictions, the state should heed lessons learned from international experiences regarding the negative effects of hosting a mega-event (COHRE 2007; Olds 1998) and address the challenges it raises for the poor. The state should confront, rather than avoid, the contradiction raised by a project focused on a mega-event in the midst of urban poverty.

The chapter first gives an overview of the housing and land strategy within the regeneration project around Ellis Park (in the context of the broader inner-city strategy), showing that there is only very limited (and recent) attention paid to lower-income residents. The next section illustrates how the poor are not only forgotten but also unwanted in the Greater Ellis Park area. They are considered a hindrance with respect to the 2010 World Cup and the global city Johannesburg dreams of becoming. Finally, the chapter looks at the ways local residents attempt to have their voices heard in a context where the principles of local democracy and community participation are sidelined in the name of 2010 urgency.

No public strategy for the poor: Desperately looking for a public land and housing strategy

The GEPD project involves a number of important public stakeholders. Although the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) is the 'implementing arm' of the project (Bethlehem interview), many important elements are beyond its control, especially transportation and housing (both of which involve other agencies, city departments and government departments). Given that different elements of the project are managed by different agents, the overall budget allocated to the initiative is unclear. This lack of clarity regarding the funding available for the project, as well as the shrinking budget directly allocated by the city to the JDA for its interventions, explains the shifting content of the GEPD project. Rumours circulated by the media and by the City of Johannesburg mentioned a R2 billion upgrade fund for the Greater Ellis Park area (*City News* 4 January 2005; *City News*

1 February 2006),[5] without making it clear whether this funding was 'required' and 'deemed necessary' for the project or if it was actually available to the GEPD project. In the JDA's business plan, of this R2 billion the JDA was expected to contribute 8 per cent of the cost (about R160 million), while the private sector and donors would contribute 48 per cent and the state (other city agencies, provincial and national government) 44 per cent (JDA 2004). This means the JDA has little direct control over public expenditure in the area, in spite of driving the urban regeneration process. It also shows that from the start the private sector was expected to play a major role in funding the redevelopment, which of course impacts on the type of development possible. In 2007/08, the JDA's budget for the GEPD project amounted to R40 million (CoJ 2007b: 36) – less than expected and maybe not enough to trigger development in the area.

In this shaky financial context, many of the initial ambitions of the project, as stated in the consultants' reports (Albonico et al. Architects and Urban Designers 2004) and in JDA draft precinct plans (JDA 2005), have been abandoned. It is therefore rather difficult to assess what will be implemented before 2010. Current investments concern mostly transport and mobility: the upgrading of Doornfontein and Ellis Park train stations and of taxi ranks; the enlargement and upgrading of roads (Charlton and Bertrams roads), in particular to implement the citywide Strategic Public Transport Network and its Bus Rapid Transit through the area; the building of much-needed parking facilities for the event; and the development of pedestrian links (see Figure 11.1).

The immediate surroundings of the stadium, the 'gateways', are also the focus of attention, both from an urban amenity and a security point of view, while the stadium itself is to be upgraded and expanded: an extra 10 000 seats will be added, bringing the seating capacity to the required 70 000. The biggest gap between expectations and realities lies in the Bertrams regeneration programme, of which very little remains. The multi-purpose centre that was to be established in the area, the urban park along the Jukskei River, community-linked initiatives and local economic development projects have all been abandoned by the JDA due to a lack of funding. The regeneration plan seems to be restricted for the moment to public–private partnerships, in particular through the Better Building Programme which is aimed at taking over (through rehabilitation or demolition) derelict buildings and handing them to the private sector; a limited number are also meant for social housing. The JDA website[6] mentions the construction of 3 215 new housing units in the area, including 780 for social housing. In early 2008, the JDA acquired a residential block (the 'Priority Block', highly visible at the corner of Bertrams and Gordon roads), which will be demolished to provide private developers with land opportunities to kick-start the development process.

Notwithstanding the implementable content of the GEPD plan, it is apparent that there is no elaborate public strategy for local and poor neighbouring residents. The little that existed in the original and ambitious draft precinct plan has been

abandoned and, significantly, even then it did not include any land or housing strategy. Although some limited strategy for affordable housing has since been established, in line with the inner-city Charter (CoJ 2007a), the main vehicle for the renovation of derelict properties remains the Better Building Programme, a good example of the City of Johannesburg's conception of the state's role: not a regulator, but a facilitator for private investment in the inner city.

The Better Building Programme functions in the following way: if a private investor is willing to buy a derelict building (often with water and electricity arrears amounting to several million rands), the city scraps the arrears. The developer can then acquire the building at virtually no cost, on condition that the building is renovated and maintained and that overcrowding is avoided. As an example, in Derby Road, the main street in Bertrams, a derelict property was purchased for R20 000 by a developer. The arrears scrapped by the council amounted to about R230 000 and the owner invested about R250 000 in renovating the building (Hodnett interview). Therefore, compared to the substantial public subsidy (the amount of arrears scrapped), nothing much is required from the private developer – no rent control, no investment or contribution to public amenities – as long as the building is rehabilitated. This, in turn, will probably raise the value of the property and increase the rents that can be commanded, so attracting higher-income groups to the area.

Given private developers' interest in the area, this appears to be a wasted opportunity on the part of the City of Johannesburg (Badat interview; Hodnett interview; see also *Saturday Star* 28 October 2006; *The Star* 26 May 2007, 22 June 2007,

Figure 11.2 Derelict housing and a vacant plot in Bertrams, Johannesburg, 2006

Note: Residential low densities are considered a 'wasted opportunity' by the JDA, which wants to attract private investment and densify the area. While many houses are of historical and architectural interest, most are too derelict to be upgraded or gentrified. The JDA's policy is to demolish as many as possible, leading to an increase in vacant lots, which are often security hazards.

Photograph: C Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006

23 June 2007).[7] First, it could be argued that the city is giving important indirect subsidies to the private sector without requiring any reciprocal contribution to the public good. Moreover, the city is transferring derelict buildings to private developers without trying to consolidate a land strategy that could regulate speculation. The city is also not using the rapid boom in property prices in inner-city Johannesburg to obtain funds for social housing programmes, for example through cross-subsidisation: selling a plot when it has gained value in order to subsidise social housing. Why is this opportunity being wasted? The following extract illustrating the position of the Johannesburg Property Company shows how difficult it is to depart from an extremely neoliberal conception of the state, capital and society:

> Upgrade or renovate, how he [*sic*] [the property developer] does that, that is his thing. We don't interfere. It is not for us to say what the rent level will be. It's for him to decide. We don't specify. We can't tell him 'you must do it like this'…There was a tender two weeks ago for social housing: three properties in Hillbrow, one in Jeppestown. The tender has gone out to the public. There are thousands of applications, because province will give funds; there are subsidies involved. We had to put it out for the public – we can't give it to someone specific [like JOSHCO, the Johannesburg Social Housing Company] – so that it is fair. (Hodnett interview)

In this discourse, any state intervention – for example, specifying conditions to the developer, like limiting the level of rent on some units for a number of years – is illegitimate. Favouring JOSHCO or any other public or semi-public entity that might be amenable to providing affordable accommodation, and which would legitimately need a state subsidy to do so, is considered unfair – despite the fact that JOSHCO cannot compete on an equal footing with private developers. The city is also averse to the idea of purchasing land for social housing or managing new public housing estates. This conception of capitalism where a form of state regulation is not considered is quite specific to South African cities in spite of decades of experiments on urban renewal around the world which show that state regulation can be effective.

The institutional structure of the city does not make it easier. The municipal agency driving the GEPD project, the JDA, has quite a pragmatic view on the renovation and possible demolition of derelict buildings and the resultant displacement of residents:

> We see [the renewal plan as] viable if it provides transitional housing. There are people interested in converting their building into transitional housing, as long as they are making money out of it. It is not finalised yet. This is not a profit-making business. It only becomes profit making if the city puts money in it, in its management. Transitional housing models are not finalised yet. It is not clear: if we displace someone, how long are we obligated to keep them there? There are legal issues that we are trying to sort out. (Badat interview)

However, the JDA has little say on the municipal land and property purchase policy, driven by another city agency, the Johannesburg Property Company. The JDA is not always aware of the activities of the latter company, for example Better Building Programmes that affect its urban renewal plan. This fragmentation of city agencies that follow their own logic and modes of action has not (yet) been overcome by strong leadership from the city's housing or planning departments, which seem only to add another layer of government rather than provide a coordinated vision or strong leadership. The delays and uncertainties in putting in place a land and property strategy are partly explained by this fragmentation, combined with the neoliberal and certainly not 'pro-poor' vision of the management of inner-city renewal projects in general, and the Greater Ellis Park redevelopment in particular.

This vision is currently being nuanced by the shift embodied in the inner-city Charter (CoJ 2007a). The Charter starts addressing the question of affordable accommodation in the inner city, which has a direct impact on the housing strategy in Greater Ellis Park. The Charter proposes a twofold strategy: the provision of a number of temporary shelter units ('emergency' units, 'special needs' shelters, 'transitional housing') on the one hand, and an 'inclusive housing strategy' on the other. This is in line with discussions held at the national level, whereby private developers are given incentives to allocate a certain percentage of their development towards low- to middle-income housing; some of it can be rental and managed, for instance, by JOSHCO. This shift is a pragmatic response to a series of court (high court, Supreme Court and then Constitutional Court) decisions in 2006/07, putting a hold on evictions of low-income, inner-city residents if the city does not provide them with alternative accommodation (Wilson forthcoming). Compelled to address the issue, the city had to develop an affordable housing policy strategy. Although this is a step in the right direction, one might argue it is still insufficient, as the provision of 'temporary' accommodation (particularly for the residents to be relocated from 'bad' buildings) seems optimistic at best and cynical at worst. How long displaced persons need to be housed in this 'temporary' accommodation is an important concern for both the city and the JDA, as it has a direct impact on how many affordable housing units will need to be built if the city wants to continue with its urban renewal project. The shorter the length of time, the lower the number of units needed. Moreover, the strategy still relies on the market, even though affordable housing is not a profit-making operation, thereby casting doubt on the volume and scope of future deliveries. Private developers are still regarded as the main drivers in the provision of affordable housing, even if they benefit from public subsidies and enter into partnerships with social housing institutions. Such institutions have little provision and management capacity – for example, Madulamoho, a Christian NGO, provides temporary shelter but has a very limited capacity. JOSHCO, which could potentially manage the affordable units within inclusive housing projects, also has a limited budget. While the refusal to create inner-city ghettos and the desire for a lively and mixed inner

Figure 11.3 Cycle of evictions and homelessness

Note: Some of the residents of this shack were evicted from a so-called 'bad building' (over-occupied and not properly maintained) in Hillbrow, resulting in them squatting on this vacant plot in Bertrams. They all work in inner-city Johannesburg, for example collecting waste and papers. In the background there is another 'bad' building.

Photograph: C Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006

city are laudable aims, the insufficient number of affordable units to be created, their temporary character, as well as the limited capacity of the providers/managers of affordable housing cast doubt on the future of many low-income, inner-city residents.

In Bertrams, public stakeholders have so far adopted the first route, providing emergency shelters, in particular to relocate residents displaced by development projects such as the JDA-driven Priority Block redevelopment. Current residents are to be relocated to a JOSHCO- and Madulamoho-managed building (BG Alexander) in Hillbrow in the inner city for a temporary period that has been left undecided. Residents will pay R520 a month for a room with shared ablution and kitchen facilities (Badat interview). While this provides a real alternative, at least in the short term, for a number of families presently living in slums, it also excludes others – larger households obviously cannot fit into these single rooms and renting several

rooms might well be unaffordable – to an extent that has not been determined. As well as highlighting the difficulty of finding a balance between one-size-fits-all and individualised solutions, this gap shows the way in which the relocation project was planned and is being implemented – as an emergency measure in response to a crisis, without really evaluating the extent and the needs of local households (which are not at the centre of the project). As for 'inclusionary housing' – requiring private developers to contribute in some way to social and affordable housing – this does not seem to be happening in Bertrams, as it is regarded as too complex and time-consuming in a context of such uncertainty (regarding the extent of private investment) and emergency (the 2010 deadline).

In brief, while relying on some of the inner-city Charter's principles, urban regeneration for the 2010 World Cup will make things worse for the poor in a regenerated inner city. First, the Greater Ellis Park area is being geared to provide an image of a global, well-managed, vibrant and lively city to international visitors, in which the poor have even less place than in the rest of the inner city. Second, the pressing deadlines to have the area ready for 2010 risk leading to quick-fix solutions that do not really reflect on a 'place' for the poor in the future of Bertrams. The priority is to relocate the poor elsewhere, out of the way of development, without trying to include them in the neighbourhoods being regenerated (see Figure 11.3). Currently, the pace of these public evictions is relatively slow due to the downsizing of the JDA's projects in the area, but this might be accelerated in the next two years if the Priority Block redevelopment is anything to go by. Third, although the presence of the private sector is necessary for the upliftment of the area, this sector's growing interest in Bertrams may result in the eviction of the poorest residents through the workings of the market, rather than directly by the state, resulting in little political visibility and less resistance. Evictions taking place in Greater Ellis Park have indeed so far remained largely invisible, and there has been no collective protest or rising awareness, in spite of the fact that the question was raised at every community meeting – South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), NGOs, street committees – attended by the author. Of course, evictions are not only the consequence of speculative landlords' actions; many individuals and organisations use the climate of uncertainty, residents' ignorance of their rights, and violence to 'hijack' houses whose owners are absent. However, with the JDA-led evictions and the debates created by the Priority Block, a form of collective awareness might arise.

An anti-poor vision for the GEPD project: Secrecy and privatisation, major forms of governance?

The lack of an alternative vision to the market-oriented growth strategy is obvious in the inner-city strategy, but it is even clearer in the context of the 2010 World Cup. The international event puts increasing stress on security and image, and the poor are considered the prime obstacle to the success of the project. This point is illustrated through several public discourses at different levels of local government.

The first is from a local councillor reflecting on the impact of 2010 on local communities:

> We need to remove these people, allocate them somewhere else. If we develop the area we can't accommodate all of them: some of them are not working. In the city we only need people who are able to pay. In the city centre it is obvious it's expensive to be there. When we develop the city we'll make it expensive. There is no other way…You have people who are not doing anything in my ward. They're just going to sleep every day. About those people you need to get RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme] houses and put them there…They need to move out, it is obvious. When the city removes them, they'll get ownership of their house. I am happy because they'll get ownership: here they are only renting. That is good if they get removed…It is time to take the city back. Put it in the way it was. We need to deal with hawkers. You can't deal with 2010 if you still have these people in the street. People being drunk, people selling all over…You can't have a city like this. Johannesburg used to be very beautiful. Look at Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban! (Ntuli interview)

This quote is striking in its blatant assertion of what many public stakeholders implement tacitly – that the city is not for the poor, who have nothing to do there – and it uses common prejudices about unemployed residents ('sleep[ing] every day') whose place in the city does not really matter. This view contradicts current public discourse (CoJ 2005), but not current practices. It is also interesting because the market solution is considered to be the only one, with the state's role being to make the market work. In its naive and brutal way, the quote is quite representative of public policies in the area.

The next quote addresses the issue of safety and security around the stadium. It is significant in the targets it sets up to secure the stadium surroundings:

> *Proposed zero-tolerance policy within the GEPD Target area:*
> …Tackl[ing] so-called petty by-law contraventions would include the identification of roadway–sidewalk nuisance activities…: commuter taxis; illegal vendors; unemployed persons; 'pan-handling' at intersections; begging; 'squeegee men' who not only have an intimidatory effect on the public…whilst promoting the public's perception of 'crime and grime'…but who often provide cover for armed robbers and 'smash and grab' artists. (Imvula Risk Management 2005: 28)

This rather tough vision for a safety strategy, prepared for the city by a consultant, is not necessarily shared by city officials. For instance, the city is trying to develop more participatory ways of managing urban space in order to encourage residents to 'take ownership' of public spaces (Cachalia interview). But in a general context of lack of

basic information on the urban renewal strategy, and everyday infringement of basic rights (lack of access to basic services, or eviction without due notice), this strategy is deemed to be limited in its impact. And, however distant this consultant report may be from actual city policies, the 'zero-tolerance' strategy encourages the Metro police to target the unemployed and those engaged in informal activities, both viewed primarily as contributing to grime and crime. The report then advises, in line with other consultants (Kagiso Urban Management 2005), developing a by-law enforcement strategy targeting infringements of health standards and illegal connections to services. While this strategy is not illegal, it is totally disconnected from any social policy and does not consider the causes of illegal service connections. The city's *Human Development Strategy* (CoJ 2005), which emphasises the necessity of extending access to the 'social package' – free basic services – to people excluded from it, appears to have been forgotten along the way. The poor are therefore the primary target of this security strategy. The 2010 World Cup requirements for tight security and a sanitised image certainly add pressure that feeds into this radical and simplistic vision. However, this unilateral discourse of by-law enforcement and citizens' education, supposedly allowing them to acquire a 'culture of compliance', is not coupled with an affirmation of residents' rights to basic services – and the discourse is being adopted, albeit in more careful terms, by the City of Johannesburg (CoJ 2007a).

Contrary to most national and metropolitan policy discourses about encouraging the informal economy – understood to be the main job provider for low-skilled workers – informal activities are unwelcome in the streets surrounding the stadium and community initiatives are not being encouraged to participate or to be formalised in order to benefit from the 2010 World Cup. Too much is thought to be at stake and small businesses are not considered able to ensure the kind of first-class service provided by well-established private companies. This is the case, for instance, as far as security initiatives around the stadium are concerned.

An informal car-guard initiative at Ellis Park

The local and informal car-guard initiative set up by residents, in coordination with the Jeppe police, is one way local residents could benefit from the proximity of Ellis Park sports facilities. Local residents started the car-guard initiative in the early 2000s in the context of a shortage of parking facilities (this will be remedied by 2010) and high levels of crime and grime in the streets. The initiative is supported by the police through accreditation of the car guards (registration, police clearance, bibs, police assistance in cases of violence, police patrols to check on car guards, etc.) and by the municipality. The latter apparently made an informal agreement with one of the initiative's leaders, whereby one-third of the money collected by each guard would go to the city, one-third to the leader and one-third to the car guard (Balang interview). This arrangement has been going on for more than 10 years. However, in the last few years it has started to become messy, with increasingly violent competition between three different groups of car guards competing over

parking turfs. Ellis Park management is now getting rid of the informal guards and deploying private security companies in the streets.

This case study illustrates how difficult it can be to work with deprived communities, whose harsh competition for resources raises management issues. However, the police seemed to manage it successfully and the problems only started recently – coincidentally when the Jeppe police officer who was coordinating the competing groups was redeployed. He did not train any other officer as he 'did not see the need to appoint someone to replace him, since Ellis Park [management] was anyway going to get rid of the initiative for 2010' (Mashile interview). This feeds into a vicious circle where community initiatives are not supported by the state because it assumes they will be discarded anyway by Ellis Park management; and Ellis Park management hires private security companies rather than formalising the community car-guard initiative because, due to the withdrawal of police monitoring and support, the initiative is perceived as unmanageable (which it probably would be without state support).

The involvement of local communities in developmental programmes linked to the World Cup is further impeded by the opacity of the urban renewal projects and the secrecy surrounding future state intervention in the area. From a public authority's (cynical) point of view, uncertainty – for example about which buildings will be demolished – has the advantage of diffusing discontent and preventing the emergence of collective resistance, as it is difficult to fight rumours. Also, the lack of a public platform for disseminating information makes it difficult to raise collective awareness and organise mobilisation. However, uncertainty also constitutes an obstacle to local investment and community involvement in potential developmental projects, like local tourism and security. Local 'ownership' of space and projects, which is also considered a major element for security, is certainly difficult to develop in this context.

What creates the opacity and secrecy around the 2010 World Cup and the GEPD project? First, there is a lack of communication, information and participation in the areas directly affected by the renewal plan (Bertrams and New Doornfontein). The JDA organised a series of once-off participatory workshops in mid-2005, and one was held in March 2006 (Negota Inc. Attorneys 2005, 2006). The irregular time intervals between these workshops and the fact that they were run by consultants meant that there was a loss of knowledge and expertise on the areas' problems and existing community structures, due to the lack of continuity in the state's engagement with the communities. There was also no identified and sustainable link between the residents and one or several key persons in local government. This kind of accessibility to the state is crucial, especially for disadvantaged groups (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008). Furthermore, the workshops offered no accountability mechanisms with respect to residents' concerns. The questions raised at the workshops were noted by the consultants and passed on to the JDA, but with no feedback or follow-up. Lastly, the workshops did not enhance community organisation. They were

organised by precinct (carved by the JDA's action plans), not by theme (housing, business opportunities, safety, etc.) or sector (CBOs and NGOs, businesses, youth, etc.). As a result, they failed to provide an overall view and a platform for community stakeholders to organise and follow up.

A second reason for the opacity around the Ellis Park project is linked (again) to the very fragmented structure of public intervention. Using a range of consultants, each drawing specific, separate and unrelated plans, leads to projects that are linked neither to one another nor to any form of business plan or feasibility study. For instance, the heritage survey (Bruwer et al. n.d.) is disconnected from the socio-economic survey (Kayamandi Development Services 2004) and from the 'bad building' survey (Kagiso Urban Management 2005). The heritage survey gives no information on the owner of the building or on who occupies it, information which is crucial if one wants to encourage local owners to upgrade their property. Another example is the safety strategy consultant report (Imvula Risk Management 2005), which is linked to neither the socio-economic survey (Kayamandi Development Services 2004) nor the community facilities survey (Gemey Abrahams Consultants 2005) and is therefore merely repressive since it does not build on existing community initiatives. This same disconnection is evident in the urban design report (Albonico et al. Architects and Urban Designers 2004), which has no land and housing strategy to rely on for its vision of future urban space. Even if the JDA and different city departments could coordinate these reports, the need for an integrated view for the neighbourhood would remain. These diverse reports lead to ready-made, one-size-fits-all redevelopment proposals that are disconnected from the area's specificities. They also make it difficult for residents (even informed ones) to access a definite and comprehensive plan that gives clear information on what the project is about. This confusion is perhaps also shared by the JDA itself, especially as the funding for the project keeps being reduced and its urban renewal ambitions and projects downsized as a result. Uncertainty regarding what funding would be available to the JDA beyond the current financial year certainly played a significant role in its inability to present a cohesive vision to the public in general and to local residents in particular.

This opacity of public actions and public agents has important consequences. First, the absence of low-income residents' awareness triggers mistrust, corruption and possibly violence. In a context of misinformation about the possible beneficiaries of temporary contracts, for example in construction activities, competing leaders claim to have the only legitimate list of candidates, some selling promises of contracts or access to housing and others requiring proof of a specific political affiliation. A lack of clarity around the rules for the allocation of public resources, combined with the invisibility of public representatives, is known to foster clientelism, corruption and sometimes even violence (Kitschelt & Williamson 2007). Second, opaque public action has important impacts on the ability of private business people, external and internal to the area, to invest in Bertrams – they lack a clear vision of the state's projects, doubt the determination of the state to invest in the area, fear possible expropriation and do not have information on which to base their investment

decisions. Therefore, the state's lack of clarity regarding the Bertrams regeneration plan is not only politically problematic; it is also undermining the very conditions for its success.

In short, information sharing, consultation and participation are not only *not* a priority, they are actively avoided by public authorities. This is unsurprising given that the only projected impact of the GEPD plan on the residents of Bertrams is their eviction. Of significance is the social aspect of the regeneration plan in the city's vision. Neither the city nor the JDA wants to take responsibility for including communities or local residents in the project. The JDA made it clear that its job is 'about physical regeneration, not social development: this is the city's job' (Bethlehem interview), especially since public funding has shrunk significantly. The City of Johannesburg, when asked about the participatory dimension of the GEPD project, stated that the 'JDA will take care of community participation' (Mazibuko interview). Clearly, and in opposition to all legislation on local government and local democracy, community participation is not a standard governance practice (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008). Rather, residents' involvement in the regeneration project is seen as a 'hot potato' that no one wants to be responsible for. It is not news that in mega-event contexts all the principles of good governance and local democracy are fast-tracked, or even set aside and forgotten, in the name of urgency. However, as stressed by Olds (1998), the impact of mega-events on evictions can be mitigated, depending on the importance of pro-poor policy frameworks, local government structures and the strength of civil society's resistance. This chapter has shown the absence of a real pro-poor policy framework in South Africa's preparations for the 2010 World Cup. But what about local politics, both in its institutional form (local councillors' interventions) and in its extra-institutional dimension (local civic and political organisations)?

