Joseph Zajda
Holger Daun
Editors

Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7

Global Values Education

Teaching Democracy and Peace

Springer

Global Values Education

Teaching Democracy and Peace

Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research
12-volume Book Series (Springer)

Series editor: Joseph Zajda (Australian Catholic University, Melbourne Campus)
http://www.springeronline.com/sgw/cda/frontpage

Book series overview

The *Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research* book series aims to meet the research needs of all those interested in in-depth developments in comparative education research. The series provides a global overview of developments and changes in policy and comparative education research during the last decade. Presenting up-to-date scholarly research on global trends, it is an easily accessible, practical yet scholarly source of information for researchers, policy makers and practitioners. It seeks to address the nexus between comparative education, policy and forces of globalisation, and provides perspectives from all the major disciplines and all the world regions. The series offers possible strategies for the effective and pragmatic policy planning and implementation at local, regional and national levels.

The book series complements the *International Handbook of Globalisation and Education Policy Research*. The volumes focus on comparative education themes and case studies in much greater scope and depth than is possible in the Handbook.

The series includes volumes on both empirical and qualitative studies of policy initiatives and developments in comparative education research in elementary, secondary and post-compulsory sectors. Case studies may include changes and education reforms around the world, curriculum reforms, trends in evaluation and assessment, decentralisation and privatisation in education, technical and vocational education, early childhood education, excellence and quality in education. Above all, the series offers the latest findings on critical issues in comparative education and policy directions, such as:

- Developing new internal strategies (more comprehensive, flexible and innovative modes of learning) that take into account the changing and expanding learner needs
- Overcoming 'unacceptable' socio-economic educational disparities and inequalities
- Improving educational quality
- Harmonizing education and culture
- International cooperation in education and policy directions in each country

For other titles published in this series, go to
www.springer.com/series/6932

Joseph Zajda • Holger Daun
Editors

Global Values Education

Teaching Democracy and Peace

Springer

Editors
Joseph Zajda
Australian Catholic University
Melbourne Campus
Australia
j.zajda@jnponline.com

Holger Daun
Stockholm University
Sweden
holger.daun@interped.su.se

ISBN 978-90-481-2509-8 e-ISBN 978-90-481-2510-4
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York

Library of Congress Control Number: 2009926167

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science + Business Media (www.springer.com)

To Rea, Nikolai, and Dorothy

Preface

Global Values Education: Teaching Democracy and Peace, which is the seventh volume in the 12-volume book series *Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research*, presents scholarly research on major discourses in values education globally. It provides an easily accessible, practical yet scholarly source of information about the international concern in the field of globalisation and comparative education. Above all, the book offers the latest findings to the critical issues concerning major discourses in comparative education in values education in the global culture. It is a sourcebook of ideas for researchers, practitioners and policy makers in values education, multiculturalism and moral education. It offers a timely overview of current issues affecting values education, comparative education and education policy research in the global culture. It provides directions in values education, and policy research, relevant to transformational educational reforms in the twenty-first century (see also Zajda & Rust, 2009).

This book critically examines the overall interplay between values education, globalisation, dominant ideologies and implications for policy research (see also Apple, 2004). It draws upon recent studies in the areas of globalisation, equity, social justice and the role of the State (Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008). It explores conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches applicable in the research covering values education, globalisation, equity and multicultural education. Various book chapters critique the dominant discourses and debates pertaining to values education, multiculturalism and relevant comparative education discourses. This book explores the ambivalent and problematic relationship between the State, dominant models of values education, globalisation and social change (see also Zajda, 2005; Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008).

Using a number of diverse paradigms in comparative education research, ranging from critical theory to globalisation, the authors, by focusing on ideology, globalisation and democracy, attempt to examine critically both the reasons and outcomes of education reforms in the domain of values education, policy change and transformation and provide a more informed critique on the Western-driven models of accountability, quality and school effectiveness (Soudien & Kallaway, 1999; Zajda & Freeman, 2009).

The general intention is to make *Global Values Education: Teaching Democracy and Peace* available to a broad spectrum of users among policy makers, academics, graduate students, education policy researchers, administrators and practitioners in the education and related professions. This book is unique in that it

- Explores conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches applicable in the research on values education, the State, globalisation and education reforms.
- Illustrates how the relationship between the State and education policy affects current models and trends in values education in schools globally.
- Demonstrates ideological imperatives of values education, neo-liberal ideology and the State.
- Evaluates the ambivalent and problematic relationship between the State, values education, and education reforms globally.
- Provides strategic education policy analysis on recent shifts in values education, and policy research.
- Gives suggestions for directions in values education and policy changes, relevant to multiculturalism, and democratic and empowering pedagogy in the twenty-first century.

We hope that you will find *Global Values Education: Teaching Democracy and Peace* useful in your teaching, future research and discourses concerning values education, schooling, social justice and policy reforms in the global culture.

Joseph Zajda
Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

References

Apple, M. W. (2004). *Ideology and curriculum* (3rd edn). New York: Routledge Falmer.

Soudien, C., & Kallaway, P. (1999). *Education, equity and transformation*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Zajda, J (Ed.). (2005). *The international handbook of globalisation and education policy research.* Dordrecht: Springer

Zajda, J., Biraimah, B., & Gaudelli, W (Eds.). (2008). *Education and social inequality in the global culture* (pp. xvii–xxvii). Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J., Davies, L., & Majhanovich, S. (2008). Globalisation and implications for equity and democracy in education. In: J. Zajda, L. Davies, & S. Majhanovich (Eds.), *Comparative and global pedagogies: Equity, access and democracy in education* (pp. 3–12). Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J., & Rust, V. (2009). *Globalisation, policy and comparative research: Discourses of globalisation*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J., & Freeman, K. (2009). *Race, ethnicity and gender in education: Cross-cultural understandings*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the following individuals who have provided invaluable help, advice and support with this major research project:

Harmen van Paradijs, Publishing Editor, Springer

Marianna Pascale, Springer

Dorothy Murphy, Assistant Editor, *Educational Practice and Theory*, James Nicholas Publishers

Rea Zajda, James Nicholas Publishers

We also want to thank numerous reviewers who were prepared to review various drafts of the chapters. These include:

Ari Antikainen, University of Helsinki

Alberto Arenas, University of Arizona

Jill Blackmore, Deakin University

Malcolm Campbell, Bowling Green State University

Paul Carlin, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

Philip Clarkson, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

David Gamage, University of Newcastle

Haim Gaziel, University of Bar Ilan

Mark Hanson, University of California (Riversdale)

Yaacov Iram, Bar Ilan University

Erwin Epstein, Loyola University Chicago

Kyu Hwan Lee, Ewha Womans University (South Korea)

Kas Mazurek, University of Lethbridge

Marie-Laure Mimoun-Sorel, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)
Wolfgang Mitter, German Institute for International Educational Research
Gabrielle McMullen, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)
Val Rust, University of California (Los Angeles)
Anne Scott, Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)
Margaret Secombe, University of Adelaide
Sandra L Stacki, Hofstra University
John Whitehouse, OISE, University of Toronto
Rea Zajda, James Nicholas Publishers

We are particularly grateful to Harmen van Paradijs, Publishing Editor, Springer, who supported this project, and who took the responsibility for the book production process, and whose energy and enthusiasm ensured that the book was published on time. The final preparation of the camera-ready manuscript for publication was facilitated by the outstanding and creative work of Nikolai Zajda, BA, BCom., MIB (University of Melbourne).

Contents

Values Education and Multiculturalism in the Global Culture

Joseph Zajda

The Historical and Social Origins of Values

Every society has its own rules defining behaviour and actions. This is a normative dimension of a society and its culture, consisting of norms and values. Hence, values are 'socially shared ideas about what is good, desirable or important' (Thio 2005, p. 46). Values refer to ideas held by individuals or groups concerning standards defining that is 'good or bad', what is desirable and what is not desirable (Giddens 1991, p. 732). In short, values can be defined as

> Principles and fundamental convictions which act as general guides to behaviour, the standards by which particular actions are judged to be good or desirable' (Halstead et al. 2000, p. 169).

Some values deal with proper ways, or standards, of interacting with others (being polite, cooperative, truthful and accepting). Other values describe desirable states of existence to which we all aspire (desire for work, happiness, peace, love and fulfilling life). Teaching our students morality or values education means teaching them what we ourselves, as citizens, with a democratic voice in a pluralist democracy, understand by morality and moral values. It is important to understand that not only values may vary from culture to culture, but they are also subjective. A value considered good in one society may be bad in another. In the USSR, moral education was based on cultivating a communist attitude towards labour and collectivist identity, where an individual works for the collective. This would not be acceptable to any democratic nation, which promoted individualism and democracy. Values also change over time. A very good example is the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and its communist ideology and the creation of a Western-style democracy. By contrast, the values of racial segregation in the USA, or *de jure segregation*, or segregation sanctioned by law, were practised until 1954, when the US Supreme Court ordered that the public schools be desegregated. The value has shifted towards racial equality, inclusive schooling and school integration. It has taken hundreds of years to achieve this value shift.

J. Zajda
Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

Cummings, Tatto and Hawkins, in their recent study of values education in 12 countries, suggested that values education will be a 'high priority for the immediate future', and where schools are likely to play 'an important role in values education' (Cummings et al. 2001, pp. 294–295). They also concluded that at the core of values education is 'the autonomous individual' and approaches to values education should reflect 'many pedagogies' (direct approach, role models, tell stories, experiential and participatory), where an integrated approach is preferred (classroom pedagogy, values education in the curriculum, etc.).

Historical Origins of Values

Throughout history of civilizations, values have emerged within different societies and cultures, and were inscribed in their different religions. The Ten Commandments contain a list of religious and value imperatives. Other major religions have their own code of values defining what is good and desirable. In the global culture, international conventions provide value statements. The United Nation's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) was a statement by the international community of the inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms for all human beings. In Article 26, Part 2, it stressed that education 'shall be directed … to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom. It shall promote understanding tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups…' (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, p. 7). Other specific value positions are found in various international and legal treaties. For example, the four major Council of Europe treaties protecting the human rights of children combined offer a policy direction for developing and promoting a global vision for a better childhood. The four principal treaties are the European Convention on the Human Rights (1950), the European Social Charter (1996), the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's rights (1996) and the European convention on Contact Concerning Children (2003). Values associated with schooling are found in the Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the twenty-first century, *Learning: the Treasure Within* (Delors 1996) and its four essential pillars of education for the twenty-first century: *learning to know*, *learning to do*, *learning to live together* and *learning to be*. More recently, the UNESCO Conference on Education for Shared Values and for Intercultural and Interfaith Understanding (UNESCO 2005) called on educational systems to incorporate common and agreed values into school curricula, to promote intercultural and interfaith understanding.

The Nature of Values in Schools

Values may refer to a particular belief system (believing that pluralist democracy is the best political system), a mode of conduct (being honest, tolerant and courageous), a state of existence (peace, tolerance and equality), or a moral judgement (truth, beauty and justice).

Different values are associated with different criteria. We can differentiate between aesthetic, cultural, civic, family, economic, environmental, intellectual, legal moral, political, religious, scientific, technological and social values.

Snook (2002) noted the nexus between ethical theory and classroom pedagogy (see also Snook 2003). In his book, *The Ethical Teacher*, Snook (2003) argues that the ethical teacher is one who understands both the moral purpose of education and the importance of viewing the process of teaching as essentially ethical in its nature. Among the ethical teacher's roles, Snook identifies *respect for autonomy* and *respect for reason*. He asks the question: How can teachers respect the learner as a person and yet try to change her in fundamental ways? This, according to him, constitutes the basic ethical dilemma of teaching:

> The ethical teacher, taking into account the student's age and maturity, tries to impart not just the conclusion of processes and arguments but the methods of arriving at the conclusions: not just ways of behaving but an understanding of these ways of behaving and the reasons for them. Thus, guided by teachers who respect her reason, the student gradually learns to use her own reason, to become autonomous, and hence does not have to rely forever on the views of others. This task of handing over full control to the learner may take a long time but it needs to be begun early so that she learns the habit of "thinking for herself." (Snook 2002).

The Erosion of Moral Education

In examining moral education, we note at least two closely related problems in debates surrounding the ethics – the lack of provision of moral education and the loss of moral direction in society. One could argue that a proper moral education is one that provides an adequate understanding of the 'moral sphere' (see Woods and Barrow 1995), just as the study of history equips one with the logic of historiography and the logic of historical thinking. Earlier, in his work, Barrow (1977) asks the question 'What is the most *effective* way to morally educate the children?' (p. 199). He suggests that children inevitably do, to some extent, acquire moral attitudes from their environment, which includes parents, teachers and other role models. Perhaps the most important point Barrow makes is when he argues that it would be wrong to assume that what a moral philosopher says is true must be so. The look to his reasoning – not his judgement – reminds us Barrow (p. 212). Carr (1993) also believes that teachers were regularly blamed, especially in times of moral panic, for 'failing to set a good example and teach proper moral standards' (Carr 1993, p. 193). Using paternalism and liberalism, as the two distinct approaches to teaching values in schools, Carr criticises different modes of moral pedagogy and the degree of connection between teachers' private and personal values, attitudes and behaviour and their professional conduct and responsibilities. He argues that liberal ethical theory is essentially a theory of the *rights* rather than of the *good* (p. 201). Paternalism is the view that it is the right or responsibility of some, as a result of their superior knowledge, expertise and wisdom, to decide what is good for others – 'in their alleged best interest' (p. 195). Liberalism, on the other hand, is the view that individuals have an 'inalienable moral right' to the free expression of speech,

thought or conduct of 'any point of view whatsoever' (p. 197). The paternalistic approach to moral education and values transmission tends to be characteristic of more traditional or culturally homogeneous societies, whereas the liberal approach favours advanced democracies.

The Politics of Values Education

The current debate on values education has become an overtly partisan political issue, producing a dominant ideology of teaching values and character education. I am reminding the readers that what we call values education was known as 'character education' in most schools during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Recently, values education has become a 'metaphor and code' for pedagogy pursuing the neo-liberal and conservative social and cultural agenda (Purpel 1999, p. 83). In some ways, the values taught in schools are traditional rather than modern:

> … the values taught in the schools are very much in line of Puritan tradition of obedience, hierarchy, and hard work, values which overlap nicely with the requirements of an economic system that values a compliant and industrious work force, and a social system that demands stability and order (Purpel 1999, p. 89).

Not only values education appears to be more traditional than modern, but by emphasising such traditional values as loyalty, responsibility, duty, obedience and honesty they may well be advancing a newly reinvented moral paradigm of 'domesticating values' (Snook 2002). He argues that that all programmes of values education are dependent on political judgements, and tend to reinforce the existing inequality:

> They serve to reinforce the status quo and the power structures which serve the interests of the dominant group. We need only reflect for a moment on how the values of "loyalty and submission" and even "love" have served the oppression of women by men while generations of South Africans and African Americans were schooled to know their place and be loyal to their exploiters interpretation is that the campaign for values education comes from those whose personal and ideological interests lie in the denigration of state schools and the promotion of private schools which (it is alleged without evidence) do a better job of values education.

The curriculum is an ideological construct, and discourses surrounding cultural and political dimensions of schooling should emphasise the ideological nature of school subjects and moral/character/values education (Purpel 1999; Apple 2004; Zajda 2005). As Purpel argues, part of this strategy is to create a discourse in which the schools are blamed for not 'teaching values'. Such a discourse, which defines desirable values to be taught in schools, attempts to shift the argument from social and political spheres to the individual and personal traits. Blaming the individual for not learning desirable values is far more acceptable than blaming the society and its structures, which exert a powerful socialising influence.

Purpel also reminds us that 'Moral issues are by definition socially and culturally situated and any dialogue on proper character is based on some communal

notion of propriety' (Purpel 1999, p. 89). Yet, values education research is characterised by the near absence of political and ideological analysis. This is a paradox, as researchers and writers addressing the issues of moral crisis would necessarily need to explain social, political and economic conditions responsible for such a phenomenon.

Moral Dilemmas

We can easily reach a consensus, at the most abstract of levels, on such values as fairness, obedience, loyalty and kindness. The Nuremberg and other trials for crimes against humanity demonstrated that obedience and loyalty to a given regime is sometimes a vice. Individuals have been executed for being obedient and following the orders of various dictators. As Snook (2002) points out, even such a value as 'loyalty', when translated into practice, can be problematic:

> … loyalty – surely we should be loyal only to those who deserve it? It is debatable whether citizens should be loyal to governments that break their word once elected. Should students be loyal to a school that treats them unjustly? Should ethnic minorities be loyal to institutions that have grossly discriminated against them? Should a woman be loyal to the man who abuses her? Should staff be loyal to educational institutions which have rejected the basic values of the academic life?
>
> … The lesson is that one should be obedient only to worthy authorities. We have to ask if our "democratic" governments of recent years have been worthy of our obedience since they have ignored the policies which we elected them on…. Those who think that the application of moral principles is an easy matter have already foreclosed on the options by embracing a political version of them.

Virtues such as freedom, justice, truth telling and kindness are general moral principles or abstractions. They, in themselves, cannot explain daily applications. Hence, values education need to be practical, as individuals confront their values, societal values, choices and their applications in everyday life. Furthermore, a critical understanding, analysis and evaluation of moral principles such as freedom, human rights, social justice and responsibility in classroom pedagogy constitute the essence of morality and values education and should form the foundation of moral education of an individual. Here, the focus is on translating the abstract moral principles into everyday life.

The Language of Rights

Jeremy Bentham refereed to the rights talk as 'nonsense walking on stilts'. Our conventional thinking concerning right is an example of such shallow, superficial and uncritical responses. Another problem associated with the language of rights is the widespread tendency to confuse the moral with other domains, such as legal,

political or economic. There are many moral rights that are not legally guaranteed, and many legal rights that are not moral or ethical one. One could argue that the desire to encode every moral issue in legislation is an ambivalent aspect of our morally confused society, and with it the crisis of values. We learn to appreciate the consequences of politically correct language in our regulated and normative society. One such example refers to the use of the term 'justice'. Justice, which used to refer to a broad procedural ideal, is now used to refer to a substantive political view of what is just.

Some scholars have argued that we should agree first on principles that enable us to judge what constitutes a moral basis and then focus on the content of particular belief (Moral education is one of the key features of sociological works of Emile Durkheim (1858–1917)). He argued that religion served an essential social and moral function, creating a strong community of beliefs and providing a basis for 'social cohesion' (Kuper and Kuper 1989, p. 215). This social cohesion was based on values consensus in any normative culture. Like religion, moral education in schools tended to focus on consensus, integration and goal attainment (see also Zajda 1988). Durkheimian notions of 'consensus' and 'collective conscience, consisting of common beliefs and sentiments, form an integral part of moral education and values inculcation in traditional societies. Durkheim believed that societies define limits defining the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. They develop an ethos or spirit of community to guide its members. Durkheim called this process, which was grounded in a moral and religious framework, as an integration of the personal and social. As Durkheim wrote, 'Morality would no longer be morality if it had no elements of religion …'(Durkheim , in Nisbet 1974, p. 197).

In modern pedagogy, the term 'moral development', associated with the cognitive-developmental, or structural paradigm is traced to Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget's pioneering work *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932) provided the cognitive basis for Kohlberg's later work on moral development. Kohlberg, who was influenced by Kant, Socrates, Dewey, Rawls and others, defined morality as 'justice' and 'respect for intrinsic human rights' (Kuper and Kuper 1989, p. 540). Moral philosophers such as Hobbes, Kant, Spinoza and Schopenhauer were concerned with the study of morality as a code of conduct. What is distinctive of ethics as a branch of philosophy is that it is concerned with 'the analysis and justification of answers to practical questions' (Peters 1967, p. 17).

Values education is a complex and controversial area of the curriculum: It is an object of study, and it influences what is selected for study. It is an essential, contested and constantly changing area of study that develops thinking skills that are vital for all other areas of study.

The methodology and methods of values education in schools could be Durkheimian in the sense that morality must be taught rather than caught. Marsh (2007) describes values education as the development of students' 'understanding of challenges and making choices about how to respond'. The National Framework for Values Education (2005) in Australia articulated two distinct styles of Values Education: the first develops abstracted and shared values and virtues; the second

develops the critical thinking skills required to develop the students' ethical judgements and understanding of values. Former Ministers for Education, Science and Training, respectively, Julie Bishop and Brendan Nelson indicated the government preference for the former descriptive style values education. Understandably, there is a constant tension in the content, philosophical approach, process and product of values education.

Recently, the Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority (VCAA) in the State of Victoria (Melbourne) produced a set of guidelines for Values Education in the school curriculum. The guide is not intended to be prescriptive (i.e., schools have flexibility in choosing their approach to values) and it is not intended to be specific stand-alone teaching (rather, it should be incidental teaching points within everyday learning contexts). The *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* (Department of Education, Science and Training 2005) provided a policy statement for an overarching framework for developing a vision for values education in schools. It identified the following nine core values for Australian schools:

- Care and compassion
- Doing your best
- Fair go
- Freedom
- Honesty and trustworthiness
- Integrity
- Respect
- Responsibility
- Understanding, tolerance and inclusion

Teaching Values Strategies

There are numerous approaches in teaching values education in schools. They include the trait approach, values inculcation approach, the cognitive development approach, and clarification of values, via role play approach (see Brady, Clark 2008).

The Trait Approach is based upon the notion that there are predetermined qualities or traits that define the moral person. These traits are 'absolute' in that the practice of the actions expressed through traits comprises 'right', 'good' or acceptable moral behaviour (Brady 2008).

Values Inculcation – instilling socially desirable values in students through direct instruction or transmission, indirectly through routine practices in the classroom, role models, reinforcement, praising, gaming and simulation and role playing to instil values in students. This can be a problematic style of teaching values, particularly in a multicultural society such as the USA in which the shared values are challenged, reconsidered and contested.

Cognitive/Moral Growth – dilemma activities, small group discussions, decision making tasks to further develop students' values.

Clarification of Value Approach – practical activities to clarify feelings towards person/event/issue.

Service Learning Approach – activities at school and in the community. According to Freakley (2008), schools should provide experiences as opportunities to practice making a *choice of actions*.

In this volume, authors who deal with globalisation, educational systems and values education examine various emerging issues in understanding and teaching values education. These range from the place of values education in educational institutions and the curriculum to classroom pedagogies and their effect on students' development of their own values and morality in the twenty-first century (see also Snook 2000; Zajda 2009).

Problematics of Values Education Ideology

The problem with moral education in general and values education specifically is that it is based on a discourse of moral imperatives that are absolute and universal. Hence such a pedagogical discourse denotes reification, rather than critical thinking. Hare (1964) argued that moral judgements tend to be universal, similar to Kantian imperatives, and the Golden Rule Principle. For example if I will an act or a belief, or a value judgement and I commit myself to the view that I, or anybody else, ought to do this, then it becomes a universal law for all. In other words, for me to justify my value it has to be universal. Relativists, on the other hand, argue that moral values are situated in different societies, and therefore are relative. However, the conflict between absolutist and relativist perspectives on moral and values education has to do with the nature of knowledge and perception. Both absolutist and relativist views can be questioned. Neither could claim to *know* with absolute certainty that something is good and that is the right thing to believe or to do. To claim that that we need to learn core values, as defined by different curricula in different societies, involves claiming that we know with absolute empirical certainty that 'there in no more to moral values than the observable fact that different societies choose to adopt different values' (Barrow 1977, p. 52). As Barrow asks 'But how do we know that this is all there is to the matter in the normal sense of 'know'. Since we have no agreement or consensus as 'to what would count as criteria for claiming moral knowledge', we know absolutely nothing about morality (Barrow 1977, p. 52).

When Socrates was told that the Delphic Oracle had pronounced him to be the wisest man in Athens, he went around the city and as he talked to various people pontificating on everything he discovered that he knew that he knew nothing (see Plato, *The Apology*). As Barrow, explains, Socrates knew the limits of his knowledge:

> … the notion of a man wise is in his ignorance is more than ingenious paradox. To distinguish between what one actually knows and what one believes or accepts on the authority of others, to know that to talk of knowledge in certain fields is sometimes inappropriate, is

> a genuine increase in positive knowledge. To appreciate that one cannot glibly assume that various moral truths are known is to learn something and to learn something important (Barrow 1977, p. 53).

Evaluation

For some educational philosophers and writers (Peters 1967; Carr 1991; Cummings et al. 2001; Brady 2009), values education is the essential part of school pedagogy. For others, like Phillips (1979), Straughan (1982) and Ryle (1972), the nexus between values education and pedagogy is very contested and problematic. The situation is further complicated, as Winch and Gingell (1999) argue that moral education seems to be 'subject to changes of fashion' (p. 147). For instance, when Hare (1963) was popular in the UK, his view of moral education was very popular, and when some philosophers re-invented the Aristotelean pedagogy of values education, it became very popular approach to virtue theory, which was based on Aristotle's *Nichomachaean Ethics*. Virtue advocates argue that moral concepts and values should be explicated in terms of character traits, which children can internalise, through classroom pedagogy and reflection. In the Soviet Union, this process of moral education was known as *vospitani*e (upbringing). Desirable character traits or *virtues* include tolerance, altruism, asceticism, benevolence, honesty, courage, fairness, moderation, conscientiousness, selflessness, sincerity, humility, modesty, magnanimity, sympathy, tactfulness, diligence, nobleness, trust, self-mastery, solidarity and frugality. Kohlberg (1984) criticised the virtue theory approach for advocating 'a crude deontological approach' to values education (don't lie, don't steal, don't cheat). According to Kohlberg, virtue education as part of moral education requires deliberation and reflection, where complex moral choice (or moral dilemma) is involved (see Winch and Gingell 1999, p. 245).

The issue is not so much methodological or pedagogical, concerning approaches to be used in classroom pedagogy of values education, but rather one between the 'believers' and 'non-believers' concerning teaching values education in the classroom. Ryle, who criticised moral education in schools, argued that morality is caught not taught. He argued that if we define teaching as 'the passing on of expertise', then any notion of moral expertise seems 'deeply dubious', for if such expertise did exist we expect for it to be institutionalised (Winch and Gingell 1999, p. 148).

Straughan (1982), on the other hand, in his critique of dominant approaches to the content of values education and the structure of values education, and the contested areas and boundaries between moral reasoning and the content of morality, suggested a pragmatic approach to values education, based on what I call the 3Ms of moral education:

- *Teaching **that*** informed decisions must be made in making moral choices.
- *Teaching **how*** to think for themselves as autonomous moral agents.
- *Teaching children **to*** **want** to be moral (to guarantee moral goodness in an individual) (see also Winch and Gingell 1999, p. 149).

To adopt Straughan's approach to values education, especially 'teaching to want to be moral', which continues the role of exemplification in values education stressed by moral philosophers such as Carr (1991), Phillips (1979) and Ryle (1972), pedagogues, as role-models, should act morally themselves and exemplify the role of moral agents or portray a moral action charisma. Snook (2002) argues that values education has to be supported but it must be 'liberated from those who seek to cure the ills by more doses of the medicine which caused them'. As he reminds us, schools ought to practise pluralist democracy, by discussing values:

> There must be a place for the disparity of views which mark a pluralistic society. Current proponents are fond of talking of the values which we all share. More important are the values which divide us; it is conflict, not consensus which marks the values domain: young people in schools should confront these conflicts and learn to handle them rationally and tolerantly.

Values education to be meaningful, engaging and authentic must involve a greater sense of community, more emphasis on social criticism and a deeper and critical understanding of democracy, equality, human rights and justice in society. In schools, where values education and critical literacy are taught, values should be discussed rather than imposed. In short, our moral and values education in schools represents our quest for the ideal of the morally good society.

References

Apple, M. (2004). *Ideology and Curriculum* (3rd Edition). New York: Routledge Falmer.

Barrow, R. (1977). *Moral Philosophy for Education*. London: George, Allen & Unwin.

Brady, L. (2009). Values Education in Australian Schools. *Learning and Teaching*, 2(1), 41–55

Brady, L. (2008). Strategies in values education: horse or cart? *Australian Journal of Teacher Education*, 33(5), 81–89.

Clark & Nance (2008). Teaching Values of Peace and Tolerance in the Curriculum. In J. Zajda (ed.), Society *and Environment* (pp. 10–12). Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Carr, D. (1991). *Educating the Virtues*. London: Routledge.

Cummings, W. Tatto, M. and Hawkins, J. (2001). *Values Education for Dynamic Societies: Individualism or Collectivism*. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre.

Delors, J. (1996) *Learning: the Treasure Within*. Paris: UNESCO.

Department of Education, Science and Training (2005). *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools.* Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Freakley, M. (2008). Values Education and Character Development. In J. Zajda (ed.), *Society and Environment* (pp. 10–12). Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Giddens, A. (1991). *Sociology*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Hare, R. (1963). *Freedom and Reason*. London: OUP.

Hare, R. (1964). *The Language of Morals*. London: OUP.

Kohlberg, L. (1984). *The Psychology of Moral Development*. San Francisco: Harper and Row.

Kuper, A. & Kuper, J. (1989) (Eds.). *The Social Science Encyclopedia*. London: Routledge.

Marsh, C. (2007). *Studies of Society and Environment.* Frenchs Forest, Pearson Education.

Nisbet, R. (1974). *The Sociology of Emile Durkheim*. New York: OUP.

Peters, R. S. (1967). *Ethics and Education*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Phillips, D. (1979). Is Moral Education really Necessary? *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 27(1), 42–68.

Purpel, D. (1999). *Moral Outrage in Education*. New York: Peter Lang.
Ryle, G. (1972). Can Virtue be Taught? In R. Dearden and P. Hirst (Eds.), *Education and the Development of Reason*. London: Routledge.
Straughan, P. (1982). *Can We Teach Children to be Good*? London: Allen and Unwin.
Thio, A. (2005). *Sociology. A Brief Introduction*. Boston: Pearson.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Geneva: United Nations Office of Public Information.
UNESCO (2005). *Education for Shared Values and for Intercultural and Interfaith Understanding*. Canberra: Australian National Commission for UNESCO.
Winch, C. and Gingell, J. (1999). *Key Concepts in the Philosophy of Education*. London: Routledge.
Zajda, J. (1988). The Moral Curriculum in the Soviet School. *Comparative Education*, 24(3), 389–404.
Zajda, J. (2005). Globalisation, Education and Policy Research: Changing Paradigms. In J. Zajda (Ed.), The *International Handbook of Globalisation and Education Policy Research* (pp. 1–22). Dordrecht: Springer.
Zajda, J. (2009). Globalisation, Nation-Building, and Cultural Identity: The Role of Intercultural Dialogue. In In J. Zajda, H. Daun & L. Saha, L. (Eds.) (2008). *Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (pp. 15–24). Dordrecht: Springer.

Section I
Main Trends and Policy Issues

Globalization, Social Capital, and Values: the Case of the Pacific Basin

William K. Cummings

This chapter provides an interpretation of the findings of a larger study of the future of values education in the Pacific Basin coordinated by the author, John Hawkins, and Maria Teresa Tatto.

1 Globalization and Social Change in the Pacific Basin Region

Today, with globalization, values are shifting in the world, and many of the Pacific Basin societies exemplify this shift. Many of these societies have benefited from an impressive stock of social capital manifested in social stability and the mobilization of communities in campaigns to promote sanitation, health and family planning, the resolution of labor disputes, and other social purposes. The educational and social institutions of the Pacific Basin region have been exceptionally rich in developing an internalized inclination toward familial, social, and national responsibility.

However, in recent decades, there are many indications that these institutions are under stress: governments, facing increasing fiscal challenges, are less capable of looking after the welfare of their citizens; workplaces facing the uncertainties of global competition are less able to guarantee security to their employees; communities have become larger and more heterogeneous; families have become smaller and more vulnerable. Because these institutions, the pillars of modernization, are less capable today of looking after their members, the attachment of individuals to these institutions appears to be weakening. Social critics link the increasing social problems to processes of modernization and globalization (see Zajda, 2005; Zajda, 2009b); Zajda, Davies, & Majhanovich, 2008. These developments have led to a search for a new approach to values education, and this paper seeks – based on the findings

W.K. Cummings (✉)
The George Washington University
e-mail: wkcum@usa.net

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_1,

from a study including interviews of over 800 Pacific Basin leaders – to outline some of the dimensions of that search.

2 The Decline of Value Consensus due to the Rapid Social Change

In times of relative tranquility, there is likely to be a high level of value consistency both between the leaders of different segments of a society and of different generations. But in times of rapid change, this consistency may break down. Rarely has humanity witnessed such an extraordinary pace of ideological, geopolitical, and economic change as in the past quarter century. The world's population has doubled and its productivity has tripled. With new discoveries in communications, media, and computers, the possibility for the global transmission of information and images has radically improved.

While the incidence of these changes is worldwide, it can be argued that the pace of change has been particularly intense in the Pacific Basin. Over the past quarter century, several Pacific Basin nations have experienced the highest rates of sustained economic growth ever witnessed in human history, rising from the ashes of World War II to build industrial societies and significantly improve the material standards of their citizens (World Bank, 1991). And then over the past few years, several Pacific Basin nations have experienced dramatic, and hopefully, temporary reversals in their economic fortunes. The rapid pace of social change in the Pacific Basin has been accompanied by a sharp rise in value dissensus, heightening uncertainty about future directions. This dissensus is evident in the political sphere with the emergence of new political parties as well as in other areas: new music and lifestyles, increasing rates of crime and juvenile delinquency, rising rates of divorce, and childbirth out of wedlock.

Research on social and cultural capital has pointed out that the values a culture holds as important are strong forces that help shape societies and influence such aspects as form of government, schooling, productivity, and social well-being (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Coleman, 1988; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Saha, 2005). These studies also observe that important societal changes are often preceded – and accompanied – by dramatic changes in values and cultural beliefs (Diamond & Plattner, 1996; Inglehart, 1997). Societies that have moved from authoritarian to more democratic forms of government see this change reflected not only in the organization of their government and in the school curriculum, but also in the media and in the relationships individuals have with one another.

3 Values, Social Development, and Social Capital

Perhaps the most controversial theme in the contemporary values debate is the relative primacy of collective as contrasted to individualistic values. A major thrust of values education in most Pacific Basin settings (the USA may be the principle

exception) has been to foster the collective values and to de-emphasize the individual values (Cummings, Gopinathan, & Tomoda, 1987). These collective values have encouraged the accumulation of large stocks of social capital through supporting strength in the collective entities of the family, the community, and the state. But at the same time, some argue that these collective values have handicapped the struggle for modernization of Asian societies.

Western thinking about modernization has stressed the primacy of individual over collective values. Individualistic values are said to be favorable to entrepreneurship (Weber, 1958), scientific, and technical innovation (Barber, 1952), esthetic creativity (Boorstin, 1992), critical, and responsible participation in democratic politics (Almond & Verba, 1964), and also are conducive to a more efficient labor market (Polyani, 1957) and industrial labor force (Inkeles & Smith, 1974). Most Western theories whether liberal to Marxist have viewed Asian collective values as impediments to change. This same line of reasoning has shaped the work of Western area specialists who have studied Asian societies. Similarly, it has been argued that the collectivist bias has limited the capacity for scientific and technical creativity or industrial innovation (Bartocha & Okamura, 1985; Nakayama, 1991).

While these pessimistic arguments have persisted, certain areas of Asia defied the experts. Japan led the Asian flock in the 1960s with an extraordinary economic resurgence. Since then, the Four Asian tigers of Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore have followed Japan's lead. And other Asian societies have been nominated as strong candidates for entering the ranks of the Newly Industrialized Countries. The rapid advances of Asian societies have been accompanied by a revisionist perspective on the nature of collective values. For example, collective values are said to facilitate the team-work and bottom-up decision-making essential to the effective functioning of the large organizations common to advanced capitalism (Miyanaga, 1991; Vogel, 1975). Collective values are also said to favor a strong achievement-oriented work ethic and the type of family support that motivates young people to aspire for educational success as well as to accept the meritocratic norms that shape job recruitment and promotions (Berger & Hisao, 1988). And collective values are said to be compatible with pro-growth public policies including pro-business attitudes, limited government intervention in business operations, and restraint in the provision of social welfare (Lodge & Vogel, 1987). The revisionist perspective has given rise to new social movements in the West to promote communitarian values (Etzioni, 1993) and to strengthen character education in the schools (Lickona, 1991).

Distinct from the relation of collective/individual values to fostering technical and economic change is their role in supporting the quality of life in families, the community, and the polity (Ming, 1991). Also, it has been observed that collective values lead to high levels of voter turnout in elections in many Pacific Basin countries. But critics note that the typical voter tends to vote according to the dictates of political machines that dominate in their communities, and fail to exercise independent judgment to select candidates who best reflect their personal interests (Curtis, 1988).

In sum, there is extensive debate about the relative efficacy of collective and individual values. Assuming that collective values foster the accumulation of social capital, does this necessarily mean that individualistic values favor a decline in social capital? While Western formulations of cultural systems tend to place collective and individual values in opposition, several studies present the contrary view that the strengthening of individual values may enable the more effective functioning of modern collective entities such as high-tech corporations and truly representative party politics. Indeed, there may be a need to reassess the relation of various social values to the prospects for social capital in the Pacific Basin. Whatever the outcome of that assessment, it is worth noting a remarkable irony: *At the very time that leaders in North America and Western Europe, influenced by the revisionist arguments, are developing a new interest in communitarian values, leaders on the Asian side of the Pacific Basin are developing a more favorable attitude to more individualistic values*. The Asian leaders have come to believe that these individualistic values are an essential foundation for the future modernization of their societies.

3.1 Leaders and Values

Research on social and cultural capital has pointed out that the values a culture holds as important are strong forces that help shape societies and influence such aspects as form of government, schooling, productivity, and social well-being (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Coleman, 1988; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Saha, 2005). These studies also observe that important societal changes are often preceded – and accompanied – by dramatic changes in values and cultural beliefs (Diamond & Plattner, 1996; Inglehart, 1997). Societies that have moved from authoritarian to more democratic forms of government see this change reflected not only in the organization of their government and in the school curriculum, but also in the media and in the relationships individuals have with one another.

Some values focus on "ends" such as increased economic productivity or improvements in culture or the quality of life and others on "means" such as the enhancement of civic mindedness so that governments are more responsive. A different example is the value of freedom from social constraints so that individuals can enjoy greater autonomy to realize personal goals. The theoretical formulation, often referred to as structural-functionalism, tends to assert that social values are "shared" by the members of a social system (Parsons & Shils, 1951; Smelser, 1963). Other social theories, most notably conflict and critical theory (Apple, 1982; Collins, 1971; Gouldner, 1971), while agreeing on the categorization of the components of behavior, dispute the contentions that values are truly shared and that they are core components. These theories argue that particular actors who enjoy dominant positions seek to bias the content of social values so as to advance their interests; thus the interests of the particular groups, sometimes called the ruling class, are the core components.

It is certainly the case that the leaders of societies devote much time to defining and clarifying values. The values leaders stress tend to reflect both their sense of the common good and their particular interests. Religious leaders are more likely to stress values of spirituality and abstinence whereas economic leaders may stress inner-worldly achievement and consumption. Leaders use their social positions to promote their values among the public through such channels as the media, public campaigns, religious organizations, and formal educational institutions. In recognition of the above debate, the argument that follows makes no assumptions about the commonness of the origins of social values. It only assumes that values play an important role in shaping the direction of behavior. Also in recognition of the effort by special interests to influence "common" values, our research group intentionally sampled leaders that represent a broad range of interests in the respective societies.

Because there was an overall pattern of strong correlations between the related why and what responses (both at the individual level and by setting) (Table 1), the figure for the multidimensional scaling of the responses had an appearance similar to Fig. 1. The same four groupings were evident, and essentially the same values were associated with each grouping.

Distinct from the particular values to be taught is the images the elites believe will be the most helpful in conveying these values. In colonial times, the curriculum tended to draw on European images. One test of the emergence of the region from its earlier Euro-centric orientation is to consider the images elites propose for the values curriculum. The survey asked the elites of each country to list the countries that they felt should be given the greatest emphasis when choosing examples for the values education curriculum. Needless to say, the elites of each setting gave highest priority to examples from their own setting. After that, there was a certain tendency to stress examples from the leading Western nations such as the USA, the UK, and France. But four of the Pacific Basin settings gave Japan a higher ranking than these Western nations, and two gave China a higher ranking. The USA and Russia which span both the Atlantic and Pacific Basin have tended in the past to see their origins in Europe, and thus the major tendency in their response was to stress Euro-centric examples.

Table 1 Rank correlations between different values in values education

Strong emphasis on			
Personal development/ reflective autonomy	Civic consciousness	Combat ecological abuse	Respect and opportunities for girls and women
		and	
Autonomy ($r = 0.69$)	Civic education ($r = 0.59$)	Ecology in values curriculum ($r = 0.66$)	Gender ($r = 0.82$)
Civic education ($r = 0.72$)	Democracy ($r = 0.66$)	Global awareness ($r = 0.72$)	But de-emphasize family values ($r = –0.77$) and moral values ($r = –0.75$)



Fig. 1 Multidimensional scaling of 15 rationales for values education

4 The Translation of New Values into Values Education

Given the considerable changes taking place in the political and economic spheres of Pacific Basin societies, there would appear to be an expanded need for debate on the new rights and responsibilities of the citizenry and for new efforts to educate citizens about the implications of the recent changes. Indeed, among the leaders of these changing societies, there has been much discussion. Will future generations have a greater social consciousness, or will they be more concerned for their own private interests? Will they be more or less committed to correcting environmental injuries, to resolving social conflicts, to strengthening community life? The outcomes of these debates concerning prospective values are certain to play a central role in shaping the quality of social capital that will be available. But, at least until the past decade, the leaders in most Pacific Basin societies were not notably effective in translating the conclusions of these debates into programs of values education that would help the new generations adjust to the changes.

In earlier times when societies were going through major shifts in their political economies, leaders articulated new values and turned to the schools to promote these through values education. The most notable such transformation occurred with the birth of the modern nation-state on the eve of the nineteenth century. Prior to the modern period, schools assumed an important role in values education with a prominent focus on religious education. The common school movement, as it developed first in Western Europe and then later in the USA, stressed the role of

the school in building a new democratic society while at the same time drawing a line between civic and social education in the schools and religious education in the homes and churches. Meiji Japan was also fascinated with the common school concept, but saw the new school as a means for promoting modernizing Western Science, on the one hand, and the Eastern moral values of respect for the Emperor and hard work, on the other hand. And with the conclusion of the Russian revolution in 1917, a new Soviet government triumphed and declared its determination to use the school to create the socialist revolution.

Yet over time, each of these societies also asked the school to intensify its contribution to other forms of socialization, notably a strengthening of the academic curriculum and an increasing stress on the development of vocational skills. And, at least in certain settings, this stress on additional responsibilities for the school has been accompanied by a diminution of the school's role in values education.

Most observers suggest that the resolution of these curricular challenges has led to a diminution of the time and attention devoted to values education. And with the shift away from values education, there has been a growing perception of a decline in the general standards of social behavior. Sociologists plot the upward trends in juvenile delinquency as well as white-collar crime in virtually every industrial society.

4.1 Interviewing Elites as a Means to Understanding the Current Values Education Debate

It is not yet clear whether the seismic cultural, political, and economic changes that have occurred in the Pacific Basin will lead to a fundamental reordering of values. But incidents such as the above have certainly spurred a renewed discussion of values education throughout the Pacific Basin in recent years. One indication of the renewed interest is the sharp increase in the frequency of statements in public speeches, popular magazines, official reports of commissions, and declarations of government policy on values education (Cummings, Gopinathan, & Tomoda, 1987).

At the risk of oversimplifying, it might be said that these debates focus on four core questions:

Why should there be improvements in values education? Leaders in the different settings of the Pacific Basin have highlighted many issues including the need to become better prepared for work, the need to make better use of the fruits of work, the need to participate responsibly in democratic politics and civic society, the need to develop richer personalities that are more introspective and creative, and the need to develop a more caring attitude to the environment.

What values should receive the greatest emphasis in values education? Values education covers many areas from civic responsibility to spiritual development. Which of these should be given the most emphasis in publicly coordinated programs for values education?

Who should be the focus of values education? Parents naturally believe that they have a major responsibility to convey sound values to their young children, but are there other stages in the life cycle that also should be a focus for intensive efforts of values education such as in the university or the workplace?

