



The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain

Democracy, Association
and Revolution, 1854–75

Guy Thomson



The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain

Also by Guy Thomson

PUEBLA DE LOS ANGELES: Industry and Society in a Mexican City,
1700–1850

POLITICS, PATRIOTISM AND POPULAR LIBERALISM IN MEXICO: Juan Francisco
Lucas and The Puebla Sierra, 1854–1917

THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 AND THE AMERICAS (*Edited*)

VISIONES DEL LIBERALISMO POLÍTICA, IDENTIDAD Y CULTURA EN LA ESPAÑA
DEL SIGLO XIX (*Edited*)


The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain

Democracy, Association and Revolution,
1854–75

Guy Thomson

Reader in History, University of Warwick

palgrave
macmillan



© Guy Thomson 2010

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2010 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN-13: 978-0-230-22202-1 hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents

<i>Illustrations and Maps</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>Abbreviations and Glossary</i>	ix
Introduction	1
Part I Party, Town and the Culture of Clandestinity, 1843–1861	
1 The Bienio Progresista in Eastern Andalucía, 1854–1856	15
2 The Moderado Restoration and Democrat Conspiracy, 1856–1857	42
3 Ballots, Conspiracies and Insurrection in Málaga and Granada, 1857–1859	67
4 The Advance of Democracy in Eastern Andalucía, 1860–1861	84
Part II The Revolution of the Blacksmiths, July 1861	
5 The Loja Revolution	107
6 The Council of War in Loja	124
7 The Sierra Bética: Conspiratorial Región	143
8 Combating Clandestinity in Antequera, July 1861–December 1862	166
Part III Catholicism, Democracy and the Twilight of the Bourbon Monarchy, 1862–1868	
9 Narváez's Return and Queen Isabel's Visit to Loja in 1862	187
10 'The Second Loja': Garibaldi and the Limits of Democracy in Eastern Granada, 1863–1864	202
11 Narváez and Democracy in Eastern Andalucía, 1864–1868	229

**Part IV 'La Gloriosa': Democrat Victory, Republican
Defeat, 1868–1891**

12	The Revolution of September 1868 in Western Granada	253
13	The Sexenio Revolucionario in Antequera: From Federal Republicanism to the Socialist International, 1868–1880	274
	Conclusion	295
	Epilogue	299
	<i>Notes</i>	301
	<i>Bibliography</i>	339
	<i>Index</i>	350

Illustrations and Maps

Illustrations

- | | | |
|---|---|----|
| 1 | Ramón María Narváez, Duke of Valencia, c.1854 | 18 |
| 2 | Rafael Pérez del Alamo. c. 1872 | 71 |

Maps

- | | | |
|---|---------------------------|-----|
| 1 | The Region | 10 |
| 2 | The Conspiratorial Region | 144 |

Acknowledgements

The book began during study leave in 1993–94 as a comparative project study of the reception of Liberalism in four regions, two in Mexico and two in Spain. It soon became a study of a single Spanish region. During the realisation of the project, that has taken longer than is now fashionable among scholars, I have incurred many debts. I am very grateful for the welcome and encouragement offered to an interloping Mexicanist by Hispanists, particularly from Clara E. Lida, Charles Esdaile, José Antonio Piqueras, Vicent Sanz Rozalén, Isabel Burdiel, Juan Luis Castellano López, Raymond Carr, Martin Blinkhorn, Alda Blanco, James Thomson, Alistair Hennessy and Mark Lawrence. I would also like to acknowledge the support and forbearance of Mexicanist and Latin Americanist colleagues, bemused by my involvement with the Peninsular, but always interested in listening to what must have seemed far-fetched comparisons between the New and the Old Worlds, particularly Luis Medina, Marco Antonio Velázquez, Josefina Vázquez, Eric Van Young, Raymond Buve, Alan Knight, François Javier Guerra, Eduardo Posada, Antonio Annino, Brian Hamnett, John Fisher, David Brading, Chris Abel, Nicola Miller, Lawrence Whitehead, James Dunkerley and Tristan Platt. I have been very fortunate in having wonderful colleagues at Warwick who have encouraged me with this project, especially Margot Finn, Anthony McFarlane, Rebecca Earle, Gad Heuman, John King, Gwyn Lewis, Roger Magraw, Steve Hindle, Rainer Horn, Sarah Richardson, Carolyn Steadman and David Hardiman. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the Arts and Humanities Research Committee, The British Academy, The Leverhulme Foundation and Warwick University. The staff of Spanish archives and libraries have also been unerringly helpful and generous with their time and resources, particularly Pilar Torres, David Torres and Miguel Hernández in Granada, José Pelayo Piqueras in Loja, and Pepe Escalante in Antequera. The maps were expertly drawn up by Lester Jones of Ladner, British Columbia (jonesmaps@telus.net). Finally, I would like to thank my family, particularly Louise, my wife, for her constant understanding and encouragement, and Peter and Joseph, who, in draughty accommodation during Easter ‘holidays’, must have wondered why their father had chosen to work on such remote Andalusian towns as El Chorro, Montejaque and Montefrío, seemingly so devoid of teenage pleasures.

Guy Thomson
University of Warwick

Abbreviations and Glossary

Alhama	Archivo Histórico Municipal de Alhama
Antequera	Archivo Histórico Municipal de Antequera
Archidona	Archivo Histórico Municipal de Archidona
AMAE	Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores
ADPG	Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Granada
AGMS	Archivo General Militar (Segovia)
AHMM	Archivo Histórico Militar (Madrid)
BARH	Biblioteca (Archivo) de la Academia Real de la Historia
BRAH	Biblioteca-Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid)
CSIC	Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Superiores (Madrid)
(The) Duke	Ramón María Narváez, Duke of Valencia
FES	Fundación Sevillana de Electricidad
FTRE	Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española (Workers' Federation of the Spanish Region)
Loja	Archivo Histórico Municipal de Loja
MECW	Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works
Memoria de Cádiz	Antonio Guerola (1986)
Memoria de Granada	Antonio Guerola (1996)
Memoria de Málaga	Antonio Guerola (1995)
Memoria de Sevilla	Antonio Guerola (1993)
REA	Revista de Estudios Antequeranos
Tapia	Archivo Municipal de Villanueva de Tapia
Zafarraya	Archivo Municipal de Zafarraya

Money, Weights and Measures

1 Duro	20 reales
1 Escudo	16 reales
1 Real	34 maravedis
1 Cuarto	4 maravedis
1 Maravedis	0.03 of a real
1 Fanega	dry measure of 55 litres, or 6.440 square metres of land
1 Arroba	11.5 kilos

Glossary

Alcalde	prefect and superintendent of town Council
Corregidor	
Alcalde	mayor
Alcalde del barrio	ward constable
Albéitar	veterinary surgeon
Aldea	village, hamlet
Algarada	cavalry raid
Alojamiento	billeting of agricultural labourers with landowners during periods of dearth and unemployment
Anónimo	anonymous threatening letter
Apuntado	sworn in member of <i>carbonari</i> society
Asilo de Pobres	hospice or work house
Ayuntamiento	Council
Bienio	Bienio Progresista (Progressive Biennium) July 1854–July 1856
Botica	Pharmacy
Botín	booty
Cabecera	municipal or district seat
Cacicazgo	area controlled by a ‘cacique’
Cacique	political boss
Caciquismo	boss rule
Camarilla	political clique
Campiña	rolling cereal producing plains of Andalucía
Canon	annual rent of common land
Capitán de cuadrilla	ward boss
Carabinero	excise guard
Carbonari	secret society following initiation rituals of the Italian Carbonari
Casa de campo	country house
Caserío	farmstead
Casería	country house
Casino	library, newspaper reading room and centre of <i>progresista</i> sociability
Caudal de propios	Council’s property account
Celador del caudal publico	guardian of municipal property
Choza	cottage
Clase menestrosa	the poor
Coacción	coercion

Coaligación	labour combination
Consumos	excise taxes
Council	town council
Cortijo	rural estate
Cortijada	hamlet
Corredor de número	broker
Desamortización	sale of corporately owned Church, Seigniorial and Municipal property
Desengaño	disappointment
Detención	illicit enclosure of municipal land
Doceanista	pertaining to the first constitutional period of 1812–14
Doctrinarios	mainstream of <i>moderantismo</i>
Exaltados	radical Liberals of the 1820–1836 period
Ejido	common grazing land
Fonda	restaurant
Grito	call to arms
Haza	plot of arable land
Hospicio	Hospice or Work House
Indultados	recipients of Royal pardon
Instituto	state secondary school
Jardin-casería	country house
Jornada	revolutionary ‘days’
Jornalero	day labourer or journeyman
Jurados	members of carbonari societies
Juzgado de primera instancia	court of first appeal
La Gloriosa	the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of September 1868
Mayorazgo	entail
Mayores contribuyentes	major tax payers
Mediodía	The South
Milicia Ciudadana	citizen’s militia in Loja in 1868, elsewhere known as ‘Voluntarios de la Libertad’
Moderados	Conservative Liberals
Moderantismo	Conservatism
Paisano	peasant, country-person
Partida de la Porra	violent gang of agent-provocateurs used in elections
Partida	irregular armed rural guard
Partido	judicial district
Patrio	name for Democrat in Loja
Pósito	municipal granary
Progresistas	Progressive Liberals

Promotor Fiscal	public prosecutor
Pronunciamiento	revolutionary pronouncement by the military
Propios	municipal properties
Pueblo	town or people
Puritanos	Left Moderados
Quinta	military draft
Resguardo	guard
Roza	plot of land on cortijo or on towns commons
Rozero	tenant of small land parcels
Secundón	second in line
Señorio	seigniorial rights over territory
Señoritos	literally 'little lords' or 'petty nobles', nouveau riche beneficiaries of the <i>desamortización</i>
Sexenio democrático	Democratic Sexennium between September 1868 and January 1875
Sierra	range of mountains
Sierra Bética	limestone Sierra between Málaga and Granada
Sierrezuela	small Sierra
Teniente	lieutenant to the mayor
Tertulia	salon, social gathering
Tornismo	arranged alternation of power between Liberal and Conservative governments
Trienio Liberal	Liberal constitution period of 1820–1823
Unión	labour solidarity among <i>jornaleros</i>
Vecino	citizen
Vega	agricultural valley
Vigilancia	special police force

Introduction

Across the street from the Café-Bar Quintana in Loja, a mountain town on the western boundary of the Spanish province of Granada, stands an architectural eccentricity. Facing the cafe at the start of La Carrera (the Street of the Horse Race)¹ are two houses: one, a plain whitewashed, green-shuttered two-storey dwelling, typical of the nineteenth-century Andalusian middle class; the other, towering over and almost enveloping its neighbour, a massive ducal palace built in the 1860s in a neo-Renaissance style.² The modest two-storey dwelling was the home of Rafael Pérez del Alamo, veterinarian blacksmith, chief of the town's Democrats and leader of the 'Revolution of Loja' of July 1861, considered by Republican historians as Spain's first popular 'Socialist' uprising without the prompting of a military *pronunciamento* (the accepted route to power in Liberal Spain).³ The ducal palace was home to General Ramón María Narváez, Duke of Valencia, warhorse of Spain's *moderado* (Conservative) Liberal party and seven times First Minister between 1844 and 1868.⁴

Two such incongruous houses, the modest vernacular dwelling almost swallowed up by its imperious neighbour, serve as a metaphor for mid-nineteenth-century Spanish politics. Between the failed uprisings of 1848 and the 'Gloriosa' of September 1868, a stubborn democratic 'pueblo' comprising 'men of ideas' from the middle and working classes embraced the religion of democratic internationalism to challenge the 'señoritos', a *nouveau riche* and reconstituted nobility who were becoming the principal beneficiaries of *desamortización* (the disentailment of seigniorial, church and municipal property) and sought exclusive claim to governing the Liberal state.⁵ Narváez epitomised this new Liberal bourgeoisie, and proudly sought to promote its values and defend its interests. In November 1862, in the wake of the suppression of Pérez's democratic uprising, Narváez secured his rival's expulsion from Loja to life-long exile in Seville and proceeded to incorporate his plot into his palace. However, in a gesture of Andalusian democratic solidarity, leading Democrats in Seville settled the Loja blacksmith's debts, enabling his wife, María Regina Ortiz Romero, to secure the property. The

Duke was obliged to redesign the eastern flank of his palace to accommodate the dwelling of his obstinate neighbour. This draftsman's compromise still prompts *lojeños* to recall this time when the eyes of Spain rested on this otherwise unremarkable town.

Throughout the 1860s, the names of these two squabbling neighbours and of Granada's second city of Loja resonated in the national consciousness. Renowned throughout Europe for his success in insulating Spain from the democratic movements that swept the Continent in 1848 earning him the nickname 'el Espadón de Loja' ('the big shot of Loja'), Narváez was repeatedly selected by Moderados as their leader in the hope that he might crush the Socialist threat and return the country to the aristocracy of wealth that had prevailed between 1844 and 1854. Pérez, 'el albéitar de Loja' ('the veterinarian-blacksmith of Loja'), was exalted among Democrats and advanced Progresistas (Progressive Liberals) throughout Spain, and as far away as Italy, as an example of rustic democratic virtue and patriotic daring; a Spanish Garibaldi.⁶ The Revolution of Loja of July 1861 provided a foretaste, terrifying for some, long-awaited for others, of the coming democratic age.

The book sets this tale of small-town rivalry within the broader context of the emergence in the towns and villages of eastern Andalucía of two increasingly polarised and mutually exclusive areas of sociability. Any town of Loja's size (17,000) in mid-nineteenth-century Spain contained combustible local party and personal rivalries. Yet because of the national renown of Ramón María Narváez (from 1846, the Duke of Valencia, henceforth 'Narváez' or 'the Duke'), his prestige within the Army and the providential role cast for him by Moderados, Loja's political divisions were placed in particularly sharp relief. During long periods of exile in Paris, Moderados in Granada were exposed to local competition, often backed by the electoral machinations of the national government, anxious to deny the General a platform for political recovery. During his seven terms as First Minister, and especially during the short periods when he returned to his beloved Loja, the city and the wider province became a focus of *moderado* resurgence nationally.⁷ As a consequence, Granada, otherwise considered to be among the most sleepy and backward of provinces, grew during the reign of Queen Isabel (1834–1868) to become one of Spain's principal political nerve centres.

As factionalism grew more intense, it became more personal and more deeply embedded in Loja's associational life. On one side, Pérez and his fellow Democrats (supporters of 'El Partido Demócrata Español' established in 1849) and Progresistas fostered a popular following through the distribution of newspapers and democratic propaganda, establishing a public reading room, patronising the same cafés and taverns, recruiting *confrères* into mutual aid and *carbonari* societies, and noisily occupying public space during National Militia musters. On the other, Narváez used his political influence in Madrid and personal ties with the Catholic hierarchy to

promote in Loja and its surrounding towns the revival of Catholic associational life; resurrecting confraternities, licensing new religious orders to operate schools and hospices, financing church building and prompting pastoral missions aimed at reversing lapsed Catholic observance. Between 1852 and 1868 Loja became a precocious example of the 'Two Spains', one free-thinking, forward-looking, Republican-inclined and cosmopolitan, and the other Catholic, intolerant, retrospective and nationalistic.⁸

Nineteenth-century Spain

By exploring the broader dimensions of the lives of these squabbling neighbours this book seeks to shed light on Spain's troubled and baffling nineteenth century. Why were politics before the Bourbon Restoration in 1875 so conflictive and why was the resort to force and revolution so habitual? Why was the legacy of constitutional liberalism forged during resistance to the Napoleonic invasion so contested? Why were the radical ideas drawn from other European countries, particularly France and Germany, seen by some Spaniards as natural and necessary and by others as alien and dangerous? Why was the praetorian and patriotic sense of nationhood awakened during resistance to the French invasion in 1808–1814 (and again in 1823–1827) so divisive and why was there so little consensus about the proper shape of the state and the meaning of the Nation? Why did many still believe that the clock could be turned back and that Spain could resume its distinct historical course, separate from the rest of Europe? By combining local histories with biographies of significant national players, set within the context of national and international events, the aim is to contribute to a better understanding of Spain's troubled nineteenth century.

Apart from exploring the local and regional manifestations of Spain's brittle political consensus, the study also contributes to the debate on Spain's historical decline and 'failure'. Until recently historians have presented Spain's nineteenth century as a catalogue of *fracasos* (failures): a failed bourgeois revolution, with the old elite merely renewing itself and with no proper democratic or entrepreneurial bourgeoisie making an appearance; a failed agricultural revolution, with the elite grabbing the best commercial land, farming it (in Andalucía at least) in excessively large units and needing tariff protection and cheap landless labour to make it commercially viable; a failed industrial revolution, with foreign economic control and low levels of consumption preventing sustainability⁹; a failed separation of Church and State, with the Church, for example, retaining a dominant stake in education; a failed modern nation, due to backward communications, high levels of illiteracy, the absence of major foreign wars and regionalism¹⁰; and lastly, a failed modern state comprising passive and cowed subjects, indifferent or hostile to politics, due to *caciquismo* (boss rule) based on electoral fraud and violence.¹¹

All of these 'failures' have recently come under revisionist scrutiny.¹² An image is now emerging of a modern Liberal nation state not marching of step with Europe, but pursuing much the same course as other European countries, even sharing the zest for new imperial adventures, although travelling at times more hesitantly and bumpily.¹³ A recent study that compares Spain's performance alongside the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and Portugal, across a very broad set of nineteenth-century indicators of modernity and 'progress', concluded that 'Isabeline Spain formed an inseparable part of that unit of civilization called Liberal Europe, one of its consequences and one of its motors...'.¹⁴ By exploring the onset of political modernity, a concept even recently dismissed as inapplicable to nineteenth-century Spain,¹⁵ in small-town and rural contexts often deemed by Spanish philosophers and historians to be 'sleeping'¹⁶ or indifferent to national politics and external ideological influences,¹⁷ this study contributes to this revisionism.

From the popular Revolution of July 1854 in Madrid – regarded at the time as the onset of 'Spain's 1848' – towns and villages in eastern Andalucía were drawn into national politics. This precocious politicisation – 20 years earlier than the entry of rural France to political modernity according to Eugen Weber¹⁸ – was a consequence of the long duration and intensity of the political violence that accompanied Spain's emergence as a Liberal nation state. Four features of this political violence stand out: an insurrectionary tradition going back to the uprising against the French invasion in 1808 and enduring until the mid-1890s; a Bourbon monarchy divided for 40 years between two warring Carlist and Isabelist factions; a culture of political representation characterised by extreme intolerance of opposition, generalised electoral manipulation and highly politicised local justice managed from the centre; and, most significantly for this study, a pattern common to most parties of reaction to the spectre of Socialism, involving repression of its manifestations in such movements as Republicanism that continued, indeed intensified, after 'La Gloriosa' in September 1868.

Eastern Andalucía was not alone in experiencing precocious rural politicisation. The popular diffusion of Republican and democratic sentiments occurred throughout Spain from the early 1840s, particularly in coastal cities, inland cities such as Madrid and Zaragoza, and large swathes of Catalonia, Aragon, the Levant, Southern Castille, Andalucía and Extremadura.¹⁹ A recent study of Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca, Guadalajara and Toledo during the reign of Queen Isabel concluded that these

eminently rural interior provinces of the peninsula...[were]...not silent, un-mobilised or dominated by languor...there were republicans...[who]..., in clandestinity for the most of the period, deployed a network of local committees, exercised an important influence over certain areas of political socialization and took part in the intestinal debates

which were thrashed out among Democrats over this prelude to the Sexenio.²⁰

The same intolerant political culture of Liberal Spain that fostered Republicanism drove others to turn to foral, Catholic and absolutist traditions, principally in the North, although Carlism had partisans throughout Spain, including eastern Andalucía. Spain, then, was 'modern' ('modern' meaning 'politicised' if we adopt Eugen Weber's definition) because most Spaniards were caught up in what seemed an interminable crisis accompanying the onset of Liberal constitutionalism, Liberal capitalism and the 'age of progress'.

As Florencia Peyrou has observed, Spanish Republicanism was part of a pan-European, indeed a global movement.²¹

The democratic and republican movement which developed in Spain during the reign of Isabel II (1843–1868) centred its discourse on the defence of a community of citizens equal before the law in civil and political rights against despotism and tyranny. It also emphasised the importance of justice and progress, the extension of economic and political liberties, the separation of Church and state, free primary education and the reduction of permanent armies. In this sense there are undoubted analogies with movements such as British radicalism and Chartism, and French, Italian and Portuguese republicanism. These similarities extend moreover into the forms of its ideological diffusion, organization and popular framework, based on the press, propagandistic pamphlets and catechisms, educational and mutual aid societies, reading rooms and popular libraries.²²

Research themes and sources

Inspired by Maurice Agulhon and the French school, research for this study focussed initially on tracing the emergence in the region of study of 'modern' forms of political sociability such as casinos, clubs, circles and mutualist associations, in the expectation of charting a corresponding decline of 'traditional sociabilities' around landowner paternalism and Catholic associations and rituals.²³ However, over the two decades following the failed uprisings of 1848, Spain's *révolution sociétaire* was a hesitant and constrained affair with repression of the Left fostering a culture of clandestinity.²⁴ Research therefore shifted to exploring conspiratorial networks and *carbonari* societies through police reports and to sketching out the political imaginary through newspapers and party propaganda. Apart from ideas and news, Democrat newspapers – *El Pueblo*, *La Discusión* and *La Democracia* – document political linkages through correspondents between Democrats in Madrid and their counterparts in provincial capitals, towns and villages.²⁵ Roger Darnton's

exhortation to combine analysis of discourse with exploring geographies of diffusion was influential here.²⁶

Research also sought to plot the geography of reaction to democratic propaganda and association. This region provided fertile terrain for Democrats and for Protestant evangelists in part because of the weakness of the Catholic Church in mid-nineteenth-century Spain, particularly in Andalucía.²⁷ Democrats and Protestant evangelists exploited the vacuum left by a depleted clergy. Diocesan archives in Granada and Málaga, which would reveal the clergy's response to this challenge, unfortunately remained closed during the period of research. However, two alternative sources permitted insight into the other side of the political divide: the personal archive of General Narváez²⁸ and the extensive memoirs of Antonio Guerola,²⁹ *moderado* civil governor consecutively of the provinces of Málaga, Granada, Seville and Cádiz between 1857 and 1876. Narváez and Guerola both possessed an intimate knowledge of the region and energetically sought to confront the democratic challenge. The book therefore not only charts the diffusion of Democrat propaganda but also the reaction to 'Democracia' from a centralised administration and still powerful *moderado* elites.

Understanding local and regional politics required mapping the overlap between formal institutions and informal allegiances in various spheres. A necessary first port of call is the municipal archive.³⁰ Municipal governments, particularly of large towns that served as capitals of electoral and judicial districts, such as Loja, Alhama, Archidona, Iznájar and Antequera, remained the lynchpin both of local power and of the national system of political representation.³¹ Yet Council minutes are notoriously silent in matters relating to local factionalism, revealing only flickers of the broader web of local and regional politics. The Cádiz constitution of 1812 had anticipated that towns would be invested with the original sovereignty of the Nation.³² However cherished by advanced Progresistas and Democrats, this remained an unfulfilled aspiration. For their part, Moderados sought to reduce municipal councils to mere administrative appendages. Yet, even with their political autonomy curtailed, their independent sources of finance decimated by the law of civil disentanglement of June 1855, and their function reduced to farming evermore crushing excise taxes (*consumos*), town councils continued to offer space for contesting initiatives from the centre, for petitioning ministers and the monarch, and for mobilising sections of the population for poor relief, public works, elections, ritual and recreation.³³ Even under centralised *moderado* administrations, well-staffed town councils with their multitude of commissions and jurisdictions provided cover for a wide diversity of political opinions as well as every day engagement with people of all ranks and stations.

Still within the sphere of municipal politics, research also embraced civic militias. From the late 1830s, the municipally controlled National Militia,

formed initially for resistance against the French invasion of 1808, became the political vehicle of Progresistas who valued it as a check on central power and a school for citizenship.³⁴ It was this symbolic embodiment of local power, pretended role in political education, and monopoly of public space on Sundays, which so enraged Absolutists and the Moderados whose first act when returning power – in 1814, 1823, 1843 and 1856 – was always to demobilise the National Militia.³⁵ For their part, Democrats, although initially eager to transform this patrician institution into a ‘nation in arms’, were always the first to be targeted during periods of repression accompanying militia ‘purification’ or disbandment.

With the final abolition of the National Militia in October 1856, Democrats and advanced Progresistas turned to Italian Carbonari enlistments and the Mazzinian idea of a popular civilian uprising. The Carbonari, with each member pledged to read a democratic newspaper and acquire a rifle, was the political nation in waiting. Sergeants in the regular army were targeted by *carbonari* instigators to undermine military discipline (suborned sergeants participated in the Democrat uprising of 1857, 1859 and 1866). The leaders of *La Gloriosa* in September 1868 chose not to re-establish the National Militia but allowed revolutionary juntas to form companies of ‘Volunteers of Liberty’, inspired by Garibaldi’s Republican volunteers. These proved as provocative to central power as the National Militia and were soon demobilised. Yet each failure contributed a new layer to Republican martyrology and to an alternative popular Republican myth of the nation.³⁶ The Risorgimento, whose project of national regeneration attracted immense interest throughout Spain, gave these Hispanic traditions of armed citizenship a heroic ‘neo-Roman’ dimension.³⁷

Local power was further complicated by the existence of centrally controlled police bodies, such as the *Guardia Civil* (Civil Guard), the *Carabineros* (excise guards), local garrisons of the regular army and *resguardos*, armed guards charged with protecting state monopolies such as the salt works at Loja and Antequera. Councils facing a substantial democratic challenge, such as Antequera, also maintained a *vigilancia* (special police force) throughout the period of study. Arms were not confined to public bodies. Landowners employed rural guards to protect their livestock and harvests. Most farmers, large and small, travelled armed. Even day labourers possessed shotguns necessary for supplementing the fragile diet in this game-rich region. The potential use of force was therefore highly diffuse and ‘democratic’. The question of gun licenses, of who controlled the different guards and police bodies and what coercive authority different bodies should possess over citizens was highly contested. Moderados favoured a centralised chain of authority but with coercive power confined locally to the Civil Guard backed by a landowner-controlled rural guard when and where properties were threatened. Progresistas and

Democrats strove to construct a local counterpoise to central power in the National Militia and the 'Volunteers of Liberty'. Banditry represented a further realm of coercion often closely tied to local intra-elite political rivalries.³⁸

Hence, local politics extended far beyond formal bodies – Councils, militias, police and guards – to include informal groups such as landowners, graziers, tenants of town commons and private estates and *jornaleros* (day labourers), all of whom regularly exerted collective pressure on local and provincial government. Liberal constitutions since 1812 had posited an atomised political order in which the sovereignty of the individual vote (limited until 1869 to the propertied few) was the legitimate link between people, state and nation. Yet, in practice, people engaged in politics collectively as well as individually, through numerous channels, formal and informal. Above all, people on all sides of the political spectrum during the middle decades of the century lived in the expectation that sooner rather than later the political nation would greatly expand, as happened in the aftermath of 'La Gloriosa' when male universal suffrage was first declared.³⁹

A regional and local focus exposes the complexity of Spanish politics at its roots and sheds light on aspects which were invisible from the Centre (or which the Centre chose to ignore or disguise): the part played by a politicised local judiciary; the fear felt by local elites when confronted by clandestine *carbonari* associations (particularly once Democrats joined forces with kidnapers, bandits and thugs); the fear felt by citizens when confronted by the presence of armed police groups such as the Civil Guard, the Carabineros and the Salt Guard; the impact on local political life of the 'Partida de la Porra' (*agents provocateurs* deployed by incumbent politicians)⁴⁰; the personal charisma and influence of particular local leaders, be they priests, captains of work gangs of *jornaleros*, Democrat leaders, doctors, veterinarians and pharmacists, school teachers, musicians or theatre performers; and the collective identity derived from belonging to the National Militia (even after it was disbanded in 1843 and again in 1856, Militia veterans continued to socialise together), or to lay Catholic organisations such as confraternities.

The study explores democratic exaltation and the birth of modern politics during the last two decades of the reign of Queen Isabel II, and, by way of an epilogue, follows towns, leaders, ideas and movements through the Sexenio into the first years of the Bourbon Restoration. Towns and villages in this region shared a common regional political culture in which the names of two *lojeños* – Narváez and Pérez del Alamo – became familiar to everyone, representing two competing visions of Spain. Long before 'La Gloriosa' in September 1868, people in this corner of Spain experienced mass politics and served an apprenticeship that shaped political identities and allegiances well into the twentieth century.


The region

Research for the book focussed on three cities and their surrounding judicial districts (*comarcas*): Loja, Granada's second city; neighbouring Alhama, the province's breadbasket; and, Antequera, second city of the province of Málaga (see Map 1). Archidona and Iznájar, situated between Loja and Antequera, also receive close attention. Additionally, within the same Sierra Bética, several smaller towns with active Democrat parties are brought into the picture: Alora, Casabermeja, Colmenar, Alfarnate, Periana and the numerous 'Villanuevas' (V. de Tapia, V. de las Algaidas, V. de Trabuco, V. del Rosario, V. de Cauche, V. de la Concepción). The analysis shifts periodically to the wider contexts of Granada and Málaga, provincial capitals that frame the region, mediating the power of Madrid and catalysing the politics of eastern Andalucía. At appropriate intervals the national context is sketched out, along with relevant events on the European and international scale, such as the Italian Risorgimento, the Moroccan War and the European Intervention in Mexico.

This region was chosen not out of any scientific consideration of what combination of physical and human characteristics makes a 'region'. Rather, towns and their surrounding districts were selected for study for being territorially contiguous, for sharing a common experience of weakened Catholic pastoral provision, for being targeted by local Democrats for *carbonari* enlistments, for falling within the boundaries of the *cacicazgo* of Ramón María Narváez, his family and his allies, and, most importantly, for having sent, or attempted to send, large contingents to Loja in the democratic uprising of July 1861. Apart from constituting a political and conspiratorial region in which local and regional leaders knew each other, at least by reputation, the region also shared broadly similar economic and social characteristics, with the principal towns closely linked by important routes and fairs.

The section of Andalusian Sierra, known as 'el sistema bético', that stretches between Ronda (Málaga) and Montefrío (Granada) served as the frontier between Moorish and Christian Spain during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Throughout the Moorish period (c. 700–1492) people in this region resided in a small number of compact garrison towns – Ardales, Alora, Teba, Antequera, Archidona, Iznájar, Loja, Zagra and Montefrío – leaving the intervening spaces largely depopulated. During the last century of Moorish rule cereal land for supplying the Nazarí capital at Granada was confined to the eastern flanks of this massif, particularly the rolling uplands between Granada and the flour-milling town of Alhama whose capture in 1482 signalled the beginning of the end of Islamic presence on the Peninsular.

Following the *reconquista*,⁴¹ these former garrison towns retained their primacy as triumphant Christian soldiers and settlers, spurred on by



Map 1 The Region

concessions of noble titles and land grants, used their control of town councils to appropriate the best lands from the Moors and to exercise jurisdiction over extensive municipal territories. Their principal interest lay in the fertile valleys (*vegas*) that grew to satisfy the region's needs as well exports of grain to the coast and inland.⁴² Until well into the eighteenth century, in spite of gradual agricultural encroachment, most of this mountainous region consisted of unpopulated and unbroken swathes of Mediterranean woodland (aspens, chestnut, holm oak, gall-oak, willows and brush).

From the early eighteenth century four inter-related developments began to transform the relationship between these towns and their territories. First, the region experienced sustained population growth, continuing at higher than the national rate throughout the nineteenth century.⁴³ Secondly, this expanding population increased pressure upon common grazing and forest land for growing food while enterprising farmers opened olive groves on land cleared of Mediterranean scrub. The state encouraged this process by sponsoring colonisation schemes and by favouring agriculture over pastoral interests such as the graziers' guild (*mesta*). Thirdly, from the later eighteenth century the state sought to transfer corporately held (Church, seigniorial and municipal) property not of direct public utility into private hands in a process known as *desamortización*.⁴⁴ Finally, and as a consequence of these developments, new settlements appeared within the territories of former garrison towns, a process hastened by the ending of seigniorial jurisdiction. Isolated homesteads and *cortijos* (agricultural estates) became hamlets (*acortijadas* or *caseríos*), hamlets became 'pueblas' (the feminised label for *pueblos* without full municipal autonomy), *pueblas* sought to become *pueblos* – independent municipalities in their own right, freed from tutelage to prying and dominant *cabeceras* (head towns).⁴⁵ The toponymic prefix 'Villanueva' so common in this region – Villanueva de Mesías, V. de Tapia, V. de las Algaidas, V. de Trabuco, V. del Rosario, V. de Cauche, V. de la Concepción and so on – is evidence of this recent settlement history. These small yet demographically aggressive settlements proved particularly hard for a declining Catholic clergy to evangelise, hence their responsiveness to appeals from Democrat leaders during the 1850s and 1860s.

Set within the mountainous borderlands of three provinces, difficult to traverse except by mule or on horseback, the region was nevertheless criss-crossed by important routes. The main roads between Córdoba and Málaga and Seville and Granada went through Antequera. The main routes between Granada and Málaga, Córdoba and Seville pass through Loja, the hub of the region. An alternative route between Granada and Málaga passes through Alhama. These axes account for the region's horse and mule breeding specialisation. Antequera and Loja held important annual horse fairs, the livestock trade attracting large communities of gypsies (still found in most of the towns of the region, small and large). During the 1850s and

early 1860s, coinciding with the culmination of the *desamortización*, railway lines, with their connecting feeder roads, were cut through the region, inflating agricultural prices and contributing to wage demands and agrarian expectations.

Although this was predominantly pastoral and agricultural region, specialising in wheat, the olive, the vine, sheep grazing, horse and mule breeding, there were also important secondary and tertiary activities. Alhama, breadbasket of the province of Granada and the coast, was an important centre of flour milling. The city also possessed a spa (popular among gamblers and the military), an important military hospital, an economic society, a casino and a theatre. Loja was home to several small paper mills, tanneries and a woollen cloth factory, an important branch of the Royal Salt Monopoly, a theatre, a municipal band, two pharmacies (Civil Governor Antonio Guerola saw the pharmacy as 'the principal club... before there were casinos'),⁴⁶ eight hotels and 30 cafés and bars. Archidona housed an important college of secondary and higher education whose graduates contributed to the Andalusian Enlightenment, the Romantic movement and the Moorish Revival. Antequera boasted an important, mechanised woollen textile industry employing 6–7-000 workers in 1859, a branch of the Royal Salt Monopoly, two theatres, a municipal band, a secondary college, two casinos, more than 50 cafés and bars. This was provincial but not 'sleeping' Spain.⁴⁷

Organisation

The book has 13 chapters, divided into four parts, arranged chronologically. The first part, 'Party, Town and the Culture of Clandestinity, 1843–1861', explores the roots of political factionalism and the development of a culture of clandestinity in the region from the Moderate Decade (1844–1854) to the eve of the Loja Revolution in June 1861. The second part, 'The Revolution of the Blacksmiths, July 1861', examines the rebel occupation of the city of Loja in early July 1861, explores the regional dimensions of the Democrat clandestine organisation that produced the uprising and reviews the actions of the military tribunals established in Loja and Málaga to try the rebels. The third part, 'Catholicism, Democracy and the twilight of the Bourbon Monarchy, 1862–1868', explores the survival of the conspiratorial networks that were behind the mass uprising at Loja in 1861, and traces attempts by Moderados to repress Democrats, to restore Catholic institutions and to revive lapsed Catholicism. The final part, '“La Gloriosa”: Democrat Victory, Republican Defeat, 1868–1891', observes how, after 15 years of political exclusion and clandestinity, Democrats and advanced Progresistas in the region, now renamed Republicans, responded to the fall of the Bourbon monarchy in September 1868 and the introduction of universal male suffrage.

Part I

Party, Town and the Culture of Clandestinity, 1843–1861

This page intentionally left blank

1

The Bienio Progresista in Eastern Andalucía, 1854–1856

For Spain 1854 was what 1848 had been for France, the hour and sign for the people to awake.¹

On 28 June 1854, amidst rumours that Queen Isabel might favour a return to absolutism, General Leopoldo O'Donnell launched a military uprising against the corrupt and discredited ministry of José Luis Sartorius. On his flight from Madrid after the inconclusive battle of Vicálvaro O'Donnell, he met General Francisco Serrano (also in flight having failed to raise his home province of Jaen) at Manzanares. Faced with the alternative of ignominious exile in Portugal, O'Donnell and Serrano issued a manifesto which transformed a failed coup into a revolution.² Drafted by a young journalist and aspiring politician from Málaga, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the 'Manifesto of Manzanares' appealed to all those who resented the favouritism, corruption, press censorship and centralisation of ten years of *moderado* rule.

We must declare what we have resolved to do on the day of victory. We want to keep the throne, but without the *camarilla* that dishonours it; we want the rigorous application of our fundamental laws, but also their improvement, especially regarding electoral and press laws; we want the reduction of taxes, founded on strict economies; we want military and civil offices to be respected according to merit and length of service; we want to save our towns from the centralisation that devours them, granting them the independence they need protecting and increasing their own interests; and, as a guarantee of all this, we want the NATIONAL MILITIA established upon solid foundations.³

Appropriately broad and vague, designed to attract Progresistas and Democrats (whose own plans for a national uprising were already well-advanced), the manifesto evoked a simpler, uncorrupted, locally controlled *doceanista* liberalism guaranteed by a patriotic National Militia. The message

was well received. Six years later, in July 1861, Democrat rebels marching on Loja called for the implementation of ‘the programme of Manzanares’.

Carried to Madrid by Cánovas ‘on a tiny piece of paper rolled up in a cigarette’, by mid-July the manifesto was circulating throughout Spain. A popular uprising in the capital led by Democrats, the sacking by angry crowds of the mansions of María Cristina (the Queen Mother) and other plutocrats (evoking memories throughout Europe of the Paris of February 1848) forced Sartorius to resign on 18 July. Uprisings in Barcelona, Zaragoza and Valladolid were soon matched throughout Andalucía. Long excluded Progresistas formed juntas. Town councils removed in the *moderado* coup in 1843 were restored. Marshal Baldomero Espartero, First Minister in 1843, was recalled to Madrid. After a triumphal entry to the capital on 29 July the ‘Duque de la Victoria’ was escorted to the palace to be invited by Queen Isabel to form a government. Meanwhile O’Donnell, after discretely delaying his entry to Madrid, joined Espartero in the palace to be offered the Ministry of War.⁴

Since the overthrowing of Espartero by Narváez in 1843 and the disbanding of the National Militia in 1844, government in Spain had been remodelled to a *moderado* centralising blueprint.⁵ The powers of central and provincial government were increased at the expense of municipalities which lost their residual autonomy to occupy the lowest rung in the administration. Centrally appointed Alcaldes Corregidores replaced locally elected municipal presidents. Appointed civil governors and provincial deputations were given powers directly to monitor municipal finances and elections, and to levy fines on infringements of the 1845 municipal law. Electors, restricted in any case by a high property qualification, no longer needed to reside in the town where they possessed a vote, favouring absentee landowners.⁶ The remaining judicial powers of *ayuntamientos* were removed with the appointment of local justice vested in the Ministry of Justice, on the advice of the provincial administration.⁷ The control of the *Juzgado de Primera Instancia* became the cornerstone of local politics and *caciquismo*. A local *juzgado* backed by a politicised provincial administration could make the life of town councillors unbearable.⁸ The final piece of the *moderado* centralist jigsaw was the Civil Guard, established in 1844 by Narváez under the direct authority of the Ministry of Government (although with officers seconded from the regular Army), obviating the need for a National Militia to maintain order. In areas where order was threatened, landowners were permitted to form *guardias rurales* to protect their estates.

The Revolution of July 1854 threatened to undo ten years of *moderado* state building. The return to the municipal law of 1823 and *progresista* control of towns under elected mayors, combined with the restoration of the National Militia, raised radical expectations of municipal sovereignty and autonomy and the rebuilding of the state from the ‘bottom up’, anticipating some kind of provincial, even federal, representative bodies. However, the

moderado state would not be undone. Divisions in the government between *vicalvaristas* (supporters of O'Donnell) and *esparteristas*, and the continuing influence in the Cortes of Moderados and the weakness of Democrat representation, delayed indefinitely the debate over a new constitution which Democrats and advanced Progresistas believed would express the spirit of Manzanares. The centralised 1845 constitution remained in force.

Politics during the Bienio existed in a state of perpetual flux. Municipalities and restored *progresista* institutions such as the National Militia confronted a much more centralised administration than in the earlier period of *progresista* rule between 1837 and 1843. A more conservative army, with O'Donnell as Minister of War enjoying greater authority than First Minister Espartero, presided over the whole period. Provincial and municipal governments that were expected to implement the *progresista* programme were wracked by fiscal crisis, cholera, prolonged dearth and social unrest.

This chapter explores the obstacles *progresista* Councils in Loja, Alhama and Antequera faced in implementing the reform agenda after ten years of *moderado* rule and traces the first signs at a local level of the broadening of politics. Although the municipal revolutions in Loja, Alhama and Antequera in July 1854 were peaceful events that followed standard constitutional protocols, involving the replacement of patrician Moderados by patrician Progresistas, there were hints of social conflict and the precariousness of public order. The restoration of the National Militia, the encouragement for greater freedom of expression and association, the expansion of education, the abolition of unpopular *consumos* (excise taxes) and Crown monopolies, the abolition of the military draft (*quintas*) and the passing of the law of civil *desamortización* requiring the sale of town commons were highly contentious and hard to fund and execute over a two-year period when municipal authorities struggled with a cholera epidemic, subsistence crises, fiscal deficits and vacillating, often repressive, provincial and central authorities.

Narváez

Before looking more closely at politics during the Bienio, it is useful briefly to survey the previous decade through the experience of General Ramón María Narváez, Duke of Valencia, the Moderados' principal protagonist (see Illustration 1). The last two years of *moderado* rule in Loja were dramatised by the return of this distinguished native son. Loja in the early 1850s was experiencing a building boom, fully sharing in Spain's mid-nineteenth-century prosperity.⁹ Like any good Moderado, Narváez saw it as his duty to promote and enjoy this prosperity, to provide political leadership and to set an example of Christian piety and charity. The Duke expressed shock on his return by the number of vagrants, beggars and the general disorder on the streets



Illustration 1 Ramón María Narváez, Duke of Valencia, c.1854

and took swift action to promote the establishment of a Hospicio (Poor House). The alarming state of the town centre persuaded the Duke initially to reside in a newly built country house and French garden on the ancestral 'caseríos de Narváez', imitating his brother José María Narváez, Conde de la Cañada, whose country house on the Cortijo de la Cañada was reaching completion.¹⁰ A massive new palace was also started in the centre of Loja,

ready to receive the Duke once Loja's charities were rebuilt and its streets cleared of beggars.

Between July 1852 and June 1854 wagons and mule trains plied the precipitous road between Málaga and Loja, protected by detachments of Civil Guard, carrying giant vases, statues, pumps, a steam engine, an iron water wheel, cases of champagne, crates of exotic plants, quantities of giant shells, destined for the Duke's country house.¹¹ Among the most valued items was Auguste Fillion, a French gardener who was paid 100 francs a month plus lodging and food 'in the style of the country'.¹² Properties surrounding the *casería*, including a paper mill, were acquired mainly for their water supply. In June 1854, on the eve of the July Revolution, 21 carts were hired to transport French furniture from Málaga protected by an armed escort.¹³

During the railway boom years of the early 1850s self-enrichment by senior *moderado* politicians and members of the Royal Family was coming under mounting press criticism, a mood which would culminate in the Revolution of July 1854. Moderados who displayed their wealth conspicuously were labelled 'polacos', a reference to the Polish origins of First Minister Luis Sartorius.¹⁴ With his seemingly inexhaustible funds of cash, two fine coaches, a palace in Madrid, another under construction in Loja, as well as a French-style country house and garden, Narváez qualified as a 'polaco' in the eyes of envious opponents. By July 1854 Narváez's *progresista* rivals in Loja, led by Francisco Rosal y Badía, commander of the militia battalion disbanded in 1843, had adopted the label of 'patriotas' to underline their pristine patriotic credentials. This factional rivalry, which can be traced back to the 1820s, achieved a particularly virulent form in Loja providing a foothold for the Democrat party to emerge in Loja during the Bienio. As Narváez was the catalyst for this factionalism, it is useful to explore the lineaments of the Duke's *cacicazgo*.¹⁵

Long periods of exile in Paris (November 1838–1823, July 1843, 1846, 1851–1852, 1853, 1854–1856, 1858–1862) contributed a broader dimension to Narváez's political career that would have implications for Loja. Among his close friends in Paris were Fernando Muñoz, husband of the Queen Mother, María Cristina, Juan de Grimaldi, banker and factotum of Franco-Spanish economic interests (particularly important once Narváez had acquired a leading stake in the Granada–Málaga railway), and Léon Faucher, minister-confidante of Louis Napoleon, through whom Narváez channelled a secret personal loan of 1,000,000 francs to the French emperor between 1849 and 1851.¹⁶ Living in Paris made the Duke more acutely aware of the danger of Socialism and the need to combat it, not simply through repression, but by rebuilding of religious and charitable institutions and, in spite of his often difficult relationship with Isabel, through supporting the monarchy. Protecting Loja's large proletariat of *jornaleros* from the preaching of Democrats became an obsession of the Duke.

Apart from brief visits to his beloved Loja, between 1834 and 1852 Narváez lived either in Madrid or in Paris. Yet he kept in touch with his home town through his brother José María, head of the family, his nephews Rafael and Pepe, and his cousin Dolores Córdoba y Caseley.¹⁷ Throughout the Moderate Decade the Campos and Narváez families looked after the Duke's business interests and possessions in Loja while controlling the Council. In return, Narváez ensured that favours and resources trickled down from Madrid to benefit his family, the local clergy and the city of his birth. The family in Loja also remained central to his emotional life throughout long years of exile, particularly the relationship with childhood sweetheart Concepción Fernández de Córdoba who had married his elderly uncle. After Concepción was widowed in 1846 they conceived a daughter together, the year of the Duke's marriage to 21-year-old María Alejandra Tascher in Paris.¹⁸

The Narváez, Campos and Fernández de Córdoba, Loja's oldest and most distinguished *reconquista* families, although not immune to internal squabbles, provided the Duke with an unrivalled political base. Yet in an age of broadening suffrage elite family ties were not in themselves sufficient to ensure local influence. For 17 years between December 1850 and his last Ministry in 1867, Narváez could count on the blind loyalty of Lorenzo Montero Rodríguez who, when not serving as fiscal of Loja's court, was First Judge (*Juez de Primera Instancia*).¹⁹ Over the same period the Duke conferred powers of attorney on José María Orejón to conduct his business affairs during his absence.²⁰ Even during short periods of *progresista* rule the Council accorded respect and obedience to Loja's 'Protector', congratulating the Duke upon his appointments to the First Ministry, commiserating when he was removed,²¹ wishing him swift recovery from illness, and, in November 1850, commissioning a statue of Loja's illustrious native son, the cost to be met by a public subscription backed by 23,000 reales from municipal coffers.²² Finally, the directorship of the Royal salt monopoly at Loja remained in Narváez's gift until his death, the administrator commanding a small force of guards, a target later of much local resentment.²³

In the broader region, Narváez possessed a valuable network of contacts, many established during his early career as a successful horse-breeder and trader. He enjoyed relations of friendship and consanguinity with the Enríquez family, wealthy merchants and landowners of the coastal region between Málaga and Vélez. As we have seen, his uncle Manuel Enríquez handled the delivery of French adornments for the country house and gardens. Manuel's son, Brigadier Enrique Enríquez y García, served as Narváez's aide de camp during the 1850s and acted variously as civil and military governor of Seville, Córdoba and Granada from the 1850s until the Duke's last Ministry in 1867. Miguel María Enríquez y Campos, canon of Granada's Hospital of San Juan de Dios, and prior of Loja's Convent of Santa Clara between 1850 and 1856, was a first cousin and advised Narváez on the rebuilding of Loja's

charities. The Duke also maintained close ties with Loja's parish priests, particularly with Francisco Yébenes, priest of the Iglesia Mayor, and Victoriano Caro, priest of the parish of Santa Catalina, whose intense rivalry and mutual jealousy contributed to the declining influence of Loja's clergy following the Bienio.²⁴ Both used the Duke's influence to secure personal promotions and funding for their parishes.²⁵ Victoriano Caro always prefixed his letters to the Duke with 'Mi Venerado Faborecedor'.²⁶

Narváez's activities in Loja during the early 1850s extended beyond private palace building and horse-breeding to the promotion and funding of charities, the repair and rebuilding of churches and the establishment of new religious orders.

Loja was not alone in experiencing the beginnings of a Catholic revival. The Concordat between the Spanish government and the Papacy in 1851 marked the end of a century of bitter conflict and laid the foundations for the institutional revival of the Catholic Church and normalisation in its relations with the Liberal state. The state accepted responsibility for funding the clergy, particularly the cathedral chapters and central diocesan administration. In return the Papacy accepted the state's disentailment of Church property, although the Church was permitted to recover some of its confiscated properties, especially those necessary for sustaining the parish clergy in small towns and villages. The Church was allowed again to own property necessary for performing its religious, educational and charitable functions. Closed convents could not be reopened but new orders might be licensed. Municipalities were allowed to raise additional taxes for funding the Church, in addition to the Territorial and Industrial taxes that had funded the clergy – inadequately – since 1841. The Papacy was once more free to relaunch fund-raising measures such as the sale of Bulls of the Holy Crusade and indulgences. The Church regained its supervisory role in monitoring religious instruction in state schools, and was free to establish schools and colleges of its own. The state retained the right of ecclesiastical patronage, but the Church was free from any secular intrusion regarding pastoral visits, missions and processions.²⁷

Activity in all of these areas is evident in Loja after 1851. Already in the autumn of 1848, Narváez had succeeded in obtaining 27 million reales of state funds to support the diocese of Granada in funding the clergy.²⁸ Immediately upon his return to Loja in January 1852 the Duke used the occasion of a mass to give thanks for the Queen's survival of an attempt on her life to donate 4000 reales to the city's poor.²⁹ The linking of a private charitable donation to a collective gesture of loyalty to the Crown marked the beginning of Narváez's campaign to rebuild Loja's religious charitable institutions, decimated by ecclesiastical disentailment and war.

The *desamortización* had left Loja with just one convent, Santa Clara, directed between 1850 and 1856, as we have seen, by the Duke's cousin Miguel Enríquez Campos.³⁰ On 28 March 1852, on the occasion of his

mother's death, Narváez proposed the establishment of a 'Hospice and House of Charity' for the benefit of the poor and homeless of any age or sex offering 12,000 reales annually to sustain it, to which the Council immediately agreed.³¹ The regime of the Hospice would emphasise education and self-improvement (including a 50 piece boy's wind band) to enable its inmates to be 'useful to their Patria, to humanity and to religion'.³² Royal permission was granted and work began immediately on the conversion of a building acquired by the Duke, as well on the restoration of a neighbouring church and a house for the Sisters of Mercy who would operate the Hospice.³³

These first steps in Loja's precocious Catholic revival owed much to the Duke's zeal in using his connections and wealth to address poverty and vagrancy which he knew from living in Paris and Madrid could be a source of political unrest. Narváez hoped to make Loja a model of prosperity, order, piety and loyalty to the monarchy, presided over by its beneficent cacique, an example for other towns and cities to emulate. Unfortunately, his *confièrès* in Madrid were more concerned with constructing luxurious palaces and enjoying the wealth derived from lucrative railway contracts than they were with promoting a Catholic revival or seeking solutions to poverty.

Loja

The Revolution of July 1854, originating as it did within a discontented army, might have been headed by Nárvaez, who by 1854 was profoundly disenchanted with the Bourbon monarchy and was never averse to the populist gesture (in September 1864 he returned to the First Ministry promising to be 'more liberal than Riego').³⁴ But in the summer of 1854, O'Donnell stole a march. With the restoration of his great rival Espartero to the First Ministry Nárvaez left Loja for exile Paris, his place was taken by Francisco Rosal y Badía, president of the deposed Council of November 1843 and commander of the disbanded Militia.

In contrast to the street fighting and army fusillades in Madrid and other cities, the transition to *progresista* rule in Loja was peaceful, although not without some rumours of disorder.³⁵ On 23 July 1854 an extraordinary Council meeting invited Rosal and the councillors removed in the coup of 1843 to resume their mandate and invited the Militia battalion to enlist.³⁶ The Council's first act was to organise a celebration to honour the triumphal entry of Espartero to Madrid on 29 July. At 6 p.m. on 1 August, carrying a portrait of the 'caudillo de la libertad' suspended beneath the 'standard of Castile', the deacon of the city led a procession through Loja's principal plazas and streets to honour 'the patriotic National uprising that has just liberated us forever from the slavery and tyranny which for so many years has kept our Country in continual alarm and prostration'. Church bells were rung and bunting hung from the city's balconies and windows.³⁷

Although Loja escaped the serious disorders that afflicted larger provincial capitals such as Barcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia, Valladolid and Málaga intermittently, relations with the provincial government remained strained throughout the Bienio. *Moderado* inclined Granada felt challenged by Loja's strongly *progresista* Council backed by a 640-strong Militia battalion. Loja resented its heavy contribution to funding provincial institutions such as the deputation and provincial Council, which had increased from around 6,000 reales a year during the 1830s and early 1840s to 29,000 reales by the end the Moderate Decade, particularly since no provincial support was forthcoming for arming and equipping the National Militia, for funding Latin teaching, for attending to the cholera epidemic of June 1855, or for providing poor relief and rations for unemployed *jornaleros* during periods of unemployment and dearth.³⁸

In the autumn of 1854 the Captain General and civil governor in Granada refused Loja's newly formed battalion's request for rifles claiming that no spare weaponry existed in Granada, leaving Rosal with no option but use *pósito* funds for arming the Militia (a time-honoured practice, going back to the war against the French).³⁹ By December 1854, although Rosal claimed that the militia 'at present is without life, annihilated, as though it does not exist', the battalion possessed at least 100 rifles and the beginnings of wind band. Yet this left 500 militiamen unarmed.⁴⁰

Riots in Málaga in December 1854 accompanying the demobilisation of radical Militia companies provided Rosal with a bargaining counter in his dealing with the provincial government. By presenting Loja's battalion as a loyal, obedient, patriotic, orderly and patrician force, the opposite to Málaga's riotous and proletarian militia, Rosal convinced Civil Governor José Gómez Sillero that he had nothing to fear from the battalion which might even be useful in the event of rumblings among Granada's own militia.⁴¹ In return for complying with the governor's order for 'purification' of National Militia lists (promising to weed out radicals who had joined up during the July Revolution), Rosal convinced the governor to persuade O'Donnell to allow Loja to equip its battalion from the 2,000 surplus rifles gathered in Málaga after the December riots (Loja received only 300, many not in working order, incurring further expense in repairs for the Council).⁴² By the time cholera struck in May 1855, Loja's battalion was adequately armed and equipped leaving Rosal free to attend to three desolating months of epidemic. By the end of 1855 the Battalion was almost at full strength, with 100 modern rifles, 400 shotguns, eight war drums, four cornets and wind instruments necessary for a band of 24 men, all funded from the existing municipal budget.⁴³

If Loja's National Militia Battalion symbolised local patriotism and desire for greater autonomy, petitions for funding Latin teaching reveal the anxiety of *lojeños* about career opportunities beyond their native city.⁴⁴ Latin was a compulsory part of the secondary curriculum and proficiency in Latin

was required for entering the Clergy, the University and any other profession. With the closure of seminaries and convents during the ecclesiastical *desamortización* of the 1830s, Latin teaching had suffered. Councils were supposed to fund the salaries of Latin teachers from income from *propios*, but this source dried up entirely with the civil *desamortización* in 1855.⁴⁵ Long before this, however, Latin teaching in Loja was reported to be in a parlous state and remained so throughout our period.⁴⁶

Petitions protesting the lack of Latin teaching throughout the 1840s and 1850s merged into a broader agenda of grievances expressed by Progresistas and Democrats on the eve of the Loja Revolution in July 1861. The inadequacy of Latin teaching disqualified the sons of Loja's middle class from entering the professions and from acquiring 'civilised' ways.⁴⁷ The middle class in Loja lacked the resources to employ private tutors or to send their sons to board at a new state secondary 'Instituto' in Granada.⁴⁸ Throughout the 1850s petitions to the provincial government for support for Latin teaching fell upon deaf ears while Council funding, never amounting to more than a single salary for a Latin teacher, was repeatedly dropped from the budget.⁴⁹

During the Bienio Loja's Council was too stretched with more pressing costs to be able to fund Latin teachers. Although a private Latin school was established in October 1854 by Andrés Padilla y Montoro of Algarinejo, 'on the bequest of certain vecinos who desire such instruction for their sons', this amounted to little more than a private tutorial for the sons of the elite.⁵⁰ The extent of middle-class frustration was demonstrated in a petition in March 1861 on the eve of the Loja revolt signed by 119 *lojeños* pleading with the provincial government to fund the Latin post. In the past the Council had subsidised Latin classes so that 'parents of the poor and the middle class, in towns remote from the Universities, could enter their sons upon literary careers'. The three or four years of sacrifice this entailed paid off because their sons entered 'the careers of law, medicine, theology, even pharmacy'. All this came to an end 'when the Colegio of San Bartolomé, which funded twelve bursaries for the poor, was closed (in 1842)'.⁵¹ Since then, only comfortably off parents had been able to afford the eight to ten years of study necessary for entering a career, while 'the parents of the middle and labouring classes, a majority in this town, painfully and resentfully resigned themselves to seeing their children deprived from such an early age of advantages of study'. The Council understood this predicament and had done all it could to provide Latin teaching. It was now incumbent upon the provincial government to provide the means for *lojeños* to qualify for university, as the Law of Public Instruction of September 1857 specified.⁵²

If the provincial government was indifferent to middle-class anxiety about Latin teaching, it was alarmed by reports from Loja on advances in workers' education. In January 1855 the civil governor warned Rosal that

... there exists in the lower halls of the ex-convent of La Victoria... a reunion instituted solely with the object of reading in the early hours of each evening political newspapers, especially that entitled *El Látigo*, attended mostly by the labouring class. I am told that commentaries are made during the readings which stir up the spirit of those who for ignorance and want of education lack the necessary intelligence to properly understand them or comprehend that these are weapons prized by the hidden enemies of the present situation to bring it down and to plunge us into the most terrible anarchy.

Gómez Sillero ordered the reading room to be closed and all newspapers and equipment confiscated. Rosal pleaded with the governor to reconsider his decision 'in order for Loja to retain the good place it deserves, and the pacific and liberal reputation for which it has always been honoured', insisting that

... the reunion of citizens which had ceased upon your order was not an association of the kind categorically prohibited by the Law in which political points are discussed but a reunion of peaceful inhabitants with the object of reading public newspapers, not only *El Látigo* but all the newspapers it can acquire, such as *La Iberia*, *El Clamor*, *La Epoca*, and such like, from which one cannot learn other doctrines than the liberal idea of order and progress... The reunion is attended not only by mere workers but by every class of citizen without distinction: artisans and farmers, merchants and farm labourers. Constantly inspected closely by the local authorities this reunion is far from being a focus of insurrection and disturbance of order, rather the contrary, on the slightest insinuation of watchmen they are ready to retire to their respective houses and even to provide them with help when requested.

Rosal suspected that 'enemies of the situation happily created last July' (the Moderados) were behind this attempt to

debase the good name of this city and its peaceful inhabitants which through good sense and prudence it has always maintained, by making it appear to the authorities of the Province to be like one of the many cities of the Nation where unfortunately the most lamentable disorders and excesses have taken place.⁵³

Although reading room was closed, a reading circle tactfully named the 'Sociedad de Habitantes Pacíficos', organised by Loja's veterinarian blacksmith, Rafael Pérez de Alamo, in collaboration with leading Progresista, Mariano Ceballos Henríquez, continued in the convent of La Victoria throughout the Bienio. This served the basis of Loja's *carbonari* society that Pérez would organise after the coup in July 1856.⁵⁴

Rosal's defence of the reading room on the grounds that 'every class of citizen without distinction' attended the readings would have increased rather than assuaged the civil governor's anxiety, whose assertion that the 'labouring class' lacked 'the necessary intelligence to properly understand' daily newspapers was ingenuous. That a reading room in the centre of Loja should be attended in January and February by agricultural day labourers was not so absurd. The custom of congregating in town centres during lean months was long established and these were slack months in the agricultural calendar when *jornaleros* were often laid off.⁵⁵ The convent of La Victoria had passed into municipal ownership in 1837 to serve a multiplicity of functions: lodgings for visitors, rooms for Latin classes and band practice, the popular 'casino' on the ground floor where newspapers were read, a missionary training college on the eve of 'La Gloriosa'. There was much happening elsewhere in Spain to interest all classes in Loja: the July Revolution and the popular uprising in Madrid, the Militia riots in Málaga in December, the general strike in Barcelona in the spring, followed by series of revolts in Zaragoza, Valencia, Valladolid, Burgos and Palencia in the early summer of 1855, a cycle of disorders that would be repeated in 1856. The *desengaño* over the broken promises of the July Revolution that was behind much of this unrest was also felt in Loja: the delay in the abolition of the hated *consumos*⁵⁶ and *quintas*, continuing restrictions on assembly and association, electoral fraud, parliamentary posturing and the postponement of long-promised constitutional reforms, quite apart from more basic issues of hunger, unemployment and high food prices. These issues were most keenly felt by *jornaleros* whose incomes fluctuated sharply over the agricultural year.⁵⁷

During the Bienio the protests of Loja's day labourers (*jornaleros*) expanded beyond the customary raucous demonstrations during periods of unemployment into a wider range of actions. At 6 a.m. on 12 September 1854 excise guards attempted to arrest a young man for selling cigarettes 'in the public market of the Plaza Nueva where all the *jornaleros* meet in search of work', whereupon 'several groups of men from Loja and elsewhere' drove the guards out of the city calling 'Death to the Carabineros!'. This action was sparked by the rumour that excise taxes were to be abolished, a matter hotly debated in the Cortes in November–December 1854. Order was swiftly restored by 'the alcalde, various councillors and officers and men of the National Militia'. To avoid future conflict the Council proposed to the chief of the Carabineros that he remove his force beyond Loja to a place in the district that he considered to be 'more safe and convenient'.⁵⁸ Loja's *jornaleros* had scored a minor victory.

Jornaleros were the only group in Loja referred to at the time as a 'class', who also behaved as such. Their behaviour was normally more prosaic than the episode just described. Since time immemorial *jornaleros* had directed their grievances at the Council during slack periods in the agricultural calendar and during regular subsistence crises. Agriculture in Alta (eastern)

Andalucía exercised a demand for labour throughout the year: cereal sowing from February to May, the cereal harvest from July to August, the wine harvest from September to October, and the olive harvest from November to March. However, January and February were often lean months due to frosts or storms delaying planting, prompting the unemployed to form rowdy crowds, requiring the Council to provide rations or employment on public works. If the crisis was judged sufficiently grave or likely to endure the Council would organise 'alojamiento': the billeting of unemployed *jornaleros* with particular landowners who were expected to provide work and food rations on their estates, encouraged by a Council subsidy, until the end of the crisis (which might last a few days or several weeks). As the Council stated candidly in January 1853, the organisation of *alojamiento* was necessary both as a charitable obligation and also to remove 'any pretext under which the subordination of the said proletarian class might be altered'.⁵⁹

Masahide Okazumi has detected 15 subsistence crises in Loja between 1842 and 1872, on average every other year, mostly in January and February but some extending into April and May, requiring the Council to provide work and rations or to organise *alojamiento* with landowners.⁶⁰ This was a period of rapid population growth combined with increasing restrictions on customary access (for cultivation, grazing, hunting and gathering) to former municipal commons, privatised as a consequence of the *desamortización*.⁶¹ Even if the number of *jornaleros* was not growing at any faster rate than the rest of the population, there was an official perception that *jornaleros* were becoming a more dangerous class. During the 1850s and 1860s at least 900 *jornaleros* resided in Loja with their families comprising some 4,500 people or one quarter of the city's population of 17,128 in 1861.⁶² Many more flocked to city from the surrounding region during months of dearth. The number receiving relief trebled from a peak of 800 a day between February and May 1847 to 2600 a day between January and February 1854.⁶³

Throughout the period of this study Loja's Council, and leading entrepreneurs such as Nárvaéz, received proposals for a solution to the cyclical problem of unemployment and dearth, ranging from the distribution of unclaimed or illegally occupied municipal land among *jornaleros* and tenants to loan banks to tide *jornaleros* and small farmers over lean times. In February 1850, Narvaéz was invited to support a savings bank and charitable fund to benefit the 'day labouring class'. *Jornaleros* would deposit their savings during the summer when they were receiving high wages to enable them to draw loans in the winter when work was scarce. The Duke declined to support the bank fearing it would encourage those who had made their 'economies' illicitly through such crimes as cattle theft to see the bank as a means for increasing their ill-gotten gains, with a demoralising effect in Loja.⁶⁴ During the devastating subsistence crisis of early 1854 the Duke received a proposal to serve as a director of the 'Agricultural and Industrial Bank of Loja' intended to attract savings from manufacturers, landowners

and artisans, and to offer loans at moderate and fixed interest rates.⁶⁵ Neither project came to anything and the municipal *pósito* (granary) remained the only formal source of credit for Loja's smaller farmers until well into the Restoration.

During the second half of 1855, following the June law of civil *desamortización*, hundreds of titles were issued to tenants of small agricultural plots located on Loja's *proprios* and commons. Some of these would have benefited *jornaleros*. But the costs and risks of independent agriculture, combined with the reluctance of *jornaleros* to forfeit their mobility, would have deterred most from bidding for land.⁶⁶ In the late 1850s and early 1860s, Democrats in Loja had significant success in titling land for tenants of municipal estates and commons. But the number of *jornaleros* grew apace. Hence social stability in Loja until well into the late nineteenth century, when emigration began to provide a safety valve, continued to depend upon the effectiveness of the Council in organising the billeting of *jornaleros* with estate owners. At least in this procedure, Narváez was exemplary. Between 1 January and 17 February 1854, 16,000 reales were spent on billeting 3,000 *jornaleros* on estates to which the Duke contributed one-third.⁶⁷

Alhama

During the 1840s, Alhama de Granada enjoyed a period of sustained prosperity as landed proprietors owners who had emerged from the seigniorial and ecclesiastical disentanglement controlled the Council and established enlightened institutions necessary to ensure their economic and cultural supremacy. The counterparts to Loja's Rosal y Badía and Narváez in Alhama were Salvador Branchat y Maestre, *progresista* mayor in 1843, and Francisco de Toledo y Muñoz, leading Moderado. In 1842, a 'Sociedad de Amigos del País de Alhama' was established, in the following year a municipal theatre (including a 'Comic Section' in which women were invited to become involved), and in 1847, a Casino and an agricultural loan bank with a capital fund of 29,372 reales (to which Francisco de Toledo contributed 18,000 reales).⁶⁸

By the early 1850s these institutions of patrician liberal sociability were in decline as a result of a trend, evident also in Loja, of the wealthier landowners (José Toledo y Muñoz, Francisco Rojas Díaz de Tejada and the Marqués de Mondejar are mentioned) choosing to reside in larger cities such as Granada and Madrid. A serious conflict accompanying municipal elections in December 1853 (still remembered in 1869) resulted in the dissolution of the 'Sociedad de Amigos del País' and the closure of the theatre and casino.⁶⁹ The actions of Alcalde Corregidor, José Pérez Navarro, in removing Council minute books and the municipal archive to his home (ostensibly in order to draw up an inventory), followed by his despatch of a commission of councillors and prominent *alhameños* to confer with Narváez in Loja, confirm

that Moderados in Alhama were under pressure.⁷⁰ Into the vacuum left by the departure of Alhama's wealthiest families stepped the first Democrats. In 1852, as a result of the trade recession of that year, Manuel Rodríguez Carbello returned from America to buy a small farm.⁷¹ A decade later 'El Americano' had become Alhama's Democrat leader, renowned throughout eastern Andalucía.

The transition to *progresista* rule in Alhama was less ordered than in Loja. On 30 July, Salvador Branchat's *progresista* Council of 1843 was recalled and the militia re-enlisted.⁷² This Council soon showed signs of radicalism. The reviled excise taxes (*consumos*), on which 14,804 reales were still owed, were suspended within days of Progresistas taking power.⁷³ This short-lived munificence was possible because the Council possessed some liquidity due to the legacies of wealthy landowner Francisco de Toledo y Muñoz⁷⁴ and cleric Juan de Raya López de Vinuesa.⁷⁵ Further evidence of the Council's responsiveness to popular grievances came in December with a petition from 28 *alhameños* for the return of common land, unlawfully occupied by private landowners, to allow the 'clase proletaria' access for grazing, gathering wood and esparto grass and charcoal burning.⁷⁶ In anticipation a Council report on disputed claims to the city's commons 70 *vecinos* invaded an estate in Arenas del Rey in January 1855 and proceeded to cut down more than 1,000 dwarf oaks which they insisted had been planted on *realengos* (common land), repeating their action on the following day. The Militia was mobilised to prevent further disorders.⁷⁷

This was not, as might appear, a movement of landless labourers seeking access to illegally enclosed commons. Rather, the protesters were farmers whose properties bordered 'land that the public believes or suspects as commons' and who were seeking to demonstrate, by clearing small trees and brush, their customary use of this land, thus ensuring recognition of their own claims to this land by the Council commission. This, then, was an invasion of former commons by farmers already with a foot in the door of private-land ownership. The Council forbade any further felling of trees until the edicts and decrees relating to commons were published and the report of the commission completed.⁷⁸

While some farmers sought self-improvement by cutting down oak trees on former commons, in mid-January 1855 hundreds more from the 'proletarian class' surrounded the square and the public gardens demanding employment'.⁷⁹ Stores of grain and firewood were raided, but authorities refrained from ordering the Militia to fire on the crowd 'in order to avoid a bloodbath'.⁸⁰ Unable to find resources itself, the Council drew up a list of the most needy who were billeted among 'large landowners, small farmers and other in possession of comfortable means' to be provided with work and rations.⁸¹

These turbulent events in Alhama had not gone unnoticed in the provincial capital where the Captain General and civil governor were persuaded by

Branchat's political opponents in Granada that Alhama's Militia was staging an agrarian revolution. Early in January 1855, a force of regular infantry sent from Granada to suppress Málaga's riotous Militia passed through Alhama and arrested several militiamen who, it was claimed, had been defying the authority of the municipal government.⁸² This intrusion inflamed a delicate situation. Two weeks later the Captain General ordered infantry and 25 cavalry back to Alhama having learned that Militia 'had committed various robberies and devastated a *monte* that was private property'.⁸³ The civil governor then removed Branchat's Council and disbanded the militia on grounds of 'disorders committed by the National Militia and to prevent their repetition'.⁸⁴ On 23 January the governor travelled in person to Alhama to supervise the installation of a new Council that had accompanied him from Granada and the enlistment of a suitably purged Militia.⁸⁵

Although the governor's intervention pacified Alhama, such violent intervention left the new *progresista* order in Alhama in a demoralised state. Apart from vetting the militia company, the governor's objective was to recover unpaid tax for 1854 still in the possession of former Alcalde Corregidor José Pérez Navarro. This was only partially achieved, leaving the new Council exposed to further onerous fiscal demands from the provincial government.⁸⁶ As a result several newly elected councillors failed to attend the swearing in ceremony. To raise cash, the Council was obliged to sell the building that had housed the theatre and casino.⁸⁷ Tax-raising in Alhama was particularly problematic due to absentee landownership, the scattered nature of the population and the continued reluctance of peasant agricultural colonists of Zafarraya, demographically the most dynamic town in the district, to pay rents for the use of Alhama's extensive commons.⁸⁸ The governor's promise to rearm the Militia was never honoured, the Council complaining as late as June 1856 that Alhama was the only district capital in the province still without arms.⁸⁹ At least this meant when the order to disarm the Militia came in November 1856, it could be ignored!⁹⁰

Alhama's Council had barely begun deliberation on what to do with the funds from the sale of *propios* required by *desamortización* decree when cholera struck in August 1855 lasting until October. Although the Council lamented the closure of two convents that traditionally had cared for the poorer barrios more distant from the parish church, several doctors and clergy, helped by the city's better off, saved Alhama from the high mortality afflicting neighbouring Loja.⁹¹

The last nine months of the Bienio in Alhama resembled its start. The Council faced conflicts between landowners and tenants over boundaries and access to commons, increasingly violent and noisy demonstrations of *jornaleros* demanding employment and rations, and the mass invasion of the Sierra de Loja (Alhama's commons) by *zafarrayanos* claiming land through the 1855 *desamortización* decree. In the face of this spontaneous peasant

agricultural colonisation, so favoured by the state since the eighteenth century (Zafarraya had been granted access to Alhama's commons Charles IV in 1801 and received Villa and parish status in 1815) there was little that Alhama could do, except occasionally send officious guards to Zafarraya in the vain hope of collecting rents.⁹² Alhama had enjoyed no legal authority over *zafarrayanos* since 18 July 1850 when, due to their long history of violent conflict, Zafarraya was removed from Alhama's judicial district to join Loja.⁹³ These conflicts would intensify over the subsequent years when Zafarraya's history of stubborn resistance to its bullying *cabecera* transmuted into an aggressive local Democrat party.

