
Governing Soviet Journalism
The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin
Thomas C. Wolfe

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THE PRESS AND THE SOCIALIST PERSON AFTER STALIN

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For my parents

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NOTE ON SOURCES

The archival references in chapter 3 are to what was called in the early post-Soviet era the TsKhSD, or *Tsentral'noe Khranenie dlia sovremennii dokumentatsii.* This is the former Central Party Archives on the Old Square. It has undergone several name changes since the early 1990s, its latest name being the Archive of Social and Political History, or RGASPI.

All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

Abbreviated bibliographic citations have been used in the footnotes. Full citations can be found in the bibliography.

PROLOGUE

This book emerged from dozens of conversations with journalists grappling with the implications of the Soviet collapse for their lives and work. Some of these conversations felt like uneasy performances, as when the vice general director of ITAR-TASS—the Soviet Union's, and after 1991, the Russian Federation's main news agency—gave a measured and sustained defense of how the Soviet media operated before 1991. He droned on and on as the latest reports from CNN flickered from the television in the corner of his office. And at the other end of the spectrum of power and prestige was the "editor-in-chief" of a small newspaper called *Sviditel',* or *Witness;* our conversation took place in the kitchen of a Moscow clothing factory. The journalist, who looked about twenty years old, called himself an investigative reporter. His paper, of which he had published two issues, was filled mostly with photographs of corpses of Russian soldiers killed in various places in the Caucasus. Both men thought of themselves as journalists, both men provided information to Russian readers, and both men had faith that a certain configuration of information was crucial to the well-being of a society.

Other conversations stick in my mind less because of what was said than because of objects that served as a kind of silent commentary on the interaction. For example, in the office of the editor-in-chief of *Pravda,* the newspaper that had been since 1918 the main organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there was an enormous globe that spun on a heavy wooden stand. As we talked about the difficulties of post-Soviet society, a parallel chain of questions flickered in the back of my mind: Had this globe sat in the office during Soviet days as a kind of exhibit, as an object that allowed the Soviet Union's most important journalists to chart the progress of Marxism as it moved across the world? Or was its presence less about Soviet power than about the power of ideas: that the interpretations of Marxism that flowed from this room were sufficient to explain the world? Another office, another object. The office of the editor-in-chief of the official paper of the Russian government, *Rossiiskaia gazeta,* was cluttered with boxes of books and papers. But sitting on a table under a glass case, as if the center of interest and attention, was a beautiful wooden model,

three feet long, of a sailing yacht, with meticulously draped threads for rigging. It evoked not communism but the pastimes of plutocrats. As we talked I could not help wondering how "privatization" had transformed "the social life of things" in the Soviet Union.[1] Another office, another object. I arranged to meet the editor of one of the smaller newspapers for and about the Russian military, *Patriot,* in the press building in downtown Moscow. The office was small and cramped, and on a shelf was a row of what looked to be Cuisinarts. I asked the editor-in-chief what they were, and he said that in order to generate money to keep the paper going, they had entered into a joint venture with a Vietnamese firm to produce low-cost kitchen appliances like these choppers and mixers. And, in fact, he ended our conversation abruptly when he realized his next appointment was due any moment. As I left the paper's office, three Vietnamese men in suits entered with briefcases.

These objects indexed enormous changes, and questions dogged me after every conversation, after every encounter: What had it been like to witness, participate in, and experience the appearance of a "free" press? How did journalists understand "freedom of expression"? And how should we represent the historical trajectory from communism to post-communism not in terms of ideas or ideologies, but in terms of practices of information?

If each of the men and women with whom I talked in 1992–1993, the first years of post-communism, were engaged in a process of learning the new parameters for media in the context of the quasi-capitalist, quasi-democratic system taking shape around them, they were doing so from the perspective of their careers and experiences in the Soviet media and their formation by the habits, dispositions, and powers that constituted daily life in late Soviet society. Of the many conversations that could serve as an entry point into the issues I explore here, one conversation in particular stood out because it ranged so fluidly across the gap between the Soviet system and the new post-communist order. This study is in a sense a response to this conversation, and to the echoes of it that I heard in other places.

FROM LENIN TO L. RON

In March 1993, in the tense political context of Boris Yeltsin's struggle with the mostly communist Congress of People's Deputies over the establishment of capitalism and the conduct of multi-party democracy in Russia, an acquaintance who worked at *Izvestiia* decided that because of my interest in the history of the Soviet press, I had to meet one of his colleagues, Aleksei Shliapov. Shliapov was a columnist who had worked since the 1960s at the paper, which was the one of the Soviet Union's two most prestigious newspapers, along with *Pravda*. My friend led me upstairs and

knocked on Shliapov's door. Shliapov was a short man with thick glasses, his square head was covered with dense, wavy, steel gray hair. His office was spacious but spare, and his large desk was covered with a massive clutter of newspapers and books, as well as sheets and sheets of white paper across which were rows of undulating horizontal lines that looked more like doodles than handwriting. After explaining to Shliapov who I was and what I was doing in Moscow, my friend left, and we began to talk.

I noticed that Shliapov had been reading just before we entered his office. He had put the book down on his desk, and as we sat down to talk, I glanced at it since I thought I recognized something familiar about its cover. Looking more closely, I noticed the exploding volcano depicted on the cover of *Dianetics,* written by the founder of scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, and I asked Shliapov what he thought of it. He answered that he quite liked it: "I think that our politicians should acquaint themselves with this book, since here is, as it were, a technology for how to become popular, how to acquire influence among the masses without having to appear a significant personality."[2] This led into an extended analysis of Russia's current political circumstances. Shliapov was clearly worried about where Russia was heading, and he had very few kind things to say about any of the leaders then struggling over power. He denounced the political conflict between President Yelstin and the Supreme Soviet as a battle between groups within the old Soviet *nomenklatura,* or that elite group of party members and technocrats, who "don't represent their society or any kind of parties or party structures." When I asked him whether any of these politicians were consciously trying to create a new political system, he replied, "How could they? They don't think about anything, not even their own speeches. They give as many speeches as possible at all of these congresses, conferences, and forums, but they don't explain anything."

He was equally agitated about the state of journalism and about *Izvestiia*'s own position within these shifting circumstances. While the politicization of society during perestroika may have been crucial to freeing the political process from the party's control, Shliapov was worried by the persistence of the strong identifications newspapers had with one political group or another. "Personally, I think that a newspaper should join neither this camp nor that one, but rather express some kind of objective opinion on the situation, from the standpoint of the law and the national interest." Disturbing for Shliapov was his paper's open alliance with Yeltsin. While several other *Izvestiia* journalists had downplayed its consequences in our conversations, Shliapov openly complained about it:

> So we unconditionally support Gaidar [Yeltsin's first prime minister, who introduced full-scale marketization of the Russian economy], despite the fact that it is completely obvious that concerning many questions, the man is not connected to real

> life [*chelovek otorvannii ot real'noi deistveitel'nosti*]. . . . Nevertheless we cannot openly express our opinions concerning the consequences of several of his actions, as much as Gaidar enjoys the unconditional support of Yeltsin, and since Yeltsin is under our patronage—or rather we are under his patronage—and as long as at this stage we are without any alternatives. Although what does it mean to be without alternatives? Yeltsin has always had alternatives, just like Gorbachev had alternatives. It doesn't mean that each word of his is right. We can't understand this, and he certainly doesn't understand this. If we begin to criticize him for something, he doesn't understand that there might be more support for him in an act of criticism than if we approved every move.

It was obvious to Shliapov that the spectrum of contemporary journalism bore the marks of this political programming; Shliapov feared that *Izvestiia* was even beginning to frighten away its own readers by the degree to which it had become a mouthpiece for Yeltsin. Those who had been attracted to *Izvestiia*'s new voice in 1990 might be repulsed by the way it tiptoed around the issue of Yeltsin's style of rule.

But politics was only one of the problems that troubled Shliapov. There was also the issue of what was happening to the pages of newspapers. Here the problem was a new set of values that governed the choice of texts. "Nowadays no one says a word about ballet, or about any kind of artistic event. Everything turns on politics. For example, if you were writing about painting, about the opening of an exhibit, the first thing you would do is find out whether the painter was a supporter of Il'ia Glazunov or not, you would have to decide whether the painter was one of ours or one of theirs."[3]

Within this political upheaval the sense of what good journalism was had turned around seemingly overnight. *Izvestiia* printed fewer and fewer analyses of contemporary problems and more and more reporting on events [*sobytiinost'*]. "Of course we try in our reporting to give our own point of view through the ways in which we present the material, but on the other hand, we are severely lacking in generalizing [*obobshchaiushchii*] and pointed political commentaries." This devaluing of commentary brought with it a devaluation of the artful writing of the era just past. He complained that there was nothing anymore like the essays of Anatolii Agranovskii, who managed to articulate penetrating criticism of the society through an elucidation of the "concrete fate" of a single person. Newspapers had no more need of carefully crafted language and subtly constructed arguments.

> Now, on the other hand, it's all frontal, written in such a way that language is unimportant. Style isn't important today; more important is to have your own source in the government, to receive from him documents of some sort, to arrange to get these papers each day, and write that yesterday some sort of unimportant meeting took place, and that they developed such and such a plan. The first three pages of our

paper has this kind of journalism. In my opinion this kind of material should exist only if it reports about truly important things.

He explained that the pages of *Izvestiia* were cluttered with the most varied kinds of information: "Here a sovkhoz is building a church, the rate of the mark is higher than that of the dollar, Smirnov vodka is being condemned again. Why are we reporting about the Latvian currency and not about the Lithuanian? That is, there is often no logic in the material."

Good journalism, Shliapov believed, was thoughtful journalism. The press could influence society only if it influenced the consciousness of a single person, "to change the form of thoughts of a person into a demand for freedom and a new life." This was possible if a journalist could adopt a disinterested standpoint on social and political events; only then could the writer extract from the tumult of events their larger significance. Shliapov lamented that few of his younger colleagues had this skill, and he criticized the paper's editors for not cultivating it. "Talented people should not be forced to do what seems important to their editors, but they need to ask what is important for themselves in whatever genre they write best in." He feared that *Izvestiia*'s editors, in their rush to make the paper into a profitable enterprise, were resurrecting the leadership style of the old system, imposing a set of rules and practices that had to be followed no matter what, and he worried that the paper's editors had stopped viewing their employees as people whose opinions were worth hearing. Even though it was widely believed that *Izvestiia* had the most talented staff of any paper, and even though the creative collective of the paper was widely praised by all observers of the Russian media, the fact remained that "at this stage of things, and with this approach to journalism, very few journalists here can find themselves in their work."

The pessimism Shliapov felt as he looked at post-communist society was so profound that he had started to question whether or not those who had led the rush toward democracy and the market had chosen the best path. He had begun to think that a more gradual path of reform might have led to a more equitable outcome. "Our chief misfortune," Shliapov said, "is that at this point we must idealize capitalism, even though it is completely clear that capitalism is no panacea for our ills. This is completely obvious. . . . Of course we need some kind of pole star to steer by, but when I think of what the outcome will be, I can't help but think that our suffering society doesn't have, as it were, an intuitive sense about how to find some kind of path out of this mess." He was skeptical, for example, about the ads on television that showed images of consumer plenty and the creation of a luxurious sphere of private life. "You know, our society differs in some ways from Western society. Our people have been taught for cen-

turies that to be poor is honorable and to be rich is unworthy." He doubted that Russian peasants had moved past the stage of wanting to burn down the barns and kill the cows of farmers who distinguished themselves by their hard work. This contributed to the more general problem of "valuing oneself too weakly, and of being too severely punished for the slightest opposition and for the smallest friction that this creates. All this leads to the caution, timidity, and prudence that many are inclined to take for wisdom." The recent past had been for Shliapov a painful process of coming to understand the inertia possessed by cultural artifacts like forms of consciousness.

Toward the end of our conversation he turned to the topic of just how far Russian society had come since the 1950s. And here he gave much of the credit to precisely that institution, the Soviet press, which, he recognized, was seen by so many in the West as the blunt object that coerced obedience from an indifferent population.

> Right here at *Izvestiia,* with Adzhubei's arrival [in 1959], there appeared a continuing rubric called "In defense of the Person." In it we constantly uncovered violations of laws, these horrible conflicts between high-level institutions of power. We were the first to write about the misconduct of ministers, procurators, judges. Our fundamental assumption: that the little man was always right, that we must never insult the little man. The essence of the situation was that precisely with this line began the transformation of consciousness, so that people could somehow see with their own eyes from their own position what kind of abnormal situation we found ourselves in. That we weren't ruled by law, but by the laws of the strong, and that we had a kind of social condition in which a person having been picked up and placed on the social staircase had no worries. . . . This system of privilege was the main characteristic of our time.

That the press succeeded in exposing this situation and in raising the consciousness of its readers was for Shliapov one of the most significant aspects of late Soviet history. He felt that far too many observers believed that the dissidents were responsible for the party's collapse. "In general, I can tell you that there exists in the West an exaggerated opinion about the role the dissidents played. It was precisely the censored press that prepared our society for the revolution in consciousness that we have seen since perestroika."

So what was this conversation? What were these utterances? A series of remarks, observations, assertions. A chain of thought triggered by my questions, quizzical looks, and signals of comprehension. Traces collected in the course of fieldwork, certainly, and yet in the curious action of time upon one's material, these comments have acquired their own aura of a past time. Instead of assisting in the ethnographic task of mapping out

Russia's transition, instead of revealing the complex layerings of interests of media owners, politicians, and journalists who shaped or were shaped by the transition, Shliapov's statements, asides, and descriptions have become traces of the ways that journalism existed in the Soviet Union as a cultural project. His reflections are challenges to make sense of the transformation of one of the Soviet Union's most uncanny features: the assumption that a differently organized media would produce a different kind of person.

Shliapov had lived a significant piece of the history of this conviction that journalism was a means of developing in individuals a concern for their common future. This history began for him in the "Soviet sixties," when journalists took up the task of helping readers think critically about the conditions of their lives; journalists turned in a new way to the problems of daily life, to questions of the link between personal conduct and the conduct of Soviet society. They had assumed that critically thinking individuals would make possible a critically aware society. The press of those years had been organized to produce a coherent picture of the world so that Soviet citizens would reflect this coherence in the conduct of their own lives. And in addition, Shliapov described a journalism that had been *useful,* although in ways that appeared unfamiliar in comparison to the capitalist press. The difference was not only that the Soviet press served as a means of acting, as Shliapov said, on behalf of the "Soviet little man," as a kind of moral agency above society and apart from the state, one that descended whenever possible to help put a life back on track. The newspaper was also a never-ending almanac where Soviet persons would be tutored into socialist consciousness, and journalists explored the problem of socialist conduct.

Shliapov had also experienced the party's retreat from this governmental project during the 1970s and early 80s. Such a journalism existed during the Brezhnev period in tension with, rather than at the service of, the interests of the Communist Party, which found itself having to closely manage and monitor the work of journalists, lest they produce too much criticism, too much reflection. And our conversation took place in yet another difficult circumstance, in the early years of post-communism when there was no question of reconstituting critical reflection around a single collective social project; journalists were in a sense forced to choose *between* projects and to make their choice in the context of vigorous market competition. According to Shliapov, *Izvestiia*'s editors had been forced to retreat from their contemplation of and action upon the consciousness of their society and to focus instead on the discursive and practical requirements of profitability; they had to find and keep an audience big enough to support the paper as the post-Soviet audience fractured along lines of class and ideology.

In such a context *Dianetics* appeared as a kind of inverted image of the manual that had been the Soviet press. In the new Russia, overcoming social and cultural difficulties was no longer a matter of the party's reflection on social problems, and journalism's transmission and translation of these reflections; after 1991, Russia's fate seemed to Shliapov more a matter of politicians making the right decisions, and here he wondered if *Dianetics* might help. Shliapov believed that if politicians followed Hubbard's instructions for the overhaul of the self by forging new and compelling self-images, they might be able to overcome the indifference, suspicion, and disgust of the average Russian with politics. Indeed, *Dianetics* explicitly taught people how to gain personal popularity, how to become, in scientology's terms, "clear." Shliapov read in its pages that everyone's problem was with the "reactive mind," which in the words of a British Dianetics Web site, "plagues a person with the unthinking, irrational dictates of its contents and imposes anxieties, fears, unwanted sensations and feelings, strange pains and a host of other undesirable effects. Freeing him from the command value such ills exert over his volition, provides new levels of self-determinism."[4] *Dianetics* seemed to promise a new "revolutionary" elite, one that smashed and rebuilt not societies, but selves. Thus rebuilt, perhaps Russian politicians could create a viable society, for without such a revolution, Shliapov doubted that the old Soviet selves of Russia's leaders had it in them to confront the host of dilemmas in the post-Soviet world.

Shliapov had traveled from Lenin to L. Ron, from socialism to self-determinism, from proletarian revolution to capitalist restoration. He had experienced the drastic revaluation of his profession as the socialist telos of Soviet society disappeared and a capitalist ethos appeared in its place. He had lived a series of upheavals concerning everything from mentalities to the configuration of geo-political power. If there was a single thread in all he had said, though, it was his conviction that journalism had been and still could be an effective practice of social engagement. Shliapov understood that individuals were in some sense the products of practices of information that constructed the social world in specific ways, and as he witnessed a profound revaluation of people's relationship to and participation in the world, he also clearly remembered the values of that prior construction of self and society. For after 1991, newspapers had ceased to be symbols of collective deliberation about common fates and had become multi-layered documents quilted together by new practices of representing time and space, and new rationalities of acting upon the public in the service of clusters of financial and ideological interests.

This book takes this conviction as its central object and explores the history evoked by Shliapov by analyzing just how journalists participated in the government of the Soviet Union and by tracing out the complica-

tions that confronted journalists in this governing role. Yet while its main interest is in the late Soviet past, it is also concerned with the larger context of the history of media and culture in the 20th century. By moving through the successive stages in Shliapov's life and career—from the Soviet sixties to the "era of stagnation" under Brezhnev, from Gorbachev's perestroika to Yeltsin's new Russia—we not only gain a better sense of Soviet society, but we also emerge on the other side of a troubling phase of the modern era, one that we can challenge with our own critical tactics and sensibilities.

GOVERNING SOVIET JOURNALISM

Introduction

The Soviet project of creating a "new" culture and society entailed a plan for the modeling of "new" persons who both embodied and fulfilled the promise of socialism. Most studies of the "utopian" dimensions of Soviet culture focus on the period of experimentation and innovation in the 1920s or consider the 1930s, when this project was invested with the complex mix of savagery and civilization characteristic of Stalinism. The present study, by contrast, examines this project from the point of view of the second half of the Soviet Union's existence, and indeed from the perspective of that project's dissolution and disappearance, through a focus on its institutionalization in the cultural practice of journalism.

My examination of this project grew out of conversations with journalists and editors like Shliapov during the course of research into the role and place of the media in Russia's transition from communism to capitalism. Reflection on their careers brought many journalists to acknowledge their role in working on behalf of the socialist system, and while some spoke disparagingly of their previous work, others spoke about it unapologetically. For some, socialism simply seemed to belong to another life, while still others spoke angrily about what they perceived as the betrayal that led to socialism's disappearance.[1] All, however, evoked an enormously complicated history. I assemble this history by piecing together a variety of sources; it is made from moments of fieldwork, from conversations, from archival material, from newspaper articles, and from both Russian and Western scholarly accounts of the Soviet press and society. I draw on scholarly arguments about the importance of the press for the consolidation of Soviet power and as a vehicle for ideological mobilization of the population. Ultimately, however, I argue for the value of a different kind of historical insight: by starting from the end of the Soviet Union's existence and look-

ing back, by reexamining the tempestuous relationship between the press and the party between the late 1950s and the late 1980s, it is possible to discern just how central the press was to sustaining the idea of the possibility of socialism. Journalists were certainly central to the Soviet project in being producers of that everyday terrain of the Soviet imaginary, that is, in disseminating the powerful images, tropes, and figures through which Soviet citizens understood their world. But they were crucial for another reason: the press they produced was the institution in Soviet society able to present a continuous reflection of the state of socialism and the achievements of a socialist society. This power was both indispensable for the party and dangerous; the reality reflected back to Soviet readers could provoke pride or alienation, joy or derision. Thus the press as an institution presented both problems and possibilities.

Journalism was not just an instrument for the consolidation of Soviet power or a "weapon" in the class struggle. It occupied a position at the heart of the Soviet project through its ability to project representations of the socialist person. Journalism was the means by which the Soviet project envisioned itself in an ongoing, relentless succession of moments made possible by the rhythmic pulse of newspapers across the endless thresholds of everyday life. In a sense all of print socialism—that enormous system dedicated to the production of the socialist imaginary—was focused upon the problem of the identity of the socialist citizen, but the press was particularly important as the daily manifestation of the party's presence and intentions. Journalists took very seriously their tutelary function, exploring from the earliest years just after the revolution to the Gorbachev era the problem of what it was to live a socialist life, to be a socialist person.[2] The evolution of the texts they produced reflected both the limits imposed upon them by the party as well as the shifting scales of values that defined good conduct at a particular time. If during the 1920s and 1930s the socialist person was constructed through ideas of cultured behavior, in the post-Stalin era many journalists projected the image of the person as a critical thinker focused on the problem of what it was to construct or enable a critical society.[3] In this sense the socialist person was no single, easily definable set of traits or dispositions; the "new Soviet person" changed over time as the conditions that made it possible evolved. One way of understanding the late Soviet period, then, is in terms of the successive redefinitions and renewals of this project as it was inflected and challenged by everything from shifts in the party leadership to new communications technologies that had to be assimilated into the operation of print socialism.

Described in this way, it is perhaps clear that this account is not a history of the profession of journalism in the Soviet Union, nor an ethnographic description of the micro-worlds inhabited by journalists. I do not examine, for example, the anti-semitism or gender hierarchies that shaped

the profession in the years since Stalin's death, nor do I venture into the terrain of how the Soviet press was received by readers. Rather, I offer a description of the central place of journalism within the Soviet system and how its presence there generated pressures that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. I do this by approaching the press from the broadly interdisciplinary viewpoint of the cultural study of mass mediated communications.

Recent scholarly attention to the place of journalistic texts in the emergence of modernity derive from a variety of developments in postwar intellectual life: the emergence in the work of Innis, McCluhan, and Ong of a concept of "media" as one of the prime determinants of culture;[4] the development of semiotic approaches in cultural anthropology, which stressed the ways that culture is constituted in daily life through the creation of meaning by individuals with a mastery of the relevant signs and codes;[5] cultural Marxism, which argues that the durability of the class structure of capitalist societies derives not so much from coercion or even the threat of coercion, but from the way economic inequalities are embedded in the habits and discourses of everyday existence.[6] All these schools of thought assume that politics and culture are not distinct categories; they suggest that newspaper texts gain their political meaning from their manipulation of cultural codes, and that the most apparently innocuous cultural production, such as the simplest piece of news reporting, carries the meaning it does because of its circulation within fields of meaning structured politically and symbolically.

These intellectual discourses encourage the researcher to pay attention to the importance of text, genre, representation, and the historical connection between texts and contexts. Individual texts and the practices and discourses from which they emerge can be read as both causes and effects of profound shifts in the operations of economic and political power on a global scale.[7]

Similar approaches have been applied with great success across a range of historiographical fields. In the context of French history, scholars focusing on print culture have generated new understandings of the French Enlightenment, the problems of the Old Regime, and the social and cultural processes culminating in the French Revolution.[8] The relationship between newspapers and the consolidation of industrial capitalism in Western Europe has been illuminated by Richard Terdiman, for example, who has shown how the rise of mass newspapers in mid-19th-century France can be understood as part of the commodification of the objects and practices of daily life.[9] Peter Fritzsche reads the public print culture of Berlin at the turn of the 20th century in an attempt to evoke the transformation of the subjective worlds of those who were making the German capital into an enormous cosmopolitan city; he describes the circuits of inscriptions

that embedded the neophyte city dweller in the political, economic, and cultural processes established by an international industrial marketplace and a consumer-oriented, sensation-seeking middle class. He shows how the mastering of modern life required mastering those modes of fragmented perception manifested by all manner of printed material, from handbills to metropolitan dailies.[10] And Jean Chalaby has described what he calls the "invention" of journalism in 19th-century Britain. He argues that what we know today as journalism arose from publishers' efforts to compete for readers by promoting a range of innovations in the discourses and practices of newspaper writers, which led by the end of the century to the consolidation of an image of the profession as being dispassionate, fact-based, and non-political.[11]

Journalism clearly possessed the power to shape the politics and culture of Euro-American societies, and we can gain a greater understanding of this power if we frame journalism in terms of the vital role it played in the formation and conduct of modern government. Newspapers were crucial vectors of ideas that promoted democratic institutions from the 17th century onward, but, more importantly, they played vital roles in the processes of rationalization, normalization, and commodification that were central to the emergence of modernity. Michel Foucault coined the word "governmentality" to describe the myriad inventions in the art of government that have characterized Western culture and society since roughly the 16th century.[12] Government, for Foucault, is the "conduct of conduct," it is the way power organizes itself within culture.[13] Studies of governmentality describe the specific and material ways that human beings are conceived as objects to be worked on, channeled, and guided to act in ways appropriate to an institution, a social practice, or an idea. Viewing late Soviet history through the lens of governmentality is a way of both bringing late Soviet history up close—by asking how journalists might be conceived as "governing" Soviet society—and at the same time distancing the Soviet Union —by viewing it in a larger, transnational, and historical context of governmental strategies and institutions intended to realize a certain vision of social order.

INSTITUTIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

What was "Soviet" about Soviet journalism, and what was "Soviet" about the Soviet press? On the one hand, these questions appear self-evident. What made journalism "Soviet" was that it was practiced by professionals in the service of the Soviet state, and what made the press "Soviet" was that it was produced for and read by Soviet readers. From this perspective, the Soviet press bore an obvious family resemblance to the Western

press; it was the product of journalists, that is, of writers who specialized in producing descriptions of the contemporary moment for mass publication. Given adequate supplies of raw materials, Soviet newspapers appeared at regular intervals, daily, four times a week, twice a week, etc., and contained a variety of texts and images of varying length that fit a variety of genres. And, of course, information was not randomly distributed over the page; in fact, Soviet newspapers, like Western ones, were laid out according to a certain internal logic, and this layout, look, and feel were remarkably consistent over the entire course of the Soviet Union's existence. Papers were produced by newspaper staffs led by editors who were ultimately responsible for the contents of their publications, and Soviet papers were read by citizens who either subscribed and had the papers delivered to their home or place of work, or who bought the papers on the street. People read papers in the metro, on park benches, at home after dinner; they looked in papers for weather reports and sports scores. In other words, the press and the practice of its production appear broadly comparable to the Western press in that it fit into the rhythms of life of any "typical" 20th-century industrialized society.

This general picture of identity begins to distort, however, when the focus turns to the content, organization, and size of the Soviet press. If we view the press at a moment in the early 1980s, what stands out is the enormous size of the Soviet press. In 1980 the total circulation of newspapers in the Soviet Union was nearly three times greater than in the United States, 179 million as opposed to 63 million copies.[14] The eight largest papers in the Soviet Union had over two and a half times the circulation of the largest eight papers in the United States.[15] The circulation per thousand people is revealing as well: between 1970 and 1986 the number of newspapers per citizen fell in the United States from 303 per thousand to 259 per thousand, while in the Soviet Union it grew from 336 per thousand to 442 per thousand. In 1986, only six countries had a greater circulation per thousand than the Soviet Union. And while the number of newspaper titles fell in nearly every other industrialized country in the world between 1970 and 1986, in the Soviet Union the number of newspaper titles remained around 8,000. The decade with the single largest increase in total circulation was between 1960 and 1970, when the total one-time circulation of the Soviet press more than doubled from 68.5 million copies to 140.7 million.[16]

From even this brief description, it is obvious that the press of the late Soviet period represented an extraordinary system for the production of newspaper texts, all the more so considering that it was produced with slightly more than half the numbers of journalists of the American press.[17] It suggests that the production of newspapers was an extremely important

part of the social order in the Soviet Union, that newspapers served a vital medium of communications, facilitating connections between journalists and readers.

And yet the significance of this enormous circulation is complicated when it is pointed out that Soviet newspapers had many fewer pages than their Western counterparts. It was rare for a major daily paper in the Soviet Union to have more than twelve pages, with papers in smaller cities and rural districts sometimes having four or even just two pages. Examination of an actual page of the paper provides clues that would explain this small size. The most obvious reason is that Soviet papers carried few, if any, advertisements. Nearly every square inch of the page was covered with text. Photographs, of course, appeared, but rarely as the center of interest. There were no huge, screaming headlines, no colorful ads, no eye-catching punctuation. And this was consistent across all Soviet newspapers. Indeed, the uniformity of this look and feel was one of the most jarring aspects of the Soviet press for anyone accustomed to the idea that papers needed their own visual identities in order to carve out a niche in the marketplace.

All these markers of difference together would point to the conclusion that the Soviet press was produced by a different *kind* of institution for different ends than the Western press. And indeed, the Soviet press is so compelling as a cultural product for the ways it redefined the nature of the knowledge provided in the everyday transactions of journalistic information, for the way it not only "supplied useful information" about the present moment but also served as a kind of almanac or digest of writing reflecting the ethos and values of the institutions that sought the moral and material transformation of the population.

These differences all derive from the fact that during the entire span of the Soviet Union's existence, the Soviet press was directed, supervised, and administered by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It reflected the party's interest in the socialist transformation of the largely agricultural society stretched across the Eurasian landmass. It reflected the particular vision of Marxist socialism developed by Lenin and his closest collaborators in the course of over two decades of revolutionary activity before 1917. Soviet leaders took it as axiomatic that the press system that would take shape in the Soviet Union would contribute to the creation of an ideal, socialist society as it had been discussed by writers, workers, and revolutionaries across Europe for much of the 19th century, and they saw the newspaper as occupying a key position at the nexus of education, information, and culture. The Soviet socialist press would serve as one of a number of systems to guide the transformation of the conduct of those who formed a socialist society. The socialist worldview dictated that the press would be characterized by a particular pedagogical orientation, and this pedagogical

focus supplied the general seriousness of purpose legible behind the long columns of text that filled Soviet newspapers. The logic of the market would not determine the nature of newspapers' relationships to their readers; rather, newspapers would be instruments of general education and enlightenment.

This pedagogical orientation was the source of another important divergence between the Soviet and Western press, a divergence that would prove troublesome to Soviet leaders in the 1970s and 1980s. This concerns the means by which Soviet newspapers constructed an image of the present moment, a knowledge of the "now." If one of the defining traits of the mass media institutions in Euro-American capitalist societies since the middle of the 19th century was the technological and commercial drive to provide consumers with a greater flow of ever "fresher" events and "better" information, the establishment of the party press and the absence of the imperative of commercial competition removed the desperate search to find ways to push newspapers ever closer to that breaking wave of the present instant. In the course of the 1920s, in fact, Soviet papers gradually lost their pretense of representing the most current "actuality" and stopped offering panoramic views of the present moment. Soviet papers usually contained some news agency texts that gestured to recent events, but many other items had little if any connection to the familiar journalistic ambition to paint a panoramic image of the present moment.

The contents of newspapers not only were shaped by the party's philosophical dedication to socialism but were also influenced by the party's overall organization of press institutions, by the way the party envisioned the tasks faced by different segments of the population. The party did not view the population over which they ruled as fractured into competing groups, but rather as pieces of a larger whole whose harmonious coordination it was the party's job to bring about. Under socialism, newspapers would not compete for fickle groups of readers and thus would not have to continually reinvent themselves, playing with boundaries of taste, sensibility, and style, in ongoing efforts to find new buyers, as in the capitalist press.

Establishing this control was in part achieved through the systematization of the party's channels of communication with the population, and specifically the relegation of the ambition that every member of the society should come into frequent contact with the press, that newspapers should reach the entire population. Bolshevik leaders had long been aware that one had to speak to different populations in different ways, and by the middle of the 1920s they were in a position to erect a national press system that would serve as lines of both communication and administration. The organizers of the Soviet press matched single papers to specific readerships defined both by their ethnic/national identities and by the place they occu-

pied within the organization of the national economy. A 1926 decree prescribed both horizontal and vertical distinctions: the press system would reflect the hierarchical organization of the party and government, with papers appearing at the all-Union, republic, regional, district, and village levels, while other central papers would be directed toward ten social and occupational groups: party-government workers, general workers, labor union members, members of farm cooperatives, peasants, women, economic experts, the military, youth, and indigenous populations.[18] The press would mirror the party's own administrative structure and the diversity of the Soviet population.

The establishment of these hierarchies provided a kind of template that would govern the growth of the Soviet press until the end of the state supervision of media in 1990. New papers could appear only when a convincing bureaucratic case could be made for the existence of a new member of a given genus of publications.[19] For example, editors would argue for increases in the size of their circulation by claiming that their place in the taxonomical structure was no longer accurate: they would try to show, for example, that their village had become a town, or their district a city, and thus required a new category of newspaper. These decisions were made by the party taking into account everything from currently available supply of raw materials, the size and growth rates of cities and regions, the supplies of skilled staff, and the relative standing of an ethnic or occupational group within the Soviet hierarchy.

To study the Soviet press, then, is to study the ways the Bolshevik leaders interpreted the cultural significance of the mass newspaper and then sought to realize this significance in daily life. The fact that the paper was so closely tied to the dominant political institution in the Soviet Union meant that the press was subject to periodic reorientations and redefinitions, as party leaders changed and as their interpretations of the problems facing both the party and the society changed. Thus in a sense the history of the Soviet press is the history of the changing strategies and attitudes that defined the party's sponsorship and supervision.

THINKING THROUGH THE SOVIET PRESS

Given this basic picture of the fundamentally political organization of the Soviet press and its service in supporting the Communist Party, it is hardly surprising that the interest of Western observers of the press has focused on the role the Soviet press played in the maintenance of the Communist Party's power. To the extent that the establishment of the socialist regime in the Soviet Union represented a fundamental philosophical critique of and challenge to Western, capitalist societies, it was necessary for

Western scholars to study the sources of support. Here it might be useful to recall that the consolidation of the Soviet regime in the 1920s took place simultaneously with the emergence of the study of propaganda. Western scholars, building on an awareness of the significance for capitalist democracies of the rise of mass politics in the late 19th century, began to use a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures to define the power of the press, its role in shaping public opinion, and its impact on electoral politics. They identified the press as one of the key mediating institutions of mass, industrial societies, as a site where a particular practice of constructing information produced direct effects on the opinions and behavior of the masses.[20] Wars and domestic scandals, such as the Spanish-American War in the United States and the Dreyfus affair in France, demonstrated the disturbing power of propaganda to produce a mass political will, but it was the shaping of public opinion during the First World War that gave the subject of propaganda such urgency in the interwar years. In the 1920s and 1930s "communications" took shape as an object of study in American and European universities, and the knowledge and techniques invented in government- and foundation-funded research about communications effects and about the measurement of opinion proved invaluable in the prosecution of the Second World War.

The emergence of the Cold War in the late 1940s changed the way scholars thought about propaganda: it went from being a neutral term evoking any kind of directed construction of information to achieve certain ends to being a pejorative term describing the attitude of non-democratic governments to information. Sociologists and students of communications invented models that made a distinction between societies within which information circulated freely and in ways that contributed to healthy democratic development, and those in which information contributed to political despotism. Reflection by sociologists and political scientists on the totalitarian nature of the destroyed Nazi and surviving Soviet regimes coincided with the turn of attention by Russia area studies scholars toward the task of creating solid knowledge about Soviet society and government, and here the Soviet press became an indispensable source. For example, in 1949 the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) began publication of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* which provided generations of researchers a chance to scrutinize articles from *Pravda, Izvestiia,* and a host of other papers in order to glean insights into a variety of topics, from Kremlin infighting to hints as to the existence of dissent or dissatisfaction within the population at large. And in 1950, Alex Inkeles's *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* appeared, which inaugurated the postwar scholarly effort to pin down the formation of public

opinion in the Soviet Union, and whose title evokes well the fear of the time that Soviet mass media was making the Soviet population into a vast threatening mob. Based on survey data provided by Russian émigrés, it was pathbreaking in its attempt to present a summary of what ordinary Soviet people thought and felt about a variety of topics. Both Inkeles's book and the many works that it inspired sought to arrive at an answer of just how loyal the Soviet population really was to the regime, if the situation really was as transparent as the Soviet theory of the press made it seem.

In the context of the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet press was understood as one key element of a totalitarian system of thought control. But as the evidence mounted in the 1950s and 1960s that Stalinist methods of rule had been rejected and that a new language and ethos of rule was taking shape in the Soviet Union, a new generation of students of the Soviet press began to apply to it the same questions that they asked of press and communications institutions in other societies about the ways the press served as a force for social cohesion, and in particular how it contributed to or impeded the process of forming independent centers of interests that would make demands on the existing structures of power. The totalitarian model began to lose its conceptual purchase, and some social scientists even promoted the idea of the convergence between capitalist and communist systems, given that both capitalist and communist societies appeared to be mirror images of each other: largely urban, educated, with political elites staffed by experts, and characterized by a certain distance between the masses and the political elites who governed them. This revision of judgments about the real nature of Soviet society is reflected, for example, in Mark Hopkins's 1970 book *Mass Media in the Soviet Union,* which is perhaps the best English-language introduction to the history and organization of the Soviet press between 1917 and 1968.[21] Instead of stressing the Soviet press's role in maintaining a basically totalitarian system, it evokes similarities as well as differences; it makes explicit comparisons, for example, between the Soviet press and Western public relations and advertising institutions. Hopkins acknowledges the political aims and purposes of the Soviet press, and yet his judgment is by no means shrill; he deplores the press's role in the Stalinist system but does not find the operation of the post-Stalin press to be so different from the effort of corporations in the West to mold the behavior of consumers.

Yet as the difficulties of Soviet society became more evident in the second half of the 1970s and as the dynamism of Western capitalist firms became more obvious, the theory that communist and capitalist societies were converging lost its self-evidence; Soviet socialism began to appear not as a successful, alternative system but merely as a failing one. The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 facilitated the return to public prominence of interpretations that stressed the oppressive

and unjust nature of actually existing socialism and the need to prosecute the Cold War to a victorious conclusion.

The scholarly interest in the Soviet press grew out of the intellectual and political contexts that shaped the study of communications more broadly in the postwar era. The Cold War helped establish the naturalness of judgments about the functional role of information within democratic capitalist societies and about the need to extend the model of the capitalist mass media throughout the world.[22] The ideas that organized the Soviet press appeared as the antithesis of those ideals of impartiality, fairness, and clarity required if national elites were to lead their countries away from the communist temptation and toward capitalist freedom. This idea that a communications system contributes to the moral superiority or inferiority of a society is indeed powerful, animating the wave of deregulation of communications systems that has been underway since the 1990s. Proponents of such deregulation argue that the phenomenon of news and information is so natural for the well-being of a society that any non-market adjustment of this flow inevitably undermines the health of the society as a whole.[23]

If there is one aspect of modern societies that is densely historical and transparently "constructed," however, it is the means by which societies inform themselves of themselves via technologies and practices of information. It is possible to examine the press within an intellectual and historical context that does not assume a framework of axioms about information, democracy, and progress, and that suggests that the Soviet press and the Western press need to be seen not as competitors but as different strands of a common phenomenon. We will turn to the journalism of the late Soviet period after considering how Soviet politics might be understood within the framework of governmentality. The task is to integrate an analysis of the press into an understanding of the operation of government in its widest sense.

GOVERNMENTALITY

Government, in Mitchell Dean's words,

> is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects, and outcomes.[24]

Analyses of government are concerned with the ways that people act upon the conduct of others. The Foucauldian examination of government is not only interested in acts, however; it is concerned with the ways gov-

ernment is manifested in *thought,* with the word "governmentality" referring to the ever expanding spheres of specific knowledges, techniques, practices, and strategies employed to both define and respond to problems of governing.

Dean stresses that the term "governmentality" has both a specific and general sense. The specific sense derives from the particulars of Foucault's lecture of that name, where he described the particular way of reflecting on the problem of sovereignty, discipline, and economy that emerged in early modern Europe in the wake of the decline of feudal societies and the emergence of extensive territories as objects of political and economic management. In the hands of his students, however, this problematization of government led to a much broader concern with the overall processes by which individuals and institutions sought to produce and reproduce social order on a variety of scales and spheres between the 17th and 20th centuries. Their particular avenues of investigation have been shaped by Foucault's Nietzschean orientation toward history, as well as by his overarching concern with the phenomenon of power, its ubiquity, productive capacities, capillary mechanisms, and discursive foundations. To study governmentality, then, is to study the ways that concepts of truth produce effects across the boundary of self and world; "to analyze government is to analyze those practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize, and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants, and lifestyles of individuals and groups. This is a perspective, then, that seeks to connect questions of government, politics, and administration, to the space of bodies, lives, selves, and persons."[25] Government is a "plural" activity, an *assemblage* of practices and actions that occur on a range of temporal and spatial scales and on a variety of fields or terrains. Histories of governmentality address the specific processes by which at a given time a particular way of defining and acting upon conduct takes shape. The work of Foucault and his students sketches a broad evolution of moments in the history of governmentality, from the emergence of a "police science" of governing in the early modern period to the displacement of this concept of police by classical liberalism in the 18th century and to the range of strategies aimed not at the individual but at that new analytic object, "society," in the 19th century, concluding with the neo-liberalism or advanced liberalism of the second half of the 20th century.[26] This last innovation in liberalism places particular importance on the individual as the ultimate locus of government. Contemporary societies are governed not only by elected officials and the bureaucrats that staff official institutions, but also by the consumption of knowledges of accountants, doctors, scientists, and journalists; by the purchase of products designed by engineers who construct new experiences of sight, touch, hearing, and motion; and by the heterogeneous experts on the "soul" who

not so much tell people what to do but how to understand themselves and the world. Individuals make themselves into both subjects and objects of government when they engage in activities as diverse as diets or psychotherapy.[27]

Studies of governmentality are not, however, innocent antiquarian pursuits, but rather are essentially critical in seeking "to make explicit the thought that, while often taking a material form, is largely tacit in the way we govern and are governed, and in the language, practices, and techniques by which we do so."[28] Here they cut against the grain of familiar historical accounts in their unwillingness to reproduce a whole series of dichotomies inherited from the lexicon of political science and political philosophy. Among the most common are those that describe a clear or absolute distinction between subjects and sovereigns; between liberation and domination; between the powerless and the powerful. The perspective of governmentality suggests that the self-evidence of these oppositions is proof that there is governmental work being done in their perpetuation. The dichotomy that has done the most to hide the depth and ubiquity of processes of governing is the distinction between the state and civil society.

In the conclusion to the "Governmentality" lecture Foucault made this general statement:

> the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance: maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity—that is, for our present—is not so much the *étatisation* of society, as the "governmentalization" of the state. . . . The tactics of government . . . make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on, thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.[29]

He implies here that both the narrative of a continual growth in the state's powers at the expense of individual rights and freedoms and that of gradual but marked autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis the state are misleading because they omit the historical processes that constitute these categories at any given time. The particular history of governmentality in modern Europe has involved the ongoing production of truth about the nature of the self and society, and the state has taken shape within these evolving discourses.

If "government is accomplished through multiple actors and agencies rather than a centralized set of state apparatuses," and if we should "reject any *a priori* distribution and divisions of power and authority," then we

should rethink those histories that give such pride of place to "the state." Instead of approaching the state as that looming agent determining the fate of citizens, investigations of governmentality take it as axiomatic that

> there is no universal object, the governed, in relation to which a body of governors proceeds to act. The governed vary over time; indeed there is no such thing as "the governed," only multiple objectifications of those over whom government is to be exercised, and whose characteristics government must harness and instrumentalize. In any concrete situation, it appears as if practices of governing are determined by the nature of those who they govern: their character, passions, motivations, wills and interests. But the reverse is the case.[30]

Governors invent those over whom they govern, and government results in the interaction of subjectivity with discourses that define identities, assert spectrums of morality, and produce authoritative measurements of reality. And, indeed, discourses about identity are particularly relevant to analyses of government, for identities attempt to sum people up, define them, make them intelligible, even though these definitions—such as those that appear on census forms—often have little connection to everyday life.

This emphasis on the production of subjects by strategies of government should not, however, be taken as a mechanical process, for this would reintroduce the static model that the framework of governmentality criticizes in traditional approaches to society and politics. Acts of governing involve the imaginary, the symbolic realm within which subjects are constituted, for

> [t]he forms of identity promoted and presupposed by various practices and programmes of government should not be confused with a *real* subject, subjectivity, or subject position, i.e. with a subject that is the endpoint or terminal of these practices and constituted through them. Regimes of government do not *determine* forms of subjectivity. They elicit, promote, facilitate, foster, and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents. They are successful to the extent that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities (e.g. of rational decision-making), qualities (e.g. as having a sexuality), and statuses (e.g. being an active citizen).[31]

In other words, the activity of government does not fix an identity but enables avenues of identification whose engagement by individuals depends on a range of historically contingent factors.[32] This is vitally important to keep in mind, for studies of governmentality do not assume the efficiency of government, but rather its unpredictability, as strategies that unfold on one field are overturned or undermined by other strategies from another field.

Given this analytic framework, it is apparent that many accounts of communications systems and networks are also histories of governing. Indeed, a number of writers on communications have made use of the concept of governmentality in their efforts to describe developing networks of news, information, and entertainment, and the dynamics of power and control that these networks have made possible in the 19th and 20th centuries.[33] These writers describe the complex processes by which communications media were adapted to a whole host of needs and possibilities directed toward the diverse publics of the liberal state. Armand Mattelart has described the profusion of institutions around communications that arose in the 19th century, from postal and telegraph unions to news agencies, and Andrew Barry has examined the link between these communications networks and the rise of liberal modes of governing.[34] Barry argues that these networks were central to the rise of liberalism because they helped solve the problem of how individuals freed from the constraints imposed by the early modern state could overcome the problem of the vastness and essential opacity of modern territories and populations.

> If, as Foucault argues, the new science of political economy arose "out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth," then communication networks provided the material and informational base on which such complex superstructural relations could grow. In effect, the communications infrastructures came to function as perfect embodiments of the liberal political imagination: maximizing the density, intensity, and spatial extension of interactions within the social body itself while at the same time, minimizing the direct demands made by the state on the people.[35]

These networks "have been increasingly seen as enhancing the self-governing capacities of society itself," for the denser the networks, so the liberal theory goes, the better the government.[36]

Still other writers have pointed out how these communications networks went on to generate their own particular dynamics of subjectivity. Benedict Anderson examined the degree to which the networks of print capitalism made possible new forms of identification based upon the nation.[37] His more central point was that the communications and discourse networks of liberal societies made possible a whole host of imagined communities, or rather, made all communities "imagined," with subjectivities formed in the course of the interactions between communities. Technological innovations in the course of the 20th century have made possible many streams of information to many publics; liberal subjects connect with each other as both individuals and as members of diverse groups via systems of communications so complex that it is impossible to identify any

kind of central power from which messages emerge. The growth of technologies of communication do not simply disseminate projects of government and self-government but actively shape them. In the late 20th century, it is evident that many activities of governing in liberal societies take place *within* media, not outside them. Timothy W. Luke points to one effect this has on the formation of subjects, the fact that many people seem to be able to live their lives completely within the global "news stream."

> Only by the coupling of quick electromagnetical means of communication and high-speed linotype printing presses in urban industrial areas can "the major media event" come into being. And with it come new human beings tied to their continuous creation in mediated events as the floating new majorities of media buyers, readers, listeners, watchers, users. Information previously unknown but now culled from a newspaper, news periodical, or newscast, remakes human beings into "news people." News, as discrete moments from our news-generated lives, also can become more distantly old news, history, and nostalgia, which can be revisited again and again as those "history-making events" of our lives.[38]

Governing now works through the loss of the distinction between a reality that is produced and a reality that is real, as whole spheres of governmental strategies are produced in response to the constructed portrayals flowing by in the news stream.

THE SOVIET PRESS AND GOVERNMENTALITY

There are two reasons why the Foucauldian vocabulary of governmentality is useful in thinking about the history of the Soviet press. First, it offers a way of conceptualizing the agency of journalists as a complex interaction of different imperatives to shape conduct in different ways. Journalists need to be viewed as one vital sector of the agencies of cultural government in the Soviet Union. The "governmental" role of journalists refers not to the official institutions of government but to a general category of action upon others' actions, of the conduct of conduct. The Foucauldian language of governmentality is invaluable in making it possible to locate at the heart of political and cultural history the phenomenon of subjectivity and the discourses that make it possible. Journalists were a key part of the vast pedagogical apparatus that sought to project on to Soviet readers modes of thinking and acting. These modes of teaching were not, however, static; Soviet leaders and institutions changed their contents, their modes of address, their rhetorics over the seven decades of the Soviet Union's existence.

The second reason for the utility of the governmentality framework is that it implies another historical narrative within which to place the his-

tory of the Soviet press, a narrative of the 20th century understood as evolving phases in a history of liberal thought and practice. Liberalism for Foucault is less an ideology than a critical stance, a disposition to look for ways of overcoming constraints on others' actions, and ways of acting to enable others' actions. The history of the 20th century, therefore, is a history of liberal inventions and the successive challenges to these inventions that then provoked new innovations in the relationship of individuals to themselves. The challenge here is how to place the history of the Soviet Union *within* rather than altogether outside of such a narrative.

According to Colin Gordon, Foucault did not ascribe to socialism any unique kind of governmental rationality. Nineteenth-century socialism was an approach to government that privileged the agency of the state as the means by which the deleterious effects of the market could be managed. It could involve "liberal solutions" such as the development of a range of institutions that would ameliorate individual sufferings and look to the root causes of collective hardship, but it could also include "radical" solutions, namely the destruction of that economic system that perpetuated the oppression of one class by another. The immediate context of the Russian revolution forced Bolshevik leaders to actually confront the question of what a socialist government would look like, and here the problem was how to create a completely "new" kind of society with the meager resources of the impoverished Russian state. Their solution was to assert their power through three institutional pillars. First there was the secret police, which served in the context of war and civil war as a kind of guarantor of the regime's existence, and which served to remind Soviet citizens of the precariousness of their achievement. Second, there was the rejection of capitalism, even if markets were tolerated and even encouraged as during the New Economic Policy (NEP). Third, there was the push of cultural transformation, the creation of the new Soviet "man" and "woman."

These pillars provide a basis for thinking about how modes of Soviet government resembled and differed from modes of government in the West. The work of Kelly, Shepard, and their collaborators, for example, shows that in the first decades of Bolshevik rule, the Soviet Union rapidly caught up to liberal governments in the West in the establishment of comprehensive programs of health and education.[39] Soviet leaders implemented policies like literacy programs, hygiene campaigns, and educational reforms that were designed to move Soviet society into an analogously "social" form of governance as in the West. What distinguished these from similar programs was, of course, their subordination to a vision of transformation that understood the telos of such biopolitical strategies to be a perfect future articulation of the individual within socialist society.

But if the governmentality framework assists us in thinking about the

early phase of Soviet history, it is equally useful in making sense of the end of Soviet history. For the governmental collapse of the Soviet system involved the dedication of the post-communist governors to the pure styles of advanced liberalism that were in a sense prerequisite for Russia's participation in processes of transnational financial and economic management. Many newspapers in the early 1990s changed from being sites for governing Soviet subjects to being sites for governing the subjects of "globalization" by changing the ways that freedom was defined and represented. From being a condition of an entire society, freedom became a characteristic or property that was visible only through the prism of an individual's private life. For under advanced liberalism, "the problem of freedom now comes to be understood in terms of the capacity of an autonomous individual to establish an identity through shaping a meaningful everyday life. Freedom is seen as autonomy, the capacity to realize one's desires in one's secular life, to fulfill one's potential through one's own endeavours, to determine the course of one's own existence through acts of choice."[40]

These perspectives can be drawn together by suggesting that Soviet government would in part be government through a practice of journalism, and journalists would become one important class of governors. They would participate in the governing of the USSR by supplying the texts and images that would make Soviet readers aware of and a part of the processes through which their society was realizing socialism. They would envision and project a form of person whose thoughts and actions would embody the socialist project; journalists would be technologists of the self.

Thus the Soviet diagram of communications was different than that of cultural capitalist states. Unlike Barry's image of a centerless network facilitating the connections between liberal subjects, the Soviet diagram would be radial, emanating outward from a center composed of those thinkers who understood what socialism was to be. It would involve not a series of interacting agents choosing their own preferred patterns of interaction, as in a liberal society with a capitalist media, but an organization of communications from center to periphery that would consist of a flow of instructions, models of behavior, and narratives of conduct whose collective emulation would realize socialism. The task of journalists was to govern people through their own self-understandings; they would become part of the enormous collective effort to ensure that all the texts and images of the newspaper page were ultimately an assemblage of teachings. The newspaper was an ideal channel of both instruction and encouragement; journalists would teach Soviet citizens how to act upon themselves.

The construction of government by journalism was by no means a secure, foolproof process. It would depend, for example, on the technical ability of Soviet factories to produce sufficient raw materials to meet the

ambition to supply the vast country with newsprint. Another source of fragility was that such an attitude of government placed immense pressure on journalists to live up to this inspiring image of their profession. They were to recognize themselves as a special kind of teacher who would embody a respectful attitude toward both the knowledge they were to impart and toward those whom they taught. They would have to learn to view their readers not as consumers but as intelligent pupils, as students upon whose education rested the entire Soviet edifice. They would be self-critical, monitoring their own work for any sign of laziness or cynicism, and would in short be proof of the superiority of socialism. As everyday philosophers, as articulate, cultured individuals able to enter effortlessly into a variety of social contexts and to participate in a variety of tasks—from the building of a dam to the organization of a village library—they would govern Soviet society by first governing themselves.

This book is a description of the evolution of this radial diagram of government. One important trajectory of Soviet history can be constructed by following the twists and turns in the relationship between journalists and the party, between those who represented socialism and those who sponsored, guarded, and defined it. The first two chapters describe the relationship of journalism to the larger context of the cultural "thaw" that began with the Secret Speech of 1956. Together they argue that one vital dimension of Khrushchev's reforms derived from the possibilities offered by a re-imagined practice of journalism that made possible the return in a new social and cultural context of those essential questions established at the founding of the Soviet regime: Who was the Soviet person? What was the Soviet person to become? What was a society of Soviet citizens to look like? What was new in the Khrushchev era was that these questions could in a sense be answered empirically; journalists were encouraged to go find out who this person was. This involved the appearance in the press of texts that expressed an emotional and intellectual sincerity that had been absent from the press of the Stalin era. Thus chapters 1 and 2 begin to provide answers to basic questions, such as what did this reinvigorated press look like? What were these inspiring articles about? Instead of providing a general description of the press's contents, I provide detailed accounts of a small number of texts that we can associate with the journalistic style of what might be called the flagship of Khrushchev's reforms, *Izvestiia.* I examine works that elucidate the central concern of the era, namely journalists' desires to refocus readers' attention on the problem of conduct and to inform readers' understanding of themselves and the world in ways that would help guide this conduct.

The first chapter provides a sense of the journalistic style encouraged

by Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of *Izvestiia* between 1959 and 1964. Adzhubei was the chief sponsor of the journalistic reforms of the Khrushchev period, and the chapter contains first an examination of an article that provides us with an emotional and intellectual image of the task of socialist government. The article is a kind of template that neatly evokes the heroic work of journalists in teaching Soviet readers how to understand the significance of their own forms of conduct. I then turn to one of the most curious texts of the entire Soviet era, an 800-page tome entitled *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). I read it as a demonstration of how the enthusiasm that characterized this era and the entire Soviet sixties grew from the journalistic conception of the Soviet Union's place as the leader of the world's progressive societies. This massive text was a place where the party's most optimistic and powerful vision of the Soviet Union was constructed, and it reveals just how much journalism was at the heart of the self-image of Soviet socialism.

In chapter 2, I turn to a very different set of texts. Another vital dimension of the Khrushchev era involved the appearance in the press of critical appraisals of the state of socialist construction. While many journalists contributed to this phenomenon, I concentrate here on the journalistic essays of Anatolii Agranovskii, who worked at *Izvestiia* from the late 1950s till his death in 1984. I take up his work because so many of my interlocutors praised him to me as the most talented journalist of his time. I present extended accounts of three of his essays in order to evoke the nature of the critical thinking that helped create the divide between party and society in the 1970s. Critical contemplation like Agranovskii's was simultaneously "loyal" to the regime and also corrosive of it, and this combination gave his work special importance.

Journalists' very success in making the press into a vivid pedagogical experience, however, was seen by a number of party leaders as threatening the authority of the party. They orchestrated Khrushchev's removal in October 1964 and redefined the relationship between journalists and the party. In place of a press that challenged readers to engage in the critical construction of Soviet society, Brezhnev and his allies orchestrated a reorientation of the Soviet media around the production of ideological statements, images, and rituals, which they hoped would promote the collective loyalty that they sought. This expansion of practices of ideology undermined the governmental modes of the press. I suggest that this ideological orientation sought above all to define the conditions of permitted behavior between party and populace. The party's retreat from giving the populations the central role in the creation of socialism and the party's need to manage the critical potential of journalists meant that journalists in the 1970s and early 1980s represented a kind of latent opposition that needed to be carefully monitored.

Chapter 3 pieces together a description of the journalism of the "era of stagnation," roughly between 1968 and 1985, marked as it was by journalists' frustration at the party's suspicion of their governing role and their awareness that the party's promotion of ideological orthodoxies served to mask its own corruption and weakness. It suggests that journalists' reactions to this situation flowed along two main lines of response. Some recognized how information was a kind of natural corrosive to the ideological framing of everyday life and wondered how the party could adapt itself to the emergence of global flows of communication, to the fact that the relative informational autarchy that existed in the 1950s and before was no longer possible in the 1970s. Other journalists troubled the party through their cynical indifference to the saturation of Soviet society with ideological messages and by continuing to engage as best they could with the pedagogical task of producing effective criticism. They sought where they could to intervene by breaking through the surface of uniformity the party obligated them to produce. Perhaps the most serious consequence for the governmental system of the press was the personal frustration caused by this heavily ideological orientation. Many journalists became estranged from their identities as socialist governors, and yet their loss of faith in the party did not necessarily mean, however, a loss of faith in the pedagogical project of governing people through their understanding of the conditions of their lives. It was just that in the 1970s and 1980s the content of this lesson would radically change; this understanding would not be of the world-historical significance of socialism, but rather of the imperfections and absurdities of the Soviet institutions that supposedly guided the realization of socialism.

Gorbachev's election to the post of general secretary of the party in 1985 began another period of redefinition of the relationship between party and journalists, the period I examine in chapter 4. Gorbachev viewed the renewal of journalism as a prerequisite for reform, since journalists were in the best position to challenge the empty productions of ideological messages that had driven so many Soviet citizens away from any interest in socialism. To the degree that journalists worked with information, they would be the targets and agents of *glasnost,* or openness, which would show the Soviet population that the party was serious in its criticism of the stultifying ideological performances of the previous leadership. In the context of Gorbachev's reforms, the innocent and relatively uncomplicated task of reporting events became recognized by all involved as being a form of ideology critique. Just "getting the story" became a heroic occupation because the "story" was, in the context of 1985–1986, likely to reflect badly on the homeland of socialism. Journalists began to govern through the supply of bad news. But at the same time, Gorbachev believed that his reforms required journalists to once again identify themselves as active agents and

creators of socialism, and so he resurrected the Leninist language of an engaged, activist press dedicated to the formation of creative, critical subjects. Journalism was at the heart of his strategy of remaking and showing the vitality and superiority of socialism.

Gorbachev did not take into account, however, the subjectivities of journalists. His first problem was their suspicion: many of those journalists to whom he appealed in 1985–1988 had lived through the consequences of that earlier moment of reform of the 1960s and knew their adoption of an activist role would in all likelihood set in motion another swing of the pendulum back toward ideological orthodoxy. So Gorbachev's attempts to reform Soviet society through reinvigorating discourses on socialism involved not so much journalists pushing toward new understandings of and hence renewed commitment to socialism, but rather their deep ambivalence about any overt pedagogical mission about social progress. Many journalists took the opportunity not to reinvest their imaginations in socialism but to teach the gulf that had come into being between the personal and the collective, between self and society. In short, a number of journalists ended up educating readers about how inadequate their educations had been. This kind of teaching involved new genres and themes that would contribute to forms of conduct formerly considered unworthy for socialist persons. Journalists began to practice new ways of seeing, parsing, and representing experience that inevitably appeared troubling to many Soviet citizens, from members of the Politburo to ordinary citizens, for the way it manifested what seemed the increasing incoherence of the public world.

The reduction of the party's status and the eventual disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1990–1991 then rearranged the landscape that journalists had done so much to define during perestroika. Between, on the one hand, the critical thinking of supposedly socialist journalists and, on the other, the flood of information revealing the inequities and incompetencies of supposedly socialist institutions, socialism—a planned economy organized according to an ideal of equality and justice—ceased to be an option. The market appeared as the solution, finally made possible by Gorbachev's exit and the dissolution of the Union. Many journalists then discovered to their displeasure that the capitalist market differed from state socialism in giving no special authority or privilege to professional journalistic practices of critical thought and truth telling. There was no longer an abstract Soviet person whom journalists addressed; the reader/thinker of the socialist imaginary ceased to exist, and instead the dynamic of advanced liberal government emerged: citizens would be governed not by an active self-identification with socialism but by engaging with self-construction via the market. After the passage of the Press Law of 1990, which separated

the press from the party, journalists were finally free to choose a kind of publication and a style of writing. Journalists of all ideological persuasions faced the necessity of choosing new identities. They went from being teachers of conduct and critics of ideology to being sponsors of myriad discourses that constituted the "necessary" and "inevitable" diversity of "normal" capitalist democratic societies.