No voice for the poor? The failure of local politics

Local councillors, who are supposed to be close to their constituencies and play a political role, do not seem very concerned about the impending fate of the residents of Bertrams and Doornfontein. These councillors hold hardly any power at the council level (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008), partly but not only because they belong to opposition parties (the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] and the Democratic Alliance [DA]). They appear to be unaware of the details of the JDA's plans for the area and do not participate in the (apparently disempowered) inner-city section 79 committee.[8] More importantly, the Greater Ellis Park area's residents are not the core of their electorate, as shown in Figure 11.4.

There is a very low voter turnout in the Greater Ellis Park area, a testimony to the weak political mobilisation in the neighbourhoods after decades of public neglect, the daily deprivation of rights and confrontations with violence. The maps in Figure 11.4 also illustrate how politically divided the communities are, possibly because of the transient character of these inner-city neighbourhoods (migrants

from South Africa and elsewhere), their levels of deprivation or the fragmentation of the urban fabric (there is a history of hostel–house dweller conflict in the area). As mentioned, the secrecy around strategies for urban change thrives on these divisions that pre-empt any form of engagement that could consolidate and strengthen civil society.

In ward 61, covering an area which has been won by the IFP in a number of elections since 1996, the councillors' support base is in the south of the ward, in and around the Jeppestown hostels. In ward 66, a DA ward, the councillors' supporters are mainly from the eastern, 'whiter' and wealthier part of the ward (Kensington). Local councillors are therefore not primarily concerned about Bertrams' residents, whose relocation would improve rather than undermine their electoral chances in the long term. More generally, their parties' ideologies are more or less in line with the ANC's liberal vision of a 'global city':

> I don't differ with the city's vision on 2010. There will be people who will not like to be relocated but unfortunately you'll have to do all that. They'll be better off in blocks of flats that will be built in the Ellis Park area. Whatever we can get there will be better. It's been so neglected…

Figure 11.4 2006 local election results in and around the Greater Ellis Park area

Source: Bénit-Gbaffou (2008)
Note: The dashed line shows the GEPD project boundary.

> Unfortunately prices have started being pushed up: when it comes to property buying by the CoJ [City of Johannesburg] it is a problem. I think they've missed the boat. You've already got speculation. And that is good: when property prices go up people make investment. Confidence returns. (Milner interview)

Technically out of the state's direct sphere of influence, ANC and SANCO local branches, supposedly in close contact with local communities, are hardly voicing a concern publicly. Their dependency on the government limits their collective political role. They require government support in order to access the (meagre) public resources that their constituencies desperately need: food parcels, skills training programmes, small and temporary contracts, etc. Both organisations are also torn by violent internal conflicts. Furthermore, the demarcation of new ward boundaries in 2004, forcing both ANC and SANCO branches to restructure accordingly, has not helped in this regard. Within the ANC branch, an obvious opposition is that between 'party animals' (with little local legitimacy or concern for the residents) and local activists (often engaged in social work). SANCO's more direct engagement with the question of evictions and access to housing, combined with uncertainty over public policies and an inability to control members and non-members in this transient neighbourhood, led to some SANCO members (as well as non-members using SANCO credentials) using their political credibility to hijack houses, evict tenants while pretending to defend them against unscrupulous landlords, or collect money from members by promising them houses.

The private sector, in particular Ellis Park World of Sport – the managing structure for the stadiums (Ellis Park, Johannesburg Stadium and the Standard Bank Arena) – appears to better understand the need to ensure safety and foster pride in the neighbourhood in order to guarantee a sustainable environment for the mega sporting event. To this end, it has been supporting various local initiatives and providing temporary employment to the youth. The integration of local residents is not its main objective though.

Rather, the city's strategies for getting rid of the 'danger' (installing monitoring systems like closed-circuit television, increasing public and private security patrols in the area, or relocating the poor far away from the sports precinct) offer easier alternatives to an integrated, more difficult to lead and probably costlier social policy that tries to reconcile the global event and a derelict and deprived neighbourhood.

The numerous local NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) do not compensate for this lack of a collective political platform. They tend to focus on the daily management and survival of the poor and generally have very specialised areas of intervention – the aged, youth, mentally disabled, AIDS victims, etc. Like the regional city administration with which NGOs and CBOs often work, they are at the forefront of real-life conditions and are embedded in the urgency of everyday crisis management. However, new CBOs with area-wide ambitions, such as the

Bertrams Community Development Forum, are emerging as a response to the higher visibility of public actions in the area, including the rehabilitation of roads and the relocation of residents from the Priority Block. These CBOs are confronted with similar challenges to those faced by the SANCO and ANC branches and are also dependent on the state, since their success in attracting clients depends on their ability to provide access to scarce public resources in the area (such as contracts in construction). In this process, however, depending on their political astuteness, they might be able to redefine the boundaries of legitimate participation and include some residents' voices in their projects. Alternatively, the competition for legitimacy (between SANCO, local ward committees, etc.) could turn violent in this rather explosive social context.

Finally, the only agent speaking in favour of the poor is the judicial system – through the involvement of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), a human rights and public interest organisation based at the University of the Witwatersrand. CALS has played a crucial role in fighting against the eviction of residents from derelict inner-city buildings, and in 2008 finally compelled the city to redress its affordable housing strategy (COHRE 2005; Wilson forthcoming).

Three groups of residents have asked for the Centre's help to prevent evictions from Bertrams (Wilson interview). One group of about 20 people, squatting in a single private house, was directly threatened with eviction. However, one of the residents had previously been evicted from another inner-city building and called on CALS for support (at the time of writing this case was still in court).

The second group, whose members are renting council houses (the '17 houses', home to approximately 100 residents – see Figure 11.5) in the vicinity of Ellis Park Stadium, was already quite organised due to mobilisation during the struggle against apartheid and their embeddedness in the neighbourhood (many residents have lived there for several decades). These residents were threatened during the 1995 Rugby World Cup with having their houses demolished, as they are located within the sports precinct, close to the stadium. However, they successfully lobbied the ANC and prevented the evictions. Due to the lack of information provided by the JDA about their current fate in relation to the 2010 World Cup, and to rumours that FIFA's 500-metre exclusion zone around the stadiums[9] requires their homes to be destroyed, they sought help from CALS. However, their strong links to ANC council members led them to eventually drop the case. Perhaps the threat of judicial action was enough for them to get assurance from the government that they would not be evicted without suitable compensation. The residents' dependence on these political links might also have put pressure on them to abandon such powerful and formal legal instruments.

The third group, residents from a 'bad building' (overcrowded and without access to water and electricity) within the Priority Block, is contesting the relocation organised by the JDA and has called upon CALS to help in this battle.

Figure 11.5 The '17 houses' in New Doornfontein, Johannesburg, 2007

Note: The corner of Fitzroy and Bertrams roads, showing the Bertrams Road upgrade in progress. Here, the council-owned '17 houses' are threatened by the GEPD. Note the stadium lights in the background.

Photograph: C Bénit-Gbaffou

Conclusion

Is participation and community involvement possible in the type of fast-tracked development required by a mega-event? Some authors (Chipkin 2005) argue it is difficult enough, if not impossible, in the routine management of depressed urban areas, let alone in the context of a mega sporting event. This is due to the highly volatile nature of civil society, particularly in Johannesburg's inner-city neighbourhoods (Simone 2004). However, examples of steady political mobilisation in neighbourhoods like Yeoville (Harrison 2002) and Troyeville, which have traditionally welcomed migrants but have also managed to retain locally rooted activists, show that participation and community involvement are possible. Bertrams and New Doornfontein, however, may lack such political resources, although some groups – within ANC or SANCO structures, for instance – have a strong legacy of community struggle. The more acute level of deprivation and

neglect in those areas (compared to Yeoville and Troyeville) makes it more difficult to sustain collective action that could provide a basis for community participation and partnership with local authorities. But who knows what could be possible if the state provided participatory platforms to help consolidate rather than disempower existing initiatives and networks (Farouk 2006)?

The financial and governance choices made by the state from the beginning, relying as they did on high expectations of private sector participation and giving the JDA, supposedly the implementation arm of the project, very little control over the overall funding for the project, show that this possibility has not been seriously considered. It is true, though, that implementing a more sustainable and integrated vision for Johannesburg in 2010 or in 2030 is probably costlier in the short term, and requires conceiving of the state as a regulator and not only a facilitator for private investment. The privatisation of urban management and reliance on global and established business partners (such as big security companies and global property developers) is certainly an easier option in the short term. Such an approach provides a quick-fix solution to the most obvious problems of urban squalor and local crime, even if it results in displacing (and aggravating) the problem to more peripheral, hidden areas.

It is a matter of concern that developmental discourses on 2010 are so discrepant and that there is little attempt from public authorities to mitigate the well-documented negative effects of mega-events on neighbouring lower-income residents (COHRE 2007; Olds 1998). There could be fast-tracked ways of providing affordable, alternative accommodation for low-income residents displaced by the mega-event, even if they are not participative or based on complex and time-consuming partnerships. The city is just starting, compelled by the 'stick' of judicial litigation, to address the question, but affordable housing provision is occurring only on a small scale and in a 'temporary shelter' type of approach that only partially responds to the challenge.

The city is relying on the absence of collective mobilisation in a fragmented local civil society (further disempowered by the lack of information and confusion about public interventions around Ellis Park), as well as on the dynamics of growing private sector involvement locally, to 'clean up' the area without having to bear political responsibility for it – something it is indeed difficult to legitimise in a post-apartheid context.

Appendix

Socio-economic data on the Greater Ellis Park area, Johannesburg

Indicator	Estimate	Date
(Low) population estimate	17 000	2001
Unemployment rate	39%	2001
Proportion of tenants	71%	2004
Householders/individuals paying < R500 per month for accommodation	41%	2004
Number of 'bad buildings' (no/illegal access to services)	134	2005
Population living in 'bad buildings'	19 600	2005
Formally employed in the inner city (including Ellis Park area)	58% (23%)	2004
Resident here for < 5 years	30%	2004
Proportion of foreigners	18%	2001

Sources: Stats SA (2001); Albonico et al. (2004); Kagiso Urban Management (2005); Kayamandi Development Services (2004)

Note: These estimates are from different sources and are sometimes inaccurate, leading to contradictory results. They are, however, the estimates on which public authorities base their decisions.

Notes

1   By 'the poor', I do not mean only the residents who live in absolute poverty (below the nationally defined poverty line). I refer to the notion of relative poverty – lack of access to goods that are considered elementary and that are defined as rights in contemporary South Africa: decent housing, access to services (water, electricity), healthcare and education.

2   'Greenfield' development refers to development in non-constructed areas, as opposed to 'brownfield' development, which occurs in already constructed areas and therefore often implies some demolition and displacement.

3   This chapter relies on research conducted in July and August 2006 in the neighbourhoods surrounding Ellis Park Stadium. The research relied on extensive fieldwork in the area: interviews with public representatives (city officials, councillors and agencies: Johannesburg Development Agency, Johannesburg Property Company; community development workers; social workers; Jeppe police officers); with private consultants; with Ellis Park Stadium representatives (Ellis Park World of Sport); with civil society members (ward committee members, ANC branch leaders, civics, residents association and street committee leaders, members of the Jeppe community policing forum). It was supplemented by attendance at several public meetings: community policing forums, ward committee elections, civic and residents associations' meetings and ANC branch meetings. In this regard, I wish to thank the people who devoted their time and energy to make information available to me, and particularly Zack Sejaphala (leader of Thusanang, a youth organisation in Bertrams), a research assistant and friend.

4   The 'first wave' of gentrification (1970s) has been broadly characterised (Hackworth & Smith 2001) as a spontaneous movement of middle-class residents into derelict neighbourhoods, often triggered by artists, intellectuals and leftist activists who played a significant role in empowering local deprived communities. The 'second wave' (1980s) saw both the intervention of more powerful capitalist interests (private developers) and the emergence of strong resistance movements to gentrification. The 'third wave' (1990s), under more neoliberal governments, meant both stronger state (but market-oriented) intervention and larger corporate, often global, private companies investing in contexts where local resistance and community mobilisation had waned.

5   'City plans makeover for Ellis Park precinct' (http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/441/168/) and 'Exciting community precincts planned around Ellis Park' (http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/426/168/), both accessed in January 2007.

6   See www.jda.co.za/ellis/index.stm, accessed in January 2008.

7   *The Star* 22 June, A Cox, 'It's Joburg's new prime real estate'; *Saturday Star*, T Magkalemele, 'Cashing in on the 2010 boom: Investors are snapping up properties in the Ellis Park area as World Cup fever grows'; *The Star* 26 May and 23 June, D Pincus, 'Growing trend to buy property at the lower end of the residential market' and 'Slum suburbs regaining appeal'.

8   The inner-city section 79 committee is a council committee supposedly allowing a group of concerned councillors from different political parties to oversee local government intervention in the inner city. It is no longer open to civil society stakeholders (Winkler 2008). The fact that the two councillors representing the Greater Ellis Park area are not part of it is telling – either of its powerlessness or of their lack of interest, or both.

9   I was not able to find, at the time of writing, a law, by-law or regulation specifying that rule. Instead, many city by-laws, as well as national Bills and Acts, define 'exclusion zones' in the immediate vicinity of the stadium as an ad hoc decision to be made by the Local Organising Committee or by the host city. In any case, such a rule does not seem to have been unilaterally imposed by FIFA, as is often claimed, but is at the very least negotiated with South African public authorities, if not decided by them.

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DREAMS

12 *Urban dreams: The 2010 Football World Cup and expectations of benefit in Johannesburg*

André P Czeglédy

I remember exactly where I was when FIFA's Sepp Blatter announced that 'the 2010 Soccer World Cup is going to…South Africa'. I was at home with a friend, a bottle of cold sparkling wine sitting on the table ready to pop.

When Blatter said those magic words, we jumped up for joy and popped the cork. After a few sips I started dreaming big. I looked at the jungle in my back yard and I saw gold. I told my friend that we would have to clear the space and pave the way for five luxury cottages to accommodate visitors to South Africa…

…My friend hadn't had a permanent job in more than 10 years and I tried to paint a glorious picture about what 2010 meant for South Africa – entrepreneurs would be born by starting small businesses, especially in the service industry; men and women like herself who had been unemployed for many years, were now going to get the opportunity to earn a living in infrastructural developments… (*Saturday Star* 15 July 2006: 14)[1]

The 2010 dream

The above extract betrays much about the hopes, dreams and expectations of the 2010 Football World Cup for many South Africans.[2] Through its title, language and content, the column is meant to reflect grassroots opinion. Its words have a double impact: they vocalise the significance of an African country hosting this global event and the opportunity that many South Africans see it bringing. The columnist writes of the announcement in much the same way that Americans of a certain generation recall where they were when news of President John F Kennedy's shooting was broadcast. She reveals the dream of establishing a hospitality business, and lets her friend know that better times are ahead, especially for those South Africans who comprise the approximately 40 per cent of unemployed workers in the country. Such optimism is part and parcel of understanding how mega-events such as the 2010 Football World Cup possess elements of millenarian expectation that configure the thinking of ordinary individuals far removed from the national staging and business sponsorship that frames much of official discourse.

The ethnographic discussion that follows concentrates attention on individual expectations of benefit deriving from the 2010 World Cup. These expectations lie between the sleepy realm of dreams and the waking hopes of persons working towards economic gain as much as towards national unity or international sporting achievement. In this general respect, the subject of dreams has a robust history in intellectual thought, with the work of Sigmund Freud (1899) taking precedence in psychology's preoccupation with the subconscious, while anthropological contemporaries such as Edward Tylor (1871) and Louis Lévy-Bruhl (1910) focused on the mind of 'primitive man'. Later, the realisation of dreams became a preoccupation within anthropological circles through studies of millenarian movements ranging from the Sioux Ghost Dance (Mooney 1896) to Melanesian cargo cults (Worsley 1968). These diverse movements do not have much common ground with the terrain of the 2010 World Cup. Nevertheless, they do share in the idea of a bountiful future predicated upon an event of monumental importance.

In order to gain insight into expectations regarding the 2010 World Cup, the discussion looks first at the reasoning behind hosting such an event before considering how it is promoted through the real estate industry. Such promotion lays stress on ambitions of economic gain among the more propertied classes, a promise of benefit that is both balanced and amplified within the aspirations of largely poor, working men and women trading on the streets of Johannesburg. Interviewed in May and June of 2006, and in October and November of 2007,[3] these entrepreneurs come from the informal settlement of Orange Farm, the iconic township of Soweto, and the interstitial 'inner-city' suburbs of Joubert Park and Braamfontein. Their perspectives illuminate the connections between personal plans, expectations of benefit and the social realities that frame the build-up to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.

Cart before the horse

Expectations of benefit are always a part of mega-events like World Expos, international trade fairs and the Olympic Games. In a Grant Thornton International survey of 200 medium-to-large private businesses in South Africa, 75 per cent of respondents believed that the 2010 World Cup would benefit them financially (*Business Report* 2007).[4] Given the highly structured ways in which large-scale sporting and cultural events are now awarded via international associations, sponsored by global businesses, promoted and coordinated by oversight committees as well as delegated agents, there is less and less of a margin for those outside of the corporate umbrella of the chief organising bodies. In these terms, just as eastern European businesses in the post-1989 period were subjected to the twin processes of corporatisation and privatisation (see Frydman & Rapaczynski 1994), so mega-events have been transformed into commercial spectacles geared more to profit than to providing entertainment, employment or an appropriate product of intrinsic

value. Hence, while the 2010 World Cup is fundamentally no more (or less) than an oversized sporting tournament, its *raison d'être* has been shifted, enlarged and irrevocably changed from a periodic competition between national teams in search of a gold statuette and four-year bragging rights to being 'World Champion', to something else entirely.

Today, an event like the 2010 World Cup serves two main purposes (apart from any sport involved). First, it exists as an ongoing business enterprise attached to international associations such as FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association). These associations have increasingly taken on civic and judicial functions, and 'frequently dictate terms to governments and businesses through complex relationships of dependency with nationalism and corporate funding' (Miller et al. 2001: 2). They attempt to legally control every detail of the event as a commercial brand. A good example is the way in which FIFA asked the South African government to consider adding a variety of specific and generic terms to its commercial rights. Accordingly:

> On May 25, 2006, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mandisi Mpahlwa, published a notice in the *Government Gazette* designating the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a protected event in terms of section 15A of the South African Merchandise Marks Act. This protection will remain in force from the date of publication of the notice until six calendar months have elapsed after the commencement of the event. (*Saturday Star* 24 February 2007: 16)[5]

Such legislation ensures that corporate sponsors will benefit most from the publicity surrounding the 2010 World Cup. Yet the proposed terminology ranges from relatively precise phrases like '2010 Football World Cup' to more general terms such as the number '2010'. This means that any commercial reference to the year 2010 can conceivably be in contravention of the law – a consideration that implies an overarching totality of experience while placing copyright and trademark boundaries hard against the walls of *laissez-faire* commerce, let alone freedom of expression. Ironically, given the popular cast to the event, this action also works against it being about grassroots participation. From this perspective, the 2010 World Cup is just as much about profit through commercial exclusion as it is about sporting inclusion.

Second, mega-events like the 2010 World Cup are now considered a catalyst for change (*Mail & Guardian* 3–9 August 2007).[6] They are aimed at transforming the international image of the country or city, generating tourism, providing impetus for infrastructure spending and other initiatives that in many ways should be part of conventional development initiatives – without the event. In other words, they are increasingly about the standard business of provision from above: they have become the reason for authorities to do what they should be doing in any case. Take, for example, the way in which the municipal authorities of Johannesburg connect the 2010 World Cup with urban development. In general terms, the city's

executive mayor, Amos Masondo, has declared that, 'We regard 2010 as a long-term investment in the future of the city and its people' (*The Star* 9 March 2007: 3).[7]

He followed up this statement by noting (in the words of the reporter) that the preparations for the 2010 World Cup formed an 'integral part of the city's growth and development strategy', as if the *spin-offs* from a sporting event create part of the *foundations* for a city's future. This perspective underscores the problematic relationship between mega-events and public responsibility, for it sees the event as a point of leverage, as a way of acquiring necessary services and facilities rather than the other way around (that is, with the 2010 World Cup being permitted by an *existing* level of efficient infrastructure, available facilities and an acceptable standard of living). As a consequence of such back-to-front thinking, Lael Bethlehem, the chief executive of the Johannesburg Development Agency – tasked mainly with improving conditions within the inner city – links urban rejuvenation directly to the goal of transforming Johannesburg in time for the 2010 World Cup. She notes:

> We have an ambitious plan to regenerate the area, but everything depends upon funding. Some basic work has already started on the new gateway to the Ellis Park [Stadium and Soccer City] area which is on the corner of Saratoga Avenue and Joe Slovo Drive…We have started with the cleaning of the bridges, which had years of grime and old posters on it. We have improved lighting and installed mosaics and street furniture. We are also working with the department of transport with regard to widening roads to make the area more accessible. (*The Star* 21 November 2006: 9)[8]

Some of this work can be justified as an extraordinary expense commensurate with staging an event of the size, scope and international status of the 2010 World Cup. Nevertheless, it is also clear that issues of cleanliness, infrastructure, pedestrian services and accessibility (to use Bethlehem's words) are of basic rather than extraordinary concern for residents used to thinking of much of the city as a 'no-go' zone (see Czeglédy 2003). In the case of Johannesburg, this status has to do with the decline of the inner city in the last three decades (see Beavon 2004). It also has to do with more recent municipal attempts to re-establish the city centre in both property and functional terms, a strategy in parallel with public land holdings as well as a range of speculative private investment that has seen vacated office buildings turned into luxury loft apartments. Such a context is a reminder that any mega-event is intrinsically tied to wider conditions of space beyond the actual sporting facilities involved. For this reason, it is instructive to review how the 2010 World Cup is being understood through the lens of the local real estate market.

Promotions in real estate

For property owners in South Africa who have witnessed the country's most prolonged real estate boom (between 2000 and 2006), the 2010 World Cup is a

dream come true. This is because it extends the intensity of a seller's market with a point of reference as optimistic as the effusive rhetoric of politicians trumpeting the event. Whether disingenuous or not, such confidence is bolstered by media coverage that categorically states how the '2010 World Cup will help boost the economy and the property market' (*Saturday Star* 3 November 2007: 11).[9]

This restrained statement can be contrasted with another sort of discourse altogether. In an unaccredited article titled '2010 should boost residential market', a journalist focuses investors' attention on the link between housing values and transport infrastructure (*Saturday Star* 5 June 2004). The journalist does so by referring to Herschel Jawitz, CEO of one of South Africa's largest property agencies. In the opening paragraph, Jawitz's opinion on the property market begins with the positive impact of the World Cup on housing values before turning to the influence of the Gautrain, the Gauteng province's flagship transport project linking central Johannesburg with Pretoria and Oliver Tambo International Airport. This second topic is not insubstantial given that the remaining six paragraphs of the article deal solely with the Gautrain. What is significant here is the emphasis put on one topic while the article overwhelmingly deals with another: both title and opening paragraph feature the World Cup while the rest of the article covers a different theme. This imbalance marks the way in which the floating image of the 2010 World Cup has taken on a life of its own, even within specialised media. It also foreshadows the material ambitions of South African property owners keen to use this sporting event as a point of leverage within the social imagination.

When considering how the image of the 2010 World Cup is being inserted into the property market, it is best to look at the *Saturday Star*, a weekly edition of Johannesburg's major newspaper containing the largest and widest real estate listings in the country. Sometimes running to over 400 pages of classified advertisements, these listings are written collaboratively by sellers and realtors. Their texts represent an odd but decisive meeting of minds over many social issues such as crime, community and even spatial centrality. Recently, however, the theme of the World Cup has surfaced within this specialised rhetoric that subtly works to project and actualise wider social ambitions. In the process, a number of important alignments are made, most of which emphasise the 2010 World Cup as an investment watershed. Take, for example, an advertisement for property in Berea, one of Johannesburg's interstitial, high-rise suburbs associated with inner-city decay, crime and overcrowding since the end of the 1980s. With the tag line of 'Investment for 2010' (*Saturday Star* 10 June 2006, Property Guide: 205), the advertisement's wording is more succinct than 'Great investment for 2010' (*Saturday Star* 16 June 2007, Property Guide: 241), a parallel text for a property in the upmarket suburb of Morningside. In both cases, however, while the phrasing lacks precision, the exhortations clearly indicate the importance of purchasing property before the event while implying financial rewards that accrue to it. It is as if such a mega-event alone warrants local investment and holds inevitable profit. This simplistic thinking is given stronger shape in the advertisement for residential property in Berea,

described as '2 bedrooms, bathroom, separate toilet, dining area/lounge, kitchen, balcony, lock-up garage' (*Saturday Star* 10 July 2004, Property Guide: 239). Without the accompanying photograph or the obligatory tag-line title that the majority of such listings incorporate, there is simply the admonishment in centred and bold capital letters:

<div align="center">

BEAT THE

SOCCER WORLD CUP

PRICE HIKE!

