EDITED BY ALEX VAILATI
& CARMEN RIAL

MIGRATION OF RICH IMMIGRANTS

GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY

Migration of Rich Immigrants

Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology

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Living with London's Olympics: An Ethnography
Iain Lindsay

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Introduction

Alex Vailati and Carmen Rial

Flows of people have been one of the most powerful forces in the transformation of places, spaces, and culture. Observation of the history of local contexts reveals how relevant the presence of migrants has been. Beginning in Africa, throughout human history, we find people moving around the world, shaping lands and cultures (Leed 1991). Generally, these movements have been described in a way that emphasizes the subordination of peoples to heteronomic economic and political powers. Migration is a word that in the current imaginary is usually associated with dictatorships, cataclysms, wars, or unemployment. Anthropological studies have also followed this perspective. The main studies on migrations have been produced within conceptual frameworks that focus on structural violence (Farmer 1996), forced migrations and displacement (Agier 2002; Malkki 1995), or national order (Sassen 1996). This focus has been clearly influenced by a methodological nationalism (Wimmer, Glick Schiller 2003; Lins Ribeiro 2013). The majority of these studies have been produced in North America and Europe. Given the experience of immigrants from non-Western countries, anthropologists have emphasized the often-dramatic difficulties of migration processes, as well as nationalistic policies against migrants. Adopting a politically engaged point of view, many scholars have produced a critical discourse about migration and, more importantly, about nationalism.

Nevertheless, the continued focus on immigration problems contrasts with the fact that anthropology has usually defended the usefulness of cultural encounters and their role in stimulating creativity. Beginning with classical studies about conflict (Gluckman 1940) and frontiers (Barth 1969), reflections on cross-cultural influences have been a key element of anthropology (Hannerz 1992; 1996). On the one hand, studies have focused on creativity to highlight how new cultural objects are produced in these cross-cultural processes (Hallam, Ingold 2007). Yet on the other hand, the identity construction process of social groups is often influenced by the idea of cultural purity (Clifford 1988). This idea is the basis for complementary reflections that present the "purity" of disadvantaged minorities and emphasize the importance of protecting them. Meanwhile, the notion of purity is often used to reinforce a nationalistic point of view (Sassen, 1996).

Looking at this wide field of studies called migration studies, this book tries to focus on studies about migrations based on fieldwork and microanalysis.

While sociologists tend to ask who migrates, when, and why, anthropologists are more interested in the experience of the migrants, and the meanings involved in the process, for themselves and their host societies. If, as we will see, the idea of a theory of migration can be considered obsolete from a socioanthropological point of view, the topic of migration is still one of the more critical issues in our society. Frontiers are still perceived as a dangerous social space that nation-states strive to preserve and protect. The Mediterranean Sea, at the time of the writing of this introduction, is probably the most dramatic example of those policies. Moreover, as this book describes, new frontiers are emerging from the current transformation in the world's socioeconomic balance. Analyses of the migrations of rich people, who usually do not gain media attention, can be at this moment a powerful tool for rethinking and criticizing imaginaries and policies that are dysfunctional and devastating for both hosts and migrants

Imagining Migrations

Although there are many studies on disadvantaged migrants in contemporary social sciences, little is written about what we call "rich immigrants." We found this category useful to help bring together a variety of fragmented categories that seem to have common characteristics. As Vertovec pointed out some years ago when considering transnationalism, "the search for more evocative terminology and concepts, while certainly not a replacement for the process of theorizing itself, can be a stimulating and sometimes revealing activity" (Vertovec 2003: 644). Migrant entrepreneurs, highly skilled migrants, and circulating students are some of the keywords that have been used to describe these "other" migrants. Generally studied for their repercussion on the economic sphere, these subjects come from a multitude of backgrounds and experiences (Adams 2003; Chalamwong 2004; Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009; Stark 2004; Xiang 2001; Zweig, Siu Fung, Han 2008; Rial 2008).

The economic literature is probably the richest source in this field, because the common denominator of these experiences has been the availability of capital, both economic and symbolic. Historically, the need to create a unique theory of migration has been the common denominator of these kinds of studies. Generally called "migration theories," these models are better defined as "labor migration theories," due to their focus on working conditions and incomes. The influence of neoclassical economics, and its focus on rational choice, led to an interpretation of migration as a consequence of the economic disparities between different countries. Social actors, in this way, choose to move to find better economic conditions. The dual labor market theory is another example of the influence of economic discourse on other social sciences. Here the principal engine of migrations is seen to be the need for low-skilled labor for the rich countries. Employment that is not desired by citizens is filled by migrants. These models have become increasingly sophisticated, but remain focused on "poor" migrants. Unfortunately, while these theories clearly do not explain the complexity of the facts (Arango 2000), in many contexts, they are still the theories that mainly influence people's imagination and policies.

Since the 1960s, there have been many studies that focus on "others migrants." Political refugees are one of the oldest examples. As Sassen (1996) demonstrates, this category appeared in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* as far back as 1796 to describe people escaping from calamities, as well as émigrés, who were French nobles escaping revolution. In a similar way, but more recently, the rise of the Nazi regime forced many Jews to escape to the United States from the late 1920s to the 1940s. Many of them were people of wealthy economic and educational backgrounds. Their flow to other countries enriched local economies and universities. Similar phenomena can be found in other parts of the world. South American military dictatorships have obliged many intellectuals to seek exile in foreign countries. Darcy Ribeiro, a Brazilian anthropologist exiled during the recent military dictatorship, contributed to the reorganization of a number of university systems in South America (Ribeiro 1975). These brief examples demonstrate the presence of "rich" immigrants and refugees in history, while the social sciences have focused more on "unprivileged" immigrants.

Those cases demonstrate the relevance of migrations in relation to social change. In particular, they introduce the question, what is the place of these migrants in the receiving context? Portes states that migrants are embedded (Portes 1993) in a socioeconomic structure. For this reason, they are not necessarily agents of short-term social change (Portes 2008). Migration processes are a result of world socioeconomic transformations that coincide with current expansions of neoliberalism, and migrants seem to be confined within this framework. From another point of view, migrations can be interpreted, according to Castles, as "one part of the process of transformations of these structures and institutions, which arises through major changes in global political, economic and social relationships" (Castles 2010: 1566). In this sense, migration is no more than an isolated consequence of global changes but is deeply connected with other processes, which include, for example, transformations in roles of "gender, race and ethnicity" (Castles 2010: 1582).

Rich Immigrants on the Stage

Research that considers the immigration of wealthy people as a social phenomenon began to be realized only in the 1960s. The exodus of scholars from the United Kingdom to the United States attracted the interest of researchers. Mostly studied from an economic point of view, the so-called "brain drain" has been a useful index of a nation's economic situation. For this reason, many studies stressed the relationships between skilled migrations and the formation of social capital (Stark 2004). But only in the 1980s did this topic become included in international migration studies (Koser, Salt 1997: 285), in an effort to revise the theoretical framework. The need to grasp this new market of "brains" led to the exploration of new research lines, such as the sociocultural perspective. While earlier studies were based on comparisons of huge datasets, this new perspective has been based on micro analyses. But looking at the current literature, these paths based on micro analyses still seem underexplored. The brain drain phenomenon has recently received considerable attention because of the global economic crisis. Some research "centers" have suffered from an exodus of scholars due to national funding cuts. Although there is public debate about the issue, usually supported by economic data (Adams 2003), important sociocultural aspects remain unstudied, and the paths based on micro analyses still seem underexplored

Political refugees, with their ideological capital, and highly skilled migrants, rich with human capital, can be compared to others, with more classic economic wealth. It is common to find a link in the literature between migration and monetary accumulation in reference to "entrepreneurs." While there are many studies in the field of human resource management about immigrants' quest for "success," migrant entrepreneurs in urban and rural economies often follow other paths not directly linked to this quest. This book provides several examples of these paths.

In reference to migration, Smart emphasizes that "social studies of ethnic entrepreneurs and ethnic entrepreneurship since the 1970s have made significant contributions to our understanding of the economic history and behavior of recent immigrant groups in the United States, Canada, Europe and other locations" (Smart, 2003: 313). Contemporary urban spaces also reflect the plurality of global cities (Sassen, 1991), the result of connections between official economies and others that have sometimes led to antihegemonic practices (Lins Ribeiro 2011). Those migrants enriched by commercial practices provide evidence of a new and unprecedented configuration between neoliberalism and resistance to it (Fergusson 2009).

The examples of political refugees, highly skilled migrants, and ethnic entrepreneurs are symbolically important from various points of view. They indicate the historical presence of rich immigrants and their importance for both their places of departure and arrival. The transnationalist perspective, as a theoretical framework, has been helpful for revealing these processes. Rejecting the nation-state as the fundamental unit of analysis of social processes (Wimmer, Glick Schiller: 2003), transnationalism allows researchers to think of the new connections created by these migrants. In this sense, migration has been studied both from the nation-state point of view, for example, analyzing policies or laws, and from a transnational perspective, emphasizing the creation of new social spaces and networks. Moreover, it allows a political reflection that has been the basis for rethinking migration, which allows understanding it not only as a negative and dramatic process but also as a way of constructing new subjectivities.

The debate on cosmopolitanism and diaspora (Hannerz 1996; Vertovtec 2009; Werbner 1999) helps reflect on this topic. Although "migrants" are our key topic, the complexity of this field of studies requires making connections with other categories. Class, although usually "purified" from its Marxist connotations, has been central to economic analysis. Migration studies have been generally based on economic differences between migrants and hosts. Socioanthropology, in parallel, has extensively emphasized the dichotomy between cosmopolitan and diasporic movements. Cosmopolitanism has been used generally to indicate, in Hannerz's words, "an orientation, a willingness to engage with the other, an intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences" (Hannerz 1996: 103). This attitude, which is linked to an implicit freedom to migrate and to broad cultural horizons, is specular to the notion of diaspora. This is usually related to processes of displacement (Hall 1999), not voluntary, but linked to geopolitical, social, and natural causes. As in the economic literature, in the field of socioanthropology we can find a reflection on migrants' "capital" conditions.

Gender, and other intersections—such as race, ethnicity, class, and age—offer a significant point of view for analyzing the social practices, images, and discourses of immigration in an interconnected world. From a flow of migrants primarily composed of men, we have reached a situation of greater equality in gender distribution, a phenomenon that has been designated as the feminization of the migratory process. In fact, the second half of the twentieth and the early twenty-first century have seen an increase in the number of migrant women, motivated by transformations in gender relations in general. The conquests of the feminist movement, among which we can include the entrance of women into the labor market, opened space in the global North for the work of immigrant women in the care sector.

If it is undeniable that more women are leaving their original countries, it is also uncontestable that women have always been at the center of the migration process, by granting men permission—as a spouse or mother—to be mobile. In fact, in most cases, migration is and has been a family project more than an individual decision. Class, gender, and ethnicity are thus involved with classic debates on migrations. Clearly, a multidimensional analysis framework is a prerequisite for migration research. In any case, what is the role and the relevance of these issues of gender, class, and ethnicity? The chapters in this book address the need to rethink the priorities adopted in migration research.

Note on Chapters

Migration composes a network of meanings that are approached here as parts of global and local transformations. For this reason, the chapters presented here focus on three key terms: places, mobilities, and paths. In the first section, the studies focus on social spaces that have been relevant for migration phenomena. Cities are the most emblematic places of immigrations, both in Europe, the United States, and South America. The analysis of immigrant networks and their relationships with urban spaces allows the authors to describe a variety of strategies adopted by immigrants and their influence on cities.

Cristiana Bastos proposes a fascinating long-term description of migration in Lisbon. The case of Ramiro Espinheira is emblematic. He was a Galician man who migrated to Lisbon and in 1933 produced the *Guia Noturna de Lisboa—Amor Livre* (A Night Guide to Lisbon—Free Love), probably the first guide to Lisbon's nightlife. The guide, which was quickly confiscated by the police, contained information about commercial sex establishments, and it is exemplary of the transformation of some Lisbon neighborhoods that today are internationally recognized for their nightlife. Bastos underlines the importance of migration in those historical transformations, showing how "the spaces for innovation have often been in the hands of newcomers, who combine imagination, initiative and the need to make a living" (p. 30).

Greater Boston is the second place explored in this book. Viviane Kraieski de Assunção proposes a deep ethnography of Brazilian restaurants in the urban space. The processes of commodification of Brazilian food culture allow us to understand the transformative dimensions of the presence of migrants. The transformations appear clearly in creative strategies that middle-class migrants use to create an ethnic market niche in Boston. The chapter emphasizes how cultural differences do not constitute an obstacle to socioeconomic affirmation, but rather are the basis for it. In the author's words, "Cultural differences are essential to their insertion in the ethnic economic niche, but in dialog with the local socio-cultural context" (p. 41).

Restaurants and other shops controlled by immigrants of different national origins in a small neighborhood of Paris *intra-muros* are the focus of the chapter by Carmen Rial and Miriam Grossi. Most of these establishments are viewed as "ethnic" foreign businesses. Classified as cultural immigrants, political refugees and postcolonial immigrants according to their motivation to leave their original nations, these immigrants established different relationships with the French local context and their distant homelands. The cultural immigrants adhere more quickly to the individualist ethos that characterizes modern-contemporary society, while postcolonial immigrants maintain stronger ties with their families of origin, among whom prevails a holistic ethos and obligations of reciprocity established by the "enrichment" involved with the immigration process. The migrants' businesses are embedded in an economy of kinship, that might not differ from small French-owned businesses in the employment of family labor, but that present other distinctive traits.

The second section focuses on social mobility. The contributions analyze the historical transformation of transnational communities, focusing on the dynamics that allow social mobility. Some examples are kinship networks, atypical entrepreneurial strategies, and cultural peculiarities. The intersection of multiple resources allows immigrants to raise their class status. There are also studies that focus on the interaction between strategies and social spaces, revealing the presence of wealthy immigrants

The difficulties in presenting a unique pattern of migration processes are deconstructed by Claudia Voight Espinola's chapter. She analyzes the migration of Arabs, mostly from Palestine and Lebanon, in Florianopolis, a state capital in southern Brazil. Their mobility appears on two planes. The first is related to social ascensions. Arabs, due to their family networks, have been able to become leaders in commercial activities in Florianopolis. Second, mobility is related to the identitarian strategies that are adopted. If migrants first opted for an invisibilization of their Arab customs and Islamic religion, recently, their trajectory has been transformed. After social transformations that established Florianopolis as a popular center of tourism, and the global conjuncture of September 11, Arabs readopted some cultural features such as the veil and the use of Arab language. This choice was made to strengthen the community and make it visible.

Another point of view on Palestine migrations is provided by Lirio Gutierrez Riviera's chapter. Transnational space is the network created by migrants between Palestine and Honduras. As in the previous chapter, the migrants' social mobility is substantial, and allows them to become part of the local economic elite. The author states that this conjuncture is related to both the trajectories of the migrants and of the local context. Honduras, in fact, is described as a state "involved in constructing and maintaining these transnationalized areas within its national territory" (p. 103). However, the economic success of Palestinian migrants is due both to their kinship ties and to the idea of Palestine as a place of origin and a shared historical construction. Those features allow migrants to create stronger transnational connections that support their economic activities.

The last chapter in this section explores transformations among Moroccan immigrants in Belgium. Morocco has for the past 50 years been one of the world's leading sources of emigration. Moreover, Moroccan immigrants have usually been perceived—especially in Europe—as low-skilled and poor migrants. Caroline Zickgraf provides here a recent study that clearly deconstructs this image, focusing on the creation of transnational spaces between Belgium and Morocco, which include migrants with high economic and human capital. An example is the role of remittances, usually a key topic in the economic literature on migration, which is here analyzed as a practice with multiple meanings that in many cases fall outside the idea of family economic support.

Zickgraf's analysis leads to the topic of the last section, in which the economic issue shifts to the background of the immigrant experience. These chapters analyze immigrants who are usually not part of this imaginary category. Here, migration processes are not described by emphasizing difficulties, but to show the importance of migration in the lives of individuals. In this sense, migration becomes a quest for adventure.

Start-up founders are the protagonists of Katrin Sontag's chapter. The phenomenon of global start-ups has been growing since the 1990s with the advent of the new economy. Professionals who have decided to start a new global company usually migrate multiple times to improve new projects. Sontag, focusing on narrative biographies, reveals the complex network of motivations, personal ambitions, and expectations of these migrants.

Moreover, the author emphasizes the role of these narratives, which describe individuals who are in a liminal space between personal freedom and embeddedness in a social and symbolic system. Mobility is no longer a consequence of migrations, but has become a sine qua non cause of it. In the author's words "Work related mobility" has become "mobility related work." Mobility here seems to create textures of careers" (p. 155).

A second path is the one of Brazilian immigrants to Dublin described by Karine Dalsin. Usually they are young skilled persons with a good job in Brazil. Migration usually leads them to take a huge step down, from an economic point of view. Nevertheless, this "unrational" path is usually perceived as a "source of excitement." The acquisition of competences, such as a language or experience in another context, is more important than the immediate accumulation of economic capital. In this way, Dalsin emphasizes the need for a new interpretation of migrations.

A deep comparison between different kinds of migrants is proposed by Giuliana Prado in the last chapter. The first case is related to the postcommunist migration in the city of Tirana, the capital of Albania. Migrants with very different sociocultural backgrounds have reached the city, and regardless of their economic status, continue to be labeled in relation to their provenance. In a similar way, the case of Britons in the North of France underlines how economic status is secondary in construing the "views of migrants." These Britons are mostly middle-income pensioners who, when established abroad, are defined as expats and not as migrants. These people are thus imagined through a "new hierarchical 'reputation-based' categorization" (p. 194), in which their country of origin, regardless of their economic and sociocultural features, shapes their perception.

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PART I

Places

CHAPTER 1

Moving to Lisbon: Labor, Lust, and Leisure

Cristiana Bastos

Diversity and Monotony in the Old City

Periods of intense cosmopolitanism and global prominence have occasionally emerged in Lisbon's long, multilayered, and inward-turned history. The most famous of them was in the early modern age, when the city became a hub of global flows of trade, peoples, riches, and ambitions related to the European overseas expansion, in which the Portuguese played an important role (Godinho 1982–1983, Couto 2003, Pinheiro 2011). With the influx of people, things and experiences from around the world, Lisbon might have become a diverse, multicultural, and global city, but its cosmopolitan moment was a short one. The alliance of the absolutist monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church, supported by the Inquisition, efficiently neutralized whomever they considered opponents. Diversity was not welcome during the Portuguese ancien régime.

There had been previous times of peaceful coexistence between people from different creeds and nations, be they Jews, Muslims, Christians, or pagans. After the Christian conquest of Lisbon in 1147 (see Mattoso 1995, Matos 2008, 2009), the living quarters for the Jewish and Muslim communities were limited, respectively, to Alfama and Mouraria, although people were allowed to freely circulate throughout the urban space (Tavares 1982, Barros 1998, Trindade 2007). Yet that coexistence of differences would give way to a forced monotony. In the fifteenth century, all non-Christians had to either convert or leave the country. Even after becoming New Christians, the converted Jews were massacred by angry mobs that feared difference and dreaded imaginary contaminations—as in the bloody 1506 episode known as the Lisbon pogrom and portrayed in the bestselling novel *The Last Kabbalist of Lisbon* (Zimmler 1996). At that point, many of those who had not yet left Iberia departed for good. They headed to the Netherlands, settled there, and became an influential community with distinguished members in different fields, the philosopher Baruch Spinoza among them. Many of their descendants went later to New York or to the New World plantations in Northeastern Brazil, the Caribbean, and the Guianas (Arbell 2002).

The once-diverse city of Lisbon entered the sixteenth century as a society blended into a dispassionate, homogenized Catholicism. Alternative rites and beliefs persisted underneath, often absorbed by the Church. Popular festivities continued to celebrate fertility, love, and carnal pleasures, while also being devoted to Catholic saints.[1] Much research waits to be conducted regarding the African rites that also persisted in the city. Africans, whether enslaved or free, were for centuries a significant component of Lisbon society, but there is still debate about how many Africans and their descendants actually lived there in different moments and in which neighborhoods.[2]

Another counterforce to Catholic hegemony came from international networks committed to the free-thinking principles of the Enlightenment—including Free Masonry. Those networks helped preserve intellectual freedom under the authoritarian monarchist regime, as they served as vehicles for meaningful intellectual exchanges within the broader international society and helped create the early scientific societies of the eighteenth century (Cardoso 1990, Diogo, Carneiro, and Simões 2001, Davis 2013, Horta 2011, Bastos 2013).

From Passing by, to Settling Down: The Galician Community of Lisbon

Every now and then, notorious visitors broke the monotony and brought in changes into the Portuguese cultural landscape. Italian musicians like Scarlatti and architects like Ludovice were invited by the crown and produced important landmarks. British literati like Lord Byron (1812) and William Beckford (1834) visited the country and wrote about it. German naturalists like Link (1801) surveyed the flora and produced remarkable scientific works (Hoffmansegg and Link, 1808–1820).[3] There were also diplomats, military attachés, and merchants bringing diversity into the country.

British merchants were among those who took advantage of the local conditions. In Porto, they flourished as a community specializing in the trade of port wine. They benefitted from a reputedly bilateral trade agreement in which the British would import port wine and the Portuguese would import textiles from England.[4] Up to our days, British names are the brand names of port wine and of the upper-crust families in the society of Porto (Martins 1990, Lave 2001, Parkhurst 2015).

No equivalent British community carved their niche in Lisbon, although there are many British expats in the glamorous suburb of Estoril-Cascais. In Lisbon, Galicians were the most expressive nonnational group of residents.

For centuries, men and women from Galicia, in northwestern Spain, left their homes and headed south to cities like Porto or Lisbon. Those cities were closer to them than Madrid, not only geographically but also culturally and linguistically. Seeking labor or escaping from wars, many Galicians found in Lisbon a good place to settle for good (Gonzalez Lopo 2008, Leira 2008, Perez Toriño 2008, Serrão 2008). They worked hard in construction or carrying water, selling coal, moving furniture, bringing messages between people, or doing odd jobs. Reputedly, they provided a large contingent of the immense labor force involved in the construction of the majestic works of the early eighteenth century, like the emblematic Convent of Mafra and the Aqueduct of Lisbon (Leira 2009:2), when gold from Brazil flooded the royal treasury, and there was a penchant for lavish expenditure. Later, they worked in the rebuilding of Lisbon after the massive destruction caused by the 1755 earthquake (Gonzales Lopo 2008: 19). The building of the geometrical Baixa Pombalina neighborhood benefited from the use of trademark Galician construction techniques, like the *tabique á galega* (Perez Touriño 2008: 13). Known as hard workers, Galicians were sometimes referred to as "sweating machines" (Gonzales Lopo 2008: 18). Over time, some urban jobs in Lisbon were almost exclusively performed by *galegos,* and they were stereotyped as water carriers (*aguadeiros*), coal carriers (*carvoeiros*), errand boys, or messengers (Museu da Cidade 1978, Governo Civil 1991).

In the early twentieth century, many of Lisbon's Galicians had become business owners, particularly in food distribution, restaurants, and lodging (Serrão 2008: 23). Some of the most iconic restaurants in downtown Lisbon, like Solmar, Gambrinus, Ramiro, João do Grão, Paris, and so on, had Galician owners. As Galician filmmaker Xan Leira (2009) notes, this history has never been fully told, nor has the role of Galician migrants in trade unionism, republicanism, and mutual societies—from which emerged, in 1908, the cultural center Xuventude de Galicia (Leira 2009: 3). The institution is still active today, and its headquarters are located in a sumptuous mansion donated by a businessman of Galician descent, Manuel Cordo Boullosa (1905–1998). Boullosa epitomizes the successful child of hardworking Galician migrants. His father sold coal and kerosene in the streets of Lisbon. Manuel helped him from an early age, and with an interest in fuels he grew up to become highly influential in the international oil business, and the head of a powerful empire that included banks, industries, agriculture, tourism, and publishing. Always proud of his Galician background, he honored it by donating a building to Xuventude for its superb headquarters.[5]



Figure 1.1 The water carrier, postcard, early twentieth century, collection Vieira da Silva, Gabinente de Estudos Olisiponenses. Reproduced with the kind permission of Gabinete de Estudos Olisiponenses, Lisbon.

Figure 1.2a Headquarters of *Xuventude de Galicia*—Centro Galego de Lisboa.
Photo: Cristiana Bastos

Figure 1.2b Sculpture representing the successful businessmen Manuel Cordo Boullosa.
Photo: Cristiana Bastos.

Other renowned names of Lisboners of Galician or Galician descent are compiled in a recent volume organized by the Xuventude (Leira et al. 2008). Some became famous in the arts and literature, and at least one became prominent in medicine: Dr. Juvenal Esteves, a medical school professor and eminent dermatologist (Fonseca 2010). The old stereotypes of Galicians, which portrayed them either as rude or as smart and mischievous (Costa 1910, Museu 1978, Pinheiro and Consiglieri 1991), slowly gave way to the acknowledgment of their contribution to Lisbon's economy and society. Their complete history in the city has yet to be written (Leira et al. 2008).

We will later return to the Galician community in Lisbon, but for the moment one note should be emphasized: their linguistic, cultural, and even physical proximity to the Portuguese worked as a competitive advantage for integration vis-à-vis other groups. Galicians were often taken for Northern Portuguese (Perez Tourino 2008:14). They might have endured negative stereotypes, which often related them to menial jobs and equated "Galegos" to a lower social strata (e.g. Noronha 1912), but they did not have to face the overwhelming racism that affected Africans and the itinerant gypsies in the city.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, Galicians were the only contingent of nonnationals with a significant presence in the life of Lisbon. Working in restaurants and often owning them, or acting in other economic and cultural sectors, Galicians increasingly blended into mainstream Portuguese society (Leira et al. 2008). Some Galician workers contributed to the struggles against the monarchy and to the trade union movement (Leira 2009: 3). In *Lápides Partidas,* Aquilino Ribeiro's celebrated novel about the republican plots against the monarchy, one of the main characters is a Galician man named Porriño (Ribeiro 1945).

The Twentieth Century: The City and Its Underground

The social and cultural atmosphere of Lisbon at the turn of the twentieth century could hardly be depicted in the glamorous colors associated with the *belle époque*. In his 1912 booklet *O Vício em Lisboa—Antigo e Moderno* (Vice in Lisbon—old and new), Fernando Swalbach lamented the general decline of social life in the capital at the time. He especially complained about the poor quality of the nightlife, parties, and brothels when compared to the past. Gone were the wild parties of the previous decades, when gentlemen spent thousands on gambling and when French cocottes—a specialized contingent of immigrants—would sit side by side with the good old Portuguese strumpets. Everything had become cheap and low class (Swalbach 1912).

In his lament, the author provides us with an insightful guide to the geography of early twentieth-century underground Lisbon. Underneath a grey, homogenous society, there was a pulsing life of brothels, from the few remaining temples of high life to a myriad of cheap and lowly hostels. In his words, Alfama and Mouraria were the cheapest sites, with "six-cent" joints, while Bairro Alto ranked slightly above them and Baixa kept a few glamorous houses. Other contemporary authors, inspired by social hygiene principles and naturalist literature, depicted those neighborhoods as swamps of degradation and degeneration (Malheiro Dias 1900, Botelho 1927).

Precisely where some saw swamps of low life and degenerating miasmas of vice, others saw a place for business opportunities. This was the case with the odd couple of newcomers Esteban Sandoval, from Cuba, and Ramiro Espinheira, from Galicia. Together they sought to depict in festive colors the gloomy downtown neighborhoods so loathed by the naturalist writers. Who were these characters, and what was their business?

Esteban Rodriguez Sandoval was one of a kind. We do not know much about him—what he looked like, when and where exactly he was born, when and why he moved from his native Cuba, how long he wandered in Europe, which countries he visited, or whether he ever returned to Cuba. We just know that in the 1930s he lived in Portugal, where he used some of his creative entrepreneurial skills. He resided for some time in the Hotel Franco, at 222 Rua dos Douradores, in downtown Lisbon. In 1934, he moved to Porto, about 300 km north and connected to Lisbon by railway and roads. While in Porto, he kept an address at 12 Rua da Fábrica. Later that year, Esteban became unreachable. He may have changed his name. He may have made himself invisible to the authorities by hiding away in a small village. He may have paid bribes to become incognito. He may have moved to Spain or even further away. One way or another, the Portuguese police could not find him when he was indicted as the author of a misdemeanor that led to the jailing of his business partner, Ramiro Espinheira.[6]

We know a little more about Ramiro Espinheira. He was born in Covelo, in the district of Pontevedra, Galicia, c. 1910, of a single mother named Carmen. At some point he moved to Lisbon. At the age of 23 or 24 he waited tables at the Hotel Franco, where Esteban was lodged. Ramiro better fits the traditional category of an immigrant in the city, as part of the large community of Galicians who at the time owned, managed, cooked, or served in downtown Lisbon restaurants and hotels.

Ramiro and Esteban met at the Hotel Franco—Esteban was a guest, Ramiro a waiter, partners-to-be in a business venture that required some imagination, a little work, and, if things went well, would bring them a reasonable amount of money. But things did not go so well. At some point, the business was interrupted by the police. Esteban disappeared for good, and Ramiro was caught and brought to jail, fined, and had his skull and features measured with the anthropometric compasses and rulers that at the time were used in criminal investigations.[7] We owe to the intervention of the police the opportunity to know their story, albeit blurred and with gaps.

What was their business venture, after all, exciting enough to engage them, illegal enough to alert the police? Basically, the venture consisted in compiling, producing, and distributing a guide to the nightlife of Lisbon. It was an entertainment guide, a precursor to the leisure guides that exist in print and digital form today. The combination of the two partners' skills was optimal: Esteban knew about making and selling guides; Ramiro knew the streets of Lisbon. They aimed to make an unbeatable guide to Lisbon's nightlife, a must-have for all those seeking lust and love. They went around town taking notes on prices and addresses, and produced the attractive *Guia Noturna de Lisboa—Amor Livre* (Night guide to Lisbon—free love).

The *Guia Noturna de Lisboa—Amor Livre* was an interesting, imaginative, and originally designed guide for commercial sex establishments in Lisbon. Printed in bright pink paper and folded for the convenience of the user, it provided addresses and prices for a variety of houses, with a few advertisements for antivenereal products or special services. The guide advertised itself as something that all men should carry with them to avoid illegal street prostitution. With the guide in hand, clients of commercial sex could choose from a large panoply. On the high end there were the luxury services of special ladies who would meet clients at a place of their convenience, or the also highly priced Jardim do Regedor 51—second floor, behind the National Theatre, for 100 escudos. There were the more moderate prices practiced on the Rua dos Correeiros (Baixa), which, depending on the house, began at 17.50 escudos, 15 escudos, 12.50 escudos, or merely 10 escudos. On the bottom end, the places in Mouraria: Rua do Benformoso, Escadinhas das Olarias, Travessa do Forno, Rua Silva e Albuquerque, Rua da Mouraria, Beco do Rosendo, had fares that were either similar to Baixa or even lower, like in Rua dos Vinagres, where the rate was down to 5 escudos.

The information was compiled by the duo, with Ramiro leading the way and Esteban asking prices and taking notes. When the list was compiled, in 1933, Ramiro acted as editor and had 3,000 copies printed on Rua da Horta Seca. Of that total, 2,300 issues were sold, mostly by Esteban. Ramiro claimed to have sold only 200, at one escudo a piece. Esteban had moved to

(a)



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

Figures 1.3 (a and b) The night guide to Lisbon, apprehended by the police. *Museu da Polícia Judiciária,* Loures; Gabinete de Estudos Olisiponenses, Lisbon.

Photos: Cristiana Bastos

Porto in February 1934 and left Ramiro with 600 copies of the *Guia*, which were kept in the closet next to his room. On March 20, Esteban wrote to Ramiro asking him to mail 100 issues of the *Guia* in two different packages and on different days. Men taking the train to Lisbon were the target customers.

All seemed well in Esteban and Ramiro's business. Yet there were flaws (perhaps typos?) that became fatal. The first of them was in the title: the correct spelling of the adjective would have been "noturno" or "nocturne," not "noturna," which is the Spanish spelling. But that was a minor detail. There were other, more relevant typos—or results of careless compilation—that affected the actions, interpretations, intentions, and exchanges between people. Some of the addresses listed in the guide had nothing to do with the sex business, leading to wrongful soliciting, angering the residents, and bringing them to call the police. This was the case of 58-year-old widow



Porto 20 Março 1934

Exe Sr.

Ramiro Espinheira

Lisboa

Apresiado amigo

Tenga la vondad de mandarme unas cien 100 Guias Noturnas, en dos paquetes, en tistintos dias, Como impresos, por Correo, lo más pronto que pueda.

Muchos contos y Salud le deseo su amigo que lo Saluda. S.S.

Esteban Rodriguez Sandoval

Travessa da Fabrica 72

Figure 1.4 Letter from Esteban to Ramiro asking him to ship 100 *Guias* to Porto in two different parcels. *Museu da Polícia Judiciária*, Loures.

Photo: Cristiana Bastos

Amelia dos Santos Repos, resident of the first floor at 115 Rua da Atalaia, in Bairro Alto, which was listed in the *Guia Noturna*. She came to the police on July 23, 1934, complaining that several men had rung at her door thinking it was a "casa suspeita." One of them handed her an issue of the guide, which is found in the police file.

On August 3, 1934, the police entered the Hotel Franco and confiscated the remaining 690 issues of Guia. The reason was that it indicated not only the houses of prostitution but also "some honest houses, strange to that industry, with severe defamation to its residents." Ramiro was arrested for publishing and selling leaflets "of an obscene nature, which contained the indication of some houses of prostitution, but also advertising as houses of prostitution some residences of honest families."

Ramiro told the police he had no recollection of registering the number 115 at the Rua da Atalaia—it had been Esteban who took notes. And it was not only Amelia Repas and her residence that were wrongly advertised but also Rua da Barroca 114–1st; Rua dos Douradores 117–3rd; Rua do Ferragial 13–1st; Avenida Almirante Reis 206-A; Beco dos Alamos 37–1st and 72 1st; Rua do Bemformoso 50–1st; Travessa da Agua Flor 7–1st; Rua Alves Correia 15–2nd; Rua de São Paulo 42–2nd;; and Rua Luciano Cordeiro 31–1st and 2nd.

Ramiro was fined 100 escudos, which he could trade for imprisonment, plus 3 escudos for the anthropometric measurements required by the police. The issues of the Guia were destroyed on August 30, except for a few that were archived by the police, leaving us a clue to Lisbon's nightlife and the initiative of some creative minds.

The Twentieth Century: Modest Routines and Cosmopolitan Interludes

The combination of a steady flow of incoming Galicians, plus some remaining "French" cocottes (who in reality were more likely to be from Spain, yet used the more glamorous French identity), as well as the occasional Cuban, did not seriously affect Lisbon's demographic growth. It was above all the influx of internal migrants, mostly from the north, but also from the south, that triggered the city's rise throughout the twentieth century. In the meantime, the city expanded to its northern plateau (Brito 1974, Salgueiro 2001). Downtown Lisbon lost residents to the newly built uptown neighborhoods, sometimes designed as urban utopias—Avenidas Novas, Alvalade, Encarnação, Ajuda, Caselas, Madre de Deus, Olivais, and so forth. The inner city decayed and was left to the older and poorer inhabitants, and the domestic migrants who continued to arrive to the capital, expanding its suburbs and keeping alive the old neighborhoods of Alfama, Mouraria, Bica, Bairro Alto, Alcântara, Madragoa, and so forth (Costa e Guerreiro 1984, Cordeiro 1997).

No longer a playground for lavish aristocrats and passersby, downtown neighborhoods entered an era of low profile. Fun and vice, which had made those areas the target of social hygienists (Botelho 1898, Dias 1900), went underground. The sanitary police regulated prostitution with weekly medical checkups. Some of the brothel streets were torn up in a general attempt to sanitize the lower part of the city (Menezes 2009, 2012, Bastos and Carvalho 2011). On the surface, all was supposed to be quiet, serene, and unchallenging in the capital, under Salazar's rule, to develop a fantasy of a nation inhabited by a people of modest virtues and past glories.

But the world turns around, and the modest living of Lisbon under Salazar was occasionally interrupted by cosmopolitan interludes. One of those moments corresponded to the rise of Nazism in central Europe and the war that followed (1939–1945), in which Portugal remained a neutral outsider. Lisbon and its surrounding areas, including the coast of Estoril, buzzed with the cosmopolitan presence of the thousands of exiles who made a temporary home there on their way to America (Ramalho 2012). People of many backgrounds and conditions lived in all sorts of accommodations. Some of them were wealthier than others, and some had sophisticated habits that clashed with local customs. Reportedly, the outdoor cafés that are now so much part of Lisbon's life were created to accommodate the refugee women who wanted to drink or smoke and were not supposed to enter the male-only sanctuaries that cafés and bars were at the time (Dias 2005).

Then once again in the mid-1970s, for even a shorter period, Lisbon became a meeting point for revolutionaries from around the world who came to see and report on a real revolution. The long-lasting dictatorship of Salazar-Caetano had been peacefully overthrown, and the society exploded in happiness, booming with energy for transformation (Tréfaut 1999).

Also at that time, following the independence of African countries, many of the residents of the former colonies moved to Portugal as returnee migrants (Lubkemann 2002, Cardoso 2011). They added diversity to the social landscape. Some engaged in entrepreneurial ventures, while others entered the labor market or joined a special contingent of public service. Still in the 1970s and 1980s, many people born in Africa also came to Portugal, whether as Portuguese nationals, as African migrants with passports from Angola, Cape Verde, or other countries, as refugees, or as undocumented migrants. Not everyone had the social, cultural, and material capital or resources needed to join in the entrepreneurial wave of the returnees. Many of those who came from Africa settled in shantytowns on the outskirts of Lisbon (Fikes 2009, Sampaio 2014).

In the 1990s, with the economic growth that followed Portugal's integration into the European Union (EU), opportunities for work and business attracted new waves of immigrants into the country, particularly to Lisbon. The flows of new migrants were no longer structured by former colonial relationships—except the one old colonial relationship between Brazil and Portugal. New groups came from Eastern Europe, Bangladesh, China, West Africa, and South America (Bastos e Bastos 1999, Bastos 2001, 2004, Machado 2002, Malheiros e Mendes 2007, Sarro and Santos 2011, Mapril 2012, Rodrigues 2013)

Millennial Shifts: Economic Glamor, Labor, and the Business of Leisure

Lisbon entered the new millennium in what seemed to be a state of cosmopolitan diversity. Its vibrant economy attracted new migrants from many different backgrounds. For some time, it seemed that a multicultural moment had finally arrived for good—as the film *Lisboetas* documents so well (Tréfaut 2004).

The many faces of racism influenced complex local geographies of permanence, belonging, and transience. African migrants tended to concentrate in neighborhoods on the outskirts, next to other communities of Africans and African descendants that had formed since the 1970s (Sampaio 2014). Newcomers from Asia and South America, however, settled more easily into some of the historical and decaying inner city neighborhoods like Mouraria and Alfama. The Martim Moniz Plaza, which had remained empty for decades since the destruction of some of the lower Mouraria streets, was refashioned and became a meeting point for migrants (Bastos 2004, Meneses 2009, 2012). The multicultural flavor of the place was later capitalized by the city to create new dynamics of urban business: ethnic foods, music festivals, initiatives for social and cultural inclusion.

