

LESSONS FROM THE WORLD
OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL



**PRACTICAL
LEADERSHIP
STRATEGIES**

ROBERT H. PALESTINI

FOREWORD BY JAMIE MOYER

**P R A C T I C A L
L E A D E R S H I P
S T R A T E G I E S**

**Lessons from the World of
Professional Baseball**

Robert H. Palestini

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Manufactured in the United States of America.

To Judy, out of whose fertile mind came the idea for this book.

To Karen, Scott, Robbie, and Brendan, whose presence in my life is
reinvigorating.

To Liz and Vi for willingly giving much-needed technical support.

CONTENTS

Foreword by Jamie Moyer	vii
1 Contemporary Leadership Theory	1
2 Leading with Heart	21
3 Walter Alston	45
4 Sparky Anderson	59
5 Leo Durocher	75
6 Tony La Russa	93
7 Tommy Lasorda	107
8 Billy Martin	125
9 Frank Robinson	145
10 Casey Stengel	159
11 Joe Torre	175
12 Earl Weaver	187
13 Leadership Lessons Learned	199
References	207
Appendix: The Heart Smart Organizational Diagnosis Model	211

FOREWORD

Bob Palestini has been a former dean of graduate studies and a professor of education for twenty years at my alma mater, Saint Joseph's University in Philadelphia. His expertise and research interest is educational leadership. His twelve books on leadership have been outstanding in their own right but his current three-book series relates his theories on leadership to basketball, football, and baseball coaching and makes for a very interesting and intriguing connection.

Having been a baseball pitcher in the major leagues for more than twenty years, and playing for a number of teams, most recently the World Champion Philadelphia Phillies, I know firsthand how coaches and managers have impacted both my personal and professional lives. I can relate to Dr. Palestini's basic premise that the tenets of situational leadership theory and effective coaching go hand in hand whether we are discussing sports, business, educational, or social settings.

In this book, the third in the series, Dr. Palestini demonstrates how the use of situational leadership theory by ten successful baseball managers has contributed to their effectiveness and how these same leadership principles can be appropriately applied to anyone's leadership behavior, whether the individual be a parent, a teacher, an administrator, or a CEO.

Each of us in our daily lives is asked to assume a degree of leadership responsibility. Bob gives us a road map to follow with excellence being the result. Palestini's book has practical applications that will allow each of us to develop and improve our leadership capabilities. It will be a valuable reference book for leaders and aspiring leaders alike.

Jamie Moyer, starting pitcher for the
2008 World Champion Philadelphia Phillies



CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP THEORY

The effective functioning of social systems from the local PTA to the United States of America is assumed to be dependent on the quality of their leadership.

—Victor H. Vroom

INTRODUCTION

Leadership is offered as a solution for most of the problems of organizations everywhere. Schools will work, we are told, if principals provide strong instructional leadership. Around the world, administrators and managers say that their organizations would thrive if only senior management provided strategy, vision, and real leadership. Though the call for leadership is universal, there is much less clarity about what the term means.

Historically, researchers in this field have searched for the one best leadership style that will be most effective. Current thinking holds that there is no one best style. Rather, a combination of styles, depending on the situation the leader finds him- or herself in, has been deemed more appropriate. To understand the evolution of leadership theory thought,

we will take a historical approach and trace the progress of leadership theory, beginning with the trait perspective of leadership and moving to the more current contingency theories of leadership.

THE TRAIT THEORY

Trait theory suggests that we can evaluate leadership and propose ways of leading effectively by considering whether an individual possesses certain personality, social, and physical traits. Popular in the 1940s and 1950s, trait theory attempted to predict which individuals successfully became leaders and then whether they were effective. Leaders differ from nonleaders in their drive, desire to lead, honesty and integrity, self-confidence, cognitive ability, and knowledge of the business they are in. Even the traits judged necessary for top-, middle-, and low-level management differed among leaders of different countries; for example, U.S. and British leaders valued resourcefulness; the Japanese, intuition; and the Dutch, imagination—but for lower and middle managers only.

The obvious question is, Can you think of any individuals who are effective leaders but lack one or more of these characteristics? Chances are that you can. Skills and the ability to implement the vision are necessary to transform traits into leadership behavior. Individual capability—a function of background, predispositions, preferences, cognitive complexity, and technical, human relations, and conceptual skills—also contributes.

The trait approach holds more historical than practical interest to managers and administrators, even though recent research has once again tied leadership effectiveness to leader traits. One study of senior management jobs suggests that effective leadership requires a broad knowledge of, and solid relations within, the industry and the company, as well as an excellent reputation, a strong track record, a keen mind, strong interpersonal skills, high integrity, high energy, and a strong drive to lead. In addition, some view the transformational perspective described later in this chapter as a natural evolution of the earlier trait perspective.

THE BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE

The limited ability of traits to predict effective leadership caused researchers during the 1950s to view a person's behavior rather than that individual's personal traits as a way of increasing leadership effectiveness. This view also paved the way for later situational theories.

The types of leadership behaviors investigated typically fell into two categories: production-oriented and employee-oriented. Production-oriented leadership, also called *concern for production*, *initiating structure*, or *task-focused leadership*, involves acting primarily to get the task done. An administrator who tells his or her department chair, "Do everything you need to, to get the curriculum developed on time for the start of school, no matter what the personal consequences," demonstrates production-oriented leadership. So does an administrator who uses an autocratic style or fails to involve workers in any aspect of decision-making. Employee-oriented leadership, also called *concern for people* or *consideration*, focuses on supporting the individual workers in their activities and involving them in decision-making. A principal who demonstrates great concern for his or her teachers' satisfaction with their duties and commitment to their work has an employee-oriented leadership style.

Studies in leadership at Ohio State University, which classified individuals' styles as initiating structure or consideration, examined the link between style and grievance rate, performance, and turnover. Initiating structure reflects the degree to which the leader structures his or her own role and subordinates' roles toward accomplishing the group's goal through scheduling work, assigning employees to tasks, and maintaining standards of performance. Consideration refers to the degree to which the leader emphasizes individuals' needs through two-way communication, respect for subordinates' ideas, mutual trust between leader and subordinates, and consideration of subordinates' feelings. Although leaders can choose the style to fit the outcomes they desire, in fact, to achieve desirable outcomes in all three dimensions of performance, grievance rate, and turnover, the research suggested that managers should strive to demonstrate both initiating structure and consideration.

A series of leadership studies at the University of Michigan, which looked at managers with an employee orientation and a production orientation, yielded similar results. In these studies, which related differences in high-productivity and low-productivity work groups to differences in supervisors, highly productive supervisors spent more time planning departmental work and supervising their employees; they spent less time working alongside and performing the same tasks as subordinates, accorded their subordinates more freedom in specific task performance, and tended to be employee-oriented.

A thirty-year longitudinal research study in Japan examined performance and maintenance leadership behaviors. Performance here refers specifically to forming and reaching group goals through fast work speed; achieving outcomes of high quality, accuracy, and quantity; and observing rules. Maintenance behaviors preserve the group's social stability by dealing with subordinates' feelings, reducing stress, providing comfort, and showing appreciation. The Japanese, according to this and other studies, prefer leadership high on both dimensions over performance-dominated behavior, except when work is done in short-term project groups, subordinates are prone to anxiety, or effective performance calls for very low effort.

MANAGERIAL ROLES THEORY

A study of CEOs by Henry Mintzberg suggested a different way of looking at leadership. He observed that managerial work encompasses ten roles: three that focus on interpersonal contact—(1) figurehead, (2) leader, (3) liaison; three that involve mainly information processing—(4) monitor, (5) disseminator, (6) spokesman; and four related to decision-making—(7) entrepreneur, (8) disturbance handler, (9) resource allocator, (10) negotiator. Note that almost all roles would include activities that could be construed as leadership—influencing others toward a particular goal. In addition, most of these roles can apply to nonmanagerial as well as managerial positions. The role approach resembles the behavioral and trait perspectives because all three call for specific types of behavior independent of the situation; however, the role approach is

more compatible with the situation approach and has been shown to be more valid than either the behavioral or trait perspective.

Though not all managers will perform every role, some diversity of role performance must occur. Managers can diagnose their own and others' role performance and then offer strategies for altering it. The choice of roles will depend to some extent on the manager's specific job description and the situation in question. For example, the tasks of managing individual performance and instructing subordinates are less important for middle managers than for first-line supervisors, and they are less important for executives than for either lower level of manager.

EARLY SITUATIONAL THEORIES

Contingency, or situational, models differ from the earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style. Early situational research suggested that subordinate, supervisor, and task considerations affect the appropriate leadership style in a given situation. The precise aspects of each dimension that influence the most effective leadership style vary.

THEORY X AND THEORY Y

One of the older situational theories, Douglas McGregor's Theory X/ Theory Y formulation, calls for a leadership style based on individuals' assumptions about other individuals, together with characteristics of the individual, the task, the organization, and the environment (McGregor, 1961). Although managers may have many styles, Theories X and Y have received the greatest attention. Theory X managers assume that people are lazy, extrinsically motivated, and incapable of self-discipline or self-control and that they want security and no responsibility in their jobs. Theory Y managers assume that people do not inherently dislike work, are intrinsically

motivated, exert self-control, and seek responsibility. A Theory X manager, because of his or her limited view of the world, has only one leadership style available, that is, autocratic. A Theory Y manager has a wide range of styles in his or her repertoire.

How can an administrator use McGregor's theory for ensuring leadership effectiveness? What prescription would McGregor offer for improving the situation? If an administrator had Theory X assumptions, he would suggest that the administrator change them and would facilitate this change by sending the administrator to a management-development program. If a manager had Theory Y assumptions, McGregor would advise a diagnosis of the situation to ensure that the selected style matched the administrator's assumptions and action tendencies, as well as the internal and external influences on the situation.

FREDERICK FIEDLER'S THEORY

While McGregor's theory provided a transition from behavioral to situational theories, Frederick Fiedler (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987) developed and tested the first leadership theory explicitly called a contingency, or situational, model. He argued that changing an individual's leadership style is quite difficult and that organizations should put individuals in situations that fit with their style. Fiedler's theory suggests that managers can choose between two styles: task-oriented and relationship-oriented. Then the nature of leader-member relations, task structure, and position power of the leader influences whether a task-oriented or a relationship-oriented leadership style is more likely to be effective. "Leader-member relations" refers to the extent to which the group trusts and respects the leader and will follow the leader's directions. "Task structure" describes the degree to which the task is clearly specified and defined or structured, as opposed to ambiguous or unstructured. "Position power" means the extent to which the leader has official power, that is, the potential or actual ability to influence others in a desired direction owing to the position he or she holds in the organization.

The style recommended as most effective for each combination of these three situational factors is based on the degree of control or influence the leader can exert in his or her leadership position, as shown in

table 1.1. In general, high-control situations (I–III) call for task-oriented leadership because they allow the leader to take charge. Low-control situations (VII and VIII) also call for task-oriented leadership because they require, rather than allow, the leader to take charge. Moderate-control situations (IV–VII), in contrast, call for relationship-oriented leadership because the situations challenge leaders to get the cooperation of their subordinates. Despite extensive research to support the theory, critics have questioned the reliability of the measurement of leadership style and the range and appropriateness of the three situational components. This theory, however, is particularly applicable for those who believe that individuals are born with a certain management style rather than that a management style is learned or flexible.

CONTEMPORARY SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Current research suggests that the effect of leader behaviors on performance is altered by such intervening variables as the effort of subordinates, their ability to perform their jobs, the clarity of their job responsibilities, the organization of the work, the cooperation and cohesiveness of the group, the sufficiency of resources and support provided to the group, and the coordination of work group activities with those of other subunits. Thus, leaders must respond to these and broader cultural differences in choosing an appropriate style. A leader-environment-follower interaction theory of leadership notes that effective leaders first analyze deficiencies in the follower's ability, motivation, role perception, and work environment that inhibit performance and then act to eliminate these deficiencies.

PATH-GOAL THEORY

According to path-goal theory, the leader attempts to influence subordinates' perceptions of goals and the path to achieve them. Leaders can then choose among four styles of leadership: directive, supportive, participative, and achievement oriented. In selecting a style, the leader acts to strengthen the expectancy, instrumentality, and valence of a situation, respectively, by providing better technology or training for the employees;

reinforcing desired behaviors with pay, praise, or promotion; and ensuring that the employees value the rewards they receive.

Choosing a style requires a quality diagnosis of the situation to decide what leadership behaviors would be most effective in attaining the desired outcomes. The appropriate leadership style is influenced first by subordinates' characteristics, particularly the subordinates' abilities and the likelihood that the leader's behavior will cause subordinates' satisfaction now or in the future; and second by the environment, including the subordinates' tasks, the formal authority system, the primary work group, and the organizational culture. According to this theory, the appropriate style for an administrator depends on his or her subordinates' skills, knowledge, and abilities, as well as their attitudes toward the administrator. It also depends on the nature of the activities, the lines of authority in the organization, the integrity of their work group, and the task technology involved. The most desirable leadership style helps the individual achieve satisfaction, meet personal needs, and accomplish goals, while complementing the subordinates' abilities and the characteristics of the situation.

Application of the path-goal theory, then, requires first an assessment of the situation, particularly its participants and environment, and second, a determination of the most congruent leadership style. Even though the research about path-goal theory has yielded mixed results, it can provide a leader with help in selecting an effective leadership style.

THE VROOM-YETTON MODEL

The Vroom-Yetton theory involves a procedure for determining the extent to which leaders should involve subordinates in the decision-making process (Vroom & Jago, 1988). The manager can choose one of five approaches that range from individual problem solving with available information to joint problem solving to delegation of problem-solving responsibility. Table 1.1 summarizes the possibilities.

Selection of the appropriate decision process involves assessing six factors: (1) the problem's quality requirement, (2) the location of information about the problem, (3) the structure of the problem, (4) the likely acceptance of the decision by those affected, (5) the commonality of organizational goals, and (6) the likely conflict regarding possible

Table 1.1. Decision-Making Processes

<i>For Individual Problems</i>	<i>For Group Problems</i>
<p>AI You solve the problem or make the decision yourself, using information available to you at that time.</p> <p>All You obtain any necessary information from the subordinate, then decide on the solution to the problem yourself. You may or may not tell the subordinate what the problem is, in getting the information from him. The role played by your subordinate in making the decision is clearly one of providing specific information that you request, rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions.</p>	<p>AI You solve the problem or make the decision yourself, using information available to you at the time.</p> <p>All You obtain any necessary information from subordinates, then decide on the solution to the problem yourself. You may or may not tell subordinates what the problem is, in getting the information from them. The role played by your subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing specific information that you request, rather than generating or evaluating solutions.</p>
<p>CI You share the problem with the relevant subordinate, getting his ideas and suggestions. Then, you make the decision. This decision may or may not reflect your subordinate's influence.</p>	<p>CI You share the problem with the relevant subordinates individually, getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. Then you make the decision. This decision may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence.</p>
<p>GI You share the problem with one of your subordinates, and together you analyze the problem and arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution in an atmosphere of free and open exchange of information and ideas. You both contribute to the resolution of the problem with the relative contribution of each being dependent on knowledge rather than formal authority.</p>	<p>CII You share the problem with your subordinates in a group meeting. In this meeting you obtain their ideas and suggestions. Then, you make the decision, which may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence.</p>
<p>DI You delegate the problem to one of your subordinates, providing him or her with any relevant information that you possess, but giving responsibility for solving the problem independently. Any solution that the person reaches will receive your support.</p>	<p>GII You share the problem with your subordinates as a group. Together you generate and evaluate alternatives and attempt to reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Your role is much like that of chairman, coordinating the discussion, keeping it focused on the problem, and making sure that the crucial issues are discussed. You do not try to influence the group to adopt "your" solution and are willing to accept and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group.</p>

problem solutions. Figure 1.1 illustrates the original normative model, expressed as a decision tree. To make a decision, the leader asks each question, A through H, corresponding to each box encountered, from left to right, unless questions may be skipped because the response to the previous question leads to a later one. For example, a no response




Figure 1.1. Decision process flow chart for both individual and group problems

to question A allows questions B and C to be skipped; a yes response to question B after a yes response to question A allows question C to be skipped. Reaching the end of one branch of the tree results in identification of a problem type (numbered 1 through 18) with an accompanying set of feasible decision processes. When the set of feasible processes for group problems includes more than one process (e.g., a no response to each question results in problem type 1, for which every decision style is feasible), final selection of the single approach can use either a minimum number of hours (group processes AI, AII, CI, CII, and GII are preferred in that order) as secondary criteria. A manager who wishes to make the decision in the shortest time possible, and for whom all processes are appropriate, will choose AI (solving the problem him- or herself using available information) over any other process. A manager who wishes to maximize subordinate involvement in the decision-making, as a training and development tool, for example, will choose DI or GII (delegating the problem to the subordinate or reaching a deci-

sion together with subordinates) if all processes are feasible and time is not limited. Similar choices can be made when analyzing individual problems. Research has shown that decisions made using processes from the feasible set result in more effective outcomes than those not included.


Suppose, for example, the teacher-evaluation instrument in your institution needed revising. Using the decision tree, we would ask the first question: Is there a quality requirement such that one solution is likely to be more rational than another? Our answer would have to be yes. Do I have sufficient information to make a high-quality decision? The answer is no. Is the problem structured? Yes. Is acceptance of the decision by subordinates critical to effective implementation? Yes. If I were to make the decision myself, is it reasonably certain that it would be accepted by my subordinates? No. Do subordinates share the organizational goals to be attained in solving this problem? Yes. Is conflict among subordinates likely in preferred solutions? Yes. Do subordinates have sufficient information to make a high-quality decision? Yes.

Following this procedure, the decision tree indicates that GII would be the proper approach to revising the teacher-evaluation form. GII indicates that the leader should share the problem with his or her faculty. Together they generate and evaluate alternatives and attempt to reach agreement on a solution. The leader's role is much like that of a chairperson coordinating the discussion, keeping it focused on the problem, and making sure that the critical issues are discussed. You do not try to influence the group to adopt "your" solution, and you are willing to accept and implement any solution that has the support of the entire faculty.

The recent reformulation of this model uses the same decision processes, AI, AII, CI, CII, GII, GI, DI, as the original model, as well as the criteria of decision quality, decision commitment, time, and subordinate development. It differs by expanding the range of possible responses to include probabilities rather than yes or no answers to each diagnostic question, and it uses a computer to process the data. Although both formulations of this model provide a set of diagnostic questions for analyzing a problem, they tend to oversimplify the process. Their narrow focus on the extent of subordinate involvement in decision-making also limits their usefulness.

THE HERSEY-BLANCHARD MODEL

In an attempt to integrate previous knowledge about leadership into a prescriptive model of leadership style, this theory cites the “readiness of followers,” defined as their ability and willingness to accomplish a specific task, as the major contingency that influences appropriate leadership style. Follower readiness incorporates the follower’s level of achievement motivation, ability and willingness to assume responsibility for his or her own behavior in accomplishing specific tasks, and education and experience relevant to the task. The model combines task and relationship behavior to yield four possible styles, as shown in figure 1.2. Leaders should use a *telling style*, provide specific instructions, and closely supervise performance when followers are unable and unwilling



When a Leader Behavior is used appropriately with its corresponding level of readiness, it is termed a High Probability Match. The following are descriptors that can be useful when using Situational Leadership for specific applications:

S1	S2	S3	S4
Telling Guiding Directing Establishing	Selling Explaining Clarifying Persuading	Participating Encouraging Collaborating Committing	Delegating Observing Monitoring Fulfilling

Figure 1.2. Model of Situational Leadership

or insecure. Leaders should use a *selling style*, explain decisions, and provide opportunity for clarification when followers have moderate to low readiness. Leaders should use a *participating style*, where they share ideas and facilitate decision-making, when followers have moderate to high readiness. Finally, leaders should use a *delegating style*, giving responsibility for decisions and implementation to followers when followers are able, willing, and confident.

Although some researchers have questioned the conceptual clarity, validity, robustness, and utility of the model, as well as the instruments used to measure leadership style, others have supported the utility of the theory. For example, the Leadership Effectiveness and Description Scale and related instruments, developed to measure leadership style by life cycle researchers, are widely used in industrial training programs. This model can easily be adapted to educational administration and used analytically to understand leadership deficiencies, as well as combined with the path-goal model to prescribe the appropriate style for a variety of situations.

REFRAMING LEADERSHIP

Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal have developed a unique situational leadership theory that analyzes leadership behavior through four frames of reference: structural, human resource, political, and symbolic. Each of the frames offers a different perspective on what leadership is and how it operates in organizations (Bolman & Deal, 1991). Each can result in either effective or ineffective conceptions of leadership.

Structural leaders develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. They focus on implementation. The right answer helps only if it can be implemented. These leaders emphasize rationality, analysis, logic, fact, and data. They are likely to believe strongly in the importance of clear structure and well-developed management systems. A good leader is someone who thinks clearly, makes good decisions, has good analytic skills, and can design structures and systems that get the job done. Structural leaders sometimes fail because they miscalculate the difficulty of putting their designs in place. They often underestimate the resistance that

it will generate, and they take few steps to build a base of support for their innovations. In short, they are often undone by human resource, political, and symbolic considerations. Structural leaders do continually experiment, evaluate, and adapt, but because they fail to consider the entire environment in which they are situated, they are sometimes ineffective.

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about “productivity through people.” They demonstrate this faith in their words and actions and often build it into a philosophy or credo that is central to their vision of their organizations. They believe in the importance of coaching, participation, motivation, teamwork, and good interpersonal relations. A good leader is a facilitator and participative manager who supports and empowers others. Human resource leaders are visible and accessible. Tom Peters and Robert Waterman popularized the notion of “management wandering around,” the idea that managers need to get out of their offices and interact with workers and customers. Many educational administrators have adopted this aspect of management.

Effective human resource leaders empower; that is, they increase participation, provide support, share information, and move decision-making as far down the organization as possible. Human resource leaders often like to refer to their employees as “partners” or “colleagues.” They want to make it clear that employees have a stake in the organization’s success and a right to be involved in making decisions. When ineffective, however, they are seen as naive or as weaklings and wimps.

Political leaders believe that managers and leaders live in a world of conflict and scarce resources. The central task of management is to mobilize the resources needed to advocate and fight for the unit’s or the organization’s goals and objectives. They emphasize the importance of building a power base: allies, networks, and coalitions. A good leader is an advocate and negotiator, understands politics, and is comfortable with conflict. Political leaders clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests. The political leader needs to think carefully about the players, their interests, and their power; in other words, he or she must map the political terrain. Political leaders ask questions such

as, Whose support do I need? How do I go about getting it? Who are my opponents? How much power do they have? What can I do to reduce the opposition? Is the battle winnable? However, if ineffective, these leaders are perceived as untrustworthy and manipulative.

The symbolic frame provides still a fourth turn of the kaleidoscope of leadership. In this frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles, and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. The main premise of this frame is that whenever reason and analysis fail to contain the dark forces of ambiguity, human beings erect symbols, myths, rituals, and ceremonies to bring order, meaning, and predictability out of chaos and confusion. Symbolic leaders believe that the essential role of management is to provide inspiration. They rely on personal charisma and a flair for drama to get people excited about, and committed to, the organizational mission. A good leader is a prophet and visionary, who uses symbols, tells stories, and frames experience in ways that give people hope and meaning. Transforming leaders are visionary leaders, and visionary leadership is invariably symbolic. Examination of symbolic leaders reveals that they follow a consistent set of practices and rules.

Transforming leaders use symbols to capture attention. When Diana Lam became principal of the Mackey Middle School in Boston, she knew that she faced a substantial challenge. Mackey had all the usual problems of urban public schools: decaying physical plant, lack of student discipline, racial tension, troubles with the teaching staff, low morale, and limited resources. The only good news was that the situation was so bad, almost any change would be an improvement. In such a situation, symbolic leaders will try to do something visible, even dramatic, to let people know that changes are on the way. During the summer before she assumed her duties, Lam wrote a letter to every teacher to set up an individual meeting. She traveled to meet teachers wherever they wanted, driving two hours in one case. She asked teachers how they felt about the school and what changes they wanted.

She also felt that something needed to be done about the school building because nobody likes to work in a dumpy place. She decided that the front door and some of the worst classrooms had to be painted. She had few illusions about getting the bureaucracy of the Boston public school system to provide painters, so she persuaded some of her family

members to help her do the painting. When school opened, students and staff members immediately saw that things were going to be different, if only symbolically. Perhaps even more importantly, staff members received a subtle challenge to make a contribution themselves.

Each of the frames captures significant possibilities for leadership, but each is incomplete. In the early part of the twentieth century, leadership as a concept was rarely applied to management, and the implicit models of leadership were narrowly rational. In the 1960s and 1970s, human resource leadership became fashionable. The literature on organizational leadership stressed openness, sensitivity, and participation. In recent years, symbolic leadership has moved to center stage, and the literature now offers advice on how to become a visionary leader with the power to transform organizational cultures. Organizations do need vision, but this is not their only need, nor is it always their most important one. Leaders need to understand their own frame and its limits. Ideally, they will also learn to combine multiple frames into a more comprehensive and powerful style. It is this Bolman-Deal leadership theory on which I will base my conclusions regarding the leadership behavior of the ten football coaches profiled in this text.

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

A charismatic, or transformational, leader uses charisma to inspire his or her followers and is an example of those who act primarily in the symbolic frame of leadership outlined above. He or she talks to the followers about how essential their performance is, how confident he or she is in the followers, how exceptional the followers are, and how he or she expects the group's performance to exceed expectations. Lee Iacocca and Jack Walsh in industry and the late Marcus Foster and Notre Dame's Rev. Theodore Hesburgh in education are examples of this type of leader. Virtually all of the coaches profiled in this study were found to be transformational leaders. Such leaders use dominance, self-confidence, a need for influence, and conviction of moral righteousness to increase their charisma and, consequently, their leadership effectiveness.

A transformational leader changes an organization by recognizing an opportunity and developing a vision, communicating that vision to orga-

nizational members, building trust in the vision, and achieving the vision by motivating organizational members. The leader helps subordinates recognize the need to revitalize the organization by developing a felt need for change, overcoming resistance to change, and avoiding quick-fix solutions to problems. Encouraging subordinates to act as devil's advocates with regard to the leader, building networks outside the organization, visiting other organizations, and changing management processes to reward progress against competition also help them recognize a need for revitalization. Individuals must disengage from, and disidentify with, the past, as well as view change as a way of dealing with their disenchantments with the past or the status quo. The transformational leader creates a new vision and mobilizes commitment to it by planning or educating others. He or she builds trust through demonstrating personal expertise, self-confidence, and personal integrity. The charismatic leader can also change the composition of the team, alter management processes, and help organizational members reframe the way they perceive an organizational situation. The charismatic leader must empower others to help achieve the vision. Finally, the transformational leader must institutionalize the change by replacing old technical, political, cultural, and social networks with new ones. For example, the leader can identify key individuals and groups, develop a plan for obtaining their commitment, and institute a monitoring system for following the changes. If an administrator wishes to make an innovative program acceptable to the faculty and the school community, for example, he or she should follow the above plan and identify influential individuals who would agree to champion the new program, develop a plan to gain support of others in the community through personal contact or other means, and develop a monitoring system to assess the progress of the effort.

A transformational leader motivates subordinates to achieve beyond their original expectations by increasing their awareness about the importance of designated outcomes and ways of attaining them; by getting workers to look beyond their self-interest to that of the team, the school, the school system, and the larger society; and by changing or expanding the individual's needs. Subordinates report that they work harder for such leaders. In addition, such leaders are judged higher in leadership potential by their subordinates as compared to the more common transactional leader.

One should be cognizant, however, of the negative side of charismatic leadership, which may exist if the leader overemphasizes devotion to him- or herself, makes personal needs paramount, or uses highly effective communication skills to mislead or manipulate others. Such leaders may be so driven to achieve a vision that they ignore the costly implications of their goals. The superintendent of schools who overexpands his or her jurisdiction in an effort to form an “empire,” only to have the massive system turn into a bureaucratic nightmare, exemplifies a failed transformational leader. A business that expands too rapidly to satisfy its CEO’s ego and, as a result, loses its quality control suffers the effects of transformational leadership gone sour. Nevertheless, recent research has verified the overall effectiveness of the transformational leadership style.

DEVELOPING A VISION

A requisite for transformational leadership is a vision. Although there seems to be a sense of mystery on the part of some individuals regarding what a vision is and how to create one, the process for developing one is not at all complex. Using education as an example, the first step is to develop a list of broad goals. “All Children Achieving” is an example of such a goal. These goals should be developed in conjunction with representatives of all segments of the school community; otherwise, there will be no sense of “ownership,” the absence of which will preclude successful implementation.

The next step in the process is to merge and prioritize the goals and to summarize them in the form of a short and concise vision statement. The following is an example of a typical vision statement:

Our vision for the Exeter School System is that all of our graduating students, regardless of ability, will say, “I have received an excellent education that has prepared me to be an informed citizen and leader in my community.” Our students will have a worldview and, as a result of their experience in the Exeter School System, will be committed to a process of lifelong learning and the making of a better world by living the ideals of fairness and justice through service to others.

The key concepts in the above vision include all students achieving excellence, leadership, multiculturalism, lifelong learning, values, and

community service. It is these concepts that the transformational leader stresses in all forms of communication and in all interactions with the school community.

The final step in the process is the institutionalizing of the educational vision. This step ensures that the vision endures when leadership changes. Operationalizing and placing the important concepts of the vision into the official policies and procedures of the school system helps to institutionalize the educational vision and incorporate it into the school culture. As we will see, virtually all of the ten football coaches profiled in this book had a clear vision of what they wanted to achieve and convinced their teams to accept ownership of what would ultimately become their *shared* vision.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERS

The implications of leadership theory for educational and other administrators are rather clear. The successful leader needs to have a sound grasp of leadership theory and the skills to implement it. The principles of situational and transformational leadership theory are guides to effective administrative behavior. The leadership behavior applied to an inexperienced faculty member may be significantly different from that applied to a more experienced and tested one. Task behavior may be appropriate in dealing with a new teacher, while relationship behavior may be more appropriate when dealing with a seasoned teacher.

The four frames of leadership discussed by Bolman and Deal (1991) may be particularly helpful to school leaders and leaders in general. Consideration of the structural, human relations, political, and symbolic implications of leadership behavior can keep an administrator attuned to the various dimensions affecting appropriate leadership behavior. With the need to deal with collective bargaining entities, school boards, and a variety of other power issues, the political frame considerations may be particularly helpful in understanding the complexity of relationships that exist between administrators and these groups. Asking oneself the questions posed earlier in relation to the political frame can be an effective guide to the appropriate leadership behavior in dealing with these groups.

SUMMARY

Recently, a plethora of research studies has been conducted on leadership and leadership styles. The evidence indicates overwhelmingly that no one singular leadership style is most appropriate in all situations. Rather, an administrator's leadership style should be adapted to the situation so that, at various times, task behavior or relationship behavior might be appropriate. At other times and in other situations, various degrees of both task and relationship behavior may be most effective.

The emergence of transformational leadership has seen leadership theory come full circle. Transformational leadership theory combines aspects of the early trait theory perspective with the more current situational, or contingency, models. The personal charisma of the leader, along with his or her ability to formulate an organizational vision and to communicate it to others, determines the transformational leader's effectiveness.

Since the effective leader is expected to adapt his or her leadership style to an ever-changing environment, administration becomes an even more complex and challenging task. However, a thorough knowledge of leadership theory can make some sense of the apparent chaos that the administrator faces on an almost daily basis.

Among scholars there is an assertion that *theory informs practice, and practice informs theory*. This notion posits that to be an effective leader, one must base his or her practice on some form of leadership theory. If the leader consciously based his or her practice on leadership theory, this would be an example of theory informing practice. On the other hand, when a leader utilizes theory-inspired behavior that is continually ineffective, perhaps the theory must be modified to account for this deficiency. In this case, practice would be informing or changing theory. This book examines the leadership behavior of ten successful football coaches to ascertain whether their behavior conforms to the principles of the Bolman-Deal situational leadership theory, and if it does not, to determine whether their practice needs to be modified or the theory needs to be modified to reflect effective practice. We also examine how these coaches' leadership practices can be applied to our own leadership behavior to make it more effective.

2

LEADING WITH HEART

Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

—The Golden Rule

INTRODUCTION

How the leader utilizes the concepts contained in the preceding chapter depends largely on his or her philosophy of life regarding how human beings behave in the workplace. On one end of the continuum are those leaders who believe that human beings are basically lazy and will do the very least that they can to “get by” in the workplace. At the other extreme are those who believe that people are basically industrious and, if given the choice, would opt to do a quality job. I believe that today’s most effective leaders hold the latter view. I agree with Max DePree, owner and CEO of the highly successful Herman Miller Furniture Company, who writes in *Leadership Is an Art* that a leader’s function is to “liberate people to do what is required of them in the most effective and humane way possible” (DePree, 1989). Instead of catching people doing something wrong, our goal as enlightened leaders is to catch them doing something right. I would suggest, therefore, that in addition to a

rational approach to leadership, a truly enlightened leader leads with heart.

Too often, leaders underestimate the skills and qualities of their followers. I remember Bill Faries, the chief custodian at a high school at which I was assistant principal in the mid-1970s. Bill's mother, with whom he had been extraordinarily close, passed away after a long illness. The school was a religiously affiliated one, and the school community went all out in its remembrance of Bill's mother. We held a religious service in which almost three thousand members of the school community participated. Bill, of course, was very grateful. As a token of his appreciation, he gave the school a six-by-eight-foot knitted quilt that he had personally sewn. From that point on, I did not know if Bill was a custodian who was a quilt weaver or a quilt weaver who was a custodian. The point is that it took the death of his mother for me and others to realize how truly talented our custodian was. So, our effectiveness as leaders begins with an understanding of the diversity of people's gifts, talents, and skills. When we think about the variety of gifts that people bring to organizations and institutions, we see that leading with heart lies in cultivating, liberating, and enabling those gifts.

LEADERSHIP DEFINED

The first responsibility of a leader is to define reality through a vision. The last is to say thank you. In between, the leader must become the servant of the servants. Being a leader means having the opportunity to make a meaningful difference in the lives of those who allow leaders to lead. This summarizes what I call leading with heart. In a nutshell, leaders don't inflict pain; they bear pain.

Whether one is a successful leader can be determined by looking at the followers. Are they reaching their potential? Are they learning? Are they able to change without bitterness? Are they able to achieve the institution's goals and objectives? Can they manage conflict among themselves? Where the answer to these questions is an emphatic yes, an effective leader resides.

I prefer to think about leadership in terms of what the gospel writer Luke calls the "one who serves." The leader owes something to the

institution he or she leads. The leader is seen in this context as steward rather than owner or proprietor. Leading with heart requires the leader to think about his or her stewardship in terms of legacy, values, direction, and effectiveness.

LEGACY

Too many of today's leaders are interested only in immediate results that bolster their career goals. Long-range goals they leave to their successors. I believe that this approach fosters autocratic leadership, which oftentimes produces short-term results but militates against creativity and its long-term benefits. In effect, this approach is the antithesis of leading with heart.

On the contrary, leaders should build a long-lasting legacy of accomplishment that is institutionalized for posterity. They owe their institutions and their followers a healthy existence and the relationships and reputation that enable the continuity of that healthy existence. Leaders are also responsible for future leadership. They need to identify, develop, and nurture future leaders to carry on the legacy.

VALUES

Along with being responsible for providing future leaders, leaders owe the individuals in their institutions certain other legacies. Leaders need to be concerned with the institutional value system, which determines the principles and standards that guide the practices of those in the organization. Leaders need to model their value systems so that the individuals in the organization can learn to transmit these values to their colleagues and to future employees. In a civilized institution, we see good manners, respect for people, and an appreciation of the way in which we serve one another. A humane, sensitive, and thoughtful leader will transmit his or her value system through his or her daily behavior. This, I believe, is what Peter Senge refers to as a "learning organization" (Senge, 1990).

DIRECTION

Leaders are obliged to provide and maintain direction by developing a vision. I made the point earlier that effective leaders must leave their organizations with a legacy. Part of this legacy should be a sense of progress or momentum. An educational administrator, for instance, should imbue his or her institution with a sense of continuous progress, a sense of constant improvement. Improvement and momentum come from a clear vision of what the institution ought to be, from a well-planned strategy to achieve that vision, and from carefully developed and articulated directions and plans that allow everyone to participate in, and be personally accountable for, achieving those plans.

EFFECTIVENESS

Leaders are also responsible for generating effectiveness by being enablers. They need to enable others to reach their potential both personally and institutionally. I believe that the most effective way to enable one's colleagues is through participative decision-making. It begins with believing in the potential of people, in their diverse gifts. Leaders must realize that to maximize their own power and effectiveness, they need to empower others. Leaders are responsible for setting and attaining the goals of their organizations. Empowering or enabling others to help achieve those goals enhances the leader's chances of attaining them, ultimately enhancing the leader's effectiveness. Paradoxically, giving up power really amounts to gaining power.

EMPLOYEE OWNERS

We often hear managers suggest that a new program does not have a chance of succeeding unless the employees take "ownership" of the program. Most of us agree with the common sense of such an assertion. But how does a leader promote employee ownership? Let me suggest four steps as a beginning. I am certain that you can think of several more.

1. *Respect people.* As indicated earlier, this starts with appreciating the diverse gifts that individuals bring to your institution. The key is to dwell on the strengths of your coworkers rather than on their weaknesses. Try to turn their weaknesses into strengths. This does not mean that disciplinary action or even dismissal will never become necessary. It does mean that we should focus on the formative aspect of the employee-evaluation process before we engage in the summative part.
2. *Let belief guide policy and practice.* I spoke earlier of developing a culture of civility in your institution. If there is an environment of mutual respect and trust, I believe that the organization will flourish. Leaders need to let their belief or value system guide their behavior. Style is merely a consequence of what we believe and what is in our hearts.
3. *Recognize the need for covenants.* Contractual agreements cover such things as salary, fringe benefits, and working conditions. They are part of organizational life, and there is a legitimate need for them. But in today's organizations, especially educational institutions, where the best people working for these institutions are like volunteers, we need covenantal relationships. Our best workers may choose their employers. They usually choose the institution where they work based on reasons less tangible than salaries and fringe benefits. They do not need contracts; they need covenants. Covenantal relationships enable educational institutions to be civil, hospitable, and understanding of individuals' differences and unique charisms. They allow administrators to recognize that treating everyone equally is not necessarily treating everyone equitably and fairly.
4. *Understand that culture counts for more than structure.* An educational institution with which I have been associated recently went through a particularly traumatic time when the faculty and staff questioned the administration's credibility. Various organizational consultants were interviewed to facilitate a "healing" process. Most of the consultants spoke of making the necessary structural changes to create a culture of trust. We finally hired a consultant who believed that organizational structure has nothing to do with

trust. Instead, interpersonal relations based on mutual respect and an atmosphere of goodwill create a culture of trust. Would you rather work as part of a school with an outstanding reputation or work as part of a group of outstanding individuals? Many times these two characteristics go together, but if one had to make a choice, I believe that most people would opt to work with outstanding individuals.

IT STARTS WITH TRUST AND SENSITIVITY (HEART)

These are exciting times in education. Revolutionary steps are being taken to restructure schools and rethink the teaching–learning process. The concepts of empowerment, total quality management, using technology, and strategic planning are becoming the norm. However, while these activities have the potential to influence education in significantly positive ways, they must be based upon a strong foundation to achieve their full potential.

Achieving educational effectiveness is an incremental, sequential improvement process. This improvement process begins by building a sense of security within each individual so that he or she can be flexible in adapting to changes within education. Addressing only skills or techniques, such as communication, motivation, negotiation, or empowerment, is ineffective when individuals in an organization do not trust its systems, themselves, or each other. An institution's resources are wasted when invested only in training programs that assist administrators in mastering quick-fix techniques that, at best, attempt to manipulate and, at worst, reinforce mistrust.

The challenge is to transform relationships based on insecurity, adversariness, and politics into those based on mutual trust. Trust is the beginning of effectiveness and forms the foundation of a principle-centered learning environment that emphasizes strengths and devises innovative methods to minimize weaknesses. The transformation process requires an internal locus of control that emphasizes individual responsibility and accountability for change and promotes effectiveness.

TEAMWORK

For many of us, there exists a dichotomy between how we see ourselves as persons and how we see ourselves as workers. Perhaps the following words of a Zen Buddhist will be helpful:

The master in the art of living makes little distinction between his work and his play, his labor and his leisure, his mind and his body, his education and his recreation, his love and his religion. He hardly knows which is which. He simply pursues his vision of excellence in whatever he does, leaving others to decide whether he is working or playing. To him he is always doing both.

Work can and should be productive, rewarding, enriching, fulfilling, and joyful. Work is one of our greatest privileges, and it is up to leaders to make certain that work is everything that it can and should be.

One way to think of work is to consider how a philosopher, rather than a businessman or -woman, would lead an organization. Plato's *Republic* speaks of the "philosopher-king," where the king would rule with the philosopher's ideals and values.