</div>

This presentation stresses the 'Soccer World Cup' in *substitution* for the conventional visual element and titling, as if mentioning the event were enough to entice a buyer without them seeing the property. Perhaps it is – if the argument were true that the 2010 World Cup will involve a sudden increase in prices that will put such property out of the financial range of a potential investor. While there is no indication from property analysts that anything but rental property will be substantially affected by the upcoming event, this does not rule out other possibilities entirely. Nevertheless, what this advertisement additionally demonstrates is how the 2010 World Cup is understood as a primary reference point in terms of the South African property market. Such a position deals with space as much as timing, a good example of the former being the listing for a non-residential property close to Lanseria Airport: 'Investment opportunity, commercial & industrial property situated only 2km from Lanseria Airport undergoing a R100 million revamp for 2010 World Cup' (*Saturday Star* 16 December 2006, Property Guide: 161).

Here we find proximity to a peripheral transport facility near to Johannesburg and Pretoria acting as the main attraction, although what connection there is between the renovation of a small-town airport and vast commercial profit remains elusive. Much more direct in terms of spatial benefit is a full-colour, half-page advertisement for a new apartment building yet to be built in Cape Town's Green Point suburb along the seafront. Its feature line reads in elegant script reminiscent of penmanship: 'Be part of the 2010 Games…' (*Saturday Star* 10 June 2006, Property Guide: 293). This is followed by smaller text that continues with the advice:

<div align="center">

and invest in the most sought-after area money can buy!
Be quick and play the field, units are selling fast!
Studios, 1 bedroom, 2 bedrooms and double volume lofts/penthouses.
Be on the winning side!

</div>

Apart from using sporting phrases like 'play the field' and 'winning side', this advertisement makes a direct connection between property investment, event participation and a wider frame of loyalty that deserves elaboration. Superficially, the text shares in the excitement of the World Cup by exhorting buyers to 'invest' in an area that includes the new Green Point Stadium. This venue was chosen instead of the planned refurbishment of an existing stadium elsewhere, (allegedly) on an arbitrary basis by FIFA representatives more interested in views of Table Mountain than the

wishes of the Local Organising Committee (LOC), community opinion and the conservationists opposed to the building of a massive sports facility on city parkland. The advertisement in question, however, skips over this local controversy cum national scandal. On an underlying level, it asks potential buyers to see the purchase of property in Green Point as an act of national affirmation, one that elides the difference between the 2010 World Cup and loyalty to the grand unifying project of the nation state. This latter implication may not be direct, but it is certainly within the bounds of public discourse regarding the project of 'nation building' in South Africa. In this respect, no less personages than then President Thabo Mbeki and Danny Jordaan (*Saturday Star* 8 July 2006),[10] the head of the local organising authority, have spoken of the 2010 World Cup as an act of national unity. This view is succinctly expressed in an article appearing in *Sawabona*, the in-flight magazine of South African Airways and the first local publication that many international tourists are likely to read:

> It is tempting to ask how bringing the World Cup to our country will benefit us as individuals. But take a second to think about it: this is the first time this event is being held on the African continent. Naturally, the benefits extend far beyond the individual. It is about being South African. It is about being African…This is what I believe the World Cup will cultivate in our nation: unity. And as we work together towards a common goal, it is unity that will get us there. (*Sawabona* August 2007: 156)[11]

Questioning the 2010 World Cup

Talk of unity is a far cry from the perspective of the average South African who does not possess the funds to fly overseas. This underlying friction has been publicly interrogated through the pairing of two articles in South Africa's leading investigative newspaper, the *Mail & Guardian* (20–26 October 2006). The initial, feature article deals with soccer's legacy from 2010 and enthusiastically details the construction of five new stadiums for R9 billion – up from the originally projected construction costs of R2 billion.[12] In Johannesburg, Ellis Park Stadium and the FNB Stadium will be completely refurbished, with the latter being renamed Soccer City in conjunction with the adjacent construction of special office facilities for FIFA and the LOC that feature a dome in the shape of a football. The second article counters by questioning how many government subsidy houses can be built for low-income earners for the same amount – more than 250 000 – before considering economic ripple effects and social cohesion, amongst other impacts (*Mail & Guardian* 20–26 October 2006).[13] Ultimately, this double analysis is a reminder of the danger of seeing mega-events as solely positive or solely negative. Yet, for the majority of South Africans, the 2010 World Cup will be evaluated in exactly such terms, largely because it must be justified in reference to deep-seated individual dreams, whether they are of commercial success, social cohesion or national sporting glory.

One of the most contentious questions posed by observers outside of Africa is whether the necessary infrastructure will be ready in time. This discordant view

finds sympathy with a historic discourse understanding the African continent as home to poverty, corruption and violence, to name but a few of the quintessentially dysfunctional elements. Nonetheless, it is a powerful image reinforced whenever someone of the international standing of Franz Beckenbauer, the legendary player and chairperson of Germany's 2006 World Cup organising committee, publicly doubts the ability of South Africa to be prepared for 2010 – and then diplomatically retracts his statement after his motives are questioned (*Mail & Guardian* 6–12 October 2006).[14] In South Africa, worries about this sort of attitude surfaced repeatedly throughout 2006 and 2007, when public debate focused attention on the rumour that Australian authorities were waiting to step in should South Africa not be up to the task of hosting the event (*The Guardian* 12 December 2006; *The New York Times* 23 April 2007).[15] This public discourse, combining the doubts of Afro-pessimism with self-doubt redolent of postcolonial insecurities, was a harsh reminder of the way in which the very location of the 2010 World Cup is encased within broader currents of perception regarding ideas of relative development.

For many South Africans, however, it is not questions about the construction status of the various stadiums that occupy their minds. Nor is it doubts about addressing chronic problems of public transportation. The latter case has much to do with provincial initiatives like the Gautrain project mentioned earlier, and municipal initiatives like those of Johannesburg's town council to introduce a new Rapid Bus Transport System, dubbed *Rea Vaya* (We are Going), which aims to place 85 per cent of residents within 500 metres of a trunk route or feeder corridor. Instead, it is the issue of personal safety that many South Africans are concerned about, in general as well as specific terms. No better illustration of this concern exists than a satirical cartoon by Zapiro highlighting the difference between German and South African contexts for hosting the World Cup. The title reads:

> Germany 2006: South African visitors have been warned of *racism* in certain areas. In return we provide the German tourist with the…*SA 2010 Getting to the Stadium Handbook* (*Mail & Guardian* 19–25 May 2006: 23)

Four pictures below this text in the cartoon refer to public shootings between rival taxi associations, occurrences of passengers being thrown off commuter trains, an incident in which scab drivers for Johannesburg's Metrobus service were burnt alive in their vehicles by striking colleagues, and the 2006 security workers' strike, which saw violent demonstrations on the streets of several cities, especially Cape Town. To South Africans, these dramatic incidents do not simply refer to the transportation industry or industrial conflict in general. They symbolise what Mary Tomlinson has labelled the 'feral state' (*Mail & Guardian* 25 October–1 November 2007: 32)[16] of the nation, one whereby the violence of crime has become unhinged from wider social and moral reference points; where crime is routinely encountered in the daily lives of most South Africans. In these terms, South Africa is a terrible exception within

the developing world as much as globally, consistently ranking among leading countries in the worst categories. Consequently, it is no surprise that of the five main sessions of an academic colloquium on '2010: Alternative Voices' hosted by the Human Sciences Research Council and the University of the Witwatersrand in October 2007, two sessions dealt wholly with violence.

In parallel to such a critical perspective, the 2010 World Cup has increasingly become a reference point for local voices in community media. This is illustrated by the words of a Johannesburg resident after a house robbery. In her letter to a community newspaper, she relates how three armed men entered a house in the suburb of Waverley where people had gathered for the Twenty20 Cricket World Cup (in September of 2007). They robbed those on the premises and shot an elderly woman and a foreign guest in the process. She writes:

> I am not sure if being a South African has toughened me up or insured me against the violence in our society. I really love this country and its people. But on Saturday night, I came to terms with the fact that crime rates are certainly not improving! We try to believe the authorities are getting a handle on crime – but they are not! And nothing seems to effect a change. In less than 'a thousand sleeps' we are hosting the FIFA World Cup. Will the horror of last Saturday night be visited on our international visitors? (*Rosebank Killarney Gazette* 28 September 2007: 6)[17]

Local organisers have responded to such questioning by emphasising their security plans. These plans include the purchase of special surveillance planes, public order barriers, and the establishment of dedicated 2010 World Cup police stations in each host city, as well as the presence of uniformed police officers from guest countries. Yet the real debate here is not about the preparedness of the South African authorities, but how more general social instabilities and shortcomings will affect visitors' experiences of South Africa on a broader basis. In this respect, Danny Jordaan (CEO of the 2010 LOC) has gone on record to emphasise how 'the 2010 World Cup has become the benchmark against which everything in South Africa is measured'. As a consequence:

> When there is a water shortage in Polokwane, I must answer what is going to happen to 2010; when there are power outages [in the Western Cape], I must answer what is going to happen to 2010; now there are questions about what is going to happen to [Zimbabwean President Robert] Mugabe, and I must answer what is going to happen to 2010. (*The Star* 28 March 2007: 2)[18]

Such questions point toward the anxiety that pervades conversation of the 2010 World Cup. They underscore how South Africans are beginning to see the event as 'larger' than their daily lives, yet also tied to social realities that affect them in an everyday manner. For this reason, it is critical to understand how ordinary South Africans see the 2010 World Cup in aspirational terms. What are their dreams about

the future? What does the 2010 World Cup mean to those who earn a living quite separate from the comfortable posts offered to politically connected officials, or the sponsorship deals struck with major corporations?

Precarious streets

The opening ceremony for the 2010 World Cup will take place in Johannesburg at Soccer City on 11 June, as will the closing game on 11 July. As many as 450 000 sporting tourists are expected to arrive in the country during the month-long event (*Mail & Guardian* 21–27 July 2006: 3).[19] For many poorer South Africans, these foreign tourists represent more than just a boost to local tourism; they symbolise the opportunity of a lifetime. This is none more so than for those small-scale entrepreneurs who line the roads of the country's cities. Such mainly informal (unlicensed) traders constitute a major form of subsistence for the underemployed, as well as one of the most distinctive elements of African cityscapes as a whole. Their noisy banter, colourful wares and makeshift stands situated along the forlorn inner-city pavements or dusty township streets have become a characteristic contradiction to neocolonial and postcolonial orders throughout Africa. The variety they bring to public space has been celebrated in the work of Simone (2004a, 2004b), who understands street traders to be an integral component in the 'human infrastructure' that makes up African cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Dakar and Duoala. Such traders subsist on the hustle and bustle of commuting traffic predicated upon uneven urban development and the endemic poverty that ensures a constant stream of small purchases by those unable to afford the price of volume outlays in chain stores distant from their places of residence. In these terms, street trading is about both the politics of space and the politics of economy. It is mostly about sheer survival for the urban poor, whether they are sellers or consumers.

Street trading often operates on the margins of the law. In the African experience, this is as much the case for entrepreneurs in Zaire associated with the informal or so-called 'second economy' (MacGaffey 1987) as it is for African curio dealers working the streets of New York City (Stoller 2002). For this reason, if no other, the business of street trading is intrinsically precarious, frequently balanced on the knife-edge between municipal regulation and police enforcement. This is evident in the words of Lazarus Ngogo (aged 60), one of thousands of Zimbabweans working in South Africa while their country's economy lies in ruins. His girlfriend Christine trades on King George Street, a thoroughfare in another of Johannesburg's interstitial, high-rise neighbourhoods:

> My girlfriend sells peanuts, cigarettes and sweeties in Joubert Park. She sells peanuts and snacks for R1 and cigarettes for R1.20 each. The money is enough, but sometimes it is worse on the street. Metro[politan police] can come any time – you can be lucky to sell for a long time, maybe some years. But you have to move fast when you see the police…just to jump

> into a taxi with all you are selling. Others can be not lucky. They can
> buy peanuts, sweets, cigarettes today [from the wholesaler] and tomorrow
> the Metro comes…they take it all. Everyone takes a chance. 2010 is the
> same – people love soccer and you can sell some food – pap [corn
> meal] and meat. A lot of people are thinking to do this…to make a
> restaurant or something on the street. It can be good. But they know
> Metro can come any time and take it all. My friend is thinking to
> cook for 2010 – lots of people will come here – and she is thinking…
> maybe you can say it is a dream, but she can take a chance to make
> lots of money.

This constant battle with authorities is echoed by Nicholas Mbali, a man in his sixties who operates alongside the supply chain for informal trading. He manages a storeroom for street vendors in Newtown, a former factory area adjacent to the city centre that has been promoted by the municipality as the new 'cultural district' of Johannesburg. Nicholas believes that the 2010 World Cup might prompt authorities to improve the living conditions of the poor:

> We are always waiting – 2010 as other changes can bring something
> good and what I see is something that can stop crime…but things are
> not easy, the council can take all this; they just take the peanuts and
> throw them on the ground when one is on the street. I think 2010 –
> we need something to make a difference. We are waiting for local
> government to make this place look better – there are no lights here…
> they need to put in windows, [need to] help these people who have no
> jobs and not take away what they need to live…perhaps 2010 can help
> these people, but at the moment they are pushed off the streets.

Not surprisingly, local politicians have sometimes made (too) much out of the heady anticipation surrounding the 2010 World Cup. Working alongside her eldest son, Gracie Saduma (41) runs a business as a street-side cobbler in Orange Farm, one of the country's largest and poorest informal settlements (formally designated a 'township' in 1997). She told me in June of 2006 that she had high hopes her life would change because of the event. After all, the local ANC councillor had appeared at a community meeting and '…they promised that they will upgrade the neighbourhood, and then also our places, our homes must also be improved…She said that everything will be improved.'

Given that Orange Farm is some 33 kilometres to the south of Johannesburg, it is unlikely to be directly affected by preparations for the 2010 World Cup. Whether such municipal promises will be kept is therefore in some doubt. This is especially the case since improving the material circumstances of its largely unemployed and underemployed population of over 350 000 residents would constitute a significant challenge for any government – let alone one concerned about state priorities such as ensuring that the immediate setting for the 2010 World Cup meets foreign expectations of an orderly city.

The hidden history of mega-events

Both Gracie and Nicholas highlight the tension in seeing the 2010 World Cup as a financial saviour while parts of the built environment remain deficient in provision. In particular, Nicholas's commentary raises the spectre of public control that is as much a part of mega-events as the regulation of branding noted earlier. In this respect, mega-events have a bad record for accommodating the poor, particularly those who temporarily occupy public spaces earmarked for visitors. In Rwanda's capital, Kigali, police detained hundreds of street-children beggars before the 2004 summit of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) took place in the city centre (*The Star* 13 February 2004).[20] This sort of sanitary evacuation is nothing new given the wider history of international sports, where the stringent qualifications for hosting the Olympic Games set by the International Olympic Committee overlook the actions which local organisers routinely undertake to ensure a sparkling setting. A comprehensive report by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) details the hidden history behind host preparations (*Mail & Guardian* 15–21 June 2007).[21] During the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, Korea, some 720 000 people were forced to make way for new facilities and housing geared to the Games, while informal street vendors were banned entirely. In 1992, Barcelona authorities used the Olympics as an excuse to clear informal traders from the streets and to disperse Roma communities. Prior to the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, authorities issued 'quality of life' ordinances on beggars and homeless people in order to move them out of high-profile neighbourhoods considered important to the events. In Beijing, at least 1.25 million people were relocated in favour of the 2008 Olympics, while London authorities have plans to demolish co-op housing and the 100-year-old Manor Garden allotments to begin their own clearance scheme for the 2012 Games.

In the Johannesburg context, it is worthwhile to briefly contrast private and public sector approaches so far. The private sector has quickly taken advantage of housing opportunities associated with the 2010 World Cup. Investment in the central business district and its adjacent interstitial suburbs has been building in momentum since the mid-decade, aided by government tax incentives granted to investors willing to renovate the many dilapidated and derelict buildings in the area. In some cases, the zeal for sudden profit seems to have overtaken social considerations, and the push to renovate building stock has seen its share of casualties already. In Bertrams, an older suburb near Ellis Park Stadium, absentee owners are reported to be returning to evict squatters from their premises now that property speculators are considering the area in anticipation of the 2010 World Cup (*Mail & Guardian* 6–12 October 2006).[22] In other areas of the city, such speculation has already been replaced by legal action. Among those affected by short-notice evictions are the residents of Argyle House in Queens Road, Parktown East. An anonymous resident had this to say:

> This is just one of eight apartment blocks – the others are Warburton Manor on Princess Place and a couple in Braamfontein. All the tenants

> have received two months' notice and when I phone the offices saying that I will be away from mid-December to early January, I was given the same answer as many other tenants got: 'You have to be out by December 31st [2007] as the builders are moving in on the first of January.' It is ridiculous – we never even knew that the building was for sale. In April we were still given the option to buy our units. Then comes this.

> I am looking for a place and will leave as soon as I find one. All this is part of the whole city upgrade…the buildings, not the people, are thought of. This [Argyle House] is not a slum but has fallen prey to speculation. The developers do not care a hoot…they are putting hundreds of people on the street. Here there is Dorothy who has lived here for 17 years…she is 78 or so and where can she go? An old-age home? She is so independent here. Catches buses into town to do her banking and also to Killarney [for grocery shopping]. Then there is Sam who has been here for 15 years…

Such treatment has left many people like her angry and bitter, fostering an unpleasant picture of the future:

> Of course the two-month notice after I had been living here for close on seven years is nothing else than an eviction…and that all in the name of profit. There is a lot that is going on in connection with 2010. But I tell you, [president Thabo] Mbeki will be killed, the country will collapse in chaos, there will be no 2010. This building will become a slum…

The city's municipal leaders have approached the 2010 World Cup more gently. Perhaps they have been cautioned by the grassroots movement World Class Cities for All, which explicitly aims 'for the inclusion of the urban poor in the 2010 FIFA World Cup preparations' and employs slogans such as 'Nothing for us without us! No relocation without alternatives! Negotiations and social dialogue!'[23] Apart from upgrading inner-city housing, municipal plans are in place to establish an official Informal Trading Policy (ITP) in tandem with local by-laws (*Randburg Sun* 10 August 2007).[24] This would create a framework for the distribution, facilitation and control of street trading in areas deemed important for the 2010 World Cup. The problem with this regulatory format is that existing by-laws stress the formal organisation of street trading as a planned and licensed activity rather than as a flexible enterprise developed *between* the physical and commercial spaces of formal business. In this way, the very spirit of the ITP runs contrary to the nature of street trading as an enterprise on the margins of society. Whether or not the ITP will be successful in converging disparate and sometimes contradictory interests remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the dreams for the 2010 World Cup remain, and the next sections continue to give them detail from the perspectives of more informal traders in Johannesburg.

International opportunities

Although the 2010 World Cup is being held exclusively in South Africa, organisers trumpet its continental significance. This is partly because the awarding of the event by FIFA was based on a controversial continental rotation policy (since scrapped) that ensured an African nation would emerge as the winner for the first time. While some criticised the policy as a case of *noblesse oblige* by the wealthy nations of European soccer and the developed world, it is also clear that the 2010 World Cup possesses a continental element that marks it as different from previous competitions. This is because of a pervading line of thought that sees such an opportunity as having wider connotations given the past history of slavery, colonialism, racism and underdevelopment with respect to Africa as a whole. This thinking is linked to a shared image among countries long considered unsuitable for hosting such an event. Yet because of it, a local newspaper headline can declare with tongue-in-cheek sensibility that the 'Neighbours are gatecrashing 2010' (*Saturday Star* 14 April 2007: 4)[25] while reporting on cooperation among the neighbouring states of the Southern African Development Community, as well as detailing their respective hopes for hosting visiting sporting teams and offshoot tourism.

More important for the discussion at hand, however, is the historic interconnection between the developing world in general. The nature of such interconnectedness ensures that low-level, long-distance links of a personal nature often work better than the high-level institutional connections designed by nation states and their elites. In this respect, both archaeological and anthropological studies have shed light on the kinds of trade networks connecting distant parts of Africa. Often these networks have an ethnic, language and/or religious basis, as among the Dyula of north-western Africa (Launay 1982), the Swahili along the Indian Ocean coast (Freeman-Grenville 1988; Middleton 1992) and the Muslim traders of eastern Africa (Horton 1987). A contemporary example of such movement and trade exists in the person of Mary Chivu (64), one of the many Shona migrant traders who routinely travel between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Every six weeks, Mary makes the journey from Masvingo in Zimbabwe and stays for two weeks in Douglas Court, located near Park Station, Johannesburg's rail and bus terminus. Park Station is close to her sales territory in Braamfontein, one of the key office nodes for the decentralised city in the post-war era (see Beavon 2004). Mary carries her wares on her head as she walks the streets in search of customers, selling them crocheted and wooden handicrafts, including cooking utensils and salad and storage bowls. On the subject of the 2010 World Cup, she says:

> 2010 offers a better future. There will be a lot of money, lots of foreigners with good currencies. Trading will be strong. I am looking forward to selling and I will be getting a lot of stocks. My son does the carving of the bowls from mopani wood. I have nine children to look after and come here as I am poor at home.

Mary's circuit between neighbouring countries is evidence of the sort of cross-border trade prevalent between South Africa and the former frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. It is also representative of the way in which South Africa acts as a nexus point for investment capital, international products and employment opportunities throughout the southern African region and beyond. In these commercial terms, Johannesburg plays a pivotal role in market development, capital distribution as well as transportation, making the city the pre-eminent base for commerce and tourism-oriented industries in relation to the 2010 World Cup. This prospect is highlighted by the figure of Hamadi Hasham (35), a former teacher of Swahili from Zanzibar. Having lived in Johannesburg since 1999, he supplies stationery to small outlets in the Braamfontein area, and sells sweets and loose cigarettes from a local corner store while taking a correspondence course in customer relations. Hamadi has plans for the 2010 World Cup:

> I want to change my business; I want to enter the tourist market with sculptures and curios. I will be fetching these from Kenya, Tanzania and Zanzibar. My friend has small experience in this – he is [already] selling in Sea Point in Cape Town and we will join hands. Another friend of mine operates in Rustenburg. We are in the process of forming a partnership and will start operations in a year and [a] half, around the time of the Confederation[s] Cup [to be hosted by South Africa in June 2009]. I have no training as such but see 2010 as an opportunity to start a good business earning lots of money selling artefacts from Africa. A student friend of mine…took off three months from his studies to sell African artefacts to tourists during the 2006 World Cup in Germany. This is my plan to take, sell and make money when large groups of people come here.

Much of his thinking is anchored in a cosmopolitan vision of social benefit:

> 2010 will bring change to Joburg…interactions between nations, cultural exchanges and it will bring tourists. There will be more money in circulation and I base this on what my student friend in Munich said about what happened in Germany: tourists were enjoying pavement trading…it was all about doing something different and they did not want to go for the formal arrangements…

This thinking exemplifies the strategic opportunism of street traders, a level of flexibility that goes hand in hand with the precarious nature of their enterprise. It is also a sensibility that runs counter to official attempts at organisation. So, although commercial opportunities do arise with mega-events, these can be frustrated by a lack of dialogue between the formal and informal sectors, as well as by the tendency of informal operators to see rules and regulations as inhibiting their independence. As Hamadi adds:

> I think Joburg will be more vibrant, a very interesting place for business opportunities but it is interesting that here, often, informal traders are

sidelined by authorities…There is a lot of talk about jobs, but jobs for whom? Jobs are few. Ordinary people must be taught, not told, how to do business and 2010 is the opportunity to help people realise their potential.

Dreams from the streets

The question of potential is important when considering how street traders can evolve from operating a micro-business on the roadside to establishing the sort of small- and medium-sized enterprises that are the mainstay of many economies elsewhere. Barbara Khumase (47) is exactly this sort of entrepreneur. She was born near Grobblersdal (Mpumalanga province) in a small village called Luckau, and arrived in Johannesburg in 1982 in search of employment. With only a Standard 5 (Grade 7) education, she was not qualified for better-paying jobs requiring a high school matriculation certificate, and therefore worked in a Jeppestown restaurant before a short spell as a domestic servant. Barbara realised one of her dreams in 1990 when she was allocated a house in Orange Farm under the auspices of the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme. Using her own savings, and by taking advantage of instalment-type payment plans, she set up a dry-cleaning business in a recycled shipping container on the side of a main road. Now she runs nine dry-cleaning locations throughout the area and her jovial face is well known among the local commercial community. In many ways, she is the ideal example of a street-smart entrepreneur who has persevered despite the odds. Barbara is not certain that the 2010 World Cup will change her life much, although she understands that 'important people' see it as significant for the country. She astutely recognises a silver lining of vanity in the events that will take place so far from where she lives and works:

> The World Cup is important to people, they will need their clothing cleaned – to look good for it. So I am hoping that business will be better. People will have jobs [because of it], and they will be able to get their clothing cleaned with me.