Yet, a few years into the new decade, the millennial vitality was mostly gone. Gone were also many of the recent immigrants. Jobs and business opportunities had drastically declined as a consequence of the major crisis experienced in European peripheries. By the 2010s, few new immigrants

Figure 1.5 Chinese festival at Martim Moniz Plaza, January 2014.
Photo: Cristiana Bastos.

were coming to the country. The Portuguese were leaving too, restoring the trend of out-migration of the 1960s and early 1970s. The economic boom of the 1990s–2000s stopped almost abruptly.

While we wait for a credible explanation for the collapse of the markets, the bank rescues, the cash-flow shortages in national economies, and the consequences that followed, we know for a fact that the more fragile economies in the EU were suddenly caught with a change in the paradigm of governance, and what had been idealized credit routines became a debt nightmare managed with externally imposed austerity. Businesses collapsed throughout the country, particularly in Lisbon. Income levels declined to what they had been in the 1970s. Many immigrants returned to their home countries or moved elsewhere, and many Portuguese emigrated in search of better lives in the fast-growing economies of Brazil and Angola, in the Arabic Emirates, or in other places that would take their work, talents, or initiatives.

But many of the recent migrants remained in Lisbon, trying to adjust and adapt to a shrinking economy that still had some business opportunities. Small shops run by Chinese and Bangladeshi families further adjusted their offers to the needs of city life: low-cost clothing and accessories, clothing repair, ethnic groceries, halal butchers, cellphone repair, long-distance phone and Internet booths, souvenir kiosks that cater to new demands, and above all after-hour convenience stores—selling everything from liquor to cat litter—which for years had been lacking in the city.

As much as the future seemed grim and unappealing in the 2010s, Lisbon was about to experience yet another turn of events. For reasons that history will one day elucidate, all of a sudden the beauty of the city, its light, its manner, its music, food, lifestyle, and so forth, long known to its residents and visitors, made it to the top of international tourist literature. Lisbon became the cool destination of choice for all tastes. Suddenly, the city became a hub of international tourism that opened a wide range of business opportunities. One trophy or award for the city led to another, and it was shortlisted in the top ten cities for this and for that and nominated the best destination for this and for that. The popularity of the city attracted massive waves of tourists from all economic, social, and cultural backgrounds. Gigantic cruise liners brought thousands of people into town, and low-cost vacation operators brought thousands more, as did regular airlines, railways, and highways. By sea, air, and land, tourists arrived en masse and changed the face of many of the city's neighborhoods.

Figure 1.6 New business in old Lisbon: Asian taylor Photo: Cristiana Bastos, October 2014.

Figure 1.7 New business in old Lisbon: Asian barbershop.
Photo: Cristiana Bastos, February 2015.

New businesses began providing lodging, meals, or entertainment for visitors. In this way, many Lisboners, old stock or recently arrived, adhered to Airbnb and other home-tourism platforms, while cultural tours, literary tours, culinary tours, and all possible circuits of exploring the city were created. "Tuk-tuks," a type of motorized rickshaw so popular in Asia, and never seen before in Lisbon, became a way of exploring the roughly paved, traffic-free historical neighborhoods.

Along with that movement, some of the nightlife spots exploded with tourism related business—to the point of making the residents angry with the noise of hordes of youngsters and oldsters at their doors and windows, paving the way for the abandonment of the old town and potentially leaving it to the floating businesses of leisure and entertainment.[8]

Figure 1.8 Tuk-tuks waiting for clients in Praça da Figueira, Lisbon, March 2015. *Photo*: Cristiana Bastos

Concluding Note

Lisbon's long history accounts for its multiple layers of cultures, experiences, and lifestyles. While the city has absorbed the incoming diversity in one way or another, often by homogenizing it into a mainstream culture, the spaces for innovation have often been created by the hands of newcomers, who combine imagination, initiative, and the need to make a living—be it in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the cosmopolitan interludes of the twentieth century, or in the twenty-first-century wave of global tourism. If most narratives about cities and their immigrants are focused on the reasons for the expansion of ghettos, vulnerabilities, and exclusion, some dissonant notes of creativity, success, and influence in the dynamics of the city should also be accounted for—as illustrated in this chapter.

Notes

1. Still visible in our days, the street festivals of Saint Anthony (June 12–13), sponsored by the Church and the city, are blatant celebrations of love, eroticism, match making, eating, drinking, community ties, neighborhood competitions, etc.

2. Isabel Castro Henriques (2011) suggests that there was an important Mocambo in Lisbon that is yet to be fully documented.
3. The *Flora* compiled by Link was produced as both an accurate object of science and a lavish artwork by Link's patron, Count von Hoffmansegg (see Bastos 1985). The two-volume edition is worth an extravagant value of over USD$ 50,000 at international auctions (e.g., http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/LotDetailsPrintable.aspx?intObjectID=228301 [Accessed October 30, 2014].
4. The agreement doubly benefited England. Portugal became a buyer of English textiles, rather than producing its own textiles. The port wine, which is a local product, was indeed exported to England, but the business was almost entirely managed by British merchants.
5. For a biographical note, see http://www.juventudedagaliza.com/informacion-galega/manuel-cordo-boullosa.html (accessed October 30, 2014).
6. All the data regarding this episode comes from the Archives of *Policia Judiciária*, II Secção, 10.05/03 cx 106, 1934.
7. At the time, the police routinely measured suspects and recorded their anthropometric features, which they considered relevant to the understanding of crime. Criminology had developed under the influence of Cesare Lombroso's theories about the correlation between physical types and propensity for crime (Lombroso 1911).
8. The distaste of downtown residents for the excess of tourism appears now and then in the media (e.g., "Tourist avalanche is destroying downtown's quality of life, say its residents", in *O Corvo,* March 16, 2015 http://ocorvo.pt/2015/03/16/avalanche-turistica-esta-a-destruir-qualidade-de-vida-na-baixa-dizem-residentes/, accessed October 30, 2014)

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CHAPTER 2

Brazilian Taste: Reflections on Brazilian Restaurants in Greater Boston

Viviane Kraieski de Assunção

Introduction

"Nowadays you find here everything from Brazil," Brazilian immigrants often told me when I asked them if they had difficulties finding and buying food in their daily routines in Greater Boston. They explained to me how they continued to eat "Brazilian food" after migration. By performing an ethnography of Brazilians' food practices in Greater Boston, I found numerous Brazilian businesses in the region, where products from Brazil can be found—especially food. Usually accompanied by the subjects of my research, I went to several Brazilian restaurants in the region. These establishments, as I show in this chapter (re)produce notions of Brazilianness, using ethnicity as a way to insert themselves into an ethnic market niche.

It is estimated that there are over a thousand businesses in Massachusetts whose owners are Brazilians, including small markets, butcher shops, bakeries, travel agencies, clothing stores, restaurants, and other establishments (Costa, 2007). Mendonça (2007) affirms that there are about 300 small Brazilian stores in Massachusetts located in areas with the highest concentration of these immigrants. According to the Mendonça, there are also two supermarket chains that sell ethnic Brazilian products in Massachusetts.[1] In the same state, according to Vitorino, there are over 100 restaurants owned by Brazilians (Vitorino, 2007 apud Mendonça, 2007).

The large number of Brazilian commercial establishments makes the presence of Brazilians visible in Greater Boston, in a different context in time and space from that described by Margolis (1998). This anthropologist, who studied Brazilians in New York in the 1980s, described the community as "invisible," mainly because of the absence of associative institutions geared to the Brazilians and the lack of community spirit among these migrants.

In addition to the visibility of Brazilians in Greater Boston, the restaurants present an idea of Brazilianness (through food and its association with other elements) as a form of the economic integration and social ascension of their owners. Restaurants have been the focus of many socioanthropological studies about food, consumption, and migration. Linger (1997) says that restaurants are key places for producing and confirming identities as they contain important symbolic resources for identity building. Spaces of commensality tend to map people into groups—based on family, caste, gender, class, and community beliefs—which reinforce feelings of similarity and distinction (Linger, 1997: 183). Eating in a restaurant is also a practice that requires knowledge of a cultural script. Linger compares a restaurant in São Luís do Maranhão to Brazilian restaurants in Nagoya, Japan, and concludes that they each engender different forms of Brazilian identity. The restaurant in Brazil, in Linger's words, cultivates a Brazilian identity. According to Linger, there are restaurants in Brazil, but not Brazilian restaurants, because the Brazilian restaurant in Nagoya is a response to migrants' life in Japan. This space is marked by ethnic pride, shown in the colors of the restaurant decorations and a longing for the country of origin (1997: 202).

I want to emphasize here a different theoretical approach. I agree with Linger that there are only Brazilian restaurants abroad, and not in Brazil. But I understand that this occurs because Brazilian restaurants outside Brazil are the result of a process of ethnicization. In this process, some elements are highlighted and used strategically as ethnic markers (Seyferth, 2005) to establish differences with other (non-Brazilian) restaurants. Thus, some foods become ethnic, symbols of Brazil or Brazilianness. The Brazilian population in Boston is very heterogeneous—from different backgrounds, social classes and geographic origin. My question regarding restaurants is how the term "Brazilian food" includes (or not) this heterogeneity. In other words, to what foods—and to which Brazilians—do the terms "Brazilian restaurant" and "Brazilian food" refer?

By using elements associated with food, the restaurants seek to build a distinctive identity and constitute notions of "Brazilian food." In this chapter, I highlight some of these elements, such as the association with rural life, home cooking, and healthy food. I also show that the owners of these restaurants establish distinctions between Brazilian and American customers, and I present some general characteristics of these Brazilian owners of commercial establishments in Greater Boston.

Brazilian Ethnic Markets: Some Common Features

The supply of Brazilian products in Greater Boston has accompanied the growing flow of Brazilians to the region. This confirms Claude Fischler's (1995) affirmation that the number of manufactured and food products grows or declines according to the classes that consume them. In my fieldwork, I found Brazilians who have been living in Boston since the 1960s and '70s, when the number of Brazilians was quite small. One of my interlocutors said to me that when he came to Boston in the 1970s, he experienced what it was to "be a Brazilian without a Brazilian community." Anthropological and sociological studies show that the flow of Brazilian immigration changed and increased considerably in the following decades. Early research on this migratory flow describes migrants as young middle-class individuals who migrated to the United States to work illegally in the secondary market. These migrants planned a temporary migration, and said that they migrated to escape Brazil's economic and political crisis—which has led some authors to describe them as exiled from the crisis of the 80's. Research has shown that they were also frustrated with life in Brazil, which would explain the construction of the myth that migration to the United States would offer a path for social ascension (Assis and Sassaki 2001).

Through the reports of my interlocutors, I found that the first Brazilian restaurants in Boston in the 1980s were opened by middle-class Brazilians, some of them in association with US partners. Since then, most Brazilian restaurants, bakeries, and markets have also been opened by middle-class Brazilians.

According to the research conducted by Martes (2001a, 2001b), most of the capital used by Brazilians to open their businesses was obtained in the United States. Of the 50 owners interviewed by Martes, 88 percent said that they managed to save money working in occupations similar to other immigrants, as pizza deliverers, house cleaners, and dish washers. Kinship relations, as shown by Martes and Rodriguez (2004), are important in the composition of the workforce. Most of these companies (56%) had at least one family member of the owner as an employee, and 13 of the 20 firms surveyed had the owner's spouse as a partner. Only five of these companies did not employ Brazilian workers. The reason was that at these companies Brazilians were not seen as target clients (Martes and Rodriguez 2004). I understand, inspired by Aldrich and Zimmer's work, that some of these features are not characteristics particular to ethnic entrepreneurship, since they are common to all small businesses. In this sense, social networks, composed of friends and family members, for example, are important to many businesses, not only those owned by migrants.

Martes and Rodriguez emphasized that the Brazilian businesses they studied in Greater Boston have characteristics also found in other groups of migrant-run businesses, such as those identified by Halter (1995) and Levitt (1995). According to Halter and Levitt, these common characteristics are due to the scarce capital of these migrant groups and their undefined legal status. These businesses require limited levels of training, experience, and expertise. However, I must point out that some restaurant owners I interviewed have had previous work experience in restaurants—before becoming owners, they had been cooks, waiters and dishwashers. This prior experience provided them information about the operation of the restaurants and its work routines, which may be regarded as capital. Thus, we can question the classification of these immigrants as low skilled or nonqualified, which are generally qualities associated with undocumented and low-income immigrants.

The emergence of an ethnic economic niche, as explained by French sociologist Michel Peraldi, must be understood in the context of changes in the economy and labor markets in the late twentieth century. These changes include the transfer of a Fordist labor force to the tertiary sector and greater labor flexibility and insecurity, which promotes the occasional use of labor. As Peraldi highlights, the establishment of ethnic businesses cannot be explained only by a "logic of survival," in which the opening of an ethnic business is the only income option for immigrants. This perspective was supported by the discourses of Brazilian entrepreneurs with whom I spoke, who move not only in economic sectors aimed at migrant communities but in the entire urban economy, which thus displays local-global interfaces (Peraldi 2007, 1999).[2]

Moreover, sociologist Marilyn Halter (2000) points out that the broad emergence of ethnic markets was part of paradigm shift that influenced both academic research and political, economic, and social realms. While until the 1970s, the United States was commonly presented as a melting pot, after this period the concept of homogeneity was replaced by a perception of a "mosaic" or "cultural salad," in which an emphasis was placed on the maintenance of specific cultures, and this permeated mass consumption (Halter 2000: 47). Thus, since the 1970s, with the revival of ethnic identities and diversification of migration to the United States, there has been an increased interest in ethnic cuisines, and the number of restaurants and ethnic markets multiplied, a trend that persisted through the 1990s (Halter 2000: 107).

In a review of the literature about the ethnic economy, Truzzi and Sacomano Neto show that there is no universal rule that governs the formation of migrants' ethnic markets. The process depends on the different levels of pay between self-employment and the opportunities offered by the labor market. Among the possibilities mentioned by these sociologists, I would argue that among the interlocutors of my research, working in a Brazilian restaurant means receiving earnings below those paid by other US businesses. This is not only because of the low wages offered by employers but also due to the less generous tips offered by the restaurants Brazilian customers.

Mário Serra Truzzi and Sacomano Neto also affirm that "unlike the most common notion proclaimed by assimilation theory, this [assimilation] does not necessarily increase mobility. Ethnic self-employment often makes non-assimilation more profitable than assimilation" (Mário Serra Truzzi and Sacomano Neto 2007: 42). I do not want to repeat here the debates about the concept of "assimilation," which has been sufficiently problematized in the literature on migration. But I think it is useful to consider Mário Serra Truzzi and Sacomano Neto's statement when analyzing the situation of Brazilian restaurant owners in Greater Boston. Cultural differences are essential to their insertion in the ethnic economic niche, but in dialogue with the local sociocultural context. These negotiations make it possible to attract both Brazilian and American customers, with some variations according to the specific strategies of restaurants in defining their preferred target audience.

In this regard, I recall an article by Georg Simmel that presents the figure of the foreigner associated with the merchant.[3] It is interesting to extend the notion of the foreign merchant presented by Simmel to the merchants of the ethnic markets, who are intermediaries between the group and access to products from other places

> Throughout economic history, the foreigner regularly appears as a merchant, or any merchant as a foreigner. If an economy is essentially self-sufficient, or its products are exchanged within a spatially limited group, then there is no need for intermediaries: a merchant is only required for products from outside the group. To the extent that members do not leave their circle to buy these goods—and in this case, these members are the "foreign" merchants in that foreign territory—the merchant must be a foreigner, since no one else has a chance to experience this. (Simmel 1983: 183–184)

According to Simmel, the foreigner is not a land owner—in either the literal or the figurative meaning. His restriction to intermediary commerce provides them the specific character of mobility, which enables them to position themselves and make a movement between closeness and distance. I believe that the shifts between these two poles can be thought of in relation to groups of Brazilians, as well as to other migrant groups and the US population.

> If mobility takes place in a closed group, it personifies that synthesis of proximity and distance, which constitutes the formal position of the stranger, because the fundamentally mobile person occasionally comes in contact with all members of the group, but is not organically connected with any of them by established ties of kinship, locality and occupation. (Simmel 1983: 184)

Foreigners maintain their position as outsiders even when inserted into a context because of characteristics that distance them from the other members of this space. This mobility between distance and proximity produces differences that can be used as insertion strategies—such as the establishment of ethnic markets—or as forms of exclusion and/or restriction of the spaces in which these immigrants can be inserted.

Restaurants for Brazilians and for Americans

By interviewing Brazilian immigrants, I realized that their dietary practices included having lunch and dinner, with variable frequency, in the Brazilian restaurants in Greater Boston. As I pointed out in the introduction, there are over 100 restaurants whose owners are Brazilians in Massachusetts. The relative ease that I found to conduct my fieldwork among immigrants was not the same upon meeting these restaurant owners, which limited my research in these establishments. I interviewed only three Brazilian restaurants owners—all of them through contacts mediated by people who are well known among the Brazilians (a pastor and the director of the Brazilian Immigrant Center). I also interviewed a Brazilian who conceived and executed the plans—from the physical space to the menu—for a Brazilian restaurant in Greater Boston. These interviews were especially significant because they have been made with the owners of the oldest Brazilian restaurants in the region that are still in operation, and helped me to think about the establishment of Brazilian ethnic restaurants. The fieldwork also included participant observation, often accompanied by the subjects of my research.

Even though a variety of dishes are offered in the Brazilian restaurants in Greater Boston, they do not represent the heterogeneity of regional Brazilian cuisines. Generally speaking, all Brazilian restaurants serve churrasco

(Brazilian-style barbeque) and oven-roasted meats (beef, pork, chicken, sausage), stewed meat, rice, beans, *feijoada*, raw salads and cooked vegetables. All of them even offer *feijão tropeiro* at the buffet, and virtually all have stroganoff and fish stew (*moqueca*) on the à la carte menu. It is interesting that there is a large variety of dishes from the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, such as chicken and okra, in addition to the *feijão tropeiro* reflecting the origins of the first Brazilian restaurant owners and the strong presence of Mineiros (as residents from the state are known) in the Boston region. Although *feijão tropeiro* is a regional specialty, it bears the national label, and now represents—especially for non-Brazilian customers, who cannot differentiate between Brazilian regional specificities—what Brazilian cuisine is. Sophisticated Brazilian restaurants menus also offer seafood options, such as shrimp and salmon.[4]

Besides their nutritional function, restaurants and bars are also privileged meeting points for immigrants where they can strengthen their social network. Machado reports that Brazilians in Porto, Portugal, interact through networks, marked by intense bonds of reciprocity, which can also be found among Brazilian immigrants in Greater Boston:

> Bars and restaurants . . . are, in a way, the nodes of social networks that spread not uniformly in Greater Porto and also cities in the north of Portugal. They connect in the same environment several networks of workers from various places, forming a map of the world of work of Brazilian immigrants in Porto. (Machado 2010: 187)

Although many Brazilians often go to restaurants in locations close to where they live or work, I noticed that others tend to "circulate" around Greater Boston, especially on weekends and days off, to get to know different places and restaurants recommended by friends, acquaintances, or relatives, either because of the food served or better prices. In this sense, the food itself is a reason to extend the geographical boundaries of known space, with the assurance that through eating, these Brazilians will find familiarity—similar to what Rial points out about tourists who look for fast food (Rial, 1992).

But in addition to Brazilians, the Brazilian restaurants in Boston also attract Americans and other foreign customers. Some of these establishments, as we shall see, have clientele formed mostly by non-Brazilians. These restaurants are generally higher priced than other Brazilian restaurants, and present strategies to attract US customers. Therefore, one can think that there are "Brazilian restaurants for Brazilians" and "Brazilian restaurants for Americans." This shows, as evidenced by Machado's criticism

(2010), that under the label of "ethnic entrepreneurship" or "ethnicity" are found quite distinct processes of construction of differences. According to Machado, "the differences are different and using the same label to categorize them can produce some confusion, misunderstandings and oversights" (2010: 3). Thus, the ethnic economy is "the economy of the different," and it should be understood considering the various processes of its formation.

Most Brazilian restaurants have a "buffet per kilo," in which customers help themselves to salads, meats, rice, beans and other dishes, and pay by the weight of what they consume, and a "buffet per person," translated into English as "all you can eat," in which customers pay a fixed price and can take as much as they want from the buffet. Many of these restaurants have *rodízio* with "Brazilian Barbecue" (in abbreviated form, Brazilian BBQ), in which meat on skewers is continually served by waiters. Some restaurants also have an à la carte menu, with dishes prepared to the customer's order. The à la carte dishes are more popular among US customers than among Brazilians, who tend to help themselves more often at the buffets and even ask for *rodízio*. When talking about the differences between his restaurant and the others, one Brazilian restaurant owner highlighted the fact that his restaurant serves only à la carte, and suggested that immigrants with lower purchasing power (the *peãozada*, a pejorative word used to refer to manual laborers) preferred buffets because they could eat a greater amount of food at a more affordable price.

> My restaurant is different from others because here there is no buffet, because I'm not a fan of buffet, I like fresh food freshly made. Here, when you go out for dinner or lunch, you go out to be served, not to lift and help yourself. Here we want to serve our customers and for them to eat a meal made to order.

The association between Brazilian restaurants and churrasco is quite obvious in Greater Boston. Many of the advertisements for these establishments on flyers and in local Brazilian newspapers have a picture of meat on a skewer. The name of the first restaurant to serve *rodízio* in the region is Midwest Grill, because, as the owner explained, he serves meat from the American Midwest. When the restaurant was opened, the majority of the customers were Brazilian, but now 80 percent of the clientele is American. The reason for its success among Americans, the owner claims, is that churrasco is quite familiar to Americans, who are frequent travelers: "Nowadays there are churrascarias all over the world, in Aruba, China." Therefore, my informant not only talks about the global spread of churrascarias but he also goes as far as to describe his US customers as cosmopolitan in the sense defined by Hannerz (1999), people with a greater openness to and knowledge about "other" culinary cultures than other customers.[5]

An analysis of the discourse of restaurant owners indicates that while Americans might be understood as cosmopolitans, Brazilian customers are thought of as transnational—concepts that indicate social, cultural, and class differences. Werbner states that both cosmopolitans and transnationals are cultural hybrids, but with some differences. The transnational, unlike the cosmopolitan, displays a hybridization that is unconscious, organic, and collectively negotiated in practice. Both think globally, but the loyalties of transnationals are anchored in translocal social networks and cultural diasporas, rather than a global ecumenism. Most translocals have economic and social difficulties, and build collective resources of sociality and mutual aid to get by. They form bonds to deal with rejection and racism, but also to entertain and celebrate (Webner 1997: 12).

In addition to the presence of churrascarias in various countries, another factor encourages the inclusion of this type of Brazilian restaurant in the greater Boston region. In the United States, steakhouses and other restaurants specializing in the preparation of meat are popular. Indeed, many American families usually have a barbecue on the weekends. Despite their dialogue with local practices, Brazilians perceive differences between these Brazilian churrascarias and US steakhouses or barbeque restaurants, principally in the use of condiments and preparation methods.

The clientele of sophisticated Brazilian restaurants is mostly composed of Americans. In these restaurants, the waiters must speak English. The restaurant owners I have talked to justified the reasons for this in fairly similar ways. They defined Americans as people who do not cook at home and are more accustomed to eating out in restaurants. They said that these customers were more willing to try different foods, because they had a more open attitude to knowledge of other places, cultures, and flavors. In contrast, Brazilians cooked for themselves more often, eating dinner at home, trying to consume more "Brazilian food." Hence, they had a tendency to avoid experiencing new foods and cultures. In the comments of the owners of these à la carte Brazilian restaurants, both Americans and Brazilians were described in homogenizing terms, disregarding nuances related to gender, class, or any other category, as seen in the example below.

> Brazilians were not numerous when we started. On Saturdays and Sundays they usually come to eat feijoada, but ninety percent of the clients are Americans. Americans say that eight out of ten meals, they eat out, because here they are not used to cooking at home. [. . .] If I invited

> you and your boyfriend for dinner, I would find a restaurant for us to go, eat and socialize, because there are no maids at home. If I am going to have a dinner for you, your husband and your child, and I don't have a maid, I'll have to work and will not be able to give attention to you. (Abel)

Two restaurant owners told me that Brazilians consider their restaurants expensive, unlike the US customers. Their discourses demonstrate a morality related to food, which are similar to the discourses of other research subjects. Through this moral discourse, Brazilians are described as people who save money when buying food, and that they "just think of the money" leaving aside other key aspects, such as health and food quality. An example is this statement by a restaurant owner about Brazilians who consider the restaurant food expensive: "It's hard to explain.... Some people want to save, some people want to eat well.... They save money on food, but spend on drugs, alcohol.... It is tough, but I just have to thank God."

Not only the restaurant owners present these notions that "Brazilians save on food." Speaking with interlocutors who worked or had worked in restaurants as waiters, I was repeatedly told that they preferred to serve US clients because they give more generous tips. Tipping waiters is a common practice—and almost mandatory—in these establishments. At the time I conducted the research, the amount of tips had been reduced considerably due to the economic crisis.

Brazilians and Americans also go to the restaurants at different times. Brazilians are more present at lunchtime, while US customers are more numerous at night. One of my interviewees told me that at lunchtime (from 11 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.), 80 percent of the clients are Brazilians and 20 percent are "mixed" (Americans and individuals from other nationalities). At dinnertime (from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m.), the opposite is true: 20 percent are Brazilians and 80 percent Americans. This frequency also varies during the week. According to the owners, the number of Brazilians in restaurants is higher on Sundays at lunchtime, when having lunch with family members is an important ritual. This meal is characterized as a moment of socialization, when the individuals eat "more and better."

Besides the demand for ethnic cuisine, Americans also patronize these restaurants accompanied by Brazilian friends. In this sense, food is an important element of socialization in interethnic relationships. This is especially true for those Brazilians who have a greater insertion into local society, with good English fluency, who are embedded in social networks that include the American middle and upper class. Food leads to knowledge of the "other" and participates as a facilitator of relationships.

There are also Hispanic customers in the Brazilian restaurants. According to the owners that I interviewed, these clients usually go to the restaurant because they are "accustomed" to eating similar foods with ingredients like "rice and beans." Hispanics were also described by my interviewees as "carnivores"—for which reason they would appreciate the Brazilian restaurants, especially those that regularly serve churrasco.

Rural Brazil, Healthy, and Homemade Food

In some of these Brazilian restaurants, one way to attract the attention of US clients is to introduce items understood to be "typical" to Brazil.

> Flavor, price and good quality are the most important. And good service. Most Brazilian restaurants do not have good service. The client, especially in the American conception, goes out, wants to be happy. He is paying, sitting there, she wants to have fun. The client is the center of the restaurant. Then you have to show the restaurant, say why the food is like that, why the restaurant is decorated like that. (Neto)

These restaurants, like the fast food establishments analyzed by Rial (1992), provide customers with food and entertainment. This is the reason decorative images are so important. The taste is not the only sense to be explored. Sight is also wooed because there is a "taste for the image." These images transform these establishments into "spectacle restaurants" (Rial, 1992). Among the decorative objects cited by one of my interviewees were the wood stove and the clay pots, which typically refer to the lifestyle in Brazilian rural areas. This decoration that values aspects of a way of life "typical of the countryside" can be related to a broader movement of rural revival among urban populations. This growth, which includes rural traditions, landscapes, and foods, is considered "natural" and is associated with the consumption of homemade food, handicrafts, and traditional festivals that attract tourists and visitors. In this process, positive elements once stigmatized as "backward" or "outdated" are resignified and associated positively with health and quality of life.

This appreciation of rural qualities had already been perceived in France by Champagne in the 1970s (1977). The author termed the process "the fashion of what's old."[6] Menasche points out that this process occurs through the construction of an idealization of country life (Menasche 2009). In rural areas, city dwellers seem to be searching for foods associated with purity, nature, and authenticity, as opposed to industrialized products related to urban living (Menasche 2009).[7]

This process is not new, and some studies suggest it can be found in different contexts. However, it is important to draw attention to the fact that this appreciation of the rural world is associated with a representation of Brazilianness in some Brazilian restaurants in Greater Boston. Elements of a rural way of life—wood stoves and clay pots—are used as decorative pieces and labeled Brazilian in restaurants, some of which are quite sophisticated and too expensive for the majority of Brazilian immigrants living there. In one of the restaurants, for instance, a wood stove is covered in marble, effectively eliminating the original rustic quality, and is used for the salad buffet. It is also interesting to note that in other social contexts—as I noted in my master's research on a middle- and lower-class community in southern Brazil—the wood stove is not in the kitchen of the house, since its presence is contrary to values of speed and practicality exuded by a modern kitchen. Therefore, the wood stove is now housed in another space, such as a garage or storeroom.

Clay pots are also repeatedly used as an element that evokes Brazilianness. They are common, for example, in pictures of food on the websites of Brazilian restaurants in Greater Boston. I also met at least two Brazilians who worked for catering companies in the area that served food at parties in clay pots. Both had brought the utensils to Boston from Brazil to use them in their work. Neither the clay pots nor the woodstoves are used in food preparation. In other words, they do not have a utility value, but are important to objectify values and images, such as those evoked in a rural past, which are strategically used to represent Brazilianness and serve to distinguish this identity from other nationalities. It is also noteworthy that materiality is an integral part of the sensory experience. In a nutshell, the clay pots and wood stoves articulate various cultural ideals (Ger and Kravets 2009: 199), representing the "purity," "authenticity," and "tradition" of an idealized rural world.

It is also important to realize that this idealization of rurality still appears in dialogue with images and imaginaries of the "country" style disseminated by the American cinema for several decades, and is part of the mediascapes that circulate globally (Appadurai 1996). The Brazilian Country Buffet, which opened in Everett during the period of my fieldwork, was decorated with rustic wood, and all the waitresses were dressed in hats and clothing in the same style. The menu options were similar to those of other Brazilian restaurants: BBQ and a buffet with dishes just as readily available as in other establishments.

In the décor of most Brazilian restaurants, some recurring representations of Brazilianness predominate. In addition to the Brazilian flag and the colors green and yellow, images relating to such stereotypes as beaches and soccer are also used as compositional elements of the environment. On one of the walls of Café Brazil, the oldest Brazilian restaurant, is a painting of a beach in Rio. Through the names of the dishes on the menu, foods are associated with names of famous Brazilians and Brazilian characters, such as "salmon à la Sonia Braga" (referring to the famous Brazilian actress who lives in the United States and plays in American movies and television shows) and "tenderloin à la Ronaldinho" (referring to a successful former Brazilian soccer player, well known worldwide). "Chicken à la Dona Flor" is a reference to the main character in the novel written by Jorge Amado, a Brazilian writer whose works have been translated into various languages. Amado's work introduces images of a mestizo Brazil and is marked by sensual female characters and religious syncretism, especially between Christianity and religions of African origin, like *umbanda* and *candomblé*.

In the physical space of the restaurants, the Brazilianness is not confined to the decorative elements. The Brazilian restaurants usually have televisions that are always tuned to RedeGlobo, Brazil's leading television network. Some also have ambient music, usually of Brazilian singers and musical groups. Some of them have live music performed by Brazilian singers who live in the region, mainly in the evenings and on weekends. In Brazilian restaurants "for Americans," Brazilian music is, in most cases, MPB (Brazilian Popular Music, which can be defined as a combination of original and updated versions of traditional Brazilian music styles like samba, tinged with other influences like rock and jazz) and possibly samba. One of my interviewees told me that he selected songs to be played in the restaurant, including both Brazilian singers singing in English and American singers interpreting Brazilian songs (either translated into English or in Portuguese). He expected these songs to engender a sense of familiarity in the customers—through the language, in the case of songs in English—and also to arouse a curiosity and bewilderment induced by the accent of Brazilians singing in English or the repertoire of Brazilian songs interpreted by American singers well-known to their clientele.

These establishments also take advantage of US holidays to attract Americans and customers of other nationalities. In addition to Mother's Day and Valentine's Day,[8] for example, they offer promotions and different menus for Thanksgiving, celebrated on the fourth Thursday of November.[9] In these establishments, roasted turkey is served, though some with a "Brazilian touch." Some restaurant owners explained to me that they use garlic and more salt than most American restaurants.

In addition to Brazilian dishes, the Brazilian restaurants also offer options to attract American or Hispanic customers who do not want to eat ethnic food. In an attempt to broaden their circle of customers, restaurants seek to broaden the diversity of potential clients. This explains the presence of dishes like Chicken à la Parmigiana, spaghetti, and hamburgers, which are common in American restaurants, as well as tamales and tortillas, as found in Mexican restaurants.[10]

In this sense, an analogy can be made between the construction of restaurant menus and Brazilian bakeries that sell other ethnic foods, Bauman's (2011) conclusions about migration and the formation of identities in a globalized world. As Bauman explains, we move from a stage of nation building to that of multicultural belonging, which is characterized by a fluidity of identities and an interplay between continuity and discontinuity. In other words, the consolidation of ethnic establishments presents not only the (re) construction of elements of Brazilianness but it is also a negotiation and dialogue with other local ethnic identities. They also feature foods such as hamburgers and pizzas, whose current ethnic label has become hazy due to their global production and consumption.

Linked to the idea of "natural" and authentic food, some restaurant owners also present the notion of "healthy food," which is one of the concerns raised by my interlocutors in relation to their dietary practices. The quest for healthy eating, and the associations between diet, body, and health, as some studies indicate, are not exclusive to Brazilians in Greater Boston, or to specific social classes. In the case of restaurants, Brazilian food is associated with a healthy diet, compared to American feeding practices, which are described as "greasy." While the latter would be high in calories, the former would be quite varied, consisting of many vegetables. In the restaurant designed by Neto, this association is also made by offering seafood on the menu, such as fish and shrimp. Neto also contrasts the healthy food of his restaurant to the food served by other Brazilian restaurants, which would be prepared with too much salt, considered highly unhealthy for those who consume it in excess.

Claude Fischler (1994) analyzes that the discourse of common sense relates dietary practices to efforts to maintain and promote corporal health. In this sense, eating is guided by rules that restrict both what and how much to eat by the food restrictions. These rules emphasize the importance of eating a variety of foods and fresh food in moderation and maintaining habits linked to tradition (Fischler 2002). It is clear, therefore, that there is a food morality associated with a perspective of medicalization of food, using terms such as nutritional values and that associates the ingestion of certain foods with the occurrence of certain diseases such as cancer and heart problems.

In addition to healthy and authentic food, the food served by Brazilian restaurants was repeatedly described by my interlocutors as "homemade," which also refers to representations of food practices that the immigrants had before migrating, which they missed. The food is also described by restaurant owners as "mother's food." In a previous study, I showed how housewives, responsible for the preparation of family meals, considered themselves experts on what their children and husbands like to eat. This expertise gives them relative power in the family dynamics (Assunção 2007). I suggest that when restaurant owners refer to mother's food, they are referring to the warmth of the family and domestic environment. In this sense, they relate the restaurant menu to these representations of the figure of the mother as a provider who understands the individual tastes of their children.

> Brazilian cuisine has to have rice and beans, especially in our time. . . . When we opened [the restaurant] here, we met Brazilians who missed rice and beans, more than anything. . . . Longing for their mother, and rice and beans. So we thought: let's create a dish with rice and beans, then they will remember their mother and grandmother. (Owner of Café Brazil).

In the discourse of this restaurant owner, it is clear that, more than food, he is selling the bonds with the families for immigrants who feel homesick, and that are evoked through food and its sensorial qualities.

Conclusions

In addition to the economic aspects of the ethnic markets, studies about these establishments allow us to reflect on the construction of ethnic identities and the strategies of insertion in a market niche. The restaurant owners interviewed had prior work experience in restaurants, which helps us think that they cannot be considered low-skilled or nonqualified immigrants. Their practical knowledge helped them open and maintain these facilities. Nor can we say that their ethnic businesses were alternatives for escaping poverty. The restaurant owners had gone through the difficulties faced by immigrants, and opened the restaurants as a way to increase their earnings and social status.

In order to establish an ethnic economy market niche, restaurants feature and construct notions of Brazil and Brazilianness. I highlighted that Brazilianness was linked, among other things, to aspects of rural life and home cooking, as opposed to fast food and notions of modernity. In this sense, these representations present a dialogue with the Brazilian immigrants' emotional needs as well as the worries and risks linked to the modern lifestyle.

If it is true that these establishments emerge and solidify ties through the group, it is also possible to say that they make visible distinctions between individuals from the same immigrant group. Furthermore, the restaurants "for Brazilians" and "Americans" demonstrate that both Brazilians and Americans are thought of in a homogeneous and stereotypical way. Considering the discourses of my interviewees, their clientele can be described respectively as transnational or cosmopolitan

The Brazilian restaurants in Greater Boston do not represent the heterogeneity of Brazilian immigrants there. Foods offered by these restaurants do not include a complete variety of Brazilians' regional eating practices. However, to maintain their businesses, they establish a negotiation and dialogue with the local society, including other ethnic groups, creating an interplay between different cultural aspects.

Notes

1. One of the supermarkets is owned by a Brazilian, and has four outlets in cities and towns where Brazilian immigrants are quite numerous (Framingham, Somerville, Hyannis, and Shrewsbury). The other one belongs to a Portuguese chain, and has 17 stores in four US states (New Jersey, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Florida). Four of these establishments are supermarkets in Massachusetts, in the cities of New Bedford, Fall River, Attleboro, and Swansea. These supermarkets were initially created in areas with high concentrations of Portuguese immigrants, and later expanded to other areas with immigrant populations. Although in some of these establishments the Brazilian clientele is not higher than 5%, in others it reaches 90%, which led to an increase in the supply of Brazilian products in these supermarkets (Cadima, 2006 apud Mendonça, 2007).
2. Michel Peraldi also states that ethnic businesses today appear more diverse than those described decades ago, and there are even migrants who organize the movement of goods between their countries of origin and destination, making their companies competitive internationally (Peraldi, 1999, 2007).
3. Waizbort (1995) analyzes that Simmel invokes the Jewish trader as the significant foreigner figure.
4. According to Martes, restaurants acquire imported Brazilian products, but also those from American suppliers. The author also reports that some foods are prepared with *Goya* brand products (specializing in Latin goods), which are also sold in supermarkets and, as I noted in my fieldwork, bought by many Brazilian immigrants (Martes, 2001a: 35).
5. Hannerz defines cosmopolitanism as an "*orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an experience of intellectual and aesthetic openness to divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity. (. . .) Cosmopolitans may be amateurs as well as experts, and are often both, at different times. (. . .) Cosmopolitanism most often has a narcissistic streak, the self is architected space where cultures reflect each other*" (1999: 254).

