Foreword by Hugh Willmott *Afterword by* Arturo Escobar

The New Development Management

CRITIQUING THE DUAL MODERNIZATION

EDITED BY

Sadhvi Dar & Bill Cooke

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To my wonderful mother, Rati Dar (1947–95);
and to my sister, Jenny Cooke, with admiration

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Foreword

Hugh Willmott

This is a book for anyone who has wondered about 'development' and what 'management' might have to do with it. Is development unequivocally a good thing? How is it justified and delivered, and how might this shape and constrain its effects?

It is to be hoped that readers of this collection will be as diverse as its contents and contributors. It is relevant for a wide range of audiences – from executive office-holders, advisers and planners in national, regional and global institutions, through academics and students of the multifaceted aspects of development, to NGO staff working on grassroots projects. Its readers will also include, I hope, people like myself who, until recently, have not been inclined to pay much attention to development beyond conscience-easing charity donations and harbouring some vague misgivings about what is being done in development's name.

As a number of the contributors emphasize, the manner of delivery of anything that promises 'development' or indeed 'enlightenment' should not be exempt from critical scrutiny. Consequential discussion of development must also go beyond mere criticism to consider the possibility of a different form of relationship between 'developers' and those being 'developed'. In particular, contributors to this volume conceive of this difference demanding a relationship that moves well beyond a conception of development as a one-way, civilizing process. It requires sufficient humility to acknowledge that, for example, it is the custodians and providers of development, not their targets, who pose the greatest threats to the planet. It is from their clients that the architects of development have most to learn about how to live with a smaller footprint.

Ecological destruction, global warming and human migration are part of the bigger picture that provides the backdrop to this book. If the suffering, frustration and dislocation associated with these developments – themselves generated or amplified by rampant and uneven capitalist

expansion – continue, then the very meaning and significance of 'development' require a major rethink. Is it, for example, coherent or defensible to call for poverty reduction through economic development whilst continuing to pursue policies of growth in 'developed' countries that rely upon a cycle of dependence and/or contribute to global warming, which has the most severe impact upon the most impoverished of the world's population?

Perhaps the most deeply entrenched assumption of orthodox thinking about development is that a technical fix – in the form of new technologies (e.g. alternative sources of power) and better management of resources – can alone square the vicious circle produced by the relentless divisiveness of managed capitalist development. According to its logic, no radical rethink or change of direction is needed because the use of material and social technologies will ensure that the planet, including its numerous natural and social ecologies, will accommodate and absorb whatever pressures are imposed upon it. *The New Development Management* contributes to an emergent interrogation of this deep-rooted but not unassailable view. Its distinctive focus is the issue of how technocratic ideas of management have been invoked to legitimize dominant development philosophies and practices, such as the use of projects and 'logframes' (logical frameworks). Its thrust, it is worth emphasizing, is not to dismiss any kind of management or even to suggest that management has no place in development. Instead, its contribution is to reflect critically upon how *particular*, apparently neutral or benign, ideas about management have been *universalized* to guide and justify *specific conceptions and forms* of development. In turn, this opens up a space for admitting and exploring the possibility of alternatives that may selectively incorporate and reconstruct management ideas but without being led or driven by them.

It is in its questioning of 'development management' that *The New Development Management* connects with, mobilizes and contributes to themes that are central to 'critical management studies' (CMS). This is by no means a one-way street. In one direction, conceptions and analyses of development can be deepened and broadened by incorporating diverse concerns and perspectives that are central to CMS, such as feminism, postcolonialism and critical environmentalism. As the editors argue, these traditions are key to nurturing an approach to action and analysis that is 'democratic, tolerant and self-critical'. Coming from the other direction, the traffic of 'critical development studies' (CDS) valuably extends and stretches critical analysis of management beyond its current, but also rather introverted if not parochial, concerns with corporations in the 'developed

world'. CDS highlights the global reach of managerialism into the field of development. The insidiousness of managerialism is also demonstrated when, in its 'softer' guise, development projects are cloaked in the alluring garb of participation, networking, partnering, et cetera. Additionally, CDS extends and enriches the insights developed within CMS by showing how, for example, the diversity of social and economic life can be homogenized by invoking a notion of 'organization' that effectively effaces their differences.

CDS extends evaluations of established theory and practice beyond a self-preservational concern to preserve the development industry by saving it from its shortcomings – for example, by commending reforms (e.g. prioritizing poverty reduction) that promise to mitigate some of its more glaring or embarrassing limitations. The purpose of CDS criticism is not to attain a comforting sense of superiority but, rather, to provide a more penetrating and less self-serving diagnosis of the limitations of development management as a basis for opening a space for a less managerialized alternative. This involves identifying some of the conditions of possibility for advancing an approach that radically rethinks about, and as a consequence of this rethinking is *significantly more attentive* to, the concerns and priorities of the recipients of development. As the contributions to this collection show, this necessitates a process of critical reflection upon the changing meaning of development as well as upon the institutions and practices through which diverse forms of development are conceived and delivered.

Contributors to *The New Development Management* have had direct and hands-on experience of its diverse facets. But their concern is not to use this experience to pontificate about how their readers should be 'doing development' differently. Rather, their contribution is to foster an alternative understanding of development that highlights its managerialization and pays attention to its largely unacknowledged, counterproductive consequences. The practical value of CDS lies in appreciating the implications of its identification and diagnoses of problems that are widely felt but rarely find public expression as they are effectively muted if not silenced within the dominant, First World order of developmentalist truth. CDS gives voice to those who currently assume the necessity, or assume an obligation, to couch their concerns and activities within the language and agenda of managerialism. Complying with managerialism is so often a condition of securing resources or credibility. By directly questioning what is taken for granted, or what is risky to challenge, CDS provides a measure of practical

intellectual assistance in making fresh sense of a complex field that has been further complexified by the advent of managerialism. More specifically, CDS speaks directly to readers who are open to be persuaded of a pressing need to ask difficult questions about, and thereby help to set in motion a radical reconstruction of, the field of development. By enabling us to think and act differently in relation to the pervasive influence of managerialism in the field of development, *The New Development Management* makes a pioneering contribution to a task that is as daunting as it is urgent.

1
Introduction: The New Development Management

Bill Cooke and Sadhvi Dar

A Dual Modernization

This book offers critical perspectives on the contemporary and ubiquitous uses of managerialism in international development interventions. Our use of the term *critical* is not as an alternative to *important*. Nor are we critical in some sense that management ideas have not been applied properly in development, or that there are development practices that must be improved managerially. We are critical in the sense that we believe there is something intrinsically wrong with the very idea of management and its applications in international development. As editors, we – and, we think, the contributions here – are:

> … critical of established management practices and the established social order. Our premise is that structural features of contemporary society, such as the profit imperative, patriarchy, racial inequality, and ecological irresponsibility, often turn organizations into instruments of domination and exploitation ...

This quotation, with which the main thrust of this book resonates, is from the domain statement of the critical management studies (CMS) interest group of the (American) Academy of Management (2007). In identifying with it we, as editors, align ourselves with what has emerged over the past fifteen years or so as CMS. Nevertheless, we are committed to making this book more than a critical management studies volume about development and development management. It is, equally, a contribution to postdevelopment, or what our (colonizing?) instincts might lead us to term critical development studies.

In bringing CMS and critical/postdevelopment understandings together, we are motivated by the intellectual approaches that these ostensibly separate fields share. This is notwithstanding the diverse range

of social theorizing, epistemological framings, and methodologies that are encompassed *within* each field. An example of this sharing is the self-evident similarity between the landmark (in development studies) Foucauldian deconstruction of development discourses and explanation of their material consequences in James Ferguson's (1990) *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic State Power in Lesotho* and the important (in management studies) Foucauldian deconstruction of human resource management discourses, linking them to their material consequences, in Barbara Townley's (1994) *Reframing Human Resource Management: Power, Ethics and the Subject at Work*. Both these studies question the ethics of managerialization (in Townley) or bureaucratization (in Ferguson) through seemingly mundane and neutral practices. These practices are described as often culminating in a singular and rational project logic that has dehumanizing effects on the lives of those impinged upon (as workers, as beneficiaries, as stakeholders) by such projects. This logic also is instrumental in constructing a regime of truth that makes particular, and often unethical, realities more legitimate than others.

Identifying the similarity in these approaches to the ethics of organizing (broadly, and not unproblematically, defined) indicates how the demarcation between critical work on development and critical work on management might begin to be bridged. But this demarcation in itself must also be an object of critical attention. Not least, this chapter and this book imply, it serves to sustain modernization and the modern as an enduring and dominating (in intent) worldview with implications for a diversity of social institutions and arenas. We do not therefore proclaim this book as marking the invention of a brand-new, novel field. Instead it is committed to exploring the interconnections, engagements and relevances that the critical management and postdevelopment understandings can have for one another.

In singling out Ferguson and Townley, we do not wish to propose that CMS and postdevelopment scholarships are wholly Foucauldian. Both embrace (in often uncomfortable simultaneity) neo-Marxism and Critical Theory; feminist, postmodernist, and/or postcolonialist perspectives; critical environmentalism, and much more. Subsequent chapters exemplify and rehearse much of this range. Further, there are already reviews and collections that describe the two fields. For CMS, key works in this genre are Grey and Fournier (2002), Grey and Willmott's reader (2005) and Adler, Forbes and Willmott's recent review (2007).

For postdevelopment, there is particularly Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) and Kothari and Minogue (2001), but also see Sachs (1991) and Crush (1995b).

CMS and postdevelopment work are often also criticized for the same reasons. Postdevelopment has been called impractical, woolly theorizing (Parfitt, 2002) that does nothing to alleviate poverty, leaving no practical options open for tackling what development agencies do (or are trying to do), and so making the situation worse.

CMS is similarly attacked for its lack of instrumental value or relevance (as acknowledged, for example, in Grey and Fournier, 2002; see also *The Economist*, 2004), on the grounds that while it is very good at presenting critical argument against managerialism, it is not at all inclined to suggest a real alternative (Parker, 2002).

But perhaps the most relevant concern here is a point debated, but yet to really emerge in print, that CMS might itself be some kind of colonizing discourse, First World in its origins, but domineering over different expressions of opposition to managerialism elsewhere. This point of criticism also potentially applies to this book. Our response would be to recognize, first, that we of course believe social phenomena to be complex, complicated and multidimensional. Just as one singular approach to alleviating poverty (as sanctioned by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund [IMF], and even some international nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) cannot fit all socially embedded geographies, histories and people, nor can there, or should there, be one institutional or conceptual challenge to managerialism in the form of CMS. Yet, at the same time, and second, we would also resist the homogenization of CMS that this potential critique entails, and reiterate the diversity of positions within it. Third, we maintain the possibility of, and indeed the necessity for, an international solidarity in opposition to an amoral, virally pernicious, globalizing managerialism that tries to obliterate borders and difference. In our view such solidarity requires a democratic, tolerant and self-critical approach to analysis and action, wary enough to avoid the paralysis and disdain that too much self-regarding self-critique will bring.

The point here, then, would be to establish some kind of mutuality in the engagements between CMS and 'alternative alternatives' to it, in this case post-development thinking. This mutuality might be strengthened by a recognition that, at a very basic level, both fields acknowledge and share certain groundings in social theory, in epistemological concerns

connecting knowledge to power, and in methodologies that guide the way knowledge is constructed in social contexts. Such a mutuality would also require us to acknowledge that there have been before us critical encounters between development and management – in a broad sense in Escobar (1988), more recently and specifically in Taylor (2001) on managerialism and participatory development, in Hickey and Mohan (2004), or in Kothari (2005). We have three small examples of how this mutuality might begin to work. These also build towards our central point about a dual modernization, the need for a critique thereof. Among other things, they describe modernity as a cultural and ideological motif (in the form of Maslow's hierarchy of needs); as operationalized through institutional mechanisms (in the shape of the World Bank); and discursively embedded, even in claims to theories of postmodernity.

The first example relates to Maslow's *hierarchy of needs*, ubiquitous in orthodox management teaching as a theory of motivation at work and in marketing (Cullen, 1997). Maslow's hierarchy suggests that people have five levels of need, and that they seek to satisfy needs at one level before moving up to the next. At the bottom of the hierarchy are physiological needs; once these are satisfied basic safety needs take priority; then social needs, then esteem needs, and then, at the top of the hierarchy, self-actualization, the fulfilment and extension of individual potential. Critical management scholars do not primarily debate whether Maslow 'works' or not. Rather, they might consider the extent to which the biological/psychologistic essentialisms implicit in the hierarchy sustain a particular set of would-be hegemonic cultural norms. These are individualizing, in the way they separate the self from the social, and place the former over the latter. They are also gendered, in the analysis of Cullen (1997), kitsch according to Linstead (2005), and a product of US Cold War liberalism for Cooke et al. (2005).

But what Maslow also argued (and which is often overlooked) was that *nations* could also be categorized according to his hierarchy of needs. In his view, only the US came close to his definition of utopia (and that was the term used), of a society able to offer its members self-actualization. Certain other countries – in his diaries, for example, Cuba, the Congo – required regimes that only had to meet lower-level needs and were therefore lower down the hierarchy of nations (Lowry, 1979). Maslow himself recognized a rough proximity of his hierarchy to a Marxist epochal schema of societal development. Switching our framing

of Maslow from CMS to one suggested by postdevelopment theorists like Escobar (1995a, 1995b) or Rist (1997) points us also to Rostow's (1960) 'phases of development' model. From this new point of view, Maslow's hierarchy is, now, *inter alia*, a modernization theory in the post-development sense of the word. Embedded within it are assumptions about the correct nature of social progress, from the 'primitive' to utopia; and the natural place of 'developed' countries, specifically the US in the hierarchy of nations, in relation to those in the rest of the world. Once seen in this way, Maslow's hierarchy is, as well as everything else, a modernizing/modernist motif that proliferates through management education, and thence the workplace, and other parts of managed daily life.

Our second example connects directly to present-day development projects and develops from an analysis of the way in which the World Bank uses soft management techniques. These techniques are used to draw governments of poorer countries around the world into implementing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The evidence (see chapters 2 and 7 by Jonathan Murphy and Bill Cooke respectively for a summary) is that behind ostensible Bank/PRSP concern for poverty reduction there still exists a set of neoliberal requirements in terms of economic, social and fiscal policy. Also associated with PRSP implementation is a narrative that suggests that the failure of their predecessors – notably the infamous structural adjustment programmes – was a consequence not of their flawed (to say the least) ultra-neoliberalism, but of the failure of World Bank experts to achieve 'ownership' for such programmes on the part of national governments. Hence the turn to soft managerialism is a tool of neoliberalism, rather than a shift to a genuine democratic participation (see Cooke, 2002).

Moreover, there is something revealing in this application via PRSPs of the managerial to the nation-state. In the academy, in the business school (and possibly even in CMS) 'organization(s)' is/are typically assumed as the primary or default social arrangement within which management is located, and within which managerialism should be critiqued. But, it can be argued (again, see Cooke, 2002) this privileging of *organization* is a discursive trick. Naming diverse social arrangements in diverse state, social, and public arenas as generic organization(s) renders them undifferentiated: from one another, and from private sector organizations. At the same time they become more amenable to that mode of governance that claims dominion over organization, that is,

managerialism (see also Chapter 3 in this volume by David Lewis). As such, the writing of 'organization' over other social locations, seals the managerialist promise of modernity – of control and stability leading to progress and ultimately a utopian society. Now, not all critical writers agree on this position on organization (see Parker, 2002b) or concede the claim to utopia (see Pieter de Vries in Chapter 9). Overall, though, reviewing the uses of managerial techniques from (post)development orientations reveals this colonization by the managerial; the *folie-à-deux* of soft managerialism and neoliberalism; and the potential and real consequences, even for critical scholars, of privileging organization as an object in this way.

Our third example revolves around managerialist appropriations and uses of postmodernism and postmodernity. At the turn of the millennium, Rosalind Eyben, the then head of Social Development at the UK government's Department for International Development (DfID), stated that 'as orthodox development loses its dominant position, so we can take advantage of recent postmodernist organizational theory which has been developed in business management faculties to explain the success of certain transnational corporations' (2000: 10). Dealing with this simultaneous claim to postmodernity, the business academy and corporations is problematic. We should flag straight away that there are different, and indeed contradictory, positions on postmodernism/postmodernity in different chapters in this book (compare Chapter 8 by Kym Thorne and Alexander Kouzmin with Chapter 10 by Sadhvi Dar). One response, from a CMS perspective, to Eyben's claim would be to revert to a distinction between postmodern ontology (reality) and postmodern epistemology (way of knowing) (for example, see Parker, 1992, Boje *et al.*, 1994). Eyben refers to the former, and alludes to an apparent corporate switching from modernist bureaucratic hierarchies to fragmented, loosely connected organizational forms, signified by terms like *networks* and *partnerships*. What Eyben is actually seeing hope in is some kind of ultra- or hyper-modern mode of organizing; and the benchmarking use of transnational corporate success shows the extent to which a modernist/modernizing epistemology, and indeed ideology, remains embedded.

A particularly relevant comparator here, selected from critical management's extensive dealings with postmodernity and postmodern epistemology, is Gibson Burrell's book *Pandemonium* and its review by Campbell Jones (1997). Burrell claims to be presenting 'retro-

organization theory' but, as Jones points out, he draws on much of his own earlier postmodernism work. The very format of the text is a challenge to the linear histories of organization and management – the book reads from the front to back and back to front, so that any one page contains fragments of different narrative threads. In content there is a similar attempt to disrupt management's, and organization studies', linear meta-narrative of orderly progress and improvement. That is, importantly for us here, Burrell recognizes and takes apart the idea of modernization implicit in accounts of management over time, and in much contemporary organization theory. Burrell also argues that this linear grand narrative has a silencing effect. Particularly relevant to a development context, Burrell challenges this silence by claiming to write the absent voice of the peasantry back into his relating of past and present (hence the claim to retro-organization theory). But that absence is still framed disciplinarily, that is, from organization studies, which too has an exclusionary effect. As Jones (1997: 2) points out:

> Burrell manages to avoid almost all of the existing work that has made an effort to theorize the status of peasants. He fails to connect with the foundational works in peasant studies ... He makes no mention of the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, and offers nothing from the extensive work of the Subaltern Studies group ... or the efforts to develop a postcolonial theory ...

Jones then goes on to make the now common problematization of postmodernist relativism and truth claims (rehearsed most uncompromisingly here in Chapter 8 by Thorne and Kouzmin). For all these reservations, Jones does not write off Burrell completely, and neither would we. Indeed, what follows in this collection reflects some of the same dilemmas and argumentation around postmodernism/postmodernity. Like Jones, we acknowledge the need to connect to work that has critically theorized development from other disciplinary positions. Hence, our call for a new mutuality of understanding. We would also argue that our point from the previous case is reinforced here. Despite a serious attempt to challenge the exclusionary effect of modernist historiographical linearity, the same effect of discipline and, particularly, that of the tacit management/organization conflation in management and organization studies, can still remain. Such disciplinary exclusion can silence the extent to which it has been possible to account for those missing in management's modernization narrative – in this case the

peasant/agrarian classes – even within a strictly linear account (e.g. classically Bernstein [1994]).

In this book we recognize the opportunities both in counter-orthodox linear accounts and critiques, based to a greater or lesser extent in tacit or explicit grand, albeit contrarian, narratives (Bill Cooke's chapter for example), and in the revelatory power of poststructuralist epistemology and methods (Sadhvi Dar's). We publish, *inter alia*, Thorne and Kouzmin's connection of the pervasiveness of a neoliberal New Public Management to the relativism of postmodernism; and at the same time, poststructural, discursive deconstructions of organizational practices in development (Sadhvi Dar and Chapter 4 by Kate Kenny). Perhaps in so doing we are opportunistic at worst, and at best have naïve expectations for the existence and achievements of an epistemological popular front. But for us, politically, while it is important to recognize the limitations of any single position, it is more important to recognize their shared transgressiveness of development orthodoxies, and their collective oppositional value. More generally, in our three cameo cases we hope we have made our point about a dual modernization – how both development and management are, by and large, modernizing projects or discourses (define them how you will); and how their status as such might be maintained, among other things by the disciplinary more-or-less separations between critical thinkers in the development studies world and critical thinkers in the management and organization studies world.

Why a 'New' Development Management?

This book is titled in homage to Ben Fine's and Jomo K. S.'s Zed collection, *The New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus*. Fine and Jomo K. S. distinguish between new, newer and newest development economics. Despite this apparent innovation, they argue, there is a continuing, underlying commitment to a neoliberal agenda. It is feasible to configure development management in the same three-phase way. First, there was a development administration phase, associated with the post-World War Two development era. This was gradually supplanted by the emergence of development management in the 1990s. Here we might distinguish between, second, this emergent early work on development management (for example that of Alan Thomas [1997], and Brinkerhoff and Coston [1999]) and, third, its most recent incarnations in practice in the implementation willy-nilly of

managerialist ideas by multilateral and bilateral agencies (see the second cameo above, and Chapter 3 by David Lewis), where the boundaries between development and managerialism become even more blurred.

According to the internal logic of the development administration/development management discourses this three-stage sequencing is tenable (which is not to say that it is therefore acceptable). Hence, for example, Esman (1991: 1) is able to claim to have been present 'at the creation of the field of development administration' now in its 'fourth decade'. In this kind of account the emergence of development administration accompanied the emergence of the post-World War Two development era, and helped meet its particular requirements. The way that development administration is now represented is as a mode of intervention that was particularly about building the capacities of (Third World) states to enable social and economic development (Riggs, 1971; Schaffer, 1973). With hindsight, Turner and Hulme represent development administration as the 'practical application of modernization theory' (1997: 12) (the implication being, of course, that with the shift to development management, modernization was abandoned). As development administration aged, identifications of particular episodes of 'crises', 'impasse', or 'deadlock' emerged. Thus, Schaffer (1969) identified disagreements about the efficacy of state bureaucracies as a space where development could become a legitimate vehicle for pursuing political agendas. Hirschmann (1981) identified three more points of conflict: the division between practically and theoretically oriented scholars; the relationship, or lack of one, between scholars and practitioners; and whether bureaucrats' class interests meant they obstructed development. Yet even he, writing in 1999, was to state that 'deadlock or not, the theory and practice of Development Administration (or Management as it came to be known) have continued, and with some vibrancy' (Hirschmann, 1999: 288).

So, from within, development management was certainly different, yet it was also the same. Key in its reformulation was the nuanced work of Alan Thomas (1996: 108), who from the UK Open University worked to identify what should be taught as development management:

> To summarize, development management should contain three types of material:
>
> 1a Development studies; and
>
> 1b conventional management theory in a development context.

2 New areas arising from viewing development management as the management of intervention aimed at 'progress' in a context of conflicts over goals and values.
3 Radical participative management methods aimed at enabling and empowering, arising from cases where development management may be viewed as the management of interventions on behalf of the relatively powerless.

Thomas's nuance came in his recognition of this as an aspirational definition; and given the claim we make to solidarity, his progressive intentions should be acknowledged here. Thus, he went on to make the distinction between the 'management *of* development', the generic management of 'deliberate efforts at progress', and subsequently (2000: 46) 'management *for* development', where development is seen 'as an orientation towards progressive social change'. For Thomas, authentic development management, consistent with his point 3, is the progressive management *for* development (2000: 42), but he is ultimately uncertain about whether or how this progressive orientation is maintained in practice: '… the majority of cases will be … ambiguous, with value based conflicts, contestations over the definition of development and power struggles. Development management will often remain an ideal rather than a description of what takes place' (2000: 51). If there is a newer development management, it might arguably be one where point 3 is not so much contested as utterly ignored or silenced. The bigger contextual and structural arguments are ignored; what matters is technical improvement of development interventions by using management techniques (a position described in David Lewis's chapter here).

For us there *is* a New Development Management, a phenomenon which for convenience, and as a political tactic, but also by any standard of legitimacy, should be labelled as such. However the three-phase parallel between us and Fine and Jomo only goes so far. What such phasing does not challenge, for example, is the claim to have left modernization theory behind with the abandonment of development administration. On Turner and Hulme's own terms this might be true. In our terms, the extension of development administration/management to non-state domains might evidence the abandonment of modernization theory in its narrow state-as-vehicle-of-planned-development definition. But it marks instead the extension of the modernizing project to new locations. Also, there are alternative – but still linear – histories of development that identify managerialist continuities between the colonial

and development eras, and do so not least at the level of managerial and technocratic ideas and practices – see Bill Cooke's chapter here, and the work of Arturo Escobar (1995a,b) and Uma Kothari (2005). There are also historical perspectives that connect development administration to, for example, the Cold War (Escobar, 1995a,b; Murphy, this volume) and the military (Kerr, Chapter 6 in this volume). Beyond this brief exploration of histories of development administration and management, then, we prefer to let our chapters speak for themselves. However, we have imposed our own editorial order in sequencing the chapters that follow.

Overview of the Book

As might be expected, we do not claim that our sequencing is the only logical ordering possible. The logic we see is that early chapters explore the institutional contexts in which development management takes place; middle chapters assess development management practices; and, later, capstone chapters analyse the nature and meaning of development management *per se*. Yet we have eschewed the formal division of this book into sections. This is not editorial laziness. In writing the overview that follows we tried to do more than write a list of stand-alone abstracts. Rather, as we summarized what for us was important about each chapter, we tried to identify what (for us, again) were the obvious connections between chapters. It soon emerged that while our basic and rough-and-ready sequencing held, there were also self-evident connections between chapters in different parts of the sequence. In the overview that follows we have tried to make some of those connections apparent. But, as in any summary, we cannot do full justice to the richness of the arguments our contributors make.

We have chosen to begin, in Chapter 2, with Jonathan Murphy's 'The Rise of the Global Managers'. Besides its intrinsic merit, it is one of two contributions to this collection that has value as a framing chapter, connecting our dual modernizations of managerialism and development. Murphy's central conception might be capitalized as Global Managerialism (although he does not do so himself). Taking a (disciplinarily relatively) long view he tracks its rise to a potential and actual globally hegemonic set of ideas and practice. His starting point is elite theories, which managerially are associated with James Burnham (1941), although Murphy draws on a broader range of theorizations from Bourdieu (1977)

and Hardt and Negri (2000) to others located within CMS (e.g. Willmott, 1993). Social elites are increasingly global, he argues, in the domains over which they claim primacy and in which they act. Rather than, say, any formal legal status, it is the claim to managerial authority that sustains these elites, and particular institutional arrangements that sustain this elite power. Juxtaposing the founding Bretton Woods arrangements with the World Bank's current 'poverty bank' incarnation, and using specific cases, Murphy illustrates the Bank's role in routinely 'porting' managerialist ideas and concepts into the management of broader society, drawing on a case study of the implementation of universal basic education in Niger.

In Chapter 3, 'Nongovernmentalism and the Reorganization of Public Action', David Lewis provides another version of a framing chapter on how managerialism encounters development. Here, though, a different set of institutions is the focus. Lewis identifies NGOs as a key area in which international development and managerialism have intersected, and like Murphy he takes a historical perspective, albeit over a shorter time period. NGOs, Lewis argues, have from the 1990s been an increasingly important presence, in numbers and in profile, within the domain of international development. With this increasing focus on NGOs as newly important development actors, says Lewis, there emerged a set of associated management ideas. Their adoption and implementation have not necessarily been even, with pragmatic and principled contestations and oppositions. Nonetheless, according to Lewis, a heavily managerialist logic of 'capacity building' and other NGO-centred prescriptions have slowly begun to shape a new subfield within the management of international development activities and institutions. Moreover, what Lewis is keen to explore is the connection between the rise of the NGO and the (typically neoliberal) advocacy of the nongovernmental (see also Chapter 8 by Thorne and Kouzmin), not least as an instrument of public action. Thus, as his title suggests, Lewis points to the extension of managerialism's claims, via NGOs and their particular institutional purposes, to new fields of public action from which it was hitherto more or less absent.

In Chapter 4, '"Arrive Bearing Gifts…": Postcolonial Insights for Development Management', Kate Kenny adopts a different conceptual framework to Murphy, and to Lewis, and takes a single NGO as the object of nonetheless more broadly situated analysis. Thus, she provides both a useful counterpoint, and adds texture to their historical framings.

Kenny argues for the value of postcolonial theory and critique (that is, postcolonialism) in deepening our understanding of organizations working in the development sphere. Drawing on a recent participant observation study conducted in the UK, she uses ideas from post-colonialism and critical organization studies to demonstrate the survival of colonial ways of knowing in one such contemporary organization. In particular, she argues that despite the complex, contested and changing nature of discursive constructions in this organization, deeply embedded West-centric epistemologies tended to dominate. This observation has important implications for organizations operating at the boundaries between the First and the Third World, such as not-for-profit, donor-funded NGOs, and for our understandings thereof. In addition, this chapter contributes to organization studies by utilizing and demonstrating the value of postcolonial theory, an approach with which even critical management studies has yet to fully engage (although see Prasad, 2003). Finally, this chapter contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the use of discourse as a methodological and analytic lens. The chapter attempts to illustrate how equal attention must be given to that which is not spoken and not written: the 'non-discursive practices' that make up an integral part of workplace life.

Chapter 5, Nidhi Srinivas's 'Managerialism and NGO Advocacy: Handloom Weavers in India', connects Kate Kenny's concern for NGOs as an object of analysis with Jonathan Murphy's and David Lewis's for the spread of managerialism to extra-organizational social arenas. In this chapter, Srinivas illustrates how these arenas might be objectified spatially (for example as craft villages) or organizationally (for example in organizational self-definition around being and/or not being an NGO). But Srinivas presents an interesting counterpoint to Jonathan Murphy's vision of a hegemonic managerialism driven by global elites and institutions, and to Kate Kenny's postcolonialist assessment of the 'Othering' in NGO practices. His is an account of an almost 'grassroots' (our term, not his) internally driven managerialism. Here, the imperative to take on managerialist discourses and modes of being and acting is not a requirement of a specifically identifiable external force; rather, it is an almost self-imposed and internalized disciplining, a self-perceived requirement for organizational and development success. In Srinivas's account, this is despite (and, perhaps, because of) an apparently counter-vailing policy and institutional framework (in contrast to Murphy's chapter), in which notions of 'craft' are the pre-eminent mode of framing

development intervention(s). Moreover, in this account, NGOs become the mediators between the world (view)s of 'craft' and of market managerialism.

In Chapter 6, 'International Development and the New Public Management: Projects and Logframes as Discursive Technologies of Governance', Ron Kerr presents an alternative, critical, perspective, drawing upon the important strand of Habermasian Critical Theory in CMS (notably in the foundational Alvesson and Willmott, 1996). Reviewing his own experience with a bilateral aid agency, Kerr situates his account in relation to the emergence of new public management, but also within a longer history of the military's Cold War involvement in the development of project management techniques. This leads him to focus on ubiquitous (in development) modes and tools of managing development – the project (hence the connection to the previous chapter) and, particularly, the logical framework (also known as the logframe). Projects are seen as matters of technical control and surveillance in which the lived experience of practitioners is irrelevant. Reflexive self-organization is constrained by the requirements of project management, in particular by the logical framework. This is seen as an entity with quasi-agentive powers, predicated with verbs of compulsion. The project framework as a technology of governance can then be seen to take the place of the manager in the hierarchy; it can also be seen as a mode of subordinating government itself to an *a priori* governance mechanism.

Bill Cooke in Chapter 7, 'Participatory Management as Colonial Administration', like Jonathan Murphy and David Lewis, takes a historical perspective. Like Murphy too his institutional focus is the World Bank. However, his particular concern is the use of participatory management practices by the bank, particularly in its implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). He starts from the point made earlier in this Introduction about the role of soft managerialism in the implementation of PRSPs. He then goes on to set out a history of the particular participatory methods used in PRSP implementation. What he is able to reveal, with some irony, is how action research, in some senses the 'master' participatory method, was developed and honed in the US by a left-liberal bureaucrat. This bureaucrat, John Collier, was Commissioner of the US Bureau of Indian [i.e. Native American] Affairs; and it is to his credit that he saw the United States' relationship with Native Americans in colonialist terms. However, Chapter 7 reveals that

his development of action research was a mode of operationalizing Lord Lugard's idealized mode of colonial administration, indirect rule, which sought to co-opt local elites. Cooke therefore identifies a continuity, in the use of participatory management, in an attempt to co-opt and diminish Third World/colonial resistance, while maintaining sovereign First World/imperial power.

In Chapter 8, 'Borders in an (In)Visible World: Colonizing the Divergent and Privileging the "New World Order"' by Kym Thorne and Alexander Kouzmin, there are some resonances with Lewis's and Kerr's chapters on the subordination of government to managerialism. This chapter can also be seen as the first of the quasi-capstone contributions. The chapter begins by problematizing the privileging of a 'borderless "New World Order"'. Challengingly, they see postmodernism as complicit in this; and business-friendly New Public Management (NPM) as this New World Order in practice. Yet, they argue, the borderless world is far from inevitable. Indeed, Guantanamo Bay and the Christmas Island gulags demonstrate the centrality of border to the contemporary global polity. What is required, they argue, is a public administration in opposition to this borderless discourse/heavily bordered reality. From this position Thorne and Kouzmin backtrack over the historical emergence of development administration, noting its origins as a field in which cultural nuance was paramount: modernization could only be made to work if it was adapted to local context. Yet, as they point out, it was always modernization, and a particular version thereof that had to be implemented. Westernization and modernization became synonymous, and the non-Western non-modern became problematic. This ethnocentric attempt to impose order on the world now may be being replaced, they argue, by the (still ethnocentric) intellectual domains of globalization and economic rationalism. This is also understood in an ethnocentric vein with the same problematization of the Other (a connection to Kenny) and with old public administration/NPM complicit in both cases.

Pieter de Vries's chapter, 'The Managerialization of Development, the Banalization of Its Promise and the Disavowal of "Critique" as a Modernist Illusion', is both critique and provocation, and is the first of two capstone contributions that explicitly try to connect critical management studies with critical perspectives on development. It also attempts to integrate explicit social theory into analyses and conclusions. In Chapter 9, de Vries does this from a development studies perspective, echoing the now familiar point about the disappointments of

development as grand modernization, and its replacement with a more opportunistic yet pernicious form of development – managerialism. Resonating with the previous chapter, de Vries argues this is 'a way of protecting Western civilization against the *ressentiment* of those who are deemed not to have the necessary "social capital" to benefit from contemporary processes of globalization'. De Vries then makes a sustained attempt to connect elements of CMS with certain critical approaches to development. But, discomfortingly, de Vries also problematizes the abandonment of modernity, and of dichotomies around it. Not least, he raises questions about what replaces it/them, for both First World post-modernists and those in the Third World still engaging with development interventions. Representationally, he argues, there are dangers too in the competing rise of a Third World depicted as inherently dystopian, and the dehumanizing categorizations of those who live there. This, he argues, amounts to negating the antinomies produced by the managerialization of development. De Vries concludes by arguing for Fournier's (2002) particular version of utopianism as a counter-neoliberal strategy for shaping chosen futures.

Chapter 10 is Sadhvi Dar's 'Realizing Development: Reports, Realities and the Self in Development NGOs'. This final chapter too connects critical ideas in management studies with development practices in the field. In her empirical focus on particular practices – in this case the production of 'the report' in development, and the meanings attached to it – she has similarities to Kerr in locating particular sites of these practices (namely, logframes, meetings, appraisals, reports) and there are parallels with the NGO chapters too – for example Srinivas in Chapter 5. However, conceptually she differs. Drawing inspiration from Hines (1988), Butler (1990) and a broadly Foucauldian foundation, she extracts revealing insights into how the modern pursuit of securing identity is reflected in managerial preoccupations with report writing and related accounting practices. Using discourse analysis she elucidates constructive elements of development management discourses, and reveals how conflation of identity and modernity leads to practices naïvely considered politically neutral, promoting design and control as the only means of justifying development programmes worldwide. However, Dar also makes explicit the fragmented and often-contested nature of values and ideas associated with development management. She therefore takes us beyond an assumption that might have been seen to prevail here hitherto, that the only force behind development

management is modernization, arguing that claims to modernity exist only to secure a sense of identity and the illusion of control. Instead she proposes a dispersed and ambiguous discursive field that is malleable, *re*constructing and continually being real-*ized* by development workers in different ways and with very different effects in the field. This last chapter therefore reopens the possibilities of a socially progressive and radical development management first identified by Alan Thomas (see above).

The Continuation

The final chapters, by Sadhvi Dar and Pieter de Vries, are important counterpoints to a possible interpretation of the preceding chapters as depicting managerialism as unchallengeably hegemonic. They point to modes of resistance and alternatives, and as such they connect us to the aspiration within CMS for emancipation as well as critique (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996). Indeed the CMS domain statement that opens this chapter continues to commit to the generation of radical alternatives to managerialism. More generally, CMS is criticized for a perhaps too easy negativity, as we have noted earlier. Our response here would be to refer to Cooke and Kothari's critical collection on participatory development (2001). They argued that the quantity of unquestioning proselytization of participation required at least a voice raised against it; and that it was unreasonable to expect participation's problems to be solved for it at the same time. We argue likewise here. We would want this small contribution to be set against the substantial volume of acritical writing about and practices of development management. We do not therefore apologize for doing not much more than problematizing development management. Indeed, more critique is needed.

2
The Rise of the Global Managers

Jonathan Murphy

'Global managerialism' describes the partly planned and partly spontaneous development of a global system of human management. Global managerialism is characterized by the following: a scientistic construction of the managerial mandate; elevation of economic discourse into unchallengeable fact; the occlusion of ideological difference through absorption, calumny, and evasion; managed participation masquerading as democracy; interweaving of private and public interests and administrations; exclusive networks in place of formal bureaucratic hierarchy; deepening and broadening transnational elite ties; conflict management through the incorporation of opposition; labour flexibility enforced through transnational markets; force as last resort; and the seepage of managerialist discourses and practices into ever more remote and hitherto marginal corners of the world.

Global managerialism is a highly adaptable worldview that justifies elite domination and grossly unequal resource distribution. It is both ideology and post-ideology. Global managerialism is a methodology of domination in the process of becoming, whose scope and coherence expanded exponentially in recent years; this expansion has been facilitated particularly through the qualitative acceleration of technological innovations permitting real-time virtual communication and rendering possible not only enhanced and accelerated global capital flows, but also a global managerial imaginary and community, fracturing local elites from physically proximate populations and reinserting them into real-time peer-to-peer networking. Despite the importance of new technologies in providing continuity of relationships, the global managers are also a physical community, compulsively networking through globally ranked educational institutions, international private–public forums and advisory boards, airline business lounges, and premium hotels, resorts and golf courses.

This chapter starts with a discussion of the roots of managerial elite theory in the work of Burnham and others in the World War Two era. I then present the four key propositions of contemporary global managerial theory. I trace the historical development of global managerialist practice through detailing four steps in the growth of a core globalizing institution, the World Bank, and then examine how the World Bank has not only incorporated key postbureaucratic disciplinary strategies into its internal practices, but also externalized them in the service of the global managerial agenda. I summarize findings of a case study demonstrating the on-the-ground operation of global managerialism in the implementation of 'universal basic education' policy in Niger, West Africa. The chapter concludes with a summary and brief discussion of the prospects for the further development of global managerialism.

The Roots of Global Managerial Theory

Global managerialism theory is most simply traced to James Burnham's managerial revolution hypothesis (Burnham, 1941; 1945), although much of Burnham's analysis was itself prefigured in Berle and Means's (1937) classic study of the separation of ownership and control, and managerial class theories were contemporaneously developed by a number of authors during World War Two (Pollock, 1941; Neumann, 1942). Burnham was, however, the first to draw popular attention to the 'drive for social dominance, for power and privilege, for the position of ruling class, by the social group or class of the managers' (Burnham, 1941: 71). Burnham argued that a managerial class was dominating life in New Deal America, Communist Russia, and Fascist Germany, especially the latter two which he claimed were certain to defeat the British empire. Despite apparent ideological differences, these new managerial elites shared a corporatist, scientific, and totalizing perspective, to which traditional democracies had no answer.

Although Burnham's theory attracted enormous attention when first published, a variety of factors, some related to weaknesses in his theory and others to his controversial political odyssey towards the extreme right wing, conspired to relegate his perspective quickly to a footnote, where by and large it has remained to the present day. Burnham never further developed his managerial theory, as he became obsessed with the 'Communist menace', an interest he single-mindedly pursued until the end of his long career as public intellectual. His account of the

managerial class was more polemical than theoretical, and his historical predictions proved generally inaccurate, largely due to his obsession with the invincibility of Nazism and to a lesser extent Communism. While both these orders contained elements of managerialism, they were overwhelmed by totalitarian ideologies which, especially in the case of Nazism, clearly drove the agenda. Burnham's managerial class theory inexplicably rejected the broad description by Berle and Means of corporate managers in favour of a narrow definition emphasizing direct production managers, a definition he then ignored in order to include government bureaucrats. His method was essentially an adaptation of a highly dogmatic Marxism that insisted both on the infallibility of his prognostications and the systemic superiority of the totalitarian managerial states. Burnham and his contemporary managerial theorists also made the error of assuming that managerial rule would rest on state property ownership. Here Burnham (1945: 54) contradicted himself, because he also argued – as I do in the global managerial theory presented here – that property form was not central to managerial rule: '… a ruling class does not presuppose any particular legal form of property right; it rests upon the facts of control of access and preferential treatment …'

Some of his predictions were prescient. Burnham foretold the waning of the nation-state and the drive towards a global system: '[t]he modern world is interlocked by myriad technological, economic, and cultural chains' (1945: 4), and anticipated 'the political consolidation of the European continent' as well as the rise of a handful of 'super-states' (1945: 174–7). He also argued – again against the grain of his veneration of totalitarian power – that the managerial elite was best served by a limited form of managed democracy in which the population's perspectives could be gathered and addressed, thus permitting more effective managerial control. This 'managed democracy' has indeed become a watchword of modern global managerialism. Burnham's major contribution, however, was simply to accord the managerialist dynamic the central role that it has subsequently been shown to richly deserve.

Burnham believed the American New Deal movement was an underdeveloped form of managerialism. However, within months of the publication of his *The Managerial Revolution* in 1941, the Roosevelt administration began planning for a new global economic order, a project that would create the institutional framework of global managerialism, and that has outlasted and outperformed the brittle totalitarian

managerial states that Burnham regarded with such awe. Ironically, Harry Dexter White, the architect of that new order, has been obliterated from the global managerialists' pantheon, due to a McCarthyite smear campaign in which Burnham (1954) eagerly participated.

The Four Propositions of Global Managerial Theory

The theory of global managerialism derives from four core propositions. The first is that the determining domain of social organization is rapidly moving to the global level. The second is that the nature and dispositions of the global system are determined, both consciously and subconsciously, by a globalized elite. The third assertion is that this is a managerial elite, whose essential characteristic is the possession and exercise of social power and control, rather than formal legal status. Finally, global managerialism is nurtured within networked globalizing institutions that collaborate together to extend globalization's spatial and programmatic reach.

The global managerial theory rests first on the proposition that human systems have overflowed national boundaries and are increasingly structured through global isomorphic pressures, a trend that appears to be irreversible. This overall hypothesis is broadly accepted by academic as well as popular opinion, although interpretations and prognoses vary widely. Since the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s, business leaders and government elites worldwide have trumpeted free trade, global production integration, and (consequent) international social policy harmonization. Within the mainstream management academy, interest in globalization has also increased exponentially. The global imperative extended beyond its ideological origins and became a leitmotif of social democracy as it morphed into the Third Way (Giddens, 2000). The globalization hypothesis is also shared by critical network theorists including Castells (1996–98) and Hardt and Negri (2000), although they emphasize its disagreeable aspects. Initially, some more conservative critical thinkers dismissed globalization discourse as little more than a fad (Callinicos, 1989; Hirst and Thompson, 1996), but even they have more recently focused their scepticism on the possibilities for a favourable outcome of globalization (Callinicos, 2000; Hirst and Thompson, 2002).

Next, I argue that elite social domination is a fundamental characteristic of global managerial society. Inequality and power imbalance exist throughout the world, and they are consistently reproduced favouring a

definable group. While academic interest in elite or class theory has declined markedly since the 1970s (simultaneously with Marxism's loss of both popular and academic appeal), there is no evidence that social inequality, whether measured by wealth and income distribution or by life chances, is declining in most of the world. Indeed, the reverse appears to be the case (Valkonen, 1999; National Statistics, 2002; Tobias and Cheung, 2003).

Elite theory is founded on the work of Mosca and Pareto (Pareto, 1966; Bobbio, 1972), predicated on their perspective that elites are ubiquitous in society. Power in society precedes – is the foundation of – economics and ownership relationships, which are vehicles for the exercise of power. It follows, thus, that merely changing those vehicles, for example by replacing the capitalist system with a command economy, or abolishing private property, does not eliminate elite domination of society. Wright Mills (1957) used the framework of Mosca and Pareto, with aspects of Weber's class theory, for his theory of the power elite. This elite was made up of intertwined networks of top figures from the state, private enterprise and the military. The global managerial elite presented here is a broadened and global version of Wright Mills's power elite, incorporating the elite of the emerging civil society sector (Murphy, 2005); an example of the incorporation of international civil society managers into the managerialist elite is provided in the case study later in the chapter.

Pierre Bourdieu's class theory (Bourdieu, 1986; 1994) contributes two additional elements that I adopt here. His theory of multiple capitals recuperates from Marxism the importance of economic power/capital, while introducing social and human capital as additional repositories of potential social power. Bourdieu's approach explains intra-elite contestation over the relative worth of the various forms of capital in the calculation of overall symbolic capital. Bourdieu's other advance is his concept of *habitus* which replaces Wright Mills's somewhat conspiratorial view of elite solidarity with an emphasis on discursive commonality. Bourdieu's reflexive approach emphasizes that elite construction does not occur in a vacuum, but is structured by the material conditions of its emergence.