In chapter 5, I present the ways that three editors of the post-communist boulevard press came to offer concrete ways of realizing one's freedom, concrete instruction into what had been impossible for seventy years: the establishment of personal projects of self-invention and self-knowledge to be followed with little reference to the state of society, to the health of the collective. By concluding with the appearance of the boulevard press in Russia, I do not mean to imply a general view of the nature of the press in the Russian 1990s; adequate examination of this topic would require another book.[41] By discussing the appearance of the soft-core pornographic, tabloid press I do mean, however, to suggest how the freeing of the press made possible the entrance of new discourses and media practices dedicated to new strategies of governing. Then in the afterword I describe how this rethinking of Soviet journalism encourages us to pay more attention to a suppressed or secondary narrative about the entire Soviet period, one that stresses the imperative faced by Soviet leaders and citizens to reinvent their society in opposition to what they saw as the dominant practices and powers of capitalism. As background for the discussion I undertake in chapter 1 about the Khrushchev era, what follows is a brief outline of the history of the press that might prove useful to readers unfamiliar with the basics of Soviet history.

OUTLINE OF THE SOVIET PRESS, 1917–1953

The establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917 set the stage for the appearance of another kind of press system, one marked by the struggle of the Bolshevik party to establish a new kind of philosophically grounded government in the context of the social chaos and violence of world war, invasion, and civil war. The new social order of Soviet society was brought about by new strategies of governing and by forms of coercion and domination that were intended to simply erase any kind of critical opposition. Terror exacted upon the White Russians, expropriations of land, forced exile, etc., formed part of those coercive strategies used to destroy the opposition. But at the same time, Bolshevik leaders understood that they simultaneously had to establish the freedom of the governed—by destroying the autocracy and the class-based society that supported it—*and* to develop peasants' and proletarians' capacities to act; these were groups who

had never been accustomed to thinking of themselves as historical actors. The Bolsheviks were faced with establishing a terrain of subjectivity that would facilitate the construction of socialism; their task was to teach the masses to recognize their own capacities for action by engaging with the printed word.

The development of the Soviet press can thus be understood as the result of specific strategies chosen at specific times by party leaders who were confronted with a series of constraints and challenges that limited their definition of just how the press would be non-capitalist and socialist, that is, both produced for the people and dedicated to culture and enlightenment. Indeed, one of the first acts of the Bolshevik government was the closure of bourgeois newspapers and the seizure of printing presses run by opposition parties. Immediately after the revolution the goal of education and enlightenment was spliced onto the party's immediate need to denounce and defeat its enemies, both domestic and foreign, and to bring its promises to important sectors of the population whose support would be crucial to the revolution's success. The Soviet Union became indeed a "propaganda state," in Peter Kenez's words, because it was born from a movement that understood social order as imposed in large part through purposeful communication. The revolution required a vast effort to replace one set of symbols with another.[42] The conduct of the revolution, therefore, required a certain conduct of information. The institution that would manage this conduct was, of course, the Communist Party, that hierarchical, centralized, and disciplined conspiratorial group with its own heroic history about the role played by newspaper in its formation and subsequent success.[43]

All these factors embedded the press in the immediate needs of the party, and yet it would be a mistake to think that the early Soviet press was a perfect expression of these needs and aims. After the conclusion of the Civil War in 1920, the party was faced with a number of fundamental problems, such as how to respond to the disastrous economic situation created by six years of war and civil war; how to establish public order in the Soviet Union's towns, cities, and villages; and how to create a political structure that would be responsive to and faithfully transmit the party's decisions and directives. The Bolshevik party had neither the staff nor the raw materials nor the political will necessary for producing a monologic mass press, and the result was that the press of the 1920s was lively and varied and reflected a variety of viewpoints, albeit within the communist movement. Julie Kay Mueller and Jeffrey Brooks have even argued that this early Soviet press, despite the narrowness of the political viewpoints it expressed, can be usefully analyzed with the conceptual vocabulary of the Habermasian public sphere; they argue that the press reflected the interac-

tions of different publics and served as a context for the flows of information within a kind of civil society.[44] And this despite the fact that, as Kenez notes, the early Soviet press lacked some of the staple journalistic genres of the Western press. The early Soviet press, for example, had no reporters reporting news about everyday events, nor any human-interest stories. And because so many Soviet citizens were illiterate, the organizers of the Soviet press had to emphasize elementary education, participating in literacy campaigns by reproducing actual pages from literacy textbooks.[45]

The heterogeneity of this press reflected the diverse policy strategies pursued by the Bolshevik rulers of Russian society. The period of NEP (1921–1928) saw the simultaneous attempt by the party to organize an administrative hierarchy that would connect Moscow to the periphery of the Soviet Union, and to promote a limited kind of commercial market complete with print advertising. The press had a vital role in the first task by serving as both a forum and an institution where Soviet government could literally invent itself, while at the same time it reflected the diversity of points of view required and generated by the negotiation of private financial interests. The criticisms and observations of party and press leaders during the formative years of the Civil War and NEP provide insight into this heterogeneity and a sense of what was involved in the construction of a Soviet press system in the early Soviet years.

Lenin, as the party's main theorist and dominant leader until a stroke in 1922 removed him from his central role in the party and government, had for many years been a keen observer and critic of capitalist societies and had understood the immense power of newspapers to shape the consciousness of the masses. After the revolution he understood that newspapers were an essential means to manifest the physical presence of the party across the vast territory of the Soviet Union and to deliver the message that Soviet power sought to create better lives for the workers and peasants who made up the masses of Russian society. However, far from seeing the establishment of an effective system of newspapers carrying this message to the people, Lenin saw a press produced by journalists who were more interested in their own theories and polemics than in the state of the country. In an editorial in *Pravda* from September 20, 1918, entitled "On the character of our newspapers" he expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Soviet journalists still had not grasped their role in the new, post-revolutionary circumstances, and he chastised them for their production of political tracts, for not realizing that they had a new audience of the masses of Soviet citizens who had no interest in the finer points of socialist theorizing.

> Why instead of 200–400 lines you can't write in 20–10 lines about such simple, well-known, clear, and already mastered to a great degree, widespread phenomena

> like the base betrayals of the Mensheviks, those lackeys of the bourgeoisie; like the Anglo-Japanese invasion for the restoration of the holy law of capital; like the chattering teeth of the American millionaires against Germany, and so on, and so on. It is necessary to talk about this, it is necessary to register each new fact in this regard, but in a few lines; to pound out in "telegraph style" the new appearances of old, already known and evaluated policies.[46]

In other words, it was important to acknowledge that the Soviet Union was facing a hostile world dominated by capitalists and capitalist states, and yet this should not be the main subject read day after day by Soviet citizens. Journalists had to turn to a new task: "attention to the building of a new life—to facts." More important was to illuminate the processes by which Soviet citizens were building a socialist economy and culture. Lenin did not want "economics in terms of general discussions, studies of reports, smart-sounding plans and other rubbish. . . . No, economics in the sense of collections of facts, *careful* checking and study of the facts of the real building of a new life." He concluded:

> We have no serious, merciless, truly revolutionary *war with concrete* carriers of evil. We have little *education of the masses* with living, concrete examples and models from all areas of life, and this is the chief problem for the press during the period from the transition from capitalism to communism. We have little attention to that *everyday* side of intra-factory, intra-village, intra-regimental life, to how the new is being built, which needs more and more attention, publicity, social criticism, denunciation of the old, and calls to learn from the good. . . . Less political babbling. Fewer intelligent sounding discussions. Closer to life. More attention to how the workers and peasants *in fact* are building something new in their daily work. And more checking of how much this new is truly communist.[47]

His frustration reflected a number of problems, chief among which was the difficulty of finding journalists who possessed the literary skills needed for passionate, engaged, and thoughtful reporting about the introduction of socialism into traditional ways of life. But his frustration at the same time gestured to a larger issue: how should journalists be taught or encouraged to see themselves as key figures in the building of socialism? How should they represent the difference represented by socialism?

These questions of what the Soviet press should actually look like and how journalists should act were also examined in numerous articles published in the trade magazine for journalists, *Zhurnalist.* The magazine published long articles about everything from the state of the press in Japan to the proper way to lay out a page or write a headline. An example of the range of permitted discussion and two sharply contrasting conceptions of journalism circulating at the time appeared in a 1923 article sent to the

editors of *Zhurnalist* from Copenhagen by A. Men'shoi. Entitled "Overseas Musings of a Russian Journalist," it examines what he called the completely boring quality of Soviet journalism. The crux of the article was the explicit comparison between the capitalist and the socialist press. Men'shoi writes:

> In Denmark they have bank failures, and in connection with them all sorts of titillation and sensational revelations. And ministerial crises too. How interesting it all is! Thrillingly interesting, and people get interested in it all like they get interested in a drama by Charlie Chaplin. The same in England too, only worse, which means its better to read about.
>
> And at home?
>
> Peaceful.
>
> Peaceful, calm, concentrated, stern [*surovo,* also "rigorous," "bleak"]. People sit behind their writing desks and work. People get together, they talk, discuss. Again peaceful, calm, concentrated, stern . . . Businesslike . . . They smoke cigarettes, and converse . . . it's boring with us, with our political life, with our system. Have you noticed it? There aren't any stories or stagings. This is why our newspapers are so boring . . . Leaf through *Pravda,* and melancholy seizes you.[48]

Men'shoi then bolsters his view by citing the opinion of an American journalist, Charles Beech Schmidt of the Associated Press, who told him that "an American newspaper man has no work in Moscow. Why? Because there is no 'story' there. No stories. Do you understand? Nothing to tell about . . . You people don't have any events, it's peaceful in Russia."[49]

For Men'shoi, the most important task of the press was to provide something "interesting," and yet for Bolshevik critics of the capitalist press, this was precisely the problem. Articles that were simply "interesting" served to distract readers from the forces and processes that shaped their lives. In fact, for the perspicacious Bolshevik, Men'shoi has unwittingly provided his own indictment of the capitalist press: capitalist journalists produced texts that make the reader feel that ministerial crises—which could be described as major shifts in the composition of the state with potentially profound implications for daily life—were in some sense "the same" as fiction films. Readers were produced as alienated observers.

Insight into the imaginary of the Bolshevik press in the making appears in the editorial note following Men'shoi's article, which provided a sharp contrast to the definition of news as simply being "interesting." The editor articulated a Bolshevik commentary on these "musings," but instead of criticizing Men'shoi's understanding of the role of journalism in a capitalist society, he took issue with the view that there is nothing important happening in Soviet society. He provided a list of events and processes underway that are supposed to seem anything but boring:

> The situation in the Donbas, the trials of the exploiters, the struggle against bribe-taking, electrification, the work of the American tractors, conferences and congresses, the successes of agriculture, light and heavy industry, the fights in the Soviets, the life and struggles of women workers, of the young, of the red army, its daily life, training, maneuvers . . . in Russia this is our real life, so many are the facts possessing this kind of importance that for the journalist who can feel the beating pulse of life, his field of action is wider than it has ever been before. . . . We have grounds to regret that our real life, labor, the creation of the millions of the masses is being reflected insufficiently clearly and fully. . . . All our strength should be directed in this direction.[50]

The Soviet present was full of events that went beyond being only "interesting" because they were about the establishment of a socialist society—no ordinary "event." Socialism redefined the scope of the profession of journalism, although not enough people had realized this. Journalists had the vital power of enabling Soviet readers to enter into the government of their own society by representing the multiple dramas underway in the multitude of sites of socialist transformation. And the readers of the press would be able to imagine themselves as the active creators of socialism. Journalists would supply the necessary facts and figures, give the relevant narrative outlines, identify the major characters, and make judgments about the degree of progress and the obstacles still to be overcome, and readers would recognize their own place in the process of socialist construction going on all around them.

While the NEP period may have seen a kind of nascent public sphere in Russia, based in part on the party's difficulty in managing the press under the hybrid market/socialized economy, it also saw the consolidation of the party's government over Soviet society and made possible the consolidation of power by Stalin, a fact with significance not only for the Soviet press but for the entire world. Stalinism in the context of the Soviet press might be best understood as the imposition of a monologic voice upon the raucous and chaotic conversations that persisted through the 1920s. The single voice was the product of Stalin's ruthless ascent to a position of unchallenged preeminence among Soviet leaders and his decision to orient the entire country to the task of collectivization and rapid industrialization. This was a task said to require the focused participation of all members of society, and thus the press was harnessed to this collective cultural project. The press of the 1930s became more narrowly focused on producing visions of superhuman personal achievement in labor; its mission of reporting was severely attenuated as journalists and writers were no longer called upon to disseminate information about the present but were asked, rather, to promote Stalin's vision of what it would mean to be loyal to Soviet power.

The impact of Stalin's rule on Soviet society is, of course, one of the crucial issues in Soviet historiography, and there is no way that a brief summary could do justice to the complexity of the issues surrounding the formation of the Stalinist system.[51] The chief problem in trying to make sense of the Stalinist system that took shape in the late 1920s and early 1930s is how to examine the contradictory and contrasting images of the period without imposing a scheme of historical explanation that would erase or judge peripheral phenomena that do not seem to fit, for the period was full of powerful contrasts. The overwhelming, tragic fact of the period was the growth and application of an apparatus of terror, which operated a vast archipelago of penal colonies holding millions of Soviet citizens. And at the same time this period saw the emergence of an immense cultural project, the transformation of millions of Russian peasants into "educated" and "cultured" citizens dedicated to socialism and loyal to the Soviet state.

The preeminent American scholar of the Stalin era, Sheila Fitzpatrick, has recently described "socialist realism," the official style of representation in art, literature, and culture that appeared in the late 1920s, in a way that helps us grasp the overall shaping of media during the 1930s: "Writers and artists," she argues,

> were urged to cultivate a sense of "socialist realism"—seeing life as it was becoming, rather than life as it was—rather than a literal or "naturalistic" realism. But socialist realism was a Stalinist mentalité, not just an artistic style. Ordinary citizens also developed the ability to see things as they were becoming and ought to be, rather than as they were. An empty ditch was a canal in the making; a vacant lot where old houses or a church had been torn down, littered with rubbish and weeds, was a future park.[52]

A socialist condition of life existed, as it were, immanently within the actual visible world, and the question was how to make the new Soviet citizens agents in the process of building socialism, how to make real this immanent world of cultured conduct. The implication of such a view was that at any given moment, socialism was both present and absent: it was present to the degree that individual citizens would succeed in embodying socialist values in everyday life, but it was absent in that there were always a number of individuals who had not yet identified or understood themselves as socialist actors, who continued to model their conduct on a range of thoroughly unsocialist ideas and habits, including everything from alcohol to cultural traditions and superstitions, to a depraved devotion to personal enrichment.

Many students of Soviet society and history have denounced this conception of a press oriented toward the future as a fundamental distortion of

the mission of journalism, as sanctioning a shallow and meaningless exercise that masked the actual conditions of people's lives. Jeffrey Brooks's exhaustive study of the contents of the Stalin era press is largely a catalogue of false claims, mindless repetition of slogans, and industrially produced glorification of the Great Leader. The metaphor that he deploys to describe the officially produced cultural products of the Stalin era is that of "performance": the press was but one site of a vast staging of an impossibly perfect leader and the life the leader made possible.[53] And yet Fitzpatrick's term "mentalité" suggests that it is possible to take this press more seriously than as simply a hopelessly clogged and narrow channel of communications. The press is perhaps better conceived as one site for the consolidation and evolution of the cultural imaginary, an imaginary that involved the public construction of subjectivities through a whole range of organizations, practices, and habits. This is the system of the imaginary presented by Thomas Lahusen in his account of the life and work of the novelist Azhaev. Oleg Kharkhordin, too, has analyzed how the Stalin period saw a number of innovations in the work done on the self through which one was to integrate the self into the collective.[54] Both take a more nuanced view of the culture of the 1930s in the Soviet Union, in particular paying attention to the ways that the images, texts, and discourses of the "official" world participated in the cultivation of a complex kind of subjectivity and self-concept that is not seen by the scholarly model of an oppressive state tormenting the lone individual with a press devoid of real content.

Integral to this vast expansion of the literary dimension of Soviet power was a significant growth in the size of the Soviet press, and here it might be useful to contrast the organization of the press in two moments twelve years apart. In 1922, Soviet newspapers were coping with the requirements of NEP to be self-financing, and this task proved so difficult that by the end of the year there were only 313 newspapers published in the Soviet Union, with a total circulation of around one million copies. Twelve years later, in 1934, there were over 10,000 newspapers being published in the Soviet Union, with a total circulation of over 34 million copies. The increase was due above all to a vast expansion in the printing of local papers, published on the units of the factory, village, or collective farm. This growth reflected the ambition of the party to reach the entire population with its directives and the rapidity with which Soviet citizens took up the offer of literacy and education.[55]

Simultaneous with the organization of a vast system of the press that reached deep into the countryside was the consolidation and centralization of the Soviet censorship apparatus. Glavlit, the principal Soviet censorship institution, had been established in 1922, but its powers grew in the early 1930s, so that a censorship hierarchy came into being that was both em-

bedded within and sat above the press hierarchy. Soviet papers saw both pre-publication censorship—in the person of censors on newspaper staffs who would check articles for the appearance of names, places, and topics that the party leadership did not want to see in print—and post-publication censorship—in the form of the careful reading of newspapers by members of the ideological committee of the party on the relevant rung of the party's hierarchy. These readers would check not just for anything the censors might have missed but more generally for the overall accuracy, professionalism, and ideological quality of the paper.

This picture of the appearance of a press system should not imply, however, that the system operated smoothly or efficiently. The Soviet press was by no means the kind of perfectly orchestrated machinery of persuasion depicted in totalitarian anti-utopian fiction like Orwell's *1984*.[56] The Soviet Union was still an economically and technologically underdeveloped country; Stalin's ambition to reach the economic level of advanced Western countries by the mid-1930s involved a vast project of social and cultural engineering that was assisted by a variety of coercive means, including party purges, mass arrests, and episodes of indiscriminate terror, none of which made for regular and consistent relationships between representatives of the party and representatives of the press, particularly in the countryside.

The outbreak of war in 1941, however, relieved this performance-oriented journalism from its obligation to print formulas of praise to the Great Leader. Between June 1941, when the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, and the spring of 1943, when it became clear that the surrender and capture of the German army at Stalingrad meant that the tide of war had decisively shifted in the Soviets' favor, the Soviet press quickly reoriented itself. Brooks writes that "An assortment of narrators with differing viewpoints—poets, writers, literary correspondents, local reporters, regular journalists, officials, and Stalin himself—began to use the press in different ways to advance one objective: victory over the invaders."[57] The number of images of Stalin that appeared in both the central and local press organs, and the number of press slogans referring to Stalin's centrality in every positive achievement, diminished significantly. The reporting from both the battlefield and the home front told powerful and moving stories, many of which focused on the tragedies and sacrifices of wartime. War correspondents like Grossman, Ehrenberg, and Simonov, who wrote for leading Soviet publications like *Pravda* and *Krasnaia zvezda,* became national celebrities whose work was followed by millions of Soviet citizens, and their writing became staple reading for succeeding generations. The sense that the war offered millions of Soviet citizens an opportunity to take control of their lives as never before in turn animated the correspondents who repre-

sented the dramatic actions of the average Soviet citizen. The press made visible, and thus offered to the imagination, an unscripted and unpredictable event whose intensity, development, and duration escaped any form of supervision or guidance. The war broke through the stylized and ritual representations on the pages of Soviet newspapers to represent a collectivity engaged with its own initiatives, emotions, and actions. Many of those who experienced the war referred to it as the first period of de-Stalinization.[58]

Brooks also shows, though, that when the war turned decisively against the Germans, the Soviet press began again to portray Stalin as the Great Protector of all Soviet peoples, the Great Warrior whose military strategies thwarted the Nazi invasion, and the Great Seer whose plans for socialist construction needed to be fulfilled with utmost haste.[59] The press returned to the familiar image of Stalin as the center of the Soviet universe and gave Soviet readers the impression that the struggle against fascism had been fought and won by the Soviet Union alone. Within this postwar performative idiom, representations of the war lost their immediacy; the war had consisted simply of a treacherous foe and a heroic people guided by an even more heroic leader. This wartime past was populated by names of battles and a handful of lionized generals, by geographic place-names, and by the names and nicknames of weapons, but not by any kind of detailed narrative that examined or analyzed the conduct of the war.

The late Stalin era, between 1945 and 1953, saw the nadir of the Soviet press. As the Cold War gathered momentum, newspapers were the vectors of the return of a discourse of insecurity and foreign threat. At the very moment that the state faced the enormous task of rebuilding the Soviet Union's shattered economy for the second time in twenty years, Stalin's paranoia, capriciousness, and suspicion rendered the party useless as a reliable arm for the administration of government. In late 1952 the press hinted at the presence of a "doctors' plot" to kill the leaders of the Soviet Union, and as many of the leading doctors were Jewish, the Soviet intelligentsia feared that Stalin and his henchmen were preparing another national purge.

And yet these eight years also constituted a kind of incubator of reform. While the news of Stalin's death provoked in many millions of Soviet citizens feelings of grief and uncertainty, many others perceived it as an opportunity to begin to think again about their society and history, and about the socialism that the Soviet Union's founders were so strongly dedicated to. Many of these men and women had been born in the 1930s, and as they came of age they came to serve a kind of constituency for reform that would emerge in the late 1950s.

ONE

Journalism and the Person in the Soviet Sixties

The collapse of state socialism in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought a number of crises in its wake, the most glaring of which was perhaps the disappearance of the welfare state: for millions of Soviet citizens, daily life acquired a new dimension of struggle and demanded new strategies of coping, if not survival. But if the economic crisis lay on the surface of everyday life in all its tragic obviousness, there were other, more veiled difficulties that took shape, such as the dilemmas of self-invention and self-knowledge created by living across the gap created by the Soviet Union's end. This was not an issue that effected people in the same way; the sixteen-year-old had a harder time recognizing himself or herself as formed by the Soviet system than the sixty-year-old. The point is that the end of the Soviet Union raised for many people the question of how to anchor themselves in their own past.

For example, the dozens of elderly men and women who met next to the Lenin Museum by Red Square to converse and sell newspapers like *Za Stalina!* (For Stalin!) made a public display of anchoring themselves in the 1930s; their newspapers applied the visual and rhetorical styles of that time to the political scene of the 1990s. Articles in these papers denounced the capitalist sellout of Russia, identifying the key players as Jewish bankers who had succeeded in seducing the weak leadership of the Soviet Union. And at the other end of the spectrum of self-invention were those former Soviet citizens who felt their lives could begin again, now that there was no KGB, no party, no required rituals or empty rhetoric to contend with at work and school and in the media. These were people who had long since given up the notion that there was anything in the Soviet past worth anchoring themselves to.

The vast majority of Russian citizens, though, were not able to make such unequivocal claims. These were people for whom the Soviet past was simply too contradictory to allow such one-dimensional understandings. The Soviet past was the scene of one's childhood, one's marriage, one's family life; the system had supplied an education and a profession, and one had practiced that profession within the constraints of the system. The system had both enabled and disabled; it had opened doors and closed them. And most people, moreover, had mastered the system, in the sense that they had developed an acute sense of when to ignore it and when not to ignore it. The pragmatic solution was to simply accept that one was "Soviet," that one could identify many meaningful anchoring points in the Soviet past, moments that existed apart from any judgments about the "system."

One of the most important anchoring points for many Soviet intellectuals and professionals navigating the uncharted seas of post-communism was the Khrushchev period, the nine years between the Secret Speech of 1956 and Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964. It is commonly described with the terms "reform," "cultural thaw," "liberalization," terms that evoke the positive moral connotations this period had for a generation of intellectuals, artists, and writers, and this chapter describes how and why the Khrushchev period can be understood as a clear moment of definition for those journalists who worked in the late Soviet press, and particularly for those who spent some time at the paper widely considered the leading paper of the Khrushchev era, *Izvestiia.* I want to describe how journalists experienced this period as making possible the rebirth of journalists' identities as governors of Soviet society. This means looking closely at the transformation of journalism sponsored by Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, who made possible the renewal or reinvention of the professional practice of journalism.

The special significance of this moment comes into focus when viewed through the lens of governmentality. According to those who sought to reform Soviet society, the socialist project needed reassembly after its distortion by Stalinism, and journalists represented a reserve army of specialists poised to restore the coherence of socialism's ideal. They were ready not only to go back to the 1920s and to Lenin's prescription of an activist, interventionist press, but also—and in direct opposition to what Sheila Fitzpatrick identified as the Stalinist operation of effacing the present—they were ready to claim the present as that arena where the power and truth of socialism could be found. The Khrushchev era was a moment when a kind of collective governmental reinvention was not only permitted but demanded by the party. This involved journalists positing new forms of subjectivity and using new discourses and styles of representation, so that the society might re-experience the cultural project of socialism.

In the context of conversations with journalists during the early years of post-communism, the aspect of this press that was referred to over and over again was that journalists had experienced a kind of *effectiveness.* They had intervened in people's lives in the most concrete way by redressing wrongs, by defending, as Shliapov said, the "little man." They dug into everyday events to discover where Soviet institutions had responded to problems or complaints in too callous and bureaucratic a fashion; journalists described and denounced instances where Soviet officials had overstepped their power. They described this in terms of the press's attention to the "person," a term that was one of the core symbols and figures of Soviet culture. And yet this effectiveness was not understood in political terms as directed at the system's subversion, but it was understood, rather, in terms of its ability to enable readers to rise above the system to communicate on a purely "human" level. In fact, E. Rakov, a journalist who had worked during these years at the *Tiumenskii komsomolets,* the paper for the youth league of the Siberian city of Tiumen', told me:

> I would have to say that the best characteristic of the journalism of those years was its humanity. Not in the sense of among colleagues, but humanity in general, in relation to one's readers, to the people. Yes, there was humanity in the press. A person turned to the press as the last instance. There, where already no one else could help, not a judge, secretary, or some kind of chairman, a person turned to the newspaper, and very often the newspaper helped, very often it helped. We helped, even such a small newspaper as ours helped people. We even helped people look for the truth. I can't give you concrete examples because these weren't some kind of global cataclysms; they were tragedies of one little person. Someone got cheated out of an apartment, someone was fired from his job unjustly, that is, we helped the person in his micro-life; it was here that the newspaper helped, since on the large scale the newspaper was helpless during those years. But it did have the ability to help the life of the little man.[1]

This relative helplessness on the macro-scale made it possible for journalists to turn their attention to the person from the point of view of the transcendent moral categories of "truth" and "humanity."

It turned out, however, that this very distance from anything political turned out to have great political significance, for these moral values supplied the foundation from which many Soviet citizens criticized the system in the 1970s and 1980s. This journalism maintained a zone of authentic critical thought outside the party's ideological supervision. The local problems of the person became the means by which journalists produced forms of and attitudes toward thought, which, they believed, played a vital role in enabling perestroika in the late 1980s. E. Alexandrov, a former *Izvestiia* correspondent, put it concisely: this journalism had done tremendous work "in the reorientation of this society" by dispersing "the cloud of ideology."[2]

Just what did these journalists mean when they referred, either explicitly or implicitly, both to the "person" and to the "thoughtful" nature of Soviet journalism? I begin with an introduction to the cultural ethos of the press under Khrushchev and to the career of the journalist most associated with this ethos, Aleksei Adzhubei. The everyday embodiment of this ethos in *Izvestiia,* the paper Adzhubei edited between 1959 and 1964, is presented by working from a 1961 article that exemplifies the genre remembered so proudly by journalists, that of the "defense of the little man." Then I turn to an enormous volume entitled *Den' mira* (A Day in the World), which I read as both a practical manual for Soviet journalists and as an idealization of the newspaper form. This 800-page "newspaper" covers not a village, a city, or even a country, but the entire globe. It contains in a single massive volume a kind of panoramic envisioning of the world, constructed through the work of hundreds of journalists and photographers from every country in the world.

While it is crucial to analyze these topics in some detail in order to be able to view them as a kind of window on to the redefinition of the governmental purpose of journalism in the Soviet Union, it may be useful to begin by contextualizing them in broader accounts of Soviet culture after Stalin. The phenomenon that both this chapter and the next treat is the Soviet sixties, that short decade which Vail' and Genis date from the 22nd Party Congress in July 1961 and extending to 1968 when Warsaw pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia.[3] For them, the sixties were so compelling because it was the only time in their lives when they experienced what seemed an authentic belief in Soviet socialism, a belief that sprang from the broad dissemination of new discourses on self, identity, and history. These discourses were marked above all by their affective register; public media became sites for the expression and exploration of the authentic private sphere of emotion, sentiment, and feeling. "Sincerity," they write, was "the key word of the epoch," one that pervaded public discourse and private conversations.[4]

The "sources" of the sixties have been described in a variety of scholarly and intellectual registers. For example, historians have long recognized the personal significance of Khrushchev as a leader whose desire to overcome Stalinism produced a string of "reforms," beginning in 1953 with his opening up vast areas of Kazakhstan to cereal cultivation and concluding with the projected reform of the party's administrative structure in the fall of 1962.[5] Most famously, his desire to renew the party led him to deliver the four-hour "secret" speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 that exposed Stalin as a sadistic and incompetent leader. This then helped introduce a wider "thaw" in the cultural sphere, in which writers were permitted to publish on previously forbidden themes such as life in the camps or the terror.[6]

At the same time, however, historians who stress the role of Khrushchev in enabling the significant improvements of the period—the general increase in living standards, including incomes, the construction of apartment buildings, and the production of food—also emphasize the way his own personality undermined his good intentions. Service's judgment is representative: Khrushchev was "at once a Stalinist and an anti-Stalinist, a communist believer and a cynic, a self-publicizing poltroon and a crusty philanthropist, a trouble-maker and a peacemaker, a stimulating colleague and a domineering bore, a statesman and a politicker who was out his intellectual depth."[7]

Stephen Hanson, however, suggests that a better approach to the 1960s can be gained if the focus is placed not on Khrushchev's personality but on the way his uncoordinated, impulsive, and chaotic reforms were expressions of the only policy "choice" he had as a socialist thinker. Hanson argues that the overarching task that confronted Khrushchev after his victory over the more economically conservative "anti-party" group in June 1957 was to pursue the "charismatic" approach to economic development, which relied on the communication of a vision of revolutionary transformation and transcendence.[8] Instead of cautiously reforming the planning system or introducing systems of incentives, as his opponents had suggested, "Khrushchev set out to mobilize the entire population of the USSR—within the context of the Stalinist planning system—to engage in the "full-scale construction of communism." Khrushchev believed "the entire population was ready for disciplined revolutionary action." The charismatic approach paid little attention to obvious constraints; like all visions of charismatic change, it would be based on working at the boundaries of the real and the rational. In Hanson's words, "Khrushchev hated to see Soviet reality get fixed into frozen, time-bound forms."[9] Khrushchev devoted much time and energy to the promotion of everyday miracles of production; his most ambitious statement of time transcendence, and one that was repeatedly held up to ridicule him once he was removed from power, was his statement in 1959 that Soviet citizens would experience communism in their lifetime. What would create a state of abundance, leisure, health, and happiness in a society with a sizable percentage of its population still with barely enough food to eat and living in communal apartments or on collective farms that had not been improved since the 1930s was every citizen's commitment to the "permanent revolution."[10] Hanson helps us make sense of the important rephrasings contained in the party program of 1961: it was no longer a matter of the party leading the people; the people would lead themselves. Stability, continuity, and routine were not viewed as rational techniques in improving production, but rather as brakes on communism's fulfillment. And yet even as reforms followed reforms, and reality repeatedly changed, there was no consistent increase in production, no

sign that the world of abundance was at hand. For those who replaced Khrushchev in 1964, the lack of progress was itself a product of trying too much too fast.

The Soviet sixties can be thought of, then, as a charismatic era because the party under Khrushchev had taken a charismatic approach to time. And likewise, the disappearance of the party's support for the cultural forms of the sixties involved the end of that projection of enthusiasm, as the new leaders approached governing not as the organization of a permanent revolution but as the establishment of a stable orthodoxy. But what neither Hanson nor any other historian of Soviet society explores is the degree to which the charisma that seemed programmed into the socialist worldview was actually the textual product of journalists.

ADZHUBEI'S LAST TEXT

I began to call Adzhubei in December 1992, when a friend at *Izvestiia* suggested that as someone interested in the history of the Soviet press, I should just go to the "source." He helped me get the phone number at the office of the small weekly paper that Adzhubei was editing, and yet on the numerous occasions when I called, it turned out I always just missed him. His assistant always apologized and insisted that I call back, assuring me that he enjoyed talking to scholars and researchers. I tried once again on March 19, 1993, only to be told in a quavering voice that Aleksei Ivanovich had died the previous day.

Although the obituary that appeared in *Izvestiia* acknowledged that few young Russians would probably know his name, Aleksei Adzhubei had been a well-known member of the Soviet establishment. He was born in 1924, fought in the war as a teenager, and met Rada Khrushchev at Moscow State University; they married in 1949. He graduated from the Faculty of Journalism and went on to work at several of the leading Soviet papers. He was first the editor of *Komsomol'skaia pravda* and eventually became editor-in-chief of *Izvestiia* at age thirty-five. Adzhubei was a member of that first post-Stalin generation of the Soviet elite who were interested in the wider world and who traveled; his memoir of the Khrushchev era, published during perestroika and entitled *Te deciat' let* (Those Ten Years), is filled with dozens of photos, most of which show Khrushchev, but there are also a number of photos that portray Adzhubei at various famous locales or with famous persons: on the observation deck of the Empire State Building; at a barbecue in the backyard of President Kennedy's press secretary, Pierre Salinger; with Pablo Neruda in Chile; with President Kennedy in the Oval Office and with John Steinbeck gazing out over Moscow from the roof of the *Izvestiia* building. In October 1964, when Brezhnev and his

allies removed Khrushchev from power, they removed Adzhubei as well, and he worked for the next twenty years at the relatively obscure journal *Sovetskii soiuz* (Soviet Union). During perestroika he returned to the public's attention with his memoir and with the publication, starting in 1991, of a new weekly newspaper called *Tret'ee soslovie* (The Third Estate).

Historians and biographers of the Khrushchev era have recognized the important position Adzhubei held within Khrushchev's inner circle; as a trusted member of the family, Adzhubei became an important adviser to Khrushchev, traveling frequently abroad as his father-in-law's personal diplomatic envoy. For the majority of commentators, Adzhubei's significance as a historical actor has been limited to this insider's status. For example, he flits in and out of William Taubman's biography of Khrushchev chiefly as a source of insights into the erratic, mercurial, and moody personality and the unpredictable style of rule of his wife's father. And yet his significance as an actor in the highest levels of power cannot be separated from his identity as a journalist. After Stalin's death Adzhubei rose to the top of the journalistic hierarchy in the Soviet Union, where he remained until October 1964, when his father-in-law and patron was removed from power.

Students of Soviet media have certainly recognized Adzhubei's impact on the organization of the press and the conduct of journalism. The Russian journalism historian Dmitrii Strovskii notes that "Adzhubei introduced a sense of vividly expressed reporting, which later began to be actively used by all our journalism. In the opinion of [*Izvestiia*'s] editor, at the base of every text there had to be an interesting fact. . . . *Izvestiia,* reflecting the liberal-reformist mood in society, succeeded in becoming its own kind of mirror and barometer of the 'thaw.'"[11] Adzhubei was one of the important figures behind the creation of the Union of Journalists, which began to accept members in July 1957 and whose first congress was in November 1959, and he was also a prime mover behind the creation of the Novosti Press Agency [*Agenstvo Press Novosti*], in April 1961, which created more jobs for journalists in a news agency that, unlike TASS, was originally intended to be "independent" from the government.[12] Both these institutions were created with the broad goal of giving journalists higher social standing, better working conditions, and a more professional identity.[13] Journalism scholar Mark Hopkins recognizes Adzhubei's importance by calling him a "pacesetter" and an "activist" in the remaking of the Soviet media.[14]

Just as Adzhubei's father-in-law renewed the party's role in Soviet government after the party's decades of subservience to Stalin, so too did Adzhubei try to renew the governmental role of the press in Soviet society. He understood that the mentalities of journalists had to be "de-Stalinized," that is, purged of the fear of originality and creativity, so that they could

participate actively in the work of governing. It is in this sense that Adzhubei's appointment to the post of editor-in-chief of *Izvestiia* in 1959 can be understood. *Izvestiia* was the perfect newspaper to do this work, for as the paper of the Soviet government, it did not have the burden or responsibility to be literally the mouthpiece of the party as *Pravda* was, or to look out for the interests of a single group within the population.

Adzhubei's appointment as editor of *Izvestiia* was accompanied by a Central Committee decree "On the Work of the Newspaper *Izvestiia,*" dated June 24, 1959, which evokes this task of renewal. The decree begins by reviewing *Izvestiia*'s role as "occupying one of the leading places among the organs of the Soviet press" and by delineating the service it has performed dating back to the revolution. It then defines a "new stage in the development of Soviet society, in the period of the extensive construction of communism, a level on which *Izvestiia* acts but does not satisfy readers and does not respond to the problems that stand before the Soviet press." The decree states:

> The most important task for the editors of *Izvestiia* is the marked improvement in the contents of the paper by means of the profound cultivation and courageous formulation of current political, economic, ideological, and moral-ethical problems, and a widening of themes and a heightening of energy [*operativnost'*] in the illumination of national and international life. The editors of the paper should stand closer to the mass reader, should attract the participation of the best publicists, writers, scientists, figures in the world of art, noted specialists and innovators; it should print more letters from workers, so that the paper can become a genuine voice of the public [*obshchestvennost'*]; it should be able to use the most varied of journalistic genres and forms of journalistic work. Literary and illustrated material in the paper should be displayed expressively and in an interesting fashion; official reports, as in other general political papers, should be published in a readable form.[15]

Here, mixed in between the processual nouns common in Soviet bureaucratic discourse—nouns like improvement [*uluchshenie*], cultivation [*razrabotka*], illumination [*osveshchenie*], and heightening [*povyshenie*]—is a vision of how journalists should understand their work. Journalists should be profound, courageous, energetic, and sensitive to the cultural milieus and level of education of their readers; they should move fluidly across the fields of science, culture, and art and should rub shoulders often with workers, whom they should encourage to write to the paper with their own ideas and opinions. And journalists should understand how to make all this principled, educative material interesting, that is, neither sensationalist nor superficial, neither abstract nor inaccessible. *Izvestiia* journalists should supply Soviet readers with a journalism of everyday enlightenment that would serve as a vehicle for the creation of socialist consciousness.

Although it is not easy to make a correlation between the "popularity" of any organ of the Soviet press and its circulation figures, because so many bureaucratic and material factors influenced circulation sizes, it is nonetheless evident that *Izvestiia*'s circulation rose greatly after Adzhubei's arrival. This growth is plausibly accounted for as the result of both a real increase in public demand and the party's desire to push this new journalism on the public, but whatever the reasons, between 1959 and 1965 *Izvestiia*'s circulation rose from a little over two million to over eight million copies per year. In early 1964 it overtook *Pravda* as the largest mass circulation daily in the Soviet Union.[16] This popularity suggests that it resonated with readers for a variety of reasons, not least of which was the sense it conveyed that its journalists no longer were obliged to repeat Stalinist orthodoxies.

That Adzhubei's press was in some fundamental sense about (re)organizing the visual field can be seen from the broadest formal comparison of the press during the Stalin era with the press under Adzhubei. The central press during the late Stalin era was, in newspaper jargon, gray.[17] The page had few photos or graphic elements and was chiefly long columns of text. The front page of most papers was much more likely to contain five or ten short letters to the Great Leader from kolkhoz chairmen about the overfulfillment of the plan than a photograph. Artwork, when it did appear, was likely to be drawings or photographs of paintings of famous figures of 19th century Russian science. While lengthy articles on human themes occasionally appeared, they tended toward reiterating the important cultural myths of the Stalin era, such as membership in the "Great Soviet family." News reports were dull, with little propagandistic charge, and international news often summarized Reuters or UPI wire reports. Analytic articles about foreign affairs were similarly dry, often centering on the machinations of the Western powers at the United Nations.[18]

One senses that journalists like Adzhubei were most disturbed by the narrowness of the genres of Stalinist journalism; they seemed inadequate means to express the convictions young journalists felt about the performance and potential of the Soviet Union. In comparison to issues from the Stalin era, organized as blocks of text with very little to interrupt the movement of the eye up and down the page-long columns, Adzhubei's *Izvestiia* was a collage of headlines, subheads, abstracts, cartoons, poems, photos, facsimiles of documents, graphics, framing lines and typefaces of many kinds and sizes.[19] The overall number of items carried on each page is significantly greater in Adzhubei's papers, their lengths are shorter, and their identified sources are more varied. Lead articles [*peredovaia stat'ia*] in the late Stalin period treated largely technical topics such as "To guarantee for the entire sown area the highest quality seeds," while in 1960 they bore headlines that evoked emotion and affect, headlines such as "Bustling Days,"

"We Will Compete, We Will Be Friends," "The Most Magical Energy," and "A New Step—New Hopes." Photographic portraits appeared on the front page, with small descriptions of the individual's achievements. An example is the *Izvestiia* of November 6, 1963, where just below the name of the paper is a studio-like portrait of smiling, twenty-three-year-old Maria Kirbiakova, who the caption announces works at the Paris Commune shoe factory and has mastered every station along the conveyor belt, twenty-two trades in all. "She will be an engineer-technologist, because she is studying at an evening institute. Maria Kirbiakova is a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR."[20] Workers are shown at the workplace, conferring over a blueprint or discussing the shape of a piece of metal that just came out of the foundry. The late-Stalin-era press depicted just a handful of individuals, while Adzhubei's press seems to cram into its pages as many people as possible.

One other valuable source of information about Adzhubei's impact on Soviet journalism was the testimonies of his friends and colleagues at his memorial service. I witnessed there the construction of a composite biography, which describes Adzhubei as a member of the humanist intelligentsia that attempted to reform Stalinism; the testimonies present him as the victim of Brezhnev's cautious, selfish, and unimaginative style and then as a liberal reformer who reemerged in the late 1980s to nurture the growth of a liberal Russia, one where power would reside in a "third estate." About a dozen speakers eulogized Adzhubei, referring to his role and his experience in the powerful forces that shaped late-Soviet history. For example, Igor Golembiovskii, *Izvestiia*'s first post-Soviet editor-in-chief, placed the very beginning of his relationship with Adzhubei squarely in the context of de-Stalinization: "It was in the fall of 1954 when he collected us young people together, completely unknown literary critics, and asked us to talk about literature with complete sincerity. He said, 'Don't be timid, be braver, speak honestly!' This was the amazing feeling of the beginning of our liberation." He also praised Adzhubei's skill as a journalist and editor, telling his listeners that Adzhubei was the first person to show him "what a newspaper really was." Two other well-known Soviet editors, B. Pankin and V. Fronin, who had also been editors of *Komsomol'skaia pravda,* praised the work Adzhubei had done at this paper. Pankin, rather than evoking the tragic events of Adzhubei's career, concentrated on the indelible marks that he had left on Soviet journalism: "Thinking back on all that [his years with Adzhubei at Moscow State University] I want to say that Adzhubei, who was famous all over the world, was for me not so much a symbol, as a living human being who all his life struggled and suffered. Our era was not very disposed so that even the strongest of our contemporaries can show themselves with great creativity. This, thank God, didn't apply to Adzhubei. All

we have to do to prove it is to look at what he did at *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* and at *Izvestiia.*" Here Adzhubei appeared as a kind of dual figure: both a classically "Russian" literary hero/victim, struggling and suffering, but also a creative force whose work transformed society.

By far the most emotional statement about Adzhubei's impact on Soviet journalism came from I. Ovchinnikova, who had worked at *Izvestiia* with Adzhubei and who used the occasion to mention the conflict between the executive and legislative branches of Russian government over the *Izvestiia* newspaper and publishing house that had come to a head early in 1993. Speaking for her colleagues, she addressed Adzhubei directly:

> We thank you for the rare chance to love our work, our newspaper, our colleagues. In the *Izvestiia* of those times we worked and lived in an atmosphere of love. And it wasn't only because everyone loved you. The fact is that here everyone loved each other, the older ones loved the younger ones, the younger ones loved and idolized the older ones. And this helped us make a newspaper that we considered better [than any other]. Maybe this isn't an objective view, but nevertheless it was beautiful. It was a great joy to think [that each day] you would come here and see your favorite people, this was truly a rare happiness, and for this we thank you. I know that it grieved you how in recent years the editorial office and the publishing house have come into conflict. And all the time you thought about how to find an exit from this conflict, how to correct it. And look how now we are all together, both those from the publishing house and those from the editorial side, we are all here beside you, so as not to worry you more. Something good will happen, everything will turn out OK. If we can't do it, then our children will do it; if right now our children are ashamed of us, the young journalists will set things right, so that memory of you will last a long time. A very long time.

The statements of Adzhubei's friends and colleagues at his funeral were charged with the emotion of the occasion. They reflected a variety of points of view and a range of positions and preoccupations in the post-Soviet present, but they all shared the opinion that Adzhubei was no gray Soviet bureaucrat, no party hack, but that he had been one of the Soviet Union's positive heroes, working within the system for something that transcended that system.

Adzhubei's obituary, published in *Izvestiia* on March 23, 1993, was a statement that concisely and forcefully linked Adzhubei's style of journalism to the concern for the Soviet person. This article, accompanied by what appears to be an official photograph, taken probably in the early 1960s, had a headline that read simply "Aleksei Adzhubei Is Dead" and that was signed only with one word in bold caps, *Izvestnitsy* (those who work at *Izvestiia*). But this was no summary of a life, a list of positions held or honors received. The first three lines of the obituary read:

. . . It is as if *Komsomol'ka* [*Komsomol'skaia Pravda*] died.
. . . It is as if *Izvestiia* died.
. . . It is as if our entire journalism has died.[21]

These were intentionally poetic statements, asserting that Adzhubei was so significant that his death might be equated with the disappearance of journalism. The authors then explained this significance by both placing him squarely in his own time and contending that he had found a way to work against his time:

> Adzhubei was not anti-Soviet, was not a dissident, was not an overthrower of power. Rather, Adzhubei fought in the stuffy world of foolish lead articles and toothless criticism with the simple, and it seems now, natural slogan: help the person. Not humanity. Not class. Not the republic, not even the country.

One senses that the obituary writers, like the speakers at his funeral, were in a sense constructing memories of the man with whom they could feel comfortable, since they, too, were faced with the task of anchoring themselves in their own past. For here was a historical outline that tried to evade the unpleasantness of actual events. What stands out is the claim that Adzhubei refused to speak in the empty abstract registers of Soviet ideological discourse, that he had managed to stand above the discursive objects whose dull repetition during the 1970s and early 1980s had made possible alienation and stagnation. The word "humanity" here did not have the high moral value that Rakov gave it, but referred to what had become the stale language of sacrifice; "class" was the main character in Marxist narratives of history; "republic" evoked the triumph of democratic revolutions since 1776; and "country" represented the mystical focus of national identification that exists above time and history. Official politics and culture under Brezhnev had been saturated with these terms. In contrast to these abstractions, the obituary writers assert that Adzhubei demanded journalists recognize real people located in the midst of everyday situations. The "person" was someone who could be helped through the active, responsible involvement of journalists, and newspapers were thus vital social institutions charged with surveying and taking constant stock of the moral and material disposition of Soviet citizens. Adzhubei managed to rise above his times by focusing so closely on those who made up those times.

It is hardly surprising that the writers of Adzhubei's obituary, as well as his friends and colleagues at his funeral, would avoid the word "socialism," for socialism supposedly had been what that system was all about. Indeed, its absence loomed over these contexts of memory and memorialization. One could interpret this silence as marking something so painful and embarrassing that it had to go without saying, and yet there is another possi-

bility. Perhaps socialism was not mentioned precisely because it had been so central to the personal and professional coming of age that Adzhubei's cohort had experienced in the 1950s. In other words, the fact that their generation had had a particularly intimate relationship to socialism had to go without saying, for as *shestideciatniki,* as "people of the sixties," they had experienced the apex of socialism in the Soviet Union, while the course of their professional and personal lives in the 1970s and 1980s, on the other hand, had been defined by the struggle to deal with shortcomings, flaws, and failures of the institutions charged with making socialism real.

Adzhubei's funeral was obviously about an ending, a disappearance, the conclusion of a life. But the history it contributes to is one about the ongoing development of the governmental discourses brought to play in the creation of Soviet subjects. Adzhubei was so important because he served in the dual capacity of both manager and patron for the renewal of journalism's governmental role. In a social context defined by the imperative of de-Stalinization, Adzhubei promoted the sense that the cultural construction of socialism had to overcome its fawning dependence on the Great Leader and should involve, rather, the active self-definition of Soviet subjects not through orders or threats, but education and understanding. Journalists would develop themselves as governors to the degree that they produced thoughtful texts, the trains of thought of socialist subjects. I will now index this governmental imagination by turning to two journalistic works from the early 1960s that evoke the modes of journalistic concern that Soviet readers found in the press.

DEMIDOV AND CONDUCT

On November 24, 1963, the same day the Soviet press carried the news of President Kennedy's assassination, an article appeared in *Izvestiia* by N. Ter-Minasova with the headline "Only One Person" [*Vsego odin chelovek*] and under the rubric "Questions of Soviet Law."[22] Beneath the article and separated by a thin bar was an accompanying article, shorter and in a different typeface, without a headline, by V. Samsonov, identified as the "Chairman of the Presidium of the Moscow City College of Lawyers." The article is a reflection on an act of illegal and uncultured behavior but is organized according to movement away from self-evident condemnation of the obviously guilty party and toward the achievement of governmental knowledge via the introduction of a number of complicating facts. The journalist appears in the text moving quickly back and forth between the vital journalistic task of illuminating contemporary reality and teaching the reader about the significance of this reality, these two aspects of the journalist's profession being at the core of the renewal of journalism's governmental purpose.

The significant facts of the case are summarized in three short para-

graphs. A policeman, G. Shchetinov, patrolling his beat in a neighborhood of Moscow, came across a couple fighting. The policeman tried to calm them down, but instead of cooperating, the man, Mikhail Demidov, became even more combative. He was taken away by the police to the local jail, where he was recognized as a thief who had been caught and punished several times in the previous eight years. He was then tried again and found guilty, and since he was a recidivist, he was given the relatively severe sentence of three years imprisonment in a work colony.

By digging more deeply into the case, however, the journalist discovers that the framework of criminal, crime, and punishment is not the one that should apply in this case. Instead of supplying a cautionary tale about public order and disorder, an account of Demidov's life reveals something positive, the transformative power of socialist society, its ability to turn non-persons into persons. The material Ter-Minasova presents to make Demidov's case includes an account of the difficult circumstances of Demidov's childhood and the effort Demidov made to reform himself, to turn himself into someone who acts in a cultured and socially conscientious manner. She then addresses the criminal act itself by adding to his biographical sketch an account of the circumstances that led to his arrest. This involved a meeting with his former girlfriend, who was also the mother of his son, a woman whose supervision of the boy Demidov had been very critical of. Demidov's loss of control is thus linked to his passionate concern for his child.

The focus of the article then shifts from Demidov's conduct to the conduct of the judge for whom these details did not matter, who ignored a key aspect of what it meant to live in a socialist society. Addressing both the judge and the reader, Ter-Minasova writes, "You should understand that in life there are no well-trodden paths, no prepared decisions, that in our society it is impossible to approach even a single person with standards prepared beforehand, that each event in life demands intelligent attention and an unrepeatable approach." Here are, as it were, condensed instructions for how to conceive of the problems of the person. The key is to look at every event in as broad a context as possible, for only in this way is it possible to connect both the good of the person and the good of society. The final paragraph reads, "If the judge's verdict is not changed, then society will only lose one person. But look how many that is—just one person!"

If one thrust of Ter-Minasova's article is to criticize the institutions of Soviet law as being somehow out of synch with the priorities of a socialist society of persons, then the accompanying article by the legal expert V. Samsonov gives Ter-Minasova's criticism yet another level of authority. Samsonov articulates the principles that lie beneath the journalist's arguments. "As nowhere else, the responsible work of the judge in our socialist society, where the person is surrounded by a special attention, is to put this

principle into force: 'Everything in the name of the person, everything for the good of the person.'" Reviewing the facts of the case, Samsonov concludes that the judge did not break any laws in applying to Demidov the sentence he did. "It only remains to wonder how the judge failed to see Demidov himself, as people laid out for him the complex details of his life, in the last years of which he had begun the stormy and complicated process of becoming a person. . . . This indifference towards the person and to the interests of society, the cold and bureaucratic sentence, all this is incompatible with our image of the Soviet judge." He notes that in general it was right to punish such an act with such a sentence, but the judge ignored how much Demidov, "with the help of those Soviet people around him, had built his life anew. Therefore he needs the support of Soviet justice. There is no doubt that this justice will be shown to him." This hint that Demidov's case will be reviewed and his stern sentence lightened provides a sense of closure to the articles and affirms *Izvestiia*'s contribution to ensuring what in all likelihood will be a more just outcome. Not only can the journalism of the person be credited with saving another "little man," but also the fundamental harmony between Soviet law and the society of persons is solidified.

Ter-Minasova's account of Demidov's difficulties provides a vocabulary with which to think about the renewal of the press under Khrushchev, for the article is not so much an item of news as a kind of governmental parable. We note here how journalism appears as a self-conscious, public, and performative act of contemplation. Ter-Minasova employs an overtly pedagogical rhetoric to teach the lesson that in the Soviet Union every institution needs to respect the individual humanity of every person. The task of journalism was in a sense to demystify fate, to show how individuals were embedded in networks of social concern and support that constituted the just foundation of Soviet society. This journalism projected an image of the journalist as a privileged actor occupying a position of moral custodianship over Soviet society, as someone who both represented and participated in broader networks of compassion and critique. The textual articulation of this journalism is thus not only about information, but also about providing a model of how to interpret the world. The implication is that the project of self-construction as a socialist person involves conducting oneself as a journalist, as someone who sees the world in terms of the realization of the socialist way of life.

The canvas that Ter-Minasova worked with here was Moscow and the everyday life of one small group of Soviet citizens. But during the early 1960s, socialism's progress seemed to many in the Soviet Union to be unfolding across the entire globe, and thus the global state of socialism was also something that needed representation and contemplation. An equally important part of the task of creating socialist persons was instruction in

the much larger phenomenon of socialism's place in the world. It was this problem that Adzhubei addressed not long after his arrival at *Izvestiia* by taking up the task of editing a massive, synchronic vision of a single day, September 27, 1960. It represents a very different product of print socialism, and yet in its concern with teaching and inspiring, it is continuous with the work that Ter-Minasova and her colleagues produced at the paper every day.

DEN' MIRA, OR WORLDVIEWS AS VIEWS OF THE WORLD

Den' mira (A Day in the World) was published in 1961 by the *Izvestiia* publishing house. It is a large, "coffee table" size book, over two inches thick, bound in cloth, and on its cover is an image of a red sputnik circling a map-like drawing of the globe, with a small image of one of the Kremlin's clocks in the lower right corner. Even without knowing Russian, it would probably be obvious to the reader, as he or she opened the book and began to leaf through it, that it is a kind of catalogue or compilation. From the layout of the text and the use of graphics, from the photographs that show among other things various icons from the middle of the twentieth century, like Bridget Bardot and the Aswan Dam, it appears as a giant almanac, a member of that old genre of encyclopedic works that seeks to cover something completely, entirely, and exhaustively. And indeed, *Den' mira* is but one of many examples of this genre of encyclopedic coverage from the 20th century, one familiar in the American context in the form of the Time-Life series *A Day in the Life of X,* where X represents a country, a city, or state, whose life was captured by the work of dozens of photographers who fanned out over the country, snapping thousands of pictures of everything they saw from midnight to midnight.

Den' mira, too, records the events of a single day—September 27th, 1960—although these events are not ones limited to a single country, nor is the means of representation exclusively photographic. The book, rather, presents information about that day from every country in the world, with the sources of this global knowledge being hundreds of journalistic texts and images. To this extent, the book represents an enormous project of journalistic editing. News items are taken from newspapers like the major Soviet papers *Pravda* and *Izvestiia,* as well as smaller regional papers like *Rabochii put', Rabochii krai, Penzenskaia pravda,* and *Mariiskaia pravda,* as well as dozens and dozens of foreign papers, some from the near-abroad, like *Mlada fronta* from Czechoslovakia and *Borba* from Yugoslavia, and others from more distant parts of the world, such as *Newsweek* and the *New York Journal-American* from the United States, *L'Unità* from Italy, and *El Dia* from Uruguay, to name just a few. The journalistic information

taken from these hundreds of papers is by no means only "news"; alongside reprinted articles appear page-long essays, letters, poems, statistical tables, cartoons, drawings, and diagrams, and on every page are at least three or four photographs of the most varied subjects: Nehru in conversation, elderly speakers at Hyde Park, Rockefeller Center, a market in Skopje, the Great Theater in Pyongyang, Albanian oil fields, an East German woman with her new baby, Armenian students at their desks, and on and on.

But unlike examples of this genre in the West that are marketed to a mass audience as a celebration of the diversity of the human or national "family," this envisioning of the world was only printed in 700 copies. *Den' mira* was hardly an everyday consumer item to be purchased by the average Soviet citizen. If the book was too big to ever be widely circulated, then why was it realized, why was it produced? My reading of *Den' mira* is that its dozens of editors indeed did have an audience in mind, but that its audience was less the Soviet reader than the community of Soviet journalists who in 1960 needed to be shown just how important their lives and work were. It is a work "by and for" journalists, both those who assembled it, and those who in leafing through it will be shown the power and beauty of their profession and feel a greater sense of connection to and responsibility for the socialist consciousness of Soviet citizens. This project must have appeared to Adzhubei as the perfect project at the perfect time, as a kind of manual that would teach journalists what the press was to look like if it was to be lively, interesting, and expressive, and would describe what journalists should seek to accomplish in a society that had turned its back on the multiple traumas of totalitarian terror and war and had entered a new phase of peace, growth, and progress.

The deceptively simple questions that the book poses are, what should journalists know as they set about their task of educating Soviet citizens, and what should they feel and believe? The answers given by the text are that they should understand that all the events large and small taking place across the globe have a logic to them, and that they should feel it is their highest duty to communicate to Soviet readers the sense that their lives are a part of a coherent, progressive adventure. Before showing how the book's sections contribute to this goal, I want to examine briefly the book's presentation of itself, for it is in the few pages at the beginning of the book that it directly thematizes its purpose.

The text on the book's title page explains that the book is a kind of second edition, and that at the heart of this new version is the immense distance traveled by Soviet society from the 1930s:

> The first book *Den' mra*—about what happened on earth on Friday, September 27, 1935—was created at the initiative of Aleksei Maksimovich Gorky. Since that time a quarter century has passed. People born at the same time as Gorky's book have left

> the time of youth and entered the time of adulthood. Those who were then young are now creators of life, made wise by experience and knowledge. In the last quarter century all humanity has travelled far ahead along the path of great renewal. The world of socialism, given birth by October, already unites a third of the population of the planet, smashes the chains of colonial slavery, and takes aim at a capitalism consumed by contradictions and doomed to perish. This new aspect of our planet appears on the pages of the second book *DEN' MIRA* engraved with the events of Tuesday, September 27, 1960. It was the most ordinary day. On the earth, as always, snow fell, flowers bloomed, people lived and died, loved and hated, plowed the earth, grasped the unknown, made steel, wrote poetry. Good fought with evil, the new, the communist, was victorious over the old, the exhausted. Fishermen and diplomats, young people and the aged, argued about peace on earth. A many colored mosaic of facts forms in the momentary snapshot of the life of contemporary humanity in one of the steepest take-offs of history.

Here, then, is the very first journalistic lesson: that what seems the everyday, the typical, the usual, is in fact evidence of momentous things. The problem, however, is how to represent them, how to make this immanence intelligible. In an introductory section entitled "To Our Readers," the editors try to answer this question by making an analogy between physicists who make cross-sections of fibers to determine their structure and journalists who produce snapshots that, when put together, create a "cross-section of humanity's life," an "engraving of the contemporary epoch in the form of one of its typical days." Such an engraving will depict what all art depicts, a better understanding of "the achievements of the human race and where it is going." The editors go on to explain that the journalists who perform this work must embody a standard of professionalism far above that of their Western counterparts, for the representation of "contemporary humanity" demands a style of journalism that avoids that staple of the Western press, the sensationalistic event:

> For the confirmation and assertion of our truths, of our views on the future of humanity, no sort of sensation, no kind of specially organized event is needed. It is enough to take the facts as they are, to bring together on the pages of a book phenomena of the most varied scale and character, to show life with its contradictions and contrasts, and the reader will make his own conclusion.[23]

The implication is that journalists have to be, on the one hand, patient, skilled craftsmen whose task is to record reality. They need to stand back and let life write their works: "Although our book was written by thousands of people, its true author is life. Unendingly varied, not knowing limits and stagnation in its indomitable movement, like sunlight in a drop of dew, it reflects in one complete revolution of the planet its entire mass of human events, actions, and thoughts" (796). But on the other

hand, this precise work cannot take place without an understanding of the larger world process that their texts and images illustrate. The editors are certain that after examining this image of a day in the life of humanity, the reader will realize, in the words of Khrushchev's Party Program of 1961, referred to in the book's last section as "the communist manifesto of the twentieth century" (796): "Above the world is passing a great, cleansing storm, marking the springtime of humanity." Faced with the evidence of this storm and the achievements of the Soviet Union, the editors conclude that "with each new day, with each new step it is becoming clearer for millions of simple people the world over, communism is fulfilling its historical mission to free labor from its social inequality, from all forms of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war, and to establish on earth Peace, Labor, Freedom, Equality, and Happiness of all peoples" (4). The truth of this assertion in the New Party Program is "confirmed by the immense variety of reality and by each fact of the typical day in the life of the great human family" (5).

The editors recognize that a work that set itself such lofty ambitions may well appear too immense to grasp. They conclude the section "To Our Readers" by explicitly recognizing that this massive tome poses the problem of how it is to be read. For it is obvious that this is not a reference book to be consulted as a reservoir of specific facts; the texts and images were not collected so that readers could selectively put them to their own use. The editor's solution was to refer to the advice given in the introduction of the first *Den' mira* published twenty-five years earlier, where Gorky and his colleagues wrote:

> "How does one read this book? . . . Readers, taking in their hands *Den' mira,* may be seized with confusion and perplexity. How to master this tome? And in general, what is it? A handbook, a scientific work, a review, a compete set of works? How should we relate to this book? Browse through it or read it from beginning to end, look through the sections that might be interesting to one or another reader or read the work according to its plan?"
>
> "We consider *Den' mira* a book for reading. First leaf through it, get acquainted with its construction, quickly flip through its illustrations, and pause at the pages that interest you. But then, without hurrying, embark on your reading, of course with breaks, but from the beginning. You won't complain. The powerful symphony of human life will grab you and carry you along."
>
> If the readers of our book, having taken up the conceptual journey through countries and continents, experience this symphony, and if they hear in the sounds of the present the voice of the worker, then the editors of *Den' mira* will consider their problem solved. (5)

The musical analogy is central to the aim of the book, for what *Den' mira* is all about is enabling an appreciation of the diversity of humanity.