6. Champagne (1977) conducted a study in a rural community of France in the late 1970s. According to him, in the '50s the peasant way of life and related elements were considered archaic. But, in the 70s, there was a movement of recovery of these aspects of life in the countryside as opposed to industrialization and urbanization. Champagne noted that, in the '50s, farmers replaced the wooden furniture, which had belonged to family members, with Formica furniture, which was related to the values of modern life. Two decades later, there is a revaluation of family furniture, then positivized as rustic. This movement of appreciation before a stigmatized peasant way of life includes traditional agriculture and related aspects that belong to the past and to nature.
7. Wedig and Menasche (2010) indicate that the appreciation of aspects of rural life for city residents is accompanied by a positiveness and a reframing of this same way of life for rural residents. The formation of a market of products related to this rural way of life creates a demand for an idealized rural, according Menasche (2009), contributing to a reinvention of practices, identities, and traditions among farm residents. In the same perspective, Carneiro shows that rural workers also associate the idea of "purity" with the power they had in the past, and is considered healthier because it "has no chemicals." The author, agreeing with Brandão (1981), clarifies that the reference to "purity" is part of the definition of healthy food and serves to establish differences and evaluations about the way of life of the past and of "today" (Carneiro, 2006).
8. Valentine's Day is celebrated on February 14 in many countries. In Brazil, there is the Boyfriend/Girlfriend Day (*Dia dos Namorados*), celebrated on June 12. Brazilian immigrants in the United States usually celebrate both dates.
9. Thanksgiving is a holiday the origins of which are quite controversial. Historians believe it was started in the seventeenth century by colonial leaders to celebrate a good harvest. According to one of the myths of origin of the celebration, pilgrims in Plymouth Colony in New England, in the Northeastern United States, did not have enough food to eat, and were fed by the North American Indians (Native Americans), who taught them to fish and gave them seeds.
10. Through the language used in the menus of featured restaurants, bakeries, and other Brazilian businesses, it is clear that these establishments seek to attract, in addition to the Brazilian clientele, customers of other nationalities. On the menu of a bakery, for example, options for breakfast appear only in English, and the options are for an American breakfast with eggs, sausage, bacon, omelettes, and pancakes. Also in English appear the options soups and salads, burgers and sandwiches, subs, wraps, and pastas. In Portuguese, other snacks and plates commonly found in bakeries in Brazil are offered, such as *Pão Frances* (a roll) (with steak or chicken breast), *Pão Francês na Chapa* (grilled sandwich on a roll) (also with cheese, egg, salami, ham, ham and cheese, etc.), and *Prato do Dia* "dish of the day"—a choice of meat (chicken, beef, pork, fish, or shrimp) served with rice, beans, French fries, fried plantains, salad, or eggs.

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CHAPTER 3

Ethnic Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Place d'Italie, Paris

Carmen Rial and Miriam Grossi

Paris as a Global City

Paris is a global city (Sassen 1991), and has been since the nineteenth century. The 87 square kilometers that are often referred to as intramural Paris include increasingly fewer low-income residents due to the gentrification that expels to the periphery French natives and foreign immigrants who cannot pay the high rents in Europe's cultural capital,[1] a city with the elevated population density of more than twenty thousand inhabitants per square kilometer, comparable only to New York and some Asian cities.

Official demographic studies on the composition of Paris's population use the term "immigrant" to refer to residents of metropolitan France who were not born in Paris, who may or may not have French nationality.[2] On a national scale, according to the Institut national de la statistique et des études économique (INSEE),[3] those defined as immigrants compose 20 percent of the current French population, a percentage no higher than it was in 1930. In 2011, the Paris population was estimated at 2,249,975 (of whom 456,105 were immigrants), lower than the 2,900,000 of 1921, the year in which the city had its highest number of residents. Until today, its population density of 21,347[4] residents per square kilometer is only rivaled by that of the communes that surround the city, because all of the other French cities have a density of less than ten thousand residents per square kilometer.[5]

In the period between the wars, the large majority of immigrants in France came from central European countries, while in the postwar period there was strong immigration from southern Europe and North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morroco), flows encouraged by state polices that sought to stimulate industrial growth. In the twenty-first century, the most visible immigrants and those most discriminated against are those who emerge from contemporary postcolonial processes and mobility flows (Creswell 2009). This study focuses on these late immigrants whose identities are ethnicized by their African, Asian, or Latin American origins, while those who were "foreigners" in the 1930s have now become "Europeans" in the recent integration of southern and eastern European countries into the European community.[6] Thus, we acknowledge that state policies shape the flow and the identities of the migrants (Beyers, Venken, and Goddeeris 2009).

As Bernard Marchand showed, in 1886 Paris was the French city with the most residents from the interior: only 36 percent of Parisians had been born there at that time, while 56 percent were born elsewhere, in the Sena department[7] or the interior and 8 percent in other countries (1993: 134). By the end of the twentieth century, the number of Parisians born in Paris was even lower. In 1999, only 31 percent of the residents were born in the capital and 14.5 percent in the rest of the Ile-de-France, while 32 percent came from the interior and 23 percent were born in other countries (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2008: 29). As seen in these statistics, the immigration of foreigners nearly tripled in a century.

While today many immigrants have foreign origins, in the nineteenth century immigration to Paris was constituted by people from the French interior—*provinciaux*—who moved to the capital, especially from Limousin, Bretagne, and Auvergne. These immigrants are located in well-defined neighborhoods—*quartiers*—which take on airs of their regions of origin: the Bretons are found near the Gare de Montparnasse, and those from Auvergne near the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. Paris is thus ethnically divided, each quartier having a predominant population in terms of class, ethnic origin, and in some areas even religion.

Like the immigrants from the interior, foreigners also locate in specific places in the cartography of the city, which marks these places ethnically. The eastern portion of the 13th arrondissement would be Chinatown,[8] the quartier de la Goutte d'Or (the 18th is occupied by Africans, while the Sri Lankan Tamil community places its shops between the Gare du Nord and the La chapelle metro station in the 10th. The spaces of the foreign immigrants have come in succession: first Belgians and Poles, then Spanish, Portuguese, and Italians, and later workers from former French colonies in Africa and in Asia.

A visit to the Museum of Immigration, which was inaugurated in 2008, reveals the existence of nearly two hundred nationalities identified in the Paris census. They are diverse, and many: in 2010 nearly 306,000 foreigners resided in Paris, 9.4 percent of the total of 3,200,00 foreigners in France, while Parisians represent only 3.4 percent of the country's total population.

The foreigners who inhabit Paris do so, as we have seen, in specific locations. The arrondissements in which we found rates of foreigners higher than average are those in which the price of residence is cheaper (the 18th, 19th, and 20th), those of the center and east (the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, and 11th) and, surprisingly, in the places where real estate values are the highest in the city (the 8th and 16th) (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2008: 30) because the Spanish, Portuguese, and Moroccans who take care of the buildings and perform services in private apartments live there, as well as the upper-level employees of many of the embassies in the region, and an elite foreign population.

Whether or not they live "within the walls" of the city, the presence of these immigrants is essential to the city's workforce and the provision of services. They are behind the counters in stores and supermarkets, as workers or shopkeepers, cleaning the streets and the offices, caring for children and the elderly and thus guaranteeing the city's existence.

It is in the context of this current situation of immigration in Paris that we conducted this study. Unlike other studies about immigrants in France, which concentrate on an analysis of exploitation and inequality like those conducted by Colette Pétonnet (1979) or Pierre Bourdieu and his team (1993), this study focuses on another type of immigrant, those who left circumstances of exclusion created by the situation of immigration and became their own bosses, opening small businesses. Some (but not all) of these businesses "assume their distinctive meanings and qualities through the coding of people, practices and objects as specifically 'ethnic'"[9] (Everts 2010).

The Neighborhood

In Place d'Italie, not surprisingly, we are confronted with some ethnic presences and some absences—the presence of North Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and the lack of Jews (whose business have traditionally concentrated in Marais), Bretons, and so on.

According to INSEE data, in 2011 the population of the 13th was 183,260, including 38,671 foreigners, which is the same proportion of foreigners as Paris, or 21.1 percent of the neighborhood. Most of these foreigners are from

North African countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, which account for 9,113 immigrants, followed by Europeans with 8,828 inhabitants (mostly Portuguese, Italians and Spanish), 6,916 from other African countries and 14,417 from other countries.

The streets chosen in the study are administratively part of what is considered to be one of the more desirable neighborhoods within the 13th arrondissement, between the Place d'Italie and the Butte aux Cailles. The Place d'Italie has a large shopping mall and is a space of high urban circulation, because of the number of metros and buses that pass through it and the Butte aux Cailles,[10] known historically for its anarchist resistance during the Paris Commune of 1813. It is now a neighborhood with many restaurants and a dynamic Parisian night life, attracting a young and trendy public and inhabited by middle-class artists and intellectuals.

This area was transformed along with the general gentrification of the city, and like a few other regions, underwent even deeper changes. From a traditional bohemian neighborhood of the Left, with anarchist associations dating back to the past, a place of passage to Chinatown, which is also located in the 13th, closer to the Bd. Periferique, is where the owners of the shops, also maintained by immigrants, have a more homogeneous ethnic origin, nearly all being Asian, Vietnamese, Cambodian or Chinese.

With the transfer to the 13th of universities such as the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS),[11] and the completion of the François Mitterrand National Library, the entire region around the Boulevard Vincent Auriol became transformed, with the restoration of the former *Moulins*, the industrial flour mills, the construction of new buildings, and the installation of intellectual commerce of books and cinemas. Although located closer to Place d' Italie, and one block from the large library, rue Père Guérin has also seen its characteristics change profoundly. What is now a pleasant street with pretty storefronts, restaurants, small businesses, apartments with flowers on the balconies, stylish lighting, and a bicycle lane, ten years ago had an impoverished quality that reflected a certain abandonment by the government: there was garbage on the sidewalks, cars parked on both sides of the narrow streets, old buildings with small rooms (some with hallway bathrooms),[12] and hotels for workers that had been restored. Since many of these workers were immigrants, and men, the demographic composition was more male than it is today.

The residential spaces have also changed substantially. Where there had been a low-income pension and a Moroccan restaurant specializing in couscous and tagines, there is now a large lot waiting for the construction of a building with only five large apartments. Where there was a busy association for Portuguese workers,[13] and later for a short time an African restaurant, there is now a children's shoe store (Aimée la Fée). Where there was once a seamstress, there is now a busy beauty parlor, proof of the social dynamic of gentrification and mobility of the spaces of the city.

On weekends and evenings, the restaurants in Butte-au-Cailles attract a clientele of young professional Parisians with high purchasing power—the so-called *bobos*—and, more recently, tourists as well, giving the neighborhood a bohemian air. This activity has even become the source of strong conflict between traditional residents and restaurants over the noise, garbage, and other inconveniences created by the restaurants' clients.[14] Nevertheless, as the owners of the restaurants on the rue du Père Guerin told us, their preferred clients are not tourists but neighborhood office workers, especially from the building in the large shopping center Paris 2. This is reflected on the menus that offer a fixed-price meal with appetizer, main dish, and dessert at a cost that corresponds to the value of a restaurant voucher (currently, less than ten euros), which according to law, workers receive as part of the salary for employees at companies that do not have a cafeteria. These employees, who eat at lunchtime, also, according to the restaurant owners, frequent the restaurants at night, paying standard prices.

Daily and Domestic Practices

This study adopts a micro-focus in an attempt to understand migration processes based on the daily and domestic practices of the agents, whether individuals or family groups, living in France and who have a current or historically strong relation with a foreign country, their homeland. Presenting a variety of ties with their country of origin, not all of them could be classified as transnational immigrants (Bauböck and Faist 2010).

The study focused more precisely on a group of immigrants who act in the urban space selected, a group that is characterized by their being the owners of their businesses, or that is, as immigrant entrepreneurs. By looking at their biographies, we sought to analyze the motivations of their migratory movements, their projects for social mobility, and how their family situation influenced their business conditions, with the analytical focus being the central place that the constitution of a small business has on their lives.

The area chosen for the study covers the small and calm street of rue du Père Guérin and the initial portion of rue du Moulin des Près, where the two intersect. We chose to study 500 meters along the street, observing how the small immigrant companies appear to have a strong spatial and figurative presence in this city space, in particular through the visual impact of the signs of the seven "ethnic" restaurants located in this urban space (two Indian, one Mexican, one Chinese, one Italian, one Thai, and one Vietnamese), in addition to a South Korean food store and a Turkish snack shop that sells kebabs located near by. Within this short stretch we found two key-making shops (one owned by a Cambodian and another by an Algerian), two massage parlors (one Chinese and one Thai), a Brazilian-owned antique store, a dentist's office (Asian), a beauty salon owned by a Chilean man, one laundry, a Tunisian-owned grocery store, a Turkish tailor, and an Argelian-Kabylie bakery.

There are also shops in the area of the study owned by nonimmigrant French: on the rue Père Guerin there is a children's shoe store; an office of three midwives who attend pregnant women, with yoga; a store specializing in chocolate; and a laundry. On the rue du Moulin des Près, there is a liquor store, a franchise of the Nicolas chain, and a stationery shop-bookstore, an appliance repair shop, a large café, another shop that makes keys, a travel agency, a real estate broker, and a print cartridge recycler.

The study was conducted by three Brazilian female anthropologists, two of whom took photographs. Both the camera and our ethnic origin had an important role, helping to "open doors," a process which, in the case of the camera, has already been sufficiently analyzed.[15] It is worth briefly mentioning the ethnic factor as a "door opener."

Each of the researchers presented herself as "Brazilian," which assisted with the contacts, making the interlocutors more open to dialogue. Many of the interlocutors expressed a positive opinion about Brazil, which varied—and at times were even contradictory—but were always pleasant and revolved around the topos carnival, football and beaches, and images of a hospitable country. To mention a few: "Ah, I love Brazilian football. You have great players, there are lots of Brazilian players in Turkey," said the Turkish tailor, who also said he was a fan of Fenebahçe from his country of origin.[16]

"I know Brazil, I was in Campina Grande, Recife, Salvador . . . the beaches, the people, everything is wonderful," said the owner of the Mexican restaurant who had worked in hotels in Brazil.

"Brazil is a peaceful country, there are no wars there," said the Cambodian key maker who indicated that he was haunted by images of the genocide of his family by the Khmer Rouge. When we mentioned some bloody moments of Brazilian history, such as the Paraguayan War, he still maintained his vision of a cordial country: "maybe 100 years ago, but not now.

Figure 3.1 Turkish tailor. Photo: Andrea Eichenberg, August 2012.

You don't want war, like other places have." And he also mentioned carnival as a Brazilian trait that he admired.

But in addition to the common clichés about a peaceful, happy, and tropical country, we were surprised to see the importance the Lula government had for the expansion of positive representations of the country. "Lula did a good job. When the Americans told him to boycott Iran, he responded 'I have business there, I will continue.' He's a real man!" Emphasizing Brazil's good relations with Arab countries, the Algerian key maker also shared a positive image of Brazil, even if inversely, emphasizing Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva's firm position in relation to US policy toward Arab countries. The admiration for former president Lula, his independence in foreign policy, and especially his speaking skills did not extend to Dilma Rousseff, at least

Figure 3.2 Mexican restaurant owner. Photo: Andrea Eichenberg, August 2012.

not in the way that she appears publicly. "Dilma lacks *massou,*" he said, using an Arab term that means a lack of sauce or flavor.

Thus, even evoking different stereotype imaginaries and topos, the image of Brazil was always positive, which facilitated the initial contact, creating a sympathetic disposition and quickly establishing a complicity also because we shared a common status as foreigners.

Interlocutors

Migration studies have shown that it is not the poorest emigrants who depart on migratory adventures (Margolis 1994, Rial 2008). But the emphasis on economic issues as a motivation is maintained in the literature since the

Figure 3.3 Postcolonial immigrant: Algerian, owner of key-making shop. Photo: Andrea Eichenberg, August 2012.

famous statement of the economist J. K. Galbraith defining migration as “the oldest action against poverty” (Rajović 2013: 1), and in the accusatory and xenophobic narratives against immigrants that are common discourse in the media and from politicians in Europe. Nevertheless, among the entrepreneurs studied, none mentioned economic factors as the reason for their departure from their country of origin, emphasizing other issues to justify their migration plans. We identified three categories of immigrants, according to initial motivation: cultural immigrants, political immigrants, and postcolonial immigrants.

Below we present more details about the main characteristics of each one of these groups.

Cultural Immigrants

Cultural immigrants are those who went to Paris to study or expand their knowledge, through contact with a cosmopolitan (Hannerz 1990) global city that offers various more intellectual opportunities than they would find in their homelands.

These immigrants feel comfortable in other countries, as in France, without failing to identify with the identity of their nation of origin. Among the reasons for their immigration is a search for contact with greater "modernity" (that you could translate as individual self-freedom and higher cultural and material consumption). In general, they become involved, at the beginning of their stay in France, in work that requires less cultural capital to be sustained, considering that they give priority to study. Over time, the survival activity, which had been secondary, might become central. This usually takes place through the purchase of a small business. Also, over time, the distance from the country of origin grows, as they acquire a more individualistic ethos. And, for these reasons, the holism present in their societies of origin appears excessive, and they identify themselves more closely with a French ethos.

The literature concerning cosmopolitans has presented the typical cosmopolite as a person who is Western and white, with financial resources, who travels to exotic countries to satiate a cultural curiosity and experiment with new flavors and environments. The cultural immigrants can be considered as cosmopolites, capable of living in other countries and ascending there socially, but they have a different profile.

They are what Appiah[17] called cosmopolitan patriots, whose parents, usually from the middle classes in their nation of origin, open educational and cultural possibilities for the children, who become cosmopolitan without losing their national attachments, or, in Appiah's word, roots:

> The cosmopolitan patriot can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of one's own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different places that are home to other, different people. The cosmopolitan also imagines that in such a world not everyone will find it best to stay in their natal patria, so that the circulation of people among different localities will involve not only cultural tourism (which the cosmopolitan admits to enjoying) but migration, nomadism, diaspora. (1997: 618)

We can provide two examples. One is a young middle-class Korean artist who came to Paris to study sculpture and wound up buying a small store from another Korean where she makes and sells Korean food. She does not think of returning to South Korea, where her parents have a business.

The other example is a Brazilian woman, 55, who also lived for a number of years in the neighborhood, where she established a network of friends and clients for the services of her family business that conducts restoration, painting, and decoration in small apartments. She came to Paris in the early 1980s to continue her university studies in linguistics and French literature. Over time, and after marriage to a French man, she shifted her interest to a field with greater opportunity in the local labor market. Her case represents one of the cosmopolitan immigration models in the neighborhood, in which interethnic marriages between foreigners and the French guarantee residence in France.

Figure 3.4 Cultural immigrant: Korean artist, owner of food shop. Photo: Andrea Eichenberg, August 2012.

Political Refugees

These are emigrants who have the legal status of political refugees or who, even if they do not, came to France to escape terrifying situations in their countries of origin. This group maintains a more ambiguous and complex relationship with their country of origin, given that they are not (or were not) able to return to it because of their refugee status or the political conditions there. We noted in this group differences that arise when there are changes in the political regimes in their country of origin and the possibility of returning is viewed differently, depending on the amount of time they have lived in France, their age, and the age of their children, if they have any. In general, the existence of adult children who are married and of grandchildren impedes plans to return to their country, even if the immigrant had wanted to for a long time.

A Cambodian man, 40–50 years old, is the owner of the key-making shop. He left Cambodia after his father, who was a nurse, and his entire family were slaughtered by the Khmer Rouge. Although in France for 17 years, he speaks with a strong accent and clearly has difficulty with French. The war is recurrent in his conversation. He only returned once to Cambodia and does not want to go back again. ("My life is here, I have no other place.") Nevertheless, the fact that Cambodia remains under communist rule is one of the elements that keeps him from the country and weakens his ties with his native land, for ideological reasons.

Another political refugee, the owner of an Indian restaurant, a Sri Lankan woman who had escaped persecution from the Tamil Tigers guerrilla movement, has a more positive view of her life. After entering France as a refugee, she has tried varied jobs but, because of difficulties in learning French, wound up in the food business, with help from family funds and lots of work. The food business is a field in which ethnicity, far from being an impediment, became an advantage in the global market of world cities. In her report, the memories of war and of persecution are not as severe as those of the Cambodian man, and her ties with her native country were restored with the end of the ethnic and political conflicts in Sri Lanka. So, the category of transnational immigrant applies to her case, and not to the Cambodian key maker, who, as the Spanish saying goes, "burned his ships," and no longer has contact with the homeland.

Meanwhile, the young Chilean hair dresser, who was 35 years old, revealed another facet of the experience of political refugees in France. He is the son of Chileans who escaped the Pinochet regime. He came to France as a child and had his entire education and emotional ties in the foreign country. Stimulated by his parents to have a useful job and good insertion in local life, he speaks French perfectly and in a few years has conquered a fixed clientele in the neighborhood, of mostly French people. The success of the business allowed him to incorporate the custom of French businesses to take holidays and close the beauty salon (where he employs his sister) in the month of August, revealing his clear insertion in the Gallic ethos of giving value to holidays and free time.

Postcolonial Immigrants

In this category, which has the highest number of immigrants, we find those who come mainly from Mediterranean countries: Turks, Algerians, and Tunisians, the so-called Maghreb. They left their country to install themselves in another that they feel is close, given the historic relations of colonization. This produces a sense of proximity among residents of the former colony with the former French metropolis, in particular because of their knowledge of the French language, which is often the main language taught in the schools in their nation of origin. Borders are not impermeable for these immigrants. To the contrary, there is great proximity between their country of origin and the destination, a more constant coming and going, and for some, the country of origin is nearly a region of France.

One of these immigrants, a Turkish man, was contacted at a tailor shop. He works for fashion designer Yves Saint-Laurent, in a high-value profession that is highly competitive and one of the few French industries that has remained on French soil, not having "decentralized," or moved out through processes of global capitalism. With a bit of pride, he told us that he recently participated in a team that created five handmade suits for the newly inaugurated French President François Hollande. During his month of vacation, he is filling in for a Turkish friend who is the owner of the *retoucherie.*

One of the Algerians interviewed has been in France for 28 years and has had a store for six. He was married for two years to a French woman who left him "to travel," and is now married with an Algerian woman with whom he has an 11-month-old child. The son was born at the same time that he bought a new boutique, which was not a mere coincidence. When they were about to have the child, he took a bank loan and purchased a commercial space for 80,000 euros. With impeccable French he explained, "I brought French in my luggage" (J'ai amené le Français dans la valise)." The relationship with his country of origin extends to daily conversations with his family by phone and the celebration of important events in Algeria like his wedding and his son's birthday. Before he had the business, he worked for other Algerians. Every year he spends his vacation in Algeria, but this year he will go to Spain for a week, for less costly vacation, revealing another aspect subjacent to this type of immigrant, the social obligations and the cost that a "return to the home country," even for a holiday, represents in presents for friends and family.

In the same group of postcolonial immigrants, we found two Tunisians who owned stores on rue Moulin des Près: one who had a grocery store and the other an Internet shop and an automatic laundry. In both, the work of their children was quite important.

Small Businesses: A "Kinship Economy"

The businesses studied are inserted in an "economy of kinship," either because of the presence of family members or because of family participation in the initial capital. The relation between family and migration has been quite invisible in migration theories, due to the economic focus that pictured men as producers and women as reproducers. As Beyers, Venken, and Goddeeris (2009: 128) argue, "In most of the 20th century, women and children were among these less visible migrants, and migration studies have reproduced that invisibility by privileging men and their public roles as study objects (Kofman 2004; Donato et al. 2006; König and Ohliger 2006, pp. 11–19).

As with other studies of "family business," we found a link between the home and business environment and the responsibility (Finch and Mason 1993) felt by family members toward a business owned by a relative. The family resources, capital, and/or labor have a central role in the establishment and survival of the small businesses (Baines and Wheelock 1998; Wheelock and Baines 1998). This is a similar role to the ethnic network that functions as an extended family. Nevertheless, not all the immigrants contacted had the same amount of financial resources from their families or ethnic network, and their businesses depended in different ways on family work. This is a situation comparable to that Catarino and Oso described when analyzing the literature on ethnic businesses:

> Studies into "ethnic businesses" have also acknowledged the role of the family as a kind of social capital, within the framework of the ethnic resources that migrants usually resort to when setting up a business. For example, Raijman and Tienda (2003) highlight the way in which Koreans in Chicago have a far greater tendency to open up a business than their Mexican counterparts, due to the differences in access to

> capital via ethnic and family sources. As Ram et al. (2001) state, most of the literature addressing the issue of the family within the framework of ethnic businesses stresses the fact that cultural differences impact on the business dynamics. Consequently, certain immigrant communities appear to benefit from greater facilities in setting up and maintaining businesses, as a result of solidarity, family ideologies or cultures that promote business activity, as in the case of South Asians. (Boissevain and Grotenberg 1987; Boyd 1990; Kibria 1994; Mingione 1999; Sanders and Nee 1996; Werbner in Ram et al. 2001)

Let us have a closer look.

Entrance in a profession is often presented by the interlocutors as having "happened by accident" and not as a conscious, previously planned decision. The Algerian explained that it was "by chance" that he learned to make keys, and by chance that the opportunity rose to purchase his location (although he had been saving for years to have his own business). The Korean had wanted to be an artist, yet wound up cooking dishes his mother had taught him.

The purchase of the place of business appeared as a second phase in the professional itinerary of these immigrants. In the first phase, they worked as employees for another business person, usually of the same ethnic origin. To purchase their own business they needed a considerable sum of money, which is higher in the elite neighborhoods (16th, 8th, 7th, and 5th) and lower in the popular neighborhoods (19th and 20th). Our interlocutors were located at the Place d'Italie, which has a median price range, but which has gone up with the general rise of prices in the city, and in a greater proportion, given the recent gentrification of the region.

Having a residence that coincides with the place of work at the beginning of the business helps one economize. Other studies of "family businesses" (Everts 2010) show the need to have the residence coincide with the workplace. The separation of the residence from a store or restaurant indicates the passage to another moment, one of greater comfort, in the lives of these immigrant business owners, as does the hiring of employees.

Another sign of business success is the employment of salaried workers. From dependence on their own and family labor, they move on to the use of salaried workers, employees who are usually of the same ethnic origin, without dispensing with their own labor or that of the family. This is a stage that depends on the success and nature of the business. We did not find employees in businesses that, given the number of clients, could easily be handled by one person. But we found them at the more successful restaurants.

Studies also indicate the need for family labor to coincide with family capital, at least in the initial stages. Nevertheless, studies of ethnic businesses show that this use of family labor is more present in certain ethnic groups than in others. However, Zimmer and Aldrich (1987), in their study that compared Asian and British shopkeepers in Britain, found no difference between local and foreign entrepreneurs and concluded that "studies examining only immigrants may find what appear to be distinctive characteristics, but, in fact, many traits are common to all small-business owners, given the turbulent environment they face" (1987: 443).

Even if we tend to agree, in general, with Zimmer and Aldrich, and also with Rekers and Van Kempen (2000), who point out that working long hours and employing family labor are not particular traits of ethnic businesses but of small businesses in general, the results of our study revealed significant differences between how the local (French) and the foreigners manage their business. One indication of the difference in service and the economic perspective between the immigrant and French entrepreneurs is the hours they keep during the week and on holidays. During one of the phases of our field research, in July 2012, most of the shops with French owners were closed for summer vacation, with only the immigrant shops remaining open for normal hours, which in general, are longer during the day than those of French-owned shops. The foreigners usually do not take a break on Sundays or Mondays, which is the common day of rest for commerce and services in France.

As we point out, restaurants are among the businesses that include mostly family members as laborers. It is also true for the immigrants dealing with food in Place d' Italie. All the "ethnic" (foreign) restaurants studied depend on the work of women, as do the convenience stores, but that was not the case of the French restaurants in Place d'Italie. The beauty parlor is also managed by and has the labor of a woman who is the sister of the owner, and the small grocery counts on the regular work of the owner's wife.

The work of children is found here outside of a strictly capitalist logic. It appears as a form of assistance, a *counter-gift*[18] (Mauss 2003) from the children at the cost of their education and/or a form of training so that in the future they can take over the business. There is an intergenerational moral debt that leads the children to insert themselves into their parents' business because of an obligation implicit in the kinship relations.

Beyond the family, both nuclear and extended, there is a network that circles each one of the businesses, formed by "friendships" that are regularly established because of ethnic or national ties and that can be involved in labor work or a counter-gift, as we saw in the case of the tailor.

Figure 3.5 Political refugee from Sri Lanka, owner of Indian restaurant and her daughter. Photo: Andrea Eichenberg, August 2012.

Relationship with France

The relationship of the immigrants with the country of origin has been a concern that is quite present in the studies of transnational migration. Here, we sought to approach them from the perspective of entrepreneurs, while considering that French immigration laws and their forms of application have been the subject of extensive debate in the country for a few decades. Immigration in France, as in many European countries, has been ideologically presented by right-wing political parties and a large part of the media as a considerable social problem. Immigrants are portrayed as an economic threat ("they take our jobs"), and a threat to public safety.

How do the immigrant business owners of Place d'Italie feel in relation to France and their country of origin? Do they share this imaginary of fear and repulsion toward other immigrants?

Contrary to what may be thought, many of the immigrant business owners in Place d'Italie share an aversion to the new immigrants and approve of restrictive immigration policies. For most of them, the other is not French, but other nationalities, as one of the key-makers told us, mentioning the importance of having a bullet-proof door in our apartment because of the presence of delinquents in Paris, "gypsies and Romanians."

Although most of our interlocutors are not planning to return to their country of origin, with rare exceptions, some maintain, at least discursively, a life between places, living a condition of transnationality. The Algerian man spoke and lived as if the geographic border did not exist—France does not have the air of a country that is geographically distant, because it is an ex-metropolis. Nevertheless, even in this case, it is perceived that he clearly senses the distance in cultural practices: "In our culture, when a boy is born he gets a bigger party than a girl," he said, recognizing the higher value attributed to men that is specific to his "culture" and is not part of French social values. Even if he has no plans to return, we can classify him as a *transmigrant*, according to the definition used by Glick Schiller due to the omnipresence of Algeria in his daily life: "Transmigrants are immigrants who live their lives across national borders, participating in the daily life and political processes of two or more nation-states" (1997:158).

The presence of family members in the country of origin, as well as the memory of good times lived there have an important role in the maintenance of this tie and the condition of transnationality. In contrast, a traumatic experience can cause a break. Of all the immigrants we interviewed, the Cambodian was the most emphatic about saying that his country is now France and that he does not think of returning to Cambodia.

Even when there is no traumatic situation, the distance can be felt little by little, by a distancing from the ethos of the immigrants' network of friends and acquaintances from before migration. In the case of the Korean, the distance is less than that of the Cambodian, but we noted an alienation in relation to her country of origin, since she complained of an obligation to go to parties every day, see friends, and so on when she visited her country. Thus, the symbolic distance that one maintains with one's country of origin and the proximity with France is independent from the geographic distance.

Gender Relations

In the past, non-European immigration in Paris had been predominantly male and colonial, coming from the Maghreb. This movement inverted, and other flows are now observed, including those from sub-Saharan Africa (also preferentially postcolonial), Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and so on. More recently, more families and unaccompanied women have been involved. Migration in France has become more feminine, following a global trend. Data from INSEE (2011) show that some flows, however, have been composed predominantly by women for some time: those from East Asia, the Americas, Oceania, and recent members of the European community, and there has been an increase in the number of women who immigrate alone.[19]

Studies have shown that the experience of transnational migration to countries of the North has transformed gender relations, generally in the sense of establishing greater equality between men and women. This was also found among the entrepreneurs of Place d'Italie, even when traditional inequalities were maintained when the immigrant returned to their countries of origin for holidays or important events (weddings, anniversaries etc.).

The gender representations they encounter at French institutions (in school, the media, cinema, etc.) "are read through culturally specific lenses" (Hannerz 1992). Nevertheless, in terms of gender relations, our study found that there is a "contamination" among immigrant populations and between them and the local population that can lead to greater transformation in these relations.

At Place d'Italie, the presence or not of women in the small businesses appears to be directly related to the type or work involved and the type of immigration (political, cultural, or colonial). Among the cultural immigrants, we noted a faster incorporation of individualistic (French) values that causes the women to have a more egalitarian role in the distribution of the tasks of the business, and in some cases they themselves are the owners.

Final Considerations

Immigration studies have focused predominantly on the facet of poorly paid manual labor. Nevertheless, along with unskilled laborers who submit to precarious working conditions, there are other flows of emigrants such as the merchants of Place d' Italie who establish themselves in other countries temporarily or permanently, in more favorable economic conditions. Many of them were immigrant laborers who initiated their migratory process in poorly paid jobs and rose socially over time, opening commercial establishments such as ethnic restaurants, cleaners, Internet shops, key-makers, and so forth, and enjoy another lifestyle and level of consumption in France.

The study showed that there is a large concentration of immigrant business owners in Paris. We found all of the cases reported along just a few hundred meters on two streets. One of the strong characteristics of the entrepreneurs that we interviewed is that they are owners of their businesses, or, in other terms, they own the means of production (the equipment and space), which places them in the category of small business owners, an important social and professional category in France.

We classified them in three broad models of immigrants: cultural immigrants, political refugees, and postcolonial immigrants. Each one of these groups is inserted in the labor market and in relationships with their families and countries of origin in a different manner.

In a continuum of the integration process, we find that on the one hand the cultural immigrants adhere more quickly to the individualist ethos that characterizes modern-contemporary society, while on the other hand postcolonial immigrants maintain stronger ties with their families of origin, in which prevails a holistic ethos and obligations of reciprocity established by the "enrichment" involved with the immigration process.

These entrepreneurs are inserted in a labor market through a network of other immigrants of the same ethnic origin. In fact, the genealogy of the locations of business shows a trend of passing on a location to other immigrants of the same nationality.

These immigrant business owners are also the main source of labor for the business, usually in conjunction with the labor of family members such as spouses and children. In the cases of restaurants, this family labor is complemented by the work of employees—who are also immigrants in the initial trajectory of immigration—who exercise subaltern functions, at low pay, and who generally work in the kitchen and in cleaning.

The ethnic origin of the immigrants has been seen as an important factor in determining the facility of opening a business—in North America, Asians are indicated as those who count most strongly on family support, family capital, a family plan, and a solidarity network because of their cultural values. In fact, we identified this facility among some Asian groups, although it was also found in others—such as Chileans—in such a way that this facility appears to be strongly related with family capital (cultural and economic) more than with an ideology that gives greater value to work or any other "ethnic" characteristic.

The experience of transnationalization clearly helps construct more equitable gender relations. But even in cases in which unequal gender relations appear to be maintained, with a division of roles in the family and a clear hierarchy, there is a type of contamination by the destination society that tends to change gender relations, at least during the time in which the immigrants are in the destination country. The women thus challenge the gender hierarchy and inequalities found in their countries of origin, and have greater agency in their family businesses.

As we have seen in the examples presented here, in Paris, ethnicity constitutes important cultural capital for some businesses, in particular those related to food, in which the ethnic factor occupies an important place in Parisians' imaginary of leisure. Immigrant entrepreneurs must be seen in relation to their cultural origins, but also within a variety of contexts and situations that can play a role with similar importance as that of ethnic origin.

Notes

1. The purchase cost of a square meter in Paris in 2008 was about 6,000 euros or less in the 10th, 12th, 18th, 19th, and 20th arrondissements, and 8,000 euros or more in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th arrondissements. In the neighborhood studied, it is in the range of 6,000–7,000 euros per square meter (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2008: 98). Rents accompany this division.
2. Since the early 19th century, internal emigration in France by residents of the "provinces" to the capital, recognized in the expression "monter à Paris," was and continues to be broadly represented in literature, cinema, and other forms of artistic expression as an experience related to alienation, suffering, and achievement. It involves a topos of French social life, usually linked to an experience of youth and related to the importance that the city of Paris had until the late 20th century as a student and economic center.
3. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, shttp://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=IMG1A&millesime=2011&niveau=1&typgeo=COM&codgeo=75056 (accessed March 20, 2015).
4. A density that includes the woods of Boulogne and Vincennes, without which it would be even higher: 33,400 residents per km^2 (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2008: 26).
5. Manhattan has a density of 24,200 per square kilometer; London's is lower than 8,000, and Moscow's lower than 10,000 (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2008: 8).
6. Julia Kristeva (1991) analyzed the behavior of Europeans toward those understood by them as foreign, that is, the stranger, outsider, alien. For her, in studying the notion in the European context over the centuries, the production of the "other" is closely related to the production of the "self." She argues that to produce the foreign person is the same process as producing oneself and that it means to build a border of citizenship and civility.
7. The department now called Ile de France.
8. A "Chinese" neighborhood that gives visibility, through restaurants and other ethnic shops, to a strong presence of Asian immigrants in Paris. Ethnicization of the neighborhood began in the 1970s through an architectural project for the urban modernization of Paris, which involved the destruction of traditional working-class homes of the 13th by the construction of tall buildings known as tours, with 20–30 stories. This process of urban reformulation of the Pompidou government lead to massive arrival of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees to the city, installed with state support—through programs for political refugees—in this urban space. In the early 1970s, Latin American political refugees also arrived in Paris, escaping totalitarian regimes in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina—a group ethnically less marked that quickly integrated into French society.

9. We use ethnicity in recognizing cultural differences. However, avoiding essentialist notions, we also acknowledge that individual practices define identities. As Alleyne notes, ethnic communities are not static entities, and should be seen "as a network of agents with ever-changing projects rather than a tapestry of people with shared roots" (2002: 622).
10. A hill close to the rio Biévre, named for Pierre Caille, who purchased it in 1543, and which came to have various windmills. During the 17th century, it was a site of limestone quarries and various activities (tapestry making, dying, clothes washing, and butchers), which left the region dirty. In 1784, a wall was built where now stands the Bd. August Blanqui, a quartier that belonged to the commune of Gentilly, bordering Paris, part of which was incorporated into the city in 1860. Given the fragile subsoil, from which limestone was removed, heavy buildings could not be built there, and thus the Butte maintains the quality of a village until today.
11. Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, the leading center of education in the social sciences in France.
12. As we described in another article (Grossi and Rial 2000), low-cost apartments in old buildings in Paris did not have private bathrooms. There were collective bathrooms in the hallways or stairwells, and baths were taken outside of the house, in the public space of the *bains publics*.
13. Not by chance, because the Portuguese are one of the largest immigrant communities in the neighborhood.
14. A recent article in the *Journal du 13ème* (from November 2011) reports on the negotiations between the resident associations and the store owners, and the mediation of the local municipal government to maintain the "artistic and touristic vocation" of the Buttes aux Cailles, and describes how local public policies support the cosmopolitan character of the neighborhood.
15. A camera facilitates contacts between the researcher and those studied, as various visual anthropologists have noted. The observation is legitimated by its presence, and subjects often show things "for the camera" they might not in an initial contact. It thus serves as a form of mediation that in most cases facilitates contact, although it may at times be a source of embarrassment. See Collier Jr. 1986; Rial 2001.
16. Andrea Eichenberg is the author of all those photos.
17. Kwame Anthony Appiah. 1998. "Patriotas cosmopolitas," *Revista brasileira de CiIencias Sociais*, 13,36: 1–17.
18. "For Mauss, a gift is any object or service, utilitarian or superfluous, transacted as part of social relations, as distinct from more purely monetary or material relations" (Catarino and Oso 2013: 166). Or, as Godbout and Caillé (1991: 32) affirm, "we qualify the gift as the provision of goods or services, with no guarantee of being paid back, in order to create, sustain or recreate social relations among people" (Godbout and Caillé 1991: 32). A countergift is a gift given back in return for a previous gift, usually with a considered time lap.
19. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=ip1524#inter4.