Elite membership is a combination of 'objective' and 'subjective' factors, and classes shade into each other according to both of these factors. Wright Mills delimited his power elite very narrowly to include only a few hundred Americans. I draw the net more widely, but at the

same time emphasize with Bourdieu that social class is a constructed phenomenon and precise definition is impossible. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of theoretical (Mizruchi, 1994; Willer, 2003) and empirical (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Easter, 2000; Murphy, 2006) research into social networks that can be used to define elites and to map power distribution.

The third element of the global managerialism hypothesis argues that the new order is fundamentally managerial. This term has two aspects. First, it defines the type of elite or class rule I wish to describe. While ownership and the rights it entails are one vehicle for the exercise of 'managerial' power, control of state power and possession of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986) can equally deliver elite status. The common feature of the contemporary elite is its domination over some aspect of the collective pool of social assets. In Castellsian network theory terms, elite membership derives from the ability to exercise social power through the ability to manage a nodal point within a social system of interlocking networks. The second understanding of 'managerial' refers to the preferred style of control. Here, I draw from CMS's insights into new management approaches that contrast with the Taylorist factory organization of industrial capitalism. These are articulated in Tompkins and Cheney's 'concertive control' (1985), Kunda's 'cultural shaping' (1992), and Willmott's 'corporate culturism' (1993). More recently, Grey (1999), Parker (2002b) and Hancock and Tyler (2004) have noted the extension of this process of identity management into everyday life. The account presented here emphasizes the extension of managerialism beyond both personal life and the organization, into the broader social terrain.

This brings us to the fourth component of the theory of global managerialism: the centrality of elite-driven organizations to the development and functioning of the global order. In the global system, there is no corollary for the state infrastructure found at the national level. Organizations are monarchs of the various principalities of social and economic space. Power is exercised through shifting network alliances including with elites in national governments. I will discuss the intentional externalization of concertive managerialism by transnational organizations expanding their reach through what they describe as 'convening power', using the World Bank as a prime example. This process is integral to the nascent system of networked global governance. Here, some of the insights of institutional theory, which have not been widely used by critical management theorists, are recuperated. Earlier

iterations of institutional theory emphasized the key role of organizations in structuring society and economy, counterposing organizational dynamics with neoclassical economists' exaggeration of the importance of the market (Simon, 1991). Historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999), largely neglected in organization studies, is another particularly useful tool, which helps explain the tenaciousness with which the organizations created at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference have pursued a globalizing mission. Even new institutionalism provides useful categories for understanding the shaping of wider social trends through organizational interaction (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), although subsequent research has been dominated by quietist approaches that systematically exclude features of interest to CMS such as 'interorganizational power and coercion' (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999: 677). Managerialist approaches also extend into political life, especially through the Third Way centrist political movements that have largely displaced traditional social democracy in the wealthy English-speaking countries.

The Historical Phases of the World Bank's Global Managerialism

The World Bank is one of the key institutions of global managerialism. The Bank's history can be categorized into four phases. The first, which I call naïve globalization, was the vision of the Bretton Woods founders, realized in the creation of a post-World War Two global economic management framework designed to straddle ideological divides, but which was stillborn as both of the new superpowers preferred regional hegemony to global co-management (Oliver, 1971; Van Dormael, 1978; Boughton, 2002; Boughton and Sandilands, 2002). The second phase of the drive towards globalization was represented by the 1960 launching of the International Development Association, the World Bank's subsidiary that offers soft loans for the poorest countries, and which allowed the Bank's activities to be extended under Robert McNamara's activist tenure into regions and countries that were previously excluded as uncreditworthy (Mason and Asher; 1973; Kapur et al., 1997). By the early 1980s, resurgent ideological conservatism forced the Bank to abandon its government-driven development approach in favour of neoliberal restructuring (Mosley et al., 1995, Chossudovsky, 1997). Paradoxically, it was the earlier IDA-driven expansion phase that gave the Bank the global scope and financial muscle to force poor countries across the world to

accept its structural adjustment programmes, the third step towards global managerialism. The organization's ability to prosper under different ideological regimes was further underlined in the fourth and most recent extension of the Bank's domain of activity through the poverty reduction programmes debuted at the end of the 1990s (Fine, 2001; Cammack, 2002a, 2002b). This putatively benign development allowed the organization to establish recipient countries' social policy goals, and opened the door to supervision of governance performance. The Bank's new president Paul Wolfowitz, appointed in 2005, attempted to extend this direction through enforcing government transparency, human rights, and anti-corruption criteria in Bank lending (Wolfowitz, 2006; Ingram, 2006).

I focus mainly on the first and fourth of these phases. Both the early and contemporary moments in the World Bank's history illustrate the importance of management theory in understanding broader social developments. The organization's tenacious pursuit of an agenda clearly traceable to its founding moment reflects the importance of path dependency or historical institutionalism in explaining not only organizational trajectory but also the role of organizations as drivers of social change. The current Bank's appropriation of postmodern management styles reflects the absorption of organizational identity and practices – mimetic isomorphism. It is crucial, however, to contextualize this development into the wider features of managerial colonization, coincidentally supporting the long overdue process of reintegrating organizational scholarship into the broader social sciences (Berg and Zald, 1978).

'Naïve' Globalization: The Origins of the World Bank

Harry Dexter White was the US government's leading economist throughout the later New Deal period. He identified economic instability as the primary cause of World War Two, and designed and vigorously promoted a system for actively managing the post-war economy, convincing Keynes and the British government, who preferred a much less ambitious project, to participate (Boughton, 2002).

White envisaged global economic institutions committed to increasing social justice and prosperity, and moderating cyclical crises. He argued that the world would face three major economic issues at the conclusion of war: re-creating an international monetary system, restoring foreign trade, and reconstructing national economies (White, 1942). Addressing

these global problems would require new multilateral institutions to be established before the end of the war, thus avoiding another downward spiral into post-war economic crisis as had happened after World War One. Two institutions would initially be created: an international Fund – today's International Monetary Fund (IMF) – to stabilize the foreign exchange system, and an international Bank – now known as the World Bank – to supply capital for reconstruction. The Fund would establish basic global rules for monetary and trade policy, while the Bank would provide reconstruction capital, short-term capital support for international trade, and redistribute gold, thus stabilizing prices, improving living standards globally, and limiting financial crises and economic depressions.

At the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, forty-five nations signed an agreement including detailed plans for the World Bank and IMF, and a commitment to create an International Trade Organization. This institutional economic structure remains the cornerstone of the world economic system, although the precipitous onset of the Cold War dramatically altered the environment in which the institutions operated. For White, this was a personal and political disaster. The Soviet Union chose economic autarky – and ultimately system collapse – over participation in the new system, the New Dealers were purged from the incoming Truman administration, and White and almost all of his colleagues and administration friends were accused of being communist spies. White suffered several heart attacks under the stress of the mounting allegations against him, and died in 1948, three days after testifying in front of the House Un-American Activities Committee. White's speech in his defence provides an insight into his worldview:

> I believe in freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom of criticism and freedom of movement. I believe in the goal of equality of opportunity, and the right of each individual to an opportunity to develop his or her capacity to the fullest.
>
> I believe in the right and duty of every citizen to work for, to expect, and to obtain an increasing measure of political, economic, and emotional security for all. I am opposed to discrimination in any form, whether on grounds of race, color, religion, political belief or economic status. (HUAC, 1948: 877–906)

Nearly sixty years after his death, White is still attacked from both left and right: '[s]ince his untimely death in 1948, he has been repeatedly

accused of having betrayed US interests in favour of Soviet communism. Now he is also accused of having relentlessly promoted the hegemony of US capitalism' (Pinkham, 2005). White was – according to his extensive personal papers and reasonably open-minded historical readings (Rees, 1973; Boughton, 1998) – a drone neither for Russia nor America, but a globalist; more specifically, the archetypal global managerialist. Although the World Bank's policies have deviated, often radically, from White's social democratic politics, the organization continues to share his commitment to a managed world order.

Opportunistic Growth

The Cold War years were understandably difficult for the Bretton Woods institutions. The World Bank – originally established mainly to aid European reconstruction – steered clear of involvement in the Marshall Plan, instead shifting its focus entirely to Third World development. This transformation, which legitimized White's insistence on involving the developing countries from the beginning, solidified with the creation in 1960 of a low-interest loan programme through a new World Bank arm, the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA permitted the Bank to lend to the poorest countries who would not have qualified for its standard market-rate loans, and also allowed the major early borrowers including India to recycle their loans at more affordable rates and thus obtain new loans. While the IDA was established under pressure from developing countries (Weaver, 1965: 11), a further opportunity to expand the World Bank's activities came from the internationalization of the Kennedy–Johnson War on Poverty under the leadership of Bank president Robert McNamara, a Kennedy intimate and bluechip representative of the US power elite. Using the IDA vehicle, McNamara spread the Bank's influence throughout the developing world, and cemented its role as a key globalizing institution, the second stage of the Bank's global managerial journey. Support for the free market was definitely not a requirement to receive Bank aid; the Bank's favourites in the McNamara era were state-led developmentalists, including India, the organization's perpetual chart-topper, Nyerere's Tanzania, Mexico, and Tito's Yugoslavia. When given freedom to make its own decisions, the Bank has always privileged expansion over ideology.

From the late 1970s the World Bank came under increasing pressure from the intellectual groundswell towards neoliberalism to abandon state-

led developmentalism (Cockett, 1995). The Bank's neoliberal revolution became known as the Washington Consensus, a set of free market nostrums, vigorously applied to all indigent nations under the enthusiastic leadership of new chief economist and redoubtable ideologue Anne Krueger. The negative impact of this policy shift for many citizens of developing countries should not be underestimated, but its most durable effect was *the expansion of the Bank's mandate* through implementation of structural adjustment policies. Whereas the World Bank had previously restricted itself to project lending – mirroring the capital investment activities of private banks – structural adjustment involved the Bretton Woods institutions dictating government policies in return for untied loans. This radically shifted the Bank's nature, away from finance and towards global governance, representing the third stage in the Bank's growth to become a central institution of the global managerial order. When the neoliberal revolution lost steam, the Bank quickly shifted back towards a more classical managerialist orientation, but retained and even expanded the policy comprehensiveness of structural adjustment. James Wolfensohn, the Bank's president from 1995 to 2005, offers a flavour of the organization's overt managerialism:

> … feeling good about individual projects is not enough. The challenges that we face are just too big. It's not ten schools. It's 10,000 schools. It's not five bridges. It's 5,000 bridges. It's not 100 people. It's millions and billions of people. (Wolfensohn, 2004)

As historical institutionalism would anticipate, the global managerial vision that White instilled in the post-1945 economic order through the Bretton Woods infrastructure and organizations has illuminated their trajectory throughout the World Bank's history, as it pushes towards an ever deeper and broader managerialism, notwithstanding numerous twists and turns to meet the exigencies of ideological fads and shareholder nations' strategic interests (largely, but not exclusively, those of the United States). The hostility faced by White and his institutional progeny from both the traditional right and left wings reflected a fundamental hostility towards global managerialism, both from right-wing market fundamentalism and American unilateralism, and from essentialist and autarkic socialist approaches on the left wing. For White and the New Deal administration, the crucial issue was not ideology, but the management of economic (and thus political and social) crisis. Contrary to the mythology propagated by essentialist Marxists, who insist on its

deep structural commitment to neoliberalism, the World Bank's policy agenda has remained true to managerialism even as it has veered from state-led developmentalism, through neoliberalism, and back to comprehensive developmentalism.

The Poverty Bank

The current, fourth stage of the World Bank's journey to global managerialism is its manifestation as the 'poverty Bank'. In this phase, the organization has adopted an ambitious and politically potent agenda based on internal and external articulations of postbureaucratic managerialism. The first iteration of the new approach was the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), launched in 1999. The CDF combines the Bank's traditional technocratic emphasis on coordination and comprehensiveness with a new focus on inclusivity, social outcomes, and country ownership: 'We cannot adopt a system in which the macroeconomic and financial is considered apart from the structural, social and human aspects, and vice versa' (Wolfensohn, 1999: 7).

The CDF formed the basis for the even more comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process: 'The PRSP will, in effect, translate the Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) principles into practical plans for action' (World Bank, 2000: 3). The PRSP seeks to enrol developing countries, multilateral and bilateral development agencies, and NGOs behind a single development agenda.

The new development approaches imposed by the World Bank entailed simultaneous economic restructuring and a broad social policy agenda, tying countries into a globally homogenized policy framework captured in a complex matrix of objectives, programmes and 'partnerships'. Cooke (2002: 23) puts it thus: 'as the matrix headings make clear, what is being managed is not a work organization, but a nation state, which is required to prioritize and taxonomize its activities according to the Bank's matrix to its satisfaction'. A further twist is that developing countries must take ownership in the comprehensive framework. This country ownership mantra is a Bank gambit to avoid government subversion of the CDF project, as had occurred with the structural adjustment programmes (Gervais, 1992). Nevertheless, the word 'must' appears prominently in Wolfensohn's proposal for the programme. Country ownership was not a choice, nor were the contents of the CDF negotiable:

> … the matrix and annexes can and should be kept up to date in real time. The matrix will be a summary management tool. But behind each heading there will be Annexes for each subject area, containing a substantive description and far more detailed listings of short- and long-term goals, programs, their present status, timing, cost and progress […] For each of the annexes, specialists would meet under the guidance of the government or minister concerned perhaps setting forth the program for the next one to three years within a ten- to twenty-year framework. (Wolfensohn, 1999: 23–4)

Along with policy homogeneity, the World Bank adopted a new working style based on participatory management principles. The Bank emphasizes internal collegiality and resemblance to a large family. Although the organization has a notably hierarchical structure, with a senior management team including four managing directors, the chief economist, and the general counsel, presiding over twenty-four vice presidents, each with a geographic or thematic responsibility, Bank mythology views itself as flat and non-hierarchical.

The World Bank invests heavily in building internal cohesiveness. Coordinated by an internal communications team, teambuilding strategies include comprehensive orientation materials, numerous internal spot awards for meritorious staff, an intranet site repeating current priority messages, teleconferenced international staff meetings, and continual repetition in internal channels of touching stories, especially those highlighting the Bank's charismatic leaders.

Orientation materials aim to instil a sense of mission. A large glossy World Bank poster hanging in the library of the Bank's London office is headed with the current top slogan, 'Our dream is a world free of poverty.' Below are alternately chastening and inspiring photographs of the developing world, then reproductions of congratulatory newspaper articles extolling the Bank's virtues, and grateful letters from national government officials. Finally, there are frames describing the modalities of Bank work and the qualities of its staff:

> *Guiding principles*
> Client centered
> Working in partnership
> Accountable for quality results
> Dedicated to financial integrity and cost effectiveness
> Inspired and innovative

Values
Personal honesty, integrity, commitment
Working together in teams – with openness and trust
Empowering others and respecting differences
Encouraging risk-taking and responsibility
Enjoying our work and our families

These managerialist practices also became central to the Bank's external activities. In other words, the discourse and technology of managerial control were extended to global social control. At the most basic level, the Bank diverts a substantial portion of its budget into self-marketing, and pursues, with pathological obsession, coordination of any high-profile development issue, a function it categorizes as 'convening power'.

'Convening power' describes the organization's capacity to assemble different actors to implement World Bank country strategies. The holistic CDFs and PRSPs provide wider convening opportunities than did the old structural adjustment programmes. The importance of 'convening power' to the World Bank is reflected in the term's appearance in several hundred different World Bank documents, particularly analyses of the Bank's 'comparative advantage' in development interventions. Other multilaterals including the United Nations have followed suit and frequently speak of their interventions in terms of 'convening' activities. Nick Stern, chief economist from 2000 to 2003, a leading member of the global managerial elite who came to the World Bank from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and left to become chief economist at the British Treasury under the Blair government, regularly emphasizes convening power's importance:

> … the IFIs, and particularly the World Bank [have] a power of 'convening' that arises from their special ownership structure and goals … The convening power is unique and is a crucial aspect of its ability to act as an agent of change … [An] example – in this case working within individual borrowing countries – has been the Bank's role in convening donors and promoting coordination through the Poverty Reduction Strategy process. (Stern, 2002: 184)

Mats Karlsson, former external affairs vice president, places convening power at the centre of the organization's r*aison d'être*:

> [The World Bank] has an international convening power and a unique role as catalyst, convener and coordinator, which helps leverage both its

> own resources as well as those of other development partners in official capacities and, increasingly, the private sector. (Karlsson, 2000)

Participation is another key word. 'Participation and civic engagement' merit their own team and section of the Bank's website, marketing various materials including a CD-ROM-based interactive learning guide, lunchtime brown bag sessions, toolkits, and participation sourcebooks. The Bank's interest in participation dates back to the early 1990s, but it was the arrival of Clinton nominee James Wolfensohn at the Bank in 1995 that made it a priority. Wolfensohn had a new sourcebook on participatory practices reissued with a new foreword in which he commended Bank staff who are 'pioneering participatory approaches in the Bank's work' (World Bank, 1996: ix). The book contains inspiring stories of Bank engagement in grassroots collaborations, contrasting the old Bank's external expert style with the new Bank where consultation and listening are prerequisites for learning. In the new Bank, the country stakeholders 'invent the new practices and institutional arrangements they are willing to adopt' (World Bank, 1996: 5). The twist in the new Bank is that the heralded country ownership is expected to result in the same diminution of the state social safety net as had been prescribed in structural adjustment: a move away from 'welfare-oriented approaches and focus rather on such things as building sustainable, market-based financial systems' (World Bank, 1996: 8). Williams (1992: 165) demonstrates that the Bank's consultative exercises have little bearing on policy; in fact adopted policies were often diametrically opposed to the participatory input received. This highlights the paradox of the new Bank, and of participatory managerialism in general. The people must be engaged and empowered, not to assert their own perspectives, but to legitimize managerial authority.

Civil society organizations have generally welcomed the Bank's shift towards participation, which depends largely on NGOs as mediating institutions, which are thus drawn into managerialist practice (Murphy, 2005). Developing-country governments have also largely acquiesced to the new participatory development modalities. Although participation and the poverty focus introduce an extended level of disciplinary control over Third World governments, senior officials have expanded opportunities to participate in the new layers of managerial activity, whether as consultants, as managers of participatory processes funded by the Bank and bilateral donors, or as international institution staff.

The participatory approach has proved a highly effective vehicle to further managerialism. Cooke and Kothari's (2001) edited collection *Participation: The New Tyranny*? was the first to effectively deconstruct development participation, using the CMS perspective that Willmott, Kunda, and others had employed to deconstruct corporate participatory practices. They argue that 'tyranny is both a real and a potential consequence of participatory development, counterintuitive and contrary to its rhetoric of empowerment though it may be' (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 3). It is necessary to move beyond technical critiques of participatory methods within the orthodoxy, towards a critique of the whole approach. Participatory methods tend to replace existing organic and democratic decision-making processes, and the Bank's participatory approach tends to strengthen the powerful and to exclude the marginalized; outcomes thus are often the opposite of the grassroots empowerment claimed by the Bank. In the same volume, Henkel and Stirrat (2001) deconstruct the discourse of participation, concluding that by engaging in the Bank's processes, grassroots actors implicitly accept the outcomes of the process: 'participation as an administrative or political principle eases authoritative force, in turn placing responsibility on the "participants"'. Thus, participation 'is a form of governance – in fact the ultimate modern form' (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001: 179).

Global Managerialism Theorizes Itself

Global managerialism is not a traditional ideology but rather the evolving worldview and governing practice of a globally linked elite. Global managerialism develops incrementally, primarily in response to emerging issues, but also through discussions at the numerous transnational fora in which the international elite have been participating for many years (Cox, 1987; Van der Pijl, 1998; Carroll and Carson, 2003). The World Bank's long-time vice president for Europe, J. F. Rischard, who claims Wall Street as well as academic experience prior to jumping into global governance, is one of the few global managers to articulate a comprehensive global governance agenda (Rischard, 2002). Rischard is involved in a plethora of global elite networks, including the (Davos) World Economic Forum, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security ('Transnational governance requires the establishment of relationships, understandings, and shared expectations that are both self-regulating and self-sustaining'), the Commission on Globalization

('a leadership network for constructive global change'), the World Business Council for Sustainable Development ('the pursuit of sustainable development is good for business and business is good for sustainable development'), and the Global Information Infrastructure Commission ('fosters private sector leadership and private–public sector cooperation in the development of information networks and services to advance global economic growth, education and quality of life'), as well as, perhaps more surprisingly, the 'Governing Body of the Institute of Development Studies' at the University of Sussex. For those who believe in rational choice, it is natural that Rischard should be a devoted advocate of a world governed by elite networks.

In *High Noon*, his 2002 bestseller, Rischard outlines a proposal for elite issues networks that would be able to tackle thorny governance issues at a global level (he cites twenty problems ranging from poverty and global warming to internationally harmonized taxation). The global issues networks would bypass unhelpful and outdated institutions like national parliaments. Led by a transnational institution convenor, they would co-opt supposedly knowledgeable government bureaucrats, global business leaders, and managers of large NGOs, who would analyse problems and design and enforce solutions:

> … to create for each of these twenty issues a global issues network … there would be people from three parties, government officials that really know the issue well … the second party that would bring in knowledgeable people from the private sector, big companies that know all the ins and outs … the third group of people would come from knowledgeable NGOs, the IUCN , the World Wildlife Fund, a lot of these big NGOs and networks of NGOs that have a lot of knowledge. (Rischard, 2003)

> These three parties would sit together and would give birth to a detailed analysis of the problem … what are the norms and standards we should impose on nation states, companies and all other players … the product of these networks would be very detailed norms and standards… In a third stage these networks would become ratings agencies, essentially producing ratings tables of countries … (Rischard, 2003)

High Noon has been endorsed by a wide range of global elite representatives. Some notable endorsers include Pascal Lamy, the former European trade commissioner who now heads the World Trade Organization, the CEOs of the International Herald Tribune, 3M, and Motorola, and, from the so-called global civil society, the chief executives of Civicus

('the world alliance for citizen participation'), Accion International, and ActionAid. Salil Shetty, the ActionAid CEO who went on to assume a senior United Nations position coordinating the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, commented that: 'Rischard's message is simple and compelling: We know what needs to be done to have a world with shared prosperity and a sustainable future. Can we get our act together to govern our affairs better in the new global context?'

The Rischardian elite networks are interlinked. While Wright Mills noted in 1957 the exchange of personnel between big business and the World Bank (Wright Mills, 1957: 287), multilateral agencies now seek also to incorporate the NGO elite. Civicus, for example, is part-financed by the World Bank (Civicus, 2003: 26), and its CEO Kumi Naidoo was a 2003 World Bank Presidential Fellow. Civil society has a potentially crucial role to play in legitimizing global managerialism. Its involvement with and endorsement of the World Bank provides democratic cover for expanding the disciplinary scope of the global elite order into the farthest corners of the earth and the details of national social policy. More than sixty years ago, Burnham foretold this 'limited democracy' of participatory schemes and civil society incorporation (Burnham, 1945: 146–7).

Global Managerialism in Practice

Global managerialist practices are ubiquitous within contemporary international development. In this section I will highlight an illustrative example; the translation into field practice, in the West African country of Niger, of a global elite partnership between the World Bank and civil society on basic education. The role of the Bank in the implementation of universal basic education policies is discussed in greater detail in Murphy (2005).

As noted above, international NGOs are ready to engage with the Bank in transnational managerial projects, especially in establishing global social programmes. Even many radical civil society representatives justify imposition of this global social order in developing countries, over the resistance of national governments (O'Brien et al., 2000: 28, 157). The idea of Education for All (EFA) came from UNESCO, a competitor to the World Bank in the global institutions' crowded neighbourhood. In Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990, UNESCO headed a global conference which committed to a broad set of education goals. The World Bank,

one of the conference's co-sponsors, promised to double its expenditures over the next three years (Young, 1990), a goal it failed to meet. By 2000, when UNESCO organized its next Education For All (EFA) conference, Bank education lending was just over half 1990 levels, and little overall progress had been made on improving global education access. In sub-Saharan Africa, where educational access was lowest, the Bank's spending on education declined by two-thirds between 1992 and 1996, while its spending on 'public sector reforms' skyrocketed fivefold in the single year 1996 (Bennell and Furlong, 1997: 10). Nonetheless, in 2000 the Bank was again an EFA conference co-sponsor.

The EFA goals include more accessible primary, secondary, and tertiary education, as well as gender equity and lifelong learning (UNESCO, 2002). Publicly, the World Bank supports EFA, but its widely whispered internal wisdom is that UNESCO is incapable of effectively coordinating EFA, and that EFA's goals are too broad. Indeed, in its public discourse, the Bank focuses almost exclusively on universal basic education. At the country programme level, the Bank argues that basic education should be funded through transferring resources away from secondary education (Mingat, 2002). EFA's broader goals are further undermined by the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), a joint World Bank–IMF effort to coordinate bilateral development resources, allocating them to countries that have accepted the Bank's education approach. Eligibility for Fast Track requires countries to accept large classroom sizes and low salaries for teachers, particularly through establishing a second tier of poorly paid contractual teachers. Surprisingly, the global alliance of teachers' unions, Education International, agreed to co-launch the FTI together with the Bank (Wolfensohn and van Leeuwen, 2000), and supported by various international NGOs including ActionAid and Oxfam.

On the ground in Niger, the second poorest country in the world, the World Bank decided that 'the main problem is the high unit cost for education', to be solved by, 'a reduction in the average salary levels' of teachers (Mingat, 2002: 7–9). The Bank has successfully pressured West African governments, including Niger's, into gradually replacing its corps of regular qualified teachers with young graduates, who are paid salaries one-third or less than that of permanent teachers, and without benefits and job security. In Niger, these wages amount at most to $100 a month. A contract teachers' union leader says it is impossible to live on this in Niger's capital city:

> In Niamey the rent is a minimum $30 a month. It will cost you $30 to get to and from the school you are working at. That only leaves you $40. You have to spend at least $10 for water and electricity. Only $30 remains. But food costs at least $40. And then you have to dress, and as a teacher you are expected to wash. (Abdou, 2003)

Despite waves of industrial action and government task forces to study the contract teachers' complaints, all proposals to regularize the status of the contract teachers have been shelved. The union is certain that the stalemate is because the World Bank has ordered the government to stand firm. The participatory Bank refuses to meet with the union, although a Bank official did acknowledge to me that in Niger, civil servant hiring is frozen as part of the Bretton Woods institutions' lending conditionalities, and government would 'have to honour that commitment' (Karamoko, 2003).

In 2003, I travelled in north-central Niger as part of a National Assembly fact-finding mission on the execution of PRSP-funded projects. We visited four newly opened primary schools. In only one of the four schools was the assigned contract teacher present. In one school, she was off sick, and in another the contract teacher had departed on a multi-day trip to collect his pay cheque from the nearest administrative centre. In the fourth school we were told that the contract teacher had disappeared, presumably to return home to the capital city, a problem the regional education director said was common among contract teachers. In all four of the schools, the regular, properly paid teachers were present. Experts from multinational institutions and even the World Bank itself (Zymelman and DeStefano, 1989: 49) had warned against trying to achieve universal basic education simply by hiring cheap teachers:

> … expansion of access has involved strategies which could pose a threat to quality. Where the quality of educational provision has deteriorated seriously, enrolment levels have tended to decline, demonstrating the inextricable relationship between quality and access. (Mehrotra and Buckland, 1998: 18)

The subtext of the Bank's basic education programme is a realignment of class structure in the developing world, through the destruction of the post-independence intellectual class and the reorientation of the national elites towards participation in, and dependence on, the transnational elite. This manoeuvre precludes the development of nationalist class alliances

against the global managerial order. The Bank's capacity to enforce its education programme was enhanced by its forging of a global alliance with civil society in favour of the programme, greatly lessening pressure to negotiate the content and even the advisability of the programme with teachers, citizens, and even the government of Niger. Although the most devastating effects of the teacher deskilling initiative are felt in sub-Saharan Africa where the Bank's writ is law, Asian countries including Cambodia and India have also been targeted by the Bank's assertions that teachers are overpaid (with salaries of about $220 per month in India), and have also introduced *parateacher* schemes in which poorly qualified staff are recruited at starvation wages without job security or benefits to teach in primary schools in place of regular teachers. In some Indian states the entire government teaching corps is being replaced by parateachers earning as little as $30 per month (Pandey, 2006). Just as the structural adjustment period entailed worldwide imposition of one-size-fits-all economic policies, the poverty Bank's social policy experts find their prescriptions are also universally applicable.

Future Prospects for Global Managerialism

In this chapter, I have outlined the key elements of the theory of global managerialism. The theory is founded on the propositions that power is to an increasing extent organized at the global level, that this global system is dominated by a transnationally organized elite, that elite power is exercised through managerialist techniques, and that in the global arena governance is organized through a web of institutional connections rather than a centralized hierarchical government. The contemporary global order is managed through overlapping power circles rooted in different aspects of 'symbolic capital' and institutional foundations. While economic power/capital is an important component of overall symbolic power/capital, other forms of power are not merely derivative of the economy. For example, the control of dominant *ideas*, as well as the ability to *legitimize* particular social orders and norms, are crucial components of a stable order in contemporary society. At the global level, institutions such as the World Bank are nodal points where there is an intersection of different types of power/capital, and where elite networks in government, the corporate sector, and 'civil society' interact. The Bank's authority in developing countries is founded not merely on its economic muscle, but also on its *convening power* that rewards local elites who accept

the institution's policy hegemony, and ostracizes and marginalizes those who do not. The case study of basic education policy in Niger indicates the fundamentally centralized, hierarchical and undemocratic nature of the global policy development process.

The chapter has traced the ever-broadening scope and ambitions of global managerialism, from its origins in the foundation of the post-World War Two global order to the contemporary extension of managerialism into global social policy. A global managerialist future is not, however, certain. While a return to American unilateralism is unlikely, a plausible argument could be made for an alternative scenario involving the emergence of one or more of the new powers including China, India and possibly Russia as anchors of a new superpower-dominated world system. Such a prospect might be imaginable, but only in the very long term. While the power of emerging nations will undoubtedly continue to grow within the global system, even China is many years away from exercising the unchallenged world economic domination that the United States enjoyed in the years after the end of World War Two. There is little prospect in the near future that the emerging powers will seek to diminish the growing power of transnational institutions, which provide an attractive alternative to American unilateralism. Further, the increasing integration of countries such as China and India into the global economic system is being accompanied by their adoption of managerialist approaches in both the corporate and public sectors, as well as rapidly expanding outbound investments that extend the web of transnational ownership and management.

The short-term trajectory of the World Bank remains uncertain. Paul Wolfowitz was nominated in 2005 by President Bush as part of the unwritten arrangement in which the IMF head is chosen by the European powers and the Bank president is chosen by the US. Wolfowitz's close association with the more extreme manifestations of American unilateralism raised hackles in Europe and the developing world as soon as his nomination was announced (Alden et al., 2005). His support for intervention in client states' governance practices continued the Bank's inexorable extension of its governance mandate, merely hastening a trend begun under his predecessor Wolfensohn. However, consistent with the American administration's predilections, Wolfowitz misunderstood the need for elite consensus in building a stable governance system (Field and Higley, 1980), especially at the global level where hegemony is highly contestable. Thus he foolishly picked a fight over corruption with the

Indian government (Times of India, 2006), and was forced into a humiliating backdown after a confrontation over aggressive conditionality with both European and developing countries' representatives at the 2006 Bank–IMF meetings (Giles and Guha, 2006). Staff opposition to Wolfowitz, which had already been manifested when his name was first mooted for the position, reached a climax when he was accused of nepotism in his management practices, although it was generally accepted that vehement attacks on him were driven more by ideological dissonance with the Bank's political predilections than by the specific allegations (Weisman, 2007). He was forced to resign in June 2007.

Wolfowitz's difficulties are further evidence of the decline in American authority over the global system. The debacle of the Wolfowitz presidency suggests that in the longer term, the future of global decision making is through transnational elite compacts. The deep elite conflict generated by the Bush administration's unilateralism only serves to underline the advantages to global elites of managed, consensual decision making. The Wolfowitz presidency, like that of its White House patron, will in all likelihood be viewed in retrospect as an unsuccessful interregnum in an overall global managerialist trajectory.

3

Nongovernmentalism and the Reorganization of Public Action

David Lewis

One key area in which international development and management science have intersected is that of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Since the early 1990s, NGOs have achieved a growing presence on the landscape of international development, with their increased numbers and profile at global, national and local levels. The development industry began to focus on NGOs as newly important actors in development, and with this interest came a set of associated management ideas and practices that aimed to reshape and optimize their organization and performance. In the same way that Mitchell (2002: 15) writes about a 'politics of techno-science which claimed to bring the expertise of modern engineering, technology and social science' to modernize the society and economy of twentieth-century Egypt, so a heavily managerialist logic of capacity building and other NGO-centred prescriptions have slowly begun to shape a new subfield within the management of international development activities and institutions.

Several factors can explain the rapid rise to prominence of NGOs in development. One has been the association of many development NGOs with the emergence of a new set of ideas about alternative development practices, centred on attractive – yet frequently ill-defined – concepts such as empowerment and participation. Another set of factors, which form the main focus of this chapter, was the ascendency of a neoliberal ideology that favoured policies of privatization, good governance and a general shift away from the idea of state-led development. NGOs, it was claimed, had certain comparative advantages in development work since they were seen as flexible and innovative, as delivering services effectively and cheaply, and as being able to work more closely and effectively with the poor than conventional donor-driven development projects or government programmes (Clark, 1990; Korten, 1990).

Development Meets Management: the Case of NGOs

The organization and management of these newly conceived NGO roles and activities has become a growing subfield within development studies, but is one that has to date attracted relatively little interest from mainstream management science, which still remains primarily concerned with the world of for-profit business (Lewis, 2007). As Cooke (2003a: 266) has argued, writers on management have generally ignored the Third World altogether, and there has so far been little critical discussion of the role of management as a global 'modernizing change agent'. The case of NGOs is therefore a potentially useful entry point for analysing the interface between management ideas and global processes of institutional change. The argument made in this chapter is that the rise of this new subfield of NGO management needs to be seen as an outcome as much of the wider ideological changes at the level of development policy as of the organizational logic of the evolution of NGOs as increasingly high-profile agents of development and social change. Furthermore, this ideological dimension should be a cause for concern and needs problematizing, because it may ultimately threaten the diversity and creativity that can be found in parts of the NGO sector.

In common with one of the key characteristics of managerialist thinking (Booth and Rowlinson, 2006), the new interest in NGOs within the international development industry was profoundly ahistorical. NGOs came into fashion in the late 1980s, but they were not new forms of organization. Instead they had had a relatively long history, though their existence had remained largely invisible within the world of international development during the 1960s and 1970s and before. Functioning on a small scale for many years, NGOs had rarely entered the relatively closed worlds of development researchers or policy makers, but these groups now suddenly began to see NGOs as the answer to many longstanding development problems (Lewis, 2005). Charnovitz (1997: 185) summarizes the history of NGO activity at the international level, which stretches back more than two centuries. He is critical of the ahistoricity of many NGO researchers and supporters, suggesting that '[a]dvocates of a more extensive role for NGOs weaken their cause by neglecting this history'. Charnovitz cites the rise of national-level issue-based organizations in the eighteenth century that were focused on such causes as peace and the abolition of the slave trade and shows that by the early twentieth century, NGOs had built associations to promote their

identities at national and international levels. At the 1910 World Congress of International Associations, for example, 132 such associations were registered. Yet there was little visibility of or attention given to NGOs in the world of international development until two decades ago.

If NGOs, or 'the nongovernmental'[1] more broadly, was not new, then what needs to be explained is its sudden appearance within the development policy frame. A set of broadly pro-NGO writings achieved a high profile at this time, including work by Clark (1990), Korten (1990) and Fowler (1997). A wide-ranging crisis of development theory in the 1980s (cf. Booth) had contributed to a loss of confidence that development could be successfully produced by the state, and this had coincided with the rise to prominence of a neoliberal analysis which argued that state intervention was the problem rather than the solution. Neoliberals came to dominate in the international financial institutions, in many governments and in significant sections of the development industry. Policies of privatization, market liberalization and administrative reform came to represent the dominant solutions to development problems (Schech and Haggis, 2000). All of this led to the provision of rapidly increasing levels of funding to NGOs, particularly to those engaged in service delivery. NGOs also became objects of research for academics. This research interest in NGOs was primarily driven at the practical level by the search for more income generation opportunities through applied consultancy research by university-based academics, which gave much of this literature a highly normative orientation. Furthermore, this move to applied research was itself an outcome of the reform and restructuring of higher education funding (Lewis, 2005).

By the mid-1990s, the early euphoria around NGOs as all-purpose solutions to development problems had begun to evaporate. A set of critical questions about NGO performance and accountability was increasingly foregrounded (Edwards and Hulme, 1995). The rise of the 'good governance' agenda of the early 1990s was a modification and tempering of the more extreme ideological approaches towards privatization in favour of a more balanced neoliberal view of the potential synergies between the state, the market and the nongovernmental or third sector, and it led to the funding of NGO activities beyond service delivery and increasingly to include advocacy and campaigning work (Lewis, 2005). It also helped create a shift in language among policy makers towards conceiving of a far broader set of nongovernmental actors. This meant a move away from a narrow conception of NGOs

towards a far wider set of ideas about civil society and the third sector, which might also include informal movements, citizen groups, faith-based organizations, trade unions, business associations and think-tanks. In what was sometimes termed the 'post-Washington consensus', this trend subsequently led donors to move away from favouring NGOs explicitly as they had done in the early to mid 1990s to, in many cases, a rejection of NGOs in favour of this new broader discourse of civil society, even though in most cases development NGOs remained important to donor agendas.

As we have seen, NGOs did not suddenly appear as new actors in development, but were instead discovered, nurtured and praised – and rapidly became elevated to a position of new importance within the tripartite institutional landscape of state, market and civil society. Alongside this re-imagining and as part of it, development NGOs were simultaneously constructed as objects of the managerialist discourses that were coming into vogue at that time. Managerialist forms of organization – defined by Parker (2002b: 10) as 'the generalized ideology of management' – rested on this new emphasis on the role of markets as a means of creating patterns of incentives within and between organizations for the more efficient allocation of resources. The external political and funding context in which development NGOs rose to prominence during this time was therefore essentially a neoliberal one in which the *private* character of NGOs as organizations was privileged, and from this a distinctive set of managerialist pressures for increased performance and efficiency soon emerged. In this way, 'NGO' became constructed as a concrete organizational category, and an associated set of organizational problems were duly defined that required management solutions: improved accountability, better planning tools, more professionalized human resources policies, codes of conduct and performance indicators. In keeping with Parker's (1992: 2) analysis, the managerialist incorporation of NGOs into development discourse carried with it strong assumptions of *control*: of a need for 'civilizing' the diverse (and unruly) communities of NGOs that existed and protecting against possible 'chaos and inefficiency'.

Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the subject of managing NGOs attracted some controversy. A lively discussion was generated within many development NGOs about the possible role of management within organizations in a sector that often saw itself as made up of a set of alternative actors that often remained ideologically

suspicious of mainstream management ideologies and practices (Korten, 1990). This subsequent 'NGO management debate' (Lewis, 2007) that took place within the pages of practitioner newsletters revealed an important set of tensions at the heart of the management/development interface: between those who saw the need for mainstream management practices and those who saw NGOs as sites for resisting such practices and developing alternatives (a debate that is usefully summarized in Dichter, 1989). In considering the relationship between the two distinctive literatures of management theory and development, the case of development NGOs therefore makes a potentially instructive case study. In the next section I consider the ways in which internal debates about management were played out among the NGO community, before moving on to the broader contextual factors that animated debates about NGO management.

Debate within NGOs about the Role of Management

Two books written by people with strong insider experience with the world of development NGOs helped to bring them into the mainstream, and such work carried with it clear management implications. David Korten's *Getting To The 21st Century* (1990), which was widely read in the NGO and donor communities, drew together his previous writings and arguments about NGOs, citizen action and organizational theory. Korten presented a set of powerful and influential ideas about new forms of participative strategic management and the evolution of NGOs through several ever more sophisticated organizational generations towards the goal of mobilizing citizens, rather than providing services; these ideas were rooted in his extensive work with NGOs in South and South East Asia. While under no illusion that most NGOs were yet working towards alternative goals with any real degree of success, Korten's book was confident in its claim that NGOs constituted a potentially important site for potential positive change in development practice. This perspective was both normative and idealistic:

> [NGOs)] ... seldom had a clear strategic focus, often lacked technical capability, and seemed reluctant to cooperate with other organizations ... Yet ... the constraints faced by NGOs are largely the self-imposed constraints of their own self-limiting vision. NGOs are capable of shedding these constraints, as many have demonstrated. Their participants need

> only the courage to embrace a more expansive vision of their roles and potential. (Korten, 1990: xiii)

In the UK, another influential text was John Clark's *Democratising Development: the Role of Voluntary Organisations*, written by an author with long insider experience at Oxfam who also saw the potential importance of NGOs as vehicles for transforming development practice. Both writers argued eloquently for the potential of NGOs to create new approaches to development and to influence development agencies more widely towards progressive, pro-poor agendas. Part of the new interest in NGOs was therefore that they could be seen as a kind of *tabula rasa* onto which could be projected a set of ideas – born partly of the frustration with decades of disappointing government-led development interventions – about issues such as empowerment, participation and new forms of management.

Interest in NGO management had started to appear from the mid-1980s. The *NGO Management* newsletter, for example, was established in 1986 by the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Geneva. This publication, containing pieces by key writers on NGOs such as Korten, Alan Fowler, Piers Campbell and others, laid the groundwork for discussing an emergent concept of NGO management, and carried some lively debates. In essence, the debate was between those who saw the need for NGOs to professionalize their work in order to scale up their activities and take on more active roles in the mainstream of development, and those on the other hand who argued against this on the grounds that NGOs should protect their identities as organizations that provided alternative thinking – alternative both to the encroaching managerialism implied by business management orthodoxy, and to the powerful international donors such as the World Bank whose motives and practices were distrusted by many NGO activists (Lewis, 2007). The debate was, in a sense, one between Parker's (2002b: 5) managerialists who believe that '[o]nce it has been learnt, management can be applied anywhere, to anything and on anyone' and alternative forms of organizing deployed by nonmanagerialists who look more broadly on *organization* in the 'general sense of patterning and arranging' and *coordination* in 'the sense of bringing people and things together in productive ways' (2002b: 210).

While people in development NGOs had often been committed activists, many had remained somewhat reluctant managers (Lewis, 2007). There were perhaps three sets of reasons for this. One was that

NGOs often tended to be characterized by a culture of action in which NGO staff were reluctant to devote significant amounts of time to thinking about organizational questions, since this would interfere with the primary task of *getting out there and doing something*. Korten (1987: 155) had suggested they instead 'relied upon high moral purpose' rather than on technical management competencies. A second reason was a widespread view, particularly among the public and donors, that NGOs should use almost all their funds for working with poor people and should not spend money on administration. A third reason was that many development NGOs had been established by people consciously searching for alternatives to mainstream thinking, and that the subject of management was, ideologically speaking, tainted ground. This reluctance to engage with mainstream management was linked to the opposition to what Chambers (1994) termed 'normal professionalism', an ideology that negated many of the stated values and priorities of good development work. Normal professionalism, in Chambers's view, was an essentially managerialist ideology that favoured quantity over quality, blueprint over adaptation, things over people, and the powerful over the weak.

But for many NGOs that were experiencing rapid growth and change, there remained a nagging feeling that they were always left one step behind current thinking in relation to the organizational aspects of their work. NGOs that had begun as small, informal structures in which management issues were dealt with on an *ad hoc*, informal basis had grown rapidly in size, and many NGOs found themselves developing more complex, multi-dimensional projects and programmes while lagging behind in relation to new management ideas, systems and procedures. In his provocative and oft-quoted article, Tom Dichter (1989) argued that many development NGOs had become seduced by the promise of 'fancy' ideas about alternative development and had forgotten that they also needed basic 'nuts and bolts' management if they were to work effectively.[2] But at the same time, the basic, insecure sense that NGOs needed to catch up led to cases where NGOs rushed headlong into utilizing what they thought were the latest management tools with unsatisfactory results, as Mulhare (1999) was later to demonstrate in the case of strategic planning in the context of the US non-profit sector.

The fact that this debate was taking place was indicative of the new importance that was now being assigned to development NGOs in the post-Cold War order within the shifting ideological climate of the time.

This historically contextualized perspective on NGO management debates can be usefully analysed within Booth and Rowlinson's (2006) discussion of what they term the 'historic turn' in management and organization theory. They set out the dangers of universalist forms of organizational analysis that assume 'a decontextualized, extended present' (2006: 6) and argue instead for the historically oriented study of organizations. Indeed, the world of international development, with its constantly changing set of concepts, approaches and language, is particularly prone to living a perpetual present in which history is downplayed (Lewis, 2006). In this way, the interest in NGOs that emerged in the 1980s can be seen as a historically constructed event that ideologically represented NGOs in terms of a set of universalistic characteristics and qualities (for example, the notion of comparative advantage) and that created a need for managerialist solutions to a set of organizational problems – whether in the form of capacity building of Southern by Northern NGOs, or the need for NGOs to embrace management-specific management planning tools such as the logical framework (logframe).

External Pressures towards Managerialism

At the level of policy within the broader world of international aid, this new thinking on the role of NGOs within the emerging good governance agendas proceeded apace. Policy-level documents celebrating the role of NGOs in development soon followed the activist research writings that I discussed above. One was the OECD's (1993) *Non-Governmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development* collection of overviews of donor NGO policies, while another, more normative document was the Commonwealth Foundation's (1995) *Non-Governmental Organizations: Guidelines for Good Policy and Practice*. Some of these documents emphasized the growing discourse of partnership between NGOs, government and for-profit actors, while others set out guidelines for improving the internal organization of NGOs through improved governance, management capacity and impact assessment. The managerialist language of organizational strengthening, capacity building, strategic planning and best practice was an essential aspect of this agenda, and much of it began to drift a considerable distance away from the more radical and idealistic approaches of writers on NGOs such as Korten, Fowler and Clark.