Paramount among the ideals that leaders need to recognize in leading an organization are the notions of teamwork and the value of each individual's contribution to the final product. The synergy an effective team produces is greater than the sum of its parts.

The foundation of the team is the recognition that each member needs every other member, and no individual can succeed without the cooperation of others. As a young boy, I was a very enthusiastic baseball fan. My favorite player was the Hall of Fame pitcher Robin Roberts of the Philadelphia Phillies. During the early 1950s, his fastball dominated the National League. My uncle, who took me to my first ballgame, explained that opposing batters were so intimidated by Roberts's fastball that they were automatic "outs" even before they got to the plate. My uncle claimed that Robin Roberts was unstoppable. Even as a young boy, I intuitively knew that no one is unstoppable by himself. I said to my uncle that I knew how to stop Robin Roberts: "Make me his catcher."

EMPLOYEES AS VOLUNTEERS

Our institutions will not amount to anything without the people who make them what they are. And the individuals most influential in making institutions what they are, are essentially volunteers. Our very best employees can work anywhere they please. So, in a sense, they volunteer to work where they do. As leaders, we would do far better if we looked upon, and treated, our employees as volunteers. I made the point earlier that we should treat our employees as if we had a covenantal, rather than a contractual, relationship with them.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, speaking to the 1978 graduating class of Harvard College, said this about legalistic relationships: “A society based on the letter of the law and never reaching any higher fails to take advantage of the full range of human possibilities. The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on society. Whenever the tissue of life is woven of legalistic relationships, this creates an atmosphere of spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes men’s noblest impulses.” And later, he continued, “After a certain level of the problem has been reached, legalistic thinking induces paralysis; it prevents one from seeing the scale and the meaning of events.”

Covenantal relationships, on the other hand, induce freedom, not paralysis. As the noted psychiatrist William Glasser explains, “Coercion only produces mediocrity; love or a sense of belonging produces excellence” (Glasser, 1984). Our goal as leaders is to encourage a covenantal relationship of love, warmth, and personal chemistry among our employee volunteers. Shared ideals, shared goals, shared respect, a sense of integrity, a sense of quality, a sense of advocacy, a sense of caring: these are the basis of an organization’s covenant with its employees.

THE VALUE OF HEROES

Leading with heart requires that an organization has its share of heroes, both present and past. We have often heard individuals in various organizations say, “So-and-so is an institution around here.”

Heroes like these do more to establish an institution's organizational culture than any manual or policies-and-procedures handbook ever could. The senior faculty member recognized and respected for his or her knowledge, as well as his or her humane treatment of students, is a valuable asset to an educational institution. He or she symbolizes what the institution stands for. The presence of these heroes sustains the reputation of the institution and allows the workforce to feel good about itself and about the workplace. The deeds and accomplishments of these heroes need to be promulgated and to become part of the institution's folklore.

The deeds of these heroes are usually perpetuated by the "tribal storytellers" in an organization. These are the individuals who know the history of the organization and relate it through stories of its former and present heroes. An effective leader encourages the tribal storytellers, knowing that they play an invaluable role in an organization. They work at the process of institutional renewal. They allow the institution to improve continuously. They preserve and revitalize the values of the institution. They mitigate the tendency of institutions, especially educational institutions, to become bureaucratic. These concerns are shared by everyone in the institution, but they are the special province of the tribal storyteller. Every institution has heroes and storytellers. It is the leader's job to see to it that things like manuals and handbooks don't replace them.

EMPLOYEE OWNERS

If an educational institution is to be successful, everyone in it needs to feel that he or she "owns the place." "This is not the school district's school; it is not the school board's school; it is my school." Taking ownership is a sign of one's love for an institution. In *Servant Leadership*, Robert Greenleaf writes, "Love is an undefinable term, and its manifestations are both subtle and infinite. It has only one absolute condition: unlimited liability!" Although it may run counter to our traditional notion of American capitalism, employees should be encouraged to act as if they own the place. It is a sign of love.

THE SIGNS OF HEARTLESSNESS

Up to now, we have dwelled on the characteristics of a healthy organization. In contrast, here are some of the signs that an organization is suffering from a lack of heart:

- There is a tendency to merely “go through the motions.”
- A dark tension exists among key individuals.
- A cynical attitude prevails among employees.
- Finding time to celebrate accomplishments becomes impossible.
- Stories and storytellers disappear.
- There is the view that one person’s gain must come at another’s expense.
- Mutual trust and respect erode.
- Leaders accumulate, rather than distribute, power.
- Attainment of short-term goals becomes detrimental to the acquisition of long-term goals.
- Individuals abide by the letter of the law, but not its spirit.
- People treat students or customers as impositions.
- The accidents become more important than the substance.
- A loss of grace, style, and civility occurs.
- Leaders use coercion to motivate employees.
- Administrators dwell on individuals’ weaknesses rather than their strengths.
- Individual turf is protected to the detriment of institutional goals.
- Diversity and individual charisma are not respected.
- Communication is only one-way.
- Employees feel exploited and manipulated.
- Arrogance spawns top-down decision-making.
- Leaders prefer to be served rather than to serve.

LEADERSHIP AS A MORAL SCIENCE

Here I address how educational administrators and other leaders should be educated and trained for their positions. Traditionally, there has been only one answer: practicing and future administrators should

study educational administration in order to learn the scientific basis for decision-making and to understand the scientific research that underlies proper administration. Universities train future administrators with texts that stress the scientific research done on administrative behavior, review various studies of teacher and student performance, and provide a few techniques for accomplishing educational goals. Such approaches instill a reverence for the scientific method—as well as an unfortunate disregard for any humanistic and critical development of the art of administration.

I suggest a different approach. Although there is certainly an important place for scientific research in supporting empirical administrative behavior, I suggest that educational administrators also be *critical humanists*. Humanists appreciate the usual and unusual events of our lives and engage in an effort to develop, challenge, and liberate human souls. They are critical because they are educators and, therefore, are not satisfied with the status quo; rather, they hope to change individuals and institutions for the better and to improve social conditions for all. I will argue that an *administrative* science should be reconstructed as a *moral* science. An administrative science can be empirical, but it also must incorporate hermeneutic (the science of interpreting and understanding others) and critical dimensions. Social science has increasingly recognized that it must be informed by moral questions. The paradigm of natural science does not always apply when dealing with human issues. As a moral science, the science of administration is concerned with the resolution of moral dilemmas. A critical and literary model of administration helps to provide us with the necessary context and understanding wherein such dilemmas can be wisely resolved, and we can truly actualize our potentials as administrators and leaders.

One's proclivity to be a critical humanist oftentimes depends on one's philosophy of how human beings behave in the workplace. Worth repeating here are the two extremes of the continuum: those leaders who believe that human beings are basically lazy and will do the very least that they can to "get by" in the workplace and those who believe that people are basically industrious and, if given the choice, will opt to do the "right thing." I believe that today's most effective leaders hold the latter view. I agree with Max DePree, owner and CEO of the highly successful Herman Miller Furniture Company, who writes in *Leadership Is an Art* that

a leader's function is to "liberate people to do what is required of them in the most effective and humane way possible" (DePree, 1989). Instead of catching people doing something *wrong*, our goal as enlightened leaders is to catch them doing something *right*. Such behavior is reflective of a leader who is in the humanist, if not also in the critical, tradition.

THE CRITICAL TRADITION

A *postpositivist leader* combines the *humanist* tradition with *critical* theory. Dissatisfaction with current administrative approaches for examining social life stems from administration's inability to deal with questions of value and morality and to fulfill its promise. For example, Griffiths (Griffiths & Ribbins, 1995) criticizes orthodox theories because they "ignore the presence of unions and fail to account for the scarcity of women and minorities in top administrative positions." David Erickson and Frederick Ellett ask, "Why has educational research had so few real implications for educational policy?" (Erickson, 1984). One answer is that an empiricist research program modeled on the natural sciences fails to address issues of understanding and interpretation. This failure precludes researchers from reaching a genuine understanding of the human condition. It is time, they argue, to treat educational research as a moral science. The science of administration can also be a moral one, a critically moral one.

The term *moral* is being used here in its cultural, professional, spiritual, and ethical sense, not in a religious sense. The moral side of administration has to do with the *dilemmas* that face us in education and other professions. All educators face three areas of dilemma: control, curricular, and societal. Control dilemmas involve the resolution of classroom management and control issues, particularly the issue of who is in charge and to what degree. Control dilemmas center around four questions: (1) Do you treat the child as a student, focusing narrowly on cognitive goals, or as a whole person, focusing more broadly on intellectual, aesthetic, social, and physical dimensions? (2) Who controls classroom time? In some classrooms, children are given latitude in scheduling their activities; in others, class activities follow a strict and mandatory schedule. (3) Who controls operations or the larger context of what it means to be human and how we resolve the inevitable con-

flicts that go on in the classroom? (4) Who controls the standards and defines success and failure?

Similar dilemmas occur in the curricular domain and relate to whether the curriculum is considered as received, public knowledge or as private, individualized knowledge of the type achieved through discoveries and experiments. These curricular difficulties also depend on whether one conceives of the child as customer or as an individual. The customer receives professional services generated from a body of knowledge, whereas the individual receives personal services generated from his or her particular needs and context.

A final set of dilemmas involves what children bring to school and how they are to be treated once there. One concerns the distribution of teacher resources. Should one focus more resources on the less talented, in order to bring them up to standards, or on the more talented, in order that they may reach their full potential? The same question arises in regard to the distribution of justice. Should classroom rules be applied uniformly, without regard to the differing circumstances of each child, or should family background, economic factors, and other sociological influences be considered? Should a teacher stress a common culture or ethnic differences and subcultural consciousness?

Much of teaching involves resolving such dilemmas by making a variety of decisions throughout the school day. Such decisions can be made, however, in a *reflective* or an *unreflective* manner. An unreflective manner means simply teaching as one was taught, without considering available alternatives. A reflective approach involves an examination of the widest array of alternatives. Thus, reflective teaching suggests that dilemmas need not be simply resolved but can be transformed so that a higher level of teaching expertise is reached.

This same logic can be applied to administration. Administration involves the resolution of various dilemmas, that is, the making of moral decisions. One set of dilemmas involves control. How much participation can teachers have in the administration of the school? How much participation can parents and students have? Who evaluates and for what purpose? Is the role of administration collegial or authority centered? The area of the curriculum brings up similar questions. Is the school oriented to basic skills, advanced skills, social skills, or all three? Should the curricula be teacher-made or national, state, or system mandated?

Should student evaluation be based on teacher assessment or standardized tests? What is authentic assessment? Finally, an additional set of dilemmas pertains to the idea of schooling in society. Should the schools be oriented to ameliorate the apparent deficits that some students bring with them, or should they see different cultures and groups as strengths? Should schools be seen as agents of change, oriented to the creation of a more just society, or as socializers that adapt the young to the current social structure?

Oftentimes, these questions are answered unreflectively and simply resolved on an “as needed” basis. This approach often resolves the dilemma but does not foster a real *transformation* in one’s self, role, or institution. If administration and leadership encompass transformation, and I would argue that they should, then an additional lens to structural functionalism must be found through which to view these questions. I suggest that the additional lens be in the form of critical humanism and the Ignatian vision. In this context, then, administrative leadership can be viewed as a moral science.

THE IGNATIAN VISION

More than 450 years ago, Ignatius of Loyola, a young priest born to a Spanish aristocratic family, founded the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits, and wrote his seminal book, *The Spiritual Exercises*. In this book, he suggested a “way of life” and a “way of looking at things” that his religious community and other followers have propagated for almost five centuries. His principles have been utilized in a variety of ways. They have aided individuals in developing their own spiritual lives; they have been used to formulate a way of learning that has become the curriculum and instructional method employed in the sixty Jesuit high schools and twenty-eight Jesuit colleges and universities in the United States; and they have been used to develop individual administrative styles. Together, these principles comprise the *Ignatian vision*.

I wish to explore five Ignatian principles here as a foundation for developing an administrative philosophy and leadership style: (1) Ignatius’s concept of the *magis*, or the “more”; (2) the implications of his notion of *cura personalis*, or “care of the person”; (3) the process of

inquiry or *discernment*; (4) the development of *men and women for others*; and (5) service to the *underserved* and marginalized, or his concept of *social justice*.

At the core of the Ignatian vision is the concept of the *magis*, or the “more.” Ignatius spent the greater part of his life seeking perfection in all areas of his personal, spiritual, and professional life. He was never satisfied with the status quo. He was constantly seeking to improve his own spiritual life, as well as his secular life, as leader of a growing religious community. He was an advocate of “continuous improvement” long before it became a corporate slogan, long before people like Edwards Deming used it to develop his Total Quality Management approach, and long before Japan used it to revolutionize its economy after World War II.

The idea of constantly seeking “the more” implies change. The *magis* is a movement away from the status quo, and moving away from the status quo defines change. The Ignatian vision requires individuals and institutions to embrace the process of change as a vehicle for personal and institutional improvement. For his followers, frontiers and boundaries are neither obstacles nor ends but new challenges to face, new opportunities to welcome. Thus, change needs to become a way of life. Ignatius further implores his followers to “be the change that you expect in others.” In other words, we are called to model desired behavior—to live out our values, to be of ever fuller service to our communities, and to aspire to the more universal good. Ignatius had no patience with mediocrity. He constantly strove for the greater good.

The *magis* principle, then, can be described as the main norm in the selection and interpretation of information. Every real alternative for choice must be conducive to the advancement toward perfection. When some aspect of a particular alternative is *more* conducive to reaching perfection than other alternatives, we have reason to choose that alternative. Earlier, I spoke of the “dilemmas” that educators face during every working day. The *magis* principle is a “way of seeing” that can help us in selecting the better alternative.

At first hearing, the *magis* principle may sound rigid and frightening. It is absolute, and Ignatius is unyielding in applying it, but not rigid. On the one hand, he sees it as the expression of our love of humanity, which inexorably seeks to fill all of us with a desire not to be content

with what is less good for us. On the other hand, he sees that humanity has not only its particular gifts but also its limitations and different stages of growth. A choice that in the abstract would be more humane than it would be in the concrete would not be seen as adhering to the *magis* principle. For example, tracking students according to ability can be seen as humane in the abstract, but in the concrete, it can be dehumanizing. Ignatius would advise us to focus on the concrete in resolving this dilemma.

In every case, then, accepting and living by the *magis* principle expresses our love of humanity. So, whatever the object for choice, the measure of our love of neighbor will be the fundamental satisfaction we will find in choosing and acting by the *magis* principle. Whatever one chooses by this principle, no matter how undesirable in some other respect, will always be what one would most want as a moral and ethical member of the human race.

Closely related to the principle of the *magis* is the Ignatian principle of *inquiry* and *discernment*. In his writings, he urges us to challenge the status quo through the methods of inquiry and discernment. This is very similar to one of the tenets of critical theory. In fact, the Ignatian vision and critical theory share a number of norms.

To Ignatius, one must enter into inquiry and discernment to determine God's will. However, this process is of value for the purely secular purpose of deciding which "horn of a dilemma" one should come down on. To aid us in utilizing inquiry and discernment as useful tools in challenging the status quo and determining the right choice, Ignatius suggests that the ideal disposition for inquiry and discernment is humility. The disposition of humility is especially helpful when, despite one's best efforts, the evidence that one alternative is more conducive to the betterment of society is not compelling. When the discerner cannot find evidence to show that one alternative is more conducive to the common good, Ignatius calls for a judgment in favor of what more assimilates the discerner's life to the life of poverty and humiliation. Thus, when the *greatest* good cannot readily be determined, the *greater* good is more easily discerned from the position of humility. These are very demanding standards, but they are consistent with the *magis* principle and the tenets of critical humanism.

In addition to the *magis* principle norm, taking account of what has just been said and of what was said earlier about the norm of humility as a disposition for seeking the greater good, the relationship of the greater good norm to the greatest good norm can be clarified. The latter is absolute, overriding, and always primary. The greater good norm is secondary; it can never, in any choice, have equal weight with the first *magis* principle; it can never justify a choice of actual poverty and humiliation over riches and honors if the latter are seen to be more for the service of humanity in a particular situation of choice, with all its concrete circumstances, including the agent's responsibilities to others and his or her own stage of psychological and spiritual development. In other words, if being financially successful allows one to better serve the poor and underserved, that is preferred to actual poverty.

Ignatius presents us with several other supplemental norms for facing our "dilemmas." In choices that directly affect the individual person and the underserved or marginalized, especially the poor, Ignatius urges us to give preference to those in need. This brings us to his next guiding principle, *cura personalis*, or care of the person.

Another of Ignatius's important and enduring principles is his notion that, despite the primacy of the common good, the need to care for the individual person should never be lost. From the very beginning, the *cura personalis* principle has been included in the mission statement of virtually every high school and college founded by the Jesuits. It also impacts the method of instruction suggested for all Jesuit schools in the *ratio studiorum*, or "course of study," in these institutions. All Jesuit educational institutions are to foster what we now refer to as a "constructivist" classroom, where the student is an active participant in the learning process. This contrasts with the "transmission" method of instruction, where the teacher is paramount, and the student is a passive participant in the process. In the Ignatian vision, the care of the person is a requirement not only on a personal needs basis but also on a "whole person" basis, which would, of course, include classroom education.

This principle also has implications for how we conduct ourselves as educational administrators. Ignatius calls us to value the gifts and charisms of our colleagues and to address any deficiencies that they might have and turn them into strengths. For example, during the employee-evaluation

process, Ignatius would urge us to focus on the formative stage of the evaluation far more than on the summative stage. This would be one small way of applying *cura personalis* theory to practice.

The fourth principle that I wish to consider is the Ignatian concept of service. Once again, this principle has been propagated from the very outset. The expressed goal of virtually every Jesuit institution is “to develop men and women for others.” Jesuit institutions are called on to create a culture of service as one way of ensuring that their students, faculty, and staff reflect the educational, civic, and spiritual values of the Ignatian vision.

Institutions following the Ignatian tradition of service to others have done so through community-service programs and, more recently, service learning. Service to the community provides students with a means of helping others, a way to put their value systems into action, and a tangible way to assist local communities. Although these were valuable benefits, there was no formal integration of the service experience into the curriculum and no formal introspection concerning the impact of service on the individual. During the last ten years, there has been a movement toward creating a more intentional academic relationship. Service has evolved from a modest student activity into an exciting pedagogical opportunity. In the past, service was viewed as a cocurricular activity; today, it plays an integral role in the learning process.

Since many institutions are situated in an urban setting, service gives them a chance to share resources with surrounding communities and allows for reciprocal relationships to form between the university and local residents. Immersion in different cultures—economic, racial, educational, social, and religious—is the vehicle by which students make connections. Working side by side with people of varying backgrounds significantly impacts students, forcing them outside of their comfort zones and into the gritty reality of how others live. Through reflection, these students have the opportunity to integrate these powerful experiences into their lives, opening their eyes and hearts to the larger questions of social justice. Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, the former superior general of the Jesuit order, in his address on justice in American Jesuit universities in October 2000, used the words of Pope John Paul II to challenge Jesuit educators to “educate the whole person of solidarity for the real world” not only through concepts learned in the classroom but also through contact with real people.

Upon assuming the position of superior general in 1973 and echoing the words of Ignatius, Pedro Arrupe declared, “Our prime educational objective must be to form men and women for others; men and women who will live not for themselves but for others.” In the spirit of these words, the service-learning movement has legitimized the educational benefit of all experiential activity. The term *service learning* means different things to different people, and debates on service learning have been around for decades, running the gamut from unstructured “programmatically opportunities” to structured “educational philosophies.” At Ignatian institutions, service learning is a bridge that connects faculty, staff, and students with community partners and their agency needs. It connects academic and student life views about the educational value of experiential learning. It also connects students’ textbooks to human reality and their minds and hearts to values and action. The programs are built on key components of service learning, including integration into the curriculum, a reciprocal relationship between the community agency and the student, and structured time for reflection, which is very much related to the Ignatian principle of *discernment* discussed earlier.

Participation in service by high school and college students, whether as a cocurricular or a course-based experience, correlates with where they are in their developmental process. Service work allows students to explore their skills and limitations, to discover what excites and energizes them, to put their values into action, to use their talents to benefit others, and to discover who they are and who they want to become. By encouraging students to reflect on their service, these institutions assist in this self-discovery. The reflection can take many forms: an informal chat, a facilitated group discussion, written dialogue, journal entries, reaction papers, or in-class presentations on research articles. By integrating the service experience through critical reflection, students develop knowledge about the communities in which they live and knowledge about the world that surrounds them. It is only after the unfolding of this service-based knowledge that the students are able to synthesize what they have learned with their lives. Through this reflection, the faculty members also have an opportunity to learn from and about their students. Teachers witness the change and growth of the students first hand. In short, service to others changes lives.

The implications of service to others for administration are clear. Not only can educational administrators enhance their effectiveness by including the idea of service to others in their curricula, but also by modeling it in their personal and professional lives. I have in mind here the concept of administrators becoming the “servant of the servants.” Servant leaders do not inflict pain; they bear pain, and they treat their employees as “volunteers,” a concept explored earlier.

Ignatius’s concept of service leads into his notion of solidarity with the underserved (poor) and marginalized and his principle of social justice. We begin with an attempt to achieve some measure of clarity about the nature and role of social justice in the Ignatian vision. According to some, Ignatius defined justice in both a narrow and wide sense. The narrow sense involves “justice among men and women.” In this case, it is a matter of “clear obligations” among “members of the human family.” The application of this kind of justice would include the rendering not only of material goods but also of immaterial goods, such as “reputation, dignity, the possibility of exercising freedom.”

Many of his followers also believe Ignatius defined justice in a *wider* sense, “where situations are encountered which are humanly intolerable and demand a remedy.” Here, the situations may be products of “explicitly unjust acts” caused by “clearly identified people” who cannot be obliged to correct the injustices, although the dignity of the human person requires that justice be restored; or they may be caused by non-identifiable people. It is precisely within the structural forces of inequality in society that injustice of this second type is found, that injustice is “institutionalized,” or built into economic, social, and political structures both national and international, and that people are suffering from poverty and hunger, from the unjust distribution of wealth, resources, and power. The critical theorists, of whom I spoke earlier, would likely concur with this wider definition of social justice.

It is almost certain that Ignatius did not only concern himself with purely economic injustices. He often cites injustices about “threats to human life and its quality,” “racial and political discrimination,” and loss of respect for the “rights of individuals or groups.” When one adds to these the “vast range of injustices” enumerated in his writings, one sees that the Ignatian vision understands its mission of justice to include “the widest possible view of justice,” involving every area where there is an at-

tack on human rights. We can conclude, therefore, that although Ignatius was, to some degree, concerned about commutative justice (right relationships between private persons and groups) and distributive justice (the obligations of the state to render to the individual what is his or her due), he is most concerned about what, today, is generally called social justice, or “justice of the common good.” Such justice is comprehensive and includes the above-mentioned strict legal rights and duties, but it is more concerned about the natural rights and duties of individuals, families, communities, and the community of nations toward one another as members of the common family of human beings. Every form of justice is included in, and presupposed by, social justice, but social justice emphasizes the social nature of the person, as well as the social significance of all earthly goods, the purpose of which is to aid all members of the human community to attain their dignity as human beings. Many of Ignatius’s followers believe that this dignity is being undermined in our world today, and their main efforts are aimed toward restoring that dignity.

In the pursuit of social justice, Ignatius calls on his followers to be “in solidarity with the poor.” The next logical question might then be, Who are the poor? The poor are usually thought to be those who are economically deprived and politically oppressed. Thus, we can conclude that promoting justice means working to overcome the oppressions or injustices that make the poor poor. The fallacy here, however, is that the poor are not necessarily oppressed or suffering injustice, and so Ignatius argues that our obligation toward the poor must be understood as linking “inhuman levels of poverty and injustice” and not as concerned with the “lot of those possessing only modest resources,” even though those of modest means are often poor and oppressed. So, we conclude that the poor include those “wrongfully” impoverished or dispossessed.

An extended definition of the poor, one that Ignatius would espouse, would include any of the following types of people:

- First are those who are economically deprived and socially marginalized and oppressed, especially, but not limited to, those with whom one has immediate contact and is in a position to affect positively.
- The second group includes the “poor in spirit,” that is, those who lack a value system or an ethical and moral sense.

- The third group includes those who are emotionally poor, who have psychological and emotional shortcomings and are in need of comfort.

In defining the poor in the broadest way, Ignatius exhorts us to undertake social change in our role as leaders, to do what we can do to bring an end to inequality, oppression, and injustice. Once again, we can see the close connection between the Ignatian principles of social justice and the main tenets of critical theory.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION

Each of the principles of the Ignatian vision noted above has a variety of implications for leaders. The *magis* principle has implications for administrators in that it calls for us to be seeking perfection continually in all that we do. In effect, this means that we must seek to improve continually. And since improvement implies change, we need to be champions of needed change in our institutions. This means that we have to model a tolerance for change and embrace not only our own change initiatives but also those in other parts of the organization.

The principle of *cura personalis* has additional implications. To practice the Ignatian vision, one must treat people with dignity under all circumstances. *Cura personalis* also requires us to extend ourselves in offering individual attention and attending to the needs of all those with whom we come into contact. Being sensitive to the individual's unique needs is particularly required. Many times in our efforts to treat people equally, we fail to treat them fairly and equitably. Certain individuals have greater needs than others, and many times these needs require that exceptions be made on their behalf. For example, if an adult student does not hand in an assignment on time, but the tardiness is due to the fact that he or she is going through some personal trauma at the moment, the principle of *cura personalis* calls on us to make an exception. Many would likely consider such an exception to be unfair to those who made the effort to complete the assignment in a timely manner; others might object that we cannot possibly be sensitive to the special needs

of all of our students and colleagues. However, as long as the exception is made for anyone in the same circumstances, Ignatius would not perceive this exception as unfair. In fact, the exception would be expected if one is practicing the principle of “care of the person.”

The Ignatian process of *discernment* requires educational administrators to be reflective practitioners. It calls on us to be introspective regarding our administrative and leadership behavior. We are asked to reflect on the ramifications of our decisions, especially in light of their cumulative effect on the equitable distribution of power and on the marginalized individuals and groups in our communities. In effect, the principle of discernment galvanizes the other principles embodied in the Ignatian vision. During the discernment process, we are asked to reflect upon how our planned behavior will manifest the *magis* principle, *cura personalis*, and service to the community, especially the underserved, marginalized, and oppressed.

The development of men and women for others requires that one have a sense of service toward those with whom the leader interacts and also develops this spirit of service in others. The concept of “servant leadership” requires us to encourage others toward a life and career of service and to assume the position of being the “servant of the servants.” Ignatius thinks about leadership in terms of what the gospel writer Luke calls the “one who serves.” The leader owes something to the institution he or she leads. The leader is seen in this context as steward rather than owner or proprietor.

The implications of Ignatius’s notion of social justice are myriad for the administrator. Concern for the marginalized among our constituencies is required. We are called upon to be sensitive to those individuals and groups that do not share equitably in the distribution of power and influence. Participative decision-making and collaborative behavior is encouraged among administrators imbued with the Ignatian tradition. Equitable representation of all segments of the school community should be provided whenever feasible. Leadership behavior such as this will assure that the dominant culture is not perpetuated to the detriment of the minority culture, rendering the minorities powerless. We will find in the succeeding chapters that the most effective of the football coaches profiled incorporate many of the Ignatian concepts into their leadership behavior.

SUMMARY

I began this book by suggesting that leaders are made, not born. I posited that if one could master the skills involved in effective leadership, one could become a successful administrator. In this chapter, however, I assert that learning the skills involved in effective leadership is only part of the story. Leadership is as much an art, a belief, a condition of the heart, as it is the mastery of set of skills and an understanding of leadership theory. A truly successful leader, therefore, is one who leads with both the *mind* and the *heart*. When we look at the leadership behavior of the ten football coaches included in this study, we should consider not only whether their leadership practices conform to the Bolman-Deal situational leadership theory but also whether they are leading with *heart*. I believe we will find that those coaches who are most comfortable operating in Bolman and Deal's human resource frame of leadership are most likely to be leading with heart. At any rate, the most effective leaders will be those who lead with both mind (structural and political frames) and heart (human resource and symbolic frames).

WALTER ALSTON

Nice guys finish first!

—Walter Alston

BACKGROUND

Walter Alston was born in 1911 in Venice, Ohio, and passed away in 1984 at the age of seventy-two. He was a Major League Baseball player and manager. Alston was a first baseman with the St. Louis Cardinals in the 1936 season, during which he played in his only major league game on September 27. In ignominious fashion, Alston struck out in his only major league at bat. After returning to the minor leagues for several years as a player and a manager, including a stint as the player-manager for the first integrated baseball team, the Nashua Dodgers of the class-B New England League, he was named manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers for the 1954 season.

Alston won seven National League pennants in his twenty-three years as Dodgers manager. In 1955 he led Brooklyn to the pennant and its only World Series championship. In 1956, he led Brooklyn to another pennant. After the Dodgers moved to Los Angeles, Alston led the team

to pennants in 1959, 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1974, and three more World Series championships (1959, 1963, 1965). He was the first Dodgers manager to win a World Series. Named Manager of the Year six times, Alston also guided a victorious National League All-Star squad a record seven times. He retired after the 1976 season with 2,063 wins.

As a manager, Alston was noted for his studious approach to the game (he was a school teacher in the off-season while in the minor leagues) and signing twenty-three one-year contracts with the Dodgers at a time when multiyear contracts were becoming the norm in baseball. He was elected to the National Baseball Hall of Fame in 1983. He was a graduate of Miami University of Ohio (Wikipedia.org; Alston & Tobin, 1976).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral modes in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style.

We shall see that Walter Alston was a very situational leader. He learned early in his career that one size doesn't fit all. For example, when he first started managing he had strict curfews for his players. Once or twice he "went off on a wild goose chase" to find a player who was violating the rules. "But I've long since given that up," he said. "You end up doing more chasing than teaching" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 88).

By Alston's own admission, he never ran what you would call a "tight ship." Some of his former coaches, like Tommy Lasorda, believed that toward the end of his career he had not been as close to his players as he once was. While admitting that this was so, Alston argued that he was in a different situation by the end of his career. No doubt, some of that change in behavior comes with age and more experience as a manager. And the mere fact that in Los Angeles the players were spread out over half of Southern California, rather than living within a few blocks of Dodger Stadium when the team was in Brooklyn, made for a differ-

ent situation. According to Alston, these conditions “make it hard to be close” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 88).

Alston was sometimes criticized for what some perceived as a lax attitude. However, in situational leadership theory terms, he was quick to point out to his critics that the Brooklyn Dodgers at that time were made up of experienced players, men who had achieved a great deal, knew their jobs well, and were intimately aware of what it took to win. These Dodgers had a “high readiness level.” Alston considered it a plus. He knew them all from the minor leagues and knew what they could do. “When you have Roy Campanella, Gil Hodges, Jackie Robinson, Pee Wee Reese, Billy Cox, Duke Snider, Carl Furillo, Don Newcombe, Clem Labine, Joe Black and the like, that spells talent. You manage them accordingly” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 102).

He felt much more comfortable praising players rather than belittling them. He was convinced that a positive response to a mistake does more good “95 percent of the time” than ripping the player, especially a young player. He also recommends that if you’re going to reprimand a player, wait a day and get him alone to do it. “You have twenty-five totally different individuals out there,” he said. Each of them is a high strung, highly talented, finely tuned athlete gifted with baseball skills or he would never be wearing a Dodger uniform in the first place. Once again, Alston advises, “treat him accordingly” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 181).

Finally, Alston demonstrated his understanding of the situational nature of leadership by indicating that he never made much of an emotional appeal to the Dodgers in all his years there. “I used to try some Knute Rockne tactics when I was coaching high school basketball years and years ago, but I figured these guys were pros, adults, and wouldn’t buy any of that malarkey” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 185). Evidently he was correct, having won four world championships in his career.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Although Walter Alston’s image is that of a human resource

leader, there are a number of instances when he utilized structural leadership behavior. As noted in his background, he was a classroom teacher by trade and was thus very familiar and comfortable with operating according to a “lesson plan.”

Alston was a high school teacher during his first six seasons in professional baseball and learned how to teach the fundamentals of baseball using the same methods he used in the classroom. Many of those methods, like thorough preparation and short- and long-range planning, are structural leadership behaviors. “I have always enjoyed kids and young people,” he said. “Being around them keeps you young, and from getting set in your ways” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 36). And, in typical structural frame manner, he always demanded that his players give 100 percent effort, whether it be at a workout, an exhibition game, the regular season, or the World Series.

Especially in the minor leagues, Alston believed that you needed to be a “teaching” manager, or you wouldn’t survive. The major leagues expected its minor leaguers to come to the major league level with a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals. According to Alston, the contemporary baseball player now learns the fundamentals at the major league level. The minor leagues are too disparate and independent of the parent clubs now for consistent training in the fundamentals to take place. At any rate, the teaching of fundamentals now takes place in spring training—and drilling on the fundamentals is a structural leadership behavior.

Alston had strong feelings about the value of conditioning and knowledge of the fundamentals of the game. “I’ve always felt that conditioning was vital to success, and I expected my players to report to training camp ready to work. If someone showed up fat and sloppy, he had a lot to do before he’d get much of my time” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 85). These are the sentiments of a leader operating out of the structural frame.

Even though Alston had a reputation as a human resource frame leader, he did use structural behavior when appropriate. He tells the story of one of his players, Chico Fernandez, habitually complaining about having to sleep in the upper bunk on the train. Exasperated, Alston said, “Look, buddy, if you pop off to me one more time, you’ll be sleeping in the bathroom” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 90). Later, Alston found out that Tommy Lasorda had put Fernandez up to it knowing that it would get Alston’s goat.

Even with the great Jackie Robinson, Alston had noticed that Robinson wasn't a very enthusiastic participant in the calisthenics that opened their practices each day. He was often late or he was off chatting with someone, usually a reporter. Alston let Robinson know about it privately and he improved. However, when Robinson got back into his old habits, Alston called a team meeting and in typical structural frame form reamed him out publicly.

One of the things that Alston liked best about the Dodgers' pristine and remote spring training site in Vero Beach, Florida, was that its location precluded anything except baseball. He shared his structural frame tendencies by stating that "we start out early in the morning and by 3 pm everyone has put in a hard day's work. I'm not a harsh taskmaster, but I do want everyone to get in shape early" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 160).

An incident at spring training in Vero Beach reflected Alston's use of structural frame behavior, when appropriate. It seems that two of his brightest stars, Sandy Koufax and Larry Sherry, broke curfew and Alston caught them going into their room. He banged his fist on the door so hard that he broke his World Series ring and cut his finger. He was really angry at them. "I took some of their money for that," he said (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 164). In a similar incident at the Marriott Hotel in Philadelphia in 1974, after a 3-2 loss to the Phillies, the players got loud at the bar playing liars' poker. "If I had played like they did, I'd be up in my room with a pillow over my head" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 199). He told them to go to their rooms. It was 8:30 pm. He always thought that was the earliest curfew in major league history. But immediately after this incident, the Dodgers built their first place lead from two games to seven. Was there a cause and effect relationship? We leave it to the reader to decide.

In true structural frame style, Alston stressed the "team" aspect of the game and insisted that his coaches teach the value of teamwork. According to Alston, baseball is a team game first—and not just the nine men on the field, but the entire twenty-five of them. He believed strongly that you needed all of them to win. Each one plays a prominent role. To get this concept across, he made sure that all his coaches had one thing in common: they were all good teachers and hard workers. He believed that characteristic was all important in something so vital as coaching teamwork and the fundamentals and that everything was

taught the same way from the lowest minor league level all the way to the major leagues.

Many in the media labeled Alston the “Quiet Man” after the John Wayne motion picture. It was a reference that he never totally accepted. He was the Quiet Man to some, but certainly not to all. “Everyone who knows me well realizes that I’m slow to anger, but, once I boil—watch out, it’s pretty hard to calm me down” (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 173). The Vero Beach and Philadelphia incidents cited above demonstrated well his selective use of structural frame leadership behavior.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. There are abundant instances when Walter Alston acknowledges the effectiveness of human resource leadership behavior. He learned about its effectiveness early in life when he had to drop out of Miami of Ohio University because of financial problems brought about by the Great Depression in 1932. Reverend Jones, his pastor at the Methodist Church in Darrrtown, Ohio, gave him \$50 to continue his education. Alston never forgot Reverend Jones’s largesse and became a devotee of such human resource leadership behavior later in life.

He also learned much in this regard from his basketball coach at Miami of Ohio, John Mauer. Mauer was a stern and serious basketball man who really knew how to teach the fundamentals of the game. But it was his ability to get the message across to all of his players that really impressed Alston. He had a good psychological approach to players. According to Alston, he knew how to handle them. He knew when to pat his players on the back and when to give them a “swift kick.”

In a similar acknowledgement of the effectiveness of human resource behavior, Alston recalled a situation in 1946 when black players were starting to be recruited to the minor leagues from the old Negro League. There was a time in a minor league game in Nashua, Maine, when Alston protested a decision a bit too loudly and got tossed from the game. He named Roy Campanella manager without a minute’s hesitation. He was the most knowledgeable player, had more experi-

ence than any of the others, and everyone respected him—so why not? Alston always felt fortunate to have been in at the beginning of the African American introduction to organized baseball. In his estimation there had never been a time in his many years with the Dodger organization where he felt there was a problem with discrimination within the team. He always considered his teams to be close-knit, with a genuine feeling of togetherness among all the players no matter what their background.

Like most human resource leaders, Alston had great faith in human nature. Thus, he never believed in bed checks or any of the other commonly used disciplinary tactics. He did have a curfew, but he felt his players were men who cared enough about the game and their futures to be in on time. He always sought to form a close relationship with his players and coaches—sometimes out of necessity. He recalls when Tommy Lasorda was coaching for him when he was managing Montreal in the minor leagues. There was a tight little clique that was established partly because it was pretty difficult to make new friends when he didn't speak French fluently. He had a number of "gimmicks" going in order to form bonding relationships. He made a list of the players he could beat playing pool, or football or golf, or playing hearts. In doing so, he formed relationships that proved valuable when he was named manager of the Dodgers and many of these same players showed up on his roster.

Alston's relationship with his coaches, especially Tommy Lasorda, was also special. They were constantly playing practical jokes on one another, albeit with Alston most often the victim. He recalled one instance when he was pitching batting practice before a game and it seemed inordinately long. But the clock that they used to time the batting practice still indicated there were five minutes left. He didn't find out until later that Lasorda kept surreptitiously turning back the minute hand on him so that he was out there for forty-five minutes, instead of his usual thirty minutes.

Alston's reliance on human resource behavior often paid dividends. He recalled a time in a World Series game, with two men on and one out and Yogi Berra up. He wanted to know how his pitcher, Sal Maglie, felt. Maglie told Alston that he was not as sharp as he might be, but he was confident he could get Berra out. He forced Berra to fly out to Sandy Amoros and the next batter, Bill Skowron, did the same thing. That was

the turning point of the game and once more supported Alston's belief that patience and human relationships are critical factors in managing a ball club. And if patience ever paid off it was in the Sandy Koufax case, not only Koufax's own patience, but that of Alston and everyone else in the Dodger organization. They could all see from the first time he warmed up at Ebbets Field that although he was wild he could throw the ball with a velocity that few could. But it took a full five years for him to gain control and become the Hall of Fame pitcher Alston knew he could be. In a similar situation, Don Newcombe was disgusted with himself after giving up two home runs in the last game to lose the World Series. The fans were on his back and conveniently forgot about Newcombe's greatness in winning twenty-seven games to get the Dodgers to the World Series. "I didn't," said Alston (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 123).

When Roy Campanella was in a car accident that paralyzed him from the neck down, Alston called him in the hospital every day and visited him on a weekly basis for the long months that he was there. After he was released, Alston remained his lifelong friend and confidant even though Campanella never played another game in professional baseball. It was not in Alston's makeup to do anything different.

When speaking about his management philosophy, we can see the importance Alston places on the use of human resource frame behavior. According to him, there is no way to adequately summarize one's philosophy or psychology of managing a baseball team. He goes into great depths to explain his views on baseball in *The Baseball Handbook*, a baseball technique book he wrote. But his philosophy of managing is not so complex. He believes in keeping everything simple, allowing a great deal of room for the individual to think on his own and respond within the general confines that Alston sets down for the entire Dodger organization. The most important thing in his mind is to know the players. Know them as players in terms of their assets and liabilities, but, more important, know them as persons. "That's where you determine how to get the best out them," he reasons (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 178). Most respond to a pat on the back—that's about 95 percent, according to Alston. A few you have to give a "boot in the rear." That's only about 5 percent.

Alston relied heavily on human resource behavior in dealing with all of his players, especially the stars. Maury Wills committed many errors as a rookie and asked Alston why he didn't just send him back to Spo-

kane in the minor leagues since he didn't seem to be doing the Dodgers much good. Alston responded that if Wills had as much confidence in himself as Alston had in him, everything would be fine. "Just go out and play the game," he advised (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 180). The rest, as we know, is history. Wills became an All-Star.