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PART II

Mobilities

CHAPTER 4

Muslim Arab Immigrants in Southern Brazil: Projects and Trajectories

Cláudia Voigt Espinola

Introduction

In the contemporary world, which is characterized by growing transnationalization processes, migratory movements reverberate with all the social implications in a globalized and multidimensional world. In times of globalization, it is understood that any group or community being studied is immersed within a context that is not only particular but also that establishes connections and correlations with its surroundings, especially with the local, national, and global. It is thus necessary to develop logically consistent constructions that can be contrasted with the ways in which the global is instilled in each culture (Canclini 2003).

In Brazil, since the 1980s, migratory patterns can be summarized as follows: reduced domestic long-distance migratory flows, increased short-distance and intraregional migrations, and more return migrations. Moreover, there has been a change in the trend toward urban concentration in large capital cities and metropolitan regions, and international emigration, with an increase of international immigrants in the southern and southeastern region. Further, in all of the states, there is an increase of more than 55 percent in the number of international entrances (Carvalho, Magalhães, Garcia and Soares). Therefore even for Brazilians abroad, international immigrations continue as a current trend.

Based on this situation, I look at the projects and trajectories of a group of Muslim Arab immigrants, composed primarily of Palestinians and Lebanese, who are residents of Florianópolis, SC, Brazil. I also analyze the implications of the economic insertion of the group and its interactions in the context of the city.

The Arab-Muslim community in Florianópolis totals some 60 nuclear families. Most of the Lebanese are from the Bekaa Valley, and the Palestinians are from the Ramallah region as well as Jordan. The arrival of Lebanese and Palestinian Muslims to Santa Catarina state intensified starting in the 1950s due to the political disturbances caused by the creation of the state of Israel and by difficult conditions in Lebanon.

In Florianópolis, the Arabs follow the traditions of Brazil and are also dedicated to commerce, together with Christian Arabs and Jews. To be a Muslim Arab, therefore, until recently meant following in the wake of Christian Arab immigration, which is better known and older, and in which most migrants were engaged in commercial activities.[1] The Muslims in the early days of their immigration, adopted assimilationist postures practiced religion privately, for example.

The assimilationist perspective contributed to Muslim Arabs, since the 1960s, even with the distinction of not being Christians, maintaining and respecting the signs of "acceptance" and "integration." The collective memory of the Muslim Arab group maintains and recreates the assimilationist discourse, which emphasizes the importance of the immigrant in the formation of the Brazilian nation and the receptivity of Brazilians.

Nevertheless, the experience of these immigrants created a place marked by invisibility, agreed to and maintained by the group, until a certain time. In its first period in Brazil, the group decided not to construct a mosque or use veils, icons of the Muslim religion and markers of a symbolic border. The current trajectory, however, points to a growth in the use of religion as a form of establishing bonds, of sharing a sense of belonging, of creating a sense of "community." Contrary to the many other groups of immigrants who at the initial moment of immigration seek support from religion, the Arabs here only gradually used this religious singularity, employing their spaces and practices as essential elements for their ethnic identification and sense of belonging. Among the elements that motivated this process, the group's socioeconomic position stands out, since it has allowed them to present themselves as a "successful group" within the economic context of the city.

We do not have specific data for Santa Catarina, but according to Waniez and Brustlein (2001), nearly 60 percent of the Muslim population in Brazil is engaged in commercial activity, followed by those in the service sector, at only 10.4 percent. It is noteworthy that 40 percent of Muslim Arabs are employers. The number who work with a partner or a nonpaid person among the Muslims is twice that of the urban population as a whole (7.7% compared to 3%). Nearly 28 percent work in establishments with more than ten employees and 38.9 percent in locations with fewer than ten employees, and those who work alone total 22.9 percent. That is, most of the Muslims are independent merchants or bosses of a company that employs fewer than ten people. In terms of income, the Muslims earn on average more than the Brazilian population as a whole, given that the percentage of Muslim Arabs earning 10 minimum wages is five times higher than the percentage among the overall population. A small proportion of the Muslims are poor, because only 13.7 percent receive one minimum wage or less, compared with 55.7 percent of Brazil's urban population as a whole.

These economic and spatial factors make the Muslims in Brazil a particular group. According to Wainiez and Brustlein, they are small in number but quite active in the upper social layers of society. Commerce is without a doubt the main economic activity of the group studied here, even if they are gradually starting other endeavors such as hotels and restaurants. Commerce is undertaken on the main streets in the center of Florianópolis, which is a space of intense commercial movement in which thousands of people circulate each day, particularly on Rua Conselheiro Mafra and Felipe Schmidt but also Francisco Tolentino, 7 de Setembro, and João Pinto.

The stores are usually small to medium size and sell various goods from clothes, shoes, bed and bath linens, sporting goods, and even miscellaneous goods like those found in $1.99 shops. It is interesting to note that some have a colonial architectural style (typical of the old buildings in the old city center) on the facade and have simple internal decoration, serving a lower-income public. Others, however, adopt a more unadorned style, with a renovated facade and decorated interior. The medium-size stores have employees, while at the smaller ones, the workers are only the owner, his wife, and children, as well as other family members such as cousins and nephews.

Defining the Migratory Steps

In Florianópolis, two generations of immigrants can be identified, with a third generation that is still quite incipient. In principle, it may be believed that there is an age difference among these generations. The first generation is represented by older members, and the second by the younger ones. But due to the local migratory process, which is recent, continuous, and dynamic, this distinction has not been found. Among the people who are part of the first generation of immigrants the ages can vary from 20 to 60 or older.

In the second generation of immigrants are young people and children. They interact with Brazilians and go to school, but at a certain time they will stay to study for a period of time with their parents or relatives in the lands of their parents. The second generation in general has dedicated itself more to school, with many youth attending the universities, an important distinction from their parents, most of whom have few years of formal education. Nevertheless, what is found is that, even after they graduate, these youths remain linked to the family business, working together with their parents or managing new stores in Florianópolis or affiliates in other cities.

The First to Arrive

In the group of "those who came first" can be classified the men and women who came in the 1960s, '70s, and '80s, some as children, accompanied by their parents. and others as adults, married or single.

As mentioned, Arab Muslim immigration to Florianópolis followed the standard described for Arab immigration in Brazil as a whole, that is, immigration that is considered spontaneous, without intermediation by agents or companies. They were mostly males who left their country of origin motivated to find better living conditions and determined to return home, like nearly all immigrants. Upon reaching Brazil, they began to work in commerce, even if for many this was not their occupation in their native land. However, this was the niche that Arab immigrants found available at that time, and it also satisfied the desire not to be salaried workers and the hope of earning money more quickly and building their own business, even if at first they worked with relatives or compatriots.

That which is customarily called the "myth of the peddler" is diffused among the Arab community, both Christian or Muslim, and among the general population in relation to the Arab immigrants. The figure of the peddler is always recalled, revived, and it is certainly their "origin myth," the entrance to Brazil.

In Florianópolis, this was no different. The entire community maintains the "myth of the peddler" in their memory. According to Seyfert (1995), Syrians and Lebanese, seeing themselves as equal to other immigrants, present the myth as a representation of succeeding under their own strength. The myth marks their trajectory that runs from peddler to large industrial or commercial entrepreneur and justifies their presence in the country's social and economic formation.

This myth of the peddler was also present in Florianópolis where some of the older adult men began their new lives by hawking goods in the street, and is found in the reports of others as a rhetorical device, confirming that the peddler myth is part of their imaginary. This act of peddling was the first trade learned by the immigrants. In a certain way, the creation of more favorable conditions in Brazil over time caused them to head to Florianópolis. Those who did so were first helped by a cousin or other relative. It is important to note that most of the immigrants who are in the city today began their activities in the interior of Santa Catarina state.

In terms of the motivations for immigration among those interviewed, a mixture of a social-economic-political nature was indicated, due mainly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the case of the Palestinians, or the precarious situation in Lebanon for the Lebanese. Some of them had left rural areas, others were involved in political activities, and still others sought to leave an uncomfortable situation as Jordanian descendants of Palestinians, who were considered second-class citizens in Jordan.

It was perceived that the kinship structure serves as a reference for migration, which fulfills two functions, because it makes viable the social reproduction of children, who remain in the place of origin. There are always those who go, but there are those who stay and also those who both go and come back. In this way, the importance given to the traditional family extends to new spaces in which they reorganize their future reproduction (Woortmann 1996).

In terms of women, it should be noted that they never come to Brazil alone. They are always accompanied either by parents or a husband, or they migrant specifically to marry. As Woortmann said (1996), the woman does not migrate, she "is migrated." With the approval of the father, she can travel.

The Recent Arrivals

The migratory flow of Arab Muslims to Florianópolis, although it is not quantitatively significant, is continuous and intense. There is always someone coming or going. The migratory objectives, to grow economically, be able to live, work, and have a family, continue to be the ideal goals for the recently arrived immigrants. Three types of large families have been registered that have continued the immigration process to Florianópolis and maintained their kinship networks since the 1960s.

In this sense, the immigration profile has not changed, and can be understood to have originated from the permanent immigration movement in which the migrants obtain their legalization in the destination country and in which the family members migrate for the purpose of family regrouping (Peixoto 1998). The flow that remains over the decades is due to these kinship relations. It therefore involves uncles, nephews, and brothers. At first they work with their already established family members, assisting in the family business and integrating into the existing family networks.

Among the new arrivals there are exceptions who do not fit this profile and who, in a certain way, inaugurate a new and unusual flow. One example of this is H, a young Palestinian who has no kinship ties with anyone in Florianópolis or Brazil. His Brazilian wife is not an Arab descendent. The couple met in the United States and got married there. They decided to live in Florianópolis, even though she has no relatives in the city. "[T]hey came to the city, liked it, and decided to stay." Curiously he is also one of the only Palestinians who has an establishment in the food sector, which is a different business from the others, who have stores for clothes, fabrics, and shoes.[4] Like other Arab youth, he lived for many years in a foreign country (in this case the United States), outside his country of origin (Jordan), and returned to his native country for a limited time (about two years) only to emigrate once again (this time, married and to Brazil). This is an example that demonstrates that a collective project is not experienced in a completely homogeneous manner by the individuals who participate. There are differences, according to particularities, trajectories, gender, and generations.

Young women continue to immigrate to Brazil, although never unaccompanied. Like the immigrants who came before them, "they came to marry." They usually marry already established immigrants or second-generation immigrants. Both generations have maintained intense contacts with the land of origin during the time that they studied or worked, and through strong family ties their marriages could be constructed and sealed according to the family perspective, which is traditional Arab marriages.

It is thus noted that, in general, the migratory pattern of the "recent arrivals" remains similar to those of who "arrived first": single men continue to come, supported by their kinship networks, as well as women who come because of a marriage. A more recent and unprecedented fact is that there are also "men who come to marry." These immigrants are marrying daughters of immigrants, which denotes the strong appeal of their parents' cultural values among these youth. Although they were born in Brazil, they feel ties to the land of origin, indicated by the fact that they want to marry in the Arab style and do so.

Impressions and Difficulties in the New Land

Regardless of when the immigrants arrived, in the 1960s or the 1990s, it can be seen that many difficulties they experience, such as their impressions about the new location and feeling like a stranger, are experiences and sensations that are common to the trajectories of the people in their situation as immigrants. These difficulties are part of the repertoire of the "beginning moments in foreign lands." Both the new immigrants or the older ones experience the same feelings or difficulties in the new land, Brazil.

Among the main difficulties, the question of language was one of the most frequently mentioned by the group. However, the opportunity to work in commercial activity that requires intense contact with the public helped them gain command of the new language.

In this context, it can be expected that the issue of work was not raised as a significant problem in the reports of the first immigrants because the act of immigrating presupposes participation in a commercial activity with a relative. With the more recent immigrants, it can be seen that the model of immigration for family regrouping persists, which currently can mean insertion in new strategies, such as expanding the commercial establishment or opening affiliates to guarantee work for those who are arriving.

Nevertheless, there are some immigrants who are college graduates and who would like to work in their fields, for example, as doctors or engineers. Brazilian law has not helped these professionals work in their field, however, as it requires proof of degrees and recognition from their respective professional councils that are often impossible to obtain. For now, this is not a major problem because these immigrants are still supported by kinship networks and come to work in the stores with all the others. Through this activity, they are able to overcome one of the greatest initial difficulties—learning the language—which they do by working in commerce.

The family relationships were and continue to be one of the great supports for this immigration, providing, by means of an extensive and solid network, opportunities for the immigrants who are arriving. They support the new immigrants at first, offering their homes and work in commerce until they become owners of their own business.

The reception in a new place, the initial hospitality, the offer of work, whether at an existing business or by providing a loan to open a business, were related to important facts in the new life on distant soil. In all the reports there was a brother, uncle, nephew, or relative who was already in Lebanon on Palestine. It is certainly a type of migration in which it can be identified that the preexisting family networks in the country of arrival and the country of origin are vital and necessary. Similarly, the financial return to those who stay is important, as a form of recognition and maintenance of bonds. As R. (a Palestinian) emphasized, in her statement,

> We always send money to people there. They have no type of commerce. They survive from money that we send. The family, the stepmother (her husband's), the two sisters. Each one has a family to support. But the

> people there count on our money here. They wait and they live better, better than the people who have been working there for years. Even with the difficulties here in Brazil, their money is guaranteed.

Travel as a Formative Element

The increased economic power of these families that is achieved through commerce, in addition to providing the group a social and political status within the context of the city, allows a series of connections and activities to be established that permeate the immigrants' intense contact with their country of origin.

It has been possible for the people of the Arab-Muslim community to establish themselves as a group of immigrants with a desire and capacity to build strong ties with their countries of origin, maintaining connections typical of transnational immigrants. These typical connections, as detailed by Mitchell (2003: 36), include "periodic travel between the country of origin and the receiving nations, communication by telephone, letter, audio or video tapes, money and goods sent to families, active associations in organizations or the undertaking of business that involve crossing international frontiers and or receiving messages from organizations (including the government) that want to stimulate transnational relations."

In this way it was possible to see that travel, or regular trips, are events that are part of daily life, and that coming and going is part of a constantly experienced dynamic, and does not involve ruptures that cannot be connected. The opportunity that these immigrants have to participate in a transnational experience, in the sense that they create significant ties that are connected to two points of the migratory flow, allows them to experience travel as steps for the creation of these ties that last an entire lifetime (Basch et al. 1993).

Travel, which guides the family projects, as an always present resource and possibility, has vital importance in the life of the community, mainly because it becomes a powerful tool for mediation in the revival of the value of family, the life project, the education of children, and in the expansion of social networks to future marriages.

The opportunity to come and go and to travel constantly permeates the life of people in the community, from childhood until adulthood, to the degree that a young couple plans this ideal starting with the beginning of their life together. While they prepare to migrate, they may also build a home and invest in their living conditions in their country of origin. Especially when the children grow up, the desire is greater for them to come live with their families.

Many times the dream of living in two places is difficult to administer and must be postponed for financial reasons. To maintain commercial activity in Brazil, while also establishing a business in the country of origin, has not been easy for some. Statements affirming the desire to return and build a life in the location of origin are common, and although many individuals are able to do so, certainly not all of them can.

With the desire to go and the desire to stay, the years pass, plans are made and revised, and travel creates the opportunity to live in these two worlds.

Concluding Reflections

Until the 1970s, Florianópolis had the image of a provincial city, which began to change considerably in the past two decades. The local economy has always been based on commerce, the city's role as the state capital, and the presence of a federal university and important federal and state companies. In the 1990s, Florianópolis came to be known as the Tourist Capital of Mercosur, and as the Brazilian state capital with the best quality of life. The opportunity to live close to nature while having the facilities of modern life has attracted many people from other states in Brazil and from abroad.

The nearly mass migration in recent decades, or as the "Florianopolitanos" call it, the "invasion," has created some conflicts in the city. The relations between "natives" and "nonnatives," and between "natives" and those from "outside," as indicated by Rial (1988), generate disputes over various ideas of what is best for the city. In this relationship that is established on the island between the "islanders" and the "new residents," differences and conflicts about what is best for the city are seen, revealing a divided city that is polarized between those "from here" and those "from outside," or between the "natives" and the "foreigners," the old and new residents, especially between the "ilhéus-manezinhos" (as the island's natives are known) and the "Gaúchos" (those from Rio Grande do Sul state), as described by Fantin (2000).

How does the Muslim community fit into this conflict? In reality, the "foreigners" to whom Fantin refers (2000) are often Gauchos, but are also from the states of São Paulo and Parana. The Arab families belong to another group that represents the city's symbolic and social scene. They are one of the differentiated ethnic groups who comprise the cliché regularly emphasized by government propaganda about the "ethnicities that shaped Santa Catarina," in which Arabs have been presented along with other groups.

The "natives," therefore, associate with Arabs the idea of belonging to an ethnicity that contributed, and still contributes, to the development of the city. The natives consider that the Arabs have something to offer the city, unlike those "from outside," who are considered predators of the beauty of the island and of the city's unique lifestyle. The Arabs are seen as part of a specific sector of city life, that is, commerce. Their insertion was defined over time as their accommodating themselves between these other groups, and not as a "threat." Their foreign origin awoke a priori in the general population the cordial relations Brazilians are understood to nurture toward immigrants.

The Lebanese and the Palestinians, confirming the historic trajectory in Brazil, work together with their families in commerce, supported by kinship relations that assist in the process of installation, to the degree to which the recently arrived immigrant can work in the family business and later acquire the conditions needed to open his own business. Here, as in many other places, as Mapril (2010) observed well, the established immigrants use various forms of sociability based on kinship to guarantee the granting of economic and human resources and information so that those who come later can gradually establish themselves. These strong ties constructed over time, and involving emotional, material, and financial bonds, are one of the factors responsible for maintenance of the migratory process in the following generations.

This group initially sought to follow the paths already consecrated by Christian Arab immigrants, opting at first to remain somewhat invisible, not making use of any type of identity sign, and not engaging in their unique religious practices in public space. With the occurrence of events that had global repercussions, like September 11, the impact of which inaugurated a new chapter in the history of relations between Western and non-Western countries, and associated with events or situations of national and local scope and impact, this group gradually began to travel new routes.

A process of ethnic identity affirmation is currently underway. The spaces of the religious and family realm are those that most reinforce an ethnic affirmation, and can be seen within a process of "Arabization," which was stimulated or even motivated by events in the local and global sphere, shaped and redesigned under a new form of relating to the social and symbolic spaces of the city.

An explanation is in order here. In Brazil, some Islamic communities, which have members of Arabic and non-Arabic origin, try to assume a discourse that is based on a separation between "being Arab" and "being Muslim." It is a movement known as "deArabization," because it tries to disassociate Arabism and Islam, based on a universalist position of the religion, in which it is not possible to juxtapose Islam to any ethnic identity.

Although in its discourse the community of Florianópolis evokes a distinction between "customs" and "religion," which can suggest a perspective of "deArabization," since 2001 the community has been in a movement toward "Arabization."[2]

The Arab-Muslim community in Florianópolis group has, in practice, emphasized an identity that associates being Arab with being Muslim. It should be noted that, although the first prayer room (which is called a mosque) in the city was founded within universalist principles of Islam, this space has been appropriated as an ethnic space as a arab space. In its early days, the mosque tried, through the initiative of converted Brazilians and Arabs, to become an Islamic space in the city, without an ethnic connotation. Various groups participated: Brazilians, Arabs, Africans, and foreigners of non-Arab nationalities.

The arrival of a formal leader, the sheikh, made an important contribution to this process. The appeal of the leader for the mandatory use of the Arab language within the mosque and the imposition of the use of the veil[3] by the practitioners, was well received by the Arabs in the community, reinforcing their ethnic characteristics.

I also consider as important in this process and even as a stimulating factor the economic power achieved by these families, which certainly guarantees the material and financial support for all these projects.

The group's favorable economic conditions have allowed them to invest in travel, making their coming and going constant, whether as visits, or temporary returns, in plans constructed at the heart of the family in which they combine new opportunities for economic, commercial, matrimonial, and religious interactions.

The "Arabization" process can be reinforced and constructed by the opportunity that the Muslim Arab community has to travel between two or more places, maintaining an interconnectivity between apparently opposite or competitive poles, such as the local and the global, which involves the juxtaposition of different symbolic forms and social experiences or practices.

That is, the countless trips and contacts that the group has with its native land make it possible for it to establish a series of collective and individual projects. They can experience the possibility of being here and, in another moment, being there, and concretize actions of the "there in the here," which are characteristic of transnational communities, while comparing them with the opportunities from the fields of possibilities of the "here."

I conclude with the words of Hannerz (1997, p. 100):

> We can assume here the existence of some daily negotiations about meanings, values and symbolic forms involving the cultures of old and new places, as well as the intense experiences of discontinuity and rupture suffered by the migrants. These negotiations are affected by the implication of the micro-cultural locus that these signified values and symbols can suffer when associated to the perceptions of the participants with particular individuals, events and contexts.

Notes

1. Arab immigration to Brazil began in the late nineteenth century. Most came from Lebanon and Syria and were predominantly Christian. Unlike other migrants, the Syrians and Lebanese did not come to work in agriculture and many began as street peddlers who over time became successful merchants and industrialists.
2. Para descrição completa do fenômeno ver Espinola (2013).
3. Para descrição dos impactos do uso do véu ver Espinola (2004).

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CHAPTER 5

Revisiting Palestinian Migration and Social Mobility in Honduras: The Caribbean Coast and Family and Kinship Relations

Lirio Gutiérrez Rivera

Introduction

Since their arrival in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Palestinians and their descendants have been successful merchants and entrepreneurs, emerging as an economic elite in Honduras. A study conducted in the early 1990s showed that 28 families control Honduras' resources and production systems through their businesses and that 12 of these families are Palestinians are of Palestinian descent (Flores 1990). The number of Palestinian families is likely to have increased in the past two decades. What accounts for Palestinians' social mobility and emergence as an elite group in Honduras? Studies point to their previous knowledge and skills in commerce and trade, and Honduran migration policies as well as favorable market opportunities for migrants, the absence of or a weak merchant class at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Palestinians' assimilation into the predominant Honduran culture and society, which is characterized by the national paradigm of *mestizaje*, that is, the racial mix of European and Indigenous groups (Flores 1990, Euraque 2009, 2006, 1998, 1996, González 1992, Amaya Banegas 1997, Foroohar 2011).

Aside from these factors, there are other issues linked to Palestinian social mobility in Honduras that are yet to be explored. In this chapter I explore two: the Honduran Caribbean Coast (or North Coast) and Palestinian kinship and family relations. First, I show that the Honduran Caribbean Coast region is a transnationalized space that historically has contributed to mobilizing and expanding Palestinians' resources and capital, especially in the early twentieth century.

Second, I look at Palestinian family and kinship relations, exploring on the one hand their links with clan-like familial structures still present in Palestinian society today and, on the other hand, how family and kinship relations help establish emotional, social, and trade networks leading to the social mobility of Palestinian migrants. Scholars observe that Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is characterized by clan-like familial structures, in particular tribes, clans, and notable families, which not only share similar extended familial attributes and informal networks but also can play a significant role in local politics and the economy (Robinson 2008, Ze'vi 2008). Although these studies focus on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, recent scholarship on Palestinian migrants suggests that similar clan-like familial structures, in particular clans, are present among Palestinian migrant communities in Honduras and play a decisive role in capital accumulation (Morales 2010).

The extensive literature on migrant entrepreneurship has also demonstrated the importance of family and kinship relations for migrants' social mobility (Zhou 2004, Waldinger, and Aldrich 1990). Scholars of Palestinian and Syro-Lebanese migration to Latin America have shown that family and kinship relations help in the setting up of businesses and trade networks (Abugattas 1982, González 1992, Ramírez 1994). In the case of Honduras, however, Palestinian family and kinship relations are relatively unexplored. Aside from Gonzalez (1992), whose work briefly discusses the role of Palestinian family and kinship in establishing local trade and emotional support networks, family and kinship relations are yet to be understood as a factor underlying Palestinian social mobility.

Methodologically, this article sets out to answer how both space—in this case, a transnationalized space—and kinship and family relations are linked to the social mobility of Palestinian entrepreneurs in Honduras. I analyze existing work on Palestinian migration and the Caribbean, recent scholarship on Central American business elites and Palestinian societies, and informal conversations and interviews conducted during an eight-week research stay in 2011 with local scholars and members of the Palestinian community in Honduras.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section discusses the Honduran Caribbean Coast as a transnationalized region and how this feature facilitated Palestinian resource and capital mobilization, particularly in the early twentieth century. The second section discusses the Palestinian familial structure and explores its links to the clan-like familial structure present in Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza strip today as well as the influence of Palestinian family and kinship relations on the establishment of various networks (trade, social, cultural) by which Palestinian families accumulate and concentrate capital within the community. Here I also point to the role of Palestinian associations in setting up transnational social ties and networks that have culturally and socially linked various Palestinian migrant communities, developing identity references that make them a culturally distinct community. The last section offers conclusions regarding future research on Palestinian migration and their social mobility, particularly how a decolonial perspective, which critically addresses colonial power structures and narratives (Mignolo 2003, Grosfóguel 2009), can contribute to reinterpreting the economic and social history of Central America and the Caribbean.

The Caribbean Coast of Honduras as a Transnational Space

The Caribbean Coast of Honduras is also known as the North Coast, because it is located in the northern part of the country. It is the country's main economic center and home to the Palestinian community. Because of its enclave past in the early twentieth century, the North Coast's economic and social history is intertwined with migrant presence and foreign intervention. As Soluri (2005) has noted, it was the enclave economy that transformed the region into a transnational space.

The association of migration with the emergence or establishment of transnational networks or space is not new. The extensive scholarship on transnationalism and migration has pointed this out observing, in the case of transnational spaces, that these processes involve various cultural, social, economic, and political relationships and interactions that are interwoven with other spaces beyond national territory (Vertovec 2003, 2004, Glick-Schiller, Szanton and Basch 1992, Glick-Schiller and Wimmer 2002, Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002, Portes 2003, Pries 2008, Guarnizo 1998, Faist 2006, Weiß 2005). Migration and multicultural societies contribute to transnationalizing space, that is, to establishing a "web of relationships, ties, and networks that reach across borders of multiple states" (Faist 2006: 4). In this section, I draw upon the notion of transnationalized processes, that is, the political, cultural, social, and economic interactions and relationships that go beyond national borders, to perceive the North Coast as a transnationalized space and not just as an enclave under foreign control within Honduran national territory.

The transnationalization of the North Coast originated in the late nineteenth century when Honduran authorities were struggling to enter the world market by exporting agricultural products. Central authorities began handing out concessions to locals, hoping to stimulate agricultural production. Concessions were also handed out for resource extraction, particularly to the British for mahogany extraction in the Mosquitia region. However, it was in the late nineteenth century, under liberal reforms, that concessions became part of national economic development policy. Originally, concessions were meant to promote coffee, but the country's poor infrastructure for coffee production in the highlands led local growers to seek a product that was easier and cheaper to produce, namely bananas (Euraque 1996). However, central authorities also handed out concessions to foreign companies, believing their presence would contribute to modernizing the country's production systems. Hence central authorities handed out large concessions, first, for mining and, later, for bananas when mineral extraction declined.

Until the late nineteenth century, the North Coast was an underpopulated and remote region within Honduran national territory. The government's foreign-oriented concession policy contributed to physically transforming the region "from swampy lowlands and tangled forests into fruitful banana plantations" (Soluri 2005: 61). The physical and social transformation of the North Coast is linked not only to the government's concession policy but also to foreign economic interests in the Caribbean and to the West's historic expansion of capital and colonial rule in the Caribbean since the sixteenth century. Companies mainly from the United States and Britain sought control over the region's trade and commercial networks, particularly agricultural products such as sugar and bananas because of their high demand and consumption in Europe and the United States (Soluri 2000, 2005, Raynolds 2000). Controlling the commercial and trade networks was not only linked to world market dynamics but was also associated with the foreign policies of the United States and Britain, which sought to increase their power through economic expansion and control over trade networks. US companies and governments also influenced local politics. In Honduras, US companies and governments established agreements with local politicians and presidents to secure their plantations and investments (Euraque 1996, Argueta 1989).

The Honduran concessionary system and foreign control over banana production and exports secured the country's entry into the world market (though peripherally). The North Coast functioned traditionally as an economic enclave connected to mass markets and mass production and where the central government had little control or influence. Along with banana production and export, and the presence of foreign companies, the North Coast was also the main destination of migrants from various regions and countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as Europe, the Caribbean (particularly Jamaica), and the Middle East (mainly Palestinians). Some migrants worked on the banana plantations, such as the Jamaicans and Salvadoreans, or set up their own businesses, as was the case with Palestinians and Germans in the central part of Honduras. Migrants and foreign companies contributed to establishing various social, political, cultural, and economic networks and exchanges that crossed national borders, turning the region into a transnationalized space.

The transnationalization of the North Coast is embedded in wider transregional and globalization processes and networks occurring in the Caribbean region. Scholars have pointed out that the Caribbean has historically been set within transregional, transnational, and transborder networks involving cultural, social, and economic exchanges and flows since its conquest in the sixteenth century (Boatcă 2011, Mintz 2010). In the North Coast, British logging of mahogany, US companies' control over banana production and exportation, and even the current presence of organized crime in the region is linked to transregional networks in the Caribbean that enable the various movements and exchange of people and capital. Furthermore, the economic, social, and cultural exchanges and flows established in the Caribbean under capitalism at different historical periods such as colonialism, European and American imperialism, and neoliberalism have contributed to (re)shaping the unequal economic, social, and racialized structures that persist today.

It is also important to note that, on a national level, the Honduran state is involved in constructing and maintaining these transnationalized areas within its national territory. On the one hand, the Honduran state needs to secure the economic exchanges and flows to remain in the global market. Thus, migration policies welcome migrants, particularly from Europe, and state concessions guarantee the transregional economic flows and exchanges. On the other hand, the maintenance of a transnational space within national territory is associated with Honduras's own historical difficulty in constructing a viable national territory and establishing center-peripheral spatial hierarchies (Gutiérrez Rivera 2009, Gutiérrez Rivera 2013).

One main trade circuit and social network in the North Coast was established by US companies. As Raynolds (2000) points out, US banana companies, which in Honduras were not only involved in the production and export of bananas, established and monopolized banana trade circuits (which they control to this day) from Latin America to the United States and North America. Their dominance over these trade circuits is linked to the rise of the United States as a hegemonic power in the twentieth century and to Honduras's weak state formation process and concessionary system. Social, cultural, and economic exchange did not only occur between the North Coast and the United States. In the second half of the twentieth century, the US banana trade circuit expanded to Europe.

Another transregional trade circuit and social network that emerged in the North Coast was established by workers from Jamaica and other parts of the British West Indies who worked on the banana plantations in the first part of the twentieth century, or by Palestinian merchants and entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, little is known about migrants' trade networks and social ties during this period, particularly those of the Palestinians, the main merchants and entrepreneurs of the North Coast.

As previous studies have pointed out, Palestinians worked first as peddlers and later opened their own businesses in the main cities of the North Coast (Euraque 1996, Foroohar 2011, Amaya Banegas 1997). Palestinian commercial activity was principally in import and export. Palestinian stores sold imported fabrics and manufactured goods such as clothes, shoes, cigarettes, candles, and handicrafts to nonethnic urban consumers. This was a very different clientele from the customers of United States-owned "general stores." These US "general stores" catered principally to wage workers and migrants working on the banana plantations. Palestinian commercial activity and retail stores were indeed a novelty in the North Coast. Palestinian merchants emerged as intermediaries between local urban demand and the industrialized centers in the world market. The absence of a merchant class and a national oligarchy in Honduras (Foroohar 2011, Torres-Rivas 1993, Euraque 1991), as well as Palestinians' knowledge and skills in transregional trade and commerce (see Norris 2013) contributed to the establishment and control of new trade circuits by which Palestinians imported manufactured goods for retail sale in the North Coast. By the 1920s, Palestinian merchants emerged—to use Bonacich's (1973) term—as a middleman minority that dominated the urban commercial infrastructure in the North Coast.

Palestinian Family and Kinship Relations

Palestinian family and kinship relations have played a key role in supporting and maintaining trade and social networks by which family businesses accumulate different forms of capital. González (1992) demonstrated that Palestinian migrants in Honduras relied on patrimonial management strategies—that is, businesses in which ownership, major policymaking positions, and significant other jobs in an hierarchy are held by the extended family—to expand family businesses and increase their wealth.

Other institutions and organizations such as the Sociedad Juventud Unión Árabe (Youth Arab Society, or SUJA) and, later, the Christian Orthodox Church also strengthened existing social ties and networks, particularly when an "Arab" identity emerged among the Palestinian community in the first half of twentieth century.

Palestinian migrants' family and kinship relations appear to be linked to clan-like familial structures still present in the homeland societies (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza Strip). This clan-like familial structure is known for sharing extended familial attributes, behavioral obligations, and informal networks, and serves as a welfare system or a security network in which members provide economic and emotional support as well as protection (Robinson 2008, Land-Info 2008, Ze'vi 2008). Furthermore, as Davis points out, belonging to a clan provides family (and clan) identification through the memory and documentation of family histories: "Family identification connects Palestinians' understanding of the past to the larger sense of Arabness that most Palestinians identify with and that is often rendered in genealogical terms" (2010: 78).

Clans, which are also known as the *hamula*, refer to a group of several extended families claiming a shared ancestry, generally a common tribal father or patriarch, fictive or real, which is traced through the father's male line (Dawod and Jaber 2003). These real and fictive kin relations are fundamental to Palestinian social organization and family life, as they indicate "[h]ow kinship is constructed in groupings such as family, clan, and tribe, whose existence (or lack thereof) varies according to the origin of the kinship group, location, and lifestyle (whether urban or rural; settled or nomadic; highland, coastal, desert)" (Davis 2010: 79).

Clans, or *hamula*, vary in size ranging from 50 to thousands of individuals. Members of a clan do not necessarily need to be related. In some cases, smaller families, breakaway groups, or families belonging to obsolete clans join larger clans, informally adopt their name, and gradually become part of the *hamula* (Ze'evi 2008). Also, clan and family histories and identification are usually not only tied to a village, where the families locate their origins, but also to local stories that reveal connections with other villages and cities.

The *hamula* in the Palestinian Territories have adapted to various political and social changes that have affected or influenced the region throughout the twentieth century (for instance, the British Mandate, the emergence of the state of Israel, the Six-Day War, the First and Second Intifada, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict). This indicates that clans are not fixed nor are they strictly biologically determined. Rather, clans change by incorporating new families and removing others, while transforming the role and importance of the clan (Davis 2010). Hence the influence of the clans varies from place to place in the Palestinian Territories. According to a recent report, families with tribal ancestry are strongest and more influential in the Gaza Strip and in the Hebron district in the southern part of the West Bank (Land Info 2008).

To what extent is the clan system present among Palestinians migrants? Were they lost, transformed? In Honduras, family and kin relationships, as well as previous knowledge and skills in commerce and trade and capital, began to play a significant role in Palestinians' commercial activities when they opened stores in various cities in the North Coast. At the end of the nineteenth century and mainly in the early twentieth century, Palestinians migrated to Honduras's North Coast from three towns: Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, and Bethlehem, which in the early twentieth century were part of the former Ottoman Empire.[1] They were predominantly Christian, and have a long tradition in transregional trade and commerce (Norris 2013). Palestinians did not arrive straight from these three towns; many arrived via other migratory routes that include El Salvador, Chile, the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti (Foroohar 2011, Marín Guzmán 2000).

Palestinian migrants had sufficient human and economic capital, which contributed to securing nonethnic urban consumers and allowed them to enter Honduras despite harsh migratory policies against non-Europeans.[2] Most Christian Palestinians had had access to education in the missionary schools in their hometowns (Norris 2013, González 1992). A recent study indicates that a Christian Arab elite had indeed emerged in the geographic area in which Palestinian migrants originated[3] (Robson 2011). This appears to be the case with Honduras. Some migrants from Bethlehem (such as the Hasboun, Giacaman, and Handal families), who became successful entrepreneurs in Honduras, were already well established financially and commercially in the early twentieth century (Foroohar 2011). Palestinians' high levels of human capital, their access to capital abroad, knowledge of various languages, and innovative forms of selling products, such as buying on credit, allowed them to establish businesses that targeted a nonethnic urban consumer market without much competition.

Palestinian stores also relied on the family, both individual and extended. The Palestinian community had grown considerably in the early twentieth century due to the difficult socioeconomic conditions in the home societies (Euraque 1996, Amaya Banegas 1997, Foroohar 2011). The Palestinian community also grew because many returned to their hometowns to fetch family members, such as wives, siblings, or cousins, who would work in the stores as paid and unpaid labor. As Waldinger and Aldrich (1990) point out, the size of a migrant community helps sustain migrant entrepreneurship since the community becomes a continuous source of labor. And indeed, the size of the Palestinian community, the largest immigrant community in the North Coast, contributed to consolidating and maintaining the retail stores. Yet family and kinship relations were central not only because they provided labor to incoming co-ethnics but also because they supported Palestinian migrants both emotionally and economically (for instance, when migrants began their own businesses) in Honduras.

Family and kinship relations contributed to establishing trade networks with other Palestinian merchants throughout the North Coast as well as abroad due to their activity of importing products for their retail stores. Palestinian trade networks were maintained and strengthened principally through endogamic marriages and the above-mentioned patrimonial management strategies, thus concentrating business shares and accumulated capital within nuclear and extended Palestinian families living in the North Coast (González 1992, Amaya Banegas 1997).

Endogamic marriages are generally perceived as a sign of nonassimilation of Palestinians as well as isolation from Honduran society, especially in the early twentieth century. Studies argue that Palestinians began "assimilating" around the 1950s when many took up permanent residence and obtained Honduran citizenship, and especially because Palestinians began to marry local Hondurans. However, a recent study on Honduras's main economic groups indicates that endogamic marriages are still present among affluent Palestinian entrepreneurs (Morales 2010, Flores 1990). For instance, table 5.1 shows some commercial activities and joint ventures of the Abudoj business, the Abudoj Family Group (Grupo Familiar Abudoj). Originally started in Bethlehem, the Abudoj family business is involved in various commercial and industrial activities such as the manufacturing of processed foods (including Arabic foods), importation of vehicles, advertising, car rentals, real estate, and so forth. The Abudoj Family Group establishes commercial activities and joint ventures with non-Palestinian families, but mainly with other Palestinian families through marriage (for instance, with the Zablahs and Hasbuns) or because they are members of the same Palestinian community (Morales 2010).