The analogy they make is not with literary works that represent an "imaginary" world that exists outside the lived time of everyday life, but rather with an art form that is experienced in the present. They suggest that this music is varied and complex, and yet above it all one can hear the melodic line of labor, whose notes unite all places and times. The press becomes nothing less than the musical notation of modernity.

The exposition that is the ambition of *Den' mira*'s editors is thus far more than a simple laying out of a theory or a philosophy. It is grounded in a kind of modernist pleasure and fascination with time that is the task of journalists to contemplate and explore. It finds expression, for example, in the book's overall organization, which begins with a twenty-page chronicle of global events entitled "From Midnight to Midnight." The first event of the chronicle, under the heading "00 o'clock, Moscow Time," reports on the birth in Moscow of a son to the nurse Tatiana Pakhomova, and the last, under "23 o'clock Moscow Time," manages to bring the chronicle back to the book itself, for it reports that Soviet writer Valentin Kataev appeared on All-Union radio, where he stated, "Soon the second Day of the World will disappear into the past. But it will never be forgotten. It will become history." In between are dozens of brief notes, such as one appearing under "05 Moscow Time": "Wellington. The Prime Minister of New Zealand Walter Nash left for New York to attend the General Assembly of the UN." And the one under 15 o'clock Moscow Time: "Seged (Hungary). The American professor Albert Sabin, who discovered a vaccine against child paralysis, visited a microbiological institute." In the book's first section, time is condensed into a single turn of the globe, and yet in other sections the stress is on the passage or flow of time. For example, in keeping with the agenda to teach just how far the world has come in the twenty-five years since the book's first version was published, it contains five four-page color-tinted sections entitled "The World around Us, 1935–1960," which compare the current state of fashion, architecture, aviation, automobiles, and interior design with the conditions of these fields twenty-five years previously. And a section toward the end entitled "About Time and About Ourselves" contains dozens of letters from young people all over the world who, like *Den' mira,* are "also" twenty-five years old, and who write with descriptions of their lives, their fears and hopes. Here time is revealed as a flow of human generations, and progress is measured by means of examining the struggles of different generations to overcome the oppressive social relations of capitalism. The text repeats on many pages the argument that the world was going to be led by a new generation whose collective desire was for a more peaceful and just world. The photographic spread used to introduce the chapters on the Soviet Union shows a young man gazing happily across the page at a factory; the Africa page shows a young man above the caption "Africa breaks its chains," gazing at a scene of deserts and

palm trees, while the American image shows a grizzled proletarian looking across at an aerial photograph of a clogged highway cloverleaf.

If one of the tasks of Soviet journalists was to develop styles of writing that expressed and made meaningful both the density of a single moment and the rushing motion of the present away from a difficult past toward a better future, then another task was the careful plotting of different countries' relationships to this global process. *Den' mira* also sets for itself a very concrete and practical, if enormously ambitious, project: to use journalism to capture the essential social processes underway in the ninety-two countries in the world.[24] This involves, above all, showing how a given country has experienced or is experiencing the struggle for peace and justice. The first chapters describe what life looks like under socialism. It presents chapters about the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Europe, and then turns to Mongolia, Vietnam, China, and Korea. *Den' mira*'s editors group the remaining countries by continent, beginning with Western Europe and North America, where the struggle between capital and labor holds sway; then they examine the developing states of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The developing countries are not easily or instantly classified as socialist or capitalist; some countries are shown to be forward looking, perhaps with anti-colonial, pro-independence, revolutionary, or socialist movements in the process of overthrowing colonial regimes, while others are shown to be still oppressed by reactionary elites. A comparison of the chapters reporting on socialist countries with the chapters representing capitalist countries reveals not only the different experiences of social systems but also the different journalistic strategies appropriate to their representation.

The state of the progressive societies of the East is represented by a compilation of textual and photographic items that "report" the events that constitute everyday life under socialism. In the chapter on the USSR, many of the news items documenting and modeling socialism are reprinted from local newspapers, news that chronicles the affairs of institutes and factories, construction trusts and kolkhoz brigades. The items assemble an image of cultural and technological sophistication: representative items report that a ballet performance in Tallinn celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the liberation of the city from the Germans, and that a new generator was tested in Tiumen' that was going to become a part of the Urals Energy Ring.

Rubrics like "In the mirror of the newspaper" suggest that socialist journalists seek to reflect back to readers the events that constituted the socialist project. *Den' mira*'s editors explain this rubric with a short text that itself bears a dateline:

> SVERDLOVSK, 28 September. (By telephone from our own *Izvestiia* correspondent.) The newspapers *Uralskii rabochii, Na smeny, Tagil'skii rabochii, Krasnii boetz,*


страна
советов
Наша великая держава — в преддверии коммунизма. Вдохновленные путеводными предначертаниями своего вождя — Коммунистической партии, советские люди трудятся и познают, мечтают и творят одной большой, нераздельной семьей, созидающей прекрасное будущее.


африка
рвет оковы
Знойный континент, откуда капиталистические страны веками черпали даровые богатства и рабочую силу, сегодня говорит: «Довольно! Мы хотим быть хозяевами собственном доме!». Впереди — борьба, впереди — трудности строительства новой жизни. Но к старому возврата быть не може

From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World), introductory pages of the section on North America. The text reads "North America." Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

Serovskii rabochii, and others published a variety of information about the events of September 27, 1960. Here are a few items.

What follows are, among other things, a notice of the meeting of mathematicians in Sverdlovsk and news of the acquisition by the Sverdlovsk Mining Institute of a collection of rare stones for its geological museum.

In fact, every one of the 175 pages dedicated to the "Great Socialist Commonwealth" is full of events like the reprint from *Kazakhstanskaia pravda* (Kazakhstan Truth) about the joyful return to Bulgaria of a trainload of Bulgarian youth who had traveled to Kazakhstan to help in the building of a new industrial town; the announcement in *Literatura i zhizn'* (Literature and Life) that another oil deposit had been found near Tiumen';

(*opposite, top*) From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World), introductory pages of the book's section on the Soviet Union. The text reads "Land of the Soviets." Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

(*opposite, bottom*) From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World), introductory pages of the section on Africa. The text reads "Africa breaks its chains." Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

and the note in *Zaria urala* (Dawn of the Urals) that the residents of the village of Chernoi had decided to change the village's name to Trudovoi. The *Orskii rabochii* (Orskii Worker) wrote that eighteen young people received their passports at a solemn ceremony that was then followed by a party where the table was set for 200 people; the paper *Zvezda* (Star) from Perm' reported on the 28th of September that the assembly shop of the Dzherzinskii factory published the eighth issue of its manuscript journal *Iunost';* and *Soviet litva* (Soviet Lithuania), also on the 28th, conveyed to readers that a new institute was open in Vilnius, called the Public Institute for Technical Creativity. In addition to these news notes cut from Soviet newspapers appear many dozens of articles written either by *Izvestiia*'s own correspondents or by the correspondents of other papers who sent their material directly to *Den' mira*'s editorial offices.

The task of journalists reporting on socialism was not just to assemble facts; it was also to enable readers to hear the voice of socialist persons. Newspapers were the stages where the vast talent show of Soviet life was performed. The section of *Den' mira* about the Soviet Union also contains dozens of letters sent in by readers, some of which were sent directly to the *Izvestiia* offices, others of which were sent to local newspaper offices that then forwarded them to Moscow. The Soviet chapter begins with a two-page spread that shows small thumbnail portraits of people representing the cultural and ethnic diversity of the Soviet population laid out beside photos of the letters that people sent in to the editorial offices in describing what they were doing on September 27, 1960. Between these two columns of images are excerpts of the contents of these letters. Vladimir Stel'mashenko, who identifies himself as an engineer in a boat repair shop from the town of Benderi, reported that "I have had a great event in my life: today, September 27, they took me as a candidate member of our glorious communist party. I am immeasurably happy and proud." And B. Ignatovskaia wrote from "ward 772" that "Today is my thirtieth wedding anniversary. This jubilee was spent with my dear friends from Saratov—my husband, two daughters and a son—in a ward of the Moscow institute for chest surgery. And imagine, everyone was in a magical mood. The operation on me, a forty-eight-year-old woman, was done beautifully by G. I. Tsukerman. The doctors said that I would soon return to my native city, completely healthy, having forgotten about the painful disease that burdened my life for sixteen years."

The newspaper texts and photographs published in *Den' mira* together evoke journalism's role in the highly self-conscious project of constructing a socialist polity. Part of the consciousness of socialist subjects, though, involves learning how to participate in the overall project of representation organized by journalists. This quality of trying on a new voice is visible (or



НАС 215 МИЛЛИОНОВ

БУДТО ИЛЬИЧ РЯДОМ

НАШИ ПОДВИГИ — ВПЕРЕДИ

ИЗ ПАЛАТЫ 772

ДОБРЫЙ, МИРНЫЙ ДЕНЬ

ВОТ И ОБЫЧНЫЙ БУДНИЧНЫЙ ДЕНЬ 27 СЕНТЯБРЯ 1960 ГОДА. ЗАПЕЧАТЛЕННЫЙ В ЭТОЙ КНИГЕ, БЫЛ ПОЛОН ДЛЯ КАЖДОГО ИЗ НАС В ОТДЕЛЬНОСТИ И ДЛЯ ВСЕХ ВМЕСТЕ МНОГИХ ПРОСТЫХ, ПОРОЮ НЕЗАМЕТНЫХ ДЛЯ СВЕРШЕНИЙ, ЗАБОТ. НО ВЕДЬ ИМЕННО ИЗ ТАКИХ ДЕЛ И ЗАБОТ МИЛЛИОНОВ ТРУЖЕНИКОВ СКЛАДЫВАЮТСЯ СТРАНИЦЫ ИСТОРИИ.

ЕСЛИ БЫ НЕ ВОЙНА...

ВСЕ ПОДДЕРЖАЛИ НАС

ЗДЕСЬ БЫЛА ПУСТЫНЯ

ГДЕ ТРУДНО, ТАМ ИНТЕРЕСНО

СЫН!

В ЧЕСТЬ ВНУКА

КАРТУ, КАК ПОЭМУ, Я ЧИТАЮ

«ПОЕЗЖАЙ ПРЯМО!»

ЭТО НАДО ЦЕНИТЬ

СЧАСТЛИВ И ГОРД

ВЫШЕ И ВЫШЕ!

СЕМЬ ЧАСОВ

From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These two pages portray three kinds of information: images of some of the Soviet citizens who wrote to *Izvestiia* about what they were doing on September 27, 1960; photographs of some of the letters the editors received, and the texts of these letters. Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

audible?) in the following letter by A. Voskresenskii from Omsk, a letter that closes with the words "from a clean heart."

Dear Comrades!

I was very excited when I learned that a second edition of *Den' mira* was going to be published. Truly enormous changes have taken place in the world, and much of it has taken place in our country. I well remember my native Omsk during the Great Patriotic War. Those weren't easy times. Lines for bread. Pitted and muddy roads, at other times dusty from the heat. A potato for lunch, and a tiny piece of sugar for the tea.

But everything's changed. In front of my eyes high-rise buildings are taking shape, factories, parks, and asphalt streets and roads. Our city has become a city of gas workers and a highly developed chemical industry. I can't include in such a short letter everything that is happening in Omsk.

After finishing the technical high school in 1957, I've been working in a gas

factory. I like the work very much. In the course of these three years, the factory has improved a great deal. The shop has laid out garden plots and green areas. How pleasant it is to smell the flowers at night after your shift!

I can write many good things about my family, my little daughter, my wife. We live very harmoniously. I can't take my eyes off my little daughter. Now she's a year old, but what will she be like in another twenty-five years? Perhaps she will write to you for the next volume of *Den' Mira.* My wife and I are trying to raise our child as an honest and hard-working person.

I will also write about our difficulties. As of right now we live in an old house. We pay a sizable sum for it, because the old lady [*babka*] takes care of our child when we're at work. Don't get me wrong, I'm not asking for help. Not at all. I know that soon these difficulties will be behind us. I only mention it because you asked us to write about everything. You see, this is the first time in my life I've written to a newspaper. (70)

The totality of these notes, articles, and letters conveys the sense that in the Soviet Union—and by extension, in all socialist countries—every member of the society is engaged in the orderly progress of creating an ever more productive, ever more cultured collectivity. No event stands out as being intrinsically more important than any other; the fact that on the 27th of September, 301 persons visited the Beloevskii Public Library was as important and exemplary as the fact that the hundredth excavator was manufactured that day at the Kentauskii Excavator Factory. These newspapers items are in the most basic sense simply lists of persons and actions that constitute the evidence of socialism's realization. These hundreds of small texts supply the small but vital themes in the enormous "symphony of life" and compose the knowledge that Soviet citizens must carry around with them. And yet all this textual material is only one section of the orchestra; its aesthetic experience would not be what it was without the major motifs supplied by photographs. Indeed, the hundreds of photographs depicting socialist countries offer a double dose of significance, first in giving the list visual form and second in requiring the editors to supply captions that succinctly name the circumstances of everyday life under socialism.

Photos of places often depict sites of socialist progress like electric plants, railroad yards, steel mills, and oil refineries, while others are more aesthetically composed depictions of landscapes, like the photo of Riga at dawn on September 27, 1960, with the spires of several old churches silhouetted against the sky; of a garden in Yalta; of Moscow avenues as seen from the air; of the Charles Bridge in Prague, and of a sunset over an electrical generating station. The majority of photos, however, are of persons. In the socialist chapters of *Den' mira* astronomers look through telescopes, high school students study maps, musicians practice instruments, workers build

bridges, welders weld, actors act, peasants pick fruit, fishermen fish, technicians service airplanes, engineers construct machines, dancers dance, peasants harvest rice, athletes practice swimming, people read books, prize-winning painters paint pictures, and college students take measurements. These activities in aggregate constitute the everyday. But more than simply depicting an activity, these photos are a kind of portrait, a portrait being that genre of representation that aims not merely at the identification of an individual's singularity but also at the singularity of his or her relation to the world. A few are indeed formal portraits, that is, head shots of smiling young people expressing their joy at being alive and being a full member of a socialist country. Other formal portraits evoke classic propaganda shots of the 1930s; the two-page spread that introduces the section entitled "About time and about ourselves" at first sight reminds one of images common to the visual repertoire of classical fascism. The couple on the left seem to be in the familiar pose of gazing off into the future, and the crowd on the right, with upraised arms, evokes the masses' adoration of the Leader, and yet it is clear that these young people are neither gazing out at a racially pure and cleansed world nor saluting the Führer. Instead the photos depict persons who seem to be experiencing everyday forms of pleasure and who are engaged in playful games rather than totalitarian ritual.

The vast majority of portraits, however, are not formal but depict people at work, where they are displaying their relationship to a field of knowledge. In these photographs, persons are always clearly identified as either students/apprentices or teachers/masters, and individuals pursue or perform knowledge in fields as diverse as ballet and metallurgy, aviation and masonry. In this sense, the rhetorics of portraiture depict all knowledges as commensurate; these pictures reveal the socialist person's commitment to the pursuit of knowledge, as well as a focused attitude of engagement and responsibility, of practiced skill and natural pride. A number of creative giants are shown as well, like airplane designer Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev and sculptor Sergei Timofeevich Konenkov, for the point is that these images are supposed to reveal how *every* Soviet citizen is defined by his or her engagement with work. And every portrait depicts models of persons as cultured subjects, comfortable with whatever station in life he or she happened to occupy, arguing that the Soviet person possesses a coherence deeper than any provided by the accident of birth.

Another class of photographs of socialist countries in *Den' mira* do not fit immediately into an obvious interpretive frame and only become grounded in the interests of the editors when one reads their captions. These images and their captions are another site where the truth of everyday life under socialism is revealed. Captions are sometimes a form of poetic commentary in *Den' mira:* for example, a photo of a boy standing in



НАСТОЯЩИЕ ДРУЗЬЯ

РУБЕЖИ ТРЕТЬЕГО ГОДА СЕМИЛЕТКИ

ХОРОШЕЕ НАСТРОЕНИЕ

У ПОДНОЖИЯ ТЕМИР-ТАУ

ПО СЛЕДАМ СЛЕТНОЙ ПЕСНИ

РЕСПУБЛИКА САМОЙ ВЫСОКОЙ РОЖДАЕМОСТИ

о времени и о себе

Друг читатель! Ты только что совершил путешествие по странам и континентам вновь пережил волнения одного дня. И страницах книги ты встречался с людьм разных возрастов. Теперь тебя ждет зн комство с двадцатипятилетиями — рове никами горьковской книги «День мира

front of a Prague bookstore is accompanied by the following caption: "He could spend hours standing in front of the window, devouring with his eyes the alluring titles. But you know, in front of him stands a long life, and perhaps victories and discoveries, about which people will write books." This is a statement projecting socialism far into the future; in a book documenting socialism the reader is shown a boy dreaming about a future that will someday be celebrated in yet more books about socialism.

Journalists make possible the supply of a knowledge of socialism's achievements and its tasks to Soviet citizens. Citizens would know their society as the scene of progress and advance, improvement and enlightenment, and they would understand that the meaning of their own lives emerged from being embedded in a common project of millions of people, a project that expressed itself daily through the work of journalists. In the world of socialism, reality is not contested in any way, and state power is not visible. In fact, in all the chapters about socialism, there are just a handful of pictures or articles that can be said to represent the "state," since, as one section reads, "The state—that's us!" And to illustrate this claim, the page shows a photograph of a serious and sympathetic looking man, who gazes thoughtfully at a young man who his hunched over, looking at his hands, in a penitent posture. The caption below the photo reads: "'So why are you so quiet, my son?' This photograph captures the scene in one of the offices of Saratov's volunteer units for the keeping of public order." Here is the policing that takes place in the Soviet Union: a fatherly man coaxing the truth and thus self-knowledge out of a young person, who is obviously ashamed of having acted in an unsocialist manner. It is as if this were Demidov, in the midst of reflection on how his moment of weakness reflected badly on the socialist way of life.

The chapters about the capitalist West, by contrast, depict societies shot through with governmental, military, and police powers required by the overarching conflict between labor and capital. The pages depicting the United States begin with a series of images and articles addressing Khrushchev's visit to the UN General Assembly in New York but then move on to report on the event that has most recently attracted Americans' attention, the Kennedy-Nixon debates. American politics is represented in

(*opposite, top*) From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These pages are from the book's chapter on Kazakhstan. Portraits of Soviet persons frame an image of a column of trucks moving the harvest. Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

(*opposite, bottom*) From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These introductory pages introduce the section of biographical sketches of those people who, like *Den' mira,* turned twenty-five years old on September 27, 1960. The text reads "About time and about ourselves." Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.



ГОСУДАРСТВО—ЭТО МЫ!

У НАС НЕТ МИЛИЦИИ

ПЕРЕД ТОВАРИЩЕСКИМ СУДОМ

ОНИ НЕ ЧИСЛЯТСЯ В ШТАТАХ

ПОСЛЕ ГУДКА

From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These pages are from the chapter on the Soviet Union. The text on the left facing page reads "The state—that's us!" Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

humorous images; Nixon and Kennedy are shown in side-by-side photographs with their mouths open in mid-sentence, and at the bottom of the page Nelson Rockefeller and Henry Cabot Lodge stuff hot dogs into their mouths at a local snack bar. The public, however, is shown in the form of glum, bored, and suspicious voters listening to speeches. The book then reminds the reader that what is behind all this is the power of capitalists, indexed by a photo of the board of directors of the DuPont Corporation as well as the power of the American military, evoked by photos of a Polaris missile, a military jet, and stacks of used tanks in one of the military's junk yards. The consequences of this system of exploitation for the average person are suggested with a range of articles and photographs: a line of policemen holding billy clubs beneath the caption "Such is the face of America"; the Pentagon; striking workers; an unemployed man on the street; a man looking through a garbage can for something to eat; lines of men standing in an unemployment office.

The role of American culture in maintaining this condition is also examined. The editors reprint a photo of comedian Phil Silvers holding a rake and surrounded by dollar bills, an image the editors explain to their readers who might not be familiar with the genre: "This is an advertisement: 'Rake in the dollars!'" (503). The immoral essence of American popular culture is revealed by an article reprinted from *Time* magazine under the headline "Sexport," which reveals how certain scenes in some American films are shot twice, with the scenes for export showing more prurient content than the ones for domestic consumption.

But as if acknowledging the Soviet Union's love-hate relationship with America, several pages depict aspects of American life in a more neutral, if still critical, light. Excerpts of short stories appear by sympathetic leftist writers like Erskine Caldwell and John Steinbeck. An article by humorist Art Buchwald is reprinted, and reports appear about art contests for young people and a recent concert by the Philadelphia Orchestra. Together these testify to moments in American life not directly dominated by the oppressive regime of capitalism. Striking examples of American modern architecture are shown, including one photograph of a futuristic building at the top of which is a sign, "Capitol Records," which an *Izvestiia* editor translated a bit too literally from English into Russian as "Washington. The building of the congressional archives." Images of late-model automobiles evoke then current American concepts of style and design, and continuing the theme that not all Americans are completely ignorant that their country is in trouble, the editors reprint an article from the October 1960 edition of *Fortune* magazine that argues that Americans are falling behind the Russians in the publication of technical and scientific magazines and journals. Another article evokes how in America science is not only under threat from bureaucracy but also from culture: reprinted from *Harper's,* it describes a meeting of Californians who are devout believers in the existence of UFOs and of interplanetary visitors to the earth.

Lest the reader become too infatuated with these bizarre and seductive aspects of America, the chapter concludes with a series of pages reasserting that beneath it all lies an oppressive and unjust system: "The industrialization, electrification, and chemicalization, of daily life here, is not only and not so much steps on the road to culture, as much as a means to profits. But the chase after profits is making civilization dangerous" (518). This point is illustrated with photos showing highways snaking through a city, smog in Los Angeles, and a chart showing the rising cost of health care. An article from the *Saturday Evening Post* is used to depict life in inner-city Chicago; photos and news from *Life* magazine, the *San Francisco Chronicle,* the *Cleveland Plain Dealer,* the *New York Post,* and *Newsweek,* assemble an image of rampant criminality, from organized crime to bank robberies and

КТО ЧАЩЕ ВЫПАЛ ПОТ...

ЧИКАГО. Вице-президент Никсон и сенатор Джон Ф. Кеннеди выступили впервые здесь в первой за историю страны телевизионной дискуссии между кандидатами в президенты. Дискуссия продолжалась один час.

Они беззлобно спорили о том, какой кандидат и какая партия предлагают стране лучшие средства для ускорения развития Соединенных Штатов в эпоху обострения международных противоречий...

Дискуссия отличалась живостью и предельной искренностью: не участникам заботились больше о впечатлениях, какое они производят на огромную телевизионную аудиторию, чем о победе в споре. Сенатор Кеннеди, не прибегавший к телевизионному гриму, улыбался редко, сохраняя серьезное выражение лица, что подобает кандидату на самый высокий государственный пост в стране. Гостеприимчивый Никсон улыбался чаще. Но чаще выпрел пот, проступавший на подбородке.

НЬЮ-ЙОРК ТАЙМС, 27 сентября.

ДИСКУССИЯ О ДИСКУССИИ

Через несколько часов после первой встречи вице-президента Ричарда Никсона и сенатора Джона Кеннеди, передавшейся по телевидению, разгорелась жаркая дискуссия о том, кто из них «великий дискуссионер».

Данные по этому неофициальному «рейтинговому опросу» показывают, что первый раунд закончился вничью...

ВАШИНГТОН ПОСТ
ЭНД ТАЙМС ГЕРАЛЬД,
28 сентября.

НЕ ОБСУЖДЕНО ГЛАВНОЕ

А что они сказали? Публика ожидала второго спора между двумя людьми, которые считаются выдающимися политическими, вполне пользуются их доводы...

Почему не проведено полное обсуждение? Почему не обсуждалось главное: состояние нашей валюты, бремя налогов, ослабление американской концепции, надежд и устремлений?

НЬЮ-ЙОРК ИНКВАЙЕР,
27 сентября.

РУССКИЕ НЕ БОЯТСЯ УГРОЗ

— Вице-президент сказал Аверелл Гарриману,— американцы имели возможность увидеть Никсона на первом своем телевизионном. Мне кажется, этого вполне достаточно.

— Попытки выдать Ричарда Никсона за опытного человека — один из самых нелепых обманов американской прессы.

— Те, кто думают, что русские боятся угроз «либо-либо», либо обманываются, пытаются сбередить американцев.

НЬЮ-ЙОРК ГЕРАЛЬД ТРИБЮН,
27 сентября.

ВАЖНО СЕСТЬ ЗА СТОЛ

САН-ФРАНЦИСКО. Эдгар Сноу считает, что противоречия между капитализмом и коммунизмом можно разрешить путем переговоров. Сноу, известный своими симпатиями к Советскому Союзу, сказал, что, по его мнению, Никсон — «более опытный человек, чем Кеннеди». Сноу считает, что Никсон «более опытный человек, чем Кеннеди», потому что он «больше времени провел за столом переговоров».

САН-ФРАНЦИСКО ЭКЗАМИНЕР,
27 сентября.

«КОЛОССАЛЬНАЯ ПРОБЛЕМА»

Перед сенатором Д. Макмилланом, председателем сенатского комитета по делам Вашингтона, встала колоссальная проблема. Сенатор Макмиллан должен решить, кого ему пригласить на обед — Никсона или Кеннеди. Господин Макмиллан сообщил своим гостям, что сенатор Кеннеди и сенатор Никсон будут приглашены на обед в три разных дня. Сенатор Макмиллан подчеркнул, что он не намерен чем-либо рисковать.

Чтобы не подвергнуться гневу сенатора в минувшую среду мистер Макмиллан заставил его пять раз менять чек с мясом. Во время мясного пира сенатору говорили, что он должен отдать предпочтение одной, говорить своим этого мнения может нагрянуть, чтобы дать ему возможность выразить свои симпатии другому кандидату.

ЮНАЙТЕД СТЕЙТС ПЬЮС ЭНД УОРЛД РИПОРТ,
28 сентября.

Советский плакат: Никсон—Никсон.

Фото из журнала
ЮНАЙТЕД СТЕЙТС ПЬЮС
ЭНД УОРЛД РИПОРТ.

Либеральная пресса не могла не вспомнить в эти дни и о некоторых темных «традициях» американской политической жизни.

О них рассказал, например, один из парламентариев, на нашедший в себе мужества подняться своим именем.

ВЫБОРЫ БЫЛИ КУПЛЕНЫ

Член законодательного собрания штата Кентукки

В прошлом году меня избрали в законодательное собрание штата Кентукки. Это произошло после того, как в одном многих избирателей допросили и весьма, которых они требовали в обмен за свои голоса. Многие из тех, кто заседает сейчас вместе со мной в законодательном собрании, избраны таким же образом.

Я думаю, что ужасающую практику, о которой я собираюсь рассказать, можно обнаружить в местных выборах и с многочисленными усовершенствованиями, во всех штатах и в большинстве избирательных округов.

Подкуп избирателей под видом оплаты их предвыборной работы — дело обычное. Если кандидат или его политические покровители не выделят определенную сумму, они рискуют потерять голос. В моем избирательном участке, где находят нанимают до полусотни «платных работников» — как правило, женщин, инвалидов, безработных. Иногда один и тот же человек выполняет с помощью шантажа деньги из двух или трех кандидатов, добиваясь одного и того же места...

Во время предвыборной кампании телефонные звонки в мои кабинете раздавались почти непрерывно. Звонили из всех уголков избирательного округа. Чаще всего раздавались звонки один из другой, как две капли воды. Одна избирательница предлочла бы голосовать за меня, но у нее только что побывал мой противник, предложивший десять долларов за работу на него. Если я не приму ей такую же сумму сегодня же, она примет его предложение. Другой уже обещала двадцать долларов за агитацию в пользу демократов, но две ее дочери заартачились и угрожают голосовать против меня, если не получат по десять долларов. Третья получила от моего противника двадцать долларов и агитационные листовки и согласилась работать на него. «Дайте мне столько же, и я выброшу листовки и начну работать на вас»,— сказала она.

Пришла потребовать своей толики и школьница из старшего класса (в штате Кентукки избирательное право предоставляется с восемнадцати лет). Она сказала, что материальное положение и «умирает от желания» работать на меня за небольшое вознаграждение в десять долларов. Когда меня меня деликатно объяснила, что я уже истратил все свои наличные деньги, школьница ушла, предварительно осведомившись, где можно разыскать другого кандидата — моего соперника.

СКОЛЬКО СТОИТ ПРИВЕРЖЕННОСТЬ

Наконец мне удалось отделаться от назойливых, и я отправился на последнее в день финального голосования. Присутствовали руководители избирательной комиссии от демократической партии, кандидаты, представители властей штата и множество влиятельных, богатых политиков.

Деньги, распределенные по купюрам, были разложены на столе в центре комнаты. Значительную часть составляли десяти- и двадцатидолларовые бумажки, предназначенные для «работяги, «толкачей», «лидеров». Виднелась кучки мелочных, хрустящих однодолларовых купюр.

Председатель участкового комитета демократической партии сообщил, что старушка Бетти зарегистрилась: «В ее семье,— сказал он,— сорок семь избирателей — дети, внуки, их жены и мужья. Она может вам как минимум. Когда я пообещал ей сколько-то долларов, если она будет работать на нас, она расплакалась в ответ. Сто пятьдесят долларов, сказала старушка, или вся ее семья проголосует за республиканцев».

Все согласились, что старушка Бетти — угроза, как чирь, и выделяет свою угрозу, если не требование не будет принято немедленно. С глубокой скорбью для нее были отложены сто пятьдесят новеньких, хрустящих долларов...

В другом избирательном участке, где ожидался очень небольшой перевес голосов, необходимо было убеждаться глину большого семейного клана. Приложив некоторые усилия, он мог бы привести на избирательный участок сем ведущих избирателей. Решили посетить старика на следующий день и намекнуть, что, если демократы придут к власти, ему вручат двадцать долларов, а одна из его снох — тяжело больной инвалид — будет получать денежное пособие от властей штата.



ЦЕНТРАЛЬНУЮ ПРОБЛЕМУ РАССМОТРЕТЬ ЗАНОВО!

В январе этого года стрелка часов на обложке журнала «Бюллетень ученых сейентистов» впервые была отодвинута назад в знак появления новых «выдающихся элементов в международной обстановке».

События последних месяцев — в Женеве, Париже, Нью-Йорке, на Кубе и Конго, над Уральскими горами и над Баренцевым морем — оправдали те ожидания.

Было ли грубым оптимизмом сказать в январе, что в игру вступили «новые сдерживающие силы — силы, определяющие судьбу человечества и ограничивающие будущие виды угрожающим»?

Мы не думаем, что это было грубым оптимизмом...

Центральную проблему нашей внешней политики — конфликт между США и Советской Россией — следует рассмотреть заново в свете доктрины атомного века. Нельзя надеяться на военное решение в этот век. Такая надежда ведет — опасной и конечной ссе, мечта, способная привести к убийству и самоубийству. Неизменность решающей пробы сил создала тупик. Выход вот могут найти, только установив и четко видение пункты, в которых заинтересованы обе соперничающие стороны. И, прежде всего, стабилизирующий положение, достаточно умеющая острую конфликта в районах, где сталкиваются интересы обеих сторон.

Мы должны верить себе способность разбираться в событиях, а не считать зло все, что происходит в коммунистическом мире.

БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ ОФ АТОМИК САЙЕНТИСТ, ноябрь.

А те, кто привел страну к рубежу бесславия! Покровы глубокой тайны скрыли их деятельность от глаз и ушей американцев. Но бывает — ветры политической борьбы приоткрывают завесу. И тайное становится явным.

ОНИ «СОВЕТУЮТ» ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВУ

Дважды в год собираются на фешенебельном курорте для конфиденциальных совещаний с высшими представителями правительства члены одного из наиболее влиятельных кругов Соединенных Штатов — «Консультативного совета предпринимателей» при министерстве торговли.

Очень немногое известно об этом совете. Однако не подлежит сомнению, что правительство не принимает политических решений без его участия.

В совет входят не просто крупные бизнесмены, а виднейшие воротилы американской промышленности, торговли и финансов. В нем состоят:

Кеттеринг Гринуолт (президент концерна Дженерал Дайнемикс),
Ральф Кординер (президент «Дженерал электрик»),
Родмэр Блэр (<Юнайтед Стейтс стил»),
Юджин Холмен («Стандард ойл оф Нью-Джерси»),
Генри Форд II.

«Консультативный совет предпринимателей» регулярно встречается с членами правительства.

Последняя такая встреча происходила с 11 по 14 мая 1960 года в резиденции президента «Хомстеда» в Хот-Спрингс (штат Вирджиния).

Детали заседания на этих встречах происходят по утрам. Вечера отведены неофициальным беседам, гольфу, верховой езде. В перерывах между обедами, состоявшими преимущественно из блюд местной кухни, имелись возможности для неофициальных бесед.

Закрытость промышленников и высоких представителей правительства проявляется во тем встречах глубокомысленные речи. Так, например, в Хот-Спрингс вице-президент Никсон в своем неофициальном, доверительном выступлении на обеде весьма откровенно говорил об опасности с самолетов У-2 еще до того, как произошел инцидент в Париже на совещании глав правительств.

На совете совета в «Хомстеде» присутствовало больше членов правительства, чем на заседаниях в столице.

Никто, кроме членов клуба и его гостей, не знает в точности, что именно происходит на подобных сборищах. Но ясно, разумеется, не допускает корреспондентов; нет в стенограмм заседаний. Протоколы, которые ведет секретарь совета, поступающий двадцать пять тысяч долларов в год, хранятся в специальном помещении здания министерства торговли в Вашингтоне.

КАРПЕРС МОНТЛИ, сентябрь.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Стрелка — вперед!

«Дважды построенный под ракету и ядерное оружие третьей мировой войны».
ЛОС-АНДЖЕЛЕС ТАЙМС.

Вашингтон. Здание Пентагона — министерства обороны США.

НЕКОРОНОВАННЫЕ КОРОЛИ

Из каретного завода «Дженерал моторс» на войны много миллионов долларов — конституирует американский экономист В. Перло.

«Деттон дю Пон» — главный трест этой династии — стал крупнейшей химической фирмой Америки после первой мировой войны. После второй — он превратился в крупнейшее военное предприятие капиталистического мира.

Деттонам принадлежит контрольный пакет (акциями при прошлого) акций концерна машиностроительного транспорта «Дженерал моторс». Концерн выпускает на 12,4 миллиарда долларов продукции (в том числе более пяти миллионов автомобилей) в год. На 157 заводах «Дженерал моторс» работает более 624 тысяч рабочих. Каждый из них дает 4165 долларов прибыли в год.

За время второй мировой войны «Дженерал моторс» получил военных заказов на 14,4 миллиарда долларов. За годы корейской войны «Дженерал моторс» сдал военных заказов Пентагону на 5,2 миллиарда долларов.

По заказу правительства «Деттон дю Пон» выплатил подряд (один миллиард долларов) на постройку завода по производству водородных бомб на реке Саванна на площади в сто тысяч гектаров.

Когда жителям города Аллентауна объявили, что на город будет сделан, чтобы дать место водородной бомбе, они выехали на дорогу плакат: «Пусть-ка теперь, почему наш городок должны быть уничтожен для того, чтобы создать бомбу, которая может уничтожить город других людей, любящих все так же, как мы любим наш».

Американцы говорят:

— Никогда еще не было у нас в мирное время столько атомных бомб и так много генеральских лбов» — генералов и адмиралов.

— Никогда еще не забирали «медные лбы» такую силу в делах государства.

ПЕНТАГОН

Мрачное, грязно-серое громадное здание министерства обороны Соединенных Штатов расположилось на берегу Потомака рядом с Национальным кладбищем в Арлингтоне. Оно напоминает гигантского спрута, выползшего из мутных вод реки. Пентагон (по-английски — пятиугольник) — возвышение темных, зловещих сил американской военщины, разрабатывающей в тиши министерских кабинетов планы новой мировой войны.

Внутри Пентагона, построенного по последнему слову техники, царит атмосфера мрачного, забронированного средневекового замка. Все здесь давит, гнетет. Бесконечно длинны тюремного типа коридоры, узкие и однообразны ряды дверей, ведущих в кабинеты. Сюда не проникает солнечный свет, а искусственное освещение кажется тусклым.

Как на стройке, в Пентагоне не видно людей, хотя персонал министерства обороны составляет несколько тысяч человек.

murders; and the racist nature of American culture is presented through images of a black man being thrown out of a whites-only restaurant and several articles and notes from the *Worker* analyzing and denouncing racism. The chapter concludes with four pages that ground the situation in the United States squarely in the conflict between workers and capitalists; photographs of men engaged in industrial work appear beside the statement "America was created by the hands of these strong, courageous, hard-working people, and yet their names remain in obscurity" (528). The reader is left in an America consumed by what Soviet society had left behind forty-three years earlier, the struggle between capital and labor.

Den' mira's chapters about Western European countries echo many of these themes of deception, decadence, and violence, beginning with a two-page spread bearing the title "In Old Europe" that depicts an elder statesman deep in thought, as if contemplating the sad state of the society indexed by a generic European cityscape that appears on the facing page. The European section concludes with a two-page spread beneath the headline "The Everyday Life of Unemployed Monarchs," which tries to explain to Soviet readers why such a sizable portion of Western publics are still so interested in the sordid private lives of their old and useless kings and queens. The chapter on France contains images that evoke both class domination and militarism. The issue of peace and war appears in a photo of Wehrmacht troops marching down the Champs Elysée with the Arc de Triomphe in the distance. The impoverishment of the French masses is shown by a photograph of a man walking down a street in Paris wearing a sandwich board advertisement. The photo's caption reads "In the Le Biella restaurant there are 150 dishes to choose from. But this human being–advertisement must walk many kilometers along the sidewalks of Paris in order to earn enough money to feed his family the most modest of meals." Many of the articles and images refer implicitly to the threat of war, to the costs of capitalism, like crime and unemployment; photos depict unemployed old men and such various agents of the state as policemen, constables, and soldiers.

One of the conclusions to be drawn from the work of comparison

(*opposite, top*) From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These pages are from the chapter on the United States and contain reprinted reports and commentary about the Nixon-Kennedy presidential contest of 1960. Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

(*opposite, bottom*) From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These pages are from the chapter on the United States. The photographs show the cover of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* with its famous clock counting down the seconds to nuclear war, the board of directors of the DuPont Corporation, the Pentagon, and a cartoon from the *Los Angeles Times* that depicts a V-formation of ducks, with one duck saying to the other, "Let's make the shape of a rocket and start World War III." Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

From *Den' mira* (A Day in the World). These pages are from the chapter on France. The text on the left reads: "In the words of de Gaulle, France occupies 'a place in the first rank of the great powers.' How to combine these words with its capitulation before the descendants of Hitler's Wehrmacht, preparing in September 1960, in a time of peace, to establish their base in France?" On the facing page is a French newspaper's report about a French nurse departing for service in the Shah's family. Izvestiia Publishing House, 1961.

embedded in the organization of *Den' mira* is clearly that capitalism produces a different kind of person than do socialist societies. In contrast to the persons of socialism, the editors instruct the reader that people who live in class-stratified societies are kept from achieving a harmonious relationship with themselves and with their society. The cultures of class societies are defined above all by alienation, a phenomenon that affects both capitalism's victims and its beneficiaries alike. Poverty and the threat of poverty drive the lower classes to despair and suicide; in the Italy chapter there is a photo of writer Cecilia Palau, who killed herself on September 27, 1960, "because of material difficulties." And the ruling class likewise is driven to self-destruction in the form of empty pleasure, like the woman who appears in the Italy chapter awkwardly biting into something; the caption beside the picture explains that "At parties in 'high society' a new

game has appeared: who can eat faster an apple hanging from a thread" (449)

The photographs that depict capitalist countries, because they are taken from Western magazines and newspapers, have a different look to them than the images showing socialist countries. There are not so many portraits and rather many candid shots, often taken with a telephoto at a great distance, shots that reveal not the person but the person-as-predicament, the person in the midst of an oppressive and endless struggle for existence. This is the message often conveyed through a caption like the following one, accompanying a photo of a man leaning against a large anchor in a Marseille shipyard: "People from Marseille are a joyful people. Evidently, this young man is feeling some sort of weight on his spirit, otherwise he wouldn't fail to smile at the camera lens" (409). The comparison is obvious: socialist persons always smile, especially when their picture is being taken.

Likewise, capitalism disrupts people's relationship to knowledge. The lesson that capitalist society is askew and inverted is conveyed by another photo in the Italy chapter that depicts a sidewalk filled with white-coated men and women, above which the captions reads: "This kind of strange strike took place on September 27. Its participants: Milan's doctors" (445). The lesson of this photo is that even the most respected and knowledgeable individuals in capitalist society are nothing more than wage laborers at the mercy of the system. If this photo stresses what seems to the editors as the irony of medical doctors on strike, another photo emphasizes even more graphically the power of capitalism to distort the person from the inside out: a jostling crowd of traders at the Milan stock market with their faces contorted, shouting and gesturing like children.

Just as an understanding of socialist societies would not be complete without hearing the voices of citizens articulating their sense of their lives and their engagement with the work of building a socialist society, so too are the editors careful to include voices of the poor in capitalist countries who articulate not joy and confidence but utter abjection. The letter below is like an inverted image of Voskresenskii's letter described above. It is from Dziro Seriguti, who is identified as a "Japanese artist."

> What should I write about? It was a typical day. I am an artist, for twenty years I've painted landscapes, portraits, still-lives. I've not achieved fame. Therefore each day begins with the dilemma, where to go, where to find work? I think that it's not only my day that starts this way. This is how ninety percent of Japanese artists, writers, and other people in the so-called free professions.
>
> Today I decided to turn to the former assistant editor of the newspaper "Mainichi," I wanted to suggest that I draw the portrait of the famous Japanese writer born in the city of Kumamoto on the island of Honshu, Sokho Tokutomi,

> because I found out that the publishing house is going to publish a second edition of his collected works.
>
> It didn't work out. But whatever, I'm used to rejections. I kept looking, as my wife and two children were waiting for me at home. And I'm the only person who can feed them.
>
> With a letter of recommendation from a friend I approached the head of the Tokyo section of the newspaper *Kumamoto Nishi-Nishi Shimbun.* Again failure.
>
> They suggested that I go to a deputy in parliament, since now there is an election campaign and the deputies are now uncommonly friendly.
>
> "Boy, I haven't seen you for such a long time . . . I thought you must have become famous. So, let's try to find you some work."
>
> With this greeting ended our meeting. The circle narrowed. There was no work.
>
> My mood collapsed. I got a new idea in my head: to draw the portrait of the leader of the influential religious sect, the Sokkogakai. I am not overjoyed about this, but I have to do something. I go. It turned out that the chairman of the sect was interested in my suggestion. But as the conversation went on, it became clear that he was only interested in me as a potential recruit.
>
> This was my typical day, as always, unsuccessful. Despair, melancholy, which I always try to master, has gripped me completely. Neither money nor future. But no, I will never give up, I have to live. I sat on the tramway. Looking around, I saw on the faces of every passenger the imprint of some kind of heavy burden. Obviously, from the side, I look just like them. (576)

Here is the lesson to be drawn from this glimpse of a life under capitalism: How can you be a person when you have to worry about where your next meal is coming from? How can you allow your talents to develop and construct a meaningful relationship with the public when you are struggling for the most basic needs?

By contrast, the entire purpose of socialism, as stated on the first page of the chapter on Czechoslovakia, is "So that a person lives happily." The rest of the heading reads:

> The following words express the most important thing in the life of Czechoslovakia, as is exactly the same as in all the other socialist countries. Complex machines leave the assembly line . . . this is for you, person [*chelovek*], so that your work will be easier. Beautiful buildings are being built . . . these are for you, person, so that you will take delight in the happiness and peace of your family. Metal is being smelted, bread baked, pictures painted, and the secrets of the atom explored . . . everything to the person, everything for the person!

Den' mira was an enormous editorial project with a very modernist aim: to sum up the situation within each of the world's nations in terms of their relationship to the global project of peace and prosperity achieved through the practice of a socialist way of life. The book is a vast almanac of

journalistic texts, translated into Russian from dozens and dozens of languages. The sources of photographs were not identified, but one assumes that many of them came from magazines produced in individual countries, and that their placement in this Soviet text involved their being cut from one discursive context and inserted into another.

The choice of journalism to do this important work of summing up national realities testifies to the conviction of Soviet journalists that their profession had tremendous power to represent the truth about the world, and that Soviet readers could experience this truth. The journalism of socialist countries simply depicted the mosaic of life that was socialism in the making; any socialist newspaper could be consulted at any moment to divine the essence of socialism. Likewise, the capitalist press depicted all the contradictions that were tearing apart capitalist societies. It printed images of policemen and plutocrats, impoverished workers and wealthy politicians. And yet the capitalist media must have another kind of power, for despite the evidence of the grinding reality of racism, poverty, etc., capitalist societies seemed to produce persons for whom such pictures simply did not matter. This was the message of *Den' mira*'s only direct meditation on the capitalist press. Not insignificantly, it appeared in the chapter on the United States.

The heading of a two-page spread with a picture of a kiosk full of newspapers next to a city street comments:

> The Press of America. Many-Sided, Many-Paged, and Many-Colored.
> Alongside the gentle fall rain drips simple everyday "wisdom" from the newspaper page. Advice to lovers, recipes for dumplings with blackberries, stock market news and instructions for moves in bridge . . .
> Impassively the press registers events, refusing to delve into the essence of appearances.
> The press discusses with endless variety, in this epoch of cybernetics and the conquest of space, the unfading theme of shrewish mothers-in-law. The press can arrange for the correct functioning of the stomach, teach how to eat asparagus, and to elegantly tie a necktie . . .
> Thus the press considers that it teaches Americans how to live. (520)

Beneath this heading are instances of what this commentary examines: an ad from the *New York Review of Books* for an encyclopedia of occultism; another ad from *Harper's* for a book about handwriting analysis; notice from the *New York Post* of Emily Post's death; an advice column from Ann Landers from the *New York Mirror;* a horoscope also from the *Mirror;* a *Newsweek* article about the canine "dynasty" Rin Tin Tin that earned its owner millions of dollars; and another reprinted article from *Newsweek* explaining that it was possible to become a religious minister simply by

paying fifty dollars to a church in Texas. The American press instructs its readers across such a vast range of activities, the great majority of which, however, are frivolous, foolish, shallow, and often demeaning. The implication is that a certain kind of person emerges from a steady diet of this press, persons unable to see clearly the relationship of their own lives to the operation of capitalism. The obvious conclusion is that Americans who need to be so constantly and thoroughly taught how to live can have the merest grasp of their own identities, not to mention the workings of their own society.

This was, of course, in sharp contrast to the Soviet press. It was not about producing isolated facts of private and public life in the service of selling more papers; it did not seek to create a bond of dependency of a weak personality on powerful capitalist institution. Soviet journalism was about creatively working and reworking the spirit of the times. In this way Soviet citizens could continue the work upon themselves that was their public duty.

Den' mira is a complex, multi-layered document. If it is indeed difficult to read in Gorky's terms, as a "symphony of life," it also refuses any attempt to classify it as *only* or *simply* a work of propaganda. It seems best described with an awkward combination of adjectives, as a poetic world-historical pedagogy, or a socialist spiritual almanac. But together with the story of Demidov, *Den' mira* evokes the degree to which the governors of the Soviet Union in the years after Stalin's death sought to reinvent themselves by reinventing their journalism. On the one hand, journalists would work on the scale of the person, crafting articles that taught what was just and unjust, and at the same time, they would operate on the scale of the world but with the same broad intent of developing readers' understandings of themselves and their society, understandings that would then feed their enthusiasm for the future.

The idea that the press could be a compelling kind of almanac was not without its risks, as it turned out. One problem was that its contents could become boring and stale, that readers would cease to be able to identify anything printed in the paper as worth learning or thinking about. Another was that depictions of the West could be read not as negative examples but as alluring glimpses into lives of ease and abundance, as the inverted image of the relative deprivation of Soviet citizens. Yet another problem was that journalists could take this encouragement to think of themselves as a kind of critical intellectual tribunal and develop a critical stance on both party and society. What was the point at which such criticism was productive, and when did it become destructive? These questions emerged quite starkly in the context of the work of Anatolii Agranovskii.

TWO

Agranovskii's Essays

A number of contradictions lay at the heart of Khrushchev's and Adzhubei's promotion of journalists' governmental identities. One was that it tied journalists' sense of purpose so closely to positive proof of the unfolding of socialism's progress around the world. By 1970, however, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the "world" did not have the coherence it had a decade earlier. The progressive spectacle of decolonization and national independence had resulted in a confusing landscape of states that were arrayed along a spectrum of ideologies and worldviews. China asserted itself as a powerful competitor with the USSR for the leadership of the world communist movement, and even socialism in Eastern Europe caused the Soviet leaders problems. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 drove home the point that the development of socialism in individual nations could take unpredictable turns.[1] It became less clear what the coherence was that journalists were to represent.

But another contradiction grew out of the dynamics of de-Stalinization. Journalists were to help make possible the overcoming of the Stalinist past by positing actors deeply engaged with the task of socialist construction, who were practicing a *non-coerced* belief in socialism. And yet, since this purpose seemed to rely on the party's support and sponsorship, what would happen to journalism when the party reined in the cultural task of de-Stalinization, when it stopped asserting that the achievement of communism would come if only Soviet citizens put a little more effort into it? The question can be put even more starkly: For journalists who had come of age under Khrushchev, who had learned to understand themselves as governors of Soviet society, how could journalism's critical sensibility exist within

a party that had no use for it? These questions became more and more pressing in the late Soviet period, as Brezhnev promoted a new form of ideological orthodoxy in the 1970s and early 1980s. Of course, not all journalists felt the weight of these questions in the same way or to the same degree, and yet it was striking that in my conversations with those journalists who had worked under Adzhubei, their resentment at the absurdity of the constraints placed on them by Brezhnev was mirrored by the admiration they expressed for one of their colleagues who embodied the renewal of the profession, Anatolii Agranovskii. His essays provide yet another optic for understanding the governmental role of journalism in the late Soviet period.

While Adzhubei can be thought of as the archetypical organizer, serving as a kind of interface between journalists and the party leaders, between a conception of the socialist project and the party's own mission, Agranovskii appeared in many conversations as Soviet journalism's most talented and important practitioner. When Vladimir Denisov, for example, began talking about how he had learned the craft of journalism, he launched into an encomium to Agranovskii that deserves full citation. He began by trying to explain how Agranovskii's style differed from other models of journalistic practice, such as investigative reporting.

> [Agranovskii] did not unmask with certain facts; he doesn't at all resemble in the nature of his work those who like to mess around in the dirt. If you look superficially, you'd say that he wrote almost exclusively about the positive. He had, as a rule, only positive heroes. But they were positive in a particular sense: they were positive because to the boss they should have been negative . . . The entire structure of his thought, it was already the stuff of literature, the means of a literary talent. The structure of his work was like that. This was the kind of journalism that existed during the era of stagnation. This was the means of transporting the truth during those days. Agranovskii taught us how to think independently and on another plane . . . He was a symbol. Among journalists he was journalist number one in all the Soviet newspapers of the 60s and 70s. No one compares with him. Everyone studied with him. There are, in fact, a couple of Agranovskiis; he belonged to an entire dynasty. There was Abram Agranovskii, his father, special correspondent of *Izvestiia* in the 20s and 30s, who was repressed in the 40s, then rehabilitated. He had two sons, both of them journalists: Anatolii and Valerii Agranovskii. But the symbol of all that was best in that journalism was Anatolii Agranovskii. You'll find his pieces not only in the newspapers, since he was a writer as well, a member of the Writer's Union, he also wrote short stories and screenplays. But he wasn't famous as a literary writer; he was an average writer, if you take writers in general, but he was a completely unique writer for the newspaper. Of course his kind of journalism is dead today, because it demands the attention of the reader, it demands space, it requires a certain kind of education . . . People reacted to the name: "Did you know Agranovskii is in the paper today . . ." Although he appeared not even once a month. He wrote

> extremely leisurely, less than once a month. He knew how to give the reader a piece of the truth. He knew how to speak in such a way that *Glavlit* couldn't find fault with it. He always acted through the subtext. He knew Aesopian language like no other. Although all readers and journalists knew it, he knew it especially well.[2]

This description echoes the problems of memory and history we have already encountered. Agranovskii, too, appears as someone who suffered from the closed and conservative attitude that afflicted Soviet society under Brezhnev. What was so important for Denisov was the fact that Agranovskii asserted his independence even as the party became more and more concerned with closely supervising and editing his work. Denisov was by no means the only journalist who praised Agranovskii's work to me; a number of journalists who had made careers in the Soviet press since the 1960s told me that Agranovskii's essays, which he wrote for *Izvestiia* across a span of twenty-five years, were for them the most important documents published in the entire Soviet press.

Agranovskii was by no means the only important and admired journalist who worked in the Soviet media, and a history of the profession would have to delve into the lives and work of dozens and dozens of writers who together supplied journalistic expertise in the Soviet Union.[3] I am more concerned, however, with making sense of journalists' judgments of Agranovskii's writing, and with investigating the question of how their enthusiasm relates to the renewal of journalism as a technology of government. The best way to respond to these questions is to look closely at a small selection of texts, and I present below extended examinations of three of his essays published in *Izvestiia* in the early 1960s. Agranovskii was read as "thinking on a different plane." Only by providing extended summaries of his essays can one gain a sense of their power and the authority they carried within the community of discourse of late Soviet journalists.

Agranovskii was born in 1922, the oldest son of Abram Agranovskii, one of the leading Soviet journalists of the 1920s and 1930s. Both his parents were arrested in the great purge of 1937; his father died in the camps in 1951 and was later rehabilitated; his mother died in 1965. Anatolii graduated from the Faculty of History of the Moscow Pedagogical Institute in 1942 and then studied in two military schools, eventually participating in the war as a navigator for the air force. After being demobilized he began work as a journalist, eventually arriving at *Izvestiia,* where he worked right up until his death in April 1984. Agranovskii was married, with two sons, and was *bezpartinii,* that is, he was never a member of the Communist Party. As to his journalistic identity, Agranovskii was in some ways like a columnist for a capitalist paper. One journalist historian made a helpful analogy between Agranovskii and Walter Lippmann: both men

produced thoughtful journalistic texts that were viewed by their colleagues as the epitome of a particular style of writing and thinking.[4] Elided in the comparison, of course, are the determining contexts of capitalism and socialism. A Western columnist is judged and paid according to a certain output; Lippmann published short columns at least several times a week for nearly fifty years, which together composed a constant flow of analysis and commentary about the very latest circumstances of national and international politics. Agranovskii's terrain, by contrast, was the Soviet economy, and he wrote long essays that appeared at most once a month during the 1960s and 1970s. But these were not dry, analytic accounts; almost all of Agranovskii's *ocherki,* or essays, can be considered in one way or another biographical sketches. They are about people, Soviet citizens, persons inhabiting a socialist society whose everyday lives shaped the experience of socialism. To this extent they are more subtle, more artfully written, more carefully researched versions of the same general genre discussed in the previous chapter, the portrait of the socialist person. Agranovskii reported on the subjectivities of exemplary persons, as well as on his own.

Strovskii summarizes Agranovskii's significance by stressing the particular quality of his heroes:

> Agranovskii's hero, more often than not, fights against obstacles pressing down on him from above. . . . However the main thing for the publicist is to value the strength of spirit of his contemporary, a task that frequently forces him to go "against the current" in order to discern his subject's true personality. In this, undoubtedly, was Agranovskii's innovation as an essayist. In his essays there are no heroes from earlier times [. . .] Agranovskii strived to show the person who was weighed down by real, earthly burdens and joys, and who because of this appeared attractive to readers.[5]

Like Adzhubei, who returned to the Soviet press in the late 1980s, Agranovskii made something of a posthumous comeback during perestroika. In 1986, the *Izvestiia* publishing house published a volume entitled *Agranovskii's Lessons,* and in 1988, Sovetskaia pisatel' published *Recollections of Anatolii Agranovskii.*[6] Both books combine personal remembrance with sympathetic accounts of his journalistic work. In the latter he appears in a number of photographs, showing him in his apartment, on various *kommandirovki,* or research trips, and standing with some of the subjects who appeared in important stories. Equally interesting is the fact that Agranovskii made a number of appearances in the post-Soviet public sphere. Agranovskii's brother, Valerii, published a book in 1994 entitled *Poslednii dolg* (Final Duty, in Remembrances, Eyewitnesses, Letters with Commentary, Documents, and Photographs, 1937–1953), which is subtitled as "The Life and Fate of the Journalistic Dynasty of the Agranovskiis, from Prologue to Epilogue."[7] Anatolii's name also appeared sporadically in newspa-

pers, as editors sought to satisfy the desire among readers for articles about Soviet times with everything from exposés of the private lives of the Soviet intelligentsia to sensationalistic accounts of the inner workings of notorious Soviet institutions. Journalists took an interest in Agranovskii's immediate family; for example, his wife, Galina Fedorovna, gave two interviews in the mid-1990s to prominent Moscow papers, *Vecherniaia Moskva* (Evening Moscow) and *Obshchaia gazeta* (Common Newspaper), and in 1998 Agranovskii's son, Aleksei, a microbiologist and rock musician, appeared as *Izvestiia*'s "Saturday Guest," answering questions about his own life and about growing up in such a famous family.[8]

Agranovskii's preferred genre was the *ocherk,* a term that is usually translated into English as "essay," although it can also be translated as "sketch," "study," or "outline," all terms that have dual reference to both text and image. His essays were long, flowing contemplations of the modes of conduct of Soviet citizens. In the immediate post-Stalin era, when journalists began publicly to reflect on their role in the process of renewal and renovation that followed the Secret Speech and the "thaw," Agranovskii was one of the champions of the *ocherk,* praising its power to challenge the reader to think, contemplate, and thus approach his or her life in a new way. More broadly, his essays represented a journalism that enabled a heightened sense of perception that looked more deeply into the gap between official claims and everyday life. His critical sensibility was couched in the form of everyday reflections and observations, and this combination of seriousness and simplicity provided a model for a kind of governmental thought that became more important as the Brezhnev era wore on.

"THE PERSON FROM THE RESTAURANT" AND "TO KNOW HOW AND NOT TO KNOW HOW"

As Denisov told me, Agranovskii wrote about heroes. And yet Denisov's qualification that Agranovskii's positive heroes should have appeared negative to his boss alerts us to the fact that often his essays performed a kind of inversion. The reason that his heroes "should have been negative" was that they did not articulate the familiar formulas about the need to overfulfill the plan, to raise labor discipline, or to follow in the steps of that legendary worker, Aleksei Stakhanov. In fact, the existence of these models of paradigmatic persons was itself a feature of Soviet life that needed exploration and criticism. What emerged as a possible object of criticism for Agranovskii was the press's habit of projecting a simplistic image of Soviet society. By the 1960s, not only had people grown weary of this model of industrial competition and emulation that derived from the 1930s, but even more important was the fact that the occupational structure of Soviet society had shifted remarkably in the fifteen years since the war. More and more

А. Аграновский. Париж. Монмартр. 1962 г.

А. Аграновский, С. П. Федоров. Коктебель, 1962 г.

С. П. Титов, А. А. Аграновский, А. М. Топоров, Г. С. Титов, 1962 г.

А. Аграновский. Копенгаген, 1964 г.

А. Аграновский перед погружением на дно Нила. Египет, Асуан, 1964 г.

А. Аграновский. Египет. 1964 г.

А. Аграновский. Стокгольм. В парке скульптуры Миллеса, 1964 г.



From *Vospominaniia ob Anatolii Agranovskom* (Recollections of Anatolii Agranovskii). The caption reads "One of the last photos of Agranovskii." Sovetskii pisatel', 1988.

Soviet citizens lived in cities, worked in offices, and thought of themselves as educated; more and more Soviet citizens consumed cultural products that both taught and assumed the value of cultivating taste and judgment. Soviet society had thus become socially more diverse, and this diversity was itself something that challenged official ideologists. Diversity could all too easily be viewed as inequality, something diametrically opposed to the ethos of equality that was at the heart of socialism. In a 1962 essay, Agranovskii set himself the task of showing *Izvestiia*'s readers that the diversity of occupations in Soviet society and, in particular, the rapid growth of the service

(*opposite, top*) A page of snapshots from *Vospominaniia ob Anatolii Agranovskom* (Recollections about Anatolii Agranovskii). Clockwise from upper left: Agranovskii in Paris, 1962; left to right, Stepan Titov, Agranovskii, Toporov, German Titov, 1962; in Copenhagen in 1964; with the celebrated eye surgeon S. N. Fedorov, in Koktebel', 1962. Sovetskii pisatel', 1988.

(*opposite, bottom*) From *Vospominaniia ob Anatolii Agranovskom* (Recollections of Anatolii Agranovskii). Left: Agranovskii in Egypt at the building of the Aswan Dam, 1964; right top: at the Pyramids, 1964; right bottom: Stockholm, 1964. Sovetskii pisatel', 1988.

sector did not have to signify the erosion of socialism, but rather one necessary facet of its achievement. What was necessary for journalists was concrete exposition of who these new workers were and how they viewed their life.

