Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer

HabitusAnalysis 1

Epistemology and Language

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In memoriam Otto Maduro

And as for certain truth, no man has seen it, nor will there ever be a man who knows about the gods and about all the things I mention. For if he succeeds to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself is nevertheless unaware of it; and opinion (seeming) is fixed by fate upon all things.
(Xenophanes of Colophon, Fragment 34, in: Freeman 1948, 30)

Language may be compared with the spear of Amfortas in the legend of the Holy Grail. The wounds that language inflicts upon human thought can not be healed except by language itself. Language is the distinctive mark of man-and even in its development, in its growing perfection it remains human-perhaps too human. It is anthropocentric in its very essence and nature. But at the same time it possesses an inherent power by which, in its ultimate result, it seems to transcend itself. From those forms of speech that are meant as means of communication and that are necessary for every social life and intercourse it develops into new forms; it sets itself different and higher tasks. And by this it becomes able to clear itself of those fallacies and illusions to which the common usage of language is necessarily subject. Man can proceed from ordinary language to scientific language, to the language of logic, of mathematics, of physics. But he never can avoid or reject the power of symbolism and symbolic thought.
(Cassirer 1942, 327)

Content

Preface

It was on one of those colorful, battered Guatemalan buses transporting the indigenous peasants across the highlands that, in 1983, I began to read Bourdieu's *Outline of a theory of praxis*. People around me sat closely packed among sacks of corn, some with hens on their laps. Military patrols at the important road crossings made us get off the bus and on again every now and then. So my reading of Bourdieu was somewhat interrupted by one of the lesser hardships of war. But the reading was as necessary as it was pleasant. I was preparing field research for 1985 and 1986 on religious movements in Central American war zones, and was acquainted with Berger/Luckmann's phenomenological sociology—which was, at that time, in Germany considered as state of the art for doctoral research such as the one I was going to conduct. I was, however, not convinced of its usefulness for my task.

When we were ordered to leave the bus, the peasants were noticeably fearful which showed in the way they quickly moved to get out of the bus and lined up alongside the vehicle. Some were interviewed by the soldiers, sometimes in a friendly and almost joking way, sometimes in an outright interrogation. Imagine a tall and sturdy military official of the Guatemalan counter-insurgency army standing in front of a small, skinny farmer with his raddled sandals and threadbare traditional trousers. What kind of fun could the officer show that would not scare the peasant? Or else, was this particular peasant collaborating with the military? What would his fellow villagers think and do about jokes and smiles between the peasant and the officer?

War is an intense social context, and it is hard to imagine two "subjects"—for instance, a peasant and an officer—constructing their social reality by merely intersubjective communication, as if they were not turned into "master and slave" (Hegel) by their objective positions in the social structure even before any conversation could start. Their encounter bears all the burden of social inequality and violence that characterizes the difference between the social positions of both men; and it shapes their religious beliefs as well. Even if they belong to the same

religious tradition—Pentecostal in this case—their religious beliefs answer to completely different contexts of life and religious needs. Their discourses may sound quite similar at first; but listening more closely and with attention to the contextual meaning one recognizes two very different religious identities. Similar, however, is the intensity of their faith. Religious movements—particularly Pentecostals, and even more so in armed conflicts— have strong religious convictions that, during war, guide their strategies of survival. These convictions have to be taken into account by an interpretative sociology (according to Max Weber's "understanding," *verstehen*). However, convictions are almost systematically misunderstood if they are taken as a context-free symbolism, as sign-systems believed in by free individuals. The semantics by which actors generate their convictions acquire their meaning only if they are used within social contexts. These contexts are constituted by objective conditions, such as war, poverty, or wealth. But for an understanding of the relation between these conditions and the convictions and practices of the actors, an "actorless" functionalism or a doctrine of a strong social or biological determination of human thought and action is of little use. Bourdieu might have had similar feelings when he was performing his first field studies during the Algerian war. In any case, he designed a theory suitable for harsh conditions and strong beliefs. At least, reading into praxeology presented me with a timely answer for an urgent theoretical need. The book turned out a pleasant read and—at the same time, during the bus ride—it was great to see that this theory really helped me to understand the situation.

Later on, the theory of the social space—as developed in Bourdieu's *Distinction*—was to provide a frame to locate the peasant, the army official, and any other interlocutor in their respective positions in society. Even further on, the model of the religious field served to distinguish different religious actors, such as Pentecostal congregations, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, Base Communities, in terms of the power they exerted relative to one another. Both models provide objective frames to understand better the central object of research: religious convictions in their social context.

According to this principal interest, what I was really fascinated by were Bourdieu's thoughts about habitus, practical sense, and practical logic—as developed in *Outline* and subsequently in *The Logic of Practice*. The concept of practical logic allowed me to understand how convictions, knowledge, and even calculus work in social relations; and thus it helped to explain better the socially shared meaning and its effects on social relations as well as on the exchange of goods and, eventually, on social structure. The concepts of practical sense and habitus facilitated the understanding of how such knowledge, convictions, preferences etc. are created by humans as cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of perception, judgment,

and action in interdependence with the social relations and structures that actors live in. These concepts also helped me to see how convictions and preferences operated by means of the practical logic in different fields of praxis, and the religious field in particular. If I should find out the logic according to which the religious, political, and social convictions, indeed knowledge in general, of the military official, the peasant, and all the others operated, I could not only describe what they were doing, but understand why they were doing it. In Max Weber's terms, I could understand their motivation and how it is that sometimes people stubbornly keep saying and doing the same outdated things, yet at other times they rapidly change their minds, undergo a religious conversion, or find creative new ways of problem-solving and even of "re-inventing" themselves.

While I was fascinated by these perspectives, I also noticed that Bourdieu had not developed methods and models for qualitative research on human attitudes, especially not for research by means of interviews.[1] With regard to Bourdieu's writings on religion, the situation was similar. His articles from the early seventies were interesting from a theoretical point of view, but they proposed quite a narrow concept of religion and did not provide adequate tools for a study like the one I was going to realize.[2] Clearly, it was a better idea for my project to stick to habitus, practical sense, and practical logic.[3] So, if I was going to do research on religious practical logics of Pentecostals in the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan wars, I had to develop a Bourdieu-based method of my own.

In January 1985, my wife, an anthropologist specializing in Mesoamerica, and I set out for two years of field studies in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the USA.[4] After conducting some explorative interviews, we discussed hermeneutical issues of understanding the cultural "other" (Schäfer 2002) while designing the guidelines for interviews and observation. The influence of cultural anthropology in our debates

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1   His only intent in qualitative, interview-based research appeared much later (Bourdieu et al. 1999, F: 1993, G: 1998). However, in that book he does not develop such a method either (see vol. 3).

2   Bourdieu 1987, F: 1971a, G: 2011a; Bourdieu 1991, F: 1971b, G: 2011b.

3   Similarly see Verter (2003, 150): "In order to see Bourdieu's relevance for sociologists of religion, one must—quite paradoxically—turn away from his writings of religion."

4   The project was financed by the *Evangelisches Studienwerk Villigst* and the *World Council of Churches* who considered it useful to have a close up snapshot of the Pentecostal movement in Central America at the time of intense political conflict about US-American and Soviet geostrategic influence in that region. Originally, the institutional frame was a doctoral thesis in ecumenical theology at the University of Bochum with Prof. Konrad Raiser (see Schäfer 1992a). As time went by, the project turned sociological and methodological.

fitted very well with Bourdieu's background in that discipline. In consequence, our interview guideline provided ample space for the interviewees to talk about *their* experiences, *their* beliefs, and *their* modes of action. With this interview-guide as our key instrument, we started into two years of incredibly intense and in many ways very moving field studies on people deeply touched and mobilized by an environment of violence, disorder, and threat.

In my own research,[5] the interviews (about 100 in each of the two countries) constituted the central interpretative axis, complemented by taped sermons (some 50 in each country), minutes of services for the analysis of church rituals (approx. 80), and of course a field diary. After these two years and our return to Germany, I began to analyze a sample of the interviews and sermons. In the light of the theory of habitus and from the analysis of the interviews, there emerged an analytical method with its focus on the semantics of ordinary religious language. I re-examined structuralist, hermeneutical, and pragmatist methods of analysis for their usefulness for my purpose. The most striking discovery, leading me back to my undergraduate days and propaedeutic courses in theology, was the organization of basic relations of Aristotelian logic in the model of the propositional square. The logic organized in this model, used since late antiquity in Western theology and philosophy, had already helped Augustine of Hippo to distinguish between the paradise, this world, and heaven.[6] In the sixties, the model had been taken up again and transformed by Algirdas Julien Greimas for semiotics. While Greimas' square provided interesting stimuli for learning more about the semiotic application of conceptual logic, for my task it was focused too much on abstract semiotics, on the meaning of concepts understood merely as their value within the "universe of signification" (Greimas). They also lacked relation to the experience of the actors and to their social context. Instead, the model from classical antiquity—since it organizes propositions and not just concepts—offered better conditions for adaptation to praxeological sociology. Finally, it took me two years—and the complaints of friends and professors that I was spending the best years of my life in a den—to develop and test the central tool and method of HabitusAnalysis, the *praxeological square*, by analyzing interviews, evaluating field observations, computing data, interpreting gray literature and official documents, and writing some 600 pages

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5   My wife employed other techniques for her study.

6   See Augustine's distinction between being able to not to sin (*posse non peccare*, man in paradise), not being able not to sin (*non posse non peccare*, unsaved man) etc.

on Pentecostals and Neo-Pentecostals in Guatemala—a piece that, due to adverse conditions, has not been published until the present day.[7]

The nascent method of HabitusAnalysis by the praxeological square represented an important advancement in the study of the Pentecostal movement in Latin America. In the literature about religious renewal in Latin America during the 1980s there was no internal differentiation within what was called "the Pentecostals."[8] In contrast, HabitusAnalysis brought to light that there was an extremely important difference, and even a division, within that religious movement. This difference was in line with the social difference between a certain cluster of believers in the lower class (rural and urban) and another cluster in the upper middle and upper classes. Under the conditions of war, this difference turned into open confrontation and controversial strategies. HabitusAnalysis evidenced that—in spite of a similar repertoire of religious symbols—along this line of conflict two completely different religious habitūs had developed in a relatively short stretch of time. Upper middle class and upper class believers practiced a charismatic and theocratic religion of divine power (dominance, *Weltbeherrschung*, Max Weber), while the poor Pentecostals followed an apocalyptic, pre-millenarian religion of withdrawal from the world (*Weltflucht*, Max Weber). The former believed that their problems had originated from demons, active not only in personal threats (like alcoholism or bulimia) but also in social ones (like the guerrilla, the unionist movement, social democrats, and socialists). Their religious identity was based on the belief that the Holy Spirit had given power to the individual believer and to "Christian" institutions (like the military) to exorcize the demons. Exorcism, "spiritual warfare," became the central practical operator. For their part, the poor Pentecostals faced military violence, hunger, the non-existence of schooling, and economic scarcity. They found themselves in a situation of "no way out" (*no hay para donde*) and understood their plight as a necessary consequence of the end times drawing near. In this situation, they waited for the imminent return of Christ and the rapture of the true believers into heaven. Their strategy was to withdraw from social and political commitment and to concentrate on preparing for the rapture exclusively by church attendance and solidarity among their congregations.[9] The

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7   Instead, a more general study of the historical and macro-sociological conditions of Protestant mission in Central America was accepted in 1992 as doctoral dissertation at Bochum University, Germany, under the supervision of Prof. Konrad Raiser.

8   See Domínguez and Huntington 1984; Stoll 1990; D. Martin 1990, for the most widespread publications in English. The same is true for publications in Spanish, e.g. Samandú 1991; A. Martínez 1989; Valverde 1990.

9   While the detailed study had not been published, a condensed version of it appeared in Spanish (Schäfer 1992b). In fact, there were at least three currents within the Pente-

difference between these factions was not only patently obvious to HabitusAnalysis but also to the actors themselves, who mutually ascribed to each other erroneous concepts of Pentecostalism.

As the distinction between two fractions in the movement was innovative in the sociological perception of Pentecostalism in Latin America, the differentiation between Pentecostals and Neo-Pentecostals became widespread among social scientists. Among the movement itself it was self-evident. Today, however, the distinction has become considerably blurred again because of the very social and religious developments of the last three decades.

For the validation of my empirical results and for frequent tests of the method it was very useful that, from 1995 to 2003, I held professorships in Costa Rica at the *Universidad Bíblica Latinoamericana*, an ecumenical institution, and at the *Universidad Nacional*. The former especially provided me with many opportunities to validate the results and the method of my research together with Pentecostals all over Latin America, and to realize some additional small studies. The reactions to my work were striking. The empirical results were approved up to 100%, not only by students, but also by Pentecostal and non-Pentecostal scholars throughout Latin America. A book[10] published in Costa Rica in 1992 was well received by students, scholars, and even religious practitioners in Latin America. When I used the method based on the praxeological square in seminars on the sociology of religion or research methods, students applied it in tentative analyses to their own churches. In the final evaluation of one of the seminars—with Pentecostals from the Central American region—, one of the students commented that he would like to apply the method to North Atlantic churches and even to academics.

The most interesting and fruitful scientific experience during the dialogue with my Latin American Pentecostal students and many experienced "servants of the Lord" was to look closely at that "infinitesimal but infinite distance" (Bourdieu) between the theoretical model of a given praxis and its practical mastery, a distance absolutely necessary to be aware of if one wants to generate a telling explanation of praxis.[11] In other words, my work with Pentecostals not only made me confident that the model worked, and that it worked as a *praxeological* model. More importantly, it gave me a strong experiential confirmation of the hermeneutical fact, which I

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costals during the eighties.

10   Schäfer 1992c, based upon parts of my doctoral dissertation in theology.

11   "The theoretical model that makes it possible to recreate the whole universe of recorded practices, in so far as they are sociologically determined, is separated from what the agents master in the practical state, and of which its simplicity and power give a correct *idea,* by the infinitesimal but infinite distance that defines awareness or (it amounts to the same thing) explicit statement." (Bourdieu 1990a, 270, G: 2008, 467)

already knew theoretically: the model is just a *model* and neither the practical mastery nor a mirror of reality—but as a model, it is very helpful. Thus, readers who expect too much of HabitusAnalysis—to be given something like a camera to take a faithful image of religious reality—are invited to feel disappointed right now. The model simply reduces the complexity of praxis: it helps to understand better how the practical logic of actors is transformed according to the challenges they meet in their social context.

Model and method are rooted in praxeological theory. In consequence, the empirical study and its methodological reflection triggered further work in theory. First, I dealt with the problem of collective mobilization of social and religious movements by developing a theory of identity and strategy as a network of dispositions based upon the concept of habitus.[12] Second, I developed an outline of a praxeological approach to theology and to religious studies.[13]

Moving from theory back to method and empirical studies, I had the chance since 2006, through a professorship of Sociology of Religion and Theology at Bielefeld University,[14] to design bigger research projects with considerable third party funding and a research team. While almost all our research projects have followed a praxeological approach, I shall here mention only those of my co-authors of the third volume of HabitusAnalysis. The first project relevant for the advancement of the method was focused on religious peace builders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The field study was carried out in cooperation with the Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies at the University of Sarajevo. We studied religious groups and institutions of Abrahamic religions engaged in peace building. The idea was to cluster the groups in a model of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian religious field and, in a second step, to compare the habitus of the actors in order to find specific similarities and differences. Leif Seibert (religious studies, philosophy, and sociology) developed a scaled model of the religious field and, together with Zrinka Štimac, conducted 90 habitus-interviews.[15] In the context of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research

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12   The book was accepted as doctoral dissertation in sociology by two of the most long-standing Bourdieu experts in Germany, Hans-Peter Müller and Klaus Eder. Presently a thoroughly revised version is being prepared for publication. See Schäfer 2003; Schäfer 2005.

13   This book was accepted as Habilitation in ecumenical theology at Bochum University, Germany, also under the supervision of Prof. Konrad Raiser (Schäfer 2004a).

14   For more information on the team and the projects, see the website of the Center for the Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Society (CIRRuS), http://www.uni-bielefeld. de/religionsforschung or google: 'cirrus uni bielefeld'.

15   Leif Seibert finalized the project with a prize winning doctoral dissertation in which he developed a fully-fledged model of the religious field and considerably advanced

at Bielefeld University, together with Adrián Tovar Simoncic (cultural anthropology, religious studies, and sociology) we then achieved a deeper understanding of identity politics within the theoretical framework of the field-concept.[16] Further, with an empirical study on religious diversity in Mexico City, which was realized in cooperation with the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM, Hugo José Suárez), Adrián contributed a praxeological perspective on religion as a means of individuation in modernity as well as progress in field theory. Since late 2011, Adrián and Tobias Reu (PhD, NYU, in social anthropology), have been realizing a research project on religious actors and their socio-political strategies in Guatemala and Nicaragua. This project is designed to test the whole range of methods and models in just one field of research in order to provide a coherent presentation of the method in volume 3 of *HabitusAnalysis*. One of the models is the social space of religious styles. It had been tested before by Jens Köhrsen (economics and sociology) in a research project about religious taste and social stratification in Buenos Aires.[17] Adrián and Jens have now co-authored the chapter on social space in volume 3. The scholars mentioned here have contributed directly to the publication of *HabitusAnalysis*.

Beyond the co-authors of volume 3, there are some more scholars in our research team who realize projects based upon praxeological sociology and who have contributed good ideas to the common task. Clara Buitrago (social anthropology) studies religious beliefs and modes of organization in the transnational praxis of migrants between Guatemala and the USA. Tamara Candela (Mesoamerican studies) studies life histories of religious peace builders in Guatemala. Sebastian Schlerka (sociology) works on "secularization as struggle." Jacobo Tancara (theology and literature) studies the constitution of subjectivity in Bolivian marginal urban writing in comparison with Liberation Theology. Rory Tews (sociology) applies HabitusAnalysis to social entrepreneurs in the economic field in Germany.

For the solution of intricate problems in our statistical "background activities"—sampling for surveys in difficult places like Bosnia-Herzegovina, construction of scales, reliable factor analyses etc.—we count on the advice and services of the StatBeCe (Statistisches Beratungs Centrum, Bielefeld University, Prof. Dr. Kauer-

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HabitusAnalysis. Leif is not only the author of the chapter on the religious field and contributor to the chapter on the analysis of the practical sense (both vol. 3). He also accompanied critically the work on the volumes 1 and 2.

16   "E pluribus unum?– Ethnic Identities in Transnational Integration Processes in the Americas," a research group at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research at Bielefeld University.

17   The project was finished in co-tutelle with École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, with a *summa cum laude* doctoral dissertation.

mann), the statistician Kurt Salentin of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, and Constantin Klein of the psychology branch of our Center for the Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Society (CIRRuS). The surveys in Guatemala and Nicaragua relied on the expertise of Gustavo Herrarte and Irina Pérez Zeledón. The Center for Interamerican Studies (CIAS) at Bielefeld University in Bielefeld presents an interesting institutional frame for discussing praxeological takes on transnational religious and cultural relations. Moreover, our model of the social space with its simplified scales for economic and cultural capital has been used since 2009 in a project on spirituality lead by my colleague Prof. Heinz Streib (Streib and Hood 2013; Streib 2014). In the faculty of History, Philosophy, and Sociology, also Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey and Thomas Welskopp as historians with a sound knowledge of Bourdieu's work are challenging interlocutors. Additionally, during the last years we had the opportunity to engage in more or less intensive exchanges about our ideas with outstanding experts in praxeological social research and neighboring disciplines, like e.g. our colleagues Thomas Alkemeyer, Ullrich Bauer, Uwe Bittlingmayer, Jörg Blasius, Helmut Bremer, Andrea Lange-Vester, Otto Maduro, Ulrich Oevermann, Terry Rey, Ole Riis, Franz Schultheis, Hugo José Suárez, Michael Vester and Loic Wacquant. Many thanks to all of them for their kind attention and advice! We hope that our three volumes will be conducive to further exchanges in the future.

At the start of this publication project, I had in mind just one book on method, with much of it already written. The project has however tripled in volume for a variety of reasons. The first reason is critics. Over the last 10 years or so, we have presented the method at conferences, where it was well received and discussed. Taking both the constructive critiques *and* the misunderstandings seriously, the only consequence—other than keeping silent—is to write more, and explain better. Second, the *Lichtenberg Kolleg* in Göttingen, together with the German Research Foundation (DFG), gave me 10 months time in 2012 to work exclusively on the epistemological and theoretical foundation of the method. So I wrote more and, hopefully, explained better. Finally, in the research team we took the decision to change our plans with regard to the volume on method (vol. 3). Initially, the different components of HabitusAnalysis were described according to the empirical context they had been developed in: the qualitative analysis of the practical sense with data from Guatemala in the eighties; the model of the religious field with data from Bosnia-Herzegovina 2009; and the model of the social space of religious styles with reference to Argentina 2010. As our recent project in Guatemala and Nicaragua was proceeding and involved all three techniques of HabitusAnalysis, we decided to take our time and to rewrite the whole book based upon the new and consistent set of data from the this project in Central America. Max Weber once

said that politics was a slow drilling of hard boards, with passion and perspective. HabitusAnalysis seems to be similar.

During the years we spent working on this project, there were many people providing technical support, good advice, and amicable gestures. Beyond the people already mentioned, I would like to name—in the order of appearance, so to say—Axel Stockmeier, Elena Rambaks, Stephanie Zantvoort, Hannah Schulz, Anna-Lena Friebe, and Nora Schrimpf for technical support during the years of work on this project. A special mention I would like to make of Sebastian Schlerka, who accompanied the last year with extremely competent technical support and who read through the text more than once with a keen eye not only on style but also on content. Teresa Castro and Michael Pätzold corrected our English with great skill.[18] For any kind of flaws a reader may find, only the author can be held responsible.

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18   If there are some flaws left in style or semantics, this has to be due to my interpolating
      some sentences after finishing the English copy-editing.

Introduction

Remembering the indigenous peasant mentioned in the preface, we also recall that he was talking to an official of the Guatemalan army. Such a situation is by no means an inter-subjective face-to-face encounter between "alter" and "ego" that develops its specific dynamics exclusively from itself. Instead, the peasant is a member of a Pentecostal church and not of a resistant Catholic base community. Moreover, the officer is a quite high-ranking member of an army widely known for its cruel massacres of civilians, "disappearances" of people, and a strong determination to extinguish any mobilization against the interests of the upper classes. Both peasant and officer are "not alone," so to say. Both are doubly restrained by circumstances largely beyond their control. On the one hand, both are guided and limited by schemes of perceiving, classifying, and judging the world, and of acting in it, which each of them has embodied during his whole life and according to his socialization. To name simply some of the most visible traits: the peasant is reluctant, silent, and subservient; the officer is space-taking, loud, and dominant. Each of them also perceives the world according to the religious beliefs he has embodied as dispositions of religious perception, judgment, and action during the course of their lives and according to their social living conditions, whether economic, educational, ethnic, or religious. The peasant's conviction that the last days are dawning and the return of Christ is drawing near makes him identify the officer with the evil powers of the last days so that he becomes careful and skeptical but finally obedient to the military man. In turn, the officer's Neo-Pentecostal conviction—that he is called to cast out demons using the power conferred on him by the Holy Spirit—gives him even more self-confidence and mistrust of "the Indians." Additionally, both of them are oriented and limited by their objective possibilities: the peasant has no power whatsoever to contradict the soldier; the military man, within the chain of command, would have almost no power to contradict an order to execute the peasant. Moreover, both are constrained by the place they occupy in Guatemalan

society with its corresponding restrictions and opportunities. Social inequality, difference, and distinction guide and limit the actors externally and internally.

If we approach this scene from Bourdieu's theory, the relations between external and internal conditions of action are of major interest. The external conditions can be conceived, first, as the fields of praxis in which actors act—in the case of the peasant and the officer, especially the military and the religious fields. Second, external conditions can be modeled as the overall distribution of capital in society (the structure of the social space). The internal conditions can be conceived as the dispositions of the actors' habitūs, i.e., the embodied results of the widest circumstances of their socialization. However, neither the military officer nor the peasant are conceived in the theory as mechanically following programs (a kind of "determination" whether by social class or by utility maximization). Instead, perception, classification, judgment, action, reaction, and the effects of things, institutions, and social processes—in short, social praxis—should rather be understood as a highly complex network of objective and embodied relations. Relations are not simply thought of as intersubjective relationships. Rather, the term refers to any kind of mutual effects that can be reconstructed sociologically between any *relata*. While *relationship* refers to the subjective aspect of a relation between actors, *relation* refers to a wide range of objective effects. These extend from the objective aspect of intersubjective relations to the fact that different positions in a model, such as social space, are defined by being mutually external and thus exert objective effects by the very difference of position. The theory assumes that, oriented and limited by a huge variety of relations, actors generate creatively their specific way of agency in whichever field of praxis they are active. Hence, we conclude that the best way to take the beliefs and practices of officer and peasant seriously in a sociological sense is to give equal consideration to three aspects of praxis: the relations people embody (their dispositions); the objective relations they are put in by society (their positions); and the practical logic that governs the relations between positions, dispositions and the wider social processes. Bourdieu's praxeology is an excellent instrument for such a procedure.

Our main interest is to understand the relations of religious beliefs and practices with the wider social structure.[19] We understand that just like any other beliefs, religious beliefs are, in principle, dispositions or convictions albeit with one specific difference: They refer to a transcendent power.[20] This transcendent power is

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19   Social structure conceived as the "relatively continuous social network of mutual effects in a given society." (Fürstenberg 1966, 441, trans. HWS)

20   See Schäfer 2004a; 2009; 2015; Schäfer et al. 2015. Our definition of religion is quite similar to the one of Riesebrodt (2010, 71ff.).

not semantically empty. The believers of most religions imagine such powers as divine beings that influence worldly matters. *For the believers*, these beings are as real as their influence on the world is taken to be real. In consequence, the believers can refer to the transcendent powers in order to ascribe meaning to their worldly experiences. However, giving sense and meaning to experience is not exclusively the business of religion. Any belief does this. We therefore have to steer our theory and method towards the relation between beliefs in general and social structure. If one considers the many possible transmutations of this relation—such as spirit and matter, idea and object, signs and things—one realizes that our interest is far from new. It is almost as old as humanity, or at least as old as philosophy. Much more recent is the scientific framework within which we want to pursue our interest. As we will see later on, sociology presupposes a specific frame for the treatment of issues like spirit and matter, or body and soul: the observation of relations. The relations between belief and social structure are the central issue of the sociology of religion. They have been addressed prominently and quite differently by Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and, taken with a pinch of salt, Karl Marx. These scholars have offered diverse clues to social differentiation, domination, knowledge, and practices in general, which are also highly relevant for the understanding of religious praxis. The difference between their clues is due to the differential weight that the three authors ascribe to factors like the interest of actors, moral consent, class-consciousness, division of labor, bureaucracies, or the conditions of economic production—in other words, to factors that in common-sense and spontaneous approaches to sociology[21] are ascribed to either matter or spirit.[22]

   If one distinguishes trends in the social sciences according to the (certainly under-complex) opposition of social structure (matter) and culture (spirit) over the last, say, thirty years, one can notice an increasing trend towards culture that has been apostrophized as the "cultural turn." In fact, there is not just one, but rather a number of turns. In the late sixties and early seventies, the names of Paul Ricoeur and Richard Rorty were associated with the "linguistic turn" and that of Clifford Geertz with the "symbolic turn" in cultural anthropology. Both currents in the humanities took the decisive step of defining culture *as* text and ascribing the crucial role of guiding social processes to the cultural (i.e. mental) orientations of actors. This trend was fostered by postmodern philosophy, and it entailed a strong focus on cultural work in post-colonial thinking, in the so-called iconic turn, and even in the spatial turn. The new attention to culture emerged, not least,

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21   See Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 20ff., G: 1991b, 24.

22   Bourdieu's approach to these authors in the context of religion, see in Bourdieu 1991, G: 2011b.

from a critical reassessment of the Eurocentric (or rather "North-Atlantic-centric") social sciences and technocratic tendencies in structural functionalism. In this sense, the cultural turn, especially with the writing-culture debate, gave rise to considerable hermeneutical advances in the social sciences and the humanities in general. Nevertheless, while the subjectivist orientation of the new culturalism was certainly strong—as, e.g., in the radical constructivism of Siegfried Schmidt—the concentration on culture does not necessarily boil down to subjectivistic mentalism. In the wider tradition of Saussure, symbolic systems also have been conceived as objective realities. Clifford Geertz related them, as socially shared beliefs, to the organization of human society.[23] Other approaches in the objectivistic vein propagate more objectivistic designs of semiotic systems, such as intertextuality, "spacialities" according to the spatial turn, or—very different—networks of material and semiotic "actors."[24] Hence, under the influence of the wider postmodern philosophy on the social sciences, what was discussed under new, culturalistic premises was not only the relation between things and signs but also the relation between subject and object, individual and society, actor and system/structure.

As time went by, the culturalistic trend became noticeable in almost all the humanities, including history[25]. Hard facts of social structure, such as the conditions of economic production, became of minor importance for the explanation of human practices and social processes. The vestments of a new idealism seemed to become increasingly fashionable among the humanities and social sciences: a triumph of spirit over matter—or merely fashionable thinking within the major trends of the neo-liberal "economy of information?"[26] In any case, with regard to a perceived alternative between structure and culture, things and signs, the decisive weight

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23   The objectivistic reading of Geertz is not the only alternative (see Reckwitz 2006, 445ff., esp. 474ff.).

24   For a critical view of this trend in textual and social sciences see Sokal and Bricmont 1998. Given the highly "innovative", universalistic, transdisciplinary etc. features of the postmodern debates, our proposal will seem somewhat conservative, down-to-earth.

25   …not least by a counter-tendency to an alleged structural objectivism of the Bielefeld school of Social History, represented most visibly by Hans-Ulrich Wehler.

26   This trend was by no means restricted to the scientific field. A new (almost magical) idealism has been propagated by the prophets of the after-cold-war electronic financial capitalism, hailed as "economy of the spirit" (George Gelder, Ronald Reagan) and useful for the neoliberal restructuring of the labor market by the technocrats of wishful thinking (see Byrne 2006; Ehrenreich 2010). Zygmunt Bauman, in his early assessment of postmodernism, finds the traces of this social condition reflected by postmodern sociology as well: "I suggest that postmodern sociology can be best understood as a mimetic representation of the postmodern condition." (Bauman 1992, 42).

is widely given to "spirit"[27]—with different results regarding the subject-object problem, since there are inclinations to both the subjective and objective spirit.

With regard to our interest in understanding religious beliefs, the new appreciation of culture in preference to structure appears to be of great benefit. However, the illusion of benefit bursts at the very moment that the real situations that one tries to understand do not reasonably allow a culturalistic interpretation. In my view, this occurs, for example, when one listens to an indigenous peasant and a military officer talk about religious beliefs in the context of the Counter-insurgency war in Guatemala; or when one observes an Israeli military officer at a checkpoint into East Jerusalem interviewing a Palestinian college youth about religious beliefs. The point is, beliefs are important but they do not operate in isolation from the social structure—and vice versa. Realistically assessing the flaws of both culturalistic and functionalist one-sidedness, the protagonists of another trend in the social sciences began to think differently about things as early as in the late sixties and seventies. Theories of praxis intended to bridge the gap between structure and culture that had been opened by an "either-or" logic. A "both-and" logic was proposed by theorists like Marshall Sahlins, Anthony Giddens, and Theodore Schatzki[28]—three outstanding proponents of this current.

Bourdieu is another, indeed the most influential, exponent of the praxeological current in the humanities. In our view, his concept of habitus turns his brand of praxeology into the most useful one for the study of religion, especially for religious meaning. This is due to Bourdieu's specific transformation of continental, more specifically French, relationist thinking through ordinary language philosophy and a bit of pragmatist influence. Hereby Bourdieu facilitates linking the study of social structures (classes, positions) with the study of the cognitive and practical operations of social actors (classifications, dispositions) and thus offers a genuine

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27   This whole, more or less postmodern, trend is nicely documented in Bachmann-Medick 2009. Zygmunt Bauman sees one of the roots of the sociological trend to focus almost exclusively on signs and meaning in ethnomethodology. "Postmodern sociology received its original boost from Garfinkel's techniques conceived to expose the endemic fragility and brittleness of social reality, its 'merely' conversational and conventional groundings, its negotiability, perpetual use and irreparable under determination." (Bauman 1992, 40) While postmodern thinkers often were critical towards the power centers of society, they limited their critique mainly to the meaning systems associated with power. On the early passing away of postmodern thought see the "obituary" by Müller (1998).

28   Giddens 1984; 1991; Sahlins 2000; Schatzki 1996. See also the reviews by Sherry Ortner (1984); Reckwitz (2003; 2006; 2002) and Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and Savigny (2001). For the turn to praxis and against "text-only," see Vásquez (2011, 211ff.): "What a practice-centered approach demands, rather, is that we always place texts in their contexts of production, circulation, and consumption."

way to analyze language and culture in their relation to social structure. We will develop this point of view with regard to theory and method in our proposal for HabitusAnalysis. In this attempt, we are challenged first and foremost by the vast and somewhat inconsistent nature of Bourdieu's work itself. In consequence, important issues of the epistemological preconditions and the sociological framing of our method remain quite unclear if they are no more than occasional references to particular works of Bourdieu. For this reason, we do not only publish a volume on method (vol. 3) but also discuss the general architecture of Bourdieu's praxeological theory (vol. 2) as well as his epistemology and approach to language (vol. 1). We will primarily focus on re-reading the original works and will respond to the secondary literature[29] either when we are concerned with issues that are crucial for developing

29   We suppose that it is obvious to our readers that we can neither discuss the overall reception of Bourdieu's work nor give an overview of his theory at large. Introduction and overviews are offered by handbooks and collections of articles on Bourdieu's work, most of which prove to be very useful and knowledgeable. Two special recommendations at the beginning of the list: Fröhlich/Rehbein (2009) is a very comprehensive and systematic introduction to the whole scientific work of Bourdieu. Loic Wacquant offers an excellent introduction to Bourdieu's theory as well as to objections against it, in his introduction to Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992. In the same book, he interviews Bourdieu forcing him to be clear about the central issues of his theory. The following suggestions of more introductory literature are in alphabetical order. Bennett et al. 2009; Bittlingmayer et al. 2002; Brown and Szeman 2000; Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone 1993; Eder 1989; Fowler 2000; Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005; Grenfell 2010; on interdisciplinary perspectives: Hillebrand and Bourdieu 2006; Jenkins 1992; Krais and Gebauer 2002; Lahire 2011 with an interesting dispositional theory of habitus; Müller 1992; Müller 2014; Rehbein 2006; Rehbein, Saalmann, and Schwengel 2003; Robbins 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2000d; Schultheis 2007; Shusterman 1999a; Swartz 1997; Swartz 2003; Susen and Turner 2011 with some chapters on philosophy. — In the last decades, Bourdieu has been debated also among Spanish and Portuguese speaking scholars. Here a short selection of introductions: A. B. Gutiérrez 2002, an introduction with special attention to the systematic coherence of praxeology; Marqués 2006, critical towards too much structuralism in Bourdieu; A. T. Martínez 2007, the Argentinian sociologist gives an introduction to Bourdieu's thought pivoting around the concept of habitus; Rodríguez López 2002; Vázquez García 2002 — On the scientific legacy of Bourdieu: D. G. Gutiérrez 2002; Institut für Sozialforschung 2002; Swartz and Zolberg 2004; Suárez 2009; Xavier de Brito 2002— More specifically on habitus: Alonso 2002; Bennett et al. 2009; Bongaerts 2009; Lenger, Schneickert, and Schumacher 2013; Ramos and Januário 2008, a comparison of Bourdieu and Giddens with regard to reflexivity. — On fields and social space Blasius and Winkler 1989a; 1989b; Höher 1989; Lamont 1992. — We will refer repeatedly to criticisms of Bourdieu's theory. Therefore, here we would like to mention some of Bourdieu's objections to the objections: Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, G: 1996; Bourdieu 1990b, G: 1989; 1998a, G: 1998b; 2000, G: 2001. "In other words, once again, the charge of reductionism thrown at me is based on a reductionist

our own praxeological strategy to deal with the practical (religious and non-religious) semantics of ordinary language, or in the context of social differentiation and domination. While our primary approach to language is through the transformation of the concept of habitus, habitus alone is not sufficient for a comprehensive analysis without the models of fields and social space, i.e. the social context in which actors live. What is crucial to our work is the relation between dispositions and positions. For this reason, "HabitusAnalysis," the name of our method, refers metonymically to habitus and social sense, to fields and social space *together*. In terms of method, we propose therefore to triangulate different models (vol. 3).

As indicated in the preface, HabitusAnalysis emerged from empirical research on religious and social movements. This research interest has obviously left its mark on our methodological and theoretical approaches. Our focus is on the meso-level rather than the macro or micro ones; collective mobilization and organization take preference over the analysis of established institutional structures or highly personalized contexts such as families. These conditions limit our approach. Even so, the meso level poses interesting challenges to an actor-oriented approach. Research has to concentrate on the relations of the collective actors to both the macro level of social structures and the micro level of human attitudes and practices. In an appendix (Appendix: Religion and social movements, p. 353), we will sketch our fields of empirical research, religion and social movements. At this point, it may suffice to render our initial research interests transparent by listing central desiderata that research on religious movements poses to praxeological theory and methodology.

We should be able to theoretically grasp and methodologically model the following aspects of human praxis:

- the practical relations that link human thought, language, and action to the structures and processes of societies;
- the transformation by interpretation of experience into judgment and strategic projections and action (more specifically, the cognitive processes involved in the experience and interpretation of grievances and opportunities);
- the specific role of language in these processes;
- the emergence of identities and strategies from the cognitive transformation of experience;
- the structural conditions of action in two regards:

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reading of my analyses." (Bourdieu 1990b, 113) . Or with Brubaker's words (Brubaker 1985, 771, quoted in Wacquant 1993, 241) one can state that "the reception of Bourdieu's work has largely been determined by the same 'false frontiers' and 'artificial divisions' that his work has repeatedly challenged".

- • functional differentiation, modeled with Bourdieu as different fields of pow-er-driven human (inter-) action, such as religious, political or artistic fields, and
  - • distribution of social power, modeled with Bourdieu as a stratified social space of differentially distributed sorts of capital and, therefore, of life chances.
- • Finally, when called for, specificities of religious praxis should be accounted for under the premise of each one of the aforementioned aspects of praxis.

In this introduction, we briefly sketch the concept of praxis that inspires our under-standing of praxeology (p. 32). Although we devote this volume to epistemology and language, praxeological terminology will be present everywhere. For this reason, we also will give a brief idea of some central terms in the praxeological vocabulary for those readers who are not familiar with Bourdieu (p. 35). Next, we concentrate on the issues treated in the present volume. Under the headings of "Meaning" (p. 44) and "Relations" (p. 47) we sketch the scientific context in which relational praxeology has developed along with often disputed concepts and operations such as reality, individual, subject, abstraction, and so forth. We end this introduction with the usual short preview of the contents of this book (p. 63).

Praxis

Based upon empirical research, Bourdieu developed a decidedly relational sociology. A philosopher by training, he paid close attention to the epistemological premises of his sociology, especially of Kantian and Neo-Kantian origin.[30] An important root of praxeology in continental philosophy is Ernst Cassirer's book *Substance and Function*, a thorough critique of substantialism combined with the development of a relational epistemology. For us it is also significant that, over time, Bourdieu became more and more interested in Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy and in pragmatism. Cassirer and Wittgenstein especially have deeply influenced Bourdieu's approach to meaning and symbolic practices, and we will therefore refer to them in our argument. Interestingly, Bourdieu's roots in continental philosophy combined with his openness to Anglo-Saxon thought shifts his thought constantly

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[30] These are by no means the only philosophical and sociological influences on Bourdieu. See the chapter "Einflüsse" in Fröhlich/Rehbein (2009, 1ff.) on the most important ones. On Cassirer see Bickel (2003); on Bourdieu's historization of Cassirer's "symbolic forms" see Christine Magerski (2005). On the relation to Wittgenstein see Gunter Gebauer (2005);   Schatzki (1997). See also García Canclini (1984).

towards a more pragmatist attitude,[31] without becoming identifiably Anglo-Saxon. This combination of influences—traditionally regarded as quite incompatible—together with the wide range of reference-theories in the humanities and philosophy entails the possibility of quite different readings as well as misunderstandings of Bourdieu's writings. This twofold risk is multiplied by the different scientific and philosophical traditions of the countries where Bourdieu's work is received.[32] We hope to present our reading and development of his theory sufficiently clearly in the

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31   See especially (Bourdieu 2000, G: 2001).

32   For the reception of Bourdieu's works in different countries see Fröhlich and Rehbein 2009, the annotations on pp. 373ff.. For the relation between Bourdieu and the Anglo-Saxon tradition, especially the US-American: Wacquant 1993; Simeoni 2000; Sallaz and Zavisca 2007; Shusterman 1999b; Aboulafia 1999; On French-German perspectives see Colliot-Thélène 2005. For the Spanish speaking regions see Moreno 2004; Suárez 2009, as well as the titles quoted in footnote 29. — Moreover, there are special problems arising with the intercultural transposition of Bourdieu's works, including the translations. First, we would like to mention misinterpretations that are "inscribed in the logic of 'foreign trade' in ideas." (Wacquant 1993, 236). See also Bourdieu 1993. They might either be due to scientific schemes of perception, entailing for example a "systems-theoretical bias" (Simeoni 2000, 72ff.) present in Anglo-Saxon (Parsonian) reading of Bourdieu as well as in some German (Luhmannian) interpretations. In this vein, Wacquant not only blames "fragmented reading" (Wacquant 1993, 238ff.) for misunderstandings, but also the disciplinary divides of the academic field at large and within sociology (Wacquant 1993, 241ff.). These separated realms generate particularistic viewpoints which often result in the attempt to "dissolve" Bourdieu's coherent proposal into a bit of Giddens, a bit of Blau, and another bit of Goffman (Wacquant 1993, 242). Finally, Wacquant also states as one important source of misinterpretations a certain lack of knowledge with regard to Bourdieu's strong roots in French and German philosophy such as Bachelard, Canguilhem, Cassirer, Saussure, Schütz, Wittgenstein and others (Wacquant 1993, 245). — A second type of misinterpretations of Bourdieu's social theory can result from dissimilar linguistic possibilities and limitations of different languages: Most notably, the fact that the English language does not provide reflexive pronouns, as the Romance languages and German do, may be considered as cause of misunderstandings with regard to habitus. The example offered by Simeoni shows that the reflexive self-constitution of the habitus (in French and German) turns into a passive procedure in English (Simeoni 2000, 78ff., 83): To the comparison of a passage of *Sens pratique* (Bourdieu 1980, 96) with its translation in *The Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu 1990a, 57) we add here the German translation in *Sozialer Sinn* (Bourdieu 2008, 107) and concentrate but on a short sequence of the example: "…l'habitus, qui *se constitue* au cours d'une histoire particulière…" — "…the habitus,which *is constituted* in the course of an individual history…" — "…der Habitus (der *sich* im Verlauf der besonderen Geschichte bildet…)…" If somebody tends to accuse the concept of habitus of "determinism", he or she will find the allegation corroborated by the passive wording. Another grammatical problem is the use of substantives. German and French, much more than English, tend to phrase sentences in a nominal style. This fosters the

present book. Throughout our entire interpretation of Bourdieu's sociological work, we emphasize the relational traits of praxeology with reference to Ernst Cassirer; we also pay close attention to the Wittgensteinian influence in Bourdieu's approach to language and practices; and we conceptualize the overarching category of "praxis" according to Bourdieu's interpretation of the *Theses on Feuerbach* by Marx.

We understand the concept of praxis to be distinct from the one of practice*(s)*. With *practices*, we simply refer to what people do. The concept of praxis embeds this action in a wider framework. Bourdieu does not give a strict definition of *praxis*, but he recurs often and in different contexts to this concept. Bourdieu's only affirmative reference to literature mentions the first of Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach: Praxis as Sensorial Human Activity." (Bourdieu 1990c, 13, G: 1992a, 31). We will come back to Marx repeatedly in this book (especially in chapter 2.1). Here we simply want to note that we support an even broader notion of praxis which combines the Marxian point of view—praxis as "sensuous human activity" in the context of social domination[33]—with three additional aspects.

For the first aspect, we go back to Aristotle (1998, 1095b 14ff.), and note that one can understand the concept of praxis in terms of *bios*, which is the mental, corporal, and social human conduct of life in accordance with an overarching goal, whether contemplation, politics, or enjoyment. Praxis then additionally refers to the entire human existence as inherently intentional. However, from the sociological point of view, intentionality of life is understood neither as a metaphysical goal nor simply as reduced to either contemplation, politics, or enjoyment. Rather, someone's life becomes objectively intentional: the habit**ū**s of actors and their subjective intentionality are shaped by their praxis under specific objective conditions of existence. Thus, the social intentionality of the habit**ū**s diversifies with the diversification of society.

We find another important aspect of praxis in Wittgenstein's "forms of life" (Wittgenstein 2004, I, §23). Social life in its different forms is intimately interwoven with language so that the meaning of language depends on its use in social context. Going a step beyond this, we hold that praxis also comprises the social conditions of human life, that is, the social structure. With reference to the relationist premises of praxeology (see below, p. 47), we conceive of human beings and the social conditions they find themselves in as intimately interwoven. For instance, the social distribution of goods affects human life deeply, and human action gives shape to this distribution. Therefore, sociological oppositions such as "actors and structures"

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reification of theoretical concepts and really turns out to be a considerable problem in the reception of Bourdieu's theory.

33   Marx and Engels 1976, 3. See below 2.1.2.

or "the individual and the society" are only understood as the scientific modeling of different aspects of one and the same social reality. Hence, empirical research should concentrate on the practical relations rather than on entities. This is a crucial point of relational sociology which Bourdieu constantly reminds us of, e.g. by the relation between "Classes and Classifications" (Bourdieu 2010, 468, G: 1982, 727). Simply put: The structures that result from the distribution of goods (the classes) shape the actors' ways of perceiving and valuating the world (classifications) and these cognitive, emotional, and bodied structures—the dispositions of the actors— shape the structures and processes of production, distribution et cetera by means of speech and practices. The concept of praxis refers to the whole process. Praxis is the relation of mutual interdependency between actor and structure, dispositions and positions, under the condition of change in time. Bourdieu has created a special vocabulary to conceptualize praxis scientifically.

Vocabulary

In the vignette at the beginning of the introduction, we already suggested that both the peasant and the military officer may have been free to conduct their conversation, but they were also constrained in multiple ways by their respective positions in the social conflict and society. Human beings are neither completely free in thought and action, as if relieved completely from the world they live in, nor do they act according to objective mechanisms such as, for instance, "determination" by social class or by utility maximization. While the philosophy of the late Baroque and Enlightenment periods for obvious political reasons loved the separation between determined nature and the free spirit, for sociology this clearcut separation of realms is of little use. Instead, sociologists have to take account of both the *relative* effects of social conditions and the *relative* freedom of choice in a mutual two-way relation.

From a praxeological point of view, praxis is best approached by asking for *relations*: the relations by which actors are differentiated from one another (social structures); the relations that actors reproduce and create through their own involvement in social life (actors, practices); and the two-way relations between structures and actors (practical logic or logic of praxis, and situations). The first aspect can be captured by modeling the distribution of different actors (individual and collective) in relation to all others. The second aspect can be studied by modeling the way actors experience the world, conceive of it, and act in it. The third aspect can be approached by triangulating the first two models and, on this

basis, analyzing the practical logic of the case-relevant mutual influences between actors and structures, for example, discourses, collective mobilization, constraints and opportunities according to capital distribution, religious rituals, symbolic violence and ideology reproduction by the media, military repression, mechanisms of social justice—you name it. In one word, if you want to observe two individuals in a conversation, praxeological epistemology tells you: Do not look at the single individuals. Rather, look at the relations between them, at the social conditions that each carries in them and is relatively conditioned by, and at the objective relations between the positions each individual occupies in society. The relation between the peasant and the military man is shaped not only by the immediate situation but also by their very different socializations, by the social environment they come from and represent, and, heavily so, by the objective social positions as military officer and suspect civilian.

For this kind of complicated constellation (in fact the normal constellation in praxis), Bourdieu has developed a finely tuned scientific vocabulary. The concepts of this vocabulary span the whole range from the most actor-centered aspects of praxis, such as "bodily dispositions," to the most structure-centered ones, such as "social space." Praxeology does not depend much on individual concepts. Instead, it uses a network of interrelated concepts that work together in describing and explaining the relations between, for example, actors and structures, or between different structural positions, single and collective actors, or between other aspects of praxis. Of course, Bourdieu defines his concepts, but he does so neither very strictly nor finally. Rather, they should be understood as models for guiding empirical research and have therefore to vary slightly in meaning, depending upon two conditions: the research objects and objectives as well as other theoretical concepts that are used together with them. The concepts interpret one another not in the form of a strict conceptual hierarchy but as elements of "series" (Cassirer) that are made up by multiple theoretical concepts.[34] These series always change to a greater or lesser extent when Bourdieu focuses on a new object of empirical research. For this reason, we do not want at this point to introduce more than descriptive definitions of the concepts most relevant to our context of use.[35] Yet there are some concepts—such as habitus, field, capital, social space—that Bourdieu and sociologists in his tradition tend to use as umbrella terms, bracketing together a group of other concepts. The weight of such a term and its function as umbrella obviously change depending on the object of research. In any case, however, a praxeological concept had best be used in relation to other praxeological terms if it is to remain a *praxeological*

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34   See on Cassirer's concept of series below, p. 101.

35   In vol. 2 we will reconstruct the inner logic of Bourdieu's theory as a theoretical series.

concept.[36] It is the relational use of the theoretical vocabulary that facilitates the study of praxis as a highly complex network of objective and embodied relations. Relational vocabulary allows describing the mutual effects between such different objects of research as, for instance, perception, classification, judgment, action, reaction, power distribution, material things, institutions, and social processes. To take the beliefs and the practices of the peasant and the military officer seriously in a praxeological sense, means to observe the relations they have embodied (their dispositions), and the objective relations they are put in by society (their positions) as well as the multiple relations between the embodied and the objectified aspects of praxis (the logic of praxis).

The theoretical concepts of praxeology function as a preconstructed cognitive grid that fulfils mainly two functions (see Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, G: 1991b). First, since this grid is theoretically constructed and consciously used as a scientific tool it operates as an epistemological break. Researchers become conscious of the fact that they do not see reality as it is in itself—which a naïve positivism might suggest—, but through a scientific instrument that corresponds to their declared research interests. Second, the concepts that constitute this cognitive grid serve as tools for modeling empirical observations. They help to organize the observed empirical manifold in a scientifically controlled way (and not simply according to the spontaneous insinuation of the common sense). In consequence, praxeological concepts do not image or mime social reality, but function as a scientifically controlled filter *between* researcher and observed reality.

For our interest in studying beliefs and meaning in the context of collective religious mobilization, the concepts of habitus, (religious) field, and the social space (of religious styles) are so crucial that we use them as umbrella terms. Nevertheless, we will, as often as possible, employ more specific terms—such as dispositions, schemes, or nomos—in order to avoid reifying the theoretical terms and treating them as entities in reality. The combination of habitus, fields, and social space spans the widest range of social praxis between actors and structures, that is, between embodied conditions of praxis and objectified conditions of praxis. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly sketch key concepts of praxeological sociology. The key terms will be highlighted by italics.

Let us begin with the embodied conditions. The concept of *habitus*, together with all the other concepts gathered under this umbrella, allows reconstructing the processes through which actors transform experience by cognitive, emotional, and bodily operations into judgments, and generate actions. The basic idea is that

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36   If, for instance, the concept of social capital is used in the context of a Putnam-type terminology, it simply is not Bourdieu's concept anymore.

human beings are in constant relation with their environment, and process this relation by interiorizing that world by means of experience and by exteriorizing multiple forms of action. While Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus originally to explain the durability of cognitive orientations in Kabyle migrants, in later works he interpreted the concept increasingly as a relatively durable but also changeable generator of meaning and practices. Habitus is not a mimesis of the world; habitus rather generates human praxis in relation to the world. We accentuate the aspect of change (as many other scholars do). To return to the example of the indigenous peasant and the military officer: the concept of habitus directs attention to the cognitive, emotional, and bodily *dispositions* that both actors have acquired during their lifetime and that become activated in their encounter. Thus, one might pay special attention to the religious ideas for interpreting the war, or to the strength or weakness of the physical presence of each actor in the meeting, and much else. The idea is that the concept of habitus stands for the entire continuous process of internalization and externalization, and mainly focuses on embodied operations "within" actors. When Bourdieu addresses habitus under the specific aspect of actors' relations with their environment, he employs the concept of *social* or *practical sense*. This is habitus in social action, so to say. The term social sense comprises observable acts of perceiving and judging a concrete social environment, and of operating in it. It refers to the brink between habitus and social context. In empirical research, habitus can only be observed at the "level" of social sense, and be inferred through conclusions based on these observations. As for the architecture of the theory, the relation between habitus and social sense allows to model some of their operations as parallel. For us, the most important parallel is the one between dispositions (habitus) and schemes (practical sense).

Bourdieu conceives the generative processes of the habitus as operations of socially acquired dispositions. In consequence, the habitus may be modeled as the interplay between different *dispositions*. In a parallel way, one can model the social or practical sense as the interplay between *schemes*. Bourdieu makes a similar use of the concept of scheme to that by Kant and Ernst Cassirer. Schemes are conceived as structured and reiterating ways of shaping human operations, such as perception, emotional response, or physical behavior. One can observe, for instance, quite stable ways in which the indigenous peasant's religious congregation responds to the repressive violence: they wait to be raptured from earth into heaven. By inference, one can now say that these people have a disposition to interpret certain kinds of experience by the religious notion of rapture. Both theoretical concepts, habitus and social sense, can be modeled as multiple operations of a myriad of different sorts of dispositions or schemes. In order to keep things simple, we distinguish with Bourdieu three types: cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions or schemes,

all embodied in actors by means of experience. As we want to model generative processes by which actors transform their experiences into thought and action, we conceive with Bourdieu of the dispositions and schemes as *operators* which do not image the world but process experiences.[37] In theory, dispositions and schemes operate the transformation of sensory input (experiences) through perception, classification, and judgment into action orientation and finally into action. Thus, perception, classification, judgment, action orientation, and action are not conceived of as images of the world in the brain, but as cognitive operations of dispositions or schemes that make sense of practical relations. Looking at the religious praxis of the fellow believers of the *campesino* in the light of this theory, one will observe the following. These believers process the experience of military violence by perceiving it through the scheme "violence versus rapture into heaven," judging the violence as a necessary "sign of the end times," and orientating their actions towards the "preparation for the rapture" by congregational prayer and by withdrawal from resistance. Nevertheless, this transformation is not fixed once and for all. It is constantly regenerated by the praxis of these believers, and it can change when the conditions change. When repression gives way to action opportunities, other religious dispositions and interpretative schemes will become more important for these believers and the apocalyptic ones will be used less frequently.

It is helpful to model dispositions and schemes as wide *networks*.[38] Thus, such modifications in the practical use of different schemes can be understood as relative and continuous transitions of practical awareness (rather than as strict either-or alternatives). Such a network model also helps to reconsider two much-disputed questions. The first is whether the habitus is conscious or unconscious. We agree with Bourdieu that dispositions or schemes can be both, conscious or unconscious, depending very much on the situation and the attention an actor pays to certain conditions while neglecting others. The second issue is whether habitus is individual or collective. Habitus is individual inasmuch as single persons acquire a specific, personal network of dispositions during their lifetime. But habitus is also collective inasmuch single persons share many of their dispositions with collectives of other actors, whether their family, their social class, their religious congregation, or a social movement. The congregation of the indigenous peasant is composed of fishermen, small agriculturalists, housewives, and farm laborers. Each person has his or her own, unique network of dispositions. Moreover, each fisherman shares some practical dispositions with other fishermen, each housewife with other housewives et cetera. Finally, all of them share the collective religious dispositions because of

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37   The idea conforms quite much to a Wittgensteinian or pragmatist concept of language.

38   On the advantages see Schäfer 2003; 2005.

which they wait for Christ to rapture them into heaven right out of their church. In consequence, praxeological theory allows a new approach to collective mobilization, and to the concepts of identity and strategy. In Bourdieu, the concept of *identity* plays a marginal role, but sometimes it is addressed in the context of collective mobilization.[39] We conceive of identity as a network of collective dispositions mobilized by certain circumstances and in relation to third groups of actors. Identity and identity-struggles acquire significance in the analysis of social and religious movements. In any case, the concept of identity involves objective social relations. This holds true even more for the concept of *strategy*.

Praxeological theory allows different views on objective social relations and on the relations between objective (positions) and embodied (dispositions) relations. The models of field and social space will be treated below. Here, we will briefly sketch the actor-centered view of the relation between positions and dispositions. We will use Bourdieu's concept of *practical logic* as an umbrella-term for the multiple operations involved. It refers to all kinds of practices, e.g. language use, sign systems, interactions, institutional arrangements, under the aspect of their mode of operation—their logic. Strategies, for instance, operate according to the dispositions of an actor in relation to the objective conditions present in a given situation. In Bourdieu, the concept of strategy is not defined by conscious calculation. There are forms of action that are not consciously calculated, but nevertheless obey an objective strategic goal, e.g. matrimonial strategies (instead of the structuralist notion of parental structures). Nevertheless, subjective strategic calculation can also be conceived as strategy. Strategy is not contradictory to the concept of habitus, since conscious calculations also take place within the limits of dispositions or, in other words, within the limits of what an actor is able to think of. From this point of view, the Pentecostal congregation of the peasant follows an objective strategy of avoiding as far as possible the military struggle and of surviving without losing self-respect. This objective strategy only works on the condition that it is not conscious to the actors. However, subjective strategies of avoiding problems with the military are not excluded. In the conversation with the officer, the peasant most probably calculates almost every word he says.

Within the frame of practical logic, Bourdieu can address a large number of social techniques. *Language* and the modes of its use are central operators of praxis and important tools in social struggles. Language classifies the social world, distinguishes social classes cognitively, and is therefore the source of social orientation and legitimacy. Struggles over classifications are at the same time struggles over the social recognition of certain actors. As recognition transforms into *sym-*

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39   Bourdieu 2006a, G: 2005a; 2006b, G: 2005b.

bolic power—and in consequence into power for the mobilization of people, for delegation, cooptation et cetera—the struggles fought by means of language are understood as highly relevant for the change or persistence of social structures. Bourdieu conceives of accumulated social recognition as symbolic capital, since it can be invested into activities such as political mobilization in order to produce greater recognition. In Bourdieu's praxeology, the traditional concept of ideology acquires the new shape of *symbolic violence*. This occurs when dominant actors employ linguistic and semiotic strategies to make subordinate actors *misrecognize* their situation as their natural living condition. In other words, discourse and its strategies (such as naming or euphemizing) as well as semiotic practices play an important role in the analysis of practical logic. All these strategies are embedded in objective conditions of action that are defined as power structures.

The concept of *field* models functional differentiation as actual social struggle between power-defined positions in each of the differentiated fields of action. Politics, economy, religion, art, law, ecology, and so forth, are modeled as two or three-dimensional coordinate systems whose coordinates are defined as the number of different forms of capital relevant for the given field. In the field of art, for instance, cultural capital can be arranged according to the dimensions of consecration to "true art" and of monetary success in the production of commercial art. Transforming Bourdieu's proposal into a model for the religious field, we conceive the religious field similarly, namely as defined by the dimensions of the *religious credibility* of actors and the *organizational complexity* of religious organizations. In parallel with other theories of functional differentiation, the different fields are conceived as relatively autonomous from one another due to the intensity of the internal struggle for the specific kind of capital. The more tightly the *nomos*—the principle of its internal lawfulness (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*, Weber)—of a given field can regulate its specific praxis, the more autonomous is the field. To a greater or lesser degree, the actors in a given field are experts who produce goods according to a *demand* from interested lay people. In the religious field, experts produce symbolic goods for the demand from the religiously interested public and, more specifically, for their clients. This production takes place in the context of a struggle among the experts for the belief, recognition, and finally the mobilization of the lay people. The pastor of the church to which the peasant belongs is in constant struggle for followers with other suppliers of religion in the village and the region. He needs to keep producing discourses and rituals that satisfy the demand of his clientele, creating a theodicy of suffering (Weber) and a transcendent hope. The same is the case with the officer's upper middle class pastor, albeit the religious semantics for his upper middle class clients is different: He interprets the social upheaval as caused by demons and promises the believers the power to exorcise the demons from society.

In consequence of the struggles, a field is always divided into competing positions of different relative power. Bourdieu has developed a concept of *capital* that serves to model power positions in a differentiated way. The most important sorts of capital he works with are economic capital (money, goods), cultural capital (knowledge, academic titles), and social capital (reliable social relations). Any one of these sorts of capital can transform for its owner into symbolic capital, provided the capital he owns is recognized as valuable by other actors. The important point of any of the resources modeled as capital is that they can be invested (and thus can be put to work or used as a gamble) and that they circulate in order to produce a surplus outcome. If one sees religious praxis through the grid of the capital model, one can follow the shifts in power between religious actors and simultaneously be attentive to their discourses of mobilization.

Everybody who is engaged in a field, who perceives it, and acts in it, does this according to the *practical sense*. With regard to the action environment of a field, this sense functions in many different ways. As a *sense of one's place*, it makes the actors conform to the position in the field that they consider theirs. The concept of *sense for the game* models the capacity of an actor to struggle in a field according to the rules by which these struggles are fought, to foresee the next moves, to know when to move, and to know when to stop. *Illusio* is a similar term. It simply means the involvement in the game or struggles that are played in a given field. *Libido* specifies this involvement with regard to emotional dispositions. *Belief* is similar again and, in the context of the field model, has nothing to do with religious faith. Rather, it refers to the, mostly tacit, attitude that takes as a natural condition the circumstances of a field, its power distribution, its struggles, its nomos, its stakes, and the capital used. Bourdieu also calls this belief *doxa* (conscious of its roots in the phenomenological vocabulary). Based upon the concept of doxa, and leaning on the sociology of religion, the struggle of a field can be conceived as a competition between three different positions: the orthodox position—the hegemon of the field—, the heterodox newcomers and opponents, and finally the allodox who act somewhat beside the logic of the field's struggles.

With regard to the empirical analysis of religious praxis, the combination of a theory of functional differentiation with a theory of embodied dispositions by means of the practical sense contributes highly sensitive instruments that are ideally suited to the methodological relation of religious beliefs with religious and even political, cultural, or economic struggles. The actor-centeredness of Bourdieu's approach allows conceiving effects that actors exert on a given field through manipulating its rules by the introduction of non-specific sorts of capital, e.g. money to the religious field or to the field of art. Such manipulation compromises the autonomous functioning of a field. The *compromising* of fields can be studied with the help of

the field concept, triangulating it with the habitus and social space models. The latter introduces the overall concentrations of power in a given society into the analysis of social structures.

For us, Bourdieu's concept of the *social space* corresponds to the observation that religious beliefs and practices do not only relate to the power structures of the religious field. The logic of *religious supply and demand* also conveys the question of the socio-structural conditions in which actors generate specific demands. The officer in our example looks for a religious legitimation not only of his military praxis but also of the overall capital he holds. The peasant demands a response to his hopeless living conditions. Bourdieu offers the model of the social space to approach this question. We do not use the model for Multiple Correspondence Analysis, but rather as a simple coordinate model with the two dimensions of economic capital and cultural capital, organized in such a way that positions can be determined according to the aggregated volume and the relative structure of capital. Also, a third dimension can be added: the development of different positions in time, their *trajectory*. Thus, it is possible to locate the peasant and the officer relative to each other and relative to other actors in a space of different power positions. Their historically accumulated, objective conditions of existence as well as their objective chances and limits can be modeled within the overall relations of social inequality. Bourdieu conceives of these positions as "classes on paper"—a consistently relational alternative to older forms of class theory. For the study of religious praxis, the model is useful inasmuch as it allows establishing correspondences between different religious habitūs, *tastes*, and *styles* on the one hand, and social power positions on the other. The theoretical idea is that class positions can be described not only by means of objectively scalable variables, such as equivalent income, but also by the actors' tastes and styles. The similar tastes of certain actors, e.g. in music, are considered to correspond quite unequivocally to their social positions and generate outwardly visible styles. These styles are conceived as social strategies of distinction and, thus, of collective and individual identity formation. The church services that the officer visits feature suit-and-tie preachers with motivational messages and fancy modern light music. They increase the distinction from most of the other religious suppliers precisely by simultaneously increasing the stylistic similarity to the upper class. In the services of the peasant's congregation, *campesino* pastors impose strict moral rules, in the communal prayers screaming and weeping produce compensation, and poorly equipped music groups offer *rancheras*. The congregation distinguishes itself from the sinful world by its holiness. In other words, one can model a social space of religious styles, tastes, and habitūs, which gives important hints about empirical correspondences between "religion, class, and status" (Weber). The models of fields and social space allow the reconstruction of the social meaning that religious beliefs

bear since they render visible the correspondence between religious dispositions and social positions and thus the context of their operations.

The theoretical grid of praxeology is actor-centered inasmuch as it facilitates an approach to religious praxis that allows the religious dispositions and the practices of actors to stay at the center of one's research interest. Under the hermeneutical caveat, however, of using models for the epistemological break, the actors are not conceived as abstract individuals, but as social human beings in the context of conditions of existence that they ascribe meaning to.

Meaning

As we focus our interest on religious beliefs of actors in their social context, language and semantics in particular is of primary importance to us. Bourdieu polemicizes frequently against universalistic semantics. This is in keeping with a trend at large among relationist scholars. With regard to language, Cassirer points out that in the tradition of Aristotelian ontology rationalism

> always was inclined to think that from the fact of a unique logic we can immediately infer that there must be a unique grammar. (…) But we are always exposed to the danger of confounding some special properties of our own language with universal semantic properties when approaching the problem from a merely logical side. (Cassirer 1942, 322)

He counters semantic universalism by referring to Wilhelm von Humboldt's studies of differences between languages. These differences render the postulation of a universal grammar obsolete, favor cultural relativity of language, but do not preclude the possibility of universal features in any given language. In the vein of Humboldt's and the Romantics' (especially Herder's) cultural relativism of language, from the 1940s on, Benjamin Lee Whorf's program became increasingly popular among relationist scholars.[40] The thesis that linguistic features structure the thought and the perceptional capabilities of actors fitted well the neo-Kantian theory of perceptional schemes. We do not need to discuss the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis here.[41] The

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40   With reference to Whorf, Elias states that an important reason for the privileged status of substances over relations in the social sciences appears to be the specific grammatical structure of "Standard Average European" languages (Elias 1978, 112).

41   Whorf 1956, first published 1941. During the sixties, especially the deterministic variant of Whorf's argument and some empirical evidence (color naming) have been

main argument, since Humboldt, has been that there is a mutual relation between cultural and social conditions of living and language. These relations do not only contribute to shape cultures (Herder) but also different ways of constructing agency and collective identity.[42] Together with other relationists, Bourdieu fits perfectly in this position and, as we will see, documents his sympathy for it. For our interest in religious beliefs, semantics is crucial, and Bourdieu's dealings with semantics are an important object of our theoretical and epistemological investigations in this volume.[43]

The scientific discussion of Bourdieu's sociological assessment of linguistic praxis is somewhat controversial.[44] While we can easily disregard some voices who say that Bourdieu had no interest in language at all, the debates about the role of semantics and the function of language as well as that about the concept of linguistic habitus, together with the relative autonomy of language, represent issues of immediate interest for us.

> The fact remains that social science has to take account of the autonomy of language, its specific logic, and its particular rules of operation. In particular, one cannot understand the symbolic effects of language without making allowance for the fact, frequently attested, that language is the exemplary formal mechanism whose generative capacities are without limits. [...] We have known since Frege that words

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strongly discussed and lost momentum in comparison to universalistic linguistics. In recent psycho and socio-linguistic research, the soft version of Whorf's argument is back. Language specific effects have been shown for example in spatial and time-related cognition (Carroll and von Stutterheim 2011; von Stutterheim et al. 2012).

42 According to the linguist and anthropologist Carlos Lenkersdorf, Maya languages do not allow for subjectivity if not in relation to other people, as collective subjectivity. See Lenkersdorf (1996). He gives an example of the different role of collectivity. In Tojolabal a phrase reads: Uno de nosotros comet*imos* un delito (One of us [*we* committed] a crime). In Spanish the same phrase reads: Uno de nosotros comet*ió* un delito. (One of us [*he* committed] a crime.), Lenkersdorf 2002, 147. See also introduction to Lenkersdorf 1979.

43 We will treat language in a general sense in vol. 1; in a more methodological and hermeneutical sense in vol. 3.

44 There are some contributions of special interest for us. We will discuss them below in a special subsection (3.2.2): Searle 2004; Thompson 2006; 1984a; 1984b; Collins 1993; Hanks 2000; Kögler 2011 (see below, section 3.2.2). See also the following titles: Hepp 2000, who emphasizes strongly the capacities of praxeology for socio-semiotics and reflects on inter-theory relations between Bourdieu and authors like Kristeva or Lacan. For an account of Bourdieu's work on language and critical remarks, see also de Albuquerque Júnior 2013 with a combination of Bourdieu and Peirce for religious language; Boschetti 2004; various contributions in Shusterman 1999a; Encrevé 2004; King 2004; Butler 1997, especially 141ff.; Hernández 2006; Snook et al. 1990; Jenkins 1992, especially 102; Jenkins 1989.

> can have meaning without referring to anything. In other words, formal rigour can
> mask *semantic freewheeling.* All religious theologies and all political theodicies have
> taken advantage of the fact that the generative capacities of language can surpass the
> limits of intuition or empirical verification and produce statements that are *formally*
> impeccable but semantically empty. Rituals are the limiting case of situations of *im-*
> *position* in which, through the exercise of a technical competence which may be very
> imperfect, a social competence is exercised—namely, that of the legitimate speaker,
> authorized to speak and to speak with authority. (Bourdieu 2006c, 41, G: 2005c, 45)

These sentences, at the end of his introduction to the chapter on "The Economy of
Linguistic Exchanges" in Bourdieu's anthology on language, indicate the relevance
of language for sociology in general and, more specifically, for the sociology of
religion; and they tie the power of linguistic utterances to their form and to the
social position of the speaker. More important for us is the fact that this passage
falls short of the analytical power that the praxeological approach to language re-
ally has—and which Bourdieu himself employs on many occasions. Semantically
empty statements, like those mentioned in the quote, still carry meaning. What
is an empty referential value for the sociologist, for the religious actor may be a
numinous power, his God, a fact that generates social reality.[45] After such a seman-
tic "take-off", even religious actors touch ground again in the land of classes and
classification, of ascribing names and values, and of structuring the worldviews
and the world according to semantic content. Hence, praxeology has to deal with
semantics—and Bourdieu does so too. Whereas much of the debate on Bourdieu
and language pivots around his emphasis on linguistic form, in this book we will
evidence Bourdieu's praxeological way of treating semantics by examining a couple
of his works. Our goal in this will be to show how Bourdieu works with semantics
in order to use this potential for developing further the study of linguistic praxis
in social actors and structures.

    Hence, we have to accomplish a double task. We have to develop an appropriate
method for the study of religious praxis, with special reference to linguistic utter-
ances; and we have to anchor the approach to language in praxeological theory.

    The lion's share of debates on Bourdieu and language locate the relevant theoretical
issues somewhere close to the theoretical concept of habitus. Habitus is Bourdieu's
name for the bundle of a great many dispositions of perception, judgment, and action,
embodied in social actors as cognitive, emotional, and bodily operators. According
to this understanding, language operates with these dispositions. Nevertheless,

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45   Cf. Thomas and Thomas 1928, 572.

the debate is compromised by a substantialist image of what habitus is.[46] There are two frequent observations. The first takes the habitus in general (or the "social habitus," Kögler) on the one hand, and the linguistic habitus on the other hand as if they were two completely separate entities. Hence, questions arise as to how the relation between a socially determined "social habitus" and a creative linguistic habitus can be conceived. The same opposition between a free and creative (mostly individual) entity and an unfree, determined entity is often constructed between a free conscious reflexivity on the one hand and social structure on the other. We do not only reject such separations. Rather, we underscore that linguistic operations are not only realized in and by social actors but that they also operate in social structures, and that both operational modes are intertwined as open systems. We suggest therefore that the clue to a praxeological approach to language lies in a decidedly relational interpretation of Bourdieu's social theory, especially of those theorems that are related to the embodied dispositions of actors and to the social conditions of living.

Relations

In the vignette at the beginning of this introduction, I sketched a conversation between a military officer and an indigenous peasant. Although I was quick to warn not to isolate this encounter from the context of war, the fact remains that there were still two individuals talking to each other, and so the question comes up which theoretical concept of the individual should be used. This question is interesting not least since it points to the epistemological and even ontological premises of sociological work. Bourdieu takes a very clear stance in this regard: He strongly favors relational ontology. He characterizes his sociology as a combination of a "philosophy of science that one could call *relational* in that it accords primacy to relations" and "a philosophy of action designated at times as dispositional." (Bourdieu 1998c, VII, G: 2007, 7) The cornerstone of this approach is the two-way-relationship between objectified social structures (fields and social space) and embodied structures (habitus). Epistemologically this program has its roots mainly in Ernst Cassirer's *Substance and Function* (Cassirer 1953). We read Bourdieu's praxeology in this relational key and with special attention to language.

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46   See below 3.2.2. Very telling is the way in which Hans-Hermann Kögler who sympathizes with Bourdieu looks for safeguarding the praxeological work with language by, finally, substantialist means.

Contested issues

Bourdieu often emphasizes that a focus on relations helps to prevent the reification of concepts, undue abstractions, and finally substantialist sociology. Furthermore, he considers it ideal for the construction of sociological models. Now, the question arises of why the shift from substantialism to relationism should be preferred or even be necessary. Substantialist ontology and logical classification by abstraction have been quite successful in Western thought. We will discuss substantialist and relationist thinking in the first part of the present volume in some detail with reference to Ernst Cassirer and Bourdieu. Here we only want to sketch briefly some introductory ideas on this issue.

Instead of naively concluding from the grammatical subject, or concept, that a corresponding substance exists, Bourdieu recommends recurring to relational epistemology. This leads to Cassirer, who held that concepts function as mutually interrelated schemes of perception that transform the indistinct flow of sensual impressions into orderly series and thus create experience. Hence, scientific concepts are models for observation. In his own work, Bourdieu constructs the models of fields, social space, and especially of stylistic correspondences in a largely relational way. However, it is not always evident that he uses his scientific concepts in a clearly relational way. First, in the heat of debate, Bourdieu uses his concepts as shorthand and somewhat emblematically. Moreover, sometimes his concept use triggers substantialist connotations. For instance, when he speaks of a "split habitus" (*habitus clivé*) one could ask if that wording does not necessarily presuppose a substantial unit as a habitus in normal conditions. "Subfields" may also suggest an ontic hierarchy between fields. In short, Bourdieu does not prevent seriously enough possible substantialist misinterpretations of his concepts. Second, this lack of distinctiveness is partly due to the logic of concept use as such. A concept condenses the result of a cognitive procedure and gives it a name. If one reads or hears a concept, it is not instantly evident whether it is formed by a relational or by a substantialist procedure. On the one hand, if the procedure is relational (i.e., one arranges different sensuous data in a series, thus producing similarities and differences), then the concept denotes just the respective series. If one is asked to explain the meaning of the concept, one can enumerate a couple of these data. On the other hand, if the procedure is substantialist (i.e. one determines an essence by abstraction), the concept denotes the *abstractum*.[47] In order to explain its meaning,

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47 A lexical definition of the adjective "medium" by abstraction could for instance be "middle state or condition." This is of course not wrong. However, it does not tell much if one wants to say something about the practical logic of concrete social communication.

one recurs to the abstract definition. It is not easy to tell *prima facie* by which of these two procedures a given concept was formed. Therefore, it is helpful to be aware of the epistemological and theoretical axioms that an author works with. Third, the epistemology of the readers counts too. Suggestive effects of concept use vary according to the epistemology a reader shares. If someone favors a substantialist view, he or she will read Bourdieu in that manner, and vice versa. This explains many misapprehensions and polemics (see p. 131 and p. 275) For example, some blame Bourdieu for structural determinism, others for the opposite fault, rationalist individualism—but in both cases the individual and society are conceived as closed units in abstract relations to each other. Instead, what Bourdieu is interested in is the multiplicity of *relations* between structures and actors; and he conceives of actors and structures in a relationist way. To put it in a correct, if awkward way: He investigates the multiple relations between all the practical series that have been condensed and are represented by the theoretical concepts of actor and structure.[48] This theoretical take is crucial for our specific interest in religious discourse. The social and symbolic activities, which generate religious (and non-religious) meaning, unfold precisely as *operations that relate* objectified and embodied structures, thus co-constituting the two-way-relationship.

Bourdieu anchors his relational sociology mainly in early twentieth century continental philosophy. Caused by the swift progress in the natural sciences and as a late effect of Kantian philosophy and the historicizing language theories of Romanticism, it was at that time that a paradigm change in epistemology occurred.[49] Ernst Cassirer was, in the fields of language and the philosophy of culture, one of the most influential protagonists of this turn to relations.[50] Beyond Cassirer, other schools developed the relational orientation in their own ways—whether it was French (Saussure, Levi-Strauss…) or American (Boas, Sapir…) structural-

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Only the contextual use permits to construct a practical series in which the expression acquires it meaning: for example "rare, medium, well done" or "small, medium, large, x-large" or "soft, medium, hard." See also Wittgenstein (2004, $6 and $206).

48 For this reason Bourdieu emphasizes that his sociology of the two-way-relation is opposed to both rational action theories with their liking for the autonomous rational individual and to "certain structuralism" (Bourdieu 1998c, VIII, G: 2007, 8) that reduces the actors to "simple epiphenomena of structure."

49 Leibniz still considered the category of relation of minor importance even for geometry. During the nineteenth century, relations became decisive in geometry (see Steiner 1992). Bourdieu emphasizes this development with reference to Bachelard: *Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique* of 1934. See Bourdieu 1968, 682ff., G: 1970, 10ff.

50 Especially Cassirer 1953.

ism, or pragmatism (James, Peirce, Dewey…).[51] The language philosophy of the late Wittgenstein also sets out a critique of the substantialist concept of the sign. In sociology, a marked relationism is advocated by Karl Mannheim and Norbert Elias, for instance.[52]

Reality

Relationist thinkers close to Cassirer often combine a critique of substantialist language theory with one of logic and ontology.[53] However, none of the theorists we refer to negates the existence of an objective reality.[54] There is no doubt that even in the sociology of knowledge the "ontic background" (Mannheim 1982c, 58) has to be taken into account; and language games are anchored in life forms so that "the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*." (Wittgenstein 2004, I, §43). However, a theory of reflection is strongly rejected. I am not aware of any relationist who agrees with the opinion that social reality in itself could objectively be mirrored by cognition and that, by this operation, an *adaequatio rei et intellectūs* could be produced. Instead, *adaequatio* is produced by preconceived schemes that guide the cognitive construction of series or structures.

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51 See Sandkühler, Pätzold, and Freudenberger 2003, 157f. One also can consider the personalism of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levin as as a relationist critique of substantialism. Moreover, many postmodern thinkers are relationists.

52 Mannheim 1982a; 1982b; Elias 1978.

53 See, brief and concise, Cassirer (1942). It is in the context of this critique that relationist thinkers often favor culture-relativist theories of language and perception—such as Boas, and later Sapir and Whorf—in opposition to a *lingua universalis*. Let me clarify at this point that in this book I simply point out some aspects of relationist thought that are immediately relevant for our sociological task. I do not judge hereby if these scholars interpret modern natural sciences or antique philosophy correctly.

54 For modern radical constructivism in social theory see S. Schmidt 1989; 1992; 1992; Rusch and Schmidt 1994. Philosophical and epistemological contributions in Fischer, Retzer, and Schweitzer 1992. Instead of following George Berkeley or Johann Gottlieb Fichte, constructing one's world exclusively in one's head, we consider it much more creative to count with the "resistance of the material" (Ernst Bloch).When Bourdieu calls his work "structuralist constructivism" (Bourdieu 1990d, 123, G: 1992b, 135) this is a very down-to-earth constructivism that merely consists in the assumption of a "social genesis" of habitus, fields, classes, and so forth. He should have called it "social" or "sociological constructivism."

Schemes

Building upon Kant, relationist social scientists suppose that the cognition of reality depends upon preconceived conditions such as the categories of time and space, a third instance between world and brain, so to say. From a social science perspective, such categories are generated from social and cultural relations and mediated by language. In the context of social experience (*Erfahrungsraum*, Mannheim), language structures the cognition of reality so that representations of the world, or worldviews, vary among different actors according to their social environment. Hence, we understand cognition as a (relatively transitory) product of the transformation of sensual data by schemes of perception.[55] The result is not an image of the social world perceived but the arrangement of the observed things, relationships, and processes into two cognitive orders: first, into a cognitively produced series together with other perceived occurrences; second, into the conditions of cognition imposed by the standpoint of the perceiving person. In other words, the result of the sociological cognitive process is the arrangement of the observed data in a model-like context of other data, thus rendering the data meaningful. It is a model of real social relations combined with knowledge about the relativity of the model, and conditioned by standpoint and historical change.

Of course, one could suppose *prima facie* that this approach completely rules out the correspondence theory of truth and cognition, but this is not the case. The *adaequatio intellectūs et rei* only is produced in a different way: as adequacy of the cognitively constructed models for the things, relations, and processes in social reality. This kind of adequacy that can be proved empirically by the model's capacity of explanation and its practical viability. Again, sociological adequacy does not mean the correct reference of a sign to a thing in the sense of reflection (*Widerspiegelung*). For us, the sociological adequacy of a theoretical concept or model rather means that the concept or the model has proven to be suitable (a) to select those empirical data which are of the highest relevance in praxis (leaning on statistical adequacy), and (b) to organize the data according to a (b1) theoretically coherent and (b2) empirically relevant structure or "series" (Cassirer) (leaning on logical adequacy). Criteria (a) and (b2) depend on the combination of empirical

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55   The thought figure of a third instance and processes between world and brain is widely spread. Cassirer calls it schemes and construction of series, Levi-Strauss structures, and Mannheim conjunctive or correlative cognition. Similarly, in phenomenology and hermeneutics, Edmund Husserl states that the "natural standpoint" hinders cognition and has to be overcome by conscious recognition, the act of *epoché*; similar Georg Gadamer's concept of prejudice or Gaston Bachelard's epistemological obstacles. Finally, it's all Kant, and today it has become almost trivial. Not trivial is the translation of this approach into sociology.

observation with a reliable theory. Criterion (b1) expresses the claim that pristine, coherent, and wide-ranging theories are more desirable than a theory mix. Adequacy cannot be laid down *ex ante*: the explanatory strength of concepts and models is more likely to be approved or disapproved by empirical validation. Finally, we are aware that this understanding of sociological adequacy implies constant circular operations between empirical research and theory construction. That is, we are doing sociology, not metaphysics.

Abstraction and reification

When the reflection theory of cognizance is criticized, critical comments are also often made on concept formation by abstraction and on the subsequent reification of conceptions. This is because reflection, abstraction, and reification often correlate with one another. If one is convinced that the concepts of thought reflect the things of the world as true images, one is also likely to believe that these concepts reflect(or even are in themselves) concrete realities, in other words, one tends to conceptual realism. Mannheim and Elias, for instance, criticize this use of the concept of the individual, while Bourdieu takes the example of class: "the working class wants…" Literalist Bible exegesis contributes many occurrences of conceptual realism. Following Francis Bacon, these exegetes believe that the Bible records natural and supernatural facts. These facts are faithfully imaged by cognition, and by their inductive analysis one can find divine truth. Now, you read in the Gospel of Matthew that Jesus speaks of the "kingdom of heaven" while in Luke he refers to the "kingdom of God." Hence, literalists until this day fill entire libraries with the debate about the difference between both kingdoms, about which one is higher or lower in the heavenly building, under what conditions one can inhabit one of them, and what particular moral requirements have to be fulfilled in order to be admitted to either of them.[56] These scholars reify a concept (more precisely: a metaphor) and from their reifications arrive at conclusions about determinant effects of causation. Indeed, causation and determination normally follow hard on the heels of reification.

Substance

Another object of relationist criticism is that substantialist thought favors the category of substance (the ancient Greek *hypokeimenon*) over those of relation,

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[56]   Historical hermeneutics explain the difference by the simple observation that Mathew would not bother his Jewish-Christian congregation by pronouncing the name of JHWE instead of "heavens." For more instructive and pleasurable examples see James Barr (1977).

quantity, and quality. In consequence, everything that one can predicate of some-thing is in the last resort caused by the substance of that object.[57] This is the result of a debate, in classical antiquity, about the question of whether being or becoming, continuance or change, was more important for the understanding of reality (with Parmenides symbolically representing continuance and Heracleitos representing change). In grammar, this distinction appears as the difference between subject (substance, continuance) and predicate (action, change).[58] Substantialist ontology gives preference to substance. One can note this preference in ordinary language by the implicit presupposition that a thing has one specific property by dint of its stable substance (or essence, *substantia*, *ousía*) and, beyond that, some other properties that are added accidentally and may change or vary (*accidentiae*). Elias gives an example of an interesting consequence of this language use for sociological thought: "It is one of the most remarkable ideas ever thought up by man that any observable change can be explained as the effect of an immovable, static 'First Cause'." (Elias 1978, 114) Following this pattern, he says, relations and processes can be conceived only as accidental properties of stable objects or substances: "We say, 'The wind is blowing', as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of processes to static conditions, which we shall call 'process-reduction' for short, appears self-explanatory to people who have grown up with such languages." (Elias 1978, 112) This pattern has had a long-term effect also on the modern concept of subjectivity.

Subject

Inasmuch as, in early modernity, the philosophy of Descartes mutates substance into a subject, one can, *mutatis mutandis*, apply much of the relationist critique to his concept of subjectivity as well. In his *Meditationes* (Descartes 1996, Second Meditation), he develops it by means of a process of abstraction. He organizes his line of thought by successively discarding the concrete world, first the objects in his room, then his body, in order to end up with his own reflexive thought as the only guarantee of reality and the stable origin (almost a *hypokeimenon*) of his self: *cogito ergo sum*. The human being is *res cogitans* precisely because of being separate

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57   Cassirer (1942, 312) states that the identification of universal thought (language) and universal being, presupposed by mainstream Antique ontology, is deeply questioned by Wilhelm von Humboldt's studies on different languages in their cultural context.

58   One also can ask what was first, the philosophical knowledge about the essence of being or the language, generated by the experience of social relations, the other, action etc. Cassirer, albeit philosopher, prefers language.

from the environment and even from the body (*res extensae*). One could well label Descartes' operation as "strategic self-reification."[59] On the long run, the disguise of substance as subject bolstered the tendency to conceive of human beings as a closed system or a unit closed in itself, similar to a billiard ball. Descartes' philosophy leads people to believe that their self is something like a reflexive core deep within themselves "and that an invisible barrier separates their 'inside' from everything 'outside'—the so-called 'outside world'. People who experience themselves in this way—as a kind of closed box, as *Homo clausus*—find this immediately obvious." (Elias 1978, 119) As another effect, Descartes' philosophical paradigm change provided new momentum to rationalism by transforming reason so to speak into the "prime mover" of subjectivity. In Descartes, conscious, isolated, rational, and reflexive contemplation turns the human being into a subject. Hence, the conclusion must be allowed that this is the universal way of subject constitution. Then, self-reflexive consciousness becomes the universal condition of subjectivity. With regard to sociology, in this tradition of thought one is very likely to overestimate the role of reflexive reason for the constitution of agency.

As a relationist alternative to this way of conceiving subjectivity, we propose our theoretical model of identity as a network of dispositions. Beyond a different theoretical approach to subjectivity, this model has the additional advantage for the social sciences that it can also be operationalized for the empirical study of the practical sense of actors within their two-way relation with social structure.[60] The idea of re-arranging the notions that relate to agency, subjectivity and so forth can also be found in other relational theorists. Mannheim, for instance, recommends taking the social context of experience into account for the definition of concepts like consciousness, action, and the individual.[61] As a sociological alternative to the *homo clausus*, Elias proposes the "idea of the *homines aperti*" (Elias 1978, 125). Instead of the abstract *homo* in the singular, Elias prefers to speak of human beings in the plural, whom he conceives as synchronically and diachronically open to spatial relations and temporal change. In consequence, individual persons are not seen as isolated subjects but as social beings.

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59   In this case, reification would then not be a logical fallacy anymore—at least not from Descartes' perspective. Given the historical context of liberation from the constraints the religious powers exerted on intellectual and economic activities, Descartes' subjectivism was a stroke of genius. Its negative effects are recorded in another chapter of history.

60   For the theoretical concept see Schäfer 2003; 2005; for the theoretical roots in Bourdieu, see HabitusAnalysis vol. 2; for the model and the research method, see vol. 3.

61   See Mannheim 1982c, 73ff.. Individuality is objectively rooted in the experiential contexture (*Erlebniszusammenhang*) of people (Mannheim 1982c, 70).

Individual

The concept of the individual is often used in opposition to the one of society. On the one hand, this conceptual opposition is fruitful by constantly creating sociological debates and theoretical discourses. On the other hand, it is often criticized as too abstract. Elias calls the distinction between individual and society "senseless," because it makes us believe "that 'the individual' and 'the society' were two separate things, like tables and chairs, or pots and pans" even though, at another level of awareness, we know "that people can only develop their "abilities to speak, think, and love, in and through their relationships with other people—'in society'." (Elias 1978, 113) For Elias, the theoretical debates about the opposition of individual versus society are quite futile, since "there can be no way out of this intellectual trap as long as both concepts—whether called 'actor' and 'system', 'the unique person' and 'ideal-type', or 'individual' and 'society'—retain their traditional character as substantives, seeming to refer to isolated objects in a state of rest." (Elias 1978, 118) In Elias' diagnosis, the problem is substantialist epistemology and the remedy is relationism.

Now, one might argue that the concepts of individual and society are already related to each other when they are used as a conceptual pair. This argument is right and wrong at the same time, and thus gives rise to the epistemological problem behind it: the different interests that sociologists and logicians have when they use concepts.[62] It is a meaningful operation in formal logic to establish an abstract concept based upon the observation of indivisible (*atomos*), numerically single, substantial beings and to use the word of *individual* to name the concept. It is also meaningful to form an abstract concept based upon the observation of a great number of such single, indivisible beings and to use the word *society* for it. It further makes sense to contrast these concepts with each other, that is, to put them into a relation of, e.g., contrariety or contradiction. Problems arise, however, when

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62 Mannheim (1982c, 220ff.) refers to this problem by discussing the difference between the function of a word as a name and as a general term.—The transition from a philosophical and substantialist concept of the individual to a sociological and relationist view is nicely reported by Borsche (1976). In historical perspective, one can note a strong contrast between Leibniz and Marx. The former operates with an abstract concept of individual in logics, and in metaphysics, he transforms it into the concept of the isolated "monad" resting in itself. In contrast, Marx considers it indispensable for the scientific interpretation of the world to focus on the concrete, the living individual human beings within their relations with nature and other people. If the reader now has the impression that, with this comparison, we are mistaking apples for oranges, then she or he perfectly accords with our proposal to distinguish well between logical and sociological heuristics.

a sociologist treats such concepts, and the logical relation between them, as entities existing in the real world, precisely as if the *abstracta* "individual" and "society" mirrored (*widerspiegeln*) the life of human beings in their social environment. Individuals in logic per definition are alone; individuals in the world and in sociology are not. One of the most common collateral problems arises when imputations are made about causation between "society" and "individual." For instance, an abstract understanding of Bourdieu's way to theorize the relation between habitus and structures often results in labeling his work as deterministic.[63]

With regard to the sociological approach to the problem of the individual versus society, we want to illustrate the relational point of view by referring once again to Mannheim. Instead of contrasting abstract concepts with one another, one has to relate living conditions and actors by means of the empirical exploration of the multiple two-way relations *between* them. It is only such empirical research that shows "how strict is the correlation between life-situation and thought-process, or what scope exists for variations in the correlation."[64] In consequence, we do not take the *abstracta* "individual" and "society" as existing entities. Instead, we first deconstruct the concepts in the research process by means of multiple models and related concepts (habitus for instance is deconstructed by concepts like dispositions, schemes, embodied capital etc.). Then, at an appropriate moment in the research process, we reconstruct the concept by theoretical reflection as an epitome (*Inbegriff*, Cassirer) of a *relation* that is well arranged and described by the knowledge generated in empirical research.