This data also suggests that the Abudoj's joint ventures with other Palestinian families are connected to their shared histories not only as migrants but also as members of one of the groups of families or clans (*hamula*), which are interlinked and dedicated to trade and commerce in their homeland, most noticeably Bethlehem. As Norris (2013) points out, Bethlehem was already an important center of global trade in the nineteenth

Table 5.1 Business activities and joint ventures of Abudoj Family Group (2007)

Family Business Group	*Business Activity*
Bendeck, Canahuati, Zablah, Simón, Sikaffy, Andonie, Handal, Larach (Non-Palestinian families) Bueso, Callejas, Bográn, Brandel, San Martín, Leiva	Banking
Kafie, Rischmawi, Kafati, Bendeck, Nasralla, Barjum, Handal, Kattán, Jaar, Faraj, Mahomar, Canahuati, Dacarett, Andonie, Atala, Facussé, Zablah, Fléfil, Saybe, Hasbun, Mourra, Sabat, Odeh	Sports, Recreation, and Culture
Canahuati, Kafati, Atala, Handal, Asfura, Kattán, Siwady (Non-Palestinian Families): Vinelli, Lardizábal, Callejas, Goldstein, Bueso	Hotel
Kafati	Distribution of food products and Arabic food products

Source: Morales, Santiago (2010). Grupos Económicos de Honduras. *Revista Economía Política*, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, 101–140.

century largely because of the influence of European Catholicism. Since the late seventeenth century, Franciscan friars not only set up missionaries and schools, to which Bethlehemites had access, but also were instrumental to the emergence of the craft industry, particularly religious handicrafts. Bethlehem's groups of families or clans acquired different skills in trade, commerce, and handicrafts as artisans, translators, and interpreters, establishing a merchant middle class that traded locally and in foreign markets. For instance, the *tarajmeh* was a clan initially made up of translators and guides for European pilgrims. However, clans diversified their original activities and work when they began migrating in the nineteenth century (Norris 2013).

Seven clans emerged in Bethlehem: the Anatreh (17 families), the Farahiyeh (62 families), the Fawaghreh (19 families), the Hreizat (22 families), the Najajreh (35 families), the Qawawseh (14 families), and the Tarajmeh (27 families). Another clan emerged more recently, the Syriac community (91 families). All are Christian except the Fawaghreh, which is Muslim. The Abudoj family originally belonged to the Najajreh clan, and even though clan reference or identification appears lost in the Abudoj family history today, as in the other Palestinian families, endogamic practices and entrepreneuerial and trade activities are undertaken with families either from the same clan or those belonging to other clans originally from Bethlehem. For instance, the Abudoj's business activities and marriages are with families that are also from Bethlehem. The exceptions are the Kafati and Larach families from Beit Jala. Three families originally from Bethlehem belong to the same clan as Abudoj: Handal, Hasbun, and Nassar. The rest belong to the Farahiyeh (Simon, Asfura, Dacarett, Facussé, Moura, Simon, and Zablah), the Anatreh (Bendeck, Canahuati, and Bendeck), the Hreizat (Atala, Barjum, and Sabat), the Tarajmeh (Flefil), and the Qawawseh (Andonie), that is, all of the six Christian family groups.

The absence of clan reference that can be noticed when one speaks to many Palestinian families today in Honduras appears to be linked to their migration experience and to the fluctuating feature of clans and their family histories. The initial migration of Bethlehemites as well as migrants from Beit Jala and Beit Sahour, in the early twentieth century was circulatory, which allowed migrants to retain trade networks and endogamic practices with members of the same clan in their place of origin as well as use the clan system to retell and remember their local histories. However, as many migrants began settling permanently abroad and establishing trade and kinship networks with other migrants belonging to other *hamula*, the clan became less of an identity reference for the newer generations. Migrant families began to construct their histories in relation to their place of origin such as Bethlehem or Beit Jala, and their experience as Arab migrants or descendents in Honduras. More recently, these places of origin have been replaced with one place, "Palestine" (Gutiérrez Rivera 2014). The emergence of "Palestine" as a common place of origin in many family histories is linked to events ocurring in the Palestinian Territories, especially the project of creating of a Palestinian state and the fact that migrants and descendants are still connected to the Palestinian Territories by traveling to meet relatives. Furthermore, constructing and imagining Palestine as a place of origin gives Palestinian migrant families a collective history as well as a sense of being a unified and distinct community in the host society. In this sense, endogamic practices are relevant. Not only do they help reproduce the Palestinian community but they also shape the relations of the individuals, who learn values such as loyalty, responsibility and so on.

Despite the absence of clan reference in family histories, Palestinian families remain clannish in various ways, which allows them to accumulate and retain capital within their community as well as emerge as an economic elite. The endogamic practices and entrepreneurial activities of the Abudoj family illustrated above are present in many Palestinian entrepreneur families today. Palestinian families still recruit relatives or members of the Palestinian community to work in their businesses. It is common for the owner of a business to place his son or daughter as manager. Their siblings and cousins would be placed in other high administrative positions. Marriage to other members of the Palestinian community ensures that capital stays within the community through inheritance or by combining capital. Even though Palestinian migrants and descendants have married outside their community, members of the most affluent families are generally expected to marry members of the Palestinian community.

Another important issue linked to Palestinians' capital expansion and success is the role of gender, particularly the role of Palestinian wives. Many Palestinian wives worked (as unpaid labor) in their husband's business. The fact that Palestinian women arriving in Honduras were educated placed them in an advantageous situation. Furthermore, Palestinian husbands generally included their wives (and children, even the daughters) when they registered properties. In the absence or death of the husband, the wife generally took over the business (Gonzalez 1992). The role of gender in Palestinian entrepreneurship has been neglected in most studies. Looking at household and business strategies more closely can yield insight into the success of Palestinian entrepreneurship.

Palestinian trade and social networks and ties were not strictly based on family and kin relations. Various organizations and associations also contributed to not only strengthening the connections of the Honduran Palestinian community with other Palestinian migrant communities in other countries but also to developing an "Arab" identity in the first half of the twentieth century. Discrimination by the host society pushed Palestinians into isolation, especially in that period. However, Palestinians reinforced their seclusion through endogamic practices and because many were in Honduras temporarily, but also because many perceived Honduras as a poor underdeveloped country. Palestinians' representation of Honduras (and Latin America) as poor, less modern, and uncivilized probably stems from "nationalist and imperialist ideologies from the Middle East, [particularly] Ottoman representations of the New World" (Pastor 2012: 1).

Against the backdrop of discrimination and isolation, Palestinians, who had become a sizeable population, took up residence in the host society and established organizations and associations to provide support, arranging the community beyond the traditional family and kin relations, and developing and mobilizing identity references that culturally distinguished the Palestinian migrant community. In Honduras, various associations emerged, such as the Asociación Femenina Hondureña Árabe (Arab Honduran Women's Association), the Sociedad Juventud Unión Árabe (Society of Arab Youth), the Centro Cultural Hondureño Árabe (Arab Honduran Cultural Center), and the soccer team El Club Deportivo Palestino. The Christian

Orthodox Church was also established in San Pedro Sula, and many associations stemmed from their relation to the Church, such as the Comité Ortodoxo (Orthodox Committee), Comité de Damas Ortodoxas (Women's Orthodox Committee), and Club Juvenil (Youth Club).

Two organizations particularly contributed to establishing a transnational support network for the Palestinian community, the Sociedad Juventud Unión Árabe (Society of Arab Youth, or SUJA) and the Christian Orthodox Church. The short-lived SUJA was founded in 1930 in San Pedro Sula by Jesús Larach and Jesús Sahuri. It organized regular meetings at which Palestinian migrants could eat food from their hometowns, listen and dance to their music, speak Arabic, and talk about their experience in the host society. SUJA established a radio program called *La Hora Árabe*, and a weekly newspaper called *Rumbos*, which published poems, editorials, and articles by first- and second-generation Palestinians, as well as Arab poets such as Gibran Khalil, and news and reports about the Palestinian communities in different countries in addition to updates about events occurring in the home societies. SUJA rapidly extended to other cities in the country, such as Tegucigalpa, La Ceiba, Tela, and abroad, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba, Mexico and Nicaragua, establishing a transnational social network that connected the various Palestinian migrant communities through media (newspaper and radio) and meetings.

The Christian Orthodox Church has also played an important role in establishing transnational social ties and networks that link Palestinian communities. The Christian Orthodox Church was founded in 1963 and is now under the jurisdiction of Archbishop Antonio Chedraoui in the Archdiocese that encompasses Mexico, Venezuela, Central America, and the Caribbean, pointing to the transnational networks and ties that stretch across various regions in Latin America and even the Middle East (for instance, Syria). The Christian Orthodox Church is also involved in education. It is associated with the trilingual San Juan Bautista School, in which instruction is in Arabic, Spanish and English, and children learn about Middle Eastern heritage and culture (López and Speer 2006). The Christian Orthodox's transnational social ties and networks and their involvement in education have contributed to establishing features that, I suggest, culturally distinguish the Palestinian community—such as religious identity, language, and Middle Eastern heritage—from the host society.

The SUJA and the Christian Orthodox Church have established sociocultural ties in multiple states that suggest the emergence of an "Arab" identity through the national constructions of identity in the host society based on mestizaje. Empirical data is needed to understand more about these transnational connections and ties, as well as Palestinian identity construction.

However, both these organizations and the Palestinian family/clan structure established formal and informal sociocultural ties and trade networks across multiple states, which mobilized Palestinian resources that have strengthened their social mobility, connected them with other Palestinian migrant communities and the home society, and promoted references that culturally distinguish them in Honduran society. Furthermore, Palestinian social mobility never would have been possible without the North Coast: its early transnationalization helped Palestinians emerge as an economic elite in the region and in the country today.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the social mobility of Palestinian migrants in Honduras, exploring two issues that have received little scholarly attention: the role of the North Coast and the Palestinian family/clan structure. In the first case, Palestinian entrepreneurs' success and capital expansion are closely linked to a transnationalized space. Palestinian entrepreneurship has relied on cross-border networks and ties to secure capital from abroad, establish transnational business/trade partners, and diversify their capital and products in the host country. The North Coast region's long history with foreign capital and its enclave past turned the region into a transnationalized space, thus making possible the mobilization of migrants' resources and capital. Palestinian merchants not only became new economic actors in this setting by moving capital, labor, and culture from one place to another but also established alternative trade circuits to the ones established and dominated by the United States and European companies to import (and later export) products for their retail stores.

Second, this chapter observes that Palestinian merchants' trade networks appear to be largely based on kinship. I suggest that kinship trade networks, which persist today through endogamic marriages, are related to the Palestinian family structure, particularly its organization in clans. The clan system is still present in the home territories of Palestinian migrants, contributing to settling negotiations or mediating with other clans. In Honduras, reference to a clan appears to have disappeared from Palestinian migrant family histories. Instead of using the clan system to imagine local family histories, the village of origin and the experience in the host society are interwoven in Palestinian migrant family histories. Recent generations speak more of "Palestine" as a place of origin. This is because the clan system and family histories are not fixed but malleable, adapting, in this case, to the migratory experience and to political and social events occurring in the Palestinian territories. More empirical research is needed to understand the modifications of family histories and genealogies as well as the role of gender in the family trees and capital accumulation within the community.

Exploring these issues of the Palestinian migrant community questions the traditional perception of Palestinians as an assimilated minority group. As Pastor (2009) observes, an "Arab" identity did emerge in the 1930s and 1940s vis-à-vis Honduras' national discourse and ideology of mestizaje. Palestinian social ties and networks were partly organized and backed by social and religious institutions and associations, such as the Christian Orthodox Church and the SUJA. They not only link the various Palestinian migrant communities across multiple states (for instance, with the Palestinian communities in Chile, the United States, Central America, the Caribbean, and the home societies) but also circulate common sociocultural references (such as religious affiliation), upon which the Palestinian migrant community in Honduras establish their representations as a culturally distinct group. Similarly, Palestinian migrant communities in other parts of Latin America (for instance, in Chile) share a sense of belonging to the host society, "while preserving cultural identity" (El-Hattar 2011: 203).

Finally, studying the Palestinian community in a small region like the Caribbean Coast of Honduras forces us to rethink the economic and social history of the Caribbean and Central America. The region's colonial past and the US and European dominance and strong presence are the usual starting points for understanding the political economy and history of the Caribbean and Central America. In taking this approach, scholars have neglected the historic role of non-European migrants, for instance, Arabs, Asians, and Jews, in shaping the region's politics and economy. In this sense, it is important to "provide an alternative, decolonial way" (Grosfóguel 2009: 10) of thinking about the Caribbean and Central America. This would involve considering Palestinians. as well as other Arab communities (for instance, the Syro-Lebanese) Jews, Asians, and Afro-descendants, as historic subjects, to shift the traditional viewpoint for analyzing the historiographies of the Caribbean and Central America.

Notes

1. These towns are now part of the West Bank.
2. Honduras's migration policies in the early twentieth century were aimed at attracting mainly Europeans. High entry fees were imposed on migrants from other regions such as the Middle East and Asia, which the Honduran government considered unwanted. Nevertheless, "Arabs," that is, migrants from what is today the Palestinian Territories and, to a lesser degree, from Lebanon and Syria, paid these high entry fees (Euraque 1998, Amaya Banegas 1997).

3. These Arab Christians were "[p]rominent in every profession and present at every level of politics. Arab Christian leaders did not view themselves as part of a disenfranchised threatened community; they considered themselves central actors in Palestine's emergence as a modern Arab nation" (Robson 2011: 2).

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CHAPTER 6

The Implications of Socioeconomic Background for Moroccan Transnational Family Practices*

Caroline Zickgraf

Introduction

Families separated by migration are nothing new, but only recently have these familial relationships that have stretched over time and distance been systematically analyzed. The most pivotal shift in migration studies that has promulgated the detailed examination of cross-border family life is the rise of the transnational paradigm (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994, Glick Schiller 1997, 2004, Guarnizo and Smith 1998, Vertovec 2004, 2009). Transnational scholars moved away from a settlement-oriented perspective on migration processes to one that involved both the sending and receiving societies simultaneously. This opened up theoretical discussion and empirical case studies about how the lives of migrants and their non-migrant counterparts are embedded in a social space that is not intrinsically linked to the geographical space of their daily lives (Faist 2000). The detachment of social space from geographical space is particularly apparent in the domain of family life.

The turn to a transnational perspective in migration studies, and the feminization of labor migration in recent decades established a foundation on which to re-examine the impact of migration on family life, even if international separation never meant the complete severance of family ties in the past. Advances in communication technology and quicker and lower-cost transportation have led to new and more diverse ways for families to keep in touch, even across national borders. As with transnationalism more broadly, transnational family studies focus on the ways in which transportation and telecommunication developments help families (nuclear or extended) stay in touch and maintain a sense of familyhood and copresence even after migration (Urry 2007, Madianou and Miller 2012).

According to Landolt and Da (2005: 625), "time-space compressing technologies offer families with varying degrees of resources new possibilities for organizing family practices of reproduction and production around multi-local border-crossing arrangements." The way in which information and communication technologies (ICTs) and time-compressing technologies have mediated these relationships is of particular interest for understanding how migrants and their families cope with distance, how family relationships are enacted and experienced through communication, and the effects of these innovations on the obligations and expectations of family members. Yet much of what we know about the lives and interactions between migrants and their family members who have "stayed behind" comes from case studies and ethnographies that have focused on the experiences of relatively poor labor migrants who have left their country of origin seeking low-skilled, low-paid work in the industrialized, global North and who, along with their families, then suffer emotionally and socially in order to prosper financially (Hochschild 2000, 2004, Parreñas 2001, 2005). Although there are some studies on wealthier, Asian families separated by distance (Waters 2002, 2003, Chiang 2008), scholarship has remained relatively silent on middle- and upper-middle-class families, and rarely are studies conducted on a particular immigrant group characterized by diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.

In an attempt to remedy this, the following chapter approaches how middle- to upper-middle-class Moroccans or persons of Moroccan descent "do family" across national borders, here specifically between Morocco and Belgium. Based on a qualitative case study, the chapter draws out the implications of socioeconomic background for transnational family life, specifically family practices (Morgan 1996, 2011). Massive Moroccan migration to Europe may have begun as low-skilled, "guest worker" migration flows in the framework of bilateral agreements in the 1960s, but the migrant trajectory and profile of the Moroccan population today is highly variegated. This diversity offers a rich sample for analyzing differences in transnational family practices between wealthier and poorer families, but also resource differentials within family networks themselves.

Theoretical Framework

In the last two decades, scholars have been increasingly concerned with how family life is affected by international migration. The literature on "global care chains" (Hochschild 2000) and the "international transfer of caretaking" (Parreñas 2001) has looked at the commodification of both formal and informal care, in which typically female domestic workers move from poorer countries to wealthier, industrialized countries in the Global North to work as child or elderly caregivers, or in institutional settings as nurses, in order to be able to send home money to support their loved ones. These women often left young children and spouses behind and had to renegotiate their roles as breadwinners, mothers, and wives. In parallel, studies developed within the transnational migration studies paradigm were less concerned with the commodification of care, and more with whether and how migrants continued to maintain a sense of kinship across national borders. Bryceson and Vuorela (2002: 3) defined these "transnational families" as "families that live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely 'familyhood,' even across national borders." Both lines of study captured the reality of many immigrants who must negotiate and adapt their family lives within the destination countries and across national borders.

Despite salient aspects, literature on transnational families, and transnational migrants more broadly, usually separates them into two types: professional migrants with financial resources, education, and language skills, such as "astronaut families" (Waters 2002, Chiang 2008), and the more frequently studied low-skilled transnational families whose migration is usually motivated by economic reasons (such as in the global care chain) or the seeking of asylum.

> Transnational families vary by race, class and nation. Upper and middle-class families may choose to transnationalize in order to pursue career or educational opportunities, while poor families, usually with roots in the global south, transnationalize as a means of finding work that pays a living wage. (Schmalzbauer 2005: 2–3)

Schmalzbauer's distinction between family types echoes the division in broader migration literature in which the latter group are "pushed into transnational lifestyles by necessity because they cannot gain a secure economic foothold in their home country" or in the host country, as opposed to professional migrants "who have the human and cultural capital to take advantage of opportunities in two settings, voluntarily adapt transnational livelihood strategies" (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 133).

Following this research division, case studies tend to document either the experiences of the elite transnational families (Bourgouin 2011) or the low skilled (Merla 2011). Rarely examined are the families that fall in between: "middle-class" migrants and their families (Chiang 2008, Prébin 2011), "who have access to enough economic, social and cultural capital within their extended networks to have a relative degree of control over their mobilities and transnational relationships" (Baldassar and Merla 2013: 10). Even less common are studies that incorporate individuals and families from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds within the same sample. Research on nuclear families seems overly bifurcated between elite family practices (astronaut families) and the "ideology of *marianismo* (a stereotyped gender role where the ideal woman is self-sacrificing and serves her children and husband) to reify the fate of the working transnational mother," rather than covering the diversity and range of class and resource differences that can be found within and among wider family networks (Landolt and Da 2005: 629). The consideration of a multitude of socioeconomic backgrounds within one case study can shed light upon the seeming opposition between elite and working-class transnational family practices, include middle-class experiences, and contribute to an overarching framework that considers more than one socioeconomic background in the same analysis.

To better understand how family life "is done," we have linked the study of poor and wealthy transnational families, to look at family practices and what consequences migration has for previously proximate families." There are opposing views on the impacts of migration on family life. A good deal of the literature on families dispersed among two or more nations has focused on the stresses and fractures resulting from migration and family separation. Contrary to much of the broader transnational literature, in which "[t]he essence of migrant transnationalism is that physical absence is compatible with social presence and participation" (Carling et al. 2012: 192), these studies depict transnational family relations as harmful and disruptive for family life, causing marital strife and strains on parent-child relationships. For instance, Parreñas (2005: 125) showed that, in contrast to the children of migrant fathers, "the children of migrant mothers are more likely to describe their families as 'broken,'" and are more likely to feel abandoned by their mother's migration than their father's.

The narrative that family is shaken by a member's migration is usually (but not exclusively) found in studies of nuclear families in which a parent migrates, leaving young children behind. Another group of studies, however, typically challenges the notion that separation begets dysfunction and breakdown. The emerging literature, especially that on adult children and their aging parents and broader networks, views the impacts of separation on family relations more optimistically by demonstrating family resilience and adaptation to geographical and temporal separation (Chamberlain and Goulbourne 2001, Herrera Lima 2001, Baldassar et al. 2007, Olwig 2007, Goulbourne, Reynolds, Solomos and Zontini 2010). Rather than portraying negative outcomes of international migration, this literature stresses how families are maintained and reproduced in spite of geographical dispersion (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, Mason 2004, Zontini 2007, 2010, Wilding 2006, Reynolds 2006, Goulbourne et al. 2010). Based on their study of transnational Caribbean families, for instance, Goulbourne and Chamberlain (2001) asserted that geographical distance did not preclude close family relationships and that people emphasized the importance of transnational ties for maintaining strong emotional bonds. Recent research on kin and caring work contends that families are able to provide support and remain close even after physical separation: "Much like ethnic, national and diasporic identities and relationships, family identities and kin relations can be maintained across time and distance and are not determined by particular localities or by state borders" (Baldassar et al. 2007: 13).

Zontini (2004: 11) declared, "The very existence of transnational families rests on kin ties being kept alive and maintained, in spite of great distances and prolonged separations." One of the purposes of transnational family practices is to give social meaning to the family relationship itself (Carling et al. 2012). The sustenance, reinforcement, and reproduction of family relationships have been investigated under the concepts of "kin work" (di Leonardo 1987), "relativising" (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002), and most recently, "transnational caregiving," or forms of exchanging care and support across national borders (Baldassar et al. 2007: 14). Typically, transnational caregiving has been applied to intergenerational exchange between adult migrant children and their elderly parents in the country of origin (Baldassar et al. 2007, Baldassar 2010). Care as depicted in these studies is often equated with support and involves a broad spectrum of practices that is not limited to the provision of physical need-based, dependency care such as that for children or the elderly. It encompasses both an ethic, *caring about,* and an activity, *caring for* (Goulbourne et al. 2010, Baldassar and Merla 2013). Caring about and caring for activities include "a diverse range of reciprocal and practical caring work performed by members of families dispersed across geographical spaces" (Goulbourne et al. 2010: 81).

Although lip service is paid to the various types of families engaged in transnational care practices, kinwork, or relativizing, seldom are the variations of backgrounds brought into the same sample to understand how they affect transnational family life. Transnational elites are viewed as "mobile" rather than "migrant," reflecting class and status distinctions, and "seem to move more by choice and be in a better position to negotiate their connections, their nationalities, and benefits associated with their choice of a national residence" (Bryecson and Vuorela 2002: 8). This superior positioning in a kind of transnational family hierarchy would then suggest that individuals and their families with more resources, who come from a higher socioeconomic background, have more control over, and one might even say more positive, experiences of family life across borders. Do the resources available to middle- to upper-class families allow them to "do" family better, or differently? How these differences, both among individuals and within family networks, qualitatively play out in the Moroccan case is the subject of the following analysis.

Moroccan Migration Background

Before embarking on the specifics of this study, it is first necessary to explain why Moroccan migration offers a rich case study for many migration issues, including socioeconomic background as it relates to transnational family practices. Over the past 50 years, Morocco has become one of the world's most important emigration countries. Its migration flows are among the most highly diverse because of the variety of ethnic groups, socioeconomic positions, migration types, and regions of origin and destination (Collyer, Cherti, Lacroix, and van Heelsum 2009). The Moroccan population abroad is approximately 3.4 million nationals[1] with natural increase as well as perpetual emigration contributing to its growth. Although the massive migration flows during the guest worker period are most commonly seen as the start of Moroccan emigration, international emigration from Morocco can be found during and even before the French protectorate was declared in 1912 (Lassonde 1982, de Haas 2007, Bilgili and Weyel 2009). Seasonal and circular migrants moved from Morocco to work in Algerian agriculture and vineyards, and Moroccans were recruited to fight for the French army in both World Wars. But the major labor flows to Europe kicked off after Moroccan independence in 1956 with the signing of bilateral agreements or "guest worker" programs between Morocco and France (1963), West Germany (1963), Belgium (1964), and the Netherlands (1969). In an effort to reroute domestic rural-to-urban migration flows, rid itself of labor surpluses in certain regions, and stem political unrest in the Rif region, the Moroccan government used precision-targeted emigration tactics to promote male labor migration to Europe (Iskander 2010).

Initially, the sending and receiving countries, as well as the migrants themselves, considered this movement to be temporary. Many migrants expected to work for a time in Europe and save enough money to invest in land or start a business in Morocco. With this mind-set, family members, including spouses and children, stayed in Morocco and often lived off of the money sent back by their migrant family member(s). However, the closing of "Fortress Europe" in the early 1970s, with increasing migration restrictions and the ending of guest worker programs, would change the relationship between migration and family life. Migrant workers were no longer assured that once they left Europe they would be able to get back in, and Morocco at the time was experiencing political and financial instability. This meant that many Moroccans chose to stay in Europe and take advantage of their right to family reunification in European countries (de Haas 2007). This shift in migration policy also meant a shift in family life and immigrants' short- and long-term migration plans. What was once considered a temporary sojourn took on a more permanent character.

In Belgium, guest worker family reunification continued into the mid- to late 1980s. After initial family reunification, family-forming migration has been an important migration route for Moroccans entering Belgium (Lievens 1999, Reniers 1999). In this phase, many second-generation Moroccans chose to return to the country, and more specifically their region of origin to find a spouse. After marriage, that spouse qualified to legally join his/her partner abroad. This path of entry, family-forming migration, still remains popular among Moroccans living in Belgium. In 2011, 71 percent of first permits of stay delivered to Moroccan nationals were for family reasons.[2]

The settlement of families in Europe since the 1970s and the continued emigration of Moroccans abroad have resulted in a wide variety of migrant profiles. At the socioprofessional level, Moroccans are represented in all professions and economic statuses in host countries, with a growing variety that includes engineers, doctors, lawyers, and so forth going far beyond the typically unskilled male labor migrants of the 1960s (Ministère des MRE 2012). Over the last decade, selective migration policies in North America have promoted highly skilled and professional migrations: 51.7 percent of Moroccan emigrants have higher education (44.9% in the United States and 62.7% in Canada) (MPC EU Neighbourhood 2013).[3] Their migration is influenced by the substantial unemployment among the highly educated in Morocco (de Haas 2009).

That is not to say that Moroccan migrants are now entirely middle or upper class: Moroccan emigrants in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are still more likely to have a low level of education (59.3%), especially in Italy (where they account for 76.6%) and Spain (78.6%), and to be employed in low-skilled occupations (MPC EU Neighbourhood 2013). However, Moroccan migration has expanded beyond the state-sponsored movement of a low-skilled, young male labor migrant and is not characterized by heterogeneity. That diversity creates fertile terrain on which to build a better understanding of transnational family practices, including caregiving, especially because the Moroccan population abroad is marked by a strong attachment to the country of origin. Moroccan immigrants and their descendants in Belgium, as well as throughout Europe, maintain social, cultural, and economic ties with Morocco, but these ties are especially noticeable in the family sphere. A 2009 CCME-BVA survey found that 65 percent of Belgian-Moroccan respondents visited Morocco at least once a year[4] and 60 percent financially contributed to a family member in Morocco, while 90 percent of first- and second-generation respondents thought that it was important that their children maintain family links with Morocco. However, little is known about the influence of class or socioeconomic background on Belgian-Moroccan transnational practices. Migration from Morocco affects the rich, the poor, and the in-between, and its diversity and persistence offers a rich case in which to observe and analyze how socioeconomic backgrounds affect the ways in which Moroccans and their descendants "do" family across national borders.

Methods

With the dominance of family-related transnational practices in mind, the following analysis qualitatively examines how middle-class Moroccans maintain a sense of familyhood across international borders based on data collected during research conducted for a doctoral dissertation from May 2011 to December 2012. Along with a transnational perspective, this project used a transnational methodology to understand transnational practices as reciprocal and multidirectional and to avoid a "methodological nationalism" in which the territorially bound nation-state (or society) is depicted as a homogenous entity (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). More often than not, empirical studies on transnationalism and migration have overlooked the relevance of migrants' counterparts in the countries of origin, but family life in a transnational context must include both migrants and their transnational "reference points" (Boccagni 2012) to understand these cross-border relationships that do not occur within a confined territory or physical place:

> This [. . .] was essential, because transnational caregiving is not something that only one person does. Rather, it occurs in the *interactions* between adult children, parents and their kin living in different countries, and it is necessary to understand both sides of the exchange. (Baldassar et al. 2007: 18, italics in original)

Accordingly, two primary cities were selected for fieldwork in the form of qualitative in-depth interviews and participant observation: Liège, Belgium, and Oujda, Morocco. Liège is an eastern Belgium city located in the French-speaking region of Wallonia. As home to many of the booming postwar industries including coal and metallurgy, it was one of the first sites of Moroccan migration to Belgium (Martiniello and Bousetta 2003). Moroccans still arrive in the city for work, studies, or family reunification. Precise statistics are difficult to obtain, but the official population of Moroccan nationals in the province of Liège, according to Belgian statistics, is 7,400 (not including those who have naturalized), of whom nearly 6,000 live in the metropolitan area of Liège, with 4,191 in the city itself.[5] This number is somewhat misleading because Moroccans in Belgium have a high propensity to naturalize (and until recently they could do so after only three years of residence), and because the statistics do not account for naturalized Belgian citizens or undocumented migrants. For these reasons, precise statistics about the naturalized and undocumented Moroccan population in Liège are not available."

The second site of fieldwork, Oujda, is a traditional area of intense international migration, having sent migrant laborers to Algeria when it was a French protectorate, and then migrants to Europe as guest workers. It is now a source of a variety of migrants from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds for all the major receiving countries of Moroccan migration. The city is only 15 kilometers from the Algerian border and, as such, is also a city of immigration and circular and transit migration. It is the capital of the country's Eastern region, which has one of the strongest emigration histories in the country. It accounts for 28.3 percent of the Moroccan population abroad.[6] The region as a whole, despite its long emigration history and strong flows of remittances, has lagged behind other parts of the country in terms of development.

This means that many of its highly skilled and tertiary-educated individuals—some of whom studied abroad—leave the region for other more developed parts of Morocco, or leave the country entirely to go to Europe or North America. It has therefore mirrored much of Moroccan national emigration patterns since its postmigratory population of second- and third-generation guest workers is juxtaposed with newly departed migrants from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.

At these two sites, I conducted over 40 semistructured interviews with migrants and nonmigrants from a variety of backgrounds. In addition, I stayed in the homes of participants in Oujda and accompanied migrants on their return visits. When possible, I moved within family networks that encompassed, but were not limited to, Liège and Oujda to collect multiple perspectives within these families. The sample was intended to capture the variation present in the Moroccan population abroad, and thus includes men, women, the young and old, long-settled migrants and their descendants, and the newly arrived. The subsequent analysis will focus especially on those interviewees who are highly educated, successful entrepreneurs and/or come from families that may be considered middle class and above. However, while some families have a relatively homogenous economic or educational background, many of the family networks include members with a wide variety of capital and resources, which reveals some of the consistencies, contrasts, and asymmetries in transnational family life for relatively privileged migrants.

Data

For all of the families in my study—regardless of individual wealth, education, or employment—the primary ways of doing kin work and providing care transnationally were through material exchange, long-distance communication, and visiting. The existence of these three broad groups of practices did not change according to socioeconomic background, That is to say, that all families exchanged money and goods, found ways of communicating with each other across national borders, and relied on annual or semiannual visits to provide in-person caregiving, but socioeconomic background did influence how, why, and which individuals and families engaged in and initiated these transnational practices.

Material Exchange

The most frequently discussed Moroccan transnational practice, and also the most tangible form of transnational caregiving, is that of material exchange, and more specifically financial remittances. Remittances, or the money sent back by migrants to Morocco, are a major source of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Morocco received 6.2 billion USD in 2012 alone (World Bank 2013). Of course, money may be sent back by emigrants to fund development projects, start a local or transnational business, or be invested in land or housing in the country of origin, but the most common explanation for financial remittances is the need for migrants to support a family member still living in the country of origin, especially since it was understood that their migration was part of a household strategy of capital accumulation (Stark and Lucas 1988). Although it is difficult to know their exact allocation, among Oujdi participants most money was sent back to relatives in the country of origin, above all parents.

The traditional assumption about migrants' remittances is that they are need based. Migrants send home money to their families in Morocco because their families *need* it. This may be true even among middle- to upper-class Moroccans. Education or entrepreneurship during or after migration may have allowed them to acquire material wealth, education, and professional training that does not extend to their parents or the broader kin network. An adult child's financial success does not mean that their parents were wealthy or highly educated. and so a wealthy entrepreneur in Belgium may still be financially responsible for family members in Morocco. It is widely recognized that remittances are a demonstrated tool for poverty alleviation and social mobility for the families of migrants, but do financially secure Moroccan families still receive remittances? If so, how and why do remittances operate for those families for whom remittances are not necessary or an intended objective of migration?

The logical inference from a need-based understanding of remittances is that families who do not need money will not get it. In her study of immigrants' transnational caregiving in Australia, Baldassar (2010: 4) notes, "In the case of the affluent migrants in particular, their migration does not represent an economic necessity for themselves or their families back home. Hence, remittances are unheard of and if money is exchanged it usually flows from parents to migrants." Among my respondents, this was only partially true. Sending back money was not a given. Several respondents did not send money because their parents and/or other family members were financially stable, whether through pensions, successful businesses, or inherited family wealth. When asked about remitting money, Ahmed,[7] a 33-year-old chemist, replied, *"No, frankly, not really. I take gifts when I go there. And I give money when I'm there. Because my brother, he works, my father has his pension."*[8]

It is also true that reverse remittances were common among my participants who come from middle-class or wealthier family backgrounds, in which it was the nonmigrant parents who sent their children money. Participants who migrated for studies or employment usually had their initial migration funded by their parents back home. While poorer families also contributed in part to their children's migration, these contributions were more often made as part of a household financial strategy in which the children would earn money and then return the investment, becoming a source of household support for the duration of their migration. For example, Yasser, a 24 year-old graduate student, was encouraged to go and study in Belgium by his parents, who assured him of their financial support:

> My father, also my mother, said to me, "Why not continue your studies [in Europe]?" For them it did not pose a problem. I don't know, other

> parents they say, "No, once you finish, you stay, you find your job." [...] "You can continue your studies tranquilly," he said to me. "We are there for the financing, don't worry," so really that encouraged me. If not, I had already done five years of study and to then continue, for the financing it's difficult. But he said to me, "Don't worry about it. No worries."(Yasser, 24, Liège)

Yasser received money each month from his parents, and if he ran out, he picked up the phone. He contrasted his migration with that of his maternal uncles, who came from a less well-off (and much bigger) family and had thus migrated to France years earlier to work and support their mother: "That was the case of my uncles. They left to work and send money to their mother. But me, it was absolutely the opposite.... We [his nuclear family] are more or less the middle class, more at ease.... If I didn't have the means, I wouldn't have come here." He had no future plans to remit based on his family's financial situation. He could only imagine sending money if it was meant as part of, or in place of, a gift, not as financial support. Financial help from parents was typical at the start of a migration journey, during migrants' studies, or until they found employment, but it also occurred when adult children struggled financially or looked for or lost work. In this scenario, it was nonmigrant parents, rather than the typically depicted migrant children, who took up the financial burden of the family. The need-based remittance shifted from parent to child and from Morocco to Belgium.

For some families, it is the nonmigrant parents who send money to their children abroad, but other nonmigrant family members still received remittances despite their financial security. Although the lack of financial need meant that some migrants did not make financial remittances to their parents, for others their family's financial means did not extinguish their religious obligations, moral desire, and/or sense of reciprocity to remit either regularly or occasionally to their parents and/or other family members in Morocco. Hamdi, an 81-year-old father of six emigrants, explains why some of his children send him money and why another son (who returned to Morocco after completing his degree in architecture) continues to financially support his parents and sisters:

> Because we, in the Islamic religion, the children help their parents. Even if the parents they have... even if they have enough. They help. Because it is written in the Koran. One helps the parents. You see? [...] Even if I tell him, "Enough!" He says, "My father... I give it to you." (Hamdi, 81, Oujda)

But even though Hamdi's more affluent sons sent money back, not all of his children did so. His migrant children were neither in the same countries nor working with the same material resources. Those who have, give, and those who do not have work or do not earn much are not obligated to remit. That is not to say that his children who do not send are poor—each owns his/her own home in Europe—but they do not have surplus income to give to their parents. The remittances in Hamdi's family thus did not depend on the needs of the nonmigrants, but rather on the capacity of the migrants to give. In this way, the lack of financial resources on the migrant's part mitigates a child's obligations to remit for religious or moral reasons.

Along with or instead of being an obligation, remittances served as symbolic gifts from adult migrants to their parents. The money given was not a tool for poverty alleviation, but a token of gratitude, a reminder of their virtual presence, that they think of their parents, and in place of gift giving. Leila, a 34-year-old PhD researcher in medical sciences in Liège is currently on the receiving end of remittances, like Yasser. Her parents in Morocco, her brother in France, and her husband in Germany supported her during her studies. Unlike Yasser, although she does not currently send money back, she plans to do so upon employment. When asked why she responded,

> I don't know, but I will do it. It's just like that. It's like a thank you. Even if they don't have any need. We have everything in Morocco. My father, he earns well and all that. But voilà, in place of buying something and sending it to them, I'll give them the money and they can take what they want. It's not obligatory [...] Not monthly. When I want. That's how I feel; I want to thank them for everything. I think of them... but it's not obligatory. But there are other people whose families are poor, it is logical that they send money. But I can send money to another, a woman that I know who really has a need for this money. Her husband is sick with throat cancer. He has already metastases and he has two children. I prefer to help this woman than my family. For my family, it is a gesture but this woman needs my money. (Leila, 34, Liège)

Leila's story points to several trends among respondents in terms of remittances. Leila had no obligation to return her parents' money, but she still planned to, not because there was need or an obligation, but as a token of appreciation and a symbolic gesture to show that she "thought of them." Thus, while middle-class and working-class migrants both remitted, or planned to remit, the motivations were quite different: while Leila's intentions were sentimental, others were primarily practical and rooted in a sense of obligation and only secondarily sentimental.

Gifts of money were often intended as surplus income with which parents could purchase luxury items or spend as they wished. For example, one migrant only sent money sporadically upon his mother's request, such as to redecorate the living room. As many of these respondents noted, the money acted symbolically as a gift that was easier than bringing back a multitude of presents, but was not a necessary source of income for their parents. Demonstrating its intention and value as a token, respondents giving money as a present often chose not to remit from abroad but to hand deliver the money during a visit along with other presents such as clothing, electronics, chocolates, and so forth. Ahmed brought some family members presents and others were given money so that they could buy things for themselves:

> My little brother plays football so I bring him football things and he really likes it. My big brother a shirt or a cologne. Well it's just symbolic! But I bring lots of candies for the children, a big bag. For my sisters, too. Often, my sisters, I bring them money. Because here there isn't really typical Moroccan clothing. I prefer to give them the money and they can buy what they want. (Ahmed, 36, Liège)

What was clear from the respondents in this study regardless of their remittance behavior was that remittances cannot be understood solely as an action that is intended for destitute or struggling family members in the country of origin. Some respondents did, through migration, entrepreneurship, and/or education, make a living that surpassed that of their parents and/or siblings. For these people, remittances were intended to alleviate financial troubles, and they were able to send more money than those with lower-paying jobs, informal work, or uncertain employment prospects. The increased capacity to give of these immigrants could meet their nonmigrant parents' practical and financial needs and therefore fulfill their filial obligations. Yet this depiction of the self-made migrant supporting his poor family in the country of origin was not as prevalent as one might imagine. Most respondents who might be considered middle class in fact came from middle-class backgrounds. The reason they could and eventually did migrate was because their parents' financial backing allowed them to do so. In turn, their parents' lack of need precluded any remittances. However, these two situations still follow a need-based conception of financial remittances. How can one explain the fact that migrants remitted despite their families' financial security? The Oujdi-origin participants in this study from higher socioeconomic backgrounds that remitted, did so not out of a sense of obligation or a need to provide financial caregiving transnationally, but rather as part of a broader material exchange in which money was a symbolic gift given with the same intentions as chocolates or clothing—to demonstrate love and that family members were remembered during times of separation, however far.