Another instance of Alston's use of human resource behavior was with his young shortstop, Ivan DeJesus. DeJesus had a great deal of potential as a fielder but had misplayed a couple of ground balls that were hit to him in an intrasquad game. He was very despondent at his play. "Don't feel badly," Alston said. "You played it correctly. You charged the ball properly. Whether it took a bad bounce or whatever happened doesn't matter. Don't dwell on it" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 180).

An indication of Alston's facility with human resource behavior was his ability to get along with Richie Allen when most other managers Allen played for were patently unsuccessful. He was able to relate to Allen because he took the time to find out that they had a mutual interest in and love of horses. He had a similar relationship with another complex personality, Frank Robinson, who is also profiled in this book. Alston simply left Robinson alone, knowing that he had such an intense desire to succeed that one did not need to "get on his back" for him to produce. He was the epitome of a self-starter.

Alston's human resource leadership behavior even extended to the opposing team. In referring to Don Larsen's historic perfect game in the 1956 World Series, he appreciated that "it was Larsen's day, his hour." Larsen beat the Dodgers 2-0. But more important it was a no hitter and a perfect game. He faced the minimum of twenty-seven batters and every one of them was set down. It took Larsen only ninety-seven pitches to achieve an immortal niche in baseball history, and even though this game propelled the Yankees to a World Series victory over the Dodgers, Alston respected Larsen's achievement. As we have observed, Walter Alston made frequent use of human resource frame leadership behavior.

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to

communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. Although this is not one of Walter Alston's favorite frames, there is ample evidence that he utilized symbolic frame behavior within his capacity to do so. For example, as a youngster he threw the baseball with such velocity that the townsfolk began calling him "Smokey," as in "Smoke that ball in here." And the nickname stuck because later in life Alston encouraged people to call him by that name.

Alston strived to reflect the image of a dignified professor and began refining that image at his first press conference upon being named the Dodgers' manager. As Frank Graham, one of the columnists who attended that first news conference, recalled, "If his first experience as the central figure in a high-powered publicity melee was wearing upon him, he gave no sign of it. He was composed, patient, responsive, and dignified" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 95), which was a contrast to Charlie Dressen, who preceded him and was just the opposite.

As a manager, Alston was noted for his studious approach to the game. As mentioned earlier, he was a high school teacher during the off-season for the first few years of his career. Alston was also famous for signing twenty-three one-year contracts even though he could have easily used his power to negotiate long-term contracts. It was his sign or symbol of loyalty to the Dodger organization, and he expected the same in return.

Alston will forever be remembered as the manager of the only Dodger team to bring a World Series championship to Brooklyn in 1955 after a number of near misses. Because of that, he remains the symbol of the Brooklyn Dodgers Glory Days even today. One of his favorite recollections was looking at the scoreboard clock when Johnny Podres retired the final batter in the World Series. It was 3:44 pm. According to Alston, at that moment every place in Brooklyn must have come apart. Thirty years of waiting was over with Podres's 2-0 shutout of the Yankees.

Alston consciously projected the image of a "players' manager." He wanted to be known as a human resource-type leader and manifested the behavior to symbolize that image. For example, after Roy Campanella had to retire from baseball because of a paralyzing automobile accident, Alston insisted on holding a "Roy Campanella Night" at Chavez Ravine. The official gate that night was 93, 103. Vin Scully, the Hall of Fame announcer, put out what they call a Sigalert in Los Angeles to

tell fans who were coming to stay home unless they had tickets. Some 15,000 fans were turned away. Alston was fond of recalling the scene when the lights were dimmed and the fans lit matches in honor of their fallen hero.

Alston also liked to reflect a make-do image. He never had an office other than the small room he had in the clubhouse in Dodger Stadium. He never had a secretary. In his view, he didn't need one. He expected the same kind of attitude from his players. For example, the 1963 season started off poorly; when the team was returning from Pittsburgh after a loss that put them in seventh place in the eight-team National League, some of the players complained about their non-air-conditioned bus. Alston hit the roof. "If any of you don't like the buses I get from now on, you come see me. Now if any of you want, right now, we'll step outside and discuss it between ourselves. And that goes for all of you." No one took him up on it and Alston later said, "That little bus incident in Pittsburgh was blown way out of proportion but it did kind of pull us together" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 170). They went on to win the pennant by six games over the St. Louis Cardinals.

Over the years, a number of writers started referring to Alston as the Quiet Man after the title of a John Wayne movie at the time. In typical symbolic leadership fashion, Alston took advantage of the situation by letting it be known that he was not averse to being referred to in those terms. Although symbolic behavior was not a particular strength of Alston's, he did make good use of it when able.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests. Although this is not one of Walter Alston's most used frames, he has been known to use it when the occasion dictates.

Alston used political frame behavior when he once had a disagreement with the legendary Branch Rickey about Buddy Hicks being brought up to the major leagues. Alston did not think he was ready to

be brought up to the Brooklyn Dodgers. Rickey and Alston talked about the situation for about an hour but Alston stood his ground and would not agree to bring Hicks up. Alston thought about capitulating, but he felt that in the long run Mr. Rickey would respect him more for sticking up for what he thought was right rather than being a yes-man.

On another occasion, Rickey wanted Alston to use Wayne Belardi at first base and Jim Pendleton in centerfield when the minor league pennant race was in hand. But Alston didn't want to upset the players by doing this too soon and flirting with losing the lead. He believed that these players had "busted their butts" all season to build a six-game lead. Experimenting with them at this point might affect the morale of a club that despite being in first place had lost three in a row. Rickey snapped at him, saying, "If you can't handle the morale of your ball club any better than that, I don't want you to manage." Fortunately for Alston and to Rickey's credit, he called Alston about 3 am the following morning and said, "Go ahead and use your own judgment from here on" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 82).

Once again using political frame leadership behavior to his advantage in negotiating his first Dodger contract, Alston told Buzzie Bavasi: "I want the job most of all. And I'd like you to give me as much money as you think you can" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 93). He got \$24,000, more than double his Montreal minor league contract. Alston went to Vero Beach, the Dodgers' spring training site, the next year with no contract. One day Bavasi reminded him that he hadn't signed a contract, so after the workout they sat down and put one together. Alston got a little raise, but was never one to push management for more. This was the start of the twenty-three successive one-year contracts that he signed with the Dodgers. He believed that showing loyalty to the organization in this way would pay dividends in the long run—and it did.

After finally winning the World Series in 1955, Alston had to spend more time with the press than he would have liked. A shy man by nature, he was never comfortable making speeches before the media. But he realized that doing so was "the price of winning." He also knew that he was not alone in being willing to gladly pay that price. Along these same lines, the Dodgers had made a commitment to a tour in Japan after the season. After losing the World Series to the Yankees, they were in no mood to fulfill that commitment. However,

Alston rallied his players to go on their goodwill tour of Japan with a positive attitude.

Alston needed to be at his best in utilizing political leadership when the Dodgers decided to move from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in 1958. In 1957 the Dodgers acquired the Los Angeles Angels of the Pacific Coast League. Immediately all of baseball exploded. They knew that owner Walter O'Malley had been trying for years, unsuccessfully, to get a new park in Brooklyn to replace outdated Ebbets Field. When it was officially announced that the Dodgers would be moving to Los Angeles next year, all of baseball was in an uproar. If it were not for Alston's astute use of political leadership behavior, especially with the players, it would have been a total disaster. He served as the ideal mediator between management, the players, and the fans.

Shortly after the first World Series win Alston received an offer to manage the Cleveland Indians: an offer everyone said he was foolish not to accept. Cleveland offered him a very lucrative five-year contract, and it was closer to Darratown, Ohio, where he grew up. But Alston had already had thirteen wonderful years with the Dodgers and Walter O'Malley and decided to stay because "they had been more than fair to me" (Alston & Tobin, 1976, p. 168). Again, the show of loyalty paid off.

In a final example of his use of political frame behavior, Alston fought fire with fire when in 1967 his two Hall of Fame pitchers, Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale, held out in tandem on signing their contracts. Alston engineered a win/win situation whereby he convinced the players to capitulate, but they eventually received one of the largest contract settlements in the history of baseball up to that time.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, Walter Alston appropriately balanced the use of the four leadership frames. Although one could argue that he overused human resource leadership behavior and was too much a players' coach, his teams were always well prepared, well conditioned, and played hard every day—a sign of the appropriate use of structural frame behavior. Although his use of symbolic behavior was somewhat limited, he successfully cultivated the image of a "cool, calm, and collected" teacher

and manager of the game. Finally, we saw how he used political frame leadership behavior when appropriate. His handling of the “flight” of the Dodgers from Brooklyn to Los Angeles and his intervention in the dispute that his two top pitchers had with management were outstanding examples of his ability to apply the appropriate leadership behavior to a given situation. Suffice to say, Walton Alston left a legacy of leadership behavior from which we can all benefit.

SPARKY ANDERSON

It doesn't cost anything to smile and say hello.

—Sparky Anderson

BACKGROUND

George “Sparky” Anderson was born in 1934 in Bridgewater, South Dakota. He managed the Cincinnati Reds and the Detroit Tigers and is fifth on the all-time list for career wins in Major League Baseball (behind Connie Mack, John McGraw, Tony La Russa, and Bobby Cox) and was the first manager to win the World Series in both the National and American Leagues, when he piloted the National League’s Cincinnati Reds to the 1975 and 1976 championships, then added a third title in 1984 with the Detroit Tigers of the American League.

As a player, Anderson was a “good field, not-hit” type. Like most of the managers profiled, Anderson had a very limited playing career. After playing the 1955 season with the Texas League Fort Worth Cats in the farm system of the Brooklyn Dodgers, he played one full season in the major leagues as a second baseman for the Philadelphia Phillies in 1959. However, a .218 batting average with no power ended his big-league career at that point.

In 1964, Anderson moved into a minor league manager's job in Toronto and later handled minor league clubs at the A and Double-A levels, including a season in the Cincinnati Reds' minor league system. During this period, he managed a pennant winner in four consecutive seasons: 1965 with Rock Hill of the Western Carolina League, 1966 with St. Petersburg of the Florida State League, 1967 with Modesto of the California League, and 1968 with Asheville of the Southern League. He made his way back to the majors in 1969 as a coach for the San Diego Padres. Finally, in 1970, Anderson was named manager of the Cincinnati Reds.

Anderson won 102 games and the pennant in his first major league season as manager, but then lost the World Series in five games to the Baltimore Orioles. After an injury-plagued 1971, the Reds came back and won another pennant in 1972, losing to the Oakland Athletics in the World Series. They took the National League West division title in 1973, then finished a close second to the Los Angeles Dodgers a year later. The media began referring to them as the "Big Red Machine."

Finally, in 1975, the Reds blew the division open by winning 108 games, swept the National League Championship Series and then edged the Boston Red Sox in a drama-filled, seven-game World Series. They repeated in 1976 by winning 102 games and ultimately sweeping the New York Yankees in the World Series. During this time, Anderson became known as "Captain Hook" for his penchant for taking out a starting pitcher at the first sign of weakness and going to his bullpen, relying heavily on closers Will McEnaney and Rawly Eastwick.

Anderson moved on to the young Detroit Tigers in 1979. The Tigers became a winning club almost immediately, but did not get into contention for the pennant until 1983, when they finished second. In 1984, Detroit opened the season 35–5 (a major league record) and breezed to a 104–58 record. They beat the San Diego Padres in five games in the World Series for Anderson's third world title. After the season, Anderson won the first of his two Manager of the Year Awards with the Tigers.

Anderson led the Tigers to the majors' best record in 1987, but the team was upset in the playoffs. He won his second Manager of the Year Award that year. After contending again in 1988, the team collapsed a year later, losing a startling 103 games. During that 1989 season, Ander-

son took a month-long leave of absence from the team as the stress of losing wore on him. Anderson probably did his best managerial job in 1991, when the Tigers finished last in batting average, first in strikeouts, and near the bottom of the league in most pitching categories, but still led their division in late August before settling for a second-place finish behind the rival Toronto Blue Jays. The secret was a power-packed lineup, led by sluggers Cecil Fielder, Mickey Tettleton, and Rob Deer, which led the league in home runs and walks that season.

Anderson retired from managing after the 1995 season, reportedly disillusioned with the state of the game following the 1994 strike. He finished with a lifetime record of 2,194–1,834, for a .545 winning percentage. He was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2000 (Wikipedia.org; Anderson & Ewald, 1998).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style.

Sparky Anderson was known primarily as a symbolic and human resource leader, but we will find that he is very adept at utilizing the structural and political frames, also. His former star player Pete Rose probably said it best in his typically colorful fashion: “You can kick a guy in the ass, you can pat them on the ass, or you can leave them alone. Sparky didn’t kick a guy that needed patting, and he didn’t pat those needing kicking. And he didn’t do either one to guys who just needed to be left alone” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 40). In Anderson’s own words, he expressed how when he was talking to a religious kid, he never used swear words. If he was talking with a street kid, he talked his talk. If he was dealing with a young man who was afraid of him, he would be gentle and quiet.

Another example of Anderson’s ability to adapt his leadership behavior to the situation occurred in his interview with General Manager Bob Howsam when he was first applying for the Cincinnati Reds job.

Howsam asked him what he would do if a star pitcher decided to leave the field and just walked into the clubhouse? In typical situational leadership style, Anderson responded by saying, “I would very much like to answer that question. But if I did, I’d be lying because I have no idea in the world how I would ever handle anything until I’m there. All I can say is that I can guarantee you, it will get done. And it will get done right” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 95). Anderson always believed that if managers or teachers, or any other kind of “boss,” are smart, they will learn as much from the people they are leading as the followers learn from them. “You learn how people act in certain *situations*, then you make adjustments so that the next time is always better than the last” (Anderson, 1998, p. 107).

Anderson cites Tony La Russa, who is also profiled in this book, as a typical situational leader. Anderson claimed that La Russa never had any set way of managing. Just when you thought you had him pegged, he pulled out another trick from the bag. He was always personally prepared, and he had his team prepared. He knew everything about the team he was competing against. He had the right balance of predictability, aggressiveness, and unpredictability. “And, he was smart about putting his hand in or keeping it out” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 223). Anderson had a very similar leadership approach.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Although structural leadership behavior was not generally perceived as one of Sparky Anderson’s strengths, we shall see that he oftentimes utilized structural behavior when appropriate. For example, he believed that running the game between the foul lines was the easiest part of managing: “*Preparing* the players to expend all their talents and energy separates the good manager from the also rans” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 39).

Structural frame leadership behavior was put to good use by Anderson when dealing with Kirk Gibson, one of his star players with the Detroit

Tigers. Gibson simply refused to mature as a person. He had made life difficult for all those around him. He was surly and self-centered. His outlook on life crippled him in his development as a player and a teammate. The showdown came in the 1983 season opener in Minnesota. Anderson pulled him from the starting lineup and told him he would be a part-time platoon player from then on. This was after a famous incident where Gibson pretended he was a football player and ran over Anderson, who typically stood his ground. Gibson was incensed. No one had ever stood up to him like that before. He threatened to break his little manager in half. Anderson did not waver. "When it was all said and done, Sparky wanted me and all of us to be proud of what we did in the game—be proud of ourselves as persons," a more mature Gibson later said (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 42).

According to Alan Trammell, one of his players at Detroit, Anderson knew his players inside and out. It was amazing to Trammell how he could get the most out of his players year after year. Even when times were tough, it was comforting to the players when Anderson walked into the clubhouse. "You knew things were under *control* then," Trammell said (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 44). There was never any chaos in Anderson's clubhouse. He was like a father figure. He taught his teams the importance of conducting themselves like professionals. He taught them the importance of dressing properly on the road and cooperating with the media. Most important, he taught them the Golden Rule: to treat people the way you wanted to be treated. In perhaps the greatest compliment someone could give another, Trammell said, "I raise my kids the way Sparky helped raise me" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 44). Anderson claimed that you can't tell people how to act right, you need to show them. You can't demand respect, you have to earn it. Words don't do it, only action counts. According to him, desired behavior must be modeled.

Anderson learned the importance of structural leadership behavior from what he called three of the smartest men he had run across in the game of baseball: George Scherger, George Kissel, and Clay Bryant—his minor league managers. Scherger taught him the importance of preparation and intensity. According to Anderson, there was no one better at teaching the fundamentals than Scherger, and nobody managed every game like it was the seventh game in the World Series like him. From Kissel, Anderson learned that, as in life, attention to even

the smallest detail can make the difference between success and failure. Base stealing, for example, is not done with speed alone. Knowing the pitchers' moves and getting the proper lead "puts an extra step even on a mule," he once said (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 84). From Bryant, Anderson learned that until someone learns to respect a loss, it's impossible to appreciate the meaning of a victory. He never let his players forget what they had learned from a loss. They learned to respect a loss. "We learned it's only a setback that can be used for victory" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 84).

Tommy Lasorda, Anderson's counterpart with the Los Angeles Dodgers, noted his friend's use of structural behavior. Lasorda described Anderson as one of the fiercest competitors he had ever known. He played by all the rules, but he'd do anything to win. "Nothing meant anything to Sparky except for winning. That's the way he came up as a player and that's the way he managed throughout his career" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 85).

Anderson believes that his use of structural leadership behavior was more frequent in the minor than in the major leagues. From a coaching and teaching standpoint, managing in the minor leagues is much more rewarding than in the majors, according to Anderson. He points out that the great coaches like Bobby Knight, Dean Smith, John Wooden, Woody Hayes, and Bear Bryant were at the college level rather than the professional level. These coaches had a set of rules, and those rules were there for everybody. The rules were the rules, and they had no names attached to them. Anderson claims that he learned the value of discipline and the need to be well drilled from Bobby Knight and Bo Schembeckler. "That's discipline," he said. "That's organization. That's learning to live within a system and making a contribution for the good of the team. It's the same in any endeavor in life" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 91). For that reason, Anderson was very complimentary to the Dodger organization. He admired the Dodger organization because there was discipline in the program that started at the top and continued down to the lowest team in their minor league system. Everything was done the same way. That was discipline in Anderson's mind—and that was structural leadership behavior.

According to Anderson, Pete Rose lifted discipline to another level. He was an original—the one and only. Anderson considered him to be mentally and physically tougher than any human being he had ever

known. “Pete taught me determination,” Anderson said. “Everybody wants to be successful. But how many of us are willing to bleed for it?” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 108).

Anderson even pursued an organization that modeled structural frame behavior in his job search. One of the things he liked about the Detroit Tigers organization when he was considering the managing job there was that there was a clearly defined chain of command. The manager was responsible solely to the general manager. The general manager was responsible to the owner alone. There were never any incidents or trouble in the clubhouse that were commonplace with other teams. He knew that he would get support from the front office and be left to determine which players belonged and which needed to move on. Not one to let a bad apple spoil the rest of the bunch, he knew that his decisions in that area would not be questioned. And he knew that the players would get the message of who was in charge—Sparky Anderson. Thus, Detroit was the perfect place for Anderson. And, he had all those good young prospects like Alan Trammell, Lou Whitaker, Kirk Gibson, Lance Parrish, Jack Morris, and Dan Petry. There is nothing that Anderson liked to do more than engage in structural behavior—like teaching. And, his character development would take hold in Detroit just as it had in Cincinnati.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Human resource frame leadership behavior was definitely one of Sparky Anderson’s strengths. For instance, one of his most famous or infamous players, Pete Rose, recalled that in spring training nobody played every game. Anderson knew Rose loved basketball almost as much as baseball. When the NCAA finals came around, he knew Rose had a special interest in them. On Saturdays during March Madness he let him do his work early in the morning and then let him go home to watch the games in a show of human resource leadership behavior. In the same vein, he knew Joe Morgan and Johnny Bench liked to play golf. There were a number of local golf tournaments during spring training, and he let them go play

after their conditioning work had been done. Anderson's disposition was that all players were going to have days off during spring training, so why not give them a day off when it corresponded with something they really wanted to do?

In true human resource manner, Anderson's approach was to get to know each player and each player's family. He got to know wives and all the children. He believed that you could get much more out of an individual if you just showed him that you cared.

Early in Anderson's career in Cincinnati, he had a pitcher named Jim McGlothlin. According to Anderson, he was a good pitcher and a marvelous young man. But it looked to Anderson like he was loafing in practice during the running drills. Of course, Anderson called him on it. It turned out that a couple of years later McGlothlin died of cancer. Anderson was angry at himself because he never took the time to find out why McGlothlin was so tired. He believes that it is not the employees' job to get to know the boss. The boss has to take the lead and know the employees.

Anderson posits that what separates the good teachers from the average ones—the good baseball managers from the average ones—is that the good ones let their students know they really care about them and what they make of their lives. "If an A student gets a B on a test, the good teacher is gonna let that student know he's disappointed" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 49).

As a human resource leader, Anderson would make sure to walk through the offices every day and say hello to everybody. He knew every secretary and janitor and anybody else who worked for the teams he managed. He used to watch his friend Bo Schembeckler, the great Michigan University football coach, when he didn't know he was watching. When he visited the Detroit Tigers' dressing room, he used to do the same things that Anderson did. He didn't just talk to the stars like Alan Trammell or Lou Whitaker or Cecil Fielder, Schembeckler would say hello to the guys on the grounds crew or the ladies selling hot dogs under the stands.

Anderson believed that a player's skills defined only half of the individual. If his young men never became responsible citizens, they were nothing more than ballplayers to him—and that was not enough. With this philosophy in mind, Kirk Gibson became one of his pet projects when he was managing the Detroit Tigers. Anderson used to say, "I

like my vegetables to grow good. If there's a weed in there, I'm gonna take it out" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 173). When he first came up to the big leagues, Gibson was the self-proclaimed "ornery prince of nastiness." But Anderson finally prevailed in convincing Gibson and Jack Morris, another project, to treat people the way they wanted to be treated—in other words, he taught them the Golden Rule.

Anderson sums up his belief in the appropriate application of human resource leadership behavior for a manager in this statement: "I don't care if he knows how much chalk goes into making the foul lines. If he don't first know how to deal with people, then he don't know nothing. He could memorize all the record books from cover to cover and still not know how to manage a team any better than the guy selling Cracker Jacks" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 227).

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. One could argue that Sparky Anderson's frequent use of symbolic leadership behavior differentiates him from many of his colleagues.

Anderson patterned much of his symbolic leadership behavior after that of his friend Tommy Lasorda. He admired Lasorda as having done things regarding the "color" and integrity of the game that no other baseball manager in history had done. For example, following Lasorda's lead, Anderson refused to manage replacement players in 1995 during the players strike. He looked at it differently than most. His first concern was for the integrity of the game. These were not the best players—not major league level. Therefore he refused to manage them. The temptation to compromise was enticing. If he was fired, he could have lost over \$1 million. But he always considered this decision as "the proudest moment of my career" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 10). He believed that using "make-believe" major leaguers threatened the moral conscience of the game. Anderson and Lasorda were a mutual admiration society. Both were cut from the same cloth and both claimed that each other was baseball's best ambassador.

Anderson used symbolic frame leadership behavior in his role as a parent. According to his oldest son, Lee, his father knew he had to “walk the walk” at home just as he did in the locker room. Over the years, Anderson often talked to his children about how education and living the right way is more important than making a lot of money. After teaching that his whole life, how could he make a decision other than the one he made regarding the baseball strike. He had to stand up for what he believed in. He did the right thing, and in the process made his son very proud.

When young people would ask Anderson for his autograph, he would always sign and return the item with a “thank you.” He would often hear them ask their parents, “How come he says ‘thank you’ when he signs the ball?” In a symbolic gesture, Anderson thanks them for asking for his signature because in doing so they are showing respect for the game that he loves. As a result of this kind of symbolic behavior, Anderson has become one of a handful of America’s celebrities who are known by their first names—Oprah, Madonna, Muhammad, Elvis, the Babe, Michael, and Sparky.

In a typical symbolic leadership way, Anderson speaks in stories, often creating his own words. Some of his malapropisms have assumed lives of their own. Once when describing a young player whose well-developed muscles suggested the power of Babe Ruth, Anderson commented to the writers: “He has the body of a Greek goddess” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 26). Another time in the heat of a pennant race when writers asked him about whether a player would play with an injury, Anderson said, “Sure, pain don’t hurt” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 26).

His nickname itself is symbolic. It was created in 1955 by a radio announcer in the minor leagues. After yet another argument with an umpire, the announcer said: “The sparks are really flying tonight” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 30). It stuck.

Anderson sought to project the image of a humble and happy man. His daughter, Shirlee, tells of the time when Anderson and she were waiting in a bank line back home after the Tigers won the World Series in 1984. Everyone was talking with Anderson and the bank manager spotted him and invited him to step to the front of the line. He refused. In a symbolic way, he was modeling humility for his daughter.

Along the same lines, Anderson's attitude was that it doesn't cost anything to smile and say hello. He always maintained that the best way of disarming hostile writers or fans was to simply smile at them. To him, every person God created is the most important person on earth. "If he wasn't the most important, then why did God waste His time making him in the first place" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 31). Anderson credits his disposition to his father. He recalls his father teaching his children that the only thing in life that doesn't cost a dime is being nice to people.

Pete Rose observed that he learned more from being around Anderson than anybody he'd been around in his life. He was nice to everyone. "You really have to crap all over Sparky for him not to be nice to you" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 31). Whenever Anderson is tempted by egoism, he reminds himself that he is really only George (his given name).

In another symbolic gesture, Anderson always credits players for his record of managerial success. "Without the horses, there simply is no race" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 38). All truly successful leaders follow a similar path, he suggests. The inspiring school principal quickly acknowledges the dedication of the entire faculty. The manager of a busy bank cannot generate new business without the tellers at the windows. The shift foreman in an automobile plant might wind up with three wheels and two steering columns without cooperation from the hourly workers who assemble the pieces, he observes. Anderson has three World Series rings, but never wears them. According to him, it was his teachers that really earned them.

Speaking of teachers, Anderson is fast to give credit to those who taught him to do things the "right way." On meeting Pope John Paul II, Anderson never forgot the Pope's face. According to Anderson, when you looked into his eyes, you could tell he really cared about every living person in the world. He didn't care about the person's religion. He didn't care about what the person did for a living. Anderson suggests that he cares about every person because he knows that everyone is a child of God. In Anderson's view, "He's the greatest person I had the privilege to meet" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 73). In fact, in what may be a first ever, Anderson got the Pope to sign a baseball for him.

In another instance of making use of symbolic behavior, during Anderson's time in Cincinnati, the Reds averaged ninety-six wins

and became known as the Big Red Machine. Taking advantage of the situation, Anderson insisted that his players be clean-shaven and neatly groomed. And when they put on the uniform, they did so “like they were getting ready for war” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 101).

One of Anderson’s favorite quotes was Winston Churchill’s, “When you’re going through hell, keep going.” So when Anderson was a player on the Cincinnati Reds and was never able to make it to the World Series or the year he lost 100 games as manager of the Detroit Tigers, he just kept “plugging” to symbolize the value of persistence, dedication, and commitment. “Except for spitting and telling a lie, there ain’t nothing easier to do than quit,” he said (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 135). That’s why the 1975 Reds were so special to him. They overachieved. The 1976 team was more talented, but that first championship is always the most memorable and showed everyone in the country that his Reds never quit.

Anderson liked to express himself in symbolic ways. For example, he would say things like, “What’s the sense of crying about a hole in the bucket. All it’s going to do is keep you from fixing it.” Or, “The biggest stars on Broadway can’t do their jobs without good role players.” “Even the best,” he said, “sometimes trip on their way to the cookie jar.” And, “You don’t need to stand up and cheer the mailman for bringing us letters every day.” Some of his other quotes with inspirational messages include: “You can win battles with people who lack character, but I’ll guarantee you, though, you won’t win the war.” And, “You miss 100 percent of the chances you don’t take.” On the value of teamwork, he said, “There ain’t no rose prettier than the bush it came from.” On finishing second, “A bridesmaid might look pretty, but nobody remembers anybody but the bride.” On Monday morning quarterbacking, he said: “Give me a second putt and I’ll sink it every time.” One of the most important lessons he learned: “Get my tongue out of the way of my brain” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 135).

Lastly, Anderson used symbolic leadership behavior in founding the organization Caring Athletes Team for Children (CATCH), through which he raised \$3 million in endowment money and \$1.5 million in grants. The Detroit Tigers team physician, Dr. Clarence Levingood, believes that although his managerial records are unchallenged and his Hall of Fame status is firmly established, Anderson will be remembered

more for what he did with CATCH than for anything he did on the field. “I don’t know how he did it,” Levingood said, “but he truly created a miracle” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 223).

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests.

Sparky Anderson was very astute at utilizing the political frame of leadership behavior when appropriate. A prime example of this was when Anderson first came to the Cincinnati Reds; the fans, the sports-writers, and more important, his players, referred to him as “Sparky Who.” On his first day on the job, Pete Rose approached him and said to him that he made the most money on the team and had been there the longest. “If you ever need to get their attention, you criticize me in front of the players,” Rose said (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 101). So, early in spring training Rose threw to the wrong base from the outfield and Anderson held a meeting after practice about throwing to the proper base. Of course his players were shocked that he openly criticized a player who had won the batting title and the Most Valuable Player Award. But according to Rose, “Everything started to fall into place after that” (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 102).

Another instance in which Anderson displayed political frame behavior was when he was fired as manager of the Cincinnati Reds after finishing in second place two years in a row. Anderson believed that one of the primary factors that led to his firing was his refusal to agree to certain coaching replacements that management wanted to make. Pitching coach Larry Shepard and third-base coach Alex Grammas were identified as having to be fired. But Anderson refused to use them as scapegoats. All he told the reporters, however, was that he understood the firing. He never pointed a finger at anyone or said anything negative about management even though he would forever believe that his firing was a grave injustice. But by holding his tongue, he was able to get another managing job almost immediately.

When his players learned of his firing, they were outraged. Anderson was especially close to Joe Morgan, who wanted to organize a players' protest over the firing. Ever the political and symbolic leader, however, Anderson advised Morgan that even though they were close friends and he was upset, he still had his job to do and he wanted him to do it with the same class he'd always shown. He urged him to play as hard for the new manager as he had played for him.

Still, upon introspection, Anderson believed that the firing was at least partly his own fault. He and management certainly had their differences. However, had he looked at the situation more objectively and examined where the roadblocks were between him and management, he believed that he could have worked them out without going to war. But he did go to war, and "guess who lost?" (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 145).

Nevertheless, Anderson utilized the political capital that he had built in negotiating for his next major league managing position. He had decided that to preclude a similar situation from developing, a condition of his return would be a financially lucrative contract with long-term security. His five-year Detroit Tigers contract set a precedent for baseball managers at that time in baseball history.

Anderson promptly built political capital in Detroit by turning down a bid by Gene Autry, the Anaheim Angels owner, to get Anderson to leave Detroit and come to the Angels. He remained loyal to Jim Campbell, the Tigers' general manager who had hired him after being fired from the Reds. Anderson said to Campbell, "Didn't I tell you I'd never leave Detroit till you told me to go home to Thousand Oaks?" "I'll never forget this," Campbell said (Anderson & Ewald, 1998, p. 157). And, he never did.

CONCLUSION

Sparky Anderson's success as a Major League Baseball manager was no accident. Although his grammar and syntax often left something to be desired, his thought processes and leadership behavior were always on target. He effectively utilized all four frames of leadership behavior suggested by Bolman and Deal. Although he balanced the use of all four frames, he was especially adroit at behaving out of the human resource and symbolic frames. His belief that it doesn't cost a dime to be nice

to people was an important part of his credo to treat everyone with human dignity. His liberal use of quotes and his unique ability to express his thoughts in memorable and symbolic ways enabled him to be one of the most recognizable figures of his era. There is much to be learned about effective leadership by studying the long and successful career of Sparky Anderson.

LEO DUROCHER

Nice guys finish last.

—Leo Durocher

BACKGROUND

Leo Durocher, nicknamed “Leo the Lip,” was a baseball player and manager in Major League Baseball. Upon his retirement, he ranked fifth all-time among managers, with 2,009 career victories, and second only to John McGraw in National League history. A controversial and outspoken person, Durocher’s career was distinguished by clashes with management, umpires (his ninety-five career ejections as a manager still ranks fourth on the all-time list), and the press. He was posthumously elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in 1994.

Born in West Springfield, Massachusetts, Durocher joined the New York Yankees briefly in 1925 before rejoining the club in 1928 as a regular. Babe Ruth, whom Durocher disliked intensely after Ruth accused him of stealing his watch, nicknamed him “the All-American Out.” After helping the American League Yankees win their second consecutive World Series title in 1928, and demanding a raise, he was waived before the 1930 season.

Durocher spent the remainder of his professional career in the National League. After three years with the Cincinnati Reds, he was traded to the St. Louis Cardinals in mid-1933. The 1934 Cardinal's team, whose famous nickname "Gashouse Gang," was supposedly inspired by Durocher. Durocher remained with the Cardinals through the 1937 season, captaining the team and winning the 1934 World Series before being traded to the Brooklyn Dodgers.

Primarily a shortstop, Durocher played through 1945, and was known as a solid fielder but a poor hitter. In 5,350 career at bats, he batted .247, hit 24 home runs and had 567 runs batted in. He was named to the National League's All-Star team three times.

After the 1938 season, Durocher was appointed player-manager by the Dodgers' new president and general manager (GM), Larry MacPhail. The two were a successful and combustible combination. MacPhail spared no expense in purchasing and trading for useful players and Durocher managed them quite successfully. The Dodgers were coming off six straight losing seasons, but Durocher made a quick turnaround; apart from the war year of 1944, he would not have a losing campaign with the team. In 1941, just his third season of managing, he led the Dodgers to the National League pennant, their first in twenty-one years, with a 100–54 record.

Yet despite all the success between 1939 and 1942, Durocher and GM MacPhail had a tempestuous relationship. MacPhail was a notorious drinker and as hot-tempered as his manager, and often would fire Durocher in the midst of a night of drinking. In the morning, however, MacPhail would always hire Durocher back. Finally, with World War II raging, MacPhail resigned to rejoin the United States Army at the end of the 1942 season. His replacement, former Cardinal boss Branch Rickey, retained Durocher as manager. Durocher managed the Dodgers until 1946.

Durocher also clashed regularly with Commissioner Albert "Happy" Chandler, who had been named to the post in 1945. Throughout his tenure Durocher had been warned to stay away from his friends, many of whom were known gamblers, bookmakers, or had mob connections and who had a free rein at Ebbets Field. He was particularly close with actor George Raft, with whom he shared a Los Angeles house, and admitted to a nodding acquaintance with Bugsy Siegel.

Furthermore, Durocher encouraged and participated in high stakes card games within the clubhouse, was something of a pool shark, and a friend of a number of pool hustlers. He also followed horse racing closely. Matters came to a head when Durocher's affair with married actress Laraine Day become public knowledge, drawing criticism from Brooklyn's influential Catholic Youth Organization; the two later eloped and married in Mexico in 1947. They divorced in 1960.

During spring training in 1947, Durocher became involved in an unseemly feud with the new Yankees owner, Larry MacPhail. MacPhail had hired away two coaches from Durocher's 1946 staff during the off-season, causing friction, then matters got worse. Durocher and MacPhail exchanged a series of accusations, with each suggesting the other invited gamblers into their clubhouses. In the press, a ghostwritten article appeared under Durocher's name in the *Brooklyn Eagle*, seeking to stir the rivalry between their respective clubs and accusing baseball of a double standard for Chandler's warning Durocher about his gambling associations but not doing so regarding MacPhail.

Chandler was pressured by MacPhail, a close friend who was pivotal in having him appointed commissioner, but Chandler also discovered Durocher and George Raft may have run a rigged craps game that took an active ballplayer for a large sum of money. Chandler suspended Durocher for the 1947 season for "association with known gamblers."

Durocher would return for the 1948 season, but his outspoken personality and poor results on the field would cause friction with Rickey, and on July 16 of that year, Durocher, Rickey, and New York Giants owner Horace Stoneham negotiated a deal whereby Durocher was let out of his Brooklyn contract to take over the Dodgers' cross-town rivals, the New York Giants. He enjoyed perhaps his greatest success with the Giants, and possibly a measure of revenge against the Dodgers, as the Giants won the 1951 National League pennant in a playoff against Brooklyn, triumphing on Bobby Thompson's historic game-winning home run. And with the Giants in 1954, Durocher won his only World Series championship as a manager by sweeping the heavily favored Cleveland Indians.

Durocher managed the Giants through 1955 before leaving the field, working as a television commentator at NBC, where he was a color commentator for Major League Baseball. He also became a well-known

television personality, appearing on a number of variety and game shows.

Durocher returned to the managerial ranks in 1966 with the Chicago Cubs. Three years later, Durocher suffered one of his most remembered failures. The Cubs led the newly created National League East for 105 days. By mid-August they had a seemingly insurmountable eight-game lead over the second-place team and appeared to be heading for their first postseason appearance in twenty-five years. However, they floundered down the stretch, and finished eight games behind the “Miracle Mets.”

While with the Cubs, Durocher had regular disagreements with their aging superstar, Ernie Banks, and nearly came to blows with another of his stars, Ron Santo. He was fired midway through the 1972 season. He then managed the Houston Astros for the final thirty-one games of the 1972 season and the entire 1973 season before retiring. Leo Durocher died in Palm Springs, California, at the age of 86, and is buried in Forest Lawn, Hollywood Hills Cemetery, in Los Angeles. He was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame three years later, in 1994 (Wikipedia.org; Eskenazi, 1993; Durocher, 1975).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style.

Until very late in his long career as a baseball manager, when he lost the ability, Leo Durocher was very aware of and adept at adapting his leadership behavior appropriately to a given situation. For example, he learned very early in his career that treating everyone the same was not necessarily effective. He learned that he had to gauge the “readiness” level of each individual and each situation to determine which type of leadership behavior should be applied. Durocher was initially very tough on one of his players, Pee Wee Reese, who ultimately became a

Hall of Fame player. But after using structural leadership behavior, Durocher later tempered it with human resource behavior. In Reese's own words, "He kind of took me in. He gave me sweaters and pants. In fact, in 1940, after I broke the bone in my ankle, I went to spring training and lived with Leo and Grace in Sarasota" (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 116). So, even though he initially used structural leadership behavior with Reese, Durocher later supplemented it with human resource behavior and the two became friends for life.

Another dramatic instance of adapting his leadership behavior to the situation occurred in the 1941 season with the Brooklyn Dodgers. Durocher had a very impressive array of talent that year, and he did the most with it. Although that team had the fewest stolen bases in the league, Durocher used the talents that they did have to compensate for their weaknesses. It was well known around the league that if Durocher had the talent, you could not beat him. In this case, he had a team that led the league in home runs, so he relied on that ability to get the edge rather than in stolen bases and hit and run plays.

In the same vein, Durocher never got along with the great Jackie Robinson after they got into an argument about Robinson coming to spring training overweight. He had utilized human resource behavior and had left Robinson to himself. But when Robinson took advantage of the situation, Durocher applied structural leadership behavior. Of course, we will never know what life would have been like for the two if Durocher had remained the Dodgers' manager. Certainly there was the paternalistic way in which Durocher later treated Willie Mays—a style that Robinson never would have accepted, nor would Durocher have been naïve enough to try. What we do know is they disliked one another intensely—Robinson with his ego that remembered every slight and Durocher with his ego that could not abide anyone who did not recognize his genius.

Ever the situational leader, however, Durocher dealt with Willie Mays in a totally different way. Durocher might have made other players angry with his use of structural leadership behavior, but he made Mays feel comfortable immediately. He simply "battered him up." He told Mays that he wanted him in the big leagues even though the Giants owner, Horace Stoneham, didn't. Stoneham thought Mays needed

more seasoning, while Durocher could see that he was a “natural” and just needed to play.

However, as stated earlier, as his career wound down, Durocher became less astute at varying his leadership style. His ultimate demise was the result of not being able to adjust his leadership behavior to the needs of the modern-day player. No longer were the players of the 1970s—products of the antiestablishment 1960s—going to sheepishly take a scolding from an old man. Only Durocher never figured this out. He continued to ream everyone out and it resulted in a team meeting of his Chicago Cubs being called by Joe Pepitone, Milt Pappas, and Ron Santo. He had been particularly critical of Ron Santo because he was in a batting slump and was not taking batting practice (even though he had told Durocher that he was not taking batting practice for a couple of days to try to kick the slump). Joe Pepitone, a clubhouse lawyer, confronted Durocher and asked him why he was always blaming people: “Pappas didn’t want to throw that pitch (0–2 strike that was hit to win the game) and Santo doesn’t *want* to be in a slump” (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 301). The disagreement got so intense that it led to Durocher’s firing in 1972.