How should these values be developed and transmitted? While values education is often provided in schools through formal instruction, some leaders proposed other locations such as youth groups, military service, and religious organizations. Thus, a final question is the proper locus of values education, and what are the most effective pedagogical and experiential approaches for communicating and transmitting values.

4.2 International Elite Survey of Values Education[1]

In an international elite survey, elites were sampled from 20 settings that represent important points of variation in terms of political/ideological affiliation, social position, gender, and regional location. Given the complexity and size of the Pacific Basin, the 20 settings in the study capture most of the salient dimensions of diversity in the region, except for the failure to complete fieldwork in Indonesia and an undersampling of settings influenced by French colonialism. It should be noted that several settings were included in the large societies of China, the USA, Russia, and Mexico in recognition of the internal diversity within each.

Individuals who came from a diversity of positions were sampled: central educational authorities, leading educational intellectuals, religious leaders, leaders of related NGOs, politicians, people in educational institutes, academic leaders (e.g., deans of education schools and prominent professors), curriculum designers in moral education, and/or values/moral education specialists. No effort was made to choose a random sample, as it proved impossible to develop a meaningful definition of elites that would fit the various countries and settings under consideration. Information was obtained from at least 30 elites, and in two instances information was obtained from as many as 80. In total, responses were obtained from over 800 elites.

4.3 The New Values

In virtually every corner of the region, the changes have led elites to question the efficacy of old values. The values of obedience, cooperation, and hard work are reputed to have enabled the Pacific Basin to make rapid progress over the past half century. In all of the settings reviewed, the leaders have expressed their concerns about the limitations of the inherited values and the ways in which these values are being conveyed to the new generation.

[1] The international Elite Sigma Survey of Values Education was carried out from 1996 to 1998.

What is surprising, in view of the diversity of the region, is the level of consensus on new values. The elites in virtually all of the settings indicate that their highest priority is new values that strengthen the individual. The elites in each setting were asked, "In your view, which are the most persuasive reasons for improving values education in your society today." As indicated in Table 2, the highest ranked concerns are to "help young persons develop reflective/autonomous personalities," "to provide a foundation for spiritual development," and "to increase the sense of individual responsibility." (The table presents items that ranked highest in many of the countries.)

The elites in most of the Pacific Basin countries seem to believe that a good society derives from the spiritual and intellectual strength of thoughtful and responsible individuals. As one leader indicated, it takes a strong and confident individual to make the right decisions in an age of uncertainty; fixed rules of behavior will no longer suffice. Another argued that innovations in science and business require individuals who can think for themselves. Similarly, it was argued that new leadership is required in politics to break through old patterns and devise new goals and strategies that will help the nation to be more outward looking and adaptive. Even among leaders who expressed concern with the decline of nationalism has emerged the individualistic argument that the strength of nations starts with the love of one's self.

In the second tier of the elite, rationales are more "collective" concerns such as "providing a guide for behavior in daily life," "encouraging civic consciousness," and "promoting values of justice and equality." Other collective concerns such as "fostering an appreciation for the heritage and strengthening national identity" and "fostering family values" tend to be less uniformly supported in the region; these values stand out in certain nations but are relegated to a low priority in others. For example, concerning "fostering an appreciation for the heritage and strengthening national identity," the US elites (as well as those from Japan and Russia) are decidedly lukewarm. In contrast, the elites of the newly industrializing countries of Eastern Asia (Korea, mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and to a lesser degree Taiwan and

Table 2 Why should there be values education: elite rankings by settings

	Development of reflective/autonomous personalities	Provide foundation for spiritual development	Increase sense of individual responsibility	Guide for daily life
Russia	2	1	1	4
Japan	1	3	2	5
Taiwan	1	3	5	2
Mexico	1	7	5	4
USA	6	15	1	2
Hawaii	2	16	3	5
Malaysia	5	2	3	1
Singapore	9	7	1	6
Thailand	10	4	1	2
Hong Kong	2	1	3	6
Korea	1	2	7	4
China	6	2	1	4

Thailand) are comparatively positive. While all of the values in this second tier make reference to social entities, the primary emphasis is on encouraging individuals to make wise choices in their associations with social entities as contrasted to blindly accepting societal prescriptions.

There were some surprises in the relative emphases of particular settings. For example, while Russia under communism stressed secular and collective values, the top concerns of the contemporary Russian elites are spiritual development and an autonomous reflective personality. The elites of Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong also give high priority to spiritual development and an autonomous reflective personality, reflecting a quest for a new direction. In contrast, despite (or perhaps because of) the USA's strong individualist heritage, US elites are more inclined to show concern for the strengthening of collective or control values such as a guide for behavior and individual responsibility. In terms of the stress on collective concerns, the American elites are close to the elites in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and even Mainland China. Mexico and Taiwan tend to straddle the gap between these two groups, expressing a mix of concerns with more individualistic and more collective concerns.

In indicating why they believe certain values to be important, the elites of the several Pacific Basin settings tend both to stress areas they feel are of fundamental importance for maintaining the traditional strengths of their societies and areas they feel need strengthening in order to cope with the future. Thus while the mainland Chinese elites, being from one of the less economically developed settings in the study, stress the need for work values to foster economic development, most of the other elites tend to de-emphasize this value area (Korea, Singapore, and Thailand were among the settings giving work values moderate stress). Settings such as Korea and Hong Kong that have only recently opened up their polities for popular voting are notable for their stress on the need to encourage civic consciousness; and the same applies to the USA, Thailand, and Mexico.

While the elites in most of the countries give a moderately high ranking to "promoting values of justice and equity" (especially those from the USA and Mexico), they give low rankings to several other issues that have mobilized social activism in past decades – promoting world peace, combating social prejudice and promoting tolerance, and combating ecological abuse. Japanese elites stand out as promoters of world peace, Singapore elites are the strongest proponents of combating social prejudice, and Japanese and Mainland Chinese elites express the most concern for ecological abuse.

In view of the prominent attention accorded by the media to the issue of combating juvenile delinquency, it is of considerable interest that the elites of most countries tend to accord this a relatively low priority; Japanese and Taiwanese elites are the major exceptions. Russian elites are notable for their concern for the dangers posed by the negative images and information provided by the media and the Internet. Thai and US elites express the greatest concern for promoting pride in local communities. It might be said that the elites of these 20 settings agree that values education needs to place greater stress on helping individuals make ethical choices. But the elites have divergent views on the areas of choice that might need the greatest emphasis.

The elites of each country focus on somewhat distinctive areas, reflecting the particular challenges their countries have and will be facing.

4.4 Patterns of Variation

Recognizing that there are differences between the settings, we next explored whether the thinking of the elites in certain settings are more similar to each other than to other settings. To gain an understanding of differences in emphasis for the different settings, the setting rank orders for each rationale were analyzed with multi-dimensional scaling. Figure 1 presents the relative position of each setting. Also in Fig. 1, are listed in different corners phrases to identify the value rationales preferred by the elites in these settings; for example, elites in settings toward the top of the diagram stress civic consciousness and democracy, those to the right prefer individual responsibility, and the need to provide guides for behavior. One way of interpreting the outcome is to distinguish four groupings of settings:

Far West Liberals. The topmost US-influenced grouping of Japan, Taiwan, Mexico, and the USA that stress the need for civic consciousness and democracy.

Southeast Asian Moralists. The rightmost group of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong that share a Southeast Asian affinity for morality and economic growth.

Confucian Middle Way. A lower quadrant Sinic grouping of Honk Kong, Korea, and mainland China which stresses the strengthening of national identity and hard work.

Former Socialist/Centrists. Finally the distinctive group of Russia that stresses personal autonomy and spiritual development.

Several other sets of country data were also analyzed with the multi-dimensional scaling technique, and the same basic pattern repeatedly emerged giving strength to the observation that the differences in the elite preferences of these groupings are firmly grounded. What should be emphasized in values education?

Distinct from perceptions of the conditions values education is expected to improve, elites were asked which they believed should get a strong emphasis in contemporary educational institutions. Across the Pacific Basin, the value areas receiving the most support were personal autonomy, moral values, civic values, and democracy. In the second group were work, ecology, family, peace, national identity, and diversity. Gender equality, global awareness, and especially religion received the lowest priority for inclusion in the values education curriculum. But not all countries minimized these values. Malaysian elites ranked religion as the second highest priority (after moral values). Gender equality was ranked fourth in Mexico. And Japan and Hong Kong gave moderately high priority to global awareness. The particular problem foci of the respective elites tended to shape their thinking about what should be emphasized in the values education curriculum. For example, those country elites who tended to express concern to help young persons develop reflective/autonomous personalities were more likely to rank autonomy a high priority in values education ($r = 0.69$), to stress civic education ($r = 0.72$), and so on.

4.5 Who For and How Should Values Education Be Implemented?

The implementation of values education is, in important respects, a more specialized matter than the What and Why, and, it was apparent that the educational elites were less confident about their preferences in these areas. For example, the Who and How may vary depending on the curricular area. Some experts maintain that certain moral and religious precepts can be taught to very young children, whereas much that goes into civic education requires a minimal cognitive understanding of the nature of community organization and the key organs of government. Given the complexity of this question, the survey was restricted to cover three values areas: religion, morals, and civics. Overall, the responses across the several countries indicated a high level of agreement. Below, we will highlight a few differences.

First, concerning the Who there was broad agreement that values education should begin at a relatively early age, and that all children should receive a common program (e.g., irrespective of their academic ability). The major exceptions to these propositions are Mainland China, where the elites placed more stress on values education at the secondary level, and Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China where the elites indicated that children of different ability levels might be taught different value curricula. Also, as noted already, there is general agreement that civic education is better taught to somewhat more academically mature students, whereas the other value areas can just as easily begin at an early stage. While the elites stressed the early years as a good time to begin values education, there was a strong indication both from the survey and the country studies that the elites believed the value crisis to be endemic and thus deserving of a lifelong educational approach; for example, they accorded nearly as much importance to values education for teachers as to values education for students.

The How questions focused on two issues: (1) what is the best locus for values education, and (2) should values be taught as a separate subject or woven into the curriculum and cocurriculum. Concerning locus, we identified several possibilities: home, school, summer camp, internships, religious institution, and national service. For all value areas, the home and family are viewed as the critical settings by the elites in all of the Pacific Basin countries (though the Russians and Taiwanese expressed somewhat weaker faith in this locus). Without familial support, in the view of our elite sample, values education carried out in other settings is unlikely to have much impact. As a complement to the family, religious institutions are pointed to as critical agents for religious education; Malaysia is the one case where schools are also viewed as a vital setting for religious education. For moral education, along with the home and school, many elites also highlighted special camps as useful settings. And concerning civic education, many elites (especially the Russians) noted the potential of internships as well as community and national service. Malaysian (and, at least for some value areas, Hong Kong, and Singapore) elites were the most supportive of the media as effective means for values education.

Schools are but one among several settings, where a coordinated program of values education can take place. For the values education that takes place in schools, the elites of most of the Pacific Basin countries are favorable to having values education integrated across the curriculum, while in Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore there is greater stress on values education taught as a separate subject. For most of the other loci identified above, values education tends to be integrated across the curriculum.

Concerning each of these dimensions, current thinking varies widely across the region. But focusing on the major differences between countries, this variation can be divided into four groupings: The Far West Liberal group, Confucian Middle-Wayism, Southeast Asian Moralism, and the (former) Centralist/Socialist group. The Far West is notable for its concern with civic values and gender issues along with a new tendency to promote communitarianism; the Southeast Asian Group is notable for its concern with moral education, orderly schools, patriotism, and religion; the former Socialist/Centralized countries are notable for their concern for personal autonomy and the need for spiritual development; and the East Asian countries tend to stand in the middle of these various tendencies.

While contextual developments and long-standing traditions may lead to divergence with respect to the Why and What of values education, there is greater unanimity concerning the Who and How. The elites agree, for most areas, it is important to start early while recognizing that values education is a lifelong challenge. Thus, in terms of who can benefit from lifelong education, they indicate that teachers and adults, as well as school children, should be the focus of values education. Most elites stress the home as the backbone of values education followed by the primary school. But, here again some there are some differences. Elites from the former Centralist/Socialist group are most inclined to rely on internships and adult institutions; the Southeast Asian Moralists are most inclined to stress schools and to prefer that values education be taught in specialized subjects (and even be evaluated by tests). The elites from the Far West tend to stress integrating civic and moral values education across the curriculum while assigning religious education to the church and family, and the Middle-Way Confucians tend to draw elements from the other groups.

Perhaps the major dilemma faced by Pacific Basin educators is that their current views, if put into practice, may foster increased personal autonomy but at the cost of weakening past approaches to preserving and strengthening the social capital. The educational and social tradition of this region has been exceptionally rich in developing an internalized inclination toward familial, social, and national responsibility; and these social institutions have tended to reinforce and reward this inclination. But in recent decades, there are many indications that such institutions are under stress: governments, facing increasing fiscal challenges, are less capable of looking after the welfare of their citizens; workplaces facing the uncertainties of global competition are less able to guarantee security to their employees; communities have become larger and more heterogeneous; and families have become smaller and more vulnerable.

The values education now envisioned by Pacific Basin elites is adaptive in the sense of helping the new generation to individually cope with these new complexities, to help this new generation make decisions that maximize their needs. But the new values education may be weak in providing a vision of the broader social purpose, of the fabric that binds many individuals into broader social entities of common value. In other words, Pacific Basin educators are fashioning a new vision of heightened individualism, but they may be forgetting the need to complement this individualism with a complementary path toward the continued strengthening of the Pacific Basin's traditional reserve of social capital. As we have seen, the elite thinking tends to divide into four groupings. The Southeast Asian group is the most consistent follower of the nationalistic moral approach that has long characterized the Asian core of the Pacific Basin. The Far West, possibly having experienced the greatest excesses of individualism, evidences a new concern to introduce collective corrections. The former centrist group is most apprehensive of collective inhibitions, and thus may, at least in the short run, be neglecting its past practice of strengthening the social capital. And the Middle Way Confucianists are seeking to strike a balance between these extremes. Of course, these projections are based primarily on our analysis of the thinking of educational elites. There are other components involved in the shaping of the respective country's emergent values – including popular movements, the military, and religious groups – which may point the values future in yet other directions. What is certain is that the Pacific Basin is undergoing a profound reconsideration of basic values, characterized by a new stress on personal autonomy and diversity.

5 Challenges for Education

The several case studies go into considerable detail on selected features of pedagogical thinking. Among the many stimulating challenges to pedagogical thinking, the following deserve special attention:

What Is Autonomy? Autonomy has often been neglected in discussions of values education, though it is certainly a core concept in theories of human development (Loevinger, 1976). It is likely that the meaning attached to this concept varied. For example, in Mexico personal autonomy appears to have a strong association with civic values *and in Malaysia it is closely associated with religious values.*

Individualism and Collectivism The concepts of individualism and collectivism are sometimes portrayed as opposites and even as in opposition to each other. For example, Asian collectivism is often contrasted with Western individualism as in Benedict's (1969) contrast of shame versus guilt cultures. These same arguments have been discussed among Hong Kong educators, but they have concluded that the two concepts are complementary rather than opposing.

Love of Country: A Foundation for Internationalism It is also sometimes argued that nationalism and internationalism are in opposition. But, in recent years, as several Pacific Nations have sought to expand their international involvements and

hence their outlook, they have taken the view that a strong sense of national identity is an essential foundation for nationalism. The argument often presented by Japanese educational philosophers builds on the Christian maxim that one has to love oneself before it is possible to love one's neighbor. While this position is sometime criticized as a feeble excuse for perpetuating nationalism, it is persistently advocated by a number of leaders in the Pacific Basin.

5.1 Possible Lessons and Problems

The case studies suggest a number of lessons for the future of education in the Pacific Basin.

(i) Values Education will be a high priority for the Immediate Future. All of the leaders in this study believe that values education requires more emphasis. They have a broad vision of values education as contributing to the development of the whole person. They see values providing guides not only for the way future citizens behave, but also for shaping the goals of behavior. In other words, they believe education should play a fundamental role in shaping the future.

(ii) At the core of values education is the autonomous individual. In the past in many parts of the Pacific Basin, values education tended to be directive – do this, do that. Individuals were taught social rules and expected to blindly and persistently follow these rules. But the new thinking in the Pacific Basin seems to be to move beyond rules toward a reliance on the judgment of the autonomous individual. Values educators do not assume that the young student has a coherent value system of his/her own. Rather, the assumption is that the values perspective of the young person has to be nurtured in the home and school through a thoughtful and caring process. But the outcome of this process should be a strong individual who has a clear sense of what is important, so that that individual can make sound decisions on their own.

(iii) Schools should play an important role in values education. Whereas homes and churches were once thought to be the most important locus for values education, it is now understood that the work of these settings needs to be complemented by a significant effort in the schools. After all, many children come from unstable homes and/or are not affiliated with a formal religious organization. Thus, in the case of many children, the school may play not just a complementary, but also an essential role in values education.

(iv) Many pedagogies need to be considered. There is a rich heritage of pedagogies in the Pacific Basin that encompass virtually ever values education option known to the modern educator. In view of this rich heritage, most school settings will be reluctant to commit themselves to any single approach, but rather will prefer to be eclectic relying on approaches (direct approach, role models, tell stories, experiential, participatory) that are comfortable and

appear to address the situation at hand. To enable this flexibility, teachers will need to be provided with a rich and diverse background in values education.

(v) An Integrated Approach is preferred. Most elites favor an integrated approach for values education that includes, along with classroom instruction, values throughout the curriculum and the cocurriculum. The comprehensive approach favored by Pacific Basin educators means that schools will have to devote considerable time each year to planning their values education approach.

(vi) The pressure of exams may thwart the goals of values education. A potential contradiction is between the cognitive content of the values education curriculum and the behavioral necessities associated with passing competitive examinations. The values education curriculum may emphasize such themes as honesty and helping other. However, the examinations students to study alone without helping their peers, and some students resort to cheating on the exams in order to do well.

(vii) The theme of multi-culturalism is neglected. While the values education philosophies of Pacific Basin elites seem to be thoughtful with respect to most contemporary challenges, in several of the settings there is an unusual level of dissonance with respect to the approach to racial and ethnic differences. More careful thought needs to be devoted to the area of multi-culturalism, as the next decades are certain to accelerate the level of interaction between people of different backgrounds.

(viii) More time in the school day might be dedicated to values education. In view of the above goals outlined for values education, more time may be needed for values education. Virtually, every elite indicated that more time would be required. Alternately, the time for values education might be better utilized. And values education can be better integrated with other subjects.

6 Conclusion

Whereas past accounts of the Pacific Basin stressed the penchant for orderliness and control including the tendency to use values education to shape habits of national loyalty and obedience, the elite respondents of the 21 settings participating in this survey suggest a new era may be emerging with an increased emphasis on personal autonomy and responsibility. Looking to the future in the Pacific Basin, the elites indicate values of nationalism are likely to be balanced with increased civic consciousness. Values of hard work are to be balanced with increased creativity and competitiveness. Values of unique national heritages are to be balanced with increased respect for the traditions and languages of others. And values of hierarchy and patrimony are to be balanced with the values of equity and respect for the rights of women as equal partners in the labor force. To the extent that elite thinking is translated into educational policy, it can be presumed that the nature of social capital in the Pacific Basin will undergo important changes in the coming decades.

Perhaps the major dilemma faced by Pacific Basin educators is that their current views, if put into practice, may foster increased personal autonomy but at the cost of weakening past approaches to preserving and strengthening social capital (see also Zajda, Biraimah, & Gaudelli, 2008; Zajda, 2009a). The educational and social tradition of this region has been exceptionally rich in developing an internalized inclination toward familial, social, and national responsibility; and these social institutions have tended to reinforce and reward this inclination. But in recent decades, there are many indications that such institutions are under stress: governments, facing increasing fiscal challenges, are less capable of looking after the welfare of their citizens; workplaces facing the uncertainties of global competition are less able to guarantee security to their employees; communities have become larger and more heterogeneous; and families have become smaller and more vulnerable.

References

Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1964). *The civic culture: Attitudes to democracy in five nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barber, B. (1952). *Science and the social order*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Bartocha, B., & Okamura, S. (eds). (1985). *Transforming scientific ideas into innovations: Science policies in the United States and Japan*. Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

Benedict, R. (1969). *The crysanthemum and the sword*. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co.

Berger, P. L., & Hsiao, H. H. M. (1988). *Search of an east Asian development model* (pp. 99–111). New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers.

Boorstin, D. (1992). *The creators*. New York: Random House.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a theory of practice*. (Trans: Fred Nice). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.C. (1977). *Reproduction in education, society, and culture* (Trans: Fred Nice). London: Sage

Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capita. *American Journal of Sociology, 94*(Suppl.), 95–120.

Cummings, W. K., Gopinathan, S., & Tomoda, Y. (1987). *The revival of values education in Asia and the West*. New York: Pergamon.

Curtis, G. L. (1988). *The Japanese way of politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. (1996). *The global resurgence of democracy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins.

Etzioni, A. (1993). *The spirit of community*. New York: Touchstone.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inkeles, A., & Smith, D. H. (1974). *Becoming modern: Individual change in six developing countries*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Lickona, T. (1991). *Educating for character*. New York: Bantam.

Lodge, G. C., & Vogel, E. (1987). *Ideology and national competitiveness*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Loevinger, J. (1976). *Ego development*. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

Ming, T. W. (1991). A Confucian perspective on global consciousness and local awareness. *IHJ Bulletin, 11*, 1–5.

Miyanaga, K. (1991). *The creative edge: Emerging individualism in Japan*. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers.

Nakayama, S. (1991). *Technology and society in postwar Japan*. London: Kegan Paul.
Polyani, K. (1957). *The great transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work: The civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Saha, L. (2005). Cultural and social capital in global perspective. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *International handbook on globalisation, education and policy research* (pp. 745–755).
Vogel, E. (ed). (1975). *Modern Japanese organization and decision-making*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weber, M. (1958). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. Charles Scribner Sons: (Trans: Talcott Parsons). New York.
World Bank,. (1991). *Asia's economic miracles*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
Zajda, J. (2005). Global trends in education and academic achievement. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *International handbook on globalisation, education and policy research*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Zajda, J. (2009a). Globalisation, and comparative research: Implications for education. In J. Zajda & V. Rust (Eds.), *Globalisation, policy and comparative research*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Zajda, J. (2009b). Globalisation and its impact on education and policy. In J. Zajda & V. Rust (Eds.), *Globalisation, policy and comparative research*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Zajda, J., Biraimah, B., & Gaudelli, W. (Eds.). (2008). *Education and social inequality in the global culture.* Dordrecht: Springer.
Zajda, J., Davies, L., & Majhanovich, S. (Eds.). (2008). *Comparative and global pedagogies: Equity, access and democracy in education.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Different Perspectives on Values and Citizenship Education

Hélène Leenders and Wiel Veugelers

1 Different Perspectives on Values and Citizenship Education: Introduction

Citizenship development is an important issue in contemporary political initiatives and public debate, and education is given a crucial role in developing citizenship. Citizenship education has recently been introduced by governments in many different countries (Davies & Issitt, 2005; Torney-Purta & Barber, 2004)**.** The Council of Europe earmarked 2005 as the 'European Year of Citizenship Education'. In the Netherlands, the Advisory Council for Education proposed a statutory obligation of citizenship education (Onderwijsraad, Dutch Advisory Council for Education, 2003). The Advisory Council on Government Policy recommended further scientific research 'into the best ways to internalise, transfer and sustain values in child raising and education in general, and in a pluralistic society as a whole' (WRR, Advisory Council on Government Policy, 2003: 271). The Dutch government not only advocated values that are essential for a democratic society (such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech), but also values that they term 'small virtues' such as respect, equality, tolerance, empathy and responsibility. These small virtues have no legal basis, but they are however considered to be important for people to live together in harmony (Kabinet, 2004). Recently, the Dutch Minister of Education, Mrs. Van der Hoeven, proposed a statutory obligation for schools 'to stimulate active citizenship and social integration'. In her explanatory remarks, the Minister stresses the relationship between citizenship, social cohesion and social integration. She describes citizenship as 'the willingness and the opportunity to be part of society and to participate actively in that society'. Social integration is according to her 'participation of civilians in society and its institutions, and social participation and familiarity with, and knowledge of Dutch culture' (MOCW, 2005).

These new citizenship initiatives are part of the changing social and political climate in the Netherlands which manifests itself in a lack of trust in Dutch political

H. Leenders and W. Veugelers
University of Amsterdam
e-mail: H.H.M.Leenders@uva.nl

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_2,

policy and in the European political project; in violence – even political violence like the killing of the politician Fortuyn and the movie director Van Gogh; tensions between native Dutch people and immigrants; and concern about the influence of non-Christian religions such as Islam. Politicians always make choices – choices that are often not well articulated. According to our analysis, the Dutch Government considers social participation to be more important than economic and political participation, and focuses more on social integration of immigrants rather than on social cohesion in society. The Dutch government is right in taking care of the social domain, but lacks a more democratic and transformative view on the social domain: a kind of citizenship development late modern society needs (Banks, 2004; Haste, 2004).

In many countries, citizenship is a separate subject, like éducation civique in France and politische Bildung in Germany. Contrary to this, citizenship in the Netherlands is not developed in one specific school subject but it is embedded in all school subjects and in the school culture. Davies and Issitt (2005: 389), who compared citizen education textbooks in Canada, Australia and England, make a distinction between education in civics ('provision of information about public institutions', in Canada), education for citizenship ('a broad-based promotion of socially useful qualities', in England) and social studies ('societal understanding that emerges from the development of critical thinking skills related to existing academic subjects such as history and English', in Australia). Citizenship education in the Netherlands has elements of education for citizenship and social studies. Given the international political and scientific debate on citizenship education and because of the cultural challenges Dutch society faces, we think it is important to analyse concepts of citizenship education.

2 Teachers and Values

Teachers contribute to building school as a social and a learning environment (Hargreaves, 2003). Each teacher makes choices and makes the formal curriculum concrete. Teachers attempt, consciously and unconsciously, to influence their students' value development. They bring educational policy, the pedagogical vision of the school and their own cultural–pedagogical project into action. Teachers demonstrate values through the material they choose, subject content, examples, and their coaching of students (Gudmundsdottir, 1990) or in the words of Arthur (2003:317) 'Values are an integral part of teaching, reflected in what is taught and also in how teachers interact with pupils'. In education, the development of certain values is stimulated and education attempts to develop skills in students to enable them to form their own opinions on values and to communicate about values. A teacher can transfer values, but can also generate conditions in which different perspectives on the topic are contrasted with one another. In the educational process, the teacher acts as a role model. Students do not need to follow the role model of the teacher but they are confronted with it in school life.

On a conceptual level, different perspectives on values and value development can be distinguished and can be linked to citizenship development. Values may be

oriented towards adaptation, to personal emancipation or to a more collective emancipation (Giroux, 1989; Veugelers, 2000). In education, teachers articulate a pedagogical vision in which a specific type of citizenship can be dominant. In the literature, different kinds of distinctions in types of citizenship can be found (Apple & Beane, 1995; Goodman, 1992). We differentiate between *adapting citizenship*, *individualistic citizenship* and *critical democratic citizenship*. Different types of citizenship relate to different kinds of educational practices. We first analyse the adapting and individualistic citizenship and their related educational goals and practices and then elaborate in greater detail on the critical democratic citizenship. We hope to transcend with this concept the weaknesses in the adapting and in the individualistic citizenship.

The recent statutory obligation for citizenship education in the Netherlands challenges educators to articulate the values they wish to stimulate, the type of citizenship they are aiming for, and the way they can support students in their identity development (Veugelers & de Kat, 2003). In the second part of the chapter, we present pedagogical and philosophical arguments for what we think is valuable for the teachers and students in the Netherlands. We propose a citizenship education, which is based on a critical democratic perspective and focuses on the development of reflexive and communication skills, and on values such as autonomy and social commitment.

3 Methodology

We analysed the international scientific debate surrounding citizenship, democracy and education, in order to clarify different citizenship concepts and their related educational practices. Computerised reference databases (ERIC and SSCI) were searched for potentially relevant studies published after 1990. We used the following keywords: moral (education), citizenship (education), civic (education), democratic (education), and values (education). We limited ourselves to reports that were published in peer reviewed/refereed journals, and chapters in books. In addition to this, we examined relevant journals and books, published before and after 1990 ('snowball method'). We selected 65 books and chapters that focus on citizenship, educational goals and practices. We analysed the material with the following questions: What are the constituent elements of different citizenship education and moral education concepts? Which aims or presuppositions are at stake? What does this mean for educational practice? What is the role of the teacher? What is the role of the student? We now first look at the adapting type of citizenship**.**

3.1 Adapting Citizenship and Value Transmission

This type of citizenship can be described as follows: the citizen is not in the first place seen as an autonomous individual who makes private choices, but rather as a social and political person whose life impinges on the life of his neighbour.

He or she belongs to a society that is characterised by shared common traditions and concepts, and by shared common values (Dekker, 1994; Heater, 1990; van Gunsteren, 1991). Morality in this view is about fulfilling one's duties. In this vision, duties are in the foreground, whereas rights are in the background. In order to achieve an identity or a 'stable character' in this perspective, people need the support of a group of people who feel and think in the same way. Citizenship in this concept is defined by the values that are shared. Homogeneity is the norm. Autonomy is not judged positively – to become a decent citizen, people need to share specific values. Adapting citizenship is very similar to what, in citizenship theories, is referred to as 'a communitaristic citizenship concept' (Heater, 1990).

Adapting citizenship is often connected to a value transmission approach, an approach in which more or less fixed values are transmitted to youngsters in order to form their character. An example of this approach is '*character education*' (Lickona, 1991; Lockwood, 1997; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). The aim of character education is to strengthen the transmission of certain values in education through the curriculum and the moral culture of the school (Galston, 1991). Relatively little attention is given to the development of skills that give students the opportunity to reflect on values and to develop their own values. In this educational approach, there is not much opportunity for students to achieve value engagement, to make judgments themselves, and to express their own values. Instead, in a value transmission approach, specific values are set out in the educational aims: values that are considered worth reproducing.

Critics point out that the character traits that are involved here do not have anything to do with democracy. Instead these traits tend to hinder democratic participation because there is too strong an emphasis on loyalty and obedience. These virtues do not go well with critical reflection, which is an essential part of civic behaviour in a democracy (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). A value transmission approach can lead to unreflected socialisation in existing political and social relations (McLaughlin, 1992).

3.2 Individualistic Citizenship and Value Communication

The dominant theory about citizenship in Europe today can be found in the liberal tradition. It defines citizenship in terms of individual rights in particular. Morality exists in the complete unfolding of the individual, and citizenship provides the liberty that is necessary to achieve this (Heater, 1990). Citizens are seen as autonomous individuals. They make choices and are connected to each other through a social contract (Dekker, 1994). Critical political scientists and sociologists point out that in this conception of citizenship, too strong an emphasis on individual rights, on the social–political autonomy of the individual and on a critical attitude towards institutions can lead to an individualistic type of citizen (Heater, 1990; Terrén, 2002; van Gunsteren, 1991). Such a citizen does not use rights and duties and responsibilities as a moral, ideological obligation, but as something that serves

his or her own interest. Rights are interpreted in terms of protection of the individual and his or her autonomy. Duties are put in the background since they mean a restriction of liberty.

A value communication approach seems to fit in with this citizenship concept. Central to a value communication approach are reflexive and communication skills such as analysing, reflecting upon values and value-laden actions, and knowing how to discuss values with others. These are skills that youngsters need in order to develop values. Examples of this mode are the value clarification method and critical thinking. The *value clarification* method (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1978) considers that the aim of education is to help students build a consistent set of values by providing them with the opportunity to identify their own values and to remove possible inconsistencies between the different values. The *critical thinking* movement (Ennis, 1994; Kuhn, 1991; Paul, 1992; Pithers & Soden, 2000) also promotes the analysis and comparison of opinions. In this approach, not only skills such as identifying assumptions are at stake, but also affective dispositions such as being open-minded, willing to weigh the credibility of evidence, and questioning prior assumptions. Learning how to think critically is important among liberal theorists and philosophers of education. According to them, education should help youngsters develop a capacity to ask critical questions, to weigh up the evidence and to discuss the things people take for granted. In this view, the aim of education is to develop knowledge, personal self-awareness, and understanding – also with respect to society. When liberal philosophers argue about citizenship education, they pay considerable attention to critical reflection (Dworkin, 1988; Rawls, 1993). *Communicative* or *deliberative* conceptions of democracy are closely related to these liberal ideas. These concepts have an optimistic confidence in the power of rationality to improve human existence and in the power of people to define and to serve the common interest in spite of individual differences (Geren, 2001).

The individualistic type of citizenship can be criticised. McLaughlin points out that when the aim of education is defined as personal autonomy with an emphasis on critical thinking and independent judgment, while the shared values are not articulated, it can lead to individualism and to a calculating behaviour. It can lead to individual choice-making and self-determination 'to be based on arbitrary preference or self-interest rather than on a view of life which is coherent and other-regarding' (McLaughlin, 1992: 243). In value communication approaches, the competence to judge and to communicate is important, but statements about the worth of values are missing. In this way, value communication differs from moral communication, in which moral criteria such as justice and care are taken as criteria for judgments (Oser, 1994). Value communication approaches can lead to ethical relativism and to opinions that are ethically reprehensible. We would like to argue that, in education, not only analytical or communication skills matter, but also the values in themselves.

But which values are important? McLaughlin (1992) puts forward a wide ranging cultural–historical discussion on the question as to which values are worth paying attention to. In his opinion, this discussion, which should not be conducted on an abstract level, should lead to a 'practical agreement about defensible strategies and

policies for educating for citizenship, including those relating to the handling of controversial issues with students' (McLaughlin, 1992: 245–246). In our view, this discussion should be a permanent discussion, in which there is attention for diversity. Values should not be fixed as educational goals once and for all, but should instead be the subject of a constant dialogue between all the people involved. Such a dialogue should be conducted at all levels, with experts, teachers, policy makers and others. The government could invite schools to formulate their own pedagogical policy within the legal framework.

3.3 Towards a Critical Democratic Citizenship Through a Combination of Value Stimulation and Value Communication

The individualistic and the critical democratic citizenship are two variants of an autonomous citizenship: the individualistic type reasons more from the actual individual, whereas the critical democratic type reasons from an involvement with others.

In former research projects, we often presented different kinds of values to parents, teachers and students. They were asked if, in their opinion, these values were or should be pedagogical goals. We found three clusters of pedagogical goals (Veugelers & de Kat, 2003):

- '*Adaptation and discipline*' with aims such as obedience, good manners and self-discipline
- '*Autonomy and critical reflection*' with aims such as forming one's own opinion and learning how to handle criticism
- '*Social commitment*' with aims such as showing respect for others, and solidarity with others

These clusters of aims could be linked in a specific way to the three types of citizenship:

- To an *adapting citizen*, discipline and social commitment are important while autonomy is relatively less important.
- To an *individualistic citizen*, discipline and autonomy are important while social commitment is relatively less important.
- To a *critical democratic citizen*, autonomy and social commitment are important while discipline is relatively less important.

These studies show that there are very different ways of paying attention to values in education. Each teacher articulates a pedagogical vision that consists of a combination of values but with the dominance of a specific type of citizenship.

In our view, modern society requires a critical democratic citizenship that is based on autonomy and social commitment. Young people should be educated to have a critical, enquiring attitude, to have the courage and the creativity to tread new paths, to have the desire to scrutinise all knowledge – including their own – for the

incorporated social conventions and the underlying power structures. They should become alert to the relationship between autonomy and social concern. We opt for what we call a critical democratic citizenship because society today is characterised by individualisation and globalisation and a need to build democracy. This demands, in our opinion, a permanent value development by each human being and a social process of actively and creatively shaping norms together. Critical democratic citizens attempt to combine individual and social development. They are human beings who actively participate in society and who are critically engaged in the transformation of the community and in handling cultural differences. Critical democratic citizenship implies self-regulation, social commitment, critical thinking and acting (Veugelers, 2003). This type of citizenship education relates to traditions such as critical pedagogy and critical theory and to certain forms of cooperative learning and moral education (see Apple & Beane, 1995; Giroux, 1983; Goodman, 1992).

When it comes to education, this implies the stimulation of certain values, the teaching and learning of skills to reflect and communicate better about values, and increasing the active participation of students. It also implies that a balanced integration is sought between the personal development of students (autonomy and critical thinking) and social commitment and emancipation (Veugelers, 2003).

When people nowadays discuss the relationship between individuals and society, they often use terms such as ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’. We prefer to use the concept of ‘democratisation’. This concept refers to active participation and commitment, not only on a political level, but also on the level of interpersonal relationships, to what Dewey already called democracy as a lifestyle. Democratisation is important in the daily interaction between people in schools, in labour organisations and in the public sphere. Through the process of democratisation, connection and concern between people in a society can be achieved. In our view, democratisation has nothing to do with consumer behaviour, market strategy and privatisation. Instead, themes such as empowerment, the balance of power, ethics and the process of giving meaning to life should enter into public debate and into education. Through citizenship education, students can be equipped with competencies that enable them to participate in the social and political arenas. Educators should also try to enhance the students’ willingness to use those competencies and to develop social commitment.

3.4 Active Participation

Our theoretical framework is partly based on the ‘moral education’ tradition, and in particular on the studies by Power, Higgins and Kohlberg (1989), Oser (1994, 1999) and Solomon, Watson and Battistich (2001). The central concepts are: *value development*, *value communication*, and *participation and community*. Values steer a person’s beliefs and behaviour and values give a meaning to a person’s actions (Berkowitz, 1997). Paying attention in education to values and value development

is therefore needed in order to prevent education from merely developing the ability to judge, without paying attention to the moral criteria involved.

Values are articulated when students give their personal meaning to the learning contents they are confronted with. There often is an exaggerated emphasis in educational theory on didactics and methods, while forgetting the content. School education should not be reduced to social experience or experimental learning only. Subject-related learning should be part of an educational process in which knowledge of others becomes a part of the students' experience and in which they are challenged to give personal meaning to knowledge and culture (Oelkers, 2000).

Participation and *community* refer to a student's active involvement in his or her own education, one's own development of values and that of other students. In various traditions, this active and more social participation of students in a community of learners is regarded as being the core of a meaningful learning process, as we see in the 'Just Community Schools' (Althof, 2003; Power et al., 1989), the 'democratic schools' (Apple & Beane, 1995; Goodman, 1992) and 'caring communities' (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1997; Noddings, 1992; Tappan, 1998). The methods that can be used include, for example, cooperative learning, dialogue and discussion, and cooperative problem solving (Apple & Beane, 1995; Arnstine, 2000; Terrén, 2002).

We can identify with a more integrated vision on moral education in which the development of values, the development of skills and participation in school culture are seen in relation to each other (Veugelers & Oser, 2003, see also Oser, 1999; Purpel, 1999; Solomon et al., 2001; Terrén, 2002). These authors stress the importance of learning by active participation in democratic decision-making processes in schools. It gives students the opportunity to exercise democratic behaviour in the context of the class and the school. Moreover, they emphasise how important it is for teachers to explicitly demonstrate fundamental democratic values such as equality and social commitment.

However, in secondary education in the Netherlands, this is not the normal situation. In the recent reform of Dutch secondary education, a crucial statement was that education should be centred on the learning activities of the student. As can be read in official statements of the Dutch Ministry of Education (1997, 1999), this 'new learning' is described as 'active, self-responsible, differentiated, skill-oriented learning', or 'self-regulated, independent, self-responsible learning', as opposed to learning that is controlled by the teacher. In practice, however, students *work* most of the time independently in class, rather than learn independently. Students follow the curriculum as described, instead of exploring issues themselves. Furthermore, there are very few learning-centred interactions between students, or ways of cooperative learning (Veugelers & Oser, 2003). We think that an emphasis on individual self-regulation can seriously hamper the moral development of students. We would prefer to define moral education as learning to think and act *together* in social contexts, and therefore it is necessary to have space for dialogue and for working collectively.

It has already been stated that students need to develop the reflection and communication skills that are necessary to develop values in dialogue with each other. However, learning how to discuss is not sufficient for a democratic education, active participation is indispensable. For example, Heater (1990: 217) concludes that

'People only learn to act responsibly by being given responsibility'. There must be an opportunity to *act* morally in order to have students not only develop ideas about morality, but also to have them develop genuine *moral ideas* that are deeply rooted within their personality. Essential to this is a school culture in which students can actively participate and where the teacher is a role model (Desmedt, 2001). We would like to add here that participation is not only needed in order to get moral ideas – thus for cognitive development – but also in particular to stimulate the development of social commitment among students and with the world outside the school.

Participation is possible on different levels. In educational research, arguments for participation can be found on the macro-level of political decision-making and participation in political processes (Cogan & Morris, 2001); on the meso-level of the school by introducing methods of self-government and practicing democratic decision making (Arnstine, 2000; Power & Khmelkov, 1998; Solomon et al., 2001); on the classroom (micro-)level by participative and active work in the classroom that gives students the opportunity to explore controversial issues and learn from real-life experiences (Davies & Evans, 2002).

We would like to warn against the use of the classroom community as a metaphor: the classroom or the school as an example of society (Leenders, 2001; Oelkers, 2000). This metaphor derives from the progressive education movement of the early twentieth century. It is naive to believe that when the school creates an environment in which students feel supported and respected and to which they can contribute in a meaningful way, they would develop habits of active engagement and attitudes that are consistent with participation in a democracy. It is simply not enough to introduce methods of self-government in schools. The embedded values in social relations in the school and between school and society should be studied as well. The link with the values themselves, also in subject-based learning contents, is indispensable. The learning content can build a bridge between school and society.

3.5 The Role of the Teacher

The role the teacher should play in citizenship education deserves particular attention. Terrén stresses the importance of a 'pedagogically directed dialogue' between teacher and student. In this dialogue, it is clear what the highest values for a democratic education are, namely autonomy (based on the assumption that students are active individuals who, through their rationality, are capable of deliberation) and solidarity (Terrén, 2002). It is to a certain extent a directed dialogue because the teacher watches over a specific normative point of view: the limit of what is acceptable. Terrén rightly argues that the teacher should not behave in a value-neutral way. It can be put even more strongly: a teacher *cannot* behave in a value-neutral way. Education is, by definition, not free of values; therefore value-neutrality is a myth and an impossibility. In critical pedagogy, the supposed value-neutrality of the teacher is contested (Giroux, 1983, 1989). McLaren (2006) concludes that value-related acting by teachers is always a social–political practice, in which teachers can make their

own choices. The specific skills and values the teachers find important for their students constitute the social-normative practice of the teacher.

We want to consider this social-normative practice of the teacher by characterising it as *a combination* of value stimulation and value communication. *Value stimulation* by the teacher means that, based on the pedagogical task of education, the curriculum, the identity of the school, and his or her personal pedagogical vision, a teacher attempts to influence the value development of students. In the meantime, the student gives personal meaning in interaction with the teacher who, consciously or unconsciously, tries to influence this signification process. The values the teacher wants to develop within students are part of his or her pedagogical content knowledge. Teachers stimulate these values by the content they choose, by the examples they give, and in their reactions towards students (Veugelers, 2000). It is important to note that value stimulation differs from value transmission since, due to the signification process on the part of the student, the outcome of the value development is, in principle, not fixed. And teachers are aware of giving students opportunities to develop a personal meaning. In addition to value stimulation *value communication* is important, since the teacher also wants students to develop skills to enable them to articulate their own value-based meaning, to theorise their meaning and to communicate about it.

4 Discussion

An educational objective such as *individualistic citizenship* refers to an educational practice in which value communication is central. In such a practice, communication skills such as critical reflection and rational discussion are stressed. There is also a clear emphasis on independence, self-responsibility, self-regulation and personal autonomy on the part of the student, and on openness and impartiality. The teacher is instructor, coach, trainer, advisor, consultant and assessor. He or she is supposed to create a stimulating learning environment, to guide the individual learning path of the student and attune it to each individual student. Too strong an emphasis on autonomy can lead to individualism (personal preference, self-interest), to strategic behaviour alone, or to a calculating attitude. Such an educational practice suffers from the persistent myth that has existed since the days of the progressive education movement in the early twentieth century. In this movement, it was often supposed that students develop self-knowledge, self-discipline and a sense of responsibility through their own actions and their own experiences, against the background of the class and the school as a ‘little’ society (Leenders, 2001). It is naive to suppose that students learn what community is like solely by living together and personal experience, while the link with the knowledge and culture outside the personal domain is missing.