Long-distance Communication

Although financial remittances dominate discussions of Moroccan transnational practices more broadly, within transnational family life, the daily glue is long-distance communication. Thanks to advances in ICTs, a multitude of platforms are available that can help people communicate with each other across distances and national borders. Not long ago most migrants' communication with their countries of origin relied on hand-written letters sent via international post or delivered via a third party. When Zara, a 59-year-old retired nurse arrived in Liège in 1971, she sent handwritten letters once every four or five days to her parents in Oujda because the telephone was too expensive. Phone calls were reserved for special occasions and holidays due to their high cost. Over the past decades, phone calls became less expensive and more widely available in family homes in Morocco, and international calling plans on mobile phones proliferated phone use between immigrants and their families. Today, ICTs have added to the arsenal of long-distance communication within families. Video chat through Skype, for instance, now enables people to see each other and maintain a virtual presence in their loved ones' lives, e-mail allows people to write to each other at their own convenience and deliver their messages instantaneously, rather than paying for the post and waiting days or longer for its eventual delivery.

These technologies, however, are not readily available to all immigrants or their families. Despite the advancements in technology such as Skype, Facebook, and mobile "smart" phones, and the increased access and decreased cost of communication, the actual use of technology is far from uniform or symmetrical, even within the same family network (Carling 2008; Pribilsky 2004). Carling et al. (2012: 204) asserted, "It is typically the migrants who have the financial and technological means to initiate communication." Families from higher socioeconomic backgrounds in Liège and Oujda had the means with which to purchase and use a computer, smartphone, tablet device, and so on, in contrast to some of their poorer counterparts, who rely on local Internet shops or school computers if they want to e-mail, Facebook, or Skype. Not only could they purchase new or more advanced technological tools for long distance, but they could also afford to use these more frequently or for longer durations.

With a selection of technologies and media platforms before them, respondents creatively engaged in online communication to maintain a sense of presence in each other's lives. For one family, Skype was not always employed as a way to communicate directly, but also as a signal that their migrant son, Yasser, was well. Yasser always stays logged into his Skype account if he is at home: "At the least I need to be connected to Skype. That's for sure! [...] At least I am connected, they know that I'm alive and well." If he logs out or is away from his computer for more than one to two days, his mother calls, worried that something bad has happened. Technology in this sense is not a means of direct contact, but is tailored for each family's needs. These families' material resources allow them to maneuver through multiple platforms and select what works for them, from short message service (SMS) to telephone, e-mail to Skype, Facebook to messenger, or postcards and letters.

Long-distance communication for middle-class migrants, however, like remittances, is not as straightforward as it appears. The availability and affordability of technology does not necessarily result in its use. First, family networks are asymmetrical in their socioeconomic background and access to technology, computers and Internet are not a given in all homes within a family network. Some relatives may have a personal computer and others may not, either because they cannot afford one or because it is a personal preference. Yahya, a 45-year-old living in Liège, has a smartphone and speaks with and visits his family regularly, but has no desire to set up Internet at home, and so video chat is seldom used to communicate. These inequalities resulted in the choice of the "lowest common denominator," or whatever media platform was available to multiple parties within the network, which typically was the fixed or mobile telephone. One party with Skype and another without a webcam diminished its usefulness and innovation as a communication medium. Second, the availability of multiple communication platforms for wealthier immigrants and their nonmigrant family members did not change the preference among all respondents for phone calls as their primary mode of communication. Yahya's sister, who is also a migrant, has Internet at home and video chats from time to time with their parents in Oujda, but prefers the ease of using her mobile phone. She can use it to call when she likes and chat while running errands or taking her children to school. Zara explained that although she has Internet, she too prefers the ease of calling and writing her family, which she can do on her own time and according to her schedule:

> The children they have Internet but me... it annoys me to stay long "Oui, bonjour, bonsoir"... because you have to stay one or two hours to talk. Me, I don't always have that kind of time. I always have something to do. I am always busy with something or another and the children say, "Come

> quick! Come quick! See my aunt or my grandmother or my niece," I say, "No, I like to write or telephone... Op! It's [a video chat] for you." (Zara, 59, Liège)

Although she has access to the Internet and video chat, Zara only uses them when she is already using the computer—for her online driver's license training, for instance. Only then will she reach out to relatives in Oujda and abroad via online communication. A preference for the phone over web-based communication was common among respondents. Although people liked the visual medium that video chat gave so that they could see their loved ones, respondents busy with work, household management, young children, and so forth, found that mobile phones gave them the best balance between being able to catch up but also enabling them to go about their daily lives and not having to rely on both parties being online at the same time, demonstrating that financial resources are not the only important factors, but that time and availability also influence long-distance communication.

In addition, having technology also does not mean that one has the ability to use it. Older age participants, migrant and nonmigrant, preferred the technologies to which they were accustomed, chiefly the telephone. Their relatively high education levels mean that they were literate, unlike many of the nonmigrant participants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds who were unable to read SMS, e-mails or Facebook messages, but the elderly were not always tech savvy or tech literate. Nonmigrant children and grandchildren then helped conduct Skype calls or messenger chats, showed their parents their siblings' most recent Facebook pictures, and so on. Fayza, for example, Skyped with her brother and sister so that they could see her children, but she only used Skype with her mother when her mother was with her siblings in Oujda, "Yes, when she is with them, yes. She doesn't know how to manipulate it on her own [laughs]!"

Wealthier migrants have access to the many forms of long-distance communication, SMS, telephone, e-mail, video chat, and messenger and social networking sites that enable them to select the medium they prefer at certain moments (when they want to see each other's faces, for example), and with less concern for the price of international calls, Internet fees, and so forth. However, mobile phones are the preferred method of communication, because of busy schedules and busy lives for migrants and nonmigrants alike, especially between aging parents and their children.

Long-distance communication holds the same place for families from all socioeconomic backgrounds as the glue that keeps them together and informed on a regular basis, but the modes with which they communicate, and the money they are able to spend on it, as well as technological prowess and literacy, enable them to be more selective and creative about how they contact each other, when, and for what purposes. The navigation of long-distance communication based on various resources and abilities, not just the migrant's, demonstrates the importance of what Baldassar et al. (2007) identified as capacity, since it intertwines with obligation and negotiated family commitments to produce caregiving arrangements and norms within transnational families. International infrastructure, time, employment, technological prowess, and so forth all factor into how families communicate, and therefore express and provide care across borders, not merely the presence of technology. As demonstrated by the respondents in this study, the wealth of migrants is not a factor in how often they speak or the sophistication of the forms of communication they use to sustain their familial relationships.

Visits

Among the types of transnational family practices used to express and provide care for family members in Morocco and Belgium, visits home are the most treasured by Oujdi respondents. The quality time spent face-to-face with relatives was more intense and valued than time spent on the phone or chatting via Skype. Immigrants were able to share more intimate aspects of their lives without concern for phone bills, work, or school commitments. Moreover, visiting home is not a practice that is only attainable by wealthy Moroccans. Across migrant profiles, Moroccans abroad have a high propensity to visit their country of origin especially during the summer. Even respondents from lower socioeconomic backgrounds typically visit Oujda once every one to two years for up to one month at a time, especially with the advent of low-cost airlines and more direct flights between Brussels and Oujda. In this way, Moroccans of higher socioeconomic status do not necessarily make more visits than their counterparts, with the visits of each guided by their financial resources and concerns. To save the expense of flying back and forth, working-class respondents often chose to make one trip to Morocco that lasted up to one month, rather than several shorter trips and, depending on the availability of low-cost flight options, relied more on driving with fellow relatives or friends to Morocco to save money. Families with less financial resources had to plan their vacations in advance, coordinate their work schedules, organize a carpool to Oujda, and save enough money for the trip. They then stayed in their families' homes in Oujda for the duration. In the case of wealthier immigrants, when work or school obligations were not an obstacle, they often chose to make several shorter trips to Oujda during the year, sometimes at the last minute.

Middle- to upper-middle-class migrants may not be international jetsetters who can come and go as they please between Liège and Oujda, but their financial resources did allow them to make more than one trip a year to Oujda, depending on their school, work, and family obligations in Liège. Some of the respondents could indeed fly to Oujda on a whim with little to no planning beforehand. Abdelkrim, for instance, flew to Oujda at the last minute to attend his sister's engagement party and then only stayed for four days in order to get back to work in Liège. Later that summer, he spent his "real" vacation of three weeks in Oujda during August. Over an 18-month period, Yahya visited his family twice, and each time he purchased his ticket only days in advance.

One might assume that wealthier migrants are able to visit their families more often than their counterparts, and to an extent this is true. Wealthier participants were not as concerned with the cost of flights, often chose their preferred flight option and airline over the cheapest, and required much less time to arrange and save for their travels. However, material resources did not actually culminate in more family time, or even equal family time, because first, for employed immigrants, maintaining their lifestyle required them to work, for students to be at university, and for parents to follow their children's school schedules. As in the case of long-distance communication, money does not necessarily buy more time. Only for retired persons (and in some cases stay-at-home wives) was it possible to spend more than a month, or multiple month-long trips in Oujda. For wealthier immigrant participants, time and not money was the resource of concern. Even with nearly as many vacation days as they would like, self-employed entrepreneurs did not always feel comfortable leaving their businesses for extended periods, and they preferred to make several short trips to Oujda. Again, the possession of funds for travel does not mean that one has the time to do so.

In addition to time commitments to work constraining the time spent in Oujda, migrants from higher socioeconomic backgrounds sometimes chose to spend less time in the country of origin than did their counterparts with fewer material resources. Restricted to a certain number of vacation days, the former often desired a "real" vacation in addition to visiting Oujda. In fact, they often took vacations elsewhere in addition to their trips home. For some, this meant spending time with family in Oujda and then renting an apartment with their families in the local seaside town of Saïdia, before traveling with their spouse and children to other Moroccan destinations such as Fez or Essaouira as tourists. For others, they divided their holidays among countries, spending one to two weeks of their annual vacation in Oujda and then the rest of their vacation time in a third country, Spain or Turkey, for instance. These multiple vacation destinations frequently meant they spent less time in Oujda with the family, than those migrants who were only able to afford the trip to Oujda and to stay the duration of their vacation in the family home.

Nonetheless, an advantage of material resources was the ability to see one's family outside of Oujda. Along with the organization of trips to Morocco, one difference that socioeconomic background made in regard to family visits was the ability of nonmigrants to visit their migrant family members in Belgium and other parts of Europe or North America. Visiting Oujda was fairly regular among all respondents, but the ability of nonmigrants to visit Europe depended both on family and individuals' financial resources and legal statuses. In some cases, migrants took it upon themselves to financially and legally sponsor the trips of family members, including visa processing and accommodation. In other cases, nonmigrants paid their own way. And yet for others, they shared the costs. Samara, a 30-year-old employee in the finance sector in Oujda, paid for the majority of her trip to Europe from Oujda while her brother, Yahya, covered the rest as a present. Samara traveled to visit family in Liège and Frankfurt, but it was combined with a tourist vacation. She flew to Paris, toured the city, and then her uncle took her to Brussels before going to visit family in Liège and finally Frankfurt. Although her cousin in Frankfurt was the main person she wanted to see, because she had family members living in other cities and savings, she extended her travels throughout Europe. In the same family network, Yahya and Samara's sister and her husband paid for Yahya, Samara, and their parents to visit them in Dubai. For nonmigrant respondents with fewer financial resources, should visits to Europe take place, they were concentrated in and around family homes. It was rather rare for parents to visit their children in Europe when children and parents had little or no financial resources. Smaller homes or apartments made it difficult to host guests, and it was more difficult to take the time from work and use savings to entertain family members with sightseeing.

Visits, however affected by material resources, must also be considered in conjunction with respondents' legal statuses. Although highly skilled immigrants may also enter a country illegally or overstay their visas, among my respondents most entered the country legally for work or studies, and their lines of work typically demanded formal residence. Some professions were more suited to the informal labor market, and could therefore hire immigrants with irregular statuses. Having an irregular status, however, makes it difficult to visit Oujda since return to Belgium is not guaranteed, and it also prohibits sponsoring a relative's visa to visit Belgium.

Therefore, while visits play a similar role for all immigrants regardless of their financial situation or socioeconomic background, in that they provide the most intensive and valued mode of transnational caregiving, they do indeed operate differently according to one's financial resources. However, it cannot be assumed that wealthier immigrants can or do visit Moroccan relatives more often or with greater duration than their counterparts. The financial capacity to vacation and "get away" can actually allow migrants to travel to more destinations, stay in hotels, rent or own vacation homes, and therefore spend less time in Oujda with their relatives. Nevertheless, a higher socioeconomic background did facilitate visits from nonmigrants to migrant relatives and therefore allow families to choose who visited whom, when, and for how long.

Conclusion

The majority of studies that examine so-called "transnational families" draw from ethnographies and case studies of families that rely on migration as means of escaping poverty and gaining social mobility. However typical, the extent to which variations in class and socioeconomic background influence family communication practices remains underexplored. In this analysis of Moroccan transnational family networks that have members living in Liège, Belgium, and Oujda, Morocco, it is clear that material resources and skills such as technological prowess do have an impact on the way in which relationships are maintained across national borders. All participating families, even the well-off families, relied on material exchange, long-distance communication, and visits to help them sustain their sense of familyhood after migration.

Regarding material exchange, although many Moroccan families depend on the regular remittances of their children and/or relatives abroad, and individual financial or professional success can increase remittances and underlying filial obligations, immigrants from wealthier families do not have the same sending patterns or motivations as their less financially fortunate counterparts. On the one hand, immigrants and their families who considered remittances to be based on need, did not perceive there to be an obligation to send money to relatives in Morocco. Often, in fact, these families were sending money in the opposite direction and paying for their children's or siblings' migration journey and/or studies. The familial obligation was then to support whomever was in need of financial assistance, in contrast to the notion that remittances (or any transnational caregiving, for that matter) only flow from migrant to nonmigrant, from country of destination to country of origin. The asymmetries in the family network regarding socioeconomic status promoted reverse remittances. On the other hand, those migrants who did not consider financial need to be a prerequisite for remittances did send money back, albeit with alternative motivations that altered the type of care being transmitted. These immigrants sent money back not to provide practical or financial support, but as a form of gift that was given alongside or in lieu of material goods such as clothing, specialty foods, and so on. As with their other gifts, they gave them to relatives to deliver a sentimental message, and therefore these remittances were primarily intended to provide emotional rather than financial support. There is not an obligation as such, but a desire to show that one thinks of one's family, that one remembers.

In terms of long-distance communication, socioeconomic background does not change the reliance of immigrants and their family members on this transnational family practice to stay in touch, informed, and maintain a sense of copresence while separated from each other. It does, however, open up options with which to communicate. The ability to own a computer or electronic communication device and to pay for international phone calls, and having the education required to read text-based messages facilitate the use of multiple media platforms in day-to-day life, but the material resources and access to technology are not uniform within all households, and it does not mean that all family members have the capacity or even the desire to communicate online, through video chat, and so forth. One should not confuse having something, or being able to have it, with actually using it. Among Oujdi respondents, the phone call remained the most relied upon and preferred mode of long-distance communication. Technological know-how and time were much more important influences on the selection of media platforms with which to chat with relatives than money or access.

Lastly, visits were a highly valued transnational family practice. Unlike a Filipino immigrant working in the United States and earning low wages, for example, Moroccan immigrants in Belgium are relatively close to their family members. Financial resources do not, therefore, have a decisive impact on whether or not one can visit the country of origin. Most Moroccans abroad visit home once every one or two years. But the advent of low-cost airlines, the drivable distance between origin and destination countries and faster transportation did not level the playing field. The form of these visits for participants with more financial resources was more flexible. They could schedule last-minute flights for a long weekend, break a single month-long trip into one- to two-week visits throughout the year, and have their loved ones come visit them in Belgium or travel with them in other countries. Despite these advantages, for some families the ability to afford vacations meant that they spent less time with their relatives in Oujda because they preferred to have a tourist vacation in other parts of Morocco or foreign countries in addition to their family time.

In conclusion, although it may be that migrants do indeed have the financial and technological means to initiate communications, visits, and remittances, whereas their relatives in Morocco do not, this overly emphasizes a depiction of immigrants as achieving these resources after migration, inferring that they come from families who have a relative dearth of money and technological prowess. However, many migrants who left Morocco for highly skilled, professional career opportunities, postgraduate studies, or for family reunification, fall outside the description of a "typical" Moroccan immigrant. Their migration paths were not part of a wider household economic strategy for advancement, but of more individual paths, the goals of which were not primarily to financially support their relatives, even if that is indeed an outcome for some. These transnational families, whether one classifies them as middle-class, upper-middle-class, or "rich" immigrants, still end up in the same position as their counterparts with fewer financial and technological resources—separated from their loved ones who stayed in the country of origin. Although their paths to family separation may be different, they must still adapt their family practices to the reality of distance. The capacity to engage in transnational family practices should be considered not only in terms of material wealth, time, for instance, can have a much greater influence on which practices one chooses, while obligations and perceived needs within family networks are also important factors (Baldassar et al. 2007). The (relatively) rich immigrants do not necessarily end up in a better family situation or with more remittances, long-distance communication, or visits than others, but they do have the luxury of *choice*. They are able to choose if and when they want to send remittances, they can select from a variety of media to find the best and preferred mode of communication, and they can visit Morocco in accordance with their schedules and vacation desires. It is this control, or potential control, over the ways in which "family is done" across national borders that has qualitative implications for transnational family relationships.

Nonetheless, any control on how transnational practices are implemented to best suit immigrants and their families' needs is diminished by asymmetries within extended family networks. An examination of extended kin networks and adult migrants, their nonmigrant parents and siblings revealed transnational resource inequalities (Carling 2008), or that financial, technological, and temporal resources are not distributed evenly among all family members. Remittances are sent to whoever has need, which for middle- to upper-class families often ends up being the migrant child. In long-distance communication, family network inequities result in transnational practices that are shaped by the "lowest common denominator." In other words, family members will use long-distance communication modes that are possessed and can be used by more than one party. Skype is only useful as a video chat medium if two or more households have a computer, Internet access, and a webcam, for example. Visits are shaped by who can visit whom and when, according to financial resources but also visa policy restrictions. Transnational family life is constituted by the border-crossing, multidirectional practices that provide and circulate care within extended family networks, and while material wealth and resources create flexibility and control over how and whether this care is provided, family networks are full of asymmetries in capacities and obligations that also mold how "family is done" across borders.

Notes

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1. According to the *MPC EU Neighbourhood Migration Report* 2013.
2. Eurostat.
3. Seventeen percent of the tertiary-educated population emigrated in 2000 (World Bank 2011).
4. The 2009 findings of the FRB-CERSS report support this statistic, with 62.4% of respondents returning to Morocco at least once a year.
5. Statbel.fgov.be.
6. Chambre de Commerce d'Industrie et de Services d'Oujda. 2012. "Monographie de la Région Oriental." Oujda.
7. All participants' names have been changed.
8. All quotes have been translated from French by the author.

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PART III

Paths

CHAPTER 7

Narrating Multiple Mobilities of Start-Up Founders

Katrin Sontag

Introduction

Optimizing careers, profit, and business reach, having seemingly endless places to chose from and opportunities to take on, designing your own self-determined, successful life—these are some of the promises presented by globalization. In recent years, however, the increasing mobility, flexibility, and fluidity of work has also been critically discussed on a macro level, and scholars have pointed to the growing challenges, uncertainties, and responsibilities faced by individuals, who, as Bröckling calls it, were becoming "entrepreneurial selves" (Bröckling 2007: 9, Sennett 2000, Schönberger 2007, Moldaschl and Voss 2003).

Migrating entrepreneurs of "born global start-ups" seem to be predestined protagonists in this context. They are a growing and important group in research about highly qualified migrants (Lehmann and Schlange 2004). However, how exactly do they migrate and move? How do they guide themselves in their migration processes? How coherent are their biographies?

The following chapter focuses on the micro level of individual biographical narrations to explore how individual actors lead their daily lives and build their careers under globalized circumstances and vanishing borders between work and life. It uses data from an ongoing research project at the University of Basel that is part of the work of a research group that focuses on highly qualified migrants.[1] This chapter is based on interviews with ten start-up founders whose businesses are mainly based in Switzerland. They share a common professional context of personal and entrepreneurial responsibility as well as experiences of migration and mobility. At the same time, they have different national backgrounds. Their business areas range from information technology (IT), life sciences, and medical technology to online retail, consulting, and event management, which are among the most typical business areas for start-up founders.

The following chapter is structured around four concepts, to discuss how mobility shapes lives and creates careers on the one hand and how people navigate within these mobile contexts on the other. The first concept, "born global start-up," stems from economic theory, and I will discuss it as a form of labor that exists because of and through networks and mobilities. Second, I follow movements through space, considering the concept of experienced spaces, which refers to the ways in which people create their own spaces and paths through their movements beyond existing political or geographical borders and mappings, which merge into personal topographies[2] of living. In the third part, I further explore the kinds of mobilities found in the narrations of business founders. The case studies seem to undermine the understanding of work as a goal of migration and rather imply that in the case of start-up founders, mobility actually creates careers. Finally, I look into the way in which people find their ways, guide themselves, and make decisions, as well as the ways in which their paths are connected with their environment—their institutional contexts and the biographies of people surrounding them.

Born Global Start-ups

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, business, media, and scientific experts have paid increasing attention to the phenomenon of born global start-ups, also called "born globals" (Rennie 1993), "international new ventures" (Oviatt and McDougall 1994), or "born global firms" (Wessely 2010). These are small- and medium-sized companies that are set up internationally at their inception. Until the 1980s and '90s, multinational companies were largely seen as being well-established firms that expand slowly in phases into international markets.

A number of factors prepared the ground for the surge in these start-ups: new means of communication and transportation; new developments and inventions in certain business sectors; and the emergence of new markets and the homogenization of international markets (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). In the areas of IT, biotechnology, life sciences, and services it became increasingly possible and attractive to found a business with little initial investment and high growth potential.

However, the personalities, international experiences, and orientation of the founders played and continue to play a key role in linking and realizing this potential (Lehmann and Schlange 2004, Ovialt and McDougall 1994). Lehmann and Schlange argue in their case study on the internationalization of small and medium companies that born globals seem to face much fewer "intercultural" challenges than traditional firms, and they attribute this to the international experience of the founders (Lehmann and Schlange 2004). Economists Oviatt and McDougall wrote in 1994 in their article on the emergence and elements of born global start-ups,

> However, recent technological innovation and the presence of increasing numbers of people with international business experience have established new foundations for MNEs [multinational enterprises]. An internationally experienced person who can attract a moderate amount of capital can conduct business anywhere in the time it takes to press the buttons on a telephone, and, when required, he or she can travel virtually anywhere on the globe in no more than a day. Such facile use of low-cost communication technology and transportation means that the ability to discover and take advantage of business opportunities in multiple countries is not the preserve of large, mature corporations. New ventures with limited resources may also compete successfully in the international arena. (Oviatt and McDougall 1994: 46)

Start-up communities are well organized online, with networks, forums, blogs, and events.[3]

In some business areas, the born global approach seems to be so natural that the term may be thought of as redundant. As one interlocutor said, "I find this term [born global startup] absolute bullshit. (…) In the Internet, for success on a larger scale, internationality is a pre-condition." Start-up founders thus seem to exemplify globalized approaches to work and an organic way of dealing with worldwide networks and mobility.

Shaping and Mapping Experienced Spaces

One of my interview partners, Pierre,[4] is French. During his university studies and early professional career, he lived in six different countries in Europe, Asia, and America. At the time of our interview, he was living in Switzerland, because of his wife's job, and he crossed the border into France four days a week to go to a French city, where he had established his office.

He chose France as his workplace because it was easier to recruit staff there. The employees of his company work in three offices in three different countries in Asia and Europe. Pierre keeps close contact with them via Skype and spends many weeks each year traveling to visit the other branches of his company and business partners.

Joan relocated ten times. Ten years was her longest stay in any one place. When I met her, she lived in Copenhagen, where she was about to establish her second start-up company with a new partner. Her first company was in Switzerland, where she still kept a place for herself to visit the staff regularly.

Bernd moved four times within Europe before he came to Basel eight years ago to set up his company. Since his wife could not work in her profession in Basel and his children attend school in Amsterdam, the family decided to stay there. Bernd spends around one-third of his time in Basel, one-third in Amsterdam, and one-third traveling internationally to visit customers. These cases exemplify certain patterns of movements. Patterns include A to B to C to D to E to n; A to B to C to D to C; and A to B to C and D. Limmer and Schneider define spatial or geographical mobility as permanent, transmigratory, and circular forms of mobility. Transmigration refers to a movement from one place to the next and on to the next. Circular mobility includes forms of movement that end up at the same place, for example, traveling or commuting. "Migration," in their definition is "permanent transnational mobility" (Limmer and Schneider 2008).

However, most movements I encountered in my interviews are transmigratory or circular. People move to different places in sequence. In some cases, people live multilocally, for example, when their company and family or their company and another company are located in different cities or countries (Rolshoven 2007). Some people travel extensively and move on a short-term basis. For example, they commute to work, crossing the border between Switzerland and France daily, or they commute between two offices, as some have a second office, for example, at a university. At times, work seems to be conducted in cafes or on trains and planes.

I asked some people to describe or draw a map of their world. These maps look different from each other and from the generally accepted world map.

Building on Lefebvre's notions of spaces as physical, social, and mental spaces, Johanna Rolshoven proposes a threefold view of space as the "space of representations—societal and historical ascriptions," "built space—measurable, architectonically constructed space," and "experienced space—perceived by the individual and realized in daily actions" (Rolshoven 2012: 165, my translation). The concept of social or experienced spaces thus allows the tracing of individual spaces of daily life experience that are continually created through the paths and movements of people themselves within processes of mobility, migration, and globalization (Hoffmann and Dilger 2012: 8).

One interlocutor expressed this notion in her own words:

> It's nice, when you say [space] within my LIFE, because this space is obviously not only my apartment or a town. Well, how does space come about, many people have written about this, but it comes into existence among other ways through movements that we make, a space is defined for oneself.

In these "experienced spaces," the world seems to become a supranational network of cities. Shapes and borders of this network are very individual and determined by professional and personal networks.

> You know, you start to accumulate friends, who disperse to other places and those places, there's usually a relatively small number of cities where your friends end up. So although it feels like they're all over the world, they're actually, you know, only a relatively small number of cities that these people go to, like, you know, London, New York, you know. So, what you might call the sort of the global people are (...) not that hard to find. It's very rare that someone would go and live in a very remote location that is not near a big international airport. (...) Tokyo, Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai, you know all these cities, London, Paris, Berlin, Zürich a little bit, it's not so big here.
>
> (...) You know, they are places you go for work or go through for work and it's usually at some stage or another you have a friend living there who you can visit. San Francisco is another big one for technology. I have friends living in Silicon Valley. In New York, all these sort of rich-people hubs, I guess you could call them.

People establish their networks through various educational or professional experiences in different places of the world; some are members of virtual or physical international clubs or associations, such as the Boy Scouts. Some already come from migrating families or are married to migrating spouses. They maintain their networks with travel, long stays as well as virtual and postal communication.

Spaces are thus shaped and mapped through personal experiences and paths beyond geographic conventions. However, these biographical experiences are not limited to geographical spaces, as Rolshoven postulates, "Understanding mobilities as a topic in practice means studying movements of people, their bodies, thoughts, actions and things" (Rolshoven 201: 54, my translation). Mobile biographies, meanwhile, create topographies of ideas, values, relationships, and imaginaries; they construct meaning and sense, aims, and orientation schemes.

Virtual and physical scapes merge on inner maps, as families and companies work— and live—via Skype, Google talk, and so forth. Bernd's family keeps in close contact via Skype. Lars runs his business from Basel with a completely virtual team, working from different countries together. He himself does not travel that much for work, but rather moves in close virtual networks, within his company and within other networks, such as supportive entrepreneurial clubs, forums, and communities.

> *K:* And how much of your working time, would you say is face-to-face and how much virtual? (. . .)"
>
> *Pierre:* I would say, if you distinguish it like this, probably 50/50. (. . .) Well, sure, because of the distance a lot happens virtually, because we address very different target groups. You just can't be everywhere in person, where I would like to be and face-to-face is really [with] my team. My team itself probably works 70 to 80% virtually, they work much more at the computer and then of course in the projects, sure, a lot takes place via Skype. Thank god for Sykpe.

In sum, places mainly seem to play a role in determining business possibilities, self-development, and social possibilities, and thus personal topographies of life. These experienced spaces are not fixed as political or physical maps are, but change and grow, coming into existence only through movement. Focusing on these multiple facets of individual topographies thus seems to place into context the classic perception of immigrating or relocating a household from point A to point B and physically integrating into a given geographical area. Instead, different transnational social spaces (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) and scapes (Appadurai 1996), multiple layers of experiencing daily life, interaction, and integration move into focus.

Textures of Careers: Mobility-Related Work

Biographies of mobility create experienced spaces and topographies of life. Moreover, they also form the underlying texture for careers. I will further explore different forms of mobility such as social, cultural, mental, and time-based mobility in this section.

Especially in the beginning, entrepreneurs move a lot between different social groups and scenes, following Limmer and Schneider's definition of social mobility as a horizontal movement "in the sense of changing between different social groups or milieus" (Limmer and Schneider 2008: 21). Founders take care of most relationships surrounding their business themselves. This includes very different groups such as investors, colleagues, scientists, customers (who sometimes also come from very different backgrounds), coaches, organizers, coworking space fellows, in some cases, such as that of social entrepreneurship, and even volunteers.

> *Pierre:* Well, yes, so my daily life is filled, of course with my job for the most part, also with the environment to which I am new here in Basel and more or less 89–90% of my daily life at the moment consists of the things I do within [his company]. The tasks are partly strategic. I also have a team of 9 people which I lead, who need every day, not every day, but at least once or twice a week, somehow, some time with me, each. And I am traveling a lot, not only in Switzerland, also in Germany and in Asia. Now in August, September, I will be there for 6 weeks. I jump between a shirt and presentations in companies and foundations to shorts and a daypack (. . .). It is very, very diverse, very different, what I am doing. And I'm really enjoying what I do. It's fun, sometimes there are moments when I think "hmm a clear structured daily routine (. . .) would also be nice" (. . .) but it is, it's a lot of fun and I'm grateful for what I'm allowed to do.

The texture of careers is influenced by subjective perceptions and motivations as well as by surrounding circumstances of life and biographies of other people. Picard writes, "In contrast to the traditional biographical writingof historism, modern research (. . .) no longer understands the relationship between the individual and society dichotomically. People are considered, just as the structures that surround them and which are shaped by it, because social structures never exist independently of single human beings" (Picard 2009: 320, my translation).

There is indeed an institutional environment of private and public organizations supporting start-ups in Switzerland. There are hubs and coworking spaces run by companies or foundations, which rent office space, offer coaching and networks among peers, and also may put entrepreneurs in contact with investors.

I am sitting in the entrance area of a coworking place in black leather seats, opposite the reception counter. People keep coming in through the revolving door. Opposite the door is an elevator, behind it a huge hall leading to different offices. A young man rides through the hall on a small lightweight scooter—an invention by a Swiss start-up. My interview partner comes up to greet me right on time, wearing a hooded sweater and jeans. He introduces himself by his first name and immediately uses the more familiar German form of addressing me. We settle at a cafe for a second breakfast.

K: What does a typical day look like for you?

Lars: it doesn't exist.

K: okay

Lars: the easiest answer so far.

K: laughing

Lars: hmm daily routines don't exist, but yes, eh it was shaped finally when we had staff by managing them, giving them tasks, controlling how everything worked out and above all, being available when they had questions.

K: hmm

Lars: hmm, and otherwise it really depended on what was necessary. When it was fundraising then we had only meetings, when [we were working on the] product, then we had only a closed door and headphones, like, 'leave me alone, I want to work on the product,' eh it's a stupid answer, but really, there is no typical day. It's long. In the first year, we surely worked 14, 15 hours every day. And then at some point, we were a little bit out of breath and then, yes maybe 10, 12 a day, but 6, 7 days a week.

Yes, but it's not the same, because, you do it for yourself and not for somebody else. Well, it's always a little difficult to explain that it's not a lot of work, but that the work is the thing you truly want to do.

And later on in our conversation he remarked,

Lars: Yes and this emotional roller coaster, it's hard, because, eh, it starts sometime in the morning, you see: oh hey, we got this press echo and yeees! Customers, customers, then you get a 'oh no, this doesn't work' and then somebody resigns and then an investor quits and then you feel very low and then, in the evening, some good news comes up and you are like yeeeees!

(. . .) you know, it's really, it's really like that, I'm not just saying this but it's really, emotionally it's up and down all the time. Somebody once said, I don't remember who it was, as an entrepreneur, you feel the ups as well as the downs much much stronger and I think that's right. If you work for some (big corporation) and 1,000 people lose their jobs,

> then it will affect you, too. But if you are the entrepreneur and have to let 1,000 people go, then it will probably affect you more. If you are not a psychopath.

"Founding a start-up is like a roller coaster" and "no one day is like another" are statements I heard frequently. In fact, the texture of mobility seems to underlie not just geographical, virtual, and social topographies. Limmer and Schneider (2008) further differentiate cultural mobility and mental mobility, which refers to openness toward networks, exchanges, and new ideas. The notion of risk and failure is particularly widely reflected, and approaches to risk range from "dealing with it" to considering it positively as the central element of all business. There is, for example, an event for start-up founders called failcon, which celebrates failure as the way to learn, when choosing a path that no one has taken before.

Referring to the example above, I would further add the concept of time-based mobility. There are no fixed working hours or daily business procedures, "no one day is like another." Leisure time and work merge. Mobility regarding space, culture, ideas, and social settings, as well as time are interconnected. They are the condition and strategy as well as the consequence of one another. They generate motility, the capability to be mobile. Motility provides the basis for further mobility. As Limmer and Schneider write,

> People who are open for change have an easier time deciding to relocate and they experience this decision and its consequences as less stressful than people who are generally interested in avoiding change. (2008: 27)

As far as start-up founders are concerned, I thus like to turn the assumption that mobility follows work around. In the case of start-up founders, work rather seems to follow mobility. "Work related mobility" turns into "mobility-related work." Mobility here seems to create the textures of careers. A combination of different kinds of mobilities, as explained above, molds the topographies from which founders gain the ideas and impetus to start their businesses and which form the base for them to lead their businesses.

Orientation Schemes

In the last sections, I talked about personal topographies and textures of mobility and careers. The focus now moves toward the question of choosing which turns to take. In my study, certain indicators seem to appear in people's personal orientation schemes that influence how decisions are taken and which potential motility is made use of in which way. I identify five orientation indicators, which may overlap within a single biography and therefore create a scheme, which simultaneously is part of and shapes individual topographies.

1. Creation of independent structures: People deliberately choose to build their own structures, which suit them and within which they would like to move. This includes daily routines, places, the design of company products, structures and hierarchies, the choice of business partners and employees, and so forth. It may also include conscious constructions of conceptions of self and identities. Sometimes it has to do with uneasiness, such as experiences of discomfort within existing structures.

2. Freedom and risk: In this category, the emphasis is on "being one's own boss," enjoying freedom, taking risks, and enjoying risks. People do not want to lead a boring or "enslaved" life (e.g., as employees of a large corporation). They want to live out their ambitions. They talk about the life of an entrepreneur as being a "roller coaster" or a "serious game." Like a pendulum, their life seems to swing between the two poles of stability and movement. "Living it up," being mobile, and living up to one's potentials and passions may also have the flip side of pressure, long working hours, and loneliness.

3. Curiosity and scientific contribution: Passion and a drive to discover, invent, and craft, and the struggle to find their career path as scientists and innovators within and outside of the university shape this indicator. People combine their scientific passion with a passion to bring something new into this world and actually materialize it, instead of "just" writing theoretical papers about it.

4. Self-realization and fulfillment: In my sample, women, who have created a second career for themselves by founding a start-up may consciously assume this indicator as their motivation and target. This may be related to a personal, professional, or health-crisis or to a reorientation after a phase of life as mother and housewife as well as after a successful first career. Founding may thus be the step to creating a new professional field for themselves that may be most appealing to their beliefs, talents, and passions.

5. Advancement of society: The wish to contribute something to society, to make things better, or to bring ones own ideas into practice determines this indicator. This includes ideas that may help make other peoples' lives easier or better. For example, in the case of medical technology, this could mean providing new ways to heal certain diseases. Some founders also have a social or environmental mission and are driven by the wish to raise awareness and give impetus to practically transforming an issue or practice within society.

Earning money and making a living certainly also play a role. However, this aspect also has a dynamic of its own. It seems like another kind of mobility: financial mobility. It is generally assumed that more secure money can be earned with a traditional career. A start-up presents the possibilities of failure, of an acceptable income, or of making it to the "exit"—the sale of the economically successful company. The exit certainly poses an attraction, but was not mentioned in any one of the interviews as the only driving force for deciding on this form of life. In the founding phase, different financial strategies may be applied, such as looking for investors or grants, or surviving on one's own, often limited resources, the so-called bootstrapping.

In each of these cases, the goal lies in striving to create and shape one's own topography in a way that enables protagonists to achieve individual targets and desires.

Entangled Biographies

This is not to convey the impression that decisions are conscious chessboard decisions. As Picard argues, biographies are never solipsistic entities sealed in a vacuum, but rather exist in thick contexts (Picard 2009: 320, Picard 2014). Many factors are involved. These are not only factors like opportunities, job offers, and business ideas but also institutional and social contexts and movements within biographies of other people, such as business partners, family members, friends, and investors.

As mentioned above, start-up centers in Switzerland provide coaching, office and lab space, networks, and connections with investors. There are public and private consulting services for founders and competitions for the best business ideas, which will receive initial funding. However, the constellation of institutions and encounters within a biography poses just one perspective. The second perspective is the question of how people incorporate incidents and life events into their personal biographical reconstructions and narratives, and how they produce meaning and make sense of circumstances. Third, of course, there is the factor of the researchers' reconstruction and perspective as communication partner, listener, observer, writer, once again caught in a situation of interaction and communication with the interview partners, the writing and reading, and his/her own meaning making (Picard 2014).