Many other street traders, who expect an increase in pedestrian traffic during the 2010 World Cup, share this optimism. A case in point is Tuli Ndovo (45), who also has high hopes for the 2010 World Cup. Tuli is from Giyani in Limpopo province, where she began cooking on the street for passers-by in 1988 before coming to Johannesburg. She now operates her micro-business in Kliptown, Soweto, from a pavement space originally intended to be part of a broader trading market. Here she cooks food on two single-plate electric stoves drawing power from an external socket. She begins cooking at about 6am to catch the morning rush of commuters and serves pap and meat stew, either as a 'take-away' for R11 or 'to sit down' for R10 if customers opt to sit on the plastic milk crates that front her cooking station. She says in an enthusiastic voice:

> 2010 will be good for me…I will be cooking [for] so many people food here…so many people will buy from me, I will have money. They

will come here to Kliptown to look at what is said about equal rights and think of what happened in 1955 and Mandela…and I will have a business…a restaurant, that is my dream.

This sort of mental graduation, from a modest, even marginal business to a fully-fledged commercial operation with formal premises and employees, figures prominently in the expectations of benefit voiced by street traders in Johannesburg. Since the majority of these entrepreneurs deal in foodstuffs (primarily cooked foods or fresh fruits and vegetables and sweets), their dreams tend to revolve around restaurants of one type or another. Among these dreams lie other ideas too. In his sixties now, John Tsepi sells craft trinkets to tourists visiting the Nelson Mandela Museum in Orlando West, Soweto. He pins his hopes for the future partly on the interest generated by the struggle against apartheid and the iconic figure of Nelson Mandela:

> 2010 is going to make us rich because all the people who come here will support us. Because this is Africa and things we have here are different and what is more…this is Orlando West…Mandela's house and Mandela and his name, what he has done, makes people come here.

John works with craftsman Marton Sexale and the two agree that '2010 will make us happy'. John says of his partner:

> Marton makes these keyrings, pen holders out of wood and writes on them 'Made in Soweto' because he is a resident of Soweto. So people come here, they take something they want – and I have something to put on my table. We trade the same hours as the [Nelson Mandela] Museum. With 2010 a lot of changes are happening…in Soweto, this place is making sleeping places…if I had a spare room, I would do that too. I can make a room and be given money. 2010 is about more money – the support we need.

John's dream of opening a bed-and-breakfast guest house is reportedly shared by many would-be entrepreneurs in Soweto (*Saturday Star* 2 December 2006).[26] It is indicative of an increasing demand for visitor accommodation in time for the 2010 World Cup. Such demand is anchored by the 55 000 beds required by FIFA alone, and the fact that this will be the first time that FIFA has extended its event contracting to non-hotel accommodation (*Rosebank Killarney Gazette* 5 October 2007).[27] This change in approach is as inclusive as it is practical, given the relative shortage of hotel beds in the country. It also has something to do with a faintly paternalistic attitude consistent with the already mentioned questioning of an African nation's suitability as host. Yet at the same time, it opens the door to everyday opportunities that the poor of Johannesburg and its sister cities can reach for. In these terms, it is no wonder that the 2010 World Cup is understood by many South Africans as the chance of a lifetime, an occasion when fortunes can and will be made. This certainty of benefit has important ramifications for considering South African expectations of the 2010 World Cup.

The certainty of benefit

Certainty of benefit is evident in the wording of a flyer passed out at Johannesburg intersections in May 2007. The text begins with the headline 'R48 000 000 000.00' before asking the reader:

> How much of it do you want?
>
> Are you still trying to work out how you are going to make money in the biggest sporting event in the world? Kick off 3 years from now (2007 + 3 = 10). 48 billion rand is coming to South Africa, the only question is will you be making money or watching other folks score?

Apart from the faulty arithmetic and an ending exhorting readers to take advantage of a 'Business opportunity to start earning right now!', what is apparent here is the explicit sense of surety involved, a susceptibility shared by the street traders whose voices anchored the preceding discussion. The only real question that readers must ask themselves is the *extent* to which they want to enrich themselves. This notion works off an intrinsic belief in a bountiful future predicated upon commercial participation in the 2010 World Cup, one that seemingly includes every potential reader. It draws on the wider idea that such riches will be arriving for all South Africans; one only has to choose to participate. While this proposition grates against the reality of a much narrower base of benefits, its power to encourage a sense of anticipation remains undiminished. An important part of this power draws on the post-apartheid sense of democratic access (somewhat tainted by the greed of neoliberal capitalism and political self-enrichment) in the wake of 1994. Yet this is a democracy of potential rather than activated economic participation, one where personal expectations of benefit possess a millenarian character precisely because of the size of the poor population. Not surprisingly, Worsley's (1968: 221, 225) benchmark analysis of Melanesian cargo cults concludes by noting how the 'history of enthusiasm' has found that the greatest support for millenarian movements comes from among lower levels of society. In other words, the greatest leaps of faith occur for those with the most to gain in relative terms. Hence, the less you have, the more you can hope for, and the greater your expectations of benefit.

Worsley (1968: 225) emphasises another dynamic. He notes:

> Millenarian beliefs have reoccurred again and again throughout history, despite failures, disappointments, and repression, precisely because they make such a strong appeal among the oppressed, the disinherited and the wretched. They therefore form an integral part of that stream of thought which refuse to accept the rule of a subordinate class, or of a foreign power, or some combination of both…

In these terms, millenarianism is fundamentally 'anti-authoritarian', forming an integral part of local forms of political resistance (Worsley 1968). Given this dimension, how can we interpret the millenarian aspect to South African

expectations of the 2010 World Cup? First, it is important to remember that many of the elusive promises regarding community development with respect to the 2010 World Cup are propagated by official authorities, and so must be understood in terms of political mileage as much as anything else. In effect, these dreams exist to further personal agendas as much as collective needs, particularly in respect of the poor majority. Second, a good deal of this sporting event deals with exactly that (sport) rather than with the economically oriented considerations that have been the main theme of the discussion in this chapter. In this sense, by sponsoring the World Cup, the South African government has bought into a modern version of the Roman 'bread and circuses' – without the bread. Third, it is also clear that after decades of economic hardship, the poor of South Africa are ready to interpret the 2010 World Cup in millenarian terms of radical change for *themselves*, if not society as a whole. Hence, after the failure of the immediate post-1994 future to provide for the redistribution of wealth promised by the ANC's Freedom Charter of 1955, they *need* something to believe in. The 2010 World Cup fulfils this role in a similar way to how John and Jean Comaroff (1991) understand the triumph of missionary Christianity among the southern Tswana of South Africa. While the missionaries preached the separation of church and state, they were happy to aid the colonial enterprise. Similarly, the 2010 World Cup affirms entrepreneurial capitalism without challenging the wider status quo; it reinforces self-reliance while kowtowing to what is essentially a state project. Of course, if you are one of the poor who do not become rich through the event, you might be consoled by the more realistic example of BDT, a financial services company that in July 2004 announced a special savings plan – for (the majority of) local fans hoping to gather enough money to simply purchase tickets for the 2010 World Cup (*Business Report* 23 July 2004).[28]

Notes

1   Zingisa Mkhuma, 'We need to see 2010 as the greatest opportunity we have'.

2   The author thanks Julia Seirlis for comments on the text, and Todd Lethata and Cheryl Stevens, who acted as research assistants.

3   Pseudonyms are used for all interviewees.

4   'Business has high hopes for 2010', available at http://www.busrep.co.za/general/print_article.php?fArticleId=3656123&fSectionId=5, accessed on 11 November 2007.

5   Thembilile Makgalemele, 'FIFA lawyers get heavy with local entrepreneurs'.

6   Connie Nel and Alf James, 'A mixed response', *Towards 2010* supplement.

7   Anna Cox, 'So much to do and so little time before 2010 bonanza'.

8   Anna Cox, 'Money is key in fixing up Joburg for 2010'.

9   David Pincus, 'Property market is healthy and growing', Business section.

10   Jermaine Craig and Charles de Olim, 'Come to paradise in 2010'; Jermaine Craig, 'Viva South Africa'.

11   Michelle Lippert, 'Women of South Africa Unite…'.

12   Lungile Madywabe, 'Soccer's lasting legacy from 2010'.

13   Lungile Madywabe, 'Housing is only "one half of the other" '.

14   Lungile Madywabe, 'Negativity threatens 2010'.

15   Luke Harding, 'Doubt over South Africa 2010' (*The Guardian*); also Sharon Lafreniere, 'South Africa vs. itself, in race to get ready for World Cup' (*The New York Times*), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/world/africa/23worldcup.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, accessed on 13 November 2007.

16   Mary Tomlinson, 'The descent into a feral state'.

17   Megan Prawde, 'I want my freedom back'.

18   Botho Molosankwe and South African Press Association, '2010 is being taken care of, says upbeat Jordaan'.

19   Ciaran Ryan, 'Here comes the soccer tourists'.

20   Sapa-DPA, 'Rwanda removes street kids ahead of summit'.

21   George Monbiot, 'Olympic menace'.

22   Lloyd Gedye, 'What World Cup?', Business supplement.

23   See World Class Cities for All at http://www.streetnet.org.za.

24   N.A., 'Street vendors join 2010 surge'.

25   Ziggy Mogopodi, Taby Moyo, Thando Ncube and Martin Dlamini, 'Neighbours gatecrashing 2010'.

26   Mbali Kubheka, 'Soweto bedding down for 2010'.

27   *Gazette* reporter, 'B&Bs gear up for 2010'.

28   Mpho Lukoto, 'Group launches savings plan for 2010 World Cup', available at http://www.busrep.co.za/general/print_article.php?fArticleId=2160242&fSectionId=5, accessed on 10 November 2007.

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13 *Aiming for Africa: Durban, 2010 and notions of African urban identity*

Orli Bass

In South Africa, 'no sport has been watched, played, and discussed more than football' (Alegi 2004: 1).[1] This level of interest in the sport is matched and even accentuated in Durban. Durban is home to three Premier Soccer League Premier Division teams: Golden Arrows, AmaZulu and Thanda Royal Zulu. Popular support for the sport is extensive; indeed, the 2006 Absa Cup Final was held in Durban despite the fact that neither of the two teams contesting the final was locally based. Furthermore, Durban's Absa Stadium is usually filled to capacity at big football matches. Even the mayor of the eThekwini Municipality, Obed Mlaba, has aligned himself to the locally-based African Wanderers Football Club (*Ezasegagasini Metro* 9 February 2007).[2]

Coupled with this substantial interest in the game are a host of aspirations in connection with the upcoming 2010 FIFA World Cup. In 2007, Durban hosted the tournament's preliminary draw and it will constitute a venue for various matches, including a semi-final. Like other host cities, numerous socio-economic spin-offs are touted and the potential urban regeneration benefits underscored. There are, nonetheless, widespread doubts regarding the ability of mega-events to deliver on promises of developmental benefits and economic growth (Baade & Matheson 2004; Black & Van der Westhuizen 2004; Horne & Manzenreiter 2006; Humphreys & Prokopowicz 2007; Matheson & Baade 2004; Owen 2005; Whitson & Horne 2006), although some (see Maennig & Du Plessis 2007) are less sceptical about such claims. On the whole, it appears that, at best, benefits are ambiguous and uneven (Andranovich et al. 2001; Gratton et al. 2000, 2001; Gratton et al. 2006).

Notwithstanding these caveats, this chapter focuses on the potential implications that this particular mega-event will have for Durban's identity and urban landscape. The 2010 World Cup is seen as a vehicle to market Durban as the quintessential African city to both citizens and tourists; football itself as the catalyst to recast its identity as African and inclusive. Indeed, sport has been described in South Africa as one of 'the best cultural activit[ies] through which to promote or generate a new national identity' (Nauright 1997: 1). Accordingly, sport is broadly viewed as a tool which can promote social integration in South Africa (Keim 2003). In this regard, it becomes apposite to assess the extent to which the positioning of Durban and its identity, through a global sporting event, has an impact on the creation of a possibly more inclusive post-apartheid African city and identity.

This chapter therefore pays attention to the manner in which Durban's identity is figured in the 2010 strategies and discourses of the eThekwini Municipality and the

KwaZulu-Natal provincial government.[3] The extent to which these discourses and strategies differ from one another and affect the way in which Durban is represented and physically shaped is examined. Through interviews and analysis of various statements and documents, the manner in which the World Cup is mobilised to profile particular and, at times, divergent versions of African urbanity and identity is also examined.[4]

Mega-events, sport and identity in Africa

There is a growing literature connecting urban imaging to the staging of mega-events (Broudehoux 2007; Custódio & Gouveia 2007; García 2004; Hall 2001; Kim & Morrison 2005; Lee et al. 2005; McCallum et al. 2005; Roche 2000; Smith 2001, 2005). It is accepted that major sporting events can project new identities and images for cities (Gratton et al. 2005; Stevenson et al. 2005). Roche (2000: 218) contends that 'we should explore the possibility that mega-events and sport culture have played, and continue to play, a distinctive role in providing some significant cultural resources and opportunities for people in modern society to address their basic human needs for individual (and also group) identity and agency'. Accordingly, South Africa's hosting and winning of the Rugby World Cup in 1995, and (then) President Nelson Mandela's donning of the captain's jersey, had a unifying impact on South Africa's identity and image, both within and beyond the country's borders. Similarly, Mandela's support for and association with the 2010 World Cup bid 'speaks eloquently for the importance of mega-events for nations in terms of their self-image and place in world society' (Roche 2000: xi).

Sport re-imaging is therefore the process by which local government, acting independently or partnering with the private sector, 'deliberately exploits sport to modify the image of a place' (Smith 2005: 218). Despite debates regarding the extent to which cities actually accrue benefits from re-imaging (Higham 1999; Smith 2005), staging a global event, as part of a strategy to attract investment and tourism, is seen as a most effective way of enhancing a city's image as dynamic and vital, and promoting local development (Broudehoux 2007). In this vein, 'many cities have used sport to stimulate and symbolize the urban transition that the reimaging discourse envisages. The symbolic dimension seems particularly important' (Smith 2005: 219). Hosting of a mega-event naturally accelerates this impetus and allows host cities in particular to symbolically inscribe their landscape with new meaning. In this regard, the repositioning of cities has 'frequently been based on the projection of a distinctive identity' (McCarthy 1998: 338), particularly in cases of cities with image concerns. It is in this context that identity strategies linked to the 2010 World Cup assume importance. In trying to both position itself internationally and negate negative perceptions of South Africa, Durban is using its host status to project a particular image of itself.

In the context of the 2010 World Cup, this re-imaging potential allows opportunities for South African cities 'to contribute to altering the way in which we…craft our

own image of ourselves and our continent' (Mbembe 2006: 2). Mbembe suggests that it is essential that South Africa's success in terms of hosting the World Cup be measured in terms of moral and cultural victories. He asserts that South Africa,

> will win the 2010 Soccer World Cup if we organize it in such a way that it powerfully contributes to changing the terms of Africa's recognition in the world. If the 2010 World Cup succeeds in fundamentally altering the ways in which Africa's voice is expressed and heard and Africa's face is seen in the world, then this – and this alone – will morally justify the colossal amounts of public money spent on this very postcolonial and megalomaniac venture. (Mbembe 2006: 1)

Mbembe therefore sees the 2010 World Cup as an opportunity to reassert African identity and alter the way in which Africa is perceived. Yet, a word of caution: an African image or identity is not simply or easily defined; indeed, it is open, mobile and variable (Appiah 1992; Mbembe 2002). This is equally true for notions of African urban identity. Specifically, the legacy of colonial planning frameworks on the urban landscape has left its imprint on the postcolonial African urban character. As Bissell (2007: 181) argues, 'colonialism worked to deny the inherent dynamism and cosmopolitan character of African urban worlds'. There is certainly opportunity for 'colonial misrecognitions' and the reproduction of 'elements of colonial urban practice' (Bissell 2007: 181, 184) to persist. African urbanism and urban identity are thus variable, contested, complex and attentive to shifting urban meanings and border crossings (Agbali 2005; Bass 2006; Carotenuto 2006; Coquery-Vidrovitch 2005; Falola 2005; Freund 2007; Harlow 2005; Lewinson 2007; Matshikiza 2004; Ngom 2005; Robinson 2004; Simone 2004).

Notwithstanding this, the intersection between football, identity and cities in Africa has the potential to transform symbolic and material urban space. Baller (2007) highlights the close relationship between football, cultural practices, identities and urban space. She contends that the 'erection of simple goalposts or the construction of a whole stadium both change the spatial dimensions of the urban environment and influence the practise performed on a specific site' (Baller 2007: 217). It is for this reason that strategies implemented in conjunction with 2010 may have the potential to reconfigure Durban's landscape and thus alter ways of living in it.

Having briefly noted the international theoretical debates on imaging and mega-events, it is apposite to turn directly to Durban and the discourses offered in support of the marketing of its identity in the context of the 2010 World Cup.

2010 re-imaging rationales

Durban is situated on the east coast of Africa's southernmost tip, in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. A city which has negotiated urban restructuring associated with neoliberalism, it is important for Durban and indeed the wider province to

demarcate a niche attractive to potential investors, tourists and its own citizens. This takes particular and accelerated effect through strategies associated with hosting the 2010 World Cup. This section briefly highlights the similar re-imaging rationales of the provincial and local governments before turning to the associated implications for identity – primarily in the urban space of Durban.

In accordance with the trends identified by Smith (2005), Durban has long positioned itself, as Municipal Manager Michael Sutcliffe designates, as 'a sporting and lifestyle city' (*eThekwini Online* 22 July 2005).[5] Sutcliffe (2006a: 1) has gone so far as to assert that, 'We have coined the word after hosting these events: the Durbanising of sporting events.' In this framing, sport and Durban's identity become inextricably linked. It is therefore clear that Durban 'aims to use the hosting of the World Cup 2010 as an opportunity to achieve a number of high level goals' (eThekwini Municipality 2007: 3). Indeed, in Durban's integrated development plan (IDP), Mayor Mlaba stresses that the municipality has 'refined and refocused our strategic programmes, so as to respond more effectively to, and maximise benefits, of key events such as the 2010 World Cup' (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 6). Moreover, the IDP clearly states that, 'Sporting events have been identified as one of the key strategies in the promotion of the City and Province' (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 35). The IDP further prioritises that the 'impact of the imminent hosting of the World Cup necessitates a focused tourism/economic strategy specific to this event, since it will have major implications' (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 37). Underpinning this notion is a clear developmental agenda and a desire to perpetuate a lasting legacy. In this regard, it is suggested that '2010 must also be used as an opportunity to engage, inform and enthuse citizens about the changes in the city and new facilities being created' (eThekwini Municipality 2007: 4). However, it is important to note that while the 2010 event is an 'ideal opportunity to promote the city' (*eThekwini Online* 2007),[6] the marketing of Durban's identity is seen to represent a continuation of current efforts, with certain additions depending on the scale. Furthermore, the eThekwini Municipality essentially wants to use the 2010 World Cup to accelerate and build on existing strategies and programmes (local politician interview).

The neoliberal imperatives guiding the eThekwini Municipality's approach to 2010 are mirrored at the provincial level. The premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Sibusiso Ndebele, suggests that '2010 will be a major catalyst for further enhancing our image and growing our economy and tourism potential' (*BuaNews* 15 September 2007).[7] This is corroborated by a senior provincial politician (interview) who contends that 2010 offers 'a tremendous leap forward in terms of marketing the city but as well as marketing the province…the fact that there will be 2010 taking place here, it will actually enhance the image of the city'. This sentiment is further enhanced by Chief Executive of Tourism KwaZulu-Natal, Ndabo Khosa, who observes that 2010 offers much opportunity for the province to brand and market itself (*The Mercury* 8 November 2007).[8] In addition, according to a senior official (interview), at the provincial level there is the expressed desire to position the province as a sporting destination.

Despite provincial and municipal management sharing similar neoliberal goals with regard to marketing the city and the province, the nuances of their effect are shaded differently and display less integration than one might expect. The chapter thus turns to an examination of the varying shades of African identity and urbanity presented through the 2010 strategies and discourses of the two tiers of government.

'Our theatre is Africa'

Both the eThekwini Municipality and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government are keen to present an African identity in connection with the World Cup. Before examining notions of African identity mobilised by the two governmental bodies, it is necessary to briefly note that these strategies are situated within the broader thrust towards an 'African' World Cup. Despite this, the two entities' understandings of the content of this Africanity are not necessarily the same. At one level, the marketing of the city at the local or provincial scale scarcely departs from existing thinking. Nevertheless, the World Cup does potentially mean exposure at a far greater scale.

A clear and crucial component of the eThekwini Municipality's '2010 and Beyond Strategy' is the positioning of Durban as 'Africa's premier sporting and tourism destination' (Ellingson 2007: 3). This is in accordance with the city's stated desire to produce a 'world class African event' (Sutcliffe 2006b: 1). According to Sutcliffe and Ellingson – the latter heads the municipality's Strategic Projects Unit and 2010 Programme – the approach of the eThekwini Municipality is underpinned by the notion that, 'Our theatre is Africa, South Africa is the stage and we are one of the main characters' (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007: 40). This phrasing is not specific to Durban and has been applied in other contexts associated with the 2010 World Cup. However, it indicates the emphasis given by the eThekwini Municipality – perceiving its role as an African actor – to notions of Africanity. It is hence important to unpack the content of this Africanity.

It is apparent that there is a strong desire to link notions of Africanity to excellence. In this sense, 'Showcasing our identity as Africans [is about] showcasing African excellence' (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007: 40) and, indeed, managing the World Cup efficiently. As such, Sutcliffe and Ellingson (2007: 40) assert that everything the municipality does 'must live beyond 2010 and be done sustainably'. Accordingly, a crucial dimension of Africanity appears to be the provision of an infrastructural legacy and developmental programmes. This must be viewed in the context of Durban's commitment to be seen as an urban African site that delivers on the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and the objectives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)[9] (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007). This is not an insular aim and Durban is a member of a host of African networks and maintains strong relationships with other African cities (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007). According to Sutcliffe and Ellingson (2007: 43, 44), 'Our 2010 African connection aims' are predicated on the need to 'forge linkages amongst cities/provinces and between cities/provinces in the form of celebrating each other's work, providing

assistance, social interaction and economic integration'. Furthermore, these aims include promoting public–private partnerships in infrastructure provision and good governance; facilitating the integration of NEPAD programmes into participating NEPAD cities; and training. Specific programmes associated with the 2010 World Cup include developing the '2010 and Beyond Strategy' via the mechanism of Sister City workshops so that the strategy is extended to these cities and their surrounding areas. Thus, in projecting itself as an African city of excellence, the eThekwini Municipality is offering a view of itself, and of its African urbanity, that is informed by practical development goals, efficiency and continental connections.

In addition to ascribing its African urbanism in the developmental realities of contemporary city life, the eThekwini Municipality uses the term 'Africa' in a cultural context. Accordingly, Durban is committed to supporting the 2010 World Cup Local Organising Committee's African Legacy programme, particularly in relation to 'supporting African renaissance,[10] football support and football people' (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007: 45). Priority areas identified in this regard include the need to develop arts and culture, joint programmes, exchanges and capacity building (Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2007).

Equally powerful is the potential which the World Cup offers the eThekwini Municipality to refigure a far more inclusive African identity. Sutcliffe (2007: 1) is attuned to the fact that 'building our brand as the municipality of eThekwini and city of Durban, and giving each person an identity with their home, are two critical building blocks for creating an inclusive, well-governed, caring and democratic city'. In this sense, the World Cup also offers an opportunity to develop an identity which responds to the challenges inherent in urban African life.

While the eThekwini Municipality's conceptions of African urbanity appear, on the whole, to be focused on practical outcomes and problematics within the context of urban Africa, the version presented by the province displays some significant departures. To a large but not exclusive degree, the Africanity applied to Durban appears to be linked to a particular ruralised version of African identity. I have argued elsewhere (Bass 2002, 2006) that Durban and KwaZulu-Natal are similarly figured through the 'Zulu Kingdom' promotional campaign as rural, paradisal sites of adventure populated by wildlife and indigenous people. The depiction of Durban by the provincial government through the vehicle of the 2010 Football World Cup represents a continuation of this trend. The *Provincial Strategic Framework: 2010 Football World Cup*[11] states that Tourism KwaZulu-Natal is responsible for the tourism marketing of the province and that the 2010 World Cup should be used to stimulate increased knowledge of, and enhance, the 'Zulu Kingdom' brand.