When we opt for citizenship education based on a *critical democratic* perspective, we suggest a combination of stimulating values such as autonomy and social commitment, and stimulating value communication by students in classrooms. The

idea is to develop student's autonomy while keeping the commitment to others. It supposes the active and cooperative construction of social life and society aimed at developing democracy and a democratic way of life. The teacher is a central figure within this process. He or she is the mediator of democratic values and norms and is at the same time a participant in the dialogical process in which students give meaning to values. The teacher participates in the dialogue while being aware of his or her own values, and of the fact that he or she represents certain perspectives that are rooted in a democratic tradition. Learning is seen as a social activity in which students can engage with others and the world around them. Students, however, develop and express their own values. In citizenship education based on a critical-democratic perspective, students will be challenged to develop intellectual and social qualities and attitudes as an integral part of their own personal identity.

5 Conclusion

Based on the analysis of values and citizenship education, we can conclude that there are very different opinions about the values, skills and attitudes citizens need. Different citizenship concepts appear to be related to different pedagogical aims, and each one of them has different consequences for educational practice. An educational objective such as *adapting citizenship* refers to a practice of value transmission. Such an educational practice is characterised by a firm focus on values – virtues such as discipline, obedience, hard work, integrity, respect and responsibility. There are 'key' values which are recognisable in all aspects of the learning process and school life, in thinking, feeling and acting. There is a clear emphasis on conformity, on loyalty towards one's own community. In a traditional hierarchical relationship between teacher and student, the teacher transmits knowledge and fixed values, or the 'right' message. Self-regulation of the learning process by the student is not strongly stimulated. The problem of this approach is that the serious concern for loyalty hinders critical reflection, which may lead to uncritical socialisation in the existing societal order, rather than to real democratic participation. In the value transmission approach that is oriented to an adapting citizenship, the autonomous identity of the student is not developed.

References

Althof, W. (2003). Implementing 'just and caring communities' in elementary schools: A Deweyan perspective. In W. Veugelers & F. K. Oser (Eds.), *Teaching in moral and democratic education* (pp. 173–192). Bern / New York: Peter Lang.

Apple, M. W., & Beane, J. A. (1995). *Democratic schools*. Alexandria: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

Arnstine, B. (2000). Developing students for a democracy: The LegiSchool Project. *Studies in Philosophy and Education, 19*(3), 261–273.

Arthur, J. (2003). Editorial: Professional value commitments. *British Journal of Educational Studies, 51*(4), 317–319.

Banks, J. A. (2004). *Diversity and citizenship education. Global perspectives*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Battistich, V., Solomon, D., Watson, M., & Schaps, E. (1997). Caring school communities. *Educational Psychologist, 32*, 137–151.

Berkowitz, M. W. (1997). Integrating structure and content on moral education. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL.

Cogan, J., & Morris, P. (2001). The development of civics values: An overview. *International Journal of Educational Research, 35*(1), 1–9.

Davies, I., & Evans, M. (2002). Encouraging active citizenship. *Educational Review, 54*(1), 69–78.

Davies, E., & Issitt, J. (2005). Reflections on citizenship education in Australia, Canada and England. *Comparative Education, 41*(4), 389–410.

Dekker, H. (1994). Socialisation and education of young people for democratic citizenship, theory and research. In L. Edwards, P. Munn & K. Fogelman (Eds.), *Education for democratic citizenship in Europe – new challenges for secondary education* (pp. 48–90). Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger.

Desmedt, E. (2001). Onderwijs en waarden. Hedendaagse visies in kaart gebracht (Education and values. Recent views examined). In H. van Crombrugge and B. Vanobbergen (Eds.), *Opvoedend onderwijs. Verkenningen in de theorie en de praktijk van waardecommunicatie op school* (Educating education. Looking at the theory and practice of value communication in schools) (pp.7–42). Gent: Academia Press.

Dworkin, G. (1988). *The theory and practice of autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ennis, R. H. (1994). Critical thinking dispositions: Theoretical and practical considerations in their delineation, endorsement, and assessment. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association. New Orleans: Louisiana.

Galston, W. A. (1991). Civic education in the liberal state. In N. Rosenblum (Ed.), *Liberalism and the moral life* (pp. 89–101). Cambridge: Howard University Press.

Geren, P. R. (2001). Public discourse: Creating the conditions for dialogue concerning the common good in a postmodern heterogeneous democracy. *Studies in Philosophy and Education, 20*(3), 191–227.

Giroux, H. A. (1983). *Theory and resistance in education. A pedagogy for the opposition*. London: Heinemann.

Giroux, H. A. (1989). *Schooling for democracy: Critical pedagogy in a modern age*. London: Routledge.

Glass, R. D. (2000). Education and the ethics of democratic citizenship. *Studies in Philosophy and Education, 19*(3), 275–296.

Goodman, J. (1992). *Elementary schooling for critical democracy*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Gudmundsdottir, S. (1990). Values in pedagogical content knowledge. *Journal of Teacher Education, 41*(3), 44–52.

van Gunsteren, H. R. (1991). Vier concepties van burgerschap' (Four ideas of citizenship). In J. B. D. Simonis, et al. (Eds.), *De staat van de burger. Beschouwingen over hedendaags burgerschap (The State of the Citizen. Reflections on contemporary citizenship)* (pp. 44–61). Meppel: Boom.

Hargreaves, A. (2003). *Teaching in the knowledge society*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Haste, H. (2004). Constructing the citizen. *Political Psychology, 25*(3), 413–438.

Heater, D. (1990). *Citizenship. The civic ideal in world history, politics and education*. London/ New York: Longman.

Kabinet (2004). *Kabinetsreactie WRR Rapport Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag* (Reaction of the government on the report of the Dutch Advisory Council). Den Haag: Algemene Zaken.

Kuhn, D. (1991). *The skills of argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leenders, H. (2001). *Der Fall Montessori. Die Geschichte einer reformpädagogischen Erziehungskonzeption im italienischen Faschismus (The Montessori case. History of a progressive education concept in fascist Italy)*. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt.

Lickona, T. (1991). *Educating for character. How our schools can teach respect and responsibility*. New York: Bantam Books.
Lockwood, A. T. (1997). *Character education: Controversy and consensus*. Thousand Oaks: Corwin Press.
McLaren, P. (2006). *Life in schools: An introduction to critical pedagogy in the foundations of education* (5th ed.). New York: Longman.
McLaughlin, T. H. (1992). Citizenship, diversity and education: A philosophical perspective. *Journal of Moral Education, 21*(3), 235–250.
MOCW (Ministry of Education). (2001). *A new phase in secondary education*. Den Haag: SdU.
MOCW (Ministry of Education). (2005). *Voorstel van Wet en Memorie van Toelichting* W2624K-2 (Legal Proposal and Explanation to this Proposal nr. W2624K-2). Den Haag: MOCW.
Noddings, N. (1992). *The challenge to care in schools: An alternative to education*. New York: Teachers College Press.
Oelkers, J. (2000). Democracy and education: About the future of a problem. *Studies in Philosophy and Education, 19*(1), 3–19.
Onderwijsraad (Dutch Advisory Council for Education). (2003). *Onderwijs en burgerschap* (Education and citizenship). Den Haag: Onderwijsraad.
Oser, F. K. (1994). Moral perspectives on teaching. *Review of Research in Education, 20*, 57–127.
Oser, F. K. (1999). Triforial moral education. Paper presented at the EARLI-conference, Goteborg, Sweden, August 1999.
Paul, R. W. (1992). *Critical thinking. What every person needs to survive in a rapidly changing world*. Foundation for Critical Thinking: Santa Rosa.
Pithers, R., & Soden, R. (2000). Critical thinking in education: A review. *Educational Research, 42*(3), 237–249.
Power, F. C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1989). *Lawrence Kohlberg's approach to moral education*. New York: Colombia University Press.
Power, F. C., & Power, A. (1992). A raft of hope: Democratic education and the challenge of pluralism. *Journal of Moral Education, 21*(3), 193–205.
Power, F. C., & Khmelkov, V. (1998). Character development and self-esteem. *International Journal of Educational Research, 27*(7), 539–551.
Purpel, D. E. (1999). *Moral outrage in education*. New York: Peter Lang.
Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. (1978). *Values and teaching*. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
Rawls, J. (1993). *Political liberalism*. New York: Colombia University Press.
Solomon, D., Watson, M., & Battistich, V. (2001). Teaching and schooling effects on moral/prosocial development. In V. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of research on teaching* (pp. 566–603). San Francisco: AERA.
Tappan, M. B. (1998). Sociocultural psychology and caring pedagogy: Exploring Vygotsky's Hidden Curriculum. *Educational Psychologist, 33*, 23–33.
Terrén, E. (2002). Post-modern attitudes: A challenge to democratic education. *European Journal of Education, 37*(2), 161–178.
Torney-Purta, J., & Barber, J. (2004). *Democratic school participation and civic attitudes among European adolescents. Analysis of data from the IEA civic education study*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.
Veugelers, W. (2000). Different ways of teaching values. *Educational Review, 52*(1), 37–46.
Veugelers, W. (2001). Teachers, values, and critical thinking. In S. R. Steinberg (Ed.), *Multi/Intercultural conversations* (pp. 199–215). New York: Peter Lang.
Veugelers, W. (2003). *Waarden en normen in het onderwijs: Zingeving en humanisering, autonomie en sociale betrokkenheid* (values and Norms in Education: autonomy and social commitment) Utrecht: Universiteit voor Humanistiek (Inaugural address).
Veugelers, W., & de Kat, E. (2003). Moral task of the teacher according to students. *Parents and Teachers' Educational Research and Evaluation, 9*(1), 75–91.
Veugelers, W., & Oser, F. K. (2003). *Teaching in moral and democratic education*. Bern/New York: Peter Lang.

Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of educating for democracy. *American Educational Research Journal, 41*(2), 237–269.

WRR (Advisory Council on Government Policy). (2003). *Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag* (Values, norms and behaviour). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Wynne, E. A., & Ryan, K. (1993). *Reclaiming our schools. A handbook on teaching character, academics and discipline*. New York: Merrill.

Globalisation, Values and Human Rights for Cultural Diversity

J.J. Smolicz and Margaret Secombe

1 Culture, Ethnicity and the State

Under the impact of economic, political and cultural globalisation, one could expect that the whole world would tend to become more and more culturally homogeneous until a convergence of cultures eventuated. Such homogenising forces have impinged upon nation-states causing them to lose some of their traditional omnipotence and charisma. The rising significance of international organisations has eroded some of the states' powers, as has the increasing acceptance of dual citizenship and the virtually uncontrollable migratory flows across the globe.

An example taken from Australia illustrates the dimensions of the latter problem facing many states, even one such as Australia that was formerly proud of its ability to control immigration inflow, with immigrants carefully classified as 'skilled', 'family reunion', 'refugees' and 'humanitarian need' cases. Australia has no official category for asylum seekers who arrive without official papers by boat, by air or inside cargo containers. This 'illegal' migration flow was no longer a minor problem. In 2000, 4,174 asylum seekers were washed up on Australian shores, arriving in 75 boats (a substantial increase from the 157 people who came in 1997–1998) (Hugo, 2001, p. 188).

The weakening authority of the nation-state in the face of such crises has paradoxically generated forces that counteract the homogenising effects of globalisation. As control slips out of its grasp, the state faces the rising demands of its local, regional and various other minority groups, which are gaining confidence and demanding their 'place in the sun'. We are witnessing round the world a renaissance, a resurgence of ethnicity (Huntington, 1996). While political boundaries are tending to become more permeable, especially in places like Western Europe, cultural boundaries are becoming accentuated *within* countries. In this context, it is important to realise that the cultural and political boundaries between states do not

J.J. Smolicz and M. Secombe
Adelaide University
e-mail: mjsecombe@internode.on.net

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_3,

necessarily coincide and that very few countries in the world today are culturally homogeneous: most are multi-ethnic.

Different countries have responded in different ways to this ethnic challenge. Not every state recognises its growing cultural and ethnic diversity. Some try to deny its existence, as in the case of the Turks, who have refused to accept the existence of the Kurds, whom they call Mountain Turks. Some think that their plurality is temporary, as in the case of Germans who have long regarded resident Turks as temporary 'guest workers', even though many of them have been resident for three generations, with grandchildren who speak more German than Turkish. In fact, Germany provides an example of a country where membership of the nation has been based on the assumption of common blood, and, therefore until very recently, people of non-German ancestry had no entry to the nation, and hence, no ready access to citizenship of the German state. That is one of the reasons why so few Turks have acquired German citizenship. Although this is changing slowly, the German nation-state still remains basically 'closed' to those who do not satisfy the ancestry criterion. There are countries in Asia which share a similar belief in the ideal of monocultural nation-state based on common descent.

In other countries, multi-ethnicity has resulted in territorial separatism imposed by the dominant group, often as the only alternative to insurgency and warfare. In still other cases, there is no separation, but every effort has been made to assimilate the minorities out of existence. This occurs in France with respect to its historic regions, as well as to its new migrant groups. In contrast to the Germans, the French nation-state is 'open' in the sense that it has been possible to gain entry to the French state through naturalisation, as many North Africans have already shown. Once one enters the French state, one is assumed to have become part of the French nation, and hence required to assimilate totally to French culture. The official French assumption is that admission to French citizenship automatically brings with it the complete obliteration of one's original culture, even if does not necessarily translate into social acceptance or job market equality. France is by no means the only country which believes in the 'republican ideal' that equality can best be achieved in a culturally homogenous society in which all cultural alternatives have been eliminated. There are Asian countries which also share similar beliefs, without necessarily being republics.

As the American political scientist, Safran (1995, p. 2) has asserted, in the world today, most states 'cannot cope "neatly" with ethnic reality short of disposing of it by expulsion, extermination, ghettoisation, forcible assimilation and other methods now widely considered to be oppressive, undemocratic, or at least "inelegant"'. Safran maintains that there is a consensus about the existence of ethnic pluralist dilemmas and the danger which they may pose to the stability of the state – 'but there is consensus about little else'. Against this background, Australia has gradually evolved into a society that espouses multiculturalism. The present day Australian nation-state is very different from both its 'closed', descent-based and 'open', yet assimilative, counterparts.

2 Australia and Assimilation

As it celebrated the centenary of its federation, Australia finds itself a great distance from the image of the 'founding fathers' of the nation who drafted its constitution in 1901. The ideology of the newly emerging state was somewhat like that of Germany, in its assumption of a homogenous British character. In fact, 'real' Australians regarded themselves as some kind of regional Britons. A former Prime Minister and one of the founders of Australian Federation, Alfred Deakin was described by Paul Kelly (1999) in the 'Great Australians' series as 'having correctly grasped the character of the new nation as that of Australian-Britons'. The assumed purity of the ancestral stock was preserved (not always successfully) by a discriminatory migration policy. The Aboriginal people, who were basically 'out of sight, out of mind', were deemed to be disappearing or assimilating, partly through the policy of removing children of mixed descent. Thus, while in 1788, the year of European settlement, Aborigines constituted 100% of the population, this proportion declined rapidly to 13% in 1861 and down to 0.8% in 1947. This decline was eventually arrested, with the numbers stabilising at 1% by 1981, and rising (through increased identification, as well as natural growth) to 1.5% by 1986 and 2% in 1996 (Price, 1989, p. 62; Hugo, 2001, pp. 134, 197).

After the Second World War came the massive immigration of Eastern Europeans, such as Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, then Northern Europeans, mainly Dutch and Germans, and later the immigrants from Southern Europe, followed by Lebanese and Vietnamese, South Americans, and still later by Bosnians and Timorese and many other groups. Under the impact of such an inflow of diverse peoples, it became impossible to regard the Australian population as originating solely from British stock. While at the end of Second World War, only 10% of the population were born overseas (mostly in Britain), by 1999, 24% were overseas born. And the composition of the new arrivals also altered dramatically. While in 1947, 81% of the settlers came from English-speaking countries, by 1999 only 39% came from this source. During the 1960s, Britain still supplied 51% of the settlers, with others coming mainly from Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Germany and Malta. By 1990s, no more than 12% came from Britain itself, with the other main source countries being New Zealand, China (including Hong Kong), Vietnam, the Philippines, South Africa and the countries of former Yugoslavia. The 'migrant' nature of the Australian population ('the greatest migrant nation in the world' according to former Prime Minister Robert Hawke) is also shown by the fact that as many as 27% of persons born in Australia had at least one parent born overseas, so that, when taken together, these first and second generation migrant Australians now account for one-half of the population (51%) (Trewin, 2001, p. 153).

Initially, this multitude of peoples were expected to conform to the country's assimilation policy. If all the people could not be of British stock, then they should at least behave like British–Australians. This supposition was built on the idea that all cultures, other than British, were to be abandoned. People of other backgrounds

would have their former cultures thoroughly washed out of them. Such cultural assimilation did not necessarily herald structural assimilation (either at primary or secondary level), since the individual's loss of native culture did not guarantee social or occupational acceptance; certainly not in the case of Aboriginal people, and often not of other 'New Australians' either.

The policy of assimilation did not prove a great success. Some people did not wish to assimilate, and clung tenaciously to their cultures and languages. Others could not assimilate because they were unable to 'disappear' and sink into oblivion within the 'mainstream'. They possessed various physical, linguistic and cultural markers that prevented their total absorption. The most sustained effort made to assimilate these 'cultural others' was through their children's schooling. The school became the agency of assimilation by excluding from the curriculum all material which did not conform to Anglo-conformist norms. This process was carried further through the devaluation of other cultures and languages. The school not only chose to withhold any information about Polish, Greek or Italian or Chinese cultures, but also was often derogatory towards the teaching of those cultures and languages which the children received from 'ethnic schools' run by the immigrant communities out of school hours, and from their own meagre resources.

There is an accumulation of research data which show the difficulties experienced by 'migrant children' as they tried to balance out their parents' emphasis on maintaining the language and culture of the 'home' country and the school's policy of uncompromising enforcement of the mainstream Anglo–Australian ways (Clyne, 1991; Smolicz, 1999; Smolicz and Secombe, 2005). Although many of the cultural groups began to shrink under the impact of the assimilationist pressures (Clyne & Kipp, 1997), there was also a growing resistance to assimilation and refusal to disappear into the Anglo-dominated mainstream (Smolicz & Secombe, 1989; Smolicz & Secombe, 2005).

3 Emergence of Australian Multiculturalism

In the era of assimilation, Australian policy resembled that of present day France in that it upheld the principles of a political democracy for all those granted permanent residence. The new arrivals were encouraged to apply for citizenship, and gained civic equity by becoming part of the electorate in a parliamentary democracy. But there was no cultural equity. This began to change over the 1970s with the gradual adoption of the policy of multiculturalism (Smolicz, 1997). These changes were precipitated by the 1967 referendum which gave the Aboriginal population full civic rights, and brought the Aboriginal issue onto the agenda. Multiculturalism arrived through the work of the Fraser government, following its initial advocacy by Grassby in the Whitlam government. The arrival, in 1972, of substantial numbers of Asian immigrants, mainly Vietnamese, finally broke the White Australia Policy, the barrier that hindered the full implementation of multicultural policy in Australia.

The Australian conceptualisation of multiculturalism has assumed the existence of an overarching framework of shared values within which different cultures co-existed and interacted with one another. The various ethnic groups were permitted, even encouraged, to activate their own core cultural values, provided they were within the framework of shared values, such as political democracy, rule of law, market economy and English as a shared language.

Debate still persists, however, about the degree of change that the framework can sustain. Interpretations have varied according to the degree of multiculturalism that the people concerned have been prepared to accept. Some have perceived the shared cultural framework to be essentially dynamic in its capacity to adjust to existing, as well as future, complexities in the population. They have pointed to the fact that the framework has already proved its flexibility through the belated political incorporation of Aboriginal-Australians, and the abolition of the White Australian Policy, sealed by the acceptance of the Vietnamese refugees (Jupp, 2001), even if much remains to be achieved in the sphere of 'reconciliation' between the descendants of immigrants and the indigenous population. 'Multicultural sceptics', afraid of fragmentation, have argued for a much more limited notion of plurality and have preferred the framework to be grounded mainly in Anglo-Celtic core values (Bullivant, 1981; Blainey, 1984). Minority cultures were then expected to contribute only peripherally, chiefly in relation to food and the celebration of colourful customs and festivals. In spite of such doubts, the multicultural model has been sustained and officially affirmed by formal resolutions passed in the Houses of Parliament and by statements of the Governor-General of Australia (Deane, 1997).

4 Australian Cultural Diversity

In its current form, multiculturalism recognises the reality of cultural differences, exemplified by the fact that Australians are not all of one ancestry or all of the same religion. While people of British descent are still in a clear majority, there is a growing recognition of the presence of the indigenous inhabitants and the increasing proportion of Australians of non-British, and particularly of Asian backgrounds.

Charles Price (1989, p. 62) has calculated the 'ethnic strength' of Australian population according to descent or ancestry. The overall proportion of British descent has declined from 90% in 1947 to 75% in 1987 and 70% in 1999 (approximately 45% English, 15% Irish and under 10% Scottish, with smaller proportions of Welsh and Cornish). At the same time, the proportion of other Europeans went up from 7.5% in 1947 to over 18% in 1999, while 'Asian' increased from 0.3% to 6.4%, with an additional 2.5% of West Asian (Middle Eastern) origin (Hugo, 2001:181).

The Asian ethnic strength has grown under the impact of an increased number of Asian-born new arrivals which has fluctuated markedly, peaking over 1988–1989 (55,700) and 1990–1991 (60,900). In 1998–1999, 21,800 settlers (26% of the total) arrived from Asia. It is of interest to note that during the same time the number of long-term visitor arrivals from Asia has also been increasing, with some 72% of them

being students. Their number reached 53,500 in 1998, or 45% of the total arrivals, nine times as high as in 1978–1979 and three times as high as in 1988–1989 (Trewin, 2001, p. 151).

The change in ancestry is paralleled by a greater diversification of Australians' religious beliefs, with the adherents of Anglican Church falling from 40% of the proportion in 1901 to 22% in 1996, while Catholics increased their proportion from 23% to 27%. Over the last 20 years, there has also been a growth of non-Christian religions (3.5% in 1996), with Hinduism increasing by 55%, Buddhism by 43% and Islam by 36%. The most remarkable, however, has been the growth of those who stated that they had no religion (from 0.4% in 1901 to 17% in 1996) or those who indicated no affiliation with any religion (an increase from 2% to 9% in the same period). Overall almost one-quarter of the current population are not affiliated with any religion, showing the growing secularisation and diversification of the Australian people.

Diversity of ancestry and religion is matched by Australia's linguistic pluralism. English became dominant colonial language from the time of European settlement in 1788, but it was implanted upon an Aboriginal society, which was itself multilingual. It has been estimated that before European settlement there existed some 250 Australian indigenous languages, as well as some 600 dialects. By 1900, about 100,000 indigenous people still spoke their own language, but by 1996, there remained no more than 44,000 people (14% of the total Aboriginal population) who spoke either an Australian indigenous language or an Australian creole (a language derived from pidgin English). Multicultural policies have altered the climate of values in Australia, making it much more positive to preserving indigenous languages, with 48 of them listed in the 1996 census. The downward slide in the use of these 'Languages of Australia' (a term currently preferred by the Indigenous Australians) has not been arrested, however, so that even the most widely spoken language, Arrente, had no more than 3,500 speakers in 1996.

While no data on language use were collected until 1976, information on 'race and nationality' suggests that Chinese languages and German were the most commonly spoken immigrant languages other than English (LOTE) before federation in 1901. A number of private Lutheran schools, with German as the language of instruction, were established over the nineteenth century, but these were either closed down or obliged to change to English at the time of First World War in 1915 (Clyne, 1985; Selleck, 1980). There was rapid expansion in the number of languages spoken in Australia following the massive European and Asian migration after the Second World War. It was not until end of 1970s, however, that most state parliaments repealed laws that forbade the use of LOTE as medium of instruction in non-government schools. In 1996, about 2.5 million people (16% of the population 5 years and over) spoke a language other than English at home (an increase from 14% in 1986). In all, over 200 languages were spoken with the leading five, Italian, Greek, Chinese, Arabic and Vietnamese, each having over 100,000 speakers. These 'LOTE' are mainly spoken by first generation Australians (i.e., those born overseas) (74%), while 26% are Australian-born speakers, showing a growing tendency to maintain LOTE over more than one generation.

Acceptance of multiculturalism as the official policy has enabled Australia to take the lead and become one of the first countries to launch a National Policy on Languages. Recognising that different ethnic identities are often rooted in their specific languages, the Lo Bianco Report (Bianco, 1987) proposed that the education system should provide for students to learn English and at least one other language, which could be either a minority ethnic language, often labelled as 'community language other than English', or a foreign language. Under this policy, students at school would be encouraged (indeed, in South Australia, required up to year 10 from 2007) to study a language other than English. Minority young people were thus being given the opportunity to participate in the mainstream of Australian life, while acquiring literacy in other tongues, some of which they already spoke in their homes, but which they could also use in businesses in Australia and with trading partners overseas. This approach has given rise to a more positive image of Australian bilinguals in the role of cultural bridges that can link different communities within Australia with those overseas, thus conferring important economic as well as socio-cultural benefits upon the country. Such possibilities have put paid to objections about the continued existence of LOTE on the ground that they would supplant English. In fact, research evidence points to the fact that English has been accepted unquestioningly as the shared language for all Australians, with over 80% of LOTE speakers claiming to know English 'well' or 'very well' in the 1996 census (Trewin, 2001, p. 165).

5 Core Values in a Multicultural Nation-State

By rejecting both the German- and French-type monistic nation-state models, Australia has embraced a level of political and cultural co-existence, whereby people are accepted from different backgrounds on their own cultural terms. One of the indications of the sustainability of Australian multiculturalism has been the extent to which Australian citizens can at present retain aspects of their non-British cultural heritage and descent and be accepted as fully Australian, i.e., as authentic members of the Australian nation and state. One issue which has been causing some concern is the fact that there are certain British 'markers' which have been almost invariably accepted as simply 'normal', whereas markers from other origins have tended to be used as labels that single out and differentiate minorities. An obvious one is that of physical appearance. Apprehension has long persisted as to the danger that Australians of Aboriginal or Asian origin, for example, could be subject to racial labelling or even discrimination. There is also the danger of other forms of discrimination which are not based on physical appearance but may exist on the grounds of difference in culture, language, religion, family structure, the clothes worn or the food eaten. In the past incidents were reported concerning, for example, the difficulties experienced at school by children of Southern or Eastern European background on account of such apparently innocuous items as the 'smelly' lunches which they brought to school. A number of adults have recalled how, as children,

they threw their lunches in the bin, despite their mother's efforts to give the 'best' their home cultures taught them. This was in response to other children making them feel ashamed of being different. Although those are stories from the past assimilationist era, there still remains a degree of sensitivity about 'labelling' on the grounds of culture, which can be referred to as *cultural racism*, *ethnicism* or *linguism*.

The danger of such possible pitfalls has become more widely understood in Australia, with the education system devising programs that demonstrate to the students that, in order to survive and develop as a nation along multicultural lines, the country needs more than the common political machinery of the democratic state. It requires also the cultivation and sustained growth of cultural values that extend beyond political structures and not only reflect the majority group's values, but also take account of the minority group's aspirations to maintain their cultural identity. Different ethnic groups experience a diverse range of values which they regard as essential for their continuity and integrity. Some groups are language-centred and, in the absence of their native tongue, their cultural vitality is endangered; they become residualised and lose their powers of creativity and development. Polish, Greek, French and Baltic groups can be regarded as belonging to this category. Others are clearly linked to religion, as in the particular case of Malays' allegiance to Islam, so that its loss endangers the individuals' membership of the group concerned.

Other cultures are cantered around family or clan structure and the concern to perpetuate the group's descent. Some groups are fortunate in having a multiple set of core values, for example, an ethno-specific language, religion and a supporting collectivist family structure to maintain their identity (Smolicz, Hudson, & Secombe, 2001; Smolicz & Secombe, 2005).The maintenance of such values in a multicultural setting presupposes cultural interaction among the groups, involving an exchange process, rather than simply one way traffic favouring one group to the detriment of another. Such a dynamic process, which proceeds through a degree of cultural synthesis, diffusion and co-existence, takes place within the framework of the shared overarching values to which all groups are entitled to make their particular contribution. In such a setting, minority groups have no fear of losing their essential cultural elements and hence cease to have any inclination towards fragmentation and separatism. The mutual confidence in a sustainable multicultural structure permits all groups to direct their creative power to constructive pursuits and ensure the resilience of the state.

From a comparative perspective, the achievement of Australia can be judged best on the extent to which it has been able to engage in a process of reshaping itself by attempting to recognise its own plurality and by demonstrating that tolerance of diversity and gradually emerging pluralist policies in languages and culture education are a better guarantee of stability than enforced rapid assimilation to one dominant language and culture. An idealised multicultural model, to which Australia aspires, is free from the divisions that are most difficult to bridge, as when one particular religion is made mandatory or when racial or ancestral characteristics are regarded as exclusion markers that set the limits of nationhood. In order to reinforce these multicultural goals, Australia has established an array of anti-discriminatory State and Federal legislation, with an active role assigned to the ombudsmen. Such

structures have been augmented by sustained educational efforts to propagate school curriculum which condemned all forms of racism, whether based upon appearance, language, customs or religion. Australian states have developed programs of 'Countering Racism through Developing Cultural Understanding', which demonstrate that while it will never be possible for all Australians to look alike, practise the same religion, live in the same type of family household or relish the same kind of food, all these practices need to be understood and accepted as compatible with the Australian nationhood and requiring the same respect and protection. The affirmation of this principle by successive governments is reassuring – always with the proviso that the cultural practices concerned are carried out within the Australian constitution and legal system and within the dynamic overarching framework of shared values.

6 Cultural Diversity and Human Rights: An Evaluation

To what extent has Australia succeeded in resolving some of the essential contradictions within its idealised multicultural model? The difficulties in reconciling cultural diversity with good governance arise out of the paradox that a democratic Australia generates both the 'policies of difference' and the 'policies of universality'. The balance between these two facets of contemporary Australian society must take into account differences in ethnicity, religion and other aspects of culture, within its legal and constitutional structures which are based on belief in the universality and indivisibility of common human rights. Such dilemmas at the heart of Australian multiculturalism persist, and they find their reflection in most culturally plural countries. In Australia, they are subjected to a democratic debate in the press and in parliament with the objective of finding the balance of minority rights and shared values – of particularity and universality. It is a dilemma which extends well beyond the borders of Australia, up to the seeming contradiction between the universality of individual human rights and the diversity of cultures and civilizations.

In the context of Australia, Justice Michael Kirby (Kirby, 1998) of the High Court has helped towards the resolution of some these issues by insisting on the *inter-dependence* of political, economic, social, cultural and linguistic rights. He has pointed out that Western perceptions of human rights have changed over time. For example, the notion of political suffrage in Western countries did not extend to women or to some ethnic and racial minorities until quite recently. What is more, many minority groups throughout the world, particularly those of indigenous origin, are still denied access to the full range of human rights. Kirby concluded that in the matter of human rights, 'the Voyage of Discovery, which the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1950) initiated, is far from complete'.

Since 1967, when indigenous inhabitants received equal civil rights, all citizens can exercise full political and legal rights as Australians, irrespective of their cultural background, descent or length of lineage in this country. The granting of political rights to Aboriginal Australian did not, however, on its own, make adequate

recompense for the past, nor provide any acknowledgement of the Aboriginal people's unique cultural heritage. Only over recent years, and in the climate of worldwide concern with indigenous rights on the part of international organisations, has Australia become actively involved in the process of 'Reconciliation' with Aboriginal Australians. There has been a rising consciousness of the need to make amends for the past appropriation of the land and destruction of so many aspects of indigenous culture.

For many Aboriginal people, assimilation to the point of vanishing into the 'mainstream' has not been a practical proposition. What is more, some of them did not wish to 'vanish'. Their lack of gratitude to the assimilation offer that was extended after years of separation and domination astounded many Australians, as many Aboriginal people persisted in their quest for Australianness in their own particular Aboriginal way, including the activation of their languages and cultural heritage, which directly involved their ancestral land.

The High Court rulings that legally dismantled the notion of 'terra nullius', or the view of Australia as an 'empty' land that Europeans could occupy and use at will; the refusal to extinguish Aboriginal rights to their ancestral land which was currently leased to pastoralists; the setting up of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission enabling Aboriginal Australians to have a voice in their own affairs; and finally the setting up of Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, have opened the way to achieving the sought for Reconciliation. Central to this process has been the recognition that human rights for Aboriginal Australians cannot be achieved without full appreciation of indigenous cultural heritage and tradition. In this sense, Reconciliation is intimately linked with the UN *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

On the occasion of 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration, Justice Kirby spoke of the need for its update, without diminishing the universality of fundamental human rights that it enshrined. When applied to Australia, these are embodied in parliamentary democracy and equal civic rights for all citizens. The acknowledgement by the Asia-Pacific NGO for World Conference on Human Rights (1992) that 'universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures' makes it possible to develop a model of Human Rights for Australia which links both Multiculturalism and Reconciliation.

In the *Tree Model* (see Appendix Diagram 1), the tree trunk represents the civic and political rights portrayed as the indivisible and universal aspects of Australian democracy. The branches of the 'tree' illustrate the different cultural rights of all the diverse groups that make up Australian society, including Aboriginal Australians. The model shows the linkage between respects for religious human rights with those involving the rights to land because of the Aboriginal spirituality that connects the two. Similarly, it demonstrates how respect for the family collectivism in Aboriginal life highlights the grief currently being expressed by the elderly people who were victims of the policy of removing children of European fathers from their Aboriginal mothers and transferring them to orphanages or foster families.

The successful outcome of the Reconciliation process with indigenous Australians through the recognition of their human rights, shared with all Australians in their



Appendix Diagram 1 The tree model of human rights

civic and political aspects, while permitting diversity in their cultural manifestations, has implication for Australian multiculturalism as it applies to all groups. The model demonstrates particularly well the need for flexibility and dynamic nature of the overarching framework if it is to accommodate the needs of all Australians, including the Aboriginal people. Their previous exclusion has impoverished the nation.

Their current inclusion enriches it and broadens the dimensions of permitted particularities within the framework of universal human rights.

The same type of framework could be adopted by other culturally plural countries, including those in Central and Eastern Europe, as they strive to harmonise their cultural diversity with a stable and resilient nation-state that adheres to the principles of universal human rights. As the 'Tree Model' indicates, some rights are indeed indispensable in a democratic state. These include civic, political and cultural rights, as indicated by the 'trunk' in the 'tree diagram'. The cultural rights however need not conform to a single pattern, with the 'crown' of the tree assuming different configurations, depending on the cultural traditions of the groups that make the nation and their members' current aspirations.

7 Conclusion

The ultimate success of the Australian multicultural achievement and cultural diversity in a globalised world lies in the fact that the various cultural branches can grow freely, while ensuring that no single one can crowd out the others and that their development occurs harmoniously within a unifying and flexible framework underpinned by the UN *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

References

Bianco, L. (1987). *Report to Commonwealth Department of Education: National Policy on Languages*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Bullivant, B. M. (1981). *The pluralist dilemma in education*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Clyne, M. (1985). Multilingual Melbourne nineteenth century style. *Journal of Australian Studies, 17*, 65–81.

Clyne, M. (1991). *Community languages: The Australian experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clyne, M., & Kipp, S. (1997). Trends and changes in home and language shift in Australia. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 18*, 451–473.

Deane, W. (1997). Multiculturalism our way. *Multicultural Life,* Volume 2:3. Adelaide:

Hugo, G. (2001). A century of population change in Australia. In D. Trewin (Ed.), *2001 Year Book Australia* (Vol. 83, pp. 169–210). Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon and Schuter.

Jupp, J. (2001). *The Australian people: An encyclopedia of the nation, its people and their origins*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirby, M. (1998). *The universal declaration for human rights: Fifty years on*. Sydney: Australian National Commission for UNESCO, (December 5th).

Ozdowski, S. (2005). Human rights: A report card for Australia. *Political Crossroads, 12*(1), 71–92.

Price, C. A. (1989). *Ethnic groups in Australia*. Canberra: Australian Immigration Research Centre.

Safran, W. (1995). Nations, ethnic groups, states and politics: A preface and an agenda. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 1*(1), 1–10.

Selleck, R. J. W. (1980). The trouble with my looking glass: A study of the attitude to Australians to Germans during the Great War. *Journal of Australian Studies, 6*, 1–25.

Smolicz, J. J. (1997). Australia: From migrant country to multicultural nation. *International Migration Review, 31*(1), 164–186.

Smolicz, J. J. (1998). Globalism, nation-state and local cultures. *Political Crossroads, 6*(1&2), 111–128.

Smolicz, J. J. (1999). Core values and cultural identity. In M. J. Secombe & J. Zajda (Eds.), *J. J. Smolicz on education and culture* (pp. 105–123). Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Smolicz, J. J., & Secombe, M. J. (1989). Types of language activation in an ethnically plural society. In U. Ammon (Ed.), *Status and function of languages and language varieties* (pp. 478–514). Berlin & New York: de Gruyter.

Smolicz, J. J., & Secombe, M. (2005). Globalisation, cultural diversity and multiculturalism: Australia. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *The international handbook of globalisation and education policy research*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Smolicz, J. J., Hudson, D. M., & Secombe, M. J. (2001). Family collectivism and minority languages as core values of culture among ethnic groups in Australia. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 22*(2), 152–172.

Trewin, D. (ed.) (2001). *2001 year book Australia*, No. 83, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Zajda, J. (ed.) (2005). *The international handbook of globalisation and education policy research.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J. (2007). Living together: Globalisation, education and intercultural dialogue. *Political Crossroads, 14*(1), 37–49.

Peace Education as Cosmopolitan and Deliberative Democratic Pedagogy

Klas Roth

1 Introduction

Peace education and a culture of peace are promoted by institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The General Assembly of the UN has designated 2001–2010 as the international decade of peace and non-violence for the world's children (UNESCO-mainstreaming, The Culture of Peace, http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/uk/uk_sum_cp.htm). Principals, teachers and students around the world are affected by this, and many are trying to realise the aims of these institutions, that is, they are participating in the effort to reduce conflicts, to achieve a culture of peace and perhaps even perpetual peace within and between nation-states through non-violent techniques in education. However, it is not clear how we should understand the concept of peace education or a culture of peace. Should it be cosmopolitan and promote deliberative democratic procedures? The concepts involved are unclear and may confuse both our use of them and our understanding of their effects. Unqualified use seems to support normalising tendencies in relation to the UN and UNESCO or majority cultures within nation-states, thus not necessarily promoting democratic deliberation or cosmopolitanism. I present a critique of such normalising tendencies and argue that a cosmopolitan view and democratic deliberation offer a more full-fledged view of peace education and a culture of peace. I begin by differentiating between different kinds of relations in which conflict can occur. Secondly, I discuss whether and in what sense peace education is futile. Thirdly, I discuss the normalising tendencies of peace education and the promotion of a culture of peace within nation-states. Finally, I put forward some ideas for peace education as cosmopolitan and deliberative democratic.

K. Roth (✉)
Stockholm Institute of Education
e-mail: klas.roth@ped.su.se

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_4,

2 Relations of Conflict

People live in worlds of actual and possible conflict. Conflicts occur in two kinds of relations among humans: the relation to the other and the relation to ourselves. (Many would say that people also have a relation to God, which can be a relation of conflict too, though I will not discuss it here. Further, they have a relation to the outer physical world. However, individuals cannot be in conflict with the physical world, since we cannot communicate with it in the sense that we can get a reasonable linguistic and understandable response from it, which reveals its intentions to us. Hence, conflicts cannot arise from 'distortion in communication' with the physical.) Thus, people can be in conflict with each other concerning their interests, beliefs and values. Two individuals can, for example, express the same *interest* in a certain woman. They know that they cannot both marry her; only one of them will be her husband. People also express different *beliefs* about the effects of a certain event. One woman may believe that she would choose him if he buys her roses, which he knows she loves, and so he buys her roses and hopes that she will choose him as her husband. The other believes that she will choose him if he cares for her and shows her love and affection through the way he relates to her generally, not only through what he buys her. The two may also express different *values* about how you ought to relate to others. The first man may value a strategic way of relating to a woman, thinking that he would achieve his aim by satisfying his beloved's interests and preferences. The second man may show her love and communicate with her, show her understanding and care for her as a person and human being, and not only as a woman whom he could use to satisfy his needs and interests.

People also understand that conflicts may also be possible *in principle*. They can, for example, imagine two individuals being in conflict with each other, and that they themselves can be in conflict with themselves. This gives a state of possible if not actual conflict even if people tried to, or believed they could, ignore it. Hence, to ignore conflicts can itself be a source of conflicts. This suggests that if people want to diminish conflicts, perhaps even to deal better with their source, they should not ignore them or the source of their force. Many people do battle with conflicts in their minds and with those between individuals and groups, sometimes seeking professional help. People, working in trans-national and nation-state institutions, cope with problems and conflicts concerning minorities, refugees and terrorism. They work with different kinds of actual and possible situations in which conflicts can occur: the job situation and the situation for the very poor, with xenophobia, racism and religious fundamentalism among the myriad of conflicts and the sources of their force.

3 Peace Education – a Futile Aim?

It seems reasonable that people should not just accept conflicts as they are, and that we can try to understand the sources of their force. Habermas (2003a, p. 35) says:

> … conflicts arise from *distortion in communication*, from misunderstanding and incomprehension, from insincerity and deception …. The spiral of violence begins as a spiral of distorted communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal mistrust, to the breakdown of communication. If violence thus begins with a distortion in communication, after it has erupted it is possible to know what has gone wrong and what needs to be repaired.

Even though people in the West live in fairly well-ordered and peaceful societies, communication between individuals and groups is permeated by structural violence, strategic action and manipulation. People can, however, develop a greater sensitivity and a critical reflexive approach towards modes of communication with the other and with themselves, in which they can achieve deeper understanding and possibly also revise their distorted self-images and images of the other. People can also widen their perspectives by intersubjectively sharing their understanding in dialogical encounters in which the meanings of utterances are assigned to the intention of the speaker in a mode characterised by care, solidarity, reflection and criticality.

To accept conflicts as they are seems to suggest that there are good reasons for all concerned to accept them, whether conflicts are harmful, or lead to injustice or decreased possibilities to understand or critically reflect upon them. Acceptance also suggests that individuals do not or should not attempt to find alternative solutions to conflicts or ways of understanding and dealing with their sources. Habermas (1992, pp. 65–66) argues – convincingly to my mind – that persons should accept whatever concerns them as morally justified if and only if the consequences are accepted by all concerned and motivated by the force of the better argument, as participants in democratic deliberation. If they are not given good reason as participants in deliberative democratic procedures, *conflicts* or their *effects* should not be accepted as valid. It is most likely that many conflicts are not legitimised by all concerned or motivated by the force of the better argument; and that not all participants have deliberated the conflicts, their histories, reasons or effects, on an equal footing.

A conflict and its effects raise certain validity claims either implicitly or explicitly, and a specific validity claim cannot be restricted to either the person raising it or the family or any other group – or a specific nation-state – since validity can be understood as something communicatively and intersubjectively legitimised (Roth, 2000). The validity of the following utterance: ‘A conflict and its effects on people ought to be accepted as they are by all concerned’ correlates to the two kinds of relations mentioned earlier, i.e., to the other(s) and to you. Normally, people evaluate the righteousness or sincerity of using an utterance by examining the reason given for it. However, since different people view righteousness differently in different social and cultural worlds, and individuals are not always sincere, they cannot always assume from the outset case that people are sincere and have legitimate intentions or reasons for every action or conflict and its consequences; or want to declare them to each other. This suggests that the validity of a specific conflict and its actual and possible effects ought to be evaluated in relation to the speaker’s intention or the reason given for it. It also suggests that a deliberative democratic process ought to be the medium through which utterances and their reasons are evaluated and determined acceptable by the force of the better argument. If actual and possible

conflicts and their effects have not been evaluated through the medium of such processes and determined acceptable, by those concerned, through the force of the better argument, then they cannot reasonably be said to have been argumentatively legitimised by practically all concerned.