Thinking that he had learned his lesson, he tried a different leadership approach in his next managing job with the Houston Astros. He decided that he was going to do something he had never done before. He would be “one of the boys.” That spring he was a real “charmer.” He told stories about his adventures with Frank Sinatra again and again. However, the modern-day players could not relate to these celebrities any longer and started to make fun of Durocher behind his back, and after awhile to his face. In addition, he had started to fall asleep in the dugout and constantly called his star rookie Cesar Cedeno the “next Willie Mays.” By 1973 Durocher realized what had happened. He could no longer relate to the players, and to his great credit, actually fired himself.

Finally, Durocher could never adapt to the Marvin Miller and the new players’ union. The animosity between the two got so heated that Durocher would hit fungo bat balls at him when he was meeting with the players in centerfield. To Durocher, Miller and the union epitomized everything that was wrong with modern-day baseball. So, although Durocher was effective early on in his career at being a situational leader, his final demise was due to his inability to do so late in his career.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment in their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. There are a number of instances that could be cited when Leo Durocher utilized structural frame leadership behavior. For example, Durocher patterned himself after Miller Huggins, his Yankees manager who fancied himself as an expert on what makes players tick and was combative with players, fans, and the press. Huggins would encourage aggressiveness in Durocher, and he was all too happy to comply.

In one situation, Huggins told Durocher to jump into the batter's box to hit before Babe Ruth took his practice swings. Ruth responded by telling Durocher to "get out, you busher" (Durocher, 1975, p. 32). When Durocher came back to the batting circle with his tail between his legs, Huggins sent him back out to take batting practice before Ruth did. Huggins was forcing Durocher to take charge and be self-assured. Huggins urged him never to lose the self-assurance that he was the best. He maintained that there were a lot of players around the league like Ruth with "strong backs and weak minds." Durocher had the reverse, and he learned to use his mind to succeed. He learned it all from Miller Huggins.

Durocher always believed that he was fortunate to be around during the era of the player-manager (1939). There was always a debate over which was more effective, the player-manager or just a manager. Durocher thought the debate was "ridiculous" in that it was always easier for him to manage from the field rather than from the bench. The two primary duties of a manager are to place players in a position to succeed and to know when to take a pitcher out of a game. According to Durocher, it was "much easier to do when you're right in the middle of it" (Durocher, 1975, p. 92).

Durocher's use of structural leadership behavior began during his playing days. He was traded to the Dodgers as player-manager in 1937. Before long, Larry MacPhail would join him in the front office as president. The "Roaring Redhead" was a tame nickname for MacPhail. Together, they would structure the Dodgers into a team that had not been a contender for half a century, into a team that contended ev-

ery year—a team to be laughed at and called the “Dizzy Dodgers” no longer. Durocher took over swiftly. It seemed he was born to manage. He was never unsure about where he was headed, and never tentative. The locker room belonged to him, the bench belonged to him, and the field belonged to him.

Sometimes, however, Durocher was his own worst enemy in regard to his use of structural behavior. He once had a discussion with Larry MacPhail on using Pee Wee Reese at shortstop to replace Durocher himself. MacPhail wanted to take a little pressure off of Reese and break him in gradually and also take some pressure off Durocher. However, Durocher took the advice in the wrong way. “With MacPhail,” he said, “everything came at you like a royal command, and with my personality, I would automatically gird myself to resist” (Durocher, 1975, p. 106). However, the same basic drive and outlook that seemed to constantly get him into trouble also made him a successful player and manager. For example, people always questioned why Durocher would argue with an umpire, knowing that the umpire would never change his call. He would do so for two reasons: (1) to protect and show support for his players, and (2) for the next close call.

He was very difficult on his players. “If you lose another game because of your dumbness, you’ve got a surprise coming. I’ll ship you off this team and out of the major leagues so quick you won’t know what hit you,” he would say (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 111). Then he would go to each player in turn telling him what he was doing wrong. Oftentimes, the Dodgers would go on a winning streak after one of his tirades, further evidence that the “Daffiness Boys” tag was a thing of the past.

One of his star players, Pee Wee Reese, attested to Durocher’s affinity for structural leadership behavior. “I knew he wanted to succeed, but he could be a little tough on you,” he said (Durocher, 1975, p. 115). He was especially tough on young players. As a result, they would get nervous about making an error, make a bad play, and not get a base hit. If anything like that happened, Durocher would come into the clubhouse enraged and “ream the player out” in front of his teammates. The players would be embarrassed for the moment but would be more focused in the future so as not to make the same mistake again. “But when I look back at it, the best thing that happened to me was playing for Durocher,” Reese said (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 115).

Another instance of the use of structural, albeit unorthodox, behavior was when his Dodgers dropped a doubleheader to the Cardinals on a Sunday afternoon. When the team staggered into the clubhouse, Durocher was waiting. "Don't anybody get undressed," he said. "You looked like girls out there today" (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 252). Then he proceeded to give each one of them an order that they did not anticipate. He instructed them to stay out all night. He did not want to see them until 8 am the next morning. "If anybody comes back to the hotel before 8 am, I'll fine them \$200" (p. 252). The next night (Monday), they won.

Chub Feeney, the New York Giants general manager and National League president considered Durocher an excellent tactician. According to him, Durocher ran a ball club as well as anybody in the game. Like everyone else, he was a much better manager when he had good players, "but when he had the horses, he knew how to make them run" (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 254).

Finally, Durocher utilized structural leadership frame behavior consistently and fairly. As great a player as Jackie Robinson was, Durocher treated him the same way he treated everyone else in a similar situation. When he came to training camp overweight in his second year in the league, Durocher let him know about it. He had gone from 195 to 216 pounds and Durocher demanded that he lose the excess weight before he would put him back into the starting lineup. Robinson complied but held a grudge for the rest of his playing days. They were able, however, to mend their relationship after Robinson retired.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. There are numerous instances when Leo Durocher acknowledges the effectiveness of human resource frame leadership behavior. As with other leadership qualities, Durocher modeled much of his behavior after that of his Yankees' manager, Miller Huggins. Among other things, he learned how to care for people from Huggins, who loved Durocher like a son and Durocher loved him like a father. Later in his career, he and Willie Mays had the same kind of relationship.

Although he could be abrasive at times, Durocher definitely had a human resource side. When Harold Parrott, a former newspaperman, became a traveling secretary for the Dodgers, he took his oldest son, Toddy, on a western trip. Durocher immediately took a liking to the boy. "You'll have to find somewhere else to live," Durocher told Parrott. "Tod and I are rooming together on this trip" (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 109). Durocher even took the upper berth, which was usually reserved for the rookies.

Another testament to Durocher's use of human resource leadership behavior comes from Herb Goran of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, who said that Durocher had a tactful way of pointing out mistakes to pitchers and other players. He took pains to point out errors, doing so almost immediately after they had happened, but never disciplined a player for a mistake that was purely mechanical.

Another instance when Durocher showed his human resource side was with Pete Reiser, one of his star players early on in his career as a manager. Reiser tried to make a sensational running catch to win a game for the Dodgers, but his momentum carried him into the wall and he dropped the ball. Instinctively, not realizing he had a separated shoulder, he threw the ball to home a second too late to stop Enos Slaughter from getting a game winning inside-the-park home run. When Durocher reached the stricken Reiser, blood was streaming from Reiser's ears. He lay with arms outstretched, face to sky, not seeing anything. Durocher was so touched by Reiser's heroics that he began to sob.

Once Durocher was back in his hometown of Springfield, Massachusetts, for a dedication of a baseball field in his name. In his acceptance speech he pointed out that a lot of people have taken credit for "discovering" him. But his real discoverer, Durocher said, was a coworker on the Wico Electric assembly line, named David Redd. Durocher introduced him from the crowd as the person who prodded him daily to try making a living playing baseball. Somewhat shyly the amiable black coworker approached the stage and Durocher embraced him for all to see.

Durocher's use of human resource behavior made him a very popular figure in his time and the image oftentimes came in handy. After a number of warnings, Happy Chandler finally suspended Durocher from baseball because of alleged mob connections and gambling. On his way

out, he told his players to play as hard for the next manager as they had played for him. They were a good club, and he was convinced that they had the talent and team chemistry to win the pennant. “But you’ve got to play together,” he told them. “And, remember, I’ll be pulling for you” (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 215). They went on to win the 1947 World Series, and they voted Durocher a full share of the series paycheck. He was reinstated as Dodger manager in 1948 and Chandler lost his job, primarily because he had suspended such a popular and well-liked figure.

Another display of human resource leadership behavior came in his treatment of Roy Campanella, the great Hall of Fame catcher whose career was cut short when he was paralyzed in an automobile accident. Durocher always liked and admired Campanella. When he was trying to make the team in his first spring training and did not, Durocher went to Branch Rickey, the general manager, and demanded that Campanella get a raise and a big league salary even though he was in the minors.

Durocher’s human resource side was most strikingly displayed with his Hall of Fame center fielder, Willie Mays. As mentioned earlier, Mays and Durocher had a father and son relationship. Durocher nursed Mays along in his early career. In effect, Durocher had two sons—his biological one, Chris, and his “adopted” one, Willie. Chris admired his father and used to copy Durocher’s attitudinal stance by standing in the dugout with his leg on the top step, jauntily interacting with players, fans, and the media just like his father. But Chris spent even more time being with and imitating Willie Mays. On road trips young Willie and young Chris would eat together, sleep together, and have a catch. The pair went to the movies together practically every night, then fell asleep in their room reading comic books. It was as if Durocher was raising two kids.

The father-son relationship continued throughout Mays’s career. When Mays returned from military service, Durocher gave him such a hug that he almost separated his shoulder. That same year, Durocher recalled the great catch that Mays made off Dick Wertz in the World Series. When the ball was still in the air, Durocher hollered, “Stay in the park, he’ll catch it” (Durocher, 1975, p. 258).

Durocher was like a father giving his son his allowance. Frequently he would peel off a \$20 bill for Mays to get ice cream or something to eat. He never came back with change because he would treat his teammates who

went with him. And when Durocher left the Giants and Bill Rigby took over, Mays came to him with tears in his eyes. “Mis-a-Leo, you won’t be here to help me.” “You don’t need my help, Willie. You’ve forgotten more than those guys will ever know, because with you, Willie, it’s God-given,” Durocher said (Durocher, 1975, p. 260). At that point, Mays leaned over and gave Durocher a great big kiss. Durocher remembered that he had to get out of there before he broke down and started to cry like a baby.

Durocher had a similar relationship with pinch hitter par excellence, Dusty Rhodes. Rhodes was an All-American partier. But the kind of guy Rhodes was, also said something about the kind of guy Durocher was. Durocher, the ex-altar boy, was not looking for altar boys as baseball players. Could you play the game and could you play for him were the questions he wanted answered. So Durocher had no problem with Rhodes staying out until all hours of the night because he was always one of the first in the clubhouse ready to play. “I’m your man, skip, if you need me today,” Rhodes would tell him (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 269).

Durocher showed his concern for others when he was offered the New York Giants managing job after many successful years with the Dodgers. He told Horace Stoneham, the owner of the Giants, that there would be nothing he would like more than managing his team, “but you already have a manager, Mel Ott, one of the nicest guys who ever put a shoe on” (Durocher, 1975, p. 235). It was only after Stoneham told Durocher that Ott had already resigned that he took the job, and only if Ott had resigned voluntarily.

Later in his career, when he was managing the Chicago Cubs, he established this same type of nurturing relationship with Billy Williams. Williams had a record of playing 1,117 consecutive games and was closing in on Lou Gehrig’s record that was recently eclipsed by Cal Ripken, Jr. The fans and the press were putting a lot of pressure on Williams and Durocher to continue to play even though Williams was injured. Durocher told Williams that he only knew of one way to end the carnival and that was by Williams not showing up for the next game. In that case, Durocher would not have to play him. When Williams did just that, the media was very critical of Durocher, whom they sensed was at the bottom of the charade. But Williams went to the media and told them *he* had asked out, reliev-

ing Durocher of the pressure—another case where having used human resource behavior paid dividends in the long run for Durocher.

Finally, another instance where the lifelong use of human resource behavior paid dividends took place after a player revolt by the Chicago Cubs. As a result of the player action, Durocher resigned on the spot. No one could talk him out of it, not even the few loyal players who had supported him. He finally decided to stay as a personal favor to Phil Wrigley, the Cubs owner, to whom he could never decline a request. As a result, Wrigley took out a full-page ad in the *Chicago Tribune* supporting Durocher.

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. The symbolic frame is perhaps Durocher's most dominant style of leadership behavior. For those of us old enough to remember him, describing Durocher as a "colorful" character is a gross understatement. Those described in this fashion are usually individuals who rely on symbolic behavior to make their marks in society. As we shall see, there is no current baseball manager who even comes close to Durocher's reputation for being "one of a kind."

Leo the Lip, Leo the Lion, and his famous quote, "Nice guys finish last," are just a few of the images associated with Leo Durocher whose career as a player and manager spanned fifty years—who played with Babe Ruth and with the St. Louis Cardinals' Gashouse Gang, who managed Jackie Robinson and Willie Mays, who jetted with Frank Sinatra to Japan for kicks, who is in the Hall of Fame, who splashed toilet water over his face and wore suits with the pockets sown tight so he wouldn't be tempted to put something in them to spoil the line, who could steal the dais from Hollywood celebrities, who married a movie star, who was a well-known television personality, and who cavorted with known gamblers and mob figures. That was the larger than life image of Leo Durocher—one that he shamelessly cultivated.

As early as August of this first year as manager, Durocher had already developed his tough guy image. Two of the most widely read magazines of the time, *Collier's* and the *Saturday Evening Post*, profiled Durocher after barely the first half year of his managerial career. "Only Cobb was more hated by fellow players," claimed Arthur Mann in the *Post* story (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 112). It was entitled "Baseball's Ugly Ducking." And Pee Wee Reese, one his early stars, noted that Durocher was the only manager he had known that people actually came to see. "He had a certain charisma that can't be learned," Reese said (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 115).

At the time, the Brooklyn Dodgers fans' behavior was known to be the worst in baseball. Of course, they had Durocher as their model. When a game with the Cubs ended with a disputed call against the Dodgers, the fans streamed out of the stands and surrounded the umpire, Tom Dunn. Durocher took a wet towel and threw it in Tom Dunn's face. He needed a police escort to get out of the stadium unharmed. Dunn was too upset to appear at the park the next day and resigned shortly thereafter.

Another instance of Durocher using symbolic behavior took place at a game at Wrigley Field where it was getting dark in the eighth inning with the Dodgers ahead of the Cubs 2-0. Knowing that Wrigley Field had no lights, Durocher told his dugout coach that he was going to start a "rhubarb" to extend the inning, hoping that the game would be called because of darkness before the Cubs could bat again. He started getting on Mickey Livingston, the Cubs catcher until Livingston finally took the bait and charged the Dodgers dugout to get Durocher. Both benches emptied and by the time order was restored, it was dark and the game was called and the Dodgers won 2-0. It was moments like this that prompted fellow manager, Eddie Stanky, to give Durocher the nickname Leo the Lion.

In 1947, Durocher married Hollywood actress Laraine Day. He was forty-one years old and she was twenty-six. Of course, the marriage was heralded in all the Hollywood magazines, which added to Leo's already established celebrity status and was another instance of his use of symbolic behavior to cultivate his image.

In still another incident in which Durocher used symbolic leadership behavior, Dixie Walker tried to organize his Dodger teammates to protest Jackie Robinson's joining the team. In his bathrobe, in the early hours of the morning, Durocher interrupted a meeting of the re-

calcitrant players and explained to them that integration in baseball was going to happen, whether they liked it or not. “I don’t care if the guy is yellow or black. I’m the manager of this team and I say he plays.” Then he delivered the clincher that has helped more than one minority member joining an organization. “I say he can make us rich. And if any of you can’t use the money, I’ll see that you’re traded” (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 206). And then there was the monumental incident when he had just assumed the manager’s position with the New York Giants. When asked how it felt to replace Mel Ott, one the nicest men in baseball, he responded to the press, “Nice guys finish last” (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 229).

By 1960, the Dodgers were in Los Angeles, with the colorless Walter Alston leading them. They had slumped and management wanted to light a fire under the team, so they hired Durocher as one of the coaches. Alston reluctantly accepted management’s decision and within a month Durocher brought the rhubarb back into baseball. In his first day in uniform, he was kicked out of an intrasquad game. He failed to stay in the coach’s box. He argued with umpires, second-guessed Alston and called him “the farmer” and finally was suspended for three days for kicking umpire Jocko Conlon in the shins.

Magnetism is probably the word that described Durocher best—a personal magnetism that infected all around him with a feeling that this is the man who will lead them to victory. During the Durocher era, Babe Ruth had that kind of magnetism, and so did Dizzy Dean, Pepper Martin, Jackie Robinson, and Willie Mays. And in the case of Willie Mays, at least, what made them even more appealing is that most of them never knew it. Leo Durocher had it too—only he knew it and used it.

It was that magnetism that prompted Phil Wrigley, the owner of the Chicago Cubs, to hire Durocher in 1966, after eleven years of not managing, to lead his perennial doormat Cubs out of the basement. It was said in those days that Phil Wrigley owned two things that people stepped on: chewing gum and the Chicago Cubs. Well, Durocher changed that, albeit temporarily, when in 1967 he was named Manager of the Year and led the Cubs, at long last, out of the hated second division.

As mentioned earlier, Durocher liked to bolster his image with his players by recounting his experiences with celebrities. Like the time he flew himself and some of his players to Miami to catch the opening of

the “Summit Conference”—Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin, Sammy Davis, Jr., Joey Bishop, and Peter Lawford—at the Fontainebleau Hotel. “Frank graciously called me to the stage to introduce some of the ballplayers in the audience, and Dean Martin graciously poured water into my jacket pocket,” he recalled (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 270). But the symbolic behavior that was so effective earlier in his career soon grew old. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the players were into the Rolling Stones and the Beatles. The Rat Pack was a bunch of has-beens to them. So the infamous clubhouse revolt of the 1972 Cubs led by Joe Pepitone, Milt Pappas, and Ron Santo showed how Durocher could no longer adapt his leadership behavior to the modern-day athlete. He called a meeting because they were playing poorly and it turned into a mutiny. The players had lost respect for Durocher partly because of his incessant references to his (no longer) celebrity friends—an example of symbolic leadership behavior gone awry.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests.

Leo Durocher used political frame leadership behavior to his advantage quite often. Just as he had done when he was traded from the Yankees to the Reds, Durocher attempted a “hold up” when he was traded to the New York Giants. He told Branch Rickey, the general manager, he would need more money than his \$6,000 yearly salary to live in New York. At the outset, Rickey was noncommittal, but Durocher’s persistence enabled him to wheedle another \$1,000 out of Rickey, a pattern that would follow Durocher even in his managerial salary negotiations.

Durocher used whatever leverage he could apply in his negotiations for a new contract. After building the Dodgers into perennial winners, he demanded a five-year contract, which was unheard of at that time. General Manager Branch Rickey would not concede to the five-year deal, so Durocher agreed to a one-year deal, but at the highest salary of any manager in baseball.

As we have seen, Durocher's controversial image started early in his career. Political frame behavior played no small part in the development of that image. For example, the Central Trades and Labor Union voted unanimously to boycott the St. Louis Cardinals until Durocher was removed from the starting lineup because of his alleged antiunion statements during a strike at Durocher's wife's manufacturing plant. In a display of political frame behavior, Durocher issued an apology of sorts to keep the seventy-five thousand member union from boycotting the Cardinals that summer. He later had trouble with Marvin Miller, president of the Player's Union when he managed the Chicago Cubs. Durocher also sided with management when Dizzy and Paul Dean held out with the Cardinals during the Gashouse Gang era. Needless to say, Durocher's continuous provocation of one type or another required him to make use of political behavior quite frequently.

Typical of those who make effective use of political frame behavior, Durocher used it with the press to his advantage. If Durocher was unhappy, he did not keep it a secret. And if a friendly newspaperman could help him make a point with a player or management, Durocher would certainly not be averse to speaking out. But, Durocher also knew when to compromise. When certain information came to Judge Kenesaw Landis that made the commissioner unhappy, he ordered Durocher to take back the four tickets in his private box he planned to leave for his friend, actor George Raft. Landis learned that Raft had won more than \$100,000 betting on baseball. Durocher took back the tickets.

There were occasions, however, when Durocher should have used political frame behavior and did not. There were times in his managerial career when he was almost completely out of control. The winning overshadowed management's disgust with Durocher's constant gambling and hosting unsavory locker-room visitors. So, Durocher's annual dance at the end of the rope was about to begin. Year in and year out, no matter how well the Dodgers, and later the Giants had played, there was always some question whether Durocher would be back the next year. And Durocher himself seemed to place obstacles in the path, daring management to fire him.

Nevertheless, most times Durocher was able to counteract the negative image using political frame leadership behavior. For example, after it was made public that George Raft used Durocher's apartment for

gambling, he immediately became engaged in a somewhat more altruistic activity. He volunteered to go on a USO tour with another of his Hollywood buddies and one his best friends, Danny Kaye. They visited seventeen military camps in three weeks.

In a final instance, Commissioner Happy Chandler demanded that Durocher cut his ties with known mobsters Bugsy Siegel and Joe Adonis and to stop staying at George Raft's house. "I did it," said Durocher. "I'll steer clear of all those guys you've mentioned. They'll call me a louse, but I'll do it" (Eskenazi, 1993, p. 202).

CONCLUSION

Leo Durocher was a prototypical Damon Runyan character. Over time, however, he became a caricature of himself. He began his professional career being astutely able to balance his use of the four leadership behaviors suggested by Bolman and Deal—albeit having a particular affinity toward symbolic and political frame leadership behavior. Today's leaders and aspiring leaders can benefit from studying his effective application of leadership behavior. As his career progressed, he fell into the trap of getting stuck in one frame, the symbolic, to the virtual exclusion of the others. As we have seen, he failed to update his symbolic behavior by constantly retelling stories of relationships with former celebrities to which his players could no longer relate. The singular use of archaic symbolic behavior proved to be his downfall, albeit after over forty years of success as a leader. We should all be so lucky!

TONY LA RUSSA

We interrupt this marriage to bring you the baseball season.

—Elaine La Russa

BACKGROUND

Tony La Russa Jr. was born in Tampa, Florida, in 1944 and is currently the manager of the St. Louis Cardinals. In 2004 he became the sixth manager in history to win pennants with both American and National League teams. He became the first manager ever to win multiple pennants in both leagues. With more than 2,400 wins, he is ranked third all-time for total number of career wins, trailing only Connie Mack (3,731) and John McGraw (2,763). He is one of only three managers to be named Manager of the Year in both of baseball's major leagues.

La Russa was signed by the Kansas City Athletics as a middle infielder prior to the start of the 1962 season. He came up to the Oakland Athletics the next season, making his debut on May 10, 1963. In the following off-season he suffered a shoulder injury while playing softball with friends and the shoulder continued to bother him during the remainder of his playing career.

Over the next six seasons, La Russa spent most of his time in the minor leagues, making it to the Oakland A's roster again in 1968 and 1969. He spent the entire 1970 season with Oakland and then late in 1971 the A's traded him to the Atlanta Braves. His final big league playing stop was with the Chicago Cubs, where he appeared as a pinch runner in one game. He also spent time in the organizations of the Pittsburgh Pirates, Chicago White Sox, and St. Louis Cardinals.

Before becoming a manager, he earned a juris doctor (J.D.) degree from Florida State University, but never entered the legal profession. He is one of a select number of major league managers in baseball history who have earned a law degree or passed a state bar exam, and the only one in the modern era.

The Chicago White Sox hired La Russa as their manager in 1979. He was named American League Manager of the Year in 1983, when his club won the American League West but fell to the Baltimore Orioles in the Championship Series. The White Sox fired La Russa after the club got off to a poor start in 1986.

La Russa had a vacation of less than three weeks before his old club, the Athletics, called him to take over as manager. With the A's, he led the club to three consecutive World Series, from 1988 to 1990, sweeping an earthquake-delayed series from the San Francisco Giants in 1989. He earned two additional Manager of the Year Awards with the A's in 1988 and 1992, again winning the Western Division in 1992.

After the 1995 season, the Haas family, with whom La Russa had a close personal relationship, sold the team after the death of patriarch Walter A. Haas Jr. La Russa left to take over for Joe Torre at the helm of the St. Louis Cardinals. The team promptly won the National League's Central Division crown in 1996, a feat his club repeated in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. In the process, he became the first manager to win the Manager of the Year Award four times. However, it was not until 2004 that the Cardinals finally won the National League pennant under La Russa. In 2006, La Russa managed the Cardinals to a World Series victory. This makes him only the second manager to win a World Series in both the American League and the National League, a distinction shared with his mentor, Sparky Anderson (Wikipedia.org; Buck, 2002; Bissinger, 2005).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style.

Although we shall see that Tony La Russa is basically a structural frame leader, he has shown a great facility in adjusting his leadership behavior to the situation. For example, in referring to the perennial question of whether the leader should adapt his or her leadership behavior to the follower or vice versa, La Russa believes that the manager's philosophy has to match that of the players. According to him, common sense dictates that if a manager likes the power game and has a number of singles hitters, "What are you going to do, have everybody swing for the fences?" (Buck, 2002, p. 43). No, says La Russa, the manager has to adjust his philosophy to the abilities of his players. Likewise, there are some managers who are more aggressive, while others are more conservative. La Russa believes that the extent to which the players, coaching staff, and manager are all on the same page determines the team's success.

La Russa points to one of his former players, Brian Jordan, as an example. According to La Russa, Brian Jordan was a clutch hitter extraordinaire. Most power hitters like to be at the plate when there is an opportunity to drive in a run. But, some players do not like that spotlight. Jordan's readiness level for those situations was high, so La Russa placed Jordan in those situations as much as he could. He practiced the same situational leadership philosophy with players who were being released. Those who had contributed were treated with a great deal of human resource behavior, while those who had not contributed were dealt with in a strictly structural style. La Russa, then, is a great believer in adapting one's leadership behavior to the situation.

Early on in his career, La Russa had decided that to prove to the world that he had what it took to be an effective manager and leader, he needed to have a combination of the skills of the trade (structural

frame), the disposition of a psychologist (human resource frame), and the demeanor of a riverboat gambler (symbolic and political frame). He intuited that some players need to be left alone, some need a pat on the rump every so often, and some need a swift boot in the rear: “fuzzy love, or tough love or no love” (Bissinger, 2005, p. 19).

So over his thirty years of managing in the big leagues, the way La Russa manages has changed significantly. The strategy is still a crucial and rather stable part of the game, but the way a manager deals with players has drastically changed. According to La Russa, instead of telling players what should be done, he now has to “coax” them. He cites Jose Canseco, one of his former players with great ability but one who was extrinsically rather than intrinsically motivated. On the other hand, La Russa considers his current star player, Albert Pujols, a “throwback.”

La Russa needed to be situational in his leadership behavior out of self-defense. Having managed in both the American and National Leagues, he needed to adjust his management and leadership behavior simply to survive. In the American League, runs come in bunches because of the designated hitter. Thus, the manager’s strategy would be to play for the “big inning.” Whereas in the National League, runs are at a premium and there is a need to employ a strategy to “manufacture” runs by using pinch hitters, hit and runs, hitting to the opposite field, and stolen bases. Having won championships in both leagues, La Russa was very capable of adapting his leadership style to the differing situations.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural frame leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Being known as a tactical genius, few would argue with the assertion that Tony La Russa is the epitome of the structural frame leader. Although he effectively employs the other frames of leadership behavior, La Russa seems most comfortable operating out of the structural frame.

In typical structural frame fashion, La Russa believes that players win games and managers lose games. “[Managers] are supposed to make

good decisions about line ups, strategies, pitching changes and putting the players in the best position to be successful” (Bissinger, 2005, p. 9). When they do and the players execute, the team wins. When they don’t, the team almost always loses.

As with most structural leaders, La Russa is seriously concerned with the fundamentals of the game. He strongly believes in the value of teaching the fundamentals. He believes that it is the manager’s duty to stress the fundamentals and to convince the players that these fundamental plays are directly related to whether a team wins or loses games. And this responsibility should not be deferred to others. The manager has the ultimate responsibility if things go wrong. He will lose his job before any of the coaches or staff. “So I think most managers that I’ve seen, the guys that I think do the best job in both leagues, they make all the decisions,” he says (Bissinger, 2005, p. 199). Thus, La Russa cedes little territory to his coaches. He takes their input, but he shoulders the responsibility of decision-making. The one exception is with his pitching coach of thirty years, Dave Duncan—which is a different “situation.”

Other La Russa structural leadership traits include his reputation for making notes on index cards during practices and games. La Russa attributes this habit to two very successful managers, Dick Williams and John McNamara. They suggested note taking to La Russa because at the end of the night, when a manager is replaying the game in his mind, he may be all alone and not have access to the scorebook and other data. “That’s when my notes come in handy,” says La Russa (Bissinger, 2005, p. 201). Still another of these structural leadership traits is advance planning. La Russa believes that one of the most important parts of game strategy is to look ahead. The decisions he makes in the first inning are always related to situations that he might encounter in the later innings.

La Russa, like all structural leaders, is constantly planning ahead, strategizing and innovating. As a result he is indented with a number of contemporary managing techniques and strategies. For example, he is credited with initiating the concept of a “closer,” whose sole responsibility is to pitch one inning at the end of the game. He has made a science of situational matchups between hitter and pitcher in the late innings. He once used five pitchers in the space of eight pitches. In a

brief and somewhat unsuccessful experiment, he challenged the starting pitcher concept and had three pitchers pitch three innings a piece.

The extensive use of videos is another of La Russa's innovations. He calls them his "Secret Weapon." Chad Blair is his video guru. "Blair's Lair" is where he finds "holes" in a hitter's swing, managers' and players' tendencies, and where he steals opposing managers' signs. Before every three-game series, the Secret Weapon creates three basic sets of videos: (1) hitters, (2) stars, and (3) pitchers.

Because of his structural leadership leanings, La Russa often has a unique approach to things. He points out, for example, that speed is thought to be everything in baseball. This is especially true for pitchers who are almost obsessed with the speed of their fastballs. La Russa believes that speed is a "false god." To offset this obsession, La Russa once ordered the speed gun section of the scoreboard juiced up a few miles per hour because he could tell that his pitcher was paying as much attention to it as the fans were. He thought that it would help his pitcher's confidence if he thought he was throwing a few more miles per hour than he actually was.

Another of La Russa's innovations resulted from the influence of another baseball genius, Gene Mauch. Stealing bases was a phenomenon in the 1960s and 1970s until Gene Mauch put an end to it by "inventing" the abbreviated windup and having his pitchers alter their patterns (like simply holding the ball longer before the delivery, or stepping off the rubber). La Russa copied Mauch's tactics and reduced base stealing significantly—nobody steals a hundred bases anymore like Ricky Henderson and Lou Brock once did.

The best managers, the ones that La Russa has modeled himself after, grind their way through each at bat. This is in contrast to those who believe that their jobs really don't begin until the last three innings, when their managerial strategies become more apparent. La Russa pours over every detail. "I've been able to devote more concentration than most to it," he says. "My life revolves around the season. I've had an incredible advantage at a terrific price" (Bissinger, 2005, p. 96). To this, his wife, Elaine, sums up their relationship with the following observation: "We interrupt this marriage to bring you the baseball season" (Bissinger, 2005, p. 96).

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. The use of human resource frame leadership behavior is not thought to be one of Tony La Russa's strengths, but as we shall see, he utilizes at least a modicum of it in appropriate situations. For example, he is almost obsessed with identifying possible ways in which he could "reach" his players. J. D. Drew's seeming indifference and Kerry Robinson's refusal to follow instructions and focus on the fundamentals keep him up at night.

La Russa applies human resource behavior in a more subtle way than many of his baseball managing counterparts. He has a very strong internal locus of control wherein he tends to shoulder the blame and takes the pressure off his players. For example, he recalls the time when one of his pitchers, Jeff Fassero, after being told not to throw anything near the plate, threw a ball down the middle that Nomar Garciaparra could not help but lace into centerfield to tie a game and send it into extra innings. Four months later, La Russa was still haunted by that incident, not because of what Fassero had done, but what La Russa hadn't done, which was to adequately prepare Fassero for the moment and for leaving Fassero "exposed" (Bissinger, 2005, p. 1).

La Russa has a great relationship with his star first baseman, Albert Pujols. La Russa's use of human resource behavior with Pujols lead him to comment to a reporter that La Russa was the best manager he had in the big leagues. "Of course," adds Pujols, tongue in cheek, "he was the only one" (Billinger, 2005, p. 15). With this kind of mutual respect, they will do extraordinary things for one another. Once, knowing how valuable Pujols was to the team, even when injured, La Russa played him in the outfield with an injured elbow that did not allow him to throw. They worked out a plan that if the ball was hit to Pujols in the outfield, he would field it and toss it to Jim Edmonds, the centerfielder, to throw it back to the infield.

La Russa attempts to model his human resource behavior after that of Dusty Baker, a very successful manager with the San Francisco Giants. Baker may not be the greatest strategist, but the way the sport and

its players are evolving, how one manages during a game is becoming less important. “What Baker is good at—superb at,” says La Russa, “is interacting with players. He can handle a ballclub as well as he handles the ever-present toothpick in his mouth” (Bissinger, 2005, p. 23). Like Baker, La Russa believes that in virtually all situations, human nature dictates the results and that his role as manager is to recognize the impact of human nature and take the best advantage of it. And if he could not, he was concerned enough about the individual to place him with someone who might be able to do it better. As a case in point: La Russa wondered whether it would be better for someone else to open himself up to the seduction of J. D. Drew’s limitless talent and find what he never could. As it turned out, he traded Drew to Atlanta where he had a number of good years under Bobby Cox.

As mentioned earlier, it is not La Russa’s nature to be human resource oriented. But he did what he had to. As Rollie Hamond, his general manager at Oakland facetiously observed, La Russa had not three, but seven strikes against him when he first started managing. He was young, handsome, smart, getting a law degree, had a nice family, spoke Spanish, and was a strict vegetarian. “Add to this his streaks of defiance and stubbornness in the face of a second guess,” said Hamond, and you have a recipe for disaster except for his ability to apply human resource leadership behavior to the situation when appropriate (Bissinger, 2005, p. 63).

At times, La Russa did not act out of the human resource mode when he should have. One such incident was when he became irate with John Mabry for joking with Fred McGriff on first base after they had lost a game. Mabry was a tough competitor so La Russa apologized the next day, but their relationship was never the same. Mabry mistrusted his manager and his performance suffered. He ended up going elsewhere. La Russa never forgave himself and has since mandated the “24 hour rule” on himself, that is, to wait at least twenty-four hours before reacting to any situation (Bissinger, 2005, p. 117).

In another questionable use of human resource behavior, La Russa ordered his pitcher to throw at Luis Gonzalez to retaliate for the Arizona Diamondback’s throwing at Tino Martinez. He was reluctant to do it because he was friendly with Gonzalez and because he would lose the game. But he knew that if he didn’t protect his players, and didn’t stand

up for them, the respect they gave him would disappear. The legendary general manager Paul Richards once told him that you sometimes have to be willing to lose a game now to win more later.

La Russa used human resource leadership behavior with one of his players, catcher Mike Matheny. He observed Matheny and his wife, Kristin, holding hands after a loss in which Matheny had played poorly. La Russa didn't want Matheny to be as obsessive about losing as he was. "Look," he said, "you're not asking for this advice but I'm giving it to you. Ignore it. Tell me to shut up. But it moved my heart to see you holding your wife's hand. Just before you held hands, you had the lost look because of something you did on the field. I made enormous mistakes with my wife and kids; now I have terrific regrets and it's too late to do much about it" (Bissinger, 2005, p. 101).

La Russa recognizes that the human element in the game of baseball is extremely important. He notes the blind adherence that most of his colleagues have with regard to things like the pitch count whereby a starting pitcher is immediately taken out of the game once he throws a certain number of pitches. But he believes that there is still room for the human element in determining how many pitches a pitcher can throw without jeopardizing his career. For example, how many of those pitches were "pressure" pitches?

The death of one of his players, Darryl Kile, affected the value that La Russa placed on human resource behavior. Kile died suddenly of a heart attack at age thirty-three. From that point on, La Russa used Kile as a model in his own life in attaining the same professional heights, but doing so with grace. There was so much more than professional achievements with Kile. "There was the humanity of Darryl Kile, the exquisite humanity," La Russa recalled (Bissinger, 2005, p. 213).

It is almost a cliché these days for coaches and managers to see their jobs as "putting the athletes in a position where they can be successful." La Russa takes this responsibility seriously but knows that in order to do so, he needs to know his players—not only their talents and abilities, but exactly what motivates them. He works hard to ascertain the needs of every player, even the bench players. He has found that since the manager cannot put them into the game very often, he needs to give his attention to them at the workouts before the game, showing them how they can improve and feel as if they are a vital part of the team.

He also recognizes that rookies are particularly vulnerable and, therefore, need more attention. He tries to get the rookies to accept that nervousness and anxiety are an important part of being successful. He tries to get the rookies into games as early as possible, but the manager cannot disrupt what is going well just to meet the needs of one individual. Instilling confidence in these young players is important. La Russa believes that sustaining confidence is directly related to being positive with them. It's also related to them doing well enough that you *can* be positive with them. According to La Russa, leaders must always try to do what is good for the team. However, it is wonderful if what works best for the individual also works best for the team.

Another vulnerable part of the team needing special attention according to La Russa are the new players acquired during the winter months. How are they going to necessitate a change in strategy? What new strengths and weaknesses do they bring? These questions need to be addressed for every member of the team, but especially those newly acquired players, rookie players, and bench players if the manager truly wishes to place the players in positions where they can be successful.

In typical human resource fashion, La Russa believes that mistakes are part of human nature. How does the manager handle a player running a stop sign at third base, for example? La Russa thinks that you have to give the player the benefit of the doubt. The mistake is usually not done with intent or defiance. If it is, La Russa's human resource behavior immediately changes to structural frame leadership behavior.

Although La Russa is known for his almost obsessive reliance on statistical data as a guide to his actions, he also believes that statistics almost never tell the whole story about a player or a team. Statistics should be helpful but not controlling. The manager needs to know his players well enough to see beyond the statistics in some cases. In order to do this, one has to act out of the human resource frame on a frequent basis, avers La Russa. This tends to foster clubhouse harmony. "You can't overrate team chemistry," he says. "I know that, very often, it is the difference between teams. So we really try to build that feeling" (Bissinger, 2005, p. 198).

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audience. Although not one of his dominant frames, La Russa employs symbolic leadership frame behavior on occasion.

Tony La Russa definitely has a distinctive image that has been cultivated through the subtle use of symbolic frame behavior. He has been described as “the face” because of his extremely intense demeanor. As a result, he has the reputation of a no-nonsense “baseball genius” who takes the game very seriously and expects his players to do so also. His image is that of the brilliant baseball mind and the strict disciplinarian. It should be no surprise that when *Sports Illustrated* polled players as to the best and worst baseball managers, La Russa appeared on *both* lists.

La Russa also uses symbolic language in his comments on baseball and baseball managing. For example, he has often likened the team to a puzzle made up of twenty-five pieces—all pieces having an integral part. “Slow it down by staying ahead of it to stay on top of it,” was the mantra that he repeated to himself after every half inning (Bissinger, 2005, p. 66). It reminded him of the dual responsibility of focus on the present and anticipation of the future, sometimes playing out scenarios a full inning or two ahead so nothing would take him by surprise. He also had a superstitious streak. Early in his career with the White Sox he had to wear a flak jacket as a result of a death threat. The threat passed but he continued to wear the jacket for another month because his team was winning.

La Russa knew that over the years he had gained the reputation for being vengeful where perhaps vengeance wasn't necessary. He was also known as a “headhunter,” but La Russa says that he never told a pitcher to throw at a player simply because he was too dangerous at the plate and needed to be “quieted down.” And, if he ordered a pitcher to throw at a batter as retaliation, he ordered the pitch to be thrown from the waist down and not at the head. Still, despite these rationalizations, he was not unhappy to have a reputation that would “put the fear of God” in the opposition.

Always conscious of his image, when the Cardinals were mired at 16 and 16 and the front office approached La Russa about renewing his contract, he said no because he thought it would look bad to players who were potential free agents and wanted their own contracts negotiated. He also adhered to the “Cardinal Way” of playing baseball, that is, a focus on the fundamentals of the game, which had been taught the same way for years in that organization. Thus, we have seen that, despite using it infrequently as compared to some of his counterparts, La Russa did use symbolic leadership on occasion.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests. As with the other three leadership frames, Tony La Russa utilized the political frame when it was appropriate to do so. For example, he often told his players that he loved them, cared about them, and needed them. And then he did what he had to do: pinch hit for them, remove them from the pitcher’s mound, or trade them for players who were a better “fit.” And the next day he would tell them again how much he loved and needed them (Bissinger, 2005, p. 4).