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63   We treat this problem with more detail on p. 131ff. and p. 275ff., as well as in vol. 2.

64   Mannheim 1954, 239, n. 1. The quote stems from part V of the aforementioned book which is a translation of an introductory article into the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim 1931) and bears the English title of "The sociology of Knowledge". Beyond the statement quoted above, Mannheim's text illustrates the problem of abstract concept use in the case of the problematic term of "determination" and with a special regard to the delicate field of translation between different languages. The translated text reads as follows. "It would be well to begin by explaining what is meant by the wider term 'existential determination of knowledge' ('*Seinsverbundenheit des Wissens*')." The fact that *Seinsverbundenheit* is translated with *determination* appeared be awkward. Therefore, a footnote is added: "Here we do not mean by 'determination' a mechanical cause-effect sequence: we leave the meaning of 'determination' open, and only empirical investigation will show us how strict is the correlation between life-situation and thought-process, or what scope exists for variations in the correlation. [The German expression '*Seinsverbundenes Wissen*' conveys a meaning which leaves the exact nature of the determinism open.]." Beyond this note, one also may ask what might be meant by "nature of determinism;" its essence? The aporias of a language type with substantialist roots become quite visible by a seemingly trivial translation problem.

To sum up, here is Mannheim on the difference between substantialist logics and relationist sociology:

> While a concept within the unhistorically generalizing type of concept formation is comprehended only when one determines its *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica*, the comprehension of a conjunctive concept attached to a particular experiential space is achieved only when one has managed to penetrate into that space. The totality of that world must be mastered, and not the totality of an abstract conceptual plane, if one is to understand a conjunctively determined concept in an historically interpretative way. This is due to the fact that it is not only the concepts that are different in different experiential spaces, but also the phenomena intended by them. This can be demonstrated in the phenomenon of 'flirting' mentioned earlier. (Mannheim 1982c, 202)

If one shares this point of view, one may be inclined to consider the sociological application of concepts formed by unhistorical abstraction no less than a category mistake. Nevertheless, as a science, sociology cannot avoid the use of concepts. A relationist approach to sociology at least escapes some aporias of abstract concept formation, but it cannot do without either concept formation or logic. One should acknowledge therefore at least three conditions of concept use in praxeological sociology. First, following Cassirer, concepts can be formed relationally by creating series. Second, the operations of abstraction and formal logic can be of great benefit for the construction of theoretical models and the definition of theoretical working concepts, and can be combined easily with a relational approach. Therefore, third, it is crucial to remain constantly aware of the difference between concepts and models on the one hand and social praxis on the other, implementing techniques of controlled scientific reflexivity.

We will examine these three conditions in the rest of this section with special regard to Bourdieu.

Structures, models, and epistemology

For Bourdieu, a relational epistemology is useful in guiding sociological observation of human praxis beyond the traps of abstraction and "spontaneous sociology" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, G: 1991b). Seemingly a paradox, relationist sociology keeps actors in view as real, living human beings who believe, feel, and transform society while being constantly transformed by their social context, precisely by means of theoretically constructed models and epistemological reflexivity. The most important relational tool is the construction of series (Cassirer)

as an alternative model to classification by abstraction.[65] First, this method allows arranging sociological data—as, e.g., the content of interviews, observed practices, the registered distribution of resources etc.—in such a way that they interpret one another. Thus, the living conditions, beliefs, practices etc. of the actors observed remain present in the analytical process. Second, from the point of view of a given sociological theory one can construct models that guide the process of arranging the data in consonance with an explicit research interest. Our models of the prax-eological square and the network of dispositions (see vol. 3) work as such guides for data arrangement.[66] Third, the theoretical and methodological explicitness and reflexivity of this whole process allows researchers to keep the difference between model and praxis in mind. Although the arranged raw data are always in sight, their arrangement in a model reduces the complexity of the praxis recorded. Knowing the theoretical conditions of complexity reduction facilitates returning from the model to the complexity of praxis by means of interpretation.

Series, structures, networks

The general concern of relationist social scientists is to concentrate on relations, interconnectedness, structure etc., and has a sophisticated philosophical counterpart in Ernst Cassirer's relationist epistemology. For the relationist tradition and for us, it is crucial that Cassirer proposes one more way of understanding the generation of knowledge, beyond logical classification by *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica*. According to him, everyday knowledge as well as scientific knowledge can be understood as the product of arranging sensory data one by one in a series so that they interpret one another mutually. Series that prove reliable will become established as schemes of perception that pre-structure the arrangement of new sensory data in subsequent acts of perception. A relational approach to praxis explains individual events or actors sociologically by reconstructing a series of events, other actors, circumstances, et cetera in which the *explanandum* occurs or is situated. Thus, an individual occurrence is explained by the mutual relations that can be observed between this occurrence and the other elements of the series. In fact, the explanation of the incident in question by its relations always explains more than just the single item; at worst it explains the neighboring elements too, and at best a whole series. Here is a brief example: after a major earthquake destroyed the center of Mexico City in September 1985, I had a coffee next morning with a Pentecostal peasant in a Guatemalan village. In the little cook-shop, we saw the headline of

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65   We will examine Cassirer's approach closely in the first part of this book.

66   With the words of Levi-Strauss (1963, 279), the social relations are the raw material out of which the models make social structure.

the current newspaper and photos of massive destruction. Mr. Chavajay said, well, this is a sign of the end-times we are in: earthquakes, war, and destruction. The true believers soon will be raptured into heaven, and the antichrist will torture all the rest on earth, and Christ will come back. Though I did not contradict him, I had a different series in my mind: earthquake, San Andreas Fault, Pacific plate tectonics, volcanoes, victims, some Mexican friends, relief activities… In these two different series, the item "earthquake" acquires two completely different meanings. Two different sets of perceptional and evaluative schemes render two completely different "pictures" of the larger context of the event and entail completely different perspectives of action.

The relational organization of thought also has consequences for the social sciences. Since the contexts of these cognitive activities differ between different scientific disciplines, different people, and last but not least different cultures, the schemes of arrangement are also supposed to be different. For the theoretical construction of models as scientific schemes of apperception, this means that the process of construction should be guided by the research interests involved, for instance, either more diachronic (as e.g. Elias) or more synchronic (as e.g. Bourdieu). The relational epistemology has consequences for the sociological approach to social praxis as well as for the understanding of scientific concepts. From a relationist point of view, we understand theoretical concepts like habitus, dispositions, capital, et cetera, not as single abstract items, or ideal types or even names for objects. Rather, theoretical concepts serve as elements of large series (or networks) of mutually interpreting sociological operators. Each concept is related to others. By this relation, concepts render other terms meaningful and are themselves given meaning by the other terms. Some of the concepts (like habitus or field) may have a greater extension than others (scheme or illusio); some are more often used than others; and some of the concepts are even molded into analytical models (mainly fields and social space). But none of the theoretical concepts on the long list can stand alone without the need to acquire its meaning by being used together with other concepts. This interconnectedness makes them appropriate for the theoretical understanding of social praxis as a mainly relational reality. The relationist epistemological principles of praxeological theory pertain, of course, also to the architecture of this theory itself.

Relational models

The construction of relational models is a means to organize scientific schemes of perception according to a given research interest and a framing theory. We opted for Bourdieu's praxeology as a frame and concentrate on social actors and their beliefs within their social context in the particular respect of collective mobilization. This research interest could be framed theoretically, for instance, by the abstract

opposition of the individual versus society. With respect to collective mobilization, we could apply with Mancur Olson (1971) methodological individualism as a model for the analysis of collective behavior. Thus, we would enter into a quite abstract discussion and consider collective mobilization a fairly paradoxical issue, since the interest of the abstract individual in utility maximization tends to turn this individual almost necessarily into a free rider instead of a movement activist.[67] Indeed, we construct a completely different model of social actors as open and multiply related networks of cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions (see Schäfer 2003). On the theoretical level, dispositions are supposed to be embodied and constantly transformed by the social environment of actors and their own actions and suffering. On the methodological level and in analytical application, the perception and cognitive transformation of social experiences reported by actors are an important element of the model. Thus, the generation of meaning and the social sense of actors is intimately interwoven with the way social relations affect (but do not determine) their lives and their social conditions. One can say that society is modeled as inside the individual, and the actor is modeled as within social relations. Moreover, the relational models of objective social structures (fields and social space) are supposed to be triangulated with the model of the actor (habitus), so that even the macro-structures of society are correctly understood only if actors and their dispositions are considered in the respective models.[68] What this approach helps to model is not the concepts of the individual and society in the logical relation of being opposed to each other. Rather, it models the mutual interrelation between objectified social structures and processes on the one hand and, on the other hand, the operational mode of the interconnected dispositions in relation to the social environment of actors. This is what we aim at with HabitusAnalysis.

Nevertheless, this methodology does preclude neither formal logic nor abstraction. On the contrary, the central model for the analysis of the cognitive transformation of experience, the praxeological square, is constructed on the principles of propositional logic. We operationalize praxeological theory for empirical analysis by going back

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67   Newer theories of rational action approach the question of mobilization and action in general by an elaborate concept of preference structures, which is not all too distant from Bourdieu's dispositions.

68   Thus, the individual in its "contexture of experience" and the "'social structure of consciousness' as such" (Mannheim 1982c, 73, with reference to Marx) is modeled. This model also allows integrating what Elias recommends as relational categories to guide sociological observation: the series of pronouns (Elias 1978, 122ff.), present in most languages, that facilitate to observe systematically self-relatedness, relations to interactional or structural counterparts, relations to third parties, and finally perspectivity.

to the basic functions of propositional logic and translating them into a sociological model. Further, one of our methods for the analysis of discourses (isotopy analysis) works in a somewhat similar way to abstraction.[69] Finally, of course we use abstract and well-defined concepts in theoretical and methodological work. The development of scientific models for the study of everyday praxis creates a tension between model and reality, which translates into a creative tension between different styles of scientific logic. The analysis of recorded data by means of formal models brings to light structural connections among the data and retains only the most significant relations. Models represent an "objectivistic intermediate step" (Bourdieu) of the praxeological approach. Synthetic interpretation of the data makes use of the structures reconstructed in the models as a reliable key for a hermeneutical re-reading of the data that enriches the significant relations with perspectivity, the flow of time, idiosyncrasies, et cetera. Praxeological explanation combines these scientific logics in order to understand the relations between social structures and actors, positions and dispositions.[70] In consequence, there is no equation of actor with subjective hermeneutics or of social structure with objectivistic models. Rather, objectivistic models are applied to study both habitus and social structure; and hermeneutical interpretation is applied to both social positions and dispositions of actors. Epistemologically, for the entire approach it is crucial not to mistake the concepts and models for images of the world in itself, but as theoretical tools used to arrange data from scientific observation in an orderly, theoretically defined, and communicable way. This is what Bourdieu points out when he gives the warning not to confuse a model with social reality and the "logic of logic" with the "logic of praxis."

Epistemological awareness

Scientific models and concepts, used as epistemological tools to understand praxis scientifically, also produce a distance between researcher and observed reality. Among almost all the relational thinkers quoted, this distance is appreciated as a beneficial means to trigger self-critical reflection about the models and concepts applied. Nevertheless, the said distance also carries various risks.

The risk of reification is found not only with substantialist concepts. Relationist concepts are equally prone to this fate. The simple fact that a given concept, such

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69   Indeed, what this method facilitates is identifying the epitome, the "systematic totality (*Inbegriff*)" (Cassirer 1953, 22), of the particular series a certain item belongs to in its practical use.

70   Such a combination of structural and hermeneutical reading is the central issue in Ricoeur (1974), albeit focused on the interpretation of texts while praxeological sociology has a much wider focus.

as habitus, is constantly used in an almost emblematic way—without braking it down from time to time into the processes it refers to—will most probably and on the long run cause the impression that habitus somehow is an entity. Even if the word *habitus* is opposed to *field*, this usage may aggravate the problem if the terms are conceived as related merely by logical contrariety. Thus, *habitus* and *field* tend to transmute into the abstract opposition between the individual and society simply because of blurred meaning through excessive use—because of "semantic abrasion," so to say. Building upon Husserl (Husserl 1983, 56ff.) and adopting a theory-of-science perspective, one could state that reification occurs when a theoretical concept—elaborated as a product of a methodological *epoché* and employed as an instrument against the fallacies of the "natural standpoint" (*natürliche Einstellung*)—through its constant use is embodied to such an extent that it becomes a natural standpoint by itself. Against this risk of concept use, there are no safety measures other than constant theoretical awareness.

In contrast to concepts, models are not risky to the same extent. They convey too many individual concepts, dimensions, restrictions, et cetera so that they are quite unwieldy and therefore unlikely to be reified, though there can be of course no guarantee. As our considerations pivot around habitus, we will construct a model of habitus as a network of dispositions. Additionally, we will often use other terms, like dispositions, operators, schemes, practical sense etc. We also speak of appropriating social reality by perception and judgment, and of shaping social reality by action. One can conceive of these operations as innumerable acts of physical, linguistic, cognitive, and emotional labor that transforms both actors and society simultaneously. While we use these notions according to clear definitions, they serve also for parsing or dissecting the buzzword "habitus" in order to prevent its reification by overuse. This is also true of the models and corresponding concepts of field (dimensions, credibility, organization, nomos, doxa, etc.) and social space (capital, trajectory, position, position taking, style…).

One benefit of epistemological awareness and the reflexive use of models is that a twofold hermeneutical distance is achieved: both between the researchers and their object of study and between the researchers and their own cognitive schemes and interests. Bourdieu regards the self-awareness of researchers concerning their (power-) positions in the scientific field and in society at large as an important instrument of the scientific *Realpolitik* of reason and as a necessary condition for good social science, since "The Personal is Social" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 202ff., 174ff., G: 1996, 238, 212; Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 72ff., G: 1991b, 83). All the relationist scholars mentioned above understand their concepts as relative to their viewpoint (and not as universal), and most are also aware of the social generation of the concepts they use and of the way they use their

concepts.[71] This critical self-awareness should orientate the choice of the theory that frames the research, in the construction of analytical models, and of course in the approximation to alien praxis.

The second dimension of hermeneutical distancing pertains to the epistemological break in relation to the field of research (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 13ff., G: 1991b, 15). For a relational approach, this break is constitutive since the logic of scientific cognition is conceived as guided by perceptional schemes.[72] We construct models, for instance, of the network of dispositions to operationalize habitus. These models serve as systematic schemes of scientific observation and, therefore, foster epistemological awareness in relation to the object of research. If models are conceived as reflexively constructed scientific schemes of observation—and not as the mimesis of things as such—they fulfill an important hermeneutical function in the social sciences. They consciously filter observations and make the filter itself an object of scientific debate.[73] This is especially helpful if one tries to understand the practices of alien cultures or religious practices. In this sense, models are a means of intercultural hermeneutics. They help to understand the relation between actors and the world according to the perception and actions of alien people. In order to realize such research, it is indispensable to have a useful theory and appropriate methods if one is to understand these people's speech and practices within the context of their overall social praxis. We claim that Bourdieu's praxeology is ideally suited to meet these demands.

HabitusAnalysis—the present book

In this introduction, we have gone through various issues crucial to praxeology. We consider Bourdieu's sociological program worthwhile to be developed further. Even if Bourdieu has repeatedly said that his theory is more of a toolkit than anything

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71   Elias states that the creation of His Highness, the independent *homo clausus*, "is deeply rooted in highly individualized societies geared to a great deal of intellectual reflection." (Elias 1978, 121)

72   This insight is analogous the phenomenological and hermeneutical concepts such as "prejudice" (Gadamer) or Bachelard's "epistemological obstacle."

73   We share the point of view of Gadamer (2006) with regard to his analysis of the difficulties of understanding in *Truth and Method*. However, in contrast to Gadamer we think that an appropriate method can help considerably to discover hermeneutical truth. As for my own studies in the eighties, some nine years of validation together with the "objects" of research gives me quite some certainty in this respect.

else,[74] what has emerged in fact from his many empirical studies as well as from his theoretical reflections is a considerably extensive and coherent theory of social praxis. It still is a theory, but not a theory developed for the sake of theoretical conclusiveness and in splendid isolation from empirical research.[75] The origin of Bourdieu's theory in ongoing empirical research renders his concepts and models a little bit fuzzy and capable of further development. Thus, we face a theory simultaneously coherent and open to change.

This openness of Bourdieu's theory gives us the chance to develop further his concepts and models, linking our own work to well-proven concepts, distinctions, and models and taking them as material to be transformed in a closely controlled way when applied to new empirical terrain.[76] We have already elaborated a theory of identity and strategy based upon the concept of habitus and on the concept of field (Schäfer 2003; 2005; Seibert 2010; 2014). In *HabitusAnalysis 3* we will present models and methods for empirical study. They will fill the gap that exists with regard to qualitative methods for the analysis of dispositions and practices; and they will offer new ways for the analysis of fields and social space.

The coherence of praxeological theory facilitates work within an extensive and open theoretical environment that provides the means to interpret very different objects of empirical interest (interviews, texts, practices, distribution of goods, political or military structure, religious competition etc.) in a coherent way, without forcing the researcher to stay at any cost with a certain terminology. This avoids theoretical inflation. Opinions differ among Bourdieu specialists on whether one should or should not use individual concepts of his theory in isolation (as often happens with the concept of capital). We hold that greater benefit can be derived from greater coherence. Therefore, in volume 2, we will give an overview of a wide range of Bourdieu's theory with special attention to how social meaning can be focused on from the perspective of the different strands of praxeology.

To the issues tackled in this first volume of *HabitusAnalysis*, we have already given an introduction so that the presentation of the contents of the present book can be quite brief.

The first part (1) discusses the epistemological premises of Bourdieu's brand of praxeology from the specific perspective of a relational advance over substantialist

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74   Wacquant 1989, 50; similar in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 160, G: 1996, 196.

75   … as it is the case in Luhmann's systems theory, where the flight of theory takes place "above the clouds" and theory is applied to the social world but not developed from the empirical study of society (Luhmann 1995, L). For a thorough critique see Seibert 2004, 141ff.

76   This helps avoiding the dissolution of meaningful concepts and distinctions, which J. L. Martin (2003, 2f.) criticizes as a pernicious trend.

social theory. We will first look at the fieldwork Bourdieu did in philosophy (1.1), as for instance in French epistemology and German Neo-Kantianism. We devote especial attention to the effects of Ernst Cassirer's work on how to conceive social relations, language, and symbolic exchange, and we will refine his approach for sociological theory. Under the heading of "Praxeological relationism" (1.2), we will study in detail how Cassirer's critique of substantialism and his epistemological relationism are intertwined with Bourdieu's brand of sociology, for instance, how it affects central sociological categories such as space, position, habitus, disposition, schemes, and so forth. An excursus (1.3) on the logic of the substantialist reception of Bourdieu's sociology is designed to clarify the reasons why one should be careful with certain strands of the Bourdieu debate.

The second part, on "Subject, object, mind, and matter" (2) is devoted to four crucial concepts of Western thought that any sociology has to deal with in one way or another. These concepts can be seen as coordinates for praxeology, if one takes into account that the relational approach produces different relations between these theoretical concepts than the oppositions commonly proposed. The first chapter (2.1) traces Bourdieu's "third way," beyond the one-sidedness of objectivist and subjectivist theories. After a look at Bourdieu's well-known critique, we demonstrate how the sterile opposition of subject and object can be overcome with reference to Marx and Cassirer, and how it is transformed into the relation between objectified and embodied structures. This leads directly to the problem of "Matter and mind—things and signs" (2.2). Here, we have reached the core issue for an understanding of how an actor's experiences of the objectified social structures relate to the embodied structures, which are partly cognitive or "symbolic." We examine the role of the schemes of perception—a concept that Bourdieu imported from Cassirer into praxeology. This step will make it easy to understand the vocabulary that Bourdieu uses to refer to meaning, his idea of the social construction of meaning, and the idea of meaning as a social operator. This section closes with some remarks about "A twofold reality," constituted by the *relations* between things and signs. Thus, we will have introduced the key terms for the conceptualization of the relation between "Structures and actors" (2.3), which will initially be carried out through an examination of Bourdieu's use of object and subject, but mainly by interpreting this relation as "historical action" in different respects: perception and construction, collective objectification, dispute and misrecognition, positions and dispositions, as well as positions and views. The second part closes by formulating "Desiderata for praxeology" (2.4): What consequences do these epistemological premises have for our *relecture* of Bourdieu's sociology?

The third part is dedicated to the definition of meaning from a praxeological perspective: "Meaning as praxis" (3). As Bourdieu's approach to language is a

matter of some debate, and semantics is our primary interest, we first have to take up some controversial issues. In the first chapter, we explore the scientific field with regard to the questions of "Language, system, and meaning" (3.1). First, we sketch, from the praxeological point of view, some *longue durée* traditions in the conceptualization of language: the Platonic, the rhetorical, and the materialist. Next, we examine Bourdieu's relation to different linguistic theories (Saussure, Fodor etc.). At this point, we can already formulate some crucial features of Bourdieu's concept of language as praxis as well as praxeological parameters for the approach to meaning. However, what is more important than these theoretical parameters is the way Bourdieu did "Fieldwork on meaning" (3.2). In this chapter, we inspect various empirical studies on language (Kabylia, Heidegger, religion…), and will see that practical semantics is at the center of Bourdieu's interest. In order to be on the safe side, we then examine the positions of some of his critics. By then, we will have enough criteria to work out, in a praxeological key, "The meaning of meaning" (3.3). We first discuss some theoretical and epistemological premises for dealing specifically with semantics. We next take a look at social structures as conditions of meaning production, and deal with the concepts of objective and embodied value as frames to describe clearly the theoretical use of "linguistic market" and "linguistic habitus." This will facilitate the distinction between market, fields, and habitus as, respectively, the exchange value of language (tendentially form), use value (tendentially semantics), and knowing how to use language (semantics and form). Finally, social struggles can be understood as a framing condition for the labor of language. Under this condition, the labor of language produces contested values, which means, among other things, semantic content as object and means of social struggle. Language becomes a productive force in society so that the concept of labor of language achieves central importance for a praxeological approach to meaning.

Our conclusions (4) combine the labor of language with central categories of praxeological theory, formulate some criteria for constructing models, and thus prepare for the re-reading of Bourdieu's sociology in the second volume.

An Appendix: Religion and social movements (p. 353), on religion and social movements serves a reflexive and critical purpose. As we developed the method of HabitusAnalysis through the research on religious movements, a brief look at theoretical cornerstones of movement research and the theory of religion from a praxeological perspective renders more transparent the explanatory range and the limits of the HabitusAnalysis. The section on religion serves to profile our approach to this field of praxis. We will criticize certain traits of Bourdieu's concept of religion, give a brief account of the scholarly discussion on the topic, and sketch the outlines of our own praxeological approach to religion. The recourse to social movement theory is especially interesting, since central theoretical issues of praxeology—such

as structure and actors, objectivity and subjectivy, mental frames and practices, as well as identity and strategy—have been discussed in social movement theory largely as controversial issues between different schools while, in praxeological theory, the aspects of praxis are integrated within one consistent theory.

The three volumes together will provide, we hope, a package for people who appreciate a sound basis in praxeology for the empirical study of society and for the further development of praxeological theory.

> "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way." (Marx and Engels 1998, 36f.)

Substances and relations—premises in epistemology

<div style="text-align:right">**1**</div>

We recall the peasant and the military officer we referred to in the preface and in the introduction. Looking at them standing face-to-face, we conceive of them as two entities, each of them a body, a substance, an entity of its own. We take this as our natural impression, an image of reality as it is.

Yet, is it really the objective reality as it is? Definitely not. We perceive the situation according to what we already know beforehand. Who knows what a young tourist, looking for adventure and some dope, perceives of that situation? When I saw the peasant and the officer, I already knew much about the counterinsurgency war. That is, I had knowledge of the objective relations both people were caught within. This knowledge shaped what I saw there, whether I was aware of it or not.

And what is it that each person in the conversation sees? Is it the objective reality of a smiling individual, face-to-face? Is this what counts in such a situation? Of course not. What counts for both persons are the multiple social relations in which each of them is interwoven. The officer is responsible to higher-ranking officers, has to react to guerrilla attacks (real and imagined), thinks of his family at home, and so forth. The same is true for the peasant, a small corn farmer who cannot bring in his crop because the military prohibits access to his land. His children go hungry, his wife is desperate, his pregnant sister-in-law was massacred and his brother is an alcoholic who damages the whole life of the extended family. More than that, both the officer and the peasant depend, more or less, on anonymous decisions from the central government and, in the end, on the ups and downs of the international market. Society is not composed of individual substances; society is relational.

For the military officer and the peasant, this means that they are what they are because of their socialization in different worlds that fiercely contradict each other. The military traditionally derives its raison d'etre from repressing indigenous peasants, and the peasants have experienced this repression for generations. Both actors are in very different and antagonistic positions in society, and both of them know that

and act accordingly. Both are defined by these positions and by their corresponding knowledge, that is, their cognitive dispositions.

Social positions and embodied dispositions (cognitive, affective, and bodily) of actors relate through an intricate, constant interplay. Bourdieu offers theoretical concepts that help to reduce the complexity of such relations between objective structures and incorporated habitus. For religious praxis, the interpretation of the social world and its embodiment in religious attitudes, convictions, and practices is extremely important. The embodiment corresponds to particular semantics. This semantics needs to be understood within the framework of its social genesis and use. While Bourdieu works intensively with meaning in its social dimension (*sens pratique*), he does not offer specifically praxeological tools for the analysis of semantics. Nevertheless his concepts of habitus, practical logic, symbolic systems, and language mark out a route towards a praxeological (not semiological!) approach to meaning (*sense, Sinn*) and signification (*signification*, *Bedeutung*), as well as to a fuller understanding of practical sense. However, Bourdieu's concepts are not self-explanatory. They are best understood by first considering their larger philosophical and hermeneutical background. Therefore, we will pay special attention to those influences on Bourdieu that are of particular importance for our special interest in a qualitative method: scientific objectivation, relationism, language, and questions regarding the analytical approach.

   In the present part on Bourdieu's epistemological premises, we will highlight his relationist approach to social sciences. A general introduction to his fieldwork in philosophy sketches various influences on Bourdieu's work. Then we narrow the focus to praxeological relationism. First, we briefly examine Ernst Cassirer and Claude Levi-Strauss in order to highlight particularities of their epistemological approach to the social sciences. In order to better understand the particularities of the relationist approach, we begin this section with a look at Cassirer's critique of "substantialism". Especially from Cassirer, Bourdieu derives two insights that shall structure our further considerations. First, social actors (and sociologists) can perceive the social world only by means of schemes of perception. Second, for the perception of the social world and for the social processes—for praxis—the *relations* between operating units are more important than the (supposedly inherent) properties of these units. In consequence, we will examine what Bourdieu's relational approach means for his models of fields, and of the social space, as well as for his concepts of disposition, taste, and style. Furthermore, the notion of perceptual schemes will receive a closer look and be considered in the context of scientific observation. Finally, we dedicate a digression to substantialist thinking with regard to social praxis and social theories.

1.1   Fieldwork in philosophy

"Fieldwork in Philosophy" entitles a printed version of a conversation Bourdieu had in 1986 with Axel Honneth, Hermann Kocyba, and Bernd Schwibs about the programmatic traits of his work (Bourdieu 1990a, G: Bourdieu 1992a; and in: Robbins 2000a, 3ff.). It catches one's eye that none of the concepts in the title are originally sociological. *Fieldwork* alludes to Bourdieu's formation and practice as an anthropologist, developing basic theoretical concepts like *habitus*, *(symbolic) capital*, and *strategies* in the context of his field-studies in Algeria (e.g., Bourdieu 1977a; 1977b, G: 2009; 1990b, G: 2008). *Philosophy* alludes to his education, professional practice, and erudition in this discipline. Sociology comes third, so to say.[77]

In Bourdieu's works, and far beyond specialized texts, as for example the book on Heidegger or *Pascalian Meditations* (Bourdieu 1991a, G: 1975a; 2000a, G: 2001a), the readers will constantly find programmatic references to philosophical authors and debates, as well as careful reflections on the epistemic premises of social sciences. Cultural anthropology and the experience of fieldwork in an alien culture pervade Bourdieu's sociology as a constant hermeneutical consciousness of the gap between the actors studied and the researcher, as well as a consciousness of the social construction of any knowledge and even of the anthropologist's reflexivity itself.[78] Philosophy permeates Bourdieu's sociology as a constant hermeneutical awareness of the epistemological premises of scientific terminology as well as of everyday language.

1.1.1   The scientific view

Bourdieu approaches the relation between everyday practices to be analyzed and the observing scientist not in terms of subjectivist hermeneutics (e.g., Gadamer) or anthropological approaches (e.g., action anthropology) but rather by a sociological theory of science.

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77   For an overview of scientific influences on Bourdieu in general see Fröhlich and Rehbein 2009. On Bourdieu's philosophical background see Zenklusen 2010; Robbins 2000a; 2000b. Hepp 2000, from an explicitly German perspective with a special focus on Bourdieu's methodology and on socio-semiotics.

78   For the traditional field of anthropology in foreign cultures see e.g. Bourdieu 1977b, F: 1972, G: 2009; 1977a; for France see Bourdieu et al. 1999, F: 1993, G: 1998; for epistemology in general see Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, G: 1991b.

French epistemology

In order to do so, he draws upon French scientific epistemology, namely *Bachelard and Canguilhem*, but also on Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and others.[79] First, Bourdieu is interested in breaking with "spontaneous sociology" that takes commonsense perception of the social world as a sufficient sociological explanation. Instead, he postulates that an object of scientific research has to be constructed theoretically and methodologically. According to Bourdieu, the epistemological tradition of Bachelard and Canguilhem establishes as the "fundamental scientific act […] the construction of the object; you don't move to the real without a hypothesis, without instruments of construction" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 248, G: 1991b, 271). This approach is consciously different from subjectivist and phenomenological approaches to social reality that tend to settle for accounts from actors as a sufficient social reality.[80]

Such a construction of the scientific object by means of hypotheses, models, and the like, fulfills a fourfold role. It overrides preconceptions of everyday or commonsense knowledge. It renders visible the perceptional schemes and criteria of the scientific view. It thus builds the basis for a self-reflexive examination of scientists and their preconditions. Finally, the *self-reflexive* construction of models helps to avoid the scholastic fallacy of identifying the model of reality with reality itself[81] and thus of superimposing the logic of social science on social praxis—as Bourdieu criticizes for instance in Levi-Strauss (Bourdieu 1990b, 30ff., G: 2008, 57ff.). In consequence, constructing praxeological models of observation for Bourdieu means navigating safely between the Scylla of subjectivist naïveté and the Charybdis of objectivist alienation. This is due to the fact that a praxeological model loses sight of neither the actors nor the social structures within which the actors perceive, judge, act, and thus create the "objectivity of the subjective" (Bourdieu 1990b, 135ff., G: 2008, 246ff.). Therefore, according to Bourdieu, sociologists

> have to carry out a second and more difficult break away from objectivism, by re-introducing, in a second stage, what had to be excluded in order to construct social reality. Sociology has to include a sociology of the *perception* of the social world, that is, a sociology of the construction of the *world-views* which themselves contribute to the construction of this world. But, given the fact that we have constructed social

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79 Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, G: 1991b; especially Bachelard 1984; 1968; Canguilhem 2008.

80 Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 248, G: 1991b, 271. See thorough critiques of subjectivism in: Bourdieu 1977b, G: 2009; 1990b, G: 2008.

81 Bourdieu 2000a, G: 2001a; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 36ff., 217ff., G: 1996, 62ff., 251ff.

space, we know that these points of view, as the word itself suggests, are views taken from a certain point, that is, from a given position within social space. (Bourdieu 1990c, 130, G: 1992b, 143, italics added)[82]

In consequence, the sociology of social *praxis* cannot settle for the construction of the objective conditions of praxis. It is not enough to reconstruct objective and universal structures of meaning. For this reason, Bourdieu fiercely criticizes Levi-Strauss' concept of structures (Bourdieu 1990b, 36ff., G: 2008, 68ff.).

With regard to our initial example, we might say that the officer and the peasant do not merely represent positions in social space and in fields. While they indeed objectively represent positions, they also perceive[83] these positions. Finally, they act according to the relation between position and perception. Thus, praxeology also has to account for the subjective conditions of praxis (the embodied cognitive, affective, and bodily dispositions of the actors). The social world is not just an assembly of relations between objects and objective processes. It is also an assembly of relations between perceptions of these objects and processes. And both the networks of objects and the networks of perceptions interrelate closely with each other.[84]

In a certain sense, Bourdieu's epistemological move, away from phenomenology to objectivistic methods, is dialectic insofar as it comes back to phenomenological interests, but in a completely new way. Leaving behind the subjectivistic traits of his early phenomenological masters (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Schütz), Bourdieu comes back to a description of the "natural attitude" (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 3) of actors as an important element of social reality. Nevertheless, he transforms Schütz's concept. He understands it as a "dialectic of objectification and embodiment" (Bourdieu 1977b, 87ff., G: 2009, 164ff., not identical) between habitus and structures.[85] Within the praxeological framework, this means that embodied

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82 See similar, but pointing to a conservative political misunderstanding of the epistemological "break with preconceptions and presuppositions" (Bourdieu 1999a, 36, G: 1998a, 94).

83 "Perception" in praxeological tone is not reduced to "*conscious* awareness." The concept also includes the implicit, spontaneous awareness operated by the dispositions of the habitus.

84 Bourdieu 2010, 468ff., G: 1982a, 727ff. These somewhat complex relations will be the condition for our dispositional model of the habitus (vol. 2) and the methodological model of the praxeological square (vol. 3).

85 He may also postulate a "science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures (…) and the structured dispositions" (Bourdieu 1977b, 3, similar in G: 2009, 147) or a "science of the dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality, or, more simply, of incorporation and objectification" (Bourdieu 1977b, 72).

objective structures act as schemes of perception. Thus, they actively structure the perception of the world and guide action upon the objective structures of the perceived world. In consequence, the phenomenological interest in subjective world-views is not simply lost in objectivistic translation, but is sublated in praxeology.

German Neo-Kantianism

A second important influence (Bourdieu 1998b, 3ff., G: 2007, 15ff.), with more or less the same tendency, is *Ernst Cassirer*'s neo-Kantian epistemology, based upon a thorough critique of substantialism and a sound theory of relation. In a nutshell, Cassirer challenges the substantialist idea that reality is composed of a hierarchy of substances (things, objects) especially in its late nineteenth-century positivistic interpretation: that is, that these substances (social agents, goods, etc.,) can be perceived by the observer as they really and objectively are. In the vein of Kantian epistemology, Cassirer counters this worldview with an analysis of how scientific knowledge is generated in mathematics and natural sciences: namely, by means of applying existing schemes of perception to the observation of reality as well as through the successive combination and transformation of these schemes. Knowledge is not generated by mirroring reality or by the…

> breaking-up of a sensuous thing into the group of its sensuous properties; but new and specific categories of judgment must be introduced, in order to carry out this analysis. In this judgment, the concrete impression first changes into the physically determinate object. (Cassirer 1953, 149)[86]

Scientific cognition operates by preconstructed categories and by establishing relations. Only these render the object meaningful. This principle does not only govern in science, but also in cognition in general. Not even a simple thing can be understood in terms of an exact correspondence like a mirror image between thing and perception. Human perception *does not mirror* things, actions, persons, experiences, and so forth, in the brain according to what these objects of perception really are. Instead, the process of perception *represents* the objects *as signs* to observers according to how their schemes of perception render the objects. Therefore, in Cassirer, representation does not mean a mirror image of a thing in mind. It rather means to put the single object, as perceived by the senses, into a meaningful series of cognitively stored signs—that is, "schemes of perception." "No matter how

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86   And further: "The sensuous quality of a thing becomes a physical object, when it is transformed into a serial determination. The 'thing' now changes from a sum of properties into a mathematical system of values, which are established with reference to some scale of comparison".

complete our knowledge may be in itself, it never offers us the objects themselves, but only signs of them and their reciprocal relations" (Cassirer 1953, 303).

In Bourdieu's sociology, a very similar structure can be found. Schemes of perception are the condition for both scientific and everyday knowledge. Scientific knowledge has to construct its object by relational models created with reference to the interest of scientists.[87] And embodied schemes of perception structure also the supposedly natural cognition of the everyday social actor observed by the social scientist. This results in a twofold relevance of perceptional schemes: in the ordinary actor's praxis itself, as well as in the scientific praxis of observing this actor and his use of his perceptional schemes. We will come to this when we discuss the dispositions of habitus (vol. 2) and the processes of modeling (vol. 3).

1.1.2 Relations in society and language

Bourdieu himself sees his emphasis on relation as the basic logical and ontological category for the social sciences in the framework of a new paradigm for modern sciences initiated not least by Cassirer. "The relational (rather than more narrowly 'structuralist') mode of thinking is, as Cassirer (1923) demonstrated in *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, the hallmark of modern science."[88]

What does this epistemological decision, pro relation and contra substance, imply? In simple terms (later on we discuss details), in social science this decision allows the understanding of social actors according to the social relations they are in, while a substantialist approach only serves to describe inherent properties. Substantialist scholars create an abstract concept of an actor and isolate the actor from other actors and conditions. While Max Weber is not a staunch substantialist, nevertheless his typological method works in a similar way with properties. For instance, Weber defines the typical priest according to certain properties, mainly his "regular exercise of the cult" with certain norms, rules, places, and associa-

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87 Therefore a self-critical "Realpolitik of reason" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 174ff., G: 1996, 212) is indispensable.

88 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 96f., G: 1996, 126. Cassirer's relationism can be regarded as "naturally fitting" Bachelard's critical view of the concept of substance and his theory of science (Bachelard 1968; Bourdieu 1998b, VII, G: 2007, 7). While Saussure and Levi-Strauss also develop their theories on relationist grounds, Bourdieu assesses them as too "narrowly structuralist." For the impact of Cassirer on Bourdieu see Nairz-Wirth 2009; Bickel 2003. According to our view, this author underestimates the influence of Cassirer's *Substance and Function* on Bourdieu.

tions.[89] On the one hand, the typological method implies a forceful abstraction, isolating just one main property. On the other hand, it implies an ever-increasing number of additional properties in order to define a "priest" in changing cultures and situations, as Bourdieu criticizes.

Instead, a relationist way of defining the concept of priest describes the objective relations a certain group of social actors in a religious field is located in with regard to other groups—that is, the prophets, the sorcerers, and the laity. In other words, while a substantialist approach would describe, for instance, a social class as an ensemble of actors with certain properties in themselves (poverty, prosperity, etc.), a relational approach describes a social class, within a model, as defined by the relations that exist between the position at stake and other positions (such as over, under, ascending, etc., in the model of social space). The properties still are taken into account, but now in relation to the properties of other positions. Only these relations render the properties their social value—that is, their social reality as a property of someone. The priest is a priest not simply because of his participation in a regulated cultic enterprise, but because of the distinction of his praxis from the praxis of a sorcerer or a prophet. In a nutshell, the relational approach, as distinct from a substantialist one, opens the gates for a modern sociology not only for Bourdieu but also for Structural Functionalism, Systems Theory, Pragmatism, and others.

As to explain the difference between substantialism and relationism with regard to empirical research, the discussion about typologies of Pentecostalism may serve as an example. This discussion is particularly interesting since Pentecostal praxis has been rapidly changing throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. From a substantialist point of view, Pentecostals have the property of strongly believing in the Holy Spirit. Then, to Neo-Pentecostals (a visibly different form of religious praxis) are attached additional attributes, such as prosperity preaching or casting out demons during church services. Thus, up to a certain point, concepts are created that can be helpful for communication. However, due to class differences[90] or to historical processes,[91] one can observe Pentecostal praxis largely without any reference to the Holy Spirit. If the definitions of *Pentecostal, Neopentecostal* and the like, are taken as mirror images of reality (that is, in a naively realist way) then it will be difficult, if not impossible, to address the differences and changes implied by social class and historical transformation. Most probably, new types of

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89   Bourdieu 1987, 119f., G: 2011a, 7f.. See Weber 1978, 439ff.

90   See Köhrsen 2013 with an excellent study on the changes of Pentecostal praxis in search of appropriateness among the middle class in Buenos Aires; also Schäfer 1990; 1992.

91   See Schäfer 2009 with regard to historical change in Latin American Pentecostalism.

Pentecostalism will simply be added to the typologies, each type with the pretention to mirror a part of reality. The increasing number of types will trigger the plural *Pentecostalisms* as an attempt to solve the problem of the observed diversity. If each type of Pentecostalism is conceived as a real entity in itself, the plural simply serves to multiply substances. It rather veils the real scientific problem. If the types of Pentecostalism are understood as nothing more than names for particular states of religious praxis (that is, in a nominalist way) at least the realist mistake of substantialism is avoided; the plural simply signals a dazzled perception of a highly complex condition. Nominalists at least know that the types are ideal; in other words, that they are simply scientific means of addressing the empirical manifold. Nevertheless, the definitions stick to properties inherent to the different types. New phenomena, therefore, require new types. A relationist approach, in contrast, also realizes particular kinds of religious behavior and convictions. Based on empirical data, it can indeed state certain continuities and particularities. However, it does not take just one element (for instance, centeredness in the Holy Spirit) as a necessary condition of belonging to a type. From a relationist point of view, one rather reconstructs all the observed elements within many different relations. For instance, a given religious praxis appears to be composed of manifold internal relations, as objectively related to many other observed practices, and to be related to the position of the practitioners at stake within the social structure. Hence, it may result that a given group never refers to the Holy Spirit in its religious praxis but, because of other reasons (historical trajectory, partaking in associations, etc.), it ascribes itself to Pentecostalism and is seen by other groups as Pentecostal. The relationist approach of HabitusAnalysis therefore does not form types in the realist or nominalist sense, but habitus formations. These formations are generated out of a large number of observed elements, more precisely, out of homologous dispositions of different actors. The habitus formations render structures of religious praxis. In other words, they render aggregated and differentiated styles of religious praxis under various possible aspects: the different generative structures of the habitus with the structures' particular central focus (Holy Spirit, rapture of the Church, Christ, wonders, etc.); the agglomeration of different habitus formations in the religious field; or the formations' position in the overall social structure. Habitus formations represent temporary shapes of praxis in a given society or field. They may be taken as real types as long as one keeps in mind that the formations (understood as real types) are reconstructed according to certain scientific schemes of perception, certain social structures, and certain historical circumstances. In other words, substantialist typologies may foster quick communication at the cost of scientific precision, which means a loss of empirical reality. In contrast, a relationist approach will rearrange the positions of a given field continuously according to the dynamics

of praxis and thus always remit the scientific discourse to the social conditions at stake, which means slower communication but a gain in empirical reality.

Bourdieu anchors his sociological relationism in Cassirer and in Marx. With regard to Cassirer, he maintains a critical distance to the philosopher's idealism (for example, when he criticizes the lack of social anchorage of Cassirer's "symbolic forms".[92] However, Cassirer's groundbreaking critique of substantialism and his introduction of a relationist approach into philosophy (Cassirer 1953) are important sources of theoretical inspiration for the basic architecture of Bourdieu's sociology.

Society

The philosophical relationism combines well with Bourdieu's adoption and enhancement of the relational concept of *society* in Marx.

> I could twist Hegel's famous formula and say that *the real is the relational*: what exists in the social world are relations—not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 'independently of individual consciousness and will,' as Marx said. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97, G: 1996, 126)

Bourdieu appreciates Marx as a relational thinker of the social world. A slave, so says Marx in his well-known critique of Proudhon, is a slave because of the social relations he lives in, since "society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand." (Marx 1973, 265) For this reason, a gross collective concept of population as a totality does not suffice for political economy until it is understood as a structured unit, "not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations." (Marx 1973, 100) In the vein of a relational concept of society, structured by domination, Bourdieu fosters relational models for the theoretical construction of the objective social conditions—such as, fields and their internal dynamics as well as the structure of the social space as a composition of mutually external positions.[93] This means that classes are constructed as classes on paper according to the defined interests of the observers.

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92   For instance Bourdieu 2000a, 16, G: 2001a, 27; 1998b, 57, G: 2007, 121 with respect to religion; similar in 1990b, 94, G: 2008, 172.

93   Bourdieu does not only build upon Marx. The relational concept of field also owes much to Kurt Lewin (a student of Cassirer) and Norbert Elias (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97, G: 1996, 126).

Language

Bourdieu also approaches *language and "mental structures"* in a relational way. He withstands the temptation to reify language as a semiotic system[94] independent from speech and refuses to understand human action as determined by objective symbolic structures (Levi-Strauss).[95] This echoes in Bourdieu's critical appreciation for Saussure and Levi-Straus. Insofar as they have reformed linguistics and anthropology in an utterly relationist sense, Bourdieu shows them respect and much of his work on symbolic utterances (such as calendars, houses, or the analogical operations of practical logic)[96] follows structuralist patterns. Nevertheless, insofar as both Saussure and Levi-Strauss dismiss praxis and reify the structures of thought as independent systems, Bourdieu rejects their proposals as too idealistic and objectivistic. While Bourdieu works with the relational concept of homologies between mental and social structures, fostered very much by Levi-Strauss, the decisive difference in his approach is not the structural or relational focus as such, but Bourdieu's insistence on the fact that such homologies are the result of human praxis mediated by (relationally understood) habitus in relation to fields.

Habitus

Eventually, it is the theory of *habitus* that safeguards the subjective dimension of social praxis, and avoids the pitfalls of subjectivist philosophy and sociology.[97] Bourdieu states that relational sociology with regard to actors does not equal the theory of (symbolic) interaction between individuals.[98] Rather, relational sociology refers to both the social relations the actors are molded by and the constitution of the social actor (the subject) as such—an ensemble of cognitive, affective, and bodily dispositions to perceive, judge, and act. Congenially, Wacquant tends to give a

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94 *Langue* as distinct from *langage* and *parole*. See Saussure 1959.

95 "I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact." (Lévi-Strauss 1983, 12)

96 See Bourdieu 1990b, 37ff., G: 2008, 71ff.; and Bourdieu 1977b, 23ff., G: 2009, ca. 154ff. On Structuralism also see Bourdieu 1968, G: 1970; Bourdieu 1990c, in: 1990d, 123ff., G: 1992b, in: 1992c, 135ff.

97 See Bourdieu 1990b, 42ff., 52ff., G: 2008, 79ff., 94ff.; Bourdieu 1977b, 72ff., G: 2009, 164ff.

98 "To describe the process of objectification and orchestration in the language of *interaction* and mutual adjustment is to forget that the interaction itself owes its form to the objective structures which have produced the dispositions of the interacting agents and which allot them their relative positions in the interaction and elsewhere" (Bourdieu 1977b, 81, G: 2009, 179ff.). While Bourdieu focuses much on Schütz and Garfinkel, see also Berger and Luckmann 1966.

relational interpretation to the concept of habitus itself when he sketches details of the concept under the subject heading of "methodological relationism" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 15, 18f., G: 1996, 34ff.). This is an important impulse in relationist thinking for the understanding of "symbolic space" (Bourdieu), embodied "mental schemes" (Bourdieu), and finally the habitus. There is no symbolic space outside the actors' mental schemes and these schemes are understood as embodied social relations. Embodied social relations do not turn into a thing (as habitus could be falsely interpreted). They are embodied as cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions to perceive, to judge, and to act. And these dispositions are constantly active in a vast network of mutual relations. Thus, relationist thinking prevents a reification of habitus in terms of a "theoretical thing," a container concept, or in terms of a simple metaphor for person, individual, or custom, finally relapsing into substance. A relationist concept of the habitus, as the modus operandi between the said dispositions, facilitates a detailed view of the synergy between cognitive, emotional, and bodily operations that process the perceptions, judgments, and actions of actors and generate the actors' strategies and their self-positionings in a given field. A relationist approach to habitus also opens new theoretical perspectives for the concept of identity. Pushing somewhat beyond Bourdieu, the approach allows conceiving of collective and individual identities as particular networks of dispositions. Instead of as a self-enclosed entity, habitus is perceived as a network of dispositions in mutual relations and in relation to multiple experiences (see Schäfer 2005; 2003).

We will interpret and use Bourdieu's concept of habitus in this strongly relationist way. Given the importance of Cassirer's work for our reading of Bourdieu's theory, we come back to Cassirer later on.

1.1.3   Language and other symbolic relations

The relationist approach comes along with a concept of language and, more generally, of *signs and symbols* as relational systems.

Structure

Bourdieu recognizes the merits of structural linguistics as a consequent turn away from substance and towards relation. The essential factor in Saussure's linguistics is "the primacy of relations: '*la langue*', says Saussure, in language very similar to Cassirer's in *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, 'is form and not substance.'"[99]

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99   Stated in the context of a critique of Foucault's "symbolic structuralism," (Bourdieu 1993a, 176, G: 1998c, 57).

Moreover, within structural linguistics and anthropology, namely Saussure and Levi-Strauss, language, signs, and the like, are conceived as systemic—a crucial datum for Bourdieu's work. Albeit "symbolic structuralism à la Levi-Strauss" dismisses the modus operandi of symbolic production. Nevertheless it establishes the relational character of significational systems. "It does have the advantage of seeking to uncover the internal coherence of symbolic systems *qua* systems, that is, one of the major bases of their efficacy" (Bourdieu 1999a, 55, G: 1998a, 119). Notably, Bourdieu criticizes Saussure and Levi-Strauss for idealism and for dismissal of the social conditions of the generation of symbolic systems. But when it comes to the study of practices of signification and (more generally) of practical logic, he follows structuralist modes of thinking—as for example the underlying distinction of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, the specific concept of value, binary series, and the search for structural homologies.[100] In the context of practical logic, it is within this framework that Bourdieu can ascribe an important role to polysemy as a key dynamic operator for practical logic (Bourdieu 1990b, e.g., 86, 245, G: 2008, 157, 429). This is important, since polysemy is a semantic operator that establishes linkages between different areas of signification. It is thus a first step to open up the structuralist systematic of the opus operatum and towards capturing the dynamics of the modus operandi within the use of language and the symbolic exchange itself.

Use

It is precisely the conditions of *generation and use of language and symbols* where Bourdieu's critique of orthodox structuralism anchors.[101] "What characterizes "pure" linguistics is the primacy it accords to the synchronic, structural, or internal perspective over the historical, social, economic, or external determinations of language" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 141, G: 1996, 175). Instead, Bourdieu wants to "reintroduce agents that Levi-Strauss and the structuralists, among others Althusser, tended to abolish" (Bourdieu 1990a, 7, G: 1992a, 28). One aspect of this attempt is that, even in Marxism, language and symbols have only been approached in an intellectualistic manner, as a matter of consciousness instead of as embodied dispositions. The other aspect is the rootedness of the incorporated dispositions in the dynamics of objective social relations of power. These two sociological points of critique are basic and early. Later on, Bourdieu's approach to language and signification undergoes some further changes.

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100   Bourdieu 1990b, 80ff., 200ff., 271ff., G: 2008, 147ff., 352ff., 468ff.
101   Bourdieu 1999a, 54f., G: Bourdieu 1998a, 117f.

Wittgenstein helped Bourdieu to better deal with problems of his own structuralist heritage and to resolve problems like the one of following the rule of the structures of kinship.

> Wittgenstein is probably the philosopher who has helped me most at moments of difficulty. He's a kind of saviour for times of great intellectual distress—as when you have to question such evident things as 'obeying a rule'. Or when you have to describe such simple (and, by the same token, practically ineffable) things as putting a practice into practice. (Bourdieu 1990a, 9, G: 1992a, 28)

The recourse to Wittgenstein opened the way for transforming into strategies of marriage what, in Levi-Strauss, had been structures of kinship. However, Bourdieu did not refer very systematically to Wittgenstein. He only made occasional references, mostly very positive.[102] Gebauer seems to be right when he states that Bourdieu was no scholar of Wittgenstein, but that he thought as the late Wittgenstein.[103] Thinking this way, Bourdieu was able to soften the structuralist heritage in terms of praxis. In a nutshell, Bourdieu's references to Wittgenstein point to a process in which the structuralist heritage of objective (and rigid) structures has been turned more fluid by Wittgenstein's basic and ever present concept of use.[104] Wittgenstein dedicates his *Philosophical Investigations* to a critique of the Augustinian concept of sign as a mirror of objects, countering with a concept of sign as a tool that is used in language-games embedded in forms of life. Thus, the meaning of signs is not constituted by its mirroring of an object but by its use in praxis. This change of view contributes to slight and quite implicit but important modifications of the concepts of sign and meaning as such. If that is so, a gentle Wittgensteinian reading of Bourdieu, with regard to our work on semantics, seems to be quite in line with Bourdieu's own developments.

A third important strand of philosophical influence on Bourdieu's concept of language is ordinary language philosophy, especially *Austin's* theory of speech

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102 See also Bourdieu 2000a, 31, G: 2001a, 44 and other references; Bourdieu 1990b, 10, 18, 25 and others, G: 2008, 7ff.; also in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, G: 1996; 1990d, G: 1992c, and many others. For a brief overview, see Volbers 2009; Gebauer 2005; Bouveresse 1999.

103 Gebauer 2005, 137. However, there is a critical voice from the Wittgensteinian side, which charges Bourdieu (and Giddens) with over-intellectualizing Wittgenstein: Schatzki 1996; 1997.

104 In this context might also Bourdieu's approximation to the American pragmatists be seen, especially to Dewey with whom he states "affinities" especially with regard to the concept of habitus? (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 122, G: 1996, 155) See also Bourdieu 1990c, 137, G: 1992b.

acts.[105] Bourdieu moves towards an approximation to Austin through a strong critique of Saussure and Chomski.[106] For Bourdieu, both theories (that of structure and that of competence) commit the same fundamental mistake of constructing, from concrete situations of speech, language and the competence to utter it as abstract. At least Chomski's concept of competence contemplates generative aspects. Nevertheless, the concept depends on the construct of an abstract, ideal speaker. Bourdieu sums up: "In short […] Chomskyan 'competence' is simply another name for Saussure's *langue*." Both linguists sidestep "the question of the economic and social conditions of the acquisition of the legitimate competence and of the constitution of the market in which this definition of the legitimate and the illegitimate is established and imposed" (Bourdieu 2006, 44, G: 2005, 48). Both concepts, as "all forms of structuralism" establish a "fundamental division between language and its realization in speech," which means according to the relation "between the model and its execution, essence and existence" (Bourdieu 1990b, 32f., G: 2008, 62).

In Bourdieu's view, Austin's theory of performative speech at least contemplates the use of language as one of its most important traits. However, it needs some advancement. The performative character of speech points towards its social use, which cannot be explained sufficiently within the limits of language as such. Performative speech can be seen as "a particular case of the effects of symbolic power" (Bourdieu 2006, 72, G: 2005, 79). And this means that, "Austin's account of performative utterances cannot be restricted to the sphere of linguistics" (Bourdieu 2006, 73, G: 2005, 80). This is due to the fact that "the illocutionary force of expressions cannot be found in the very words," since the "power of words is nothing other than the *delegated power* of the spokesperson" (Bourdieu 2006, 107, G: 2005, 101). Therefore, utterances have to be interpreted by taking into account the institutions, their positions in the relevant fields, and so forth, which produce the performative power of speech—in short, the position of the speakers in the relevant social power relations. At the bottom line, Bourdieu's reception of Austin's theory can be understood as similar, but somewhat more specific to Wittgenstein's notion of use. Again, Bourdieu insists that it is indispensable for a full understanding of language to take its *social* conditions of generation and use into account.

Bourdieu's insistence on the social conditions remains fundamental for a sociological evaluation of language, signs, and symbols. Notwithstanding his intensive discussion of different strands of semiotic and linguistic science, his own approach falls somewhat short when it comes to semantics and the role of language, signs,

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105 Austin 1967; much of Bourdieu's discussion of language in this vein, see in Bourdieu 2006; also Thompson 2006.

106 Saussure 1959; Chomsky 1969; Chomsky and Halle 1968; Chomsky 1967 and others.

and symbols in the social ascription of attributes as well as in the formation of cognitive (and affective) dispositions of habitus.

Missing links

This corresponds to the fact that two possible links to quite similar scientific currents are missing. First, it is surprising that Max Weber's focus on "*Verstehen*" does not play a major role in Bourdieu's approach to language. Explicitly, it is not even present in Bourdieu's writings on religion where he recurs to Weber's description of beliefs in the context of professional positions—for example, that concepts of sin and salvation "seemed remote from all ruling strata."[107] However, implicitly Weber's approach is present in Bourdieu's sociology. According to Weber, the subjective meaning—which is a social fact!—that an actor ascribes to his acts is important in order to understand these acts sociologically. Here are the basics for an actor-centered approach to language, signs, and symbols that does not dismiss the social positions, dispositions, and strategies of the actors.

Still a wider scope is the *hermeneutical tradition*. It was generated in the tradition of the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, two of the philosophers Bourdieu studied in his early period. Especially Gadamer[108] demands that it is necessary to become conscious of hidden preconceptions in order to understand the utterances of others. This thought is not all too alien from Bourdieu's insistence on the "difficult and perhaps interminable work that is necessary to break with preconceptions and presuppositions."[109] The most striking difference is that Gadamer (as Husserl and Heidegger too) contents himself with a mental operation in order to render the preconceptions conscious, while Bourdieu reflects on the social genesis of the preconceptions. However, the typically hermeneutic "break" is quite the same. Instead of critically connecting to the hermeneutical tradition, Bourdieu either shows a very broad concept of "hermeneutics" as a general notion of comprehension or understanding,[110] or he makes critical reference to a "hermeneutic tradition"[111] that is not quite clearly defined. If this tradition was the one that roots in historical hermeneutics

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107 Weber 1978, Vol I, 472; quoted in Bourdieu 1991b, 18, G: 2011b, 59.

108 Gadamer 2006, especially II.4 "Elements of a theory of hermeneutic experience", 267ff.

109 …"that is, with all theses that are never stated as such because they are inscribed in the obviousness of ordinary experience, with the entire substratum of the unthinkable that underlies the most vigilant thinking" (Bourdieu 1999a, 36, G: 1998a, 94).

110 See e.g. in Bourdieu 1990b, 34, 80, 94 as "objectivist hermeneutics", G: 2008, 64, 147, 171f.

111 See e.g. in Bourdieu 1990b, 36f., G: Bourdieu 2008, 70f. with reference to Merleau-Ponty, or Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 141, G: 1996, 175f., as similar to Saussure.

of theology and in Lessing, and the one that develops through Dilthey's historism to Gadamer and furthermore to Ricoeur, then some positive links might have been possible; while, with regard to the philosophical tradition, a critique of its subjectivist stance would have been necessary. As for the theological hermeneutics of the Bible, since the late nineteenth century the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (with members like Bernhard Duhm or Hermann Gunkel) interpreted the scripture radically in its historical context, and since the Seventies, Gerd Theißen (1977) in Heidelberg has worked on a sociological hermeneutics of the Biblical texts. Today, socio-historical hermeneutics is quite common in exegesis. Thus, paradoxically, for sociologists the sociological interpretation of (written) language might be a less well-known terrain than for scholars of other disciplines, namely history and theology. In any case, Bourdieu could have connected more positively to the hermeneutical tradition.

In sum, what we can observe with regard to language in the course of Bourdieu's development is that a French-structuralist concept of sign, signification, and meaning slowly adopts more and more facets of Wittgensteinian and Pragmatist notions, as well as of Austin's theory of speech acts. In terms of language, Bourdieu overcomes structuralist idealism and linguistic reduction to internal operations of language, while he maintains the relational concept of signification by difference. Central for this development is the idea that signs (words, deeds, signposts, clothes, material goods, etc.) are instrumental and exert effects on those who use them and perceive them, according to the positions these actors maintain in society. Very creatively and without a particular philosophical influence, if not a bit of Durkheim, Bourdieu has woven this idea into his theory of the relation between classes and classification as put forth, for example, in *Distinction*. Language, signs, and symbols operate in social relations. Therefore, they are social realities, facts. We will especially consider this tendency of praxeological theory in order to develop our reading of Bourdieu's theory (vol. 2) and our tools of HabitusAnalysis (vol. 3).

1.1.4   Sociological perspectives

Bourdieu's philosophical orientations transform into a sociological program not by simple definitions of concepts or the like, but by the grounding of sociological thought on sound epistemological premises and, in turn, by submitting his philosophical sources to an equally profound sociological, empirically based critique. His neo-Kantian, structuralist, phenomenological, and pragmatic inspirations have all been fruitful for sociology, and all of his teachers have been asked if their theory can stand a sociological test of validity in praxis or if it is too idealistic. Philosophy thus becomes intimately related to social sciences, which Bourdieu develops from

empirical research, but not without constant reference to a wide array of notable social scientists: Marx for social structures of production and reproduction (social space, fields, capital); Durkheim for social and symbolic structures and differentiation (classification, fields); Weber for domination, differentiation, and religion (fields); Weber, Schütz, Mauss, Merleau-Ponty, Elias, Goffman for habitus and practical logic; Mauss for strategies, and many others. We will touch these influences briefly as we proceed to deal with the corresponding sociological issues.

However, Bourdieu integrates all of these theoretical currents into his own proposal of praxeology, adapting them to his own relational point of departure. In order to clearly distinguish features of the relational approach, he tends to strongly emphasize its difference from substantialism. Since this distinction is a highly important undercurrent in Bourdieu's theory and since relationism will be highly important for our approach to HabitusAnalysis we will dedicate a closer look at this distinction, as advocated by Bourdieu.

Bourdieu's work and the way he positions himself in the field of social sciences presuppose a pervasive change in Western sciences—a real turn—at the beginning of the twentieth century: the crisis of representation and its solution through a critique of substantialist epistemology and the establishment of a relational approach to reality.

1.1   Fieldwork in Philosophy

1.1.1   The scientific view

A scientific approach to social reality implies the use of consciously preconstructed models (Bachelard, Canguilhem). These help to navigate safely between an objectivist focus on structures alone and a naively subjectivist reduction to the accounts of actors. Therefore, praxeological models have to take into account both the objective social structures and the subjective perceptions, judgments, and actions of the actors involved.

1.1.2   Relations in society and language

This approach renders more plausible if it is understood as a result of Cassirer's rejection of positivism and substantialism, as developed on the grounds of neo-Kantian epistemology. Perception renders the objects of social reality to the actors only according to the actors' combined schemes of perception—that is, structurally. In consequence, for Bourdieu schemes of perception are relevant for both the social actors and the scientific explanation of their praxis.

Bourdieu relies very much on Ernst Cassirer's relationist approach. He applies it not only to epistemology. Instead of defining social actors mainly by their properties, actors are defined mainly by the positions they maintain in relation to others within a determined space. Bourdieu's concept of social class highlights the relational aspects in Marx and consequently ends up with "classes on paper," defined by the researcher. Language

1.1.3 Language and other symbolic relations

and mental structures are also conceived of as relational. However, both are embodied by actors as dispositions of perception, judgment, and action—in short, as habitus. Therefore, the resulting concept of habitus is thoroughly relational. Our reading of Bourdieu takes that seriously.

Bourdieu criticizes the structuralist approach to language as too idealistic. He does not only counter by postulating that social relations have to be taken into account, but also uses the significational dynamics of polysemic signs in order to attain a more praxis-oriented and generative approach to meaning. Most important is Bourdieu's recourse to Wittgenstein's concept of a sign. Accordingly, a sign acquires its meaning not by mirroring something, but by its use in praxis. Bourdieu deepens this approach to language by taking up Austin's idea of the performative effect of speech. However, he goes one step further by postulating the social relations of power as a necessary condition for generating and understanding linguistic utterances. It nevertheless takes us by surprise that Bourdieu does not enter more deeply into an applied semantics, not even in his references to Max Weber (verstehen) and even less in his negative references to "hermeneutics."

1.1.4 Sociological perspectives

Even if Bourdieu's sociology has deep roots in philosophy, he does not give in to idealism. With reference to various, important sociological schools, he rather confers a strictly sociological drive to the epistemological premises.

1.2   Praxeological relationism

"The real is relational."[112] Bourdieu often repeats this affirmation in many different guises. However, its relevance does not seem to communicate very well.[113] Bourdieu's relational point of view puts him in the tradition, more or less, of structural theorists, such as Marx and Durkheim, Elias, Piaget, Saussure, Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, and particularly of philosophers like Cassirer. This is important if one searches for instruments for the (qualitative) analysis of habitus, compatible with Bourdieu's theory. More than that, according to our understanding, relationism is of much farther-reaching significance for the entire praxeological theory. Without a clear understanding of the relationist approach to social reality, Bourdieu's concepts and models (as for example, the habitus) are easily reified and taken as "theoretical things"; as the essence of …; in short, as fetishes. Moreover, a clear-cut relationist approach to theory and methodology is of great help in order to maintain the rela-

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112 Bourdieu 1998d, 3, G: 1998e, 15; cf., briefly and lucidly, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 15ff., G: 1996, 34ff.

113 See below (1.3) on substantialist misreading.

tion to Bourdieu's sociology, especially when developing methods to tackle objects that Bourdieu himself has not been reflecting upon very much theoretically, such as semantics and a qualitative methodology for the analysis of habitus.

However, it also is true that Bourdieu's harsh rejection of substantialism is not the last word on the issue. In keeping with our remarks in the introduction, we should have in mind that neither Cassirer nor Bourdieu has completely solved the problems they posed and that both carry forth some substantialist heritage in their scientific vocabulary.[114] Nevertheless, the relationist approach to reality is a necessary epistemological condition for Bourdieu's praxeology. Sociologically, his approach boils down, first, to avoiding the reification of (abstract) concepts such as class or population and the like, and rather focusing on the objective relations that sociologists can observe between operational units in society. Second, a relational view of social praxis does not mean an abdication of things, of artifacts, and of physical objects. A relational view means a shift of attention from the simple appearance of things, artifacts, and objects as single entities, and a shift towards the relations they are in, the conditions of existence they respond to, the effects they bear, and so forth. With regard to our Guatemalan scenery, we are no longer looking at the officer as an individual or at the military "as such." We look at the officer and the military *in relation* to the peasant and in relation to the surrounding political system.

It is well known that such a relational logic operates in Bourdieu's models of social space and of fields where, in terms of power, he conceives of positions as both mutually exclusive and mutually defining. Additionally, we will see[115] that a relational logic, inspired by Cassirer, also operates within the concept of habitus and this concept's connections to other key theoretical concepts of models in Bourdieu's praxeology.

In the present chapter, we will first sketch the most important relationist antecedents to Bourdieu's theory and then Bourdieu's relationism with a special focus on the habitus. In both sections, we will exemplify the rather abstract issue by means of graphical models. Diagrams are always ambiguous. On the one hand, they may well clarify; on the other, they convey the risk of oversimplifying. Therefore, we ask the reader to take the diagrams as an invitation to concentrate on relational logic rather than as an attempt at exhaustive explanations.

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114 This is hardly surprising, since the structure of the Indo-German languages invites very much a leap from "substantive to substance," as Bourdieu points out with reference to Wittgenstein (Bourdieu 1990b, 37, G: 2008, 69).

115 See in the present chapter and in volume 2.

1.2.1 Relation and perception

Cassirer develops a relational approach to philosophy and the humanities by means of a thorough examination of the relational logic of mathematics and also through a critique of what he calls the substantialist tradition of Western thought.

In the wake of the twentieth century, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) was confronted with what some call the "crisis of representation" (Sandkühler, Pätzold, and Freudenberger 2003, 18, trans. HWS). With regard to the things to be represented, one can also speak of an ontological crisis. The substance of objects could no longer be taken as an independent guarantee for their stability and their properties. The ontological and epistemological crises were closely related to each other.

Until around the middle of the nineteenth century, it was rather common in continental Europe to think that cognition mirrored nature as it is. In Anglo-Saxon countries this idea lasted even longer.[116] This (tacit) convention was disturbed by Kant's critique of reason (and its aftermath), by the development of hermeneutical thinking in the tradition of Lessing and historicism, and by some Pragmatist impulses.[117] *Representation* could no longer be understood "as an image of the 'external world' which maintains the structure of the latter."[118] This also meant that neither individual things in the world nor ideas could be taken naïvely as substances, the properties of which did not depend on anything else other than the substances themselves.

Cassirer confronts this problem in a profound way. He redirects the perception of reality from the substances to relations and function. He was well acquainted with the works of Kant, Humboldt, and Husserl, as well as with those of recent theorists in "exact" sciences, such as Hertz, Helmholtz, and Einstein. Using tools from these traditions, he answered the question of representation by addressing the ontological reasons for the idea of representation as mirroring (*Abbild*) and by developing a new theory of representation. He started with a criticism of substantialism, developed a relational theory of cognition, and thus opened a path towards an approach to physical and social reality oriented in relation and function. Later on, this approach was pursued in functionalism and structuralism. For Bourdieu, Levi-Strauss' structuralism was an important stopover on the way towards his own praxeology.

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116 See Rorty 1980 on this problem.

117 William James (1974) criticizes "metaphysics" for its verbal magic and postulates a concept of theories as tools for more new work. Cassirer in *Substance and Function* refers to James positively, but only on details, not on the pragmatist approach at large.

118 Sandkühler, Pätzold, and Freudenberger 2003, 18, trans. HWS.

We will first concentrate on substantialism and Cassirer's critique of it (1.2.1.1). Then we will sketch the alternative approach of relationism with reference to Cassirer and Levi-Strauss (1.2.1.2).

1.2.1.1   On substantialism

A remark on substantialism and positivism

Bourdieu often, sweepingly and harshly criticizes substantialism and essentialism. In this short section, we aim at briefly sketching what can be understood by these terms, as well as by the term *positivism*, which Bourdieu uses often in the same breath. The concepts are of considerable weight, and each of them represents long-standing scientific and philosophical traditions. Moreover, they serve as markers for grand modes of thinking, similar to materialism and idealism. In this emblematic use, scholars can employ such terms in order to profile their own positions by what these positions are *not*. In Bourdieu, these terms fulfill such a role to a certain extent—albeit well rooted in Cassirer's critique of Aristotle's substantialism, as we will see later on. Hence, in the following remarks we will approach the concepts in question as broad categories of thought, typical for historical epochs. According to Arthur Lovejoy's way of writing the history of ideas, ideas (such as they are represented by concepts like substantialism) normally do not influence modes of thought in a very precise philosophical manner but by way of a more general orientation. Corresponding concepts may represent simply "more or less unconscious mental habits" (Lovejoy 1936, 7), for instance by using certain images. Still, it seems to me that the concepts of *substantialism*, *essentialism*, and *relationism* rather function as "termed dialectical motives." They may even dominate the thinking of a whole generation as "one or another turn of reasoning, trick of logic, methodological assumption, which if explicit would amount to a large and important and perhaps highly debatable proposition in logic or metaphysics… for example,… the nominalistic motive" (Lovejoy 1936, 10). According to Lovejoy, it is furthermore quite normal that scholars use these motives with a considerable "metaphysical pathos" and employ "sacred words and phrases," emblematic for a "period or a movement" (Lovejoy 1936, 11, 14)—a fact that reminds one immediately of struggles in the academic field as a condition for the advancement and application of theories. In the following notes, we will take a short look at the *motives* of substantialism and positivism. However, we are far from a sound examination of its philosophical profundities but may hopefully shed some light on the background of Bourdieu's arguments.

The problem of substantialism goes back to Plato and Aristotle. The synonymous terms in Greek and Latin debates (*ousía*/*essentia* and *substantia*, or the German

term *Wesen*) refer to "that, by virtue of which something is what it is."[119] The English language does this by various words: essence, substance, nature, character, or quiddity. The problem these notions convey for social science becomes clearest in comparison with the most distant representative of substantialism or essentialism: Plato. The essence of an individual thing (a horse or a man) is the eternal and unchangeable idea of this thing. Plato's accent lies on an external foundation of changing appearances in a higher, ideal reality. The essence of the individual being is determined by an eternal idea. The real reality is the changeless idea, while empirical change lacks this reality. The whole concept aims at postulating firm and persistent foundations underlying a changing fate in the realm of experience. The underlying distinction is persistence versus change.

In turn, the early Aristotle is interested in experience and draws attention to the individual thing or being. The essence of an individual being can be determined by its location in a hierarchy of ever-more general terms: its species, its genus, its class. Each of these hyperonyms is defined via *differentia specifica*, and the order of these specific differences makes up the essence/substance of the individual being who is subsumed under these abstractions. The essence of an individual man is his mortality, rationality, et cetera—the order of proprietary characteristics. Other attributes can be ascribed as *accidens*, attached to the (individual) substance but not necessary (e.g., an attribute such as the color of hair). While Aristotle overcomes the strongly idealistic trait of Plato, his classification by abstraction still presupposes a preceding and independent essence/substance of the individual being.

With the wake of early modernity, one particular concept of substance from the Antique and Scholastic heritage spread particularly wide. According to this tradition, *substance* is defined as "'something independently subsisting for itself' (*per se subsistens*) that underlies its proprieties and states of being (*substat accidentibus*)."[120] In this vein, the term *substantia* becomes identified increasingly with the individual thing/being and with the subject (as for example, in Descartes). From Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* onward, the subject plays the part of the substance. Early modern subjectivism takes the thinking *sub-iectum* as the persistent entity underlying the flux of changing thoughts. This construction is highly prone to confound logical and ontological judgments as well as objective and subjective reality. In linguistic utterances, the thinking individual appears as logical subject and the thoughts as

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119   Mittelstraß 1996, 133 trans. HWS; see also Halfwassen 1998; Arndt; Wald 1998; Trappe 1998; Schantz 1998.

120   „…S. als des ,selbständig für sich Bestehenden' (*per se subsistens*), das seinen Eigenschaften und Zuständen zugrundeliegt (*substat accidentibus*)" (Arndt 1998, 521, trans. HWS).

its predicates. The first confusion arises if the logical subject is taken for an on-tological substance.[121] *Cogito* refers to a logically necessary subject. If this logical necessity is taken as a natural and ontological necessity, the subject is reified into a physically existing and independent entity. Having once arrived at this construc-tion, it is only a small step to absorb objective *substantiae* into the subject. While in ancient Greece—particularly in Plato—the *ousía* (the *hypo-keimenon*, essence, *sub-stancia*) was conceived of as objective and situated out there in the heaven of ideas, since early modern subjectivism the idea of an underlying substance can be identified with the *sub-iectum*. It becomes subjective and reducible to the indi-vidual actor: the modern, self-conscious, and self-realizing subject. That is, along with the overall changes in the (early) modern worldview, the concept becomes consistently trivialized. One of the problems that arises with the modern nightfall of transcendence is that the predicates of substance are no longer identified with transcendent ideas. Instead, now these predicates (independent subsistence, ahis-torical persistence, inherent properties, etc.) may be ascribed to historical actors, such as to the modern individual "subject," to *Il Principe*, to the state, to a social class, or to single objects of scientific observation. Substance becomes increasingly identified with individual objects. This trend continues under different guises and breaks forth strongly in French existentialism, especially in Sartre[122] and later in postmodernist subjectivism. Substance turns subjective.

A second issue that Bourdieu critically refers to is that of "positivism." More or less when early modern subjectivism emerges, empiricism installs individual objects as its key entities of scientific interest. According to Francis Bacon (and similarly, later in Comte's positivism), the observation of individual objects is believed to enable inductive conclusions about causal determinations and natural laws. Substance multiplies into substances.

Now the question is how to obtain knowledge of abstract laws, general con-cepts—in short, knowledge of the essence of empirical objects. Plato and, later on, the realism of universals in medieval scholasticism maintained that the *intellectus* was capable of recognizing the essence of beings. This belief was increasingly sub-stituted, first by nominalism and then by an empiricist concentration on "data." However, what remained intact was the old idea that the mind simply "mirrors"

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121 Bourdieu (1990b, 37, G: 2008, 69) refers to precisely this confusion when he reminds of Wittgenstein's observation that the confusion of substantialism consists in leaping from substantive to substance.

122 Sartre explicitly recurs to Descartes' cogito in order to design the existentialist concept of a human being that finds its reason for existence exclusively in their works (Sartre 2007).

the objects of sensual perception.[123] For an empiricist approach, the facts of nature are objects that the human mind can recognize objectively, provided that some delusions (*idola*, Francis Bacon) are removed. The human mind mirrors positive data objectively and reliably, thus leaving theology and metaphysics behind in favor of positive science (Comte). Hence, the single being (in other words, a secularized substance) becomes the object of direct, undistorted perception and knowledge. In the long run, for an explanation of society this means that objective hard facts such as statistical data are taken as objective knowledge and override any other kind of source, such as interpretative or subjective sources.[124]

If one envisions both developments together, it becomes plausible why Bourdieu often mentions contemporary substantialism in the same breath with positivism. This said, one should consider that just as the notions of substantialism and positivism in present scientific and political debates are often used as "categories of imputation and defamation"—so too is "materialism" (Przybylski 1989, 1121).

Quite probably, the key problem in this historical development is the mixing up of what Plato's substantialism wanted precisely to keep apart: time and eternity, temporal becoming and timeless being, historical change and persistent lawfulness. In other words, as their eternal, transcendent horizon vanishes, people have to come to grips with their historicity; they can hardly maintain eternal truths. Without that horizon of eternity, essentialism and substantialism incur the risk of becoming trivial. If they only serve (as Bourdieu notes for some sociological discourses) to ascribe nonhistorical properties to historical entities or to treat abstract concepts as if these were historical actors, then the concepts lose their usefulness for thoughtfully distinguishing between historical change and persistent properties of beings, between objects of experience and abstract ideas.

However, modernity brought not only a trivialization of the substantialist case. It also generated new "dialectical motives" (Lovejoy). Locke, for instance, conceives of substance as a complex idea that condenses various simple ones. A step further, Hume substitutes substance with a bundle of properties that, together, make up an object. However, most important for Bourdieu's approach is Kant's treatment of the

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123 For a history and a sound critique see Rorty 1980.

124 See Introduction in Adorno 1976, 1ff.; and Sociology as Empirical Research, in: ibid., 68ff. Adorno criticizes positivism and scientific objectivism, and advances a dialectical approach to objective and subjective data not all too distant from Bourdieu's praxeology. "Empirical social research cannot evade the fact that all the given factors investigated, the subjective no less than the objective relations, are mediated through society." Against fallacies provoked by a too close immediacy of the data, sociology has to protect itself by "refinement of the method" and not least "motivational analyses" (Adorno 1976, 84ff.).

issue. Substance is an *a priori* category of human thinking. As a category of relation that generates objective knowledge, it conveys persistence, and thus turns out to be a condition for recognizing change (Kant 1998, 342f.). In other words, Plato's ontological problem (persistence versus change) is transformed into epistemology. In this vein, Cassirer confronts Aristotle's elaborated version of substantialism in a detailed analysis to which Bourdieu owes much.[125]

Another philosopher Bourdieu refers to, in order to advance the new motive for social science, is Wittgenstein. His ordinary language philosophy operates as an explicit critique of the essentialist concept of signs in Augustine. He transforms the ontological "urge to understand the basis, or essence" of phenomena into an interest in the "'possibilities' of phenomena"—that is, into an investigation of "the kind of statement that we make about phenomena" (Wittgenstein 2004, §§ 89f.), in other words, language. "*Essence* is expressed by grammar" (Wittgenstein 2004, § 371). And grammar is a part of "language-games" that are embedded in "life-forms," social *relations* mediated by the *use* of language. In short, relation comes up as the new dialectical motive of an epoch.

While all these modern alternatives to substantialism focus on the use of language, another critical approach to problems related to substantialism starts from an analysis of capitalist production. Marx—and later on Lukács and the Frankfurt School—analyses "The fetishism of the commodity and its secrets" (Marx 1992, 163ff.). The process of reification of human labor creates ever-more abstract, seemingly substantial units that function as fetishes: such as commodity, money, and finally capital (the completely abstract relation between money and money, M–M, in interest-bearing capital). As the origin of commodities, money, and capital in human labor is veiled by multiple ideological transformations and finally passes into oblivion, the commodity (as well as money and capital) "reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things."[126] Thus, commodity is treated as a natural value of commodity in itself—a transformation visible for instance in the symbolic force (and quite often violence)[127] exerted by labels and discussed in a host of literature on branding.

Bourdieu considers both critiques of substantialism and its consequences (the language-oriented and the production-oriented) for the design of his praxeological

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125   We will go into the details of Cassirer's approach later in this chapter.

126   Marx 1992, 164f. On interest-bearing capital see Marx 1967a, chap. 24. "The relations of capital assume their most externalised and most fetish-like form in interest-bearing capital. We have here M–M', money creating more money."

127   On symbolic violence see volume 2.

sociology. At this point, we can boil down the problem to some issues that recur in Bourdieu's writings. However, we want to prevent a possible misunderstanding right from the start. Bourdieu has no problem with physical reality in society and with hard facts. Hence, his proposal for abandoning substantialism is not compatible with postmodern idealism, which loses sight of physical reality over the discussion of perception and discourse.[128] Bourdieu does not escape from the struggle with substantialism into an imaginary universe of pure signs and discourse. Instead, he approaches society in all its aspects (symbolic and physical) by means of analyzing its operating relations.

In a nutshell, Bourdieu's key criticisms against "substantialism" and "positivism" seem to address primarily two problems: The first is the risk of reification as a consequence of treating objects and concepts as a-relational objects. The second is the epistemological problem of the mental representation of empirical objects, which is posed differently, on the one hand, for social actors in their praxis and, on the other, for the observing sociologists.

For instance, Bourdieu criticizes reification with regard to "the individual as *ens realissimum* of spontaneous social science" (Bourdieu 1968, 690, G: 1970, 19) or to collectivities that are constructed as if they could act deliberately: "the bourgeoisie thinks." (Bourdieu 1990b, 37, G: 2008, 71) That is, abstract concepts are treated as entities on their own with inherent properties such as fixed preferences or power. While reified concepts are easy to use, however the sociological price for reification is high: One loses sight of the fact that power, preferences, and the like, are not naturally inherent to actors but are generated by the social relations the actors are part of (Wacquant 1992, 15, G: 1996, 34f.). From the point of view of relationist sociology, properties have their history and social origin. They are recognizable and effective only in a network of social relations. Bourdieu reacts to substantialism and reification with Cassirer's conceptual relationism as well as with Marx's relationism of production and labor.

The mental representations of the social world are relevant in two respects:

Regarding the study of social actors, the following problem arises through a substantialist approach. Different aspects of praxis are conceived of as independent units of inquiry rather than focusing on the relation between them. A "physicalist vision of the social world" concentrates on "physical force" whereas a "semiological vision" concentrates only on "meaning" (Bourdieu 1999a, 52, G: 1998a, 116). This veils precisely the real "source of historical action": the "relation between two

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128 See for instance Schmidt 1992a, particularly the essay Schmidt 1992b, 7ff. For provocative critique of "fashionable nonsense" from the *haute couture* of pseudo-scientific discourse production see Sokal and Bricmont 1998.

states of the social," that is, between "the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and the history incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system of enduring dispositions which I call habitus" (Bourdieu 1990e, 190, G: 1985a, 69). According to Bourdieu's understanding, the *relation* between habitus/practical sense and fields/social space has to be studied in order to understand praxis.

With regard to scientific observation, a (bluntly) positivistic concept of the social sciences is supposed to claim "immediate knowledge" of the social objects, eventually conceived of as single substances (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 13ff., G: 1991b, 15ff.). There is an influence of "essentialist philosophy" for instance in "naive uses of criteria of analysis such as sex, age, race, or intellectual capacities"—taking them as single properties without regard to their conditions of generation and use (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 19, G: 1991b, 22). All of this is caused by the illusion of "spontaneous sociology:" the illusion that social reality is transparent to observation (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 15, 20, G: 1991b, 17f., 24), in other words, that mind mirrors nature. Bourdieu counters this motive with a clear option for carefully crafted and hermeneutically reflexive models that serve as theoretically built schemes of perception.

This is where Bourdieu most closely links up with Cassirer's epistemological critique of substantialism.

Critique of substantialism—Cassirer

Cassirer's *critique of substantialism* in *Substance and Function*[129] digs deeply, insofar as the philosopher sets out with an examination of the ontological premises and logical procedures of how to form concepts. His critique refers to the most common reading of Aristotle in European history, which rests on the doctrine that "thinking and being are one"[130] and on the common preference of the category of *substance* over that of *relation*. There are of course other uses of Aristotle's logic than that of the mainstream. Nevertheless, the mainstream has the strongest influence on (social) science. Therefore, Cassirer addresses it, rejecting primarily the following features: Substantialism postulates the premise of an ontological correspondence between the order of things (in themselves) and the order of ideas. Accordingly, it conceives logic as a mirror of ontology, and the perceptions and ideas as a mir-

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129 Cassirer 1953, mainly the first chapter, but permeating the whole book. In the present methodological book we can sketch the argument only very briefly. However, we will illustrate Cassirer's argument and the structuralist as well as praxeological procedures with some examples.

130 …which as such rests on a most probably wrong interpretation of Parmenides. See Schäfer 2004a.

ror image of the individual things.[131] It posits a hierarchical order of things and concepts, with substance (or essence, *ousía*) at its top. It advocates the ontological idea that substance (or essence) unfolds in *genera* and species, and combines this notion with a logical complement: the one that concepts (and thus the highest truths about individual beings) are found by abstraction from the concrete and by building generic notions. Finally, substantialism focuses on individual things (*substantiae*) and their properties (*accidentiae*). Substantialism is well pictured through the pyramid of beings (known as *arbor porphyriana*). This pyramid can be conceived of as conveying a logical and an ontological aspect. Thus, on the logical side of the pyramid the scientist performs a process of abstraction: by subtracting more and more properties from the observed object, he aims to find the "essence" of the individual thing. In other words, he impoverishes the empirically rich object of observation by means of a process of reduction to its *essence*. On the ontological side of the pyramid, the scientist assumes that the "the real substance successively unfolds itself in its special forms of being" (Cassirer 1953, 7). Hence, *genera* and individual beings are determined by the substance (their essence); they empirically turn out to be what their essence presupposes them to be. While the logical formation of concepts operates by reduction of content, on the ontological side, this formation is complemented by causal determination of the single object by its essence. The "higher" the position of a concept in the pyramid, the more abstract it becomes. According to this method, one could say that the "essential truth" of a concept increases as it becomes less connected to the empirical data it is associated with. For Cassirer this means that the concept becomes increasingly meaningless.

We can exemplify Cassirer's diagnosis with a brief look at the *arbor porphyriana,* one of the most influential models following Aristotle. According to the order of cognition (*ratio cognoscendi*), the individual cases of Socrates and Plato at the bottom are reduced to what they essentially are by subtracting mortality, reason, senses, and the like, until finally naming the cases as substance. After this logical operation, what these individuals essentially are can be determined by the ontological operation in the inverse direction. According to the order of being (*ratio essendi*), to the substance are added qualities (*differentiae specificae*) such as corporeal, animate, sensible, rational, and mortal' in order to determinate what the individuals essentially are. The model is based on the idea that being and cognition mirror each other. On this ground, the model can tell what Plato and Socrates essentially are by combining inversely two operations: the cognitive operation of winning (by reduction) abstract concepts of individual cases and the ontological

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131 In Plato it is definitely the other way around: the allegory of the cave tells us that ideas are real and things are just shadows (Plato 1966, 123–125).

operation of giving a foundational explication (by determination) of the essence of the individual's being. This is what it means to say that a concept denotes the essence of a case. For sociologists it may be important that Cassirer's critique points to the fact that this approach makes general affirmations about single empirical objects (Socrates, Plato) by systematically omitting their empirical existence and, instead, recurring to logical and ontological abstraction.

Fig. 1   Arbor porphyriana

1.2.1.2   On relationism

For a relationist approach to the humanities, Cassirer is crucial. Among others, his works strongly influenced French structuralism.

Representation and relation—Cassirer

In *Substance and Function,* Cassirer applies his relational philosophy to the problem of the cognitive *representation* of reality and explains it thereby. He sets out with a critique of the metaphysical idea that "the 'presentation' (*Vorstellung*) refers to the

object, which stands behind it."[132] Representation, for Cassirer, is not reflection. So, how do we have knowledge of such an object in itself other than by an act of perception, which represents the thing? While Cassirer maintains a classical definition of representation as "the representation of one content in and through another,"[133] nevertheless his relational approach changes the use of the concept. In brief, Cassirer conceives of representation as the "embedding of a single and particular phenomenon, eventually a sign, in a complex relationship of meaning." (Plümacher 2003b, 175, trans. HWS) The new meaning of representation derives from the logic of series.

> It is now recognized that each particular phase of experience has a 'representative' character, in so far as it refers to another and finally leads by progress according to rule to the totality of experience. But this reference beyond concerns only the transition from one particular serial member to the totality, to which it belongs, and to the universal rule governing this totality. […] It places the individual in the system. […] Hence if we understand 'representation' as the expression of an ideal rule, which connects the present, given particular with the whole, and combines the two in an intellectual synthesis, then we have in 'representation' no mere subsequent determination, but a constitutive condition of all experience. […] The particular element, which serves as a sign, is indeed not materially similar to the totality that is signified, for the relations constituting the totality cannot be fully expressed and 'copied' by any particular formation, but a thoroughgoing logical community subsists between them, in so far as both belong in principle to the same system of explanation. (Cassirer 1953, 284f.)

Thus, the particular experience acquires meaning only via a constructive act of perception, which understands the experience according to the logic of a structure already present in the mind, the logic of mental schemes, so to say.

Cassirer responds to the crisis of the concept of representation in the philosophy of the late nineteenth century, which also triggered other, similar answers with concepts such as interpretant, theoretical frame, language-game, conceptual scheme (Sandkühler et al. 2003, 21). The common denominator of all these theoretical attempts to counter the crisis of representation is their proposal to provide "a third [unit (*ein Drittes*)] which mediates between cognition and reality and aims at the

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132 Cassirer 1953, 282. See also: "If one accepts the *reproduction theory* (*Abbildtheorie*) […] this way of putting the question merely embodies the old fallacy of hypostatizing the fundamental categories of thought and language" (Cassirer 1968, 268). We would like to mention here that we take r*eproduction* as something quite different from a mirror-image (*Abbild*) Cassirer refers to. Mirroring is precisely *not* production; it is reflection.

133 Cassirer 1968, 105. Cf. for the following outline Sandkühler et al. 2003; Pätzold 2003; Sandkühler 2003a; Plümacher 2003a.

dissolution of dualistic subject-object assumptions." (Sandkühler et al. 2003, 21, trans. HWS) Such "third units" are conceived of as cognitive "frames" (*Rahmen*, Sandkühler) that structure the perception of reality. For Cassirer, the "symbolic form" functions as such a frame.

When Cassirer states that the representative character of each particular content of experience consists in the relation that this "particular serial member [has, HWS] to the totality, to which it belongs, and to the universal rule governing this totality" (Cassirer 1953, 284), he establishes a *double relationality*. On the one hand, the individual content (a sign, a symbol, an impression, an image, a single experience, etc.) acquires its meaning by its position in a structure of other contents of the same class. On the other hand, it is by this connection that the individual content represents the whole structure; content stands for structure, invokes it, makes it present in experience, and so forth. This double aspect of representation depends on the fact that the classes of contents, the "series," are already more or less established. This is the case with the perceptional schemes constructed theoretically or by experience (and not as a transcendental a priori), whether in a quite abstract way in mathematics and natural science or with reference to everyday cognition in psychology. Thus, perception is laden by theory (See Cassirer 1953, 326ff.; Plümacher 2003a, 85ff.) or by schemes related to everyday life.

In consequence, perception, according to Cassirer, cannot be separated from *judgment*. Perception is not simply passive (as naïve positivism would have it). On the contrary[134]—judgment, in the very process of perception, is the act "by which a particular content is distinguished as such and at the same time subordinated systematically to a manifold."[135] Hence, there is no perception of any particular content of experience that will not be given a meaning by putting it in relation to a specific general or universal by means of previously present mental structures. Cassirer condenses the result of these considerations in the formula of "symbolic pregnance." This means "the way in which a perception as a sensory experience contains at the same time a certain nonintuitive meaning which it immediately and concretely represents."[136]

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134 "The fact that there is no content of consciousness, which is not shaped and arranged in some manner according to certain relations proves that the process of perception is not to be separated from that of judgment. It is by elementary acts of judgment, that the particular content is grasped as a member of a certain order and is thereby first fixed in itself" (Cassirer 1953, 341).