The essay "Chelovek iz restorana" (The Person from the Restaurant) is about a waiter Agranovskii met in a restaurant in Murmansk.[9] From the beginning of the essay, it is clear that this is to be a different kind of investigation of labor, as this person is far removed from the usual scenes of labor heroism, such as factories, mines, and collective farms. Agranovskii dismisses the objection that a waiter might be unfit for representation in the Soviet press with a statement that highlights how the real subject of the essay is the waiter's own profound thoughtfulness. As if articulating the accumulated prejudices of nearly fifty years of Soviet history, Agranovskii writes, "After we came to know each other well, I asked him if this wasn't a little demeaning, to be a waiter. 'Here's how I see it,' he said. 'I serve you, and after I go home I open up *Izvestiia* and you serve me. We all serve each other'" (350–351). Agranovskii then uses his friendship with this waiter to develop a meditation on the nature of work in a society in which service industries were historically devalued in comparison to industrial trades, but in which such service work will be increasingly important as the Soviet economy becomes more prosperous and oriented toward consumption. But before he can draw such a conclusion, he must first learn what it is like to be a waiter, placing himself in the position of being a student, with the waiter, Roshchin, his teacher.

He and Roshchin go to another restaurant in Murmansk where Roshchin teaches Agranovskii how to gauge the guests as they come through the door, how to guess what kind of people they are. There are good guests, impatient guests, *limonadchiki* (glass of lemonaders), half-bowl-of-soupniks. When Agranovskii himself guesses that a recently arrived guest is a "good guest," Roshchin reprimands him, "What do you mean good guest? He picked up the menu himself at the entrance. He sat at a dirty table. Not good at all" (355). Roshchin here is a kind of governor, teaching Agranovskii, and through Agranovskii all of *Izvestiia*'s readers, about cultured conduct.

Roshchin recognizes, however, that a restaurant is just another site where the momentous changes underway in Soviet society are working themselves out, and that it takes time for people to get used to new conditions of daily life. Aware that one of the socialist criticisms of restaurants was that they were sites where petty bourgeois mentalities and behaviors survived and were encouraged, Agranovskii brings up the problem of tips. Roshchin is thoughtful about this too, arguing that "I don't want you to think that I'm for tipping. I simply think that to be silent about the survivals of the past is not the best way to fight against them. I'm simply stating the facts of daily life, which as we know determine the consciousness of people. Of

course it's necessary to educate them. Wages were raised for us, our standard of living rose, and now it's possible and necessary to get to the point where our consciousness is at the same level as our daily life." Roshchin appears here as a natural Marxist, theorizing from the midst of his experience.

Agranovskii at the beginning of the essay openly sets aside the kinds of perspectives familiar to the genres of "worker's testimonies" and "evaluations of labor performance" familiar to Soviet readers. "Is Roshchin a good waiter? Is he, that is to say, a *peredovik* (leading worker)? He always fulfills the plan. Have people been grateful to him? They have been, although you can get as much of that as you like . . . Have there been complaints? Roshchin had one case when he was rude to a visitor. That is, they were rude to each other, but the waiter is always guilty since he's at work. . . . This is unfortunate of course, but in essence it doesn't say very much." The point Agranovskii then makes is that "service" is not the same kind of good as something material, "because between the producer and the consumer there is neither time nor distance. Here the individual qualities of a person play a special role: decency, cordiality, civility" (353).

After recounting Roshchin's life story, his view of his job, his thoughts about tipping, he reflects on Roshchin's statement that how one works "depends on the individual: how he understands himself, how he sees himself. And also on how others see him. Am I right or not? Answer me." Perhaps Agranovskii answered him during their conversation, but in the context of his text he chooses to answer with a discussion of "the social side of this question. Let's approach it fearlessly and without preconceptions. Who is this contemporary man, this person from the restaurant? Will this kind of labor remain in the future?" (357). A quick look at the Central Statistical Department annual resolves this matter very quickly for Agranovskii. There he finds evidence that service jobs are growing at a fast rate, and he recognizes that this growth will present the state with a problem of how to describe these new jobs, how to represent the social significance of this type of work. Noting the disparity in pay between jobs in heavy industry and jobs in the service sector, and the snobbism that justifies this, he then asks pointedly,

> Where does this absurd aristocratism come from in us? Why do people who serve machines make more money than those who serve people? Why did I permit myself to speak at first with Roshchin with a tone of sympathy? And you too, reader, think of yourself as a young waiter . . .
>
> Have you thought about it?

Then follows an important qualification that the problems facing the service sector in the Soviet Union are still not as serious as in the West. He states that he has been to

> Paris, Gothenburg, New York, Copenhagen, Rome, Tripoli, and the waiters in these places were very diverse, but they all shared the threat that the person who hired them could throw them out the door at any time. These waiters in the West did not seem as though their job was a blow delivered by fate; to the contrary, they seemed happy to have the job. Why? Because other paths were not open to them. This then is in marked contrast to the Soviet Union where all paths are open to each one. Although this doesn't mean that each path is open to everyone. Anyone could become a cosmonaut, but it's known beforehand that everyone won't become a cosmonaut. Everyone won't become physicists, actors, blast furnace operators, or deep sea divers either. . . . It's very important now for us to all learn together to respect the people who didn't become these things. Any and all kind of work is good; it's time to understand that this rule has no exceptions. (358)

Agranovskii returns to the broad historical perspective that drove him to consider the "social side of this question" in the first place. "Today there is occurring an interesting movement in people's consciousness. The sphere of service, formerly considered second rate, as barely covering expenses, is now recognized as a concern of state importance. And on this turning point stands Gennadii Roshchin. . . . We will not exaggerate nor seek to improve Roshchin. He has still not learned to value people who drink lemonade as opposed to vodka, and this is unfortunate. But he has already stopped measuring his relationship to his guests by the degree of their generosity, and this is grounds for hope. But most importantly, he has begun to understand the social utility of the work that he has chosen for himself."

Agranovskii thus presents Roshchin as the most basic kind of hero. He is someone who deserves not simply respect but also admiration and emulation, not just for his seriousness, but for the way he embodies a distinctly socialist kind of consciousness, for the way he thinks, because his reflections then spur Agranovskii's own questions about consciousness and conduct in socialist society. But Agranovskii cannot end his essay without contrasting the sphere of Roshchin's socialist common sense with the nonsense or anti-sense of officials who try to apply to the act of going to a restaurant an official ideologized vision. He cites a brochure by L. Shpungin (whose position is not identified, but most likely he is an official with the Ministry of Foodstuffs), who promotes the self-service cafeteria as the way of the future, as an institution with which to create a truly communist society. Agranovskii quotes with enjoyment from what he calls the "philosophical conclusions" that Shpungin draws. "'If there are individuals who do not like this form of self-service, then they must free themselves of these superstitions, of these petty-bourgeois survivals of which members of our society should all be free.'" Agranovskii then comments, "Free yourself, reader, while there is still time! The next steps on the road to progress—you'll

wash the dishes yourself. And the next—you'll make the borscht yourself. But then I wouldn't like this at all, I would have to write complaints about myself" (359).

In the last paragraph he returns to a less comic, more sober tone:

> I think that there will always be waiters . . . there will always be the person who meets the guests, who feeds them their favorite foods, who knows how to take care of them openly, happily, in a cultured fashion. There will always be the profession of hospitality. And people will forget to speak of it in terms of "service," just as they'll forget to speak of doctors, teachers, lawyers in terms of service. Doctors cure, teachers teach, lawyers defend. About my hero, they'll say he entertains, feeds, takes in guests. . . . And this profession, by the way, will be very beautiful.

At the core of Roshchin's particular kind of heroism is his knowledge of how to be a waiter. Agranovskii implies here that the most important characteristic of Soviet persons, as it is reflected through the prism of his investigation of "the person in the restaurant," is the ability to work, to do something well. *Umenie,* a word that can be translated as "skill," "ability," "know-how," is, in fact, the concept that lies at the heart of Agranovskii's vision. Being competent in one's work is a vital part of socialist culture, with a value that transcends the party's sphere of control or interest. Work, Agranovskii seems to be saying, has for too long been a charged, ideological terrain; what is necessary is a conscientious attitude toward the social and economic role that one's life has allowed one to play.

Umenie can be considered one of Agranovskii's main themes; it was what all his heroes shared. In fact, the collection of essays published in 1979 bears the title *Umet' i ne umet',* or To Know How and Not to Know How. In the title essay of this book Agranovskii turns again to an anonymous hero, although one who works in a sphere that is a more familiar terrain for the Soviet press, the sphere of building or construction. Like Roshchin the waiter, who is portrayed as possessing a natural sense of society's problems and issues, Lysov the builder is portrayed as possessing a similar kind of knowledge, here a knowledge of how to manage people. Like "The Person from the Restaurant," this essay, too, evokes a pressing political and economic context; it refers to the extensive discussions of the economic reforms that were undertaken by Khrushchev during his last year in power and that were continued by Kosygin in 1965, but then quietly shelved.

Near the beginning of the essay Agranovskii writes:

> We have spoken and written a lot lately about economic restructuring. This is very important, and in the end this is decisive. But it seems to me that by making this the main thing, we might be ignoring such a minor thing as simply the ability to work. (340)

Written in the form of a recording of someone narrating his life story, this essay reveals just how much *umenie* is a matter of attitude, requiring not simply education in practical disciplines but also a knowledge of and a feel for people. Lysov is a builder, and as Agranovskii looks carefully at him during their last visit, it seems to Agranovskii that Lysov has not changed much since they first became acquainted fifteen years earlier. Agranovskii thinks, "As Lysov was, Lysov is. Time passes, circumstances change, but he's still the same. Maybe that's what happens when someone simply knows his business so well. In all these years, not once has anything failed" (341). Lysov offhandedly recounts how he turned failing building trusts around, trusts that now perform what seem to be miracles of production. All he can say is that he knows how to work with people. He came to a new job, and for a month he just watched. After a month he removed a couple of people in key posts. He had noticed that the workers on the site came to work at eight while the engineers came at nine; this did not make sense so he made a rule that everyone came to work at eight. He made changes in little things like these, and soon they were overfulfilling the plan. Lysov's narration suggests that the successful director knows above all how to create an environment in which those under him can perform their work without any interference or intrusive supervision. Agranovskii asks him about his principles of leadership. He cites five: be clear about what you want done; supply the means to accomplish it; criticize the work in progress; help the workers when they ask for it; and reward workers in accordance with their performance.

After several more examples of the success of this kind of commonsense management, he returns to the context of their discussions, the economic reforms of the mid 1960s. Agranovskii is forced to ask a difficult but obvious question: "Why should Lysov be concerned with reforms? If he has had successes all these years, then maybe it's not from the economics of the thing but in the person. That is, give each building site, each factory one Lysov, and the country will prosper; it won't need any kind of reforms."

Agranovskii wonders how it is possible for someone to be so consistently productive. When he learned that Lysov would be directing the carpenters who worked on the Aswan dam project in Egypt, Agranovskii wondered whether this foreign context would change Lysov's style of work, whether he would be able to work as well. "When they sent him to Egypt, I thought that there in a foreign place, the person will change, he'll reveal some new, unexpected aspect of himself. No. As Lysov was, Lysov remained" (344). Across the course of his career, Agranovskii is able to tick off what Lysov's skills were: "He knows how to begin a project. He knows how to listen. He knows how to precisely separate obligations, and with them responsibilities. He knows how to promote people, he knows whom to pro-

mote without fearing that they might turn out stronger, more able than he is. He knows how to reprimand poor workers, preferring, as far as I can remember, to do it face to face. And he knows how to praise capable workers, not too often, not too ponderously, but certainly in front of everyone. So where can you teach all this?" (349).

Agranovskii then again moves to a critique of the bureaucratism that pervaded Soviet society by pointing out that the sphere of management in the Soviet Union was associated more with privilege than with *umenie.* While it went without saying that surgeons or ballet stars required immense training, he noticed that the average person thought that anyone can be a manager: "It seems to all of us not a very clever thing: you ride around in your own car and give orders. And yet we might point out that we're speaking here of the most complicated kind of activity, at the junction of economics, technology, psychology, social psychology, ethics . . . How can this be taught?" This special nature of management requires talent, although this talent is not the kind that appears from birth, like musical or mathematical talent. It was Lysov's experiences—as a student, in the army where he served as a tank officer, in his early years of working on major construction projects—that taught him special lessons, and "perhaps it's just impossible to teach this."

> Managers emerge for us from the depths of the people. And as it was, it will be. That is, there will never be a school where a student would study "the subject of Lysov," like they study physics or English. Yes, and it's difficult to imagine a school where the boys and girls would answer with one voice the question "what do you want to be?" with "I want to be a boss!" You certainly wouldn't call such kids modest. No, you work, like everyone else, and show yourself in action, show how you've done better than others—this is the sole path, true and honest, on the stairway of official matters . . . The first test is the matter at hand. However you judge Lysov, his canals and dams, factories and power stations, roads and bridges, will remain; you can't take this away from him.

Agranovskii lets Lysov bring the essay to a close: "Enough. Everything has been said. You must have had enough." Then follows a long final quotation where Lysov proposes to Agranovskii that they take a fishing trip together to the Volga. He describes with great pleasure the scenery, the crawfish that he will cook up, and the huge carp they will catch. The paragraph begins, "Listen, have you ever traveled on the Volga in summer?" and concludes, "We'll sit on the shore; you won't feel like this is any old Nile—it's the Volga! Close in all that green, and farther out, where the green hits the blue of the sky . . . It's simply fantastic" (350).

Lysov, too, is simultaneously real and exemplary, embodying socialism

and projecting it both to everyone he comes into contact with and, via Agranovskii, to the entire readership of *Izvestiia.* Besides being a subject that deserves representation for the way he "knows how," Lysov also makes the serious point that one should be suspicious of bureaucratic solutions to economic problems. Lysov's success, Agranovskii argues, has nothing to do with the mechanics of planning or the system-wide features of the economy. On the contrary, Lysov's success comes from his relationship to life and to other people. This skill, ability, know-how, is something more real, more true, more human than the details of reform. This fact then provides the context for how to read the apparently unconnected concluding passage about the Volga. Agranovskii makes the point that one's ability to manage is based on the same human traits that could make someone feel about the Volga the way Lysov does; they are all of a piece. They are not two unconnected realms but express the connectedness of all the most valuable aspects of life. It is not a matter of making Lysov seem endearing or—of the people—rather, it is an enthusiasm for living that Lysov expresses, the same enthusiasm that makes it possible for him to rise above the complicated policies of the party/state.

These two essays provide a kind of foundation on which to construct an account of Agranovskii's popularity. Both essays are ostensibly about the Soviet economy; and both are about workers, although of very different kinds. And yet Agranovskii's main point is clearly not to address official issues, like the pressing tasks in the service industry or the problems involved in the education of engineers. Agranovskii's essays do not engage reality on the party/state's terms, but rather construct that reality out of the relationship that Agranovskii forms with his heroes; he lets his subjects define these issues for themselves, and as the essay unfolds Agranvoskii has them speak through his own text, as if articulating a kind of common sense that had little in common with the party/state's pronouncements. Agranovskii discovers that Roshchin and Lysov are both *already* accomplishing what so many experts are struggling to design, plan, and order. Roshchin already understands what it is to be a cultured person and to treat people in a civilized way, and Lysov understands what it is to literally build socialism. Both essays thus treat central themes in Soviet ideology, but they show how certain individuals have appropriated these themes and, in a sense, redeemed them by removing them from the context of the party/state.

Furthermore, Agranovskii does not write about them as heroes to be emulated; the profession of "waiter" was certainly far down the list of prestigious professions in the Soviet Union, and as he writes in the Lysov essay, "How many children grow up wanting to be a boss?" And yet this refusal to show more one-dimensional heroes becomes the basis for suggesting

another kind of emulation. Roshchin and Lysov are exemplary for being thinkers. Both men demonstrate a simultaneously profound and modest understanding of themselves and their society, understandings that form the foundation of their conduct in daily life.

This discussion is enough to suggest why Agranovskii's essays must have posed a dilemma to his editors and to the party's supervisors. In neither essay does the party/state appear as a respected source of authority, and, in fact, the party/state is both satirized, in the essay about Roshchin where Agranovskii cites Shpungin, the Foodstuffs expert, and dismissed, in the essay about Lysov where Agranovskii refers to the party's then current discussion about economic reforms. Agranovskii does not allow his subject's significance to be defined by the discourses of the party/state; rather, he focuses the reader's attention on the way his subjects create for themselves a kind of independence and autonomy, which derive from the way they embody a principled way of acting in the world.

But at the same time, his supervisors could not help but recognize that Agranovskii's reports from the depths of Soviet society were powerful documents of belief in the utopian project of socialism. After all, the governmental role of the Soviet press as it emerged in the 1960s was to create an experience of reading that would make possible a deeper understanding of socialism's significance and a clearer sense of how socialist persons might act. Agranovskii implied that Soviet society was actually full of Roshchins and Lysovs, full of socialist persons, and in so doing he could be seen as furthering the party's ultimate interests. For here is one more dimension of the power and authority of these essays. It was not only that Agranovskii carefully constructed an image of socialism; he carefully constructed an image of himself discovering this socialism. He presented himself as witness to the superiority of socialism as it was lived and understood by Soviet citizens, and thus his essays are themselves not just statements of understanding; they are sketches that reveal journalism's drama.

There is some evidence that this was the aspect of Agranovskii's work that most fascinated his colleagues. Lev Tolkunov, editor of *Izvestiia* in the 1960s and 1970s, in his contribution to the volume of reminiscences about Agranovskii published in 1989, noted that the "process of researching the material often became in Agranovskii the subject of the essay, where the correspondent himself acts, ponders, discusses, unobtrusively attracting the reader in his search for a single goal. And so in the process of reading his books, we experience a bitter and at the same time joyful knowledge of a person known very well who lived among us, but whom you've never set eyes on, never spoken to, and never asked a single question of."[10] In both essays Agranovskii narrates his own process of understanding, the way he remarks on the process of writing. His essays thus represent, on the one

hand, a journalist digging deeply into life in order to act upon readers' consciousness of themselves and others, and at the same time they represent a writer digging deeply into himself, struggling to put into his essay an outline or sketch of thought. The problem of thinking independently is manifested with persistent reference to the dilemma of how to write.

In "The Person from the Restaurant" his dialogue with himself about writing is not at all hidden; it forms the narrative structure of the piece. After the introductory dialogue in which Roshchin impresses Agranovskii with his statement that "we all serve each other," Agranovskii writes, "Then and there I understood that I will write about him."[11] Here the decision to write is taken after experiencing some kind of understanding; writing is itself synonymous with a moment of clarity in the midst of the welter of impressions, sights, sounds, and statements of everyday life.

Likewise, in "To Know How and Not to Know How" one notices how many references to writing the essay contains. It is written in the form of an interview or interaction with Lysov and contains extended passages of Lysov speaking, and it moves across a span of fifteen years, as if following Lysov in his career. But instead of the references to writing coming only from Agranovskii, in this case they also come from his subject, from Lysov, his hero, who constantly turns the subject of the conversation back to his being the subject for one of Agranovskii's essays. For example, Agranovskii writes, "I asked him, 'What have you done in your life?' He smiled. 'You're going to have to write a long time. One notebook won't do it.'"[12] Lysov punctuates his speech with orders to Agranovskii: write this, add that, don't write this. These certainly serve as embellishments of Lysov's character, as he is a man who is accustomed to giving orders, but at the same time Agranovskii happily reports what Lysov orders him not to write. At one point the problem of writing about Lysov hits him squarely:

> How can I write about this man? We've met with each other many times, in different cities, in different times, and I've jotted down very little. All the others were highly visible; they accomplished, as they say, miracles of labor heroism, but this one is commonplace. Well, he worked. He fulfilled his assignment.[13]

Agranovskii is suggesting that precisely what is so special about Lysov needs few words, and yet it is precisely this unsaid sphere that Agranovskii feels compelled to understand and communicate to his readers. The reader thus becomes a kind of intimate witness of the effort to make sense of Lysov's place in the wider socialist project.

The two essays I have discussed so far can be thought of as elaborated textual renderings of the kinds of portraits at the heart of 1960s journalism in the Soviet Union, as portraits, however, into which Agranovskii has also

drawn himself. But Agranovskii's reputation was built not only on his ability to find socialist persons and describe the nature of their "heroism"; it also derived from his ability to ground those persons in a place and a history, to make them more than a pedagogical abstraction or, rather, to make the pedagogical context into a more profound experience by acknowledging the multiple contexts within which those lives were lived. And here is a key to another dimension of the widespread admiration that journalists felt for Agranovskii: he was able at least for a time to weave into his essays an acknowledgment of the tragic dimensions of the Soviet past.

AGRANOVSKII ON CONQUERING SPACE, CONQUERING STALIN

One of the most conspicuous traits of the Khrushchev period was its obsession with achievement, and yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the late Soviet discourse on achievement only as the bluster of egotistical leaders, such as Khrushchev's famous kitchen debate with Nixon in 1959. Achievement and the prediction of further achievements had been a part of the genetic code of official Soviet culture since the early 1920s, when the end of the Civil War presented the Soviet government an opportunity to celebrate the achievement of its own survival. The dominant achievement of early 1960s, however, was undoubtedly the Soviet space program.[14] The context of this concrete proof of the technological sophistication of Soviet science provided Agranovskii with an opportunity for an essay that, like the two discussed above, is notable for the way it appropriates an event with the goal of extracting a different and unexpected kind of significance from it. But unlike the essays about Roshchin and Lysov, his 1962 essay, "How I Was the First," describes not just his own struggle with writing, but his effort to come to grips with his own family history. The essay is in one sense an effort to reconcile himself to the catastrophic impact that Stalinism had on his family; both parents were arrested and sent to the camps, and his father died in one just two years before Stalin's death paved the way for the Secret Speech of 1956. And yet the essay is not really about himself but presents the troubling fact that Soviet society was still peopled by those who had made Stalinism possible. It is a kind of warning about the continuing presence of those years in the present, the way Soviet society was still indelibly marked by the aberration of Stalin.

The event that set the stage for "How I Was the First," ["Kak ia byl pervym"], was one of the most important triumphs in the Soviet Union during the early 1960s: Herman Titov's twenty-five-hour orbital flight on August 6, 1961. The essay begins with Agranovskii's arrival in the village of Polkovnikovo in the Altai region of Siberia early in the morning of the

August day that Herman Titov is to be launched into space, "before the radio report that will make this village famous the world over."[15] The first half of the essay is spent describing the scene at the Titovs' house as the family's lives are transformed by their son's adventure. Agranovskii, as the first one there, describes a rather bucolic scene: "A blissful quiet was all around, birds sang, the woman of the house was making gooseberry jam, the man of the house had gone out to the sovkhoz garden, and everything seemed to me so important, everything was full of special significance, and I was the first." The reader might wonder at Agranovskii's presence there, since he is not a reporter, and, in fact, his presence becomes the puzzle that will be solved as the essay unfolds.

That the essay is in some fundamental way about Agranovskii himself is hinted at in Agranovskii's description of his introduction to Titov's father, Stepan. Instead of writing simply that he went up to Stepan Titov to introduce himself, he quotes from Titov's description of that same interaction published in his book *Two Childhoods:* "From the edge of the garden somewhere a car made a noise. A tall black-haired man came toward me through the raspberries. '*Izvestiia* correspondent Agranovskii,' he said." Agranovskii reveals himself as a character in someone else's book.

After the radio report that Herman Titov had been launched into space, the arrival of the media from all over the East bloc begins, and their appearance takes over Agranovskii's narrative. These reporters begin pestering the Titovs with questions, which Agranovskii records, along with the answers. "Was he a model student?" "What sort of hobbies did he have?" (17). The imperfections of communications technologies in the Soviet Union appear in Agranovskii's account of a phone interview Titov had with a journalist from Moscow. "Yes, I hear you . . . Yes, this is Titov speaking. Yes, it is me. Yes, I hear you. Well, thank you very much. . . . What can I say? We're extremely happy, flattered, that our son is serving the state . . . that the party chose him for this great task . . . And who is this speaking? The *Teacher's Newspaper*?" Journalists are interviewing Herman's family and friends; the *Ogonek* correspondent even tried to interview Agranovskii. He hears one friend of the family droning in a corner to a correspondent, "I've known Herman Stepanovich since he was three years old." One scene in particular reveals the comical and slightly ridiculous side of the media that are capturing this world-wide historical event.

> A truck drove up to the house, the driver got out, healthy, grubby with dust, and asked where the Titovs were. They showed him where, and he went up to Aleksandra Mikhailovna and bowed from the waist. I'm writing what I myself saw and heard: he really bowed. 'Congratulations, Mama dear! Happiness to you for raising such a son! I'm just his age. I was driving around Lake Teletskii, and I heard the news on the

> radio, and I changed my route. Of course, I'll catch hell for it . . . But don't worry, mama. Everything will go just fine." And then the mother began to cry and hugged the driver, and they kissed, and just then the people from Novosibirsk newsreels (the newsreel people were already there) decided they had to capture this on film. They led the driver off to wash himself. He washed. They wanted the truck washed. It was washed. They told him to drive away from the house, turn around and drive up again. He drove away, he drove up, and then it turned out that they couldn't film after all. The truck was a Studebaker. An impossible situation! They asked the driver to get into a different truck, of which fortunately there were many in the village, but he refused point blank. "The whole Altai knows my old truck!" He said that he has been driving this truck since before the war, that he's fixed it a hundred times, and that he couldn't manage not using it. So they made him back up to the house, the film camera chattered, again he bowed before the mother, but there wasn't even a shadow of the former scene. (18)

By the evening there were over fifty journalists present at the Titovs' house, and Agranovskii noticed that "the degree of informedness was inversely proportional to the distance of the press organs from the village. The Muscovites appeared first, and were masters of the situation. Then a military crew flew in from Vladivostok. Then, as I said, the people from Novosibirsk" (19). Later, reporters arrived from Hungarian radio and from the East German paper *Neues Leben,* and finally, the next day, as the Titovs were being driven to the airport for their trip to Moscow, two reporters from the district newspaper showed up, chased down the car, and pulled the Titovs out. Agranovskii quotes them shouting at each other: "You idiot, hurry up, take the picture!" "But I've just run out of film."

Agranovskii calls these journalists' spending the night in their parked cars around the Titovs' home a "bivouac" and presents the entire scene in a tone of ironic detachment, which highlights much more the question of why he was there, literally, in the first place. "I should admit that I looked around at my brother-competitors with a certain feeling of superiority. Where this came from, I'll explain below." But before beginning that story, he needs to conclude the first one. His fellow journalists eventually settled down, finished their stories, and went looking for telephones and telegraphs to transmit them. But while they concerned themselves with their urgent work, Agranovskii "went nowhere . . . It was an amazing night. The sky hung crystal clear. The Milky Way sprawled all over the Titovs' house. At three in the morning the door scraped open. Stepan Pavlovich stood on the threshold a long time looking up at the heavens. Where was he up there? If only one of those tiny stars would move."

The next day arrived and the bivouac took life again; everyone had an ear to the radio for any news of the flight. At seven o'clock local time, Moscow transmitted this report: "The flight is continuing, the cosmonaut

is fine, there is a two-way radio connection with him" (20). Everyone then started to wait for news of the landing, and in this context of danger and uncertainty Agranovskii pauses to reflect on how the Titovs were holding up. "They are taking this time of glory, striking unexpectedly like a bolt from the blue, with a rare sense of dignity. They are simple, cordial, truly *intelligentny.* The whole time they stay themselves." Then just as Roshchin forces Agranovskii to reflect on the problem of writing, this scene, too, presents a similar problem: "I thought, I needed to show them just as they are, without dreaming anything up, with all their conversations and the details of their daily life. I thought: one always has to trust life, describe it accurately and simply."

Agranovskii then acknowledges for the second time that he still has not explained why he is there. Referring to himself in the third person, he writes, "How is it that the special *Izvestiia* correspondent can be so calm in the midst of this hubbub? Why isn't he running to the telegraph, and ripping notebooks out of the hands of his colleagues? There's a reason for this. First, I wouldn't have to rush because my paper is an evening paper. But secondly, I know that my editorial office already has written out and typeset material about Herman Titov, that that priority of *Izvestiia* has already been taken care of. It was guaranteed still earlier, a third of a century ago, but that's a special story" (21). This cryptic comment is left unexplained. Finally the radio announces that the cosmonaut has made a safe, successful landing. "So . . . Well, there it is . . . ," says Stepan Pavlovich to his wife. "I told you, I told you everything as going to be alright. Didn't I say so? So what are you crying about?"

The scene at the Titovs' takes up just under one half of "How I Was the First." It serves as a kind of decoy, for in the second half the essay performs a complete reversal or inversion of both the characters and the story. Agranovskii is not there to report on the background to scientific achievement but to confront someone who represented all that was bad about Soviet society. The story of this other mission becomes the real subject of the essay, and in this story, the important Titov is not the cosmonaut, but rather his father, Stepan. Thus all the naturalistic details he provides about Herman's parents take on added importance as the essay unfolds. The reader is encouraged to wonder, how did the elder Titov become the person he is? How did he become an *intelligent*? How was a Siberian peasant able to write a book? Agranovskii portrays Stepan Titov as being remarkable for his education, and the story of his education, specifically the story of his teacher and his teacher's tragic encounter with Stalinism, turns out to be the real subject of the essay. This is the story that emerges between the lines, as it were, of a conversation that Agranovskii reports he had that next morning with an unnamed man "in a large Siberian city."

Agranovskii writes:

> I met with a person whom I already knew was going to be hard to understand. I prepared myself for this meeting, and hurried, since I knew that if I had come one day later, he wouldn't have met with me. I didn't warn him; I had to take him by surprise. So I simply went to him early in the morning and introduced myself. "Agranovskii. Special correspondent from *Izvestiia.*" Something glimmered in his eyes and I understood: he knows my name. Either read me or heard of me. "I'm interested in Toporov. You, I think, are familiar with him?" "Permit me to ask," he said. "It was you who wrote about Toporov? In *Izvestiia* . . . Yes, I think it was 1930." "1928," I said. "It was a lousy article," he said, "harmful."

Agranovskii explains to the reader that in 1928 he was six years old, and that the article in question had been written by his father, but that this was not the first time that he had been mistaken for his father. The story of his father's article requires an extended citation:

> In 1928, my father came to the most remote region of the Altai; he arrived in a raging blizzard; this was really the end of the earth. Especially back then, this was extremely far away. In the peasant hut where he was led, a girl by the name of Glafira was reading a book. "What are you reading?" my father asked. "Heinrich Heine," she said somewhat embarrassed. "Oh wait, no, forgive me. Henrik Ibsen." And then the old man, the master of the hut, noticing how this guest was surprised at this slip of the tongue, said, "Live with us, you'll learn things you never thought were possible. Here even the old women know their Ibsen." And father saw a miracle. He saw the commune "May Morning" where every evening young and old went to the club, where they wrapped their children up in shaggy fur coats to sleep, and they read—Tolstoy, Turgenev, Leskov, Gorky, Lermontov, Korolenko, Nekrasov, Bunin, Pisemskii, Pomialovskii, Muizhel', Grigorovich, Gogol. "All of Gogol!"—they said to my father—"So write it down. All of Gogol. All of Chekhov. All of Ostrovskii." "We're relying [*napiraem*] on everything new!' And again a list of names: Vsevolod, Ivanov, Seifullin, Lidin, Kataev, John Reed, Babel', Demian Bednii, Esenin, Shishkov, Leonov, Novikov-Priboi, Utkin." "How long did it take you to read all this?" "Eight years, my friend. Eight years, day after day, every evening in the club." And again, my father wrote it all down, and he recognized that he, "a Moscow clerk," with all his humanism and his universities, felt himself like a splinter in a surging wave: "Moliere, Ibsen, Hugo, Heine, Hauptmann, Maupassant, Maeterlinck . . . Write it down, keep writing!"
>
> "Belinskiis in bast boots" my father called them, because not only did these Siberian men and women read these books aloud, but they also discussed them, passed judgment. And the teacher made a project of this, wrote down these discussions, and compiled from them the fantastic book *Peasants on Writers* (it appeared with a foreword by my father). (22)

Abram Agranovskii had come to the commune in order find out why the teacher who had founded the commune in 1920 had become in 1928 the target of slander and criticism. The conclusion of his feuilleton "Heinrich Heine and Glafira," published in *Izvestiia* on November 7, 1928, minced no words. Toporov, this outstanding and creative person, was being persecuted "'Because [. . .] to create the revolution in a circle of bunglers is devilishly difficult, because envious people gather around heroes, because ignorance and bureaucratism cannot tolerate anything brave, revolutionary, alive. And that's all. And isn't that really enough?' [. . .] The article's last words were, 'Let's remember the name of the teacher: Adrian Mitrofanovich Toporov.'" Anatolii then adds, "And I remembered this name from childhood."

Having rapidly set the groundwork, Agranovskii can finally make the link to the Titovs: it turns out that Stepan Titov grew up on the May Morning commune. In fact, the day of Herman's space flight, Agranovskii had overheard the elder Titov telling the journalists who had come to interview him about his own youth and the commune and Toporov: "I had been there as the parents of the cosmonaut told journalists about Toporov, how he had taught the Titovs, helped the Titovs become persons [*vyvel Titovykh v liudi*]" (23). The idea for the essay arose as Agranovskii had realized that Titov's flight would be the ideal context in which to resurrect the story of Toporov's persecution thirty years earlier. But he understood that he would have to do this before the younger Titov's launch into space hit the newspapers because he doubted that the chief persecutor would want to speak to him once the afternoon papers started reporting Titov's achievement, in articles that would no doubt make references to the link between the elder Titov and the commune May Morning.

The rest of the essay focuses on Agranovskii's conversation with Toporov's chief opponent, the "antipod of Toporov." It combines a transcription of their conversation with Agranovskii's own commentary on their encounter as it was happening. The encounter unfolds from Agranovskii's question, "Tell me, do you have any facts, even one fact, that Toporov was against Soviet power? I mean, didn't he build a commune and fight against Kolchak?" And in response, the man begins a long explanation of why Toporov was suspected, why Toporov was thrown out of the commune, and why the commune was broken up (23–24). For Agranovskii, however, these explanations, recounted across the shattering experiences of the terror and the war, become less an argument than the display of a certain kind of mentality that afflicted and continues to afflict Soviet society. This mentality is displayed in one sense as a historical artifact, as when this man tells Agranovskii that one of the reasons they suspected Toporov was that he

had organized an orchestra and a choir at the commune, and that "back then we considered this represented a bourgeois influence. And it wasn't just me, but comrades superior to me came and condemned this in the strongest terms." Agranovskii then heightens the sense of historical strangeness by inserting a parenthetical paragraph:

> (Honestly speaking, I didn't believe my interlocutor: this [about the orchestra and choir] was too much. But then later a document fell into my hands: "With his readings and with the melancholy violin melodies of Tchaikovsky and Rimski-Korsakov, the teacher Toporov is weakening the revolutionary will of the workers and distracting them from the ongoing political problems"—this from the speeches of two inspectors from the neighboring kolkhoz.) (24)

The problem of mentality becomes even more acute when the man, who had himself become a teacher, starts talking about Toporov's character, his "moral aspect." The criticisms appear inane: that he washed a lot and encouraged others to wash, that he drank milk from his own cow, that he didn't mention the poor peasant class in his book, that he was so attached to reading. But when he refers to the moment when Toporov was brought to account, this man's own pettiness becomes glaring: "'But when he [Toporov] was brought before the Control Commission and the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate, I sat there right in the center, and he stood right there in front of us. Stood there for a whole hour . . .'" And here Agranovskii turns the interrogation around: "So this is the principal victory in the life of this person, the subject of secret pride, indeed, not even secret anymore—he told me about it and in fact remembers it with a thrill: 'I sat—he stood.'"

The summary judgment of the man and the era, however, Agranovskii reserves for the elder Titov. Later Agranovskii had occasion to talk with Stepan about the motives behind the man's persecution of Toporov. "'Envy, you think? But are they smart enough to envy someone? Because envy is a strong feeling. In order to envy someone, you have to grasp the dimensions of that which you envy. No, this is worse than envy. This is the desire to destroy, to crush everything that is better, smarter, and greater than yourself. . . . How can such people exist?" "Such people live," Agranovskii writes, "and one is sitting there before me; he looks at me through the thick lens of his glasses, and I see that across all these long years, he has managed to learn nothing at all, has not disarmed himself, and although it's clear that my visit has made him anxious, he remains convinced that he has lived correctly his long, even, empty life."

As crowning proof of this point, the man finally warns Agranovskii that it would be a mistake to write again about Toporov.

> "You're a writer, of course you can write about whatever you want, but if there were again articles about Toporov, even in a feuilleton, then for us old fighters, this would be an insult. It'd be better not to write about him. I don't presume to give you advice, Comrade Agranovskii, but what would be the point? That all that was in vain? That it was all for nothing? It was a fantastic time, a better time: we trusted those people who were devoted, and we knew how to take care of those who didn't agree, and everything went properly and nobly [*chinno-blagorodno*]. And remember: it wasn't we who decided. We only followed orders . . . Do you understand me?"
>
> Yes. I understood.

Before providing his response to this suggestion that he not write about Toporov, Agranovskii steps back again to reflect on both Toporov's life and the chain of events and thought that led him to write this essay. He provides a short list of Toporov's further triumphs and difficulties and concludes with the simple and eloquent exclamation, "What a devilishly rich and enviable life!" And as to why he decided finally to write about Toporov, he explains that the idea came to him after rereading the third volume of Gorky's letters. This time he was struck by the effort Gorky had made in the late 1920s and early 1930s to help a number of writers and teachers who were being hounded for various unjust reasons. Agranovskii had to ask himself, "What do we really know about the persecutors of these men? [. . .] And is this wise—to forget the persecutors? I'm not asking for a judge, nor punishment—God forbid—but to remember, to know their names" (27). And yet with one of these persecutors there before him in 1961, he is nevertheless struck by the difficulty of reckoning with this past. "So this was what I was thinking, but then I glanced at the old man sitting in front of me, and suddenly understood that it would be no simple matter for me to identify him with his real name. I mean he is old and sick, and he has a family, and he is looking at me and there is fear flickering behind those lenses . . . I don't know. I just don't know."

Returning now to the man's suggestion that he not write about Toporov, Agranovskii finally answers. "'No,' I told him, 'they will write about Toporov. They have to write about him. You heard it on the radio: Herman Titov was in space. And he was born in that same village; he is from 'May Morning.' And his parents, right in front of my eyes, told the journalists that all the best in them they owe to their first teacher, Toporov. So nothing can help you: they're writing about Toporov right now." The effect of these words was a long silence. Agranovskii then describes that the physical space of their encounter carried a certain irony: "We sat there together in a school, spacious and clean, in an empty classroom; he behind the teacher's desk, I in one of the students' desks in the front row; it smelled of remodeling, sunlit squares lay on the painted floor, and in front hung a black, as yet

untouched by chalk, gleaming blackboard . . . I've been thinking about this argument for a long time. The worst enemy of even the best action is the dull executor, the follower of orders. It was said a long time ago: force him to pray to God, and he'll hurt his forehead. But this is how it really is: not him, since he's no fool, but he'll make it so that everyone else hurts their forehead. And the justification is always ready: he didn't think it up himself, they forced him to. Force a fool . . . And who was the victor? I thought further. Makarenko was the victor. Tsiolkovskii was the victor. And we've forgotten the names of those who hounded them. And Toporov, too, was the victor. So it was, so it will be. As it should."

Agranovskii concludes the essay by returning to the overlap between his life and his father's, and to the fact that the man continued to confuse Agranovskii with the man who wrote about Toporov in the late 1920s. The man says that he complained about that article, that he wrote a letter to *Izvestiia* setting forth the errors in the article, "of course, as I understood them then."

> "Did you get an answer?"
>
> "I gave my political evaluation, from the point of view of the sharpening of class struggle," he said. "I wrote thoughtfully, and the answer was barely serious, I remember . . . " That is, you decided to judge Toporov, who towered above you, and in your letter, the letter of a teacher, there were six grammatical mistakes. That's it. And the signature on that reply: A. Agranovskii." (28)

And here at the end of the essay he writes that although he had been mistaken for his father many times before, it was at this moment that he felt most intensely that he was continuing his father's work. "'Obviously, I didn't write that article about Toporov," I said to this person. 'The article was written by my father. And my father wrote you that response as well. But I would have written the identical thing. Word for word.'"

"How I Was the First" turns out to be not about the second flight of a Soviet cosmonaut, but about an immoral, unjust, and tragic act that took place thirty years earlier. The ambition of this essay goes somewhat beyond the two previous ones discussed above, for there is a sense in which Agranovskii makes his own family's history and the history of the Titovs stand in for Soviet history in general, and to this extent, it is a history that is neither triumphant nor unambiguous. In fact the entire essay is characterized by a kind of obliqueness, its narrative is not really concluded, it is only suspended. It refuses to get to its point; it frequently switches point of view. And it also refuses any kind of definite interpretation. It is as if it were suspended between two attitudes toward the Soviet past. On the one

hand it contains material with which to reconstruct the remarkable movement from the elder Titov's life as a "Belinski in bast boots" on a Siberian commune to manned space flight, a story that could be seen as evidence for the progressive march and momentum of Soviet history. On the other hand, however, there is the story of Toporov, and the catastrophic history that Toporov indexes. This story is a kind of anti-narrative, a narrative without change, as Agranovskii notes that what was so remarkable about Toporov's persecutor was that he was the same as he had been thirty years ago. Nowhere in the essay is progress highlighted; nowhere does Agranovskii assure the reader that this regrettable past has been left behind. In fact, it is as if Agranovskii takes note of how elusive a concept progress is by choosing to describe Stepan Titov looking up at the night sky and by putting in his mind the thought, if only one of those stars would move; if only there were proof that Soviet society had given up Stalinism.

The subject of the essay could be distilled down to the brute clash between the cultured and uncultured, between real persons who have achieved a certain personality and those who never understood what socialism meant. The intensity of this struggle is written into the essay in the form of Agranovskii's uncertainty about the need to "name names." He tells us in fact that he sought out Toporov's persecutor because of Gorky's insistence that people know the names of those who acted wrongly; Agranovskii's account of his encounter with Toporov's persecutor begins with a tone betraying no trace of sympathy or forgiveness, and yet it is as if he realizes that such hardness in a sense mimics the intolerance that this man had shown Toporov thirty years earlier. He concludes ultimately that this case is different from those discussed by Gorky, that he cannot bring himself to name names. But at the same time he is certain that once again Toporov will be remembered, discussed, illuminated in the press because of his connection to the Titovs.

The essay is a complicated interweaving of themes and interests. It is an intensely personal account about his own identification with his father, who first "discovered" Toporov thirty years earlier. It also stages a confrontation between those forces that seem the principal motivating forces behind Soviet history. The revolution, by establishing the socialist system, set the stage for the next struggle, between those who sought an ordered, cultured society, and those who would not see beyond their own narrow, selfish interests; between those who understood and those who did not understand. And Agranovskii expresses no certainty about how this ongoing confrontation will turn out. One can only write, Agranovskii seems to be saying, one can only illuminate those who know how to work, how to think, and how to embody cultured conduct in everyday life. This essay, too, contains a familiar absence, the party/state, for indeed the only representatives of the state that appear are Toporov's persecutors.

Agranovskii's essays thus leave socialism open, as very much a work in progress. His unmistakable lesson was that Soviet society still required a fundamental kind of teaching, as it did in the 1920s and 1930s, back when the majority of the population had only just learned to read. Agranovskii's own teaching was not a formal instruction, but rather a kind of journalistic investigation into the meaningfulness of work and history, and about the fact that no institution or party could mass-produce these meanings, that one had to engage in their construction oneself.

Agranovskii's essays should certainly be read as documents that shed invaluable light on their immediate referents—the waiters, engineers, and teachers—who constituted Soviet society between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s. They certainly help us imagine the contours of everyday life in the Soviet Union, but they can also be read for the way they both embodied and enacted a certain journalistic practice that was classically governmental, that is, engaged centrally in both the production of governors and the governed. In short, he produced an image of himself through his work of educating others into socialist conduct.

In a 1968 piece called simply "Let's Think," one of the few pieces Agranovskii produced where he reflected on his own method, he contextualized his understanding of the essay form within the deeper history of *publitsistika,* or publicistic writing, which had been the most prestigious form of intellectual journalism in Russia since the early 19th century, and whose most illustrious practitioners had been revolutionary heroes such as Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, Herzen, Plekhanov, and Lenin.

> What is *publitsistika*? There are a lot of definitions, and each is correct in its own way. But the most important thing for me is this: *publitsistika* is called to stir up social thought. And so when, sitting at our table, we are looking for a new direction, a new subject, new words, we should remember that we are doing all this in order to lead the reader with a way of thought. If *publitsistika* is monotone, if the repetition of what is said hides the stating of vital themes, then social thought will not be stirred up; it will be put to sleep. Works of this kind are sometimes called useless, but this isn't true. What's useless is harmful. Thoughtless *publitsistika* brings an enormous harm to the development of social thought, a harm that we still don't know how to understand. A person who writes well is not just a person who writes well, but who thinks well.[16]

Here Agranovskii acknowledges that publicistic writing takes as its explicit goal the conduct of conduct, the shifting of the condition of people's lives. And yet he is also concerned in this passage to recognize that the practice of *publitsistika* takes place within a larger institutional context. The phrase "thoughtless *publitsistika*" evokes an empty performance of ideas,

as opposed to an authentic experience of thought. Good publicistic writing was not, however, merely a matter of criticism, of denouncing something or someone in the most ruthless of terms. The repetition of critical slogans for Agranovskii was just another form of bureacratism, another kind of official indifference. The reader could only have an experience of thought if the writer had had his own experience of struggling to come to an understanding.

> I understood long ago that it was possible to permit oneself criticism of any degree of sharpness if the reader sees that the journalist suffers from his work, if he writes to help move things forward, trying, in the words of V. I. Lenin, "to enable the broadening of the movement, the conscious choice of the means of struggle." Conscious—there's the important word, and consciousness—it's also tranquility, soberness in word and deed.[17]

The task of government here appears as one that puts enormous pressure on the journalist. Criticism is not only a mode of social action but also a mode of self-government. Agranovskii's essays were thus invaluable to journalists as concise models of behavior, examples of how to construct and maintain oneself as thinker and actor.

The essays described above were written in the Khrushchev period; they provide yet another way of understanding how journalists participated in the renewal of governing. Journalists were to think of themselves as activist critics and teachers of the worldwide progress of socialism, and they could also govern by engaging in a renewed kind of critical public thought.

Journalism was one of the first things to change after Khrushchev's removal. One of *Izvestiia*'s well-known columnists, I. Ovchinnikova, in an article published in *Izvestiia* just after the 1991 coup attempt, described the scene at the paper after Adzhubei had been told to vacate his office in October 1964.

> As for older workers like myself, we remembered that long day in October 1964 when our respected editor-in-chief, Aleksei Adzhubei, slowly descended the marble stairs of *Izvestiia*'s office. We clenched our fists and did not hide our tears when we saw him off, but in the evening of the same day we published a newspaper which was quite different from what we had published with him only the day before.[18]

The party leadership under Brezhnev decided that the Soviet press needed to devote itself to a much more coherent ideological program than the "climate of enthusiasm" that had formed under Khrushchev and Adzhubei. The press's repetition of the party line became increasingly im-

portant in the late 1960s and 1970s, as the party focused its energies on guarding its own power and interests.

An indicator that Agranovskii found himself on the other side of official opinion appears in a textbook used at the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University published in 1971, *The Journalist's Handbook.*[19] In the course of its 685 pages it covers everything that one had to know in order to be part of the productive sphere of print in the Soviet Union. In a chapter that defines the purposes of the twenty or so genres that appear in Soviet newspapers, Agranovskii appears as an object of criticism for making a false distinction between "informational" and "publicistic" genres. The editors refer to a discussion that took place at the Union of Journalists on the topic of publicistic writing six years earlier, in 1965, where on one side was the editor-in-chief of the magazine *Kommunist,* the main theoretical journal of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, and on the other was Agranovskii. The party official stated categorically that "Everything that is written in our newspapers and social-political journals is publicistic writing . . . a newspaper from beginning to end is publicistic writing," while Agranovskii expressed a contrary opinion, saying, "I can't agree with the assertion that everything that is published in the newspapers should be considered publicistic writing simply on the grounds that the newspaper is speaking with the people. Publicistic writing, in my opinion, begins where there is thought." Agranovskii's response is then attacked by the textbook's editors: "So what does this then mean? It means that the chronicle, the [genres of] brief and broad information, the account, interview, reportage, quick sketch (*zarisovka*), which all belong to what journalism researchers have called informational genres, all these it turns out are written 'without thought,' are completely free of all traces of publicistic writing? It's impossible to agree with this assertion . . . Each item in a newspaper, journal, radio or television broadcast carries a publicistic charge. The only difference is in how strong the charge is. This depends on the genre, on its own particular possibilities."[20]

This exchange between Agranovskii and his colleagues, which took place in 1965 and was later reproduced in the magazine *Sovietskaia Pechat',* can be understood, I think, as an expression of the redefinition of journalism's governing role that took place with Khrushchev's removal. Agranovskii here is represented as somehow promoting the exclusivity of thought, as implying that he believed that there were two types of journalists who produced the Soviet press, those who thought and those who did not. But one senses that the opposite was the case, that he was trying to preserve the practice of thought from the incursions of ideologists who legislated thoughtfulness rather than letting it emerge from the always turbulent process of self-government. Perhaps it was the work of these ideologists he had in mind

when he wrote, in the passage quoted above, about "thoughtless *publitsistika.*"[21]

During the 1970s and into the 1980s, Agranovskii's articles appeared less and less frequently in *Izvestiia.* Several of his former colleagues at the paper told me that Agranovskii's infrequent appearances stemmed from the awareness of the Propaganda Department of the party's Central Committee that Agranovskii's intelligence and popularity had to be treated with extreme caution. They told me that Agranovskii paid such careful attention to his writing that he would become incensed whenever any editor made a change in what he had written. Denisov remembered an incident in the early 1970s when Agranovskii wrote an essay about the problems of supply experienced by an enterprise. The subtext of the essay was that in a planned economy, no programmed system of supply was ever efficient. Within the essay was a phrase, "the system is guilty." The immediate textual context of the phrase clearly referred to the "material and technical system" of supply, not to the party or communist ideology. But as the draft of the essay made its way through the layers of editors, Agranovskii noticed something.

> He ran into Grebnev's office [one of the deputy editors-in-chief during the 1970s], and said, "Why did you cross out my text?!"
>
> "What do you mean, friend [*milyi*]?" said Grebnev. "I didn't cross anything out."
>
> "But you changed it!"
>
> "Look," the editor said, "this is what you wrote, 'the system is guilty.' And I wrote, 'The material-technical system' is guilty.[22]

Agranovskii's line was a typical example of coded criticism of the communist system, and he became so angry because Grebnev's intervention let all the pressure out of the phrase.

During these years Agranovskii's reputation grew that much stronger among those who had been inspired by his embodiment of the ethic of the publicist because he was widely viewed as changing neither his style nor his interests in response to the general pressure that the ideological leaders in the Central Committee placed on the press. What did change was the care with which he wrote, for it seemed to him that the longer Brezhnev remained in power, the more necessary "thought" was. For Agranovskii the task became how to keep on saying something meaningful, rather than accepting the relatively narrow boundaries of expression defined by and demanded by the party. Thus as the 1970s wore on, his textual "essays" at critical thought became an emblem of a superior if isolated culture, one that was not so much interested in the socialist project as the preservation of the meaningfulness of criticism.

For many of the journalists who had worked with Agranovskii and with whom I conversed in the early 1990s, he continued to serve as a kind of anchor. By continuing to write right up until his death, he symbolized an independence and originality of thought that represented a form of resistance to the cynical deal between party and society that took shape in the 1970s. He also inspired by not quitting journalism, by not giving up on the idea that publicist writing could continue to stir up social thought even in the most stagnant of circumstances.

For younger journalists in the post-Soviet present, however, Agranovskii's stance appeared less immediately comprehensible. The difficulty of making Agranovskii's conception of journalism intelligible was evident in the May 1995 interview Agranovskii's wife gave to the paper *Vecherniaia Moskva.* Far from confirming the young interviewer's assumptions about the superiority of the post-Soviet present to the Soviet past, Galina Fedorovna makes a point to instruct the interviewer into the values of that culture that Agranovskii's work represented. In fact, she uses a term to describe it knowing full well how incongruous and inappropriate it would appear both to the journalist and to his paper's readers. She finds she has to rephrase the interviewer's very first question, "Galina Fedorovna, journalists were subordinate people, back in those years before perestroika. They fulfilled tasks given to them by their editors, and they often determined the character of their material. But Anatolii Agranovskii never wrote essays that simply fulfilled this task. How was he able to get out of fulfilling these unpleasant editorial assignments?" After asking permission to "claim the right to express myself subjectively and with partiality," she answers this question by displacing it onto an altogether different plane:

> I think that my generation, the generation that is leaving the scene . . . was happy with the fact that it possessed, from my point of view, a sense of inner freedom. As this concerns Anatolii Agranovskii, his opinion about this or that problem rarely coincided with official opinion. But this didn't bother him because he felt this inner freedom, which included a feeling of obligation before the reader, which meant by extension before the whole country.[23]

To a question that presumed an absolute separation of the Soviet era from the present ("He probably was fully aware of the shortcomings of the existing system?") she again answered by rephrasing the question:

> We live in a uniquely stable country: a country where themes never get old. The last article that lay unfinished on his writing desk when he died was called "Reducing the Apparat." Look how much we are talking about that today! Or take another essay, "Meeting with a Primitive Mercantilist"—another topic that never gets old. The bureaucrat says that he can't give out statistics because they're secret. Agranovskii

says, "'I don't need statistics. I want to know the principles that guide your work.' 'We don't have any principles here.' Long pause. 'Then what directs the way you work?' 'Orders.'" So tell me, has all this disappeared today? It seems to me that a sense of inner freedom is even more necessary today. I still read with polite interest newspapers—by habit, *Izvestiia*—and it is a rare exception when I feel that the writer feels this inner freedom, when he is not engaged. Publicistic writing is a genre that we don't have today. A newspaper article lives a single day, publicistic writing is a genre for the ages, so far as the problem it poses. Because Herzen is today our contemporary, as is Uspenskii and Korolenko.

And once more, when the interviewer tries to steer her toward a subject that encapsulates the gulf between the old press and the free press, namely the subject of the presence of KGB officers on the staffs of major Soviet newspapers, she states flatly that Agranovskii did not think about it much. "Really, could Agranovskii and his friends have worked so freely if they had felt afraid?"

Having redrawn her interlocutor's sketch of both Agranovskii and the culture of the 1960s, she then proceeds to a critique of the contemporary media culture of post-communist society. "Of course, today the reader has turned into a viewer. Television is a dangerous invention. Reading, you sympathize and think. The tube frees you from the necessity of thinking. This visual order is like an enema; you don't even digest it. I would even say that it forces you not to think! [. . .] Thanks to television we see what a huge number of fools, demagogues, and empty-headed people we have. It's like reverse propaganda. The chairman of the newly formed party tells us about his marvelous program. Then an ad for Tampax. Both the party man and the advertisement promise you happiness!" Nor was she impressed by the constitutional breakthrough in Russia: "Openness and free speech, these things only matter when you have something to say."

Both Agranovskii and Adzhubei were born at roughly the same time, both men knew intimately the repressive dimensions of Soviet power, and both men lived through a succession of upheavals. Adzhubei outlived the Soviet Union, while Agranovskii died in April 1984, at the beginning of the reign of Konstantin Chernenko, who appeared to many both inside and outside the Soviet Union as perhaps the most pathetic of all the Soviet Union's leaders. In a sense, the timing of Agranovskii's death made the problem of memory easier, since his public image did not need refashioning as it did in the case of Adzhubei, who was demoted and removed from power, and who later had to reinvent himself in the circumstances of post-communism.

Adzhubei and Agranovskii, however, occupied different places in the community of journalists at *Izvestiia* and represented two different sides of

journalism's governmental definition and ambition. Adzhubei was a journalist who became an official by marrying into the highest ranks of the Soviet leadership; Agranovskii remained a "simple" journalist, a *gazetchik,* throughout his life. Adzhubei was not so much a writer as an editor, organizer, and institutional leader, while Agranovskii wanted no part of the office or office politics. According to his wife, he rarely went to the *Izvestiia* building, only to drop off drafts and pick up proofs. Galina Fedorovna told me in an interview that the two men had in fact an uneasy relationship: Adzhubei used the familiar form of the second person pronoun *ty* with Agranovskii, and Agranovskii replied in the formal form, *vy*. In the 1995 interview, she recalled a few lines from her husband's notebook: "Galka [the familiar name of Galina] is mad at me because I let Adzhubei call me 'ty.' She says he should call me 'vy.' I call him 'vy' so that he will recognize the distance between us. As to his 'ty,' that's his problem." This confirms our sense that Adzhubei used familiarity to create alliances and to form patronage networks, that he was a political animal. Adzhubei was also a party member, while Agranovskii remained all his life *bezpartinii.*

Even with, or perhaps because of, all these differences, one can easily imagine that their relationship was mutually beneficial: Agranovskii was useful to Adzhubei because he was a vital source of *Izvestiia*'s prestige, while Adzhubei was useful, if not invaluable, to Agranovskii in reconstructing the Soviet press and allowing journalists to, as Shliapov said, "find themselves" in their work.

The two men shared a conviction that journalism was powerful because it was governmental. It was not about monitoring thought; it was a medium that possessed a visceral and immediate kind of power. Both men in their different ways made this medium of government meaningful in the Khrushchev period, and it was their very success that challenged the party on so many different levels during the following decades, before another reformer appeared on the scene in the mid-1980s, who spoke once again about the government of journalism.

THREE

Journalism against Socialism, Socialism against Journalism

As with every leadership change in the Soviet Union, the replacement of Khrushchev by a group of his former colleagues in October 1964 involved more than a simple retirement, more than an accession of a slightly younger and more vigorous cohort of leaders. It represented, rather, another redefinition of the role of the Communist Party in Soviet society. But because journalism in the worldview of the sixties was essential to the vision and practice of Soviet government, this redefinition involved a diagnosis of the inappropriate relationship that had appeared between party and press after Stalin's death, and an attempt to foreclose the possibility that journalists would continue to define the agency of the party. Khrushchev's successors would insist on a new set of more stringent rules by which journalists would operate, and on new ways to lead journalists to a different kind of practice.

The atrophy of the radial diagram of government after its renewal under Khrushchev and Adzhubei can be seen in a variety of sources, providing glimpses of journalists' experiences of stifling supervision and memories of ludicrous encounters with Soviet officials. But by looking "out and down," as it were, from the position of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, we can also discern the difficulties this institution met with in implementing Brezhnev's strategy of governing. The redefinition of the party's identity had two main consequences for the practice of journalism.

The first was to create constant friction at the interface of press and party. The press was no longer to explore the question of the meaningfulness of socialism, but rather to repeat the mythic history of the Soviet

Union that Brezhnev and his colleagues saw as the best way to define individuals' relationship to the state. Journalism was to be about neither the process of persuasion nor the evocation of enthusiasm, but rather about the support of communist orthodoxy pronounced by the party's authorized thinkers. No longer would journalists be the active agents of socialist self-understanding or use their critical, imaginative faculties on behalf of the party, but they would supply images and texts that would represent an effective, stable, and prosperous state of "developed socialism." For those who understood themselves as *shestideciatniki,* as "Children of the 20th Congress," writing became more complicated as texts became subject to new readings and as new criteria of judgment were applied by the party's supervisors of ideology. From this definition of a narrow authorized practice came a heightened sense of what it might mean to criticize the party, and this awoke in many journalists a desire to smuggle into one's texts commentary that would be readable as signs of independent, critical thought.

This first consequence emerged as it were within the terms of journalism's critical role as it appeared in the 19th century: journalists realized that they were experiencing a kind of supervision not unlike other moments of such supervision in the history of the Russian Empire. The second consequence, however, was that the party's close supervision of texts allowed for the appearance of an entirely different image of the governmental role of journalism. In circumstances in which the party demanded from journalists the defense of orthodoxy and stability, and in which there was no need to imagine socialism as anything but the rhetorical idiom that justified the party's power, some journalists began to wonder what it might mean to produce "timely," "reliable" information for Soviet readers. Here journalists found themselves negotiating a new position between readers and the party. For on the one hand they were faced with the opinion that all information contributed to the formation of socialist conduct, that it was impossible to simply "report" on society without making political judgments; and on the other hand there was mounting evidence that the achievement of a state of "developed socialism" brought with it a corresponding appetite on the part of Soviet citizens for a perspective on and a knowledge about their own lives that could not be satisfied through traditional channels. Journalists understood, for example, that foreign radio beamed into the Soviet Union represented a source of information that had no competition from *within* the Soviet Union, and that these new sources of information were so powerful because they offered a different model of government. If journalists in 1960 had understood their work to be about instructing readers in the formation of a socialist consciousness that would help establish a progressive and prosperous socialist society, the new model of journalism

that filtered in from abroad *presumed* the readers' or listeners' ability to decide for themselves the relevance of this information. The question for journalists and the party was, what was journalism's connection to the present when this present had to appear through the lens of myth and orthodoxy? This made journalistic questions about the accuracy, timeliness, and relative value of information fraught issues. Some journalists began to wonder how they might "get a story" and lay it before the Soviet public, knowing full well that journalistic reporting on the Soviet present would be corrosive of these myths. And they recognized that the erosion of the party's authority was occurring despite the party's active supervision of media, through the transformation of the climate within which information, knowledge, and ideas circulated.

The task is to index these consequences across the nearly two decades of Brezhnev's rule, from the late 1960s, across the decade of the 1970s, and right up to the mid-1980s, when another reformer would reestablish journalism at the center of Soviet government. The place to begin, though, is with journalism's place in the crisis that brought about the succession from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. Then I will turn to a number of images, stories, and vignettes that evoke the repercussions that this redefinition had on journalists in the 1970s. Some of the reactions that I recount came from conversations, others from the archives of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Some reveal journalists as bullied by their local party leader, others show journalists displaying a kind of detached appreciation of the absurdity of the situations they found themselves in, and yet others describe a serious kind of intellectual engagement with the question of what it might mean to construct an important, non-charismatic practice of journalism in a "mature" socialist society. Together they construct a mosaic of the disarticulation of journalists from the party that is vital for understanding the attempt to re-articulate them that took place between 1985 and 1989.