As they moved further into the mainstream of the development

industry, many NGOs were themselves becoming subject to funding-based pressures for new bureaucratic systems for reporting and accountability. One example is the ubiquity of the 'logical framework analysis' planning tool within the development industry (see also Chapter 6 of this volume). Its adoption may be a requirement for NGOs wishing to secure funds and implement donor-funded projects, and it has therefore created strong professionalizing pressures on NGOs (Smillie, 1995). In addition to the administrative demands this method raised, the changes also brought new challenges around shifting NGO organizational purposes and organizational identities.

While there had always been some relatively formal mainstream NGOs, such as the Red Cross, many NGOs had begun as small-scale, resource-poor organizations located on the fringes of so-called alternative development work. Others emerged as opportunistic responses to the changes in funding climate. As NGOs grew closer to mainstream donor agencies, they were required to develop new systems of accountability, and their efficiency and effectiveness were questioned and challenged. Much NGO management has therefore taken the form of an imposed managerialism, rather than emerging organically as part of an NGO's own agenda. A good example of this was the debate about the capacity building by Northern NGOs of Southern NGOs. The preoccupation with NGO capacity building which arose in the 1990s was partly a reflection of the search for new identities and roles by Northern NGOs. No longer wishing to implement their own projects directly in low-income countries, and bypassed in some cases by bilateral donors eager to work directly with third sectors in these countries, many Northern NGOs turned instead to the challenge of 'building the capacity' of their local 'partner' organizations (Smillie, 1995; Lewis, 1998). The result was that capacity building was widely seen as something that Northern NGOs 'did' to Southern NGOs rather than as a two-way, exploratory learning process (Lewis, 1998; Simbi and Thom, 2000). Capacity building has remained an area of conflict and confusion, embodying both the risk of managerialist tendencies in the training agendas it has spawned (witness the many NGO training consultancy businesses and websites that have emerged) and the debates over power and autonomy which have led many activists to question what they see as 'Northern' assumptions about 'Southern' NGOs, and to numerous attempts to re-evaluate the concept of 'partnership' so readily deployed in recent discourses of development policy and practice (Lewis, 1998).

More recently, Roberts et al. (2005: 1849) have argued that an under-appreciated feature of the process of 'globalization' is the way in which increasingly dense transnational networks of NGOs are serving as a kind of transmission belt for managerialism, acting as nodes that link international donor agencies down to grassroots NGOs and their projects. They point out that 'mainstream Northern managerialism has become a fairly entrenched and institutionally developed set of knowledge and practices in the NGO sector' (in the form of an emphasis on transparency, accountability and participation, and techniques of double-entry bookkeeping, strategic planning and project evaluation) and that this has transformed the day-to-day operations of many NGOs in developing-country contexts.

The Rise of Nongovernmentalism: the Managerialist Reorganization of Public Action

As we have seen, it is important to view the rise of the new field of NGO management within a broader ideological framework of non-governmentalism that became dominant within international development policy from the 1990s onwards (Lewis, 2005). Nongovernmentalism can be defined as a policy ideology of comparative advantage that privileges ideas about the efficiency and flexibility of nongovernmental actors, alongside a set of assumptions about their positive roles in the strengthening of citizenship and democratization, and which seeks to enhance the roles of such actors in development policy reform processes around good governance agendas, as in the case of the recent use by donors of participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in many developing countries.[3]

The origins of this ideology of nongovernmentalism can be located in four sets of ideas and reactions to anxieties about international development among policy makers and academics. The first was a reaction to the prevailing sense of disillusionment, as Brodhead (1987) pointed out, with more than two decades of largely government-centred development initiatives and the search for new alternatives. In the light of this apparent failure of official aid, the development industry discovered NGOs as a possible solution to various problems, such as a demonstrable lack of impact on poverty, based primarily on the idea that they were 'not government' (Stewart, 1997). The second was the theoretical *cul-de-sac* that development studies had reached by the mid-1980s. As Booth

(1993: 49) famously suggested, an 'impasse' has been reached. Theoretical debates derived from predominantly Marxist approaches that had promised so much during the 1970s no longer seemed to suggest practical ways forward in the struggle against global poverty. Partly as a result, there had been a widening gulf between academic enquiry and the various spheres of development policy and practice. One way out of the impasse was to focus more on empirical studies of the *new* non-governmental development actors and the emerging alternative approaches with which they were associated. A third reason for the rise of a nongovernmental discourse was the attraction, to many researchers and practitioners, of viewing NGOs as a site for working through and rethinking relationships between researchers and practitioners. Finally, the spirit of nongovernmentalism had come to dominate many UK university departments as a result of new systems of resource allocation and incentives as universities in the 1980s found themselves part of the restructuring impulses of neoliberalism and were driven further into the commercial world of academic consultancy.

The rise of nongovernmentalism can therefore be associated with the attempt to claim ideas about public action for the good governance agendas of neoliberalism, through linking NGOs with privatization agendas and a set of managerialist ideas about organizations. A World Bank-edited collection of writings on NGOs by Paul and Israel (1991) was concerned to bring the work of Korten and others on NGOs into the emerging policy framework of the period. It set out the main reasons for the Bank's decision to begin 'an institution-wide effort to expand its work with NGOs' (Beckmann, 1991: 134). This decision was based on a view that states and markets had only limited capacity to reduce poverty while NGOs had distinctive competences such as closeness to the poor, committed leadership, and capacity to build access to services. This, then, was the start of a period of explicit recognition of NGOs from within an unfolding neoliberal development agenda, which had gained confidence rapidly following the end of the Cold War. Neoliberalism was hailed as being a return to the preoccupations of an earlier economic liberalism in the nineteenth century which privileged the market as 'the proper guiding instrument by which people should organise their economic lives' (MacEwan, 1997: 4). While this market-oriented policy agenda brought back the importance of market competition and theories of comparative advantage, it also shifted ideas about government away from national planning and state services towards markets and the non-

governmental actors. It envisaged a new enabling function in which the role of government was to secure the conditions in which markets could operate more fully across a range of areas of social and economic life. For example, the reorganization of wider social service delivery to citizens could be seen in the growth, for example, of non-formal education in Bangladesh which was provided predominantly by NGOs. These policies were also highly supportive of the provision of microcredit aimed at the strengthening of women's incomes. The result was a dramatic explosion in numbers of microcredit organizations (mostly in the nongovernmental sector) and programmes in both rural and urban areas and the growth of a global microfinance industry.

A second wave of academic writings on NGOs often appeared less critical or open in their thinking about NGOs than the earlier work of Korten, and this pro-NGO literature more explicitly celebrated development NGOs rather than asked questions about their potential. In particular, the practical concerns of perceived inefficiency and corruption in the public sector – which led many donors to view NGOs as new and alternative channels of funding to government – contributed to an at times strongly anti-state ideology. For example, central to Fisher's (1997: 2) upbeat account of the rise of NGOs as *Nongovernments* were assumptions about the 'increasing inability of the nation-state to muddle through as it confronts the long-term consequences of its own ignorance, corruption and lack of accountability'.

This type of thinking led to many accounts of NGOs that took on a strongly functionalist logic. In such accounts, NGOs were represented as possessing a set of comparative advantages in relation to public sector agencies that included better cost-effectiveness, a less bureaucratic operating style, a closeness to local communities, and lower propensity for corruption than government (Cernea 1988). One aspect of the ideology of nongovernmentalism was therefore a rather conservative strain of populism in which NGOs were represented as essentially private, non-state protectors of the public interest. Theoretical and critical writings on NGOs did not arrive until later in the decade. William Fisher's (1997) piece on NGOs engaged with the context of neoliberalism, and examined the political implications of NGO discourses. Likewise, Stewart's (1997: 12) paper in the *Review of African Political Economy* commented on the apolitical nature of the new NGO management science on one side and the prevailing ideology of 'NGOs do it cheaper, better, faster' on the other.

The result was that development NGOs as a subject category were

incorporated into a redefined conception of public action that underpinned the good governance agenda: a conception that spoke of the mixed economy of welfare, public–private partnerships and the purchaser–provider split and that viewed NGOs as private actors acting as flexible, private, non-state actors both in the delivery of services and – to a limited extent at least – as contributors to the broader policy process. Today, development policy for the international donor community appears to have moved comprehensively upstream and away from direct involvement in action against poverty on the ground and is characterized by a form of high managerialism that places its main emphases on forms of direct budgetary support to Southern governments, the directing of progress towards international anti-poverty goals, and an audit culture governing NGOs and other service-providing organizations (Quarles Van Ufford et al., 2003).

Conclusion

The rise of NGOs within the world of international development has brought many positive elements in terms of extending scope for innovation, extending opportunities for citizen engagement and achieving flexible responses to development problems. But it has also helped create a space in which the more intrusive impulses of neoliberal development policy (cf. Mosse, 2005a) have gained further ground. This becomes particularly clear when the relationship between NGOs, development and management is analysed in the context of the historical turn within critical management studies (Booth and Rowlinson, 2006).

We have seen the way in which NGOs were first identified as key players within the neoliberal development agenda of good governance: key players that reshaped public action for development away from state-centred approaches towards private, market-based policies solutions, and then were slowly reconstructed as objects of managerialist intervention requiring new systems of control and organization. At the same time, NGOs have also been at times a site of resistance to such pressures in their efforts to think more broadly about alternative forms of organization as opposed simply to management (cf. Parker, 2002b). As such, the story of development NGOs in the past two decades can usefully be seen as representing a microcosm of wider debates and struggles around managerialism. As NGOs have grown in scale and ambition, there are those that have recognized limits to their own effectiveness and begun to

examine management and organization issues in more depth, recognizing that idealism and alternative ideas require appropriate organizational frameworks if they are to make any impact on longstanding and complex problems of poverty and inequality.

But there are good reasons to remain concerned about the ways in which the worlds of development NGOs have been professionalized and changed. For example, Dichter's (2003) book reflects, after thirty years of experience, on an increasingly professionalized but largely ineffective international development effort. He argues that development has become a professional field rather than simply a value-driven calling or a voluntaristic pursuit, and that strengthened concerns with career and salary issues among NGO staff rarely reflect tangibly improved performance in the work that they do. Elsewhere (1999: 54) he argues that NGOs have been forced to become more 'corporation-like' in a struggle 'to cater to a marketplace (of ideas, funders, backers, supporters)'.

None of this would amount to more than nostalgia for a lost world of amateur activists if it could be shown that, as a result, NGO work had become more effective. However, despite these levels of professionalization within the worlds of development NGOs, it is difficult to find systematic data to show that levels of performance have improved. Indeed, there are signs that morale is quite low among NGO staff. One such account comes from a recent study by Wallace et al. (2006: 165). They find in Uganda and South Africa strong evidence that NGOs increasingly struggle within a difficult and unhelpful aid environment in which an imposed managerialism sits uneasily with the earlier notions of flexibility and comparative advantage that had characterized the NGO discourse in the 1990s, one that the new field of NGO management had promised to somehow unlock:

> Many staff in both north and south complained that they felt more like bureaucratic aid administrators than development workers and that more time was spent on paperwork than [on] development … The disjuncture between the paper-based plans, objectives, activities and indicators and the day-to-day realities that poor people and NGO staff try to grapple with in a wide range of contexts and cultures is too great to be bridged.

NGOs may have been constructed and acted upon as objects of managerialism, but the search for alternative forms of organization and action in the third sector remains an even more pressing priority than ever before.

NOTES

1. Nongovernmental' actors are labelled and defined differently in different parts of the world, but the term is used here to include the broad family of what are variously termed 'non-profit', 'third sector', and 'voluntary' organizations working in development.
2. As Dichter had put it in an earlier issue of the ICVA *NGO Management* newsletter (No. 4, 1987, p. 26) 'the last thing we need is an excuse to be even less structured and less well organised than we already are'.
3. Nongovernmentalism is not confined to the world of international development, but is also a key component of policy reform ideologies and practices in rich industrialized counties, such as the mixed provision of welfare services in the UK.

4

'Arrive Bearing Gifts …': Postcolonial Insights for Development Management

Kate Kenny

Organizations working in the development sector play an important role in contemporary processes of globalization. The term *globalization* has many interpretations, but it tends to refer to a certain set of observed societal changes. These include the disrupting of national boundaries, and the expansion of channels of communication between First and Third World nations (Castells, 2001). Development organizations are seen to be at the forefront of these interactions at this point in our history (Ebrahim, 2003; Prasad, 2003a).

This chapter reports on a nine-month participant observation study within one such donor-funded nongovernmental organization (NGO). Based in a medium-sized town in the United Kingdom, EWH designs and builds information technology (IT) products[1] aimed at reducing poverty in lesser-developed countries. For the purpose of this study, this organization is conceptualized as a system of competing discourses. Insights from postcolonial theory and criticism, or postcolonialism for short, and critical management studies are used to provide an analysis of the organizational discourses in operation (Knights and Morgan, 1991, Knights and Willmott, 1999, Prasad, 2003b). Each discourse is analysed in terms of its constituent tropes, which are at once contradictory, silent and supportive. By attempting to highlight the taken-for-granted discursive assumptions in operation within the organization, the study makes three key observations. First, the study demonstrates the survival of colonial ways of knowing in a contemporary organization. Second, the importance of recognizing both ambivalent and contradictory discourses, along with 'non-discursive practices', is illustrated. Third, the chapter argues that, despite the contested nature of dominant ways of knowing, the embedded Western-centric epistemologies within this organization appear to remain dominant over time. The chapter

concludes by outlining the implications of these findings for the study of development management in an increasingly uncertain, global context.

Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism takes as central the idea that colonial adventures by Western nations, along with resistance to these adventures by colonized peoples, have played a significant role in shaping the ways in which we know the world today. Postcolonialism thus highlights these ways of knowing, arguing that the implications of the colonial encounter are experienced not only in contemporary geopolitical boundaries, but also in the economic, social, cultural and even linguistic norms in operation.

These ways of knowing, rooted as they are in a colonial past, have been critiqued as 'power/knowledge relations' by Foucauldian scholars (Foucault, 1976; Escobar, 1995b). This body of research has pointed to the 'truth effects' of such discourses, noting that they are observable in their operation in contemporary society. To give an example relevant to this study, authors have noted that the dominance of particular epistemological frameworks in Western organizations is such that staff members implicitly assume that by using a particular methodological framework for empirical data collection, people in non-Western contexts may be studied, analysed and ultimately *known* (Kwek and Prasad, 2003). Moreover, such hegemonic epistemologies have been criticized for their own blindness to the very assumptions that underlie them, an effect that in turn contributes to the silent power held in contemporary society by such epistemic frameworks (Escobar, 1995b; Mir et al., 1999; Prasad, 2003a).

A key critique of this politics of representation is given by Said (1978) in his discussion of the discursive operation he calls 'Orientalism'. Widespread in today's Western society, Orientalism operates by creating a series of constructions of the East that act to reinforce the West's hegemony over it. For example, Said notes that the East, or the Other, came to be constructed in terms of a series of stereotypes such as *cruel*, *sensual*, *illogical*, *cunning* and *childish*. Western societies then began to discursively constitute themselves in polar opposition to these stereotypes, implicitly constructing a series of binomial opposites, for example: centre/periphery, developed/underdeveloped, scientific/superstitious and so forth. These opposites are clearly hierarchical, with the West invariably linked to the superior pole and the non-West relegated to the inferior. This construction of the East served as a focal point for the West

gradually to constitute its own self-image as a superior civilization (Kwek and Prasad, 2003). Once a link between inferiority and the non-West had been discursively constructed, colonialism became acceptable as a 'project designed to civilize, improve and *help* those peoples who were "lagging behind" in the March of History and Civilization' (Prasad, 2003a,b: 12). Given these observations about the hegemony of the colonial discourse, a number of scholars have queried the implications of this for organizations. Mir et al. (1999), for example, discuss whether non-Western organizations might ever be able to construct their own voices, outside of a Western epistemological framework. Even if this were to occur, the authors ask, would Western organizations be able to hear such voices, given the hegemony of colonial ways of knowing?

However, recent scholars in this area have observed that such hegemony cannot be thought of as final and complete; even the most hegemonic discourses are inescapably unstable. Postcolonial authors have critiqued Said's work from this perspective. Most notably, Homi Bhabha has problematized the idea of the colonial discourse as something that is monolithic and homogenous in its discursive fixing of notions of the East (Bhabha, 1994). Instead, he deems Orientalism to be characterized by ambivalence, uncertainty and contradiction (Bhabha, 1994; Prasad, 2003a). To illustrate this, he shows how this ambivalence is particularly evident in the ways colonial discourse recognizes and frequently highlights *difference*, for example in race, culture and history, and yet at the same time assumes that the Other may be *fully accessed* and *understood* (Escobar, 1995). The paradox is, according to Bhabha, that on the one hand the discourse of Orientalism conceptualizes the Other as being radically different and thus occupying a conceptual space fully *outside* the West (hence 'unknowable'), while on the other hand colonial discourse regards non-West colonized peoples as being fully knowable with the help of Western categories and epistemologies, such as those frequently used by, for example, aid and development agencies (Kwek and Prasad 2003). Because of this inescapable permeability of the discourse of Orientalism, it must be conceived of as being always open to subversion. Authors such as Bhabha have argued that this instability preserves a space for anticolonialist struggle (Prasad, 2003a,b).

In summary, the postcolonial approach to the study of organizations implies three concerns for this study. The first idea involves the way in which postcolonialism isolates taken-for-granted ways of knowing in order to critique and examine their effects. The second concern involves

Said's notion of Orientalism, a means by which the non-Western Other is discursively constructed. The third idea draws on Bhabha's notion of the ambivalence and complexity inherent in these western constructions of the Other.

Organizational Discourse Theory

The conceptualization of discourse used in this study is closest to Michel Foucault's notion of 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (1972: 49). Foucault conceives of power as a series of networks, in which individuals more or less collaborate. He calls these networks 'power/knowledge relations' because they tend to propagate a view of the world (a knowledge) that becomes, over time, so taken for granted as to be almost invisible (Foucault 1976; 1990).[2] By investigating how these discourses came about in the first place, he problematizes their taken-for-grantedness in contemporary life. He argues that discourses are sustained by their re-enactment in everyday life at the 'restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power)' (1990: 94–5). This conception has been used by many management studies scholars in the study of discourse and power (Grey, 1994; Knights and Morgan, 1991; Knights and Willmott, 1999; Walsham, 1993; Watson, 1994).

In this chapter, I attempt to extend the concept of discourse traditionally evoked by organization theorists, which tends to draw only upon that which is written and spoken (Brannen, 2004, Boje; et al. 2004; Hardy, et al. 2005). In contrast, I view a focus on practice as equally important for understanding how discourses are established, resisted, reproduced or subsumed over time in given settings (Watson, 1994). Related to this, an important aspect of the analysis of data in this chapter is an emphasis on the 'non-discursive', silent aspects of organizational life (Foucault, 1990).

The value of practice, I would argue, lies partly in its highlighting of instances in which what happens in the workplace directly contradicts what is spoken about or written.

Studying EWH

EWH is a small, non-profit NGO based in a medium-sized town in the UK. The organization consists of approximately fifteen members, most of whom are from either development or IT backgrounds. Half of the staff members receive salaries, with the other half volunteering their

time. June 2004, the month I joined the team, was a time of great excitement for EWH: the organization had just received a large amount of money from a major UK donor, in order to carry out a pilot study. EWH had recently developed an idea for an IT product that would assist with communication problems in developing countries and had now been granted the funding to develop and test it. Spirits were high, and the team was actively recruiting volunteers. Over the nine-month period of observation, I was based in the office from nine to five, for three days a week. I attended meetings with the donor who was funding the project and with collaborating organizations in the public and private sectors. I accompanied the team on a six-week trip to an African country in order to test the new IT product. Social activities formed an important part of life at EWH. The team often went to the pub in the evenings and always ate together at lunchtime, during which hour everyone would gather in the kitchen to chat. As detailed above, the theoretical angle adopted for this study conceptualizes discourse as a phenomenon that is enacted in practice, talk, documentation and silence, and it was for this reason that I spent nine months hanging out with the organization. I wanted to observe as much as possible the smaller aspects of EWH life that would be difficult to access from interview transcripts or document analysis alone: the jokes, the random emails that are sent around, the upsets over lunch. It was the smaller aspects of EWH life that would be difficult to access from interview transcripts or document analysis alone.

At the outset of the study, I had no perceived intention to draw upon postcolonialism. As the research progressed and I attempted to make sense of the hundreds of emails, intranet pages, notes from daily diary entries, photographs, documents and transcripts of interviews with colleagues that I had collected, it was difficult to know where to begin. I was aware, however, that there was something that puzzled me about the way that EWH members, including myself, spoke about the people in developing countries we were trying to help. I had a vague concern about the lack of coherence of this discourse. From this observation, I examined the data for all references to people constituted by EWH staff as those we were helping, using the metaphor of the 'Other' (Said, 1978). In particular, two aspects of the ways of speaking and acting regarding the 'Other' appeared important: 'Saving the Other' and 'Knowing the Other'. These observations will be unpacked below and the following points highlighted:

- Although initially, the survival of colonial ways of knowing appeared evident in the dominance of the idea that the Other can be both 'saved' and 'known' by EWH members as they developed their IT tools, upon closer inspection it became clear that these views of the 'Other' were marked with contradiction and ambiguity.
- Moreover, these ambiguous ways of speaking and contradictory ways of acting appeared to obscure distinctive and important silences surrounding the discursive construction of the Other at EWH.

Despite these challenges, ambiguities and silences however, the assumption that the Other can be both 'saved' and 'known' by EWH members remained central to the organization: to its ways of speaking about the 'Other', and to the practice and outcomes of its work. These points are illustrated next, using extracts from the data collected for this study.

Colonial Ways of Knowing

First, it appeared at meetings, in documents and in interviews that the idea that the Other can be helped and saved by EWH was taken by all as a given. The Other was discursively constituted as being implicitly inferior and thus in need of help from EWH: 'I would not be putting my time into projects if I didn't see the benefits. Once the South gets itself sorted economically, we can stop running round after them helping them' (John, interview, April 2005). Getting 'sorted economically' implicitly means adopting the specific form of capitalism that has come to dominate flows of finance in Western nations, at this particular historical juncture. The assumption is thus that this specificity of political economy is necessarily better than any system 'the South' might operate:

> Now I kind of have it as a fundamental, deeply held belief, the way people believe in God, because I have been blessed with a wonderful education, very very safe … (I have) everything in life and never wanted for anything … and there are millions and millions of people starving all over the world and … it's just fundamentally unfair. So to use all my education and *try* to help people in the world … (emphasis in original interview). (Sally, interview, July 2004)

The assumption is thus that it is a moral imperative to attempt to help the Other, from the privileged position of a Western education. The idea of being able to help the Other, in helping 'it' to catch up with Western

ways of living, was further evident when discussing the upcoming visit to an, as yet unknown, African country. As we discussed the development of a methodology for carrying out the planned assessment, John outlined the importance of gifts:

> See how you can be useful to them, this is a trade, yeah? I have an old Apple Mac laptop, take that through and give it to them, it's crap, it's 27 hertz … give it to them and they will use it … these sorts of things … 'Arrive bearing gifts …' (John, internal meeting about assessment methodologies, June 2004)

With the belief that the Other requires the help of EWH, the next discursive manoeuvre involved constructing the organization itself to be in a position to provide this help. This view is implied in the excerpts above and was widely shared within the organization. The assumption of being able to help was evident in the mission statement prepared by EWH:

> Mission Statement: To research, develop and deploy Engineering tools that assist humanitarian development and relief work, reducing poverty and suffering. EWH's aim is to create products that, as much as is possible, are accessible to the poorest communities. (Document, EWH Mission Statement, taken from proposal sent to UKD, EWH's main donor, in April 2004)

In summary, it was thus implied that the Other could be helped and therefore saved by the work of EWH.

A second idea that appeared to be widely held was that despite the many differences between EWH and those we were trying to help, it was fully possible for EWH to come to know and understand the Other. This would be achieved through the project methodology, which was loosely based on the popular PRA (participatory rural appraisal) approach and had been used by team members on previous development projects (Edwards and Gosling 2003). During the preparatory meetings for the field trip to Kenya, my colleagues and I appeared, from the data gathered, to collude in the notion that through the careful use of the correct methodology, in particular its emphasis on 'cultural sensitivity', the Other would be rendered knowable. At the outset, this view was promoted mostly by John, head of the Humanitarian Department at EWH. However, as others began to work on the development of the assessment methodology, we drew on literature, research and feedback from others in the development sector, all of which promoted this view

to a greater or lesser degree. In legitimating this approach, John drew on his previous developmental experience:

> Before I go to the field, I need to know what's on their minds. Before I go to India, if they call Superman, you know, 'Shaftiman', well then, I can drop that into the training programme: 'You don't have to be like Shaftiman' and get a laugh out of them, you know … culture is important. (John, internal meeting about assessment methodologies, June 2004)

Moves like 'hiring a driver' and spending long periods of time 'in the field' were seen as providing the key to unlocking the differences and really knowing the Other:

> Hire a driver for the first week. He will be your fixer, your translator, he will be the most important person in the evaluation; for filling in the gaps, helping with the context. We need to make sure that the problem isn't 'oh, it's Ramadan at the moment' or 'the truck has broken down three miles out the road'. (John, internal meeting about assessment methodologies, October 2004)

Again, although the above excerpts draw on John's contribution to these meetings, this view of being able to know the Other featured in the methodology that the rest of the team produced. This document was presented to new staff members, volunteers and partner organizations in addition to being taken on fieldwork, and as such, this way of knowing the world was reproduced in the working practices of EWH.

Another important aspect of the methodology employed by EWH, along with the above sensitivity to culture, involved categorization and quantification of the Other. This was achieved through the use of questionnaires, field notes and comparison across countries and regions in order to develop a profile of the given country in terms of prescribed categories.

> Once we decide what we are trying to measure, what you do is set up a phrase … (for example:) 'Our (software) enables access to information, to reduce poverty', and then we have to *nail* each part of that sentence; 'What is access? What is poverty?' We come up with a couple of indicators and bang, bang, bang. (John, internal meeting about assessment methodologies, October 2004)

A focus on measurement is key, where measurement refers to the ability to categorize and count all aspects of the context being studied.

> It's all about linkages and triangulations (between countries). We want to

> look here (Ghana), 'does that correlate to *there* (Solomon Islands)? Oh yes it does!' Just three indicators, three simple indicators with one question for each … We can check those boxes then, you in the Solomon Islands, Emily in Ghana … we can really nail those. (John, internal meeting about assessment methodologies, September 2004)

Thus, in carrying out a set of assessments according to this methodology, EWH's humanitarian team would develop a series of 'user group profiles' for potential beneficiaries of the software. These profiles would be developed using specific categories, such as age, income and access to computer technologies. In sum, careful adherence to assessment methodologies would make the world of the EWH software user easier to access and to know.

Colonial Assumptions in Saving and Knowing the Other

When speaking about the people that we were trying to help, the language used and resulting conceptualization of the Other implied distinctly Western-centric epistemological frameworks (Mir et al., 1999; Prasad and Prasad, 2003). Whether it was constructing the Other as inferior ('Once the South gets itself sorted economically … we can stop running round after them helping them …') *or* hammering the Other into categories for quantification and generalization ('… just three simple indicators'), these forms of representation had attendant power effects. Constructing the Other as inferior (as needing help) went hand in hand with the attendant conceptualization of EWH as being superior (in a position to give that help). Said (1978) argues that constructing these kinds of binomial oppositions reflects the ways in which Western discursive practices can often tend to construct a form of Western identification against the idiom of an inferior, helpless Other. Similarly, projects that focus on the categorization and quantification of the Other for data collection purposes are seen by some authors as performing an ontological function: in distinguishing the Other, such categorization and quantification essentializes it, and renders it usable for whatever purposes the researcher wishes to put such 'knowledge' to (Kwek, 2003). As Kwek observes, these ways of representing the Other are violent and potentially destructive as they inescapably forward a particular way of knowing the Other and the world, which involves separating out 'experts' (often the aid sector workers) from 'non-experts' (the intended beneficiaries) and 'knowers' from 'non-knowers', ignoring the fact that these non-knowers

are frequently experienced experts in the very local practices that are being studied (Kwek and Prasad, 2003).

Ambivalence and Contradiction

It would be simplistic to say, however, that I and my colleagues at EWH all subscribed all the time to a discourse that conceptualized the Other in terms of needing to be saved and being fully knowable, although manifestations of this way of viewing the world were clearly in evidence. The following section explores the alternative discourses that did emerge, in particular those that constituted the Other as being outside the scope of EWH's power to save or know. Cynicism about whether development could actually achieve the goals it set out to meet was common across the organization:

> I mean, development generally comes from within … if you look at South Korea, if you look at China or India or all those kinds of places, they have developed themselves, no one else has done it for them. (A friend) was saying there is anecdotal evidence that Africa might have developed further if it wasn't for development workers. (Sally, interview, July 2004)

Over the course of the nine-month project, two influences appeared particularly significant in generating scepticism among team members about their ability to save the Other. The first one was the 'group reading scheme' that was implemented. The team began to read critical papers which problematized aspects of development and aid. Members of EWH discussed these papers at weekly sessions, which often generated debate about the nature of their work.

> I'm not sure … When I started here first, I thought that development was the way forward. But now, I mean it's *so* context specific. (Sally, conversation, September 2004)

The second influence that appeared to generate sceptical talk was the six-week visit to the country in Africa. During this time, EWH members visited a number of IT-for-development projects, which although well known in the international development community did not actually appear to them to be helping the intended beneficiaries very much. During this period, and upon returning to the UK, EWH's location in the development sector and its related ability to 'help' or 'save' the Other were frequently contested in conversation.

> It just feels a bit wrong to try and get donor funds to fund our team in the UK to build (IT products) for these guys. (Is it a) bad use of funds? (Roger, conversation, November 2004)

Just as the idea that EWH could save the Other was continually challenged, the organization's ability to know the Other was likewise debated and contested over the nine-month project. Key to this was the conceptualization of the Other as fundamentally different in terms of culture, race and language, an idea that appeared to be taken for granted by most members of the organization. The idea that these differences would be difficult to overcome when the team went to carry out the testing of the IT product in the context of the African country was shared by most.

> If you want any decision to be made in Africa, first off they will say yes to you and it's not going to work, they need to say yes to you about five times and the decision needs to be made once a month …' (John, meeting, June 2004)

The differences were generally conceptualized as being inexplicable, irritating and opaque.

> Be very careful with the whole sexism thing, don't go into rooms alone with a guy, you will compromise them … all these things are manipulated, it's rather like *EastEnders* on acid. Everyone is looking for a scandal, everyone is looking for revenge and they will use your lack of familiarity with their social construct … you gotta try and be as neutral as possible … you have got to be very sensitive to their cultural signals. (John, meeting, June 2004)

The Other was very much conceptualized as being outside the cultural space of the UK context in which EWH operated, a notion that stands in direct contradiction to the view of development methodologies as rendering the Other 'knowable'.

In short, despite initial assumptions about the hegemonic nature of the Western-centric ways of knowing in operation within this organization, closer examination revealed much deeper levels of complexity and contradiction within these discourses. While this notion that discourses are subject to continuing contradiction and change is widely accepted in social theory, in management studies the nuances of how this occurs in practice are frequently glossed over. In postcolonial theory, however, this very aspect of discourse is given centre stage by authors such as Bhabha (1994), who emphasize the changes and contradictions observable

within the colonial discourse. In developing an approach to the study of development organizations, one contribution of the present study is to add to the work of Bhabha and others by highlighting the significance of discursive silences in the workplace. The importance of this aspect of organizational life emerged in the nine months of participant observation with EWH.

Silent Discourses

This chapter has so far focused on illustrating two dominant discourses, and ways in which they were resisted and challenged within the daily operations of EWH. However, there were things that happened in practice during my time with EWH that were rarely discursively articulated, but that represented very important aspects of the work of the organization. Going by the definition of discourse as a whole set of power/knowledge relations, which are written, spoken, communicated and embedded in social practices, I refer to these other 'things' as discourses, albeit silent ones. Foucault locates silence, 'the things one declines to say', as less the absolute limit of discourse 'than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies' (1990: 27). In order to write about these other aspects of life that remained silent but that were observable in practice, it is necessary for me, as author, to inscribe them with my interpretation of their role in this social setting, a methodological manoeuvre that has attendant power effects. The potential problems with this are discussed later on. First, two such silent discourses are outlined.

The first one concerns the notion that EWH can save the Other, a discourse that was shown above to have been challenged by the view that perhaps the Other was neither in need of being saved by EWH, nor *could* be saved by EWH. What was not articulated discursively, though, was the fact that the Other was saving EWH on a daily basis. First, without the presence of a needy Other, the funding that paid the salaries of EWH staff would never have been obtained from donors. Second, having chosen careers in the field of development, both EWH staff and EWH volunteers implicitly depended for their livelihoods on this ongoing conceptualization of a needy Other that can and needs to be saved. It must be noted that this discourse was never fully 'silent'. These issues were sometimes, although rarely, the subject of jokes and asides from members of the organization. However, from my experience of this

organization they were never the subject of formal debate or of any significant engagement in conversation. It must be concluded that the hegemonic nature of the 'We *can* save the Other' was so very strong that even questioning *that* discourse through an articulation of 'Perhaps we *cannot* save the Other' proved unsuccessful. The deafening silence surrounding the notion of 'the Other *saves us*' is thus perhaps unsurprising.

The second silent discourse surrounded the fact that despite the shared acknowledgement of perceived problems with ICT for development and its attendant methodologies, funding structures and vested interests, the position of EWH within this sector and its processes was never seriously debated. In fact, conversations that addressed ways of overcoming the issues found within this sector tended to conclude with an agreement to apply 'more development': for example, spending more time 'in the field', attracting funding from a wider sphere of Western donors and so forth. The strong underlying notion that 'development is flawed' remained largely silent, though emerging in jokes and throwaway comments throughout the period of observation and during interviews with participants.

Reasons for these two deafening silences can only be guessed at, though it could be suggested that to articulate either one and seriously engage with alternative courses of action could only lead to a questioning of the existence of EWH, of the usefulness of development as an industry and of the very self-identities of EWH staff members, self-identities implicitly bound up with these phenomena (Knights and Willmott, 1999). It is interesting that both of the silent discourses observed concerned the fact that despite numerous articulated challenges, EWH as an organization carried on. Reasons for the organization's persistence, and the silences that accompanied it, are explored next.

Saving and Knowing the Other: Persistent Discourses

Despite the challenges to the dominant discursive ways of viewing the Other, outlined above, activity around recruiting new programmers and developing existing and new IT products increased during the remainder of my time with EWH. In short, observing the workplace practices at EWH implies that by the end of the project, EWH generally continued to conceptualize the Other in terms of needing salvation, and their organization in terms of being able to save them.

Despite the agreement that certain problems were present within the

development apparatus, EWH members appeared convinced that they were in a position to transcend these issues. Potential ways of achieving this included a change in approach. For example, it was suggested that EWH, in addition to developing IT solutions, might investigate the provision of IT training for the Other:

> It worries me slightly about our approach, bringing solutions that have already been developed in the West, over here … I mean perhaps what we might be better off doing is training African programmers to do it themselves … but then it's like (an acquaintance) said, 'What makes you think the programmers here are worse than your ones; perhaps they're better?'… (Thinks for a bit) … I suppose maybe what we are doing is developing a global solution to a global problem. (Roger, conversation, November 2004)

It was clear that even with these doubts, the conviction that the Other can be saved by EWH was so deeply embedded that it was able to resist the challenges that it had faced. In fact, the most significant outcome of the visit to the country in Africa, besides the testing of the original IT product, was the development of a plan to design a new, improved IT product to help poor people. To fund this new idea, applications for donor funding continued, and continued espousing the inferior Other in need of help, with EWH styled as saviour.

Similarly, regarding the assumption that EWH was in a position to know the Other fully, despite the alternative points of view that were expressed, the overall problem was framed as being fundamentally solvable by a more sophisticated methodology. Problems could be overcome by using more participatory elements, by talking to people more, by immersing oneself in the field for longer periods of time and so forth. The possibility for EWH to know the Other for the purposes of this project remained implicit. 'The only way to understand a farmer's needs is to talk to a farmer … what I mean is it's not staying (in this town) and thinking we have got the solution' (Roger, meeting, November 2004).

In short, despite the acknowledged differences between EWH and the Other, the accepted participatory approaches to development projects, which involved talking to local people as well as quantifying and comparing across cultures, were seen as providing the means fully to access, know and understand the people in developing countries that the organization espoused to help. The initial assumptions around 'saving' and 'knowing' the Other remained dominant in conversation, in documentation and moreover in practice.

To explore how certain discourses survive and dominate over time in this manner, it is useful to draw on Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) study of hegemony in discursive activity. The authors note that in social spaces that are subject to frequent changes and uncertainty, dominant ideologies and imaginaries tend to be drawn upon in the construction of a stable discursive realm (Appadurai, 1996; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). The space occupied by small, relatively young NGOs operating between the First and Third Worlds forms such a shifting, uncertain context. For example, in the case examined here, EWH's work involved significant engagement with a highly unfamiliar context, the country in Africa. Previous experience was limited to visits to different African and other developing nations as part of past development projects. Moreover, 'permanently changing conditions' is a phrase that could be used to describe the contemporary development sector, as the current shift towards more managerial practices and the continuously changing priorities of donor interests contribute to uncertainty and change (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 138). In short, it is perhaps unsurprising that developmental ways of knowing were drawn upon and persisted in the work practices of EWH staff, despite the debate and cynicism that these generated.

The above observations have implications for those interested in the dominance of Western-centred ways of knowing within the sphere of development management. In particular, it is interesting that while resistance to dominant discourses is often highlighted by critical studies of both development and organization, such resistance appeared in this case to have little practical impact on the reproduction of such ways of knowing within EWH. Perhaps Foucault (1976) provides an answer. In *The Birth of the Clinic*, he notes how contesting discourses can in fact act to reinforce the dominant discourse by giving the impression that it has been laid open to challenge, and has survived. In a later work he asks, 'did the critical discourse that addresses itself to (in this case) repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that had operated unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same historical network as the thing it denounces?' (Foucault, 1990: 10). In Foucault's view, hegemonic ways of knowing such as the Western-centric epistemologies highlighted for discussion above are, in fact, reinforced by the presence of resistance and cynicism. In summary, the above observations imply that these epistemologies might be more difficult to resist and subvert than authors such as Bhabha suggest.

My Role in the Process

Of course, my role as a participant observer in this study was by no means neutral. More overt aspects of this influence were evident in my choice of literature when, after three months with EWH, I was asked to provide 'social studies of development' papers for the team to read. I had begun to wonder silently whether the methodology, which derived directly from the team's previous experience on aid and development projects, was problematic in its boxing of the 'beneficiaries' into categories predefined by development theorists. I therefore provided a number of critical papers that called into question some of the basic assumptions of development as a discipline. These papers were read by team members and presented at lunchtimes. They sparked some debate, as outlined previously.

The second occasion where my influence was particularly clear to my mind involved a meeting with EWH's main donor, UKD. At this meeting, I was introduced as a PhD student-slash-EWH member. I recall wanting to appear competent to the donor for the sake of my colleagues at EWH. My diary notes are as follows:

> We plan for the meeting ahead … I am asked to organize my response to any potential questions on the (methodology), so I make some quick notes in my diary. I see now, re-reading, that I had included the words 'participatory approaches' and 'livelihoods' in the hope of glancing at them and possibly throwing them into the conversation. (Fieldnotes, UKD meeting, September 2004)

In short I had begun to use and reinforce the language of development, despite having personal reservations about it. As Escobar notes in his analysis of development as a discourse, 'to speak is to do something – something other than to express what one thinks; … to add a statement to a pre-existing series of statements is to perform a complicated and costly gesture' (Escobar, 1995b: 217).

Finally, the critique of accepted ways of knowing the world must be turned inward on my own approach to this study, which is merely a representation of my data, which are in turn a representation of my interpretations of EWH life (Geertz, 1973). My views are necessarily Western-centric and my own ways of speaking of the Other are no more nor less representationalist and power-laden than those of my colleagues at EWH. Furthermore, I acknowledge the inescapable 'hidden agenda' behind my efforts to construct forms of knowledge in the pursuit of my own academic status (Knights, 1996).

Conclusion

I have empirically demonstrated that in the case studied, the discursive constitution of the Other at EWH was markedly characterized by ambivalence, contradiction and silence, rather than by articulated one-dimensionality. However despite these challenges, dominant discursive formations that reinforce colonial ways of knowing appear to remain hegemonic.

A potential limitation of the present study lies in its specificity. For example, the nine-month time frame used could be critiqued as being inadequate for observing longer-term changes in the hegemonic discourses discussed here. Similarly, the youth of the organization studied, and its location in a specific cultural context of the UK, at the particular time at which the study was conducted, must be considered. Given all these, however, I would argue that the observations presented here remain relevant for the study of development management for the following reasons. First, it is interesting to observe that all members of this organization shared a similar background with thousands of NGO workers worldwide: educated at Western universities and with a number of years' experience at large international development institutions (Gopal et al., 1999). In addition, the development sector context, described above as shifting and uncertain, is shared by many NGOs of varying sizes, all over the world (Giddens, 1991; Prasad and Prasad, 2003). Thus, this chapter makes the following important contributions to the study of development ma nagement and organizations, more widely.

The first contribution is to help overcome a recognized gap in the field of organization studies. Although, in the last few decades, organizational research has drawn upon a number of different scholarly traditions such as feminism, postmodernism and so forth, surprisingly even *critical* organization scholarship has mostly ignored the insights offered by postcolonialism (Prasad, 2003a). The few exceptions to this omission tend to focus on macro-level critiques of theory and policy (Avgerou et al., 2003; Cooke, 2003a; Gopal et al., 1999; Mir et al., 2003; Prasad and Prasad, 2003). There is thus an urgent need for further work that uses ideas from postcolonialism in the study of micro-processes of power within contemporary organizations. Providing one such study is the first contribution of this chapter.

The second contribution is a theoretical one, albeit supported by empirical illustrations. This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate

regarding the use of discourse as a lens for studying organizations. Organizational theorists who use the concept of discourse have tended to focus exclusively on that which can be easily accessed empirically; the spoken and the written (Brannen, 2004; Boje et al., 2004; Hardy et al. 2005). This chapter argues that equal attention must also be given to that which is not spoken and not written, the 'non-discursive practices' that make up part of organizational life (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 107). This chapter provides an empirical illustration of the importance of giving non-discursive practices equal weight in organizational research.

Finally, the postcolonial lens applied to the study of this development organization usefully critiques the increasingly dominant view that NGOs must be welcomed as an apolitical organizational form, which promises to bypass the problems inherent to both private-sector and government-assisted aid. From the discussion of the present case, this chapter suggests that NGOs may, through the colonial ways of knowing that persist in social, cultural and even linguistic practices, be contributing to the reinforcement of Western-centred epistemologies, and the resulting confinement of the non-West into categories of the West's own making. Moreover, as was noted here, the operation of these ways of knowing is such that their very enactment ensures that organization members remain blind to their inherent assumptions, and so such discursive reproduction remains invisible and beyond critique. Studies such as this, however, can render taken-for-granted discourses open to examination.

NOTES

1. In the interest of confidentiality, the location and field sites named here are fictitious.
2. 'Discourse' is used in place of the more cumbersome 'power/knowledge relations'.

5

Managerialism and NGO Advocacy: Handloom Weavers in India

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In this chapter I focus on managerialism within international development, that is, the concentration of decision-making power with professionally trained staff often being termed 'managers' (or with such a function). Parker (2002b) offers a nuanced definition of managerialism, which he describes as 'the generalized ideology of management' (10). Management, he argues, has become associated with the features required for social progress and economic growth, through three assumptions: first, that social progress requires greater control of the natural world around us; second, that human beings also must be controlled; and third, that control requires a form of organization that efficiently orders 'people and things in order that agreed collective goals can be achieved' (4). Aspects of development practice that are in this sense managerialist include technocratic decision-making power over intended aid and project beneficiaries, efforts to standardize development-related tasks by national and international agencies, and toolkits and techniques that attempt clearly to define and measure development-related outcomes. Admittedly the term 'managerialism' is a broad one; my purpose in this chapter is not to define it authoritatively, but rather to explore creatively its potential as an interrogative device, in helping observers to understand contemporary shifts within development-related policy and practice in organizational and extra-organizational locales.

Accordingly this chapter explores managerialist notions within the handlooms sector in India, through three succeeding narratives. I begin with an account of contemporary urban experience of handicrafts, a visit to a 'crafts village' in the city of Hyderabad. In this impressionistic section I seek to locate perceptions more transparently and show how crafts are presented within Indian urban life. Also, I examine what crafts signify historically in terms of development policy and practice. To guide

my analysis, I follow an account of how the autonomous handlooms sector was created after independence by the Government of India and particularly the manner in which crafts were imagined within this project.[1] In the past decade, criticisms of such centralized state initiatives, as well as of market-liberalism reforms, have grown within Indian intellectual circles. In acknowledgement, the third narrative focuses on a recent response to such policies that positions NGOs in between market forces and local craft communities and traditions. This organizational example is based entirely on interviews and site visits to the Dastkar Andhra collective.[2]

Across these three narratives I explore the notion of managerialism. In terms of post-Independence India, it was part of a project of technocratic intervention urgently needed for national betterment. While the means of such intervention have shifted in content and influence over decades in India, the mode of intervention remains fundamentally technocratic. What *is* new however, as I discuss in the final section, is the involvement of NGOs in governmental efforts to decentralize policy implementation, leading to a distinctive change in the manner in which citizenship and politics are imagined.