Hence, people cannot take it for granted that conflicts and their effects are argumentatively legitimised, or ever will be, by all concerned. It seems, therefore, that conflicts and their effects cannot be said to be justified by those concerned unless they can evaluate, in democratic deliberative procedures, the reasons given. Does this mean that peace or peace education is futile? Let me note – as suggested above – that it seems reasonable not to ignore conflicts or accept them or the way(s) they are being understood as valid without investigating whether they are motivated by those concerned through the force of the better argument. Peace education and a culture of peace – purportedly having conflicts in focus and their possible resolutions – especially those that people try to solve through non-violent democratic deliberation – do not then seem to be futile aims. However, education or a culture with a more positive and stronger aim, i.e., *perpetual peace* as a state of mind and a state of relations between at least two people in which all actual conflicts are or could be resolved, such an education *is* futile. It is a positive Utopia, and an impossible aim in the sense that we never could achieve such a state of harmony among all living and future human beings. As long as people express different interests, beliefs and values and it is possible to interpret utterances differently, peace as a state of mind and relationship between at least two people is not really an achievable goal. People and nation-states *do* express differences and relate to one other in different ways. It is not even possible that all people should ever come to embrace the same values and beliefs. This will be so at least as long as the utterances people use can be interpreted differently. Davidson (2004, p. 13) says:

> Thought is creative because of our ability to combine a limited repertoire of concepts in a potentially infinite number of ways.

This suggests that we can combine an infinite number of sentences, but also *conflicting* sentences. However, while individuals can create an infinite number of sentences, they are not always or everywhere permitted or entitled to do so. We learn from history that efforts to make people embrace the same or similar beliefs, knowledge and values – for example within nation-states – have in many cases and places meant, and still mean, people being assimilated or killed, tortured or forced to accept permanent marginalisation (Kymlicka, 2002, pp. 326–376). We can also learn that people, especially non-members of a nation-state's majority culture, have not been given and are not being given the same or similar political, civil and social rights as full members enjoy. We can further learn that education within nation-states with a strong assimilationist culture has been used and is still being used to initiate children and young people into the majority culture (Roth, 2000). Yet further, we can learn from the present situation that making the other embrace the same or similar values and beliefs without the other's consent based on the force of the better argument violates his/her freedom and rights.

The solution to the fact that people express their differences is, then, not to make them similar or less different or deny them rights and opportunities to do so.

UNESCO (2002, Article 1), for example, declares the following as a response to issues of difference:

> As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations.
>
> In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. (UNESCO 2002, Article 2)

It is argued that since diversity is necessary for biodiversity, diversity among human is also necessary for humankind. This, however, does not follow logically from the assertion that diversity is necessary for biodiversity. It has, for example, to be shown that biodiversity includes humankind. But there is no argument given for this, and I am not convinced that the association is successful, since it cannot reasonably be assumed that plants interact harmoniously as human beings can. Only humans are capable of interacting harmoniously and can understand and express their differences as well as what they have in common. Nature, however, does not communicate its intentions to us humans in ways which we can understand. Hence, humans cannot assume that the ascribed necessity is the same in both cases. However, humankind expresses difference in various ways. It has then to be shown why and how people ought to respond to this. In the next section, I formulate such an argument.

4 A Culture of Peace and Peace Education, and Their Normalising Tendencies

How then should people handle the issue of difference and conflict? Are non-violent ways of relating to each other the best way? In 1795, slightly revised in 1796, Kant (1983) published his essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in which he envisaged perpetual peace in a world republic and a cosmopolitan ideal of world citizenship. He believed, according to Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (1997, p. 3), that:

> … a world republic is "the one rational way to achieve peace," but [Kant] maintains that peace will be attained through the inevitable spread of the institutional and legal structure of a "peaceful federation" among independent republican states, each of which respects the basic rights of it citizens and establishes a public sphere in which people can regard themselves and others as free and equal "citizens of the world."

For Kant, this would require an educated, enlightened and critical world public, which would work towards perpetual peace and cosmopolitan right, limited to the conditions of universal hospitality, i.e., 'the right of an alien not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another's country' (Kant, 1983, p. 118). Philosophers, however, have rejected Kant's view of a single world republic, and Habermas (1997, p. 127) claims that any 'fundamental conceptual revision of Kant's proposal

ought to focus on three aspects: (1) the external sovereignty of states and the changed nature of relations among them, (2) the internal sovereignty of states and the normative limitations of classical power politics, and (3) the stratification of world society and a globalisation of dangers which make it necessary for us to rethink what we mean by "peace"'. Habermas also argues against Kant and his idea of a justification of norms in terms of the categorical imperative. Even the monological interpretation of the cosmopolitan ideal suggested by Kant and his ideas of a monological justification of norms in terms of the categorical imperative is abandoned. Instead, an intersubjectivistic, deliberative, democratic and evaluative procedure as a cosmopolitan ideal, and its outcomes motivated by the force of the better argument, is envisaged (Habermas, 1992, pp. 195–215, 1995, 2003b).

I believe that the cosmopolitan ideal and deliberative democratic processes need to be addressed in (peace) education, as does the importance of clarifying our understanding of peace, peace education and non-violent techniques (see also Salomon and Nevo, 2002 for a discussion on the concept of peace education, its principles and practices around the world). Today, many people in, e.g., democratic education, civic education, citizenship education, feminist education, multicultural education and the philosophy of education directly or indirectly support the idea of education for peace and that such education should be non-violent. However, they do not agree upon the means, nor on what we should acknowledge in order to achieve such an aim. Gur-Zeév (2001, p. 315), for example, asserts that proponents of peace education 'manifest good will but little theoretical coherence or philosophical elaboration concerning the propositions, aims, methods, and evaluation of their effects and their meaning'. Proponents of democratic education usually acknowledge formal aspects such as rights and principles for decision-making procedures, and some for evaluative procedures sustaining understanding among participants. Civic educationalists usually focus on the virtues needing development among participants in education. Proponents of citizenship education concentrate on epistemic aspects as well as virtues, and some on democratic procedures. Feminist writers acknowledge constructionist approaches to identity constructions and the misrecognition of gender, especially the misrecognition of female identity. Multiculturalists on the other hand focus on different identities such as ethnic, religious and cultural and not only gender; and on how different identities are misrecognised in different social situations. Philosophers of education suggest different views of criticality and other issues. They disagree whether criticality should be understood in terms of neo-Marxism, Foucault-inspired analyses, pragmatism, critical thinking, Habermas's discourse ethics or whatever (Roth, 2006). While many in these fields do agree upon a general approach in education in terms of peace, there is no specific agreement on how to understand peace itself or the ways it should be reached – or whether it is possible.

Even trans-national institutions such as the UNs and UNESCO which promote peace education and non-violence lack any clear definition of 'peace education' or the concept 'culture of peace'. The General Assembly agreed a declaration on a culture of peace and a programme of action thereon (United Nations, Resolution 53/243. Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace), and declared

that 'since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed' (ibid, p. 1). Their resolution on a *Culture of Peace* emphasises that 'peace not only is the absence of conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation' (ibid, p. 2) and that people ought to recognise 'the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance, including those based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status' (ibid, p. 2). However, it seems futile to believe that people in general can ever 'eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance' as argued earlier. Such an approach would require that they agree or could come to agree upon how this ought to be done and upon their definitions of discrimination and intolerance. This is problematic, as shown above. Other problems are related to the definition of the 'culture of peace' declared by the UN and UNESCO. The UN declares in its resolution 53/243, Article 1, that 'A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life' (ibid, p. 2), and UNESCO (http://www.unac.org/peacecp/intro/index.html) declares the following:

> The expression "Culture of Peace" implies that peace means much more than the absence of war. Peace is considered as a set of values, attitudes and modes of behaviours promoting the peaceful settlement of conflict and the quest for mutual understanding. In fact, peace is one way to live together. The expression "Culture of Peace" presumes that peace is a way of being, doing and living in society that can be taught, developed, and best of all, improved upon.
>
> The culture of peace is peace in action. Introducing such a culture is a long-term process requiring both a transformation of institutional practices and individual modes of behaviour. Finally, in order to survive and become entrenched in our values, a culture of peace requires non-violence, tolerance and solidarity.

The expression 'a culture of peace' is defined in terms of peace which would enable individuals to 'resolve conflict peacefully' and which would promote 'the peaceful settlement of conflict and the quest for mutual understanding'. However, the definition includes the concept which is supposed to be defined, and is thus circular. UNESCO's definition also focuses too heavily on behaviouristic changes, but not on the necessity of understanding the intention and speakers' beliefs. Further, the use of UNESCO's definition may promote peace education within nation-states without necessarily taking account of cosmopolitan issues. Understanding cannot, however, be reduced to behavioural terminology in relation to the other or yourself. It necessitates intention by the speaker, and that the hearer assigns the *speaker's* intention to the meaning of the utterance.

An essential part of a definition of peace education is the concept of understanding, which, however, is not properly noted in the definition, suggested in UN resolution 53/243 and by UNESCO (see also Fountain, 1999 for a discussion on the definition suggested by UN and UNICEF). It is not enough that people agree upon using the following concepts: 'peace', 'peace education', 'culture of peace' and 'non-violent education'. They also need to be clear about the definitions of the concepts as such or as Wittgenstein (1978, VI–39) put it: 'It is essential for communication that we

agree in a large number of judgments'. This requires, he asserts, that people agree on both the use of judgment and the definition thereof.

Success in communicating the terms mentioned does not, however, depend on behavioural changes in those concerned. It requires understanding that the hearer assigns the meaning of utterances to the intention of the speaker (Glüer, 2001, p. 55). Success in communicating utterances, including the concepts mentioned, depends on whether the intended meaning is understood by the interpreter. Meaningful utterances are particular actions by specific speakers in specific situations at particular times, the intended meaning of which is recognised by the hearer. This suggests that understanding another person's utterance, i.e., the use of utterance, necessitates a holistic approach to the interests, beliefs and values attached to such use as well as other thoughts expressed in sentences by the speaker. Since thoughts depend on each other, sentences too depend holistically on each other. This in turn suggests that individuals recognise how persons employ concepts in sentences and the use of sentences in relation to other sentences and in specific situations (Davidson, 2004, p. 9); and also how speakers attribute 'meaning' to the concepts and sentences employed.

Moreover, the normativity of the definitions suggested by UN and UNESCO is problematic. The meaning, i.e., the use of utterances – including the concepts mentioned – is supposed to be determined by the rules, norms and conventions set up by, e.g., the UN or UNESCO, or by the majority culture within nation-states. A correct use would then be in agreement with the rules, etc., in relation to those institutions or that majority culture and an incorrect use would not be in agreement therewith. If individuals forget how to use or doubt the use of utterances including the asserted concepts of peace, etc., they have recourse to the force of rightness-in-use by considering how the institutions or the majority culture within nation-states use the concepts, and then use them in the same or similar way. People who did so would use such utterances or expressions regularly, correctly and in agreement with the institutional or majority-culture rules. However, semantic correctness says little about the *meanings of utterances*. The prescriptive force of the concepts discussed cannot be derived from how these institutions or the majority culture tell us how to use the concepts. In other words, just by repeating the concepts and utterances as other would use them in relevantly similar situations does not mean that I understand them or can myself use them correctly. People cannot assume from the outset that there is a convention – set up by, for example, the institutions mentioned or the majority culture within nation-states – that assigns (a universal and fixed) meaning to utterances including concepts such as 'peace', 'peace education' and 'non-violence education', which would show the speaker how to go on, and to which he could refer to in order to explain or justify successful communication. The meaning of the concepts under discussion and of utterances in which they occur – the use of them – would then be normatively regulated or determined by the institutions mentioned or by the majority culture within nation-states. The difference between thinking and using utterances correctly would then be decided by the normative force of specific rules, norms or conventions set up by someone, or something, else. However, successful communication and especially deliberative democratic communication

requires that the hearer recognises the speakers' intention. This suggests that successful communication cannot be explained by assigning the same meaning to utterances regardless of who utters them, the situation in which a speaker uses language, and to whom a speaker uses meaningful linguistic expressions. Such communication is, instead, a holistic enterprise which requires that beliefs and intentions are mutually understood and argumentatively justified in practical discourse by in principle all concerned.

The meaning of expressions and their use are *not* normative in the social externalist or conventionalist sense described, above that is that people would use an utterance correct if and only if he/she would use it as others would do in relevantly similar situations. Semantically correct use does not explain or justify the difference between thinking and using an utterance correctly. An individual may very well be thinking he/she is using an utterance correctly and still be using it incorrectly; and vice versa: using the same concepts or utterances as others do does not explain the difference between thinking one is using them correctly and actually using them correctly. Hence, the source of their force is NOT necessarily the norms, rules or conventions regulated by the institutions or the majority culture within nation-states.

Learning or teaching peace and non-violence does not then necessitate that children and young people acquire the ability to use the same or similar words and sentences in agreement with syntactic and semantic rules, norms or conventions in relation to the majority culture or specific institutions. This is so because successful communication would here depend on students and teachers sharing such ability. Successful communication or mutual understanding does not, however, necessitate such a shared ability, according to Davidson (1994, p. 2):

> … mutual understanding is achieved through the exercise of imagination, appeal to general knowledge of the world, and awareness of human interest and attitudes.

This does not mean that people in practice do in fact have the same intention when using the same or similar words and sentences in relevantly similar situations. Davidson (1994, p. 2) denies 'that such sharing is sufficient to explain our actual communicative achievements, and more important [he] denied that even such limited sharing is necessary'. To whom then, should people relate and show mutual understanding? Should their imaginative ability, their interest and rationalised attitudes be restricted to their family, friends, social and cultural groups to which they pertain, the nation-state to which they belong and of which they are citizens? Should people – defined in social, cultural, ethnic, religious or any other terms – solve conflicts only within the same group and together with its members? Should they only promote peace, peace education and non-violence within groups of which they themselves are members? Should democratic deliberation as conflict resolution and peace education be restricted to, or promote patriotism or loyalty in, only those members identifiable with the same group or the majority culture within nation-states (see also Nussbaum, 1996, 1997; McDonough & Feinberg, 2003; Roth, 2007 for a discussion on loyalty, patriotism and cosmopolitanism)? If this was the case, however, people would not necessarily act communicatively towards others as members of different groups and nation-states. They would probably instead act strategically

and violate the principle of charity: that is, they would not assume that there is 'a degree of logical consistency in the thought of the speaker' (Davidson, 2001, p. 211) considered to be an 'other' and that he/she would react 'to the same features of the world that he (the interpreter) would be responding to under similar circumstances' (Davidson, 2001, p. 211). People would also probably direct their positive emotions to those others whom they identify: they would and try to strengthen the emotional bonds between members of the same group. Some would require of citizens that they restrict their loyalty to each other as members of the majority culture within a nation-state. Further, they would probably require members of the same nation-state to be loyal and patriotic and not cosmopolitan; that is, orientate themselves towards the concrete and not towards generalised others as members of *different* nation-states, cultures, religions or ethnic groups. They would probably then not relate to the stranger communicatively from a moral point of view and in terms of justice, because this would imply giving them the same rights as you and I have or ought to have. Hence, a culture of peace would not necessarily promote cosmopolitanism and deliberative democratic procedures. A more deliberative approach, however, would recognise the interrelated and intertwined relation between justice and solidarity, i.e., the relation towards the generalised and towards the concrete other as well as the relation between application and justification. Habermas (1993, p. 154) says:

> … each individual finds himself compelled to adopt the perspective of everyone else in order to test whether a proposed regulation is also acceptable from the perspective of every other person's understanding of himself and the world. Justice and solidarity are two sides of the same coin because practical discourse is, on the one hand, a procedure that affords everyone the opportunity to influence the outcome with his "yes" or "no" responses and thereby takes account of an individualistic understanding of equality; on the other hand, practical discourse leaves intact the social bond that induces participants in argumentation to become aware of their membership in an unlimited communication community.

This suggests that people cannot 'overlook the concrete other and his or her particular situation' (Habermas, 1993, p. 153). Individuals cannot only recognise how sentences and words are used within specific communities and take this application as the source of the force of normatively regulated concepts such as peace, peace education, culture of peace, and utterances containing these concepts. They have to view the moral and justificatory aspects, and especially those of the relation between the intentions assigned by the speaker and the use of an utterance, which requires that we relate with one another holistically and with understanding. This in turn requires solidarity with, respect for and tolerance of the concrete other, and a general acceptance of a norm that passes the justification test of the relation between intention and the use of sentences by specific speakers in a deliberative democratic procedure.

The belief that techniques oriented towards peace education and a strategic use of non-violence would solve or diminish conflicts in our world, and perhaps even 'eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance' is, as I have tried to show, problematical when one focuses too heavily on the application and use of words and sentences. It seems strategic and not communicatively oriented, and focuses too little on distortion in communication. It could, as Gur-Zeév (2001), p. 322) points

out, lead to an effort to normalise education, invoking new forms of totalising education and power relations through the work of over 50 million teachers and correspondingly many students around the world. If this Foucault-inspired analysis is true, then the efforts at this (according to Gur-Zeév purportedly totalising) concept of peace and peace education will only invoke new forms of violence and conflict both in nation-states and between them as well as between sociocultural groups.

Foucault-inspired discourse analyses, however, seem to confuse much of the talk of power/knowledge relations. Such analyses over-identify knowledge with power or vice versa, and they invoke reductions of the following kind: the understanding of the speaker and the hearer is reduced to agreement in use, and the source of normativity comes from sameness in application in relevantly similar situations (see Roth, 2006 for a critique and discussion of Foucault-inspired analyses). Agreement in use does not, however, explain or justify the meaning of utterances; nor is it a reasonable explanation of the source of the force of normativity. Even Foucault in an interview with Gerard Raulet remarked:

> …it has been said, but you have to understand that when I read – and I know it has been attributed to me – the thesis "knowledge is power" or "Power is knowledge," I begin to laugh, since studying their *relation* is precisely my problem. If they were identical, I would not have to study them …. The very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not *identify* them …. I am not prepared to identify reason entirely with the totality of rational forms which have come to dominate – at any given moment, in our era and even very recently – in types of knowledge, forms of technique, and modalities of government or domination: realms where we can see all the major applications of rationality…other forms of rationality are created endlessly. *So there is no sense at all to the proposition that reason is a long narrative which is now finished and that another narrative is under way.* (Foucault, 1990, p. 133, 125)

Ilan Gur-Zeév seems careful about making too much of his analyses of the normalising tendencies of peace education around the world, and counters the negativism of such analyses and perhaps even the defeatism underlying the approach with the idea of counter-education and negative Utopia:

> Counter-education not only has no positive Utopia; it also looks for a new language that has not yet been born. … The realization of negative Utopia is the imperative of counter-education. Even when realized to a certain degree on a specific occasion it can never offer peace of mind or symmetrical relations. Yet it can offer sensibility to be called upon by something totally Other, by the Other as a demand for responsibility, seriousness, and love. (Gur-Zeév, 2001, p. 336)

He does not want to abandon concepts such as 'understanding' or 'dialogue' between parties, and favours hope for development through committed, responsible and critical communication in practice. However, such an enterprise needs to be mindful of the necessary conditions for democratic deliberation and the deliberative democratic procedures for testing the justification of knowledge, values and norms and the cosmopolitan ideal or so I have argued. UNESCO nowadays declares an awareness of possible normalising tendencies and the idea of consensus:

> The idea of consensus, or peace, is sometimes mistaken for an absence of conflict or for society's homogenization process. However, in order to achieve mutual understanding, there must first be differences with regard to sex, race, language, religion, or culture.

> The quest for mutual understanding begins with the recognition of these differences and of a will to overcome them to reach a common objective. Achieving mutual understanding protects a society from self-destruction by letting it build foundations so as to design a new way to live together. Indeed, mutual understanding fosters certain values vital for peace, including non-violence, respect of others, tolerance, solidarity and openness to others. (http://www.unac.org/peacecp/intro/index.html)

So far I have argued that the UN and UNESCO declaration to strive for a culture of peace in a tormented world through peace education and non-violent techniques has to take account of communicatively oriented relations between peoples and individuals, and of the cosmopolitan ideal, in order to become full-fledged. Such an account is not a positive Utopia promising perpetual peace. It is not embodied by negativism, nor does it support defeatism. It articulates a 'new language': ideas for peace education as cosmopolitan and deliberatively democratic. It is also wary of any normalising tendencies or strategic uses of the concepts mentioned. I turn to a discussion of these suggested ideas.

5 Peace Education as Cosmopolitan and Deliberative Democratic

If, then, people have to hold that most of the other's beliefs are true in most cases, and to interpret the simplest sentences that the speaker holds valid, we can ask ourselves, who has to justify them and in what cases. Should the speaker find out what he/she means, or should the interpreter do this? Should the speaker or the interpreter solve the conflicts? First, it depends on the relation in which the problem occurs. If a question of meaning or conflict occurs in relation to yourself, it seems that no one else can clarify the meaning, find out what legitimises the validity of the utterance or elicit the nature of conflict. Who else could? A person cannot solve a conflict or achieve understanding without actively trying to. Without actively finding out the meaning or justification and the nature of problems, no one will understand or solve conflicts. If on the other hand, the conflicts occur within the relation to the other, the onus is on the other to find out what the speaker means. He/she is responsible for asking the speaker what he/she means, and to adjust his/her beliefs as rationally as may be, and to make his/her system of beliefs as coherent as possible. The speaker on the other hand is accountable, that is, morally committed to expressing an intention and to giving reasons for any validity claims if he/she wishes to act communicatively and not strategically.

Secondly, since all of people's beliefs cannot be false, an individual cannot assume that the speaker whom he/she interprets holds only false beliefs. He/she has to grant the speaker true beliefs, interpreting him/her as a rational human being who reacts to the world in similar ways under relevantly similar circumstances. This means that the other has to ascribe to the speaker a modicum of logic and a set of legitimate beliefs. This is of course not true for every belief or for all cases, but there is a necessary assumption that the other holds a coherent set of beliefs and

that he/she would respond in a similar way to the same features in the world (Davidson, 2001, p. 211).

Thirdly, a reasonable way in which people can solve conflicts is to communicate with each other and with themselves. People cannot, however, solve their conflicts without communicating their thoughts linguistically. Language has to be shared to be meaningful, and people can distinguish between using utterances correctly and using them incorrectly through communicating with each other. However, they cannot always understand each other in communication without deliberating democratically the assertability condition of the utterance or the speaker's intention. Peace education and a culture of peace then have to observe that content is expressed by using utterances correctly and that people have to communicate, and investigate the validity of, utterances and speaker's intention in order to understand each other and solve their conflicts. Otherwise, they will not understand, or even understand that understanding is always a matter of degree; and '[w]hat is certain is that the clarity and effectiveness of our concepts grows with the growth of our understanding of others. There are no definite limits to how far dialogue can or will take us' (Davidson, 2001, p. 219). Hence, since understanding is a matter of degree, and peace, peace education and a culture of peace require understanding, the understanding of these is also a matter of degree. The issue is not then whether people have achieved or ever will achieve (perpetual) peace and a culture of peace, but the degree to which we have or can achieve these and in what sense.

Fourthly, the above suggests that communication has to be cosmopolitan and not restricted to members of same or a similar social, ethnic, cultural or religious group; that the communicated knowledge, values and norms are legitimised within these groups and those individuals ought to:

> … acknowledge membership in a society of minds. If I did not know what others think, I would have no thoughts of my own and so would not know what I think. If I did not know what I think, I would lack the ability to gauge the thoughts of others. Gauging the thoughts of others requires that I live in the same world with them, sharing many reactions to its major features, including its values. (Davidson, 2001, pp. 219–220)

Such sharing of thoughts requires that people identify themselves first and foremost as reasonable humans with the capacity to communicate, and that such communication of thoughts presupposes the possibility and right to communicate these, which suggests that individuals are accountable to and acts responsibly towards each other. Unless this possibility and right to express intended meaning and to check whether it is sincere and legitimate and how far it is understood by the interpreter is conceded, deliberative democratic communication seems impossible. Hence without it, people will not resolve conflicts or even come to understand the nature of conflicts peacefully. They will probably instead use the other strategically and not relate communicatively to him/her, or democratically deliberate the meaning of utterances, especially conflicting ones and their assertability conditions. Worse, people could misrecognise the other, or perhaps compel him/her to come to the same or a similar understanding, or even exterminate him/her. Finally, disagreement and hence conflict will always be possible if not actual, and so perpetual peace cannot be achieved.

6 Conclusion

Peace education should aim to achieve a greater understanding and make meaningful disagreement possible among humans with different identities, and a culture of peace can sustain such an achievement, through endorsing the right to democratically deliberate knowledge, values and norms (see Dryzek, 2000; Eriksen & Fossum, 2000; Habermas, 1996; Roth, 2000 for a discussion on the value and importance of deliberative democracy, deliberative democratic procedures and democratic deliberation). This is especially important when people express conflicting interests, values and beliefs, and are in conflict with each other and themselves. In discussing the normalising tendencies of peace education and the promotion of a culture of peace within nation-states globally, as demonstrated above, the paradigm for peace education should reflect cosmopolitan and deliberative democratic values.

References

Bohman, J., & Lutz-Bachmann, M. (Eds.). (1997). *Perpetual peace. Essays on Kant's cosmopolitan ideal*. Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press.

Davidson, D. (1994). The social aspect of language. In B. McGuinnes & G. Oliveri (Eds.), *The philosophy of Michael Dummett* (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Davidson, D. (2001). *Subjective, intersubjective, objective*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Davidson, D. (2004). *Problems of rationality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dryzek, J. (2000). *Deliberative democracy and beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eriksen, E. O., & Fossum, J. E. (2000). *Democracy in the European Union. Integration through deliberation?*. London: Routledge.

Foucault, M. (1990). Critical theory/intellectual history. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Critique and power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Fountain, S. (1999). *Peace education in UNICEF*. Working paper, education section, programme division UNICEF: New York.

Glüer, K. (2001). Dreams, nightmares: Conventions, norms, and meaning in Davidson's philosophy of language. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin & G. Segal (Eds.), *Interpreting Davidson* (pp. 53–74). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.

Gur-Zeév, I. (2001). Philosophy of peace education in a postmodern era. *Educational Theory, 51*(3), 315–336.

Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms. Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*. Polity: London.

Habermas, J. (1992). *Moral consciousness and communicative action*. Cambridge: Polity.

Habermas, J. (1993). *Justification and application. Remarks on discourse ethics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; London: Polity.

Habermas, J. (1995). Communicative versus subject-centered reason. In J. D. Faubion (Ed.), *Rethinking the subject* (pp. 153–164). Boulder: Westview Press.

Habermas, J. (1997). Two hundred years' hindsight. In J. Bohman & M. Lutz-Bachmann (Eds.), *Perpetual peace. Essays on Kant's cosmopolitan ideal* (pp. 113–153). Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (2003a). A dialogue with Jürgen Habermas. In G. Borradori (Ed.), *Philosophy in a time of terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* (pp. 25–43). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Habermas, J. (2003b). From Kant's "ideas" of pure reason to the "idealizing" presuppositions of communicative action: Reflections on the detranscendentalized "use of reason". *Truth and Justification* (pp. 83–130). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Kant, I. (1983). To perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch. *Perpetual peace and other essays* (pp. 107–143). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Kymlicka, W. (2002). *Contemporary political philosophy: An introduction* (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDonough, K., & Feinberg, W. (2003). *Education and citizenship in liberal-democratic societies. Teaching for cosmopolitan values and collective identities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1996). *For love of country? In a new democracy forum on the limits of patriotism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1997). *Cultivating humanity. A classical defense of reform in liberal education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roth, K. (2000). *Democracy, education and citizenship. Towards a theory on the education of deliberative democratic citizens*. Stockholm: Stockholm Institute of Education Press.
Roth, K. (2006). Deliberation in national and post-national education. *Journal of Curriculum Studies, 38*(5), 569–589.
Roth, K. (2007). Cosmopolitan learning. In K. Roth & N. C. Burbules (Eds.), *Changing notions of citizenship education in contemporary nation-states* (pp. 10–29). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Salomon, G., & Nevo, B. (eds). (2002). *Peace education. The concepts, principles, and practices around the world*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
UNESCO. (2002). UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, http://www.unesco.org/culture
Wittgenstein, L. (1978). *Remarks on the foundations of mathematics*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
UNESCO-mainstreaming, *The culture of peace*, http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/ukuk_sum_cp.htm.
United Nations, Resolution 53/243. *Declaration and programme of action on a culture of peace*.

Education in Values Through Children's Literature. A Reflection on Some Empirical Data

Santiago Nieto Martín

1 Introduction

Currently, the subject of values is acquiring an unprecedented use and prestige. Every day one hears more and more about *changes in values*, if not about a *crisis in values*. The constitutional rules of countries are articulated around *values* shared by society, albeit with modalities and nuances which, in each community and at each historical moment, acquire a unique profile. The life of each individual is defined by the values he or she prefers or chooses. These are the objectives towards which we tend, which orient our intentions and determine our way of life.

> Attitude and values from a fundamental part of education. People are always the fruit of the age and culture that we live in, and which, logically, changes. Our society, the lifestyles and the systems of values are changing, and changing fast. One might speak of a transformation of children and adolescents and their closest institutions: the family, school, living spaces, way of organising their time …
>
> The first and fundamental objective of education is to provide children, young people of both sexes, with a full education that will allow them to shape their own essential identity, as well as construct a conception of reality that at the same time includes knowledge and the ethical and moral assessment of it. This full education has to be addressed to the development of their capability to exercise, critically and in an axiologically plural society, *freedom, tolerance* and *solidarity.* (LOGSE [Law for the General Ordering of the Educational System], 1990)

Moral education must help analyse everyday reality and the prevailing social–moral rules critically, so that it will help devise more just and adequate ways of living together. Likewise, it seeks to bring those being educated closer to behaviour and habits more consistent with the principles and rules they have constructed. Finally, moral education aims at forming habits for living together that will strengthen values such as justice, solidarity, cooperation and respect for nature.

S.N. Martín (✉)
University of Salamanca
e-mail: snietom@usal.es

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_5,

Keeping to an eminently educational perspective, we should concern ourselves with moral education inasmuch as it makes it possible to approach the desirable horizon of integral education. 'If integral education means thoroughly looking after all human capabilities, it is necessary to give new relevance to moral education' (Puig Rovira, 1992: 10).

Moral education does not necessarily have to be an external imposition of values and rules for behaviour, but neither is it reduced to the acquisition of personal skills, for adopting purely subjective decisions. Moral education can be a field of reflection that will help one detect and criticise the unfair aspects of everyday reality and of the prevailing social rules, construct fairer ways of life both in interpersonal and collective spheres, prepare autonomously, rationally and dialogically general principles of value that will help judge reality critically, get young people to assume the type of behaviour consistent with the principles and rules they have constructed personally and get them to also acquire those rules that society, democratically in search of justice and collective well-being, has given itself.

During recent years studies and bibliographic productions on values have abounded. But the subject is not new, since in the first quarter of the twentieth century the philosophers Scheler, Hartmann and Lavelle devoted special attention to axiological research, although the subject did not become consolidated in a solid and flexible way. For many years, philosophical research moved on to other issues, leaving the axiological field open, although lately some interesting contributions are being produced by the different trends of philosophical thought more fitted to the demands of each aspect of reality (López Quintas, 1989).

Currently, the reports and publications on the attitudes that citizens show towards the most diverse social topics of greater or lesser interest are overwhelming: attitudes towards the family, politics, education, health, religion, matrimony, racism, immigration …. In most cases, the methodological strategy is almost always the same; through the administration of a *questionnaire* or survey citizens can answer about what attitudes or values they proclaim, express, believe …. These are usually cross-sectional studies, where, taking as a basis a representative sample of the population, it is sought to explain the diverse evaluative expressions of the subjects according to sex, age, social class … or any other variable that the researcher may consider, this being a model that has reigned as a general norm and through which interesting results are being obtained.

2 Values and Education

In education, it is fundamental to take into account the subject's capabilities as well as his or her preferences or interests, style of learning and living. There is no way of teaching something disconnected from a subject's way of being, but, in turn,

what is taught has to be positively valuable. And this is the great challenge we face when research does not want to stop at the mere analysis of the data obtained. Looking towards what is positively valuable is a key dimension, without which there is no education possible. But, without knowing these individual and collective preferences, there is no way whatsoever to achieve a genuine education. Hence, we are interested in determining the frameworks of action that condition their conduct, the values they prefer, the family and school settings, the impact of the mass media, their lifestyles and the meaning they give to their lives, because it is not possible to change a reality that one does not know, and changing human reality with a view to its improvement is the role of education.

Moral education does not necessarily have to be an external imposition of values and rules of behaviour, but neither can it be reduced to the acquisition of personal skills, to adopt purely subjective decisions. Moral education can be a field of reflection that may help detect and criticise the unfair aspects of everyday reality and of the prevailing social rules, construct fairer ways of life both in interpersonal and collective spheres, prepare autonomously and rationally general principles of value that will help judge reality critically, get young people to assume that type of behaviour consistent with the principles and rules they have personally constructed and also get them to acquire those rules that society, democratically and seeking justice and collective well-being, has given itself.

In other words, moral education should collaborate with those being educated in order to facilitate the development and training of all those capabilities that intervene in judgement and moral action, so that they will be capable of orientating themselves rationally and autonomously in those situations where a conflict of values is posed.

Nowadays, undoubtedly, ethics is in fashion; and it is so both in excess and in default. (Muñoz Redón, 1998). The present individual and social situation shows many and varied examples in both directions; hence, the importance acquired in the pedagogical sphere by the large number of studies and bibliographical productions concerning values and attitudes.

The study we present is the product of a research study that is attempting to blaze a trail in a *first order educational and didactic resource which is that of values transmitted through children's literature*, a field mid-way between education and culture, the *control* of the publishing market, economic profitability and social and economic power and influence. The fact is that, although the essential aim of children's literature is, or seems, clear and conclusive, behind it there are always the business interests that can even determine *what should be* published with a view to foreseeable economic profitability. It is not merely a question of publishing that which might be considered *good*, but also of whether the author offers the *right profile* demanded by the *prestige* of the publishers, and whether the work can produce benefits. Indeed, it is quite possible that the list of children's books *written on order* may be unending (Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1 List of children's books analysed and percentage of teachers who chose them

Order	Title and author	%
1°	*Fray Perico y su borrico* by Juan Muñoz	84.5
2°	*Treasure Island* by R. L. Stevenson	65.5
3°	*Le Petit Nicolas* by René Goscinny	62.1
4°	*Manolito Gafotas* by Elvira Lindo	60.3
5°	*La hija del espantapájaros* by María Gripe	56.9
6°	*Matilda* by Roald Dahl	46.6
7°	*El pirata Garrapata* by Juan Muñoz	41.4
8°	*Las ballenas cautivas* by Carlos Villanes	29.3
9°	*The Little Vampire* by A. Sommer-Bodenburg	27.6
10°	*Renata toca el piano…* by R. García Domínguez	25.9
11°	*James and the Giant Peach* by Roald Dahl	24.1

Table 2 Percentage distribution of values in each children's literature book

Values	Children's literature books analysed										
(%)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Vital	13.8	17.5	16.5	21.9	17.6	21.9	13.4	7.6	18.9	20.3	22.5
Production	2.9	4.8	0.9	0.3	1.9	1.2	6.8	1.2	0.0	0.0	5.9
Noetic	2.7	8.1	5.9	1.1	5.0	8.5	2.2	7.0	2.6	13.6	4.5
Affective	33.5	8.6	43.8	53.1	38.7	19.7	29.2	13.8	46.2	31.9	17.6
Social	14.3	32.8	23.2	20.1	18.0	25.0	30.4	56.4	25.1	16.3	37.5
Aesthetic	3.1	1.9	5.4	0.8	4.7	2.6	5.0	0.6	1.0	0.8	8.5
Development	2.7	15.2	0.0	0.0	10.1	18.9	1.2	6.1	6.2	16.7	3.2
Ethical	14.7	9.9	4.3	2.6	1.2	0.8	11.8	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Transcendental	12.3	1.1	0.0	0.1	2.8	1.4	0.0	4.4	0.0	0.4	0.3
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3 Values and Their Teaching

The teaching of values in the classroom evades the usual methods and techniques of professional work, not fitting into the same strategies that could, for example, be used in teaching mathematics or history. It is a matter of different spheres and hence different actions are also required. Education in values shows specific characteristics that clearly distinguish it from other types of learning.

The teaching of values is in sufficient if it is only attempted from the school; it thus requires other, necessarily shared approaches. The school is a requisite for education in values, but not sufficient in itself; it also needs the essential mediation of the family, social groups, etc. Values 'are taught and learnt *in* and *from* the whole of the *experience* of the students' (Ortega, Mínguez, & Gil, 1986, 18).

The acquisition of values requires every day experience in them, experience which will also always be contradictory: justice–injustice, tolerance–intolerance

…, hence teaching them becomes complex if experiences of the values one wishes to transmit are not offered jointly (family, school, companions, mass media). Therefore, it is essential 'to retrieve them daily' and in an 'ordinary' way, forming models of behaviour that are always close and within reach of everybody, thus enriching the experience of those being educated through the surrounding culture and life.

Moreover, it is necessary to discover values in 'oneself', to reflect on what our own scale of values is, which values guide our lives, what is useful for us and others ('clarification of values'). To this must be added the experience of values in 'others', with an appreciation of the naturalness and effort of each one to achieve worthy goals of respect and consideration. Values should be loved and wanted, if we want them to become a guiding force in our personal lives. Furthermore, a value exists and is resolved in practice. Man's destiny is *action*. 'If they did not act, men would not be able to exist as individual beings or survive as a species. Action does not always make history, but "it makes" society…. Action is the fundamental form of man's social existence' (Luckmann, 1996, 12).

The acquisition and shaping of values and attitudes in a child is the result of a *socialisation* process, started from the cultural and environmental milieu that the family has provided, and a process of *maturing* and *cognitive development* in which the school plays a main *role* (Zabalza, 1998). The school thus plays a bipolar role in relation to the process of transmission and characterisation of values and attitudes. On the one hand, it *strengthens* those values considered positive and *stimulates* the development of other, new ones, while on the other hand it *modifies* those values that act in detriment to the child's educational development and contradict the values that the school usually assumes.

4 Procedures and Strategies for Education in Values

Starting from an essential postulate based on scrupulous respect for the general principles inherent in every process of educational intervention, there is a great variety of strategies for education in values and attitudes in the classroom, although it seems reasonable to limit them to certain procedures as specified by Ortega et al. (1986):

1. *Clarification of Values* This technique consists of a set of work methods that help the students to carry out a process of reflection, making them aware of and making them reason about what they value, accept or think.
2. *Discussion of Moral Dilemmas* Dilemmas are brief stories in which a conflict or choice between values is posed. The conflict can be resolved in several equally feasible and defendable ways. The students must think about what is the optimal solution and base their decision on moral and logically valid reasoning.
3. *Case Studies* A case is the description of a real or fictitious situation investigated and adapted so as to make possible a broad analysis and exchange of ideas in group. One of the characteristics of case study is that each component in the group can contribute a different solution.

4. *Analysis of Values and Critical Analysis of Reality* This is a useful procedure for analysing complex problems, from experience, that involve a large number of factors and their possible consequences.
5. *Critical Commentary of Texts* This is an effective method for critically facing reality, i.e., a suitable means for making a topic problematic or for going further into those that are already conflictive. Commentary of texts is a process of integrating diverse information, a valid means for becoming aware of the milieu in which we move and for understanding and critically examining relevant or significant messages or contents.
6. *Self-Regulation of Behaviour* One of the most important dimensions of pedagogical action in the sphere of education in values should be oriented towards the development of competencies, attitudes and behaviour that entail a high level of self-regulation and self-control in the student, understanding by self-regulation the behavioural process of a continuous and conscious nature in which the person is ultimately responsible for his or her conduct.

In practice, the above-mentioned strategies acquire their fullest meaning when they are *represented* and *expressed* in an inter-related way, a question which here we try to project onto curricular design through children's literature.

4.1 Language and Literature in Curricular Design. Educational Dimensions

Language is a complex human activity which is addressed to ensuring communication and representation, through which in turn we can regulate our own behaviour and that of others. It is closely linked to thought and knowledge and contributes to the person's social and cultural integration.

> Language must be present in the school as an instrument for representing and communicating feelings, emotions, states of mind, memories, expectations …, in order to obtain and offer information and to promote or perform a certain action or set of actions, to strengthen the development of linguistic communication in the students is to favour the deployment and up-dating of that communication in all its functions and dimensions. (MEC, 1992, 16)

Written texts, as bearers of meaning, are cultural media for the social construction of a critical outlook. Encouraging in students the reading of literary texts or of texts conventionally considered as children's literature contributes to strengthening their overall education as autonomous individuals, aware and creative in the milieu in which they live, as is clearly reflected in the curricular orientations prepared by the Ministry of Education and Science for setting in motion the educational reform promoted by the education law in Spain, LOGSE.

Reading is pleasure, imagination, creativity, knowledge …. Reading makes us free. Reading is a splendid and wonderful adventure of the human mind that goes beyond all rationally established limits, being a transcendental element vital for the development of the human being.

> Reading is an aesthetic vehicle, a discovery of the world of thought, a therapy recognised by all specialists in psychological problems, an awakening to attitudes, both critical and creative, for the forming of personal criteria that will lead to independence of thought and thus to freedom, a means of transferring knowledge and thus of a necessary interdisciplinarity and also, and not as the least of its qualities, a source of satisfaction and enjoyment. (Del Campo & López Polanco, 1990, 13)

In a world such as ours, excessively confined by technology and by the image, the book may have lost a certain cultural capacity inherent to it, bringing in its wake a certain loss of freedom of thought, expression and capability for reflection. However, the act of reading should spring from necessity. As Stendhal wrote, 'reading works that have been thought out is how one learns to think and feel', forming, in turn, 'intelligence and heart'.

Reading should be understood as an essential experience for life; the pleasure of fantasy and imagination that leads to dreaming and living other lives; the pleasure of aesthetics it brings with it, the intellectual dimension, knowledge, living together, reflection, attitudes, values … (Acín, 1995). Without doubt it is an excellent mediating element in the student's overall education.

4.2 The Moralising Discourse of Children's Literature

From the historical point of view, no one can deny a constant that has clearly defined the literature addressed to children: its moralising aim. Perhaps because of this, we should not really speak of a children's literature until the nineteenth century, when a transition took place, going from a didactic-moral discourse to a playful aesthetic one (Sánchez Corral, 1995). Although in earlier ages a social and educational space was slowly being opened up for children, they were still considered the *object* of doctrinal contents oriented according to the dominant ideological and ethical precepts. It was thus difficult to conceive of literature particularly addressed to children.

The moralising priority mentioned above *forced* a narrative development of the facts and generated certain mistrust in the possibilities of aesthetic creation. 'The mistrust in the acquisition of literary competence in children unexplainably lives side by side in writers and teachers with the conviction of attending to the vital interests and needs of the child's personality, as if inventing or re-inventing reality by means of the imagination and fantasy were not an interest and a need in subjects who are building their egos' (Sánchez Corral, 1995, 103).

Pragmatism, in one form or another, has always been present in the use that parents, teachers and writers have made of the different activities proper to children, among them reading, with unquestionable educational effectiveness. To this respect, it can be said that it is not a good idea to excessively instrumentalise certain artistic fields with an exclusively pedagogical aim, if this entails distorting or even overlooking the actual artistic nature of literature, music, magic, fascination …. Nowadays, children's literature has opened up to new, less indoctrinated horizons,

in which the literary aspect, the quality of the writing and the breadth of contents and experiences are an essential aim in themselves.