REMOVING KHRUSHCHEV

One does not have to look far for evidence that the press was seen by Khrushchev's colleagues to be a major part of his problem. On the evening of October 14, 1964, when Mikhail Suslov, before the entire Central Committee, read aloud to Khrushchev a fifteen-point indictment of his policies and conduct, two of his first three points referred to the press.[1] First Suslov argued that the Soviet press had given so much attention to Khrushchev that it was undermining the confidence of the people in the party. To quantify this pernicious influence, he compared the number of photographs of Khrushchev that had appeared in the Soviet press with those of Stalin and

found a disturbing result; 120 photographs of Khrushchev had appeared in the central press in 1963, and 140 photographs of him had appeared in the first nine months of 1964. Photographs of Stalin, on the other hand, had appeared in the press only ten or fifteen times per year.[2] The conclusion that Suslov drew was that a "personality cult" had taken shape around Khrushchev, and this led to a second point. The sources of this cult lay in the fact that "Khrushchev surrounded himself with relations and journalists . . . whose advice had been more valuable to him than that of members of the Presidium." Here the chief culprit was, of course, his son-in-law, Adzhubei, who was singled out by the plotters as being "obsequious, incompetent, and irresponsible," a meddler in "diplomatic affairs at the highest level," who confused and disrupted the work of Soviet ambassadors.[3]

The concern with the frequency of appearance of Khrushchev's image in the press was more than a convenient way to tar Khrushchev by associating him with the Soviet leader whom Khrushchev had risked so much to denounce eight years earlier. It suggests the degree to which Suslov and his colleagues felt it necessary to condense their criticisms into easy and unmistakable symbolic form. They saw in these images not so much a personality cult like that of Stalin, but something equally dangerous, the reorientation of the party away from its history and toward an idiosyncratic and charismatic interpretation of socialism. By seizing on the press photographs, Suslov was able to argue that through the marriage of his daughter to Adzhubei, Khrushchev had become prey to a circle of journalists whose interpretations of Soviet history and society were dangerously heterodox. These journalists had been the authors of a de-Stalinized comprehension of the world, of the assertion that a sober and honest account of at least part of the Stalin era would justify pride in the history of the Soviet Union more than a blatantly false and one-sided representation of it. These journalists had argued furthermore that the party was fallible and did not have all the answers to economic and social problems; that socialism was a more just system than capitalism but nevertheless had chronic sources of injustice that needed to be addressed; and that improvement in the standard of living of Soviet citizens depended not on the party but on the lived commitment and conviction of persons to socialism in their everyday lives. In citing the photos of Khrushchev that appeared in the national press as an index of the supposed danger of another dictatorship, Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Shelepin, the instigators of the removal, were able to denounce these "journalistic" attitudes condensed in photographic representations of Nikita Sergeevich's image.

But perhaps the most revealing evidence that in Suslov's eyes there was a direct link between the problems that beset the party and the nature of Adzhubei's press comes from a brief comment Suslov made at the meeting

of the Central Committee Plenum that removed Khrushchev. In his memoirs, Adzhubei wrote that Suslov had directed a few comments at him, and that he remembered one of these very well: "'Imagine,' said Suslov, 'in the morning I open up *Izvestiia,* and I don't know what I'm going to find there.'"[4] Suslov was not prepared to accept that the Communist Party's head of ideology would be unsure of the contents of one of the Soviet Union's most important newspapers.

Of course, behind Suslov's judgment was nearly a decade's worth of experience with Khrushchev and his reforms. Suslov and his colleagues were concerned about Khrushchev's personal style, his impetuosity, and his unpredictability, and about what he had done to the coherence and identity of the party. His effort to revitalize the party after the "long sleep" of the Stalin era led to a series of reorganizations that sought to make the party more responsive and effective, and yet ended up undermining the party's ability to act quickly and efficiently. His distrust of Stalinists in the party bureaucracy compelled him to replace over 50 percent of the first secretaries of republic and regional party committees between 1953 and 1956, and after his new appointees helped save Khrushchev from the "anti-party" group that sought his removal in 1957, this layer of the party hierarchy underwent another round of removals in 1960–61, when again over half of the regional party secretaries were retired or reassigned.[5] These removals were in direct response to the suspicion on Khrushchev's part that responsibility for the obstruction of reform lay with the inertia of the top party officials in the localities. He had been so anxious about the potential for the lower levels of the party bureaucracy to subvert the mobilization of the masses for reform that he suggested in 1961 an unprecedented plan for term limits on party officials, a plan that Suslov and his colleagues saw as disrupting the ability of the party to supply consistent leadership where it was needed most. Clear expression of Khrushchev's desire for the party to find for itself a new kind of effectiveness was the creation in 1957 of 105 regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) that were to coordinate both agriculture and industry in the localities. This was an attempt to redistribute power away from the central bureaucracies to those with a better grasp of local needs and requirements. Even more striking was his plan to divide the party into two groups, one that would supervise industry and another that would supervise agriculture.

These redesigns were part of the overall effort to develop a final push toward communism, while the overall effect of these reforms was to introduce a degree of uncertainty into the party that complicated the lives and work of party officials. The cluster of leaders who supported Podgorny, Shelepin, and Brezhnev's move against Khrushchev were seeking what became a watchword of the Brezhnev regime, "stability in cadres."[6]

But it was not only Khrushchev's policies that troubled his colleagues on the Praesidium, it was also his style: they disliked and distrusted Khrushchev's populism. In George Breslauer's terms,

> Khrushchev's vision of political community called for the creation of an active, self-regulating society of like-minded individuals; this vision, he came to believe, was also incompatible with prevailing conceptions of political and bureaucratic autonomy. By 1961, therefore, when Khrushchev's economic, social, and political programs had faltered, his personal political difficulties fed into his populist approach to political participation, leading him to sponsor a far-reaching redefinition of authority relationships between officials and masses.[7]

This redefinition took many forms. Khrushchev sought to make the party a more effective organization by increasing its overall size and encouraging the membership of more highly educated groups.[8] This was accompanied by a stress on "democratization" within the party; the officials he had inherited from the Stalin era were removed and replaced with younger, more energetic cadres. In regard to the economy, it meant giving more autonomy to the "center in the localities," in other words, to the heads of local party committees who could coordinate planning as well as mobilize the population for greater productivity. He wanted these party officials to be not the "troubleshooters of the Stalinist type," but educated specialists and professionals who could give valuable advice to economic managers, find compromises, and build consensus.[9]

Khrushchev's populist approach had emphasized practical results. He believed that Soviet society would solve its problems only if the masses solved their own problems. This had meant a downgrading of ideological criteria for judging both policy and personnel. Thomas Remington describes this in terms of a shift "from a deductive logic of validation . . . to a positivistic logic of observable progress."[10] Under Khrushchev, socialism's superiority would not be proved in arguments, but in the actual achievement of economic and social plans. The capitalist West was to be "buried" not by philosophical debate but by concrete evidence of socialism's superiority. And indeed the spurts of growth exhibited by the Soviet economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s seemed to justify this confidence. The result was a new kind of ideological activism, one based not on scholastic argument but on the mobilization of the masses by representations of an enthusiastic population. This kind of mobilization was essentially different from the enforced "voluntarism" of the Stalin era, in that Khrushchev's rejection of terror required a shift from coercion to persuasion. And this effort at persuasion was to be backed up by an emphasis on accountability.[11]

Khrushchev's reforms, in other words, had also involved a change in

the climate of ideas that shaped the governing ethos of the party. Most significant in this regard had been the downgrading of the importance of ideology and ideological rationales for the party's actions. In Remington's words, a "theoretical void" appeared under Khrushchev, a void hollowed out by the abandonment of any ambition to inculcate a doctrinal logics for plans, campaigns, and programs.[12] It was this "void" into which journalists eagerly stepped, with their conviction that "reality" was an ideal tool of instruction. Their resuscitation of the press had no need to rely on or justify itself with reference to the past. The Party Program was, after all, in the words of *Den' mira,* the "Communist Manifesto of the 20th century," a phrase hardly evincing modesty and deference before the slim volume that started European socialism down its glorious and victorious path.

The diagnosis of Khrushchev's critics was that both the party and its representations had to change. All tampering with the party's organization stopped after October 1964, and even more significant for journalists, Khrushchev's successors expanded the sphere of ideology as an inventory of images, signs, and interpretations whose production and circulation would take up ever more room in Soviet papers and would demand ever more time of Soviet journalists. Here a focus on the triumphs of the known past displaced any kind of mobilization for an unknown and therefore risky future; instead of promoting the party's commitment to the process of "achieving communism," Brezhnev and his colleagues substituted the idea of living in a "developed socialist society," one characterized not by "becoming" but by "being." Thus coextensive with Suslov's criticism of Khrushchev's conception of the party was a criticism of journalism's relationship to the superstructure of ideas that manifested the glorious history of the USSR. After 1964, Khrushchev's "theoretical void" would be filled not by journalists but by ideologists, guardians of the canons of doctrinal Marxism-Leninism and the narrative of the Soviet Union's mythical history.

This change in the status of ideology was evident in a number of ways. The key doctrinal statement of the Khrushchev era, the *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (1959), written by a group of historians, philosophers, and journalists, was replaced by the *Foundations of Scientific Communism,* a text produced by ideologists that showed remarkable divergence from the earlier summary of the party's thinking.[13] Ominously, the *Foundations* contained no criticism of Stalin, and de-Stalinization policies were either criticized or not mentioned. Concepts that had been associated with Khrushchev underwent significant repositioning; the doctrine of the non-inevitability of war faded into the background, and the idea of peaceful coexistence was no longer mentioned. Phrases were rewritten with significant shifts of emphasis: "the danger of war and the struggle for peace" that appeared under Khrushchev became "the revolutionary process and the struggle for peace,"

thus stressing how war was not to be thought a "danger" when it was a matter of the theoretical imperative of socialism's victory over capitalism.[14] In fact, the book could be termed "neo-Stalinist" in its efforts to describe the party leadership's insistence that any kind of discussion of the communist future was dangerously speculative, and that "discipline and subordination to the decisions of the Party in the solution of all topical political questions" was to be the paramount rule for all Soviet citizens.[15]

In sum, the press became one of a number of channels for the promotion of what Stephen Hanson calls the center-orthodox position, one of the discursive positions that, along with the "right-rational" and the "left-charismatic," was "programmed" into the structure of ideas of European socialism. The essence of this position was the belief that the party's most important duty was the security of the revolution, and that the safest way to secure it was to create a stable and satisfied bureaucracy that guaranteed not permanent revolution but predictable administration. This required not only a promise that the party leaders would not meddle in the affairs of the locality as long as local party leaders showed loyalty to the leadership, but also a different approach to the press. Journalists under Khrushchev had been more interested in teaching the reality of socialist consciousness than repeating ideological slogans; Khrushchev's successors would make sure that the press's portrayals would refer to the mundane task of constructing a sacred ideological and institutional history and to the transmission of the myths that constructed the leadership's own vision of itself. Central to these myths, of course, was the Great Patriotic War, which joined Lenin and the revolution as the two events that united the Soviet people.[16] The Soviet press would stand "closer to life" only as long as the life portrayed fit seamlessly into the ideological priorities and needs of the moment.

The description of the Khrushchev era as a time of charismatic Leninism explains the relative absence of ideological appeals in Adzhubei's press. Soviet communications institutions under Khrushchev returned to their Leninist roots in order to apply them to the next stage of building socialism. Through this Leninist optic, ideological criteria for judging both policy and personnel were hardly adequate, for the next stage of socialism would take the party into uncharted ideological terrain. It was this disconnection from tradition, from the "truth of authority," to cite the title of Remington's work on Soviet ideology, that spurred the resistance to Khrushchev. For his approach had not brought Soviet society to the verge of fulfilling the revolutionary promise of communism but rather dangerously close to jeopardizing the remarkable success the Soviet Union had had in rebuilding an economy and a society shattered by the war. Khrushchev's championing of expertise, creativity, and spontaneity, his belief in the power of the masses

to facilitate great changes as had been done in the 1920s and 1930s and during the Great Patriotic War, all these approaches and attitudes became in the eyes of his colleagues sources of chaos and confusion, for they did not share his belief that one final push would "create communism."

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that journalists instantly and obediently responded to the effort to subordinate the press to the party, or that journalists simply turned their back on their former governmental identities. In fact, the tension between an ideology focused on the justification of the power of the Communist Party, on the one hand, and a journalism dedicated to the creation of a critical socialist consciousness, on the other, would last right up until the end of the Soviet Union. This latter attitude could not simply be eradicated, since so many journalists had been inspired by the discourses of the 1960s, and because many journalists understood their work as being investigations of social transformations rather than descriptions of an achieved state of satisfaction. Many journalists continued to approach their work from within the framework of practice promoted by Adzhubei, and traces of the conflicts and tensions generated by this attitude and approach are readable in numerous documents from the archives of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. This tension between the journalistic and the ideological is readable in two cases, one from 1965 and another from 1983.

In July 1965, the newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossiia* published two articles that aroused the anger of the new ideologists who supervised the Soviet press under Brezhnev. One article was published on July 13 and entitled "For a Drop of Poison," and the other appeared in the July 23 edition and was entitled "Someone Else's Pain"; both became the subject of discussion with the Propaganda Department. It criticized the former article, whose subject was the behavior of drug addicts in a provincial city, by arguing that the article "took up a great deal of space, counted on a sensationalistic appeal, and had an intriguing title."[17] The latter article told the story of the kidnapping of a child in Tomsk and the eventual apprehension of the kidnapper and child a few days later; likewise it contained "sensationalistic material, and counted on a backward and undemanding reader." The critic from the Propaganda Department cited approvingly an article that appeared in *Pravda* two days after the publication of "Someone Else's Pain" entitled "To Please Undemanding Tastes," which was nothing less than a frontal attack on the journalistic style encouraged by Adzhubei.

The unsigned *Pravda* article criticized the articles on several grounds. It pointed out that the second article's appearance showed poor editorial judgment because the kidnapping was no longer timely; the paper printed the article long after the case had been solved. Nevertheless they seemed to

"consider this event the main news of the day, giving it practically half a page!"[18] Still more serious than this was the article's tone, and here the editorialist takes aim at the journalism of the person.

> Central place was given to the descriptions of the lovesick and much-suffering life of the kidnapper. All its sentimental and flowery prose was used to move the reader to pity, to force him to sympathize with the criminal, to understand "someone else's pain." The article was even called "Someone Else's Pain."
>
> But we also need to understand the pain of an attentive but undemanding reader, when the newspapers offers him on its pages some completely useless reading, filled to the brim with sniveling sentimentality, mediocrity, and the obvious heated desire of the author to pander to the most undemanding tastes.

This criticism reveals the coexistence of two conflicting concepts of journalism's governing role. The *Sovetskaia Rossiia* journalists wrote according to the understandings of Adzhubei and the journalism of the person; they approached the story from the perspective of the "much-suffering life of the kidnapper" because the story of her frustrations opened a window on to the formation of socialist consciousness. The story of suffering was an avenue into the superiority of socialism. They took as their theme the problem of the person under socialism, and yet their readers in the Propaganda Department insisted on adherence to a more formal code of communication between journalist and reader, one based upon a more rigorous process of filtering and repackaging "negative phenomena." The *Pravda* editorialist did not believe that the journalists' goal of giving an account of some citizens' psychological problems helped readers form a proper understanding of their society, especially because after 1964 the newspaper was for something else, namely cementing readers' loyalty to the party. The journalists had projected images of readers, of the governed of Soviet society, as "petty," "undemanding," and "sentimental," as opposed to principled, cultured, and unemotional. In short, the journalists did not know what teaching was all about:

> In the elucidation of problems representing a social interest, including, of course, interests in the realm of ethics and morals, what is necessary is a respectful relationship to the reader, a feeling of measure and taste, which is the highest of journalistic responsibilities.

The editorialist here reminds the journalist of the formality and seriousness that needs to be maintained in the moment of contact between party and reader.

These articles and their subsequent criticism reveal one other vitally important aspect of the new relationship between party and journalists

that took shape after 1964: the issue of negative news. The *Pravda* editorialist was perhaps most angry about the way these articles seemed to imply the taking of pleasure in the imperfections of Soviet society. The editorial admits, on the one hand, that this event had once been news, and that the capture of the kidnapper had been worth mentioning as proof of the effectiveness of Soviet law enforcement agencies. But, on the other hand, the elaboration of the case long after its newsworthiness disappeared implied a kind of sensationalist exploitation, and that such exploitation had a negative impact on the consciousness of socialist readers. The editorialist argued that journalists, as providers of information, should never forget that the impact of negative news was to undermine the readers' confidence in the party and socialism.

The durability of this tension between the proper pedagogical missions of the press is indexed by the appearance seventeen years later, in February 1983, of a disagreement between the editor of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* and the head of Goskino, the state film production agency. The collection of correspondence concerned a *Sovetskaia Rossiia* article entitled "You Have to Take Them All Away," which criticized the showing of foreign gangster films like *Diva* and *The Godfather* in the Soviet Union. The article received a harsh response from F. T. Ermash, chairman of Goskino, who argued that these films were critical works that exposed the corruption of capitalist societies; in other words, they were effective means of counter-propaganda. In addition, he singled out *Diva* as a work of "high artistic quality and distinct humanist pathos." Mikhail Nenashev, editor of *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* then responded to Ermash with a copy to the Propaganda Department, in which he took up these arguments. He accepted that while the *Godfather's* theme music was quite good and was in fact heard all over Russian media, the film itself was terrible; in his view, "good music doesn't make a good film." The crux of his argument, though, was that

> Western films showing fighting among gangsters in no way can be treated as films exposing the plagues of capitalist society. According to the enormous number of letters received, most viewers liked the images of the sweet life, and thus the film is more like propaganda for Western morals and everyday life. So for Goskino to orient itself fairly often toward the purely diversionary side of the subject of Western entertainment, in an attempt to assert that the external side of the subject (like the fights in capitalist countries between state organs and the police, the corrupting of judges by gangsters) is an exposure of the workings of imperialism, well, this argument appears hardly convincing. We shouldn't forget the fact that film production [in the West] . . . serves as the basic means used by studios to amass vast profits.

And he went on to criticize the fact that many of these foreign films are not reviewed in appropriate publications, unlike Soviet films. "Thus the for-

mation of aesthetic tastes and of a communist world view among our viewers is truly hindered."[19]

It is clear that this conflict was between a concept of the socialist worldview and the convenient deployment of orthodoxy. Nenashev argued, against the head of Goskino, that if they wanted to keep the promise of socialism alive, then they would have to recognize the way such films served for Soviet viewers as sources of imaginary identifications. The argument that these films were good because they showed American society in such a bad light appeared cynical and misguided, and no doubt what informed his opinion was the certainty that after twenty years of Brezhnev, socialism was indeed in trouble, that few Soviet citizens cared much about being instructed in the superiority of socialism, for they did not take the film as "evidence" but as sources of pleasure and fascination.[20]

These two cases were moments when the tension that emerged from the removal of Khrushchev emerged into view, and they revealed the durability of the journalistic sensibility of the 1960s. There is evidence, however, that other instances of journalists practicing as best they could the journalism of the person—that journalistic style that would instruct the Soviet reader into a knowledge of the state of socialist construction—caused the Central Committee more complicated problems. Here, journalists' attempts to instruct by publicizing the case of an injustice done to a Soviet little man, and to intervene through the criticism of corrupt officials, could lead to not "stability in cadres," but to the Propaganda Department placating various provincial party officials, apologizing for the behavior of journalists, and chastising editors for allowing their writers so much license.

The January 8, 1970, edition of *Pravda* contains an article that appeared in the classic model of an activist journalist intervening in a case of injustice; it follows the same general form as the article by Ter-Minasova discussed in chapter 1. The journalist lets her character tell his story, with the journalist supplying the context and frame and presenting a description of the episode's larger significance. Entitled "Along the Stony Path," it tells the story of one such Soviet "little man" who entered *Pravda*'s offices in Ordzhonikidze in order to introduce himself and describe his problem: "Doctor Dzgoev from Karmadon. Well, I guess I should say simply a doctor without work."[21]

Dzgoev was a clearly a positive hero: he is "youngish but has completely gray hair," and has the "lively eyes and the swarthy face of the inhabitants of the mountains." Dr. Dzgoev was a well-known writer of several books about the mineral water spa he dedicated his life to making accessible to anyone suffering from complaints of the muscles and bones, and chose this path in life after witnessing the miraculous cure of his father's rheumatism by the mineral springs of Karmadon. He dedicated himself to

creating a spa at the springs where his father was cured; this involved overcoming the indifference and skepticism of many people and institutions, not to mention the hardships of the mountain climate and geography. The authors emphasize that Dzgoev believed in the powers of the waters, and that this belief sustained him. His success was apparent in the objects that covered the walls of his office at the spa:

> In the small office of the head doctor there is an astonishing collection of items that have accumulated over time: canes, walking sticks, crutches, thrown away as being of no use by those leaving the spa. To Doctor Dzgoev, this collection is better than any decoration; it undoubtedly best embodies his youthful dream: to give people health.

Only in the final column of the long, four column article are the specifics of Dzgoev's present situation laid out: the doctor has been removed from his position as head of the spa, and he has turned to the party's most important newspaper for help.

As with so many "little men" in Soviet society, the injustice that has deprived Dzgoev from his life's work is portrayed in terms of the ill-performed work of bureaucrats; the "case" against Dzgoev is referred to literally, and thus pejoratively, as papers lying between the covers of a "pink folder." For the *Pravda* journalists, Dzgoev's innocence was proven by his goodness, which the journalist has already amply demonstrated, and thus the entire process that produced the criticism of Dzgoev became merely a matter of tracing out and refuting the accusations. He was accused of "breaking rules of economic-financial activities over the course of five years." The authors pointed out the ill-informed nature of this accusation by stating that during the second half of this period, Dzgoev "was abroad, honestly fulfilling the duties of a Soviet doctor." Just as Demidov had displayed moments of weakness even after he had "become a person," so too had Dzgoev made some mistakes:

> So a person at some point made a few mistakes at work, was punished for them, but then after three years these mistakes become the basis for firing him? This isn't very logical. And not very just. All the more so since it was a matter of mistakes and not misuse of funds or personal greed.

The only person mentioned in the article who agreed with the decision to relieve Dzgoev of his position was the new boss of the spa, who refused to employ him and who believed that the material in the pink folder proved Dzgoev's unfitness for the job. The authors then destroyed the credibility of this witness by pointing out casually that "by the way, Tsallagov is new to the department. He has never worked a day with Dzgoev. Before com-

ing there, he only knew about Karmadon by word of mouth. But the material in the pink folder is enough to tear someone away from the work of his entire life. With a stroke of the pen, this man was relieved from his life's work." The final paragraph of the article reads:

> This story has a happy ending. After the involvement of *Pravda,* the North Ossetia oblast' trade union council not long ago restored U. S. Dzgoev to the position of chief doctor at Karmadon. We decided to write about this so that a such a story would not take place again.

For the reader of *Pravda,* and presumably for the editor who approved its publication, it thus appeared another case of journalism's positive intervention in society, redressing wrongs done to a typically remarkable socialist person. Of course, no details are given, no individual other than Tsallagov is identified as the actual source of the decision to dismiss Dzgoev. No specific bureaucratic interests are portrayed; rather, the guilt is focused on the human misfortune of bureaucracy, symbolized by the pink folder, which cannot act according to the moral worth of the person.

But despite the claims of the authors, Dzgoev's case did not end with *Pravda*'s intervention, for immediately after the article's publication, the North Ossetian oblast' committee wrote to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, objecting strenuously to the article, thus initiating an investigation of the issues that would take eight months to sort out. In August 1970, a summary of the case written by the Propaganda Department reported that the oblast' party committee was angered by *Pravda*'s intervention in the Dzgoev affair, as the paper "unfoundedly took up the defense of the former chief doctor at the spa Karmadon, Comrade Dzgoev."[22] Eventually a meeting took place between the first secretary of the obkom and the editor of *Pravda,* and a solution was reached. *Pravda* gave up its interest in Dzgoev, and the North Ossetia obkom promised to find a job for him. A final footnote was provided by a letter dated almost exactly a year after the article first appeared, written by one of the assistant editors of *Pravda,* who described the meeting that had taken place with the paper's editorial board and the journalists who wrote the article. He described how the authors were criticized for allowing "certain factual inaccuracies" and providing "incorrect emphasis." The editors indicated to the authors of the article the necessity of more "carefully and attentively attending to the checking of facts in the preparation of material for the press."[23]

Pravda intervened on Dzgoev's behalf because they found the outlines of his case ideal for the display of an activist journalism, showing readers that Soviet persons could find justice by turning to the press. Such articles portrayed journalists as effective critics and actors, and yet it is apparent that the journalists entered into what appears to be an intricate set of rela-

tionships involving Dzgoev, the oblast' committee and its first secretary, and the spa's new managers, and that the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee was called upon to manage the disruption caused by this defense of the little man. The local party organization in this case hardly reacted with unquestioning obedience to the intervention of the press, but to the contrary, it fought back and succeeded in preventing Dzgoev from gaining his position back. It seems that the local party officials did not view the journalists from the party's most important newspaper as powerful representatives of the party leadership but more as a nuisance, as people with the power to disrupt and inconvenience their work.

A second example of journalists causing trouble for the Propaganda Department by adopting a critical and suspicious stance occurred in 1981, when two *Sovetskaia Rossiia* journalists traveled to the Siberian city of Omsk in order to follow up certain anonymous letters that denounced the luxurious life of the head of a building trust. Their article, entitled simply "Connivance," tells the story of Anatolii Nikolaevich Kanashov, who from the article's opening paragraph was portrayed as a Soviet bureaucrat in trouble.

> With wide, powerful steps, he enters his office each morning as he did before. Seeing him, people lower their eyes. The waiting room, always full of people, is empty these days—people now go to the chief engineer with all their important business. The numerous telephones on his desk ring much less often now. Having talked for a few minutes on the phone, he goes out into the corridor, opens a door, and in an unusually subdued voice makes a request or gives a direction. Hearing him, people turn away their glances. Formally, he's not the former, but the current, director of the city's most powerful building company. But important documents request the signature of the chief engineer. These days he's waiting for a decision from the office of the *gorkom* [city party committee]. Other people are waiting for the decision too. And not only his subordinates, but also his direct superiors, colleagues.[24]

From this rather ominous opening it is clear that Kanashov is in the midst of his downfall, no longer signing important papers, no longer receiving eye contact from his staff. But the authors, special correspondents Burov and Potapenko from Moscow, do not really present the case against Kanashov. They did not approach the case with the goal of marshalling evidence and weighing its quality, but rather to use whatever facts they found to construct a larger, educative point. They admit that "it's not worth it to lay out the details of our hunt for 'details.'" The implication is that "it's not worth it" because journalists cannot "prove" anything in the same way that a prosecutor can. They admit that a judicial case was underway against him but define their task in different terms.

The result is that the article veers back and forth from a focus on Kanashov to a focus on a larger problem, only indexed by Kanashov, which,

the authors conclude, is the fact that Kanashov was helped in his morally suspect activities by the more or less active assistance of others. This is the conclusion they reach after their study of the case, based on conversations they had with Kanashov's friends and colleagues.

They admit that summarizing the case was difficult not only because these kinds of cases are initiated in closed meetings of party committees, but also because, it turns out, Kanashov is actually a good manager. Sensing this apparent contradiction, the authors add parenthetically, "We do not mean [to criticize] his actions concerning his work, which was visible to all and which deserved and received high awards." The problem, they suggest, is deeper than this. "You will not say that he 'made a mistake,' or that he 'overstepped his bounds'[. . . .] Mistake, accident, these words signify a single action, at one time. In his actions [. . .] that were hidden, or so it seemed to him although they were visible to many, in his actions there was a system, a consistency, a logic. A system of narrow pedantry [*krokhoborstvo*], the consistency of a self-seeker, a logic that permits everything."

The only direct speech from Kanashov in the article is what he told the correspondents upon their first and only meeting: "Two months ago, when people first started coming forward with complaints to the directors, they asked me, 'Has anyone written about you?' And even though I'm not superstitious, I spit three times over my left shoulder, and said, 'So far, nothing.'" But then the authors add, with some satisfaction it appears: "It wasn't nothing for long." People began writing letters to the Omsk city party committee complaining about Kanashov, and these letters started his fall.

The authors began to circle in on the "connivance" theme of the article's title when they pursued some of the rumors about Kanashov's venality. These involve allegations that he added an expensive linoleum floor to his kitchen, that he added a veranda on to his dacha, and that he had a lavish fiftieth birthday party on board a riverboat tied up at its dock for the winter. Each of these misdeeds is evoked with a descriptive passage, such as, "The sounds of the orchestra were heard far away, the lights of the triple-decker steamship were visible from far away, where the chief celebrated his jubilee birthday. Not alone, not in a narrow circle of family[. . . .] We had no luck in finding out who gave their permission that such a ship tied up at the dock for the winter was to be prepared for such an important event." They describe their interactions with two bureaucrats who were investigating Kanashov and with the manager of a vacation camp where Kanashov had built his dacha. These men hardly provided damning evidence against him, and yet after several encounters, each represented in a similarly brief fashion, the authors arrive at the conclusion that what is so important is not Kanashov, but people's attitudes toward him. "What is surprising is

something else: the unwillingness to give some kind of evaluation to what has occurred, the striving not to associate these acts of Kanashov to anyone but Kanashov himself."

What is emerging is the connivance theme, and to drive this point home, they quote the manager of the vacation camp where Kanashov had his cottage built. "Anatolii Nikolaevich came here very rarely [. . .] he never gave direct orders that this little house was his personally . . . In exceptional circumstances, when we were full up, I would ask Anatolii Nikolaevich if we could rent his cottage out, too." Despite the implication that Kanashov is at times generous with his cottage, this encounter reveals to Burov and Potapenko the loyalty of the manager to Kanashov. They then ask, "Isn't the desire to always serve one person at any minute even at the expense of many others, isn't this too connivance?"

Burov and Potapenko conclude that the central problem raised by cases such as Kanashov's concerns the nature of moral influence in Soviet society. They ask, how can people in the workplace and in the party cell discuss the behavior, even the personal behavior, of individuals with whom they work, and who work hard and are skilled, but who display fundamental moral flaws? The problems are admittedly difficult on the level of the shop floor or office, when work relationships are intertwined with personal relationships. But the authors find reasons to be even more concerned. They point out that the oblast' party committee wrote a decree about Kanashov's case and directed the Omsk city committee to review the matter. "It is not for us to doubt the justice and expediency of this decree, but here's what calls forth a certain anxiety: the primary party organization, of which Kanashov was himself a member, this time stood aside . . ."[25] The party organization in Kanashov's workplace, which should have had the most interest in keeping itself clean, abstained from any action. The ellipsis has a certain ominous quality to it, suggesting that in all probability nothing has changed, that the dimensions of the problem are still vast, that perhaps the ranks of the connivers include individuals with high-level party jobs. It implies not so much connivance as conspiracy.

The authors conclude by returning to the sources of the original accusations made against Kanashov, the letters received by the city committee. They admit that some people (including Kanashov) believe that the letters of complaint about him are efforts to get revenge on a strict, perhaps overly demanding, boss. But the authors state that there is another reason for the "signals" given in these letters: "genuine worry of the authors of the letters about the cleanliness of the ranks of the party, about the authority of the present director; people's deep conviction that party-mindedness and moral integrity is not a slogan, but an unbreakable law of inner party life. It is this opinion that seems to us most probable." And it is, of course, this opinion

that justifies their involvement in the case in the first place. The journalists thus become channels through which legitimately concerned citizens speak about "the cleanliness of the ranks of the party," a concern that seems several orders of magnitude removed from the misdeeds of one man, or even of the small circle of people who are asserted to be conniving with him.

While there was no way for a reader of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* to know, unless perhaps they lived in Omsk, the day after this article appeared Kanashov committed suicide. In the suicide note found in his pocket, Kanashov insisted that he did not have his hands in the state's coffers, and asked the authorities to make sure his family was informed that he felt himself innocent. He went on:

> For my whole conscious life I struggled to work not with words but with deeds; at work I didn't steal anything but gave it my all. And now it's come to this. After this, I simply don't have enough physical and moral strength to survive, and therefore have made the hard choice—to leave life. My party card is in the safe, the key to the safe is in my pocket. In the press I've been represented as a speculator, and as you know, it's impossible to argue with the press. Again I want to repeat that to terrorize me not with party and administrative discipline but with newspaper trash yesterday in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* and tomorrow on the pages of the local newspaper, here where I've lived my whole life. I consider this fundamentally unjust, when one or two people can judge a worker on his whole life.[26]

Kanashov's case then became the subject of discussion within a triangle composed of the local party committees, *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* and the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, with the correspondence from the obkom clearly revealing that they thought the newspaper overstepped its authority in this case. The city party committee had told the journalists that the matter was under supervision and that disciplinary action was being discussed. And yet the journalists obviously worried that the investigation might itself represent the connivance they were worried about in the first place. In the face of this criticism, the editor-in-chief of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* defended his journalists:

> The paper's attention to this theme was neither accidental nor hurried. Reason for attention to this topic was given in a letter received by this paper's Omsk office in August of this year, in which were presented serious misdeeds that were being concealed by the oblast's People's Control Commission. Review of local facts showed that unhealthy circumstances had existed there for a prolonged period of time.

As to why exactly Kanashov committed suicide, the Omsk oblast' committee concluded "that the unjust haste in the publication of the article, the extreme tone of its evaluation, including other various facts, including

the personality of Kanashov A. N., led to this tragic outcome." By citing Kanashov's personality, the party committee implied that Kanashov was an emotionally fragile individual who, it appears, committed suicide because of an inability to tolerate the burden of shame the article placed upon him. But by pointing out "the extreme tone of the article," which represented Kanashov as occupying the center of concentric circles of connivance, the oblast' party committee was pointing out that Kanashov's fate was the result of a journalistic style that sought to make a crucial intervention in not only the operation of the Omsk party committee but also in the understandings of anyone remotely connected to Kanashov and his organization. This was not simply teaching, but a powerful indictment of the way the Soviet system operated: far from achieving a standard of moral conduct that would enable a socialist culture, Soviet citizens in their everyday life support and sanction a system that subverts the kind of moral behavior demanded by a socialist way of life. Such an article appears as almost militant in its denunciation of the party's inability to act. The journalists and the editors that stood by the article appear as critics, but critics without any positive, reassuring message.

What the articles about Dzgoev and Kanashov evoke is the friction created by the crosscutting interests of press and party. In the context of the ideological orthodoxy that became under Brezhnev the essence of the party's message, criticism caused problems because the party had little sense of itself as channeling the flow of the fluid situations of socialism. Journalists had the best seats to witness the party's creeping sclerosis, and this gave journalists and editors who shared a sense of disappointment at the fate of the Soviet sixties a kind of license, for they knew that the party could not very well renounce the work of journalistic investigation into the shortcomings of Soviet society, even as they had no real use for it.

A sense of the awkwardness of journalists' positions in the ideological landscape of the Brezhnev era appeared not only in the archival traces left by articles like those discussed above, but in other Propaganda Department material, as well as in nearly every conversation I had with journalists that touched on the "era of stagnation." For example, archival material showed how journalists could be both witnesses to and victims of the dysfunction of local party leaders. A pathos-filled image of how the relationship between local party officials and journalists could go wrong appeared in a plaintive letter written by the editor of a paper from Smolensk oblast' to the vice director of the Propaganda Department, I. A. Zubkov, in January 1974. The letter amounted to a candid confession of the situation at his paper and a damning criticism of the party leadership in his district: "Party principledness compels me to write to you about everything that has been worrying me, as director of the newspaper, and to express my

point of view." He began by pointing out that the social and economic situation in his district was not very good, its population and production were falling, and such a serious situation made the newspaper even more important. "Yet from the day of the paper's creation in 1965, there hasn't been one moment when the paper appeared among the finer district and city newspapers. This could not but worry me, as editor." He cites two reasons for this situation: first, the weakness of the newspaper staff, and second, the weakness of the local party's direction of the paper, since "not once has the paper received the required support from the party committee." But the party leaders in the district, led by first secretary Voroshilin, ignored the situation and even assigned the newspaper's staff to other kinds of work, such as fixing sidewalks, harvesting grain, and planting trees. The first secretary even refused to allow the editor to go to journalism seminars. "The paper used to have a number of activists and worker-peasant correspondents, but at a number of meetings the first secretary threw some unflattering words in their direction, and now the activists have gradually fallen away, and those that continue to write request that they be published under a pseudonym." There were even episodes when the first secretary decreed that he did not have to respond to critical articles in the press; and workers in the sovkhoz were made to view the newspaper staff as meddlers, as collectors and fabricators of rumors. He also reassigned the driver of the newspaper's car to another organization. If there was a last straw, it was a confrontation between himself and the first secretary, in which the secretary threatened to fire him if he dared complain to the Central Committee. "Thus, breaking all norms of democratic and party ethics, the first secretary trampled me, as a person, not to speak as a communist and editor." He concluded his plea by referring to the fact that nine months ago he had been in Moscow for a refresher course for party workers, and that his instructor, Comrade Zubkov, had appeared before them and "spoken about that great role that the press must play in this stage of socialist construction . . . It is truly a shame that we in our district have not been able to make the proper conclusions from these speeches emanating from the central organ of our party. And this even with the fact that our paper is read by every fifth member of the district's population!"[27]

The Propaganda Department's investigation confirmed the situation described in such pathetic terms by the editor. The department's final report came down hard on the local party leader, Voroshilin, who, it said, seemed to think that it was only for journalists to work on the newspaper, only for correspondents to write articles for the press, while in fact it was the duty of every party worker and especially the party leader to take an active interest in the contents of the paper. The local party committee paid no attention to the choice of staff and ignored pressing tasks like the im-

provement of agricultural yields. "The majority of articles in the paper . . . use a mass of meaningless facts that frequently go unanalyzed by the authors. The conclusions of these articles notwithstanding their sounding so categorical, are often banal, abstract, and poorly argued. Often they give trivial recommendations, like 'work harder,' 'give more attention,' 'feed and water the animals on time,' 'plow deeper,' and so on." The poor supervision and leadership from the party first secretary "does not permit journalists to concentrate on the publication of the paper; it calls forth irritableness, it harms the creation of a genuinely creative atmosphere within the collective . . . The result of all this is that there is not a surplus of material waiting to be published, often there is not enough material to fill the current issue. Half of many issues are filled only thanks to TASS material."[28] The problem for the Propaganda Department was Voroshilin's apparent unwillingness to see journalists as relevant to any dimension of the party's activity, and here was more evidence that the agenda of ideologizing the press was far from successful.

A story of E. Alexandrov, who worked at *Sovetskaia Rossiia* during the 1970s and early 1980s, confirmed that it was not only journalists in the provinces who could be ignored by important party officials.[29] This had been one of the more absurd moments of his whole career, when the fiction of the close cooperation between party and press was revealed in glaring terms.

> I was sent in 1978 to Tula, in order to conduct an important interview with the first secretary of the Tula oblast' party committee. I describe how I arrived there but was never taken to him; nor was I given any documents or material to work with. After a couple of days of confused contact with the first secretary's assistants, and seeing my deadline approaching, finally I sat down and wrote out the questions I was going to ask him, and then I wrote down his answers. I showed it to the great man's assistant, and he read what I had written and said, "Very good! Now the only thing you need to add is a short citation from Brezhnev." Then without even showing it to his boss, he had the interview sent to my paper's offices Moscow. Only later did the assistant show it to the first secretary, who made several small changes that were then phoned in. I, along with four other journalists, met the secretary the next day at a quasi-news conference, after the edition with the interview had already come out. He greeted me personally and praised my interview, telling everyone that it was so important to work with the press, and that it was impossible to refuse the request of so important a paper as *Komsomol'skaia pravda.* All the same, I knew that what he could actually tell me would be no better than what I wrote.

One wonders what feature of the story is more comically absurd: that Alexandrov felt compelled to write the text of an interview that never took place, or that he was able to do this so well that his supposed interlocutor

made just a few corrections and, in fact, played along with Alexandrov's fiction at the news conference after the interview's publication. On the one side, Alexandrov shows himself as a skilled writer, who, having mastered the formulas and turns of phrase required by the supervisors of the press in the Central Committee, could produce on demand one of the required genres of text that represented "reporting" on Soviet reality, and on the other side, there is a local party boss who appears as a potentate shielded by his subordinates from any contact with a journalist authorized by his own party to publicize his work.

Vladimir Denisov, who had worked at *Izvestiia* since the 1960s, captured the relationship between the party and press under Brezhnev with an image from the lexicon of military tactics. He said that the press engaged the party as one army engages another in a policy of the "contact defense." This described two opposing and unequal units that were locked together in constant contact, with one side on the offensive and the other on the defensive. The party, of course, was the more powerful of the two forces and closely monitored journalists for the slightest hint of criticism, and yet wherever there was the slightest weakening of the party, the press instantly took advantage of it. Within the context of the newspaper office, one side consisted of the paper's editor, whose job was to represent the interests of the party, and on the other side was the journalist. Alexandrov echoed Denisov's sense of the open conflict that existed between the two forces. "When I wrote my material, I oriented myself not to that person who would open up the newspaper and read it, but to that person who would either take or reject my article. I had to deceive him . . . no matter how good a relationship I had with him, I knew my task was to get around him." This demanded a high level of literary skill on the part of journalists in order to slip something critical into their texts. This was not only something that journalists cultivated; naturally enough it was also something that editors learned to look for. Journalism became less a sphere of give and take between editors and writers, and more a context of subdued confrontation between a desire to report on reality and the need to ensure that any reference to the world made its way through a series of ideological prisms that made the reference orthodox and safe.

Journalists also knew that displeasing their editors or their editors' supervisors in the Central Committee could have serious consequences, and that the Central Committee knew how to manipulate journalists in the search for ideological purity. Denisov gave me the example of Vladimir Osipov, who during the 1960s had been *Izvestiia*'s correspondent in Britain. He had written a book about British society that had displeased certain people in the Central Committee, and so Osipov lost the ability to receive visas to travel abroad. He was not accused of anything, rather he

was simply denied the right to go back to work in London. The Central Committee then made it clear that he could rehabilitate himself by directing the work of producing slanderous articles about Andrei Sakharov. Less than a week after accepting this work, Osipov died of a heart attack at the age of forty-nine.[30]

Looked at from a distance, all these cases and stories refer to journalists' estrangement from the image of their profession as it was defined in the 1920s and as it was rearticulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Journalists discovered in the 1970s that party leaders did not agree that the party's main task was to overcome the Stalinist legacy and return to the party's identity as it was defined by Lenin and the revolution; as the party's faithful and intimate servants, they were in a position to see how the party's own embrace of consistency, continuity, and "stability in cadres" represented an avoidance of the troubling question, how should the socialist project be rethought in changing international and domestic circumstances. All this led to a paradoxical situation in which a press that had been designed for activism, and that during the 1960s imagined itself as an active partner in the government of Soviet society, was harnessed to the task of repeating orthodoxies. And yet as the article about Kanashov shows, however, the party's distrust of journalism strengthened many journalists' combative instincts; by the early 1980s, some editors realized that they were in a position to orchestrate criticism of lower party organs and officials as long as they did not go so far as to openly criticize the party leadership. Alexandrov, in fact, described *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in those days as the "most fearful newspaper for bureaucrats," and stated that his first article for them had been deemed not critical *enough.* These instances of criticism were significant not so much in changing the party's attitude, but in maintaining for the community of journalists a sense of their connection to a governing mission, however attenuated it had become within the larger operation of Soviet government.

There was, however, another source of interest and distraction, and this was the dilemma forced on both Soviet journalists and ideologists by changing technologies of communications that challenged the Soviet Union's existence as a separate informational universe.

INFORMATION, PLEASE

Accidental timings are significant: it was during the Brezhnev era that the major shift in the media systems of industrial societies took place, a shift that many writers have described as having far-reaching consequences for the nature of politics, culture, and consciousness. This is the shift in what Régis Debray refers to as "mediaspheres," in this case from a mediasphere defined by print to one defined by the image. In the 1970s it was

impossible for important figures in Soviet journalism not to notice that their press institutions, procedures, and beliefs did not easily adapt to the informational climate created by the electronic transmission of sound and images. A newspaper held text that needed reading and deciphering; watching television was an entirely different kind of social and cognitive act, one that was in a sense perfectly suited to Brezhnev's ideological interests. What the television did do well, for example, was to facilitate an endless recycling of patriotic, tragic, and inspiring films about the hardships of earlier decades and their projection into living rooms from Smolensk to Vladivostok. The television of the late Soviet years was one of many sites for what Nina Tumarkin refers to as the leadership's strategy of co-opting the younger generation into feeling a sense of gratitude, shame, and guilt about their own lives of relative comfort and ease. It was less clear how television should deal with the socialist present.

The rise of the televisual in the West was made possible by whole chains of technological inventions that changed the rate at which information could be created, edited, disseminated, and consumed, so that even something primarily textual like the press was itself transformed as it became possible for editors to print greater amounts of more current information and to choose from an ever-increasing flow of images and graphics showing events that were only hours old. This involved a general acceleration of the rate of flow of information both within and between societies. And perhaps the central characteristic of this shift from print technologies to image technologies, that is, from technologies that stressed linguistic symbols to ones that embodied traces of apparently unmediated presence, was their indifference to national borders. Radio waves could not be stopped, but only interfered with; communications satellites meant that the salience of border areas as zones of information overlap was diminished, as national territories became projections glimpsed from thousands of miles in space, areas that could be covered with information.[31]

These technologies challenged the party's ability to supervise and control the information consumed by Soviet citizens and presented the more abstract problem of learning to understand how communications technologies redefined the conditions of competition between systems. For this was a significant shift: Adzhubei facilitated reporting *about* the world, while Brezhnev's ideological watchdogs were confronted with reports *from* the world. The party was forced to acknowledge that citizens' judgments about their own society was being affected by images and arguments from abroad. This shift did not, of course, suddenly cause problems with information; rather, it exacerbated them, gave them a new twist. And in dealing with these problems, the party was constrained by two positions: the first was the critique inherited from the revolutionary era that news articles and items were hardly an inconsequential press genre, that news was knowl-

edge, and that the press had a duty to consider the relationship of current events knowledge to the socialist project. The second position acknowledged that the task for the party in the 1970s was less to win people over to socialism than to manage Soviet citizens' feelings of complete indifference to it. Again, a great part of the problem lay with what to do about "bad" news, news of natural disasters, industrial accidents, and transportation crashes of various kinds. It had been a policy of the Soviet press since the beginning not to print such negative news, as it was believed that it fostered sentiments of fear, uncertainty, and suspicion, that did not lend themselves to the task of building socialism.

Soviet leaders understood that there were structural problems in the ways that news and information were disseminated in the Soviet Union. The following example underscores the difficulty of operating simultaneously according to a set of priorities defined in the 1920s—when the imperative of contrasting the realities of socialist and capitalist societies was established in the Soviet press—in the context of the 1960s, when the shortcomings of daily life in the Soviet Union were not so easily dismissed as being the product of an early stage of socialist construction.

A general critique of the unfortunate handling of news and information by Soviet media institutions is contained in a letter from the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, P. E. Shelest', written in April 1965, where he complained about the publication of news about mine disasters. The target of his criticism was the practice of reporting on European mine disasters in a country in which there were twenty-five to thirty major mining accidents per year, many of which occurred in Ukraine. He wrote that he fully agreed with the general policy of not reporting this kind of negative news in the press, but the problem, he argued, lay elsewhere: not infrequently, national papers printed reports of these foreign disasters on the very days on which either a Soviet disaster had occurred or rescue operations were underway to find survivors of Soviet disasters that took place only days or weeks earlier. He writes:

> For example, on 17 November, 1963, an explosion in a mine [in Ukraine] killed eleven and left 18 wounded. On that day in *Izvestiia* under the headline 'Victims of catastrophe' was a report about a mine collapse in Belgium that left two miners dead. And on 25 of January, 1965, another Soviet disaster occurred that claimed thirteen lives, and by February 10, eleven lives had been saved. Yet on February 3, *Izvestiia* published a report a mine accident in France . . . In 1963–64, *Pravda, Izvestiia,* and *Trud,* published almost fifty reports of accidents in the mines of capitalist countries, many of which took place simultaneously with unfortunate events in the coal industries of Ukraine. This creates an unhealthy mood among certain groups of workers and gives a reason for many people to express undesirable sentiments.[32]

He concluded with a request that Soviet press and broadcast institutions only report on foreign mining accidents when they were sure that no similar misfortune had recently occurred in the Soviet Union.

Shelest's letter is an example of the way the informational policies of the Soviet government operated to produce an image of the party as callous and insensitive. He did not say that there should be a reduction in the reporting of disasters in the West, for these reports gave Soviet readers the opportunity to compare their society with the West, to remind them that capitalist states are the scenes of numerous misfortunes of all sizes and kinds. And yet Shelest' was worrying about the population of his republic making another kind of comparison: in his words, "They [the Soviet press] can inform the entire Soviet Union about two people in Belgium, but they can't say a word about eleven people dying in the Donbass."

The situation Shelest' described came about in large measure as a consequence of the radial diagram of Soviet government. It was difficult if not impossible for a paper like *Izvestiia* or *Pravda,* whose audience was the entire Soviet Union, to take into account how a given item might be read in a specific locality. This kind of problem only became more marked in the 1970s, as the editors of central papers grappled with the problem of how to deal with the quickening flow of information about world events, a flow that in part reflected improved technologies but also the Soviet Union's deeper commitment to confronting the West over the world's governance. But it was not simply the need to print a steady supply of news of foreign disasters that caused problems; *all* international news challenged Soviet habits of working with information, and many of the most serious critics of these habits were journalists who were either *mezhdunarodniks,* or Soviet foreign correspondents, or were columnists who specialized in foreign affairs.

In a 1970 letter to the Propaganda Department *Izvestiia's* correspondent in France, S. Zykov, expressed concern that the Soviet press was not responding adequately to shifts in the ways that capitalist states were supplying world news to their readers. His main suggestion was that the Propaganda Department allow an increase in the number of pages in each issue of *Izvestiia,* even if it meant reducing the size of its overall circulation, because "in contemporary conditions, *Izvestiia* is simply not a weapon of high enough caliber." The main reason for its weakness was that it had not changed its approach in response to the fact that other media had surpassed it in the ability to deliver news. The question Zykov posed was why *Izvestiia* continued to pretend that it reported "news" at all. Soviet radio, local newspapers, and foreign radio broadcasts all provided Soviet citizens with knowledge of events happening in the world; *Izvestiia,* by contrast, reached many subscribers two and three days after publication. And tradi-

tionally *Izvestiia* had given great attention to international issues, with articles, reviews, and correspondence responding to the events. "But today the reader gets something else, he finds in the paper a scattering of reporting about events he has already heard about, and the very minimum of explanation." This is unfortunate because

> [w]ith each passing year, the interest of the Soviet people in the problems of foreign policy grows. Connections with foreign countries are proliferating. The international situation is itself becoming more complicated. Those areas in which we are entering into constant contact with the outside world and which did not exist before the war, are multiplying; take for example the existence of socialist countries. All this demands a deeper and more multifaceted analysis of international problems. *Izvestiia* has the potential to solve the problems, to respond to the contemporary situation . . . But the editors are only able to publish but a small part of the correspondence that it receives, its offices use material irrationally, without tapping into its full strength.

Zykov concluded by pointing out to the Propaganda Department one tendency that was occurring in all foreign countries.

> In conditions of the development of such massive means of communication as television and radio, the circulation of the daily press is falling. At the same time newspapers are increasing their size: being unable to compete with radio and television in the speed of supplying information, they are striving to take revenge on these other media at the expense of more detailed analyses of international events and by strengthening anti-communist and anti-Soviet slander. It is impossible not to take this into account as well.[33]

Zykov argued that Western papers, in an effort to compete with radio and TV, were changing their styles toward a simpler, faster kind of press, perfect for the expression of a virulent anti-communism. The fact that "anti-Soviet slander" was a major part of the shift in the overall media climate in Western countries demanded that the Soviet authorities respond. And a few months later the Propaganda Department did respond: "We consider this suggestion inexpedient, since for its realization a limit would have to be placed on subscriptions."[34] Here the Propaganda Department obviously took the easier course: it was far simpler to argue that the paper needed to reach as many readers as possible than to acknowledge the deeper question about how the Soviet media should respond to the changing conditions of the global production of information.

This question about how to redefine the mode by which Soviet readers were governed through journalism appeared in a detailed letter that Aleksandr Chakovskii wrote to Brezhnev in September 1970. Chakovskii was at the time editor-in-chief of the Soviet Union's weekly newspaper

Literaturnaia gazeta, as well as a popular socialist realist novelist.[35] Chakovskii tried to think through the ways that the Soviet media contributed to the alienation of Soviet citizens and to imagine how Soviet institutions might operate on the terrain of information in ways that would satisfy what appeared a pent-up desire for Soviet citizens to form their own picture of the world. The core of the problem was how this process would not ultimately end up reflecting badly on the Soviet system. It was one thing to continue the tradition of not printing negative news, but it was another task altogether to figure out how readers and viewers might be given a picture of contemporary Soviet life that would not undermine the party's leading role.

He began by reminding Brezhnev that they had promised each other to have a long, honest chat about the state of the country but had not gotten around to it since the general secretary had been so busy, and so finally Chakovskii decided to set down in writing those thoughts that had been weighing on him for so long. What follows is an examination and thorough critique of the Bolshevik tradition of the press as it continued to operate not only in print media but also in television and radio, as well as a proposal consisting of several concrete steps that could be taken to address these serious shortcomings. He acknowledged that the subject had already been examined by the Central Committee, which had made a number of decisions on the topic, and yet he wrote that he "will take upon himself the courage to report that in practice, no cardinal changes have taken place." Thus he decided to take up the "problem of information as a whole, that is, in its ideological, methodological, and organizational aspects." The main problem was that "if you understand information as a part of its own kind of 'war with facts,' as part of a general ideological struggle, then we must recognize that we are systematically losing the fight. We might have undoubted successes in the ideological struggle as a whole, but in the area of the 'competition of information' we remain losers almost all the time."[36]

At the center of Chakovskii's analysis was the fact that during the 1960s, foreign governments sought to undermine the confidence of Soviet people in their communications institutions by using radio to speak directly to Soviet citizens. It was not possible, Chakovskii insisted, to create some kind of technological shell around the Soviet Union, and therefore "it is necessary to look the truth in the eye: bourgeois programs in Russian are listened to by not a small part of the Soviet population. . . . And when you take into account the natural 'chain reaction' that occurs, then it is clear how harmful it would be to underestimate the size of that 'orbit' of Western information into which Soviet people are directly or indirectly drawn."

The danger of these broadcasts lay not only in their overt propagandis-

tic appeal; this was less important than the simple fact of Soviet citizens encountering "bourgeois information." "Information thus appears as the first echelon of bourgeois propaganda. It is like a 'plow' that turns the soil of people's consciousness, preparing it for the second echelon, that is, subsequent anti-Soviet 'reflections,' 'observations,' and so on." It is this first "echelon" that worried Chakovskii most, because this information was not overtly ideological, but rather lively and interesting. Foreign information aroused curiosity, and to this degree it was in stark contrast to what was found in the Soviet press.

> The more boring and formal our newspapers, radio, television, and oral propaganda are; the more thoughtlessly they follow those forms which were developed in the 30s and 40s, that is, in circumstances in many ways different from today's; the more infrequently they address the difficult questions of everyday life, the more our people turn—and unfortunately will turn—to means of information accessible to them. No matter what kind of healthy biases Soviet people have against the bourgeois radio programs, the information they contain does not proceed and cannot proceed without cost to the spiritual health of the listeners.

According to Chakovskii, these radio broadcasts were made in such a fashion as to be particularly attractive to Soviet listeners. First of all, they appeared objective because they included reports that were critical of events occurring in the very countries that the broadcasts emanated from. Sometimes they even appeared to make positive comments about one side of a political struggle that the logic of class analysis predicted they would oppose. They also counted on the fact that Soviet journalists sought to educate people with positive examples, so that information from the West about negative events, such as "plane crashes or local catastrophes or approaches to the West by this or that dissident," reported in "an emphasized tone of the everyday, will become a sensation." He implied that they aroused a kind of thirst in the Soviet public for information that at the present time the Soviet media on its own cannot quench. The "organizers of bourgeois information" also recognized that

> there is a continuing lack of correspondence in our country between the whole range of efforts to foster democratic education, to bring the mass of the people into government, to wake up their creative initiative, and the practical work of the Soviet press, radio and television. For our enemies, the uninteresting quality of the press, the lack of anything impressive, the dryness of our theoretical articles, which are often torn from any real events and concrete practice of ideological struggle, the fact that it is full of slogans repeated a hundred times, all this is well known. The opponent, without a doubt, counts on the fact that, let's say, our special informational programs on radio and television are mechanically produced like at the beginning of

the 1930s. . . . Unfortunately, in these cases we find ourselves in the power of formalism and routine.

The impression is created that the leaders of our organs of the press, radio, and television do not take into account in the conduct of their work not only the changes that have occurred in the country in comparison to the epoch of the first five year plan, but also those corresponding to changes in the psychology of the people.

At the beginning of the 30s even laconic reports about the building of a new apartment building, that this or that factory over fulfilled the plan, that this or that kolkhoz successfully collected the harvest, had immense emotional impact on the reader or radio listener.

And this was natural. The question of "*kto kogo*" [who (is beating) whom?] had been decided, the entire country lived in the zeal for industrialization and collectivization, people knew that victories in production had been achieved by heroic struggles . . . But today, in completely different circumstances, when we begin the 'latest news' or the program *Vremia* with dry announcements that this or that textile factory made so many meters of fabric above the plan, that some kolkhoz stood out in the amount of harvest collected, that such and such a factory made so much, let's say, ammonia (although it is nearly impossible to find liquid ammonia in the pharmacy), all this fails to make an impression.

Of course, the fact that creative labor stands and should stand at the center of the attention of the people must find reflection in information. But the selection of facts and the methods of its presentation must be otherwise, and all this must be creatively rethought.

Given this enormous problem, Chakovskii wondered how the Soviet reader or listener could not arrive at the conclusion that "the directors of Soviet information sources are not concerned with making the most effective impact on the spirits of people, and only think about using any possible means and to use any connection not to allow reference to the events before them, and to only formally attach this event to everything, even to that which has no connection at all to it."

A central problem, Chakovskii wrote, was the slowness of Soviet information; he concluded bleakly that given the current way that Soviet press institutions are organized, Soviet news organizations would never be able to compete with foreign sources. He pointed out that it took two days for Soviet newspapers to confirm that there had indeed been an outbreak of cholera in Astrakhan; and worse, Soviet news organizations could not even react to events they knew were going to happen, such as the release of Daniel and Sinyavskii from prison, an event that received considerable attention in Western broadcasts. Moreover, the media's silence about certain interviews with dissidents broadcast on foreign radio seemed to confirm the impression that there was an enormous dissident movement in the country, with their own publication called "Samizdat."

> However, all this is unavoidable. Unavoidable because the problem of information is itself closely connected with the general problem of the methodology of our propaganda in the wide sense of the term. However, this is another question . . .

But despite his helplessness at being unable to address "this other question," not only did Chakovskii's letter contain critical commentary, but it also proposed several practical measures. First, he suggested that regular meetings should be convened by the heads of the party and government with workers, collective farmers, and members of the intelligentsia, so that the leaders of Soviet society could be shown as engaged with the practical problems of everyday life. Second, ministers and high party officials should be more visible to the population by appearing regularly on TV. He wondered if it would be possible to arrange for phone calls from viewers that leaders would have to answer. "I'm convinced of one thing, that during one of these well-prepared interesting discussions, people will not run off to listen to the 'Voice of America.'" He admitted that he was not unaware of the potential difficulties in producing a "live" show: "Of course, all this would require serious, careful preparation, so that the results of the meeting were always to our advantage." Third he suggested a morning TV show hosted by a member of the Central Committee Secretariat in order to "react directly, indirectly or not at all to important world events." Anticipating the criticism that the official evaluations of events should not be formed in haste, Chakovskii countered that of all the things that happened in the world in a day, it seemed to him that only 5 percent required special discussion by party and government leaders before an official position could be reached; the other 95 percent could be examined and acted upon by the next morning. He concluded by urging the discussion of these problems at the highest levels of the government and the Politburo. He then asked Brezhnev to forgive him for not being able to put down his thoughts in a more compressed way. I found no copy of a response from either Brezhnev's office or any commentary from the Propaganda Department.

Chakovskii's letter is interesting for many reasons, not least of which is its acknowledgment that, despite the production of so many mythical rituals and performances, Soviet society in 1970 was increasingly disconnected from its past, that the practices of the 1930s were no guide for a world in which foreign broadcasts brought Soviet listeners within a global orbit of information. The total absence in the letter of any reference to the most recent past, namely the "thaw" of the 1950s and 1960s, can furthermore be read as an implicit argument that this period too had little to offer in terms of solutions to these problems, both because they had learned how disruptive an activist party paired to an activist press could be, and because all the evidence was pointing to the retreat of Soviet citizens from public life. Moreover, Chakovskii was sensitive to what was most powerful about

radio, namely that broadcasts could possess an "exaggerated tone of the everyday" that enabled the work of capitalist ideological manipulation to proceed, as it were, under cover. And similarly, it makes perfect sense that he should prescribe television to close the gap between rulers and ruled, as television was that technology that specialized in supplying an impression of unmediated immediacy. Television seemed able to efface the distance between rulers and ruled; the spoken televised word could bypass the elaborate structures of the press that had been constructed to ensure the durability of the revolution, structures that served as much to filter as to transmit. Seen in the context of the particular history of Soviet government, Chakovskii was trying to imagine a new practice of governing, one that would enable the party to enjoy a non-Leninist kind of resurrection and reclaim those alienated citizens with timely information about the world.