Such strategies do little to dispel dominant ways of conflating Durban's identity with that of a rurally imagined province. The rhetoric of the premier reinforces this conflation. He observes:

> if we are to be recognised in those thousands of images which are
> continually being sent out around the 2010 FIFA World Cup event, then

we must brand ourselves simply and consistently. Each time we take a step towards the opening of the event, let's make sure that as the host city within the beautiful province of KwaZulu-Natal…and let's brand ourselves as one. Our bid recognises the host city of Durban which lies in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. (Ndebele 2006: 1)

Certainly, when the host city is marketed, it is marketed as 'eThekwini, KwaZulu-Natal in order to link the attractive features of Durban to others in the province' (provincial politician interview), or as one brand within which it is difficult to separate the two (provincial official interview). As such, 'the face is Durban but at the same time, it's the whole province we are marketing through that' (provincial politician interview). In part, in the minds of the provincial leadership, Durban needs to be actively linked to the province in order to spread potential benefits more widely. However, such a depiction has problematic implications and indeed perpetuates stereotypical and colonial representations of African landscape, culture and identity. It serves to exclude the experience of urban Africans by aligning the city with rural imagery. This denies the dynamic nature of African urban life (as Bissell [2007] points out) and panders to the colonial notion that Africa is not urban.

Thus, provincial strategies situated around promoting and establishing an African identity in Durban may serve to obscure its very urbanity. As Mbembe (2006: 3) warns, South Africans need to be careful that:

> In the absence of proper institutional infrastructures, policies and strategies, the only images we might end up peddling will be the usual stereotypes of happy natives in leopard skin and beads, performing a so-called traditional culture, they, in fact, are inventing almost from scratch, all of this in the midst of lions and elephants roaming the wild African landscape.

Sliding into this territory, Premier Ndebele (2007: 4) contends:

> Fortunately, we have one of the most recognizable brands in the world which we just need to build on. It is a fact that anywhere in the world brands such as Mercedes Benz, Coca-Cola and Pepsi are among the recognizable. Not far from that is the Zulu brand. Municipalities will have to define the Zulu brand and sell it to our visitors to the Preliminary Draw. We will define it through the courteous and royal treatment of our guests at the airport when they arrive…The totality of their experience must be such that they all want to come back to our province in the time leading to 2010 and beyond.

Within this statement, mythical ideas of Zuluness and royalty are invoked and coerced into the manner in which it is expected that the province will be marketed and made attractive to visitors. This is added to gratitude for the fact that, in the premier's words, 'We are lucky in this province because if you say Zulu anywhere

in the world, people know what you are talking about. We must position ourselves to give every visitor to the Preliminary Draw…a royal and warm welcome' (*The Mercury* 8 November 2007).[12] In this light, 'People around the world will not only remember our province…[but also] associate the word 'Zulu' with it' (Ndebele 2006: 2). Within this rhetoric, Durban, as a city grappling with development goals and contemporary urban life, is obscured. Rather, the image projected is one of Zuluness informed by mythical conceptions of royalty and ethnicity.

Certainly, this imagery is openly perpetuated. One provincial official (interview) asserts that KwaZulu-Natal is:

> a unique province. We've got a very very strong Zulu tradition here.
> I am not saying that everybody here is a Zulu but it is a very very
> strong…I mean King Shaka was here…and then if you will talk about
> 1879 when Dingane defeated the white people…So, those are the things
> which in [the] UK they will know about…we are saying that we want
> to upgrade our museums, we want to upgrade all…[these] heritage sites
> so that they actually can come from [the] UK…and see exactly what
> was happening.

In this vision, the identity which is formulated panders directly to images of Zulu ethnicity formed and perpetuated in the colonial imagination. And Durban, in this picture, is thus seen as 'an African city. It is a city which…[is] more dominated by the Zulus anyway, which is going to bode well for those people who would like to come in and study the Zulu traditional way of living' (provincial official interview). This sentiment casts the city not as a vibrant urban place, but rather as a repository of a 'traditional' way of life.

However, Ndebele observes that the '2010 Soccer World Cup…will change the view the world has of this country and the rest of Africa' (*The Mercury* 8 November 2007). Accordingly, 'Team KwaZulu-Natal Durban is ready to roll out the red carpet', a distinctly non-African metaphor, and 'give…a truly African and memorable experience'.[13] If tourists and citizens are offered uncritical and stale versions of African identity, how will such imagery destabilise perceptions of the continent?

Despite the appearance of two distinct trends, divisions between province and city are not absolute. From the provincial side, both the official and the politician point to the cultural and physical diversities inherent in the province. And Ndebele himself acknowledges that the province has 'a rich multi-cultural heritage' (*Daily News* 23 November 2007).[14] Nevertheless, Durban is seen as 'an entry point – the rest of the features of the province should be made use of…and that's how we link the identity of the province and the city' (provincial politician interview).

Additionally, the message emanating from the eThekwini Municipality is not uniform. According to a senior local politician (interview), an African city can be understood as one that 'is driven by African values – values of caring', 'ubuntu,[15] humanisation and humanity' and is cognisant of the history of important 'African'

people who played a role in the future of South Africa – one of whom included Shaka. It is interesting that this politician immediately reverts to the figure of Shaka when defining the meaning of an African city. Yet, this appears not to be a static history and is linked to the more contemporary political history of the African National Congress, which started in Inanda, Durban (local politician interview). In this sense, the local politician's compass of African history includes both political and mythical reference points.

The balancing of these twin sentiments is mirrored by Zweli Mkhize, the MEC of Finance and Economic Development in KwaZulu-Natal, who in a welcoming address at a trade exhibition in 2007 explained that KwaZulu-Natal is both a 'Kingdom' and witness to a contemporary political history. He observed that KwaZulu-Natal 'is the old Kingdom of the Zulu people, fashioned by its founder and military genius King Shaka'. When communicating with foreigners, reference is always made to Shaka. Granted, this is tempered with a more recent political history, but rhetoric is seldom free from the tried and tested tropes of wildlife: 'the best of the wildlife, the Big Five and a plethora of fauna and flora, KwaZulu-Natal has everything a tourist may wish for'; adventure: 'For the hikers…the highest range of mountains'; and indigenous culture: 'with the footprints of prehistoric paints of the San and Khoi people'. Nevertheless, despite these stereotypical applications, there is the desire to leave the tourist to 'sample the warmth and the smiles of the friendly people of our country and the diversity of cultures, in cuisine, religion and languages to make us a rainbow nation. We will do everything for you to feel that you are…home away from home' (Mkhize 2007: 5).

The provincial politician extends these sentiments in a discussion of the African city which departs from conventional rhetoric. This politician sees the concept of an African city, and Durban in particular, as 'one of the major cities of Africa as a continent' and views the city in terms of the 'cosmopolitan appearance of its population, the multitudes of cultures [and] the acceptance and tolerance of the diversity of cultures' (interview). This includes places of worship, friendly inhabitants, services and the:

> availability of a diverse kind of goods, particularly when we talk about the arts and crafts, that are very specific in terms of the identity – that these are what you will find in an African setting. And its increasingly also getting very cosmopolitan in terms of African, as in residents from different African states, that you will find actually already showing their influence around. So it makes you very much…able to say once you are here, you are in a friendly environment that will be almost the kind of spirit you should expect when you get to any part of Africa. That's how we look at it. But linked to that of course is a question of efficiency. (provincial politician interview)

In this conception, the African city is vibrant, cosmopolitan, friendly and efficient and reminds one of home. Indeed the city, in its Africanness, should project:

> [a] helpful kind of atmosphere that if you walk in here, you must find
> it safe; you must find it a place that you are already at home when you
> come here…the issue of an African welcome…once you are here, you
> are home and that's the kind of spirit that we want to kind of foster.
> (provincial politician interview)

More attention, the local politician admits, needs to be devoted to culture, which is one element which is not 'captured well' in Africa and which people do not see as driving the economy and the growth of the nation (interview). This politician is also cognisant of the need to redefine culture; it should not be merely about Zulu dancing. It should also be about creativity, innovation and the inclusion of other elements – for example science and technology (interview). It seems that this politician is particularly sensitive to the urban nuances attendant on marketing Durban in connection with the 2010 World Cup.

On the whole, despite overlapping messages, the distinction in the approaches between the two spheres of government can be seen in their launching of separate 2010 logos prior to the preliminary draw. Notwithstanding any disharmony between the two entities this might imply, the logos clearly reveal differences in intent in terms of the projected image. This is illuminating in underscoring the nuances inherent in the two bodies' opinions of the identity of the host city. The provincial logo is comprised of a Zulu shield and the horns of a Nguni cow, which 'represent the welcoming arms of KwaZulu-Natal's people', superimposed 'on a colourful background made up of three quadrants of a soccer ball, which form an outline similar to the African continent' (*Sunday Tribune* 18 November 2007).[16] In addition, a soccer ball is placed on the mid-section of the horns. In contrast, the eThekwini Municipality's logo:

> takes into account the beautiful design of our stadium which depicts us
> going higher and higher. Two arches come together expressing our unity
> in diversity and the colours reflect our oceanic backdrop, the green of
> our recreation environments and the golden beaches which mark us as
> South Africa's outstanding tourism destination. The warmth of the logo
> epitomises our friendliness and the fact that we are passionate about the
> beautiful game of football.[17]

Both logos attempt to project a friendly, inviting atmosphere but the provincial example more overtly draws on pre-accepted imagery of Zuluness, adventure and animals. The eThekwini Municipality logo, while still emphasising nature, eschews any preconceived notion of ethnic identity and instead focuses on physical 2010 infrastructure, that is, the stadium. For Ellingson, Durban's logo 'will give us a unifying identity for the many aspects of our 2010 programme and will ensure that Africa's theatre in 2010 will be on South Africa's stage and Durban will gain recognition as one of the main players'.[18] Thus, the theme of Africanity – comprised of success, efficiency and excellence – that is promoted by the eThekwini Municipality is continued in the symbolism of their 2010 logo and is indicative of the kind of city that they are attempting to project and represent.

If, as Smith (2005) suggests, re-imaging associated with sporting events symbolises the urban transition, Durban can be seen to be subject to competing imperatives. On the one hand, the city is presented as developmental, successful and attentive to the shifting demands of African urbanism in a post-apartheid context. On the other, rhetoric emanating from the province indicates a city that is paradoxically static, rural and unchanging. The chapter now turns to a consideration of the material implications of these discourses, thereafter assessing the ability of such endeavours to create cohesion in Durban.

Material effects: The Moses Mabhida Stadium

The tensions inherent in the nuanced versions of African identity perpetuated by the eThekwini Municipality and KwaZulu-Natal provincial government have material manifestation in the urban environment through a host of developmental and infrastructural projects. This chapter chooses the most visible example to make its point – the new Moses Mabhida Stadium.

Durban, like other host cities, is pouring capital into the erection of an iconic stadium. It has been proposed that developing 'iconic buildings, such as a new football stadium, will provide a powerful catalyst for destination creation, leading to value creation and thus urban regeneration' (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 37). According to Sutcliffe and Ellingson (2006: 7), the construction of the stadium is justified according to the following rationale: 'Iconic structures generate feelings of enthusiasm as well as community and national pride…improving the image of the region.' In this regard, it is envisioned that the stadium will form 'the centre of a sporting precinct which will be well used on a daily basis, by citizens of Durban, tourists and visiting sports people' (Ellingson 2007: 27).

The new stadium is intended to communicate an image of Africa. According to Smith (2005: 221–222), the 'size and complexity of urban spaces mean that individuals and cultures use memorable features to make them legible to the human imagination. This process generates synecdochical representations, where a whole city is represented by a single icon.' Using this logic, the whole city of Durban is represented by its stadium, and its constructions of Africanity and African urban space are thus transmitted to the wider space of Durban. As Smith (2005) pointed out, the symbolic dimensions are important. Accordingly, the stadium's symbolism potentially speaks to notions of African urbanity, identity and urban transition in the post-apartheid city. Nevertheless, Smith (2005: 219) asserts that, 'Rather than providing a distinctive image, the development of sport facilities is considered by some to be a fundamental contributor to the process of urban homogenization.' This is an important point – for if distinctiveness in the form of Africanity is desired, and generic theme-parking indicative of neoliberal urban restructuring is the result, then the stadium contributes to the greater homogenisation of Durban's urbanity rather than carving out a vernacular African space.

Despite this caveat – and at times, the framing of the stadium in elegiac rhetoric – there are suggestions that the stadium should reflect the multicultural fabric and history of the city. This is certainly positive. Furthermore, Durban is a palimpsest space layered with creolisation and concealment (Bass 2006). It is seen as important that the iconic stadium makes reference to the past, present and future and connects to wider spatial reference points. In this sense, the presentation of history is not limited to profitable imagery but rather stretches back in geologic time and across space. In this view, history is progressive, open and accessible to a variety of perspectives.

There is evidence of the attempt to progress beyond stereotypical images and assumptions and the stadium design seeks to draw on more inclusive imagery of local culture. Nevertheless, the provincial official (interview) is less convinced, observing, 'Ja, I mean if you look at [the stadium], it looks more like a shield,' adding that the planned museum will be a space where traditional items will be stored and past events will be simulated. The provincial official observes: 'You look at it – it's a shield…you get inside there, you get all the history of the Zulus. So basically, we want people to understand where we come from' (interview).

Such different interpretations are indicative of a wider trend wherein the provincial government relies overtly on the ruralised 'Zulu Kingdom' strategy while the local authority is less dependent. This tendency is manifest in the shift in the name of the stadium. Originally, the stadium was to be named King Senzangakhona Stadium, after Shaka's father; however, this was supplanted, at the behest of the local government, in favour of a historical figure, Moses Mabhida, reflective of South Africa's recent political past. In this regard, it is also encouraging to note that contemporary African culture is to be given greater profiling in the stadium design through representation of cultural practitioners and sportspeople. An attached museum is also planned. Both tiers are committed to marketing and showcasing culture, arts, heritage, innovation and sport (provincial politician interview; Sutcliffe & Ellingson 2006). This could potentially correspond with Mbembe's (2006: 4) desire to position the event as 'a large-scale cultural festival of mass popular and international appeal. Continental and diasporic artists, intellectuals, musicians, fashion designers, writers, architects, former football stars should be involved.'

Notwithstanding the positive aspects, discourses become problematic in other areas. 'Birthplace' imagery has begun to filter into the rhetoric. As an example, Mayor Mlaba responded to the warm reception from preliminary draw delegates by replying, 'Africa is the cradle of humankind. This is where we all originate from' (*Ezasegagasini Metro* 30 November 2007).[19] Approaches which situate Africa as the cradle of humankind have been harshly criticised. According to Mbembe (2006: 1), 'Not only does such a theme smack of nativism, it does not say anything meaningful about who we are, who we want to be, and what our proposition for the world is.' While Mlaba insists that, 'Africa's time has come to use the World Cup to change perceptions of Africa and reposition the continent in a positive light' (*Ezasegagasini*

Metro 30 November 2007), in the light of his earlier assertion such statements ring hollow, as birthplace imagery does little to challenge perceptions of Africa nor is it helpful in understanding contemporary African urban life.

Despite these concerns, the stadium is supposedly designed not only as an icon but also on a scale that is welcoming and enticing to local residents. In this endeavour, the stadium and its urban surrounds are viewed, theoretically, as a source of pride and something that is open, accessible and potentially inclusive. Having assessed notions of Durban's identity and urbanity associated with the 2010 World Cup and examined the impact this is having on the built environment, the argument now turns to a consideration of whether the stadium and other 2010 initiatives can contribute to the formation of a more inclusive, cohesive African city.

Reaching out: Cohesive plans

Implicit in the rhetoric surrounding the imaging of Durban associated with 2010, and in the justifications supporting its associated developmental agenda, is the recognition that hosting such an event, 'creates an opportunity to unite citizens and create greater levels of pride in the city' (eThekwini Municipality 2007: 4). Moreover, it is expected that social cohesion and nation building are strategic opportunities that arise from the event (Ndebele 2007). Football, in this vision, 'must unite the province and help build a non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous KwaZulu-Natal' (Ndebele 2007: 4).

Yet, how is such civic pride and unity to be established or created? There is the recognition that, 'A lot of the cultural, sporting and musical activities are the strongest in actually contributing to nation building' (provincial politician interview). Corresponding to Roche's (2000) belief in the impact of mega-events on national identity, the provincial politician (interview) holds that, 'the build-up to 2010 will have a significant impact on nation building'. This will lead to 'a united people who are friendly and forward-looking, optimistic, hard-working and proud of their identity and their country…and efficient services that are able to put us at the same level as any other country in the world. That should for us be the legacy for 2010'. Football, the provincial government states in its *Provincial Strategic Framework*, should be used to unite the province. The expectation exists that football and the 2010 World Cup will be a socially cohesive force and lead to a more unified, inclusive society.

Indeed, Premier Ndebele has said the province intends 'to use football, strategically, to unite the people of the province' (*BuaNews* 15 September 2007).[20] In order to achieve this perhaps inflated goal, the provincial government has identified a number of sporting and cultural projects linked to 2010. The province is spearheading a sports development programme and much effort is being put into school-level football development (provincial official interview). According to the *Provincial Strategic Framework*, this strategy has earmarked funding of R165 million between 2006 and 2009 (for both communication strategy and football

development). In addition, attention is being given to arts and cultural programmes. The provincial Department of Arts, Culture and Tourism's 2010 strategy is themed 'KwaZulu-Natal: Showcasing its cultural diversity'.[21] This strategy is seen to complement Tourism KwaZulu-Natal's marketing efforts to situate the province as an attractive tourism destination and includes training workshops (on craft, video, film, arts, language and drama), cultural exchange programmes, stakeholder workshops, festivals, exhibitions and the establishment of a mass choir. Little detail is given about these projects; however, the provincial strategy document highlights that additional funding is required to implement them. Indeed, Tourism KwaZulu-Natal and the Department of Arts, Culture and Tourism require a yet unfunded R120.35 million between 2007 and 2010. This shortfall will need to be obtained from alternative sources, the reprioritising of budgets and forward budgeting and planning.[22] The provincial official (interview) suggests that the Department of Arts, Culture and Tourism's plans include developing traditional singers (who would showcase Zulu music) and encouraging Zulu culture in craft production through the rebranding of spears, shields and traditional mats, which could be marketed to tourists. Other elements could include joint performances of Zulu and Indian dancers (provincial official interview). It is debatable whether such strategies will foster real cohesion and inclusivity.

On the other hand, the eThekwini Municipality has more concrete ideas, linked to their notion of African urbanism, of the manner in which to encourage social cohesion. In terms of the goals of the eThekwini Municipality's communication strategy, the city aims to 'leverage the maximum benefit for the city of Durban… especially amongst potential investors and tourists; and, to gain the buy-in of residents, by generating excitement from communicating what the city is doing for 2010 and to prove to interested parties that Durban's preparations are on track' (eThekwini Municipality 2007: 4). Moreover, evident in the official discourse of the city is the desire that Durban's residents 'Be proud of their city' (eThekwini Municipality 2006). Thus, the rhetoric clearly outlines that while external investment and tourists are the intended targets, ordinary Durbanites are not excluded from the communications strategy and the event. Citizen participation might therefore take effect through a range of mechanisms, including but not restricted to football outreach/development programmes, supporters' initiatives, cultural activities and urban regeneration programmes. From a baseline of five sport and recreation interventions in June 2006, it is hoped to achieve 120 interventions by 2010/11 (*Ezasegagasini Metro* 30 November 2007).[23]

Certainly a stated goal of the IDP is to create and establish 'the conditions under which sports, arts and culture, and heritage opportunities can be realised for personal growth, community solidarity and economic advantage' (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 66). The municipality realises that by 'stimulating sports, arts and culture… there is growth both for individuals and communities' (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 66). The consequence of this is a community and city that is enriched and attractive to visitors. The eThekwini Municipality takes such outcomes seriously. In this regard,

the municipality is 'improving facilities, providing support for our professional clubs and focussing on our young people to ensure our passion for soccer, and sports in general, is realised by having a more active population' (eThekwini Municipality n.d.: 1). To this end, under the broader umbrella plan of 'Celebrating our Cultural Diversity', the IDP identifies two programmes around promoting sport and sporting activity in communities and developing the economy of recreation and sport. While it is difficult to determine the budget allocation for these individual projects, the plan as a whole was allocated a capital budget of R3.200 million in 2006/07, R4.200 million in 2007/08 and R5.289 million in 2008/09 (eThekwini Municipality 2006: 69). The mayor contends that the bottom line of what this 'means for the people of eThekwini is increased job opportunities and increased economic growth' (*eThekwini Online* 12 June 2006).[24] Attention is also being given to multi-sport and practice venues. Tenders have been launched with respect to upgrading 2010 training venues and establishing sports hubs (*The Mercury* 21 September 2007).[25]

These initiatives are important components of the identity endeavour. Mbembe (2006) stresses the importance of asking questions about the participation of citizens in the event, as well as about taking the World Cup to communities. As pointed out by Baller (2007), modifications in the built environment – be it the construction of a simple sporting facility or a stadium – can impact on the nature of urbanity. There is much rhetoric in Durban regarding the sporting infrastructure associated with 2010 and its implications for an altered sense of African urbanity and the manner in which it is experienced. Notwithstanding assertions of inclusivity and social cohesion, this is an outcome which requires monitoring as 2010 approaches.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the versions of Durban's African identity and urbanity which are mobilised by the eThekwini Municipality and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government in the lead-up to the 2010 Football World Cup. As evident from the preceding discussion, this imaging does not offer a fundamentally new way of representing Africa to the world, as Mbembe (2006) would have hoped. Yet, despite this, the eThekwini Municipality is potentially offering a representation of its African urbanity which speaks to the contemporary nature of African life. If such an approach is continued, this will have an important effect not only on how outsiders view the city but potentially on how citizens themselves view each other and their space within the city. Thus, this chapter has addressed the possible implications of such identities for Durban's material space and the associated opportunities for urban inclusivity and social cohesion.

As of the time of writing, there is little content by which to measure the rhetoric. In part, this is attributable to the fact that the event is still in the future and plans and strategies are still being formalised. In addition, the ambiguity of message is partly associated with the fluidity of the notion of Africanness. In this light, it is difficult to predict what impacts these shifting discourses will ultimately have on

urban spaces. The preceding discussion merely serves as a reflection of local and provincial governments' current attempts to present Durban to a wider public and its own residents. It will be fascinating to track the growing impact of these notions of African identity on the urban landscape as 2010 approaches.

Notes

1   I would like to thank Richard Tomlinson for his comments on this chapter.

2   S Maphumulo, 'Mayor brings boardroom muscle to Wanderers FC'.

3   Durban falls under the jurisdiction of the eThekwini Municipality in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

4   The designations of most interviewees are listed at the end of the chapter. Others preferred not to be acknowledged.

5   *eThekwini Online* reporter, 'Ready to roll'.

6   'Time to tackle 2010', available at http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/Tourism_and_Leisure/outdoors_and_sport/osnews/time2010/view, accessed in March 2007.

7   'South Africa: 2010 will enhance KZN's profile – Premier', available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200709160192.html, accessed in September 2007.

8   M Savides, 'Tourism in KZN must exploit 2010'.

9   African Union programme which promotes integrated development and renewal in Africa. See http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/home.php.

10   Former president Thabo Mbeki's notion of the African Renaissance calls for the reinvigoration of the African continent in cultural and economic terms.

11   *Provincial strategic framework: 2010 Football World Cup*. Prepared for KwaZulu-Natal provincial 2010 Football World Cup Indaba, 2007.

12   C Dardagan, 'Businesses must focus on what they can do for 2010'.

13   'KwaZulu-Natal Premier visits Seoul Soccer World Cup Stadium', press release, 22 September 2007.

14   S Ndebele, 'Our golden opportunity'.

15   Concept of shared humanity.

16   A Hlongwane, 'No draw for brand new logo'.

17   'Durban host city FIFA World Cup 2010 launches its composite logo', press release, 20 November 2007.

18   'Durban host city FIFA World Cup 2010 launches its composite logo'.

19   O Mlaba, '2010 World Cup: It's time for Africa'.

20   'South Africa: 2010 will enhance KZN's profile – Premier', available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200709160192.html, accessed in September 2007.

21   *Provincial strategic framework*, page 43.

22   *Provincial strategic framework*.