Like many of his counterparts, La Russa used political frame behavior when dealing with umpires. When asked by the media why he continued to “bait” umpires even when they seldom, if ever, change a call, he replied: “Sometimes you do it to ‘save’ a player. Sometimes, to show your team that you’re into the game and motivate them, and sometimes you are trying to influence the next call” (La Russa, 2002, p. 193). So, as we have seen, Tony La Russa was not above using political frame leadership behavior to his advantage.

CONCLUSION

Tony La Russa’s success in winning baseball championships in both major leagues is no accident. Although one could argue that his dominant

leadership frame is structural, there is ample evidence that he varies his leadership behavior among the four frames according to the situation. His knowledge of the game is perhaps unsurpassed, but he tempers his no-nonsense style with human resource behavior in the form of genuinely caring about his players both in their professional and personal lives. He cultivates a positive image of himself and motivates his players and staff through the judicious use of symbolic leadership behavior and employs political frame behavior when necessary. His leadership style has obvious implications for leaders and aspiring leaders who wish to be effective in their application of situational leadership theory.

7

TOMMY LASORDA

You catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.

—Sabatino Lasorda

BACKGROUND

Tommy Lasorda was born in 1927 in Norristown, Pennsylvania, and is a former Major League Baseball pitcher and manager. Lasorda signed with his hometown team, the Philadelphia Phillies, as an undrafted free agent in 1945 and began his professional career with the Concord Weavers. He missed the next two years because of service in the armed forces. He returned to baseball in 1948 and became famous in the minor leagues by striking out twenty-five Amsterdam Rugmakers in a fifteen-inning game, setting a since-broken professional record. In his next two starts, he struck out fifteen and thirteen batters, gaining the attention of the Dodgers, who drafted him from the Phillies chain. He was sent to the Montreal Royals of the International League in 1950. He pitched for Montreal during the years 1950–1954 and 1958–1960 and is the winningest pitcher in the history of the team (107–57). He led Montreal to four straight Governors' Cups from 1951 to 1954, and a

fifth one in 1958. On June 24, 2006, he was inducted into the Canadian Baseball Hall of Fame.

Lasorda made his major league debut on August 5, 1954, for the Brooklyn Dodgers. He pitched for the Dodgers for two seasons, and then for the Kansas City Athletics for one season. He went back to the minor leagues and was finally released in 1960. Lasorda's first off-field assignment with the Dodgers was as a scout from 1961 to 1965. In 1966, he became the manager for the Pocatello Chiefs in the rookie leagues, then managed the Ogden Dodgers to three Pioneer League championships from 1966 to 1968. He became the Dodgers AAA Pacific Coast League (PCL) manager in 1969 with the Spokane Indians and remained in the position when the Dodgers switched their AAA farm club to the Albuquerque Dukes. His 1972 Dukes team won the PCL Championship. Lasorda was also a manager for the Dominican Winter Baseball League team Tigres del Licey. He led the team to the 1973 Caribbean World Series title.

In 1973, Lasorda became the third-base coach on the staff of Hall of Fame manager Walter Alston, serving for almost four seasons. He was widely regarded as Alston's heir apparent, and turned down several major league managing jobs elsewhere to remain in the Dodger fold. Lasorda became the Los Angeles manager in 1976 upon Alston's retirement. He compiled a 1,599–1,439 record as Dodgers manager, won two World Series championships in 1981 and 1988, four National League pennants, and eight division titles in his twenty-year career as the Dodgers manager.

His final game was a 4–3 victory over the Houston Astros, at Dodger Stadium on June 23, 1996. The following day he drove himself to the hospital complaining of abdominal pains, and in fact was having a heart attack. He officially retired on July 29. His 1,599 career wins ranks fifteenth all-time in Major League Baseball history. He was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 1997 as a manager in his first year of eligibility. The Dodgers retired his uniform number, 2, in 1997 and renamed a street in Dodgertown as "Tommy Lasorda Lane."

Lasorda came out of retirement to manage the United States team at the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney. He led the Americans to the gold medal, beating heavily favored Cuba, which had won the gold medals at the two previous Olympics. Lasorda was named vice president of

the Dodgers upon his retirement from managing in 1996. After the sale of the team to Frank McCourt, Lasorda took on his current position as special advisor to the chairman, where his responsibilities include scouting, evaluating, and teaching minor league players, acting as an advisor and ambassador for the Dodgers' international affiliations, and representing the franchise at more than one hundred speaking engagements and appearances to various charities, private groups, and military personnel each year (Wikipedi.org; Plaschke, 2007).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style. Tommy Lasorda is very aware of the need to adapt one's leadership behavior to the situation. In his characteristically blunt and candid way he poses the question: "Do you use foul language at home? No, you act different in your home than you do at work, right? Everybody does" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 11). For the record, he does not curse around his wife, children, or grandchildren. But he has been known to scream at a player in the dugout and hug him in the clubhouse. In typical situational thinking, he breaks them down and builds them up. According to Lasorda, some of his players played hard because they wanted to avoid the scolding. Others played hard because they couldn't wait for the hugs. Either way, they played hard for him because he practiced situational leadership behavior theory by adapting his behavior to the situation.

When Lasorda first became manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers, he called all his players, including the quiet Bill Russell, on the telephone. He started the conversation with the question, "Do you have a pencil?" He next asked most of them to write a figure down on a piece of paper. In Russell's case it was thirty to forty-five. Why? That's how many bases he expected Russell to steal that season. With the moody Reggie Smith he took a different approach. "I really need your superstar talent this

year,” he said. “I need you to help me survive my first year of managing” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 123). Smith couldn’t believe his ears. Usually managers scolded him. In this case someone was embracing him. Lasorda knew his people (situations) and applied the appropriate behavior in each case. With Russell he used structural leadership behavior, while with Smith he used a human resource approach.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural frame leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Although Tommy Lasorda is not known as a structural leader, we will see that he practices structural leadership behavior when appropriate.

Early in Lasorda’s career as a minor league coach he fought to be transferred from a tiny town in Colorado in the very low minor leagues to a South Carolina town for his first Dodger minor league job. It was in Greenville, South Carolina, in 1948 that Lasorda learned what kind of manager he did *not* want to be—that would be a manager like Clay Bryant.

Bryant was a tough, stoical man who treated his players like animals. With every shout, with every stare, he reminded his players that they were not human—they were just cogs in a wheel, minor parts in the big Dodger machine. Everything that his first minor league manager did, Lasorda resolved to do the opposite. Bryant did not allow players to talk to anyone in the stands before or during games. Lasorda, on the contrary, had his teams practically camped out in the stands, reinforcing the notion of the Dodgers as a family. Lasorda saw how Bryant’s coldness affected his teams. He saw how fear of the manager turned into passive play, resulting in strikeouts, preventing any creativity or spontaneity on the part of the players. Lasorda resolved never to use excessive structural leadership behavior in this way.

Still, Lasorda understood the benefit of appropriate structural leadership behavior. For example, after the spring training games ended, Lasorda would hold up to three hours of extra practice for the young

players, a session that he labeled “Lasorda University.” During those sessions he stressed the fundamentals. Professor Lasorda taught them how to bunt, field, and hit, throw, and “the dangers of squeezing curves in strange cities” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 57). The Dodgers had five consecutive Rookie of the Year Awards in the mid-1990s, which, it could be argued, were a direct result of Lasorda University.

When you enrolled in Lasorda University he liked to say that your tuition would be perspiration, determination, and inspiration. And if you are lucky enough to graduate, you can look forward to more money than a professor at Harvard or Yale. He considered the valedictorian of Lasorda University to be Mike Piazza, who was the very last player drafted that year and will most likely be a future Hall of Famer.

Even when he first arrived in Los Angeles under Walter Alston, Lasorda made up his mind that he was going to utilize structural leadership behavior when appropriate, even as an assistant. In spring training that year he combined structural and human resource behavior and started what he called the “111 Percent Club” for the team’s nonroster substitute players, rewarding the novices’ hard work by letting them pose for a photograph in front of the locker of their favorite Dodger players.

Combining structural and human resource leadership behaviors was one of Lasorda’s strengths. One of his star pitchers, Tommy Sutton, liked to run rather than shag fly balls, which was the rule for pitchers on the days when they were not pitching. Lasorda said to Sutton, “Fine, you want to change the rule, we’ll fight over it. If I beat you, the rule stands” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 126). The rule stood because Lasorda knew that Sutton would never fight him.

Another instance of combined structural and human resource behavior took place with Steve Sax. Lasorda’s star second baseman could not throw the ball accurately to first base—which was an obvious problem since that is one of the very basic plays for a second baseman. He made over thirty errors in one year because of this inability. This was a very important moment in Lasorda’s career to be able to show his critics that he could not only motivate players to play hard but also make them change *how* they played. He asked Sax how many people can hit .280 as Sax did? Not many. How many can steal fifty bases as he did? Again, not many. “Now, how many people can throw the ball from second base to first base? I’ll tell you,” he screamed. “Millions! Everyone but you. How can you not figure

it out?” This approach was diametrically opposed to Lasorda’s normal “pat on the back” approach, but Sax never made thirty errors in a season again. Knowing that this was a case of mind over matter, Lasorda built Sax up and then broke him down and in the process convinced him that he was “better than this” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 156).

In another instance of not using his usual pat on the back approach, Lasorda when out to talk with his pitcher Jesse Orosco after he issued a couple of walks. “Can you throw a bleeping strike? Can you just throw the ball over the plate? I am sick and tired of looking at your bleep. Throw a bleeping strike,” he said and stormed off the mound. Afterward, Orosco complained that he never had a manager talk down to him like that before. To which Lasorda replied: “What are you complaining about, you got the guy out didn’t you?” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 166).

Never one to overuse structural leadership behavior, Lasorda had only one hard and fast rule: don’t be disloyal. To Lasorda it was simple. He showed them loyalty as a father, and he expected them to show him loyalty as his sons. Although this was his only rule, he enforced it strictly. He traded away one of his star pitchers, Rick Sutcliffe, in his prime because he publicly berated Lasorda for leaving him off the post-season roster. He also disowned his successor, Bill Russell, after Russell went out of his way to point out that he was not going to be another Lasorda.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Tommy Lasorda is perhaps best known as a leader in the human resource vein. There are numerous instances when he acknowledges the effectiveness of human resource frame leadership behavior. For example, when Jay Howell, a Dodger reliever, was asked why he never criticized Lasorda for how he used his bullpen, he remarked, “How can you rip someone who your kids call Uncle Tommy?” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 10).

Lasorda consciously projected the image of a human resource frame leader. He had the habit of inviting a couple of minor leaguers to his

home for dinner. He would then produce a telephone and make them call their mothers and tell them they were having dinner with Tommy Lasorda. Lasorda would get on the phone and soothe the often crying mother, saying that she had produced a future Most Valuable Player (MVP). It gave Lasorda credibility with the distrustful young stars. When they reached the majors, they would remember the phone call. If a teammate asked them to join a mutiny against the manager, they remembered the phone call and most often declined.

He encouraged the players to play jokes on him and each other. He was never upset when he was the target of a joke because it meant that they were not afraid of him. And if they weren't afraid of him, that meant they weren't afraid to be aggressive on the bases or take chances at the plate. In Lasorda's mind, they weren't afraid to be great!

Lasorda attributed much of his human resource style of leadership to one of his mentors and a former Yankee manager, Ralph Houk. Houk taught him that if he treats players like human beings, they will try to play like Superman. He also taught him how a pat on the back can be just as important and effective as a kick in the butt.

He remained the Dodgers' manager for an unheard of twenty years. He believed that his long tenure was not the result of the stars that performed so well for him, as much as it was the role played by players and clubhouse guys and low-level employees, whom Lasorda coddled and embraced and eventually won over. If any player grew angry with Lasorda, even his biggest stars, he would be surrounded by so many people who were undyingly loyal to the manager his voice would be silenced.

Lasorda was a master of making friends and influencing people. Once on a preseason tour to generate excitement for the upcoming season, he introduced the newest Dodger, Juan Pierre. "Everybody," he said, "this is one of the greatest players on our team, Juan Pierre. If you don't like Juan Pierre, you don't like Christmas" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 97). Pierre laughed, but remembered that comment for the rest of his life—and when Lasorda needed a friend, Pierre would be there for him.

He literally embraced the young players, becoming one of baseball's first managers at any level to hug players after homeruns. This human touch was not exclusive to younger players, however. When he needed someone to be his surrogate in the locker room, he chose the veteran Kirk Gibson, who was not only the toughest player in the clubhouse,

but one that had become Lasorda's disciple. According to Lasorda, "In every walk of life, a manager needs guys like that: employees who will watch the boss's back and spread the boss's word" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 161).

The human resource frame approach was particularly effective with international players. The Dodgers were known as groundbreakers regarding diversity, having been the first team to include an African American on its major league roster, Jackie Robinson. One year Lasorda had a pitching rotation that included players from five different countries. How does one get across to such a diverse audience? According to Lasorda, you do so using the universal language: a hug, a home-cooked meal. Each day he would tell them that he would be their father away from home—and that is how he acted toward them.

Lasorda's use of human resource behavior paid dividends not only during his managing career, but also in his retirement years. New Dodger owner, Frank McCourt, offered Lasorda a job with the Dodgers at a time when he was in his twilight years and being ignored by most baseball people. This would be a job with a new title and new responsibilities for the aging former manager. The job was more or less to be the Dodgers' roving ambassador to baseball and the world. To most people, this offer would have been one that required much thought and negotiation. Lasorda, however, engaged in neither. He did not need to think about it. He did not even pause. He just repeated the same phrase he used throughout the meeting. "Thank you" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 210).

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. Tommy Lasorda made abundant use of the symbolic frame of leadership behavior. For example, to preclude any distractions from negatively influencing his team, he banned all advertisements in or on Holman Stadium, the Dodgers spring training facility in Vero Beach, Florida. He also banned all mascots (except for himself, of course).

Lasorda liked to use slogans, quotes, and epithets in his everyday speech as a way of inspiring and motivating his followers. In typical symbolic frame fashion he believed that one can always catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. One of his often-quoted mottoes was to always be nice to the ones who threaten you the most; always keep your enemies close. When you hear Lasorda speaking today, it is really his father talking. His father would always say to his son that he was rich. He was rich because it doesn't cost a cent to be nice to people. He used the metaphor of building a house to make his point with the young Lasorda. If you build a house and the foundation is faulty, everything that you place on the foundation will be faulty. According to Sabatino Lasorda, the foundation of life is love and respect. If you have five guys on one rope, pulling together, he would say, they can pull half a town behind them. If they are pulling against each other, they go nowhere.

Once, Lasorda's father gave him a glass jug to get some water for the flower garden. All of the sudden, his father hauls off and hits him. Why? "What good would it be to hit you," he replied, "*after* you break the bottle?" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 9). Later Lasorda would scream at his players so much about the fundamentals beforehand that when they made a mistake they already felt bad enough, so he rarely ripped his players *after* they made an error.

Lasorda respected his father mightily. He honored his father when he was given an award on Ellis Island in 2006. "I thank God everyday," he said, "that my father didn't miss that boat. Of course, if he had missed it, I would probably be addressing you today as Pope Thomas XXIV" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 9).

As a minor league player, Lasorda was known as a feisty competitor who was not shy about settling an issue with his fists. But as a major league manager he projected another image altogether. Throughout his Dodger career, the man who had been known for throwing punches became famous for his hugs. He never tore into his players in public. He fawned over their children, joked with their wives, remembered the names of entire families, and insisted that everyone refer to him as an uncle or brother or grandfather. So engrained was his inspiring image that he won his final World Series in 1988 with a mediocre team, whipping two of baseball's regular-season giants with several of baseball's greatest postseason speeches.

Lasorda was fond of reminding his players that there are three kinds of people in this world: people who make it happen, people who watch it happen, and people who wonder what happened. He urged his players to be in the first category. And this type of symbolic behavior positively affected his players. Kirk Gibson and Orel Hershiser, two of his best, were among those who lived the Lasorda gospel. They weren't just baseball players, they were "village storytellers" spreading the word and carrying on the tradition.

He had a way of finding a player's weakest point and then complimenting him on it until the player began believing it was a strength. For example, Orel Hershiser was given the nickname "Bulldog" by Lasorda. Fernando Valenzuela was "Skinny," and Mike Sciosia was "Speedy." Hershiser, for one, responded with a 2.66 ERA, a record fifty-nine consecutive scoreless innings, and a Cy Young Award.

In a combination of symbolic and political leadership behavior, Lasorda responded to a fight between two of his minor leaguers by screaming at Leon Everitt, who claimed that he was hit by "one of his own kind" (another black player), that his own kind are the guys in the Dodger uniforms. Lasorda's refusal to make racial and ethnic distinctions was good for the colorblind Dodger organization and earned him the respect of players of all backgrounds for the remainder of his career. It was on his watch that the Dodgers were the first to start a game with minorities in all nine positions.

In another instance of his use of symbolic behavior, he coined the phrase "Big Dodger in the Sky" so that his players would have something other than themselves in whom to believe. Lasorda also took great pleasure in seeing his symbolic self in his players. Bobby Valentine, who joined Lasorda in Ogden, Utah, on one of his minor league teams as the Dodgers' first draft pick, showed Lasorda daily hometown newspaper stories about his progress as a Dodger. The articles were mostly minutiae. Sometimes he would read that Valentine didn't get a hit, but had a great throw from the outfield. It was not until much later that it was learned that Valentine wrote the stories himself. Lasorda loved him because it was something that he would have done, and Valentine became his favorite player.

One of his players, Billy Graves, constantly complained of a sore arm, but x-rays always were negative. Lasorda knew of Graves's great reli-

gious convictions, so he summoned him to his office. He asked Graves to tell him exactly when his arm hurt? Graves indicated that it only happened when he actually threw the ball. He then asked him how long it hurt? Graves said that it only hurt for about a second on each pitch. Lasorda remarked that if he threw a hundred pitches a game, his arm would hurt only about one minute and forty seconds. “Do you know how much pain Christ endured when he was crucified?” he asked. “Do you think it was more than 140 seconds?” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 113). The next game Graves pitched a shutout. Experiences like this reinforced Lasorda’s notion that maybe he could actually do this job.

Lasorda used symbolic leadership behavior to convince Joe Ferguson to switch from a glamorous outfield position to the less glamorous catching position. He told Ferguson that Hall of Fame catchers Gabby Hartnett, Mickey Cochrane, and Ernie Lombardi had all started out as outfielders. Al Campanis, the Dodgers general manager, observed this conversation and privately told Lasorda that none of those players started out as outfielders. “I know that,” Lasorda remarked, “but Fergy didn’t and look at him with a catcher’s mask on” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 115).

He often used symbolic behavior in more subtle ways. He believed that a manager’s office said a lot about the manager. His office was not only going to be his home, it was going to be *their* (the team’s) home. The manager’s office was transformed from the stark office of Walter Alston to the office of food and photographs of Tommy Lasorda.

Lasorda learned the value of symbolic leadership behavior from none other than Frank Sinatra. Once, when Sinatra was playing the Valley Forge Music Circus just outside Lasorda’s hometown, he was invited to Lasorda’s mother’s house for a preshow dinner. Afterward, at the concert, Sinatra announced that he was dedicating the show to Lasorda’s mother, Carmella. “And people wonder why I take such good care of everyone else’s mother,” asks Lasorda? “Look what Frank did for my mom” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 132).

Lasorda would use any reasonable means to motivate his charges. The Dodgers were playing the Montreal Expos for the pennant and were down two games to one. The next game was to be in ice-cold Montreal and Lasorda thought that it would be a good time for the Big Dodger in the Sky to become involved. He had the very religious Dusty Baker read

a verse of the Bible to the team. In summary, the verse he chose indicated that suffering produces endurance and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us. The Dodgers were inspired and won the next game. For the fifth game, Lasorda resorted to another symbolic ploy. He instructed all of his players to get rid of their warm-ups and told his players: "Don't let them see you shiver" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 140). They won that game, also.

On the occasion of addressing a group of Los Angeles firefighters, Lasorda made further use of symbolic behavior. He remarked to them that he had been with the Dodgers' organization in one capacity or another for fifty-eight years and married to his wife for fifty-seven years and after all that time they still go dancing. He says his wife goes on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and he goes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. He went on to note that he once got home at 3 am and his wife, Jo, caught him. He poured a shot of vodka and asked her to drink it. She resisted, but finally took a sip. "This stuff is terrible," she said. Lasorda's retort: "And you think I'm enjoying myself" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 161).

Over the years, the Dodger teams under Lasorda were known for the reserves making extraordinary contributions to their success. So Lasorda referred to them as the "stuntmen." For several years they were led by the flamboyant Mickey Hatcher. Where Kirk Gibson enforced dedication, Hatcher enforced humor and Lasorda sat back and watched with pride.

Of course, Lasorda was also known for his inspirational pep talks. He once gave a pep talk to the Dodgers in a World Series when they were down 2-0. According to him, they were like a guy whose boat capsized a mile offshore. He swam to within one yard of the shore and then drowned. He should have died at sea when his boat capsized. But it's worse when you get so close and don't make it. "We're only a yard away," he said, "We can make it" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 167). In speaking to his general manager later, he admitted that he had no idea if any fool ever drowned in a foot of water, but does it really matter? His Dodgers defeated the Mets to win the pennant. And Lasorda greeted the outcome with even more symbolic behavior. He pointed out that the Dodgers saved a lot of people a lot of money by winning that series. A lot of people spend money every year to go to Lourdes, France, to see

a miracle. All they had to do to see a miracle that year was to watch the Dodgers defeat the Mets.

Lasorda believes his greatest use of symbolic behavior to motivate his players happened in Spokane, Washington, in the minor leagues. It seems that he went to the mound to speak to rattled pitcher Bobby O'Brien in the last inning with Spokane leading 2–1. In an effort to settle his pitcher down, Lasorda said, “Bobby, imagine the heavens coming apart and you’re hearing the voice of the Big Dodger in the Sky, and he says, ‘Bobby, this is the last hitter you will face on earth, then you will come to heaven with me.’” Then Lasorda asked O'Brien how he would want to face the Lord on that day? Would he like to face him having gotten the batter out or giving up the winning hit? Of course, O'Brien said that he would like to face the Lord after getting the player out. “All right then,” said Lasorda, “pitch like you’re going to die.” No sooner did Lasorda return to the dugout than O'Brien gave up a two-run homer and Spokane lost the game. Asking O'Brien what happened, the pitcher replied: “I was afraid of dying and couldn't concentrate on pitching” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 175). Lasorda says to forget the 1988 championship as the pinnacle of his motivational success. Making a player believe that on his next pitch he was going to die was his greatest motivational achievement.

Speaking at the Air Force Academy and escorted by a young lieutenant named Bob Wright, who was one of his minor league players, Lasorda asked Wright when he was going to start flying again? He responded that after being hit in the head with a line drive, his doctors said that he would never fly again. “What was the name of the doctor who told you that?” asked Lasorda. “Was his name God?” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 186). Lasorda went on to point out to Wright that the only person who can say you can't fly is God. And, just because God delays, it does not mean He denies. Two years later, Lasorda received a photograph of Bob Wright standing next to a plane he was about to fly overseas.

A similar incident involved Lance Goodman, a teenage baseball player who had been seriously injured in an automobile accident in San Francisco. Goodman was in a coma when Lasorda was requested by the parents to come to the stricken boy's bedside. “You've got to get better. People are counting on you,” he said. “I need a batboy. You've got to believe” (Plaschke, 2007, p. 186). Suddenly, tears start falling from

the boy's eyes and shortly thereafter he recovered. Now, every time the Dodgers play in San Francisco, Lance Goodman is their batboy.

One last instance of Lasorda's liberal use of symbolic behavior occurred when he was coaching the U.S. Olympic baseball team. At the end of the 2000 season, his starting pitcher on this particular day was Ben Sheets. He was a member of the Milwaukee Brewers, and they did not want him to pitch in September for fear that he would hurt his arm. It seems that Sheets had never pitched in September because his teams never made the playoffs and he had never gone that long. Lasorda had a simple solution. "Tell him it's August 31," he said (Plaschke, 2007, p. 210).

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. As we shall see, Tommy Lasorda was quite astute in his use of the political frame of leadership.

Lasorda was particularly adept at using political frame leadership behavior with the media. He exploited the media in his own and the Dodgers' interests. He catered to them and made certain that he and his players were readily available to them. He built personal relationships with many media figures and built up their egos. For example, it was a practice of his to greet the parents of the Dodger beat writers with this observation: "So you're the ones who raised this guy (or gal) to win a Pulitzer" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 11).

Loyalty was an important characteristic to Lasorda. He was loyal to his players, and in exchange, he expected them to be loyal to them. When one of his players, Adrian Betre, became a free agent and left the Dodgers after only one year, he railed about his lack of loyalty. He could not understand how Betre could leave so abruptly after all that he and the Dodger organization had done for him. Where was the commitment? He could not fathom how someone could turn away from the organization that "raised" him. If Lasorda could work for twenty consecutive years on one-year contracts and turn down several managerial

offers to remain with the Dodgers out of loyalty, why couldn't Betre do the same?

Lasorda also used political frame behavior when he negotiated his contracts. When he was first recruited by Jocko Collins to play for the Philadelphia Phillies, his hometown team, he held out for forty-eight hours in order to get a larger signing bonus and salary. He finally got Collins to agree to a signing bonus of \$100 in addition to his salary. He later revealed to Collins that he would have gladly paid the Phillies to play for them.

In another example, in 1954 he negotiated his first contract with the Dodger general manager at the time, Buzzy Bavasi. Bavasi offered him \$9,000. Lasorda was insulted and quit on the spot. Bavasi picked up the phone and got him a job at the local brewery for \$6,500. Bavasi asked him if he wanted the job now with the added incentive? Lasorda "un-quit" and from then on, because he felt that the organization had been so generous with him, never hired an agent nor negotiated for more than one day as a Dodger and ended up working on one-year contracts for the remainder of his career.

He also used political frame behavior in dealing with his star pitcher, Fernando Valenzuela. When Valenzuela became eligible for arbitration, Lasorda testified before the arbiter about Valenzuela's *lack* of pitching ability. Here was an instance where Valenzuela had pitched his heart out for Lasorda, but in remaining loyal to the Dodger organization, which wanted to save money by releasing their aging pitcher, Lasorda felt that he had to say what they wanted him to say. However, Lasorda was not proud of himself in this particular use of political behavior.

As mentioned earlier, Lasorda was a master of building up political capital. Even as a minor league manager, he used political frame behavior. He would advise his young mentees that when they got to Dodger Stadium and did something special, they should look up into the stands and acknowledge the individuals who helped them along the way. This little speech was more than a motivator. It was self-preservation in that he was laying the groundwork for support that he might need someday.

The political capital that Lasorda accumulated came in handy at times. After he gained a reputation as a successful minor league manager in the Dodger chain, John McHale of the Montreal Expos offered

him a job as their manager. However, Lasorda told him that he could not accept the job because of his loyalty to the Dodger organization. He cashed in his political capital the very next year when he was named the Dodgers manager to replace Walter Alston.

Lasorda even used political behavior in enforcing the team rules. When players broke the few rules that he had, he imposed trade-offs. Davey Lopes and Joe Ferguson refused to sit at their assigned autograph tables. Lasorda said, "Fine, but not one member of your family will ever fly on the Dodger plane again" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 125). Needless to say, Lopes and Ferguson capitulated.

Lasorda often used political behavior in settling player disputes. Don Sutton and Steve Garvey had a long-standing personality clash. Sutton, who was very unpopular in the locker room, was jealous of Steve Garvey's popularity and accused him of being all "Madison Avenue" with the press. Garvey became angry at the comment and went to Lasorda for advice. Lasorda knew that Garvey had a reputation on the team of being "soft" and Sutton of being "arrogant." Lasorda wanted to kill two birds with one stone, so he advised Garvey to challenge Sutton to a fistfight. So Garvey challenged Sutton to a fight and proved that he was not soft, and the cowardly Sutton never bothered Garvey or his teammates again. Most managers would act as peacemakers in this situation, but not the calculating and politically astute Lasorda.

Finally, when Bob Watson was considering whom he would name as the manager of the Olympic baseball team, the candidates included Lasorda, Ray Miller, Jim Lefebvre, and Terry Collins. "Are you kidding," Lasorda said. "I won more games than all of them combined" (Plaschke, 2007, p. 204). Acting insulted, he walked out hoping they would run after him because he really wanted the job. They did, and the rest is history. Under Lasorda, the U.S. Olympic baseball team upset the Cubans for the first time ever.

CONCLUSION

Tommy Lasorda utilized situational leadership behavior in a well-rounded way. One could argue that he is essentially a symbolic/human resource leader, but he also uses the political and structural frames

when appropriate. His use of symbolic leadership behavior is legendary. He is a master at motivating his followers and regaling them with stories and anecdotes. He is also adept in his use of human resource behavior in that his players idolize him and many relate to him as a father figure.

Lasorda seems to be somewhat sensitive and defensive about his alleged ignorance of the fundamentals and strategies of baseball. Conscious of this alleged weakness, however, he dwells on the appropriate use of structural leadership behavior. His view is that with so much success in his career, he must be doing something right. And, as we have seen, his teams were well prepared and he did think strategically during the process of a game. The establishment of Lasorda University is but one example of his employment of structural leadership behavior.

As we have also seen, Lasorda is particularly adept at the use of political frame leadership behavior. Sometimes he may go a little too far, and it can be perceived as manipulative behavior. But, all leadership behavior is somewhat manipulative in nature. Whether it is used for good or evil is the determining criterion. And, there is no doubt that his leadership behavior is in the pursuit of a good.

Tommy Lasorda is an exemplary leader in the situational mold. He operates out of all four of Bolman and Deal's frames, depending on the situation. His success as a leader is no mistake. Leaders and aspiring leaders would do well to enroll in Lasorda University vicariously, majoring in situational leadership.

BILLY MARTIN

I only have two team rules: (1) do as I say, and (2) when in doubt, revert to rule one.

—Billy Martin

BACKGROUND

Born in 1928, Billy Martin played and managed at the major league level. He is best known for managing the New York Yankees on an unbelievable five different occasions. He led the Yankees to consecutive American League pennants in 1976 and 1977 and won the 1977 World Series. He also had managerial tenures with several other teams leading four of them to division championships.

Martin had a lifetime winning record as a manager, but was better known for his flamboyant style, arguing with umpires, getting into fistfights with players, and publicly challenging general managers and owners.

Martin started his playing career in California while attending Berkeley High School when he began playing for a team affiliated with the Pacific Coast League. After graduation in 1946, he played in the low-level Pioneer League. The next year he began playing with the Oakland Oaks

of the Pacific Coast League. There, he played for the soon to be famous Casey Stengel. Stengel became a father figure to Martin and when he became manager of the Yankees in 1948, he brought Martin along.

Martin began his major league career in 1950 after spending two years in the Yankees' minor league system. As a player, he was known as a fiery competitor and a clutch performer. He saved a number of games with spectacular fielding plays and timely hits. His best professional season was 1953 when he had career highs in home runs, RBIs, doubles, triples, and times being hit by a pitched ball. He was the MVP of the 1953 World Series, as he batted .500. Martin was an All-Star again with the Yankees in 1956.

In 1957, he was traded to the Kansas City Athletics and his playing career began to decline. He played for six different teams with only moderate success. He retired in 1961 with a career batting average of .257. However, as an indication of his clutch hitting, he hit .333 in twenty-eight World Series games for the Yankees.

As we will see, Martin had a definite flair for the dramatic. He had a reputation for excess drinking and consequent rowdy behavior. In fact, the reason that he was traded from the Yankees to the Athletics was because of a nightclub brawl where he and some of his teammates got into a fight that made headline news the next day in the *New York Times*. In one particular incident, he charged the mound after believing that he was being brushed back and broke Chicago Cubs pitcher Jim Brewer's cheekbone.

Martin began his coaching career with the Minnesota Twins organization. He spent eight years with the Twins in various coaching capacities. Finally, in 1969, he became manager of the Minnesota Twins. In his only season as manager he won a Division Championship but was fired after a fight with one of his pitchers, Dave Boswell, outside a bar after a game.

Martin then managed the Detroit Tigers for two years. He guided the team to a first place finish in 1972 but lost in the first playoff round when he got into a brawl when one of the opposing players allegedly threw his bat at Martin's pitcher. After being fired in Detroit, he managed the Texas Rangers for two years before being hired for the first of five times by the New York Yankees in 1975.

As mentioned earlier, Martin led the Yankees to two World Series in 1976 and 1977, winning in 1977. However, he publicly feuded with his star outfielder, Reggie Jackson, and was finally fired for the first of

five times in 1978, only to be rehired a year later. After a poor year in 1979, Martin got into a fight with a salesman at a hotel in Minneapolis and George Steinbrenner fired him once again.

The soap opera continued as Martin resurfaced with the Oakland Athletics, where he perfected a style of play that became known as “Billyball.” It consisted of a combative and aggressive style of baseball, directed toward intimidating other teams. His early success with the team enabled him to gain almost total control when he was also appointed general manager. However, following a 68–94 season in 1982, he was fired.

The phoenix returned to the Yankees in 1983, 1985, and 1988, but never for more than one season. During the 1983 season, he was involved in one of the most controversial regular season games, popularly known as the “Pine Tar Incident,” where umpires nullified a game-winning home run by the Kansas City Royals great, George Brett. Martin had argued that Brett had too much pine tar on his bat. The league found in Martin’s favor and the game was replayed from the point of nullification. In 1988, Martin was fired for the fifth and last time by the Yankees after being involved in another fight where one of his pitchers, Ed Whitson, broke one of Martin’s arms.

Martin was employed as a special consultant to George Steinbrenner in 1989 when he was killed in a car crash in Binghamton, New York, on Christmas Day. Martin had been drinking heavily with his friend William Reedy, who was driving at the time of the accident. Ironically, Martin was preparing to manage the Yankees for a sixth time in the 1990 season when he had his fatal accident.

Billy Martin was eulogized by Cardinal O’Connor at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City. His grave is located just 150 feet from that of Babe Ruth. The following epitaph by Billy Martin appears on the headstone: “I may not have been the greatest Yankee to put on the uniform, but I was the proudest” (Wikipedia.org; DeMarco, 2001).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations.

Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at the given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style. Although Billy Martin was basically a symbolic leader, there is ample evidence that he effectively utilized the other frames in the Bolman-Deal model.

Situational leadership was modeled for Martin by his father, who was a high school baseball coach. Martin recalled that his father had the ability to “push people’s buttons,” and he was unique in his ability to read people. He could take one player who needed to be built up and tell him, “Hey, you’re my guy,” assuring him that he didn’t care whether the player got off to a quick start. He promised the player that whatever happened he was staying with him. Then he could take another player who wasn’t playing the way he had in previous years and say to him, “Look here, I don’t care what you’ve done in the past. You’re going to be alright, but if not, hit the road” (DeMarco, 2001, p. xii). It all depended on the particular situation and the personality of the player.

Martin also observed this same situational approach with his major league mentor, Casey Stengel, the great Yankees manager. He learned to use different tactics for different personalities, much like Stengel had done with the Yankees in the 1950s when Martin played for him. Martin’s approach with the Hall of Famer Rod Carew, for example, had nothing to do with the loud Billy Martin so well known to baseball fans and players like Hall of Famer Reggie Jackson. As Rod Carew observed, “I had heard so much about how hot-headed Billy was—he was tough to get along with, things like that, and I never saw that. I never saw that person” (DeMarco, 2001, p. 68). Carew made a wonderful gesture of thanks to Martin by having him act as the godfather of his daughter, Stephenie.

One of Martin’s assistant coaches, Charlie Manuel, the manager of the 2008 World Champion Philadelphia Phillies, recalled that he had learned to be situational in his relationship with his players from Martin. As a manager, Manuel believes in communicating with his players in a situational way. He has had people like Alex Ramirez and Manny Ramirez, and now, Ryan Howard—players that he could “play with, basically the way Billy used to play with us.” These are the players whom you can hit and they hit you back, behavior commonly referred to as

“horseplay.” They are playful and Manuel communicates with them in a physical way. On the other hand, there are players who do not relate well to that kind of interaction. In those cases, Manuel is more diplomatic and understanding. With them, he tries to “carry on a more intelligent conversation and forget about the kidding and joking” (DeMarco, 2001, p. 71).

The Hall of Fame ex-manager Earl Weaver commented that Martin’s teams don’t exhibit any particular style. According to Weaver, that is precisely why he was so successful. He observed that if you look at the teams he managed in Minnesota, Detroit, Texas, New York, and Oakland, the first thing that you will notice is that no two of them were alike. Martin always looked at the talent first, then managed accordingly. Former Arizona Diamondbacks and Yankees manager, Buck Showalter, echoes Weaver’s view. Showalter says that a lot of managers come in and ask players to adjust to their styles, which he thinks is a mistake. He learned from Martin that it is best not to have a style. Rather, the style should be dictated by the skills that your players have.

In true situational form, Martin adhered to the four-part philosophy of (1) pushing hard during good times, (2) pulling back during a slump, (3) appealing to pride with a fatigued team, and (4) disciplining a complacent team.

However, as situational as Martin was on the field, he was not so off the field. The gunslinger attitude that he adopted in the dugout conspired against him outside the lines. That same confidence and swagger that enabled him to infuse ball clubs with an aggressive fury to beat and embarrass an opponent made it difficult for him to avoid confrontations, whether in bars, parking lots, hotel lobbies, or office suites. He, in effect, violated one of the basic tenets of situational leadership, namely, that one’s leadership behavior needs to be adapted to the readiness level of one’s followers not only in one’s professional life but also in one’s personal life.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural frame leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic

planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Although his symbolic and political behavior sometimes dominated the headlines, there are numerous examples of Billy Martin operating out of the structural leadership frame.

Displaying his structural leadership behavior tendencies, Martin was always known as a hands-on manager. He would build his players up, give them pride, and teach them the game. He was out there on the field, not buried in his office. He was always instructing, preaching, sometimes screaming, and always, leading. To most of his players, Martin was a teacher and a winner, and the lessons he taught them were timeless and basically without boundaries. There was no mistaking that by the time Martin took over the Yankees as manager in 1975 he had honed his structural leadership skills to the point where he had a feel for baseball that enabled him to conduct a game from the dugout like a baton-wielding maestro. However, the belief that Martin was a natural born manager ultimately rings false. A closer examination reveals years of dedicated training, study, and preparation that eventually enabled Martin to manage a ballgame with such fined-tuned skills and insight as to appear magical.

Gil McDougald, one of his Yankees players, noted how Martin thought about baseball all the time. It was his love. "Baseball to me was a game," he said. But to Martin, it was more than a game. It was his life. "It was like he worshiped the game," said McDougald. "It was a religion to him" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 11).

The impact that Martin had on his players and teams is reminiscent of stories surrounding the famous World War II general George S. Patton, a man whom Martin admired and tried to emulate. Both men were known for their instant decisiveness that was construed by many as a lack of preparation, and both men captured the national consciousness as aggressive geniuses full of "guts and glory." Yet, both men were structural leaders who believed in tireless preparation grounded in dedication and deep-rooted love for their respective professions that enabled them to make informed decisions that looked like they were flying by the seat of their pants. As Buck Showalter observed, "Billy thought things out very deeply. You don't get lucky over 162 games" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 27).

Sam Mele, the Minnesota Twins manager who first hired Martin as a coach, commented that whatever skills Martin had as a manager were

largely acquired skills. Throughout his boyhood years and his twenty years in professional baseball, he built a store of knowledge that along with an intelligent mind and an energetic spirit enabled him to become one of the greatest field managers in the history of the game (DeMarco, 2001, p. 29).

Like many of his effective manager counterparts, Martin had a firm grasp of the fundamentals of baseball and the ability to teach his players what he knew. But one of his greatest skills, the one that separated him from many of his contemporaries, was his ability to look into the hearts of his players and to bring greatness out of them. He could convince his players to think like winners. In typical structural frame fashion, Martin believed that winning was a habit that could be *taught* and learned.

An example of Martin's ability to effectively use structural behavior is his 1980 Oakland A's team. He had inherited a ball club that in the previous year had lost an incredible 108 out of 162 games. In just one year he turned them into a winning team that challenged for the American League pennant. One might ask how Martin achieved such an incredible turnaround or transformation? The answer would be, the old-fashioned way. He did so by having a plan, being prepared, and being a strong leader. In one short spring training, Martin gave a young group of players direction and confidence, and he got them playing a wild brand of exciting, aggressive baseball that was referred to in the media as "Billyball." He returned a sense of order, teamwork, and winning professionalism to the A's by practicing the fundamentals and demanding execution—all structural frame behaviors.

As any structural frame leader would be, Martin was very demanding of his players. He once said to his players in spring training, "When I'm managing, you'd better take your job seriously, or you won't be around long" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 40). If you played for Martin, you were expected to play the game like you approached life. You played to be successful; you played it with dignity and pride, and you played it aggressively. One of Martin's favorite players, Rod Carew, confirmed Martin's attitude. According to Carew, Martin didn't care what you did before or after the game, but once you were on the field, he wanted his players to get themselves fully prepared for the game.