Chakovskii's letter demonstrates an awareness that in the context of the transnational circulation of information, it was imperative for the party to rethink its relationship to governing. It was no longer a question of whether or not citizens were devoted to the project of building socialism; after all, the chief ideologists of the Brezhnev era were describing a state or condition of "developed" socialism. The conflict between capitalism and socialism—which had appeared, for example, as the subject of the images and texts on the pages of *Den' mira*—was not quickly or simply resolving itself. Instead of a waxing socialism and a waning capitalism, the global scene seemed better understood in terms of the presence of two stable global blocs within which the main problem was how to fashion loyal, obedient, or at least not actively hostile audiences. And here, in Chakovskii's view, the West had a head start. Media publics there had been constituted as such since the early part of the 19th century, when national affairs acquired mass constituencies, and this support had grown throughout the 20th century as media publics became engaged with the project of mass consumption and the formation of consumer lifestyles. But in the Soviet Union, it was not at all clear how such an audience, characterized by a simultaneous desire for information and a tendency to retreat into private life to avoid ideological discourse, was to come into being. So Chakovskii imagines a Soviet media that circulates information in such a way as to communicate not so much the events themselves as the ability of the party to instantly communicate news of those events to the far-flung territories of the Soviet Union. In this way the contemporary world situation would appear before the Soviet citizen as something that the leaders of the state and party have mastered.

Chakovskii's letter represents the contemplation of one of the more important governors of Soviet society as he tried to imagine an effective media. It is impossible to know just how much Chakovskii believed that fundamental reform of the Soviet media was possible; there were numer-

ous moments in his letter when he implied that such a change would require not small adjustments but major transformations in the institutions that produced information for Soviet audiences.

The Central Committee did, in fact, take up one of Chakovskii's suggestions, for in the 1970s there were attempts to use television to counter the image of a distant and indifferent party. And yet the correspondence sent to the anchormen of these programs from viewers reveals not so much evidence for these programs' effectiveness as the magnitude of the frustration felt by Soviet citizens. This material certainly justified Chakovskii's judgment of the difficulty of effecting just such a transformation from an activist press constructing socialist persons to a Soviet media delivering timely information at the service of Soviet government. Again in these letters from readers, the topic of foreign radio appears over and over again, hammering home the point that the Soviet public was no longer what or where it used to be.

For example, in 1973, Iurii Zhukov, political observer for *Pravda* and the host of a TV talk show, sent a summary to the Propaganda Department of the letters he received after a show about the state of the Soviet economy. He reported that one letter took him to task for counseling Soviet citizens not to listen to foreign radio broadcasts: "Why not listen to these shows? They inform people about the events inside our country faster and more fully than the Soviet radio and press."[37] Zhukov went on to summarize the letter writers' complaints as falling into three broad categories concerning, first, the lateness of information, second, the quality and quantity of information, and third, the marked silence in the Soviet press about accidents and difficulties, all of which together aroused confusion and caused frustration in the reader's mind. One letter writer gave an example about the very topic that the *Izvestiia* correspondent Zykov mentioned several years before, foreign affairs:

> At one time our papers wrote about Mobutu in the same spirit as they wrote about that low-life Chombe. They asserted that he was responsible for the murder of Lumumba. Then the papers stopped mentioning Mobutu. Now they write about Mobutu as the leader of a state who is worthy of our respect, that he helped Lumumba to become a national hero, that he played an active role in uniting the countries of Asia in the struggle against imperialism. So is this the same Mobutu? What is his political orientation? These kinds of rebuses pop up quite often in the press, for example, concerning Indonesia or the Philippines. What kind of government do they have there? You won't find out from the newspaper.

Zhukov also quoted from the letter of a teacher who complained that she did not know how to answer her students' questions about world events or the propaganda of enemy powers, especially when "the students assert

that the truth can only be found from foreign radio broadcasts." Other letters demanded more access to the facts of history and called attention to the danger of rumors, such as the rumor that went around that Soviet authorities were considering ceding Siberia to the Japanese. Finally, Zhukov was particularly irked by one letter that asserted the truth of rumors the writer heard about all the finest products of Soviet factories going for export: this viewer wanted to buy some good plates and dishes for her family and so searched all over Moscow, but she found only rejects or broken ones for sale. She concluded that her own difficulty in buying dishes proved what she had heard about the best products being sent abroad; she demanded that all trade with foreign countries be suspended until Soviet consumers received the goods they needed. This letter confirmed Zhukov's opinion that "we need to strengthen in our propaganda the examination of economic relations, stressing the two-sided nature of trade and the concept of mutual advantage."

The theme of foreign radio appeared in summaries of his mail that Zhukov sent to the Propaganda Department a year later, in the summer of 1974. One letter came "from an eighteen-year-old young man from the countryside around Kursk, who displayed a genuine interest in international relations, and who, in my opinion, justly criticizes our propaganda."[38] The youth informed Zhukov that not only do many people he knew listen to foreign broadcasts, but they also repeated the contents to their friends and comrades. The author asserted that the bourgeois countries would not broadcast their programs if no one listened to them, and then he answered the question of why people listen by saying "the desire to boast of being well informed, the desire to listen or record a certain kind of music, or songs; curiosity, interest . . . No less an important fact appears from my point of view the lack of currentness [*neoperativnost'*] of our propaganda, the lateness of our information, the showing of too much restraint before the particularity of circumstances."[39]

Another writer complained again about the news he received about international affairs:

> The Soviet press repeats over and over again about the antagonistic activities of China toward our country, that China considers us her number one enemy and therefore is turning her military force against us. We ask ourselves, what does *Krasnaia zvezda, Izvestiia, Sel'skaia zhizn',* which I subscribe to, write about the concrete military plans of the People's Republic in relation to the Soviet Union, about the Chinese initiatives toward our country? What is being written concretely about this is in other Soviet journals and newspapers?

The writer looked at several further examples of world events whose reporting in the Soviet case came days late, noting in one case that "TASS

decided to report about this event only after two weeks! Commentary, as we say, is not necessary . . . I only want to say that Soviet propaganda does not give Soviet citizens full examination of international events." He then asserted his own suspicion of foreign broadcasts:

> Personally, I trust the Soviet press, radio, and television, but I know people who relate to the reports in our newspapers with a certain amount of skepticism, even mistrust, trusting them less than, let's say, the Voice of America. Personally, on the whole I approve of the situation regarding propaganda in our country, because the Soviet people must be raised with glorious ideals, with the positive, and not relish in particularities, deficiencies, and so on.[40]

On the one hand, this writer appeared to be hedging his bets: he knew many people who listened to foreign broadcasts, but he, of course, was a loyal Soviet citizen who would not dare to break the law. But on the other hand, he felt it necessary to take upon himself the task of informing the party about just how poorly the current system operated.

Letters like these continued to flow into newspaper offices during the 1970s and 1980s, and they continued to prompt concern on the part of the managers of the Soviet media. But as Chakovskii surmised, no "cardinal" changes took place in the Soviet media during the 1970s, and what looked like attempts to adapt to new demands and new technologies often revealed more about the old mentalities than about their creative rethinking. The problems posed to the Soviet leadership by television, for example, were so large that their analysis would require a separate book, but I want to at least touch on the fact that this form of communication brought with it its own challenges and difficulties.[41]

A *Pravda* article of December 26, 1974, entitled "The Viewer Asks the Questions," analyzed a show called *Press-klub,* broadcast locally in Kiev, which broadcasted the live appearance of bureaucrats responsible for various local services. As if following Chakovskii's advice to the letter, a show was created in which officials would answer questions from journalists and then would take telephone calls from viewers. The article described one show on which the head of Kiev's Department of Auto Transport and the chief engineer of the tramway and trolley bus lines were invited to appear in order to discuss problems with transportation in one of the new microraions outside of Kiev. As long as these two men answered questions from journalists that had already been prepared, things went "more or less smoothly." But as soon as a caller phoned with the question:

> "When was a trolley bus line going to be put in on Zabolotniy Street?" a certain awkwardness was felt in the studio. The chief engineer responded that he didn't know where this street was, despite the fact that it is a major thoroughfare. There

were more questions and more answers, but it was clear that on the whole it wasn't a great success.[42]

The *Pravda* journalist then cautioned the overzealous reader, who was prepared to condemn the Soviet bureaucrat, that there was nothing shameful in not being able to answer a question, of not having the facts right at hand. The author's concern was again more general: "Even more serious is the fact that most 'responsible people' have no desire to take part in shows like this. In a program about food products, they tried to get on the show the head of the restaurant trust, who gave the request to his deputy who then 'categorically refused.' 'Let them fire me, but there's no way I'm going on television! Only at the last moment did he change his mind.' Approaches by the producers to officials in several republican ministries and departments were met with cool responses." The journalist once again tried to understand the feelings of these officials. "It goes without saying that it must be difficult for someone appearing for the first time in the studio to overcome the constraints he feels before the lens . . . But there are some people who despise the tribune of television not because of shyness but because they are convinced of the superfluity of what they consider such 'tele-spectacles,' so that they experience discomfort before this channel of criticism."

The author then provided a gloss on Chakovskii's promotion of television: "Such a form of communication with a mass audience permits a direct and open opportunity to acquaint people with the situation in concrete areas of economic and cultural construction, with the outlook for their development . . . And, of course, so that such information does not appear superficial, it cannot avoid the difficult questions of daily life, and so the officials invited to participate must be absolutely competent in their field, and responsible, answering in full for whatever area of their expertise." The author concluded, "The main editors of the program in Kiev and Kiev oblast' have showed productive initiative. However, in order for the meetings on *Press-Klub,* broadcast live, to become genuinely popular, to meet the expectations of television viewers, the studio must have the active support and help of the local leadership organs. Above all, of the Kiev oblast' and city party committees. Without this support, this well-intentioned program will miss its viewers."

That the Soviet media continued to "miss its viewers" was apparent in much of Propaganda Department material from the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some items were mainly about the material difficulties faced by editors: a plaintive 1975 letter from the editor of *Vechernii Dushanbe* (Evening Dushanbe, from the Tadjik Republic) provided a list of problems that was almost pitiful in its comprehensiveness. The first item was the

name of the paper: it was not an evening paper but a morning paper, and the remaining nine items covered everything from the lack of a teletype connection to TASS, the main Soviet international news agency, to the absence on the staff of a Tadjik language translator who could help journalists with the republic's principal language.[43] In July 1979 the editor of the *Birobidzhaner Stern,* published in the Far Eastern Jewish autonomous republic of Birobijan, reported to the Propaganda Department about the difficulties the paper was facing in fulfilling the Central Committee's decree of January of that year "[o]n the means for the further uncovering of the reactionary essence of international Zionism and anti-Soviet Zionist propaganda." They had only sixteen workers on a staff that was supposed to have thirty-two; the majority of workers at the paper were quite elderly; the typographic department lacked Hebrew type, and the paper was poorly distributed by the state distribution service, Soyuz Pechat'.[44]

The organizers of the Soviet press continued to receive concerned letters from politically conscious, principled readers like L. M. Bobylev, who sent an article to the editor of *Pravda* in 1982 entitled, "How to Raise the Effectiveness of Print," which was forwarded to the Propaganda Department for review. His main concern was that Soviet institutions had stopped reacting to criticism that appeared in the press. He gave seven examples going back a decade and concluded by suggesting the creation of a new institution dedicated to following up criticism that appears in print, for "Such a control would permit us to significantly speed up the development of all areas of the national economy." The deputy director of the Propaganda Department rejected the idea, arguing in good Leninist fashion that it was the editors and journalists of newspapers who were responsible for making their criticism as forceful and effective as possible, not some new kind of enforcement agency.[45]

Still other material showed how information came to be an increasingly vexing problem for the managers of the Soviet media as the USSR became both encircled and penetrated by a global system of electronic media. The priority of speed and timeliness continued to plague the system. In 1983, the general secretary of TASS complained to the Propaganda Department about how long it took to inform Soviet citizens of the invasion of Grenada.

> The incident in Grenada confirms the immediate necessity of making a cardinal decision about the publication of international reports in the Soviet press. It seems it is not just a matter of this news receiving little space. Adding a few pages [to TASS reports] will not improve things. Because of lengthy articles in newspapers, there isn't enough room left for information. Thus an artificial information hunger is created, which a part of the Soviet people try to satisfy by listening to the programs of enemy radio stations, with all its harmful consequences.[46]

He concluded with the suggestion that the Propaganda Department instruct central papers to print at least two-thirds of a page of just international news.

Given Chakovskii's prescience, it is not surprising that he was back in the archives again in 1983, although this time not as an author or critic, but as an object of criticism. P. K. Romanov, the chief of Glavlit, the censorship agency, wrote to Chakovskii, with a copy to the Propaganda Department, complaining about the number of times his workers in recent years had to strike out material approved for publication by the editors of *Literaturnaia gazeta,* thus arousing the anger of the paper's journalists. In recent years, he wrote, *Glavlit* was forced to either refuse or demand many corrections of articles about (1) an underground missile that would bore through the earth on the way to its target, which was declared impossible by many Soviet scientists, (2) the Soviet economy, which the author argued would not be effected by the decisions taken at the 1982 Party plenum since it left untouched existing economic mechanisms, (3) the American Strategic Defense Initiative, which was described by an American scientist quoted in *Der Spiegel* as a "bluff of the Pentagon," a statement that flatly contradicted the party and government's official line on Star Wars, (4) another article about the Soviet economy, demanding more flexible forms of economic organizations, and (5) crimes committed by teenagers, criticized for being full of naturalistic and sensational details.[47] What is interesting here was not the tenacity of Romanov's institution, which until roughly 1989 continued to faithfully monitor the Soviet press for ideologically inappropriate material and politically incorrect references, but rather the contents of Chakovskii's paper. These topics testify to the existence of a variety of journalistic styles found in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* the Soviet Union's "intellectual" newspaper. The articles about the Soviet economy criticized half-hearted and ineffective reforms, while the articles about underground missiles, SDI, and teenage crime evoke a kind of yearning for authority that would be achieved by reaching readers with fanciful and titillating topics. In fact, it was as if Chakovskii recognized that under the stifling rule of the party and its aged leadership, his most immediate gesture of protest was to turn the entire world into a journalistic sensation.

The Soviet Union relied on the radial diagram of government that defined the party's connection with the population. Journalists occupied key positions at the switches and relays, making the instructions sent down from "above" into governmental documents. The 1960s saw journalists come into full possession of this governmental identity, and yet this identity proved threatening to the party through the implication that the fate of socialism was in the hands of Soviet citizens and not the party. The radial diagram fractured under Brezhnev as the purposes of the party and

press diverged. Journalists, while remaining dependent on and tied to the party, came to an awareness of the gulf that appeared between the party's interests and the interests inherent in the practice of journalism that emerged from the Khrushchev era. They were no longer journalists working with and sometimes guiding the party in the construction of socialism, but they appeared rather as nothing more than the public relations arm of the Soviet Union's most powerful institution. They had to negotiate the party's need to use their skills and the party's suspicion of these skills. The problem for journalists inspired by the 1960s was that the party distanced itself from the task of achieving socialism. Soviet newspapers became institutions where journalists struggled with their alienation from the task of government. Some continued to work from within the framework of acceptable criticism. Some tried to keep defending the Soviet "little man," while others produced texts—like Burov and Potapenko's article about Kanashov—that supposedly taught negative examples. But far from being evidence of the party's desire to fix the system, such articles seemed the expression of journalists' inertia and frustration: it was as if the vehemence with which Kanashov was denounced by the journalists from *Sovetskaia Rossiia* was a function of the fact that he stood not just for a particular human weakness but for the corruption of the entire system. Other journalists, cut free from the task of realizing socialism, found themselves forced to confront the urgent task of managing information. Gorbachev's election to the post of general secretary in March 1985, after the embarrassing interregnums of Andropov and Chernenko, set the stage for one final burst of reforms that sought one final time to reestablish journalists at the heart of Soviet government.

FOUR

Perestroika and the End of Government by Journalism

The Gorbachev era saw all the contradictions of Soviet history compressed into six chaotic years, and depending on one's theoretical point of view, the policy decisions of Gorbachev and his allies can be read for the way they embodied a logic that had to lead to the regime's collapse. One could argue that the managers of the Soviet economy simply stopped needing to worry about socialism, since by the mid-1980s they had become more powerful than the party.[1] One could also argue, on the other hand, that the logic was embedded in Gorbachev's own weakness: he was both seduced and distracted by his adulation in the West, and this led him to carelessly formulate a revolution from above that left the vast majority of Soviet citizens worse off than before.[2] Yet another argument is possible, that the logic of the collapse was simply the logic of freedom, proven by the way the Soviet people between 1985 and 1990 rose up to denounce the tyranny that had kept them enslaved for four generations. Every theory, however, is selective; every theory constructs its arguments by leaving things out, and every theory values history above all as the terrain of its own proof.

The Foucauldian concept of governmentality draws our attention to the fact that subjects of modern states are formed by a range of actors and institutions, that government goes on in myriad sites outside of official institutions, and that many institutions share in the imperative of discursively constructing the subjectivities of those individuals who form the populations of states. In this sense the Soviet state appears as not radically different from but contiguous with the operation of government in the West. Although in liberal capitalist states this process occurred by working from the assumption that an individual's free initiative could be molded in

ways consonant with the overall aims of democracy and the market, in the Soviet Union the molding of persons was to be directed toward the goal of creating a socialist society. One of the distinctive aspects of the process by which Soviet government had operated was the assumption that that this molding could take the form of an overt pedagogy by which governors would form the governed.

One of the roots of the Soviet system was the assumption that a society could govern itself through its citizens' dedication to creating a socialist society. Such a vision of a different kind of polity was both made possible by, and could only be realized through, the establishment of a new environment of texts and images—print socialism—that would serve as the conduit for a kind of fusion of individual and collective purpose and understanding. Representations of society would be vehicles of instruction and enlightenment; they would foster the splicing of a self into the larger material of society by portraying the project of social transformation as the most attractive and compelling form of life.

This project emerged in part from an analysis of and deep experience with the mass press that appeared in the second of half of the 19th century and from the organization of cultural technologies that would enable new forms of subjectivity. The core act of this mode of government was a multitude of private acts of reading; the socialist society imagined at the end of the 19th century was in a sense a political vision enabled by the newspaper. Because this technology of government appeared from within capitalism, a socialist society would necessarily resemble a modern capitalist one, with the difference that citizens would not carry inside of them the priorities and imperatives required by capitalist competition, but rather the goal of collective progress toward a just and prosperous life. The corollary of this intimate connection between socialism and journalism was that any actual realization of socialism would depend on the existence of a cadre of specialists in its representation; socialism would be only as vital as the commitment of journalists to its continued development.

The government of Soviet society was thus doubly fragile. First, it depended on the party leadership's willingness to give journalists a role in this process of government. The leadership had the ability to encourage, distort, resurrect, or suffocate the governmental role of journalism. Second, it depended on the integrity of what I have called the radial diagram of government, which was that structure given to Soviet government by the definition of territory produced by the press's physical organization of space. The press was organized from center to periphery along radial lines determined by both administrative and functional economic rationalities. The strength of this organization could be weakened by an indifferent or suspicious leadership and depended on the relative isolation of Soviet citizens

from other national medias and the forms of governing they embodied. The coherence of the radial diagram of government was disrupted by the rise of both new communications technologies that brought the West "home" to the Soviet Union and also by new televisual technologies of mass mediation that bypassed the elaborate mediating structures of print socialism and brought new and disturbing forms of publicity to the officials of the party and state.

Between 1985 and 1991 the Soviet Union saw one final attempt to redefine Soviet government. These were, of course, tumultuous years that no brief summary could adequately capture. They saw the end of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War, and the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself. They saw the appearance of a market economy and forms of democratic politics, as well as the public debates over ideology and policy. The Gorbachev era has, of course, received a great deal of attention from scholars, intellectuals, politicians, and journalists in the West who first watched as the Soviet system sought to reform itself, and who then after 1991 began mining these years for the causes that led to the sudden and, for the vast majority of informed commentators, unexpected breakup of the Soviet Union. In the last decade a new significance has emerged for perestroika: it can be examined as harboring the immediate sources of the quasi-capitalist, quasi-democratic system that took shape under Yeltsin and that continues under Putin.

There was a contradiction at the heart of Gorbachev's strategy to realign journalism and socialism. In a nutshell, Gorbachev's effort to both undermine the ideological formulas of his predecessors *and* to articulate again a vision of socialism as a viable and critical alternative to capitalism created cross-cutting currents within the media that led to the public fracturing of the party's identity and eventually to the party's displacement from its position of being the leading institution of Soviet society. The task is thus to evoke Gorbachev's readings of his own society and his use of the media and journalists in particular in the cause of reestablishing the vitality of the Soviet system.

Thus, instead of approaching the Gorbachev era in terms of the theory that would best explain the collapse of the Soviet Union, I select from this "era" a few of its distinctive features that would illuminate the problems experienced in the attempt to realign the interests of party and press after their disarticulation during the Brezhnev era. I refer as well to several instances of journalists' reflections on their participation in glasnost and perestroika in order to convey the way that the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the role of the media in that collapse, continued as intense memories of a tumultuous time. The fate of the distinctive mode of government in the Soviet Union unfolded the way it did because of Gorbachev's desire to

reanimate the landscape of media. The strategy of governing available to Gorbachev depended on the journalistic field as it had arranged itself under Brezhnev; his reforms can be read as an expression of the desire, on the one hand, to overcome the ideologically driven orthodoxy of the Brezhnev era by allowing journalists greater power as gatherers and disseminators of information and, on the other hand, to imagine a new kind of commitment to the socialist project by encouraging journalists to once again project the image of an active project of constructing socialism. Journalists had to be found who would work with him in realizing this agenda of reform; as it turned out, it was easier to find journalists eager and willing to attack the Brezhnevite orthodoxies than to write again as if instructing Soviet citizens in the conduct of socialism. Approaching the Gorbachev era like this is also a way of seeing these events not as leading to the collapse of the Soviet system, but rather to the transition to the neo-liberal mode of government that emerged under Yeltsin in which citizens were to be "spun-off" from the state to construct their own forms and styles of identity and satisfaction. Before reviewing the journalism of the Gorbachev era in more detail, it would be useful to provide a larger framing narrative that would help us understand the relationship between a resurrected journalism and a reinvigorated socialist government.

CHARISMATIC LENINISM, ONE MORE TIME

A useful way to introduce the dynamics at the heart of the Gorbachev era is to compare it to that earlier period of reform, that of Khrushchev, especially because so many of the leaders of perestroika were young men and women who had come of age during the Soviet sixties, and who had memories of socialism as being something other than the empty sign of Brezhnev's ideological slogans.[3] Gorbachev and Khrushchev shared a number of similarities including their personalities.[4] Unlike their predecessors, though, whose public images were marked by a granite-like silence—Stalin's ostensibly from cruelty and madness, Chernenko's from sickness and senility—both Gorbachev and Khrushchev liked to travel, to be among people, and to talk. Khrushchev had been famous for his outbursts and harangues, while Gorbachev became known for his long, extemporaneous speeches and the extended arguments he carried on with delegates at the various congresses, plenums, and conferences.[5] Both men also experienced a meteoric elevation to the status of world statesman on a stage of global publicity, although their relative standings in this sphere ended up reversed: while Khrushchev was vilified in the West for his impetuosity and crude manners and only later rehabilitated thanks in part to the work of Western scholars, Gorbachev was lionized by Western publics in the late 1980s as

the epitome of the far-seeing statesman, even as his popularity among Soviet citizens evaporated.[6]

Aside from questions of personality, however, the overarching parallel between these two periods derives from the fact that both leaders recognized the need for significant reform in the face of urgent crises facing their societies. For Khrushchev, the overwhelming task was to overcome the legacy of over twenty years of arbitrary rule by Stalin and to establish a new relationship between party and citizens. In retrospect, however, it is clear that the problems confronting Gorbachev were an order of magnitude greater than those that faced Khrushchev. First of all, Gorbachev took over a party indelibly marked by twenty years of control by an aged clique suspicious of popular aspirations and hostile to any form of public criticism. The majority of party members had long since divested themselves of the sense that they were actors on a world-historical stage, as people who shared a mission, project, identity, or moral imperative. Party membership had largely devolved to a gatekeeper function, a necessity for anyone wanting to get ahead, to attend a certain institute, travel abroad, or secure a promotion. Secondly, the Soviet economy was obviously in trouble. Soviet economists estimated that since 1965 the growth rate of the Soviet economy had been steadily declining; between 1965 and 1970 the economy had grown at the rate of 4.1 percent, while between 1980 and 1985 the rate of growth had slowed to 0.6 percent, and was showing every sign of coming to a standstill in the very near future.[7] Brezhnev addressed his country's food problems by importing grain from the West rather than by introducing fundamental reorganization of agriculture, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 bound the Soviet economy as a whole ever more tightly to the interests of the military-industrial sector. Third, unlike the late 1950s and early 1960s when decolonization and anti-imperialist movements were seen by many in the Soviet Union to prove the weakness of the "old world" of capital, the international environment of the mid-1980s was dominated by global finance capitalism whose central actors, multinational corporations, operated with little concern for borders and the supposedly absolute value of national sovereignty.[8] If the editors of *Den' mira* had described the world in 1960 in terms of a tripartite division among capitalist states, socialist states, and "people's democracies," the classification seemed much simpler in 1985: now the operative shorthand of political economists identified a "North-South" divide, or "first" and "third" worlds, "developed-developing" and "debtor-borrower" nations, with socialist states no longer constituting their own category. And embedded within all these intractable problems, was a larger and more amorphous problem of cultural malaise, of the dissatisfaction of many Soviet citizens with various aspects of their lives and their society.[9]

The problem was seen by many to be a reflection of larger demographic trends within the Soviet Union. Different parts of the country were experiencing significantly different kinds of social problems; birth rates were falling in the European parts of the Soviet Union and were rising sharply in Central Asia, while Slavic cities coped with problems of youth crime, alcoholism, and rising rates of divorce and infant mortality.[10] The coherence of the Soviet Union as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural empire seemed threatened as culture and religion entered the vacuum created by the party's weakness.[11] Islam became a more public and hence political presence during the 1970s in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and non-socialist cultural resources were drawn upon not only by the populace but also by republican bosses who were in a position to amass for themselves immense wealth.[12] Another line of fracture ran between generations: in 1985 a generation was coming of age that had no direct experience of the mobilizing enthusiasm of the 1960s, that knew Soviet history largely through the deadening rituals of the war cult.[13]

To the degree that Gorbachev's most pressing problem was the mounting evidence that the Soviet economy was grinding to a halt, he continued the modest reforms begun under Andropov that focused on labor discipline, calling in 1985 for economic "acceleration" [*uskorenie*] to be achieved through disciplinary campaigns like the anti-alcohol campaign launched in May 1985.[14] Gorbachev responded to the failure of this policy by widening the field of his interventions and cautiously endorsing some forms of market-oriented enterprises, specifically cooperative businesses. He also understood the necessity for attacking the party's entrenched power structure and for fostering economic decentralization; multi-candidate elections for local offices took place in 1987, and the first public discussions by non-party political groups occurred in the same year, discussions that were the seeds of the independent political groupings that were to emerge in 1989–1990.[15] The year 1988 saw a range of remarkable events: the public appearance of nationalist independence movements, particularly in the Baltic states and in the Caucasus, the rehabilitation of old Bolsheviks repressed by Stalin, and the public appearance of a rift in the party between "radical reformers" and "conservative hard-liners." The emergence of something that began to look like a "civil society" occurred simultaneously with the worsening of the Soviet economy. Lines for basic goods grew longer and shelves emptier during 1988.[16] Despite the growing hardship, in June and July of that year the program of perestroika was reaffirmed at the 19th Party Conference. In hindsight, this conference, and the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the revolution, represented the high-water mark of the political discourse of perestroika.

Gorbachev, however, gradually came to the opinion that the political debates and discussions within the party that he had made possible were,

in fact, impeding the cause of reform rather than enabling it, and by late 1988 he began to doubt that the Communist Party could serve as the vehicle for the reform of Soviet society. This position was strengthened by the accumulating evidence that many party members were actively resisting and undermining his reforms. His personal exposure to the arguments and intense criticism of the party's leading role expressed by leaders of pro-democracy groups, most famously by the physicist Andrei Sakharov, no doubt also played a role in moving him toward even greater plans to re-engineer the structures of Soviet government. In 1989, Gorbachev began to envision himself as occupying a position above the squabbling factions that he had inadvertently brought into being, and to imagine fundamental constitutional reform. He spoke positively about multi-party democracy—rather than the party's officially sanctioned and designed democratization—that had been promoted by many civil groups as the only way out of the Soviet Union's problems. He acted on this belief in March 1989 by allowing multi-candidate elections for one-third of the seats in the new Congress of People's Deputies, whose first sessions in May and December were broadcast live to the entire population, showing for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union "real" politics, unscripted statements and arguments, shouting and finger-pointing. Hoping to shore up his own position, Gorbachev pushed through the Supreme Soviet a fundamental reorganization of Soviet government. The article in the 1977 "Brezhnev" constitution that guaranteed the party's leading role in society was removed on March 14, 1990, and on March 15 Gorbachev was elected president of the USSR by the Supreme Soviet. The party's disintegration was in full swing as it tried to organize itself for the 28th Party Congress in July; top party leaders, like Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak, announced their resignation at the congress.

In early 1991, the situation became even more chaotic as President Gorbachev pushed through the Supreme Soviet laws granting him even more power, causing former colleagues and allies like Foreign Minister Eduard Shevernadze to resign and to warn of a creeping dictatorship. Gorbachev even contemplated suspending the press law that had been passed in July 1990 but backed down in the face of public outcry. His time in power was brought to an end as a consequence of his plan to sign a new Union treaty in late August of 1991 that would replace the USSR's highly centralized organization with a looser, federative structure. This was perceived by a number of his conservative colleagues not as shoring up the Soviet Union but as the beginning of its destruction, and so while Gorbachev was on vacation in the Crimea, a "State Committee for the Extraordinary Situation" attempted to remove Gorbachev from power. This was widely perceived as an attempted coup d'état, although after only three days the plot disintegrated as a result of public disgust, the suspicion and in some

cases outright opposition of key elements of the army, and the resistance of Boris Yeltsin, who had been elected president of the Russian Republic in June 1990. In the course of these three days, Gorbachev's own authority had dissolved; as the *Izvestiia* headline read on the day the coup plotters had given up and Gorbachev returned to Moscow from his house arrest in the Crimea: "Gorbachev Returns to a Different Country; Does He Know This?"[17] No powerful Soviet leader had any stake in the Soviet Union's existence besides Gorbachev; on December 25, 1991, he decreed the Soviet Union out of existence.

It is, of course, fruitless to search for a single explanatory key that would unlock both the complexity and the logic of these events. The Gorbachev era can be read in one sense as a case study of the centrality of unintended consequences as the driving force of history. As mentioned, it can also be viewed through the lens of a personalist, intentionalist framework that centers on the character and agency of Gorbachev himself: his abilities, limitations, goals, and tactics. For the unintended-consequences school of thought, Gorbachev appeared as just a cog in the great malfunctioning machine of the Soviet system, while for the Gorbachev-centered framework, Gorbachev was the hapless man behind the curtain struggling to control the smoke and mirrors that gave the Soviet system its life.

There is something to be learned from both these arguments, although it could also be argued that both operate by generalizing and essentializing chance, on the one hand, and the unified, self-transparent actor, on the other hand. It is possible, however, to shift one's attention and attend to the discourses that shaped both the field of accidents and the conditions of intention. This is, again, precisely what Stephen Hanson attempts in using neither the frameworks of totalitarian theory or the modernization school of Soviet history to explain Gorbachev's rise to power and the Soviet Union's dissolution, but rather by seeing Gorbachev as "a would be innovator within the context of the charismatic-rational conception of time in the mold of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Specifically, Gorbachev's *perestroika* was introduced as an attempt to bring about the rapid transformation of Soviet culture in a charismatic direction—to produce a culture, and not merely a socioeconomic structure, based on a mass internalization of norms of disciplined time transcendence in everyday life."[18]

For Hanson, Gorbachev was the end of socialism's discursive line. While Marx could overcome the philosophical stagnation of Hegelian thought, while Lenin could overcome the political stagnation of socialist revolutionary action, and while Stalin could overcome the socioeconomic stagnation of the quasi-socialist, quasi-capitalist period of the New Economic Policy, it was simply not possible to "overcome" the stagnation of the vast

and inefficient system of centralized planning through the "realization of a mass cultural norm of permanent, disciplined, revolutionary time transcendence."[19] The core contradiction of the Gorbachev era derived from the tension between the goal of leading the Soviet population to think in new ways about their commitments and desires, and the dispositions and inclinations of those who manned the Leninist institution of the Soviet mass media. It is thus vital to gauge the distance between the language of socialist reform articulated by Gorbachev and his advisers, and the positions of journalists who were called upon to internalize and reproduce this task of cultural transcendence.

While Hanson argues that Gorbachev's reforms can be read as a movement to ever more drastic positions that would make possible the intensification of enthusiasm for socialism, with *glasnost'* coming as a second phase after the initial phase of reform of *uskorenie,* it is nevertheless clear that the mass media were on Gorbachev's mind from the beginning of his election to the post of general secretary in March 1985. In early March 1986, *glasnost'* officially became the slogan that symbolized the need to reestablish journalism at the heart of Soviet government. The meaning of the term was suitably flexible; it referred to everything from greater openness in the party's handling of official material to more explicit forms of self-criticism from party officials, and eventually to limited freedom of expression.[20] In their effort to challenge the media's supply of orthodox and ideological narratives, Gorbachev and his allies initially focused on two publications, *Ogonek* [The Spark] and *Moskovskie novosti* [Moscow News]. *Ogonek,* a glossy monthly, received a great deal of attention in the West, since under its editor, Vasily Korotich, it became a sensational kind of *Life* magazine, marked as much by the vivid style of its photographs as by the frank letters it published from readers.[21] By the late 1980s, both had come to represent with brutal directness slices of Soviet society that had never appeared in the print public sphere.[22]

Moskovskie novosti was the perfect "choice" for Gorbachev because unlike other newspapers that were targeted to a certain segment of the Soviet population, this paper had since its start been aimed at foreigners and therefore had only a small pre-existing Soviet audience that defined its content and style. The English-language paper *Moscow News* had been started in the late 1920s by American socialist journalist Anna Louise Strong for a readership of Americans who came to Russia as technical experts during the First Five-Year plan.[23] It was closed down during the Great Patriotic War and then was restarted again, first in English and then in French in 1956, as a part of the general turning outward toward the world that was central to Khrushchev's approach to representing socialism.[24] In 1980, a

Russian language version of the paper joined the existing English, French, Spanish, and Arabic versions, and then in early 1986 Gorbachev appointed a new editor at *Moskovskie novosti,* Egor Iakovlev, a journalist who had worked at a number of the central papers and who had been one of the reformers of the 1960s. In a very short time, *Moskovskie novosti* became enormously popular; on the days of its publication, lines would form at kiosks hours before sunrise. It was material proof that the party was permitting journalists to develop a parallel press dedicated to the representation not of the mythic past but of the complicated present.

A conversation with one of the assistant editors of *Moskovskie novosti* in 1993 brought home how the simplest practice of reporting was read as disrupting the entire field of ideology disseminated in the Soviet mass media. E. Loskov had come to the paper with Iakovlev in early 1986, and he told me that he had written

> some material—it was the fall of 1986—about a railway collision. Two trains had collided, the conductors were killed, two cars were thrown from the rails. In today's circumstances, this would get a paragraph in the "events" section of the paper; in the absolutely best of circumstances it might be a fast, brief subject for a small book. But then, because so much was forbidden, because it was not possible to overstep the framework of rules given to us from above about what you could write about and what you couldn't write about, after my report about the train wreck appeared—which wasn't political at all, but an economic issue—the arrows on the tracks weren't working, they hadn't been repaired for a long time, and so on—well, my friends came up to me, shook my hand, and said, "Nice going, you really did it!"[25]

What Loskov "did" was to report the news about something that had been forbidden for Soviet journalists for seventy years, namely, domestic accidents with loss of life. The appearance of this article and others like it that followed were so important because they represented an autonomous engagement of the journalist with the world. Here was a new kind of news item, one that implied that the everyday life of Soviet society was, in fact, a vast field of intrinsically interesting events needing representation. Moreover, the article about the train wreck was an event that gripped readers because of its inherently tragic nature; it gestured to the possibility that one way of overcoming the alienation and anomie of the Brezhnev era was by reconstituting the Soviet imaginary through the reporting of reality.

For journalists, the possibility of embracing a new identity as reporter of reality was intoxicating. As Loskov said,

> In that moment we gave ourselves the goal . . . to become a newspaper without any forbidden themes. That is, *Moskovskie novosti* would write about everything, that's the task we set ourselves in 1986. We wanted each of our pieces to possess something

> sensationalistic. You must understand that this used to be a criticism from the Central Committee, that a paper had a weakness for sensationalism . . . But we put it before ourselves as a goal.

Loskov did not see this attitude, however, as political. He defended his work as merely following the general line of perestroika.

> You understand, when Egor Iakovlev came to direct the paper back then, none of us were revolutionaries who wanted to go to the barricades, to burn down the Central Committee of the CPSU there on the Old Square; we wanted to improve the existing system. At that moment we formed our worldview from our existing possibilities, from that which under the best circumstances seemed possible: to change the party, change on the side of the country's democratic values. We didn't think for a moment about closing down the CPSU, or condemning it; this wasn't in our thoughts. But it turned out we were extra-brave, because we thought this way, we talked this way, and we tried to write about it in the paper.

While glasnost may have begun with articles about train wrecks, it certainly did not end with them, for the logic of the sensational is that there is no end to what some readers or viewers will find interesting. But because reporting about accidents, disasters, and hardship focused an uncomfortable light on the Soviet authorities, it was only natural that the policy of glasnost aroused the anger and resentment of Soviet officials and leaders who were disturbed both by events and by the fact that such events appeared in the mass media. In hindsight it is remarkable that Gorbachev seemed so confident about the need to present articles such as these, which he must have known would cause confusion and discontent for many party members. Part of the answer to this puzzle can be drawn from Hanson's observation that Gorbachev's generation was the last generation of Soviet citizens "both to believe in the original ideas of Marxism and Leninism *and* to remain substantially uncorrupted. The idealism characteristic of party members of Gorbachev's generation had prevented them from using their party positions merely as tools for furthering personal power and privilege and led them to despise the large number of cadres who did."[26] Furthermore, this was a generation that had been profoundly influenced by the idealism of Khrushchev's reforms and the culture of the Soviet sixties. And just as Khrushchev had understood that the personal commitments of Soviet citizens to socialism relied on accurate portrayals of the contemporary moment, so too did Gorbachev and his advisers believe that there would be no renewal of socialism without the conscious dedication of journalists and everyone else who produced material for the mass media to the elucidation of reality.

The identification of reform with the objective representation of real-

ity appeared in an April 1987 speech by Gorbachev's main adviser on culture and ideology, Aleksandr Iakovlev, to a conference of social scientists. He emphasized above all the pressing need for what had been for twenty years the most burdensome deficit for Soviet society: accurate, unbiased information. But better information was not merely a technical requirement for better decision making. Better information meant better selves. For Iakovlev, perestroika—which had become in early 1987 the term that referred to the complete overhaul of Soviet institutions—was significant as a kind of floating indicator of progressive change:

> Perestroika is a time of self-cleansing and fundamental transformation, a continuation in new historical circumstances of the affairs of the Great October Revolution. Perestroika is also the process of the objective analysis of the state of affairs in our society, in the development of the world, in everything from which the being of the person and of humanity takes shape.[27]

The social sciences, as that part of the educational and scientific establishment dedicated to true knowledge of social processes, therefore had a special role to play in the process of perestroika: to provide Soviet society with a knowledge of itself, without the supposed help of dogma or formulas like those of a vulgar Marxism:

> The social sciences today are simply required to analyze the innovations and particularities of perestroika and of the conditions in which it is taking shape. Any primitivism here is simply another form of dogmatism. One has to do one's work oneself, not setting it to the classics. For the fact is that the accumulated potential of dialectical thinking itself will direct the emergence and stimulation of new situations and approaches. . . . The most important theoretical problem can be briefly formulated like this: contemporary socialism in the first place must come to an understanding of itself.

This meant coming to soberly acknowledge the "real contradictions" that existed in society; "the necessity of seeing objectively and scientifically what is happening in society, to contemplate and analyze it in all its depths, in all its integrity, and in all its dialectical contradictions. To see the entire complex of connections between cause and effect, whether they be in the economic, the social, the political, or in other spheres between these." The result of this clearer knowledge will be a strengthening of socialism: "In this renewed system of revalued coordinates, the person as the end in itself of progress, of socialism, moves to the center, and the human factor is its decisive strength." For socialism, according to Iakovlev, was "above all the person in his real connections with society, with other people, with the material and the spiritual spheres."

Iakovlev's identification of the "person" as being the key unit of socialism certainly appears as strong echoes of the moment of the 1960s, when Adzhubei, Agranovskii, and other journalists embraced the task of renewal after Stalin by dedicating themselves to reestablishing the press at the heart of Soviet government. While Iakovlev and Gorbachev did not believe that socialism was something that would be fulfilled in one final, heroic push toward communism, they echoed the argument of Khrushchev and his allies from twenty-five years earlier, that socialism had to rely on the "popular initiative of the masses" for its practical measures. What the party could do was disseminate images of intensely transformed selves, working upon themselves in the knowledge that through their own self-construction, they were working on the realization of socialism.

That journalists had to become the agents, the very backbone of perestroika, was apparent in Gorbachev's discussions with leading figures in the mass media in July 1987, an edited transcript of which was published in *Pravda* on July 15. He emphasized first the fact that perestroika and the party were synonymous, that the party existed to realize these reforms. As if to disabuse anyone present who hoped for sudden, radical political democracy in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev asserted that the party

> will fulfill its mission as the leading force of society. It is the genuine organizer of society and its political avant-garde . . . Especially now, in a stage of great changes in our enormous state, when we are unfolding processes of democratization, discussion, searching, and nevertheless while we are on the march, we must guarantee the progress of perestroika. Without the party it would be impossible to consider the situation scientifically and to formulate corresponding policies and strategies for the practical solutions of problems; this would be impossible without cadres whom the party spent decades in preparing and will continue to prepare. If someone thinks otherwise, they are at the very least mistaken. Socialist society needs an active, strong party, and the party itself needs to live a full-blooded life. Only then will it be able to fulfill its organizational and leadership role.[28]

The party appears here as a place from which it is possible to see clearly the problems in Soviet society, and also as a kind of person who needs to live a healthy and vigorous life. Later he addressed the journalists and editors directly, pleading with them to leave behind their cynical reason and draw on their own feelings in the task of representing Soviet society, because the images and narratives could serve as vital sources of energy: "I ask you: raise up your emotions . . . Lift them up, and think of the people, about society. Otherwise, we will not have enough strength to carry through the task we have begun." When Gorbachev turned to the practical strategies journalists might use to contribute to perestroika, he turned the clock back not to 1960 but to 1918, and to one of the journalistic techniques

identified by Lenin in his *Pravda* editorial cited in the introduction of this book. Taking the words right out of Lenin's mouth, he argued:

> In the current stage of constructive work, of constructive affairs, it is very important to see everything that is going on in a positive light. Especially important in this regard is this kind of [journalistic] presentation: Here, one right next to another, are two raions, two enterprises, two oblasts, or two republics, and the question to be answered by the journalists is, how in one of them their approach leads to movement, to speeding up, to real results, while in the other, where laziness is present, there is inertia, an attachment to the old, backwardness, which hampers the collective and the personality. This is now the main theme for the articles of journals and newspapers, yes, and even for artistic literature. [. . .] At the same time there should not be in leadership positions people who are stale, inattentive, who do not see the people's needs, who are not pained by them, and who do not perceive them with all their hearts. We discussed this at the July Plenum of the Central Committee, and I ask you to take all this as your weapon and act. Act so that everyone who cares about the person, about people, about the most simple things, in the depths of the countryside and in the center, will become heroes in our press, heroes who will not be broken.

He concluded his talk with a plea that sounds as if it were taken from the pages of *Den' mira:*

> In conclusion I will say that the CPSU values highly the contribution of the means of mass communication to perestroika. Why? Because everything goes through the person. The person goes out to the main line of battle, through the person travels all of perestroika. That is, his thinking, his position will have decisive significance for the outcome of perestroika. Such a conversation with the person we need to conduct every day, using the enormous resources of the means of mass information.

This was certainly a vivid echo of the discourse of the 1960s, and specifically of the attempt to resurrect journalists' purpose of transforming Soviet citizens. Gorbachev introduced another key metaphor, however; for if journalists would instruct the population through the comparison of two factories, two republics, they were to do this not through heavy-handed propaganda, but rather through a "conversation." The mass media were to organize a conversation by means of which the reader/person would come to understand the needs and requirements of the moment. The media would supply models of conduct to be contemplated and emulated by readers. Perestroika would not advance without the masses coming to a different sense of themselves. In short, he urged journalists to refashion themselves as governors of Soviet society by positing and exploring that figure for whom and by whom socialism was to be realized. The mass media would clarify the situation of socialism in the country so that the "person" could understand it and work to improve it.

It is difficult to overestimate the curiosity, disquiet, and fascination aroused by these speeches and the attitudes they expressed through the end of 1987. One can only imagine the shock felt by millions of party members and members of the general public when, after two decades of an elaborate public charade, in which newspapers solemnly pronounced on the correctness of the party's political and economic programs as evidence mounted that these programs were failing miserably, articles suddenly appeared that made explicit reference to the absurdity of these claims.

For example, a June 1987 edition of *Pravda* printed a letter on the "About Perestroika" page that bore the headline "That We Could Stop the Numbers Race."[29] Its subject was the ubiquitous reference in public discourse to economic plans and the constant charting of success in fulfilling them. In a personal, humorous, but critical tone (the article is subtitled "Notes of a Dilettante") the author, a writer [*literator*] by profession, complained about the absurdity of the constant pressure to tie economic performance to the publication of certain numbers in the newspaper. This was, of course, a potentially controversial terrain, given the fact that the pace of social and economic life in the Soviet Union since the 1920s was geared to the rising and falling arcs of urgency to meet and surpass planned targets of production. The target of the author's criticisms were the wooden linguistic formulas used by the mass media to describe economic activity, such as "The workers of N. factory announced their initiative to produce only quality items." She found it odd that they needed to announce such a commitment to quality, when quality is what work should be all about. In a conclusion that could be lifted directly from one of Agranovskii's essays of some fifteen or twenty years earlier, the author writes,

> And so in general, isn't it possible that we don't need to fulfill the plan, but simply to work? To simply build buildings, write books, treat patients, and bake bread? To stop this racing after empty figures, to rid ourselves of their delusions.

Again, what is unmistakable is the echo of the journalism of the 1960s. Here was an explicit endorsement of Agranovskii's point of view, as if Roshchin himself, Agranovskii's "person from the restaurant," decided to write t*o Pravda.*

The not-so-veiled object of this *literator*'s criticism was the facade of public culture that had been erected by the party during the era of stagnation. Glasnost and perestroika, by contrast, were dedicated to and premised upon the exposure of that public culture as a sham. Both the publication of "news" and the exhortation of journalists to envision themselves as governors of a renewed socialist society, had as their common target the way the mass media had held the masses back from coming to a true knowledge of their capacities as creators of socialism. By focusing solely on the

need to guard the heroic achievements of 1917 and 1945 from the hostile and predatory world of global capitalism, citizens had become desensitized to what socialism was all about.

The implication that those who were not for perestroika were somehow lacking understanding and imagination was no doubt troubling for many party members for whom the ideological descriptions of the Brezhnev era provided many comfortable truths. In fact, disagreement about the nature and pace of reforms had been present at the emergence of glasnost. Gorbachev's chief critic here was his fellow Politburo member Yegor Ligachev, who in 1985–1986 had been a supporter of a shake-up in the media, but who then became concerned about the media showing too much license in the interrogation of fundamental narratives and myths of Soviet history.[30] The emergence of opposition to perestroika was halting, however, in part because of the obligation of party members to fulfill the directives of their superiors, and because editors began to assert more authority over what appeared in their papers, knowing that daring articles would likely be defended by reformers in the Central Committee.

That glasnost and perestroika had provoked an open split in the party between Gorbachev's supporters and opponents became clear in March 1988, when a Leningrad schoolteacher, Nina Andreeva, published a letter in the paper *Sovetskaia Rossiia* entitled "I Will Not Give Up My Principles."[31] The "Nina Andreeva Affair" quickly became a cause célèbre by showing that "party unity" was just a facade, and that Gorbachev was opposed by party leaders who could mobilize forces in the very institution that Gorbachev was relying on to further his cause, the mass media.[32] The letter frightened many observers in its criticism of perestroika's attitude toward Soviet history, in its call for an "objective" attitude toward Stalin, and in its denunciation of the "left-wing liberal socialism," widely read as a reference to an allegedly Jewish school of social democratic thought. The letter was furthermore read as containing veiled threats and intimidation, and yet for my interests here, the letter is much more interesting in its manifest content, because the vehicle of her criticism, as it were, is a reading of the state of Soviet mass media and, more particularly, of Gorbachev's effort to remake the climate of information within which socialism would take shape.

Andreeva's principal concern was with the impact of the media of perestroika on the historical consciousness of youth. The media, she argued, were causing a crisis in the relationship between students and teachers. Her chief complaint was that the mass media had filled students' heads with all sorts of wrong and sensationalist ideas about their country's history. What students needed most, she argued, was a sense of continuity that would allow the reproduction of identities in a healthy, stable context. The sources of this disturbance lay in a seemingly unregulated flow of in-

formation produced by journalists and intellectuals who refused to place this information in the context of the prevailing narrative of the Soviet people. Without this contextualization, she worried, students had no way to connect the present to the past. This cleavage between a past embodied in the present as a lived continuity that is known and understood in the truth of a correct evaluation of experience, and a past that is infinitely malleable in the works of writers pursuing their own private agendas, was at the source of her displeasure with the opinions of her students as they argued with her about Soviet history.

She gave the example of a recent documentary film about the Sergeii Kirov assassination, which she wrote was in general a good film, but she had noticed that in certain places the voice-over left the documentary genre altogether and "expressed a kind of double-meaning." "Let's say that the camera portrayed an explosion of enthusiasm, joy, the spiritual outpourings of the people building socialism, but the narrator's text spoke about repressions, disinformation, and ignorance." She implied that in an ideologically grounded system of media, the words and the pictures would go together. But unfortunately, the Soviet media had become a terrain where words and pictures were manipulated in order to produce disorienting effects, where readers and viewers were led to equate the unequatable, to correlate the incommensurate, supposedly in the service of renewing socialism. Such films and articles were sudden unpredictable eruptions of information about the past, and they were harmful because they provided a "monochrome" picture of things, suggesting, for example, that Stalinism was the only significant fact about the Soviet past, and that the achievements of Soviet society were in reality an illusion. She furthermore rejected any kind of relativistic or pluralist approach to the past, and to Lenin and Stalin in particular.

> I think that no matter how contradictory and complex this or that figure of Soviet history, their genuine role in the building and defense of socialism sooner or later will receive its objective and singular [*odnoznachnyi*] evaluation . . . Singular means, above all, concrete-historical, divorced from any opportunism, which will display—according to the results of history—a dialectical correspondence between the activities of the personality and the fundamental laws of the development of society.

She stressed that a correct understanding of Stalin could be found in the party's denunciation of the personality cult and in the party leader's speech on the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

Her main point was that a correct account of history proceeded not from an opportunistic journalism but from the deliberate consideration of the party; an interpretation of history was not simply another form of in-

formation, but rather the conclusion reached by careful and reasoned analysis. What disturbed her historical sensibility most, though, was the view that any two versions of the past could appear to her students to be equal, as if they were nothing more than commodities for sale. Mass culture offered an endless stream of equivalent objects, just as what she called "left-liberal humanism" saw the individual as that ultimate value in his or her intrinsic equivalence with the next person. For Andreeva, the individual did not exist outside the framework of classes and historical progress. Liberalism, from this point of view, was nothing more than an ideological artifact resurrected by interested party members to hide their real interests.

Andreeva's letter had been published when Gorbachev was abroad on a trip to Yugoslavia, but there is evidence that upon his return he and Aleksandr Iakovlev orchestrated a massive response to this rejection of perestroika's worldview. This response was not only voluminous, amounting to a full-page "response" in *Pravda* of April 5, 1988, under the headline "The Principles of Perestroika: The Revolutionary Nature of Thinking and Acting," and also the publication of collections of readers' replies to this article, as well as summaries by journalists of letters received by *Pravda,* on April 11, 12, 14, 18, and May 4, letters that articulated thoughtful and enthusiastic support for the party's programs. And yet what is so compelling about the April 5th article is the way it spoke in terms that explicitly evoked the process of self-transformation.

The article began by condemning Andreeva's views as "not constructive," for "in this long article beneath a pretentious title there is no consideration of the essence of a single problem of perestroika."[33] Supporters of Andreeva were denounced as "ideological opponents" of perestroika, who were "foreign to the nature of socialism." The authors then spent many lines denouncing their opponents' problematic relation to historical knowledge. They are shown to be partisan to the old methods that don't work, to the bankrupt system of the command economy. To this is opposed the reformers' faith in "Leninist principles," characterized by their "scientific" approach.

> There is in the article an absence of precisely the most important thing: that which determines a scientific approach to these matters, a striving to represent the essence of historical processes and to separate the objective from the subjective, the necessary from the contingent; which serves to protect socialism from that which would harm it both in our own eyes and in the eyes of the whole world.

Andreeva's approach to history was called "fatalistic," a philosophy of "all or nothing; either everything is harmonious and good or everything is com-

ing apart and bad . . . The position 'When the tree falls, chips will fly' is compatible neither with genuine science, nor with socialist morality."

But then the authors adopt a self-critical tone that refers explicitly to the governmental project of renewal at the heart of perestroika. In one of perestroika's most revealing self-descriptions, the authors write,

> Over the course of the past three years, we have become other than who we were. [*My stali drugimi.*] We have lifted our heads, have straightened up, honestly and openly looked the facts in the face, spoken out loud about what is hurting us, and we are together searching for solutions to problems that have been accumulating over the course of decades. Without a decisive turn to democratization, real victories would be impossible, and solutions have already begun to take shape in a number of social and economic areas.
>
> We are all learning to live in conditions of spreading democracy, glasnost; we have enrolled in a great school. This school is not easy. To free ourselves from the old in thought and action has turned out to be more difficult than we supposed. But the important thing—what unites us today—is consciousness of the fact that there is no turning back. The ruinousness of such a return is obvious.

The "we" in the passage are those faithful students of perestroika who were transforming themselves in order to realize socialism. The passage places a person's sense of self at the center of reform, and yet the unmistakable worry of the article is that this process is in danger, that there are old Soviet selves attempting to remind "us" of the supposed comforts of the old ways. For the proponents of perestroika, on the other hand, while "we" have become other than who we were, "we" are not yet who we will become. The editorial's hints about these future selves came down to a description of a fully cultured society, one in which "in the spiritual life of the society, the voice of the intelligentsia and of all workers, will ring out loud and clear." The intelligentsia is particularly important in this regard, since it is associated with "the best traditions," with calls to "conscience, morality, decency, humanist principles, and socialist norms of life."

So far the editorial defended perestroika in a familiar and passionate manner. But immediately following this passage the authors acknowledge that there are problems with the new conditions of media that they made possible:

> But we also see something else: the absence in some works of empathy or sympathy with the people, with its history, with its joy and pain. An author might take upon himself to become the apostle of truth and make decrees about what should be done and how to do it. There are not a few attempts to promote oneself, to make a noise with sensations, to amuse oneself with facts and factoids [*faktik*], not to serve the truth but in the service of one's own unquenchable vanity. This leads to the juggling

> and distortion of facts, and most importantly, substitutes for the history of the people, a history of the mistakes of the leadership. Naturally this leads to the wounding of the feelings of millions of honest people, and does not extract from history objective and useful lessons.

These comments indeed resonated with the fears of Andreeva, and so the editorialist must make a distinction between the media criticism of reformers and the criticism of conservatives. And here they are forced to reckon with precisely that agency that made perestroika thinkable in the first place, the agency of journalists themselves.

> Some people are ready to attribute all our difficulties, all the unpleasantness of daily life to the fact that newspapers babble on about everything, make judgments about everything, and excite public opinion . . . We should recognize this: the newspaper page is a secondary phenomenon. Primary is life itself! So that people don't read about shortcomings on the pages of newspapers, there shouldn't be any shortcomings in life.

This was indeed a remarkable passage for writers dedicated to socialist renewal to compose, for it acknowledged that the climate of information within which socialism was to take form could not be simply arranged to foster that likelihood. To the contrary, it was as if Gorbachev and his allies were acknowledging that the media represented a complex set of cross-cutting interests and that journalists acted according to a variety of motivations. They too had realized that in the "liberal" media, journalists were producing sensational revelations about the Soviet past for no other reason than the fame and notoriety that would result. Thus, because journalists could be selfish and vain, it was necessary not to take too seriously what some newspapers printed. Even more troubling for the reformers was the conclusion this implied, that a renewal of socialist government would have to come into being despite, rather than because of, the interests, practices, and desires of journalists. The achievement "of communism as a permanent *cultural* ideal—as a principle of day to day life for the masses" would no longer be articulated along the radial diagram of government, but would have to become a matter of the personal dedication of extraordinary individuals.[34] In a sense, the renewal of the party's task of governing had led it by the spring of 1988 all the way back to 1917, to being an organization of dedicated revolutionaries. It was as if the long evolution of Soviet society had brought it to a point of requiring another rebirth.

After 1988 Gorbachev proceeded to distance himself from the party even as he continued to proclaim the goal of adhering to the ideals of socialism. He tried to adopt a position above the two factions whose existence he had allowed into being, and he became more and more convinced

that the institution of the party created more problems than solutions. He tacked back and forth between "liberals" who wanted more market and more democracy and "conservatives" who wanted more order and more stability. In February 1990, in pushing for the repeal of article 6 of the 1977 Brezhnev constitution that guaranteed the party's leading role, he basically acknowledged that the Leninist party had ceased to have any connection to the ideals of socialism, and that the party would henceforth have to earn its leading role in Soviet society. And yet even as Gorbachev struggled to keep the Soviet Union together, to create an orderly system of politics, he remained a socialist; in the summer of 1991 he pulled back from the Shatalin Plan to introduce market reforms in the Soviet Union, thus strengthening the hand of Yeltsin, who had become the leader of those forces seeking to liberalize and marketize the Soviet economy. Socialism in the Soviet Union clung to the ideals and memories of a single person. The coup nudged Gorbachev offstage; it is doubtful, in fact, that when he stepped off the plane from the Crimea in late August 1991, he realized that he had indeed returned to a different country.

It was unlikely that the party would achieve its renewal by once again aligning socialism and journalism in a common governmental project, for journalists no longer saw their own agency in terms of the party's goals and objectives. Gorbachev and his allies could not see that the agents of perestroika had come to their own conclusions about socialism and journalism. They understood that any attempt at a reform dedicated to the renewal of socialism required the empowerment of journalists, and yet journalists had spread themselves across the discursive landscape during the Brezhnev era; they were hardly the group of patient cadres waiting to be called again to the glorious task first glimpsed by Lenin a century earlier, to create a just and prosperous socialist society. We can gain a sense of journalists' states of mind during perestroika by turning to accounts that express their responses as they were called upon to be the main actors of perestroika, to be those who would help Soviet citizens to become "other than who they had been." These accounts reveal both the suspicion that many journalists felt toward this project *and* how they found ways to define their work in positive terms.

JOURNALISTS BETWEEN REFORM AND REFUSAL

While journalists at *Moskovskie novosti* after 1986 struggled to publish their sensations, causing debates and discussions within the Central Committee and Politburo, journalists and editors at major publications like *Izvestiia* were caught in a kind of bind. Their paper had been the most important voice of reform in the 1960s, and yet fulfilling the party's task,

even a liberal one, was troubling for many journalists. Indeed, the accounts of writers who had been present at meetings with Gorbachev, such as the one with the editors and journalists in July 1987, suggest that Gorbachev had there a very difficult audience. Mikhail Nenashev, for example, whose memoire, *An Ideal Betrayed,* offers a fascinating glimpse into the problems of all spheres of mass media in the 1970s and 1980s, denounced Gorbachev's famous discussions with the representatives of the mass media as being less a dialogue than the delivery of a set of instructions. He suggests that the journalists who heard these exhortations shared a similar kind of suspicion: why should Soviet citizens—especially those occupying important positions in Soviet institutions—who possessed decades of experience dealing with the party's hypocritical strategies and tactics, suddenly take the party's calls for rejuvenation and renewal as sincere, when no independent standpoint existed from which to judge either the party's sincerity or the results achieved? Why should Soviet journalists trust the assertions of the party when the party was that institution that still reserved for itself the right to judge their work as true or not? For, contrary to the view that saw the earliest signs of glasnost as the first expression of the Soviet people's yearning for freedom, a yearning that inevitably produced the democratization of 1988–1990, most journalists recognized that perestroika and glasnost were in the classic mold of many of the other dramatic shifts visible in Russian history. As he looked back from 1993, the judgment of *Izvestiia* columnist Vladimir Denisov was harsh:

> During Gorbachev's rule I'd guess that no one anywhere ever considered these genuine changes. I mean that the entire period of glasnost' was a period of high-liberal censorship, and not the absence of censorship. There are a great number of different forms that censorship can take, from the naming of editors from the Central Committee to the coordination by the center of both which materials to publish and what general line to follow. The center might be a kind of liberal person like Aleksandr Nikolaevich Iakovlev, but all the same it was . . . just that, high-liberal censorship . . . Therefore for the period of glasnost it was characteristic that no one of us ever felt that he was completely free. We could write what we in reality thought and knew. This was possible. But this existed under their eye. It's like in one of your supermarkets, where they're watching you all the time. They were watching us all the time. And by the way I don't mean the professional eye of the newspaper manager, which is normal. I'm speaking of ideological censorship. The ideological video camera was always watching us.[35]

Denisov noticed that the embrace of this new censorship had more than a little pathos and hypocrisy to it. Perestroika, he said, was from the beginning

> a struggle for the renewal of communist ideals. But the funniest thing, the most amusing thing was that at least half of the journalists who repeated these clichés had at least ten or fifteen years earlier stopped believing in them. They were completely certain that no kind of communist ideology, no kind of communism with a human face, no kind of glasnost, no kind of harmony between communists and others would ever exist. We had discussed all this in our kitchens a long time ago. We had recovered from this a long time ago. We already knew this.

Their discomfort derived from being unsure that freedom of thought could emerge from the party's leadership's injunctions to "speak freely!" They asked themselves how they could help create a kind of critical, enlightened public when the party was always there to judge how critical they could or should be.