Throughout the Bienio Alhama's *progresista* Council faced a consistently hostile and fiscally voracious provincial authority (much as did Loja), a looming regular army, two subsistence crises, a serious epidemic and an increasingly uninhibited plebeian population composed, on the one hand, of tenants and small farmers demanding a share of commons and a halt to the further enrichment of large landowners, and, on the other, riotous *jornaleros* expecting work and food. With the imposition of a *moderado* Council in October 1856, perhaps Alhama's Progresistas felt some relief at being released from such daunting responsibilities.

Antequera

Like Loja and Alhama, Antequera before the Bienio was divided between *moderado* and *progresista* factions although these possessed less fluidity due to the presence of a more ancient and, until the later 1850s, largely resident titled nobility (Antequera was re-conquered in 1410, two generations earlier than Loja and Alhama). During the late 1840s and 1850s, Antequera gained some notoriety nationally for the close family and political ties between prominent members of the city's nobility and leading *moderado* ministers, particularly Narváez and Luis Sartorius.⁹⁴ Because of these close ties, the July Revolution left Moderados in Antequera feeling particularly exposed.

Advanced *progresismo* in Antequera was represented by the Aguilar family.⁹⁵ The family's radicalism derived from Manuel María Aguilar y Puerta (1785–1867) who, as ambassador in Naples, London and Lisbon before Narváez's coup in 1843, witnessed the *carbonari* struggle against the Bourbons in southern Italy, greater freedom of association and expression in Great Britain and Portugal's more advanced constitutional monarchy. Manuel María was a close friend of the similarly cosmopolitan José María Orense,⁹⁶ 'El Mazzini Español',⁹⁷ with whom he founded the Spanish Democrat Party at a meeting in April 1849 at the Aguilar's Madrid residence, attended by 300 advanced Progresistas and Utopian Socialists.⁹⁸ Manuel María's three sons – José Antonio (n.1824), Francisco Joaquín (n.1826) and Manuel María (n.1828) – went on to shape radical and Republican politics in Antequera and the wider province throughout the second half of the

nineteenth century. An Aguilar served as mayor during the First (1873–1874) and Second Republics (1932–1936).⁹⁹

Upon the arrival of news of the Madrid *pronunciamento* on 20 July a ‘*junta directiva*’ composed of prominent Progressistas was formed in Antequera.¹⁰⁰ The key members of the new Council were not the three *alcaldes* plucked from the nobility but the two *syndics*, Francisco Joaquín de Aguilar and José González Berdún, who would lead the city throughout the *Bienio*.¹⁰¹

Well before the *Bienio* Antequera’s workers had begun to form mutual aid associations and to receive French democratic-socialist ideas promoted by Fernando Garrido and Antonio Ignacio Cervera through the newspaper *El Trabajador*. Cervera’s ‘School of the Worker’ established in Madrid in 1852, in which the teaching of French, drawing and mathematics was combined with the diffusion socialist ideas and democratic propaganda, was emulated in Antequera during the *Bienio* with the establishment of an ‘Ateneo’ where workers could read newspapers, receive evening classes and discuss ideas freely.¹⁰²

The first disorders of the *Bienio* in Antequera occurred on 13 August, the day that the new *progresista* Council was sworn in. A crowd demanding the abolition of *consumos* attacked the Civil Guard barracks and assembled noisily in front of the Council building. Several properties were damaged and the Civil Guard was forced to abandon the city.¹⁰³ The enlistment of the Militia and convocation of national elections (under the 1837 law with less restricted suffrage than the 1846 law) added to the tense atmosphere.¹⁰⁴ Unrest was not confined to the city. In the neighbouring jurisdiction of Colmenar *jornaleros* demanded titles to land they worked on the estate of Ducado del Arco.¹⁰⁵

A month later factory workers struck for higher wages and called for the removal of mule jennies recently introduced to the city’s factories.¹⁰⁶ Workers were inspired by a Barcelona strike in July against Arkwright ‘selfactinas’ (Compton mule jennies had long been accepted in the Catalan capital). Labelling the strike as ‘seditious’ and ‘tumultuous’, mill owner Vicente Robledo called upon the Council to prohibit meetings, provide more effective policing and ‘make the workers respect liberty of work’. As it happened, Antequera’s first ‘modern’ strike was very orderly and received moral support from the Council. Council *syndic* Francisco Joaquín de Aguilar assured Robledo that he had received no reports of disorders and that workers had presented their complaints directly to the Council in an orderly manner.¹⁰⁷ Aguilar helped compose a further representation signed by 300 spinners directed at his own Council and urged spinners to accept the new machines stressing the economic benefits for all.¹⁰⁸ The striking workers received a salary increase although the mule jennies stayed in place.¹⁰⁹ This was the start of a long association between the Aguilars and the city’s workers that would endure at least until the 1890s.¹¹⁰

A year later in October 1855 the city experienced another labour dispute. Acting municipal president Gaspar Carrasco y Luque (Aguilar was temporarily absent attending to the cholera epidemic) had learned that '... the artisan class and workers of this City are showing a certain predisposition to abandon their work in order it seems to increase the price of their labour', urging councillors to adopt all necessary measures for the conservation of order.¹¹¹ Again, municipal intervention ensured a swift resolution.¹¹² The city's workers were conspicuous among the 33,000 from throughout Spain who had appealed in July 1855 against a law drafted by Alfonso Martínez to limit the right of association.¹¹³ From Antequera 1028 signatures (more than Málaga, Valladolid, Córdoba and Madrid) tally with the 1,000 workers estimated by December 1855 to have joined 'La Fraternidad Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas', a mutualist association that would endure into the twentieth century. In the same month 200 spinners and weavers formed a second mutual aid society which had attracted 500 members by the end of the Bienio.¹¹⁴

If the Bienio was propitious for workers' association, it also restored the embodiment of *progresista* Liberal patriotism in the National Militia. As in Loja, Antequera's Council succeeded in insulating the battalion from the wider conflicts that compromised the Militia's political impartiality elsewhere, particularly in Málaga where radical companies were disbanded in December 1854. Suppressed on 4 February 1844, reenlistment of Antequera's militia battalion of six companies, comprising 1,247 men aged between 16 and 58, took place on 19 August 1854.¹¹⁵ The Militia was drawn from all occupations although independent artisans and tradesmen predominated: printers, painters, white-washers, tailors, shoemakers, hat makers, button makers, barbers, millers, tanners, saddlers, dyers, carpenters, iron workers, locksmiths, silversmiths, bakers, potters, stonemasons, stonecutters, pavers, bricklayers, silk and blanket weavers, carters and muleteers. Woollen weavers (listed as 'de lana') represented 32 per cent (394) of recruits, agricultural labourers ('de campo') 11 per cent (133), with smaller numbers of bleachers, fullers, trimmers, carders and others associated with textile industry. The middle and upper classes occupied the officer ranks: six factory owners, 15 landowners, 13 state employees, 19 'men of the pen' (*de la pluma*), six brokers, three notaries, three schoolmasters, three tavern keepers, a scribe, a 'master of works', a lawyer, a tobacco seller (*estanquero*), a merchant, a doctor, a pharmacist and a veterinarian.¹¹⁶

The battalion fared only slightly better than its counterparts in Alhama and Loja in attaining armaments. In August the Council agreed to provide the battalion with uniforms, drums, cornets and musical instruments for the band.¹¹⁷ At first militiamen were expected to carry their own shotguns. In October Civil Governor Enrique O'Donnell (brother of Leopoldo) sent Antequera 113 percussion rifles with bayonets. Even when armed (and most

of the volunteers possessed no firearm until well into 1856) militiamen were allowed to carry their weapons only when on parade unless they possessed a license issued by the civil governor. Promised initially in October 1854, these licenses were never issued during the Bienio, attesting to the official fear of the Militia, particularly in Málaga where by attempting to reverse the decision of the Diputación Provincial to annul the municipal elections, the Militia provided the government with the justification to demobilise the city's more radical companies on 15 December 1854.¹¹⁸

In spite of containing, in the view of the Captain General of Granada, 'troublesome elements', Antequera's Militia escaped the 'purification' suffered by its counterparts elsewhere. Militias in Alhama, Málaga, Motríl and Alhaurín el Grande were being forcibly disbanded for meddling in elections.¹¹⁹ This outcome may have been helped by the tactical decision of Aguilar and González Berdún to resign from their militia commands in the autumn of 1854.¹²⁰ One of the first acts of the new more radical Council in January 1855 was to reject these resignations and reinstate Aguilar and González in their commands.¹²¹ Although the Council agreed in January 1855 to 'rectify' militia lists in order to weed out troublemaker, nothing was done apart from granting certain militiamen certificates in recognition of their services during the Liberal period 1833–1843, to enable to qualify for an 'honorific cross' they had been promised upon enlistment.¹²²

The renewal of the Carlist rebellion in early February secured the future of the battalion, the civil governor bolstering Antequera's Militia with a further 400 rifles.¹²³ As Inajeros has shown for Castilla-LaMancha, Carlism experienced a revival during the Bienio, attracting sympathy among Antequera's nobility.¹²⁴ In April, as a result of further disturbances in Málaga the provincial government authorised Antequera to raise 50,000 reales from district revenues to equip the battalion, resulting in a rapid increase in recruitment during April and May including the formation of a cavalry company.¹²⁵ Meanwhile discipline was tightened under Juan García Tortosa, *citador* (summoner) of the Militia, who would play an important part in organising the mutualist society in Antequera following the return of Moderados to power in October 1856.¹²⁶

Only the Militia of the district capital would be properly equipped and strengthened. The civil governor was opposed to companies being formed in the smaller towns of the jurisdiction (Mollina, Bobadilla, Humilladero, Fuente de Piedra, Cuevas Bajas, Cuevas Altas, Villanueva de Cauche and Alameda) for fear of placing arms 'in the hands of men who are not well off, of very doubtful political beliefs and it being likely that they would make bad use of them'. Moreover, arming towns close to the salt lagoon at Fuente de Piedra would be 'a motive for continual conflicts which more than once we have had to lament' (referring to the *sal del pronunciamiento*, the custom of people helping themselves to salt stocks during periods of social and political unrest).¹²⁷ The Council agreed that smaller towns should not be

enlisted in the Militia. Indeed Aguilar had been working hard throughout March and April to establish a politically dependable new force of security guards (*guardas jurados*) to protect rural areas against 'the constant rapine of all the products of the soil carried out from time immemorial by entire barrios, supported by more than speculators'.¹²⁸

Aguilar was concerned more with the security of private agricultural property (of which his family was acquiring a growing portfolio) on the *vega* of Antequera than with that of the salt factory at Fuente de Piedra which had been invaded shortly after the July Revolution. The abolition of Royal Salt Monopoly and excise taxes were very popular issues in July 1854.¹²⁹ Throughout the first year of the Bienio *antequeranos*, particularly from the smaller towns and rural areas, helped themselves freely to salt stocks held at Fuente de Piedra. In June 1855 the government tactlessly despatched Francisco Marzo y Sánchez, a former *moderado* Alcalde Corregidor of Antequera renowned for his brutality, now 'Inspector of the Royal Salt Monopoly of Andalucía', to recover these salt thefts and restore the monopoly's control over stocks and the factory at Fuente de Piedra. This provoked stout opposition from the Council and an emotional petition from Aguilar to the Queen.¹³⁰ However, it was cholera that drove the Salt inspector from the city, the government resuming its efforts to recover control of salt stocks in late September 1855.¹³¹

Since the arrival of cholera in the province in mid-August 1854 the Council had succeeded in preventing contagion by establishing a lazaretto on the edge of the city in the ex-convent of La Magdalena for sufferers. On 13 June the first cases were diagnosed in *casco* of the city creating 'such an extraordinary panic and terror that the greater part of the well-to-do classes and some of lesser resources left the city immediately'.¹³² Throughout the epidemic no musters of the National Militia were called and schools remained closed.¹³³ Aguilar set a fine example in attending to the sick, receiving a tribute from the Council on 5 September.¹³⁴ The heroism of the priest Cristobal Fernández Hidalgo was also acknowledged by the Council.¹³⁵ At regular intervals religious images were paraded through the city.¹³⁶ By 23 August, when the last death from cholera was recorded, 929 had died of the 5,314 taken ill, 4,385 recovering. Those affected 'were in the most part the poor and badly fed, and in general those who were suffering from other illnesses and particularly pregnant women and women in childbirth'.¹³⁷

The costs of attending to the cholera epidemic prevented the Council from backing a project to establish a secondary school proposed by Francisco Hernández in May 1855.¹³⁸ During the 1840s Antequera had been well served by three religious secondary schools. All had closed by the end of the decade, leaving Antequera's elite and middle class with a choice between three expensive options, either to employ private tutors or to make 'the doleful sacrifice of removing their children from their irreplaceable care and direction at the most dangerous age' by sending them away to 'Institutos'

at Málaga and Ronda, or to send them to the nearby Escolapío college at Archidona. Hence, Antequera, a city of 23,000 in 1855, started and ended the Bienio without a secondary school.¹³⁹ Nor was the Council able to provide any support for Latin teaching, although it was able to vouch for the good moral and political conduct of Dionisio de Checa y Palma, ‘professor of Latin’, who requested permission in February 1856 to provide private classes.¹⁴⁰

The Council could not evade its obligation to provide primary schooling although it fell far short of the legal requirement that all boys and girls should receive primary education. In 1854 two municipal primary schools, one for beginners and the other for more advanced pupils, operated in Antequera.¹⁴¹ Apart from these schools which were exclusively for boys, there were several smaller primary schools for boys and girls operated by the Church or privately. In the outlying towns of the district schooling of any kind was absent except for a small primary school for families of the salt works at Fuente de Piedra. In April 1855 the progressive spirit of the Bienio was evident in a decision by the Council to establish a night school for ‘the children and poor men who have to work during the day as is the case with the virtuous fraternal societies which are demanding this help’.¹⁴² The cholera epidemic sank this project. Inadequate funding remained a constant complaint of Francisco de Lara Pedrosa, school director throughout the Bienio, who in turn was the butt both of frequent complaints from parents over his suitability as moral mentor and of accusations from the Council over the propriety of his management of the hefty budget necessary for operating a school with as many 200 children.¹⁴³ In spite of these complaints, Lara Pedrosa remained the preferred school director among Antequera’s *Progresistas* throughout the Bienio and beyond. In July 1861 he was detained on suspicion of complicity in the Loja Revolution although by the end of the month he had been restored to his post.

Poor relief was less politically controversial than primary education. In November 1855, echoing Narváz’s Hospicio in Loja, the Council proposed the establishment of an ‘Asilo de Mendicidad’ in the ex-convent of La Trinidad, initially for those left orphaned or unprotected by the cholera epidemic.¹⁴⁴ After the Bienio this institution was sustained as a private charity by the Conde de Colchado and Nicolás de Porrás Escobar, ‘very impressive young men’ in the opinion of the civil governor who observed that ‘Antequera contains a few people notable for their charity (although unfortunately too few)’.¹⁴⁵ The *progresista* Council was not averse to turning to Neo-Catholic religious orders to help combat the social problems facing the city. In March 1856, learning that eight Sisters of Charity were available in Madrid, Cortes deputy José Antonio Aguilar (brother of Francisco Joaquín) requested that they be deployed in Antequera’s hospital.¹⁴⁶

If with the Militia, public schooling, attending the cholera epidemic and welfare, the Council was concerned above all with the *cabecera*, the

application of the June 1855 law of civil *desamortización* required attending to claims from the entire district. The Council needed to proceed warily with the transfer of remaining municipal properties and commons into private hands to avoid the agrarian conflicts that had wracked nearby Colmenar and Alhama. Hence, in spite of the fact that many councillors (including the Aguilar family) were guilty of illicit enclosure (*detentación*) of municipal land, in September 1854 the Council established a commission under Juan Talavera Orbaneja, 'guardian of public property', to survey the city's land tiles for evidence of suspected illegal enclosures.¹⁴⁷

Scrutiny of the rental agreements on *propios* going back to the 1820s and 1830s revealed extensive underpayment of rent or, according to how it was seen, massive *detentación* of land beyond the initial agreement.¹⁴⁸ Efforts to recover rent arrears by requiring subject towns such as Cuevas Bajas to demand back payment from debtors were unsuccessful with mayors already stretched with attending during the spring of 1855 to the unemployment and hunger resulting from the excessively heavy rain during the first two months of the year.¹⁴⁹ Cholera then delayed a prompt response to June law of civil disentanglement which required all municipal properties to be transferred to those in possession of rental agreements. Between the end of the epidemic in August and November, hundreds of smallholdings of between 1 and 7 fanegas passed into private ownership.¹⁵⁰ An added incentive to proceed swiftly with the sale of municipal properties and commons was the concession granted by the Diputación Provincial that Councils could retain 80 per cent of the revenue proceeding from the sale of municipal land, provided it was invested in public works or in funding agricultural banks.¹⁵¹ Within less than six months of the law of June 1855 all *propios* had been sold apart from a few cases in which tenure was contested or of tenants who claimed already to own land that the Council insisted still belonged to the *caudal de propios*.¹⁵²

Large tracts of common land were exempted from public sale: land needed for common use such as grazing before slaughter, the Sierra del Torcal comprising 3,372 fanegas which was kept for quarrying and grazing, and several other Sierras where mixed use (cattle and horse rearing, sheep and goat grazing, pig rearing and chestnut forestry and scratch agriculture) complicated the shift to private ownership. These latter areas had been favoured for horse breeding by Antequera wealthiest families before the Bienio.¹⁵³ Renewing their rental contracts following the 1855 law, these families succeeded during the subsequent two decades in converting these leases into privately titled estates with the effect of closing off customary access to large areas of Sierra, much to the consternation of families who depended upon them for subsistence or seasonal gleaning.¹⁵⁴ Democrats generated much support from this constituency during the late 1850s and 1860s.

If the civil *desamortización* was applied in Antequera without incurring, at least in the short term, agrarian discontent, during the autumn of 1855

the city experienced a wave of crime and public disorder that would become commonplace over the next 20 years. At the end of September disturbances in the Calle de Lucena accompanying the return of militiamen from Sunday muster caused considerable alarm until order was restored by municipal police aided by officers of the National Militia.¹⁵⁵ In November, Archidona accused Antequera of providing sanctuary to deserters from the army, escapees from *presidios*, bandits (naming the infamous Nicolás Jordan) and criminals.¹⁵⁶ In response Aguilar proposed the establishment of a special police force to support the Council's own network of *alcaldes de barrio*.¹⁵⁷ He remained deeply frustrated that Militia ordinances, which required enlistment of all adult males, were still not being applied in Antequera.¹⁵⁸ Only half the Battalion was armed with 513 ageing rifles (93 Spanish and 420 English) and 5,000 cartridges.¹⁵⁹ In late October, concerned that there were insufficient militiamen to man patrols and guard entries to the city, let alone 'march to wherever the liberty and independence of our Patria is in danger' (against the Carlists for instance), the Council supported the summoner's proposal for a tightening of discipline over leave, attendance at parades, sentry duty and good behaviour when in uniform.

A measure of influence of the Aguilars in Madrid came in August when the already 'Very Noble and Very Loyal City' of Antequera was granted the title of 'Excelencia' in recognition of 'the important services leant at all times by the City', an accolade secured by Cortes deputy José Antonio Aguilar. The ceremony held to receive the honour proved to be the last occasion Antequera's Progresistas would parade in all of their corporate finery. Within eight months the Battalion would be disbanded armed, its officers excluded from political office, several driven into exile.

The ceremony was held on 9 September 1855 attended by councillors in full Militia uniform. At 12 noon a commission set off by coach from the Council building to the Aguilar home at the Quinta de Valdealanes, returning to the chamber with Cortes deputy José Antonio to present him with a vote of thanks in the presence of the city's principal notables and authorities: his father, 'Exmo Sr. D Manuel María de Aguilar', 'Ministro plenipotenciario jubilado, caballero Gran Cruz de la Real y distinguida orden de Isabel la Católica', the archpriest, the Commander of Arms, the officers and chaplain of the Militia, the deacon of Antequera's 'titles of Castille', commander of the Civil Guard, and numerous other senior municipal employees, judges, notaries, the post master, officials of Royal monopolies, doctors and pharmacists.¹⁶⁰

During the first four months of 1856, Antequera was beset by appalling weather, heavy rain and storms that washed away roads and damaged bridges creating fuel and food shortages, difficulty in getting to the fields, exacerbating seasonal price rises and making a lagoon of the *vega*.¹⁶¹ On top of this, *antequeranos* learned that the Córdoba–Málaga railway would not pass through the city but at some distance. After tireless lobbying in Madrid,

José Antonio ensured that Antequera would at least be connected to the system.¹⁶²

Throughout the final months of the Bienio, Francisco Joaquín laboured to complete the equipping and arming of the Militia battalion which in April comprised 540 men in nine companies (one of grenadiers, six infantry, one cavalry and one of sappers) with equipment worth 49,230 reales (540 cartridge belts, 579 bearskins and 544 carbines).¹⁶³ On 2 May 1856 the battalion was promised a 'magnificent banner that is being embroidered' which would be blessed and sworn in at next Sunday's muster.¹⁶⁴ Again, events elsewhere strengthened Aguilar's hand. Following the *quinta* riots in Valencia on 6 April, José Antonio succeeded in extracting a further 300 rifles in recognition of Antequera's loyalty to Espartero and the discipline of its battalion.¹⁶⁵ However, these were held at the northern port of San Sebastian from where the Council was expected to collect them at its own expense. It is uncertain whether the rifles were delivered before the battalion was demobilised and disarmed following O'Donnell's coup in July 1856.¹⁶⁶ In contrast to the stout resistance of Madrid's Militia to disarmament, Antequera's battalion agreed peacefully to disband on 29 July.¹⁶⁷ On 10 July, Captain Manuel de Arce (possibly related to Félix de Arce whom Narváez would use for policing the region until last months of Isabel Bourbon) arrived in Antequera to remove 'the arms, belts, munitions, war chests, banners and other military supplies belonging to the dissolved National Militia of Antequera'.¹⁶⁸

If with the disbanding of the Militia Progresistas lost their symbolic control of public space, at least they left two more permanent reminders of their two years in power. The restoration and partial rebuilding of the Council building was completed. In early June, days before the removal of the Council in the coup, a simple inscription was placed on the façade: 'Lápida de la Constitución'.¹⁶⁹ This remained an aspiration. The new constitution promised in July 1854 was deferred throughout the Bienio and Progresistas and Democrats would wait 13 years before the *moderado* constitution of 1845 was finally replaced.

Conclusion

Two unbroken years of *progresista* administration without the distraction of civil war or serious political unrest allowed a new politics to take shape in the three cities that emphasised active citizenship based upon freedom of association and press freedom. Regular militia musters provided a symbolic space – uniforms, music and parades – for the expression of patriotic and progressive Liberal sentiments and for fraternal association between *progresista* patriicians and the 'popular classes', including teachers, musicians, artisans, small farmers and skilled factory workers. The regular arrival of national newspapers, the opening of reading rooms, the experience among the illiterate of hearing news read out and the diffusion of Democrat propaganda through

pamphlets and political catechisms marked a significant broadening of politics. The popular associationism that had emerged hesitantly in Madrid and the larger provincial capitals during the Moderate Decade reached Spain's smaller cities and towns during the Bienio.¹⁷⁰ Members of the liberal professions, shopkeepers, artisans, workers, small farmers and even tenants and landless labourers formed mutual aid societies, marking the beginning of a culture of self-help in which people pooled their resources for borrowing and lending, medical care, housing and even wage bargaining. Antequera experienced its first strikes.

These more 'modern' developments occurred alongside an intensification of 'traditional' protests by tenants of municipal commons, animated now by the prospect of becoming property owners through the *desamortización*. Those fearing the loss of customary access to commons also joined protests. *Jornaleros* were not excluded from the new politics. In Loja they capitalised on the new freedoms by gathering outside the public reading room or the post office to hear the news from Granada, or Málaga, or Madrid, and by demonstrating rowdily during period dearth and unemployment.

Yet, for all this exaltation and free association, *progresista* Councils were limited by crushing financial constraints enforced by intrusive and centralised provincial governments. The initial proposals of the July Revolution, inspired by the Manifiesto of Manzanares and designed to draw Democrats into the revolutionary alliance, to remove hated excise taxes, the military draft and the salt monopoly, were soon shelved. Councils remained severely limited in their capacity to fund the educational improvements so coveted by the middle class who saw their peers in the provincial capitals enjoying state-funded secondary education that was not available in smaller cities. Primary education remained pathetically underfunded and for the most part non-existent in towns and villages beyond the district capitals. Forbidden from forming their own Militia companies, smaller settlements were deliberately excluded from sharing the *progresista* sociabilities of their *cabeceras*. Even in the district capitals Militia battalions were closely monitored by the provincial authorities. Alhama's Militia companies never received the arms promised at the start of the Bienio. Even had Councils enjoyed greater fiscal and political autonomy, the demands of attending to poor relief during two prolonged periods of dearth and unemployment in early 1855 and 1856, combined with the cholera epidemic, would have absorbed Councils' funds and increased their debts.

Apart from this experience of the fiscal limitations of *progresismo* locally, *Progresistas* and Democrats in these towns witnessed in daily press reports the abandonment at the national level of the promises of the Manifiesto of Manzanares; on taxation, political decentralisation and reforming the constitution. Espartero's harsh repression of strikes and social unrest in the larger cities confirmed their conviction that social and political reform would

forever be deferred until the 'traditional obstacles' (meaning the conservative 1845 constitution and the excessive powers of the monarch) were removed. This *desengaño* ensured that over the next 20 years 'Democracia' and Republicanism would become Spain's most popular and most feared political force.

2

The Moderado Restoration and Democrat Conspiracy, 1856–1857

The last months of the Bienio Progresista were marked by dithering in the Cortes over the new constitution, mounting Court and Army intrigue, increasing proscription of political activity and press censorship. The end began in early June with the closure of Barcelona's *progresista* clubs by Military Governor, General Juan Zapatero. Espartero's failure to defend freedom of assembly cost him what little support he still retained among advanced Progresistas and Democrats. With the Cortes suspended for a short summer recess, deserted by the only leader of sufficient notoriety to be able to confront O'Donnell, and no longer with any rights of public association, advanced Progresistas and Democrats returned to the politics of conspiracy.

In late June food riots in Castile provided the cue for the army to move to centre stage and for Democrats to be framed as the culprits. The executions, imprisonment and exile meted out on the leaders, presented by the conservative press as contaminated by the 'democratic plague', would be re-enacted almost annually through until the Revolution of September 1868.¹ On 14 July, Espartero resigned from the First Ministry to be replaced by War Minister O'Donnell. Rather than capitulate to what was essentially a military coup, Minister of Government Patricio de la Escosura barricaded himself in his office and ordered the provinces to resist. Progresistas and Democrats throughout Spain were faced with having to accept defeat or take up arms.

On 14–16 July the popular rump of Madrid's National Militia took to the streets to face bombardment by the regular army under Generals Manuel Gutiérrez de la Concha and Francisco Serrano. Resistance, although courageous, was largely symbolic. Prominent Democrats – Sixto Cámara, Manuel Becerra, Fernando Garrido, and Antequera's Manuel María Aguilar (junior) – headed Madrid's Militia units. This would be the Democrat party's last involvement with what many, such as *El Pueblo* editor Emilio García Ruiz, regarded as an untrustworthy and defunct *progresista* institution.² Sixto Cámara escaped arrest and travelled south in the vain hope of coordinating an Andalusian uprising. But resistance here proved even more ephemeral than in Madrid.

Two years of inadequate funding, constraining legislation, continual vetting and reorganisation by the regular army and antiquated armament reduced the capacity of the National Militia to resist disarmament. However, O'Donnell still feared that an *esparterista* backlash might gather force in the provinces, particularly in Andalucía. Soon communications with the South were threatened by the pronouncements of Froilán Carvajal y Rueda in La Mancha and León Merino in the Sierra Morena.³ Jaén's 3000 strong Militia followed suit while the pronouncement of Almería's battalion on 14 July established a rebel line between the Sierra Morena and the Mediterranean.⁴ Much would now depend upon the resolution of *progresista* authorities in Granada and Málaga.

Barricades went up in Granada between 17 and 19 July as the civil governor invited the Captain General to amalgamate his garrison with the Militia.⁵ Likewise in Málaga the civil governor at first put himself at the head of the Militia and army garrison and ordered the expulsion of the military governor.⁶ But upon receiving the news of the defeat of the uprising in Madrid, the officers and soldiers of Málaga's garrison declared for O'Donnell while the governor and consular body mediated a peaceful settlement with militiamen who had built barricades. Meanwhile in Cádiz and Seville the civil authorities capitulated and the Militia was disarmed with scarcely a scuffle.⁷

This chapter examines the consequences of the failure of the Bienio in Loja, Alhama and Antequera as restored *moderado* Councils sought to rebuild their authority around limited franchise, judicial persecution of Progresistas and Democrats and increased police powers through centrally appointed Alcaldes Corregidores backed by local rural guards and a centralised Civil Guard. Democrats and advanced Progresistas responded by re-establishing clandestine networks, by broadening their activity on the international front and by adapting Mazzini's 'action' strategy to Spain's tradition of liberal revolution. Sixto Cámara's democratic conspiracy between April and July 1857, although a pitiful failure, laid the foundations of a strategy of encouraging civilian insurrection that endured over the subsequent 12 years.

Having defeated the uprising O'Donnell hoped to relaunch the Liberal Union first proposed in 1854. In a conciliatory gesture he conceded that only the provincial authorities and Councils that had supported resistance would be disbanded to be replaced by bodies nominated 'without respect to Party'.⁸ In an attempt to avert a return to party feuding, O'Donnell forbade the restoration of the *moderado* Councils and deputies that had ceased in July 1854, ordering new elections.⁹

Moderados soon got tired of O'Donnell's conciliation of Progresistas. An attempt to buy *moderado* support by abolishing the National Militia failed to stem mounting opposition from Court, Church and leading Moderados. Matters came to a head when O'Donnell refused to end the *desamortización* and return Church property to its former owners, measures sought by Queen

and her Catholic advisers. Ominously, in late September Narváez returned from exile in Paris. On 10 October, on the occasion of a ball held to celebrate the Queen's 25th birthday, O'Donnell tendered his resignation and Narváez was invited to form a government. His ministry would last just over a year, although the *moderado* restoration endured a further eight months before O'Donnell inaugurated his cherished Liberal Union.

If Progresistas during the Bienio were handicapped by fiscal crisis, labour unrest, poor harvests and a desolating cholera epidemic, Narváez faced no more propitious conditions for restoring *moderantismo*. During the winter and spring Andalucía endured dearth, unemployment and dramatic increases in food price, accompanied by increased crime, banditry and a new fashion for kidnappings, 'anónimos' (anonymous threatening letters) and attacks upon men of property.¹⁰ Between April and July 1857, Democrats attempted a national uprising, centred upon Catalonia but with Madrid, Granada, Seville and Málaga as secondary centres.

Loja

The restoration of *moderantismo* in October 1856 had drastic implications for the region of study where Narváez's friends and family had endured two years in the political cold and expected a prompt renewal of patronage and political support from their illustrious native son. Avoiding any direct involvement in the mid-July uprising, Rosal y Badía retained control of Loja's Council until early August. Although the handover to the new Council was peaceful, the disarming of the Militia battalion on 31 July was accompanied by considerable disorder, resulting as much from *moderado* glee at the disarmament of their rivals as from *progresista* unruliness.¹¹ Pérez del Alamo, sergeant in the Militia during the Bienio, had no doubt that the hand of Narváez was behind the disorder, recalling in 1872 that 'on the day of the disarming... a crowd of hired assassins led by some relations and followers of Narváez insulted, mistreated, wounded and killed honourable men who had committed no other crimes than being just and generous with their enemies and loving the liberty of their fatherland'.¹²

True to O'Donnell's objective of avoiding simple *moderado* restorations Loja's Council was selected by the Captain General of Granada. The new mayor, Francisco de Paula Osorio y Domínguez, announced that his mission was to avoid any 'political banner or partiality', calling upon

...the Illustrious Men who are before me, eminent patricians of this city – an honourable, laborious and docile community, always a model of good sense and wisdom – to strengthen ties of love, or better said, Christian charity, so that we can dedicate ourselves to improving our city with useful and beneficent advances, the primordial object of municipal government. Let us distance ourselves from the sterile and utopian

questions of politics that have cost us in the past so much dissension and so much blood. United by religion, by community and by (more or less remote) family ties, let us not be divided by that black and perfidiousness exclusionism that resembles a wild animal coming out of the forest, a roaring lion that tears us apart and devours us, scouring our provinces, and fanning the torch of discord.¹³

Yet, with the Duke's return to Spain, the 'roaring lion' of political division (Narváez's newspaper was called *El León Español*) was bound to remain.

Narváez's family and property in Loja had not been the target of any particular political malice during the Bienio.¹⁴ Yet it was a perceived insult in a newspaper article published in August 1856, shortly before his return from France, that provided the Duke with the opportunity both for restoring both his family's hold over Loja and for re-establishing his pre-eminence within the *moderado* party. Claiming to be a *lojeño*, Antonio Prieto wrote to Madrid's *La Nación* accusing the Duke of embodying the worst qualities of the 'polaco'. Narváez had not always been wealthy, Prieto asserted. Rather, from being quite poor, he had acquired great wealth suddenly and quite recently, as a result of royal favour and shady business practices, wealth that he spent extravagantly on pomp and personal luxury. The letter elaborated in great detail how Narváez had acquired his fortune: through aggressive farming of Loja's excise taxes, 'particularly the aguardiente tax... a low and repugnant business', and by using his family connections after his return to Loja in 1852 to buy 'everything which came on the market in such a way that, had he remained in Loja longer, at the rate things were going, he would have owned the whole jurisdiction'. With two palaces and several fine coaches, 'the daily cost of his household could not have dropped below 3–4000 reales'.¹⁵ It is testimony to the survival of aristocratic values that being accused of being 'without land or fortune' before becoming rich, a measure of success elsewhere, should be considered so insulting.

Claiming that the letter damaged his honour in the eyes of Spain and of Europe, encouraged by soon-to-be Minister of the Interior, Cándido Nocedal, Narváez proceeded to sue Daniel Carbello, editor of *La Nación*, who paid for his indiscretion with 30 months of imprisonment and the closure of the newspaper.¹⁶ Throughout September the well-publicised lawsuit brought Narváez back into the public eye, drawing attention to his noble lineage and momentous political and military achievements and reminding Spaniards of their duty to honour and not deride great men (his defence placed him in the company of Charlemagne, El Cid, Alfonso the Wise, Columbus and Cortes). The case against *La Nación* also enabled the Duke to test his support in Loja. On 27 September 396 *lojeños*, 'among whom can be found all the members of the Ayuntamiento and Clergy, the richest landowners, members of the National Militia, public employees, representatives of all the art and craft guilds, and the names of people from all political parties', signed a letter

to *La Nación* condemning the injuries and calumnies and confirming the Duke's good reputation.¹⁷ Shortly after receiving this affirmation Narváez left the French capital for Madrid. Two weeks later he was called to the Palace.

Not everyone in Loja rejoiced at Narváez's return to power. On the evening of 12 October, two days after the Duke's appointment, 'upon the arrival of the post, a numerous gathering of *paisanos* was observed among whom figured many who had been *Nacionales* on whose faces agitation could be observed. They occupied the entire Café spilling out also onto the Plaza'. On the following day an extraordinary Council meeting called for military support to prevent further disorder. Meanwhile, before troops arrived from Granada on 15 October, *lojeños* were urged to hang out lanterns and decorate the facades of their houses, while the clergy were instructed to ring church bells 'as a sign of happiness' and to offer a mass to request 'God's help in providing good leadership and government, and in advising Her Majesty on what is most conducive to the public good...'.¹⁸ Already under a state of siege that had applied throughout Spain since July, Loja was placed under a 9.00 p.m. curfew.

Pérez later recalled this as the critical moment in the exacerbation of factionalism in Loja that convinced him to organise the secret society, a decision that culminated in the uprising of June 1861. Former 'Nacionales' in Loja were detained in such large numbers in Granada that 'the prison would not hold them and a provisional prison had to be made in the public granary with military guards', the Loja blacksmith recalling bitterly that his brother had died from a wound inflicted by a guard when refusing food.¹⁹

This repression is confirmed in correspondence between Narváez and Lorenzo Montero, the judge appointed on the Duke's recommendation, who boasted in mid-November that his nocturnal patrols had arrested men for singing 'subversive songs' and sent them to the Audiencia in Granada.²⁰ The Duke's nervousness about security in Loja extended to removing the mail conductor of the Bailén–Málaga line that passed through Loja, for spreading alarming news of disorders in Málaga, and tax collector Don Antonio Salas y Estambre, known to be 'one of the leaders of the Democrat party', accused of embezzlement of public funds. Of particular concern was Salas's habit of varying tax assessments in order to adjust the electoral roll in favour of *Progresistas* and *Democrats*.²¹

The return of *Moderados* to government on 10 October signalled the end of O'Donnell's attempt to conciliate party differences under the banner of Liberal Union. A new *moderado* Council in Loja was truly a *narvaecista* body headed by the Duke's cousin José López y Narváez and staffed by several other family members (Juan de Torres Salcedo, Francisco Fernández de Córdoba and Manuel Campos Balona) and fellow landowners (José Garzón Fresneda, Manuel Fernández Gallardo, etc.).²² With Loja's Council so firmly under *moderado* control Narváez's options in pursuing his political enemies broadened.

On inspecting the outgoing Council's accounts, the new Council instructed Judge Montero to prosecute the entire Council that had held office during the Bienio on the charge of embezzlement of public funds. From pursuing singing plebeian *Nacionales* around Loja's bars Judge Montero now had the invidious task of taking Loja's leading *progresistas* through the courts. Starting on 15 November 1856, sentences were eventually passed on 21 August 1857. Personally orchestrated by Narváez, the judicial persecution of leading *progresistas* was a source of great bitterness in Loja. More than any other single act of repression, the legal action contributed to the intensification of factionalism and to the radicalisation of local political discourse. The case also backfired on Narváez with Democrats moving into the positions left vacant by Loja's persecuted *Progresistas*.²³

Leading the prosecution in Loja was Lic. José Cuervos, a protégé of Narváez throughout his career. The Bienio councillors were accused of misappropriation of funds and a fraud committed during the epidemic of cholera in June 1855. In 1855 the Council had requested permission from the provincial government to spend 24,616 reales of *pósito* funds to repair the granary building that it claimed was in a ruinous state, supporting their request with a survey from two Granada architects (whom it transpired had not even visited Loja to inspect the building). Unaware of this deceit, the provincial government permitted the Council to sell wheat from the *pósito* to the value of 24,616 reales to pay for the repairs. A 'pretence' was made of putting the work out to tender. A mere 3,000 reales were disbursed for repairing the *pósito*, the remaining 20,000 reales spent on arming and equipping the Militia.²⁴

The new *moderado* Council welcomed this opportunity to use criminal prosecution to redouble pressure upon its political opponents, cataloguing *progresista* abuse of *pósito* funds during the cholera epidemic in a long representation to the provincial government on 2 December. López y Narváez claimed that during the cholera epidemic between June and August 1855 the Council had instructed the *pósito* to sell wheat valued at 75,634 pesos when only 47,416 pesos was required to attend to the costs of providing relief from the epidemic (in fact the cost of attending to the epidemic between 6 June and 15 August 1855 amounted to 79,636 reales).²⁵ The *progresista* Council then had failed to restock the *pósito*, contributing to the crisis that afflicted the city's wheat supply throughout the second half of 1856.²⁶

The provincial government, which had been inspecting Loja's accounts since October, responded by instructing both Councils – the current *moderado* Council and the *progresista* Council of 1854–1856 – to reimburse their debts to the *pósito*. With the aggravation of wheat shortages throughout Andalucía, Granada's provincial government urged all municipal councils to replenish *pósitos* so that sufficient grain would be available to both consumers and farmers for spring planting. López y Narváez was ordered to return 610 fanegas of wheat taken from the *pósito* in 1854 to pay for the

completion of the statue of Narváez.²⁷ Rosal y Badía was ordered to return within a week the 498 fanegas taken from the *pósito* in April 1856 but still not returned.²⁸ At the height of the wheat price rise, these demands had grave implications for municipal finances and for the personal fortunes of the 'consejales de 1855'.²⁹

The incumbent *moderado* Council was obviously in a stronger position than the dethroned and persecuted *progresistas* to comply with the order from the provincial government to replenish the city's *pósito*. López y Narváez resolved to cut back on overheads, to pressure *progresistas* to replenish the *pósito* and to petition the Crown directly for funding an ambitious road scheme. Already in early December he had petitioned the Monarch for funds for the construction of a new road to link Loja with Iznájar, Rute and Lucena to provide work for Loja's hundreds of hungry and unemployed *jornaleros*.³⁰ On 11 December the Council ordered a cessation of work on the pedestal for the statue of Narváez, offering the bronze to the Duke for his private enjoyment.³¹

Loja's *Progresistas* were therefore pursued from two sides, with local justice pressing criminal charges, and the provincial and municipal councils demanding that the *pósito* be restocked. Rosal struggled to comply but, due to the extreme shortage and high price of wheat, was only able to return 81 fanegas to the *pósito* by the expiration of the seven-day deadline. The Council granted a further 25 days. However, Rosal now feared that buying up wheat would accentuate the shortage afflicting the population, a situation that had prompted the Council to prohibit the sale of wheat beyond the city.

In desperation, on 24 December, Rosal and the ten accused councillors drafted a petition to the Queen, describing the sequence of public calamities during the Bienio that had necessitated the call upon *pósito* funds and requesting a pardon.³² The petition was sent via Narváez with an accompanying letter in which Rosal asked the Duke to pass on the petition to the Queen, beseeching his old political rival

... to listen to the voice of those who have signed, all compatriots of yours and some who like you have spent the first years of their life under the same sky, happy days when, united by the sympathies of the heart, we were far from those passions which have disturbed and embittered brief moments of our existence. On no occasion or circumstance have we had the remotest intention of offending you by word or by deed and whatever our political opinions have been or remain, they are always exercised with the measured dignity and deference due especially to those notable men such as yourself who have lent, and it is hoped will continue to lend, great services to the *patria*.

Rosal and the councillors explained that 'the effervescence of political passions' had put them in office and all they had been able to do was to respond

to the 'exigencies of the époque' by using the resources that were available to them.³³

On behalf of the Council, López y Narváez also pleaded with the Duke for a 'generous hand' in supporting Rosal's petition.³⁴ Narváez replied that the matter was in the hands of the courts, explaining that 'I cannot and must not intervene in any way, nor involve myself in the free workings of the judicial power until the case has ended and the legal verdict is known'.³⁵ With their petition stranded on Narváez's desk in Madrid, Rosal appealed in desperation to the civil governor of Granada, pleading that it was the calamitous agricultural conditions and the collapse of tax revenues that had precipitated the sale of wheat from the *pósito* in April 1856, without which it would have been impossible to meet the city's tax contribution for the second quarter of the year. Since then, the exacerbation of the agricultural crisis, the political crisis in July and 'the sudden and unexpected cessation of our posts', followed by the criminal proceedings, had prevented the replenishment of the *pósito*. Now, in January 1857, with wheat prices at 92 reales/fanega (compared to the 50 reales/fanega of April 1856), and with all available wheat already distributed among farmers for this year's planting, returning wheat to the *pósito* had become impossible. Rosal pleaded to be allowed to wait until the summer harvest when prices would drop and the 'councillors of 1856' would be able to replenish the *pósito* from their own funds.³⁶

The provincial government acceded to both López y Narváez and Rosal y Badía's requests for a delay in replenishing the *pósito* until wheat prices had come down.³⁷ However, the trial continued throughout the first half of 1857. In mid-May the Bienio councillors confessed under duress to having spent *pósito* funds on arming and equipping the Militia. On 21 August they were fined and sentenced to the varying terms of imprisonment, in the opinion of Pérez del Alamo, for no worse a crime than of having 'distributed the wheat of the *pósito* to the poor'.³⁸ Rosal and eight councillors were sentenced to 11 years in prison and fines of 400 duros, and three others to five and a half years in prison and fines of 200 duros. José Contreras Osorio, brother of Granada architect of the same name, was sentenced to one year in prison. All were suspended from all public duties and the enjoyment of political rights during the period of their sentence and ordered to pay court costs. Four councillors were absolved. Additionally, the *progresista* Council was ordered to return 7,250 reales to the *pósito*, the value of the difference between the price at which the wheat was sold and its current price, as well as to return 403 fanegas of wheat at current prices.³⁹

Throughout the trial Montero kept Narváez regularly informed of the proceedings. An annotation by Narváez to Montero's letter informing him of the completion of the trial confirms the part played by executive intervention in the judicial process, demonstrating the importance

the Duke placed upon exemplary punishment in the attainment of order:

With pleasure I have observed the zeal and loyalty in which you have occupied the *juzgado*. Only with fair and firm administration can the peace and good administration of towns be achieved. Write to the Governor of Granada to urge him to follow the proceedings of the case in the criminal court with care. Speak in my name to the judges and magistrates, and speak in my name to the Regent of the Audiencia that he should confirm the rulings of his inferiors. If more help is needed, you should provide it without delay as it is absolutely necessary that there should be an example in Loja if it is to be possible to live in that town. You should not say anything about these matters and you must appear rigidly severe in the face of the actions and entreaties of the citizens of Loja and family squabbles.⁴⁰

That Loja escaped the riots and uprisings that had affected many parts of Andalucía, including Alhama and Antequera, from February 1857 must have justified, in Narváez's mind, his judicial persecution of the city's Progresistas, many of whom abandoned politics indefinitely. Others, however, joined the Democrats in the clandestine associations that were spreading throughout the country. Hence, Narváez's intention that judicial persecution of his political enemies would make Loja a peaceful place for his political retirement was not achieved. Indeed, the Duke's unrelenting prosecution of patrician Progresistas provided just the cause Democrats in Loja needed to build upon their support.

Under O'Donnell's Liberal Union (1858–1863) the pendulum of politicised justice swung back in favour of Loja's Bienio councillors. On October 1858 all were released from prison, reprieved by a Royal decree that exonerated them from all charges of fraud and embezzlement of *pósito* funds and declared them free to take up any public post.⁴¹ Yet many by then were financially ruined and would not be reimbursed for their losses for another five years with many claims for compensation still pending after the fall of the Monarchy in 1868. On 16 January 1863, Loja's *moderado* Council was ordered by Royal Decree to reimburse the councillors for everything they had been required to return to municipal coffers since the beginning of the trial on grounds that the wheat initially taken from the *pósito* had been used properly for helping the poor during the 1855 cholera epidemic. Loja's *mayores contribuyentes* met on three occasions in 1864 and agreed to reimburse 186,983 reales to the councillors at the rate of 15,000 reales a year together with any surplus that might remain at the end of each year in the 'public calamity' fund.⁴² These conciliatory gestures helped Loja become a politically more quiescent place during the last four years of Isabel's reign. By

then, however, Isabel's need for Narváez in the First Ministry prevented him from returning to enjoy the peace and prosperity of his home town.

Alhama and Antequera

In the early months of 1857 dearth and unemployment caused widespread public disorder throughout Andalucía. Although well-policed Loja avoided unrest, disorders in Alhama and Antequera assumed alarming proportions. In October and November 1856, accompanying Narváez's return to power and the imposition of a new *moderado* Council, Alhama and the surrounding countryside experienced incursions of armed and mounted rebels from Málaga, a plague of horse theft, and, on the night of 7 November, a riot of *jornaleros*, desperate from hunger and unemployment, requiring the deployment of Civil Guard and municipal guards.⁴³ Helped by large private subscriptions, the Council responded by employing *jornaleros* on improving the Granada road. Two months later, funds for paying their wages had been exhausted, work on the road suspended and the propertied class in Alhama was reported to be gripped by fear;

landowners and other comfortably off people are unable to leave the city for the countryside to inspect their estates, or even to step out of their houses at night for fear of attacks from a certain class of people who in the name of necessity commit robberies which even take place in the middle of the day on the edge of the city.

The Council urged 'trusted individuals' to arm themselves in self-defence voting additional funds for road repairs and for *alojamiento*.⁴⁴

If managing unemployment and dearth in Alhama was costly but controllable, the *moderado* Council in Antequera under Narváez's cousin, Juan Casasola Fonseca, faced an altogether more aggressive threat early in 1857. Disorder was averted in Loja by tough policing but also by prohibiting the extraction of grain from the district and by Council pressure on farmers who were indebted to the *pósito* to replenish stocks from their private stores. With a population almost twice the size of Loja and with numerous factory workers not directly involved in agriculture and already organised into *carbonari* association, the crisis of subsistence in Antequera had more serious implications. Fearing unrest among the several hundred unemployed and hungry *jornaleros* milling around the city centre, the Council announced a collection of unlicensed arms (imposing fines of 100 reales for illegal possession), a billeting of *jornaleros* with landowners and the deployment of any remaining on the roads at 4 reales/day.⁴⁵

On Sunday, 1 February, officials charged with supervising the *alojamiento* noticed reluctance on the part of labourers to come forward. Those not requiring work were ordered home, whereupon

from within the crowd the cry of “Long live Liberty, and death to the robbers” became generalised and, ignoring the entreaties of the Council, the crowd began to launch stones and fire shots at the landowners and their agents obliging them to retreat to the Convent of San Francisco in order to organise their defence.

The attack on the ex-Convent of San Francisco (which housed the Council offices) and on various armourers’ shops around the main market continued until a force of Civil Guard restored order.⁴⁶ Perpetrators were arrested and sent to Málaga for a military trial, gatherings of more than three persons were prohibited and all taverns were closed.⁴⁷ An improvised militia of *paisanos* recruited by Francisco de Rojas (a cousin of Narváez) from among Antequera’s nobility and senior public officials was deployed and peace swiftly restored. Serious threats to public order continued throughout the subsequent five months until an improved summer harvest eased 18 months of pressure on the food supply.

Antequera’s authorities knew that the cause of the unrest went beyond food shortages and unemployment. In March the rural guard captured a band of five well-armed men in the Sierra de Antequera that had been involved in cattle rustling and sending threatening letters to prominent landowners and stock raisers, among them the district’s wealthiest citizen and horse breeder, José María González del Pino. The discovery on each of the five prisoners of wire cutters (José López was found with a bag containing ten such implements), along with pistols, shotguns, rifles, daggers and foreign money, suggests that this gang formed part of a more ambitious conspiracy to open recently enclosed grazing land being claimed through the temporarily suspended *desamortización*.⁴⁸ Since his accession to the First Ministry, Narváez had urged his family and friends in Antequera to restore the *moderado* hold over the city, much as he had done in Loja. Having resided in the city throughout the Bienio, mayor Casasola was aware of the widening of political divisions and of the difficulties *moderantismo* would face.⁴⁹ Following the February riot he reminded his cousin that Antequera was a large city of ‘5000 *vecinos* (in which) working people have gained an importance and with the establishment of societies and a thousand revolutionary elements the moral force of authority is no longer sufficient: the material force of bayonets is now indispensable’. Yet he doubted that anyone standing in the Council elections would ‘risk his skin by facing up to the daily and imminent danger’.⁵⁰

Narváez met Juan Casasola’s call for stronger authority for dealing with revolutionary elements with the appointment of an army officer, Félix María Travado, as Alcalde Corregidor.⁵¹ Travado had instructions to persuade Casasola to stand for election as Cortes deputy with the promise of support from Interior Minister Nocedal. Intimately aware of a destructive rivalry among local *moderado* factions, Casasola declined the invitation

and recommended instead, Rafael Chacón, close relative of Narváez whom Casasola favoured over *moderado* rival, the Marquis of the Peña de los Enamorados.⁵² Chacón duly triumphed on behalf of 'the conservative party' although only narrowly, Casasola explaining that 'it has been necessary to defend the ground palm by palm against the republicans to the extent that it (the seat) nearly fell into their hands on account of their party having organised elements among the masses and of the palpitating memory of two years of Kepis' (an illusion to the hats worn by the Militia).⁵³

The troubles in Antequera continued. With the *pósito* empty and private stores bare, in mid-March the Council requested 1,000 fanegas of wheat from Málaga for the needs of the city's poor.⁵⁴ In early April, the return of the prisoners arrested after the February riot provoked further disorders. As the prisoners approached the city they were met by a crowd of some 2,000 men, women and children, comprising prisoners' relatives and 'others with less justification or out of curiosity'. The crowd gathered strength as it escorted the prisoners to the jail in the Council building, requiring the prisoners to enter by a side door. Although Travado did not regard these events as of 'grave importance' he nevertheless saw the crowd as 'intelligent, with tendencies that relate to the origin of the seditious crimes that gravely disturbed the order of the city on 1 February' reminding Civil Governor Juan de Barcena that the city contained a population of nearly 28,000 including more than 4,000 workers employed in manufacturing, 'a most exaggerated school where a single pernicious theory is taught, which on more than one occasion has been attempted to be put into practice, gravely affecting public order'. Barcena refused Travado's request for a permanent force of 50 infantry to keep the peace reckoning the city's notables, the Civil Guard and local police to be sufficient for maintaining order.⁵⁵

Public order was again threatened in mid-April, this time the result not of dearth or unemployment but of the renewal of Democrat conspiracy following Sixto Cámara's Zaragoza manifesto. As early as February, Democrat propaganda, such as the pamphlet *Misionero Democrático o sea Catecismo del Pueblo*, was reaching towns throughout the province.⁵⁶ The civil governor urged town mayors to redouble security measures against 'enemies of order and of Her Majesty's throne' who had selected 'the Serranía de Ronda and the towns of Antequera, Campillos and their surrounding areas' for a Republican uprising, warning them to beware of 'revolutionary agents seducing unwary persons with money and other valued objects' and to pay particular attention to travellers and known troublemakers, and ordering them to gather up all shotguns without licenses.⁵⁷ In late April news of the murder of Canon Juan Rodríguez by a gang of seven bandits and the kidnapping of José Rojas Alvarez, son of the principal landowner of Antequera's dependency of Molina, finally convinced the government to despatch a force of regular infantry from Granada to bolster the city's improvised police force.⁵⁸

In a report to the civil governor Travado insisted that these were just the most conspicuous scandals in an orgy of crime,

no-one believes that they are safe even in the interior of their houses... Today there exists in Antequera a growing number of vagabonds who infest the city, pervert its good and traditional customs, scandalise by their bad example, morally alter the public repose, and, in a word, form the fundamental base and nucleus out of which the robber, the murderer and the author of anonymous threatening letters emerge and spread out, a nucleus that terrorizes the domestic hearth with kidnappings and threatens agricultural wealth (whose product is ready for harvest but whose closest and most immediate attention will come from this alien and destructive mass) with conflagration.

Travado had identified Antequera's *carbonari* society. Insisting that ordinary justice had no effect, he called for special powers to 'cauterise the gangrene' and to 'extirpate the bad seed at its root', which, combined with the registering of delinquents, would calm 'the neighbourhood, provide people with security, restore the moral order, and return the principle of authority to the high esteem where it should be'.⁵⁹

Democrat conspiracy, April–July 1857

As *moderado* municipal authorities struggled to police and feed hungry and seditious populations, Democrats and advanced Progresistas returned to clandestine conspiracy. By May 1857, a nationwide revolutionary conspiracy led by Sixto Cámara, based upon a revival of the Democrat party's clandestine network, was already far advanced. Antequera had been chosen as one of the revolutionary centres.

Carbonari societies were first introduced to Spain during the Liberal triennium (1820–1823) by Italian refugees fleeing the failed Piedmontese and Neapolitan revolutions. Their resurgence after 1855 coincided with Mazzini's promotion of the 'Party of Action'. Only revolutionary action, by revealing the true face of Habsburg and Bourbon tyranny, would pressure moderates in Piedmont to take a more forward policy on Italian reunification. This strategy appealed to Democrats in Spain who had experienced repression during the Bienio and were pursued into exile following the restoration of *moderantismo* in the autumn of 1856.⁶⁰

Resulting, as in Italian case, from persecution, exile and political desperation, this 'action strategy' involved mounting civilian carbonari-based uprisings, seemingly destined to failure, yet in the wake of which certain political gains were achieved due to intensified police repression, the creation of martyrs and unsteady nerves of those in power. The same logic lay behind the doomed uprisings in Italy, France and Spain during the

1820s and early 1830s.⁶¹ What made the 1850s and 1860s propitious was a more favourable climate of domestic and international public opinion fostered by the press. In Italy, the willingness of the Piedmontese government to be carried along in the wake of Mazzini's action strategy, to which it was formally opposed, made it additionally compelling.⁶² In Spain, the weakness of the Bourbon monarchy combined with the wavering loyalty of the armed forces under *moderado* rule, enhanced the propaganda value of conspiracies and uprisings which a decade earlier would not have caused such concern to the authorities or so encouraged radicals and Republicans. Hence, from the autumn of 1856, Democrat leaders at home and in exile dedicated their energies to newspaper propaganda, drafting democratic catechisms, extending their popular following through Carbonari enlistments and developing their international ties in preparation for insurrection.⁶³

Although Democrat clandestine conspiracy after 1856 was based upon the same national choreography of earlier conspiracies, centering on the coastal cities of Galicia, Catalonia, the Levant and Andalucía, linked with centres inland, such as Zaragoza, Madrid, Jaen and Granada, from the end the Bienio Andalucía and Estemadura emerged as the favoured loci of insurrection. This was due to the proximity of exile communities in Gibraltar and Portugal combined with the receptivity of Andalusian society, particularly smaller cities and rural areas, to democratic propaganda and *carbonari* enlistments, a consequence of the weakened pastoral presence of the Catholic Church.

Málaga and Granada became the centres of clandestine conspiracy. With a seasoned revolutionary pedigree going back to the 1820s, Málaga, along with Cádiz, was feared in Madrid as the centre of Andalusian Liberal conspiracy. Yet by 1856 this reputation presented more of a handicap for Democrat conspirators. During the Bienio Málaga's Militia had been repeatedly purged of radical elements accounting for its ephemeral resistance to O'Donnell's coup in July 1856. In November 1856 a conspiracy by leading Democrats Sixto Cámara, Bernardo García and Romualdo Lafuente to encourage a mutiny of officers and sergeants commanding an expeditionary force destined for Africa failed pitifully with 50 wounded and six deaths.⁶⁴ Although the city remained an important centre of Democrat propaganda and conspiracy, and was home to a growing community of the Spanish Reformed Church whose political sympathies were firmly behind the Democrat party, the city was too well-policed, and too geographically isolated by mountains and poor communication (until the opening of a railway connection with the interior in 1865), to serve usefully as a centre for Democrat insurrection before the 'Gloriosa' in September 1868.

Granada also had a revolutionary pedigree going back to the struggle against Ferdinand VII's restored absolutism (1823–1833) when *granadino* lawyer Juan Rumí had established close links with national and international conspiratorial circles.⁶⁵ The city even ended the 'infamous decade' with a martyred revolutionary heroine of national renown in Mariana Pineda,

executed in May 1831 for the crime of embroidering a masonic banner.⁶⁶ Yet Granada lacked the progressive mercantile elite of Málaga and other coastal cities while its isolated inland location, combined with the *moderado* sympathies of the *granadino* elite, ensured that the city remained a secondary nucleus of *progresista* and Democrat conspiracy until the Bienio.

During the Bienio Granada was considered a safe location for political exile. In 1854–1855 *Moderado* intellectual Andrés Borrego lodged in the palace of the Alhambra in 1854–1855 where he penned an important tract on political parties in which Democrats are given a cautious welcome.⁶⁷ In May 1856 26-year-old Ceferino Tresserra, known as ‘Tresserra of the Barricades’ for his success in organising Barcelona’s cotton weavers into *carbonari* discipline, was exiled to Granada for his part in organising Barcelona’s April street disturbances.⁶⁸ Housed comfortably in the Alhambra and given a free rein of the city, Tresserra remarked in a pamphlet addressed to General Zapatero, hammer of Barcelona’s Democrats, that he found Andalucía, particularly Málaga and Granada, very welcoming and ‘highly democratic’.⁶⁹ He soon came into conflict with Granada’s religious authorities but by the time of his departure at the end of the Bienio he had earned a commanding position among the city’s Democrats.⁷⁰

By the end of the Bienio, then, the province’s historic marginality Granada’s supposed political marginality and physical isolation (un-connected to the railway network until 1867), combined with a cosmopolitanism resulting from the large community of foreign residents (attracted by the capital’s Moorish buildings), endowed Granada with certain conspiratorial advantages. From July 1856 the city emerged as the centre of *carbonari* conspiracy for the provinces of eastern Andalucía (Málaga, Córdoba, Jaén and Granada). The city’s Protestant community also achieved national and international renown in 1860 with the imprisonment of Manuel Matamoros and José Alhama. Granada’s newfound conspiratorial centrality was uncovered during the police investigation conducted by Antonio Guerola, civil governor of Málaga, in the aftermath of the Loja Revolution.

A *carbonari* society named ‘La Venta Nacional’ (*venta* was adopted from the Italian ‘vendita’ meaning ‘stand of timber’) had been established in Granada at the start of the Bienio, probably with the help of Italian immigrants (Italian *fondas* throughout Andalucía became centres of Republican sociability). The Society was organised hierarchically, mirroring the centralisation of the Bourbon state, and democratically, with an emphasis on training local leaders, encouraging mass recruitment and achieving territorial inclusiveness. A ‘President’ was elected for a three-year term by unanimous vote from among ‘Masters of the Order’ themselves selected on the basis of industriousness and zeal in propagating the doctrines of the association. The duty of these ‘Masters of the First Degree’ was to visit district capitals, such as Antequera, Loja and Alhama, to nominate or remove presidents of local societies (‘cabins’) according to their performance in extending recruitment and

raising funds in smaller towns, villages and *cortijos*. The presidents of these 'cabins' in the district capitals were expected to recruit or dismiss 'Second Degree Masters' in subject towns, again on the basis of success in increasing membership. Presidents in smaller towns in turn nominated 'Third Degree Masters' for streets, barrios or wherever they were able to recruit at least ten members. Much emphasis was placed on the mobility and accountability of Masters who were expected to travel frequently between towns with verbal instructions to be passed among members.⁷¹

Enlistment into *La Venta Nacional* spread from its centre in Granada north into Jaén, south-east into Almería and west into Málaga and Córdoba. Masters commonly possessed occupations noted for their mobility, or contact with people on the move: blacksmiths, veterinarians, musicians, comedians, theatre actors, hat sellers, tailors, carpenters, stonemasons and peripatetic schoolmasters. In 1855 a branch of the Society was established in Antequera by a tinsmith from Granada, attracted by opportunities for work in the new, mechanised woollen factories. Antequera became the base for the recruitment of masters throughout the towns of Sierra Bética and the *campiña* of Antequera.⁷² Late in 1856, Rafael Pérez del Alamo organised a branch in Loja.⁷³ A branch named 'Los Carbonarios' was organised in Málaga by skilled cabinetmaker Clemente Hernández in 1856. Málaga acted as a centre of recruitment for the towns of the coast, the surrounding agricultural areas and the Sierra of Málaga. Another tinsmith and companion of Hernández, Antonio Córtes, maintained links between Málaga and a similar organisation in Alicante.⁷⁴ 'Los Carbonarios' attracted several prominent journalists and Protestant evangelists: Antonio Azuaga, a printer who had participated in the November 1856 uprising and later would join in the Loja revolt; Tomás Manuel González, alias 'El Cojo', a newspaper editor with close links with Democrats and in exile;⁷⁵ Juan Vivas Jiménez and Federico Villarazo, Protestant evangelists;⁷⁶ and Manuel Matamoros, a young military officer and landowner who in the winter of 1857–1858 would convert to Protestantism while in exile in Gibraltar, to become Spain's leading Protestant evangelist.⁷⁷ A society was formed in Colmenar in 1857 by Catalan Francisco Ferrer, owner of a stagecoach company who helped establish societies throughout the mountainous wheat and vine-growing Axarquía that lies between Loja and Málaga.⁷⁸

Hence, when Cámara resolved to travel south to Andalucía in November 1856 to lead the abortive Málaga uprising he would have been aware that *carbonari* associational ties complimented and extended the solidarities created by service in the National Militia. Belief in the insurrectionary potential of this mass organisation influenced the language of his 'Zaragoza' manifesto of April 1857 and his insurrectionary strategy during summer.

The government too was aware of the spread of clandestine associations linked to international revolutionary circles. In early December, Cándido Nocedal informed the civil governor of Granada that Spanish emissaries had been present at a recent meeting in Genoa presided over by Mazzini and

that revolutionaries were active in Spain organising revolutionary clubs and secret societies. A Frenchman named Aragón y Garnier Pagés⁷⁹ had been commissioned to organise Mazzinian secret societies throughout Spain. Necedal warned that Mazzini at this meeting had recommended assassination 'as one of the best political measures'.⁸⁰

Although Isabel María Pascual Sastre found no evidence of direct communication between Mazzini and Sixto Cámara, it was likely that they were in contact during the winter of 1856–1857.⁸¹ During the Bienio Cámara had published several pieces by Mazzini in his paper *La Soberanía Nacional* promoting the idea of a short period of Republican dictatorship while a constituent assembly, elected by universal suffrage, deliberated a new constitution (the process begun but never completed during the Bienio).⁸² In mid-January 1857, Narváez was informed that Cámara, who had been residing in Gibraltar under the pseudonym of Don José Asnardo Gibert, had departed on a French steamer for Tangiers having received fund from his wife in Madrid.⁸³ At the end of January, Cámara was writing to his friends in Spain informing them of his presence in Gibraltar having returned from a visit to England.⁸⁴ For a Democrat of Cámara's stature to have visited London without meeting Mazzini is hard to conceive.

In mid-April 1857 any doubts that Narváez may have had that the democratic cancer had spread to his native Granada were dispelled by a police report received by the Civil Governor José María Campos (Narváez's cousin) detailing the existence of Republican secret society. Although Campos attempted to play down the society for being composed 'in the most of incorrigible people of the worst antecedents' he did point out that a 'junta of artisans' had been formed that had encouraged people to believe that 'if the republican party were to triumph, property would divided up among the poor'. Members were observed to have formed into 'circles' each 'containing a certain numbers of persons who receive news frequently from various points of which the most recent was that "the binge" (*la jarana*) would very soon be organised in Madrid, Zaragoza, Coruña and other points, and in some provincial capitals'.⁸⁵

Far from being 'incorrigible people of the worst antecedents', the police report reveals that Granada's conspirators came from many walks of life: lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, teachers, municipal employees, tailors and hat makers, barbers, printers, booksellers and tavern and billiard hall keepers, men who were 'well-known publicly'; hardly a *demi-monde*. As in Loja, the growth of the society in Granada had been spurred throughout the winter of 1856 by the Narváez's pressure on Granada's authorities to expel prominent Progresistas from their municipal posts, employment in the University and from positions of command in the cavalry regiment whose loyalty he suspected.⁸⁶ Further details would have alarmed Narváez. Arms and ammunition had been hoarded in preparation for an insurrection and Democrats in Granada were in close touch with their counterparts in Cartagena and

Almería. Most worrying was the information that 'the Chief of them all' was 'Ceferino Trecera (sic), he of the barricades', prominent Catalan Democrat. The image of the city as a sleepy and graceful Moorish backwater was transformed into Granada, centre of Democrat conspiracy, wired into national and international networks (after his release from exile in Granada Tresserra had been arrested in Barcelona and was currently living in Italy).⁸⁷

Apart from the Catalan and Mazzinian connection the police report identified another area of sociability in 'Don José Alhama . . . manufacturer of hats with a shop in the Zacatín near the Alcaicería and a factory in the Realejo, a Republican and chief of the association of hat makers who among artisans are the most united'. He would not have known that Alhama had also become 'the organiser and first minister of Evangelical Church of Granada'.⁸⁸ Following the Bienio, Protestant evangelists in Granada, Málaga and Seville, linked to the agents of Bible societies and leaders of evangelical sects based in Gibraltar, used Democrat secret societies as a cover for their evangelical efforts.⁸⁹ The spread of Protestantism provided additional concern for the *moderado* authorities. Evidence of this shared sociability came in June 1857 when several prominent Protestants were involved in the abortive Democrat uprisings throughout Andalucía.⁹⁰

On 5 April 1857, Cámara issued a 'Manifiesto of the National Revolutionary Junta to the People' from Zaragoza calling upon Spaniards to rise up to recover the liberties stolen from them by O'Donnell coup on 14 July 1856.⁹¹ This manifesto differed from previous plans, such as the Manifiesto of Manzanares, in not mentioning the National Militia or the constitutional duties of the Liberal army, calling instead upon the 'People' to rise up to complete the work of the national uprising of July 1856. This would be a revolution made by volunteer forces. Evangelical religious rhetoric pervaded the manifesto. Several paragraphs appealed to the clergy, calling upon 'real ministers, formed in good Christian teaching, in the honest habit of our master, in his zeal, in his ardent charity for the poor and the destitute, in his love and gracious meekness'.

Cámara urged Spaniards not to be deterred for having recently been disarmed. At the appointed time the 'Junta Nacional' would provide the arms, organisation and equipment for the 'thousands of brave men who, formed into columns of volunteers, will occupy the wildernesses, the plains and the Sierras, to block the passage of the army from every direction'. The army would then be confronted by 'another means of combat inside towns where women, the old and even children can be used'. Evidently, Cámara believed that there was such popular anger with the *desengaño* of the Bienio, the disarming of the National Militia and the return of Narváez and the Moderados to power that people everywhere would fearlessly rise up in indignation.

The manifesto targeted specific social groups. The 'poor farmer' and 'modest landowner' were promised credit. The *jornalero* was promised a piece of land where 'you will live in freedom, dignity and happiness with your wife

and children'. The public official was promised a regular salary and security of tenure. The young conscript would be released from the 'sad clock of the quintas'. The soldier was exhorted to throw down his 'patricidal arms'. The 'Minister of Jesus Christ' was urged to rise up against 'the Church of Popes, bishops and archbishops, with their unquenchable thirst for domination and wealth' and to return to principles of the primitive church, to educate 'this flock in the social virtues of liberty, their rights to equality and in the Christian sense of fraternity'. 'Virtuous young men, chosen ones of the revolution, arbiters of our destiny, flower and cream of Spanish youth' were urged to 'take up the sacred standard of the Fatherland and lead it to victory!'.⁹²

The day 10 May was chosen for the start of the uprising. Three hundred thousand copies of the manifesto were printed in Portugal to be distributed in adjoining provinces. Rifles prepared by one Luis Maroto were ready for collection from Gibraltar by chiefs in Madrid, Cáceres, Málaga and Barcelona.⁹³ A work stoppage among weavers and spinners in Barcelona on 8 and 9 May would precede the *grito*.⁹⁴ In March, Cámara had urged Republicans to maintain scrupulous unity with Carlists so as to concert efforts against the regime.⁹⁵

A list of volunteers pledged to join the revolt shows that support was strong among the cotton spinners and weavers in Barcelona, substantial in the cities of the Levant (Tarragona, Valencia and Alicante), slender in Madrid, strong in Málaga, significant in the Sierra de Ronda and strong from the Merino brothers in the Sierra Morena.⁹⁶ Support in Antequera, considered a key strategic point by Cámara and Romualdo Lafuente (Málaga's premier Democrat who in late April was residing in Antequera under the pseudonym of Juan Ramírez), had already eroded due to Travado's heavy policing. Support had collapsed in Granada where, as we have seen, the conspiracy had been rumbled.⁹⁷

Although the authorities in Granada and Málaga were prepared for uprising, they differed over where it would break out. Granada expected Barcelona to be the flashpoint while the governor of Málaga believed that Democrats would launch the revolution in his city.⁹⁸ On 28 April, Necedal authorised governor Campos in Granada to detain Republican leaders in Granada and Motril. Arrests and house searches in Málaga revealed a plan to burn down factories owned by city's leading industrialists, Heredia and Larios, and to assassinate the political authorities.⁹⁹ Cámara's instructions to Juan Antonio del Rio in Madrid proposed that squads of volunteers occupy the royal palace, ministries and private house of ministers, the captain general and civil governor. A secret tribunal would then, 'within less than five minutes', carry out the execution of Madrid's principal public authorities as well as 'cursed race of Bourbons'.¹⁰⁰

With the rumbling of the conspiracy in Malaga, Motril and Granada, and with signs that support in Barcelona was faltering, Cámara had to rethink

his strategy.¹⁰¹ The west and interior of Andalucía now became the strategic focus of the uprising. An intercepted document addressed to Cámara in Lisbon in early May outlined an ambitious project of regional revolts coordinated from revolutionary centres at Huelva, Seville, Cádiz, Ronda, Antequera, Alcalá (Jaén), Jaén and La Carolina (Sierra Morena) where rebel columns would concentrate from outlying towns.¹⁰² The plan suggests an intimacy with political geography and a familiarity with patterns of resistance and insurrection in the region going back to the French invasion in 1808. However, the document reveals a new strategy of revolt. Revolution would result not from a peripatetic military column in the style Riego's revolt in 1820 that had sparked *pronunciamientos* throughout Spain, but from columns of civilian volunteers formed in towns and villages, converging on revolutionary centres, a strategy favoured by the Carbonari and Republicans in France from the 1820s, and currently being employed in Naples by Carlo Pisacane.¹⁰³

The proposed choreography of revolt for eastern Andalucía in May 1857 closely resembles the pattern of insurrection adopted during the Loja Revolution four years later. Antequera would act as the centre for revolts in Colmenar, Loja, Alhama, Montefrío, Benamejé and Archidona, shutting off routes between Granada and Málaga. Alcalá would serve as centre for uprisings in Rute, Lucena, Priego, Cabra, Campillo de Arenas, blocking routes to Granada from the North and opening links with Jaen and Huelma. This was the heartland of the Narváez *cacicazgo*. It would also be the hearth of the Loja Revolution in July 1861.