Martin demanded that his players take responsibility for their performance. For him, this meant three things: (1) eliminating mental errors,

(2) always concentrating for nine innings whether you are in the game or in the dugout, and (3) being accountable by accepting blame for the physical errors that were an inevitable part of the aggressive style that his teams played.

Martin's spring training camps were short on "face time" but long on efficiency. He didn't care if you worked long hours as long as you worked "smart" hours (DiMarco, 2001, p. 92). He knew that more could be achieved in four hours than in twelve hours if there was a rhyme and reason to the effort and the activities were organized properly. His teams worked very hard on the fundamentals because that's where Martin believed much of the key to winning was. According to George Mitterwald, a coach on Martin's Oakland A's teams, Martin told his 1980 team, "Look, you lost 43 games by one run. You weren't that far away from being pretty good" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 94). Martin believed that that team didn't do the "little things" that lead to winning—the little things being the basic fundamentals of the game. Under Martin's tutelage, the A's won 97 games the next year.

Martin believed that structural frame leadership behavior such as mastering the fundamentals was what it took to be effective in any leadership position, whether it was in business, education, or even family life. Such structural behavior as exploiting the strengths of your organization, making your personnel feel good about their strengths, trying to put your followers in situations where they can succeed, and protecting them from situations where they are likely to fail were the keys to effective leadership.

When he took over the Yankees in 1976, they had not made it to the World Series in twelve years, but they immediately succeeded in making it to the Fall Classic in 1976, 1977, and again in 1979. He achieved much of that success through the application of structural leadership behavior. Martin changed one-third of the players on the team in 1976, but it was not a matter of just changing the personnel. In addition to the new players came a new attitude. Martin had instituted a sweeping *culture* change in his organization.

Martin believed that being named to a position like manager gives one a certain amount of authority, but it does not make one a leader. Leaders need followers. Leaders attract followers by displaying *competency* and by creating *excitement* for the task at hand. By most accounts, Martin excelled in both of these areas.

In addition to displaying competency and creating excitement, Martin believed that leaders need to be innovators—they had to take risks. He was fond of General Patton's sentiments: "In case of doubt, attack." An example of Martin taking risks was when he taught Rod Carew how to steal home—a very risky endeavor, indeed. He was so effective in his teaching that Carew still holds Major League Baseball's record for steals of home in one year—seven.

Taking the offensive, according to Martin, was empowering. It gives one the feeling of control over one's own destiny. He liked to use the words "create" and "force," rather than "react." He believed in the power of intimidation to both players and managers—keeping the opponent guessing and even a little scared. Martin understood Patton's notion that simply attacking induces the enemy to believe that you are stronger than he is. It is safe to say that Martin was a master at applying structural frame leadership behavior in his efforts to be an effective leader.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Although most people perceived Billy Martin as the personification of a structural and symbolic leader, there was the Billy Martin who demonstrated human resource frame leadership behavior by picking up the phone to call Dave Righetti's parents immediately after he threw his famous July 4, 1983, no-hitter against the Boston Red Sox. There was the Billy Martin who helped a young, pressing Mike Pagliarulo to relax a little just by taking him out alone for a couple of beverages and some baseball talk. And there was the Billy Martin who restored the confidence of Paul Blair, maybe the greatest defensive centerfielder ever, by leaving the bat in his hands in so many clutch batting situations during the Yankees' World Championship season of 1977.

Martin witnessed firsthand the value of human resource behavior in his relationship with the legendary Casey Stengel. The childless Stengel fell in love with Martin's energy, aggressiveness, love for the game, and would come to see the boy as the son he never had. Likewise, Martin

would see Stengel as the father he lacked (his father left the family early in Martin's life).

Martin's son, Billy Jr., recalled that, despite his father's reputation as a rowdy, he saw his father reach into his pocket for a mother who had two little kids with her walking down the street. The way they were dressed and looked gave away the fact that they were poor and hungry. Martin would regularly give folks like this a \$20 bill. Along these same lines, Charlie Manuel, the current Phillies manager, said: "For some reason, Billy took a liking to Graig Nettles and me. As a matter of fact, we used to play with him all the time. We used to wrestle him. He loved to play with you" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 23).

Once Martin found players who reflected his sort of desire, he would apply human resource behavior toward them by working closely with them so that they would reach their potential. Over the years many stars emerged under his tutelage. Rod Carew, Graig Nettles, Mike Hargrove, Jim Sundberg, Willie Randolph, Ron Guidry, Rickey Henderson, Don Mattingly, and Jay Buhner all flourished under his direction. Three players in particular stand out as Martin's favorites. Rod Carew was considered by many to be a moody troublemaker. But to Martin he had a "burning desire to be the best" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 46). Ron Guidry was twenty-six years old before Martin recognized his combination of talent and heart, becoming one of the dominant pitchers of his era. Martin saw Rickey Henderson as a once-in-a-lifetime player and consequently built his Oakland A's team around his speed. Martin was willing to "coddle" Henderson because of his talent just like Casey Stengel coddled Martin as a youngster. We, of course, would replace the term *coddling* with a wise and prudent application of human resource behavior.

Martin believed that "the whole thing to managing is building up the ego, making a player feel he can do it" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 66). He did so by showing the player how to do it and "getting him over the humps." He also believed that success on the baseball field translated to success in life because he learned to be a competitor. Paul Blair, his speedy centerfielder who won eight Gold Gloves with Oakland and the Yankees, remembered that Martin had total confidence in his players, and as a result, they believed that they could do anything that he asked them to do. "He made me feel that way," said Blair (DeMarco, 2001, p. 66).

Although many believed that Martin acquired his influence over players through fear, his players felt otherwise. To the contrary, they indicate that he took a much more human resource nuanced approach and urged them not to play out of fear of him, but to “just play.” Martin believed that the competitors he selected for his teams would respond to his tactics, learn to play the game his way, dig a little deeper for strength, and become “professionals.”

Toby Harrah, one his star players with the Texas Rangers, tells the story of how Martin astutely used human resource behavior with him. Harrah played two years for Martin and never missed a ballgame. One day, Martin told Harrah to let him know when the Rangers were facing a pitcher that he couldn't hit and he would give him a rest that day. Harrah indicated to Martin that Luis Tiant was the pitcher with whom he had the most trouble. He couldn't follow Tiant's pitching motion when he turned and faced second base before delivering a pitch. At any rate, the Rangers faced Tiant three or four more times that year and Harrah was in the starting lineup. Harrah said, “What's up, Billy?” “I know what I said,” Martin replied, “but I need you out there as a leader, and I have faith that you can hit Tiant”—and he did (DeMarco, 2001, p. 68).

Because Martin had the knack of applying human resource behavior so astutely and appropriately he worked on both the head and the heart of his players. So whether with Carew, Harrah, Righetti, or Blair, Martin was not the loud, obnoxious Billy Martin so well known to baseball fans and the media. Toby Harrah recalled that you weren't just a player to Martin, you were an individual. This approach was reinforced by Mickey Rivers, Martin's leadoff hitter for the Yankees. Rivers recalled how he was going through a nasty divorce, and Martin acted as a buffer between Rivers and the media, protecting him from their prying eyes. He even took care of getting Rivers's car repaired after his ex-wife vandalized it while it was in a parking lot.

Martin always sought the “one big happy family” ideal. He did so even during the times when there was so much pressure on him that he might be excused for not applying human resource behavior to the situation. In 1977, in the midst of the Yankee soap opera swirling around Martin, team owner George Steinbrenner, and players Reggie Jackson and Thurman Munson, Martin still found time to address an

incident involving Yankee infielder Mickey Klutts. It seems that someone broke into the rookie's hotel room and stole \$500. When Martin found out about it, he left an envelope on Klutts's stool in the locker room with \$500 in it, and a note that read: "Don't let New York get you down" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 136).

Of course, there was a method to Martin's madness in using human resource behavior with such regularity. He wanted to get the best out of his players. When Dave Righetti pitched a no-hitter on July 4, 1983, for the Yankees versus Boston, Martin loved it. He called Righetti's parents and shared the joy as if it were his own son who accomplished the great feat. Righetti's reaction? "I know how much he really liked me," he said. "And, I tried to give him everything I had" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 152).

With Martin, even though there were always heart-wrenching decisions to be made, there was always room for compassion. He once traded one of his favorite players, Jackie Brown of the Texas Rangers, for Hall of Famer, Gaylord Perry. According to Jackie Brown, when Martin called him into his office to tell him he was about to be traded, Martin broke down and cried.

Sam Mele, Martin's assistant coach with the Minnesota Twins, recalled that being an Irish Catholic, Martin routinely invited fifty nuns to many of the Twins home games. Before the game, he would grab Mele and the two of them would go out to the stands and talk baseball with the nuns. "Now for Billy to do something like that," Mele said, "you know he had to be a saint in a way" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 205).

Finally, Frank Lucchesi, the former major league manager, remembered the time he was flying with Martin from Dallas to Oakland during the off-season. On the plane, a young boy approached Martin for an autograph. When Martin asked him where he was headed, the boy replied that he was from a broken home and was going to see his mother for Christmas. Martin asked the boy whether he had a Christmas gift for his mother. When the boy replied that he did not have any money to buy his mother a gift, Martin gave the boy a \$20 bill and said: "When you get off the plane, you go and take your mom shopping to get her a Christmas present" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 284).

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. Symbolic leaders have a definite flair for the dramatic, and there is not much doubt that Billy Martin had that flair.

Martin was a master at cultivating his image—a sign of a symbolic leader. In 1981, he appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine and the Oakland A's brand of Billyball was all the rage. When he was with the Yankees, Martin became famous for his appearances in Miller Lite beer commercials where he would be depicted as a barroom brawler fighting over whether Miller Lite's best quality was "low in calories" or "great taste." In both cases, he nurtured his image as an aggressive and feisty leader. That aggressive, feisty image was well earned, indeed. For example, there was the time Casey Stengel was trying to motivate his team during a batting slump. He told the team that he would give anybody who got hit with a pitch \$100. Billy Martin earned \$200 that night.

As a Yankee, Martin absorbed the culture of an organization committed to success. The Yankees played as a team and played to win. And because they did win, role players like Martin earned individual fame greater than that of many stars on losing teams. He carried this phenomenon into his future and tried to nurture that Yankee culture in all the teams he was to manage. He adopted the philosophy of his beloved teammate Mickey Mantle, who said that he wanted to be remembered not as the greatest switch hitter of all time, but "as a great teammate" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 18).

The Billyball style of play that Martin featured during his years with the Oakland A's was symbolic of the turn-of-the-century baseball with such tactics as hit-and-runs, sacrifices, squeeze plays, hitting behind the runners, and a generally aggressive style. It was all about attitude—Martin's swaggering, in-your-face attitude. A typical display of this attitude was when he went to the pitching mound to talk to his struggling pitcher. He advised him to stop trying to hit the corners of the plate and just throw strikes. "Babe Ruth is dead," he said.

Martin seemed to believe that he had to project a tough image to be taken seriously as a leader. He kept that “Billy the Kid” image out front and kept his gentler act in the background so that he could maintain the hard-charging aura. He even prohibited Muhammad Ali from coming into the locker room after a loss. “Tell him to stay out or I’ll knock him on his ass,” he said (DeMarco, 2001, p. 200). When Martin took his characteristic position on the top step of the dugout, it was much like Patton riding in his jeep—standing up, sirens blaring, the stars boldly plastered on his license plate.

Martin was always setting up a “we against them” scenario to motivate his players. And where a rivalry did not exist, he would create one. He “created” a California Angels rivalry when he was with Oakland. He was constantly creating adversarial relationships between the players and management, the press and the players—whatever worked.

The aura around Martin bolstered the confidence and self-esteem of his players, even as he worked on their own self-images. Martin’s confidence and his skills lent credibility to his message of belief. At the same time, it was infectious. Texas Rangers’ player and general manager Tom Grieve said, “When you went onto the field, when you traveled to another ballpark, when someone came to your ballpark, you had a good feeling knowing your manager was Billy Martin” (DeMarco, 2001, p. 75).

The stories of Martin cultivating his bad boy image are myriad. Martin was well known for drinking to excess and for rowdy behavior when drinking. In 1957, a group of Yankees met at the famous Copacabana nightclub to celebrate Martin’s twenty-ninth birthday; the party ultimately erupted into a much publicized brawl. A month later, general manager George Weiss, believing Martin’s nightlife was a bad influence on teammates Whitey Ford and Mickey Mantle, exiled him to the Kansas City Athletics, the Yankees’ minor league affiliate.

In 1960, a similar incident took place. Martin, then playing for the Cincinnati Reds, charged the mound in the second inning after receiving a brush back pitch from Chicago Cubs pitcher Jim Brewer. Martin threw his bat at Brewer, who picked up the bat and started to hand it to Martin as he approached. Martin punched Brewer in the right eye, breaking his cheekbone. Brewer was hospitalized for two months, and Martin served a five-day suspension, further reinforcing his bad boy im-

age. On another occasion later in his career, while posing for a baseball card as the manager of the Detroit Tigers in 1972, Martin gave photographers the middle finger. The gesture went unnoticed until after the card's release.

As virtually the entire world knew at the time, he feuded publicly with both Yankee owner George Steinbrenner and star outfielder Reggie Jackson. In one especially infamous incident in 1977, in the middle game of what would prove to be a three-game series sweep by the Boston Red Sox at Fenway Park, Martin pulled Jackson off the field in mid-inning for failing to hustle on a ball hit to the outfield. The extremely angry and highly animated Martin had to be restrained by his coaches from getting into a fight with Jackson in the dugout during the nationally televised game. Of course, the entire world was familiar with Martin's highly publicized run-ins with Yankee owner, George Steinbrenner, which led to Martin being hired and fired no less than six times.

Nevertheless, in 1986, he endeared himself to Yankee fans forever, when upon the retirement of his beloved uniform number, 1, and a huge plaque was hung at Yankee Stadium's hallowed Monument Park, he told the crowd, "I may not have been the greatest Yankee ever to put on the pinstripes, but I am the proudest" (DeMarco, 2001, p. xxxiii).

However, one could argue that Martin played the symbolic leader card once too often. Late in his career, the public grew increasingly intolerant of the boys-will-be-boys lifestyle that Martin and many other athletes and coaches during his era enjoyed. Eventually the elbow-bending escapades and periodic brawls that were always part of his folklore were cast in a negative light. He went from being a folk hero to being perceived as a wild, mean, alcoholic boor.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests. Billy Martin could have been a master in the use of political frame leadership behavior. But as we shall see, he didn't always use it in the most appropriate manner. Martin was

no yes-man, but one could argue that there were times when he would have been far more effective if he had used a little restraint and held his tongue.

Such a show of restraint would have been useful in 1969 when he was managing the Minnesota Twins. Martin interceded in a midseason bar fight between pitcher Dave Boswell and outfielder Bob Allison. In the process, he ended up beating Boswell unmercifully. As a result, he lost political capital with owner Calvin Griffith, and following a loss to the Baltimore Orioles in the American League playoffs, he was fired.

In other instances of the misuse of political behavior when it would have been appropriate to show restraint, Martin was fired from the Detroit Tigers in late 1973 after repeated disagreements with the Tigers' general manager, Jim Campbell. Once again, in 1976 when the Cincinnati Reds of Johnny Bench, Pete Rose, Joe Morgan, and Tony Perez swept the Yankees in the World Series, George Steinbrenner stepped in, signing flamboyant slugger Reggie Jackson to the team. The world would never be the same. In 1978, the Yankees struggled to keep up with the hot pace of the Boston Red Sox, and the tensions between Martin, Jackson, and Steinbrenner ultimately contributed to an O'Hare Airport outburst from Martin where he disparaged Jackson and Steinbrenner to the press, saying, "One is a born liar [Jackson] and the other is convicted [Steinbrenner]," referring to an illegal donation to the Nixon campaign charge against Steinbrenner. This lack of political behavior led to his first firing from the Yankees. Martin lost the Yankee job for a second time a couple of years later when he had a highly publicized fight in a hotel lobby with a traveling salesman. Restraint in the form of political frame leadership behavior would have been more appropriate.

Some of his former players tried to influence Martin's use of political behavior, but to no avail. Dr. Bobby Brown, a former Yankee, went to desperate measures to try to get Martin to use more political frame behavior to help him remain employed. He convinced Gil McDougald, one of Martin's favorites, to intervene. McDougald tried to talk sense to him, but without success. He asked Martin how many times he had to get fired before he learned a lesson. "You're always trying to prove that you're smarter than somebody," he said. "Just pitch the guy they want you to and show them they are wrong" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 171). But

Martin just couldn't get himself to compromise what he regarded as his principles, so he continued to get fired.

Martin's continued obstinacy was not a wise and prudent approach with regard to his job security. But from the standpoint of being loyal to the game and loyal to the players on the team, his actions made sense to him. Martin would sometimes go to unusual lengths to protect his authority. Detroit slugger Willie Horton once watched Martin quit his job as manager of the Detroit Tigers when club general manager Jim Campbell lectured Martin on how to manage Horton with the slugger sitting right there in the room with them. Horton recalled that when Campbell started questioning whether Martin should have pinch hit for him, Martin stood up and started to yell. There was a pipe on his desk that Campbell had given him in better days. Martin picked it up and threw it at him saying, "You take your pipe and your team. You don't tell me how to run my ball team" (DeMarco, 2001, p. 202).

Martin also struggled with his relations with the media throughout his career, especially in New York. Phil Pepe, who covered Martin throughout his career and liked and admired him, regrets Martin's behavior around the press. Pepe said that it bothered him that Martin could very often be rude and mean-spirited to baseball writers. On the other hand, Martin prided himself on being a baseball expert, and he was unwilling or unable to bite his tongue and use political frame behavior when the media would say or do something that he considered to be amateurish.

In another instance of placing what he considered "principle" over expediency, Martin wanted Steinbrenner to get Joe Rudi from the Oakland A's to help the Yankees over the hump, but Steinbrenner preferred Reggie Jackson. From the first, Martin made it clear to Jackson that he didn't want him and totally ignored him in spring training, ultimately paying the price. Steinbrenner was proven right when Jackson, despite his public and private disagreements with Martin, was instrumental in the Yankees winning two World Series. Nevertheless, everything came to a head on a hot day in Boston in June 1977. With a national television audience of 50 million people watching, Martin went after Jackson in the Fenway Park visitors' dugout after Jackson, playing the outfield, seemed not to hustle after a pop fly that fell in front of him for a single. Martin substituted Paul Blair for him on the spot. When Jackson got to

the dugout he said, “You embarrassed me in front of 50 million people,” and an altercation broke out between them (DeMarco, 2001, p. 190).

In contrast to all these instances, Martin effectively used political frame behavior early in his career as a player when he received a lucrative offer to play professionally in Japan, where he was both known and popular from a few Yankees’ barnstorming trips. Martin turned down the offer to stay in American baseball with the Minnesota Twins organization. This decision paid dividends years later when the Twins gave him his first major league managing job.

Martin often used political behavior with his players—sometimes not very admirably. He was known to have used players who were dispensable to keep the other players focused. This method may have been the least attractive but effective methods of Martin’s leadership. For these players, life was tough because not only were they going to sit on the bench and be made examples of, they were also going to take the brunt for some of his anger and frustration as a means of motivating the rest of the club.

Another example of the effective application of political frame behavior had to do with Martin’s running battle of wits with Larry Gura, a star pitcher for the Kansas City Royals. Gura had just lost to the Yankees 4–1. When speaking to the reporters, Martin said: “He pitched very well.” He limited his remarks and restrained himself from saying what he really felt, namely, that Gura’s pitching mistakes lost the game for the Royals. He confided in his friends, “I just said that because I want them to pitch him again” (DeMarco, 2001, p. 248).

CONCLUSION

There is no question that Billy Martin was an effective leader. The only question is whether he was as successful as he could have been? His teams were always well prepared and highly competitive, indicating his effective use of structural frame leadership behavior. As a result he was known as the consummate “student of the game.” He was also adept at utilizing human resource behavior in motivating his teams to play hard. He also convinced most of his players that he had their best interests in mind in his decision-making. He formed lasting relationships with his

players both on and off the field. Hall of Famer Rod Carew is but one of his former players who considered him to be a father figure.

It could be argued that Martin was most gifted in the effective use of symbolic frame leadership behavior. He forged a reputation as a fiery competitor to the point where the press coined the term Billyball to describe his teams' character. He also fostered the image of one who would never compromise his principles for the sake of expediency. He stood his ground to the point where he would rather jeopardize his job than capitulate. The characteristic pose of him standing atop the dug-out steps, peering out onto the field was reminiscent of the pose of the sculpture *The Thinker*.

If there is a criticism of Martin's use of situational leadership theory, it would be regarding his effective application of political frame leadership behavior. Although he used this frame of leadership behavior on occasion, one could argue that his use of it was much too infrequent. The restraint required of political frame behavior was at times anathema to Martin. He just could not convince himself to "look the other way." As a result, he was way too combative for his own good. At times, his life was akin to a soap opera. But it didn't have to be that way. If he could have walked away from some of his unnecessary fights and confrontations, he could have fully realized his enormous leadership potential. As it is, however, there are many lessons to be learned from studying the leadership behavior of a true baseball legend, Billy Martin.

FRANK ROBINSON

A man who walks and believes in God will always reach his destination.

—Dusty Baker

BACKGROUND

Frank Robinson was the first African American manager in major league history, beginning his managerial career with the Cleveland Indians in 1975. He was born in 1935 and admitted to the baseball Hall of Fame in 1982. As a player, he was an outfielder for the Cincinnati Reds and the Baltimore Orioles. He played for twenty-one years and was the only player to win the Most Valuable Player (MVP) Award in both the American and National Leagues. Other notable achievements as a player were two Triple Crowns, one in each league, and two World Series. He ranks seventh on the career home run list with 586.

After becoming a player-manager with the Cleveland Indians in 1975, he went on to manage the San Francisco Giants, the Baltimore Orioles, the Montreal Expos, and the Washington Nationals. Before becoming a manager, Robinson had a long and successful playing career. Most of

his playing career was spent with the Cincinnati Reds and the Baltimore Orioles. He closed out his playing days with the Los Angeles Dodgers, California Angels, and Cleveland Indians.

In 1956, his rookie year with the Cincinnati Reds, he tied the rookie home run record with thirty-eight home runs. He was named Rookie of the Year. His best year was with the Reds in 1961, when the Reds won the pennant and Robinson won his first MVP award. Robinson was known to “crowd the plate” as a hitter and set records for being hit by pitched balls.

In 1966, Reds owner Bill DeWitt made the controversial decision of sending Robinson to Baltimore in exchange for pitchers Milt Pappas and Jack Baldschun, and outfielder Dick Simpson. The trade was remembered as one of the most lopsided in major league history and tarnished DeWitt’s reputation for many years. Meanwhile, Robinson’s first year in Baltimore was a historic one. He accomplished the rare feat of winning the Triple Crown, leading the American League with a .316 batting average, 49 home runs, and 122 runs batted in. The Orioles won the World Series and Robinson was named the series MVP.

In Baltimore, he became integrally involved in the civil rights movement. He originally declined membership in the NAACP unless the organization promised not to ask him to do public appearances. However, after witnessing Baltimore’s segregated housing and discriminatory real estate practices, he changed his mind and became an outspoken critic of racism.

The Baltimore Orioles won three consecutive pennants between 1969 and 1971 and won another World Series crown in 1970, ironically defeating Robinson’s former team, the Cincinnati Reds. Robinson’s career totals include a .294 batting average, 586 home runs, 1,812 runs batted in, and 2,943 hits.

Robinson’s managing career began in the winter leagues, after which he was named the player-manager of the Cleveland Indians in 1975. His managing career would go on to include another four major league stops. He was awarded the American League Manager of the Year Award in 1989 for leading the Baltimore Orioles to an 87–75 record, a significant improvement to the previous year when they went 54–107. He retired as a manager with over 1,000 career victories (Wikipedia.org; Robinson, 1988).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style. There is ample evidence that Frank Robinson was a situational leader who adapted his leadership behavior to the readiness level of his followers.

Robinson acknowledges that one of his biggest challenges when he began his managing career in the Puerto Rican winter leagues was how to handle pitchers. It took him two or three years to figure out that he could no longer relate to them in the same way as he did as a player. Now that he was in a different role, his earlier leadership behavior no longer applied. Elrod Hendricks, his Oriole teammate and his winter league catcher, told him, “Frank, I think you hated pitchers for so long as a player that you have trouble relating to them as a manager” (Robinson, 1988, p. 73).

Robinson learned that he had to be situational to be effective by contrasting himself to Dick Williams, a manager whom Robinson felt was ineffective because he was “stuck” in one leadership frame to the detriment of the others. According to Robinson, Williams was a hard-driving, hard-nosed, no-nonsense type who was a difficult man to be around. He could be gruff, sarcastic, and abrasive in his comments to his players. As Robinson observed, Williams was successful for a year or two wherever he went, but was never effective for longer because he never supplemented his structural leadership behavior with human resource behavior.

Robinson recognized the usefulness of situational leadership theory when he pitch hit for John Ellis and Ellis started throwing his catching gear around the dugout, almost hitting Robinson. Robinson “went off” on him in the dugout. However, Robinson noted upon looking back on the situation that he should probably not have reacted so sharply. In later years he tried to hold his temper in such situations and make his point with the player when things had cooled down. He had played for

managers like Earl Weaver who responded in kind to angry players. Still he found that the “24 hour delay rule” was a better way to deal with the *contemporary* ballplayer. In other words, according to Robinson, what worked in the past will not necessarily work in the present because the *situation* may have changed.

Robinson stopped arguing with umpires because that particular behavior was no longer effective. Early in his managing career he became known as an umpire baiter, and it was having a detrimental effect on him and his team. One of the Cleveland sportswriters conducted a survey at the end of the season regarding the umpires’ relationship with Robinson. One of the umpires spoke for the rest when he observed that “Robbie has changed almost 100 percent since midseason. At first he’d start yelling at us on the first pitch of the game and never stop. All the sudden he went the other way. Maybe it’s because the pressure of being the first black manager is gone” (Robinson, 1988, p. 132).

Being situational with his players soon became a Robinson trademark. With some of his players like Rico Carty and Lowell Blanks, he occasionally had to push a little and lay down the law. With other players, like Buddy Bell and Duane Kuiper, he had to pat on the back and encourage, or they would feel that he was ignoring them. He also learned to utilize peer influence in a situational way. Robinson recalled that Joe Morgan applied the velvet glove approach in the locker room, whereas Reggie Smith “just yelled at them” (Robinson, 1988, p. 198).

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural frame leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Frank Robinson’s image as both a player and manager was one of a no-nonsense, stone-faced professional. He prided himself on his structural leadership behavior, for his teams being well conditioned and well prepared, and for being serious about his craft.

Robinson credits most of his training in the importance of structural frame leadership behavior to his former manager with the Cincinnati Reds, Birdie Tebbetts. Tebbetts was like a father to Robinson and

taught him to study the opposition and to think ahead, to anticipate what the other manager and the other players would be expected to do in various situations. Thus, from the very beginning of his managing career in the Puerto Rican leagues, Robinson was known for “laying down the law.” When one of his pitchers from the big leagues, Juan Pizarro, would not throw between starts as was customary, he told Pizarro that he would be fined if he did not conform. To his credit, Pizarro did conform, saying “I’ll do whatever you want, Frank” (Robinson, 1988, p. 73). Thus, Robinson was not nearly as loose as most of the other managers were with ball clubs in Puerto Rico. In his mind, they were not there for vacation; they were there to work on their weaknesses.

He also learned a lot about the use of structural behavior from another of his major league managers, Earl Weaver and his Baltimore Orioles. Weaver kept precise statistics on how each of his players hit against every pitcher in the league. The boos would rain down at Memorial Stadium when in the ninth inning Weaver would send up Mark Belanger, who ordinarily was a weak hitter, to pinch hit against Hall of Famers Nolan Ryan and Goose Gossage. Little did they know that Belanger was hitting over .400 against both of them. It was right there on those little index cards that Weaver was fond of keeping and, in turn, Robinson imitated.

Further, Weaver was fixated on the fundamentals and would be out on the field showing the players what to do and how he wanted plays executed. Like Weaver, Robinson worked on fundamentals for hours day after day. By contrast, as Robinson recalled, the Dodgers, under legendary manager Walter Alston, virtually ignored drills on fundamentals. Robinson obviously preferred Weaver’s approach.

Along the same lines, Robinson believes that baseball players in general do not do enough running, so he had all his players doing long-distance running from foul line to foul line in the outfield, the way pitchers run. According to Robinson, Hall of Famer Gaylord Perry was the biggest culprit among pitchers, but Robinson insisted that the star pitcher comply just like everyone else. As one of his former players, Boog Powell, says of Robinson, “He’s a perfectionist about baseball details and when things aren’t done right, it’s got to eat at him” (Robinson, 1988, p. 122).

One final example of Robinson's effective use of structural leadership came at the hands of his star first baseman, Don Baylor, who was in a slump. Robinson looked at yards of videotape on Baylor's swing and his position in the batter's box. He suggested some adjustments and Baylor ended up hitting twenty-five home runs that year.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Although this frame is not thought to be one of Robinson's strengths, there is evidence that he can operate out of the human resource frame when appropriate. Robinson, himself, was intrinsically motivated as a player, so he did not initially see human resource behavior as being necessary. However, when he played for Fred Hutchinson at Cincinnati, he saw the effect that the lack of human resource behavior could have on some players. He respected Hutchinson as a manager, but he never could warm up to him. "He was just too tense to be in any way open and friendly," says Robinson. "He only talked to us when we made mistakes . . . never complimented us for doing well" (Robinson, 1988, p. 42).

Robinson's respect for human resource leadership behavior was another "gift" that he received from Earl Weaver. When he told Weaver that he wanted to manage someday, Weaver got him a job with Santurce in the Puerto Rican winter league. Robinson managed there for eight years while still playing for the Orioles in the summer. The valuable experience he acquired in Puerto Rico served him well when he became a major league manager, and it was all due to the application of a little human resource leadership behavior by Earl Weaver.

Still, the use of human resource leadership behavior did not come instinctively to Robinson. Hiram Cuevas, owner of Santurce, talked with him about how others related to him. Robinson replied that he did not care much about what people thought of him. Cuevas said, "Frank you're wrong. Everyone cares what others think of them. You care but you've never admitted it to yourself. You've been afraid to let people get close to you, to get to know you as a person" (Robinson, 1988, p. 74). Cuevas went on to point out that others did not really know Rob-

inson and were put off by his manner. When Robinson inquired as to what Cuevas was getting at, he referred to the fact that Robinson never smiled and always looked so serious, so intense that people took him the wrong way. He suggested that Robinson be more approachable, and to his credit, Robinson tried to come out of his shell. But as Robinson is quick to point out, it is still a work in progress.

Nevertheless, Robinson became somewhat facile at applying human resource behavior, especially after his initial use of structural behavior. For example, when Reggie Jackson was working on his swing in Puerto Rico, but not running ground balls out and getting to the games on time, Robinson asked him to sit next to him on the bench to get him out of the “vacation mentality” that he was obviously in. But while he was sitting next to him, Robinson took the opportunity to discuss Jackson’s stride, head position, bat speed, and pitch selection. It was almost immediately after that little tête-à-tête that Jackson became known as “Mr. October.”

As mentioned earlier, Earl Weaver had perhaps the greatest influence on Robinson’s leadership behavior overall, and on his human resource leadership behavior in particular. Robinson believed that Weaver kept his players happy over a 162-game season better than any manager he had ever known. According to Robinson, Weaver knew how to use all twenty-five men on the roster, and he was not afraid of being criticized for using the twenty-fifth man. He kept everyone relatively happy because the players did not just sit on the bench. He had regulars, platoon players, and role players. And, although he sometimes screamed at his players, he always allowed them to scream back—and he never, ever held grudges. Thus, he tended to get the most out of his players and Robinson followed suit during his managing career.

Robinson learned what the lack of human resource behavior rendered from one of his former managers, Dick Williams. “Dick kept himself farther from his players than any manager I’ve ever known,” Robinson remembered (Robinson, 1988, p. 103). Williams was successful, winning a pennant with the Boston Red Sox and two World Series titles with Oakland, but his inability to relate to modern-day ballplayers led to his eventual demise. His intimidating presence succeeded for a while until his players rebelled against him. Robinson was in the manager

business for the long haul and did not want what happened to Williams to happen to him.

Robinson became quite astute in dealing with players on an individual basis in his application of human resource behavior. George Hendrick played for Robinson when he managed the Cleveland Indians. Hendrick was known to have “marched to his own drummer.” He did not hustle on the field at all times, which annoyed fans, writers, teammates, and the front office. “All I asked of George was that he give *his* 100 percent,” said Robinson. “It might not be the same as another’s 100 percent” (Robinson, 1988, p. 115). As a result of this treatment, Hendrick had his most productive years under Robinson.

Getting to know your followers is a requisite of human resource frame leadership behavior. And Robinson was a master at getting to know the idiosyncrasies of his players. John Ellis, a catcher who played for Robinson, had a very difficult time remembering opposing players’ names and faces and only knew them by number. In one particular game, he missed a tag on a player coming to the plate, but the player missed touching the plate. By the time Ellis realized it, the player was in the dugout with the rest of the team with their backs to the bench so Ellis could not see their numbers. No problem—Robinson instructed him to tag everybody in the dugout.

The Hall of Fame second baseman Joe Morgan gave testament to Robinson’s effective use of human resource leadership behavior. When Morgan came to the San Francisco Giants to play for Robinson, he was at the tail end of his career. Robinson, however, gave him some hitting tips that ended up extending his career. As a result, Morgan became Robinson’s manager on the field and in the clubhouse. He called Robinson “one of the most open, accessible managers in the game. His door was always open to players” (Robinson, 1988, p. 1999).

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. Not particularly known for his strengths in the area of symbolic leadership, Frank Robin-

son nonetheless used it effectively at times. Both as a player and manager, Robinson projected an image of a serious, no-nonsense, and aggressive individual, and he did all he could to cultivate and sustain that image.

As a player, he became known as a guy who cut down infielders. He became infamous for sliding hard into second base with his spikes high. In a game with the Dodgers, he spiked second baseman Don Zimmer, which prompted the great Duke Snider to shout out, "What are you trying to prove?" (Robinson, 1988, p. 33). The answer was that Robinson was trying to prove that he was not a person to trifle with. As an indication of his toughness, Robinson was particularly proud of the fact that in his rookie year he was hit by pitches on twenty different occasions, which led the league. He went on to lead the league in that category ten different times during his long career as a player.

Robinson saw the humoristic side of building an image when he was playing for Fred Hutchinson and the Cincinnati Reds. Hutchinson had a reputation for being volatile with a terrible temper. After a close loss to the Pittsburgh Pirates, he stormed into the locker room and threw a folding chair at the wall. Nothing happened to it, so he threw it to the ground. Still nothing happened, so he slammed it down again with a thud—still nothing. Finally, he unfolded it and sat down on it. "I think I've finally met my match," he said (Robinson, 1988, p. 41).

Being one of the first African American superstars required Robinson to engage in both symbolic and political behavior in gaining the respect of his teammates and the rest of baseball. On more than one occasion he was made painfully aware of the deep-seeded prejudice that he had to overcome. On one of these occasions, a fight broke out between his Cincinnati Reds and the Philadelphia Phillies. A couple of Phillies grabbed Robinson and threw him to the ground. The Phillies pitcher, Hall of Famer Robin Roberts, called him a nigger. Roberts later apologized, but Robinson believed "that what came out of his mouth was what he felt in his heart" (Robinson, 1988, p. 45). In a similar vein, Robinson was accused of forming a "Negro Clique" with Vada Pinson of the Reds that many teammates believed undermined the morale of the club. Jim Brosnan wrote in his book that Robinson was "not the type of person you go out for a beer with" (Robinson, 1988, p. 55).

Robinson admitted not being friendly with the white players, but they didn't take any initiative either, according to him. However, this all

ended in 1963 when Pete Rose arrived in Cincinnati. “Charlie Hustle” was resented by the white players for his hustle because he made them look bad by comparison, but not by Robinson who saw some of himself in Rose. Robinson asked Rose early on if he would like to join Pinson and him for dinner. Said Rose: “Damn right, Frank, I’ll be honored” (Robinson, 1988, p. 55). And over time, Robinson was able to change his image from being someone with a chip on his shoulder regarding race to that of a hard-working and valuable asset to any team. This image transformation culminated on March 16, 1981, when for the first time two black managers, he and Maury Wills, exchanged lineup cards at home plate.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interest.

Along with other African Americans during Robinson’s era, he had to “swallow hard” a number of times in order to reach his true potential. Knowing early on that he had the desire to become a major league manager eventually, he did not want to be labeled as a troublemaker because what owner in his right mind would want to hire a troublemaker as a manager especially if he also happened to be black.

Robinson astutely used political frame behavior by taking advantage of a gaff that unexpectedly opened the door for African American managers. After Al Campanis, the Dodgers general manager, made his colossal blunder on the television show *Nightline*, saying that blacks didn’t have the “necessities” to manage, Robinson thought that this might be the biggest breakthrough for blacks in sports since Jackie Robinson broke the color line in the major leagues. Robinson took advantage of the first opportunity that presented itself and became the first African American to manage in the big leagues.

This was not the first of Al Campanis’s blunders. In April 1987, Stan Hochman of the *Philadelphia Daily News* wrote, “Campanis babbled about blacks lacking buoyancy as a reason why you see so few black

swimmers” (Robinson, 1988, p. 10). As if to excuse Campanis for his view, some people pointed out that he had helped a lot of black players get to the major leagues. But the reality was that the Dodgers signed them because of their ability that could help them win pennants and make more money. But after their careers as players were over, Robinson was quick to observe, they were judged to no longer have any ability—certainly not the ability to manage.

So to survive in this racially charged era, Robinson had to employ political frame leadership behavior continually throughout his career as a player and as a manager. For example, the Reds general manager, Bill DeWitt, demanded that Robinson agree to a pay cut because he had a “down year.” He had “only” hit .297 with 83 RBIs and 31 home runs. Of course, by today’s standards, he would have been offered a \$10 million per year contract for these numbers. Robinson acknowledged that his statistics were down from the year before, but he reminded DeWitt that his stats were still the best on the club in all three areas and that he had given five good years to the club and deserved a raise on that basis. He capitulated and finally signed for the same salary. A couple of years later he was the MVP in the National League and DeWitt offered him a \$2,500 raise. This brought him up to \$12,500 after five strenuous and demeaning negotiating sessions. One could not blame Robinson if he developed a chip on his shoulder over these years. But he grit his teeth and endured this mistreatment so that he would be held in good stead for someday acquiring a managing position.

However, in 1964, he reached his last straw. Bill DeWitt gleefully cut his salary by \$5,000 for the next season, since Robinson was on the downside of his career. He just couldn’t take it any longer and blurted out to reporters that he had “taken a bad cut and I’m going over to the Reds’ office and have the stitches taken out” (Robinson, 1988, p. 56). This lack of political frame behavior caused Robinson to be labeled a troublemaker by many of the owners.

Robinson not only used political frame behavior to his own benefit, he did so in support of his teammates, further reinforcing his troublemaker image. One year the Reds scheduled a spring training game in Mexico, with the veteran players like Robinson staying in a luxury downtown hotel and the rookies staying at a Causeway Inn to save money. Robinson protested the unfair treatment and finally was able to persuade management

to give everyone the same deal that he and the other veterans had. In a similar incident when he was first traded to the Baltimore Orioles, the general manager, Harry Dalton, acknowledged that Robinson had some pretty good stats, “but you didn’t produce them for us.” Robinson replied, “I didn’t trade for me, you did” (Robinson, 1988, p. 58). He got his raise.

Robinson was forced to use political frame behavior even as a manager. Robinson didn’t want to be a player-manager because as a first-time manager he wanted to concentrate on his primary job of managing. But he capitulated in order to get his first big league job. To make things worse, they paid him his player’s salary and he was forced, in effect, to manage for nothing. Again, he capitulated. His thinking was that this was the first time a black man had been offered the job of managing in the majors, and it may just open up the door for others.

Robinson was not above using the media to his political advantage. One of his pitchers, Jim Perry, the older brother of Hall of Famer Gaylord Perry, threatened to go to the media with his complaint that Robinson took him out of a game prematurely. Robinson’s reaction was in kind. He suggested to Perry that he would most certainly have a bad game sometime in the future and the media would be coming to Robinson for a comment—the strong insinuation being that if Perry was going to rip Robinson in the press, he could expect the same treatment in return. Sometimes, however, this strategy backfired on Robinson. He once gave an interview to Russ Schneider of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* where he rated the umpires in the National League from “best to worst” in what worked out to be a very inappropriate use of political frame behavior.