Moreover, we cannot overlook a certain current polemic generated around what is considered to be an excessive tendency to *take children's literature into the school* and use it as an educational resource, in that it is understood that explaining the meanings or values of a story would be to distort the power of fiction, hindering the child from activating his or her own deductive and imaginative capability. We believe, however, that both dimensions are compatible and can live together side by side in the home, the classroom, or the street, and that all types of artistic manifestations have their pedagogy, and all pedagogy is always imbued with a certain amount of artistry. All texts are written with an end in mind, and the end determines the strategies (language, contents, forms, values ..., and of course, commercial strategies). There *may be* a book for each child, and each child *needs* a certain type of publication; each writer or publisher *has* certain readers, and each reader *looks for* those books that more or less fit his or her taste or interests. It would be extremely dangerous for us to 'congratulate ourselves' because a child becomes really interested in and motivated by children's literature, without perceiving that he or she could be holding back from deciding and acting. And in this sense, teaching has a fundamental role to play.

Currently, children's books have become one more commodity in a free market society, ruled by ferocious and unlimited competition in the publishing industry. Under these commercial conditions, the book somehow becomes distorted as such and its production is conditioned by prior thorough market studies, as well as by almost exclusively business concerns.

This industrial and commercial influence thus affects the production of children's literature, with the praxis of writing becoming subjected to the socio-communicative praxis: writing is done by order, advice on themes and/or language *is accepted*, the production conditions of children's books *are assumed*.

As simple and obvious as it may seem, children's literature demands a suitable symbiosis between literature and childhood, which needs an interdisciplinary scientific treatment whose path is still to be travelled. There is a need to coordinate, as far as possible, psychological and pedagogical principles with those of aesthetic theory, in order to avoid conceptual and methodological imbalances in teaching. And this is a future hope that should be attended to, selectively, both by the professionalism and good judgement of the writers and the responsibility of parents and teachers with a view to the *total education of the child*.

5 Empirical Study on Children's Literature for the 10–12 Age Group

Aware of the importance of the topic posed, the *'Vicente y García Corselas'* Foundation of the University of Salamanca propitiated, in the 3rd edition of awards for educational research, an empirical study on the values projected and transmitted through children's literature for 10–12 year olds.

5.1 Methodology and Sample for Analysis

Given, on the one hand, the large amount of books published and on the market, and on the other, the *doubtful* validity of research that analyses books which are hardly sold, and therefore only minimally affect the child reading public, we posed a three-phase selection of books. Thus, we first asked the most important publishing firms to give us a list of a maximum of 10 of their best-selling books (this was an essential criteria since what we want to know is their impact); second, once we had made a list of all the titles they gave to us (a total of 58), we consulted primary school teachers about which 10 books of those presented they would choose *to work on in class* with their students, according to the values, which, in their opinion, they suitably transmit in the children's educational process. Based on this, we then selected those books which surpassed 20% of the choices received. Nevertheless, more complete and detailed information on the process followed and the books selected, as well as other aspects and technical issues that oriented our work (reliability, validity …) can be found in the article: *Estudio empirico sobre los valores en la literatura infantil: estrategias, técnicas y procedimientos* (Nieto & Gonzalez, 2002).

Undoubtedly, questions such as *what is sold, what is read, what values* are transmitted, *what values prevail, what* is the *specific profile* of each work, what are the *thematic focuses of interest*, the *human nuclei* around which a work is created … are all of great interest, and we attempt to answer to them here.

The aim of the present chapter is thus to show clearly the trend of the categories of values transmitted by children's literature by presenting the percentages we have extracted from an analysis of the content of the 11 literary works selected (Table 3). *The final objective is to highlight the moral educational potential inherent in children's literature as a pedagogical instrument and strategy in the classroom, given the variety, wealth and intensity of the values transmitted.*

The 11 works of children's literature analysed were the following, shown with the percentages corresponding to the number of times they were chosen by literature teachers in primary education:

To carry out the analysis, we began with an interesting classification of the values categories made by Bartolomé and Other (1997), which, in a simplified way, groups

Table 3 Overall percentages by categories of values

Values	Percentage
1. Affective	29.80
2. Social	26.11
3. Vital	17.58
4. Development	8.10
5. Noetic	5.54
6. Ethical	5.08
7. Aesthetic	3.06
8. Production	2.45
9. Transcendental	2.24

values into the following categories: *vital*, *production-related*, *noetic*, *affective*, *social*, *aesthetic*, *development-related*, *ethical and transcendental.*

5.2 Reliability and Validity of the Analysis

One of the most difficult problems to resolve when applying techniques of analysis of contents is that related to *reliability* and *validity*. 'The importance of reliability stems from the security it offers as regards the data being obtained independently of the event, instrument or person measuring them. By definition, reliable data are those that remain constant in all the variations of the measuring process' (Kaplan & Goldsen, 1965, 83). Reliability, therefore, represents the degree to which 'any research design (totally or partially) or the data resulting from it represent variations in real phenomena, instead of representing extrinsic circumstances of measurement, the hidden idiosyncrasies of each of the analysts or the surreptitious trends of a procedure' (Krippendorff, 1990, 192).

In order to verify reliability, a certain doubling of efforts is required; on the other hand, validity is verified on the basis of the data fitting to what, presumably, is 'true' a priori or what is already presumed as valid. In the analysis of content, we distinguish at least three different types of reliability: stability, reproducibility and accuracy.

The design that the analysis of reliability as *stability* requires, starts from what is commonly called 'test–retest', by means of which, however, we accept the reasonable supposition that the successive incongruities of the observer are revealed; hence it is considered the least effective of all.

Reliability as reproducibility ('test–test') requires at least two observers. This does not prevent the errors of incongruity that the observers may make, or the disagreement that may occur among them. Nevertheless, it is more effective than the above, and it is the one on which we base our discussion.

Undoubtedly, the most effective of the types of reliability mentioned, at least in theory, is *accuracy*. For this a 'test-norm' design is established, where, however, neither the incongruities of the observers nor the disagreements among them are eliminated, and where, moreover, systematic deviations may appear with respect to the norm.

As regards scientific findings, the aim is that they should be valid in the sense in that they represent the real phenomena, which lead us to accept them as unquestionable facts. An analysis of content is valid inasmuch as its inferences can be sustained versus other data obtained independently.

Following the scheme of the different types of reliability given above, it should be said that we have followed a *combined strategy*, starting from a 'test–retest' design with percentages of agreement higher that 90% (*stability*) to subsequently make a *reproducibility* design using the so-called 'test–test'. It is in this phase of the obtaining of data that the triangulation process acquires its greatest relevance. This is aimed at eliminating, as far as possible, the incongruities of each observer as well as the disagreement among observers.

5.3 The Obtaining and Description of Data

Naturally, every *value* has its corresponding *countervalue*, although, in our case, their presence in the literature could not be considered negative, since they usually appear as a counterweight of worthy behaviour of positive contrast, which is what we are really interested in from the educational point of view. In any case, we wish to reflect their comparative presence with the following two graphs.

First, to reflect the *values/countervalues* percentage ratio (Fig. 1), taking into account the overall accumulation both of the different books and the different categories, where a ratio of 59.8% of *values* with respect to 40.2% of *countervalues* can be observed.

Taking into account this ratio between the different categories of values, Fig. 2 the counterweight *values/countervalues* in the set of the different works in children's literature are shown.

Table 4 presents the quantitative description of the data obtained for each category of values, with the aim of showing the evident presence of values in each of the works of children's literature we have analysed, albeit with the nuances suggested to us by the indexes of concentration of values that we analyse subsequently.



Fig. 1 Values/countervalues percentage ratio



Fig. 2 Values/countervalues percentage ratio between the new categories

Table 4 Matrix of *indexes* of concentration of *values*/children's *books*

Indexes of concentration	Children's books analysed										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Vital	3.75	2.79	3.92	4.72	4.33	2.90	1.96	1.85	2.08	2.70	2.84
Production	0.79	0.76	0.21	0.06	0.47	0.16	1.00	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.74
Noetic	0.74	1.30	1.41	0.23	1.23	1.13	0.32	1.71	0.28	1.80	0.57
Affective	9.12	1.37	10.4	11.4	9.54	2.61	4.29	3.34	5.11	4.24	2.22
Social	3.89	5.23	5.50	4.32	4.44	3.32	4.47	13.7	2.77	2.17	4.73
Aesthetic	0.84	0.30	1.28	0.16	1.15	0.34	0.73	0.14	0.11	0.10	1.07
Development	0.74	2.43	0.00	0.00	2.49	2.50	0.18	1.49	0.64	2.24	0.41
Ethical	3.99	1.57	1.02	0.56	0.29	0.10	1.73	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.00
Transcendental	3.35	0.18	0.00	0.03	0.68	0.18	0.00	1.06	0.00	0.05	0.04

5.3.1 Percentage of Categories of Values for Each Work of Children's Literature

After carrying out the quantification corresponding to each category of values, below we give the classification of the results obtained:

In Table 4, two trends can clearly be seen which we highlight below. First, the *affective* and *social* values mark the essential dynamics in almost all the books analysed, and, second, the presence of *noetic* and *ethical* values is scant, and the presence of *aesthetic, production* and *transcendental* values almost negligible.

From the percentage distribution observed in the above table, we can arrange the different categories overall according to the mean percentage of the values that appear in the different books.

The percentages obtained reveal the importance that *affective values* (29.8%) acquire in the books analysed, closely followed by *social values* (26.11%), and, in third place, also with a high percentage, *vital values* (17.58%). If to this we add the values of *development*, we find that the four categories mentioned make up 81.5% of the total values counted.

We would, then, be dealing with a network of literary stories that are essentially structured around *affective, social* and *vital* values, and to a lesser extent, around *development* values. We have interpreted these categories in the following terms:

- As regards the *affective* values referring to the protagonist, we find people who are happy, affectionate, charming, hopeful, loving, calm…with a happy family-oriented lifestyle … which revolves around four essential values: *love, happiness, hope* and *friendship*.
- The *social* values on which the different works are structured are developed around communicative characters, capable of collaborating, who are understanding with others, helpful, courteous, participative, open … with a clearly community-oriented life-style, taking as a reference seven ways of life as an end: *community, service, society, communication, participation, equality* and *social recognition.*
- The *vital* values refer to characters with vitality, a desire for biological enjoyment, physical fitness … with a lifestyle that is comfortable, pleasant, calm, sporting … and three broad surrounding objectives: *life, peace, pleasure*.

– The *development* values refer to subjects who are mature, self-fulfilled, self-sufficient, independent, active, flexible, open to new experiences, integrated … with a balanced and personalistic life-style, with a view to finally reaching milieus of people with *self-esteem*, who are *self-fulfilled* and *mature*.

6 Indexes of Concentration of Values

The percentages of comparative analyses can give rise to a deformation of results given the great difference in length between the different works of children's literature analysed. Hence, it would be appropriate to carry out comparisons based on *indexes of concentration of values* for each of the categories, taking into account the different number of words in each book.

The above *indexes* jointly reflect the books/values crossings according to the concentration of values obtained. Once again, we confirm that the mere visualisation of data makes it possible to verify that the highest *indexes* of concentration occur in *social* and *affective* values, followed by *vital* values.

If we are obliged to reflect on the *internal* reasons for which the sample of books we are analysing sells well and is also well accepted by the teachers consulted, in no case are the reasons related to the greater or lesser length of the books, i.e., the length of the work has no effect whatsoever on acceptance and sales. Neither are the *indexes* of concentration of *values* shown as clear indicators that justify success, although it is true that a certain positive trend is observed in this sense. We are, then, convinced that, aside from strictly literary values, *the characters and their contextual environment are what mark the atmosphere that defines the acceptance of each of the books*: main characters, almost always children; their relationship with adults, first their parents, and then their teachers; context, the street, school …. In short, from the creative and *witty* treatment the author is capable of applying in the combination of these elements around an original, imaginative and *opportune* plot, we can intuit the possibilities of success on the market.

7 Correlations Between *Indexes* by Categories of Values and Children's Books

The correlational analyses are intended to confirm or detect whether two or more variables are related to each other, as well as the degree and intensity of such a relationship; we are, thus, speaking of correlation when we assess the joint *covariation* between the variables (Tables 5 and 6).

Correlation requires certain conditions in order to be able to be applied, linearity being fundamental, i.e., the points that represent the ordered pairs on an axis of coordinates must be close to the diagonal.

Table 5 Correlations of the indexes of concentration between categories of values

Correlation between indexes of categories of values	Production	Noetic	Affective	Social	Aesthetic	Development	Ethical	Transcendental
Vital								
Vital								
Production	–0.14							
Noetic	–0.09	–0.24						
Affective	**0.81	–0.23	–0.20					
Social	–0.29	0.07	0.38	–0.15				
Aesthetic	0.41	0.48	–0.04	0.36	–0.09			
Development	–0.11	–0.12	0.64	–0.42	–0.01	–0.27		
Ethical	0.13	0.61	–0.13	0.25	0.04	0.24	–0.22	
Transcendental	0.18	0.33	0.04	0.27	0.15	0.17	0.00	**0.81

* Significant for $\alpha = 0.01$.
** Significant for $\alpha = 0.05$.

Table 6 Correlations between indexes of values of the children's books analysed

Correlation between indexes of values	Fray Perico y su borrico	Treasure Island	Le Petit Nicolas	Manolito Gafotas	La hija del espantapájaros	Matilda	El pirata Garrapata	Las ballenas cautivas	The Little Vampire	Renata toca el piano…	James and the Giant Peach
Fray Perico y su borrico											
Treasure Island	0.16										
Le Petit Nicolas	**0.87	0.37									
Manolito Gafotas	**0.90	0.30	**0.98								
La hija del espantapájaros	**0.82	0.37	**0.96	**0.97							
Matilda	0.40	**0.81	0.64	0.64	*0.75						
El pirata Garrapata	*0.76	0.63	**0.89	**0.83	*0.78	0.63					
Las ballenas cautivas	0.28	**0.86	0.48	0.37	0.41	0.65	*0.73				
The Little Vampire	**0.84	0.44	**0.98	**0.99	*0.75	**0.86	0.51				
Renata toca el piano…	0.61	0.47	**0.81	**0.81	**0.87	0.61	0.38	**0.88			
James and the Giant Peach	0.39	**0.81	*0.67	0.60	0.62	*0.79	**0.82	**0.85	*0.69	0.56	

* Significant for $\alpha = 0.01$.
** Significant for $\alpha = 0.05$.

In this study, we work with data measured nominally, and we have therefore reported them that way in all the analyses performed: percentages, graphs …. However, after making the comparison by categories of values based on the *indexes* of concentration obtained according to the total number of words in each book, we can calculate the correlation coefficients from the *indexes* obtained, both among the different categories of values and among the books analysed. With this, we seek to observe possible trends by way of joint *covariations* among the distributions of the different *indexes* obtained.

Thus, in Tables 5, we give the correlations obtained between the different categories of values.

In general, the table shows low *coefficients*; only two significant *coefficients* occur among the *vital/affective* and *ethical/transcendental* categories, in both cases with a coefficient of 0.81.

Given the previous result, we now go on to show the *correlation coefficients* obtained among all the books analysed based on the different *indexes of values.*

In this case we observe, in general, high correlations between the *indexes* of several of the books that make up the study, which can be understood not only as a considerable balance in values among books, but also among categories of values within each book. Of the 55 coefficients obtained, almost half exceed the correlation 0.80, which *indicates a high homogeneity among the values transmitted through the different works of literature analysed.* This has great pedagogical significance, inasmuch as it shows a trend to a certain stability in the preparation of most of the children's books we analysed.

8 Conclusion

In this chapter, we seek to highlight the importance and significance of children's literature as an educational instrument and strategy in the moral training of pupils. For this purpose, we have attempted to empirically demonstrate the content and transmission of educational values in a sample of books from children's literature, where we confirm the significant presence of *affective, social* and *vital* values, which form the nuclei around which the main arguments of each of the books we analysed are constructed.

References

Acín, R. (1995). *Escritores en las aulas, in Several: Invitación a la lectura*. MEC: Zaragoza.

Bartolomé, M. (1992). *Análisis de valores a partir de documentos educativos, in Several: Modelos de Investigación educativa, series Seminario n° 9*. Barcelona: Ediciones Universidad.

Bartolomé, M., & Other. (1997). *Diagnóstico a la escuela multicultural*. Barcelona: Cedecs.

Del Campo, M. M., & López Polanco, G. (1990). *El estudio de la lectura: Consejo y orientación psicoeducativa para mejorar la habilidad lectora en universitarios*. Madrid: Dykinson.

Fox, D. (1981). *El proceso de investigación en educación*. Eunsa: Pamplona.
Kaplan, A. Y., & Goldsen, J. M. (1965). *The reliability of content analysis categories, in Language of Politics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Krippendorff, L. (1990). *Metodología de análisis de contenido*. Piadós: Barcelona.
LOGSE. (1990). *Ley Orgánica 1/1990, de 3 de octubre, de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo Español (BOE de 4 de octubre de 1990)*. Madrid: BOE.
López Quintas, A. (1989). *El conocimiento de los valores*. Navarra, Verbo Divino: Estella.
Luckmann, Th. (1996). *Teoría de la acción social*. Piadós: Barcelona.
MEC. (1992). *Lengua Castellana y Literatura*. Madrid, MEC: Primaria.
Muñoz Redón, J. (1998). *La bolsa de los valores*. Barcelona: Ariel.
Nieto, S., & Gonzalez, J. (2002). *Los valores en la literatura infantil*. Valladolid, Aral Editores: Estudio empírico. Técnicas y procedimientos de análisis.
Ortega, P., Mínguez, R., & Gil, R. (1986). *Valores y educación*. Ariel Educación: Barcelona.
Puig Rovira, J. M. (1992). *La educatión moral y cívica*. Madrid: MEC.
Sánchez Corral, L. (1995). *Literatura infantil y lenguaje literario*. Barcelona: Piadós.
Vázquez, J. M. (1983). *Juan Pablo II en España a través de la prensa*. Madrid: Instituto de Sociología Aplicada.
Zabalza, M. A. (1998). Evaluación de actitudes y valores. In A. Medina & Other (Eds.), *Evaluación de los procesos y resultados del aprendizaje de los estudiantes*. Madrid: UNED.

Section II
Global Pedagogies

A Global Imperative of Teaching Multiculturally in Florida's Schools

Anna Boguslawa Kochan

1 Postmodernity, Cultural Diversity, and Globalization

Today, planetary citizens live in the global community. They live in the era of postmodernity: the times of collapsing transcendental values and the compression of time and space. In the new millennium, the scientific concept of postmodernity reflects the confusion of the rapidly changing world. For scientists, postmodernity is a way of describing our new chaotic world – fractured, relative, pluralist, and eclectic. In Derrida's (1987) terminology, postmodern citizens have experienced an absolute epistemological break with the past. Global villagers attempt to make sense of the rapidly shifting conditions and landscapes. They struggle with the complexity of our world, organizing, and systematizing the data and information. The information age is defined by a fast flow of information, images, ideas, technologies, and capital. Worldwide, a technological revolution has an affect on teaching and learning. It has triggered a heated debate about the goals of education in a postmodern society. An international discussion centers on the new model of education, capable of producing flexible and productive workers. The on-going postindustrial revolution requires a parallel revolt in education. It calls for a paradigm shift in education. In his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn (1996) defines a paradigm shift as a profound change in the thoughts, perceptions, and values that form a particular view of reality. According to Kuhn, a crisis in the dominant scientific paradigm takes place when there is an anomaly in the fit between theory and nature. Paradigm shifts produce pressure for large-scale changes in any modern education system. If Kuhn is right, contemporary education systems, rooted in positivistic and modern traditions, are in conflict with the increasingly postmodern nature of the world. Fundamental restructuring requires a cognitive leap, in our case, a rethinking of education. It calls for a restructuring of the entire education system in relation to cultural, social, and economic superstructures. It also requires brand new educational programs.

A.B. Kochan (✉)
University of Central Florida
e-mail: bkochan@mail.ucf.edu

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_6,

As of today, such a postmodern curriculum is in the process of being made. There are several innovative school subjects that reflect a postmodern paradigm. One of the most advanced fields is multicultural education. Multicultural education deals with changing cultures and societies. As an important social topic, it has become a trademark of postmodernity and globalization (Gutek, 2006; Lynch, 1989). Multicultural education has always mirrored a societal transformation. In multicultural education, innovative solutions worldwide have been forced by the convergence and internationalization. Educational researchers have come to understanding that engines of school change are located outside of education, in a global society (Arnove & Torres, 1999). In the twenty-first century, education systems worldwide have displayed a pattern of convergence found in school structures, goals, and curricula. Moreover, national education systems show remarkable similarities, despite different economic and political circumstances (Wit, 2002). This phenomenon is just one of many surfacing symptoms of globalization in education.

The global framework expands our understanding of the contemporary world (Friedman, 2000; Torres, 1998). Globalization is the major change agent in the twenty-first century. Logistically, globalization is the process by which a given dimension of society acquires the technological and organizational potential to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale (Castells, 1994). To put it simply, globalization means living in the shrinking world. For a scientist, it means the collapsing of all frontiers, the compression of space and time. To systematize our knowledge, the United Nations listed six key trends of globalization: the spread of liberal democracy; the dominance of market forces; the integration of the global economy; the transformation of production systems and labor markets; the speed of technological change; and the media revolution and consumerism UNRISD, United Nation Research Institute for Social Development (1995). In the 1990s, the globalization theory has replaced the Cold War ideology of two competing superpowers (Cusher & McClelland, 2006). Today we live in the more peaceful times of market integration and cooperation.

This article is a direct response to the University of Central Florida's invitation to improve the quality of multicultural courses for UCF students studying at the College of Education. A primary and secondary student population in Florida is becoming multicultural and multilingual. A variety of students' cultural background has forced the educators in Florida to redefine and redesign educational courses at the university level. This research was guided by my belief that postmodern citizens live in the interconnected world. In the twenty-first century, it takes a global village to raise a child. By extension, this process should be guided by a culturally proficient teacher. The increasing cultural diversity in Central Florida calls for qualitatively different multicultural approaches to teacher training. Today, teacher training should include an awareness of social and cultural diversity. In the interdependent world, the responsibility of American schools is to prepare graduates for the future interactions with diverse populations. Transnational and multicultural habits of mind are essential capabilities in the new millennium. Living in a global village has impacted all of us. For example, the September 2008 stock market collapse at Wall Street has impacted markets in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Worldwide,

globalization has caused the inexorable integration of markets and communication technologies. It has brought a tremendous change in the way people across the planet educate their children.

2 Multicultural Pedagogy – a Global Imperative

For decades, schooling was a small-scale national enterprise with local consequences. In the twenty-first century, sweeping forces of globalization have changed the ways the educational enterprise works. In today's global village, the national borders have become blurred and insignificant. In such an interdependent world, the responsibility of schools is to prepare students for the interactions with diverse populations. Schools are being asked to increase their teaching of international development issues to empower children to change the world (BBC News Online, 2008). The International Development Secretary, Clare Short, has announced a strategy to educate children in the UK and to understand the key global considerations which shape their lives.

How to start global enculturation at schools? How to respond to a new global order? No doubt, educators should take action. For example, they should adjust to these new worldly conditions by designing the state-of-the art courses in multicultural education for teachers and students. In 2006–2008, I have developed a new global syllabus for UCF undergraduate students. I selected *Human Diversity in Education: An Integrative Approach* (Cusher & McClelland, 2006) as a leading textbook. This innovative book offers a fresh perspective on multicultural education. It recognizes the important fact that education is undergoing a major societal transformation (Chapter 1). Also, it expands the traditional definition of culture (Chapter 3). The authors acknowledge that the classrooms are dynamic places. More important the authors assume the classrooms are global communities in micro-scale (Chapter 6). They underline an importance of teaching with a global purpose (page 213). This textbook embraces both concepts multiculturalism and globalization. It redefines our old-fashioned definition of *culture.*

It is important to acknowledge that multicultural education hosts both cultural and global perspectives under one roof. Education for a global perspective helps students better comprehend their own place in the global community and make effective judgment about other people. A global perspective means the development of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to live effectively in a world characterized by limited natural resources, ethnic diversity, cultural pluralism, and increasing interdependence. *Multicultural education* expresses the idea of multiplicity of cultures. It refers to evolving cultural values and norms under the conditions of globalization. Rapidity of change brings confusion and renders our modern definition of culture obsolete. If the purpose of multicultural education is to prepare our students to live and work in diverse societies, then we must redefine the classic term *culture* to fit it into the postmodern conditions. Traditionally, *culture* is most commonly viewed as a pattern of knowledge, skills, behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs, as well as material artifacts, produced by a human society and transmitted from one

generation to another. Culture is the whole of humanity's intellectual, social, technological, political, economic, moral, religious, and esthetic accomplishments (Pai & Adler, 2001). Culture is like a map, not only in a geophysical but also in a sociological sense. A map is not just the territory but an abstract description of trends toward uniformity in the words, deeds, and artifacts of a human group. Under globalization, it is harder to distinguish social groups. In fact, we share many cultural features and characteristics of a new group of globetrotters. In a traditional description, each culture has its unique value system. In a new era, values and norms of global village have become a dominant cultural system. Castells (1994), in his formidable trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, offers a vision of interconnected economies and cultures. For Marshall McLuhan, *a global village* is a reality in which cross-cultural contact is the norm.

If postmodern culture is global, we must view schooling as a part of global acculturation. Multicultural/global education should be a fundamental building block for successful global relationships. In the Unites States, an imperative of working globally is forced by two major factors. The first is a rapid shift in demographic make-up of an American population and the second is a global economic competition. The United States has just experienced the greatest immigration wave in its history. The new Americans have arrived from Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Today, about one in ten Americans is foreign born (Sadker & Zittleman, 2007). Demographers have drawn a portrait of highly diverse American population. By 2030, the number of American residents who are nonwhite or Hispanic will be about 40% of the U.S. population. By 2020, students of color will comprise nearly 50% of the elementary and secondary school population. In many urban classrooms, students of color already constitute 70–90% of the students.

3 Action Research as a Reflection of My Personal Journey

I am a curious person. Working on research projects reflects not only my professional interests, but also my personality type. I have been working as a researcher for many years. However, this is my first independent "action research project." I start this section by making distinctions between research and action researching. Research is a process of systematic investigation leading to increased understanding of a phenomenon or issue of interest. Action research is a small-scale, direct answer to the research problem. It is a form of self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations. It examines the rationality and justice of their own social and educational practices, as well as understanding of these practices and the situations in which these practices are carried out (Kemmis & McTaggart, 1988, p. 6). The distinctive feature of action research is its immediate application. New understanding can be utilized right away to solve a problem at hand (Stringer & Dwyer, 2005). Accordingly, action research assisted me to find new curricular solutions for my classrooms in the academic years 2006–2008. It took place in the social context of the university and in the geographical context of southern United States (Florida).

Conducting educational research requires extensive preparation and knowledge of schooling and a high level of cultural proficiency. As an immigrant and a globetrotter, I have acquired multicultural knowledge first-hand. Personal experiences, subjectivity, and a level of political engagement played a vital role in this search. I have acknowledged my specific cultural background: my cross-cultural Polish, Canadian, and American roots. Personal experiences did matter. I was raised and educated in a communist country. My Polish family was upper middle-class. Thanks to perseverance, I obtained several university degrees in Poland, Egypt, and Canada. My ethnic background, SES and a level of education have influenced my position and social orientation and, in turn, influenced the kinds of research that I produced.

Here, I would like to present my personal journey in a 10-min time capsule. I have spent many years living in big urban places such as Warsaw, Cairo, Toronto, Washington, DC, and Orlando. Throughout my life, I was exposed to multicultural crowds and metropolitan lifestyles. I have encountered a multicultural atmosphere of Toronto and Washington, DC, truly cosmopolitan cities. Washington, DC is a typical postmodern city, a place in which life revolves around making money, shopping, dressing up, and showing off. After living for such a long time in big cities, today I stay away from the stressful pace of metropolitan life. I find pleasures in gardening, sailing, exercise, and many other natural things. In 2006, I moved to sunny Florida. I live in the tiny village of Christmas near Orlando. Moving to Florida symbolizes the beginning of the quiet, reflective stage in my life. In downtown Toronto, I lived amidst the concrete and steel. I longed for expanses of green. In Florida, I decided on a house in the forest to escape to the natural beauty and tranquility of a subtropical jungle.

Over the years, my professional interests have also crystallized and stabilized. At the University of Toronto, I worked on many international projects, developing new teaching methods for elementary and secondary schools. My futuristic vision of multicultural/global education was inspired by the Ford Foundation project on Global Citizenship Education in 11 countries (Motani & Selby, 2004). In 2004, I worked as an adjunct professor at the American University in Washington, DC. In the capital city, my students were very interested in international politics and the world. Many of them worked for the U.S. government and international organizations. They displayed job-related interests in international affairs. In 2006, I moved south to teach undergraduate courses in multicultural education at the University of Central Florida. My first observation was that a knowledge gap between my Washington and Orlando students was enormous. I noticed that my UCF undergraduate students had a limited knowledge of the world. I found this situation alarming and disturbing. This state of affairs prompted me to design this intervention.

4 Research Design

I approached this university project with a "postmodern mindset." The postmodern mind is an open-ended, indeterminate set of attitudes that has been fashioned by a great diversity of intellectual and cultural currents (Tarnas, 1991). The postmodern

design is an integral feature of on-campus action research. It is a major tool of my scientific inquiry into multicultural education. Action research employs qualitative processes of interpretation as a central dynamic of investigation (Stringer & Dwyer, 2005). Here, its purpose is to describe and give meaning to events, showing how a set of events or phenomena is perceived and interpreted by students and teachers in the school setting. At UCF, undergraduate students have been the key role-players and interpreters.

This research intervention takes place on the UCF main campus in Orlando. In 2006–2008, I have obtained university grants to modify the existing course EDG 2701 *Teaching Diverse Populations* and to design a brand new course SSE 5391 on *Globalization and Education.* Dr. Elisabeth Sommer, an Academic Interdisciplinary Fellow, joined me in teaching these courses. Dr. Sommer, an expert on cross-cultural communication, offered linguistic perspective on communication, diversity, and interdisciplinary study. A team teaching method was ideal in the university setting. Over the 2-year period, we worked with over 600 undergraduate students in 12 different classrooms. In my first year (fall 2006), I taught three courses in multicultural education. Initially, Dr. Sommer and I have introduced new themes and activities. After this trial and errors period, we redesigned the course in December 2006. In the academic year of 2007–2008, we offered a revised course. In 2008, capitalizing on our success with EDG 2701, we expanded the university global curriculum by adding two brand new courses on globalization and education. Thanks to extra funding from the UCF Office of International Studies, we developed innovative courses on globalization and education for both graduate and undergraduate students.

Overall, our students were satisfied with the new multicultural curriculum. A very high rating is a direct indicator of our success. Over 90% of participating students evaluated new EDG 2701 as outstanding. Thanks to this positive feedback, I was invited to design advanced global courses at the graduate/professional level. The new SSE 5391 *Global Education: Developing a Global Perspective* will help students to further explore their interests in global education and cross-cultural communication. This course is aimed at providing graduate students with the knowledge, skills, and tools in the international/comparative field. The main goal of SSE 5391 is to prepare future teachers for the global interactions. Thanks to our marketing efforts, the new course has become a CORE CURRICULUM course in the Graduate Certificate in International and Comparative Education Program. This course was added to the spring 2009 catalog as one of five mandatory courses in the international certificate program at the College of Education. A Graduate Certificate in International and Comparative education offers training to education professionals who wish to work in the international field. *Global Education: Developing a Global Perspective* has become a logical extension of the 2006 action research project. It symbolizes our victory as researchers and practitioners. It confirms that action research is a meaningful and practical tool of academic inquiry available to university professors. In a much broader sense, it is a triumph of global, postmodern thinking in southern American states. The innovative SSE 5391 employs an interdisciplinary mode of delivery, reaching across several social

science disciplines, e.g., linguistics, education, political science, environmental studies, and economics. Interactivity and interconnectivity are attractive methodological dimensions of these courses. In my view, both courses, basic EDG 2701 and advanced SSE, have a great replication potential. They can be used with education students at other colleges in the Unites States.

5 Our Approaches to Teaching Diverse Population (EDG 2701)

Florida's future teachers need to demonstrate a depth of cultural awareness and develop effective responses to difference. At UCF, EDG 2701 is an introductory course focusing on social and cultural issues in multicultural education. With the help of Dr. Elisabeth Sommer, I added more interdisciplinary and international perspectives to the existing programming. Our plan was to incorporate more global themes to the theoretical sessions and to introduce practical sessions with hands-on activities.

In the new EDG 2701, students transcend over the cultural barriers by learning about the world and its citizens. Thanks to the rich international context, students develop a better understanding of the complexity of education and globalization. They develop skills in cross-cultural interactions at the school level. We focus on cultural universals, those things all humans have in common. We learn how to promote equity and social justice and improve inter-group relations. It is important to build communities across cultures in order to reduce stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. The UCF students learn how to recognize and confront inequalities in Florida's schools.

We believe in learning by doing. During our classroom debates, we address global and local power dynamics, race theories, and critical pedagogy and human rights. During our practical sessions, we develop hands-on activities to practice multicultural teaching strategies. We also engage in a creative process of designing a multicultural study unit. EDG 2701 includes a direct field experience. The UCF students have to complete 15 h of observation in three different settings. They are expected to spend 5 h with ESOL students, 5 h with ESE students, and 5 h with alternative/at risk/ethnic education students. Service learning is a special feature of Florida multicultural training. The state of Florida stipulates that new teachers should have proficiencies and practices related to multicultural education. Service Learning is a practical way of acquiring cross-cultural competencies at local elementary and secondary schools. The UCF and its school partners collaborate on the design of field experiences and clinical experiences. While the field experience placements generally include students with exceptionalities and students from diverse ethnic, racial, gender, and socioeconomic groups, student diversity is specifically addressed in EDG 2701. The field experience placements for this course must include working with ESOL and lower socioeconomic level students.

6 Walt Disney and Space Center

In the twenty-century, Florida has become an international hub of tourism and space industries. Orlando is a busy multicultural city. Floridians deal with cultural differences on the daily basis. They meet interesting multicolor people at the restaurant, at the beach, and at the workplace. The crossroads location of the University of Central Florida justifies the need for multicultural training. Here I share some geopolitical and economic factors that add validity to action research methodology. Orlando is growing rapidly. The city is best known for world class attractions. Over 48 million of visitors came to this area in 2004. The city of Orlando is the largest inland city in Florida with over 200,000 inhabitants. The greater area of Metro Orlando is currently the 28th largest metro area in the United States. Thanks to Walt Disney Resort and two international airports, this area has a great deal of international exposure. Also, neighboring Volusia and Brevard counties are experiencing an explosive growth. Brevard County's major attractions are the Kennedy Space Center and coastal areas. Central Florida has a warm and humid climate, perfect for colorful subtropical plants and flowers. The Orlando area is known for picturesque lakes. The Space Coast is famous for pristine ocean shores.

People of Central Florida enjoy many benefits of the balmy weather and the strong economy. The major industries are tourism, manufacturing, high tech, research, film, and television (Universal Studios). According to the 2000 census, the racial makeup of the city was 61% White, 27% African-American, and 18% Hispanic or Latino of any race. Orlando has a large population of Puerto Ricans, Colombians, Venezuelans, Haitians, Indians, and Vietnamese, among others, and a growing number of Russian and British residents. The city has a large and increasing number of Hispanic residents which is reflected by the abundance of Hispanic-themed restaurants and radio stations. Orlando is home to many Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and lately Russians.

The University of Central Florida is a public metropolitan research university, dedicated to serving its surrounding communities with their diverse and expanding populations, technological corridors, and international partnerships (UCF Accreditation Report, 2005). UCF is in the Orlando suburbs in the eastern high tech corridor. Established in 1963, UCF is one of the Florida's 11 public universities. According to Carnegie Classification, this research-based university offers 95 Baccalaureate programs, 96 Master's programs, and 25 Doctoral programs. Fall 2006 headcount enrollment was over 46,000 students. According to the University Diversity Profile, over 70% of students were White, Non-Hispanic, about 13% Hispanic, and over 8% Black. The main campus is located in Orlando, Orange County.

7 An Innovative Multicultural Curriculum

University teachers have been always working on improving a multicultural curriculum in colleges and universities. In fact, the process of curriculum transformation is never ending (Banks & McGee Banks, 2005). It is up to us as university

teachers to design new theoretical underpinnings of multiculturalism. In the past, American educators have been guided by Banks' four progressive approaches to multicultural education (Banks, 2002). Four levels of integration of multicultural education express a societal progression from passivity toward activity. Banks' initial contribution approach proposes the insertion of ethnic heroes and discrete cultural artifacts into the curriculum. The second additive approach introduces content, concepts, themes, and perspectives to the basic curriculum. At the level one and two, the mainstream curriculum remains unchanged in its goals and structure. The third, transformative approach differs fundamentally; the structure of the curriculum is changed to enable students to view concepts, issues, and themes from the perspective of diverse ethnic and cultural groups. For example, when subjects such as music, dance, and literature are studied, the teacher shows how ethnic groups influenced the country's artistic and literary traditions. The emphasis is on how the common U.S. culture and society emerged from the process of multiple acculturations. The fourth, social action approach incorporates active components that require students to make decisions and take actions. In the classroom situations, Banks' classic four approaches are often customized and blended. However, Banks' classical conceptualization reflects the social realities of the 1990s.

In the new social and economic realities of the global world, we need to revise this classic multicultural model. I propose to enrich Banks' model by adding the fifth approach. It could be named *the global acculturation approach.* The fifth level reflects the global environment. Today, teaching has transcended the national boundaries. The fifth stage is an educational answer to the new global order. For centuries, teaching has been a local activity. Teachers have always operated on the small scale of classrooms and local communities. Therefore, it has been hard for educators to think on a worldwide scale and make connections between local action and global consequences (Arnove & Torres, 1999). Multicultural educators, who are, by definition, more exposed to multiple cultures, are more willing to incorporate global framework into teaching.

For example, businessmen, journalists, and economists are much more exposed to the outside world. Working as a foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*, Thomas Friedman reflected, "The more I traveled, though, the more it became apparent to me that we were not just in some messy, incoherent, indefinable post-War world. Rather, we were in a new international system. This new system had its own logic, rules, pressures and initiatives, and it deserves its own name: 'globalization.'" (Friedman, 2000, p. 6)

Globalization is the best framework for understanding contemporary politics, economy, culture, and by extension education. Is schooling becoming borderless in the new millennium? Can we talk about the globalization of education? Yes, we can. A deep penetration into traditionally state controlled education system is contributed to workings of globalization. Spontaneous homogenization and planned convergence has been taking place in education in the post-Cold-War on an unprecedented scale. Globalization is transforming teaching and learning around the world as the new global order slowly seeps into the consciousness of contemporary educators (Burbules & Torres, 2000).

Apart from understanding the new global order's influence on education, it is also important to understand globalization's essential asymmetry (Brzezinski, 1997). The new global order is a distinctively American design. On today's chessboard of nation-states, American dominance in the four decisive domains of global power – military, economic, technological, and cultural – is unquestionable. America also dominates in the field of education. For example, Americanization of education and culture is one of the most noticeable trends in Eastern Europe (Kochan, 2006). In transitional states, globalization erodes congruity between the economy, polity, and culture (Cunningham & Jacka, 1996). The transitional state tends to decentralize their institutions. This process undermines the state's ability to consolidate its power and provide its own blueprint for national education.

In university courses EDG 2701 and SSE 5391, we use an overarching framework of globalization and global culture to discuss local and global dynamics. What does it mean to live in a globally connected society? What are some basic concepts that underlie an international or global perspective? What are practical strategies that future teachers use to prepare students to better understand and interact with others not only in the United States, but also around the world? I start a lecture with an overarching concept of global culture, then narrow it down to national cultures, Florida culture, corporate culture, and campus culture. To exemplify the global trends, we share many examples of global business cultures (Googman, 2006). My co-lecturer, Dr. Bettie Sommer, discusses an importance of languages and linguistic barriers in cross-cultural communication. Learning intercultural communication is a three step process: awareness, knowledge, and skills. The first step, awareness, means that we are brought up with different worldviews. We discussed many practical, interdisciplinary implications of globalization; the most obvious one is an appearance of borderless business (Mann & Gotz, 2006). Globalization has become a new point of reference in both economic and cultural respects. Economically, the "deep integration" among economies resulting from international investment and technology flows is blurring boundaries between nations. The economic performance, per capita incomes, and competitiveness of countries as well are measures by global comparisons. By extension, the countries' educational performance is measured by global comparison in education (comparative education). We also discuss our participation in the global march through travel, communication, Internet, entertainment, and mass migration. In a cultural sense, the United States has become a global aspiration disembodied from its geography and politics. Thomas Friedman says that "globalization is a means for spreading the fantasy of America around the world." As Govindarajan and Gupta (2001) interpret, Americans transform global presence into global competitive advantage.

During the classroom debates, we ask our students to explore the global/local consequences at the personal level. What do we mean when we say that we live in an increasingly global world? If you are a student, it means that you can travel cheap internationally. It means that you can talk with all your international friends. The emergence of the digital era has bridged distance among people. If you are a Hollywood producer, it means that your market is a global market and your movie will be presented in many countries and your fame is global.

One of my thematic and methodological objectives is to develop critical thinking skills as applied to the current global matrix. The debate on pros and cons of globalization in the context of dialectics of global and local serves this purpose. Globalization unifies and divides people. Corporate globalization divides people along axis of class, gender, economic inequality, religion, and geopolitical location. Shiva (2005, p. 1) writes in her article *The Polarized World of Globalization. A Response to Friedman's Flat Earth Hypothesis*:

> When you look at the world perched on heights of arrogant, blind power, separated and disconnected from those who have lost their livelihoods, lifestyles, and lives – farmers and workers everywhere – it is easy to be blind both to the valleys of poverty and the mountains of affluence …. From his microcosm of privilege, exclusion, blindness he shuts out both the beauty of diversity and the brutality of explosion and inequality, he shuts out the social and ecological externalities of economic globalization and free trade, he shuts out the walls that globalization is building – walls of insecurity and hatred and fear – walls of "intellectual property", walls of privatization.

In my classrooms, I stress an interdisciplinary character of globalization and global culture, presenting examples from many disciplines. Globalization is best understood as a concept that transcends individual disciplines. It is a phenomenon that manifests the extreme intricate interconnectedness of human life across the planet. One of the most convincing examples I offer my undergraduate students is an environmental phenomenon of *global warming*. Driving fancy vans in the United States and cutting trees in the Amazon jungle are directly related to the crops and hunger in India or Sudan through climate changes. For an environmentalist, holding a global vision has become the necessary condition for strategic planning.

The debates, lectures, and group discussions help broaden students' horizons. Visuals materials supplement discussions and appeal to students' emotions and stimulate imagination. Based on students' and educators' recommendations, we introduce interesting movies, documentaries, news excerpts with international contexts. *Hotel Rwanda* is one of many examples. This inspirational film gives an international example of ethnic prejudice in action. It gives students a much broader perspective on race and ethnicity. American teachers should understand the role of race t in students' lives, in an American society, and global community at large. With explicit images of ethnic hatred, *Hotel Rwanda* allows college students to understand the profound impact of race and ethnicity in African countries. In the movie, the ethnic divisions between Tutsi and Hutu are historically and culturally constructed (Cusher & McClelland, 2006).

8 Innovative Teaching Methods

Culture is a fascinating topic to teach. Probably the best way to teach about cultures is to prepare interesting and meaningful lessons that engage all students. Under these conditions, students do not have time to misbehave or be alienated because they are so wrapped in a learning process (Martin & Loomis, 2007).

At UCF, college students are "demanding customers." Paying so much in tuition, they expect to obtain knowledge and skills that are practical. In the United States, college students expect to be taught in ways that are effective and engaging. Therefore, I attempt to make the curriculum, instruction, and assessment meaningful and interesting. The objective is to enrich and customize the state-prescribed curriculum in multicultural education. In 2006, I used one of the most popular textbooks on the American market, *Multicultural Education of Children and Adolescent* (Manning & Baruth, 2004). It gave us a basic structure, predictability, and accountability. This textbook was suitable for covering basic cross-cultural competencies as required by the state of Florida. However, it did not contain international themes or examples. It presented cultures from an American perspective. In 2007, I switched to the textbook that included the "global chapters." The new textbook, *Human Diversity in Education: An Integrative Approach*, perceives the classroom as a global community (Cusher & McClelland, 2006).