A further intercepted document composed by Don Eladío Manuel Guerra, a *malagueño* resident in Lisbon, promised each volunteer 'a beautiful campaign uniform' (claiming that 40,000 were being made), rations, lodging, 10 reales a day and a ribbon of honour to acknowledge his patriotism. Those enlisting before 10 May would receive a prize of 3,000 reales, those joining after, sufficient to travel home. After the Revolution, when dividing their commons, Councils would offer the best land to those who have served liberty and the fatherland. Volunteers would receive a 'Diploma' issued by the Junta Nacional which would attain 'more or less value' according to notes attached to it by commanders of columns. Families of volunteers would receive pensions. In return, volunteers should present themselves with a rifle or shotgun, obey ordinances and follow the flag until the column was disbanded. Anyone without valour or with stain upon his honour was advised to stay at home.¹⁰⁴

The uprising proposed for 10 May was postponed. In the end, the revolt Cámara launched in Andalucía in late June resembled the rearguard efforts by the Militia in July 1856 and future Democrat uprisings in the region through until the Revolution of September 1868. Towns in the Sierra Morena such as La Carolina, Bailén and Despeñaperros could be relied upon to rise up. Towns in the Axarquía of Málaga, southern Córdoba and Jaen were also

primed for revolt. But the principal coastal cities and provincial capitals were too well policed to afford more than transient protest and the occasional crowd scuffle.¹⁰⁵ Seville would prove a tragic exception.

Realising that raising provincial capitals of Andalucía in rebellion would be difficult, Cámara's only hope rested with smaller towns and the countryside. The last week of June coincided with end of the harvest when *jornaleros*, whom Democrats hoped to rally to arms, were congregated in harvest gangs that had long been on the move and had cash in their pockets. Returning to their towns, many were preparing to attend Corpus Christi celebrations and the mid-summer festivals of San Juan, San Pedro and San Pablo.¹⁰⁶ Tempers were already frayed, Andalucía having recently experienced a *quinta*.¹⁰⁷ Surely, Cámara must have hoped, this combustible terrain would yield the support needed to be able to stretch the army beyond its limits?

On the Day of San Juan (25 June) – the day Carlo Pisacane set off from Genoa to liberate Naples and Sicily from Bourbon oppression¹⁰⁸ – Narváez informed Necedal that Cámara had entered Spain having ordered 'volunteer bands' to rise up in the countryside to distract the army and the 'people' ('populacho') of the towns also to rise up.¹⁰⁹ On 26 June, Bernardo García (editor of *La Soberanía*) raised the standard of rebellion at Bailén in the Sierra Morena reactivating the movement that he had led in August 1856.¹¹⁰ The authorities were temporarily caught off guard and rebels led by the Merino brothers at first made some progress, taking Bailén, La Carolina and advancing south towards Jaén. Meanwhile at Despeñaperros, a few kilometres to the north on the Cordoba–Madrid road, Cámara was expected to raise the standard of rebellion.¹¹¹ But Cámara failed to appear and by early July Francisco Muñoz y Andrade, military governor of Jaén, could report to Narváez (his old companion at arms) that he had suppressed the rebellion in Jaén and that García and the Merino brothers had escaped to Portugal.¹¹²

The only other significant main focus of rebellion was Seville. On the night of 25 June army sergeants Manuel María Caro y García and Cayetano Morales received orders from Cámara in Lisbon to lead a column of volunteers out of the city to ignite the province of Seville in rebellion.¹¹³ Caro received support in raising the column from Joaquín Serra y Asencio, an ageing yet charismatic Protestant evangelist and retired military officer.¹¹⁴ In his declaration to the military tribunal following his capture Sergeant Caro claimed he had been convinced that 'the revolution was already made morally and that in the course eight to twelve days all would be concluded without having to lament any misfortune, since... the revolution was very organised and its triumph secure'.¹¹⁵ On the morning of 28 June, 120 lightly armed men left Seville for Utrera believing that they were marching into territory prepared for insurrection.¹¹⁶ Yet their reception on the *campiña* was lukewarm, Utrera's Council refusing to part with any funds or provide rations. Only Gabriel La Llave, 79-year-old owner of

a match factory and tobacco shop, inspired by the April Manifesto, rallied to the cause, contributing some infantry and a squad of cavalry, all former Nacionales.¹¹⁷

Upon entering the ducal town of El Arahal on 30 June, the temper of the uprising changed. Although Caro and La Llave were eager to maintain order and legality, promising upon completion of the Revolution to return a forced loan of 12,000 duros, the local population took advantage of the presence of the column to settle old scores (going back at least as early as 1836).¹¹⁸ Ignoring rebel guards placed outside public buildings and the houses of the well-to-do, a crowd composed entirely of locals, including large numbers of women and children, sacked the casino, destroyed the municipal archive, destroyed the houses and archives of three prominent notables (the administrator of the Duke of Osuna, the public notary, and the town scribe and judge) and immolated the house of a priest. Later on the same day, the crowd travelled to the neighbouring town of La Parada to sack the house of a priest before returning to their homes in El Arahal at 3 a.m. on 1 July.¹¹⁹

Baffled by the tornado of theft, archive and house burning its presence had unleashed, Caro's column hastily departed the *campiña* of Seville via Morón and Alcalá del Valle into the Sierra de Cádiz and the Serranía de Ronda to be routed by Civil Guard cavalry at Benaoján on 3 July.¹²⁰ Half the force escaped into the Sierra of Málaga where the 'Aguilar brothers' of Antequera were reported to be provoking disorders around Antequera, Vélez and Archidona and blocking the Córdoba-Málaga road at Almogía.¹²¹

On 12 July, Sergeant Caro and 26 others from the original column were executed in Seville, an event witnessed by Seville historian Guichot:

the majority of the victims were beardless young men, artisans for the most part, who had let themselves be seduced, ignorant of the revolutionary attempt they were about to commit, to the extent that on the horrible walk from the chapel to the place of punishment, they were still asking the priests and the brothers of charity who were supporting them in their last moments 'are they really going to shoot us, and for what crime?'¹²²

Soon after, 12 more rebels were shot in Seville, including Second-in-Command Sergeant Morales and the Protestant Serra y Asencio. La Llave and ten others were taken to Utrera to be shot. Twelve rioters were shot in El Arahal, including several youths aged between 14 and 16.¹²³ Two rebels sympathetic to the cause faced a firing squad in Ronda.¹²⁴ The persecution of 'La Nueva Carbonaria' in Seville continued for several more weeks resulting in numerous imprisonments and the despatch of over 1,000 men into exile.¹²⁵ This was a scale of punishment Spain had not witnessed since 1848.

In July 1857 'El Arahal' entered the political vocabulary of Isabeline Spain. For Narváez and Nocedal, the violence and destruction unleashed

by the Democrat column and the targeting of the properties of the local elite provided proof that Democracy, already tarnished by its association with Protestantism, was synonymous with Communism and Socialism. For Democrats, 'El Arahal' illustrated the dangers of inflaming conflicts in towns with long histories of discord resulting from the *desamortización* and where *progresista* institutions such as the Militia no longer existed to maintain order. Cámara expected townsmen and women to form democratic columns and march out to conspiratorial centres obediently to await orders from Masters and Presidents of *carbonari* societies, not to turn on landowners and priests in a spirit of petty revenge. The Seville uprising also illustrated the weakness of the Carbonari as a model of conspiracy and revolt. Already by April the regime knew more about Cámara's conspiracy than most of those involved in it. Rumour, bluff and utopian expectation were part of the model. The regime could easily exploit these weaknesses. Indeed, Fernando Garrido, who was waiting in Cádiz to provide logistical support and arms once the rebellion got underway, was convinced that Narváez and Nocedal had deliberately provoked the Seville to justify more draconian repression of Democrats, to instil terror through exemplary punishments and to remind the army of the price of disloyalty.¹²⁶

There is evidence to support Garrido's claim. On 24 June, the day before learning from Narváez that Cámara had entered Spain, a full four days before the Seville uprising, Nocedal declared a state of emergency empowering local authorities to detain all suspects, advising that 'proceedings against rebels should be most rapid'.¹²⁷ Yet the recently appointed civil governor of Seville (a nephew of Narváez), in spite of being alert to the city's assertive and conspicuous Democrat party, declined to use these powers, tolerating open sedition in the city in the lead up to the uprising and allowing the column to leave the city without impediment. Once the uprising was underway, the governor arrested leading Democrats, broke up meetings and closed down bookshops, obeying Nocedal's instructions of 24 June.¹²⁸ After the capture of the rebels no effort was made to investigate the complicated local causes of the uprising in Seville or the riot at El Arahal. Instead, Narváez urged the military authorities and tribunals to execute instigators as well as rebels without delay.¹²⁹

Although the rebellion was centred in Jaén and Seville, there was much sympathy for it elsewhere in Andalucía, as there was horror at the executions. In Loja, conditions could not have been less favourable for demonstrating any support for the 'Seville martyrs'. Judge Lorenzo Montero, who was reaching the final stage of the trial of the *progresista* councillors, reported to Narváez on 11 July (the eve of the executions in Seville) that

in spite of the horrible events in Utrera, the peace of Loja has not been altered in the slightest degree, and, because of these events, the authorities have been united in their vigilance, having resolved that any attempt

of any kind against public order would be punished in a prompt and exemplary way.¹³⁰

However, public order in Loja was evidently not 'perfect', as in mid-June the Council resolved to establish a force of 20 mounted guards to keep order and protect agricultural property and harvests throughout the district, landowners incurring the hefty fiscal burden until the force was disbanded with the fall of the *moderado* government in the summer of 1858.¹³¹

Finally granted its military garrison, Antequera needed no special force of rural guard during the summer of 1857 to preserve order although improvised *partidas* of cavalry were regularly mobilised to pursue bandits, kidnappers and thieves. The city could also call on the Salt Guard at Fuente de Piedra, part of which was despatched to Seville in July to help with the suppression of the rebellion.¹³² During the uprising Narváez was informed by his cousin Juan Casasola that Democrats still organised quite openly in the city citing Francisco Romero, a broker, who was '...well known as an ardent democrat and owner of a Café where Democrats meet and celebrate the coming of the day when they will exact vengeance on the defenders of the Government'.¹³³ Reports of such confident Democrat sociability, echoed in reports from many others parts of Andalucía such as Jaén, must have strengthened Narváez's resolution to use the uprising for teaching a lesson to Spain that the Bienio Progresista was over.¹³⁴

In mid-July Alcalde Corregidor Travado, using the state of emergency, began drawing lists of 'vagabonds and suspicious persons' and those who had committed crimes against 'honourable people and their properties'. In early August, without charges or trials, several columns of prisoners were sent to Málaga to serve terms of varying lengths in the Canaries.¹³⁵ This was the start of a practice in Antequera of exiling troublemakers that would continue throughout the subsequent quarter century until well into the Restoration. These measures bought two months of peace until the Queen, following the birth of a son and heir to the throne, issued an amnesty for 'all those detained as a result of governmental measures'.

Travado complained bitterly that the amnesty threatened to undo six months of arduous police work, begging to be allowed to forbid the return of any of those exiled from the city.¹³⁶ Casasola shared Travado's concern and was particularly incensed by the decision of the Audiencia of Granada to drop the case against the assassins of Canon Rodríguez, an action that was causing 'real moral alarm among the decent people in this city' insisting that

that crime had no involvement with politics except that two of the prisoners, and principally their leader, belonged to the most abject part of the National Militia and for that reason the principal chiefs (of the now disbanded National Militia) have been pressuring and have even gathered

a clandestine subscription so that by all possible and reprobate means the punishment of these criminals is avoided.

Casasola urged Narváez to do all in his power to prevent the abandonment of the trial insisting that the assassins were being defended by Democrats, 'the most ardent demagogues of this city'.¹³⁷

Conclusion

Between his accession to the First Ministry in October 1856 and his dismissal in October 1857, Narváez, supported by Cándido Nocedal, sought to rebuild a *moderantismo* that would match and crush its *progresista* and Democrat opponents. By abolishing the National Militia, increasing the police powers of Alcaldes Corregidores, repressing the clandestine organisations of Democrats and Protestants, sentencing Democrat leaders from their home towns without trial for indefinite periods of exile augmenting the surveillance of conspiratorial networks established by political exiles and, most importantly, responding to civil and political unrest and rebellion with implacable harshness, involving mass executions, Narváez and Nocedal hoped to cauterise and uproot the democratic cancer that had infected Spain since the 1840s.

These measures covered political opposition in Loja and Antequera and defeated Cámara's attempt to launch a democratic uprising in Andalucía during the spring and summer of 1857. However, the extreme severity of the government's response to the pathetically small and poorly armed volunteer column that left Seville in late June lost the regime its support even among Moderados and significantly within the Court. The regime's conflation of a Democrat uprising with an unrelated anti-ducal riot and representation of these events as the first salvo of communist revolution in a socially combustible rural Andalucía launched the enduring myth of Spain's brooding revolutionary *mediodía*. Yet repression and official misrepresentation of events acted as a spur to Democratic propaganda and clandestine organisation that would grow steadily over the subsequent years. Moreover, the image of *moderado* implacability, harshness and strength, which Narváez and Nocedal so desperately wanted to create, was sabotaged in the winter of 1857 by Isabel's penchant for granting amnesties. In December 1857 those imprisoned and exiled as a consequence of governmental measures against political crimes between August and October learned that they could return to their homes.

3

Ballots, Conspiracies and Insurrection in Málaga and Granada, 1857–1859

The scale of executions in July, followed by the arrest of Democrats in cities throughout Spain and their confinement at Leganés (a mental asylum south of Madrid), lost Narváez support among 'Puritanos' (moderates) in the *moderado* party. O'Donnell's project for a Liberal Union regained momentum. On 12 October, Narváez was dismissed over a disagreement with the Queen regarding her new favourite. With the Duke went intransigent Interior Minister Cándido Nocedal. Their replacements, General Joaquín Armero, First Minister and Minister of War, and Manuel Bermúdez de Castro, Minister of the Interior, signalled a modest liberalisation. The Royal amnesty in early December confirmed this trend. On 30 June 1858, after two further *moderado* ministerial crises, O'Donnell was finally invited to form a government. The Liberal Union, envisaged by Cánovas since 1854, was finally launched.

During the winter of 1857–1858, Sixto Cámara continued in Lisbon to prepare for an Andalucian uprising, wary after the July 1857 fiasco that much more care was needed in fostering an effective conspiratorial network.¹ Working alongside him was Fernando Garrido, who during his exile in Britain had established ties with the stars of 'Democratic International' in London: Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin and Herzen. Garrido found the British connection useful for printing propaganda and as a source of arms. Cámara and Garrido were helped by Ceferino Tresserra ('of the barricades'), who returned in December from his Italian exile where he had observed the revival of the Carbonari following the failure of insurrections in Sicily 1856 and in Genoa and Naples in 1857.² Against the better judgement of Nicolás Rivero, leader of the party, Cámara, Garrido, Tresserra and Francisco Pi y Margall revived and extended the party's clandestine network.³

In the still repressive yet gradually liberalising atmosphere of the tail end of the Moderate Biennium, the Carbonari met with considerable success. In the winter of 1857–1858, Democrats claimed 80,000 affiliates in Andalucía alone.⁴ Confidence in this popular support was demonstrated on 1 February 1858, when Cámara issued a 'Political Manifesto of the National Junta

of the Spanish Democrat Party' from Madrid, more measured in tone than the Zaragoza manifesto of April 1857. No call to arms, no guileless predictions of spontaneous mass uprisings in city and countryside, no instructions to jubilant crowds of women and children to corner and disarm the regular army; instead, the Revolution would appear at the appropriate moment out of disciplined decurial sections which, with its victory, would transmute into juntas that would set about transforming the Spanish state from the bottom up.

The preamble of the Manifesto lamented the disunity and treachery that had prevented the realisation of revolutionary goals in the past, stressed the need for discipline and keeping to the Democrat programme after the Revolution, and warned against imbuing the Spanish state – that 'horse of Attila, that renders sterile the soil over which it tramples' – with any further power. Much stress was laid on the need to decentralise the administration and to rebuild the state in accord with popular sovereignty, beginning at the local level with the municipalities. The party programme was reiterated: freedom of the press; association and conscience; universal suffrage; free and obligatory primary education; equality of citizenship and a single *fuero*; trial by jury; free criminal justice; the unification of civil and criminal law; the right of civil and criminal defence; the abolition of *consumos* and all indirect taxes; the abolition of state monopolies on salt, tobacco and any other goods; the completion of the *desamortización*, with remaining lands held by the Crown; municipal, common and wastelands to be divided up among 'proletarians'; the abolition of *quintas* and forced naval recruitment; the reduction in the standing army; and the revival of the National Militia as an army reserve. The Monarchy was not mentioned but for the first time the Democrat party committed itself to the idea of a 'REPUBLICA DEMOCRATICA'.⁵

Early in 1858 police uncovered the leadership of the party's clandestine organisation in Madrid. Thirteen prominent Democrat leaders were imprisoned and the organisation dissolved into its regional parts.⁶ In February, Antonio Guerola, Málaga's new civil governor, uncovered a conspiracy in Málaga with an insurrectionary choreography and leadership identical to that of April–July 1857. Orchestrated by Romualdo Lafuente and Cámara, the conspiracy was at an advanced stage with a shipment of arms at Gibraltar already loaded and ready to be delivered. Málaga's port workers were expected to rise up, the military governor assassinated and an uprising in the Sierra de Ronda would be seconded in Antequera. Harsh police measures, including a ban on the wearing of masks at Carnival and the arrest of Lafuente and other Democrats, combined with coastal naval patrols, to prevent the entry of arms and to deter an uprising.⁷

Guerola's policing of Democrats was helped by the continuation of the state of emergency (extended also in Catalonia and the Carlist territory of Maestrazgo) until 20 September, allowing the authorities throughout the

province to maintain close vigilance of potential 'disturbers of the public calm' and to keep in place the policy of governmental detention and expulsion of 'vagrants'.⁸ These measures, combined with good intelligence from the Spanish consul in Gibraltar, disrupted conspiratorial networks, preventing, in Guerola's opinion, a Democrat uprising during the summer of 1858.⁹ However, the exiling of so many potential troublemakers ensured a continuation of the politics of insurrection as renowned leaders were joined by *capataces de cuadrilla* (local ring leaders) and common criminals who enjoyed closer links to the population.¹⁰

The restoration of the Liberal Union in June 1858 was followed by the dissolution of the Cortes and the convocation of new elections. To emphasise the break with the past, Interior Minister José Posada-Herrera promptly ordered a 'rectification' of electoral rolls although these had been recently revised under the Moderados. In a context of extremely restricted suffrage, when a few votes could make the difference between victory and defeat, rectification of electoral rolls was politically a highly contentious procedure. 'Intransigent' Moderados feared they would be squeezed off electoral rolls by Unionist governors, while Progresistas and Democrats spotted the chance to increase their representation, even within the constraints of extremely limited suffrage.¹¹ Other public utterances during the electoral campaign increased expectations of a more open political environment. The government programme announced on 21 August answered many of the demands of Progresistas and Democrats: administrative decentralisation, greater autonomy for provinces and municipalities, completion of the civil and ecclesiastical *desamortización*, a new more liberal press law and an appeal to youth to become involved in public life.¹²

In practice, however, *progresista* committees often found their efforts to increase their representation on the electoral roll stymied while requests to hold meetings were often denied. As for Democrats, they drew little encouragement from the arrival of the Liberal Union. They could publish newspapers but were forbidden from holding electoral meetings. Hence Democrats continued clandestine organisation or disguised themselves as Progresistas.¹³ The rectification of electoral lists hardly, therefore, announced a new electoral age, merely an opportunity for greater competition during electoral preparations. Above all, it helped the Liberal Union shift Cortes representation away from its *moderado* bias and to reward its supporters in both Liberal parties.

By carefully managing the rectification of electoral lists, Guerola succeeded in ensuring victory of Unionist candidates in seven of the nine districts of the province of Málaga. Guerola later recalled that Antequera proved the hardest district to manage due to its leading families being

consumed in intestinal struggles... animated more by spite and local party spirit than by politics. In the shadow of this disunion, Democrats,

workers of its numerous factories and the middle class had formed a progressive party with revolutionary tendencies that was increasing in number and daring by the day.¹⁴

Moderado divisions meant that no candidate was likely to command sufficient support to confront José Antonio Aguilar, advanced *progresista* (Democrat) candidate.¹⁵ Guerola therefore chose as government candidate, Francisco de Paula Marqués, native of nearby Alora where he enjoyed as ‘absolute, complete and useful influence’. Marqués duly triumphed over *moderado* Rafael Chacón (backed by Narváez) and José Antonio Aguilar.¹⁶

In Loja, Moderados suffered no such internal divisions, having benefited recently from having Narváez in the First Ministry, while Progresistas, cowed by continual judicial persecution since 1856, put up no candidate. Even under the less favourable political conditions of the Liberal Union, *moderado* candidate Carlos Marfori, a cousin of Narváez who had recently married into the Fernández de Córdoba, Loja’s other leading family, should have triumphed. Rafael Pérez del Alamo (see Illustration 2) later recalled how Marfori used ‘promises, gifts, posts, threats, coercion’ to attract support, even obtaining Royal pardons for Loja’s persecuted *progresistas*, while Unionist candidate Luis Dávila, a wealthy *granadino* landowner, fearing for public order if he were to win, had resolved to withdraw until persuaded by the blacksmith that the ‘Society’ (the Carbonari) would bring in the votes and keep order on election day.¹⁷

Marfori’s letters to Narváez reveal a concerted strategy by O’Donnell to block a *moderado* victory thereby denying his great rival a home base.¹⁸ At the start of the campaign O’Donnell replaced Alcalde Corregidor Félix de Arce, Narváez’s appointee, with Higinio Herrera, and removed the city’s senior officials appointed after the Bienio (judge, *procurador fiscal*, administrator of taxes and post master). Municipal officials in outlying towns (the mayor in Algarinejo and the entire *ayuntamiento* in Montefrío) were also replaced. Even such junior positions as Loja’s four mountain guards and tobacco sellers were removed from their posts. Section boundaries within the district were also redrawn on the eve of the election to make it harder for electors from towns that were friendly to Narváez to reach their designated tables on election day. In spite of this gerrymandering, Marfori lost only narrowly to Luis Dávila by a margin of 32 votes: Marfori defeated Dávila in Loja (120/75); Dávila beat Marfori in Montefrío (82/79) and in Yllora (107/34).

Apart from these technical obstacles facing the opposition, only to be expected from parties in power, Marfori’s letters reveal differences in electioneering style. Dávila was more energetic than Marfori in his tours of the district and brought out larger crowds. Marfori described how on 26 October, after visiting the homes of Loja’s persecuted Progresistas (mentioning Rosal,



Illustration 2 Rafael Pérez del Alamo. c. 1872

Cevallos and López Cózar), Dávila had presided over an evening meeting which 'all the most dejected (*perdida*) people here attended and among whom there were only six electors', confirming that the Liberal Union candidate was mobilising support well beyond the narrow circle of electors. By contrast, Marfori avoided public meetings and directed his efforts instead at visiting friends, family and fellow landowners to convince them to set an example by participating actively in the election and by persuading others to vote for the candidate of the party of Loja's illustrious native son.

Marfori made a particular effort to encourage Jacinto Cantero (one of the three *progresista* councillors to be absolved from the charges against his fellow councillors in 1857) to take an active part in the election. It was hoped that Cantero, who owned estates between Loja and Iznájar adjoining those of Narváez and was a close business partner of the Narváez family, would mollify angry *Progresistas* who had just received pardons and persuade others to vote for Marfori, apart from convincing his own tenants to vote for the *moderado* candidate. However, on the morning of the election, before the voting had taken place, Jacinto Cantero, accompanied by his brother Pedro, left Loja for their family estate. In the absence of their masters, Cantero's tenants who had travelled to Loja voted instead for Dávila.¹⁹

Apart from holding public meetings, Dávila deployed considerable intimidation to discourage Marfori's supporters from voting. In Montefrío the recently imposed Liberal Union mayor sent guards and aldermen into the countryside six hours before the election to coral electors by force and hold them incommunicado until the time of the election. This prevented Marfori's supporters from being able to canvass Montefrío's electors, the Duke's cousin estimating that the manoeuvre lost him between 30 and 40 votes in Montefrío, and possibly the election. To counter intimidation in Algarinejo, having heard that Dávila's opponents were intending to accost 49 electors on their long journey to vote at Yllora (Dávila's home town), Marfori sent supporters to protect them.²⁰

Marfori had also hoped that the recent Royal pardons would attract *Progresistas* to vote for him in gratitude.²¹ The manoeuvre backfired. Although the pardons were approved in May, due to delays in the Audiencia in Granada engineered by Narváez, it was further six months before they were finally granted, on 3 October, the eve of the election.²² Hence *lojeños* thanked Dávila and O'Donnell, not Marfori and Narváez, for the pardons. When on 15 October 1858 houses throughout the city were decorated with illuminations to celebrate the arrival of the pardons from Granada, Marfori had to advise the Duke's brother, the Conde de la Cañada Alta, and other members of the family to do the same, 'for it we had not done so it would have seemed that we were opposed to the event'.²³

Marfori's electoral defeat delayed Narváez's plans to return to Loja where he yearned to develop his business interests, to complete the construction of his palace and country house and to promote the construction of the railway in which he and Marfori had acquired leading interests in 1857.²⁴ Liberal Unionist success in the Cortes elections throughout the region, particularly in Loja, the heart of Narváez's *moderado* cacicazgo, allowed greater freedom for Loja's Democrats and *Progresistas* to organise and not to face direct judicial persecution from Narváez's still powerful local allies. In particular, conditions for extending the secret society improved under the less centralised Liberal Union. Pérez del Alamo later recalled that Marfori's defeat 'produced immense happiness among the friends of liberty and rage and

fear among those who had believed that the electoral body was a fief that belonged to them. The immediate consequence was the replacement of the existing authorities by others more just and impartial and, consequently, a quieter life for the towns.²⁵

In December 1858, Progresistas backed by Democrats won seats in municipal and provincial elections throughout western Granada, southern Córdoba and Málaga, helped by Posada Herrera's instructions to civil governors to watch over local elections but not to intervene in favour of any particular party. Pérez mentions Democrat–*progresista* victories in Granada, Loja, Iznájar, Alhama, Huétor Tajár, Antequera, Salar, Yllora, Archidona and 'almost all of the towns of the coast of Málaga and in much of the province of Jaén'.²⁶ Although Guerola ignored Posada Herrera's advice by intervening directly in local elections, *progresista* victories in several Málaga towns in 1858 were helped by his absence attending to his sick wife (confined in Barcelona's San Baudilio de Llobregat asylum).²⁷ By demonstrating that there was some breathing space within a constitutional regime still regulated by the extremely centralised and limited *moderado* constitution, these victories animated Progresistas and Democrats.

In spite of the Liberal Union's resistance to any substantial political reform, the new Cortes witnessed lively debates from a broad constellation of political opinions, from Absolutists to Democrats. Debate was given added resonance by the renewal of the Risorgimento making for a lively press which, in spite of draconian restrictions upon press freedom, flourished between 1858 and 1864.²⁸ Proscribed and excluded from parliamentary representation, Democrats exploited the propaganda potential of the press. Editors and columnists found subtle ways of getting the message past the censors: reprinting columns from other newspapers on subjects that they might have been prevented from printing; satirically ventilating the ideas of their political opponents; leaving columns, even whole pages, blank on days when censorship had been applied; maintaining silence about events in which Democrats were known to be involved; organising collections for the widows and orphans of martyred Democrats and printing long lists of subscribers from the remotest towns and villages; giving prominent coverage to the heroic actions of foreign *confrères* such as 'José Garibaldi'.²⁹

If the authorities had some success in limiting the political content of the press, it was harder to restrict the distribution of newspapers and subversive pamphlets and impossible to limit the oral diffusion of news. Guerola suspected that both censored and uncensored versions of *La Discusión*, the leading Democrat paper, circulated freely in Málaga. Yet had he even chosen to inspect copies, a provincial civil governor could not lawfully remove a paper from circulation once it had been accepted for publication in Madrid. Even more exasperating was the way *La Discusión* was distributed. The law limited street sellers to calling out the title of a paper, forbidding

commentary on content.³⁰ Yet distribution of *La Discusión* in Málaga was controlled by an agent 'known for his democratic ideas' who employed

various blind men who, crying out at the top of their voices, sell the newspaper at a very moderate price, in the most public places where artisans are wont to gather, exciting their curiosity and finding somebody who is willing to read out the newspaper to the huddle of people.³¹

Guerola was convinced that the Democrat press, both in its content, which kept 'the poor in a certain state of excitement and alarm', and in the defiant way in which newspapers were distributed, was part of a broader campaign to extend the network of Democrat secret societies throughout the province.³²

Limited by censorship to covering foreign news, editors became skilled at promoting press campaigns which, although not ostensibly political, served to create a sense of national community and solidarity among Democrats that compensated for the exclusion and persecution suffered by the party after the Bienio. A campaign that caught the imagination of Democrats was the public subscription to fund the education of the orphaned daughters of Tomás Brú, Valencian lawyer and leading Democrat. Brú was murdered in Sagunto on 1 November 1858 on the eve of the congressional election in Murviedro which he was destined to win.³³ Seville's Nicolás Rivero took his place to become the only Democrat elected to the Cortes of 1858–1860.³⁴ Opened on 13 January 1859 by Rivero and José María Orense, over the next 18 months *La Discusión* published hundreds of lists of subscribers by town of origin, constituting a human geography of the Democrat party in Spain in the later 1850s.³⁵ Between 13 January and 15 April 1859, 21,840 men, women and children from 218 towns, contributed 163,142 reales to the fund, rising to 28,620 subscribers donating 197,242 reales by the end of July. The subscription continued well into 1860 as towns sought to outstrip their rivals in the number and generosity of their subscriptions.³⁶ Although the majority of subscriptions came from towns in the Levant, Andalucía was also well represented, with Seville contributing the largest subscription of all Spain, but with Málaga, Loja, Granada and Almería also well represented.³⁷

Some subscribers identified themselves by their names. Many, however, chose to disguise their identities, choosing instead some political or ideological affiliation ('A Democrat', 'A Pure Progresista', 'A Falansterian', 'A Patriot', 'An Affiliate', 'A Charcoal Burner', 'A Spiritualist'), or occupation ('A proletarian', 'An artisan', 'A servant in the casino of the artisans', 'A farm worker', 'The meal of an artist'), or by some historical or compound identification ('One deported to Manila in 1857', 'A National Militiaman of '36 and '56', 'One disinherited of his social goods who like a good Christian is a Democrat', 'A heart felt falansterian', 'A Democrat in favour of the emancipation of

women', 'A very poor nun but a democrat', 'One Ramón who is not Narváez', 'A liberal who is not a banker', 'for four years, son of a democrat, who is waiting to be free of the draft'.³⁸

The region of study was particularly well represented. Málaga produced the longest list nationally with over 800 names, of whom 200 were listed as 'artisans' contributing between 2 and 10 reales, with 300 others identified by name, but not occupation, contributing less than 2 reales (mostly 1 real). Contributing a princely 57 reales to the fund was Tomás Manuel González, organiser of the secret society and editor of *La Ilustración* (Málaga's much persecuted Democrat daily paper), who would lead the city's Democrats during the Loja insurrection of July 1861.³⁹ Granada's 221 subscribers raised 2,423 reales (11 reales/contributor), almost matching Málaga's overall 2,620 reales (3 reales/contributor), raised from a small army of poorer subscribers.⁴⁰ Many subscribers from Granada were hat makers, 32 from the factory of Francisco Gómez and 12 from that of Antonio Muñoz Campoy.⁴¹

Beyond the capital, the province of Málaga was poorly represented. Energetic policing prevented a collection in Antequera in June 1859,⁴² and only two towns in the Axarquía highlands above Málaga saw their subscriptions published in *La Discusión*.⁴³ Colmenar's subscription was headed by blacksmith Juan García Pérez, who had established Colmenar's secret society in 1857.⁴⁴ Cutar's list was headed by the carpenter Francisco Castejón, who in July 1861 led out 60 *cutareños* to Loja. Both García Pérez and Castejón were condemned to death 'in rebellion' by the military tribunal at Málaga in August 1861.⁴⁵

Granada's smaller towns were also poorly represented. Only Loja and neighbouring Algarinejo submitted contributions. Loja's subscription was published in *La Discusión* on 1 and 3 May 1859, coinciding with the 'Dos de Mayo' patriotic celebrations. *Lojeños* numbering 532 contributed 2,046 reales, rivalling Granada and Málaga. Two august Progresistas, Francisco Rosal y Badía and Miguel Ceballos Henríquez de Luna, led the subscription donating 10 and 19 reales respectively. Rafael Pérez del Alamo is not listed but his father Andrés contributed, proudly describing himself as 'A national (militiaman) of '36 and a democrat of '56'. Remote Algarinejo's subscription was headed by the town's pharmacist, identified as 'D.J.M.A', who contributed 19 reales, dwarfed the contributions of 25 others who added a further 71 reales. Half of Algarinejo's contributors were named Montero. Mariano Montero y Ronchel was described as 'commander of the extinguished National Militia' and Antonio Montero y Moreno signed himself as a 'journeyman who earns thirty *cuartos* to maintain his wife and three children which leaves them without bread one day a week'.⁴⁶

The granting of such generous column space, over such a protracted period, was not motivated solely by the desire to provide Brú's orphaned daughters with the best education that the city of Valencia could offer.⁴⁷ The subscription became as a nationwide public protest at the murder of a

Democrat on the eve of the 1858 election that had allowed only one Democrat into the Cortes. Denied other means of protest, or a judiciary willing to investigate electoral intimidation, the subscription demonstrated that even the poorest and most disenfranchised could register their protest and reveal their individual political identities in a national newspaper. In exchange for their subscriptions, Democrats could request a photographic portrait of the martyred Tomás Brú from *La Discusión*. Francisco López y José, a subscriber from Toledo, even requested portraits of Brú's daughters to place next to their father on the family altar.⁴⁸

Although Democrats in Granada possessed no daily newspaper, they used the national press alongside clandestine Democrat and Protestant evangelical organisation to expand their support. In spite of the discovery of Republican secret society in Granada in March 1857, Madrid continued to regard the Democrat challenge in this Conservative province as insignificant. Yet the conspiratorial wing of the Democrat party, informed by the experience of leaders such as Tresserra and the Fourierist Fernando Garrido, both of whom had spent lengthy periods of exile in Granada, saw the province's economic backwardness, remoteness and territorial vastness as strategic advantages.⁴⁹ In *La Regeneración de España*, published in 1859 under the pseudonym Evaristo Ventosa, Garrido chose Granada, not Seville, as Andalucía's capital in his scheme of Iberian federation.⁵⁰

Between January and July 1859 fellow Fourierist Antonio Quiles edited a literary journal in Granada dedicated 'to promoting and encouraging the education of the productive classes'.⁵¹ Influenced by Cervera's ideas on workers' education, *La Verdad* promoted freedom of association, workers' housing, flower gardens, adult education (Quiles inaugurated an adult school on the edge of Granada on 10 January 1859), the moralisation of labour and abstinence from alcohol, the education and emancipation of women from domestic drudgery, the dignifying of labour and its harmonisation with capital around 'social industry'.⁵² The final number published on 27 July 1859 contained an obituary to Sixto Cámara, who had recently died of thirst near the Portuguese border in a fruitless attempt to raise Andalucía in rebellion (Cámara had expected Quiles to raise Granada's Democrats in early July). Calling upon his 'correligionarios granadinos' to take revenge, Quiles must have realised that even Granada's sleepy police would forbid further publication.⁵³

Pérez del Alamo would have received *La Verdad* in Loja and would have met Quiles at meetings of La Venta Nacional which were near the office of *La Verdad* in Granada's Calle de San Antón. Quiles's influence on Pérez is evident in his attempts to moderate rents in Loja's scarce workers' housing. During the last years of his life the Loja blacksmith established a cooperative for funding workers' housing in Arcos de la Frontera.⁵⁴ As agent for *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*, Pérez del Alamo developed close ties with correspondents in smaller towns of the province and party leaders in

Madrid. He later recalled that it was the energy of Democrat newspaper propaganda that encouraged Loja's Progresistas, 'confused' and in disarray following Narváez's judicial persecution, 'to embrace as a banner the politico-administrative and economic programme displayed by *La Discusión* in its headlines'. Both in their content and in the way newspapers were distributed, the Democrat press grew to shape the development of Loja's secret society and of district politics more widely.

As we have seen, Loja's secret society formed part of a wider network that by late 1850s had extended throughout the provinces of Granada, Málaga, Jaén and southern Córdoba. At the centre of the Society was a Council composed of 16 members 'almost all residents in Loja' elected by the heads of sections comprising 25 men. The Council elected a president, licensed new sections and supervised the operation of existing ones. Each section was required to subscribe to either *La Discusión* or *El Pueblo*. When members of the section were away engaged in agricultural tasks, a member would be charged with collecting the newspaper or pamphlet from Loja, while his fellows carried out his work. One person in each section was charged with reading the newspaper aloud during periods of rest. Each member was expected to pay a monthly quota of 2 reales to the section for welfare needs or to buy shotguns to be raffled among members. With the income from these raffles, more arms could be bought and distributed among the 'most trusted members'. Wealthier sections were expected to subsidise poorer ones. Any member employed in the house of wealthy person was obliged to inform section heads of the arms held by their employers.⁵⁵

The Society also became enmeshed in economic matters. After a year of excessive wheat prices in 1856–1857, wages were set in relation to wheat prices, with members refusing to work for less than an agreed rate. The Society gained the support of municipal assessors charged with inspecting rents on municipal commons and estates: farmers found to be charging rents considered too high were told to reduce them or lose their tenants. Shopkeepers who refused to join to the Society were boycotted. Finally, tenants were encouraged to petition the Council to declare the Sierra de Loja as common land, hence exempt from the *desamortización*.⁵⁶

The Society sought also to regulate leisure and private life. Members were expected to consume wine only in moderation and to give up *aguardiente* altogether. Various penalties could be administered by the Council against violations of the Society's rules, ranging from warnings, to expulsions from the Society (with members instructed not to talk to the expelled), to exile beyond 'the three provinces of Granada, Málaga and Jaén'.⁵⁷ Benito Pérez Galdós, who corresponded with the Loja blacksmith and received his unpublished memoirs, describes how the Society exerted authority beyond its own membership by 'pursuing and castigating drunkenness and other excesses; and, such were the good effects, that the excise tax receipts dropped by

one half compared to previous years'. Diego Ansuere, the young mariner-protagonist of Galdós's *La Vuelta al Mundo en la 'Numancia'*, was surprised to learn that the moderation of Loja's Democrats had ruined many tavern keepers. This is partially confirmed by commercial censuses of 1855, 1860 and 1867.⁵⁸

The defeat of Marfori in the Cortes election of October 1858 confirmed that the *carbonari* society organised by Pérez had become an important player in local and regional politics. But how effective was *carbonari* organisation nationally? Two basic conditions were necessary for a *carbonari* network to stand any chance of success: secrecy and a single chain of command between the supreme command in the *alcazares* and the rank and file in the *chozas*. Neither was met during five years of the Liberal Union. Democrats nationally disagreed over how to extend the Carbonari network and what political purpose it should serve. The continued proscription of the party dictated that some kind of clandestine organisation would exist, if only for defensive purposes. Yet Spanish history demonstrated that constitutional advances owed more to the *pronunciamientos* than to clandestine organisation.

The leaders of the Party, José María Orense and Nicolás Rivero, saw the two Democrat clandestine societies active in the winter of 1857–1858 – 'Los Carbonarios' and the 'Falansterio Nacional' – as secondary to the broader strategy of attracting Progresistas to the party. They sought to make the most of opportunities under the Liberal Union for increasing representation and spreading democratic propaganda. Progresistas within the army were the likely future route to power, Rivero envisaging the disbanded National Militia as a model for rebuilding the armed forces after the Democrat victory.⁵⁹ The arrest of the 13 Democrat leaders in Madrid early in 1858, including Tresserra and Garrido, ended any coherent central direction of the party's *carbonari*. However, the Carbonari continued to flourish on the regional and local levels.⁶⁰

A more radical tendency within the Party, represented by Tresserra, Cámara, Cervera, Garrido, Pi y Magall, Quiles and Aguilar, sought to deepen democratic organisation by promoting worker's education and freedom of association, and by including workers in mutualist associations that doubled as secret societies (the Society in Loja operated from a pharmacy and offered its members rudimentary sickness benefits). These Democrats, who by 1859 had become identified as the 'Socialist' faction of the party, shunned the idea of an alliance with Progresistas, regarded the regular army as an oppressive and counter-revolutionary force and considered the National Militia, with its vacillations and vulnerability to disbandment, as a dead letter. They showed some interest in the tactic of suborning army sergeants as a way of undermining discipline within the ranks, thus hastening a Democrat victory. But the key to success Democrats was the clandestine organisation of the mass of the working population which, at the given

moment, would rally against the Bourbon regime with an insuperable show of civic force.

Throughout the autumn and winter of 1858–1859, as Democrat leaders at home and in exile prepared for the next insurrection, they were not alone in favouring a forward policy.⁶¹ Following the lead of Louis Napoleon, O'Donnell appreciated that an active foreign policy might compensate for unpopularity and constitutional deadlock on the domestic front. Confident that economic expansion and increased revenues derived from the *desamortización* would support an expanded military budget, in September 1858, O'Donnell began a series of colonial military adventures starting with support for French claims in Indo-China and Mexico. Not content with serving as mere auxiliaries in Frances's war in Indo-China, during the summer of 1859 O'Donnell ordered the Spanish authorities in Ceuta to prepare a case for war against neighbouring Morocco. Connecting with the historic struggle against the Moorish threat, this proved a much more popular cause (even among Democrats) and in October 1859 Spain declared war. This wave of pan-Latin, colonial aggression was matched on the European front by France's declaration of war against Austria in April 1859, signalling the renewal of Italy's struggle for national unification.⁶²

Hence, from the summer of 1859 Democrat insurrectionary strategy faced an increasingly militarised environment, presenting not only opportunities but also obstacles.⁶³ The doubling of *quintas* produced popular resentment and garrisons of unwilling conscripts whose sergeants might be suborned. In Catalonia the raising of volunteer forces for the Moroccan war involved appealing for assistance from Democrat leaders, long excluded since the repression in Barcelona in April 1856.⁶⁴ Yet in the name of national security O'Donnell proved implacable in pursuing Democrats in Madrid and punishing sedition within the armed forces, measures that matched those of Nárvaez in 1848 and Nocedal in 1857.⁶⁵

In the early summer of 1859, Sixto Cámara requested a passport for returning to Madrid on two occasions, which the government, fearful that he might rekindle the party's clandestine leadership, refused.⁶⁶ With the insurrectionary wing of the party leaderless, Cámara appreciated that conspiracy could now proceed only as a consequence of regional and local initiatives, backed by appeals from abroad. Repression in Seville following the 1857 uprising had left Democrats there less eager to put themselves at the vanguard of another insurrection. Instead Cámara selected Extremadura for starting the uprising, accessible terrain from Lisbon, and well-prepared conspiratorially. In his last book, *A União Ibérica* (Lisbon, 1859), Extremadura was chosen as the natural starting point for the campaign of Iberian unification.⁶⁷

In Badajoz Cámara could count on the tireless preparations of friend and co-religionist, José Moreno Ruiz who, between 1857 and 1859, masquerading as a bed merchant, succeeded in extending Democrat organisation

throughout the province. From Badajoz, Moreno Ruiz, alias 'El Estudiante', travelled to smaller towns of Elvas, Llereña, and Olivenza, villages and *cor-tijos*, accompanied by 'an old man of French nationality', ostensibly to sell beds, but chiefly to distribute Democrat pamphlets and newspapers, and to impress people (especially women) with his eloquent and educated manner and imposing bearded appearance.⁶⁸ Seemingly overlooked by the provincial authorities, although feared by the government in Madrid, Democrat organisation flourished in Estremadura following the Bienio Progresista. Apart from the preaching of Moreno Ruiz, a travelling theatre group was also important, not only in the diffusion of Democrat propaganda, but also in the propagation of tastes, such as the *boina*, a beret with a blue pompom inspired by the headwear of Greek patriots, a taste Inarejos has observed was shared by Democrats in Quintanar de la Orden (Castilla-La Mancha).⁶⁹ The link between Democrat organisation and the local military was provided by Gonzalo Moreno, 'young man of 28 years, well off, who possessed a good house and some land', who produced shoes for the provincial regiment of Badajoz.⁷⁰ Formed by O'Donnell in 1859 as an army reserve with police functions, the 'provinciales' would prove particularly responsive to Democrat propaganda and featured prominently in the Loja Revolution in July 1861.⁷¹

Democratic tastes and organisation extended beyond cities and town to the rural labouring population. Day labourers in Villafranca de los Barros were avid readers of *La Discusión*, much to the disgust of the mayor who in June 1859 attempted to prevent distribution of the 'demoralising' newspaper advocating that they should read the Catholic *La Esperanza* instead.⁷² Also active in Estremadura was Nicolás Díaz Pérez who, while in prison in Trujillo in May 1859, was inspired by Emilio Castelar's speech on Italian unity to form an Iberian legion in support of Mazzini's 'Juventud Italiana' in the liberation of Italy from foreign rule.⁷³

Hence, Cámara's choice of Estremadura as the cradle for a democratic revolution was not so irrational, particularly given proximity to Liberal Portugal, where the freedoms sought in Spain had long been enjoyed.⁷⁴ The Democrat uprising of 1859, like that of 1857, was timed for late June and early July, to coincide with the end of the harvest and the Feast of Saint Theobald, patron saint of the Carbonari. The uprising would start in Estremadura with sergeants of garrisons in Olivenza and Badajoz leading their men into revolt.⁷⁵ An arsenal of weapons had been concealed on a nearby estate and in the theatre at Badajoz.⁷⁶ Forged Spanish money was being produced in Málaga and Lisbon, and finance had been promised from French restaurant owners in Seville.⁷⁷ Democrat uprisings would follow, to be led by Pedro Rodríguez de la Borbolla in Seville, the Aguilar in Antequera, Garrido in Cádiz, Quiles in Granada and Castelar in Madrid. Democrat agents in Cartagena and Alicante were also involved.⁷⁸ Encouraged by these heroic events in the South and the Levant, Democrats throughout

Spain would then follow suit. Finally, it was anticipated that the insurrection would draw upon the 'Iberian Legion', a force of volunteers currently being organised by Cámara, Díaz Pérez, Garrido, Beltrán, Ruiz Pons and Soler in response to Mazzini's invitation to participate in Italy's struggle for unification.⁷⁹

This time the government would not wait for rebellion to break out, as Narváez and Nocedal had cynically done in June 1857, allowing instead the leader to fall into a trap. In June the Spanish Consulate in Lisbon finally agreed to return Cámara's passport.⁸⁰ Crossing the frontier Cámara was followed by government spies who had observed his movements over the previous year.⁸¹ Meeting up with his secretary Moreno Ruiz at Olivenza the plan of insurrection was put in motion. Although Torrero and Davila pronounced on 10 July on behalf of Olivenza's infantry garrison, Cámara and Moreno Ruiz, realising that they were being followed, took flight for the Portuguese frontier. On foot and overdressed, travelling in the middle of day during the hottest month of the year, still suffering from pneumonia contracted in Lisbon during the previous winter, Cámara died of asphyxiation and heart failure shortly before reaching the frontier.⁸²

With its leader dead and the uprising nipped in the bud, General Julián Juan Pavía, Captain General of Estremadura, felt sufficiently confident of his control of the province not to have to request martial law or a state of siege.⁸³ In late August, Cámara's widow asked to be allowed to exhume her husband's body and return it to Madrid. Contravening a permit granted by the Queen, Pavía refused the request, suspecting that it had really come from leading Democrats and fearing that disorders might attend the exhumation and the return of the coffin to Madrid.⁸⁴

Having prohibited any public honouring of Camara's remains, on 1 September Pavía proceeded with his own ceremony: the public execution of two sergeants (Davila and Torrero Franco) and two civilians (Moreno Ruiz and Victoriano Valdez).⁸⁵ Arrests, trials and executions, which began in Seville soon after Cámara's death, continued throughout Andalucía and the Levant during the autumn, as the government learned of the breadth and depth of the conspiracy.⁸⁶ Wise to the Democrat tactic of using a public subscription as cover for democratic clandestine organisation, the government forbade the publication of lists of subscriptions for paying for the education of Cámara's orphaned son and for bringing the martyr's body back to Madrid.⁸⁷ The campaign to return Cámara's remains to Madrid and to fund the cost of a funeral would occupy Democrat leaders over the next two years. The martyr's remains were eventually brought to Madrid by Romualdo Lafuente early in 1861, days before the outbreak of the Loja Revolution.⁸⁸

For the O'Donnell government, a cult of democratic martyrdom was a price worth paying for the death of Spain's most daring and charismatic

revolutionary. Cámara's death was a great blow to Democrats. No leader of Cámara's stature came forward to replace him as the party's senior insurrectionist before the Revolution of September 1868. The conspiratorial cell in Lisbon was now leaderless. Plans for the Iberian Legion were temporarily interrupted. Democrats in Madrid and provincial cities were hounded into exile.⁸⁹ The strategy of involving the army in an insurrection by suborning of sergeants was discredited. Divisions within the Democrat party over the wisdom of insurrection widened even further.

Feigning ignorance of the July conspiracy reported elsewhere in the press, the editors of *La Discusión* were obliged humiliatingly to declare that 'we condemn these projects of which Spanish democracy is accused'.⁹⁰ The paper's tactic of combining a public subscription with clandestine organisation had been discovered, further restricting the agenda of the Democrat press and limiting its options in circumventing press censorship. In containing the conspiracy, provincial civil and military authorities obtained useful lessons in how to penetrate and break up clandestine organisations by exploiting social and ideological divisions among Democrats. Málaga's Civil Governor Antonio Guerola became particularly adept at this game of 'disorganising' Democrats, by using informers among 'a faction that boasts of being more decent than the others' to penetrate and inform on the conspiratorial and money forging activities of the 'more abject faction'.⁹¹

The revolutionary attempt in July 1859 was the fourth failed Democrat uprising since the end of the Bienio Progresista. Faced with such a dismal picture at home, the only encouragement for Spanish Democrats lay in news from Italy. The war in Italy would become a thermostat for Democrat expectations at home. In September 1859, Guerola observed how, with Cámara's death and peace in Italy, 'what little animation seen among the Democrats has disappeared'.⁹² Yet by the summer of 1860, Garibaldi's successes in southern Italy offered Spanish Democrats renewed hope for a strategy that combined clandestinity with insurrection.

One person who took the Italian example particularly seriously was Pérez del Alamo. For the Loja blacksmith, Sixto Cámara provided an inspiring example of revolutionary daring and fortitude, a Spanish Pisacane. Writing on the eve of the First Republic in 1872, Pérez appealed to:

Republican leaders! If you desire popularity and glory, earn them with your own sacrifices! It is now sixteen years ago that a martyr of democracy, the tireless Sixto Cámara, taught us the way. Follow him without vacillation! And if our party needs organisation and armament in order to triumph, this is how to organise it and arm it; the first can be achieved through labour and activity; the second with money; and money can be had by taking out a small loan, as Mazzini and Garibaldi did for their glorious enterprises. Not all republicans are obliged to be heroes, but none

can be decorously excused from serving their party. Fewer speeches and more action!⁹³

Other Democrats, though, were discouraged by Cámara's death. In Granada Quiles closed *La Verdad* in July 1859 and withdrew from clandestine political activity.

4

The Advance of Democracy in Eastern Andalucía, 1860–1861

The abject and tragic failure of Cámara's fifth attempt at insurrection in three years revealed the weakness of clandestine organisation once police got on the scent. The insurrectionary wing of the Democrat party never recovered momentum that it had enjoyed under Cámara's leadership between 1855 and 1859. Yet with the foundation of Italy as a nation state in 1860, Democrats could now appreciate how failed insurrections had been a dynamic factor in the Risorgimento. Hence Sixto Cámara's reputation grew after his death, the newspaper campaign for the return of the martyr's body to Madrid keeping the myth of insurrection and heroic sacrifice alive. On the local level Democrats in Loja observed how clandestine organisation had contributed to the defeat of Carlos Marfori, Narváez's candidate for Loja in 1858. The logic of clandestinity therefore remained while Garibaldi's exploits in southern Italy showed how Spain's own national regeneration might be achieved through inspired acts of daring.

This chapter explores the broadening of clandestine organisation and its impact on elections and labour conflicts in Loja, Antequera and the wider region, and traces police measures to disrupt the region's *carbonari* societies and to prosecute their leaders during the first six months of 1861. Conflict in Loja acquired a particularly spirited tone as Narváez sought to return from his Paris exile to confront the troublesome blacksmith whose secret society had begun to shape local politics in Granada's second city.

Loja

We saw in the last chapter how the Liberal Union opened space for party competition on local level with Progresistas and Democrats triumphing in municipal elections throughout the region in 1858. Yet Francisco Rosal y Badía and his fellow *progresistas* in Loja, in spite of the Royal pardon, were unable to return to politics. Bankrupted, receiving no compensation for the loss of their personal wealth until 1864, these 'first order' Progresistas either were disqualified from standing for office voting by virtue of their exclusion

from the electoral register or chose to avoid the risk of further impoverishment by holding office in a heavily indebted city.¹ This opened space for 'second order' Progresistas many of whom had turned to the Democrat party.

The entry of Democrats into municipal politics coincided with two highly contentious developments; the tendering of the contract for the construction of the railway and the resumption of the civil *desamortización* temporarily suspended during the *moderado* restoration (1856–1858). Granada's leaders were acutely aware that the province was in danger of being left out of Spain's transport revolution. The decision in 1856 to construct the Córdoba–Málaga railway, but with only uncertain plans for a branch line to Granada, seemed to condemn the province to eternal, picturesque backwardness. Without a rail link to the port of Málaga or with the rest of Spain, the province's agriculture would remain permanently depressed. The 1858 Cortes elections brought a sudden improvement in Granada's prospects of ending its isolation. Having failed to be selected for Málaga's Merced constituency, José de Salamanca, *malagueño* banker and Spain's premier railway entrepreneur, agreed to stand as deputy for Granada's Sagrario seat, receiving an almost unanimous vote from *granadinos*.²

Supported by his recent electoral rival Jorge Loring (now deputy for Málaga) in March 1859, Salamanca succeeded in pushing through a new railway bill that allowed separate tendering of railway contracts for the construction of shorter runs. The unwieldy and financially daunting railway concessions that had brought Andalusian railway construction to a halt in 1856 could now be broken up into much smaller concessions. In late December 1859, tenders were invited for the construction of the Córdoba–Málaga railway, including a branch from Campillos through Antequera to Loja and Granada, for which Salamanca was granted exclusive concession in June 1861.³ Over the next decade, the influx of surveyors, engineers and railway construction workers would have important consequences for the region: on land values, wage rates, attitudes to politics and to the outside world.

Connecting Granada to the railway network required revenue. In the autumn of 1858, the Diputación Provincial ordered town councils throughout the province to complete the sale of their *propios* 'with the aim of investing their value in shares in the Granadan railway'.⁴ In Loja the renewal of the *desamortización* contributed to an already heated political environment following Dávila's defeat of Marfori in 1858. Marginalised from national politics since October 1857, Narváez saw the completion of the *desamortización* as an opportunity to rebuild his influence in Loja, additionally attractive now that the decision had been made to proceed with a Granada–Málaga railway connection which would pass close to his estates. He had first attempted to buy a portion of Loja's municipal *propios* while still First Minister in 1857, hoping to consolidate his reputation as the city's

principal benefactor by offering tenancy agreements at low rents, while also benefiting his horse breeding business.⁵ Strapped for income needed for repaying debts to the *pósito*, the Council had declined to sell. In 1858, Narváez repeated the offer from his Paris exile. Mobilising his administrator José María Orejón, his cousin Francisco Fernández de Córdoba, his nephew Pepe Narváez and various members of the Campos family, the Duke attempted to corner the sale of the Sierra. Pérez del Alamo later recalled how, with the help of the ‘Society and certain landowners who did not belong to it’, he succeeded in defeating the ‘cabals and intrigues of these *narvaeista* brokers’, ensuring that ‘the people retained the said sierra, thereby creating some hundreds of proprietors’. Using his friends in Madrid, Narváez attempted to annul this sale but Luis Dávila frustrated the Duke’s ‘egotistical designs’.⁶

Council minutes confirm the assertiveness of the city’s tenants and the Council’s positive response to petitions from smallholders in early 1859. Three petitions, two from *rozeros* (small cultivators) in Salár and Algarinejo, and one from over 700 *rozeros* and *colonos* (tenant farmers) resident in Loja, claimed that access to the Sierra de Loja was essential for their livelihood and requested proprietary rights over the land cultivated. The Council accepted the petitioners’ claims, declaring the land to be ‘the exclusive property of the cultivators, prior to a suitable imposition of a *canón* (annual rent) which each one respectively must pay in accord with the Law’. The rest of the vast Sierra de Loja, used since time immemorial for free pasturage, was declared common land.⁷ Hence, the *desamortización* was neatly sidestepped and municipal revenues assured.⁸

While provincial authorities continued to pressure Loja to declare *propios* (municipal properties) still not sold, throughout April and May thousands of *jornaleros* clamoured for work and relief due to a severe drought that had halted agricultural employment.⁹ Granada refused Loja’s request to raise 20,000 reales from the city’s landowners to invest in public works for occupying the unemployed, ordering the city to organise an *alojamiento* instead.¹⁰ April was late for *alojamiento*, January and February being the normal months, and landowners were slow to respond. In early June, riots required troops to be sent to the city, precipitating the resignation of Higinio Herrera as Alcalde Corregidor, replaced by José Henríquez y Soldevilla, a *progresista* of long patriotic pedigree.¹¹

Henríquez struggled to strike balance between popular local pressures for a share in the *desamortización* and fiscal pressures from the provincial government. In January 1860, the Council backed the claims of 86 tenants against Francisco García Iturriaga, Loja’s leading lawyer, whose family had illegally extended an estate in the Hacho Alto y Sierrasuela de Agicampe rented from the city since 1808.¹² In April and May, Henríquez approved plans for the construction of a more salubrious prison in the ex-Convent of Victoria and for embellishments to the façade of the Council building, both projects to

be funded from an increase in the territorial tax.¹³ In July the civil governor refused Loja's request to increase the territorial tax for building the new prison on grounds that the Convent of La Victoria had been given to the city in 1848 for educational purposes.¹⁴ The governor also prohibited the use of *pósito* funds for expenses other than the purchase of grain, the basis of the longstanding case against the 'consejales de 1855'.¹⁵ In the same month a commissioner was sent to Loja on a salary of 30 reales day (to be paid by the Council) to reclaim 33,498.5 reales owed by the city's *propios* for the period between 1818 and 1857. Claiming that the city no longer possessed any *propios*, Henríquez demanded that the commissioner be recalled.¹⁶ The provincial government then returned to the issue of *pósito* debts ordering the Council to make every effort to recover the backlog.¹⁷

More than fiscal fastidiousness these measures suggest a determination by the provincial government to concert pressure on Loja's Progresistas. Yet Henríquez did not lack friends in Granada. In June 1860, a request from Loja's 'consejales de 1855' for the reimbursement of the difference between the price of wheat borrowed in 1855 and that returned in 1857 was accepted, revealing that, apart from Mariano Ceballos Henríquez, Loja's *progresista* deputy on the Provincial Council, the city had other friends in Granada.¹⁸ Over 1860 Pérez became increasingly adept at exploiting the tensions between city and province and in taking advantage of the presence of *lojeño* Progresistas in high positions in the provincial capital.

In January 1860, Pérez joined the hallowed ranks of 'major taxpayers' with the right to attend Council meetings.¹⁹ His opponents later questioned how this was possible from the income from a solitary blacksmith's bench, claiming that he enriched himself from the Society's membership dues, enabling him to refurnish his house, dress elegantly, associate with the best in the town, free himself from the drudgery and indignity of manual labour and travel at will to Granada, Málaga and Madrid.²⁰ They had a point. In 1855, Pérez's bench ranked second in tax value among Loja's six *albeitares* at 112 reales.²¹ By 1860, against a general trend of fiscal and economic expansion, his business had slipped into third position with an assessment of only 80 reales.²² On the income from the bench alone he would not have qualified as a *mayor contribuyente*. Pérez's later claimed that Narváez's family and friends had boycotted his veterinary business as a punishment for his participation in the National Militia during the Bienio Progresista implies that he was receiving income from other sources.²³

Whatever the reasons for his improved economic circumstances, Pérez's presence on the Council increased the influence of the Society. In May 1860, he was appointed to the Health Committee, comprising a surgeon, a doctor (his brother, Juan Antonio), a pharmacist and two syndics, convoked to confront cholera brought back from Africa by returning soldiers. As 'veterinary professor' he was responsible for inspecting the sanitary conditions and the welfare of livestock in the municipal slaughterhouse, markets and the annual

August fair. His brother, in turn, was responsible for inspecting young men selected for military service, a post also offering political opportunities.²⁴

If the veterinary activities put Pérez in contact with country people of all ranks, electoral work involved him with all levels of administration. Throughout the first months of 1860, Pérez worked in conjunction with Mariano Ceballos in Granada soliciting inclusions to and exclusions from the electoral roll so as to improve *progresista* and Democrat electoral prospects. Their proposal that Lorenzo Montero (Narváez's *confidente* responsible for prosecuting Progresistas in 1856–1857) be excluded was refused on grounds that the accused could demonstrate that he was paying sufficient tax.²⁵ Yet other rectifications were accepted, helped by the *progresista* sympathies of the deputy governor. Overall the rectification must have benefited Pérez's allies for in the municipal elections in November Progresistas and Democrats triumphed.

Recognition of Pérez's growing civic profile came in November when he was nominated to supervise the municipal elections. From a total of 4,367 *vecinos* only 460 *lojeños* were entitled to vote for candidates selected from among 330 eligible citizens. The election of 14 councillors was organised in three districts. Serious undermanning of the proceedings, with Pérez given sole responsibility for supervising the vote in the central district, would have helped the Democrats.²⁶ On 16 November, signing himself as 'Vanguard Democrat', Pérez reported the victory to the Director of *El Pueblo*, Emilio García Ruiz, urging him to publicise the party's triumph in a city 'until now dominated by the Duke of Valencia, his party and his relations'.²⁷ The veterinarian blacksmith proudly listed the former militia ranks of the new councillors: three captains, the adjutant (his brother), a standard bearer, four lieutenants, a sergeant, a corporal and three militiamen, mostly from the urban middle class, one landowner (Narváez's neighbour Jacinto Cantero), two owners of olive presses, a doctor, a pharmacist, a cloth merchant, a jeweller, a flour miller and the owner of a fulling mill and hat shop.

The Duke, kept abreast with affairs in Loja by his nephew Pepe, observed these developments in Loja from his Paris exile with mounting anxiety. With his palaces nearing completion and the equine herds well stocked, Narváez yearned to return to Loja to enjoy the company of his family, to be close to his daughter Consuelo and to resume his place as Loja's senior Moderado and leading entrepreneur. Absence from Loja had hindered his attempts to take advantage of the civil *desamortización* and in the summer of 1860 he was again frustrated in his attempts to expand his properties.²⁸ Convinced that only his presence in the city could reverse the declining fortunes of Loja's Moderados, in September 1860 the Duke announced his decision to return to Spain on the day the news arrived in Paris from southern Italy that Garibaldi had captured Naples precipitating the fall of the Bourbon dynasty.²⁹ These events sent tremors through Spanish politics and delayed Narváez's return.

In early October, Narváez publicly disclaimed any intention of putting himself at the head of a *moderado* challenge, claiming to have renounced any involvement in politics since stepping down in October 1857.³⁰ Yet privately he pledged loyalty to the Queen Mother and to her relations in Naples and stated his determination to defend the Bourbon throne in Spain at all costs.³¹ Stirrings of *moderado* discontent in Madrid crystallised on 13 October when Luis González Bravo issued a manifesto criticising the Liberal Union, especially its indecisiveness in the face of the Bourbon collapse in Naples and Sicily.³² Four days later a young Democrat, dressed in a new frock coat and cap, avid reader of 'advanced newspapers' and owner of a copy of '*...Masaniello, ó la Revolución en Nápoles*, which he would read with frequency', made an attempt on the Queen's life at the Puerta del Sol. A pistol shot passed through the Queen's coach.³³

Coming on top of the alarming events in Italy and Madrid, news of the Democrat victory in Loja in November 1860 brought home to Narváez the pace of change at home and the sheer recklessness of Interior Minister Posada Herrera in choosing not to intervene in local elections. The Duke now concerted all efforts at influencing the choice of appointed positions on Loja's Council (the Alcalde Corregidor and his three lieutenants, the post master, district attorney and administrators of taxes and salt monopoly) deploying his nephew Pepe, cousin Marfori and senior *moderado* friends in Madrid such as Claudio Moyano and José Nuñez del Prado (in whose household the recent would-be regicide was employed as a servant).³⁴ Their efforts failed in the face of a *progresista* counteroffensive directed by Rosal y Badía.³⁵

By early January 1861, the new Council had been installed with Pérez's brothers, Juan Antonio and Cristino appointed as Henríquez's lieutenants, Rafael remaining as veterinary inspector for the city.³⁶ As a rearguard action, the Duke instructed his friend and lawyer José Olmedo to prepare a legal action against the blacksmith on charge of calumny (in a letter to *La Discusión* Pérez had accused Narváez's relations of becoming 'what they are by exploiting the interests of the population').³⁷ But without the re-appointment of Lorenzo Montero as district attorney this stood little chance of success. In any case, Pepe warned his uncle that any legal action would have to be prepared carefully and brought at the right time otherwise 'we could provide another triumph for this trickster' (Pérez).³⁸

Pepe's efforts to influence posts in Loja on his uncle's behalf continued into January but to no avail. Complicating his efforts was a serious meteorological crisis in mid-January that caused severe unemployment requiring *alojamiento*. Pepe reported that three prominent cortijo-owning relations and friends of the family (Manuel de Campos, Francisco Fernández de Córdoba and Francisco Fonseca) were more concerned with maintaining friendly links with the new Council in order to profit from receiving municipal funds for re-employing labourers they had just laid off, than they were with challenging or displacing this Democrat-*progresista* body. He

observed that many friends and family were ‘playing two games’, adding that although the family’s morning *tertulias* were still held, ‘everyone is afraid’, concluding angrily that:

What Loja needs is a ‘partida de la porra’ (a gang with clubs) which, without distinction, will hit anyone, and, out of fear, a compact and ordered party will be achieved willing to oppose on any terms the rebels and troublemakers.³⁹

The ‘partida de la porra’ would become a necessary element of local power during the early Restoration. For the moment, *moderado* elites had to live with the competition that Posada Herrera considered necessary for sustaining the credibility of the Liberal Union.

Narváez’s friend Félix de Arce, still vainly awaiting elevation to the post of Alcalde Corregidor, elaborated on the doleful consequences of the absence in Loja of a ‘party of the club’:

Sr. Vizconde (Pepe Narváez) each day is worse. Yesterday, on coming out of the Church, Father Cuero was grabbed by the throat by a *Patrio* (as they say here) who said that he fancied killing a priest who are all *Polacos* and soon the day will come when not one is left. At eleven in the morning, also yesterday, in the Plaza Mayor, another *Patrio* with a knife in hand ran at Enrique Torres, calling him a retrograde *Polaco* who will have to be killed. Fortunately, the ‘proconsul’ Rafael Pérez appeared, as if by a charm, and took him away. Had he not, I believe that Torres would have been harmed. I should add that the authors do nothing, boasting that we are in flight, for these outrages go unpunished. Tonight there were grand musical parades with vivas to the Republic, to Rosal and Espartero, which concluded with a beating given to the son of Pepe Vera and to another whose name I don’t have.⁴⁰

Narváez and his nephew redoubled their efforts from Paris and Madrid to neutralise the Democrat Council with friendly appointments, appealing to Posada Herrera and Cánovas but to no avail.⁴¹ Throughout February Pepe continued his efforts to settle an embarrassing family dispute between Rafael Narváez and Joaquín Campos and to secure the re-appointment of Lorenzo Montero as district attorney to pursue the perpetrators of disorders in Loja. Montero had informed Narváez that the source of the trouble in Loja was a book containing the names of all those who had sworn Republican oaths. Although the Queen promptly ordered its confiscation, this ledger of society members could not be found even during the trials conducted by the Council of War following the uprising in June.⁴²

With a hostile Council in Loja, Narváez remained in Paris throughout the first half of 1861, poised to return to Spain when called upon.⁴³ In early

June, conditions for his return sharply improved when O'Donnell's ministry looked to be on the point of collapse.⁴⁴ Moderados rallied around Luis González Bravo but eyes turned to the Duke as the only one 'possessing the force and means that the situation demands'. In late June he was assured by his secretary that the Liberal Union was facing imminent demise.⁴⁵ Business prospects also looked good, with Salamanca handing Narváez a controlling stake in the construction of the Granada–Campillos railway.⁴⁶ Backed by the French 'Companie General de Crédit' he also acquired a two-thirds interest in the Granada–Málaga railway.⁴⁷ The only obstacle now to the Duke's return was the Democrat Council in Loja. No wonder O'Donnell and his ministers had refused to give way on appointments!

As Narváez learned of the extent of the secret society in Loja in January 1861, the conservative Madrid paper *El Reino* ran a series of alarming reports of a conspiracy of the 'socialist family' emanating from Antequera with ramifications in Loja and Alhama where workers were expected soon to rise up. Antequera's weavers had been on strike since December and property was already being divided. Meanwhile, 'Republicans' from Loja and Alhama had met in the remote Granada town of Zafarraya, where *vivas* were offered to Garibaldi and to the Republic. Pérez denied these rumours insisting that Loja's workers were not involved in anything other than 'toil to sustain their sad proletarian state sunk in misery', explaining that the events in Zafarraya were the work of 'two intoxicated men of low life and worse opinions', former inmates of Granada's *presidio*; 'such a class of men should not belong to the Liberal party'.⁴⁸

Pérez's familiarity with the criminal record of Zafarraya's Democrats betrayed his knowledge of the wider network of *carbonari* conspiracy, confirmed by simultaneous protests against the *El Reino* article from artisans and workers in Granada, Málaga and Antequera. Seventy Granada Democrats, 'although it could be two thousand', defended the moral purity of the true Democrat and condemned the episode in Zafarraya as the work of 'lowlife drunkards'.⁴⁹ Fourteen Málaga artisans (among them the founders of the city's *carbonari* society Clemente Hernández and Antonio Azuaga) denied that there had been any discussion of the division of property in Antequera insisting that the conflict there concerned exclusively wages.⁵⁰ Thirty-seven workers in Antequera, 'all of us proud Democrats', condemned *El Reino's* 'calumnious report' defending their right to strike for a wage of 1 real per pound of wool woven, necessary for sustaining their families.⁵¹

Antequera

Since December 1860 weavers in Antequera had discovered how clandestine organisation could bolster labour demands. Civil Governor Guerola first became aware of the full extent of Antequera's *carbonari* society – named 'Los Garibaldinos' – in January 1861, when he visited the city to mediate in the

weavers' strike that had halted production in the city's textile factories since December. If Italy provided the Society with its name, Guerola believed that the city's intra-elite political divisions, combined with the Liberal Union's light hand with local policing, ensured its growth.⁵² During the first six months of 1861, the Garibaldinos extended their recruitment from factory workers to agricultural labourers and from the district capital to outlying towns. By June 1861, Guerola had uncovered a clandestine organisation using common rites of initiation, linked to the same conspiratorial structure, in town and country throughout eastern and northern Málaga.

In their initiation rites and decurial structure Antequera's 'Garibaldinos' resembled Pérez's 'Society' in Loja and also the secret society discovered by authorities of Alhama on the eve of the Loja Revolution, confirming that this was a regional clandestine organisation obeying a common set of rules and rituals set out by the Society's progenitors in Granada during the Bienio Progresista. With the largest and best-organised society, Guerola was convinced that Antequera had now taken over from Granada as the revolutionary centre, with the societies in Archidona, Málaga, Loja, Alhama and Granada as secondary poles.⁵³

Antequera's strike began in December 1860 when weavers in the second largest factory owned by the French Señores Auroux demanded to be paid by the weight of wool woven instead by the finished piece of cloth. Calculating that this would amount to a 50 per cent pay increase, the owners rejected the proposal. The workers then walked out. Factories receiving spun wool from Auroux then stopped production. By the end of January, nine of the city's 18 factories had ceased production. Convening a meeting of factory owners Guerola learned that the strike 'was not in their view an isolated demand by workers for an increase in their salary but a product of a plan forged in the secret society established in the city'. Funds from the Garibaldino Society were enabling operatives to stay out of work, while fear of shame and retribution discouraged any return. If they ceded to the workers' demands, Señores Auroux believed that the Society would turn its attention to the needs of workers in spinning, carding and dyeing.