On most occasions, however, Robinson effectively utilized political frame leadership behavior. For example, when he was fired at Cleveland, although bitter, he did not air the dirty laundry in public and simply told the press that his two plus years managing in Cleveland were tough but enjoyable, and that he hoped to manage again sometime soon. In yet another instance of effectively using political frame behavior, when Giants’ general manager Tom Haller summarily fired Curt Molton, one of Robinson’s minor league instructors, Robinson went to owner Bob Lurie and had him reinstated. Later Lurie wanted the image of a happy family reported to the press and asked Robinson for a payback. “We

have to be together here, Frank, and work in harmony,” Lurie said. “He asked me to put on that type face with the press,” said Robinson—and he did (Robinson, 1988, p. 196).

CONCLUSION

When assessing Frank Robinson’s leadership ability one must always be aware of the context in which it took place. Leadership is a complex skill without the additional challenge of being a black man in a white man’s game. Just as Pat Summitt and John Thompson in basketball and Tony Dungy in football, Robinson had to overcome added obstacles to succeed in his chosen profession. As a result, Robinson was forced to utilize political frame leadership behavior on a more frequent basis than his managing counterparts. With good reason, Robinson sometimes seemed to perceive the world as a basically hostile place, which is typical of a leader operating out the political frame. This worldview is very likely due to his being an African American in an era when the presence of white managers clearly dominated Major League Baseball. Still, despite his frequent use of political behavior, there is clear evidence that he also used structural, human resource, and symbolic behavior when appropriate. Under the circumstances and considering the readiness level of the individuals and groups with which he interacted, Robinson took a very balanced approach to leadership. Robinson’s record of success as both a player and a manager speaks for itself. There is much to be learned from studying his effective application of situational leadership behavior.

CASEY STENGEL

My advice to you players is to buy stock in Pennsylvania Railroad, because if you don't start playing better ball there's gonna be so many of you riding trains outa here that railroad stocks are a cinch to go up.

—Casey Stengel

BACKGROUND

Casey Stengel was a legendary baseball manager, most notably with the New York Yankees. He was born in Kansas City in 1890 and acquired his nickname, Casey, when he began his major league career and his teammates began referring to him as “K. C.” after his hometown. The K. C. eventually morphed into Casey. In the 1950s the sportswriters dubbed him with yet another nickname, the “Old Professor,” for his sharp wit and his tendency to deliver long soliloquies on baseball.

Stengel was a very good athlete and played a number of sports in high school, including baseball, football, and basketball. He had no particular illusions of sports as a long-term profession, and he initially

had aspirations of a career in dentistry. However, during his dentistry training his minor league baseball career prospered and he was drafted by the Brooklyn Dodgers and spent most of the 1912 season playing for one of their minor league clubs. He was brought up to the Dodgers late in the season, and baseball soon became his obsession.

Stengel was an outfielder on several teams in the National League, including the Brooklyn Dodgers, the Pittsburgh Pirates, the Philadelphia Phillies, the New York Giants, and the Boston Braves. He played in three World Series: in 1916 for the Dodgers and in 1922 and 1923 with the Giants. He finished his career with a very respectable batting average of .284 in fourteen major league seasons.

Stengel became much better known for managing than for playing. His first managerial positions with the Brooklyn Dodgers and Boston Braves, however, were not very successful, never finishing better than fifth in an eight-team league. Nevertheless, Stengel eventually proved that he could be a successful manager if his team had some talent. In 1944, Stengel was hired as the manager of the minor league Milwaukee Brewers, over the strenuous objections of club owner Bill Veeck, who was serving in World War II and unable to prevent the hiring. Veeck was proven wrong as Stengel led the Brewers to the American Association pennant that year. In 1948 Stengel managed the Oakland Oaks to the Pacific Coast League championship. This led to his appointment as manager of the New York Yankees.

Despite a great amount of skepticism in the press, Stengel was hired by the Yankees in 1949 and finally achieved success at the major league level. He proceeded to set records for championships, becoming the only person to manage a team to five consecutive World Series championships. He ultimately won a total of seven world championships and ten American League pennants with the Yankees.

However, despite his overall record of success, after losing to the Pittsburgh Pirates in the 1960 World Series on a dramatic game-winning home run by Bill Mazeroski, Stengel was forced to retire, because at seventy he was thought too old to be a manager. Over the years his tactical genius kept the Yankees in many games they might have otherwise lost. However, in the 1960 World Series, Stengel's moves and lack of moves allowed a woefully inferior Pittsburgh team to win in seven games.

After one season in retirement, however, Stengel was hired to manage the fledgling New York Mets. Although spectacularly unsuccessful with the “Amazin Mets,” Stengel still had the personal charisma to fill the stadium day after day. He stayed with the Mets for five years until he fell and broke his hip and subsequently announced his retirement on August 30, 1965. His uniform number, 37, has been retired by both the Yankees and the Mets. He was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 1966. Stengel was admitted to Glendale Memorial Hospital in California on September 14, 1975. It was determined that he had cancer of the lymph glands. He died there just fifteen days later at age eighty-five (Wikipedia.org; Creamer, 1984).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style.

As we shall see, Casey Stengel was a master at using situational leadership and balancing his leadership behavior among the four frames of Bolman and Deal. He used the symbolic frame to establish himself as “Stengel the Clown.” He was known as a very funny man, a quick-witted wisecracker, a physical comic, a natural mime who was very facile at imitating others. Yet he was always serious about the game of baseball and about how it should be played. He moved from symbolic to structural leadership behavior in placing a great emphasis on having his players thoroughly schooled in the fundamentals of the game.

John McGraw, the Hall of Fame manager of the New York Giants in the early part of the twentieth century, was Stengel’s hero. He patterned his managerial behavior after that of McGraw. Beyond winning, McGraw imposed his personality on his team and on the game. In his mind, he was the best, his team was the best, and he used symbolic leadership behavior to get everybody else to know it. He also used structural behavior, at times to excess, in being ill-tempered, sneering, bullying,

and unpleasant. His structural leadership behavior also established him as a baseball genius, a tactician whose sense of the progress of the game was uncanny, a strategist who could see impending strengths and weaknesses in his own and other clubs before anyone else. But at the same time, he was known to utilize human resource behavior in being warmhearted, generous, and even charming at times. Stengel wanted to be just like him—and as we will see, to a great extent, he was.

An astute awareness of change helped make Stengel and his mentors great managers. Stengel came into baseball when it was a low-scoring, singles-hitting game. He was still a player when home runs and high batting averages took over. He managed three decades later when it was a home runs and low-batting-average league. Watching McGraw, Stengel learned about change at the same time he learned what was immutable. He learned, for example, that you not only have to have the players, you have to know how to handle them, to keep them motivated. In short, he learned that he had to utilize a variety of leadership frames in order to remain effective as the situation changed. When he was managing the Yankees, he used a much different approach than when he was managing the Brooklyn Dodgers and the Boston Braves earlier in his career. When asked about his lack of disciplinary rules for his Yankees, he responded: “If you have men who make you set rules, then you have rules. If they don’t need rules, then you don’t have to make rules” (Creamer, 1984, p. 223).

Phil Rizzuto, the great Yankee shortstop, took note of Stengel’s changing leadership style in a less than positive way. He claimed that Stengel was a changed man after winning the pennant in 1949 with a flawed team. He became loud and sarcastic, took too much credit for the good things the team did, criticized his players when things went wrong, and got too chummy with the press. According to Rizzuto, the subdued Stengel who had patched up the underrated 1949 team and held it together to win the pennant was gone, and a garrulous, confident, know-it-all had taken his place. Actually, it was Stengel practicing situational leadership—albeit in questionable fashion.

However, as astute as Stengel was as a situational leader in most cases, he was not able to reach the proper balance among the leadership frames with perhaps his most gifted pupil, Mickey Mantle. Stengel was never quite able to get Mantle to conform to his wishes.

It was simply not in Mantle's nature to openly defy an authority figure like Stengel. Rather, the defiance came in the form of not listening, in not paying attention, in not doing, like an intractable teenager. On the other hand, Stengel knew what buttons to push with Billy Martin. Once when Martin was fuming over Stengel pulling him for a pinch hitter, Stengel walked by Martin saying, "Widdle Bilwy mad at me?" (Creamer, 1984, p. 258). That kind of back and forth was impossible with Mantle. Stengel's anger toward Mantle subsided with the years, and they got along well enough after Stengel accepted the inevitable—Mantle wasn't going to change.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural leaders develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Despite his reputation of being "a character," which would imply the frequent use of symbolic behavior, Casey Stengel was equally recognized as the Professor for his dedication to teaching the fundamentals of the game and for being a supreme strategist—both traits of the structural leader.

The paradox that was Casey Stengel was encapsulated in the following observation made in 1942 by Dave Egan, a reporter for the *Boston Herald*: "He's a funny guy, always funny at somebody else's expense, always funny in his cruel and malicious way. And he was not at all reluctant to enjoy another's discomfort. Some of his players, including Joe DiMaggio and Phil Rizzuto, hated him for that, but Stengel never seemed to mind their antipathy" (Creamer, 1984, p. 13). In fact, it was a reflection of his extreme use of structural frame behavior.

As a further indication of his use of structural leadership behavior, Stengel always saw a lot of things in baseball that others did not. He was remarkably intelligent, although with little formal education beyond the minimum forced on him in grammar and high school and what he picked up during his two semesters at dental school. He had a prodigious memory and a startling ability to recall relevant detail. In baseball he had the kind of understanding of a situation that is often described as

intuitive, but that is probably just rapid-fire, computer-speed deduction derived from long years of experience.

Stengel was schooled in his use of structural behavior by a number of mentors including Norman Elberfeld, his manager in the minor leagues, who taught him the intricacies of the hit and run, hitting behind the runner, and hitting to vacated areas. He also showed him how to stand close to the plate to get hit by a pitched ball and moving up in the batter's box to be better able to hit a curve ball. As a result, Stengel was always sharing his knowledge, always teaching—sometimes out of self-defense. “What else are you gonna do when you get a second-division ball club,” he said. You only have a couple of youngsters to work with. You keep on them. You ask them why they didn't make that throw? You ask them why they played that man there?” (Creamer, 1984, p. 185).

He learned to utilize structural frame behavior early in his career when he was managing the minor league Milwaukee Brewers. One of his players there, Ed Levy, remembered that of all the managers he played for, there was never one that was smarter and keener regarding the intricacies of baseball than Stengel. Another of his players, second baseman Tommy Nelson, indicated that Stengel had taught him more about playing second base than he ever dreamed there was to learn. Still another of his players, Heinz Becker, said that he was the greatest manager in the game when it came to keeping his players thinking. Becker never knew a manager to spend so much time with his players trying to get smart baseball across to them, trying to prepare them so that when their time came to go to the big leagues, they would be ready.

Although Stengel benefited from the Yankees' deep pockets and ability to sign great players, he was a hands-on, structural manager. For example, the 1949 Yankees were riddled by injuries, and Stengel's platooning abilities played a major role in their championship run. Platooning also played a major role in the 1951 team's World Series run. With Joe DiMaggio declining rapidly and Mickey Mantle yet to become a superstar, the Yankees were weak offensively. Stengel, leaving his solid pitching alone, moved players in and out of the lineup, putting good hitters in the lineup in the early innings and replacing them with better defensive players later in the game. The strategy worked and the Yankees won both the pennant and the World Series that year.

In his first year with the Yankees, Stengel initiated what he called his “seminar-type” instruction, where he divided the players among his superstars and had them share their knowledge of the game in small groups. Nothing like this was ever seen in a Yankee camp before, and there was considerable skepticism among the sportswriters and some of the players. But Stengel defended the method, saying he would have loved to have been schooled by a player with Joe DiMaggio’s skills as a kid learning the game of baseball. He was constantly creating new ways of looking at things, always evaluating, discovering inadequacies, locating strengths. As a result, he was one of the first to use the platoon system to maximize strengths and minimize weaknesses.

After winning his first World Series in the late 1940s, Stengel decided to use even more structural behavior to keep his team from becoming complacent. He had no illusions. He knew that winning a second championship could be even more difficult than winning the first, and that he had a lot of work to do. That year he was more direct and forceful in running the team, much to the chagrin of his star shortstop, Phil Rizzuto. But Stengel didn’t worry about Rizzuto’s view because in his mind Rizzuto was a follower, not a leader. On that same team was Joe Page, his great reliever in 1949 who was a manager’s bane, a night person with a cavalier attitude toward authority. Stengel put up with it in 1949, but no longer. Page was Joe DiMaggio’s personal troubleshooter, a role that Billy Martin would assume when Page was traded away that year. When DiMaggio slumped in 1950, Stengel dropped him to fifth in the batting order—no more deference was given. Page protested the move on behalf of DiMaggio. Stengel promptly traded him. Page was not missed; DiMaggio ended up hitting over .300 and Rizzuto batted .324 and blossomed in the field and was voted MVP. Thus, Stengel’s more structural leadership behavior worked. In addition, he brought up his protégée Billy Martin who was noisy and cocky in the Stengel tradition.

As Stengel became more successful as a manager, he gained confidence and began to increase his use of structural behavior. He began to use sarcasm more often as a motivating devise. For example, when rookie outfielder Gene Woodling lost a ball in the sun and the Yankees lost a shutout, Stengel came out of the dugout to replace Whitey Ford, and while on the mound did a mocking pantomime of Woodling staggering under the fly ball. This curious performance angered some, like

Woodling, while amusing others. That he could openly criticize one of his own players before a crowd of nearly seventy thousand people demonstrated how far Stengel had come in asserting his dominance over the ball club.

Stengel's new position of strength and his urge to teach led the Yankees early in 1951 to accede to his request that they establish an "instructional school" for young players, to run two or three weeks before spring training began to expose the young players to the wisdom and knowledge of Stengel and the other coaches. The reporters immediately dubbed him the Perffessor, purposely misspelling the term to conform to "Stengelese." Mickey Mantle turned out to be the prized graduate of the school.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Despite his all too frequent use of sarcasm aimed at his players, there are numerous instances when Casey Stengel operated out of the human resource frame of leadership.

Al Bridwell, who knew Stengel when he played for the New York Giants, noted that "it wasn't so much knowing baseball. All of them know that. What makes the difference is knowing each player and how to handle him" (Creamer, 1984, p. 141). When Stengel had the players to work with, as he had with the Yankees, he held them to a high level of performance for a dozen years. To keep a team playing that well for that long is more than luck. It is the astute use of human resource behavior, along with the other frames of leadership behavior.

Stengel learned most about the appropriate application of human resource behavior from his New York Giants manager, the legendary John McGraw. McGraw had become genuinely fond of Stengel. He often invited Stengel out to his new home in Pelham in the New York suburbs, where he and Stengel would sit in the kitchen talking baseball until all hours of the night. Stengel later built this same kind of relationship with Billy Martin.

Billy Martin remembered that when Stengel managed him in the minors, he would hit grounder after grounder to him, showing him different ways to make the double play, growled at him, laughed at him, bawled him out, praised him, and constantly tried to help the young Martin develop into the ballplayer he knew he could be. He was like a father to him. He particularly liked Martin's "fire," because it reminded him of himself.

Also, when he managed in the minor leagues, he started the tradition of rewarding his players when they won both ends of a doubleheader. He would bring them into the locker room and say, "You fellas did pretty well today and it's up to me to buy you each a three-dollar dinner" (Creamer, 1984, p. 203). The next day he would pass out three dollars apiece to twenty-seven men. This was back in 1946 when three dollars would buy you a gourmet dinner.

Another player that Stengel showered with human resource behavior was his Hall of Fame catcher, Yogi Berra. Stengel did more than just coach Berra; he was aware, as no one before him had been, that Berra was a truly sensitive young man who was hurt by many of the quips made about him yet had the courage to smile through them, Stengel acted as a buffer between Berra and those who poked fun at him.

Stengel was especially astute in applying human resource leadership behavior to the young and impressionable players. Al Lopez, the Cleveland Indians manager, observed that Stengel was unique in sticking with a young player and nursing him along. Stengel would sit and talk to them by the hour. He never had any children of his own, so they became his surrogate children. Of all the players Stengel managed in New York, none better exemplified the kind of individual he was trying to develop than the talented, professional, and versatile infielder Gil McDougald. McDougald was one among many that Stengel groomed into good players and, as important, good citizens.

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts

to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. One could easily argue that Casey Stengel's most dominant frame was the symbolic one. Over time, he built an image of himself that was recognized internationally. He was a master storyteller who spoke in his own unique language that was labeled "Stengelese."

His use of symbolic behavior began early on in his career. In 1919, Stengel was playing for the Pittsburgh Pirates and was being taunted mercilessly by fans of the Brooklyn Dodgers, his former team. Somehow Stengel got hold of a sparrow and used it to turn the crowd in his favor. With the bird tucked gently beneath his cap, Stengel strutted to the plate amidst a chorus of boos. He turned to the crowd, tipped his hat and out flew the sparrow. The jeers turned to cheers, and Stengel became an instant celebrity.

In another instance that added to the fast-developing legend, Stengel pulled a similar stunt. Wilbert Robinson, his Hall of Fame manager in Brooklyn, thought up an opening day gimmick where one of his players would catch the ceremonial first pitch by catching a baseball dropped out of an airplane flying over Ebbets Field. Stengel put the pilot up to dropping a grapefruit instead of a baseball and the "big splatter" occurred as the grapefruit fell off the catcher's mitt and hit the ground. Based on past experience, everyone involved had a good idea of who was responsible for the prank.

Stengel once posed as a farmer in the stands when his team was playing the Philadelphia Athletics. He taunted the A's players who invited him out on to the field to "do better." Of course, he did, hitting balls out of the stadium. They soon discovered it was Stengel putting on a show for the crowd, yet again. On another occasion he put his uniform on backward prompting Phillies manager Gavy Cravath to say: "You've done everything else backward here, you might as well wear your pants that way too" (Creamer, 1984, p. 131).

As a result of these antics, despite the triumphant end to the 1934 season, his first as a major league manager, Stengel was still considered a clown by most people during the years he managed the Dodgers, a humorous throwback hired to lead the latest edition of the "Daffiness Boys." He contributed to that image, of course, playing the comedian in the coach's box during games. For example, whenever Nick Tremark, a tiny five-foot-five-inch outfielder got on base, Stengel would make a

great show of looking for him through mock binoculars, which always broke up the crowd. We saw earlier, however, how he eventually dispelled his clown image by using structural frame behavior and ultimately became known as the Perffessor. Stengel finally got fired by the Dodgers, but as an indication of the broad popularity he had commanded, he was given a going away party and a gift. Steve Owens, then the coach of the New York Giants football team said, "This must be the first time anyone was given a party for being fired" (Creamer, 1984, p. 189).

After Brooklyn, Stengel managed the Boston Braves with limited success, but he continued building his image by the frequent use of symbolic behavior. Still, it wasn't until he had his monumental success with the Yankees that his image as a baseball genius fully blossomed. One of his great stars with the Boston Braves, the Hall of Fame pitcher Warren Spahn, who later played for Stengel when he managed the Mets, astutely commented: "I played for Casey before and after he was a genius" (Creamer, 1984, p. 195).

Stengel's image prompted others to treat him accordingly. For example, Stengel was hit by a car and hospitalized in 1943 when he was managing the Boston Braves. Frankie Frisch, then managing Pittsburgh, sent a telegram to the hospital that read: "Your attempt at suicide fully understood. Deepest sympathy you didn't succeed." That same season, Dave Egan of the *Boston Herald* wrote: "The man who did the most for baseball in Boston in 1943 was the motorist who ran Stengel down two days before the opening game and kept him away from the Braves for two months" (Creamer, 1984, p. 195). The next year, the *Sporting News* took a poll of 151 sportswriters rating the funniest managers. Stengel had four times as many votes as second place Jimmy Dykes and six times as many as third place Charlie Grimm. Stengel was now officially the "king of the clowns."

Stengel became a master publicist and promoter of both himself and his teams. He was a captivating raconteur and especially during the years of success with the Yankees had the media eating out of his hands. He became as much of a public figure as many of his star players. He appeared on the cover of national magazines such as *Time*, *Look*, and *Life*. His apparent stream of consciousness monologues on all facets of baseball history and tactics became known as Stengelese to the sportswriters, who nicknamed him the Old Perffessor.

But he still had his dissenters. When hired as manager of the Yankees, some of the writers could not believe that the dignified Yankees were hiring the “clown of baseball.” Dave Egan of the *Boston Herald* once again took a tongue-in-cheek shot at Stengel when he wrote: “Well, sirs and ladies, the Yankees have now mathematically eliminated themselves from the 1949 pennant race. They did so when they engaged ‘Perfessor’ Casey Stengel to mismanage them for the next two years, and you may be sure that the perfessor will oblige to the best of his unique ability.” Stengel, however, fought back in his typical symbolic style. Trying to establish himself as a good manager, rather than just a clown, he presented a serious image at the Yankees press conference. But he could not keep himself from uttering a final quip. “I’ve been hired to win,” he said, “and I think I will. There is less wrong with the Yankees than with any other club I’ve ever had” (Creamer, 1984, p. 223).

Some of Stengel’s quotes became nationally known. When speaking about his own hitting prowess, he said: “I was such a dangerous hitter I even got intentional walks during batting practice.” Then there was the quote with which we began this chapter. As manager of Toledo in the minor leagues, he said: “My advice to you players is to buy stock in Pennsylvania Railroad, because if you don’t start playing better ball there’s gonna be so many of you riding trains outa here that railroad stocks are a cinch to go up.” Then, in 1953, after the Yankees had won four straight World Series victories, he made the following observation: “If we’re going to win the pennant, we’ve got to start thinking we’re not as smart as we think we are.” And when, in his seventies, he became manager of the Mets, mocking his well-publicized advanced age, when he was hired he said, “It’s a great honor to be joining the Knickerbockers,” a New York baseball team that had seen its last game around the time of the Civil War (Creamer, 1984, p. 178).

The Mets proved to be so incompetent that they gave Stengel plenty of fresh Stengelese material for the New York City newspaper writers. “Come see my ‘Amazin’ Mets,” Stengel said. “I’ve been in this game a hundred years, but I see new ways to lose I never knew existed before.” On his three catchers he commented: “I got one that can throw but can’t catch, one that can’t catch but can’t throw, and one who can hit but can’t do either.” Referring to their rookies Ed Kranepool and Greg Goossen in 1964, Stengel observed, “See that fellow over there? He’s 20 years

old. In 10 years he has a chance to be a star. Now, that fellow over there, he's 20, too. In 10 years he has a chance to be 30." When Marvellous Marv Throneberry hit a triple, but was called out for not touching first base, an enraged Stengel challenged the umpire who said, "I hate to tell you but he missed second base, too." Stengel responded by saying, "Well, I know he touched third base because he's standing on it." Commenting on the brand-new Shea Stadium, Stengel said, "It's lovely, just lovely. The park is lovelier than my team," After a seven-game losing streak, he said, "If anybody wants me, tell them I'm being embalmed." Perhaps his most famous comment came after another exasperating Mets loss when he complained, "Can't anybody here play this here game?" (Wikipedia.org).

In typical symbolic leadership style, Stengel was incessantly talking and performing. During a game, when he ventured out of the dugout to talk to his pitcher or to argue with an umpire, the crowd would sit up and pay attention because anything could happen. When he spoke at banquets or luncheons or just sitting around a table, he performed with his body as well as with his words, making his odd little gestures, lifting his head this way and that. His speeches rambled incredibly, moving from one topic to another in midsentence as one thought cascaded into another. Once, in response to a reporter's question, he talked for forty minutes. When the reporter complained that he had still not answered his question, he replied, "Don't rush me" (Creamer, 1984, p. 262).

Stengel oftentimes made light of his player's failures to make his point more palatable to them. Once when Babe Phelps, his Brooklyn Dodgers catcher was catching knuckleballer Dutch Leonard, someone hit a ninth-inning homer off Leonard to win the game. Stengel asked Phelps what pitch he had called, to which Phelps replied, "A fastball." Stengel asked why he didn't call for his best pitch, which was a knuckler? "His knuckler's tough to catch," Phelps said. "If his knuckler is so hard to catch, don't you think it might be a little tough to hit, too?" Stengel replied (Creamer, 1984, p. 187).

In building his image, Stengel became supremely successful in his time with the New York Yankees. After having won pennants and World Series in the late 1940s and early 1950s, if he could win the pennant again in 1952 he would tie John McGraw's four straight set in the 1920s, which Joe McCarthy had matched a decade later. When he did so, it was

no longer a matter of proving he could manage. He was in fast company now and when Joe DiMaggio retired in 1951, the Yankees were no longer DiMaggio's Yankees, they were Stengel's Yankees. Five straight pennants and five straight World Series allowed Stengel to stand alone, beyond McGraw, beyond McCarthy, beyond everyone.

On his deathbed, he was watching a baseball game on television and listening to the national anthem, and in one last symbolic gesture, he swung his legs out of bed, got to his feet, and stood at attention with his hand over his heart like a Kansas City schoolboy. On Monday, September 29, the day after the 1975 baseball season ended, he died. He had lived eighty-five glorious years.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests.

Stengel began very early in his playing career to utilize political frame behavior, especially in dealing with upper management in salary negotiations. Even as a rookie, he began a pattern of negotiating the very most that he could get in his contacts. In 1912 at Brooklyn, dealing with owner Charles Ebbets, he was offered \$250 a month. He wanted \$350 per month. Stengel, only a rookie, with three weeks of major league experience held out all winter. Ebbets finally yielded and Stengel agreed to \$350 just as spring training started.

Stengel also used political frame behavior to establish himself as a model citizen and "employable commodity." In his first major league coaching job with the Brooklyn Dodgers, Max Carey was the manager. Stengel was a good soldier. He worked hard under Carey, did all the things a coach should do and sublimated his character so as to not upstage the colorless, humorless manager. He also was careful not to be critical of management when he was fired, hoping that his restraint would lead to another job—and as we know, it always did.

Stengel again showed great restraint when Lou Perini, owner of the Boston Braves, watched an exhibition game and was bothered when

one of the Braves bunted into a double play. After the game, he asked Stengel what had happened. Stengel was polite even though he bristled inwardly, as managers do when their baseball wisdom is questioned. But Perini was the owner, so Stengel went into one of his convoluted explanations, a wordy smokescreen designed to sound like an answer without imparting much specific information. Whether in frustration or being somehow satisfied with the explanation, Perini let the matter drop. Mission accomplished!

Another display of political frame behavior came when George Weiss, the Yankees general manager, wanted to trade Stengel's favorite son, Billy Martin. Stengel objected, but when Weiss insisted because he thought that Martin was a bad influence on the younger players like Mickey Mantle, Stengel capitulated. Martin never forgave him, but Stengel, as a result, gained points with upper management.

His greatest audience regarding the use of political frame leadership behavior was the media—the sportswriters who covered his teams on a daily basis. Theirs was a symbiotic relationship. Stengel needed them, needed their attention, needed their admiration, and they needed him for copy. He used the press masterfully, sometimes even using it “to get to his players.” The Stengel legend probably peaked on July 9, 1958, when he testified on behalf of baseball before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. He both entertained and “snowed” the senators with Stengelese for almost two hours.

CONCLUSION

Casey Stengel ultimately became a universally beloved figure in American life. He became so through the frequent use of symbolic leadership behavior, sprinkling in structural, human resource, and political frame behavior for good measure. He regaled the media and the American public with his colorful stories and flamboyant behavior, creating a language unto himself. However, he also established himself as the Professor by using structural leadership behavior in the drilling of his teams in the fundamentals of the game and in the unique strategies that he employed both in preparing for and during the games.

Although he did not overdo the use of human resource frame leadership behavior, he did employ it at appropriate times. He was especially successful in applying the human touch with his protégé, Billy Martin. He was so effective with Martin that he considered Stengel his second father and became his coach on the field and in the locker room.

We saw how Stengel practiced political frame leadership behavior when appropriate. He was constantly trying to “win friends and influence people,” which is emblematic of political leaders. He negotiated “sweetheart” contracts for himself and never burned any bridges when he was fired. He was particularly successful in applying political behavior with the media. As a result, he was quoted and on the cover of virtually every national magazine of his time. Casey Stengel was an effective practitioner of situational leadership well before Bolman and Deal developed their theory. In fact, it was from studying leaders like Stengel that situational theory was formulated. Leaders and aspiring leaders can benefit from studying the leadership behavior of an exemplary and timeless situational leader like Casey Stengel.



JOE TORRE

Each at-bat is a new day.

—Henry Aaron

BACKGROUND

Joe Torre was born in 1940 and is a former major league player and currently the manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers. Coincidentally, he once played for the first three teams that he managed, the Atlanta Braves, the New York Mets, and the St. Louis Cardinals. The string was broken when he became manager of the New York Yankees and then the Los Angeles Dodgers.

Torre's managerial experience with the Mets, Braves, and Cardinals was mixed. It was not until he became manager of the New York Yankees in 1996 that his career took a turn for the better. In the eleven years that he led the Yankees, they went to the postseason each year and won six American League pennants, and four World Series titles. He has since managed the Los Angeles Dodgers to the postseason playoffs in his first year on the job.

Torre followed in his brother Frank's footsteps and joined the Milwaukee Braves in 1960. He quickly became a significant contributor on a veteran Braves team that included Hall of Famers Hank Aaron and Eddie Mathews. He hit over .300 in each of his first two years. After eight years with Milwaukee/Atlanta, he was traded to St. Louis in 1969. His best year was in 1971 when he hit .363 and drove in 137 runs and won the MVP award. In 1975, he was traded to the Mets and became a player-coach, then a player-manager before retiring as a player in 1977.

Torre's managing career began in 1977 when he was playing third base for the Mets, and was asked to become player-manager after a poor start resulted in the firing of their full-time manager. Because he thought he could not do the job properly while still playing, he decided to retire at age thirty-seven. Torre managed the Mets through the 1981 season, but was unable to post a winning season. He then took over as manager of the Atlanta Braves, leading them to the National League Western Division title in his first season before slipping into second place the next year, and third place the year after that. After being fired by the Braves, Torre spent the next five seasons as a television analyst.

In 1990, Torre was hired to manage the St. Louis Cardinals. In five years at the helm, his teams were never able to reach the playoffs. He was fired once again in 1995, but the next year he became manager of the New York Yankees. It was with the Yankees that he enjoyed the greatest success, leading them to four World Series titles in eleven years.

In 2007 he became the first major league manager ever to have 2,000 hits and 2,000 victories. He is currently ninth on the all-time list for major league victories. Despite all this success, however, in 2007 the Yankees offered Torre just a one-year contract for \$5 million, which Torre considered an insult. He demanded a multiyear contract like he had in the past, and when his request was denied, he turned down the original offer and ended his relationship with the Yankees. Subsequently, on November 1, 2007, the Los Angeles Dodgers offered him a multiyear contract and announced that Torre would be their manager beginning with the 2008 season (Wikipedia.org; Torre, 1999).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style. It is obvious when analyzing Joe Torre's leadership behavior that he practices a situational model of leadership. An example is how Torre treated his players differently, depending on their readiness levels. Yankee outfielder Paul O'Neill, a high strung perfectionist who considered every at bat an Armageddon, was handled with kid gloves because he was hurt when someone criticized him. Third baseman Wade Boggs took criticism like water running off a duck's back. First baseman Tito Martinez, on the other hand, became angry when criticized, and Torre treated him accordingly, stressing his many contributions to the team instead. Outfielder Bernie Williams needed reassurance, while pitcher Hideki Irabu needed a friendly "kick in the butt." And with pitcher David "Boomer" Wells, who likes to test people in authority, Torre was firm.

Torre was constantly striving to assess the readiness levels of his players and their ability to become leaders themselves. As mentioned earlier, Paul O'Neill was a warrior who wears his heart on his sleeve, inspiring others with his unrelenting determination. According to Torre, Chili Davis is a consummate professional who goes about his business in such a model way that his teammates follow. Joe Girardi's willingness to sacrifice, his knowledge of the game, and his ability to articulate it inspires others—all assets that enabled him to succeed Torre as manager of the Yankees. And, Bernie Williams has so much dignity and grace on and off the field that he draws followers. As Torre astutely points out, these four are all leaders, but with distinctly different styles.

Torre's leadership behavior was largely influenced by Bill Parcells's book *Finding a Way to Win*, where he says that if you believe in something, stick with it. Torre believes that applying a human touch is the key to being an effective leader, and he has made a conscious effort to

reflect that philosophy. Torre realized how ironic it was that this affirming piece of advice should come from Parcells. His style is almost diametrically opposed to Torre's, but works spectacularly well for him and his players. He is a different personality in an entirely different sport with a unique set of players and challenges. So, while Torre believes that managers must change and mature, they all have a core set of beliefs that guide how they conduct themselves as professionals. In other words, one size doesn't fit all.

In another indication of his belief that leadership is situational, Torre makes a distinction between the regular season and the postseason as being two significantly different situations, which need to be managed differently. He still tries to go with the people and strategies that got him there, but in critical situations he must be flexible enough to make lineup changes that give his team the best chance to win on that particular day. He cites the season when Shane Spencer came up from the minors and had a spectacular final month, but Torre chose to insert Chad Curtis in his World Series lineup for his defense. In that situation (postseason), defense was preferred over offense, which was the priority during the season. As we shall see, Torre was a master at adapting his managing style to the situation.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural frame leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. Although Joe Torre is recognized as being a human resource type leader, or in sport's jargon, a "players' manager," there is ample evidence that he uses structural frame behavior when appropriate. For example, he decided to write his book *Ground Rules for Winners* to share his philosophy of management and motivation. He has broken his philosophy down into a series of twelve simple keys that anyone can follow to become a more effective team leader, manager, or executive.

As a true structural leader, Torre strives to define success for himself, rather than waiting for others to define it for him. To him, success and winning are not always one and the same. Success is playing to the best

of one's ability, and winning is often, but not always, the by-product of doing so. If he had used winning as the only measure of success, he would have considered himself to be a failure at his first three managerial stops. "I simply made a realistic assessment of my situation and concluded that it all wasn't my fault," he said (Torre, 1999, p. 9). He refused to write himself off as a major league manager with the potential to win a World Championship. He believes that once one brands him or herself as a loser, one will never maintain the level of drive and optimism necessary to keep working hard in pursuit of his or her goals with unwavering passion and intensity.

As with all structural leaders, Torre believes that to be successful, one must work relentlessly on the fundamentals of the game. In baseball, that would mean honing your fielding skills, making smart adjustments at the plate, and practicing bunting, hitting behind the runner, and base running. In business it may mean something different, but as Torre points out, "It's still the fundamentals" (Torre, 1999, p. 10).

Just as Torre felt compelled to place his leadership philosophy in writing, he did so with his six rules to engender fairness, trust, and respect. Although fairness, trust, and respect are human resource concepts, making a list of them is an example of structural behavior. We will enumerate the rules later when we review Torre's use of human resource leadership behavior. For now, we focus on the typically structural leader's behavior of codifying one's standards. Torre maintains further that an effective leader must teach, motivate, and relate to each person differently but apply the basic standards of performance, effort, and preparation equally. His unwritten rules are "run hard, play hard, and be prepared."

Torre believes that communication is the key to trust, and trust is the key to teamwork in any group endeavor, be it in sports, business, or family. He recalled a critical situation in the 1996 World Series speaking with his star pitcher, David Cone. Torre's decision to let him pitch or bring in a reliever would depend solely on how Cone answered Torre's question: "How do you feel, and don't B.S. me?" This game was too important not to be totally frank. "I can get him for you," Cone said (and he did). The point being, that in this display of structural leadership behavior, Torre *demanded* the truth as compared with *asking* for it (Torre, 1999, p. 75).

In true structural form, Torre has rules for when and how to conduct meetings: (1) Use strategic team meetings when required, but don't overdo them. (2) Use meetings to address team performances or motivation sparingly. (3) Define your goals clearly so your speech is focused and concise. (4) When necessary, allow yourself to display controlled emotion. (5) Maintain your attitude for fairness, respect, and trust (Torre, 1999, p. 104).

Torre asserts that in baseball as in business, leaders have to do their research. They must gather information before they act. There is a time for playing hunches, but even then, the decision is based on information that has been garnered over a period of time—something akin to MIS (management information systems). Torre gives the example of having to make a decision among Shane Spencer, Tim Lincecum, Chad Curtis, and Ricky Ledee as to who to start in the outfield against the San Diego Padres' Kevin Brown. He ultimately chose Ledee because he was hungry for a start and had been working very hard in practice.

Showing his structural frame tendencies, Torre has developed a strategic approach to baseball that breeds steadiness. He calls it the “small bites” approach, and it can be applied to any endeavor in business or life. Basically, the small bites philosophy is that winning results from an assembly of small elements over time. For example, Torre remembers hiking in the Grand Canyon and when he looked up he was overwhelmed, so he put his head down and concentrated on the next step. Finally, he reached the summit by focusing on small bites. Applying the small bites approach to baseball, Torre asserts that when he had to look at the Atlanta Braves' starting pitching of John Smoltz, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, and Denny Neagle in the World Series, it looked overwhelming. But using the small bites model, Torre focused exclusively on game one (Torre, 1999, p. 234).

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Joe Torre is probably best known as a human resource leader. In fact, he is sometimes criticized for being too soft on his players. However, judging from

his long record of success, that would be a somewhat specious criticism. On the contrary, I would argue that his application of human resource behavior was almost always appropriate.

Torre identifies his “key” to managing and grooming team players as getting to know his players—knowing their skills, knowing their potential, knowing their personalities, and knowing their personal and professional needs. According to Torre, this is the only way that a manager is able to put his players in a position to succeed. Along these lines, Torre is not big on team meetings. He prefers one-on-one sessions. He claims that managers can use these individual meetings almost the way doctors use office visits for both diagnosis and treatment. For example, one of his players, Chuck Knoblauch, was a hard worker who set such lofty standards for himself that he occasionally tried too hard and got too tense in the field and at the plate. In one of his counseling sessions with Knoblauch, Torre tried to take the pressure off him by saying, “My only expectation is that you play the way you play. The best way to achieve that is to be relaxed” (Torre, 1999, p. 19).

In support of his human resource frame inclinations, Torre cites Daniel Goleman’s book *Working with Emotional Intelligence*, where he posits that a characteristic of superior emotional intelligence in the workplace is understanding others. Torre agrees wholeheartedly with this assertion. His motto is that every employee must feel useful. In order to build teamwork, everyone has a role, no matter how minor.

Torre points out that television lawyers prove defendants guilty by demonstrating that they had the means, the motive, and the opportunity to commit the crime. Likewise, Torre wants to make sure that his players have the means, the motive, and the opportunity to be winners. He cites one of his pitchers, Ramiro Mendoza, as an example of one who is particularly adept at serving many roles: starter, middle reliever, and closer. So Torre used him in each of those roles, while others who are not as flexible, like David Wells, is used exclusively as a starter. Torre is able to fully utilize his personnel because he takes the trouble to get to know them.

A player like Derek Jeter, for example, is very successful because he is not afraid to make a mistake—he dares to be great. Knowing this,

Torre tries not to overreact to mistakes so players feel free to take risks and become leaders. The ability to maximize his players' potentials was verified by his successor with the Yankees, Joe Girardi, who said about Torre, "He gets the most out of every one of his players" (Torre, 1999, p. 24).

Torre is so attuned to the need to incorporate human resource behavior into one's overall leadership style that he went through the trouble of developing six rules to engender fairness, trust, and respect:

- Treat players with honesty and trust and ask for the same in return.
- Give me effort and I'll never second-guess you.
- Apply rules evenhandedly.
- Never air grievances in public.
- Never embarrass or humiliate players in front of others.
- Don't play favorites. (Torre, 1999, p. 38)

Some managers use fear, favoritism, manipulation, or public humiliation to light a fire under players. Torre does not believe in this philosophy. These humane tendencies have resulted in some in the media to label Torre a "players' manager." To this charge, Torre pleads guilty.

When Torre first joined the Yankees, he inherited two former Mets, Darryl Strawberry and Dwight Gooden, both of whom had issues. Torre applied human resource behavior and started with a new slate in an atmosphere of fairness, respect, and trust and both of them thrived. By his own admission, Torre learned much of what he knew about the need for human resource behavior from Red Schoendienst, his first big league manager who was fair and evenhanded in his managerial style. Mariano Duncan, the great Yankee reliever said of Torre, "He doesn't play favorites. All twenty-five guys are his favorites" (Torre, 1999, p. 49).

According to Torre, he had only one player who was not receptive to human resource behavior and refused to conform to the family atmosphere that Torre tried to create—Ruben Sierra. He never could understand why he wasn't always in the starting lineup and complained incessantly about it both on the field and in the locker room. Since human resource behavior didn't seem to work, Torre decided to employ a little structural behavior—he traded him.

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. Unlike Casey Stengel, Tommy Lasorda, Billy Martin, and Leo Durocher, Joe Torre is not primarily a symbolic frame leader. However, he does exhibit symbolic behavior on occasion.

Torre has been known to generate some very quotable lines. For example, after winning his first World Series title with the Yankees, the press asked him what he would do to motivate his team to repeat this accomplishment. He told them that they “would not shoot for the same record (114 wins). Just shoot for the same preparation” (Torre, 1999, p. 4). He would also tell the press that baseball was a metaphor for life. In football, an undefeated season is achievable. In baseball, however, as in life, you are considered extremely successful if you lose fewer than 60 games in a season. Like the average person, baseball players work every day, not just twice a week.