23   'IDP: Call for comment 2007–2008 review of the Integrated Development Plan 2006–2011', supplement in *Ezasegagasini Metro*.

24   Unveiling of Senzangakhona Stadium: statement from His Worship Mayor Obed Mlaba on the occasion of the unveiling of the new stadium for Durban.

25   eThekwini Municipality's Strategic Projects Unit and 2010 Programme, 'Upgrading of 2010 training venues and the establishment of sports hubs'.

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14 *The offside rule: Women's bodies in masculinised spaces*

Margot Rubin

The numbers of women football fans[1] and female football players have been steadily increasing since the early 1990s. The German Bundesliga (Pfister 2003), the English Premier League (SNCCfFR 2001; Williams 2002) and the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cups all bear testimony to the growing numbers of female football fans at matches and fan festivals, and watching games on television in sports bars and at home. It is estimated that 50 million women in the USA alone follow sport (Gibbons 2003) and a survey conducted on the Football Association Premier League in 2001 suggests 15 per cent of all supporters are female (SNCCfFR 2001a). Furthermore, a study conducted in 2002 of female fans at women's football matches shows that almost half of the people in the stadiums are women (Williams 2002). In the German Bundesliga, women are reported to now make up 25 per cent of fans that attend matches (*Deutsche Welle* 2 July 2006).[2] Although the statistics are relatively impressive, women's presence as football fans seems to be ignored and discounted in a variety of ways and for a number of reasons, some of which are explored in this chapter. The relationship between football, being a fan and gender is analysed in order to understand the potential impact that the 2010 Football World Cup may have on South Africa and South African gender constructions and relations.

Sex, gender, sport and football

If we take as the starting point that the characteristics of masculinity and femininity are not essential but are learnt and performed (Butler 1993; Richardson 1999), then the arenas in which these gendered behaviours are taught bear scrutiny. There are a number of theories and hypotheses that deal with gender construction, but the basic points of consensus are that a gendered identity is constructed through a variety of processes which take place in a range of arenas; the most prominent is in the home, where children are taught to model themselves after the parent of the same gender (Caudwell 1999; Guthrie & Custelnuovo 1994; Richardson 1999). The process is, however, entrenched in other spaces, such as schools, where certain subjects are considered more appropriate for girls than for boys and vice versa[3] and, most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, in their leisure activities and sport in particular (Jarvie & Maguire 1994).

The idea of what boys and girls should do with their leisure time is decided by two main factors: the first is what society wants the child to learn from the sport or activity,

and the second is what characteristics the child's body should display whilst learning, practising or engaging in the sport or activity. The ideas become mutually reinforcing so that the learnt characteristics and the process of learning consistently teach and emphasise the same points. Such an approach allows for the consistent naturalisation of gendered characteristics. In the case of male children, boys learn that 'sports are a male initiation rite, as fundamental and natural as shaving and deep voices – a prerequisite, somehow, to becoming an (American) man' (Nelson 1995: 32).

Sport as a site in which boys learn how to become men is a commonly accepted refrain. It is on the sports fields that boys learn to 'do their gender'; they are affirmed for their aggression, competitiveness and stoicism in the face of pain, anger or disappointment, and for their ability to play in a team (Richardson 1999). Boys who do not demonstrate these traits are often rejected and disapproved of by their peers, coaches and families, and they are shamed using a wide variety of pejorative names, many of which are around gender or sexuality, for example 'you throw like a girl'. The association with femininity is intended to make the boy realise that there is something wrong with his behaviour that should be rectified (Greendorfer 1983). Boys thus learn to modify their actions so that they are consistent with the expectations of those around them and they internalise certain characteristics, traits and behaviours regarded as masculine in order to ensure their affirmation and acceptance within their families, communities and peer groups.

These sports also satisfy the second factor, which is that the activity should be congruent with ideas about what is appropriate for that gender. This means that through the activity boys should not be made into simulacra of girls and girls should not be made to look like boys. The thought underlying such a statement is based on the idea that some activities are appropriate for some bodies but not for others. Thus boys and men are perceived as active, dominant and competitive. As such, it would not be acceptable for them to be in positions of passivity, subservience and cooperation; those are 'female features' and are therefore not appropriate for boys and men.

This is also true of girls and women, who are considered to be 'naturally' softer, less aggressive and more nurturing and emotional; therefore, engaging in active, dominant and competitive sporting activities is unacceptable (Pfister 2003). What it means in the arena of sport is that girls are encouraged to engage in activities that 'girlise' or 'feminise' them, that is, teach them to behave as girls and women should, whilst ensuring that girls' characteristics are not compromised during the process (Birrel & Theberge 1994).

In situations where women play 'masculine' sports there is an immediate and visceral reaction from a number of fronts.[4] Carroll (1986: 91), in a paper written not all that long ago, exemplified this sexist view when he wrote:

> [W]omen should once again be prohibited from sport: they are the true defenders of the humanist values that emanate from the household, the values of tenderness, nurture and compassion, and this most important

role must not be confused by the military and political values inherent in sport. Likewise sport should not be muzzled by humanist values: it is the living arena for the great virtue of manliness.

Sport is then an essential part of the gendering process and helps to entrench 'masculine' and 'feminine' signifiers and forms of behavior through legitimating and endorsing bodies in certain kinds of activities in certain contexts. It is, in short, an institution of the hegemonic order and one of its most effective mechanisms (Bryson 1994). The next section examines the role of football within the larger arena of sport and looks at how gender is constructed and maintained through it.

Football: The maker of men, the undoing of women

Football, as the world's most popular sport, facilitates and reproduces the cultural hegemony of masculinity and femininity. The sport as it is played, the sight of professional football as a spectacle, the spectacle itself and the manner in which the fans identify themselves and behave all contribute towards embedding traditional notions of gender. The relationship between masculinity and football is an interesting and complex one, and operates around a series of signifiers and processes. At its most basic level, football matches are places where social and cultural norms are 'produced and reinforced' (Walther 2006: 4). Football works as a locus where so-called 'masculine traits' are enacted and glorified by epitomes of masculinity, for a male audience. Aggression, competitive spirit, determination and physical action are key characteristics of both traditional masculinity and of football itself. Football is thus a rejection of female traits – and hence of women as well – and a veneration of traditional masculinity or, as the supporters and players would have it, an experience 'where "true masculinity" may be lived and expressed both on and off the field' (Walther 2006: 5). Men feel that football and its associations are the last bastions of true masculinity, places where they can play out their role as men and where they are lauded and encouraged to do so (Marschik 2003).

Football and the stadiums in which matches are held become sites where men can express what they feel is the 'correct form' of masculinity, that of the 'macho' male (Dunning 1994). Stadiums thus become microcosms of the larger world and act as sites and spaces that bolster men's sense of not only how the world is, but also how it should be (Rowe & McGuirk 1999). It is in these places that men feel comfortable to express their hegemonic masculinity, their sense of superiority, their physicality and aggression; where they can take vicarious part in the ritualised violence happening on the pitch in front of them and project their masculine identities onto the 'mock battle' that is taking place (Dunning 1994). It is also felt that football is one of the last defensible spaces in which men do not have to be politically correct or pander to new and unfamiliar notions of masculinity; it all feels quite familiar and comfortable for the majority of football fans and players (Richardson 1999; Walther 2006).

Football players and fans thus consistently valorise the idea of being a 'real' man and as such women and all things feminine are derided and degraded within this environment. The association with the feminine and all things female becomes normalised as unacceptable. The pejorative statements and insults about men and boys who are not playing to the standard required by the constructed idea of masculinity, and who are regarded as being somehow feminine and wrong, are extended beyond the pitch and into the stands. Fans of a particular team construct themselves and their identities as being correct and everyone else (all other supporters) as being inherently wrong and therefore not 'real' men. Anthony King (2000) argues that football fans, especially those classified as hooligans, see themselves and their actions as those of 'proper' males and everyone else as 'deviant' others. The actual details of the masculinised identity of the specific group of football fans vary from place to place (Hughson 2000). The logic, however, is consistent: the only correct masculine identity is contained within the idea of being a specific kind of man and therefore a specific kind of fan; if one is not that type of fan, then one cannot be a real and proper man. The aim of rival fans is therefore to prove that their enemies are not real men. As such, insults which seek to 'feminise' their rivals are shouted at one another and war cries deriding their opponents' masculinity are sung and shouted during the matches (Hughson 2000).

In such an environment, women are not welcome for a range of reasons, including the idea that they do not belong there, they are the wrong sorts of bodies within these spaces and they restrict the way that men can behave. This leads to the idea that football is a male preserve, a place where only men should be allowed. Furthermore, there is the sense that in the face of women moving into a number of traditionally held male strongholds, men feel that there is less and less space in which they can act as men. Thus when women want to be players or fans, they transgress against the very institution which gives men such a strong sense of their own masculinity. The entry of the individual woman into such spaces is not seen as a threat; the unique nature of the intrusion ensures that it does not endanger this refuge of masculinity. When, however, women want to participate *en masse*, their intrusion is considered an unacceptable infringement of men's space (Walther 2006). The question is, then, how does this relationship actually play itself out in contemporary society, where women are increasingly entering into men's domains? The examples of the 2002 and 2006 Football World Cups will be examined to see what happened when women transgressed into male territory, and what this may mean for women in South Africa.

FIFA, the World Cup and the masculinisation of space

FIFA, the governing and marketing body that holds and controls the Football World Cup every four years, is an independent profit-generating entity governed by an international board of directors. FIFA is a phenomenon that bears further examination, but for the purposes of this chapter one merely needs to understand its role as an institution that produces cultural hegemony through football. FIFA chooses a country to host the World Cup and an agreement is then entered into which defines

the roles of both parties as well as the nature of investment and infrastructure that is needed. Underlying the whole contract is the idea that the country and its host cities will, for the duration of the World Cup, devote themselves to catering to the teams and hordes of supporters who arrive for the event. Since the majority of football fans are men (during the German World Cup in 2006, over 80 per cent of the fans were male), the cities and other parts of the host country are literally converted into football-dedicated – and thus male-dedicated – locations. Host countries then take on the sense of having been designed for traditional male fantasies, a type of endless 'stag do' (*BBC News Online* 28 June 2006)[5] in which, as Roodt (2007: 4) describes the space in an entirely different but appropriate context, '…an extended festival of self-recognition – a discovery and re-discovery of where they are coming from, which in turn serves as a reminder of who they are and with whom they belong' takes place. The masculinised nature of these spaces caters to, supports, nurtures and reproduces 'real men', who look around and see other men behaving in 'masculine' ways that are mutually recognised and celebrated. Women in these spaces can and must bolster the celebration of masculinity and manliness in order for the fantasy and carnival-like nature of the event to remain coherent. Women who transgress against the unity and coherence of the experience must be disciplined or somehow made to fit the gendered moulds expected within these spaces in order to maintain the fiction that has been created. The next few sections examine what happens to women in these spaces and the moments when they are acceptable and when they transgress.

2002: The 'feminised' World Cup?

The 2002 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted by Japan and Korea, was dubbed the 'feminised' World Cup. This is thought to have happened because an estimated one-half to two-thirds of supporters in the stands and on the streets were women (Hyun 2004: 42). According to World Cup organisers, the number of women at this particular event was enough to make it stand out from its predecessors. FIFA and the local organisers argue that the number of women involved in the 2002 event ensured that there were very few incidences of violence and bad language. Hyun (2004) further (and rather controversially) argues that the female fans were there because it was the first time that Korean women felt comfortable expressing their sexuality in the form of appreciation for the football players.

Apparently, the World Cup allowed women for the first time to experience being the observer rather than the observed: '…because the power relation between men and women has been broken down through the "gaze", it makes women emerge not as the position of "being seen" but as the position of seeing the male body' (Kim 2003, cited in Tanaka 2004: 56). The Korean female fans were presented as finding the World Cup a sexually liberating public event in which they felt free to express their appreciation of the male form. Most female fans were termed 'ppasun-i's', which means a kind of football 'groupie', by their male counterparts. Their dedication to being fans, which took on a highly ritualised and formalised appearance in Korea, was disregarded and their sexual attraction to the players consistently emphasised.

The role of women as fans at the 2002 World Cup is a contested one. In the view of the female supporters, their dedication to their teams and players, expressed through their knowledge of the sport and the team, the organisation of events, and the display of dignity in the face of rivals, legitimised them as real fans. Their detractors, particularly male fans, argued that their behaviour was not congruent with 'real' fandom because they brought an element of sexuality to the game, which somehow taints the female fans and their appreciation of the sport. The gaze of female fans on male bodies inverts the 'natural order' and breaks down the carefully constructed nexus of traditional masculinity and football (Manzenreiter 2004). Men cannot be the subject of the gaze, as that makes them both passive and objects of desire rather than the active figures that desire the objects. Such an inversion is considered unacceptable within such a masculinised environment. The only way, then, to deal with these transgressive females is to define them as 'not-real fans'; real fans would collude with the gendered project rather than fragment it. Since female fans are not 'pure', it is easy to dismiss them and to re-establish the existing gender order. An alternative but perhaps even more unacceptable reading of female fandom would be to acknowledge the sexual objectification of football players, but that would then suggest that part of men's enjoyment of the game lies in the homoerotic pleasure derived from watching the male body on the pitch. Given that football is supposed to reinforce traditional notions of masculinity, which include compulsory heterosexuality, the idea of men watching men in a sexualised manner would be considered unacceptable (Crawford & Gosling 2004).

Another area of contestation that needs to be raised is whether women really did find a way to express themselves as sexually liberated at the 2002 World Cup, as proposed by Hyun (2004) and others. The question remains an open one, as women do not seem to have been asked. However, work completed in other male-dominated sporting arenas, such as professional ice hockey (Crawford & Gosling 2004) and other football events (Caudwell 1999; Williams 2002), tends to suggest that women do not attend sporting events to lust after the male players, but spend as much money, time and effort as their male counterparts in gleaning knowledge about their chosen team and sport. The idea that women can appreciate the qualities of the sport for its own sake once again inverts the natural order, as sport is for men and by men to entrench and reproduce ideas about masculinity. A woman who is able to appreciate these masculine qualities, and who enjoys the game for these qualities, suggests that they cannot be the sole preserve of men, and begins to destabilise the naturalised connection between men, masculinity and football. This is because women are not supposed to be able to appreciate the characteristics demonstrated by football, as it goes against their biologically determined natures.

In a sense, football's defence against women is foolproof: if a woman finds sexual expression in watching football, then she is not a real fan; if, on the other hand, she demonstrates a full knowledge and enjoyment of the game for its own sake, well, then she is not a real woman.

Academics were not the only ones to sexualise women at the 2002 World Cup; the media certainly played a role. The photographs of the event presented female fans in highly sexualised and objectified ways:

> The shots (television and print media) focusing on the women's bodies are almost exclusively the ones that highlight the bare skin of their breast, groin, hip, and legs. Compared with the actual fashion of women in the stadium, which colorfully varies, the representation of the female fans in the newspaper and on television is the surprisingly and uniformly similar clothing of 'exposing' fashions. (Tanaka 2004: 57)

The media colluded in the sexual presentation of women's bodies in these spaces. The average female fan, dressed much like her male counterpart, was virtually ignored, but sexualised and objectified women among the spectators were emphasised. Sexualised women, the objects of the male gaze, are perfectly acceptable and contribute to the gendering process, but women who are simply fans in the same way that men are can only be ignored. If 'ordinary' female fans are acknowledged, then the link between football, fandom and masculinity is broken. As a result, the media colludes in maintaining the fiction by only portraying sexualised versions of women in the stands and in a sense denying the existence of other women as fans.

2006: Women as prostitutes? Definitely. But as fans?

The 2006 World Cup in Germany provides fascinating insight into what happens when women transgress and enter men's spaces. Two things are especially interesting about women and the 2006 World Cup. The first is the world press and the organising committee's preoccupation with the threat of vast numbers of prostitutes pouring into Germany for the World Cup; the second, the almost total disregard with which the many female fans were treated by these very same groups once again. These issues are discussed below.

It was originally estimated that 40 000 illegal prostitutes would find their way to Germany during the World Cup to service the vast number of male fans, who it was expected would want commercial sex during their stay in Germany (*Deutsche Welle* 6 July 2006).[6] Specially erected prefabricated units, called 'sex garages', complete with condom and food dispensers, were set up close to the stadiums to facilitate the quick and easy sale of sex (*The New York Times* 3 July 2006).[7] It was feared that literally thousands of women from eastern Europe in particular would be forced into the sex slave trade for the World Cup. The media in the weeks preceding the World Cup were full of reports warning against the incipient wave of prostitutes and the clear human rights violation that this constituted (Loewenberg 2006). The German government quickly responded to the international outcry, particularly after a group of American lawmakers called the German government an 'official pimp' (*Deutsche Welle* 5 May 2006)[8] and established a campaign to warn supporters about the expected high number of forced prostitutes. This was followed by raids on brothels and sex shops and strict entrance controls at all borders.

The mass of prostitutes simply never arrived and people involved in the sex industry were hardly surprised. In fact, many prostitutes decided to go on holiday during the event. The fans were more interested in the games and the parties and, according to Stephanie Klee of the German Association of Sexual Services, 'fans (had) neither the time nor the money to pay for sex' (*Deutsche Welle* 6 July 2006). Some sources argued that there was a dip in prostitution in all cities except Munich, and online services were quoted as 'going pretty slowly' (*Deutsche Welle* 6 July 2006). Those who work in the sex industry and its associated services in Germany saw the whole thing as 'hysterical media hype' and the claims of the predicted forced prostitution as 'exaggerations' (Loewenberg 2006: 105).

In direct contrast to the 'media hysteria' around prostitution, female fans – who made up 20 per cent of people in the stadiums and as many as half of the supporters at fan festivals and watching the games at home and in pubs – were basically ignored by the media (*Deutsche Welle* 2 July 2006). Articles that mentioned the high number of women attending games described them as taking their summer holidays with their partners and families rather than being 'real' fans or supporters (*BBC News* 28 June 2006). They were designated as 'WAGS – Wives and Girlfriends' rather than as fans in their own right. Marketing on television and at the event was aimed at men, with the result that marketing and advertising companies missed out on the opportunity of enticing 39 per cent of their television market and 50 per cent of the supporters on the ground (*The Sunday Times* 3 July 2006).[9] Some advertising executives acknowledged that they had missed out on an opportunity but asked the question, 'Have we really thought through how to connect to an audience of women who clearly have a big passion for something?'[10] The implication is that the world of advertising is comfortable with women as members of families or as WAGS, but simply does not know how to advertise to women who are fans in their own right and who are passionate about the sport.

This view is reinforced by the advertising that was targeted at women just before and during the World Cup. It was aimed at the traditional 'football widows' market – women who had to put up with the World Cup rather than enjoy and take part in it. Reuters reported that most of the World Cup advertising focused on traditionally male products such as beers, cars and electronics.[11] The adverts featured bawdy humour, men playing football and bikini-clad women. The advertising aimed at women was quite different and apparently 'appealed to them as sufferers rather than fans' (*The Sunday Times* 3 July 2006). Easyjet, a low-cost airline, advertised female-only getaways and the Swiss Tourist Board's print and televised media campaign featured attractive men in seductive poses, with the tag line, 'Dear Girls, why not escape this summer's World Cup to a country where men spend less time on football, and more time on you?' (*Deutsche Welle* 21 April 2006).[12]

The response to women at the 2006 World Cup is telling. On the one hand, women as prostitutes were facilitated within the masculine spaces; sex for sale was

considered one more element of the masculinised space of the World Cup. Women as sex objects were considered acceptable and even 'right', as they contributed to the established image of men as sexual beings. Even the media preoccupation with forced prostitution contributed to the larger fantasy engendered by the World Cup. The connection between sex, football and men is so taken for granted that no one seems to have questioned its presumption. On the other hand, women as fans – both in the flesh and from a distance – were not considered during this 'male World Cup', despite constituting 40 to 50 per cent of the fan base.[13] As mentioned, it would seem that women within these men's spaces were only acceptable when they bolstered the existing gender order. When women did not fall into the requisite categories and roles, they were in a sense reconstructed by the media and other fans into hangers-on, wives, girlfriends and 'not-real' fans, even in the face of evidence to the contrary. The institution of football is so powerful in its social project of shaping (Marschik 2003) and producing gender, that to break it down becomes intensely difficult as it consistently resists any challenge through processes of remaking, ignoring or dismissing women in world spaces of football.

2010: Any different or more of the same?

The 2010 World Cup to be held in South Africa will no doubt have its own character and issues. However, as with its predecessors, the question is: Will it entrench the gender order or will South Africa display something quite different? Early indications are not favourable for those seeking a less traditional gendered project.

There is a clear lack of equality in South Africa and the country suffers from high rates of sexism and violent forms of paternalism. Richardson (1999: 3) argues, 'In South Africa research indicates that forms of male domination exist among all ethnic groups. Women as a social group suffer from powerlessness, marginalization, exploitation, and systematic violence.' Statistics add to the discouraging picture, as abuse, rape and violence against women are part of the lived experience of almost 40 per cent of women in South Africa.[14]

Recent remarks by highly placed government officials about the 2010 World Cup and prostitution also provide a sense of *déjà vu* and display an alarming lack of understanding about gender, abuse and violence in this country. The first report to come out in the media in 2007, from the now disgraced national police commissioner Jackie Selebi, stated that there should be a special dispensation to legalise prostitution during the World Cup (*The Cape Argus* 30 March 2007).[15] Selebi made the suggestion to the National Assembly's Safety and Security Committee, in response to a request from the Committee for innovative ways of policing the 2010 World Cup. The statement was met with enormous censure by the more conservative South African political parties, namely the African Christian Democratic Party and the Freedom Front Plus, who saw the suggestion as contributing to South Africa's moral decline and sending 'mixed messages' to the public regarding HIV/AIDS and crime (*The Cape Argus* 30 March 2007). More recently, ANC MP George Lekgetho

told a meeting of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee of Arts and Culture that prostitution should be legalised, arguing that 'it is one of the things that would make it [the tournament] a success, because we hear of many rapes because people don't have access to them, women'. He continued by saying, 'If sex working is legalized, people would not do things in the dark. That would bring us tax and would improve the lives of those who are not working' (*BBC Online* 29 January 2008).[16] He was immediately taken to task by a number of women's organisations and by the ANC and a few days later made a public apology, 'I deeply regret the damage my ill-considered statement has done to the dignity of this country's mothers and sisters and the harm it might have inflicted to the progressive and historical positions adopted by my organisation, the ANC, on the issues of women's rights and gender emancipation' (*Mail & Guardian Online* 2 February 2008).[17] Unfortunately, Lekgetho shows a desperate lack of understanding of the nature of rape and its almost total lack of relation to sex.

Once again the connection between football and commercial sex is made explicit, but with more troubling overtones. In the first instance, Lekgetho and Selebi expose a clear assumption that a successful football tournament is dependent on making sex available to male football fans coming to South Africa, irrespective of evidence to the contrary from Germany. This once again essentialises the relationship between football, masculinity and sex. Neither argues for the total legalisation of prostitution and its recognition as a legitimate form of employment. Rather, they argue that it will make the World Cup more successful and decrease the number of police needed to deal with prostitution and soliciting. What is blatantly missing in this discourse on prostitution and the World Cup is a debate from those in charge of safety and security on the safety of female prostitutes as well as female fans within this environment. Concern around women's safety and their ability to move around the city was highlighted by the sexual abuses perpetrated on female taxi commuters at the Noord Street Taxi Rank in Johannesburg in February 2008.

The case that brought the abuses to the media's attention was the attack on a young woman who was allegedly 'punished' at the taxi rank for wearing a miniskirt: her clothes were torn off; she was sexually assaulted, called names and doused in alcohol (*The Times* 20 February 2008).[18] Apparently many of the taxi drivers felt that the young woman in question was dressed inappropriately, that she was 'half-naked', and that wearing miniskirts aroused men and led to rape. According to one driver, 'Before 1994 women wore clothes neatly and properly, now they say they have rights' (*The Times* 20 February 2008). It is views like these that are prevalent throughout South Africa and which are not helped by some of the opinions expressed by FIFA's top executive.

Sepp Blatter, for example, argued that in order to make women's football more popular (and no doubt more profitable for FIFA), football should be 'feminised' (Hong 2003: 268). Fan Hong argues that what this means is that '…not only are more female spectators, but also more "feminine" players are required' (Hong 2003: 269).

Her interpretation was borne out when in 2004 Blatter called for women football players to '…play in feminine clothes like they do in volleyball. They could, for example, have tighter shorts' (*The Guardian* 16 January 2004).[19] FIFA would then be seen to be opening the so-called 'doors' to the house of football to those women who conform to certain standards of femininity. Women who transgress, either because they are not feminine enough players or because they refuse to conform to the standardised picture of females as sexy and sexualised, would apparently not be welcome.