Given the clandestine nature of the campaign, Guerola realised that the 'arbitration tribunals' that he had used successfully to resolve strikes in Barcelona in 1853–1854 would be ineffective. Instead he resolved to deploy the law of 21 May 1855 that established complete freedom of employment and individual work contracts, designed to combat combinations (*coaliciones*) and coercion (*coacción*). Confronted by a wall of silence among the operatives, Guerola proposed three measures to attract weavers back to work: an address to be posted throughout the city exhorting operatives to return to work (reminding them that vagrancy was a crime, offering protection to those choosing to return to work and announcing weekly prizes for workers distinguished by their good behaviour); the arrest of the seven chief

instigators of the secret society using the vagrancy laws; and, the drafting of a list of all those on strike in preparation for judicial proceedings.

In spite of the reluctance of Antequera's *juzgado* to arrest the instigators, weavers 'little by little' began to return to work although not until the end of April was the strike finally resolved following the decision of Diego Moreno, owner of the largest woollen factory, to 'accede to part of the demands of the weavers, others following his example'.⁵⁴

The weavers' success was not simply due to the discipline of the secret society and the support that it provided for its striking members. Violence was also deployed, particularly against young weavers persuaded by Guerola to return to work in the factory belonging to Cristobal Aviles. However, the Society strove to create an appearance of orderliness and legality. During his three days in Antequera in early February, Guerola was able to sense this mood and to learn how the Garibaldino Society operated, lessons that would be useful in the aftermath of the Loja Revolution when he would attempt to break up the Society.

While the Society in Loja had grown relatively undisturbed since its formation in 1856, Antequera's conspirators had twice, during the summers of 1857 and 1859, been the subject of police and judicial action, on the latter occasion resulting in the discovery of lists of 2,000 members and other papers, and the arrest and imprisonment of leaders.⁵⁵ A royal amnesty in May 1860 allowed these leaders to return to Antequera to rebuild the Society.⁵⁶ By March 1861, they had created a highly disciplined organisation capable of taking on the city's principal woollen manufacturers and of defeating attempts by the authorities to arrest its organisers and to drive weavers back to work. Guerola reported that 'This association, master of the art of conspiracy, writes little, has no secret meetings and therefore escapes the investigations of the police. Cafés, taverns, squares, public promenades, are the places where the chiefs give instructions under the shelter of an inoffensive conversation'. Although Antequera's police knew the three taverns where new members were sworn in, and raided these establishments frequently, no papers, arms or compromising materials were found, 'just some men drinking'.

Invisible as a criminal conspiracy, the Society's presence was palpable to the civil governor during a three-day return in early March:

... the preaching of the society that is most stressed to affiliates is the need to preserve order, obedience and respect for authority. And although this seems a mockery from people who are attempting to overthrow society, there is a complete although deceptive calm. There is not an outrage, insult or attempt, even of the slightest kind. The municipal authorities are respected, as are also its subordinates. At ten o'clock at night not a soul is seen in the streets. If a foreigner was accompanying me in those days on my walks around the city he would formed the idea that Antequera was a

country privileged with obedience, because there were no other demonstrations than that of respect for the authorities. Last night there was an example of this... a funeral procession was given for a labourer – doubtless an affiliate of the society – and oddly, and even to the surprise of the neighbourhood, nearly a thousand workers carrying torches assembled at the church to accompany the hearse, wishing to flaunt their strength in the most religious act of social life, in such a way that it would be impossible to prohibit the gathering... On the same night they organised another funeral for the wife of a carpenter, also doubtless one of the affiliates. A confidant informed me that, precisely because I am here, they were preparing a similar demonstration, for the leaders have said that they wanted to show me how numerous and how peaceful Democracy is in Antequera... In the light of this I ordered the watchmen... to prohibit more than twenty torches for any funeral procession, with the rest to be put out... more than two thousand men appeared with their torches, but in the moment that the watchmen intimated that they should put them out, they did so without the least resistance or argument and contented themselves in silently and calmly following the viaticum to the house of the sick woman. Such is the state of this city: the authorities vigilant to discover and ready to deal with the slightest sign of material disturbance; honourable citizens gripped by a great moral fear, and, the working classes, united, conspiring, but offering no pretext for being proceeded against.⁵⁷

Málaga and environs

Upon returning to Málaga, Guerola concentrated his investigation on ‘a Democrat called Clemente Hernández, expert cabinet maker, decided revolutionary and with a well-organised brain’ whose letters from tinsmith Antonio Córtes, during the latter’s visit to Alicante, were sufficient to convict him. Although the arrest of Hernández yielded ‘good results’, Guerola experienced similar constraints in the capital to those he had encountered in Antequera. He knew who the organisers were but because ‘public order is so complete’ he was prevented from acting ‘due to the strict legality that informs the political ideas of the Government’. Like Antequera, a serene calm lay over the city of Málaga, ‘undoubtedly one of the points in Spain where the working class is most perverted’.⁵⁸

The arrest of Clemente Hernández on 13 April 1861 provided Guerola with a series of leads useful for investigating Democrat organisation in the vicinity of Málaga: Cártama, Pizarra and Alora in the Guadalhorce basin, Almogía and Casabermeja in the Sierra de Málaga, and hamlets and farmsteads in the ‘Montes de Málaga’ just to the east of the city. Hastened by the 1856 laws of civil *desamortización*, the Guadalhorce basin during the late 1850s and early 1860s was being transformed by agricultural colonies, commercial

estates and the opening of roads.⁵⁹ The start of the Málaga–Córdoba railway in March 1860, planned to pass through Pizarra and Alora before entering a tunnel through the Sierra Bética at the Valle de Abdalajís, contributed not only to this economic confidence, but also, worryingly for Guerola, to a rising wage curve in the valley. Clandestine Democrat organisation developed apace. Although Alora, Pizarra and Cártama were not among Guerola's list of 24 *malagueño* towns in which 'Democracy' was considered to have achieved a significant foothold, in April 1861 Guerola advised the mayor of Alora to monitor the activities of country tailors, barbers and school teachers in the area who were suspected of spreading socialist ideas and fomenting democratic organisation.⁶⁰

Archidona

If Guerola was confident that he could handle Democrats in Antequera and the Guadalhorce basin, Archidona, 20 miles to the east of Antequera on the road to Loja, provided an altogether greater challenge. A largely mountainous and wooded district, only 9,000 of Archidona's 26,000 fanegas were suited for arable farming, confined mostly to the compact *vega* at the foot of the precipitous limestone escarpment upon which the district capital (population 9,000) stands beneath a ruined Moorish castle. At least two-thirds of the *vega* were dedicated to the cultivation of wheat, grown on 125 small *cortijos* averaging in size around 50 fanegas. Formerly part of the *señorio* of the Duke of Osuna, these estates had recently become the property of their former administrators through the *desamortización*.⁶¹ Although most good arable land was heavily concentrated among this clutch of *cortijeros*, there were also many small and medium-sized farms. More rural and less socially polarised than Loja or Antequera, where the number of *jornaleros* greatly exceeded the combined number of landed proprietors and tenants, the social structure of Archidona closely resembled that of neighbouring Colmenar. In both jurisdictions the combined number of landed proprietors and tenants greatly exceeded the number of *jornaleros*.⁶²

In common with Loja, Antequera and Alhama, Archidona's Council had been invited in April 1861 to survey, divide up and put on sale its remaining waste lands and mountains, to be made available first to tenants and then to those already in possession of adjacent properties.⁶³ The Council showed little inclination to comply. In the week following the Loja Revolution, Archidona requested to be allowed to retain its remaining common lands arguing that they had belonged to the town since time immemorial, were by nature unsuitable for cultivation and to proceed with their sale would cause 'notable harm to the primary wealth of the town'.⁶⁴

Guerola described Archidona as an 'important city profoundly divided into parties'. In particular two *moderado* factions vied for political dominance, one comprising the Lafuente-Alcántara and Rodríguez families and

the other, the Cárdenas and Valera families, each backed by powerful allies in Málaga and in Madrid, and each seeking to control outlying towns in order to challenge the authority of their rivals in the *cabecera*. Archidona lacked Antequera's divided aristocracy (the whole district had formerly belonged to the Duke of Osuña) or democratic working class. Yet wooded and mountainous terrain and divided politics offered ideal cover for bandits who plagued the north-west of the district in the municipalities of Alameda, Cuevas Bajas and Cuevas de San Marcos. Divided elites and loose central control over this area left the district vulnerable to Democratic organisation, Guerola observing that 'democracy was very widespread' particularly in subject municipalities of the four Villanuevas: Algaidas, Rosario, Tapia and Trabuco.

The feud in Archidona began in 1858 in the fiercely contested Cortes election in which José Lafuente Alcántara, member of a distinguished and influential local family, lost narrowly to Juan Valera, a prominent Córdoba writer resident in Madrid.⁶⁵ As in Antequera, where the election in 1858 went against the local Moderado (Rafael Chacón) due to votes from the neighbouring municipality of Alora, Lafuente's defeat in Archidona was due in part to the influence Valera enjoyed in neighbouring Colmenar through two local notables, Andrés Fernández Santaella and José Freuiller. In spite of receiving the blessing of the civil governor, Lafuente was obliged to accept second prize as provincial deputy for Archidona.

Following his defeat, Lafuente, in collaboration with José Maria Rodríguez, a senior functionary in the Ministry of Justice and landowner in Colmenar, worked to replace Fernández Santaella's allies (*alcaldes* and justices of the peace) with men they could depend on, to ensure that they would recapture the seat in the elections of 1862. In Villanueva del Rosario, Lafuente's meddling even included protecting the leader of the town's Democrats from Guerola's attempts to have him removed and charged with subversion (the mayor had recruited the entire male population into a secret society called 'La Mosca').⁶⁶

While Archidona's elite families squabbled over posts and preferment, the town's Democrats increased *carbonari* recruitment and consolidated ties with their confreres in neighbouring jurisdictions. Underpinning these ties in some instances was common schooling at Archidona's Escolapío college, one of few secondary colleges outside of provincial capitals. It was while attending this school that *lojeño* Ramón Calvo de Jiménez, Pérez del Alamo's second in command during the Revolution of Loja, first met Luis Miranda, leader of Archidona's Democrats.⁶⁷ The connection between Democrats in Loja and Archidona receives further confirmation from a case of judicial harassment of Loja's Democrats in early May 1861. Upon coming out of the theatre at midnight Pérez del Alamo learned that an auxiliary postman with whom he had sent a consignment of pamphlets to Archidona had been arrested. Pérez rode forthwith to Archidona to arrange the man's release, only to be imprisoned on grounds of being the owner of the pamphlets.⁶⁸

The Mayor of Archidona, Cristobál Aragón, was more concerned about papers he found among the pamphlets that linked an unnamed barber in Loja's Calle Real with Democrat co-religionists in Archidona. To shed light on this connection he ordered all the barbers in Loja's Calle Real to be brought to Archidona. Three barbers duly complied but disclaimed any knowledge of the papers. Convinced that his investigation was going nowhere, Aragón released Pérez along with the sundry *lojeños*. Before returning to Loja Aragón assured Pérez that there were 'many very good and pacific' Democrats in Archidona who were embarrassed by the arrests, implying that he had been acting under pressure from Lafuente-Alcántara.⁶⁹ Aragón's political ambivalence was confirmed after the Revolution of Loja when he broke with Lafuente and Rodríguez and laboured hard to protect Luis Miranda and other Archidona Democrats from the Councils of War in Málaga and Loja.⁷⁰

A letter from Lafuente-Alcántara to *El Pueblo* confirms that he was directing the judicial harassment in Archidona. The purpose of his letter was to expose Pérez del Alamo's claim that following his release he had associated only with Archidona's 'sensible' (moderate) Democrats. Lafuente admitted that many in the city, including himself, considered themselves Democrats. Indeed, Mayor Aragón described himself as a 'Demócrata puro' and was Archidona's only subscriber to *El Pueblo*. But, Lafuente insisted, this was not the company with whom Pérez's del Alamo chose to associate after his release. Rather, while in Archidona, Pérez was accompanied by two men 'who by their youth lacked any political colours' and visited the house of 'a *vecino* of this town who is known publicly as the chief of the socialists'. For their part, the two *archidonenses* who had been arrested along with the *lojeño* conductor of Pérez's 25 pamphlets, were being investigated for involvement in a secret society. Like Guerola in Málaga, Lafuente distinguished between 'sensible' Democrats, men of order, and Socialists who used Democracy as a cover for their conspiracies to overturn society. Pérez's sympathies and associates were firmly with the latter. Mayor Aragón had therefore been right to be pursuing '...those who, shrouded in mystery and with illicit objectives, meet cunningly, and, with their threats of expropriation and death, hold the honourable, decent and sensible part of this population, which comprises the great number of its *vecinos*, in constant alarm'.

Meanwhile, Pérez del Alamo persisted in cataloguing the persecution of the region's Democrats in the columns of *El Pueblo*, reporting that the Civil Guard had been conducting violent searches of the houses of 'good Liberals' in neighbouring Iznájar.⁷²

Iznájar

Perched precariously on a fortified escarpment overlooking the River Genil, Iznájar is the remotest municipality of Córdoba's southern-most district of

Rute. Frontier zone between Castille and Nazari, Iznájar remained sparsely populated until the onset of the olive in the late eighteenth century between 1752 and 1860, from 2,250 to 6,048, tripling in population. The War of Independence hastened a process of settlement and subdivision of seigniorial land, often granted as reward for patriotic services in the fight against the French. During this period 18 *cortijos* belonging to the heirs of the Duke of Castro-Enríquez, Condes de la Revilla, were divided up among their tenants, with the result that 'a numerous proprietary peasant population was borne, with the small and medium sized properties predominating'.⁷³

During the mid-nineteenth century, colonisation accelerated with the expansion of the olive and cereal production, spurred on by the ecclesiastical and civil *desamortización*. Some larger farms were formed from municipal *propios* but only three *cortijos* were registered in 1932, comprising 1,189 hectares, 9 per cent of the municipal area. As in most of southern Córdoba, Iznájar's population was scattered among numerous *caseríos*.⁷⁴ Córdoba's most distant municipality was also one of the most under-represented in the province, measured by the ratio of electors to population.⁷⁵ This landscape of poor, scattered, proprietary farmsteads proved peculiarly susceptible to Democrat organisation.

Pérez del Alamo's denunciation in *El Pueblo* in April 1861 was the stir caused by Civil Guard Captain, Julián Ortiz de Febrer, commissioned by the governor of Córdoba to investigate 'the democratic-republican character of the area'. The governor had received reports of the dissemination of Democrat propaganda and of the threats to join secret societies, to which the local authorities were turning a blind eye.⁷⁶ Although Ortiz's house searches uncovered the existence of the Society and detected the fear that it instilled, he found no incriminating evidence. Not appreciating that the Society received protection from members of the Council, particularly from its secretary, Rafael Delgado, Ortiz invited Mayor Antonio Cañas to convene a meeting of the principal organisers of the Society to warn them of the penalties for organising secret societies. Upon leaving Iznájar in early May he reported that he had 'calmed agitated spirits... restored somewhat public tranquillity' and convinced 'the few estate owners and proprietors landowners who had not joined this society to advise their tenants and servants not to do what so many others had been forced to do'.⁷⁷

This advice was disregarded. On 11 June, posters urging a work stoppage and calling for an end to piece rates, judged to be the work of those who 'are terrorising the peaceful and honourable men of this population, both from the labouring and landowning classes', appeared on walls in the centre of Iznájar where day labourers congregated. The Council replaced the posters with its own addresses warning citizens not to be seduced or coerced by the enemies of the peace, and to reach agreement with their employers 'in the liberty that the Laws concede'.⁷⁸

The reapers' strike and the *carbonari*

Inflation and labour scarcity during the summer of 1861 encouraged wage demands throughout the region which clandestine organisations attempted to exploit.⁷⁹ With the approach of the summer harvest, Democrat leaders in Málaga, Antequera and smaller towns, such as Colmenar and Casabermeja, worked to increase affiliation to *carbonari* societies in an attempt to repeat the success of Antequera's weavers. Although restrained by Posada Herrera in his use of the courts to pursue known organisers of secret societies, Guerola intensified in his campaign to surprise their instigators and disperse their membership.⁸⁰ In early June 1861, he issued a circular to the mayors of towns warning them of the spread of 'socialist ideas' by secret societies, the efforts being made to exploit the 'simple imagination' of field and factory workers, of the danger these ideas posed to the 'rights of property without which society is not possible', and, of the harsh punishment awaiting anyone attacking property or disturbing public order.⁸¹ But without police at hand, and with many anyway compromised with local Democrat leaders, mayors could do little to deter combinations or coercion during the harvest season.⁸² It fell, therefore, to larger cities to fund guards for policing the countryside.

Guerola was confident that he could prevent disorders in the agricultural areas of coastal districts around Vélez and the provincial capital with the help of the Civil Guard and various *partidas* of rural guard. But he was less confident about Antequera with its fertile *vega*, breadbasket of the province.⁸³ During his visit to Antequera in January, the civil governor had recommended 'the establishment of a rural guard to protect properties and ensure freedom of work and agricultural contracts... particularly during the harvest'.⁸⁴ Yet nothing was done to establish the force until early June. Part of the problem was the sheer cost of such a force, estimated at 1,28,450 reales a year on salaries alone, before calculating the cost of uniforms, arms and cavalry, or the prizes necessary for rewarding the capture of suspected criminals and bandits.⁸⁵ Guerola blamed the delay and the general ineffectiveness of the authorities in the pursuit of Democrats on the youth and inexperience of Alcalde Corregidor, Francisco Javier Camacho.⁸⁶ After much prodding and the replacement of Camacho by the more active Captain Benito Alvarez Santullano, Antequera's Council agreed to establish a force of 40 rural cavalry which was sworn in on 1 July.⁸⁷ The five-month delay in establishing the rural guard meant that during the first half of 1861 Democrats faced few obstacles to extending their organisation in rural areas.

In June Democrats attempted to instil the discipline that had brought them success in the weavers' strike in April to wage demands during the wheat harvest.⁸⁸ Guerola and the landowners eventually discovered that there was much 'sham and lying' in labourers' demands for higher wages. But for a short period between mid-May and mid-June reapers throughout the province stepped up their demands for higher wages and an end

to piece rates. Throughout the *vega* of Antequera they were successful. Using *carbonari* enlistments and helped by the labour shortage, Democrats achieved the general abandonment of piece rates in favour of a daily wage.⁸⁹

A letter sent to *El Reino* in early July illustrates the ambivalence and pragmatism of agricultural labourers and how work stoppages around Málaga and Antequera in June 1861 were part of a broader Democrat conspiracy of the kind we saw during the same season in 1857 and 1859. The letter claimed that reapers' demands were the culmination of a conspiracy that had developed over six to eight months radiating from Gibraltar and Granada, involving Protestant as well as Democrat propaganda, recruiting at least 15,000 affiliates through 'terrible initiations, accompanied by Phrygian caps, skulls and daggers'. The government was aware of the conspiracy but believed that nothing would happen because of the meagre resources of the affiliates. Without money, the correspondent believed, employees would remain loyal to the proprietors with whom they enjoyed 'fraternal relations'. The purpose of the June work stoppages was for Democrat leaders 'to get them (the labourers) together to show them their strength'. Having convinced labourers that they had access to 'all kinds of resources', workers would transfer trust from their employers to Democrat leaders. The correspondent observed that for a short period in late June Democrats experienced some success. Even when wages rose to 12, 15 or 20 reales, labour could not be found around Málaga to complete the harvest. It was during this time, the correspondent insisted, that 'some of those not affiliated, who for some months had been excluded from the common lunches had to take refuge in Málaga', while affiliates were able to subsist due to 'abundance of money sent from Gibraltar and Madrid'.⁹⁰

Although the Málaga correspondent exaggerated the extent of external funding in support of reapers' wage demands, he correctly identified how Democrat leaders were using wage bargaining as a way of extending support in the countryside. Their success was dramatised in the Axarquía town of Comares at the end of May when tens of young Democrats from neighbouring towns came to the aid of a *confrère* who had been arrested for carrying out illegal *carbonari* enlistments. Trumpeted by the conservative press as 'republican uprising', this local municipal scuffle revealed the extent of clandestine Democrat organisation in rural Málaga.⁹¹ What Guerola described as the 'insurrection in Comares' prompted an intensification of police and Civil Guard surveillance of secret societies and wage combinations by reapers throughout June.

Convinced that it was from remoter towns that recruitment to secret societies was being organised, in mid-June Guerola ordered two officers of the Civil Guard to carry out house searches in the Arroyo de Cache, an isolated settlement close to the Málaga–Córdoba road between Almojía and Casabermeja. Close to the Sierra de Torcal, south of Antequera, once renowned for its robbers and bandits, Arroyo de Cache contained between 300 and 400 *vecinos* scattered over an extensive and exceedingly

hilly territory. The civil governor's suspicions were confirmed when the Civil Guard reported the discovery in the houses of various suspected Democrats,

two knives and the red cap that seem to have served for initiations, lists of those inscribed in the secret society and of those who comprise its Junta, with the symbolic names of each one (Sisto I, Orsini chantos, Ramiro tantos, etc.), tickets for convoking meetings of the Junta, a Protestant tract and various democratic newspapers.

A cache of arms was also found. Nineteen men were arrested for belonging to an illegal society and taken to the Juzgado in Alora.⁹²

The Conservative and neo-Catholic press made much of these events and criticised the Liberal Union for its complacency in the face of the proliferation of secret societies and the diffusion of heretical texts.⁹³ In reply, *La Discusión* ridiculed their alarm over 'agitation in Loja, Comares y Trabuco, towns so important that once they have pronounced for democracy, will carry the movement to Paris and the revolution will be proclaimed in the Hotel de Ville', explaining that the so-called 'secret societies' were in fact friendly societies 'in which for four reales a week they receive four reales a day in case of illness and free medical assistance'.⁹⁴ *La Discusión* accused *La España* and *El Pensamiento Español* of serving Narváez's Machiavellian design to discredit the Liberal Union by releasing news of insignificant events occurring in Comares and 'in other towns which are not on the map'.⁹⁵ Yet, letters from these remote localities addressed to the national press confirm that something was afoot in eastern Andalucía during what, after all, was the season of insurrection.⁹⁶

In Antequera, although the reapers' strike was reported to have petered out by mid-June, the Society continued to recruit.⁹⁷ It did so in the face of more thorough policing by a new Alcalde Corregidor backed by two companies of regular infantry.⁹⁸ Ever alert to new converts, Antequera's Democrat instigators turned their attention to the soldiers of the eleventh company of San Fernando infantry stationed in the city. At 4 p.m. on Sunday 16 June, four soldiers strolling in their free time were invited into a house in the Calle Nueva in the weavers' quarter for a glass of wine. Once inside, they were led to a room where they were made various offers of 'whatever they needed' providing they signed their names. The soldiers refused and left. On the same day and time another soldier on a stroll was persuaded by four locals to enter a house in the Calle de Pasillas. Here he was joined by four other men, 'spoken to in similar terms as the others' but, in spite of 'persuasion and threats', refused to go down into a subterranean chamber to participate in ceremony involving a crucifix, vowing that he had to leave in a troop muster.⁹⁹

The trail of Antequera's *carbonari* society soon led Alvarez to rural areas of the district. On 21 June 1861, *jornaleros* in the nearby agricultural town of Mollina rioted in response to an attempt by the mayor to arrest an instigator

of the *carbonari* society.¹⁰⁰ Alvarez went in person to Mollina to suppress the riot with considerable force causing several wounded and some deaths.¹⁰¹

Described by Guerola as ‘very scattered in its settlements, insignificant in politics, subject to influences from Antequera, especially those of the del Pino family’, Mollina provides a good illustration of the mood in smaller settlement on the eve of the Revolution of Loja.¹⁰² Much of the municipal territory was taken up by estates belonging to Antequera’s wealthiest families, such as the Rojas and González del Pino. Mollina’s 2,506 inhabitants lacked any institution of public education, as did the neighbouring towns of Humilladero (1,235) and Fuente de Piedra (1,036), demonstrating the low priority Antequera placed upon schooling and literacy. Rates of illiteracy in Mollina, Humilladero and Fuente de Piedra were the highest in the district, increasing in Mollina from 94 per cent in 1860 to 96.2 per cent in 1877.¹⁰³ As the largest settlement on the *campiña*, home to hundreds of *jornaleros* who worked on estates throughout the region, Democrat leaders in Antequera appreciated Mollina’s strategic value. Without a schoolmaster, with a secretary appointed from Antequera, the arrival on market day of an entertaining hat seller in possession not only of Democrat newspapers containing news of exhilarating events in Italy but also with ideas about how to increase the daily wage (so as to be able to afford finer hats) would have been an attractive spectacle.

Rural conflict in Antequera on the eve of the Revolution of Loja was not confined to the wage issue. Agrarian grievances were also widespread. Indeed, the most intractable problem faced by Guerola in Antequera was not the weavers’ strike or the reapers’ stoppage but the flagrant and illegal self-enrichment of large landowners derived from their unlawful occupation of municipal commons and *propios* since the 1840s.¹⁰⁴ This proved a hard, ultimately impossible nut to crack.¹⁰⁵ Throughout 1859 and 1860, the occupants of current and former municipal *propios* filed title claims for illegally occupied municipal property. Fearing the political fallout from such a volatile city were he to concede to these petitions, Guerola sent two lawyers to Antequera in April 1861 to review the status all former *propios*.¹⁰⁶

Although Antequera’s Council, most whom were landowners, obstinately refused to reveal the extent of their illegal occupation or to cooperate with the delegation, various claims were received from tenants threatened by the loss of security of tenure as former *propios* became private property.¹⁰⁷ For example, on 5 May Juan García Pérez and 23 others cultivators, speaking on behalf of ‘more than one hundred families’ that had rented land on Antequera’s *propios* since ‘time immemorial’ in the Sierra de Abdalajís, appealed to the civil governor to prevent the sale of this land, insisting that they had prior right, having planted vines and olive trees, built their houses on it, and paid an annual rent. The petitioners observed that their new condition as tenants, paying rent to a landed proprietor who could evict them at will, compared unfavourably with their former status as cultivators on common

land enjoying security of tenure in perpetuity on payment of their *canón*.¹⁰⁸ Guerola responded to the petition sympathetically referring the case to the lawyers he had recently sent to Antequera.¹⁰⁹ The case had not been resolved by late June when many from the Valle de Abdalajís set off for Loja in the hope of achieving a favourable resolution of the dispute.

Conclusion

By the summer of 1861 *carbonari* societies organised by local Democrat leaders, although largely disowned by the party leadership in Madrid, had extended throughout western Granada, southern Córdoba and eastern Málaga. In Loja, the Society led by Pérez del Alamo secured the victory of a *progresista*/Democrat Council and, helped by Posada Herrera, blocked attempts by Narváez to neutralise this Council by appointing his friends and family to key posts. Elsewhere, particularly in smaller towns, but also in larger ones such as Iznájar, mass enlistment in *carbonari* societies received protection from municipal authorities. Even at the elevated district level rival elite factions turned to clandestine organisation in order to pursue congressional ambitions, as was evident in Loja and Archidona during the 1858 Cortes elections. Most worrying for the authorities, however, was the way clandestine organisation was used to bolster wage demands and intimidate the wider population in weavers' strike in Antequera in January 1861 and the reaper's strike later in the year.

Thanks to the reports from energetic provincial governors such as Antonio Guerola, the government in Madrid became aware of the spread of Democrat clandestine organisation in the region. But it underestimated its strength and the challenge the *carbonari* posed to public order. In January 1861, intelligence was leaked to the conservative press who berated O'Donnell and Posada Herrera for tolerating an insidious spread of Socialism throughout Andalucía, linked to an equally deplorable invasion by Protestant evangelists from Gibraltar. The Risorgimento increased Conservative anxiety, as it heightened Democrat *alegría*. However, after the failures of 1857 and 1859, few Democrats or their opponents rated clandestine organisation as a viable route for mounting a successful insurrection. Rather, *carbonari* enlistments were viewed by leaders as a way of bolstering wage bargaining and creating political clientele, while for the affiliates they offered some security while also appealing to Andalusian traditions of *unión* and male solidarity in a context of declining or non-existent Catholic pastoral care. Dramatic events in Loja would soon cause government and parties to revise their relaxed view of the impact of clandestine organisation and Democrat propaganda on the people of eastern Andalucía.

This page intentionally left blank

Part II

The Revolution of the Blacksmiths, July 1861

This page intentionally left blank

5

The Loja Revolution

I now come to this inexplicable event. You will have already noticed the imponderable magnitude which it has attained, not only in Loja, but also in many other towns and some large capital cities, whether it be the initiation of great disturbances or the approach of large crowds from the mountains, recalling those savage cavalry raids (*algaradas*) and those barbaric *morisco* attacks of the middle ages and for some centuries after, until the total expulsion of the moors from Spain. This recent democratic revolution has no example in our history, apart perhaps from bearing some resemblance to what happened back in uncivilised times, and seems to us like a fable from our ancient chronicles. But the sudden disappearance of these hordes of men in their thousands does not even seem to come from the chronicles but rather from the magic tales of the fantastic. (6 July 1861, José Gutiérrez de la Vega, Seville, to Ramón María Narváez, Paris)¹

In early June 1861, in response to 'infinite number of complaints' of judicial harassment from members, some 40 'notable and influential' affiliates of La Venta Nacional, representing the provinces of Granada, Málaga and Jaén, met in Granada's Calle de San Anton. A majority decided against a summer insurrection of the kind attempted by Sixto Cámara in 1857 and 1859. Rafael Pérez del Pérez, representing Loja's Democrats, also voted against an armed uprising, later recalling that two factors deterred his *confièrres* from embarking upon a military adventure. The first was 'the situation of the *progresista* party, which was dispersed, disorganised, without chiefs of the fighting kind, and, furthermore, distant from us'. The second was the strength of the regime, 'we saw O'Donnell with the brilliant halo of the war of Africa... and we were aware of the respectable forces which the Government could count on in Andalucía'.²

Those advising caution would have remembered the tragic fate of Sixto Cámara just two years earlier. Since October 1860, Democrats and Protestants in Granada had experienced mounting repression. Manuel Matamoros and José Alhama were still in prison (although this did not prevent them in mid-June 1861 from contributing to the subscription to fund the return of Cámara's remains to Madrid).³ Antonio Quiles had been silenced. Progresistas were weak and in disarray. With Salamanca's re-election to the Cortes in January, Moderados had regained ascendancy in the city. To counter a wider *moderado* revival, Posada-Herrera appointed Celestino Mas y Abad to the civil governorship to bolster Granada's Liberal Unionists, but with instructions also to intensify the pursuit of Protestants and Democrats.⁴

Given these unpromising circumstances, why was a Democrat insurrection launched in late June? And how were the insurgents able to hold onto Granada's second city for almost a week? The chapter explores the choreography and beliefs of the Loja Revolution and reflects on whether it resembled more an archaic Moorish 'algarada' – a peasant jacquerie – or provided a glimpse of modern politics of the kind envisaged by Democrats throughout Europe since the Revolutions of 1848.

The minority that proposed an armed uprising at the meeting of *La Venta Nacional* in Granada had argued that 'something should be left for fortune', a reference to a recent debate in *El Pueblo* at the height of Garibaldi's campaign in southern Italy during the previous autumn.⁵ Cámara's death in July 1859 had convinced Democrat moderates such as José María Orense and Nicolás Rivero that insurrections organised by secret societies, in league with the exile community in Lisbon, were fruitless gestures. Democrats should be patient and only act when conditions, particularly closer relations with Progresistas, were propitious. In reply Fernando Garrido and Ceferino Tresserra urged continued perseverance pointing to the example Garibaldi as a leader who took chances and did not simply sit and wait for the appropriate moment.

Until now, Garibaldi has come out of his risky enterprise so well, not, as you claim, for having waited twelve years since his famous defence of Rome before going to Sicily, but for a mixture of fortuitous circumstances, which for him have been favourable, but which had been inauspicious for Pisacane some years earlier. Garibaldi, I repeat, has taken a risk.

Simply to be prepared was not enough. The true Democrat should also organise, conspire and strike whenever possible, rather than just wait patiently so as not to alarm the middle classes.⁶

In the end the decision over whether or not to rebel was informed more by questions of geography and the perceived strength of the Spanish state than by insurrectionary theory. For Democrats in provincial capitals such as Granada and Málaga, facing continual police surveillance and repression

and the presence of large military garrisons, the prospect of success for a revolt in the summer of 1861 would have seemed slight. For them, the example of Garibaldi with his mobile group of volunteers freeing Italy from Bourbon and Habsburg rule by raising the South in rebellion, however inspiring, had little relevance to Spain. By contrast, for Democrats in remoter, un-garrisoned and lightly or un-policed smaller towns and villages, who enjoyed closer ties with the rural labouring population which they had begun to recruit into *carbonari* associations, the daring example of Garibaldi was more relevant. Indeed during 1860 and the first half of 1861 Garibaldi became central to the rhetoric and style of local Democrat leaders throughout the borderlands of Granada, Málaga and Córdoba.

Even in larger towns such as Loja and Antequera, still without railway connections and the telegraph only recently been installed (Loja), or still not installed (Antequera), Democrats could envisage that an insurrection, supported by a mass of affiliates in city and countryside, might stretch the resources of the state beyond its capacity to resist. The weakness of the state away from the provincial capitals, the complicity of local municipal authorities in the establishment of mutualist societies that doubled as clandestine Democrat cells, even the occasional paternalistic nod of approval from local landowners, all encouraged a certain defiant optimism and blindness to the power of the state.⁷

Upon returning from Granada to convey the decision of his *confreres* in Loja, Pérez recalled being faced by a barrage of 'insults and taunts from the associates: that prudence was cowardliness; good sense, treachery'. A meeting was convened in the house of the young Ramón Calvo de Jiménez. Lasting three days and two nights, attended by delegates throughout the region, Loja's Democrats decided upon an armed uprising and authorised Pérez to select a date for the start. The veterinarian-blacksmith chose Monday 24 June, the festival of Saint John.

The authorities in Loja were prepared. On the morning of 24 June (three days after the Molina uprising) Pérez was arrested and confined to the house of Alcalde Corregidor Henríquez and was to be escorted to Granada on the following day.⁸ The 'people massed and in a threatening mood' promptly occupied the main square, persuading Henríquez to transfer Pérez to his house on security of the deposit of an identity card. Pérez retired to his bed until Thursday when a Civil Guard officer called with a warrant for his arrest issued by the *juzgado* of Alhama.⁹ Helped by his wife and another woman who distracted guards posted outside the house, Pérez escaped on a horse 'like a thunderbolt'.

He rode east to the Campiña de las Salinas, a saline depression on the border between Granada and Málaga, where armed followers had been ordered to concentrate. Located at the convergence of the Málaga-Iznájar and Granada roads, source of the region's salt, Salinas was familiar to most people. Soon joined by 'one thousand valiant men from Loja, Iznájar,

Villanueva de Trabuco, Archidona and Las Fuentes' (was he thinking of Garibaldi's 'One Thousand'?), who acclaimed him as their leader, Pérez marched his forces north throughout the Friday night arriving at Iznájar on Saturday morning. Leaving his forces on the edge of town, he walked with 20 men to the Council building where they requested arms, ammunition, rations and tobacco.¹⁰

Although Iznájar's Council complied, the Civil Guard detachment resisted, surrendering only after a two-hour gun battle in which five men were wounded. Pérez, himself suffering a wound, intervened to ensure that the captured guards became prisoners rather than the first victims of the Revolution, as some of his men would have liked.¹¹ The Council having approved supplies, Pérez issued a proclamation:

Citizens: all who feel sacred love for the liberty of their fatherland, take up your arms and unite with your comrades: he who does not will be a coward or a bad Spaniard. Our mission is to defend the rights of man, as the democratic press advocates, respecting property, the domestic hearth and all opinions. In name of the *Centro Revolucionario*, Rafael Pérez del Alamo, 28 June 1861.¹²

At 4 p.m., weighed down with supplies (2,000 rations of bread, ham and wine, and 200 pounds of tobacco), Pérez marched his men south-east to Loja, led by four musicians plucked from the town band.¹³

Crossing the River Genil at Cuesta Valerma with the help of barges and ropes, in the early evening the rebels met a government force at Campiña Grande de Campo-Agro, comprising Civil Guards, excise guards, road workers and 74 *provinciales*. After an 'obstinate struggle' the enemy retreated with the *provinciales* joining the rebels. Pérez spent the night at the Cortijo de Narváez belonging to *progresista* Alderman Jacinto Cantero while most of the rebel force gathered on the heights to the north and west of Loja to be joined by more volunteers. By Sunday morning Pérez counted 6,000 'very determined and mostly armed men', organised into battalions of 700 men, companies of 100 and platoons of 25, all 'with their respective chiefs, officers, sergeants and corporals'.

At daybreak Pérez gave orders to march on Loja. The rebels took up positions in the Sierra around 'that beautiful city', rations, arms and munitions were requested from the Council who were advised to order government forces to evacuate the city. At 12.00 noon the main rebel force entered Loja, government forces beating a swift retreat. Pérez recalled entering 'amidst patriotic hymns which increased the enthusiasm and support of almost all the population'.¹⁴ The rebels succeeded in holding Loja for five days until departing through the Sierra de Loja on Thursday 4 July.

The secrecy surrounding the conspiracy that preceded the occupation of Loja shaped the way that it was reported and has been remembered. Too

frank an account of what went on during occupation, depending where the narrator stood politically, might invite either prosecution or retribution. The three newspapers that were best placed to report on events – *La Andalucía* of Seville, *La Ilustración* of Málaga and *La Crónica* of Madrid – were immediately shut down.¹⁵ Pérez, more concerned with justifying the causes of the ‘Revolution’ and with tracing its consequences for the Democrat party, dedicated a mere paragraph to the occupation in his 1872 account. Yet the ‘Revolution of Loja’ has left an impressively long wake in Spanish and European historiography.¹⁶

As with the abortive uprisings of 1857 and 1859, the Democrat press either disowned the movement in the case of *La Discusión*, whose editor lavished attention instead on events in Italy, or treated it as harmless hi-jinks of the kind to be expected from the South, in the case of *El Pueblo*.¹⁷ The regime, however, knew that these newspapers were involved in the movement, and throughout July the subscribers complained, especially from Andalucía, that copies were not reaching them.¹⁸ Later, however, Republican historians recognised the Revolution of Loja as a watershed, Nicolás Estévez characterising it as ‘the first popular, frankly socialist movement in Spain’ without the involvement of the armed forces.¹⁹ To Fernando Garrido the peaceful, civic and democratic character of the movement demonstrated the readiness of the Spanish people for the vote and full inclusion in the Nation.²⁰

Initially, the Madrid press was bemused by the movement, *La Correspondencia de España* speculating that the plan of the rebels was to ‘defraud the public purse... (and)... to make a great contraband’, an activity traditionally associated with this region.²¹ Rumours soon gathered. Had the rebellion been orchestrated by Protestants commanded from Gibraltar seeking to take advantage of a mission-starved Andalusian countryside?²² Had Socialism taken a precocious hold over the Andalusian peasantry?²³ Perhaps the uprising had been orchestrated by Narváez from his exile in Paris in order to embarrass his rival O’Donnell and secure the return of *moderado* rule and his own return to his beloved Loja.²⁴ Or perhaps O’Donnell had provoked the uprising in order to justify the repression of Democrats thereby trumping the Moderados’ strongest card, a view supported by *La Discusión*.²⁵

With time, most contemporary observers stressed external factors exploiting the candour and misery of the Andalusian peasantry, a cue adopted by most later historians who almost universally have used the Revolution of Loja as an example of pre-political or proto-Anarchist agrarian protest against an unjust *desamortización*, a product of a moral economy inherited from the Ancien Regime, displaying timeless Andalusian qualities of ‘*unión*’ and collective protest of the *jornalero*.²⁶ The Revolution of Loja was therefore not the dawning of a democratic age but part of a southern tradition of agrarian social protest by those dispossessed by the Liberal property revolution and the onset of rural capitalism.²⁷

Although the main protagonists kept their lips sealed on the causes and objectives of the Revolution, even during the lengthy military trials that followed its dispersal and defeat, Madrid's major newspapers kept the public informed of events. Two anonymous observers, neither with any previous knowledge of the secret society (hence no inkling of what had been planned), recorded first-hand accounts. Finally, Narváez in Paris received almost hourly reports on the events from his family and friends in Loja.²⁸ What follows is an amalgam of these reports.

Day 1 (29 June)

Like the 1830 Revolution in Paris and the birth of Belgium as a nation-state, the Revolution of Loja broke out during an opera production.²⁹ Early Saturday evening the audience in Loja's theatre was waiting for a *zarzuela* to begin when Alcalde Corregidor Henríquez entered to inform the house that the function was cancelled and they should return to their homes. During the previous night *cortijo* owners had received reports from their overseers of rebels searching their estates for arms, ammunition and rations while chanting patriotic and Republican slogans. Henríquez evidently intended to negotiate a deal with Pérez instructing Narváez's nephew Rafael not to mention the blacksmith's name in his report to his uncle 'in order not to alarm him'.³⁰

Although Rafael Narváez did not accuse Henríquez of complicity with the rebels, as others would do later, he considered the behaviour of the authorities to be 'extremely criminal' claiming that they knew which houses in Loja were used for enlistment and oath taking. By believing that that mob could be 'amicably convinced' Henríquez showed extreme weakness and naivety. Pepe, Rafael's brother, was less charitable, believing that Henríquez was deliberately playing for time in order to put himself at the head of the movement once it had become clear that the Loja and its surrounding towns were joining the rebellion. Why else should he have delayed reporting the events to the provincial governor until 12 p.m. on Saturday night, 14 hours after being informed of the first skirmish at the Narváez Cortijo de la Torre on Friday?³¹

Realising that Pérez would not negotiate and that an invasion of the city was imminent, Henríquez convened an extraordinary Council session to discuss the rebels' request (on notepaper headed 'Centro Revolucionario de Andalucía') for 6,000 rations of bread, ham and cheese.³² Why did the rebels wait until Sunday morning before entering Loja? Pepe Narváez believed they were waiting instructions from 'Aguilar, the one of Antequera, who is commanding them'.³³ Indeed, Manuel María Aguilar, Antequera alderman, was already under investigation and would soon be arrested and transported to Málaga.

Day 2 (30 June)

On Sunday morning at daybreak (4 a.m.) Pérez repeated his request for rations, arms and munitions claiming to have 6,000 men at his command. Receiving no reply he ordered Henríquez to evacuate government forces and instructed his own forces to advance. In shirtsleeves, some armed with clubs, others with shotguns, the first squad of some 200 rebels entered the city at 7 a.m. unopposed.³⁴ The authorities ordered bells tolling for Sunday mass to be silenced. At 8 a.m. a second rebel force entered Loja led by the wind band. Taking up positions in the main square, the rebel commander invited Henríquez to appoint a commission to accompany rebels in the requisitioning of food from retail stores. At 11.30 a.m., finally convinced that there would be no resistance, Pérez led the main force down from the Sierra directly to his house on the Carrera which became the rebel headquarters.

The arrival of the 'President of the Society' was the signal for those who had taken the oath to join the uprising. Although an estimated 1500 *lojeños* came out to support their leader, Pérez later lamented 'the failure of half of the members to act on their word'.³⁵ In the short term, however, already buoyed by their unimpeded entry to Loja, the rebels were bolstered by this support and by the arrival of men from many other towns in the region. Pepe reported to the Duke:

News of the retreat of government forces... has spread throughout the countryside with the speed of lightening... The whole of Loja has answered Pérez's call, as have all the people of the countryside, all the artisans and many more comfortably off, leaving the fields deserted and the *cortijos* closed. Montefrío, Salar, Sagra, Algarinejo, Fuente de Serna (sic), Iznájar, Entredicho (Villanueva de Tapia), Trabuco, Zafarraya, Alhama and Vélez have sent their people.³⁶

Pérez quickly set about organising Loja's defence against an anticipated assault from forces reported heading from Granada. Barricades were constructed at the Granada gate from carriages and theatre furnishings, on the bridge crossing the Genil from poplars cut from the Paseo, and at the Mesón de Arroyo on the Málaga road from stagecoaches and poplars. Meanwhile, small groups spread out throughout the city gathering weapons (helped by intelligence from household servants) and instructing inhabitants to keep their doors open.³⁷ The requisitioning of arms was described to the Duke as orderly.³⁸ The Royal gunpowder monopoly was commandeered peacefully and a carriage loaded with iron bars heading for Granada was requisitioned. A witness described 100 blacksmiths working around the clock producing clubs, pikes, swords and spears, 'in fact, it seemed like the revolution of Masaniello in Sicily'.³⁹

Keen to arm his followers as quickly as possible, Pérez was also attentive to their material needs. Initially he offered the Society members a daily wage of 5 reales. However, with cash hard to come by, fulfilment of this offer was put off each day in favour of direct rations.⁴⁰ Meals were served in the Carrera on trestle tables. The Convent of La Victoria became the quartermaster's store, stocked initially from two captured cartloads of tobacco. Each rebel was equipped with a passbook and invited to collect a daily tobacco ration.

Having announced their presence throughout the city, the rebels took over communications with the outside world. Telegraph operator José Luis Díaz was prohibited from sending messages 'on pain of death' (although messages to Málaga continued to get through).⁴¹ The post coach was detained upon entering Loja, correspondence was confiscated and placed with the Administration with orders not to be touched.⁴² *Lojeños* were forbidden from leaving the city without permission and from sending or receiving any written messages.

Early in the afternoon shots were exchanged between the rebels and two companies of Córdoba infantry who promptly retreated; the only armed action of the day. Barricade and trench building continued into the evening.⁴³ At 8 p.m. Pérez, Calvo and Joaquín Narváez of Iznájar, linking shoulders, led a procession around the illuminated city after which 'everything became quiet and the night passed in the greatest calm'.⁴⁴

Day 3 (1 July)

Bugles sounded reveille at 3.30 a.m. At 6 a.m. 'Citizen Pérez de Alamo, Chief of the forces mobilised in this city' issued a band thanking the 'loyal population for the spontaneous illumination of the previous night' and urging them to repeat the action each night, offering those poor who were unable to afford oil and lamps to equip themselves from his house on the Carrera. At 8 a.m. Pérez inspected his forces, this time on horseback and with sword drawn, always accompanied by 'an adjutant, mounted on his mule, one Mellado, a dealer in cattle'. A witness confirmed that

The revolutionary force was composed of the following contingents: Loja, Salar, Zagra, Fuentes de Cesna, Villanueva del Rosario, Algarinejo, some from Archidona and Antequera, Periana, Viñuela, Alhama, Alfarnete, Alfarnetejo, Los Chorreros, and all the labourers of Iznájar, comprising a total of seven or eight thousand men, of whom only 1500 possessed firearms, the rest carried lances, sword-sticks, dress-swords, sabres, and swords of all ages and times, for some looked very original.⁴⁵

At noon, upon news that four companies of government forces were approaching from Málaga, Pérez accompanied by his brother Cristino led

1,000 men to take up positions in small groups in the Sierra to the south of Loja. Fighting raged throughout the afternoon with the rebels pushed back into the city by superior fire.⁴⁶ Then, much to the rebels' surprise, the enemy commander sounded a retreat setting up camp for the night at the Cortijo de los Abades (currently location of the service area on the Seville–Granada motorway). Not realising that the retreat was prompted by a shortage of ammunition the rebels 'took great heart' but decided not to go in pursuit. Three hundred rebels remained in the Sierra, the rest returning with 'the band always playing' to the city 'that, on orders of the chief... was completely illuminated'.⁴⁷ At 8 p.m. Pérez, 'his face etched with happiness and satisfaction at the flight of the enemy' (which he expected to surrender on the following day!), marched his 'one thousand' back through the city to La Carrera led by the wind band. At 10 p.m., the rebels having feasted, Loja returned to a 'complete calm'.⁴⁸

Day 4 (2 July)

On Tuesday at daybreak a reveille was sounded in the Plaza. Government forces camped at the Cortijo de los Abades, still lacking ammunition, retreated across the Sierra de Loja to Alfarate, enabling Pérez further to consolidate his hold over the resources of the city and the minds of its inhabitants. At 7.30 a.m. a full Council attended by major tax payers met in extraordinary session to approve Pérez's request for 6,000 reales. There was evidently some reluctance for a witness reported that at 10 a.m. Henríquez was marched to the Council building 'between bayonets', his escort collecting the priest of the parish of San Gabriel on the way so as to lend further weight to the proceedings. To convince the Council to part with such a large sum, Pérez promised that the loan, as well as forced contributions already received from Manuel de Campos (1,000 reales), the tax collector Silverio Ruiz (1,000 reales) and José Orejón (3,700 reales), would be repaid from the proceeds of salt sales, a pledge that carried little weight given that rebels were helping themselves to salt free of charge.⁴⁹ Pérez's second pledged would have been more reassuring:

Señores: peace has been preserved in the population and I offer to keep it like this. While I still have a drop of blood, no *vecino* will suffer abuse; those attempting it will first have to step over my dead body.⁵⁰

The Council agreed to the loan to be shared among 17 *mayores contribuyentes* (at 4,500 reales each).⁵¹

As more rebels arrived from towns in eastern Malaga and western Granada, subsistence became more urgent. By Tuesday evening, with between six and eight rebels occupying the city, Pérez ordered 14,000 rations to be prepared for Wednesday morning.⁵² The collection began immediately with the

removal of 16 *arrobos* of cheese from Francisco Fernández de Córdoba's store and similar amounts, as well as more than 300 hams from the stores of other landowners. Loja's three principal millers were ordered to provide all the flour they had stock in exchange for bills of receipt. Pérez relaxed his strictures on temperance by allowing 10 *arrobos* of *aguardiente* to be taken from the excise administration.⁵³

During the afternoon, with no enemy to face, the rebels tightened their grip on Loja. Houses were searched for a second time but without yielding more weapons.⁵⁴ *Vecinos*, 'even the washerwomen', were forbidden from leaving the city although an exception was made for the families of notables, 'Juan Collados and family, Diego Martínez, the Señores Campos, Fernando Campos and family, José Córdoba and family', who were met by an advance guard of excise guards and government troops to be escorted to Granada. More barricades were constructed from street paving and trees. Stocks of hemp were commandeered to make slings.⁵⁵

At evening prayers off-duty rebels formed up behind Pérez and Calvo in the Carrera and marched down to the Mesón del Arroyo and back again to the Plaza preceded by the band 'playing alternately the Hymn of Riego, that of Maella and the Tragala'. The rebels then dispersed, some to the Sierra, others to the barricades, and others to their houses.

Day 5 (3 July)

No reveille was sounded at daybreak on Wednesday. Nor was the usual procession held through the Calle Real, a practice observed since the first morning of the occupation. On hearing that an officer had presented himself at the barricades near the Málaga gate to request surrender, Pérez 'went down on horseback at great speed, dressed in black, wearing a straw hat and carrying a travelling bag'. After a short parley he returned 'at speed' to report that government forces were 'dying of hunger and wanting to surrender', but that the officer had refused to accept his condition that they leave their arms in the countryside before entering the city (a witness commenting that 'only imbeciles ... could have believed such absurd news').⁵⁶

Pérez then issued the customary morning band instructing 'all *vecinos* to take to the streets in the unfortunate case of troops entering the city', ordering those with balconied houses to leave their doors open so that they could be used for defence, and inviting all food shops to provide an account for what they had already supplied to the rebels and what stocks remained.⁵⁷ To reanimate the population Calvo, holding up a large sky blue, red and white banner with 'DEMOCRACIA' embroidered in its centre, led a procession around the city behind the wind band.⁵⁸

During the morning Pérez supervised the fortification of Narváez's palace and various other strategic points throughout the city. Frantic gathering of rations continued for what was now a sizeable rebel army. Failing to extract

500 fanegas of wheat from the store of Francisco Fernández de Córdoba, who had already fled the city, Pérez turned again to the Council. At noon, in a full session attended by major taxpayers, the Council approved a request for 1,000 *fanegas* of wheat from the *pósito* of which 600 were promptly delivered. An attempt to generate revenue from salt sales failed with only one buyer appearing. The stock of all shoe and sandal shops was then divided among the rebels.

For lunch off-duty rebels feasted on meat and ham served on trestles set up in Carrera, the Calle del Duque, the Plaza and the Calle Real. During the afternoon Pérez and Calvo paraded around the city behind the wind band to maintain morale, as government forces approached from various directions. Combat was avoided and in the evening off-duty rebels returned to the Plaza behind the band. The night passed quietly.

Day 6 (4 July)

At daybreak on Thursday again no bugle reveille was sounded. Instead *lojeños* woke up to find a printed order from Pérez that women and children should not go out into the streets, that all men should leave for the countryside and that the doors of houses should be left open. Sentries posted in each street ensured that the order was enforced, 'the town soon being left in the most profound silence'. At 8 a.m. Pérez, mounted on a large chestnut horse with 'three or four other leaders', appeared in the Plaza and the Carrera to address a gathering of those rebels who were not in the Sierra or manning the barricades. In a 'disturbed and unintelligible voice' he gave his farewell, appealing to his supporters to leave the city to engage government forces in the countryside so as to preserve life. He advised those choosing to remain not to resist, insult or attack government forces.⁵⁹ 'Wearing a dark suit, a silk waistcoat, a straw hat trimmed with black ribbon, carrying a travel case, with sword drawn and a revolver belonging to Francisco (Fernández) de Córdoba, mounted on a chestnut horse belonging to D Joaquín de Campos', Pérez then left Loja by the Sierra in the direction of Alhama.⁶⁰ Calvo, wearing a 'black suit and straw hat, mounted and carrying a drawn sabre', left Loja by the Genil bridge.

At 8 a.m. bugle calls announced the start of battle and firing opened between a rebel post and a vanguard company of the Battalion of San Fernando. Fighting around and within the city continued until 3 p.m. when a ceasefire was arranged between Teodoro López, rebel commander of the barricade at the Mesón de Arroyo, and Brigadier Prat. Sporadic firing continued until 5 p.m. when the streets were reported empty and most doors firmly shut.⁶¹ At 6 p.m., three hours after the surrender at the barricade, 12 hours after the departure of the main rebel force, General Serrano and his commanders, accompanied by Henríquez and the Council, followed by 'troops from all directions', clambered over the barricades to enter a seemingly deserted

city. There was no formal surrender as the chiefs, accompanied by some 300 men, had long since departed. Other rebels had returned to their houses in Loja, others were returning to their towns or remained hidden in the Sierra: 'there was no submission... only a complete dispersal'.⁶²

From the outset, Pérez's intention was to take the provincial capital after gathering more forces at Alhama. By the fourth day of the occupation, Pérez claimed to have 31 battalions, half of them armed, requiring 28,000 rations per day. On his estimate of 700 for a battalion, this was a rebel army of 21,000 men. No witness, however, counted more than 8,000 while most estimates were between five and seven. Pérez recalled that morale remained high and that the initial victories in skirmishes with the enemy strengthened his men's resolve 'giving them a consistency which they had lacked, deserving a special mention the proper and hard-fought action of day two (Monday) which lasted eight hours and in which we made the Army retreat two leagues'.⁶³

In the face of a massive deployment of government forces, including artillery sent from Madrid, after receiving 'commissions from all social classes begging me to leave to avoid the disastrous effects of artillery and the rigours of an assault', noting the 'laments of women' and 'the failure of half of the affiliates to keep to their word', Pérez resolved to evacuate the city. Distracting Serrano's cavalry by deploying a guerrilla battalion against them on the plain, the main rebel force escaped unnoticed through canyons into the Sierra. Attempts to cut off the rebel retreat failed in the face of heavy rebel fire, enabling Pérez to lead his forces across the Sierra towards Zafarraya and Alhama from where he hoped to 'revive the agonised revolution'.

Zafarraya's Council had already demonstrated its hostility to the Revolution on Wednesday by gathering all the 'pikes and mattocks' in the town and placing them at the disposal of the chief of military operations against Loja.⁶⁴ When Pérez arrived there on Thursday evening, men were still working in the fields gathering the harvest. To avoid difficulty the Council agreed to hand over bread, rice, bacon and chickpeas and allowed the rebels to spend the night at Ventas de Zafarraya (where the *vivas* to Garibaldi had been heard in February).⁶⁵

Early on Friday morning Pérez crossed the Sierra de Júrtiga towards Alhama leading between 300 and 400 men. The rebels could have matched Alhama's improvised force of 100 'honourable men' armed with shotguns which the Mayor, Eduardo Montes, had mustered at the start of the rebellion. But rather than risk loss of life for no strategic benefit, Pérez pitched his Democrat banner on a hill in sight of Alhama, inviting Montes and Alhama's tax administrator to come out to meet him, and calling upon all patriotic *alhameños* to join the rebels in their march on Granada. In exchange for 2,000 rations Pérez promised not to invade the city.⁶⁶

Pérez then retreated by Las Pilas to await more forces before the march on Granada.⁶⁷ This delay allowed a superior government force to catch up.

Although Pérez's men put up a good fight, many having served in the army, the rebel force was defeated and dispersed.⁶⁸ After wandering in the hills of Alhama for two days, Pérez returned to Loja where he spent Monday night in the house of 'my good friend D. José Cerrillo', moving to the house of his sister before returning to the wooded sierras of Alhama where he received sanctuary for several weeks on the Cortijo de Pera, property of a friend, Francisco López de Cózar, a retired Hussar colonel, before travelling on to Madrid.⁶⁹

Democratic uprising or peasant jacquerie?

What does the five-day occupation of Loja reveal about the aims and beliefs of the rebels? The slogans uttered by the rebels or seen decorating their banners were cited in the press as evidence of their ideological confusion and failure to conform to recognised party orthodoxies. A witness described the men arriving at Pérez's camp on the eve of the Revolution as

those poor devils, estate workers, who hardly dare to sleep beneath a roof, some called *vivas* to the Republic, others that salt should be free, others that taxes should not be paid, others that *cajillas* (cigarettes) should be at two *cuartos*, others that God left all the land to our father Adam, and that as we are all descended from him we should be equal in fortunes; in sum, a halo of nonsense.⁷⁰

After evacuating Loja rebels were reported to be wandering from town to town 'requesting rations... some calling for the programme of Manzanares, others *vivas* to the Republic, others for the suppression of *consumos* (excise taxes)... all revealing a confused plan'.⁷¹ In fact, these rebels were expressing quite faithfully the propaganda and manifestos of the Democrat party while also calling for fulfilment of promises made by O'Donnell in his Manifesto of Manzanares of July 1854.

Yet rebel slogans exceeded the classic liberal patriotism of Pérez's own Iznájar declaration or the Manifesto of Manzanares. During the first major skirmish on Day 3, rebels called across the lines 'Long live the Republic, those who fought in the African campaign, join us!'.⁷² Other slogans, such as 'Death to Pius IX! Viva Garibaldi!', were taken as evidence of the part played of Protestant propaganda in fomenting the rebellion. Indeed, the courts in Granada attempted unsuccessfully to indict imprisoned Protestants Manuel Matamoros, José Alhama and Miguel Trigo, as instigators of the Revolution.⁷³ In line with the official position of the Democrat party on the Monarchy, Pérez opposed any explicit Republicanism, castigating those who called 'Long live the Republic', proposing as more likely to appeal to *lojeños*, the slogans 'Long live Liberty! Long live the Queen! Long live Democracy! Down with the Government!'.⁷⁴

The official banner of the rebellion provides the clearest evidence of the objectives of the rebellion. Suspended from a pole 'of roughly worked poplar, with a lance head at its head', the banner was made of 'white, red and blue taffeta, with DEMOCRACIA embroidered in vast letters in the middle, and, on the ribbons, "Horror at vice", "Tolerance for all men of politics, whatever their opinion", "universal suffrage", "only one chamber"'.⁷⁵ Another report had the ribbons proclaiming 'Long live Democracy!', 'Morality', 'Respect for Property', 'Down with Tyrants', 'Obey the Law'.⁷⁶ Carried around the city on each day of the occupation, this banner accompanied the rebels on their retreat for the Sierra on Thursday 4 July and was pitched on a hill facing Alhama in the midst of 300–400 rebels on the following morning.⁷⁷ Another banner carried at the head of a company of 200 rebels from Algarinejo was also tricolour with 'Democracia' emblazoned at its centre, with ribbons embroidered with different slogans such as 'Horror against Crime', 'Respect for Property' and 'Faith in Religion'.⁷⁸

If slogans and banners confirm the Democrat orthodoxy of the Revolution, the omnipresence of wind music symbolised its civic and patriotic temper. From when four musicians of Iznájar were persuaded to join the rebels on Friday 28 June until they evacuated Loja left for the Sierra on 4 July, wind music was an essential part of the uprising.⁷⁹ During the march to Loja musicians from several other towns joined the rebels.⁸⁰ Before entering Loja, Pérez sent for the 24 piece municipal band that was ordered to lead the advance guard into the city on Sunday 30 June.⁸¹ The same band then led the way as the rebels went round the city gathering arms and supplies, dignifying what might otherwise have been an alarming door-to-door collection.⁸² By the time the main rebel force entered Loja behind Pérez, also preceded by a wind band comprising the Iznájar musicians,⁸³ *lojeños* had already experienced a melodious procession throughout much of the city centre, comprising rebels, the municipal band and a commission appointed by the Council to supervise the gathering of supplies.⁸⁴ Loja's municipal band, and those of other towns, accompanies parades and processions throughout the occupation and impromptu concerts were held at the various barricades. Even when the rebels finally abandoned Loja on Thursday morning, they were accompanied by the band. Only when they had entered the Sierra headed for Zafarraya were orders given to the musicians to return to Loja.⁸⁵

Apart from the omnipresence of patriotic wind music, the barricades built at the main entrances to the city offer further evidence of the civic, democratic nature of the occupation. Constructed by the rebels within hours of occupying the city, these piles of coaches, shutters, doors and furniture were more a symbolic than a practical defence against government fire, let alone artillery, although the barricades were later strengthened with paving stones and bricks. Throughout the five days of the occupation these barricades were manned by companies of rebels. Banners were placed on them, particularly on the barricade at the Granada gate. The final act of submission was signed after a drawn-out process of negotiation at the Mesón del Arroyo barricade

enabling most of the rebel force to slip away from the city into the Sierra de Loja unnoticed. Loja's barricades were a deliberate attempt to place the rebellion alongside other revolutions, such as February Revolution in Paris in February 1848 and its echoes in Madrid in March 1848 and again in July 1854 and July 1856, marking the boundary between Democratic Spain and the Spain of an unreformed Ancien Regime.

Twentieth-century interpretations of the Loja Revolution focussed on its presumed agrarian causes. The mountainous Axarquía region of Málaga had a history of agrarian uprisings, an uprising in 1840 aimed at dividing up estates attracting support from the same towns that sent contingents of rebels to Loja in July 1861.⁸⁶ Numerous reports confirm that rebels expected some agrarian benefit from their decision to journey to Loja in early July 1861. A correspondent in Antequera explained that people had flocked to Loja because

they have been made to believe in those towns that the redistribution of common land (*los bienes de todos*), municipal and state properties, was certain and that whoever failed to join the movement would not share in the booty. One insurrectionist stated that he had gone to Loja so that he could not be accused of failing to do something for his sons.⁸⁷

El Reino reported that rebels from Antequera had been promised 5 *fanegas* each of property from state lands, and that they already 'spoke of the different properties within the municipal boundaries as if they were already theirs'.⁸⁸

During the occupation of Loja, a rebel who had placed on guard by a spring to prevent government forces from cutting off the water supply, when asked how much he was paid replied, 'Would I be so ungrateful as to demand a wage for two or three days of work from those who are going to adjudicate an estate (*finca*) which is sufficient for feeding the whole of my family comfortably?'⁸⁹ One correspondent insisted that the rebellion was primarily about the promise of land, not democratic principles, recounting how one *jornalero* had gone out of Loja with his family to hold a celebratory meal on his new plot while others had already borrowed money on property they considered to be theirs. Meanwhile, a rich proprietor visiting his estate found only his overseer's wife who reported that her husband was out in the fields organising the subdivision of the estate, adding that the owner was welcome to visit whenever he liked because he had always been a 'good master'.⁹⁰ Narváez's nephew confirmed to his uncle that, although the rebels had shown punctilious respect for property during the occupation, the rebellion did contain an element of agrarian expectation:

It cannot be said that so and so was or was not (in favour of the uprising); all those who live from a daily wage or salary and many much better off, and even many farmers of substance answered the call made by Pérez.

Some also, fearing for their haciendas, mixed and fraternised with the principal leaders.⁹¹

In spite of this evidence of agrarian expectations among the rebels, these should be seen in the context, not of twentieth-century peasant revolution, but of nineteenth-century Liberal agrarian reform. In mid-nineteenth-century Spain the idea of a Liberal *reparto* that should yield social as well as economic benefits was still much in the air. The Loja Revolution coincided with the end of an 80-year cycle of seigniorial, religious and civil disentanglement. In eastern Alta Andalucía, a region in which smallholdings jostled with medium-sized estates, and where tenants of municipal properties were acquiring the economic means to operate as small farmers on their own account, the completion of the civil disentanglement was fraught with conflicts.⁹² As we have seen, municipal councils in Loja, Alhama and Antequera since the Bienio had been active in identifying flagrant cases of illegal encroachment upon municipal land, and in encouraging smallholding tenants to stake their claims in petitions to Councils. By July 1861 the three cities had already decided to pre-empt further conflict by declaring disputed properties as common land, thereby exempted from further disentanglement, or, by ensuring that smaller claimants received a share of privatised land. The optimism and foolhardiness observed among the rebels derived from this recent experience. *Carbonari* initiation ceremonies and statutes also included the promise of a share in the *reparto* for the poor and landless.⁹³

In this sense, there was a gulf between leaders such as Pérez who were insistent about the need to respect and protect private property, much of it recently disentailed and of questionable legality, and their followers who still saw the liberal *reparto* implicit in the 1855 law of civil *desamortización* as unfinished. The process of attaining land through the *desamortización* required demonstrating current use of land with the proof of recent payment of a rent (*canon*). Tenants and Councils knew what land had been occupied illegally and it was this potential *botín*, administered by friendly municipal authorities, that must have inspired many rebels to flock to Loja in early July 1861.

Conclusion

The Revolution of Loja was no ordinary town riot or provincial military uprising. Much less did it resemble 'those barbaric *morisco* attacks of the middle ages' as Gutiérrez de la Vega described the events in his letter to Narváez.⁹⁴ Rather, this was the first civilian uprising to establish itself in one place for more than a few hours (barricades in Madrid in March and April 1848 were cleared within hours and Cámara's followers in 1857 and 1859 were constantly on the move). The Revolution was the outcome of rising expectations among Democrat leaders and *Carbonari* society members in a

constellation of towns, hamlets and *cortijos* in the mountainous borderlands of Granada, Málaga and Córdoba, which the provincial authorities and the Civil Guard found harder to police than their provincial capitals.

A reluctant revolutionary, Pérez proved to be an effective rebel leader who maintained his authority over a movement which could have easily got out of control, as happened at Arahál in 1857. His assessment on the eve of the Revolution that conditions for a successful uprising in the summer of 1861 were unpromising proved correct. The absence of revolutionary outbreaks elsewhere meant that the government could bide its time with the suppression of the movement. However, this gave the Revolution breathing space and allowed the rebels time to demonstrate that a democratic Spain was not as disordered and diabolical as the conservative press had predicted. The Revolution therefore soon found a prominent position for itself in the progressive historiography of Spain.

In spite of its democratic orthodoxy and moderation historians have stubbornly held on to the view that the Revolution of Loja was a protest of the dispossessed against the negative consequences of a Liberal property revolution that had excluded most people from its benefits; in one recent view:

a faithful reflection of an unsustainable social situation . . . the city of Loja reproduced in the Nineteenth Century the scheme of the agro-cities of the Andalucian interior: important presence of properties of seigniorial origin, great social inequalities and a great number of inhabitants subsisting in a situation of misery and calamity.⁹⁵

Yet there is little evidence that the revolt arose from misery or from a yawning gulf between classes. Rather, this period experienced sustained increases in wages and employment (particular in road building and railway construction), enhanced access to land through the *desamortización* and expanding opportunities in agriculture. The testimonies of the rebels confirm this optimism and rising expectations.

Rather than a widening of the gulf between rich and poor, this period witnessed the growth of a middle class and the diffusion of middle-class values and patterns of consumption among wider sections of the population. It was Moderados in Loja who felt persecuted on the eve of the Revolution as *Pátrios* whittled away their power, criticised their conspicuous consumption, mocked *Polacos* and insulted their favourite parish priests. It was the increasing harassment of Democrat leaders and *carbonari* organisers by town judges and the police, pressured from the provincial capitals, from Madrid and even from Paris, that precipitated the uprising. The government now had to decide how to deal with the consequences.

6

The Council of War in Loja

Once it had become clear that no other part of Spain would second the Loja Revolution, Rafael Pérez del Alamo and other rebel commanders offered to lay down their arms and surrender in exchange for pardons. However, army commanders had been instructed not to enter negotiations with the rebels and to demand unconditional surrender.¹ This refusal to negotiate was an ominous sign. In spite of the rebels' moderation and punctilious respect for property and municipal legalities, it soon became clear that the Government had already categorised the movement as on a par with 'El Arahál' in July 1857, to be treated with the same harshness. This official intransigence posed a problem for 'a movement of people who had come to deliberate', as Fernando Garrido later described the Revolution.² The rebels saw themselves as a patriotic citizenry, courageous enough to offer the first glimpse of a democratic age to be characterised by freedom of association, freedom of conscience and universal suffrage. Yet many saw the movement as inspired by un-Spanish ideas of Socialism, Protestantism and Communism, and 'aimed at the upset and complete variation of our current social situation'.³

Orders from Madrid to General Luis Serrano, senior military commander in Loja, were that punishments should be harsh. Scores of executions were expected. Reeling from shock after the rebel occupation, *lojeños* now faced the prospect of becoming a theatre of exemplary punishment of kind experienced in the province of Seville in 1857 and 1859. Loja's protector, Narváez, was unlikely to come to their defence. Inaction and silence from the distance of his Paris exile could only redound to his benefit. The reputation of O'Donnell's Liberal Union, already tarnished for allowing the uprising to happen, would be further damaged by severe repression. Unimpeded military justice would clear Loja of Democrats and advanced Progresistas, leaving the ground for the Duke's return, setting Moderados on their way to resurgence nationally.

This chapter explores the response of Loja's leading families and clerics to the trials of rebels and instigators of the democratic movement held by the

Council of War established in the city between July and September 1861. Although prison sentences were harsh, the anticipated 'lesson' (*escarmiento*) involving mass executions did not take place. The chapter reflects on why this shift from an iron fist to a velvet glove took place.

The military suppression of the Loja Revolution was a continuation of the gradual buildup of security, particularly in Málaga, since the beginning of June, in response to intelligence on the increased activity of secret societies.⁴ This military focus on Málaga accounts for the army's delay in responding to the rebel occupation of Loja. The authorities knew of the uprising from Friday 28 June, yet the first serious skirmish between the rebels and regular forces sent occurred at noon on Monday 1 July, Málaga's military commander explaining the delay by the need to attend first to the security of his own province.⁵

The depleted state of Granada's garrison also prevented a swift response to the rebellion. At the start of the uprising the provincial capital was defended by just two companies of infantry and 80 cavalry whose prime duty was to guard the inmates of the *presidio* located at some distance from the city. Having visited Granada on 23–24 June, Pérez del Alamo expected his *confrères* in the provincial capital to rise up in support of the Revolution in Loja, even if earlier in the month they had decided against an uprising.⁶ *La Alhambra* believed that Democrats in Granada would have staged an uprising had not the military governor deployed all his forces on the first and second day of the uprising.⁷

It is not clear whether Serrano deliberately delayed the reoccupation of Loja in order to allow most of the occupying force to slip away, or whether, as Pérez claimed, the rebels cleverly slipped around enemy lines unnoticed.⁸ On the day after the rebels' departure, Narváez's estate manager Francisco Lora wrote that 'We are left like ones who see visions. The rebels had been departed six hours before the troops entered Loja. At present it is not known what has happened to eight thousand men, or where they have gone as they were not observed by the advance forces.'⁹ A *pasquín* appeared on a wall in Granada depicting a general standing over the city with a foot on each peak between whose legs the rebels are seen leaving peacefully.¹⁰

Rather than declare a state of siege, the Cabinet decided to apply the Law of 17 April 1821, a sloppily drafted martial law intended for dealing with French-backed absolutist peasants during Trienio Liberal (1820–1823).¹¹ This empowered military commanders to detain anyone found armed, absent from their towns or suspected of complicity in the rebellion and to try them in military tribunals.¹² Having allowed most of the rebels occupying Loja to escape, it was vital for Serrano to move quickly to detain as many as possible before they returned to their towns. Three larger columns were sent south into the Sierra de Loja in pursuit of the main rebel force while smaller columns of around 40 men were sent in all directions in pursuit of rebels

returning to their homes.¹³ Many small bands of rebels fearing to return to their towns were reported 'wandering through the mountains' requesting rations 'without causing damage or any other annoyance'.¹⁴ Their sufferings were only beginning.