After the Nina Andreeva affair, journalists were forced to choose a side to support, and yet the gradual politicization of media troubled many writers, who began to view the press as an institution that was most effective when it stood above social conflicts. Journalists at *Izvestiia,* for example, began to write articles that could best be described as a form of cautious criticism. In so doing they clearly supported the cause of the reformers, and yet by hinting that the party was part of the problem rather than the solution, they tried to assert an independent stance from which to criticize both sides. A June 1988 article in *Izvestiia* by Albert Plutnik entitled "To Speak in One's Own Name" criticized what he saw as the tendency of Soviet citizens to cloak their own opinions within the monologic agreement of some larger group.[36] As foils for his article, he chose two examples from letters *Izvestiia* had received from readers. The first letter began, "The leading segments of our city's society, together with me, are upset by the fact that I have still not received an apartment"; and the second letter began, "All Soviet people are convinced that the young chess Grand Master behaved immodestly." Plutnik then reflected on each letter's distinctive style of address; he asked specifically why there existed in Soviet society this tendency to substitute the voice of the collective for the voice of the individual: "Behind this phraseology is a familiar form of thought, a kind of tradition of the interrelationship of the person considered separately and the collective, society—a tradition imprinted even in the well-known poetic phrase, 'the individual is nothing, the individual is garbage [*edinitsanol', edinitsa-vzdor . . .*].'" The consequences of this, Plutnik wrote, were serious:

> So it seems that in raising the authority of the collective and the significance of public opinion, we have inevitably reduced the authority and influence of the personality, the opinion of that most extreme minority, the single person.

> Then in the manner of a therapist he describes the psychological legacy of being born of those times, of those relationships, and those circumstances when to speak in one's own name was empty, hopeless, and worse, blameworthy. The limitation on opinion that lasted for many years created a kind of inferiority complex, a distrust that each one acting separately could make an influence on the course of important events. From that time, we have a fear of ourselves, a fear of being alone with our opinions.

Plutnik argued instead that "to speak in one's own name is natural. And this is what is necessary today, in a time of the establishment of real pluralism of opinions, of open confrontation of ideas and interests." To not do this is to use the same strategy as the bureaucrat, when he speaks for the people, as in "We can't do that, the people [*narod*] won't understand it." He concluded by stating, "To claim that one's own opinion is the people's opinion, that is the solely correct one, is the height of conceit. It is more modest to speak in one's own name." Here, Plutnik was engaging with and at the same time commenting on the priorities of perestroika. He took up the party's "line" but took it in a direction whose implications for the party's rule were ambiguous, since what he was envisioning was less the socialist project than the civil conduct of a pluralist public sphere.

An even more obvious case where boundaries and tolerances were being tested appeared in the conclusion of an article written by V. Nadein in July of 1988. He was clearly negotiating the supposedly new relationship between himself and the party when he concluded an article about the poor handling of a case of corruption by party officials in Kirghizia with the following paragraph:

> We are learning to live and work anew. Under these circumstances divergences are inevitable. No one has a monopoly on the truth—including of course journalists. The point is not to use any means available to prove one's correctness, that is, the incorrectness of your opponent. The point is that glasnost cannot exist as something thrust down from above, as a fashion, as something without which it would be indecent to appear in public. In the final analysis, glasnost is not needed by the editors' offices of the central and local papers, but by the Communist Party of the republic, and by those who lead it.[37]

Such a conclusion is a carefully worded endorsement of glasnost, behind which is a no less carefully embedded skepticism. The journalist was pointing out the danger that glasnost may be absorbed as yet another layer of the party's armor of hypocrisy.

These writers were struggling with the imperative of sustaining a vision of journalism's integrity in the face of forces that sought to limit the power of the press. And to the degree that they identified with *Izvestiia*'s "heri-

tage" of producing quality publicistic journalism, they negotiated the possibilities and pitfalls of perestroika. But other journalists at *Izvestiia,* like Alexandrov, understood that the politicization of Soviet life made other demands on the paper, and that the best way to support the reformers was to practice a compelling, interesting form of journalism.

Alexandrov had watched with interest the transformation of *Moskovskie novosti* under Egor Iakovlev beginning in 1986. Iakovlev wanted his journalists to write in a different style: simple, direct, short on opinions, and long on facts. When Alexandrov recalled the popularity of *Moskovskie novosti* between 1986 and 1989, and when he actually went back and read over its issues, he had been both amazed and amused. "Those issues were nonsense, boring, completely uninteresting by today's standards, and yet why did people start standing at the kiosks at 6 AM on the day *Moskovskie novosti* was to appear? Because it was written in a different language."[38] This language was above all marked by the presence of direct speech, unedited, unscripted transcriptions of individual's voices. To this extent, Alexandrov understood *Moskovskie novosti* as preparing the ground for the introduction into Russian political culture of argument, discussion, unplanned speeches, and, in most general terms, preparing for the new democratic politics that would appear after 1989. He saw, too, that Iakovlev's journalism was a model that was more in synch with the times. A liberal society was characterized above all by a certain speed and pace to the flow of information, and to the degree that *Izvestiia* sought a liberal audience, it needed to meet these expectations. In 1989, Alexandrov published 30 articles in *Izvestiia,* and in 1990, he published 120. To achieve this four-fold increase, he had to learn a different style and rhythm of work.

> I had to go first to the office, then I would run down to parliament and look around there, leaf through other newspapers, check out some documents, and then go back and write up some kind of commentary, with some kind of evaluation of what was happening with all these things. And because *Izvestiia* is an evening paper, I had to do it all right on time. It was no longer possible to carefully consider what I wanted to say. Nobody had time for this. Either they printed this, or they printed what someone else had written. Everything changed.[39]

Another aspect of the press's disengagement from the structures of the party with direct consequences for how Alexandrov worked was that politicians began to see the press as platforms from which to address, massage, and mold public opinion. In contrast to the fictional interviews he had to produce for the press under Brezhnev, interviews became contexts where the press acquired a whole new power, with journalists either supplying or withholding opportunities for publicity.

> I was astonished at my meetings with Nazarbaev in 1989. I flew to Alma-Ata for an interview when he had only just been chosen first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. We spoke for three days, four hours a day. I simply turned on the tape recorder, and we started conversing. It was an unbelievably open meeting. I quite liked him back then, and I still do. I would transcribe the cassettes at night, fifteen pages worth. I would give it to his assistant, and he would start crossing things out. Then Nazarbaev and I would meet the next time, and he would restore everything that had been crossed out. His assistant would shorten the text I gave him, and then Nazarbaev and I put right back into the text everything that his assistant had considered not necessary.

This relatively sudden change in the status of the interview and of his own questions astonished Alexandrov as he looked back on it. "This was amazing: I would come to someone and converse with him, and I was more interested in *what* he would say, than in *how* he said it. And I was freed of the necessity of making my interlocutor intelligent."

He acknowledged that these new kinds of articles had been disorienting for readers of *Izvestiia* used to the old style, although he preferred to take some of his more orthodox readers' criticism as a backhanded kind of praise. In 1989, *Izvestiia* had published word for word an interview that Alexandrov had conducted with Iu. Prokof'iev, the new first secretary of the Moscow City Committee. Afterward they had received a letter from a reader incensed at the paper for publishing an interview in which, as the reader said, "the questions asked were more intelligent than the answers received"; this struck the reader as a sign of the most blatant disrespect for the party's authority. Alexandrov, on the other hand, took the observation as a compliment.

As perestroika gave way to Gorbachev's efforts to manage the fractious groups that constituted the political class in the Soviet Union, it became more and more difficult for Alexandrov, Denisov, Shliapov, and others to accept any group's s sponsorship or ownership of the paper, and yet in 1990 and 1991 *Izvestiia* became the object of a struggle fought by different political groupings within the party. The paper's journalists and editors tried to steer a course between those on the Central Committee who saw *Izvestiia* as forsaking the role it had played for over seventy years and reformers who began to doubt that a media without any controls could contribute to political and social reconstruction. The Press Law of the Soviet Union had been passed in July of 1990, but later that year Gorbachev, bowing to pressure from the nomenklatura groups who still occupied key positions in the government, proposed suspending the law until the situation in the country became more stable. As a part of this package of moves designed to placate his conservative comrades, Gorbachev removed Laptev

from the editor-in-chief's position at *Izvestiia* and, against the wishes of the *Izvestiia* collective, who wanted I. Golembiovskii, instead chose N. Efimov as editor-in-chief. Gorbachev then asked Anatolii Lukyanov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to attempt Golembiovskii's removal from his position as deputy editor-in-chief and to suggest that Golembiovskii be sent abroad as *Izvestiia*'s correspondent in Spain.[40] This interference in the internal affairs of the paper became a scandal of major proportions, and although Golembiovskii refused to leave and remained in his post, for many observers this was more proof of the need to push through even faster the kind of liberal reforms that would guarantee the press its independence.

For Alexandrov this episode had been convincing proof that *Izvestiia* needed to rise above the political battles of the day, and that its most pressing task was to construct for itself a non-partisan, unaffiliated position that would speak to the best interests of the society as a whole. This was what new newspapers like *Nezavisimaia gazeta* [The Independent], which had begun publishing on December 21, 1990, were trying to do. Supported by a small consortium of banks, it had no obligations to anyone in the existing power structure. And with this independence it was able to print extraordinary images and articles, ones that evoked a point of view completely alien to the Soviet establishment. This was the point of its first issue, whose front page bore the then-mesmerizing headline "They Rule Us," beneath which were several dozen small square photographs of the leading party and government bureaucrats, complete with several empty boxes filled with question marks.[41] As its first deputy editor told me, their goal had been to print whatever they were sent by readers, without commentary, and this resulted in an almost instantaneous and spectacular success. It was less clear how *Izvestiia,* or any of the important central papers for that matter, which had been identified for seven decades with the party and socialist values, ideals, and aspirations, would establish this kind of independence, particularly in the circumstances of a capitalist media market that took shape in the second half of 1990.

This problem of an imagined independence was then exacerbated through the specific manner in which the Soviet Union disappeared. The coup attempt had suddenly forced people to declare allegiances and to choose sides, and on this issue there was no doubt where the majority of *Izvestiia* journalists stood: they had no desire to be any party's "weapon." The putschists had instructed all media to publish their decree informing the public that Gorbachev was no longer leading the country, but according to an account by I. Ovchinnikova, one of *Izvestiia*'s leading journalists, when the paper's printers saw what they were publishing for the evening edition of the first day of the coup, August 19, they refused to work. They demanded that Yeltsin's appeal to the nation be printed as well. The editor

refused. The result was that *Izvestiia* did not come out the evening of the 19th but was published the following morning in two editions, after the editors agreed to publish a shortened version of the appeal beside the putschists' decree. The paper's next two issues gave much more space to Yeltsin's resistance, printing large photographs of those resisting the putschists at the White House in Moscow and in Leningrad.[42] After the coup fizzled, Efimov and his deputies resigned, and the staff elected I. Golembiovskii as its new editor-in-chief. The journalists also formed a collective that took over the juridical "ownership" of the newspaper.

The August coup cast a long shadow over the post-Soviet public sphere. The political terrain became polarized between "democrats" who sought an escape from Soviet political culture and the "red-brown coalition," who sought to reconstruct Russian politics along nationalist lines.[43] This was a situation hardly conducive to a stance of "independence" and to the risk of appearing indifferent that sometimes attends the position of independence. In Alexandrov's view, the liberal press missed an important chance in those first months after the coup attempt. While before the putsch these papers had become a de facto opposition party, united in their dislike of the lingering control by party bureaucrats over the political sphere, after August they had an opportunity to pull back from their close and necessary engagement with politics and establish themselves as independent voices. But they had become intoxicated with their newly felt power and thus could not see that they would best serve Russian society's transition to democracy by establishing themselves as watchdogs over not only the losers but also the victors.

Most disturbing for Alexandrov, as he read *Izvestiia* at the end of 1991, was that the paper continued to support Yeltsin in 1992 as he moved on to his next political battle, now against the opposition in the Congress of People's Deputies. "This idea [of not criticizing Yeltsin] has unmistakably set our press back, because a press that begins to serve power cannot be a good press. It represents a turning back to what it was before." That Yeltsin could in theory pose as many problems as the party bureaucrats before him was obvious as briefly as several days after the coup attempt when he ordered the closing of *Pravda.* This led to an outcry from journalists at liberal publications that forced Yeltsin to rescind his order. Alexandrov was proud of this unanimous outcry from journalists of all political stripes who insisted that this was precisely the kind of action that would not be permitted to take place in a democratic country. An even more serious issue was the means Yeltsin and his main media adviser, Mikhail Poltoranin, created to assist individual newspapers in their transition from reliance on the party's financing to the exclusive support of readers and advertisers. Rather than holding down the prices of paper, ink, and distribution, the Yeltsin govern-

ment had decided to simply give out money in the form of subsidies to papers that it thought politic or expedient to support. This policy, according to Alexandrov, was

> economically senseless, politically injurious, and completely morally bankrupt. Economically, this money is not enough for those who receive it, although it is enough to keep some editors from thinking about how to remake their publications. Politically, no matter who says it, if the ministry pays out money to a publication, the paper becomes in a relationship of dependence on the ministry, a relation of political dependence. I could give you a number of examples. For example, I conducted an experiment last year [1992]. I wrote an article that was sharply critical of some move by Poltoranin. I took it to various papers. They told me that they didn't even want to read it . . . And one told me straight out: "You have to understand, Poltoranin promised to give me 15 million rubles in a week. First let him give us the money, then we'll read your article." This is the simplest example. It was an essentially inoffensive article, although Poltoranin wouldn't have liked it at all, but that's another conversation. But already this was the introduction of a kind of censorship, when you give to one person a lot of money, and to a second, less, and then to a third none at all. This works to corrupt journalists. For no matter how honest, just, and intelligent the people are who make up the list of who gets the money, they wouldn't be free of the suspicion that they were working for the good of their own political ideas.

Looking more generally at the new media styles that emerged after the passing of the Press Law, Alexandrov observed that very few Russian journalists were suited to these new conditions of work. He described to me the immense difficulties that *Pravda* and *Sovetskaia rossiia* had in this regard, simultaneously trying to compete with the timely and fact-based essence of journalism's "new language" while retaining the polemical, leisurely, and thoughtful style of the pre-glasnost era. But conservative publications were not the only problem; their politics might be misguided, but they possessed literary standards. Particularly problematic, in Alexandrov's view, were the new publications, like *Kommersant'*. Begun as a weekly for Russia's new business class in July 1990, the paper, according to Alexandrov, was remarkable for the degree of inaccurate information it published. "*Kommersant'* lies quite a bit. It lies not because it is in its nature to lie, but because very unqualified people work there. They simply don't know how to work with facts." But he understood these individual failings to be connected with the larger problem of a media sphere that was limited by nothing at all, in which it was possible to print whatever you wanted to. The journalists at the new, post-ideological papers, he felt, had no discipline:

> Whatever you pick up within earshot, you can rush it into print . . . There has been a wave of people, who seem to think that it is all so easy, because after all, it is pretty simple to write in this new style. The inadequacies derive more from the human,

> moral level: that of the twenty short notes you write, you think that, well, the twenty-first you don't have to check because you think you know all the facts. The very ease in writing now does these young kids a disservice. They also have an inflated opinion of themselves, and that too leads them into errors.

Alexandrov admitted, however, that "It's a completely different matter, however, that for people of my generation and for those older than me, it is still more difficult to adapt, extremely difficult, because journalism has changed. The enormous canvas of the essay, with its lyrical and thought-filled pauses, is going, going, gone. There is simply no time anymore for a journalist to spend two months on a single article." As to the sources of this new style, Alexandrov simply said that it was required by

> this life itself, by this hasty life. When you have to set down as quickly as possible what was said at an evening demonstration, what Gorbachev said to Sakharov, what Yeltsin said to Ligachev, there is simply not time to slip in some kind of evaluation. All the more so, because the objective style you are expected to write in won't permit it . . . In principle, there is the influence of normal, Western journalism, although its direct influence is minimal, since our journalists rarely possessed a knowledge of foreign languages. The influence of the West is mediated by many things, but obviously, this is the only style possible for the description of real life in these circumstances.

When we talked in February of 1993, Alexandrov criticized the overall poor quality of Moscow's print media, and he was contemplating the possibility of establishing his own publication, one that would publish what he "doesn't see in other papers."

> The fact is that in principle newspapers now are pretty monotonous [*odnoobraznyi*]. What would make our paper different wouldn't be the positions of the journalists who published it, but the system of priorities that we would use in choosing news. Open any paper today, and I know perfectly well that the main news on the first page will be Yeltsin and the referendum. Of course, different papers can give different evaluations, but the first and second pages in all papers are becoming identical.

He allowed that there were differences in quality, and that some papers were more interesting than others, but he believed that, in general, the circle of people who produced the papers and their texture [*faktura*] were one and the same.

> What we don't have is a newspaper that would speak about politics but that would at the same time be turned toward the person, to the individual person. Now everything is appearing on the level of the parliament, of the government, and so on. The concrete individual doesn't exist. All our papers simply repeat the same things over

> and over again. We don't have any paper that stands in some corner and pronounces that what would be politically expedient would not be this or that political step, but the rights of the person. We have no paper like this.

I gave Alexandrov examples of several papers that I thought tried to do this, but he found none of them accurate or adequate.

> Here's an example. The kind of news I would have as the main event of the day would not be some speech of Yeltsin's in the Constitutional Commission, but that the minister of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan punched in the face the editor of a local paper. That's what I would make the main event of the day.[44]

For Alexandrov this example captures what it would mean for the press to adopt an independent stance on politics and society. He would embody this independence in the public exposure of acts of injustice and incivility done by those in power to those with no power. The readers who would seek such a publication would share above all the conviction that those with power needed constant, unrelenting criticism, and the only way to be above the political fray was to be in the midst of it. Readers would engage with freedom to the degree that they made their own lives the context for this critical engagement. Earlier chapters of this book suggest that one of the sources for Alexandrov's imaginary paper was precisely the journalistic person who traveled down the seven decades of Soviet print culture. Alexandrov's person, however, was not defined by a relationship to the project of "building socialism," but by the possession of a consciousness that was at the heart of all possible politics. Such a paper would inevitably share the goal of teaching, raising up, enlightening; the same goals, in other words, that were at the heart of the Soviet press. The journalist's identity as teacher was the same, but the content of the lesson had changed.

By 1990, journalists like Alexandrov had ceased acting as if their work had any relationship to the progressive socialist transformation of Soviet society. Instead, it was a matter of how to fulfill the expectations of a practice of journalism defined by the need to produce information within what was becoming a competitive media market. No longer were they writing for the entire Soviet audience, but rather for that segment of liberals and democrats in Soviet society who were trying to imagine a new position for themselves in the spaces opened up by the party's disintegration. Journalists struggled to make the paper responsive to a variety of readers and a variety of styles; articles became shorter, discussed the workings of the market and capitalism, and promoted Russia's entrance into the European international marketplace. Papers began to create their own priorities and to define their own readership.

Many images and articles could symbolize the transformation of *Izvestiia* in the last months of the Soviet Union, but one that vividly captures the power of the new concept of journalistic practice was on the front page of the July 2, 1990, edition. It showed General Secretary Gorbachev at the opening of the 28th Party Congress, the last congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The photograph portrayed Gorbachev at the podium, holding some papers in his hands, with rows of empty seats behind him. He is looking off to one side as if trying to get someone's attention. Above the photograph is the headline, "The 28th Party Congress Opens in Moscow," and beneath the photo the caption reads "The first minutes of the congress."

The photo presented a sharp contrast to the traditional codes of representing meetings and congresses in the old Soviet media, which always showed a figure in the midst of a speech, standing at the podium in front of his fellow central committee members and in front of a rapt audience of delegates. The 1990 photo showed neither a view of the entire multitude of delegates listening patiently, nor a close-up view of the speaker as he read his text. Rather, we are shown a completely unimportant moment, a slice out of time that by itself did not refer to any representational code and did not require the activation of any process of decoding. The laconic and quintessentially journalistic headline and caption, devoid of any of the formulas usually used to describe such events, suggested that the paper was simply reporting; the editors, in their desire to stress their own independent attitude toward the event, chose a photograph that seemed to convey only the fact of the congress's existence: literally, the first minutes of the congress. The congress was transformed into nothing more than an image by the practice of journalistic objectivity, as an independent journalist was supposed to observe even the most charged events with dispassion and distance.

And yet in the specific circumstances of the decay of the communist system such dispassion was, of course, an engaged act; this non-political act of objective reporting was itself political, with the "hidden" political statement here being also the literal one: Gorbachev was alone on the vacant stage of the Communist Party. If the tribune of the Party Congress was a site where the vast imaginary membership of the greatest political organization in the world was given metonymic presence, then the irony was obvious: by the middle of 1990, the party Gorbachev imagined was a party of one. Nothing was carried over from the old representational code; the photo calls attention to itself as another piece of photo-journalism, and not a document for the ages. The photo has been cropped in such a way that it cuts off on either end the three rows of seats on the platform, giving the impression of having been deliberately not "formally" composed. The

only "figure" to share the stage is the huge head of Lenin that looms above Gorbachev on the curtain, an image now shorn from the context of thousands of members listening to the wisdom of the party's leaders and Lenin's descendants. Lenin is suddenly removed from any claim on the present and is shown only as just an icon fixed to a literal background.

Most important, though, was that the object of journalistic representation here is reduced to Gorbachev's physical form: by taking the shot before the beginning of the congress, before the delegates have even taken their seats, and as Gorbachev looks off into the distance, the photographer has snapped a photo of the body of Soviet power not clad in its clothing of symbols. Instead of the usual image of the party draped in its trappings of power—from the rows of medals that used to line Brezhnev's chest to the rows of bureaucrats and party officials who provided a dense and impenetrable robe for the body of the party at congresses such as this one—the photograph shows the party's body as merely information for the newspapers. Journalistic objectivity emptied the body of the general secretary of his density, transforming Gorbachev the man into an object, a person, a form, no longer covered up by the symbolism with which decades of representational practice had endowed the party leader. The issue raised in the most general terms by the discursive dynamics of this image is that of the materiality of human beings, and to this extent such a representational dynamic was continuous with another unprecedented media phenomenon that emerged in 1989–1990, pornography. If *Izvestiia*'s editors had metaphorically undressed the party in this photo, the boulevard press sought an even more literal form of undressing. It was in this domain of print culture where the problem of post-Soviet bodies and selves was asserted most starkly, and it is from this sphere of print culture that insight can be gained into the practices of advanced liberal forms of governmentality.

FIVE

Teaching Tabloids

The end of the Communist Party's political monopoly in February 1990 and the passage of the Press Law in June 1990, which introduced freedom of the press to Soviet society, effectively brought an end to the radial diagram of government that had been established at the beginning of the Soviet regime. No longer was there a center that would define and delimit the work of journalists; no longer was there a powerful pedagogy to be promoted and disseminated that would project images of Soviet subjects. The breakup of the Soviet system of media did not mean, however, that editors and journalists were suddenly free and unconstrained, or that the press, operating now within a framework of law, took its place within a just and democratic system. Above all, editors faced the enormous problem of adapting their publications to the conditions of the market economy. They had to find new ways of paying for newsprint and ink, and new employees able and willing to work under new conditions. The situation in the Russian case was made more severe by the policy of "shock therapy" introduced in early 1992, which caused a sudden and spectacular inflation that drove circulations down just when newspapers came to rely on income from subscriptions. The delivery of newspapers to the market also became a serious problem, as the state distribution agency, Rospechat', struggled to work with a smaller budget and less resources. John Downing notes that these new economic conditions produced a number of "distortions" in media practices in the early years of post-communism. Politicians would charge journalists for interviews, and some journalists would take bribes or payments for writing "objective" news accounts that showed their subjects in a favorable light. Papers desperate for money would turn for

support to the new banks and financial structures that appeared during 1992, and this shaped their reporting of the corruption, bribery, and violence that channeled Russia's transition to capitalism.[1] The melting away of the immense property of the Communist Party into banks and holding companies, industrial combines and stock companies, and all the other institutions of nomenklatura capitalism meant that new structures of patronage evolved, with the attendant ethical and practical problems of how to define the freedom of a press system so dependent on formerly visible but now largely invisible organizations of financial power.

Editors also had to deal with the intense interest of post-socialist political elites in the contents and conduct of media organizations. No observer of the media systems of post-socialist states in Europe identifies a situation in which the press immediately began acting as a powerful fourth estate, vigilantly observing and destroying with the weapon of publicity any manifestations of corruption, illegality, or vice. In every state, those who occupied positions of power after the end of socialism paid close attention to what they read in the press and watched on television; aspiring officeholders understood that in a democracy, politicians derived their legitimacy from the public's favorable judgments, judgments that emerged mainly from impressions provided through the mass media and, above all, through television. The post-Soviet Russian governments have shaped media content by controlling the flow of subventions to editorial offices and by putting pressure on editors and broadcasters to control what messages get said and how often. Throughout the 1990s, for example, Boris Yeltsin influenced the outcomes of elections and referenda by ensuring that Russian television promoted only his causes, and his successor, Vladimir Putin, seems to be continuing this approach. Generalizing about post-socialist systems across Eastern Europe, Slavko Splichal identifies a "paternalistic-commercial media," based on "a highly regulated broadcasting sector and an unregulated print sector, each of which represents the new political elite's lack of commitment to the goals and interests of citizens."[2] The regulated broadcasting sector promotes the ideologies of elites, while the unregulated print sector establishes a print market organized according to the competitive logics of commercial enterprises. Neither contribute to what Splichal considers fundamental, the creation of a civil society.

The interpretive framework that I have drawn upon suggests that we examine this transformed system in terms of how various sectors of the media became sites where new strategies of governing found a mass presence in Russian society. The framework of governmentality suggests that the transition that took place in the early 1990s in Russia can be viewed not only as one from socialism to capitalism, but also as a movement from one problematics of government to another, from Gorbachev's brand of

charismatic Leninism to the advanced liberal government of post-socialism. From this perspective, the important issue is not that newspapers continued to struggle with the state over censorship, but how those newspapers that operated freely, openly, and by and large successfully, within the framework of the market, contributed to this shift in the discourses of Russian government. Newspapers came to represent a variety of forms in which the "person" as a governmental object was re-imagined and re-described by groups of cultural producers negotiating the passage of their own careers and lives from one governmental practice of journalism to another. The specific sector of the media that I examine here is the low-brow, "boulevard" mass press in Russia, which was a vector for the introduction of a vocabulary of governance that promoted new vocabularies of self-understanding and fulfillment. To investigate the emergence of this new governmental discourse, I want to present extended accounts of conversations with three journalists who edited popular mass papers in post-Soviet Russia. Their descriptions of the founding of their papers, of the logics that organized their material, and their understanding of their significance for Russian history and society reveal their engagements with this new governmental purpose. It is as if they produced a discourse of the Soviet person, but turned inside out: instead of instructing Russian readers about their essentially social nature, they taught readers their new situation of autonomy and normality. By looking at two of the sexual tabloids and at one of the supermarket-type tabloids, this new dynamic of governing will come into focus.

Before presenting this material, however, I should emphasize how the changes that took place in Russia were a part of a truly global development. Russia's re-engagement with liberalism took place in a particular moment in the organization of the global circulation of capital, knowledge, and expertise. Foreign experts arrived to consult with Russians about everything from how to hold an election to how to set up a stock market and organize a banking system. Russia was engaging with a "West" that was engaged in its own redefinition of what the goals, methods, and technologies of liberal government should be. More specifically, the "West" that Russian leaders beginning with Gorbachev opened up to in the mid-1980s was one experiencing a revaluing of the modes of liberal government that had emerged in the decades after World War II, modes that were founded on the imperative of official agencies of the state to intervene in a range of ways to guarantee the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The leaders with whom Gorbachev interacted with the goal of reducing the tensions of the Cold War were Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the leaders of the Anglo-American alliance who used conservative rhetorics to criticize the welfare state not just for being wasteful and expensive but for

being despotic in its creation of a "culture" of poverty. The irony was that just as Western elites were rejecting the welfare state, Gorbachev and his advisers contemplated how to move the Soviet Union toward some version of it; he sought a social market economy, just as a new framework of liberal government emerged in the West, one that Nikolas Rose has called "advanced liberal."[3]

As Rose argues, by the late 1970s, the core problem for liberal governments shifted to how to organize an effective government without the competitive overlapping layers and agencies of expertise fixed in vast state bureaucracies. Or in other words, how to manage the disruptions and dislocations created by capitalism without resorting to a multitude of social instruments that ended up helping not the poor but the middle-class experts. The constellation of advanced liberal strategies that have appeared in Anglo-America in particular is centered not on inventing more effective bureaucracies but on developing more effective individuals whose sense of themselves was founded on responsibility, autonomy, and choice. Advanced liberal governmentality stresses not the agency of the state's multiple agencies but the wills of individuals to identify themselves in new ways. The state moves from a "social" state to being an "enabling" state. Central here is the encouragement of any and every means by which individuals can be led to a sense of themselves as responsible for their own lives. The most successful subjects of government become individuals who succeed in "enterprising themselves," recognizing themselves as free agents whose "business" is their own fulfillment. This new constellation of ideas about government builds on new forms of expertise, namely those psychological and therapeutic discourses that help people overcome their inability to see themselves as free. Advanced liberal government thus works through a concept of freedom, "the capacity for self-realization which can be attained only through individual activity." And for subjects intent on treating their own life as an enterprise, it is imperative that they learn ways of calculating the risks and probable consequences of a course of action. To this extent, the problem of government ceases to be how to construct a relationship between the citizen and the society in which he or she lives; it becomes how to govern through the embedding of responsible individuals in self-governing communities.

Given that the advanced liberal mode of government relies so heavily on individuals' engagement with a vocabulary of self-understanding, societies that have moved away from welfare conceptions of government have been the sites for an explosion of self-instruction. These involve what Rose calls the psy-discourses, those discourses that provide profound knowledges and techniques of managing one's self-understanding.[4] And like any pedagogy, they evoke a specific community of students like oneself that share a

set of aims and hoped-for satisfactions. Mass media, in its current phase of "de-massification," or market segmentation, can be thus seen as one of the most powerful sites of government in the advanced liberal mode. Mass media systems no longer represent the imaginary of a virtual national society, as they did into the 1970s, but rather the multiple imaginaries of proliferating communities. These communities might have different values and practices, but they are organized by mass culture in similar ways through similar technologies, by the transmissions of radio stations, the programming of cable TV shows, and the flows of print media, each of which constitutes a channel of entertainment, instruction, and identification. Communities emerge as modular in that they are based on a common model of the self-enterprising individual finding a place within a group of other individuals who seek to understand themselves in the same way. Unlike the 19th-century "communications infrastructures" that facilitated connections within the social body, early 21st-century communication technologies make possible the communitization of society.[5]

The appearance in Russia after 1991 of new publications and new genres of publications therefore can be viewed as the emergence of new repertoires and projects of self-construction. The sexual boulevard press can be viewed as a particularly salient example of the introduction of advanced liberal forms of thought and practice. The sexual tabloids teach how to construct a landscape of, as the title of one of the more important tabloids put it, "private life," while that other genre of the boulevard press, the sensationalist, supermarket-style tabloid, represented the individual as the entertaining object of vast unknowable forces. Instead of highlighting the satisfactions of individuals, this genre highlights the vagaries of individuality, conveying the sense that humanity—in the form of individual Brazilians, Germans, Americans, and Russians—is indeed a spectacle worth enjoying.

PROFILES OF THE BOULEVARD PRESS

"Punk Wedding, and Our Correspondent Was Invited." "Love Story: Because of Wright, He Broke Up with . . . Madonna!" "Dolphin with Human Hands, Puzzle of Nature." "Woman Weighs 260 kilograms." "Miracle: Sex Brought Him Back to Life." "An Unexpected Question: Is It Possible to Conceive in Weightlessness?" "Virgin Wedding: Already a Year and Nothing's Happened."

These are not headlines from the *National Enquirer* or the *Daily Mail,* or the *Weekly World News,* but from Russian newspapers published in 1992. It is quite possible that some of these headlines were taken from other, foreign publications, but it is impossible to be sure, since these papers paid

little attention to copyright law. The headlines came from three of the most popular boulevard newspapers in Moscow, *SPID-Info* (AIDS-Info), *Chastnaia zhizn'* (Private Life), and *Skandaly* (Scandals). The boulevard press emerged in 1990–1991 in the wake of both the disappearance of censorship institutions and the appearance of media entrepreneurs seeking new audiences. The Press Law of June 1990 began the process of the stratification of the Russian media market; a number of new lowbrow publications appeared, and certain revered Soviet papers, such as the daily *Moskovskii komsomolets,* began to attract a mass audience with exposés of crimes, corruption, and consumption. It still mixed in politics, however, and by 1990 had developed its particular style of cynical and ironic commentary about politics that would continue right across the border of the Soviet Union's end. The pages of the early boulevard press in the Soviet Union resembled similar papers in the West; they were filled with discussions of sex, gossip about Russian and Western movie stars, tales of paranormal phenomena, exposés of conspiracies involving fantastic scientific discoveries and technologies, pathos-filled tragedies of daily life, and sensational accounts of horrific crimes, physical oddities, and abnormalities. Their style was strongly visual, with constant use of titillating, provocative, horrific, and generally sensationalistic photographs, and the texts that accompanied these photos were often short and highly narrative, with little attention to journalistic issues around the veracity of their narrative claims.

These papers were remarkable because of their size: collectively, the three papers I discuss below together had a monthly circulation of over seven million copies.[6] In the first years of post-communism, the monthly paper *SPID-Info* quickly became one of the most popular newspapers in the Soviet Union: while the circulation of the prestigious daily papers in Russia during 1992–1993 hovered between 100,000 and 200,000, *SPID-Info*'s editor, Andrei Korshagin, claimed a circulation of over 4 million, which, if true, gave it one of the two largest circulations in the country. The source of *SPID-Info*'s success was a flashy visual style that mixed erotica and sensational topics; bold graphics and text claimed the attention of pedestrians on the street or those riding the suburban trains, and at the mobile newsstands set up along pedestrian walkways of the Moscow metro it was common to see at least two or three issues of *SPID-Info* hanging at eye level, hung by clothes pins attached to wires fixed between makeshift stands. *Chastnaia zhizn'* was a tabloid begun in April 1991, published twice a month, with sixteen pages and a circulation of 400,000 copies by the end of 1992. Its visual style was cleaner and less cluttered than *SPID-Info*'s, and it looked more like a newspaper with a layout built around orderly columns and simpler graphics. Its themes overlapped those of *SPID-Info*'s, although its articles were longer and sometimes touched on social prob-

Front page of the post-Soviet tabloid *Chastnaia zhizn'* (Private Life), 1992.

lems, albeit in a sensationalist style. *Skandaly,* was founded in the spring of 1992. It began as a monthly, but in November 1992 began to publish bimonthly, with sixteen pages and a print run of 400,000 copies. It was a two-color publication, with red used to highlight the publication's name as well as certain key words in the headlines of articles on the front and back pages and on the center two pages, pages 8 and 9. Its layout resembled those of American supermarket tabloids in consisting of four main visual units: large, garish headlines and subheads, usually announcing a horrific or unbelievable event; photographs or drawings of the protagonist or antagonist of the article, whether they be cockroaches or exploding moons; a box of text that summarizes the assertions of the headline and photograph, and a small number of brief paragraphs that constituted the article itself.

SPID-Info was one of the few successful mass tabloids that was born in the era of Soviet censorship.[7] Its editor had been a professional journalist who worked during the 1980s at the monthly paper *Meditsinskaia gazeta,* which had been published by the Soviet Ministry of Health. There the idea

Front page of the post-Soviet tabloid *Skandaly* (Scandals), 1992.

arose in early 1989 to start a bulletin sponsored by the Association for the Fight against AIDS that would be a kind of "cautionary publication," a "news sheet" that would alert people to the danger of AIDS and discuss how AIDS was transmitted and how to avoid infection. This purely medical orientation had helped one of his colleagues maneuver the paper past the censors: because the paper was ostensibly a bulletin from an organization dedicated to the dissemination of knowledge about public health, the Central Committee had agreed to the publication's appearance, although Korshagin admitted that the chaotic political context of perestroika certainly helped, since those who would have "smothered" the publication had more important battles on their hands. Once the press law was passed, however, the paper's staff took ownership of it and transformed the public health bulletin into a mass newspaper.

One of *Chastnaia zhizn*'s editors, Petr Bondarev, was also a veteran of the Soviet press. He had worked for eight years at the paper of the Moscow party committee, *Moskovskaia pravda,* and then for the next seventeen years

at the all-Union paper, *Sovetskaia kultura,* beginning there as a correspondent and working his way up to the position of assistant chief of the news department. In the course of our conversation, he complained about many of the same frustrations that other journalists had, resenting most the party's stifling supervision of journalism as the party became more and more suspicious of discussions that veered even slightly from the framework of orthodoxy established in the 1970s. Of course, like other journalists, Bondarev had had some successes: he told me with some pride that he considered himself the first person to succeed in acknowledging in print that AIDS existed in the Soviet Union. He left *Sovetskaia kultura* in 1990 for a number of reasons, the most important of which was his general exasperation, frustration, and fatigue at having his work depend not on knowledge, ability, talent, or the facts, but on the will of his boss, who was appointed by the Central Committee.

Both men recognized that the marketization of the Russian press had given them the opportunity to produce a completely different kind of publication, and yet both men, acutely aware of the controversial nature of their papers, stressed that their choice of theme was by no means driven solely by the desire to make money. Indeed, their remarks were characterized above all by a faith that their publications were providing an immensely important service to thousands of individuals: both believed that Soviet citizens had been traumatized by the official suspicion of that most important of the joys of "private life," sex. The official inattention to the broad dynamics of relationships between men and women meant that a large vein of journalistic material had for seventy years gone unmined. Bondarev in particular said that he felt a certain awe when he contemplated the vastness of his paper's potential material: "The themes of *Chastnaia zhizn'* are limitless: the private life of every person—this is limitless. It has so many themes, so many nuances, so many shades, a boundless quantity of themes."[8] And Korshagin said that it was only natural that a bulletin about AIDS should turn to the topic of sex, for this was a topic "that simply didn't exist" during the Soviet era, although he also went a long way to deny any connection between the public's brief infatuation with pornography and his own success. "Why did we grow from that point [1990] on while all those pornographic papers disappeared as quickly as they appeared? Because of sex? Absolutely not. How much sex can you take? A normal person can't read the same thing twenty times. So we didn't lose readers. Why? Because our newspaper is different from all the others in that it is turned toward the person."[9] Here is that same familiar object of journalistic attention but defined now as an object of therapeutic attention. Both men understood their own publications' popularity as confirming the accuracy of their readings of the psychological ills inflicted on the average person by the official

silences of Soviet culture; and both men believed that Russian citizens' ignorance about sex marked Russia as backward in comparison to the sexually knowledgeable societies of the West.

Korshagin explained this to me by describing the way Americans allegedly understood the balance between politics and private life, stating that in America politics was not an important aspect of people's lives. He pointed out that in 1992 Americans had just voted one president out and another one in, and no one thought this unusual or cared very much about it; it was simply the way things worked. In contrast to these kinds of events in the public sphere, what was most important to Americans was the

> home, family, that everything at home is good, happy, healthy, with intimate friends, kids . . . But we've never had that until now. Till now we've had, I don't know, the collective, the state, everything for the collective, you know, the trade unions, communism. The party said everyone was supposed to work for us. But then suddenly *SPID-Info* appears. We're an open text, and we say with our material that all that ideology was a load of crap. We say that the most important thing is you yourself, that you're happy, that you're together with someone, no matter whether you're man or wife or simply lovers. But build your lives yourselves. We'll do it together with you; if we can help, we will. We won't teach you, we'll simply share the knowledge we have.

Bondarev, in a similar vein, likened the situation in Russia to the situation in America in the 1940s and 1950s, when the sexologist Kinsey was so poorly treated, ostracized from the medical establishment for studying sex. Bondarev thought that one indication of the progress made by America was shown by the fact that today there was an institute that bore Kinsey's name. But the USSR in the 1980s was like America sixty years ago, when everything was prohibited, nothing in the open. He recounted how this gap between Russia and America was laid bare in a famous incident during one of the "television bridges" organized by U.S. and Soviet talk show hosts Vladimir Posner and Phil Donahue. A Russian woman responded to one of Donahue's questions about sex by saying "We don't have sex in Russia." This proved to Bondarev that "we truly have a lot of uneducated people in the country."

Bondarev was more explicit about the psychological roots of the problems of Russian society, justifying his opinions with the remark that one of his ancestors had been a well-known psychologist, and that he himself had started reading Freud when he was thirteen or fourteen years old. He drew a distinction between open and closed personalities, the former being normal and balanced, and the latter being distorted from the buildup of sexual pressures. He believed that there had been tremendous human cost brought

about by public ignorance and official silence about sex, and like Korshagin, Bondarev insisted that it could not be treated simply by permitting people to publish and consume pornography. He sought to make his paper into a supportive and sympathetic teacher that would educate its readers into how to construct a more normal, balanced life.

> From the absence of sexual education, an enormous number of families fall apart. Russia holds close to the top position in Europe, if not the world, in the number of divorces. An enormous number of abortions are performed because women don't know how to use contraceptives. The psyche collapses, the most extreme imbalance and disorder occurs in the organism; the number of sex crimes increases, and so on. It would be possible to construct an enormous chain of cause and effect beginning with the problem of sex. Look, in America it's possible to speak more or less openly about these things, as it is in any of the civilized countries of Europe.

For the editors of both *SPID-Info* and *Chastnaia zhizn'* post-communist Russia consisted of two diametrically opposed communities. He did not mean the red-brown coalition and the democrats, but those who sought sexual knowledge in order to build a rich and satisfying private life, and those who shunned this knowledge and continued to live and think as the now wholly imaginary party wanted. Bondarev gave me the example of his own family. Bondarev's cousin worked as a translator for the paper, and his cousin's mother was scandalized by what her daughter was doing, believing that the paper was shameless and degrading. These two communities could be fairly accurately mapped according to generations: the older you were, the more resistant you tended to be to the healthy knowledge offered by his paper. He described the critics of his paper as having a "sexual inferiority complex," as being people who were not "harmonized in their personality." This kind of person could find something sinful or criminal anywhere. "Like I said to my aunt, when she said, 'How can you write about that stuff?' I say, 'We can, the whole world does, and no one pays any attention.'" These criticisms were the sorts of thing that uncultured, uneducated people or ones with some kind of psychological or sexological problems said.

> A person for whom everything is in order, everything is normal, he wouldn't pay attention to this sort of thing. And don't forget that we had the Soviet Ten Commandments, the Moral Codex of the Builder of Communism. Because of this an enormous quantity of people were lead away from the sphere of knowledge. They aren't able to use this new knowledge, they simply don't know anything.

Of course, this was to be expected, Bondarev said, since for seventy years they understood things in one way, and now they are suddenly being asked

to understand it in another way; it was natural that such a change would cause a certain amount of anxiety in people.

The sexual for Bondarev was just one topic within the limitless terrain of private life about which Russians needed to educate themselves. In fact, he demanded that each item in the paper somehow instruct his readers across a range of issues: "how to behave, what to do, how to achieve harmony in one's health, what kind of medications it's all right to substitute with other medications, how to earn money, how to save money, and so on. There is practically no material in our paper that doesn't give advice."

Bondarev even saw this didactic aim at work in the paper's articles about figures who lived lives far from the difficult daily life of post-communist Russia. He admitted that perhaps the lessons provided by the paper's profiles of Hollywood's rich and famous might not consciously teach readers, but nevertheless he was certain that people like Jane Fonda were excellent role models, and that descriptions of how Fonda stayed in such good physical shape were very helpful to many people. Articles about Russian film stars, on the other hand, offered more practical lessons: his paper's profile of the private life of the Russian actress Klara Luchko included a description of how she fed her dog when meat was so expensive.

Korshagin's framing of his paper's importance began with his discussion of its name. First, Korshagin gave me two reasons why they did not change the paper's name after it became a commercial venture. First, he said, was the "purely emotional" reaction of "not wanting to deny the name you were born with"; the vast majority of papers from the Soviet era had not changed their names, and it did not seem right to pretend that a new name could erase one's Soviet origins. But more importantly, the name had a cultural and symbolic significance for Korshagin. He understood AIDS as signifying a vast threat, a persistent

> mortal danger that people don't understand, and yet we all live under it. It's like a sign of the times, of the twentieth century, the century of revolution, of our so-called socialism, of communism, fascism. So the twentieth century is also the century of AIDS. This is what we're after. That is, we're taking the problem in its larger sense.

He then linked this "larger sense" to the convenient homophony between the Russian acronym "SPID" and the English word "speed." "Speed" referred to the pace of life in the 1990s, and he and his colleagues wanted as well to imply that the reader could find in his paper "express information, quick answers, fast reactions."[10] He did not want his paper to print material analyzing the complex social determinants of the relationship between men and women, or about the connection between government policy and women's status in the home and workplace, because he was convinced that the one thing he must avoid was the deadening tone of high moral dis-

course that Soviet citizens had endured for decades. He said, for example, that "We don't say that a mistress is bad . . . we will never say that it is forbidden to have a mistress, that you should have only one lover at a time. Life is too complicated for such a prescription." They were interested in dispensing accurate, useful knowledge validated by serious scientific investigation:

> We're not betting on entertainment. We don't call ourselves a leisure magazine, we call ourselves a scientific-popular [*nauchno-popularnyi*] publication, and above all we try to publish material that will be important for both men and women. For us the important thing in the material is elucidating the problems that arise in, let's say, the sexual life of the couple. The visual dimension of the paper is in second place, and herein lies our uniqueness, what we do as opposed to what *Playboy* or *Penthouse* does. And maybe this is the reason why printing in color is not that important to us, since for us the main thing is the text.

The "text" was the key both to his own success and to an understanding of the declining circulations of American publications like *Playboy.* Korshagin condemned the latter for giving up the goal of supplying the reader with informed advice; he thought that the *Playboy* letters column was more a venue for light porn than honest information. *SPID-Info,* on the other hand, by bringing together the scientific and popular in the realm of sexuality was helping his readers immensely, and with some pride he raised the possibility that *Playboy* would follow the lead of *SPID-Info,* that it would realize that the only way they could survive was be to become more "serious." *Playboy,* he felt, should recognize that the theme of sexuality is "eternal" and common to all people and hence needs more respect than simply the representations of light pornography. His paper, by contrast, paid great attention to the tone of its articles, for he was certain that the millions of people who regularly read the paper would never have shown such demand for a publication that was vulgar or banal. In fact, he insisted that he wanted the paper to be "refined" [*intelligentnaia*], "cultured," "readable," with "just a touch of the sensational." The public "doesn't want a paper that has no aesthetic component to it." The important thing was to avoid vulgarity, for "most people want to get some kind of interesting, normal information. Information, let's say, bordering on the sexual. I understand that it's very important not to overstep this boundary."

The deep connection between their papers and their readers were for both editors evident in the letters they received. As Korshagin explained:

> The readers understand, they respond to us in their souls, that the most important thing is that everything in their home is in order, that they try to build a normal family life, a normal love life, whatever you want. The other thing we do is to let

> people investigate certain ideas and give them someone to turn to. Because no one ever turned to the trade unions with personal problems. And so for decades these kinds of problems piled up.

He acknowledged that many letters were simply astounding; people wrote to the paper as if they were confessing to a priest, and Korshagin was convinced that they would not have enjoyed this enormous success if they were not responding to people's deepest needs. Not that he had not made mistakes; he was still learning what those deepest convictions were. He gave the example of a short article he had run in 1992 about Michael Jackson's nose, about how it had collapsed and required a great deal of cosmetic surgery. After the issue was published, Korshagin had received a flood of letters from fans of Michael Jackson denouncing the paper for its disrespectful attitude toward their hero. "For me, this was a signal that we had made a mistake by publishing this item. We didn't have to. We shouldn't have insulted the sensibilities of such a large number of people. I wasn't going to touch this kind of item again. It would have been better to find some kind of provocative detail about his private life, but I learned: don't touch his appearance."

The contents of these papers thus appeared between two discursive poles, the sensationalist/erotic and the scientific. Both Korshagin and Bondarev's papers were full of references to the scientific study of sex and sexuality. Given that *SPID-Info* was the offspring of *Meditsinskaia gazeta,* it is not surprising that the masthead claims medical science as its authorizing discourse. On *SPID-Info*'s "editorial council" were six names, all men, with impressive-sounding qualifications and positions: a candidate in medical science and general secretary of the Russian Association of Sexologists; a doctor of psychology; a doctor of philosophy and professor and member of the International Academy of Sexological Research; a doctor of medicine and director of the Russian Center for the Prevention of AIDS; a professor and doctor of medicine; and another professor and doctor of medicine and director of the Academy for Traditional Medicine. Their particular expertise was called on in about half the material printed in the paper. It was highlighted, for example, in the section of the paper entitled "Short and Clear: Answers to Readers' Questions from Candidates in Medical Science N. Antipova and S. Agarkov." In the issue of November 1992, from which the following examples are taken, these experts reassure the parents of an infant that even though their child's bed is right next to theirs, they will not have to make other arrangements for having sex since at least for several more years the child will be too young to notice; and they assure another reader that it is very rare for a man's penis to become frostbitten or for extremely cold weather to reduce potency.

Both papers create an image of the competent sexual actor. For *SPID-Info,* this is someone who not only possesses knowledge, is sexed, and seeks sex as a fulfilling expression of nature, but also someone who is familiar with sex being a fundamental part of culture. One article from the November issue educates the reader about the history of prostitution by asserting that the origins of the prostitute can be found in ancient cults. An article subtitled "Priestess of Love, What Do They Call You Now?" defines a number of terms concerned with prostitution throughout history. Sex, in fact, is so important as a subject of knowledge that each item in the paper's "Suitcase Full of News" section somehow evokes sexuality as a vast studied terrain: the call by a science columnist at *Literaturnaia Gazeta* for research into sex in space; the estimate by experts that "each day in the world there are one hundred million sexual acts committed, and of those 910,000 result in conception, half of which are not planned!"; a note about Japanese zookeepers trying to stimulate listless gorillas into an interest in sex by showing them videos of gorillas mating, which is termed "pornotherapy" by the author; a woman in Israel who after hormone treatments was found to have twelve fetuses in her womb ("Her doctors did not expect any to survive"); the price of prostitutes in Kiev; a paragraph entitled "All Hopes on the Japanese?" stating that the Ministry of Health and Social Services of Japan will spend over a million dollars on developing a project to genetically engineer a medical treatment for AIDS.

SPID-Info, however, was not only about educating the reader. Other rhetorical forms helped the reader assemble a picture of the sexual practices at work in Soviet society. For example, one genre of article defined the reader as eavesdropping on a sex therapist's conversations with his patients, and a feature article offered a voyeuristic glimpse into the lascivious rites of a "punk wedding." And for all of Korshagin's professed concern with the text of his paper, it was questionable whether his paper would have enjoyed such success if it did not possess sensationalistic photographs and erotic illustrations.

Bondarev's publication differed only in presenting its material with a slightly more "*intelligentny"* tone. For example, he reached out explicitly to both men and women by publishing entire pages dedicated for readers of one gender or the other. The pages dedicated to men only were entitled "Male Conversation" and to both men and women "He plus She." On the page that Bondarev said was written exclusively for women, he published anatomical drawings of the female reproductive organs. Some articles were purely didactic; other articles dealt with the much more diffuse theme of "knowing oneself." Both publications used the genre of the "test" that would reveal one's true personality, one's true identity.

Korshagin and Bondarev were both editors and experts working to establish viable businesses in the context of the establishment of the market

economy in Russia. Their discussion of sex as a phenomenon of nature effectively undercut any effort to acknowledge the importance or desirability of discussing the cultural or social rules that should govern the sexual encounter. They imply that first of all men and women should realize that they are owners of their own sexuality, and that this sexuality is the surest way to achieving a state defined by all those adjectives that did *not* refer to Soviet reality: normal, satisfied, fulfilled. Thus the self can be figured economically: Russians needed to take the management of the self in hand in order to build the life that was denied them by the obsession with the collective.

Bondarev and Korshagin were journalists who seized the opportunity presented by the freedom of the press to participate in a kind of governmental entrepreneurialism of the self. They represented themselves as serious students of the human condition, and as former Soviet citizens they understood what they saw as the complex problems associated with the silences produced by the Soviet system. Viktor Dobychev, one of *Skandaly*'s editors, was less a cultural critic and quasi-historian than a businessman trading in sensations. The origin of his paper lay not in any kind of mission to disseminate a therapeutic education but rather in the need of a "serious" weekly paper, *Megapolis kontinent,* for money. Dobychev left his post as first deputy director of *Megapolis kontinent* to become *Skandaly*'s editor-in-chief.

His initial answer as to why he and his colleagues decided on this particular kind of paper emphasized the practical problem of finding an unoccupied place in a newspaper market that was already very crowded. In fact, entertainment was suddenly everywhere in the Russian media.

> We thought to ourselves, what can we possibly do, what kind of niche is not yet occupied? Political papers were everywhere; sex papers were everywhere, we had proved for over five years that there was sex in the Soviet Union . . . and besides people had gotten rather sick of that. We thought they wanted something a bit lighter, funnier, and preferably mysterious.[11]

Television was the most powerful terrain of entertainment, but they had no desire to simply put the tele-novella *Marianna* into a newspaper form; they were afraid that people would not spend time reading tele-novellas. Nor could they compete for the blood and gore market when there were shows like Aleksandr Nevzorov's *600 Seconds* on TV.[12] Dobychev told me that he admired Nevzorov, although he did not share Nevzorov's political views. "I watch and evaluate him as a professional, and from this point of view he is not at all bad." People all over the country loved Nevzorov because he showed them "dismembered corpses, burned-out apartments, people who had just fallen from their balconies. Everybody loves it, now

that's entertainment! Although that isn't the kind of entertainment we wanted to provide." Dobychev said that in their first discussions about what kind of paper they wanted to start, they began by considering the word that for seven decades represented the most despised concept within Soviet journalism: "sensation."

> What does the word mean? It means a shock of feeling. There's nothing at all bad in this kind of shock of feeling, and so we decided to try to wake up the imaginations of people, their curiosity, and somehow try to satisfy it. Perhaps sometimes closing our eyes to the fact that some events we report don't seem too plausible. But we don't want to convince people of anything. You know, there is a Russian proverb, "*Za to kupil, za to prodal*" (Take it or leave it). So we read, we reprinted, and then if you want to believe it or not, that's your business.

Dobychev and his colleagues finally decided to imitate the paper some Polish colleagues were producing in Warsaw. *Skandaly* was not a joint venture, however; Dobychev said that their Polish colleagues merely "helped." First, they helped by supplying a name for the publication, "They call their publication *Nove skandal*e, while we call ours simply *Skandaly.*" Second, because the majority of stories Dobychev ran were reprints from Western newspapers, the Polish journalists initially helped with a supply of foreign newspapers, since it was difficult for them to find a copy of a "source" like the British *Week-end World News* in Moscow. And third, the Poles helped in providing a "look" that the Russian publication could copy, a look that Dobychev said *Nove skandal*e had since abandoned, but that he and his colleagues liked and kept for their paper.

Dobychev believed that since its appearance, the paper could be considered a success: after only six months it was on the verge of becoming profitable. He was proud of the fact that it had established a base of loyal readers so quickly. It started with a circulation of 100,000, and six months later it was printing 400,000 copies per issue. And while circulation figures were not necessarily reliable indicators of the number of copies actually sold, Dobychev was confident that few of these 400,000 copies were being destroyed by the distributors for lack of sales. In fact, he told me that the opposite seemed the case. They had included in one issue a simple survey form so that the paper could learn some basic demographic facts about its readers; the response to one of the questions indicated that each issue was read by five or six people, such as other family members, friends, and colleagues at work. This success had not surprised Dobychev; given the history of late Soviet society, and the difficult economic conditions of most Russians in the immediate post-Soviet era, he believed it completely natural that a paper that stayed so far away from politics would be received so well.

If both Korshagin and Bondarev shared the conviction that their publications were a kind of education that should also entertain, then Dobychev professed a simpler faith in the importance of entertainment because the Russian media seemed to have in it nothing but that most disgusting phenomenon, politics:

> When from morning till night you hear on the radio politics, you see on the television politics, in all the papers politics, you feel like crawling under the blanket and seeing and hearing this politics no more. We have learned from experience that things are not going to get any better from this kind of politics.

Like Shliapov, he denounced the present political leaders of Russia as the same old crowd that had made the Soviet people miserable before: "There is no unemployed former instructor from the Central Committee of the CPSU, nor is there an unemployed former oblast' committee secretary, or even instructor from a district committee." Only a handful of people have managed to build something out of the new situation, and the majority of them were people who were already in a position to take advantage of the collapse. He said that the first people to take advantage of the market were those in charge of the Komsomol organizations. He knew this because he used to work in the north, where "these things were impossible to hide, unlike in Moscow." He explained: "The district Komsomol secretary put the video player under his arm and drove up to some village and arranged a showing of Bruce Lee or Schwarzenegger or someone like that . . . These showings would bring in big money, at four or five rubles per sitting. In those days five rubles was two kilograms of meat!"

If Dobychev stopped short of describing the Soviet individual as distorted in personality, he did not refrain from citing the "deformities" of Soviet history. He referred to that particular kind of "Soviet mentality" in which appearances were everything and substance accounted for very little.

> To get something, you had first of all to be a member of the Communist Party. And then to get ahead, you didn't need an education, you needed a piece of paper saying that you had an education. A man could be a genius, but if he didn't have a letter saying he finished some institute or another, he was going nowhere.

The result of this was an overwhelming need to be entertained. Jokes, he told me, were "a great means of saving oneself from the absurdities of life," but even better were foreign films. He emphasized how much the Soviet public had enjoyed watching Indian films. He intoned with a kind of self-deprecating solemnity: "There is in each person's life a mood in which you feel like doing nothing else than sitting and watching an Indian film . . . They were pretty, there were songs and dances, and you didn't have

to think about anything as you watched. So they portrayed some kind of simple intrigue, mistaken identities, that sort of thing, and, of course, everything turns out all right in the end . . . They gave comfort, helped you forget that you needed expensive medication that was nowhere to be found."

Dobychev observed how this need for entertainment itself changed in response to the political situation in the country. During perestroika people had needed consolation and comfort more than ever, thanks to the chronic shortages of staple goods and food. But it was no longer possible to simply forget one's troubles; the promotion of the free market had changed the conditions of escape. While Indian films had been the entertainment of choice under Brezhnev, offering glimpses into an exotic, graceful, and utterly foreign cultural experience, under Gorbachev the Mexican tele-novellas first shown on Soviet TV in 1989 were so popular because they offered practical entertainment, providing insight into the meaning of money, into how rich and poor were supposed to conduct themselves. Entertainment was no longer simply entertaining. The collapse of the Soviet Union then involved yet another round of dislocations, and it was at this moment that Dobychev and his colleagues set themselves the task of connecting with people's needs to be entertained pure and simple. They wanted to give their readers "a safety valve, telling them that not everything is so bad, that not everywhere are things so bad." He was careful though to deny any relation to the new media of international soap operas whose images of wealth and plenty caused so much frustrated desire. "But at the same time, we do not want to give people something to envy . . . I mean if we give them a photograph of some unhappy woman from California who weighs 250 kilograms, well, nobody's going to envy her, although to read about her is interesting."

This logic of "interest" was the chief criteria that guided him in his choice of material, from major articles to classifieds. In fact, Dobychev was convinced that interesting classifieds sold papers, and that people read his classifieds in the same way as they read the articles in the body of the newspaper. These ads were more like mini-articles, offering a glimpse into the private lives of Russian citizens. For this reason Dobychev did not print ads that were simply selling things. *Skandaly*'s classifieds

> must also be readable material, they have to be interesting to read. When someone writes, for example, that "I will sell to the devil any spirit with an average amount of sinfulness," now that's interesting. But when someone writes that they want to sell their motorcycle, that's not for us.

The classifieds were ideal forms of entertaining material that the editors made money from twice over, as it were, in both payment from the placement of the ad and in the purchase price. Dobychev chose ads concerning

everything: sex, military prowess, and new age healing. Some seemed humorous and pathetic at the same time: "Young family with children will gratefully accept the gift of a good car. Foreign make is OK."

If Dobychev was pleased by the relative freedom he had in dealing with classifieds, his main articles presented a different sort of enjoyment to the public. The articles were interesting in two senses: first, he was convinced that the public took great pleasure in his articles about blind surgeons and alien abductions, and he stressed how they distracted people from their regular cares. Although the majority of articles were about individuals in foreign countries, he believed they nevertheless dramatized the predicament of human existence in general and the inexplicability of individual fates. But he knew that *Skandaly* was interesting in a second sense: in showing a photograph of a Brazilian man smiling at the camera with a pistol in his hand and asserting that this man cured himself of a brain tumor by shooting himself in the head in an attempt at suicide, the paper makes journalism itself interesting. The paper arouses interest simply by playing with the meaning of what a newspaper is. The mediation of politics and ideology, which restricted the number of events it was possible to represent to a fraction of the world's complexity, becomes the mediation of unrestricted openness, governed only by the judgment that a person or event was "interesting." The journalist's function of checking facts and serving as the skeptical filter of untruths is reduced to being simply the relay of someone else's claim. It is no surprise, then, that so much of Dobychev's contact with the public concerns the paper's own relationship to what it publishes.

> We get many people who call up and ask something like "Is all that true, what you wrote about the dolphin with the human hands? Hurry up and tell us if it is true or not." And we say, "Guys, we don't know if it is true or not. We took it, this information has not been verified, but a sufficiently established [*solidnyi*] newspaper published it, we accurately reprinted it with a reference, and if you want to believe it, go ahead, if you don't want to believe it, then don't."

Dobychev was so certain that his paper created a pleasurable kind of cognitive dissonance in his readers' minds that he soon began to publish a small selection of the letters he received, complete with his own brief, polite, and often humorous answers.