The potential implications of this for the 2010 World Cup are manifold. On one level, both women and men will once again be forced to play out their traditional roles within the space of the World Cup in order to be acceptable, and challenges to the status quo will be dismissed, ignored or discounted if they dare to confront the existing gender order. In addition, gendered notions of sex, football, compulsory heterosexuality and stereotypical gender roles are certainly not being challenged within the current conversation that is taking place around the South African World Cup and women. In fact, if anything they are being reinforced.

There are, however, moments of hope, contestation and open disregard for the status quo. The first was a women's march against sexism that was led by the young woman who was assaulted at the taxi rank. All of the participants donned miniskirts and paraded through the streets of Johannesburg, a sure sign of defiance and protest against the sexism that had been in evidence just a few weeks before. A second point of resistance, and one that is perhaps more related to the 2010 World Cup, is the fact that South Africa boasts over 300 women's football clubs with over 50 000 players and a national side that is considered one of the best in Africa.[20] South African female football players face cultural and social difficulties when choosing a career in the sport and have developed a range of coping mechanisms to deal with the blatant discrimination and exclusion that they face (Pelak 2005).

Unfortunately, these are only moments and the larger hegemonic gender roles remain firmly in place. This is emphasised by one of the few surveys on the World Cup that includes female fans.[21] Statistics on the number of women attending football games generally in South Africa, and the number who will potentially buy tickets to the 2010 matches, are not available. Rather, the survey reports that:

> South Africa's women will be watching too, though for different reasons!
> According to the survey, 51% of South African women follow the
> World Cup because they like watching men in shorts – second only to
> Brazilian women at 62%. (Japanese and Korean women, at 4% and 9%
> respectively, came bottom of the voyeurism stakes.)[22]

Once again, the majority of women fans are presented as 'different' to their male counterparts, who are able to enjoy the skill of the game, while most women are only able to appreciate the players' physical attributes and are not fans but rather 'voyeurs'.

Conclusion: Women and the future of football

The connection between football and masculinity is so deeply entrenched in the social and cultural psyche that challenges to it almost seem pointless. Attempts to enter these spaces are met with a wide variety of strategies that seek to defend the masculine space that football entrenches and FIFA reinforces. The cultural practices seem impermeable to change, even in the face of evidence which shows that women can be 'real' fans and football players. Changing the institution of football seems far too frightening for those who prop it up, and at times far too difficult for those who want to change it into a more equitable space – one in which men and women are not compelled to act out compulsory gendered roles and there is greater freedom and acceptance for a range of different genders, sexualities and sexes. The constraints that hegemonic constructions put onto people are as tension filled and unacceptable for men as they are for women, and therefore the temptation not to contest football as a mechanism for entrenching gendered ideas needs to be firmly resisted.

The 2010 World Cup has the potential to challenge hegemonic gender roles but it requires commitment from a range of parties, including female football fans, male football fans, all players, FIFA and the media. Women have to consistently battle against the system of which they form an integral part and find ways to resist the gender constructions and break down the institutions that imprison them (and men) in a series of performances that are not necessarily congruent with who they are, or with football. The 2010 World Cup would seem like a good place to start. South Africa, with its history of resistance and struggle, may be the perfect site for such a battle and for recognising that it is not just the physical structure of our cities that needs to be upgraded, but also gender and social relations.

Notes

1   For the purposes of this chapter the definition of a sports fan is taken to mean a person who engages in 'the systematic pursuit of an amateur, hobbyist, or volunteer activity that is sufficiently substantial and interesting for the participant to find a career there in the acquisition and expression of its special skills and knowledge' (Stebbins 1992: 3). Sports fans are, however, differentiated from other serious leisure seekers by the fact that they are not considered '…a passive spectator…[rather] a vital component in the proper functioning of the institution of sport, for both society and for individuals' (Edwards 1973: 23).

2   'Soccer a boys' club? Not anymore', available at www.dw-world.de, accessed on 25 August 2006.

3   Up until the policy change in 1994, teachers and educators offered gendered curricula choices for boys and girls in South Africa. Girls were discouraged from taking maths and science at a high school level as there was a pedagogical stance that girls were not mathematically inclined. Even in the post-apartheid period, many of the educational programmes and projects adopted this stance (Moletsane 2004.; Wilson 2002).

4   A great deal has been written on the 'transgressive' nature of women in certain kinds of sport and the general attempt to sexualise professional sportswomen through a variety of strategies and mechanisms.

5   C Heald, 'Are there any women here?', available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/new.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5123380.stm, accessed on 25 September 2006.

6   'Feared surge in World Cup prostitution proves unfounded'; available at www.dw-world.de, accessed on 25 August 2006.

7   M Lander, 'World Cup brings little pleasure to German brothels', available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/03/world/europe/03berlin.html, accessed on 28 August 2006.

8   'US, rights groups blast Germany over "World Cup brothels"', available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5123380.stm, accessed on 28 August 2006.

9   A Shevel, 'Ads just not scoring with women', available at http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/articles/articles.aspx?ID=ST6A193574, accessed on 28 August 2006.

10 Richard Pinder, quoted in 'Sex shift among soccer fans', available at www.fin24.co.za, accessed on 28 August 2006.

11 'Sex shift among soccer fans'.

12 'Cashing in on the lucrative "soccer widows" market', available at www.dw-world.de, accessed on 25 August 2006.

13 'Sex shift among soccer fans'; see note 10 for Web address.

14 There are also highly controversial arguments around the correlation between sport events and the increase in incidence of domestic violence and abuse. See Katz & Scarborough (1992) and Cramer & Jackson (2006).

15 WJ da Costa, '2010 prostitution plan sparks outrage', available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=6&click_id=2871&art_id=vn20070330123320544C239101.

16 'SA call to legalise prostitution', available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7215962.stm.

17 'ANC MP backs down on prostitution comments', available at http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=331271&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__national/, accessed on 3 April 2007.

18 'Anger mounts over miniskirt attack', available at http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=710132, accessed on 3 April 2007.

19 Cited in M Christenson and P Kelso, 'Soccer chief's plan to boost women's game? Hotpants', available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jan/16/football.gender, accessed on 3 April 2007.

20 'SA's soccer "girls" growing up', available at http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/sports/features/banyana_211003.htm, accessed on 24 August 2006.

21 The Synovate study is the only study that could be found that included female football fans in South Africa. There is clearly a dearth of information on female football fans and this is no doubt a rich area for further studies.

22 'South Africa is World Cup craziest!', available at http://www.southafrica.info/2010/wc2006-survey.htm, accessed on 24 August 2006.

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15 *A World Cup and the construction of African reality*

André P Czeglédy

The 2010 FIFA Football World Cup is quite simply *more*. It is more than a sporting competition, more than an entertainment event, more than a commercial venture, more than a chance for international tourists to revel in the diversity and exuberance of the post-apartheid 'Rainbow Nation'. While all of the above play their part in the staging and experience of one of the world's few truly global spectacles, the timing and placing of this event has far-reaching ramifications on an international level. In such terms, 2010 is about *peeling off* – as much as back – the biased layers of history, and addressing the meaning of Africa well beyond its borders. It is simultaneously about rejection in the cultural realm and acceptance into the wider social imagination, an action that truly sees the 'past as a foreign country', in the words of Lowenthal (1985), and the present as a distinctly African one. It is about an affirmation of presence that embraces Africa as a continental equal rather than an addendum, as a space of arrival rather than one of departure, as a point of active origin instead of passive puppet. Such terms and phrases are not just hollow words strung together to highlight the importance of what might otherwise be described as the periodic kicking of a ball between various groups of men, after which fireworks go off as one of them lifts a gold statuette above his head. They are, instead, the very real embodiment of a sense of selfhood that goes beyond sporting passion to grasp at the essence of what it means to be African today. The 2010 World Cup is thus about a new Africa to Africans, and about Africa *of the world* rather than just in it.

The discussion in this chapter interrogates and reflects on the meaning and significance of '2010' for Africa and for Africans as a whole. While this perspective takes leave of a specifically South African angle, it does so in order to recognise the singularity and scope of an event of this magnitude being held in Africa rather than simply in South Africa. Such wider perspective is intrinsic to understanding the reach of 2010 in tandem with its implications. As will be shown, these implications are fundamentally about creating a new Africa in the social imagination just as much as they are about the bricks and mortar – and concrete, steel and glass – of the new stadiums and other infrastructure currently being built. Given the history of international relations over time, they are also about precedent – the precedent of an African nation hosting a global sporting event for the first time some 80 years after the inaugural 1930 World Cup in Uruguay (and more than a century after the 1896 Olympic Games in Greece). In these terms the relationship of 2010 to Africa as a whole is ultimately cast in the material of symbolic capital, above all else.

Bidding and selection

The 2010 World Cup is the first event of its kind to be staged in Africa. Comparable world sporting events like the Olympic Games have so far stayed away from the continent, and it took an unprecedented shift in policy on behalf of FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) to agree to shortlist away from Europe and other traditional bases of the sport, such as Latin America. This shift followed the selection of the 2006 tournament host (Germany), when the governing body of international soccer decided that the six global confederations (roughly corresponding to continents) would leave behind the tradition of alternating between European and Latin American venues for the World Cup. It was decided that the competition would rotate on the basis of the next host country being selected from within a confederation's members as the event moved from confederation to confederation around the world on an equal basis.

The main reason for instituting the rotation policy had to do with the international politics of host selection, and the way it played out in the original bidding process for the 2006 World Cup. For reasons that remain unexplained in their entirety, a last-minute abstention by one of the voting members representing the Oceania confederation ensured that Germany won the right to host the 2006 World Cup, over and above the expected favourite, South Africa. Sepp Blatter, the president of FIFA who had strongly endorsed the South African bid as a sign of international acknowledgement of the place of the sport in Africa, then led a change in FIFA policy away from random selection in order to ensure that an African nation would emerge as the next host country. Whether one sees the introduction of the rotation policy as just recompense for dubious manoeuvring on behalf of the 2006 German bid team, or as overdue credit to the African contribution to international sport, or as belated recognition of the institutional and infrastructural ability of African states to act as a host country, it is clear that the decision to award 2010 to the Confédération Africaine de Football had multiple dimensions. One reporter has suggested that the decision was possibly motivated by FIFA positioning itself as a global institution in addition to developing the game away from its traditional European basis – and as a reward from Blatter for previous electoral support in his own career politics (*Observer Sports Monthly Column* 3 June 2007: 2).[1]

While part of the decision lies in the murky background of the 2006 bidding process, a good deal of it has to do with answering long-standing histories of perspective that have relegated Africa and Africans to a position of negative value within international standing. For this reason, just as the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin could never be understood as merely a sporting contest, and the 1980 Moscow Games were a pawn within Cold War relations, neither can the 2010 World Cup in South Africa be seen as just another international football tournament. This is because any such event must be considered from a contextual as well as an intrinsic angle; it is borne out of historical legacies and social relations that pre-date and configure perceptions of suitability both at home and abroad. Before looking at

the significance of 2010 for Africa, then, we must review how the continent has been visualised in the wider imagination. This is because if one considers the hosting of 2010 as a matter of *placing* as much as timing, it is necessary to understand the background to the symbolic politics of selection.

Creating Africa

There may be as many differences between Africans as there are between Africans and others. Over and above these differences, however, it is crucial to point out that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the gap conventionally attributed to having existed between Africa and Europe did not exist prior to the sixteenth or seventeenth century. In other words, the disparate communities of medieval Europe, for example, were not much more 'advanced' than those of their African counterparts of the time. As Samir Amin (1981) points out in an often overlooked but significant analysis of political economy, African societies developed successfully and autonomously up until what he calls the 'mercantilist period' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He precedes this observation by noting:

> The pre-mercantilist period stretches from the earliest days until the seventeenth century. In the course of this long history, relations were forged between Black Africa and the rest of the Old World, particularly from both ends of the Sahara, between the savannah countries (from Dakar to the Red Sea), and the Mediterranean…During that period, Africa, by and large, does not appear as inferior, or weaker, than the rest of the Old World. The unequal development within Africa was not any worse than north of the Sahara, on both sides of the Mediterranean. (Amin 1981: 29)

By reference to mercantilism, he means that time when foreign colonisation together with nascent capitalist expansion began to significantly impact upon African societies in very direct ways, particularly through the international slave trade. This period was followed by the partial integration of African societies into European capitalism in the nineteenth century, after which colonial subjugation completed the process of social and economic integration and created the structural conditions of dependency and underdevelopment that still characterise much of the continent today – and that are understood to require radical revision in the minds of both Africans and non-Africans alike.

Irrespective of the impact of the European powers on their respective colonies, no part of the African continent has escaped the effects (and after-effects) of the colonisation process. An integral part of this process involved the imagining of Africa as composed of discrete spatial units matching colonial ambitions with geography. The main product of this imperial linkage was the territorial map which created a 'spatial reality' (Anderson 1991: 173) over and above far more fluid and transitory notions of territory and jurisdiction, in much the same way that

borders were developed by maps in south-east Asia, especially Siam, the former Thailand (Winichakul 1988, cited in Anderson 1991: 171–173). Similarly, the spatial territories of Africa were not redrawn in the sense of revision, but newly invented in line with how mapping involves 'creating and building the world as much as measuring and describing it' (Corner 1999: 213). This invention famously developed international boundaries on often arbitrary logics so that imaginary lines divided populations, communities and even families at the stroke of a pen. These lines were seen only by the colonising powers, and immediately worked against local traditions of movement between populations and across topographies. Anderson's (1991) revised analysis therefore reminds us that the drawing of borders is intertwined with the development of maps, a co-joined birth that has always linked such graphic visualisation with expansionist ambitions as much as territorial agreements.

Visualisation's significance for the present discussion lies in two dimensions, the first of which is the indivisibility of geographic parts when it comes to Africa, as if the weight of the continent pushes all else before it, including the notion that any part of it might be distinct enough to merit complete separation in the imagination. This is apparent in the very branding of the 2010 World Cup, which features two major graphic representations in its logo – a soccer player kicking a ball, and a stylised background abstraction of the continent in different colours that reminds us this World Cup is about Africa as much as it is about South Africa. It sets a precedent in that no FIFA World Cup logo in the past has ever made reference to a continental association of any kind – a telling demonstration of how 2010 is conceived of as a distinctly *African* event, a topic that we return to at the end of this discussion.

The second significance of colonial mapping lies in the fact that it was an early demonstration of how Africa is composed outside of itself. In this sense, the external creation of an image of Africa is part and parcel of wider processes of imaging that have treated the continent as a *tabula rasa* – a blank void to be filled by (European) civilisation or (Christian and Islamic) religion produced from outside its shores and outside its own cerebrum. This filling in is evident in the colonial metaphor of what Comaroff (1997: 178) calls 'Africa-as-desert', a contrived invitation to spread European influence wherever desired. It is even clearer in the long-used title 'the Dark Continent', a reference to Africa that is not so much about the relative skin tone of many of its inhabitants but rather about the idea of darkness or absence, an absence needing to be illuminated by the light of others. Of course, such absence is intrinsically tied to historic understandings of Africa as a space that is fundamentally outside of Time in a way that makes it permanently primitive, backward and violent (see Fabian 1983). While these understandings are mostly to do with ignorance of the continent (see Curtin 1964), even an intellectual such as Hegel (1956: 91, 99) could not help but dismiss Africa with the following comments in his introduction to *The Philosophy of History*:

> Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained – for all
> purposes of connection with the rest of the world – shut up; it is the

> Gold-land compressed within itself – the land of childhood, which
> lying beyond the days of self-conscious history is enveloped in the dark
> mantle of Night…

> What we properly understand as Africa, as the Unhistorical,
> Undeveloped Spirit still involved in the conditions of mere nature
> and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the
> World's history…

These homologies of 'childhood', 'night', 'unhistorical' and 'undeveloped' – along with others such as 'wild', 'tyranny', 'untamed' and 'cannibalism' (see Hegel 1956: 93, 95) – retain their force into the present day as international media continue to repeat essentially Victorian images of disease and destitution, famine, corruption, warfare and atrocity to a global audience *ad infinitum*. Not surprisingly, they stand as antonymic icons, contradicting the necessary images of order, stability, prosperity and recreation that are mandated by a sporting event such as the World Cup. The impact that they have had is so pervasive that even Africans themselves have had difficulty in stepping over the prejudices developed from such rooted bias. Nevertheless, in the form of colonial criticism and postcolonial theory, several important authors have risen to contest the twisted vision of what Africa must be, rather than what it actually is.

Colonial relations and the present

Both George Lemming (1960) and Robert Young (1990) use the term 'mythologies' in the course of their separate investigations into history in relation to race and origin. While Lemming is keen to identify the relationship in history between the writer and his or her colonial background, Young is more interested in understanding Lévi-Strauss's (1966) position on history vis-à-vis Sartre's (1976) application of structuralism in the first *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Nevertheless, both of them point towards an important dimension in the construction of social reality: the ability to develop an imaginary deeply connected to the play of power *between* peoples as much as about them. As Lévi-Strauss (1966) himself makes clear, history has everything to do with the hinge of *relation*, a relation that (although he himself does not emphasise it) backgrounds the 'primitive' within the process of historicisation. This idea of selectivity is not unique given the many analyses of how history is a representation of power. It is, however, a key insight into the rejection of the past that is itself inscribed into voices from below and at the margins of power. Such rejection is an important dimension underlying African motivations to host the 2010 World Cup. Like other forms of material organisation to be discussed later, it is not simply about developing relations of production or consumption but about meeting – and substituting – established prejudices of what constitutes African reality. How ironic, then, that the project of colonisation was itself substantially concerned with the substitution of tradition as much as with power (see Hobsbawm & Roper 1988).

None of the voices dealing with the inequalities between coloniser and colonised, between centre and margin, have had more influence than that of Franz Fanon, the Martinique-born Francophone intellectual who has come to symbolise the colonial critique which has taken shape in the mainly literary tradition of postcolonial theory. Fanon's background in psychotherapy gave him special insight into the twisted relationship between coloniser and colonised that marks out the latter as forever *less*, especially in the sort of mental terms envisioned by Dr Carothers, then expert for the World Health Organization, who understood Africans as essentially lobotomised Europeans (see Fanon 2001). For Fanon (2001: 29), the 'colonial world is a world cut in two', where the separation between coloniser and colonised is fundamental to understanding the colonial condition. This separation is both actively enforced by differences in rights, opportunities and living conditions, and self-constituted in the primary distinctions between the two categories of persons. Consequently, it is also an *interdependent* life: 'For it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The settler owes the fact of his very existence, that is to say his property, to the colonial system' (Fanon 2001: 28).

This line of analysis makes it difficult to see any rapprochement between the two – except possibly in the case of a total transformation in property relations. Fanon clearly does not think this is likely when he opens *The Wretched of the Earth* by coupling decolonisation with violence. This is apparent in an early statement that constructs the colonial divide by way of absolute difference, cutting open the prospect of revolution by noting that '…decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain "species" of men by another "species" of men' (Fanon 2001: 27).

The use of the term 'species' here is completely intentional. It highlights the gulf between one population and another, between persons who might otherwise have been 'bred' to insoluble difference rather than just having lived within its tight cage. At the same time, this biological reference solidifies the social construction of reality, its design and limitations, and the way in which colonialism develops a polarity between the 'citizen of empire' and the 'subject of the imperial colony'. Mamdani (1996) takes up this distinction by concentrating on the controlled position of the indigene in the colony. Particularly in Africa, where Mamdani focuses his attention, the indigenous peoples have been coerced into a distinct set of power relations – and have resisted these relations in very specific ways. This fundamental dialectic between structure and resistance frames the length of Mamdani's argument, and provides insight into both direct and indirect rule, as well as into how customary law was developed as a form of colonial/neocolonial control, especially in the shape of the Native Authority in apartheid South Africa. The latter has particular significance for the present discussion, not simply because in 'the language of power, custom came to be the name of force. It was the halo around the regime of decentralized despotism' (Mamdani 1996: 287) – but also since the idea of qualified independence, especially in the case of the native reserves of South Africa, was an integral feature of maintaining dependency and, just as importantly, continuing an effectively parental relationship between colonial-type powers and the indigenous population.

This idea of independence within limits, or even pseudo-independence (and pseudo-sovereignty), is salient when considering the general relations between Euro–America and much of the so-called 'third world'. Many forget that the very idea of the third world was originally conceived in positive terms, primarily as a Cold War alternative to the first and second worlds (of northern hemisphere capitalist democracy and state socialism respectively). Nevertheless, it is far less easy to overlook the ongoing sense of condescension that is part and parcel of global media reports, macro trade negotiations and the subtext to international relations and diplomacy, especially in the case of Africa. This dynamic remains firmly embedded in even seemingly innocuous events. In February 2008, African media widely reported that Sepp Blatter, the president of FIFA, publicly reasoned that the scheduling of the biennial African Cup of Nations tournament – then taking place in January and February – should be switched to different months and possibly held only every three years. His logic was transparent, taking for its point of origin the primacy of the playing schedule for the major European domestic leagues over that of Africa's biennial, continental tournament.

Blatter may have been prompted by the much publicised departure of high-profile African players like Didier Drogba (of Côte d'Ivoire) and Samuel Eto'o (of Cameroon) from top European clubs such as Chelsea Football Club and Barcelona Football Club, all of them en route to the host nation of Ghana. However, his suggestion seems to have been influenced by an implicit order of priorities making Africa an *object* of direction rather than a *subject* of independent decision. As will be shown, it is this very attitude that gave major impetus to South Africa's bidding for the 2010 World Cup in tandem with other large-scale, intra-state initiatives.

What Blatter's comments made plain was not simply the prominence of some domestic leagues on a global basis, but also how Africa might be appropriate to serve as the hunting grounds for international scouts wanting to discover the next Michael Essien or John Mikel Obi – but not suited to scheduling its own tournament at a time of its own choosing. In this way, Blatter's accompanying comment to the effect that FIFA would be seeking the 'harmonisation' of the international fixture calendar was somewhat disingenuous, and certainly open to criticism when considering that other regional soccer tournaments were not questioned in the same manner. This attitude begs the following question: What makes Africa so easy to single out in such general terms as opposed to simply speaking about sport fixture scheduling?

Africanity and the Other

During the 2008 African Cup of Nations, the British Broadcasting Corporation provided live coverage of the games on its third terrestrial channel to an unprecedented degree. This coverage not only helped to showcase the talent on display, but also confirmed the sort of interest that African football has increasingly generated on an international level. The image of an African continent brimming

with footballing talent, however, is neither the first nor the most prevalent in terms of international perception and association. In these terms, the modern period is most familiar with a succession of what Ruth Meyer (2002) refers to as 'colonial images in the times of globalization', to quote the subtitle of her volume on the idea of Africanity. 'Africanity' is the sum of 'artificial concoctions of Africa' (Meyer 2002: 1) that create, refine and preserve a stereotypically exotic profile of the continent. This profile 'should not be conceptualised as an all-inclusive and committing code or subtext but rather constitutes a fragmentary collection of images and styles, called up and acted out in ever varying ways and contexts' (Meyer 2002: 5–6). Invoking Roland Barthes, Meyer (2002: 6) understands the strengths of this disparate yet cohesive assemblage to be so influential because 'Africanity functions like a modern myth'. As myth, it is instantly accessible yet ultimately artificial, founded on nothing less than some of the most sophisticated visual conceptions of recent times – and on nothing more than much of the same stable of historic prejudices and misconceptions that have made African realities seem as impenetrable to the present Euro–American world as in the days of Stanley and Livingstone. However, many of the most common fallacies are specific and calculated rather than simply random and ad hoc in nature; their potency lies partially in the repetition of common themes and familiar tropes that have worked their way into the international consciousness over centuries (and not mere decades). Such consciousness is at least partly based on our 'experiences' as imbibed through two realms of representation: the cinema and literature. It is for this very reason that an event like the 2010 World Cup, or the joint activities of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), for example, are necessarily active and *material* demonstrations of competence and achievement meant to act as a contra-experience to those provided by the international media factory. This is clearly evident in the official slogan for NEPAD – 'An efficient and effective African Union for a new Africa'.

The realms of cinema and literature fundamentally involve the reproduction of image, and largely exist as products of the imagination (as opposed to some combination with sensual knowledge). Meyer highlights a wide range of examples in both regards. Interestingly, she skips the cycle of black-and-white format Tarzan movies from the 1930s onwards that featured one swimming sensation after another. Instead, she focuses on more recent offerings such as *Greystoke* (1984), *Congo* (1995) and even the Walt Disney Studio's animated version of *Tarzan* (1999). She emphasises how many of these films speak about Africa but actually celebrate the iconic figure of the white warrior instead. In these terms, the Other of Africa really has very little meaning except to act as a foil for cultural (and even genetic) superiority. This dimension of superiority is paralleled in the long passages of adventure fiction, travel writing and colonial reminiscences that both pre-date and are contemporary to such celluloid dreams.