With the end of the rebel occupation of Loja, notables who had taken flight at the start of the Revolution – principally the Narváez family – returned.¹⁵ Marfori travelled to Loja on the afternoon of Friday 5 July to test the ground with Pepe and Rafael Narváez following on Sunday 7 July.¹⁶ Although relieved by the collapse of the rebellion and pleased by the removal of Alcalde Corregidor Henríquez, Marfori was angry at the way this had been achieved, believing that the rebels had scored an impressive moral and political victory. By delaying the entry to Loja, Serrano had allowed the rebels to return to their homes, ready to repeat the exercise in the future at the moment of their choice:

What has resulted so far is that this rirraff has gone without punishment and their first attempt has come out perfectly; their organisation has been tried out and proven; and little by little they can return quietly to their houses where they await the signal for a new gathering... we are even more exposed than before.

Marfori found Loja to be in a state of shock; 'nobody is able to believe that a situation in which the town was at the disposition of four or five thousand unrestrained savages could have ended as it did; now it is all over, but what is deplorable is that situation cannot get any better'.¹⁷

After two days in Loja, Marfori was no more sanguine, observing that the same *laissez faire* attitude that had characterised the Government's dealings with Loja before the insurrection was informing its military response. The revolutionary faction had been dissolved and its members were 'parading themselves in the town, as they are doing, so I am told, in the other towns'.¹⁸ Such impunity was demonstrated (although Marfori would not have known) by Pérez's brief return to Loja on the night of 8 July, departing once the Council of War was established on the 10th.¹⁹ The leniency of the Government was 'naturally reflected in all the acts of the provincial and local authorities, instilling more and more fear among people of honour in Loja'.²⁰

Loja, then, on the eve of the arrival of the Council of War, was a disconcerting place for a Moderado. The picture Marfori painted was of rebels parading freely through the streets, 'honourable people' living in fear of a repetition of a Democrat uprising, and Progresistas terrified that the judicial authority of the State would turn its attention again to them, as it had done so brutally in 1856–1857. The only slightly less grim news for Narváez was the part played by Alcalde Corregidor Henríquez. Marfori rejected press assertions that Henríquez was in league with the rebels or that he was even a

leading member of the 'Society'. Rather Henríquez had 'believed that he had Pérez in his pocket, using him to gain support in the town against the Rosal's people (the Progresistas); Pérez then hoodwinked him using the protection which he was granted'. There were many occasions when Henríquez could have arrested Pérez but he continued to answer for him with the authorities in Granada. Only with the uprising, when Pérez imprisoned Henríquez to prevent him leaving the city, did the Alcalde Corregidor realise the dangerous game he had played, Marfori concluding that '... he has only been stupid; but a stupidity that cost dear'.²¹ In this plausible version of events, the Loja Revolution was a consequence, first of the Liberal Union's tolerance of Democrats in order to block the return of Narváez and the Moderados, and secondly, of the decision of Rosal y Badía and Loja's Progresistas to distance themselves from local politics, a result, in Félix de Arce's view, of 'their condescension with the lower class'.²²

Two days after this pessimistic prognosis, Marfori relayed better news to the Duke: the army had become more energetic in its pursuit rebels. Marfori put this down to the influence of the press and public opinion in Madrid. The news that the government had prior knowledge of a Democrat conspiracy in Andalucía, had taken no measures to prevent the uprising and, then, had deliberately allowed the rebels to escape was causing a stir in the capital. Although no state of siege had been declared, an *Auditor de Guerra* had arrived in Loja on 9 July accompanied by the Council of War. A telegraph from Madrid 'had urged them to be severe in their penalties'. Around 40 of those who had figured most prominently among the rebels had been arrested and more captives were being brought by the day. General Serrano would stay to oversee the trials. Pleasingly, the General had moved his lodgings from the house of Mariano Ceballos Henríquez, *progresista* deputy on the Provincial Council, to Narváez's brother's palace.²³

Marfori was also encouraged by progress on the political front, informing his cousin that Progresistas on the Council had begun 'to declare everything they had seen, citing the names of everybody'. As friends of the family, the three *tenientes* of the alcalde – José María Orejón, Joaquín Campos and Antonio Abad Torres – were expected to be particularly forthright in their declarations to the Council of War.²⁴ Pepe confirmed that 'the town is in a state of shock at seeing such measures. Many turn their eyes towards you imploring your intervention... in general they are in a real panic'.²⁵

Marfori was fortunate in not being present in Loja during the two months of military justice. Reassured by Serrano that the Council of War's investigation would be thorough and its sentences draconian, Marfori left for Madrid, from where he departed for France on 16 July to join his friend, cousin and protégé, General Ramón María Narváez, the Duke of Valencia.²⁶

A circular issued on 7 July by Santiago Fernández Negrete, Minister of Justice, revealed how swiftly perceptions of the Revolution of Loja had become set within a vision of a Catholic Spain under siege:

The scandalous rebellion of Loja, foolish as it may seem, has shaken the deepest foundations of the social order. The nation has witnessed with shock how the most absurd theories, those which good sense had relegated many centuries ago to realm of chimeras, have suddenly taken form and appeared, with insolent audacity, in the midst of a town that has always been religious, always submissive to authority, and always loyal to its kings . . . punishment of this crime should be exemplary as the horrific tendency of the crime demands . . . it is not sufficient to punish the crimes committed; it is necessary to avoid their repetition: you are urged with a robust hand to pull up the last root of the evil plant which has produced such dangerous fruits.

What had happened at Loja was,

. . . an attack on the Catholic principle, and eminently civilised principle, which makes order compatible with liberty, which strictly harmonises rights with duties, which protects the proprietor as it gives hope and consolation to the underprivileged, which supports authority in the exercise of its functions, and yet teaches it to be kind and generous in its leadership; to destroy the Catholic principle is to tear away the basis of the social order.

Having received only the briefest account of events the Minister concluded that the *sucesos de Loja* (*suceso* was used to refer to a crime rather than a political upheaval which could be graced with the label 'revolution') had broken the penal code in at least three areas: by attacking religion, by attacking constitutionally constituted authority and as the action of an illicit association. Moreover, like the Valladolid riots of 1854 and the Arahall rebellion 1857, the Loja insurrection had attacked property. The punishment of perpetrators of the Loja insurrection should be inflexible and exemplary, as it had been after those rebellions.²⁷

Shaken by events that were partly of his own making, Interior Minister Posada Herrera, avoiding the alarming tones of Minister of Justice, announced that the insurrection was the result of illegal associations and Socialist propaganda. Recognising newspapers as the principal source of seditious doctrines, he issued a circular tightening enforcement of laws on the press, free association in wage bargaining and vagrancy and sanctioning the application of the martial law of 17 April 1821 once sedition has been declared.²⁸ It was now left to the Minister of War, Juan Zavala, to arrange the capture and punishment of the rebels.

General Zavala resolved that the Council of War should be established in Loja rather than in Granada, and staffed by local officers of the Provincial Regiment who were familiar with adjudicating appeals relating to military recruitment. To avoid disputes that might delay military justice, Félix Alcalá Galiano, Captain General of Granada, issued an order that no legal authority other than that exercised by the *Auditor de Guerra* should have effect in the areas where the law of 17 April was to be applied.²⁹ Although Serrano sought a declaration of a state of siege, Zavala considered the martial law of 17 April as sufficient to ensure the supremacy of military justice throughout the rebel zone.³⁰ Rather than suspend civil justice, much better to harness it in the pursuit of the rebels and the investigation of illegal secret societies. The disadvantage was that the degree of cooperation of the civil authority differed from one town to another.³¹

On 9 July a Council of War comprising a President, two prosecutors, five *vocales* and eight defenders travelled to Loja where they would spend the next two months. Although the ultimate authority was the *Auditor de Guerra* in Granada, to whom all sentences had to be sent for approval before they were handed out, Serrano, as commander in chief of Loja, was granted considerable latitude in sentencing. As the Council began its hearings on 10 July, Serrano informed Zavala that he favoured life sentences in *presidios* and executions, rather than prison sentences, which might, by interning rebels locally, endanger public order.³²

The first arrests were of men captured during or immediately after the evacuation on 4 July, or brought in to Loja by military columns sent in pursuit of the disintegrating rebel army. Apart from the patrician Alcalde Corregidor, José Henríquez, 'believed to be in league with the rebels', and Juan Morales Sementi, 'pharmacist in whose shop lists of the Society had been discovered', Marfori described those arrested so far as 'shirtless' and 'low class', confirmed by their use of nicknames: Manuel Jiménez Heredia (a) Characha, 'for captaining the mobs'; José Pérez Peláez (a) Once, 'who had carried the rebel banner and defended Loja on 4 July from the Church tower'; Antonio Arjona (a) Zorriza, 'captain of the gypsies'; Gregorio Carrillo, 'ardent inciter of socialist ideas'; an anonymous 'leader of the republicans of Periana'; Blas Ruiz Ropero (a) 'El Sombrerero', 'leader of the republicans of Alhama'; Baldomero García and José Lozano of Salar; Pedro de Moya (a) Becerra of Alhama; Juan Orbes Pardo (a) El Chato, of Ventas de Zafarraya; and Ramón Calvo (a) Panorra of Loja, 'chief of the revolution' (a mistaken identity for Calvo had already fled into exile).³³ Further arrests were ordered on 5 July with the help of enrolment lists found in the pharmacy belonging to Morales Sementi.³⁴

With the arrival of the Council of War the pace of arrests quickened.³⁵ On 9–10 July 40 men were arrested, among whom were several leaders who had been conspicuously active during the occupation: Francisco Pascual Pérez (a) 'El Papelero', 'one of the chiefs and instigators of the revolution'; Miguel

López Conet, 'for leading a squad of rebels'; Francisco Mellado, 'for carrying the banner'; Manuel Fernández Martín, 'blacksmith's assistant and servant of Pérez' and so on. Included among the 40 were leaders from towns that had been enthusiastic in the despatch of contingents: Francisco Giménez, schoolmaster of Salar, Antonio Morales Mostazo of Periana, Francisco Reyes, member of the 'junta revolucionaria del Colmenar', Francisco Rico of Villanueva del Trabuco and so on.³⁶

The supply of prisoners then momentarily dwindled, as troops found town mayors and public employees reluctant to provide evidence.³⁷ On 13 July, the Minister of War demanded to know why the number of rebels so far arrested did not correspond to the numbers involved in the rebellion. Although not every one of the 8,000 involved in the uprising could be captured, Zavala urged persistence in punishing between '200 and 300 of the most guilty', proposing that if these could not be found in Loja, 'go out to the villages supported by columns and with two or three of the more active prosecutors in order to reduce to prison as many instigators as must be submitted to the military commissions'.³⁸ Serrano's zeal in carrying out the Minister's order is confirmed by the sharp increase in prisoners awaiting trial in Loja; from 31 on 6 July to 546 by 23 July (the day of the execution of Francisco Mellado in Loja).³⁹

So busy was the Military Commission by 19 July that Serrano had to request additional staff insisting that ten prosecutors were insufficient to handle the army of *paisanos* that military columns were bringing to Loja every day.⁴⁰ The mass arrests, heavy sentences, and, especially, the executions carried out in Salar on 19 July and in Loja on 23 July caused general alarm throughout the region. It had now become clear to all that the military commissions in Loja and Málaga were pursuing not simply those who had incited, led or joined the insurrection, but those known to have sympathised with it.

In late July, Serrano issued an order that only instigators should be arrested as the number arrested (365) now exceeded the number suggested (200 to 300) by the Government for 'exemplary punishment' (execution):

the moral effect is complete, because of the extraordinary terror which has gripped all the towns in the region: so many had taken an active or passive part in the uprising that those affiliated in the societies or suspected for their bad opinions have fled their houses and are wandering or in hiding a situation which if it is prolonged may well take a turn which I consider inconvenient to public order and to the intentions of the Government.⁴¹

Faced with military justice in their midst, over whom the local civil and religious authorities had little or no influence, *lojeños* turned to petitions. The new Council under José de la Casa y Robles (replaced on 24 August

by Manuel Camacho) limited itself to a letter of gratitude to the Monarch for her Government's successful suppression of the Revolution, presenting it as the work of an immoral or gullible few who had been hallucinated by 'the anti-Catholic ideas of democratic Protestantism', stressing the eternal patriotism, Catholicism and loyalty to the Monarch of the great majority of *lojeños*.⁴² Any pleading for a reduction of sentences or clemency would have been seen as an attempt to protect local interests and blunted efforts to restore Loja's reputation as 'Most Loyal and Noble City'. Hence, the first petition for clemency was organised by Victoriano Caro, *lojeño* archpriest of the Cathedral of Granada, former priest of Loja's parish of Santa Catalina and close friend of Narváez. In the political vacuum created by the rebel occupation followed by the trials, Caro spotted an opportunity for promoting both his own interests and those of the Church.

Caro began gathering signatures on 9 July following General Serrano's warning that the sentences of the military tribunal would be harsh. The petition was completed on 19 July, too late to prevent the first execution at Salar or the second in Loja itself on 23 July. Caro's troubled and tragically delayed petition laid bare the divisions within the city that had contributed to the insurrection. It also revealed much about the dilemmas facing O'Donnell in punishing a revolution which his Liberal Union was in part responsible for provoking and whose leaders shared the progressive ideals of members of the government.

The main obstacle in the way of a swift completion of the petition was the Narváez family, particularly the Duke's cousin Marfori and nephew Pepe. Marfori suspected (correctly) that the initiative for the petition had come from General Serrano, as a way of getting the Government out of its commitment to be tough and overcoming its embarrassment for not having taken swifter action. A petition for clemency from those who had most suffered from the rebellion would get the Government off the hook. A crop of death sentences for the principal leaders, followed swiftly by a magnanimous gesture from the Monarch, commuting the same sentences to life imprisonment, was the ideal solution for the Liberal Union. By blocking the petition, Marfori hoped to embarrass the government; Democrats and Progresistas in Loja should not be let off the hook for the sake of saving a floundering Liberal Union. They needed to be taught a lesson, otherwise they would repeat their depredations.⁴³

As for Pepe Narváez, the petition presented a painful dilemma. As the heir of the Duke's sick and declining brother, the Conde de la Cañada Alta, Pepe was expected to preside over the recovery of the fortunes of the Narváez family and those of the *moderado* party in Loja. Caro's petition, if successful, would grant immunity to the family's political opponents and encourage them in their impunity. Pepe therefore discouraged Caro from approaching the Duke directly and stoutly resisted pressure to sign. Yet as the Council of War became more profligate with its arrests and

sentences, blocking the petition became harder to sustain. If the Narváez family was left off the petition, its suffering would be greater in any future revolution, for not having defended Loja against unjustly harsh repression.

On the eve of the first execution in Salar, with military columns bringing in chains of prisoners every few hours, Pepe wrote to the Duke in a state of shock:

My dear Uncle: I am writing to you under the painful impression caused in me by the account of Colonel Sánchez de Aguilar and other military officers residing here, of the exemplary punishment for which this population, already terrified by similar news, is shortly to provide the theatre. According to these three men, there will be many death penalties.

Pepe had just been visited by Caro who explained that it was members of Council of War who were pressing him to gather signatures from 'the most notable people in the town' to add weight to the petition. Soon, he admitted that he too would be obliged 'to cooperate with our signatures, for if not insults would rain upon us'.⁴⁴ Shortly afterwards Pepe signed the petition.⁴⁵

On 19 July, Caro despatched the petition to the Queen, currently bathing at Santander, via the Archbishop of Granada and her confessor, Padre Claret.⁴⁶ Expressing shame that Loja had been the 'theatre to crimes of disloyalty in which the majority of the population had not taken the smallest part', the petition appealed for clemency on behalf of 'victims hallucinated by theories, which although criminal and demoralising, did not reach the point of dragging them down to the acts of cruel vandalism in which other towns in an analogous situation have been plunged'.⁴⁷

The petition arrived too late to prevent the first execution at Salar on 19 July. Close to Loja on the road to Alhama, Salar was chosen as the site for the first execution because of the violence of the rebel assault on the headquarters of the Royal Salt Monopoly at the start of the uprising.⁴⁸ The coercive presence of the state was greater in Salar than anywhere in eastern Granada. Apart from a substantial force of Salt Guard, Loja's Civil Guard contingent and the Excise Guard were also billeted there. A necessary military target for the rebels, taking Salar also had symbolic value; Narváez enjoyed the gift of the 'Principal Administrator of the Salt Factories' there. Leading Salar's Democrats were Francisco Giménez Morales (a Sandalio, schoolmaster, and José Francisco Corpus Lozano, 'head of the slingers who among other republicans invaded the city (Loja)'. A search of Lozano's house revealed 'two copies of *La Discusión* newspaper, a list of what appeared to be people signed up to work on the road and two daggers'.⁴⁹

Antonio Rosa Moreno was singled out for execution because of the influence he exercised over his fellow salt workers many of whom marched to Loja on the first day of the Revolution. Described as a 'worker of Salar' he

died by *garrote* at 8 a.m. on 19 July.⁵⁰ Fifteen other *salarenses* were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment (mostly 20 years or life in *presidio*).⁵¹

Neither Caro's petition, nor a more passionately worded plea from men awaiting trial, in Loja's jail, arrived in Santander in time to prevent the first execution in Loja.⁵² On 22 July, Francisco Mellado Fernández, a prosperous 50-year-old cattle dealer and major taxpayer, was sentenced to death by *garrote* for having acted as Pérez del Alamo's standard bearer and for being 'one of those who captained the insurgents of Loja'.⁵³ Pepe Narváez disputed that he had been so influential, believing that Mellado had been selected for exemplary punishment because he had disarmed two Civil Guards during the taking of Iznájar.⁵⁴ Perhaps his proximity to Pérez during the revolt (he acted as the blacksmith's 'adjutant' in one description) also influenced the Council of War in search of a suitable candidate for the first execution in the Revolution's hearth.

Informed at 10 a.m. on 23 July that his sentence had been approved by the *Auditor de Guerra* in Granada, Mellado fell to his knees and was helped in 'an agitated state' to the chapel to await execution in the company of Loja's three parish priests. Refusing food and spiritual comfort, Mellado protested his innocence, insisting that he had never harmed anyone and cursing Pérez for having destroyed him and his family.⁵⁵ Mellado's apparent lack of penitence and disrespect for the clergy prompted two witnesses to speculate that the prisoner was a Protestant convert.⁵⁶ However, a third, more detailed and unpublished account of the execution (the continuation of the diary of the rebel occupation of Loja kept by a friend of Narváez) refutes imputations of Protestantism, presenting Mellado's extreme behaviour on the way to the scaffold as a desperate last appeal to fellow members of the Society to come to his aid. This inevitably involved some disrespect for the clergy who encircled the prisoner throughout his final hours as he tried to get his message through to a crowd among whom he knew there to be numerous Society members.⁵⁷

For maximum effect, Mellado's execution was timed for 10 a.m. rather than at 6 a.m., the normal hour for public executions. On the morning of the execution, Loja resembled a garrison town in a war zone presided over by anxious members of the clergy. All but two shops remained closed throughout the day and private houses kept their doors closed.⁵⁸ At 8 a.m. two columns of prisoners, 89 from Periana and 120 from Colmenar, Casabermeja and Comares, arrived to join the 400 already confined in Loja's jail. At 9 a.m. a picket of 37 lancers left the square in the direction of the Mesón del Arroyo where the scaffold had been erected at the point where the barricade had stood during the occupation. Meanwhile the Luchana Battalion was deployed along the route of the procession.

At 9.30 a.m. the bells of Loja's three parish churches tolled continuously as the prisoner was escorted by a squad of infantry and cavalry to the main square where the sentence was pronounced. Upon arriving at the scaffold

and hearing his sentence for the final time, Mellado requested a cigar to which the priest obliged. The prisoner then begged everyone's forgiveness, uttering another barely comprehensible phrase that a priest took to mean that the prisoner wanted 'to sit and wait for a moment in the hope of a pardon'. Then, 'with some violence', Mellado accompanied the executioner to the scaffold. Upon tying his feet, the prisoner asked for his shoes to be removed and given to his son. Still saying the creed, Mellado died at 10.18 a.m., his body remaining exposed to the public on the scaffold until the evening when it was carried to the graveyard in a box and buried without the presence of a priest. A collection was then made by the Sisters of Mercy from Loja's three parishes to pay for 20 masses for Mellado's soul to be held in each parish with any remaining going to his widow (now burdened with seven children).⁵⁹

The events of 23 July left Loja numb with shock. Normally an assiduous daily letter writer, Pepe only resumed his correspondence with the Duke on 31 July. The anonymous diarist who had chronicled events in the city on a daily basis since the start of the rebel occupation on 29 June stopped writing altogether, signing off: 'From the 24th day of July until the 5th of August nothing in particular occurred except that each day the Council of War met as before'.⁶⁰ Yet, there was much to record over these 12 days; only the diarist chose to remain silent.

The execution of a prominent and respectable member of Loja's middle class brought home to *lojeños* the gravity of the situation. Their failure to prevent such an obvious injustice demonstrated the futility of their political divisions which were hotly debated throughout July. This willingness to debate ideas was, in itself, an improvement on the state of the city before the uprising when Moderados and Progresistas were not talking to each other, ideology and party divided even the city's leading families, 'Polacos' and priests were the targets of Democrat hotheads and many chose to leave for a quieter life in the provincial capital. In the aftermath of the rebellion at least Loja had become more peaceful.

This mood of political introspection is conveyed in latter from Pepe Narváez to the Duke of 17 July, the day after he had signed the petition. The scene he describes – political enemies pausing in the Paseo to discuss politics and ideas – would have been inconceivable between July 1857 and June 1861:

Last night as I was strolling in the Paseo, also walking there on the other side was (José) Castellón with Mariano Cevallos (both Progresistas); on one of the occasions we passed each other Castellón stopped to ask me for light and naturally the conversation passed to the issues of the day, Cevallos stating that he was the first to condemn the outrages. From here I held forth and told him that I was not surprised and what had happened was nothing other than the fruit which he and his political friends had sown;

that he should recall the meetings held in La Victoria, where the most disruptive doctrines had been read and discussed among the *clase jornalera*, and that from there to the present situation, no more than a single step had been necessary, and that this had been taken by Maestro Pérez, who had found people minds prepared by what had happened before. In this mirror could be seen all the harm they have caused in Loja with the result that they (the Progresistas) have been left alone and isolated. He tried to explain himself as best he could, repeating that he had always been a man of order and that in no way should he be understood in this way for he could never have wished to reach this point. I told him that because of his principles there was no option but to be towed along behind, whereas with our ideas, that could never happen; and that for one who has so much to lose I could not understand how he could chose to follow a line so opposed to his interests, other than that his political resentment or pride were so great as to prevent him from taking a step back to entertain other ideas in which just repression of pernicious ideas, security of the individual and proper liberty were to be found.

As we continued this conversation, I was helped with clarity and energy by Joaquín de Campos who joined us and took great pleasure in hearing me rebut the assertions of Cevallos. I have learned from Palomares that Miguel Calvo (father of Ramón, Pérez's second in command) is expressing himself in quite the opposite way to that which he has sustained until now; from this I deduce that much fear is spreading among these people. And if the High Priests of Progress (*Santones del Progreso*) will continue as before, at least many of their followers are likely to retire.

Today, those who have seen the evil close to are all turning their eyes to you, especially the popular class (*la clase del pueblo*): some because they know where they have been led astray and others because they believe that their sentences will be lightened.⁶¹

The public execution in Loja on 24 July was expected to be the first of many in a city whose very name by mid-July had begun inspire fear throughout Conservative Spain. Such a draconian punishment amidst continuing mass arrests revealed how seriously elements in the Government now regarded the Revolution of Loja. With orders from his arrival in Loja to be 'severe' and to ensure that 'the action of justice is prompt and rapid', General Serrano still expected in late July to preside over a further 70 executions.⁶² However, just two days after the execution, a decision in Granada challenged Serrano's authority in Loja and stalled the programme of exemplary executions. Two men awaiting execution in Loja had their death sentences overturned by the *Auditor de Guerra* in Granada. A week later, after a hearing by the Supreme Tribunal of Military Justice in Madrid, two more death sentences on *lojeños* were commuted to life imprisonment.⁶³

When sentencing resumed in Loja on 5 August, the death penalty was applied only in three more cases. No more *lojeños* faced the ultimate penalty.⁶⁴ Of rebels in captivity, only three received death sentences, in each case, leaders from outlying towns which had sent large contingents to Loja at the end of June: Iznájar, Periana and Alfarnate.⁶⁵ Given the national panic over Loja, the ultimate toll of death sentences carried out by the Councils of War was therefore quite modest.

What accounts for this change from the iron fist to a velvet glove? During the two weeks following Mellado's execution, as jails and barracks in Loja and Málaga overflowed with prisoners brought in from towns and villages, instead witnessing of a spree of public executions intended as a warning to 'protestant-democratic-socialists' in Loja and elsewhere in Spain never again to take to arms, sentencing ground to a snail's pace and death sentences stopped. What was happening behind the scenes to shift military justice from exemplary capital punishments towards less sensational albeit still draconian sentences to overseas *presidios*?

Three developments help to explain why Loja did not become another 'Arahal'. The first was the impact of the petitions for clemency upon the Council of War, the Government and the Monarch. The second factor was the reticence of witnesses to incriminate known leaders, evidence that the Society still inspired fear and loyalty. The third factor was the determination of Hilario de Ygón, *Auditor de Guerra* in Granada, to moderate the sentences, especially to commute death sentences. Serrano believed this to be the result not simply of Ygón's legal stickling but to the cover he received from higher levels of *granadino* society and politics.⁶⁶

Following the Democratic uprisings of 1857 and 1859 military justice was exacted swiftly without allowing time for petitions. The delay in setting up the Council of War in Loja allowed time for petitions to be drafted before the first executions were carried out. Moreover the Church, whose voice was absent in 1857 and 1859, played a leading part in organising petitions that sought to engage the Queen's notorious piety as well as her clemency. As we have seen, the petition of 19 July that attracted the support of Loja's principal *moderado* notables and townsmen was the work of an archpriest of the diocese who seized this opportunity to increase the influence of the Church in western Granada, where for years he had watched democratic ideas grow in inverse proportion to the decline of Catholic pastoral and missionary effort. The petition sent on 20 July from the prisoners awaiting trial in Loja was also drafted by a cleric, one 'D. Salvador de Salvadores'.⁶⁷ On 22 July, Archbishop of Granada Salvador Josef added his voice, appealing to Isabel's piety, clemency and maternal care, for 'my unfortunate diocesans...who awaiting their sentences from the Military Council... (are)... for the most part ignorant men incapable of reflecting on the falsity of the attractive theories by which they have been seduced'.⁶⁸ Finally on 23 July, the day of Mellado's execution, 74 Loja women, headed

by Caridad de Campos (Narváez's aunt), expressed shock at the trials and begged the Queen's clemency:

A considerable number of men, hallucinated by a few fanatics, raised their seditious banner and senseless call disturbing for no more than a few hours the peace of this pleasant town of beautiful and fertile Andalucía. The exponents well understand that rigour is as necessary as it is painful to contain the development and extinguish the germs of the revolutionary spirit; but today, Señora, a scaffold has been erected in this city; a man has expired on it; paying with his life not the perversity of his heart, but because of the loss of his mind, and pain and terror fills our souls.

For thirty-five years, Loja has not witnessed a comparable catastrophe, and the city trembles agitated before it, with profound desolation and mortal anguish. The ordeal, the prisoner, the executioner, form a horrific picture; so horrific that no colours exist in the physical world to portray it, and when this picture is viewed so close to as to be able to touch it with the hand, it offers a vision that burns the eyes, terrifies and shocks!⁶⁹

Luis Dávila, Loja's Cortes deputy, added to the crescendo in a telegraph to O'Donnell on 25 July pleading clemency with the death sentences just passed on Pascual Pérez and Retamar. He even travelled to Santander to entreat the Queen to grant a general pardon of the rebels.⁷⁰ On 27 July, Saturnino Calderon Collantes, the First Secretary of State in Santander, sent the petitions from Caro and the Archbishop to the Minister of War in Madrid with instructions that 'you provide in the Ministry under your dignified charge the effects which should take place'.⁷¹ After this date no more death sentences were passed on *vecinos* of Loja. It is likely, therefore, that the petitions from Granada and Loja contributed substantially to the avoidance of a much harsher response to the democratic uprising in Loja than had originally been envisaged.

If the petitions helped soften the highest levels of state, they also served to mobilise influential elements of local and provincial society in a broad campaign to moderate the decisions of the Council of War in Loja. Serrano and the *granadino* officers manning the Council of War were keen to serve their superiors in Madrid. But they were also exposed to local sentiments. Billeted in the homes of *lojeños* with whom they mingled socially during the two months of the trials, they could appreciate the moral effect of the executions. With the first signs of liberalisation from Madrid, these officers were relieved to be allowed to abandon the ultimate penalty.

A second factor was the reticence of witnesses to incriminate known leaders, suggesting that the Society continued to inspire fear in spite of the failure of the Revolution. This became evident from the first case to

be heard by the Council of War. The pharmacist Juan Morales Sementi, keeper of the enlistment ledgers, was considered by Serrano as an ideal candidate for the first exemplary execution. Moving to Loja to establish his *botica* only a year before the rebellion, various membership books of a mutual aid society were found in his house. Upon his arrest on 5 July he was accused of holding meetings and preparing the insurrection in his house, and for acting as 'instigator and director of the uprising', for which he was sentenced to death on 13 July. However, on 18 July the *Auditor de Guerra* commuted the death sentence to 12 years imprisonment for lack of evidence, the defence having argued that Morales had been ill and confined to his home throughout rebel occupation of Loja and could not therefore have been a 'principal caudillo'. The Law of 17 April 1821 required that the accused be detained 'in rebellion' (away from home) and armed.⁷²

In the case of Mellado the proof that he had acted as a 'principal caudillo' was easier to establish because of his armed encounter with the Civil Guard at Iznájar, his friendship with Pérez and his conspicuousness as standard bearer of the Revolution. Yet, part of the cause of the unease that accompanied the execution was that Franciso Mellado evidently was not a 'principal caudillo' comparable to Pérez or Calvo. Nor was he involved in organising the Society, as Morales so evidently was. Nor was he a notorious instigator to rebellion, like Antonio Rosa Moreno of Salar. To be an effective deterrent for the future, the Council of War needed to execute prominent and well-known leaders. The death on the scaffold of the little-known Mellado sent out an ambiguous message, evidenced in the rumours that he was a Protestant. In this respect, D. Francisco Pascual Pérez (a) 'El Papelero', the 'brains' behind the Revolution, and Francisco Retamar (a) 'El Jornalero', a powerful influence among Loja's numerous class of day labourers, were better candidates for exemplary punishment.

Accused of being 'chiefs of the revolution and instigators', Pascual and Retamar were arrested in Loja on 9 July and sentenced to death on 24 July. Serrano described Pascual as

one of the principal leaders of the rebels, who exercised among them more authority than those who have been executed, and who is more to be feared for his greater education, and, in my opinion, he is one of the few who possesses the secret of who are the real authors of the rebellion.

Superior education was a quality Pascual shared with Morales Sementi. Among the 177 listed as 'belonging to the democratic-socialist faction of Loja' held for trial on 17 July, Pascual Pérez and Morales Sementi were the only two prisoners accorded the title of 'Don'.⁷³ Like Morales, Pascual Pérez was not a native of Loja, but of Valencia, from where he had moved to Loja to direct the paper factory (hence his nickname 'El Papelero').

Serrano continued his biographical sketch:

... he fulfilled his contract well and earned good money, but the owner of the factory had to throw him out because of the disturbance which his socialist ideas produced among the workers. He then established a paper shop and shamelessly continued to follow the revolutionary path. He took an active part in the uprising; this having ended, he returned to his house and calmly reopened his shop, such confidence he had in his impunity.

Francisco Pascual displayed similar confidence in his encounter with military justice. From the first day of his trial, he repeated that if he were to be condemned to death, the sentence would not be approved, a statement that was reported to have produced apprehension among the witnesses 'who, when asked to ratify their claims, did so without the clarity of their initial declarations'. Did they fear that Pascual or the Society might take revenge upon them upon his release? In spite of this reticence, the Council of War nevertheless heard sufficient evidence to convict Pascual an instigator and leader of the rebels, for which the penal code allowed the death sentence. Witnesses had been seen him carrying a sabre, leading a squad of rebels and urging men to fortify balconies. This, combined with the common knowledge that he was 'one of those closest to Pérez... (and)... perhaps... the only one who knows the true motives and objectives of the events in this city', was sufficient for Pascual to be sentenced to death by 'garrote vil'.⁷⁴

As the prisoner had predicted, the *Auditor de Guerra* found fault with the sentence on what Serrano considered 'puerile pretexts'. The vague accounts of witnesses at best established Pascual as a 'subaltern leader' not a 'caudillo'. The Council of War was also at fault in declaring that death should be by 'garrote vil' when the penal code reserved this distinction exclusively for the crimes of patricide and regicide (properly, the sentence should have simply specified 'garrote').⁷⁵ In any case, Ygón considered the evidence against Pascual insufficient to merit a death sentence.

Ygón rejected the death sentence on Retamar on similar grounds. Retamar's wife recalled that on the first day of the insurrection he had come from the fields to his home where he remained until the arrival of government forces. However, witnesses had stated that Retamar was 'an instigator in a high degree', had 'figured among the rebels as a subaltern chief' and 'was one of those who exercised a subaltern command'. But the accounts of three other witnesses were based on 'more or less hearsay'. Resisting strong pressure from the Ministry of War and from the Captain General, on 4 August Ygón commuted the death sentences on Pascual and Retamar to *cadena perpetua* on grounds that there was insufficient proof that they had acted as 'caudillos' or 'chiefs', and were at best only 'subaltern leaders'.⁷⁶

The desperate entreaties Mellado made to the crowd on his way to the scaffold, Pascual's bravado in the dock and the reticence of witnesses, all were signs of the continuing sway of the Society over the minds of *lojeños*. Former Judge Lorenzo Montero reported to the Duke in early August that the 'hidden directors' of the Society continued 'undisturbed' demonstrating 'their importance by receiving vows even on the very day of the executions'.⁷⁷ Pepe Narváez confirmed that continued recruitment by instigators, combined with the government's requirement that all *jornaleros* take out a security card signed by a guarantor, had brought the harvest to a standstill, reporting to his uncle that 'as all of them (*jornaleros*) had joined the rebels, no-one will vouch for them and consequently they do not take out the card and, fearing that they will be asked for it and not be able to present it, they go into hiding'.⁷⁸ Given such fear and insecurity, organisers of the Society were able to continue to recruit. No wonder it was so difficult to convict leaders from Loja, let alone their followers!

It is significant that all the mass arrests were of townsmen from further afield – Salar (15), Zagra (41), Fuentes de Cesna (44), Iznájar (59) and Periana (42) – where leaders identified their followers in order to demonstrate their legitimacy and to seek safety in numbers. There were no corresponding mass arrests in Loja where by mid-August sentences were disproportionately low (35) given the thousands who had come out in revolt.⁷⁹ *Lojeños* also benefited from the reluctance of the municipal Council and *juzgado* to investigate higher levels of the Society, and from the protection they received from people of influence in Loja and Granada whose own complicity in the Revolution was suspected or under investigation. By contrast, people arrested from smaller towns faced the full force of military justice and received little protection from local authorities or from people of influence in the provincial capital.

A third factor that helps to explain the shift from a policy of mass executions to one of long *presidio* sentences were the checks and balances within the hierarchy of military justice, in particular the willingness of Captain General to resist pressure from Madrid to expedite sentences and to allow time for the *Auditor de Guerra* to moderate the sentences passed by the Council of War in Loja. It was not clear whether this commutation of harsher sentences, particularly the death sentences, resulted simply from Ygón being a stickler for legality, or whether there were wider stirrings in Granada seeking to protect *granadinos* from becoming undue victims of O'Donnell's embarrassment and need to teach Democrats a lesson.

Serrano was convinced that he faced more in Granada than a scrupulous *Auditor de Guerra*. From the beginning of the trials, Serrano had noted 'some tendency among the principal rebel prisoners to betray the hidden instigators of the revolution'. Mellado had wanted to 'make revelations' while awaiting execution and another prisoner also 'fluctuates between this impulse and the fear of offending his accomplices', Serrano commenting

on how rapidly rumours of such declarations spread, not only within Loja but in Granada where the news that prisoners in Loja were declaring spurred Democrats in the provincial capital to bring influence to bear upon the *Auditor*.⁸⁰

Since Mellado's execution Serrano had noted a change in the way the *Auditor* processed sentences. Whereas before the execution sentences had been approved without 'noting any defects in the substance of the cases', now the Council was receiving sentences back from the *Auditor* 'full of delaying red tape, which are going to hinder, even perhaps annul, the action of justice'. This 'strange conduct' convinced Serrano that:

Auditor is powerfully influenced, and if it seems that the leaders of the Revolution do not count for much, one should redirect one's gaze towards another part, and seek in another party, whose leaders have greater social standing, the great interest that revelations should not be obtained.⁸¹

On this reasoning, the *Auditor's* moderation of sentences and the commuting of the two death sentences were the result of pressure from some 'party' in Granada anxious to discourage revelations that would embarrass or even incriminate senior figures in Loja and Granada.

Serrano was surely referring to the Progresistas as the party likely to be embarrassed, were the trials in Loja to bring further revelations. Before the Insurrection, Loja, with its *progresista*-Democrat Council, was the beacon for the province's advanced Progresistas and Democrats. The Loja Revolution and its repressive aftermath left these closely related parties, and the Liberal Unionists who had provided cover for them, dangerously exposed. For their part, Moderados seized the opportunity to recover influence, a process already under way before the Revolution with Salamanca's election to Granada's Sagrario constituency. All that now remained to ensure that *moderado* resurgence was for Narváez to return to Loja to resume his natural leadership of the province.

Such an outcome, of course, could only follow the collapse of Liberal Union. Although this had been anticipated throughout the winter of 1860-1861, paradoxically the Revolution of Loja granted a three-year stay of execution to O'Donnell, who succeeded in balancing conservative demands to take a hard line on the threat of Socialism and Protestantism, with the avoidance of excessive repression on the scale of 'Arahal', while at same allowing the Monarchy and the Church more active roles evidenced in the Royal pardon and tour of Andalucía in September 1862. O'Donnell was also helped by the *moderado* instinct for 'enriches-vous', evident in Salamanca, Narváez and Marfori's control of the Málaga-Granada-Cordoba railway contract which for the moment prevailed over any desire for a prompt return to high office.⁸² Hence, although O'Donnell and Posada Herrera were determined to teach a lesson to those Progresistas and Democrats who had promoted secret

societies and engaged in insurrection, there was an equal determination not to allow Moderados to take advantage of the Government's embarrassment by dictating excessive, exemplary punishments.

Narváez's close friend and confidant Felix de Arce confirmed Serrano's suspicion that the military authorities in Granada had come under the influence of Progresistas. In early August the removal of repressive Civil Governor, Celestino Mas y Abad, who had been appointed in March to pursue the city's Protestants and Democrats, was followed by the dropping of charges against Henríquez (for failing in his role as *Comandante de Armas* in the face of the rebel invasion of Loja) and the release of Sergio Quintana, Loja's highly respected *progresista* councillor, who over the last seven years of Isabel's reign would lead the city's Democrat committee.⁸³

Conclusion

Given the sheer scale of the *carbonari* society and Loja's centrality in the conspiracy that culminated in the Revolution, *lojeños* escaped lightly from the rulings of the Council of War compared with other towns in the region. Petitions for clemency to the Queen in Santander combined with the reluctance of *lojeños* to inform on fellow townsmen, evidence of the continued sway of the Society, stymied Serrano's intention to use the Council of War to teach a lesson to the city and the rest of Spain that democratic revolution was a perilous act. *Lojeños* did not achieve the moderation of sentences on their own. Progresistas in the provincial capital also protected *confrères* who might otherwise have followed Mellado to the scaffold. Finally, the ponderousness of military justice, its exposure both to local pressures, as officers settled into life in Loja and witnessed the terror caused by Mellado's execution, and to central directives, as the Government holidaying in Santander shifted from its initial hard line to one favouring clemency, also contributed to the softening of sentences. Other towns in the region were less fortunate. The actions of the Councils of War in Loja and Málaga uncovered a vast conspiratorial geography which the next two chapters will explore. Men from some 43 towns in western Granada, eastern Málaga and southern Córdoba marched, or attempted to march, on Loja in late June and early July 1861.


7

The Sierra Bética: Conspiratorial Región

The geographical spread of the uprising was confined to towns within a day's march from Loja where carbonari societies were strong and well organised. First-hand accounts record the presence in Loja in early July 1861 of rebels from 20 towns.¹ The Military Commissions in Loja and Málaga then scoured towns, villages, cortijos and caseríos throughout the Sierra Bética, the mountainous region running west from Alora to Santa Cruz de Alhama, and from Albuñol and Vélez-Málaga in the south to Priego, Rute and Montefrío in the north, bringing in men from 43 towns. We have seen how the trials in Loja were obstructed by the resistance of the Society and the protection received by Granada's political elite. Chapter 8 explores Civil Governor Antonio Guerola's efforts to break the hold of the 'Garibaldino' Society in Antequera, the intended hearth of the revolt, through the judicial process of *espontaneamiento* (confession to membership of a secret society in exchange for legal immunity). This chapter traces the conspiratorial geography of the broader region (see Map 2). Would the Military Commission in Málaga, combined with Guerola's own police measures, be a match for the region's most deeply embedded clandestine associations? What light do the trials and police investigations shed on the penetration of democratic ideas and associations in the smaller towns of the region by 1861?

Antonio Guerola and the Council of War in Málaga

Having succeeded during the first six months of 1861 in uncovering conspiratorial networks and containing strike actions throughout the province, Málaga's civil governor was dismayed to observe a Republican uprising breaking out just across the north-eastern boundary of his province at Iznájar and Loja. Antonio Guerola was particularly angered by the part played by José María Rodríguez, aspirant *moderado*/Conservative-Liberal deputy for Archidona, whose judicial harassment of Loja's Democrats in June 1861 had precipitated the uprising.²



Map 2 The Conspiratorial Region

Upon hearing of the 'republican' uprising at Iznájar on 29 June, Guerola sent troops to Antequera, Colmenar and Ronda, towns known for their Democrat sympathies, preventing *pronunciamentos* in all but two 'little towns': Villanueva del Trabuco and Villanueva del Rosario.³ Yet Democrats throughout the province took heart upon hearing that rebels had taken Loja and defeated government forces in four separate skirmishes between 28 June and 1 July. This optimism, Guerola claimed, prompted 'forty or sixty of the most daring in each town infested by socialist ideas to launch themselves into the field'.⁴

Hence, Málaga's participation in the Revolution was appreciable. Indeed Guerola believed that the provincial capital was also close to succumbing to an uprising in early July. With the city's forces already attending to trouble spots inland, particularly along the road between Málaga and Loja where Guerola knew that rebels had been instructed to mass, and with reinforcements sent from Cartagena still at sea, Málaga was defended by a mere two companies of infantry, 100 conscripts manning the artillery, 21 cavalry, 20 Civil Guards and 50 excise guards. With telegraph communications with the rest of Spain severed by the rebels, the night of 2–3 July was particularly fraught with rumours circulating of a national uprising.⁵ Only with the arrival of packets from Algeciras and Alicante on the morning of 3 July did *malagueños* learn that no other part of Spain had seconded the movement.

Guerola was convinced that had he not personally organised patrols throughout the night of 3–4 July (with no help from the Ayuntamiento!), Málaga might have fallen to the rebels.⁶ Yet, much like their counterparts in Granada, Progresistas and Democrats in Málaga were not optimistic about the success of a summer uprising having experienced Guerola's tough policing since March.⁷ On the morning of 4 July the arrival of Marine infantry from Cartagena secured the capital, freeing Guerola to send troops to the 'Montes de Málaga' where several clashes resulted in the arrest of rebels.⁸ By the evening *malagueños* learned that government troops had occupied Loja and that the rebels had taken flight.⁹ The Revolution seemed to be over.

On 3 July, Guerola instructed all mayors to publish the martial law of 17 April 1821 and urged rebels already in the field who had not committed any punishable act to return to their towns and hand in their arms, promising that if this were done within six hours no further action would be taken.¹⁰ Given the tight deadline, the order could only have appealed to prospective rebels who had not already left for Loja or who remained close to their homes. Five days into the uprising, rebels had either long departed for Loja or were already occupying the city. Hence Guerola's circular was a warning to remain in hiding. He regretted General Serrano's failure to capture more rebels while they were still in Loja.¹¹ The publication of the martial law opened a Pandora's box in which any person absent from his hometown

could now be presumed a rebel and arrested. Then, on 7 July Posada Herrera removed any basis for an amnesty by ordering the arrest of all men who had been absent from their towns during the Loja Revolution, even those who had returned to their homes. The normally quite moderate Minister of Government urged that 'This is the occasion to clean this province of vagabonds, and you must take advantage of it'.¹²

Guerola relayed this order (confidentially, not publishing it in Málaga's *Boletín Oficial*) throughout the province, instructing mayors to detain those who had presented themselves for amnesty.¹³ Mayors of towns with active Democrat parties, such as Periana or Villanueva del Rosario, resisted implementing an order that would have involved arresting a majority of the adult male population (the mistake the alcalde of Comares had made at the end of May, provoking the first 'republican' uprising). Guerola therefore issued a stronger warning of the serious consequences of disobeying his authority, advising mayors to prepare for a visit from the commander of the Civil Guard.¹⁴

In contrast to the swiftness of the proceedings in Loja the trials in Málaga faced numerous delays. The underlying problem was the difficulty of applying martial law in a province in which, although there was much support for the rebels, there was little active involvement in the rebellion itself. The Council of War therefore had to rely on municipal authorities and local civil justice for investigating support for the Revolution. Efforts to stimulate active policing by mayors were hindered by General Serrano's practice of sending military columns at will to any part of the province to detain suspects without notifying Málaga's civil or military governors. These raids sowed fear, undermined the trust Guerola hoped to instil among mayors and hindered the work of the Council of War in Málaga.¹⁵ By early August hearings in Málaga had ground to a standstill with most renowned local leaders safely in exile.¹⁶ Guerola realised that his authority, even when backed by the Civil Guard, was unlikely to prompt mayors, many of them complicit in local Democrat organisations, to become more active in pursuing leaders, instigators and members of *carbonari* societies.

To hasten the proceedings, Félix Alcalá Galiano, Captain General of Granada, accompanied by Hilario de Ygón, *Auditor de Guerra*, visited Málaga on 7–8 August.¹⁷ Praising the zeal of the military tribunal in his report to the Minister of War, Alcalá explained that the difficulty lay in the fact that 'the cases in Málaga are not generally against the rebels who seconded the revolutionary movement, but against the conspirators who were disposed to second it'. He recommended an increase in the number of fiscals and the immediate sentencing of prisoners who had already confessed (rather await the cases of their 'companions'), urged fiscals to go out to the towns to gather evidence (rather than wait for witnesses to be sent to Málaga) and advised them to take cases directly to trial upon their return to Málaga.¹⁸ Alcalá commented to the Minister that the most interesting lesson from his three-day

excursion to Málaga was what the trials, however slow, were revealing 'about the secret society, the real focus of the conspiracy for rebellion that broke out in Loja, and which was on the point of breaking out in many other towns, above all in the province of Málaga which undoubtedly was much more thoroughly prepared by the revolutionaries'.¹⁹

Málaga, then, not Loja, in particular the Aguilar bailiwick at Antequera, was intended as the centre of the uprising. What follows is a closer look at the conspiratorial geography of the smaller towns of the region between Málaga and Loja, approached sub-regionally, in three longitudinal zones (see Map): a western zone stretching west and north from Málaga up the Guadalhorce valley to Alora, Valle de Abdalajís onto the *campiña* of Antequera at Mollina and Humilladero; a central zone encompassing the mountainous Axarquía region north of Málaga, stretching north through Archidona and its dependencies across into Córdoba's southern most district of Iznájar; and an eastern zone leading north from Alhama and Zafarraya to the environs of Loja north to Algarinejo and Montefrío.

The western zone

The Guadalhorce valley leading west from the capital and then north into the Sierra and onto the *campiña* of Antequera became Málaga's most dynamic growth pole once the valley was chosen as the route of the Málaga-Córdoba railway which began construction in March 1860. As we have seen, on the eve of the Loja Revolution, Guerola uncovered a clandestine network of itinerant Democrats – schoolteachers, barbers, hatters and tailors – on Alora's dispersed *cortijos*, small farms and wine and olive presses. Antequera was intended as the revolutionary 'centre'. The first 'spark' of the Revolution occurred at Mollina on the *campiña* of Antequera.

With an investigation already underway, Guerola expected cooperation from Alora where he had close ties with the ruling Marqués family (Francisco de Paula Marqués was Cortes deputy for Antequera), visiting the town on four occasions during his governorship.²⁰ Miguel Marqués, the mayor, would have cooperated with him had it not been for Posada Herrera's withdrawal of the amnesty accompanied by a heavy-handed confiscation of arms belonging to all *vecinos*, rich and poor. Marqués had already drawn up three lists, one of *aloreños* who had taken part in the Loja uprising, one of those who had been absent from Alora during the 'events', and another of those intending to take advantage of the amnesty. With the revocation of the amnesty the mayor resolved not to send the lists to Málaga.²¹

Following Alcalá's visit to Málaga on 7–8 August, Marqués finally agreed to provide the Council of War with the lists.²² Yet these on their own were of little use, and gathering evidence to charge these men proved a slow process. Finally in mid-September, on evidence provided by one Carlos Aguilar, resident of Málaga and owner of an oil press near Alora, the Military

Commission made 40 arrests.²³ The trials dragged on into the autumn, long after the formal conclusion of the Council of War on 3 October, and even after its closure on 1 November.²⁴ Of the 73 *alobreños* arrested, Manuel Iglesias (a 'The Tailor' was sentenced to death (*en rebeldía*) and 15 others to *presidio* terms of between seven years and *cadena perpetua*.²⁵ The investigation revealed Alora's *carbonari* society to have been most active away from the municipal seat among the scattered population of *cortijos* and *lagares* (oil presses), while in the *cabecera* itself democratic sociability revolved around an inn belonging to one 'Tío Pepe', native of Casarabonela.²⁶

Alora was not alone in the Guadalhorce valley in attracting the attention of the Council of War in Málaga. On 21 July, 21 'vecinos, chiefs and instigators' from Pizarra were brought to Málaga for trial.²⁷ These arrests were linked to another case against Juan García Pérez and 23 others from Valle de Abdalajís (Antequera) where a suspected *carbonari* society was being investigated before the outbreak of the Revolution. Democrat organisation in Valle de Abdalajís was closely related to unresolved conflicts over the division of Antequera's municipal *propios* and commons.

As we saw, in May Guerola responded sympathetically to a petition from tenants of Antequera's former *propios* in Valle de Abdalajís who had complained of harassment from their new landlord. By June, however, having learned of the existence of a secret society involving 'the whole valley', the civil governor was less well disposed. By the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, ten men from Valle de Abdalajís languished in Málaga's jail, accused of threatening labourers on the 'Cortijo Grande', a property belonging to the Rodríguez family, major beneficiaries of the *deasmortización*,²⁸ for refusing to join the Society.²⁹ Undeterred by these arrests, men from Valle de Abdalajís would have marched en masse to Loja at the end of June had it not been for the efforts of the mayor. In reply to an order on 9 July that he should present himself in Antequera, José de Reyna explained that he was 'indisposed, because of the bad nights and exceedingly worrisome time I have had in tranquilising this town and avoiding evils, which has now been achieved'.³⁰

Reyna not only prevented the men of Valle de Abdalajís from joining the Revolution, he also protected them from the Council of War in Málaga. On 11 July, Juan García Pérez and 23 others, signatories of the May petition, were arrested and charged with 'conspiracy by means of the secret society of the Valle de Abdalajís'.³¹ In the absence of evidence 'for the rebellion that did not break out', the cases against all 24 were dismissed.³² A case against Juan Rodríguez (a) Clarín and two members of the rural guard of the Sierra del Torcal (on the southern border of Abdalajís), accused of conspiracy with their Democrat confreres in Casabermeja, was also abandoned.³³ The devotion of the *carbonari* of Valle de Abdalajís and the Sierra del Torcal to their vows of secrecy paid off for no one was sentenced from these jurisdictions.³⁴ In October only four men from Valle de Abdalajís 'owned up' to belonging

to the secret society compared with hundreds in Antequera, Molina and Humilladero.³⁵

In October, Guerola turned his attention to Antequera's outlying towns of Molina and Humilladero in a campaign to wean agricultural labourers away from the *carbonari* societies known still to be gripping the region. In particular, links between Antequera and Molina were investigated. The mayors of Molina and Humilladero provided names of artisans and merchants who visited their jurisdictions and in early October leading to the arrest of eight men in Antequera, four of whom were identified as 'Garibaldinos' and charged with 'instigation' of secret societies.³⁶ These arrests may have contributed to the spectacular coup achieved by Guerola in Molina and Humilladero later in the month.

In mid-October, Guerola sent his secretary José Francisco Valdés Busto to towns throughout the district of Antequera with orders to persuade members of *carbonari* societies to renounce secrecy and to take a vow of loyalty to the Queen. Valdés succeeded in convincing 315 from Molina, 158 from Humilladero and 13 from the neighbouring Fuente de Piedra to renounce their vows. Guerola kept to his word that no one from the three towns would be brought before the Military Commission in Málaga.³⁷ In spite of this mass renunciation, reports of violence against men in Molina who had renounced their membership continued throughout 1862, with the local branch of the 'Garibaldino' Society kept alive by visits of a hatter from Antequera named Luis de Burgos.³⁸

The central zone

If eastern Andalucía possessed a natural democratic territory, mountainous wheat- and vine-growing region Axarquía around the appropriately named Colmenar (beehive) best qualifies for the title. Towns in the district of Colmenar, especially Periana and Alfarnate, sent some of the largest contingents to Loja in early July. Axarquía towns registered the largest number of arrests, suffered proportionately harsher punishments (including two executions) and revealed some of the highest ratios of affiliation to secret societies in relation to population.³⁹ In Guerola's rating of the extent to which the 'revolutionary secret society' had taken hold in 24 towns of the province – 'a lot', 'regular' or 'little' – five towns in the district of Colmenar were rated a 'a lot' (Colmenar, Casabermeja, Periana, Comares and Almogía), two as 'regular' (Villanueva del Cauche and Cútar) and only one as 'little' (Borge).⁴⁰

Almogía, situated strategically on the road between Antequera and Málaga, acted as a centre for recruitment of Society members throughout the mountainous area between the Guadalmedina gorge west to the basin of the Guadalhorce. Twenty men from Almogía's dependency of Arroyo del Coche, already languishing in Málaga's jail when the Revolution broke out, and accused of belonging to the 'revolutionary lodge', were, along with two

men from Almogía proper, accused of 'secretly distributing medals of the revolutionary society'. Guerola believed that these arrests, along with the detention at the start of the Revolution of Juan García (a) El Herrador in Colmenar and Francisco González in Almogía, two of the principal leaders, 'disorganised revolutionary preparations' throughout western Axarquía.⁴¹

Although there were no formal *pronunciamientos* in June 1861, rebel mobilisation from towns in the Axarquía was generalised, evidence of the confidence Democrats felt in the strength of their organisation. Guerola credited this confidence to the purveyors of Democrat newspapers, especially *La Discusión*, particularly in Colmenar and Casabermeja, home of Don Tomás González, director of *La Ilustración*, Málaga's Democrat daily. Since the autumn of 1856 González had promoted Democrat sociability in Málaga through the press and through a clandestine organisation centred upon 'Los Moles', a *lagar* (an olive and wine press) he owned at 'Tres Chapiras', strategically located close to the main road between Antequera and Málaga.

'Lagares', where grapes and olives were pressed and wheat milled, were popular meeting places, associated with illegal alcohol consumption, contraband and rowdy partying. The Axarquía was peppered with them, many originating in the Islamic period, if not before. Aided by his wife, González extended the secret society from 'Los Moles', where he recruited the foreman and workers, to include settlements throughout the municipal territory of Casabermeja. Members of the Society were called 'mangarios' (beggars), those not inscribed, 'panzones' (pot-bellied ones). As the 'principal chief from whom all the inspiration, orders and communications were received', González would sign his letters 'Cromwell' or 'Sixto 1o'. As President of the Society González liaised with the 'Junta Directiva' in Granada and would have been present at the meeting in Granada in early June 1861 when the question of the uprising was debated.

On 14 July, González and three other leaders from Casabermeja were arrested and taken to Málaga where they joined a further eight *casabermejenses* who had been arrested while attempting to join their *confreres* in Loja on 3 July.⁴² By the end of July, 24 *casabermejenses* were imprisoned in Málaga of whom 11 received *presidio* sentences. In late August, Antonio Guerola watched Tomás González, in poor state of health and carried on a litter, embark on the schooner 'Covadonga' to serve 12 years in the Canaries. By the end of the year, 597 'mangarios' had owned up, believed by Guerola to be the tip of the iceberg.⁴³

If Tomás González provided the Axarquía with ideas, inspiration, links with the press in Málaga and the 'Junta Directiva' in Granada, Colmenar's blacksmith Don Juan García Pérez secured the growth of membership throughout the region through a network of men and women involved in transport, animal and human medicine. He was supported by his wife Doña Antonia, who established a women's association called the 'Sisters of Charity' that operated a field hospital, earning the nickname of 'La Segunda

Mariana', after Mariana Pineda, Granada's martyred heroine in the struggle against absolutism.⁴⁴ Francisco Ferrer, a Catalan blacksmith and stagecoach administrator, was credited with bringing democratic ideas to Colmenar in 1857. Leaders of Colmenar's Society shared a similar occupational profile to that of Loja: apart from the blacksmith-veterinarians García and Ferrer, there were two more masters of this art, Rodrigo Mateos Barba and Antonio Gómez Pérez; a pharmacist, José Villar; and Joaquín Ascencio, an employee at Tomás González's printing press in Málaga where *La Ilustración* was published. Joaquín Ascencio's enthusiasm, along with the importance of the press, was recognised in his appointment as 'Chief and President' of the entire district of Colmenar.

Guerola was convinced that his arrest on the eve of the insurrection of Juan García Pérez had 'prevented an uprising in Colmenar like that of Loja, because he could count on great support and was as daring as his friend and companion Pérez del Alamo'.⁴⁵ In spite of García Pérez's arrest, and later escape to Lisbon, Colmenar sent a sizeable contingent to Loja, the military authorities estimating that 270 *colmenarenses*, captained by 29 'chiefs and instigators', had pronounced and headed for Loja in late June.⁴⁶ On 29 September, García Pérez was sentenced to death *en rebeldía* with 23 other sent to overseas *presidios* to serve terms of between five years and *cadena perpetua*.⁴⁷ In December, 672 *colmenarenses* owned up to belonging to the *carbonari* society.⁴⁸

The largest Axarquía contingent to march on Loja came from the mountain redoubt of Periana, a town of around 2700 souls situated on the south-western fringe of the Sierra de Loja. The source of many of the migrants who had settled the fertile commons of Alhama since the eighteenth century, *perianenses* contributed to Alhama's defiantly independent agricultural communities of Zafarraya and Ventas de Zafarraya. Of all the *malagueño* towns he had visited, Guerola considered Periana to be the most rebellious:

A disastrous town: barbaric, rustic, very Democrat, with its administration in a state of abandon; there are some landowners, respectable, although simple, but they are intimidated by the *canalla* (rabble).⁴⁹

As in Loja and Colmenar, the Society in Periana was organised by a blacksmith-veterinarian, one Antonio Abad Morales Mostazo (a) 'Abatais' (*albeitar* = vet), 'who received his inspirations from Colmenar and the chief of that town ... Juan García (Pérez)'.⁵⁰

At the end of June, *perianenses* were among the first to cross the Sierra de Loja to join Pérez del Alamo in Loja. A 'Leader of the Republicans of Periana' (surely Morales Mostazo) was captured on 5 July along with leaders from Loja, Alhama, Santa Cruz, Ventas de Zafarraya and Salar suggesting that *perianenses* operated alongside townsmen from western Granada.⁵¹ Unlike

most rebels who dispersed to their towns or to the mountains in small bands, over 100 *perianenses* stayed together for some days after the Government's occupation of Loja, led by their Mayor, Rafael Nuñez, and the parish priest, Don Gabriel de Navas.

Known locally as 'el Cura Bueno', Gabriel de Navas took over the leadership of Periana's Democrats after the capture of Morales and the flight of other leaders into exile. Formerly a member of the regular clergy, Navas had returned from America to look after his widowed mother. Although two brothers resident in Málaga disputed his involvement in the Revolution, Guerola was convinced that he had played an important part, not only in leading rebels, but in organising Democrat propaganda before and after the uprising.⁵² In league with Morales and one 'Ruiz', Navas had organised an 'association of day labourers' that subscribed to *La Discusión* which 'was read at various points, including the house of the priest, who afterwards would make commentaries'.⁵³ That this association provided social benefits as well as ritual and Republican propaganda is evident from the pledges to Navas's good character from two of his friends in Málaga, one a doctor and the other a pharmacist.⁵⁴ The hot water springs at 'Baños de Vilo' nearby, with its small medical establishment, where soldiers from the Africa campaign had convalesced in 1860, contributed an air of cosmopolitanism to otherwise rustic Periana.⁵⁵

Periana figured disproportionately in the Revolution of Loja and the ensuing trials and sentences. Eighty-seven *perianenses* were brought into Loja for trial in mid-July and 41 were despatched to varying terms in overseas *presidios*.⁵⁶ Yet, an official sent by Guerola to inspect the town in December 1861, expecting Periana to be traumatised by the public execution of Morales Mostazo, found Democracy to be flourishing: 'this town is in a worse state than any other place I have visited... the socialist idea is perhaps germinating with greater determination today than at the beginning (of the insurrection)'. Apart from the malign influence of 'El Cura Bueno', the official put down the survival of the Carbonari society to Periana's bitter division into two bands: the 'partido Chica', composed of 'men of value and responsibility', and the 'partido Ruiz', which 'although it certainly contains some men of value, in the majority comprises the town's dregs'. With its leader Joaquín Ruiz exiled in Portugal and its 'capitán de cuadrilla' executed, the 'partido Ruiz' was reported to be losing prestige and suffering divisions in the face of pressure from Guerola to disavow *carbonari* membership.⁵⁷ By late December, 385 *perianenses* had owned up to belonging to the secret society.⁵⁸

The execution of *perianense* leader, Morales Mostazo, was the fourth since the start of the trials and the first of two to be carried out in the province of Málaga. Captured on 9 July at the head of a band of men from Periana and Cútar armed with 33 shotguns and seven pistols, Periana's veterinarian-blacksmith was sentenced to die by *garrote* for four crimes: having 'gone out

twice at the head of armed rebels', 'for having fought the forces that first approached Loja', for having 'affiliated the workers of Periana to the secret society' and for being 'an active promoter of the Society'.⁵⁹ Guerola described him as 'more a criminal than a man of politics', an opinion shared by the prisoner's mother.⁶⁰

After much violent resistance in his cell in Loja, claims of insanity and pleading to be executed in Loja rather than in home town, Morales was returned to Periana to face the wrath of his mother, who, after a prolonged harangue, 'pardoned him and asked him to die like a good Christian'.⁶¹ Morales accepted his mother's advice. At 6 a.m. on 17 August, this tall strong man walked calmly to the scaffold.⁶²

Among the crowd witnessing the execution were men from Comares and Cútar. Since the 'Republican uprising' in Comares in the end of May, repression had produced divisions among Democrats. The leaders of the original *carbonari* society, Manuel Ruiz Reiné (a) 'Mingolla' and Miguel Cabello Padilla (a) 'Libertá', eventually persuaded their followers to 'own up', 268 taking this course in December. A breakaway faction led by Francisco García Quintana (a) 'Pan-seco', who had taken his oath at González's *lagar* near Almogía, proved more resistant to pressure to abandon their vows, perhaps awaiting instructions from their leader who had gone into hiding. By contrast, in neighbouring Cútar, followers of Democrat Chief Francisco Castejón López, a master carpenter, abandoned secrecy, prodded by mass arrests (in late July and August, 102 *cutarenses* were held in Málaga) and by the death sentence conferred on their leader *en rebeldía*.⁶³ In spite of the advanced state of Democrat organisation, Comares and Cútar avoided the harsh sentences experienced by other Axarquía towns, with only three *cutarenses* and no *comarenses* sentenced to *presidios*.⁶⁴

The final exemplary punishment in Axarquía came with the execution of Antonio Martín y Martín (a) 'El Estudiante' in the square of Alfarnate at 6 a.m. on 3 September. Chief of Alfarnate's 'republican society', Martín enjoyed links with other towns in the Axarquía.⁶⁵ The severity of the punishment was due to the size of the contingent (reported to exceed 200) that he led to Colmenar (rather than to Loja) at the start of the Revolution. This manoeuvre confirms that Martín was following orders from Tomás González that armed columns should assemble along the road between Granada and Málaga in preparation for the march on the provincial capital.⁶⁶ Finding that no successful uprisings had taken place at either Colmenar or Málaga, Martín returned to his home where, unarmed and without putting up resistance, he was arrested and sent to Loja for trial.⁶⁷

Alfarnatejos, like the *perianenses*, received harsher sentences than their confreres in Cútar and Comares because of the proof that many had taken up arms. Forty-two men from Alfarnate and Alfarnatejo were held in Málaga at the beginning of August, of whom 40 received *presidio* sentences.⁶⁸ Martín died 'with the resignation of a true Christian', the event given added

poignancy by the news received 15 days earlier that his wife had given birth to a daughter after suffering 18 years of infertility.⁶⁹

Archidona, across the Sierra Bética to the north-west, played an important part in the lead up to the Loja Revolution and in the trials that followed. Pérez took to arms partly as a consequence of judicial harassment from its mayor, Cristobal Aragón, in May. Ramón Calvo, Pérez's second-in-command, spent the first night of the rebellion in the house of Luis Miranda, a fellow graduate of Archidona's Esolapío college. His association with Calvo became the basis for case against Miranda in the Military Commission in July. Guerola later recalled that 'This town (Archidona), the closest to Loja, was terrifying, because of this circumstance and because of the revolutionary elements it enclosed'.⁷⁰

Archidona was 'terrifying' to Guerola not so much for 'the revolutionary elements it enclosed' but because of the district's bitter political factionalism. As we have seen, the civil governor's refusal in 1860 to support the electoral ambitions of José María Rodríguez had antagonised this high-level employee in the Ministry of Justice and close friend of Antonio Cánovas. Rodríguez was behind the judicial harassment of Pérez in May, personally orchestrated the persecution of Luis Miranda, Archidona's leading Democrat, after the Loja Revolution, and even used his influence in Madrid to attempt to have Guerola and Bessières removed from their civil and the military governorships. Martial law provided Rodríguez with an opportunity to eliminate his political enemies and prepare the ground for winning the Archidona seat in the Cortes elections of 1862.⁷¹

Several months before the insurrection, Archidona's *juzgado* had been pursuing clandestine organisation in the district capital.⁷² Guerola was convinced that the arrest in May of three men involved in recruitment to the secret society, and the detention of one José Dionisio Velasco Atienza, the principal leader of the 'abject faction' of Archidona's Democrat party, had 'disorganised the work of the revolutionaries', preventing all but a very few from reaching Loja in early July.⁷³ However, significant numbers from the outlying 'Villanuevas' – Trabuco, Rosario, Tapia, Algaidas and Cuevas de San Marcos – joined Pérez in Loja. Here clandestine democratic organisation was undisturbed in May and June 1861.

Convinced that the moderation and loyalty of Archidona's Democrats should be rewarded rather than punished, Guerola laboured throughout July to protect Miranda from arrest, convinced that this lawyer was 'incapable of associating with the socialist demagoguery that produced the Loja uprising'.⁷⁴ In the end, prevailed upon by José María Rodríguez, who was summering at Granada's spa of Lanjarón, the Council of War at Loja ordered Miranda's arrest.⁷⁵ Aware that he was likely to receive a life sentence, or worse, Miranda escaped to Gibraltar.⁷⁶

With Miranda's flight into exile Archidona's Democrats might have expected, under protective authority of Cristobal Aragón, a *progresista* mayor

with Democrat sympathies, to escape the attentions of the Council of War. Yet following the Captain General's visit to Málaga on 7–8 August (the result of pressure from Rodríguez), the military tribunal resumed processing the many un-concluded cases that had accumulated over July with renewed energy. On 9 August, Archidona became the first town in Málaga to receive a flying column, headed by a military fiscal Captain Juan Silva, with instructions to disarm the town, to investigate what part *archidonenses* had played in the Loja insurrection and to uncover the 'Socialist Republican Secret Society'.⁷⁷

Throughout August and September the Council of War kept up pressure on Mayor Aragón to despatch those suspected of belonging to the secret society men to Málaga. The evidence Aragón sent to Málaga provides insight not only into Democrat sociability and conspiracy, but also the Council's strategy to ensure that, even if the town was obliged to despatch over 100 *archidonenses* to the tribunal Málaga, at least the evidence accompanying them was sufficiently vague to make convictions hard to achieve. Only four men from Archidona were sentenced to terms of imprisonment while the two main leaders, Miranda and Santiago Fernández Rodríguez, slipped into exile.⁷⁸ In late October, 94 prisoners were returned to Archidona and placed under the local *juzgado*, immediately to be released.⁷⁹

If Archidona's Council succeeded in protecting its native sons in the *cabecera* from prison sentences, municipal authorities in subject towns of the district were equally effective. In early August, 50 men from Rosario, 30 from Trabuco and 26 from Tapia were held in Málaga awaiting trial.⁸⁰ But only 11 men from the three Villanuevas were eventually sentenced, while no arrests were made in San Marcos or Algaidas, where, as we shall see, local democratic societies were active, many actually taking up arms and marching to Loja at the beginning of July.⁸¹

The Loja Revolution began in the remote, hilly area of hamlets and isolated *caseríos* north of Archidona on the boundaries of Granada, Córdoba and Málaga. This area possessed an anachronistic landholding pattern and stunted municipal development. The large seigniorial estates and jurisdictions, either established as rewards during Reconquista in the fifteenth century or purchased later during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, should officially have been transferred to private ownership with the Mendizabal *desamortización* of 1837. But this had happened only haltingly leaving an agrarian patchwork characterised by uncertain jurisdiction and ownership. In the mid-nineteenth century, Archidona, Iznájar and Antequera still collected rents for grazing rights to commons from this extensive and sparsely populated region.⁸² In Villanueva de Tapia absentee former *señores* still treated their erstwhile seigniorial jurisdictions as their own property, managed through administrators, with the help of town councils. In most parts, however, small- and medium-sized proprietary farms prevailed, with the peasant owners residing in scattered *caseríos*, providing an example

to their landless neighbours of what they might expect to achieve. Everywhere there was the usual ballast of landless labourers.⁸³ Because most towns in this extensive region contained fewer than 60 *vecinos*, the 1845 municipal law allowed every adult male citizen to be an elector, a constitutional idiosyncrasy that contributed to the heated politics and political assertiveness of these small settlements.⁸⁴

At the end of July 1861, one José Márquez of Loja, prompted by Rafael Narváez, on orders from his uncle, the Duke of Valencia, in Paris, visited a cluster of towns in the triangle between Archidona, Loja and Iznájar to find out why so many men from this area had joined the Revolution.⁸⁵ Work was about to start on the Campillos–Loja railway and the Duke was eager to extend the network of roads to the north-west of Loja to link the city with the prosperous olive-growing region of southern Córdoba where he had interests (a road project he had cherished since the mid-1850s).⁸⁶

From his base in Cuevas Altas de San Marcos, on the boundary between Málaga and Córdoba, José Márquez travelled through the area, observing how Democrat leaders offered various inducements to join *carbonari* societies:

To the poor, five *fanegas* of land each, to the farmers of the Algaydas, the property of their small *cortijos*, with all security promised to them and their sons, and to others, a certain quantity of money so that to each according to their position and their aspirations. These offers have been made by the corporals of the sections who are the chiefs of the squads into which they are divided.⁸⁷

Democrats in Cuevas Altas adopted the standard practice of recruiting members through a mutual aid society called 'La Hermandad', described by Márquez as 'the most vicious and dissolute in their conduct that can be found, and the same goes for the affiliates that I know in the surrounding area'. 'La Hermandad' had three 'Chiefs' identified by numbers and nicknames, mirroring the ranking of the municipal offices they coveted. On 26 June, two days after Pérez's call to arms, the first chief in Cuevas Altas, Presentado Sánchez (a 'Solillo', nephew of the incumbent mayor, had instructed his wife to whitewash her house, Márquez explaining that 'within three days he would hold the rod, by which he meant "I am going to be Alcalde" '. Solillo's second-in-command was Cristobal Moscoso Repiso (a) 'El Rubio', a blacksmith whose brother-in-law, Juan Repullo Repiso (a) 'Reimundo', was third in command.⁸⁸

In neighbouring Villanueva de Algaidas, a former seigniorial town, Márquez reported the 'number of those committed to be great'.⁸⁹ Chief Democrat was Antonio José Casado, first lieutenant of the mayor. In the *cabecera* two-thirds had affiliated while in its dependency of Algaidas Bajas all had joined the Society. Second-in-command was Antonio Luque (a)

'Perdigón', formerly Council secretary until 'he was dismissed for bad conduct'.