135 Cassirer 1953, 341. This synergy of perception and judgment will be an important trait of our theoretical and methodological modeling of the habitus in volumes 2 and 3.

136 Cassirer 1957, 202; see for more detail Plümacher 2003a, 96f.

While we have understood much of Bourdieu's relational approach by recurring to Cassirer, notwithstanding we have to highlight (with Bourdieu) an important *limitation* of Cassirer's approach. Whereas the neo-Kantian concept of perception renders very usefully for sociology, Cassirer's philosophical idealism falls short. From the perspective of a "*sociology* of symbolic forms" (Bourdieu), meaning cannot be generated by symbolic forms or a symbolic system alone; it always needs the context of praxis to be constructed. It is precisely to Bourdieu's merit, that he has translated Cassirer into sociology by interpreting the mental structures as socially generated and as socially in use: as dispositions of habitus and operators of practical logic. As such, the mental structures are constantly practiced in the interminable dynamics between the habitus and the fields of praxis.

Relations and series—Cassirer

In an interview with Johan Heilbron and Benjo Maso in 1983, Bourdieu emphasizes the important role Cassirer has for social sciences. According to Bourdieu, Cassirer in various works describes

> the genesis of the new way of thinking, of the new concepts that are brought into play by modern mathematics or physics, he completely refutes the 'positivist' view by showing that the most highly developed sciences were only able to come into being, at a very recent date, by treating relationships between entities as more important than entities themselves. (Bourdieu 1990f, 40, G: 1992d, 57)

For the relationist approach, *Substance and Function*[137] is fundamental. Therefore, we will take a closer look at this work. Cassirer sets out to criticize the metaphysical (substantialist) tradition for "transforming what is logically correlative into an opposition of things," (271) thus separating thought and being as well as subject and object in terms of distinct and disconnected ontological objects.[138] Instead, Cassirer aims to overcome this idea of reality by a relationist one. What does this mean for the formation of scientific knowledge?

Right in the first chapter of *Substance and Function* alongside his critique of substantialist theory, Cassirer arrives at important conclusions about the relational use of concepts. Later, he goes into detail regarding the notion of thing and of relation in mathematics, geometry, and the natural sciences in general, as well as regarding the implications of relationism for the concept of reality. With some excursions to later parts, we resume the argument of the first chapter as follows.

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137 The quotations in this section marked with a number in parenthesis are taken from this work (Cassirer 1953).

138 See in more detail below, 2.4.

As distinct from the substantialist procedures of abstraction and reduction of sensual objects, Cassirer states that from the relationist viewpoint, concepts are formed by means of constructing *series*. A series establishes relations between objects, which are ordered according to a certain principle. For Cassirer,

> all construction of concepts is connected with some definite form of construction of series. We say that a sensuous manifold is conceptually apprehended and ordered, when its members do not stand next to one another without relation but proceed from a definite beginning, according to a fundamental generating relation, in necessary sequence. (15)

It is important to note that the substantialist method does not take into account "the wealth of possible principles of logical order" (16) but is limited to similarity as its operational principle. In contrast, relational logic can arrange the objects of observation according to very different principles of organization. By no means is it limited to difference (as some postmodern authors might suggest). The classic relational approach offers much more variety. Researchers are free to define the prevailing order of the arrangement corresponding to their research interests and, thus, to their schemes of perception and evaluation under the sole condition

> that the guiding point of view itself is maintained unaltered in its qualitative peculiarity. Thus side by side with series of similars in whose individual members a common element uniformly recurs, we may place series in which between each member and the succeeding member there prevails a certain degree of difference. Thus we can conceive members of series ordered according to equality or inequality, number and magnitude, spatial and temporal relations, or causal dependence. (16)

With regard to the subsequent application of relational thought in structuralism and semantics (where binary relations tend to prevail) it is worthwhile to note that Cassirer assumes many different possibilities for organizing a series.[139] The scientific rigor resides in the "relation of necessity" by which the elements of a series are organized and by which the corresponding concept of the series arises. It is important to note that the concept of a series is not found in the mere similarity of elements but in their relations. It is not as if "the work of thought were limited to selecting from a series of perceptions αα, αβ, αγ … the common element α" (16 f.) and to describing the element according to its properties. The relationist approach treats

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139 We will come back to this observation when we construct our network model of the praxeological square (vol. 3), since the analysis of everyday language can operate with its semantics, provided that the relations which organize the structures are properly defined and consequently treated.

the element as an exponent of the one common law of functioning that governs the relation between all the elements of the series.

> The connection of the members [of a series] is in every case produced by some general *law of arrangement* through which a thoroughgoing rule of succession is established. That which binds the elements of the series a, b, c,… together is not itself a new element, that was factually blended with them, but it is the *rule of progression*, which remains the same, no matter in which member it is represented. (17, italics added)

For scientific observation, the elements of the series a, b, c,… receive their meaning from their position among other elements, which are related to one another by a specific logic. This law is not an element of the series itself. It can only be perceived by analyzing the relation that prevails between the elements that constitute the series. Only the environment an element is in reveals the meaning of the element.[140]

For the generation of scientific concepts, the relational procedure implies that it is not possible to determine such a thing as an essence of an individual element or a single case; and it is even less possible to condense such an essence in a word.

> The ideal of a *scientific concept* here appears in opposition to the schematic general presentation which is expressed by a mere word. The genuine concept does not disregard the peculiarities and particularities, which it holds under it, but seeks to show the necessity of the occurrence and connection of just these particularities. What it gives is a universal rule for the connection of the particulars themselves. (19 f.)

While the essence in substantialism is determined by abstraction from individual cases, the formulation of a rule of connection is only possible by considering the individual cases and by maintaining their visibility. They are terms in structures, elements of series, or steps in ordered processes. The rule that governs such relations can only be determined by means of any individual element and by the combination of all the individual elements of a given objet of perception. It cannot be found by dismissing the individual element or case. "The individual case is […] retained as a perfectly determinate step in a general process of change." (20)

At this point, we would like to exemplify this approach by trying to interpret Cassirer (see Fig. 2, p. 104). We take the individual case of the number *4*. In order to develop a concept of the meaning of this number, we do not try to abstract it from its concreteness; we do not begin reasoning, for example, about its "numberness." Instead, we strengthen its concreteness by looking at the present context we find the number used in. Such a context could be the series 1, which is linear and increas-

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140 In view of our network model of the habitus (vol. 2 and 3), one could also say that only its *use* within a structured context reveals the meaning.

ing: *1, 2, 3, 4, 5,…* It could alternatively be the series 2, linear and decreasing: *5.0, 4.5, 4.0,…* Or it could be an exponentially increasing series: *2, 4, 8, 16,…* In any of these cases, the meaning of the number *4* is determined by the rule of progression of the series, the law of arrangement in which we encounter the number. A simple commutative test shows what this means. Instead of the number *4*, please imagine the case of your actual monthly income and its future projection, and then decide what series you would like to put it in.

		Individual case		Principle of the series
Series 1:	1, 2, 3,	4,	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,…	Linear, increasing
Series 2:	5.5, 5.0, 4.5,	4,	3.5, 3.0, 2.5, 2.0, 1.5,…	Linear, decreasing
Series 3:	2,	4,	8, 16, 32, 64, 128,…	Exponential, increasing
Series X:	?, ?,	Income, July 2014	?, ?, ?, ?, ?,…	*…you name it.*

Fig. 2   Cassirer: mathematical series

Cassirer also discusses the difference between substantialist and relational thinking with regard to the understanding of *"the universal" versus "the particular."* According to Cassirer, from a substantialist point of view the universal and the particular are categorically different, separated by an "insuperable gap" (224). From a relational point of view, the particular and the universal can be rather understood as two different aspects of the relatedness of things since,

> the universal itself has no other meaning and purpose than to represent and to render possible the connection and order of the particular itself. If we regard the particular as a serial member and the universal as a serial principle, it is at once clear that the two moments, without going over into each other and in any way being confused, still refer throughout in their function to each other. It is not evident that any concrete content must lose its particularity and intuitive character as soon as it is placed with other similar contents in various serial connections, and is in so far 'conceptually' shaped. Rather the opposite is the case; the further this shaping proceeds, and the more systems of relations the particular enters into, the more clearly its peculiar character is revealed. (224)

"The universal" is universal inasmuch as it explains the connectedness of "the particular." Applied to our interest, we can summarize as follows: The particular meaning of an empirical content (a ritual act, a sentence, or any other practice) can be understood only with relation to the universal principle that governs the relations the empirical content is used in (a dawn ceremony, a missionary campaign, etc.). Furthermore, the content acquires more determinateness *and* universality, the more contexts it is used in (oppressed indigenous culture, transnational strategies of symbolic domination, etc.).

Finally, Cassirer's relational approach to reality also has consequences for the concepts of scientific and ordinary *perception*. In short, perception is always prestructured by logical schemes. Cassirer quotes as an example the "category of the thing and its attributes" and the "whole and its parts," subdivided even into "sub-parts,"[141] in order to criticize the substantialists' supposition behind such categories—that these concepts describe the ontological character of given objects. Cassirer counters:

> In truth, however, the 'given' is not thereby merely described, but is judged and shaped according to a certain conceptual contrast. But as soon as this is recognized it must become evident that we stand here before a mere beginning that points beyond itself. The categorical acts (*Akte*), which we characterize by the concepts of the whole and its parts, and of the thing and its attributes, are not isolated but belong to a system of logical categories, which moreover they by no means exhaust. (17 f.)

Such logical categories prestructure the perception of reality so that there is no naïve mirroring of given objects in cognition but a process of logically structuring their perception, by placing the objects in series. This process of structuring is especially evident in mathematical concepts as they rest "on pure *construction*" (116) and with the *a priori* of "ultimate logical invariants" in experiential cognition—a relation not alien to convinced empiricists.[142] Thus, cognition is prestructured by logical schemes that forestall any direct, immediate mirroring of (social) reality in the mind.

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141 See also a certain substantialist tendency when talking about "fields and sub-fields," sometimes in Bourdieu himself, more often in secondary literature. For a closer look see below on "substantializing Bourdieu" (3.3.4).

142 "Only those ultimate logical invariants can be called a priori, which lie at the basis of any determination of a connection according to natural law. A cognition is called a priori not in any sense as if it were prior to experience, but because and in so far as it is contained as a necessary premise in every valid judgment concerning facts. If we analyse such a judgment, we find, along with the immediate contents of sensuous data and elements differing from case to case, something permanent; we find, as it were, a system of 'arguments,' of which the assertion involved represents an appropriate

A subsequent problem is the relation between the prestructured scientific perception and the *thing-like reality*. How can things be perceived appropriately if the perception is prestructured? Seemingly, a dilemma arises. According to Cassirer, even this dilemma can only be resolved by the relational approach.

> Here, in fact, no reconciliation is possible; the exactitude and perfect rational intelligibility of scientific connections are only purchased with a loss of immediate thing-like reality. This reciprocal relation between reality and the concepts of science, however, furnishes the real solution of the problem. It is only owing to the fact that science abandons the attempt to give a direct, sensuous copy of reality, that science is able to represent this reality as a necessary connection of grounds and consequents. It is only | through going beyond the circle of the given, that science creates the intellectual means of representing the given according to laws. For the elements, at the basis of the order of perceptions according to law, are never found as constituent parts in the perceptions. (164 f.)

Transposed to sociology, and especially to praxeology, this program points towards the necessity of relational models based in scientific logic, albeit only as intermediate objectivistic steps. As we are heading towards a model of the habitus beyond Bourdieu, Cassirer's relational concept of scientific knowledge will serve as a guiding principle for our methodological work.

Therefore, at this point we add some considerations on the *praxeological transformation* of Cassirer's concept of series. In Cassirer, the objects of a series are of one class (empirical objects or practices or concepts, etc.). For a praxeological transformation of the neo-Kantian approach, it is recommendable precisely *not* to restrict the taxonomical instrument of class or series to either the domain of mental processes or the domain of object-related processes. We are interested in the practical logic of praxis. In other words, we are interested in the logic of praxis of specific actors (e.g. interviewees), according to *their* way of perceiving and organizing their praxis. We precisely do not aim at applying preconceived classifications in order to build corresponding series.

According to Bourdieu, a practical process always involves objective actors and action, as well as perception, judgment, and action orientation (see vol. 2). If such a process is conceived of as a series, it consists of objects of different kinds (if seen from the perspective of a philosophical ontology). Such a practical series (e.g., a ritual, buying and selling something, cooking a meal, chopping wood) forms part of and can integrate mental, material, subjective, and objective terms. It can, for example, be composed of a particular perception, a judgment, an intention,

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functional value. In fact, this fundamental relation has never been seriously denied by even the most convinced 'empiricism.'" (269).

a physical act, and an effect in the composition of the material world. Semantic elements ("language-games," Wittgenstein), action-related elements, and physical elements ("life-forms") of a series obtain their meaning through the position they precisely occupy in this series composed of ontologically different elements. For instance, a fly really bothers me while writing. I perceive that for some time, judge it as insupportable, decide to get rid of the fly, and open the window. It will not leave, so the aforementioned process repeats with another result: to want to kill it. I get a flyswatter and do what I have to do. The meaning of the intention to kill (and the corresponding assessment of the actor), thus, cannot be derived from the ideal position of "killing a fly" in the semantic universe of terms related to killing. However, the intention's meaning, while undeniably semantic, can only be derived from the practical series of terms (perception, acting, dead fly) that belong to different (ontological) "realms" and that, precisely for this reason, produce meaning and make sense. For the concept of sign, this means that the pragmatic aspect adds to the structural one.

In any case, relationism in its structural aspect has primarily had a strong influence on French structuralism—namely, on Claude Levi-Strauss, one of Bourdieu's influential academic teachers.

Objective structures—Levi-Strauss

Levi-Strauss translates philosophical relationism into anthropological theory and method. Bourdieu appreciates structuralism precisely because of its relationist course of research and its formalized models (Bourdieu 1968, 681f., 699, G: 1970, ca. 8ff., 32), while he criticizes its insistence on objectivism. Here, we can limit ourselves to a very short glimpse of Levi-Strauss' application of relationism.

In a well-known comparison, Levi-Strauss said that only through structuralism have anthropologists learned that they were like amateur botanists who simply collected single samples, but now they are challenged to organize whole collections (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 315). Levi-Strauss understands anthropology as a "general theory of relationship" (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 95). Moreover, he interprets structuralism (following Saussure) as principally engaged with linguistic relations. The linguistic structure, the system of language (*langue*), brings about that "the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms upon content." Thus, "it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other customs" (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 21).

In consequence, this approach to relational social science does not start from a direct comparison between "language and behavior" but from the comparison between already formalized data from both "structures" (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 72).

We can exemplify this relational method with a short passage from *Structural Anthropology* (148 ff.).

Fig. 3   Levi-Strauss: Structures

Again, the aim is to understand the individual case. Here, it is the distinction of time. It is reconstructed by the binary code of day versus night. The terms *day* and *night* are each associated with a series of other terms that add meaning to the initial terms. Moreover, each of the two series is associated with a group of people living in a certain part of the village in question. Finally, the series and any of its items can be interpreted through the principle of the distinction that governs the series: the rites of initiation of the village groups. Again, the individual case (the content of the initial observation) acquires meaning not by abstraction (as an essential content) but by its place in a well-structured whole of symbolic relations that correspond to one another by an overall homology.

   While appreciating the relational approach of Levi-Strauss, Bourdieu criticizes the "realism of the structure."[143] In sum, one may say that this critique objects to a soft form of idealism, which Bourdieu also criticizes in Cassirer. In both cases, Cassirer and Levi-Strauss, the social genesis and use of the relational concepts are widely dismissed. For Bourdieu, the challenge rather is to formulate a relational social theory (including a theory of symbolic relations) that centers on real human beings, actors, and thus on social praxis, since the "objective relations do not exist and do not really realize themselves except in and through the system of dispositions

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143   Bourdieu 1968, 705, G: 1970, 39. See also Bourdieu 1977b, 3ff., 27, G: 2009, 127ff., and especially Bourdieu 1990b, 30ff, 96, G: 2008, 57ff., 175ff.; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 15ff., 224ff., G: 1996, 17ff., 257ff.

of the agents, produced by the internalization of objective conditions" (Bourdieu 1968, 705, G: 1970, 39f.). Hence, the habitus becomes the key operator.

1.2.2 Structures, habitus, models—Bourdieu

Bourdieu translated philosophical relationism and anthropological structuralism into praxeological sociology. This by no means implies the abdication of things, objects, facts, or physical matter, force, and events. It means that the thing as such and its inherent properties are no longer of prime interest, but rather the relations things are used in and connected by. Equally, actors are not supposed to have inherent properties. Instead, their social relations are supposed to explain the properties as socially embodied dispositions.

In order to reconstruct this relation, the scientific view of society operates through preconstructed schemes of perception, in other words, through models.[144] Therefore, scientific modeling and construction are indispensable. This said, one can distinguish four dimensions in which relations become particularly significant for praxeological sociology. The first dimension represents the objective relations of fields and the social space. These models enable Bourdieu to transform series into the structures of distribution of capital, that is, into the scientifically recognizable result of labor and social conflict. Second, we can indicate a two-way relation between these structures and the habitus: perception and action, the affectedness of the actors by the social structures and their action upon the structures. The models of the field and the social space integrate this two-way relation inasmuch as they depict positions and *dis*positions. Third, we draw attention to the relations between the dispositions that constitute a habitus. This perspective is not very common in the literature since the habitus is often treated as a homogenous unit.[145] Instead, we refer to the network of embodied dispositions of perception, judgment, and action orientation that operate constantly, processing experiences into meaning and meaning into action. Fourth, we focus briefly on the logic of modeling as an epistemological condition for praxeological sociology. Finally, in a digression, we will draw attention to substantialist readings of Bourdieu's theory.

In this section, we will sketch the different dimensions of praxeological thinking only briefly and in an introductory manner. We will treat Bourdieu's theoretical program in vol. 2. Here, our considerations will be guided by a short lecture

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144 See below (4.3) and the reflections on modeling in volume 3.

145 See below the digression on the substantialist reading of Bourdieu (p. 133).

Bourdieu gave in Japan explaining his book *La Distinction*.[146] Additionally, we will offer some auxiliary diagrams. Our language will now be oriented towards Bourdieu's theoretical vocabulary.[147]

1.2.2.1   Spaces of positions…

In his lecture, Bourdieu refers to the guiding logic of *La Distinction* under the section title of "The Real is Relational." First, he discards substantialist modes of social thought. Then he states that in any society one has to deal with "positions, activities, and goods." In order to describe them adequately it does not suffice to ascribe certain properties to each. Rather it is necessary to reconstruct the objective relations that positions, activities, and goods are mutually connected by. It is these relations that allow the description of "*social positions* (a relational concept), *dispositions* (or habitus), and *position-takings* (*prises de position*), that is the choices made by the social agent" (Bourdieu 1998d, 6, G: 1998e, 17). The properties that things, practices, thoughts, and the like, convey are turned into what they socially are by the positions they occupy in relation to other elements of praxis.

This is obvious with regard to the exchange value of money. Rich people are not rich because of a certain quantity of money they possess. A billion *Reichsmark* was a lot of money, but it did not buy much during the inflation period in prewar Germany. Whether a person is rich is defined in comparison to other economic actors at a given time and space. The military officer of our example is not rich in comparison to a Guatemalan industrialist, but in comparison to the peasant, indeed the officer is. Similarly, the use value of a thing, a practice, or an utterance varies with the context of use. The best raw duck is useless for a meal if one does not know how to prepare it, and the recipe for fried duck has no use in most Western households if it is written in Chinese. A relational approach does not sacrifice the use value for the exchange value. It rather relates both to their specific contexts and sees things, practices, and signs under both aspects.[148]

Similarly, one can fully understand the disposition of an actor to attend a certain church only if one relates this disposition to the social positions the actor and the church occupy. A given actor has a religious demand that is met by church A, not by church B, because of a particular position church A occupies in the religious field and the social space. Moreover, any attribute or quality of the religious actor (such

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146 Bourdieu 1998d, G: 1998e, a lecture presented at the University of Todaï, 1989.

147 With regard to religious studies, we may add that beliefs (understood as cognitive and emotional dispositions) also are reckoned under habitus.

148 This complementarity is important for the distinction between the concepts of fields and markets as well as for the treatment of semantics. See 3.3 and 4.2.2.

as speaking in tongues) is defined by the distinction it marks among attributes of other actors in the field and in the social space. What facilitates adequate cognition (scientific or everyday) is "nothing other than difference, a gap, a distinctive feature, in short, a relational property existing only in and through its relation with other properties" (Bourdieu 1998d, 6, G: 1998e, 18). It is from this basic notion that Bourdieu develops his concepts of social space and fields.

Space

Hence, the *concept of space* in general has nothing of the substantialist idea of a container space, an area confined by outer limits. Instead, space is defined as "a set of distinct and coexisting positions which are exterior to one another and which are defined in relation to one another through their mutual exteriority and their relations of proximity, vicinity, or distance, as well as through relations of order, such as above, below, and between" (Bourdieu 1998d, 6, G: 1998e, 18). As shown in the figure Bourdieu presents in the quoted passage, each action (football, fishing, etc.) or actor (SKILLED WORKER, COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEE, etc.)[149] is defined by the actors' positions in a series (of capitals) that describes them as different from other actors or properties. It can be seen that the disposition to go fishing is quite near the positions of FOREMEN and COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES. Here, the simple series has turned into a complex two-dimensional model. For the actors (individual or collective) and the things they possess, this means that they are "situated in a place in social space, a distinct and distinctive place which can be characterized by the position it occupies relative to other places (above, below, between etc.) and the distance (sometimes called 'respectfully': *e longinquo reverentia*) that separates it from them" (Bourdieu 2000a, 134, G: 2001a, 172).

Accordingly, Bourdieu constructs his model of the *social space*

> in such a way that agents or groups are distributed in it according to their position in statistical distributions based on the two principles of differentiation which, in the most advanced societies [...] are undoubtedly the most efficient: economic capital and cultural capital.[150]

In other societies, other forms of capital, as for instance social relations, can be more significant and therefore serve for the construction of a correspondent space of social positions (Bourdieu 1985b, 743, n. 4, G: 1985a, 42f., n. 3). For the model

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149 In the quoted figure Bourdieu uses majuscules for social positions and minuscules for practices.

150 Bourdieu 1998d, 6, G: 1998e, 18. See in much detail Bourdieu 2010, and in volume 2, on the social space of religious styles.

of the space, the forms of capital are the key perceptional schemes that allow construction of the series according to which the observed objects are grouped. The forms of capital function as theoretical principles of construction for a geometrical model of a space. In consequence, the space accounts for differences between actors

> in such a way that the closer they are to one another in those two dimensions, the more they have in common; and the more remote they are from one another, the less they have in common. Spatial distances on paper are equivalent to social distances. (Bourdieu 1998d, 6, G: 1998e, 18)

The classes that result from this approach are not social classes with essential attributes or a specific class consciousness, but "classes on paper."[151]

Fields

As an aside, we want to mention here that Bourdieu also applies relational principles in the construction of *fields*. Since a field is also "a network of objective relations (of domination or subordination, of complementarity or antagonism, etc.) between positions,"[152] it is also organized by differential distances between the actors according to objective indicators. The indicators are different from those of the space. In the field of literary production (nineteenth century, France) the degree of consecration and the degree of economic compromise are the series according to which the field is organized. However, the model also presupposes homologies between the positions and the dispositions of the actors. In any case, the models of fields are constructed according to the same relational principle as the model of the social space is.[153]

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151 Bourdieu 1985b, 725ff., G: 1985a, 12ff.; this essay still does not distinguish clearly between the concepts of field and space, e.g., social field (p. 724, G: 10f.). See also Bourdieu 1990g, 117f., G: 1989a, 408. One goal of this emphasis becomes evident when we take into account that Bourdieu wants to set an end to substantialistic definitions of classes and social actors, as mentioned above. A class, in Bourdieu, is not a "historical subject" mobilized against its enemy, but a "class on paper," that is, theoretically constructed according to a defined interest of research.

152 Bourdieu 1995, 231, G: 1999b, 365. "In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions." (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97, G: 1996, 127)

153 See Bourdieu 1995, 122, G: 1999b, 199. See also Bourdieu 1983.

1.2.2.2 … and of dispositions

We have already referred to the idea that models of the social space and the fields allow depiction of the dispositions of actors (for instance, the one who goes fishing, instead of reading a book or going sailing) as homologous to their social positions. This is more than a methodical effect. The observation points to an intimate two-way relation between social structures and the habitūs of actors. In other words, praxis can be described in multiple ways as relation between the embodied dispositions (attitudes and capacities) of actors, on the one hand, and the social structures that, simultaneously, coin the actors' dispositions and are coined by the actors' activities.

Two-way relation

In the preface of the book that contains the lecture in Japan, Bourdieu refers to this two-way relation as follows.

> Next, it is a philosophy of action designated at times as *dispositional* which notes the potentialities inscribed in the body of agents and in the structure of the situations where they act or, more precisely, in the relations between them. This philosophy is condensed in a small number of fundamental concepts—habitus, field, capital—and its cornerstone is the two-way relationship between objective structures (those of social fields) and incorporated structures (those of the habitus). (Bourdieu 1998b, VII, G: 2007, 7)

This two-way relation connects *objective and subjective conditions* of human praxis. However, this does not happen as a relation between two or three substantial entities—as if space, field, and habitus were such substances. The concepts of habitus, field, space, and capital must not be reified, and may not be taken as theoretical entities. This means for the two-way relation that it has to be conceived as multiple acts of mutual influence that are conditioned by the multiple and complex internal relations of habitus, fields, social space, and situations in time. Therefore, depending on the empirical object of research, the internal relations may be described in very different ways: with regard to different capitals, to practical logic, to symbolic domination, to identity politics, to performative effects of speech, and so forth. The observations may focus, for instance, on objective limitation of subjective action opportunities; on perception of goods and practices, judgments, axiological ascriptions to goods and to other actors; on strategic operations; and on much more.

Wacquant points to this multiplicity of relations when he states for the relation of habitus and field: "Thus both concepts of habitus and fields are relational in the additional sense that they function fully *only in relation to one another*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 19, G: 1996, 40). In addition, he deepens the comprehension by quoting Bourdieu who talks about an "ontological complicity" and a "mutual

possession" between the habitūs and the social world that is the operational condition of the practical sense. Fields and habitūs are codependent, among others, via relations of mutual "conditionings" and of "knowledge or *cognitive construction*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127, G: 1996, 161).

Dispositions, tastes, and styles

Since the objective "social topologies"[154] of space and fields relate different actors to one another and the habitūs maintain a two-way relation with them, it is consequent to translate the space of positions into a space of dispositions of the (collective) actors and of their corresponding self-positionings. Accordingly, Bourdieu says in his Japan lecture that the "space of social positions is retranslated into a space of position-takings through the mediation of the space of dispositions (or habitus)" (Bourdieu 1998d, 7, G: 1998e, 20). This makes two affirmations. First, there is a correspondence—which does not mean causation—between the social positions, the dispositions (habitus, attitudes), and the practices (actions, ascriptions, position-takings) of social actors. Second, these positions, dispositions, and practices are defined by means of their effective and meaningful relations to other positions, dispositions, and practices.

Using structuralist vocabulary, one can distinguish *syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations*. Syntagmatic relations govern the structural order on each, the different levels of the positions, the dispositions, and the position-takings. Paradigmatic relations (Bourdieu: correspondences, polysemy, etc.) govern *between* the levels of position-takings, dispositions, and social positions.

> To each class of positions there corresponds a class of habitus (or *tastes*) produced by the social conditioning associated with the corresponding condition and, | through the mediation of the habitus and its generative capability, a systematic set of goods and properties, which are united by an affinity of style. (Bourdieu 1998d, 7f., G: 1998e, 20f.)[155]

The relational construction of spaces of social positions, embodied dispositions, and practical position-takings facilitates the recognition of correspondences by superimposing one structure upon another as one can superimpose one transparent sheet upon others. (Bourdieu 2010, 120; G: 1982a, 211–214).

In principle, it is possible to obtain a third, fourth, and more relational "spaces" to be superimposed, according to the interest and observational capacity of the

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154 For both the social space and the fields see Müller 1992, 262 and Bourdieu 1985b, 723ff., G: 1985a, 9.

155 See also: Bourdieu 1985b, 725, G: 1985a, 12.

researchers. Social positions may be superimposed by dispositions, by tastes, by styles of life, by position-taking (political or other), by mobilized collective identities, and so forth. In other words, the space of social positions can be constructed simultaneously as a space of dispositions (habitus), a space of styles, a space of political identities, and much more. This understanding will be crucial for our adoption of the objectivist models for HabitusAnalysis.[156]

It is important to note that the relations between the different spaces (or the layers of transparent sheets) do *not* come about by means of a similarity between singular attributes. From Cassirer's perspective, that would be a typically substantialist way of reasoning. Inversely, corresponding positions of different features in different systems of relations (the space of social positions and the space of dispositions, for instance) create affinities and may render already existing similarities socially and sociologically meaningful.

For example, religious actors like the military officer (a member of a Neo-Pentecostal church) have a disposition to embody the power of the Holy Spirit in their church services and to take the position of being capable of casting out demons. The religious distinction between Holy Spirit and demons, embodied by the neo-Pentecostal believers, has no substantial affinity with their social position. There is no property of the social position that would cause or motivate the actors to identify with a semantic content such as demons or Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, there is an observable correspondence between the social position and this specific semantic content. Additionally, there is an observable distinction from another social position, in which this semantic content is absent. From a relational point of view, one does not impute here something like a causation or even a determination of the cognitive content by the material circumstances. Rather the aim is to describe the correspondence and to render it sociologically meaningful by interpreting the practical use of the semantic content. In consequence, one can observe that these Neo-Pentecostal actors (like the military officer) occupy mainly the position of a modernizing upper middle class, way above the revolting lower classes and in fierce competition with the traditional upper class. These positional differences, together with the context of the political and military conflict, give meaning to the religious dispositions of the Neo-Pentecostal believers—no later than in the moment when these religious actors interpret the killing of indigenous revolutionaries as "spiritual warfare" between God and the devil.

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156 This adaptation is not based upon multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) but compatible with it. We rather aim at approaching the relation between dispositions and positions from the angle of the religious habitus. For details, see volumes 2 and 3.

It is of crucial significance to note that Bourdieu conceives the relation between these two objective spaces—the one of positions and the one of dispositions—as an active one; as mediated by generative human activity, that is, by the operations of the habitūs.[157] For this reason praxeology in general (and specifically with regard to the study of religion) relies as much on the subjective aspect of social reality as on the objective, as much on the perceived being as on the objective being, as much on symbolic as on material reality, and as much on signs as on goods.[158]

1.2.2.3   Habitus, dispositions, and the generation of praxis

The two-way relation between social structures and habitūs is not based on similitude, on a mirror image of the world in the mind of the actors. If we consider Bourdieu's resort to Kant, Cassirer, and Wittgenstein, it becomes immediately clear that things are different. Partly, the relation rather depends upon perception conceived of as an active process of construction mediated by language. Partly, and with recourse on Marx, it depends on relations of production and human action (labor) that structure these relations. This is why we often disaggregate the habitus into dispositions of perception, judgment, and action. By means of this distinction, we refer to the operators that are active in the relation of internalization and externalization between the social world and the actors.[159]

As the actors internalize their social conditions, they actively process experiences through dispositions of perception, judgment, and action orientation. As the actors exteriorize their judgments and actions according to their disposition-guided practical sense for situations in the relevant fields of praxis, their dispositions take effect on the objective structures. In a condensed expression: a habitus relates to a field and a field to a habitus.

Habitus

In his lecture in Japan, Bourdieu continues to specify the relation between the objectively constructed spaces of positions and of dispositions, introducing the concept

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157 Notwithstanding, a certain danger of substantialist misunderstanding lurks in Bourdieu's terminology. Bourdieu often uses social space and symbolic space quite randomly as fixed terms. Hence, some readers might be tempted to imagine two container spaces or closed-in (autopoietic) systems. Alternatively, they might treat the spaces as objectivist structures (similar to the early Levi-Strauss) with the exclusive relation of symbolic homology between one space and the other, not mediated practically.

158 See Bourdieu 1990b, 135ff., G: 2008, 246ff.; Bourdieu 2010, 468ff., G: 1982a, 727ff.

159 Bourdieu talks about dialectics (Bourdieu 1977b, 72, G: 2009, 164). See a detailed discussion in volume 2, part 1.

of *habitus*. The notion of habitus conceptually condenses a vast amount of practical operations in cognition, emotion, and body that, altogether, serve to give account

> for the unity of style, which unites the practices and goods of a single agent or a class of agents. […] The habitus is this *generative* and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices. (Bourdieu 1998d, 8, G: 1998e, 21; italics added)

The concept of habitus powerfully condenses multiple operations of human praxis: mental, emotional, bodily, and social. Therefore, our relationist reading of the concept aims at preserving the multiple operational relations as well as possible.[160] This reading comprises at least two dimensions: the embodied relations that operate as dispositions of perception, judgment, and action; and the relations between embodied dispositions and the experienced relations to other actors and to the fields of praxis. In other words, "the habitus" is not an entity. Instead, habitus is a conceptual cipher (a name) that stands for the synergy of multiple human operations—in individuals as well as in small or large collectives.[161]

Dispositions and experiences

Bourdieu uses the concept of disposition to disaggregate the concept of habitus and refer to specific operations such as perception, judgment, or action.[162] He conceives of cognitive, emotional, or bodily dispositions as specified coiled springs that are

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160 As a strongly condensed term, habitus conveys some danger of reification, similar to the concept of space. I would call it a hard reification if someone conceives of the habitus as a thing-like entity, a property of actors (like charisma in an everyday religious understanding) that simply is part of them. A soft reification would be a similar idea of a habitus as such, but mitigated by the concession that this entity is related to other entities, such as a field or a space by *external* relations (that do not affect the "habitus as such" but simply regulate its relation to "the field" as another entity). Additionally, some other misunderstandings of the concept of habitus are quite common, such as "deterministic," "irreflexive," "mechanical (consuetudinary)," "counter-creative," etc. At this point, it is sufficient to say that none of these readings would occur with a consequently relational use of the concept of habitus. For more details, see the digression on substantializing Bourdieu (3.3.4).

161 This means that habitus is not, *sensu strico,* a microsociological concept. While it describes processes within individuals, theses processes and their results can also be described in groups and even bigger collectives such as nations. The synergy between individual and collective habitus will be treated in volume 2.

162 Of course, he does not think that dispositions can be described other than by inferences from observable utterances and practices.

ready to react, obeying certain patterns, to the events (outer or inner) that actors face (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 135, G: 1996, 168). In Bourdieu, the concept of disposition (as well as the one of scheme) stands for a relational understanding of the notion of habitus. Dispositions designate the modes of operation whereby the habitus functions, in other words, its modus operandi.

As a condensed theoretical term for dispositions of human beings, the concept of habitus may be used for referring to multiple operations (such as structuring, generative, axiological, strategic etc.) that represent an extended universe of *embodied relations* of (individual and collective) social actors.[163] This relational understanding of habitus as the functional principle of a series of dispositions explains why Bourdieu can ascribe such a large number of operations to the habitus (Bourdieu 1998d, 8, G: 1998e, 21). Habitūs are

- "differentiated, but […] also differentiating";
- "distinct and distinguished, […] also distinction operators";
- "implementing different differentiation or using differently the common principles of differentiation";
- they are "generative principles of […] practices";
- "classificatory schemes, principles of classification, principles of vision and division, different tastes";
- they distinguish "between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and what is wrong, between what is distinguished and what is vulgar and so forth."

Habitūs mediate rationality; organize perception, judgment, and action; create new ideas; generate strategies; and much more.[164]

This is to say that the dispositions of a given habitus act and respond very specifically on particular conditions of the fields of praxis and the social space. Hence, habitus should best be conceived as composed of a myriad of specific dispositions that maintain constant relations with a myriad of structural and situational conditions of the relevant world. In a metaphoric expression, one could say that habitūs are pervious or porous for the relations of power and the practices of the fields of praxis, as the latter are permeable or penetrable for the presence and effects of

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163 See Bourdieu 1990b, 54ff., G: 2008, 101ff. Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 18f., G: 1996, 38f.) highlights the relational constitution of habitus as he exposes the concept under the subject heading of "methodological relationism."

164 A consequently relational application of Bourdieu's notion of habitus on the concept of social actors can go further than Bourdieu does and disaggregate the concept into a multiplicity of relations and, for instance, theorize identity as a network of dispositions. See Schäfer 2005.

the actors' habitūs. This renders the idea of mutual facilitation theoretically and methodologically manageable. In consequence, the relations of mutual facilitating between embodied and objective structures become of crucial praxeological interest. How does that mutual facilitation work? How do positions shape dispositions and vice versa?

In his lecture, Bourdieu comes to the end of the paragraph on relations, coming back to the specific form of how the objective and subjective aspects of praxis relate. His view is very much neo-Kantian and relationist. The subjective and objective aspects relate by the perception of experienced events (physical or mental), of differences, of distribution of goods or life-chances—in short, by social experiences. Experiencing "the differences […] in the goods possessed, or in the opinions expressed" according to the embodied schemes of perception—"these principles of vision and division"—turns those differences into a "veritable language" or into "symbolic systems" (Bourdieu 1998d, 8f., G: 1998e, 21f.). The objective distribution of goods and signs (e.g., opinions) translates into an embodied system of structured and generative cognitive dispositions, which inversely exert structuring effects on the distribution of goods and signs.

The above-mentioned multiple operations of the habitus create, in sum, practical knowledge and capabilities, embodied in the actor and at the same time operating in practical logic.[165] The dispositions of the habitus endow the utterances and actions of actors with this practical logic that operates in social relations, produces effects and, finally, becomes perceptible to scientific observation. Observable as practical logic, the dispositions can be treated as if they were a kind of language that mediates between experiences, on the one hand, and cognition, emotion, and action orientation, on the other.

The relations of habitus—the woodchopper 1

Above, we have shown figures to demonstrate the relational logic of Cassirer's series (Fig. 2, p. 104) and of Levi-Strauss' structures (Fig. 3, p. 108). At this point, we propose a similar figure for Bourdieu's concept of habitus. It aims at highlighting the relational epistemology behind the construct of habitus in comparison to Cassirer's and Levi-Strauss' relationism.[166] Our model may be of some use for an introductory explanation of the notion of habitus. However, it does not contribute

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165 Bourdieu 1990b, 80ff., 143ff., especially 200ff., G: 2008, 147ff., 259ff., 352ff.. See also: Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 19ff., G: Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996, 40ff.

166 Since the model is not constructed with essentialist zeal, it does not intend to show how "the habitus" really is. For some comments on essentialist approaches to Bourdieu's models, see the digression (3.3).

sufficient detail for HabitusAnalysis (see instead vol. 2). Even less, the model serves as an alternative analytical model to our praxeological square. However, the model exposes the relational logic that governs the dispositions in processing experiences by cognition and cognition by experience—a particular relation that is crucial to our methodology.

In order to construct the diagram, we recur to an example: Max Weber's well-known woodchopper (Weber 1978, 8). Weber argues in the epistemological chapter of *Economy and Society* for an interpretative sociology (*verstehende Soziologie*). He depicts a man who chops wood. For the sociologist, in order to "understand" (*verstehen*) what the woodchopper does, it is necessary to know the meaning he ascribes to his action. Additionally, for an "explanatory understanding" we need to know if the "woodchopper is working for a wage or is chopping a supply of firewood for his own use or possibly is doing it for recreation … [or] … working off a fit of rage" (Weber 1978, 8f.). This is what dispositions do: they ascribe meaning to action and experiences.

Praxeological understanding tries to reconstruct (by means of different sources, such as for instance an interview in the case of the woodchopper) as well as possible the relevant dispositions from the observable material. It does not aim at deducing the meaning of the observed act from properties of the actors (e.g., the class conscience of the woodchopper). In other words, the relation between object and meaning, signifier and signified, cannot be treated as a direct translation of one content into another.[167] It can only be determined by taking a detour via the construction of a series of other relevant elements, the relation to which contributes meaning to the signifier (Bourdieu 1968, 685, G: 1970, ca. 13). Hence, the praxeological observation reconstructs a series of experiences and activated dispositions for a particular case, in order to find the principle of distinction (and functioning) at work and ascribe an objective meaning to the whole story.

According to the former relational models (Cassirer and Levi-Strauss), the *explanandum* is the single case: the simple act of chopping wood, without any meaning ascription (see Fig. 4). First, we state an individual praxis and distinguish with Bourdieu practices and mental schemes as relevant for this praxis. Then we locate the act of chopping wood in a series of distinct practices. Further, we construct a parallel series of mental schemes (dispositions) that operate cognitive distinctions. The relation between both is not conceived as simple homology (with Levi-Strauss).

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167 Bourdieu refers to "earlier mythologists" and their "word-by-word translations" and "dictionaries of universal symbolism" (Bourdieu 1968, 685, G: 1970, 13; also: 1990b, 7, G: 2008, 13)—a description which could fit religious phenomenologists, e.g., the school of Mircea Eliade.

Rather, with Bourdieu we interpret the relation as a generative processing of experience by means of the reciprocal interaction of perception and interpretation as well as judgment and strategies—in other words, the operating dispositions of cognition, judgment, and action. Looking at the empirical content of action and interpretation,[168] we might observe that the woodchopper, prior to chopping, had a conflict with his brother and was defeated. This led to an emotional arousal and a blaze of anger, in relation to which he appreciated the chopping of wood as a way to calm down and find serenity. Here, the act of chopping initiates reconciliation between the woodchopper and his brother. Hence, the principle of distinction in the series of mental schemes turns out to be treatment of rage; in the series of practices, it is conflict management. Finally, the whole story is about a family conflict.

Fig. 4   The woodchopper

The same model will produce different results, if the empirical content and context is different. Knowing about the demand for firewood on the market, the chopper could also work because he needs money. Hence, he thinks that chopping will make him

168 Not understood as an intellectual exercise, but as spontaneous meaning ascription (*Deutung*).

rich. He chops, calculates a price, and sells. The series of the "mental schemes" boils down to the interest in economic profit, the series of "practices" to profitable economic activity. The whole story is not about a family conflict, but about earning money.

One of Bourdieu's most important transformations of Cassirer and Levi-Straus in his praxeology is introducing symbolic and physical human *labor* to the relational approach.

Praxeological series

Praxeology implies a look at human praxis different from that of accustomed scientific taxonomies.[169] The latter employs for instance classificational categories such as individual, species, genus and looks for the *differentiae specificae*. The family of Rosaceae, for instance, denotes the series of rose plants only; a pine tree among them would not suit. Cassirer combines series of cognitive elements only, particularly of scientific knowledge. Levi-Strauss constructs series of symbolic elements paralleled by series of material elements. These series are guided by different ontological categories. The point is that the criteria to construct these series are well established and accustomed, as for instance the difference between matter and spirit. They reflect a state of scholarly reasoning employed to classify empirical observations according to the academic logic (and bear the risk of gliding into what Bourdieu calls scholasticism). On the other hand, these taxonomical criteria are necessary to reflexively construct theoretical models capable of "breaking with appearances" and of "generalization" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 54, G: 1991b, 63).

In consequence, praxeology does not abstain from adducing theoretical criteria for the series to be established by methodical reconstruction. However, the praxeological interest is different from the interest that drives, let us say, taxonomical geology. Praxeology is interested in human praxis within its broader social context. As human praxis involves many factors that are not observable at first glance (such as dispositions, corresponding judgments, or motivations) praxeology has to master at least two tasks. First it has to construct theoretical models that are capable of capturing as many of the theoretically important aspects of praxis as possible.[170] Second, these models have to allow sufficient space for the actors' dispositions, motivations, aims, etc., to emerge.[171] With regard to the methodical

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169 For example, the taxonomic ranks in biological classification that distinguish between species, genus, family, order, class, phylum, kingdom, and domain.

170 We will try to achieve this by the combination of the praxeological square with the models of the (religious) field and the social space of (religious) styles.

171 We pursue this task by the specific construction of the praxeological square as an instrument for explorative qualitative research.

reconstruction of series, the problem can be described as follows. Since the logic of the human praxis to be reconstructed, analyzed, and understood is unknown to the researcher and obeys many other premises other than scientific ones, this practical logic most probably unfolds according to an implicit series of elements whose connection and reason for existence are only plausible to the actors themselves. The series—earthquake, war, starvation, sin, divine punishment, end times, church attendance—may not only be quite strange to an observing sociologist. From the viewpoint of classical ontology, it is also composed by elements of very different ontological order (geological, human body, human beliefs, divine action, time, religious practice). From the viewpoint of the actors the series is crucial for survival. In terms of classical ontology, praxeological series are impure. From the praxeological point of view, they are pure, since in the best of the cases they follow the practical logic of the actors to be understood.[172]

At a first glance, the example of the woodchopper does not corroborate this affirmation. There is one series of mental schemes and another of practices that combine under the principle of family conflict. However, this is due to the purpose of the diagram: to show the dialectic that the concept of habitus introduces into the analysis of praxis. Alternatively, one also can construct a straight series of elements relevant for this particular event of wood chopping. If one is interested in its temporal sequence, symbolic and practical elements may blend into a correspondent series.

Defeated in conflict → remembering conflict → emotional arousal → blaze of anger → chopping calms down → chopping wood → serenity → reconciliation = family conflict.

In terms of the practical logic of that particular family conflict, the series simply describes the conflict and gives the clue to understand the individual case: the woodchopper's action. As distinct from the older structuralist tradition, a praxeological series does not consist of symbolic elements only, but also of elements of social structure and practices. In other words, in scientific logic a series consists of individuals of the same species (different animals, numbers, etc.). In practical logic, a series is formed regardless of ontological species or genus. It is constructed simply of those individual items that are necessary to constitute a unit of praxis, meaningful for the actors involved. For instance, a cave, some candles, a stone, incense, a certain person, specific movements and linguistic utterances, and religious convictions of the partakers combine into a religious ritual with social effects. Symbolic elements (beliefs) are not organized in one particular series, and material elements (ritual ob-

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172 This approach is completely contrary to the one of rational choice theory that imputes the principle of practical logic as utility maximization.

jects) in another. Rather, a practical series combines elements of different kinds under a common practical denominator, such as a religious strategy or an economic ritual.

Social actors constantly form these series according to their schemes of perception, judgment, and action. However, such series are not easy to reconstruct methodically from empirical material such as interviews, speeches, videos, etc. Even more difficult is the, scientifically indispensable, comparison of case-specifically reconstructed series with other similar or dissimilar series. These tasks cannot be evaded by means of spontaneous sociology or a naïve recording of more or less random observations. In contrast, the primary task is to construct a theoretical model of practical logic that allows methodical analysis of qualitative material and that grants sufficient margin for the dispositions of the actors to surface—even though merely as schemes of semantic operators.

1.2.2.4   Schemes, models, and the perception of praxis

According to Cassirer, cognition and the acquisition of knowledge do not occur by collecting mirror images (reflections) of the world in our heads as "direct, sensuous copies of reality" (Cassirer 1953, 164). Instead, knowledge and cognition result from the active processing of sensuous experiences by means of preconstructed mental schemes that structure our perception, both in scientific work and in everyday life.

Structured and structuring perception plays a key role in both the everyday praxis observed by sociology and the sociological observation of praxis (observed by sociological epistemology). At this point, we limit ourselves to some brief introductory remarks and a diagram.

Schemes

Bourdieu anchors his concepts of perception and cognition in Cassirer. But he conceives the generating and structuring processes as social praxis, coined by relations of power and domination.

> So far as the social world is concerned, the neo-Kantian theory, which gives language and, more generally, representations a specifically symbolic efficacy in the construction of reality, is perfectly justified. By structuring the perception which social agents have of the social world, the act of naming helps to establish the structure of this world, and does so all the more significantly the more widely it is recognized, i.e. authorized. There is no social agent who does not aspire, as far as his circumstances permit, to have the power to name and to create the world through naming. (Bourdieu 2006, 105, G: 2005, 99)

Actors construct social reality via their structured schemes of perception. Therefore, the symbolic structures and the power of structuring the perceptions are, at the same time, means *and* object of the social struggle. The dominant symbolic order

imposes the frame for legitimate perceptions of the social order. This is valid not only for everyday perception but also for scientific. One important notion for the mediation that takes place between experiences of the social world and cognition (emotion, and bodily states) is "scheme."

For Bourdieu, the concept of scheme is relatively important when he refers to perception, judgment, and action (the basic operations of the habitus) within the context of social relations. In contrast to objectivist structuralism with its abstract concept of logical categories, Bourdieu uses the concept of schemes often when he refers to the dispositions of the habitus. Within the dialectic between social structures and dispositions, schemes act for instance as logical categories. They are principles of logical division that correspond to the division of labor, "or temporal structures, imperceptibly inculcated by 'the dull pressure of economic relations' as Marx puts it, that is, by the system of economic and symbolic sanctions associated with a particular position in the economic structures." Thus, schemes structure social experience without any "mechanical determination or adequate consciousness" (Bourdieu 1990b, 41, G: 2008, 77f.).

The concept of scheme in Bourdieu links loosely to the Kantian tradition and combines it with Marx's theory of social inequality. Cassirer adopts the notion with some changes from Kant,[173] but uses it only marginally, albeit characteristically.[174] With regard to Bourdieu's use of the concept, however, it is interesting to note the larger epistemological frame in Cassirer. The logic of schemes (mediating experiences and cognition) is crucial for Cassirer's concept of judgment. A judgment is "any kind of designation of a particular by its relation to a general."[175] Thus, schemes of perception (*Anschauung*) govern this operation and, thus, produce the meaning of the judgment. There is no self-sufficient phenomenon. This approach has three consequences worthy of mention with regard to Bourdieu's later work.

The first is what Cassirer calls *symbolic pregnance* (95f.).[176] For epistemology, Cassirer rejects Kant's distinction between sensation and concept or matter and form. Instead, for Cassirer what is "the given" for sensual perception is already taken in a specific regard. That is, interpretation is not a secondary act, but it already comes

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173 He quotes Kant's distinction between scheme and sensual image as useful insofar as images are only possible through the implementation of schemes (Cassirer 1957, 162, 248).

174 Dealing with the method of induction, he highlights that a "scheme of experience beforehand" has to structure the description (Cassirer 1953, 251). Or, with reference to Leibniz he speaks of a "monadological scheme of the world." (Cassirer 1953, 391)

175 „…Kennzeichnung eines Besonderen durch seine Beziehung auf ein Allgemeines" (Plümacher 2003a, 92, trans. HWS).

176 The numbers in parentheses in the next lines refer to Plümacher 2003a.

with perception. On the one hand, Bourdieu stays relatively close to this position when he refers to the phenomenological tradition (e.g., in the context of the practical sense, see vol. 2). On the other hand, the fine distinction in Cassirer blurs when he refers to objective social processes with regard to their appreciation by certain actors.

We will consider Cassirer's point of view when we establish the distinction between interpretation and experienc*es* as opposite terms of one scheme in our model of the praxeological square. Thus, "interpretation" is precisely *not* an intellectual act a posteriori.

Second, the possibility of *changes of perspectives* on a given particular object is an immediate consequence of relationist epistemology (102f.). Different schemes allow imagining a given object within different series. Thus, the object changes its meaning according to the changing context. Representation occurs through the localization of a sensorial object in a series of other objects—that is, by "symbolic faculty" (*Symbolvermögen*) (Cassirer 1957, 275).

This change of perspectives by transposing an object of perception from one series to another is crucial for religious symbolism. The same sensorial experience can acquire completely different meanings, according to the series (religious or nonreligious) of schemes of perception it is put into. Methodologically, this distinction is relevant for the reconstruction of networks of schemes and dispositions.

The third question is as to what point schemes are constituted by *language* (94 f.). Cassirer—in line with the phenomenologists—aimed at overcoming an exclusive bond between thought and language. He postulated that sensorial experience might have a categorical content independent of language. This independence may arise from the capacity of the mind to generate constant terms of experience that operate in the recognition of definite objects. In a nutshell, Cassirer does not abolish the linguistic constitution of schemes, but he opens a view towards nonlinguistic relational epistemology. With regard to Bourdieu, this points towards the emotional and bodily dispositions of the habitus. Nevertheless, Bourdieu also maintains a course quite near Humboldt, Sapir, and Whorf, which means that the linguistic constitution of thought is by no means alien to the praxeological approach.

Our model for HabitusAnalysis concentrates on language and cognition. However, in the future it may be extended to emotional and bodily dispositions.

With regard to the notion of scheme, Bourdieu is very much in line with Cassirer's general epistemology, but he does not apply every distinction the philosopher took as necessary. Bourdieu rather uses the term in a general sense relationally with the scope on mediating between experienced social conditions and cognitive contents. Simply said, schemes make sense out of experiences.

Social praxis in general

Bourdieu insists that "schemes of perception and thinking" (Bourdieu 1991b, 18, G: 2011b, 59), such as religious beliefs, are important means for structuring human praxis in general. Schemes of perception are results of and operators in a doubly generative relation. As early as in *Outline of a Theory of Praxis,* Bourdieu builds on Cassirer and relativizes the philosopher at the same time, referring to Marx:

> With the Marx of the *Theses on Feuerbach*, the theory of practice as practice insists, against positivist materialism, that the objects of knowledge are *constructed*, and against idealist intellectualism [Cassirer, HWS], that the principle of this construction is practical activity oriented towards practical functions. (Bourdieu 1977b, 96, G: 2009, 228)

The construction of knowledge operates by "schemes of perception, appreciation, and action" (Bourdieu 1977b, 97, G: 2009, 229), which result from former incorporation and represent the subjective side of a double-sided process. On the objective side are the social structures as, for instance, the distribution of goods, institutions, et cetera, the "objective structures of social space" (Bourdieu 1985b, 728, G: 1985a, 17) ready to be incorporated by perception. However, this does not mean to be incorporated as a mirror image. Instead, the previously embodied dispositions of perception and judgment shape the way the objective structures are perceived by the actor. Objective structures and embodied perceptions are both conceived as aspects of praxis. It is important to note that subjective and objective aspects of praxis are not separated from each other as if they were each part of different realms of reality. Instead, they *relate* in praxis. In other words, praxis is generated via their mutual interdependency and interaction.

In comparison to Cassirer, Bourdieu strengthens the part of the objective structures. But he neither dismisses the crucial relation between subjective and objective aspects of praxis and habitus nor the "objectivity of the subjective" under the scientific eye (Bourdieu).

Scientific observation

Scientific knowledge is structured by the schemes of perception of researchers (their preconceptions). These are not categorically different from perceptional schemes in general social praxis. What makes a difference rather is the peculiar logic of the scientific field. Hence, typical "scholastic fallacies" (Bourdieu 2000a, 9ff, 49ff., G: 2001a, 18ff., 64ff.) plague this specific form of knowledge—namely, the projection of the logical logic of science on the practical logic of ordinary social actors. Another

widespread problem is to one-sidedly overemphasize either the objective social conditions or the subjective actors (Bourdieu 1990b, 30ff., 42ff., G: 2008, 57ff., 79ff.).

In sum, social science according to Bourdieu has to heed relationist epistemology (especially Cassirer and Bachelard) and its theory of prestructured perception for scientific procedures. Hence, the object of scientific investigation has to be theoretically constructed, the process of research has to be rationally controlled, and finally the standpoint of the scientist in the scientific field and in society at large has to be subject to critical reflection.[177]

We finish these brief introductory remarks with a diagram that sketches basic orientations for the observation of praxis.

Fig. 5   The scientific view

Schemes of perception, judgment (and action), intervene in both scientific and everyday praxis. Scientific observers are only able to perceive praxis by means of

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177 See Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 33ff., 57ff., 69ff., G: 1991b, 37ff., 65ff., 80ff.; Bourdieu 2010, 503ff., G: 1982a, 784ff.

their scientific models—that is, by scientifically reflexive schemes of perception. What they help to observe is the relation between actors and their everyday world. This relation, again, is mediated by the schemes of perception, judgment, and action of the observed actors—that is, by the dispositions of the habitus adapted to the structures of the everyday world.

Regardless of whether everyday or scientific perception is concerned, neither of them is similar to an eyeglass, which passively registers objects like a mirror of outer reality (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 121, G: 1996, 153). According to Cassirer and Bourdieu, both ways of perception are processes of active construction. Bourdieu deepens this approach to knowledge by taking into account the practical conditions of the generation and use of the knowledge, and by treating perception, judgment, knowledge, action orientation, and so forth, *as praxis*. While Cassirer develops his reflections on relational perception further in an outline of a (idealist) theory of reality (Cassirer 1953, 271ff.), Bourdieu, in contrast, conceives of reality as social praxis.

1.2   Praxeological relationism

Relationism is the most important premise of Bourdieu's sociology. He primarily relies on Ernst Cassirer's critique of substantialism and his relational theory of (scientific) perception as the outset for a structural approach to social reality, as realized, for example, by Levi-Strauss.

1.2.1   Relation and perception

Cassirer's reflection on both perception and relation was rooted in a critique of two customary and closely intertwined figures of Western thought: the idea that mind mirrors nature and substantialist (or essentialist) ontology.

Both go back to ancient Greek philosophy and refer to the objective logical and ontological order of beings. In early modern Europe (Descartes), the general orientation of thought shifted towards the subject as the (only) guarantee for the reality of thought and being—thus omitting the historicity of human existence. At the same time, empiricism posited the single empirical thing as an objectively perceivable unit, fundamental for the inductive generation of knowledge about reality. Notwithstanding, Kant's critique of reason proved that there is no knowledge without cognitive preconditions. Thinkers as different as Marx, Cassirer, and Wittgenstein deepened this insight in their particular ways.

Ernst Cassirer's relationism is crucial for structural and functional thinking. In *Substance and Function*, Cassirer criticizes the substantialist approach of Western science and the humanities for focusing on properties of single objects and for determining the essential truth of an object by abstraction. Instead, he proposes a relational epistemology. The single object acquires its meaning, not by inherent properties, but by its position in a series of other objects constructed according to the cognitive scheme that is active in perception. The position of an element in a structure provides information about the element and about the structure. At the same time, the cognitive conditions of perception (the schemes) structure the way that objects are perceived. Levi-Strauss translates this

approach into structuralist anthropology. However, his objectivistic concept of symbolic structures is what Bourdieu criticizes as idealism, as he also criticizes in Cassirer.

1.2.2 Structures, habitus, models—Bourdieu

Bourdieu transforms philosophical and structuralist relationism into his specific brand of praxeological sociology. This involves theories on objective social positions and embodied dispositions, as well as a specific approach to scientific perception.

Important models of praxeology are those of the social space and fields. Both are conceived in a consequently relationist way. They are defined by positions that are mutually exterior and determine one another by their mutual relation. The model of the social space is constructed according to different capitals, and the model of the (literary) field according to the degree of seniority and consecration.

Dispositions of the habitus, tastes, and lifestyles of the actors maintain a two-way relation to the social space and the fields of praxis. Subjective dispositions and objective positions influence each other mutually, albeit not as separated entities but by a myriad of single but systematic acts of relationing. This is how, through generative human activity, homologies between social positions, human dispositions, position-takings, and styles are generated. These homologies may be modeled as superimposed transparent layers.

The notion of habitus is not to be conceived as designating a closed (substantial) entity. It rather refers to countless dispositions, processing experiences by means of generating perception, judgment, and action in the cognitive, emotional, and bodily dimensions—indeed, a modus operandi. The concept of habitus, as any other theoretical notion in praxeology, is conceived according to relationist logic. This is exemplified by an application of the relationist point of view in Max Weber's example of a woodchopper.

Relationist logic also applies to scientific perception. On one level, the praxis of social actors is conceived as a mediation (by schemes of perception, judgment, and action) between the social world (modeled as social space and fields) and the actors' dispositions (habitus). On another level, scientific observation also depends on schemes of perception and judgment, due to different factors, such as scientific theories and methods. These preconceptions need to be objectivized and transformed into models that facilitate observation.

1.3   *Excursus*: **Substantializing Bourdieu**

Above, we have sketched Cassirer's careful critique of substantialism and briefly introduced the relational traits in Cassirer and Bourdieu. This is not to claim that all the arguments for a substantialist approach to science are debated or that substantialist notions in general are of no use. However, we do not aim at discussing pros and cons of substantialism. Rather, we have to focus the problem on the works of Bourdieu. In this regard, there are mainly two more points of certain interest: Bourdieu's harsh critiques of substantialist positions, and a substantialist reading of Bourdieu's works. (Albeit not central to our approach to methodology, they may be treated in a digression.)

Bourdieu's critique of substantialist approaches to social science is grim. He charges them of "fetishism of concepts, and of 'theory,' born of the propensity to consider 'theoretical' instruments—habitus, field, capital, etc.—in themselves and for themselves, rather than to put them in motion and to make them work."[178] For many of the problems, Bourdieu blames "spontaneous sociology" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 20ff., G: 1991b, 24ff.) for its nonreflective use of everyday language. He goes on against subjectivist theories for turning the individual into the "*ens realissimum* of the spontaneous theory of the social"[179] and criticizes in particular the rational decider in rational choice theory, the face-to-face communicator in Ethnomethodology or Symbolic interactionism, and the Sartre-conform existentialist. He picks at *objectivistic scholars* (like orthodox structuralists, functionalists, or Marxists), on the other hand, for reifying abstract concepts (moving right away from the substantive to substance (Bourdieu 2010, 13f., G: 1982a, 46f.). According to Bourdieu they treat—as quoted above—"constructs like 'culture', 'structures', 'social classes' or 'modes of production' as realities" (Bourdieu 1990b, 37, G: 2008, 71).

Sometimes he hits a point. However, he also tends to stereotype heavily. Often a bold critique of two (supposedly) contrary points of view serves primarily to open the happy medium for Bourdieu's own approach. No matter whether his critiques of alien positions are always justified or not, his relational approach is straightforward. Therefore, our second point (the possible flaws of a substantialist reading of Bourdieu's sociology) seems to be much more interesting. A closer examination of possible substantialist misinterpretations of Bourdieu's work will be useful for our

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178 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 228, G: 1996, 262. See also Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 3, G: 1996, 18).

179 Bourdieu 1968, 690, G: 1970, 19 See also Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, G: 1991b chapters 1.3 and 1.4.

relational understanding of praxeology. In order to clarify first how a substantialist interpretation of a given practice works in contrast to a relationist one, we begin with a substantialist edition of the woodchopper example. Then we proceed with Bourdieu's own concepts, particularly with the way a substantialist reading of Bourdieu's work chops his theory into pieces.

The essence of chopping—the woodchopper 2

Above[180] we have explained relational logic using the example of Max Weber's woodchopper (Weber 1978, 8). We will proceed here to exemplify a substantialist/ essentialist approach to it. We simply apply substantialist procedures, as depicted by Cassirer, to interpret Weber's example of the woodchopper.

Substantialist observers of the woodchopper would probably separate the material activity (body) from the mental (ideas). On both levels, they would first apply a reductive conceptual abstraction. According to different theories (Marxist or rational choice), they might proceed to conclude (left to right) that the woodchopper has either a "worker's conscience" or "fixed preferences" (level of ideas) and belongs either to the "working class" or is a "utility maximizing individual" (level of material life). Inversely (right to left), now the substantialists are in a condition to infer a determination of the woodchopper by his essence as a working class member (worker's conscience) or a utility maximizer (fixed preferences). According to the affiliation of the substantialist scientists to either the materialist or the idealist fraction of the scientific field, they may then establish a second deterministic relation. If they are materialists, they can infer that the material being (worker) determines the ideas of the woodchopper about what he is doing (bottom to top). If they are idealists, they can infer a determination exerted by ideas (worker's conscience of fixed preferences) over the material conditions (top to bottom). In both cases, the tacit premise is that ideas mirror material things or activities, or vice versa—that is, as Cassirer would say, they appear as "a direct, sensuous copy of reality."[181]

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180 P. 119, see also the sketch of Cassirer's critique of substantialism, p. 96.

181 Cassirer 1953, 164. For more on the mirror concept of cognition, see below 2.1.3.

Fig. 6 The substantialist woodchopper

In comparison with the relational approach to the woodchopper problem, the substantialist way of dealing with it turns out to be considerably abstract. It does not tell us anything about the context that the practices and mental conditions are woven in. Instead, the substantialist model recurs to theories (materialist class theory, rational choice) and prefixed theoretical concepts in order to explain the praxis of the woodchopper. Finally, the model is not capable of conceiving the relation between mental and material conditions other than as one-sided determination.

Substantialist interpretations also can be applied to theories.

Chopping Bourdieu's theory

At times, Bourdieu explicitly contradicts substantialist interpretations of his sociology. For instance, people who blame his theory for reductionism read his work in a substantialist, and therefore reductionist, way.

> It is because the analyses reported in *Distinction* are read in a realist and substantialist way (as opposed to a relational one)—thus assigning directly this or that property or practice to a 'class', playing soccer or drinking *pastis* to workers, playing golf or drinking champagne to the traditional *grande bourgeoisie*—that I am taken to task for overlooking the specific logic and autonomy of the symbolic order, thereby reduced to a mere *reflection* of the social order. (In other words, once again, the charge

of reductionism thrown at me is based on a reductionist reading of my analyses.) (Bourdieu 1990g, 113, G: 1989a, 403)[182]

According to Bourdieu, substantialist thinkers (spontaneous sociologists as well as convinced objectivists) address their scientific objects (e.g., individuals or classes) as independent entities, which can be perceived in themselves and endowed with an essence.[183] In the next step, they tend to transform such concepts into key categories for entire theoretical approaches. Thus, they flip from a substantive of description (e.g., the individual or a class) to a theory conceived as a substantial theoretical entity specific to the substantive of description (e.g., methodological individualism or class theory). Of course, this kind of reading may distort a relationist theory.

Based on such a reading, Bourdieu's theory is occasionally criticized as reductionist. In turn, Bourdieu retorts this critique charging his critics of reductionism. This defense is very much in line with Cassirer's critique of substantialism: The key procedure of a substantialist science towards reality is reduction by abstraction while the relationist approach relies precisely upon establishing as many relations of the *explicandum* to other objects as possible in order to construct a series.

In order to illustrate a substantialist reading of Bourdieu's theory, we apply once again substantialist procedures, as depicted by Cassirer—this time to some key theorems of praxeology, abused for a substantialist explanation of the woodchopper.

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182 Or with Brubaker's words one can state that "the reception of Bourdieu's work has largely been determined by the same 'false frontiers' and 'artificial divisions' that his work has repeatedly challenged." (Brubaker 1985, 771; quoted in Wacquant 1993, 241).

183 "The 'substantialist' and naively realist reading considers each practice (playing golf, for example) or pattern of consumption (Chinese food, for instance) in and for itself, independently of the universe of substitutable practices…" and moreover ascribes "substantial properties" and "biological or cultural *essence*" (Bourdieu 1998d, 3f., G: 1998e, 15f.). See also Loic Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 3, G: 1996, 18), who states that substantialist theories favor endoxic notions such as individual in opposition to society and infer from them theoretical antinomies like methodological individualism versus structuralism. These are terms, which are "not probable but plausible" in the sense of being likely to be applauded by the public (Bourdieu 1991c, 376).

Fig. 7   Chopping Bourdieu

As depicted in the *diagram* (Fig. 7), it is possible to imagine theories as entities or single objects of cognition. Thus, the theory of habitus could be understood as a theoretical object designating subjective action; or the theory of field as an entity designating objective structures. If theoretical concepts are conceived as abstract essences of existing things, the theoretical terms can be reified and appear in scientific discourse as real social objects or facts—for instance, a reified social class or a habitus. Sentences like "there is a habitus," "a habitus exists (in a field)," or "a field contains a habitus," and so forth, often indicate such a reification. (This will especially be the case if the epistemological environment of such utterances is also substantialist.)[184] Once one proceeds from the existence of a theoretical concept to the existence of a coextensive social reality (the habitus of given individuals, the political field of a given nation, etc.), it is but a small step to further consequences. In a general way, the theory, instead of being seen as an ensemble of tools, may now be seen as a symbolic or mental entity in itself. Accordingly, two practical implications may appear: First, the theoretical entities (habitus, fields, etc.) can be

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184 Relationists may also pronounce such sentences in the heat of an empirical debate but the relationist approach itself tells us that the contextual relations of such utterances in relationist environments allow for a different understanding.

conceived of as the determining ideas and actions of the actors in question. This alleged determinism converts praxis (wood chopping) into reified theory (the woodchopper as idea or as physical matter). Secondly, according to either idealist or materialist affiliation of the scientists, two different variants of determination may be adduced: Some might allege a rational choice character of praxeology with a determination of "fields" by "habitus." Others might allege a materialist character of praxeology with a determination of "habitus" by "fields." Bourdieu counters such reifications with the diagnosis of "scholastic fallacy," either with a subjectivist (A) or with an objectivist tendency (B).[185]

There is no doubt that a relationist approach to praxis has to deal with complex (processual) relations. There is also no doubt that relationist researchers work with concepts such as habitus, capital, and the like. However, these concepts are nothing more than names, or ciphers, for functional principles of certain series that have to be kept in mind in order to understand the functional principle. Further, each theoretical concept is nothing more than an element of the theoretical series it belongs to. In other words, habitus is nothing without field, or disposition, or capital, et cetera. Instead, from a substantialist or essentialist point of view, a concept is a stand-alone, abstract theoretical entity. Hence, it seems natural to grasp just one Bourdieuian concept to work with, for instance, social capital in and of itself, without taking into account the concept's relative value and use in relation to other theoretical tools such as fields, *illusio*, game, investment, style, and the like. It is true, Bourdieu emphasizes that his theory is like a toolbox and the concepts are open to further development. However, it is also true that a toolbox consists of different tools each with a special function complementing the function of the other tools, and it is not very likely that someone pimps his motorbike simply with a hammer.

Chopping Bourdieu's critique

A substantialist reading not only misunderstands relational theory, it is even prone to reifying Bourdieu's criticisms on reification. A "critique of the critical critique" (Marx/Engels) is needed. We can exemplify this with the contraposition of "materialist social physics" and "idealist semiology" (Bourdieu 2010, 484f., G: 1982a, 752f.) and Bourdieu's intention to overcome this disjunction. From a substantialist understanding, his intention can be understood as the will to abolish two separated theoretical entities. From this point it follows that one would also want to abolish the theoretical and methodological distinction between the distribution of goods, on the one hand, and the distribution of beliefs and attitudes, on the other hand.

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185 See Bourdieu 2000a, 49ff., G: 2001a, 64ff.; 1990b, 30ff., 42ff., G: 2008, 57ff., 79ff.; 1990h, G: 1998f.

The result is a lumping together of the conceptual distinctions (not separations!) into one indistinct essential entity, the "practical *nature* of social life."[186] Definitely, Bourdieu abolished neither subjective actors and social structures nor symbolic utterances and material goods as analytical concepts; he abolished rather the (subjectivist and objectivist or materialist and idealist) scholarly ways of approaching different aspects of praxis as if these aspects were separate substantial entities. In consequence, the hint about the practical nature of social life indeed brings to mind an advanced level of distorting Bourdieu's relationism.

Not that much advanced are critiques that impute either a determinism of social structure or an approach of individualist utility maximization to Bourdieu's concept of praxis.[187] There are hints for either allegation to be found in Bourdieu's texts: on the one hand, structuration of the habitūs by social conditions; on the other hand, the interests of the actors. However, the point is epistemological. If a reader takes one of these two aspects of praxis (there are a myriad more!) as a property, a *differentia specifica* that defines praxis,[188] the theory of course becomes either "deterministic" or "utilitarian." In contrast, a relationist approach will recognize that both the interests of actors and social conditions—as well as *many more* factors—constitute praxis, and that any of these factors conditions praxis only in a certain respect and never completely.

Bourdieu calls for surmounting the work with isolated, thing-like, substantialist concepts such as individual, society, and the like. A substantialist reader might draw the conclusion of lumping together the old notions into a new concept: "Praxis" and the "practical nature of social life" might sound attractive at first. However,

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186 I took this quote not by chance. In HabitusAnalysis we methodologically distinguish between goods and beliefs in order to be able to describe the relation between them systematically. A peer reviewer of an article of mine misunderstood "distinguishing" as "tearing apart" what Bourdieu had meant to be the "practical nature of social life." This person seems to have a strongly essentialist quill, and I wonder what he might have meant by "nature."

187 See for more detail vol. 2.

188 One also could talk about a predicate that defines a subject. In this case, there is an interesting parallel to be found in the discussion about the Aristotelian principle of contradiction. Tugendhat and Wolf (1993, 50ff., 59) explain a modern understanding of the principle with reference to Strawson (1971, chap. 1). A common misunderstanding of the principle is to take a predicate for something definite (*etwas Bestimmtes*) and conclude there from that a contradiction already takes place when a subject has two mutually exclusive predicates. A similar misunderstanding of praxis is to say that praxis is either determined by structure or individual choice, not both. As for the logical problem, the misunderstanding consists in denying that an object can be red and edged at the same time.

understood as a separate, self-contained, and independent theoretical entity the word *praxis* is almost as far from relationist praxeology as the eternal nature of the things in Plato's philosophy is.[189]

1.3   Excursus: Substantializing Bourdieu

Based on Cassirer's critique of substantialism, the flaws of this kind of scientific thought in the social sciences is discussed threefold: first in relation to social praxis with recourse to Weber's woodchopper; second, through an assessment of the substantialist critique of Bourdieu's praxeology; and third, through a critique of the substantialist reception of Bourdieu's critique of substantialism.

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189 Max Weber characterized the problem of conceptual realism in sociology as the belief to have grasped, by the theoretical "concept-images" (Begriffsbilder), the essence of historical reality. (Weber, quoted in Fürstenberg 1956, 624)

Subject, object, mind and matter— coordinates of praxeology

<div style="text-align:right">**2**</div>

We observe again the peasant and the military officer in conversation. We have already seen that they do not simply enter into a face-to-face relation, unencumbered of previous conditions. Rather, when these two people enter into dialogue, everything they can think of and say is permeated by the social relations they have been brought up in and within which they are now situated. Every word they pronounce, every gesture they make corresponds to the limits of what they can think of. And their words and gestures derive meaning from the mental schemes each of them owns, and also from the very situation they are in. Any utterance exerts an effect in the moment they talk to each other and beyond that moment—an effect that can easily turn out to be dangerous for the peasant.

The fact that both belong to non-Catholic churches does not help. Instead, their beliefs separate them from each other even more. The indigenous peasant is a member of a small Pentecostal group. He hopes that the Lord will come back soon to rapture the True Church out of the turmoil of violence and to punish the rich and the violent. The officer is a member of an upper-class neo-Pentecostal church. He is firmly convinced that he has the power of the Holy Spirit to cast out the demons that possess and are driving the insurgent peasants; and one never knows behind what pious masquerade the demons may hide—maybe even behind the façade of an outwardly Pentecostal peasant.

"The Real is Relational" (Bourdieu 1998d, 3, G: 1998e, 15)—the real, for sociology, can be described as praxis. Bourdieu refers to the young Marx in order to foster a relationist approach in sociology and to advance the neo-Kantian brand of relationism into a praxeological one. Especially in the context of habitus, he often quotes the first thesis of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*.[190] The thesis condenses two

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190   See among others Bourdieu 1990b, 52, G: 2008, 97; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 121, G: 1996, 154; Bourdieu 2009, 143 (not included in the English translation). The text of the first thesis see below, p. 149.

relations, which are both important for praxeological theory: one between knowledge (mind) and material social conditions (matter), and the other between subject and object. These relations help to narrow down how "reality" can be (sociologically) constructed. Accordingly and with regard to the title of this part (Subject, object, mind and matter—coordinates of praxeology), one could make the following point. Praxis is not another abstract, reified concept for reality; rather, reality in the praxeological sense of the term is the series of social structures, practices, dispositions, and the like, that are organized according to praxis as the principle of distinction: sensorial human activity and its structural context. In other words, we understand the concept of praxis as the organizing principle of a series of scientific terms (such as habitus, strategy, capital, goods, signs, discourse, etc.) that spell the meaning of the concept by way of its descriptive range.

The relations mentioned in *Theses on Feuerbach* address crucial problems about the definition of reality in the humanities. The first problem goes back to the early days of philosophy (eventually discussed as the mind-body-problem). The second problem acquired its actual shape with early modernity. Since then, both problems tend to merge. Knowledge is very much associated with the knowing subject while nature and social conditions are seen as material objects. Nevertheless, this distinction underwent many transformations during modernity. As for early modern continental philosophy, since the mid-eighteenth century the distinction of "subjective versus objective" has become the established vocabulary as to designate the opposition between the "states of the (human) mind and the things."[191] In this context, Kant above all relativized the status of objects. According to him, human perception cannot experience things in themselves (*an sich*). Hegel and Marx introduced the idea of a dialectics between subject and object and with it the idea that reality is constantly being produced—according to the subject, primarily by the labor of ideas, and according to the object, primarily by physical labor. In contrast, Cassirer has developed another concept of subjectivity and objectivity that defines both as different states of the stability and reliability of knowledge.

Bourdieu stays more with Marx, but sometimes slides towards Cassirer. In the heat of writing about empirical problems, his diction may sometimes also shift into the simple identification of subject with the knowing human and of object with material things. The relations between object and subject as well as those between knowledge and the material world are crucial for Bourdieu's praxeology—not least because they become sublated in the concept of habitus. The mental and the material as well as the objective and the subjective aspects of praxis are considered

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191   Karskens 1998a, 407ff.; see also: Knebel 1998a; Knebel 1998b; Onnasch 1998; Karskens 1998b.

altogether in the relation between habitus and fields. But they are not lumped into one, as it often has been done in recent decades by "both/and-approaches" aimed at the "instantaneous dissolving of what for centuries have been understood as profound antinomies."[192]

When Bourdieu speaks about "dialectic," this means that the antinomies that constitute the dialectical movement are not lost somewhere in the discursive space, but rather are sublated in another concept. The antinomies—or better, the semantic oppositions—stay intact as terms of a dialectical transformation. Bourdieu does not conceive of them as separated substances, each in and of itself, and mutually incompatible.[193] Rather he sees them as terms mutually constituted by specific relations between them. It is toward these constitutive relations that the analytical attention is directed. For this reason, in this chapter we will examine subject, object, mind, and matter. We approach these concepts as analytical distinctions that facilitate the understanding of praxis as immediate social reality for the actors involved and as distinguishable social reality for the observing sociologists.

In the present part, we will approach the multifaceted relations between subject, object, mind, and matter with specific regard to habitus theory. We have two goals

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192 Martin 2003, 2. Martin argues that in the recent past it has become fashionable to dissolve long-standing antinomies (such as "structure/agency, macro/micro, social/individual, nature/nurture, static/dynamic," similar to subject/object, mind/matter) postulating that in any one antinomy both terms are important, thus suffocating analytical and theoretical potential. "A premature defusing of this tension robs us of an important incentive to theorize," and rather fosters a proliferation of issue-specific "theories." We consider these developments as a result of disregarding basic epistemological considerations, as we already have sketched in the "Excursus: Substantializing Bourdieu" (1.3).

193 If there are so many sociologists who state incompatibilities and mutual exclusiveness between terms such as mind and matter, probably a look at the substantialist system of classification helps to understand this point of view. The problem resides in the fact that these terms are taken as real entities in themselves. Consequently, the Arbor Porphyriana (see above Fig. 1, p. 98) allows understanding this intellectual operation. The Arbor shows that mind and matter are classified as two different genera. So, how should they be applied to a coherent social reality and be maintained at the same time as different categories? Aren't they different entities? In contrast, from a deconstructionist point of view, the problem is the hierarchical classification of substances in classical ontology. In this vein, Deleuze and Guattari postulate the model of a rhizome for the organization of knowledge. See Deleuze and Guattari 1983. From a relationist point of view, Cassirer responds to the problem by the transformation of a metaphysical approach into an epistemological one, and by the organization of knowledge in series. Bourdieu's contribution is the transformation of the series into relational sociological theories and models. In consequence, the point for our endeavor of HabitusAnalysis is to develop models that sublate (overcome and maintain) the traditional antinomies.

in mind. The first is to better understand Bourdieu's proposal. Bourdieu's writings oscillate between different usages of the terms mentioned. Therefore, it is useful to take into account the historical development of the debates relevant to Bourdieu's texts. Three proposals are particularly interesting.

1. The early modern (ontological) separation between the perceiving human and the thing-like reality is the standard of any usage according to common sense. It does not need further comment.
2. Marx's proposal for a dialectic relation, combining physical and cognitive labor, is also relevant and has to be considered.
3. Cassirer's distinction between subjectivity and objectivity as different states of the stability and reliability of knowledge and of perceived phenomena requires some attention.

Considering this, we hope to reach our second goal: to arrive at a sufficiently clear, systematic proposal for the theoretical relation between things and mental dispositions as well as between subject and object, in order to have a reference point for our methodological proposal of HabitusAnalysis.

For this purpose, it seems useful to follow Bourdieu's own way of locating his theory in the scientific field. He sketches competing theories under the labels of object*ivism* and subject*ivism,* social physics, and semiology in order to stake out the terrain and thereby mark his own path for theoretical advancement. While the labels are often somewhat overdrawn, the theoretical map is useful.

At the outset of this part, we will sketch this map and some traits of Bourdieu's particular path. Then we discuss Cassirer's and Marx's proposals insofar as they are relevant for our reading of Bourdieu, and we sketch with thin strokes some praxeological consequences. The two following chapters, we will dedicate to the relation between matter and mind as well as between objects and subjects. Since we are interested in language and meaning, the chapter on things and signs will go into more detail. We close this part bringing mind, matter, subjects, and objects together as epistemological coordinates of social theory that serve as to expose both an epistemological undercurrent of praxeology and explicit desiderata for the praxeological approach.

2.1 Objectivism, subjectivism, praxeology—Bourdieu's third way

Since we will have to carefully integrate habitus theory and language, it is wise not to step into the traps of those theoretical currents Bourdieu marked as incompatible with his approach. Therefore, we summarize Bourdieu's critique of "subjectivism," "objectivism," "idealist semiology," and "social physics." The labels Bourdieu employs and the anathemas he pronounces are often sweeping. They hardly depict in depth the theories he addresses. However, we aim neither to do justice to these theories nor to critically examine Bourdieu's judgments. We simply want to indicate a path we can follow for developing an analytical method from habitus theory.

2.1.1 Objectivism and subjectivism—Bourdieu's critique

Bourdieu follows two main lines of argument. One line of thought treats the problem of the disjunction between objective social structures and subjective actors. It contrasts the objectification of the social world by objectivist theories with "the imaginary anthropology of subjectivism."[194] For Bourdieu, Sartre is as emblematically a subjectivist as Saussure and Levi-Strauss represent objectivism per se.[195]

The other course of critique deals with the separation of physical and mental aspects of the social world in some social theories:

> It is necessary, first, to overcome the opposition between a physicalist vision of the social world that conceives of social relations as relations of physical force and a 'cybernetic' or semiological vision which portrays them as | relations of symbolic force, as relations of meaning or relations of communication. (Bourdieu 1999a, 52f., G: 1998a, 115f.)

While in the heat of writing and giving interviews, sometimes Bourdieu's distinctions and overlaps become somewhat blurred,[196] however, the underlying logic of

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194 Bourdieu 1990b, 30ff., 42ff., G: 2008, 57ff., 79ff. See also the French (Bourdieu 1972, 162ff.) and the German (Bourdieu 2009, 146ff.) version of *Outline of a Theory of Praxis* with a detailed discussion of "three modes of theoretical knowledge": objectivism, subjectivism, and praxeology. Similar in Bourdieu 1977b, 3ff.

195 Bourdieu 2009, 151, trans. HWS, passage not included in English. See also Bourdieu 1990b, 30ff., 42ff., G: 2008, 57ff., 79ff.

196 …for instance the classification of his own work as „structuralist constructivism" (Bourdieu 1990c, 124, G: 1992b, 135).

critique is quite clear and telling.[197] Reconstructing the logic of Bourdieu's approach, we can simply distinguish the field of problematic sociological episteme into four positions: an objectivist and a subjectivist "social physics," and an objectivist and a subjectivist "social semiology."[198] We can take these distinctions and Bourdieu's corresponding assessments of scientific schools or currents as signposts in the field of scientific theories in order to guide our reading of Bourdieu's reception of the said theories.

Social physics

According to the subject-object distinction, one can observe two sorts of what Bourdieu calls social physics.

Objectivist social physics is one of Bourdieu's preferred targets: It is the "present-day structuralist readers of Marx," as for instance Althusser, who conceives the relation between objective social structures and human practice as equivalent to the relation between "essence and existence" in traditional substantialist philosophy (Bourdieu 1990b, 41, G: 2008, 78). Thus, these readers "reduce history to a 'process without a subject', simply replacing the 'creative subject' of subjectivism with an automaton driven by the dead laws of a history of nature" (ibid.). More importantly, Bourdieu refers to the structural functionalists after Durkheim, especially to their economicist fraction: This school seeks to "grasp an 'objective reality'" by reducing its program to "analysing the statistical relationships among distributions of material properties."[199] Thus, it maintains a strong affinity to positivism.[200] Similar to the

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197 „Speaking in very general terms, social science […] oscillates between two apparently incompatible points of view […]: objectivism and subjectivism, or, if you prefer, physicalism and psychologism" (Bourdieu 1990c, 124, G: 1992b, 136). For the following lines I recurred mainly to this text: Bourdieu 1977b, 3ff., G: 2009, 146ff. on "three modes of theoretical knowledge."

198 If one would like to determine dominant and dominated positions in this field, one could observe, during Bourdieu's lifetime, a change of orthodoxy from objectivism—be it Marxist or Saussurean/Levi-Straussean—to subjectivism, especially in its idealistic variants, such as postmodern philosophy and the cultural (mostly literary) sciences. Things "turned," so to say. Today, it might therefore be prudent to beware especially of subjectivist and idealist seductions.

199 Bourdieu 1990b, 135, G: 2008, 246. This scientific position clings exclusively to "statistics in objectivist fashion to establish distributions (in both the statistical and economic senses), quantified expressions […], identified through 'objective indicators'" (Bourdieu 2010, 484f., G: 1982a, 752f.).

200 And especially an affinity to the "positivist inclination to see classifications either as arbitrary 'operational' divisions (such as age groups or income brackets) or as 'objective' cleavages (discontinuities in distributions or bends in curves) which only need to be

economicist line of Marxists, these functionalists concentrate on the "mechanics of power relations" (Bourdieu 1990b, 136, G: 2008, 247) but, in the end, they are not able to see relations of domination, even in the relations among social classes. As Bourdieu points out, with regard to human action any of these approaches convey the idea of a mechanical determination of action by structure (Bourdieu 1990b, 46, G: 2008, 86f.).

Subjectivist social physics also implies rigid determination of human action, but in this case due to the fixed preferences of the rational utility maximizer. However, Bourdieu does not label this branch of theory subjectivist social physics. It simply appears as the subjectivist counterpart of objectivist economicism,[201] which Bourdieu especially associates with the names of Jon Elster and Gary Becker. In their theories, "the so-called 'rational actor' theory oscillates between the ultrafinalist subjectivism […] and an intellectual determinism which […] is separated only by a few differences in phrasing from a mechanistic determinism"[202] typical of objectivist social physics. Another indicator for a physicist approach to individual action might be seen in "numerous theoretical models" (Bourdieu 1990b, 47, G: 2008, 88) that convey an air of intended rationality to the agent, but at the same time determine the subject's action by the principles of fixed preferences and utility maximizing—thus conveying an objectivist consecration to a seemingly subjectivist theory of action.

Semiology

In contrast to the two brands of social physics, another problematic approach is "'social semiology' which seeks to decipher meanings and bring to light the cognitive operations whereby agents produce and decipher them" (Bourdieu 2010, 485, G: 1982a, 753).

Subjectivist semiology for Bourdieu is represented mainly by phenomenological sociology (e.g., Schütz), by Symbolic interactionism (Blumer) or by Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel). Alfred Schütz, according to Bourdieu's view, "takes exactly the opposite standpoint to that of Durkheim" (Bourdieu 1990c, 125, G: 1992b, 137) as

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recorded" (Bourdieu 2010, 591, n. 23, G: 1982a, 753, n. 20). This refers not least to the American Durkheim tradition surrounding Parsons with an inclination to both grand theory and pointillistic positivism as well as "attempts to mimic […] hard sciences" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 175ff., G: 1996, 213). See also Bourdieu 1990c, 124f., G: 1992b, 135.

201 See Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 117ff., especially 119f., G: 1996, 149ff., 151f.; with more detail Bourdieu 1990b, 46ff., G: 2008, 86ff.

202   Bourdieu 1990b, 46, G: 2008, 86f. More details on the "false dilemma between mechanism and finalism" in Bourdieu 1977b, 72ff., G: 2009, 164ff. See also Bourdieu 1990c, 125, G: 1992b, 136f.

he establishes the decisive clue for this line of social science. Schütz concentrates scientific observation on the "objects of thought" in common sense, by which the individuals establish the "structures of pertinence" of their everyday "lifeworld." Accordingly, Garfinkel studies "accounts of accounts." Following Schütz, social science has to reconstruct the cognitive constructions that actors make of their world. Symbolic interactionism and Ethnomethodology[203] develop this program with greater attention to the role of human interaction for the mental construction of mental representations of the social world. For instance, these approaches consider expectations in face-to-face encounters. Nevertheless, in Bourdieu's view "social phenomenology" tends to reduce the social order

> to a collective classification obtained by addition of the classifying and classified judgments through which agents classify and are classified, or, to put it another way, through aggregation of the (mental) representations that one group has of the (theatrical) representations that other groups give them and of the (mental) representations that the latter have of them (Bourdieu 1990b, 135f., G: 2008, 247).

According to Bourdieu, all of these scientific accounts forget that there is no "universal subject, the transcendental ego of phenomenology" (Bourdieu 1990c, 130, G: 1992b, 243). They set aside that the actors rather are subject to social conditions and to differences between classes, which exert an effect on the way the actors construct their mental distinctions of the social world, that is, their classifications.

Objectivist semiology refers mainly to the structuralist tradition following Saussure. Bourdieu sees one important similarity among different theorists, such as Saussure, Chomski, and Levi-Straus, as well as neo-Kantian idealism. It is the common supposition that language and other systems of signs subsist as objective symbolic structures that predetermine linguistic practices.[204] For Bourdieu, Chomski's distinction between competence and performance is a telling example of the "fundamental division between the language [as objective system, *langue*, HWS] and its realization in speech" (Bourdieu 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61). This distinction haunts all forms of structuralism. The Saussurean concept of *langue* translates into different strands of structuralism as the supposition of universal objective structures of language and mind, regardless of social and cultural differences. Levi-Strauss goes so far as to postulate that the structure of myths thinks itself within human beings (Lévi-Strauss 1983, 12). Finally, the problem boils down (in a paradoxical expression) to a "relationist substantialism" insofar as Levi-Strauss "reifies ab-

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203 Bourdieu 2009, 148ff.; this passage is not included in the French and English editions.
204 Bourdieu 1990b, 70ff., G: 2008, 57ff.; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 121, G: 1996, 154; see also in German: 2009, 151ff., English: Bourdieu 1977b, ca. 23ff.

stractions" (Bourdieu 1990b, 37, G: 2008, 71). Bourdieu's principal critique is clear: Objectivist semiology disregards the social genesis of (albeit systemic) language and its use in social relations as well as the operations of practical logic, both of which are by no means simple applications of prestructured symbolic forms, grammars, or mental structures.

Beyond this critique, two more observations are relevant for us. The first one points to an intellectualist tendency in semiotic objectivism. One of the results of this tendency is the "fact of introducing into the object the intellectual relation to the object" (Bourdieu 1990b, 34, G: 2008, 65). In sum, it is the constant danger of all work with models: to confuse the model of reality with reality itself. Another effect of intellectualism concerns more closely the understanding of language. This effect entails "apprehending language from the standpoint of the listening rather than the speaking subject, that is, as a means of decoding rather than a 'means of action and expression'" (Bourdieu 1990b, 33, G: 2008, 63).