Urban Experiences of Crafts: Cyberabad and Shilparamam

One January afternoon in 2006 I visited a 'crafts village' called Shilparamam in the city of Hyderabad. The capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad is today an important centre of software development and service outsourcing. Traditionally the city comprised two parts connected by a large lake in between, Hussain Sagar. These twin cities, Hyderabad and Secunderabad, have been joined in the late 1990s by a third, the planned development eventually called Cyberabad. As the name implies it was intended to serve software developers, and indeed one of the first to set up office was Microsoft, in an area called Hi-Tech city. Here, wide, straight roads pass tall office buildings enclosed within walls, sentries flanking their gates. The crowded clutter common to other parts of Hyderabad is still absent. The airport and train stations are relatively far away, commercial centres are few. What the area lacks in such amenities is made up for by a distinctive sense of the urban, self-conscious newness. A train passenger once told me Cyberabad was an important tourist attraction of Hyderabad, because within it 'you will not believe you are in Hyderabad, but in a foreign place'. The key marker of

Cyberabad is a generic modernity but of a manner recognizably un-Indian. This sense of the simultaneous modern and foreign occurs at a site primarily of software development, knowledge-based activities that themselves are not easy to distinguish as domestic or foreign given that their revenue originates from economic transactions that cross national boundaries. The distinction of Cyberabad is really in the aspiration of its participants for the global modern. Such an aspiration is evident for instance in the very title of 'The Indian School of Business', a well-endowed business school recently launched nearby by a consortium of Indian corporations and American business schools. It prides itself on offering a US-style MBA degree with an American curriculum, and faculty based or educated mostly in business schools in the United States. In a sense all that is Indian about the ISB is its name – if it can help it. It represents the desire of many Indians wishing to learn and emulate certain aspects of US social institutions, engendering an American future and perhaps forgetting an Indian past.

It is here within this generic and futuristic modern space that a 'crafts village' has been created. What is a crafts village? It is certainly not a village – this is not a place where people live as such. Nor is it about crafts as such – you do not see the production of any crafts, and information provided here on Indian crafts traditions is negligible. Shilparamam is really a recreational space for urban citizens. Every year from late December to mid-January it comes alive with traders eager to sell products. Stalls are set up, and assorted attractions are offered to attract people to the village such as music, dance, and the common array found in amusement parks. But by being termed a crafts village this impermanent market is reconstituted as a particular type of performance, where those who negotiate the purchase and sale of craft products in the process also produce different understandings of what handicrafts and handlooms mean to them.

Part of the understanding of craft transactions is common enough. On the one side are people who sell crafts, who could be the actual artisans themselves, or members of artisan castes. In any case, there is a slippage here between the craft maker and the craft marketer; though these two may not be the same, there is a presumption somehow that their interests are the same. On the other side are city residents eager to find a good product at a good price,[3] and a suitably traditional product. Their interest is in a lifestyle distinct from the standardizing imperatives of clothing, decorations and products that can represent the modern and the West.[4]

But another part of this understanding is the interaction between perceived markers of tradition and modernity. So at the Shilparaman entrance you purchase the entry ticket from a kiosk. The ticket is barcoded, and next to the kiosk is a turnstile. Presumably you could swipe the ticket for entry. But instead you hand it over to a man who then turns the turnstile for you to enter. Why sell a barcoded ticket if you have to hand it over? Why have turnstiles that are not automatic? But this juxtaposition of the automated and the manual makes sense if seen in terms of ritualistic ascriptors of the modern. The barcode displays the hi-tech world in which Shilparaman is situated. But such a world does not in this case have material utility, only a symbolic one.

On this closing day most vendors looked tired. The newspapers reported record low sales, while vendors complained of high stall rentals and congestion. I walked past stalls with kalamkari prints, embossed in red and brown vegetable dyes, illustrating the *Ramayana* or the *Mahabharatha*, smelling of the cow's milk used in finishing the dying. Other stalls displayed gond brass statues from Adilabad and central India, their metal twisted into crude images of hunters, herders, dancers, animals and birds. There were Madhubani prints from Bihar, in arresting tones of red and black, once used as decorations on the walls of tribal huts, now decorative prints. But despite their beauty, most stalls were vacant, the vendors bored. In any case, as in other crafts exhibitions I noticed how little these products spoke of their traditions, their manner of production, their historical purposes. (What were kalamkari prints used for? How were they made? What is so special about them?) Without such an understanding, or with the need to locate such an understanding oneself, these products seemed to lose their uniqueness. And what is a craft if it is not unique, if it does not somehow evoke its hand-made quality?

Moving away from the stalls, I wandered through the rest of the village. An ornamental lake occupies its centre. On its banks is the clay statue of a man cleaning clothes, meant to evoke the traditional occupation of the dhobi. Past the statue is a 'crafts museum'. Inside are more dummies: vegetable vendors, weavers, people painting dolls, people making statues, people telling fortunes with the assistance of parrots, and so forth. This is a model village, of craftsmen, weavers, and a market. The only things missing are the craftspeople themselves. And what is missing outside, in the crafts village's many stalls, is the production of these crafts, their significance within a village. Why do we

see this separation of the location of craft production from its sale, even here in a crafts village?

The reason is that to urban Indians such as those who shop at Shilparamam, purchasing crafts is closely connected to enacting a self-consciously modern urbanity. Paradoxically, the demand for the traditional is precisely due to the rise of the modern, but in a context where it is very hard to know if the modern is particularly new and if the traditional is particularly old. Generic modern spaces like Cyberabad resemble other urban emulations, such as in Dubai, where the sprawling urban spaces dominated by highways and stark office towers seem to evoke a cultural image of America, Las Vegas, Los Angeles. Such urban spaces have the logic of the airport, of non-places that are so generic that any place becomes possible (Ackley, 2005). But what would be the consequence of such generic spaces if not a demand for the self-conscious 'embedded place', something that declares one's identity, a comfort surely next to the stark, standardizing imperatives of these new urban developments? So a part of the logic of the generic modernity of Cyberabad may be the creation of static heritage spaces like Shilparamam, where the sense of the traditional is moored into model villages and museums just as the sense of the modern is celebrated through self-descriptive labels, where, as Ackley (2005) has it, 'one can understand the entire logic of a place from its title', the layout and the buildings within it. The carving out of *spaces of tradition* like Shilparamam is part of the same impulse that creates the self-conscious modern spaces of Cyberabad.

A Recent History of Two Policy Assumptions

Handloom textiles have 'consistently maintained a one-fourth share of the total textile production' in India. Cloth production was 7,682 million square metres in 1997–98, and 7,170 million square metres in 1998–99 (Mukund and Sundari, 2001: 25–6). Unlike its cousin the power loom, where mechanized small-scale mills are used, handloom production relies on non-mechanized means to weave the warp and weft of raw silk or cotton into a textile (Roy, 1999).

Post-Independence India's handloom policy was shaped by two assumptions: that India's national identity was based around a craft and weaving tradition; and that craft production could reduce high rural unemployment (Brijbushan, 1976; Chattopadhyaya, 1986; Greenough, 1995; Mukund and Sundari, 2001; Srinivas, 2001). Nationalist leaders

identified handloom and handicrafts as important signifiers of cultural purity, an essence endangered by colonialism.[5] Therefore the newly independent nation sought to nurture handloom production. To do so the five-yearly national plans allotted a budget for both the 'handlooms sector' and the 'handicrafts sector'. On the part of policy makers like Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya who dominated the handicrafts sector for two decades, the intention was to establish a viable and legitimate sector able to meet and nurture urban consumer demand while providing rural employment.[6] Labour-intensive occupations such as weaving and handicrafts could be the basis for a significant village-based economy (Brijbushan, 1976). Handloom production did not require an industrial base. Weavers remained in the village, self-employed, self-reliant. But to ensure demand, craft products would have to combine two features: a traditional aesthetic and utility for the end user.

Through these assumptions, handloom policy cohered around an array of regionally distinctive products and textile patterns and designs, intended for urban demand, enhancing their utility for specific consumer uses without 'losing their basic integrity of shape or material' (Brijbushan, 1976: 144). Rapidly a variety of craft products was developed sometimes with prosaic uses: handloom bed sheets and pillow-covers, sandalwood bookends, ornamental ashtrays. Such products melded craft traditions with urban utility, aesthetics with end use. Thus the intricate metalwork of *bidri* was now used to manufacture ashtrays that could be both used for this purpose as well as displayed as *objets d'art*. At the same time the handicrafts sector emphasized some standardization of textile patterns by identifying distinctive craft regions, and the design and training activities of 'Pilot Project Centres' and 'Design Centres'. Raw material was made available at discounted rates.[7] Craftsfolk also benefited from public exhibitions organized by the government ministries, in India and abroad.

These policies transformed the lives of craftsfolk across India. As Indian states followed the government policies with their own similar efforts, craftsfolk became increasingly assertive within regional political alliances. Perhaps the most significant consequence of these policy assumptions was at the institutional level. Cooperative societies were identified as the key implementation mechanism for these policies. Governed by member-elected boards they offered an efficient means to assist local communities. It would be through weaver cooperatives that local weavers ultimately learned of new textile patterns and designs. At the same time, government-owned sales outlets were started in urban

areas, to sell craft products. By the mid-1960s handloom policy had stabilized into an institutional system where weaver cooperatives and federations enjoyed exclusive contracts to supply government-owned emporia catering to urban consumers. In this manner contracts, subsidies and resources were channelled from federations to cooperatives to weaver communities, and in turn weaver textiles were channelled from federations to sales outlets. The overarching federation of weaver cooperatives in Andhra Pradesh was the Andhra Pradesh State Handloom Weavers' Co-op Society (APCO).[8]

This institutional system offered political benefits to state governments. The system was attractive, distributing subsidies and loans in return for a stable vote bank. Ministers lobbied for their constituents. Government-run banks, educational institutes, retailers and training institutes accommodated to such pressure. Cooperatives were also useful as a political proving ground, where community leaders could be vetted for political office. This patronage relationship encouraged both sides largely to ignore questions of economic performance and organizational autonomy (Mooij, 2002; Mukund and Sundari, 2001; Niranjana, 2004). Similar patterns have been described in other sectors (see Baviskar and Attwood, 1996). The incentives of this institutional system gradually became political and not commercial, geared more towards maintaining patronage than towards viable market-based production.

APCO comprised a particularly significant regional vote bank. Incumbent governments sought to control it, staffing its board with their politicians. But they dared not focus on larger questions of performance and sustainability. As a result, few systems functioned to maintain APCO's financial health. The tipping point came in the mid-1990s. Government agencies cancelled orders for staff uniforms. APCO demanded payment for these orders, to no avail. In turn it was unable to repay member cooperatives for these orders. Given the high debt and financial instability, many cooperative societies simply folded, driving some members to suicide. The APCO crisis is emblematic of the larger problems of patronage as a substitute for market-based performance incentives, of agencies simply purchasing textiles neither designed for consumers nor produced under contracts properly audited or enforced, but which ultimately kept politically loyal cooperative boards in business (Mukund and Sundari, 2001).[9]

The presumption throughout these interventionist policies and the resulting institutional system was that urban demand for handloom

products had to be actively *created*, that it was so modest it required little segmentation. As a result weaver cooperatives lacked sensitivity to the many product segments for handloom textiles that emerged through the 1990s. Ironically, demand for high-end handlooms continues to grow in India, as witnessed in the growing number of exclusive designer boutiques. The popular retail store FabIndia, which sells handloom bedsheets and clothes, and a limited range of organic spices, soaps, furniture and furnishing, has been expanding across India and now sells on the internet. But a blight of bad news persists about weavers, their suicides, starvation deaths and widespread discontent (Frontline, 2002; 2003; Outlook India, 2006). To a certain extent these contradictory facts coexist because high-end products depend on design and a close interface with consumer demands and brand identities. However most handlooms policy and the efforts of weavers remain geared *not* for niche products but for mass products, emphasizing standardized craft production over product design.

For handlooms, then, a sector of manual production, a difficulty seems, ironically, standardization. The challenge today is in translating expertise in rare and unique weaving techniques into attractive product designs. The policy that has prevailed in contrast has neither strengthened low-volume, high-skills, high-price segments nor sufficiently met the high-volume, low-skills, low-price segmentation that commercial ventures seek to target.

Over the past decade the state government has reduced investment in the handlooms sector while promoting the state capital, Hyderabad, as an important site for software development. This changing scenario continues to pose grave difficulties for cooperative organizations, traditionally dependent on government assistance. The sources of funding and revenue they relied on, indeed were urged to maintain, are now drying up. At the same time the shift in emphasis from heritage and employment to private investment and global competition also offers new incentives for civil society actors (Johnson, Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Mooij, 2002; Sidel, 2000).

An Organizational Example: Dastkar's Approach

From Cyberabad I travelled through the city's busy roads to the offices of Dastkar Andhra, in Secunderabad, in a busy market area with many textile shops. Dastkar Andhra advocates and markets on behalf of

handloom weavers. In the main room was a large map of the state, next to a whiteboard labelled with a 'monthly activities schedule' (including sales exhibition) with columns for 'place, people, purpose'. The adjacent room displayed a wooden weaving loom, spinning wheel, and computer; the floor was covered with a charpoy (cane mat), and in the next room there was a sewing machine. The far room was a library, containing magazines and books on NGOs, left-oriented critiques of globalization, and substantial studies of textile history. The organization's underlying role has been to strengthen weaving traditions within the state by documenting traditional weaving, by advocating policies more supportive of weavers, and by assisting weavers to design and sell textiles for viable consumer segments. Once I travelled with Dastkar Andhra's founder, Uzra Bilgrami (now retired), to a village where she cajoled reluctant weavers to experiment with natural dyes. She told them of a time when specialized dyers knew the skills to create colours using local plants. Another time she leafed through a catalogue from the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, showing us Indian textiles from a few centuries past. In both instances the concern was to restore a skilled weaving tradition mostly lost. The patterns we were seeing were made with skills that were now disappearing. Weaving remains an occupation of apprenticeship. While technical assistance, training, modern technologies (CAD/CAM) can help, ultimately weavers still learn to create a textile by participating in a community of practitioners. And it was the erosion of this form of knowledge, its predicted loss, that worried Uzramma. Moreover, how weaving was now marketed could have an effect not only on weavers' own occupations, but also on the broader cultural identities of Indians, due to government neglect, changing markets, and ill-informed consumers.

For Seemanthini Niranjana, one of the two Dastkar staff members I interviewed, a fundamental difficulty for the handlooms sector was the assumptions of policy makers that handlooms were a site of tradition, and suitable solely for rural employment. Weavers were being 'boxed in' by such perceptions. The key advocacy goal was to establish another perception about handlooms among policy makers. To policy makers the sector was not viable without government support. But, as she explained, the handloom sector could not have survived solely on government support. What had made the difference was the entrepreneurial ability of weavers, able to develop textiles for local markets. *That* was the traditional reason for the sector's survival and not that it was somehow a

stable and enduring repository for Indian culture. The 'contemporary organizational base of the handloom industry' could 'explain why it has survived'.[10] Well-functioning cooperatives had found means of responding to domestic market changes while offsetting the power of master weavers (Niranjana, 2004; Mukund and Sundari, 2001).

To succeed in persuading the consumer of the inherent quality of hand-woven textiles would also tacitly challenge such assumptions. So Dastkar's marketing complemented its advocacy, challenging the assumption of a static domestic demand based in regional styles: what Latha Tummuru, another Dastkar staff member, termed 'the cooperative production style'.[11] In contrast, the traditional focus was on displaying regional identity within 'the product, so for instance in Venkatgiri it is in their saris, which are to be made exclusively by cooperatives based in the Venkatgiri area only. But to us the question is, is the customer still there for this product?' In short, the effort to showcase different regional weaving traditions had lost sight of the efforts on one hand to nurture and maintain a consumer base for these products, and on the other to ask what the consumer wanted from a textile. The manner in which government policy had sought to help the handloom weavers had actually insulated them from consumer preferences and the market, which had 'become distant from their activities'. The consumer wanted more than a unique production style, the staff member argued, the consumer wanted a distinct product.

Dastkar's marketing emphasized two principles: pre-selling and segmentation. All textile products, where possible, were already sold before production. The pre-sale policy was Dastkar's effort to avoid repeating the APCO experience. Ultimately the federation had been unable to repay the cooperatives on orders for which it had not received owed money. 'This stock pileup led to coops not able to pay weavers'.[12] Pre-sale meant that there was no production until a sale was confirmed. The second principle was to identify distinct product-market segments, specifically retailer servicing, exhibition marketing, direct sales, home selling network, and LIG (lower-income group) sales. The biggest and most viable segment was retailer servicing. Dastkar received contracts from medium-sized retailers like FabIndia, to whom it sold cloth cut into products like bedsheets and tablecloths. It also sold to small, high-price boutiques catering to an exclusive market with expensive cotton/silk creations. Retailers' organizations like Dastkar, since they worked closely with weavers, were more aware of changes in customer tastes. For a

similar reason Dastkar organized yearly exhibitions across India, which allowed weavers some interaction with urban consumers, helping them 'read the consumer directly'. Exhibitions also encouraged design ideas that were then passed back to cooperatives and suggested to retailers.

Developing capacity in product design remained the challenge. Interventionist policies and a changing market had led to a neglect of how traditional products were to be designed: 'We have to ask ourselves where do we locate design? There is a major disconnect between marketing and design at present.' It also meant how to teach design: 'We have to look at ways of acquiring technology without the baggage attached to it, as when master craftsmen teach others.' But the 'we' in this instance, Dastkar, could not really be termed an NGO. 'NGOs are perceived as unprofessional, even pathetic. They are not expected to have professional services as much as be grant-driven.' The ultimate problem with NGOs was their lack of accountability to their constituents. 'When you are business-driven you have to meet targets, inventory, billing, stock levels ... You have to be accountable to the weavers. See what sold last season, what was ordered, what they prefer in yardage, dupatas [long scarves]'.[13] What was crucial, then, was offering market-driven accountability to weavers.

Discussion

The three narratives presented here substantiate Parker's (2002a,b) argument in terms directly relevant to the field of development policy. Across these three narratives managerialism is revealed as a specific ideational *mind-set* that associates developmental outcomes with *organizational accountability* and *community involvement*: organizational accountability in that particular social actors (such as government ministries, or NGOs) are deemed to be responsible for quite well-specified developmental outcomes without sufficient thought to the involvement of stated beneficiaries in clarifying such responsibilities; and community involvement in that these social actors are expected to closely work with local communities (such as weaver communities) to attain their stated outcomes. Thus, managerialism, as I define it here, is an ideology that associates benefits deemed 'good development' in terms of interventions by specific organizations that seek relations between these organizations and specified communities in terms that are ultimately both instrumental and reificatory.

Across these narratives is an argument that government handloom and handicraft policies depend on particular ideational conceptions. In my visit to Shilparamam what was striking was that the crafts village was itself reliant on a particular notion of the urban. It is no coincidence that a 'crafts village' is situated next to a 'hi-tech city' within the self-styled city of Cyberabad. In fact the uniqueness of this new urban space requires emphasizing its modernist aspiration, as a break from pasts, as something self-consciously new, part of a desire for generalized vague notions of efficiency and progress. Such emphasis is brought out not only in terms of the self-explanatory labels used for delineation, but, in this case, by requiring with it a space for the non-modern, for a self-conscious exploration of India's heritage. I wish especially to underscore the planned quality to the choice of Hi-Tech city and Shilparamam. The hopes of some urban theorists have been for 'sustainable cities', where different narratives of the urban experience can be shared and exchanged, to constitute public spaces (Beauregard, 2003). But such cosmopolitan efforts of storytelling are hard to imagine in the dual enclaves of privatized software towers and heritage enclosures of Cyberabad. What is striking instead is precisely the *absence* of shared storytelling, the creation of a social setting that does not allow such social exchange and instead encourages a fixed spatial rendering of static juxtapositions: modernity on one hand, tradition on the other; software towers on the one hand, craft dummies on the other.

A similar ideational tension underlies the second narrative, of the historical context of handloom policies. The notion that handlooms survive only because of the government supports the belief that weavers are impervious to market changes. Such beliefs echo policy views that different observers have noted and often reflected in the welfare initiatives available for weavers (Mooij, 2002; Mukund and Sundari, 2000; Niranjana, 2004). Such views recognize the importance of crafts as a relatively fixed and regionally defined cultural heritage. It is not the same as recognizing crafts as a lived occupation that continues to thrive and provide sustenance. Rather it is part of the effort of policy makers to carve out a few exceptions within the greater trend of policies favouring urban growth, global exports and reduced government support. The impact of such policies is ultimately perverse: private initiative is to be rewarded in the case of software development, but in the case of the handloom weavers private initiative tends to be questioned or ignored, perceived as rather irrational, an eccentric effort to maintain a traditional occupation that cannot withstand the ravages of the modern economy

unprotected. Such policy initiatives remain paternalistic, maintaining a particular conception of handlooms and weavers, while offering limited space for scrutiny and critique by their ostensible beneficiaries, the weavers themselves.

The third narrative, on Dastkar Andhra, also reveals an ideational conception, one that shapes and at times circumscribes the organization's activities. The Dastkar staff I interviewed were sensitive to an image of NGOs from which they wished to distance their own work; in that sense they wished to clarify that Dastkar was *not* an NGO. In part it seemed to be the image of NGOs as fly-by-night operations to reap aid money that they repudiated. In that sense 'not an NGO' meant an organization conducting a long-term and formalized effort to attain specific goals for a set of clients. This was the context in which one staff member described Dastkar as more professional than grant-driven. This professional orientation also entailed services that could be priced. Market-driven activity could translate into a direct accountability to the stated clients – you were selling products on their behalf with their support. The two staff members I interviewed were also eager to distance Dastkar from another image of NGOs, as actors detached from those to be helped, without sufficient involvement in the grassroots. The staff emphasized to me the necessity that weavers represent themselves, be more vocal in holding the government responsible. The underlying ideational conception these staff resisted seems one of NGOs as actors focused on short-term donor and government mandates, detached and unaccountable to their intended clients.

What do these three ideational conceptions signify in terms of international development and governance? In distinct ways these three conceptions reveal the further centralization of decision-making power away from local communities and into the hands of salaried and trained professionals. The first conception juxtaposed *modern* versus *traditional* and in doing so situated the latter as a static sphere amenable to understanding and appropriation by the former. Clearly in this juxtaposition those who work with craftsfolk, those who work in rural areas, those interested in traditional occupations (for want of a better term) are relegated to a role subordinate to those within the sphere of the urban. It is a hierarchical distinction that mirrors the largely urban-based professional occupations that coordinate and administer development-related activities primarily for those within the rural areas. The second conception juxtaposes the weavers to other petty capitalists, where the former are to be protected

since they cannot otherwise endure the ravages of the market. Again this attitude of cherishing the crafts is rendered into a patronizing gesture that in reality enables further control of these activities by salaried (and mostly governmental) professionals. The third conception juxtaposes the NGO to the community, where the former becomes an agent of the latter's welfare on behalf of the government. Again in reality it enables further control of the latter by salaried (and in this case mostly nongovernmental) professionals politically unaccountable to their stated beneficiaries. Therefore across the three conceptions is a similar trend, the continuing shift of decision-making power away from the hands of beneficiaries to specialized and accredited 'helpers', acting as agents of aid and welfare initiatives. Dastkar Andhra's efforts, however, seemed a striking challenge to these trends, simultaneously questioning the notion of non-profit (its marketing organization, the Dastkar Andhra Marketing Association, was market-driven) and of apolitical intervention (it remains an active advocate for weavers).

Managerialism in terms of international development policy is the institutionalized role of trained and accredited specialists in accomplishing development-related outcomes, for the benefit or on behalf of a community. There are dangers in solely emphasizing expert-based external helpers within the NGO field, since they can downplay the role of grassroots-based representative actors (Mohan, 2002; Mercer, 2002; Mintzberg and Srinivas, 2007). Such grassroots-based actors include social movements, grassroots cooperatives, village councils, and informal credit associations among others. The shift away from grassroots-based representational activities is ultimately depoliticizing, emphasizing administration over politics, service delivery over advocacy, welfare policy over popular democracy (Kamat, 2003; Stiles, 2002).

The prevalence of external helpers has been accompanied by the growing 'technicization' of development, a reliance on toolkits, checklists, forms and procedures to formalize the process of development interventions. Particularly popular are tools that enable measurement of developmental outcomes (Gasper, 2000a; Roberts, Jones and Frohling, 2005), social interactions (Harriss, 2001), and participative process (Cooke, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Kothari, 2001). Reliance on such specialized techniques to manage development as an effort to better identify necessary outcomes isolates actors to be held accountable for these outcomes, and delegates resources to such actors for better coordination of development. Typically in these efforts local communities

are made to deliver on contingent developmental funds offered to them, usually through external NGOs acting as intermediaries, liaising with donors and governments. Such trends contribute to further *power asymmetry* and *privatization*: power asymmetry in that crucial choices are no longer exercised by people to be benefited but instead by those meant to benefit them; privatization in that political choices are no longer conceived in terms of generating a shared public outcome, but rather in terms of narrower individual ends.

Conclusions

A decade ago the leader of a grassroots federation told me the difference between his organization and an NGO: 'I am a professional working in a fishery organization. But these others are professional organizations working with fishermen and others' (Srinivas, 2001: Chapter 4). Ultimately any process of social change must also entail local organizing, community actors hiring professionally trained staff when needed. This is quite different from the converse: professionally staffed NGOs organizing communities in terms of available grants. The former, local organizing, can offer a political response to government policy. But the latter, professional organizing, remains apolitical, using local communities as a means of distributing specific resources, whether of the government or an outside funder, or both. This dualism of the local grassroots doers and the external professional helper (see Mintzberg and Srinivas, 2007) echoes Chatterjee's (2001) notion of a dual civil society in India, a sphere of segmented interaction between people connected by kin, language, and caste, and also of elite interaction between people without such shared affinities. The latter understanding, he believes, is a legacy of the colonial process. The manner in which urban elites historically received the concept of 'civil' in India made them 'serious protagonists of a project of cultural modernization still to be completed', in which it 'must necessarily exclude from its scope the vast mass of the population' (166–9).

Managerialism remains closely tied to this project of cultural modernization, part of a social imaginary of modernity (Taylor, 2002) that deems concentration of expertise normatively appropriate, while excluding most of those imagined as part of society. Exclusions have a cost. To Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius (2004), divided Baghdad is representative of contemporary global civil society. The world's fortunate live

in a green zone with access to basic infrastructure and political order. The less fortunate negotiate the red zone, fighting for scarce resources in situations of acute violence. Increasingly, we will have to eschew the ideology of management, paradoxically enough, in order better to manage these dualities and divides.

NOTES

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1. Much of this data was collected in 1996 during my thesis work (Srinivas, 2001: Chapter 5).
2. Interviews and visits took place over three time periods, October 1996, January 2002 and January 2006.
3. For crafts, while not cheap, are often relatively inexpensive. Certainly if you ask the craftsman he will tell you that he does not get paid enough for the skills and labour he invests in creating a work that, at times, seems a work of art.
4. My intention is not to generalize but simply to state that crafts offer an alternative to those who view Western clothing as somehow, even if in part, non-Indian.
5. Nowhere was such a perception of the handicrafts sector as clear and forthright as in the politics of Mohandas Gandhi and the theories of A. K. Coomaraswamy. Gandhi demanded that Indians wear only hand-woven cloth, to affirm their commitment to Indian weavers. By wearing khadi, hand-spun cotton, Indians could resist British imports of cheap machine-made cloth. In the view of nationalist thinkers like Coomaraswamy, colonization had led to a Westernized Indian elite whose members had lost their cultural roots, including the use of handicrafts and handlooms. Coomaraswamy believed that industrial systems, market competition and professional education were tearing traditional craftsmanship from its roots in Indian culture, leaving Indians deculturated.
6. Chattopadhyaya had been involved in discussions of handicraft policy as early as 1917, when she started exhibiting handicrafts in urban centres, while achieving some prominence as a freedom fighter (Brijbushan, 1976; Chattopadhyaya, 1986). She suggested creating a government organization exclusively for handicrafts; similar initiatives occurred for handlooms; both were intended to be strictly advisory, recommending policies to specialized

ministries. To identify the important craft regions, Chattopadhyaya travelled across India, even to the troubled borders with China and Pakistan. Her sober attention could be unnerving to the craftsmen who called her Hastkala Ma, 'the handicrafts mother' (Brijbushan, 1976: 142–5).

7. An unintended effect, arguably, was that in their zeal to promote crafts and textiles, these policies did not serve well less evident, rare, complex designs and techniques which either lacked mass market appeal or were difficult to disseminate.
8. The Cooperative-Societies Act varies across India's states but in general identifies cooperatives as member-owned organizations offering commercial services. Cooperatives are entitled at times to government assistance and are deemed to operate with a mixture of altruistic and private interests (Baviskar and Attwood, 1996). Government assistance is offered only to registered cooperatives; but in return variations of the Act mandate a high level of government involvement (and interference) in an organization's governance (see Srinivas, 2001: Chapter 6).
9. As an institution cooperatives also did not resolve the weavers' crucial dependence on the 'master weaver', an entrepreneurial marketer who would negotiate orders and then contract them out to weavers. Master weavers performed a vital function, interfacing between consumer demand and production (Niranjana, 2004). But as a consequence they held inordinate power. Cooperatives could become 'captured' by this elite, distorting contracts and revenue distribution.
10. All quotations in this paragraph are from an interview with Seemanthini Niranjana, 11 January 2006, Secunderabad.
11. All quotations in this paragraph are from an interview with Latha Tummuru, 10 January 2006, Secunderabad.
12. All quotations in this paragraph are from an interview with Latha Tummuru, 10 January 2006, Secunderabad.
13. All quotations in this paragraph are from an interview with Latha Tummaru, 10 January 2006, Secunderabad.

6

International Development and the New Public Management: Projects and Logframes as Discursive Technologies of Governance

Ron Kerr

This chapter presents a retrospective analysis of the author's experience working as a consultant in the field of international development in the 1990s. My concern in writing is to understand the processes in which I was involved at that socio-historical conjuncture and I do this in order to critique the ontological and technological presuppositions of the British aid agencies at that time and the way that British (and other Western) conceptions of governance (instanced in the New Public Management) and governance technologies (the logical framework) were used to make accountability the central issue for workers in the development field.

In order to do this, I use the critique of instrumental reason as developed by Habermas (1970; 1987) and Critical Discourse Analysis, a social scientific approach that connects history, the social and the textual (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2003) to look at how control systems and technologies that were developed in the military sphere migrated to civilian spheres of operation (management, business) and then to the management of international development projects.

The particular examples of managerial discourse and practice that I focus on are the *project* and the *logical framework*. In this chapter, management discourse is seen to work across time and space in two ways. First, we can study how the project has moved through time and across space (diachronically) – and second how it is used to control the actions of distant others through time and across space (synchronically). I therefore begin by tracing the migration of this particular technology, what I call a governance technology, from its origins in the planning of science and war in the 1940s to its use in the field of international development in the post-Cold War period, where its role has been to coordinate and control action across time and space. I then present data from a case study of discourse in international development in the New Public

Management period (from 1996). But before doing that I want to discuss two aspects of my methodology: (1) Critical Theory as a critique of instrumental reason and its relation to critical management studies; and (2) Critical Discourse Analysis as an approach that combines text and context.

The Critique of Instrumental Reason

Critical Theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt School (as represented by Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas) can be understood in part as a series of attempts to understand and oppose certain pathologies associated with modernity and in particular the spread of bureaucratic or instrumental rationality (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972; Adorno 1973; Habermas 1970; 1987). The concept of bureaucratic or instrumental reason as used by the Frankfurt School and in particular by Habermas derives from Weber's (1968) concept of *Zweckrationalität* (or 'means-ends rationality'). In Habermas's view, the expansion of instrumental reason into all spheres of human interaction (what he calls the 'colonization of the lifeworld') has been a characteristic of post-Enlightenment modernity, and part of Habermas's critical project has been to identify the social pathologies caused by the illegitimate migration of instrumental reason into lifeworld contexts in which it can then be used to distort and manipulate human interactions and commodification'. The first of these processes, *bureaucratic rationality*, was identified by Weber (1968) as 'means-ends rationality' (*Zweckrationalität*) or 'instrumental reason' (Habermas, 1987).

This aspect of the critique of instrumental reason has been influential in certain approaches to the study of management. Thus, if management studies, as traditionally understood, have been concerned with making the processes of management more efficient and effective (namely, with descriptions of management problems that allow the prescription of efficient solutions), then critical management studies (CMS) has, on the other hand, promoted critique of the presuppositions and presumptions of management as field and practice (Alvesson and Willmott 1992). One stream of CMS has drawn on Habermas's concepts in order to critique the presuppositions of the management field and in particular its instrumental or *Zweckrational* concerns with economic and administrative efficiency as the dominant values of the field and its practices (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). This chapter can then be seen as situated in this tradition.

For the purposes of this chapter, *Zweckrationalität* in organizations can be understood as involving (in many cases) the disassociation of means and ends and thus setting up a functional division of labour between those responsible for ends and those responsible for means. Translated into organizational terms, this means that we (as employees) abdicate to others (managers, leaders) responsibility for the ends that we pursue and thus become in ourselves and to ourselves means (alienated from the ends of the organization; alienated from our own reflexivity). The organization then models a Cartesian dualism, with its 'thinking' organ responsible for the direction of the subaltern 'limbs'. This functional differentiation has negative consequences for participative democracy and for communicative reason (Habermas, 1987), in that it promotes the rule of managerial and policy experts, what Bourdieu (1998: 90) calls the 'dominants, technocrats or epistemocrats', and the promotion of the instrumental over the ethical dimensions of organizational life.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical methodology has an empirical moment and a historical moment and in CDA this equates to the textual moment and the moment of social or historical context (Fairclough, 2003: 6). CDA thus answers the empirical deficit of Critical Theory (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000) with the text, and answers the positivism of linguistic analysis by bringing in history. CDA therefore provides a procedure, not a prescriptive methodology, for critical research that, in general terms, is qualitative and utilizes empirical data (see Fairclough, 2003 for a comprehensive discussion). Thus, I agree with Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 17) who 'do not support calls for stabilising a method for CDA', because, as they say, this would 'compromise the developing capacity of CDA to shed light on the dialectic of the semiotic and the social in a wide variety of social practices by bringing to bear shifting sets of theoretical resources and shifting operationalizations of them.' So what are discourses?

In my research I take a narrow view of discourses as forms or constellations of language. This approach does not follow the broader interpretation of discourses as epochal historical phenomena (as with, for example, Foucault). In my view, discourses are not necessarily and always ideological. Discourses can, however, be used ideologically to legitimate power, to represent the world, and to integrate and distinguish social groups. Discourses can be associated with specific fields, and powerful

discourses from fields such as management can migrate across fields, thus colonizing other fields. My approach does not require a concept of 'false consciousness' – I do not discount it, but it is not necessary in my model. Fragmented consciousness, specialization as a result of functional differentiation, and social power are enough to account for the phenomena that I analyse below.

For me, discourses are analytically separate from practices. Analytically, the world does not collapse into discourse (as in discursive idealism), but rather discourses represent the world (often in motivated ways) (Fairclough, 2003). However, discourses as manipulated in the interests of power/authority can be used performatively to change the social world (Bourdieu, 1991). So in this chapter, management discourse is seen as working in two ways. First, the project as instrumental discourse and practice moves through time and across space. Appearing in different material forms, it is used to monitor and control the actions of (often distant) others and so we can follow diachronically a series of horizontal links that shows the genre migrating and developing through time from World War Two to 1996. Secondly, we can follow another series of links, this time vertically and synchronically down though the hierarchy of agencies, showing how government (as constituted power) operates to impose the *project* as a governance genre on those agencies. The vertical trajectory of the technology then is: (1) from the government's policy organs (where ideology has a legitimating function) to the commissioning agency, then (2) from the commissioning agency to the contracting agency, and then (3) from the contracting agency to operations. The two critical issues in this process for me are: (1) the role of power (operating as *conditionality*) and (2) the role of ideology (operating as *accountability*). Thus governmental authority (constituted power) can, via its recontextualizing agents (Bernstein, 1996) and enforced by conditionality, impose its will downwards through the vertical, whereas accountability is required to flow back up to the source of the conditional funding. As a consequence, there are different texts that flow in either direction: from 'above', there are entextualized (Silverstein and Urban, 1996) policies and strategies (directive texts) that flow downwards and from 'below' there are entextualized plans and reports that flow upwards.

Now of course, as I have noted, these discursive 'links' have material existence as text-artefacts that entextualize discourses. But that says nothing necessarily about how discourses operate in/as practices. Because it is in the context of practice (recontextualization) – and in the context

of power – that the text-artefacts become operational within discourse/practice genres: the difference being, for example, how I read the project framework document here in the university compared with how I read it in the past as a project manager and was positioned by it, where it embodied and mediated organizational authority (Althusser, 1971). What we can be sure of from the project documents is no more than that a project exists at the intertextual level (perhaps primarily or even solely at that level) and is self-referential in that texts refer to texts, comment on texts, validate or invalidate them, generate texts. This is a discursive idealism in action – a representation of the world that is divorced from and mediates at best an abstract reduction of the lifeworld (Kallinikos, 1995). That operations go on at a level of practice disassociated from the level of texts – that resistance, negotiation of agendas and so on go on at the level of practices – we might infer, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discover.

The Project Approach: Science, Planning, and War

In this section I want to look at how certain control systems and technologies that were developed in the military sphere migrated across space and time to civilian spheres of operation (management, business) and then to the management of international development projects. This process can be called 'technicization', what the Frankfurt School identified as a 'growing interdependence of research and technology … whereby questions of moral value and political controversy were converted into managerial, technical or planning processes' (Ray, 1993: 51). Planning and managerial control are, according to the project management literature, at the heart of projects, or the *project approach* (BBC, 1988: 4), which took form in the military/scientific/technological collaborations of World War Two (Thorpe, 2004).

The classical nexus of science, industry and the military in World War Two is the Manhattan Project, the project to develop the atomic bomb (Meredith and Mantel, 1995; Hales, 1997; Norris, 2002; Thorpe, 2004). The Manhattan Project involved the transfer of military organization to the management of scientific research and was managed by the Corps of Engineers under Major General Groves. Groves took overall control of the Manhattan Project from the scientists in 1942 and organized a 'clear chain of command' with an 'enforceable system of schedules and priorities' which made the development of the atomic bomb into 'a social

order independent of its original rationale or motivation' (Thorpe, 2004: 32).

The project approach thus constituted a methodology for organizing time, money, materials and people to produce a piece of military hardware. Its organization was large-scale, differentiated, structured and rigorously scheduled (Thorpe, 2004: 37). And it was strictly compartmentalized, so that only a few key managers at the top of the organization understood the project as a whole (Hales, 1997). Workers on the project at lower, 'subaltern' levels were given a minimum of information and were in some cases deliberately misled as to the real nature of their work. This enforced 'the hierarchically established mission of the Project' and prevented 'the scientists from diverging from the instrumental programme' (Thorpe, 2004: 35). Thus the strategic/ planning functions and operations were separated so that workers had to focus on 'the merely instrumental', on accomplishing 'the job at hand' (Thorpe, 2004: 35). As noted above, this *Zweckrationalität* involves the rationalization of means and ends through the functional differentiation of planning and operations and is typical of the instrumental discourse and practice of project management.

After World War Two this kind of scientific/military/technological project became known as 'Big Science', where 'formal hierarchies and organization charts' replaced what had been the norm of 'informal collaborations' between scientists (Thorpe, 2004). With the advent of Big Science, government, science, technology, industry and the military then fused into a system, with flows of innovation moving from civilian to military spheres and back again (Habermas, 1970: 230).

The period of the Cold War and the Arms Race then saw the emergence (and nomination) of project management. This occurred as a response to the requirement by the US military and its contractors for management systems in order to respond to the increasing complexity of military production and to the pressure exerted on production by the shorter lead times imposed by the arms race with the USSR (Engwall, 2000). The key example here is Polaris, characterized as 'the breakthrough of Project Management' (Engwall, 2000), for which new management tools were developed, including the network planning technique PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) – leading to the claim that 'PERT built Polaris'. But 'the Department of the Navy's Special Projects Office found that the Management Information Systems (MIS) they had introduced (such as PERT) came to

represent the success of the venture, regardless of the actual track record of Polaris developments' (Sapolsky, 1972; see also Yanow, 1996: 234). In this period (the late 1960s) project management was discussed as a formal methodology at NATO conferences (Thomsett, 2002: 15–17) – a formal methodology being a necessary prerequisite for the project's migration to other spheres of activity.

Thus the instrumental *project,* as terminology and practice originating in the military sphere, acquired more specialized and elaborated denotations as it migrated from the military/scientific/technological sphere into the field of civilian management. We can trace discursively how the *project* moves into this new context of management discourse by the way it acquires new collocations, for example: project manager, project management; project management cycle, project framework. Thus a project is no longer something *thrown into the future* (as its Latin derivation would indicate): it is removed or denaturalized from life-world contexts and comes to designate a generic and specialized regulatory technology (Bourdieu, 1991: 270). The project is also a typical modern concept (Habermas, 1987: 7), in that change and the old/new ideological schema (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000: 3) are central to its operations; indeed: '(a)ll projects are primarily concerned with change ... with knocking down the old and building up the new' (Baguley, 1995: 8).

So although, according to the Project Management Institute (PMI), in the 1950s the expression 'project management' was mostly limited to the engineering and construction industries, literature on the subject of 'management by projects' had already begun to emerge, and in 1969 the PMI was formed as part of the constitution of the emerging profession of project manager, with 'new actor roles and relationships … being created, such as project managers and team leaders' (Räisänen and Linde, 2004: 103). However, project management is sometimes represented not as a profession but as a science with universal applicability: '(i)t is only in the last 30 years that project management has become a recognised science … a refined and practised skill which can be applied to any project irrespective of size or budget' (Burke 1990: 3; see also Räisänen and Linde, 2004: 107). On this basis various standardized project management models have been created, 'tied to a variety of technocratic planning, execution and reporting tools to ensure that projects run rationally according to set budgets, goals and time schedules' (Räisänen and Linde, 2004: 103). In this way the universal project as discourse and

practice was prepared to spread and colonize further fields, including the field of international development.

This conception of the project as a universal methodology was particularly suited to management of *international* development in that the project could (in theory) extend managerial control over space and time. That is, a technology that had been designed for producing military weapons became a technology for producing human products. This began to happen in, for example, educational development, where the project was imported as a tool or series of tools for changing people and institutions, replacing what had been a professional, colonial officer approach, and promoting modernization (via technical assistance) to the Third World as a technocratically neutral process, a continuation of formal imperialism (Cooke, 2004). Then, in the post-Cold War period, the focus of UK-funded and -directed international development moved for political reasons away from Third World 'developing' countries (as Cold War proxies) to the so-called transition countries, the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and (in an economic sense) China, with the aim of incorporating them into the global capitalist economy.

This migration to the field of international development of the discourses and technologies that had been originally developed to control military and Big Science projects was further facilitated by a variety of factors. These included, in addition to an interest in management at a distance, neoliberal concerns with functional differentiation and a governmental focus on value for money, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability and audit (Power, 1997; Strathern, 2001). These became paramount in the UK during the period of the New Public Management reforms in the 1990s.

The New Public Management and the Governance of International Development

The term *New Public Management* (NPM) designates a series of neoliberal-inspired innovations or reforms in the governance of the public services in the UK and a number of other countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Hood, 1991; Minogue, 2000; for neoliberalism in the development field, see Jomo and Fine, 2006). The NPM reforms that are most relevant to this chapter are those that involve a separation of functions between *conception* (or *policy*) and *execution* (or *operations*), expressed in a separation

between *funding agencies* and *contracting agencies*. However, although accountability for operations (i.e. decisions about means) is devolved or contracted out, accountability for policy and strategy (decisions about ends) is centralized (I prefer 'accountability' to 'responsibility' here, in that one of the paradoxes of this accountability regime is that the attribution of responsibility becomes less and less possible). The question for government was then how to manage the accountability relationship between such functionally separated agencies.

In this NPM model, governance was to be conducted at a distance by means of mediating technologies, including the project, that would serve to organize and coordinate actions involving people, time, space and money in the interests of efficiency and accountability. And because of this supposed efficiency in organizing resources to meet specified ends over space and time, the project has (as noted above) come to play an important part in the field of international development, particularly in the post-Cold War period in Britain, where its administration and operations were conducted by two main agencies.

The two main British governmental or quasi-governmental agencies for promoting international development in the post-World War Two period have been the British Council (BC) and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). The ODA was, before the New Labour victory of 1997, a functional wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), funded and effectively controlled by the FCO, and headed by a Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Overseas Development. Before 1979 and again after 1997, the ODA had the status of a separate ministry, and as recognition of this in 1997 the ODA was renamed the Department for International Development (DfID).

The British Council is a quasi-independent organization, but one that relies on the FCO for its core funding. It therefore has to agree its strategic objectives with the FCO, which is also represented on the BC's governing board. The BC, before and during the period under consideration, administered various kinds of development aid on behalf of the ODA. Much of this aid, in the form of technical assistance, was designed to promote the use of English in developing countries, and later in transitional (post-communist) countries, and was targeted at raising the standard of English language teaching (ELT), a process sometimes designated *linguistic imperialism* (Phillipson, 1992).

In ELT and education in the mid- to late 1980s (Jacobs, 1996: 3), the administration or management of development (see Cooke, 2001 for a

discussion of these terms) involved a move away from the model of the *professional*, who embodied the values and the practices of the profession, to the NPM model of control and accountability, where the technology itself externalizes and mediates the will of the controlling centre. This change in governance meant that staff in international development agencies had to adopt new ways of working, epitomized by the project and, by extension, *projectization* (British Council, 1986: 127–8). This move to projectization involved importing the paraphernalia of project technologies into the field of international development, thus creating 'a common methodology which includes the logical framework, project cycle and standard appraisal techniques' (Jacobs, 1996: 3). ODA and BC representatives at this time represented such changes in their organizations as being forced on them by pressures from the government of the period (British Council, 1996). This was done by imposing conditionality (particularly relevant to international development, where the IMF, the World Bank et cetera have power and money) and by ideological legitimation (with efficiency, effectiveness and accountability as steering terms) in the spread of the discourse and practice.