In nearby Villanueva de Tapia chief of the affiliates was one Juan López, currently at large, along with many *tapienses*, in the Sierra del Pedroso y del Camorro. Most *tapienses* had not affiliated, Márquez describing the Mayor Francisco Arias as 'strong, blustering and free of compromise with the riff-raff'.⁹⁰ Yet 100 *tapienses* joined their *confrères* in Loja, almost half the adult male population of 249 *vecinos*.⁹¹ *Tapienses* figured prominently in the trials, 91 appearing before the Council of War in Málaga between mid-July and early September, all escaping sentences thanks to the Council's reluctance to provide evidence.⁹²

Márquez decided not to 'inconvenience' his friend with an account of what happened in Iznájar, the source of the Revolution, except to describe the fate of Antonio Castillo, a 'companion and friend' of the Duke, who, two days after the Revolution, intending to hand over a list of those who 'had inscribed in the Revolution' to the mayor, was enticed instead to a tavern, plied with drink and then brutally murdered at the hamlet of La Barca.⁹³

No town sent so many to Loja or had so many sentenced for participation in the Revolution of Loja as Iznájar.⁹⁴ The original rebel force of 600 to 700 that rallied to Pérez on 28 June came from five hamlets dependent upon Iznájar (Fuente de Conde, Alcubilla, Cuesta de Palma, Cuesta de Valerma and Los Pechos) and from Fuentes de Cesna (Loja).⁹⁵ A further 400 joined the uprising from the *cabecera* on 29 June. From population of 6,000 at least 1,000 *iznajeros* joined the uprising. Of the 478 sentenced by Loja's Council of War to varying terms in *presidios*, 66 were from Iznájar. Iznájar also contributed perhaps the Revolution's most influential leader, Joaquín Narváez Ortiz.

As we saw in Chapter 4, Iznájar's secret society had already been investigated in April by Captain Julián Ortiz, who returned in July to continue his investigation, in both the *cabecera* and 'the infinity of rural households in its extended municipal territory'. In uncovering the conspiratorial network, Ortiz found *iznajeros*, in spite of their 'timidity' and 'monarchical principles', reluctant to own up to membership, still believing 'in the infallibility of the revolutionary triumph... (for)... in spite of the dispersal of Loja, the hope remained alive for some days that the more important cities Spain would follow the movement. Their illusions even reached the point of believing that the revolutionaries would be helped by Garibaldi and his volunteers'. This expectation that 'Garibaldi and his volunteers' might lead the Spanish Revolution was not so absurd. *La Discusión* had recently announced that, following the death of the more moderate Cavour, Mazzini and Garibaldi were poised to resume their struggle for a united Italy with its capital in Rome, and to continue the fight for a democratic Europe.⁹⁶ Although Ortiz observed that these ideas 'were seen as foolish by people who knew something about politics and the situation of other nations', they

were believed by 'the more timid and less enlightened from whom I hoped to profit in my investigations'.⁹⁷

By offering immunity from prosecution to informers, Ortiz regained the confidence that he had achieved during his earlier investigation. In early August the Civil Guard Captain made 128 arrests in a military swoop through Iznájar's *caseríos*.⁹⁸ Having rounded up the foot soldiers of the revolution, Ortiz proceeded to investigate their leaders and instigators. Some, such as Rafael Delgado, secretary of the Council of Iznájar had already fled for Portugal, along with his son Antonio and two instigators.⁹⁹ On 1 August, Ortiz achieved a coup with the arrest of Cristobal Godoy Granados (a Manduca, maker of arms and considered 'the leader and principal instigator' of Iznájar, and Salvador de Llamas Horcas, 'furious revolutionary who did much harm in Loja'.¹⁰⁰ At this point, although Ortiz was keen to continue the investigation, Córdoba's civil governor called a halt believing that sufficient terror had been sown.¹⁰¹

Absent from Ortiz's report is any mention of Joaquín Narváez Ortiz (a Mellado (gap-tooth), at 39, senior of the three leaders who had patrolled Loja each evening during the occupation.¹⁰² Owner of 'Casería de Silva' (one of Iznájar's few *cortijos*), Narváez was distantly related to the Duke of Valencia. His maternal grandfather was administrator of the estate of the Count of Altamira, his father was a doctor and he had completed secondary education at Cabra. He was a close friend of the wealthy Rafael Nogués, administrator of Iznájar's premier seigniorial family, the Duchess of Castro-Enríquez. Twice married, with eight children, his second wife, Doña Dolores Padilla Almansa, was the mistress of Iznájar's primary school for girls.¹⁰³ He was related to several members of Iznájar's Council upon which, as a major tax payer, he sat intermittently. Like Loja, Iznájar had a Democrat/*progresista* Council in 1861, several of whom were dismissed for complicity in the Revolution.¹⁰⁴

After the final dispersal of the uprising on 7 July, Joaquín had returned to his home before going into hiding at his brother's house in Córdoba where he was arrested and returned to Iznájar. Here, long after the flight into exile of most other leaders, Joaquín trustingly remained under house arrest, surrounded by his family, attending to his agricultural tasks, until summoned by the Council of War in Loja.¹⁰⁵ During the trial Narváez was reported to have informed on a large number of his fellow townsmen ('half the town' in the opinion of Pepe Narváez), confirmed by the 75 *iznajeños* brought to Loja in the days following his arrest.¹⁰⁶ Yet, judging from the calm dignity and courage that he showed before his execution on 7 August, Joaquín Narváez evidently did not intend to incriminate his fellow *iznajeños* in order to save his neck. Rather, his intention may have been to overwhelm the Council of War with a demonstration of democratic solidarity. He would have also known that he was providing the Council of War information that they already possessed (from Captain Ortiz's investigation).

Iznájar was the perfect target for swift and exemplary military justice, possessing none of the handicaps that hindered the hearings of *lojeños* (intimidation of witnesses, pressure on the Military Commission from local society and political pressure from Granada). Before withdrawing from Iznájar on 3 August, Captain Ortiz proposed exemplary punishment to serve as a warning against rebellion. This advice may have been critical in persuading the Council of War to overlook substantial doubts over Narváez's case. On the following day the Council of War sentenced Don Joaquín to death by public execution. Another 66 *iznajeños*, mostly *jornaleros* of all ages, were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment ranging from 2 to 20 years in *presidios*.¹⁰⁷

Because of his elevated social status, Narváez's execution caused great controversy in the national press.¹⁰⁸ The trials left Iznájar almost deserted. Even carpenters and planks for constructing the scaffold had to be sent for from Rute.¹⁰⁹ Only a very small crowd, compelled by the authorities to witness the execution, heard the prisoner's last speech from the scaffold. Joaquín Narváez advised his fellow *iznajeños* to be 'obedient to the authorities and not to get involved in political matters, and that all those who talk to his children should remind them of the sad end of their father so that they never become involved in political affairs of the kind that he had taken part in'.¹¹⁰ Privately, however, Joaquín Narváez struck a more defiant tone in a verse composed for his children on the eve of his execution:

No lloreis hijos del alma
que yo, con sosiego y calma,
sufro mi muerte afrentosa.
En mi corazón reposa
el no haber sido ladrón,
ni falté a mi Religión,
porque siempre fuí cristiano,
y este Gobierno tirano
me mata por mi opinión'

Narváez died at 11 a.m. while reciting the creed.¹¹¹

The 'War of Bread and Cheese', as the Revolution of Loja is known in Iznájar (due to its unexpected beginning leaving time only to gather bread and *orza*, an oily cheese produced in Iznájar's *caseríos*), and the punishments that followed, left the municipality in a state of shock with the *cabecera* partially depopulated.¹¹² To disguise their Republican sympathies, men throughout the municipality shaved off their moustaches and beards.¹¹³ Yet the execution and the repression were not forgotten in Iznájar. *Iznajeño* historian Angel Aroca Lara recalled that the name 'Ramón' was avoided by Joaquín's descendants out of contempt for Ramón María Narváez, and 'the portrait of Espartero, the great enemy of the *lojeño* general, competed

with the saints for occupying the pre-eminent place of devotion in their homes'.¹¹⁴

The eastern zone

As we have seen, the arrest of four Democrat leaders in Alhama de Granada on 21 June led to the order for Pérez's arrest that precipitated his decision to flee Loja and mount the rebellion at Iznájar on 29 June. After abandoning Loja on 4 July, Pérez hoped to rally support from Alhama for the march on Granada.¹¹⁵ However, Alhama's mayor armed the 'honourable' part of the population preventing any attempt from the city to second Pérez's movement.¹¹⁶ In spite of these measures, an estimated 500 marched from the towns of Alhama to occupy Loja between 29 June and 4 July.¹¹⁷

Alhama, then, was probably more primed for a democratic uprising in June 1861 than Loja itself. Although the *carbonari* enlistments in Alhama began soon after the end of the Bienio, a Council investigation revealed that a society only became fully organised following *progresista* success in Alhama's Council elections in December 1860. Clandestine Democrat organisation put down particularly strong roots in towns in the west of the district – Zafarraya, Ventas de Zafarraya, Alhama, Arenas del Rey and Santa Cruz – and formed a continuum with comparable organisation in the Axarquía (Periana and Alfarnate) and north to Sálar and Loja. The occupational profile of Democrat leaders in Alhama was similar to elsewhere: inn and tavern keepers, hat and cloth sellers, tailors, blacksmiths, carpenters, comedians, musicians and small farmers. Absent among Alhama's Democrat leadership were higher status occupations – priests, pharmacists, newspaper editors, lawyers and larger landowners, Alhama's middle class preferring to reside in larger centres such as Loja or Granada. Events in Italy and the belief that Garibaldi might arrive to lead Spain's democratic revolution further encouraged the growth of the Society throughout the first months of 1861, much as in Iznájar.

Of all the district-wide *carbonari* societies we have examined (Loja, Antequera, Colmenar, Iznájar), Alhama's was the most explicitly agrarian in its objectives, a reflection of the district's recent history of agrarian conflict and inequitable, and still uncompleted, *desamortización*.¹¹⁸ Entry to the Society followed the standard practice of an orthodox *carbonari* initiation rituals and agreement to a monthly contribution for the purchase of democratic newspapers and provision of 'support during sickness and when suffering persecution from justice'. Recruitment was directed specifically at landless *jornaleros*, with new members informed of 'the plot or estate which corresponded to them in the *reparto*, designating the victims who had to fall in the first moment'. *Jornaleros* who resisted enlistment were threatened with loss of employment, 'something that has caused a few fights, but for better or

worse, ensured that all the *jornaleros* were inscribed in the society'. As in Loja and Antequera, the influence of the Society became evident during funeral ceremonies and religious processions:

On one occasion when the viaticum was being administered to one who was said to be an affiliate, it was very surprising to see those people in a procession numbering more than four hundred, some with candles, and the major part formed up behind in pairs, and we were assured that the same people would attend the procession of Corpus Christi, although this did not take happen because it was held during the day and most of them did not possess decent clothes.

The 'Generals in Chief of the Conspiracy' arrested on 21 June were Manuel Rodríguez Carbello (a) 'El Americano', farmer of Santa Cruz; Francisco Guerrero (a) 'Vereda', blacksmith and keeper of a tavern in Alhama 'where Democrat newspapers are read'; Francisco Jaimes Arca (a) 'Violin', a musician; and Antonio Torres Torrubía, a carpenter, the latter two natives of Loja but living in Alhama. Rodríguez was the recognised leader of the Society in the district, Guerrero (a) 'Vereda', known as 'General Veredas', his second-in-command. Having returned from America in 1854 'with money', Rodríguez was reported rarely to visit 'his insignificant farm', preferring to spend his time preaching and recruiting.¹¹⁹ In his home town of neighbouring Santa Cruz del Comercio the Democrat society had succeeded in recruiting the entire male population by 1861. With no resident priest or school teacher, Rodríguez faced little competition with his preaching.¹²⁰

In spite of the notoriety of Alhama's Democrat leaders, the public knowledge that most of the district's *jornaleros* had been recruited into the Society, with over 70 arrests in the *cabecera* and its subject towns, only 24 *alhameños* (16 from Santa Cruz) were sentenced to *presidio* terms of between 12 and 20 years.¹²¹ Democrats were helped by the reluctance of Alhama's *progre-sista* Council to provide evidence for the trials and by the discipline of the *carbonari* society which continued to instil fear and obedience among its members.¹²² As a result *carbonari* organisation throughout the district survived substantially intact, Alhama becoming the region's centre for Democrat conspiracy in 1864.

As would be expected, towns within the district of Loja provided the largest cohort of rebels in early July, with Sálar (c. 150) and the remoter and less accessible towns of Zagra (c. 200), Fuentes de Cesna (200–300) and Algarinejo (c. 200) sending the largest contingents. Huétor Tajár and Montefrío were too well policed to allow for more than a handful of rebels to slip through the cordons established by improvised local defense forces. These towns belonged to same electoral district as Loja and had participated in the election of Luis Dávila as their deputy in 1858. For Pérez del Alamo and Democrat leaders in outlying towns, this was a single political territory

united by the network of local newspaper correspondents and the *carbonari* society.

Algarinejo became victim of the amnesty promised to rebels or rebel sympathisers who had reported to the local authorities within six hours of the publication of martial law. Once the amnesty was withdrawn by Posada Herrera, these names were promptly sent on to the civil governor who passed them on to General Serrano and the Council of War.¹²³ A similar deception may account for the large number of arrests in towns close to Loja: 43 from Algarinejo, 41 from Zagra and 28 from the 'Cortijos de Loja' were brought to the Council of War in Loja in late July and early August.¹²⁴ A high proportion of these were sentenced to lengthy *presidio* terms: 28 from Zagra, 48 from Fuentes de Cesna and 18 from Algarinejo.¹²⁵ The presence among the rebels of significant numbers of *provinciales* from each of these towns (nine from Zagra, four from Algarinejo and eight from Montefrío) suggests the residue of the National Militia disbanded in 1856.¹²⁶ Both Algarinejo and Montefrío had formed companies of National Militia in 1837 and 1854 and the subsequent confiscation – in 1841 and 1855 – of weapons and musical instruments purchased from their own resources was still resented.¹²⁷ The presence of a drummer among the rebel contingent from Zagra and an entire wind band leading the contingent from Algarinejo is further evidence of this National Militia pedigree.

Apart from feelings of affronted patriotism, Cesna, Zagra and Algarinejo shared extreme physical remoteness, administrative marginality, ambiguous jurisdiction and patchy Catholic pastoral care. Roads reached these towns only in the 1950s. In 1861, Algarinejo and Zagra had schools for boys but not for girls; Fuentes de Cesna had no school or priest. It would not have been hard for Democrat propagandists to convince people in these towns that they received little in return for their excise, territorial and property taxes and *quintas*.

Conclusion

These case studies reveal how widespread Democrat *carbonari* societies had become throughout the region by 1861. But did the *carbonari* introduce a new dimension to a politics still shaped by patrician moral and cultural values and by the *moderado* ideal of limited suffrage and power confined to the propertied and the educated few? The Councils of War focussed on a small number of leaders and instigators rather than the hundreds of affiliates. To protect their towns mayors presented *carbonari* societies as instigated by a few patrician Democrats (most of whom had gone into hiding or exile) aided by a small corps of trouble-making *capataces* (corporals/foremen), who would not be missed if sentenced to *presidios*. Evidence forwarded by mayors to the military tribunals presented these patrician Democrats and the more rustic 'capataces' as preying upon the candour, fear of

exclusion and fondness for drink of a mass of otherwise blameless and harmless affiliates. Yet, although the authorities presented *vecinos* as sheep being led by madmen, the investigations revealed a vitality among leaders and their following, a shared field of sociability that straddled city, town, hamlet and countryside, that inspired fear among Moderados and envy among Progresistas and Liberal Unionists. How was this achieved?

Newspapers, particularly *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*, helped local leaders gain recognition from higher levels of the Democrat party in Granada, Málaga and Madrid, while their distribution through *carbonari* societies deepened ties between conspiratorial centres, such as Antequera, Casabermeja, Colmenar, Loja and Iznájar, and outlying towns and villages. The content of these newspapers was critical in creating a mood of optimistic expectation of the fulfilment of the party's programme of universal suffrage, the abolition of *consumos* and *quintas*, freedom of conscience and association. Blanket news of the Risorgimento re-enforced the redemptive power of Democrat propaganda. Stories of Gariabdi's achievements, along with lithographic images of the Hero of Marsala distributed to subscribers to *El Pueblo* and *La Discusión* free of charge, inspired many to believe that they too could achieve national regeneration by taking to arms behind their own bearded chieftains.¹²⁸

Police reports revealed that there was no shortage of leadership in rural areas believed by patricians to be bereft of culture and civilisation. In larger towns such as Loja, Archidona, Casabermeja, Antequera and Iznájar, patrician Democrats such as Pérez del Alamo, Luis Miranda, Tomás González, the Aguilar brothers and Joaquín Narváez were important players in municipal politics and regional party and factional rivalries. Their success in recruiting clandestine followings translated directly into local political advantage, regardless of the severe restrictions on suffrage of Isabeline Spain, accounting for the determination of national players such as Carlos Marfori and José María Rodríguez, eager to achieve regional cacique status, to crush these rivals and break their hold over local society. The kinds of occupations typically held by Democrat leaders – municipal secretaries, lawyers, teachers, doctors, veterinarian-blacksmiths, pharmacists, even some priests – bound them to local society and gave them an advantage over absentee rivals who preferred to do politics from the safety of provincial capitals, spa towns such as Lanjarón, Madrid or, in the case of Narváez, from Paris.

Visibility on the local scene contributed to the prestige of Democrat leaders who saw themselves as a progressive middle class whose style and values, in time, would be embraced by the rest of the population. Police reports show these leaders to have been helped by their wives. María Regina Pérez del Alamo helped her husband escape before the Revolution, provided sanctuary during his flight into exile, and vigorously defended his interests in Loja in subsequent years. García Pérez in Colmenar was supported by his wife, 'Doña Antonia', 'La Segunda Mariana', whose 'Sisters of Charity' strengthened the region's most territorially extensive *carbonari* society.

Tomas González's wife was active in *carbonari* enlistments in Casabermeja while he attended to his journalism and conspiratorial activities in Málaga and Madrid. Joaquín Narváez's second wife, Doña Dolores Padilla Almansa, was mistress of Iznájar's primary school for girls.

The prestige of Democrat leaders also derived from their efforts to revive welfare activities formerly the province of lay associations of the Catholic Church such as confraternities. Most *carbonari* societies were fronted by mutual aid societies which, even if they were too recently formed to be able to provide substantial welfare benefits, succeeded in convincing many artisans, shopkeepers and *jornaleros* that their businesses and employment opportunities would benefit from membership. *Carbonari* societies also capitalised on traditions of occupational and communal solidarity. The 'unión' practised by *jornaleros*, the rites, processions and festivals of the Catholic religious calendar, and the preference for people in smaller communities for political consensus, prompted almost all adult males in smaller towns such as the Mollina, Santa Cruz de Alhama, Periana and the Villanuevas of Archidona to enlist.

Democrat success in colonising associational spaces traditionally occupied by the parish clergy was recognised by the Church and its elite patrons such as Narváez, who blamed inadequate state funding for the clergy's failure to attend to remoter and poorer communities. Guerola observed how the violent political conflicts dividing Archidona's outlying town of Cuevas Altas de San Marcos, that he had been unable to resolve on his own, were swiftly healed 'on the Day of the Cross, thanks to the measures taken by the zealous parish priest, Don Juan de Sol'.¹²⁹ When *Carbonari* societies throughout the region underwent a startling revival in 1863–1864, the civil and religious authorities in Granada found that Easter preaching missions and modest increases in parish funding could transform the moral temper of towns, undermining Democrat agitators.

So far we have stressed the personal, ideological and cultural explanations of the Democrat's success in organising and politicising people in the region. However, two further explanations for Democrat success need to be repeated: material incentives and fear. We saw in Chapter 4 how the Loja Revolution grew directly out of judicial persecution of Democrat leaders following their regional campaign to take advantage of the solidarities and territorial reach of *carbonari* societies in labour disputes, at first in Antequera's woollen strike, later during the wheat harvest. Apart from the advantage of society membership in wage bargaining, Democrat leaders acknowledged the need to make promises of wages (if only in forged money!) and land if they were to persuade even their own society members to join insurrections.

The fear instilled by Democrat leaders should also not be underestimated. *Carbonari* initiation ceremonies, experienced by thousands of men throughout the region, were terrifying ordeals. The material benefits, trust and companionship derived from membership of these societies were palliated

by the fear of ostracism and even death that might result from breaking initiation vows. During the trials several *apuntados* took their own lives.¹³⁰ Others, such as a prisoner from Periana and Francisco Maese Gaspar of Colmenar (who attempted to shoot the civil governor in Málaga on 5 July 1861), went mad.¹³¹ In November 1866, from the relative safety of his cell in Málaga's prison, Maese García wrote an incoherent yet haunting memoir of years of persecution and attempts on his life at the hands of Colmenar's leading Democrats, which the military governor considered of sufficient interest (in what it revealed of the survival of Colemanar's secret society) to pass on to First Minister Narváez.¹³²

8

Combating Clandestinity in Antequera, July 1861–December 1862

Between 1856 and the 'Gloriosa' of September 1868, Antequera was the centre of Democrat *carbonari* conspiracy in eastern Andalucía. As we have seen, throughout the first half of 1861 workers in the woollen factories and *jornaleros* on the *vega* experienced the dividend of society membership in wage negotiations. Advanced Progresistas led by the Aguilar brothers were well represented on Antequera's Council and maintained close relations with leaders of the 'Garibaldino' Society. This chapter examines the efforts of the Military Commission in Málaga and exposes the participation of *antequeranos* in the conspiracy that resulted in the Revolution of Loja. Civil Governor Antonio Guerola's campaign to persuade members of the Garibaldino Society to forswear their membership in exchange for guarantees, in a judicial procedure known as *espontaneamiento* or 'owning up', in the face of sustained resistance by Garibaldino leaders, is then explored. The chapter concludes with account of Queen Isabel's visit to Antequera in October 1862.

Antequera was prevented from seconding the Revolution of Loja by Guerola's prescience in pursuing the secret society combined with strong-armed measures taken by a new Alcalde Corregidor. In contrast to the dithering of Henríquez in Loja, Antequera's first authority, Lieutenant Colonel Benito Alvarez Santullano, had no scruples in pursuing Democrat conspirators, breaking up their meetings, confiscating Democrat publications, imprisoning suspected instigators and disarming affiliates.¹ When news arrived of the fall of Loja to Pérez on 1 July, Alvarez could count on the services of a newly formed Rural Guard, a large Civil Guard detachment, a garrison of San Fernando infantry and an 'improvised squads of honourable *vecinos*' to defend Antequera and its rural areas. The inclusion of potential revolutionaries among these squads of armed *vecinos* helped further to maintain order, as it had at Alhama.²

In spite of these security measures, many *antequeranos* succeeded in getting through the military cordons to reach Loja.³ Others were captured on their way to Loja.⁴ Others were arrested in small groups as they prepared to leave

for the revolution's centre.⁵ As at Málaga, armed sympathisers in settlements around Antequera attempted to invade the city during the first days of the Revolution but were prevented by the Civil Guard backed by the Salt Guard at Fuente de Piedra.⁶ Convinced that Antequera was the intended focus of the insurrection, Alvarez later recalled that *jornaleros* stopped work in the fields at the beginning of July ready to invade the city when instructed, claiming that only his security measures prevented the city from succumbing to the revolutionaries.⁷ Meanwhile, heavy-handed policing prompted an estimated 400 to 500 *antequeranos* to flee the city in early July.⁸ Convinced that many councillors shared the ideas and aims of the revolutionaries, Alvarez decided not to convene a Council meeting until 6 July, after the crisis had subsided.

Well before the outbreak Alvarez was in possession of a list of some 500 'Garibaldinos' found by his predecessor hidden in a wine barrel in a tavern owned by Antonio Vergara Benítez.⁹ Hence, when ordered to investigate all those returning to the city, Alvarez already had names to pass on to the civil governor.¹⁰ Alvarez would have liked to have arrested all 500 but succeeded in rounding up 48 to send to Málaga for trial (senior among them was Diego Galván Benítez, aged 69, who had been arrested in June 1859 for possessing democratic books and involvement in the *Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos*). All still languished in Málaga's Cárcel del Levante a month later, the cases against them unable to proceed for lack of evidence.¹¹

The Revolution of Loja gave Alvarez the powers he needed to investigate ties between advanced Progresistas in the Council and the secret society. On 4 July, the day the rebels left Loja, he ordered the arrest of José Antonio Aguilar, *progresista* councillor, landowner and personal friend of Guerola. Aguilar was marched on foot from La Quinta de Valdealanes, the Aguilar family home, to a cell in the Council building.¹² Released to attend an extraordinary session on 6 July, Aguilar railed against his fellow councillors for allowing divisions to appear during this period of crisis.¹³ The Council rejected Aguilar's motion castigating Alvarez for not convening a meeting earlier and for not allowing the Council 'to discuss measures for calming the population'.¹⁴

Ignoring this appeasement, on 11 July Alvarez ordered the arrest of eight more councillors. Six days later seven of the nine detained were despatched, on foot and in sweltering heat, to Málaga to stand trial.¹⁵ Although the trial would last four months, the investigation soon stalled for lack of evidence.¹⁶ Alvarez's mistake was to have arrested the councillors in his capacity as Alcalde Corregidor. Had he detained them as 'Commander of Arms', the Council of War could have charged the councillors under the martial Law of 17 April 1821.¹⁷ In late August the Supreme Court in Madrid ordered the councillors to be returned to Antequera to be investigated by civil justice.¹⁸ Although in mid-October a commission of the Council cleared all the councillors of any association with the secret society, insisting that 'they are

known to be opposed to it', judicial proceedings against several councillors continued well into 1862.

As in Loja and Archidona following the Revolution, councillors argued that elevated social status, of itself, precluded membership of democratic societies which were 'publicly known' to possess exclusively plebeian membership: 'the individuals included in this report belong to the tax-paying class on a grand scale, as proprietors, landowners or industrialists; and have suffered, as is well known, the evil consequences of the society'. The commission insisted that the councillors charged by Alvarez were 'Progresistas, constitutional monarchists and men of order' who had been observed 'on the side of the authorities in sustaining public order and opposed to the recent events of Loja which produced such alarm in this city', singling out for special mention José Antonio Aguilar who, had it not been for his illegal imprisonment, would have followed the lead set by the civil governor in taking legitimate measures for maintaining public order.¹⁹

Neither Alvarez nor his successor accepted the commission's plea of innocence on behalf of their fellow aldermen. Although the councillors were released in late November, judicial investigation into their 'moral and political antecedents' continued well into 1862, documenting the involvement of councillors in the same circles and associations that had fostered the Garibaldino Society. Although evidence was insufficient to incriminate any councillor, José Antonio Aguilar remained suspended from his post until the Royal pardon of September 1862.

Alvarez's determination to seek out and destroy Antequera's revolutionaries went far beyond the pursuit of *progresista* councillors. Following the Captain General of Granada's visit to Málaga on 8 August the cases against 62 *antequeranos*, stalled since early July for lack of evidence, were taken up with renewed energy. The investigation uncovered the participation of a wide range of social groups in the Garibaldino Society. Among those first arrested at the beginning of the Revolution were Don Francisco Martín Casco and Don Francisco de Lara Pedrosa, primary school directors during the Bienio Progresista. On 17 August, José Conejo Somosierra, a young *antequerano* historian and teacher of Latin, was arrested on his return from Gibraltar, having fled to the British colony at the start of the Revolution (helped by an identity card belonging to his publisher, Don Guillermo Ballesteros y Alvarez, prominent Málaga lithographer and Democrat, sparring partner of Civil Governor Guerola).²⁰ Don José Quesada, a painter and musician, 'very well known in all circles of the population', was arrested in early September, tragically committing suicide in his Málaga cell later in the month.²¹

If these intellectuals lent a decorative edge to Democrat conspiracy in Antequera, woollen weavers the core of the Garibaldino Society. A search of the home of Manuel Fernández de León in the weavers' barrio of San Juan revealed utensils used in initiation ceremonies and documents relating to the 'Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas'.²² The detention of

Fernández de León, otherwise 'known as Manuel La Muerte', led to an order for the arrest of Antonio Acedo Montero, a master of dyeing ('the one who works with machines'), principal organiser of the 'democratic society' who had collaborated with Fernández de León in swearing-in ceremonies. Antonio Acedo had already fled Antequera upon witnessing the arrest of his brother, also a weaver, while attempting to join the rebels on 2 July. Both brothers had belonged to the National Militia during the Bienio Progresista.²³

A further case against Antonio Villalón Morillo (a) 'el manco Morillo' confirmed the spread of clandestine conspiracy among agricultural workers. Alvarez judged the moral and political conduct of Villalón to be without blemish although he believed that oaths were taken in his house. More reprehensible was the moral conduct of Villalón's friends, Gerónimo Moreno and Juan Pinto Gallardo, both agricultural labourers. Apart from a propensity for drink and fighting, Moreno was reported to have prevented a fellow *jornalero* from getting work for having refused to enlist in the secret society. The political and moral credentials of Pinto Gallardo, 'known as the son of El Pintado', were even more reprehensible. Three large daggers were found in his house and in February 1861 he had presented the Council with a petition requesting bread and work declaring that *jornaleros* should not work for less than 7 reales a day.²⁴ Yet even this evidence was insufficient for securing convictions from the Council of War.

The Council of War had more success in the case against Antonio Torres de Aguilar (a) 'Maia' and ten others – all artisans, factory workers and *jornaleros* – arrested together at the beginning of July and accused of belonging to the 'socialist and Garibaldino Society'. Torres, a shoemaker, was judged to have shown 'very good' moral conduct, the conduct of other ten conduct ranging from 'good' to 'bad, drunken and quarrelsome'. Several had criminal records for violence or political offences: Juan Guerrero Cuenca (a) Filusa had been sentenced to a *presidio* in 1857 'for political crimes'; José Carrasco Acosta, 'brandishing an axe', had led an attack on an armoury shop during the riots of February 1857; Antonio Rubio Berruecos had been arrested for 'subversive shouting' and insulting the Alcalde Corregidor during the 'romería de San Pedro Alcántara' in October 1860; Juan Maroto Garcia had attacked 'a policeman and while being led to prison had shouted loudly that he was a Garibaldino' at the beginning of July 1861. Eight of the 11 received *presidio* sentences of between seven and eight years.²⁵

The Council of War also secured convictions against another group of seven workers and artisans headed by Joaquín Jiménez Aguirre, blanket weaver, arrested and sent to Málaga at the beginning of July. The group included Antonio Vergara Benítez, silk weaver, owner of 'a tavern where Garibaldinos meet' and keeper of the Society's lists.²⁶ In contrast to Torres's group, all were judged of 'good' moral character except Juan Garcia Romero, a scribe who had served a sentence for homicide.²⁷ Six of the

eight were sentenced to *presidio* terms of between seven and 12 years in the Balearics.²⁸

In spite of the large number of arrests in July, Antequera, like Loja, suffered proportionately fewer sentences to *presidios* than smaller towns such as Periana, Alfarnate and Colmenar. Only 14 men from Antequera were sent to *presidios* and only two answered the royal pardon of September 1862, although by November all 14 had been released.²⁹ At the end of September 1861 the 39 *antequeranos* remaining in prison in Málaga, mostly *vecinos* of the *caseríos* of Cauche and Saucedo, were set free. At the same time, the 33 arrested in mid-July were returned to Antequera to be investigated by civil justice.³⁰

Having failed to find sufficient evidence to incriminate the councillors, Alvarez kept them behind bars throughout November as he scrutinised the moral and political conduct of their 'consorts'. His investigation centred on 15 men, mostly textile workers – weavers, spinners and dyers – who had been active in the weavers' strike in January 1861, and itinerant merchants and hat makers suspected of spreading socialist ideas in nearby Mollina and Humilladero. Again, apart from 'public opinion' that confirmed that several belonged to the Garibaldino Society, no firm evidence was found of instigation or propagation in these towns (such evidence might have secured a conviction under the martial law of April 1821 given the riot at Mollina on 22 June). Three, all of whom exhibited fondness for drinking, prohibited games and brawling, had also been exiled and later amnestied for their involvement in the riot of February 1857. One had been absent during the Loja Revolution.³¹ Yet no serious fault was found in their political behaviour (apart from membership of the Garibaldino Society which did not qualify as 'political' in the eyes of the judicial authorities unless the accused could be shown to have been a patrician, a 'chief', a 'propagator' or an 'instigator'). The right combination of moral and political defects were lacking for securing a conviction.³²

Although the Council of War in Málaga was formally concluded on 3 October, hearings against absent *antequeranos* believed to have been the chiefs and instigators of the secret society continued throughout October.³³ Finally, on 1 November 1861, the Captain General announced that, after five months of hearings with all cases completed, the Council of War in Málaga was dissolved.³⁴ Guerola could now resume his full authority as civil governor, in abeyance since the declaration of martial law on 8 July. For his part, Alvarez saw his authority as Alcalde Corregidor wane. Distrusted and disliked by Guerola, however effective he may have been in containing revolution in Antequera during June and July, Alvarez resigned on 16 December, to be replaced by Antonio González de Asarta, formerly Secretary of Government in Vizcaya. Nothing now stood in the way of Guerola's campaign to encourage *antequeranos* to take advantage of his programme of *espontaneamiento*.³⁵

On 22 September, Guerola launched a province-wide campaign to persuade affiliates of secret societies to 'own up' to membership, issuing a circular to all town mayors urging them to publicise the order 'especially in the *caseríos* and rural districts'. The band outlined the penalties for belonging to secret societies and offered exemption from these penalties for members who confessed and informed the authorities of the 'object and plans of the association'. Guerola set a deadline for 'owning up' at 12 midnight on 6 October 1861 (extended until the end of October and then indefinitely) and offered protection to those complying with the band.³⁶

In mid-October, Guerola sent his secretary, José Valdés Busto, to promote the programme in Antequera, with instructions to concentrate first on the surrounding towns of Valle de Abdalajís, Mollina, Fuente de Piedra and Humilladero where 500 men promptly declared their membership of secret societies. Valdés then turned to the district capital where at first he was less successful. Many members of the Garibaldino Society, including most leaders, were still in hiding, had been sentenced to *presidios* or were still facing prosecution. Only 12 men in Antequera 'owned up', five of whom were reputed to be leaders. One, claiming to be the principal leader, offered to help restore confidence among his *confrères* in the government, judged necessary before any more would come forward.³⁷

Valdés's offer of protection in exchange for owning up to secret society membership eventually yielded dividends.³⁸ On returning to Antequera in November, with the Council of War in Málaga now concluded, several hundred *antequeranos* came forward to confess membership of the 'Society of the Garibaldino Republic'. As in the smaller towns, Valdés learned that the Society had succeeded in increasing its membership with promises of higher wages (one member claimed by offering 20 reales as a minimum daily wage!). Guerola's secretary also found that the Society had been through various reincarnations since its foundation in Granada as the 'Venta Nacional' in 1854. In the face of the repression following the Bienio the Society had adopted the title of 'Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos' to avoid attention from the authorities. Its most recent reincarnation as the 'Carbonaria Republicana Garibaldina' reflected not only the current enthusiasm over Italian reunification, but also the divisions among Democrats nationally between 'individualists' and 'socialists'. After 'lengthy debates and heated discussions' the more moderate 'Democrats' had parted ways with the more radical 'Socialists'. Valdés considered the latter tendency to have gained the upper hand on the eve of the Revolution of Loja, with the rush of agricultural labourers to join between February and mid-June in preparation for the reapers' strike.³⁹

Apart from the ending of piece rates and higher wages Valdés believed that agricultural labourers had been persuaded to join in such large numbers with the promise of land, and not by threats or coercion, as was sometimes the case with textile workers.⁴⁰ By using the influence of *cortijo* foremen Valdés

encouraged a few agricultural labourers to own up. But, as at Loja, most remained too 'fearful and reluctant' to come forward. The process was also hindered by the resistance of certain prominent landowners to cooperate with the authorities, a consequence of 'the jealousies and rivalries that divide the principal families'. Valdés had more success in persuading weavers and factory workers to own up, again by using foremen at the work place. By the time he left Antequera on 16 November, 661 men – mostly artisans, workers and factory operatives – had presented themselves. Valdés informed Guerola that the Society was 'completely dissolved', predicting that 'owning up' would continue and doubting that the 'Garibaldino' Society would regroup, even with the return of its leaders who were currently in prison or in flight.⁴¹

Early in 1862 it became apparent to the new Alcalde Corregidor that the 'Republicana Garibaldina' had not been dissolved. Municipal police reported that the secret society had regrouped and was preparing *jornaleros* to oppose piecework during the new season's harvest. A Council session on 9 January recommended the posting of military detachments throughout the *vega* to protect *jornaleros* from pressure from the Society to not accept piece rates.⁴² Later in the month, fear of a repeat of the weavers' strike brought the arrest of Josef Romero Enríquez, accused of organising a combination in the city's largest factory belonging to Antonio Burgos.⁴³ On 23 January, Pedro Bernal Pérez, weavers' leader in 1861, was arrested along with one Francisco Medina Guzmán.⁴⁴ These arrests coincided with a theft from the Carmen woollen factory belonging to Juan Moreno y Moreno and an attempted theft of blankets from the factory belonging to the Señora Viuda de Peréa, a pattern that continued throughout February.⁴⁵

Fear of a return to the 'bad times' brought a hasty conclusion to the case against 'Luis Talavera César and consorts', (44 councillors, municipal officials and members of the Garibaldino Society) that had run on since July 1861. In investigating the case, apart from information received from those 'owning up', the judge admitted relying on the opinions of 'the six major tax payers with the most knowledge of the persons and of the events which occur in this city ... whether or not they belong to the socialist secret society, as well as the reputation they enjoy'. These were José María González del Pino, Antonio Enríquez Paris, Antonio Palma Checa, Rafael Barnuevo Fuentes, Juan Ródriguez Muñoz, Ramón Sanz, at least three of whom would be targeted in a wave of politically motivated crime over the spring and summer.⁴⁶ Relying on the opinion of major taxpayers in legal cases squared with *moderado* ideal that superior wealth reflected greater honour and moral quality, and incurred greater political responsibility during periods of crisis (fiscal, political, public order, or otherwise).⁴⁷ Evidence from major taxpayers was acknowledged collectively under the heading 'public opinion states' or 'so-and-so is publicly known to have been'. Yet, certain major taxpayers evidently knew more than others about the activities of the secret society.

José María González del Pino's step brother, Joaquín, had been the target of a campaign of threatening letters in 1857 when, as first Alcalde, he had been instrumental in calming the population following the riot of February 1857. José María and Joaquín González del Pino ranked sixteenth and ninth respectively in Antonio Parejo's league of Antequera's family fortunes. Both acquired numerous arable estates – former Church and municipal properties – around Antequera, and grazing land around Humilladero and Mollina during this period.⁴⁸ Their sister Concepción was married to José Moreno Burgos, landowner in Mollina and Antequera's leading woollen manufacturer (whose factory in January 1862 was being affected by union activity and thefts). With such extensive interests in cereal agriculture, horse-raising on former commons, flour-milling and the textile industry, José María González del Pino would have unrivalled knowledge of the activity of Progresistas and Democrats engaged in organising workers employed in these sectors. The family's extensive interests in Mollina, a town observed by Guerola to be 'submitted to the influences of Antequera, especially to the del Pino', explain why the Alcalde Corregidor had been so determined to investigate Democrats suspected of organising secret societies in Mollina and neighbouring Humilladero in October and November 1861.⁴⁹

The report on 'Talavera and consorts', although vague in the extreme and unable to prove any crime apart from membership of a putatively 'socialist secret society', nevertheless provides a radiography of clandestine and semi-clandestine democratic associational life and political organisation in Antequera in 1861. The report contains evidence on 44 men arrested by Alvarez and sent to Málaga in July 1861. Of these, only eight were judged not to have been 'publicly' associated with the secret society. The other 36 were declared variously to be 'chiefs' (6), 'instigators' (16), 'agents' (6), 'affiliates' (6) or mere suspects (2).

The 'Garibaldino' and 'Republican' labels favoured by Valdés in his October and November reports are nowhere to be found in Judge Manuel Jiménez's January report. The only mention of the Democrat Party in the report is in relation to Manuel María Aguilar, described as 'a resident of Madrid... (and)... first chief of the Democratic Party' who was reported to have visited Antequera during a 40-day period in 1861. Instead, Jiménez sought to document the degree of involvement of the accused in a 'socialist' conspiratorial movement. Twelve among the 44, the only men in the report graced with the title of 'Don', are described as 'Progresistas' or 'advanced Progresistas', confirming that politics in Liberal Union Spain was still officially regarded as an exclusively patrician activity. Men of politics might be Moderados, Progresistas or Liberal-Unionists, and were by definition patrians. Plebeians, lacking education, and therefore reason, and excluded from voting by their modest means, could display 'moral' but not 'political' qualities. Although logically plebeians could not therefore possess 'political antecedents', they could be seduced by democratic evangelists to join

secret societies, or be indoctrinated with foreign ideas, such as Socialism and Protestantism. But these ideas were judged alien to the Spanish body politic; consequently not to be graced with the epithet of 'politics'.

Although Judge Jiménez was chiefly concerned with documenting the political activity and moral conduct of the accused during the Revolution of Loja, evidence from earlier periods was included, particularly from the Bienio Progresista.⁵⁰ Luis Talavera César, understood to have been the ringleader of the 'socialist' conspiracy in 1861, was listed as the standard bearer for the National Militia Battalion in 1854. Many of Talavera's 'consorts' had also served in the Militia, spread across its five companies. Don Juan Rodríguez Salguero (arrested in July and investigated in early August 1861) had occupied the important position of muster sergeant (*citador*) for the entire battalion.⁵¹ His advanced *progresista* political antecedents went back at least as early July 1847 when, as a *vecino* and secretary of the Ayuntamiento of Mollina, his arrest was ordered by *moderado* Civil Governor Melchor Ordoñez for unspecified political crimes (possibly related to the civil disorders occurring in many parts of Andalucía arising from high bread prices and unemployment).⁵² Another advanced *progresista* conspirator, Don José Galán, was remembered in 1862 as the '*músico mayor* of the Band of Music which used to belong to the national Militia', further confirmation that specialists in the arts were involved in the secret society.

The presence among the conspirators of the standard bearer, the sergeant of arms and the bandmaster (not to mention Juan Zambrano, 'chief bugler') of Antequera's demobilised National Militia suggests that the 'Garibaldino' Society owed as much to Progresismo as it to Socialism. Three other conspirators who had served in the National Militia and were active in the political and intellectual life of the city during the Bienio Progresista were Don Francisco Martín Casco and Don Francisco de Lara y Pedrosa, schoolmasters, and Don Juan García Tortosa, boot maker, grenadier in the National Militia and founder of *Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas* in 1858. In January 1854 (before the July Revolution that ushered in the Bienio Progresista) Lara y Pedroso had been removed from his post of teacher and director of the orphanage amidst accusations of corruption.⁵³

Jiménez's report documents the associational ties that bound patrician Democrats with wider social groupings. The Democrat party sought to abolish *ancien régime* social distinctions by ushering in a new age of equality and fraternity in which middle-class values would replace aristocratic attitudes and popular deference. Yet the report confirms a clear social and cultural hierarchy among members of the society. At the summit of the city's democratic political culture was 'a society called "Clarín" that meets in the Café of Don José González Berdún' (*procurador síndico* during the Bienio Progresista and militia captain, arrested and sent to Málaga in July 1861).⁵⁴ A prominent member of Clarín was schoolmaster Martín Casco whose frequent attendance at this café made Jiménez suspect him as an instigator

of 'the socialist society'. Still among the 'Dons', sharing the broader associational ties of Martín Casco, was García Tortosa who was judged 'markedly *progresista* and, without being able to demonstrate with certainty that he is a socialist, it is certain that socialism in this city dates from the installation here of the *Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos* of which he was president'.⁵⁵ The search of his house in June 1859 had revealed a stock of democratic books and newspapers, the building serving as an agency for the Málaga press. Two artisans had been arrested although García escaped prosecution. Most likely the house continued to serve as a centre for democratic propaganda and the mutual aid society until the crackdown in July 1861.

Apart from González Berdún's Café where the 'Clarín' Society met and García Tortosa's house where book-selling took place and the *Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas* had its headquarters, six other sites are mentioned in the report where meetings of the 'socialist secret society' were held, recruitment encouraged and oaths of allegiance taken: three taverns, the Santa Catalina flour mill and two private houses. The inclusion of two barbers among those investigated confirms that barber shops were also sites of sociability where the Society might extend its membership (as Archidona mayor suspected to be the case when he ordered the arrest of all the barbers in Loja's Calle Real in June 1861).⁵⁶

As for the occupations of these 'socialists', although men of letters, municipal functionaries and proprietors were well represented among the accused, there was a preponderance of artisans and workers, particularly weavers, hatters, carpenters and shoemakers. Two workers in particular provide clues for the effectiveness of the 'socialist secret society' in the labour disputes of early 1861: Pedro Bernal, woollen weaver, 'publicly considered an instigator of the socialist party and chief of the weavers affiliated to the party', and Francisco Díaz González, 'considered by public opinion to be the chief of the socialist bricklayers' (bricklaying was a growing occupation during this period of rapid demographic expansion and growth in the textile industry).

The completion of the case against 'Talavera and consorts' on 21 January precipitated a spate of arrests aimed at reviving the pace of *espontaneamiento* which had ground to a halt in December. What was remarkable about this crackdown was the absence of charges accompanying most of the arrests, although several of those arrested had been detained in July 1861.⁵⁷ On 21 January, 24 men were arrested, among them Francisco Palomas Rojas (a) 'El Niño del Limbo', who was accused of organising *jornaleros* to oppose piece rates.⁵⁸ On 23–24 January, 13 others were arrested by the officer of the Civil Guard, again with no charge, although with Pedro Bernal heading the list, the detained most likely were involved in the labour combination currently affecting textile industry.⁵⁹

Although successful in increasing the number of *espontaneamientos* in the short term, it soon became evident that the Garibaldino Society was fighting back by intimidating workers and *jornaleros*. A policeman listening by

the door of the house belonging to José de Lara in the Calle de Herradores at midnight on 21 January overheard a heated discussion, in which a man (who was not present) was called a 'cochino' (pig) for having owned up to belonging to a secret society and was threatened with decapitation.⁶⁰ This fate had already been suffered by Rafael de la Torre, murdered 'for refusing to take an oath of allegiance to the socialist party' by Diego Galán Fernández (one of the 'consorts' in the Talavera y César case).⁶¹ The death from wounds of Cristobal García Zurita, a young textile worker, at the 'Fábrica de la Cañada' on 20 February was also believed to have been the consequence of intimidation.⁶² Fear, then, might explain why only 73 had owned up to membership of the Society since Valdez's departure from the city on 15 November.⁶³

In response, Alcalde Corregidor Antonio González de Asarta re-issued the circular urging *antequeranos* to take advantage of the legal guarantees for those renouncing membership of secret societies, ordering the poster to be placed upon all the billboards in the city, with copies to be sent to all the *cortijos* in the jurisdiction.⁶⁴ The arrests of 21–25 January were a warning to those stubbornly resisting owning up and a signal to those contemplating retracting their *carbonari* vows to make up their minds quickly. To further hasten the process, González de Asarta invited a representative of the Society of San Vicente de Paul, currently visiting the city, to instruct the priests of the city's six parishes to urge their congregations to 'secure the end of judicial proceedings' and 'to achieve peace and security for their families' by embracing *espontaneamiento*.⁶⁵

The arrests of 21–25 January dramatically increased the numbers owning up; 1,436 disavowed membership of the Garibaldino Society between 19 January and 13 February. González de Asarta could now report triumphantly to Guerola that 2,174 *antequeranos* no longer belonged to the Garibaldino Society, promising that many more would join them 'from Saturday 15th February, over the next 15 days, for, according the custom of the countryside, this is when the people who live on the *cortijos* come to the city'.⁶⁶ To hasten the process he ordered more arrests, 12 on 11 February in the Calle de Pasillas (the weavers' barrio) and a further eight on 16 February, including Manuel Fernández León (a) La Muerte, master of the initiation ceremony, also arrested in the weavers' barrio.⁶⁷ The results of these arrests were however disappointing.

From mid-February the pace of owning up slowed as it became evident that the Garibaldino Society's campaign of resistance was having an effect. González de Asarta reported disconsolately to Guerola that between 13 February and 5 March, when labourers from the *cortijos* had flocked to the city, only 190 had owned up.⁶⁸ A combination of circumstances might explain why *espontaneamiento* eventually ground to a halt leaving the Garibaldinos to fight another day. First, as Valdés had observed in November, agricultural labourers showed greater

resistance to owning up than textile workers, due to long engrained habits of solidarity (*unión*), pragmatic obedience to foremen and *jefes de cuadrilla* (leaders of work gangs) and the fear of ostracism, unemployment, even violence if a *jornalero* were to break rank and own up. No such entrenched solidarity existed among textile workers or artisans.

A second factor was the intimidation of witnesses. The arrests had left the *juzgado* with a logistical problem; how to process so many detainees accused of such a nebulous crime as membership of a secret society. In May, still with numerous unresolved cases outstanding, González de Asarta lamented that the conclusion of cases was being delayed by the failure of the police to find evidence and by the fear of witnesses to give evidence in public at trials involving so many defendants.⁶⁹

If the difficulty in finding witnesses courageous enough to testify hampered the prosecution, it was also an obstacle for the defence. At the end of March, Miguel Solís Montero and José Ordoñez Borrego (a 'Calimaco' were arrested, accused of persuading men 'to retract from *espontaneamiento*'. The judge informed González de Asarta that the prisoners, in order to present their defences, had asked for the names of those who had informed on their activities to the authorities. Needing to protect his informers, the Alcalde Corregidor could not disclose the names.⁷⁰

There were also administrative obstacles to the efficient processing of the cases due to the continued suspension of seven of Antequera's 24 councillors.⁷¹ A further seven councillors took no active part in the running of the city, either because they were living elsewhere or were too sick and old.⁷² This left a small rump of nine councillors to shoulder the hefty business of distributing *pósito* grains, collecting taxes, pursuing members of the secret society to convince them to own up, completing the *desarmortización* of the city's *propios*, 'quite apart from the ordinary tasks of adornment, drains, welfare, education, slaughtering animals, etc.'

With local government approaching paralysis because of the unfinished case against Aguilar and other *progresista* councillors, and with the Garibaldino Society seemingly staging a comeback, the Cortes elections of 8 and 9 April might have been expected to have caused some foreboding. Yet, after years of internal divisions, only defused by the introduction of candidates from Alora (currently Francisco de Paula Marqués), Antequera's elite agreed to sink their differences and to fall in behind one of their own: Francisco Romero Robledo, a young lawyer, nephew of a leading woollen manufacturer and landowner.⁷³

Although later a successful landowner, during this period Francisco Romero was principally involved in the woollen industry and was therefore familiar with its turbulent and troublesome workers.⁷⁴ As a young man during the Bienio Progresista he had witnessed his uncle aggressively confronting the city's first modern labour action in the spinners' strike of September 1854.⁷⁵ His friendship with Málaga's leading Conservative Liberals (Cánovas, Loring and José María Rodríguez of Casabermeja/Archidona

fame) ensured support from Madrid. A mark of the new spirit of reconciliation in a hitherto divided Antequera was the decision of Joaquín González del Pino, who was leading the field in 1862, to withdraw in favour of Romero.⁷⁶ Yet in spite of this local support, the election was very close with Romero beating Marqués by a mere 25 votes.⁷⁷

The significance of this election would not be fully apparent until after the Restoration when Romero Robledo, 'El Pollo de Antequera', established the Restoration's most enduring *cacicazgo*. In the short term, having an energetic young industrialist representing Antequera in Madrid calmed elite anxieties about the challenge of Democracy. However, Romero's election meant little to the mass of disenfranchised *antequeranos* (only 752 votes were cast in the entire electoral district of Antequera/Alora during the election) to whom national politics was an esoteric pastime occupying the wealthy and the educated. For those many hundreds of men who had formerly or still belonged to the Garibaldino Society, especially those who had access to newspapers such as *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*, politics over the previous few years had come to mean something different; the promise of the realization of the programme of the Democrat party, the experience of how association could bring benefits in terms of social security, increased wages and the ending piece rates, and, not least, the sense of belonging to a brotherhood of like-minded workers, artisans and *jornaleros*. Romero's talent was to recognise and engage with this new sociability.

In September, on the eve of Queen Isabel's visit to Antequera, appreciating that continued repression would more likely perpetuate rather than destroy the secret society, Romero seconded a petition, drawn up by 100 weavers who had been indicted for involvement in the textile strike of January 1861, requesting to be included with the Loja rebels in the Royal pardon of 3 September.⁷⁸ This conciliatory approach contrasts with the customary response of Antequera's authorities to labour unrest since the end of the Bienio; imprisonment and exile.

Before this period of social harmony accompanying the Royal visit of October, Antequera underwent another summer of discontent. During March and April, after the early successes in January and February, the pace of owning up slowed to a standstill. Public order deteriorated in proportion. On 4 May a 'political fanatic imbued with pernicious socialist doctrines' made an unprovoked attack on Don José María González del Pino, Antequera's wealthiest *vecino*, chief witness in the case against 'Talavera César and Consorts'. Rafael García Escobar explained to the policeman who arrested him

... that he did not hold any personal grudge against the wounded man, nor possess any other motive for killing him except that he is rich, and that he could have done it to any other well-off person who had presented himself at that moment, adding that if one day he is released and

someone comes to talk to him about secret societies, he will be the first to remove himself from such company, for he knew the great harm caused to society by doctrines that preach to the poor in order to inspire hatred for those who are not.⁷⁹

Guerola instructed Jiménez to investigate whether this incident signalled the resurgence of the secret society and what measures were being taking against this.⁸⁰ The judge's investigation revealed that the crime was not an isolated act of a political fanatic. Before and after the deed García met up with Francisco Palomas Rojas (a) 'El Niño del Limbo/Timbre' (accused in January of intimidating *jornaleros* by administering public beatings at the Peña de los Enamorados).⁸¹ The investigation revealed that Francisco Palomas was currently the leading influence in the Garibaldino Society, securing, with the help of a gang friends and family, the survival of the Society by intimidating those who were considering owning up or already had done so. Guerola would have been alarmed by Jiménez's reflection that

unfortunately in this city, as the entire class of *jornaleros*, with very few exceptions, was found to have been affiliated to this society, it is impossible to find anybody prepared to declare against the affiliates, for, even if they have owned up and left the society, they retain that terror which was instilled in them when they took the criminal oath to keep the secret and to behave like brothers.

Further indirect evidence of the importance of Palomas Rojas in the Garibaldino Society was found in the *espontaneamiento* files:

the greater part asserted in their declarations they had to join the *Garibaldino* Society, because otherwise they would not have found work, nor even been allowed to mix with other people. This has not happened in the case of Palomas Rojas, for it is certain that he has been able to work whenever he has found it convenient, and he has been observed almost continuously in taverns and public places gathered with many people who today are to be found among the *espontaneados*.⁸²

Twelve companions of Palomas Rojas, including his brothers Antonio and Miguel, were arrested. Each possessed an *espontaneado* number, proof that by the summer of 1862 'owning up' meant little in terms of obedience to the law or the Monarch.⁸³

Security measures confirm the agitated state of the city. On 25 April the Alcalde Corregidor ordered the confiscation of all daggers with blades that exceeded one *cuarta* in length (about six inches) from armourers and in private possession.⁸⁴ On 7 May all domestic employees were ordered to carry a passbook and to register with a *comisario* who would draw up a register. Eight

hundred copies of a 'Cartilla de Sirvientes' were then distributed among the city's domestic servants.⁸⁵

By June 1862, González de Asarta had become convinced that the campaign of *espontaneamiento* was failing, especially among agricultural labourers. The Palomas Rojas case had revealed that many so-called *espontaneados* continued to meet and conspire. On 2 June a new judge, Antonio Burgos, informed González that the 'Padrón de Espontaneamientos' contained 1,551 names of men 'who assure me that they were inscribed in the Republican Carbonari Society, entitled the Garibaldinos', 812 fewer than the number claimed in early March (2,363).⁸⁶ How can this shortfall be explained? Either, the *padrón* contained only those who had owned up since the arrests in January and February and not those who had responded to Váldez's campaign of October and November. Or, many of those owning up had failed to complete the full legal process necessary to be entered into the ledger.⁸⁷ In any event, whether the number was 1,551 or 2,363, this was only a small part of the 6–7,000 who had belonged to the Society on the eve of the Revolution of Loja.

Crimes during the spring and summer revealed the continued existence of the Society. On the night of 27 April an attempt was made on the life of Angel Rodríguez Morales, owner of the Cortijo Grande (a focus of agrarian tension in June 1861) by Fernando Rodríguez Leyra of Almogía, believed to be a 'Garibaldino'.⁸⁸ On 20 June a 16-year-old weaver shot himself with an English pistol, a result of pressure to join the Society.⁸⁹ The Society's influence was also evident in the towns and *cortijos* surrounding Antequera and further afield. On 3 June, José Bautista Trujillo, poulterer and 'Garibaldino' from Antequera, was arrested in Cuevas Bajas (Archidona) for purveying socialist doctrine.⁹⁰ In mid-July fires caused deliberately on recently privatised grazing lands in the Sierra del Valle belonging to Antonio Checa Ortiz, major beneficiary of the *desamortización*, recalled earlier attacks on *cortijos* in 1857 and 1859.⁹¹

Further confirmation that the authorities had failed significantly to dent the confidence of the secret society came in early June. Upon the arrival of three companies of the Vergara Battalion, sent to preserve public order during the harvest (confirmation surely of the continued strength of the Society!), five workers from the woollen factory belonging to Cristobal Avilés were arrested, charged with insulting, indecorous and threatening behaviour. From behind the bars of a window on the top floor of the factory, amidst guffaws and catcalls, officers reported hearing offensive remarks such as 'How pretty you are', 'So you have come at last!', 'Bloody wanker! You're wearing a dirty shirt! You're coming late!'. Four of the five arrested had belonged to the Society, the fifth was too young to join.⁹²

If the rank and file of the Democrat party in Antequera was proving robust, the elite, including the Aguilars, continued to command respect from higher levels of the party. On 13 June, Don Romualdo Lafuente and Don José Prieto,

Málaga's leading Democrats, visited the city, Guerola warning González de Asarta to keep a close eye on men 'known for their democratic ideas, their journey may have the object of altering public order and spreading corrosive ideas'.⁹³ The conspiratorial link with Málaga was confirmed with the arrest on 16 June of Antonio Arías Méndez, 'native of Málaga, silk weaver, who when he is not occupied in extracting molars and calluses is publicly known to propagate socialist ideas for which he was expelled from that city (Málaga) at the beginning of last year (1861)'.⁹⁴

In early July, Antequera's three senior magistrates (the Alcalde Corregidor, Judge and Promotor Fiscal) were removed from their posts by Royal Order. *La Discusión* suspected that Neo-Catholics had persuaded O'Donnell that Antequera's authorities had been too lenient in the treatment of those suspected of involvement in the Loja Revolution. Although Alcalde Corregidor González de Asarta and Judge Jiménez were energetic in their pursuit of conspirators, they kept within the bounds of legality and refused to conclude cases or pass sentences on evidence considered to be too weak. Posada Herrera, possibly prompted by Guerola, decided that these procedures were insufficient for defeating the Society. *La Discusión* praised González de Asarta for his determination to remain 'completely detached from the struggles and hatreds of the parties' and described Jiménez as a

... very dignified judge of first appeal of this city, the only individual of the Spanish bar who dared to lift up the toga from the dust in which it was being trampled by the unopposed military power in the province of Andalucía, on the pretext of the unhappy events of Loja.⁹⁵

Travado in 1857 and Alvarez Santullano in 1861 had simply rounded up suspects on rumour alone to be despatched in cords into internal exile or to overseas *presidios*.

Precipitating the removal of these senior magistrates was Guerola's discovery of corruption within Antequera's *policía de vigilancia*. Two policemen were found not only to be prone to drunkenness and indulgence in prohibited games, but 'were frequently observed mixing with people who have belonged to the Garibaldino Secret Society that existed (sic) in this city'.⁹⁶ However, galling it was to learn of the fallibility of the Antequera's 'vigilancia', the special police branch he had wanted to deploy in every town in the province, Guerola would surely have been relieved to learn that the pursuit of the Garibaldino secret society in Antequera was, officially at least, a thing of the past. The Royal pardon proclaimed on 3 September 1862 ended all unresolved judicial proceedings, and hence also terminated the campaign of *espontaneamiento* in Antequera.⁹⁷ The pardon applied not only to the 14 *antequeranos* held in overseas *presidios* for involvement in the Loja revolt but all those still held or pursued for political crimes.

On 8 September, taking advantage of the Guerola's visit to Antequera, a representation of weavers indicted in 1861 for union activity, pleaded for his support in a petition to the Queen requesting to be included under the terms of the pardon. Convinced that the workers were 'repentant' Guerola agreed, explaining to Posada Herrera that 'placing seventy to eighty individuals in prison to suffer four months of detention would not only go in counter to... the amnesty (sic)... but would cause an industrial disturbance, depriving the factories of the principal mass of operatives' (surely a measure of these workers' continued strength). The weavers' request for amnesty was also supported by the new Alcalde Corregidor, Antequera's new Cortes deputy Romero Robledo, Provincial deputy Joaquín Rodríguez del Pino, and 'various other persons, principally among them, factory owners'.⁹⁸ The exemplary behaviour of Antequera's weavers during the Queen's visit at first seemed to justify the confidence that political authorities and factory owners had placed in them.

Although Isabel's visit to Andalucía in October was the third in a sequence of royal tours provincial tours of the provinces (Castille, León, Galicia and Asturias in 1858, the Balearics, Catalonia and León in 1860) aimed at acquainting Spanish subjects with their monarch, Guerola insisted that the prime objective was 'to excite monarchical sentiment in those towns where democracy had so flourished'.⁹⁹ As Andalucía's most troublesome and best organised centre of Democracy, Isabel's visit to Antequera on 15–16 October was a key stop which would test the healing powers of Monarchy. Helping reawaken monarchical sentiment was Isabel's confessor, Antonio María Claret, who set himself a punishing regime of sermons.¹⁰⁰

O'Donnell's vision of a revitalised, popular and peripatetic monarch (the last Spanish monarch to visit Granada and Málaga was Phillip V in 1730) owed much to the greater ease of travel afforded by newly laid railways. However, eastern Andalucía had yet to be included in the network and the Queen's journey from Granada to Málaga, passing through Loja and Antequera, was, for the most part, on second-class roads, described by Guerola as 'natural and not made up', traversable only by wagons and not by carriages. The eight leagues between Loja and Antequera, vital stops on the royal tour where Democracy was most feared, were among the most neglected.¹⁰¹ Over the six weeks before the visit, Emilio Díaz, engineer of the province, worked frantically to improve the four-league section that crossed the province of Málaga. The four leagues from Loja to the Málaga border remained untouched.

Abandoning their carriages in the mud at Rio Frio, hardly out of sight of Loja, the Royal party travelled on by horse, mule and donkey to Cuesta de Palma, on the border with Málaga (the place chosen by Pérez del Alamo for rallying his band of rebels 16 months earlier). Here, at 3 p.m. on 15 October the Queen was welcomed by Antonio Guerola, standing by a campaign tent and a triumphal arch. Among the inscriptions engraved on the arch

Isabel would have noticed: 'Clemency is the virtue of Monarchs'.¹⁰² Guerola ended his welcoming speech announcing that 'Your Majesty will find in the province of Málaga a loyal people, addicted to her Royal person and family, and anxious to salute the best of Queens. Long live the Queen!'. More than 10,000 people who had gathered at Cuesta de Palma from surrounding towns replied to their governor's speech with 'enthusiastic *vivas* mingled with the sounds of a military band'.¹⁰³

Deterred by a recent outbreak of smallpox from entering Archidona, the Royal party continued its journey towards Antequera to be met a league out from the city by

five or six hundred mounted farmers each carrying a national flag . . . After saluting Her Majesty they gathered around the carriage cheering ceaselessly. This group of 600 horsemen – such a numerous Arab squadron –, moving in a disorderly gallop around the carriage, was a novel spectacle, the continual fluttering of 600 Spanish flags presenting a beautiful sight. Many of those who were rendering such warm homage of respect and love for the Queen had perhaps belonged to the Loja rebels.

Closer to Antequera 'forty-six gentlemen of Antequera, dressed in uniform, offered themselves as an escort for Her Majesty'.¹⁰⁴ 'Luxuriously uniformed, with patent leather riding boots, white speckled breeches, frac and top hat', these members of Antequera's equestrian society escorted the Royal party into the city, passing under three 'magnificent arches, surrounded by an immense multitude which scarcely allowed the carriage to advance', proceeding to the *Iglesia Mayor* where a *Te Deum* was celebrated. The Queen lodged in the magnificent palace of the Marqués de la Peña de los Enamorados where, later in the evening, she received visits from Antequera's ladies, gentlemen and 'a commission of the guild of weavers', accompanied by 'four children dressed as angels' who donated 'Her Majesty a beautiful bedspread made in the city'.

On the next day, after attending another mass and visiting the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, the Royal party lunched at Antequera's temple of modern industry, the woollen spinning and weaving factory belonging to Diego Moreno. Guerola was particularly gratified to observe the seemingly spontaneous monarchist piety of the operatives:

It is impossible to describe the picture which offered itself for view in the factory of Don Diego Moreno: the operatives surrounded Her Majesty soliciting the honour of kissing her hand, which was conceded to all, as also to the great part of the town that succeeded in penetrating the factory. As Her Majesty visited the various departments, women workers spread a multitude of flowers on the ground forming a soft and sightly carpet. Everywhere there was happiness: the Royal family and men of state were mixed up with the crowd and were full of jubilation to see such

sincere demonstrations of enthusiasm. Her Majesty the Queen, upon leaving the factory with tears in her eyes, told the Alcalde Corregidor, Señor Marqués de Fuente de Piedra: 'I wanted to say goodbye to the people of Antequera, but the emotions I feel in my heart prevent me: do it in my name and protect the prosperity of your fellow citizens, whose deep affection towards me has left indelible memories'.

During the afternoon, the Royal party continued its tour of Antequera passing under 'a beautiful arch' erected by the Guild of Carpenters in the Calzada to the Plaza de San Sebastian in the heart of the city where 'a beautiful obelisk, supporting a statue representing justice, paid for by the guilds of confectioners, tailors, potters and hat makers' had been constructed. The Junta de Beneficencia had pledged to distribute alms to more than 200 of the city's poor. Additionally, 80 suits of clothing were distributed to blind men and women. Following the example Guerola's 'Prizes to Virtue', eight lots of 500 reales were distributed to 'artisans, fathers of family, natives and *vecinos* of the city who have distinguished themselves for their honour and love of work'. Equally, eight lots of 500 reales were distributed to agricultural workers 'who had demonstrated the same qualities'. A further 30 lots of 200 reales were distributed to 'heads of families who used to enjoy a regular position but who now live in indigence and misery'. To all 1,700 *antequeranos* who had been unsuccessful in the draw, 20 reales were given to men, ten to women. This festival of charity had begun in the morning of 15 October with free bread rations distributed to all comers in the bullring. Even the inmates of the prison were given two special meals on each day of the visit comprising 'a breakfast of two plates of meat, bread, wine and two desserts, and lunch of soup, a main course, a salad and sweet deserts. Besides, cigars were distributed to all'.

Guerola was pleased by the success of the Royal visit to Antequera, the town that had caused him the greatest anxiety and posed the greatest threat to public order of his five-year governorship.

'Such was Antequera's magnificent reception. I was delighted. This was the first proof that Antequera, where a year ago revolutionary democracy was boiling over, had acclaimed her Queen and could demonstrate her monarchical sentiments with the greatest enthusiasm'.

He later recalled that the incident he found most moving was the presentation of the woollen bedspread to Isabel on the evening of her arrival.

'I was present. Twenty workers entered to present the Queen with a product of their factories and, spontaneously kneeling before the Queen, one of them delivered a short and simple speech which moved Her Majesty. Perhaps among those weavers were affiliates of the secret society'.¹⁰⁵

Part III

Catholicism, Democracy and the Twilight of the Bourbon Monarchy, 1862–1868

This page intentionally left blank

9

Narváez's Return and Queen Isabel's Visit to Loja in 1862

While the authorities worked to break the hold of the Garibaldinos in Antequera, Narváez returned to his native Loja from his three-year exile in Paris. The Duke's presence in Granada's second city revitalised Catholic institutional life in the region and revived his family's control of the Council. As Narváez settled back into provincial domesticity, O'Donnell's Liberal Union faced mounting problems with the exit from the cabinet of prominent reformists, Spain's unfortunate involvement in Louis Napoleon's Mexican adventure, and the revival of the Risorgimento culminating in Garibaldi's attempted march on Rome. These developments prompted the renewal of Democrat clandestine conspiracy during the summer months of 1862, as we have just seen in Antequera.

O'Donnell turned to the Monarch to secure a life line for his floundering Liberal Union. A royal tour of Andalucía – the first in 250 years – would encourage the Catholic revival and help combat Socialism and Democracy in Spain's *mediodía*. A key event of the royal tour was the Queen's visit to Loja. Among those greeting the monarch were Rafael Pérez de Alamo and other recently amnestied rebels who had occupied the city 18 months earlier. Yet, rather than herald a new spirit of concord, the amnesty and the Royal visit encouraged Narváez and the Moderados to resume judicial persecution of the Loja blacksmith, embargoing his property and securing his lifelong exile in Seville. The return of the conflict in Loja between the 'Duke and the Blacksmith' set the tone nationally for the escalation of party divisions that would culminate in 'La Gloriosa' in September 1868 and the fall of the Bourbon monarchy.

Upon returning to Spain late in 1861, Narváez chose to reside in a freshly renovated palace in Madrid. *Moderado* hopes that the Duke would lead a challenge to the Liberal Union were soon dashed. José de Salamanca, Narváez's wealthy business partner whom Moderados hoped would fund their political resurgence, snubbed the party in August when he left for Portugal to pursue his railway projects. In December, Moderados were angered

when Narváez neglected to use his vote to boost opposition in the Senate. Indeed, the Duke chose to keep a low profile in national politics until his recall to the First Ministry in September 1864.¹

Rather than lead a *moderado* challenge to the Liberal Union the Duke chose to return to Loja where there was much to attend to: rebuilding the family's political and economic fortunes, completing the ducal palace and French country house started in 1852 and attending to the construction of the Granada–Málaga railway for which he held the exclusive concession.² His closest family had been urging his return since the autumn of 1860, with tales of the declining fortunes of his elder brother and of embarrassing divisions between the Campos, his maternal family, and the Narváez.³ There were also compelling personal reasons for returning to Loja, in particular to be close to his childhood sweetheart Concepción, now married to Marfori, and to their daughter Consuelo. Numerous high-level friends would attend to his interests in Madrid, not least Marfori whose friendship with the Queen had grown since 1858.⁴

Prospects for the Duke's successful restoration as Loja's pre-eminent *cacique* were much better than a year earlier. The city's advanced Progresistas and Democrats were in disarray, many serving overseas sentences, or, like Pérez del Alamo, in hiding. Moreover, Narváez possessed a lever to ensure the good behaviour of those who remained or might return, in the petitions for clemency received from prisoners' families.⁵ Loja's Moderados soon took advantage of his return by pressing for the inclusion of friends and the exclusion of enemies in Posada Herrera's second rectification of electoral rolls, contributing to Marfori's successful recapture of Loja's Cortes seat in March 1863.⁶

Narváez returned to several uncompleted projects in Loja. In 1852 he had concentrated on finishing his French-styled country house. Ten years later he was determined to complete his palace in the heart of the city. Work resumed in January 1862 under the supervision of Granada architect Tomás Aranguren. On the site of the uncompleted palace stood the ruins of the former palace of the Islamic mayor of Loja's dependency of Zagra, directly adjoining and partially overhanging three rooms belonging to the home and business of Rafael Pérez del Alamo. When Aranguren ordered the demolition of the ruins in preparation for rebuilding, the wall between the two properties collapsed. María Regina Pérez del Alamo, who in her husband's absence was operating the smithy in order to sustain their four children, was faced with sharing the cost of re-building the wall, something she could ill afford.⁷ The affair soon found its way into the Democrat press. An article in *La Discusión* entitled 'a horrible arbitrariness' described María Regina and children, along friends who had spoken up her defence, suffering eviction and harassment at the hands local justice.⁸ Eventually, thanks to support from Democrat *confères* in Seville and elsewhere, she succeeded in securing the property.

Narváez knew that his rehabilitation as Loja's premier cacique and natural lord depended on more than the completion of an ostentatious palace. Democracy and Revolution could only successfully be resisted by continuing the revival of Catholic charitable and devotional life which he had initiated in 1852. These had stalled during the Bienio, momentarily to revive in 1856–1857, only to falter again during the first three years of the Liberal Union.⁹ Narváez's close relations with the Queen mother, with Salvador Josef, Archbishop of Granada, and with Victoriano Caro, canon of the Cathedral and director of Granada's seminary of Saint Cecilia, made him a useful medium for those seeking help with funding Catholic devotional life and church improvements.