The second observation regards the use of models (instead of a simple narration of the narration): The epistemological conscience that a break with the "natural attitude" (Husserl) or "doxic experience" (Bourdieu 1990b, 31, G: 2008, 58) of the actors is necessary in order to uncover the logic of the objective structures that make the actors say what they say and do what they do. According to "objectivism," these structures are unconscious. Moreover, following Bourdieu, the presupposition of the unconsciousness of objective mental structures is common between semiological objectivism and Durkheimian and Marxian social physics.[205] As an intermediate step of analysis, Bourdieu does not oppose the necessity of constructing the scientific object through the use of an objectivistic model. What he rejects is the objectivist way (for instance, in Levi-Strauss) of using models as a "*Deus ex machina*": locating the finality of action in the very mechanism of the model and "forgetting historical action" (Bourdieu 1990b, 40, G: 2008, 76).

In conclusion, what Bourdieu criticizes is a latent substantialism. The *…isms* set out from a concept like subject, object, mind, or matter. Then they transform the concept into an exclusivist theoretical program. Instead of relations between knowledge and the thing, between subject and object, they establish dichotomies between theories. Bourdieu's theory of the habitus is developed with the purpose of opening a third way.

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205 Bourdieu 1990c, 124f., G: 1992b, 136f.; 1990b, 40, G: 2008, 75f.

No dichotomies, but habitus

Bourdieu highlights the programmatic exclusiveness of objecti*vism* and subjecti*vism*, semiology and social physics (In part, this highlighting may be due to his broad-brushed assessment of theories). This mutual exclusiveness results in dichotomies.

> We have to refuse the *dichotomy* between, on the one hand, the aim of arriving at an objective 'reality', 'independent of individual consciousnesses and wills', […] and, on the other hand, the aim of grasping, not 'reality', but agents' representations of it (Bourdieu 2010, 485, G: 1982a, 752f.).

In contrast to these dichotomies, from a praxeological point of view the *relations* between subject and object as well as between signs and things are the focus. In terms of theory, Bourdieu's praxeology is open to combining as many perspectives as it is useful for serving a determinate research interest, as long as the perspectives' mutual effects are under conscious scientific control and none of them reintroduce substantialistic epistemology. The relationist architecture of praxeological theory itself facilitates the adaption and use of different theoretical traits and impulses of other theories, such as the theory of the body by Merleau-Ponty or Mauss.

Accordingly, Wacquant can summarize the useful aspects conveyed by objectivist and subjectivist approaches: Objectivism undermines the "illusion of the transparency of the social world" and it helps to decode the "unwritten musical score" underlying social action (Wacquant in: Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 8, G: 1996, 25, quoting Bourdieu). Subjectivism, especially phenomenology, underscores the "part that mundane knowledge, subjective *meaning*, and practical competency play in the continual production of society"; subjectivism also highlights the symbolic systems of relevance (Schütz) "through which persons endow their 'life-world' with *sense*." (Wacquant in: Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 9, G: 1996, 27, partly quoting Schütz)

Moreover, relational epistemology serves to sort out or bridge problematic disjunctions (originating in substantialism or everyday thought) such as determined/ free, mental/material, identity/strategy, "individual/society, individual/collective, conscious/unconscious, interested/disinterested, objective/subjective" (Bourdieu 1998b, VIII, G: 2007, 8).

With respect to the four different theoretical challenges pointed out above, the theory of the habitus turns out to be the most comprehensive praxeological response. The problem of determinism in objective and subjective social physics is overcome by the two-way relation between habitus and field, the latter a relation mediated by a complex interplay of experiences and dispositions. In this context, the concept of dispositions moreover conveys a particular notion of strategy that resolves the problems of fixed preferences.

With regard to subjective semiology, praxeology can well integrate the phenomenological attention to interactions, ascriptions, and expectations. Furthermore, within the framework of the habitus theory it is also possible to elaborate a praxeological concept of identity, a notion Bourdieu sometimes uses (see vol. 2) but never develops theoretically.

Concerning objective semiology, the theory of the habitus is well suited to avoid the objectivistic pitfalls for sociology, such as universal semantics or structures of the human mind. It also is useful to resolve the problem of unconscious universal structures. These are substituted by the implicit operations of the cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of the habitus. However, the dispositions of the habitus have more important functions for theory and method. They mediate the structuring effects that the society has on the experience of the actors (Bourdieu 1990b, 41, G: 2008, 77f.). In consequence, the perceptions and worldviews of the actors are a social fact that has to be taken into account in the study of the social distribution of power and goods (Bourdieu 1990c, 130, G: 1992b, 143). Inversely, this means that the study of language has to consider the positions that the speakers occupy in the power structures of society and how their positions are affected by social "invitations and threats" (Bourdieu 2010, 469, G: 1982a, 729). Our model of the praxeological square aims exactly at this kind of research.

In consequence, we find it interesting that, historically, behind subjectivism, objectivism, semiology, and social physics stand age-old distinctions between mind and matter as well as between subject and object. For praxeology, Marx and Cassirer seem to be of special interest when it comes to dealing with the said distinctions.

2.1.2   Subject, object, and perception—Bourdieu's sources

Bourdieu's concept of habitus has many sources, relative to its multiple aspects. With regard to aspects of relational epistemology and the subject-object dynamics, Marx and Cassirer offer two outstanding and independent theories that serve Bourdieu as important sources. The two scholars roughly coincide in a relational approach to their respective objects of study. Both also address the old key issues of subject, object, mind, and matter. Nevertheless, they differ regarding their approaches to the key issues as well as regarding their use of subject (subjectivity) and object (objectivity).

Marx

Marx has integrated the four said aspects of reality in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, a vital text for Bourdieu.

> The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the *object*, or of *contemplation* (*Anschauung*), but not as sensuous human activity, practice (*Praxis*), not *subjectively*. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as *objective* activity. (Marx and Engels 1998, 569)

Marx criticizes two oppositions of terms. The first is the separation of a (passive) object and an (active) subject; the second is the contraposition of materialism and idealism. Marx relates the terms to one another postulating that sensuous human activity should be conceived *simultaneously* as subjective and objective activity.

From this point of view, Bourdieu creates plausibility for a concept of praxis that pivots on the relation between habitus and field (and space); at times, he addresses more the aspect of perception or cognition (mental schemes, cognitive dispositions, etc.), and at other times he addresses more the aspect of the subject-object relation (actors, structures). This is similar to Cassirer who, when developing his concept of reality, also deals with relational concepts of subjectivity and objectivity, generated from his relational theory of perception.

Both overlap and distinction between the pairs of subject-object and mental-material have comprehensible reasons for appearing in philosophical and sociological writing. On the one hand, in (at least) the Western philosophical tradition, it is quite normal to think of perception of "the world" as something that happens between a human (mental) subject and outer (material) objects, between inside and outside, so to say. (At the latest, since Descartes' epistemological subjectivity, these distinctions, or separations, have become central schemes of European thought.) Thus, overlaps between subject-object and mental-material are frequent when perception, cognition, or psychology is in debate. On the other hand, not every issue regarding subjects or objects has to do with perception or materiality. (For instance, methodological individualism as applied in classical rational choice theory can dismiss structured perception almost entirely as it concentrates on the subject and operates with the presupposition of fixed preferences.)

However, in a coherent praxeological sociology none of these aspects of praxis implicit in Marx's thesis (knowledge, things, subject, and object) can be disregarded. Bourdieu joins all four aspects in the concept of habitus, conceived in a strictly relational way. In other words, the elements of the series—knowledge, things, subjects, and objects—interpret and identify one another mutually. Relationality with regard to knowledge and things as well as to subject and object leads again to Cassirer.

Cassirer

In Cassirer, perception is the pivotal concept for understanding relations. Perception operates by means of the relation between knowledge and sensorial experiences. Taken with a grain of salt, in Marx, the active practical relation between subject and object is primary and allows the conceptualization of the relation between knowledge and things. In Cassirer, inversely, perception or knowledge gives the clue to conceive subjectivity and objectivity. The result in Cassirer is very different from the commonsense idea of subject and object. On the one side, it causes Bourdieu's use of these terms to be sometimes blurred; on the other, it conveys a surplus value when it comes to understanding seemingly paradoxical expressions of Bourdieu, such as subjective objectivity or objective subjectivity.

Cassirer begins the chapter "The Concept of Reality" in *Substance and Function* with a *remark on metaphysics*. The "old question as to the relation of thought and being, of the subject and object of knowledge"[206] is the classical locus for metaphysical strategies of ontological separation. The metaphysical tradition has been "transforming what is logically correlative into an opposition of things" (271). The conceptual separation between things and mind is transformed "into two separate spatial spheres, into an inner and an outer world, between which there is no intelligible causal connection" (271). In contrast, the relational approach offers a different view of these central issues of human praxis (cf. 271ff., 296ff.).

From the *relationist viewpoint*, Cassirer points out that one can observe that the "immediate experience" (272) does not even convey a notion of a difference between subject and object; only by logical reflection can empirical perception begin to establish differences; but finally, only science bears in germ the distinction of subject and object. However, according to Cassirer, the goal of empirical knowledge is not to mirror things in the world, but to gain ultimate invariants by constructing series "which remain steadfast in the flux of experience" (272). He calls these invariants "objective." In contrast, the term "subjective" expresses the "particular, unique here and now" (272). Thus, the opposition of subjective versus objective "signifies the differing power of empirical judgments to withstand continuous testing by theory and observation, without thereby being altered in content" (274). Hence, objectivity is generated by means of constructing, testing, and (collectively) acknowledging series (or structures). Subjectivity refers to the situational, unstable, and particular, which have not gone through a long process of becoming established and, therefore, have no stable position in an established series. One might imagine the relation between subjectivity and objectivity as a continuum of increasing stability between the pole of subjectivity and the pole of objectivity.

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206 Cassirer 1953, 271. The numbers in parentheses along this section refer to this book.

Accordingly, Cassirer proposes to distinguish various degrees of *objectivity* (275), the highest of which is the "thing-concept of ordinary experience" and of "science" (276). Correspondingly, things are defined as "metaphorical expressions of permanent connections of phenomena according to law, and thus expressions of the constancy and continuity of experience itself" (276). This concept of thing—only at first glance somewhat uncommon to common sense and to sociology[207]—does not derive its meaning from its metaphoric character but rather from the permanent connections of phenomena.

We can exemplify the important role of connections by the status of the individual case in relationist thinking. According to Cassirer, in relational thought the individual case is not forgotten (for instance, due to an abstract universalistic concept). Rather, it is retained and explained together with other cases by a "principle of serial order" (20). Thus, the members of the series are "bound together by an inclusive law." Moreover, the "more firmly this connection according to laws is established," the more unambiguously the particular is determined by its place in the series and the more objective it is rendered.

The other end of the continuum of stability is named *subjectivity*, referring to the volatile and fugitive impressions of the here and now, the particular. Hence, one may think of occasional phenomena, for instance individual impressions, in comparison to collectively shared doctrines.

In conclusion, Cassirer proposes to conceive subjectivity and objectivity in a very consistent relationist way as the poles of a continuum. On one end of the continuum, we find constant, tested, and reliable relations, that is, well-established and well-known series with fixed positions. On the other end, we see casual, fugitive, and poorly reliable relations, that is, particular cases with unclear positions in scattered series. If one employs the notion of network instead of series, we have dense and strong networks on the first end and widespread and loose networks on the other. Thus, subjectivity and objectivity result in being conceived as sparse or dense networks of knowledge.

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207 In contrast, this concept of thing should be quite normal for common sense. Even the most everyday sort of thing, such as a cup, is a thing because of its permanence to perception and its genesis, effects, and use in relation to other things and to actors. Hence, the error of a naïve commonsense objectivism does not lie in ascribing an object-character to things, but in forgetting their history and use. With regard to sociology, Friedrich Fürstenberg (1966, 441) turns his observations about the operational, functional, and historical dimensions of society into the following classical definition: "The recognizable, relatively continuous social network of mutual effects in a given society is its social structure." (*Der erkennbare, relativ kontinuierliche soziale Wirkungszusammenhang in der Gesellschaft ist ihre Sozialstruktur.*) See on the development of different concepts of structure also Fürstenberg 1956.

It is obvious that this approach to subjectivity and objectivity does not easily match either with the commonsense concept of subject and object or with the dialectical concept of Hegel or Marx. Further, Cassirer's focus on knowledge is only partly suitable for Bourdieu's purpose to relate embodied knowledge and social structures in his sociology of praxis. These incompatibilities may explain why, in Bourdieu's sociological relationism, the concepts of subject and object remain somewhat blurred. Sometimes Cassirer's heritage, and that of the structuralists, is strongly palpable, as for example in the metaphor of a network of schemes (Bourdieu 1990b, 269f., G: 2008, 466f.), a metaphor highly important for our approach. Yet, most of the time Bourdieu works within the premises of the dialectic concept of subject and object.

2.1.3 Logic of praxis, objectification, and embodiment— Bourdieu's transformations

For relationist sociology, subject, actor, knowledge, meaning, thing, goods, structure, object, and the like, are terms in the theoretical series, the functional principle of which is praxis. In order to avoid social semiology and social physics as well as to find some clear-cut working definitions for our particular purpose of HabitusAnalysis, we proceed with another look at some aspects of Bourdieu's praxeological epistemology.

Bourdieu designs his concept of praxis in explicit dismissal of the (commonsense) notion of knowledge as mental reflection of the world. Akin to Cassirer, he does this by means of a relational approach to knowledge and perception. From this outset, he abolishes the subject-object dichotomy of common sense, and he reinterprets the dialectic relation between subject and object in such a way that allows him to integrate, to a certain degree, the different concepts of Marx and Cassirer. The Marxian dialectic between an object (conceived as society, economy, etc.) and a subject (conceived as human actor) prevails in the picture. This dialectic stands for a sociological interest in social structures. In the tradition of reflexive philosophy, the dialectic focuses on the relation *between* subject and object. However, this relation does not prevent with certainty a possible reification of subjects and objects. Here, Cassirer's relationism comes in. Not only the act of perception is conceived as relation; rather, both subjects and objects are conceived as relations. Cassirer develops this idea primarily with regard to the subjectivity and objectivity of the series of acquired knowledge—that is, to its varying degrees of density and generality.

Bourdieu transforms this idea for sociology. He applies a strictly relational understanding to Marxian notions of subject and object. This understanding is

particularly obvious with "objective social structures."[208] These structures are conceived as strictly relational. As for the subjects, Bourdieu conceives of an actor also in a strictly relational way. The habitus is not an entity. It is a scientific name for an extended series of bodily, emotional, and cognitive dispositions or schemes (embodied knowledge). These dispositions or schemes constitute what actors (individual and collective) are in their situational relations to other actors and in the objectified structures of society.[209] Habitus is not only a relational concept, in the sense that habitus is conceived as constantly related to fields. It is also "internally" relational, so to say. The dispositions (or operational schemes) are in constant relation as they process experiences.

Simply put, Bourdieu's interest in overcoming the concept of knowledge as reflection, by recourse to Marx and Cassirer, has lead to a sociological transformation of the epistemological interest. We examine some steps of this transformation in more detail.

Social knowledge

In order to counter epistemological common sense, Bourdieu invokes Marx against those[210] who make

> common knowledge or theoretical knowledge a mere *reflection* of the real world. Those who suppose they are producing a materialist theory of knowledge when they make knowledge a passive recording and abandon the 'active aspect' of knowledge to idealism, as Marx complains in the *Theses on Feuerbach* [italics in the original], forget that all knowledge, and in particular all *knowledge of the social world*, is an act of *construction* implementing *schemes of thought and expression*, and that between

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208 Here, Bourdieu loses widely out of sight Cassirer's idea of a continuum between thick and thin knowledge and the corresponding concepts of subjectivity and objectivity.

209 A concept of identity as a network of dispositions located at a given position in the social space is a consequent advancement in this approach. See Schäfer 2003; Schäfer 2005.

210 The Marxist interpretation of the theory of reflection or mirroring (*Widerspiegelungstheorie*) is particular in that it highlights the primacy of social structures over mental pictures. This is at least initially the case when, for instance, Engels call the "dialectics of the mind" a reflection of the dialectics of the "forms of motion of the real world" (Engels 1972, 203) Tilman Borsche and others localize the logic of reflection in three currents of Marxism: its social theory (base/superstructure), its theory of knowledge, and its aesthetics. As for the theory of knowledge, Lenin on the one hand installed it as a basis trait of materialism (1909); but he also relativized it saying that the reflection of the objective world also creates reality (1914). In this vein, later Marxist work (Lukács, Gramsci, and Althusser) increasingly favored a more active role of the mental operations (Borsche et al. 2004).

conditions of existence and *practices* or *representations* there intervenes the *structuring activity* of the *agents*, who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical stimulations, *respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning they have helped to produce*. However, the principle of this *structuring activity* is not, as an intellectualist and anti-genetic idealism would have it, a system of universal forms and categories but a system of *internalized, embodied schemes* which, having been constituted in the course of *collective history*, are acquired in the course of *individual history* and function in their *practical state, for practice* [italics in the original] (and not for the sake of pure knowledge). (Bourdieu 2010, 469, G: 1982a, 728f., italics added if not labeled otherwise)[211]

Among many issues raised in Bourdieu's comment, we want to highlight here only those of specific interest for our enterprise. First, for readers who consider *Distinction* a merely objectivistic work, oriented in statistics on the distribution of objective attributes, it might be surprising to find such a strong emphasis on the *knowledge of the social* world precisely in the introduction to the conclusion of just this book. If such a reader should try to alleviate his irritation assuming Bourdieu to have a positivist concept of knowledge (a mental stock of items reflecting the objective data) this assumption is rendered pointless from the beginning. Bourdieu not only opposes right away any theory of reflection and most positivism; instead, he characterizes knowledge as active *construction* that operates using the instrument of structured mental content: *schemes of thought and expression*. Such construction, far from being a miraculous reflection of society in the mind, is a *structuring activity of actors*. The activity consists of establishing a constructive relation between the *conditions of existence* of these actors and the *practices* and *representations* they bring to bear on their lives. The linkage between the conditions of existence and the practices and representations consists of a *structuring activity*, of "sensuous human activity, practice," as Marx puts it. In order to explain such activity in more detail Bourdieu marks differences: The activity is neither a mechanical reaction to stimuli exerted by the social conditions, as some Marxist or functionalist theories would interpolate; nor is it a free and contextless activity of the (individual) mind as promoted by intellectualist idealism or rationalism.

Relation in between—logic of praxis

Rather, the relations between two times two factors shape this activity—quasi in itself. Initially, we may label the factors roughly as "subject" and "object" and as "mind" and "matter." However, none of these traditional conceptions will be sufficiently applicable in their commonsense understanding.

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211 Italics in the whole following section indicate references to this text.

In Bourdieu's vocabulary, corresponding questions to these relations may read as follows. How are symbolic systems generated in and for the actors by way of their relations to the social structures they live in? How are the social structures generated by way of the symbolic systems embodied in the actors? He answers these questions in two ways. First, he postulates (and empirically evidences) homologies between the social structures and mental schemes of the actors. Second, in order to explain this observation, he develops a theory of the "dialectic of objectification and embodiment" (Bourdieu 1977b, 87, G: 2009, 189).

In Bourdieu, the interplay between subjective, objective, mental, and material factors permits the description of basic operations of praxis: These operations take place precisely *as* the *relation* between subjective and objective processes in the physical and the symbolic medium. The relation *in between* is the principal factor. It shapes the processes on either end. This relation is operated by the "logic of praxis" or "practical logic."[212] This logic makes the habitus and the fields interplay[213] in the exact way they do. Thus, a quite precise reference to the mediation between habitus and field, subject and object, is practical logic or logic of praxis (which, by the way, does not imply a reification of the concept, see vol. 2). Praxis is constantly being generated according to this logic. Thus, the logic of praxis governs the relation between habitus and fields, while the latter two concepts refer to the subjective and objective inputs, and both (!) of these inputs can be symbolic (mental) or physical (material).

These relations do not process automatically, without the active and creative, the cognitive, emotional, and bodily *involvement of actors*. This is why, for instance, the (objective) effects that social conditions (the distribution of goods, institutional processes, social occurrences, events, etc.) exert on the actors depend (partly) on the fact that the actors (subjectively) perceive these conditions as invitations or as threats. The objective conditions do not remain meaningless to the actors, but are given a specific meaning by the actors themselves. To a certain extent, the fact that

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212 One could also say that the relation is operated by the dispositions of habitus or by the power relations (capital) of fields. In the former case, one highlights more the subjective aspect, in the latter the objective. In any case, it should be kept in mind that we are talking about a constant interplay between both processes. See vol. 2 on practical logic.

213 The word "interplay" may not be either common or neat style, but it contains the element of "play." Thus, it alludes to Bourdieu's concept of *illusio*, having in common the reference to *ludus* (Latin for *play*). *Illusio* is as central concept that relates the practical sense of the actors to the games played in fields. The German term *Kollusion* would be suitable as well. However, in English *collusion* conveys too many negative connotations. The use of *interplay* pursues the emphasis that both ends of the process of praxis (the human creativity and the social structure) are dynamic, changing, and mutually challenging.

the actors are able to perceive their social conditions as meaningful depends on the complementary fact that the actors in turn exert effects on the social world. Their *schemes of thought and expression* as well as their *practices* and *representations* are instruments (social divisions, symbolic institutions such as law or religion, etc.), which structure the world objectively and, at the same time, subjectively for the actors. That is, the actors are not alien to their social world; they rather help to *produce meaning* in a world where they perceive occurrences as meaningful invitations or threats. Further, this ascription of meaning to (already) *meaningful invitations* is not redundant, since the actors' schemes of assessment and action—operating in the complex network of their practical logic—actively and creatively transform the perceived meaning of social or natural events.

However, it is important not to misunderstand this ascription of meaning as a conscious or even an intellectual operation. It operates implicitly and is prone to *misrecognition*. Bourdieu shares with the phenomenological tradition the understanding that the processes of meaning ascription, operated by the disposition of the habitus, are primarily "implicit" (Bourdieu) and far from being conscious. That is, the actors, instead of constructing their world reflexively,[214] perceive their world as an utterly objective one. The actors maintain for themselves a passive relationship towards the world. With their naïve positivism, they take the world as objectively given and their perception of the objectively given "reality" as a reflection of the things as they are. They disregard the entire process of mutual construction of subjectivity and objectivity. In Bourdieu's words, they systematically misrecognize the world and their position in it. This kind of false conscience is a necessary condition for taking the world as objective and naturally given.

Objectified structures

Bourdieu often uses the term "objectified structures". These structures are not naturally given, but a result of a structuring activity. In the vein of Marx, they are objecti*fied* in the sense that they are products of physical and mental human labor. As such products, the structures are endowed with meaning. Objectified and meaningful, they can face the humans that have produced them and ascribed meaning to them as invitations and threats.[215] This simply means that Bourdieu scientifically

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214 That is, with the conscious insight by the fact that they are constructing their world consciously and subjectively. The fact that reflexivity according to Bourdieu is not the normal state of the human relation to the world, does not mean praxeology excludes reflexivity from human praxis. Praxeology rather aims at describing the conditions of reflexive action.

215 In this context, Bourdieu objects to Cassirer as idealistic and intellectualist because of his exclusive focus on knowledge. See Bourdieu 2010, 469, G: 1982a, 728f.; 1977b, 96, G: 2009, 228.

takes into account that, outside the human body, there are organized and operating social forces that relate with body and mind in multiple ways. Therefore, the operations that take place as "incorporation and objectification" (Bourdieu 1977b, 72, G: 2009, 164) are crucial in order to understand his concept of habitus (see vol. 2).

In the vein of Cassirer, the operating social forces are understood as structures. Be it ideas or physical objects, anything is perceived (and supposedly exists) in relation to something else, is part of a series, a network of different items, similar to one another in certain respects. Social *conditions of existence*, for instance, are the functional principle of a chain of relations that combines a myriad of single facts as relevant to the existence of a definite number of actors. Similarly, *schemes of thought and expression* or *representations* are only meaningful and socially effective if they are related in series with others. Bourdieu calls this "symbolic systems." The same counts for *practices*.

If this is agreeable, one can turn Cassirer's concept of objectivity relevant for Bourdieu's approach at this point—albeit beyond Bourdieu's own use. One can conceive of gradually more or less objectivity of objectified physical or mental structures. The degree depends on how frequently the structures are used and how much they are stabilized by the recurrent proof of reliability. Thus, a social structure, such as a religious institution, may develop more or less objectivity according to the followers it durably attaches to itself. Or, an objectified system of beliefs, such as the Catholic Catechism, varies in objectivity according to the frequency of its use in religious praxis.

Embodied structures

Human beings perceive, judge, and act by virtue of *a system of internalized, embodied schemes*. Here, Bourdieu's concept of subject and subjectivity clearly draws from Marx, not from Cassirer. It centers in the concept of habitus, a subjectified objectivity, so to say, conceived as embodied objective social relations and their continuous transformation.

In a similar way as the objective structures are not simply objective and natural, the subjective structures are not natural either. They are socially embodied, subjecti*fied*. Bourdieu grants special importance to the fact that the embodiment of such schemes in habitus is a social process involving *collective* and *individual history* as one direction of structuring. The other direction is the externalization of the schemes as linguistic and physical practices.

For Bourdieu, Marx's dialectic relation between subject and object acts as the model. Cassirer comes in as the social conditions are embodied as structured dispositions and schemes that operate the whole process of internalization and externalization from the end of the individual and collective actors.

The schemes are embodied by the actors as a *system* of cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of perception, judgment, and action. That is, they literally become part of the physical system, even to the point of becoming automatic reactions of the nervous system to any kind of triggers. The dispositions are *structured* by experience and have *structuring* effects themselves. Any element is connected with any other by means of relations. Thus, dispositions operate in the two directions we have already outlined. On the one hand, they structure perception and thus organize the further embodiment and the restructuring of the dispositional system; that is, they perceive the *invitations and threats* of the world, evaluate them and produce their meaning—a process which, as we will see below, is quite well understood to be a creative activity. On the other hand, the actors (via their dispositions of perception, judgment, and action) generate practices, reactions, solutions, strategies of transformation, and the like, in response to the invitations and threats of the world, creating new invitations and threats.

Thus, the operational structure of these embodied dispositions, the totality of the *embodied schemes*, corresponds to the twofold process that generates meaning. This process also has two aspects both related to the world: the generation of perceptions from experience and the generation of practices from judgments. Thus, the schemes of perception, judgment, and action can be conceived as practical operators. However, none of their operations mirrors the world. Rather, the schemes of habitus function *in a practical way and for praxis*.[216] They are practical operators (cognitive, affective, and bodily) by which the actors perceive, judge, and act under the pressure of the multiple *invitations and threats* that the social world presents to them.

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216 The sequence of "fonctionnent à l'état pratique et pour la pratique" (Bourdieu 1979a, 545, E: 2010, 469, G: 1982a, 729) could be translated differently. By the translation of "function in their practical state, for practice" it seems to be suggested that the schemes could have other states than the practical one, and that functioning in *this* state equals functioning for practice. I prefer to translate by "functioning in a practical way and for praxis." Thus, I refer to the double sense of practical logic as different from logical logic and as practical in the sense of being useful. Moreover, this translation renders more obvious that "for practice" is not just equal to a certain state of the embodied schemes, but indicates the schemes' function as operators of the practical sense, as the sense *for* praxis (more on this notion in vol. 2).

Table 1 Embodiment and objectification

	objectified (objective)	embodied (subjective)	Relation by:
mental	Symbolic systems, objectified ascriptions of honor (titles), represented beliefs (discourses), etc.	Dispositions of cognition and emotion; schemes perception, judgment, and action; knowledge, etc.	⇧ Perception/ constructing series/ judgment
physical	Distribution of things and capital, institutions, symbolic systems, things, books), etc.	Physical disposition (hexis, complexion, tendency to healthiness or illness, etc.); schemes of action;	Pragmatic effects/ action ⇩
Relation by:	Perception/Internalization ⇨ ⇦ Action/Externalization		

Finally, Bourdieu's transformation of the old distinctions of subject/object and mind/matter points right to the theory of habitus.

> Thus, the social agents whom the sociologist classifies are producers not only of classifiable acts but also of acts of classification which are themselves classified. […] To speak of *habitus* is to *include in the object the knowledge which the agents, who are part of the object, have of the object*, and the *contribution this knowledge makes to the reality of the object*. But it is not only a matter of *putting back into the real world* that one is endeavouring to know, *a knowledge of the real world that contributes to its reality* (and also to the force it exerts). It means conferring on this *knowledge a genuinely constitutive power*, the very power it is denied when, in the name of an objectivist conception of objectivity, one makes common knowledge or theoretical knowledge a mere reflection of the real world. (Bourdieu 2010, 469, G: Bourdieu 1982a, 728, italics added)[217]

The (subjective) knowledge of the actors is classified by the objective conditions, and inversely it contributes to—but does not exclusively construct!—the reality of the objective world. It is not by pure chance that these considerations on the *genuinely constitutive power* of knowledge conclude a book by Bourdieu on largely objectivistic models of social structure and styles. Nor is it random that very similar reflections finish the "Critique of theoretical reason" in *Logic of Practice* and open the reader's mind to dealing with "Practical logics" (Bourdieu 1990b, 135, G: 2008, 246).

For our endeavor to find a praxeological access to the analysis of meaning, these thoughts are programmatic. In the following two sections, we will therefore have to

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217 Again, the italics in this section refer to this quote.

go into more detail on Bourdieu's way of dealing with the relations between things and signs and between subject and object.

In the Western philosophical and sociological tradition, two distinctions are prominent: mind versus matter and subject versus object. For Bourdieu these terms serve as a basic coordinate system for his theoretical thought, but (following Marx and Cassirer) he emphasizes the relations between these terms.

2.1   Objectivism, subjectivism, praxeology
2.1.1 Bourdieu's critique
Bourdieu's critical assessments of other theories follow a fourfold and somewhat sweeping distinction. "Objectivist social physics" is too much concentrated on statistics and mechanical determinism. "Subjectivist social physics" postulates abstract individuals with fixed properties (preferences). "Subjectivist semiology" conceives society as a result of face-to-face communication. "Objectivist semiology" reifies systems of signs as universal entities.

2.1.2 Bourdieu's sources
Marx: With reference to Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*, Bourdieu creates plausibility for a concept of praxis that integrates subject and object as well as signs and things, within the relation between habitus and field.

  Cassirer: The strictly relationist approach to epistemology influences Bourdieu's concept of perception. In contrast, Cassirer's relationist conception of subjectivity and objectivity, as different degrees of certainty, has only a marginal effect on Bourdieu's work.

2.1.3 Bourdieu's transformation
By means of relationist epistemology, the theory of habitus and field in a two-way relation serves to integrate the most important aspects of society marked by the terms of subject, object, signs, and things. The generative relations that dispositions of the habitus establish between social and embodied processes come into the focus of interest.

  Knowledge is transformed into a structuring social activity of embodied schemes. The concept of practical logic refers to the mediations that produce the homologies between social structures and mental schemes, by means of a practical "dialectic of objectification and embodiment."

  Hence, social structures are understood as structured products of objectifying human labor. Embodied structures appear as the product of the human labor of internalization through the activity of the schemes of perception that process invitations and threats of the social environment.

2.2   Matter and mind—things and signs

As the method of HabitusAnalysis focuses on practical operations with meaning, the mediation between material structures and mental structures is of special interest. After a short introduction, this chapter aims at narrowing the focus on the relation between perceptional schemes and experience. We proceed with a brief review of Bourdieu's vocabulary in relation to meaning. A subsection on the social construction of meaning addresses the framing of schemes of perceptions in the broader approach of habitus theory. Then we focus on the reinterpretation of terms like symbol and polysemy as social operators. Finally, Bourdieu's notion of a twofold reality closes the section.

2.2.1   Schemes of perception and experience—narrowing the focus

At the outset, we would like to narrow our focus, briefly dealing with two possible pitfalls: a dualism between mind and matter, and an intellectualist or idealist approach to cognition.

Against a dualism of mind and matter

According to Bourdieu's late reflections in *Pascalian Meditations*, "scholastic" and "mentalist" theories tend to foster the "belief in the dualism of mind and body, spirit and matter" (Bourdieu 2000a, 133, G: 2001a, 171), and the belief in a separation between the social and the mental dimensions of the world.[218] We have seen above some epistemological aspects of Bourdieu's way to avoid this kind of dichotomies and, nevertheless, allow creative work with the distinctions of mind, matter, subject, and object.

What can be seen in Bourdieu's writings at first glance? A first impression may be that in early writings Bourdieu was more inclined to accentuate the difference between the symbolic or mental and the material, as well as the difference between the subjective and the objective.[219] In later works,[220] he increasingly abandoned these distinctions. This view is coherent with the observation that, over the years, the

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218 This opinion is set forth in political utopianism (Bourdieu 2000a, 41, G: 2001a, 56).

219 Bourdieu 1968, G: 1970; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970, E: 1977; Bourdieu 1971a, E: 1991b, G: 2011b; 1972, E: 1977b, G: 2009; 1980, E: 1990b, G: 2008.

220 Bourdieu 1979a, E: 2010, G: 1982a; 1984, E: 1988, G: 1998g; 1989b, E: 1996, G: 2004a; 1992e, E: 1995, G: 1999b; 1997, E: 2000a, G: 2001a.

influence on Bourdieu of Wittgenstein and of pragmatists increased. However, this development never led him to explicitly distance himself from his early works.[221] Bourdieu does not seem to have felt the need to abstain from distinctions such as "Social space and symbolic space" (in: Bourdieu 1998b, 1, G: 2007, 10). He even identified as one of his most important aims the theoretical mediation between "objective structures" and "subjective representations."[222]

We understand that there was an implicit development in Bourdieu's work with respect to symbolic, mental, and significational practices. He opened up the structuralist concept of signification to the social context and the use of signs, thus taking into account hermeneutic and pragmatic concerns in a sociological way. Hence, the analytical distinction (not separation) between mental and material, subjective and objective dimensions of praxis remains completely valid—as a frame of reference to understand the mediation between these terms as the central issue of *praxeo*logy. Therefore, it is consequent that Bourdieu's antidote against mentalist (and in the end substantialist) separations remains the same. In *Pascalian Meditations* it is still his interpretation of Marx's first thesis contra Feuerbach (Bourdieu 2000a, 133f., G: 2001a, 171f.). Within the framework of a dialectics between classes and classification it is not only allowed but imperative to examine embodied cognitive schemes of classification in relation to, and therefore in analytical distinction from, objective material structures. The physical or material relations and the symbolic relations should not be torn apart but should be taken as two legitimate and important aspects of an "intrinsically twofold reality" (Bourdieu 1990b, 135, G: 2008, 247).

Notwithstanding, some sociologists state that Bourdieu does not work at all with *meaning* or, at least, that he dismisses "the specific logic and autonomy of the symbolic order" (Bourdieu 1990g, 113, G: 1989a, 403). Bourdieu argues that this reproach is due to the fact that his critics read "the analyses reported in *Distinction* … in a realist and substantialist way" (as opposed to a relational one), reducing the symbolic relations "to a mere *reflection* of the social order." (ibid.) Bourdieu's concept of homology will be entirely misunderstood, if one reads his theory through the lens of an epistemology of reflection (cognition as mirroring). In further consequence, his entire social theory will be distorted into a crude brand of Marxism-Leninism.

However, Bourdieu shares neither such an epistemology nor its awkward consequences for sociology. Following Ernst Cassirer who, along with others,

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221 As he did for example with regard to an all too mechanistic view of religious praxis in Bourdieu 1987, 135, n. 5, G: 2011a, 21, n. 12.

222   Bourdieu 1990c, 125f., G: 1992b, 138. This is not a relapse into the theory of the mind as a mirror of nature. Reflection is not representation. Representation takes place when a sensation is put into a meaningful cognitive series.

proposed a solution for the "crisis of representation in the 19th century," he counts on a "third entity" between "cognition and reality" (Sandkühler et al. 2003, 21, trans. HWS): schemes of perception. Thus, cognition turns into an active construction of knowledge, based on the processing of experiences by schemes of perception. In consequence, "Social structures and mental structures" (Bourdieu 1996, 1, G: 2004a, 13) are mediated by schemes of perception (and action). If this is so, for a sociological approach it is important that cognition not be conceived as a purely intellectual operation.

Cognition—non-intellectualist

Bourdieu often puts mental structures or even "symbolic forms" (Cassirer) in focus.[223] But he strives to avoid the pitfalls of an intellectualist or idealist approach, such as he rejected in Cassirer, Saussure, Levi-Strauss, the phenomenologists, and others. What is the point?

The theory of habitus (see vol. 2) underscores heavily that cognitive operations are bound to the body: "The cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the social world are internalized, 'embodied' social structures" (Bourdieu 2010, 470, G: 1982a, 730). They are not objective ideas according to an idealist fashion, but acquired, formed, and transformed by social learning. Thus, the cognitive structures function within the equally individual and collective body of the actors as cognitive operators—for example as thoughts, ideas, imaginations, or representations. As such, these operators are closely linked to emotional and bodily dispositions and schemes, as the theory of habitus maintains.[224] However, they are embodied *cognitive* operators, and not bodily (physical) ones. This means that Bourdieu can treat them as mental structures without turning idealist and as interiorized social relations without slipping into social physics.

When we examine the terms Bourdieu uses to refer to the "order of words" as opposed to the "order of things" (Bourdieu 2010, 483, G: 1982a, 750), we can observe a considerable emphasis on cognitive processes precisely that book many readers rate as purely objectivistic. Hence, in order to understand praxis scientifically and practically, it is not only necessary to consider the distribution of goods but also the knowledge that actors have of this distribution, the mental structures they associate with the distribution.

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223 This is very much in line with our method of focusing primarily on cognitive operators, not on emotional or bodily ones. Counting social psychologists in our team, we could expand the method.

224 See especially writings on "Bodily knowledge" (Bourdieu 2000a, 128ff., G: 2001a, 165ff.; 1990b, 66ff., G: 2008, 122ff.).

> The *practical knowledge* of the *social world* that is presupposed by 'reasonable' behaviour within it *implements classificatory schemes* (or '*forms of classification*', '*mental structures*' or '*symbolic forms*'—apart from their connotations, these expressions are virtually interchangeable), *historical schemes of perception* and *appreciation* which are the *product of the objective division into classes* (age groups, genders, social classes) and which function *below the level of consciousness and discourse*. Being the product of the *incorporation* of the fundamental *structures of a society*, these *principles of division* are *common to all the agents of the society* and make possible the production of a *common, meaningful world*, a common-sense world. All the agents in a given social formation share a set of basic perceptual schemes. (Bourdieu 2010, 470, G: 1982a, 731, italics added)

In sum, the point is to keep mental schemes, structures, representations, and the like, in their practical (not reflective) relation to their genesis and their use in the social world. For a theory of cognition, this means that meaning is generated by the connection that perceptional schemes establish between experiences of the social world and prior embodied knowledge.

2.2.2   Bourdieu's vocabulary in relation to meaning

A survey of Bourdieu's writings[225] shows a rich vocabulary with reference to cognitive operations, that is to say, symbolic praxis. The term "symbolic" is clearly the heading of the series of concepts Bourdieu employs. It is used most frequently, it has a wide array of uses, and it refers to different aspects of praxis. We shall come back to this particular term later. At this point, we will give a rough overview of the concepts Bourdieu employs and of some possible misunderstandings.

Concepts and patterns

First, we list the *vocabulary* employed for objects of empirical observation that Bourdieu directly relates to "the symbolic." We find wisdoms, sayings, prescriptions, prohibitions, instructions, rituals as objectified mental schemes, utterances, expressions, position-takings (*prises de position*), messages, language (in use, *lan-*

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225 For this purpose I mainly examined Bourdieu 1977b, G: 2009; 1990b, G: 2008; 2010, G: 1982a; 1996, G: 2004a; 1968, G: 1970; 1991b, G: 2011b; 1986, G: 1992f; 1985b, G: 1985a; 2000a, G: 2001a; and the essays and interviews in Bourdieu 1990d, G: 1992c; 1998b, G: 2007; 1993b, G: 1993c. For details, see the appendix on Bourdieu's vocabulary (p. 365). Within this selection we will pay special attention to the works dedicated to ethnological praxeology, Bourdieu 1977b, G: 2009 ; and 1990b, G: 2008. The explicit considerations on language in Bourdieu 2006, G: 2005, will be examined in more detail, below, in part 3 on "Meaning as praxis".

gage), discourse, communication, senders and receivers, gestures, words and speech (*parole*) as symbolic practices (that convey equivocations, innuendoes, unspoken implications, and gestural or verbal symbolism). All these terms could easily become the object of an idealistic science of pure meaning and/or communication. However, it is simply impossible to describe even these basic observational notions in Bourdieu's work without referring to physical, material praxis. Complementarily, social practices, even the "elementary acts of bodily gymnastics … are highly charged with social meanings and values" (Bourdieu 1990b, 71, G: 2008, 132). Things, such as a house or a tool, are not simply and positively just things; they are perceived things, meaningful objects and therefore socially consequential and effective. This is why social structures are represented in symbolic structures, and why classes of social relations become meaningful via classifications.

In consequence, it is almost impossible to find notions with an exclusive reference either to symbolic or to material phenomena. Instead, Bourdieu always binds meaning to social relations; inversely, he considers social practices, objects, and structures almost constantly in view of their symbolic social energy, which depends on the meaning that the practices, objects, and structures have for the actors.

This observation corroborates what we have said about the practical logic of praxeological series (p. 122). Praxeological concepts are not used according to ontological criteria but according to their practical combinations with other terms, situations, or material conditions. In consequence, we also look for the *structural patterns* that Bourdieu's terms appear in.

Two patterns are most salient and intimately linked. The first relates the symbolic and the material— the Marxian tradition, so to say. The second highlights the structuredness of different (onto-logic) domains—the Cassirer current. The former pattern focuses meaning generation through the relation between symbolic and material practices (albeit not as reflection). The latter focuses meaning generation through structural combination. Both aspects of meaning generation interplay in the praxeological series constructed by the actors and for its praxeological reconstruction.

In Bourdieu's vocabulary, these patterns appear as follows: universe of meaning versus universe of practice, mental structures versus material structures, symbolic space versus social space, space of works and discourses versus social space, language system versus social conditions, symbolic relations of power versus social relations of power, symbolic relations versus class relations, system of classifications versus system of classes, and so forth.

While all of these terms (even the "universe of meaning") are strictly relational and social, nevertheless, they are somewhat prone to misunderstandings.

Possible misunderstandings

The notion of *structure* could be understood in an objectivist way as a universal pattern of human thought—a conclusive, ready-made opus operatum. However, this reading is not consistent with the logic of praxis. Praxeology rather refers to the structuredness of action, transformation, and processes—the modus operandi.

Similarly, the concept of *space* may be understood as a container in which signs, actors, or objects are contained. Such an understanding defines a space by a boundary line drawn around that space. A good example may be found in the critique of the container model of the nation state in the globalizations debate. Here, space is conceived as the function of objective boundary lines that include x and y but excludes z. Bourdieu's own diagrams (namely the "space of power") at times further this misunderstanding.[226] In contrast, Bourdieu's theoretical and methodological positions as well as his methods, such as correspondence analysis, treat space (and fields) as a theoretically structured mutual externality of positions. What may be mistaken as boundary lines are the dimensions (economic and cultural capital, for instance) according to which the positions are measured. Hence, the concept of space refers to a scientific construct that defines any social position by means of its relation (that is, its relative difference) to other positions (very concise in Bourdieu 1998d, 6, G: 1998e, 18). Hence, the space of power, strictly understood, means a concentration of capital in relation to other social positions of relatively lower volumes of capital.

Finally, Bourdieu's frequent reference to *homology*—for instance, as a relation between symbolic and social space—is likely to be understood in a structuralist and objectivistic manner: homology as structural similarity between ready-made structures, opera operata. However, when Bourdieu refers to such homologies, this is normally a shortcut reference to the scientifically visible result of a continuous process: the practical production of affinity between the rules of different meaningful series—for instance, the distribution of goods, the (individual or collective) ideas of how goods should be distributed, and the social conflict about the distribution of goods.

> The space of social positions is retranslated into a space of position-takings through the mediation of the space of dispositions (or habitus). In other words, the system of differential deviations which defines the different positions in the two major dimensions of social space corresponds to the system of differential deviations in agents' properties (or in the properties of constructed classes of agents), that is, in their practices and in the goods they possess. To each class of positions there corre-

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226 Cf. the diagrams in Bourdieu 1996, 267ff., G: 2004a, 324ff.; 1995, 122, 124, G: 1999b, 199, 203.

sponds a class of habitus (or *tastes*) produced by the social conditioning associated with the corresponding condition and, | through the mediation of the habitus and its generative capability, a systematic set of goods and properties, which are united by an affinity of style. (Bourdieu 1998d, 7f., G: 1998e, 20f.)

One cannot adequately understand the homology between spaces, or between the mental and the material, without taking into account the human activity that generates it. Social structures are the parameters of the game that takes place in society, the parameters for the objective sense of this game, which makes no sense without the subjective sense of the game that the actors employ to succeed in it. Different fields have distinct symbols and uses of symbolic practices. Thus, language also has a "linguistic market," which determines the value of linguistic goods. In short, the structural patterns that connote objective relations cannot be understood without taking the activity of actors into account, and this activity is mediated through the cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of the actors.

2.2.3   Social construction of meaning

Cognition actively interprets social experiences. The theory of habitus frames this in a new way, anchoring the production of meaning stronger in social praxis.

Dispositional activities

Very much in line with the neo-Kantian tradition, Bourdieu takes perception, appreciation, appraisal, evaluation, anticipation, and similar cognitive operations as constructive and creative activities. He transforms these impulses, framing them in his theory of habitus.

The *cognitive schemes* of the *actors* structure, evaluate, and handle the experienced empirical manifold; the actors' schemes produce their practices. These processes presuppose and simultaneously produce mental structures, schemes (matrices) of thought. In terms of the theory of habitus, these generative activities of cognition are operated by the dispositions of the habitus. The body serves as a depository of thoughts and language, a linguistic habitus. Structurally, these dispositions of perception, judgment, and action form systems of classification that function as principles of vision and division: a worldview conceived as composed by distinctive qualifiers that generate meaning by establishing differences and similarities. In this sense, the classificatory schemes are cognitive instruments with social functions such as the formation of group identities. In consequence, cognitive construction by perception (as equally emotional and bodily activities) are always coined by

social praxis and thus turn out to be the conditions for basic social relations such as the consensus on the meaning of praxis or as recognition and misrecognition.

Social meaning

Bourdieu transposes the neo-Kantian idea of an active cognitive construction into a sociological frame. In Cassirer, the process of meaning construction is explained primarily with regard to the relation of the perceiving actor to the perceived empirical manifold. From a sociological point of view, the empirical reality lives, so to say. It changes, imposes itself on the actors as invitations and threats, is affected by the actors' practices, and reacts to the actors' action. Even the "meaning of a symbol is never completely determined in and through the actions into which it is put." (Bourdieu 1990b, 264, G: 2008, 458)

In consequence, words, signs, practices, and things, the processes of signification and naming, ritual overdetermination of practices and similar operations acquire a socially constructed meaning. The social meaning of an utterance, for instance, is generated by the interplay between the structuring perception of different actors, the social use of the utterance, other utterances in a given field, and its accustomed semantic content.

For our interest in HabitusAnalysis, the semantic content is important. Bourdieu constantly analyzes semantic content.[227] Notwithstanding, semantic content is not to be understood as defined by universally or even culturally fixed meanings, and in no way should content be considered a mirror image of objects or of social order. Instead, the meaning of semantic content (e.g., a certain word) is generated by the activities of human actors within their particular social context, by praxis. Meaning is generated as a mutually interpretative practical relation between semantic content, social positions of the actors, the situation of speech, the form of the utterance, the use (positions-takings) of it, and its function in larger society.

The said transformation to social meaning affects the neo-Kantian and structuralist heritage in Bourdieu's theory and methods. Not least, the concept of signification undergoes an implicit change, and with it some other concepts such as symbol and metaphor.

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227 See below, chapter 5, and passim. This is simply the case, even if Bourdieu, in some explicit remarks, treats content with a certain disdain in comparison to function. In fact, his aversion against semantics rather addresses theories of universal lexical semantics.

2.2.4　Meaning as social operator

While Bourdieu's methods, especially in earlier times, rest quite strongly on structuralist techniques, he points out that, in the course of the years, his approach to meaning has integrated ever more impulses from Wittgenstein and the Pragmatists, especially Dewey (e.g., Bourdieu 2000a, 31, G: 2001a, 44). Austin should also be mentioned here. This influence brings the social use of signs more into the scope. However, except for some hints, Bourdieu does not discuss these changes in theoretical perspective and even less with regard to methodology. For our concentration on semantics, the issue is nevertheless of interest.

Therefore, we briefly examine some key concepts that refer to different modes of signification.[228] Thereby, signification is understood as an umbrella term for operations that generate meaning. We set out with the concept most frequently used and with the largest extension: symbolic. Then we narrow the focus to concepts used with a more specific reference to semantic and semiotic operations: polysemy, homology, and metaphor. Subsequently we sketch some traits of the implicit notion of "sign" underlying the praxeological approach to meaning. However, we will not go beyond Bourdieu with proposals for a modified concept of signs.[229]

Symbol

The strong *concept of symbol* and its derivates illustrate the changes conveyed by sociological use. Symbol refers simultaneously, and interdependently, to:

- semiotic representation of an actor (*ego*) in terms of a cognitive operation (a sign represents something or is ascribed a certain meaning by putting it into a cognitive series);
- social recognition of that representation in terms of a cognitive operation of third actors (*alter*) (the meaning is identified by locating the object in another, collectively shared, series);
- social recognition in terms of evaluation by *ego* and *alter* (the meaning is identified as legitimate);

228　As the main interest of our whole approach is a praxeology of meaning, this topic keeps on evolving throughout the three volumes.

229　Our model of the praxeological square integrates the social dimension of signs anyway. See volume 3.

- and recognition of the actor (*ego*) who uses the symbol (or is himself the symbol) by *alter* (who recognizes and possibly follows *ego* as a representative of something).[230]

In other words, practices or utterances become symbolic only by the social use of their semiotic function—that is, *as* social operators.

The notions of symbolic space, symbolic system, symbolic distinctions, symbolic signification, symbolic meaning, symbolic goods, symbolic relations of power, symbolic exchanges, symbolic profits, symbolic domination, symbolic capital, and, finally, symbolic labor indicate that Bourdieu uses the term symbolic mainly as an adjective. The concept appears as a *function* of different practices, linguistic or semiotic utterances, objects, and cognitive states (signification) or practical conditions (e.g. violence). Within these different contexts of use, the meaning of the term acquires various nuances.

However, there is a peculiar combination of social and semiotic traits, which characterizes Bourdieu's use of the concept in various contexts. In his definition of *symbolic capital*, these traits are best condensed. "Symbolic capital" is any kind of capital "insofar as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge or, more precisely, of misrecognition and recognition…" (Bourdieu 1986, 255, n.3). This relation is semiotic inasmuch as the *capital x*, as a signifier, is *represented* by a signified, a meaning that the signifier acquires. That is, the symbolic function redoubles the signfications of first degree that practices have anyway.[231] However, this meaning is not objective, attached to a linguistic system, a *langue* in Saussurean terms. It is practical since it relies on the cognitive and evaluative operations of apprehension and recognition (and misrecognition), where *recognition* should be understood in the double sense of the word: identification and appreciation. Again, and now programmatically, Bourdieu's concept of symbol combines semiotic and social processes.[232] Therefore, meaning (including its social functions and effects) is conceived as the product of a social-semiotic transformation that involves relations of semiotic representation and social recognition of such representation—and thus involves construction by the schemes

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230 See volume 2 on symbolic operations.

231 Cf. F: Bourdieu 1966, 221f., G: 1974, 71, not available in English.

232 Together with this concept of symbol, the notion of representation also acquires practical meaning. Bourdieu uses it in the double understanding of a semiotic relation between signs in a series and the social practice of representing an institution or a social group as a spokesperson.

of perception and evaluation. Simply put, meaning is a product of symbolic labor that works through transformational operations.

Polysemy, metaphor, homology

These concepts focus more specifically the semiotic aspects of symbolic labor. Bourdieu uses them mainly in the context of practical logic and of the theory of the social space of styles. The concepts express different techniques of symbolic labor, but always involve both the social/interactional and the semiotic/semantic aspects. Polysemy, metaphor, and homology are dynamic elements of practical logic[233] that generate the linguistic or semiotic transpositions and conversions between fields (the "paradigmatic relations," in a structuralist language). They facilitate scheme transfer. They are particular instruments of the "*work* of language," as Paul Ricoeur would call it.[234] Albeit, in Bourdieu it is not language (*langage*) as such, which labors. It is the actors, who work with language in the midst of social relations, situations, and conditions. The practical "use" (Wittgenstein) of language is of interest. However, the comparison with Ricoeur also evidences that the semantic, syntactic, and grammatical possibilities that a given language system offers indeed are relevant for sociology.

As distinct from a strictly monosemic expression (in a technical handbook, for example), polysemy, analogy, homology, metaphor, as well as metonymy offer specific uses in language. These forms of expression play with meaning. Actors use them to produce double meanings or connotations. They create long chains of connotations, combining different fields of praxis. Actors overdetermine a situation with additional meaning (for example religious: God's punishment); or they slip out of a strongly determined situation into indeterminacy (God will foresee). The said semantic operations produce a surplus of meaning that can be transformed into a surplus of possible social uses of such meaning, for example in naming (you are a minister of the Lord) or in reevaluating (affluence becomes *blessing*).

This surplus production of meaning occurs when actors deliberately transpose expressions from one field of praxis to another—from religion to economy, for instance. Thus, they modify the first meaning slightly in order to obtain an effect in the alternative field (simple affluence turns into religious "blessing"). The change can only take place on the condition that there is something to be changed.

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233 Bourdieu 1977b, 96ff., G: 2009, 228ff.; 1990b, 80ff., G: 2008, 147ff.

234 Ricoeur 1974, 95. His orientation to language or discourse as an act of labor makes Ricoeur speak rather of "structuring" than of "structure." Thus, he does not focus on the work as a product, but on the process of labor.

Core meaning?

Such an invariant unit could be the fixed meaning of a word. This sounds very much like objectivist lexical semantics—abhorred by Bourdieu. For him there is no doubt that "understanding is not a matter of recognizing an invariable meaning, but of grasping the singularity of a form which only exists in a particular context" (Bourdieu 1977c, 647). Nevertheless, one has to take into account the persistence of a core meaning, a

> basic meaning (the kernel of meaning which remains relatively invariable through the various markets and which the 'feeling for language' masters practically), […] This is because the different values of a word are defined in the relationship between the invariable kernel and the objective mechanisms characteristic of the various mar|kets. […] If, to take another example from Vendry's, we say of a child, a field, or a dog, '*il rapporte*' (i.e. tells tales/ yields a profit/ retrieves), that is because in practice there are as many verbs *rapporter* as there are contexts for its use, and because the meaning actually realized by the context (i.e. by the logic of the field) relegates all the others to the background. (Bourdieu 1977c, 647f.)[235]

In the example, the basic or core meaning is "to bring something" (a tale, a profit, or a shot animal), which is modified (or disambiguated) by the different contexts that the word is used in. This is quite a trivial observation. Nevertheless, it shows that Bourdieu, while despising theories of essential meaning, presupposes (with Saussure) a *conventional* meaning of words (and accordingly of signs). Seen from the theory of practical logic, conventional meaning becomes a semantic operator. It operates the transposition and conversion of the meaning of a given sign between fields. As such, conventional meaning varies from field to field in terms of value (importance in the language of the field) and of nuances of (semantic) signification and paradigmatic (associative) power. Notwithstanding, and in spite of the variations, Bourdieu states a relatively constant "kernel" of meaning for semantic units—an expression which should not be misinterpreted as a final surrender to essentialist concepts of meaning. The kernel is not scientifically determined by an analytical procedure but is socially constructed by human praxis.

> The different meanings of a word are defined in the relation between the invariant core and the specific logic of the different markets [or fields, HWS], themselves objectively situated with respect to the market in which the most common meaning is defined. (Bourdieu 2006, 39, G: 2005, 44)

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235 Similar in Bourdieu 2006, 39, G: 2005, 44.

The core meaning can be defined as the product of the social linguistic production in a field where the word is most prominently and most commonly used. *Blessing*, for example, is a word most strongly coined by the religious field, but used, with modified meanings, in other fields too.

If the fields involved are simply distinguished by functional differentiation, the variations simply obey the logics of this differentiation. If there are relations of dominance between the fields involved (as today between economy, on the one hand, and politics or religion, on the other), it is most probable that specific concepts of the dominant field introduce new logics into the other fields (as for instance, business consultants in churches introduce the concept of asset into the religious field). It can also occur that the meaning of strong words in subordinated fields changes by adoption into the dominant field, such as *freedom* from the political field turning into laissez-faire in economy.[236]

Moreover, Bourdieu distinguishes an invariant semantic core from an actual meaning. The latter is the result of a relation between that core and the specific logics of different fields (or markets). This is to say that there is no meaning of a word without a relation between that word and its actual social context of use; and even the market, where according to Bourdieu the most common meaning is defined, is a context of use with unequal relations of linguistic production.

If this is so, then the core meaning is nothing other than the (historical) invariance of use that the word maintains in a specific field. The constancy in the use (Wittgenstein) of a given word generates the invariance of its meaning, which (according to Cassirer) equals its objectivity.

However, this objectivity is socially constructed; it is bound to a certain community of actors. Praxeological objectivity does not convey the idea of a universally objective core meaning of words as lexical units. On the contrary, the meaning is objective and invariant inasmuch as it is constructed in a relatively constant mode, by a relatively constant collectivity under relatively constant conditions. Under these conditions, praxeology (without defecting to universal semantics) can work with relatively constant core meanings of words according to social contexts. However, praxeology cannot presuppose core meanings with reference to a universal lexicon or the like. The valid constant signification of a given word in a social collective (such as a religious movement) always is the object of empirical research.

What concept of sign and signification is implicit here?

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236 According to Bourdieu's analysis, Heidegger plays with these kinds of interfield relations when he incorporates the word *care* (*Fürsorge*) into philosophical language in order to negate its primary meaning in ordinary language (Bourdieu 2006, 142, G: 2005, 148).

Sign

From the French structuralist tradition, Bourdieu has inherited a dyadic *concept of sign* as the relation between a signifier and a signified. In earlier publications, for instance *Outline of a Theory of Practice*,[237] he stuck to this concept. Later, he shifted towards the idea of use (Wittgenstein) and the pragmatic value of linguistic utterances (Austin, Dewey). This shift of focus could have taken place as an explicit discussion of dyadic and triadic theories of signs and as a conversion from Saussure to Charles Morris (1946; 1964), for instance. Thus, the semantic, the syntactic, and the pragmatic aspects of significational processes could be represented within the very concept of the sign. Bourdieu did not do this. According to our observation, he simply maintains implicitly a dyadic concept of sign, enriched by a sociological attention to the use and effect that signs engender as operators in social relations. According to circumstantial criteria of the empirical research interests, focus and methods may change.

In other words, debating the concept of sign does not further an understanding of praxeology, at least not for our purpose. It is far more helpful to draw attention to the mediations between the symbolic and material side of what Bourdieu calls a twofold reality.

2.2.5 A twofold reality

> Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127, G: 1996, 161)

Bourdieu states that the social sciences must not tear apart the mental and material dimensions of reality. Instead, they have to deal with an "intrinsically twofold reality" (Bourdieu 1990b, G: 2008, 246): on the one hand, material objects, institutions, bodies, physical practices and the like; on the other, perceived properties of these things and practices within their practical relations, cognitive schemes, meaningful series of signs, and so forth. This twofold reality is praxis since it consists of interdependent practical operations: on the one hand, perception and judgment by means of constructing meaningful series from the experienced material conditions that exert effects on the mental structures; on the other hand, performance of language, use of signs, and action that exert effects on the material conditions. Human perception locates physical things in practical relations and, thus, turns them meaningful and relevant. If so perceived, even the "stones may cry" (Lk. 19:

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237 See also Bourdieu 1990b, 200ff., G: 2008, 352ff.

40; Hab. 2:11) and their cries are put into a meaningful cognitive series (a network of dispositions). Inversely, the mental dispositions of the actors turn into action, so that one day the "enemies shall not leave in thee one stone upon another" (Lk. 19: 43 f.).

For the processes of perception and action, there are resemblances in theory. The aspect of perception connotes mainly Cassirer. Wittgenstein is insofar important as the meaning of a thing is disclosed by its use. The aspect of linguistic action connotes Wittgenstein (and some Pragmatists) insofar as the meaning of a word is disclosed by its use. Hence, linguistic action also connotes Austin's concept of performance. In sum, one could talk about a semiotic function of things and a pragmatic function of signs. Nevertheless, this would not be sufficiently precise with reference to praxeology, since the "dialectic" between material and mental structures plays an important role for Bourdieu's concept of habitus.[238]

In this section, we will sketch the two poles (the material and the symbolic) with regard to their function in the mutual interrelation.

Telling things

When Bourdieu distinguishes mental from material structures, or language from social conditions, this does not mean that the material objects, structures, and practices are silent. To the contrary, they are telling, since they convey meaning. Even the "elementary acts of bodily gymnastics … are highly charged with social meanings and values" (Bourdieu 1990b, 71, G: 2008, 132). Things, as a house or a tool, are not simply and positively just things. They are perceived things and therefore socially meaningful and consequential.

This is the case with the human body's posture (hexis), mimic, and gestures, as well as with social groups, fields of producers (for example, fields of literature, religion, or science) and the producers' products (books, artworks, rituals). This is the case with houses and housing, institutions (schools and universities), religion and law (as an institution and codified regulation), office and its functions, economic production, and much more. Although Bourdieu pays much attention to material objects, he is not so much interested in the materiality of the objects as such.[239] He always refers to material objects in practical and, therefore, meaningful relations.

There is no point in labeling Bourdieu as a staunch structural materialist. Browsing his works for material goods one rather ends up with three observations. First, goods and things are important for praxeology insofar as they exert influence on human praxis. This is the case mainly through the effects that goods and things exert, as well as through the effects that human actors perceive and

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238 See above 1.2.2.3, particularly the diagram, and volume 2.

239 As distinct from the so called "material turn"; see for instance Bennett and Joyce 2010.

evaluate—as recognition, misrecognition, demand, and the like. In this respect, it is as *perceived* distribution of goods that goods take effect on the perceiving actors; they restructure their schemes of perception and classification. It is the activity of perception (not mirroring) which "duplicates" the social world[240] and unfolds the logic of praxis. Second, Bourdieu describes things as elements of structures, related to other elements. He understands these structures as practical relations, shaped by the practical logic that generates practices according to interests and demands in relation to the invitations and threats of the social conditions.

For these reasons, things are telling for the actor involved in praxis. Inversely, meaning always unfolds in relation to things by means of perception, judgment, and action perspective.

Practical signs

Things are telling, since they are perceived and put into meaningful cognitive series or *structures* (as Bourdieu prefers to say). In Cassirer and objectivist structuralism, these series are limited to the universe of thought and language. In praxeology, they overarch different traditional ontological realms (see p. 122). They embrace whatever is relevant for a given praxis: words, deeds, goods, emotions, distributions of possibilities, et cetera. In this sense, signs in praxeology are practicing. They acquire their meaning by exerting effects in practical processes.

Accordingly, Bourdieu interprets Erving Goffman's critique of the social representation of mental illness as a work of substituting series:

> In order to understand the social conditions that produce the pre-constructed object (psychiatric hospital and mental patient), which a 'sociology of mental illness' could only assume as such, it was necessary to tear apart the web of apparent relations that, in the common consciousness, contain madmen and insanity. The series madman, insanity, neurosis, psychiatrist, mental hospital, cure, had to be replaced by the one that it disguises: committed, commitment, forced residence, prison, barracks, concentration camp, institutional alienation. (Bourdieu 1968, 696, G: 1970, 28, interpreting Goffman 1961)

In this approach, the distinction of material conditions and mental structures is not the basic parameter to lead the analysis. Objects, experience of the objects,

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240 See for example, an older text (Bourdieu 1974, 60ff., not available in English), and a newer one (Bourdieu 2010, 468ff., G: 1982a, 727ff.). "The world of objects, a kind of book in which each thing speaks metaphorically of all others and from which children learn to read the world, is read with the whole body, in and through the movements and displacements which define the space of objects as much as they are defined by it" (Bourdieu 1990b, 76, G: 2008, 142).

and mental representations are not separated in order to describe meaning as a correct reflection of material conditions (signifiers) by a mental image (signified). Meaning is rather constructed by the relation of different objects and/or ideas to others, organized in two series that are meaningful to different people: the first series to the US-American common sense in the fifties, and the second to Goffman and to reformers of psychiatry in the sixties. Nevertheless, as denoted in Bourdieu, the series reconstructs representations supposedly present in the consciousness of actors. In any case, this means that a relation between things and mind is presupposed here. However, it is a practical relation.

In terms of theory, Bourdieu's references to *Wittgenstein and Austin* correspond, each in its particular way, to this praxeological turn, particularly in the approach to language. *Wittgenstein's* concept of language as a tool and of meaning as its *use* within life-forms[241] is well suited to philosophically frame the praxeological approach. Austin's theory of performative speech acts corresponds well with that focus on the use of language. Notwithstanding, Bourdieu insists that the illocutionary force of a speech act is not so much to be seen in speech itself but in the social conditions of its utterance, mainly in the power delegated to the speaker.[242] This reminds one of the fact that the conditions of linguistic utterances and any other practices are conditions of power that have to be taken into account as such by the sociological analysis of the construction of meaning and of the use of language.

In praxeology, the relation between things and mind does not unfold simply between signifier (things) and signified (mind). Rather, this relation is operated by the dispositions of the habitus. The dispositions of perception, judgment, and action structure the experience of social objects, actors, communications, and the like. They construct meaningful series of cognitive content by transforming experience through perception, judgment, and action orientation. This happens within objective social relations of power.

2.2   Matter and mind—things and signs

2.2.1 Narrowing the focus

In contrast to the dualism of mind and matter in the substantialist tradition, Bourdieu recurs to the mediation between both through a third entity, the schemes of perception. In contrast to an intellectualist or idealist concept of cognition, Bourdieu links perception strongly to experiences of the social world.

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241 Wittgenstein 2004, §11 and §206. See also above p. 81 and below p. 218.

242   See Bourdieu 2006, 72ff., 107, G: 2005, 79ff., 101. See also below p. 232.

2.2.2 Bourdieu's vocabulary on symbolic praxis

Bourdieu has a rich vocabulary referring to operations with meaning. The term "symbolic" is the most important among them. All the concepts and patterns employed refer to semantics and meaning generation as operations of social praxis. The examination of some possible misunderstandings endorses the strong social underpinnings of semantic operations in Bourdieu's view.

2.2.3 Social construction of meaning

In the framework of the theory of habitus, perceptional schemes are conceived as dispositions of the habitus. In consequence, the meaning of the semantic content is produced by the activities of the actors in their particular social context.

2.2.4 Signification as operation

Framing semiotic concepts within the theory of habitus conveys changes. Practices or utterances become symbolic only by the social use of their semiotic function, that is, as social operators. Mostly used as an adjective, "symbolic" is a function of utterances and practices. It refers to simultaneous semiotic and social recognition.

Polysemy, metaphor, and homology refer to operations called paradigmatic by structuralists. These operations produce chains of connotations. As operators of practical logic they facilitate the transfer of schemes between different fields of praxis and produce a surplus of meaning for given situations.

For Bourdieu, the core meaning of a linguistic unit is its conventional meaning, but this meaning is bound to social exchange. The core meaning of a word is a product of the social linguistic labor in a field where this word is most commonly and most constantly used. It represents the (historical) invariance of use in a specific field.

The implicit concept of sign in Bourdieu's works is primarily the dyadic one of structuralism. Bourdieu's later shift to Wittgenstein, Austin, and Dewey did not convey explicit changes to the sign concept but rather conveyed an elevated emphasis on social relations for the production of meaning.

2.2.5 Twofold reality

Instead of tearing apart things and minds, Bourdieu postulates a twofold reality. Things are telling. Material objects, structures, and the like, are not just silent facts or dead objects. As they are involved in human praxis, they almost automatically convey meaning. In turn, sgns are practicing in the sense that they acquire meaning via their position series of practices, things, emotions, et cetera; and not by their position in a series of merely mental representations. A sign is a tool within a life-form (Wittgenstein). Social relations of power condition the meaning of the sign.

2.3   Objects and Subjects—structures and actors

Besides mind and matter, the relation between subject and object is the other classical issue of sociological epistemology. We have touched this issue already with some remarks on objectified and embodied structures (2.1.3). It is apparent that Bourdieu fosters a relational view of the issue and that he aims at resolving it mainly through the models of habitus and field. Hence, in Bourdieu's writings the issue appears repeatedly in different perspectives, mostly without previous notice. This does not always foster an easy reading.

Therefore, we open with a short clarification regarding our approach to the issue. We proceed with an introduction to Bourdieu's vocabulary. Finally, we bundle the problem around the question of what the source of historical action is. This gives us the opportunity (after a sketch of some basic traits of praxeology) to deal with the problem while advancing from subjective to objective relations.

2.3.1   Perspectives and relations—narrowing the focus

In this section, we want to narrow the focus to the subject-object relation. First, we will reduce complexity by concentrating only on the relations of the praxis observed, not on the relation between the scientist and the praxis. Second, we introduce the basics of Bourdieu's relational approach to subject and object.

First-order relations

It simply is "easier to treat social facts as things or as people than as relations" (Bourdieu 1990e, 190, G: 1985a, 68). In doing so, one can describe social reality in a onefold manner, so to say. In contrast, a praxeological approach to the old question of subjectivity and objectivity, only with regard to people has to consider at least three different relations. First, there are the dynamics of embodiment of objective social structures in the actors (internalization) that involve a structured perception of social relations as well as the emotional and physical effects of the objective social structures on the actors. Second, the construction of social objects by the actors (externalization) involves, among other things, linguistic, physical and material practices. Third, the scientific objectification of the two former aspects involves the theoretical and methodological conditions of scientific praxis.

In this sense, for praxeology the reality for action is threefold. The first two aspects refer to the relations between social actors. We take these aspects as relations of first order. The third aspect refers to the scientific observation that reconstructs

this praxis by means of its preconstructed models. We take scientific observation as a relation of second order.[243]

The processes on the first-order level embrace all kinds of social relations and operations: objective positions of the actors, the actors' endowment with different forms of capital, their (perceived) social relationships and positioning, the particular perspectives they construct their world from, ascriptions by others, self-ascriptions, shared and not shared convictions and ideologies, and much more. The second order observation involves constant reflexivity, among others with regard to the scientific models employed.

Two-way relation

On the first-order level, we can observe a two-way relation. Bourdieu identifies, as one of the cornerstones of his work, the two-way relation "between objective structures (those of social fields) and incorporated structures (those of the habitus)." (Bourdieu 1998b, VII, G: 2007, 7)[244] Instead of contraposing entities, this theory comprises multiple and complex relations of mutual generation between subject and object. Further, the theory does not simply identify the subject with mental activities (signs, meaning) and the object with matter (things, institutions). Instead, the relations of mutual production between subject and object are mediated by signs and things alike. The embodiment of the socially objective world takes place by means of perception of symbols as well as by means of physical effects on the body; the externalization of the bodily dispositions takes place by verbal utterances as well as by material practices.

This twofold two-way relation is a step forward on the way to overcoming Descartes' classical separation between subject (*res cogitans*) and object (*res extensa*) in a dialectical way, as indicated by Hegel and Marx (see 2.1.2). This also means leaving behind the everyday perception of oneself and the world as separated into two ontological realms. By means of the embodied dispositions of the habitus the world is inside the actor, and by means of the actor's judgment and action the actor is constantly in the world.[245]

Notwithstanding, this program does not prevent Bourdieu from frequently using the opposition of "objective versus subjective," and from prominently using the term "interest," or from defining the habitus as both individual *and* collective. This vocabulary is possible, since the point of interest is the mediation, the relation

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243 See above 1.2.2.4, particularly the diagram.

244 See above 1.2.2.2.

245 In this sense, Bourdieu draws heavily on the phenomenological tradition. See volume 2, on practical sense and field.

between the terms. For instance, the mediation between object and subject takes place through the representation of the object according to embodied categories of experience (dispositions of the habitus). These categories put sensorial experiences into meaningful series and thus represent the objects of perception as a meaningful social world that invites the actors to action or threatens them. Seemingly, paradoxical expressions like "subjective objectivity" are due to these mediations.

However, some irritation may arise by the fact that, in Bourdieu, the relationist theory of cognition and the dialectical subject-object scheme interfere with one another. First, subjects are human actors, bodies that act in the context of objects (other bodies and things). Second, the relational theory of embodiment of the world via perception and of the exteriorization of practices and works (objects) sees subjects and objects as intimately identified by a "genuine ontological complicity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127f., G: 1996, 161). Third, both subjects and objects, actors and fields, are conceived as relational. For fields and social space, this is easy to realize. It boils down to a different concentration of capital according to different positions. However, the concept of subject undergoes a transformation. The theory of habitus disaggregates the subject into a network of dispositions (or schemes) generated by a myriad of perceptions, judgments, and actions during a life's history. In consequence, such a network of dispositions would consist of areas with stable and reliable knowledge and other areas with faint and ephemeral perceptions.[246] Form Cassirer's point of view, this would be a different degree of either objectivity or subjectivity (Cassirer 1953, 271ff.).

In sum, as we approach the object(ive) and the subject(ive) in Bourdieu, we can distinguish two ways of approaching praxis. The first is the one between actors (mind and body, individual and collective) and world (everything else): the dialectical tradition. The second is the relational concept (the network) of the actors and of the world: the neo-Kantian and structuralist tradition. In order to understand praxis, it is useful to consider both approaches: The mediation between the network of dispositions (the actors) and the structure of distribution of capital (field or space) does not take place by means of a simple structural homology, but rather by mutual production and reproduction. The dialectical production and reproduction takes place not as a deterministic relation between readily defined entities, but rather as extremely frequent, detailed, and complex interrelations between the structures of the world and the networks of dispositions.

This said, similarly to Marx's comments on Feuerbach, Bourdieu takes objectivity and subjectivity as just two aspects of one continuous historical process: praxis.

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246 Our interpretation of the habitus (vol. 2) will be strongly relational. From these impulses, I have outlined a theory of identity as a network (Schäfer 2003; 2005).

2.3.2 Bourdieu's vocabulary on object and subject

Reviewing the same works as in the last section,[247] we will now give an overview of Bourdieu's vocabulary regarding the subject-object scheme. Additionally, in order to deal with some interference we will briefly refer to Cassirer's point of view on the issue.

Concepts and patterns

Subject and object open a wide space for connotations. Bourdieu writes about objective social structure, objective relations between classes, objective positions in space and fields, objective positions in class condition and in social order; and he contrasts these concepts with subjective representations, individuals, physical persons and subjects, habitus and dispositions, the sense for reality, as well as with heads and brains.

We have frequently found the following patterns. Bourdieu distinguishes objective structures (exterior to the actors) from interior dispositions: e.g. field from habitus and body; objective relations between classes from individuals; social structure from subjects; objective expressive acts from subjective and intentional ones.[248] More specifically, he works with an opposition between objectified meaning/sense in institutions and practical sense in individual actors. The mediation between the opposed terms consists of practical operations such as creating a shared world of common sense, of inhabiting institutions, or of conditioning—in short, practices and effects that operate according to the logic of the given praxis. In most cases, the habitus is associated with the subjective side of praxis; the fields and the social space are associated with the objective.[249]

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247 Bourdieu 1977b, G: 2009; 1990b, G: 2008; 2010, G: 1982a; 1996, G: 2004a; 1968, G: 1970; 1991b, G: 2011b; 1986, G: 1992f; 1985b, G: 1985a; 2000a, G: 2001a; and the essays and interviews in Bourdieu 1990d, G: 1992c; 1998b, G: 2007; 1993b, G: 1993c; 2006, G: 2005. For details, see the appendix on Bourdieu's vocabulary (p. 365).

248 See French: Bourdieu 1966, 221, G: 1974, 71. As far as we know, an English translation does not exist.

249 With regard to scientific observation, Bourdieu relates scientifically observed objective probabilities to subjective sense and aspirations (Bourdieu 1990b, 54, G: 2008, 101). Sociological observation can establish the objective probability of the access of a given actor to goods; on the actors' side, their sense for reality and their capacity for adequate anticipation corresponds to the objective conditions (Bourdieu 1990b, 60, G: 2008, 112). Moreover, Bourdieu constructs the social space (of styles) and the fields in an objectivist way, while at the same time he distinguishes the objective sense of the game (in a field) and the subjective sense for that game—the latter is associated to the habitus.

In sum, Bourdieu's vocabulary indicates that he is primarily oriented in a dialectic interpretation of the classical modern concepts of subject and object. Additionally, he often combines utterances about objective or subjective aspects of praxis with the vocabulary of "mind and matter." A relationist approach is clearly present in the concepts of habitus, practical sense, field, and space, which he uses to reinterpret the dialects between subjective and objective factors of praxis in the mode of praxeology.[250]

Ambivalences—Cassirer and Marx

Bourdieu's orientation in both scientific traditions results in some ambivalences.

Dealing with "The concept of reality,"[251] *Cassirer* discusses the problem of the certainty of knowledge. He introduces concepts of subjectivity and objectivity that are simultaneously intriguing and problematic.

Cassirer maintains that there is no objectivity in entities themselves independent of consciousness. Instead, objectivity can only be achieved by means of cognitively structuring experience and, thus, constructing entities as well-located objects in cognitive series. This means that knowledge becomes more objective as it links empirical data to principles that proof invariant and reliable interpretations of the constant flow of new empirical data.

> Each partial experience is accordingly examined as to what it means for the total system; and this meaning determines its degree of objectivity. In the last analysis, we are not concerned with what a definite experience 'is,' but with what it 'is worth;' i.e., with what function it has as a particular building-stone in the structure of the whole. (277)

Accordingly, systematic scientific procedures provide the best degree of objectivity. In contrast, subjective knowledge is volatile and good only for the "particular here and now" (272). Thus, objectivity and subjectivity appear as different degrees of the reliability of knowledge. In terms of the classical subject-object distinction, this means that only the subject is involved. This conveys difficulties for the adaptation of Cassirer's theory of objectivity to sociology.

Nevertheless, the relational concept of objectivity and subjectivity is intriguing. In a network of knowledge, neither "the subjective" nor "the objective" is a given point of departure (279). Rather, it all depends on continuous experience and reflection of experience. Thus, series of (logical) relations take shape inductively. In consequence,

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250 Eventually, it also appears when he takes invariance as an indicator of the objectivity of a scientific observation, as Cassirer proposes.

251 Cassirer 1953, 271ff. References to Cassirer in this section appear in parentheses. See for interpretation Sandkühler 2003a; 2003b; van Heusden 2003.

the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is now gradually between ephemeral (subjective) knowledge and well-corroborated (objective) knowledge.

This approach to knowledge and certainty allows for advancing the concept of habitus in terms of a network of dispositions, occasionally suggested by Bourdieu (see vol. 2). One can distinguish between denser and sparser, thicker and thinner areas of such networks with a higher or lower degree of reliability and certainty, respectively. The denser dispositions are those of long-standing use and reliable results in perception and action; the more scattered ones may be either new, or outdated, or seldom used. One could also transpose the network metaphor of certainty to social structures. Well-established structures are stronger and offer more reliability; new structures or disintegrating ones offer less.[252]

In contrast to these possibilities, Bourdieu maintains a *traditional vocabulary* insofar as he associates perceiving and acting human beings—such as individuals or collectives (groups), or institutional representatives (spokespersons, etc.)—with subjective praxis. Objective praxis and its derivates have a wider array of uses. These expressions refer to institutions, goods, class relations, and struggle between specialists. The use of the term "objective" in Bourdieu often presupposes a scientific view on reality. Scientists can reconstruct objective relations (in models of distributions, etc.) that regular actors, involved in praxis, are not easily able to see (or are even doomed to misrecognize systematically). Further, Bourdieu speaks of "objectifying" in a double sense: Mostly, in the context of scientific operations it can be understood as "turning something into an object of cognition." In the context of practical operations, and based in Marxian tradition, "objectification" can be understood by reference to the concept of labor, as producing something or imparting a structure to something. The objectifying subject is not conceived as a free, contextless subject that posits itself and posits objects (as Fichte would put it). Bourdieu rather makes his point inversely. The subject is already prestructured by the social structures it has been raised in.

In reference to both aforementioned theoretical traditions, Bourdieu's usage of the terms allows two observations about the subject-object relation in his theory. According to Hegel and Marx, the subject is always also the product of (a former stage of) what it is producing: social reality. Between object and subject, subject and object, there is a third, constituting instance: the "deed" (*That*, Hegel) and activity or "labor" (*Tätigkeit*, *Arbeit*, Marx). According to Cassirer, the subject of knowledge constructs the object by means of the activity of another third instance: the cognitive schemes.

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252 This interpretation also would suit the formal definition of social structure by Fürstenberg (1966, 441).

Be it physical work or the activity of cognitive schemes of perception, both perspectives convey a shift in the approach to the subject-object question. Instead of the terms as such—subject and object—now the mediation between both terms turns important: action and perception.

2.3.3   Historical action

Bourdieu radicalizes the focus on mediation by calling the relation between subject and object the real source of historical action. We start with this affirmation. From here, we could have followed straightforward Bourdieu's way to his developed praxeological concepts, especially habitus and field (see vol. 2). However, we are interested in the epistemological premises of the praxeological approach to meaning. Therefore, we will sketch only some basic lines of praxeological theory at this point. For the rest of the section we will stay with the subject-object relation (and its vocabulary). We aim to make plausible why the relation between subject and object can be seen as the source of historical action. For this reason, we proceed from social subjectivity to social objectivity.

The source of historical action

When one asks for the source of historical action (or for the driving force of history) the question of subject, object, and relation is posed in a more radical way. Normally, we are accustomed to answering this question with reference to either the creative subject or the force of material circumstance. Bourdieu sees the source in the third instance, the relation.

> The source of *historical action*, that of the artist, the scientist or … the worker … is not an active subject confronting society as if that society were an object constituted externally. This source resides *neither in consciousness nor in things* but in the *relation between two states of the social*, that is, between the history objectified in *things*, in the form of *institutions*, and the history incarnated in *bodies*, in the form of that system of enduring dispositions which I call *habitus*. (Bourdieu 1990e, 190, G: 1985a, 69)

From this point of view, praxeology is an advanced theory of mediation between subject and object. The driving force of history is localized in the *relation* between two aggregates produced by human history: institutions and bodies.

Table 2   Basic relations

Objective state of the social	← (relation) →	Subjective state of the social
Things, institutions	← (relation) →	bodies, dispositions, habitus
[social space, fields	← (practical logic… → …of material and symbolic effects)	practical sense, dispositions]

As a theory of mediation, praxeology does not simply describe just one term of the relation that constitutes praxis: not consciousness *or* things, not subjective dispositions *or* social structures. Praxeology rather describes the relations between both terms and the capacities for relation of either one. In other words, the relations unfold as mental (cognitive, emotional) *and* physical (bodily, material) activities: labor in cognitive and emotional form as well as in physical activity (as an effect of the subjective term on the objective one), as well as constraints *and* opportunities (as an effect of the objective on the subjective term). The subjective and objective terms of praxis (e.g., bodies and institutions) relate through different capacities. Due to the dispositions, the bodies are able to perceive, judge, and act on what happens on the objective "side" of praxis (e.g., in order to protect liturgical utensils the pastor locks the door of the church). In turn, the objects are not dead matter either, but exert material influence on the actors (e.g., the locked door keeps a parishioner closed out) and serve as signifiers of social conditions (e.g., the parish is regarded as unfriendly); thus, they are capable of serving as threats or invitations for the actors. The practical relations between subjective dispositions and the objective conditions operate according to practical logics specific to particular environments (fields).

In a nutshell, Bourdieu structures praxeological theory accordingly. Listed from the objective towards the subjective term of the practical relation, we find a series of praxeological concepts: The social space is a model for the conditions of action, the result of foregoing struggles over the distribution of capital. The fields are models of actual areas of social struggle and their specific power distribution, directly relevant to actors. The practical logic and the practical sense designate the interplay of the logic of the fields with the operational capacity of actors to perceive, judge, and act accordingly and to take part in the game played on the fields. The dispositions of the habitus represent the embodied conditions of social life: the embodied schemes of perception, judgment, and action. (The dispositions are conceived as historically embodied objective conditions; the objective conditions are conceived as historically objectified dispositions.) The mediations take place as symbolic *and* material operations, through mind *and* matter. Both signs and things have an effect on both the formation of meaning *and* on material conditions.

The overall condition for all relations and mediations to take place is the historically accumulated objective and subjective inequality of the actors, subjectively perceived as invitation or threat and conveyed by the objective distribution of goods and, thereby, of the chances to live. In consequence, the source of historical action is the involvement of humans in all the dimensions of social struggle.

In contrast to the opinion of some readers, Bourdieu's approach to the subjective and objective aspects of social praxis does not eliminate subjectivity. It rather anchors subjectivity in social relations and anchors social relations in subjective activity.[253]

Social subjectivity—perception and construction

Subjectivity, as a creative operator in the construction of the objective world, is part of Bourdieu's theoretical toolkit.

> The 'subject' born of the world of objects does not arise as a subjectivity facing an objectivity: the objective universe is made up of objects which are the | product of objectifying operations structured according to the same structures that the *habitus* applies to them. The *habitus* is a metaphor of the world of objects, which is itself an endless circle of metaphors that mirror each other *ad infinitum*. (Bourdieu 1990b, 76f., G: 2008, 142)

However, Bourdieu does not refer to the free and unconditioned subject of subjectivist constructionism (e.g., Schmidt 1992a). The subject is anchored in objective social relations by means of the habitus—or more concretely put, by the dispositions of perception and judgment. In consequence, a sociology of perception may clarify the praxeological notion of subjectivity.

In a short lecture, Bourdieu explains quite programmatically what he understands by a "sociology of the perception of the social world—that is, a sociology of the construction of the worldviews, which themselves contribute to the construction of this world."[254] While Bourdieu concedes a certain truth to other theories, he rejects theories of universal subjects and structures. Instead, for him the actor's cognitive construction of their social world is oriented and limited in two ways. First, on the side of the "perceiving *subjects*," (132) the habitus is limited to the particular

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253 See the introduction to this chapter and the paragraph on "Chopping Bourdieu's critique" (p. 136).

254 Bourdieu 1990c, 130, G: 1992b, 143. Page numbers in parentheses in this section refer to this text. The lecture was delivered at the University of San Diego in 1986. Bourdieu, once again, objects to a positivist misunderstanding of *Distinction* (128) and in this context sets out to explain the objectivity of the subjective. Another lecture, Japan 1989, gives an equally concise and interesting account of Bourdieu's approach: Bourdieu 1998d, 3ff., esp. 8f., G: 1998e, 15ff., esp. 21ff.

social position of the actors (131). Second, the "objective" side, the social space, (132) presents itself to the actors as highly structured. Nevertheless, the effect of the objective social world is not unlimitedly strong. The social subjects may well describe and construct their social world "in different ways in accordance with different principles of vision and division" (132). Thus, difference and disagreement between actors and their context is possible (and even probable under conditions of social and symbolic inequality).

Bourdieu summarizes this assessment of the subjective construction of the objective as follows:

> Thus *perception of the social world* is the product of a double structuring: on the *objective level*, it is socially structured because the properties attributed to agents or institutions present themselves in combinations which have very unequal probabilities: just as feathered animals are more likely to have wings than are furry animals, so the possessors of a sophisticated mastery of language are more likely to be seen in a museum than those who don't have this mastery. On the *subjective level*, perception of the social world is structured because the models of perception and evaluation, especially those which are written into *language*, express the state of relations of symbolic power […]. These two mechanisms together act to produce a common world, a world of *common sense* or, at least, a minimum consensus about the social world (Bourdieu 1990c, 133, G: 1992b, 146f., italics added)

The subjective construction of social reality is not an individual operation. It is social, and it operates in relation to the distribution of the objective goods, capital, and properties of actors. To a considerable extent, the subjective construction of social reality operates through language and is involved in struggles for symbolic power. Hence, it contributes to the construction of an objective symbolic reality, that is, a common sense.

Common sense—collective objectification

The constructive operations of subjects can produce objective reality, material or symbolic. Common sense stems from a collective symbolic objectification of subjective convictions by means of communication. Common sense is a collective, objectified mental reality that may face individual subjects as an imperative symbolic force that may well turn physical (as, for instance, riots confirm).

On the one hand, this common sense functions as a basic invariant; its "immediate self-evidence is accompanied by the objectivity provided by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world," a consensus reinforced by reiterating shared experiences (Bourdieu 1990b, 58, G: 2008, 108). Common sense does not only represent a widely shared series of logical combinations between empirical data, it also produces homologies that create relative invariants between different

fields of practice. For instance, respect for God equals respect for the priest, equals respect for the father, equals respect for the president.[255]

But on the other hand, it is also true that "the objects of the social world … can be perceived and expressed in different ways, since they always include a degree of indeterminacy and vagueness, and, thereby, a certain degree of semantic elasticity" (Bourdieu 1990c, 133f., G: 1992b, 148ff.). Adding the differences in social positions, interests, and modes of perception to this vagueness, symbolic struggles about the legitimate vision and division of the world are a necessary consequence (Bourdieu 1990c, 134ff., G: 1992b, 148ff.).

Symbolic struggle—dispute and misrecognition

The subjective construction of social reality is anchored in the experience of an already established reality of *social struggle*. The unavoidable experience of social inequality, the struggle for life chances, and the relations of symbolic power exerts an effect on the subjective production of worldviews. Actors experience their class conditions as opportunities and constraints for themselves "as 'closed doors', 'dead ends' and 'limited prospects.'" Hence, they acquire a corresponding "'art of assessing likelihoods', as Leibniz put it**,** of anticipating the objective future, in short, the 'sense of reality'**,** or realities" (Bourdieu 1990b, 60, G: 2008, 112).

In consequence, actors construct their worldviews and condition their sense of reality with regard to the dynamics of the struggles: the multiple relations of social differences, competence, struggles, identifications and alliances, objective and calculated strategies, crises and rational readjustments that unfold among social actors. Hence, the worldviews turn out maps of conflicting positions, ascriptions and auto-ascriptions, evaluative judgments, strategic options—all this structured according to the differences and conflicts experienced by the actors. As the symbolic struggles represent and transform objective material struggles, they are as objective as the material struggles are.

Part of this symbolic struggle is the symbolic power exerted by those who hold power in the society and give shape to the common sense. This power negates the struggle and favors the reproduction of established common sense. Thus, it fosters *misrecognition* of the state of affairs. Common sense inculcates the socially dominant criteria of perception, evaluation, and action for the subjective construction of the worldviews. Because the actors recognize these criteria as natural and self-evident, and because they use them for their own subjective construction, actors simultane-

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255 Similarly, social distinction establishes the dominant positions as "invariant of the dominant discourse" and the commonplace "of elegant disquisition on innate taste" (Bourdieu 2010, 65, G: 1982a, 131).

ously misrecognize the arbitrariness of the criteria. More than that, they misrecognize that these criteria operate as a form of symbolic power. Thus, social rites "tend to consecrate or legitimate an arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of the limit and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate" (Bourdieu 2006, 118, G: 2005, 111). The subjective misrecognition turns socially objective: A majority recognizes the domination as legitimate.

Struggle and misrecognition as the context of the subjective construction of social reality render visible that this construction is not an intellectual exercise of mirroring nature as correctly as possible. The subjective construction in its social context rather turns into a strategic tool disputed by different (objective) social forces.