In the next section I look in particular at the logical framework (one of the project technologies) and at how this technology of governance was imposed on the field of international development.

Instrumental Technologies in International Development: the Logical Framework

The logical framework is a management control system that has the material (or electronic) form of a matrix of boxes. In some cases the framework is based on a problem/solution approach to intervention in the social world and has an if/then model of progression, thus (at least in theory) taking the external (to the project) environment into account. In the project management literature and in the field of operations the logical framework often appears as the neologism (Matthews, 1991) or short form 'logframe'.

Like the project itself, the logical framework originates in 'work in engineering, military and private business contexts' (Gasper, 2000); by the 1990s, the project approach and the associated logframe had been increasingly and widely adopted by international development agencies (British Council, 1988: 131; Gasper, 1999; 2000). There have, however, been three 'generations' of logframe (Gasper, 2000). The first generation,

in the 1970s and 1980s, was based on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 4x4 matrix (this model was adopted by the ODA in 1986). The second generation of logframe was the new wave of brand-name models in the 1990s, drawing on the ZOPP (*Ziel Orienterte Projekt Planung* or Objectives-oriented Project Planning) model developed by the German aid agency GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit). The third generation (in the early and mid-1990s) extended the technology to include computer packages, training and links to other planning methods.

As noted above, the ODA was one of the agencies that adopted the project approach in the mid-1980s. The ODA then imposed the project approach on its partner agency the British Council as a condition when funding projects (British Council, 1987). This was despite the fact that using project frameworks had not always been the ODA's preferred way of working. Indeed, there is evidence that the logframe approach was contested by the ODA as being an attack on the autonomy and professionalism of the locally based manager. So in 1984, an ODA spokesperson justified this resistance to the full rigour of the logical framework approach because '(o)ur experience has been that a good project manager is someone who is all the time reviewing his objectives and if necessary making adjustments to the project if circumstances call for it' (British Council, 1984: 25).

However, this kind of resistance to the framework approach disappeared as accountability became an increasingly dominant steering concept for governments (Neave, 1988; Power, 1997). In 1986 (two years later) another senior BC manager employed a discourse of compulsion ('a grid which obliges') to recommend the adoption of the project framework to the BC:

> The project framework is a grid which obliges the originator of a project to look at all the various interlocking parts of a project and state precisely what it should achieve, how that is to be brought about, what measures for monitoring are to be taken, and how 'success' is to be evaluated. The Framework measures not only the inputs, or in other words the various items that are contributed by the donor and the effectiveness and efficiency by which they are put in, but also the outputs … It is a valuable intellectual discipline. (British Council, 1986: 127)

There is in this extract a concern with instrumental measurement and an attribution of devolved agency to the Framework (capitalized in the original text), as in the clause '(t)he Framework measures'. The

framework is now part of the ODA's management and accountability system, and 'measures' the managerialist concepts of 'effectiveness and efficiency'. It is not clear in this text who the 'originator' of the framework is or where the originator is – in London or elsewhere – but that person's professional judgement is considerably constrained compared with the 1984 account quoted above.

Then in the 1990s, the ODA adopted the new generation 'TeamUP' model and in particular its 16-box matrix (framework) for projects. According to the TeamUP handbook (dated 1991–1994), 'TeamUP PMC' (project management cycle) is produced by 'international consultancy firm and software development house Team Technologies, Inc., a company based in Middleburg, Virginia'. TeamUP is based on the logical framework method, proposed as universal standard. According to the TeamUP manual, 'Teamware PC/TeamUP 2.0™' is a 'set of integrated tools to implement and operationalize your designed projects using your people, time and money', designed by Team Technologies Inc. in collaboration with the World Bank, a major lending agency in the development field, and therefore in a position to impose its required practices (projects, logframes) on executive agencies by means of conditionality.

In TeamUP (one of the commodified 'brand name' models: Gasper, 2000), 'good projects' (according to the TeamUP handbook) have a 'clearly defined project objective, necessarily and sufficiently linked to an achievable solution to a problem which obstructs progress'. This problem-based approach is criticized by Gasper (2000) on the grounds that 'problem' may not be a universally culturally acceptable way of analysing social life, where 'progress' is an unquestioned good in itself. There is also the question of who gets to define the problem for which the project is designed to provide a technically efficient solution. The TeamUP model presupposes a world of predictability and controllability. It is a *problem* → *solution* system and follows an *if* → *then path*. That is, it deals with diverse situations in a variety of very different local contexts as problems that can be solved by applying technical solutions. Thus the project designer starts with a problem, to which the answer is a technical/instrumental solution. It does not start with ontology or with ethics (although an ontology is presupposed).

As already noted, in some examples of ODA discourse the framework has certain quasi-agentive powers. This can be seen in the clausal processes that are associated with the logframe. In my data (discussed in

the following section), these are verbs of compulsion, wordings of *to force*. This class of clausal Process (Halliday, 1994) represents the logframe as an entity with quasi-agentive powers to enforce practices. Gasper (1999: 76) notes that frameworks are often associated with external compulsion, in that '(l)ogframes are often used only when demanded by an external authority', and these examples of the language associated with the logframe would seem to bear this out. I now turn to a further discussion of the framework as a technology of governance, drawing on data that I collected while working for the BC in China in 1996. The data and its analysis come from a case study of the discourse/power vertical (Kerr, 2003).[1]

The Logical Framework: Accountability Across Time and Space

Between 1988 and 1998, the British Council, the UK government's Overseas Development Administration and the State Education Commission (SEdC) of the People's Republic of China organized on a biennial basis a series of conferences for workers on a programme of jointly sponsored educational development projects in China. It was at one of these conferences (Wuhan, 1996) that I collected the data on which the following sections of this chapter are based. This event occurs at a discursive conjuncture of the NPM and international development.

From the event I draw in particular on a policy speech given by an ODA Educational Adviser (hereafter 'the Adviser') to an audience of 23 UK education specialists (of whom I was one) and 45 Chinese academics who were working on the (at that time) 22 educational development projects in China. ODA Educational Advisers are policy specialists (civil servants) with high status within the organizational hierarchy. I take this to be the key text of the event, the keynote speech, in which the Adviser describes the context of the conference and explains how the NPM-type changes in governance will affect policy in the field of development.

In my field notes, I describe how, while delivering his speech, the Adviser is positioned in space in a lecture theatre, standing on the podium at a lectern, speaking through a microphone, wearing a suit and tie. This self-presentation is important semiotically: Bourdieu (1979: 552) draws attention to *hexis*, as a kind of *physionomie social*, and its link to *valeur social;* and Rosen (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000: 142) also notes the significance of the suit in certain contexts: '(f)or those in higher positions, the norm system dictates very narrowly what is desirable …

strict, formal, rather expensive suits'. In this forum, the Adviser's physical appearance and position serve to distinguish him from the (casually dressed) audience.

The speech itself includes representations of temporality, locating the present in relation to the past, and of locality of physical space, indexed by this position in a university lecture hall. According to Bourdieu et al. (1994: 10–11):

> Space is a source of pedagogical distance … It is in all the particularities in which the academic institution locates the teacher – the rostrum, the chair from which a French professor holds forth, his position at the point where all attention converges – that he finds the material conditions to keep his students at a distance, to require and enforce respect.

So while making the speech, the Adviser is distanced in space from the seated audience in the auditorium, making use of the lecturer's pedagogical distance, which requires and enforces respect. The Adviser's speech includes representations from which we can reconstruct the systems of governance within and external to the ODA at that time, with a focus on accountability, a concept central to the NPM (Kerr, 2003).

Accountability in the ODA at the time of the NPM is articulated in, and performed by, the technologies of the project as a system of monitoring and evaluation. Projects are seen in ODA discourse as managerial (or as administrative) tasks: matters of technical control and surveillance with no space for lived experience. This is what I take from the following representations of the project by the Adviser:

- *there is a long sequence you identify . what . you want to do . you appraise . to see if it is . worth doing . to see if you can do it . in a cost effective . way . you design the project er . to do that . you monitor it . you evaluate it . you measure . the impact . of it … a much tighter . process . of project . design* (Kerr, 2003: 119–22)
- *there's going to be much more . ODA involvement . at every step . of the . project .. we need very careful design . thorough appraisal . implementation under . close . scrutiny .. objective evaluation .. and we shall participate . ourselves .. .. in this ..* (Kerr, 2003: 155–7)

In these representations, there is a preoccupation with project management as instrumental technology and an absence of the educational – or affective – dimension of the work or of the lifeworld of the project. I

know from my own experience that during this period, the ODA insisted on objective evaluation and defined the kind of data that were acceptable for evaluation. This approach translates into practice as the 'box-checking approach', where the boxes of the logframe can be ticked as achieved and reporting is by exception (ODA's preferred method in the mid-1990s). That is, only failure to achieve objectives need be explained in accounting to the hierarchy and therefore no local voices need be heard, unless in justifying failure to achieve.

Another part of the Adviser's purpose in his speech is to impose the new generation TeamUp logframe – although TeamUp could not be mentioned by name as the ODA did not at that time possess a software licence. The framework (as noted above) is a piece of project technology that allows (in theory) the administrators in London to manage operations at a distance. This process is represented by the following extract from my data where an ODA officer explains that the logframe is:

- *a sixteen box matrix … the completed form . you will see that it has . goals . purposes . inputs . outputs . activities .. assumptions … it all sounds quite easy*

This new framework replaces the old framework and involves a change in the categories that constitute the project matrix, that is, in the titles of the boxes that construct the project as a representation of social processes. It is imposed as a technology of governance by means of which the bureaucracy can manage, monitor and account for operations that are geographically dispersed. The project can now be represented by the ODA Adviser as a simple linear progression:

- *we shall . go through . a much . tighter . process . of . project identification and design .. there is a long sequence . you identify . what . you want to do . you appraise . to see if it is . worth doing . to see if you can do it . in a cost effective . way . you design the project er . to do that . you monitor it . you evaluate it . you measure . the impact . of it … a much tighter . process . of project . design ..* (Kerr, 2003: 117–22)

In this representation, the project appears as a series of bureaucratic tasks, in which 'project implementation becomes an object in its own right' (Hauge and Gariba, 2001). This is also the *Zweckrational* model of projects in which policy generation is separated from implementation and

the two are connected by technologies of governance that perform monitoring and accountability. These technologies are represented as having universal applicability (through the use of generic *you* and the use of the present tense with universal force):

- *and I do commend . our present . log frame . to you . precisely because . it forces you . to be specific . about what you are going to achieve . it forces you to work out . how you are going to . know . if you've achieved it .. and then . from there . you work out . how .. you're going to do it ..* (Kerr, 2003: 133–5)

The new logical framework is represented by the Adviser as an entity with certain quasi-agentive powers, predicated with verbs of compulsion, expressed as Material processes (as defined by Halliday, 1994). These include: *requires*, *forces*, *by forcing*, *obliges*, *compels*. The project framework (and other project documentation, including financial spreadsheets) as governance technologies can then be seen to take the place of the manager in the hierarchy (Kerr, 2003):

- *the new log frame . requires you to think . much more carefully . much more systematically . about what you . can do .* (pp. 124–5)
- *it forces you to be realistic .* (p. 125)
- *and it does all this .I think . by forcing you to start . not with inputs . but with outputs* (pp. 125–6)
- *I do commend . our present . log frame . to you . precisely because . it forces you . to be specific . about what you are going to achieve .* (pp. 133–4)
- *it forces you to work out . how you are going to . know . if you've achieved it ..* (p. 136)

So in the Adviser's speech, which represents the Adviser's view of the ODA in the context of NPM reforms, the role of manager is delegated to the logframe, which then becomes the organizer and monitor of the work. So in this model the project disappears leaving the local manager, who is replaced by regulation and accountability systems, operating to concentrate power in the hands of the bureaucratic policy makers and performing the division of labour between the thinkers and the doers. We can see how this is represented by the Adviser by further analysing his speech using Halliday's (1994) types of clausal process.

There are a number of clauses with *I* (there are 36) or *we* (there are

85) in theme position, and of these, 30 of the first-person singulars and 27 of the first-person plurals are followed by Mental or Verbal processes. There are 61 Verbal and 55 Mental processes in the Adviser's speech. The first-person singular is followed by verbs such as *want*, *think*, *hope*, *was very pleased*, *disagree*, *am aware*, *say*, *commend*. Halliday (1994: 129–30) characterizes Verbal processes as external-processing (exocentric) and Mental processes as internal-processing (endocentric). He also states that Verbal processes 'might more appropriately be called "symbolic processes"'. But the Adviser's use of Mental processes is not internal to himself, what he thinks and wants; rather, it representS the thought and volition of the ODA's corporate agents. The Adviser as a bureaucrat thinks the thoughts of others. These Mental/Verbal processes however represent grammatically the thinking and speaking part of the organization. Thus, there is a thinking organ that makes policy (and is responsible for ends), that speaks about and reifies policy and strategy, and there are executive limbs that perform the operations (and are responsible for means), on the model 'I think therefore you act'. There is, therefore, in the text, a representation of social hierarchy. High in the social hierarchy there is the grammatical agent as Senser and Speaker, who performs mental and verbal bureaucratic labour (the construction of policy, accountability, et cetera). I would have expected the 'lower', subaltern functions to be represented in the text by Material processes, but in fact Material processes are more often associated with systems of accountability and measurement. Material process is sometimes represented as mediated through Mental process, for example *we think things should be done,* where Material process is an obligation (*should*), that emerges from the thinking of the organization (*we* as corporate agency). Note, however, that the (subaltern) agent of *should be done* is elided (done by whom?). But there are very few examples of Material processes that represent operations performed by people. The subaltern operational functions are present in the text as Material process only in the following, *to work*, *sharing* and *establish* (Kerr, 2003):

- *how . valuable it is . for you at universities . to work together ..* (p. 190)
- *the number of times you referred to . replicability . you were . er . sharing materials* (p. 191)
- *I think over the past fifteen years . the co-operation has helped to establish a lot of models . a lot of materials . a lot of systems . that you can now share with each other* (pp. 193–4)

Subaltern Material processes are more often nominalized or subsumed in abstractions and institutions, as in the wording or 'texturing' (Fairclough, 2003) of education by the Adviser (remember that the Adviser is Principal Education Adviser). The wordings that texture education in the Adviser's speech include: *universities*, *nursery schools*, *postgraduate study*, *literacy*, *doctoral theses*, *curriculum development*, *education management* [i.e. managerialism], *teacher appraisal* [i.e. accountability], *your university departments*, *your schools*, *your expertise*. There is very little sense in this reified worldview of active human beings as agents, pursuing their interests and agendas. This is what Halliday (1993) calls a world of abstract entities and reifications, a bureaucratic world that can be measured and manipulated by the policy maker and the strategist. Bourdieu (1998: 38) calls this sort of person *le penseur fonctionnaire*, whose thought 'is pervaded by the official representation of the official'.

Jessop (2002: 23) describes three modalities of governance: exchange, command and dialogue. Applying these modalities to the Adviser's representation of the ODA in my data brings out the command nature of governance in the ODA in 1996. The possibilities of proposing local initiatives and of negotiating agendas locally are removed from the operational level. The local voice is silenced. Dialogue and negotiated consent are restricted to the intergovernmental and policy levels and to the strategic level of the ODA hierarchy: 'the organization shifts the "policing" power of project managers and local line managers to a higher level of the organizational hierarchy' (Räisänen and Linde, 2004: 102).

I am not claiming that projects and frameworks as represented in this text are typical of all uses of projects and frameworks. However, I do think that this representation of the project can be taken as a kind of ideal type of the instrumental project, the most abstract and distant from the processes and chaos of the lifeworld. But whatever the abstraction and reductiveness of the representation, the discursively excluded are still able to reassert themselves through the subversion and humour of the carnivalesque.

Conclusion: the Carnivalesque and What Escapes the Instrumental?

What escapes the instrumental? On this occasion (in Wuhan in 1996), the excluded of the event re-enters and is expressed in the carnivalesque happenings outside the formal conference agenda. Bakhtin (1984: 4–5)

defines *carnivalesque* as: 'folk festivities of the carnival type, the comic rites and cults, the clowns and fools, giants, dwarfs, and jugglers, the vast and manifold literature of parody – all these forms have one style in common: they belong to one culture of folk carnival humour'. He identifies the importance in the carnivalesque of 'comic verbal compositions, parodies both written and verbal'. And in fact outside the formal conference events, there were carnivalesque parodies of managerial discourse, performed at the conference dinner and in the bar.

These included a parodic song (written by one or more of the Specialists), based on 'Little Boxes' (written by Malvina Reynolds; the best-known version is by Pete Seeger) and mocking the sixteen-box logframe. The carnivalesque is evoked by the following excerpt: *All the goals have got a purpose/ And what was yours for coming here?/ Mine was drinking, his was thinking/ After drinking they're all the same*. The song also refers to the learning experience of the TeamUP workshops during the course of the conference, where ODA and BC officers tried to explain the operation of the new logframe: *So form your groups up/ Have a team up/ Trying to fill up little boxes is enough to drain the brain*.

The parodic words of the song intertextually rearticulate the Reynolds song, evoking its critique of 1950s America, with its conformist thinking and behaviour, but like most carnivalesque events this song as performed (it was performed twice) is anti- not counter-hegemonic. Included in the performances at the official banquet, it performs the role of 'licensed' jester – celebrating

> temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions. Carnival was the true feast of time, the feast of becoming, change, and renewal. It was hostile to all that was immortalised and completed. (Bakhtin, 1984: 8–11)

'Becoming, change, and renewal' are what projects are supposed to be about, but they have been devised as technologies, as articulations of instrumental reason – devised by the Centre, the policy makers and strategists, the established order, those with hierarchical rank, privileges – projects are thus constructed as systems of constraint on agency (norms, prohibitions), not as what they might be, celebrations or adventures.

The discourse of the logframe at the end of its long journey to China speaks, but in this carnivalesque time and space it is turned around, subverted – parodied – sent back to the masters of discourse to remind

them that we are not mere instruments, that what is represented by the powerful is not the final word on representation.

NOTE

1. I am grateful to the ODA's successor, the UK Department for International Development (DfID), for permitting me to use material produced before, during the course of, and after this 1996 conference (communication to me from DfID, 1 September 2002).

7

Participatory Management as Colonial Administration

Bill Cooke

This chapter[1] is about continuity and change in what is now called development management. The change it identifies is its adoption of a particular, managerialist, version of participation as a distinguishing feature. The continuity is of this version of participation with colonial administration strategies of 80–90 years ago.

Claiming a link between colonialism and development (e.g. Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Crush, 1995a,b, 1995b; Escobar, 1989; 1995a,b), and colonial administration and development administration (Dwivedi and Nef, 1982; Hailey, 1999) is not, of course, in itself particularly original. What distinguishes this chapter, first, is that the continuity is seen in a particular idea associated with development management: managerialist participation, which its proponents claim reconfigures First World/Third World power relationships. Second, that idea is claimed to be both a novel and a defining feature of development management compared to its adminitrative predecessors. Third, this chapter argues that the continuity is evident in more than a replication of colonialist power relationships, although this replication is worth revealing in its own right. There is a direct genealogical link with the mode of colonial administration called indirect rule. In making this link I synthesize two previous pieces of work: a postcolonialist reading of the history of managerialist ideas about culture change (Cooke, 2003b); and an exploration of the application of these ideas at the level of the nation-state by the World Bank (Cooke, 2004).

This chapter is also different in that, in the spirit of the collection in which it appears, its position largely concurs not only with that of critiques of development, but also with that of critiques of management. As the introduction to the collection notes, development's heterogeneous critics challenge its orthodoxy to locate it within a range of

critical sociological, political and/or historical analyses (for example, those who see the link with colonialism listed above). Management's critics do the same with management (see, for example, Alvesson and Willmott, 1996), and have collectively come to be collectivized as having a commitment to critical management studies (CMS) (see Fournier and Grey, 2000). CMS literature is heterogenous too. If it has anything in common, though, it is a recognition that managerialist representations of management as a neutral, technical means-to-an-end set of activities and knowledge conceal its status as a product of broader social (global-to-personal) power relations and inequalities, and in particular, its role in sustaining these.

Logic and Structure of the Chapter

This chapter reinstates part of the social and historical context of development management, then, by demonstrating its link to colonial administration. This link is personalized in John Collier who was Commissioner of the US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) during the New Deal under Roosevelt, from 1933 to 1945. Collier subsequently set up the Institute for Ethnic Affairs (IEA) (see Cooke, 2006 for a fuller account).

The chapter's sequence of argument and components is as follows. First, it briefly presents a short assessment of indirect rule, the particular form of colonial administration with which contemporary continuity is seen. Second, it shows that the version of participation that development management has adopted is specifically managerialist. This is done by exploring conceptual accounts of development management (from Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999 and Thomas, 1996; 2000), and then examples of contemporary development management practice on the part of international agencies, particularly the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Third, the chapter goes on to explain managerialist participation's debt to indirect rule.

Colonial Administration and Indirect Rule

As with imperialism and colonialism more generally, there are dangers in seeing colonial administration as a homogeneous set of ideas and practices. Indirect rule did, however, dominate large parts of Africa, Asia, and beyond in the late colonial era; indeed it was practised, it is shown

below, on the US mainland itself. The principles of indirect rule were most famously set out in the British colonial administrator Lord Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922). According to Perham (1965: xlii) this was a 'canonical book' for British colonial administrators in the 1930s.

In *The Dual Mandate*, Lugard argued that British colonial rule could only be sustained 'indirectly' by co-opting (or often, in reality, creating) 'native' institutions. Hence the preferred mode of colonial administration was indirect rule, the essential feature of which was that 'native chiefs are constituted as an integral part of the machinery of the administration'; however, the 'chief himself must understand that he has no right to place and power unless he renders his proper services to the state'. More, there were limitations on the 'chief's' powers – chiefs could not raise or control armed forces, raise taxes, appropriate or redistribute land, and 'in the interests of good government the right of confirming or otherwise the choice of the people of the successor to a chiefship and deposing any ruler for misrule is reserved to the Governor' (Lugard, 1965: 207). Hence Mamdani's description of a 'separate but subordinate state structure for natives' (1996: 62).

As Mamdani points out, the idea of indirect rule did not 'spring full blown from the mind of a colonial architect, for although Lugard theorized it as the British colonial system, its origins predated Lugard's reflection on it; also the practice it summed up was not confined to British colonies' (1996: 62), in Africa or elsewhere. Mamdani also noted the pejorative and offensive nature of the terms 'native' and 'tribes', and argued that the investing and, often, the invention of 'chiefs' with administrative power led to forms of decentralized despotism.

The need for imperial rule to be sustained in this way was described by Lugard in terms of obligation first, exploitation second. Thus the first part of the dual mandate typifies what Said (1994: 10) identified as an 'almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior or less advanced peoples', and consists of:

> … moral obligations to the subject races … such matters as the training of native rulers; the delegation to them of responsibility as they are fit to exercise; the constitution of Courts of Justice free from corruption and accessible to all; the adoption of a system of education which will assist progress without the creation of false ideals; the institution of free labour and a just system of taxation; the protection of the peasantry from oppression and the preservation of their rights, etc. (Lugard, 1965: 58)

Here we see themes that have current development/development management parallels – the need to train to build capacity, the importance of the rule of law and the absence of corruption, the role of education in progress, flexible labour markets, fair revenue collection, and espoused support for the rural poor. Having apparently given moral and ethical issues primacy, the second part of the mandate went on to address economics, concerning 'material obligations … [the] development of natural resources for the mutual benefit of the people and mankind in general' (1965: 58). Lugard was clear that there was self-interest involved here; but he argued that both the colonizers and the colonized would benefit. Racism underpinned indirect rule. Lugard asserts '[w]e hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonize, to trade, and to govern' (1965: 618–19).

Indirect rule was subsequently endorsed by, among others, the British liberal imperialist Julian Huxley (who was to become the first Director-General of UNESCO in 1946). In *Africa View* he states:

> Indirect rule, in fact, means the employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate, their gradual moulding by means of the laws made and taxes imposed by the Central [i.e. colonial] Government and of the guidance given by administrative officers, into channels of progressive change, and the encouragement within the widest limits of local traditions, local pride and local initiative, and so of the greatest possible freedom and variety of local development within the territory. (1931: 103)

Among the several things of note in this paragraph is Huxley's vision of colonial officers as mere technocrats and as agents of 'progressive change', and his identification of 'development' as a concern of colonial administration.

Here the consideration of colonial administration comes to a temporary halt. It is important to recollect, though, that colonial administration, or the administration of imperialism, in practice did not of course end with indirect rule. Particularly important to historical understandings of the more generic uses of participation in development is the point noted by Hailey (2001) regarding participation's possible debt to participatory methods developed in imperialist wars in South East Asia in the latter half of the twentieth century (namely, Vietnam). For the case being made in this chapter, though, the preceding consideration of indirect rule is sufficient.

Development Management and Participation

In this section I address the novelty and significance of participation in development administration/management (DAM); the particular managerialist forms that participation takes in DAM; and, from a CMS perspective, the purposes of managerialist participation. That there is generically continuity between development administration and development management is not disputed, and this is set out in the introduction to this book. Nonetheless, the emergence of development management was accompanied by differentiation from development administration.

From development administration to development management

In an important article, Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999) identify changes in focus – away from the state as the sole vehicle of development – and in processes used, which is the main concern of this chapter. They also identify four facets of development management, of which two relate to these processes:

> *Development management as toolkit* [their italics]… promotes the application of a range of management and analytical tools adapted from a variety of disciplines, including strategic management, public policy, public administration, psychology, anthropology and political science …' (1999: 350).

Whereas:

> *Development management as process* operates at three levels – [first] in terms of the individual actors involved it builds on process consultation and organization development … starting with the client's priorities needs and values … [second] at the organizational level, whether … individual agency or multiple organizations … [and is] concerned with the organizational structures and processes through which plans are implemented … [third] at the sector level – public, civil society, and private … [it] addresses broader governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and the role of the state ... this brings in empowerment in its societal and political dimensions. (1999: 350)

Here the strong presence of managerialist participatory approaches in development management is evident. This is not just in the overt references to 'management and analytical tools' *per se*. 'Organization development' and 'process consultation' are specific participatory management approaches, which make a point of 'drawing from a range of disciplines' (see French and Bell, 1999 and Cooke, 1999 respectively).

At the same time, Brinkerhoff and Coston establish that these managerialist approaches are to be applied beyond the micro-, organizational-level context and stretched to civil society, government, and society more generally.

A similar incorporation of managerialist participation is identified by Thomas (1996; see also the introduction to this volume). His setting out of the field of development management specifies that it should include 'conventional management theory in a development context' (1996: 108); and, consequently, that it should draw heavily on 'empowering' managerialist approaches. In fairness to Thomas, he also argues that participation in development management should go beyond that offered by managerialism, and include the radical approaches of, for example, Friere, Chambers's participatory rural appraisal, and Fals-Borda and Rahman's participatory action research. Thus, to repeat a quotation also made in the introduction, it should include (1996: 108) '[r]adical participative methods aimed at enabling and empowering, arising from cases where development management may be viewed as the management of interventions on behalf of the relatively powerless'.

While Thomas is clear that this pro-powerless intervention is what should happen in development management, he is cautious about whether it actually does. Brinkerhoff and Coston do not, implicitly, share this caution. One of their two remaining facets of development management is *'development management as values'*. Here they recognize explicitly that development management requires political interventions in the status quo, but for the best of reasons, because it 'takes a normative stance on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and the marginalized, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs' (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 349). Their analysis does have some nuance in its understanding of First World/Third World power relationships within these processes. The remaining facet recognizes development management is about First World interventions in the Third World, identifying: *'Development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas* … most often sponsored by international aid agencies, all of which have their own … agendas; [t]ypically development management professionals enter the scene upon the request from a donor agency for a predetermined task …' (1999: 349).

The preceding two paragraphs have moved this chapter on from establishing that managerialist participation is one of the features which, it is claimed, define development management as new, to a consideration

of the purposes for which it is used. Practice examples follow; but first the nature and purposes of managerialist participation generically must be explained.

Purposes and practices of managerialist participation

The overt purpose of participatory management is to improve organizational effectiveness, on management terms. Its variety of approaches to participation are most coherently brought together and codified in the field of organization development (OD), within which the idea of process consultation, developed by Edgar Schein (see, for example, Schein, 1987), is an influential strand. Identified specifically with development management by Brinkerhoff and Coston, OD and process consultation have presences in management in their own right. They also feed ideas into texts and practices associated with the terms *planned change*, *change management*, *organizational learning*, *action learning*, *total quality management*, and so on, which Kunda has categorized as 'culturalist' forms of management (Cooke, 1992; Hanson and Lubin, 1995; Kunda, 1992).

As I have argued elsewhere (Cooke, 2003b, 2004), what can be seen as the *raison d'être* of all these is the manipulation of employees' values and beliefs (the culturalist obsession) to engender 'psychological ownership', often shortened to just 'ownership'. The intention is that employees have a high level of belief in and commitment to what their work organization is doing, and take responsibility for ensuring that it operates effectively (that is, they are 'empowered' to do so). An alignment between personal or group aspirations and (apparently reified) organizational aims is sought. Opportunities for resistance to management control are diminished, because 'empowerment' apparently removes that control. 'Ownership' is never literal, however, and empowerment is permitted only in relation to micro levels of organizational processes. Broader managerial goals remain given and immutable; moreover, the desire and strategies for 'ownership' are managerially impelled. Critical understandings of management therefore see its purpose as co-optation and control, and not genuine empowerment. Alvesson and Willmott argue that together these approaches 'portend a more totalizing means of management control that aims to produce an internalization of the means and norms selected by senior managers' (1996: 32), although, unlike some others CM theorists (see Fournier and Grey, 2000), they see managerialist participation providing (highly constrained) opportunities for genuine empowerment.

This managerialist requirement of 'ownership' is now a familiar part of development management rhetoric – although in an interesting, obvious, but as yet unremarked-within-CM shift, development management makes ownership a prerequisite of (apparently) nation-states rather than individuals or workforces. An example within the past ten years but undated is a UNDP Management Development Programme manual. Entitled 'Systemic Change in the Public Sector: Process Consultation', it takes for granted requirement for a particular form of public sector restructuring. (Hence, 'as the pace of change accelerates, governments with administrative processes designed for routine operations and agencies geared to the performance of distinct and separate functions will have difficulties. Bureaucratic organizations are not designed to cope … administrations need to develop flexibility, creativity …' [Joy and Bennett, n.d.: 9] But while it adopts managerial process consultation, hitherto only applied at the organizational level, 'ownership' has to be achieved by national governments. Hence 'systemic improvements must be internalized … fully assimilated and owned by the system ...' (n.d.: 5), the requirement is for a 'national programme for action' which 'has to be owned by those who implement it' (n.d.: 21).

More recent still, and more significant in terms of its ongoing impact and its relevance to Thomas's aspirations (and Brinkerhoff and Coston's claims), for a pro-poor development management, was the initiation of Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by the IMF and the World Bank towards the end of the twentieth century. The Bank stressed that there was a strong link between the two, although what that meant in practice was not clear. However, generically they have mutated into what now are known as Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs – see Hickey and Mohan, 2007). The problems with Washington Consensus ultra-neoliberal structural adjustment programmes were attributed to their unwanted imposition on governments by external agencies, rather than their intrinsically flawed market inhumanity – that is, to a lack of ownership. So, it became the case that:

> [c]ountry-ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount. Broad based participation of civil society in the adoption and monitoring of a poverty reduction strategy tailored to country circumstances will enhance its sustained implementation. (IMF/IDA, 1999: 6)

The World Bank also used managerialist participatory processes in CDFs.

Thus claims were made for action learning, a process that attempts to reconfigure 'learning set' members' cognitive frameworks by setting up problem-solving teams with different professional and organizational backgrounds (for example, in this case getting ministry of finance and World Bank teams to work together). The claim was made that 'people learn better by using a "hands-on" approach than [in] the traditional classroom setting', which for the Bank helps focus on the 'need to deliver real country products in real time'. According to the World Bank Country Director for Bolivia, action learning

> … was essential in producing effective stakeholders' discussions. I have never seen this in the Bank before – where you go through the process of discussion, have so many perspectives at once, but you have action, but you have action at the end. And there was not just a unilateral decision, but everyone was involved …

A managerialist NGO, the Society for Organizational Learning (SOL), was commissioned by the Bank to evaluate the Bank's action-learning programme in the CDF pilot phase, and concluded that 'the approach catalyzed innovative institutional change, enhanced leadership competencies consistent with the CDF requirements, and led to enthusiastic support for the new way of doing business'. Following a point made in one of the three case cameos in Chapter 1 of this book, note that in making this comment the Society for Organizational Learning extends its mandate to *institutions*. (All quotations from World Bank, 2001, unpaginated.)

Elsewhere the World Bank reviews its CDF work with five countries (Bolivia, Ghana, Morocco, Romania, and Vietnam) using managerialist language hitherto used only in the context of work organizations. This work is categorized as to whether it is about 'leadership behavior (roles, skills, attitudes)', 'organizational environment (structure, processes, culture)', 'learning approach (learning, context, content, process)'. Again this is culturalist language which is easily found in standard texts on OD, leadership and culture change (see for example Cummings and Worley, 2000; Schein, 1990). The same is true of the terminology used to describe country-specific activities. In Bolivia this included 'empowering teams … and infusing passion' … and 'using a results- and decision-oriented learning approach which promoted a results- and decision-oriented work culture'. In Ghana it was 'building a culture of mutual respect and trust ...' and 'applying an action-learning approach sped the

process of joint learning'. For Morocco 'facilitation of country team retreat by process expert enhanced team process skills and effectiveness'; and so on.

The implication of the standard CMS critique of these approaches is that insofar as they work on their own terms, they engineer the co-optation and ideological conversion of technocratic/political elites (Cooke, 1999; 2004) or even where they don't, they bring about a knowing if unwilling capitulation to the realities of the World Bank/IMF. Hickey and Mohan (2007) from a political economy perspective, tracking the most recent, second-generation PRSs, but again with a particular focus on participation, identify separate concerns. These nonetheless also resonate with the general CMS problematization. For them, PRS uses of participation (at the risk of oversimplifying, and caricaturing their measured tone) appear to undermine the democratization of societies, enabling a privileged bypassing of mechanisms of institutional accountability consistent with democracy and/or democratization. The holders of that privilege are IFIs, that is, the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

Thus this bypassing and this co-optation are ways in which the uses of managerial participation might be represented as colonialist, or at least as a neocolonialist replication of power relations in practice. This claim is all the more substantiated however through the revelation of a direct line of continuity with colonialism in managerial participation itself. This is addressed in the next section.

Managerialist Participation's Debt to Indirect Rule

This section explores the intellectual foundations of managerialist participatory change, including that associated with development management. It begins by noting the prominence attributed to Kurt Lewin and the reason for this prominence, notably his invention of action research. Action research's foundational status in relation to managerialist participation is explained, and then the case for considering John Collier as its co-inventor is set out. Following this, Collier's status as a colonial administrator, his advocacy of indirect rule, and of action research as a tool of indirect rule are analysed.

Action research: the foundation of managerialist participation

In the management orthodoxy, little attention is paid to John Collier.

Instead, the psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) is identified as the most important individual in the history of participatory management. For Schein, of 'process consultation' fame, 'there is little question that the intellectual father of contemporary theories of applied behavioral science, action research and planned change is Kurt Lewin' (1980: 238; see also Kleiner, 1996). Most important among the ideas with which he is credited are those of group dynamics, from which team building sprang, and co-terminously, and particularly here, action research.

Action research has an extensive currency outside managerialism. Not least it is applied in participatory development interventions. This is most evident in Fals-Borda and Rahman's PAR (and they too pay homage to Lewin), but Reason and Bradbury (2001) also identify action research with the work of Chambers. The history that follows is that of these broader generic uses of action research in development as it is of its uses in development management. However, it is in development management that the genealogical link is most prominent, and most telling, not least as it is with colonial administration.

Action research is at the core of managerialist workplace participatory approaches such as OD, process consultation, action learning and total quality management (TQM), which are now finding their way into development management (French and Bell, 1999; Reason and Bradbury, 2001). French and Bell identify action research as offering both a process and a philosophy of organizational change. As a process it proposes a sequence of steps in which standard elements of a research process are followed by action components round an iterative loop. As a philosophy, action research centres on collaboration between researchers and the researched. This collaboration brings better results instrumentally. Participants know more than external researchers about organizational practicalities and modalities, and about the broader organizational culture. Furthermore, the very act of participation, and engaging participants in data gathering, analyses and problem solving, is intended to engender their commitment to the process, and to implementing, archetypally, the action plan which would not be achieved by the imposition of external expertise. In short, action research brings about 'ownership'. Finally, action research is prescribed as a means of changing workplace culture *per se*, by incorporating values or attitudes, and critical reflection thereon, in the research process.

The case for Collier as inventor of action research

Lewin's status as inventor of this foundational process rests on limited published evidence. Lewin only ever published three articles on action research *per se*. One discussed the action research work of others (Lewin 1946a); another (1947) was published after his death, with post-mortem editorial improvement. In the other, 'Action Research and Minority Problems' (1946b) Lewin does make mention of colonialism and of John Collier. The article refers to an early action research workshop, the so-called New Britain Workshop in Connecticut in 1946. In managerialist origin stories, this workshop is famous not only as a foundational action research project, but also as the site of the invention of group dynamics, which too was an important component of participatory management. That workshop's own status *vis-à-vis* imperialism is ambivalent; and I have represented it elsewhere as keeping the lid on African-American resistance to racism in the 1940s (Cooke, 2003b). It was, however, also a well-intentioned intervention aligned with the politics of the New Deal, designed to address inter-ethnic group relations. More, Lewin himself aligned it with a global struggle against imperialism (1946b: 45–6):

> Inter-group relations in this country will be formed to a large degree by the events on the international scene, and particularly by the fate of the colonial peoples … Are we … to regress when dealing with the United States' dependencies to that policy of exploitation which has made colonial imperialism the most hated institution the World over. Or will we follow the philosophy which John Collier has developed in regard to American Indians and which the Institute for Ethnic Affairs is proposing for the American dependencies. This is a pattern which leads gradually to independence, equality and cooperation.

This reference to Collier is the first of a series of pointers to his having worked with, rather than independently of, Lewin. One text on managerialist participation (French and Bell, 1999) does identify Collier as inventing action research simultaneously with but 'independently' of Lewin while Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs between 1933 and 1945. French and Bell's source on this is a personal letter from Ronald Lippitt. Lippitt was one of Lewin's closest collaborators, and indeed did much to promote Lewin's reputation after his death, so he should be taken seriously (again, see Cooke, 2006). However, the suggestion of 'independence' is both intrinsically odd (it would be quite a coincidence) and untenable in the face of the evidence.

Lewin was a founding vice president of Collier's IEA, and in his autobiography Collier describes how the then Israeli ambassador to the US and his good friend Kurt Lewin met at Collier's home in 1946 to plan 'an action-research institute, or an ethnic affairs institute for the Middle East' (1963: 334). That the reference to Collier is made by Lewin, and that this relationship did exist, suggests that an understanding of what Collier's 'philosophy' was might provide hitherto unrecognized insights into the genesis of action research. This is even more the case once Collier's claims to have been a co-inventor of action research, rather than just an influential friend of Lewin, are established.

In an article published in 1945 (therefore before New Britain even took place), Collier claims to have been carrying out action research from 1933 onwards; his claim is supported by evidence elsewhere (Philp, 1977). Collier lists a number of principles which underpinned his time with the BIA. Principle seven (also cited in Cooke, 1998), he says:

> … I would call the first and the last; that research and then more research is essential to the program, that in the ethnic field research can be made a tool of action essential to all the other tools, indeed that it ought to be the master tool … We had in mind research impelled from central areas of needed action … [S]ince the finding of the research must be carried into effect by the administrator and the layman, and must be criticized by them through their experience, the administrator and the layman must participate creatively in the research, impelled as it is from their own area of need. (Collier, 1945: 275)

Also noted was a land reform/soil conservation action research project with the people of Acoma, where (1945: 285)

> … no divorce was created by the old lasting life, its consecrations, its hopes, and the new life; instead, the old life created the new, and no dichotomy arose at all, no split in the community organization, no con flict between fundamentalism and science, and no conflict between world views.

Action research as a tool of indirect rule

Cooke (1998) claimed Collier as an early development practitioner on the basis of these statements. What that paper naïvely failed to recognize was that Collier's period as a practitioner (1933–45) ended almost as the development era is said to have begun. Hence Collier's work is not properly situated within its time; more specifically, Collier's self-proclaimed

status as a colonial administrator is not mentioned, let alone addressed. In addressing this omission, and in so doing identifying the continuity at the centre of this chapter, two sets of resources provide particularly important insights. First, there are a set of histories of Collier's Commissionership written from the perspective of American Indians (for example, Biolsi, 1992; Hauptman, 1981; Parman, 1976) and analyses which have developed from these, particularly Hauptman (1986). Second there are the words of Collier himself: in his publications and also in the substantial microfilm collection of Collier's own papers.

In the preface to *The Iroquois and the New Deal*, Hauptman (1981: ix) explains how praise for Collier's commissionership began to be qualified from the 1960s onwards as evidence suggesting his paternalism, authoritarianism, and a failure to recognize American Indian institutional and cultural diversity began to be taken seriously. According to Hauptman, for 'many Native Americans today the New Deal years … mark an era … of non-Indian tampering with existing tribal systems' (1981: x). This, he goes on to argue, was the case with Iroquoia, parts of which saw its sovereignty being infringed by BIA interventions. Costo (1986) makes a similar point, asking by what right Collier intervened in sovereign nations with rights and relations with the United States established by treaty.

Some of these revised histories do see positive aspects to Collier. Thus Hauptman praises the BIA's revival of Iroquois language and customs, its reinvigoration of some tribal governments, and its homebuilding and infrastructure provision. Biolsi (1992), referring to the Lakota, sees Collier's legacy as paradoxical. Under his rule BIA actions actually contradicted the BIA's official discourse of empowerment, through the use of what Biolsi represents, via Foucault, as various technologies of power and surveillance. Nonetheless Biolsi argues that Collier changed power relationships, 'opening up the political space for all Lakota people of all political stripes …', and that the 'postcolonial culture of Indian affairs is [an] important legacy of the Indian New Deal' (1992: 85). Later in his life, Collier was also to argue with Lippitt's claims for a technocratic, value-free, scientific action research, asserting that it was inevitably politically and socially engaged.

However, as we will see, Biolsi is also among those who subsequently point out that there is more that is problematic with Collier when it comes to action research. According to Hauptman (1986), Collier's espousal of American Indian self-government was always within the

limits prescribed by the idea of indirect rule. The evidence supporting this is strong. Hauptman points out that Collier's memoir (1963: 345) quotes the paragraph from Huxley's *Africa View* cited above (page 114), and that *Africa View* was required reading for BIA staff. Collier also explicitly proclaims himself a colonial administrator at the BIA, and discusses his links with British colonial administrators. Specifically named is H. A. C. Dobbs, who had been a lecturer on Colonial Administration at Oxford University. Collier is far from uncritical of certain manifestations of indirect rule, not least its manipulation by white settlers. He is nonetheless explicitly an advocate (as late as 1963: that is, after a number of post-World War Two independences). Collier's position on decolonization, endorsed by Lewin in *Action Research and Minority Problems*, and hinted at by Lewin's use of 'gradually' in the passage quoted on p. 122, was that 'British responsibility to the Africans will take a century' (Hauptman, 1986: 367). Elsewhere, in a very brief chapter Biolsi (1991) accuses Collier of trying to co-opt potential opposing forces using participatory methods.

Thus far it can be argued that there is only a contextual implication that action research was developed as a tool of indirect rule. But there is also circumstantial evidence linking Collier, colonial administration and action research. Collier (1963) notes that Dobbs reported on 'Action Research throughout the Vast South Pacific' in the IEA newsletter in 1950. The IEA had also published a paper by Dodds entitled 'Operational Research and Action Research' in 1947 (the date of which qualifies it as one of the first articles on action research). Hauptman also cites an unnamed BIA employee in Collier's time claiming that Collier set up participatory experiments because 'he believed that students of group activities among exotic peoples might demonstrate some skill in manipulating them' (Hauptman, 1986: 371).

Confirming evidence of action research's role as a tool of indirect rule is provided in the words of Collier himself, in his 1945 article, as he reinforces his case for action research:

> … in ethnic matters … government intervention can be harmful or benign. In any field of human relations, when the government tries to do the whole job authoritatively and monopolistically, the result is baneful. But when government makes research an inseparable part of its ethnic operations, eschews monopoly, acts as a catalytic and coordinating agent, offers its service through grants-in-aid to local subdivisions and yet holds in reserve a mandatory power sparingly used, then government can be

> decisively benign, as the recent Indian record also demonstrates. (1945: 301)

This paragraph all but specifies action research as a tool of indirect rule. There is, however, a final piece of confirming evidence. Collier's archive contains drafts of a series of chapters, dated 1950 and 1951, possibly for a never-published book on action research. A section of one of these is headed 'THE (sic) 'Underdeveloped World' and Action Research' (microfilm reel 53 item 1130). The section begins by arguing for action research in development, and by setting up British indirect rule in Fiji as good practice.