Among the spread of popular literature, few types of novels have had wider appeal or greater impact than those of the exotic adventure sort. This is true particularly for the work of Edger Rice Burroughs and H Rider Haggard, whose double visions

of a mysterious and primordial Africa were essentially colonial in perspective and lushly depictive in conveying unquestioned continental traits of untamed Nature, both in terms of flora and fauna. Not surprisingly, the fauna includes the 'natives' being just as violent – and much more cruel – than the worst of the animals. Most of the societies encountered in the course of the safari expedition or other voyage of discovery are tattered remnants of (once imported) Civilisation rather than its progenitors, a familiar story exemplified in the way that the Great White Hunter, Allen Quartermain, finds the legacy of biblical (for which read western) history in locating King Solomon's Mines (Haggard 1885). Of course, this discovery ultimately involves a journey of self-discovery as much as high adventure, one where *Homo Europeansis* as well as rugged masculinity emerge triumphant and revitalised by meeting and conquering the savage land of a hidden Africa. What it does not involve, however, is any real humbling of the adventurer, who even in moments of abject despair remains essentially stoic and ultimately heroic. Nor do any characters in Haggard's stories allow for any real acceptance of the Other, largely because this might open the door to acknowledging similarities between Civilised Man and his Others. Popular literary acceptance of the Other is therefore intrinsically entwined with knowledge and its process of development. In this respect, Raymond Aron (1961) differentiates between knowledge of the Self and knowledge of Others in several ways, marking out how first impressions count in terms of the latter:

> Actually, we do have, at first meeting, a global impression of other individuals. Just as our consciousness preserves for us, throughout time, a certain affective identity, so each individual, as seen by others, is characterized by a certain manner which makes him himself and unlike any other, even though he has gone from Fascist to Communist or from criminal to virtuous citizen. But to this institution, which is both insistent and vague, it is difficult to give logical form. It presents a guarantee of veracity only when thoroughly examined and corrected. This intuition of the whole combines with the immediate understanding of the expression and gives us the illusion that we arrive at the essence of the individual. Actually, both of them, being partial and ambiguous, need to be developed, to be made finer and more certain by means of practice and by the attainment of a body of knowledge. (Aron 1961: 62–63)

Of course, Aron is only referring to one of three forms of *immediate knowledge* of the Other, but it goes without saying that his delineation of how one knows of the stranger amongst us (let alone away from us) has relevance for understanding the African predicament. This is because unlike Aron's category of global impression, in the case of Africa and Africans there is most apparent a set of images – or rather biases and prejudices – that convey a retrograde totality with utter conviction and complete disregard for contemporary realities, including the continent's internal variation. More importantly, these images come ready-made with a booming ring of certainty so that one might find it easy to continue to agree with African stereotypes that confirm an immortal essence of such long-standing pedigree – Hegel, for

example – that it all seems too obvious to disagree with. Through such a frame, Africa is kept forever in the past, incomplete, incoherent and still waiting to be realised.

The logic of incompleteness

Incompleteness can take many forms. Meyer (2002: 34) points out that tied to the conclusion of *King Solomon's Mines* is the following situation:

> When the colonizers leave, however, Gagool is dead, and a hybrid system of law and order has been established in Kukuanaland, so that this possible interpretation is effaced and the univocal hierarchy of manipulators and manipulated has been reasserted. The system the Britons leave behind constitutes a second-rate culture, a mock-modernity based upon primitive needs and customs, the paradigms of modernity (communication, technology, and transformation) subtly tuned down so that they comply with an 'Africa' system of thought based upon silence, magic, and eternal sameness.

This scenario allows for the sort of Africa out of Time noted earlier. Simultaneously, it presents an incompleteness that has become one of the key descriptors for the continent. Often, this trope is as unintentional as it is determined, a way of seeing things that both interrogates local circumstances vis-à-vis conventional expectations *and* betrays the idea that somehow Africa's own time has not yet arrived. For this reason, it is not entirely surprising that Abdou Maliq Simone's (2004) volume comparing the experiences of African cities is entitled *For the City Yet to Come*, while a special issue in 2004 of the journal *Public Culture* is similarly titled *Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis*. Both these titles suggest the idea that in Africa the urban form is incomplete, unfinished or simply not realised as yet; that it is hard to pin down and difficult to find in solid form. While the contents of these publications are in no way a replication of the sort of stereotypes enumerated above, the underlying message of partiality is nonetheless encoded within them. Such partiality inevitably questions the ability of Africans to finish *whatever* may be under consideration because it has become a generally perceived trait of the continent rather than a specific outcome (as it should otherwise be).

Given the sobriquet of partiality, it is no wonder then that South African preparations for the 2010 World Cup have been questioned in ways unlike the arrangements made by previous hosts. No less than Franz Beckenbauer, the only person to have won the World Cup as both player and coach, and the chair of Germany's 2006 World Cup organising committee, bowed to widespread condemnation in October 2006 when he retracted an earlier statement expressing the belief that he doubted South Africa would be able to meet its World Cup obligations (*Mail & Guardian* 6–12 October 2006).[2] His original comment was entirely in line with a series of publicly voiced concerns regarding the ability of the country to succeed. As the sports journalist Xan Rice points out, these doubts have significant social ramifications within the local context:

> Germany and the United States have been mooted as possible alternative
> hosts, as has Australia – which, for many [South Africans], is the
> ultimate insult since Australia has become a haven for whites dissatisfied
> with life in the 'new South Africa'. (*Observer Sports Monthly Column*
> 3 June 2007: 2)

When Rice interviewed the CEO of South Africa's 2010 Local Organising Committee (LOC), Danny Jordaan, he answered with the curt response, 'Will we be ready? I am not answering that question anymore' (*Observer Sports Monthly Column* 3 June 2007: 2).

This answer is implicit proof of the questioning that still surrounds the 2010 World Cup preparations. In February of 2008, South African newspapers reported that serious personal and/or professional tensions between leading figures within the LOC were jeopardising the event as a whole (see *Sunday Times* 17 February 2008: 1).[3] Alleged clashes between Jordaan and Irwin Khoza, the chairperson of the LOC, were even said to have spilled over into an acrimonious relationship between colleagues, and possibly led to the resignation of several senior staff members. More importantly, the crisis in the LOC ranks – whether real or simply perceived – gave life to a situation whereby:

> Fears are growing in soccer circles that, although infrastructure projects
> like stadiums will be completed on time, FIFA will lose confidence in
> South African's ability to run the event and simply parachute in its own
> people to take over. (*Sunday Times* 17 February 2008: 1)

Whether far-fetched or not, this consideration is of considerable significance in gauging the wider meaning of 2010 in the African context. On the one hand, it goes against the stream of naysayers who have brought to public attention a variety of hurdles and hiccups in the various construction and infrastructure projects associated with 2010. In so doing, a certain level of confidence is posited in South Africa's ability to complete the infrastructural preparations. On the other hand, it addresses a lack of *organisational* ability on the part of local administrative leadership, and suggests the possibility that managers from abroad may be needed to carry off the event in the end. Both sides of the issue are far-reaching in their implications, primarily in two ways. First, there is the idea that Africans are able to complete the material requirements for 2010, but not the managerial ones. This thinking is in line with the strictly physical associations of the continent, as well as all the biases against mental engagement that they have engendered. Second, there is the idea that in the absence of sufficient South African expertise or internal cooperation, FIFA will 'parachute in its own people'. Of course, given the site of FIFA headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland, there follows the inference that these people will be European in origin or background. This inference does more than cast doubt on the professional capabilities of African sports leadership and event management; it brings into play (admittedly more by absence than statement) a non-African candidature for *saving* the 2010 World Cup. In this way, Africa can only

be completed from outside itself, exactly the sort of reasoning that characterised the colonial project of imperial dominion, as well as the missionary spirit of Christian evangelism that impacted so greatly on this continent. For this reason, if no other, the political analyst and commentator Xolela Mangcu says:

> Everything that South Africa does today is about showing the international community that we are up to scratch, and the World Cup is a good example of that…It's about black people saying to white people, 'We inherited this country, and now it's better than before.' (Cited in *Observer Sports Monthly Column* 3 June 2007: 2)

This statement presents the hosting of 2010 as an examination of national and even racial maturity. It provides a categorical dimension to the World Cup that is difficult to ignore precisely because of the ongoing conflation of Africa with 'Black Africa' in both the local as much as the international imagination. Such conflation highlights the two sides to the 2010 coin. The first is 2010 as the *test* of Africa and confirmation of Africanity, a perception that falls quickly into external biases of historical record. The second is 2010 as *proof* of footing, an internal sensibility tied to the active refutation of divisibility and dependence that has parallels in other continental initiatives and narratives. This Janus nature means that 2010 can be simultaneously viewed as both precipice and summit, with the latter perspective linked to ideas of self-definition and empowerment that contain the nub of conscious demonstration.

The past is a foreign country

In a 2007 statement by the Eighth Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa, the Union officially declared 2010 'an Africa event' which involved 'committing our countries to the full and substantive involvement in the preparation leading to the 2010 World Cup' (African Union 2007). In such collective terms, one of the most intriguing aspects to 2010 is that while the event is formally hosted by South Africa, it is also considered to be an *African* World Cup. As noted above, this has something to do with the indivisibility of the continent as seen from outside. It also has to do with the way in which Africans themselves have projected 2010 as a *common enterprise* that signals the development of the continent as a whole. This projection is different from other incarnations of the World Cup. For example, when the 2002 World Cup was held in Korea and Japan, it was never billed as an *Asian* achievement – although it *was* considered a strategic move into a highly lucrative regional market on the part of FIFA. Similarly, when Germany hosted the 2006 World Cup, it was never promoted as a distinctly *European* event; and now that Brazil has secured the 2014 World Cup, it is not labelled as cause for *Latin American* celebration and cooperation. Yet in the case of 2010, media headlines continually underline the linkage between 2010 and its continental identity. Take, for example, the article 'United, African voice needed for 2010' (Gadebe 2007), which draws the equivalence even tighter through disseminating announcements such as that of South African Sports Minister Makhenkesi Stofile, who noted, 'The 2010 [World

Cup] is Africa's time. The entire continent must work together to consolidate the African solidarity around this project – the African showpiece.'

This sort of statement highlights the notion of arrival, of how Africa has not simply come into its own and can now be counted on to successfully host the World Cup, but that a new period of African prominence has begun commensurate with hosting such a global sporting competition. As Stofile added in the same announcement:

> We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa's time has come.

This introduction of *historicity* as a way of thinking about 2010 gives reason to consider how the event is understood to mark out periodic time for Africa in its relations with the rest of the world. The recent idea of an African Renaissance has similar overtones in constituting a revision of unequal relations of development between Africa and the developed world just as the continent takes on responsibility for its own social and political security. Like the African Renaissance touted by former president Thabo Mbeki, 2010 is thought to act as a break from the past, a reversal of passivity and a marker stone of history itself. In simple terms, the big event is even more: a *historic* event that will soon take its place in future annals as the dividing line between whole eras of experience. Cast in such magnitude, the significance of 2010 goes beyond the immediate (time) to coincide with broader narratives of transformation that equally challenge international relations.

The connection between 2010 and the African Renaissance is not far-fetched given parallel emphases on continental unity as well as a shared aim of rejecting historic stereotypes of what Africa is and what Africans can do. This joint ascription begins at the simple level of appellation, where Cape Town's sparkling new stadium in Green Point is to be named the African Renaissance Stadium. In just as direct terms, none other than former president Thabo Mbeki contributed the following words to the 2003 South African Bid Book for 2010: 'This is not a dream. It is a practical policy…the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to [the] Africa renaissance.'[4]

A phrase such as 'practical policy' underlines the material reality of 2010 through the very concrete of its stadiums, for Mbeki here understands the event as an accelerator for the continent. This understanding also brings into relationship his calls for an African awakening and a new era of continental assertion wherein African states cease to become international aid recipients and take responsibility for their own polities. 2010 therefore signifies the momentous *change* that the African Renaissance is already thought to embody (Liebenburg 1998). Recent institutions like NEPAD and the African Union itself follow the same agenda, seeking to establish a level of independence through mutual cooperation vis-à-vis the first world of donor states and geopolitical powers. Hosting the 2010 World Cup is in line with such an assertion on several fronts, ranging from the political kudos attached to acting as host to global personages as

tournament visitors, to the economic intensity that such an event generates, to the development of international image via world media attention. Just as importantly, such hosting claims the *recognition* to stage such an event, particularly in sub-Saharan 'Black Africa', an area that has long been considered a global backwater of sorts – the true Dark Continent, to use that fully loaded (and therefore appropriate) term.

Mention of race has considerable consequence here, for football is a sport in the local context that is rooted in the majority population. On a popular level, it opposes other colonial sports like cricket and rugby, which tend to have a much paler complexion to their following in South Africa and do not possess any continent-wide attraction. In this respect, the hosting of 2010 is also a clarion call for the 'post' in post-apartheid; it signals an end to the equivalence of sports supported by former minority rule and resolutely caters to the wider population in its appetites, along with the rest of the continent. Such tactics are nothing new given that, 'Sport is clearly part of the base and symbolism of government, providing fit bodies and spectacular icons and a populist notion of citizenship' (Miller et al. 2001: 121).

Yet at the same time, 2010 is something entirely new in its constellation of specific sport, global event, location and the attitudes taken to it. As demonstrated above, it embodies Lowenthal's (1985) now familiar phrasing of a foreign past in ways that are overtly geopolitical rather than simply social in terms of original intention. In other words, this event does not simply respond to previously external constructions of history and image, but actively seeks to replace them with a new understanding that is fully in Time. This is because 2010 for South Africans, and for Africans in general, is about relegating pervasive images of the past conjured from outside *to the past*. Such relegation cannot take place merely through the faint words of diplomacy, nor by way of flighty marketing campaigns, but through the lived experiences of an event exactly like the 2010 World Cup. In these terms, the true meaning of 2010 is the demonstration of Africa as a reality beyond the foreign past, and into its own present.

Notes

1   X Rice, 'Ready or not', available at http:www//football.guardian.co.uk/News_Story/ 0,,2091484,00.html, accessed on 22 February 2008.

2   L Madywabe, 'Negativity threatens 2010'.

3   B Batho-Kortjaas, '2010 turmoil'.

4   2010 Communication Project Management Unit, African Legacy, available at http:// www.sa2010.gov.za/africa/legacy.php, accessed on 31 March 2008.

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Afterword

Udesh Pillay

Major international sporting events have an extraordinary capacity to generate powerfully emotional shared experiences. Sport has historically been employed as a means to enhance nation building, providing us with socio-cultural 'touchstones' which cause otherwise sober people to suspend their critical faculties on a mass basis (Black & Van der Westhuizen 2004). Major international sporting events constitute striking moments of intense identity formation, projection and patriotism, often transcending entrenched social cleavages and providing politicians and other elites with opportunities to build and project common political identities. Similarly, these sporting events provide promotional and civic re-imaging opportunities for prospective host cities. Public investments by national governments in infrastructure, for example, are seen as opportunities to lay – or renew – the foundations of a tourist industry that would bring visitors and income to host cities for years to come. It is argued that more 'peripheral' or 'regional' host cities are provided with an opportunity to proclaim civic/'regional' identities, and that economic growth will follow through outside investment following such repositioning exercises (Whitson 2004).

Proponents of major international sporting events frequently argue that they are positively associated with processes of political liberalisation, democratisation and human rights amelioration – in short, as Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004) note, with enhancing the prospects for, and quality of, democratic life. People are said to feel empowered by the successful staging of sporting mega-events and by succeeding in the eyes of the world. As Altringer (2006) points out, they develop a sense of common purpose with their fellow citizens and feel a greater sense of ownership of both the event itself and the community of which they are part. These benefits are expected to contribute, in turn, to the development of an informed and empowered citizenry, with a greater ability to assert itself and hold governments accountable. Civil society is ultimately enhanced and strong 'social capital' built.

Economic and social development benefits are often cited as axiomatic in relation to the hosting of international sporting events. The economic legacy of a mega sporting event is generally anticipated in terms of short- and medium-term job creation, international investment and dramatic increases in tourism, ideally sustained over time due to the international spotlight that the event brings to a destination. In social development terms, urban rejuvenation and infrastructure upgrades, including property revitalisation and the targeting of new areas for urban development, are seen as key goals, as are opportunities for sport development in terms of the legacy of world-class facilities for training and competition that are left behind. These will ostensibly support improved performances in future competitions.

All these development benefits are framed in common-sense terms – in other words, that global events and the developments they bring with them are good for the community in a larger sense in that they have direct revenue potential and are able to unlock vast public and private investments for physical and social infrastructure, including transportation, environmental rehabilitation, new housing and hotels, new parks and other forms of beautification, and the like. As Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004) observe, the occasion of major sporting events invariably prompts governments to invest heavily in urban renewal and causes a surge in local construction activity. Sustained levels of economic growth and investment are anticipated, as are opportunities to shape, restructure, improve, pre-package and sell the host city (or cities) to a worldwide audience.

In a context where the exigencies of globalisation bear heavily on nation states, mega sporting events have become highly sought-after commodities as developed countries, and increasingly some leading developing countries, move towards event-driven economies as symbolic representations of prestige and power.

This book has interrogated some of the key assumptions mentioned above in relation to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, in the process unravelling the complex interplay of relationships between these objectives as they relate to the potential to foster urban and economic development in particular, while asking some difficult questions along the way. The overall conclusion is that the contribution of the event to economic development, including tourism, job creation and poverty mitigation, has almost certainly been overstated (Pillay & Bass 2008). On the other hand, if one takes into account the distinction between capital investment in the stadiums and associated infrastructure, and capital investment that was already planned and was expedited for the 2010 World Cup, then the host cities and the economy generally may benefit considerably from investment in transport and information and communication technology. With respect to the former, the 2010 World Cup will no doubt contribute to the design and implementation of an integrated public transport system in South Africa's metropolitan conurbations. An efficient public transport system is a critical national and public good, whose realisation in the country has suffered historically through the imperatives of separate planning and development, and the spatial anomalies and distortions under apartheid. The work that has commenced over the past few years in getting our public transport infrastructure up to speed therefore augurs well not only for the event itself in terms of tourist traffic and service delivery mobility, but could also appreciably improve the lives of all South Africans, especially those with huge cost and time burdens associated with the daily commute between places of residence and work. An efficient public transport network could well turn out to be the event's biggest material legacy.

Similarly, observations are made with respect to the fact that while the 2010 World Cup is unlikely to sustain the 'feel-good effect' occasioned by a powerfully emotional shared experience beyond the event itself, it does provide an opportunity to aid

identity formation and instil a sense of patriotism. While identities are multiple and identity formation occurs in relation to 'others', which can sometimes be polarising and marginalising, sport does promote political nation building and allow one to proclaim civic identities. In a country like South Africa, where 'social capital' is strong and the citizenry is empowered and well informed, this is highly likely to occur, however ephemeral.

The book has also provided commentary on the extent to which the event is able to contradict commonly held representations of Africa and project a contemporary, reinvigorated image of the continent through a celebration of its unique culture and identity. As Altringer (2006) has pointed out, the intensely political nature of the selection process for the 2010 World Cup suggested that South Africa's ultimate success in winning the bid was at least partially related to the country's self-promotion as a leader on the African continent, as well as playing a leadership role within the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In that respect, showcasing the continent's abilities and talents and celebrating its diversity, while simultaneously affirming its competitive standing in the global economy, will become important markers in the run-up to the event.

It is important to keep sight of the notion that the 2010 World Cup presents an opportunity to rethink the manner in which African culture, gender and identity are experienced and represented. For Africa, the measure of success will lie not only in being seen to manage the 2010 World Cup to world-class standards, but also in the ability to assert and embrace a contemporary African culture and identity both at home and on a global stage. This is perhaps likely to be the biggest legacy of the event, although an intangible and indeterminate one.

Finally, given that this book represents a scholarly endeavour, it begs the question what the contribution of research is to the 2010 World Cup. It is argued here that despite the technical planning imperatives associated with delivering the World Cup, research informing aspects of the event – as this book has tried to achieve – is critical and needs to be taken seriously. The value of informed scholarly analysis and rigorous impact assessment research cannot be overestimated. In terms of the public debate it generates alone, it will have a formidable bearing in articulating the kind of legacy that the event is likely – or needs – to leave behind. While not necessarily impacting on the trajectory of this huge capital and public works project itself, reflective scholarly insight and independent commentary thus has the potential – even if minimally – to influence the possible legacy of the event, developing along the way a necessary set of checks and balances at different discursive and representational scales. This book represents such a contribution.

Divergent stakeholder interests in mega-events reflect the unresolved debate on whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs. This is where full public debate and dialogue on the 'opportunity' costs that are likely to fall most heavily on the poor and marginalised becomes critical. This argument may, however, prove irrelevant if organisers can find a way to host such events with careful consideration of where

investment originates and where it is distributed in the form of economic and infrastructure development. This will require innovative planning, organisation and incentives in order to responsibly finance the event and ensure identifiable lasting benefits. Greater depth and variety of research will be needed to develop our understanding of the success factors and risks associated with hosting mega-events. Success, for instance, is defined in many different ways and across divergent stakeholder populations. Post-event longitudinal analysis is also required that looks at standard measures of urban economic growth and development (for example, employment figures, business start-ups, transport system deliverables, property prices, sales tax revenues, etc.), as opposed to commissioned studies that present *a priori* impressions of the benefits and positive effects. It would also be useful to promote research collaboration, which could result in a greatly improved understanding of the complex impacts of mega-events across various contexts. Although such research will require additional funding and mechanisms for collaboration, it would be a worthwhile consideration for host nations intent on using mega-events to further their national and development agendas.

The 2010 World Cup has provided South Africans with a wonderful opportunity to air a range of views, some directly related to the event, others only peripherally. In other words, the event has provided all South Africans free range to discuss and pronounce on all manner of issues. It has created a deliberative platform and a 'safe' space. In the debate that has ensued, the analysis that has been provided and the record that has been documented, we have engaged in issues – critical to us as a nation – that we may not have (directly) done previously. Hard and contentious matters that seemed to be the exclusive domain of government officials, party representatives and public intellectuals have been discussed and debated, positions articulated and solutions proffered. A number of examples come to mind. Dialogue that started on the economic impact of the 2010 World Cup became a wide public debate on South Africa's future growth prospects, the effect of the event on the current balance of payments, and strategies to accelerate job creation. A conversation on the poverty-mitigating potential of the 2010 World Cup turned into a wider discussion on whether government's 'war on poverty' plan was working, why it is so difficult to measure poverty, and what may constitute an appropriate poverty datum line. Debate on whether the event could help accelerate service delivery in our large urban areas added impetus to ongoing discussions on backlogs, including the fact that there is still a public housing deficit of 2.5 million units. Public commentary on an effective transportation system for the World Cup turned into an animated debate on the importance of getting the principles underpinning an integrated public transport system right from the start, so that its benefits will outlive the event (discussion in this regard also coalesced around the escalating costs associated with the construction of Gauteng's rapid rail system, otherwise known as the Gautrain, and the fact that it is consuming most of the province's public transport budget). Reflections on whether the World Cup had the potential to debunk notions of Afro-pessimism led to high-level political engagements on what needed to be done

to revive the ailing fortunes of NEPAD, as well as Thabo Mbeki's and the African Union's vision of an African Renaissance. And the list goes on.

What we take from this is that the 2010 World Cup has allowed us to speak to each other as a nation, especially at a time of much political uncertainty and social stress. Rooted in the reality that in June 2010 the event will *definitely* kick off, and that no manner of public opinion and scholarly analysis will (necessarily) impair preparation, South Africans became eager – using the event as a lens – to exchange opinions, trade solutions and articulate positions on issues of national interest. It should provide wonderful archive material if we are to host another event of this magnitude, as well as telling insights – if our policy-makers have been listening carefully – on some of our major challenges as a new democracy and emerging economy.

This book has contributed to the conversation we have been having as a nation about the 2010 World Cup, provided reflective insight into – and critical analysis of – some of the key issues associated with event delivery, pronounced on issues of legacy, and affirmed the value of research in discourses on planning and development. It is not always the case that *dreams* are realised through *development*, but if the articulation between the two in a developing economy context is well formulated and then scrupulously applied, the prospects of a better life for all are that much more easily realisable and social justice so much more attainable.

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