Social objectivity—positions and dispositions

From a praxeological point of view, the subjective construction of social reality is not conceivable without regarding the influence of objective structures on the activities of actors. This is where, at the latest, the dispositions of the habitus come into view. They "are one of the mediations through which the objective structures ultimately structure all experience, starting with economic experience, without following the paths of either mechanical determination or adequate consciousness" (Bourdieu 1990b, 41, G: 2008, 77f.). The dispositions allow one to conceive the subjective construction as the processing of social experiences by means of the labor of perception, judgment, and action orientation.

Through perception and judgment, the actors ascribe meaning to objective social structures. Such collective ascriptions generate the "symbolic effect" by which the "established order, and the distribution of capital which is its basis, contribute to their own perpetuation" (Bourdieu 1990b, 136, G: 2008, 246). In the inverse direction, the objective structures produce corresponding subjects. The distribution of capital, the access to goods, the demands of bodily existence, physical force, social groups and institutions, and material infrastructure collectively share beliefs and practices, and multifaceted conflicts—in short, objective social relations give shape to specific subjective constructions of reality. Bourdieu can give emphasis to this side of the subject-object relation as well.

> Being established among social conditions and positions (e.g., those defining a class situation), *objective relations* have *more reality* than the *subjects* involved, than the direct or mediated *relations actually taking place among the agents*, than the *representations* the agents form of these relations. To ignore the objective relations leads to apprehending all the characteristics observable or even disclosed by experimentation

as if they were substantial properties, attached by nature to individuals or classes of individuals. (Bourdieu 1968, 691f., G: 1970, 21, italics added)[256]

In consequence, for a full account of the subject-object-relation it is necessary to locate the subjective production of goods and meaning in the context of the objective distribution of capital, goods, and beliefs. In Bourdieu's vocabulary, this means relating habitus, capital, fields, and social space to one another.

> On the basis of knowledge of the space of positions, one can separate out classes, in the logical sense of the word, i.e., sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances. (Bourdieu 1985b, 725, G: 1985a, 12)

In this sense, Bourdieu offers various concepts and models for reconstructing objective distributions of goods, capital, practices, and the like. These models are particularly those of fields, of the social space, and that of correspondence analysis. In one way or another, all these models permit localizing actors, their dispositions, their taste, their style, as well as their linguistic or material products within objective social relations. Such relationist modeling realizes systematically that most members of a modeled class

> have been *confronted with the situations most frequent for members of that class*. Through the *always convergent experiences* that give a social environment its physiognomy, with its 'closed doors', 'dead ends' and 'limited prospects', the *objective structures that sociology apprehends* in the form of *probabilities of access to goods, services and powers*. (Bourdieu 1990b, 60, G: 2008, 112, italics added)

The convergent objective positions amount to convergent experiences that transform into convergent dispositions and convergent languages and practices, and convergent perspectives on the social world.

Social perspectivity—positions and views

As different positions generate different schemes of perception and judgment, they also spawn different views of the social structure, and different maps of the social landscape. The differential distribution of goods and power translates into

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256 See also Bourdieu 1966, 223. In this passage, the influence of Cassirer's concept of objectivity as a denser, more reliable reality than subjectivity is palpable. For the social conditions and positions Bourdieu says that "ils ont plus de réalité que les sujets qui les habitent."

a differential distribution of worldviews. A social position is a point of view that conveys a determinate perspective on the entire social world.

> given the fact that we have constructed social space, we know that these points of view, as the word itself suggests, are views taken from a certain point, that is, from a given position within social space. And we know too that there will be different or even antagonistic points of view, since points of view depend on the point from which they are taken, since the vision that every agent has of space depends on his or her position in that space. (Bourdieu 1990c, 130, G: 1992b, 143)

It follows that from each point of view such a *mapping* of the social space differs from other mappings. This is due to various factors, but not least to the power over the social world conveyed by each position. The more capital that is concentrated in a given position, the larger the space of the perceived positions will be in general.

The specific perspective on the social space (or a given field) will also take effect on the assessment of other social actors and of one's own position among the other positions perceived. This may turn into a calculus of relative possibilities and conflicts (Bourdieu 2006, 227, G: 2005, 129). In any case, the positioning conveys self-ascriptions and ascriptions to others, relative to the difference of the positions and the associated (subjective) points of view. The ascriptions may turn objective, as communicated judgments or prejudice.

Moreover, these observations translate into a more cardinal consideration on *subjectivity and objectivity* in the relational praxeological framework. Once the objectivistic construction of a social space or a field is done, the positions are marked. The actors (individual or collective) associated with the positions have dispositions that make them see themselves as subjects facing a surrounding world of objects: things, institutions, and other actors. Thus, what is perceived as subjective or objective is relative to the given actors. Everybody is subject and, at the same time, an object to everybody else. The embodied schemes of classification of one actor (*alter*) are objective schemes for the other (*ego*).[257]

In consequence, a praxeological view on social relations does not only consider ascriptions and self-ascriptions as schemes of the habitus. It also takes the worldviews of the actors as an expression of their perceived subjectivity in relation to a perceived objectivity. The comparison of the perceived objective position with the

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257 This effect of positional perspectivity may possibly explain what Bourdieu means by the somewhat awkward expression "objective classifications, whether incorporated or objectified" (Bourdieu 2006, 227, G: 2005, 129). See the long quote on p. 198. An embodied classification (a disposition for a certain judgment, for instance) is embodied by *alter* and objective according to the perception of *ego*.

sociologically reconstructed objective position of the actor renders information about the real perspectives of the actors in relation to their perceived perspectives.

2.4   Subject, object, praxis—desiderata for praxeology

In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have examined some epistemological aspects of a description of reality as praxis—that is, as multiple relations.

The cleavages between subject/object and mind/matter in the Cartesian understanding have deeply coined the notion of reality in Western modernity. There is no way back, before these distinctions, to the holy and universal objectivity of the Middle Ages. Nor is it convincing to dissolve the distinctions by reducing the view to just one of the terms or by declaring the distinction as generally meaningless. Instead, Bourdieu attempts to overcome the cleavage with a theoretical focus on relations. However, he maintains the four themes (subject, object, matter, and mind) as a kind of epistemological coordinate system for occasional orientation of his discourse.

In this last section of the chapter, we will draw some conclusions from the hitherto observations. After discussing our conclusions, we will postulate that the praxeological approach is a consequent advancement for tackling praxis in a sufficiently complex manner without losing sight of the legitimate concerns behind the traditional themes of mind, matter, subject, and object.

2.4.1   A concluding remembrance

Bourdieu, with impulses from (Hegel and) Marx as well as from (Kant and) Cassirer, centers his attention on the cleavage itself: redefining it as a relation of social activity, praxis. However, Bourdieu does not define concepts in the manner of analytical philosophy. He develops a scientifically practical notion of "praxis" from empirical social research and theoretical reflection. The Marxian tradition offers a developed concept of labor (and with it of production, reproduction, demand, capital, etc.); the neo-Kantian tradition offers a way to conceive the mediating third instance between matter and mind through the relational concept of perceptional schemes (thus providing the tools for a theory of classification as well as tools for deepening the relational understanding of objectivity and subjectivity).

Thus, the Cartesian cleavage is neither ignored nor "eliminated by definition." Instead, Bourdieu transforms it into practical relations between relative terms

in (dialectic) reciprocal action. In consequence, praxeological sociology focuses primarily on two intertwined relations: the relations between actors (subject) and social structures (object) as well as the relations between the knowledge of social inequality (vision, classifications) and the material social differences (division, classes) (Bourdieu 2000a, 185f., G: 2001a, 238). Furthermore, praxeological sociology does not regard these relations to be ahistoric structures. Rather, the relations are the means to scientifically describe a social world in constant change, production, destruction, and struggle. Hence, praxeology deals with practical operations. For instance, cognitive construction has nothing in common with reflecting (mirroring) the objective world. Cognitive construction is rather described as an operation of processing experiences by means of the cognitive (and emotional) tools of perception, judgment, and action—by dispositions of the habitus. Thus, language and communication turn out to be as important for the symbolic, social, and material reproduction and transformation of the social world by social actors as the material production is important for the reproduction and the transformation of actors, communication, and language.

In short, Bourdieu transforms the theoretical cleavages into a theory of the relations between habitus and fields, mediated by operations according to a particular practical logic. However, the traditional distinctions persist as epistemological orientations in tension with the specific theoretical concepts of praxeology.

2.4.2 Productive tensions

One can conceive of the traditional epistemological distinctions (subject/object, mind/matter) as a kind of a coordinate system that underlies Bourdieu's praxeology—as a set of scientific perceptional schemes, so to say. Seen from this perspective, praxis unfolds as a myriad of operations that mediate dialectically between subjects and objects in mental and material states. Notwithstanding, Bourdieu has developed a large set of specific theoretical concepts for his praxeological sociology. The concepts of habitus and field may serve here as metaphors for a larger series of theoretical terms that compose the backbone of praxeological theory—terms such as social space, fields (games), (operations according to) practical logic, practical sense (for the games), and dispositions of the habitus.

As early as *Outline of a Theory of Practice,* Bourdieu characterizes his scientific project as an "experimental science of the *dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality*, or, more simply, of incorporation and objectification" (Bourdieu 1977b, 72, G: 2009, 164). Here, the individual and collective human actors are referred to as body and 'inside' in relation to the 'outside' world

of objects. Alternatively, he formulates the task of "grasping the principle of the dialectical relationship that is established between the regularities of the material universe of properties and the classificatory schemes of the *habitus*" (Bourdieu 1990b, 140, G: 2008, 255f.). Here, the material things with their properties and effects are conceived to be in a dialectic relation with the mental schemes of perception and judgment. Both epistemological distinctions (subject/object and mind/matter) are in use. Nevertheless, the terms are not separated in a substantialist sense. Rather, they are treated as terms of relations, whereby the practical mediation is the focus of interest. Hence, the two distinctions function as epistemological orientations.

The epistemological coordinates of subject/object and mind/matter serve as analytical categories facilitating a systematic observation and interpretation of praxis. Additionally, the theoretical concepts of praxeology (habitus, field, etc.) fulfill the same function. Thus, the epistemological coordinates enter into a certain productive tension with Bourdieu's praxeological concepts. For instance, by tendency "habitus" appears to be identified with subject and perception, whereas "field" seems to be identified with object and material structures. If this identification were systematically and consistently the case, then these concepts would perfectly fit into a Cartesian model. Habitus, field, and other concepts could easily be reified. However, Bourdieu does not use the concepts in that way. On the one hand, he constantly refers to the epistemological status of the concepts; on the other hand, his praxeological concepts do not fit exactly into the coordinate system, but rather create cognitive irritations with regard to the accustomed usage of the traditional terms. For example, a reader might easily identify "habitus" with the body and the subjective term of the subject-object relation. This identification would foster a reification of the concept. However, while Bourdieu uses habitus definitely as a concept for em*bodied* (subjective) schemes, the body also appears as an *object*ification of history (Bourdieu 1990b, 57, G: 2008, 106). Seen from the perspective of the epistemological coordinates, this is irritating, but helpful against reification.

As we are aiming at a method for the analysis of habit*ū*s, we are most interested in resisting the temptation to reify the concept. Therefore, with reference to some of Bourdieu's texts, we construct a diagram of the epistemological distinction that will hopefully serve as an enduring irritation with regard to our interpretations of the central concepts of praxeology (vol. 2) and to the analytical models (vol. 3).

2.4.3   Deep structure of praxis: a diagram

In spite of the hazards of oversimplification a diagram always conveys, I will close this chapter by graphically relating the epistemological coordinates to some of Bourdieu's texts.

The diagram spans the four terms of objective, subjective, material, and symbolic in their mutual relations.[258] It can be understood as modeling in a very elemental way the deep structures of praxis. The composition shows that the objective is not understood as material only, but as material (e.g., concentration of goods) and mental (e.g., codified meaning, rules). Objective relations are associated with social positions. The subjective pole also is understood as both mental (e.g., cognitive schemes) and material. We made the conjecture of "bodily dispositions" (hexis, complexion, etc.) as to plausibilize subjective materiality. Subjective relations are associated with dispositions. The material pole of the diagram is conceived as having subjective (bodily dispositions) and objective aspects (things). It is associated with material forms of exchange such as material production and commerce. So is the mental pole associated with subjective (cognitive schemes) and objective (e.g., common sense) aspects. It is associated with symbolic forms of exchange such as recognition (and misrecognition). The different sorts of embodied and objectified capital can be invested in exchange and production by material as well as by symbolic means. All the poles of the diagram are connected by dialectic relations, which function according to the logic of the current praxis.

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258 The concepts of habitus, fields, and social space are intentionally left out.

Fig. 8   Deep structure of praxis

In what follows, we will examine two of Bourdieu's texts with strong references to the epistemological coordinates and locate the theoretical notions used in these texts within the frame of the diagram.

In the strongly theoretical chapter, "Structures, *habitus*, practices" in *Logic of Practice,* we find the following text.

> Thus the dualistic vision that recognizes only the self-transparent act of conscious-ness or the externally determined thing has to give way to the | r*eal logic of action*, which brings *together two objectifications of history*, objectification in *bodies* and objectification in *institutions* or, which amounts to the same thing, two *states of capital*, *objectified and incorporated*, through which a *distance is set up from necessity and its urgencies*. This logic is seen in paradigmatic form in the *dialectic* of *expressive dispositions* and *instituted means of expression* (*morphological, syntactic and lexical instruments, literary genres*, etc.) which is observed in the intentionless *invention of regulated improvisation*. (Bourdieu 1990b, 56f., G: 2008, 105f., italics added)

Both body and institutions are seen as objectifications that emerge from the course of history. Capital appears to have two aggregate states: embodied and objectified.

The dialectic relation between dispositions and means of expression is conceived of as improvisation.

In his article, "Identity and representation" (published in *Language and Symbolic Power*), Bourdieu deals with the identity politics of regionalist groups. At the end of the article, he summarizes some theoretical conclusions.

> Here as elsewhere, in sum, one must escape the alternative of the 'demystifying' recording of objective criteria and the mystified and mystificatory ratification of wills and representations in order to keep together what go together in reality: on the one hand, the *objective classifications*, whether *incorporated or objectified*, sometimes in *institutional* form (like *legal* boundaries), and, on the other hand, the *practical relation to those classifications*, whether *acted out* or *represented*, and in particular the individual and collective *strategies* (such as regionalist demands) by which agents seek to put these classifications at the service of their *material or symbolic interests*, or to conserve and transform them; or, in other words, the *objective relations of material and symbolic power*, and the *practical schemes* (implicit, confused and more or less contradictory) through which *agents classify other agents* and *evaluate their position in these objective relations* as well as the *symbolic strategies of presentation and self-representation* with which they *oppose the classifications* and representations (of themselves) that others impose on them. (Bourdieu 2006, 227, G: 2005, 129, italics added)

In the article, Bourdieu deals with identity conflicts. This theme appears at the end of the quoted text: Groups that mutually impose classifications and oppose these imputations. The relations between one group (agent, subject, *ego*) and another (others, object, *alter*) frames the processes referred to in the rest of the text. The strategies used in the identity conflict are symbolic and consist of presentation and self-presentation as well as of opposing unwelcome imposed representations. Practical schemes enable actors to map the terrain of the conflict by classifying other actors and to evaluate their own relative positions in the objective relations. Cognitive schemes are applied within the context of objective relations of material and symbolic power. Actors apply schemes in their strategies in order to serve their material and symbolic interests by making use of objective classifications (that can be either embodied or objectified in institutions).

Fig. 9 Praxeological concepts

The diagram is built upon epistemological premises that Bourdieu constantly refers to, not with the intention to tear praxis apart into different entities but "in order to keep together what go together in reality" (Bourdieu 2006, 227, G: 2005, 129). On the one hand, we can see that some theoretical terms used by Bourdieu are quite compatible with the traditional epistemological categories. Many of them fall intuitively in the right place: institutions or material power as objective and material, or expressive dispositions as mental and subjective. Other terms seem to stand in odd positions: capital as subjective (embodied), body as objectification of history, symbolic power as objective, classifications and means of expression as objective. The seemingly odd positions are due to the relations; in other words, to "the dialectic of the incorporation of externality and the objectification of internality" (see Bourdieu 1977b, 72, G: 2009, 164). The impression of awkwardness also stems from the dialectics between the material properties and the "classificatory schemes of the habitus" (Bourdieu 1990b, 140, G: 2008, 255f.).

Finally, it is important to note that the epistemological coordinates of subject, object, mind, and matter cannot grasp these relations. To understand the logic of these relations we have to proceed to Bourdieu's original theorems: dispositions of the habitus, practical sense, logic of praxis, fields, social space, capital, and others.

Desiderata

For our further work, the epistemological coordinates have mainly three functions. All of them show desiderata that call for the praxeological approach for the study of praxis, and particularly of language.

First, a silent debate with the substantialist interpretation of the coordinates indeed runs through much of Bourdieu's writings. Therefore, the debate serves to mark the difference between this scheme of scientific observation and the schemes effective in Bourdieu's specific concepts.

Second, the objectivistic end to which we have brought the discussion of subject, object, mind, and matter at this point does not invite one to identify these categories all too easily with those of habitus, fields, etc. This will facilitate reading different models simply as different models.

Third, with regard to our interest in an approach to habitus via semantics, it is now clear that, from a praxeological perspective, neither habitus nor language is reducible to one of the four terms. "In order to keep together what goes together in reality" (Bourdieu 2006, 227, G: 2005, 129), both habitus and language should rather be understood as mediations between different terms. Habitus is not a subjective mental issue, but engendered by a complex relation between actor and the objective world.

> In the relation between habitus and field, history enters into a relation with itself: a genuine ontological complicity, as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty suggested, obtains between the agent (who is neither a subject or a consciousness, nor the mere executant of a role, the support of a structure or actualization of a function) and the social world (which is never a mere 'thing,' even if it must be constructed as such in the objectivist phase of research). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 128, G: 1996, 161)

Neither language nor its meaning is explained as an objective semantic system with its internal relations. Language rather comes into view as mediation between human beings and the world, as a tool for orientation and for causing effects. Language and habitus (according to our view of Bourdieu's view) are intimately interwoven. A praxeological approach to language, and especially to semantics, will implement a model of the generative transformations by which the dispositions of the habitus relate experiences, perception, judgment, and action orientation. Thus, language can be modeled in terms of its use within the dynamics of the invitations

and threats that the social relations present to the actors. This is exactly what our attempt to integrate semantics with praxeology by our model of the praxeological square aims at.

In order to do so, initially it seems useful to explore in more detail the praxeological approach to language and to operations with semantic content in Bourdieu's work.

2.4   Subject, object, praxis—desiderata for praxeology

After all, the praxeological key concepts appear to be appropriate for tackling praxis without losing sight of the legitimate concerns of the traditional terms of mind, matter, subject, and object.

A concluding remembrance condenses what has been said about how Bourdieu's transforms these cleavages form their Cartesian understanding into praxeology.

Productive tensions exist in Bourdieu's work between the traditional terms and his new praxeological concepts. On the one hand, the four terms serve as a kind of implicit epistemological coordinate system. On the other hand, concepts such as social space, fields, practical logic, practical sense, and dispositions of the habitus do not fit into this system. This causes a tension, productive for social analysis.

A diagram of the coordinate system exemplifies compatibilities and tensions.

Finally, some desiderata call for the central praxeological concepts, particularly for the study of language and meaning.

Meaning as praxis—language and signs **3**

Again, we recall the encounter of the peasant with the officer. The officer keeps the conversation going. Often this kind of chat reveals some strategic information about the attitudes and inclinations of the populace, particularly of the village-dwellers who often support the guerrillas. The peasant is happy that the conversation drifts towards religious beliefs. Both are non-Catholic, Pentecostal. Maybe they find some common ground. In any case, it is better to talk about "the things of God" (las cosas de Dios) than to be asked about suspicious movements in the mountains, neighboring villages and such things.

So the peasant talks about his congregation and his faith. But even if the peasant and the officer use the same words, it does not mean the same and it has a different effect. "I hope for Christ to come back soon and rapture the Church into his kingdom," the peasant says. What he means is an end to military violence, his hope for survival, and the final punishment of the evildoers: the military and the rich. "Amen," says the officer and thinks that the peasant is utterly mistaken: "The indio waits in vain!" Instead, the officer considers the kingdom of God to be erected on earth by his church, by the power of the Holy Spirit, and by a portion of military action against communist atheists. So, he is doing God's work in eradicating the leftists. But anyway, he thinks, for the peasant it is good to wait for Christ to come back on the clouds of heaven, so he will not join the guerrillas. The officer smiles. "God bless you," he adds, and unconsciously lets his fist rest on the grip of his pistol.

"Language is a mirror of nature"[259]—this guise of substantialist ontology becomes particularly relevant as we now approach Bourdieu's works on language and signification. As a result of the long-standing attempt to conceive the relation between world and language according to, roughly, a Platonic notion of idea versus matter,

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259 For a sound critique of this statement see Rorty 1980.

linguistics until today is influenced by the theory of reflection—even if only as a silent implicit axiom, a basic scientific disposition. Reflectionist theory of knowledge does not necessarily take the shape of naïve positivism. It might also appear in a relationist variant that postulates the reflection of isomorphic structures of reality in knowledge, thus turning into a brand of literary structuralism.[260]

However, the reflectionist approach does not resolve the crisis of representation and the quest for the "third unit" (see above, 1.2.1) to mediate between cognition and reality, subject and object. This crisis has been resolved in similar ways by neo-Kantian structuralism, ordinary language philosophy, pragmatism, and speech act theory. Language is treated as a regulated and relational human activity, a tool for understanding and shaping the world. Language, signification, meaning, expression, etc., as praxis, molds into the operations of the habitus, of practical logic, and of fields. Bourdieu followed this line of thought. A considerable part of his work is dedicated to a praxeology of meaning ascription. He presented analyses of his own, and he positioned himself in the field of language theory. One could rightly call this current of Bourdieu's work a praxeological semantics or semiotics. We have developed our method of HabitusAnalysis in this vein of praxeology. Therefore, in the present chapter, we will establish some points of orientation.

After opening this part with two general remarks on Bourdieu's approach to language and meaning, we will consider the scientific field of linguistics (in a broad sense of the term) as it is depicted in Bourdieu's work. We aim at clarifying Bourdieu's own positioning in this field. The following chapter will examine Bourdieu's fieldwork on meaning—for instance, his studies on the Kabylia, on Heidegger, and on religion. We also listen to the voices of his critics. The third chapter will focus on the meaning of meaning in Bourdieu's approach. We address premises, implicit and explicit conceptions, and the tension between the paradigms of structure and production. We target the discovery of opportunities and constraints of praxeology as well as the identification of desiderata left by Bourdieu's approach to meaning.

Pragmatique sociologique

"La science des discours comme pragmatique sociologique"[261] can well be characterized as a "structural sociology of language," which has to "take as its object the relationship between the structured systems of sociologically pertinent linguistic differences and the equally structured systems of social differences" (Bourdieu 2006, 54, G: 2005, 60). In a nutshell, while Bourdieu's approach to language is based on

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260 See for instance Serres 1987.

261 F: Bourdieu 1982b, 165, G: 2005, 141. The part of "Analyses de Discourse" (F: Bourdieu 1982b, 162ff.) as such, is missing in the English version.

the relational logic of structuralism, in order to make it work for the social scienc-
es he blends in features from structuralism and ordinary language philosophy
(Wittgenstein) as well as from some pragmatism. The most important ingredient
of this blend is the social conditions of production and consumption of linguistic
utterances. This additive is well known in (marginal, nineteenth-century) social
hermeneutics (*Sozialhermeneutik*) and of course, since the late sixties, in the new
discipline of sociolinguistics.

Bourdieu's critical sociological work on language goes back to the beginnings of
his studies on Kabyle language in the late fifties. Today (especially from the viewpoint
of sociolinguistics) some of Bourdieu's critiques of the seventies might seem like
he has been beating a dead horse. But the "horse" of pure structural linguistics in
France was not only quite alive then, in Bourdieu's view it even dominated social
sciences in France from the early sixties.[262] In contrast, Bourdieu conducted his
intent to transform linguistics for praxeological use by giving a sociological accent
to Austin (translucent to Wittgenstein and, later on, to pragmatist thought). Both
his ordinary language leanings and his antagonism against "pure linguistics,"
especially semantics, led him to concentrate his empirical studies on the formal
and functional aspects of speech and to consistently refuse to read culture like
a text, the grammar of which could be described in a Saussurean way as *langue*.
Notwithstanding, Bourdieu empirically worked very much on meaning, not only
in the Kabyle society but also under many other aspects. Meaning is never mean-
ingless for social praxis and the social sciences.

> The social sciences deal with pre-named, pre-classified realities which bear proper
> nouns and common nouns, titles, signs and acronyms. At the risk of unwittingly
> assuming responsibility for the acts of constitution of whose logic and necessity they
> are unaware, the social sciences must take as their object of study the social operations
> of naming and the rites of institution through which they are accomplished. But on a
> deeper level, they must examine the part played by words in the construction of social
> reality and the contribution which the struggle over classifications, a dimension of
> all class struggles, makes to the constitution of classes—classes defined in terms of

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262 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 156, G: 1996, 191. On the one hand, Bourdieu's attacks
on pure linguistics have been harsh, and one may rightly wonder why he would blame
lexical linguists for doing linguistics and not sociology. On the other hand, Bourdieu's
intuition that language was going to be overemphasized in wider social sciences is
anything else but wrong. The linguistic and symbolic turn in social sciences (Rorty,
Geertz) and the history of concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*, Koselleck) are but the softest
variants of the trend. Many developments since then in postmodern, postcolonial, and
other post turns (often under the direct influence of literary sciences or philosophy) as
well as even in the sociology of knowledge tend to tear language and social conditions
apart—quite in contrast to sociolinguistics.

age, sex or social position, but also clans, tribes, ethnic groups or nations. […] | […] In short, social science must include in its theory of the social world a theory of the theory effect which, by helping to impose a more or less authorized way of seeing the social world, helps to construct the reality of that world. The word or, *a fortiori*, the dictum, the proverb and all the stereotyped or ritual forms of expression are programmes of perception and different […] strategies for the symbolic struggles of everyday life […] imply a certain claim to symbolic authority as the socially recognized power to impose a certain vision of the social world, i.e. of the divisions of the social world. In the struggle to impose the legitimate vision […] agents possess power in proportion to their symbolic capital, i.e. in proportion to the recognition they receive from a group. The authority that underlies the performative efficacy of discourse is a *percipi*, a being-known, which allows a *percipere* to be imposed, or, more precisely, which allows the consensus concerning the meaning of the social world which grounds common sense to be imposed officially, i.e., in front of everyone and in the name of everyone. (Bourdieu 2006, 105f., G: 2005, 99f.)

This programmatic text points towards the fact that, in terms of semantics, "there are no neutral words," but most of the words have different acceptation, usage, and even meaning according to different social classes (Bourdieu 2006, 40, G: 2005, 44). Any use of speech and, more generally, of meaning or signification is entangled somehow in the relations of social power and struggle. We take this as an impulse to concentrate on the meaning of, mainly, linguistic utterances as well as of any other kind of signs as operating instances in the modus operandi of social praxis. We think that the empirical, methodological, and theoretical work on a praxeological approach to meaning is a contribution, showing the strength of Bourdieu's method and refining it, in order to develop "step by step the principles of a veritable sociological pragmatics."[263]

Bourdieu's work on meaning

For us, meaning as an object of praxeological sociology is crucial. In this regard, John Thompson observes that Bourdieu tends "to neglect the content of what is said. He thus fails to give sufficient attention to the question of meaning (or signification) and he strips away all too abruptly the rational features of linguistic communication" (Thompson 1984a, 43). While we consider both observations as appropriate, we

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263 The passage is not existent in the English version. Translation by HWS. "Mais, pour affirmer complètement la méthode tout en l'affinant, il faudrait multiplier les études de cas, et dégager ainsi peu à peu les principes d'une véritable pragmatique sociologique" (Bourdieu 1982b, 166). „Um aber die ganze Stärke dieser Methode zu zeigen und sie selbst weiter verfeinern zu können, bedarf es noch vieler Fallstudien, anhand derer dann allmählich die Grundzüge einer echten soziologischen Pragmatik zu entwickeln wären" (Bourdieu 2005, 141).

would nevertheless like to give them some more nuances. Bourdieu does not neglect meaning and the rational use of language altogether. Indeed, he very often studies the meaning of verbal utterances (even interviews), written text, rituals, everyday practices, and images. However, it is true that he rarely reflects theoretically on meaning and the rational use of language. He neither develops a consistently praxeological way to analyze meaning (beyond binary series of paradigmatic relations between terms). Both lacunae seem to result from Bourdieu's opposition against the structuralist, intellectualist, and rationalist mainstream in French (Saussurean tradition) and US-American (Chomskian tradition) linguistics for their separation of "internal" semantics and grammar from the social use of language.

We think that the best way to deal with this problem is by linking up with the logic of Bourdieu's existing work with language and meaning in order to develop, on this basis, a wider and more consistent analytical approach. In doing so, one finds much material. Some studies analyze meaning in context, such as the ritual signification in Kabyle daily life.[264] Others focus on style as an operation that attaches meaning to social positions.[265] And other works reflect on the use of language, albeit focusing considerably more on form than on content (Bourdieu 2006, G: 2005; 1979b; 1977c). In all of the cases, Bourdieu analyzes how social actors make use of the meaning of utterances, practices, and objects for social praxis by naming, recognizing, misrecognizing, denying, affirming, representing, delegating, demonstrating, ordering, obeying, and so forth; none of these operations work without semantic content.

Moreover, when examining the entirety of Bourdieu's scientific development, we observe a slow transformation of the underlying and never explicitly discussed concept of sign (see above 2.2.4). In early publications, such as *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, the underlying notion of sign seems to be very much the Saussurean two-term relation between signifier and signified. Without passing through a discussion of pragmatist sign models of three terms (such as Peirce or Morris) however, Bourdieu's approach to significational relations changed. With reference to Austin and reverence for Wittgenstein, Bourdieu integrates the (performative) *use* of signs into the operations of ordinary language as a basic function for signification and meaning to arise—a very helpful transition for integrating the Marxian and Weberian focus on domination into the sociological work on language. Now language and, more generally, semiotic processes can be conceived as practices of domination and resistance. Saussure's concept of the value of a sign in a system, as an important

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264 Bourdieu 1977b, G: 2009; 1990b, G: 2008; 1991a, G: 1975a.

265 Bourdieu 2010, G: 1982a; 1988, G: 1998g; 1985c, only partly translated in German: 1982c.

factor for its meaning, transforms quasi by nature into Marx's distinction between use-value and exchange value. Now, the social context of use almost necessarily comes into focus, and it has to be modeled in order for one to understand the uses of language and, more generally, of signs. In this vein, the model of a "market of linguistic goods" allows a closer look at the logics of linguistic exchange in a more specific sense. The models of different fields and the social space facilitate the study of the use of language in differentiated social contexts (religion, politics, economy, law, etc.) and take into account the conditions of such use, ruled by the distribution of different forms of capital in the social space as a whole.

Some linguists might take this as a tiptoeing dissolution of a serious (that is, rigorously formal) treatment of language. In fact, Bourdieu draws a sharp line of distinction between what he considers a "scholastic" misinterpretation of language and a correct praxeological regard for linguistic and social praxis in general. Thus, Bourdieu's option for ordinary language philosophy is framed by a sharp distinction between the operations of science, according to its own logic (a logic of its own, specific to the scientific field), and the logic of the praxis that has to be described by the science of society and language. The distinction between what Bourdieu sociologically calls "logic of logic" and "logic of praxis" (or "practical logic") has a homology in linguistics: the distinction between scholarly and ordinary language. A praxeological approach to language and signification, which claims to describe human linguistic praxis, has to consciously bridge this gap with appropriated means.

While Bourdieu drives this debate as a matter of principle and as a question of the legitimacy of a whole branch of the sciences, alternatively one could refer to the achievements of sociolinguistics and boil the question down to a matter of specific *sociological* interest in the use of language. While we will briefly consider some of the mentioned discussions in order to locate Bourdieu's position in the scientific debates, we will narrow the pretentions of our own approach to the use of language within the limits of praxeology. In short, what interests us here is to understand how the meaning of linguistic utterances and of signs at large operates in practical logic as well as how meaning mediates between things and signs or classes and classifications.

3.1   The scientific field: language, system and meaning

In *Pascalian Meditations* (Bourdieu 2000a, 30ff., G: 2001a, 43ff.) Bourdieu reflects upon his relation to ordinary language philosophy, his "essential allies." As a counterimage in the field of philosophy, he refers to the "scholastic illusion" that

consists mainly in the presupposition that philosophy deals ahistorically with historical objects (such as language). According to Bourdieu, the founding father of this illusion is Plato with his teachings on *skhole* and with his parable of the cave. Against this concept of philosophy based on an illusion about its own truth, Bourdieu stresses the importance of ordinary language philosophy as represented mainly by Wittgenstein, Moore, Ryle, Strawson, and Toulmin. According to Bourdieu, Wittgenstein, for instance, remembers that understanding a word and learning its meaning is not simply "a mental process implying the contemplation of an 'idea' or the targeting of a 'content'" (but, we would like to add, it involves learning how the word is used in a language-game and a life-form). Or Strawson "criticizes the logicians for having concentrated on sentences 'relatively independent of their context.'" Bourdieu concludes that, "one can as I have always tried to, draw on the analyses that the ordinary language philosophers, and also the pragmatists, especially Peirce and Dewey"[266] have presented. This would even radicalize the critique of the scholastic use of language and open up opportunities to close the gap between "scholastic logics and the logic of practice" as well as towards a language that is not "socially neutralized" (Bourdieu 2000a, 32, 2001a, 45).

At first glance, this contrast of ordinary language and scholastics may appear quite schematic. However, it offers two important conductive lines to Bourdieu's work with language. First, Bourdieu's central interest is establishing a sociological way of treating language and signification nonneutrally, in the sense that the social relations of power are intrinsic elements of the theory of language and the scientific way of analyzing it. Second, and concomitantly, any theory of language or signification is sociologically insufficient and even detrimental, if (in Platonic style) it abstracts from the power-driven context of use and constructs language as a system of self-sufficient ideas.

As often occurs in his writings, Bourdieu constructs extreme oppositions in order to profile his own position by distinction. With regard to language and signs, he quite resoundingly overemphasizes form over content. As we will see, the praxeological truth (the praxeological praxis of working with linguistic utterances, so to say) is somewhere in the middle.

We will first describe some of the long-standing currents of philosophical and scientific approaches to language, with special interest in the incidence of praxeology in them. Second, we will draw attention to Bourdieu's relation to scientific linguistics. Finally, we will sketch some basic cornerstones for the praxeological approach to

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266 Bourdieu 2000a, 31, G: 2001a, 44 On pragmatist influences see various contributions in Shusterman 1999.

language and meaning, in order to prepare well our endeavor in Bourdieu's own fieldwork on meaning, the issue to be dealt with in the next chapter.

3.1.1   Language—the longue durée and the praxeological Kondratiev wave

By making an associative reference to Fernand Braudel, it may be allowed in this section to think of praxeology, together with sociolinguistics, as part of a conjunctural wave within the *longue durée* of philosophical and scientific dealings with language and signification. In this section, we would like to comment briefly on Bourdieu's self-positioning in one of his early papers.[267] From here, we can point to some longer developmental lines in the scientific dealings with language. We thus hope to better understand: what the central interests of Bourdieu's work on language and signification are, how they relate to other scientific traditions in this field, and what ought to be considered for the development of a praxeological method for qualitatively analyzing linguistic utterances and semiotic processes.

Bourdieu's framing of the issue

In said article, Bourdieu provides a schematic overview "as part of an attempt to present an assessment of a number of investigations of symbolism" (Bourdieu 2006, 163). The scheme is not meant to be a history of developments, the apex of which is praxeological theory, but simply a schematic overview of theoretical achievements that have to be "integrated (and transcended) in order to produce an adequate theory of symbolic power" (Bourdieu 1977d, 112).

Accordingly, the figure distinguishes between "symbolic instruments" and their different treatment by various scientific currents. While there still is no hint of ordinary language philosophy, the scheme nevertheless offers an interesting perspective on Bourdieu's approach. Above all, it is important to note that Bourdieu distinguishes the three currents of thought according to their use in his theory of praxis as "structuring structures," "structured structures," and "instruments of domination." Thus, this approximation to theories of signification and language is, from the beginning, oriented in the relationist underpinnings and the critical sociological interests of praxeology.

The central column of the table (see Fig. 10, p. 212) termed "structured structures" refers to what Bourdieu elsewhere calls "objectivist idealism." This idealism

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267 Given in 1973 and first published in English as Bourdieu 1977d, later in Bourdieu 1979b as a typescript, and finally added to Bourdieu 2006, 163–170.

is a full-fledged Levi-Straussian structuralism ("symbolic objects"), distinct from the neo-Kantian tradition ("symbolic forms") and in the tradition of Saussure. According to Bourdieu, it represents an abstract construction of language (*langue*), a fixed product of communication, an opus operatum, and thus a mere "condition of the intelligibility of speech" (Bourdieu 2006, 166). In consequence, the social aspect of communication is narrowed to the idea of the conventionality of the language system. From here, Bourdieu adopts the idea that language is a system, while he passes censure against the separation between the sign system and the world of practices.

In the left column, Bourdieu lists structuring structures—referring to the relationist neo-Kantian tradition, namely Cassirer, and deepening its action-oriented and historicist aspects by reference to Wilhelm von Humboldt as well as to Sapir and Whorff, and to Marx (*Theses on Feuerbach*). Here, language functions as an instrument for "constructing the objective world" (Bourdieu 2006, 165). That is, it operates actively in perception and judgment. Through its culturally acquired forms, language structures the actors' ways of seeing and judging their world. Consequently, when it comes to sociology, Bourdieu links up with Durkheim's version of the Kantian tradition, with his project of turning the symbolic forms into *social* forms of knowledge.

The right column raises the issue of domination with reference to Marx (and Weber), especially to the theory of ideology. The dominant symbolic systems function at the service of the dominant class. They integrate the society, imposing a false conscience on the dominated, thus legitimizing the established order. That is, symbolic systems function as a media of communication; they conceal and simultaneously contribute to the separation of society into dominant and dominated sectors. Thus, the "Marxist tradition lays great emphasis on the *political functions* of 'symbolic systems', to the detriment of their logical structure and gnoseological function" (Bourdieu 2006, 166). Language and social structure, mind and world, thus remain without a convincing mediation.

Fig. 10   Symbolic instruments
Source: Bourdieu 2006, 165

Bourdieu establishes three lines of research as challenge and orientation for further research on language and meaning, which represent (to a larger extent than is visible in Bourdieu's article) long-standing traditions and denote both massive limitations as well as great possibilities of synergies. The first tradition is the Platonic, which needs a closer look. The second tradition is the one Bourdieu associates with Wilhelm von Humboldt. And the third (not too distant from Marx's view of language) is sociolinguistics.

Plato dies hard—knowledge as reflection

The tradition dedicated to structured structures combines the advantages of a relational approach to reality (structuralism) with the problems of idealism. It is mainly due to the tradition's idealist abstraction, which transforms linguistic utterances into universal structures of human thought, that Bourdieu criticizes the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. This abstraction is precisely the flaw of scholastic

language. Bourdieu traces it back to Plato's parable of the cave when he criticizes scholastic intellectuals from the point of view of ordinary language philosophy (Bourdieu 2000a, 30ff., G: 2001a, 43ff.). This genealogy is not by chance, since Plato's concept of knowledge (from Bourdieu's point of view) marks a major difficulty for a theory of language and meaning.

With regard to language, here again we are confronted with the deep roots of the concept of knowledge as a mirror-like *reflection* of reality.[268] According to the Hamburg-based linguist Wolfgang J. Meyer, this idea still rules the analysis of language today. In the vein of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Scholastics, the problem of how to guarantee the reliability of language (and speech) has been approached in two ways: by the study of the significational character of language and by dealing with the "logical-semantic problem of the relation between language and world. In this context, the solution was the theory of reflection … which—in form of a system of grammatical categories—rules linguistics until today" (Meyer 2010, 614, trans. HWS).

We have referred to the theory of reflection before and affirmed that a relational ontology offers a good alternative. However, when it comes to language we have to proceed to a further distinction, which prompts, more than the earlier treatment of the question, a pragmatist or Wittgensteinian support for the relational approach. This is because we can distinguish the reflectionist theory into two strands. One, nearer to Demokrit's naïve theory of realist pictures of the things in knowledge, has made its way into the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection (*Widerspiegelung*). The other one, nearer to Plato, claims an isomorphic relation between the reality of things and their reflection in thought and language: it is just the structure of things that is reflected in thought. This version has made its way as far as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1975, 4.014)—in order to be theoretically refuted later on by Wittgenstein himself. Both versions of the reflectionist theory of knowledge tend to conceive of the relation between world and knowledge as an image and, inversely, of the relation between knowledge and world as application in practice. Thus (and this is the main point of Bourdieu's critique) Saussurean as well as Chomskyan linguistics reduce the practical use of language to an "actualization of a kind of ahistorical essence, in short, (to) nothing" (Bourdieu 1990b, 33, G: 2008, 62).

The reflectionist conception tends to linger implicitly in the "natural attitude"— as the phenomenologists say—of human beings towards their lifeworld. Thus, it operates as an unconscious and tacit axiom, a basic but unaccounted for disposition

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268 See Rorty 1980. Ivan Snook (1990, 160f.) affirms that Platonism and intellectualism endured much longer in the (*non*-Kantian) Anglo-Saxon tradition than in the continental one.

of linguistic or sociological work. As such, this conception can contravene much of the scientific possibilities of conceptualizing a third unit between world and mind. In relation to semantics, both versions of reflectionism turn specifically problematic. The naïve version is visibly close to semantics, since the meaning of a sign is conceived simply in terms of the function of its referential object. The isomorphic version, in turn, maintains a relationship with structuralist concepts such as homology. However, this can turn out to be dangerous for praxeology, if the relation between material structures and mental structures are conceived of simply as isomorphic reflection. The combination of structure and semantics (as in structural anthropology or formal semantics) increases the danger of, what might be called, a substantialist version of structuralist relationism—that is, a reification of structures and concepts, which Bourdieu is constantly fighting.

Bourdieu passes censure against both traits because of their substantialism and objectivism (see 1.2.1.1 and 2.1). With regard to linguistic positions, he targets Saussure and "pure linguistics" as well as different forms of Marxist social determinism. However, as we will see in this whole chapter, Bourdieu remains ambivalent in his own sociological work with linguistic utterances. On the one hand, he regards meaning (in fact, semantics and semiotics) intensively, applying structuralist tools such as binary series and homologies. However, he does not provide a theory or methodological reflection other than some hints about Austin and Wittgenstein. Quintessential might be the view that meaning is constituted by an utterance, plus its situational, plus its structural social conditions. On the other hand, Bourdieu concentrates on the formal aspects of speech. Of course, this concentration is functional for a functional concept of language. Nevertheless, it circumvents a more thorough controversy over the philosophical underpinnings of linguistics and the philosophy of language, especially with regard to the crucial issue of meaning (which equals, sociologically speaking, the important issue of naming).

A closer treatment of the issue of meaning could easily link up with traits already sketched by Bourdieu. This treatment could be done by advancing the combination between structuralist and Wittgensteinian (or pragmatist) notions about the role of significational processes (naming and the like), as processes of the transmission of social power, in the relation between "world and words," so to say. The praxeological concept of language (and signs)—especially its Wittgensteinian and pragmatist traits—subverts and transforms any structuralist or formalist variant of language theory that is bound to idealism and reflectionism. Naturally, the strength of the approach can best be developed and tested in a context where the competing approach is strongest: in semantics. This is what the present book and the method of HabitusAnalysis aim at: a praxeological concept of language and significational praxis in a broader sense, not as an (isomorphic) image of reality

but as practical operators within power-shaped praxis. In consequence, language has to be conceived as relational praxis, which operates based on experience, as a *transformational* third unit between cognition and reality.[269]

An important step in this direction is to conceive of linguistic utterances not only as structured but also as structuring activities.

Sophists too—rhetoric, culture, and ordinary language

In the figure shown above (see Fig. 10, p. 212), Bourdieu refers to a group of theoretical positions that enable one to conceive of signs and language as instruments for *constructing the world*. These positions are in line with the "neo-Kantian tradition (Humboldt-Cassirer or, in its American variant, Sapir-Whorf, as far as language is concerned)" (Bourdieu 2006, 164). Here, the most important common feature is the nexus between language and culture. In the same vein (and in critique of idealist stances), Bourdieu sometimes refers back to ancient sophists and their practical way of dealing with language.[270]

In doing so, Bourdieu opens the historical perspective on the *rhetorical tradition*, and thus offers a completely different way of dealing with language. With an explicit reference to Gorgias of Leontinoi, language as power, as *dynastès*,[271] comes into focus. Consequently, two important issues of the practical use of language are raised: the right situation and the appropriate words.

> It is no accident that the Sophists (I am thinking in particular of Protagoras and Plato's *Gorgias*), who, unlike the pure grammarians, aimed to secure and transmit practical mastery of a language of action, were the first to raise the question of | *kairos*, the right moment and the right words for the moment. As rhetoricians they were predisposed to make a philosophy of the practice of language as *strategy*. (It is significant that the original meaning of the word *kairos*, 'vital (and therefore deadly) point', and 'point aimed at, target', is also present in a number of everyday expressions: to strike home, hit the nail on the head, a shaft of wit, etc.). (Bourdieu 1990b, 287f., n. 3, G: 2008, 61, n. 1)

In a linguistic understanding, this reference to the rhetorical tradition points to a specific way of treating pragmatics and semantics. The *situation* and wider *social*

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269   This will be a major challenge for modeling in the analysis of the practical sense by the praxeological square.

270   Bourdieu 1977c, 646 and 664, n. 2; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 142, G: 1996, 176; Bourdieu 1990b, 287f., n. 3, G: 2008, 61, n. 1.

271   Gorgias of Leontini: „Speech is a great power [*dynastés*], which achieves the most divine works by means of the smallest and least visible form; for it can even put a stop to fear, remove grief, create joy, and increase pity." (Freeman 1948, 132, fragment 8).

conditions of power that accompany the use of a particular word also exert influence on the word's meaning (as understood by the receiver in that situation). Therefore, the situation and social conditions coregulate the word's appropriateness and, thus, the felicitousness of the expression. To be the right one, a chosen word does not depend on an objectively fixed meaning. Appropriate word choice is a matter of how a socially more or less conventional meaning is specifically nuanced by the situation of use. It is the conjunction of conventional meaning in a given language community (as stored in the linguistic dispositions of the actors involved) and of the situation and power structure, which makes a word "hit the nail" or "miss its target." The point is that a word achieves its social effect. In consequence, a concept that merges effectiveness and felicitousness or adequacy would be quite useful to denote this specific praxeological merger of pragmatics and semantics. The German word *treffsicher* looks like a suitable candidate. I will translate it as *effective*.[272] Widening the perspective, the strategic use of language comes into focus. Linguistic strategy (that does not necessarily have to be conceived of as rationally chosen) plays not only with time, situation, and the positions of the communicants, but also with nuances of meaning. Linguistic strategy is an important operator of practical logic and, finally, is stored in the dispositions of the habitus.

However, the most important aspect of the Humboldt-Cassirer-current is the *historicity* of language. While in a practical sense already present in the ancient rhetoricians and revived (implicitly) by renaissance philosophy (e.g., Vico), historicity has been scientifically asserted in German romanticism. Bourdieu refers particularly to Wilhelm von Humboldt. Historical and comparative linguistics understand language as a culturally coined system that, albeit quite stable, nevertheless undergoes constant change (Majetschak 1995, col. 1481f.). This said, connections between culture, language, and thought can be established, thus explicitly dismissing the idea of language as a preconstructed and completed entity, a "work" (*Werk*). For Humboldt, language is "no product (*Ergon*), but an activity (*Energeia*),"[273] as an "ever-repeated *mental labour*." (Humboldt 1988, 49) In other words, if language

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272 The German noun *Treffsicherheit* means "accuracy" in the sense of marksmanship: the ability of a speaker to hit the point with his word in a given situation. As the noun ascribes a property to an actor, it is not well suited to cover also the pragmatic idea of the effect an utterance produces. The adjective, instead, can be applied to the utterance. A word can be *treffsicher* in a given situation. It is uttered by someone with linguistic and situational marksmanship and produces an effect "hitting the point." I will employ the predicate "effective" for such a language use.

273 Humboldt 1988, 49. Note that the late Humboldt, in his famous introduction to the treatise on the Javan Kawi-language, employs the same term to denote the movement of dialectics as that which appears in Hegel and Marx.

is conceived as human activity, as labor, as the cognitive transformation of nature into culture, etc., then this concept conveys a completely different approach to significational practices and meaning than idealism conveys. The active human being (the subject) and its cultural conditions of living (the nation) come into focus. Language marks the subjective worldview and orientates the construction of thought as it mediates between the human being and things (Cf. Humboldt 1988, 59f.). Thus, language is positioned between mind and world as a human activity, an operation. In consequence, Humboldt can turn the Platonic concept from its head to its feet, making a point with a phrase like "speaking generates language" (*aus dem Sprechen erzeugt sich die Sprache*) (Humboldt 2010, 225).

This concept of language is very conducive for praxeological thinking. In consequence, Bourdieu closes ranks with Humboldt in an important programmatic passage for his theory: "Thus one has to move from *ergon* to *energeia* (in accordance with the opposition established by Wilhelm von Humboldt), from objects or actions to the principle of their production."[274]

Bourdieu also mentioned a further important step in this line of thought: the work of *Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf*.[275] Reaching back to German romanticism (Herder), the linguist and ethnologist Sapir studied the connection between culture and language and paved the way for Whorf to launch the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis on the relation between language and culture (Whorf 1956). The point of the argument is that an actor's perception of the world is influenced by the grammar and the semantics that this actor is used to. Thus, different languages divide, for example, the physical continuum of the scale of colors into a certain number of discrete units, each of which is named differently. According to different languages, the numbers can be different (let's say three kinds of blue in one language, five in another). From these kinds of observations (mostly made by the comparison between Standard Average European and American indigenous languages) Whorf concludes a "linguistic relativity principle" (Whorf 1956, 214).

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274 Bourdieu 1990b, 94, G: 2008, 172; but critically on the hazard of nationalism Bourdieu 2006, 49, G: 2005, 54. See also Wacquant's note on "naturalized preconstructions," drawing a line between Wittgenstein, Elias, and Whorf (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 241, n. 36). See Snook (1990) for a discussion of Bourdieu's concept of language as rooted in the continental European tradition of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein (concerned with "human activity" as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon "intellectualism").

275 Bourdieu 2006, 163ff.; earlier: Bourdieu 1979b. See also: Bourdieu 1990b, 287, n. 1, G: 2008, 57, n. 1.

That is, human cognition is relative to the possibilities that culturally generated, different languages offer to their speakers.[276]

Bourdieu also closely links this historicist notion of language to *Cassirer*. The neo-Kantian theory for Bourdieu is "perfectly justified" inasmuch as it ascribes to language and, "more generally, [to] representations a specifically symbolic efficacy in the construction of reality" (Bourdieu 2006, 105, G: 2005, 99). Cassirer's concept of cognition as a schema-based constructive activity allows one to add important interpretative traits to the older model. Not least, Cassirer's relationism is open to a historicist understanding of language while it, simultaneously, safeguards against the pitfalls of essentialist interpretations of the romanticist concepts of nation and culture.

At this point, in Bourdieu's relatively early essay of 1973 a reference to *Wittgenstein* would not have been out of place. Yet such reference does not appear. However, as this philosopher became so important for Bourdieu later on, it seems helpful to dedicate some brief lines to him at this point of our reflections. Bourdieu is not an exegete of Wittgenstein; rather he "thinks as the late Wittgenstein did" (Gebauer 2005, 137, trans. HWS). One ought to take it as a pointer to Wittgenstein's significance for Bourdieu that the latter introduces the first part of his key work *Logic of Practice*, the "Critique of Theoretical Reason," by an epigraph quoting Wittgenstein's note on the justification of following a rule.[277] According to Wittgenstein, to follow a rule means to act according to certain regularity since rules are derived from practices, not inversely. This idea helped Bourdieu to transform the structuralist concept of kinship systems into one of marital strategies (Bourdieu 1990i, G: 1992g). Wittgenstein's radical historization of language also turns out to be helpful for Bourdieu's critique of the "internal" (*werkimmanent*, HWS) interpretation of

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276 Discussions on linguistic "determinism" (resulting from Whorf's theory) led, for some time, to staunch criticism of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (criticism that was, to a certain degree, relative to a mechanistic understanding of determinism). With newer constructivist debates, this hypothesis is taken into account again. See e.g., Erickson, Gymnich, and Nünning 1997. Recent research on language specificity in cognitive processing has shown that speakers follow language specific principles when processing information. Language specific effects have also been shown in nonverbal categorization and spatial and time-related cognition (Carroll and von Stutterheim 2011; von Stutterheim et al. 2012) using eye tracking and chronometrical methods for measuring cognitive processing independent of language use. It is of special interest that Chinese and German speakers linguistically construct even movement through space and its bodily references very differently. See for some initial considerations in a similar direction Whorf (1956, 57ff.) on languages without space-time concepts.

277 Bourdieu 1990b, 24ff., G: 2008, 47ff.. Cf. Wittgenstein 2004, § 217. For the relation of Bourdieu to Wittgenstein see also above, p. 82.

linguistic works by Saussurean structuralists as well as by Foucault. How would it be possible to restrict oneself to a merely internal interpretation of a literary work if, according to Wittgenstein, even "mathematical truths are not eternal essences, springing fully armed from the human brain, but historical products of a certain type of historical work accomplished in the particular social world that is the scientific field?" (Bourdieu 1993a, 177, G: 1998c, 59) This historization also offers the clue to Wittgenstein's concept of the meaning of words: their meaning is derived from their use. In critique of the (Neoplatonic) Augustinian concept of meaning (and of the idea of mirroring reality), Wittgenstein recommends that one associate the concept of meaning with the image of a tool. "Think of the tools in a tool-box." (Wittgenstein 2004, § 1ff., here: 11) Meaning develops from the use of words in language-games that, on their part, develop among life-forms. Human behavior is the frame of reference for interpreting language (Wittgenstein 2004, § 206). Wittgenstein pushes the historicity of language and, particularly, of semantics in a considerably materialist way[278] as he links meaning insolubly to the practical use of the signs by people. Yet, it also is correct (albeit never criticized by Bourdieu, but by Habermas)[279] that Wittgenstein's concepts of language-game and life-form do not denote structured social relations, and particularly not relations of power.[280] This observation brings two aspects of the scientific thought on language to mind that bear certain risks for a praxeological approach to meaning.

The first aspect is closely linked to the tradition of German romanticism. The hazard lies in the concept of subjective activity that is prone to capsize into plain subjectivism. Therefore, in his above-mentioned programmatic references to Humboldt and Cassirer, Bourdieu concurrently warns against misconceiving human activity as an expression of the "mythopoetic subjectivity" (Cassirer). Rather social science should seek to reconstruct significational human praxis as a "*socially constituted* system of inseparably cognitive and evaluative structures" (Bourdieu 1990b, 94, G: 2008, 172).

This recommendation directly refers to the second risk: It is not by chance that Bourdieu, when referring to human activity in the context of Humboldt, Cassirer, and Whorf, also mentions Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. Relations of social domi-

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278 But he does not reflect on the social position of his own philosophy, having therefore his interpreter Ulrich Steinvorth calling him an "inconsequent dialectic materialist" (Steinvorth 1969, 147ff., trans. HWS).

279 Habermas 1988, 130ff., particularly 148ff.

280 According to Bourdieu, Wittgenstein goes as far as to state that in the context of the political and cultural conditions of social reproduction an „intention […] is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions" (Bourdieu 2006, 172, G: 2001b, 70).

nation also have to be taken into account when it comes to dealing with language and meaning.

And likewise Materialists—Marx and sociolinguistics

Bourdieu does not refer to Demokritus, although he could have. One plausible reason (besides Marx's doctoral dissertation) would have been Demokrit's materialist theory of how matter, by means of tiny particles emitted by matter (*atomoi*), is reflected in the human mind as they impinge on the body (Democritus, in Freeman 1948, 93, fragment 9) Such an approach, however, would not have led directly to the benefits of the Marxist tradition for a praxeological theory of meaning. Rather this approach would have helped to rule out a misleading application of Marxian thought.

The materialist version of the theory of reflection does not put the idealist theory on its feet; it rather turns the mirror upside down. While in Marx and Engels there are some allusions to reflectionism,[281] it turns into a fully developed theoretical concept in established Marxism-Leninism. The social conditions find, in human consciousness, an "ideational reproduction almost true to the original."[282] According to Bourdieu, this theory can be found in Sartre as well as in objectivist Marxists (Bourdieu 1993a, 177f., G: 1998c, 59ff.). Nevertheless, the theory is incompatible with praxeology, since it does not take into account the differentiated conditions of the production of symbolic goods, often dependent on the logic of struggles between specialists.

Moreover, theories of reflection (similar to those of mechanistic determination) dismiss the activity of actors, the *production* of language and meaning. This is why Bourdieu recurs to Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. The aspect of production is central to Marx's concept of praxis and, thereby, of function of language: Praxis is "sensuous human activity (*menschliche sinnliche Tätigkeit*)" within an "essentially practical" social life, in which not only the circumstances change men, but circumstances also "are changed by men."[283] In *German Ideology*, it is even more evident that the mind, meaning, consciousness, and language, are intimately interwoven, by a relation of mutual effects, with the "material activity" as the condition of existence and, form there, "are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc." Consciousness, therefore, is not so much a mirror of the world. In contrast, "[C]onsciousness [*das*

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281 Engels writes that only dialectics, which takes the contanst „actions and reactions" into account, is appropriate for the description of the "development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men." (Engels 1975, 31).

282 *…annähernd getreue ideelle Reproduktion.* (Kosing 1975, 1302, trans. HWS. Cf. also Wittich 1975a; 1975b).

283 Marx and Engels 1998, 569ff. See also Marx and Engels 1998, 46, G: 1969, 44.

Bewusstsein] can never be anything else than conscious being [*das bewusste Sein*], and the being of men is their actual life-process." (Marx and Engels 1998, 46, G: 1969, 44) Consequently, language, social life, and consciousness are producing one another in one and the same process related to to the conditions of existence and as *distinct* factors of human life with.[284] Only because of their distinct and practical union in the labor of producing praxis it is possible that the "productive forces, the state of society and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another" because of the division of labor. (Marx and Engels 1998, 46, G: 1969, 44) The notion of production makes the Marxist approach resemble the romanticist, while the conditions of production separate both currents of thought.

In Marx, the condition of linguistic production is the capitalist market, which turns language into a language of commodities, a language of comparison of prices (Marx 1967b, 58). Thus, language becomes "false," it turns into *ideology*. In terms of awareness of the conditions of social exchange, this concept of language moves considerably beyond the romanticist concept. Nevertheless, it is not sufficiently complex for a differentiated society. Nor does it encompass the conditions of linguistic exchange itself—that is, the commodity relation between linguistic utterances.

Bourdieu addresses these issues in his works on language. Notwithstanding, he does this by completely disregarding *sociolinguistics*. Bourdieu positioned himself with regard to language in the early seventies. At that time, he would have had a chance to search for synergies with the sociolinguistics who caused an important break in the science of language. In the sixties, the social conditions of the production and consumption of linguistic utterances turned into an important object for research in sociolinguistics. Bourdieu makes a few positive references, especially about William Labov's work on English spoken by black US-Americans. Labov's research corroborates the idea of a class specific linguistic habitus. Lobov also does away with a former linguistic opinion that posited a linguistic deficit in black Americans. He rather proves a functional equivalency between code and social position and denounces the devaluation of the black American's linguistic capital.[285] Moreover, Labov's findings on semantic indeterminacy (i.e., that speakers use

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284 "Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men." (Marx and Engels 1998, 49, G: 1969, 30)

285 Bourdieu 2006, 83, G: 2005, 90; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 143, G: 1996, 177f.. See Labov 1973. In Bourdieu et al. 1999, 611, G: 1998, 784, Bourdieu refers to Labov's interviewing techniques. In a reference to Lakoff (Bourdieu 2006, 85, G: 2005, 93)—a much later representative of sociolinguistics—he also points to class-specific use of adjectives as "hedges."

different, class specific names for the same objects), could have served Bourdieu as stimuli for a closer theoretical look at meaning from a praxeological perspective.

Nonetheless, Bourdieu does not really link up with the sociolinguistic advances. Possibly this has to do with the particular conditions in France where semiology, in the tradition of Saussure, dominated linguistics (Greimas, Barthes, and others), while structuralism (Levi-Strauss) and a materialist transformation of it (Althusser) was influential in social philosophy. Sociolinguistics was weak in France. It was not until 1974 that the first handbook by Jean-Baptiste Marcellesi and Bernard Gardin was published; Luis Jean Calvet's important anticolonialist work on the French in Northern Africa was also published at this time.[286] But in the United States, sociolinguistics was growing rapidly into an important discipline: beginning with William Labov's research on race-specific (and thus class-specific) language, Labov (Labov 1966); and with the following works of (Fishman 1971); and Bernstein (1971), among others.[287]

Bourdieu's missing link to sociolinguistics is even more astonishing as leading proponents of this new branch of the social sciences shared quite a lot of common ground with Bourdieu. Basil Bernstein, for example, highlights his early readings of Cassirer, Sapir, and Whorf; anchors part of his work in Marx, Durkheim, Cassirer, Whorf, and Mead; and treats certain aspects of the relation between classes and classifications—namely, "between symbolic orders, forms of social organization, and the shaping of experience in terms of codes" (Bernstein 1971, 6, 171, 202). Additionally, in semiotics the social conditions of production and the use of signs

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286 Marcellesi and Gardin 1974; Calvet 1974; see also Encrevé 2004, 300ff. On the other hand, it is quite understandable that Bourdieu did not enter into debate with the book by the well-known Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1966). Even if some passages in the last chapter on commodity-form and language could be found as an allusion to what later became Bourdieu's concept of the linguistic market, Lefebvre treats language in an utterly objectivistic manner and precisely does not pay attention to its production, the producers, and their position in society.

287 Excellent overviews of this discipline in France and internationally: Tabouret-Keller 2003; Ammon 2006; and Ball 2010. In Germany, the work of Ulrich Oevermann on language and social descent (Oevermann 1972, first published in 1970) should be mentioned here, since it later turned into a fully fledged program for social research. For a review of the early developments see Wulf Niepold (1970). Additionally should be mentioned that, in Germany, the subjectivistic hermeneutical tradition entered into dialogue with social sciences (Gadamer 2006; Habermas and Apel 1977). Finally, we also would like to mention that in the 1970s in theology the nexus between class and religious language became an issue of some importance, especially with Latin American Liberation Theology. An echoe in France was Casalis 1977. Bourdieu would have had excellent possibilities to achieve synergetic effects for praxeology.

also became an important issue; sometimes discussed with explicit relation to Marx and critical assessment of postmodernism.[288]

While Bourdieu did not pay much attention to these important developments of a new blend of Marxian, historicist, and structural thought on language, his own works, inversely, have been taken into account by the sociolinguistic community. His study, together with Passeron, on social reproduction through education (F: Bourdieu and Passeron 1970, E: 1977) is ranked as an important sociolinguistic advancement of the early seventies (Dittmar 2006, 704); Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, symbolic power, and market, as well as his works on regional dialects and language conflicts are also considered to be important contributions. Equally recognized is Bourdieu's attack against the presupposition of an equal exchange value of linguistic goods in Saussure. Bourdieu does this by establishing the model of a linguistic market, based on the axiom of an *un*equal value of linguistic utterances (probably recognized because of the particular usefulness of this attack for establishing *socio*linguistics in the scientific field).[289]

For methodological purposes, Bourdieu's reference to Marx renders evident that the social conditions of language use are crucial for sociological research on language. However, the possibilities wasted by not receiving the advances of sociolinguistics indicate good reasons for advancing the praxeological approach through an analytical approach to semantic content.

A synthesis on symbolic power

In the past subsections, we have tried to sketch some flows in the *longue durée* of scientific dealings with language, as far as they are relevant to Bourdieu. Praxeology (similar to sociolinguistics) may be seen as a conjectural "Kondratiev wave" in a longer stream. We come back to Bourdieu's 1973 lecture in order to refer preliminarily to this wave. In his lecture on *Symbolic Power*, Bourdieu proposes two syntheses of his threefold approach to sociological work with language.

The *first synthesis* is the one between the *structuring and the structured structures*. It is in line with what we have often mentioned: as "instruments of knowledge *and* communication, 'symbolic structures' can exercise structuring power" (Bourdieu

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288 For example see Posner 1988 with articles like Hauser 1988; Demirović 1988; Gottdiener 1988. Most of these publications have the tendency to integrate semiotics into a Marxist framework of society (Lagopoulos 1988, 14).

289 It is particularly interesting to see which themes make Bourdieu's praxeology known in the field of sociolinguistics: habitus, symbolic power, linguistic market exchange with use value versus exchange value (in contrast to the equal exchange in Saussure), as well as regional dialects and language conflicts. See Steinseifer, Marcellesi, and Elimam 2006.

2006, 166). However, the way this power is exercised by means of language and symbolic action is not yet much developed. Bourdieu refers to Durkheim's "logical conformism" and to Radcliffe-Brown's concept of the social functions of shared symbolic systems—both are still structural functionalist references. The structuring effects of significational structures as such (schemes of knowledge stored as dispositions of the habitus and operative in practical sense and practical logic) could have been mentioned here. As well, Wittgenstein's concept of the generation of meaning by the use of language could have opened the praxeological perspective on the structuring effects of symbolic utterances. But this was not yet the case in 1973. However, later on, Bourdieu deepened the concept of symbolic power considerably through his work with notions like representation, symbolic capital, recognition, misrecognition, authorization, delegation, cooptation, identity, etc.

The *second synthesis* mediates the first synthesis with the aspect of *domination*, which up to that point only developed in terms of orthodox Marxism, and derives from considerations on symbolic power. Social power relations (precisely as structured and structuring means of knowledge and communication) coin language and other significational systems thoroughly. Language and signs are transformed into instruments of power and, therefore, domination and resistance. In consequence, what Max Weber calls the "domestication of the dominated" is a result of the structuring power of the cognitive schemes of the dominated made plausible to (and thus being recognized by) actors, which occupy subordinated positions in the social structure. In contrast to a theory of simple reflection, here the gnoseological operations are relatively autonomous. This implies that the struggle for scarce goods between different classes also develops as a struggle about the acknowledged "definition of the social world" (Bourdieu 2006, 167) with its own dynamics. The struggle over social power thus turns into "a struggle over the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence (cf. Weber)" (Bourdieu 2006, 168). This is not to dilute a real struggle into something "merely symbolic." Symbolic operations are very real inasmuch as we are talking about the cognitive, emotional, and bodily schemes that make real actors perceive, judge, and act—if necessary driving a truck loaded with explosives into an embassy. The pragmatic reality of symbolic operations frames *symbolic* violence as an important device in the struggle for *social* power. Accordingly, Bourdieu defines symbolic violence as the "the power to impose … arbitrary instruments of knowledge and expression (taxonomies) of social reality—but instruments whose arbitrary nature is not realized as such" (Bourdieu 2006, 168).

Such a struggle, however, does not develop simply into a bipolar relation between dominant and dominated classes. It is entrenched in a multiplicity of social relations and it is led by ordinary social actors in every day relations as well as by specialists of symbolic production in a variety of specialized fields of social praxis.

Accordingly, Bourdieu's theory of linguistic and symbolic relations and violence is only viable with the underpinnings of a differentiated theory of objective social relations, such as the linguistic market, different fields, and the social space.

Finally, the concentration on symbolic power transforms the research perspective. Questions of how to deal with language and meaning and how to deal with social structures, in societies where people speak and use signs, turn into just one question: how to mediate communication and the distribution of goods, embodied cultural capital, and objectified capital (of whatever sort) under the circumstances of asymmetric social power relations. Symbolic power is one concept to do so.

> Symbolic power, a subordinate power, is a transformed. i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated form of the other forms of power. One can transcend the alternative of energetic models, which describe social relations as relations of force, and cybernetic model, which turn them into relations of communication, only by describing the laws of transformation which govern the transmutation of the different kinds of capital into symbolic capital, and in particular the labour of dissimulation and transfiguration (in a word, of *euphemization)* which secures a real transubstantiation of the relations of power by rendering recognizable and misrecognizable the violence they objectively contain and thus by transforming them into symbolic power, capable of producing real effects without any apparent expenditure of energy. (Bourdieu 2006, 170)

It is not random that symbolic power is generated by the "*labor of dissimulation.*" Activity, production, and labor are common ideas in both the Marxian view of society as a whole and the neo-Kantian view of actively constructing knowledge of the world. Indeed, labor turns out to be a central notion for understanding the mediation the "third unit" realized between symbolic and material, subjective and objective aspects of praxis. And symbolic power, by far, is not the only concept Bourdieu offers to refer to this activity. There are many more concepts and most of them are closely related to the use of signs and, more specifically, to the use of language. Thus, they are related to meaning.

For the method of HabitusAnalysis this indicates various consequences. The cognitive dispositions have to be addressed equally as a system and as operators that transform experience of the social conditions into cognitive orientation. This transformation has to be reconstructed taking into account the social conditions of meaning production and of the reproduction of symbolic power and violence. These processes have to come into the scope of analysis within a framework that does justice to the social conditions of differentiated societies.

The corresponding theoretical concepts of Bourdieu's praxeology developed along with his self-positioning in the field of linguistics and with his own fieldwork on meaning. Bourdieu's position-taking was somewhat intricate.

3.1.2   Bourdieu and linguistics—an intricate relationship

Bourdieu's relation to linguistics (as purported by his writings) is complicated: He perceives that scientific linguistics (in the sixties in France) postulates a formal equality of all human beings in terms of language. Additionally, the discipline of linguistics claims dominion of the academic field and demands universal validity of its claims. According to Bourdieu, this constellation boils down to the rule of those philosophers who proclaim that there is neither power nor domination: a "philosophocracy" in the scientific field, based on the Platonist statement of equality in the realm of ideas. From this point of departure, Bourdieu critically approached linguistics and, more generally, the textual science of the seventies. He failed to notice possible friends and concentrated on identifying foes. We will limit our review to the most important names on the list. We will organize this list according to the distinction between "internal" and "external" interpretation of "cultural works," which Bourdieu uses in the essay, *Principles of a Sociology of Cultural Works*.[290] Our sketch of Bourdieu's assessment will follow the logic of the said essay: internal interpretation, external explanation, and praxeological interpretation. Through this *tour de raison*, we will also extend our perspective to general problems of the interpretation of linguistic products, such as texts.

Given the conditions in the scientific field and the intentions realized in the praxeological program, Bourdieu finds more foes among the "internalists": Saussure, Chomsky, and Austin are central to Bourdieu's criticisms; on semantics, Fodor and Katz are seldom mentioned. Foucault receives more attention.[291] (Postmodernists also belong to this genus of interpreters, but are picked to pieces by Bourdieu with some three sentences in an interview, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 154, G: 1996, 189.) The "externalists," which Bourdieu briefly quoted, are mainly Marxists: Sartre, Lukács, and Goldmann.

We will be guided by the importance Bourdieu confers to the respective authors. Therefore, the section on the interpreters' "linguistic communism" will be longer than the one on the "communist" interpreters. Moreover, our intention is not to figure out if Bourdieu understood the authors correctly. Rather, we aim at learning about the direction Bourdieu wants praxeological interpretation to take, in order

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290   Bourdieu 1993a. This text is a translation of a lecture given at Princeton University in 1986. The publication in French (Bourdieu 1994) shows slight differences from the English text, which we have (at one instance) to refer to. The German translation (Bourdieu 1998c) is based on the French version.

291   One could at this point also refer to Levi-Strauss. Since we have done that before and the critiques are more or less similar to the critiques of Saussure, we abstain from referring to him.

to avoid the pitfalls he sees in the negatively assessed authors. Our review will begin with a short look at the scientific field that Bourdieu saw himself situated in.

3.1.2.1 Philosophocracy—Plato on the academic field

From today's perspective, Bourdieu's insistence on Saussure's mistakes seems, to a certain extent, like beating a dead horse. Nevertheless, the debate has two interesting facets: the historical situation in the French academic field and the actual science of culture in its culturalist variant.

As for the first facet, Bourdieu highlights that, by the late sixties and early seventies, the *French intellectual field* was dominated by academics like Levi-Strauss, Dumezil, and Braudel, and that the "central focus of all discussions at the time shifted to linguistics, which was constituted into the paradigm of all human sciences, and even of such philosophical enterprises as Foucault's."[292]

Of course, such a situation bears the risk that the specific inner standards of linguistics would be perceived as the universal standards of human and social science in general and would be imposed on other disciplines—just as Structural-Functionalism might have had such a position in the USA in the fifties and rational choice might have today. Bourdieu's impression can be corroborated as well by the observation that the linguistic turn (Rorty) and the interpretative turn (Geertz) gathered speed in the social sciences at that time.

This leads to the second facet. A mistake by Bourdieu might serve as a telling introduction to it. Consider Bourdieu's account of a project that he attempted to realize around the late sixties and luckily never published: the transformation of Saussure's *Cours* (Saussure 1959) into a "general theory of culture" (Bourdieu 2006, 32, G: 2005, 37). Bourdieu gave up the work, not because of a concentration on semantics but, because of Saussure's strict systemic separation between internal (linguistic) and external (social) elements of language, which only allowed "the mechanical transfer of concepts taken at face value" (Bourdieu 2006, 32, G: 2005, 37). In Saussure, the spheres of language, culture, and social relations are practically separated. This does not combine well with praxeology.

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292 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 156, G: 1996, 191f. See also some personal remarks on encounters with these mandarins in Bourdieu 2004b, 110, G: 2002, 123f. "The public reading of that text which, written outside the situation, still had to be read as it stood, without modification, before the assembled body of masters, Claude Levi-Strauss, Georges Dumezil, Michel Foucault and others, was a terrible ordeal. People told me later that my voice was toneless. I was on the point of breaking off and leaving the rostrum." Some background from Loic Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 47ff., esp. 56, G: 1996, 77ff., esp. 89.

However, such a separation is not a grievance for everybody. In the *culturalistic cultural sciences* of today, *text, discourse, metanarrative, aesthetics, deconstruction*, et cetera, are buzzwords. For Bourdieu, these concepts can be lumped together with "political irresponsibility" (Heidegger hype), "aestheticist entertainment," and the "irrationalism" of the postmodern humanities, as well as with the names of Lyotard, Barthes, Baudrillard, and Derrida (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 154, G: 1996, 189). Quite consequently, this development had field-effects on sociology. Beyond those effects that everybody can state for linguistic and interpretative turns, Bourdieu diagnoses what he calls the "logy effect." This label stands for "the efforts of philosophers to borrow the methods, and to mimic the scientificity, of the social sciences without giving up the privileged status of the 'free thinker': thus the literary semiology of Barthes, the archeology of Foucault, the grammatology of Derrida" represent such practice (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 156, G: 1996, 192).

Seizing authority for the analysis of the social world, these textual specialists caused a further effect: the double deprivation of sociology and anthropology. First, the culturalist's claim over "discourse" at large deprived sociology of its competence for the analysis of communicative relations (which used to be the domain of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism). Thus sociology, seemingly, was left alone with the brute data of "social physics." Second, the specialists for texts left sociology, without even its social facts, and seized everything that remained, since discourse (and the like) was proclaimed to *be* altogether the whole reality. You interpret discourse, and you have it all!

In the power struggle in the scientific field, the far-reaching validity claims of linguistics, diagnosed by Bourdieu, endanger particularly interpretative sociology. The linguists' basic axioms regarding logic, exchange patterns, and the epistemological status of scientific methods (such as the minimal status of empirical research) tend to be imposed on sociology almost without regard for the objects of research. Thus, the power struggle transforms into an issue of strictly academic reasoning: first, as the question of scientifically legitimate boundaries between disciplines, and second, as the question of an epistemologically justified interdisciplinarity.

The crucial question, however, is the one of social power among the actors observed in society. This question motivated Bourdieu to make a somewhat polemic remark against Saussure and Chomsky. The remark states the heart of the problem and, at the same time, opens Bourdieu's debate about "linguistic communism."

3.1.2.2   Language as *langue*—linguistic communism

> The illusion of 'linguistic communism,' which haunts all of linguistics […] is the
> illusion that everyone participates in language as they enjoy the sun, the air, or
> water—in a word, that language is not a rare good. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992,
> 146, G: 1996, 181)

Bourdieu opens his essay on "Principles of a Sociology of Cultural Works" with a
discussion of the method of *internal interpretation*, which "is meant in the sense of
Saussure's 'internal linguistics;' it can also be called formal." Primarily an exercise
of literature professors and philosophers, the method "is sustained by all the logic
of the university institution" (Bourdieu 1993a, 174, G: 1998c, 56).

There are a couple of names, which Bourdieu refers to repeatedly, when he
negatively assesses "internal" linguistics and interpretation. Saussure[293] and Chom-
sky[294] are mentioned most often, the name of Saussure being almost a metaphor
for abstract, formal, "pure" linguistics (Bourdieu 2006, 43ff., G: 2005, 48ff.; 1993a,
174ff., G: 1998c, 56ff.). In Bourdieu's judgment, both linguists, with their leading
oppositions of *langue/parole* and competence/performance, conceive language as
an ideal system and understand the use of language as mere execution.

> What characterizes 'pure' linguistics is the primacy it accords to the synchronic,
> structural, or internal perspective over the historical, social, economic, or external
> determinations of language. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 141, G: 1996, 175)

Saussure

Such an approach conveys, especially in Saussurean linguistics, a concept of lan-
guage as "an intellectual instrument and an object of analysis […] detached from
real usage and totally stripped of its functions."[295] For Bourdieu, it is telling that
Saussure constructs *langue* as a system and object of analysis by dismissing all ele-
ments of communication, "on the grounds that 'execution is never the work of the
mass' but 'always individual'" (Bourdieu 1990b, 33, G: 2008, 62).[296] This operation
has two decisive consequences: First, *langue* is constructed as an equally abstract

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293 Saussure 1959, first published in 1916.

294 Works of Chomsky discussed at the time in question: Chomsky 1967; 1968; 1972.

295 Bourdieu 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61. See also earlier Bourdieu 2009, E: 1977b, ca. 23ff.

296 One can add the observation that this operation of stripping praxis in order to construct
an abstract entity—not dissimilar from Descartes construction of the *cogito* (Descartes
2008, 19f. = Meditation II 6)—replicates a trait of substantialist epistemology as well
as bourgeois political thought: the common is abstract and the concrete cannot have
another shape as individual.

and self-sufficient system of terms. Thus the internal organization of that system appears to be "the necessary and sufficient condition of the production of meaning"; and even more, it seems as if "one could infer the usage and meaning of linguistic expressions from analysis of their formal structure" (Bourdieu 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61). Given that this operation constructs the meaning of language as a mere function of the internal systemic relations of a model, the use of language is not only seen as mere execution but also becomes insignificant for the constitution of meaning. Thus, in the end, the individual (which was first sanctified by not being "mass") turns out to be a completely abstract unit without any creativity and individuality whatsoever. The Saussurean logic

> by privileging the *constructum* over the materiality of the practical realization, reduces individual practice, skill, everything that is determined practically by reference to practical ends, that is, style, manner, and ultimately the agents themselves, to the actualization of a kind of ahistorical essence, in short, nothing. (Bourdieu 1990b, 33, G: 2008, 62)

While Bourdieu recognizes as a merit that Saussure introduced relational strategies into the analysis of language (Bourdieu 1993a, 176, G: 1998c, 57), the objectivistic and idealistic way of employing relationism on language makes one forget "that language is made to be spoken and spoken pertinently" (Bourdieu 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61). For Bourdieu, Chomsky is a similar case.

Chomsky

According to Bourdieu, Chomsky's transformational theory of grammar, with its claim to universal validity and its distinction between competence and performance, conveys problems almost homologous to those that Saussure presents.[297] Speaking is understood as the execution of universal grammatical rules, and grammatical correctness appears to be a sufficient condition of meaning.

In contrast, Bourdieu accentuates the main problem for praxeology, quoting a statement of Jacques Bouveresse "that the problem is not the possibility of producing an infinite number of 'grammatical' sentences but the possibility of producing an infinite number of sentences really appropriate to an infinite number of situations" (Bourdieu 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61).

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297 See Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 141f., G: 1996, 175f.; Bourdieu 1977c, 646; 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61.

Fodor and Katz

As we are particularly interested in meaning and therefore cannot disregard semantics, we quickly refer here to a short remark by Bourdieu on these two semanticists.[298] Bourdieu does not go into any detail but labels Fodor and Katz's "pure semantics" as an extreme form of the abstractions he disapproves in Saussure and Chomsky. The idea of an abstract system of generalized, objective meanings of words, exclusively defined by their inner components and their mutual relations, is incompatible with Bourdieu's way of dealing with the meaning of words.

However, Bourdieu also deals with semantics. Yet he does it under three quite different conditions: First, he does not target any universalistic theory of meaning. Second, he spells the meanings out in the practical conditions of speech and with vivid attention to power relations. Third, in the course of his scientific analyses, he combines semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics (he even considers phonetics), while abstract linguistics tends to separate these aspects of linguistic praxis almost as if they were different disciplines (Bourdieu 1977c, 646).

Notwithstanding, for semantics, as for other branches of linguistics, it is important to see that, since Fodor and Katz, times have changed considerably.

Foucault

Though different from US-American semanticists, Foucault was spatially near to Bourdieu and well recognized in the French academic field. He needs to be mentioned here, since he is the only member of the postmodern "philosophocracy" to whom Bourdieu dedicates more than two lines (and whom he honored by bearing the coffin at his funeral in 1984).

First, we ought to say that Bourdieu recognizes Foucault (as he does other structuralists) as having the merit of "seeking to uncover the internal coherence of symbolic systems qua systems, that is, one of the major bases of their efficacy." (Bourdieu 1998b, 55, G: 2007, 119; referring to Foucault 1971) However, this point of view very much restricts precisely the study of Foucault's central theme: symbolic domination. Foucault's method is confined to the finished work (the opus operatum) and disregards the modus operandi of the practical logic that causes social recognition and, thus, the efficacy of symbolic domination.

Beyond this general observation, Bourdieu dedicates a longer discussion to Foucault's thought under the rubric of the internal interpretation of texts.[299] Foucault

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298 Fodor and Katz 1964; see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 141, G: Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996, 175f.; Bourdieu 1990b, 32, G: 2008, 61.

299 Bourdieu 1993a, 175–177, G: 1998c, 57–59. The quotes in this subsection are taken from this passage. See also Bourdieu 1995, 193ff., G: 1999b, 309ff.

has "given what seems to me to be the only rigorous formulation of the structuralist project (other than that of the Russian formalists) as regards the analysis of cultural works." Aware of the linkage between different cultural works "Foucault proposes to call the 'ordered system of differences and dispersions,' within which each individual work is given definition, the 'field of strategic possibilities.'"[300] So far, so good! But then, Foucault postulates the absolute autonomy of that field of intertextual relations. Like the "semiologists … Foucault refuses to search anywhere outside the field of discourse to elucidate each of the discourses that is thereby invoked." The commonalities between texts of the same historical period, for example, cannot be explained by similar social conditions but only by the field of texts itself, as a system of common references. Leaning on the idealist-structuralist division between internal and external language, Foucault insists in the "absolute autonomy of the 'field of strategic possibilities,' which he calls episteme" and he even denies the influence of divergent "interests or mental habits among individuals."

While there is some similarity with his concept of a field, Bourdieu proceeds, the striking difference is that Foucault claims the complete autonomy of the "cultural order, the episteme." Thus, the "border between orthodox structuralism and the genetic structuralism that I propose lies [in the fact that] Michel Foucault transfers the oppositions and the antagonisms, which have their roots in the relations between the producers and the users of the works under consideration, into the heaven of ideas." Finally, for Bourdieu, Foucault's position has to be called simply "essentialism, or… fetishism"—an evil against which Bourdieu immediately invokes Wittgenstein.

According to Bourdieu, Foucault remains caught up in the philosophical abstraction of a world consisting of texts, signs, culture—albeit promoting a program of vitriolic social critique against the mechanisms of power. In the final analysis, Foucault's critique involves a Platonic separation between ideas and the social conditions of the ideas' producers, production, and effects, which disavows most of Foucault's own program. In a later interview, Bourdieu states clearly: "I would like to stress everything that separates Foucault's theory of domination as discipline or 'drilling,' or, in another order, the metaphor of the open and capillary network from a concept such as that of field" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 167, G: 1996, 203).

And Austin?

The question mark behind this name indicates that Austin can neither simply be classified as internalist, nor as externalist. On the one hand, his theory opens a *pragmatic perspective* to Bourdieu. On the other, in the course of time, Bourdieu acquires a more critical view of Austin's approach, as still too internal.

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300 Bourdieu quotes here Foucault 1968, esp. 40.

Relatively early in his studies on the Kabyle society, Bourdieu deals much with meaning and language and applies structuralist methods. However, as early as in the *Outline of a Theory of Praxis*, he sees a need to tackle the issue of the practical use of language. He recurs to Austin's theory of speech acts as developed in *How to Do Things with Words* (Austin 1967), writing that an anthropological observer should not forget

> that, as Austin formulates, one 'can do things with words', that is, one can form the *acts* of another person and not only the thoughts, and that the meaning of an information […] definitely is nothing else than the totality of the actions it triggers.[301]

Since Wittgenstein was already in Bourdieu's focus, this positive reference to Austin weighs even more. It is the appraisal of a linguistic program (in France possibly unexpected) that was apt to solve the problem that in Saussurean linguistics the pragmatic dimension was lacking. Moreover, Austin presents the pragmatic dimension not only in terms of a felicitous understanding, but also as a triggering action—just what fits praxeology. Thus, semantic content can be integrated into the theory of practical logic much more fully than it could with the French structuralist model of sign and meaning. Performative utterances, for example, may be understood more adequately as "a particular case of the effects of symbolic domination, which occurs in all linguistic exchanges" (Bourdieu 2006, 72, G: 2005, 79).

Notwithstanding, later on, it is precisely the question of *power* exerted in performative enunciations that drives Bourdieu's appraisal of Austin into a crisis. Discussing the conditions of the felicitousness of a speech act (Bourdieu 2006, 72ff., G: 2005, 79ff.), Bourdieu maintains that these conditions are nothing other than social conditions and that pragmatics does not suffice to give account of this fact.

> But by pushing to the limit the consequences of the distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic, on which it purports to base its autonomy (notably with regard to sociology), pragmatics demonstrates by *reductio ad absurdum* that illocutionary acts as described by Austin are acts of institution that cannot be sanctioned unless they have, in some way, the whole social order behind them. (Bourdieu 2006, 74, G: 2005, 80)

This assertion might not be all too difficult to digest for a sociolinguist. However, Bourdieu provides his critique with still more drive as he maintains (against Austin and Habermas) that the illocutionary force does not reside in speech, but that the "power of words is nothing other than the *delegated power* of the spokesperson."[302]

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301   Bourdieu 2009, 146, F: 1972, 162, trans. HWS, passage not included in English.

302   Bourdieu 2006, 107, G: 2005, 101. Notwithstanding, one should take into account that Searle counters this critique as inadequate. See below 5.2.2.

Bourdieu says in another occasion that the theory of speech acts is good but that it still does not sufficiently regard objective social powers. The power of a speaker is a product of his investiture—for example, with a *skeptron*, that is, of delegated social power.[303]

Bourdieu's *debate* with speech act theory demonstrates where he is heading: language, significational processes, meaning, and symbolic relations must be, as densely as possible, woven into the social fabric of objective social relations that are relations of power. Social power relations are the focal point of the whole theory, and therefore language has to be addressed within this context. Notwithstanding, language, meaning, etc., are not *identical* to social relations. Bourdieu underscores this repeatedly with expressions like "the relative autonomy of the symbolic." Nevertheless, in his work on language—and more precisely in his later dealings with speech act theory (e.g., in Bourdieu 2006, 107ff., G: 2005, 101ff.)—the relative autonomy of symbolic relations falls somewhat short in comparison to other parts of his work (see below 3.2). Hence, in his debate with speech act theory, the particular effects of symbolic relations drift out of focus.

3.1.2.3   Language as society—communist linguists

In his essay on "Cultural Works" Bourdieu proceeds by assessing the "external explanation," which links texts and extra textual reality: biographies or social structures. Such

> external analysis,[…] viewing the relationship between the social world and cultural works according to the logic of 'reflection' (*reflet*) [*Widerspiegelungstheorie*, HWS], links works directly to the social characteristics of their authors (to their social origin) or to the groups to which they are actually or supposedly addressed, and whose expectations they are supposed to fulfill. (Bourdieu 1993a, 177, G: 1998c, 59)

As reconstructed by Bourdieu, the external method maintains the theory of reflection between the material and the mental world, society and text. It remains within the basic Platonic scheme. It simply turns the mirror around and moves the predicate of "real reality" from the world of ideas to the world of things. Basically, external explanations acquire the shapes of biographical methods and socio-structural determination.

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303 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 147, G: 1996, 182. One also looks for a corresponding critique of Wittgenstein. It fails to appear. This might be due to the different status of Wittgenstein in Bourdieu's theoretical frame of reference. Wittgenstein is the guarantee for the general turn to ordinary language and radical historization. Moreover, Wittgenstein's concept of use modifies Bourdieu's implicit concept of sign.

Sartre and the biographical method

Bourdieu quotes *Jean Paul Sartre* as the main exponent of the biographical method in its subjectivist branch. In his analysis of Flaubert, Sartre recurs to "the particular condition of the author's existence" (Bourdieu 1993a, 177f., G: 1998c, 59f.) in order to find the clue for the interpretation of his work. Behind Bourdieu's scant sentences echoes his whole critique of Sartre's existentialist subjectivism.[304] The exclusive role of the author's individual biography for the interpretation of a text represents the heroic apotheosis of the free subject, faithful to itself, its own will and the autonomously designed project of its own life. From the praxeological point of view, such a concept of biography is insufficient since objective social relations of power are categorically excluded.

In this regard, the *objectivistic branch* of biographical approaches is similar. Bourdieu refers to statistical methods guided by predefined categories, such as schools and genres, in order to provide an external frame of reference for the interpretation of literary works. Albeit these methods construct external parameters, in Bourdieu's judgment they fail to realize the really important frame of reference: the field at stake, constructed as a field of different and distinct power positions.

Marxism and class interest

The final variant of external explanation, which Bourdieu lists, is inspired by objectivist Marxism—that is, such authors as Georg Lukács, Lucien Goldmann, or Theodor Adorno "who try to relate works to a worldview or to the social interests of a social class."[305]

Bourdieu states that this approach to literary texts generally presupposes a naïve idea of the artist as a medium of class interests. It also suggests a relatively direct influence of the group or class interest on the production of the work. In contrast, Bourdieu does not give much credit either to the possibility of detecting class interest behind artistic works, or to unveiling the serving function of a given work for these interests. He rather postulates that it is necessary to keep the "internal logic of cultural objects, their structures, considered as *languages*" in mind (as the internalists do!); and to consider the groups of actors who produce the works (such as "priests, jurists, intellectuals, writers, poets, artists, mathematicians, etc.)" (Bourdieu 1993a, 178f., G: 1998c, 61). The latter consideration is possible by constructing a field of power relations between the artists at stake. Thus, the external influence on the works is mediated by specific conditions of production as differentiated societies

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304 See for example Bourdieu 1990b, 42ff., G: 2008, 79ff.; 1977b, 73ff., G: 2009, 165ff.; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 133, G: 1996, 167f.

305 Bourdieu 1993a, 178, G: 1998c, 60f.. See Lukács 1971; Goldmann 1978; Adorno 1973.

provide them. The field refracts considerably (like a prism) the external influence on the works exerted by the social structure.

> External determinants, for example the effects of economic crises, technical advances, or political revolutions, which the Marxists used to invoke, cannot exert themselves except through the intermediary of transformations in the structure of the field which results from them. (Bourdieu 1993a, 179, G: 1998c, 62)

This statement could have been enough to comment on this variant of the theory of reflection (however substantial it might be, for example, with regard to Adorno's critique on Heidegger). Yet Bourdieu enriches his critique with a very interesting argument. He says that even if "functions" could be detected, the Marxist approach however would not have advanced anything in the "understanding of the work's structure." That is, to simply state that religion functions as an opiate of the people does not say much about the "structure of the religious message," given that the "structure is the condition of the accomplishment of the function" (Bourdieu 1993a, 178, G: 1998c, 61). Now, what else can be understood by the term "structure of the work" other than the related semantic contents and meaning determined by the term's relative value—exactly the object of internal interpretation?