> Action research in the 'developed world' is important not less than in the under-developed world. But in the under-developed world it is more practicable. A single instance may make this proposition more clear.
>
> When Britain accepted responsibility for Fiji, a crisis of de-population was under way. In those years the colonial service had to be financed out of the colony being serviced. Hence in Fiji the administrator faced a gigantic task, pressing in time, with almost no money.
>
> From this situation developed, 60 years ago, the concept of indirect administration. The white administrator functioned through the Fijian native society. One consequence is that even today … the Fijian social order functions richly, smoothly and almost autonomously …

Collier then goes on to suggest that the training of Fijians as 'sub-professional' health workers was an action research project where, the implication is, 'the white administrator functioned through the Fijian native society'. This he compares with the US and Native Americans, whereby 'after 1933 a sustained and complicated effort resulted in achieving somewhat the pattern of white-"native" relationship, and the consequences were strikingly productive in social and vital energy among the Indians'.

As with Biolsi's analysis, it can be argued that Collier's concern for not just adequate, but better health provision reflects well on him, and Collier certainly was more liberal than either his predecessors or his immediate successors as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. His association with Roosevelt and the New Deal, and his left politics also attracted all kinds of criticism during his office and after, and he and the IEA were to fall victim to McCarthyism (Collier, 1963; Cooke, 2006). It might also be argued that his argument in 1945 for a non-monopolistic, catalytic and coordinating mode of intervention has resonances in Brinkerhoff and

Coston's initial representation above of contemporary development management having moved away from the monolithic state as vehicle of development.

However, Collier's uses of the phrases 'mandatory power sparingly used', and 'almost autonomously', and Lewin's attribution of the word 'gradually' with respect to colonial independence do make clear the true and real nature of indirect rule. But they might also be seen to be no different to conditionalities which donors still impose, or the situation acknowledged by Brinkerhoff and Coston where development management is a means to foreign assistance agendas, or the issues around PRSs described by Hickey and Mohan. Here Collier is at least honest about the power relationship; but this does not change its essential character. For all the claims for participation and empowerment, action research was still a means of controlling what the colonized did, according to the priorities of a colonial power, in this case, the United States.

Conclusion

There is an irony in the renaming of development administration as development management. Renaming is often about concealing links with the past, as Williams (2000) points out. This renaming has had the opposite effect, and unwittingly aided the revelation of continuity. The choice of the word 'management' as opposed to 'administration' may be taken as an attempt to signify an ongoing modernization of the field itself, while also maintaining an image of technocratic neutrality. This neutral meaning of the term is that supported by the managerialist orthodoxy of management more generally, but not by CMS scholars, whose attention is drawn to development management by its adoption of the word 'management'. These scholars are only recently and tardily beginning to assess the significance of imperialism and colonialism for understandings of management (Prasad, 2003b is groundbreaking in this respect); and indeed it can be argued that they have a lot to learn from, and catching up to be done with, those identified in the introduction to this chapter who have for some time recognized continuities between colonialism and development. This is particularly the case since management's own origin stories (critical as well as orthodox) identify its emergence as a consequence of development, in its broadest sense of capitalist modernization, but pay no attention to imperialism, and its

organizational and managerial complexities in that emergence (Cooke, 2002).

Insofar as this last argument comes to be seen to be the case, development management will find it more and more difficult to define itself as historically separate from colonialism and colonial administration. This may invite a defence that development management is no different from any other field of Western knowledge and practice in this respect; and the significance of the particular continuity identified in this chapter may therefore seem diminished. Anticipating this, this continuity is still particularly telling. This is because the very claims made for participatory management in development management are that it gives voice to the hitherto voiceless, and that it is a readjuster of power relationships in favour of the previously/ongoingly colonized. What is revealed here is that this means of readjustment was at its very birth intended to sustain imperial power.

NOTE

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Borders in an (In)Visible World: Colonizing the Divergent and Privileging the 'New World Order'

Kym Thorne and Alexander Kouzmin

In 1990, Kenichi Ohmae foresaw a borderless world in which states could no longer control, or even regulate, the flow of people and information. Borders were seemingly rendered ineffectual in Ohmae's corporate vision, where globalization erased the significance of race, ethnicity and national governments. Indeed, sovereignty was a fast-disappearing quality in the intended confusion of principal/agent distinctions consequent to the radical attack on sovereign governments in neoliberal propaganda. Public administration had not escaped being caught up in the neoliberal enthusiasm for capturing world markets, leading to the inevitable and systemic deregulation of economies and the destruction of communities – from full privatization to corporate imperialism.

Duplicity and propaganda constitute much of the emerging discourse of a borderless 'New World Order'; such discourses have been documented in popular culture by a number of cultural commentators – think of Mark Moore, Naomi Klein and Arundhati Roy. Deconstructing neoliberal propaganda is one issue. Understanding other colluding discourses is another. Postmodern rhetoric has yet to understand its complicity in refusing to acknowledge and critique the totalizing discourse of neoliberalism, and there are dangerous currents to be negotiated in the fatuous collapsing of globalized 'end of history' and American Exceptionalist posturings within so-called borderless worlds.

This chapter explores the implications, for public administration, of borderless identity and community. This exploration questions the privileging of the borderless New World Order as discourse and practice that eliminates all alternative approaches to public administration, identity and community. Events at the Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) and Christmas Island (Australia) gulags and other global sites for 'extraordinary

rendition' demonstrate the purposeful (re)emergence and persistence of borders. The challenge for public administration is to escape the illusions and impractical schemes presented by neoliberal interests, which benefit from constructing the dichotomies of: visible/invisible, borders/non-borders, communities/non-communities, divergent/convergent and persons/non-persons, amongst others. However, recent discursive gyrations over the legal and political fictions associated with the categories called alien/non-alien, combatant/non-combatant and terrorist/non-terrorist, situated within nineteenth-century, imperially imposed borders, have led to new contradictions surfacing in administering not only citizenship, but also identity and community.

What is evident is that the notion of sovereignty has not disappeared but, rather, has appeared in new ways that expose the global orthodoxy of a borderless world as just another gambit in corporate imperialism's manipulations of the visible and invisible. Sovereignty of the state, where borders are exposed as visible or rendered invisible, can be understood according to the *qui bono* credo. This is not a US imperial novelty. Others, including Australia, are becoming increasingly adept in manipulating the visibility and the invisibility of borders and national sovereignty.

Far from the neoliberal fiction about the withering away of the state, a relegitimated and efficacious public administration could confront the political economy of opportunistic (in)visibility. Identity politics has already benefited from being rendered somewhat more 'visible' – social capital and communitarianism less so due to the complicity of post-modernism in the neoliberal project. As Thorne and Kouzmin (2004; 2006) indicate, the neoliberal faith in rampant information and computer technology (ICT), unbridled consumer demands and unencumbered, global, free markets resonates with postmodern fascinations with fragmentation, flexibility, multiplicity, surface, media images, hybridity, consumption, technological augmentation and ever-changing, free/perfect markets. As Fox (2003) outlines, the postmodern is for a fragmented, multiple, socially and linguistically decentred subject that favours relativism, indeterminacy and detotalization over coherence, linearity and causality – a subject that prefers political strategies which involve identity, culture, and the realm of everyday life over and above political strategies involving the state and political economy.

In more explicit terms, public administration needs less of a contractual and functional-styled management role. Public administration needs to understand critically the purposeful, ongoing fluxes and abrupt

changes in visibility and invisibility that, if highlighted, could keep the public domain always visible within a renewable agenda.

The fictional non-persons of Guantanamo Bay and Christmas Island are useful in reminding public administration of the continuing ubiquity of boundary definition and redefinition that are increasingly coercive in corroding and diminishing existing and hard-won public domains of visibility. If this reminder remains invisible, how long before the defence of the homeland legitimates setting up new US and Australian gulags for domestic social and political dissenters (Thorne and Kouzmin, 2004)?

A Borderless World

According to the pro-globalization literature, such as Drucker (1993), Hammer (1996) and Thurow (1997), a paradigm shift emerged with the end of the twentieth century. What happened before no longer mattered. Ohmae (1991: 269) presents an early, and perhaps his most lucid, version of this New World Order: 'The free flow of ideas, individuals, investments and industries [had] developed into an "organic bond" between developed economies.' He outlines how people are now 'living in a world where money, securities, services, options, futures, information and patents, software and hardware, companies and know-how, assets and membership, paintings and brands are all traded without national sentiments across traditional borders' (Ohmae, 1991: 213). What is emerging is the Inter-Linked Economy (ILE), consisting of the Triad of America, Europe and Japan, joined by the 'aggressive economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore' (Ohmae, 1991: xii).

Many other globalists, such as Friedman (1999), went further, proposing that everywhere on the globe could be incorporated into a universal – and level – economic playing field. Some globalists also incorporated a virtual dimension into this encompassing economy, suggesting that technological developments could allow economic activity to flow between widely spread locations. There were even those, including postmodernists such as Baudrillard (see Bogard, 1996), who were convinced that physical globalization was accompanied, or even replaced, by a disembodied, global cyberspace that was a simulacrum of so-called *real world* activity. Such disparate discourses galvanized and led to legitimating loud hosannas of praise for the 'global market as the benign, universal deity – immortal, "invisible", omniscient, omnipotent' (Wheen, 2004: 234).

The transformation of national borders started with the deregulation of foreign exchange markets due to advances in communication and computer technology. Somehow, as information about products and services became available to international consumers, they apparently demanded access to the best possible goods and services: 'Governments – and the national boundaries they represented – become invisible in this kind of search' (Ohmae, 1991: 228). Underlying this assumption was an almost religious faith in the transforming power of information about the products and services available elsewhere in the world. It was a belief that information could dissolve national-based borders, communities and identities. This consumer-driven, global knowledge-based economy had its own logic and didn't have to respect national borders. Nation-state-based models of community and identity were no longer relevant. This was especially true for those who imagined cyberspace as a substitute for a physicalized world (Tiffin and Terashima, 2001). Business and other organizations needed to develop new senses of hybrid identities and dispersed, consuming communities to survive this newly designed landscape.

Borderless Public Administration

Ohmae (1991: 265) recommended that government leaders should realize that 'their role is to provide a steady and small hand, not to interfere'. The mercantile age was long over, and the welfare state was thus no longer relevant. Planning only constrained financial processes and was not deemed effective in the new global economy. Public administration had to be transparent and allow the flow of information throughout the world, culminating in a new identity that Davidson and Rees-Mogg (1998) termed the 'sovereign individual'.

In Ohmae's view, government's central failure was the monopolizing of information: 'cooking it up as they saw fit and re-distributing it in forms of their own devising' (1991: 23). This ability to arbitrage was being eliminated by new communication and information technology throughout the ILE. Even national governments exhibited converging trends in relation to key economic indices, such as using public policy and public expenditure as a percentage of output. Public administration was to focus on communicating with people and on making sure 'that they have as much information as possible' in order to provide a first-class infrastructure for business (Ohmae, 1991: 242). No barriers or artificial regulation could control the invisible flow of funds. Following

this logic, governments made certain nations and cities attractive locations for global companies to nurture local businesses in and to grow into multinationals. Any protection or subsidy had to be short-term or directed to training or other specific infrastructure provision. Everything had to be related to providing jobs for the many versions of the consuming New Alphas.

Reich (1992) emphasized that this was not just about creating jobs in general but rather 'symbolic analysts' that would be able to manipulate global information flows. Florida (2003) went even further, suggesting that those in charge of any specific geographic location must focus on constructing physical and electronic infrastructures that could provide the bohemian, yet consumerist, lifestyle in synch with the dominating cyber-space dimensions of a borderless world.

Public administration's essential role was therefore to enlighten business, by making 'sure the [business] information provided was full, accurate, and generally available' (Ohmae, 1991: 243), allowing individuals to make autonomous decisions. Public administration, as the captive of the outmoded welfare state, was unable to manage such flows across borderless worlds. Public administration's best response would be to get out of the way and surrender to the market in all aspects of human endeavour (Thorne and Kouzmin, 2006).

The hegemony of neoliberal public administration

In a way, public administration's inability to respond to the demands of the market was exacerbated by postmodernity's complicity with the neoliberal agenda. As Eagleton (2003: 67) emphasizes, 'Post-modernism gets off the ground when it is no longer a matter of having information about the world but about the world as information.' In starker terms, Wheen (2004) points out that the postmodern is not interested in any systematic critique of capitalism *per se* and connected economic activities 'since Capitalism is, itself, a fiction – like Truth, Justice, Law and other linguistic "constructs"' (Wheen, 2004: 84). Postmodernity is therefore criticized by Wheen for its depoliticizing effect on economic debate due to its inherent relativism. As Leivesley (1997: 5) acidly observed, 'the French foundational writers seem to have no curiosity about economics'.

For example, Baudrillard (1989) dismissed the public sphere as part of the 'hyper-real' and explored the global simulacra without any 'critical concern for the empirical dirtiness of the politics and economics' (Leivesley, 1997: 5). Neoliberalism and the postmodern seem to share a

worldview based on the end or exhaustion of history. They both share a reliance on ironic, pretentious ambiguity to create ideological spaces for individualism and for the individual as agent of any transformation (to the extent that the postmodern accepts the possibility of any transcendence). This has justified the privatization of aesthetics, morality and consumption in order to legitimize a globalized quest for agency based on individual self-fulfilment where market replaces state as the final arbiter of success or failure.

This mutually reinforcing anti-state, anti-hierarchical and anti-centralization critique of public administration has had serious repercussions. As Thorne (2005) indicates, the neoliberal faith in rampant computer information technology, unbridled consumer demands and unencumbered global free markets resonates with postmodern interests in fragmentation, multiplicity and surface. This mutuality inherently distrusts communal and political action, instead celebrating the liberating possibilities of technology, of hybridity and of self-absorption.

Neoliberal and postmodern faith in globalization transforming capitalism (in some way) is part of a more extensive theoretical confusion over the origin, context and nature of a borderless world. The world is not unified or, even, uniformly interrelated. Globalization is theorized as both its own cause and its own effect and by Rosenberg (2000: 165), as 'unavoidably push[ing] the categories of space and time into a role which they cannot be imagined to fulfil'. However, it must be acknowledged that Gerlach and Hamilton (2000), via their reliance on Bogard (1996), demonstrate that the postmodern does help one to understand the dangers of a dephysicalized, borderless world. The postmodern enables ways of understanding how surveillance (Foucault, 1979) extends into the image and electronic simulation of surveillance of many aspects of contemporary life, and allows one to render how individuals are being distracted, if not submerged, by surface, image and desire. However, as Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) propose, the postmodern, despite its insights into the dark side of global capitalism, is constrained, if not captured, by its insistence that what is needed now in relation to capitalism is just, as Lyotard (1984) implies, to stretch market boundaries without changing anything essential.

As Eagleton (1996: 164) indicates, this does not mean that the postmodern is not insightful: the postmodern contains a 'rich body of work on racism and ethnicity, on the paranoia of identity-thinking, on the perils of totality and the fear of otherness ... along with its deepened

insights into the cunning of power'. However, we contend that it is the relativist foundations that make postmodernism the restless, transforming and colonizing pluralism of capitalism. The postmodern exhibits a fundamental attraction to the capitalist marketplace, identifying with its logic of 'pleasure and plurality, of the ephemeral and discontinuous, of some great de-centred network of desire of which individuals seem the fleeting effects' (Eagleton, 1996: 132).

The limitations of new public management have led neoliberal ideologues to build a discourse to hide their essentially conservative agenda. But there are more complex matters involved: disguised conservatism is like 'a carnival mask: depending on the quality of its craft, it can disguise, more or less, but it always hides something beneath it' (Andrews and Kouzmin, 1999: 18–19). Increasingly, what has been disguised is the invisible, regulated and exploitative dimension of the borderless new global order. As Singer (2003: 3–18) discovers, the privatization of public military and security activities allowed corporate warriors, trained by public expenditure, to act invisibly in government and corporate interests without any formal declaration of conflict or any responsibility for the outcome except that the invisible were rendered somewhat more visible in the 2004 Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison scandal.

(Re)Emerging Borders

Borders have been made to disappear and reappear in new locations and spatial dimensions. After 9/11, both the United States and Australia found it useful to assert that geographical areas usually considered part of the national compact were actually different in some crucial aspects or could be effectively exorcised completely. During the war on Afghanistan for example, some captives were taken for interrogation to Camp X-Ray (then to Camp Delta) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. About the same time, the Australian government dealt with the danger of having to accept boatloads of Middle Eastern 'terrorists' (many fleeing repressive regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq) by removing offshore islands from Australian sovereignty. The shifting and translation of borders is an inherently political act. The designation of captives as 'enemy combatants' not prisoners of war is intended to keep them outside the protection the Geneva Convention affords to prisoners of war. The location of the enemy combatants on land leased from Cuba is intended to keep them outside the protection of the United States Constitution and the Bill of

Rights, ensuring that their captors are kept outside of the International War Crimes Tribunal. The location of enemy combatants at a US military base, captured from the Spanish and on the front line of the confrontation with Cuban and Soviet Marxism, is intended to keep these individuals outside of civilian justice and to reinforce the sacrifices that would need to be continually made to keep the United States 'safe'.

As mentioned above, another example of this fragile construction of borders is the exclusion of Christmas and other offshore Australian islands in 2001. Asylum seekers who made a dangerous water journey from Indonesia were diverted to small island nations instead of the mainland through the implementation of the Pacific Solution. This solution involved the avoidance of Australian legal protection being afforded to illegal and unwanted immigrants arriving on Australian sovereign territory. Those people who managed to reach one of the excluded islands, or who managed to be rescued by an Australian vessel, were then transferred for processing to the tiny, near-bankrupt island-nation of Nauru where they were housed at the expense of the Australian taxpayer without ever gaining any protection of Australian residency. During 2006, the Australian government went even further, removing the northern shores of the Australian mainland from any usefulness for arriving immigrants in terms of qualifying for the protection of Australian residency.

Although some things flow more easily in the New World Order, such as financial flows, or flow more rapidly, such as some communication flows, everything is not unrestricted. Although it is possible that markets are poorly constrained by sovereign borders and that social compacts may be made more amenable to borders, both may be involved in the deliberate manipulation of visibility and invisibility within areas of contested or limbo sovereignty. In effect, borders are moved around, rendered visible or invisible, in order to demonstrate the ability of certain nations or elites to escape the supposed level playing field of globalization, to resist the reach of international institutions such as the United Nations, and to renounce international treaty obligations when national interests are threatened. Individuals are also made visible, as actual or potential terrorists, or made invisible as human beings in a manner that savagely echoes the non-persons of the concentration camps, gulags and Devil's Islands.

The neoliberal, global world order, based on liberal democracy, free markets and information and other technology, is not universal. Nation-states persist. There are more restrictions nowaadays on the movement of

individuals, refugees and non-refugees, than existed during the height of nineteenth-century imperialism. Supra-regional governance is more noticeable today too. The US dominates the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the UK has been selective about its involvement in the European Union (EU), and Australia is excluded from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Association (AFTA).

According to Hirst and Thompson (1999) and O'Hara (2001), few, if any, significant markets are free or completely open. The United States and Australia Free Trade Agreement favours the US farm, media, intellectual property and pharmaceutical sectors. Exchange rates, especially Chinese rates, are not always free-floating. And even though computer and communication technology is more pervasive, the internet is not in every home or available to everyone.

The internet is a good example of the difficulty of devising and operating viable cyberspace-based businesses. Even in cyberspace, frictionless, constantly fracturing perfect markets are hardly in evidence. Smaller players flutter around the conglomerates, sometimes finding favour but, more often, being crushed by their inherent lack of market power. Single global markets are resisted: for example, DVD and film/media launches are based on regions. The democratic, creative possibilities of easily replicable digital code are being resisted by legal sanctions and the extension of restraints on intellectual property. More and more organizations are dissatisfied by the size of their investment in information systems and by ongoing performance and maintenance issues. Terrorism has slowed air traffic volume flows and, now, city train travel patterns.

The predictions that Ohmae and his McKinsey colleagues, Henzler and Gluck, made in their Declaration of Interdependence about the year 2005 have not eventuated (Ohmae, Henzler and Gluck, 1990). The Inter-Linked Economies of the Triad have not resulted in a 'capacity for boundless prosperity'. Equally doubtful appear their claims that any borderless economy improves the well-being of everyone and is open to all, creating no winners or losers. On the contrary, among the rare, shared conclusions in the extensive and discordant globalization literature is the view that, however one defines economic globalization, it should inevitably produce winners and losers.

More and more evident are the dangers of interconnection. The Asian financial crisis, SARS, AIDS, terrorism, mad cow disease and bird flu

suggest that there is no immunity in an ILE. In a post-9/11 world, it is most uncertain whether the Singapore solution of focusing on commercial activity and renouncing military capacity provides any security at all. As the US and the usual suspects in the 'coalition of the willing' have demonstrated, unilateral action is possible and a lack of extensive cooperation within global networks is not fatal. It is apparent that the information-dependent, consumer-driven pathway to legitimate global citizenship is hazardous at the very least. It is most doubtful that 'people have become more informed and clever, as a real consequence of living in a truly global information era' (Ohmae, 1991: 13). As Albrow (1996) concludes, it is doubtful whether any borderless world will be able to create a system of shared values or whether new notions of identity and community will be able to replace the glue and social capital provided by a nation-state.

What is Going On?

What is going on in this supposed borderless, new global order is best understood by asking who benefits from it. Opportunistic governments and politicians, financial wizards, media barons, corporate capitalism, the military industrial complex or the military industrial and administration complex (Eisenhower's original formulation), and ideological supporters and freeriders, such as conservative, religious groups, exhibit the requisite vested interests. These interests revolve around what Ritzer (2003) identifies as the globalization–growth dynamic, operating through three interrelated processes – Capitalism, Americanization and McDonaldization – three processes that are concerned with the production of the material and dreams of superabundance. This dynamic eats up places, people, things and services, replacing them with 'centrally conceived and controlled forms that are largely lacking in distinctive content' (Beilharz, 2003: 106) and are destructive to the conduct of everyday life.

Some understanding of how invisibility and visibility function as a strategic imperative is necessary. The visible strategy in the globalized, borderless world is to convince everyone that the presumed ideological and practical defeat of socialism and communism was, and is, due to the spread of Western, liberal democracy. It also assumes that information technology, communications technology and free markets mark out global capitalism as the only practical way forward in which all can share

the bountiful rewards – if only they are prepared to create new, highly productive, fragmented identities and to remove or transcend outmoded social, political and economic compacts.

The invisible part of the globalized, borderless world strategy is to remove, or render ineffective, socio-political barriers to economic activity, to open social and public spheres to competitive activity, and to make constant consumption the enveloping basis of material affluence. The central, invisible intention is to avoid risk. This supposedly obscures the 'business as usual' forms of organization, encouraging instead new types of exploitation (flexitime, part-time, temporary, contractual, offshoring, call centres) practised by global capitalism.

In its most extreme form, this strategy needs to convince us that we have passed over into a dephysicalized, new world where the clash of capital and labour is no longer possible and where disembodied, creative individuals electronically roam cyberspace, constantly competing to generate new ideas and to manipulate information and logistic systems the better to satisfy the limitless need for goods and services. For example, as global consumers, we preserve our identity by failing to see, or identify with, the exploitative economic gulags: the sweatshops and factories that are located in impoverished regions. Nor are we required to resent the relocation of state services to the private sector or resist the new work ethic that demands the worker spend even more hours at work, honing a career.

Once the borderless world is exposed as some strategic gambit and not some inevitable outcome of the 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992), American Exceptionalism can be revealed as an attempt to use visibility and invisibility to shape a favourable economic outcome and co-opt others to comply with a restricted vision of the future. Once globalization blinkers are removed, it is evident that borders have appeared and reappeared in a number of locations, benefiting the powerful and dangling the carrot of consumerism (not security) for others.

Furthermore, it is evident that physicalized notions of time and place still have a vital role to play in the construction of individual identities and communal compacts. Most fundamentally, it becomes apparent that much of the actual global economy is not invisible but is physical and, in fact, highly visible. This is evident in the proliferation of Northern-owned conglomerates and also through the growth of an almost intangible service sector that supports a wholly English internationalism through a network of international offshoring practices.

What fate awaits the New Alphas of the New World Order, where the individual is the agent of economic transformation and where the ability to locate, interpret and act on information is tangential to costly training and equipment? How will these New Alphas survive when the New World Order requires them to detach themselves from the ruins of the immediate physical environment and to seek advancement through a series of weak ties or instrumental contacts with other similarly physically dispossessed cosmopolitans? How viable is it to have any social order based upon the decomposition of loosely related individuals who have, at best, a symbiotic connection with their immediate surroundings and are more likely to exhibit a parasitical connection with their environments?

Through analysing the political dynamics that precipitate borders to (re)emerge, it becomes clearer that rather than economic prowess, it is the role of national military hardware and a sophisticating armed force that mitigates this border(less) world order. Even advocates of globalization, such as Friedman (1999), have acknowledged that '[t]he hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist' (Wheen, 2004: 240). So, despite the claims of globalization gurus who advocate a level playing field, it seems that this level playing field is far from being realized and that we have still not left the old pre-consumer paradigm behind, where a government's role was to represent its people's interests, protecting them from foreign invasion.

Ohmae (1991) and other economic globalists have proposed that the common language of global citizenship be English, yet they have wanted multiple cultures to coexist in the new, borderless organizations. Without a meaningful economic role for local and non-English languages it is highly possible that the relative freedom of information flows will not make old geographical barriers irrelevant.

The Challenge for Public Administration

Sovereignty persists, history matters, and the past does not need to be removed in order for the future to flourish. Public administration must not surrender sovereignty, whether visible or invisible, to punitive market forces. There are many pathways to the future. One must comprehend and resist the visible and invisible strategies used by elites, particularly in association with seemingly benign notions of market capitalism and enlightened individualism.

Public administration must come to terms with the limitations that the collusion between neoliberal and postmodern imposes on the future of public administration. Public administration must come to terms with the ideological juggernaught created when neoliberal 'egotism' meets postmodern 'narcissism'. This neoliberal and postmodern collusion, evident in Lyotard (1984) and Baudrillard (1989), denigrates any reliance on rules of coherence drawn from the outcome of sustained ideological critiques of totalizing discourses. Instead, shadowy individuals are left to make political and social judgements on a case-by-case basis when engaged in the beguiling, endless pursuit of the aesthetics and material fruits of the borderless affluence.

This collusion exhorts self-enrichment while denying the existence of any actual autonomy or integrity. This collusion also extols a visible, but empty self. Here Shusterman's (1988: 352) questioning of Rorty's (1986) notion of the non-self is revealing:

> the ideal self for the powers governing a consumer society – a fragmented, confused self, hungrily acquiring as many new commodities as it can but lacking the unity, integrity and agency to challenge either its habits of consumption or the system which manipulates and profits from them.

Not surprisingly, public and social spheres have diminished just at the same time as economic globalization has supposedly provided an unrestricted playground for the unmediated actions of cosmopolitan elites, such as the New Alphas, to transgress notions of settled or traditional communities without any fear of reprisal.

'The power of Capital is now so familiar, so sublimely omnipotent and omnipresent, that even large sectors of the political "left" have succeeded in naturalizing it' (Eagleton, 1996: 23). The vehicle for this remarkable default, largely, lies with postmodernist discourse rationalizing political failure and, in so doing, further facilitating, in 'the economic metaphor of [Anglo-American] intellectual life, "buying into" conceptual closures of their masters' (Eagleton, 1996: 5). It ought to be something of an embarrassment to postmodernism that, just as it was discarding concepts of ideology, collective, agentic subjects and epochal transformations, such political manifestations broke out where least expected (for example, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, economic globalization).

It is vital to interrogate ruthlessly the purpose(s) of those who want to ignore history and devastate notions of community and identity. One should be more careful in accepting those who propagate a rupturing

with the past. One must establish to what extent everything must change and how irresistible is the irresistible change. Does one not need a public administration, a sense of community and identity capable of dealing with all these possibilities? How should one react when one discovers that networked organizations (Korac-Boisvert and Kouzmin, 1994), supposedly operating throughout the globe and connected everywhere in real time, are more like geographically precise, simple and direct connections recreating domestic (Northern) infrastructures in non-domestic locations? Perhaps, even more pressingly, how should one act when a Greenback Empire, not afraid of resorting to gunboat diplomacy, dominates the chessboard of international networks (Johnson, 2004)?

Public administration must establish the extent to which it is useful for our common interests that New Alphas accept the imposition of stateless 'do it yourself welfare' (Elliott, 2004: 37). It would seem that this acceptance reinforces their detachment from settled communities and traditional forms of personal identity without any examination of the difficulties of such detachment. More significantly, this self-reliance further exposes those unable to operate successfully within the borderless world and those more attuned to settled communities and traditional forms of personal identity being consigned to the global backwaters and the status of invisible non-persons.

For public administration, the requisite responses would require more than its current acceptance of what Truss (2003: 7) refers to as the polite acceptance of invisibility. Perhaps the ultimate challenge for public administration is to emerge from the shadows of a globalized ego--centralism and revoke the licence for presumptive action granted to rampaging global capitalism. Following Sennett (1998; 2004), such action is essential to prevent economic globalization devastating the moral fabric of settled places, to rebuild mutual respect between citizens and nations, and to prevent the acceptance that individuals could be rendered visible persons or invisible non-persons simply on the basis of a lack of economic success and/ or their lack of interest in hybrid identities and fragmented communities.

Even in a 'restless world', Beilharz (2003:104) warns that we must not neglect Bauman's (2003) injunction that 'place-making is a precondition of politics'. It is possible that our world is increasingly a flux of visibility and invisibility, place and non-place, product and non-product, service and non-service, and persons and non-persons (Hogan, 2003: 105). If these dichotomies are culturally significant, then by existing in these

dichotomies, we must be aware of, what Ritzer (2003) suggests and Hogan (2003: 105) terms, 'the embrace of being in nothing, being "invisible" in our own place and having our world emptied by the very means by which we are living it'.

Divergence, Development and 'Academic Imperialism'[1]

The following section draws on ways current and ongoing academic debates on the nature of the public have impacted on the possibilities for thinking outside the so-called 'New World Order'. There have been a variety of intellectual debates relating to societal development variously defined. Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse (1997: 140) cite an array of polemics within academia:

> 'industrialization' (Biggart, 1992: Womack and Jones, 1994); 'modernization' (Baudelaire, 1964; Williamson, 1975; Bell, 1976; Berman, 1982; Frisby, 1985); 'neo'- and 'post-Fordism' (Dohse, Jurgens and Malsch, 1985); 'late capitalism' (Williams, 1976); 'post-industrialization' (Bell, 1974; Jaikumar, 1986); 'post-modernization' (Baudrillard, 1983a; 1983b; Jameson, 1984; Lyotard, 1984; 1986; Drucker, 1990a; 1990b; Higgins, 1992; Williams et al., 1992); the 'consumer society' (Bell, 1976; Williams, 1976; Muetzelfeldt, 1988); 'Toyotaism' (Marceau, 1992); 'Japanization' (Wilkinson, Morris and Oliver, 1992); the 'information-economy' (Forester, 1985; 1987; Marceau, 1992); and 'globalization' (Wallerstein, 1974; 1980; Henderson, 1991; Dicken, 1992).

These debates, listed above, show the breathtaking diversity of argument within academia. However, what this list does not make explicit is the way that academia has had a role to play in the changing definition of public administration and the public domain (what is visible and what is invisible).

It is ironic that political and administrative development, as essentially an American comparative preoccupation, should peak in 1965 at the same time as the escalation of the Vietnam War. By 1965, no less than five major studies of comparative politics/administration were published (Almond and Verba, 1963; Apter, 1965; Easton, 1965a; 1965b; Huntington, 1965; Pye and Verba, 1965). Empirical studies canvassed Africa, Asia and industrializing Japan, with implications increasingly explicit for ongoing, Cold War-related rhetoric.

The demise of comparative and development administration in contemporary managerial discourse was as startling as it had been swift.

Almost without notice, the political and ideological preoccupation with modernization had been overtaken by unchallenged concerns about managerialist reform and market-driven economic restructuring on a globalized scale (Kouzmin, Leivesley and Korac-Kakabadse, 1997).

The early theoretical innovators in comparative development seemed highly prone to creating their own language, especially Riggs (1964), Apter (1965) and, to a lesser extent, Levy (1966). The Prismatic Scale, for example, was composed by Riggs (1964) and based largely on his research in Thailand and, later, refined from his 'one-dimensional' (differentiated–undifferentiated) scale. The Prismatic Model was a new theory of modernization, a theory that involved the juxtaposition of old and new social structures in modernization and, second, rejected the exceptionalist US public administration experience as universally valid in modernization. Ironically, the more Riggs (1961; 1964; 1966; 1969) theorized about the conceptual problems associated with prisms, so US society itself was becoming ever more differentiated and dis-integrated. Riggs (1971) acknowledged that such malintegration existed domestically in the form of urban crises, race riots, student uprisings, popular apathy, the hippy phenomenon, and the profound turbulence produced by a continuing war in Vietnam.

Another theory of social change was that of Apter (1964; 1965: 197), who was concerned with changes in value systems, an approach that, while novel, was hardly unique. But his idea that a theocracy could constitute a Modernizing autocracy did raise some interest. Apter (1965) described this potentially modernizing approach as constituting a political religion. Using his own typology, it is obvious that his matrix compelled some kind of (structurally) pyramidal system professing (if not enforcing) consummatory values – values that emphasize social values as a product of social convergence.

Lucien Pye, likewise, used the value-aspect variable of political change in a novel and imaginative manner (Pye and Verba, 1965; Pye, 1966a; 1966b; 1967a; 1967b). Like Riggs, his fieldwork was based in South East Asia – in Burma. Pye's concept of political development deserves more detailed analysis than can be provided here. However, two aspects of his work should be stated at least. First, it should be noted that Heady (1979: 261), an influential US academic in the area of comparative administration and a leading member of the Comparative Administration Group (CAG), an influential network of comparative administration scholars, argued thus:

> During the 1950s and early 1960s, when military regimes were concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa ... the prevailing judgment was that military rule was reformist and promised to speed up economic growth and other modernization. Lucien Pye and Manfred Halpern were leading spokesmen for this interpretation. Pye looked upon the army as a relatively modernized organization ... and the good soldier as also to some degree a modernized man.

Pye and Verba's (1965) and Pye's (1966a; 1966b; 1967a; 1967b) work presents a second issue: the problem of ethnocentrism. Few policy makers in Washington, DC, would publicly support blatant, US-inspired 'praetorianism'. Pye's approach was more subtle – to show value frameworks in overseas countries to be culturally different. As Jaquaribe (1973: 198) observed, Pye's meaning considering political development as political modernization takes the latter concept as being practically identical to Westernization. He is then inclined to consider that meaning is affected by Western ethnocentrism.

Once what is Western and what is modern become almost coextensive, there is no way to measure political development other than to assume that its level increases or decreases according to its larger or smaller incorporation of Western forms of institution and Western traits. The global reach of American comparative politics/administration was not wholly intellectual. After 1960, the CAG, led by professors Riggs and Pye, demonstrated a fundraising ability with foundations, NGOs and Congress alike.

From 1962 to 1971, the CAG and its numerous members flourished as *policy entrepreneurs*. With Britain and France withdrawing as colonial powers on a global basis, this dynamic group of scholars fought to rewrite the theoretical literature (so far as it had been developed by the Europeans) but, more significantly, sought to meet the charter of the Ford Foundation which was to see a transfer of knowledge from CAG programmes to practical applications through technical assistance projects and domestic developmental undertakings within the target countries (Heady, 1979: 16–17):

> Looking back, one of these experts (Jones, 1976) describes the scene as follows – 'The 1950s was a wonderful period. The "American Dream" was the World Dream' – and the best and quickest way to bring that dream into reality was through the mechanism of public administration ... in the 1950s, public administration experts were magicians, of a sort ...

> they were eagerly recruited by US aid-giving agencies and readily accepted by most of the new nations, along with a lot of other experts as well.

Certainly, the US Congress thought so. In 1961, US officials were told that aid advisers were closely related to the development of political democracy (Packenham, 1966), whilst in 1967, the amended Foreign Assistance Act 1961 included generalized statements of the 'idealized polity' (Braibanti et al., 1969: 5) as they related to *US national security*. But, at the same time, it was also noted that 'on the academic side a serious obstacle is the escalation of theorizing divorced from government operations in the field' (Braibanti et al., 1969: 29).

Other critiques of the official establishment were harsher. At a funding level, by the mid-1970s resources were more than halved (Heady, 1979: 22) whilst economists replaced the CAG group as experts. Jones (1976: 101) stated: 'the public administration technicians … of the 1950s were exterminated by a new animal as fearsome and aggressive as the ancient Norsemen – the new development economists'.

By the time President Carter arrived in Washington DC (late 1976), the sun had set not only on the British empire but on the CAG as well. The imperialism of US academic public administration, however, was to be not only maintained but even broadened and enhanced in policy effectiveness terms by its more recent subjugation by neoliberalism, economists and economic rationalism.

Within the Cold War context, political diversity was to be managed and redesigned through the intellectual domain of comparative and development administration – understood in a remarkably ethnocentric vein. In a post-Cold War context, political diversity, whilst increasingly problematic (Huntington, 1996), continues to be managed and redesigned through the intellectual domains of globalization and economic rationalism, also understood in an ethnocentric vein (Thorne and Kouzmin, 2007a; 2007b). In both aspects, new public administration continues to be a willing and subordinate agent for such hegemonic distortions.

Conclusion: Towards a New Divergence in a 'Borderless' World

> The world is falling back into an ocean of contention and a babble of tongues, on which the only safe life rafts are the affinities of birth and upbringing. There is, however, a difference: for the first time, non-Western civilizations are joining in the making of history at a global level ...

> Culture trumps politics, and economics too …
>
> Civilizations are ghosts: we fear them, see them, but 'know' that they are not really there. (Jones, C., 1997: 7)

Political and administrative development must confront significant issues of ideology and epistemology if they are to balance successfully the development needs of governance in transitional economies. Governance cannot continue to be dominated by the theology-like canons of economistic rationality, with its organizationally naïve faith in idealized market forces and the hidden dimensions of the psychological-cognitive politics of markets (Ramos, 1981). There has been an increasing 'negative balance of growing relative incapacity to govern' (Dror, 1980: 139) in liberal-democratic societies, providing sobering re-evaluations about social, political and organizational design potentialities in a post-industrializing 'North–South' gradient (Kouzmin, 2002).

One needs to be cautious of the resurfacing of colonial desires. Such desires, which are prevalent in moves towards creating 'world order', demonstrate the power of colonial practices and their enduring lure. Professional and academic literatures must cultivate strong critical positions to combat such ideas that present themselves as new, but remain embedded in imperial discourses (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993).

Dror (1987: 82), for example, outlines some thirteen functional requisites for high performance in enhancing 'the central mind of government', including long-range, process-system views; 'fuzzy gambling' sophistication; grand policy thinking and policy paradigm iconoclasm; 'momentous' choices; crisis decision-making capacities; rapid learning; and novel modes of reasoning. Such a list of requisites ought to remind the interested observer of just how modest Western administrative and policy transfer recommendations to societies in global transition or development may need to be, especially in an era when an invasive New World Order threatens to merge into an endless War on Terror fundamentalism.

Despite the globalization discourse's professed abandonment of the state and governance for an abject surrender to the invisible hand of the market and/or the visible hand of management (Thorne and Kouzmin, 2006), there is evidence for a continuing, yet subverted, role for the 'unnecessary' state and public sector agency in visibly and invisibly (as deemed appropriate) supporting imperialist ambitions and the accumulation of capital. What remains of the state and public sector is captured in

a free-market, neoliberal discourse that eschews social capital, the public domain and any forms of communitarianism. The maintenance of neoliberal and fundamentalist hegemony, by the fluxing of visible and invisible power, is the only game in town.

Governmental actions must be freed of these constrictions masquerading as global imperatives that somehow enhance economic well-being and bring freedom for all. Globalized and non-globalized, national and other, social compacts must regain a questioning, proactive and fully functioning approach to public policy and public administration attuned to underlying self-interests in all their visible and invisible manifestations.

The situation is exacerbated by the visible and invisible machinery of elites pursuing global power. Thorne and Kouzmin (2007a), for example, examine the use of administrative discretion to damper or remove some of the worst excesses committed in the name of supposedly enveloping, new, global, virtual and individualizing, aggrandizing world order.

Coda: from New 'Alphas' to New Gulags

One of colonial Britain's contributions to so-called civilization was the invention of the world's first gulag: in Australia's Botany Bay. Domestic but marginalized, non-persons were rendered invisible by the simple expedient of deportation – a process cross-subsidized by a global search for a new source of a strategic and military commodity, that is, a new source of the flax – used to make linen sails – required to maintain the supremacy of the British navy (Blainey, 1982).

Variants of Botany Bay emerged in Tsarist expressions of a Russian empire and, then, in the Soviet gulags to buttress the imperial expressions of an exceptionalist Socialism in one Country. Guantanamo Bay and Christmas Island constitute a further dimension to the marginalizing and rendering invisible of global citizens in the name of new imperialist pretensions. That such neoliberal gulags should exist in the face of duplicitous and Exceptionalist mantras of constitutionality, sovereignty and democratic rights is challenging global credulity in the face of the synchronized, egotistical and narcissistic fantasies shared by the neoliberal and the postmodern: that the expanding global man (*sic*) has no real borders to his (*sic*) ambitions to fulfil his (*sic*) consumerist ambitions and, unfortunately, no other compelling purpose in life.

Such globalized duplicity may continue to prevail in an Anglo-American denial of the consequences associated with a global expression

of American Exceptionalism. Forebodings about future gulags, beyond the twenty-four international gulags that have become a little more visible since Abu Ghraib (ABC News Online, 2004), might result from a historical and comparative awareness of other, previous gulags. The US Patriot Act 2001 resonates with a collective ignorance of such history(ies) and foretells the emergence of Homeland and outsourced gulags of incarcerated non–persons of the politically marginalized and the invisible.

It should not be surprising that the US, the largest incarcerating state on earth (Shelden, 2004), should now, under the protective cover of privatized invisibility, seek to broaden the incarcerating mandate drawn from race and poverty to the political dissonant and those who refuse to politely accept their invisibility. A system of invisible, Homeland gulags, within an exceptionalist democracy in one country, is not consistent with the end of history or the disappearance of borders, but is consistent with a new beginning of history associated with xenophobic and chauvinist, neoliberal–driven and postmodern-condoned, corporate imperialism.

NOTE

1. This section relies, in part, on arguments previously published by Kouzmin, Jarman and Korac-Kakabadse (2000).

9

The Managerialization of Development, the Banalization of Its Promise and the Disavowal of 'Critique' as a Modernist Illusion

Pieter de Vries

This chapter is about current shifts in representations of development: from views that see development as part of a utopian, modernist effort for creating a better world, through managerialist notion of development as a project, to development as a deep social transformation aimed at ending irrationalities in the South. The argument, in short, is that while development as a modernist project has become profoundly discredited, the idea of social transformation has been salvaged in an utterly opportunistic way so as to legitimize the existence of a development organizational apparatus. While development in the past carried a promise of constructing a new world, current managerialist approaches see development as a way of protecting Western civilization against the *ressentiment* of those who are deemed not to have the necessary 'social capital' to benefit from contemporary processes of globalization. This managerialist shift, I argue, entails the banalization of the promise of development through representations of the Third World as a source of instability and violence.

It should be made clear from the outset that this is not a defence of the modernist project of development management, but neither is it an embracement of a postmodern celebration of the demise of notions of progress and development and attendant ideas of the end of history. Modernity and modernization have been rightly critiqued for their denial of cultural difference and for their devaluation of place, everyday life, feminine and subaltern knowledges, to the benefit of masculinist and rationalist ways of ordering reality. However, it must be said that at the core of the modernist project the idea and practice of critique has always been central. Modernization theory always relied on a critique of the present as a way of constructing a different – if pre-defined – future, while the classical Weberian analysis of modernity contained an internal critique of its inherent excesses. In other words, modernity was self-

consciously aware of its own transgressive nature, and it sustained this position in a self-critical mode by setting out to find effective ways of managing this inherent transgression. It is my aim to show that postmodernist and Third Way approaches to development, which dismiss the hubris of modernity while negating the possibility of a radical critique of the present, by necessity have to rely on forms of managerialism that are not less ethnocentric and authoritarian than the modernist positions they reject. So, there is a suspicious and pernicious continuity between the modernist project of social transformation and the postmodern/Third Way idea that, with 'the end of history', the only challenge that remains is that of managing the risks and hazards of globalization as an inevitable process (Fournier, 2002a; Parker, 2002a). In other words, I see the managerialization of development as a disavowing strategy for negating the current contradictions and cynicism of global development institutions. Such a strategy functions through the construction of an imagined irrational 'other', who by necessity has to be 'managed' so as not to become a danger for civilization and to him/herself.

At this point, it is apposite to say something about my theoretical perspective. In a recent article (De Vries, 2007) I engaged with the work of James Ferguson (1990) as a classical example of a poststructuralist analysis of the global development apparatus. In his book *The Anti-politics Machine* he shows that the development institutions reproduce themselves through failure, while systematically bringing about unintended instrumental effects. Although agreeing with the general thrust of his analysis I differ from his approach by focusing on the paradoxical fact that people in the Third World do actively engage with, and persist in believing in, the promises of the development apparatus. If it is true that development projects work in a depoliticizing mode while facilitating bureaucratic expansion, they also render possible new ways of desiring, in the guise of technologies, infrastructures, and organizational forms that lend themselves to all sorts of fantastic imaginations. In short, development projects do not only function as instruments for the governing of distant populations in the Third World (Foucault's governmentality perspective); they also enable the subjects of development to organize their desires through all sorts of utopian fantasies in which the promise of development plays a catalytic role. It is in this vein that I draw upon Deleuzian and Lacanian notions of desire in order to analyse the development apparatus as a desiring machine that produces all sorts of desires that can never be fulfilled in reality for the reason that they do not belong to the present.