The showpiece of Narváez's charitable crusade in 1852 had been the Asilo de San Ramón which he hoped would banish vagrancy from Loja's streets and providing subsistence and security for the poor. Ten years later this objective had not been achieved. Although the Asilo had remained open, its ambitious remit of attending to the city's poorest and unprotected, particularly orphans and foundlings, had not been matched by adequate funding or staffing. On the eve of the Revolution in June 1861 the Council had resolved that Loja's foundlings be sent to the *casa cuna* in Granada (at 24 reales for each journey) rather than to the Asilo de San Ramón, 'for remaining would expose them to the dangers of depending upon the scarce means of subsistence which is all that this city can afford them'.¹⁰ Immediately upon his return to Loja, Narváez resumed his support for the Asilo with funding for a new bell.¹¹

From the start of his crusade to revive Loja's charitable and religious institutions, the Duke was keen to leave his personal imprint. The feast of his namesake San Ramón at the end of August was designated as the occasion for the distribution of alms to the poor of the city in their homes and for the admission of the needy to the Asilo. After returning to power in October 1856 the Duke had expressed his concern that the image of San Ramón in the chapel of the Hospicio compared poorly with the more generously framed image of the Virgin Mary hanging above the main altar. In consultation with the director and his cousin Joaquín Campos it was decided that the image of San Ramón should replace the Virgin in the finer and larger frame, which should also be gilded, the Duke considering its existing decoration to be 'unsightly and painted in the colour of old mahogany'. Campos would consult with his sister Matilde on the matter of an appropriate cape to be suspended above the re-framed image of San Ramón.¹²

Apart from the renewal of his imprint on the Asilo, Narváez retained a keen interest in Loja's last remaining nunnery, the Convent of Santa Clara. In January 1857 he had ordered 2,000 reales to be paid to the Abbess for repairing buildings neglected during the Bienio Progresista and to provide a dowry for a novice who had been without one since joining the convent four years earlier.¹³ On the occasion of the feast San Ramón the Abbess

congratulated the Duke on his saint's day, enclosing a small, framed print of San Ramón, regretting that the poverty of the nuns forbade sending a work of greater perfection.¹⁴ In following month the Queen approved 56,684 reales to be spent on to the convent's buildings 'surely enough', the abbess believed, 'to be able to carry out a good repair'.¹⁵

Although the Duke continued his support of the convent, providing funds in July 1859 for an additional novitiate, the restoration was delayed.¹⁶ In mid-April 1862, Archbishop Salvador Josef explained that the Cathedral treasury was unable even to pay the salaries of the clergy, although he was convinced that, with the Duke's return to Loja, the prospects for church funding would immediately improve:

I have always expected much of you, but today, more than ever I am convinced of the enormous good that must result to Loja from your return to the city; and to me also, because only your presence will cure the sad feelings from which I have been suffering.¹⁷

This indeed proved to be the case. In June 1862 the Queen sanctioned the release of funds from Granada's Cathedral treasury for two additional novices for the convent, one to serve as choir mistress and the other as organist.¹⁸ The Archbishop promptly approved 12,000 reales for this purpose, Caro assuring Narváez that the prelate 'is entirely decided in favour of seconding your beneficent ideas in everything and for everything'.¹⁹

Narváez's enthusiasm for reviving liturgy and sacred music extended beyond the convent of Santa Clara to the church of Santa Catalina, the parish most favoured by Loja's elite. In March 1862, 30 members of Santa Catalina's 'Confraternity of the Saintly Concord' asked the Duke (a fellow member) to use his influence to secure funding for a new organ to replace the existing 'small and useless one'. A new organ was judged necessary for solemnising religious acts in the church which was undergoing major refurbishment, including the construction of a wider main entrance, a high choir and screen.²⁰ Through Enrique Enríquez, his former aide-de-camp and agent in Paris (currently busy purchasing luxury fittings to equip the palace in Loja), Narváez was able to inform the confraternity that prices of organs in Paris ranged from 4000 to 15,200 reales. An organ, 'the best in Paris', was duly ordered, delivered and installed ready for the Queen's visit in October.²¹

If in 1852 his principal concern had been to 'cure the leprosy of the vagabond and the idler who infect and destroy the social body' by establishing the Asilo, ten years later Narváez was more concerned to combat the hold that corrosive doctrines had grown to exercise on the minds of Loja's young since the Bienio. The solution he proposed was the establishment of a secondary school operated by *Padres Escolapios* of the kind that opened recently in Ubeda (Jaén), a city of comparable size to Loja.²² The lack of a

secondary school was the source of continuing anxiety among Loja's middle class, unable to afford private tutors or the cost of boarding their children at Granada's recently opened provincial Institute of Secondary Instruction.

In July, Narváez's close friend José Gutiérrez de la Vega convinced the Minister of Education, 'who generally thinks badly of the utility of the *Escolapios* as an element of instruction', not to oppose the project 'knowing the support that it has received from the Duke of Valencia'.²³ In August the Council was invited to allow the establishment of *Escolapio* college in the ex-Convent of La Victoria (home during the Bienio to the newspaper reading room).²⁴ Costly preparations for the Queen's visit in October delayed a decision until mid-December when, after a lengthy debate, the Council agreed to support the school, recognising that:

The establishment will be very useful to the District, because it will moralize a population led astray by the effects caused by the alluring but corrosive doctrines which produced the events of 1861; to Religion, because of the progress that have been made and the roots that have been put down as a result of the machinations of the Protestant Society of England; and to the Throne and the Glorious dynasty of the Queen Our Sovereign, because of the crude war and sabotage that have been waged against so August an institution.

The Council made its support contingent upon securing resources necessary for establishing the required number of primary schools to comply with the 'Ley Moyano' of 1857 (that required children of both sexes to be provided with free primary education), insisting that work would not start until this concession had been granted, 'for it should be understood that the principal object of this college is the improvement of primary education'. The Council also requested that the fees charged to Loja students boarding at the Institute of Secondary Education in Granada would be reduced 'on grounds of the greater cheapness of articles of first necessity'.²⁵ Although the Council attempted to extract benefit from the project for the broader educational needs of the city, many in Loja questioned the decision to establish an *Escolapio* seminary and missionary school, rather than a college suited to the needs of a secular age.

As Narváez attended, from his hometown, to the rebuilding of Catholic Spain, O'Donnell sought to quell the deepening crisis afflicting the Liberal Union. Progresistas had even more compelling reasons than Moderados for opposing a government that from late in 1860 had shifted to the Right. O'Donnell's reluctance to implement the reforms announced at the beginning of the Liberal Union, to replace the repressive press law, to devolve budgets to the provinces and to introduce a new municipal law, pushed leading progressive Unionists into opposition. Early in 1862, Antonio de los Rios Rosas, *puritano* leader of the chamber of deputies, declared his opposition to

the government. In June, Alonso Martínez, upon whom O'Donnell had also relied for congressional leadership, joined the opposition over his failure to support a new municipal law that would have given greater autonomy to Councils.²⁶

Facing declining popularity at home, O'Donnell returned to his preferred vocation of seeking Spain's aggrandisement overseas. At the 'Tripartite Convention' of London on 31 October 1861, Spain, France and Great Britain agreed to a joint military operation to force Mexico to honour its debts.²⁷ On 8 December, an expeditionary force of 26 ships carrying 6,000 Spanish, 3,000 French and 3,000 British troops commanded by General Luis Serrano, governor of Havana, took the Mexican fortress of San Juan de Ulúa. Allied consensus soon dissolved. Much to Serrano's chagrin, O'Donnell appointed General Juan Prim as Commander-in-Chief of Spanish forces and Minister Plenipotentiary in Mexico. Without consulting France or Britain or even the Spanish cabinet, Prim entered negotiations with the Mexicans reaching an agreement in February 1862. In exchange for Mexico agreeing to repay its debts, Spain would return the Veracruz custom's house to Mexico, disassociate itself from Napoleon's territorial objectives and withdraw all of its forces from Mexican soil.²⁸

The hero of the African War succeeded in weathering a barrage of affronted patriotism, from O'Donnell, the Army and the conservative press, keeping his position in government thanks to support from the Queen.²⁹ As a result, Prim enjoyed six months in the limelight during which Spain earned some international respect for its seemingly progressive, anti-colonialist stance. O'Donnell's stock dropped in proportion and the Liberal Union looked weaker than ever, particularly now that Spain by its actions had alienated its main ally, France. Although Prim remained in the government until the end of the Liberal Union, this episode increased his prestige among Progresistas and Democrats who, admirers Mexico's Benito Juárez, were searching for a leader to replace the departed Espartero. Following the collapse of Liberal Union in March 1863 Prim gradually assumed Espartero's mantle.

With this trumping of his favourite card O'Donnell returned to the domestic agenda. In May, Democrats and Progresistas in the Cortes deputies led by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta proposed a pardon for those sentenced for involvement in the Loja Revolution. Although the motion was defeated by 142 to 35, much concern had been expressed since the previous autumn from all sides of the Cortes over the flimsy legal standing of military tribunals and the severity of the sentences in what was recognised as a civilian and largely peaceful movement.³⁰ In particular, the government was unable to explain why the Carlist rebels of San Carlos Rápita of March 1860, an absolutist uprising timed unpatriotically to coincide with the height of the war in Africa, had received such swift amnesties, when capital punishments and 20-year sentences had been doled out on Loja's rebels for merely marching, mostly unarmed, on Loja.³¹

Government doubts over the justice of the sentences were temporarily dispelled in July when the hydra of Democracy, with seasonal precision, once more reared its head. The arrest of a senior army officer in Zaragoza and a Civil Guard commander in Madrid, believed to be agents of a much wider conspiracy, confirmed the survival of the clandestine network that had mustered so many affiliates to Loja in July 1861.³² An international dimension was also evident in the renewed activity of Fernando Garrido, who had established close ties with Mazzini during his exile in Britain.³³ Garrido included a letter from Mazzini as a frontispiece to his re-edited 1856 pamphlet, *Propaganda Democrática El Socialismo y la Democracia ante sus adversarios*. The preface reminded Spanish Democrats that: 'If yesterday a Cámara succumbed, if today a Pérez del Alamo fails, tomorrow a Riego or a Spanish Garibaldi, more fortunate, or more able, will complete the work into whose foundations has flown so much generous blood'.³⁴

The importance of the Italian connection was confirmed in August when exiled Galician Democrat Eduardo Ruiz Pons chose to reside in Italy.³⁵ This coincided with the renewal of Garibaldi's campaign in southern Italy aimed at completing the work of political unification (to include Venice) and creating a democratic state with its capital in Rome, in place of the conservative Piedmontese compromise that had obtained since 1859.³⁶ Garibaldi's progress during the summer re-activated Spain's Democrats as it alarmed neo-Catholics and Moderados. Who would come to the defence of Pius IX and the Papal States? Already over-stretched in Mexico (stunned by the defeat at Puebla on 5 May 1862), Napoleon was in no position to strengthen his forces in Rome to confront Garibaldi's volunteer advancing from the South. And after the Mexican debacle there was no question of Spain working in tandem with France in coming to Pope's rescue, as General Fernández de Córdoba had done in 1849.

With opportunities for foreign adventure blocked, with the resurgence of democratic conspiracy at home and with Isabel flirting dangerously with the idea of 'turnismo' between Progresistas and Moderados, O'Donnell's proposal in mid-August 1862 of a visit of the Royal Family to Andalucía was an inspired move.³⁷ Conceived on a lavish scale, the tour was intended to restore the popularity of the Monarchy in the region, reanimate Catholic devotion and reverse the progress made by the corrosive doctrines of Socialism, Protestantism and Republicanism in Spain's *mediodía*.³⁸

No royal visit to Andalucía could go ahead without a pardon for those convicted of involvement in the Loja Revolution. The imprisonment of 1,183 men (387 bachelors, 720 married men and 76 widowers) had left several thousand women, children and the elderly without support, ensuring a steady flow of petitions for clemency to the Queen, O'Donnell and Narváez.³⁹ Since opening of the Cortes session in October 1861 the government was repeatedly embarrassed by accusations from *progresista* and Democrat deputies of having allowed military tribunals to use defunct

legislation (in particular the law of 17 April 1821) to arrest unarmed men in their homes who were then sentenced on mere hearsay evidence to life sentences in *presidios*.⁴⁰ O'Donnell's defence that the Loja rebels had been treated with moderation in comparison to the spree of executions meted out by Narváez on the Arahál rebels in July 1857 did little to remove the impression that the sentences were excessive and of dubious legality. The Royal visit to Andalucía would provide the ideal occasion for a pardon.

Rather than await a symbolic moment on the royal tour, such as the Queen's entry to Loja, for announcing the pardon, a gesture which might be interpreted as a response to his rival Narváez's pleading, O'Donnell resolved to announce the pardon forthwith.⁴¹ On 3 September a full pardon was granted to all those sentenced for involvement in the events of June and July 1861 'in the city of Loja and other towns of the territory of the Audiencias of Granada and Seville'. The state would pay the costs of those returning to the Spanish mainland from overseas *presidios* although not to their homes. Rebels who had escaped punishment or been sentenced *en rebeldía* were to report to Spanish consular officials within 30 days to take advantage of the pardon.⁴²

News of the Royal pardon may have compensated for the bad news received on the same day that Garibaldi's volunteer army had been defeated at the battle of Aspromonte, with Garibaldi seemingly mortally wounded.⁴³ Although an amnesty would have been preferred to a pardon (*La Discusión* pointed out the anomaly that the absolutist rebels of San Carlos de la Rápita had been granted a full amnesty), at least beleaguered Democrats gained some breathing space and a quasi legality which they had been denied since the Loja Revolution. Democrat leader Nicolás Rivero, who had led demands in the Cortes for an amnesty, could therefore parade his 'dear friend and co-religionist' Pérez del Alamo publicly through the streets of the Andalusian capital to present his request for pardon to the civil governor, who 'received the director of *La Discusión* and the insurgent of Loja with extreme courtesy and, of course, in noble and generous words, assured him that he could live peacefully in the security that no-one would trouble him'.⁴⁴

No such welcome was accorded by the conservative press for whom the pardon for the Socialist rebels was considered a betrayal of Catholic Spain. Neo-Catholic *La Regeneración* portrayed Pérez del Alamo as 'a ferocious and ridiculous monster', triggering a war of mutual insults which would result, by the end of the year, in hefty fines for Loja's blacksmith, confiscation of his properties in Loja and exile to Seville.⁴⁵ For the moment, however, Pérez del Alamo was able to enjoy his newfound freedom, travelling first to Madrid before rejoining his family in Loja 'very satisfied with the welcome he had received from the Democrats of Madrid'.⁴⁶

The return of Loja's 'indultados' to Spain provided the first opportunity in four years for propaganda through public subscription of the kind mounted for the widows of Tomás Brú in 1858–1859. Long lists of contributors to the

expenses of Loja's returning prisoners were published on the cover pages of *La Discusión*.⁴⁷ Subscriptions were not confined to Madrid. Hundreds of workers employed in railway workshops in Zaragoza and Alicante, and on the *Ferrocarril del Mediodía* in Andalucía, also chipped in. In Alicante, local Democrats paid for the hospital expenses, burial service and a niche in the cemetery for Miguel García y García of Alfarnate, returning from the Balearics with his two sons (whose fares home were also paid).⁴⁸ José Fiol, leading Mallorca Democrat, organised the return of 114 rebels to Málaga.⁴⁹ This public appeal on behalf of persecuted and impoverished co-religionists, many in poor health although armed now with Royal pardons, provided the party with an opportunity to refute the official view that the Loja uprising had been a 'social' revolution and to present the events of July 1861 instead as a peaceful civic parade.⁵⁰

Returning via Jaén and Granada, where 'numerous friends, anxious to congratulate him, came out to receive him', Pérez arrived in Loja 'to receive visits from the greater part of the *vecinos*, irrespective of their political opinions, proof of the justice which his behaviour in Loja had preserved during the days of the uprising'. One of his first visitors was the widow of Francisco Mellado, 'captain of the insurgents' who had died on the scaffold in July. Living in 'the worst misery' and unable to feed her eight children, Pérez promised help.⁵¹ The families of the leaders of the rebellion escaped such desperate privation. Ramón Calvo, Pérez's second-in-command, returned to Loja in early October to find his family 'well... after 15 months of painful absence'. He was met a league out of the city by 'very many friends' who accompanied him in a jubilant entry, a mere five days before the Queen's arrival.⁵² In early October the elation felt by Loja's Democrats over the pardon and return of their *confrères* must have increased with the news that Garibaldi had recovered from his wounds and that his volunteers were to be granted full amnesties.⁵³

Meanwhile preparations were frantically being made in Loja for a more illustrious visitor. News of the Queen's visit was greeted enthusiastically by the Council who immediately dedicated a *paseo* to her 'as proof of the affectionate respect which the population professes for the Her Majesty's August family'. The cost of a 'castle of fireworks', four triumphal arches, illumination of the Council building, the Ex-Convent of La Victoria and the street leading to the Convent of Santa Clara, portraits of the royal couple, donations for the poor and so on, budgeted at 321,664 reales, would be paid from the territorial and industrial taxes backed by a voluntary loan. *Pósito* funds would defray the cost of festivities for welcoming the monarch. The Council also resolved to support the festival of San Ramón on 31 August 'to give on that day a public testimony of affection and gratitude to His Excellency the Duke of Valencia for the eminent services which during his long career he has lent to the throne, to the dynasty of Her Majesty the Queen, and to the Nation'.⁵⁴

Narváez's contribution to the financing and organisation of Loja's reception of the Royal party was paramount. Workers and craftsmen currently completing his 'Casa Palacio' were redeployed in the construction of triumphal arches and in the decoration of churches, convents, private buildings and streets. The Duke personally funded the triumphal arch in La Carrera, the decoration of the Asilo de San Ramón, the Convent of Santa Clara and the Ex-Convent of La Victoria, the distribution of alms to the poor from his palace, the furnishing of the Queen's apartment, and the receptions for the Royal Family at his brother's palace, at the Asilo de San Ramón and at his 'Casería' on the second day. Sixteen other sites and events were funded by the Council, the Guilds of Landowners, Merchants, Hatters, Musicians, Flour Millers, Bakers, Clergy, Confraternities and 'public employees and those who have followed scientific careers'.⁵⁵

Queen Isabel's tour of Andalucía got underway with the arrival of the monarch in Granada on 9 October. Although the Royal party would travel throughout Andalucía, visiting all the main provinces (Jaén, Córdoba, Granada, Seville, Cádiz, Málaga and Murcia) Isabel's visit to Granada, involving eight days of festivities and religious services, including the celebration of her birthday, was symbolically the most important part of the journey.⁵⁶ Tents pitched at provincial and municipal boundaries for receiving the Royal party, and neo-Moorish and neo-classical triumphal arches constructed at city gates and entries to important thoroughfares, imitated the paraphernalia of the fifteenth-century *reconquista*. Speeches reminded *granadinos* of Isabel of Castille's statement in 1492, 'I will go to Granada not to conquer her inhabitants but to allow myself to be conquered by them', an example that Isabel II followed by mixing freely with the crowd in Granada.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, a frantic timetable of preaching by Father Claret, backed by a small army of clergy, reminded everyone that Royal tour was as much about reviving Catholic devotion as restoring monarchical sentiments.

A highpoint of the visit to Granada was the opening of a Provincial Exposition of Art, Industry and Agriculture held in the ex-Convent of Santo Domingo, at the end of which Isabel presided over a 'prizes for virtue' ceremony.⁵⁸ Public 'prizes for virtue' ceremonies had been pioneered in Málaga by Antonio Guerola in 1859 as part of his propaganda campaign against Democrats.⁵⁹ After much opposition from *granadino* neo-Thomist philosopher Juan Manuel Orti y Lara, who warned that 'real virtue is not encouraged, nor even preserved, but ruined by prizes in money', Granada had followed suit with its first 'prizes for virtue' ceremony in May 1861, on the eve of the Loja Revolution.⁶⁰ In the ceremony presided over by the Queen on 11 October, one of five prizes for charity went to Francisco Tallon Cahiz of Algarinejo, a town which had seen a disproportionate number of its men sentenced in August 1861 to overseas *presidios*. A prize of 2,000 reales went to Antonio Mellado of Loja, who, since his father's execution for

leading squads of rebels, had been responsible for maintaining his mother and seven siblings.⁶¹

On 14 October the Royal party left Granada for Loja, stopping in the morning for a municipal reception and *Te Deum* at Santa Fe, the garrison city constructed during the siege of Granada in the 1480s, and, in the early afternoon, at Venta del Pulgar where the Marqués del Salar, who owned most of the land along this stretch of Granada's fertile *vega*, awaited the Queen next to an immense triumphal arch.⁶² Men from Salar, along with those of Algarinejo, had figured disproportionately among those sentenced to lengthy *presidio* terms. From Salar the Royal party rode on to Loja arriving at 5.15 p.m. at Manzanil where, by 'two beautiful arches of foliage and natural flowers which formed enlaced vaults over the road', Narváez, the Council and 'the most notable people of Loja' had been waiting in a tent since 'eleven in the morning on a beautiful autumn day'. At some distance, lining the route between Manzanil and Loja, Pérez del Alamo and numerous *indultados*, had assembled to greet the Queen. Throughout the day the crowd swelled with the arrival of 'many thousands from the *caseríos* and from the surrounding towns, rich and poor, men and women, children and old people', many having started their journeys before daybreak.⁶³

After brief refreshments and changes of clothing, the Royal party proceeded to Loja aboard an open carriage drawn by 'magnificent horses, saddled with rich harnesses à la *Dumont*, offered by General Narváez from his own property', to the accompaniment of bell-ringing and strains of a wind band, 'sounds that were drowned by the cheering crowds'. Numerous *indultados*, carrying a 'beautiful banner' embroidered with 'To SS.MM. and AA., the grateful pardoned ones', waving palm leaves and olive branches, surrounded the coach and led it to Loja.⁶⁴ At the head the squad of *indultados* Pérez del Alamo walked in extended conversation with Antonio Aguilar y Correa (the *antequerano* Marqués de la Vega de Armijo), explaining to the Minister of Development that the movement in Loja in 1861 was not a conspiracy against the throne, 'for which their only exists love and respect', but rather 'the cry of pain that was vexed by one (Narváez) who does not understand the spirit of the century'.⁶⁵ The Royal carriage was followed by Narváez, 'mounted on a beautiful sorrel from his own stock', four cavalry escorts, the Alcalde Corregidor, high employees from the Palace and provincial and local administrations, 'with a large number of notables bringing up the rear who had gone out on horseback to await the arrival of the august travellers'.⁶⁶ The Royal party entered Loja at 6 p.m. through a triumphal arch built in the Arab style where they were greeted by O'Donnell and other senior ministers. The band of the Regiment of America struck up the Royal march as 'beautiful girls' standing on the parapets and balconies showered the Royal carriage with flowers.

Once inside the city, the civil and religious authorities minimised potential embarrassment by limiting opportunities for casual encounters between

the people and the Royal Party. There were no walkabouts or impromptu factory visits of the kind that had occurred in Granada and would shortly take place in Antequera. Nor were Loja's religious sentiments to be trusted. A priest accompanying father Claret wrote that 'He could not preach to the people, because the order was given that no-one should enter the Church, in order to avoid confusion when the Queen entered... the *Señor Arzobispo* felt this deeply, for this was precisely the town which was most in need'. Hence, Father Claret preached only to the converted: to the nuns of 'the only convent that exists in Loja (Santa Clara), and later to the clergy', the priest recalling that 'although the pueblo desired to hear him, they were unable to, because, in order to avoid confusion, the order had been given that no-one should enter the church when Her Majesty was present'.⁶⁷

Upon entering Loja the Royal party was led directly to the Iglesia Mayor to hear a mass at which Loja's Archpriest, 'Señor Cura Yébenes, ex-cloistered Capuchin and famed orator', thanked 'Her Majesty for honouring Loja by her visit, for conceding the amnesty (sic)'. In his sermon, Francisco Yébenes 'strove to remove any bad opinion that might have been formed about the city by the misconduct of one of its sons'.⁶⁸ Isabel then crossed to the sumptuous lodgings prepared for them by Narváez in his brother's palace (his own was not yet completed). After raffling 16 prizes among the poor of Loja, a 'delicate dinner' was served, followed by a firework display and country dances to the accompaniment of a guitar and violin orchestra in front of the palace. The following morning, after visiting the nuns of Santa Clara and poor of the Asilo de San Ramón, the Royal Party left the city through a Renaissance arch on the Málaga road.

Before allowing the Royal Party finally to depart, Narváez had a few more treats in store. In front of 'delicious *quinta* of General Narváez' a large tent had been pitched where the Royal Party witnessed:

a tender and moving spectacle. More than twenty delightful girls, all very beautiful, dressed in white, adorned with flowers and carrying baskets in their hands full of recently picked fruit and flowers, were awaiting the arrival of the Royal Family to place themselves at their feet.

Accompanied by O'Donnell and Narváez, the two men who would sustain the monarchy for the next six years, the Royal party then inspected the Duke's country house and French garden. After a 'splendid meal' comprising 'exclusively local dishes' served in a pavilion especially erected for the occasion, during which the band of the Regiment of America played various pieces, O'Donnell 'bade his farewell to the Duke of Valencia in order to precede the Royal Family in entering Antequera'. Then, at noon, the Royal party departed, as they had arrived 18 hours earlier, 'amidst the enthusiastic *vivas* of an immense throng which had gathered from the surrounding *cortijos*, towns and *caseríos*, to salute their Kings'.⁶⁹ The visit to Loja left a deep

impression on the monarchs and successfully reinstated Narváez in royal favour.⁷⁰

Although the return of the Duke and the Royal visit augured well for *moderado* resurgence in Loja and Granada, the welcome Pérez, Calvo and the *indultados* had received was a reminder that Loja was as Democratic as it was Monarchist. After the euphoria of the Royal visit had died down, Marfori expected the city's Democrats, protected now by Royal pardons, to renew their challenge to the Duke's interests and allies in Loja. He resolved to confront this prospect immediately by enticing Pérez into a public exchange of insults in the press which could then be used as evidence in writs of calumny against the Loja blacksmith. This was a well-tested strategy used by Narváez in dealing with his political opponents since his return from Paris in 1856.

Immediately after the departure of the Royal party Marfori invited Pérez to his house in Loja, along with other *lojeños*, including Ramón Calvo and Jacinto Cantero, to sign a letter refuting an account of the Royal visit to Loja published recently in *La Andalucía* by Seville Democrat Francisco María Tubino. This article had questioned the spontaneity of Loja's monarchist sentiments, Tubino observing that 'a group of townsmen' who were not even *indultados* had been given palm leaves and olive branches and ordered to greet the Queen, adding that the Royal party must have noted the coldness of the reception in Loja compared with the warmth shown to the Monarch everywhere else in Andalucía.⁷¹ More seriously Tubino, reiterating Pérez's statement to the Minister of Development, described Loja as a 'feudal castle with serfs and lords' and characterised the Revolution of July 1861 as 'a cry of pain' rather than an uprising organised by the Democrat Party. Narváez saw the hand of Seville Democrat Nicolás Rivero, editor of *La Discusión*, behind the article.⁷²

Failing to persuade Pérez to sign the letter of protest, Marfori turned to the courts, issuing the Loja blacksmith with a writ demanding compensation for damages incurred during the Loja Revolution. Marfori then returned to Madrid to wage war through the press, publishing an account of his meetings with the blacksmith and accusing him of changing his political allegiance.⁷³ Pérez replied to Marfori's accusations in letters in *El Pueblo* and *La Discusión* in which he described his recent political and judicial harassment and accused Marfori of acting 'dishonourably' and 'dishonestly', uncompromising language that immediately exposed him to further legal action. An editorial in *La Discusión*, accusing Marfori of being 'so respectful of the law when his own person is in some risk, yet so abusive towards the press and so fond of imprisonments when Civil Governor of Madrid', provided Marfori with the ammunition he needed to silence Pérez.⁷⁴ After consulting with Narváez's *camarilla* in Madrid (Gutiérrez de la Vega, Canseco, Seijas, Fernández de la Hoz, Claudio Moyano), urged on by the Duke, Marfori proceeded to sue Pérez for calumny.⁷⁵

Unwisely Pérez persisted in his newspaper dialogue with Marfori, defending the honour of his 'profession' of veterinarian-blacksmith and mocking

Marfori for having stated in a letter to *La Discusión* that it would damage his 'decorum' to have to explain to an 'albéitar' (an old-fashioned term for veterinarian) why he was resorting to the courts to defend himself against crimes of calumny and injury:

Señor Marfori refuses to give me any explanations because I am an 'albéitar'. I believe that there is no profession that dishonours a man. I am very happy, very satisfied and very proud of mine. I believe that working honourably in an honourable job, however humble, is more meritorious than obtaining high post as a result of shameful favours. We are all equal before the law, equal before society; we are all men, we are all citizens.

Moreover, if Señor Marfori were some descendent of high and noble ancestry one could understand that a remnant of noble pride might linger, fruit of habits learned at home.

But between an *albéitar* and the son of a cook, of a *fondista* (small restaurant), there is not such a great distance in social habits. I am the son of a good farmer: Señor Marfori, son of a good cook, a good *fondista*. Consequently, he could have easily descended to my level and given me pacific and conciliatory explanations, which I asked him decorously to provide, because I too have honour, as I too am a man.⁷⁶

This letter convinced Marfori, urged on by José Gutiérrez de la Vega, to proceed with a second case of calumny.⁷⁷

Although the art of the veterinary-blacksmith had been professionalised since the eighteenth century, requiring an examination to enter any one of its three branches ('veterinario', 'maestro albéitar' and 'albéitar herrador'), it was still regarded by the upper class as a 'humble office', not on a par with medicine or pharmacy. Pérez's *moderado* opponents therefore made much of his humble occupation, as have later historians. Pepe Narváez referred to him as 'Maestro Pérez' in correspondence with his uncle. The neo-Catholic newspaper *La Regeneración* attacked *La Discusión* for referring to Pérez as 'Don' in an article, for which title the Democrat paper was happy to offer a lengthy defence. Narváez's friend, José Gutiérrez de la Vega, refers to Pérez variously as 'el albéitar' or 'el herrador'.⁷⁸ In fact, as we have seen, Pérez del Alamo belonged comfortably to Loja's middle class.

To his satisfaction, Narváez learned that Marfori's legal action against Pérez, much publicised by Gutiérrez de la Vega in *El Reino*, had not only silenced the Loja blacksmith and *La Discusión*, but also convinced the editor of *La Andalucía* to withdraw a second article by Sr Tubino in which he reaffirmed Loja's tepid reception of the Queen. Instead, Tubino had agreed to praise Narváez's 'efforts to lavish attention on the august travellers' in a forthcoming 'chronicle of the journey of Her Majesty'.⁷⁹ The record would therefore be put straight, Gutiérrez de la Vega assured the Duke. The public

would now recognise that 'the revolution of Loja was democratic and they (Pérez del Alamo and Nicolás Rivero) are and always will be democrats; consequently it was not a cry of pain... and that what you have done for the Queen is what everyone knows, lavished attention on her in your homeland (*país*)'.⁸⁰

Marfori won his court action and Pérez was fined 10,000 reales.⁸¹ Appreciation of the part played by Gutiérrez de la Vega and *El Reino* in the affair is confirmed by Narváez doubling his friend's monthly allowance from 2,000 to 4,000 reales.⁸² Chastised by the Madrid courts, Pérez returned to Loja to face an even worse situation. A faction of his Democrat *confrères* behind Ramón Calvo attempted to assassinate him requiring the persecuted blacksmith to resort in costly criminal proceedings. Siding with Calvo Loja's Alcalde Corregidor denounced Pérez to the *juzgado* for sowing alarm since his return to Loja by making 'frequent journeys to the capital of the monarchy where he makes public declarations of the persistence of his old opinions by means of democratic newspapers, of which he has sent a multitude of examples to this city'.⁸³ Apart from this political persecution, Pérez was also faced with a demand to contribute half the cost of rebuilding the party wall that had collapsed during the construction of Narváez's *casa-palacio*.

Faced with such danger and hostility in Loja, Pérez del Alamo may have felt some relief upon hearing the sentence in Marfori's case of calumny. Narváez and Marfori achieved their objective of removing the troublesome blacksmith from Loja. Pérez was sentenced to two years of exile from Loja beyond a ten league radius, suspended from all public duties and political rights during that time, fined 6,000 reales and charged full costs amounting to 8,064 reales or, in case of inability to pay, imprisonment. Unable to pay the fine, having already borrowed money for two previous bails, with several of his Loja properties already embargoed, Pérez was transported to Seville, his chosen city of exile, to serve his sentence.

Pérez was soon released, *confrères* in Loja and Seville paying his fines, a measure of the prestige he had attained among Democrats for his leadership of the 'rebellion of the blacksmiths'. He was praised in the Democrat press for his courage in standing up to Marfori's bullying and for speaking up for the common man. The next two years would reveal that he could organise the Democrat party in Loja and western Granada quite as effectively from his blacksmith forge in Seville as from his old business in the Calle Carrera, where sharing a party wall with Narváez, whose palace was finally completed in 1863, would probably have been too close for his comfort or safety.⁸⁴

10

'The Second Loja': Garibaldi and the Limits of Democracy in Eastern Granada, 1863–1864

My long experience in the Government of Málaga convinced me that there is a continuous and latent conspiracy in these Andalucian provinces. Although this rests more than anything else on illusions that maintain the fervour and hopes of democrats, it has been necessary to follow them step by step, in order to prevent events occurring beyond Spain from encouraging Spanish conspirators, or, even without these external stimuli, to prevent the democratic doctrines alone from producing a second Loja.

3 July 1863, Antonio Guerola, Seville, to Minister of Government, Madrid¹

The revolution can be seen growing here, as everywhere else, in a terrible way, and it is certain that we are just as we were in the days before the Revolution of Loja. Meetings are being held everywhere: democratic and socialist newspapers are read in great circles in the streets; those who profess these ideas all wear beards as a distinctive mark, each one believes himself to be a minister or a revolutionary. Pray to God that we survive this summer peacefully! Undoubtedly Spain is in a period very similar to the century of the destruction of ancient Rome.

19 February 1864, Alhama correspondent, *El Espíritu Público*²

This chapter explores the consequences in the borderlands Granada and Málaga of the collapse of O'Donnell's five-year Liberal Union in February 1863 and the return of the Moderados to power. This reversal in the liberalising trends, if only promised, propelled Progresistas into five years of *retraimiento* (electoral abstention) where they joined the already proscribed Democrats. This convergence on the Left re-activated Spain's clandestine and conspiratorial politics and coincided with a renewal of Mazzini's 'action' strategy in Italy. As we have seen, news of events in Italy after 1859

contributed importantly to the democratic exaltation that preceded the Loja Revolution of July 1861. In 1863 and 1864, Democrats and advanced Progresistas again drew upon the analogy of Italy's regeneration, and the inspiration of leaders such as Garibaldi, in a renewed struggle against 'Bourbon despotism'. The prospect that Garibaldi himself might lead the revolution in Spain on his return from England in May 1864 infused Democrat conspiracy in the region with additional enthusiasm and 'alegría'.

If the Royal tour of Andalucía served temporarily to revive the popularity of the Monarchy it did nothing to arrest the decline of the Liberal Union. Only economic prosperity and the patronage this afforded, combined with the popularity of the African War, had kept the project afloat. Progresistas and Democrats were enraged by the failure of O'Donnell to deliver on promised electoral, municipal, press and constitutional reforms. Moderados feared Posada Herrera's political tolerance and liberalising utterances. Yet in opposition both parties remained fragmented and defensive. Progresistas feared being overtaken by Democrats, Moderados by Neo-Catholics or by the younger generation of Conservative Liberals (who would inherit the Spanish state with the Restoration in 1875).

O'Donnell resigned in February 1863 to be replaced as First Minister by the Marqués de Miraflores, a Doctrinario who proceeded to appoint a *moderado* cabinet.³ Miraflores presented this as a short-term measure before the convocation of new elections out of which it was hoped the historic parties would emerge reinvigorated behind new leaders. The idea was for an ordered alternation between Progresistas and Moderados, ensuring the exclusion of Democrats on the Left and Neo-Catholics on the Right. This cherished ideal, inspired by the British two-party system and its decorative monarchy, was soon dashed. Liberal Union deputies behind Posada Herrera and Democrats behind Nicolás Rivero denounced the government's bias in favour of the historical parties. The suspension of 2 May civic and military parades traditionally held to commemorate the 1808 uprising against the French betrayed the *moderado* bias of the administration and inflamed congressional opinion.⁴ On 6 May the Cortes session was suspended ending the five-year 'Long Parliament'. Elections were set for 11 October.⁵

The dissolution of the Cortes sparked party activity throughout Spain. On 25 June, Miraflores issued an election circular promising free and open elections with civil governors instructed to abstain 'from imposing any candidate'.⁶ Unconvinced by this show of liberality, the political parties awaited the Government's announcement of a political programme, impatient to launch their campaigns. Finally in mid-August Interior Minister, Florencio Rodríguez Vaamonde, issued an ambiguous manifesto favouring 'the election to the future Congress of a majority capable of consolidating conservative and liberal interests', reminding provincial governors that, although they were to ensure that 'the will of the electorate should be scrupulously respected', they should not deny their support to candidates

who identified with the government's programme.⁷ An additional circular in August outlined the responsibility of civil governors to supervise electoral meetings, to ensure that meetings were attended only by citizens who had qualified as electors, and to insist that discussion in these political meetings be confined to electoral issues.⁸

The August circular provoked an immediate storm even within the government. Democrats and Progresistas were the most incensed because they attracted supporters who, by virtue of their low incomes, were often not electors. The debate among Progresistas over electoral abstention came to a head, party leader Pedro Calvo Asensio ordering a cessation of all electoral activity on 23 August 1863. On 11 September 1863, *progresista* newspapers carried a 'Manifesto to the Nation' announcing a boycott of electoral activity.

Initially Democrats delayed joining Progresistas, due to a division between Emilio García Ruiz, editor of *El Pueblo*, who favoured closer collaboration with Progresistas, and Nicolás Rivero, editor of *La Discusión*, who, apart from distrusting Progresistas since their betrayal of Democrats during the Bienio Progresista, was reluctant to lose his Cortes seat that had served as a platform for Democrat propaganda throughout the Liberal Union. Rivero finally published a manifesto in favour of electoral abstention, but separate from the Progresistas. In 1864 Democrats would experience far deeper internal divisions over the place of Socialism within the party. But for the moment, the arrival of patrician Progresistas into the revolutionary camp augured well for Democrat fortunes.⁹

Democrats did not await the convocation of the October election before resuming their conspiratorial activity. Within a week of O'Donnell's resignation Narváez was informed that Pérez's arrival in Madrid had coincided with the appearance of anti-Narváez broadsheets and slogans on the streets of the capital.¹⁰ Within a month Narváez had received a more alarming report from Antonio Lora in Granada (son of his estate manager Francisco Lora) that 'four to six Democrats, or so they call themselves' had met in a Granada café to hatch a plot to involve Pérez in an attempt on the Duke's life. Presiding over the meeting was a 'lame man' (*cojo*), a comedian, who had acted at the *zarzuela* in Loja on the eve of the Revolution of Loja, and who had gone on to serve as Pérez's secretary during the occupation of the city.¹¹

The resumption of the feud between 'the Duke and the Blacksmith' was part of a more generalised stirring of activity among Democrats in the wake of the collapse of the Liberal Union. In April, Joaquín Alonso, civil governor of Granada, was warned that a certain '*comandante* Moriones' had left Madrid for Granada to promote an insurrection in Andalucía, part of a general uprising emanating from Barcelona and Valencia planned for 25 April.¹² The uprising was expected to start in Loja where 'disturbers of order' would take advantage of 'the *romería* of San Marcos that attracted an infinite number of *vecinos* from the surrounding towns and *caseríos*'. Accordingly, Alonso sent troops to re-enforce Loja's garrison, instructed the Civil Guard to increase its

patrols in Loja and surrounding towns, and ordered the Alcalde, José Pérez Ordoñez, to take precautions necessary to ensure order.¹³

Pérez Ordoñez replied that he kept constant watch on the 'professional disturbers of public order' but had found it impossible to surprise them at their work claiming that 'the only means of fruitfully defeating them is through the action of local justice' (i.e., arbitrary arrests and exile). The Alcalde observed that Loja's Democrats in Loja had divided into factions but, following the attempt on Pérez's life, they had fallen behind a 'common chief', Ramón Calvo, whom he was ready to arrest at the slightest excuse. Meanwhile, a close watch was being kept on travellers staying in Loja's numerous inns.¹⁴

The April uprising did not take place, authorities throughout Andalucía having been well briefed on the conspiracy. On the expected day (on 25 April) Guerola, now civil governor of Cádiz, arrested Romualdo Lafuente in Cádiz despatching him to his native Málaga to serve a nine-month prison sentence.¹⁵ Although Pérez was reported by Ordoñez to be travelling repeatedly between Loja and Granada around the proposed date of the uprising, the rivalry in Loja between Pérez and Calvo made any concerted movement in western Granada unlikely. Indeed on 26 April Pérez requested a permit to move with his family to Madrid, claiming later that life in Loja had become too dangerous.¹⁶

The Loja blacksmith arrived in Madrid at the height of the rumpus accompanying the cancellation of the patriotic celebrations of 2 May. By June he was reported to have returned to Granada and to have visited the shop of Emilio Lattes, an Italian silversmith, on several occasions.¹⁷ In early July, at the height of the second insurrection scare of 1863, he arrived in Seville with his family, the new Civil Governor of Seville, Antonio Guerola, recalling that:

... a powerful revolutionary element arrived in Seville, already in such a threatening state: the famous Rafael Pérez del Alamo, chief of the insurrection of Loja. He presented himself to me saying that in Loja he was unable to survive because of the persecutions of the Narváez family, and that he came to Seville to work peacefully at his job of veterinarian-blacksmith, vehemently assuring me that he had distanced himself from politics and of his intention not to get involved conspiracies, to the extent of desiring to be watched so that I would be convinced of his assurances. He established his blacksmith shop next to the Puerta del Mar, but I was not so candid as to trust his assurances, so I had watched carefully. In fact, at first he did not show himself to be a friend of the conspirators, even if he always kept company with Democrats.¹⁸

The April conspiracy failed in part because of lack of support from Democrats in exile. Fernando Garrido, who was expected to send 500 rifles

to Catalonia from his exile in Marseilles, was reported to be too poor, sick and housebound to be able to recruit supporters or purchase rifles for any revolution in Spain. Indeed, Democrats in Madrid were so short of cash that they implored Garrido to send a portrait to help them raise funds from a public subscription. The Spanish Ambassador in Paris rated Garrido an able propagandist but believed exiled Democrats in France to be too poor and disorganised to pose any threat to Spain. In any case he believed Spanish Democrats to be awaiting the fall of Napoleon III and the proclamation of Republics in France and Italy, events they expected during the summer, before they were prepared to take any action.¹⁹

The optimism observed among Spanish Democrats (so belied by their poverty, disorganisation and lack of preparation) reflected the more adventurous policy on the international front favoured by Mazzini throughout 1863–1864, a consequence of secret diplomacy between the Italian exile and Victor Emmanuel. Using the good offices of Diamilla Muller, an arms dealer who arrived in London early in 1863, Mazzini hoped to hasten the completion of Italian unification, currently stalled by Napoleon's refusal to allow any further changes in the political map of Italy. The first objective was to precipitate a revolt in Venice. To this end, Mazzini entered Italy in April 1863, just as Spanish Democrats were being urged by their leaders to take to arms.²⁰

The Habsburg rump in Venice proved more resilient than expected (Napoleon needed good relations with Austria because of the Mexican adventure). Yet Spain's provincial Democrats continued to conspire over the summer of 1863. Guerola observed in Seville how events in Italy gave Democrat leaders an emotional issue around which to rally support.²¹ The Democrat conspiracy in Andalucía in July 1863 resembled those of 1857 and 1859, both in its choreography – it involved the Merino brothers in the Sierra Morena of Córdoba and Jaén, Badajoz, Seville, the Sierra de Ronda, Málaga, Granada and Almería –, and its failure.²² Rather than following the Loja model of a mass uprising around a single revolutionary focus, the initial strategy was to convene, at an undisclosed central location, a small number of Democrat delegates and disaffected military from all over Andalucía from where fast-moving cavalry columns would fan out to connect with a more generalised revolt from military garrisons and local *carbonari* cells.²³ Conspirators also hoped to exploit the Democrat sympathies (borne out by their contributions to the cost of the returning Loja *indultados* in September 1862) of large contingents of railway workers congregated in camps throughout Andalucía.²⁴

Like the April conspiracy, the July uprising came to nothing. Yet Democrats remained optimistic. *Retraimiento* had ended their isolation and reaffirmed the primacy of insurrection. Pan-European Republican expectations were rekindled by the travails of Napoleon in Mexico, the Polish revolt against Russian occupation and Mazzini's forward policy in Italy.²⁵ By July,

Fernando Garrido had recovered his health and energy sufficiently to be able to attend a reunion of European Democrats (attended by German, Swiss, Italian, French and Belgian representatives) at La Chaux-de-Fonds in Switzerland, at which an 'Association for the creation of Democratic congresses' was proposed. Later in the year, working on behalf of the 'Democratic Societies of Catalonia', Garrido was reported to have had met up with his Italian counterpart in Brussels.²⁶

The optimism and excitement among Spanish Democrats over events in Italy is illustrated by an incident in a Granada restaurant on 1 July 1863 (the festival of St Theobald, patron Saint of the Carbonari, and the day proposed for the uprising). While dining at the 'Fonda de los Siete Suelos', the Canon of Granada's parish of Monte Santo and Don Clemente Ribera, a treasury employee, witnessed 'a meeting of men who toasted with each other in alarming tones: "drink for liberty of conscience, drink for socialism, drink for Garibaldi and death to Pius the Ninth!"'. Recognising three of the five men to be *granadinos* and supposing the other two with beards to be foreigners, Ribera replied, aghast, 'I drink for the Queen and for the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion!'. When challenged by a municipal watchmen, the three *granadinos* had continued shouting 'Long live the Republic, Garibaldi and death to Pius IX!' and insulted the official, although their two foreign companions 'had shown their disgust and reprimanded the others'. The five had then disappeared into 'the palace of the Alhambra and its *alamedas*' but were later found by the watchman in the gardens of the Generalife where he was able to establish their identities. The subsequent investigation revealed a conspiratorial network that would occupy the provincial authorities over the next 12 months.

The two foreigners identified themselves as Don Eduardo Roniger, a Frenchman staying at the Fonda de la Alameda, and Don Emilio Lattes, an Italian silversmith with a shop in the Calle de los Reyes Católicos. The three *granadinos* were identified as two brothers, Don Julio and Don Juan de Dios Rodríguez y Barrueso, and Ramos Lara Higuera, a tailor resident in the Calle de Camiseras. Upon closer investigation, the political antecedents of Lattes were shown to be 'bad' having recently been witnessed singing hymns to Garibaldi and giving *vivas* to the Republic in the company of Ramón Calvo, leader of Loja's Democrats. He had also received, as we have seen, frequent recent visits from Pérez del Alamo. In the opinion of the chief of Granada's municipal watch the purpose of Lattes' presence in Granada was not to work as a silversmith but 'for propaganda in favour of his republican ideas'. Joaquín Alonso ordered the arrest of the five men.²⁷

While Democrats, inspired by events in Italy, became more daring, the region's Moderados sought to take advantage of the dismissal of the Liberal Union by increasing their representation in the Cortes. The October elections provided Narváez with the opportunity to consolidate his position as eastern Andalucía's senior *moderado* cacique. Progresista and Democrat

retramiento, and Pérez's move to Seville, had removed troublesome opposition. The Duke's residence in Loja, recently distinguished by the Royal visit, acted as a magnet for political forces throughout eastern Andalucía. In late September his cousin Juan Casasola Fonseca warned him that Antequera's wealthiest *vecino*, Joaquín González del Pino, was about to donate him a sword, to be delivered personally by Rafael Chacón, 'in order to request your help and powerful influence' in the forthcoming electoral struggle against Romero Robledo.²⁸

Marfori triumphed in Loja without opposition. Neighbouring Alhama, however, where the local candidate was Francisco López Cózar, a Progresista whose family had provided Pérez with sanctuary in July 1861, presented more of a challenge. The official candidate was Cruzada Villamil, a young conservative-liberal intellectual whose presence was sought in the Cortes to serve as a manageable opposition in the absence of Progresistas and Democrats.²⁹ Resisting pressure from his friends in Madrid, Narváez insisted on backing Mariano Fonseca, a close relative, who duly triumphed.³⁰ Fonseca's success was no simple consequence of nepotism. Throughout September Narváez had courted Manuel Moreno, alcalde of Zafarraya, by promising support in a local struggle to stop further subdivision of the grazing land, vowing to use his influence in Granada and Málaga to fund the construction of a new parish church.³¹ Narváez knew that Zafarraya, Alhama's most demographically aggressive town, was a Democrat stronghold. Backing Moreno therefore served several purposes.

Narváez's correspondence confirms that by 1863 he was regarded in Madrid, Granada and Málaga as the principal broker in the region, with seats in Loja, Alhama, Alcalá Real and Priego in his gift.³² Moderados triumphed in most of Granada's 11 seats at the expense of the Liberal Union. Incensed by their exclusion, Liberal Unionists led by Pedro Antonio Alarcón and Antonio Mantilla directed a broadsheet attack on Civil Governor Alonso, who was obliged to flee the province in October to take up the governorship of Málaga.³³ When Guerola arrived in Granada in November 1863 to assume the governorship, although he judged Granada's Liberal Unionists to be 'respectable', he found Duke of Valencia to be 'the principal influence' in the province and Moderados to be dominant.³⁴

Following *moderado* success in the October elections, Narváez tightened his control over Loja by restoring Montero Rodríguez to the *juzgado*.³⁵ In contrast to 1856–1857 when Montero had led the judicial persecution of Progresistas and Democrats, the Duke now promoted reconciliation. By securing a Royal order compensating *progresista* councillors for their losses and fines suffered following the *Bienio*, he hoped to attract Loja's Progresistas away from *retramiento* and to secure allies against Granada's Liberal Unionist Committee that had as its principal target 'the destruction of *polaquismo*, the weed that smothers the field of politics'.³⁶ Most prominent among the province's 'polacos' were José de Salamanca and the Duke of Valencia.³⁷

In March 1864 Narváez, now resident in Madrid, secured the appointment of his close friend, José Gutiérrez de la Vega, to the civil governorship of Granada, to ensure support for his various projects in Loja, including the construction of the road to Iznájar, Church building and restoration, the opening of Escolapio seminary and the completion of his Casa-Palacio.³⁸

If Narváez was succeeding in consolidating *moderantismo* on his home patch, the Miraflores government continued to flounder, facing, apart from Democrat and *progresista retrainimiento*, mounting opposition in the newly elected Cortes from Moderados and Liberal Unionists alike. Miraflores's aristocratic detachment and lack of a programme left him exposed to the Court where Isabel's confessor Padre Claret was determined not to yield to foreign pressure for greater freedom of conscience and an end to the persecution of Protestant evangelists. In April, Miraflores commuted to indefinite exile the long *presidio* sentences passed on Granada's imprisoned Protestants, Manuel Matamoros, José Alhama and Miguel Trigo, during the Royal visit in October 1862. But this did little to reduce international and domestic pressure over the continued persecution of Protestants, reinforcing the image of an intolerant retrograde Spain which Ministers such as Alonso Martínez were keen to dispel.³⁹

Miraflores resigned on 15 January 1864 after a defeat in a Senate vote. His successor Lorenzo Arrazola lasted until 2 March when Alejandro Mon selected an unapologetically *moderado* (*doctinario*) cabinet that endured until Narváez's return to the First Ministry in September 1864.⁴⁰ Mon proposed a return to the constitution of 1845 and a more repressive press law which categorised press infringements as public order offences to be tried by military tribunals.⁴¹

This succession of increasingly Conservative governments inspired ever greater daring and bravado among the parties in *retrainimiento*. Encouraged by initial promises of greater freedom of political association, however closely superintended, Democrat propaganda became more expansive over the winter of 1863–1864. Two new Democrat dailies appeared in January 1864; Castelar's *La Democracia* and Nicolás Díaz Benjumea's *La Unión*, and a weekly, *Gil Blas*. *La Democracia* adopted a more combative anti-Bourbon tone, called for the separation of Church and State, filled its columns with news from Italy extolling a common pan-Latin Republican struggle with Garibaldi as its figurehead, and offered free democratic catechisms to its readers.⁴² Within a few weeks of its appearance, police in Loja and Alhama reported *La Democracia* to be outstripping its rivals, *El Pueblo* and *La Discusión*.⁴³ García Ruiz's *El Pueblo* also enthused about all things Italian, offering its columns to any pronouncement Garibaldi chose to make, or to any Spanish admirer of the Hero of Marsala.⁴⁴ In an attempt to recover the revolutionary vanguard the *progresista* press, such as *La Iberia*, became more radical and populist in its rhetoric.

Bolstered by the strategic alliance with Progresistas over *retramiento*, the greater assertiveness of the Democrat press reflected a renewed upsurge of democratic internationalism. In October 1863, Mazzini returned to London from six months of residence in Switzerland from where he had made periodic sorties into northern Italy to weigh up prospects for hastening the completion of Italian unification. Victor Emmanuel's clandestine backing for Mazzini's 'Party of Action', which endured until July 1864, infused democratic internationalism with renewed confidence.⁴⁵ Spain, with its unpopular monarchy, a government staffed by senile Moderados and with parties of the Left in public *retramiento*, became a valued asset. The removal of the Spanish Bourbons in a successful Republican revolution could only hasten the completion of Italian unification with the incorporation of Venice, the movement of the capital from Florence to Rome and the triumph of Republicanism.⁴⁶

The interest of Italy's liberators in Spain's struggle for political regeneration had grown during 1862–1863 as a result of the presence in Florence of a small but active group of exiled Democrats headed by Eduardo Ruiz Pons and Fernando Garrido, and backed by a young *garibaldino* volunteer Leonardo Sánchez Deus.⁴⁷ Among six Spanish officers who fought in Garibaldi's southern campaigns, Sánchez Deus established the closest friendship with the General. Joining the 'Thousand' in June 1860, he fought in the Sicilian and Calabrian campaigns, answered Garibaldi's call to arms again in August 1862, and was wounded and imprisoned, along with the General, at Aspromonte. After the release of the volunteers in October 1862, Sánchez Deus returned in Florence, becoming an active member of the city's Democratic Committee, contributing articles to *La Nuova Europa*, including one in December 1862 in which he defended the reputation of Pérez del Alamo, leader of the Loja revolt, currently under attack from Marfori and Narváez.⁴⁸

Exiled Spanish Democrats also sought sanctuary and support in Portugal. After a year's exile in Florence, Ruiz Pons moved to Portugal in October 1863 where conditions for Spanish exiles had improved after the Históricos (the equivalent to Spain's Progresistas) had returned to power in 1860 under the Duke of Loulé, and especially with the accession of Luis I to the throne following the untimely death of his brother Pedro V from typhoid in 1861.⁴⁹ A bookish man detached from politics, Luis was the kind of constitutional monarch Spain's Progresistas and Democrats yearned for. Upon marrying María Pía, daughter of Victor Emmanuel, in 1861, Luis became even more attractive, especially to Progresistas, the Braganza–Savoy pact reawakening Iberianist hopes.⁵⁰

In late October 1863, Ruiz Pons was reported to be preparing an uprising in the northern and eastern provinces of Spain, coordinated by a revolutionary organisation that called itself 'La Unión Ibérica'. Meanwhile the official visit of two senior Italian army officers to the Portuguese Court raised fears in Madrid of an Iberianist challenge to the Bourbon dynasty in Spain, backed

by Italy's resurgent House of Savoy. These suspicions were confirmed when the Italian officers travelled to Madrid and Cádiz to meet members of the Spanish opposition.⁵¹ Six months later, in March 1864, Ruiz Pons was again reported to be planning an uprising in Galicia with Iberianist objectives, having been joined in Oporto by Romualdo Lafuente and by General Don Enrique Lazen, the latter expected to lead the outbreak in Galicia. Meanwhile the return of Piedmontese General Cristoforo Muratori to Lisbon brought renewed fears in Madrid of a Braganza–Savoy pact.⁵²

Iberianism soon foundered on divisions between Democrats and Progresistas. While Progresistas were prepared to harness Piedmontese dynastic ambitions in the hope of replacing the Bourbons with a more modern constitutional monarchy, exiled Democrats favoured a Republican variant of Iberian reunification. Once Ruiz Pons and Lafuente began promoting the idea of an 'Iberian democratic and federal republic' in a series of articles in *El Nacional*, a paper launched in Oporto in Spanish, the Duke of Loulé went cold on Iberianism and tightened police pressure on Spanish exiles.⁵³ By early April, Ruiz Pons had abandoned plans for a Galician uprising and was preparing to return to Spain to accept an amnesty (a convenient cover for the conspiracy he was coordinating in Andalucía).⁵⁴ Portugal was a convenient place for exile and for mounting insurrections. But Iberianism lacked the historical inexorableness of the Risorgimento, particularly now Salamanca's Madrid–Lisbon railway was reaching completion, raising fears in Portugal of economic absorption by Spain. Italy, by contrast, offered emotionally more powerful and, above all, more serviceable models and affinities for both parties in *retraiamiento*. Besides, Mazzini and Garibaldi now actively sought an end to Bourbon rule and the onset of a Republic in Spain.

Spanish Democrats, home and abroad, learned how to exploit these affinities. In October 1863, Manuel Rodríguez Carballo (a) 'El Americano', leader of Alhama's Democrats during the Revolution of Loja, was arrested at Ardales (west of Antequera) for delivering a speech in which he congratulated Garibaldi for his full recovery from the injury suffered at Aspromonte to a crowd of men currently employed on the Málaga–Córdoba railway. Rodríguez had been observed drawing up lists and gathering signatures for a message of congratulations to be sent to Garibaldi at his island retreat of Caprera. Recalling that judicial persecution in June 1861 had precipitated the 'events of Loja', Alhama's mayor advised that Rodríguez be released and allowed to continue working on the railway, for fear of attracting unmerited attention.⁵⁵

Hundreds of Democrats throughout Spain enhanced their stature and extended their organisation by gathering signatures for such messages.⁵⁶ Many expressed a yearning to serve Garibaldi offering to fight in a common fraternal struggle for Democracy. In April 1864 a house search of José Trinidad Moreno in Zafarraya revealed a letter congratulating Garibaldi on his recovery from his wound avowing that '... the Democrats of this Villa

de Zafarraya wait with impatience the order from the Illustrious Garibaldi. Once he resumes his rapid journey among all oppressed peoples, we will be able to begin the honourable crusade against the oppressive tyrants'.⁵⁷

Touched by these letters, over the autumn and winter of 1863–1864 Garibaldi grew receptive to proposals for a more direct involvement in Spain's Republican struggles. Without reliable direct intelligence from Italians resident in Spain, Mazzini and Garibaldi were dependent on Democrat propagandists such as Garrido, Ruiz Pons and Sánchez Deus who routinely exaggerated the strength of Spanish Democrats, their preparedness for insurrection and the fragility of the Bourbon regime.⁵⁸ Following the return of Ruiz Pons to Portugal in June 1863, Garibaldi urged his friends Sánchez Deus and Giuseppe Dolfi, popular leader of Florence's Democrats, both veterans of the southern campaigns, to join him in Caprera. In August the General instructed Giuseppe Mazzoni, who had established close ties with Spanish Democrats when living in Madrid in 1858–1859, to return to the Spanish capital to renew these ties. In the same month Sánchez Deus arrived in Caprera where he remained, except for a short visit to Madrid in November,⁵⁹ until March 1864 when he accompanied the General to Gibraltar on the first leg of his voyage to England.⁶⁰ As Garibaldi continued his journey, Sánchez Deus, now a Colonel, crossed over into Spain.

Here then is evidence that the *alegría* observed among Democrats in eastern Andalucía throughout 1863 and 1864 and the rumours of an imminent Garibaldi-led uprising were not messianic musings but rational expectations of local Democrat leaders based on communications with *confrères* in exile, comparable to preparations preceding insurrectionary attempts in 1856, 1857, 1859, 1861 and 1863. The difference in 1864 was that Mazzini was now prepared to promote any cause that might hasten the consummation of Italian unification. Moreover, Garibaldi, now retired from war and politics at his island retreat of Caprera, was offering his assistance to Republican brothers in Europe or further afield in their struggles against tyranny.⁶¹ Where and when this service might be offered would depend on the advice Garibaldi received from his Spanish friends.

In January 1864, Granada's authorities received reports of a conspiracy in eastern Andalucía with ramifications elsewhere in Spain, counting on external support from Spanish exiles in Portugal and France and anticipating leadership from Italian generals, if not from Garibaldi himself.⁶² Based on the same Carbonari cells that had mobilised men to converge on Loja in July 1861, the conspiracy would also involve the element that was lacking in the Loja Revolution: a conspiracy within the army orchestrated by Juan Prim and Salustiano Olózaga.⁶³ The uprising was planned to coincide with the patriotic celebrations of 2 May 1864, when Progresistas and Democrats would join in an open-air banquet in Madrid to honour the return from Portugal of the remains of the Cádiz *constituyente* of 1812, Diego Muñoz Torrero.⁶⁴

With Pérez del Alamo living in Seville it fell to Ramón Calvo Jiménez, his second-in-command in July 1861, to coordinate the conspiracy and prepare the region for the May uprising. The blacksmith's brother, Andrés Pérez del Alamo, owner of an olive estate located outside Loja on the Málaga road, judged by police to have 'played an active part in the Republican revolution of Loja in 1861', would also play an important part in the conspiracy. Using the pretext of collecting debts from stagecoach operators who stopped at his *cortijo*, Andrés made frequent visits to Málaga, sometimes lasting ten days, from where he travelled on to meet his brother in Seville. He had also inherited his brother's connections with Madrid, receiving letters from Emilio Castelar with instructions to begin enlistments of *paisanos* for a revolution to be 'equal to that of Loja in 1861'.⁶⁵ Another leading figure in 1861, the pharmacist Juan Morales Sementi, 'one of the most tenacious apostles of republicanism', was reported to be holding nocturnal meetings having resumed his post as keeper of the lists of those enrolled in the Society.⁶⁶

A thin, pale young man of between 26 and 30 years, of medium height with a 'high brow and full beard grown to nature', Ramón Calvo differed in most respects, apart from his energy and his Garibaldino beard, from his mentor Rafael Pérez de Alamo. In contrast to the Pérez's austere teetotalism, Calvo (a) 'banona' (*vanona* meaning vain or boastful) delighted in doing the rounds of Loja's cafés and billiard halls, accompanied by fellow Democrats from other parts, giving impromptu orations on the future democratic utopia.⁶⁷ His favourite line was 'within three months we will have achieved happiness'. Sharing Pérez's admiration of Garibaldi, he had written to the General in November 1862, offering sympathies for his wound at Aspromonte, concluding with the prophetic statement: 'My general, I am inspired to complete such a precious task, may God protect you'.⁶⁸

Like Pérez, Calvo appreciated the need to broaden support beyond Loja by mobilising the smaller towns, *caseríos* and *cortijos* of the wider region. Thanks to intelligence from three Loja Democrats, who had rejected 'the violent and revolutionary means that Calvo wishes to employ', we have an account of his movements in the weeks leading up to the uprising. Accompanied by two personal secretaries, José Cuberos and Rafael Madrid (owner of a billiard hall in Alfarnate), Calvo preached his message on his home patch of western Granada, especially in Loja, Salar, Alhama, Santa Cruz, Zafarraya, Huétor Tajár and Villanueva de Mesías, and further afield in *malagueño* towns of Archidona, Colmenar, Alfarnate, Periana and Antequera.⁶⁹ He was also in touch with Democrat leaders further afield in Motríl, Albuñol and the Sierra de Alpujarra.⁷⁰ The three Democrat informers stressed that Calvo expected the insurrection in western Granada to be met by an uprising in the provincial capital where he had recently boasted that 'he could count on 10–12,000 men who are in the know and are ready to subvert the public order'.⁷¹ Iznájar and Algarinejo, towns which had sent the largest contingents in July 1861, were also reported to be in conspiratorial readiness, the

mayor of Algarinejo reporting in late April that 'the affiliates of the Democrat party are meeting with greater frequency than usual; a certain kind of happiness and satisfaction can be discerned in their expression which appears provocative...'.⁷²

Apart from this peripatetic preaching by 'regional' Democrat leaders such as Calvo, the region was also visited by prominent leaders from other parts of Spain and from overseas. In mid-April the Civil Guard commander reported that Loja had just been visited

...by two Portuguese men, someone else who described himself as English, although he seemed more likely to have been Aragonese or Catalan, and Calvo, who seemed very united with these men and went with them from tavern to tavern. I have even been assured that they visited and signed up all of the *indultados*. The *indultados* appear animated and contented, and today among them the idea is going around that on 2 May there will be a *pronunciamiento* in Spain at the head of which Garibaldi will place himself who will come from Gibraltar.⁷³

The visitor of uncertain national identity may have been one, Duval Paul Jordan, a Swiss Democrat, who, masquerading as a gentleman engaged in a 'journey of pleasure', was in fact (in the opinion of the Spanish consul in Cette) a 'messenger of democratic politics'. The consul's investigation of Jordan's movements reveals an uncanny overlap between his itinerary and key places in Portugal and southern Spain's conspiratorial geography.

A native of Berne, Jordan had studied at Padua before joining Garibaldi's volunteers in 1860, serving in both southern campaigns before leaving the General's service after the battle of Aspromonte in October 1862. Jordan's Iberian tour began at Marseilles in the autumn of 1863 (where he would have met Fernando Garrido), from where he travelled to Oporto. Lodging with a Swiss watchmaker he met up with Ruiz Pons, who took him on as his secretary. Leaving Oporto on 10 January 1864, after spending three days in Lisbon, where he received contributions for his travelling expenses from friends of Ruiz Pons, the English College and even from the Prime Minister, the Marqués of Loulé, Jordan travelled overland to Badajoz and on to Seville. During the three weeks he spent in the Andalusian capital he would surely have met Pérez del Alamo. From Seville he travelled via Córdoba to Antequera, where he spent a day with the Democratic Committee which had been briefed on him in advance by Ruiz Pons. Arriving in Málaga on 23 March he lodged for a fortnight in the 'Fonda de Italia' and was presented by an Italian at the 'Casino Democrático'. From Málaga the Swiss Garibaldino travelled on to Granada. He would have passed through Loja precisely at the time that the Civil Guard commander reported the visit of the two Portuguese and another foreigner of uncertain nationality. In Granada he lodged for six weeks at the 'Fonda del Falcón' and

hence was present in the city on 2 May, the day intended for the national uprising.⁷⁴

As we have seen, while Jordan was staying at the 'Fonda de Italia' in Málaga in late March, a fellow Garibaldino volunteer, Sánchez Deus, crossed into Spain from Gibraltar. Before leaving Gibraltar the Spanish Garibaldino wrote to his friend and protector, Florentine Democrat leader, Giuseppe Dolfi, that 'it is time for action not words. We must stop waiting and complete the work of 1848. Faith and Hope.'⁷⁵ He travelled first to Cádiz before moving inland to Córdoba. Here in mid-April conflicting press reports have him stabbing himself to death in the tower of Córdoba's Mezquita and being wounded in an attack by a mob of religious fanatics only to be rescued by the police. It is more likely that he was deliberately provoked by a *porra* (paid gang) with the ensuing fracas used by Córdoba's police to justify his arrest. After receiving medical attention he was released to travel on to Portugal, where he was received by Ruiz Pons and Giuseppe Dolfi, who were coordinating the Italian and Portuguese dimensions of the conspiracy.⁷⁶ In May he left Oporto, returning to Florence via Caprera.⁷⁷

Meanwhile, Mazzini and Garibaldi in London, Mazzoni in Florence, Garrido in Marseilles and Ruiz Pons and Dolfi in Portugal remained open to the idea of supporting a May uprising in Spain. While Garibaldi was being feted in England, Spain's ambassador to Belgium learned that 'a clandestine expedition of arms for Spain' was being planned.⁷⁸ As Garibaldi left Southampton, the Marqués de Rivera reported from Lisbon that agents of the Italian government, Colonels Cristoforo Muratori and Baron Porcelli, had departed for Spain, adding that their purpose was 'not in order to amuse themselves', urging that they be closely watched, especially on 2 May.⁷⁹

If this evidence proves that Ramon Calvo and his fellow conspirators in eastern Andalucía were quite realistic in their expectation of some external support, news from Madrid was less encouraging. The Italian Colonels arriving in Madrid in late April would have found Progresistas divided over and ill-prepared for an uprising on 2 May. Juan Prim had signed up several provincial regiments and part of the Madrid garrison some of whose members actually attended the 2 May celebrations 'dressed as country people' (*paisanos*) ready for battle. But Progresistas remained divided over the wisdom of insurrection following a speech by Olózaga in which he had proposed that Espartero should relinquish his leadership of the party. Although Espartero had not been involved in the direction of the party for several years, the removal of this revered figure offended many conspirators in the armed forces who used the retirement of their hero as an excuse for withdrawing from the insurrection. Olózaga's speech also laid bare *progresista* divisions over *retramiento*. Prim favoured contesting elections, Olózaga, a strict 'all or nothing' *retramiento* and the tactic of insurrection.⁸⁰

In an attempt to keep up the momentum of conspiracy, Prim postponed the date of the outbreak of the rebellion to 6 June but this was frustrated

when the revolutionary plot within Madrid's garrison was rumbled. The revolution was then postponed until the first days of August when Prim moved to Toledo where two regiments had agreed to pronounce. The reticence of Colonel Díaz de la Rada, commander of the Saboya Regiment, assured the failure of this plan.⁸¹

Although *retramiento* presumed consensus over the need for insurrection, leading Progresistas in Madrid were half-hearted revolutionaries in 1864. Having discarded their own praetorian leader, Progresistas were reluctant to hand the baton to a foreign leader of Garibaldi's stature, whose following among Democrats and Republicans in Spain and abroad by now amounted to a religious cult. Ten years later Garibaldi reminded Castelar that only the prudence of Spain's leaders in May 1864 prevented him from offering his 'presence and sword for the cause of Spanish liberty'.⁸² Hence, when Garibaldi disembarked in Gibraltar on his return from England on 4 May 1864, he did not cross the frontier into Spain, because no Spanish leader had invited him to do so. After receiving visits from numerous admirers, including members of a poor Gibraltarian branch of his family, the Hero of Marsala continued his voyage to Caprera.⁸³ Yet, until that moment, provincial Democrats conspired in the expectation that some external redeeming figure might assist them in their efforts.

Although Calvo never enjoyed the authority among Loja's Democrats, or respect in Madrid, that Pérez had achieved, he nevertheless took his commission to prepare the region for the May uprising seriously. His efforts to sign up support in Huétor Tajár, east of Loja on *vega* of Granada, the first step for any advance upon the provincial capital, confirms that his objective, like that of Pérez in 1861, was to raise the entire province of Granada in revolt. On 2 May, the night of the intended national uprising, he met up with eight men from Huétor Tajár on the banks of the River Genil, gave them 500 reales in coins of 5 duros ('believed to be false'), and instructed them to be ready again on the night of 11 May 'in order to continue their democratic plans'. Meanwhile his secretary Cuberos hired a mule to transport a cargo of forged money disembarked at Huétor Tajár at the town.⁸⁴ Three days later Calvo was reported to be giving orders to an assembly of leaders in the Sierra de Loja from where he travelled on Alhama to meet Francisco Guerrero (a Vereda (veteran of July 1861) at the Posada de San Francisco. From Alhama, always accompanied by Cuberos and Madrid, Calvo travelled to Zafarraya, gateway to Málaga's Axarquía, from where he expected mass support. After a two-hour discussion with José Trinidad Moreno (author of the April letter to Garibaldi) near Zafarraya, Calvo and Cuberos travelled to Archidona, Madrid returning to Alhama.⁸⁵

The civil governor remained unruffled in the face of this report.⁸⁶ Already assured by mayors of towns with large Democrat followings, such as Alhama, Zafarraya, Santa Cruz and Loja, that affiliates, however well disciplined, would not make a move before the lead was first taken from elsewhere, José

Gutiérrez de la Vega regarded Calvo more as a bragger than a genuine revolutionary threat. Without any lead from Progresistas in the army, or from Garibaldi and his volunteers, the Democrat conspiracy in western Granada quickly withered. On three occasions in mid-May 1864 Calvo requested a passport for Portugal not realising that all he needed for his departure was a certificate of residence.⁸⁷

By mid-May the provincial authorities could breathe a sigh of relief in the knowledge that Garibaldi was back on Caprera and Calvo's attempt to resurrect the Revolution of Loja had failed. Symptoms of unrest, however, remained. Gutiérrez de la Vega learned at the end the month that a Belgian steamship, the 'Condé d'Hainaut', having deposited railway equipment at Málaga, had departed intending to land its remaining cargo of arms along the coast of Granada. Frantic correspondence ensued with the mayors of Alpujarra towns.⁸⁸ These events coincided with serious clashes between soldiers and armed gangs in the port of Málaga on the night of 23 May in which cries of 'Viva la Libertad!' and 'Ya vendrá Garibaldi!' were heard.⁸⁹ Romualdo Lafuente was reported to have returned to Málaga and to be in close contact with *confrères* in Granada.⁹⁰ These signs of the revival of democratic conspiracy at the end of May were probably related to General Prim's revised timetable for a Progresista–Democrat national uprising.⁹¹ *La Discusión* commented that Prim and the Progresistas saw the Democrats as his 'batidores' (scouts, beaters) for his conspiratorial preparations.⁹² Perhaps that was all expected of Calvo between January and May 1864.