One interview partner remarked about his working space in a start-up center,

> It provides a kind of network of people, I mean on the administrative level or on the advisory level, to provide us a network. Especially because I mean none of us [the founders] is German speaking or also because

> we are not in a network here, so it's another kind of limitation from the start.

In his case, as in other cases, the founding was a spin-off from a university, which often serves as a meeting place for ideas and partnerships to emerge. He found his three partners through his university:

> I met A, who was my supervisor, when I did [an exchange] here and at that time he was a postdoc and then after a few years when I began here in 2009 he got a professorship position so he built this group and I started with him and that's how I met A. And then B is another professor here (. . .). And then C arrived here because his wife, she is also a scientist, she found a job at [company x] so they moved here and C began to look for, I mean (. . .) he got in touch with A and then everything started, we were showing the technology to C and then he realized that the technologies we developed have a quite applied aspect, (. . .) so everything began from there.

Thus, enterprises also seem to have their own biographies. Biographies are shaped by founding narratives, which may often be retold and help build a foundation and an identity. Interacting, intersecting, or immanent within these stories are factors that cannot be foreseen and that follow their own dynamics. Different business stages demand different kinds of attention and care. Growing, shrinking, failing, a new employee or partner, a new investor and his/her demands confront founders with decisions, opportunities, and challenges. Personal schemes of orientation as described above grow and change within these contexts and biographical intersections. Manuel describes how he felt influenced and shaped by people around him:

> I am strongly influenced by my family, my parents also by my friends. We all are, but I can identify how I was influenced and by whom. Because we are, how can I put it, people who communicate constantly, or animals who communicate constantly and we are influenced every day and I know that and I realize that even now, when I am saying something in German, I will express it the way a certain person does. At the beginning I said things mainly like [his girlfriend] pronounces them and now I realize which other persons are influencing me.

Meeting his girlfriend simultaneously involved discovering his professional field for Manuel, as she kept discussing and introducing topics, organizations, and public debates with him. A new biography thus entered the stage and changed his biography. A new narrative interacted with his own narrative: *"She really transformed me, changed me."* Later on, having a child with her led to his decision to stay in Switzerland for the moment. The young daughter also influences his way of work. He chose to structure and organize his daily life to meet her needs. Moreover, he describes how she helped him change his attitude, forget his stress and troubles in the evening, and gain a different view on priorities.

In Joan's case, the cornerstones of her narration are as follows: after a few moves during her studies, Joan moved with her husband from Denmark to Spain because of his job. They had children, and Joan lived as a housewife. From Spain, she moved to Switzerland, also because of her husband's job, and took care of their children. It was not possible for her to work in her original profession since she had been away from the work for too long. After some time, she saw a market gap, a business opportunity, and decided to start her own business. Just as it began running successfully, the couple split up. Joan moved to Copenhagen, from where she is still partially involved in the business in Switzerland. At the same time, a friend also had a business idea, and the two of them started a new business together.

In her narration, there are thus different constructions and interpretations for moving and founding. Her moving may have been the precondition for the founding as she brought questions and ideas along that helped her find her business opportunity and market niche. Likewise, private reasons were the precondition for her moves or for her second founding with her friend. The motive of questioning her role as housewife plays a role, just as the new orientation and organization of the family after the divorce. Likewise, there was the question of her possible new professional orientation and contribution to her surroundings. The biographies of her husband and children, her parents, her cofounders, business partners and employees, her friends, and finally her new business partner and her ideas are thus entangled with her own drive, wishes. and personal struggles.

Each move is tightly embedded within individual topographies and entangled with the biographies of others. Work, the starting of a business, private life, and moving cannot be understood in isolation (Schönberger 2007: 88). Each step may have different motives, produce different meanings and consequences. A biography of mobility, however, may influence the options for action, which a person perceives in a given situation, and it may influence the way in which events and decisions are narrated, interpreted, and rendered meaningful, the ways in which personal biographical narratives, as well as narratives that structure the image of the start-up company emerge.

Conclusion

The mobility of start-up founders cannot be easily comprehended by a traditional scheme of migration, immigration, or emigration as a permanent transnational and one-way move. Movements are multiple and range from transmigratory to circular, multilocal, and virtual modes. These movements form topographies of geographical spaces, but also of social relationships, institutions, goods, ideas, values, and goals. The texture of mobility extends to social, cultural, mental, and time-based mobility, and forms the underlying texture for careers. It provides a high motility, a high potential for mobility, which, when redeemed, produces further motility.

How this potential is realized depends on individual schemes of orientation as much as on interactions within institutions and other peoples' biographies, which also influence individual orientation schemes. Founders guide themselves, following motivations and targets, such as the creation of independent structures, maximizing freedom, scientific research, and self-realization, as well as the wish to contribute to a greater well-being. They are not free-floating individuals, but are rather embedded in contexts of institutions—which are often transnational—such as universities, start-up centers, and supporting networks, as well as social relationships. Biographies intersect and influence each other and provide contexts of interaction and decision-making, as well as more or less pressing possibilities for mobility and entrepreneurship. Founders thus neither make merely rational and strategic use of the opportunities of globalization, nor do they move in fluid, dislocated, or borderless spaces.

Narratives are overlapping and in movement, and it remains to be asked, are they created by the protagonists, the researchers, or by grand metanarratives?

Notes

1. Swiss National Science Foundation project: "living and working in different places: biography and work migration of the highly qualified—a perspective from cultural anthropology."
2. I thank Jacques Picard for introducing the term "topography" and for his valuable feedback and discussions of the text.
3. E.g., www.startwerk.ch, http://blog.inno-swiss.com, www.startup.ch, www.startupday.ch.
4. Names of persons, companies, and places are anonymized

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CHAPTER 8

Why Did You Move to Ireland?

Karine Dalsin

Immigration Explanations

One of the simplest questions about immigration remains, to a certain extent, unanswered: "why do people immigrate?" Over recent years, a great deal of work has been done to identify and understand the diverse reasons why some people live, permanently or temporarily, in a nation in which they were not born. This chapter maintains that, despite the progress made in this field of study, further consideration of the topic is required to overcome the tendency to simplify the debate about immigration in both academic and nonacademic spheres. It is argued, throughout the following pages, that an important and problematic aspect of the classic approaches to migration and its diverse set of causes is that they give predominance to an economic perspective.

To explore this matter, it is crucial to visit the work of Massey et al. (1993, 1998), Portes and Rumbart (2006), Arango (2000), and De Haas (2010) as these authors have provided extensive reviews of existing theories that basically examine the reasons why people immigrate. In the neoclassical approach (Harris and Todaro 1970, Ranis and Fei 1961), for example, the rational individual's economic decision-making is based on an evaluation of the costs and benefits of staying or moving. This approach was heavily criticized because of its overemphasis on individual decisions. In light of these criticisms, the "new economics" emerged and shifted the emphasis from individual choice to decision-making by families based both on employment opportunities and the economics of labor migration (Stark

1991, Taylor, Rozelle, and De Brauw 2003). Similarly, the world-systems perspective supports this de-emphasis on individual choice and integrates the migration debate into a broader context (Portes and Walton 1981, Sassen 1988). This theory considers migration within the scope of global economic development and recognizes migration to be an integral part of capitalist development. It affirms that migration is an outcome of inequalities related to market formation and the structure of the global economy as it shapes relations between developing and developed regions. All these approaches focus on analyzing economic factors that trigger migration.

Theories of migration perpetuation examine migration initiation from a slightly different angle. They investigate the influence of established immigrants on migration decision of their relatives and friends. The most prominent is social network migration theory, which maintains that interpersonal ties among people in the place of origin and destination set migration in motion by increasing the likelihood of migration (Castles 2004, Massey et al. 1998). It emphasizes collective agency and the importance of relatives and friends in the immigration process. The social network approach understands that people are more likely to immigrate if they have friends or family in the country of destination, because this lowers costs and eases the transition. This approach helps broaden the perspective of analysis by considering the connections and dynamics of individuals in both the country of origin and of destination. However, studies in this field still place great emphasis on themes such as remittances, labor, and ideals of financial prosperity.

Framing Immigrants

As the previous section demonstrated, most of the well-established theories in migration studies directly associate immigration with economic factors. Perhaps that is one reason why there is a growing body of literature that opts for using terms other than "immigrants" when studying human mobility. For example, Thompson and Tambyah (1999) speak about expatriate professionals, while Pham (2013) refers to the population studied as international students. Lee (2005) talks about immigrant workers as self-initiated expatriates, while Yoshida et al. (1997) use the term Japanese "living abroad" instead of Japanese immigrants. Different terminologies may avoid associating moving abroad with a quest for economic betterment.

This diversification suggests that there is a growing concern with the perception that the term immigrant is synonymous with economic immigrants. As Castles (2010: 1567) notes, in recent years "movements of highly skilled professionals were celebrated as exemplifying professional *mobility*, while those of the lower-skilled were condemned as unwanted *migration*" (emphasis in original). In this context, the use of alternative terms may represent a distancing from stigmas, misunderstandings, or misinterpretations that are caused by the perception that mobility is an acceptable manifestation of progress in the much-celebrated globalized world, while migration is a natural outcome or even a byproduct of relative deprivation.

Freeman (2011) observes that there is a difficulty in the political sciences in explaining the preferences of actors and recognizing that they are not always based exclusively on material considerations, an observation that can be extended to a variety of social arenas. The solution to overcoming this difficulty does not imply complete abandonment of the economic aspects of migration. As Freeman notes, "[A]lthough immigration preferences do not always reflect underlying material interests, the material stake of immigration must be taken into account" (p. 8). Therefore, economic aspects of migration still have a role to play in any consideration of this topic. The key point to consider is that economic factors should not be automatically privileged as the sole driver of migration.

Last but not least, it is important to stress the importance of conducting reasearch and fostering debate on migration initiation. Arango (2000: 293) argues that "the time seems to have come to switch the bulk of theoretical attention away from causes and into other dimensions of migration which are of paramount interest, both in intellectual and policy terms." Despite this suggestion, further exploration of the causes, motivations, and reasons is still relevant, since certain groups do not seem to fit comfortably within existing economically oriented conceptual frameworks. A case in point is the focal population of this study. I argue that constant revision of our understanding of the motivational underpinnings of migration is of fundamental interest as we develop theoretical and analytical approaches to account for broader processes of social change and to inform policymakers about the motivational diversity contained within the term "migration."

Brief Overview of Brazilian Immigration to Ireland

Amid the diverse nationalities living in Ireland, Brazilians occupy a prominent position. According to the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (2011), the current top six registered non-European Union (EU) groups are Indians (11%), Chinese (9%), Brazilians (9%), Nigerians (9%), Filipinos (8%), and Americans (7%). These populations collectively account for over 50 percent of all non-EU persons registered. Moreover, it is estimated that one in every six people in Dublin is not from Ireland. Migrants from Poland, the United Kingdom, Romania, India, China, and Brazil represent 45 percent of these total non-Irish residents (Ireland, Central Statistic Office, 2011).

The flow of Brazilian nationals to Ireland dates from the late 1990s, when workers moved to the country to fill a shortage of labor in the meat industry in the West (Hearly 2006, McGrath 2010, McGrath and Murray 2009, 2011). This first wave of immigrants ceased when the economic downturn took place in 2008. Around that time, immigration was expected to decrease drastically. The flow of Brazilian immigrants to Ireland, however, has in fact been increasing significantly since then. This second wave of Brazilian immigrants, though, differs considerably from the first wave in terms of socioeconomic profile.

Second Wave of Brazilian Immigrants

A core aim of Ireland's International Education Strategy for 2010–2015 is to be recognized and ranked as a world leader in international education (Ireland, Department of Education and Skills, 2010). From 2004, efforts were made to promote Ireland as a destination for international students (Gebhardt, 2011). In 2010, students already represented an important component of Ireland's immigrant population. It was estimated that there were 96,250 overseas students studying in the 122 approved schools and language centers in Ireland (Fáilte Ireland, 2011). According to Enterprise Ireland (2010), the goal is to expand this number to 120,000 by 2015.

Among language students, Brazilian nationals are prominently featured. Since around 2004, Dublin has become the temporary home of many Brazilians seeking an experience of living abroad and the opportunity to improve their English language skills. Notably, in 2010, the Irish governmental body responsible for promoting the Irish education sector abroad, Enterprise Ireland, declared that the total number of Brazilian students had increased 60 percent since 2006.

Entreprise Ireland (2012) recognizes Brazil as a priority market for promoting the Irish education sector. The organization's strategy of visiting Brazil and taking part in education fairs has successfully influenced Brazilians to consider studying in Ireland (FPPMedia, 2006). Simultaneously, the strong growth of the Brazilian economy promoted changes in the profile of those interested in moving to Ireland. Brazil has been dubbed by the leading Latin American education fair, Brazil EXPO Roadshow, as the largest market for the recruitment of students in the region.

In tune with worldwide changes, the profile of the Brazilian immigrant in Ireland shifted considerably over the last decade. The Brazilian Embassy in Dublin estimates that there are 21,000 Brazilians living in Ireland, of whom 25 percent were permanent residents and 75 percent were language students.[1] In my fieldwork, I found that the majority of these students live in Dublin, where most English language schools are situated. This second wave of immigrants is composed mostly of individuals from the higher classes of Brazilian society who hail from the wealthier states in Brazil. These immigrants are typically single and from 18 to 40 years old. The group's gender ratio is evenly distributed. Most of them regard their stay in Ireland as temporary.

Methodological Approach

As discussed above, it is often assumed that people move in search of a better life, mostly for financial reasons. With the aim of deconstructing this perception, this study presents and examines one group of immigrants for whom financial prosperity does not appear to function as a primary driver of their decision to migrate. By doing so, it draws attention to the existence of a variety of noneconomic factors underpinning the decision to migrate.

There are several reasons for focusing on Brazilian language students in Ireland. First, in the last decade there was a noteworthy increase in the number of Brazilian nationals in Dublin, with language students representing 75 percent of this population. Second, this group has not been the focus of academic research to date. Third, it can be argued that the particular nature of the migration experience of members of these immigrant groups has great potential to contribute to the theoretical and policy debate on migration initiation.

In line with the purpose of the investigation, and drawing on an insider status, a combination of participant observations and interviews was considered the most appropriate and productive methodological choice for accessing the experience of the target group of Brazilian immigrants. The data collection employed in the study was broadly based on an approach outlined by Hammersley (1992) and Hammersley and Atkinson (1995). It consisted of participant observation (from 2010 until 2013) in diverse social activities attended by Brazilians, such as house parties, concerts, dinners, musical and cultural projects, and sports activities, as well as places associated with Brazilian immigrant life in Dublin, such as Brazilian restaurants and shops. Commonalities and convergences in immigrants' experiences were identified and explored further through semistructured interviews.

Eleven semistructured interviews were conducted with Brazilians living in Dublin, in which participants were invited to talk about their lives in Brazil, their decision-making process, and the expectations they had regarding moving abroad. The interviews also addressed numerous aspects of personal and professional experience in Ireland, such as making friends, studying, and working. When asked their language preference for the interview, all participants chose Portuguese. The interviews were recorded with the participants' permission, and, although they did not demonstrate any concern in relation to divulging their real name, they were assured that names would be replaced by pseudonyms. The length of the interviews varied from 36 minutes to 1 hour and 13 minutes. At the end of the procedure, participants were asked if they could indicate a friend who would collaborate with the study. The data were coded and analyzed with the broad purpose of apprehending the reasons why people decide to live abroad and what people look for when they immigrate.

In writing this chapter, the author decided to use more data from the interviews than from the field notes to allow the immigrants to speak for themselves about the phenomenon being researched. Although the extensive amount of data collected through participant observation may not be explicitly referred to in the interview analysis, it did inform and support most of the thematic outcomes of this analysis.

Immigrating and Its Decision-Making Process

Most Brazilian language students considered a number of other destinations, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and England, before organizing their journey to Ireland. The participants of the study reported that they first decided to move abroad and later decided where to go. Some of them went to a travel agency to ask for advice, while others made a list of possible destinations and then spoke to friends, relatives, and friends of friends who could provide information or advice. Typically, the decision-making process was conducted alone, yet often with periods of support from family members and friends.

Ireland was not the obvious destination for this group of immigrants. Many individuals reported that they always felt especially attracted by the idea of being in the "Old World," understood by them as the European continent, but none of them reported any particular predilection for Ireland. In line with Thompson and Tambyah's (1999) findings that expatriates wanted to use Singapore as a springboard to travel in Asia, we noticed that most Brazilians perceived Ireland as a springboard to visit Europe. For instance, Jorge (29, three years in Ireland) said that it was very important for him to find out that there is an Irish airline company that sells low-price tickets to other European countries. For Jorge and many other Brazilians, the systems that Ireland offers in terms of transportation played an important role in their selecting it as the destination for their experience abroad. Overall, the choice of Ireland was related to four main aspects: (1) it is in Europe; (2) it is a country that offers systems for traveling in Europe easily and at a low cost; (3) it is a country in which English is spoken; (4) it offers the *Student Visa Scheme,* which permits students to work 20 hours per week during a six-month study period and 40 hours for another six months.

Once the decision was made, the next step was to organize the means to meet the financial requirements of the trip. The preparation for the move to Ireland consisted of paying for an exchange program, commonly sold by travel agents specializing in student packages. The package usually includes an English school (normally for a year), accommodations for the first few days or weeks, health insurance, and flights. Moreover, Irish immigration law requires that each student must deposit €3,000 in cash in an Irish bank account upon arrival. The interviews and field notes include repeated mentions of selling belongings to gather the funds required for the trip. Most Brazilians report that they used savings and/or sold cars, motorbikes, and other personal items. For example, Roberto (37, in Ireland for six years), who was a musician, sold his work equipment. "I got rid of all my instruments; my father got annoyed with me." When describing his travel preparations, Luciano (35, four years in Ireland) said, "We [Luciano and his partner] gave up the apartment we lived in. We put all of our belongings up for sale and sold everything we had at home. When we go back, we can buy them again. What we couldn't sell my mother bought. We sold the car and everything." With or without the approval and support of family members, the act of selling material goods underpins the decision to leave behind a more stable life. It also signals their commitment to what is often perceived as one of the most significant life changes they will ever undertake.

Life Prior to Immigration

In addition to their goods, these immigrants also tend to leave behind their professional identities. Many of them have considerable working experience back home. They have typically worked in high-skilled jobs, and have enjoyed good salaries in their chosen professional area. Many of them had jobs related to their college education. Some had several years' professional experience in their area of expertise. Others reported having had more solid careers in terms of stability or promising professional futures in a competitive field. For example, Ana (34, seven years in Ireland) had worked nearly ten years as a work-safety technician, and Carla (35, three years in Ireland) had a decade of experience as a television producer.

Accordingly, these immigrants reported having privileged access to goods and services. Fernanda (28, one year and three months in Ireland) had a car and her own furnished apartment. She notes, "In contrast to my life in Dublin, back in Brazil I could eat out and go out whenever I felt like it; that wouldn't compromise my budget." Mariana (30, three years in Ireland) says, "I worked in an export-import and logistics company. I didn't necessarily like it, but I also wasn't hurting, I earned a good salary." Lack of money is not viewed as an issue even for those who were not so well established in their professional careers. For example, Raquel (30, nine months in Ireland) says that money had never been an issue for her. She notes that she never earned much, but her family always supported her since they enjoy a considerably privileged socioeconomic status. It was noticeable that, back in Brazil, this group of immigrants lived quite a well-structured life in terms of family, career, and goods.

Life after Immigration

These individuals' standard of living in Ireland contrasts markedly with their life back in Brazil. The decision to migrate involved abandoning a more comfortable life and experiencing a radical change in lifestyle. Before moving, they were fully aware that, despite the fact that they would bring some money with them, they would have to work when they arrived. Furthermore, this group of immigrants knew that the decision to move abroad would result in a marked lowering of their standard of both accommodation and access to goods and services.

Once in Ireland, it was not a surprise for them that they would most likely work in jobs that required considerable physical exertion and little mental effort. They also expected to be paid the minimum or below the minimum wage. They were conscious that the jobs they would get would not be in their area of expertise. For example, Luciano was a marketing coordinator in Brazil, and is a waiter in Ireland; Raquel was a social sciences teacher in Brazil, and is an au pair in Ireland; Fernanda was a chemical engineer in Brazil, and is a waitress in Ireland; Jorge was a journalist in Brazil, and is a kitchen assistant in Ireland.

During interviews or informal conversation, when people talked about the jobs they had in Ireland, they did so as if they were telling a joke, expecting the listener to laugh. Interestingly, although they often used irony when describing their labor experiences, their narratives were strongly permeated by a sense of pride and bravado. When asked if they had worked or would work in the same positions back in Brazil the immediate answer was "no, never."

Most individuals emphasized that working in low-skilled jobs would not be considered acceptable back home. Mariana noted that moving abroad represented a significant change in her lifestyle:

> Super! Totally! It was difficult and still is. It is a very rich experience. I worked in a pub, cleaning a pub, I sold newspapers on the street, I collected glasses in a pub, I worked in a cloakroom, that was an easy job! I worked in storage pulling trolleys. But besides the work, there are unpleasant work environments [. . .] you may spend most of your time in a place where people don't look at you or greet you.

As Mariana's testimony illustrates, the differences between her life in Brazil and her life in Ireland are drastic. As mentioned before, she used to have a stable position in an import-export and logistics company in Brazil. In Ireland, she worked in several jobs over a period of three years, nearly all requiring great physical exertion. Mariana seems to be somewhat critical of those occupations; however, she defines the overall experience of change, as a consequence of moving abroad, as an enriching one.

Crucially, working in Ireland is considered to be about experiencing life abroad, and not being concerned with enhancing one's economic well-being. For example, Raquel works as an au pair and earns much less than the Irish minimum wage. She states emphatically, though, that she does not work solely for the money.

> I don't want to put myself in the position of an immigrant which is a submissive position. You have to place yourself and say to your bosses that the car they drive and the jobs they have are the same that your parents have. My bosses' children study in a private school and I did that too. I always try to put myself in the same position and state that the work I do here is not for the money but for the experience. I don't need it.

Raquel is assertive about the way she understands her condition as an au pair and how she considers it important to inform her bosses about her background. She refuses to be seen as an immigrant, a status she perceives as inferior. She deliberately plays down the importance of her income and insists that to work and to make money abroad are not her main goals.

In the case of Mariana, Raquel, and many other Brazilian students in Ireland, classical theories and approaches in Migration Studies seem to be of little help in explaining individual motivations to migrate. Mariana and Rachel are young single women who enjoy good socioeconomic standards back in Brazil and left with the purpose of moving on their own to a place where they neither know anyone nor have friends or relatives. They are quite resigned to work in jobs that would be unthinkable for them at home in Brazil, while maintaining some uneasiness with regard to their work relationships and social status in Ireland.

Motivational Detour

As discussed above, the population in this study does not fit into more prevalent explanations of immigration. Consequently, drawing on concepts used in tourism and travel studies offer a promising theoretical advance. For instance, Hannerz's work (1990) presents the notion of home plus. He borrows the term from Theroux (1986) to articulate his ideas about why people travel. According to Hannerz, for many people, "Spain is home plus sunshine, India is home plus servants, Africa is home plus elephants and lions" (p. 241). In the case of Brazilian immigrants, Ireland is definitely not home plus good income, comfort, or stability. On the one hand, Ireland seems to be home plus English or home plus traveling in Europe. On the other hand, for this population, Ireland does not seem to be home at all. It was noticeable in the interviews that they did not identify any similarities between their lives in Ireland and their lives in Brazil.

Another possible contribution to address the issue is Urry's (1995) claim that the obvious reason people travel is for pleasure. Urry explains that traveling allows people to relax from the rules and restrictions of routine life at the same time as it entails new forms of sociability. Yet the findings of this study suggest that as Brazilians engage with working activities in Irish society, they engage with a new set of rules and restrictions that replace those from back home. And the new forms of sociability they experience are not necessarily described as pleasurable. In this context, the question of why these individuals immigrate to Ireland therefore remains unanswered.

Why Did You Move to Ireland?

The central line of this inquiry focused on the question "why did you move to Ireland?" It emerged that this is a question put to them on a regular basis by Irish people. In general, they have a ready-made "one sentence" answer to this question: "to learn English." Although this response is a reasonable one, it offers only a partial insight into the full motivational texture underpinning the decision to migrate.

Most individuals point out their intention to learn English. That is the ready-made answer they have at the tip of their tongue. In ordinary conversation, learning English is almost always declared to be the main motivation.

At first glance, acquiring fluency in the English language seems to be a reasonable justification, though when confronting it with the data, it was found that some people, like Luciano and Paulo (32 yrs, six months in Ireland), were fluent before coming to Ireland, while others declared they did not to have a clear view of how English would impact their careers back in Brazil. Cases such as Elsa and Raquel illustrate a certain hesitation about the contribution that fluency in English would make to their professional lives. Elsa (27, in an e-mail just a week before she moved to Ireland in 2012) said, "I'm a municipal physical education teacher and I decided I wanted to learn English. For what? At first for nothing really, hahaha." Raquel also affirmed that learning English played a minor role in her decision. "I had no goal to learn English! Learn English for what? For when I come back to work in a private company? Or do a PhD or master's degree? No, I didn't have it in mind." The cases above question the assumption that language plays a vital role in the decision to move to Ireland.

Another inspiration to move abroad is expressed in remarks such as "I always wanted to live abroad for a while" and "I always thought about living abroad for some time." There were recurrent mentions of a willingness to have an experience abroad at some stage. However, it did not seem that this inclination alone would be strong enough to justify the action. To find a more comprehensive explanation, it seems necessary to shift attention away from more common-sense answers and to reflect upon process, rather than outcome, and therefore to ask, Why did these individuals move when they did, why not before, why not later? What pulled the trigger? The next section will focus on life events that are related to the act of immigrating to identify a variety of aspects that permeate the decision-making process.

Life Events and Immigration Resolution

Some of the interview questions asked to elicit further information about the immigration process were the following: "How was your life back in Brazil before you came to Ireland?" "What was your decision-making process in regard to moving abroad?" "What were the moving preparations?" "What were your expectations for living abroad?" In most cases, interviewees did not provide condensed answers about why they migrated; instead, they delivered insights piecemeal, each adding more information. Indeed, sometimes the most telling details emerged when they spoke about other topics.

For some people, migrating was a way to deal with a sense of dissatisfaction. For instance, Roberto said that he decided to move abroad when he was feeling fed up. He explained that he was not happy with his career and lifestyle. He complained of not having time to socialize with his friends. He added, "I had also finished a relationship; it was my first, and it bothered me a lot." He summarized his decision, saying, "I came to see what was going to happen." The sense of giving a chance to the unpredictable was very strong in his account.

In Carla's case, what pulled the trigger was a sense that everything was wrong. She says, "I thought [silence] . . . I wanted to come because of the English, of course, like everyone. But I was feeling that I was dumbing down. I was always doing the same things." As the interview continued, Carla mentioned she was tired of her friends and her job was taking most of her time. She worked 15 hours a day from Monday to Saturday. The fact she was still living with her parents also bothered her, and on top of that she experienced the end of a promising relationship, followed by a distressing romance with another person. "All that made me feel suffocated. I felt suffocated!" She defined her reason for moving by using the Portuguese verb *desbravar*. "Europe my God, the Old World, let's *desbravar*!" The word *desbravar* has no precise equivalent in the English language. It can be defined as a combination of "to break new ground," and "to unleash." Carla's use of the word communicates a lack of fear and emphasizes the urgency of exploring the unknown.

Raquel's story was quite similar. She explains that she lost her job, her relationship ended, and she had to go back to her parents' house. She saw herself as trapped. The only possible solution she could think of was to get out: "I wanted distance from everything that was making me suffer." Raquel perceived migration as an opportunity to make changes in her life. For example, she mentioned that she thought about working in a pub, restaurant, or hotel to gain some experience in hospitality that could help her access other working opportunities in Brazil. But, most of all, Raquel states, "I wanted to try to live without depending on anyone because I always had family, boyfriends, I was never alone. I never lived on my own." This quote expresses an explicit desire to leave behind what is considered for many people the *comfort zone*. Interestingly, all the support Rachel had available in Brazil was perceived by her as overly protective and somewhat stifling.

Similarly, Fernanda's decision to pack her bags was mostly driven by her inability to meet her family's expectations. She had no complaints about her professional life. She noted that she had a busy and stressful working life, but what disturbed her most was her family's pressure on her to find a partner, have children, and build a family. She said that at some stage the pressure became unbearable, and her decision to move abroad was the outcome. Fernanda's case illustrates the importance of also taking into account nonlabor aspects of life.

The sentiments expressed in these immigrants' stories demonstrate that lifestyle and relationships with family and friends play a crucial role in decisions to migrate. In most cases, disruptions in the routine result in a sense of "time out," the time or space to do something someone always thought about doing. It was found that the act of migrating is often predicated on overall discontentment with one or a combination of aspects of their private and professional life, including: a broken heart, pressure to commit to a relationship or have children, excessive control and constraint exercised by the family, a stressful working routine, job loss, and dissatisfaction with a current job or career.

Final Thoughts

The preceding sections presented contrasting aspects between life at home and life in the society of destination. We saw that in most cases, the decision to move to Ireland had strong implications for the individuals' socioeconomic standards and that these individuals were aware of this before they migrate. Brazilian language students seem to be willing to "step down," in financial terms. The findings demonstrate that for many of them, the decision to migrate was motivated by a major disruption or a series of disruptions. It seems that social pressure in the future immigrant's professional and/or personal life builds to a crescendo. At some stage, individuals report that this pressure or dissatisfaction with one or more aspects of their lives was unmanageable and that this feeling was the final straw. Often, migrating was seen as an escape from the pressure of fitting into a more linear lifestyle defined by milestones, such as graduating from college, pursuing a high-profile career, acquiring goods and property, and starting a family.

The reasons for migrating are neither restricted to improving employability back in Brazil by learning English nor informed by the urgency of acquiring financial capital. They transcend economic capital in the strict sense. While migration studies traditionally tend to confirm the commonsense expectation that immigrants' ultimate goal is to look for economic betterment, this study found that a core feature running through these Brazilian immigrants' stories is a strong desire for adventure based on notions of exploring or "giving a chance to the unpredictable." More than purchasing an exchange program, these individuals are consuming some time away from their former routines and opening up space for the element of *randomness* that permeates the immigration experience and serves as a source of excitement.

In conclusion, this study calls attention to the multifunctional nature of migration. It demonstrates that simple explanations for moving elsewhere do not necessarily communicate the core motivations of individuals' decisions to migrate. This chapter focuses on a relatively privileged group of Brazilian migrants, and its findings serve to recast research approaches toward personal migration drivers of immigrants more along class lines that emphasize opportunity, experience, cosmopolitanism, and the preservation of social capital among richer migrants who make different kinds of choices to move to another cultural setting. Hence, to better understand immigration, it is essential to go beyond and beneath macroeconomic depictions. By doing so, the investigation of why immigration occurs can generate significant contributions to the discussion of migration flows in the context of ongoing global societal transformations.

Note

1. Communication via e-mail by Pedro Yacubian. Brazilian Consular Sector in Dublin (August 22, 2011).

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CHAPTER 9

Views of Migrants and Foreign Residents: A Comparative European Perspective

Giuliana B. Prato

> Settembre, andiamo. È tempo di migrare.
> Ora in terra d'Abruzzi i miei pastori
> lascian gli stazzi e vanno verso il mare:
> [. . .]
> Ah perché non son io cò miei pastori?[1]
>
> (Gabriele D'Annunzio, "I pastori."
> In *Alcyone. Sogni di Terre Lontane*)

When I began outlining the content of this chapter, two descriptions of human migration flashed through my mind. One is ethnographic, the other poetic. Let me start with the ethnography. While doing research in Brindisi, in southeast Italy, in the late 1980s on how political ideologies had influenced economic policies in the area, a successful local entrepreneur told me that he had rejected the suggestion to move his business to the North of Italy. Experience, he said, had taught him that, because of his southern origins, he would be treated as an immigrant, a "rich" immigrant perhaps, but a "migrant" nonetheless (Prato 1993). Personal feelings apart, he said that due to the negative stereotypes associated with southerners, the relationship with his northern business partners would inevitably change once he moved to the North.[2] This entrepreneur's observations brought to mind the poem dedicated to the transhumant shepherds of Abruzzo, in central Italy, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, which stimulated comparative reflections.

The poem, written by Gabriele D'Annunzio at a time of heavy Italian migration abroad, is infused with the kind of nostalgia often associated with migrants. It is the nostalgia of ancient memories; it is about the longing for the native land, for the people who inhabit that land and their culture. Throughout the poem, the shepherds' seasonal migration not only emerges as a necessary journey from the mountain pastures of Abruzzo to the coastal grazing land of Apulia but also as a process that leads to the encounter, and subsequent interaction, between different people and their cultural traditions.[3] Although this kind of encounter is generally seen as engendering new knowledge, and is therefore perceived as enriching, the moment of migration marks, nonetheless, the beginning of a melancholic time for those who must leave their native land. This melancholy, according to D'Annunzio, never leaves the hearts of those in exile. However, although he seemed to share the melancholy and nostalgia of these seasonal migrants, he did not consider himself, nor would he be generally regarded as, a migrant. The son of a rich landowner from the city of Pescara, he had an urban upbringing. As a teenager, he had been educated away from home, in Tuscany. He, then, attended university in Rome, where he lived most of the time, with spells in France and Dalmatia (in contemporary Croatia), before retiring on the shores of Lake Garda in northern Italy. In short, he could be described as a flamboyant cosmopolitan who moved confidently among the aristocracy and the most fashionable literary circles of early twentieth-century Italy.

Both the example of the Brindisi entrepreneur and the nostalgic mood of D'Annunzio's poem raise interesting questions about migration, first among them, how to identify who is "categorized" as a migrant. Does this "status" depend on geographic provenance (as in the stereotypical portraits of southern Italians), ethnic origin, or economic status? If this is mainly a socioeconomic category, how do we understand it in a way that makes sense of the distinction between, for example, "immigrants" and "foreign residents"? Is this category still analytically relevant to our understanding of the rapid transformation of the scale and scope of the contemporary global transboundary demographic mobility?

According to United Nations data, in 2013 the number of people living outside their home country amounted to 232 million. Nearly 75 percent of these international migrants are of working age, between 20 and 64, and 48 percent are women (Thornhill 2013). These international migrants include a varied range of people: from those traditionally categorized as "economic migrants" to international students living abroad, to so-called "lifestyle migrants" and professionals working abroad, traditionally defined as "expatriates." The latter group—that is, the professionals—has been further subdivided into "foreign executives in local organizations" (also known as FELOs) and "self-initiated expatriates" (also known as SIEs).[4] This complexity, together with the continuously changing geopolitical situations and attendant global interests, demands a new approach to the study of contemporary migration that acknowledges the importance of a cross-disciplinary dialogue. Furthermore, when looking at new trends in labor force mobility, such a new approach should also take into account the role played by the interaction among social, economic, legal, political, and cultural factors in the quality of migratory policies and in the status of foreigners in the host society. Legal and political factors may include bilateral agreements between countries; laws on the free movement of people, as in the case of the European Union (EU); agreements between governments and private sectors; and issues specific to the immigration policy of each country (see, e.g., Da Silva 2013, Giordano 2012, Ruspini and Eades, eds. 2014). Social and cultural factors may be linked, among other things, to the role of transnational families and diaspora communities (see, e.g., Rubel and Rossman 2009, Benson and O'Reilly, eds. 2009). Of course, as anthropologists, we cannot ignore that, with variations in degree and intensity, all these factors influence native people's attitudes toward migrants and the latter's position in the host society (see, e.g., Fernandes and Morte 2011, Pardo 2009, 2012, Webner 1990). Although most studies have traditionally focused on "poor" migrants, new research is increasingly carried out on the aforementioned FELOs, often focusing on cross-cultural interactions in the workplace (see, e.g., Arp et al. 2013), and on skilled migrants' social capital and networks (e.g., Ahmed 2012, Casado Diaz 2009). The attention paid to these international migrants would stimulate a redefinition of traditional analytical categories, such as "expatriates" and "economic migrants."

In this chapter, I address the distinction between "immigrants" and "foreign residents," and the cultural meaning attached to the socioeconomic status of "economic migrant" and "expatriate" (usually identified as "rich immigrant"). I focus on two European regions that have experienced a large influx of foreign residents and expatriates in the past two decades. They are in Albania and France.

The first part of the discussion addresses the extent to which internal migration and the increasing presence of foreign residents have influenced urban policies in major Albanian cities, like Tirana, the country's capital. The second part of the chapter looks at British expatriates in the North of France. The Albanian and the Franco-British cases highlight how the presence of rich foreign residents (and in the case of Albania of broader geopolitical and economic interests), on the one hand, and "economic migration" on the other, may affect urban policies and the local housing and land market. At the same time, these two ethnographic cases bring out how the local context and cultural factors interact with the newcomers' specific circumstances in determining their impact on contemporary urban changes and their position in the local society.

Postcommunist Migrations and the "Urban Renaissance" of Tirana

Albania is historically considered a country of emigration (see, e.g., Prato 2009). However, since the collapse of the communist regime in 1990, Albania's major cities, in particular the country's capital, Tirana, have become the recipients of a large number of new residents. This new demographic mobility has occurred on two levels. On the one hand, there has been a significant internal migration from rural, mountain areas to the urban peripheries. Following the closure of cooperatives, state industries, and state farms, and the attendant collapse of the economy, there was almost no employment in the countryside. The rural North was particularly affected by the economic crisis and the consequent deterioration of the infrastructure. The combination of these negative events triggered the exodus of the working-age population from the mountain areas. Those who could not emigrate abroad moved to the country's urbanized areas, leading to a high demographic concentration in the central coastal region, mainly in the Tirana-Durrës area. On the other hand, major cities like Tirana have experienced a large influx of foreigners, who reside there (usually temporarily but, in some cases, permanently) as diplomatic personnel, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activists, executives in local organizations, consultants to the Albanian government and to other key public institutions, and private investors. A different aspect of migration has also had an important impact. Albanian migrants' remittances, new businesses established by returning migrants, and an increasing number of transnational entrepreneurial ventures have injected a considerable amount of capital without necessarily producing widespread welfare. These new demographic and economic phenomena have engendered significant changes that, though generally affecting people's lifestyle, have truly benefitted only a minority of the population. An example of selective beneficial changes is illustrated by the scheme called Rilindja e Qytetit (Urban Renaissance) promoted by the mayor of Tirana in 2000. The scheme stimulated the design of several urban plans targeted to make life comfortable for the foreign residents and the new Albanian elite and, the dominant rhetoric stated, to make Tirana a dynamic "world-class" city attractive to further investment. In contrast, the areas inhabited by a significant number of internal migrants, who moved to Tirana in search of jobs and better living conditions, have been mostly neglected and generally bypassed by this "renaissance." Most of the internal migrants live in the urban peripheries that lack basic services and infrastructures. Nevertheless, in the case of Tirana, both the internal migration and the presence of foreign residents have contributed, in different ways and degrees, to the rapid transformation of the urban landscape, generating what many observers describe as a "dual city." In order to understand why and how this dual reality has developed, it is important to examine the processes that spurred the unplanned, unauthorized urbanization of Tirana's periphery.