And the point not to be lost is that this shortfall cannot be accounted for only by development projects' inability to deliver, but that it also points to the utopian and revolutionary potentiality of subaltern people's modes of desiring. The global development apparatus therefore persists in a double bind. It feeds upon people's imaginations/desires while banalizing them through organizational practices that are becoming increasingly managerialist (see Murphy in Chapter 2 of this volume; Cooke, 2004). Consequently, it can be argued that the embrace of postmodern/Third Way disavowal strategies by the global development apparatus entails the betrayal of a promise – that of development – Third World people carry on believing in. As a result the (utopian) object(ive) of development is lost, and it is my argument that this betrayal is reflected in the ascendancy of management as the new neoliberal ideology of global capitalism.

Ferguson's work is firmly embedded within a critical tradition in development anthropology and sociology. Curiously, little reference is made in this literature to debates in the field of development administration and management studies (DAM; see Cooke, 2004). Yet, there are remarkable parallels between debates in the respective fields of development and management studies. Thus, we encounter a shared equivocation around the critique of modernist approaches to development/management and a certain hesitance *vis-à-vis* uncompromising, everything-goes, forms of postmodern thinking. Here, I wish to extend the argument outlined above through a sustained engagement with the field of critical management studies (CMS), and in particular the critique of (global) managerialism as a hierarchical, authoritarian and depoliticizing ideology that excludes all forms of organizing that do not fit with the current neoliberal agenda of global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Parker 2002a; 2002b). One good example of the workings of this global agenda within development administration concerns the current fashion of 'participatory development management' within the World Bank. Cooke (2003a; 2004) and Murphy (see Chapter 2 in this book) have spelt out the managerialist assumptions underpinning such apparently benevolent management approaches. Cooke in particular argues that participatory management approaches have to be located within a longer history of development management that can be traced back to the principles of indirect rule during British colonial administration, and reinvented in postcolonial strategies for the management of natives in the United States. Today the same principles are recycled so as to naturalize the current imperatives of user's fees and

'individual responsibility'. Murphy, in turn, sees such managerial approaches as concomitant with the rise of a global managerial elite wedded to the neoliberal ideology of the free market as a one-size-fits-all solution for all organizational problems. This, it must be said, is another strand of critique that resembles strongly that of authors such as Ferguson, while drawing upon different sources.

I do share with critical currents within DAM the interest in exploring the theoretical, political and ethical implications of taking, from a critical non-managerialist point of view, the promise of development seriously. In my view, the challenge is how to be 'for managing' while being 'against management', or more programmatically how to think of 'managing without management'. As Parker (2002a: 217–24) persuasively argues, managing is about coping with everyday life situations, finding ongoing ways of resolving mundane and less mundane problems, while holding to defined notions about the good life. Managing thus is quite common in societies that do not know, or discard, the very concept of management. Yet, the inverse is not possible as management always goes together with assumptions about the possibility to manage the world according to defined organizational frameworks and objectives (for example, the language of missions and visions). Parker's reflections on management as an essentially authoritarian project are highly useful in this regard. However, I do agree with Cooke's criticism that Parker tends to see organization as the critical operational unit and that we should be aware of the existence of global managerialist institutional agendas that shape the functioning of even the most well-intentioned local organizations (such as NGOs, cooperatives, women's associations, et cetera).

It is my aim in this chapter to bring together these two sets of debates with a view to contributing to a productive cross-fertilization between the different fields of development studies and critical management studies. In the next section I put forward an example of the disjuncture between managing/coping and managerialism, as reflected in forms of imagining organization that, on first sight, may seem quite modernist but in fact are ways of engaging with the promise of development.

Andean Villagers and the Promises that Arrive only in Their Dreams

It must be a strange experience for students of development well versed in the latest discussions about 'post-' or 'alternative' development to be

confronted with the thoughts of Andean villagers in the Peruvian highlands. There, when engaging people in discussions about the meanings and costs of development the position is clear: what is needed is big and small infrastructure, highways and feeder roads, irrigation systems, dams, schools, town halls, et cetera, what in local parlance are called *'las obritas'* ('the small works') *they* (meaning the state and NGOs) should bring to us. In fact, when the Andean villagers are asked how they would define development their answer is surprisingly straightforward: 'an extensionist who comes to our field and tells us the kind of fertilizers we should apply in order to increase our yields'.

We should not discard these ideas as the naïve thoughts of people unaware of the risks that development interventions entail. Neither should we see them as a lack of knowledge of the possible dangers and environmental hazards of infrastructural works and agricultural innovations. These people are utterly conscious of the momentous consequences, and dangers, of development projects/programmes for their everyday lives. What they mean to say, though, is that they hold development institutions accountable for their unfulfilled promises: the roads that were never built, the schools that never arrived, the jobs that never opened up – in other words, the material progress that was promised but only arrives in their dreams.

We see here an interesting paradox, that of the appropriation of highly modernist notions of development by subalterns who take development managers to task for not being able to deliver what they promise. This is not to say that Andeans did successfully internalize the organizing principles of modernity. Quite on the contrary, as we show elsewhere (De Vries and Nuijten, 2003; see also Nuijten and Lorenzo, 2005). The people I am referring to are seen as 'the other' of modernity, yet they do engage with its promises in a sustained way by developing organizing practices that mimic those of the state and development institutions. Yet this mimesis is at the same time a subversion and a ridiculing of modernist principles of organization. To put it very briefly, modernist notions of organization have been appropriated by indigenous communities in very strict ways through the imposition of a comprehensive set of rules and prohibitions in what could be defined as a highly demanding disciplinary regime. The point, however, is that this disciplinary fantasy cannot be enforced in practice, thus giving way to all kinds of organizing practices that are viewed as 'our customary ways of dealing with our own reality'. This dialectic between the modernist fantasy of 'community order and

discipline' and the flexibility of local organizing practices is dealt with by the villagers in a highly ironic mode. One fine example of this contradiction is the practice of *faenas* or work parties that start early in the morning as highly 'organized' projects (in terms of labour division, task definition, hierarchical order), yet end up in the evening as rather carnivalesque drink parties. The point I wish to make in this regard is that modernist fantasies of order and discipline serve as ways of engaging with the promise of development while holding to organizing practices that are everything but modernist.

As we see, the idea and promise of development as a utopian project are central in the thinking of these Andean villagers. This, however, is not any more the case for postmodern managerial thinkers. As I argue next, development thinking has traversed a long journey: modernization and political economy approaches have given way to a celebration of the end of the grand narratives in a self-reflexive or ironic mode. The concept of development has come to be seen as part of the problem and hence been subjected to thorough criticism as part of the ideological equipment of an outmoded modernist paradigm. It is my argument that such disavowals amount to a betrayal of a promise that has been taken all too seriously by the subjects of development. In other words, the grand narrative of development persists in the minds of people in the Third World. The major thrust of the chapter is therefore that rather than indulging in disavowal strategies, critical theorists should engage with the meanings and desires that the insistence in the promise of modernity entails.

The remainder of the chapter consists of four sections. First, I present a very short overview of four major theoretical approaches to development and argue that they fall short in their inability to engage with the fantastic and utopian side of the promise of development. Second, I delve deeper into two contemporary examples of what I call the betrayal of the promise of development, and conclude that the real subjects of ideology are not the people who insist in believing in the promise of development but rather the postmodern managerial thinkers who engage in strategies for disavowing its utopian images. In the third section, I engage with current dystopian representations of the Third World as corrupt and barbaric spaces delinked from modern civilization and argue that this amounts to a strategy for negating the antinomies produced by the managerialization of development. Finally, I engage with the political and ethical potentialities of utopian thinking (or as

Fournier denominates it 'utopianism') by going back to the example of the Andean villagers and their ways of imagining a different world. Utopianism, I conclude, is not about negating the present but rather about dealing with the small miracles that continuously take place around us and that we have so many difficulties grappling with.

Development Theories and Their Inability to Deal with the Promise of Development

In the literature we find manifold explanations for the shortfall of development and the disjuncture between goals and expectations and real outcomes. Those who follow a modernization perspective take a benevolent/magnanimous position towards development as part of a project of modernity that brings order, stability and growth. In this view there is simply no alternative but modern forms of organization for alleviating the fate of the poor. The very existence of a body of international agencies working on the promotion of new forms of expertise is viewed as a heroic (if quixotic) modernist endeavour (Robertson, 1984), or as the expression of the culture of modernity as manifested in the belief in planning and its symbolic paraphernalia (Hoben, 1995; see also Strathern, 2001, for a fascinating collection of articles on the rise of cultures of accountability as a mode of governing neoliberal enterprises and selves).

Radical political economists see donor-funded development projects as vehicles for the penetration of capitalist relations of production (for example Bernstein, 1979; 2001; Galli, 1981; de Janvry, 1982). In this view development interventions are not good or bad in themselves but must be analysed in terms of the political interests they represent. Although highly critical of development institutions such as the World Bank this approach does not extend its critique to the modernist assumptions of development management and organization. Thus, radical political economists are inclined to share with modernization thinkers the belief in the advantages of modernist technological and organizational forms (as enshrined in notions of advantages of scale), while decrying populist arguments in favour of small-scale organizing.

It should be noted that both modernization and radical political economy theories maintain a modernist belief in development as a way of improving the plight of Third World people. Since the late 1980s these theories have been joined by two other perspectives which are

highly critical of such modernist assumptions: the poststructuralist critique of development, also denominated 'postdevelopment', and reflexive modernization theory. Both perspectives have in common a critical stance towards modernity, the first by taking a dismissive attitude towards it, and the second by arguing that the project of modernity, rather than exhausted, should be completed through a second modernization.

The poststructuralist perspective of 'postdevelopment' (Escobar, 1995b; Sachs, 1992) criticizes development by demonstrating its dependence on patriarchal, positivist and ethnocentric principles that derive from the modernist project of the Enlightenment. In this view development management is seen as a constellation of power–knowledge geared at controlling Third World populations through forms of governmentality in which what is at stake is nothing less than the disciplining of bodies through the imposition of epistemic structures that condition the ways in which 'the Other' (in this case Third World people) relate to their own bodies and to nature. This, in fact, is a sustained critique of Western modernity that has broad parallels in the field of management and organization studies (Burrell, 1988; Böhm, 2005; Clegg, 1989). In this view, development, rather than a promise, is a modernist illusion. The reflexive modernization perspective, on the other hand, argues that modernity has adopted a reflexive character, thus rejecting what it labels as the utopianism/vanguardism of past notions of progress (Beck, 1994a, 1994b; Giddens, 1994). The argument here is that in an era of post-scarcity, social struggles revolve around the acknowledgement of all sorts of risks brought about by modernity (thus by development). Modernity from having been a promise becomes a risky challenge to be managed accordingly. Reflexive modernization thus sets out to devise forms of non-utopian management as exemplified in styles of deliberative democratic planning, soft management, horizontal strategic planning, and – especially in development management – the use of participatory governance approaches.[1] This line of thought, I argue later, is a good example of what I denominated the betrayal of the promise of development.

These four approaches – though differing in their stance towards development institutions and management – share a common set of assumptions. First, there is the common idea that development relies on forms of expertise that come from outside. The locus of control thus lies with the expert manager who is seen as the prime designer of development. The same holds for the ways in which Third World people are seen to engage with development, or in other words how they come

to 'desire development'. Thus, it is assumed that the desire for development is instilled by foreign commodities, values and organizational structures. No attention is paid to the diverse ways in which people construct desires that enable them to dream about a different future. Thus, it is my argument that the idea of development relies on the belief in promises that by definition cannot be fulfilled. In other words, there is a certain 'excess' in the concept of development that is central to its functioning. The desire for development points, therefore, to a utopian element that is always-already out of place. It is precisely this utopian element that postmodern and Third Way critiques of the emancipatory potential of development discard. It is to these critiques that I now turn.

The Postmodernization of Development: the Loss of the Object

Since the early 1980s a vast body of literature has emerged that focuses on narratives and discourses of development from a semiotic and deconstructivist perspective. What we could call the 'linguistic turn' in development (and management studies) occurred in the context of the rise of neoliberal thinking all over the planet and the design and implementation of programmes of structural adjustment in Third World countries. One can wonder whether it is a mere coincidence that this withdrawal from the object of development by theorists occurred at the time that programmes of national development came under attack from the international financial community, and development policies were being directed to the creation of the macro-economic conditions that would permit Third World societies to reap the benefits from globalization.

Semiotic and narrative analyses of development policy discourse view 'development' not so much as a process of social transformation but in terms of more or less coherent sets of discursively constructed claims, diagnoses and prescriptions that function both as a legitimization and as a roadmap for practical action (Apthorpe, 1986; Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996; Roe, 1991; 1995). Development thus is approached as a 'text' that is discursively constructed and that hence is subject to deconstruction and reinterpretation.

Here, I wish to argue that the reframing of development as an object of discourse works as a distancing or disavowal strategy with respect to the real effects of development interventions on peoples and societies in the Third World. This, I argue, is conducive to a cynical attitude on the

part of the development expert, an attitude that is indicative of what we could call a postmodern form of ideology. In what follows, I provide a sample of such views and show how the focus on policy discourse and narratives of development perfectly lends itself for various forms of postmodern managerialism.

It is important to go back into history and note that the interest in development policy discourse started as a critique of the positivistic and naturalistic underpinnings of common policy thinking and its role in excluding certain issues and actors from decision-making processes. As Bernard Shaffer puts it:

> The question is whether there is an objective world of problems outside the problems with which the practices of policy claim to be concerning themselves. In practice policy constructs those sorts of agendas of problems which can be handled. It then labels the items on those agendas as problems in particular ways. For example, people become referred to as categories of target-groups to whom items of services can be delivered. (Schaffer, 1985: 33)

Labelling practices are prominent in this critique of policy making as a way of trying to make sense of the disjuncture between both real-life situations and social actors and the ways in which these are represented through labelling devices in policy discourse. Thus Geoff Wood points out:

> Labelling is essentially a contradictory process in the sense that its primary function of disorganizing the dominated, the weak, the vulnerable, the poor or just the excluded (via the decomposition of their story into separate cases) contains simultaneously the potential of reorganizing interests around the solidarities which the labelling might itself engender. It is perhaps more accurate then to recognise hegemonic tendencies in this labelling process rather than hegemony itself. (Wood, 1985: 20).

With the work of Apthorpe (1986) we see a further textualization of development, as when he argues that his objective is to show how language is used to construct and legitimize particular sets of codes, rules and roles. His argument is that policy discourse can become a sort of rationalization of the hegemony of development experts within the 'development arena'. As he says, '"discursive practice" can be taken as an example of the capture and exercise of power by some sorts of people, arguments and organizations against others through specific happenings, in particular arenas, over various periods of time' (1986: 377).

Apthorpe thus sets out to 'deconstruct development policy' by analysing the 'discursive habits' of social scientists engaged in development studies so as to remind the reader that 'facts never speak for themselves, they are bespoken and spoken for'. So, contradiction and conflict are inherent in the actual practice of public policy (what he calls policy speak; Apthorpe, 1986). He argues that:

> It is precisely so as to *manage*, to exclude, or otherwise deal with potential contradictions and conflict that development policy discourses have constructed their ploys and games. These discursive ploys are available only to certain sorts of participants who for the most part are themselves labelled and disguised so as to avoid a full display or enlightenment about what they are doing. (Apthorpe, 1986: 385)

In fact, what Apthorpe is arguing here is that reification (failure to refer to an actual world) is integral to development management discourse. At the same time he is interested in the workings of hegemony through the social construction of expert knowledge.

This form of deconstruction still responds to a critical agenda aimed at creating space for manoeuvre for actors threatened with exclusion from the policy process. The argument is that policy works through discursive ploys and labels and by rendering invisible certain actors and issues. The challenge for the critical development practitioner then is that of opening discursive spaces in which alternative voices and interpretations can play a role. Although the terrain in which these struggles take place is very much envisioned as that of discourse, the subjects of development still remain on the horizon of Shaffer's, Wood's, and Apthorpe's preoccupations. The role of the critical development analyst is envisioned as that of 'giving voice' and making 'visible' the interests and concerns of people who in policy discourse only appear under a label. Yet the question of under which conditions 'development' fails or succeeds is not posed. Development policy is a form of encapsulation and categorization aiming at incorporating Third World people within defined hegemonic structures. Though critical of the hegemony of development, such deconstructive strategies shy away from confronting it, let alone positing alternatives to it. Not only is the discourse of development policy and management all-empowering, but it seems that it is impossible to escape its purview. This, I argue, is the beginning of the betrayal of the promise of development.

It should be borne in mind that discourse analysis as propounded by

authors such as Ferguson and Escobar aims at developing a poststructuralist critique of modernity, which is different from postmodern deconstructive and managerialist approaches to development. The difference between poststructuralism and postmodern positions is that the first is a critique of the Enlightenment (for example, see Foucault's *The Order of Things* [1994], for an analysis of the construction of epistemic objects through labelling and classification devices) whereas the latter is 'beyond' critique, hence taking an amused stance *vis-à-vis* the project of modernity. This is expressed in the postmodern ethos of play and the celebration of difference. Here we obtain the pure textualization of development as a set of narratives that lend themselves for all sorts of recombinations and that cannot be captured within any master narrative.[2]

Emery Roe's work (1991; 1995) is a case in point. He takes a self-avowedly postmodern managerial stance, while jettisoning any notion of 'critique' of the hegemony of experts. He sees narratives as stories with a beginning, middle, and end that purport to describe and explain a problem to be addressed and to imply a solution. Development narratives in his view are stories about the world that frame problems in particular ways and in turn justify particular solutions. While policy deconstructivists see the role of the analyst as that of creating room for manoeuvre for alternative arguments and projects and hence as a way of including those who are excluded from the policy process, postmodern narrativists such as Roe conceive the task of the development manager as that of a translator whose task it is to produce narratives that make sense to policy makers.

However, as Talal Asad (1986) argues, translation always implies a reappropriation and transformation of a work by putting it in a different language and hence represents a form of exercising power. What is troubling in Roe's pragmatic approach is not so much the idea that simplistic notions of a detached reality out there are naïve, but that he denies the materiality of social antagonism as immanent to development.[3] What is lost in this postmodern perspective is the fact that development as an organizational apparatus is fraught with all sorts of material contradictions and struggles by which the field is politically constituted. As Chantal Mouffe (2005: 2) argues, an 'anti-political vision which refuses to acknowledge the antagonistic dimension constitutive of "the political" … reveals a complete lack of understanding of what is at stake in democratic politics and of the dynamics of constitution of political identities and … contributes to exacerbating the antagonistic potential existing in society'.

Another case in point of such denial of the politics of development is David Mosse's anti-poststructuralist criticism of Foucauldian perspectives on development. This is a good example of an approach that sets out to analyse ethnographically the 'reality' of development by focusing on all sorts of practices of development, except for the practice of critique itself which, indeed, has always been inherent in good development thinking. This is an approach that eschews any form of critical commitment to Third World people's desires and aspirations for development.

Mosse takes poststructuralist accounts of development to task for the sin of 'teleological functionalism', in other words, for assuming development practice should be concluded from an ethnographic analysis (Mosse, 2004). Furthermore he decries Foucauldian approaches for not doing justice to the complexity of policy making and its relationship to project practice and to the creativity and skills involved in negotiating development. He singles out in particular Ferguson and Escobar for their unwillingness to take into account the predicaments of policy makers and development managers. As he puts it, '[t]he ethnographic question is not whether but how development projects work; not whether a project succeeds, but how success is produced' (Mosse, 2004: 641). This social construction of success is achieved through the active enrolment of supporters including the 'beneficiaries'. Yet, he qualifies such a view by adding that this does not necessarily mean 'that such compromises are in the interests of the poor, who are often excluded from benefits by pragmatic collaborations between junior bureaucrats and the better-off that compromise development targeting' (Mosse 2004). Underpinning such a relativistic view of success is an overtly managerialist organizational theory in which failure is accounted for in terms of opportunist alliances between inexperienced (local) bureaucrats and the (local) elite. In this view, development experts – who of course are all seniors – are exempted from carrying responsibility for failure. The critical point to be made is that this kind of analysis conceals a systematic bias in the distribution of the benefits and costs of development; experts engage in the social construction of success for their own professional benefits, while the subjects of development (both the duped and non-duped beneficiaries) have to bear the brunt of the real consequences of development projects. Mosse's perspective in fact sounds as a perfect legitimation of the workings of a global managerial elite (see Murphy in Chapter 2 of this volume).

At a theoretical level, Mosse's critique of poststructuralism is, in my

view, quite convoluted. Foucauldian analysis can be criticized for many reasons – for not taking into account issues of agency, for being utterly disparaging, et cetera – but a criticism directed to its inability to make a neat distinction between description and analysis is besides the point. For at the centre of the theoretical apparatus of Foucault is the notion that discourse and practice are inseparably intertwined, that they co-produce each other. Any account/description of practice is a (discursive) practice itself, while even the most theoretical discourse is itself embedded in day-to-day practices. Arguing that practices are untainted by concepts and theories is mere empiricism. As for Mosse's criticisms that post-structuralists are not interested in the predicaments of policy makers, one's fault is the other's virtue. Authors such as Escobar are indeed highly critical of the knowledge practices of development experts for the precise reason that they tend to systematically devalue all kinds of knowledge that are not institutionally legitimated. One good example of such delegitimization is the current managerial use of 'local knowledge' for participatory planning purposes. Is this not a good example of an attempt to capture and institutionalize (see Cooke, 2003a; 2004) types of knowledge that by definition escape the reach of expert institutions? What if indigenous people refuse to 'share' their knowledge with planners and policy makers? And, is 'local' not a pejorative form of referring to everything that is not expert knowledge?

Concluding, postmodern managerial approaches to development that reject 'critique' for its modernist or teleological connotations have several serious limitations in common. The rejection of 'determinist' forms of causal thinking as in modernization theory or political economy (in terms of stages, et cetera) and the disavowal of any interest in larger power issues is substituted by the proliferation and re-signification of the concept of development into a plethora of variations around the same theme. As Watts puts it,

> some recent scholarship self-consciously explores development as a text, or more properly as a series of texts, from a semiotic or rhetorical perspective ... However, Roe's analysis, like those of Apthorpe and McCloskey, generally ignores or does not develop the social basis of ideas, the social and historical context in which such stories are produced and told, and how or why some stories become dominant and others relegated. (Watts, 1995: 265)

The question then becomes what the emphasis on interpretations, stories and narratives actually accomplishes. Isn't it the case that this disavowal of

material reality and attendant social contradictions ultimately leads to a further reification and depoliticization of development? In other words, doesn't this lead to a radical disjunction between the rhetoric and the practice of development? The narrativization of development presumes that the latter is only knowable through the conversations in which policy makers and development managers/experts are involved. Development in this sense becomes tautological, a compromise formation devoid of a telos in which it is not possible to imagine a different world. It relates to the practices, worldviews and technologies by which development intervention is accomplished and not to people's struggles for the construction of a new kind of society. In other words, language rather than practices or events becomes the focus of attention in these theories; hence, the object of development is lost.

Development and the Third Way: Reflexive Modernization

We now turn to a different disavowal strategy represented by another perspective on development: 'reflexive modernization' or the 'Third Way'. Reflexive modernization is an interesting example of a social theory that engages in wider social debates about the future of society while breaking with notions of development as an emancipatory collective project.

It is important to pay some attention here to Beck's and Giddens's notion of the second modernization (Beck, 1994a, 1994b; Giddens, 1994, 1998), the idea being that we have entered a reflexive society organized around the consciousness and management of all sorts of risks. In terms of development thinking the argument would be that old modernist paradigms (modernization and political economy theories) have failed in designing environmentally sound, democratic and sustainable paths of development. What is a limitation in modernist paradigms is their naïve belief in Enlightenment values such as progress and emancipation and accordingly their lack of self-critical reflexivity. Present-day conflicts are not any more between social categories or classes fighting for the distribution of the social product, or between dominant elites and subordinated populations about the stakes involved in social transformation. Rather they are about how to deal with the vulnerabilities engendered by technological change. And the point is that these vulnerabilities are experienced and dealt with in individual reflexive ways.

According to these theories, the first modernization has been all too successful in erasing fixed boundaries (class, gender, cultural, etcetera),

thus making redundant any ideology based on shared social consciousness and interests. This negation of the existence of ideological mediations between the individual and society results in an image of the world as one in which everything seems to be negotiable, a matter of individual choice. Rather than following some outmoded meta-narrative of progress and transformation external to people's own reflexive understandings of the world, the challenge then becomes that of creating new kinds of social arenas (platforms or movements) in which agendas can be constructed so as to deal reflexively with the legacy of the first modernization (environmental degradation, et cetera). This colonization of the social world by reflexivity – the idea that since everything is subject to individual choice the problem of dealing with pernicious externalities resides in developing and enhancing individuals' reflexive capacities – resonates with the commonsense postmodern doxa of the impossibility of intellectual mastery of the 'real world'.

The problem with this position is that in a world in which all are modern, in which modernity is pluralized, theory has no role anymore in constructing a project of society. Rather the role of theory becomes that of mediating between the structural conditions of global change and individuals' choices and preferences. The problem, therefore, is not ignorance but the multiplicity of incommensurable knowledges and consequently the lack of a single master scientific narrative. As a result, science loses the legitimacy it had during the first modernization. This is an image of a world transparent to the individual who – bombarded by new technologies, types of knowledge and choices – has to organize his/her life by developing advanced forms of reflexivity. It cannot be stressed enough, however, that reflexive modernization does not call for the demise of expert knowledge. On the contrary, new kinds of reflexive expertise are demanded as exemplified in forms of interactive, or deliberative, management and policy making.

In my view, there are major problems with the notions of society and global change that underlie theories of reflexive modernization. To begin with, the presumption of the inevitability of capitalist modernity – in fact its naturalization as the only game in town – is, as Bewes argues, the ultimate form of reification itself. It does not address the question of what it would mean not to be modern (Latour 1993), or to be excluded from modernity. Bewes puts it elegantly (2002: 119):

> To claim to have transcended the dialectic of modernization and counter-modernization in a new order of 'reflexive modernization', to claim the

> virtue of freedom from ideology, to situate oneself 'beyond left and right', to declare that, finally, the tension arising from the discrepancy between human knowledge and the realm of the unknown is a thing of the past, is to re-inscribe oneself more firmly than ever within the dialectic. Such convictions are representative of the most subtle and therefore most pernicious forms of false consciousness ... In the risk society nothing escapes human administration and determination; the implication of 'reflexivity' is that all mediation has dissolved.

What are the implications of theories of reflexive modernization and political programmes such as the Third Way for development theory? One thing that strikes the mind is that within these perspectives the 'Third World' is deemed to stand outside history. The pervasiveness of abject poverty is not viewed as an expression of global processes of unequal development but in terms of the lack of reflexivity in cultures and regions that are not able to engage in a path of sustainable transformation. It thus corresponds to Manuel Castells's (2000) idea that some peoples, some regions, are outside of globalization and thus outside history. The idea, then, is that in Asia people are reaping the fruits of globalization, but people are doing so less in Latin America and not at all in Africa. The reasons for this are increasingly sought in the persistence of given cultural mind-sets that hamper the capacity of societies to create an enabling environment for economic change. As Bewes (2002: 118) puts it, 'reflexive modernization posits the triumph of Western capitalism, meaning its decisive mastery over *everything that it is not* ...' This is a theory of disenchantment precluding any place for utopia. It is also a theory in which there is no space for intellectual 'critique', for dissenting voices arguing for a radical transformation of society and of the global order of things. In this view an organization such as the MST (the landless movement in Brazil) that sets out to organize people on the basis of their belonging to an excluded social category is but a hangover of the past. Globalization thus becomes a narrative of the freezing of history as imagined in the trope of the end of history (Fournier, 2002). As Fredric Jameson (1992) puts it, for these authors it is easier to imagine the end of the world through some sort of ecological catastrophe than the end of capitalism.

The current popularity of the notion of 'sustainable livelihoods' is a good example of an approach that disowns the utopianism of narratives of social transformation, of any attempt to subject the capitalist mode of production to a fundamental critique. Thus we can see the concept of

sustainable livelihoods as indicative of the anxiety caused by the failure of modernization theory to relate with poverty, not simply as a problem to be overcome, but as a persistent reality, and as a problem of its own making. This is in fact an anxiety caused by development's inability to honour its promise. Reflexivity then becomes a strategy for dealing with such anxieties. In fact, the sustainable development approach itself is not subjected to reflexive introspection. The question is not that of 'what is there in the expectations of the poor that our theories cannot grasp', or, 'is there something in the promise of development that transcends what we can deliver', but that of 'how can we represent, analyze and *manage* the poor's livelihoods so as to make them sustainable'.[4]

Rather than subjecting the theory to reflexive analysis, the demand for reflexivity is transposed onto the objects, or categories, of development 'projects'. The anxiety caused by development's inability to reflect upon its own persistent failures, as a purported rejection of reified theory, produces notions that are not less reified themselves. Thus a *livelihood* is seen both as a way of experiencing the world, the environment, the economy, et cetera (we could even say a structure of experience), and as an object of knowledge and intervention. Such a representation of the lives of development subjects, for the purpose of sustainable planning, has the great advantage of avoiding any form of theoretical positioning, as was the case in past discussions within peasant studies on commoditization processes. As Bewes puts it, 'reification refers to the act whereby a process or relation is generalised into an abstraction, and thereby turned into a "thing"' (2002: 3). A life in the 'sustainable livelihoods' approach becomes a thing, and this thingitude of life is the hallmark of reification. The phenomenology of the thing is then put at the service of planning/policy-making while avoiding the need to reflect about the politics of representation that are involved in such practices.

This reified, virtual realm of development interventions expresses itself through morality plays in which experts transform themselves into facilitators who embrace error, while beneficiaries play at being indigenous people ready to share their local knowledge, in which women are ready to present themselves as small entrepreneurs so as to qualify for micro-credit programmes (Rahman, 1998), thus generating effective networks of complicity. As Murray Li (2000) beautifully shows, this morality play is rendered possible by an act of disavowal taking the following form: we all know that development interventions go together with all sorts of struggles and conflicts, that all talk about good intentions

conceals the fact that it is all a big farce; however, for practical purposes we act as if we all are part of a big family united by our shared belief in the larger goal of creating a world without poverty, injustice and so on. Next, I argue that this is not merely a pragmatic strategy but an essential element for the very workings of ideology: in other words, that hegemony works through the construction of webs of complicities, which entice social actors to operate in cynical ways.

The New Ideology of Cynicism: I Know, But …

It can be said, then, that the current dominant approaches in development policy and management, whether modernization-based or narrative-based, are examples of the wider depoliticizing effects of the developmental managerial apparatus. In effect, it may lead to a certain kind of cynicism, which – following the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1988) – can be phrased as 'they know very well what they are doing, but still they are doing it', which for our purposes could be phrased as, 'they know very well that the development apparatus does not deliver what it promises, but still they play the game'. The cynical subject, thus, fully accepts that the official version of reality is distorted, yet still embraces it for pragmatic reasons. Slavoj Žižek (1993; 1994) argues that the cynic is the quintessential subject of ideology in postmodern times. To show this, he turns around the classical Marxist critique of ideology in which knowledge (or in fact the lack of knowledge) defines its functioning: 'they do not know it, but they are doing it'. Ideology, in Žižek's view, thus pertains to reality and not to (false) knowledge. What is overlooked in theories of false consciousness is that reality is always-already structured by illusion, that there always is a 'belief before the belief', and that ideology works through the disavowal of such primordial beliefs. This is what the cynic overlooks, that s/he already believes, that his/her acts are not anchored in rational decisions but in the acceptance of reality 'as it is', the point being that this uncritical acceptance of reality is ideology as its purest.

Let us take as an example the case of the development expert who knows that the development apparatus is a crazy machine that feeds on the best intentions of practitioners and the desires of those it targets. His/her argument will be that those who believe in development are gullible people who should know better. For it is just a discursive game in which what matters is your capacity to produce the most persuasive narrative.

Yet the postmodern development manager who for entirely pragmatic reasons (since s/he knows how things work in reality) engages in the perpetuation of the machine through the manufacturing of development narratives and 'new' policy/managerial models is in fact the 'real believer', ready to invest in the official text of the development apparatus while disavowing the essentially political nature of development. The status of this primordial belief/illusion is that of fetishistic disavowal in the form of 'I know very well that the development industry often has tremendous negative effects on the lives of Third World people, yet I act as if it were just a game, a discursive construction without any real effects'. As Žižek (1989: 316) puts it, 'Cynical distance is just one way – one of the many – to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, *we are still doing it*.

The Return of the Disavowed Object and the Radicalization of Development Theory

Ironically, the concept of reflexive modernization has led to a counter-position within development studies in the work of Mark Duffield (2001; 2002). He shows in a very explicit way how the anxieties caused by the disavowal of the object produce all sorts of images of the Third World as a fantasmic obscene space, representing everything that the West is not. The questions posed in theories of reflexive modernization can then be posed as 'what does reflexivity look like in societies that have never made a transition from a first to a second modernization, that exhibit a "lack" rather than an excess of development, societies that experience all the disadvantages of development (environmental degradation, all sorts of risks ranging from the emergence of new types of wars to AIDS, to draughts), without enjoying its erstwhile advantages (material well-being, health services, stable bureaucracies, the existence of a public sphere)?' Take note that according to conventional modernization theory, such societies lack modern class structures and even more a progressive middle class, as residual classes such as the peasantry have been always majoritarian. These are purportedly postcolonial societies whose nation-states have followed different trajectories from Western industrialized countries and suffer from endemic wars and humanitarian disasters. They are societies, in short, that in the media and in policy documents are represented as the 'other' of modernity.

Mark Duffield (2001) deftly shows how present representations of the Third World as spaces of excess and abjection interrelate with a new political economy in the South that, rather than examples of failure, should be seen as creative responses to neoliberal structural adjustment policies. His line of reasoning is as follows. According to much contemporary thinking, Third World societies with 'failed states' have fallen into a perverse cycle of poverty, war and social regression, thus having regressed into marginal or borderland regions that reflect the failure of modernity in much of the South. But, says Duffield, such representations of failure and images of regression provide the justification and legitimacy for new kinds of managerial programmes, for a new will to govern the unstable areas of the global margins. (Likewise, mainstream thinking about 'failed states' makes a neat distinction between metropolitan areas and the borderlands, the latter exhibiting traits such as barbarity, excess and irrationality in contrast to the civility, restraint and rationality of the former.) These representations, Duffield stresses, are imaginary, or ideological in the sense that they operate as legitimizations of this new will to govern. For '[t]he borderlands are ... imagined spaces of breakdown, excess and want that exist in and through a reforming urge to govern, that is to reorder the relationship between people and things, including ourselves, to achieve desired outcomes' (2002: 1053).

Following Castells (1996) and Cox (1995), Duffield argues that these legitimating processes engender new forms of reflexivity in the South. Thus the outcome of the present logic of capitalist development that excludes large areas of the world gives way to a different kind of nonliberal reflexive modernity in the South, which compels these societies to uncouple from liberal forms of regulation. Conflict in his view rather than an impediment for development has become the source of, and pretext for exploiting, the new development opportunities provided by globalization. Only, development follows a different logic from that of the metropolitan areas. Whilst metropolitan areas constitute integrated spaces of trade and investment propelled by globalization within a liberal capitalist logic, the borderlands thrive in the shadows of such a logic exhibiting a nonliberal logic of overlapping networks of illegal trade and war.[5]

Development within this reformed managerial discourse has been able to transform itself and overcome criticisms directed to its apparent lack of success, through the radicalization of the concept of development. As Duffield puts it, 'Aid can be seen as part of an emerging and essentially

illiberal system of global governance ... embodied in public–private networks of aid practice that bring together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies' (2002: 1050). It should be clear that this new form of governance directed to the reconstruction of entire societies in the South is in essence an extremely authoritarian and managerial kind of project, as manifested in large-scale interventions to build 'social capital' and create civil societies. Here we see the return of the repressed object of development in the guise of neocolonial programmes of civilization and containment of 'barbarian' Southern populations.

So far, it has been argued that narrative and reflexive approaches to development thinking lead to the loss/disavowal of its object. Development thus becomes part of a wider apparatus of rule aimed at managing risks or governing distant and unruly populations. In effect, the development apparatus has become part of such an illiberal system of global governance constituted through networks of complicity between international agencies, warlords, drug and weapon mafias. Yet, while the discourse of development has been radicalized and its managerial field has expanded, Third World people's desire for development persists. Hence, the gulf between, on the one hand, the images and representations of the Third World as a dangerous space that has to be contained and, on the other, the expectations of modernity as experienced by people in the South has never in history been so large.

We obtain then the paradox that development in practice is banalized as a means for managing relationships with an illiberal South yet Third World people do insist on the promise of development. In other words they refuse to compromise their desire for development. Next I argue that this stance of not compromising your desire does have a tremendous utopian potential. I elaborate this argument by counterposing it to the Foucauldian postdevelopment perspective that disparages development as a ploy intended to manipulate Third World people's aspirations.

Interrogating the Poststructuralist Agenda: Utopianism and the Ethics of the Real

Escobar (1995b) has brilliantly applied Foucault's ideas to development when arguing that development has been rendered possible through the invention of poverty. The representation of the 'other' as poor, indigent, and thus in need of aid is part of the constitution of a network of power

relations that reproduces images both of otherness as pathology and of the 'other' as a subject to be reconstructed through the expertise of development managers. Accordingly, disciplinary power is harnessed by techniques of classification and categorization (for example, the use of indicators and economic modelling techniques), that provide the rationalities of government (or governmentality) through which the conditions that impede development can be identified and analysed. In other words, governmentality is about the problematization of the social as a realm that lends itself for the application of managerial technologies of government aiming at instilling the idea of development as both the problem and the solution for the predicament of postcolonial subjects.

It cannot be emphasized enough that, in this view, 'problematization' through the production of rationalities of government (governmentality) is the process by which both regimes of legitimization are constructed and the social becomes the object of the gaze of the development apparatus. At the same time the aims and objectives of development operate as pretexts for the workings of governmentality. In this way the social is constructed as a space for intervention through which development subjects are fashioned as the targets of the technologies of development. The political programme of poststructuralists therefore is that of fracturing the unified gaze of the development apparatus so as to render possible the dissemination of other knowledges.

But is this a political programme that corresponds with the desires and dreams of the subjects of development? Let's go back to the example of Andean villagers, who rather than development alternatives or alternatives for development would opt for the real thing since, as they themselves put it, they have learnt to desire development. Is such a poststructuralist programme not again a disavowal of the promises of development, and of the utopian fantasies it generates? Is there not a danger that such a programme ends up colluding in the banalization of such promises? As argued, this 'real' of development is evoked by those small objects (the Andeans' *obritas*) that evoke something in development that is more than itself. In my view the challenge for a leftist critique of development is that of engaging with the incapacity of the development apparatus to deliver what it promises.

Of course, poststructuralist critiques of development would argue that individuals and communities can imagine themselves in other ways and devise strategies for combating or undermining the hegemony of development. Such strategies are usually presented and formulated in

terms of alternative modernities. But one could argue that this is just another way of disavowing the very fact that the subject of development is a desiring subject by virtue of the fact that s/he has learnt to yearn for a different kind of world. In other words, Foucauldian poststructuralist theory fails to interrogate the very lack in development itself, its inability to engage with the dreams and fantasies it triggers.

Which leads us to the classic Marxist position. The issue is not that of developing forms of social justice in response to capital's drive for profits, but that of surpassing and overcoming the very bourgeois notion of social justice. The issue is not that of providing development subjects with new languages for imagining (alternative) modernities, but that of interrogating how different stakeholders deal with the very inability of the development apparatus to deliver, which in a perverse way leads to their degradation to being a simple development category (Pigg, 1992). The issue, then, is not that of hiding the void of (purpose) development by imagining new subject positions (thus a proliferation of development categories and identities), but that of exposing as much as possible this void as a constitutive lack in the development apparatus.

A case in point are the villagers in the Andes I referred to before. In the 1980s the area was the centre stage of an uprising set up by the Maoist guerrilla movement the Shining Path. The Peruvian military reacted in an utterly repressive way, treating villagers as potential subversives and establishing peasant vigilante groups in order to counter the threat of the Shining Path. After the end of the conflict all sorts of NGOs and government organizations flooded the area with programmes aiming at introducing forms of democratic governance with the help of managerial methodologies of participatory planning, organizational development and capacity building. Also, much emphasis was placed on the need to develop new forms of accountable leadership. An underlying assumption in these programmes was the idea that poverty and lack of modern forms of social organization had given the 'subversives' the opportunity to gain a foothold among traditional indigenous people. Such programmes thus were aimed at instilling modern democratic values and institutions in the Peruvian countryside.

There is no doubt that the new discourses of displacement and institution-building provided a precious opportunity to the development apparatus to expand its field of operations into topics such as gender, local organizations and leadership formation. And indeed many villagers and refugees did adopt the new identities so as to be eligible for aid.

However, not all Andeans chose to follow this path. Thus in some areas, rather than subjecting themselves to the imperatives of the development apparatus, villagers chose to organize themselves within their indigenous community organizations and thus to reinforce their own structures of leadership and accountability. At the same time they pressed government institutions to channel reconstruction money into tangible development structures (buildings, roads, markets), rather than into intangible activities such as workshops in participatory planning. The point not to be lost is that these Andean villagers did not compromise on their desire for development. Rather than letting the promise of development be banalized by neoliberal discourses of responsible citizenship and by the latest fads in development thinking they insisted on demanding the 'real' thing.

This example raises important questions for a notion of utopia, based on people's aspirations and dreams, that foregrounds people's capacity to desire. In this regard the work of Valerie Fournier (2002: 192) on utopianism as a 'critique and rejection of the present ... that makes the all too familiar "promise of neo-liberalism" look absurd, outrageous, but also "resistible"' is important. Utopianism differentiates itself from 'utopia' in the sense that it does not accept any kind of organizational closure or blueprint, while reasserting the truth that (different) choices are always possible and that the future is always open, and thus undecidable. Thus, organizational interventions always carry consequences which can be traced back to the decisions of particular actors. Utopianism is thus a strategy for cultivating possibilities that contrary to the neoliberal mantra does not evade responsibility for decision-making.

In a similar vein philosophers such as Žižek (1993), Zupančič (2002), and Badiou (2002) have developed such a call for utopian thinking in their Ethics of the Real, an ethics encapsulated by the Lacanian maxim 'don't compromise your desire'. The 'Real' here does not stand for reality, but for the principle of contradiction and antagonism that makes reality 'real'; that mysterious Thing that makes reality intractable to manipulation and management. Thus, if it is true that the development apparatus sustains its hegemony through the generation and banalization of hope, then not compromising your desire means refusing to accept the banalization of development by the anti-politics machine. This is an ethics of sustaining the capacity to desire, of demanding that which the development apparatus promises but is not capable of delivering. This is an ethics that demands the realization of the impossible through its

insistence on the 'real' thing, an ethics that believes in the existence of miracles. And, of course, from the point of view of these Andean communities, the impossible stands for a miracle that they expect to occur, and on which they keep insisting when dealing with governmental and nongovernmental programmes. For, in their eyes, there is nothing so excessive, utopian and miraculous as development itself.

There is no doubt that Andean people underwent a lot of suffering during the years of guerrilla and state violence. At the same time NGOs and state development agencies have drawn upon the new discourse of displacement and loss in order to justify new kinds of intervention that should function in a therapeutic and precautionary mode. The point not to be lost, however, is that such discourses render invisible the political agendas behind such interventions by establishing a 'natural' relation between poverty, subversion and displacement, while representing Andean people as passive victims of such processes. Within this line of thought new governance structures and forms of participation have to fill in the void created by the conflict. Yet, as we saw, many Andeans have responded by refusing to become trapped in this perverse logic of victimization and instead have proceeded to reinvent 'old' forms of communal solidarity and to engage in forms of peasant politics that enable them to press claims on the state and to fantasize about forms of development that strengthen community life.[6]

This, I think, is a good example of what Žižek calls an ethics of the Real that, in opposition to a depoliticized ethics of human rights, does not assume that there is any guarantee for its existence in an external 'humanitarian gaze', or in universal norms of victimization (see also Badiou, 2002). This entails a radical politicization of ethics; an ethics of the Real is an ethics of taking risks and making radical decisions, of not compromising a fundamental desire, which for Andeans means holding to defined images and practices of community institutions and fair access to land and other natural resources, as against state programmes of land privatization and neoliberal governance. This stance of not compromising on the desire for belongingness and justice that feeds Andean notions of development runs counter to the global development consensus that establishes that development is about the production of responsible and calculating individual citizens subject to forms of governmentality epitomized by depoliticized notions such as 'cost-sharing' and 'financial transparency'. Are such counter-tendencies then not really small miracles, in the sense that they attest to the capacity of

development subjects to desire a different world? Perhaps the Zapatista uprising of 1 January 1994 in Mexico, occurring on the same day that the North American Free Trade Association Treaty was installed, was just such an example of a miraculous, yet traumatic, event that came to symbolize the spurious universality of the global neoliberal project.

NOTES

1. For a critique of the Third Way approach in Brazil see Petras and Veltmeyer (2004).
2. Of course the classical text celebrating the end of master narratives is Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition*.
3. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have been path-breaking in their theorization of the notion of antagonism.
4. This analysis parallels Parker's (2002) critique of Third Way thinking as an ideology that maintains that no alternatives to neoliberalism are possible and that therefore the only way to deal with the absence of success is by prescribing the same remedies.
5. As Duffield puts it, invoking the example of Africa, 'the impact of structural adjustment served to accelerate the dismantling of non-viable patronage networks based on public bureaucracies. As an alternative, the metropolitan-encouraged process of privatization has provided the opportunity for many African rulers to develop trans-border networks as a new basis for political power' (Reno, 1998, cited by Duffield). At the same time, while the downsizing of the public sector and standing armies has increased the ranks of the unemployed, it has also provided the necessary personnel for the expanding shadow economy of extra-legal trade (p. 1056).
6. In fact, one such fantasy was based on the introduction of internet as a way of linking the community with the wider global world.