> —Dear *Scandals*, Your work is absolutely necessary in our *prosypaiushcheisia* (exhausted) Russia. I get enormous satisfaction from the information in your paper, and I have no doubt about its trustworthiness.
>
> Response: Dear Svetlana, Thanks to *prosypaiushcheisia* Russia for the good words. We took enormous satisfaction in your letter, and we have no doubt about its earnestness. Gratefully, *Scandals.*

—*Scandals:* I saw your paper for the first time at the kiosk. I bought it and read the whole thing. In the future I will not read any paper but your *Scandals.*

Response: Unknown friend from Kirovo-Chepets! So why so quick and dirty? On the contrary, read as many newspapers and magazines as you can. So that again and again you'll come to the conclusion that nothing is better than *Scandals.*

—Writing you are two friends Sergei and Dima. We read in the October issue of your paper about a guy in Romania who invented a time machine. And that until now he has not been able to test it on anyone except his wife. We thought about it and decided to write to you, and see if you could connect us with him. We would be happy to test the machine for him.

Response: "Dear Sergei and Dima, Unfortunately there remains some vagueness about this Romanian guy. The police, for example, suspect that he thought all this up to hide the murder of his wife (we, by the way, mentioned this in the body of our text.) However, we'll keep your request on our desk. As soon as a time machine appears here in Russia, we'll set you up with its inventor. Truly, what are rabbits and white mice to our scientists, when we have courageous Sergeis and Dimas around."

Dobychev believed that their choice of publication had been a smart one because, according to their own research, *Skandaly* resonated with readers across Soviet society.

> Everyone reads the paper, everyone finds something interesting in it . . . Everyone, independent of their social or political memberships, independent of whether they have capital or cash, of whether they live in an apartment or a dormitory, everyone needs to be distracted. Our paper isn't a narcotic, but it is a glass of cold water on a hot day, pleasant to drink. And even if sometimes the bottle has a label that says "Narzan" [a brand of mineral water] and it's in fact just simple cold water, well all the same, it's pleasant.

Here was an admission that his paper sometimes played with normal journalistic practices, and he admitted, in fact, that "[p]erhaps we sometimes even close our eyes to what doesn't seem to us very plausible material. But we are not trying to convince anyone of anything." He gave me another example of a Russian researcher who came to his office and claimed that the statues on Easter Island were put there by ancient Russians who sailed all over the world many centuries ago. Dobychev summed up the options this article presented to the reader: "If you like the article, then you will say, 'Yes, those statues depict our ancestors.' If you don't like the article, then just say 'no.'"

In terms of the governmental shift at work in the early 1990s in Russia, the publications of Korshagin and Bondarev represented individuals as actors in charge of their own fulfillment. Another dimension of the advanced

liberal mode of government, however, involves the exposure of individuals to forces that represent obstacles to that fulfillment. The ability to maximize one's life occurs in a context marked by uncertainty, chance, and accident, and it is in this context that Dobychev's paper appears to bring in another dimension of advanced liberal government. *Skandaly* displayed the disasters and miracles that happen to individual bodies as they are buffeted by any manner of incomprehensible forces, from simple fate to the ungraspable designs of extraterrestrial civilizations. Articles in one issue of *Skandaly* concern not only a man who, in the act of trying to commit suicide, accidentally cured his brain tumor by shooting himself in the head ("Bullet against Cancer Tumor") and the blind surgeon in Brazil ("Surgeon: A Genius and Absolutely Blind"), but also a doctor who claims that more than 30 percent of his patients have been contacted by aliens but do not remember these meetings ("Meetings Wiped from Memory—Surprising Hypothesis of Dr. Lane"); the prediction of the moon breaking in half by the middle of 1993 ("Scientists Predict That the Moon Will Break into Two Parts, in No More Than Half a Year"); a cat who killed its owner's stepfather when he tried to rape her ("Bloody Revenge of a Tomcat"); the capture on film of the devil ("Satan from San [sic] Paolo Conquered by Father Montoya, with the First Ever Photographs of the Devil"); a girl who was saved from drowning by the spirit of her recently dead mother ("Spirit of Mother Saves Child").

These stories depict the person as acted upon by events that have no social logic to them; they represent the pure action of contingency on human lives. Indeed, the cultural and national settings of the images and stories in *Skandaly*—from Europe, North America, Africa, Latin America, Russia—create in aggregate a pan-cultural individual who, despite the language she speaks or cultural patterns she reproduces, is subject to the force of something that cannot be explained in any normal way. Each story displays, in fact, a kind of failure of explanation: what can one say about the Argentinian whose act of suicide enabled his rebirth? How can one possibly explain the evidence that the "legitimate" sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology, which have become so sophisticated during the past several centuries, are actually puny in comparison to the sciences of civilizations on other planets? This failing of words runs directly against the certainties that are the province of all the centers of discursive production in scientific societies. Contingency was an enemy of Soviet culture, as much as it remains an enemy of the modern technocracies that span the globe.

For Dobychev, his paper was so successful because all these bizarre events were so enjoyable to interpret. I would argue, however, that they produced more than mirth, for this kind of publication also fits within the problematic of liberal government that appeared in Russia in the early 1990s. By

cataloguing events from the far ends of the bell curve of the everyday, they also established images of the limits within which a normal life is led. The multiplication of risks and uncertainties attendant upon the market economy can best be met by a serious effort to calculate the chances of success of a course of action; the enjoyment of the absurd event exists in direct proportion to the security of one's own life. Thus the role of "scandals" within a governmental system intent on making individuals construct and guarantee their own security. Together, then, the Russian boulevard press can be read as performing a vital pedagogical role: to project individuals who seek their own private fulfillment through self-education and a new attention to risk and security.

Without diminishing the victory represented by the end of censorship, it is necessary to recognize that the specific topics and tools that Korshagin, Bondarev, and Dobychev took up were not only a product of their own inner liberation. Rather, their publications were reflections and, via translations, instantiations of an international circulation of journalistic material. On the practical level, their publications were made possible by the legal climate of post-communist Russia in which it was impossible to enforce international copyright agreements. All three men borrowed images and text extensively from German, American, French, and British newspapers and magazines, some of which were themselves borrowed from Latin American and Asian publications. Their publications became part of a media context in which information circulated across borders in the form of units of information named *Cosmopolitan, Daily Express,* and *Bunte,* off of which Russian publications poached with impunity. The advanced liberal mode of governing is global to the extent that its media of instruction form a crucial segment of the global trade in images.

And yet it would be a mistake to think that these men, having a chance to reject the style of journalism they learned as young men, suddenly ceased to be the expression of their own movement through Soviet history. They were well aware of their own experience within the definition and redefinition of journalism as a key part of the governing practices of Soviet socialism. In this sense, they felt an intimate connection with the outline of Soviet history, as well as the awkwardness and ambiguity of where their liberation from that past had left them. The end of communism meant that discourses of truth and falsehood, of belief and doubt, began circulating in new ways through the society, enabled by freedom from the journalistic rules of the past and the absolute imperative to create flows of money that would provide new sources of income to pay for paper, ink, and salaries. Journalists and editors did not, of course, go through this shift alone; they watched each other make choices, decisions, and compromises; they watched and read as some friends and former colleagues hitched their jour-

nalistic fortunes to powerful firms that financed papers that usually implicitly but often openly reflected their own political and economic interests. They watched as younger colleagues pursued new models of success, and they struggled with the never-ending flows of judgments about each other that flowed back and forth as a part of the post-Soviet media's settling process. This involved not only "red," communist papers denouncing liberal ones and nationalist papers denouncing "Western," democratic ones; it also involved boulevard papers denouncing each other.

Dobychev showed little angst about the need to reinvent himself, in moving from being a frustrated Soviet journalist-critic to a post-Soviet entrepreneur of the unbelievable, and yet something must have gotten to him. He must have read in the richer, better-financed press one too many denunciations of *Skandaly* as a cynical, lowbrow boulevard rag that had shed every last ounce of journalistic integrity. He must have been very annoyed with the popular daily *Moskovskii komsomolets,* for in one issue of *Skandaly* he dropped the persona of entrepreneur and spoke again as the journalist-intellectual. He devoted considerable space to expose the absurdity of a small story from *Moskovskii komsomolets* about a "vampire cat" that had terrorized a family in Moscow. His article was accompanied by a drawing of the head of a black cat with vampire fangs protruding beneath its whiskers. *Skandaly's* headline reads "Was That Really Liursik?" and a subhead explains: "'Cat drinks child's blood' reports *Moskovskii komsomolets.* But *Skandaly* is convinced this is a real dog." *Skandaly*'s article was an attempt to confirm or corroborate this story as it appeared in *MK.* One of Dobychev's reporters tried to find the family with the vampire cat, but "naturally, the person who had supposedly written the article had never heard of the Popov family, nor about Liursik, nor about the nightmarish vampire cat." *Skandaly*'s journalist then turned to an expert, a veterinarian who had never heard of any cats that behaved like vampire bats. The investigator from *Skandaly,* noting that the cat was supposed to have drunk the blood from the child's leg and suggesting perhaps that the child had a cut on its leg, asked the expert, "So do you think it possible that the cat, seeing the cut on the child's leg, was simply licking it?" "Absolutely," replied the veterinarian. "That is completely consistent with feline habits. By the way, the cat's saliva has quite a useful antiseptic substance in it." For the reporter, the conclusion is clear:

> So there's the entire "sensation." The unbelievable story, published by *MK,* with close scrutiny turns into an everyday stupidity. As for the completely innocent reader of such an article, *Skandaly* warns that if you see an incomprehensible, healthy, chestnut-colored being, then it is a journalistic canard, changed into human form on the streets of the capital by *Moskovskii komsomolets.* The canard answers to the name of Liursik.[13]

This is a pointed piece of criticism, both a dig at the pretentiousness of *MK* and convincing proof that Dobychev knew the difference between journalism and entertainment. Here journalism is mobilized in the service of truth, with Dobychev's story dropping the dramas of unreality and undecidability for a mundane parable of reality, truth, and accuracy. One page of *Skandaly* governed through a dizzying enjoyment of spectacles of contingency, and the very next page governed through demystification and centering journalism on the telling of truths. This is in a sense an old Soviet kind of enjoyment: revealing the stupidity of the powerful.

Bondarev, too, whose biography could be constructed with reference to the titles of the publications where had worked—from *Moscow truth* to *Soviet culture* to *Private life*—allowed himself at the end of our conversation to change registers, to allow his memory to inflect his reflections. After we had talked for over two hours, a tone of weariness became discernible in his voice. He lamented the crassness of much of what passed for culture in Russia, and he worried that the kind of uncultured journalism that had appeared after the end of communism was not in reality an expression of

> [t]he deep, unnatural processes that arose back in the olden days [*vo vremenakh onykh*], that is during the 20s and 30s, when the press was deprived of its freedom. Those years have by no means left our society, nor have they left Russian journalism. We all emerged from beneath the great coat of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, and each of us, somewhere inside, is afraid. Each of us is prepared for the return of censorship; it wouldn't surprise us if tomorrow the censor would leave his prison and take up his position once again. Each of us is ready for this. And you can already see the little shoots of this censorship, the first small, illiterate and illegal shoots, but they are already appearing.

It was as if Bondarev were reminding himself of who he was and where he was coming from, recognizing his own paradoxical position as a member of a society that still existed even though so much discourse was devoted to representing it as if it had vanished. This change in the tone of the conversation was palpable, and suddenly the importance of Klara Luchko's dog food recipe seemed very far away. In place of the rapport that he constructed between us, according to which we both belonged to the same transnational class of people who allegedly possessed a knowledge of Freud and Kinsey, of film stars and normal life, a space appeared formed by the indelibility of our "national" formations. The force of this realization led him to make a comment that fits perfectly as a kind of book end to the comments of Shliapov:

> Freedom, it's not as sweet a word as you would think, because you received greater moral satisfaction, much greater, when you managed to surmount a thousand obstacles so that your material would appear in print. I felt more enjoyment then than I do now, when I can print whatever I want . . . All the prohibitions have been taken away, all the obstacles removed, no one pressures us, but the fact remains that the more difficult it was, the more interesting it was.

Here it is possible to discern an echo of Agranovskii or, more generally, of that long tradition of Russian journalism whose most important characteristic was not so much satisfaction as sacrifice, not the pleasures of self-fashioning but of social criticism. In the post-Soviet present, he was no longer speaking truth to power; he was speaking a useful knowledge to anyone who would pay for the knowledge, projecting governable subjectivities onto the material of newly individualized selves. And yet the agency of advanced liberal modes of government in Russia appeared divided; as long as the generation of Bondarev, Alexandrov, Denisov, Shliapov, and other journalists whose thoughts shaped this book continued to work in Russia, it was likely that there would be these kinds of moments that intervened in the reproduction of responses to the problem posed by liberalism. Brief gaps, hesitations, moments when the engine suddenly and unexpectedly freezes up, quick glimpses of another way of living, memories of other projects of governing.

Afterword

My discussion of the appearance of tabloid newspapers in the Russian Federation has brought me to the end of the arc of transformation of the Soviet press, an arc whose beginning was a conversation with Vladimir Shliapov, the *Izvestiia* journalist whose outline of his career supplied the outline for this work. I have presented glimpses into the history of late Soviet journalism; I have not sought a comprehensive overview of Soviet journalistic institutions but rather have offered a description of the governing role that journalists tried to play even as the conditions in which they lived and worked changed in unpredictable ways. It has centered on the idea that journalists were to participate in the creation of "socialist persons," and indeed if we look at certain moments in the late Soviet past, it is possible to recognize the conviction that a climate of information must somehow participate in the project of creating a social form of learning, one that led individuals into a knowledge and awareness of common predicaments and into a search for common solutions. This conviction was there at the emergence of the Soviet Union as a political project; it ebbed and flowed in response to that society's—and the world's—complex evolution during the 20th century. In this book I have argued that at times this impulse can be "seen" at certain moments; it was present during the Khrushchev period, in the works of Agranovskii, and in the language of perestroika. It expressed itself in the practical problem of how to represent in the given genres and discourses of the time that object that was assumed to be at the center of what socialism was all about, the Soviet "person." These persons were to be valued and respected as individuals whose identities grew from their contribution to the collective welfare, one that citizens were not to take for granted, but to think about and care for. Yet this book

is not only about identifying some of the ways the socialist project was expressed in the sphere of journalism; it also is about the disintegration and eventual disappearance of government dedicated to the realization of the socialist project in the Soviet Union, as Soviet government was transformed in the early 1990s.

The socialist project in the Soviet Union is an awkward and peculiar historical object. It is difficult to present with the tools and techniques of empirical history; it is difficult to simply "tell the story" of the socialist project in so far as the central characteristic of that project involved moves in discourse, the articulation of identity across a range of media, efforts to reshape the contours of everyday experience and to work upon the shifting terrain of subjectivity. These are phenomena that escape the commonly used terms to describe acts of political communication, terms like "propaganda" and "indoctrination." Put even more sharply, one might even start to doubt if the conventions of traditional history are adequate for the representation of the "socialist project." This is how I read, for example, Thomas Lahusen's recent attempts to evoke the Soviet 1920s and 1930s, as well as to portray the centrality of ruins in the landscapes of Soviet life, through the medium of video, for the documentary form enables a literal glimpse into how many older contemporary Russians view their own lives as a trace of the vanished project of building socialism. Lahusen does not analyze the socialist project; he lets his subjects articulate it for him, in voices, glances, and gestures dense with overtones of youthful enthusiasm, endurance, tragedy, and loss.

My own strategy to examine this project has thus required a certain weaving in and out of traditional disciplinary approaches in the social sciences and humanities, so that ultimately this book might seem to some not as "inter"-disciplinary but "schizo"-disciplinary. It involved bringing together anthropological fieldwork (interviews with journalists) and a particular sociological framework (governmentality) to write an account of a past conceived as an investigation of a terrain usually understood in terms of political science (totalitarian communications), but here conceived as a body of literary representations (newspaper texts) that constructed a social imaginary (socialist humanism?). The aim has been to insert a different kind of story about the Soviet past into the discursive field created by historians of the 20th century.

This is important because even the most cursory survey of media discussions and representations of geo-politics would reveal that in the United States after 1991 the meaning of the Soviet past has settled into the comfortable grooves of common sense. The specific contents of these meanings vary slightly depending on which segment of the media is sampled; many Americans, primed by images and narratives circulating endlessly through popular culture, know the Cold War as the triumph of freedom and good-

ness over tyranny, of capitalism and the market over an inefficient and unjust socialism, even though there are many instances in post-socialist societies where these two lessons contradict one another. More "informed" members of the public might refer to pundits and talking heads in the more "thoughtful" media, whose main point is exactly the same: from the Red Terror to the repressions of nationalist demonstrations in Tbilisi and Vilnius in the 1980s, a single thread of savagery characterizes the Soviet past. This past, therefore, is a *Soviet Tragedy,* to cite the title of Martin Malia's recent book, and the specialists who supply the media with its dominant images and concepts demonstrate, as François Furet did, *The Passing of an Illusion.*[1]

One might argue, however, that the existence of so complete a consensus is more about a process of forgetting than of truthful recording, that it is more a product of the need to control and order unruly memories than to acknowledge the essential ambiguity of the past. One might go further and suggest that these works, because of their circulation in a discursive economy that defines, circumscribes, and channels the political imagination in certain ways, seek to close the book on one of the most complicated and important sites of social change in the 20th century. They are examples of works anxious to control the possibility that the past has no single lesson to teach, and they raise for me the question of their relationship not so much to the "historical record"—that is, whether they have accurately told the most important stories about the Soviet past—but to those institutions in this society at this moment that find such narratives useful. The dominant discourse about socialism involves supporting the consensus among a wide swath of both the public and policymakers about the significance of American power for American citizens and for those beyond our borders, about the proper use of this power, and about the nature of the obstacles to the exercise of this power. In other words, I am interested in the ways that works of history participate in foreign policy broadly conceived and in the ways that intellectual life in those Western states that engaged in the Cold War has been shaped by the discourses and sensibilities essential to the formation of that policy. Indeed, it is necessary to recognize the ways that historiography is itself governmental, how works of history operate to fix the readers' relationships to issues that are ostensibly dead and gone but continue to channel decisions, shape sensibilities, and judge possibilities. For works of history can transform what has irretrievably vanished into something that can act in the present to define, instruct, develop, and shape conduct across a range of spheres.

These are certainly complex issues, ones that deserve much more than the space I can give them here, and they appear to take us far from this book's interest in the role of media within governmental projects. But on

the other hand, I want to suggest that a knowledge of the evolution of practices of governmentality in the late Soviet Union as they took shape in the discursive sphere of journalism can contribute to the cultivation of modes of concern and criticism in those societies that "won" the Cold War. And in the context of the power of historical accounts to shape attitudes in the present, it might be useful to project in simple and broad terms another historical outline that provides another narrative route from the Bolshevik revolution to the present. Such a narrative would stress that the collapse of the Soviet Union need not be seen only in the context of socialism's own failings and would show how "actually existing socialism" unfolded within a context that was, on the one hand, global but that, on the other hand, was managed by a relative handful of individuals whose inclinations to see the world in terms of the power of the wealth-creating imperative of capitalism helped form socialism's fate.

THE USSR AND THE UNCANNY OF CAPITALISM

The Soviet Union took shape in a world in which for the vast majority of elites there existed an obvious terrain of international relations dominated by capitalist, imperial states that controlled the dominant share of the world's resources. These elites were national, to the extent that they looked out at this world through the prism of their own country's interests and values, and the single most important characteristic of the international sphere that confronted them was its harshly competitive nature. States had no choice but to compete with each other, and thus the chief concern for leaders and governors was to guard, and if possible increase, the amount of power a state had. Technologies of mass communications helped consolidate national publics for whom the condition of their state's power was an abiding concern. Important and sizable populations of readers, and later viewers, were from the early part of the 19th century made to worry about their state's ability to compete and were encouraged to participate in the project of strengthening the nation through governmental strategies that included everything from compulsory military service to scientific programs of eugenics. But in doing so, national populations often came to feel the harshness of the international arena, for national publics supplied the soldiers when the national cause required the waging of war.

The establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917 disrupted the coherence of this international sphere. Its leaders claimed that it did not want to participate in this global competition because it was nothing other than the scene for imperial projects that sought to subjugate the world's peoples for the benefit of a tiny few. Socialists argued that such competition between states was simply the form required by the competition between

capitalist firms when the relevant geographic scales were not measured in miles or even hundreds of miles, but in oceans and continents. Extracting the former Russian Empire from this international sphere was no easy task and was further complicated by the theory that the Bolshevik revolution would trigger working-class uprisings across Europe. If for European and American elites the Russian Empire was still geographically far away, there was still the Bolshevik's disturbing argument that the sphere of the relationships between states, with all its pomp, prestige, and glory of war and diplomacy, travel and power, was but a mask for violence and domination, and that sooner or later capitalism would destroy itself wherever it happened to exist.

The founding of the Soviet Union then was troubling for Western governments because it established a home for a worldview that made explicit appeals to the citizens of *other* states, that in a sense claimed these citizens as their own. For the Soviet Union was a state founded on behalf of the world's "workers," a group that represented above all the workers of the industrial states of Europe and North America, but that implied a much greater mass of workers the world over. The working man had no home, socialists argued, and to millions of people who heard this message it made a great deal of sense.

Thus the USSR was doubly illogical to those who managed the international arena. Its leaders argued that it was possible to *not* participate in the violent anarchy of international affairs, and that their state was not just for their own citizens, but that it existed for all working people, who because of their position in the capitalist economy in fact had no state. This refusal to participate in the world in the way it had been understood since the Westphalian system took shape in the middle of the 17th century meant that the Soviet Union provoked the enmity of the world's richest and most powerful states. The hostility that emerged during the earliest years of the Soviet Union's existence set the pattern that was maintained until the late 1980s. The USSR's first five years were spent in more or less a constant state of conflict with Western powers, with several, including Britain and the United States, participating in the Russian civil war on the side of the "Whites," those Russians who understood the world in basically the same terms as did the other European powers. The Soviet Union survived past 1920 because the catastrophic context of World War I made it impossible for European states to imagine, much less conduct, another war, especially on a territory as vast as the Soviet Union; the Western dislike of Soviet ideas and policies was outweighed by the desire to make peace in Europe itself.

The combination of self-proclaimed exile from the world of capitalist states and the open hostility of these states drove the Soviet Union's leaders

to become obsessed by security. This obsession was expressed in idioms of Russian political culture that certainly clashed with the ideals of European Enlightenment promoted by socialism. This tension was partly embedded in the physical space of the seat of Soviet power. Its leaders occupied the same structure, the Kremlin, from which earlier tsars had organized the expansion of Russian lands in the 15th and 16th centuries. And they struggled to communicate their values to a largely peasant society by making their heroes into icons and by making the Soviet Union's founder into a patron saint. And at the same time, the depth of their grounding in old ways of imagining the nature of official power drove them to pursue modernity at all costs, for without industry, railroads, warships, and an educated populace there was no way the Soviet Union could survive the massed powers of the capitalist states to the West. So tracks were pushed through forest and taiga, cities took shape in empty steppes, and a single generation of Soviet citizens went from country to city, from peasant agriculture to industrial enterprise, from folklore to atomic science. And these tremendous disruptions took place *at the same time* as Stalin turned on Soviet citizens and made them the object of his own anxieties about the Soviet Union's weakness, of his fear that the Soviet Union was a historical abnormality, as ephemeral as all those other failed uprisings suppressed by the reactionaries and the bourgeoisie. The apparatus of repression fed off a certain fanaticism that grew from and strengthened Stalin's own position, but it also strengthened the image of the Soviet Union as a society firm in its identity as an opponent of capitalism.

The Nazi invasion in June 1941 had the paradoxical effect of making the Soviet Union briefly a legitimate member of the international community. It had found itself in the 1930s faced not only by communism but by radical forms of nationalism that rejected the values of liberal capitalism. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union both because he understood that communism represented the extreme expression of those Enlightenment ideals of reason, progress, and rationality that were the very antithesis of the sense of belonging based on nation and race that lay at the root of Nazi ideology, and because he sought to settle Germans across the "empty" territories inhabited by "inferior" Slavic peoples. The war in the east, as many writers have emphasized, was fought not just in national terms but in racial terms; the brutality of the Nazis generated a different but equally horrific brutality on the part of the Red Army, as it drove the Wehrmacht back to Berlin. The war devastated Soviet and Russian society; more than revolution, civil war, or terror, the experience of what became called the Great Patriotic War defined the Soviet 20th century.

The war ended victoriously for liberal, capitalist states in Europe because the United States understood Nazism as alien to the values that it

promoted, and so it mobilized its entire economy to destroy both Nazism and Japanese imperialism. With the American-led peace, the international sphere reconstituted itself, albeit with a heightened awareness of the problem of security in an age of mobile mass armies, atomic bombs, and air power. With the Allied victory, the Soviet Union became that most paradoxical of geo-political entities: a defeated victor. From the ruins of Soviet cities, Soviet leaders looked out at Europe's reconstruction as the reconstitution of that familiar world that socialism had criticized and defined itself against, and with the peace, Western leaders once again realized just how alien and anomalous the Soviet Union was. In the first postwar years, the Soviet Union responded to this situation in the most opportunistic of ways, by manipulating the political processes on the territories of Eastern European states that it now occupied (a number of which had fought at least for a time with the Nazis), so that local communists friendly to the Soviet Union were guaranteed a leading say in the formulation of postwar policies. In this way, Eastern Europe became a physical and emotional buffer between the world of capitalist states and the homeland of socialism. These "new" socialist states eventually became the members of a parallel universe that served, symbolically at least, as a counter-example to the anarchic sphere of international relations. This reality was then frozen into shape by the nuclear standoff that began with the Soviet test of 1949, which provided the international sphere with a sudden, fixed structure of stability. For the first time since 1917, socialism seemed "safe," and another generation of citizens appeared on the scene to take up the cause of socialism.

As I suggest at various points in this book, the two decades after Stalin's death were considered by many Soviet citizens to be socialism's best years. The international arena seemed to be changing radically. Imperial capitalist states were challenged around the world by a variety of local groups, classes, and forces, demanding an end to the presence of European powers in their countries. The developing world was taking its position within the great wave of progress envisioned by Marx, Lenin, and millions of other socialists. But at the same time, the very stability that secured socialism in the frozen structure of a bipolar nuclear "balance" also enabled capitalist states to transfer the anarchic competition to particular regions of the world where a variety of conflicts between imperial powers and their proxies, and indigenous movements were taking place. Liberal capitalist states led by the United States distributed their active strategies of ideological opposition to socialism to the poor largely agricultural regions of Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and the Middle East, where socialism represented for millions of people not an oppressive and alien ideology but a general vision of secular progress providing a sense of purpose in the wake of the collapse of colonial regimes. First Khrushchev and then Brezhnev

believed it necessary to foster and protect socialism's expansion but had no idea of how to go about it or what it would cost. In case after case Soviet leaders consistently misunderstood what was involved in playing at "great power politics": from the blockade of Berlin to the Cuban missile crisis to the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union played badly the game demanded of it by the U.S. and its allies. But this weakness was in a sense built into the Soviet state, for the dogged determination that established and defended the revolution in the early 1920s and the heroism and sacrifice that marked the Soviet victory over the Nazis were not the most useful traits in confronting a coalition of powerful, wealthy states with interests spread across the globe, who were investing heavily in the military and economic resources that would be turned against the USSR in the 1980s.

The stability of the Cold War, therefore, while protecting the Soviet Union's existence, enabled the slow bleed of Soviet resources expended on a military-industrial complex that was mistakenly seen by Soviet leaders as the principal instrument for the defense of socialism. Like the tsars, they assumed that the best solution to foreign threat was a larger, more powerful army. They were incapable of understanding the massive ideological and material investment of Western states in the Cold War, or that the spirit of opposition became more determined and acute in the early 1980s, as U.S. foreign policy became directed by those who saw the Soviet Union not only as a force to be contained but as the moral antithesis of the West. By the late 1980s, the U.S., with the help of other capitalist states, had reproduced the ideological struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil the world over. Ronald Reagan then took it upon himself to destroy what he understood as not so much a coherent ideological threat as a simple mistake in world history. The American government, unlike the Soviet one, was able to sustain vast military expenditures and to invent ever more strategies and programs—some, like SDI, alluring and fantastical—to break the stability created by nuclear parity and return the world to the familiar state of international anarchy dominated by the wealthiest capitalist states. Unfortunately for the world, the "threat" represented by a vast, weak state whose economy showed signs of weakness and decline as early as the 1970s, and whose population had become alienated from socialism as a progressive ideology, required the arming of anti-popular, anti-socialist groups in dozens of countries. Al-Qaeda, tragically, is the "collateral damage" of the single-minded pursuit and destruction of Soviet socialism.

This narrative is, of course, partial and incomplete, but it does not pretend to completeness. It is meant to suggest, rather, just how much the terrain of foreign affairs has been influenced by the identification of socialism as a *problem* for democratic societies. It forces us to take a step back

and consider the entire amalgam of institutions and discourses that contribute to the conduct of foreign policy. Such an account might furthermore make us doubt that foreign policy (or foreign relations or foreign affairs, more generally) refers to the rational management of national interests, but rather to an odd mixture of complex motives, from personal enrichment and self-aggrandizement to moral and religious crusading, that animates individuals across a range of institutions.

The complex cultural sources of foreign policy have been the subject of recent scholarship. David Campbell, for example, argues that American foreign policy is best understood as an expression of the need for politicians to manage the production of "American" identity.[2] He suggests that since the 17th century the predominant threat to America has been defined by powerful groups and discourses as that of the cultural "Other," those who represent dangerous and unholy threats to "our" way of life. The Cold War did not unfold from any sober contemplation of threat and insecurity posed by the Soviet military but took shape via cultural mechanisms of translation and amplification that transformed the critical argument of socialism into a doctrine of global, totalitarian ambition. And lest people think that constructing a "good" foreign policy is simply a matter of teaching policymakers and politicians how to recognize their own various "Euro- and ethno-centrisms," he stresses how these mechanisms are not just unfortunate practices but, in fact, are constitutive of American identity.

Such a framework is both challenging and troubling for anyone who grew up as a child of the Cold War and who remembers the feeling of threat constructed around communism, because it argues that this threat and insecurity was less about communism than about the powerful actors and institutions in our own society who insisted that its citizens feel their place in the world in a certain way. And it is challenging in forcing us to ask just how academic scholarship participated in the protection of a concept and practice of national identity that led to such ambiguous geo-political outcomes. Campbell's text raises the question of how any historical or contemporary knowledge of the world might be consciously set against these powerful logics of identity.[3] He prods us to ask ourselves how else might we have "understood" the Soviet Union, and communism/socialism, other than through the lens of identity/difference? What other descriptions of that 20th-century history could fit into the critical project of self-awareness required by a society that, a decade after the Soviet Union's disappearance, is still engaged in a cold war?

In place of this cultural logic, it is clear that the contemplation of "foreign policy" should proceed from the contemplation of the state of our own societies, from the effort to realize how and where simplifications and generalizations are asserted in the face of complexity, and moral judgments

are applied as reflexive responses to unfamiliar statements and events. Such critical reflections are not meant to be the final and definitive accounts of reality, but rather general maps to help in the ordering of experiences and arguments, feelings and logics.

An example of one such valuable account of the condition of our own societies is that of Zygmunt Bauman, who has argued in a number of books that the present can be broadly understood as the product of the success that capitalist states have had in forcing the retreat, or better, the disappearance, of those ideologies, philosophies, or political positions that saw a central role for the state as the central agent and facilitator of social progress. Bauman notes that in the course of tossing the totalitarian state into the dustbin of history, the concept of the common, public good may have been tossed out as well. Compelling arguments about positive freedoms, about the freedom to act collectively in the service of a reasoned argument about human values, find little articulation in the speeches of politicians or public intellectuals; political discourse centers on negative freedom, on the demand to be protected from any agency that would impose limits or constraints on the fulfillment of personal desires.

The implications of this new disposition of political discourse are multiple but can all be related to a shift in the way that human beings are identified and identify themselves as social beings. From the overlapping ideological calls of Family, Church, Nation, etc., that assembled the multilayered and conflictual selves of the 19th-century bourgeoisie, liberalism for Bauman now produces "modular" selves: "The modular man is a creature with *mobile, disposable, and exchangeable qualities;* he is someone reminiscent of the 'protean man', that celebrated ideal of renaissance philosophers. To put it in a nutshell: the modular man is, first and foremost, a *man without essence.*" These are persons who do not experience struggles over their identities but who move from one social context to another, according to algorithms assembled by experts in entertainment, satisfaction, and security. Given Bauman's assumption that freedom means conscious self-direction toward the public good, he arrives at the diametrically opposite conclusion from those who identify the Soviet Union's collapse with the realization of freedom: "To be an individual does not necessarily mean to be free. The form of individuality on offer in late-modern or postmodern society, and indeed most common in this kind of society—privatized individuality—means, essentially, *unfreedom*" (emphasis in original).[4]

Although Bauman does not explicitly thematize it, his diagnosis hinges in large measure on a reading of the state of capitalist systems of media, on the way the media defines the interactions that make the public good possible. The *agora,* which he denotes as that vital space constitutive of democracy, where private interests move into the arena of public debate and

deliberation on the way to their becoming a part of the laws that all agree to live by, has for Bauman become empty of the vigorous discussions present earlier in the century when the agora was under threat by an overreaching state. Socialism at least sustained the value of the social framing of positive freedom, and here one could add parenthetically that we should not view Soviet history as providing hard and fast "lessons" about any mobilization of positive freedom. Liberal democracies, Bauman fears, are no longer hospitable hosts for a practice of the republican idea, oriented as it is around the problem of the public good. The demand for freedom from the state has in a perverse fashion turned into an unwillingness to acknowledge the inescapability of shared destinies. "Liberalism is left with an aggregate of free yet lonely individuals, free to act yet having no say in the setting in which they act, no inkling of the purpose to which their freedom to act may be put, and above all no interest in seeing to it that others are also free to act and in talking to them about the use of everybody's freedom."[5] The contradictions and conflicts so generated are not resolved but rather are endured, and the surest escape into an apparently total and secure belonging is into yet another kind of unfreedom, that provided by the nation. For the nation is that unquestioned source of meaning that requires an end-run around reason. It demands participation in rituals, performance of songs, repetition of slogans; it requires constant instruction into its history, and as it becomes difficult for people to participate in a republican practice of critical deliberation about a common future, it becomes easier for people to mistake national rituals as being the product of political debates.

The republican idea, on the other hand,

> denies the virtue, the authority and the need of historical remembrance, just it devalues the past itself. The republican idea in its pure form (which found its arguably most vivid expression in the headiest days of the French Revolution) is precisely about the *dethronement of past history* (remember Marx, the French Revolution's spiritual heir, dismissing all the past as just 'prehistory' and announcing that history was yet to begin) and about the 'new beginning.' . . . Revolutionary republicans . . . postulated the republic as *the factory of the common good*—and as the *sole* factory capable of producing it. The good society of the republicans was all in the future, not yet attained, and not likely to arrive other than through the work of the republic.[6]

The contradictions in the republican ideal are many, as has been pointed out by critics of Enlightenment thought since the 18th century. First, the supreme value of happiness can be experienced only on the level of an individual, and yet deliberation on the public good requires the expression of a social intelligence formed from sustained and sometimes fractious interactions sustained over the long (indefinite?) term. Second, republics are constructed through the daily discarding of old methods and the invention

of new ones, and yet human beings in industrial societies construct history by default, in the accumulation of sediments of material life that demand to be recognized as meaningful historical artifacts that can provide orientation and comfort. Third, individuals must be free to pursue their own pleasures and to reject the common good if they so choose; the pursuit of the common good cannot be legislated. This list of tensions and contradictions could be expanded. The point for Bauman, however, is that the republic would not exist if it were not for these contradictions, that it is

> an institution which casts the liberty of its citizens not just as negative freedom from constraints but as an *enabling power,* as freedom to participate; an institution which tries, always inconclusively yet with undiminishing zeal and vigour, to strike a balance between *the individual's liberty from interference* and *the citizen's right to interfere.* That right of the citizens to interfere, to participate in the making of laws that outline the order binding them all, is the republican answer to the nation's blood, soil, and historical legacy—the specifically republican mortar which cements individuals into a community, the *republican* community [emphasis in original].[7]

Bauman's description is provocative in urging us to be aware of the use of history in the service of causes that seek to constrain and limit freedom, and also to be aware of the danger of engaging in a general diet of historical representations that ends up obscuring the fact that action in the present is the one thing that every individual is capable of.

The Soviet Union is a historiographical object that one must approach fully conscious of the role that representations of it have played in the establishment of the present as that complex knot of economic, geo-political, and ideological imperatives that shape everyday life. And likewise, one might approach this past with sets of questions that might illuminate the present. One might, for example, begin by making the Soviet state into a question: how did Soviet citizens at different times and in different places participate in the governmental project of socialism? Answers to this question would not be all or nothing; they would not justify or condemn the entire Soviet project but rather would seek to understand the ways that efforts were made to redefine 19th-century strategies and modes of governmentality.

The Soviet press was the product of one such effort at redefinition. It emerged as a part of the larger critique of capitalist culture articulated by socialists across Euro-American societies in the last half of the 19th century. Socialists assumed that the construction of a different society would both require and produce a different sense of self; succeeding generations of Soviet journalists worked on and within this process, under conditions that evolved as Soviet society grew from the ground zero of the rural tsarist empire to the "mature" urban Soviet society of the 1970s and 1980s. So-

cialists shared the assumption of many liberals that people were essentially self-governing, and that this self-government represented one of modernity's great moral leaps forward. But at the same time, socialists argued that the conditions of life that made this leap possible did so by establishing and naturalizing structures of inequality and exploitation, structures maintained by a range of powerful filters that shaped the consciousness of the masses. Modern, industrialized media institutions, which produced floods of sensationalistic texts and images, constituted one such filter with the power to determine the contents of individuals' self-awareness. They argued that the working classes in the West were kept from a higher state of freedom by their condition of spectatorship. A socialist press, by contrast, would be the vehicle for a higher quality of consciousness, and socialist journalists became analogous to the position of intellectuals in the West. This governmental role endured throughout the history of the Soviet Union: we saw it in the work of Anatolii Agranovskii, and its loss was what many journalists were struggling with in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

And yet equally unmistakable is just how difficult it was during the 1970s and 1980s to govern the Soviet Union according to the framework improvised by Bolshevik thinkers in the early decades of the 20th century. Journalists in the late Soviet era were not able to project forms of subjectivity that would embed large segments of the population in any kind of purposeful common agency; the party's unwillingness to allow a broad rethinking of what socialism would mean in a largely urban, industrial society meant that many Soviet citizens became largely indifferent to the task of imagining themselves acting on behalf of socialism. Gorbachev certainly acknowledged this overwhelming undergovernment. He and his allies tried to shape perestroika as one vast moment of cognition, as an attempt to fire at once all the critical neurons of the thousands of members of the intelligentsia and the millions of rank-and-file party members with injunctions to Reveal! Know! Criticize! Change! Perestroika drew inspiration from Khrushchev and the Soviet sixties, when journalists were encouraged to open their eyes and notebooks in order to produce the cultural phase shift from a stagnant and corrupt planned economy to a vibrant socialist way of life.

It is clear now just how complex and audacious it was to attempt to rule a society by encouraging readers to identify with socialism. At base was the problem of how to reproduce this encouragement in the idioms of different generations, for the spaces between the social and cultural experiences of Soviet generations grew steadily wider as the century wore on. By the 1980s, the younger generation of Soviet citizens was yet another audience for a global mass culture, and in such a context they recognized socialism as merely supplying the rhetoric for official rituals. And many of the

older generation felt more comfortable with the old combination of public rituals and private freedoms than with any policy or strategy that would put this equilibrium in jeopardy.

It is clear that the study of media must take into account both local cultural contexts and globally organized flows of cultural production, both the interpretive schemes that render information meaningful and the myriad institutions and logics that produce it. And in the effort to describe the dilemmas posed to republican citizenship by capitalist media, it will be useful to have recourse to the experiences of other governmental organizations of media and subjectivity. Such accounts might serve as a kind of counter-memory to official histories, charging readers to consider (again) the state of the relationship between government, text, and subjectivity.

NOTES

PROLOGUE

1. See Appadurai 1986.

2. Shliapov interview, March 15, 1993. All subsequent citations are from this interview.

3. Glazunov is a painter who began work in the 1960s, working in a completely realist manner, but depicting religious and patriotic themes. Laqueur refers to his style as "socialist realism turned inside out." Laqueur 1993, 91.

4. "New Era Dianetics Auditing," http://www.neweradianetics.org.uk/ (accessed June 2002).

INTRODUCTION

1. See Grant 1993 and Wolfe 1996 for interviews with nationalist and communist journalists and editors who articulated passionate criticism of Russia's capitalist turn.

2. I am indebted to Eric Weitz for this formulation.

3. See Kelly and Shepard 1998, 291–313.

4. Key works here are Innis 1972, McCluhan 1969, and Ong 1982.

5. Central are two collections of Geertz's essays: *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973) and *Local Knowledge* (1983).

6. The key intellectual figure here is Antonio Gramsci. The starting point for his work is *Prison Notebooks* (1992). British cultural studies developed as one key offshoot of cultural Marxism; see Hall 1978 and Fowler 1991.

7. For seminal texts that display such reading, see Said 1978 and 1993.

8. See Chartier 1987 and 1988; Darnton 1985 and 1995.

9. Terdiman 1985.

10. Fritzsche 1996. See also Sloterdijk's account of print culture in Weimar Germany in *The Critique of Cynical Reason* (1987), 307–315.

11. Chalaby 1998. For the American context see Schudson 1978 and his discussion of Chalaby in Schudson 2002.

12. "Governmentality," in Foucault 2000.

13. For an analysis of the role of culture in the operation of government, see Bennett 2003, 47–66.

14. *UNESCO Statistical Handbook* 1988.

15. Remington 1988, 100.

16. *Pechat' CCCP v 1980 godu* (Moskva: Finansy i statistika, 1981), 229 ff.

17. Thomas Remington estimates that in the mid-1980s there were 100,000 full-time journalists working in the Soviet media, while the U.S. census reported 191,000 writers, editors, and press agents working in newspapers, magazines, television, radio, news agencies, corporations, and government organizations. Remington 1988, 100.

18. Hopkins 1970, 83.

19. The Communist Party archives are full of requests from local party committees requesting increases in circulation or permission to start up new papers. For example, in 1958 the Kaliningrad oblast' committee made a request to start a newspaper called the *Kaliningrad rybnik,* or "Kaliningrad Fish Seller," by pointing to the rapid growth of the region; the Propaganda Department would not be fooled, however, and informed the committee that it had checked with the Heavy Industry Department of the Central Committee and found that this vaunted extraordinary growth had, in fact, not yet occurred; therefore the oblast' would not get its own newspaper. TsKhSD, Fond 5, opis' 34, ed. khr. 32, s. 35.

20. See Sproule 1997 for an introduction to the history of the study of communications in the United States.

21. See also Mickiewicz 1981 for a sociological account informed by the general relaxation of ideological conflict in the 1970s.

22. See in particular Schramm 1964.

23. This is the position taken by Brooks in the conclusion to his recent work *Thank You, Comrade Stalin,* where he condemns the Soviet press for making it so hard for post-communist Russians to achieve democracy. See Brooks 2000, 246–247. For a lucid review of the literature on media and description of the institutional landscape of global culture, see Hesmondhalgh 2002.

24. Dean 2003, 11.

25. Ibid., 12.

26. See the descriptions of this broad historical evolution in Rose 1999, 15–61, and Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 1–52.

27. For the history of what Rose calls the psy-discourses, see Rose 1990 and 1985.

28. Dean 2003, 36.

29. Ibid.

30. Rose 1999, 40.

31. Dean asks, "What forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? What statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority . . . and those who are to be governed? What forms of conduct are expected of them?" Dean 2003, 32.

32. See Joan Scott's account of the difference between identity and identification in Scott 2001, 85–103.

33. See Miller 1993 and 1998, Bratich, Packer, and McCarthy 2003, and also Mitchell 2002, for works that investigate in different ways the connection between techniques of inscription, knowledge production, and government.

34. See Mattelart 1996 and Barry 1996b.

35. Barry 1996b. The Foucault passage is from his lecture "Governmentality" in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 101.

36. Barry 1996b, 128.

37. See Anderson 1983.

38. Luke 2002, 214–215. See also the account of subjectivity in Gitlin 2001.

39. See Lynne Attwood and Catriona Kelly, "Programs for Identity: The 'New Man' and the 'New Woman'," in Kelly and Shepard 1998, 256–290.

40. Rose 1999, 84.

41. See Zasurski 1999.

42. See Kenez 1985. On the symbolic dimension of the revolution, see Figes and Kolonitskii 1999.

43. The text at the root of this mythology is Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?* from 1902,

where Lenin insists that a newspaper be not only an agitator and propagandist but also a collective organizer. See the text in Tucker 1975.

44. Mueller writes that the press during the New Economic Policy (NEP) "fulfilled a number of the press' traditional functions in completely new ways, and thus developed a new kind of newspaper." Mueller 1992, 2. Brooks suggests that the press contributed a great deal to the creation of a "new public culture," and that its readers "were serious about learning the new language of public life." Brooks 1989, 21. See also Brooks 1991.

45. Kenez 1985, 230–231, 229.

46. Lenin 1960, 89–91.

47. Ibid.

48. *Zhurnalist,* no. 3 (1923): 26-30.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 29.

51. The literature on Stalinism is indeed enormous. Starting points for review include Dunham 1990 and Tucker 1990. The standard work on the terror is Conquest 1968, although the collection of documents published by Getty and Naumov (1999) provide much needed information on this central dimension of the period; see also Fitzpatrick 1994 and 1999.

52. Fitzpatrick 1999, 9.

53. There are reasons to challenge not so much Brooks's readings of the press content during the Stalin era but his conclusions about the cultural dynamics that this contents represented. I explore these later in the book.

54. See Kharkhordin 1999, especially chapters 4 and 5, and Lahusen 1997.

55. Hopkins 1970, 93.

56. Fitzpatrick describes, for example, the circulation of jokes, satirical poetry, and intentional rewritings of newspaper headlines in Fitzpatrick 1999, 184–185. Kharkhordin writes, "Stalin's regime still allowed for the existence of random patches of individual human freedom. Chaos and insufficiency frequently characterized the management of the 'quicksand society' of Stalin's days: people could sometimes escape the imminent threat of terror by simply moving to another city." Kharkhordin 1999, 302.

57. Brooks 1991, 160.

58. See Weiner 2001 for a detailed description of the intensity and variety of war experiences of Soviet citizens.

59. Ibid., 195ff.

1. JOURNALISM AND THE PERSON IN THE SOVIET SIXTIES

1. Rakov, interview by author, May 14, 1993.

2. Alexandrov, interview by author, February 11, 1993.

3. Vail' and Genis 1996, 5. Like any periodization, these dates are significant only because of the clear importance of the events that they mark.

4. Ibid., 14.

5. See Service 1998, 373–375; and McCauley 1981, 188–190.

6. Two key works of the period were Yevtushenko's poem "Babi Yar," about the massacre of Jews by Nazis in Ukraine between 1941 and 1943, and Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* which appeared in the magazine *Novii Mir* in 1962.

7. Service 1998, 375. William Taubman's biography provides ample evidence of Khrushchev as a figure defined by contradictions between progressive reform and orthodox reaction. Taubman 2003. See also the overview in McCauley 1995.

8. The "anti-party" group consisted of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov, who wanted to slow down the momentum of reform. See Keep 1995, 52–54.

9. Hanson 1997, 174–175.

10. Ibid., 176.

11. Strovskii 1998, 176–177.

12. For an account of APN's founding, see Turpin 1995, 19–24. For an account of the Union of Journalists, see Remington 1988, 170–171.

13. During the Brezhnev era these two institutions became expressions of the generally narrow approach toward ideology. Novosti, as the arm of the propaganda institutions that sought to "raise the consciousness" of public opinion outside the Soviet Union about the achievements of Soviet socialism, "became famous as a spy organization with numerous reports of clandestine scandals linked to its staff" (Turpin 1995, 22). The Union of Journalists, according to Thomas Remington, "has taken its place alongside the party as a second line of political control over the socialization and surveillance of journalists" (Remington 1988, 70–71).

14. Hopkins 1970, 107.

15. The text can be found in *KPSS O sredstvakh massovoi informatsii i propagandy,* 342–344.

16. Roxburgh 1987, 281.

17. See reproductions of pages of the Stalin press in Brooks 2000.

18. For a detailed account of press contents, see ibid.

19. This visual interest and energy of the press during the sixties is celebrated in the graphic material presented in Vail' and Genis 1996. See especially the material beginning each chapter.

20. *Izvestiia,* November 6, 1963.

21. *Izvestiia,* March 23, 1993, 7.

22. *Izvestiia,* Nov. 24, 1963. All subsequent citations are from this article.

23. Adzhubei 1961, 4. All subsequent citations of page numbers from *Den' mira* are listed parenthetically in the text.

24. The editors of *Den' mira* took a broad view as to what constituted a country; they include chapters on the legally sovereign states of Andorra, San Marino, and Vatican City, as well as a chapter on what it viewed as a colonized territory, Puerto Rico.

2. AGRANOVSKII'S ESSAYS

1. For an account of the relevance of the Soviet model of development for developing states in Asia and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, see Marks 2003.

2. Denisov, interview by author, December 1992.

3. See, for example, Strovskii's discussion of Vera Tkachenko, Ol'ga Chaikovskaia, and Tatiana Tess in Strovskii 1998, 177–178.

4. I thank an anonymous reviewer for Indiana University Press for this point.

5. Strovskii 1998, 179.

6. See G. F. Agranovskii 1988 and I. N. Golembiovskii 1986.

7. See V. Agranovskii 1994.

8. The two interviews with Agranovskii's wife appeared in *Vecherniaia Moskva,* May 5, 1995, 3, and *Obshchaia gazeta,* April 13–19, 10, and the interview with his son Aleksei appeared in *Izvestiia* April 11, 1998, 2.

9. See A. Agranovskii 1979, 350–359. All subsequent quotations are from this edition and are cited parenthetically.

10. G. F. Agranovskii 1988, 5.

11. A. Agranovskii 1979, 351.

12. Ibid., 340.
13. Ibid., 341.
14. Taubman 2003, 417–418; see also the chapter "Nixon in Moscow: Appliances, Affluence, and Americanism" in Marling 1994.
15. A. Agranovskii 1987, 16. All subsequent quotations are from this work and are cited parenthetically.
16. Golembiovskii 1986, 259.
17. Ibid., 263.
18. Ovchinnikova, cited in G. N. Vachnadze 1992, 87.
19. Bogdanov and Viazemskii 1971.
20. Ibid., 259.
21. We might suggest the possibility of further evidence that Agranovskii's conception of publicistic writing was at variance with the opinion of the organizers of ideology in the Central Committee: in a book published by the Political Literature Publishing House in 1973 entitled *Publitsistika i politika* (Publicistik and Politics), there is not a single footnote to Agranovskii, while the author manages to throw in references to Marshall McCluhan, Robert Park, and Wilbur Schramm. Indeed, one might imagine that Agranovskii would have viewed such academic treatment of the topic as fuel for the thoughtlessness that he found so harmful. Uchenova 1973.
22. Denisov, interview by author, December 22, 1992.
23. *Vecherniaia moskva,* May 5, 1995, 3.

3. JOURNALISM AGAINST SOCIALISM, SOCIALISM AGAINST JOURNALISM

1. For an account of Khrushchev's fall, see Taubman 2003, 3–17.
2. McCauley 1995, 122.
3. Ibid.
4. Strovskii 1998, 177.
5. Keep 1995, 68.
6. Ibid., 193.
7. Breslauer 1980, 52.
8. The party increased its size during the Khrushchev years, nearly doubling from 6.8 million members in 1952 to 11.8 million in 1965. The educational profile of party membership changed, too; those classified as "engineers, technologists, or agricultural specialists" grew from 20 percent of party members in 1956 to 32.5 percent in 1965. Keep 1995, 66–67.
9. Ibid., 91–92.
10. Remington 1988, 83.
11. Breslauer 1980, 54.
12. Remington 1988, 82.
13. See Leonhard 1970, 195–198, for a discussion of the *Foundations.*
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 198. The media's reorientation around the production and dissemination of ideological positions required significant institutional change. For example, according to Remington, it involved an "immense expansion of activist participation in mass political work, both in areas in which party ideological work had been done for decades, such as agitation and adult political education, and in others introduced in the 1960s and 1970s." This expansion of ideological practice resulted from the party's desire "to incorporate members of the social elite from every institutional sphere into the ideological *aktiv.*" These were individuals who gave talks and lectures and made appearances in local electronic media

where they expanded on the ideological themes the party leadership wanted to stress at any given moment. Remington 1988, 4.

16. The key texts in this regard are the works of Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!* (1983) and *The Living and the Dead* (1994), that examine the two primary "cults" used by the party to create a climate of solidarity through the production of a mythical history. See Wolfe, in press.

17. Fond 5, opis' 34, delo 123, 185–190.

18. *Pravda,* July 25, 1965.

19. Fond 5, opis' 89, delo 84, 11–13.

20. Nenashev's critical sensibility, his willingness to criticize the deployment of orthodoxy, especially when it seemed so cynical, made him an important ally of Gorbachev in 1985, and his ultimate disappointment with how Gorbachev's reforms undermined socialism led him to title his memoirs *An Ideal Betrayed* (1995).

21. *Pravda,* January 8, 1970.

22. Fond 5, opis' 62, ed. khr. 40, 161.

23. Ibid., 185.

24. *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* September 13, 1981.

25. Fond 5, opis' 84, delo 104, 91.

26. Ibid., 88.

27. Fond 5, opis' 67, delo 117, 7–10.

28. Ibid., 11–17.

29. Alexandrov, interview by author, February 11, 1993.

30. Denisov, interview by author, December 22, 1992. Another case of a journalist struggling between the requirements of his work and his conscience was that of a deputy director of TASS who had resigned in 1973 because of "the propaganda campaign against Academic Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and other like-minded people, in which TASS played an active, if not the central role." Fond 5, opis' 66, delo 145, 123.

31. See Virilio 1989 and Mattelart 1994 on the connection between technologies of communication and the imaginaries that construct geo-political space.

32. Fond 5, opis' 55, delo 127, 158–159.

33. Fond 5, opis' 62, ed. khr. 39, 237.

34. Ibid., 241.

35. Chakovskii was by no means a "liberal": a Rand Corporation report from the early 1980s said of him that "*Literaturnaia Gazeta* under his leadership was among the first to reflect the new conservative trend in cultural affairs in 1963, publishing a negative review of one of Solzhenitsyn's first short stories at a time when the writer still appeared to enjoy official favor." Chakovskii was, however, "the archetype of the experienced and sophisticated literary manager." He was appointed editor of the *Litgazet* in 1962 and received "high level support" to turn it into a lively and interesting weekly newspaper. Dzirkals, Gustafson, and Johnson 1982, 115–129.

36. Fond 5, opis' 62, ed. khr. 39, 283–293.

37. Fond 5, opis' 66, delo 144, 4.

38. Fond 5, opis' 67, delo 117, 49.

39. Ibid., 53.

40. Ibid., 54.

41. Soviet and post-Soviet television is the subject of the work of the sociologist Ellen Mickiewicz. See Mickiewicz 1988, 1997.

42. *Pravda,* December 26, 1974.

43. Fond 5, opis' 68, delo 384, 3.

44. Fond 5, opis' 76, delo 188, 126.

45. Fond 5, opis' 88, delo 133, 78–83.
46. Fond 5, opis' 89, delo 83, 69.
47. Fond 5, opis' 89, delo 84, 45.

4. PERESTROIKA AND THE END OF GOVERNMENT BY JOURNALISM

1. See particularly Kotkin 2001 and Iakovlev 1993, a work by one of Gorbachev's principle advisers.

2. This argument is made by David Kotz and Fred Weir in *Revolution from Above* (1996).

3. See the discussion of Gorbachev's appreciation of Khrushchev in the epilogue of Taubman 2003, 647–650; and see the essays by Shakhnazarov and Reddaway in Taubman, Khrushchev, and Gleason 2000, in which the similarities and differences between the two men are explored.

4. Sakwa 1991, 29.

5. That Gorbachev liked to talk much more than he liked to listen is a point made by Mikhail Nenashev, who knew Gorbachev well and had ample opportunities to observe his style of interacting with his colleagues and his subordinates. See his description in Nenashev 1995, 133–154.

6. Gorbachev received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, an act that for many of his countrymen proved his complicity with the aims of Western leaders.

7. Keep 1995, 223.

8. For a concise description of this new regime, see Harvey 1990.

9. See Yurchak 1999 for a compelling analysis of the nature of late Soviet culture.

10. Sakwa 1991, 20.

11. Lane 1996, 265.

12. Keep 1995, 370–372.

13. See Tumarkin 1994.

14. See Keep 1995, 341–342.

15. See Weigle 1994.

16. For an ethnography of daily life under perestroika see Ries 1997.

17. *Izvestiia,* August 21, 1991.

18. Hanson 1997, 182.

19. Ibid., 189.

20. Keep 1995, 342.

21. See Gibbs 1999, 26–31.

22. Not even *Ogonek,* Denisov told me, could be considered as practicing independent journalism during perestroika. "Even *Ogonek,* the bravest publication, simply, as we say, pulled the wool over the eyes of foreigners. In fact, it also coordinated its outbursts with this or that part of the party apparatus. That is, they were still a part of the games played out by the party structures. In no way could we consider this independence." Even though it might not be independence, the representations of the seedier side of Soviet society and history attracted a wide and supportive audience. For a collection of articles from *Ogonek,* see Korotich 1990.

23. For a brief history of the paper *Moscow News*, see Schillinger and Porter 1991.

24. Not that the paper was a joy to read. According to Schillinger and Porter, the postwar *Moscow News* was "relentlessly partisan, platitudinous, internationally oriented, decidedly upbeat, and, by most standards, ponderously dull. The prose style varied between listless and breathless." Ibid., 129.

25. Loskov, interview by author, February 17, 1993.
26. Hanson 1997, 185.
27. *Pravda,* April 18, 1987, 2.
28. *Pravda,* July 15, 1987.
29. *Pravda,* June 1, 1987, 2.
30. Ligachev had, in fact, been the one to promote Vitaly Korotich to the editorship of the fortnightly magazine *Ogonek,* whose discussions of Stalinism and the camps made it immensely popular. Gibbs 1999, 26–27.
31. *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 13, 1988. A copy of the letter is translated in Eisen 1990, 23–31.
32. For discussions of the significance of the Andreeva letter, see Service 1998, 458–459; Suny 1998, 459–460; Keep 1995, 353; and Gibbs 1999, 66–73.
33. *Pravda,* April 5, 1988.
34. Hanson 1997, 199.
35. Denisov, interview by author, December 22, 1992.
36. Plutnik, in *Izvestiia,* June 5, 1988.
37. *Izvestiia,* July 27, 1988.
38. Changes in the language of the press during perestroika were the subject of a number of scientific articles in *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta: Seria 10, Zhurnalistika.*
39. Alexandrov, interview by author, February 11, 1993.
40. See Vachnadze 1992, 82–83.
41. For the founding of *Nezavisimaia gazeta,* see Zasurskii 1999, 60–61.
42. See a translation of the article by Ovchinnikova in Vachnadze 1992, 87.
43. The phrase "red-brown coalition" refers to the generally sympathetic connection between communists and nationalists that emerged in the late 1980s and that formed alliances against Yeltsin in the early 1990s.
44. Alexandrov, interview by author, February 11, 1993.

5. TEACHING TABLOIDS

1. See Downing 1996, 130–131, and Androunas 1993, 147. For an analysis of the state of the Russian economy, see Goldman 2003 and Kotkin 2001.
2. Splichal 1994, 113.
3. See Rose 1996, 37–64.
4. Rose 1999, 89–93.
5. Rose 1996, 58.
6. These circulation figures are those reported to me by the editors of these papers in early 1993. All three editors told me that even if not all copies of an issue are sold, the actual number of readers of each issue is many times more than the number suggested by the circulation figures, since each copy was read by more than one person.
7. See the discussion of *SPID-Info* and Soviet pornography in general in Goldschmidt 1999.
8. Bondarev, interview by author, January 18, 1993.
9. Korshagin, interview by author, July 8, 1993.
10. When I asked him if he realized that many people in the United States would be offended by the detached, metaphorical manner with which he used the subject of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, he answered that he did understand, but that he and his colleagues were free to use the image of the disease in this way because AIDS was a much smaller problem in Russia than in the U.S.
11. Viktor Dobychev, interview by author, December 15, 1992.

12. Nevzorov was one of the many controversial media figures who emerged during perestroika. He was a kind of muckraking tele-journalist, and his show instantly attracted a national audience. During the last years of perestroika, he turned sharply to the right and began criticizing the democrats and particularly the "criminal" selling off of Russia's national wealth.

13. *Skandaly,* no. 5, 10.

AFTERWORD

1. See Furet 1999, Malia 1994; and see the thoughtful review of these works in Suny 2002.

2. See Campbell 1998.

3. I think in this context about the study of totalitarianism, for there was arguably no more important concept in the arsenal of ideas with which American cold warriors fought between 1945 and 1991. It served as the perfect idea to represent the cluster of fears over security, purity, and identity that took shape after the end of the World War II, fears that had driven the creation of national identity since the encounter of Europeans with indigenous peoples centuries ago. Its moral authority derived from the claim that communism "caused" the gulag, and that communism, in causing such suffering, shared the same ethical anti-space as Nazism and the exterminatory racial policies of the Third Reich. See Gleason 1995.

4. Bauman 2002, 158, 63.

5. Ibid., 167.

6. Ibid., 164–165.

7. Ibid., 166.

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THOMAS C. WOLFE is Assistant Professor of History and Anthropology at the University of Minnesota.

Examines the pivotal role of the media in creating Soviet society and personhood.

The Soviet project of creating a new culture and society entailed a plan for the modeling of "new" persons who embodied and fulfilled the promise of socialism, and this vision was expressed in the institutions of government. Journalism occupied a central place within the cultural and intellectual structures of Soviet government. Working across historical and anthropological frameworks, Thomas C. Wolfe draws on archival sources, close readings of journalists' essays, and interviews with journalists in the early years of post-communism to provide an account of the final four decades of Soviet history as viewed through the lens of journalism and media.

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