Since 2007, this textbook has served as our reference point. Apart from the official textbooks, I use a variety of formal and informal sources of information. My favorite is the student-based curriculum that reflects students' interests and methodological choices. Working together on a new syllabus was also the best-selling classroom strategy among undergraduate students. The College of Education students were actively engaged in re-designing the 2701 course. They took this activity very seriously and customized the course to suit their personal needs. No wonder, students like to be in charge, to be decision-makers instead of the curriculum-followers. About 500 undergraduate students, divided into 70 groups, participated in these intro activities. At the beginning of the semester, the first task was to prepare students' *wish lists* for the instructor. To start, I ask students about their favorite modes of learning; in other words, how would you like me to teach this course? I ask students to work in small groups and design a syllabus for their classes. Usually, college students approached this task very seriously because their final grades are at stake. Given a choice, they like to learn in a stimulating environment.

So far, the most consistent pattern is that a majority of students prefer teamwork. They envision working with their colleagues on projects, assignments, and small group discussions. This strong preference for cooperative learning comes as no surprise. *Cooperative learning*, an instructional strategy that involves students working collaboratively in groups with little teacher supervision, is popular among university students (Putnam, 1998). University students thrive on social interactions inside and outside campus. Cooperative learning allows students to work in a group that is diverse in academic performance, as well as race, gender, and language proficiency. The desire to have peer interactions is generally strong among undergraduate students.

At the university level, cooperative learning can be done in many different ways. In the Student Teams Achievement Divisions (STAD) model, a professor presents a lecture to the whole class. Following the initial presentation, students are organized in several "round table-teams." Teams can also compete in many games, quizzes, and tournaments (Slavin, 1990). Each team is given 30 min to study the topic in detail. Cooperative learning can supplement a lecture-style teaching. As a matter of fact, my students were very chatty but productive working in groups. Many freshmen

do not wish to be exposed (answering questions or have a formal presentation) in front of the whole class. As a graduate student at OISE/University of Toronto, I participated in interesting group debates. Our instructor Paula Stanovich, an excellent educator and psychologist, encouraged us to discuss educational problems in small groups. I remember vividly that I liked this format very much. I gave me an opportunity to share my opinions without being exposed. As a first generation immigrant who spoke with a heavy accent, it was very important to have this unique, stress-free opportunity to share ideas.

The second important research discovery is related to hands-on activities. It reinforces our instinctive behavior, our human desire to practice, to compete, and to excel. We all like learning by doing. And yet, university professors rarely exercise this common sense option. For example, I teach in a brand new building; a new blue glass and silver steel structure. An impressive, postmodern design! We do have an integrated multifunction technology system in each classroom ready for DVD, computer or Power Point presentations. In my daily teaching, I utilize high-tech equipment. But I think that our students have fun with school materials (crayons, scissors, play-doh, coloring paper, and building block). I am not kidding; in their stressful and very serious lives, students need an outlet for play and creativity. In my classes, we discussed an importance of play at schools. My suggestion is that at the university level we should model for future teachers hands-on activities. Our task is not to lecture about an importance of play, music, and arts and crafts. Our task is to engage them in school-like activities to show them true values of these attractive teaching tools. I overheard students' conversations that in 2701 they were allowed to get dirty and play-like kids. We usually divide an allocated 3-h long session into theoretical and vocational part. In the first part, we listen and talk. In the second part, we play and experiment. This division has to do with psychological and physiological factors as well. Optimally, the students like to listen to short, structured lectures for 20–40 min. They like to discuss issues in small groups for 20–40 min. They like to watch short, interesting movies and documentaries. Most people like a variety and changes in their daily routines. At the same time, students feel secure having structures in a predictable environment. The most important task of the instructor is to have a right combination of secured predictable activities and challenging ones. In education, a teacher's flexibility is crucial. On a rainy gloomy morning, a long movie would be a good choice. Students react to the weather, heavy traffic, and low pressure. There is no way you get your students genuinely involved with the world politics at 7:30 in the morning. You have to realize that at 7:30 your students are driven by basic instinct (hunger and sleep deprivation) and they are merely struggling to stake awake. By contrast, on Fridays at 10:30 students are mostly in a good mood. A great part of American work culture is that we love Fridays in expectation of a long weekend. This cultural and physiological phenomenon allows the teachers to have great classes on Fridays. The weather can have a similar impact on our students. I always try to schedule meaningful outdoors activities (e.g., a nature hunt, a photo session, interviews with diverse students, cultural events on campus) accordingly. On a bright sunny day, students have a natural desire to explore outdoors; on a gloomy rainy day they prefer the indoors.

Flexibility is also important when selecting award-winning activities for students. For example, music always invigorates young people. One of my favorite multicultural activities was *a music show***.** This activity of my own design let us explore the global world of music. The idea was to understand culture though the universal language of music. I asked my students to bring their favorite international CDs and tell us more about this type of music. I asked them to learn more about the country of origin. This proved to be very engaging activities since almost all students share a great passion for music. This activity allowed my students to express their interests in music in an original and unrestricted way. In no time, the students took over the class, sharing favorite CDs.

My recipe for sharing political ideas is to provoke a heated discussion. In the section, *Understanding Arab Americans*, I show how the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war in Iraq alter what we do in schools. This serves as an opportunity to explore dialects of global and local in the educational contexts. Live CNN coverage, newspapers, and documentaries can be used to provoke ad hoc heated debate. For example, I use a book *Why do people hate America?* by Sardar and Davis (2003). This book is highly critical of the United States foreign policy. Students, who are normally disinterested in global politics, respond to this book. The authors openly provoke Americans to respond and take a stand. After reading the excerpts from this book, many students felt the need to either defend or further accuse American decision-makers. The provocative fragments meant to stimulate a heated debate in the classroom. Here are some accusative excerpts that forced students to take a stand and to defend or accuse the government and its foreign policy:

> The trauma of 9/11 has produced no change. In September 2002, only about 26% Americans surveyed said they followed foreign news "very closely," while 45% said international events did not affect them….
>
> The targets of attack on 9/11 were deliberate, and their selection directly related to the question of why people hate America. The World Trade Center, when built the tallest skyscraper in the world, as a symbol of the global economy in a globalized economic order. It has its foundations deep in the soil of the most cosmopolitan city in the richest nation on Earth. The Pentagon is the command center of the military might of the most powerful nation in human history ….
>
> Most Americans are simply not aware of the impact of their culture and their government's policies on the rest of the world ….
>
> No society is more open than America, more blessed with the means of communication, the resources to learn and to know, to express and project its ideas. Yet, the product of this enormous American Infrastructure – its media – is intensely inward looking and self-absorbed ….
>
> The "one-way message" that the US sends out to the rest of the world is that its own cultural and social reality is the only reality that really matters. Just because Americans eat on average three burgers a week…then the rest of the world's people should also eat burgers …. But hamburgers chains do not just impose hamburgers on the world. They also carry with them the principles and processes that lie at the base of fast-food restaurants: clinical efficiency, total predictability, callous calculability and complete control through the replacement of humans with non-human technology ….
>
> The Unites States government demonizes and imposes sanctions against other states, such as Iraq, that develop or hold stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. Yet, it has the world's largest stockpile of smallpox, anthrax, and other biological weapons ….
>
> Is being a Muslim American any different from being, say, an Irish or Italian American? Should Muslims pay a price simply for being Muslims?

One of the most stimulating sessions was devoted to children's literature. My goal was to show my students a variety of resources available to them. With the greater availability of multicultural literature in all genres of children's literature, the prospective teachers can create many multicultural activities (Sadler, 2002). For example, the book *Multicultural Friendships Stories and Activities for Children Ages 5–14* by Roberts (1998) provides teachers with ready-to-use, age-appropriate, multicultural lesson plans.

BOOK 3.6 THE PEACE CRANE (119)

Ages: 7–8

Heritage: African-American/Multicultural.

Goals: To relate the concept of friendship to a world view of people; to develop and expand vocabulary related to literature; to portray an act of friendship and peace through artwork; to participate in friendship groups.

Materials: Copy of *The peace Crane*, art paper, crayons, markers, paints.

Activities: ***(World Collage)*** Have the children look through magazines, newspapers, and brochures and cut out illustrations to prepare a collage that shows how they would interact as friends with others around the world.

The Peace Crane emphasizes a worldwide view of the needs of people. An African-American girl foldsher wishes for peace into a paper crane. Later, the peace crane visits her in a dream and takes her on a flight over farms, hills, and landscapes to see people and ways they care and show benevolence. The flight of the bird takes the girl away from the violence of her world and allows her to see the goodness of people who want to be part of a caring Earth without weapons and acts of violence.

9 Summary

Effective and innovative outcomes emerge when participants (in our case – prospective teachers) are actively involved in the search for solutions (Stringer & Dwyer, 2005). This search for solution is never ending. In other words, keep working and keep improving. The cyclical nature of action research calls for *Everyday Evaluation on the Run* (Wadsworth, 1997). Action research inquiry and monthly process of evaluation (examinations, quizzes, and projects) assist us in building our common understanding of the worth of new activities we introduced. Daily, weekly, and monthly observations allow for on-going evaluation of existing practices. For a university professor, it is important to ask questions. How are we doing? What is working? What should we change? What else should we do? Normally, our students assume the ownership of a student-prepared curriculum. If something did not work, they approached me and we introduced changes right away. In 2006–2008, students' feedback, the essay-type examinations and reflection papers helped me improve my teaching and select powerful teaching methods.

My ultimate test would be to answer the following questions: Have I empowered my students? Have I encouraged them to take action? Multicultural education is an approach to empower all students through teaching and learning (Nieto, 2000; Rasool & Curtis, 2000). Have I empowered my students enough to understand pluralism and to take action for social justice? At the end of 2701course, my students were better prepared to deal with human diversity. Also, infusion of global perspectives into 2701, prepared my students for diversity, equity, and interconnectedness beyond their own communities, in the world. As a result of 2701 course, my students were more knowledgeable and more sensitive about social, ethnic, and cultural differences. Some of my Florida students are ready for social activism and political engagement. In reflection papers, many students declared a desire to teach and to make a difference in students' lives. A review of their reflection papers suggest that cross-cultural experiential learning brought positive results. In a globally oriented 2701, teachers made curricular connections between global and multicultural education.

10 Conclusion

Global and multicultural education goes hand in hand. Global and multicultural education overlaps to develop multiple perspectives and interdisciplinary outlooks. Therefore, infusing global motives into standard multicultural education courses can be the best way to for American teachers to gain multicultural/global proficiency. Education for a global perspective must involve teaching with a global purpose, a *sine qua non* condition of post-modernity. In post-modernity, the human experience is a global phenomenon in which people are constantly being influenced by transnational, cross-cultural, and multicultural interaction. In my class, students gained the planet awareness and cross-cultural awareness. They gained better understanding of economic, political, and social conditions outside the United States.

Subtitles: Cultural competency for American teachers: how to design interdisciplinary multicultural courses for teachers. How to infuse the global content into existing multicultural programs at teachers colleges.

References

Arnove, R. F., & Torres, C. A. (Eds.). (1999). *Comparative education. The dialect of the global and local.* Rowman & Littlefield.

Avery, P. G., & Hann, C. L. (2004). Diversity and U.S. 14 year-olds' knowledge, attitudes, and experiences. In W. G. Stephan & W. P. Vogt (Eds.), *Education programs for improving intergroup relations: Theory, research and practice* (pp. 195–210). New York: Teachers College Press.

Banks, J. A. (2002). *An introduction to multicultural education*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Banks, J. A., & McGee Banks, C. A. (2005). *Multicultural education. Issues and perspectives*. New York: Wiley.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1996). *Democracy and capitalism. Property, community, and modern social thought*. New York: Basic Books.
Brzezinski, Z. (1997). *The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives*. New York: Basic Books.
Brzezinski, Z. (2004). *The choice: Global domination or global leadership?*. New York: Basic Books.
Burbules, N. C., & Torres, C. A. (eds). (2000). *Globalization and education. Critical perspectives*. New York: Rutledge.
Castells, M. (1994). *The information age, economy, society, and culture*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Clegg, S. R., Ibarra-Colado, E., & Bueno-Rodriquez, L. (eds). (1999). *Global management. Universal theories and local realities*. London: Sage Publications.
Cunningham, S., & Jacka, E. (1996). *Australian television and international mediascapes*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Cusher, K., & McClelland, P. (2006). *Human diversity in education. An integrative approach*. McGraw Hill Higher Education: New York.
Derrida, J. (1987). *The post card: From Socrates to Freud and beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Elashmawi, F. (2001). *Competing globally: Mastering multicultural management and negotiations*. London: Butterworth Heinemann.
Friedman, T. (2000). *The lexus and the olive tree: Understanding globalization*. New York: Anchor Books.
Gollnick, D. M., & Chinn, P. C. (2006). *Multicultural education in a pluralistic society*. New York: Pearson Merrill/Prentice Hall.
Googman, M. B. (2006). *Work with anyone anywhere. A guide to global business.* Belmont, CA:
Govindarajan, V., & Gupta, A. K. (2001). *The quest for global dominance. Transforming global presence into global competitive advantage.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. (Professional Publications, Inc.)
Gutek, G. L. (2006). *American education in a global society: International and comparative perspectives*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Kemmis, S., & McTaggart, R. (1988). *The action research planner*. Geelong, Melbourne: Deakin University Press.
Kochan, A. B. (2006) *The decade of uncertainty. Educational change in Poland.* Doctoral Dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. Toronto: University of Toronto.
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). *The structure of scientific revolution*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lynch, J. (1989). *Multicultural education in a global society*. New York: Falmer Press.
Mann, C. J., & Gotz, K. (2006). *Borderless business. Managing the far-flung enterprise*. New York: Praeger.
Manning, M. L., & Baruth, L. G. (2004). *Multicultural education of children and adolescent.* Pearson Education.
Martin, D. J., & Loomis, K. S. (2007). *Building teachers. A constructivist approach to introducing education*. New York: Thomas Wadsworth.
Merryfield, M. M., Jarchow, E., & Pickert, S. (Eds.). (1996). *Preparing teachers to teach global perspectives*. Corwin Press, Inc. A Sage Publications Company.
Moore, F. (2005). *Transnational business cultures*. London: Ashgate.
Motani, Y., & Selby, D. (Eds.). (2004). *Citizenship education in 11 countries.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Nieto, S. (2000). *Affirming diversity: The sociopolitical context of multicultural education*. New York: Longman.
Pai, Y., & Adler, S. (2001). *Cultural foundation of education*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merill.
Putnam, J. W. (1998). *Cooperative learning strategies for inclusion: Celebrating diversity in the classroom*. Baltimore, MD: P.H. Brookes Publisher.
Rasool, J., & Curtis, A. C. (2000). *Multicultural education in middle and secondary classrooms: Meeting the challenge of diversity and change*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Roberts, P. L. (1998). *Multicultural friendship stories and activities for children ages 5–14*. Lanham, MD, London: The Scarecrow Press.
Sadker, D. M., & Zittleman, K. R. (2007). *Teachers, schools, and society*. New York: The McGraw-Hill.
Sadler, N. (2002). *Multicultural connections. Creative writing, literature, and assessment in the elementary school*. Lanham, MD; London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Sardar, Z., & Davis, M. W. (2003). *Why do people hate America?*. New York: MJF Books.
Shiva, V. (2005). *The polarized world of globalization. A response to Friedman's flat earth hypothesis.* On-line journals on education.
Slavin, R. (1990). *Cooperative learning: Theory, research, and practice*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Stephan, W. G., & Vogt, W. P. (2004). *Education programs for improving intergroup relations, theory, research, and practice*. New York: Teachers College Press.
Stringer, E., & Dwyer, R. (2005). *Action research in human services.* Pearson Merrill Prentice Hall.
Tarnas, R. (1991). *The passion of the Western mind: Understanding the ideas that have shaped our world view*. New York: Ballantine Books.
Torres, C. A. (1998). *Democracy, education, and multiculturalism: Dilemmas of citizenship in a global world*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
UNRISD (United Nation Research Institute for Social Development. (1995). *States of disarray: The social effects of globalization.* Geneva: United Nations.
UCF Accreditation Report. (2005). University of Central Florida, College of Education.
Wadsworth, Y. (1997). *Everyday evaluation on the run*. St. Leonards, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Wit, H. D. (2002). *Internationalization of higher education in the United States of America and Europe: A historical, comparative, and conceptual analysis*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Learning to Be in the Twenty-First Century: Its Evolving Meaning and Implication in the Classroom Pedagogy

Marie-Laure Mimoun-Sorel

1 Understanding the Complexity of *Learning to Be* in the Twenty-First Century

The *learning to be* dimension was identified by UNESCO, through the Delors's Report (1996), as one of the four essential pillars of education for the twenty-first Century: *learning to know*, *learning to do*, *learning to live together* and *learning to be.* More than 10 years after the publication of the Delors Report, *learning to be* continues to be difficult to understand and apply in the classroom. As a teacher, I am responsible for preparing students to deal with ever more complex global, social and cultural challenges they will encounter in the course of their life (Zajda, 2005; Zajda, 2007a). Having a role to play in educating young people, I do not want to omit the *learning to be* dimension, defined as an essential learning for the twenty-first century. In this chapter, after reviewing the complexity of the concept of *learning to be* in the twenty-first century, I will investigate the epistemology and ontology of the *learning to be* dimension (see also Labercane, Griffith, & Tulasiewicz, 1998).

The need for *learning to be* strongly emerges when studying the context of the twenty-first century, particularly in multicultural societies where heterogeneity of cultures and values brings contradictions, disorganisation and tensions which are experienced at the individual and collective identity level (Bindé, 2004). In addition to these tensions, globalisation of the world requires human beings to conciliate the global and local within their value system (Smolicz & Secombe, 2005; Zajda, 2008a). The educational need, then, is not only content oriented emphasising technology and the sciences: education in the twenty-first century, but also requires focusing on human progress, strongly recommended by the Delors Report (1996). As knowledge is culturally based (Banks, 2002; Kron, 1998; Smolicz, 1999; Zajda, 2007a), there is a concern of sustainability for all the world community which, according to Morin (2001a), must develop an Ethics of Understanding which should start with the individual in order to recognise cultural conditionings. Morin (2001b) stresses that

M.-L. Mimoun-Sorel (✉)
Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus)

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_7,

human progress commences from introspective questioning. Even if the dynamic of the twenty-first century requires adaptation and flexibility of human beings, these qualities are essential but they are not enough. What is required is order of transformation: transformation of oneself, of our way of thinking about ourselves and the world, if we have the desire to survive as a species (Barbier, 1997; Bindé, 2004; Delors, 1996; Fullinwider, 1996; Matsuura, 2004; Morin, 2001a).

The characteristics and the dynamic of heterogeneity and sustainability demand an education oriented towards the cultivation of *wisdom* which is, according to the Delors Report (1996), 'a factor which would prevent a disaster'. Like transformation, *wisdom* requires a different way of thinking about oneself, our relationship and our connection with our environment. Looking at the recommendations of those researchers and authors addressing the complexity of the twenty-first century, I understand that wisdom could be achieved through auto-criticism, understanding of oneself and others, transformation and freeing oneself from cultural boundaries. It is clear that those recommendations represent a call for the *learning to be* dimension.

2 The Origins of "*Learning to Be*"

Learning to be in its current wording first appeared as the title of the Faure Report (1972). The commission working on the report feared that the world would be dehumanised as a result of technical change (Faure, p. xxiv) and proposed recommendations to free human beings from being seen and used essentially as productive tools for a given society, claiming that education was more 'utilitarian than cultural' (Faure, p. vi). According to the Faure Report, education should enhance the full expression of being human. Twenty-four years later, through the Delors Report (1996), UNESCO recommends four indispensable pillars for the education of the twenty-first century: *learning to know*, *learning to do*, *learning to live together and learning to be.* This report, through the pillar *learning to be*, reinforces the idea of enhancing the full expression of human being, stating that to be able to evolve in a changing world; the twenty-first century needs a variety of talents and personal qualities. The principles set out in the Faure Report are still relevant: 'the aim of development is the complete fulfillment of man in all the richness of his personality, the complexity of his forms of expression and his various commitments' (Delors, 1996, p. 95). The report emphasises that education's essential role is to offer freedom of thought, judgment, feeling and imagination (Delors, 1996, p. 94). Thought, feeling and imagination are not a process of *learning to be* in itself. It is an inherent characteristic of the human being to be able to think, feel, imagine (see Tulasiewicz & Zajda, 1998). It is a natural expression of oneself. However, freedom of thought, feeling and imagination may be considered as a process of *learning to be* if the people concerned have been oppressed by an authoritarian educational system (Zajda, 2008a). In that case *learning to be* would effectively consist of freeing the expression of oneself using different pedagogical approaches. That reflection leads us to wonder if the underlying idea within the Delors Report is that people are or have been oppressed by the educational system (Zajda, 2008b).

2.1 An Inner Journey

Within its definition of *learning to be*, the Delors Report (1996) goes beyond the aim of freeing the expression of individuals: 'Individual development (…) is a dialectical process, which starts with knowing oneself and then opens out to relationships with others. In that sense, education is an inner journey' (p. 95). The meaning of 'knowing oneself' is not very explicit in this report. If we deconstruct that phrase, 'knowing oneself' contains the notion of 'understanding' oneself. Then, the question is who is oneself? 'Oneself' is the human being. Therefore, the new phrase could be: 'understand oneself as human being'. Here we are not at the level of expression of oneself; we are at the level of understanding oneself. Therefore the process of *learning to be* is legitimate because '*knowing oneself*' is '*understanding how one works as human being*'. There is a cognitive requirement. The Delors Report gives us another indication with the phrase 'education is an inner journey' (p. 95). With the word 'journey', we have the image of 'exploration', then the *inner journey* can be understood as an 'exploration of oneself'. The process here is first to discover, then to see what is inside and around, that is, the interior dimension. 'Seeing' is the first step to be able to understand (Desjardins, 1981).

These reflections take us back to the Faure Report (1972). From its definition of *learning to be*, we can understand that dehumanisation, through behavioural conformity imposed on human beings, is not exclusively the result of technological change. Before the technological era and without the acquisition of *learning to be* in the sense of knowing oneself, human beings could have been misled, absorbing a given education without consciousness of themselves. So, dehumanisation may have started a long time ago within societies.

2.2 Understanding and Perspectives

In reading the Faure and Delors Reports, I understand that the meaning UNESCO brings to *learning to be* is mainly: freeing and developing the expression of oneself as well as 'knowing oneself' for understanding oneself. From here, because philosophy deals with interrogations on possible ways for the subject to access to the truth (Redeker, 2001), I move on to consider how it would define the *learning to be* dimension.

3 *Learning to Be* as a Dimension of Humanistic/ Existentialist Philosophy?

Even if *learning to be* used in this formulation has not been defined by philosophy, its meanings – learning to express one's potential and learning how one works as a human being – are developed in humanistic education. Aloni (2002, p. 12) emphasises that the question 'how to be a human being?' lies at the centre of humanistic discourse,

and I begin here. It makes clear that 'human beings are thinkers, scriptwriters, directors, actors and audience of the reality of their lives'. Broadly, Aloni's study of humanistic education stresses that all humanistic trends are committed to the 'humanisation' of the human kind 'by means of employing educational experiences that will enable all human beings to develop the human resources inherent in them, and live a full and dignified human life' (Aloni, 2002, p. 62). The other central idea of humanists is to free human beings from any kind of indoctrination that serves political, religious, ideological and economic ideals and interests. This idea is especially re-enforced by existentialists, considered by Aloni as a humanistic trend. Their educational approach is 'to arouse, motivate and encourage their students towards caring, interpretive, evaluative and creative involvement in their own lives' (Aloni, 2002, p. 46). Tilich (1969) identifies that educational success is demonstrated when students define themselves and create beyond themselves without losing themselves. Nietzsche (1965) suggests to young people that they seek their freedom and personal identity and create their own unique path.

3.1 Freedom and Responsibility

If we look closely at existentialist education, its answer to the central question 'how to be a human being?' is that a human being has the freedom and the responsibility for his/her self-creation. This concept of self-creation is radicalised by Sartre's (1979) assumption: 'There is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it. (…) Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself' (pp. 35–41). Sartre emphasises that the full responsibility of human being's existence rests on his/her shoulder and 'he/she can't start making excuses from himself'. According to Sartre's existentialist approach, *being* comes through experience of life: none of some form or level of authority should intent to shape it. It would be interesting to know what Sartre's definition of freedom is. In fact, an action which would be a re-action to defy any form of authority would not be an expression of being free. It would still be a conditioning. Authority is everywhere; indeed nature is authoritative in its own way. How can human beings be free of nature while being part of it, as well as being part of its constitution? Sartre extracts human beings from their interior and exterior context. He makes them totally blank. Life is full of complexity as Shakespeare wrote: 'There are more things on the earth and in the sky than within all our philosophy' (quoted in Morin, 1990, p. 177). In his way, Sartre is very dogmatic, and an education claiming the non-existence of God would still be an authoritative one.

3.2 A True Humanistic Education

As a psychologist, the humanist Maslow (1971) investigated the interior of the human being: 'education alienates human beings in the sense people are out of touch

with their own inner signals. The remedy is embodied in true humanistic education which will assist students in becoming honest with themselves, discover their unique identity and goal in life, cultivate an attentive and sensitive ear that can penetrate beyond the noise of cultural conditioning and absorb the sounds and messages that emanate from their original and inner I' (p. 184). It seems that becoming honest is first being able to really see and accept who we are. Aloni (2002) proposes the concept of 'experinsight', which stands for experiential insights, as humanistic education's basic educative units, explaining that 'these insights affect us, modify our perceptual framework and the ways in which we think, give us new eyes' (p. 113).

3.3 Understanding and Perspectives

The humanistic approach seems in harmony with the Delors Report regarding the condition in which human beings are considered in their multidimensionality and in that the understanding of the interior is not forgotten. Humanistic and existentialist approaches are concerned with the individual dimension of human existence. Expressing, knowing, understanding, defining and freeing oneself do not constitute a comprehensive approach to the *learning to be* dimension because a human being cannot survive on its own; he/she is shaped by and connected to the community he/she lives in and to all species on the Earth. From a cosmological and existentialist point of view, Reeves (1994, p. 209) claims, in opposition to the statement of existentialists, that human beings are not foreigners to the universe; they are born from it. From this last statement, my understanding is that the *learning to be* dimension would also require knowing and understanding one's links and interconnections within Nature. Belonging to Nature and Cosmos is an understanding that indigenous people over the world demonstrate through their own diverse concepts of being and evolving (Piquemal, 1994).

4 What Is the Indigenous Meaning of *Learning to Be*?

I am interested in investigating indigenous people's approach to life and education because defining the *learning to be* dimension depends on who is speaking and from where. Native Americans' traditions stress learning to know how to integrate oneself perfectly with Nature where one belongs, and feeling that all forms of life are sacred (Piquemal, 1994). If we refer to an Ojbwa prayer, it underlines the importance of *learning to be* wise and learning 'to understand my strongest enemy, myself' (Piquemal, p. 27). Included in their human development is also learning to preserve the unity of their being by silencing their thoughts (p. 49). They understand that human beings may become a threat for themselves and their environment. For Native American traditions, Nature is sacred and human beings need to look to integrating themselves into it, without disturbing it.

On another continent, the Bambras from Africa observe that 'we are not born as a whole.'[1] The idea here is that we are evolving beings and there is a learning process. The Bambras understand that our being is evolving not only physically and intellectually, but also emotionally in our relation to ourselves, to others and to the world. Being born, we slip on our earthly identity which makes us alive. From there, we pave the way which will create us. This notion has been taken up in Western thought through the work of Deep Ecologists (see for example Drengson, 2005).

Regarding the identity of human beings, Aguilar-Castro (2005) from El Salvador claims that 'being an indigenous is a state of mind': it involves an education of every human being having consciousness of their humanity and their earthly identity. According to Aguilar Castro, our prime indigenous identity is the cornerstone, where the other levels of identity lie. A repetitive pattern seems emerging from in the indigenous understanding of *living and existing*. For indigenous people *education* consists of *learning to be* a human being on the earth, who attempts to understand Nature, and the nature of oneself. Indigenous people see themselves equally as one of other species on the Earth. It is central to their thought pattern and to the way they organise their life.

4.1 Understanding and Perspectives

Being aware of our earthly identity brings us back to the consciousness and to the indigenous respect to be part of the Earth and its system. Coming back to our first identity, our indigenous identity as earthly beings seems to be, for indigenous people, indispensable to the physical and psychological survival of our species. It is a pacifying and unifying notion shared between all human beings. This notion of 'learning to know our common earthly condition' should be included in the Delors Report definition of *learning to be.* However, Morin (2001b) wrote: 'it is still difficult for us to recognise the Earth as our common home' (p. 225). After considering the indigenous approach, I wonder, from their understanding of the human being, how sociologists, psychologists, physicists or biologists give meaning to the *learning to be* dimension.

5 Perspectives on Human Complexity

Different features emerge from the reflections of the authors selected here. I will proceed in two steps to develop their ideas: First, I will examine the authors who have explored the *needs* of education for the twenty-first century (see Section 5.1); and second, I will examine the authors who, through their approach to the world, would bring *meaning* to *learning to be* (see Section 5.2).

[1] The quote referring to the Bambra Tradition from Africa was transmitted orally via Saïbou from Benin in 1995.

5.1 The Needs of Education for the Twenty-First Century

Through his diagnostic of the new needs for education, Morin (2001a) emphasises that the one of the greatest problems we face is 'how to adjust our way of thinking to meet the challenge of an increasingly complex, rapidly changing, unpredictable world'. The enactivists Maturana and Varela (1987) wrote: 'the world everyone sees is not *the* world but *a* world, which we bring forth with others'. In the Jewish tradition the Talmud re-enforces that statement: 'We do not see things as they are; we see them as we are'.

Edward Hall's (1976) understanding is that our understanding of ourselves is very limited because 'we have been taught to think linearly rather than comprehensively'. Singer (1987) finds relevant the symptom of non-questioning : 'The way we perceive the world, what we expect of it and what we think about it is so basic (…) and is buried so deep in our consciousness that we continuously act and react without thinking why – without even realising that we may think why' (p. 53).

Trocme-Fabre (2004) argues that it is essential that learners know and understand themselves as ever-changing human beings: 'This is the key-competency for living organisms which contains all the others. "Ever-changing human beings" should be, more than ever, at the heart of our educative concerns' (p. 42). With the authors above, there is a common concern to have a complex approach to reality which would require the understanding that 'various elements (economic, sociological, psychological) that compose a whole are inseparable, and there is inter-retroactive, interactive, interdependent tissue between the subject of knowledge and its context, the parts and the whole, the whole and the parts, the parts among themselves' (Morin, 2001a, p. 31). Reeves (1994, p. 37), on the other hand, argues that the question regarding *how the world functions* made considerable progresses during the last centuries. But, Reeves stresses that it is not the case for *how to live*. Morin (2001b, p. 204) develops the idea that in observing the world, we should understand that: 'technical and economical advances are neither the driving force nor the warranty of human progress'. Here, we should understand 'human progress' as personal progress of a human being.

I understand there is a need for education to fully embrace the paradigm of complexity in order to comprehensively interact with our environment and investigate who we are. It seems that we only could approach reality but never define it. Being ever-changing human beings, *learning to be* should be embedded in a perpetual movement. This paradigm of complexity would require that education changes its learning focuses.

5.2 Meaning to Learning to Be

Looking at the exploration of the authors below, we understand that the *learning to be* dimension may serve human progress and wisdom. In order to understand that

reality is complex, Morin (2001a) advocates an education which starts with tangible facts: teaching the human condition – physical, biological, psychological, cultural, social and historical – and the recognition of our common humanity and our earth citizenship. Morin (2001b) stresses that the human being is to be defined as the trinity *individual–society–species:* '*Species*, society and individuals produce one another; each of those terms generates and re-generates the other'. Morin (2001b) underlines that each of those terms is irreducible although it depends on the others. This constitutes the base of human complexity. Understanding the dynamic individual–society–species would help us to see and recognise the different interconnected levels of reality which are impacting on human beings. It also would shape a framework to understand the *learning to be* dimension.

Through his Integral Approach, Wilber (2001) addresses the issue of complexity and proposes a framework that is inclusive, balanced and comprehensive. This model is aimed to help people to adopt an integral approach to specific problems and their solutions, by identifying both interior and exterior dimensions of being and proposing their integration. In 2002, UNESCO/APNIEV published a sourcebook on the pillar *learning to be* in order to provide models for teachers to incorporate to schools curriculum. However, the sourcebook does not attempt to cover all dimensions of the concept of *learning to be*, but has a deliberate focus on the value dimension of human development.

Capra (2003) refers to Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) writing: 'Philosophy should be able to respond to the fundamental need to know ourselves – to know '*who we are*, *how we experience the world and how we ought to live*' (see also Zajda, 2008b). In this quote, according to the *learning to be definition*, we could change the word 'philosophy' to 'education': *education* should be able to respond to the fundamental need to know ourselves. Lakoff and Johnson's quote brings us to the spiritual nature of philosophy according to Michel Foucault (2001) who recognises the necessity of '*la pratique de soi*', which he defines as being the personal transformations of the subject, through practice, to be able to access other levels of truth. I understand that 'transformation' represents a deeper level of *learning to be*. Transformation would require an awareness of the dynamic we could call *beyond from within* which was underlined by Krishnamurti (1977) as follows: 'when we study who we are, we also find the whole humanity in us' (p. 27).

Morin (2001a) recommends the necessity to develop qualities of character – curiosity, freedom of mind, creativity, reflexive consciousness and sense of strategy – to be able to confront uncertainty and complexity of the world in order to navigate beyond the known.

Messiha (1996) advises that, to be able to understand who we are, we should learn 'to be nothing particular', explaining that if we lock ourselves in a specific identity, we separate ourselves from the whole and from the complex understanding of reality.[2]

[2]Messiha, K. (1996). I was a student of Dr. Khalil Messiha between 1994 and 1996, in Cairo, Egypt. From a Coptic tradition, Messiha was a Doctor in Medicine and an Egyptologist specialised in pharaonic science.

According to Messiha (1994), the key is to have no form of expectation and simply to give way to humility. Being in a state of humility connects us to 'the energy of knowledge in presence'. Through humility we are not in the paradigm of getting knowledge, we enter in the paradigm of becoming knowledge: becoming 'nothing particular', just 'I am'. Krishnamurti (1977) advocates the necessity to understand oneself in 'the topicality of what I am', explaining that learning is a perpetual movement which has no past. He also emphasises that 'a person full of certainty is a dead person' (p. 29). Krishnamurti's thought is connected to the Santiago Theory of Cognition developed by Maturana and Varela (1987): 'in order for a living being to be alive, it has to create and re-create itself, and to sustain and transform itself'. Through their experiments and their observations these authors describe 'cognition as the breath of life'.

Instead of thinking in a linear and mono-cultural way human beings should learn to look at the complexity of the world reality and recognise their existence and being within the perspective of cultural diversity and multicultural pedagogy (Smolicz & Secombe, 2005). Learning to understand oneself and others is another important aspect, which can help human beings to live in peace on the earth. However, it is also necessary to develop certain qualities of character and state of mind to be able to deal with a rapidly changing world. Having access to the topicality of knowledge depends on the quality of human beings as open-minded learners. Human beings should learn to understand their interior dynamic and start a personal transformation in order to impact on the recursive dynamic *individual–society–species* and offer constructive solutions for the future.

6 Conclusion

The understandings developed by the authors above deepen and open the *learning to be* dimension. *Learning to be*, as defined by the Delors Report, encompasses the notions of freeing and developing the expression of oneself as well as knowing oneself but, it goes beyond. Embedded in a perpetual movement, *learning to be* has to evolve with the requirements of the twenty-first century. Historically, we observe that educating young people is not neutral; it is always political, social or cultural in nature (Msila, 2007; Zajda, 2007a; Zajda, 2008a, b). Nowadays, the outcome is necessarily global, because we have entered an age of education for sustainability, together with an eco-literacy and eco-survival paradigm. Education has to change its learning focus because, as essential learning for the twenty-first century, *learning to be* has to produce *wisdom*; a *wisdom* which is achievable through personal transformation in order to save the individual–cultural–species identity of our earthly condition. If I draw a parallel between Maturana and Varela's definition of cognition and the *learning to be* dimension as developed above, I understand that *learning to be* could be seen as well as '*the breath of life*'. This leads me to the following perspectives: recognising and understanding *learning to be* as a fundamental need, a fundamental human right, as a cluster of values, and

a fundamental responsibility and an indispensable priority to be considered in the classroom pedagogy.

References

Aguilar-Castro, M.E. (2005). Personal correspondance with Maria-Eugenia Aguilar Castro, director of '*Instituto para el Resurgimiento Ancestral Indígena*'. El Salvador, Centro América.

Aloni, N. (2002). *Enhancing humanity, the philosophical foundations of humanistic education*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Béji, H. (2004). *Où vont les valeurs: La Culture de l'Inhumain*. Paris: Editions UNESCO/Albin Michel.

Capra, F. (1996). *The web of life*. London: HarperCollins.

Capra, F. (2003). *The hidden connections*. London: Flamingo.

Delors, J. (1996). *Learning: The treasure within*. Paris: UNESCO.

Faure, E. (1972). *Learning to be*. Paris: UNESCO.

Foucault, M. (2001). *L'Herméneutique du Sujet*. Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, "Hautes Etudes".

Hall, E. (1976). *Beyond culture*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press.

Krishnamurti (1977) *Se libérer du connu* (seconde édition) (*Freedom from the known*). Paris: Editions Stock.

Kron, F. (1998). Cultural and ideological dimensions of language awareness. In Tulasiewicz, W., & Zajda, J. (Eds.), *Language awareness in the curriculum* (pp. 33–40). Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Labercane, G., Griffith, B., & Tulasiewicz, W. (1998). Language awareness in the classroom. In Tulasiewicz, W., & Zajda, J. (Eds.), *Language awareness in the curriculum* (pp. 1–10). Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh*. New York: Basics Books.

Learning: The treasure within. (1997). UNESCO report for education for the twenty first century, published by the German UNESCO Commission. Berlin: Luchterhand.

Marshall, S. (2004). *Supporting student wellbeing*. Adelaide: Research Conference of the Australian Council for Educational Research.

Maslow, A. (1971). *The farther reaches of human nature*. New York: Viking.

Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1987). *The tree of knowledge*. Boston: Shambhala.

Morin, E. (1990). *Science avec conscience*. Paris: Fayard.

Morin, E. (2001a). *Seven complex lessons in education for the future*. Paris: Editions. Morin, E. (2001b). *L'identité Humaine-La méthode 5: L'humanité de l'humanité*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Morin, E. (2001b). *L'identité Humaine- La méthode 5: L'humanité de l'humanité*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Msila, V. (2007). From apartheid education to the revised national curriculum statement: Pedagogy for identity formation and nation building in South Africa. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, *16*(20), 146–160.

Nietzsche, F. (1965). *Schopenhauer as educator* (J. W. Hillesheim & M. Simon, Trans.). Chicago: Regency-Gateway.

Ordonez, V. M. (1998). *Education pour le XXIème siècle – Questions et perspectives/L'éducation de base au XXIème siècle*. Paris: Editions UNESCO.

Piquemal, M. (1994). *Paroles Indiennes*. Paris: Albin Michel.

Redeker, R. (2001). *Le philosophe spirituel*. Le Monde Diplomatique, Août 2001.

Rogers, C. (1983). *Freedom to learn for the 80s.* Colombus: Charles E. Merill.

Sartre, J.P. (1979). *Essays in existentialism*. In W. Baskin (Secaucus). New Jersey: Citadel Press.

Secombe, M. & Zajda, J. (1999). (Eds.). *Education and culture*. Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Singer, M. (1987). *Intercultural communication: A perceptual approach*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Smolicz, J., & Secombe, M. (2005). Globalisation, cultural diversity, and multiculturalism: Australia. In J. Zajda (Ed.), *The international handbook of globalisation and education policy research* (pp. 207–220). Dordrecht: Springer.

Tilich, P. (1969). *The courage to be* (5th ed.). London: the Fontana Library.

Tulasiewicz, W. & Zajda, J. (Eds.) (1998). *Language awareness in the curriculum*. Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Zajda, J. (Ed.) (2005). *The international handbook of globalisation and education policy research.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J. (2007a). Living together: Globalisation, education and intercultural dialogue. *Political Crossroads, 14*(1), 37–49.

Zajda, J. (Ed.) (2007b). *Education and society* (4th edn). San Francisco & Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers.

Zajda, J. (2008a). Citizenship education and nation-building. In H. Daun, L. Saha & J. Zajda (Eds.), *Nation-building, identity and citizenship education: Cross-cultural perspectives*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J. (2008b). Globalisation and implications for equity and democracy in education. In J. Zajda, L. Davies & S. Majhanovich (Eds.), *Comparative and global pedagogies: Equity, access and democracy in education* (pp. 3–12). Dordrecht: Springer.

Academic Freedom in England and Germany: A Comparative Perspective

Rosamunde F.J. Becker

1 Globalisation and Neo-Liberal Ideologies in the Higher Education Sector

With economic globalisation and the adoption of neo-liberal ideologies in a number of countries, several governments are trying to ensure the international competitiveness of their national economies (Henry et al., 2001; Reich, 1991). In countries such as Australia, England, New Zealand and the United States, governments have identified universities as core instruments to strengthen their knowledge economies because of the universities' role in the production of knowledge (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). In these countries, market approaches have been adopted by the State to reduce the government expenditure and to increase the universities' relevance to the country's international economic competitiveness.

In a number of countries, universities have been made to operate within markets in which they compete for students and research funding. Several authors have argued that academic work is becoming framed by a business-like logic that emphasises short-term deadlines, commercialisation and profit, and that the organisation of universities as businesses within markets, and a greater emphasis on the commercial benefits of knowledge, transforms the boundaries of academic freedom (Currie, 2004; Fulton, 2002; Marginson, 2000;Margolis, 2004; Rochford, 2003).

An obvious possibility is that academics are in narrower and narrower territory. There is a trend towards conditional funding and there is some evidence that social science research is increasingly commercialised, that university researchers are becoming more dependent on 'contestable' sources of funding to earn their living, and that more and more government funding for research is designated to evaluations of policy implementation (Ham, 1999; Simons, 1995). There is also a trend towards restrictive contracts in government commissioned research (Ham, 1999). Incidentally, the preparation of research and teaching materials by an academic might be affected by rules related to intellectual property, and thus a university may be in a position

R.F.J. Becker (✉)
e-mail: r.becker@obhe.ac.uk

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_8,

to control the publication of research findings or the subsequent utilisation of those findings by an academic (Rochford, 2003).

An important problem with external funding of universities is the risk it carries for sustaining the institution's 'mission' and intellectual profile. Except in the rarest case, attracting external sources of funding involves compromises between the university's academic priorities and the priorities of the outside funding agency. The attempt to balance market forces with the need for institutional coherence in most cases remains imperfect. This can cause a fragmentation of faculty allegiance between promising funding opportunities and institutional loyalties, and is becoming a serious problem for a growing number of universities (Weiler, 2000). External funding can also have consequences for academic freedom. There is a danger that the university agenda will be shaped increasingly by market dynamics, and that its 'products' will primarily benefit powerful economic, social and political groups. In spite of its appeal to the common good, the university may come to serve primarily the interests of business and industry and the political agenda of the Government (Meira Soares and Amaral, 1999; Schugurensky, 1999).

In a number of OECD countries, the need for universities to react flexibly in markets also has an impact on traditional patterns of academic appointments and careers. There has been an increase in short-term workers, many whom are undertaking fixed-term contract work. The need for flexibility often requires a negotiation of the balance between institutional objectives and individual academic work and autonomy (Morey, 2003). While not all research contracts harm professional autonomy and academic freedom, contracts do not always offer academics much opportunity to define their own research themes and methods. Research findings are sometimes suppressed for political reasons or because of corporate funding arrangements, hindering the freedom of academics to disseminate the results of their research. Thus, market pressures are forcing universities to establish new priorities that can erode their commitment to accessibility, their reliance on open debate, their scholarly integrity and their critical voice in society (Currie, 2004).