3.1.3   Language as praxis—praxeological relations

By way of Bourdieu's critiques, we could already discover some hints about his own approach to language. Appreciating the notion of language as a system in contrast to idealist structuralism, nevertheless he underscores the importance of the use of language. Dismissing formal semantics, he favors the combination of semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics. In contrast to Austin, he emphasizes social power as the source of the illocutionary force of language. Against the subjectivist and objectivist biographical method as well as against objectivist Marxists, Bourdieu highlights the proper dynamic of fields, which prevents both subjectivist individualism and social determination in the production of cultural works. Most importantly, in contrast to the Marxist's reduction of language to its mere functions (opiate of the people), Bourdieu emphasizes that the structure of the (religious) message, its meaning, is important to understand a given cultural work or practice (cf. Bourdieu 1991b, 10ff., G: 2011b, 46ff.).

   After examining some long-standing currents of research in language and then Bourdieu's assessment of the linguistic field, we finish this section with some more details on Bourdieu's own position with regard to linguistics and language. First, we sketch Bourdieu's model of interpretation of cultural works, still following his

article on this issue. Second, we turn to the translation of linguistic terms into praxeology. Third, we conclude with some remarks on praxeological parameters for the approach to meaning.

3.1.3.1 Bourdieu's model of interpretation

Proceeding through Bourdieu's article, we find some hints for an answer to our question regarding semantic content. Bourdieu first introduces the concept of the field. Then he addresses again the internal analysis of meaning, asking if the "gains made by the more subtle supporters of the internal reading" (Bourdieu 1993a, 179, G: 1998c, 62) are valid for a praxeological approach. They are. We set out with some observations on meaning.

Meaning

In the article discussed here, Bourdieu reacts to the alternatives of exclusively internal or external approaches to the meaning of cultural works. This reaction yielded a short sketch of principal outlines of his general theory of praxis. This is not by chance. It is rather due to his understanding of meaning as a function of praxis. Meaning is generated by practical operations that involve material as well as cognitive, emotional, and bodily factors, which operate within contexts of unequally distributed power and opportunities.

One can sum up the argument of the article with a programmatic utterance of Bourdieu in an interview with Wacquant. Bourdieu aims at destroying "the ordinary opposition between materialism and culturalism" through a relational concept of language affirming that "linguistic relations are always relations of symbolic power through which relations of force between the speakers and their respective groups are actualized in a transfigured form" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 142, G: 1996, 177). Among other things, this means that meaning is generated within the practical dynamics of fields.

Fields

The analysis of meaning according to the parameters of classical structuralism is not completely abolished, but sublated. It becomes part of synthesizing theory and method. "One can conserve all the achievements and all the requirements of the internalist and externalist, the formalist and the sociologist approaches, if one establishes a relation"[306] between two fields: the field of the works and the field of

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306 This is our own translation from the French original: "C'est ainsi que l'on peut conserver tous les acquis et toutes les exigences des approches internalistes et externalistes, formalistes et sociologistes en mettant en relation l'espace des œuvres … conçu comme

the works' producers. Of course, both fields are conceived relationally. The field of the producers (the authors, their schools, etc.) consists of positions, which are differentiated according to their power in terms of control over the production. The field of the works, then, represents the (intertextually) related works not as reified quasi-actors but as position-takings (*prise de position*) of the authors; that is, each work represents its author in the field of works in terms of a statement that he makes.

While each field has its own regularities, no one field can be conceived as an entity secluded in itself. The concept of *field* is a model, an eyeglass, which allows one to see more clearly certain aspects of the activities realized by a variety of actors (in this case producers of cultural works, such as novels or sermons). As the traditional sciences of interpretation have separated the works from the rest of life or, at most, linked both works and life by the mirror effect, the challenge for praxeology is to maintain the achievements of the past and to integrate them into an encompassing theory of praxis.

Production

This is why in Bourdieu's text, which we are analyzing here, the concepts *producer and relation* (between fields) are extremely important. One ought not to read the terms as accidental, peripheral, or negligible.[307] They mark crucial differences between Bourdieu and the theories he refers to in his study. *Relation* means that the interrelated fields are not ontologically separated, but only methodically distinguished as *terms* of a relation between fields. As terms of a relation, they cannot be conceived as independent from each other, but rather as influencing one another mutually (by that relation) and therefore as only *relatively* independent. *Producer* recalls that the relation is one of production. A work does not come into being by parthenogenesis, but by genesis through labor—as everybody knows who has written a scientific book. Thus, the mode of production (the modus operandi) can be understood to spell out in detail what this relation is about: the actors' perception of the status of existing works; their appraisal of their own position, their appraisal of possible demands on the market, and their own history of production; the relative value

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un champ de prises de position qui ne peuvent être comprises que relationnellement, à la façon d'un système … d'écarts différentiels, et l'espace des écoles ou des auteurs conçu comme système de positions différentielles dans le champ de production" (Bourdieu 1994, 69, G: 1998c, 63). The English text instead maintains the focus of the preceding passage on Foucault and reads: "Retaining what we get though the idea of intertextuality" (Bourdieu 1993a, 180).

307 The substantialist habitus might suggest this, the cognitive schemes of which are rather sensible of words like essential, substance, core, attribute, basis, being, character, entity, kernel, nature, property, quality, root, etc.

of their acquired capital of specific knowledge; the actors' positions in relation to other authors in terms of access to editorials, stipends, assistants, etc.; and finally, general social trends as, for example, the increasing or decreasing value of academic titles, cultural works, etc. While these relations (and more) can all be considered for research, they are conceived as relations between terms: the works in relation to other works and the conditions of the producers in relation to other producers. This is why the works can be analyzed with regard to their internal semantic content, their structure, and their formal aspects. And all this can be simultaneously understood as an element in or as a function of the relations of production.

Thus, on the one hand, the works acquire their *meaning* through their use (position, function, etc.) in the relation of production—which of course includes reproduction, cognition, appraisal, further production, etc. Yet on the other hand, production, its functions, and its meanings cannot be fully explained when the relatively independent signification and meaning of the works are dismissed. Neither (the field of) works nor (the field of) production acquires meaning in itself, but only by the distinction from one another, which is operated (and thus mediated) through production. This brings to memory "once again, the formula of Benveniste: 'To be different and to have meaning is the same.'"[308]

In the rest of his lecture Bourdieu describes how the focus on relations of production, provided by the model of fields, contributes to a better coping mechanism for various problems in the sociological theory of cultural works (Bourdieu 1993a, 180ff., G: 1998c, 63ff.).

For instance, the problem of *change* of cultural production and products can be tackled when one see the problem as the result of a struggle, mainly between specialists. The relation between the works (their form, style, themes, etc.) and the structure of the field in which they are produced (art, literature, etc.) allows one to explain the changes among the works by means of the struggles in the field where the conditions of their production are being disputed. The dynamics of these struggles are partly due to the *strategies* that the actors opt for and the positions that they aspire to (that is, among other things, the kind of works they produce in order to position themselves). The strategies depend on the position the authors have in the field and on their *habitus*. Far from any mechanistic determination, the dispositions of the habitus (acquired in past struggles in the field) enable the actors to perceive and to assess their opportunities and constraints in the field; and to creatively produce precisely those works that are most adequate to their appraisal of their positions in the game played on the respective field. Simultaneously, once

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308   "Et rappeler, une fois encore, la formule de Benveniste : 'Etre distinctif, être significatif, c'est la même chose'" (Bourdieu 1994, 70, E: 1993a, 180, G: Bourdieu 1998c, 63).

integrated into the game as players, the actors are not free anymore to abstain from positioning themselves through their works. (Other players in the field are assessing their production.) Even if they stop producing works, they are locating themselves by abstention—unless they are not reckoned anymore as players. Moreover, the dynamics of a given field (such as religion or the arts) might be considerably autonomous, but they are never completely independent from factors external to the field. These can be, for example, macroeconomic changes or a transformation of the educational institutions. Such conditions, Bourdieu describes predominantly with the model of the social space.

Through his overall approach, Bourdieu translates linguistics into praxeology.

3.1.3.2   Praxeological translation of linguistics

After portraying Bourdieu's argument for an integrated praxeological interpretation of cultural works according to the hitherto referred article, we will now briefly sketch what Bourdieu proposes for the translations of linguistic concepts into praxeology.

Beyond Bourdieu's focus on social conditions, two particularly interesting traits of his theory seem to be the main reason for its acknowledgement even in sociolinguistics. First Bourdieu translates linguistic categories into sociological ones, thus establishing controlled relations between the two disciplines. Second, he describes the praxis, referred to by these categories, as relational activity *(dialectics, production, representation,* etc.), and he applies carefully crafted models: of human dispositions (habitus) as well as of capital-based interactional dynamics (practical logic, fields) and distributions of power (space).

Translation

Bourdieu explains the *sociological translation of linguistic categories* with regard to three basic terms: grammaticalness, communication, and competence.

> In place of [1] *grammaticalness* it puts the notion of *acceptability*, or, to put it another way, in place of 'the' language (*langue*), the notion of the *legitimate* language. In place of relations of [2.1] *communication* (or symbolic interaction) it puts *relations of symbolic power*, and so [2.2] replaces the question of the *meaning* of speech with the question of the *value* and *power* of speech. Lastly, in place of specifically [3] *linguistic competence*, it puts *symbolic capital*, which is inseparable from the speaker's position in the social structure**.** (Bourdieu 1977c, 646, bracketed numbers added)

Since we take up these points later in the framework of Bourdieu's wider theory (vol. 2), we only add a few remarks here. Generally, we consider it important not to draw the wrong conclusions from Bourdieu's overemphasizing attitude by using the term "displacement." We do not think that this statement is rightly understood

by imputing that Bourdieu wants to substitute the "reality" of grammaticalness of linguistic utterances by the other "reality" of social acceptability. In tune with Bourdieu's moderate scientific constructivism, the "changes" and "replacements" should be read as a change of modeling parameters in the observation of linguistic utterances. Sociological observation of grammatically correct utterances relates them to the social conditions of speaking and hearing. These conditions provide a wide array of quite different social standards of acceptable correctness or incorrectness. Labov's studies on Black American English show this, as Bourdieu's works on the dialect in Bearn do. The sociological translation adds additional meaning to the linguistic category of grammaticalness: its social use and its significance for social distinction. Nevertheless, distinction is only possible with reference to a shared (albeit imposed) concept of what is (grammatically) correct and what is not. While some linguists might still think that such a frame of reference is universal, sociologists rather suppose cultural and social relativity of the standards of an utterance's acceptability. Yet normally, sociologists are neither schooled in the analysis of the highly specific grammatical constraints of a given language nor interested in grammatical analysis.[309] Hence, from a linguist's point of view, the praxeological focus on language may seem quite narrow.

In sum, we treat Bourdieu's sociological reading of linguistic categories as a methodically controlled way of widening the visual angle of the praxeological model of social relations.

Legitimacy

This said, we would like to add some observations on the translation of *grammaticalness* into *socially constituted legitimacy [1]*.[310] Even if this translation no longer shares the idealist traits of Saussure or Chomsky, the praxeological translation does not dismiss the fact that language is systemic. Actors who ascribe legitimacy to one utterance and, in the same breath, illegitimacy to another, presuppose a common system of reference (even if this system is under dispute). This is why Bourdieu recognizes Saussure's notion of the systematicity of language as very helpful and why he occasionally even recurs to notions like the "core-meaning" of a word. In short, Bourdieu is not so naïve as to dismiss the notion of a shared semantic, grammatical, and pragmatic system of language. What would the objective symbolic space be about, if not partly about language and the meaning of spoken, written, painted, or enacted signs? However, this system operates in practical, social relations. It is

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309   If help is needed, however, a sociologist can ask a socio or psycholinguists for help.

310   The bracketed numbers in this and the following subsection refer to the bracketed passages of the quote on grammaticalness in the last subsection, p. 240.

subjective in terms of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*) inasmuch as the system involves human activity in order to simply exist and develop; it is *objective* in terms of socially "densified" praxis (invariantly repeating ways of saying and doing) and objectified institutions (dictionaries, academies of official and thus legitimate language, etc.). Praxeology describes the use of language as an activity that *relates* both dimensions, sytematicity and legitimacy, to one another.

Bourdieu's translation of linguistic competence into *symbolic capital* [3] and of *communication* into relations of symbolic power [2.1] immediately relates to the issue of legitimate language. From a praxeological point of view, the competence to communicate correctly is indeed a form of capital that can be invested in order to achieve a social position. Correct speech has to be learned and is uttered from the social position that the speakers occupy. Speech is therefore a function of a speaker's social position. For communication [2.1] this means that speech comes into the sociological focus under the aspect of symbolic power. In sum, the one who speaks grammatically and semantically in an adequate way for the group with whom he communicates gains symbolic capital and thus legitimacy and power.[311]

Meaning

Finally, in social relations, grammar does not work without semantics and pragmatics. Notwithstanding, Bourdieu's emphatic rhetoric of "replacing" *meaning* with value and power [2.2] triggers the impression that he is throwing the baby out with the bath water completely negating the sociological significance of meaning. Written in the early seventies, the article might still purport quite much of the fervor against structural semantics, the mandarin position in the academic field. Therefore—and very much conforming to Bourdieu's own treatment of meaning (see below 3.2)—we propose a less belligerent reading. Bourdieu does neither displace meaning nor supplant it by value.

Of course, a sociological way of dealing with meaning does not share the point of view of internal word semantics (such as Fodor/Katz). It rather sees the meaning of an utterance within the context of the "value and power of speech" in society, or the meaning of a ritual act within the religious context of the "value and power of

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311 Leif Seibert noted that this interpretation of language, which Bourdieu proposes here, is already very much in line with the notion of the power of language, which we derive from Bourdieu's work later on (4.1.2). The power of language is more than the power of the speaker. The fact that grammaticalness, communication, and linguistic competence are differentiated from one another, already implies that the power of linguistic expression has many more facets than only a correspondence to the social position of the speakers—not least because the same speaker may well be able to communicate appropriately in different sociolects.

the ritual." Semantic content, value, and the power of linguistic utterances are co-dependent. What "value" would exist between two empty terms? What connotations (metaphor and polysemy in practical logic!) and what accumulation of recognition would be possible, if not by a transposition of meaning between different fields of social praxis? Inversely, what kind of "existence" could an abstract "objective core-meaning" of a word have in reality? The reality of the abstract meaning is the dictionary of the Royal Academy—and even in the dictionary the seemingly abstract meaning has a practical life: a carrier to symbolic power, since the meaning codified in the dictionary and invested by Royal legitimacy determines the socially dominant use of the word.

In sum, without considering the meaning of speech, interaction, and things (as operators of symbolic and social power), much of what Bourdieu constructed as praxeology would simply fall apart. How could one approach the whole issue of "classification"? How could one describe the actors' (individual and collective) construction of a meaningful social world—for instance, common sense? What would become of the Kabyle women, who derive their social identity through the embodiment of symbolic gender distinction? Bourdieu hardly meant to destroy his own approach.

In sum, all these translations put linguistic categories into a new context of use: praxeological sociology. By this very operation, their use (and thereby their meaning) is modified from a linguistic to a sociological use. In a similar way, Bourdieu uses other terms praxeologically that have a history in the science of language: homology, metaphor, polysemy, etc. The strictly linguistic use opens up to a semiotic and a sociological one. The sociological use, finally, sets new frames for the semiotic and linguistic terms: the sociological notion of a particular "dialectics" between symbolic and material, subjective and objective relations in social life, coined into theoretical models referred to as, for example, practical logic, habitus, capital, market, field, and space.

3.1.3.3   Praxeological parameters for the approach to meaning

Finally, we can sum up our hitherto considerations on Bourdieu's dealings with linguistics as we sketch some praxeological parameters for the study of language and meaning. Bourdieu refers to some of the parameters in two programmatic sequences of an interview. One sequence highlights the habitus of class, the other focuses on power. Together they allow one to project praxeological perspectives.

Habitus and power

In order to understand language sociologically, it is necessary to place

> linguistic practices within the full universe of compossible practices: [...] the whole class habitus, that is, the synchronic and diachronic position occupied in the social structure, that expresses itself through the linguistic habitus which is but one of its dimensions. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 149, G: 1996, 184)

This relation between habitus and social position is the socio-epistemological condition for the use of language by actors and for its scientific description by sociology. When the focus narrows to language, the concept of habitus is used in a more specific sense too: *linguistic habitus* as an "expression" of the general (class) habitus of an actor. Bourdieu is careful enough to specify that the concept of linguistic habitus denotes a "dimension" of the general habitus of an actor. For our understanding, this has two consequences. First, any reification of linguistic habitus as some sort of a "thing," separate from habitus in general, is ruled out. Nevertheless, we would even prefer to talk about linguistic dispositions or operators, taking up Bourdieu's own usage with regard to habitus in general. This form of disaggregating the concept of habitus not only prevents a reification of "the" linguistic habitus. Concomitantly, it connotes that, as dispositions, linguistic capabilities are woven into the vast network of other dispositions of the habitus (see vol. 2 on dispositions and habitus). Second, this understanding indicates that linguistic practices (as are religious ones) are not confined to specific fields but are an operating tool in every field of human praxis—albeit to a different degree.[312]

In sum, class habitus is an important factor for producing linguistic utterances. A second factor, even permeating the habitus, is *relations of power*. As communicative acts develop between different actors, the social power relations take effect on the linguistic exchange.

> Even the simplest *linguistic exchange* brings into play a complex and ramifying web of *historical power relations* between the *speaker*, endowed with a specific *social authority*, and an *audience*, which *recog-|nizes* this authority to varying degrees, as well as between the *groups* to which they *respectively belong*. What I sought to demonstrate is that a very important part of what goes on in *verbal communication*, even the *content of the message* itself, remains unintelligible as long as one does not take into account the totality of the *structure of power relations* that *is present*, yet invisible, in the exchange. [...] To push this analysis further, one would need to introduce all kinds of *positional coordinates*, such as gender, level of education, class origins, residence, etc.

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312 To a certain extent, this idea is also realized in the concept of a linguistic market (see p. 307 and vol. 2).

> All these variables *intervene* at every moment in the determination of the objective structure of '*communicative action*,' and the form taken by linguistic interaction will hinge substantially upon this structure, which is unconscious. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 142f., G: 1996, 177f., italics added)

Verbal communication is structured by power relations between the participants in the exchange. These power relations involve the groups that the communicants belong to as well as objective positional coordinates. The content of a message is only intelligible with reference to these conditions: the structures of the social space, the dynamics of the fields, and the dispositions of the habitus—all of these are shaped by the relations of power between the actors. From here, we can derive some *praxeological guidelines* for the approach to language and meaning.

Actors who partake in a communicational event, such as a conversation or a sermon, construct the meaning of what they hear according to power relations that are mediated by the following factors:

1. The habitus of the communicating actors provide *schemes of perception and evaluation* that represent the social relations, the embodied "dos and don'ts", the ascriptions and self-ascriptions, etc. Through the *habitus* the (1.1) individual and collective history and (1.2) the social *power structures* are immediately present in the communicative situation.
2. The situation as such provides a certain *actual setting of constraints and opportunities* for communication—for a sermon other than for a conversation or for an interview. However, no situation is simply emerging (*emergent*, Luhmann). Instead, it is informed by (2.1) the *ascriptions, expectations, and anticipations* of the actors according to their habitus. These symbolic activities allow one to deal with the (2.2) forces of the *fields* and the (2.3) objective distribution of *social power*, as represented in the situation.
3. Finally, this objective distribution of capital is represented by the *different participants* of the communication according to (3.1) the autonomy and authority provided to them by their recognized (and misrecognized) objective *positions in the respective field* (religion, journalism, etc.) as well as (3.2) by the different total amount of embodied (linguistic competence, ease, knowledge) and material (money, office, etc.) capital in relation to all other positions in the *social space*.

Relations, praxis, struggles

We conclude by summing up three basic guidelines for a praxeological approach to language and meaning.

The claim of some scholars of literature and philosophy on the descriptive authority over the entirety of cultural and social relations can hardly be answered by a similar claim in the inverse direction. Thus, we do not claim that praxeological sociology is a better linguistics. However, we do strongly assert that it offers a particular and very eye-opening sociological way of dealing with the social use of language and meaning. For its theory and method, some orientations and borrowings from linguistics and semiotics are useful, but the particular focus of praxeological sociology is not on text.

A praxeological view on language, as we understand it according to Bourdieu, rather encompasses three perspectives: First, it focuses on the *relation*—the mediation between signs and things, knowledge and world, language and distribution of goods, mental and material structures, subjective and objective factors of praxis. Second, with regard to language, it does not separate semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics. It rather sees language as *praxis* and integrates these three linguistic perspectives on language as mere aspects of the social use of language. Hence, linguistic and semiotic utterances are conceived of as practical operators. Third, praxeology treats language as praxis under social conditions, which involve unequal distribution of *power* and scarce goods and, hence, *struggles* over power and goods. In these struggles, symbolic praxis is an active factor, often decisive for the outcome. Language is a practical operator that functions according to practical logic.

This said, a sufficient praxeological framework is sketched in order to examine in more detail how Bourdieu approaches meaning in his own empirical analyses—in his fieldwork on meaning, so to say.

Bourdieu's works carry along an implicit praxeology of meaning that serves as the basis for HabitusAnalysis. In contrast to structural semantics, Bourdieu deals with language from the perspective of his own brand of sociological pragmatics. Meaning always appears in social power structures.

3.1   The scientific field: language, system, and meaning
Bourdieu criticizes Platonic notions of self-sufficient ideas and postulates a sociological pragmatics of power relations in order to approach language.

3.1.1   Language—the *longue durée* and the praxeological Kondratiev wave
Bourdieu frames the scientific treatment of language with three currents. Objectivistic structuralism contributes the notion of language as a system. The historicist (Humboldt) and neo-Kantian (Cassirer) currents establish language as a creative means of structura-

tion. The Marxist heritage renders visible the function of language for domination. Each of these currents of thought has a deep-rooted tradition beneath it.

Levi-Strauss, inasmuch as he is idealistic, is related to Plato through an inclination for an epistemology of reflection. This epistemology is still present in linguistics, orthodox Marxism, naïve everyday knowledge, and even some brands of structuralism. The latter variant is particularly problematic for praxeology, since it conveys the temptation of using isomorphic structures as if they were reflections.

The tradition of Humboldt, Cassirer, Sapir, Whorf, and Wittgenstein is rooted in the Greek sophists and in rhetoric tradition. Effectiveness of speech and historicity are of central interest. The notion of historicity renders language a changing instrument of communication and relative to cultures as well as to structures of social power (omitted by most of this tradition). For praxeology, the historicist input is important. Risks reside in subjectivism and a lack of attention to social domination.

The Marxist tradition conveys the risk of materialist reflectionism. However, once this problem is ruled out, the tradition anchors the historicity of language in the social conditions of language production and use. Accordingly, the Marxists develop the notion of a mistaken view of the social conditions, that is, ideology. While Bourdieu adopts these lines of thought, astonishingly he does not link up with sociolinguistics, dismissing excellent opportunities of synergy in the study of meaning.

As a synthesis, symbolic power turns out to be a potent concept for mediating between social structures and the cognition of the actors. This is the case, not least since the symbolic relations in society are as well embodied as cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of the habitus. Symbolic violence becomes an important device for social struggle. The central concept for understanding the mediation is "labor"; this is equally the case for understanding reproduction of the social conditions and the construction of cognition.

3.1.2   Bourdieu and linguistics—an intricate relationship

Philosophocracy: Bourdieu's critical approach to linguistics is determined by his observation that, in the sixties and seventies, the French academic field was dominated by linguistics. This domination conveyed validity claims that resemble the claims of today's culturalists. Bourdieu coined the notion of "logy-effect" for the mimicry that philosophers and linguists make of sociology. They claim the scientific authority over discourse, defining discourse as the total reality.

"Linguistic communism" equals the illusion that everybody partakes in language just like enjoying the sun or the air, as if language were not a rare good. Correspondingly, the linguists construct language as an abstract system to be applied in speech. As Saussure locates meaning in the abstract language system (langue), he dismisses the function that the use of language has for meaning. Chomsky's transformational grammar and his distinction between competence and performance also make language appear as an application of universal rules. The semantics of Fodor and Katz fall under the same judgment.

Foucault's analyses of symbolic domination miss their point, since he dismisses the social production of domination. Restricting himself to "internal" interpretations of text, he constructs an absolute autonomy of intertextual relations and turns social relations into abstract semiological ones. Thus, in Bourdieu's view, Foucault curtails his own critical program.

Bourdieu's relation to Austin is ambivalent. On the one hand, in early works, speech act theory underscores that the use of language is crucial for its meaning. On the other hand, later on, Bourdieu remarks that the power of speech resides not simply in its illocutionary force, but in the delegated social power of the speaker.

In contrast, "communist" linguists claim that language is almost identical with society. Their approach to language remains within the epistemology of reflection. It simply defines social reality as primary and focuses on biography and social determination. Sartre represents the subjectivist brand of the biographical method, which focuses on the "free subject." The objectivist brand concentrates on biographical statistics. Both fail to consider the importance of the specific field and its power positions. Marxist scholars tend to understand cultural works as expressions of class interests and structures. They fail to consider the internal structure and meaning of a cultural work.

3.1.3   Language as praxis—praxeological relations

Bourdieu states that the interpretation of cultural works has to consider the relation between (only) two relatively independent fields: the field of the works and that of the producers. These fields are not separated realms of society but interdependent by means of relations of production. Production of cultural works implies the power structures of the fields, the habitus of the producers as well as their strategies. Therefore, the meaning of cultural works is generated by the mediation between the fields and is an important factor for positioning and understanding the works in their context. Change of production or products is due to struggle in the fields.

The praxeological translation of the linguistic categories of grammaticalness, communication, and competence widens the sociological view on praxis precisely with regard to the use of language and signs. Grammar is translated into legitimacy, insofar as an actor who communicates with a grammar and a semantic considered adequate by the group to whom he speaks gains legitimacy and symbolic capital.

In spite of superficial impressions, Bourdieu does not simply supplant meaning with value. Rather, semantic content, value, and power of utterances are codependent and structure one another. The gain of praxeology is not to be found in its supposed supplanting of linguistic and semiotic thought altogether; rather in transforming linguistic categories through their use in the context of social relations of power and struggle.

Praxeology presupposes certain parameters for the approach to meaning. The linguistic habitus is a dimension of habitus in general, but by no means separate. Linguistic dispositions are interwoven in the fabric of all the other dispositions of a given habitus. Thus, they are effective in every field of human praxis. Verbal communication is structured by social power relations that permeate the social structure, the dynamics of the fields, and the habitus of the communicating actors.

Summing up, one can name three basic guidelines of a praxeological approach to language (and with it meaning): the role of language in the mediation between symbolic and material exchanges, its function as practical operator, and its use under conditions of social struggle

3.2 Fieldwork on meaning

If one draws conclusions from the observation that "the subjective is objective" (Bourdieu 1990b, 135, G: 2008, 246) and that "the subjective" is constructed by structured perception and classification of the social world, then almost everything has to do with meaning. Even the reconstruction of style by means of the model of the social space and multiple correspondence analysis in *Distinction* reconstructs structures of meaning in an objectivist manner. Styles are systems of distinctive signs, which are meant to be perceived and ascribed meaning to by third actors. The objective or "social meaning and value" they acquire come "from the positions they occupy in relation to one another" (Bennett et al. 2009, 32). However, the notion of "meaning," presupposed here, is not the same as that of lexical semantics. Rather this notion comprehends social relations, differentiated and structured by power, as well as the various relations of perceiving and being perceived. Nevertheless, in Bourdieu's works the notion is nowhere defined.

Therefore, we opt for tracing Bourdieu's empirical study of meaning in different works, including the few theoretical and methodological comments he gave on the issue of meaning. Then, we consider critics of Bourdieu's work on language. With some final remarks on Bourdieu's empirical studies on meaning, we filter out what we have to take into account in our own praxeological approach to meaning.

3.2.1 Bourdieu's studies on meaning

In a couple of studies, language and meaning are at the center of Bourdieu's interest, mainly as the means by which the dispositions of a certain habitus operate. These are precisely not Bourdieu's studies on the theory of language (see 3.3). Rather, these studies are dedicated to practices that rely very much on operations with meaning: the Kabyle society, Heidegger, religion, and French slang.

3.2.1.1 Kabylia

Structuralist socio-semiotics

Bourdieu entered the social sciences with his anthropological research among the Kabyle peasants in Algeria. His *Outline of a Theory of Practice* gives a detailed account of that work.[313] Published in 1972, the book is a collection of texts written during the

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313 Bourdieu 1977b, F: Bourdieu 1972, G: Bourdieu 2009—three very different versions of the same work especially what regards length and detail.

sixties. Much of the book is indebted to structuralism and looks like *structuralist socio-semiotics*. However, it is no longer structuralism in the Levi-Straussian sense. Rather, the symbolic structures are understood as generative dispositions of the actors' habitūs and as operators of a practical logic. This changes the theoretical approach to meaning quite fundamentally, while it is still an approach to meaning. However, the methodological and methodical aspects and procedures remain quite conventional. During the seventies Bourdieu critically reflected upon his relation to structuralism (Bourdieu 1968, G: 1970) and distanced himself somewhat more from it. However, one of his most important books, *Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu 1990b, F: 1980, G: 2008), reformulated the whole argument of *Outline*, but modified only marginally the methodical approach to meaning, which was exposed in the earlier book.[314]

In *Logic of Practice*, the leanings on structuralist methods in the study of meaning are most visible in the introduction, and in the chapters "The Logic of Practice," "Irresistible Analogy," and "Kabyle House." The operations of practical logic are particularly interesting. First, one cannot understand them without considering that they are "fuzzy and indeterminate." Second, fuzziness and indeterminacy are nothing else than states of irregular and partial transformations of a structured system (the logic of which is practical and not scientific). In other words, the regularity of the symbolic relations *is* altogether the condition of the possibility for operations and partial structures to be fuzzy. Third, operations of practical logic in any way are meaningful.

Practical logic

In consequence, the concept of practical logic, within the environment of habitus theory, reframes Bourdieu's approach to meaning in terms of theory. We will exemplify this particular approach to meaning, via the concept of practical logic, by means of a self-explanatory quote from *Logic of Practice*.[315]

> The *universes of meaning* corresponding to different *universes of practice* are both self-enclosed […] and objectively adjusted to all the others
>
>   in so far as they are loosely systematic *products* of a system of practically

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314 The structuralist study of the Kabyle house, for example, does not appear as a leading piece anymore but only as an annex. Binary series and homologies are still central.

315 Even if self-explanatory with regard to content on the one hand, on the other hand the text is quite complicated with regard to its structure. Therefore, we organize the text by indentation, following the syntactic structure. In the quote, the italics are added as usually by HWS, and any paraphrase or omission appears in brackets.

            integrated *generative principles*

                   that function in the most *diverse fields of practice.*

In the approximate, *'fuzzy' logic*

            which immediately accepts as *equivalents* the *adjectives*

                   […] in the Kabyle tradition, 'full', 'closed', 'inside', and 'below',

the generative *schemes are interchangeable* in practice.

This is why they can only generate *systematic products*, but with an approximate, *fuzzy coherence* […].

Sympatheia tôn holôn [italics in original] as the Stoics called it,

            the *affinity* among all the *objects* of a universe in which *meaning is everywhere*, and everywhere superabundant,

has as its basis, or its price, the *indeterminacy or overdetermination* of each of the elements and each of the relationships among them […].

Ritual practice performs an uncertain abstraction

            which brings the same symbol into different relationships

                by apprehending it through different aspects,

            or which brings different *aspects* of the *same referent* into the same relationship of *opposition* […].[316]

Because the principle opposing the terms that have been related

               (for example, the sun and the moon)

            is not defined and usually comes down to a simple contrariety,

analogy

            (which, when it does not function purely in the practical state, is always expressed elliptically—'woman is the moon')

establishes a relation of homology between relations of opposition

               (man: woman :: sun: moon),

            which are themselves *indeterminate* and overdetermined

               (hot: cold :: male: female :: day: night :: etc.),

applying *generative schemes* different from those that can be used to generate *other homologies*

            into which one or another of the terms in question might enter

               (man: woman :: east: west, or sun: moon :: dry: wet).

This uncertain abstraction is also a false abstraction which sets up relationships based on what Jean Nicod calls '*overall resemblance*' (Nicod 1961: 43-4).

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316 The left out passage reads: "In other words, it excludes the Socratic question of the respect in which the referent is apprehended (shape, colour, function, etc.), thereby obviating the need to define in each case the criterion governing the choice of the aspect selected and, *a fortiori,* the need to keep to that criterion at all times."

This *mode of apprehension* never explicitly limits itself to any one aspect of the *terms* it links, but takes each one, each time, as a *whole*, exploiting to the full the fact

> that two 'realities' are never entirely *alike* in all respects
>
> but are always *alike* in some respect,

at least indirectly (that is, through the mediation of some *common term*).

[Ritual logic operates by opposing elements that symbolize something while never being completely fixed in their meaning (indeterminate and overdeterminate), thus building series of terms that interpret one another, as a *reality' like gall* with *bitterness* (equivalent to oleander, wormwood, or tar, and opposed to honey), *greenness* (it is associated with lizards and the color green) and *hostility* (inherent in the two previous qualities). Accordingly, Bourdieu proposes a metaphor from music to understand the operations of meaning in practical logic:]

[…] modulations play on the *harmonic* properties of ritual *symbols*,

> whether *duplicating* one of the themes with a strict *equivalent* in all respects (gall evoking wormwood, which similarly combines bitterness with greenness),
>
> or modulating into *remoter tonalities* by playing on the *associations* of the secondary harmonics (lizard: toad).…

Another modulation technique is *association by assonance*, [such as 'opening the heart,' 'opening the door,' etc.].

[…]

Ritual practice makes maximum possible use of the *polysemy* of the fundamental actions, *mythic 'roots'* that the *linguistic roots* partially reflect.

Although imperfect, the *correspondence* between *linguistic roots* and *mythic* roots is sufficiently strong to provide the *analogical sense* with one of its most powerful supports,

> through the verbal associations,
>
> sometimes sanctioned and exploited by sayings and maxims,
>
> > which, in their most successful forms, reinforce the necessity of a *mythical connection* with the necessity of a *linguistic connection*. […]

One would only have to let oneself be carried along by the *logic of associations*

in order to reconstruct the whole *network of synonyms and antonyms*, synonyms of synonyms and antonyms of antonyms.

The same *term* could thus enter an *infinity of relationships*

if the number of ways of relating to what is not itself were not *limited* to a few *fundamental oppositions*

linked by relations of *practical equivalence*.

[However, the linguistic operations are only one layer of practical operations. Another deeper layer is the postures and operations of the body.]

> But the language of overall resemblance and uncertain abstraction is still too intellectualist to be able to express a *logic* that is performed directly in *bodily* gymnastics.
>
> (Bourdieu 1990b, 87ff., G: 2008, 159ff., italics added if not labeled otherwise)

Far from dismissing meaning, Bourdieu elaborates on how the ascription and transformation of meaning turn into important operations in Kabyle practical logic.

Here, we want to highlight only the most important theoretical premises that this passage is based upon. While the "universes" of meaning and practices are relatively autonomous, they are however linked by *generative operators*. These articulate the most diverse fields with one another. For instance, relations of similarity (such as affinity, analogy, polysemy, or homology) function as symbolic operators for constructing series of homologous, meaningful signs. These series (binary in Bourdieu) extend over different fields of praxis and combine, for example, social experience (hostility) with an organ of the body (gall) and an emotional state or sensation of taste (bitterness)—thus perceiving, interpreting, and assessing each one of the terms through all the others (quite the same as a series in Cassirer). Finally, such logic of associations is organized like a network of synonyms and antonyms governed by a few basic oppositions.

The flipside of the overall similitude is the overall difference, which is also a principle of the generation of meaning. The division of the similar into opposing series is another factor of the indeterminacy of meaning (as well as of its consistency). Difference is necessary not only with reference to the meaning of a given object in its context (say, the building of a church in a neighborhood—sacred versus profane), but also in relation to the parts of that object (like the altar versus the vestibule etc.).

> A partition within the part, producing for example a division between the big and the small even within the small, so giving rise to the sequences of interlocking partitions (of the form a : b :: b 1 : b2) which are so frequent both in the organization of groups and in the organization of symbolic systems. (Bourdieu 1990b, 264, G: 2008, 458)

Moreover, the "universes of meaning" and "universes of practice" (the symbolic and material structures) are both conceived to be relatively autonomous from each other. Nevertheless, they are linked by the operative schemes of perception and assessment.

> [On] the one hand, material properties, starting with the body, that can be counted and measured like any other thing of the physical world; and on the other hand, symbolic properties which are nothing other than material properties when perceived and

appreciated in their mutual relationships, that is, as distinctive properties. (Bourdieu 1990b, 135, G: 2008, 246)

It is the practical operations of human beings, according to their orientation by practical relevance, that generate symbolic affinities by linguistic ascription of meaning. These practical operations, in the long run, weave a social-symbolic texture from the threads by which the "demon of analogy"[317] deploys its force on human praxis. The operations' basic instruments are those elements of language that are able to augment meaning by the labor of language (Ricoeur): the "tropes," such as the metaphor, that give the language "another turn." The tropes and the interchangeable schemes of meaning are the main tools that enable language to create homologies between different fields of praxis—for instance, between the women's work, the cuisine cycle, and the structure of a day in the dry season. (Bourdieu 1990b, 249ff., G: 2008, 436ff.)

These semantic and semiotic operations are crucial for the practical sense to engage meaningfully and strategically with the world of objects.

> Practical sense, working as a practical mastery of the sense of practices and objects, makes it possible to combine everything that goes in the same sense, everything that at least roughly fits together and can be adjusted to the ends in view. (Bourdieu 1990b, 267, G: 2008, 462)

Therefore, praxeology has to reconstruct "the '*fuzzy*', flexible, partial logic of this *partially integrated* system of generative schemes" (Bourdieu 1990b, 267, G: 2008, 463)—that is, the "network" between all those oppositions, secondary oppositions, homologies, and so forth, that finally constitute meaning as praxis (Bourdieu 1990b, 269, G: 2008, 466f.).

While this treatment of meaning is recognizably structural, it is however not idealistic or objectivistic. Instead, the actors are operating by means of their embodied dispositions of perception, judgment, and action orientation. Thus, it is also obvious that "the different meanings produced by the same scheme exist in the practical state only in their relationship with particular situations" (Bourdieu 1990b, 90, G: 2008, 164). In other words, "the meaning of a symbol is never completely determined if not within and by the actions in which it enters."[318] In order

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317 "Le démon de l'analogie" (Bourdieu 1980, 333) is the French title of the chapter, the "Irresistible Analogy" in *Logic of Practice* (Bourdieu 1990b, 200, G: 2008, 352). Here, Bourdieu develops his most important empirical studies on meaning.

318 Own translation of: "Du fait que le sense d'un symbole n'est jeamis complètement détermine que dans et par les actions oú on le fait entrer" (Bourdieu 1980, 429). Compare

for meaning to turn certain, acknowledged, and effective, it is necessary that the semantic content unfolds in a situation (and is understood via this situation).

Semantic content, through its situational meaning, is a crucial operator of practical logic. The ascription of meaning to the experiences of the world is an important operation, beginning early through socialization, when the schemes of perception, judgment, and action of the habitūs are generated. When children embody the dispositions of their habitūs, all kinds of discourses, objects, and practices play an important role. Over the course of time, children experience meaningful series (in Cassirer's sense) that coin their schemes of perception, evaluation, and action; these series "sink" into the body as more or less deeply rooted dispositions. The schemes that generate meaning according to situations are quite few. Yet the can produce and transmit a great number of cultural products, such as discourses, sayings, or images.

> Whether in verbal products such as proverbs, sayings, gnomic poems, songs or riddles, or in objects such as tools, the house or the village, or in practices such as games, contests of honour, gift exchange or rites, the material that the Kabyle child has to learn is the product of the systematic application of a small number of principles coherent in practice, and, in its infinite redundance, it supplies the key to all the tangible series, their *ratio,* which will be appropriated in the form of a principle generating practices that are organized in accordance with the same rationality. (Bourdieu 1990b, 74, G: 2008, 137; cf. Bourdieu 1977b, 87f., G: 2009, 190)

A few dispositions of the habitus (enacted as schemes of perception, judgment, and action) generate a huge quantity of products, which convey the logic of the dispositions of those who bear that habitus; a habitus that is molded according to the situations of utterance and that can be transmitted to other actors by means of the products. The meaning of the discourses, practices, rites, etc., is the product of cognitive schemes and situations. As the cognitive schemes relate the semantic content of the discourses (or the already known meaning of practices) to the situations, actual meaning is generated and the schemes are corroborated (or called into question).

In sum, *meaning* is of crucial importance for praxeology, as one operator of practical logic along with other operators. Hence, meaning is only relevant and significant (and of interest for sociology) in its use as an operator of praxis.[319] As an

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with: "Because the meaning of a symbol is never completely determined in and through the actions into which it is put" (Bourdieu 1990b, 264, G: 2008, 458).

319 In consequence, Bourdieu does not conceive of the analysis of inner meanings in lexical semantics as a sufficient explication of the meaning of a word (and nor do we), unless in the strictly defined context of the scientific-linguistic field—where the ascriptions

operator of praxis, meaning (and its generation, use, and embodied, institutional-ized forms of social presence) is best understood as a more or less fugitive result of human praxis in social context—that is, under the conditions of a struggle about scarce material and symbolic goods.

3.2.1.2 Heidegger

Bourdieu's "praxeo-philosophical" studies of Martin Heidegger's philosophy have turned out to be an interesting exercise in philosophical meaning endowed with a quite different social meaning.[320] One of Bourdieu's results is particularly telling with regard to his analytical approach to the philosophical discourse. He proves that Heidegger maintains a "polyphonic discourse," oscillating between the phil-osophical field and the field of politics.[321]

Polyphonic discourse

Bourdieu shows how Heidegger transposes words of everyday language into a philo-sophical context, how he changes their value and meaning and, finally, how he makes these words more or less tacitly operate in the political field. The decisive change is one of meaning and, thus, of the social function of words. This works as follows:

> The Heideggerian words that are borrowed from ordinary language are numberless, but they are transfigured by the process of imposing form which produces the appar-ent autonomy of philosophical language by inserting them, through the systematic accentuation of morphological relations, into a *network of relations* manifested in the concrete form of the language and thereby suggesting that each element of the discourse depends on the others *simultaneously* as signifier and as signified. (Bourdieu 2006, 140, G: 2005, 147)

A typical word, usable on the border between politics and existentialist philosophy is *Fürsorge* (solicitude).

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of an inner meaning to a lexical unit always include a scientific position-taking, that is a contextual meaning as well.

320 It ought to be said that we discuss here simply how Bourdieu works with language in his interpretation of Heidegger's work. We do not judge whether this interpretation does justice to Heidegger, or if it, at least, keeps track with other critiques of the existentialist, for instance critiques by Theodor W. Adorno (1973). There are doubts about this issue in our team.

321 For this section cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 150ff., G: 1996, 185ff.; Bourdieu 2006, 140ff., G: 2005, 146ff.; and Bourdieu 1991a, G: 1975a. See also Schäfer 2004a, 47ff.

> Thus a word as ordinary | as *Fürsorge* (solicitude), becomes *palpably* attached by its very form to a whole set of words from the same family: *Sorge* (care), *Sorgfalt* (carefulness), *Sorglosigkeit* (negligence, carelessness), *sorgenvoll* (concerned), *besorgt* (preoccupied), *Lebenssorge* (concern for life), *Selbstsorge* (self-interest). (Bourdieu 2006, 140f., G: 2005, 146f.)

Heidegger translates this word, which in ordinary language means *Sozialfürsorge* (social care) and is denounced by Carl Schmitt, into an important category for his theory of temporality. Thereby he makes the meaning of this word in ordinary language disappear. The word's meaning disappears due to its position in the new system (Saussure!), the philosophical one, without changing the "substance," that is, the word as such. The signifier remains the same whereas the signified changes. The change of fields conveys the change of meaning.

According to Bourdieu, a following step attaches a negative connotation to the word *care* (*Sorge*) in the context of the analysis of *being* and *being with*. This conveys a negative association with the word *solicitude* (*Sozialfürsorge*, *social care*). Solicitude now means *deficiency*.

> There is, in fact, no doubt: 'social welfare', *Sozialfursorge*, is indeed 'concern for' and 'on behalf of' | those in receipt of aid, which disburdens them of concern for themselves and authorizes their inclination to be 'careless', to 'take things easily and make things easy', just as philosophical solicitude (*Fürsorge*), which is the sublime variant of the former, disburdens *Dasein* of concern. (Bourdieu 2006, 146f., G: 2005, 154f.)

A similar operation takes place when Heidegger constructs the opposition between authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichekeit*); Adorno has made this opposition the basic distinction in his assessment of Heidegger (Adorno 1973). Bourdieu realizes a structural analysis of Heidegger's discourse on themes related to authenticity. His results amount to a binary series of oppositions more or less like this (Bourdieu 2006, 140ff., G: 2005, 146ff.):

Authenticity	versus	inauthenticity
Elite	versus	"the They" (*das Man*)
(Elite)	versus	mass
Freedom	versus	care (*Sorge*)
Resolution (*Entschlossenheit*)	versus	resignation/degradation
Self-responsibility	versus	social welfare

Finally, this new systemic context not only changes the meaning of *social welfare* by a negative connotation, but also widens the meaning of the word. Social welfare now becomes a condition of an irresponsible, degraded, and inauthentic mass of people, who "opt out of their freedom and slide into a tendency to take things easy and make them easy; in short 'they' behave like irresponsible welfare recipients who live off society" (Bourdieu 2006, 143, G: 2005, 150). Heidegger's partisanship in favor of the Nazis is quite consistent with this design of valuable human life (Bourdieu 2006, 151ff., G: 2005, 160ff.).

However (and this is important) here is no direct relation between politics and Heidegger's discourse and practice—neither a reflection (*Widerspiegelung*) nor a rational calculus of instrumentalizing philosophy for political aims. Instead,

> the intelligible relation that exists between the 'philosophical führer' and German politics and society, far from being a direct one, is established only via the structure of the philosophical microcosm. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 151, G: 1996, 186)

The relatively independent and autonomous social and symbolic structure of the philosophical field mediated (and had to mediate) Heidegger's operations with meaning: Thus, the operations turned into fully recognizable philosophical speculations of an ex-avant-garde actor, by then *arrivé*; simultaneously the operations became fully effective politically without becoming compromised by politics.

Bourdieu's analysis of Heidegger's *polyphonic discourse* concentrates on semantic contents, transformed as they are transferred from one field to another. His special interest is focused on the term of *Fürsorge*. This term functioned for Heidegger as a practical metaphor for his philosophical practical logic, enabling him to link the field of ordinary language to the philosophical field through the seemingly identical meaning of this metaphor. However, he does not take the central metaphor of *Fürsorge* as a single metaphor,[322] but as an operator in different larger systems (binary series), that is, in different contexts of use. Thereby it is possible to show structural homologies between fields as well as transformations of meaning from one field to another.

One would not hit too far from the point by labeling Bourdieu's approach a structural interpretation of Heidegger's semantics in the context of the philosophical field and the larger political space. However, it is worthwhile to consult briefly Bourdieu's own assessment of his work on Heidegger.

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322 As some studies of metaphor in discourse do, see Lakoff and Johnson 1980.

Comments on content

Loic Wacquant asks Bourdieu for a comment (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 150ff., G: 1996, 185) on his Heidegger studies. Bourdieu highlights his "twofold refusal" of both internal interpretation of a text and direct externaldeduction of meaning from the social conditions.

Bourdieu did not abstain from analyzing Heidegger's *semantic*, just as he did not abstain from Kabyle semiotics. However, consistent with his twofold refusal, he neither realized a "semiological," exclusively internal analysis (while analyzing the text structurally), nor did he deduce meaning directly from the political field (while definitely considering its social context of production and use). He rather studied the meaning of Heidegger's texts in a differentiated context: the specific linguistic dynamic of particular fields on the one hand, and the general social conditions that shaped the commonly shared language, on the other.

> Thus, to grasp Heidegger's thought, you have to understand not only all the 'accepted ideas' of his time (as they were expressed in newspaper editorials, academic discourses, prefaces to philosophical books, and conversations between professors, etc.) but also the specific logic of the philosophical field in which the great specialists, i.e., the neo-Kantians, phenomenologists, neo-Thomists, etc., entered in contention. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 152, G: 1996, 187f.)

The *"accepted ideas" of his time* is an important category. It does not refer to the philosophical field but to ordinary language. It can be read as a praxeological translation of Saussure's *langue* into a social (and sociological) category. It refers to the commonly shared language, a result of the praxis of a given collectivity of people (at that time the German nation); a language tacitly convened upon, collectively embodied, and objectified in mass discourse (newspapers, etc.).[323] Such a social *langue* (absolutely common among sociolinguists) stores structured fields of words (nouns, adjectives, verbs) specific to a certain time and place. Thus, *authority*, *obedience*, *punctuality*, *responsibility*, as well as *Sorge* and *Fürsorge* were very much at the center of the social *langue* in Heidegger's high time. These terms were present in common sense as an unquestioned condition of all discourse. Such a socially shared common semantic serves as background in distinction to which a special semantic, such as the philosophical one, acquires its particular function and meaning. Common terms of the social *langue* can serve here as metaphoric operators.

In contrast, highly specialized or popular philosophies are less successful. A hermetically closed terminological language, such as that of the *Wiener Kreis* or

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323 Such a notion is not very distant from Leo Weisgerber's grammar of linguistic content (Weisgerber 1973) that leans on Humboldt and also nears Sapir and Whorf.

of analytical philosophy at large, pays for its profit of philosophical distinction by a lack of influence on wider society. A popular philosophy appears in the feuilleton but pays with a lack of recognition in the philosophical field.

Heidegger's combination of a seemingly ordinary language with philosophical sophistication enabled him to build upon the consensus of common sense for his metaphors in order to betray the common language philosophically. Bourdieu's analysis brought to light that Heidegger modulated with philosophical virtuosity on the semantics of ordinary language. Recalling Bourdieu's analyses of Kablye society: Heidegger took advantage of the magic of resemblance in order to "modulate on the harmonic properties of ordinary words," that is, on their connotative capabilities created, among other causes, by semantic similarity shared by the dispositions of a common habitus.

Bourdieu works in his research (on Heidegger as well as on the Kabyles) on the premise of such socially shared semantics. He neglects this premise only in his theoretical writings on language.

Comments on form

Bourdieu's theoretical focus is rather on *linguistic form* (quite consistent with French structuralism and not so much with Humboldt and Sapir/Whorf). In his interpretations of Heidegger, the aspect of form is not as important as the aspect of content, and form is by far not as central as it is in his writings on language. However, in his own comments on his studies on Heidegger Bourdieu discusses the issue of form briefly in the context of the field change from ordinary to philosophical language. Both the internal and the external interpretation have in common

> their ignorance of the effect of philosophical stylization (*mise en forme*): they overlook the possibility that Heidegger's philosophy might have been only the *philosophical sublimation*, imposed by the specific censorship of the field of philosophical production, of the same political and ethical principles that determined his adherence to nazism. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 152, G: 1996, 187)

While a philologist interpretation tears politics and philosophy apart, the materialist lumps them together. In order to see the relation between both (realized by the symbolic production of the metaphor of *Sorge*) one has to apply a "double reading" (Bourdieu) which considers the special requirements of philosophical and political form. Each field exerts its own constraints on the form that linguistic expression has to have in order to be accepted as "correct," that is, as legitimate. Bourdieu calls this the "censorship of the field." Without Heidegger bringing his language-games into the life-form of the philosophical field, without awarding the ordinary words the exclusivity of a quasi-mystic verbalization in philosophy, these

words would not have accumulated the symbolic power they finally gained in the field of philosophy; and they would never have found symbolic force in politics. In consequence, if this *mise en forme* had not been successful, none of Heidegger's metaphoric transformations would have acquired political momentum. Nevertheless, it is also true that the category of "form," related merely to the regulations of given fields, does not explain the metaphorical transformations without recurring as well to the semantic content.

Comments on production

The transformation of meaning through the change between fields is a productive process. It produces new meaning.

> Heidegger had to draw on an extraordinary *capacity for technical invention*, that is, an exceptional philosophical capital (see the *virtuosity* he exhibits in his treatment of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*) and an equally exceptional ability to give his positions a *philosophically acceptable form*, which itself presupposed a *practical mastery of* the totality of the positions of the *field*, a formidable sense of the philosophical game. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 152, G: 1996, 188, italics added)

The process of production is twofold. The first aspect refers to the producer. Bourdieu acknowledges the virtuosity of the specialist who is able to transform the meaning of a word by conferring on the word an acceptable form in a new field. The second aspect of the transformation is *what* Heidegger does with the words and their meaning. He uses the transformational possibilities that the structures of language, particularly semantics (and finally semiotics), provide. He operates with the similarity of the signifier in order to change the signified through a connotative addition of new meaning (*Fürsorge/Sorge/Selbstsorge*). Heidegger's virtuosity consists precisely in his capacity to arrange these "over-determinations" (Bourdieu) in an acceptable way. He realized a similar operation when he made (dis-) appear "anti-Semitism sublimated as a condemnation of 'wandering'" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 153, G: 1996, 188).

In conclusion, it is not sufficient to reduce the source of effectiveness (*Treffsicherheit*) of a linguistic, or any other symbolic, utterance to the authority conveyed to the speaker by an institution that he represents or by the investment of belief on the part of the audience.[324] Speakers have to be able to link to the semantic content and (thus) to the cognitive structures of their audience, and they have to exert an effect on their audience. They have to be able to adjust to the particular "sense of the game" in different fields and they have to able to translate between

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324 As Bourdieu affirms in his rejection of Austin (Bourdieu 2006, 72ff., G: 2005, 79ff.).

these fields in a plausible way. The translation has to appear to be intuitively true without being too easily recognizable as a translation. In the case of Heidegger, these games were philosophy and politics with metaphorical operators stemming from everyday language. The adjustment of the speakers to the different games and their investment of magical—since effective (*treffsicher*)—metaphors generates a product that the laity misrecognizes and therefore identifies with. In Heidegger's case: social welfare as irresponsibility.

3.2.1.3   Religion

Up to a certain point, Bourdieu's works on religion do justice to the fact that religion is incomprehensible unless one considers its operations with meaning—thus reflecting the influence of Max Weber on his approach to religion. The sociological understanding of religious praxis remains strongly reductionist as long as merely its social function is examined and important operations are ignored. It is not negligible, for instance, that religious symbols, language, and practices vary relative to different social positions, or that religious naming either condemns or sanctifies people and things and can cause considerable social effect.

While Bourdieu puts more emphasis on aspects of form and function of religious praxis, he does not completely dismiss semantic and semiotic meaning production. It is worthwhile at this point to examine briefly two texts on religion.[325]

Religious demand and message

We are primarily interested in the way Bourdieu deals with meaning. In his essay on the religious field according to Max Weber (Bourdieu 1987, F: 1971b, G: 2011a), the structure of the field is the main object of interest. Therefore, we will concentrate here on another article, focusing more on religious production: "Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field."[326] Both essays were written in 1970. Both are deeply indebted to Weber, especially with regard to the integration of the meaning of religious beliefs and practices with considerations about the social functions of

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325 We would like to take a closer look at religion here (given that the author is a sociologist of religion) but we will have to wait for another occasion, since this book is focused on meaning in general.

326 Bourdieu 1991b, F: 1971a, G: 2011b. For more information on Bourdieu and religion, see the introduction to Bourdieu's sociology of religion, especially with an eye on Weber, in an interview with Bourdieu conducted by Franz schultheis and Andreas Pfeuffer (Bourdieu, Schultheis, and Pfeuffer 2011, G: Bourdieu 2000b). Egger, Pfeuffer, and Schultheis 2000; Egger 2011; Egger and Schultheis 2011; Schultheis 2007; and the competent introduction into Bourdieu's works on religion by Terry Rey 2007. See also Dianteill 2003.

religion. Nevertheless, Bourdieu does not examine religious meaning empirically, as he did in his examinations of the Kabyle rituals or Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore, the results from our reading of "Genesis and Structure" might be somewhat less instructive in terms of the empirical object. However, the reading provides some insight into Bourdieu's approach to religious meaning.

Following Weber, Bourdieu states that religion *explains the world* (not least the origin of evil) through the production of a particular kind of meaning. People look for the "justification for existing in a determinate social position" (Bourdieu 1991b, 16, G: 2011b, 57) and are answered by religious specialists who offer different forms of legitimation to the people, according to their social position. Bourdieu recalls Weber's observation that the origin of evil "becomes a questioning of the meaning of human existence only in the privileged classes," while in the underprivileged classes, in a much less universal tone, the "meaning of suffering" is the issue. In Weber's words, a "theodicy of good fortune" contrasts a "theodicy of suffering." In consequence, "theodicies are always *sociodicies*" (Bourdieu 1991b, 16, G: 2011b, 57).

The different groups of religious *specialists* who produce theodicies represent different positions in the *religious field* and produce different kinds of religious messages. For instance, the prophet is characterized by

> producing and professing an explicitly systematized doctrine, able to give a unitary meaning to life and the world and to provide thereby the means to realize the systematic integration of everyday behavior around ethical principles, that is, practices. (Bourdieu 1991b, 24, G: 2011b, 68)

The specialists thus produce

> symbolic systems, *myths* (or mythico-ritual systems) and *religious ideologies* (theogonies, cosmogonies, theologies), which are the product of a *scholarly reinterpretation* operated by reference to new functions—internal functions, correlated to the existence of the field of religious agents, and external functions, such as those born of the constitution of states and the development of class antagonisms and which give their raison d'etre to the great world religions with their universal pretensions. (Bourdieu 1991b, 10, G: 2011b, 46f.)

If these systems of meaning, the religious representations, are interpreted in the wider social context, they unveil their character as, so to say, systematic and integrating sociodicies:

> In a society divided into classes, the *structure of the systems of religious representations and practices* belonging to the various groups or classes contributes to the perpetuation and reproduction of the social order. (Bourdieu 1991b, 19)

At this point, we recall that, according to Bourdieu, the specificity of religious praxis conveys legitimacy and meaning to human life, according to the different social positions that humans exist in.

Such meaning can have objectified symbolic and institutionalized forms: systematic *doctrines* and ethical principles, ideologies, theologies, myths, etc., which represent the social structure symbolically. Thus, the forms are able to produce a unitary meaning that integrates the society of classes systematically. That is, religious actors (individuals as well as institutions) produce fully fledged symbolic systems that exist not only in an embodied state (as beliefs and convictions) but also in an objectified state (as dogmatic treatises, books of prayer, confessions, etc.).

We find here the distinction between social structures and symbolic representation in religious language, which is quite consistent with earlier observations on Bourdieu's distinction between material and symbolic relations or "spaces."

A new feature—much less salient in the Kabyle studies and inexistent in the research on Heidegger (because it was not necessary)—is the relation between religious production and *religious demand*. As religious experts compete for the allegiance of the laity, the supply of meaning that they provide for the laity exerts a retroactive effect on the power conditions in the religious field. In competition with the priests it is possible that "extrapriestly forces" surge, "that is, the religious demands of certain categories of the laity and the metaphysical or ethical revelations of a prophet" (Bourdieu 1991b, 8, G: 2011b, 43).

The concept of demand relates closely to the idea that meaning is generated by a productive process; we have seen this idea in the traditions of both Humboldt and Marx. Demand fosters production and the accumulation of capital by the producers. The laity articulates a demand for meaning, either in nonreligious or religious expression. Religious specialists interpret this demand and transform it into an explicitly religious demand, which the laity identifies with. Then, the specialists respond to the demand with a religious message that solves the problem with religious meaning and strategies. Finally, the laity recognizes the specialists as credible. In consequence, the specialists transform the demand by way of religious production into "religious capital (as accumulated symbolic labor)" (Bourdieu 1991b, 9, G: 2011b, 45).

In differentiated and class-structured societies, in addition to the habitūs of the actors, demands become more differentiated, flexible, and changeable than they are in traditional societies like the former Kabylia. Nevertheless, the class specific habitūs of different actors generate demands, based on these actors' relatively realistic anticipation of their possible future. Thus, religious demands become effective (in

contrast to mere dreams and fantasies)[327] and bring to bear structuring effects among the conflicting suppliers in the religious field. Not least these dynamics explain that, according to Bourdieu, the religious demand of the laity (also denoted as "religious interest") is, together with the interests of the different groups of specialists, the driving force of the religious field and "therefore of the transformations of religious ideology" (Bourdieu 1991b, 17, G: 2011b, 59). And, nota bene, religious demand is a demand for religious meaning.

The demand for religious meaning, for a justification of social existence, thus explains one important aspect of the symbolic production. The theorem of religious demand expounds well the dynamics that generate symbolic capital and power; and it demonstrates equally well how the relations of power in fields develop. However, for us the most important point is that the concept helps to elucidate how "religious ideologies" transform.

This boils down right away to the question of how *religious meaning—its embodiments (dispositions, schemes, beliefs, convictions, etc.) and its objectifications* (discourse, message, symbol, ritual, buildings, etc.)—is related to its producers and consumers, to those who communicate it and who receive it. As Bourdieu had no field research on religion at hand, with regard to the content of religious discourse, he referred to Weber.

> Max Weber [...] gives himself a way of linking the *contents* of mythical discourse (and even its syntax) to the *religious interests* of those who produce it, diffuse it, and receive it, and more profoundly, of constructing a system of religious *beliefs* and *practices* as the more or less *transfigured expression* of the *strategies* of different categories of *specialists competing* for monopoly over the administration of the *goods of salvation* and of the *different classes* interested in their services. (Bourdieu 1991b, 4, G: 2011b, 36f.)

This text speaks for itself. There is not the slightest doubt that the contents of the symbolic utterances and ritual practices is taken as a major operator of praxis, as was in the studies on the Kabyles and Heidegger. With regard to more detail on religious content, Bourdieu relies on Max Weber's observations with their strong focus on religious meaning in relation to religious and social demand.

> Thus, as Weber observes, 'As a rule, the warrior nobles, and indeed feudal powers generally, have not readily become the carriers of a rational religious ethic [...]. Concepts like *sin*, *salvation*, and religious *humility* have not only seemed remote from all *ruling strata*, particularly the warrior nobles, but have indeed appeared

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327 On the generation of "effective demand" from the habitus, according to Marx, see Bourdieu 1990b, 64f., G: 2008, 120f.

reprehensible to its sense of honor.' (Bourdieu 1991b, 18, G: 2011b, 59, italics added; quoting Weber 1978, 472)

Bourdieu builds upon a semantic input imported from Weber: sin, salvation, and humility in the context of the ruling strata. He continues immediately to interpret the symbolic operations based on the harmony between the symbolic operators and the social positions involved.

> This harmony is the result of a *selective reception* [italics in original] necessarily involving a *reinterpretation* [italics in original] whose principle is none other than the position occupied in the social structure; the *schemes of perception and thinking*, which are the conditions of reception and also define its limits, are the product of the conditions of existence attached to this *position* (class or group *habitus*). That is to say that the *circulation* of the religious *message* necessarily involves a *reinterpretation* that can be *consciously* performed by specialists […] or *unconsciously* effected by the laws of cultural diffusion alone […].

It follows that the form taken by the structure of systems of religious practices and *beliefs* at a given moment in time (historical religion) can be quite different from the *original content of the message* and it can be completely *understood* only in reference to the complete structure of the relations of *production, reproduction, circulation, and appropriation of the message and to the history of this structure* […].

> In the same way, in synchrony, *religious representations* and behaviors that refer to one and the same *original message* owe their diffusion in social space to the fact that they receive radically *different meanings and functions* in various groups or *classes*. (Bourdieu 1991b, 18, G: 2011b, 59ff., italics added if not labeled otherwise)

The central object of these reflections is religious meaning: beliefs, the content of religious messages, representations, and different meanings of "original messages" in different classes. Such objectified forms of meaning circulate and are interpreted, reinterpreted, and thus selectively received by the actors. These processes can take place consciously or unconsciously, but they involve schemes of perception, embodied in the habitus of groups and classes. Therefore, the processes render different results (that is, different meanings) according to varying social positions.

For the *interpreting sociologists* this means that they can understand the meaning of religious messages, religious beliefs, and so forth, only by contextualizing them in the processes that these symbolic operations are involved in: the competition in the religious field as well as production, circulation, and appropriation within the different social positions of the actors involved.

There is no doubt that sociologists, in order to properly do their job with regard to religion, have to understand religious beliefs, convictions, contents of messages, and the like, in terms of their religious meaning, that is, their meaning for the actors. One can even go a step further. If sociologists of religion are expected to understand religious praxis, the notion of "understanding" should be taken in the sense of Max Weber. At least, the explicit proximity of Bourdieu's deliberations on religion to Weber suggests this. Understanding, in the sense of Weber's *Verstehen*, means that sociologists come to know the subjective meaning that actors attach to their actions (Weber 1978, 1).

Notwithstanding, there is no doubt that meaning cannot be understood either by internal analyses (by philology, semiology, abstract linguistics, etc.) or by pure communicational interaction between contextless individuals. Thus, the analysis of meaning always has to take into account the production and use of meaning by (collective and individual) habitūs within differentiated and power-shaped social relations. However, Bourdieu's enlightening analysis of Heidegger highlights the other condition of full sociological understanding: Without an analysis of the semantic, syntactic, pragmatic, semiotic, etc., operations, which includes knowledge about the historical genesis of collectively shared "original messages" (Bourdieu), the whole endeavor of understanding religious praxis stops at the halfway mark. Thus, subjective and objective meaning and the embodied and objectified conditions of meaning, have to be interpreted with reference to each other.

We can evidence this by a critique of one of Bourdieu's own empirical pieces on religious praxis.

The new liturgy

In 1975, Bourdieu published another article that contains a short analysis of interviews with Catholic laity on changes in their church (Bourdieu 1975b, E: 1991d, G: 1990j). The article studies "authorized language" under the particular aspect of the "social conditions of the effectiveness of ritual discourse." Bourdieu launches a scientific battle, the whole nine yards, against Austin's concept of *illocutionary force* in speech acts.[328]

> In fact, the illocutionary force of expressions cannot be found in the very words, such as 'performatives', in which that force is *indicated* or, better, *represented* […]. The power of words is nothing other than the *delegated power* of the spokesperson, and his speech—that is, the substance of his discourse and, inseparably, his way or

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328 In fact, insofar as performative speech is addressed, Searle is also in view, beside Habermas, whom Bourdieu explicitly mentions.

speaking—is no more than a testimony, and one among others, of the *guarantee of delegation* which is vested in him. (Bourdieu 2006, 107, G: 2005, 101)

Whereas this opening statement sounds quite hard edged, later on Bourdieu modifies his position slightly. In order to explain the performative force of language, he continues, it is not enough (but at least something) to refer to determinate situations, styles of the speakers, and connotations of the words used. None of these aspects of a discourse sufficiently explain language's illocutionary force. "In fact, the use of language, the manner as much as the substance of discourse, depends on the social position of the speaker" (Bourdieu 2006, 109, G: 2005, 103). For an authorized speaker, this means that his or her words only have a meaning and are effective because of the symbolic capital invested in this speaker by the group or institution he or she represents and by the listeners.

For Bourdieu, the *Catholic Church* is a telling example. Here, the laity delegates its power to the priests, the legitimate representatives of the ecclesiastical institution. In consequence, the crisis of "institutional religion and the concomitant crisis of ritual discourse" serves for Bourdieu as a "quasi-experimental verification" (Bourdieu 2006, 113, 115, G: 2005, 107) of the thesis that the power of the words only resides in the representational force of the spokesmen. Under this premise, Bourdieu inquires into collected texts of Catholic laity, published by a Dominican monk and radio preacher in 1972.[329]

Bourdieu's scant analysis boils down to the following results (Bourdieu 2006, 113, 115, 117, G: 2005, 107ff.). The laity's insistence on the ritual code equals its insistence on the "contract of delegation." The priests breach this tacit contract when they abandon the symbols of their spiritual office. After the Second Vatican Council, priests stepped back from using much of the habituated habit, such as the chasuble or other symbolic objects. Moreover, they changed the liturgical rituals. The crisis of liturgical language, vestment, and ritual, points to a crisis of the whole institution. The modification of the liturgy represents a crisis in the "reproduction of the priesthood (a crisis of priestly 'calling') and of the lay public ('dechristianization')" (Bourdieu 2006, 116, G: 2005, 108). Finally, "the crisis over the liturgy points to the crisis in the priesthood (and the whole clerical field), which itself points to a general crisis of religious belief" (Bourdieu 2006, 116, G: 2005, 108).

The texts Bourdieu reproduces give the following impressions. The opinions expressed by the laypeople are exclusively conservative. The interviewees enforce their interest in highly "officialist" priests, a "priestly" style of the rituals, and so forth,

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329 Lelong 1972; see Bourdieu 2006, 108, G: 2005, 102, quoted with a slightly different title.

as part of their contract of delegation. The mechanisms detected by Bourdieu are there: The power of the priests is (for these laypeople) the result of their investments of belief. Nevertheless, Bourdieu's additional conclusions (finally the "general crisis of religious belief") are not at all evident. Instead, his conclusions seem to obey a fully fledged secularist preconception, rather than a careful analysis of the meaning of the texts, together with the "history of the original message" (Bourdieu) as well as with the positions of the speakers and the actors mentioned in the religious field and in the society at large. Bourdieu's analysis disregards all these aspects, well considered in theory and in some of his other empirical studies. Only at this price, does he arrive at the conclusion that the crisis of delegation represents an overall secularization.

If one applies the hitherto mentioned cornerstones of *praxeological interpretation*, then a different analytical procedure appears to be adequate. Beyond the merely functional question for the delegation as such, the first question might have been: *What* is it that the mechanics of delegation warrants for the believers? Then, it would have been interesting to learn what position in the religious field we are dealing with and, more specifically, what position within the Catholic Church. Finally, the general position of the quoted believers in society would have been of interest. While this last question is hard to answer without the corresponding data, the first two can be reconstructed to a certain extent from the texts.

With regard to the history of the original message, it was unavoidable to heed the reforms of the Second Vatican Council. These reforms triggered fundamental changes in Catholic liturgy, the role of the priests, the relation between Church and world, etc. Vatican II also gave momentum to reformative, leftist initiatives in the Church—such as, in France for example, the worker priests, the Taizé movement, as well as growing base communities and the general mobilization of active laity. These activities included new roles for the laity in liturgy. Quite obviously, the believers quoted by Bourdieu belonged to the conservative fraction of the Catholic Church that opposed these new impulses.

When we ask what is at stake in Lelong's book, we find an *issue of meaning*: the strong ritual symbol of the sacrament of communion (Eucharist). The complaint about the new role of priests pivots around this traditional symbol of the mediation between the holy and the profane. By the speakers' (semantic) references to transcendence (such as Communion, Eucharist, or Church) they establish a distinction between the holy and the profane as a basic (symbolic and organizational) vision and division. This is the cognitive and emotional condition for these believers to partake of the holy by means of the sacrament. In both the symbolic and the institutional sense, the sacredness of the priest (his *character indelebilis*) represents this taking part in the holy. The priest is mediator between the holy and the profane, and

as an instituted mediator, he represents and enacts simultaneously two religious "truths": First, the holy and the profane are neatly separated, and the Church has access to the holy. Second, through his office the priest is authorized to mediate between the divine sphere and that of the profane laity (thereby legitimizing its own existence). These two convictions generate a third one: The fact that mediation is necessary and really takes place, corroborates for the laity the conviction that the holy itself is real. In consequence, the sacredness of the priest condenses various chains of connotation that involve the larger society: priest versus layperson, immaculate versus sexually active, spiritual versus economically interested, devoted versus sinner, priest/church versus atheists, conservatism versus communism, and so forth. Hence, for conservative believers the dismissal of the frontier between holiness and profanity by the sacred persons themselves (e.g., with the permission of Vatican II, celebrating the holy Eucharist in an ordinary suit), appears to be the abolition or negation of the holy as such, and therefore of the believers' natural vision and division of the entire world. From such a point of view, after Vatican II the frontiers blur between "good and bad," and the objectivist representation of the eternal order of the world by the sacred hierarchies of the Church melts down into the pot of a universally leveling modernism.

The other fraction within the Catholic Church (the Vatican II priests, the base communities, the workers' movement, and Liberation Theologians) exactly matched what the conservatives feared. These groups precisely intended to turn permeable the membrane between the holy and the profane. They wanted to confer sanctity to the most profane practices in daily life, thus honoring (quite similarly to Protestant ethics) mundane activities and the laity's responsibility to taking care of life on earth. They sought to anchor certainty of existence in the subjective faith, beliefs, and practices of the individual believers, thus representing the holy subjectively.

With regard to society at large, what we observe in the interviews is not the progress of secularization, but frictions in the Catholic Church generated by different ways of coping with the challenges of a differentiated society and with changing individual responsibilities.[330] With regard to the religious field, the Vatican II position implied losing one's confessional profile in relation to Protestants—another

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330 One could additionally look at the history of the Vatican II movement in order to make a test by commutation: Given the (hysteresis of the) Catholic habitus among the believers, the movement underestimated precisely the symbolic and social effect of the religious schemes of judgment present in the dispositions of the laity. In consequence, there was almost no possibility of being recognized by the laity as legitimate ecclesiastical actors even though these priests could objectively rely on the overall legitimacy conferred by the Second Vatican Council. In theoretical terms, this means that it is not enough that a speaker relies upon institutional authority if the content of their message does

form of diminishing the difference between the church and the world and putting at risk the objective religious guaranties for truth and legitimacy.

Finally, our brief critique of "The new liturgy" has shown that Bourdieu's harsh argument against Austin devolves into serious contradictions with his own norms for correctly interpreting cultural works. Indeed, the formal authority of a speaker is an important factor for making the speaker's message effective with regard to a given audience. However, it is just one factor among many others. Our own interpretation of the texts according to praxeological guidelines evidenced that another one of these factors is meaningful here. In other words, the semantic content of what is said has to make its point by fitting the perceptional schemes, the social strategies, as well as the opportunities and constraints that actors are oriented and limited by in relation to the dynamics of the fields of praxis and to the conditions of the social space.

A note on form and content

Bourdieu's reception of Austin as well as some of his writings on language and on the linguistic market (p. 307) overemphasize the (correct) distinction between form and content, turning this distinction into a contradiction (of almost ontological quality). This drive is explicable when one considers the background of his fervent struggle against the mandarins of structural semantics in France, in the seventies. However, the ardor is not helpful for gaining a pondered approach to a praxeological analysis of the symbolic operations in social praxis. Form and content rather interpret one another.

The example of religious language that we have seen in our sketch of Bourdieu's article, "Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field" indicates this. Linguistic form is important as a function of the fields, albeit not as such, but in synergy with the semantic work of the metaphors, with content. This is precisely due to a strict concept of field. While the concept of context is quite unspecific, the one of field in its strict praxeological acceptation connotes specific dynamics with regard to the particular issues (kind of capital, *enjeux*, *illusio*, gains etc.) that the actors of the given field are struggling for and by. This means that a linguistic utterance has to be acceptable with regard to power relations, social positions, and forms of expression. However, the utterance has to be equally acceptable in terms of the semantic content. A discourse may be completely correct grammatically and issued from a respectable position, but if it uses the wrong semantics, it may utterly fail. For instance, a researcher may introduce herself to conservative Pentecostal practitioners

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not concord with, or even contradicts, the habitualized (and relatively independent) schemes of perception and judgment of the actors at stake.

as a Protestant or an agnostic, but then she speaks about "Mass" and "Eucharist," instead about "service" and the "Lord's supper." This will turn out felicitous only in a very narrow linguistic sense; socially the researcher rather is likely infelicitously to irritate the informants. Once accepted in a given field, the semantic content of a word may develop its own dynamic and even influence a particular form of communication. Heidegger introduced everyday terms, such as *Fürsorge/Sorge,* into the philosophical field. Once accepted in philosophical discourse, they developed their own dynamics. The terms could modify not only the discourse but also the legitimate forms of behavior in that field. For Heidegger, the traditional jerkin, the hunting lodge, and the forest became the almost magic insignia of a philosophy of German words, bonded to the native soil—all this very much in contrast to the sharp, intellectual reasoning orientated in mathematics and physics of an urban Jew like Cassirer. Once their semantic has been modified, the words also can be reintroduced, by the inverse direction, into the field they stem from—in the case of Heidegger, from philosophy to ordinary language. Now these words appear as old friends vested with new power through important figures of society (the philosophers). However, they are false friends since they have changed their meaning, as we have seen by Bourdieu's analysis. The semantic content of *Fürsorge*, care, has changed to *irresponsibility*, politically betraying those who depend on social care.

From this logic of semantic change between fields, the *symbolic power* of religious words is generated. We ascribe this power of linguistic expressions only in a lesser degree than Bourdieu does to the social authority of the speakers. Instead (in accordance with Bourdieu's own analyses), we draw attention to the semantic operations. Quite similar to Heidegger's *Sorge*, religious language can mediate between different fields and produce additional meaning. By shifting an ordinary word such as *despair* to the field of religious praxis, the word is conveyed another meaning. It is transferred into a new series and thus combined with other, religious words, which confer a new meaning to it. Premillenarist Pentecostalism relates despair to the conditions of the end times. Despair indicates that the return of Christ is near. The world's (and one's own) despair is no reason for despair anymore. Rather, it motivates religious hope. In a world full of despair and in a congregation in solidarity, this makes sense.

3.2.1.4 Body-language

Finally, we examine Bourdieu's approach to meaning in the context of linguistic references to the body.[331] Beyond the simple orientation in the sense of direction

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331 Another semiotics is that of the body itself; its movements, positions, and states speak their own language. Thus, any body position of a fighter always conveys a message to

(such as left versus right, and up versus down) the metaphoric function of the reference to the body is important for sociology. We briefly sketch two examples of the way Bourdieu deals with language that refers to the body.

Mouth, trap and class

The first example is the way class differences in France are expressed by a different vocabulary (a different lexicon) to name the parts of the body.[332] With reference to the word *mouth*, the opposition between the working class and the bourgeois is transformed into the opposition between *bouche* and *gueule*. Correspondingly, the entire bodily hexis is classified by many other, similar distinctions. Moreover, the social difference is overdetermined by a gender difference, insofar as *bouche* has a feminine connotation while *gueule* has a masculine one. This implies that among the male members of "the dominated classes, the values of culture and refinement appear as feminine," and, inversely, the use of upper class semantics connotes "a repudiation of masculine values." For the women of the lower classes, however, these distinctions amount to facilitating a softer identification with upper class values without alienation from their gender identity (Bourdieu 2006, 86ff.., G: 2005, 94; 1977c, 661).

Again, in this special field of language use (the domain of the human body in relation to class) we find acts of naming, of ascribing semantic content that relate differentially to different social practices and distinctions. Metaphorical operations represent class relations in the form of semantically charged classificational schemes. Inversely, these schemes structure the corresponding strategies and practices of the actors, through their semantic content in multiple relations of use.

The lazy South

In his short essay on the "Montesquieu effect" from 1980,[333] Bourdieu examines Montesquieu's climate theory in *De l'esprit des loix* (1748) very much the same way as he examines Heidegger's work. He summarizes: "In order to develop mythologies it is enough to let the words play with their multiple meanings." This is a sufficient condition for even "scholarly discourse" to function "as a network of euphemisms" (Bourdieu 1982b, 236, G: 2005, 196). In Montesquieu's work, it is the linguistic

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his opponent (Bourdieu 1977b, 11, G: 2009, 146. See for instance Wacquant 2004).

332 See Bourdieu 2006, 81ff., G: 2005, 89ff. and Bourdieu 1977c, 660ff. with explicit reference to Labov and Lakoff.

333 "La rhétorique de la scientificité: contribution à une analyse de l'effet Montesquieu," in Bourdieu 1982b, 227ff., G: 2005, 189ff., but not published in English. We quote from the French and German edition, in our own translation.

reference to the human body that generates the metaphors of a colonialist body cartography of domination with legitimatory intentions.

Bourdieu employs his praxeological strategy of discourse analysis to unveil a "mythologie 'scientifique'" (Bourdieu 1982b, 228, G: 2005, 196) that connotes, to the geographical distinction of north and south, various kinds of bodily characteristics and attitudes. He puts a strong focus on the use of polysemy and metaphor (Bourdieu 1982b, 230, G: 2005, 191). Thus he reconstructs, beneath Montesquieu's text, an underlying network of opposing terms such as:

North vs. South
Active vs. passive
Virile vs. womanish
Tense vs. limp wristed
Etc.[334]

> Everywhere under this scientific apparatus a mythical underground shines through. Without much analysis one can reconstruct, as a simple scheme, the network of mythical oppositions and equivalences, a veritable phantasmatic structure, which sustains the whole theory.
>
> These network relations generate, as in all such cases, from a small number of oppositions (mostly, only one of which is marked) that trace back to one basic generative opposition, the opposition of *master* (of oneself and therefore of others too) and *slave* (to one's senses and to the masters) (Bourdieu 1982b, 231, G: 2005, 192, trans. HWS).

The notion of a network (also present in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* and *Logic of Practice*) does not only apply to the results of a structural analysis. Without confusing a model with reality, this concept has somewhat more theoretical depth. The basic idea has been handed down from Humboldt, Cassirer, and Whorf. It roughly presupposes that knowledge is structured by cognitive schemes. Hence, the products of knowledge can be conceived of as structured by these schemes too. In consequence, the text produced by Montesquieu (as well as any other text or linguistic utterance) must have a subtextual structural semantic and a slightly logical grid that is, as such, not visible but it organizes the message.

> Despite of being completely present in the heads of the author and his readers […], this system of mythical relations is never visible as a whole; and in the linear flow of discourse the relations it consists of only can be activated successively. And there is nothing, which keeps the interest in rationalizing from veiling this mythic relation under a 'rational' relation, which redoubles and suppresses it at the same time. (Bourdieu 1982b, 235, G: 2005, 193 and 196)

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334 See Bourdieu 1982b, 235f., G: 2005, 195ff.

Bourdieu uses the notion of "network" in a way that oscillates between metaphor and the first sketch of a real model. Taken seriously as a model, however, one would have to say that it is a model of an opus operatum. It is the result of a structural analysis of terms, which are set into homological relations with the basic opposition of master versus slave. The model brings a lot to the light of the day, but as a model for research, it very much resembles traditional structural semantics (in some traits, for example, resembling Greimas' work).

In our development of theory and methodology (vol. 2 and 3), we shall build quite strongly on the notion of a network. But we will transform it. Our praxeological network of dispositions will not model the opus operatum but the modus operandi. In other words, it will be a model of transformations.

3.2.2 Critics

Bourdieu's work has met with interest in the sociolinguistic and the psycholinguistic communities. However, not everything he wrote about language and linguistics was wholeheartedly welcome. For instance, I recall a conversation I had with a psycholinguist who is specialized on intercultural differences in speech and action. After reading Bourdieu's 1977 article, the "Economy of Linguistic Exchange," and appreciating some of his ideas, she was doubly astonished.[335] First, she said that the way Bourdieu treats Chomsky equals asking a sociologist why he does not engage in astrophysics. Second, Bourdieu beats a dead horse, since he does not take into account the sociolinguistic revolution that has literally razed "pure" linguistics since the late sixties.[336]

Indeed, even semantics changed as linguists began to consider, for instance, the conditions of communication in "world knowledge" (*Weltwissen*). In Germany (following the tradition of Humboldt, and parallel to Sapir and Whorf) a special branch of research on the cultural content of language (*Sprachinhaltsforschung*) has developed. Jost Trier reconstructed lexical fields (*Wortfelder*), a model of semantics that falls under Bourdieu's verdict of being too idealistic. However, Weisgerber applied a concept of *Geltung* (validity) that settles not far from the idea of a linguistic habitus

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335 I thank Christiane von Stutterheim, co-Fellow at the Lichtenberg Kolleg, for kindly helping me out with linguistic expertise for the assessment of the said article.

336 See also Jenkins (1992, 102): Bourdieu's concepts of language are conventional sociolinguistic wisdom and his critique of formal linguistics is an "old hat." Also Jenkins 1989. For an account of Bourdieu's work on language, see also Boschetti 2004; also various contributions in Shusterman 1999; also Encrevé 2004.

(see Weisgerber 1973). Albeit in this tradition social structures are not necessarily seen as shaped by power, the tradition offers advancements that would have fitted Bourdieu's interests quite well. Lamentably, Bourdieu's exaggerated rejection of neighboring scientific proposals has the flipside of forfeiting analytical perspectives.

Some critics, referred to in this subsection, have observed this pattern in Bourdieu's arguments. However, only a few scholars have focused on Bourdieu's work on language and meaning. This is possibly due to Bourdieu's harsh polemics against what he calls "pure semantics" that might have scared off some scholars from studying the role of meaning in praxeology. Another reason for the lack of research might also be the claim laid on Bourdieu's work by objectivist, macrosociological, and sometimes even substantialist reception. Nevertheless, some scholars have focused on the approach to meaning in Bourdieu's work. I will briefly refer to five of his critics in order to prepare the conclusion of the present section.

John R. Searle

In an international colloquium in June 2003 (in honor of Bourdieu who had died in 2002) the prestigious philosopher of ordinary language and student of John Austin presented a paper with some notes on Bourdieu's work (Searle 2004). As learned politologist and economist, Searle is not suspected to be a pure linguist (see Searle 1969; 1995).

First, Searle objects to Bourdieu's criticisms of Chomsky and Austin as "unsubstantiated" (*infondées*) (Searle 2004, 190), including Bourdieu's identification of Austin's approach with that of Saussure. Both overblown criticisms, for Searle, seem to be due to Bourdieu's narrowly limited concept of language, especially with regard to the relation between language and power.

Then, Searle comes right to his first main point: The power of language is not exclusively based in the institutional authority of the speaker. In order to understand language well, one rather has to realize that its power resides in its functioning, looked at under the aspects of semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics.[337]

His own theory, Searle continues, is only comprehensible under the premise of a close relation between language and power. Thus, he does not perceive major contradictions to Bourdieu's approach in this regard. Rather, Searle combines two interesting observations: His conception of "background" (Searle 1995, 127ff., esp.

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[337] "To the one who understands correctly what language is, in my opinion it is clear that authority is inscribed in language, and that the human language—the entire apparatus of syntax, of semantics and of pragmatics, theory of speech acts included—implies already the power relations which are included in its very functioning." (Searle 2004, 191, trans. HWS)

134ff.) is quite similar to the concept of habitus. A background consists of structured language, generates collective intention, exerts social functions, and (via language) generates institutional reality. In consequence, for Searle, background is the warrant for the claim that social power resides in language. Thus, Searle indirectly elevates the role of the theory of habitus, for an even deeper concept of linguistic power than the concept proposed by Bourdieu.

Searle also addresses an important function of language for unfolding a special power: the representation on two levels (Searle 2004, 202ff.). This is precisely one of the functions of "symbolism." The power of language resides in "thinking one thing as another thing" (Searle 2004, 203, trans. HWS); the power of language resides in its capacity for symbolism. In consequence, Searle states that the principle of symbolic language, to take something for something else, coincides with the principle of the power of language.[338] As already mentioned above, Bourdieu's theory of fields provides a very useful context for identifying the different meanings that are effective on the different levels, which produce the symbolic power of language.

Finally, Searle's assessment of language in Bourdieu's theory and his own propositions underscore that it is recommendable to foster the capabilities of praxeology for dealing with different kinds of meaning in relation to social power. In this context, when Searle points to the habitus, praxeological sociologists should hear that as preaching to the converted. The habitus, its linguistic dispositions, and the operations of these dispositions as a practical logic, are of course the praxeological framework for learning more about the power that resides in the use of meaning.

John B. Thompson

The Cambridge based sociologist is a specialist in language, ideology, and hermeneutics. He edited an English collection of Bourdieu's most important works on language.[339] In the introduction to the edited volume, he discussed Bourdieu's work on language; he also discussed this topic more critically in an article on "Symbolic Violence" (Thompson 1984b). We concentrate on the latter article.

Thompson submits Bourdieu's works to a quite thorough inspection. First, he sketches "Bourdieu's approach to language," examining the process of the reproduction of legitimate language, the relation between power and performativity, the theorem of the linguistic market, the embodied linguistic habitus, and symbolic violence. In the second section, he assesses Bourdieu's key "concepts and claims" and shifts the focus more to issues of meaning. Recognition, consensus, semantic

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338 "I would suppose that one could make the consequences of the 'take as'-principle coincide with the ones of the principle of power." (Searle 2004, 214, trans. HWS)

339 Bourdieu 2006, G: 2005. See also Thompson 1984a; 2010.

content, power relations, and the rationality of linguistic practices are examined. Here, we will concentrate on Thompson's observations with regard to meaning. I will sketch his main arguments and add my own comments.

Thompson finishes the introduction to his article with a statement on meaning, quite congruent with the criticisms of John Searle:

> I shall also suggest that Bourdieu's preoccupation with *style*, with the way things are said and with the profits obtained thereby, leads him to neglect the content of what is said. He thus fails to give sufficient attention to the question of meaning (or signification) and he strips away all too abruptly the rational features of linguistic communication. (Thompson 1984b, 43)

Thompson develops the reasons for this judgment mainly in the section on "Style and content" (Thompson 1984b, 64ff.). Thompson alleges mainly two reasons for Bourdieu's overemphasis on style: his concentration on formal, ritual, and institutionalized language; and his concept of value. Here, Bourdieu follows Saussure, but transposes the notion of differential value to social relations, thus creating the idea that social value can be generated by linguistic distinction. These factors develop a synergetic effect with Bourdieu's interest in distinctive style. This is where Thompson's critique sets out:

> And yet that is not *all*, of course, that is involved in speaking. For to speak is *also* to say something, or to claim to say something, about something. [...] My reservation concerning Bourdieu's approach is that [...] he tends to neglect the *content* of what is said or to treat the content as in some sense 'exhausted' by the style. (Thompson 1984b, 65)

Thompson has no problem admitting that there is a close relation between what is said and how it is said. However, the reference to the combinatorial form does not suffice, if the content of the message is not duly considered. In this context, he makes an interesting observation concerning Bourdieu's own concept of meaning.

> In raising the question of content, I wish to defend the dimension of meaning or signification and to claim that this dimension is not reducible to the level of *sens*, where the latter is understood as the differential value of a term in relation to the other terms of a system. (Thompson 1984b, 65)

We agree with this affirmation. With the term *sens,* Thompson refers precisely to Saussure's concept of word sense, which consists of the differential value of the word within the system of *langue*. This concept addresses an inner linguistic relation, and it is highly formal. Such a strongly reduced structuralist concept of semantic

content is not forceful enough to bring semantic contents into the praxeological interplay with form and manner. The concept explains that meaning in Bourdieu's work and its reception can easily move out of sight.

Thompson responds with some propositions in order to save *meaning* (as semantic content) for praxeological sociology.

> First thesis: 'meaning' is […] a multi-layered and fluctuating phenomenon which is constituted as much by the conditions of production as by the conditions of reception. Hence one cannot 'understand the meaning of an expression' without investigating the social-historical conditions. (Thompson 1984b, 65f.)