Torre was also adept at being able to get his points across in memorable terms. We saw earlier how he developed his six rules for engendering trust and respect and his rules of fairness. He also developed what he called Torre’s Triple Play—fairness, respect, trust. He tries to embody these three characteristics in everything he does. Torre treats his players with honesty and trust and expects the same in return. We began this chapter with one of Torre’s favorite quotes, which he uses in his batting instruction: “Each at bat is a new day” (Torre, 1999, p. 111).

Other symbolic terms coined by Torre include the three basic qualities of a winner: caring (the ties that bind), conviction (the will to succeed), and commitment (building your foundation). He also created his 12 Ground Rules for Winners:

Know your team players.

Fairness, respect, and trust: Torre’s Triple Play.

Straight communication: the key to trust.

Maintain serenity.

Sustain optimism.

Trust your intuition.

Dealing with tough bosses: create mutual respect.
Dealing with tough bosses: assert your agenda and your integrity.
Dealing with tough bosses: deference, distance, and dialogue.
Steadiness and small bites.
Caring, conviction, and commitment.
Sacrifice is not just a bunt. (Torre, 1999, p. 249)

Even Torre's subtle use of symbolic behavior did not often go over other's heads. When he first managed the Mets in the late 1970s, Ken Boyer, then the Cardinal's manager, visited him in his clubhouse office. Boyer noticed all the personal pictures Torre had hanging on the walls and exclaimed, "You expect to be here for awhile" (Torre, 1999, p. 187).

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests.

As with all of those in his profession, Joe Torre has utilized political frame behavior to his advantage when necessary. In Torre's case, most of its use surrounded his dealings with the Yankees' controversial owner, George Steinbrenner—which could be a book in itself. Torre depicts his relationship with Steinbrenner as "the good easily outweighing the bad," although he might wish to revise that statement after the way he was treated in his last year with the club.

According to Torre, his interactions with Steinbrenner almost always involved "tradeoffs," which is exactly what political frame behavior is all about. His approach was to confront Steinbrenner on issues where the bad clearly outweighed the good, but not to challenge him too frequently for fear that Torre would lose his credibility—by "crying wolf." His credo was not to let an unpleasant personality drive him out of a good job. To Torre, Steinbrenner's strong points, like availability, drive, passion, and commitment, have been far more important than his flaws.

Torre liked to pick his battles. If Steinbrenner interfered with his authority in the clubhouse or on the field, Torre would go to battle. However, if the issue had to do with Steinbrenner's realm, the acquisition and paying of players, he tended to exclude himself. Listening to Steinbrenner's suggestions regarding lineup changes and the like is a problem with most managers, but not with Torre. If he demanded a lineup change, however, Torre would assert his authority. His philosophy was to leave his ego at home when he went to work.

When Steinbrenner signed the troubled outfielder Darryl Strawberry without informing him, Torre let Steinbrenner know that he disapproved, but did not push it because the acquisition of players was Steinbrenner's bailiwick. Just the opposite happened when Torre wanted to trade for Joe Girardi and Steinbrenner objected. Steinbrenner wanted Mike Stanley instead, but capitulated to Torre's wishes showing the mutual respect they had for each other. As it turned out, Girardi went on to establish himself as a leader in the clubhouse and recently replaced Torre as manager of the Yankees.

As was explained in the background section of this chapter, in 2007 after the Yankees failed to make it to the World Series for several years, Steinbrenner lost some faith in Torre and only offered him a one-year \$5 million contract. Embarrassed by the offer, Torre had to decide whether he was going to utilize political frame behavior one more time. Ultimately, he decided not to, and shunned the Yankees' offer to sign instead with the Los Angeles Dodgers.

CONCLUSION

Joe Torre is proud of the fact that he is known as a players' manager. He is not shy about his frequent use of human resource leadership behavior, which he believes creates a culture of mutual respect. At the same time, he sees the need for the use of the other three frames of leadership behavior. He stresses the knowledge and use of baseball fundamentals and prepares himself and his athletes to be competitive, which are structural frame behaviors. He sometimes uses inspirational quotes and often comes up with creative ways of expressing his baseball

philosophy, like Torre's Triple Play—fairness, respect, and trust. These are instances of his use of symbolic behavior. And, as we have seen, his use of political frame leadership behavior, especially with George Steinbrenner, is exemplary. Suffice to say, Joe Torre's success is not a mistake. He achieved it the hard way—he earned it.

12

EARL WEAVER

The easiest way around the bases is with one big swing.

—Earl Weaver

BACKGROUND

Earl Weaver was born in 1930 and is best known for managing the Baltimore Orioles. He spent his entire managerial career with the Orioles, managing the club for fifteen years. He was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 1996.

As a player, Weaver was a right-handed-hitting second baseman in the farm system of the St. Louis Cardinals. However, he never played an inning at the major league level. He joined the Baltimore Orioles organization in 1957 as the manager of their Fitzgerald club in the lower minor leagues. He was promoted to the major league club as their first-base coach in 1968 and took over the managerial role during the middle of that season.

During his tenure as manager, the Orioles won six Eastern Division titles, four American League pennants, and a World Series championship. Of the fifteen years of managing the Orioles, Weaver had only one losing season.

During his career as a manager he was well-known for his confrontations with the umpires, resulting in an American League record of ninety-seven ejections. He was a strong proponent of the long ball, thus his quote leading off this chapter, “The easiest way around the bases is with one big swing.” He was also responsible for such baseball innovations as the radar gun, extensive use of statistics, and an elaborate platoon system.

After retiring, Weaver served as a color commentator for ABC television, and called the 1983 World Series along with Al Michaels and the legendary Howard Cosell. Weaver was the top ABC baseball analyst for much of the 1980s. He initially retired in 1982, but came back to manage one more year, 1985–1986, before retiring for good (Wikipedia.org; Weaver, 2002).

SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Situational models of leadership differ from earlier trait and behavioral models in asserting that no single way of leading works in all situations. Rather, appropriate behavior depends on the circumstances at a given time. Effective managers diagnose the situation, identify the leadership style or behavior that will be most effective, and then determine whether they can implement the required style.

Earl Weaver was very adept at adapting his leadership behavior to the situation. There is ample evidence that he utilized all four of Bolman and Deal’s frames of leadership, depending on the situation. The ideal situation, according to Weaver, is to have nine athletes who can hit, run, throw, and field at each position. In that case, the same lineup can be used every day. However, that situation rarely, if ever, exists. Thus, adapting to the situation, Weaver made much use of what he called “situational baseball.” He invented the “situational at bat” and “situational players.” By matching his bench players’ strengths to his starters’ weaknesses, he was able to create players of All-Star caliber from spare parts. For example, one year Benny Ayala, John Lowenstein, and Gary Roenicke were platooned in left field and combined to hit thirty-seven home runs.

Although he was a proponent of the long ball, Weaver was flexible enough to consider playing “small ball” if the situation called for it. For example, there was one park in the American League where it would be

a mistake to manage using power hitting—that being Kansas City. “If I were manager of the Royals,” he said, “I would have to go for speed over power” (Weaver, 2002, p. 37). As we shall see, although Weaver was basically a structural frame leader, he used the other three frames of leadership behavior when the situation dictated it.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAME

Structural frame leaders seek to develop a new model of the relationship of structure, strategy, and environment for their organizations. Strategic planning, extensive preparation, and effecting change are priorities for them. As mentioned earlier, it could be argued that Earl Weaver was fundamentally a structural frame leader.

Weaver’s managerial philosophy is often labeled as “pitching, defense, and the three run homer.” He eschewed the use of the so-called small ball approach, which featured the stolen base, the hit and run, or the sacrifice bunt, preferring a patient approach of waiting for the home run. He maintained that “if you play for one run, that’s all you’ll get. And on offense, your most precious possessions are your 27 outs” (Weaver, 2002, p. 193). Weaver claims to have never had a sign for the hit and run, citing that the play makes both the base runner and the hitter vulnerable, as the base runner is susceptible to being caught stealing and the hitter is required to swing at any pitch thrown.

In typical structural frame form, Weaver also insisted that his players maintain a professional appearance at all times. He allowed mustaches, but not beards, and, as a rule, players had to wear a suit or jacket and tie on board an airplane for a road trip. Again, in the structural mode, Weaver made extensive use of statistics to create matchups that were favorable either for his batter or his pitcher. He had various notebooks with all sorts of data on how his hitters fared against opposing pitchers and how his pitchers handled the opposing hitters. It was this data that prompted him not to pinch hit for his Gold Glove but weak-hitting shortstop, Mark Belanger, when he was facing relief pitcher Jim Kern. Belanger was a lifetime .250 hitter, but against Jim Kern, he batted an astronomical .625. Likewise, Boog Powell, the 1970 American League MVP, hit a meager .178 against Mickey Lolich and would be pinch hit for by little-known Chico Salmon, who hit over .300 against Lolich.

Practicing the same type leadership behavior, Weaver made expert use of his bench. On the Oriole teams of the late 1970s and early 1980s, he made frequent use of platoons, with the most successful example being the use of Gary Roenicke and John Lowenstein in left field, absent affordable full-time solutions. Weaver also exploited a loophole in the designated hitter rule by listing a starting pitcher as the DH so as not to lose a hitter should the opposing pitcher be ineffective or get injured before it was the DH's turn in the batting order. Subsequently, a rule was created to close this loophole. Weaver also pioneered the use of radar guns to track the velocity of pitches during the 1972 spring training season.

In using these tactics, Weaver quickly developed the reputation of being a structural frame leader. Harry Dalton, the general manager of the Milwaukee Brewers, went on record indicating how he felt about Weaver's abilities. "I think Earl Weaver would have been a success no matter what he did for a living" (Weaver, 2002, p. 3). According to Dalton, Weaver had a quick mind and his organizational skills and his knack of understanding statistics was outstanding. He was not afraid to make a decision and stay with it. He had great courage and was able to get the most out of his baseball teams.

As a minor league manager in the Orioles chain, Weaver developed the training program for the entire Baltimore Orioles organization. He designed the drills, the cut-off plays, and the procedures for spring training. As a result, his and the other Orioles teams ran like well-oiled machines. And his teams improved daily and were particularly successful as the season moved on. His teams were like well-trained marathoners. They might stumble out of the gate in April when he was using all his players, getting to know them and defining their roles, but by September they were running on all cylinders. His teams made few errors and always executed the fundamentals, a direct result of his meticulously planned spring practices. Thus, he had a significantly higher career winning percentage after September 1 than he did before that date.

In typical structural leader form, he placed all of his ideas into writing. He was famous for "Weaver's Laws," a compilation of his baseball principles. He developed ten laws that codified his baseball philosophy:

1. No one's going to give a damn in July if you lost a game in March.

2. If you don't make any promises to your players, you won't have to break them.
3. The easiest way around the bases is with one big swing.
4. Your most precious possession on offense is your 27 outs.
5. If you play for one run, that's all you'll get.
6. Don't play for one run unless that run will win the ballgame.
7. It is easier to identify four quality starters than five.
8. The best place for a rookie pitcher is long relief.
9. The key step for an infielder is the first one, but before the ball is hit.
10. The job of arguing with the umpires is the manager's, because it won't hurt the team if he gets thrown out. (Weaver, 2002, p. 193)

Elaborating on one of his laws, over the years Weaver adopted the strategy of using four starting pitchers rather than the conventional five. According to Weaver, this gives the pitchers chances for more wins and, quoting one of his laws, "It is easier to identify four quality starters than five."

Because of his structural thinking, Weaver believed that the main attributes of an effective coach or manager are intelligence and the ability to teach. But the manager needs a body of knowledge to teach. Weaver acquired that knowledge by constantly writing information on his index cards. Mostly, he would list the four or five things that gave him an idea of the opposing player's strengths, weaknesses, and tendencies. For example, he learned that the Minnesota Twins' Kent Hrbek liked fastballs. Mike Hargrove was very selective. Carlton Fisk liked pitches low. Reggie Jackson was vulnerable to the high inside fastball. Weaver made the Orioles one of the first teams to have charts on every hitter in the American League that showed exactly where they hit the ball against Baltimore pitchers. Suffice to say, Earl Weaver relied heavily on structural frame leadership behavior.

THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME

Human resource leaders believe in people and communicate that belief. They are passionate about *productivity through people*. Although Earl

Weaver could never be described as warm and cuddly, he did make use of human resource frame behavior on occasion.

Weaver learned much of what he knew about the importance of the human touch from his jobs outside of baseball. Early in his career, he had to supplement his baseball salary with winter jobs. He had a number of different winter jobs and had to interact with every kind of person one could imagine. “I know how to get along in any type of setting,” he said. “They loved me at Liberty Loan [where he allegedly never made a bad loan] and when I was a used car salesman” (Weaver, 2002, p. 5). Parenthetically, he once sold seventeen cars in one month.

Weaver was especially effective in applying human resource behavior when he had the unfortunate task of cutting a player. He empathized with them so closely that he considered cutting players as the most difficult task of any manager. He took time to tell them exactly why they did not make the team, even though in most cases it was an exercise in futility.

As mentioned earlier, Weaver was a great proponent of platooning players. However, in order for platooning to be effective, the players have to be convinced of their role and its importance to the team. Here is where human resource behavior comes into play. Weaver was uniquely adept at convincing most players that platooning was both to their own advantage and to the advantage of the team. According to Weaver, John Lowenstein was particularly cooperative—and the results showed. On the other hand, he could never convince Terry Crowley that platooning with Boog Powell was in Crowley’s best interest.

The results of Weaver’s use of human resource leadership behavior are indisputable. While he was managing the Orioles, they had at least one twenty-game winner for thirteen straight years, which is a major league record. In 1971, four Orioles pitchers won twenty or more games: Dave McNally, Mike Cuellar, Jim Palmer, and Pat Dobson. Weaver was particularly proud of his ability to handle pitchers and how productive they had become under his guidance.

Pitcher Mike Cuellar had a bad reputation before coming to the Orioles from the Houston Astros. He was known as a brooder. Weaver applied human resource behavior and found that the problem that Cuellar had in Houston was not an attitude problem, but a language problem. So any time Weaver had to speak to Cuellar, especially in his first few

years with the Orioles, he had Elrod Hendricks with him. Hendricks was born in the Virgin Islands and spoke fluent Spanish. In his first year with the Orioles, Cuellar went 23–11.

The primary reason that Weaver was an outspoken critic of throwing at a batter was a human resource one. Simply put, “It has put people out of the game for life and deprived them of their livelihood,” he said (Weaver, 2002, p. 73). Along these same lines, Weaver prided himself on knowing what made his players tick. For example, the conventional wisdom was that burly first baseman Boog Powell should lose weight. But, according to Weaver, he was one crabby man when he couldn’t eat. When Powell was eating all he wanted, he was much happier and generally played better. Similarly, Jim Palmer and Weaver had a relationship based on mutual respect. Despite their notoriously tempestuous relationship they each respected one another’s opinion even though they often disagreed. As a result, they remained close even after they both retired.

Sometimes, however, Weaver had a misleading and unconventional way of practicing human resource behavior. He basically believed that a manager should stay as far away as possible from his players. He did not believe in much personal contact either on the field or in the clubhouse. “I don’t know if I said ten words to Frank Robinson while he played for me,” he once said. But he didn’t have to indulge Robinson. He was a self-starter, and Weaver knew that. So by staying away, he was in reality practicing human resource leadership behavior.

Weaver believed in the old adage that familiarity many times breeds contempt. He never believed in joking around with his players for fear that they would take advantage of him sometime in the future. And knowing that he would eventually have to cut them, he never wanted to be placed in a position of being perceived as being two-faced. This belief led to one of his more famous quotes: “I’m not going to make any promises. If you don’t make any promises, then you won’t break any” (Weaver, 2002, p. 102). But in a convoluted way, one could interpret this to be an exercise of human resource behavior, that is, a concern for people’s feelings.

Weaver was troubled by the dilemma between the application of compassion and discipline. He tried to treat the least talented and little used players like Tom Shopay and Tim Nordbrook the same way as

he treated Reggie Jackson. There was individual consideration when a player had a personal problem, but as far as the team rule went, Weaver prided himself on treating everyone the same. And his players were quick to recognize Weaver's use of human resource behavior. Shortly after coming to the Orioles, pitcher Steve Stone observed that Baltimore was a "we" team as opposed to an "I" team. As a result, there was a lack of jealousy and animosity and a desire to work together and win a championship in the Orioles' clubhouse.

Even though Weaver was not one for "patting fannies," he was sensitive to the feelings of his players. He would agonize over having to cut them as well as discerning when a player was in a slump or simply could not do it anymore. He utilized his coaches when his players were upset at something and did not want to talk to him. As he said, "I don't go in much for patting fannies, but there's no reason you can't use a coach to do it" (Weaver, 2002, p. 121).

So, although Weaver had a reputation of being a real tiger, in many respects he was a paper one. By his own admission, he could be a pushover. He refused the opportunity to be both a manager and general manager because he would have had to negotiate contracts with the players. "I'd just give the players what they wanted," he said. "As a manager, I want the players happy on the field, so I'd give them all nice contracts" (Weaver, 2002, p. 180).

THE SYMBOLIC FRAME

In the symbolic frame, the organization is seen as a stage, a theater in which every actor plays certain roles and the symbolic leader attempts to communicate the right impressions to the right audiences. Earl Weaver made good use of the symbolic frame in being perceived by many as the little bantam rooster of the American League and a baseball strategist, par excellence. As soon as he became the Orioles' manager in 1968 he set the tone by posting a sign on the locker-room wall that read: "It Is What You Learn After You Know It All That Counts" (Weaver, 2002, p. 6).

Weaver is perhaps best known for his clashes with umpires. In Rochester he grew weary of arguing with an umpire and simply picked up

the third base bag and carried it off the field and into the dressing room. While with the Orioles, he once carried a rule book onto the field and tore it up in front of the umpire, demonstrating what he felt was the umpire's complete disregard for the rules. Of course, he got himself thrown out of the game as a result.

Once umpire Bill Haller told Weaver before a ballgame that if he left the dugout, he would automatically be ejected. Of course, this was a challenge that Weaver could not ignore. He instructed his catcher to inform Haller that he would be out of the dugout on the second pitch in the first inning. Weaver came out of dugout and Haller was getting ready to toss him because he was challenging his authority. But Weaver went straight to the mound and talked with his pitcher just to show up Haller. As he grinned at Haller going back to the dugout, Haller got the last laugh and ejected him from the game.

Weaver prided himself for being "thrown out of all the best places." He even was tossed once when the Orioles played an exhibition game in Japan. According to Weaver, none of it was ever calculated. But that is hard to believe when one observes that he has been ejected from a record 99 games in his colorful career and is on record as saying, "I don't tolerate anybody's mistakes, whether that be a player, coach or an umpire" (Weaver, 2002, p. 127).

Along with being feisty, Weaver consciously projected the image of being a student of the game. The famous "Oriole Fundamentals"—cut-off plays, rundowns, pitchers' fielding drills, bunt defenses, defending against the steal with runners on first and third were all part of his legacy. He was also a famous proponent of the long ball, often declaring his mantra, "Praise Be the Three Run Homer!" He delighted in pointing out that the great hitting guru of the day, Charlie Lau, was known for producing .300 hitters, and he turned out a good number of them. But when Lau was with a team that hit a lot of homers, they won, and when he was with a singles-hitting club, they lost.

THE POLITICAL FRAME

Leaders operating out of the political frame clarify what they want and what they can get. Political leaders are realists above all. They never let

what they want cloud their judgment about what is possible. They assess the distribution of power and interests. Like virtually all effective leaders, Earl Weaver did not become a baseball legend without the astute use of political behavior when he found it to his advantage to do so.

Weaver acutely knew that his source of power as manager was that he was the one who made out the lineup card. The source of power is dependency, and the players depended on him for playing time. In Weaver's eyes not playing a regular is the biggest fine that could be leveled against him. He used that power to get the players to play the way he wanted them to play.

Weaver was not one to demand that players do what he says, but not what he does. He modeled the behavior that he desired. For instance, he modeled political behavior by adhering to the Orioles' strict team dress and grooming rules, even though he personally preferred to dress casually when he traveled. He also "had his players' backs." According to Weaver, when a player argues with an umpire, the manager must quickly get on the field and say the words the player wants to say before the player gets ejected. He much preferred that he got ejected rather than the player and at the same time being seen as having been ejected in defense of his players.

Finally, Earl Weaver was the supreme pragmatist and used political behavior to his and his team's advantage. "You want to know how not to get fired?" he would ask rhetorically. "It's easy. Win. *And*, get along with the front office" (Weaver, 2002, p. 175). Along the same lines, he observed that some players thought that he was hard to get along with. He never bought it. He pointed out that he had worked for two owners and three general managers and stayed dedicated to the organization almost to a fault. For example, he reluctantly became the player-manager of the Knoxville Smokers to show his loyalty to the Orioles' organization. Of course, it was Weaver's view that political behavior in the form of loyalty almost always paid off, both for players and for managers.

CONCLUSION

Earl Weaver is yet another example of how the wise use of situational leadership theory can lead to success. Although he was basically a

structural leader whose teams were always well prepared and utilized the most advanced baseball strategies, he balanced his use of structural behavior with the other three frames of leadership behavior.

One could argue that he could have used the human resource frame more frequently, but many of his players testified to his sincere interest in them as individuals. His use of the symbolic frame is legendary. He has gone down in history as one of the most colorful managers to ever don a uniform. His animated arguments with umpires and subsequent ejections have become part of modern baseball lore. Finally, his use of political behavior to motivate his players and to appease management is a study in itself. It is fair to say that Earl Weaver's road to success as a manager was paved with the skilled use of situational leadership behavior. The study and emulation of his leadership practices and methods can be a distinct advantage to those who are already leaders and to those who wish to become leaders.

13

LEADERSHIP LESSONS LEARNED

The greatest discovery of my generation is that man can alter his life simply by altering his attitude of mind.

—William James

What do we learn about leadership from these ten remarkably similar coaches? First, we learn that situational leadership theory makes eminent sense. Virtually all of these coaches are effective as leaders because they are able to adapt their leadership behavior to changing situations. None of them is “stuck” in one paradigm. Some might be criticized for using one or another leadership frame too exclusively, but the reality is that, by and large, they were successful because, to a person, they were able to balance their use of the four leadership frames enunciated by Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal very effectively.

More specifically, we have learned that there are four requisites for effective leadership:

A knowledge of, and passion for, one’s field (competency).

An ability to engender mutual trust and respect with one’s followers.

A knowledge of the organizational *culture* (readiness level) of one's followers.

An ability to apply *situational leadership theory* to one's practice.

LEADING WITH MIND

Knowledge of one's field is a sine qua non for effective leadership. This quality usually manifests itself in one's structural frame leadership behavior. In baseball terms, the leader must have a good command of the fundamentals of the game. In business terms, the effective leader must have at least an adequate knowledge of the technical aspects of how a business operates and a sense of how to develop a business plan. In education, the leader needs to know how schools and school systems operate and what the best practices in the field are in curriculum and instruction. In a family situation, the leader (parent or guardian) needs to have at least a modicum of knowledge regarding the principles of child psychology to be effective. In short, leaders in any field need to know that field and be able to apply that knowledge through the theory and practice of organizational development, which would include the following:

Organizational Structure: how an institution is organized.

Organizational Culture: the values and beliefs of an institution.

Motivation: the system of rewards and incentives provided.

Communication: the clarity and accuracy of the communication process.

Decision Making: how and by whom decisions are made.

Conflict Management: how dysfunctional conflicts are handled.

Power Distribution: how the power in an institution is distributed.

Strategic Planning: how the mission, vision, and strategic plan are developed.

Change: how change is effectively implemented in an institution.

I will not go into detail about these processes here. If the reader is interested in a comprehensive look at these processes, I would recommend an earlier publication of mine, *Educational Administration: Leading with*

Mind and Heart, 2nd edition. However, included at the end of this book is a survey entitled “The Heart Smart Organizational Diagnosis Model,” which I developed to help leaders assess the organizational health of their institutions and to identify which of the factors listed above are in need of improvement.

LEADING WITH HEART

To recap, then, the effective leader needs to be *technically* competent. However, being technically competent is not enough. To be truly effective, leaders need to master the *art* of leadership and learn to lead with *heart*. In effect, leaders need to operate out of both the structural and political frames (science) and the human resources and symbolic frames (art) to maximize their effectiveness. This means that they must be concerned about the person (*cura personalis*). They must abide by the Golden Rule and treat others as they wish to be treated. As noted in chapter 2, truly effective leaders treat their employees like volunteers and empower them to actualize their true potential, thus engendering mutual trust and respect among virtually all of their colleagues.

In their new book entitled *Leading with Kindness*, William Baker and Michael O’Malley reiterate my views. They explore how one of the most unheralded features of leadership—basic human kindness—drives successful organizations. And while most scholars generally recognized that a leader’s emotional intelligence factors into that person’s leadership behavior, most are reticent to consider it as important as analytical ability, decision-making skills, or implementation skills. Such emotions as compassion, empathy, and kindness are often dismissed as unquantifiable, and are often seen as weaknesses. Yet, research in neuroscience and the social sciences clearly reveals that one’s physiological and emotional states have measurable effects on both individual and group performance.

In the jargon of the day, individuals who lead with heart or kindness are said to have a high degree of emotional intelligence. Most of us are familiar with the current notion of multiple intelligences; that is, individuals have a number of intelligences in addition to cognitive intelligence. Among these intelligences is emotional intelligence. Several theories

within the emotional intelligence paradigm seek to understand how individuals perceive, understand, utilize, and manage emotions in an effort to predict and foster personal effectiveness. Most of these models define emotional intelligence as an array of traits and abilities related to emotional and social knowledge that influence our overall ability to effectively cope with environmental demands; as such, it can be viewed as a model of psychological well-being and adaptation. This includes the ability to be aware of, to understand, and to relate to others; the ability to deal with strong emotions and to control one's impulses; and the ability to adapt to change and to solve problems of a personal and social nature. The five main domains of these models are intrapersonal skills, interpersonal skills, adaptability, stress management, and general mood. If the reader sees a similarity between emotional intelligence and what I term *leading with heart* and what Baker and O'Malley call *leading with kindness*, it is not coincidental—it is intentional.

LEADING WITH MIND AND HEART

So, the truly effective leaders lead with *both* mind (science) and heart (art)—with cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence. One or the other will not suffice. Only by mastering both will the leader succeed. For example, former President William Clinton was rendered ineffective as a leader because of the Monica Lewinsky affair and was nearly impeached. Why? Because he suddenly lost the *knowledge* of how government works (science)? No! He lost his ability to lead because he lost the *trust and respect* of much of the American public (art). He could still lead with his mind, but he had lost the ability to lead with his heart.

On the contrary, one could argue that former President Jimmy Carter lost his ability to lead because of a perceived lack of competency. The majority of the voting public did not believe that he had the knowledge necessary to manage government operations and effectively lead with mind. However, virtually no one questioned his concern for people and his ability to lead with heart. Absent the perceived ability to do *both*, however, he lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan.

I conclude, then, that effective leaders are situational; that is, they are capable of adapting their leadership behavior to the situation. They

utilize structural, human resource, symbolic, and political leadership behavior when appropriate. They lead with both mind (structural and political behavior) and with heart (human resource and symbolic behavior). They master both the science (mind) and art (heart) of leadership, and in doing so, they are transformational, leading their organizations to new heights. As Chris Lowney writes in *Heroic Leadership*, in a word, such leaders are truly “heroic” (Lowney, 2003).

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Effectively balancing the use of the four frames of leadership behavior assumes that the leader has a thorough knowledge and understanding of the leader’s organizational culture. In the words of Harold Hill in *The Music Man*, the leader needs “to know the territory.” Knowing the territory, or knowing the organizational culture, means that the leader must know the beliefs, expectations, and shared values of the organization, as well as the personality of the individuals and the organization as a whole. Without such knowledge, the leader cannot appropriately apply the correct leadership frame behavior to the situation.

As mentioned in chapter 1, Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard contribute to our understanding of what it means to know the culture of the organization with their concept of readiness level. They define *readiness level* as the follower’s ability and willingness to accomplish a specific task; this is the major contingency that influences what leadership frame behavior should be applied. Follower readiness incorporates the follower’s level of achievement motivation, ability, and willingness to assume responsibility for his or her own behavior in accomplishing specific tasks, as well as his or her education and experience relevant to the task. So, a person with a low readiness level should be dealt with by using structural frame behavior (telling behavior), while a person with a very high readiness level should be dealt with using human resource and symbolic frame behavior (delegating behavior).

At this point, the reader may be thinking that using leadership theory to determine one’s leadership behavior is an exercise in futility. How can one be realistically expected to assess accurately and immediately the individual’s or group’s readiness level before acting. It seems like

an utterly complex and overwhelming task. When confronted with this reaction, I relate using leadership theory to determine one's leadership behavior to riding a bike. When we first learn to ride a bike, we have to concern ourselves with keeping our balance, steering, pedaling, and being ready to brake at a moment's notice. However, once we learn and have had experience riding the bike, we seldom think of those details. We have learned to ride the bike by instinct or habit. Having used situational leadership theory to determine my own leadership behavior, I can attest to the fact that its use becomes as instinctive as riding a bike after a while. At this point, I can almost always instantly assess the readiness level of an individual or group and apply the appropriate leadership frame behavior—and believe me when I tell you that if I can do it, so can you.

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

We all aspire to be transformational leaders—leaders who inspire positive change in their followers. As we saw in chapter 1, charismatic or transformational leaders use charisma to inspire their followers. They talk to the followers about how essential their performance is and how they expect the group's performance to exceed expectations. Such leaders use dominance, self-confidence, a need for influence, and conviction of moral righteousness to increase their charisma and consequently their leadership effectiveness. A transformational leader changes an organization by recognizing an opportunity and developing a vision, communicating that vision to organizational members, building trust in the vision, and achieving the vision by motivating organizational members.

Virtually all of the managers profiled in this book could be considered transformational leaders. In almost every case, they moved their organizations from being ineffective to being extremely effective. Most of them inherited losing teams only to transform them not only into winning programs, but into supremely effective ones—they all won either a pennant and/or a World Series. They achieved this success by displaying the characteristics of a transformational leader. They all had a vision and had the personal charisma and ability to convince others to join them in

achieving that vision. However, they did so in different ways by applying the appropriate leadership behavior to their differing situations. They were able to gauge the *readiness level* of their followers accurately and apply the appropriate leadership behavior, whether it was structural, human resource, symbolic, or political frame behavior, or some combination thereof. Although this is easier said than done, studying these managers' leadership behavior as depicted in this book should be helpful to anyone aspiring to become a transformational leader.

LEADERSHIP AS A MORAL SCIENCE

Left on its own, situational leadership theory is secular and amoral. As such, it is just as likely to produce a leader like Adolph Hitler or Bernie Madoff as it is to produce a leader in the Mother Teresa or Martin Luther King Jr. mold. So, to further ensure that leaders lead with heart as well as mind, I would suggest the use of the Ignatian Vision as the lens through which one views his or her leadership behavior. As recommended in chapter 2, asking ourselves whether our leadership behavior conforms to Ignatius's principles of the *magis, cura personalis*, discernment, service to others, and social justice will bring to completion our understanding and use of situational leadership theory and transform leadership into a moral science. In my view, therefore, using the Ignatian Vision, or a similar model, as our moral compass will help ensure that history will witness more leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. and fewer like Adolf Hitler.

CONCLUSION

Recently, a plethora of research studies have been conducted on leadership and leadership styles. The overwhelming evidence indicates that there is not one singular leadership style that is most effective in all situations. Rather, it has been found that a leader's leadership behavior should be adapted to the situation so that at various times structural, human resource, symbolic, or political frame leadership behavior may be most effective.

The emergence of transformational leadership has seen leadership theory come full circle. Transformational leadership theory combines aspects of early trait theory with the more current situational models. The personal charisma of the leader, along with his or her ability to formulate an organizational vision and communicate it to others, determines the transformational leader's effectiveness.

Since the effective leader is expected to adapt his or her leadership style to an ever-changing environment, leadership becomes an even more complex and challenging task. However, thorough knowledge of one's organizational culture and of leadership theory can make some sense out of the apparent chaos that a leader faces on a daily basis. It is my hope that this text will shed some light on the *situation*—pun intended.

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APPENDIX: THE HEART SMART ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGNOSIS MODEL

Just as there are vital signs in measuring individual health, I believe that there are vital signs in measuring the health of organizations. This survey will help identify those vital signs in your school system. The purpose of the Heart Smart Organizational Diagnosis Questionnaire, therefore, is to provide feedback data for intensive diagnostic efforts. Use of the questionnaire, either by itself or in conjunction with other information-collecting techniques such as systematic observation or interviewing, will provide the data needed for identifying strengths and weaknesses in the functioning of an educational institution and help determine whether the leaders are leading with both mind and heart.

A meaningful diagnostic effort must be based on a theory or model of organizational development. This makes action research possible, as it facilitates problem identification, which is essential to determining the proper functioning of an organization. The model suggested here establishes a systematic approach for analyzing relationships among the variables that influence how an organization is managed. It provides information for assessment of ten areas of formal and informal activity: structure, identity and culture, leadership, motivation, communication, decision making, conflict resolution, goal setting and planning, power distribution, and attitude toward change. The outer circle in Figure A.1 is an organizational boundary for diagnosis. This




Figure A.1. Organizational boundaries for analysis.

boundary demarcates the functioning of the internal and external environments. Since the underlying organizational theory upon which this survey is based is an open systems model, it is essential that influences from both the internal and external environment be considered for the analysis to be complete.

Please think of your *present personal or professional environment* and indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. A "1" is *Disagree Strongly* and a "7" is *Agree Strongly*.

			<i>Neither</i>			
<i>Disagree</i>		<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree Nor</i>	<i>Agree</i>		<i>Agree</i>
<i>Strongly</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Slightly</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Slightly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1. The manner in which the tasks in this institution are divided is logical.
2. The relationships among co-workers are harmonious.
3. This institution's leadership efforts result in the fulfillment of its purposes.
4. My work at this institution offers me an opportunity to grow as a person.

5. I can always talk to someone at work, if I have a work-related problem.
6. The faculty actively participates in decisions.
7. There is little evidence of unresolved conflict in this institution.
8. There is a strong fit between this institution's mission and my own values.
9. The faculty and staff are represented on most committees and task forces.
10. Staff development routinely accompanies any significant changes that occur in this institution.
11. The manner in which the tasks in this institution are distributed is fair.
12. Older faculty's opinions are valued.
13. The administrators display the behaviors required for effective leadership.
14. The rewards and incentives here are both internal and external.
15. There is open and direct communication among all levels of this institution.
16. Participative decision making is fostered at this institution.
17. What little conflict exists at this institution is not dysfunctional.
18. Representatives of all segments of the school community participate in the strategic planning process.
19. The faculty and staff have an appropriate voice in the operation of this institution.
20. This institution is not resistant to constructive change.
21. The division of labor in this organization helps its efforts to reach its goals.
22. I feel valued by this institution.
23. The administration encourages an appropriate amount of participation in decision making.
24. Faculty and staff members are often recognized for special achievements.
25. There are no significant barriers to effective communication at this institution.

26. When the acceptance of a decision is important, a group decision-making model is used.
27. Mechanisms at this institution effectively manage conflict and stress.
28. Most of the employees understand the mission and goals of this institution.
29. The faculty and staff feel empowered to make their own decisions regarding their daily work.
30. Tolerance toward change is modeled by the administration of this institution.
31. The various grade-level teachers and departments work well together.
32. Differences among people are accepted.
33. The leadership is able to generate continuous improvement in the institution.
34. My ideas are encouraged, recognized, and used.
35. Communication is carried out in a non-aggressive style.
36. In general, the decision-making process is effective.
37. Conflicts are usually resolved before they become dysfunctional.
38. For the most part, the employees of this institution feel an “ownership” of its goals.
39. The faculty and staff are encouraged to be creative in their work.
40. When changes are made, they do so within a rational process.
41. This institution’s organizational design responds well to changes in the internal and external environment.
42. The teaching and the non-teaching staffs get along with one another.
43. The leadership of this institution espouses a clear educational vision.
44. The goals and objectives for the year are mutually developed by the faculty and the administration.
45. I believe that my opinions and ideas are listened to.
46. Usually, a collaborative style of decision making is utilized at this institution.

47. A collaborative approach to conflict resolution is ordinarily used.
48. This institution has a clear educational vision.
49. The faculty and staff can express their opinions without fear of retribution.
50. I feel confident that I will have an opportunity for input if a significant change were to take place in this institution.
51. This institution is “people-oriented.”
52. Administrators and faculty have mutual respect for one another.
53. Administrators give people the freedom to do their job.
54. The rewards and incentives in this institution are designed to satisfy a variety of individual needs.
55. The opportunity for feedback is always available in the communications process.
56. Group decision-making techniques, like brainstorming and group surveys, are sometimes used in the decision-making process.
57. Conflicts are often prevented by early intervention.
58. This institution has a strategic plan for the future.
59. Most administrators here use the power of persuasion rather than the power of coercion.
60. This institution is committed to continually improving through the process of change.
61. This institution does not adhere to a strict chain of command.
62. This institution exhibits grace, style, and civility.
63. The administrators model desired behavior.
64. At this institution, employees are not normally coerced into doing things.
65. I have the information that I need to do a good job.
66. I can constructively challenge the decisions in this institution.
67. A process to resolve work-related grievances is available.
68. This institution has an ongoing planning process.
69. The faculty and staff have input into the operation of this institution through a collective bargaining unit or through a faculty governance body.
70. The policies, procedures, and programs of this institution are periodically reviewed.

HEART SMART SCORING SHEET

Instructions: Transfer the numbers you circled on the questionnaire to the blanks below. Add each column and divide each sum by seven. This will give you comparable scores for each of the ten areas.

Structure	Identity and Culture	Leadership	Motivation
1 _____	2 _____	3 _____	4 _____
11 _____	12 _____	13 _____	14 _____
21 _____	22 _____	23 _____	24 _____
31 _____	32 _____	33 _____	34 _____
41 _____	42 _____	43 _____	44 _____
51 _____	52 _____	53 _____	54 _____
61 _____	62 _____	63 _____	64 _____

Total

_____	_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------	-------

Average

_____	_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------	-------

Communication	Decision Making	Conflict Resolution	Goal Setting/ Planning
5 _____	6 _____	7 _____	8 _____
15 _____	16 _____	17 _____	18 _____
25 _____	26 _____	27 _____	28 _____
35 _____	36 _____	37 _____	38 _____
45 _____	46 _____	47 _____	48 _____
55 _____	56 _____	57 _____	58 _____
65 _____	66 _____	67 _____	68 _____

Total

_____	_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------	-------

Average

_____	_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------	-------

<i>Power Distribution</i>	<i>Attitude Toward Change</i>
9 _____	10 _____
19 _____	20 _____
29 _____	30 _____
39 _____	40 _____
49 _____	50 _____
59 _____	60 _____
69 _____	70 _____
 Total	
_____	_____
 Average	
_____	_____

INTERPRETATION SHEET

Instructions: Study the background information and interpretation suggestions that follow.

Background

The Heart Smart Organizational Diagnosis Questionnaire is a survey-feedback instrument designed to collect data on organizational functioning. It measures the perceptions of persons in an organization to determine areas of activity that would benefit from an organizational development effort. It can be used as the sole data-collection technique or in conjunction with other techniques (interview, observation, etc.). The instrument and the model reflect a systematic approach for analyzing relationships among variables that influence how an organization is managed. Using the Heart Smart Organizational Diagnosis Questionnaire is the first step in determining appropriate interventions for organizational change efforts.

Interpretation and Diagnosis

A crucial consideration is the diagnosis based on data interpretation. The simplest diagnosis would be to assess the amount of variance for

each of the ten variables in relation to a score of 4, which is the neutral point. Scores below 4 would indicate a problem with organizational functioning. The closer the score is to 1, the more severe the problem would be. Scores above 4 indicate the lack of a problem, with a score of 7 indicating optimum functioning.

Another diagnostic approach follows the same guidelines of assessment in relation to the neutral point (score) of 4. The score of each of the 70 items on the questionnaire can be reviewed to produce more exacting information on problematic areas. Thus, diagnosis would be more precise. For example, let us suppose that the average score on item number 8 is 1.4. This would indicate not only a problem in organizational purpose or goal setting, but also a more specific problem in that there is a gap between organizational and individual goals. This more precise diagnostic effort is likely to lead to a more appropriate intervention in the organization than the generalized diagnostic approach described in the preceding paragraph.

Appropriate diagnosis must address the relationships between the boxes to determine the interconnectedness of problems. For example, if there is a problem with *communication*, it could be that the organizational *structure* does not foster effective communication. This might be the case if the average score on item 25 was well below 4 (2.5 or lower) and all the items on organizational *structure* (1, 11, 21, 31, 41, 51, 61) averaged below 4.