However, there is no point in having loose talk on academic freedom. This leads to poor generalisations. It is argued that what is happening in a number of countries is not a decline in academic freedom, but a loss in institutional autonomy. Institutional autonomy here refers to the self-government of institutions that allows them to set – free from external interference – their own aims, research agendas, evaluation criteria, and promotion procedures (Schugurensky, 1999).

There is some evidence in a number of countries that it has become more difficult for universities to preserve their autonomy as they are forced to react to both market and state imperatives (Marginson, 2000; Schugurensky, 1999). It is not the case that all institutional autonomy has been removed (indeed, in some procedural ways it has been increased). However, what is happening in some countries is that the autonomous space of the institutions is being reduced, and gradually taken over, by external powers that are increasingly capable of imposing their own logic and interests. It is not so much that the university is operated by non-academic actors as that its daily practices (its functions, internal organisation, activities, structure of rewards, etc.) are more and more organised according to the

logic imposed by the State and the market (Schugurensky, 1999). Changes in the sources of university income, for instance, have serious implications for institutional autonomy, which in turn may have an impact on governance, curriculum and research priorities. These changing relationships between the university, the State and the market do not only change the *modus operandi* of universities but also their social purpose (Currie, 2004; Schugurensky, 1999). The next section will move on to test the argument that market-framing of universities is leading to a reduction of institutional autonomy in England and Germany. It will examine legislative defences of academic freedom, emerging consequences of market-framing, and career pressures.

2 Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy in England

2.1 Legislative Defences of Academic Freedom

Universities in England have a long tradition of independence from the State. Their large degree of institutional autonomy was supported by their charters. This worked because there was a level of trust and consensus between the universities and the State about the role of the university. Practices of academic freedom were institutionalised for instance in the form of the University Grants Committee (UGC), a body that allocated state grants to universities and that formed a buffer between the universities and the State.

However, in England there is no legal protection guaranteeing academic freedom (Birtwistle, 2004). The 1988 Education Reform Act provides only limited protection for academic freedom. Section 202-2 of the 1988 Act (which only applies to the pre-1992 universities) states that the University Commissioners are

> to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions; (…) to enable qualifying institutions to provide education, promote learning and engage in research efficiently and economically; and (…) to apply the principles of justice and fairness. (Great Britain, 1988, section 202-2)

This legal statement is of little practical help because no Commissioners have been appointed since 1996 (Birtwistle, 2004). Section 32 of the 2004 Higher Education Act also gives a reference to academic freedom, but it seems to limit its effect to admissions and gives no hint at all as to how the section might be given effect in any context (Birtwistle, 2004).

Traditionally, one way to protect academic freedom was the system of tenure (Rochford, 2003). Once the competence of an academic was established, the system of tenure protected the academic from arbitrary dismissal. However, in the 1988 Education Reform Act, the Government removed the legal right of universities to

offer lifetime tenured appointments. The abolition of tenure and the growth in contract-based provisions not only was a response to financial pressures, but also a step in the creation of a market-oriented system in which relevant quality and performance could be rewarded (Williams, 2004).

2.2 *Emerging Effects of Market-Framing on Institutional Autonomy and Academic Freedom*

In England, universities, departments and individual academic staff have been made to compete in markets for (external and government) funding, grants, contracts, students and prestige. One way to encourage competition between institutions has been through the publication of national league tables of performance. An explicit move towards market-framing of English universities in the last two decades was the encouragement of institutions to generate income from non-government sources. Universities have been pushed to raise external funds, for instance through the sale of research and consultancy services and through the introduction of fees, particularly for fee-paying international students. There are increased pressures and competition to attract privately or jointly funded projects as a way of attracting income to universities, even when they are of dubious academic merit (Williams, 1996), and pressures to secure grants from whatever source, rather than efforts to extend knowledge, increasingly shape the formation and operation of research centres. Not surprisingly, many researchers report their agendas to be increasingly defined by 'others' (Willmott, 2003). In applying for (external and government) grants and contracts, academics are increasingly asked to show the results (i.e., demonstrable outcomes) they are expecting, which then become performance indicators that have to be met for the external funders. Such contracts and developments can undermine the autonomy of institutions to do research.

In England, market-framing has been combined with increased bureaucratic assessments and controls to provide accountability for the use of public funds. The State imposed a wide range of 'quality' requirements on the university system, and universities received increased procedural autonomy while operating within centrally defined and regulated parameters that are managed by the Funding Council. The creation of the Funding Council was a mechanism intended to emphasise efficiency: it was given the power to prescribe national criteria of performance and to conduct 'quality' requirements. This restriction of institutional autonomy was reinforced by the construction of funding formulae, which were linked to performance outcomes in the national Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and which carry significant rewards and punishments for universities. Institutional autonomy to define quality thus was sharply diminished. In consequence, English universities are now far less free to take many of their own academic and financial decisions than they were at the beginning of the 1980s (Evans, 2003; Williams, 1997).

Market influence on government-funded academic research is also increasing in other ways. After the 1996 RAE, there was much criticism of the RAE because of

the lack of employer representatives on assessment panels, and of the lower status accorded to applied research (McNay, 1999). Employers are now represented on RAE panels and in the 2008 RAE entrepreneurial activities will count next to academic activities.

Within the university, management has been given much greater power. This has contributed to an erosion of professional autonomy (Bryson and Barnes, 2000). Within the university, the centre establishes the strategic plan and desired policy outcomes for the institution, while the policy-making periphery is responsible for achieving these goals. However, any new autonomy at the periphery operates in relation to means rather than policy ends, for these are set tightly by the centre as part of a new regime of outcomes accountability and performance management (Henry et al., 2001).

2.3 Career Pressures and Promotion Criteria

The market-framing of universities has had a profound effect on the employment conditions and environment (Bryson and Barnes, 2000). The British State, through introducing quality management procedures and markets, promoted new reward mechanisms in the university.

The career structure for teachers in the old (pre-1992) universities is lecturer, senior lecturer, reader, and professor. Promotions are based predominantly on the research record of the candidates. In the new universities (i.e., the post-1992 universities, formerly polytechnics), the criteria for promotion to senior lecturer are less research-oriented than in old universities because the new universities generally have weaker research cultures than the old ones. Recent appointments to the professoriate in new universities have included external candidates, sometimes from old universities. This has been done to increase the research ratings of departments under the research quality assessment exercise. New universities have professorial appointment procedures, based on those in old universities, enabling qualified internal applicants, normally senior lecturers or readers, to apply for personal chairs. These too stress the central importance of research output, the generation of external research income and the national and international standing of candidates in their fields (Farnham, 1999). In all universities, to be promoted to professor, one needs a distinctive research reputation. A readership denotes achievements specifically in research, whereas senior lectureships may denote research, teaching, or any other achievement, usually in combination. However, the precise criteria depend on variable institutional policy (Fulton and Holland, 2001).

It is clear that academic merit in England is no longer defined as being acquired primarily through publication. Instead, it is being defined at least in part by success with market and market-like activities, such as attracting external research funds. Academic staff increasingly have to act as market actors. Because of a need to replace a reduction in government funding, promotions and salaries have become more dependent on the ability to secure research grants. In pre-1992 universities, to

get promoted to research grade 2 often requires the individual to obtain guarantees of sufficient external funding for promotion to be considered (Bryson and Barnes, 2000). And at the Institute of Education University of London, for instance, promotion from lecturer A to lecturer B is not only based on an assessment of teaching and research, but also on consultancy and other third stream activities (Institute of Education, University of London, 2004).

The nature of academic employment also has changed dramatically. Academic careers have become less structured and more differentiated. The majority of new staff appointments in the last decade have been part-time or for fixed-term periods of less than 2 years. This enables universities to respond more quickly to changing market circumstances than they could 25 years ago when three-quarters of all staff had appointments with lifetime tenure. (Farnham, 1999; Williams, 1997).

In English universities, research is where the money and prestige has moved to and rests for the moment (Clark, 1993). Career pressures and promotion criteria to a large extent are effected by four- or five-yearly national cycles of the RAE. As mentioned earlier, government funding for research in universities in England is based on assessments of research 'quality'. Each department's 'research output' over the last 5 years is evaluated and graded. The grades are linked to levels of government funding. The main criteria in the research assessments are number and quality of publications, external research grants and PhD theses completed. Departments that receive a lower grade or the same grade as in the previous RAE risk losing a significant share of their budget, which would compromise future research activities. This funding arrangement fosters strong competition between universities. University managers have to get their institution to the top of the league table and academics are under pressure to produce work that will achieve high RAE scores. High-performing departments cannot afford to lose a grade and low-performing departments have to improve if they want to sustain their ambition to become a research-based department.

Thus, while individual struggles for recognition through publication have always been important for individual career advancement, with the RAE, they have become part of departmental and institutional competition for reputation and resources. The financial penalties for not engaging in those struggles can be heavy. There are also penalties in terms of career progress: academics can become excluded form the category 'research active', which means that their teaching and administrative loads are increased to relieve their 'research active' colleagues of some of their teaching and administration. In that case, the development of a publication record thus becomes more difficult to attain and their continuing employment can also come under question as research is so critical to the status and financial basis of many universities (Henkel, 2000).

At the same time, the appointment of departmental research directors and the introduction of regular appraisals meant that for many academics, especially those in their early careers, their personal academic agendas have come under continual review. Their actual and potential contribution to the RAE is central to this process as well as to their prospects for promotion (Henkel, 2000). Research by Reed et al., conducted between 1998 and 2000, showed that academic staff in the UK saw

academic peer review in selection and promotion procedures as retaining a significant and continuing role in university management and the organisation of academic work. However, peer review procedures were seen to be increasingly overlain and undermined by new managerial control structures and practices – such as target-setting and performance monitoring – that, cumulatively, were substantially eroding what was left of the autonomy of individual academics to organise their own work (Reed, 2002).

Before 1992, there were sharp differences both in the mission of the universities and the then-polytechnics and in the funding that they received for research. Although the 1992 universities are now eligible to compete for research funding, their basic assumption for workloads purposes is still that teaching is the core activity of staff and that eligibility for research time cannot be automatic. In the pre-1992 universities, on the other hand, increasing competition and greater financial differentiation between high and low scores on the RAE have meant that, where once all staff were assumed to be devoting a fixed percentage of their time to research, there are now sharp variations in funding for research between universities and also between departments within them – and indeed, if a department so chooses, between individuals. Thus, increasingly in both types of university – but possibly with more resistance in the old universities where it represents a distinct loss of autonomy – teaching load and research time are a matter for management prescription or individual negotiation and can vary widely even between individuals within the same department (Fulton and Holland, 2001).

As decision-making and managerial control is increasingly finance-driven, academic staff now have to self-regulate their teaching and research 'quality' in relation to more explicit, internally and externally generated, financial and performance criteria. Staff have become subject to more intrusive work performance and allocation systems that require them to self-assess individual action and 'outputs' across a range of measures, and they have become subject to more formalised peer-review scrutiny of individual and collective performance. In consequence, the autonomy of academics is under increasing and direct pressure from career pressures, managerial imperatives for greater 'productivity' and from externally imposed systems of quality control that incrementally erode the legitimisation of academic professionalism (Bryson and Barnes, 2000; Reed, 2002).

3 Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy in Germany

3.1 Legislative Defences of Academic Freedom

In Germany, academic freedom is guaranteed by Constitution. The German *Grundgesetz* states: '*Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei*' (Art and scholarship, research and teaching are free) (Grundgesetz, 1998, Article 5(3)). This constitutional

guarantee of academic freedom resulted in a particular balance in the relationship between universities and the State. The German notion of academic freedom recognised *Lernfreiheit* – the freedom of students to learn – and *Lehrfreiheit* – the professional freedom to conduct research and to teach and discuss research findings in lectures. This means that individual scholars must be free to determine research directions and modes of investigation, and to decide on the contents of their teaching. In these matters, the State is not allowed to intervene.

The constitutional guarantee of academic freedom was combined with strong state regulation. In Germany state regulation was traditionally seen as a guarantee of academic freedom: the State would protect the university against narrow external interests, but it would intervene if academic freedom were misused. These assumptions were institutionalised by a combination of (i) strong state regulation (and low institutional autonomy), and (ii) a high degree of freedom and tenure of the chaired professors. Another traditional protection for academic freedom is through the tradition of participation by faculty members in academic governance (Rochford, 2003). German professors have a real voice in decision-making. In this way, they can secure a situation in which scholarship can thrive free from administrative restraints. Thus, the traditional German university had a very low degree of institutional autonomy, which was combined with a large degree of academic freedom. This combination of close state regulation and oligarchic academic independence still dominates today, although changes are underway.

3.2 Market-Framing, Institutional Autonomy and Academic Freedom

Until recently, German universities were subject to strong state regulation of financial and personnel policies. Under the prevailing rule of 'homogeneity', universities and their departments could not distinguish themselves in comparison to others very much by differentiation and the quality of their course programmes (Liefner et al., 2004; Schimank et al., 1999). The very low degree of institutional autonomy in German universities has been one of the main reasons for scarcely existent competition between institutions and the lack of formal and explicit quality assessment systems in the past (Gellert, 1985). In consequence, competition for students and funding is relatively weak in the German university system.

Formal quality assessment of teaching and research was not common in Germany until recently. It was the assumption that the performance and degrees of all universities were equivalent, and there was public confidence in their quality. The Federal State was responsible for guaranteeing equality and 'legally monitoring' (*Rechtsaufsicht*), and the responsibility for quality (*Fachaufsicht*) was left to the university. Salaries were paid and funds distributed without any reference to measures of performance. Implicit quality assurance took place by means of peer review and by setting entry standards and procedures for the appointment of staff. German governments so far have not gone very far in the direction of a regular and

comprehensive evaluation of teaching and research performance (Schimank et al., 1999). Although quality assessment systems have been introduced in the past years there is no nation-wide system. Quality assessment does not lead to budget cuts or to the closing down of departments or programmes (Huisman, 2003). The introduction of formal and external quality assessment systems in German universities is a break with the long tradition of, and the guarantees for, freedom of teaching and research, and difficult because of the power of tenured individual professors (de Rudder, 1994).

Another factor that limits competition between German universities is absence of student fees so far. German university education has for a long time been shaped by the idea of providing equal opportunities in every region. This led to standardisation of universities with respect to their course programmes and academic standards. Although university rankings have appeared, they are not very meaningful.

Furthermore, performance-based funding (of universities and individual academics) is relatively weak in Germany. This has several reasons (Becker, 2004; Liefner et al., 2004). Firstly, the share of income distributed through performance-based allocation models is very low at German universities. Several German states have started to introduce resource allocation models that estimate a certain amount of money for a particular university set against performance indicators. However, the proportion of funding allocated to a university on the basis of performance indicators is relatively low. Most German states redistribute less than 5% of the universities' budgets on the basis of performance indicators, although Lower Saxony's statewide model redistributes around 10% of the budgets of all its higher education institutions (Liefner et al., 2004). Secondly, acceptance of competitive elements within the German university sector is comparatively small. The third limiting factor has been the strong influence of state governments on German universities. The employment of academics is still largely based on lifelong contract so that there is little space for strategic restructuring. The perception that most academics hold about their job is still governed by academic freedom rather than by competition.

In Germany, market-orientation is still relatively modest in higher education policy-making, and its importance is politically contested. German universities are still largely dependent on state funding, and at the moment there is hardly any competition between universities and academic staff on the basis of formal performance outcomes, despite the political rhetoric to do so. The introduction of competitive elements in German universities so far had little or no effects (Liefner et al., 2004).

3.3 Career Pressures and Promotion Criteria

In Germany, the appointment of professors normally is the responsibility of the individual states. The professoriate is responsible for appointing other academic staff. Within the professoriate, promotion and financial reward are strongly based on research performance, with teaching of lesser importance. Divisions among

academic staff are reflected in pay scales. Past work experience, qualifications, length of service and age were important criteria when establishing the respective pay scales (Herrschel, 1999).

Traditionally, the road to a professorship was long and involved considerable uncertainties and risks. The first degree was followed by two phases of qualification that together took on average 12 years: the first was the doctorate and the second was the *Habilitation* (the 'higher doctorate', taking 7–8 years). The *Habilitation* required an original research thesis exceeding the doctoral thesis in scope and level of scholarship. The *Habilitation* was a prerequisite, but not a guarantee to gain a professorship (the latter possibility depended on a post becoming available). The *Habilitation* led to the right to teach in a certain discipline, and thus the main teaching qualification at university was primarily based on proof of research ability.

German universities are largely publicly funded. This affects conditions of employment. Professors, other academic staff and most of the administration are directly employed by the State and are usually public servants. Their contracts are virtually permanent, especially of professors. There are no nation-wide or state-wide formal staff appraisals in German universities. The German professoriate is still largely free to undertake research, unconstrained by productivity and evaluation criteria. The idea behind this policy, to guarantee independence and academic freedom, has far-reaching affects on staff policy and the efficacy of incentives (Liefner et al., 2004). A survey based on interviews with 54 German academics, conducted by Liefner et al. (2004), revealed that academics in Germany usually do not see resource allocation models as an instrument to promote internal competition. Most respondents in their study expected that the performance-based allocation models would have little or no influence on their own behaviour and performance. However, in time the development of research evaluation measures is likely to lead to review systems for academic staff that would influence promotion and reward systems (Enders, 2001). University leadership would be responsible for carrying out regular performance evaluations of academic staff that would determine the resources dedicated to departments and professorships and future salary levels, especially of professors.

The structure of academic staff in Germany is characterised by a strong gap between professorial and sub-professorial positions. As mentioned earlier, professors have great decision-making power and freedom to work free from formal productivity criteria. Professors assess the work of their assistants and junior staff, who do not enjoy such freedom (Herrschel, 1999; Krais, 2002). The junior positions are highly differentiated and include student assistants, doctoral candidates, post-doctoral fellows, freelancers and academic staff with contracts of various types and duration. Between the professoriate and the junior positions, there were only very few assistant professorships (until recently). These positions were rare and required the *Habilitation* qualification.

This structure and qualification made it difficult for junior academics to climb up the career ladder. Junior academics were largely dependent on their supervisors and did not have much control over when and whether they would move to a better academic position. This meant that young people who wanted to build an academic career had to show that they could work independently and demonstrate decision-making

and leadership abilities despite the fact that they were restricted to a position on formal dependence in what was primarily defined as a learning position. In addition, the working methods in universities are to a large extent dependent on the 'great personalities' of the professors, rather than on set structures (Krais, 2002). The personality of the director in charge of a particular field therefore is very important. From the perspective of the junior academics, the power to define the decisive position in one's career – the job in which the *Habilitation* can be completed – rests with the director. Whether or not such a position can be attained is therefore dependent on complex and usually implicit processes of social interaction and negotiation. Transparent structures for the careers of young academics (from junior to senior positions) did not exist.

In the last decade, there has been increasing criticism in Germany that the university system offered very few and unattractive job opportunities for young and promising academics (Krais, 2002; Liefner et al., 2004). Particular problems were the long duration of the academic qualification, the lack of autonomy for post-doctoral researchers, the age of starting professors, and the lack of quality and efficiency incentives in the academic salary structure (Huisman, 2003). In recent years, state governments have made various attempts to rearrange the staff structure and junior staff positions. These reforms followed amendments of the *Hochschulrahmengesetz*, the German Federal Law, in 2002. The Federal Law was amended after a long period of deliberation because the subject was highly controversial. The most crucial changes relate to the introduction of the post of junior professor (3,000 were to be appointed in 2002), the abolition of the *Habilitation* (the second doctorate that was a necessary condition to become a professor), the introduction of the doctoral status, and the introduction of salary incentives.

The recruitment of professors is based on the quality of the doctorate, teaching ability, and additional academic achievements (formerly these were demonstrated by the *Habilitation*, but since the abolishment of this qualification the achievements are neutrally defined by law). Professors are usually appointed by the Ministry of Education and Science in the respective state as civil servants with limited or unlimited tenure, although they can also be taken on as salaried employees. Non-professorial academic staff are civil servants or salaried employees who are responsible for academic services. Recent changes in the Federal Law pave the way for the introduction of performance-related pay of academic staff, including professors. Until recently, salary increases beyond regular raises and other significant awards were given only when a professor received an outside offer for a professorship at another university or in another, equivalent position.

The introduction of junior professorships in 2002 was intended to replace the time-consuming *Habilitation*. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research has supported each junior professorship with seed funding and many of the federal states have used it. However, the situation of younger academics is still an issue for concern (Enders, 2000; Liefner et al., 2004). Despite financial incentives a number of academics doubt whether an academic career would be possible without a *Habilitation* and junior professors are not always assured equal opportunity (Welsh, 2004). In practice, many junior professors are unsure whether their post will be successful and write a *Habilitation* next to their work as junior professors.

Another prominent and controversial issue was the introduction of a flexible salary structure, consisting of a non-performance-related basic salary plus variable performance-related salary components (Enders, 2001; Herrschel, 1999). The Rector's Conference in 1998 proposed linking academic salaries to performance, and allowing universities to pay industrial-level salaries to 'top quality' academics (Hackmann, 1999). In essence, universities would no longer be obliged to restrict themselves to *Länder*-determined salary scales, and would thus be free to negotiate starting salaries with a candidate for employment. Increments would then be performance-related, with assessments being based on number of publications, the amount of external funding secured, prizes and/or awards, numbers of examinations set, and the results of student teaching evaluations. The German Association of Universities, representing approximately 17,000 professors, was strongly opposed to this suggestion (Hackmann, 1999).

However, the 2002 *Hochschulrahmengesetz* altered employment contracts of academic staff and made it possible to introduce stronger performance- and competition-oriented pay structures for professors. These reforms were aimed at 'strengthening the performance and innovation capabilities of the university system' and at 'recovery of their international competitiveness'. Efforts to abolish the civil service status of professors met with strong resistance and, in the end, were unsuccessful. However, as part of the new public service law, a new compensation scheme has been introduced that replaced seniority by merit criteria for all new recruitments since 2005, but due to a provision exempting already existing contracts, making the new salary scheme standard procedure will take up to 20 years (Welsh, 2004).

The different degrees of state reforms of staff structures and promotion criteria are part of a search for a new distribution of power between the State, the academic oligarchy and the market (Enders, 2000). It is not yet clear what consequences they will have for the shape of institutional autonomy in Germany and for the traditionally high levels of freedom of teaching and research of the chaired professors.

4 Evaluation: Academic Freedom in England and Germany

The two cases of England and Germany show quite significant differences. There is no loss of academic freedom in Germany because it is guaranteed in law and institutionalised in a high degree of freedom of the chaired professors. In England, there is almost no legislative defence for academic freedom: academic freedom is only guaranteed by custom and by weak legislation. In addition, the market-orientation of German universities is still very modest, whereas universities in England progressively have become organised as businesses and framed within markets in which they have to compete for students and funding.

However, what is important is what academics have to do for their career. In Germany academic promotions are based on the intellectual quality of research as measured by peer review on the basis of academically defined criteria. However, in England the agenda of academics is being taken over by career pressures and con-

cerns to be promoted. To be promoted, you have to (i) publish books (your own books rather than edited books), (ii) publish chapters in top journals (rather than book chapters, which should not be written really – book chapters do not count much as they are not necessarily peer reviewed and thus considered to be of inferior quality) and (iii) demonstrate your success in attracting external funding.

It is suggested here that current career pressures and concerns to be promoted – as currently can be seen in England – may lead to 'corruption' by academics who do not even try to do brilliant work anymore. Therefore, the threat is not to academic freedom in the conventional sense, but it is a limitation of what academics can do. In other words, it is not merely the market that is harming academic freedom, but it is also (i) the academics responding to career pressures and the need to get promoted, (ii) which are handled by university managers, and (iii) the result is *as if* academic freedom is limited.

For example, academic researchers in education are becoming more and more like policy analysts and less and less like independent seekers of knowledge (Ham, 1999, p. 275). Academics start to avoid certain topics, and they do not criticise the Government. As Reed argues: 'what we see now in England is that academics are less and less like disinterested pursuers of knowledge, and more and more like knowledge 'producers', routinely engaged in generating and communicating socially and economically useful skills or techniques' (Reed, 2002). Fuller notes that perhaps the cult of research productivity prevents academics from devoting the time needed to fully grasp all the ideas their work contains, but that more and more academics do not make an effort anymore to be creative and critical in constructing their own ideas (Fuller, 2005). He states that the current academic culture in England values a limited understanding of productivity over critical and intellectual thinking, and that it does not cultivate independent-mindedness. Fuller goes on to argue that many academics are either just concerned with advancing their careers or they are 'entrepreneurs marketing a product' (Fuller, 2005). However, academics should think for themselves, rather than second-guessing who might pass judgement on them and shaping their work accordingly.

5 Conclusion

This analysis raises some pertinent, and potentially vital, questions about the longer-term position and influence of the academic profession, particularly in England. The current controls of research productivity and career pressures that lead to a decline in the professional autonomy and freedom of academics risk the progressive disenchantment with academic work, and make academic work a less attractive career option, in particular for the most able persons (Williams, 2004; Willmott, 2003). Furthermore, while the University must respond to developments in society, it is important to realise that academic freedom does not exist for the benefit of the academic, or even for the university as an institution, but for the critical awareness and understanding of society at large. A lot is at stake, and the future is not assured.

References

Becker, R. F. J. (2004). The politics of performativity and universities: Comparative analysis between England, the Netherlands and Germany. *Doctoral thesis*, Institute of Education University of London.

Birtwistle, T. (2004). Academic freedom and complacency: The possible effects if 'good men do nothing. *Education and the Law, 16*(4), 203–216.

Britain, G. (1988). *Education Reform Act 1988: Article 40*. London: HMSO.

Britain, G. (2004). *Higher Education Act*. London: HMSO.

Bryson, C., & Barnes, N. (2000). Working in higher education in the United Kingdom. In M. Tight (Ed.), *Academic work and life: What it is to be an academic, and how this is changing* (pp. 147–185). New York: Elsevier Science.

Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung. (2000). *Hochschuldienstrecht für das 21. Jahrhundert; Das Konzept des BMBF. Higher education personnel legislation for the twenty-first century; concept of the Federal Government for Education and Research*. Bonn: BMBF.

Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung. (2001). *Bericht der Expertenkommission "Reform des Hochschuldienstrechts" Report of the Expert Committee on the reform of higher education personnel legislation*. Bonn: BMBF.

Clark, B. R. (ed). (1993). *The research foundations of graduate education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan*. Oxford: University of California Press.

Cowen, R. (2000). The market-framed university: The new ethics of the game. In J. Cairns, R. , Gardner & D. Lawton (Eds.), *Values and the Curriculum* (pp. 93–105). London: Woburn Press.

Currie, J. (2004). The neo-liberal paradigm and higher education: A critique. In J. K. Odin & P. T. Manicas (Eds.), *Globalization and higher education* (pp. 42–62). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Deutscher Bundestag. (1998). *Hochschulrahmengesetz. Federal law on higher education.* Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Paragraph 5.

Deutscher Bundestag. (2002). *Hochschulrahmengesetz. Federal law on higher education*. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Section 1.

Enders, J. (2000). Academic staff in Europe: Changing employment and working conditions. In M. Tight (Ed.), *Academic work and life: What it is to be an academic, and how this is changing* (pp. 7–32). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Enders, J. (2001) A chair system in transition: Appointments, promotions, and gate-keeping in German higher education. *Higher Education*, *41*(1–2), 3–25.

Enders, J., & Teichler, U. (1996). The academic profession in Germany. In P. G. Altbach (Ed.), *The international academic profession: Portraits of fourteen countries* (pp. 439–492). Princeton, NJ: the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

Evans, G. R. (2003). Freedom and regulation: The White Paper dilemma. *New Era in Education*, *84*(1), 26–30.

Farnham, D. (1999). The United Kingdom: End of the Donnish Dominion? In D. Farnham (Ed.), *Managing academic staff in changing university systems: International trends and comparisons* (pp. 209–236). Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press.

Frackmann, E., & de Weert, E. (1993). Hochschulpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Higher education policy in Germany. In: L. Goedegebuure, F. Kaiser, & P. Maassen et al. (Eds.), *Hochschulpolitik im internationalen Vergleich: eine länderübergreifende Untersuchung. Higher education policy: An international study* (pp. 69–104). Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Fuller, S. (2005). *The intellectual*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

Fulton, O. (2002). Higher education governance in the UK: Change and continuity. In A. Amaral, G. A. Jones & B. Karseth (Eds.), *Governing higher education: National perspectives on institutional governance* (pp. 187–211). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Fulton, O., & Holland, C. (2001). Profession or proletariat: Academic staff in the United Kingdom after two decades of change. In J. Enders (Ed.), *Academic staff in Europe* (pp. 301–322). London: Greenwood Press.

Gellert, C. (1985). State interventionism and institutional autonomy: University development and state interference in England and West Germany. *Oxford Review of Education*, *11*(3), 283–293.
Grundgesetz. (1998). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
Hackmann, H. (1999). Germany. In: H. Hackmann & A. Rip (Eds.), *Priorities and quality incentives for university research. A brief international survey.* (pp. 51–62). The Hague: Sdu.
Ham, V. (1999). Tracking the truth or selling one's soul? Reflections on the ethics of a piece of commissioned research. *British Journal of Educational Studies, 47*(3), 275–282.
Henkel, M. (2000). *Academic identities and policy change in higher education*. London: Jessica Kingsley.
Henry, M., Lingard, B., Rizvi, F., & Taylor, S. (2001). *The OECD, globalisation and education policy*. Oxford: Pergamon.
Herrschel, T. (1999). Germany: A dual academy. In D. Farnham (Ed.), *Managing academic staff in changing university systems: International trends and comparisons* (pp. 94–114). Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press.
Huisman, J. (2003). *Higher education in Germany: Country report*. Enschede: Center for Higher Education Policy Studies.
Institute of Education University of London. (2004). Advancement and promotion procedures for academic staff. Retrieved April 2005, from http://k1.ioe.ac.uk/personnl/informationforstaff/academicpromotion procedure040326.doc.
Krais, B. (2002). Academia as a profession and the hierarchy of the sexes: Paths out of research in German universities. *Higher Education Quarterly*, *56*(4), 407–418.
Liefner, I., Schätzl, L., & Schröder, T. (2004). Reforms in German higher education: Implementing and adapting Anglo-American organisational and management structures at German universities. *Higher Education Policy*, *17*(1), 23–38.
Marginson, S. (2000). Rethinking academic work in the global era. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, *22*(1), 23–35.
Margolis, M. (2004). The withering of the professoriate: Corporate universities and the Internet. In J. K. Odin & P. T. Manicas (Eds.), *Globalization and higher education* (pp. 24–41). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
McNay, I. (1999). Changing cultures in UK higher education: The state as corporate market bureaucracy and the emergent academic enterprise. In D. Braun & F. X. Merrien (Eds.), *Towards a new model of governance for universities? A comparative view* (pp. 34–58). London: Jessica Kingsley.
Meira Soares, V., & Amaral, A. (1999). The entrepreneurial university: How to survive and prosper in an era of global competition. *Higher Education in Europe*, *24*(1), 11–21.
Morey, A. I. (2003). Major trends impacting faculty roles and rewards: An international perspective. In H. Eggins (Ed.), *Globalization and reform in higher education* (pp. 68–84). Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Muller, S. (ed). (1996). *Universities in the twenty-first century*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Peisert, H., & Framhein, G. (1995). *Higher education in Germany*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education Science, Research and Technology.
Pritchard, R. M. O. (1998). Academic freedom and autonomy in the United Kingdom and Germany. *Minerva*, *36*(2), 101–124.
Reed, M. (2002). New managerialism, professional power and organisational governance in UK universities: A review and assessment. In A. Amaral, G. A. Jones, & B. Karseth (Eds.), *Governing higher education: National perspectives on institutional governance* (pp. 163–185). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Reich, R. (1991). *The work of nations. Preparing ourselves for twenty-first century capitalism*. London: Simon and Schuster.
Rochford, F. (2003). Academic freedom as insubordination: The legalisation of the academy. *Education and the Law*, *15*(4), 249–262.
de Rudder. (1994). The quality issue in German higher education policy. *European Journal of Education, 29*(2), 201–219.
Schade, A. (2003). Recent quality assurance mechanisms in Germany. *European Journal of Education*, 38(3), 285–290.

Schimank, U., Kehm, B., & Enders, J. (1999). Institutional mechanisms of problem processing of the German university system: Status quo and new developments. In D. Braun & F. X. Merrien (Eds.), *Towards a new model of governance for universities? A comparative view* (pp. 179–194). London: Jessica Kingsley.

Schugurensky, D. (1999). Higher education restructuring in the era of globalisation; toward a heteronomous model? In R. F. Arnove & C. A. Torres (Eds.), *Comparative education: The dialectic of the global and the local* (pp. 283–304). Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Secretariat of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (Kultusministerkonferenz). (1999). *The education system in the Federal Republic of Germany 1998; A description of responsibilities, structures and developments in education policy for the exchange of information in Europe*. Bonn: Kultusministerkonferenz.

Simons, H. (1995). The politics and ethics of educational research in England: Contemporary issues. *British Educational Research Journal*, *21*(4), 435–449.

Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). *Academic capitalism. Politics, policies, and the entrepreneurial university*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Slaughter, S., & Rhoades, G. (2004). *Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, state, and higher education*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stucke, A. (1999). Higher education policy in Germany: Is there any strategy? In D. Braun & F. X. Merrien (Eds.), *Towards a new model of governance for universities? A comparative view* (pp. 163–178). London: Jessica Kingsley.

Teichler, U. (1991). The Federal Republic of Germany'. In G. Neave & F. A. van Vught (Eds.), *Prometheus bound. The changing relationship between government and higher education in Western Europe* (pp. 29–49). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Weiler, H. (2000). States, markets and university funding: New paradigms for the reforms of higher education in Europe. *Compare*, *30*(3), 333–339.

Welsh, H. (2004). Higher education in Germany: Reform in incremental steps. *European Journal of Education*, 39(3), 359–375.

Williams, G. (1996). The many faces of privatisation. *Higher Education Management*, *8*(3), 39–56.

Williams, G. (1997). The market route to mass higher education: British experience 1979–1996. *Higher Education Policy*, 10(3–4), 275–289.

Williams, G. (2004). The higher education market in the United Kingdom. In P. Teixeira, B. Jongbloed, D. Dill & A. Amaral (Eds.), *Markets in higher education: Rhetoric or reality?* (pp. 241–269). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Willmott, H. (2003). Commercialising higher education in the UK: The state, industry and peer review. *Studies in Higher Education*, 28(2), 129–141.

Education as a Method of Re-Orienting Values

Madeleine Mattarozzi Laming

1 Introduction: an Educational Dilemma

Education has long been recognised as a powerful tool for shaping and reinforcing social values. Throughout history, various governments around the world have used their education systems to promote a particular version of national identity and as a means of inculcating a particular set of values. Heathorn (2000) describes how the elementary school curriculum, in particular reading materials, and organisational structures were used to construct a sense of national identity that privileged Englishness in the late nineteenth century. In a similar fashion, Zhao (1998) has described the Chinese government's initiation of a patriotic education campaign intended to boost loyalty among a population that was becoming disenchanted with the rhetoric of communist ideology.

In the lead up to the 1983 federal election, education represented a dilemma for the Labor Party. On the one hand, they were determined to present themselves to the electorate as economically and fiscally responsible, incapable of repeating the mistakes made by the pervious Labor government led by Gough Whitlam in the 1970s. However, Labor had been the party of social justice since its foundation in 1891 and many of Whitlam's educational initiatives such as funding for preschool education, the Disadvantaged Schools Program and abolition of university tuition fees had been exceedingly popular. Moreover, education, in particular higher education, had held a special place in the Australian community as a means of personal and social improvement for several generations. A Labor government determined to prove its economic credentials by reducing the education budget would need to approach the issue very carefully.

M.M. Laming (✉)
Australian Catholic University
e-mail: m.laming@patrick.acu.edu.au

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_9,

2 Community Attitudes to Education in Post-War Australia

The special place accorded to education in Australia can be traced back to the closing days of Second World War and the immediate post-war years. Prior to that time, community attitudes to education were ambivalent, even contradictory. Schools of various types were established quickly and by the end of the nineteenth century free, state-supported elementary education was available in all but the smallest settlements while religious bodies, primarily the Catholic Church, operated secondary schools in cities and country towns, but the first university was not founded for more than 60 years. Moreover, the colonial universities were elite institutions that promoted an aristocratic view of higher education in opposition to technical education institutions such as the Bendigo School of Mines or the Melbourne Working Men's College. Initially, Latin and Greek were compulsory subjects at the Universities of Sydney and Melbourne and the first professors were recruited from England. Academic staff at the University of Melbourne were to have 'such habits and manners as to stamp on their future pupils the character of loyal, well-bred English gentlemen' (McIntyre, 2002, p. 8). However, community acceptance that university was the preserve of the social elite and a few fortunate scholarship holders was changed irrevocably by the Depression and the Second World War.

As the troops returned from active duty and the economy began to expand, university qualifications became highly sought after; shortages of skilled employees in most areas meant that a degree guaranteed not just a job, but a career. To the generation of ordinary Australian women and men who had suffered through the twin evils of the depression and the war, secure, well-paid employment was extraordinarily valuable, however access to university was much more than a means of acquiring a meal ticket; it was an important component of the Australian self-concept. The growing number of university graduates in the community was evidence that Australia was an educated, even cultured nation; it had left behind its uncouth origins while remaining free of the rigid class hierarchies that limited opportunities for success in England and Europe. Possession of a degree became a powerful symbol of the new era of Australian life, as powerful in its own way as ownership of a new Australian-made motor car or house in the suburbs (Capling, Considine, & Crozier, 1998; McCalman, 1993).

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s this attitude to education was also supported and encouraged by both the Labor and Liberal parties who were equally adamant that Australian citizens would never again be humiliated by mass unemployment. Both parties also understood that the pressing need for qualified personnel to undertake the task of reconstruction and restart economic growth would create opportunities for individuals to improve their lives, and although their respective visions of a better society were based on differing interpretations of the relationship between the individual and society (Capling et al., 1998), both parties acknowledged that increasing the number of university-educated people in the community would improve the quality of public life overall. In fact, university education retained its symbolic value to successive governments and the general

population until the 1980s when Australia, together with other developed nations, adopted a market-based interpretation of the value of university education as part of a general trend towards neoliberalism.[1]

3 The Rise of Neoliberalism in Australia

Despite growing support in both for monetarist economics in both the Labor and Liberal parties throughout the 1970s, it did not properly enter the policy domain until the mid-80s. From our current perspective, it is difficult to underestimate the magnitude of the transformation that took place within the Australian Labor Party between losing office in 1975 and the election of the Hawke government in 1983. Convinced that it would remain out of office as long as it remained committed to its traditional social democratic policies which had come to be regarded as too expensive to implement and more significantly, out of step with modern trends, the party began to remake itself. In pursuit of this goal, senior party members were persuaded to embrace free market principles: Curtin's vision of a just and equitable society was not to be achieved by careful government management and intervention when necessary, but through the operation of market forces.

Within a short time of taking office, the Hawke government gradually introduced a number of policies across all policy areas that were intended to transform the Australian economy into a modern, globally competitive entity. A major part of this transformation involved a deliberate refashioning of Australian social values to support an individual rather than collective approach to wealth creation and to social problems. As is often the case in states that are undergoing a major transition (as Australia was at that time), the education system became an important tool in forming collective beliefs that promoted and supported the desired new ideology and identity (Greene, 1990). According to the Hawke government, public attitudes about the purpose of education and responsibility for the costs involved had to be brought into line with economic policy; however, the process of reorientation had to be accomplished without the full understanding of the voting public who were unlikely to accept changes made for ideological reasons: with the symbolism of Whitlam's decision to abolish university tuition fees in mind, and some alarming examples emanating from Thatcher's Britain, Reagan's United States and Muldoon's New Zealand the government opted to move slowly and cautiously – at least to begin with (Hattam & Smyth, 1998).

The Labor Party was elected for three successive terms of government between 1983 and 1996. During that period, it became progressively more enamoured of

[1] Monetarism is an economic theory based on the use of the money supply to control inflation and direct the national economy; neoliberalism is a social movement which seeks to break down all other social relationships, all principles of association and replace them with the market principle (Blunden, 2006).

the monetarist approach to economic policy. The first two Budgets continued to rely on a Keynesian approach to managing the economy in combination with an agreement between the government, business and the unions to control wage and price increases intended to control inflation, known as The Accord, but as the process of opening Australia's economy to international markets continued, the Keynesian approach became difficult to sustain in the face of deteriorating economic conditions and policy began to take on an increasingly monetarist hue. In the case of education policy, the initial focus under the leadership of Senator Susan Ryan as Minster for Education was on efficiency and the need target funds to the most needy recipients. In response to growing demands from the community, the government created an additional 13,000 tertiary places between 1984 and 1988, most of which were reserved for non-traditional students including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, women, migrants, low-income groups and people with disabilities (Smart & Dudley, 1990). From 1985 onwards the emphasis on economic efficiency grew steadily (Jennett & Stewart, 1990). Senator Susan Ryan remained Minister, but the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission was prompted to initiate a review of the whole sector in 1986. The review found that university funding had remained unchanged in real terms for more than a decade while student numbers had increased by 25%, but did not suggest an increase in government funding; rather it recommended that tertiary institutions should find ways to attract income from the private sector (Commonwealth Tertiary Education Committee, 1986). Further evidence of the government's changed attitude emerged as the Minister for Finance, Peter Walsh, attempted to persuade the government to reintroduce tuition fees of around $1,400 for university students and $900 for college of advanced education students. Walsh argued that free tertiary education could not be justified in the tight economic circumstances facing the nation, and that it amounted to a subsidy for the wealthy. Caucus rejected the proposal, but the Budget included a Higher Education Administrative Charge (HEAC) to cover part of the administrative costs of university degrees (Power & Robertson, 1988). By its third term, the Hawke Government was talking about the need to restructure the whole economy to make it competitive. Higher education was to be made to contribute directly to the national economy. When the Hawke Government came to power in 1983, 91% of university funding derived from the Commonwealth Government and 3% form fees, charges and research, since then the proportion of government funding had declined steadily, but by 1987 members of the government were beginning to question its role in funding university education at any level (Smart & Dudley, 1990).

4 Underlying Causes

The change in the interpretation of the purpose of higher education owed more to ideology than economics. Between 1985 and 1987, a number of key ministers who were strong advocates of deregulation and privatisation gained ascendancy; these

included Paul Keating, John Dawkins and Peter Walsh. It was Walsh and Dawkins who had insisted on the HEAC, a radical overturning of the Labor Party's commitment to free university education that had been accepted as the one of the key achievements of the Whitlam Government (Edwards, 2001). In turn, they recruited key advisers who shared their views. Policy was now being developed by advisors such as Professor Michael Porter from the Centre for Policy Studies at Monash, an advocate of private universities and the reintroduction of fees (Smart & Dudley, 1990). Within a short period, anyone who advocated an alternative point of view had been replaced. The takeover by advocates of neoliberalism culminated in the appointment of John Dawkins as the Minister for Education in place of Senator Ryan. The express aim of this decision was to facilitate the remodelling of the higher education sector along ideologically acceptable lines (Maslen & Slattery, 1994).

Dawkins already had an impressive reputation for his efforts in the Department of Trade, Dawkins set about and he was determined to use those skills to deal with what he saw as the problems in education (Smart & Dudley, 1990). His appointment, and the consolidation of the Department of Education into the meta-Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET), symbolised the completion of the transformation that had been in progress since 1983. Using the OECD (1985) report that expressed concern that Australia's education system was not preparing young people for the nature of work in a rapidly changing global society to justify his actions, he began construction of a new discourse on education (Vickers, 1995). This new discourse, combined with the unprecedented union of education and employment, signalled that education's primary, if not sole, purpose was to serve the economy (Smart & Dudley, 1990).

Determined to expand the entire tertiary sector and make it responsive to the needs of the economy while keeping costs to a minimum, Dawkins insisted that the universities should raise a substantial part of their own funds and students should contribute directly to the cost of their education (Maslen & Slattery, 1994). Dawkins was impatient with the universities, regarding them as complacent institutions, unprepared to face reality and unwilling to make hard decisions following the 1982/83 economic downturn (Maslen & Slattery, 1994). In contrast, he admired the Colleges of Advanced Education (CAEs) no-nonsense, top-down management systems and the fact that they worked longer hours, spent less per student and engaged in practical, applied research (Bessant, 1996).