Informal Urbanization beyond the "Yellow Line"

The rapid development of new urban areas at the periphery of Tirana is the outcome of the postcommunist reforms, in particular, the newly acquired freedom of movement and the rights to private property and to private business. As a consequence, the population of the metropolitan area of Tirana has exploded from about 250,000 to well over 800,000 inhabitants—mainly due to internal rural-urban migration. In the process, an uneven development has taken place, leading to the aforementioned "dual city," that is, a trendy and fast modernizing inner city and an urban periphery mostly characterized by illegal building and a lack of basic infrastructure (see, e.g., Pojani 2010, Pllumbi 2013). Perversely, this duality continues to reflect the old rural-urban division enforced under communism.

To understand the relevance of this duality to present-day Tirana, a brief historical explanation is necessary. The contemporary suburban settlements are located outside the so-called Yellow Line, which, under communism, defined the limits of the "allowed" expansion of a city. Yellow Lines were imposed on every city by the communist regime as borders beyond which a city could not expand. They were an important element of the communist urban planning strategy implemented after 1960. This was, de facto, an antiurbanization strategy with a threefold aim: to foster the development of rural areas and of the suburban industrial districts; to control urban growth; to control demographic mobility. Once a city's expansion reached the Yellow Line, the excess population was forced to move to other, less populated cities or to newly created towns (see Aliaj 2003). It must also be noted that under the communist totalitarian regime, Albanians could not move freely from one city or village to another. They needed permission from the state's representatives. As Pllumbi (2013) points out, this urban control was justified as a form of planning strategy aimed at achieving an "optimum city size," a concept based in part on the nineteenth-century idea of "garden city." Although this modernist model of urban planning was not new in Albania, the communist strategy of the 1960s was meant to emulate the project of self-sustaining urban settlements that had been implemented in some East European countries and in some regions of the Soviet Union.[5] The establishment of the Yellow Line not only allowed the state to control population movements but also enforced a distinction between the rural and the urban. In line with the concept of self-sustaining urban settlements, land outside the Yellow Line was organized in state-owned farms and publicly managed cooperatives whose priority was to supply the urban population.

Following the economic collapse of the state cooperatives and industries in the early 1990s, the farmland and business buildings were leased to private individuals. Initially, the privatization process benefitted mainly the former communist nomenklatura, who took advantage of their position and contacts to acquire state properties. At the same time, parcels of state-owned land and ex-cooperative farmland were allocated as private property to worker families and to residents of the state farms on condition that they would work the land and become independent farmers. However, new legislation on the redistribution of formerly confiscated land led to thousands of land claims. It soon became obvious that the postcommunist state bureaucracy was not equipped to administer this new situation. Many Albanian informants—private citizens as well as public officials—have pointed out to me that land allocations and redistribution were made quickly and on many occasions arbitrarily, and that it was often difficult to draw clear boundaries for the allocated plots of land (Prato 2011; see also Bardhoshi 2011). Moreover, state-land recipients were told that the document testifying to their parcel assignment had to be intended as a long-term lease and did not specify future rights (Bloch 1998). The difficulty in determining the final status of the state-farm lands, together with demographic pressure from internal migration, led to the creation of an "informal" land market, whereby land recipients began to sell "informally" their assigned parcels to rural immigrants and building speculators. Rural migrants and low-income families who could not afford regular housing in the city center contributed to accelerating the "informal land market," phenomenon as they occupied illegally plots of private or public-owned land on the suburban fringes, where they built houses without permission (see, e.g., Bardhoshi 2011). As soon as the land was claimed and built upon, even if illegally, it became available for sale on the informal land market.

The social and cultural dynamics, and the economic and political implications of this kind of informal market have been studied from different disciplinary perspectives.[6] For the purpose of this discussion, it is relevant to point out that these "informal" areas amount to 40 percent of the urban expansion of Tirana and that they are located outside the official boundary marked by the Yellow Line. In particular, the initial squatter settlements grew in four specific periurban areas: Kamza to the northwest, Babruja to the north, Sauk to the south, and Yzberish to the southwest. Apart from morphological reasons, these areas were well located—they were near transport routes and could be easily connected to electricity and water supply lines.[7] Most significantly, the strongest expansion occurred toward the northwest, along the planned EU transportation Corridor VIII (one of the major European Ten-T Corridors). The pressure to acquire land for development produced widespread speculation, rampant unauthorized building, and, not surprisingly, an increase in the (informal) market value of the land. A study carried out on the Kavaja and Durrës corridor routes in 1995 (Felstehausen 1999) identified more than 1,000 shops and businesses per square kilometer in the suburban areas. This study also documented the rapid development in the commercial use of highway space for approximately 50 meters on each side of the road.

The informal land market and the construction of new houses and businesses in these areas have occurred in the absence of public planning, street layout, and infrastructure. Water and electricity supply was achieved by illegally tapping into the public grid. As these areas have become more urbanized, these services have fallen under the control of illegal ward bosses who charge each household a hook-up fee.

From the "Right to the City" to Planned Urban Renaissance

Inner-city Tirana, too, initially experienced an "informal" development in part similar to that described above. In a perverse interpretation of the "right to the city" that followed the collapse of communism, ordinary people not only began to enjoy access to previously forbidden areas, such as the so-called *Blloku* (blocked area)[8] but they also occupied public spaces. Inside the Yellow Line, both old residents and a few newcomers began squatting in public spaces between houses and in public areas and the city's parks, claiming these spaces for commercial activities, including small shops, kiosks, and above all restaurants and bars that catered to the increasing number of foreign residents and to the new Albanian economic elite. Parallel to the establishment of these commercial activities that allowed people to earn a living, the need for new housing led to real estate speculation in the center. New high-rise buildings mushroomed unplanned, totally out of control (Pllumbi 2013). In some cases, old houses were illegally "extended" into public space, as their inhabitants built additional rooms, bathrooms (or simply toilets), kitchens, storerooms, and so on. In other cases, the public space outside residential buildings was divided into private courtyards. In the absence of urban planning, these unauthorized constructions generated a "collage" city. By the mid-1990s, Tirana had become a construction site dotted with countless new or renovated buildings that emerged next to run-down neighborhoods.

Thus, postcommunist Tirana has probably been the fastest-changing capital in Europe. Under the aforementioned "Urban Renaissance," the city's mayor, Edi Rama, ordered the demolition of all the illegal kiosks, restaurants, and bars built in the city-center's public spaces after 1991. Most of the illegal constructions in the centrally located Rinia Park were also destroyed. As part of this renewal process, previously grey apartment blocks were painted in bright colors, though the interiors were often left unchanged.[9] As I have mentioned earlier, this "Urban Renaissance" project, which sought to turn Tirana into an attractive, booming, and modern European capital, mainly targeted the city center. Examples abound. The *Blloku* has now become an upmarket neighborhood with shopping areas, trendy bars, and restaurants. This once secluded residential area (see note 8), now the "playground" of the young Albanian elite, is very attractive to foreigners, who enjoy the many local bars, restaurants, nightclubs, and casinos. The centrally located Rinia Park has been transformed into a green commercial area with renovated buildings, including some illegal constructions that have survived the cleansing order by the mayor. The complex known as the Taiwan Center has become the most popular gathering place in Rinia Park, with its expensive restaurants, outdoor terraces facing a fountain, trendy bars, a bowling alley, club, and casino.

Over the last 20 years, half a dozen urban plans have been outlined for Tirana with the help of foreign consultants from the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and France, whose influence depended on their relationship with the political party in power. These plans targeted mainly inner-city development, though in some cases they addressed the whole metropolitan area, including the informal zones beyond the Yellow Line. Because of the continuously changing political situation, many of these proposals were often the outcome of "informal" agreements between the consulting firms and politicians. As they did not undergo the established approval procedure, their legal status was often unclear.[10] Meanwhile, a master plan for the Tirana metropolitan region has been in preparation for over two decades without completion. Moreover, in 2012 the municipality of Tirana confusingly announced the preparation of a new master plan, which would include a study for the development of the Tirana-Durrës region—these two cities are 30 kilometers apart and are situated along the route of Corridor VIII, which has attracted substantial government and international financial investment (see Prato 2012, 2014).

It is worth reiterating that all of the major master plans for Tirana have put a strong emphasis on the city center, which is the part of the city that would serve mostly foreign residents and rich visitors. In particular, as part of the Central Axis Masterplan, urban development projects have focused on Skanderberg Square and its surrounding boulevards, and the relocation of the central train station.[11]

Over time, from an initial focus on Tirana's city center, the urban development projects have gradually radiated outward, first toward areas within the official boundary of the city (the Yellow Line), then, toward the informal areas. However, once again, most of the projects planned at the city's outskirts do not seem to address the need for substantial infrastructure improvement in the informal zones. Many of these projects are about the construction of modern, multifunctional centers along the highway connecting Tirana to the port city of Durres and on the highway to the airport, or in the direction of developing residential areas.[12] On paper, all these new developments would be easily accessible to everybody either by private car, through renovated or new main roads, or by public transport. In particular, a strong emphasis is put on the new privatized transport system, which has apparently put an end to the informal services that emerged in the late 1990s, following the decline of the dilapidated public transport system inherited from the communist period. At the time, informal transport was provided by privately run minivans (*furgonë*). These *furgonë* ran more frequently and reliably than the public buses and also reached destinations not normally served by public transport. Many people, including wealthier residents, preferred to use these *furgonë* also because during their intercity journey they would pick up and drop off people on request along the route. Following the privatization of public transport that began in 2001, new legal requirements for running the service were introduced. For example, a license was required. These changes caused a decline in the number of *furgonë* in operation (Pojani 2010). In 2004, intracity *furgonë* were eventually banned. By 2006, nine out of ten urban lines had been privatized and were operated by four companies. However, not all suburban areas are served by these lines, and the companies charge a considerably higher fare for suburban destinations. Urban bus lines charge 30 Lek (approximately US$0.30) per ride regardless of the distance traveled within the city. They are also legally bound to offer monthly passes and reduced fares for students. In contrast, not only are fares higher on suburban lines,[13] but they also vary depending on the distance travelled, and monthly passes are not available. Few residents in the informal areas own a car, so they are among the people most heavily dependent on public transport, particularly since most of them work in the inner city. Furthermore, the younger residents point out that this situation makes it more difficult for them to go to school and to attend university, and makes it impossible for them to enjoy the nightlife in the city center. Thus, the image of a "dual city" is reinforced.

We know that these informal areas, which account for 40 percent of the new urbanization, are located outside the historic Yellow Line. While this Line seems to have lost its original meaning of delimiting the boundaries of urban growth, it has acquired a new meaning. It has become a symbolic line within society, indicating differences of status. It is now a dividing line between the formal and the informal city. It is a line of segregation, separating the "true" urban residents—who include the original inhabitants of the city and foreigners—and the newcomers, who are still seen as outsiders who do not have the "right mentality" and culture to live in the city. As Pllumbi has aptly noted, "The phenomenon of the expansion of the city resembles a patchwork puzzle, the patches here are separated and suffer in their vulnerability and lack of identity. The Yellow Line is transformed in a social wall that separates the components of the city" (Pllumbi 2013: 79–80). Not only do most foreign residents usually not integrate into the local society—at most they seem willing to associate with the local elite—but also, most significantly, it would appear that the old urban residents, who claim their right to the city, do not wish to grant that same right to the rural migrants.

The Tirana case seems to mirror Krase's observation (2012a, see also 2012b) that the transformation of the urban landscape produced by migration introduces a new ordering of city life. Here, while rural migrants have changed the suburban landscape, the inner city has been changed by urban planners to satisfy what local administrators perceive to be the needs of the foreign residents and to transform Tirana into a "world-class city" that would hopefully attract new investors and rich immigrants. Following Lofland (1985), it could be argued that the built environment is symbolically communicating people's position and the ordering of the urban inhabitants in terms of spatial location, and that it does so in such a way that urban residents will know a great deal about each other simply by looking.

British Expatriates and Economic Migrants in the Nord-Pas-De-Calais

In contrast to Albania, the United Kingdom has historically been a destination for many foreign migrants, mainly from former British colonies. Beyond this historical pattern, there are two demographic phenomena that need attention: the presence in the United Kingdom of "migrants" from other European countries as a consequence of EU "free movement" policies, and the growing number of Britons who move abroad. Here, I shall focus on the latter phenomenon.

An expatriate is by definition a person residing in a country other than his/her homeland. In common usage, however, this word is usually applied to professionals and skilled workers working abroad for a specific length of time or to so-called lifestyle migrants, often including pensioners who move abroad in search of a better climate or lower living costs. The "category" expatriate does not, therefore, include all "migrants." In particular, it does not include manual laborers, or the so-called economic migrants, that is, people who are poor and move abroad to earn money and improve their living standard. In this light, we should ask to what extent the increasing number of British people living in northern France is to be considered an expatriate community. As we shall see, Britons residing permanently in northern France are by no means a homogenous socioeconomic group, and some of them would certainly fit the category of economic migrants.

In addition to lifestyle migrants, it must be pointed out that during the second half of the twentieth century, a combination of many factors created a global market for professional expatriates. Contrary to "traditional" professional expatriates, some of them chose to move abroad on a short-term basis, while others chose to do so permanently. Many commuted between their new residence abroad and their workplace in the home country. To many Britons from southeastern England, northern France was ideal for such "commuting" expatriation, which is described in the literature as self-initiated expatriation (SIE). Initially, the SIE category referred to the significant number of young people who every year moved abroad "for a prolonged period of travel, work, and tourism" (Inkson et al. 1997: 358). The concept was later broadened to include other groups of "expatriates" (see, e.g., Bozionelos 2009, Selmer and Lauring 2011), generating a considerable number of subgroups that are so different from each other as to make one wonder whether a single category is a viable analytical tool. To complicate matters further, Suutari and Brewster (2000) have suggested that when the geographic and cultural distance is limited, as in the case of people moving to neighboring countries, it would perhaps be more appropriate to use the expression "self-initiated foreign experience" (SFE).

So, are the British expatriates in the Nord-pas-de-Calais an example of SFE? The ethnographic cases that I have studied would suggest that they could be generally described as relatively rich immigrants. Although they are not particularly well-off, they are generally wealthier than the native inhabitants.

Drawing on ethnographic material collected in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in the discussion that follows I look at a community of Britons (mainly from southern England) who over the last 15 to 20 years have moved to northern France in search of a better lifestyle. Many are pensioners, while others are professionals or small-scale entrepreneurs. Rather than moving to big cities, they, like many others, choose to reside in midsized towns that can offer cheap housing and living costs and are easily reachable from the United Kingdom—most of which are a 30- to 50-minute drive from the ports of Calais, Dunkirk, or Boulogne. This choice has fit nicely with the French's interest in populating the country's economically declining rural and postindustrial areas. For the expatriate community, better living conditions mostly mean being able to afford a British-style social life that they could no longer sustain in their home country.[14] Furthermore, expatriates often qualify for many financial benefits, including tax benefits either in the country of origin or in the host country. For example, UK pensioners can qualify for the "recognized overseas pension scheme" (QROPS). This scheme has become popular among British expatriates due to the tax advantages it offers. For example, pension funds left in the United Kingdom are heavily taxed, in some cases up to 50 percent; however, if the UK pension fund is transferred to a QROPS, the pensioner can avoid UK taxation.[15]

Most of the British expatriates whom I have met in the North of France appear to rely on a network of acquaintances and friends. Some say that they have been helped by their "old boy" network, or by their membership in gentlemen's clubs back in the United Kingdom. In a significant number of cases, it would indeed appear that people could have not afforded to expatriate without the help of their networks. In recent years, however, the number of Britons moving to this part of France has increased so significantly that a real estate agent has aptly chosen the name "L'Abri-Tanique" for his business, playing on the French words *abri* (shelter) and *britanique* (British). This firm advertises its services as a bilingual real estate agency for those who want to buy or rent a townhouse, a farmhouse, or any other property, land, apartment, or villa near the Channel ports.

The phenomenon of British expatriates living in European countries is, of course, not new. In 2009, the United Kingdom had the most expatriates among developed Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with more than three million British people living abroad, half of whom were in EU member states.[16] One thinks, for example, of the many Britons who moved to Italy and Spain. In Italy, most of them initially settled in Tuscany in such a number that this Italian region became known as "Chiantishire." Their presence rapidly changed the housing market, and when prices became too high, newcomers started settling in nearby Umbria. In Spain, the presence of British expatriates in the Costa del Sol, first, and more recently in the Costa Blanca is a well-known phenomenon (see, e.g., O'Reilly 2000, Benson and O'Reilly 2009, King et al. 2000). In her study of British expatriate women in the Costa Blanca, Ahmed (2012) describes how they establish social barriers not only between the network of expatriates and the native population but also within the expatriate community, determining who is accepted in their circles. Most of these women make a distinction between "acquaintances" and people with whom there is a "shared sense of community." However, in many cases it is a "superficial" feeling of belonging that satisfies their need for security and safety, and such a feeling is based on sharing with their compatriots the same language and culture. As Ahmed points out, such a feeling can be switched on and off for pragmatic purposes. Above all, belonging to the expatriate network seems to be a matter of being able to continue their British lifestyle. As these expatriates do not seem interested in learning the local language and culture and integrating into the wider society, Ahmed notes (2012), their establishment and maintenance of these social networks is a strategy for thriving in a foreign environment.

Contrary to this Spanish situation, the British expatriates in the North of France do not live in "segregated" residential areas or far from the native population. Although belonging to the network of local British expatriates gives a sense of continuity to their lives, most of my informants seem to make an effort to integrate with their French neighbors.[17] Some have taken French citizenship. Although British nationals do not need to have a French passport to reside permanently in France, they have chosen to become French nationals for two main reasons. One is hypothetical and has to do with the debate on whether the United Kingdom should move out of the EU, so, they say that at their age it is wise to plan in good time. The other reason is more immediately practical and has to do with social integration. This second reason is given mainly by those who have established a local business, such as a bed and breakfast or other tourist-related activities. They say that by taking up French citizenship, they are showing the local community their determination to become fully integrated into French society and culture. They hope that their business will also benefit from this choice, gaining local people's support and help. In both cases, however, my informants are keen to point out that because both France and the United Kingdom are EU member states, they have not lost their British citizenship. They see their dual citizenship as an advantage.

Let us now look in more detail at the socioeconomic composition of the British living in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais. As I mentioned earlier, some are retired. However, a significant number, especially failed entrepreneurs in the United Kingdom, have established new businesses locally, in most cases a bed and breakfast. Others, less adventurous, look after the houses and gardens of fellow Britons who have not yet moved permanently into the area and who use them seasonally or rent them out. These may be people whose pension is too low even for the cost of living in this part of France and who, therefore, complement it with this kind of activity, or they may be people who have not yet accrued enough pension contributions and continue to work in the United Kingdom, often on casual or part-time contracts.

Some more adventurous expatriates, who do not have skills employable in the current labor market but are still of working age, have started a business that they call "alternative tourist experience." They advertise among their British networks, offering hospitality in their French chalet (or, in some cases a chateau, that is, a house bigger than usual set on several acres of land) to paying guests and a "full immersion" in the local way of life. Usually, such "alternative tourist experiences" consist in food and drink tours with visits to local *caves* (winemakers) and specialist wine merchants, tours of local *brocantes* (secondhand, or vintage shops) and visits to flea markets, and open-air activities such as cycling or horseback riding in the countryside. Sometimes these activities are combined with painting lessons or French book-reading sessions. Also in this case, the acceptance of the local French inhabitants appears to be fundamental to the success of the business, especially considering that many customers are people passing through the area.[18] As these people stop at local cafes and restaurants, they are informed of this "alternative" tourist opportunity by the locals who run these businesses. In this symbiotic relationship between the locals and the expatriates, the latter direct their friends and, if in business, their paying guests to patronize the local cafes and restaurants.

The relationship between the locals and the expatriates is, however, not always so idyllic. Some opposition to the presence of "too many British" arose when some expatriates began to speculate on the housing market. These self-declared "housing entrepreneurs" began to buy derelict properties at very low prices—in some cases paying little more than the value of the land—which they proceeded to restore at low cost using inferior materials and sell to newcomers at prices far above the local market value. This practice has inflated the housing market and has made it more difficult for local people to become homeowners.

Significantly, while the United Kingdom is the OECD country that "exports" the most expatriates, all the major British political parties have engaged in an increasingly heated debate on limiting the number of immigrants and revising the country's immigration policies. Interestingly, the (legal) principle of free movement of people from other EU member states has become the focus of attention in this debate. EU visitors are collectively labeled as "migrants," including those young people who would rather fit the description of SIEs. Meanwhile, there is pressure from various lobbies to encourage the presence of so-called "rich migrants," such as rich Chinese or Russian entrepreneurs, Arab "expatriates," and so on. Equally interestingly, while the Britons who move abroad continue to be described as expatriates, regardless of their socioeconomic status, foreigners who decide to settle in the United Kingdom but come from certain countries—including some EU countries, particularly but not only in Eastern Europe—continue to be labeled as "migrants," even when they are financially wealthier than the majority of native Britons.

Conclusions

At the beginning of this chapter, I questioned who should be included in the categories of "migrant," "foreign resident," "expatriate," and "rich migrant." The Albanian and Franco-British cases that I have discussed highlight the arbitrariness of categorizations, be they based on socioeconomic or biological criteria, which have been widely debated in the social sciences. Of course, we have seen that, when discussing socioeconomic categories, people's wealth does not refer merely to monetary or, more generally, material wealth but also to social and cultural capital. We should indeed ask what is the political relevance of these forms of capital and what is their impact when combined with economic wealth. In the Albanian case, some of the rural migrants who settled at the urban periphery managed to accumulate substantial economic capital through their involvement in the informal land market and building speculation, and yet, they continue to be considered "outsiders" whose culture does not fit into the transformation of Tirana into a "world-class city" and, more generally, of Albania into a modern and modernized country. We have seen that, perversely, the attitude of the traditional urban residents seems to mirror that of the communist regime toward those who did not fit into the prevailing political project. Newcomers are not considered to be full urban citizens because they are the bearers of a cultural tradition that conflicts with the new dominant political project. Following Pardo (2009), we could argue that they are, therefore, treated as second-class citizens. In contrast, Britons who move abroad see themselves and are seen in their country of origin as "expatriates" and, regardless of their wealth, they are usually seen as "rich migrants" in the host society. Significantly, although UK emigration is the largest among the OECD countries, British politicians claim to be responding to the instances of their constituents when they say that there is a need to curb "indiscriminate mass migration" in Britain, including "migration from other EU member states." At the same time, "rich immigrants" from non-EU countries continue to be apparently more than welcome to settle in the United Kingdom. New financial and political agreements, changes in the labor market, and cheaper travel opportunities have made it easier for people to move to other countries. New analytical constructs, such as FELOs and SIEs, have been devised to describe the status of the various kinds of new "migrants."

The different attitudes that have emerged in this discussion make one wonder whether the status of new migrants is determined by a new hierarchical "reputation-based" categorization, whereby the status of the migrant is assessed on the basis of the international reputation of the migrant's country of origin. It is noteworthy that this reputation is essentially linked to international recognition of the political and economic weight that a country is allowed to have in the continuously changing geopolitical framework. Of course, in this scenario, it is irrelevant whether this reputation reflects reality (and is therefore truly deserved) or is fictitious. What matters is that the "virtual" status of the country meets the criteria established by a well-understood but unspoken ranking. It is not surprising, therefore, that people who decide to move abroad from countries like Albania will continue to be categorized as (poor) migrants, whereas people who do so from countries like Britain will continue to be regarded as (rich) expatriates. It is equally unsurprising that this should be so regardless of these people's economic wealth. However, the case of British expatriates in France and the literature on expatriate communities more generally show that, although expatriates do not consider themselves "migrants," their eagerness to belong to a network of compatriots is not, after all, so different from the nostalgia of D'Annunzio's migrants. Perhaps they, too, on occasion dream of being with "their shepherds."

Notes

1. September, let's go. It's time to migrate./ Now in the land of Abruzzi my shepherds / leave the pens and take to the sea: [. . .] Alas, why am I not with my shepherds? (from "The Shepherds." in G. D'Annunzio, *Halcyon: Dreams of Distant Lands*, first published in 1903 by the Publisher Treves of Milan).
2. This widespread stereotype of southerners moving to the North as migrants was famously satirized in a film by Massimo Troisi titled *Ricomincio da tre* (Let me re-start from three). In the film, while traveling for pleasure to Tuscany (a region in the centre-north), the young Massimo rhetorically asks why everybody assumes that, because he is from Naples, he must be an emigrant.

3. This annual migration occurred along the so-called *tratturi* (rural trails), which were part of a regulated system of wide grassy trails that connected the mountain areas to the coastal plains. The legacy of these ancient *tratturi* has been preserved as a unique cultural patrimony by the Regions in which this transhumance occurred (that is, Apulia, Abruzzo, and Molise). Interestingly, the Region of Molise has proposed that UNESCO designate the five historical *tratturi* of transhumance as World Heritage sites. These are L'Aquila-Foggia, Centarelle-Montesecco, Celano-Foggia, Pescasseroli-Candela, and Ateleta-Biferno. A proposal has also been made to declare some cultural aspects, such as the festivals that marked the beginning and the end of the winter migration and the rituals performed along the *tratturi*, as "intangible cultural heritage."
4. See, e.g., Inkson et al. 1997, Peltokorpi and Froese 2009, Bozionelos 2009.
5. The concept of "garden city" was developed in the late nineteenth century by Ebenezer Howard (Howard 1898). Many early twentieth-century architects who embraced this concept proposed the creation of "garden city communities" in metropolitan areas. These would be residential neighborhoods surrounded by parkland and pasture. In Tirana, the "garden city" model had been applied by Italian urban planners first in the 1920s and in a more significant way later through the "Bosio plan" of 1940, which created the shape of Tirana as a pedestrian-friendly city with radial roads converging to the center—which could be reached within 30 minutes from any direction—and circular roads at the outskirts.
6. For an anthropological perspective, see Bardhoshi 2011. For different disciplinary perspectives, see, e.g., Felstenhausen 1999 and Pllumbi 2013.
7. Local residents repeatedly reported that, among other advantages, the proximity of the land to transportation routes also provided the opportunity for the migrant families to send their children to school.
8. The *Bllok* was the residential district where the communist leadership lived. The dictator Enver Hoxha had his villa there. Armed guards constantly patrolled the boundaries of this area, which was off limits to ordinary Albanians.
9. In 2004, Edi Rama won the "City's Mayor World" contest for having improved the inner city of Tirana.
10. An example of how changes in the political sphere have influenced the implementation of these plans is provided by the Toptani Plaza complex, now under construction, which has replaced the old Toptani shopping center approved by the former mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama. The new multifunctional complex is described as an indoor, pedestrianized extension of the modern city of Tirana.
11. This master plan envisages the construction of ten 85-meter-tall towers around Skanderberg Square. Two of them have already been completed—the TID business center and the 4-Ever Green Tower—and now dominate the urban landscape with their multifunctional 25 floors that include residential apartments, shopping facilities, office space, and luxurious hotels with panoramic views

12. Typical examples are the Mall of Albania and the City Park to the northwest, which, among various facilities, include shops, cinemas, casinos spa centers, luxurious hotels with high-tech conference facilities, and the Tirana East Gate to the southeast, which is described as Albania's largest covered retail and entertainment center.
13. For example, a round-trip fare to reach the informal settlements west of the city is 100 Lek (US$1.00), which is a considerable sum for low-income commuters and students (Pojani 2010).
14. In the cases of professionals who lost their jobs or entrepreneurs who went bankrupt, they say that they could not face the shame of living in disgrace and relative poverty in England.
15. The "Qualifying Recognized Overseas Pension Scheme" (or QROPS) was launched in 2006 by Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (HMRC). It can be used by UK residents who have accrued a pension fund and have decided to leave the UK either to retire or to work permanently abroad. To have access to QROPS, claimants must meet specific requirements, such as establish themselves in a country recognized under the scheme and with which the UK has a Double Taxation Agreement, which includes EU member states.
16. For the past ten years, British emigration has stood at about 400,000 people per year.
17. O'Reilly (2000) discusses these aspects of integration in the host society with reference to British expatriates in Spain.
18. These are usually British tourists traveling to other French destinations.

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CONCLUSION

Why Do Rich People Migrate?

Ruben George Oliven

Human beings have always migrated. Otherwise, how can we explain the presence of people on different continents when we know that the human species originated in Africa? Some of the world's most important narratives are related to migration. In the Old Testament, the history of humanity begins with Adam and Eve being driven out of paradise and going east from the Garden of Eden. In the New Testament, the Gospel of Luke tells us that Jesus was born in Bethlehem because, the Romans having ordered everybody to take the census where they were born, would have led Mary and Joseph go from Nazareth, where they lived, to Bethlehem, where Jesus was born. And a central narrative of Islam is Muhammad's hijra, when he escaped Mecca and fled to Medina in 662 CE.

We are used to imagining that migrants are poor or starving people who leave their places of origin to go to other countries to survive. This image is frequently supported by pictures of people shipwrecked in the Mediterranean Sea or reports about illegal immigrants suffocated in closed containers in trains.

Although poverty is frequently seen as the cause of migration, several studies have shown that even poor migrants are not the poorest of their place of origin. Migration is a selective process. It requires people who have the possibility to leave their homes, usually younger persons without a family. It also influenced by gender. If there is a market for unskilled labor in construction, men will more easily migrate. If there is a market for domestic work, women will more easily migrate. Migration also requires people with the initiative and courage to take risks. Skills and education are other important factors.

A classical theory about migration speaks about "push" and "pull" factors. There are situations that expel people from a certain region, and others that attract them to another area or country. But there are different push and pull factors. The reasons for leaving one's home can vary: difficulty surviving, religious or political persecution, a lack of opportunities, an adventurous inclination. In the same vein, one might feel attracted to a place because it has better job or business opportunities, more religious or political freedom, a cultural or intellectual atmosphere, and so forth.

Push and pull factors are not the only aspects to be considered. In considering the subject of migration one should remember what Merton (1968) called "reference groups." Migrants compare themselves with other people and groups. When assessing their situation, migrants can ask, "How do I compare with my siblings or with my parents when they were my age"? Or, "How do I compare with people of my place of origin who did not leave it"?

Those questions can help explain why people who are doing fairly well in their countries migrate to others. Recently, there have been more studies about people who engage in international migration and who cannot be defined as poor. They are usually educated and have a reasonable life standard in their place of origin, but nevertheless decide to live in another country. So why do they migrate?

There are a host of reasons for people with richer economic and cultural backgrounds to migrate. Some might believe that they will be better off going to more advanced regions where they can seek jobs that pay more, or open businesses that can turn them into entrepreneurs. Others think of the opportunities their children will have in the country of destiny. Others migrate with the intention of making money and then returning to their countries of origin to open businesses there. Others are looking for a more adventurous life.

This book addresses precisely the questions underlying the migration of richer people. Through different studies, all of them based on detailed and usually ethnographic research, the various chapters give us a rich and diverse picture of the phenomenon in different places and situations.

Rial and Grossi divide the migrants they study in Paris into three categories: cultural immigrants, political refugees, and postcolonial immigrants. They have different characteristics, and they migrate for different reasons. Cultural immigrants went to the capital of France to study or enhance their knowledge. They were seeking a cosmopolitan global city with intellectual opportunities that they lacked in their countries of origin. They were searching for greater "modernity." Political refugees were fleeing from a terrifying situation in their homelands. Postcolonial migrants, in turn, come from former French colonies, and therefore speak French and feel close to France due to the historic relations.

Traveling has always been a formative experience. International migrants are people who have traveled from other countries, bringing different experiences to their host countries. One of the things the chapters of this book show is that richer migrants make an important contribution to the places to which they go. They open restaurants, they contribute to the artistic and cultural scene, they act in entertainment, and they open businesses. Their contribution enriches the cultural and economic life of these places, thus bringing a more cosmopolitan perspective to the countries to which they migrate.

In this sense, Bastos presents us with an interesting account and analysis of a venture started in the 1930s by Esteban Rodriguez Sandoval, a Cuban who migrated to Portugal and knew how to write, and Ramiro Espinheira, a Galician who went to Lisbon, where he worked as a waiter, and who knew the streets of the city. Together they produced and distributed a highly successful guide to the nightlife of Portugal's capital, the *Guia Noturna de Lisboa—Amor Livre (Guide to Lisbon's Night Life—Free Love)*. They both got into trouble with the police for the book since, although Lisbon had been a city visited by artists like Scarlatti and Lord Byron in the 19th century, during Antonio de Oliveira Salazar's regime the capital was supposed to have a quiet and unchallenging life.

Ethnicity has always been a key issue in international migration. It is natural that when migrants move to another country, they join together with those from the same origin. Their ties are related to residing in the same place, having the same religious affiliation, finding jobs, doing business, marrying their children, and so forth. Family bonds are strongly related to ethnicity and play a key role in and operate as a kind of social capital when migrants set up businesses. This topic appears in Rial and Grossi's study on ethnic immigrant entrepreneurs in Paris, people who became their own bosses, opening small businesses. Self-employment among international immigrants is found among people who do not seek regular jobs in the market. They need to build networks, and ethnic ties are fundamental in this process.

Brazil has historically always received vast contingents of immigrants. Recently, the trend has reversed and Brazilians have been migrating to countries in the Northern Hemisphere. There are currently over 3 million Brazilians living abroad, mainly in Europe and the United States. Restaurants are one of the ways migrants make a living. This is an enterprise that can have different scales and can start small, using the entire family for labor. It also has to do with offering food that is different from and sometimes exotic as compared to that found in the region. In her study about Brazilians who opened restaurants in Massachusetts, Kraieski de Assunção shows us that they use ethnicity as a way to insert themselves into a market niche. She points out that more that a thousand businesses in that state are owned by Brazilians, among them small markets, butcher shops, bakeries, travel agencies, clothing stores, restaurants, and other establishments. The majority of the Brazilian restaurants of Boston, the capital, have been opened by middle-class Brazilians. She questions the common classification of these immigrants as low skilled or nonqualified, which is how undocumented or low-income immigrants are usually defined. Analyzing the clientele of the restaurants, which includes both Americans and Brazilian customers, she argues that while the former are *cosmopolitans*, the latter are *transnational*.

Dalsin's study of Brazilians in Ireland challenges commonsense theories of migration to emphasize the multifunctional nature of migration. The ultimate goal of the migrants she studied was not economic betterment. On the contrary, in Brazil most of them had high-skilled jobs with good salaries in their chosen profession and led a well-structured life in terms of family, career, and goods. They thus abandoned a comfortable situation and went through a radical change in their lifestyle. In Ireland, they earned less and worked in jobs they would never have accepted in Brazil. Dalsin discovered that their migration had to do with an overall discontentment with one or a combination of aspects of their private and professional lives. Although the common explanation was, "I wanted to learn English," what they were looking for was a strong desire for adventure and a quest for the "unpredictable." Working in Ireland was considered to be about experiencing life abroad, and not enhancing economic well-being.

If there is a growing number of Brazilians who are moving abroad, Brazil nevertheless still attracts many immigrants, not only poorer people from countries like Haiti and Senegal but also migrants with richer economic capital. Spinola studied Muslim Arabs who migrated from Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine to Florianópolis, the capital of Santa Catarina State, in southern Brazil. They follow the tradition of Christian Arabs and Jews of starting their economic life in commercial activities. Commerce was the main activity of the first generation, although this was not their main occupation in their native lands. This helped create "the myth of the peddler," a narrative that is frequently recalled and revived, and that functions as the group's myth of origin. Although the second generation has more formal education, with many of them going to universities, most of them have remained linked to their family business, which is usually based on clothes, fabrics, or shoes.

Initially, these migrants also adopted assimilationist postures, which meant that in the early days of their immigration, religion was only practiced privately. But the newer generation is currently experiencing a process of ethnic identity affirmation. Family ties are maintained by sending money to relatives in the homelands, and going back to marry or having relatives from their place of origin come to marry someone from the community.

Gutierrez Rivera's study on Palestinians in Honduras concurs with some of Spinola's findings. She agrees with other authors who have showed that Palestinians worked first as peddlers and later opened their own businesses in the main cities of the country's north coast, operating mainly in the import and export of fabrics and manufactured goods like clothing, shoes, and so on. They soon dominated the urban commercial infrastructure of Honduras's north coast. She also agrees with Spinola about the key role of family and kinship relations in the accumulation of capital.

Zickgraft's study on the family practices of richer Moroccans living in Belgium and their families that stayed in Morocco departs from the usual picture of low-skilled remittance-dependent migrant families. Her research shows that, although wealth and education can allow for more visits and remittances to the families that stayed behind, the reality is much more complex. She argues that remittances are not only intended for destitute or struggling members in the country of origin. Her respondents were middle class, and they were able to migrate because of the financial backing of their parents. The latter did not need the remittances. The remittance was given not out of a sense of obligation but as part of a broader exchange in which money symbolized a gift, like other gifts that demonstrate love and remembrance during times of separation. Mauss's (1974) classic essay on the gift certainly portrays the situation. More than financial help, money here is a way of maintaining family ties through the obligation to give, to receive, and to return.

In her study of biographies of migrating founders of born global startups, Sontag argues that their mobility cannot be understood through a traditional scheme of a permanent transnational and one-way move. She explains that the movements are multiple and range from transmigratory to circular, multilocal, and virtual modes. The people she studied move to different places in sequence. Through these "experienced spaces," their world becomes a supranational network of cities. The borders and shapes of this network are individual and determined by professional and personal networks. She identified five orientation indicators that influence decisions and the use of potential motility: the creation of independent structures, freedom and risk, curiosity and scientific contribution, self-realization and fulfillment, and the advancement of society.

Focusing on Albania and France, Prato questions who should be included in the categories of "migrant," "foreign resident," "expatriate," and "rich migrant." Pointing out the arbitrariness of these categorizations, she addresses the distinction between "immigrants" and "foreign residents." She stresses the cultural meaning associated with the socioeconomic status of "economic migrant" and "expatriate," the latter referring to "rich immigrants." While the term immigrant is more often applied to poor migrants, the term "expatriate" is used for professionals and skilled workers working abroad or for the so-called "lifestyle migrants," a term that can include pensioners living abroad. We therefore have a distinction between people who live abroad and are poor and do manual labor, and those who are richer and do not engage in manual labor. Through this "reputation-based" categorization, the status of new migrants is determined by the activities they perform and the reputation of their country of origin.

The way migrants are characterized demonstrates that there are different ways of categorizing people who move from one country to the other. When they are poor, they tend to be labeled "economic migrants." If they are looking for a better education, they are called "international students." If they have a higher education and economic background, they are seen either as "expatriates" or "foreign residents."

The studies in this book point to a new reality in migration studies, showing that migration is far more complex than one could imagine. They indicate that, although economic factors are important for understanding why people decide to migrate, they are not the only consideration. People have different motivations for moving from their country of origin to a different one. When assessing their situation in their homelands and contemplating the possibility of migrating, they consider several aspects such as discontentment with their present life, desire for adventure and quest for the unpredictable, the possibility of facing new challenges, intellectual opportunities, and the opportunity to enhance their knowledge.

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