10

Real-*izing* Development: Reports, Realities and the Self in Development NGOs

Sadhvi Dar

> Ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing trangressions have as their main function to impose a system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating difference between within and without, above and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created. (Mary Douglas, 1969)

The 'textual turn' in the social sciences has received a fair share of criticism. Realists and positivists have rendered discursive investigations into social reality misguided, fluffy, pseudo-political science (Parfitt, 2002), and in some cases those within critical social science have also critiqued the poststructural perspective as dangerously unrealistic and lacking political conviction due to its hero worship of heterogeneity and depoliticized relativism (see Thorne & Kouzmin and De Vries, in chapters 8 and 9 of this volume). This critique of poststructural discursive research often has its roots in a modernist concern: the moral objective to strive towards improving reality through rigorous and rational inquiry, to promote a better way of being and experiencing life. At its heart then, the modernist project is concerned with revealing a single, objective truth that can unlock human potential and lead to progress. This chapter seeks to address these critiques of poststructuralism by promoting a politically engaged discourse analysis that both acknowledges the material effects of 'discourses' on development projects and promotes a diverse social reality. This double consequence, I argue, is a corollary of human language. If we can argue that language is the precondition for both diversity and homogeneity, then we can begin to work towards a more inclusive (heterogeneous, democratic) version of social reality, whilst at the same time embracing an outcome that seeks to improve human life and alleviate poverty.

The self is bound to social reality through language. Thus a single version of reality may be constructed through language that has *real* impact on the lives of beneficiaries that development projects seek to improve or develop. Therefore, in communicating reality we are condemned to construct it too (Hines, 1988). This is an ethical as much as a political issue for social scientists. Therefore, rather than embark on a search for the *real*, instead I propose an investigation into the *socially* real, that is, the authentic, the diverse and fragmented reality that is bound to language and in turn is bound to the subject (Butler, 1990). This chapter therefore also has its own political imperative: to promote a democratic and socially inclusive version of reality. And for this I make no apologies. On the other hand, this chapter embraces the agentive qualities of social reality and processes of construction. It is the self that manipulates meanings, interprets truths, experiences realities, and so a fragmentation of reality emerges that is resolved by creating a semblance of uniformity. In a way, I promote an aspect of critical social science that reflects a preoccupation of modernism – of the Enlightenment project in particular – that is explicitly committed to improving human life by undermining relativism and has been so eloquently described by Knights (1992). Yet I maintain my commitment to discovering heterogeneity in homogeneity and homogeneity in heterogeneity and so challenge the rigid dichotomy between structure and resistance that underlines debates about discourse and its relevance to the social sciences. This dichotomy I wish to challenge by collapsing both poles into each other. I therefore argue that the structures in language are always tantalizing the self to transgress and *change* social reality, and these transgressions are always bound to a structured reality.

More than embark on a theoretical exploration of this social phenomenon, I wish to present a way of empirically discovering it. This chapter outlines a fragment of empirical research that took place in India three years ago in conjunction with several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Due to the limitations of space, however, I am confined to describing just one of these organizations. I will be presenting observations, semi-structured interviews and an analysis of texts (namely, organizational reports) that illuminate the way cultural artefacts, *managerial artefacts*, can shed light on the subtle bind between subject, discourse and social reality.

My analysis is framed by the development management context and my study focuses on understanding the cultural relevance of reporting in

development NGOs. I attempt to unravel the social and cultural processes through which discursive artefacts impact realities experienced by NGO workers. Reporting, I suggest, has a constructive role in organizations. Reporting is creative (of roles, identities and activities in organizations) as well as stifling (delegitimating and closing off some identities and activities), leading to an ongoing ambiguity within organizations that workers never truly resolve, but instead *experience* as development management. It is this experience of existing in a fractured reality that allows the subject to choose a reality/truth, reject a reality/truth or give up that choice altogether. This is a study of *politics in managerial process* and the underlying *process in politics*. By tying my study of process to discourse, I do not undermine a critique of the material consequences of development management nor do I repress a political engagement with my object of study. On the contrary, I expose the very mechanisms through which development management is *made* real or real-*ized*; the way it is rendered a regime of truth and denoted legitimacy.

Reports as Artefacts of Modernity

Reporting as a practice stands at the nexus of a rising tension within NGOs: between homogeneity (that is, a drive to standardizing monitoring and evaluation practice) and heterogeneity (that is, a drive for bottom-up, participatory approaches). I wish to show how a critical management perspective can illuminate meanings attached to development work through exploring tensions embodied in reporting practices. I attempt to examine how managerialism as a tenet of modernity has imbued development practice with certain values and also has framed the way development ought to be thought about. The report can be thought of as the operationalization of managerial assumptions in organizations – it is a practice with a political and cultural history. Reporting in development NGOs can lead to a conflation of management ideals with development practices, giving birth to a unique clustering of activities associated with the term *development management*. Such activities include monitoring and evaluation, partnering, strategic alliances, crosscutting and thematic programming. As such, the emergence of the term *development management* has led to the proliferation of organizational practices that seek to homogenize development practice worldwide (Ferguson, 1990; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Murphy, 2005). In this way, reports can be

rendered as homogenizing practices in the way they reflect and also promote certain values and ways of framing reality: for example reports use certain textual representations of reality that imbue it with a sense of order and organization. These representations could be the use of tables, bullet points, professional jargon, white margins and black text. On the other hand, reports are also unique in the way they use a number of rhetorical techniques that are metaphorical and often pertaining to individual organizational writing styles. Metaphors of development management could be scientific, emotional or experiential, and I argue that these meanings embedded in reports frame the realities of workers, signifying the identities of workers and the activities the organization carries out. Reporting can be shown to be constructive of how managerialism and development as concepts are contingent to meanings created through workers' micro-negotiations (and therefore heterogeneous meanings) that ultimately real-*ize* development.

In this section, I cannot offer a comprehensive or even a partial critique of literatures that can help to highlight the cultural value of reporting in NGOs. Nevertheless, I do attempt to introduce the reader to a variety of academic fields (development studies, critical management studies, narrative theory, critical accounting and, briefly, theories of the self) that can be used to thread together a critique of reporting in organizations. By engaging in an interdisciplinary critique of the report, I make links to wider development management issues such as accountability, legitimacy and identity. Essentially, what I wish to explore in this critique is the main research question that guides my interest in development management: how might the report as a way of communicating reality crystallize ways of knowing and consequently real-*ize* development.

Ebrahim (2003) makes an important contribution to understanding the links between NGOs and reports and he does this by defining the report as a learning mechanism within NGOs that enables organizational change. Working between development studies, organization studies and social psychology, he builds a model of organizational learning that explores how the report is a mechanism implicated in how organizational identities emerge and consequently how development is constructed through texts. Organizational culture and identity are linked to the donor funding patterns inherent to how development is organized. This link is made tangible through reporting systems and accounting practices: it is an explicitly financial relation, but one that Ebrahim defines as an

implicit symbolic bind of information/reputation. This symbolism is inherent to NGOs' relationship with donors because the measurement of success – the quantification of social change – is so ambiguous. To reduce this ambiguity, information in reports is standardized, and instead reputations, status and prestige become defining measures for efficiency. The report is an object of exchange within this bind, and a representation of the organization itself that transforms information into a form of power.

These symbolic relations of exchange reduce ambiguity between organizations but consequently create interdependencies between NGOs. Behaviour and activities are homogenized through the creation of such interdependencies of information and reputation. Such 'information struggles' highlight the role of report content in the reproduction of unequal NGO–funder relations of power. Yet such a conceptualization of reports does little in assessing the constructive effects of such narratives on how the self and actions may be bound to reporting rhetoric. Information is either shared or limited – perhaps even eclipsed – in the hope of resisting donor priorities or in other cases of conforming to them. Information is the currency that structures this exchange mechanism, and through different types of information being exchanged, changes occur at an organizational level leading to changes at an institutional level.

Ebrahim highlights his main research interest as being to understand the effects of external funding relations on structuring information systems (such as reports) and the strategies used by NGOs to resist this external interference. Yet his analysis of reporting in organizations is limited to a discussion of the cognitive aspects of learning rather than a critical investigation into the sociality of power. The status quo, the dominant regime of truth that homogenizes identity and behaviour, is reinforced in this view of the production and consumption of human knowledge. What is left out is an evaluation of reporting and its cultural relevance to NGOs.

Through pursuing a narrative approach in critical management studies, Czarniawska (1997) explicitly analyses 'the forms in which knowledge is cast and the effects that these have on an audience' (Czarniawska, 1997: 6). Using the broadest definition of text, one that includes actions, behaviour, structure as well as written and spoken words, Czarniawska theorizes identity as emerging in these texts. Authors, narrators and characters are singled out as positions taken in text that have an effect on how we present ourselves as knowing, perceiving, or reacting respectively

within given contexts and histories: 'Institutions are not just patterns of action – they are sustained and repeated through justifications, norms and rules of accounting' (Czarniawska, 1997: 24).

Czarniawska perceives change as a narrative and moreover narrative is defined by its changing and shifting nature: a process that is constructive of identity and continuous in its search for meaning (Czarniawska, 1997: 28). It is this search for meaning, and shared understanding of meaning, that leads organizations to align themselves with one another. That is, if organizations exist in texts, then such texts are connected to one another and in a way *belong* to one another. This shared meaning exists as a material trace in surfacing texts (Czarniawska, 1997: 69) or reports.

Reports as cultural artefacts can be rendered as cultural narratives in Czarniawska's reading of identity construction. This perspective supports a definition of discourse as shifting and fragile and also orientates the subject within this dynamic of flux and improbability. In this way, understanding identity construction as a process that is constitutive of change and fragmentation is supported, and the report as a relational, constructive bind between workers and organizations can be rendered an important cultural artefact.

However, narrative theory as described by Czarniawska does not necessarily reveal the underlying philosophy from which reporting practices proliferate. Nor does it critique the premise from which the narrative form itself becomes a cultural expectation and in this way a technology of the self within a regime of truth. Therefore, narrative theory does not support an investigation into the political nature of managerial texts, nor does it fully explore the ways in which the narrative form is a necessary and integral rhetorical device that is constitutive of a managerialized and democratized reality.

Reporting practices have direct consequences for the way the social world is constructed. Understanding these consequences is the premise from which critical accounting and audit studies conceptualize such organizing technologies. In Power's (1997) cultural study, audit is described as a 'set of attitudes, or cultural commitments to problem-solving' (Power, 1997: 4). In particular he links the culture of audit to how ideas of trust and risk have become strongly implicated in the way a lot of our daily lives are patterned and organized. Power suggests such mechanisms as owing their prominence in society to their inherent vagueness and ambiguity (Power, 1997: xvii). This ambiguity is an outcome of the way audit has been separated into what Power describes as

programmatic elements and technological practices. The programmatic elements of audit shape the mission of practice; they are the abstract ideals that lead to a vague understanding and an opportunity for practices to serve a number of diverse goals. The technological practices are the concrete tasks – checklists, analytical methods, the logframe, or reports. As such, this distinction between ideas and techniques explicates how the ubiquity of audit is an idea that has become embodied in a variety of practices that are applied to the most diverse of situations and circumstances. Yet this explosion in audit is not spontaneous or uncontrived: the demands for audit are connected to the way that governance and accountability have become increasingly important concepts to a society that is preoccupied with the problematization of trust and the perception of a risky society (see Ogden, 1995). The promise of curtailing these perceived problems and risks is imbued in practices of accountability and audit, and so these techniques have gained such cultural status in society.

The prospect for such an Audit Society to remain legitimate, concrete and embedded in our social reality is reliant on the continuation and proliferation of ritualizations of accountability techniques. The danger of embracing such an Audit Society is that such techniques of accountability rely solely on constructing and managing a certain *image* of the organization. Belief in the image, rather than a committed and ethical way of promoting trust between people, is the unintended consequence of a culture preoccupied with managerial techniques of control. Audit has become an institution rather than an informed choice, and alternatives to audit practices seem all the more impossible.

Performance, quality, critique and reflection are all in danger of being defined in terms of conformity to such processes of image making. And so what Ebrahim (2003) describes as 'information struggles', Power dismantles as rhetorical play and a depoliticization of the way in which knowledge is transformed into a likeness of reality. This likeness is inextricably tied to a notion of a uniform and universal story of the organization, a narrative that Czarniawska (1997) would describe as a cognitive necessity, but Power would critique as a semblance created out of a deep desire for a trusting and risk-free society.

So far, I have outlined the way that the report embraces aspects of the modern episteme that demands an organized and planned intervention for economic and social progress. Subjectivities seem to be captivated, fixed, suspended in a modernist discourse that lays down boundaries,

defines typologies, and creates its own rules and norms. These understandings of development management are absorbed and communicated through a wide array of accounts – including reports – and are constructive of a perceived reality where development and management logic seem the most appropriate strategy for progress. It is through a synchronization of accounts (taking the form of organizational reports, organizational literature encapsulating development and project logic) that development has come to be constituted as an object within this regime of truth. By promoting a particular way of communicating reality, we close off certain avenues of theorizing and analysing the world around us (Hines, 1988; Foucault, 1979). Our actions, and what we deem possible, are held in suspension by the way reality is communicated and enters our social worlds. Organizational accounts serve as constructive artefacts: they are informed by a certain development-managerial logic and tend to the preservation of the same logic.

Through a subtle integration of existing perceptions and cultural stereotypes, reports legitimate actions in the name of development, and attempt to maintain the status quo (Ebrahim). But the exchange of knowledge and information between NGO and donor can also be rendered as a more subtle and complex bind that constructs the necessity for an organizational identity (Czarniaskwa). That is, the way in which donor–NGO relations are bound to the visualizing practice of reporting creates the need for a cohesive and unique organizational identity to emerge. This construct is taken as a presupposition rather than exposed as an Occidental construct, in this way creating a logic and necessity for change that is determined by Western ways of inventing identity (Power).

I now outline some analytical findings from a discourse analysis of reporting in an NGO based in Vishakapatnum. I have changed the NGO's name to 'MAMTA Vizag' for anonymity reasons. It is part of a larger international NGO federation that includes MAMTA India (its national HQ) and MAMTA UK (its governing organization).

Reports and Real-*izing* Development

MAMTA Vizag is a unique entity as it has only one 7-year project (compared to its sister organizations that have up to ten). This project is called the Sustained Tribal Empowerment Project or STEP. It is supported financially by a very generous grant from the European Commission (EC) and seeks to target 200,000 'tribal households'. Although STEP was

conceived of as a project long before anyone in the organization can remember, it was formalized in 1999. However, STEP only truly came into existence in 2001, when MAMTA was able to set up an organizational base from which to launch its multi-million-euro project. The project has also been slow to take off because of the director's inability to secure NGO partners to carry out the work; this has led to many conflicts between the funding body (the EC) and its managing HQ: MAMTA India. Despite this shaky start, the organization is now composed of a team of around twelve men and one woman (the director's secretary). The organization works through a complex network with district government officials and twelve partnering NGOs in the area.

This section outlines my empirical analysis. It is separated into two parts. The first part looks at the meanings and ideas that are constructed in organizations through reporting, or, as Power (1997) expresses it, the programmatic aspects of reporting. The second part of the analysis is composed of a closer analysis of the reports as texts, as technologies within organizations.

Meanings and ideas about reports

When I first encountered MAMTA, I was immediately interested in how reports were treated and valued in the organization. As notes from my observation diary describe:

> … I have stumbled across some reports in Vizag. Reports, loose papers, old keyboards, printers and stationery are all stacked up in a small bookcase in complete disarray. At first glance, these reports looked like out-of-date or rubbish reports no one needed. But then I realized that these are official organizational reports. There are monthly reports from partnering NGOs, bi-annual reports for the STEP programme. There is also a proposal from a partnering NGO about a certain project. Some are handwritten, others are laminated and printed on posh paper. (Observation notes, 20/1/2004)

At MAMTA Vizag, there was no effort to try and consolidate ideas put forward in reports; nor was there any desire to protect and collect old ones. Reports were multifarious, free-flowing, renewable forms of ideas production and reproduction. A large number of MAMTA's documents were about strategy and conceptualizing new projects and approaches. This suggests how the organization was concerned with capturing and controlling the future, a future that perhaps is always in that moment of

escaping and taking on a new meaning. The future was, in this way, a source of anxiety for MAMTA and its staff.

MAMTA Vizag were also only able to offer me reports dating back two years. In fact, I was given absolutely no annual reports dating from pre-2000 and there were only two annual reports collected in total – one from each MAMTA office. But what MAMTA *were* able to provide me with in great quantity was the various strategy documents, concept notes, monitoring formats, monitoring indicators and Powerpoint slideshows. This suggests that MAMTA was not so interested in consolidating history. Instead, it was more interested in the production and proliferation of ideas and of tackling the future (through strategy documents and concept notes). There was a very different temporal visioning of identity from other NGOs that kept their organization's reports safe and locked in glass cabinets.

When I probed this temporal construction by asking the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer about STEP's history, he replied, 'I don't know! Actually, no one knows! No one is sure when it all started, there's rumours that it all began seven, eight years ago but there is no documentation of that. We have only now started documenting everything. I can show you our logframe: it sets out the philosophy of the project …' (interview, 28/1/2004). It was the new idea, the emerging thought that was crystallized in print, that seemed to be most appealing to MAMTA. This concern for solidifying the new was a way of grounding and locating the organization: '[reports] are the methods of knowing where we are' (interview with technical specialist, 30/1/2004).

Concurrently and paradoxically, history was not only unimportant, it was also perceived as contestable, revealing, and possibly dangerous. For example, when I asked to see past annual and other similar progress reports, the programme director told me that his office was in disarray and that it would be too difficult to find them now. When I asked for soft copies, the director was again noncompliant. His behaviour suggested that he did not want me to access these reports and came across as defensive. This kind of defensiveness was limited to MAMTA Vizag and to the director's behaviour in particular. Nevertheless, even at MAMTA India, reports were not easily accessible. MAMTA was the only organization that asked me to make a formal request to the director of MAMTA India to allow me to read and photocopy reports. Reports at MAMTA may have been stacked in shoddy bookcases, but they were also considered as potentially threatening. As such, the disarray in how

reports were stored made them even more inaccessible. You cannot share a report that is missing or misplaced. Sharing reports, especially with outsiders, was thought of as a risky business, and so this way of storing them was an easy strategy to conceal them as well. Reports do not allow flexibility. What is written in indelible ink remains and forms a forced bind to the past – a past that cannot be erased, but can be obscured through the proliferation of more documentation, creating a new history for the future organization.

History revealed a side of the organization that MAMTA workers may not have been too happy to share. By hiding this part of the organizational self, MAMTA workers were able to promote a semblance of the organization that met their own expectations of what a successful NGO should be doing.

Reports as management performatives

Reports are very particular pieces of documentation. They are written for a variety of reasons, and they have an impact on the organizations they circulate within. Much more than mundane and stagnant pieces of paper, reports and the meanings that surround them play a very significant role in how organizations construct an identity for themselves and for others, and form a relationship between the reader and the author, the reader and the organization, and also the author and the organization. From the preliminary analysis above, four sets of interpretations can be proposed.

First, the report is inextricably linked to the formation of a sense of history and knowing within organizations. It can be given the status of creating *legacies* within organizations, and thought of as relating writing to experiencing, and experiencing to writing. This assumption is reflective of the development management belief that monitoring-and-evaluation is a learning tool (a way of reframing perceptions and influencing experiential reality) and an inherently managerial activity (see Ebrahim, 2003). Learning implies a history of learning that is refined and improved over time. In this way, reporting has a temporal dynamic, which produces and reconstructs relations between the organization, its past and its future – obscuring the experience of the present by the very fact it is a formal and *post hoc* activity.

Second, reports can limit flexibility, silencing departing narratives and heterogeneous accounts of organizational history. A sequential and linear narrative is formed – not so much by the reports themselves – but by the

way they are presented and valued within organizations. This implies that through controlling a historical narrative, progress can be clearly articulated even if it can't be achieved. Saying this, very different types of reports circulate within organizations (some are internal, some external, some are hand-jotted and in local languages, others are more formal and written in English). Nevertheless, even these local forms of reporting and documentation encourage a certain re-visioning of the organization and in this way encourage debate and discussion within the parameters of what is deemed acceptable by the organizational report.

Third, the report closes off channels for experiencing what is happening on the ground. It wraps up experience in a textual style or format, segregating it from embodied forms of knowing. Cultural and historical contingencies appear to be played down in reporting styles that demand a professional language and that appeal to managerial ideas such as structure and control. Despite these constricting and sometimes impossible expectations, the report is considered an inescapable ritual for those who need to appear to be professional and managerial.

Fourth, and related to the third point, by insisting on a particular style the report eclipses informal, local or colloquial language and non-textual processes of documentation. The result of promoting a managerial style and format is that other narratives are sidelined or considered inappropriate. Authoring a report requires the writer to imitate a managerial self. Harding (2003) refers to this managerial self as socially constructed from a variety of psycho-affective traits and cognitive abilities. The managerial self applies methods and practices that are supposedly universally applicable and apply to any moment of time and history. To what extent this image is constructive of the author's sense of self is yet to be examined.

Here, Butler can be most illuminating in understanding this process of identity making. It is the report that lends all organizational activities *a coherence*. It is 'scientific', it is a 'philosophy', it is 'knowing'. All these descriptions of reports invoke a mental image of homogeneity, of structure, and of concreteness. Feeling or looking like you don't know what you're doing is no good for writing reports. For this would expose the possible incoherence of organizational activities and development practice. But the report edits out such dissonance and instead presents as an aftereffect, a form, an image, *an identity*. 'Coherence', it is suggested by Butler (1990: 136), 'is desired, wished for, idealized … this idealization is an effect of a corporeal signification. In other words, acts, gestures,

and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this *on the surface* of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause' (italics in original). What Butler conveys in her dense prose is how identity is not a self-evident reality or a set of attributes that make up some sort of concrete core. It is, instead, the semblance of substance, an illusion, ineffable – constructed through political and discursive strategies embodied in practices (acts, gestures, desire – even reports!) and somehow always negating its fragile and fragmented existence. The use of a strong narrative, and of a historical concreteness and an established set of professionally coded language all contribute to reporting practices being highly successful in creating a semblance of identity.

The practices that make up this semblance of coherence are described as 'performatives' (ibid: 136). The report in this way can be rendered as a management performative – a tiny part of a more elaborate web of processes that contribute to the construction of identity and claims to knowing within organizations. Reports themselves offer differing truths and convey varied experiences. The organization therefore can never completely capture its own essence in reports – it can only offer an identity that continually escapes the boundaries of the report. There is, according to Butler, no real ontological security and there can never *be* ontological security, for identity is performative: a process; and therefore any inner truth is always a fabrication, a manufactured truth engineered for political ends. The report fakes it. It *fakes* a concrete and cohesive reality in the face of an ever-elusive one.

Let us move on then to a more focused analysis of the reports to attempt to expose the political and social resources that reports pool together and craft into a semblance of reality.

Reporting technologies

This part of the analysis is a more focused analysis of the texts and their role within organizations as concrete technologies that construct a certain reality. The following detailed discursive analysis of the texts seeks to expose how reports use certain rhetorical resources to carve out particular identities and narratives. My analysis also takes into account how these reports reflect discursive relationships between organizations and development management rhetoric as much as they reflect the organizations themselves.

First impressions …

MAMTA Vizag's annual report is a 42-page A4 document printed in coloured ink. It is spiral-bound with a laminated cover and back page. The front page has the name of the project written in a large font in the centre ('Sustainable Tribal Empowerment Project STEP'), the period it is reporting on (July 2002 – June 2003), and a list of three 'contact persons' just under the title. These people include three executive managers: one from Vizag, one from MAMTA India in Delhi and one from London in MAMTA UK. The document is called the 'Annual Progress Report'. Each top corner of the report is decorated with the MAMTA and European Commission logos. The report immediately signals a collaboration between various organizations: working in very different parts of the world, but working together in a coherent and unified way. No single author name is given and it is difficult to decipher how many people actually wrote the report as the style and language are more or less consistent throughout. Inside, the general layout is reminiscent of UN reports that set out Acknowledgements, Abbreviations, and a Table of Contents at the beginning. By following the same sort of standard, the report is immediately imbued with professionalism and a seriousness that implies MAMTA has its own *professional code* that is a legitimate and appropriate resource from which to imagine its own identity. The list of abbreviations includes many that are only used within MAMTA (indicating a unique MAMTA language) and others that are only used in the nongovernmental sector.

At first glance, the report looks stark and serious. There are no photos, no graphs or other diagrams. There is instead a dense and exhaustive prose that is broken up only by the occasional table or logframe. Parts of the text are underlined; this underlining points the reader to important or very significant parts of the report. Before we get to the contents page, we are given the 'Progress Report: Executive Summary'. The summary begins by stating:

> July 2002–June 2003 has seen a great deal of progress towards the consolidation of the STEP's inception phase. Certain delays encountered in recruitment and procurement delays have not prevented the significant attainment of targets set out in the Annual Workplan for this period. Sharpening the comparative advantage of STEP in the evolving context of GoAP's statewide poverty reduction programme and Velegu has been a top priority. To this end, the establishment of advisory and steering committee mechanisms has been accomplished with the State Level

> Advisory Committee (SLAC) meeting twice in the course of the year. Key achievements for each of the five key result areas during the reporting period include: …

This first paragraph of the report, made up of four sentences, portrays the project through a narrative of improvement over time and this progress seems to be simple, important and structured. This stability that defines the kind of process being described is extremely important in legitimating skewed power relations between the controlling and controlled. If the process was considered chaotic, disordered, or difficult, then the project's image would be portrayed as fragmented and contested – an idea that is in antithesis to the fundamental guiding principles of modernity (Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Parker, 2002b). The project is given the semblance of a stable reality and its progress is presented as a concrete, quantifiable body of work. By making the project itself a concrete object, the report is able to illustrate progress as having been achieved and targets having been attained with significant success.

The key 'results' are listed in bold. They are: Community Self-management, Capacity Building of Service Providers, Micro-Projects, Micro-Finance, and Strengthening Civil Society. On each of these key results, there is a line or two of quantitative data about, for example, how many villages have been supported by the project's management exercises (there are 2,209) or how many poverty assessments have been undertaken (there have been assessments in 40 villages). So it is uncertain how many villages should have been assessed and whether the project has fallen short or surpassed its targets. But these numbers are given without any context or comparison – perhaps it is not necessary to contextualize a new history within an organization that presupposes success. The success of the project becomes the most important aspect of reporting, rather than discussing the social and historical contingencies that have contributed to the project's performance (Ebrahim, 2003). The summary continues in a dense prose which is not easy to follow, and the executive summary includes no conclusions, only expectations for the coming year.

Community self-management

One area of success is outlined as 'community self-management'. This strikes me as a curious and interesting idea and reminiscent of Cooke's assertion (in Chapter 7 of this volume) that development management

ideas have their roots in colonial strategies for indirect rule. By applying distinctly managerial ideas through seemingly neutral projects, NGOs conceal the political underpinnings of development projects and the ways in which they seek to promote a particular worldview, a concealment that has the consequence of sustaining inequalities. The report creates new areas for success that enable managerial criteria to be applied to even the most personal and political components of social life.

'Community self-management' is a theme that is picked up on throughout the report through the discussion of 'community empowerment' and 'community ownership'. The community itself is a revealing concept – the report pays special attention to it: defining it, problematizing it, and reorganizing it. The community is defined as 'poor people living in marginalized tribal communities'. This community could be more than 235,000 households (the number of households that the project seeks to benefit) yet the reader only reads about the community as a homogeneous and unique group of people. Political, economic, and social differences in this mass of people are glossed over in MAMTA's overarching definition, making its single framework for development all the more appealing to readers. The report sets out the 'main problems being addressed' by STEP as the

> … tribal-poor's acute lack of voice and power in accessing basic services, taking advantages of economic opportunities and exercising legal rights. Without appropriate support to promote the empowerment of tribal communities, the translation of long term and state wide investments in rural poverty reduction into tangible and sustainable improvements in the lives and livelihoods of the tribal poor will not be realised.

This is an interesting paragraph, first, because the underlining is in the original – highlighting its importance to the report itself and, second, because it sets out a distinctly managerial project by carving out a definition of the 'community', setting out the problem with that community, and proposing a strategy to rectify the problem with the community. The report is able to remove all direct responsibility to the people it works with by redefining it as a collective and homogeneous group.

The report also predicts what fate will follow if the project does not go ahead. The community is defined as the 'tribal-poor' with an 'acute lack of voice and power'. The problem is set out as the community not 'taking advantages of economic opportunities and exercising legal rights'. The appropriate strategy proposed by STEP is for them to give

'appropriate support to promote empowerment of tribal communities' and to *translate* 'long term and state wide investments' for the community. If STEP as a project is not allowed to intervene then improvements 'will not be realised'. The above paragraph does not mention the potential role of the Andhra government in improving the 'community's' well-being; it also fails to mention what good the local government has achieved so far and what STEP can build on (this comes much later in the report). The above paragraph also fails to mention the ongoing work carried out by local NGOs. These community-related organizations are set apart from the community, as if the 'tribal-poor' live in total isolation from the local government workers and grassroots NGOs. This segregation is a vital and important part of making the STEP logic work. For if the 'tribal-poor' are not segregated from the rest of the community, then how could the staff of STEP be singled out as exclusive and skilled managers capable of re-organizing the community to achieve its full potential? This need for segregation is subtly suggested by the threat posed at the end of the paragraph. If the needs of the 'tribal-poor' are not translated by STEP workers then the community will remain voiceless and disempowered. So, somewhat paradoxically, and whilst employing the rhetoric of participation ('support', 'empowerment'), the report suggests that the 'tribal-poor' must give up their voice in favour of a *translation* carried out by STEP to regain their voice and improve their lives. It is the STEP project that will make the community's goals 'tangible' and 'sustainable'. The report constructs development practice in a managerialized form, giving the elusive voice of the 'tribal-poor' the semblance of something 'tangible'. It is STEP who defines and reorganizes the community into STEP workers and the 'tribal-poor' where the tribal poor and the individual workers' voices remain – at least in the report's text – voice*less*.

Intervention logic and the STEP project

As well as separating the community into the 'tribal-poor' and STEP workers, the report makes another demarcation: between 'intervention logic' and the STEP project itself. Part 3 of the report describes in one detailed paragraph the intervention logic of the project. It states:

> As a result of detailed situation analysis of the tribal-poor (primary stakeholders), the underlying intervention logic of the Project has been confirmed. Working with multiple stakeholders, the Project's role is to

> facilitate and promote capacity building at various levels. A multi-pronged strategy has been developed for achieving the Project objective with appropriate understanding of the situation in which the tribal people live and the underlying root causes for such a situation.

In this paragraph, we find how the intervention is objectified. It is, firstly, described as 'logic' – something quite different from an assumption, a theory, or a strategy. Logic is mathematical, it is rational and predictable. By applying 'intervention logic' to the project (which now appears as the personified 'Project' with a capital P), various logical strategies and appropriate understandings can be extracted and employed. Logic also translates the underlying problem of the 'tribal-poor's … acute lack of voice' as a 'situation'. A situation is more transient than a problem. 'Situation' suggests a set of circumstances, a critical point, or a particular position. It is inherently unstable. The logic also assumes that to know the cause is to remove the cause for such a situation arising. And of course 'intervention' requires the prior construction of the tribal poor as an object to intervene in. The project therefore, being the result of a 'detailed situation analysis', stands a high chance of success – at least this is what the 'intervention logic' would assume. The paragraph goes on to make the following proposal:

> … specific activities and strategies employed will be determined by community managed needs assessment and prioritisation through the application of [the] Action Orientated Learning (AOL) approach. This approach encourages the community groups not only to identify and prioritise their issues and solutions but also to monitor the implementation of their choice of interventions, and application of lessons for consistent improvement. This approach can develop community ownership of the development interventions and processes, critical for sustainable development impact. Detailed stakeholder analysis will be conducted over the extension period.

The 'voice' of the 'tribal-poor' is given a logic and structure – it is filtered through a 'community managed needs assessment' and through the application of the 'Action Orientated Learning approach'. Management and development have been all at once conflated into a single definition of the 'Project'. This new definition is unique to the STEP project. The report as a first step has un-organized the community into segregated and powerless units ('tribal-poor', 'lacking voice') and as a second step has re-organized it into well-managed 'community groups'.

Development becomes synonymous with managerialism: structure and control over the community will result in 'consistent improvement' and a utopian conclusion. What is lacking in all this is the political question of power, of autonomy, of choice and manoeuvrability between political positions. Through the presentation of 'community self-management' and 'intervention logic', the report reconstitutes people as 'stakeholders' who can then be the objects of 'stakeholder analysis'. This redefinition is vital to managerial ideas appearing neutral, yet sustaining a semblance of reality that justifies a continuing intervention into the lives of the 'poor'.

The Material Consequences of Reports

Organizations are able to apply a number of rhetorical devices in reports that reconstitute the nature of their work, the beneficiaries they work with, and, in relation to these constructions, how they constitute their own identities as workers. The practice of accounting, audit or reporting does not exist as a singular and homogeneous structure. There are enormous disparities between how organizations incorporate certain organizing tropes and exclude others. From the report analysed above, three broad interpretations can be proposed.

First, the organizational report creates a semblance of identity through constructing its own unique report *voice*. In MAMTA Vizag's case it was a voice imbued with 'logic'. The report collates all project experience under a single banner of the organizational voice – a coherent narrative. As a management performative, the report relies on its own internal coherence to bind all identities and experiences within a single way of experiencing reality.

Second, and related to the first point, these organized voices in reports play on the differences between text and experienced reality; sometimes they state the two as distinct, in line with the 'logical' narrative set out in MAMTA's report, and other times they are found to be tied together, as was the case with other NGO reports that incorporated an emotional or subjective voice. The experiential is linked to text in a variety of ways, depending on what organizing tropes are involved. This aspect of the report makes its construction of reality a fragmented one. It appeals to its audience through a variety of rhetorical devices, making it all the more persuasive when targeting a variety of reader groups. So long as the report is coherent and its conception of organizational history is plausible, authors can digress from the managerial aspects of organizing report

narratives and create other criteria for measuring performance: for example through an emotional or psychological report narrative.

Third, because there is no single format or language that threads every organizational report together, there exists an enormous diversity of styles, formats and structures. I could only present a single analysis in this space; however, a spectrum of ideological perspectives may underpin descriptions of beneficiaries, approaches to working, and organizational activities. Meanings become ambiguous as do approaches to work. And it is this ambiguity that *un*-organizes development activities – leaving interpretations to emerge that are creative and imaginative. Paradoxically, it is the desire to create a single language of empowerment and citizenship that has been a catalyst to the emergence of new and fragmented interpretations of development practice.

Conclusions

The first part of the analysis focused on how meanings and ideas are constructed in organizations through reporting. Reporting as a set of practices remains legitimate and appropriate because reports symbolize a coherent and whole narrative: reflecting a modernist preoccupation with unlocking a single truth. As an organization's representation of itself, the report is inextricably tied to the way documentation is valued by organizations. This value has much to do with the report's symbolic importance within and between organizations, as suggested by Ebrahim (2003). However it is not the report's construction of *status* that is most highly rated (as Ebrahim suggests), but rather the way it is an indelible effigy of the organization constructing the objects in its environment and the environment itself (as Harding [2003] and Butler [1990] would suggest). The report is therefore instrumental in creating a semblance of a cohesive history, of stabilizing and grounding reality in a distinct *report reality*.

The second part of the analysis drew out the specific organizing rhetorical devices employed in a particular organizational report, and this closer textual reading led to a more fragmented representation of reality emerging. There is no single defined philosophy that underpins all development projects, nor is there any evidence that a common goal is being worked towards. Meanings are constructed locally, in organizations, not institutions. This is no new finding in itself; recall Power's (1997) thesis that suggests audit techniques are as ambiguous and porous

as ideas. But what can be proposed from this finding is that development management as an idea and philosophy is constituted within shifting regimes of truth. These regimes exist organizationally rather than as any homogeneous institution or overarching discourse. And these meanings proliferate through textual artefacts such as organizational reports. Text leaves its traces behind – in the way objects and subjectivities are organized within its *report reality*. Yet these traces are mutable, they are fragmented and exist in locations not global landscapes. Homogeneity and heterogeneity exist in each other and are constitutive of each other. The organization is composed of many different ways of knowing the organization, although all may not be communicated and real-*ize* the boundaries of what is socially real.

Rather than supporting a gap between rhetoric and reality, the findings of this initial analysis suggest that there are gaps between *texts* and between *realities*. It is this fracturing that challenges the utopian promise of modernity and is glossed over through a web of management performatives. But it is also this same fracturing of discourse that allows these performatives to be manipulated, to be interpreted and to proliferate through this flux.

Afterword

Arturo Escobar

Few ideas have been so central to international development, and yet so unchallenged, as that of management. As the editors state in their Introduction, the link between management and development has served 'to sustain modernization and the modern as an enduring and dominating' worldview. Building bridges between critical traditions in both fields, in this way, not only makes a lot of sense, it helps to advance the scholarly and political cause of reorienting development at a very basic level. This reorientation might well be seen as a contribution to 'critical development studies' (CDS). Needless to say, a CDS field must be constructed from many critical fields and traditions; postcolonial, feminist, and postdevelopment theories have been among the most important contributors in recent years to a heterogeneous CDS field, yet contributions from perspectives as varied as political ecology, complexity, science and technology studies, liberation theology, and modernity/coloniality perspectives have begun to make their presence felt.

Besides addressing a particularly important link, the spirit of this collection is unique and exemplary. What the authors have in mind is an eminently constructive task in two senses: towards an international solidarity of scholars in the face of pernicious managerialized forms of development; and constructing a mutuality on the basis of theoretical, epistemological, and methodological kinship among various fields at the intersection of CDS with critical management studies (CMS). At the first level, one finds interventions in this volume that dissect the 'colonization by the managerial' of development interventions, as in the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In regard to the second goal, the authors muse about the possibility of 'an epistemological popular front,' metaphorically speaking, in the sense of bringing together perspectives that are critical of the disciplines but which use disciplinary

and interdisciplinary knowledges to transgress development orthodoxies in such a way as to augment 'their collective oppositional value'. In this way, I find a lot of resonance between this volume's project and J. K. Gibson-Graham's, in that both projects call on us to cultivate ourselves as 'theorists of possibility' (see, for example, Gibson-Graham 2006: xxvii–xxx). This takes a measure of self-(re?)education, since our academic subjectivities are more attuned to the competitive and cumulative behaviours that are also at the basis of development and modernity than to the ethics of solidarity and collective subject formation that should be part of going beyond development. Perhaps one can say that 'another academy is possible', and these two parallel projects are among the first in the Northern academies to move in this direction, that is, toward a scholarship that is critical in content and that at the same time searches for different ethical principles, practices of collaboration, and forms of intervention (see Ziai, 2007 for a related set of inquiries around the notion of postdevelopment).

Many chapters in this volume attest to the notion that any encounter with management is an encounter with power. There is tradition in CDS already of dealing with this aspect in terms of the Foucauldian notion of governmentality. In my limited knowledge, it is also important to keep in mind, as some of the chapters in this volume do, that there is a related but different tradition, largely in the UK and Canada, of writing about management and planning from critical sociological perspectives (writings by authors such as Dorothy Smith, Philippe Corrigan, Bernard Shaffer, Geof Wood, Raymond Apthorpe, and so forth). A generation ago, these works initiated the analysis of management, planning, and organization as political technologies of sorts. The critical analysis of participation has also been rich in the UK, and some of the main works are referenced in this volume (for example, Cooke and Kothari, 2001). More recently, studies of governmentality have been criticized, largely by anthropologists, for their inability to deal with the question of agency, particularly on the part of those being 'governmentalized'. It might be instructive to say a few words about this trend, since it also constitutes a contribution to the dialogue between CMS and CDS, and reveals a set of persistent questions (a bridge between this volume and the ethnographic projects is David Lewis; an important precursor of some of these trends is Norman Long's actor-oriented approach).

Recent approaches to the ethnography of development projects have suggested that ethnographic research could be used to understand both

the social work of policy ideas and the transformation that locals effect on the projects, and that this understanding could be utilized to link more effectively 'the emancipatory intentions of policy and the aspirations and interests of the poor' (Mosse, 2005a: 240; see also Mosse and Lewis, 2005). This goal requires a detailed understanding of the relation between policy and practice as it is played out at many sites by a diversity of actors; interestingly, this understanding needs to be multi-positioned in addition to multi-sited, with the anthropologist as part insider and part outsider in several of these sites. The hope is that, given the reality of development, the critical ethnographer could illuminate the conditions for a more effective popular appropriation of the projects. Sinha (2006a, 2006b) has underscored that this process of appropriation also goes on at the national level, where political imperatives are crucial for negotiating development agendas; these agendas, indeed, have multiple lineages, some of which might even have little to do with Western intervention *per se*. Closer attention to the interaction between state and civil society organizations, he adds, should give us a more nuanced account of the flows of power than in previous poststructuralist analyses, underscoring how development operates as a multi-scale hegemonic process that, as such, is transformed and contested all the time.

By de-essentializing development and by looking carefully at the actor networks that, in the last instance, make up development, it seems to me that these newer approaches solve some problems but create new puzzles. These puzzles are found in much contemporary theory that emphasizes a dispersed and networked logic as the basis of the production of the social; the problems are thus pervasive in Northern-based contemporary critical theory at least. I see four interrelated problems originating in four moves, or claims, found in this literature (1) *Radical agentivity*: everything/everybody has agency; the question thus becomes: how does one differentiate among various kinds of agency? What happens to power? (2) *Radical connectivity*: everything is connected to everything; new questions are: How are things variously/differently connected? How do they fulfil different functions in a network of connectedness? (3) *Radical contextuality*: everything is context-dependent. The questions in this case are: What happens to difference? What is there in any given situation that is not fully produced by capitalism, development, and modernity even if in touch with them? (4) *Radical historicity*: everything has a genealogy, a lineage. Question: what happens to what is emergent, unpredictable? Final questions: In the newer approaches, how do authors

construct their object of critique? What happens to praxis, that is, the connection between theory and practice, knowledge and action (see also de Vries's critique in Chapter 9 of this volume)?

Some of these works move in the direction of answering these questions. The mixture of theory and ethnography by which they broach the questions is interesting in itself, although this would require separate treatment. It seems to me, for instance, that the macro-claims made by this newer scholarship continue to be the most interesting and convincing, and are consistent with those of the present volume. Some of these claims concern the emergent aid regimes that bring together donors and recipients in partnerships geared towards poverty reduction strategies. A shift in discourse towards 'good governance', 'partnership', 'ownership', and overall rational action is clearly identified, and then ethnographically researched. Very interestingly, some authors (for example, Gould 2005) see in this shift a more refined modality for the dispensation of global inequality. This regime 'not only gives expression to the deep-seated will to civilize, it does so in a way that reaffirms sacred values of the aid domain: modernity, rationality and political neutrality' (p. 69). Gould's conclusion resonates well with the findings of the present volume: 'Strip away the moral buffers of "poverty reduction" and "good governance" and the aid domain appears as a game-like struggle among competing actors and interests' (p. 81). To paraphrase: scratch a management scheme, and you'll find a power struggle, even if couched in terms of rational action.

Modernity, however we define it, is part and parcel of the tradition that needs to be reoriented if different understandings of development are to be crafted, or even made visible. There would be much to say about current attempts to go beyond modernity and even modernities (in the plural), yet there is one aspect I would like to comment on in this regard: the role of experts. The ethnographies of development have done much to bring into visibility the transnational expert communities whose training, interests, tastes, orientations, and economic and political goals coincide enough to keep the development actor-networks going, and often well oiled. As the environmentalist and activist Larry Lohmann put it in the context of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's important What Next project, 'at each stage, specialists in new fields are called in to create their own roles in the story of the global application of expertise' (2006: 150); hence the need for a renewed awareness of the politics of expertise that leads to a practice of 'forming working alliances that can engender

complexes of new practices' (175). As Lohmann says, we need to call standard rationality, common sense, and pervasive dualisms into question through 'a performance art requiring practice, experience, intuition, flexibility, improvisation, sensitivity to historical and political circumstances, a sense of what lies over the horizon, and the ability to handle unforeseen consequences' (156).

This call resonates with Gibson-Graham who, towards the end of *A Postcapitalist Politics*, adumbrates the possibility of building community economies 'as a practice of (post)-development' (2006: 192). His framework of a diverse economy might constitute one possible 'alternative set of "dynamic principles of development"' (195). These principles should include, among others, meeting local needs more directly; using the surplus to strengthen communities; recognizing consumption as a viable route for development; re/creating, enlarging, and replenishing the commons; and acknowledging the interdependence of people, nature, things, and knowledge. Gibson-Graham's dream is for a moment when 'the development project no longer entails simply (painfully) submitting to the demanding logic of global capitalism, but becomes instead an ethical and political engagement – a sometimes difficult and conflictual process of experimenting with, fostering, exploring, connecting, expanding, and reworking the heterogeneous and scattered elements of a diverse (becoming community) economy' (195). He envisions a collective dis-identification with capitalism – to which we can add with development and modernity, in their more dominant and conservative forms.

It seems to me that works of this sort can also be taken as elements to build the mutuality of arguments to which Bill Cooke and Sadhvi Dar summon us in the Introduction to this volume. I often find myself telling students and colleagues in the US about the rich debates in Development Studies that one often finds in England, Ireland, the Netherlands and some of the Scandinavian countries compared to the utter poverty of the field in the US. Surely the vibrancy of the field in some parts of the world and its poverty in others are due to particular historical junctures, institutional practices, and so forth (for example, structures of aid, the existence of institutionalized mainstream development studies with some spaces for critical debate, as in the UK). This 'uneven development of development studies' might suggest that development is being undone at the main hegemonic centre, while remaining alive and even flourishing in places that are no longer so central. Be that as it may, it is tremendously

important, and exciting, to keep the critical thrust alive and well, particularly in the constructive spirit of critique and collaboration represented by this collection.

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