Dawkins was given a free hand by Prime Minister who was not deeply interested in this particular portfolio. Unlike his two immediate predecessors Fraser and Whitlam, Prime Minister Hawke had never been Minister for Education and as the former leader of the Australian Council of Trade Unions he regarded the economy as a more appropriate focus for his attention (Ryan, 1999). Dawkins was deeply involved at every stage of the policymaking process and The Green Paper articulated a clear vision of the type of education that he wanted (Maslen & Slattery, 1994). It was utilitarian in both content and style and made little mention of the cultural and moral value of tertiary (especially university) education. In contrast, the Martin Report, which was written in response to a similar crisis in the late 1950s, emphasised that education had more than an economic dimension (Committee on the Future

of Tertiary Education in Australia, 1964). The language used in the Green Paper suggests that the few references it did make to the intrinsic value of university education were included to mollify critics. They were not explained, and since there was very little mention of them except in the introduction, they did not dilute criticism (Crittenden, 1990; Harman, & Meek, 1988; Kramer, 1990). Dawkins was not perturbed: speaking at the University of New England in February 1998 he defended his position by repeating the familiar refrain that the Hawke Government had been elected to provide sound financial management (Dawkins, 1988a)

The Green Paper on higher education led directly to the appointment of the Wran Committee on Higher Education Funding that recommended a graduate tax in April 1988. Before the end of that year the proposal had been endorsed and the legislation passed (Dawkins, 1988b). From January 1989, almost all university students were required to pay a $900 fee per equivalent full-time semester under a program known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) that replaced the Higher Education Administrative Charge. HECS was a complex system with discounts for up-front payment and provisions for deferred payment through taxation once the graduate's salary reached a certain level (Miller & Pincus, 1997). Although it was unpopular with some sections of the Labor Party, and with students, the new tax was successfully presented to the electorate as economically prudent and a step towards equity. Dawkins placated the majority of Australian voters, who did not have degrees, by describing HECS payments as a tax on the middle class who could afford to send their children to university. He also assured the Labor Party's traditional supporters that it would use the funds it had 'saved' on tuition for the wealthy to provide programs for disadvantaged students.

In September 1988, following the government's acceptance of the policy on tertiary education, the binary system was dissolved. All tertiary institutions were invited to apply to become a part of the Unified National System; 19 universities and the 54 CAEs ceased to exist and 39 new universities were created through a series of hastily arranged mergers (Bessant, 1996). Under the new funding arrangements each new institution would have to have a minimum student load of 2,000 equivalent full-time students (EFTSUs), at least 5,000 EFTSUs to receive research funding and 8,000 to qualify for research grants. Each new institution was required to develop an educational profile, defining its mission and goals, following negotiations with the Department of Employment, Education and Training relating to national priorities (Maslen & Slattery, 1994). By 1991, the focus had shifted to training and reform of the Technical and Further Education Sector and little direct attention was paid to the universities (Maslen & Slattery, 1994). The message they received was unequivocal – further structural changes were their responsibility and they should expect 'considerably less involvement by the Commonwealth than in the recent past' (DEET, 1993a). Policies made during these years emphasised quality control and accountability to the consumers (i.e., students) through external audits (DEET, 1991) thereby consolidating the neoliberal perspective of society where all transactions are exchanges of commodities. According to this view, university education is a service available to those individuals who can afford to buy it.

5 Effects of the Change

To say that peoples' personal values are deeply affected by the dominant values of the society in which they grow to maturity is to state the obvious (Bronfenbrenner, 1995; Durkheim, 1972). The attitudes and values acquired in childhood continue to shape expectations and influence decisions throughout our lives. It is also possible to transform community values through the constant reiteration of a particular point of view, especially if key figures in society can be persuaded to support it. Friedman (1962) understood this when he stressed the importance of talking about the market-based model of education at every opportunity, and in all forums, so that it entered the public consciousness as the normal state of affairs. Pusey (1990) was able to demonstrate that students who studied neoliberal economics at university in the 1970s and 1980s carried those attitudes with them into key policymaking positions in the public service and private enterprise where they have continued to influence public policy. In turn, this shift in attitude at the elite level policymaking level has had a pervasive effect on the whole of society. Similarly, Karstedt and Farrall (2003) argued that there was a clear demarcation between the value systems of adults born after the election of the neoliberal Thatcher government and those who had already reached maturity at that point time. No research along these lines has been conducted in Australia, but evidence of changing community attitudes can be found in the substantial increase in demand for vocational and professional courses (DEET, 1993a). Although this trend began in the 1960s and was well established in the 1970s, the particular growth in business-related fields that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that it was the result of something more than a predictable (and wholly understandable) choice to seek a career in a new field of study such as happened when scientific and technological developments provided a wide range of new opportunities. While there has been little research into young people's understanding of the purpose of university education until recently, several investigations into community attitudes or secondary school students' attitudes found that the most frequently cited reason for going to university was to gain entry to a particular occupation or to secure a better type of job (DEET, 1988; DEET, 1993a; DEET, 1994). Given the strong association between university education and employment, such a utilitarian approach is not surprising, but West (2006) argues that a deeply utilitarian approach to education in general, and university education in particular, has become dominant within the middle class leading to a widespread acceptance of the idea that the most desirable occupation is the one the greatest potential to generate the largest income. Other recent studies have also detected a strengthening in the utilitarian approach among senior secondary school students, but note that it is concentrated in the 'new' middle class (Mattarozzi Laming, 2006; Mattarozzi Laming, 2008). The young people who entered school around the start of the 'Dawkins Revolution' grew up with an education system based upon the user-pays principle and in an era when government policy regarded education as valuable insofar as it served the needs of the economy, and it appears that at least some of them have internalised this message.

Evidence of changes in attitude to university education can also be found in the behaviour of university administrators. As government policy enforced a change to a corporate type of governance overseen by professional managers universities became conglomerates of separate academic 'profit centres' (Dill & Sporn, 1995). Arrangements varied, but a number of universities elected to cut staff or close or demote uneconomic departments rather than supporting them from general revenue in the interests of maintaining breadth or diversity. The effects of this approach were captured on film by Connolly and Anderson (2001) in *Facing the Music* which documented Sydney University's music department struggling for financial support in the face of growing debt.

6 Evaluation

Like previous Labor governments under the leadership of Chifley and Whitlam, the Hawke and Keating governments stressed the importance of higher education to the national interest, but they defined the national interest almost entirely in economic terms. Consequently, the Hawke and Keating governments promoted a pragmatic, utilitarian approach that regarded university education as an instrument, rather than an experience (Porter, Lingard, & Knight, 1993). In reality, the process of reorienting of public opinion took several years and contained a number of steps. To begin with, the government confined itself to promoting the importance of making Australia into the 'clever country' in order to create jobs and preserve prosperity (Smart & Dudley, 1990). Resources were reallocated to specific types of educational courses and institutions that were deemed to be particularly relevant to the national interest (Becher & Kogan, 1980) and a series of policies that stressed the economic benefits of education to the individual and to the nation were introduced. The language of education changed: education policymakers began to talk about 'benchmarks', a term that had originally been used in engineering workshops to describe the marks that lathe operators drew or scored on their work benches to guide their tools; other terms such as access and social justice also underwent subtle reinterpretations (Hattam & Smyth, 1998). By appealing to the community's fears for their children's employment prospects and by emphasising the need to compete at the global level, the Hawke government was able to transform the public discourse on education from one that combined personal advancement with community welfare to one that promoted a devil-take-the-hindmost approach to competition at all levels. At the same time, policies and programs aimed at guaranteeing access to postcompulsory education, including university, for disadvantaged students were framed in terms of individual deficits or needs and carefully avoided questioning the structural basis of their disadvantage.

In line with its more hard-line, neoliberal values, the Howard government intensified the emphasis on the economic costs and benefits of university education, but changed community expectations meant that there was less need for it to shroud its motives in rhetoric about cleverness. So effective was this change in community

attitudes to education that statements like Minister Nelson's remark about an increase in university funding being the same as providing a bigger bus for the passengers that would have been truly shocking in the 1980s, passed almost unnoticed in 2003.

The election of a new Labor government in 2007 does not hold out much promise of a major change of direction despite a noticeable softening of the language employed to describe proposed initiatives. Evidence suggests that the philosophical approach to education is largely unchanged and the emphasis remains firmly utilitarian in its interpretation of the role of education. Policy statements released before the November election concentrated on increased funding for computers in schools and more training places to ease the shortage of skilled labour. The press release announcing a very welcome expansion of the Commonwealth Learning Scholarship scheme stated that additional funding for research would be required so that Australia could 'find new sources of competitive advantage' (Rudd, 2007). It also highlighted the creation of a new class of scholarships, National Priority Scholarships, to train students the most important priority areas 'such as nursing, teaching, medicine, dentistry, allied health, maths, science, and engineering' (Rudd, 2007). Once in government, these initiatives were translated into policy as soon as practicable, but the discussion paper, *Scholarships for a Competitive Future* (DEEWR, 2008a), makes no mention of any reasons other than employment or economic issues for enrolling at university.

However, there are some promising signs: the discussion paper released by the Bradley Review in June 2008 acknowledged 'self-fulfilment, personal development and the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself' as one aspect of the functions of higher education, it also recognises that higher education has a role to play in 'the development and maintenance of the nation's culture and social structures' (DEEWR, 2008a) indicating a distaste for the more extreme position espoused by the Howard government. There is also a marked recognition of the need to find ways of including members of the community who are underrepresented in university enrolment figures: applicants from low socioeconomic status backgrounds, from rural areas, from particular ethnic backgrounds and indigenous applicants. All of these are positive signs; however, they do not represent a radical change in direction. Close reading of the final report (DEEWR, 2008c) suggests that reforms to higher education which might make the student experience more enjoyable or satisfying have more to do with attracting and retaining enough students to produce a sufficient number of qualified graduates to meet the needs of business and industry than with the cultivation of personal character. In this respect, the Bradley Review resembles the tone and sentiments of the 1964 *Tertiary Education in Australia: report of the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia to the Australian Universities Commission*, better known as the Martin Report, which attempted to solve the conundrum of providing for the scientific and technical revolution taking place in the 1960s while preserving a commitment to the humanist ideal of university education as qualitatively different to technical training. Notwithstanding the troubled history of the implementation of that report, the present government could have found far worse models to emulate.

7 Conclusion

Recent events in the history of higher education in Australia provide another example of this process with the introduction of curriculum materials identifying a set of nine Australian values that were to be taught in all schools (DEST, 2003) and the national history syllabus proposed by the Howard government in 2007. Less common are attempts to reshape public attitudes to education itself. Yet, that is precisely what the Labor government achieved during the 1980s with consequences that were more profound and far reaching than it could have imagined.

References

Anderson, D. S., & Vervoorn, A. E. (1983). *Access to privilege*. Canberra: Australian National University Press.

Becher, T., & Kogan, M. (1980). *Process and structure in higher education*. London: Routledge.

Bessant, B. (1996). Higher education in Australia – the Unified National System. *Education Research and Perspectives, 23*(1), 110–123.

Blunden, A. (2006). "All that is solid melts into air…". *Proceedings of the Hegel Summer School 2006*. Retrieved November, 23, 2006, from www.werple.net.au/~andt/seminars/neoliberalism.html

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1995). Developmental ecology through space and time. In P. Moen, G. H. Elder & K. Lüscher (Eds.), *Examining lives in context* (pp. 619–648). Washington: American Psychological Association.

Capling, A., Considine, M., & Crozier, M. (1998). *Australian politics in the global era*. South Melbourne: Longman.

Committee, M. (1992). *Employment-related key competencies: A proposal for consultation*. Melbourne: The Mayer Committee.

Committee, M. (1994). *Key competencies: Report to the AEC and MOVEET on employment-related key competencies for post-compulsory education and training*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia. (1964). *Tertiary education in Australia: Report of the committee on the future of tertiary education in Australia to the Australian universities commission*. Melbourne: The Committee.

Commonwealth Tertiary Education Committee. (1986). *Review of efficiency and effectiveness in higher education*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Connell, R. W. (1971). *The child's construction of politics*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Connolly, B., & Anderson, R. (2001). *Facing the Music*. Sydney: Film Australia and Arundel films in association with channel four and the ABC.

Crittenden, B. (1990). The cultural role of universities. In J. V. D'Cruz & P. E. Langford (Eds.), *Issues in Australian education* (pp. 270–301). Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Dawkins, J. S. (1988a). *The green paper on higher education*. Address to the conference on Australian Higher Education. University of New England.

Dawkins, J. S. (1988b). *Higher education: A policy statement*. July 1988. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

DEET. (1988). *A survey of community attitudes to commonwealth employment, education and training policies and programs*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

DEET. (1993a). *National report on Australia's higher education sector*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

DEET. (1993b). NSW y*ear 10–12 students' attitude to education and training.* Occasional Paper No. 5, July. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

DEET. (1994). *Young people's attitudes to post-compulsory education and training. Follow-up study*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
DEET. (1989). *National report of Australia to the international conference on education. 41st session. Geneva 1989*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
DEEWR. (2008a). *Scholarships for a competitive future: expansion of the commonwealth scholarship program. A discussion paper.* Retrieved May 1, 2008, from http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/higher_education/policy_issues_reviews/key_issues/scholarship/Scholarships_Competitive_Future.htm
DEEWR. (2008b). *Review of higher education discussion paper*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
DEEWR. (2008c). *Review of Higher Education Final Report.* Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. DEST. (2003). *Values education study (Final report)*. Melbourne: Curriculum Corporation.
Dill, D. D., & Sporn, B. (1995). What will the university of the twenty-first century look like? In D. D. Dill & B. Sporn (Eds.), *Emerging patterns of social demand and university reform: Through a glass darkly*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Durkheim, E. (1972). *Selected writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Edwards, M. (2001). *Social policy, public policy: From problem to practice*. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.
Finn, B. (1991). *Young people's participation in education and training: Report of the Australian education council review committee*. Melbourne: Australian Education Council.
Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Greene, A. (1990). *Education and state formation: The rise of education systems in England, France and the USA*. London: Macmillan.
Harman, G. & Meek, L. V. (1988). *Australian higher education reconstructed? Analysis of the proposals and assumptions of the Dawkins green paper.* Department of Administrative and Higher Education Studies. University of New England.
Hattam, R., & Smyth, J. (1998). Competing logics in the key competencies: A sociological reading of post-compulsory education and training in Australia. *Research in Post-Compulsory Education, 3*(2), 133–151.
Heathorn, S. (2000). *For home, country, and race: Constructing gender, class and Englishness in the elementary school, 1880–1914*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
Jennett, C., & Stewart, R. G. (1990). *Hawke and Australian public policy: Consensus and restructuring*. South Melbourne: Macmillan.
Karstedt, S. & Farrall, S. (2003). *The crimes of the respectable: Far too honest?* Paper presented at BA Festival of Science, Salford.
Kelly, P. (1984). *The Hawke ascendancy*. Melbourne: Angus and Robertson.
Kramer, L. (1990). Higher education: Curriculum and national objectives. In J. V. D'Cruz & P. E. Langford (Eds.), *Issues in Australian education* (pp. 217–218). Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
Maslen, G., & Slattery, L. (1994). *Why our universities are failing*. Melbourne: Wilkinson Books.
Mattarozzi Laming, M. (2006). *Between the idea and the reality … falls the shadow.* Unpublished doctoral thesis. Melbourne, The University of Melbourne.
Mattarozzi Laming, M. (2009). *The place of university in the culture of young people*. Dordrecht: Springer.
McCalman, J. (1993). *Journeyings. The biography of a middle class generation 1920–1990*. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
McIntyre, S. (2002). Introduction. *Students, scholars and structures: An early history of the University of Melbourne* (pp. 8–11). Parkville: History Department, University of Melbourne.
Miller, P., & Pincus, J. (1997). *Financing higher education in Australia: The case for superhecs*. Nedlands: University of Western Australia.
Nelson, B. (2003). The education system is like a bus. PM. 2 June, 2003. ABC Radio. Retrieved October 20, 2003, from http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2003/s870356.htm
Newman, J. H. (1852). *Discourses on the scope and nature of university education: Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin*. Dublin: J. Duffy.
Norton, A. (2002). *The unchained university*. St Leonards: The Centre for Independent Studies.

Porter, P., Lingard, B., & Knight, J. (1993). Higher education, national development, and the academic profession: Do we still want "good people thinking about the universe?" *Higher education in transition: Working papers of the higher education policy project.* St Lucia*:* Graduate School of Education. Brisbane: University of Queensland.

Power, C., & Robertson, F. (1988). *Participation in higher education: Effects of the administrative charge.* National Institute of Labour Studies Incorporated. Bedford Park: Flinders University.

Pusey, M. (1990). *The impact of economic ideas on public policy in Canberra*. Kensington, N.S.W.: Public Sector Research Centre.

Pusey, M. (1991). *Economic rationalism in Canberra: A nation-building state changes its mind*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Pusey, M. (2003). *The experience of middle Australia. The dark side of economic reform*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Rudd, K. (2007). *Scholarships for a competitive future – federal labor's plan for improved and expanded commonwealth scholarships.* Media Release 14 November 2007.

Ryan, S. (1999). *Catching the waves. Life in and out of politics*. Harper Collins: Sydney.

Smart, D. (1989). Education. In B. W. Head & A. Patience (Eds.), *From Fraser to Hawke. Australian public policy in the 1980s* (pp. 304–323). Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Smart, D., & Dudley, J. (1990). Education policy. In C. Jennett & R. G. Stewart (Eds.), *Hawke and Australian public policy. Consensus and restructuring* (pp. 204–222). South Melbourne: Macmillan.

Vickers, M. (1995). Cross-national exchange and Australian education policy. In C. Evers & J. Chapman (Eds.), *Educational administration: An Australian perspective* (pp. 110–131). St Leonards: Allen & Unwin.

West, A. (2006). *Lifestyles of the rich and tasteful*. North Melbourne: Pluto Press.

Zhao, S. (1998). A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China. *Communist and Post Communist Studies, 31*(3), 287–302.

Cultural Diversity and its Recognition in Public Universities: Fairness, Utility and Inclusion

Geoffrey Brahm Levey

The university has received scant attention in discussions of multicultural theory and practice.[1] The notable exception is in the United States, where much of the debate over multiculturalism has focused on which groups' histories and cultures are taught on campus (D'Souza, 1991; Glazer, 1997; Nussbaum, 1998). However, in the United States multiculturalism has been a critical protest movement from 'below' rather than official government policy. In places such as Australia, Canada, and Britain, where multiculturalism has been official government policy designed to manage a culturally diverse society, universities largely have been ignored in multicultural discourse. This is surprising, since, in key respects, universities tend to be 'heightened' microcosms of the societies they serve. For one thing, their staff and students typically are much more culturally diverse than the wider society. For another, as bastions of Enlightenment values, they tend to be far clearer about, and more resolute in upholding, certain ideals of individual character and behaviour. Universities thus sharply bring together the two animating dimensions of liberal multiculturalism – cultural diversity, on the one hand, and enabling but also limiting liberal values, on the other.

In this chapter, I want to consider one facet of multiculturalism on campus, namely, the question of institutional adjustment to cater for minority students. My frame of reference will be specifically Australian public universities and the requests for cultural consideration and adjustment now being voiced by Muslim students. Universities in other parts of the world are, however, facing similar issues. The concerns of Muslim students may be grouped into three categories. First, there may be need-based interests for *new campus facilities*. These include the provision

G.B. Levey (✉)
University of New South Wales
e-mail: g.levey@unsw.edu.au

[1]The argument of this chapter was presented at the Australian national conference on "Access, Inclusion and Success: Muslim Students at Australian Universities," Sydney, 2–4 September, 2007. I thank Dr. Sev Ozdowski for the invitation to present at the conference and the occasion to reflect on these issues.

J. Zajda and H. Daun (eds.), *Global Values Education*: Teaching Democracy and Peace, Globalisation, Comparative Education and Policy Research 7,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2510-4_10,

of Halal food in university refectories, prayer rooms within a reasonable distance of lecture and teaching rooms, and ablutions facilities for ritual washing. Second, there may be need-based interests to have *learning and recreational norms modified*. For example, there have been calls for men and women to be separated in the classroom or during sporting sessions, such as the university swimming pool. A less controversial request is that the university not set exams or assignment deadlines during Islamic holidays and festivals. Finally, a third category is not so much about specific needs as simply acknowledging the cultural diversity of the university community, including Muslims. It includes cultural sensitivity at university functions and various kinds of symbolic recognition.

Like claims for cultural recognition in general, where these kinds of issues have been advanced or canvassed, they often have been framed in terms of fairness (or equity and non-discrimination). My contention is that this approach is unduly limiting, both from the perspective of the claimants and the university. Two other arguments for cultural accommodation have particular relevance and should also be countenanced in a public university setting: namely, utility and inclusion. Utility considerations include the efficaciousness of teaching and learning, the achievements and productivity of staff and students, and intangibles such as a sense of pride in, and connection to, one's university. Inclusion signifies the importance of a sense of belonging and rightful membership. Rather than asking what is a fair adjustment, universities should be asking what is the best way of responding to the cultural diversity of their students, all things considered. Taking into account all three issues – fairness, utility and inclusion – promises a more mutually advantageous approach to questions of institutional adjustment than considering reasons of fairness alone.

I will begin by briefly canvassing Australian multicultural policy and its relevance to the present discussion. I then detail the limitations of the fairness approach to cultural accommodation, before considering the importance and advantages of the principles of utility and inclusion.

1 Arguments for Cultural Accommodation

Cultural accommodation has been defended on a variety of grounds, including identity and recognition (Honneth, 2002; Taylor, 1994); equality, fairness, even-handedness or justice (Bader, 2007; Fraser, 2002; Kymlicka, 1995); autonomy and liberty (Gill, 2001; Levey, 1997; Tamir, 1993); toleration and freedom of conacience (Kukathas, 2003; Swaine, 2006); civil peace and avoiding harm (Levy, 2000); and economic and public goods (Goodin, 2006; Parekh, 2000). Albeit in its own terms, Australian multicultural policy has long emphasised the cultural liberty, equity, and public goods arguments. The first national multicultural policy statement, *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) 1989), proclaims an individual right to 'cultural identity' (liberty) and to 'social justice' and 'equality of treatment' (fairness), and emphasises 'economic efficiency' or the 'the need to maintain, develop, and utilise effectively the skills

and talents of all Australians, regardless of background' (public goods). The other main national policy statement, *A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia* (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999) – developed under the conservative (Howard) government – similarly endorses rights to 'cultural respect' and 'social equity', and the importance of 'productive diversity' or maximising 'the significant cultural, social and economic dividends' of Australia's diverse population.[2]

It is important to note that one of the justificatory principles endorsed by Australian multicultural policy – cultural liberty – has little relevance in the present discussion. Whether the issue is Halal food, prayer, ablutions, religious holidays and the like, there is no question of public universities violating Muslim or any other students' religious liberty. Such violation would *prima facie* occur were there to be regulations banning the observance of Islamic practices, or otherwise making their observance impossible. But these are not the kinds of disabilities that are at issue regarding the institutional adjustment for Muslim students. Moreover, insofar as the established arrangements of a university make it more difficult (though not impossible) for Muslim students to observe their faith, then the principle in question is, strictly speaking, equality rather than liberty. Indeed, most discussions of institutional adjustment for minority students at universities intuitively sense that the question is one of equality or fairness rather than of liberty.[3]

The other preliminary point worth noting about Australian multicultural policy is the *absence* altogether of 'inclusion' as a justificatory principle. This seems odd if only from the perspective of classical liberal democratic theory: as in the tricolour values of *liberté*, *egalité* and *fraternité*, valorisation of brotherhood and inclusion is deemed central to a democracy of equals. One might argue that the principle of 'inclusion' is derivative of that of equality, and thus is implicitly recognised in the Australian policy's endorsement of social justice and equity. However, this interpretation overlooks the fact that one can enjoy equal citizenships rights and still be socially alienated. It also fails to accord with Australian cultural norms. The latter famously include a strong tradition of egalitarianism and a 'fair go', but they also mark out a separate and even mythic place for the value of 'mateship', which is the quintessentially Australian sentiment of fraternity and inclusion (Day, 1999). However intimate their relationship at times, inclusion and equality stand as independent values. As we will see, 'inclusion' is a value of some importance in addressing issues of university adjustment for minority students and staff. But first it is important to consider the limits of equality-cum-fairness as a ground for institutional adjustment.

---

[2] In early 2007, the then Howard government expunged the word "multiculturalism" from (federal) government use in favour of "integration" and "citizenship," a change that has been retained by the Rudd Labor government. However, there is little to indicate that the guiding principles of Australian multicultural policy have been abandoned. For an analysis of Australian multiculturalism, see Levey (2008a).

[3] For present purposes, I am treating fairness, equality, equity, and justice as a family of principles representing the same basic approach to defending cultural accommodation. For other purposes, these concepts may be distinguished from each other. For a recent example, see Espinoza (2007).

2 The Limits of Fairness

Claims for minority cultural accommodation in the name of fairness have become pervasive over the past few decades. Behind this development lie several interrelated factors.

One is the modern intellectual trend to view equality as bound up not only with human dignity, and thus equal treatment, but also with being authentic in one's identity, and thus the need to respect and recognise the difference (Modood, 2007; Taylor, 1994). Another factor has been the broadening of the definition of discrimination in international protocols and their counterparts in national anti-discrimination laws. Where originally discrimination simply meant direct or invidious attempts to exclude individuals on the basis of their background group characteristics, since the 1970s, many countries have recognised 'indirect' discrimination as well. According to the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia,* this kind of discrimination is 'unwitting' and 'systemic' and 'occurs when cultural assumptions become embodied in society's established institutions and processes' (Office of Multicultural Affairs, OMA, 1989: p. 15). Or as the Australian Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth) puts it, indirect discrimination occurs when a 'practice or policy appears to be fair because it treats everyone the same, but it actually disadvantages more people from one racial or ethnic group'. A third influence has been the equality-based arguments developed in multicultural political theory, themselves heavily indebted to John Rawls's (1971, 1993) work on social justice. Perhaps the best-known example is Will Kymlicka's (1995) theory of minority rights based on the idea of disadvantages variously endured by national and immigrant minorities in accessing a 'societal culture'.

It is not surprising, then, that arguments from 'fairness' or 'equity' should also figure prominently in discussions of minority claims in a university setting. For example, one researcher suggests that the 'strong relationship between the concepts of multiculturalism and equal opportunity at both practical and theoretical levels' is sufficient reason to treat the question of 'implementing multicultural policy in a university' solely through the prism of equity (Batorowicz, 1999: 5). Fairness and equity obviously have an important place in the life of a university community, as elsewhere. However, this approach to securing cultural accommodation for minority students is not as powerful or compelling as is often assumed.

There are two areas where the approach would seem to have particular force in supporting adjustments for Muslim students. The first concerns the situation of international students. Special obligations apply where a university targets or receives significant numbers of visiting international students, especially where these are short-term (for a semester or two) study abroad students. Such students are heavily dependent on the environment and facilities supplied by their host university, and, unlike Australian students, do not tend to have ready access to alternative social networks and facilities off-campus. Moreover, international students pay substantial fees to attend Australian universities, and there is at least implicit in the acceptance of culturally different students and their money an obligation to cater for these students' cultural needs, where necessary and appropriate. In the case of Muslim

students, these considerations would seem to justify at least the provision of Halal food outlets on campus. It is less clear whether they are sufficient to justify also the provision of prayer rooms and ablution facilities. However, the nature of the relationship between the university and these students is such that these adjustments should at least be seriously considered.

The second case where fairness has particular force is, perhaps, more obvious, and occurs where an institution differentially treats even its minority students. Were a university to provide for the cultural interests of some minority student bodies but not others – as, for example, in agreeing to provide on-campus facilities to serve Jewish and Buddhist students' spiritual interests but not those of Muslim students – then this, in the absence of any compelling and overriding explanation, would be clearly unfair and discriminatory.

Beyond these two sorts of cases, however, the fairness approach, I suggest, is seriously limited in justifying institutional adjustment in the interests of a minority student body.

One problem is that fairness or equity can be satisfied simply through blanket institutional prohibition or denial. A classic example is the 2004 French law banning the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols and clothing. Some years earlier, the American political theorist Nancy Fraser (2002: 35) had argued that 'policies forbidding Muslim girls to wear headscarves in state schools constitute[d] unjust treatment of a religious minority' because 'no analogous prohibition bars the wearing of Christian crosses in state schools; thus the current policy denies equal standing to Muslim citizens'. On her argument, Muslims in France now enjoy equal standing. In this case, equality or fairness was secured at the price of individuals' religious liberty. In a university context, fairness might be attained without jeopardising liberty simply by the university refusing, for example, to allow *any* of its facilities to be used for religious purposes. Instead, students would be advised to pursue such interests off campus. Of course, such a policy discriminates between religious and non-religious activities, and so may still be deemed unfair. But this would depend on whether the university could mount a compelling and non-prejudiced case for the policy.

This brings us to what is perhaps the most pressing limitation on the fairness approach to minority cultural accommodation in a public university. As implied above, fairness takes on board not just the interests of the minority claimants but the interests of the entire community affected. A good example of this feature of fairness is the Australian government's *Disability Standards for Education 2005*, as incorporated in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).[4] As it happens, there is a spirited debate in political theory over whether cultural disadvantage is morally comparable to physical and mental handicap in generating public assistance, a debate that has turned largely on whether or not cultural identity is 'chosen' (Danley, 1991; Kymlicka, 1989: pp. 182–200; cf. Tamir, 1993). However, let us assume, for the sake of treating the strongest argument, that cultural disadvantage

[4] *The Disability Standards for Education 2005* were formulated under 31 (1) (b) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) by the Attorney-General Philip Ruddock on 17 March 2005.

is morally analogous to physical disability. The *Disability Standards* invoke two key concepts in considering the entitlements of disabled students in an education environment: 'reasonable adjustment' and 'unjustifiable hardship'.

According to the *Disability Standards* (S. 3.4 (1)), 'an adjustment is reasonable in relation to student with a disability if it balances the interests of all the parties affected'. Obviously, this includes the interests of the student and whether the adjustment is likely to have the desired effect. But it also importantly includes 'the effect of the proposed adjustment on anyone else affected, including the education provider, staff and other students' and the 'costs and benefits of making the adjustment' (S. 3.4 (2)). The guidelines advise that the 'concept of unreasonable adjustment is different to the concept of unjustifiable hardship on the provider'. The reasonableness or otherwise of the adjustment is considered first, based on the aforementioned considerations. But, significantly, even if the proposed adjustment is determined to be reasonable, it is then 'necessary to go on and consider, if relevant, whether this would none-the-less impose the specific concept of unjustifiable hardship on the provider' (S. 3.4: *Note*). In short, fairness and non-discrimination require a comprehensive assessment of the context and competing interests involved, and even then may legitimately accept the hardship faced by the education provider over that of the students with a disability.

Applying the 'reasonable adjustment' and 'unjustifiable hardship' criteria to the present case of Muslim students seeking certain kinds of university adjustments cannot generate clear-cut conclusions short of a highly detailed assessment of the details of each particular case. Nevertheless, they serve to underscore the complexity and contingency of establishing fairness in such cases. Consider some of the examples.

With little cost or effort, a university might find that it has some unused space that it could offer as a designated prayer room. But if it has no such room available, is it then fair that it spend university resources on building one? Even if the financial burden were to be alleviated by, say, raising the necessary funds to construct a new facility among the local Islamic community, it is not self-evident that fairness would sanction using university property to serve the interests of a specific, and typically small, student group. After all, the defining feature of student services, such as sports facilities, is that they are available to *all* students to use. An alternative arrangement is for the university to construct a multi-faith centre on campus, which all faith groups on campus could access around agreed timetables. The University of Toronto, for example, has adopted this approach.[5] Because a cross-section of the student body is served, this may be the fairest approach to building a new facility for these purposes. Still, whether fairness justifies such a facility will ultimately depend on a university's financial and other resources, what other kinds of facilities it provides its students, and the proportion of students that such a facility serves.

Ablution facilities introduce an additional dimension. Islam enjoins Muslims to wash themselves in a prescribed way before prayer several times a day, and to observe certain standards of personal cleanliness. A shower cubicle with a medium-sized hand basin and paper towels, and either a bidet in some toilets or a flexible

[5] See: http://www.studentlife.utoronto.ca/programs/multifaith.htm

hose connected to the water cistern can generally meet these requirements, respectively. These features are generally unavailable in toilet facilities at Australian universities. As above, a cost–benefit assessment of providing these facilities for a small number of students would inform whether this constitutes a reasonable and fair adjustment on the part of a university. However, there is the further factor of the inconvenience that may follow for many non-Muslim students and perhaps staff if such facilities were *not* made available. If, for example, Muslim students only had available the standard hand basins in toilet facilities, then observing the requirement to wash their feet is likely to lead to substantial amounts of water left on the floor. This may constitute a compelling reason for university management to provide suitable facilities for Muslim students. But if so, this additional reason would be one of prudence rather than fairness. Indeed, fairness might well dictate only that Muslim students who use hand basins to wash their feet have the responsibility to ensure that the floor is left dry after them.

On the face of it, the provision of Halal food on campus would seem to be a less taxing case than the physical adjustments required for special prayer rooms and ablution facilities. Usually this involves the university or student services simply seeking a commercial tender to supply such food. But what if no tender is forthcoming? Is it fair that the university subsidise a business to supply the food? And how many students or what proportion of the overall student body constitute a sufficient number to warrant such an arrangement? Consider an analogy. At my own university, it is virtually impossible to procure anything substantial to eat after about six-thirty p.m. Staff and students working on campus after this time are, by definition, gastronomically disadvantaged compared to their more diurnal colleagues, who enjoy a plethora of dining options during the day. Is this situation unfair? It is in the commonplace sense that some university-goers have to endure a disadvantage that, in an ideal world, would not apply. But it is less clearly unfair if we mean by this that the university is morally obligated to ensure that some eating-places are open throughout the evening for the comparatively few people then on campus.

Much the same applies regarding the separation of the sexes. It is hard to imagine secular universities agreeing to separate classes for male and female students under any circumstances, let alone for religious reasons. However, the question of scheduling times when only women may use the university swimming pool, for example, should not be ruled out categorically. Does fairness demand it? It is hard to see how it does where only a small number of Muslim women have an interest in availing themselves of the restricted period. However, one's sense of fairness here would likely quickly change were most women on campus asking for a restricted period.

Finally, what about the scheduling of exams or indeed holding of classes during the religious festivals of minority students? Clearly, scheduling exams during these times without making alternative arrangements available to such students would strike most people as unreasonable and unfair since it strikes at one of the core activities and purposes of the university. And indeed, Australian universities typically have codes to ensure that students, in these circumstances, do have alternative exam arrangements available. But the notion that it would be even fairer if exams were simply not held where they clash with a minority holiday is not widely accepted.

In the United States, some elite colleges, where 20% (or more) of staff and students are Jewish, suspend classes on *Rosh Hashana* (the Jewish New Year) and *Yom Kippur* (the Day of Atonement). But others with just as many Jewish staff and students hold classes on these days.

In all these cases, a key consideration in determining reasonable adjustment is the number or proportion of students needing or seeking the adjustment. This concern is consistent with an influential account of collective rights. On this account, a collective right arises where the accumulated interests of the several individuals comprising the group are necessary to put others under an obligation (Jones, 1999: 85). Or put differently, unlike conventional individual rights, the interest of no single member of the group is sufficient by itself to justify the right, and hence impose a duty on others (Raz, 1986: 208). There is no metric for establishing how large or what proportion of a community a group needs to be before the joint interests of group members will be sufficient to generate an entitlement. As usual, context matters. All other things being equal, perhaps 30% of the student body needing a prayer room or ablution facilities is more than enough to recommend these facilities as a fair expenditure of resources. In contrast, and again all other things being equal, perhaps 30% of the student body is not enough to warrant a university cancelling classes for the other 70% of students. The trouble, of course, is that all other things are rarely equal. All sorts of competing considerations command attention. The institutional adjustments to which Muslim (and other) students are entitled on grounds of fairness are, in fact, highly contingent and far from self-evident. Other grounds for institutional adjustment need to be considered.

3 Utility and Inclusion

As we have seen, fairness as a justificatory principle often leaves minority cultural claims in the lurch because it is unable to provide sufficient moral support for them. However, the flipside of this inadequacy is that *satisfying* a minority claim for adjustment might actually compromise fairness. In either case, public universities would only be justified in accommodating their cultural minorities if there were some other compelling grounds for doing so. This is where and why considerations of utility and inclusion are important.

As noted, utility considerations are recognised as a key plank in Australian multicultural policy. There, under the rubrics of ‘economic efficiency’ and ‘productive diversity’, the concern is with harnessing the cultural diversity of the Australian population with a view to maximising Australia’s ability to compete in a global marketplace and, ultimately, Australians’ prosperity. In a public university setting, the public goods have to do with the productivity and achievements of the students and staff, the effectiveness of the university’s teaching and learning environment, and students’ sense of pride in, and connection to, their university. It scarcely needs to be argued that all these goods are more likely to be served where students feel that their university is supportive of them.

In recent times, as government funding of the university sector has dwindled, many Australian universities have made concerted efforts to develop their alumni networks in the hope of advancing philanthropic giving to their institutions. With modest expectations, they look to American universities for inspiration and their ability to raise many millions of dollars each year from their alumni. What they do not always notice is how focused many American institutions are on pleasing their students during their years on campus. Notwithstanding the many differences between the two societies – including an American higher education sector dominated by wealthy private universities compared to an Australian sector primarily composed of struggling public universities – the fact is that Americans give back so generously to their alma mater because they *want* to. Australian universities should bear this in mind when considering the often-modest expense involved in accommodating some of the interests of their minority students. Greater attention to the experience they offer *all* their diverse students is likely to pay dividends in future years.

A sense of belonging and inclusion will also likely contribute to these utility interests of the university. However, inclusion should be honoured not only for these ulterior motives, but also in its own right. Australian multicultural policy lamentably does not recognise inclusion, but Australian culture gives it a special name, 'mateship'. Ultimately, inclusion is important to honour for no other reason than you or he or she is one of us, in this case, a member of this or that university community. Inclusion can often be promoted (and undermined) through symbolic gestures. These tend to be cost-free in resource terms, yet nevertheless have proven remarkably difficult for Australian universities to manage. An example is the still prevalent university practice of holding 'Christmas parties' for their staff and extending 'Merry Christmas' to all staff and students. The issue is not, as it is often presented, one of minorities being 'offended' by Christmas and its trappings. Rather, the issue is about the university signifying an awareness of its own diversity, and an acceptance that not all of its members do observe or identify with the festival (Levey, 2006). A simple switch to holding 'end-of-year' parties and extending 'Season's Greetings' or even 'Merry Christmas and Season's Greetings' would promote a sense of inclusion and show that the university is mindful of all its members.

Even where the calculus of fairness might lend them too little support, and even where no material gain to the institution is likely to result, a university might well agree to make certain adjustments to accommodate its minorities solely to signify that they too are valued members of the university community. They might agree, that is, because they want all their students to feel included.

To be sure, cases may arise where pursuing utility interests and/or inclusiveness clashes with the dicta of fairness. In a situation of scarce resources, providing for a particular student group may be considered a gross breach of fairness given the force of other pressing interests. What is more, such a breach of fairness may cause widespread resentment and itself erode the cohesion of the university community and its utility concerns. This kind of scenario underscores again the importance of context and contingency in treating competing interests and claims and determining the best course of action. Still, it is important to see that there is another side to the relation between fairness and these other university objectives.

Following Ronald Dworkin (1978: 125), equality may be understood as 'equal treatment', involving equal measures of a particular good, and 'treatment as an equal', where all parties are shown equal concern and respect. In the present context, 'equal treatment' need not involve a mechanical allocation of identical opportunities or resources; it may well take into account how certain members are differentially situated to begin with. That is, equal treatment here involves equal shares given unequal starting points. The sort of controversy referred to above would arise where *even taking into account the differential situation of parties*, it is believed that one party is receiving more than its fare share in the circumstances. However, on the alternative conception of equality – treatment as an equal – what everyone is owed is equal concern and respect, not equal treatment. On this conception, equality may well sanction *disparate* treatment of members out of consideration for pressing background circumstances and other social goals. Utility concerns and social inclusion are precisely the kinds of broad objectives that might justify what otherwise might seem to be unfair treatment. And the reason they perform this justificatory work, and undercut the claim of unfairness, is because they are deemed to benefit the *entire* community and not only those seeking the adjustment.

4 Conclusion

In what may be called our 'multicultural age' (Levey, 2008b), universities will increasingly be expected to respond to the cultural diversity of their students and staff, no less than states will in regard to their societies. In this chapter, I have considered this challenge from the perspective of public universities in Australia facing claims for institutional adjustment from Muslim students. I have suggested that the question 'What is a fair adjustment?' is not the only important one regarding whether to accommodate cultural diversity in public universities. University leaders also need to consider calls for cultural accommodation in the light of their own utilitarian interests and the intrinsic importance of promoting an inclusive scholarly community. Doing so is likely to engender a more supportive and mutually advantageous resolution of calls for cultural accommodation than considering reasons of fairness alone.

References

Bader, V. (2007). *Democracy or secularism? Associational governance of religious diversity*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Batorowicz, K. (1999). Implementing multicultural policy in a university: Towards further way into equal opportunity in higher education. *Paper presented to the Equal Opportunity Practitioners in Higher Education conference*, the University of Auckland, New Zealand, 30 November–3 December: www.adcet.edu.au/uploads/documents/implementingmultipol.pd

Commonwealth of Australia. (1999). *A new agenda for multicultural Australia*. Canberra: AGPS.

D'Souza, D. (1991). *Illiberal education: The politics of race and sex on campus*. New York: Free Press.
Danley, J. R. (1991). Liberalism, aboriginal rights, and cultural minorities. *Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20*, 168–85.
Day, M. (1999). *Pulse of a nation: A portrait of Australia*. Harper Collins: Sydney.
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
Dworkin, R. (1978). *Taking rights seriously*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Espinoza, O. (2007). Solving the equity/equality conceptual dilemma: A new goal oriented model to approach analyses associated with different stages of the educational process. *Educational Practice and Theory, 29*(1), 75–96.
Fraser, N. (2002). Recognition without ethics. In S. Lash & M. Featherstone (Eds.), *Recognition and difference: Politics, identity, multiculture* (pp. 21–42). London: Sage Publications.
Gill, E. R. (2001). *Becoming free: Autonomy and diversity in the liberal polity*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Glazer, N. (1997). *We are all multiculturalists now*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goodin, R. (2006). Liberal multiculturalism: Protective and polyglot. *Political Theory, 34*(3), 289–303.
Honneth, A. (2002). Recognition or redistribution? Changing perspectives on the moral order of society. In S. Lash & M. Featherstone (Eds.), *Recognition and difference: Politics, identity, multiculture* (pp. 43–55). London: Sage Publications.
Jones, P. (1999). Human rights, group rights, and peoples' rights. *Human Rights Quarterly, 21*(1), 80–107.
Kymlicka, W. (1989). *Liberalism, community, and culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Levey, G. B. (1997). Equality, autonomy, and cultural rights. *Political Theory, 25*(2), 215–248.
Levey, G. B. (2006). Symbolic recognition, multicultural citizens, and acknowledgement: Negotiating the christmas wars. *Australian Journal of Political Science, 40*, 355–370.
Levey, G. B. (2008). Multicultural political thought in Australian perspective. In G. B. Levey (Ed.), *Political theory and Australian multiculturalism*. New York: Berghahn Books.
Levey, G. B. (2009). Secularism and religion in a multicultural age. In G. B. Levey & T. Modood (Eds.), *Secularism, religion, and multicultural citizenship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levy, J. T. (2000). *The multiculturalism of fear*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Modood, T. (2007). *Multiculturalism: A civic idea*. Oxford: Polity.
Nussbaum, M. (1998). *Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA). (1989). *National agenda for a multicultural Australia*. Canberra: AGPS.
Parekh, B. (2000). *Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political theory*. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan.
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).
Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1993). *Political liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Raz, J. (1986). *The morality of freedom*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Tamir, Y. (1993). *Liberal nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition* (pp. 25–73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Author Index

Subject Index