While this first thesis is completely compatible at least with what we found in Bourdieu's empirical work on meaning, the second thesis requires one to make more inroads into the *linguistic* terrain:

> My second thesis is this: while meaning is not reducible to *sens*, nevertheless it is mediated by certain structural features of the linguistic product. In the case of linguistic products which exceed the length of individual utterances or sentences, such features include narrative and argumentative patterns as well as various aspects of grammar, syntax and style. The meaning of an expression is not wholly constituted by these features but is commonly constructed with them, so that an understanding of meaning may be facilitated by a reconstruction of the features which structure the linguistic product. (Thompson 1984b, 66)

We understand Thompson's proposition to highlight the necessity of employing linguistic and other interpretational tools in the framework of praxeological sociology. However, a systematic reconstruction of the linguistic features is not enough. Thompson's third thesis postulates therefore *interpretation*:

> It is my view, however, that such a reconstruction can never dispense with the need for a creative interpretation of meaning: this is my third thesis. A linguistic product is not only a socially and historically situated construction which displays an articulated structure, but is also an expression which claims to say something about something; and it is this claim, understood in terms of what is asserted by an expression and what that expression is about, which must be grasped by interpretation. (Thompson 1984b, 66)

Interpretation is something Bourdieu practices constantly while, simultaneously, negating it constantly. For us, there is no doubt that Thompson is right. Beyond that, for the sake of scientific reflexivity, access to qualitative and quantitative data, the implementation of models, and so forth, a theory of praxeological interpretation should be welcome in order to foster the praxeological approach as a whole.

At this point, for Thompson the analysis of *ideology* comes into the play. Ideology is not simply the symbolic system of the dominant imposed on the whole society, but a "complex series of mechanisms whereby meaning is mobilized, in the discursive practices of everyday life, for the maintenance of relations of domination" (Thompson 1984b, 63). If one attempts to analyze ideology, one has to get into the details of different positions of production and reception, especially since it is possible to identify and criticize an ideology only by distinguishing between the convictions of the actors and the socially imposed values. Hence, without the analysis of meaning it is not possible to discern *mis*recognition.

Thompson keeps on widening the array of his assessment to the question of *language and power*, also addressed by Searle. Thompson quotes Bourdieu's harsh remark that the "substance" of a speaker's discourse is, at the most, but a testimony of his being delegated by a group (Bourdieu 2006, 107, G: 2005, 101)—a statement we showed to be quite overblown, in the context of treating the "new liturgy." Then Thompson states that the external legitimization is rather the exceptional case for speech. Instead, there are "countless instances of everyday speech […] which could be said […] to be acts of power" (Thompson 1984b, 68). In order to compromise a person in front of others with an indiscretion or to threaten a partner with suicide, one does not need to be a *porte parole* of anyone.

At this point, Thompson finishes his critique of Bourdieu's work and proposes some ideas for facing the problems. One of his points is to highlight that language has definitely a power in itself, insofar as it is a medium by which different resources, such as intellectual or affective capabilities, can be implemented in the context of a society divided by relations of power. A second point regards the power of rational conviction. The "support by reasons" (Thompson 1984b, 70) cannot simply be dismissed or downgraded in sociological analysis.

Thompson pushed even harder than Searle to complement the praxeological toolbox with instruments to study the meaning and the semantic power of language as such. While for Thompson it is absolutely clear that language should be studied as an operator in society, it is also evident that the means for research on language have to be suitable to describe the *specific* features of language for generating powerful effects.

Our work on HabitusAnalysis is precisely pointing to this aim—within the context of Bourdieu's wider theories of habitus, fields, and social space. The next critic we look at articulates some doubts precisely with regard to the suitability of this larger framework.

James Collins

The Albany based linguist and anthropologist has worked, among other themes, on Native American identity politics and has published various articles on Bourdieu. For the issue of language, we will focus on one of his articles (Collins 1993).

Collins revisits Bourdieu's (and Passeron's) work on education and language.[340] While he does not enter into much detail, his critique is interesting for us since it operates as a creative misunderstanding. In fact, the article gives much more space to linguistics besides Bourdieu. First, it portrays the language deficit debate (Labov, Bernstein), and then Bourdieu's linguistic writings as an advancement of this debate in terms of "political analysis and critique" (120). The last chapter is devoted to different linguistic approaches with certain relations to Bourdieu.

The title of the chapter dealing with Bourdieu, "Determinism versus Constructivism in Language and Education," reveals both the misunderstanding and its creative impulse. Collins centers his critique on the argument that Bourdieu establishes a deterministic relation between the objective and the subjective aspects of praxis that transform linguistic praxis into mere reproduction (120, 124). He states that, in Bourdieu, social structure determines everything else quite strictly, and that this determination derives "from a set of interdependent concepts—capital, field, and habitus" (122). These interrelated "concepts" convey such a tight mutual determination that linguistic interaction cannot be approached sufficiently. According to Collins, on the one hand, capital, field, and habitus are too tightly interwoven; on the other hand, capital varies very much with regard to extremely different fields, and the mechanisms of embodiment of the habitus remain opaque (127). Collins illustrates the problem by means of a comparison with Goffman and judges that for Bourdieu "the social" is not entailed in interaction (123) but in social structure.

Collin's Durkheimian reading of Bourdieu's work fosters the imputation of determinism. Nevertheless, Collins at least concedes that in Bourdieu the idea that habitūs are generated in the progress of time causes a small gap between structure and habitus. Yet, this concession does not really help. According to Collins, the space for subjectivity in Bourdieu is not large enough, so that he "has erred in the objectivist direction" (126), and a "routine repletion of the pregivens" (127) in the habitus can be alleged. Interestingly, Collins' critique amounts to the following statement: "In Bourdieu's work, discursive interaction seems to have no reality except as a highly constrained, epiphenomenal reflection of social structures" (126). The fact that Collins judges Bourdieu's treatment of the relation between classes and classification as deterministic and as due to a theory of reflection obeys a quite

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340 Mainly Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu 1977c; 2006, G: 2005. See Collins 1993. In this subsection, the numbers in parentheses represent page numbers of this article.

common misunderstanding, which itself follows from a substantialistic and/or positivistic approach to social sciences and to Bourdieu's work.

Nevertheless, as Collins is interested in the practical issue of language use in education, he incidentally turns his misunderstanding productive. He makes the observation that contradictions in the praxis of a given actor are spaces of linguistic (and cognitive) creativity, and he quotes a study on working class youths in this regard (Willis 1977). Under explicit criticism of Bourdieu and Althusser, the study shows such a contradiction within the youths' praxis: While their education limits them to industrial work, nevertheless they achieve critical knowledge of the educational ideology.[341] Collins draws a first conclusion from this study stating that

> it becomes increasingly evident that to understand the intersection of capital, fields, and habitus, we must have detailed ethnographic information, as well as a healthy respect for the semiotic complexity of classification struggles and face-to-face verbal interaction. (Collins 1993, 127)

We agree very much with Collins that ethnographic information, semiotic complexity, and verbal interaction are important for praxeological analysis. Our own method focuses on qualitative data, especially on semantics. Nevertheless, we wonder how Collins could overlook the incredible amount of such information, which Bourdieu integrated into his works on the Kabyle habitus and on French culture.

A second conclusion Collins arrives at, is to turn from Bourdieu rather to theories of intersubjective relations. Hence, the relations between interaction and social structures are better conceived of as "loose couplings" (Goffman) than as the alleged "determination" (127). However, one should take into account that Goffman[342] himself conceived intersubjective relations as embedded in shared frames that provide the underpinnings of intersubjective communication—a fact which points to the direction of Bourdieu's concept of habitus again.

We agree completely with Collins in that it is important for praxeology to be able to adequately address the "semiotic complexity of classification struggles and face-to-face verbal interaction" (127). Yet, we do not agree with his proposal, rooted in his misunderstanding, to leave Bourdieu's theory behind. For our methodology we rather build upon the relationist approach to praxis. This means for the theoretical

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341 For the sake of fairness, it should be said here that Bourdieu addresses precisely the problem of the contractions and paradoxes in strategies of resistance and submission: "Resistance may be alienating and submission may be liberating. Such is the paradox of the dominated, and there is no way out of it" (Bourdieu 1990k, 155; G: 1992h, 173. See also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 23f., G: 1996, 46).

342 Goffman 1999. For the relation between Goffman and Bourdieu, see Willems 1997.

concept of habitus (in the context of ongoing substantialist misunderstandings in the scientific field!): We conceive of the concept in a radically relationist and anti-substantialist way referring to the habitus, whenever possible, rather using the concepts of *dispositions*, *schemes*, or *operators*. This is not to dismiss the concept of habitus as such, but to prevent its substantialist misunderstanding and reification. For our methodological approach to the dispositions this means that we focus on the analysis of practical sense. Here again, we try to prevent a reification of this concept by rather speaking of operators or schemes of the practical sense and the practical logic. Finally, this means that precisely the "semiotic complexity of classification struggles" can be analyzed as such *and* in the larger framework of (equally not reified) relations of fields and social space.

To relate to the example from Willis in Collins' article: HabitusAnalysis allows one not only to analyze the "semiotic complexity" of apocalyptic Pentecostal premillennialists in Guatemala but also to show, in Collins' words, the "contradictory moment of grounded, collective critique of oppressive social structures acted out in forms that limit other understandings and perpetuate the actions of—that is, reproduce—those structures" (127). The contradictory moves of recognition and misrecognition in the practical logic of these Pentecostals could be interpreted in the context of their immediate experience. Additionally, the HabitusAnalysis rendered evident how and why this Pentecostal habitus formation developed a very different (linguistic, semiotic, material, etc.) praxis in religion, politics, culture, and the like, from other religious and political actors in the country.

Such an analysis has to integrate some linguistic tools into the praxeological work with qualitative data. The last critic we present here asks for such tools.

William Hanks

The anthropologist and specialist on Mayan languages addresses, with his "Notes on Semantics in Linguistic Practice,"[343] the possibility of integrating fully fledged linguistic approaches into a praxeological framework. He sets out with a definition of what is being talked about: "'Semantics' here designates the system of meaning that relates grammatical forms and what is literally said when these forms are uttered in context" (Hanks 2000, 160). This said, he examines some standard theories in linguistics for compatibility with praxeology. However, at the end of the day Hanks, inversely, understands praxeology simply as a general impulse to sociolinguistics. Notwithstanding, his article offers us two helpful insights.

First, "practice theory has so far produced no framework in which to talk in detail about semantics" (Hanks 2000, 161). Concepts like market or capital are

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343 Hanks 2000, originally published in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone 1993.

helpful for the analysis of semantics, but they are no substitute for a clear-cut consideration of semantics. "Indeed, the analysis of symbolic practice requires a theory of signification that includes the linguistic system in a nonreductive way" (Hanks 2000, 161). Therefore, a certain integration of linguistics into praxeology could be helpful.

Second, on these premises Hanks examines the theories of truth functionality, of cognitive semantics, of objective realism, of different traits of formalism (including Grice and Saussure's conventionality), as well as Peirce's distinction between type and token, and he mentions some similarities between praxeology and Lakoff's cognitive theory.

Finally, we consider important what he says with reference to formalism:

> What is necessary is to reappropriate language from formalism, by demonstrating the irreducible role of agents, social fields, markets, the distribution of capital in the form of knowledge and hence, potential semantic creativity, and the social body. That is, formalism can be encompassed without according it the primacy or constant relevance in which it is usually enshrined. (Hanks 2000, 166)

We can reword this programmatic idea for praxeology: As Bourdieu's praxeology has already gained the terrain of actors, fields, and other social "hardware" and the dispositional "software" of the habitus, it is also necessary to reappropriate language as (objectified) semantic creativity, operating in the sphere of social exchange. This implies a transformation of formalist semantics. In other words, formalist techniques (such as, for example, the semiotic square) ought to be transformed in such a way (such as the praxeological square) that they facilitate a controlled and fruitful integration of semantic analysis into praxeology for the benefit of the entire praxeological program.

For that purpose, according to Hanks, praxeology needs a viable concept of a conventional system of linguistic rules. We would like to add that a concept of shared semantic meaning would also be useful. Hanks is right that without knowing a *langue* (however socially ephemeral this knowledge might be) one cannot understand *parole*. We would like to add that one cannot "do things with *parole*," especially not in the strategic mode of intentional infringement of common regularities. Bourdieu largely neglects this aspect. However, for a praxeological theory of language the idea of a socially created and recreated, power-shaped linguistic conventionality seems to be indispensable. What else should such a conventionality be, if not a function of the common linguistic habitus among a given group of actors?

The social, tacit, and habitualized conventions on semantics are, as silent background, an objective condition of possibility for outraged linguistic conflicts, spurred by ethnic or religious actors. According to Hanks, it is due to the social

conventionality of language that these "breakdowns" and "crises" of language, which Bourdieu describes on some occasions, can be dealt with as moments of special semantic creativity, as particular fructiferous "loci of production of meaning" (Hanks 2000, 168).

Hanks finds the best opportunities to advance praxeological thought for a better understanding of semantics just in the structuralist formalism in which praxeology is rooted. Therefore, we take Hank's expert linguistic observations as a double orientation for our purpose. First, instead of jumping to whatever scientific tradition, we will primarily look to the structural tradition for possibilities to advance the praxeological toolkit. Second, we will focus on developing a praxeological approach to semantics that allows for a feasible analytical method.

Hans-Herbert Kögler

The Florida-based Austrian social philosopher Hans-Herbert Kögler[344] documents sympathy for the praxeological approach and considers it suitable for language research. Nevertheless, he feels some tension between Bourdieu's concept of habitus and linguistic praxis as an intentional and reflexive activity. Kögler is interested in theorizing intentional agency as well as the capability of actors to relate reflexively to others and to observe moral orientations, with both of which abilities he thinks habitus is relatively incompatible. (294). He frames the problem and his proposal as follows:

> Yet, if we focus specifically on Bourdieu's account of language, we will see that his departure from semiotic structuralism, which rightly needs to be overcome through a more contextualist and pragmatic account, nevertheless fails to account fully for the relatively autonomous realm of linguistic world-mediation. I will argue that the capabilities related to habitus are capabilities operating always at both a pre-linguistic and a post-linguistic level, that is, they can only be understood | as involving both pre-conceptual practical skills and linguistically mediated conceptual frameworks. (272f.)

While Kögler flags as a problem that Bourdieu neglects the relative autonomy of linguistic operations, he argues for an understanding of habitus that involves both pre-conceptual and conceptual skills. He expresses his hopes in a way that indeed almost equals ours:

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344 Kögler 2011. In this subsection, the numbers in parentheses represent page numbers of this article. Kögler wants his article to be taken not as "an external point against Bourdieu's conception of agency, but [as] an immanent criticism and even constructive explication." (291)

> We can also hope to integrate the fruitful concept of habitus into a body of social theory that is finally free from the traditional dualisms of agency and structure, freedom and determinism, individual and society, to conceive of social situations as mediated possibilities to interact creatively so as to enhance the realm of options and opportunities. (273)

To achieve this goal, Kögler first examines Saussure's model of language and communication as well as, briefly, alternatives advanced by Gadamer and Wittgenstein. With regard to Bourdieu, Kögler states that his concept of habitus overcomes structuralist abstractness but that he fails by not accounting for normative orientations of actors and by following an agency-structure paradigm that relegates intersubjective relations to marginal significance. In a further step, Kögler discusses the important question of whether it makes sense to "locate the rules that speaker and hearer follow within the performative practices themselves." (279) He contrasts speech act theory and Habermas with Foucault and Bourdieu, especially in terms of the "possibility of context-transcendence" that actors may achieve (281). The clue to the difference between these two positions is the role that they ascribe to "background" (283) with regard to reflexive reasoning. This is where a discussion of "Language, Habitus, and Symbolic Power" (284) is needed as well as reflection on "Linguistic Habitus and the Social Sources of Agency" (289). After a critique of Bourdieu's concept of habitus, Kögler establishes language as the medium of a reflexive recourse to what he calls "social habitus" and arrives at formulations that we can readily agree with:

> The fact that human agency is intentionally structured does not challenge the deeply social grounding, but it anchors within the symbolically mediated contexts the basic capability to reconstruct how a particular practice understands itself in light of its linguistically articulated concepts as well as its practical contexts. | […] Far from suggesting that there is such a thing as a neatly separated sphere of practical, pre-conceptual, and unconscious meanings on the one hand, and linguistic, conceptual, and conscious meanings on the other, the creation of socially grounded meaningful attitudes is a symbolic-practical co-constitution. (292f.)

However, this statement is in contradiction to Kögler's interpretation of the relation between habitus and language. We share very much Kögler's concern with a theoretical approach to creative agency and therefore consider it helpful to sketch the problems arising from his understanding of habitus that prevent him from developing a convincing praxeological approach to language. Kögler reads the habitus concept as if Bourdieu was "grounding" one type of habitus in another:

> My thesis is that as a basic approach to these questions, Bourdieu grounds the linguistic habitus (the *symbolically mediated background assumptions, values, and skills*) in the social habitus (the *socially inculcated and context/class-specific knowledges, skills, and practices*) which leads ultimately to a problematic and under-analysed identification of both background dimensions. (284)

In Kögler's further argument, "social habitus" appears as completely "unconscious and pre-linguistic" (287) and therefore pre-reflexive. As "linguistic habitus" is "grounded" in the unconscious and merely "practical" social habitus, intentional use of symbols and their critical assessment can hardly be grasped theoretically.[345] Instead of overcoming the "agency/structure divide," Bourdieu's theory "can appear to be reductionist vis-à-vis agency due to its subordination of linguistic habitus" (289).

This flaw is in our view not due to Bourdieu's theory but to Kögler's rather essentialist reception of it. This becomes obvious when he proceeds to the discussion of agency (289 ff.). There Kögler argues that, while "social habitus" would have to entail intentionality in order to become useful for agency, in Bourdieu capabilities emerge within "objective contexts that *determine* how the emergent capabilities are de facto constituted" (290). In consequence, the cognitive resources of the "individual bearers of intentional processes, carry the irrevocable stamp of their environments, their relative wealth or poverty" (290). Moreover, instead of conceiving an "independent access to the objects of intentional disclosure, the capacities are defined as relative to their contextual usefulness" (290). Kögler sums up:

> As explained above, Bourdieu conceives the contextual structures such that they shape the social habitus—the agent-based capabilities—which thereby become (a) an objective *reflection* of the existing social environments and (b) a subjectively incorporated scheme of understanding that directs the intentional cognition of the respective individual agent. (290)

If one structures Kögler's critical reconstruction of habitus and language according to Bourdieu, a double series of oppositions appears.

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345 "If the use of language is grounded in a linguistic habitus, which in turn relies on a social habitus formed through unconscious, practical interaction with one's environment, then speech practices can be nothing but the expression of that underlying disposition. It is hard to see then how speakers could critically reassess or change their habitual structures, since they are inculcated into a level of 'understanding' that escapes the conscious and intentional use of symbols." (289)

Table 3   Kögler's model

Structure	Relation	Habitus
Context / structure	reflection / determination	social habitus / capabilities (collective)
versus		
Scheme of understanding	subjective incorporation	linguistic habitus / intentional cognition (individual)

The basic structure of Kögler's argument contains some epistemological premises that very often affect the reception of Bourdieu's writings. First, habitus is taken as an entity, as a substance or a thing. In consequence, a "social habitus"[346] can be separated from a "linguistic habitus". An important indicator of a problematic reading is that the relation between social structure and "social habitus" is conceived either as "determination" or as "reflection" (naturally in the sense of the philosophical theory of cognition as reflection). From the ontological perspective, one thing determines the other; from the gnoseological perspective, one thing reflects the other. According to a substantialist understanding, the relation between social structure and social habitus is conceived as determinative (obviously in the sense of causation in a preset and unchanging way). In conclusion, linguistic habitus then ideally appears as characterized by free (undetermined) intentionality, reflexivity, and individuality. This logic amounts to the critique that Bourdieu's theory binds linguistic habitus too tightly to "social habitus" and in consequence "unduly [reduces] the role of language in the mediation of individual agents with their objective environments, or in the constitution of habitus" (289).

There are a number of problems with this interpretation. First, it is based on a substantialist epistemology as Cassirer[347] criticizes it—even though far less than other readings. Hence, Kögler fails to interpret Bourdieu's writings according to their epistemological underpinnings. Second, it is precisely for this reason that his fruitful intention to relate linguistic creativity and contextual existence suffers from the underlying opposition of determination/social structure versus freedom/reflexive individual.

Having said this, we want to add that we share almost all of Kögler's goals. Well-conceived praxeological concepts of habitus and language have to account for the relative freedom and creativity, for the "self-understanding" (290) of the actors, and their understanding of others, for reflexivity, for intentionality, and for

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346 We do not remember having seen this predicate of habitus in Bourdieu's writings.

347 See above section 1.2.1.1; for sociological approaches, see the excursus in 1.3.

the capability of critical value-orientation. However, what we do not share is the underlying interpretation of habitus. In the final analysis, with an essentialist understanding of habitus one cannot reconstruct or, more specifically, model freedom and creativity. One can only postulate the freedom of actors, but this postulated freedom is gained by revoking the most creatively possible features of the habitus concept due to a substantialist misunderstanding.

In contrast, if the concept of habitus is understood relationally, habitus can be conceived and modeled as a complex and extremely wide network of interactive relations between regular operations that are cognitively, emotionally, and bodily inscribed. In short, a relational reading of the habitus theory may recur to the concepts of dispositions or schemes in order to model relationality.[348] What Kögler describes as mutually excluding, namely social habitus and linguistic habitus, may then be modeled as a complex interrelation between different dispositions, schemes, or operators (vol. 2). Then the use of language, the conceptualization of the self and of others, linguistically meditated cognition and recognition, and ethical reflexivity can be conceived within the theory of habitus together with all the other benefits of the praxeological package. For instance, it will be easy to conceive within the premises of habitus theory that the "acquisition of a social habitus is not accomplished pre-symbolically but goes hand-in-hand with symbolic means" (292); in other words, language and meaning have a legitimate and important position in praxeology (vol. 1). Moreover, on these grounds, language use, habitus, fields of praxis as fields of language use, and the social structure as a conditioning factor can be modeled, thus offering instruments for the sociological analysis of how actors with contextualized creativity make use of language in their lives.

3.2.3 On Bourdieu's study of meaning—concluding remarks

We have already quoted Bourdieu's programmatic statement that "even the content of the message itself, remains unintelligible as long as one does not take into account the totality of the structure of power relations that is present, yet invisible, in the exchange" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 142f., G: 1996, 177). At the end of this section, we can invert this statement (without cancelling the validity of the original): *The social power relations present in linguistic or symbolic exchange cannot be sufficiently understood, if the content of the messages remains without interpretation.*

In this section, we have reviewed Bourdieu's practical (theoretically silent) dealings with meaning in central pieces of his work. He produces admirable results, even

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348 See for instance Lahire 2011; or, deploying a different argument, Schäfer 2003; 2005.

if he operates within the narrow limits of a quite traditional structural approach. We also have witnessed an instructive flaw when he explicitly dismisses meaning in favor of a radically functional approach to linguistic and religious praxis.

His critics from the field of linguistics and sociology have unanimously demanded the necessity to conceive of the power of language as operating through meaning. We would prefer to speak of the power that language (and signs) develops as a semantic (and semiotic) operator of practical logic.

In order to understand better what desiderata can be inferred from these observations, we shift our attention back to the former section (3.1). In that section, we reconstructed three major lines of tradition, which Bourdieu sees himself obliged to as he considers language and symbolic relations in general. If the first tradition is stripped of Platonic idealism, what remains is a structuralist concept of the organization of language and ideas as well as a two-sided concept of sign. The second tradition, in the vein of Wilhelm von Humboldt and ordinary language philosophy, conveys various legacies: A concept of language as the constant labor of the mind rooted in culture is combined with a special focus on semantic content. In the vein of Cassirer, the labor of language can be understood as the cognitive structuring of experience. In the vein of Wittgenstein, the meaning of a sign can be conceived as a product of its use. Third, the Marxist and Weberian tradition, finally, has anchored Bourdieu's work on language in the firm ground of a sociology that is able to describe differentiated social relations of domination.

These riches of reference in the tradition of the humanities and the social sciences convey great opportunities that Bourdieu has realized in an impressive work on language and practical logic. Yet these references can also trap. One might think of such a trap when Bourdieu programmatically disdains meaning (crucial for Humboldt and his followers) in order to study linguistic exchange in view of just form and social use. Thus, meaning is set aside as a supposed opus operatum while the modus operandi is functionalized. In consequence, it is obscured that the operations of meaning (central for metaphor and polysemy, for instance) are forceful operators of practical sense and practical logic.

In contrast, it is possible to study meaning in its social use, employing structural means to reconstruct it as a modus operandi of practical sense and practical logic, taking the form into account as an additional factor of meaning production. The concept of meaning as modus operandi of practical sense, which we are going to advance in our method, has nothing to do with the idea of meaning as an essence of something or a propriety attached to something. We rather conceive meaning as a relational and productive occurrence between the symbolic and the material relations, as well as between the subjective and objective factors of praxis. Meaning thus is constructed as a third unit, active in the production of (subjective and

objective) social reality—in other words, as *energeia*. Hence, with regard to the actors, meaning has to be modeled as a transformation between experience and interpretation—that is, as perception, judgment, and action orientation.

Our project aims precisely at the latter. In order to approach the goal of developing models and methods for empirical research in a praxeological key, we have to study in more detail how Bourdieu deals with meaning in order to sort out how to develop the concept of meaning in a proper praxeological way.

3.2 Fieldwork on meaning

In Bourdieu's works, socially produced meaning is an important object of research. But the concept is nowhere defined. Therefore, Bourdieu's studies on meaning may provide some insight.

3.2.1 Bourdieu's studies on meaning

Kabylia:
In the early stages, the methodical approach to meaning has traits of a structuralist sociosemiotics. However, the theory of practical logic reframes the theoretical approach to meaning and coins Bourdieu's analyses of Kabyle daily life. Semantic operations (e.g., by similitude or by difference) are understood as operators of practical relations. The labor of language, for instance through metaphors, operates within practical social relations. Therefore, linguistic and other symbolic operations are fuzzy: they have to adapt to the world of practices. Semantic content is an important operator of praxis insofar as it carries the logic of the schemes of perception, judgment, and action and, therefore, unfolds as a socially significant meaning according to the situations of its use.

Heidegger:
According to Bourdieu, Heidegger maintains a "polyphonic discourse" that constantly oscillates between the philosophical and the political fields, changing the meaning of everyday words into philosophical and political programs. Bourdieu realizes a sociosemiotic analysis.

Bourdieu's reflections on his own analyses of Heidegger refer to contents, form, and production. The rejection of internal and external interpretation enables one to see that Heidegger used the "accepted ideas of his time" as a common semantic ground for socially plausibilizing his philosophical and political modulations of everyday words. While form is an important category in Bourdieu's theoretical writings on language, in the Heidegger studies form refers simply to the logics of different fields into which the metaphors translate the semantic content. Finally, in Bourdieu's analyses, the transformation of meaning is taken as a productive process. The virtuoso uses the transformational possibilities of semiotics as means of production.

Religion:

In his works on religion, Bourdieu considers semantics and even semiotics, but puts the emphasis on form and function.

In the article, "Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field," Bourdieu dedicates some consideration to religious meaning. Religious message explains the world according to the class-specific demands of different groups of laity. Different groups of producers of meaning (specialists) represent different positions in the religious field and use different forms and content of messages. The prophet, for instance, tends to be ethical and apocalyptic, from a contesting standpoint in the field and/or from a low class position. The meaning conveyed can have the objectified form of doctrines, myths, ethical principles, theologies, and the like, or of embodied beliefs. The demand for religious meaning (legitimacy) is a dynamic force in the religious field, for instance, fostering prophetic alternatives to the priestly monopoly in the field. Specialists take up the demand, interpret and answer it religiously. In consequence, they gain religious capital in terms of credibility among the laity. The effective demand for religious meaning has structuring effects on the religious field and on the further production of religious "ideology." With reference to Weber, religious meaning is seen as symbolic transformations of strategies and class positions of the specialists and the laity. Religious meaning is embodied in dispositions, beliefs, convictions, and so forth, and objectified in theologies, discourses, rituals, and the like. In consequence, sociologists of religion ought to understand (*verstehen*) both the subjective and objective meaning of religious utterances, practices, and objects by interpretation of each aspect with reference to the other.

In his article about the liturgy reform in the Catholic Church Bourdieu attempts to show, through the example of religious opinions, the flaws of Austin's concept of the illocutionary force of language. His analysis of interview texts arrives at the conclusion of an overall secularization in the Catholic Church, at the price of disregarding basic praxeological conditions of sociological interpretation. In contrast, our analysis of the quoted texts, which considers the praxeological guidelines for interpretation, shows different results. Among other things, our analysis evidences that meaning is one of the important factors to consider.

With regard to Bourdieu's occasional preference of form over content, we state that form and content have to be seen in their mutual relation.

Body language:

Linguistic reference to the body is a field of semantics that is important for sociology. French slang represents social differences of class and gender in the different meaning of the terms *gueule* and *bouche*, both referring to the human mouth.

A reconstruction of the network of linguistic operators in Montesquieu's text on northern and southern bodily habitus evidences that this network represents an entire system of colonial domination. The notion of a network is worthwhile to further develop.

3.2.2 Critics

John Searle passes censure on Bourdieu's critique of Austin and on his overemphasizing of form. In contrast, Searle draws attention to the power of language, which unfolds in its symbolic function of combining different levels of thought and reality.

John Thompson criticizes Bourdieu for overemphasizing form. However, he regards praxeology as very suitable for working with semantic content. He regards the interpretation

of the social meaning of linguistic utterances and larger bodies of text as a necessary task of praxeology. Interpretation has to be complemented by the study of ideology. Thompson holds that language exerts power by itself insofar as it is a medium to implement intellectual, rational, and emotional resources in the social struggle for power.

James Collins mainly objects to what he believes to be a deterministic relation between the central theoretical concepts of capital, habitus, and field. This misunderstanding leads Collins to see discursive interaction in Bourdieu reduced to an "epiphenomenal reflection of social structures." However, he sees spaces of freedom generated by practical contradictions. These become visible through ethnographic information on semiotic complexity.

William Hanks appreciates praxeology but states that Bourdieu has no sufficient framework for integrating semantics. Therefore, it is necessary to develop such a framework. According to Hanks, the structural tradition presents opportunities to do so.

3.2.3 On Bourdieu's study of meaning—concluding remarks
Bourdieu states that the social power relations underneath a linguistic exchange are necessary in order to understand the meaning of a given message. We add that the interpretation of the message is necessary to understand the power relations present in the linguistic exchange. Heavily condensed, the considerations of the present section point to the necessity of integrating semantic content with praxeological theory and method as a social operator, present as much in habitus as in practical logic and the dynamics of fields.

3.3   The meaning of meaning

What does *meaning* mean? A glimpse into *The Meaning of Meaning,* by Charles Ogden and Ivor Richards (1946), makes one feel desperate about this question. But since we are not claiming to define meaning objectively for all sciences, the despair makes way for an interest in how to address the practical meaning of words, signs, and practices in the framework of Bourdieu's praxeology.

While we have focused on empirical studies on meaning in the last section, in this section we will approach the issue from the viewpoint of theory. We will sketch those praxeological theorems that provide the theoretical environment for the study of practical operations with semantic and semiotic content in Bourdieu's work. Expressed in Cassirer's vocabulary, of the entire series of praxeological concepts, we describe those that are most proximate to the concept of meaning. We will concentrate on the meaning of linguistic signs.

Bourdieu does not offer clear-cut definitions of fundamental concepts, such as meaning, sign, signification, denotation, connotation, and so forth. He rather redefines meaning, more implicitly than explicitly, within the praxeological framework. The most striking new trait seems to be that he conceives of meaning as emerging through the perceptual transformation of experience and the transformation of

judgment into social action. Therefore, we will not aim at finding Bourdieu's definition of meaning or something similar. Rather, we will describe the praxeological framework, the series, within which meaning becomes an issue and thus acquires its praxeological meaning.

First, we sketch two more boundaries in the scientific landscape. Then, we outline four epistemological premises relevant for a theoretical approach to meaning. Finally, we revise the three basic orientations of Bourdieu's praxeology—structure, habitus, relation (praxis)—as the framework for operations with meaning.

3.3.1   Boundaries in theory

Above (3.1.2), we have already described most of Bourdieu's critique of linguistics. Now we focus more specifically on opportunities that praxeology offers for the analysis of meaning. Hence, we address two, somewhat more specific boundaries that Bourdieu draws in relation to other approaches to meaning. First, we discuss intellectualist concepts of language centered in decoding, and second, we examine interpretative shortcuts in the research on symbols.

Listening and speaking—decoding

With reference to Charles Bally, Bourdieu draws attention to an approach to meaning, which he characterizes as "apprehending language from the standpoint of the listening rather than the speaking subject, that is, as a means of decoding rather than a 'means of action and expression.'"[349] According to Bourdieu, the problem is that researchers impute their intellectualist concept of language and meaning to the actors. Hence, they treat meaningful objects such as texts or works of art as opus operatum, "as discourse to be decoded by reference to a transcendent code, analogous to Saussure's *langue*" (Bourdieu 1990b, 34, G: 2008, 64). In anthropology, for example, this kind of approach interprets marital practices as an enactment of an objective system of kinship, reducing praxis to applying the (scientifically stated) structures of that system. As for kinship relations, Bourdieu retorts by developing a theory of marital strategies. Thus, he steps from the "means of decoding" to the "means of action and expression."

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349 Bourdieu 1990b, 33, G: 2008, 63; with reference to Bally 1965, 58, 78, 102; see also Bourdieu 1977b, 1, G: 2009, 141. Today, similar positions are advocated by those representatives of the interpretative turn and of discourse analysis who ascribe social existence to discourses and to their intertextuality, independent of the actors who use them.

   Notwithstanding, Bourdieu does *not* affirm with his critique that the meaning of a linguistic utterance or a semiotic object is negligible. Nor does he dismiss listening generally. Rather, he objects to a scholastic mistake. If scholars superimpose their way of approaching their objects of research on these objects of ordinary praxis, the error occurs. Sociologists, anthropologists, or other scientists ensure listening to the actors that they study in order to decode their expressions. However, they must not think that the actors speak and listen with the same intention. The social actors speak in order to act, to exert effect, to "do things with words"; and they listen, normally, to acquire an idea about what to do. However, listening in contexts of everyday praxis also supposes an (implicit or explicit) act of interpretation.[350] Listening is a mode of decoding a linguistic product by means of "schemes of interpretation" and thus it is a "creative appropriation" (Bourdieu 2006, 38, G: 2005, 42) of information in the context of a given praxis. Bourdieu's emphatic rejection addresses the intellectualist reduction, but neither the practical nor the praxeological operations of listening.

   In sum, listening (seeing or feeling) is as important as saying or showing. Both listening and speaking are instances of the production of meaning and, thus, of the social modus operandi of linguistic utterances and semiotic acts. The correspondent meaning is neither stored in the act of emission nor in the act of reception. The meaning develops *between* emission and reception as a practical operation under the conditions of the habitus of the actors involved, of the situation the communication takes place in, of the game the situation unfolds in, and finally of the overall social positions the actors occupy.

Interpretative shortcuts—symbolism

The logic of the *scientific* listener exerts a problematic effect with regard to symbols. It seduces one to take interpretative shortcuts. For instance, dictionaries of religious symbols (often in the tradition of the phenomenology of J.G. Jung) offer quick information on the universal meaning of a given symbol. According to Bourdieu, they function by "word-for-word decoding" and constitute the symbols as "essences capable of being defined in themselves" (Bourdieu 1990b, 4, G: 2008, 13). Such a fictitious assignation of meaning even prevents the objects in question (such as ritual devices, myths, etc.) from being interpreted. By taking "short-cuts,

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350 Our use of the concept of interpretation does not introduce intellectualism through the backdoor. As we will see in the model we propose (vol. 3), interpretation refers to the implicit and explicit use of the embodied cognitive (and emotional) schemes of the habitūs in the processes of perception, judgment, and action orientation. The concept of interpretation is understood within the framework of habitus theory (vol. 2).

which directly lead from each *signifiant* to its correspondent *signifié*, scholars were diverted from the long detour by the total system of the constitutive significant" (Bourdieu 1968, 685, G: 1970, ca. 13). According to Bourdieu, this logic also conveys a way of studying myths and similar objects with "greater attention to the subject matter of the myth than to the way it was told" (Bourdieu 1968, 685, G: 1970, ca. 13).

Bourdieu's general alert against intellectualist social science is focused here on a specific hazard: the isolated ascription of meaning to a single signifier, such as a single metaphor. However, he does not say that the study of meaning is obsolete. Rather, the way a myth is told should be taken as a factor of its meaning. Thus, we arrive at a similar conclusion, as we did a moment ago. Scientific interpretation of meaning, in addition to content, has to consider the practical context, form, and use of a signifier.

3.3.2   Epistemological premises focused on meaning

For all the reasons hitherto exposed, Bourdieu considers it is insufficient or even misleading to conceive of meaning as an essential property of a given signifier, as the reference of a sign to an object, or as the value of a sign in distinction to another sign in an idealist universe of signification. For a praxeological approach to meaning, it is rather recommendable to realize some basic structuralist premises of Bourdieu's praxeology—of course, without backsliding into objectivist structuralism.

In this section, I will therefore discuss, with a narrow focus on language and meaning, a few key concepts that function as an epistemological undercurrent, implicit in Bourdieu's analyses: series, difference, similarity, and words.

Two kinds of series

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, Bourdieu transforms Cassirer's relational concept of meaning—the position of a term in a series—into praxeology.[351]

The series turn praxeological. They reconstruct the practical construction of meaning by ordinary actors. From the point of view of classical ontology these series are impure. *Practical and praxeological series* are not conceived as being composed by terms of the same ontological genus (material objects, semantic units, grammatical units, emotional states, etc.); series are rather made up of distinguishable units of practical processes that are composed according to the logic of the given process (and not according to the logic of a scientific, ontological classification). In the environment of a practical series, for instance, a word acquires its meaning

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351 See also above, p. 122.

as an operator within the practical process it is employed in. One can also say, the meaning of the word performs as a practical operator between different terms. These terms can be communicated signs, practices, material objects, mental images, or anything else. Speech acts, discourses, emblems, and practically any perceived object, engender meaning in collective or individual actors by virtue of relating to other elements of reality by the act of perception (embodiment, internalization); they produce objective meaning as objectified operators in any kind of practical process in society (externalization). However, this is not the only way of praxeologically approaching the use of language.

One can also describe the practical logic of linguistic utterances in a different manner. Now, the observer pays attention to the conditions of the speech act applying a theoretical model: the distinction between habitus and field. He describes the act as the encounter between subjective and objective conditions, each conceived as an *independent series*: the dispositions of the habitus on the one side and the states of a given field or market on the other. This approach leads to two initially different series. However, it is nothing else than a scientific operation of the analytical objectification of praxis. It distinguishes (does not separate!) practical processes methodically in order to describe better how the utterances and practices in question produce meaning by situationally linking terms that the researcher would not have expected to be linked in praxis. "Every speech act and, more generally, every action, is a conjuncture, an encounter between independent causal series." The series of the habitus, the dispositions, interact with the series of the objective structures, such as the linguistic market and the fields (Bourdieu 2006, 37f., G: 2005, 41f.).

Roughly speaking, the distinction between habitus versus field serves as a leading theoretical orientation for structuring the praxeological observation of practical processes. Bourdieu's leading distinction is the distinction between embodied and objectified social structures (be it symbolic or material). Nevertheless, the practical processes remain ontologically impure in the sense that they are made up of a whole lot of ontologically different elements. For instance, in the Eucharist we find as elements of the meaningful series a piece of bread, a bodily movement of consecration, a chasuble, the ringing of a bell, the distinction between priest and layperson, the belief in transubstantiation, the religious demand for embodying the holy, etc.). Practical processes take place according to their particular practical logic that, in the last analysis, is generated by the embodied and objective conditions of praxis according to the specific situational interplay between these conditions on a given field of praxis. It is for this reason that the theoretical distinction between habitus and field does not crush Bourdieu's empirical approach to practices but simply

remains in the theoretical background, as an underlying model that facilitates a controlled scientific view of praxis.[352] What does this mean for meaning?

Meaning "resides" nowhere. It is constantly produced, generated in practical relations under social conditions. It operates right there, turning the processes meaningful for the actors. From the scientific viewpoint, praxeological sociology structures the practical processes in particular ways in order to understand the meaning of meaning in the context of the conjunctures of praxis. It reconstructs praxeological series. In a series, meaning is generated by the difference between the semantic contents of its elements.

Difference, position, and meaning

Meaning emerges from differences. Quoting Benveniste, Bourdieu states that "it is the same thing to be distinctive and to be meaningful."[353] In his essay on cultural works, Bourdieu refers, with this reminder of the structuralist concept of value, to the distinction between schools of writers in the field of literature. The works are not an isolated universe of intertextual relations. They are position-takings in the struggles in the literary field. In consequence, Bourdieu specifies that praxeology has to deal with a double distinction. First, the one "between two homologous structures: the structure of the works (genres, forms, themes, etc.) and the structure of the literary field, a field of forces" (Bourdieu 1993a, 181, G: 1998c, 64); and second, the distinctions within any one of these structures or series (the distinction of works, and the distinction of struggles).

In consequence, the meaning of any cultural work, any utterance, any practice, emerges from its distinctive position in at least *two dimensions*. The distinction between one work and another work (two terms of the same ontological status) is self-evident. Any idealist can agree with it. Another thing is the distinction between the different structures, the works, on the one hand, and the struggles among their creators in the field of production, on the other. However, without this social context of production one cannot understand the meaning of the work sufficiently.

Here, the structuralist concept of value (the central term for the structuralist understanding of meaning) has undergone a sociological transformation. Two different kinds of content (the work of art and the social position) are set in relation

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352 See for instance, Bourdieu's studies on time (Bourdieu 1990b, 98ff., G: 2008, 180ff.) or on language (Bourdieu 2006, G: 2005). In volume 2 see particularly the parts on externalization, practical logic, practical sense, and fields.

353 "Et rappeler, une fois encore, la formule de Benveniste : 'Etre distinctif, être significatif, c'est la même chose'." (Bourdieu 1994, 70, G: 1998c, 63). This sentence is missing in the English version (Bourdieu 1993a, supposedly on p. 180).

to one another. This relation renders the content meaningful. However, in order to understand the meaning of the work of art sufficiently, the self-evident distinction also has to be regarded—the distinction between the work in question and other works. In both cases, meaning emerges when two different contents are related. In other words, the terms to be related are not "empty." A position in the field of arts, of course, comes with socially ascribed and practically effective "properties".[354] The artist, or the professor at an acknowledged academy who is famous worldwide, has other properties and opportunities than those of the bohemian student with great plans. A work of art also enters the (sociologically reconstructed) relation with its properties, such as the composition of colors, the size, the format, all of which already have a socially ascribed, primary meaning.[355] Both, the properties of the positions and of the works are not essential[356] but historically produced and socially ascribed. However, they are real in a sociological sense. In short: the distinction becomes meaningful because it relates two historical facts, communicated as semantic or semiotic contents.

This is to prevent a misunderstanding about the structuralist approach to meaning. The concept of distinctive value does not imply that a term is *exclusively* defined by what it is *not*—as if *A* were sufficiently defined by *Non-A*. Rather, *A* is described by its relation to *B*, *C*, *D,…* (or to *C*, *E*, *G,…*). So as to enter into this relation, *A* already has to have a conventional meaning: the first letter of the European alphabet.

In Bourdieu, there is no hint of using the logic of distinctive value abstractly. Rather, each term of a relation (sociologically observed) enters the relation with its historically acquired and socially ascribed properties. By way of its placement in a series of other terms, a term's properties are simultaneously put into different relations that distinguish the case in point from other cases. In other words, the observer specifies the firsthand meaning, the content, of the single case or work by widening the perspective according to which he observes the case or the work.[357]

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354 Of course, not "essential" properties.

355 This is immediately evident if one imagines two compositions of colors, as for instance black and red versus green and blue.

356 And therefore written with single quotation marks.

357 Just imagine two single paintings, with bold strokes, stark contrasts, strong colors, and strange people (Max Beckmann, *The Night*, 1919, and *Bird's Hell*, 1938). One almost automatically puts them into different series in order to understand them: a marginal position in the field of arts, somewhere between New Sobriety and Expressionism, distinct from Cubism, Constructivism, Impressionism, Pointillism, figurative painting, and later Fascist Realism—in the historical times of the break with nationalist liberalism after World War I, also palpable in the lyrics of Gottfried Benn, in the theology of Karl Barth, and in other "dialectics"; finally the political exile in Amsterdam….

This operational logic is true also for Bourdieu, even in a simple linguistic sense: We have seen that he in fact presupposes a conventional core meaning of concepts (see 2.2.4). It is even truer in the sociological sense, which we have briefly exemplified, by his praxeological use of series (see 2.2.5). Every element of a series (e.g., *psychiatrist*) contributes with its (conventional) meaning to the meaning of the series (*neurosis, psychiatrist, mental hospital, internship*) that in turn delimits the meaning of the term (*psychiatrist* equals *the one who interns you in a hospital*). The meaning of *A* is narrowed down, not by an abstract *Non-A* but by *B*. The practical relation realizes a practical disambiguation of the term.

With reference to our modeling of the operations of practical logic (vol. 3), we would like to already mention that this is one of the reasons that we do not employ the semiotic square of Greimas and Rastier but transform the antique propositional square. The negation is thus meaningful in the praxeological sense. Moreover, the reconstruction of a network provides us with complex series of meaningful differences.

Similarity, fields, and meaning

Within a series, similarity and difference are codependent. A series denotes a certain ensemble of practices and/or signs that are connected by a common "story" of which they are a part. As we have seen, for a praxeological assessment of meaning, it is not only important to construct series of (differential) similarity but also relations of similarity between different series. This issue brings us to central theorems of practical logic, which we will come back to later (vol. 2). Here, we highlight just one aspect.

Bourdieu explains that *practical logic* operates in and between different "areas of practice" by means of its play with meaning.

> Just as the same word receives a different sense [*sens*] in each of its broad areas of use while remaining within the limits of a 'family of meanings' [*famille de significations*], so the fundamental structures are realized in meanings which are very different between one area of practice and another, although they always share some feature with at least one other element in another series and all have in common a kind of 'family look' which is immediately intuited. (Bourdieu 1990b, 261, G: 2008, 452; bracketed additions taken from the French original version: 1980, 424)

This quote indicates the well-known fact that a word can acquire different meanings in different contexts and, nevertheless, connects these contexts by virtue of a similarity of conventional meaning, which is conveyed by the very word. This is a crucial operation of practical logic (embodied as practical sense or objectified as the logic of a given praxis), based on the play of meaning, for shaping and transform-

ing field specific praxis. The meaning of a word varies according to the practical series that the word forms a part of, *and* according to the relations between any of these series and still other series, in which the word is also used. (In Saussure's vocabulary, the meaning emerges from relatively stable syntagmatic relations and from a variety of paradigmatic relations.[358])

The operations of practical logic (for example, metaphors and polysemy) constantly make use of the differences between series by means of establishing similarities—and the operations veil these similarities by heeding, for instance, temporal distance between corresponding utterances (Bourdieu 1990b, 86ff., G: 2008, 157ff.). Metaphors make use of the social stability of conventional meaning that the denotation conveys, as well as of the associative power of the connotations.[359] The aim is to link different series by means of elements that are evidently similar. In the context of the counterinsurgency war in Guatemala, for the peasant the metaphor of the "blood of Jesus Christ" opens a symbolic relation between the bloodshed of the massacres and the saving presence of church communities. The decisive particular function of similarity is that it engenders identification of the different. In praxeological terms, this operation is crucial for the entire politics of identification; it is important, for instance, for the mobilization of actors in social and religious movements.

Bourdieu translates the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations into praxeology, mainly by means of the distinction between different *fields of praxis*. The syntagmatic relations govern within a given field; the paradigmatic relations govern between different fields. The similarity that operates in the paradigmatic relations produces the links between the fields. Similarities can serve for the transfer and the conversion of capital between the different fields—a conversion that operates through the similarity and because of the difference. In the case of the "blood of Jesus," the similarity of "blood" produces the link between experiences of military violence and religious salvation. The religious connotator, "Jesus," produces the difference and generates a specifically religious logic. Christian religion does not deal with "blood" as the military does. Rather, the account of the bloodshed of Jesus on the cross invites the believers who suffer from violence to identify with the person on the cross. The religious connotation of "Jesus is the son of God who died for us" turns the bloodshed on the cross into a saving event. By

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358   As it is well known, Saussure uses "associative" instead of "paradigmatic", thus making reference to the associative character of the paradigmatic relation as distinct from the more constrained syntagmatic relation (Saussure 1959, 122ff., F: 1972, 170ff.). For a short account of the semiotic usefulness of this distinction see Barthes 1969, 58ff.; and for its practical use in semiotics see Barthes 1972.

359   See Bourdieu 2006, 39, G: 2005, 43 on poetic language.

virtue of the identification, the believers can take part in the salvation and regain hope for their daily survival.[360] Hence, "the blood of Jesus" may work as one operator (among many others) in religious mobilization.

Identification within differences, for instance by means of an effective discourse, turns out to be a valuable operator between different fields, such as the religious and the political field. Identification can serve as a means for converting capital (authority and legitimacy) from the religious to the political field—as was, for example, the case with the Serbian Orthodox Church when it transferred legitimacy to Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 at Kosovo Polje. To "defend" the nation of Serbia *meant* the same thing as to defend Orthodox Christianity.

In sum, meaning is created by difference and identification. The distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations is the structuralist equivalent for difference and identification. It is an important operating principle in Bourdieu's theory of practical logic, and it can turn out to be very useful when one attempts to develop methods for the praxeological research of meaning.

The meaning of "family of meanings" (*famille de significations*), in the above quoted passage from *Logic of Practice*, still remains unclear. While Bourdieu does not despise completely the idea of a relatively constant core meaning of a word, he is quite unlikely to refer here to strong semantic theories, such as those of lexical fields (*Wortfelder*) or word families (*Wortfamilien*). On the other hand, a common feature of the words (and their meanings) guarantees a recognizable similarity between different fields, uses, and meanings—a similarity which is prone to become a crucial operator for the transference of capital between the fields in a given moment. However, these similarities and differences are framed by the sociological concepts of practical logic and practical sense, and they denote not only words but also practices, objects, people, etc. Hence, it is most likely that Bourdieu did not refer to strict semantic theories, but *en passant* was reminded of Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances" between different words and their meanings.

Word or proposition?

Our hitherto deliberations in this section left open what basic linguistic (and thus semantic) unit of operation we address in a praxeological approach to meaning. Are words (notions, concepts) a sufficient reference point?

Bourdieu's works on the ritual practices and convictions in Kabyle society often refer to words (such as *low*, *high*, *humid*, *dry*) when he reconstructs binary series of practical operators. Bourdieu never discusses the question of what status concepts and their relation have for a praxeological approach to meaning. Nevertheless, he

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360 This is a simple connotational operation. See Barthes 1969, 89ff.

refers to a similar issue when he discusses (quite randomly) the relation between content and form of a linguistic expression.

He quotes Charles Bally (1952, 21) who

> enumerates various expressions […] which are, in appearance, perfectly interchangeable, since they all aim at the same practical result—'Come!', 'Do come!', 'Would you like to come?', 'Wouldn't you like to come?', 'Say you'll come!', 'Suppose you came?', 'You ought to come!', 'Come here!' […] Although such expressions are theoretically interchangeable, they are not so in practice. Each one represents the only possible way of attaining the desired end in a determinate social conjuncture […]. In other words, the form, and the content expressed (the information) which it informs, condense and symbolize the whole structure of the social relationship from which they derive their efficacy (the celebrated 'illocutionary force') and their very existence. (Bourdieu 1977c, 666, n,19)

In order for the pragmatic effect to take place (a person "comes"), the effect requires different forms of expression in correspondence to different relations between speaker and recipient. The example renders immediately evident that an analysis focused on lexical semantics would be far too simple.

Form and content communicate. Any of these propositions express a different meaning for the prompt "to come," just because of a different combination of content and form: a polite, a rough, a friendly, a bossy, and the like, meaning. For a qualitative praxeological analysis of discourse, this implies, first, that the primary object of the analysis cannot be just words, concepts, or single notions. The primary object ought to be propositions. Second, content and form observed together in their syntagmatic context—that is, in comparison with other similar occurrences—render an initial hint about the meaning of the utterance. A proposition conveys a pragmatic dimension and therefore implies a third step: to examine the pragmatic conditions of felicitousness. From a praxeological point of view, we are talking about *social* felicitousness. Hence, finally, the propositions have to be studied as operators in fields of praxis and under the conditions that the social structure provides.

3.3.3 Social structures, habitus, and meaning production

Meaning emerges from the structured, productive activity of actors who are constantly acting and reacting within their social relations. Therefore, the praxeological research on meaning looks for structure, more precisely, for the cognitive (emotional and bodily) processing of structured social experiences by way of meaning production. Praxeological research looks for content in relations, not for unconnected loose pieces.

Structured production—no repertoires

The interest in meaningful connections is the reason why mere *inventories or repertoires* of words, signs, practices, artifacts, and the like, are not sufficient for praxeology, neither to describe social praxis nor to describe the meaning of objects. Bourdieu underscores this with reference to Clyde Kluckhohn and states that two cultures can have the same inventory and, notwithstanding, can be completely different (Bourdieu 1974, 46f.). Further, Kluckhohn affirms that a mere list of "behavioral patterns" would be like a kind of map that simply lists the "mountains, rivers and lakes" but does not depict them in "their actual relationship to one another" (Kluckhohn 1963, 38).

In contrast, Bourdieu's basic concept of praxis—the human activity *between* the polarities of material and symbolic, embodied and objectified conditions—offers a consistent orientation to describe language and meaning within their structured social relations. The conditions of the social space, the fields, and the linguistic market, as well as the structured schemes of perception, judgment, and action of the actors along with their experience, constitute the conditions that orient and limit the *production* of meaning, practices, styles, and so forth (and thus the reproduction and the transformation of the said conditions). The linguistic circulation, the symbolic exchange is where these conditions come to bear and where meaning emerges.

Hence, in order to conceptualize and to study meaning, on the one hand, one should address the objective and subjective conditions of its production (habitus, fields, etc.). On the other hand, we have to consider practical relations—that is, the practical logic of discourses and other objectifications of language that operate the symbolic circulation and, thus, the effects of meaning.

Value—not abstraction

> The objective *meaning* [*sens objectif*] *engendered* in *linguistic circulation* is based, first of all, on the *distinctive value* [*valeur distinctive*] which results from the relationship that the speakers establish, consciously or unconsciously, between the *linguistic product* offered by a socially characterized speaker, and the *other products* offered simultaneously in a determinate *social space*. It is also based on the fact that the linguistic product is only completely realized as a *message* if it is treated as such, that is to say, if it is *decoded*, and the associated fact that the *schemes of interpretation* used by those receiving the message in their *creative appropriation* of the product offered may diverge, to a greater or lesser extent, from those which guided its production. Through these unavoidable effects, the market plays a part in shaping not only the symbolic value but also the meaning of discourse. (Bourdieu 2006, 38, G: 2005, 42, italics added; bracketed additions are taken from the French original version: 1982b, 15)

Bourdieu calls the distinctive value between the speakers the basic factor for meaning production. By virtue of the different positions of the speakers (and their styles) in the social space, in fields, and in the linguistic market, their utterances turn into symbolic goods with a socially distinctive value. Nevertheless, there is no simple objective production of meaning. Rather, the interpretation by the recipient plays an important role. A linguistic or semiotic product always has to be decoded by the receiver. Hence, objective meaning is engendered by the multiple generation of subjective meaning through the "schemes of interpretation" embodied in actors "in so far as each recipient helps to produce the message which he perceives and appreciates by bringing to it everything that makes up his singular and collective experience" (Bourdieu 2006, 38f., G: 2005, 42f.). As the receivers decode the messages, they recur to their experience; their social position is present in their interpretation by means of the dispositions of their habitūs.

In consequence, there is a triple generation of distinctive value. First, the interpretation of the message involves its difference from other interpretations, according to which the interpretation acquires its value and thereby it's meaning. Second, the interpretation involves taking a position that is different from other interpretations so that social value and meaning emerges. Finally, since the social position informs the interpretation of the actor, it objectively acquires a (semantically relevant) value in distinction to other social positions, their accumulated capital, their possibilities of action, and their power.

In order to depict the "mountains, rivers, and lakes" (Kluckhohn) of praxis with respect to the generation of meaning, on the following pages we specify in somewhat more detail the major factors that have impact on meaning production (see 3.1.3.3). We will narrow the focus of our reflections to language and meaning and proceed in line with Bourdieu's most basic systematic: the distinction between objective factors (social structures), embodied factors (habitus and practical sense), and relations (mediations according to practical logic). The notion of distinctive value will run along as we put forth the argument.

3.3.3.1 Structures—objective value / imposing value

"Discourse always owes its most important characteristics to the linguistic production relations within which it is produced" (Bourdieu 1977c, 647). These relations comprise almost any facet of praxis, emotions, and even the bodily hexis, insofar as language depends partly upon phonetics, and the body expresses the "whole relation to the social world" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 149, G: 1996, 184). For our purpose, however, the conditions of the cognitive production are of primary importance. Bourdieu lists these conditions quite clearly.

> Thus, what can be said and the way of saying it on a given occasion depend on the structure of the objective relationship between the positions of the sender and the receiver in the structure of the distribution of linguistic capital and the other kinds of capital [social space]. Every verbal expression—chatter between two friends, the 'official' statement of an 'authorized' spokesman, a scientific report—bears, in its form and content, the mark of the conditions which the field in question provides for the person who produces it, depending on the position he or she occupies in that field [fields]. The raison d' être of a discourse is never to be found entirely in the speaker's specifically linguistic competence [habitus]; it is to be found in the socially defined site from which it is uttered, i.e. in the relevant properties of a position within the field of class relations [social space] or within a particular field, such as the intellectual field or the scientific field… [fields]. In other words, the form and content of discourse depend on the capacity to express the expressive interests [habitus] attached to a position within the limits of the constraints of the censorship [linguistic market] that is imposed on the occupant of that position, i.e. with the required formality. (Bourdieu 1977c, 657)

The form as well as the semantic (and semiotic) content of any message depend on objective (social space, fields, linguistic market) and embodied (habitus, practical sense, interest) conditions of production and reception. These conditions provide the positions that turn the elements of a communicative relation into values—in other words, that turn them meaningful. Every verbal or semiotic expression (a felicitous *bonmot* or the admired new evening gown) is a meaningful product only by virtue of being a cluster of these conditions, which turn the expression into a value with regard to other expressions.

We interpret the quoted text in the following subsections with respect to semantic and semiotic aspects: first the social space, then the linguistic market, and finally the fields.

Social space: positional value

First, the most strongly objective conditions are those of class relations. These relations are modeled as the social space—that is, the present result of the past struggles for the distribution of capital (see vol. 2). In this space, the sender and receiver occupy relative positions, which objectively define the relation between them. As the space is structured according to both the total amount of capital and the structure of different sorts of capital, the positions are distinguished according to criteria of domination as well as of differentiation. The notion of social space allows one to relate the linguistic capital (the capacity to say acceptable content in an acceptable way) of each position to other forms of capital (economic, political, cultural, social, etc.), which are concentrated in that position. Income, schooling,

social status, political office, and so forth, emerge as conditioning factors of the linguistic performance of a given speaker and listener.

> Thus the differences which separate the classes on the plane of language … constitute a system of congruent signs of […] distinction, which arise from socially distinct and distinctive modes of acquisition. In a person's speech habits […] the memory of his or her origins […] is preserved and exposed. (Bourdieu 1977c, 659)

The strong connection between the social position and the linguistic style and habitus can be observed in "situations of stylistic collision" that occur "when a speaker finds himself confronted with a socially very heterogeneous audience" (Bourdieu 1977c, 657). The speaker can hardly comply with the demands of the linguistic market.

Linguistic market: exchange value

I think it is important to consider that Bourdieu's concept of the linguistic market was developed in order to explain *linguistic exchange* (Bourdieu 1977c). The concept should not be taken as another field that "exists" as distinct from politics, fashion, ice hockey, or religion. Bourdieu did not introduce the concept to isolate language functionally from religion or from economy. It is rather self-evident that language operates in any field of human praxis. The concept of market also does not state that language is a merely formal operation without any necessary employment of semantic content. In contrast, the model of a market for linguistic goods helps one to understand (with a specific reference to language and semiotic processes in general) that even a seemingly innocent symbolic production is influenced by power relations on the mere level of "speaking and listening." The linguistic operations obey rules of exchange that transmit a social value to them.

The said situation of utterance, while facing a heterogeneous audience, is coined (among other conditions) by specific demands of linguistic acceptability and other "censorships," which the market of linguistic goods exerts on every speaker. A certain content and way of expression will obtain a high price only from one part of the audience, while the other part will not value the content or expression.

The notion of the linguistic *market* refers, as distinct of the concept of fields, to the specific conditions of linguistic (semantic and semiotic) exchanges. This market is described as a "system of relations of force [...], which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and specific censorship, and thereby help fashion linguistic production by determining the 'price' of linguistic products" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 145, G: 1996, 180). A well-formed expression of the most acceptable content in a certain context will obtain the highest price and, thereby, increase the relative chances that the actors have to achieve their goals in that sit-

uation. Inversely, this operation depends on the strategic capacities of the habitūs, especially in anticipating the conditions of pricing. That is, "the practical anticipation of the price that my discourse will fetch contributes to determining the form and contents of my discourse" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 145, G: 1996, 180).

In Bourdieu's model of the linguistic market, the structuralist concept of systemic value of a sign is transformed. It becomes *exchange value* in comparison to other signs under two conditions. The first is that the utterances are competing with one another; and the second is that the specificities of different fields of praxis and the positions of the actors in the social space exert effects on the symbolic production. The exchange value of a sign (in the sense of the linguistic market) is the marginal value that the sign attains under given circumstances of inequality. Hence, in semiotic terms, certain properties of social actors, recognized as valuable, tend to function as symbolic capital

> bringing in dividends of distinction directly related to their rarity […]. All appearances notwithstanding, the value of the properties capable of functioning as symbolic capital lies not in any intrinsic characteristic of the practices or goods in question, but in their marginal value. (Bourdieu 1990b, 136, G: 2008, 249)

The initial structuralist concept of value, thus, undergoes a double transformation in praxeology. From this point of view, the value of a sign is anchored in a series of social praxis in general and, more specifically, in conditions of inequality, domination, competition, and struggle. The notion of value acquires a social-axiological connotation of power and legitimacy. In consequence, the question arises of who provides the axiological criteria of language (semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic). In a society of class, usually, the criteria are imposed by the well-off, the well schooled. The market is "dominated by the dominant, the holders of the legitimate linguistic competence" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 146, G: 1996, 180).

Communication thus is not a simple act of exchange of meaning. Rather, meaning operates and is produced under the aspect of its social value. Linguistic capacities turn into capital that can be inverted in linguistic exchange and the production of strategically implemented meaning. Thus, linguistic capital is capable of producing, by linguistic exchange, a "certain material or symbolic profit."[361]

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361 "Linguistic exchange—a relation of communication between a sender and a receiver, based on enciphering and deciphering, and therefore on the implementation of a code or a generative competence—is also an economic exchange which is established within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit" (Bourdieu 2006, 66, G: 2005, 73).

> In other words, utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to
> be understood and deciphered; they are also *signs of wealth*, intended to be evaluated
> and appreciated, and *signs of authority*, intended to be believed and obeyed. (Bourdieu
> 2006, 66, G: 2005, 73)

This is, according to our understanding, to say that the meaning of signs *also*, among other things, derives from deciphering these signs, taking into consideration the conditions of wealth and authority that the signs are used in.

The aspect of the conditions of practical use of linguistic utterances, however, leads to the concept of field. According to our opinion, one can only understand the production of meaning, as well as the consent or dissent over it, as due to the dynamics of specific fields of social praxis, such as religion, politics, or economy. While formal aspects of linguistic utterances, such as grammaticality, might outweigh those of semantic contents in the formation of prices according to the model of a linguistic market, in the fields "pricing" is different.[362]

Fields of praxis: use value

Alongside the class relations, the positions of actors in different fields (such as the economic, religious, political, etc.) bear effects on the social use of language, on the success of utterances, and on the profit obtained by language use. Still, it is not a profit simply of linguistic distinction but also a profit in terms of the *governing sort of capital* in the corresponding field: money, political power, religious credibility, etc. Thus, "the relevant properties of a position within … a particular field, such as the intellectual field or the scientific field" (Bourdieu 1977c, 657) are important for the use of language in that field. This circumstance confers a more important role to semantics. In fields, a social struggle for different goods develops according to particular practical logics. This implies that the issues debated in the field are defined by names, and even the naming itself is an object of struggle. The correct word—for example, a technical term in the scientific field—and its factual adequacy can decide much more over a felicitous and effective (*treffsicher*) performance of an actor than the form of the expression can. To put it simply, a religious believer might communicate to formal perfection with the personnel manager of a bank, but if he calls the financial system the realm of the devil, then he will hardly be given a job.

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362 Bourdieu's terminology of market and field is often difficult to distinguish. We will have to establish an unequivocal use of the terms. Bourdieu's distinction between linguistic and social capacities (both active in determined fields) may serve as an orientation for this distinction. Linguistic and social capacities have to go together in order to produce meaning.

Meaning also plays an important role in other aspects of the field theory. The important *conversions* and transformations between fields are operated by carriers and transformers of meaning (such as metaphors and polysemy), and the corresponding processes generate new meaning and action opportunities (Bourdieu 2006, 118ff., G: 2005, 112ff.). Beyond this, the dynamics of the fields also are shaped by the *struggle* between orthodox and heterodox positions. He actors on these positions wrestle for the definition of the vision and division of the world—to a high degree a semantic struggle.

Finally, within the dynamics of fields, linguistic operations are oriented mainly towards the practical effects that they have on the production and the struggles that govern a given field. While this fact does not exclude the form and exchange of meaning, it nevertheless draws attention forcefully to the *use value* of meaning. In relation to the practical dynamics of a field—for instance, production in the economic field—linguistic utterances simply attain value by being useful or not useful for the field-specific form of praxis. Normally, utterances attain this usefulness not by grammatical correctness but by an adequate semantic content that elicits effects in the practical processes of the field. In this sense, the use value of a sign resembles very much Wittgenstein's concept of signs as tools in practical use. For instance, in a debate about the Eucharist, an argument for transubstantiation may be presented in awkward grammar; as long as it demonstrates good reasons in the adequate semantic, it attains practical usefulness and use value for the debate. The semantic content represents the practical use value of a linguistic utterance (or a semiotic practice). The content is realized only in processes of production and consumption in a given field. Similar to the use value of a material good, semantic content constitutes the material content of a linguistic utterance in terms of its usefulness for a practical process. In a second instance, the good or the semantic content and its use value enter into relations of exchange. First, the use value may foster a determinate position in an objective competition or struggle in the field. In our example of the debate on the Eucharist, the argument might strengthen the realist fraction as against the nominalist. Second, the semantic use value may turn into a linguistic exchange value, if a certain semantic content (such as transubstantiation), by the dominant can be established as the legitimate content to be used in a certain regard (and the use of another term is sanctioned).

In sum, with a grain of salt, we can establish the following difference between the models (not between real social realms!) of linguistic market and fields of praxis with regard to meaning. In relation to fields of praxis, we conceive of the meaning of linguistic utterances or semiotic practices primarily in terms of semantics as use value for the practical processes in and between the fields. In relation to the model

of a linguistic market, we conceive of meaning primarily in terms of form and the social exchange value that utterances have in comparison to other utterances.

3.3.3.2   Habitus—embodied value/knowing how to value

The relations of the production of discourse not only encompass the objective conditions of the social space, the fields, and the linguistic market. The habitus is the condition on the subjective side of the process of meaning production. Here, we use the term *habitus* as a cipher for a complex interplay of different dispositions and schemes. As such a cipher, the term also refers to the operations of the practical sense—a term Bourdieu employs as to underscore the interdependency of the conditions of fields and the actors, who are caught in the games on the fields by vivid interest and almost by their entire existence (see vol. 2). In this sense, the concept of *habitus* here allows us to refer globally to all the processes, on the side of the actor, which we examine under the aspect of meaning production.

Bourdieu models the linguistic production and the circulation of meaning as the relation between linguistic habitus and the markets where the linguistic products are offered. Consistent with the concept of praxis, habitus and objective structures interrelate in meaning production: the habitus as the embodied, and thus transformed, social structure; and the markets as the objectified history of the social game, and thus as the social structures that engender the demand, the supply, and the consumption of meaning.

> Every *speech act* and, more generally, every *action*, is a conjuncture, an *encounter between independent causal series*. On the one hand, there are the socially constructed dispositions of the *linguistic habitus*, which imply a certain *propensity* to speak and to say *determinate things* (the *expressive interest*) and a certain *capacity* to speak, which involves both the *linguistic capacity* to generate an infinite number of grammatically correct discourses, and the *social capacity* to use this competence adequately in a *determinate situation*. On the other hand, there are the structures of the linguistic *market*, which impose themselves as a system of specific *sanctions* and *censorships*. This simple model of linguistic production and circulation, as the relation between linguistic habitus and the markets on which they offer their products, does not seek either to challenge or to replace a strictly linguistic analysis of the code. But […] it tries to give an adequate account of discourse in all its conjunctural singularity. (Bourdieu 2006, 37f., G: 2005, 41f., italics added; similar in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 145, G: 1996, 179f.)

As we have already addressed the linguistic market and other objective conditions, we will concentrate here on the habitus.

On the following pages, we will interpret the above quoted text: first with regard to linguistic habitus, second with regard to interest and capacity, and third with regard to dispositions and fields.[363]

Linguistic habitus

Above (3.1.3.3), we have already said that *linguistic habitus* is not to be understood as an entity apart from other habitus—just as there are no substantial entities such as an "emotional, religious, economic, or bodily habitus.

The capacity to speak, to signal, to utter grammatically correct sentences, to communicate felicitously, to ascribe meaning, and so forth, is simply an analytically distinguishable function of *habitus* (a concept that is nothing more than a model of certain observable regularities of human existence). In the wording of praxeological theory, the concept of *linguistic habitus* refers to specific dispositions (and their operations) that are linked to other dispositions within the dispositional network. The concept of linguistic habitus acquires its full analytical power precisely when it is related to other dimensions of "the" habitus—in other words, when the activities of linguistic dispositions are seen in relation to the activities of other dispositions.

Given that the "form and content of what can be and is said depend" partly on the linguistic habitus (Bourdieu 1977c, 656), the dispositions of the habitus, insofar as they are linguistic, are conceived as storing material knowledge (semantic content) in the form of linguistic signs. This concept of linguistic habitus, via its dispositions, presupposes a wide and complex interaction of linguistic dispositions (of whatever content) with any other kind of disposition embodied by a given actor. Saying *linguistic habitus* simply means that one is addressing that immense, complex diversity of dispositional operations from the perspective of language. In consequence, the linguistic habitus comprises particular capacities of the actors, such as their *competence*, *propensity*, interest, and strategies—everything under the perspective of language, linguistic utterances, and meaning.

Interest, expression, and capacity

Bourdieu highlights that for the linguistic habitus the expressive interest of the actors, their propensity and capacity to speak, is an important function.

The *expressive interest* of actors is conceived as their *propensity* or inclination to perceive, judge, and (linguistically) act in a specific way. With regard to their participation in a given field of praxis, this means a particular practical interest. The proximity of interest, inclination, and propensity is significant for praxeology.

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363 The italics in the text of the next subsections refer to the above quoted text.

The praxeological concept of interest is anchored in the theory of habitus. It differs from the rational choice concept of interest in utility maximization by rationally designed tactics. The theory of habitus contemplates a nonrationalist concept of the rationality of action. It allows one to relate dispositions, strategies, and interests in a much more subtle way. "Interest" can be conceived of as implicit or explicit (conscious and calculating or unconscious and automatic). However, in either case interest is objectively orientated in objective goals through the interplay between field and habitus. With regard to speech or any other symbolic practice, Bourdieu describes this interest as an expressive interest.

Expression in the speech act takes place when dispositions of the habitus operate in the generation of utterances according to the relevant practical logic. Expression closely relates to the operations of externalization of the dispositions (vol. 2), such as discourse (naming) or symbolic violence. Thus, expression renders the speaking actors present in the corresponding field and linguistic market. The expressive interest is realized in saying (or somehow signaling) *determinate things*. It is semantically defined by these *things*, it is "filled," it is defined by the content of the expression. Thus, the expressive interest is realized by expressing certain semantic (or semiotic) content in a certain situation in a certain way. Since there is no abstract action, beyond the interrelation of habitus and field, a communication deprived of content or of form is impossible for praxeological sociology.

Capacity is a further condition that habitūs provide for meaning production. Since the embodied dispositions correspond to the objective praxis that the actors have been socialized in, their habitus are equipped with innumerable dispositions of perception, judgment, and action. Every disposition, in a network, is linked widely and variably to a multiplicity of other dispositions. The *capacity* of these dispositions means that they are able to generate customarily and creatively adequate utterances for relevant markets and fields.

Bourdieu distinguishes *linguistic capacities from social capacities*. We interpret this distinction as corresponding to the (theoretical) difference between linguistic markets and fields. The specific linguistic capacity or competence refers to the skills necessary to dominate a particular significational system—for instance, a certain language or Braille. This *capacity* or *competence* entails the ability to realize the expressive interest in *grammatically correct discourses*.[364] To express *determinate things* in a correct way, it is necessary for the utterance to be correct in the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic dimensions of speech (and signification in general). From Bourdieu's perspective, a pragmatic function—oriented and limited by the fields of

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364 I do not think that the term "grammar" here is well understood in an exclusively formal sense, referring to syntax only.

praxis and the linguistic market—rules the syntactic and semantic functions that contribute to felicitous utterances. In other words, the pragmatic dimension (in a broad sense of the term) encompasses the social conditions and the social situation of the utterance, including the socially defined parameters of the correct syntax and of the words that make the point. For an expression to be felicitous, it has to be socially acceptable. Felicitousness ends up as a social category.

This is why the linguistic capacity goes in hand with the social capacity of performing *adequately in a determinate situation*. A situation, according to Bourdieu, cannot be conceived of as a momentary encounter between context-free subjects. It is rather an instant in the continuous temporal series of events in a given field, which is prestructured by the history of the struggles, the positions of the actors involved, as well as by the actors' (expressive) interests. This is why the *linguistic capacity* alone never suffices, but has to go together with the *social capacity*. Finally, both are anchored in the knowledge of the field, which is stored in the dispositions of the habitūs. In consequence, the fields and their games are the major conditioning factor for linguistic (and semiotic) practices as social practices.

In our opinion, this observation renders the model of a linguistic market subordinate to the model of fields.

Dispositions and fields—knowing how

Since the linguistic dispositions are objectively adapted to the games, which take place in the different *fields,* the actors are able to anticipate the right content and form of a linguistic utterance in order to ensure that the utterance is acceptable—that is, felicitous—in a given situation. However, the

> definition of acceptability is not in the situation but in the *relation between* a situation and a habitus which is itself the product of the whole history of its relationship with a particular system of selective reinforcements. (Bourdieu 1977c, 655f., italics added)

For us, it is important that the dispositions of the (linguistic) habitus engender a "sense of acceptability" (Bourdieu 2006, 77, G: 2005, 84) in a situation that is coined by the structure of the field in which it occurs, and by the overall social positions of the actors involved in it. By their sense of acceptability, the actors feel out the situational conditions of reception for a concrete speech act that they are going to utter.

In consequence, the production of acceptable and effective (*treffsicher*) linguistic utterances presupposes the recognition of an effective demand of such utterances in the situation (and thus the "conjuncture" [*conjuncture*] of the field). In other words, in order to be able to utter an acceptable content in an acceptable form, the actor must be able to recognize the specific demand for meaning that arises in the specific

state of the game in which the actor is engaged. In consequence, one can say that the linguistic (and semiotic) dispositions of an actor and the relevant state of the field articulate with each other as a demand for and a supply of adequate meaning.

This relation of habitus and fields, however, is shaped by objective relations of *power* in the relevant fields as well as in society at large (social space). These relations between dominant and dominated actors become embodied in the dispositions of both dominant and dominated actors as a "sense of their place." This sense for one's own position takes effect on the linguistic capacities, competences, propensities, and strategies. In view of the society at large, the ruling class (the well-off, the well schooled, the influential in the media) defines the linguistic standards so that this class' "linguistic habitus is the realization of the norm." In contrast, the dominated classes have "to choose between negatively sanctioned outspokenness and silence" and the "petty-bourgeois speakers are condemned to an anxious striving for correctness" (Bourdieu 1977c, 658). Power relations in the fields refract the overall distribution of social power according to the particular logics of the fields.

These social power relations translate into linguistic praxis. We can observe field-specific "authorized languages" (Bourdieu 1977c, 648ff.; 2006, 107ff., G: 2005, 101ff.). Often, it is the orthodox dominant position in a field that coins and represents the authoritative language. The dominant actors "incarnate the linguistic norm" (Bourdieu 1977c, 659). Therefore, they themselves enjoy ease and mastery of language and semiotic expression. Simultaneously, they engender for the other actors (who are not so well provided for) a high "tension between recognition and mastery" constantly bringing these actors into situations in which they either have to strive for "additional linguistic resources" (Bourdieu 1977c, 651) or have to establish an alternative: a heterodox position, including discourse, strategy, identity, and habitus.

The generation of an alternative position especially renders evident that which also pertains to the other positions: In the context of linguistic and semiotic exchange, any social position translates into a specific demand for meaning and, in competence with the others, a supply of meaning.

3.3.3.3 Relation—contesting values

Linguistic expressions mediate, in different ways, the relation between the objective social conditions and the embodied, habitualized conditions of praxis. Therefore, the "form and content of what can be and is said depend on the relationship between a language habitus […,] a language market" (Bourdieu 1977c, 656, similar 662), fields of praxis, and the social space. The relations between them are the key. Inasmuch as linguistic operations mediate this relation, they function according to the practical logic that governs the entire array of practices and effects, which take place in this relation (see vol. 2). Each of these practices is associated with a position in relation

to other positions. Therefore, the practice represents a value that conveys a meaning to the position. Since the social conditions involve inequality and the struggle for scarce material and symbolic goods, the positions are contested, and so are value and meaning, which the positions represent with regard to other positions.

In other words, seen from the perspective of linguistic (and semiotic) praxis, the conditions for meaning production described by the concepts of social space, linguistic market, fields, and habitus point to the dynamics of linguistic and semiotic demand and supply as praxis. The attention shifts to the circulation of language and meaning ascription that operates between the material conditions of existence, the practical struggles for different forms of capital, the regularities of unequal linguistic and semiotic exchange, as well as the actors' experiences and their (implicit and explicit) interpretations by means of the schemes of perception, judgment, and action that they embody.

More particularly, we are focusing here on some traits of the linguistic mediation between structure and habitus. That is, we indirectly observe operations of the practical logic. Language appears as a practical operator that realizes a labor of reproduction and transformation of praxis and thus transforms cognitive dispositions of the habitus as well as social structures.

In this subsection, we will outline some central aspects of linguistic praxis, such as the power relations in linguistic exchange, the operation of naming, the labor of language, and the dynamics of the demand and supply of meaning.

Linguistic exchange, power, and struggle

Relations of social exchange are shaped by power and struggle. This does not only apply to the "hard" social relations, such as the distribution of goods or physical violence. It also applies to the symbolic and, thus, linguistic relations.

> In order to break with this social philosophy [Saussurean structuralism, HWS] one must show that, although it is legitimate to treat social relations—even relations of domination—as symbolic interactions, that is, as relations of communication implying cognition and recognition, one must not forget that the relations of communication par excellence—linguistic exchanges—are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized. In short, one must move beyond the usual opposition between economism and culturalism, in order to develop an economy of symbolic exchanges. (Bourdieu 2006, 37, G: 2005, 41)

The exchanges that operate with meaning reproduce and transform the social distribution of power. The struggle over the meaning of the world is a struggle over the world, since this struggle determines the perceptions, judgments, and actions of the actors in different positions. The two main operational directions

of semantic and semiotic operations, as represented for instance in a discourse, respond to the social positions of the actors involved—that is, to their (objective and embodied) differences of power. On the one hand, the actors perceive and judge their (social) experience according to both their own position and the positions that they perceive. On the other hand, the symbolic (linguistic) and physical action of the actors is (objectively and subjectively) adapted to the opportunities and constraints, which the power relations impose upon the actors. Thus, language fulfills an objective social function.

> It is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and knowledge that 'symbolic systems' fulfill their political function, as instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another (symbolic violence) by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them and thus by contributing, in Weber's terms, to the 'domestication of the dominated'. (Bourdieu 2006, 167)

The structures of language and the corresponding utterances (especially the structured semantic content) objectively function as social and political instruments. However, they do so not only for legitimation and domination, but also for delegitimation and resistance.

The important issue for the praxeological study of language is the following. If relations of social power and struggle are mediated linguistically, this mediation cannot happen without a corresponding semantic content. Inversely, the semantic content acquires its meaning through its position and operational function in the linguistic utterance and in the social conditions of domination in which the utterance operates. This has consequences for words.

Content, naming, and pretended neutrality

As for *semantic content*, the power of words does not reside simply in their conventional meaning as such. However, this power does not completely depend on the ascribed power of the speaker either. The power that words can exert in a given moment arises from a combination of various factors. The conventional content of an utterance is combined with other semantic content, with the relation between the positions of the speakers involved, with the conjuncture of forces in the relevant field of praxis, with the relations of recognition (and misrecognition), with formal linguistic constraints, and with accidental situational circumstances. In any case, informed by these relations, it is the words, the semantic content that exerts power.

Semantic content exerts a specific power through *naming*. It assigns names to things and to relations, which qualify these things and their relations, within a system of axiological schemes agreed upon commonly or at least by a group with

a certain social position. According to Bourdieu, naming is an almost magical act that can officialize accidental states of affairs and create social actors by identification and, thus, boundary drawing (see e.g., Bourdieu 2006, 224, G: 2005, 125). By naming, an actor can even turn visible, and qualify social relations that have been kept invisible. However, even if naming operates so ostensibly with semantic content, the power and effectiveness (*Treffsicherheit*) of the ascription arises from a double relational condition. First, effectiveness stems from the meaning that the act of naming confers to a certain social relation (calling a certain individual a heretic, for instance); second, effectiveness stems from the social relations within which the act of naming takes place (e.g., a session of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Rome).

Inversely, the structure of power hardly permits semantic contents to be innocent, neutral with regard to social relations of inequality and power. First, there is *no social neutrality*. This may best be clarified by means of the example of programmatic neutrality. Programmatic neutrality is not neutral if dominant actors highlight their neutrality and press for consensus. Such a consensus is a

> fundamental agreement concerning the meaning or sense of the social world [*accord fundamental sur le sens du monde social*] (thus converted into the doxic, natural world) which is based on agreement concerning the principles of di-vision. (Bourdieu 2006, 131, F: 1982b, 154, G: 2005, 134)

This consensus is an agreement about the meaning of the social world between two groups of actors who do not share the same social world—if one considers each group's living conditions, such as working time, healthcare, life expectancy, education, leisure activities, social security, etc. However, as a socially produced and shared common meaning of the world, consensus will stifle any attempt to detect ruptures in the social world. Thus, neutrality and consensus are not neutral; they are operators of an equality believed in by unequal actors. In consequence, postulated neutrality is a form of veiled partisanship. Only revealed positionality—in terms of a self-critical "*Realpolitik* of reason" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 174ff., G: 1996, 212ff.)—conveys the chance to develop a relative neutrality.

Second and similarly, there is no universal semantics, *no neutral word*. Bourdieu refers to the use of expressions of taste in surveys. He points out that the "word *soigne* (neat, clean, conscientious), for example, used approvingly by the petits-bourgeois, is rejected by intellectuals" (Bourdieu 2006, 40, G: 2005, 44). The meaning of words is produced by its usage from a specific position within unequal conditions of symbolic and material exchange. Meaning is generated by this differential social value, and it conveys this value to the different social situations in which it is used: as an operator of contempt in the relation between the intellectual and the petty

bourgeois, but also as an operator of self-appreciation and distinction in the relation between the petty bourgeois and the unemployed worker.

Another effect of meaning that neutralizes the claim of a neutral language is the normative use and understanding of descriptive words. "Even the most strictly constative scientific description is always open to the possibility of functioning in a prescriptive way." The use of notions like "equilibrium" in the economic sciences, for instance, consecrates a certain economic praxis, instead of describing states of economy (Bourdieu 2006, 134, G: 2005, 137). In this sense, the use of words can acquire the performative power of self-fulfilling prophecies, creating the social realities they pretend to describe by structuring the schemes of the social actors' perception, judgment, and action.

Labor of language, crises, and style

We conceive of the multiple functions that linguistic practices exert in the relation between habitus and structures as *labor of language*. This concept approaches *symbolic social action* combining the views of Humboldt, Cassirer, and Marx.[365]

Bourdieu highlights for instance the crucial importance of "the labour of enunciation" (Bourdieu 2006, 129, G: 2005, 133) that "names the unnamed." With "meaningful words," the "labor of dramatization," and "prophecy," destroys the doxa of a field and creates a new, heretic position. Language is an operator of social cognition and recognition as well as of social transformation. Language takes different forms and different modes of operating in practical logic. The most important mode is the labor of representation, which Bourdieu often refers to, especially with regard to social identities and movements (Bourdieu 2006, 26, 90, 130, 234, G: 2005, 29, 133). Language can also operate in the "labour of codification and normalization" (Bourdieu 2006, 48, G: 2005, 53) of "inculcation" (Bourdieu 2006, 61, G: 2005, 67f.), of "politeness" (Bourdieu 2006, 80, G: 2005, 87), or of "naturalization" (Bourdieu 2006, 248, G: 1985a, 36).

"Labor of language" is a scientific metaphor for the reproductive, creative, and transformative use of language in praxis. The notion makes language the subject of the transformational and creative activity, of labor. Labor of language takes place when, for example, the "polysemy of religious language" produces the "ideological effect of the unification of opposites or denial of divisions" (Bourdieu 2006, 40, G: 2005, 44), and thus creates a unified "Church" for all those actors who classify their experience of the institution according to the criterion of unity. In the broad semiotic sense of the term, the labor of language operates *mutatis mutandis* in all the other forms of symbolic activities to which Bourdieu refers, be it representation,

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365 Indeed, the concept is also used by Ricoeur (1974, 95) in a remarkably similar way.

inculcation, naturalization, or the generation and use of symbolic capital. Thus, the labor of language has an impact on the schemes of perception and judgment and constitutes reality for the actors involved. The power to constitute reality is particularly strong in religious and political language and "never clearer than in situations of crisis" (Bourdieu 2006, 129, G: 2005, 132).

Crises can be conceived as intense marginal cases of a constant transformation of subjective and objective reality. In crisis situations the conditions of production and transformation of meaning, of structuring experiences according to established schemes of perception and judgment, transform much more rapidly than normal. On the one hand, the actors have to rely more on the habitualized schemes; on the other hand, the constraints and censorships in the fields and the linguistic market are, at least, conjuncturally lower. So it is "no accident that political crises (or, at another level, interaction crises) are conducive to verbal explosion" (Bourdieu 1977c, 663). This phenomenon provokes a particularly intense labor of language that may lead to a more or less violent and profound reorganization of the customary forms of symbolic and material circulation and domination. Heuristically speaking, crises are therefore particularly well-suited conditions for studying the practical dynamics of the labor of language.

Another product of the labor of language relies more on continuity than on rupture. This product is *linguistic style.* Linguistic style combines the operations of expression and perception in the production of collectively shared objective markers of social positions. The production of an expressive style depends on the interplay between the expressive dispositions and the practices of one group of actors and the dispositions of perception and evaluation (recognition) of another group of actors.[366]

In consequence, the linguistic goods that circulate on the linguistic market and produce communication and practices on fields are stylistically formed discourses. "What circulates on the linguistic market is not 'language' as such, but rather *discourses* that are *stylistically marked* both in their *production*,… and in their reception" (Bourdieu 2006, 39, G: 2005, 43).

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366 Style is "a *being-perceived* which exists only in relation to *perceiving subjects*, endowed with the diacritical *dispositions* which enable them to make distinctions between different ways of saying, distinctive manners of speaking. It follows that style, whether it be a matter of poetry as compared with prose or of the diction of a particular (social, sexual or generational) class compared with that of another class, exists only in relation to *agents* endowed with *schemes of perception and appreciation* that enable them to constitute it as a set of systematic differences, apprehended syncretically" (Bourdieu 2006, 38f., G: 2005, 42f.).

These discourses mark different social positions through meaningful properties, reproduced by those who share the positions, and recognized (or rejected) by those who perceive the positions and their ascribed properties. (One can observe this multiple relation of ascription, recognition, misrecognition, and disapproval most markedly by the role the royals play for some European societies or by the role of the pope for the Catholic Church.) As for language, these stylistic properties organize entire "systems of difference" from the "social value" of expressive linguistic differences—for example, "between prosodic and articulatory or lexical and syntactic variants." Finally, those who have a practical sense for these distinctions apprehend "social classes through classes of stylistic indices" (Bourdieu 2006, 54, G: 2005, 60).

Demand and supply

The labor of language is productive. Among other things, it produces meaning. As meaning production, in *praxeology,* links back to Humboldt, Cassirer, and Marx, cognitive and social processes enter in synergy by this labor. Meaning answers to demands, transforms them and create new demands.

The relation between *habitus and market* or field corresponds perfectly to this logic. For instance, there are suppliers of religious discourses and a demand from lay people for a religious interpretation of their conditions of existence. The discourse is the supply for the demand. However, this is not to insinuate that the idea of meaning is a product like a box of cornflakes: readily packed by the producer, it finds its way to the supermarket where it competes with other boxes of cornflakes, and finally meets the demand of a consumer who buys it.

In contrast, meaning is not a product finished by a producer. Meaning is rather generated *between* the different factors involved in rather complex relations. Bourdieu ascribes the dynamics between demand and supply to his basic distinction between habitus and market (or field). "Every speech act and […] every action" can be conceived as the relation or "the encounter between two independent causal series" (Bourdieu 2006, 37f., G: 2005, 41f.). One is the series by which the dispositions of the habitūs can be modeled; the other is the series of the objective social conditions relevant for the utterances, practices, and so forth. In the *relation* between habitus and social conditions, meaning is produced. Meaning results from the constructive labor that relates experiences of the empirical manifold with the cognitive (emotional and bodily) schemes of the habitūs. In other words, meaning is constantly produced as the dispositions of perception, judgment, and action process the "invitations and threats" presented by the dynamics of the different fields—mediated, among other things, by the linguistic market-value of the discourses employed.

3.3.3.4   The theoretical program

As far as language and meaning are concerned, the praxeological approach conveys particular advantages, especially the possibility of conceiving language as an operator of the subjective and objective factors of meaning production and additionally, as a mediator between both embodied and objective factors—language as an operator of practical logic and practical sense. The concentration on practical logic and sense as well as on their transformative power, operated partly through the labor of language (and not the ritualistic repetition of an essentialist concept of "the habitus" as a magical formula), definitely furthers a relational understanding of many other praxeological terms and helps to

> transcend the alternative of energetic models, which describe social relations as relations of force, and cybernetic models, which turn them into relations of communication, only by describing the laws of transformation which govern the transmutation of the different kinds of capital into symbolic capital, and in particular the labour of dissimulation and transfiguration (in a word, of euphemization) which secures a real transubstantiation of the relations of power by rendering recognizable and misrecognizable the violence they objectively contain and thus by transforming them into symbolic power, capable of producing real effects without any apparent expenditure of energy. (Bourdieu 2006, 170)

This scientific interest points to what Bourdieu calls a "structural sociology of language." This program is coined in a passage we would like to quote at the end of this chapter, since it points to further developments that we will deal with later on (vol. 2).

> A system of *sociologically pertinent* linguistic oppositions tends to be constituted, which has nothing in common with the system of *linguistically pertinent* linguistic oppositions […]. However great the proportion of the functioning of a language that is not subject to variation, there exists, in the area of pronunciation, diction [lexicon, *lexique*] and even grammar, a whole set of differences significantly associated with social differences which, though negligible in the eyes of the linguist, are pertinent from the sociologist's standpoint because they belong to a system of linguistic oppositions which is the *re-translation* of a system of social differences. A structural sociology of language, inspired by Saussure but constructed in opposition to the abstraction he imposes, must take as its object the relationship between the structured systems of sociologically pertinent linguistic differences and the equally structured systems of *social differences.* (Bourdieu 2006, 54, G: 2005, 60; bracketed addition taken from the French original version: 1982b, 41)

While the whole program does not need more comments after the considerations of the present chapter, there are two details, which deserve a short note. First, Bourdieu

refers to "lexicon"[367] as one of the important features of language for praxis. Hence, semantics is important. The other point is that the socio*logical* pertinence of linguistic utterances and semiotic systems is nothing else than the scientific effect of their *social* pertinence in the struggles of society. Simply said, the use of language and signs follows the operating principles of praxis.

In consequence, we can understand meaning as a transient result of the mediation between the habitus of the communicating actors, the content and form of the expression, the conditions of the fields involved, and the distribution of capital in the social space.

3.3   The meaning of meaning

This section focuses on theoretical aspects of the praxeological approach to meaning.

3.3.1   Boundaries in theory

Intellectualist approaches dismiss the social functions of listening and speaking. These approaches take language as a medium to be exclusively decoded and thus superimpose a scholastic approach to praxis.

Another mistaken approach to meaning is the shortcut conclusion from a given signifier to a supposed signified, which dictionaries of symbolism sometimes offer. Instead, it is necessary to additionally consider social context, form, and use of a signifier.

3.3.2   Epistemological premises focused on meaning

The relational epistemology of the praxeological approach to meaning is strictly sociological. In consequence, relational epistemology deals with two kinds of series. On the one hand, we deal with ontologically impure, but praxeologically pure, practical series. On the other hand, the distinction between habitus and field serves as an encompassing theoretical orientation. Both perspectives combine well in empirical research. For the theoretical concept of meaning, this implies that meaning "resides" nowhere but is constantly produced in practical relations.

Difference, position, and meaning are codependent in praxeology. Distinctive positions of cases in point appear in at least two different series: one is homogenous in terms of logical or ontological class (between different works of art), and the other series derives from the relation between a work and its social context (field of arts). The terms of a distinction are not empty but enter the relation with their conventional social meaning.

Similarity and meaning are also codependent in praxeology. Important operations of the practical logic and practical sense, such as polysemy and metaphor, establish paradigmatic relations between different (syntagmatic) series. Thus, these operations produce similarities that may even serve for the conversion of capital between different fields.

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367   *Lexique* was translated as *diction* and not as *lexicon*.

Propositions, instead of single concepts, are the smallest unit of analysis adequate for a praxeological approach to meaning.

3.3.3 Social structures, habitus, and meaning production

Praxeological research on meaning has to focus on structures, the combination of terms, not on inventories or repertoires. Accordingly, this research has to interpret terms (content) as value in different social systems of relations.

Social structures—objective value:
The form and semantic content of any message depend on objective (social space, fields, linguistic market) and embodied (habitus, interest) conditions of production and reception. The social space conveys a positional value to utterances, insofar as the conditions of the positions (capital amount and structure) involved in communication establish unequal relations between the speakers.

The linguistic market is not a field apart. Rather, the concept models the function of linguistic exchange in general. Utterances receive an exchange value. The criteria for the value ascription are defined by the dominant, especially the well schooled. Under this condition, linguistic capacity turns into a capital that can be invested to obtain profits (in different fields).

In the fields of praxis, the meaning of an utterance causes effects on the practical processes of the respective field. This implies that, in relation to fields, the semantic content becomes more important and is understood in terms of its practical use value.

Habitus—embodied value:
A linguistic habitus is not an entity apart from supposedly other reified habitūs. The concept of habitus generally ought to be conceived of as a vast network of highly different dispositions. In consequence, the (model) term of linguistic habitus permits one to address competence, propensity, interest, strategy, and other operations of habitūs under the particular perspective of language. A linguistic habitus encompasses an expressive interest and the capacity to linguistically realize that interest. Interest is anchored in the dispositions of the habitus (and is not conceived according to rational Choice). Expression externalizes the dispositions of the habitus according to the conditions of the fields and the linguistic market.

The dispositions and fields are articulated with one another through the sense of acceptability that the actors have. Their practical sense realizes the relationship between the effective demand for meaning and the adequate supply. However, this relations is not exempt from domination. The social power relations translate into linguistic praxis as the tension between the legitimate language of the ruling class (in fields or in the overall society), the linguistic striving of the middle class, and the silence of the lower class—or the formation of linguistic heterodoxies.

Relation—contesting values:
The mediation of language between embodied and objective conditions of existence by way of linguistic practices shifts to the center of attention.

Linguistic exchange is a means of mediating social power relations. The "structured and structuring instruments of communication" (Bourdieu) fulfill an objective political function of domination or of resistance.

Semantic content can become socially powerful, because it operates within a wide array of social relations that convey specific and effective meaning. Hence, naming turns out to be a powerful semantic operation. Naming may even engender social groups. Inversely, neutral positions and neutral words are not possible under the conditions of social power relations.

The labor of language is an important concept that goes back to the traditions of Humboldt, Marx, and Cassirer. The concept refers to the productive and creative operations of language for the construction of objective social reality. The labor of language turns particularly visible in crises. In these situations of discontinuity, the labor of language can foster the creation of groups and even explosive (linguistic) outbursts. Linguistic styles, to the contrary, are created by a continuous labor that organizes symbolic markers of social positions in commonly recognized systems.

The dynamics of the demand for and the supply of meaning are a decisive factor for a creative production of meaning.

The theoretical program:
The concentration on the operations of the practical logic and the practical sense opens a particularly promising approach to a "structural sociology of language," which Bourdieu postulates. In consequence, meaning can be understood as the (transient) result of the mediation between the habitus of the communicating actors, the content and form of the expressions, the conditions of the fields involved, and the distribution of capital in the social space.

Conclusions and perspectives

In the present book, we have outlined epistemological conditions, empirical procedures, and hints to the theoretical framework of Bourdieu's approach to meaning. In spite of the opinion of some of his readers, we have seen that Bourdieu indeed studies semantic and semiotic contents and that he develops a praxeological way to do so. This approach is visible mainly in his empirical works. In theoretical terms, Bourdieu's sociological transformation of the relationist (respectively structuralist) tradition introduced elements from the Humboldtian school, from ordinary language philosophy, and (with the notion of "labor of language") even some traits of a genetic hermeneutics. On the other hand, his polemical focus on his structuralist antecedents forestalls the proactive development of a praxeological theory of meaning.

From the theoretical perspective, one could say that Bourdieu steps into the trap of his own polemics. On the one hand, he names Humboldt and the respective tradition as one of his sources—given that semantics is a central concern of this current of language research. On the other hand, his attacks against semantics (as prevalent in France in the sixties and seventies) are not very differentiated and end up in a polemic even against Austin. While it is true that an understanding of semantics as opus operatum does not serve praxeology, however, it is not plausible that the modus operandi of language should be reduced to mere functional aspects related to the position of a speaker. Possibly it is due to this trap in the French scientific field that Bourdieu did not develop a method for the qualitative analysis of habitus.[368] In any case, as we have seen above (3.2.2), some critics of Bourdieu's work on language have drawn the consequences and highlighted some shortcomings in this respect.

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368 He reflects only in the late years on understanding (*verstehen*) in the sense of a qualitative sociological approach to linguistic utterances (interviews) of social actors. See Bourdieu et al. 1999, G: 1998.

Nevertheless, Bourdieu's praxeology conveys excellent conditions for sociological research on semantics and semiotics. Particularly Searle mentioned the benefits of habitus theory. This theory facilitates studying meaning in its social use, employing structural means to reconstruct meaning as a modus operandi of the dispositions of the habitūs in the context of the operations of practical logic. The concept of meaning as modus operandi, which we are going to advance in our method, has nothing to do with the idea of meaning as an essence of something or as a property "attached" to something. We rather conceive meaning as a relational and productive occurrence between the symbolic and the material relations of actors, as well as between the embodied and objectified factors of praxis. Following the dynamics of perception, judgment, and action orientation (vol. 2), meaning is constructed as a third unit, active in the production of (embodied and objective) social reality—in other words, not as *ergon* but as as *energeia* (Bourdieu 1990b, 94, G: 2008, 172). Hence, with regard to the actors meaning has to be modeled as a *transformation* between experience and interpretation—that is, as processing experience by perception, judgment, and action orientation.

In our concluding observations and the perspectives for modeling and further work, we can presuppose that the hitherto exposition has already shown some landmarks for a praxeological approach to meaning. At this point, we take up some critical remarks (see 3.2.2) as impulses for enhancement. First, we refer to remarks on language and then to remarks on Bourdieu's concept of habitus. We finish this part with perspectives for modeling (that will be realized in vol. 3).

Language

With regard to language, we will enlarge upon various criticisms of Bourdieu's work. In view of our methodological aim, we will address the issues of meaning as interpretation, the power and the labor of language, the relation between classification and value judgment, as well as the issue of the social reality of convictions.

Critics: interpretation and power

In this section, we refer back to the critics of Bourdieu's work as far as language is concerned (see 3.2.2).

Thompson: interpretation

While Bourdieu constantly interprets meaning and simultaneously negates doing so, from Thompson's congenial critique of Bourdieu, in a general sense, one can conclude that praxeological theory should develop a fully fledged sociological theory and method of *interpretation*, setting out from the focus on classifications. Sociology cannot do without a "creative interpretation of meaning." (Thompson 1984b, 66) Thompson is right in emphasizing that "linguistic products aim at saying something about something." If this is a truism even in propositional logic, how much more is it true for practical communication in ordinary language? In consequence, what an utterance means in the context of its use is very important for praxeology. For Thompson, scientific interpretation is the only way to grasp the meaning. For us the issue boils down to a combined praxeological analysis of qualitative and quantitative data, of meaning in the context of social structures.

Hanks: language, power, and a structural toolkit

Hanks' criticisms indicate the necessity of reappropriating language as (objectified) semantic creativity that operates in social exchange. This reappropriation implies a transformation of formalist semantics. In other words, formalist techniques (such as for example the semiotic square by Greimas, see vol. 3) ought to be transformed in such a way that they facilitate a controlled and fruitful integration of semantic analysis into praxeology.

For that purpose, according to Hanks, praxeology needs a viable system of conventional linguistic rules. We would like to add that a concept of shared semantic meaning would also be useful. Hanks is right: without knowing a *langue* (however socially ephemeral this knowledge might be) one cannot understand *parole*. We would like to add that one also cannot "do things with *parole*" alone (particularly not in the strategic mode of intentional infringement of common regularities). For a praxeological theory of language use, the idea of a socially created and recreated, power-shaped linguistic conventionality seems to be indispensable. What else should such a conventionality be, if not a function of a common semantic habitus among a given group of actors, or in other words, a common sense?

The tacit and habitualized social conventions on semantics are, as silent background, an objective condition of the possibility for outraged linguistic conflicts that take place and are spurred by ethnic or religious actors. It is due to the social conventionality of language that these breakdowns and crises of language, which Bourdieu describes on some occasions, can be dealt with, according to Hanks, as moments of special semantic creativity, as particular fructiferous "loci of production of meaning" (Hanks 2000, 168). These observations draw our attention to the role

of meaning for coping with contingency. Critical situations have to be interpreted, understood, and provided with meaning in order to become manageable. Moreover, the process of coping conveys the logic of demand and supply of meaning.

Hanks finds the best opportunities to advance praxeological thought for a better understanding of semantics just in the structuralist formalism in which praxeology takes root. Therefore, we take Hanks' expert linguistic observations as a double orientation for our purpose. First, instead of jumping to any scientific tradition, we will primarily look to the French structural tradition, for possibilities to advance the praxeological toolkit. Second, we will focus on developing a praxeological approach to semantics that allows for a feasible analytical method.

Issues: meaning, power, and reality

The issues that Bourdieu's critics stated with regard to meaning deserve some more consideration in view of our methodological aim.

Meaning as practical interpretation

Bourdieu is very unambiguous about the fact that, normally, people do not speak in order to be interpreted intellectually. Nevertheless, he knows well that any message has to be decoded by the receivers in order for the message to take effect (see 3.3.1). A practical interpretation of its meaning is necessary for any utterance to exert an effect. Hence, the study of meaning needs a concept of practical interpretation.

Accordingly, one of Thompson's major points of critique is the weak role of semantics in Bourdieu's systematic studies of the *ideological functions* of language. Especially Bourdieu's tendency to conceive the dominant system of classifications as imposed from above and operating mainly through the form of the classificational utterances and the position of the speakers, does not respond sufficiently to the

> complex series of mechanisms whereby meaning is mobilized, in the discursive practices of everyday life, for the maintenance of relations of domination. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to search for ways in which the theory of ideology can be linked with methods for the analysis of the discursive forms in which ideology is expressed. (Thompson 1984b, 63f.)

From our perspective, Thompson is perfectly right in stating that one of the crucial elements of discourse (and thus of its ideological function) is meaning and that therefore a praxeological method for the analysis is needed. In view of such a method, how can we conceptualize meaning in a praxeological way?

Over the course of our deliberations, it has become evident that meaning, from a praxeological point of view, can best be conceived as a *relational operator*. The semantic content, stored as cognitive dispositions, processes experiences by transforming them into meaningful events, thus producing new meaning that eventually produces new utterances and transforms the dispositions. Thus, meaning not only embraces linguistic but, in a broad sense, semiotic operations. Perception, judgment, and action orientation in cognitive, emotional, and bodily ways actively produce social reality as embodied, social, and material praxis. The dispositions and the operations of the practical sense and the practical logic operate in the "dialectics" (Bourdieu) *between* structure and habitus. In other words, the dialectics occur between historically constituted objective structures, the logic of praxis that they operate by, the practical sense by which the actors are linked to the social processes, and the embodied dispositions with their operational logic. Therefore, meaning is "deposited" neither in mental images nor in verbal signs, nor in physical objects; it is deposited neither in subjective convictions nor in institutionalized rules and procedures. Rather it is generated *between* these poles *as praxis* or, in other words, as different forms of *labor*: representation, naming, euphemization, identification, naturalization, oppression, violence, and the like. An appropriate method to grasp meaning empirically should be able to model and reconstruct the said transformational processes.

Put briefly with a praxeological formula, the relation between habitus and field produces meaning. "Every speech act and … every action"[369] (Bourdieu 2006, 37f., G: 2005, 41f.) imply the *synergy of habitus and fields*. We can understand meaning, in a praxeological sense, as a generative operation within the very relation between habitus and field (of the producers and the consumer alike). By means of the operation of semantic terms *in* the very act of encounter between dispositions and action in the field (the speech act), between the series of dispositions and the series of positions, the meaning of the act is generated *by* the operations that take place

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369 Such an action could be the exposition of a ritual object. The example of a ritual object is particularly interesting, inasmuch as the practitioners see a magical ritual as having its power over and its effect on the "external" reality by itself, by its substance, so to say. The relationist observation, instead, concedes this power and effect to be *socially* real, precisely by locating the power and effectiveness of the ritual object in two series of a completely different kind, which encounter in the ritual act and the object that is used for the act. The two series are the causal series of the beliefs that the object is situated in, and the causal series of the practices, situational circumstances, and field positions that constitute the social context in which the object is also situated. Hence, the social effectiveness of the ritual object is generated by the synergy of objective series in an object that is perceived by the practitioners (negating the series as such) as a "thing in itself with its own innate power."

in the act and *for* the actors involved. For the actors, the meaning of the act is its semantically named value given to the act by its position in the different series of the actors' praxis—for instance, religious beliefs and the cycle of agriculture that merge in the act of lighting incense in the four corners of a corn field.

A speech act, for instance, is experienced by actors and processed by their schemes of perception, judgment, and action orientation. This processing obeys partly the dispositions already embodied for such events and partly new situational conditions of the objective event. The objective event, the experience of it, and the processing of the experience by dispositions of perception, judgment, and action, fall together into one practical "micro-procedure," so to say. This procedure, simultaneously, *is operated by* meaning and *generates* meaning, because of the simple fact that there are neither shapeless objects (as for instance events) nor empty dispositions. Virtually every object is socially named, and the *cognitive*[370] dispositions of the habitus either are semantically coded or do not exist.[371]

In sum, the theoretical concept of habitus (particularly of its dispositions) together with the concepts of practical sense and practical logic, and the models of the objective conditions of praxis (fields and space) offer the framework for a praxeological theory and methodology of practical interpretation.

The power of language

Searle and Thompson criticize that Bourdieu neglects the power that linguistic and semiotic operations exert as such (without borrowing power from institutions, etc.)—for example, through rational argument or through an emotional threat, such as the announcement of suicidal plans.

Religious, ethnic, and political languages are particularly good examples of how *symbolic power* works. Partly, symbolic power draws its effectiveness indeed from the position of the speaker who may have a charisma by office, a mandate, a

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370 Other rules are valid for affective and bodily dispositions.

371 For example, one could think of a midlevel religious specialist of a conservative Pente-costal church in war torn Guatemala in 1985. This man offers his discourse to everyone alike, since he believes in its objective truth. Mainly he teaches that in the present end times the Second Coming of Christ draws near and, therefore, everybody has to obey the discipline of the church. This discourse meets the demand of desperate indigenous villagers, victims of Napalm bombings and torture. They happily embrace his discourse and join his church. He also visits the upper middle-class women's Aglow fellowship with the same discourse and runs into a wall of cold rejection. This rejection is due to the meaning of the discourse, which develops in the very relation between the dis-course offered and the social conditions perceived by the consumers. In the first case, the discourse meant safety and consolation; in the second case, the discourse meant legalism and, finally, impertinence.

representative function by age, and so forth. However, the symbolic power is not sufficiently explained solely by positional differences between speakers. For instance, a religious conversion can take place as the result of a surprising but adequate act of naming. The speaker names a state of affairs; the listeners acquire a completely different view of themselves and their situation, and decide to convert. The power here partly depends on the effect that the semantic content exerts on the addressee. However, even the effects of words of magic do not reside in the magic words themselves; the effects derive from felicitous encounters between habitus and field. The demand for meaning, resulting from certain conditions on a relevant field of praxis, encounters an adequate supply. In any case, both demand and supply presuppose a charge in terms of semantic content, in order to produce a reaction, in terms of a practical effect.

With respect to theory, the problem in Bourdieu's approach is not the Saussurean principle of meaning by difference or distinction, as long as one considers that distinctions distinguish *something*. Bourdieu considers this issue. As we have seen, in many of his analyses (e.g., about Heidegger) he strongly refers to semantic content. Nevertheless, meaning becomes meaning only if it exerts an effect; meaning becomes meaning if it is in *use*, as Bourdieu indicates with his references to Wittgenstein and some Pragmatists. Meaning is interpretation in use, in action, so to say. Therefore, the analysis of meaning cannot be restricted to the reconstruction of an abstract opus operatum. The analysis has to show the transformations of social experience by means of embodied dispositions into action orientation and the design of strategies with reference to the relevant fields—considering what Bourdieu calls the "practical sense." The power of language as language (and of signs as signs) resides in the effectiveness (and thus felicitousness) of the mediation it realizes between these factors of praxis.

Hence, it is desirable that a praxeological model of meaning production depicts the modus operandi of language, in order to reconstruct its semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic *energeia*. The best way of doing so seems to be by maintaining , in the analytical model, the relation between experience and its processing by means of the cognitive schemes of perception, judgment, and action orientation.

Labor of language

The power of language results from the labor of language. The notion of "labor of language" presupposes something like a productive process engendered by the pragmatic use of semantic content, namely in polysemic or metaphoric operations.

Such a labor of language operates the most important relations that are referred to in Bourdieu's elaborations on practical logic. Bourdieu's concept of the labor of language is remarkably close to a similar notion of Paul Ricoeur, and to the structur-

alist model of connotation as put forth, for example, by Roland Barthes[372]—in spite of Bourdieu's disapprobation of the overall theories of both authors. A comparison between these authors and Bourdieu allows us to approach the issue with more details. Labor of language is not just a scientific metaphor. Rather, structuralist semiotics provides models for empirical research to grasp important aspects of the labor of language, as for instance connotational operations by which—to say it in Bourdieu's vocabulary—polysemy links different fields to one another. In fact, Bourdieu uses structuralist thought to realize most of his analyses on meaning. However, a difference between Bourdieu and said authors is due to Bourdieu's insistence on the social dimension of the signifying operations. The connotative, symbolic, or metaphoric function of an utterance, a practice, or a thing is produced not by the semiotic function itself, but by a combination of various factors. The connotative operation is a certain way that a social actor perceives an experience and processes it cognitively as well as axiologically. Hence, the effectiveness and felicitousness of the connotative operation never depends solely on the linguistic operation. Instead, it always depends as well on recognition and on acknowledgement (or disapproval) by social actors. (Accordingly, Bourdieu's use of the concept of symbol and its derivates always extends to social recognition.) A further difference between the two idealist authors and Bourdieu is that, according to the latter, all these operations of social signification take place in the context of the relations of social power that characterize the situation, the field, and the social space in which the involved actors are positioned and communicate. For instance, a doorstep in a traditional Kabyle house is not just a doorstep (Bourdieu 1990b, 228ff., G: 2008, 398) . The villagers provide it with additional meaning. Hence, the doorstep is a symbol of a leading cultural difference: the difference between women (inside) and men (outside)—a distinction that reproduces the gender difference as the main structuring principle of the economic division of labor, of the practices of recognition (honor), and of political authority.

In sum (and again, somewhat against Bourdieu's own occasionally emphatic statements), in this line of thought the praxeological point of view is not rightly interpreted as antagonistic to the logic of structural thinking and the analysis of meaning. Instead, Bourdieu enhances the relationist (and with it the structuralist) tradition with the social pragmatics of power relations that are as equally relevant for the structure of classes as for the structure of classifications.

For a praxeological analysis of the use of meaning, the labor of language, by for instance metaphoric operations, is important. Taking into account the labor of language helps to understand practical operations like the transformation of

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372 Ricoeur 1974, 95; see also Schäfer 2004a, 126f.; Barthes 1969, 89ff.

experience by the habitūs, the conversion of capital between fields, or the "be-ing-perceived" of styles (see vol. 2 on styles) and the corresponding strategies of imaginative manipulation. The labor of language consists of the broking of power through words and signs. The labor operates the power of language, not least by simultaneously classifying and judging.

Classification and judgment

Bourdieu occasionally remarks that the categories for classification are simultane-ously instruments of logical order and axiological sentence (*kategorestai*) (Bourdieu 2010a, 477ff., G: 1982a, 741). As schemes of perception and judgment, these catego-ries interpret experiences. In the very same operation, they interrupt the indistinct flow of the empirical manifold and distinguish it according to categories of order (cognitive judgment), which also serve as axiological categories (value judgment).

The cognitive judgment does not reproduce the continuity of the experiential flow. It rather establishes classificatory distinctions. The experiences record the empirical manifold as in flow, in constant change, and as embedded in an overwhelming multiplicity of relations that are relative and complex, but the cognitive judgment partitions this flow with clear-cut distinctions. Cognition reduces complexity. "The logic of the symbolic makes absolute 'all or nothing' differences out of infinitesimal differences" (Bourdieu 1990b, 137, G: 2008, 251).

These cognitive distinctions turn almost necessarily into axiological judgments, since practical cognition is no scholastic meditation but is involved in the invitations and threats of life. To a higher or lower degree, cognitive distinctions are pondered according to their practical references and, thus, to their value within the struggles and the cooperation for optimal conditions of social reproduction. The cognitive order transforms almost necessarily into an axiological orientation of action.

A model for the praxeological analysis of meaning should be able to depict this basic distinction between complex experience and the clear-cut judgment with which the labor of language operates.

Dispositions and social reality

The *actor's views of society* represent embodied social reality, the dispositions of the actors.[373] As dispositions are supposed to categorize the world of the actors and to be quite firm, we may also talk about worldviews and convictions. The theory

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373   "Concretely, it is the practical expectation (which can hardly be called subjective, since it is the product of the interrelating of an objectivity—the objective chances—and an embodied objectivity—the disposition to estimate those chances)" (Bourdieu 1977c, 655).

of habitus conceives them as subjectively embodied. However, "the subjective" is objective. It constitutes an objective reality (such as collective opinions) that exerts objective effects and is sociologically observable. The worldviews and convictions of actors are an objective social reality insofar as they take effect on the social reality through the actions of the actors or simply by being perceived by other actors. This fact provides a central affirmation of Bourdieu's sociology, which makes it so useful for understanding specifically cultural and religious praxis.[374] This affirmation condenses a whole theory that allows one to understand the actor's views, their convictions, and their beliefs, in two regards. First, their views are related to the social conditions of existence. The actors combine experiences with previous knowledge (dispositions generated from earlier experience), interpret the new experiences, and make them meaningful. Second, the views are related to judgments and social practices. From the assessment of the conditions, actors develop more or less adequate strategies, and cause effects on the conditions. Convictions and beliefs acquire the role of (embodied) cognitive practical operators that generate objectified practices and utterances. In consequence, these operators transform and thus shape a socially shared objectivity, a social world, by which the operators in turn are shaped. This effect comes to bear precisely through the classificatory and axiological interpretation of complex experiences.

It may be exemplified, with respect to religious praxis, by the religious mobilization in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The initial, habitual experience of a continuous praxis of good neighborliness between Serbian Christians and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina turned into a categorical difference between true and false religion and between legitimate and illegitimate political affiliation. Then, the dispositions of action, accordingly, turned the categorical difference of value into fierce hostility.

Habitus, fields, and space

In the context of praxeology, the issue of language and meaning almost automatically boils down to the concept of habitus. However, the notion of habitus does not offer the quick and easy recipe for dealing with this issue. "Habitus" is just one element in a large series of theoretical concepts that explain each other mutually. Thus, any one of them regulate, up to a certain point, the scientific use of any other concept. In

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374   Bourdieu is very close to the well-known "Thomas-theroem": "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas 1928, 572).

consequence, theoretical concepts such as disposition, operator, scheme, practical sense, practical logic, classification, illusio, position, field, capital, and even social space are relevant when the concepts of language and meaning are going to be theoretically grasped. Additionally, the theoretical framing of these concepts is but one step; the methodological approach to the reconstruction of meaning through the analysis of linguistic practices is a necessary next step. Notably, Bourdieu himself has not developed a model for the analysis of habitus, comparable to his models of the field, the social space (plus the field of power), and the correspondence of styles. In consequence, the almost automatic reference to habitus in the context of language and meaning, as a matter of fact, indicates a vast field of theoretical and methodological reflection and construction yet to accomplish.

Hence, these concluding reflections on the concept of habitus have no other goal than to open a perspective for our reading of Bourdieu's material theory (vol. 2) and the construction of our models (vol. 3). Again, as in the last section, first we attend to the words of some critics and then we add some further observations on the issues at stake.

Critics: meaning and habitus

Searle objects to Bourdieu's interpretation of Austin's concept of language and the power of language. But he highlights the concept of habitus as a useful tool for studying the use of language. Praxeological sociologists should hear this as preaching to the converted.

The theory of habitus, framed by the related praxeological concepts, is also useful for satisfying Thompson's demands. Thompson pushes quite hard to complement the praxeological toolbox with instruments for studying the meaning and the semantic power of language as such. However, in order to understand the meaning of an expression, a "multi-layered phenomenon," it is indispensable to study the "social-historical conditions" of the respective utterance (Thompson 1984b, 65f.). The relation between habitus and field, by means of practical logic, does not only serve Thompson's interest in the sociohistorical conditions of meaning generation. The relation also facilitates one's approach to the conditions of production and the reception of meaning as well as to the operations that mediate between these conditions. Collin's substantialist misunderstandings serve to better profile the relationist approach to language and meaning. Finally, Kögler's contribution serves to emphasize even more that the linkage between the creativity of menaing production and its social conditions is undertood best by a relational concept of habitus.

We will foster a strictly relationist approach to praxis and habitus. For the theoretical concept of habitus, this means that will use preferably the concepts of *dispositions*, *schemes*, *operators*, or even sometimes *ideas*. This is not to dismiss the concept as such, but to prevent its reification. Similarly, we try to prevent a reification of the concepts *practical logic* and *practical sense*, by speaking rather of *operators* or *schemes*. Finally, we can analyze the semiotic complexity of classification struggles as semiotic operations within their larger framework of fields and social space—likewise avoiding reification by breaking down these concepts to positions and capital. It is necessary to integrate the objectivist elements of Bourdieu's theory, fields, and social space, into HabitusAnalysis, since the sociohistoric context of linguistic practices is vital for reconstructing their meaning. The objective social processes and relations of power are indispensable for the reconstruction of meaning.

Issues: positions, dispositions, and meaning

As already indicated, Bourdieu's approach to language and meaning, as well as the observations of his critics, draw our attention to the concept of habitus. However, habitus alone is not enough. The concept is part of a series of mutually explaining praxeological theorems that focus different states of objectivity and embodiment, as well as different degrees of mental and material praxis: habitus (dispositions), body, actor, practical sense, practical logic (logic of praxis), illusio, games, fields (positions), investments, capital, institutions, social space, and others. In consequence, a praxeological approach to meaning by means of the concept of habitus has to consider the relations of habitus to every other theorem. The dispositions of the habitus can only produce meaning through their relation to the positions of the actors in objective social relations. We will examine and model these processes in detail later on (vol. 2 and 3). Here, we will but briefly sketch what our arguments are going to be.

We will first refer to the connection between fields and markets as indispensable reference points for the operations of the habitus. Only then will we briefly outline the concept of the habitus with respect to its challenges for methodological modeling.

Fields, linguistic market, and semantics

The "stock market," so to say, for the broking of power takes place in the games played in the different *fields of society*. In line with what we have already said about fields (see 3.3.3.1), I would like to accentuate forcefully that every field is constituted by its *particular semantics*. It is simply not by chance that a word like *sacrifice* is specific to the religious field; nor is it by chance that, if political prophets use this

word with regard to economic practices and the victims of economic practices, then investment bankers might not be happy about it.

If an utterance with regard to a situation is to be effective or felicitous, it not only has to be acceptable in terms of correct form, style of pronunciation, or the positional authority of the speaker. It also has to pronounce the right *word*—that is, a semantic content adequate to the issues dealt with in the field and significant in the series of field-specific practices in which the utterance intervenes. Adequacy, viewed from the perspective of field-specific praxis, depends upon the mastery of field-specific semantic content; the calculated inadequacy of the heterodox heretic depends even more on semantics.

Thus, in the context of fields, meaning is not a negligible, residual category. In contrast, meaning rather becomes an important operator of practical logic. This is readily illustrated by operations like naming or representation in religion or politics. The specificity of meaning in this context is due to its twofold capacity: First, meaning generates specific, valuable, functional, and adapted cognitive and emotional "visions and divisions" of the world by transforming experience. Second, the specificity of meaning generates strategies that are adapted to the capital, the stakes, the *nomos*, the resources, the other actors, and so forth—in sum, to every object, person, and power relation in the field identified by a name.

For the analysis of language use, Bourdieu establishes the additional concept of the *linguistic market.* However, his terminology of *"market" and "field"* is often equivocal. In contrast, for our goal we opt for a clear analytical distinction between the model of linguistic market and the model of field. According to the distinction between linguistic and social capacity, we will conceive of a linguistic market as the aggregate of the socially shared regularities with respect to semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic correctness. These regularities represent social conditions of power only inasmuch as the dominant criteria of correctness are generally (but not necessarily) the criteria imposed by the socially dominant and well-schooled classes. Thus, the notion of market refers to the socially produced linguistic and semiotic conditions for the felicitousness or, better put, for the effectiveness (*Treffsicherheit*) of an utterance in terms of linguistic correctness. Finally, we conceive the concept of market from the perspective of the exchange value of language.

However, an actor's capacity to dominate these conditions and rules depends, to a large extent, on his sense for the games played in the respective *field*, be it religion, politics, economy, fashion, art, literature, and the like. The game in a field obeys many factors beyond language or signs. Yet the game also obeys language, even its formally correct use. Nevertheless, correctness cannot be seen exclusively as defined by the dominant class. The criteria, even of formal correctness, differ in a slight but significant way from field to field and from position to position. A

correct grammatical use of the perfect tense, for instance, is of much more symbolic value for academic historians than it is for visual artists. The value of a specific colloquial language (such as the "Black English" Labov referred to) varies according to the field in which it is practiced and to the relative positions of the actors (the national labor market versus a congregation in Harlem). Finally, the stakes in a field are not linguistic ones. While language is in most of the fields an important medium of communication, its value does not reside so much in its grammatical correctness than in semantic effectiveness. Thus, finally we conceive the concept of field (with regard to language, signs, and meaning) from the perspective of the use value of language.

In sum, we consider the social dimensions of the formal correctness of linguistic utterances to be, without doubt, a legitimate object of sociological research. Bourdieu's model of a linguistic market proved useful for illuminating this specific aspect of the use of language. However, this strategy of research should not be taken as a sufficient reason to reify "the" linguistic market and to profile it in contrast to (equally reified) fields. We interpret the model of the linguistic market as a tool to show that, in the context of a given field (such as the regional-ethnic relations between Paris and Béarn, or the religious difference between an urban Episcopalian congregation and a rural Pentecostal one), *even* linguistic form is drenched in field-specific power relations. But form does not come without content.

Seen from the perspective of the praxis in fields, the semantic content of utterances is an important factor for the constitution of a certain game and its respective power relations. Effective (*treffsichere*) linguistic participation in the struggles of a field requires the right words, and these depend in most cases primarily on the adequate semantic content and only secondarily on grammatical correctness. Lacking semantic adequacy it is not even possible to enter a game and to engage in the struggles for determinate (that is, named) profits, to invest particular resources, and to develop strategies according to a ruling *nomos* (a named rule). A field-specific habitus knows all these conditions by name.

Habitus, dispositions, and the logic of networks

The dispositions of the habitus translate the differences between social positions into meaningful distinctions that orientate the actors. The dispositions operate as schemes of perception that categorize experiences. Bourdieu sketches these operations as follows.

> But the essential point is that, when perceived through these social categories of perception, these principles of vision and division, the differences in practices, in the goods possessed, or in the opinions expressed become symbolic differences and

constitute a veritable language. Differences associated with different positions, that is, goods, practices, and especially manners, function, in each society, in the same way as differences which constitute symbolic | systems, such as the set of phonemes of a language or the set of distinctive features and of differential 'écarts' that constitute a mythical system, that is, as distinctive signs. (Bourdieu 1998d, 8f., G: 1998e, 21f.)

Bourdieu has developed the concept of habitus in order to refer to that veritable language of symbolic differences. The point is that this concept draws the attention away from a purely cognitive acceptation of that language. Rather, it intimately combines its cognitive aspect with, at least, four other dimensions. Habitūs are socially and historically produced; they are embodied; they operate also emotionally and bodily; and they are composed of a myriad of dispositions that combine to generate perception, judgment, and action.

On the one hand, habitus, as a system of embodied social structures, is more associated with the subjective aspect of praxis than with the objective aspect. It operates in the practical sense of the actors as their capacity to cope with their environment. However, on the other hand, the fact that the concept of habitus represents embodied social structures binds subjectivity strongly to objectivity.[375] A relational reading of the concept of habitus should consider two complementary aspects. The first aspect follows the often-repeated advice of Bourdieu: A habitus always has to be conceived in its relation to fields, as fields always have to be conceived in relation to corresponding habitūs. The second aspect regards the internal relationality of the habitūs. Bourdieu does not explicitly highlight this aspect. Nevertheless, it follows almost necessarily from his (relational) explanation of the concept as a system of dispositions or schemes of perception, judgment, and action. Habitus is an umbrella concept for a myriad of complex interactions between cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of perception, judgment, and action, related to and semantically charged by multiple, different fields of praxis. These dispositions process the social experiences of the actors and generate their practices and utterances with regard to the fields. The dispositions operate so that their modus operandi is of analytical interest.

It follows for the praxeological analysis of meaning that the modus operandi of the dispositions has to be modeled—that is, the transformation between experience, classification, and strategy design, by means of the schemes of perception, judgment, and action.

A praxeological model of meaning production is intended to "give an adequate account of discourse in all its conjunctural singularity." While the praxeological sociologist is aware of the lacunae of abstract linguistics, however he does not ex-

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375 Moreover, a body of a person is not simply subjective but also an objective social reality.

clude by principle a "strictly linguistic analysis of the code" (Bourdieu 2006, 38, G: 2005, 41f.). For praxeological sociology, according to our reading, the meaning of a word or a proposition does not "exist" objectively, but is generated by operations of the dispositions according to practical logic—no operations, no meaning. Thus, meaning is generated by the conjunctural singularity of a discourse in a given field (and not by the general or universal traits that the discourse might represent).[376] Therefore, meaning can be reasonably studied only within the context of use of the respective utterances. However, it is not enough not to exclude the "analysis of the linguistic code." According to our view, a praxeological study, in order to understand the social meaning of discourses and practices, has to include the analysis of the code systematically. The analysis of the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of a discourse is quite indispensable in order to understand the social meaning of that discourse in its conjunctural singularity as an operator of social praxis—and to understand the singularity of the conjuncture of the respective field as, partly, a product of this social meaning.

A further-reaching aspect is that Bourdieu conceives of the dispositions as related in a vast *network*. This more or less metaphorical notion is very useful for understanding and modeling the operations of the dispositions. Modeling the transformational processes of the dispositions as a network should facilitate addressing the semantics that are specific to different fields of praxis. Thus, it would be possible to integrate the "external" reference of the dispositions (to manifold experiences) into a model of differentiated cognitive processing of experiences. The relations of the actors to different fields could be depicted from the perspective of the actors. In consequence, such a model would relate the dispositions of actors to the states of the fields of praxis concerned, as well as to the positions the actors occupy in that field. Theoretical concepts such as *illusio*, practical sense, and sense for the game would come systematically into the horizon of the analysis of meaning.

In a praxeological framework, it holds true that sociologists have to *interpret* linguistic utterances, metaphors, homologies, and signs, in order to *understand* them. However, this precisely does *not* mean to defect from praxeology to the interpretative or linguistic turn. Rather praxeology considers the "objectivity of the subjective" (Bourdieu) as well as the effects of objective social conditions on meaning.

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376 Even if a discourse as the Pentecostal teaching of the healing power of the Holy Spirit is globalized, its specific meaning only develops in "conjunctural situations." These are either the innumerable transformations of this discourse and of related practices in the countless local conditions it is operated in; or it is the global context of globally competing specialists in healing praxis or globally competing scientists devoted to Pentecostal praxis.

This leads us to the *objective aspect of praxis* and its modeling with regard to the analysis of social meaning. Given that the dispositions of the actors towards fields are modeled as habitus, these habitūs and the corresponding social sense of the actors require connection to the objective conditions of their operations. Bourdieu himself developed advanced relational models that combine relations of domination with social differentiation: the model of fields and the model of the social space. Once the models of the habitus are constructed and identified with data on the objective social positions of the actors according to the logic of the models of field and space, the habitus can easily be located within fields and space. Thus, the production and use of meaning can be interpreted as influenced by and operative within the objective logics of praxis.

Such a procedure generates a broad praxeological frame within which the labor of language and, particularly, the significance of meaning for social praxis can be located and further explored. The central tool of this procedure is a model of the practical sense of the actors as of the generative modus operandi of the dispositions. However, the empirical analysis of habitūs only is complete, if this relation between the actors and their world is reconstructed. Therefore, we provide a model for the analysis of the practical sense of actors, for the (religious) field they act in, and for the overall social conditions in relation to the dispositions, the social space of (religious) styles.

Perspectives for modeling and theory

In this volume, we advanced from relationist epistemology via the issues of subject and object, mind and matter, to Bourdieu's ideas on language and meaning. In the present chapter, we have narrowed the focus of the praxeological perspective still closer to the study of meaning. At this point, we end our deliberations and want to draw some conclusions from the epistemological and linguistic reflections for our further approach towards praxeological theory and methodology, and analytical models for HabitusAnalysis in particular.

Since our primary goal is a consistent methodology for HabitusAnalysis, we first draw some brief conclusions from the epistemological and linguistic reflections in the present book for the methodological tasks to be accomplished in our further work (vol. 3). Anchoring the praxeological analysis of meaning in a sound sociological theory has the advantage of preventing the danger of a relapse into sociologically naïve assumptions about semantics and meaning. We will therefore turn some observations made in the present book into questions for our reading of Bourdieu's

work from the specific aspect of operations with semantic content (vol. 2). Thus, we first describe our final goal and method, then move on to our intermediate goal and theory, and finally we sketch a way of how to get there.

The final goal: models

The source of historical action is neither the subject nor the object but the mediation between them. It is within this relation that meaning is generated. Meaningful relations between things and signs can, therefore, be discovered by the study of the operations of embodied cognitive schemes in interaction with objectified processes and distributions of capital, goods, and cultural as well as religious works and institutions. The models for HabitusAnalysis are designed according to these aspects of historical action.

The relationist approach to sociology carries some general implications for modeling. Already relational are Bourdieu's models for fields, the social space, and correlations of styles. The concept of habitus, in contrast, lacks such a relational model. Relational epistemology explains how actors perceive and interpret the sensual manifold experienced by putting it into orderly series of semantic elements. The cognitive operations of perception, judgment, and action orientation accomplish this task by relating experience to classificatory as well as evaluative concepts. We aim at creating a model of said operations and linking it with the models of field and social space. The models to be created and used in HabitusAnalysis are doubly relational, externally and internally. Each model itself is designed as consisting of relations, as can easily be evidenced by Bourdieu's models of fields and social space. We will also model habitus as internally diversified by different operating schemes. Externally, the models can be put into relation with one another by controlled triangulation and interpretation.

Habitus and practical sense

We conceive *habitus* in a strictly relational sense. Far from referring to an ontological entity, the concept of habitus denotes the synergetic operations of cognitive, emotional, and bodily *dispositions* involved in the processing of experiences through perception, judgment, action orientation, and action.

However, the dispositions of the habitus cannot be described by themselves. They have to be inferred by means of the regularities of expressions and practices of the actors that show the operation of practical schemes. Bourdieu theorizes these schemes of perception, judgment, and action orientation as well as their operations with the concept of the *practical sense* of the actors. The corresponding schematic

operations serve to design a model that facilitates the reconstruction of the semantic transformations that create meaning.

While the theoretical status of habitus and practical sense still have to be clarified (vol. 2), we can already state the following points with regard to the *analysis of meaning*. Our basic object of examination will be language in use. We will not focus on the lexical content of single words. Instead, we will examine propositions in their context of use in ordinary language and reconstruct their function within the operations of perception, judgment, and action orientation of the actors involved.

Since actors are in constant relations with the *structures of society* through their *experience*, we can conceive the semantic transformations as the practical interpretation of this experience. Experience, from the point of view of actors, is the mode of relation they maintain to the objectified social processes and structures.

These relations and their transformations through perception, judgment, and action orientation can be analyzed with our *model* of the "praxeological square," a sociological reinterpretation of a figure of propositional relations dating back to classical antiquity.[377] This model is crucial for HabitusAnalysis. It is a tool for the qualitative analysis of the operations of the practical sense. Thus, it responds to the demand for a qualitative tool for the better understanding of the habitūs of given actors. The model primarily allows the analysis of language material (such as interviews and any other kind of discourse, e.g. written texts). If desired, it is also possible to extend the use of the method supplementing the modeled results (praxeological square) by observations on practices (the use of images, ritual practices etc.).

Based on this decision, the square can serve as a model for multiple social practices, such as coping with crises, the generation of identity and strategy, or ascription of properties, motives, et cetera, to oneself and others.

With regard to the study of language, this approach fits very well with Bourdieu's concepts of language and of habitus, since it both combines a structural concept of signs (distinction) with the pragmatic one of use, and conceives of meaning as creatively generated through the relation between experience and cognitive construction. With regard to scientific epistemology it is important to note that the model fulfils the general function of objectifying the scientific view through "its capacity of breaking with appearances and its capacity for generalization" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991a, 54, G: 1991b, 63). What is still more important for the praxeological study of meaning, it provides a modeled structure

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377 The propositional square of Apuleius of Madaura, through its promotion by Boethius, became already in the early Middle Ages a central model for propositional operations. It has been applied to semiotics by Julien Greimas. We transformed the model into a tool for sociology by giving a special status to the experience of actors. For details, see volume 3.

that grants a sufficient margin for the semantics of actors to surface as operational schemes of the practical sense.

Network

We have repeatedly emphasized the idea of a "network" with regard to Cassirer's relationism and to Bourdieu's concept of practical logic or even the dispositions of habitus. While the mere metaphor of a network has already proven to be helpful in many ways for a relational approach to the humanities, it is helpful to model it in a stricter, praxeological sense. A model of a network can be constructed as an extension of the basic model of the praxeological square. Hence, the network would maintain the transformational linkage between experience and interpretation and, simultaneously, cover more demands of praxeology.

Dispositions of habitus, operating schemes of the practical sense, and even operators of practical logic can be modeled as transformational networks of highly different terms, according to the practical series relevant for the actors involved. Since the empirically ascertained structures of such a network may be denser or more scattered—according to Cassirer and in a lesser degree to Bourdieu—they indicate more or less durable and reliable convictions and action schemes of praxis. A network composed of schemes of the practical sense extends over the experience and interpretation of as many different fields of praxis as are relevant for actors.

We have constructed a model of such a network extending the praxeological square. During the empirical analysis of discursive material, the positions of the square become saturated with semantic content referring to different experiences, practices, and fields of praxis. The analysis of the syntagmatic relations that the corresponding propositions maintain in the empirical material allows the extension of the square into a network structure. Such a network can provide insights into the transposition of practical schemes from one field of praxis to another, indicating the labor of language. Such connotative operations are crucial for religious symbolism in political contexts. These insights are due to the fact that the network models the actors' view of the different fields of praxis and provides an idea of the subjective factors of a given praxis, or more precisely, of the relations the actors maintain to the world of objectified relations and things.

Fields and social Space

Bourdieu models the objectified social relations that determine the experience of the actors, as *fields and social space* (including the "field of power" and correlations between styles). The dispositions of the various habitūs never generate meaning without relation to the corresponding fields and to the position of the actors involved

within the overall distribution of capacities to act (capital). In consequence, the models of field and space depict the objectified social relations according to their own dynamics. They model the positions that allow the understanding of the dispositions of the actors. Thus, they are the objectivist complements to dispositions and practical schemes that complete our HabitusAnalysis. Moreover, it is vital that the objectified social relations are modeled as differentiated relations of domination and power within an overall context of social struggle. This means that, from the praxeological point of view, words are not neutral but usually operate under conditions that compromise meaning from the start.

In contrast to habitus and related concepts, Bourdieu presents for fields and the social space elaborated relational models. However, these models have to be adapted to the study of meaning in general and to religious meaning in particular in order to facilitate an instructive triangulation with the models of the practical sense.

Our proposal for modeling the religious field (as an example of modeling other fields as well) takes up the logic of Bourdieu's sketch of the field of arts.[378] Any field functions according to its own lawfulness (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*, Weber) which Bourdieu theorizes through the term of *nomos* of a given field. The *nomos* of a field expresses its principle of operation. In consequence, there are two different sorts of conflict going on in any one field: the one about the definition of the *nomos* and thus about changing the rules of the game, and the other over playing according to the dominant rules of the game in order to achieve as high a position as possible in the field. In order to model these dynamics one needs to distinguish two different dimensions according to which the game is played: i.e. on the one hand, the achievement of eminence, and on the other hand, authenticity. For the religious field, we translate these dimensions into the complexity of religious organizations in terms of a hierarchy-membership ratio and into the religious credibility that the different specialists enjoy with the laity. Both dimensions can be calibrated and made suitable for quantitative surveys. This two-dimensional model facilitates the correlation of the habitūs of the actors with their positions in the ongoing religious competition.

Our model of the *social space* follows Bourdieu's simplest proposal.[379] The model allows depicting the distribution of social positions, that is the results of past competitions and the chances of future action that can be ascribed to any of the positions. Their distribution is constructed according to the volume and the

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378 Bourdieu 1983; 1995, G: 1999b; Seibert 2010; 2014. We do not work with the model as presented in Bourdieu 1987, G: 2011a.

379 Bourdieu 2010, 120ff., G: 1982a, 211. As for the present methodological proposal, we do not realize the possibilities correlational analysis offers (e.g., Blasius and Schmitz 2013) although this technique would surely meet perfectly the needs of an advanced study of religious style.

structure of two basic types of capital, economic and cultural. When one meaures the amount of both types of capital that religious actors have at their disposal, it is possible to locate these actors, together with their habitūs, in different social positions relative to one another. Thus, the different religious habitūs can be interpreted when taking into account the chances of basic reproduction that any of the actors can count on—which procedure basically serves Max Weber's interest in the relation between "status, class, and religion"[380] through the triangulation of different models.

In this way, the *triangulation* of the two habitus-centered models (square and network of schemes) with the model of fields (in our case the religious field) as well as with the model of social space shows the relations between embodied and objectified factors of praxis. The models of field and of social space thus facilitate reconstructing the ways in which the processes of creative meaning generation through the embodied cognitive dispositions are intertwined with the objective power structures of social life; and they show how social positions and embodied dispositions render each other meaningful.

Thus, these models are a technical means of reconstructing observable relations, mainly of practical semantics in the context of social power relations.

The intermediate goal: theory

We have anticipated some core notions of Bourdieu's sociology without explicating them to the extent necessary for developing sound models of creative meaning production within the theoretical environment of praxeological theory. The methodological goals formulated in the last sub-section already allow naming the central theoretical concepts that need to be explained and interpreted with regard to meaning production. After a brief list of these concepts, we will proceed to some further relevant theoretical issues that concern more specifically language and meaning.

Among the *core notions of praxeology* that require theoretical explanation, habitus, practical sense, and practical logic are the most relevant for the embodied aspects of meaning production. As these concepts cannot be taken naïvely as ready-made substances, we have to ask what are the relations and operations that they denote. A closer look at the theoretical dynamics of praxeology reveals a host of generative notions that regulate the sociological approach to what Bourdieu calls the "internalization of externality and the externalization of internality." Since all

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380 *Stände, Klassen und Religion* is the original title of the chapter "The religious propensities of peasantry, nobility and bourgeoisie" in Weber 1978, 468.

the generative concepts are framed by the notion of social struggle, this is also the case with the terms used in the context of internalization and transformation: e.g. *embodiment, dispositions, experience, cognition, affect, body, schemes, operator, perception, judgment,* and *action.* All of these notions can be conceived in the theoretical frame of the actor as a network of dispositions, and all are important for meaning production. In the context of externalization, we also find concepts that denote operations with semantics: distinction (and identification), representation, symbolic power (violence, struggle), recognition and misrecognition, naming, euphemizing, discourse, identity, authority. Even with regard to the models of objective social relations, the fields and the social space, a host of notions denote operations of meaning ascription: e.g. *illusio*, stakes, game, *nomos*, capital, time, conversion, compromise, class, trajectories, and power. All of these theoretical concepts are anything but floating or loose: on the contrary, they operate within a theoretical landscape marked by central theorems. This landscape ought to be mapped so that the praxeological approach to meaning production becomes transparent for researchers. Such a mapping is the task to be accomplished next in our research.

Our discussion in the present volume has raised some special issues and concepts with regard to meaning production. The most significant seems to us *labor of language.* This concept is not only critical to some of Bourdieu's views, it confirms also a basic trait of praxeology. The concept stands for the insight that the power of language is generated not just by the social positions of the speakers, but also by the *semantic* operations of language. This labor of language takes place in the processes of internalization, when actors meaningfully relate their convictions with their experiences. The labor of language interprets complex experiences and engenders clear-cut judgments and suitable strategies, not least by combining different fields through semiotic techniques (metaphors, polysemy etc.). In addition, it produces new perspectives for self-positioning and for action. With regard to externalization, in social life the labor of language constructs a socially shared objectivity in an effective (*treffsicher*) way, relating collective beliefs as practical operators to the social conditions of existence, such as social struggle. Through all these operations it becomes evident that the concept of labor of language confirms Bourdieu's theory of the central position that the notions of labor and production have for praxeology. Labor, production, and social struggle make meaning apparent as a socially contested operator of praxis. In other words, meaning emerges as a result of creative labor with signs (semantic and semiotic content) that addresses a socially generated demand.

The emphasis on difference in structural linguistics (the Saussurean tradition), on the one hand, and the interest in semantic content (the Humboldtian tradition) on the other call for a good balance between both *difference and content.* Difference

is of course important for meaning generation, but is not formal, i.e. semantically empty. Semantic content functions as a term of difference. Without (semantically) identified terms that constitute a relation of difference, there is no difference at all. For the generation of meaning, identity is as important as difference, and so are the social processes of identification and of distinction. Similarity and dissimilarity always have to be analyzed in mutual relation. There is no vision and division of the world without perceiving and naming the terms that are envisioned and divided. The same is true for the structuralist distinction between syntagmatic and para-digmatic relations. Bourdieu's empirical studies evidence the interconnectedness of difference and identity as an important trait of praxeology, albeit operating in the deep socio-logical structure of praxeology.

The linguistic concept of *value* comprises this mutuality between similarity and difference, while also relating to the labor of language inasmuch as the latter pro-duces useful and exchangeable symbolic goods. In terms of theory, the distinction between use value and exchange value is no less interesting t, as is the question of how the two different concepts of linguistic value relate to praxis in fields and in linguistic markets.

With regard to language, Bourdieu's concept of *linguistic habitus* also needs to be mentioned. Our re-reading of Bourdieu's theory will conceive linguistic habi-tus within the overall relational approach to the concept of habitus. The adjective linguistic then will refer to the complex interplay of language-related dispositions with other dispositions of any other possible kind. In empirical and methodological terms, the linguistic operations of the practical sense, particularly the semantic ones, facilitate the analytical approach to cognitive dispositions (schemes of perception, judgment, and action orientation).

Finally, it should be pointed out that, emotional and bodily as well as perform-ative and icon-related dispositions, operations, and practices are without doubt of crucial importance for a praxeological approach to praxis. As we put the emphasis of our theoretical and methodological approach on cognition and language, we must almost necessarily neglect *embodied non-linguistic dispositions* and operations. We can therefore consider these aspects of praxis and habitus only marginally. However, we refer to them in our *re-lecture* of theory in the appropriate places; and in the methodology of HabitusAnalysis, we will sketch a proposal of how to link cognitive, emotional, and bodily dispositions of habitus as well as iconic and performative aspects of praxis.

The way forward: future work

In the present volume, we have hopefully clarified the relational premises of praxeology and the corresponding approach to language and meaning. Nevertheless, for all the reasons stated above, we will not jump from here right into the construction of analytical models for HabitusAnalysis. Rather, in our next step (vol. 2) we will reread Bourdieu's theory in order to find the concepts that operate in its deep structure and in order to map the theory to the extent that is relevant to our approach to meaning. We will examine the filigree structure of this social theory for the resources it offers to the attempt at a praxeological description of the meaning of convictions and beliefs, of linguistic utterances, of symbolic practices, and of physical objects, as well as social relations within the objective social conditions of existence.

Only then will we proceed with the methodological work and construct our different models of HabitusAnalysis in volume three.

Appendix: Religion and social movements

HabitusAnalysis is, so to say, a by-product of our original interest in religious praxis, and more specifically in religious movements. Almost all the projects that we have realized until today in the context of the development of HabitusAnalysis have been devoted to religious actors.[381] At times, we paid a little more attention to individual actors, at other times we were more interested in collective actors or even institutions, but always in the context of religious movements. Our concentration on both meso-level and religious praxis may have favored certain concerns (e.g. with human beings as actors and exponents of beliefs) and may have limited other aspects (e.g. the specific dynamics of institutions such as the Vatican). In any case, the empirical research topics have had some effect on our theoretical and methodological work discussed in the three volumes of *HabitusAnalysis*. For this reason, I will discuss briefly some details of religious praxis and of social movements that seem relevant to our work.

Religion in Bourdieu

In Weber and Durkheim, the study of religious praxis has proven to be a fertile ground of momentous findings for other fields of sociology. This is not so in Bourdieu. He has made his important discoveries in other areas, especially in cultural sociology, and has used these theoretical guidelines for his assessments of religious praxis. Bourdieu's early articles on religion (Bourdieu 1991, G: 2011b; 1987, G: 2011a) apply praxeological thought on religion and have profited from his re-reading of Max Weber in the late sixties.[382] In these two key articles, Bourdieu anchors his take on

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381 One exception is Rory Tews' dissertation on social entrepreneurs.

382 On religion in Bourdieu see the leading book by Terry Rey (2007) as well as Rey 2004; applied to empirical research: Rey 1999. Preferentially also Egger and Schultheis 2011, and the interview with Bourdieu (Bourdieu, Schultheis, and Pfeuffer 2011). Presumably the first monograph to apply Bourdieu's general theory to religious praxis is Maduro

religion in a discussion of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, in which he emphasizes the importance of language for religious praxis with a reference to Wilhelm von Humboldt and Ernst Cassirer (Bourdieu 1991, 1, G: 2011b, 30; 1987, G: 2011a). The whole article on the "Genesis and structure of the religious field" reads like an attempt to interpret the cognitive structure of religious beliefs within the larger conditions of knowledge, framed by differentiation, domination, and practices.

We consider Bourdieu's way to deal with religion as both helpful and problematic. It is problematic in terms of an insufficient concept of religion. It is helpful in terms of a non-specific social theory as a means to explain a specific praxis. It is a trivial point that only a general social theory provides the frame of reference without which it is simply impossible to detect and compare differences and specificities of the social praxis in different fields. More specifically, only a general social theory that is not *per definitionem* a theory of religion can render the specificities of religious praxis visible by comparison with non-religious praxis. A general-sociology approach to religious praxis is also helpful with regard to the operations of the dispositions of an individual, no matter in what context. Religious people classify and judge their perceptions and act in the world according to both non-religious and religious criteria. One can make economic decisions because of religious reasons, or vice versa: e.g. either prefer the nearer (but not so nice) church in order to save gasoline, or spend much time and gas in order to listen to a really inspired sermon. A qualitative analysis cannot detect this if it only asks for the *religious* motivation. In other words, if one thinks of giving religion a special status treating it as a phenomenon *sui generis*, one mistakenly strips it of its status as a specific form of social praxis. This is even more so if the corresponding theories are religious or, worse, theological theories of religion (Schäfer 2004a, 272ff.). In consequence, we consider a general praxeology a very good means to approach religion.

Nevertheless, it is here that the problematic part of Bourdieu's approach to religion comes in, namely his concept of religion. The first problem is that it is very narrow. For him, religious praxis is the consecration and disguise of social interests, and, ultimately, of domination. The concept is not completely mistaken. Religious praxis *can* work this way; but as a leading analytical criterion, this function does not suffice. In contrast, the general praxeological theory offers very suitable theoretical concepts such as habitus (dispositions, schemes, perception, judgment, language,

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2005, originally published in Spanish in 1979. In alphabetical order, other important contributions to the theme are Dianteill 2003; Dillon 2001; Engler 2003; Goodchild 2000 on religious beliefs; Kleinod and Rehbein 2012; Krah and Büchner 2006 on religious dispositions in the context of intergenerational transmission of culture; Schäfer 2008; Suárez 2006; Swartz 1996; Turner 2011; Urban 2003; Vásquez 2011, especially 240ff.; Verter 2003; Wienold and Schäfer 2012; Wood and Bunn 2009.

action, strategies etc.), field (*illusio*, capital, stakes, *nomos*, power etc.), social space (styles, capital, economic production, education, dominance etc.). Within this theoretical framework, religious practices and beliefs can be empirically studied without a previous restriction to certain functions.

The second problem, closely related to the first, is Bourdieu's too narrow way of working with religious language. At the start of his article on the genesis of the religious field (Bourdieu 1991), he refers to the importance of language—especially semantics, with a reference to Humboldt—and stresses repeatedly the importance of the "logical and gnoseological" function of religious language. Nevertheless, there is no particular emphasis on religious semantics. It is true that he reflects on the "representation of Paradise as a place of individual happiness;" or that he notes the harmony between "religious beliefs" and the interest of a certain clientele and, thereby, the social relations of differentiation and dominance. Again, he exemplifies the necessity of an interest-driven (re) interpretation of semantic content with reference to Max Weber's observation that the "warrior nobles" did not identify with religious concepts such as "sin, salvation, and religious humility." (Bourdieu 1991, 16f., 18, G: 2011b, 58f.) However, the occasions are rare when Bourdieu interprets religious semantics. A fact that, most probably, is due to Bourdieu's lack of empirical knowledge about religion.[383] This relative lack of attention to practical semantics in Bourdieu's writings on religion contrasts sharply with his work on the practical sense and the practical logic of the Kabyle people as well as with other works on language, which we examine closely in the present volume. If the praxeological approach to semantics is combined with sufficient empirical knowledge of religious language, it will work for the study of religion—if it was not for the third problem, namely that Bourdieu has not provided a method for the praxeological study of linguistic utterances. This is the reason why we propose HabitusAnalysis.

Even so, the problem remains as we consider Bourdieu's concept of religion not sufficiently appropriate. Like many other sociologists, influenced by Enlightenment agnosticism, he considers religious ideas as far too lunatic to take them seriously into account as social facts. But they are facts, even if strange ones.[384] It could seem that the more eccentric the ideas, the stronger their social effects. The hope of a frustrated male youth to be rewarded with 72 virgins in paradise may motivate him, at least partly, to volunteer for a suicide bombing attack. The expectation to be transported

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383   As a French intellectual, his interest in religion was fairly limited. Additionally, his articles on religion show that his empirical object was merely the French Catholic Church. See—co-authored with Monique de Saint Martin and based on interviews by Claire Givry—the study Bourdieu and de Saint Martin 1982, G: 2009; see also Bourdieu and de Saint Martin 1978. In this volume we examine one short study, see section 3.2.1.3.

384   See the so called Thomas theorem (in Thomas and Thomas 1928, 572).

to a perfect life on Sirius made members of the Order of the Solar Temple commit collective suicide. Or—to quote a more respectable but no less strange example for most "normal" people—the belief in the crucified Christ makes believers give away their property and devote their lives completely to serve the suffering.

We understand religious praxis as a specific kind of praxis that operates formally in the same way as other forms of praxis do, whether economic, political, or any other. Thus, religious practical logic blends into the overall cognitive, emotional, and bodily processes that construct an actor's identity and strategy. Therefore, a "religious identity" never is some "thing" apart from an individual's or group's wider identity. Dispositions, coded with religious semantics, can easily be combined with the operators of other logics, such as political or juridical. Either the religious dispositions transform the latter, or the political, juridical, and other operators transform the religious dispositions. Homologies are created between religious and other social practices and schemes of beliefs. Specific religious strategies may boost or dampen other strategies. Religious dispositions link up to the logics of other fields, and, most importantly, translate experiences, problems, happy events, troubles, et cetera of non-religious fields into religious language and logics. This translation transforms the non-religious cognitive and emotional states, since religious logics are consistently different because of one specific operation: they refer to transcendence and use this reference practically. We conceive religious praxis according to John Hick as a special form of "experiencing as,"[385] and for religious believers the "as" is defined by the reality of a transcendent being.

What is transcendence? This question has been discussed by phenomenological (Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade…) and functional (Yinger, Luckmann, Luhmann…) approaches to religion. The former advocate a concept of transcendence as the self-revelation of divine powers to human beings (as *tremendum* and *fascinosum*) and concentrate on the contents of the revelations in an essentialist manner. The latter concentrate on social functions of human self-projection and neglect contents.[386] In

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385 Hick 2005, 140, and the chapters 8 to 10; an analogy to Wittgenstein's "seeing as" (Wittgenstein 2004, pt. II, chapter XI). See also Schäfer 2004a, 266, 296.

386 This debate from my perspective in Schäfer 2009; also Pollack 1995. On the debates about the definition of religion see Platvoet and Molendijk 1999 and Schäfer 2004a, 265 with more literature. The often used definition of religion as "a system […] formulating conceptions of a general order of existence […]" (Geertz 1985, 4) is too broad a concept for us (see Schäfer 2004a, 266, 332). On the interdisciplinary use of the concept of religion in political and religious sciences see Hildebrandt and Brocker 2008. On the ambivalence of religious mobilization in the context of violence see Gopin 2000; Appleby 2000; 2001; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000; Hasenclever 2003; Hasenclever and Juan 2007; Hildebrandt 2007; Hildebrandt and Brocker 2005.

short, today a widely shared understanding is that both the content of the believers' beliefs and the social function of religious praxis have to enter into the analysis of religion. This is what we think, too. However, we would like to emphasize that the semantic content expressed as belief is crucial. Believers believe in transcendence as "superhuman powers" (Riesebrodt 2010, 72ff., 75). Transcendence has a face for them, so to say. For a praxeological approach to the religious practical sense, it is crucial to know which face believers give to "their" transcendence. We have seen that the Guatemalan military officer had a very different idea than the indigenous peasant. Another point is that in our praxeological approach (as is clearly indicated by the praxeological square) religious and non-religious meaning is generated only if interpretation goes together with experience (or to use Cassirer's words, if the perceived experiential manifold is put into meaningful series by the schemes of perception). This basic epistemological assumption has an analogy in the theory of religion. Some scholars conceive of religion mainly as a symbolic system (Durkheim 1982) or as a "realm behind the world" ("hinterweltliches Reich", Weber 1920, 103) that consists of structured semantic contents. Other scholars explain even the origin of religion by its function of problem solving, especially with regard to the insurmountable problem of death (Tylor 1970) or to "adverting misfortune" in general (Riesebrodt 2010, 92ff.). We consider both aspects of religious praxis as intimately interrelated. On the one hand, religious praxis can only serve for problem solving if it can resort to superhuman powers. On the other hand, we conceive of the cognitive relation between experience and interpretation as a dynamic transformation (modeled by the schemes of perception and action orientation in the praxeological square). Symbolic systems, as objectified in church doctrines for instance, are not fixed systems of signs (as an orthodox Saussurean position might have it), but tend to be in constant use for interpreting experiences. Indeed, they only make sense and become meaningful in a context of use.[387] In short, transcendence becomes practical for the believers; and for praxeological researchers, transcendence becomes a pragmatic operator.[388]

As a result of the context of use in which religious signs are situated, different experiential contexts will trigger different religious symbols even from identical semiotic inventories, as e.g. the Pentecostal one. Thus, actors in different social positions will develop different religious identities and strategies, including dif-

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387 This is even the case with dogmatic treatises. They are in use *as* dogmatic works that for their users order and legitimize theological thought and, most probably, the social position of their readers.

388 In the second volume we will come back to religious praxis. For this introduction, a further short remark on religious language with reference to our model has to suffice.

ferent concepts of the relation between transcendent forces and society or history. This includes, of course, very different strategies in social conflicts and indeed in any kind of dispute.

The reference to transcendence relates by interpretation "earthly" experiences to transcendent beings and realms, while at the same time upholding the distinction between both. It is precisely the difference between "otherworldly" powers and "worldly" affairs that strengthens the social effects of religious interpretation. On the one hand, transcendence turns concrete and practical: In the flow of praxis, the recourse to transcendence becomes what we call an "operator of practical logic." It is the very relation between earthly experiences and otherworldly interpretations which creates religious identities, strategies and, in the end, a type of praxis very much of its own (but not *sui generis*!). Hence, the specificity of religious praxis is neither to strictly separate religious from non-religious spheres nor to divide religious symbols from material processes. Rather, it lies in relating religious interpretation to non-religious experience and social processes, i.e. making it similar. On the other hand, religious interpretation emphasizes simultaneously the distinction between worldly and otherworldly powers. The religious symbols used for transcendent powers convey their radical difference from earthly affairs. The rapture of the church into heaven is similar to the experience of being nearly annihilated by violence and misery in that it speaks the language of time, despair, and hope. But it is totally different in that it pronounces hope as a transcendent future that contradicts radically present despair, but can only be created by God himself, not by the believers. When the believers identify with this promise of salvation, they are enabled to keep their distance from despair, to experience hope, and to gather in a community of other believers who practice their hope in that transcendent future as communal solidarity. If religious discourse does not create sufficient distance from the despair of everyday life, if the sources of hope are not imagined as transcendent and powerful, the dialectics of religious distancing cannot take place and the religious option loses its appeal as a real alternative.[389] The more eccentric the religious praxis is, the more it appears to be able to trigger the mobilization of religious movements.

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389   One can interpret the problems of the Theology of Liberation in Latin America to a certain extent within this key. The promise of a just society by ethically motivated political change was not distant enough from the situation of despair and from other, non-religious, programs.

Social movement research

As we consider religious praxis very similar to any other kind of praxis—except for its postulate of transcendence—we can approach religious movements counting on all the benefits of the rich tools offered by the social movement theories.[390] We have developed and tested our method by studying religious movements in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Argentina, and Mexico,[391] and we have advanced our way of doing research on religious movements by a critical reception of the social movement debate.[392]

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390 On the relation between research on religious and on social movements has not been published much; see Hannigan 1991; Willems 2004; Boehme et al. 2004. Religious movements are commonly treated from a perspective of religious studies or under exclusive premises of the sociology of religion (mostly Weberian) as well as issue oriented. On the state of the art see Arweck 2010. An issue oriented new compendium: Lewis 2004. Weberian perspective: Swatos 1992; Wilson 1990 with a focus on Weber's concept of sect.

391 See the brief account of all the research process in the preface.

392 See Schäfer (2003; 2005). For some of the corresponding currents of movement theory see the following footnotes and more remarks in volumes 2 and 3. Only quite lately, Bourdieu's theory has been discussed explicitly in the context of social and religious movement research. Some older works that apply the praxeological way of thought in creative ways, but do not develop methods of analysis: Eder 1996; 2000; Eder et al. 2002. However, as far as we can see, there is not much work reflecting explicitly (possible) theoretical relations between praxeology and social movement theory. The only monograph we know is Crossley 2002. He presents a thorough theoretical interpretation that we will refer to later on. Some small works: Bilić 2010. The author searches to "hybridize" Bourdieu and social movement theories with a special emphasis on habitus, the crisis concept, fields, capital, and illusio, and with the empirical object of peace groups on the Balkans. Husu (2012) discusses the possibility of studying identity-oriented movements by the single theoretical frame of habitus, capital, and field, instead of applying particularizing approaches such as framing, RMT, and Political Process theories. Samuel (2013) applies Bourdieu to North American sexual minorities with specific respect to symbolic violence and epistemology. Vester (2007) examines the discussion on New Social Movements and proposes Bourdieu for a new approach to the class positions. Vester tackles the problem masterfully from this own praxeological theory of milieus (Vester et al. 2001). Some applications of praxeological concepts: Damon (2013) explores the concepts of field, illusio, doxa, logic, and symbolic capital in the attempt to construct a field of social justice protests. Schmitt (2007) endeavors in social inequality and protest movements under the concept of symbolic violence. On the contrary to the cited authors, Giegel (1989, 149ff.) considers praxeology unsuitable for social movement research. However, this is due to Giegel's strongly objectivistic reading of Bourdieu. Instead, it is precisely Bourdieu's linking of structure and actor which renders his theory fruitful for solving several key problems of social movement research. — On religious movements, there are much less applications of Bourdieu to empirical research. For example, Duschinsky

This focus, respectively, on social and religious movements of course narrows the perspective from which we adapt and apply the anthropological and sociological work of Bourdieu. Our attention is directed preferentially to the meso-level of society, to collective and individual actors, to language in the context of mobilizing discourses and to its reception and reproduction, as well as to the social conditions of domination, resistance, and accommodation. This is because we consider the meso-level perspective as most appropriate for the study of the mediation between habitus and structure in an actor-oriented way. In this sense, social movement research has an inspiring effect on praxeology. Conversely, it is also true that praxeological theory opens the perspective of social movement research to a much broader range of praxis. This is specifically the case as concerns the somewhat sterile opposition between identity and strategy-oriented strands, but also for the approach to the social macro-perspective. Here, we can only sketch these issues with broad strokes (more in vol. 2 and 3), and concentrate briefly, with reference to Crossley (2002), on the theoretical debate.

The issue of identity has come very much to the fore in different schools of movement research.[393] It turned out to be a basic feature of the *New Social Movement* (NSM) approach, especially in Europe. Soon, a debate developed with US-based *Resource Mobilization Theory* (RMT), which emphasizes strategy instead.[394] The former underscores the importance of social contradictions, relative deprivation, and collective grievances for a demand-oriented explanation of social mobilization.[395] On the other hand, RMT stresses the ever-present desire of individuals to maximize their utility within a framework of opportunities and constraints in order to explain mobilization by the supply side.[396] The strong polarity between these approaches, however, has been diminishing while the *relation* between actors

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(2012) applies field theory to fundamentalist movements. Fer (2010) applies habitus and field theories to an institutional study of a Pentecostal church in Polynesia. Wood (2009) passes a critique on theories of spirituality referring to Bourdieu's concept of strategy. If established churches can be treated as religious movements, then Vögele, Bremer, and Vester 2002 have to be mentioned. These authors have produced a very useful piece of work, transforming praxeological theory into a detailed empirical study of Protestant milieus in Germany. — Bourdieu himself published on social movements only in the form of polemic treatises (Bourdieu 1998d, 2004, G:; 2002). In his obituary, Habermas (2002) remembers Bourdieu as a social scientist politically committed to social movements of the left; so does Suárez (2009).

393 See Hellmann, Klein, and Rohde 1995; Eder 2000; Snow and Benford 2000; Neidhardt and Rucht 1991. For more literature see Schäfer 2005.

394 Cohen 1985; Rucht 1991a.

395 Touraine 1983; Bader 1991, 32; Raschke 1988, 117, 126.

396 Iannaccone 1990; Gill 1999; Zald and McCarthy 1988; Zald 1991.

and structures has moved more into the centre of attention.[397] It is obvious that the praxeological approach fits very well with these issues in theory. It is especially the mediation between identity and strategy through the conception of habitus as a network of dispositions that turns praxeology into an innovative proposal for the theoretical understanding of the relation between identities and strategies. Obviously, this issue has consequences for theories about agency in general. The same is true for two other almost classic issues in identity theories that can be grasped in an innovative way by a strictly relational version of habitus theory. The first question pertains to the relation between individual and collective identities.[398] Klandermans (1992, 81) states that from five important approaches[399] none is appropriate for the combination of both levels in the analysis of social movements. This problem is, however, easily resolved by a network theory of habitus.[400] For empirical research, our model of the network of operators can be applied to collectives and individuals by reconstructing homologies ("overlaps") between dispositions as well as differences. The second issue is the constitution of social groups by identity construction. Construction by difference (or boundaries) is the most popular idea, fostered not least by social psychology.[401] Today, however, it is widely agreed that boundary marking *and* naming by semantic content operate complementarily in the generation of identities.[402] The network theory of identity and the network model, in empirical research facilitate the reconstruction of both moves as complementary cognitive operations that ascribe both differences and

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397 In rational choice theory e.g. schemata, habits and scripts (Esser 1991, 440ff.) gain importance while the concept of actor is being decomposed (Wiesenthal 1987, 443). Debates on identity politics connect the concepts of identity and strategy in a new way: social movements and individuals employ identities as strategic tools to enhance their social positions. See on „ethnicizing modernity" ("Ethnisieung der Moderne", Eder 2000, 29): Eder and Schmidtke 1998; Eder et al. 2002; Eisenstadt and Giesen; Goldstein and Rayner 1994; Schäfer 2004b; Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007. On identity and calculus also Polletta and Jasper 2001, 198ff.

398 Hellmann, Klein, and Rohde 1995, 4; Gamson 1992, 59f.; Snow and Benford 2000, 631.

399 "Cognitive liberation" (McAdam), "ideological packages" (Gamson), "formation and mobilization of consensus" (Klandermans), "frame alignment" (Snow/Benford), and "collective identity" (Melucci).

400 The idea of imagining "overlaps" between individual and collective identity is not new (see Bader 1991, 106, 109; see also Snow and Benford 1988, 198; Kreissl and Sack 1998, 44). But there was no satisfying theoretical and methodological supply for this demand.

401 Tajfel 1978; 1982; the classic of the boundary approach to identity: Barth 1970.

402 Barth (1996) revises his former point of view and says that both boundary and semantic content constitute identity together; also Eder 1996, 182; Klandermans 1997, 42; 1992, 82; Bader 1995.

properties. Mobilization is a crucial issue for social movements. Here the different scopes of identity and strategy in NSM and RMT theories come into play. According to Klandermans, neither explains sufficiently "what makes people define their situation in such a way that participation in a social movement seems appropriate" (Klandermans 1992, 77). Klandermans recommends to regard grievances as an important means of linking the definition of a situation with a rationale for action. This corresponds to Bourdieu's view. Grievances imply the interpretation of experience by means of perception, judgment, and action. Hence, they can be represented—for the time being still metaphorically—as locations on a "cognitive map" related to the social positions of actors with their perceived constraints and opportunities. Therefore, we consider the range of the praxeological approach to be wider than indicated. From the viewpoint of our network model of the habitus, grievances are complementary to opportunities. Habitus generates identities and strategies. Therefore the series (Cassirer)[403] of "grievance, demand for solutions, identity generation, self-positioning, value-oriented action" can be conceived of as complementary to the series of "opportunities, supply of ideas and alliances for solutions, strategy generation, adscription to adversaries (or constraints) to deal with, purposive action." To put it simply, grievances turn into mobilization only if they are interpreted within the context of opportunities and constraints.[404] One could call this "strategic coping." However, this process does not depend on cognition alone, but to a considerable extent also on emotion.[405] While this aspect is not at the center of our interest, the theory of habitus as a network integrates the aspects of emotion and body in the conceptualization of identity (Schäfer 2003, 262, 272, 279, 353; Schäfer 2005). When we operationalize this theory through our models of the square and the network, we will show possibilities of extending their use to emotions and physical states as well (vol. 3).

Finally, social structures are crucial for most of the social movement theories. In order to discuss the actor-structure relation from the perspective of social structure it seems appropriate to sketch briefly two strongly objectivist theories. In the tradition of Marx, Alain Touraine has proposed a specific brand of social movement theory. Touraine's important contribution emphasizes social domination. Especially in the phase of his classic *Production de la Société*[406] he oversimplifies social conflicts by

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403 See section 1.2.1.2.

404 This observation already evidences that grievances are but one element among different others. See below on Crossley (p. 364).

405 See e.g. Klandermans 1997, 43; Rucht 1995, 10 or on affective elements in framing Snow and Benford 2000, 615.

406 Touraine 1977. See also Touraine 1984. Critiques in Rucht 1991b; Touraine 1991.

postulating just one conflict line in a bi-polar model of social domination (Touraine 1983, 96; Rucht 1991b, 13). Granted that he deconstructs reified images of actors, it seems nevertheless too straightforward to end up with society objectively acting upon itself by means of its classes and self-representations ("historicity").[407] In Touraine's objectivist phase, social movements appear as "historical subject," (Touraine 1983, 98) which simply means that they somehow have self-consciousness and oppose the system—society acting upon itself.[408] "Society mobilized against society" is also the catchphrase by which Luhmann characterizes social movements, viewed from the perspective of functional differentiation.[409] Their function is to "implement the negation of society in society in operations." (Luhmann 2013, 164) Protest needs the selection of a theme, and inasmuch as movements invent (or look for) themes and corresponding histories, they invent and construct protest as their own reason for existence. They invent problems where there are none, maintain the form of protest while varying their "thematic obsessions" (Luhmann 2013, 162), create "pseudo-events" (Luhmann 2013, 163) etc., all of which in order to invent themselves as movements. In other words, they construct themselves as "autopoietic system" (Luhmann 2013, 162), by causing trouble through illusionary and irrational communication of fear (Luhmann 2013, 165). After all, by imposing "reference to the environment" ("Umweltbezug," Luhmann 2013, 165) into the communicative self-reference ("Selbstbezug," Luhmann 2013, 165) of society, they disturb and unsettle other systems and at least further their communicative procedures. Even if other system theorists make more headway than Luhmann himself,[410] the concept of autopoiesis persists as an impediment to understanding human action.[411] In spite of Touraine and Luhmann, Eder (1996, 3) is right in arguing that the macro-perspective on society must not be abandoned in movement research. Instead of the old class perspective (and we add, systems theory), he conceives of collective action as "embedded in a *cultural texture*, a reality consisting of a specifically organized discourse that is prior to the motivations of actors to act together." (Eder 1996, 9)

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407 Touraine 1977, 60ff., 134ff. This is why Touraine himself, later, proclaims the *Return of the actor* (Touraine 1988).

408 On the other hand individuals are taken into account as subjects, "centered as they are on their intentions, their objectives, and their ideologies," (Touraine 1977, 63).

409 Luhmann 2013, 154ff.; Luhmann 2004. It is interesting to note that, while Touraine celebrates social movements as almost constitutive for modern society, Luhmann's texts reflect much disdain towards them.

410 Ahlemeyer 1995; Hellmann 1996; Fuchs 2006.

411 Maybe it is for this reason that the inventor of this concept, biologist Francisco Varela, warns not to transpose the concept from biology to social sciences (Varela 1988. See also Varela 1979, 54).

From our perspective, this transforms class into a position in a Bourdieuian social space or field. Finally, class can be dealt with as a "social opportunity structure," (Eder 1996, 61) which actors located in a similar position perceive in similar ways. In consequence, it is plausible for empirical work to triangulate habitus, fields, and social space. Nevertheless, to avoid the pitfalls and enhance the benefits of a Bourdieuian approach to social movements, it is helpful to take a brief look at a thorough discussion of this issue.

Nick Crossley[412] surveys different theories of social movements and concludes his book (168 ff.) with the proposal to use Bourdieu's praxeology to advance social movement theory. For Crossley, the strong point in Bourdieu's theory is that it offers a more appropriate perspective on the relation between agency and structure than other movement theories. The weak point is, however, that praxeology only lists as causes for mobilization crisis or social strain (183). These observations convey two consequences of our interests. First, Crossley seems to have a problem with the understanding of habitus. He states that Bourdieu sometimes insinuates, for situations of crisis, that the habitus is to be completely substituted by rational calculation (186). Crossley's alternative is that "crisis situations allow for a different set of habits to kick in" (186). These "habits" can be conceived of as "durable dispositions towards contention" (189), which must have been constituted by previous experiences of protest.[413] While we share the idea that in crisis situations the dispositions of the habitus are not simply suspended, we have a hunch that the "habits of contention" are another habitus-like thing, only slightly changed. We also see the problem, but our solution is different. A concept of habitus and a corresponding model that conceive of both identities and strategies as generated by a wide network of dispositions can combine value-oriented action (identity) with purposive action (strategy), and conceive of conscious reflection as a specific mental operation which operates by certain dispositions but also brings certain dispositions into the focus of attention. Thus, the mental operation is not split off from the dispositions of the habitus. It rather accomplishes its task by means of dispositions, of the situational factors and of the capacity of reason to take reflexive distance. Strategies, for instance, activate dispositions and combine them with situational perceptions (new ideas etc.) according to the interests of actors, whatever these may be. Second, Crossley, in our view rightly, regards Bourdieu's unilateral emphasis on crises and structural strain as cause of mobilization as insufficient and

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412 Crossley 2002. See on habitus also Crossley 2001. In volume 3 we will discuss more details.

413 He refers to the student movement of May 1968 as such an event that created a persisting habitus of contention in a whole generation.

comes up with a very interesting proposal. After examining the leading theories of social movements, he rescues Neil Smelser with a carefully thought out argument (39 ff., 186 ff.).[414] Smelser proposes six social factors to explain the mobilization of a social movement. The first benefit of this model of mobilization seems trivial: Smelser keeps together what other scholars of social movements have torn apart into different theories (187). In their mutual interrelatedness, Smelser's criteria turn out to be a helpful tool for praxeological movement research (Crossley 2002, 43). First, Smelser does not neglect the effect of crises, social strain, and grievances on mobilizing. Second, he acknowledges social systems as structurally conducive in terms of opportunities and constraints. Third, the spread of beliefs as interpretative means for the social conditions is another crucial category. Fourth, he mentions mobilizing activities of organizations, networks, and media. Fifth, one has to register "precipitating factors" such as sudden events (an earthquake, for instance). Finally, Smelser also points to social control, by agencies such as the police or the military or through ideological means by the media. These criteria for empirical research and for theorizing are not only fully compatible with praxeology at large, but can be addressed by our different analytical models in their entirety. Beyond this, they may serve as landmarks for a praxeological examination of the historical trajectories of social and religious movements.

In conclusion, the empirical focus on religious movements and in particular the debates in the social movement theory, served to condense all deliberations on epistemology and theory under the aspect of sociological usefulness. Praxeological research should be able to approach preferentially the following issues: the practical relations between the dispositions of actors and social structures; the generative and transformative processes that take place between experience, thought, and action; the specific role of language in these processes and in social praxis generally; the identities and strategies of actors; the structural conditions of action, with regard to functional differentiation and stratified structures of domination. Finally, where this is indicated, specificities of religious praxis should be taken into account according to the aforementioned aspects of praxis.

On Bourdieu's vocabulary (tables)

With the following two tables, we want to contribute some underpinnings of what we stated about Bourdieu's use of central concepts. According to relational logic, we do not define the concepts but register them in their prevalent relations of use.

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414 Smelser 1963.

The first table is dedicated to the relation between the material and the mental dimensions of praxis, the second to the relation between object and subject.[415]

Bourdieu's vocabulary in relation to meaning

material	Relation	mental	Source
order of things		order of words	(Bourdieu 2010, 483, G: 1982a, 750)
goods	are converted →	distinctive signs	(Bourdieu 2010, 485, G: 1982a,754)
groups, individuals being position in production	← project by practices → and properties ~ class ~	representations being perceived consumption	(Bourdieu 2010, 485f. , G: 1982a, 755)
material determinants of socio-economic condition	relative autonomy	symbolic representations	(Bourdieu 2010, 486, G: 1982a, 755)
condition	← practical relation→ Produce →	classificatory schemes representations	ibdm.
power	struggles about over →	meaning classificatory schemes	(Bourdieu 2010, 481, G: 1982a,748)
whole social being of actors	given by use →	meaning of classification	(Bourdieu 2010, 480, G: 1982a, 746)
social world	pertinence in perceiving	schemes	(Bourdieu 2010, 477, G: 1982a,741)
social world	of… "reasonable" behavior in…	practical knowledge classificatory schemes (or forms of classification mental structures symbolic forms (their connotations)	(Bourdieu 2010, 470, G: 1982a, 730)
objective division into classes (age groups, genders, social classes)	product of →	schemes of perception and appreciation beneath consciousness and discourse.	(Bourdieu 2010, 470, G: 1982a,730)
conditions of existence Invitations / threats	structuring activity of actors response	(practices) representations	(Bourdieu 2010, 469, G: 1982a, 729)
thing / practice	of… taste, anticipation	meaning (*sens*) and value	(Bourdieu 2010, 469, G: 1982a, 728)

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415 The arrows (→, ←, ← xxx →) denote the direction of influence indicated as prevailing by the context. The tilde (~) denotes equivalence of the concepts. Certainly, we do not pretend any completeness but merely intend to give some telling examples.

material	Relation	mental	Source
social conditions	degree of freedom relative autonomy	symbolic manifesta-tions, the symbolic	(Bourdieu 2010, 249f., G: 1982a, 392f.)
struggles over […] goods		symbolic struggles to appropriate distinctive signs	(Bourdieu 2010, 247, G: 1982a, 388f.)
		intentional strategies [of distinction, HWS]	(Bourdieu 2010, 244, G: 1982a, 382)
struggles among the classes		properties […] [as] weapons and prizes	(Bourdieu 2010, 243, G: 1982a, 381)
struggles among the classes	← stakes of the struggle	definition of the legiti-mate means	(Bourdieu 2010, 243, G: 1982a, 381)
		symbolic power as recognized power	(Bourdieu 2010, 249, G: 1982a, 378ff.)
social space		symbolic space	(Bourdieu 1998d, G: 1998e)
social structures		mental structures	(Bourdieu 1996, 1, G: 2004a, 13)
space of positions […] in the academic field	homology	space of the works [and discourses, HWS]	(Bourdieu 1988, XVII, G: 1998g, 17)
distribution of power and prestige positions […] in the field of production	correspond to each other homology	judgement, expressing stances, contents, styles	(Bourdieu 1988, XVII, G: 1998g, 17)
objective structures Fields struggles in social space	incorporation → (apprehension) ← participation in struggles	mental structures biological individuals mental structures	(Bourdieu 1990c, 14, G: 1992a, 31f.)
world	← active presence → ← urgencies / to be said →	gestures, words (*gestes, paroles*)	(Bourdieu 1990b, 52, G: 2008, 97)
social structures	correspondence	mental structures	(Bourdieu 1991b, 5, G: 2011b, 38)
stance of body	(relation of signification, HWS)	meaning (of the body's stance)	(Bourdieu 1977b, 11, G: 2009, 146)
structures	practices →	representations	(Bourdieu 1977b, 21, G: 2009, 149)
group	authorizes →	ordinary language	(Bourdieu 1977b, 21, G: 2009, 150)
social conditions	…the efficiency of…	language	(Bourdieu 2009, 150; trans. HWS, passage not included in English)
social conditions	the possibility of an →	objective system of language	ibid.
speech (parole) economy, politics, social structures, classes	appears as the precondition for → ← function of (condition) →	language (langue) speech, communication message	(Bourdieu 1977b, 23, G: 2009, 154f.; only partly included in English)

material	Relation	mental	Source
political power relations	(condition) →	symbolic power relations market of symbolic goods power	(Bourdieu 2009, 156; trans. HWS, passage not included in English)
situation, context	(condition) →	language (*langue*)	(Bourdieu 2009, 156; trans. HWS, passage not included in English)
practices	habitus / production	representations	(Bourdieu 1977b, 72, G: 2009, 165)
objective probabilities		wisdom, sayings, evaluation, *ethos*, dispositions	(Bourdieu 1977b, 77, G: 2009, 166f.)
economic and social necessity		matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions	(Bourdieu 1977b, 78, 83, G: 2009, 168f.)
the most diverse domains objects	← (conditions of) →	*metaphor*, mutually reflecting metaphors	(Bourdieu 1977b, 91, G: 2009, 170)
objective structure defining the social conditions	practice →	habitus (as producer ← of practice)	(Bourdieu 1977b, 78, G: 2009, 170f.)
techniques involving the body and tools	← charge	social meanings	(Bourdieu 1977b, 87, G: 2009, 190)
(body, space)		(symbolism of body and space)	(Bourdieu 2009, 193; trans. HWS, passage not included in English)
somatic utterances	correspondence	language	(Bourdieu 2009, 194; trans. HWS, passage not included in English)
classes in relations	reduplication →	symbolic relations	(Bourdieu 1974, 57f.; trans. HWS, essay not available in English)
position in social structure	← symbolize	symbolic distinctions (as signs)	(Bourdieu 1974, 60; trans. HWS, essay not available in English)
practices = signifier		status positions = the signified	ibid.

Bourdieu's vocabulary in relation to object and subject

Object	Relation	Subject	Source
field	conditioning	habitus	(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127, G: 1996, 160f.)
social structure		individuals, subjects	(Bourdieu 1974, 57, trans. HWS, not available in English)
objective function of expression	goods as signs	subjective intention of expression	(Bourdieu 1974, 71, trans. HWS, not available in English)
[objective] structure, externality	dialectical relationship	[structured] dispositions internality	(Bourdieu 1977b, 84, 72, G: 2009, 147)
objective probalities	dispositions	subjective aspirations	(Bourdieu 1990b, 54, G: 2008, 100)
social structure		physical person / dispositions	(Bourdieu 2009, 181, trans. HWS, passage not included in English)
social class […] as system of objective determinations	→	sense of reality	(Bourdieu 1977b, 85f., G: 2009, 187)
objective structures = without		mental structures = within	(Bourdieu 1988, XIV, G: 1998g, 13)
class condition	~	dispositions	(Bourdieu 2010, 243, G: 1982a, 382)
social order (inclusion, exclusion)	progressively inscribed in →	people's minds (judgments)	(Bourdieu 2010, 472f., G: 1982a, 734)
the sense objectified in institutions	← habitus inhabit institutions	practical sense	(Bourdieu 1990b, 57, G: 2008, 107)
objectified meaning → objectivity (Cassirer)	harmony (habitus) common-sense world ← consensus on the meaning	← practical sense	(Bourdieu 1990b, 58, G: 2008, 108)
probabilities of access to goods (sociology)	always convergent experiences	art […] of anticipating the future; sense of reality	(Bourdieu 1990b, 50, G: 2008, 112)
objective structures within which it [the game] is played out	feel for the game →	subjective sense	(Bourdieu 1990b, 66, G: 2008, 119)

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