Of greater concern to the authorities in late June was the uncovering of a Democrat conspiracy, organised by a retired army sergeant 'who reads Madrid newspapers' in the strategic town of Albuñol which links Granada's Sierra Nevada with the coast, organised by former members of the National Militia.⁹³ The Albuñol conspiracy was no isolated affair. Conspirators were expecting a delivery of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar, after which they intended to take to the Sierra of Yegen, to extend operations to the entire Alpujarra, thence to join up with rebels from the Serranía de Ronda, Málaga, Córdoba and Jaén.⁹⁴ The Gibraltar connection was confirmed when Gutiérrez de la Vega received news of the departure from Barcelona of the British packet 'Lesprig' carrying 71 cases of arms from Marseilles.⁹⁵ The civil governor deployed 27 Civil Guards and 87 excise police and instructed mayors throughout the Sierra Alpujarra to allow *vecinos honrados* to arm themselves and come to the help of Albuñol in the event of attack.⁹⁶

Alhama: A moral radiography

Although the Conservative and Neo-Catholic press throughout the spring and summer of 1864 presented eastern Andalucía as teetering on the brink of social revolution, local authorities were less alarmed. Reports from town mayors across the district of Alhama during the lead up to the aborted

insurrection of 2 May 1864 reveal a wide spectrum of political cultures across the district. This local knowledge helped Civil Governor Gutiérrez de la Vega to direct appropriate policing and Catholic pastoral to where it was needed, helping to deter the revolutionaries in towns where Democrats were strong from attempting a 'second Loja' at Alhama.

The district capital was the ideal territory for *carbonari* enlistments. Here Democrat leaders could count on a large cohort of 'indultados', secure in their Royal pardons they had received upon returning to their homes in September 1862, reinforced by the customary solidarities of some 800 landless *jornaleros*.⁹⁷ Alhama's triumvirate of Democrat leaders was same as in 1861 – Francisco Guerrero (a) Veredas, 'who is generally called General Veredas', blacksmith and keeper of a tavern 'where democratic newspapers are read' and two *lojeños*, Francisco Jaime Arca (a) 'Violín', a musician, and García Torrubia, a carpenter – backed by a committee of eight others, including 'three travelling cloth salesmen', one of whom kept the key to the society's meeting room in the Posada de San Francisco.⁹⁸ Here, then, was the command headquarters of Alhama's Revolution.

In March 1864 Alhama's mayor, Francisco Castillo, reported that:

The political situation of Alhama is alarming. The most absurd ideas have won followers among the working classes, so much so that it can be said that not an individual remains who is not affiliated to the party known as 'the party of the *apuntados*', which dreams of the realisation of the doctrines sustained by the newspaper *La Democracia*; and hopes for the abolition of the *consumos* tax, the freeing of the salt, tobacco and gunpowder monopolies, etc., and the division of the wealth of the rich who have usurped it, because God created the world to be the patrimony of everyone, as are the sun, air and water; and he did not intend the inequality of wealth which has converted the immense majority of human kind into slaves, victims of privations and of hard labour. At the same time, these men do not fear God nor have knowledge of his Divine precepts, because they do not respect them or practice them: and some even appear convinced that in the supreme hour of ceasing to live, he who dies is finished forever, regardless of the good and the bad he has done in this world, and that there is nothing beyond, not even an eternal prize, nor even an eternal punishment, for the good and the bad work of this life. Castelar is a Demi-God for these men... his newspaper, *La Democracia*, has led astray, and continues to lead astray, more men than *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo* combined... these people yearn for a revolutionary movement, in whatever form it takes, to launch themselves into the field waving their flag. However, it is certain they will not take the initiative and will wait until the call to arms is given elsewhere, before seconding it immediately. In this they are in agreement, and they communicate, but not clandestinely, nor by means of nocturnal meetings... Daily in all parts they can be seen

talking; they read democratic newspapers, or listen to them being read; and for the rest they operate with the cautiousness of the most wary and drilled conspirator. Castelar is in the habit of writing to them from time to time urging subscriptions and circulation of his newspaper, and he calls them 'Martyrs' (alluding to the past events of Loja) and he animates them to continue on the 'good path' assuring them of a secure and not too distant future of prosperity and good fortune, of equality and of liberty.

With such support, no wonder Castelar chose to include Alhama in his tour of Granada in September 1864!

As a cure Castillo advised tighter espionage (including building a false room in the Posada de San Francisco from where committee meetings could be overheard) and recommended especially a more active Clergy:

The Clergy can help the working class, guiding them, with their word and example, along the road to good, and leading them away from the road to perdition on which they continue fleeing from God and getting closer to hell. Yet, it saddens me to tell you, the Clergy in Alhama and Santa Cruz do not fulfil their mission and, what is worse, perhaps are not able to replenish their mission with fruit. We are already in Lent, and nobody would know it. How much good could have been achieved had the missionaries passed by here!⁹⁹

Everything Castillo reported about district capital could also be applied to its dependency of Santa Cruz 'where the mayor, the council and a few others are the only ones not to follow in the footsteps of Morán'. Here leaders were same as those had led hundreds to Loja in June 1861: Manuel Rodríguez (a) 'El Americano', Gregorio Morán, 'a clown of much estimation and a professional gambler', Nicolás de Fuñes (a) 'Chilindrín', Manuel Moreno 'a scandalous, impenitent and baneful man', and Francisco Díaz, 'who is of little importance although identified with the others'. Castelar's famed oratory was emulated by Manuel Rodríguez:

... it is worth watching him very carefully. He deceives anyone with his affected idiom. He and Morán are the idols of the mob. It was he who wrote from Málaga requesting signature to congratulate Garibaldi.¹⁰⁰

With Rodríguez away working on the Málaga–Granada railway Gregorio Morán, landowner and innkeeper, ruled Santa Cruz. Believed to be a native of Antequera (where his brother had been sentenced robbing and murdering a canon) Morán was described as

... a cunning man, daring, reserved, active and influential to excess among the ignorant class which he perverts; for in this town all but a

small number dream of what will follow the destruction of society. Morán is a gambler, and it is evident that for some time he been handling plenty of money. He continually makes journeys, and it is known that he travels to Granada, Loja, Alhama and other points . . . He is one of those pardoned for the events at Loja.

As in the district capital the landless *apuntados* of Santa Cruz were prepared for an uprising, but only when instructed from elsewhere.

If Alhama and Santa Cruz were deeply infected by the Democrat virus, and with no defences in terms of an active clergy, traditionally rebellious Zafarraya had by February 1864 become a model of good government, helped by generalised land ownership, efficient municipal administration, effective pastoral care, and, not least, patronage from Narváez. Here, Castillo reported that:

. . . most *vecinos* think only of their farms, and it is certain that they would all rise up *against* any revolutionary attempt which might happen, but which is not to be feared from Zafarraya.

Yet he believed the town to be vulnerable to a small number of men who 'dream of a republic and are in communication with *apuntados* in other parts'.¹⁰¹ Much would depend on whether Manuel Moreno, Zafarraya's mayor, with whom Narváez would remain in correspondence until 1866, received support from the provincial and ecclesiastical authorities:

. . . the Alcalde, Don Manuel Moreno Sánchez, is excellent: a man of much independence, great firmness of character and with much prestige. He is united with the Council, which is good, especially the Secretary, Dn. Antonio Mateos Porras, who has the reputation of being a *puro* (Progresista) and runs the administration with a clarity and order most uncommon in small towns . . . In order to prevent the subversion of the good order of this town, it is necessary to strengthen the moral force of the Council, and therefore that of the Alcalde, and to that purpose, the file on the grazing rights should be resolved quickly in the way that he has solicited. It is also necessary to activate the resolution, now in Madrid, ordering the construction of the Church. Both things *vecinos* ardently want.

Further insulating Zafarraya against the Democrat challenge was the priest:

. . . José Jiménez Bueno carries out the obligations of his sacred ministry in a manner that could serve as an example. He is loved and respected: the Church is never closed. He is continually in the pulpit, and that

devotion and good morals, far from declining, are increasing, is due to his example and his word.¹⁰²

If the political order of Zafarraya appeared robust, that of its dependency of Ventas de Zafarraya, which had sent a contingent to Loja in 1861, was judged fragile:

... Zafarraya should not be confused with Ventas de Zafarraya. In the latter town there are many rogues who are thieving democrats, or democrat thieves, who are in intimate relations with the *apuntados* of Periana, town in the province of Málaga.¹⁰³

Although Ventas was supposed to have a priest (a coadjutor of the Cura of Zafarraya) and a school, in February 1864, like most of the smaller towns in the region, it had neither.¹⁰⁴

If Zafarraya's authorities were succeeding in holding the Democrat tide at bay, so also were those of Arenas del Rey to the south-east of Alhama. Although home to many *indultados*, several of whom had marched to Loja in 1861, Castillo expected no call to arms in Arenas, nor even any support for a revolutionary movement that might start elsewhere. This was not for any lack of Democrats but because men of property had armed themselves against a possible uprising. The Council was controlled by one José Moreno Ramos, 'a young landowner of good instincts, strong willed although not very bright', who had formed an auxiliary force designed to 'avoid and to contain all disorders'. Moreno Ramos sent Castillo two lists: one containing the 38 members of his auxiliary force, mainly proprietary farmers who could be relied upon to defend public order, the other, 15 men 'who should be closely watched' and from whom any request for arms license should be turned down.¹⁰⁵

The first list included the mayor, his lieutenant, four aldermen, one syndic, the town secretary and three justices of the peace, 20 'labradores' (proprietors of medium-sized estates), two day labourers, one muleteer and one shopkeeper, most sharing one or more of same surnames: Moreno, Ramos, Fernández and Ruiz. The second list, comprising several cultivators of small plots, a tavern keeper, returnees from *presidios* and day labourers, evokes an image of democratic sociability around the tavern, commerce, credit and clandestinity. Heading the second list was Juan Molina Morales:

... chief in Arenas of those who affiliated for the uprising of Loja, and the one who received the vows. He is a man ready for anything and enjoys a bad reputation. He is employed on a small farm (*labor*) which he owns, and lends money on interest.

All the others were listed as 'affiliates... ready for anything', most possessed nicknames – 'Catalinilla', 'Candelario', 'Conforme', 'Cano Tito', 'Canijo', 'Filín', 'Fino'–, and several were related to each other or shared surnames with members of the auxiliary guard.¹⁰⁶

Apart from the 15 leaders considered a danger to public order, Castillo learned that there were a further 150 *apuntados* in Arenas as well as many other sympathisers who had not yet affiliated to the secret society. Such evidence of social and political polarisation did not concern Alhama's mayor unduly, commenting that it was easier to control Democrat propaganda in Arenas, where 'newspapers are not read' and 'the public spirit is generally good', than in the district capital. Order in Arenas was further re-enforced by the presence of a coadjutor priest, Don Antonio Castro Vargas, who 'is continually in the Church and whose religious acts are attended by very many women although by few men'. Castro worked under Don Manuel Guardia, professor of the Colegio Eclesiástico of Granada currently engaged in a mission in Alhama from where he would travel to Arenas during Holy Week. 'Much is promised there by him', Castillo concluded.¹⁰⁷

If Arenas was protected from Democracy by its compact landowning elite and active clergy, the smaller town of Játar situated further up the Arroyo de las Huertas in the foothills of the Sierra Jurtiga offered barren terrain for Democrat propaganda. Indeed, in Castillo's opinion, Játar possessed the key elements necessary for resisting the cancer of Democracy:

What can be said about Játar can be said of few towns in the *partido* of Alhama. Socialist ideas have found no echo here, and, although some of the day labourers who worked with people from Alhama were 'signed up' when the events which took place in Loja were being prepared, none took part in that uprising... This, and the fact that the *vecinos* of Játar can be considered as a united family in agreement about everything, is due to the tact, uprightness, special conciliatory character and goodness of a man who is the consolation of the poor, and the personification of Charity in this town, and to the legitimate influences that he exercises. With his short breeches and his hat turned up at the brim (*sombrero calañés*), he is worth a lot: he has a great natural talent which makes up for his lack of education, which is nevertheless great when his class and place of birth are taken into account. He is very keen on reading and does so to his considerable self-improvement. He is called Don Juan García Navas, and is currently Justice of the Peace in Játar. It is worth getting in touch with this man. He enjoys prestige in the surrounding towns where he is loved and respected, as far as Alhama.

Castillo procured a list of trusted men upon whom García Navas could rely to form an auxiliary in the event of disorder. Of the 25 listed, all were described as proprietary farmers (*labradores*) belonging to just three

inter-related families: García, Martín and Navas. Juan García Navas headed this list, which included his two brothers, two sons, eight nephews, one cousin, a brother-in-law, with most of the others only slightly more distantly related to the patriarch.¹⁰⁸ Indeed the list approximates the *moderado* ideal of public office controlled by an enlightened propertied elite ready to protect their patrimony by force of arms against any Democrat threat (which in Játar was anyway small).

And, as in Arenas, the authority of these proprietary olive farmers was re-enforced by a priest:

The religious spirit is excellent. In ecclesiastical matters Játar depends on Arenas. The assistant of the priest of that town is a modest and humble young man who is very zealous in carrying out his sacred duties. He is called Don Antonio Morales Pedrajas. He has living his poor and aged mother with him. He spent the first years of his childhood in the countryside working. Thanks to a priest of Alhama, as pious as he was enlightened, today this man is a worthy Minister of God, loved and respected by all the *vecinos* of Játar who are edified by his example and by his simple and virtuous conduct, which is not all affected because it is his nature.

Castillo concluded his account of the moral condition of Játar with a survey of its agriculture:

To conclude. Játar is the most industrious town of the province. Its municipal territory is so reduced that it can hardly be said that it has a territory at all. The land here was a stony place (*pedregal*). By dint of demolishing cliffs, building supporting walls, and bringing earth from other places, a beautiful terrace valley (*vega*) can be seen planted with olives that today constitute the principal wealth of the locality. For days on end there is not to be seen a man in town: all are occupied in the countryside. Idleness and vagrancy are unknown nor understood in Játar.

Castillo's reports on Zafarraya and Arenas del Rey revealed how strong municipal leadership, combined with an active clergy, was sufficient to contain the Democrat challenge, and, in the case of Jatar, to remove it altogether.

Narváez and Castelar's visit to Granada

By August the provincial authorities had switched their attention from the danger of rebellion to the menace of Emilio Castelar, whose much-publicised visit to Granada, Loja and Alhama reanimated the region's Democrats, as it preoccupied the authorities.¹⁰⁹ Narváez returned to Loja on

the eve of Castelar's visit, determined to restore his authority in a region so hallucinated by the dream of Democracy. In December 1863 the Duke had left Loja to live in Madrid accompanied by his natural daughter Consuelo to complete her education.¹¹⁰ In April she became ill, and, after being taken by her doctors to Aranjuez, died, aged 17. Her body was returned to Loja for burial. The Duke, devastated by the loss, followed shortly after.¹¹¹ So distressed was Narváez at the loss of his only child that Marfori forbade him from entering the cemetery to see Consuelo in her coffin. Another friend advised him patiently to await a reunion with his daughter in Heaven, 'to seek a palliative in living in the country', and even to follow another course:

... not of finding consolation, nor of killing the pain, but in replacing it: in great enterprises; great undertakings of honour and bravery; undertakings such as in 1848. But these are not in your hands. Your own retirement keeps you apart from such things; and Heaven could not wish upon anyone the duty of having to carry out such things.

Narváez rewarded this advice in September by appointing his friend Lorenzo Arrazola to the Ministry of Justice in his new government.¹¹² The shock of Consuelo's death was followed in June by two falls from his horse which confined him to bed. Friends were still enquiring of the delicate state of his health in August 1864.¹¹³

Narváez found a Loja changed mood from the town he had left nine months earlier:

... a great effervescence of spirits can be observed and many people are enlisted for a movement which is said to be close, and these people are seeking others to enlist, with much zeal and insistence. The enlistment is done in the Calle de Bodegones in the house of the pharmacist Don Juan Morales. Here they are preparing a noisy reception and great banquet for Don Emilio Castelar who is due to arrive tonight. Even many women (*mujeres*, '*damas*' was crossed out!), who today are Señoras, have already donned their elegant dresses in readiness to lavish attention on him and to make the honours at the fiesta. It is as though Sr. Castelar is coming to announce the arrival of the Messiah and to review his army of followers in this area. All these things raise the spirits and result, as is already happening, in an increase in the number of the bad and in a diminution in the number of the good.

The Duke fulminated on how he had been unable to secure the funds for Loja's Escolapio college or for the construction of a parish church promised for Zafarraya, in spite of the 'propaganda from Gibraltar which each day is gaining more proselytes, introducing catechisms and Protestant bibles

destroying the already weakened religious spirit that exists here'. He accused Mayans, Minister of Grace and Justice, of preferring 'to see the *vecinos* of Zafarraya go to the devil rather than be led to the feet of Jesus Christ'.¹¹⁴ Narváez twice urged Marfori to read out his letter to 'your chief and mistress' (the Queen) and to the President of the Council of Ministers 'to demonstrate the dangers to those who can and must remedy them'. Although he denied any interest in returning to the First Ministry, this desperate plea for the monarch's support in sustaining civilised, Catholic society on his own patch was a clear manifesto. Within just over a month, Isabel had recalled Narváez to the First Ministry.

Narváez's return to Loja in early August coincided with Castelar's visit to the province. During his three-day visit to Granada this rising star of the Democrat party was kept under the strictest surveillance with supporters forbidden from serenading outside his lodgings or from any public demonstration. A dinner 'behind closed doors' was allowed at his lodgings but with a government inspector always present. Upon his departure for Loja, Civil Governor Gutiérrez de la Vega travelled to Malá, a town between Loja and Granada, to confer with Narváez on a broader strategy for confronting the Democrat challenge.¹¹⁵

Castelar was welcomed upon his arrival at Loja at 11 p.m. on 20 August by a committee of 25 leading Democrats who accompanied him to a boarding house belonging to 'las Señoras Quintana' (there were two Quintanas on Loja's Democratic Committee). On the following morning he was shown Loja's paper mill and after lunch visited 'more springs and the most notable sites of the population'. At 8 p.m. a dinner was held at the 'Café Nuevo' for 40 guests, whose names had previously been vetted by the Alcalde. Pérez Ordoñez reported that

no speech was made nor was there any ground for the least suspicion in their conversation... the importance of the *progresista* party in the historical development of nations was discussed, the events in Poland were lamented and the dinner was concluded with a eulogy for this country whose rights and privileges have been so repressed.¹¹⁶

After dinner Castelar left for Málaga on the overnight coach.

Castelar's visit signified a new kind of politics. No previous national Democrat or *progresista* leader had thought to visit Loja. Indeed, following the Revolution of Loja in July 1861, national leaders had been keen to disassociate themselves from the city. The public walkabout and the banquet held in public view reveal a politics that was less secretive, more institutionalised (the visit was organised by a permanent party committee), less centred on Madrid and more cognizant of party support in the regions, with more emphasis on the personality of leaders and less on strict points of ideology.

Three months earlier, in the aftermath of Calvo's failed insurrection, this respectable body of Democrats had suffered a wave of police harassment, including arrests, house searches and confiscation of firearms.¹¹⁷ The divisions among Loja's Democrats noted earlier were a reflection of a national polemic that was raging among Democrats over the meaning of Socialism following an attack from Castelar on the doctrine in the columns of *La Democracia*. Stakes had been raised when Francisco Pi y Margall took over the direction of *La Discusión* from Rivero in April, using the party's official paper as a platform for promoting federalist ideas and defending moderate state intervention for social ends. The debate assumed greater passion and venom than in 1860 because of the contest over the leadership of the party and improved prospects of achieving power through the alliance with the Progresistas.¹¹⁸

Publicly Loja's Democrats sided with Castelar. In mid-June 130 *lojeños* wrote to *La Democracia* disassociating themselves from the 'Socialist' views expressed in *La Discusión*:

... Democracy in Loja does not contain in its midst even a single socialist, nor anyone who differs in a single point on the purity of democratic dogma, which is *liberty in everything and equality for all*... Composed in its totality of hardworking and honourable workers, each dependent on what he obtains from the sweat of his brow, never for one moment has he considered appropriating that which does not belong to him in order to form a mob of good-for-nothings instead of a numerous group of free men... Socialism, by absorbing the most free and spontaneous functions of the individual into the breast of the state, by regulating even their private actions, is not liberty, but worse than tyranny. Socialism, by calling into question wealth honourably earned or obtained by families, by desiring that the poor man should enrich himself at the expense of the rich, the idler at the cost of the industrious, is the worst of all despotisms...¹¹⁹

In their alliance with Progresistas, provincial Democrats had a difficult course to steer, expected, on the one hand, to be 'beaters' and to raise the masses in insurrection, and, on the other, to behave as paragons of respectability and social order. In 1861, however vilified as a 'Socialist', Rafael Pérez del Alamo had succeeded in steering this course very skilfully. This was why he was so feared by Narváez. By 1864, although Pérez's sympathies, and those of many other *lojeño* Democrats, were more with the moderate state interventionism of Pi y Margall and the associationism of Fernando Garrido, it made sense to them strategically to support Castelar whose star was on the rise and whose campaign against the 'Socialism' of his rivals helped *lojeños* refute 'the endless calumnies that Spanish democracy, and especially Loja's democracy, has suffered, without being permitted any defence, since the unhappy events of 1861'.¹²⁰

Conclusion

In spite of the extent of Democrat conspiracy in the province of Granada during 1863 and 1864, Civil Governor Gutiérrez de la Vega remained confident that, through the judicious use of administrative powers, and in collaboration with the Church, he could successfully stem the tide of revolution:

I do not deny that here, where politics have always inspired passion, democracy possesses its frenetic champions. And I do not deny that democracy has corroded the imagination of many simple and ignorant people, in the mistaken belief that they will achieve happiness. Democracy is a grim fact throughout the world, as it has also become here in Spain over the past few years, especially in our southern towns. Perhaps in the future, but a long time ahead, it may become a danger for society, but there is an immense difference between this and what today confronts the province under my command.¹²¹

The governor was confident that he could keep Democrats at bay by a more rigorous enforcement of the law on firearms (particularly banning firearms from casinos, cafés and the streets where arms were often used to intimidate 'men of order'), by a programme of public works to employ the poor from among whom the Democrats recruited, by missions to reanimate the village clergy and by the propagation of 'classical and religious texts which so sweetly provide understanding and moralise the hearts of people... the way to defeat these evil is by disarming the revolutionaries legally, and properly moralising the ordinary people'.¹²²

In confronting Democrats Gutiérrez de la Vega showed much of Antonio Guerola's guile and determination. In March 1864 he responded to the mayor of Alhama's call for mission to provide religious instruction during Lent by convincing Archbishop Salvador Josef to send a mission comprising two members of the Cathedral chapter and a professor from the Royal Seminary of Granada to combat the preaching of Democrats, urging all possible support for the missionaries.¹²³ In August, timed to coincide with Castelar's visit, the Archbishop sent another preaching mission to Alhama to which clergy from smaller towns were invited to attend. In October the civil governor approved the despatch of the Sisters of Mercy to establish a 'casa de socorros' in Pinos de Genil, for which he received a pledge of gratitude signed by 30 *vecinos* of 'this wretched place, victim of disease and misery, the precise consequence of this being a town of *jornaleros*'.¹²⁴ Meanwhile, municipal authorities, backed by the Civil Guard, arrested Democrat leaders and combed town and countryside for illegal holders of firearms.¹²⁵

Likely to be less effective than these pastoral and security measures was Gutiérrez del la Vega's proposal to combat Democrat propaganda

through the publication of a series of exemplary books entitled '*La Biblioteca de Escritores Granadinos*... which, having awoken patriotic sentiment, will substitute with good, tasteful and moralising doctrines, the bad and pernicious books which the Democrats propagate and which, without any scandal or incineration, will cease being used'. Given the high levels of illiteracy throughout the region, Golden Age classics and moralising religious tracts could not hope compete with democratic catechisms and newspapers, read out aloud by local leaders, or with portraits of Garibaldi, in capturing the minds of the illiterate masses.¹²⁶ Yet Gutiérrez de la Vega was correct in his assessment that Democrats, by themselves, posed little threat to the social order or to the Monarchy. Like Narváez, he knew that the key to Spain's stability lay in the Army, predicting that 'if the army resists the contagion, there is nothing to fear throughout the breadth of the province of Granada'.¹²⁷

11

Narváez and Democracy in Eastern Andalucía, 1864–1868

By August 1864 the Mon government was looking particularly frail in the face of another unsuccessful revolutionary attempt by General Prim from Toledo, the financial crisis resulting from O'Donnell's reckless public spending during the Liberal Union, a disagreement within the Court over whether to allow the return of María Cristina (Isabel yearned for her mother to return while the King and her religious advisers opposed it), the un-workability of the draconian new press law (press offences were to be tried by military Councils), mounting criticism from all sections of the press and deep divisions within the cabinet itself.¹ Only a divided opposition prevented the government from falling. O'Donnell and Prim attempted to form a coalition but the Progresistas' alliance with the Democrats was now too firmly embedded. O'Donnell then declined the Queen's invitation to form a government, proposing instead his old rival Narváez as the 'necessary policeman' to confront revolutionary challenge from the 'advanced parties'.

Narváez ruled Spain for 32 of the 44 months between September 1864 and his death in April 1868. Although unsuccessful in restoring *moderado* dominance nationally, occupying the First Ministry over two relatively protracted periods gave him an unprecedented opportunity to use his influence in Madrid and Granada for the benefit of his home town: to support Loja's *moderado* Council, to ensure effective policing of Democrats and revolutionaries, to release public funds both for Loja's Catholic institutional revival and for road-building and other public works judged necessary for generating employment during periods of severe dearth and unemployment in 1867 and 1868. The private economic success of this *moderado* chieftain mirrored a tangible prosperity in Loja on the eve of the collapse of the Bourbon monarchy, enabling the city to cope more successfully with the dearth and unemployment which brought social and political disorder elsewhere in Granada and throughout Spain in 1867 and 1868.

Although in September 1864 Narváez chose a cabinet of ageing *moderados* (mostly old friends), he also sought to bring Progresistas back into the fold

by announcing a general amnesty for all those serving sentences for their opinions. Unimpressed, Progresistas again voted to abstain from Cortes elections called for 22 December. Like the three previous legislatures, this Cortes was short-lived. In April 1865, Narváez provoked a crisis by directly involving the executive in the judicial persecution of Emilio Castelar, whose article in *La Democracia* had ridiculed the generosity of the Queen in offering the Royal patrimony to the nation. Castelar was removed from his university post precipitating the resignation of the Rector of the University of Madrid in protest. Narváez appointed as his replacement the Marqués de Zafra, a personal friend and 'furious reactionary who hated the liberal factory and who appeared willing to be an agent of Narváez and of the clergy within the University'.²

These sackings prompted student protests in Madrid and the provinces, culminating in a *serenata* in honour of the deposed rector on the night of 8 April 1865. This was broken up by the army and during the street fighting that ensued over subsequent days there were several deaths, with over 100 wounded on the fatal 'Night of St Daniel' of 10 April. The government justified harsh repression of student demonstrations on grounds that they formed part of wider democratic-*progresista* conspiracy.

Although Narváez was praised for his 'política de resistencia' by the monarchs and by Marfori in Loja, his government faced near universal censure.³ Taking advantage of the unrest and the government's unpopularity, Prim returned from exile to resume conspiratorial work within the army with the object of leading an uprising in June 1865. Anticipating an outbreak in the Levant, Prim travelled to Valencia. But government informers tracked his movements, *progresista* colonels in Valencia vacillated and the Catalan general was obliged to beat a retreat in a small launch from which he was rescued by a steamer and taken to Marseilles. In spite of this fiasco, the 'Noche de San Daniel' had left the government fatally weakened. In June 1865, on the initiative of Luis González Bravo, the cabinet resigned, Narváez was dismissed and O'Donnell accepted Isabel's invitation to resurrect the Liberal Union.

Like Narváez, O'Donnell hoped to attract the Progresistas away from *retramiento* and to breathe new life into the Liberal Union. An amnesty was conceded to Prim and *progresista*/Democrat rebels. Castelar and other dismissed academics were restored to their university posts. Elections were convoked on a significantly wider suffrage, a more liberal press law was promised and the government announced its intention to recognise the new state of Italy. From the start, however, O'Donnell's strategy of attraction faltered in the face of the refusal of prominent Progresistas, such as Prim and Fernández de los Ríos, to accept cabinet posts, combined with opposition from the Court to any liberalising gesture, in particular, to the recognition of Italy.⁴ Following the convocation of elections for December, Progresistas and Democrats re-confirmed their *retramiento*. Facing no competition from

the Left, Liberal Unionists returned a large majority to the Cortes, facing a minority of Moderados and Neo-Catholics.

A military uprising timed for 2 January 1866 failed due to the timidity of officers who had pledged to lead out their men, Prim's refusal to involve Democrats and his continued reluctance to denounce the Monarchy, combined with O'Donnell's brutal repression of the first signs of revolt by publicly executing sergeants. The lesson Prim drew from this second fiasco in six months was that a military uprising on its own was insufficient for bringing down the government. Democrat 'beaters' were also needed. Conferring in exile with leading Democrats, Joaquín Aguirre and Manuel Becerra, Prim agreed that Democrats would be involved in any future conspiracy.

In short term this combination had tragic consequences. In the spring of 1866 a military conspiracy was hatched which drew on the Democrat practice of suborning sergeants deployed by Cámara in 1857 and 1859. To guard against pusillanimous officers abandoning the cause at the last minute (the form since the onset of *retramiento* in 1863) sergeants were now to be instructed temporarily to detain their officers while the revolution got underway. And this time the revolutionary focus would be in Madrid rather than the Levant or Andalucía. Democratic clubs in the capital would organise *jornadas* comprising barricades, open-air banquets and street demonstrations to lend a popular and civil patina to the sergeants' revolt.⁵ The betrayal and arrest of officers and sergeants in Burgos on 21 May delayed the start of the insurrection until 5 June. Divisions among Democrats, rivalry between Democrat and *progresista* organisers, the unfamiliarity of Democrat leaders in Madrid with *progresista* conspiratorial circles in the army caused a further delay until 22 June, by which time the commitment of most regiments to the insurrection had cooled. The rebellion eventually went ahead on the strength of just four Madrid artillery regiments whose sergeants duly imprisoned their officers.

In the absence of effective leadership, the sergeant's coup, which amounted to no more than 1200 soldiers and 30 pieces of artillery, soon faced the full force of regiments that had remained loyal. Chances of success were greatly reduced by Prim's failure to present himself at the head of the insurrection and by the ineptitude of General Blas Pierrad, whom Prim had placed in command of the Madrid actions, who spent most of the uprising prostrated before a crucifix.⁶ In spite of the slender participation of the army, the uprising was suppressed with some difficulty and at the price of a considerable cost in life; 200 were dead during General Zabala's retaking of the San Gil barracks alone. Only after prolonged military sweeps through the city, in face of vigorous resistance from Democrat barricades and positions, was the insurrection put down.⁷ Reporting on the day's events to the Monarch, Zabala was advised by Isabel that the 1000 prisoners taken 'should be shot before sunrise'.⁸

It is tempting to see Narváez's hand behind this draconian royal order as he was temporarily housed in the Royal Palace, having participated in the military action and suffered a light wound (for which he was receiving attention at the hands of Isabel herself!).⁹ But Narváez was in a fatalistic and confessional mood, convinced that his wound presaged his imminent demise. Expressing repentance for his 'reactionary and unpopular policies' the Duke called for union to save the dynasty and for Spain to be given more liberty:

I have witnessed in my life many civil and military uprisings, but none has shocked so much as the present, not because of its importance, but because I see in it a social character which makes me fear for the future of Spain.

Ignoring his rival's premature deathbed mutterings, O'Donnell followed the advice of the Queen, signing the death warrants of 66 soldiers (mainly sergeants and corporals) who were shot in public between 25 June and 7 July.¹⁰ Apart from executing rebel leaders, the military tribunal passed death sentences on the principal Democrat leaders, most of whom had fled into exile (Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, Cristino Martos, Becerra, Castelar and Pi y Margall), while others (Rivero and Sorni) remained in El Saladero prison ready for execution. The scale of repression, unmatched since 1848, did not satisfy the Queen, who sought an even greater example. For his part, O'Donnell, judging the bloodletting to have been more than sufficient, was then dismissed for warning Isabel that 'if all the soldiers captured were to be shot so much blood would be shed that it would flood the royal chamber and drown you'.¹¹

Sacking O'Donnell, just as he had successfully achieved the pacification of the country, fatally weakened the monarchy, drove Liberal Unionists into the revolutionary camp, and left Isabel even more firmly in the hands of Moderados and Neo-Catholics. On 11 July, Narváez was recalled to the First Ministry with the professed intention (as in September of 1864) of stewarding a rapprochement between Moderados and Progresistas. He knew, however, that his brief was to follow Isabel's maxim that 'more revolutionary pressure requires greater resistance'. González Bravo returned as Minister of Government with responsibility for delivering this policy. Throughout July numerous deportations and executions were administered to those imprisoned for involvement in Madrid's 'June Days'. Only at the end of the month, upon the sovereign's departure from Madrid for her summer holiday at the northern resort of Zarauz, were the executions suspended.¹² Presented as a gesture of Royal magnanimity, this avoided a repeat of a long summer of petitions for clemency of the kind that had interrupted the Queen's bathing in July and August 1861 after the Loja Revolution.

Ending the executions, which had far exceeded of anything experienced since the year of revolutions in 1848, was as far as Narváez was prepared to go

with conciliation.¹³ Retaining the state of emergency secured by O'Donnell in early July, Narváez ruled without parliament until March 1867. The Democrat party was declared illegal, judged to be 'subversive and opposed to law and order', its principal leaders driven into exile after being sentenced to death by the military tribunal.¹⁴ Leading Progresistas were also exiled. Newspapers were forbidden from referring to the proposals and acts of the Government, a prerogative exclusive to the official *Gaceta del Gobierno*. A series of executive decrees increased central authority over provincial and municipal governments, while the Church was invited to become more centrally involved in education at all levels. In late December, Narváez exiled President of the Cortes, Ríos Rosas, for drafting a petition to the Queen in protest against the Government's violation of the Constitution. General Francisco Serrano, president of the Senate, suffered the same fate for persisting in an attempt to present the petition to the monarch. The Cortes was then dissolved and elections were convoked for 27 March 1867.

Met by the generalised abstention of Progresistas, Democrats, Liberal Unionists and even some Moderados, the March elections resulted in a Cortes populated largely by *moderado* unknowns, with Neo-Catholics and Absolutists doing well in Castile and the Basque countries.¹⁵ The reactionary Marqués de Miraflores assumed the Presidency of the Senate and Martín Belda, Marqués de Cabra (a cacique who controlled much of southern Córdoba, bordering Narváez's own *cacicazgo* at Loja), occupied the presidency of the Cortes.¹⁶ With congress packed largely by inexperienced mediocrities, a new ministerial crisis in June 1867 resulted in the further consolidation of ministers noted for their reactionary views. Narváez appointed his friends and fellow Andalucians, Lorenzo Arrazola and Martín Belda, to the ministries of State and Marine, while Marfori (since January 1867 the Queen's favourite and lover after the dismissal of her long-standing secretary Miguel Tenorio) became Overseas Minister and Intendant of the Palace.¹⁷ Such a government provided a tempting target for a wide spectrum of political forces, and sapped the confidence of those in the provinces with the responsibility for maintaining order and sustaining the regime.

Loja

If in Spain at large Narváez struggled to keep the forces of opposition at bay, surely on his home ground, some semblance of order might be achieved as a barrier to Revolution. From his return in 1862, Narváez had endeavoured to create in Loja a model of *moderado* stability, prosperity and moral revival. Although occupying the First Ministry meant living away in Madrid, high office strengthened the hold of his family and friends over local office and enhanced their ability to deliver an ambitious programme of material improvements. New streets were cut and others widened to accommodate the increased traffic anticipated from the railway connection with Granada.

A new road was built between Loja and Iznájar in southern Córdoba. A new bridge was constructed over the torrent at Río Frío improving communications with Málaga and Antequera. Loja's churches, convents and charitable institutions underwent extensive repairs and embellishment. The Convent of La Victoria was restored to house a seminary for training missionaries under the direction of a resident Bishop. A new prison was constructed. The Duke's massive palace in the centre of Loja was completed and his 'garden-country house' became the required port of call for visiting dignitaries. Narváez's cousins Marfori and Joaquín Campos emulated the Duke in constructing country houses.

Key positions in Loja were now once more in the Duke's gift. The position of Alcalde Corregidor abolished in 1861 reappeared in the centrally appointed office of Sub-Governor, a post occupied by Joaquín Campos during the last years of Isabel's reign. Members of the Narváez family also packed the Ayuntamiento. Loja's confraternities and clergy became more vocal and regularly demonstrated their allegiance to the Duke. Moderados wrested back control of the province of Granada from the Liberal Unionists and Granada's military and civil governors were all close friends of the Duke. Plans to shift Granada's university to Córdoba were abandoned (after much protest) and in May 1867 the provincial capital acquired an Academy of Artillery, an institution more to Narváez's taste.¹⁸ The Archbishop and the Curia in Granada ensured that funds reached the Duke's pet projects on western margins of the province: Zafarraya's imposing new neo-classical parish church, repairs and re-embellishment of Loja's three parish churches, the fitting out of the Convent of La Victoria as a missionary training school, the virtual rebuilding of the Convent of Santa Clara, and the continued improvements to the church and buildings of the Asilo de San Ramón staffed by French Sisters of Charity.¹⁹

Justice in Loja was once more dispensed by the decisive and blindly obedient Lorenzo Montero Rodríguez. Montero's letters to the Duke show the judge to have been active on his patron's behalf, keeping him regularly informed on public order in Loja and the surrounding towns, sending lists of *lojeños* with the 'necessary qualities' to stand in local elections, and helping the Duke to transfer his possessions for ecclesiastical entail to private property. In exchange, Montero sought help with the cost of a son's schooling and the start of a military career, and in preventing his promotion to the *Juzgado* in Granada, which would have removed him from the domain he knew so well.²⁰ Occupying the *Juzgado* was the key to controlling elections and keeping a watch on the opposition, surveillance that could be re-enforced by lawsuits and arrests whenever Loja's Progresistas or Democrats became too assertive. Marfori, now deputy for Loja, could count on the full cooperation of Montero for renewing the troublesome blacksmith's two-year exile from his native Loja.²¹ The appointment of the Duke's close friend, Lorenzo Arrazola, as Minister of Justice and Grace (in 1864–5, and again

in 1866–67) re-enforced his control on local justice for political ends, helping also with the release of public funds for church building and clerical salaries.²²

During Isabel II's final four years, proscription and persecution of the party combined with *restraint* to make the activities of Democrats, nationally and locally, less visible than during the Liberal Union. The lesson Democrats drew from abortive conspiracies in 1856–57, 1859, 1861 and 1863–64 was that a *carbonari*-based Democrat conspiracy on its own stood little chance of success without support from a *progresista*-instigated movement within the armed forces. Ever-tighter censorship limited the role the press could play in catalysing and coordinating Democrat conspiracy. Democrats also became increasingly divided over doctrine, the polemic between Socialists and Individualists intensifying during the winter of 1864–65. With the likelihood before too long of *progresista*–Democrat succession to the 'regimes of the generals', personal rivalries also intensified.²³

Narváez was kept regularly informed about conspiratorial circles in Madrid, Loja and Portugal by Pérez's second-in-command in July 1861, Ramón Calvo, recruited as a spy by Marfori during his emigration in Portugal in the autumn of 1864.²⁴ Late in November 1864 Calvo sent the Duke an elegantly printed broadsheet listing the members of Loja's recently formed Democratic Committee (several of whom had narrowly escaped execution or *presidio* sentences in 1861), adding that the committee had recently convened a 'scandalous meeting of working folk (*gente jornalera*)'. So soon after his departure from Loja, and accompanying another report that Democrats in provincial capital were conspiring during the November electoral period, Calvo's report that Loja's Democrats had regrouped would have angered the Duke.²⁵

Divisions among Democrats became evident in the provincial capital during the summer and autumn of 1865 as the party took advantage of liberalisation following the return of O'Donnell. Large meetings were held in Granada's Campos Eliseos in July, and on 5 September a plenary meeting was called to choose a single Democrat electoral committee for the province. Presided over by Juan Rodríguez, leader of the 'socialist faction', attended by 500 to 600 Democrats 'many or the major part workers, who are certainly not electors', the meeting ended in disorder with the 'democratic faction' walking out behind its leader, Ricardo Martínez, who reconvened his more patrician following later in the morning in the more decorous confines of the Liceo. Neither meeting could agree upon the composition of a single electoral committee.²⁶ The debate, in any case, was academic, as Democrats nationally chose to join Progresistas in abstaining from the December elections.

Protestant evangelists also took advantage of the relaxation of police surveillance under the restored Liberal Union. Two thousand copies of the New Testament were printed in Málaga by Ramón Giral in the summer

of 1865, financed by the Scottish Bible Society and coordinated by Miguel Trigo, *granadino* companion of Manuel Matamoros who had recently returned from exile. Using the same cell structure of earlier evangelisation, supported from Gibraltar, Pau, Geneva and Edinburgh, clandestine Protestant congregations regrouped in Granada and Málaga during the final three years of Isabel's reign. For the first time congregations appeared in smaller settlements such as Loja, Guadix, Santa Fé, Pinos Puente, Motril, Vélez, Antequera and Ronda.²⁷

With the Catalan Prim's emergence as premier *progresista*, Andalucía declined in importance as the centre of conspiracy and insurrection shifted back to Madrid, the North and the East (Catalonia, Aragón and the Levant). The student demonstrations in Madrid of April 1865, the abortive *progresista* uprisings of June 1865 and January 1866, the San Gil sergeants' uprising in June 1866 had few repercussions in Andalucía although Pérez del Alamo was jailed briefly in August 1866 in a crackdown by Governor Auñón on Seville's Democrats following Narváez's return to the First Ministry.²⁸

In spite of this temporary eclipse of Andalucía as the insurrectionary vanguard, Democrats in Granada were still active in the autumn of 1866, taking advantage of the increased demand for labour resulting from the programme of church building and repairs, road building and the construction of the Granada-Málaga railway link. In late September, Granada's Democratic Committee sent an agent to Loja charged with organising railway workers. Sub-Governor Campos immediately arrested and expelled the man assuring Narváez that all was calm in Loja. Narváez was sure, however, that a conspiracy was afoot and warned Campos that the two pharmacists, Morales Sementi and Ortega, posed a danger, reminding his cousin that the suspension of individual guarantees of July was still in force and that sub-governors of cities were expected to observe the decree as much as civil governors of provinces. Narváez even proposed that Campos might hand over the running of the Council to a deputy sent from Madrid freeing his cousin to concentrate on policing Democrats and public order. The Duke insisted that what was needed was someone 'with the necessary drive to carry out a cleansing in Loja of such people as the two pharmacists', warning his cousin that he would instruct the Captain General of Granada that 'the two subjects should be closely watched so that at the smallest indiscretion they should be sent to Fernando Poó'.²⁹

During the spring of 1867, severe drought, high wheat and bread prices and mounting unemployment brought renewed Democrat plotting throughout province. The situation was particularly grave in Loja where, apart from livestock suffering from the heat, lack of pasture and water, *jornaleros* faced unemployment '...because farmers, who expect little or nothing from planting, do not want to incur any costs on their land'.³⁰ Over the winter Narváez's administrator in Loja speculated on this agricultural crisis,

buying wheat in October 1866 at 42–46 reales/fanega and selling in early May 1867 at 98 reales. Price rises were also felt in the provincial capital from where Civil Governor José de los Santos y Méndez assured Narváez that he had measures in place to avoid a wheat shortage so as ‘to prevent the professional agitators from taking advantage of the critical circumstances that would threaten us if the drought which is afflicting this province were to exceed the necessities especially of the proletarian class’.

The governor confirmed that subversive broadsheets were circulating but assured the Duke that he knew their purveyors. Moreover, those known for ‘radical ideas’ had ignored the promptings of the professional revolutionaries ‘for lack of elements favourable for achieving an uprising’. The governor advised against ‘a state of alarm or strong measures that might prejudice authority... My system is to appear not give them any importance, but I am always alert, and the very indifference that I show keeps them under watch’ (a maxim of good government that Narváez evidently found repulsive, furiously annotating this section of Santos’s letter!). Santos suspected Ricardo Martínez to be the ringleader and claimed to have this moderate Democrat under constant surveillance, ready to arrest and transport him ‘at the moment that his revolutionary preparations reach the height of finding an echo which until now has not happened’.³¹

More worrying to Narváez were reports at the end of April of ‘animation and expectation of happiness’ in the towns between Loja and Antequera, the epicentre of the revolt in July 1861. In Loja, Iznájar, Algarinejo and Alhama conspirators were distributing newspaper propaganda and organising meetings with initiation rituals similar to those of 1861. Narváez urged Campos to show the firmness, determination and self-sacrifice demonstrated by the central government ‘in the struggle which arm to arm we are sustaining with the revolution’, advising his cousin to ‘use rigorous measures against determined persons’, even if this might ‘affect your spirit or cause you pain, for being opposed to the conditions of your character’, warning that he would be unable to excuse him before the Ministry of Government were he to fail to take the necessary measures to ensure that ‘in Loja nothing will happen’.³² Campos explained to Narváez that intelligence he had received from a ‘mole who secretly informs me of what they (the conspirators) are doing and of what they believe’ was too vague to act upon, quite apart from this information often not being given ‘disinterestedly’. Yet he was convinced that ‘the rebels are quiet and doing nothing, in spite of harbouring agreeable expectations about the results of the revolutionary preparations which they believe are being prepared in other parts’.³³

By mid-May Campos reported with relief that ‘it has rained and the climate has become cooler; as a result spirits have been greatly reanimated, the rise in price of wheat and bread has slowed and there is no reason to fear a conflict with the *jornaleros*’ adding that that there was work on the road to Iznájar ‘for any person from Loja who presented himself’.³⁴ Yet Democrats in

Loja were still expecting a mid-summer outbreak out in Andalucía aimed at distracting the government from uprisings planned elsewhere in Spain, particularly Barcelona. Garrisons in Seville, Barcelona and Madrid had promised their support and resources were believed to be abundant as a result of a loan of 10 million francs, a rumour which Campos believed to be 'nonsense spread among them to keep the revolutionary spirit alive'. He had reliable information that Democrats in Loja had decided 'either to do nothing or to accept what they are told to do from elsewhere, feeding in the meantime on their hopes'. As a concession to the Duke, Campos promised that the next time Democrats met 'to swear in or to enlist or to concert' he would order the arrest of some conspirators and 'transport them to other parts only on the evidence of the certainty that I have and without any need for proof that they have acted beyond the law'.³⁵

Narváez's fear that the Andalusian summer would bring its customary Democrat insurrection proved unfounded. During the autumn the Duke's concern in Loja shifted from policing of Democrats to various complaints he had received of improprieties in the tendering of contracts for church building and restoration and an oil milling racket orchestrated by Sr. Sevilla, Loja's Inspector of Police. Both incidents caused him further to doubt his cousin's capacity to govern his native city which he so yearned to become a model of Catholic revival and the extermination of the democratic virus.³⁶ Campos energetically defended his police chief and refuted all the accusation of impropriety in contracting of the public works.³⁷ Yet he voiced his concern that work on church restoration was proceeding very slowly and that several projects had strayed beyond their budgets, expressing a general anxiety felt in Loja that 'on the unhappy day that you leave power every kind of benefit for persons and for the town will abruptly cease... we all beg you to show even more than normal your goodness and interest for Loja'.³⁸

Campos's anxiety over the slowing of material improvements contrasted with his upbeat report in the previous April, when he had described progress on all fronts: the imminent arrival of Sisters of Mercy to serve in the hospital and operate a new primary school, the completion of the road to Iznájar and the bridge at Rio Frío, street widening in preparation for opening the railway connection and work well-advanced on the secondary school in Convent of La Victoria and a new prison.³⁹ By early August Campos reported problems: the budget for repairing the Convent of Santa Clara had been used up with essential work still to be done; work on the Convent of La Victoria had strayed beyond budget due to the incorporation of costly adornments specified by the Duke (a tabernacle, two side altars, new steps up to the high altar constructed from 'red jasper instead of rough stone' and 'two beautiful new doors'); a towering new belfry for the parish church of Santa María (also requested by Narváez in preference for the smaller, less costly one favoured by the Archbishop) had also exceeded the budget; and the Sisters

of Charity were still without a school room for their infants' class. Only the Queen could resolve these problems, Campos inviting the Duke's direct intervention with the sovereign, adding that his motive for

soliciting the execution of all of these works is to avoid conflicts this winter which could be anguished if the autumn rain does not present itself early. In this way the needy classes will have work, for, the harvest having been so scarce and with the price of wheat reaching 70 reales, they have been complaining of shortages and symptoms of misery are observable.⁴⁰

In September, Campos was gratified to be able to report to the Duke that the autumn fair, which 'attracted an extraordinary animation and congregation of outsiders as well as people from Loja', had been concluded 'amidst the most absolute calm, confidence and tranquillity... no drunkenness, no fighting, not a single episode of such behaviour which, however insignificant, tends to cause others discomfort or concern'. Campos had feared that 'troublemakers' from other parts might invade Loja, as in July 1861, but 'the great part of those known as democrats has placed itself beside the authorities in order to resist them', reminding the Duke that employment provided by the Council in public works was what distinguished Loja from its troubled neighbours, Antequera and Granada.⁴¹

The troubles to which hard-working Loja was proving immune were the reverberations of Prim's abortive uprising of August 1867. Prim's rapprochement with the Democrats after the failure of the Sergeants' revolt in July 1866 had culminated with a meeting of 45 delegates from each party at Ostend on 16 August 1866. Over the subsequent ten months the pact produced few results, with both parties divided internally and in disagreement with each other. Progresistas favoured a constitutional monarch and *progresista* generals were opposed to the Democrat insistence upon universal suffrage. Democrats favoured a Republic but were divided over whether it should be federal or centralised.⁴² Finally, at a meeting in Brussels in June 1867, Prim and Salustiano Olózaga, representing the Progresistas and Cristino Martos, José María Orense and Eduardo Chao, representing Democrats, decided in favour of common movement in the name of 'National Sovereignty' leaving an assembly to decide upon the form of government after the conclusion of the revolutionary movement to be led by Prim.⁴³

The first result of this pact was a failed uprising at the beginning of August. Valencia was chosen as the 'centro revolucionario' but failed to rise up leaving the military leaders, Pierrad and Moriones, who had crossing into Catalonia from France, having to retreat, once scattered uprisings in Catalonia, Aragón and Castile had fizzled out. In spite of failing to take any major city the revolutionaries were encouraged by gestures of popular support. For its part, the regime suffered the shock of the death in combat of a

senior military figure, General Manso de Zuñiga, Captain General of Aragón, whose troops lost heart and fled. This event seriously damaged the morale of the Narváez government.

Echoes of these abortive uprisings were felt throughout the province of Granada in 1867, prompting the authorities to tighten security, monitor Democrats and arrest and deport known troublemakers. Public order was rendered more precarious by Narváez's instruction that the Civil Guard should withdraw from their posts in smaller towns and villages, where it was feared they might become too sympathetic to local interests or vulnerable to attack, to be concentrated in central barracks. In the province of Granada, only two Civil Guard garrisons would remain: one in the capital and the other at Salar near Loja. A new corps of 'Interim Rural Guard', divided into four regional sections, was inaugurated. Although Narváez ordered the new force to be armed in mid-August, it took two months for first two sections, including Loja's 20-man force, to be commissioned, leaving the province very lightly policed throughout September. Once commissioned, Governor Santos admitted to the Duke that the Guard was equipped only with English rifles which, 'although all the guards, as veterans of the army, are accustomed to them, are not the most suitable weapons, as you know very well, for this rugged terrain'.⁴⁴

Although admitting that the withdrawal of Civil Guard detachments had encouraged 'hot heads' in some towns to promote disturbances, Santos saw no immediate danger to the security of the province because the 'chiefs' who led the 'revolutionary elements' found no sympathy among 'la fuerza pública' (presumably meaning the army). Yet he expressed concern for the future, believing 'while the bad plant is not uprooted and destroyed at its root, I believe we will not achieve a regular tranquillity'.⁴⁵ In late August, encouraged by Narváez and protected by the state of emergency, Santos started rounding up known Democrats in Granada and deporting them to Cádiz for despatch to overseas *presidios*.⁴⁶

The passage through Loja of a chain of political prisoners from Granada on 10 September, and the 'complete ovation' and 'prodigious banquet' they were afforded by Loja's Democrats, caused Campos and Santos great embarrassment and maddened Narváez, who immediately demanded an enquiry.⁴⁷ Three investigations, one commissioned by the civil governor, a second by Sub-Governor Campos and a third by the Duke himself, revealed that Democrats could congregate quite freely in Loja and even count on the sympathy of members of the *moderado* Council. The three perspectives on Democrat sociability in Loja make intriguing reading, revealing the gulf between Narváez' pathological fear of Revolution and snobbish contempt and personal loathing for Loja's Democrats, Campos' more pragmatic belief that Democrats were an ordered and respectable group who did not threaten the social order, and Governor Santos' ingenuous belief that Loja was so firmly under the control of the Duke that even the despatch of cords of

Democrats considered dangerous in Granada required no advanced warning to Loja's Sub-Governor.⁴⁸ Indeed, as the prisoners entered Loja on the morning of 10 September, to be welcomed at the Granada gate by a deputation of 12 co-religionists, led by pharmacist Don Anastasio Ortega (who had headed the representation of Loja's Democrats against Socialism in June 1864 and had recently returned from exile in Málaga), Sub-Governor Campos and his full Council were meeting in session to draft a letter to the Duke, thanking him for his heroic leadership in defending the Monarchy and the Patria 'against revolutionary upheavals at times when even the foundations of European society were threatened' and congratulating their *paisano* on the recent triumph against 'new and deplorable events promoted by disloyalty' (the failed uprising in August).⁴⁹

The three reports on the reception accorded by Loja's Democrats to their exiled *granadino confreres* shed light on the close ties between Democrats in the two cities. Years of persecution and common conspiratorial activity had fostered camaraderie between Democrats in Granada and Loja (one of the prisoners was Don José Riza, 'Italian and owner of a *fonda* in Granada', whose establishment, frequented both by Pérez del Alamo and Ramón Calvo, had been reported in 1863 for hosting hymn singing to Garibaldi and denunciations of Pope Pius IX).⁵⁰ These associational ties were reinforced by occupational ties formed during Loja's current building boom (the repair of churches, new streets and roads, bridges, the railway). One of the prisoners, Don Juan Almendros, had recently completed the contract for numbering houses and putting up street signs in Loja. Upon his arrival in Loja, as part of the reception committee were 'two outsiders (*forasteros*), friends of the prisoner Almendros, employed as stonemasons'.⁵¹ Their place on the committee is a measure of the influence of such worker-foremen, drawn to Loja's building boom. Indeed, five of the 12-man reception committee were not accorded the title of 'Don'. Apart from the two stonemasons, the other three 'commoners' were 'José Barrera, el del Barrio', described by Narváez as 'the Chief of the Democrats of his barrio', 'Vicent Cacheculo, hijo de Cacorja', described by the Duke as 'a scoundrel' (*pillete*), probably a Gypsy, and Francisco Navarrete, described by Narváez as 'a drunken bricklayer who is not from Loja'. Hence, representatives from Loja's Democrat rank and file as well as the patrician *plana mayor* were present to welcome the prisoners as they entered the Granada gate.

The Duke was less generous than either Campos or Santos as to who qualified as a patrician and merited the title of 'Don'. In his annotated list of Loja's reception committee, of the two Cerillo brothers accorded the title of 'Don' by Campos and Santos, the Duke scorned the claim to gentility of 'Don Francisco Cerrillo y Barranco ... (who) ... assumed the title of *don* because he felt like it: from being a servant in an inn he has made himself a Chief of Democrats'. As for his brother José (with whom Pérez del Alamo had lodged immediately after his evacuation of Loja in July 1861), the title of 'Don' is

absent from Narváez description: 'José Cerrillo is an employee in a posada and as bad as his brother'.⁵²

Insisting that he would have isolated Granada's prisoners from their Loja co-religionist had he be warned of their coming, Campos attempted to steer the Duke away from his fixation with the embarrassing events of 10 September to his success in governing and pacifying this once rebellious city:

...during the critical circumstances which have just passed. While in Granada, Antequera and Málaga the authorities were alarmed and pacific *vecinos* shocked and fearful of an explosion within their own populations, in Loja everyone slept quietly with no fear as I have assured them that what might happen in other towns could happen here. This town, not so long ago turbulent and revolutionary, is today one of the most pacific and obedient in Spain, for the small number of those who visited the prison signify nothing in the general disposition of the population for whom the event that concerns us passed almost unnoticed.⁵³

Narváez was unconvinced by his cousin's defence, warning him that 'the next time Democrats pass through Loja, Democrats there should remain quietly in their houses; because if they do what they have done before, I will send them to Fernando Poó'.⁵⁴ Campos continued to insist that Loja's Democrats posed no threat to order, 'not only would they not take any initiative of a revolutionary kind, but that if the conflagration were to extend over a great part of the nation, here they would remain mere spectators. Moreover, far from being animated, they are frightened. This is truth.'⁵⁵

If Campos was confident about controlling Democrats he could not disguise the gravity of the subsistence crisis afflicting *jornaleros* in Loja and many other towns in the province during the autumn of 1867. In August, and again in early October, Civil Governor Santos Méndez instructed town councils, in union with major tax-payers, to provide occupation for day labourers on public works, sanctioning Councils to finance the work by using credits from the previous year, payments owed, a 5 per cent increase in direct taxes, surpluses from the auction of farmed taxes and so on.⁵⁶ The day after posting this decree *jornaleros* rioted in Montefrío resulting in the arrest of seven ringleaders.⁵⁷ Narváez urged the civil governor to punish such delinquent behaviour harshly and swiftly. Sixteen of Montefrío's rioters were arrested and tried by a military commission with instructions that 'the rest of the towns of the province be given a severe but healthy lesson'.⁵⁸ To his credit Narváez ensured that 2,014,758 escudos were released for five projects for constructing 107,902 kilometres of roads (including the road between Loja and Alhama).⁵⁹

In early December 1867 unrest spread to Loja, the Council deciding that *jornaleros*, who had been noisily requesting alms in front of the Council building, should be put to work on the road on the Iznájar road (work

hitherto reserved for *presidio* workers from Granada). On 9 December a group of workers downed tools and marched to Loja to complain to the authorities about the abusive behaviour of the foremen, being paid by the fortnight instead daily, and poor lodging. Campos convoked a Council meeting which, in consultation with José España, contractor of the Iznájar road, agreed improved work conditions (work 'from dawn until dusk', a wage paid daily of 6 reales, work to be offered to men of all ages, including the disabled, and lodgings within *cortijos* rather than in barns).⁶⁰

Relations between foremen and *jornaleros* remained tense and on the night of 12 December 200 'abandoned all their tasks and presented themselves in the city in a mob (*en tropel*), which they had done on the night before, although with greater silence and moderation'.⁶¹ Fearing for public order, Campos posted pickets of regular army, Civil Guard and the new Rural Guard at the principal entries to the city, while the Council published a new band outlining less onerous conditions of employment before ordering the workers to return to their homes. Workers' grievances again revolved around the abuses of Sr. España's foremen. The new band allowed workers to arrive late and to down tools when they chose, although with the penalty of a reduced wage. *Jornaleros* were reminded that the Council 'had no other object than that of attending to the public misery', warning that 'not even the smallest outrage or the slightest attitude which reveals the least agitation will be tolerated' forbidding *jornaleros* in the future 'from presenting themselves en masse in the city' (a time-hallowed practice).⁶²

Narváez received this news from Loja with undisguised anger, annotating the civil governor's account with large scribbles: 'Whoever is doing this should pay for it; the Public Order Law should be studied and applied'. Although the Duke agreed with Santos that the 'scandal that has occurred in Loja with the workers' was not of 'material consideration', he stressed that 'being an act opposed to the laws' it could be 'the start of greater excesses' which could become 'the essence of an affair of much greater consideration', recalling the events in Loja of July 1861:

A more or less numerous group of people who make demands as a crowd (*en tumulto*) reveals a bad spirit and a pernicious tendency. These workers have been accustomed for a long time to impose themselves, and not to earn even half of the wages which are stipulated and are paid to them, and on refusing to work for more hours, they do not have the right of consideration, for they should be obliged to do what workers do in other parts.

Only a short time ago these actions indicated a base of greater evils. Socialist propaganda put down deep roots in this country, bearing fruit which made the name of a coarse and ignorant blacksmith resound only because he became the priest of a new cult which consisted of taking possession of other peoples' property.

Narváez ordered the Santos to study the law on public order and apply it with the greatest rigour to anyone who committed 'excesses of this kind' anywhere in the province.⁶³ Yet Santos was far too occupied with defending his position in Granada to be able to concern himself with minor labour problems in Loja. At the end of December he was forced to resign after a sustained campaign accusing him of a litany of financial improprieties, terrorising the province during the failed Democrat insurrection of August, and incompetence in dealing with the subsistence crisis during the previous three months.⁶⁴ His departure undermined *moderantismo* in Granada, already weakened in by the recent closure of *La Correspondencia de Granada* edited by the influential cleric Francisco Javier Cobos.⁶⁵

Sending the unemployed to work on the Iznájar road failed to resolve unemployment and 'public misery' in Loja. On 16 December the Council returned to the tried and tested practice of *alojamiento*, distributing those *jornaleros* who were not employed on the Iznájar road among property owners 'and the other classes of society who can support them' at a daily wage of 4 reales.⁶⁶ In spite of some initial resistance from influential proprietors, the measure lessened tension in Loja and provided the poor with support and employment throughout the first four months of 1868.⁶⁷

Although the arrival of rain at the beginning of February 1868 brought some relief, the provincial capital continued to suffer serious dearth and food shortages as wheat prices rocketed throughout February and March. The subsistence crisis affecting much of Spain was felt particularly sharply in Granada due to primitive communications, with roads in a very poor state and rail connections still incomplete. On 25 January, Granada endured a full day of rioting before peace was restored. In early February unrest spread to rural districts, Granada and its surrounding towns experiencing serious bread riots on 25 February resulting in 120 arrests in the capital and over 70 in Armilla, Churriana, Gavía and Santa Fé.⁶⁸ The authorities lost control of Granada for 4 hours as crowds removed wheat from private stores and delivered it in carts to the Ayuntamiento. Rioters were charged variously with stealing wheat, sedition, stealing firearms, firing on troops, rioting, threatening Civil Guards and attacking excise guards.

The riots shook the provincial capital out of its administrative lethargy. By the beginning of March all available public funds were being invested in grain, a public subscription was organised for helping the poor, and over 2,500 *jornaleros* were put to work on improving the roads between Artafe and Pinos Puente and Granada and Alhama. Meanwhile Narváez's former aide de camp now Military Governor, Enrique Enríquez y García, established a Council of War with instructions to pass prompt and draconian sentences to deter further disturbances. In spite of numerous arrests and the first executions (urged by Narváez to be carried out swiftly), riots continued in Granada into early March when several houses were broken into. As always with Councils of War, the authorities complained of the slowness of the

proceedings, the lack of good witnesses, crowds flocking around the prisons allowing time for petitions of clemency to be presented.⁶⁹ Grain remained scarce throughout March, as the arrival of wheat, much of it ordered from Marseilles, was delayed by poor communications.

Late in March, Enríquez reported to Narváez on the conclusion of the trials of those arrested for involvement in the riots of 25/26 February. Of 246 individuals who faced trial, 128 received sentences of varying terms of imprisonment, Enríquez assuring the Duke that 'for some time the *granadinos* will not forget the lesson which they (the trials) have brought'. Although by the end of March order reigned in the capital, Enríquez still feared that, 'as the misery is great', some spark might ignite disorder in another town of the province. Finally at the end of March, 18,000 fanegas of wheat arrived and Granada's garrison was instructed to provide 600 rations daily and a quarter pound of bread daily to each poor person until July.⁷⁰

Antequera, the other city that during the hot summer of 1867 Campos compared unfavourably with Loja in matters of public order, had in fact experienced four years of relative social peace since the Queen's successful visit in September 1862, helped by the posting of a permanent military garrison in the city. In November 1864, upon his return to the First Ministry, Narváez blocked the re-election Romero Robledo as Cortes deputy due to his Liberal Unionists leanings. This was against the desperate pleading of his cousin, Juan Casasola, who reminded the Duke that the young *antequerano* deputy 'knew with his words how to change the tendencies of the working class to the point of being able to carry them with him to receive Her Majesty the Queen when she visited this population'. Reminding Narváez of the 'patriotic' services of the 'fathers of families who took up their rifles to defend their sons in the "*jornada de Loja*"' (the Revolution of July 1861), Casasola predicted that without Romero's talents in the Cortes the government would become more exposed to its enemies.⁷¹ This prediction proved correct. During Narváez's last term in office Antequera returned to become the centre of Democrat conspiracy in eastern Andalucía.⁷²

By the spring of 1867 the garrison that had kept the peace since 1862 had become a liability. The military authorities in Granada defused a conspiracy to launch an armed uprising during Holy Week, the first act of which would be the capture and execution of the officers.⁷³ This went beyond the formula of temporarily detaining officers agreed for the Madrid uprising of July 1866. Sub-Governor Félix de Arce, old friend of Narváez and veteran of campaigns against Democrats since 1856, was convinced that 'enemies of order and professional rebels' were working in the city 'to seduce the unwary with the aim of initiating them or taking their oaths of allegiance in order to make them instruments of their iniquitous plans in this population in which eleven thousand declared *garibaldinos* live who do not desist in their projects to overturn the social order'.⁷⁴ Carlos de Friedrich, military governor of the

province, promptly ordered the arrest of José Antonio Aguilar believed to be behind the revival of the Garibaldino secret society.

Exiling Aguilar to Torremolinos did nothing to quell mounting unrest throughout the province of Málaga during June and July 1867.⁷⁵ On 31 July a serious riot broke out at Antequera's Granada gate resulting in numerous arrests and deportations over the next three months. Félix de Arce was convinced that the Aguilar brothers were behind the incident.⁷⁶ From the names of those arrested it is likely that this 'revolutionary attempt' at the Granada gate, close to the home of the Aguilars at 'La Quinta', where the city gives way to *vega*, involved principally *jornaleros* and reflected the current misery and dearth.⁷⁷

Over the autumn and early winter Antequera and its rural districts experienced a wave of theft, banditry and clashes between the rural guard and armed groups. In late August the commander of the Salt Guard at Fuente de Piedra called for re-enforcements to prevent illegal extraction of salt, a sure sign of desperation in rural areas as the drought impacted upon incomes and the ability to sustain livestock.⁷⁸ In late September, Félix de Arce despatched 12 'vagrants, thieves, protectors of robbers and *garibaldinos*' to Málaga, the first of several contingents over the subsequent weeks.⁷⁹ In November disturbances in Mollina, still feared for being the 'spark' in June 1861, forced the Civil Guard to flee the town.⁸⁰

Taking advantage of the state of emergency, Sub-Governor de Arce established a 'Council of War' in Antequera over the summer and autumn, sentencing 21 incendiaries, 41 'garibaldinos' involved in the events of 31 July, 31 men found in possession of prohibited firearms, 20 more for involvement in the events of 31 July and for carrying prohibited weapons, and 'various groups' of *paisanos* who had stolen salt from Fuente de Piedra. Among those detained were many Garibaldinos involved in earlier labour disputes, including Francisco Palomas Rojas (a) 'El Niño del Limbo', who had organised the reapers' strike in June 1861 and the revival of the Garibaldino Society in the summer of 1862, and Pedro Maroto García, who had organised the *garibaldino* shoemakers in 1861.⁸¹ Eighteen political prisoners from Antequera were eventually deported to Cádiz on 15 September.⁸²

While Félix de Arce struggled to maintain order in Antequera, Joaquín Campos strove in Loja to keep the programme of material improvements on track and to realise Narváez's vision of moral renewal. The centrepiece of the Catholic revival in Loja was the missionary college in the ex-convent of La Victoria, still undergoing refurbishment. At the beginning of September 1867, Bishop Benigno de Carrión, Capuchin director of the college, appealed to the Duke for help over shortage of funds insufficient even for paying his salary: 'I see the day still far off when we will occupy the college in Loja with men who will fulfil our desires: this hurts me profoundly'.⁸³ Funds were needed to complete work on the church and convent; '... in neither building is anything ready except the four walls'. The Bishop insisted that the high

altar, 'which did not figure in any budget' (and which Narváez had insisted should be crowned with a tabernacle and reached by steps of alabaster), should face the same economies and savings which were being applied to the rest of the building. He predicted, however, with God's help, and the faith of the Duke who had so cherished the project, the day would soon come when the missionary college would 'provide benefits in Andalucía, starting in Loja, and in America'.⁸⁴

After concerted pressure from Narváez and the Minister of Finance on Civil Governor Santos, the last instalments for the repairs were released, although further calls on the Duke's generosity were necessary in early November in order to finance un-budgeted further adornments to the chapel (specified by Narváez!).⁸⁵ In December, Narváez also secured further funds for the rebuilding of the old convent of San Francisco for the Fathers of St Vincent of Paul.⁸⁶ Bishop Benigno thanked the Duke 'for all that has been done and is being done to re-establish, better said, to give new being and life to the church and convent of La Victoria', and, although moved by 'the solidity, neatness, even beauty of what has been restored', admitted that he had to struggle to assuage his 'scruples and remorse, in view of the fact that neither the church nor the house are in harmony with Capuchin poverty and simplicity'.⁸⁷

The re-consecration of the Convent of La Victoria as a school for training missionaries for the Philippines would be short-lived. Handed over to the Bishop by the Council on 30 May 1867, opened as a missionary school in April 1868, work on repairing the building was still not completed by the September Revolution when it was occupied by a column of 'Volunteers of Liberty' from Seville commanded by Rafael Pérez del Alamo. On 19 October 1868, the Council invalidated the title of transfer of the building to the Capuchin order and the convent was returned to the Council. After serving as a 'Liceo' during the Sexenio, the Convent was used for municipal offices and as a school building during the Restoration.⁸⁸

Although the conditions of subsistence remained precarious throughout the first half of 1868, Loja avoided the riots and unrest that afflicted the provincial capital in January and February. Some credit for Loja's success in weathering Spain's longest and harshest subsistence crisis since 1847 must be given to landowners and employers who responded swiftly to several *alojamientos* administered by the Council between mid-December 1867 and May 1868. With private employers taking responsibility for the subsistence of hundreds of *jornaleros*, and by a judicious use of *pósito* corn reserved exclusively for 'the poorest and neediest', the Council, with the support of Loja's three parish priests, was able to deploy funds to road improvements and other public works.⁸⁹

Channelling private wealth into public welfare over such a prolonged period of dearth was possible because, in spite of dearth, Loja was the most prosperous city in western Granada. Symbol of this prosperity was Narváez's

estate of which in 1867 comprised the massive palace in the centre of Loja, numerous urban properties, the country house and garden, a multitude of olive farms, extensive grazing land, and herds of prize mares, sheep and cattle. For a second son, with a military and political career that involved him in prolonged periods of absence from Loja, Narváez had created a remarkably successful business in Loja. Without even taking into account the core of the enterprise (grain speculation), the business earned profits of 83,172 reales 22 cuartillos in 1866 and of 93,446 reales 3 cuartillos in 1867. With the value of grain dealing included, the overall balance in the Duke's favour in 1866 was at least 233,000 reales, amply exceeding the 150,000 reales sent from Madrid to be invested in the estate.

In these years of subsistence crisis and record wheat prices, Narváez's irrigated *cortijos* to the west of the city around the *jardín-casería* could yield harvests when dry farming harvests failed elsewhere. Indeed, with its numerous springs and subterranean sources Loja was uniquely insulated from the effects of serious dearth, accounting for the city's ability repeatedly to overcome the social consequences of subsistence crises by organising *alajamiento*. Olives and livestock complemented cereals at the core of the Duke's wealth. Apart from the 483 arroba olive harvest from the demesne (increasing to 642.5 arrobas in 1867) valued at 23,036 reales, the Duke received rents from 39 olive farms valued at 40,382 reales in 1866. Livestock joined the olive in the commercialisation of Loja's *montes*. The sale of 15 colts to the 'Establecimiento Remonta de Sevilla' for 60,000 reales in October 1866 was the biggest single item on Narváez's farm account. The value of these beasts at 4000 reales each explains why they were targeted by thieves in December 1866!⁹⁰ The account also shows Narváez to have been an important producer of sheep, cattle, wool, milk, ham and wine, while his stake in Loja's secondary and tertiary sector can be appreciated from the rental income received from a paper mill, two flourmills and shops in the Plaza Nueva.

The benefit from Narváez's accumulation of *cortijos* and *montes* between Loja and Iznájar can also be seen in 44,611 reales indemnity Narváez received from the constructors of the new road linking these towns, and from the 7,610 reales received in rent from shepherds in 'all the mountains of the *cortijos* of the Campiña de Campo Dabro y Partida de Alcaudique'. This, combined with the rents of between 300 and 3,000 reales from each of the 39 olive-producing *cortijos*, reveals that Narváez had succeeded in achieving a pre-eminent position as Loja's greatest landowner and beneficiary of the *desamortización*, something Loja's Progresistas and Democrats had struggled to prevent between 1858 and 1861. In 1880, Narváez's heirs paid Loja's largest tax quota confirming that the Duke had succeeded in becoming Loja's wealthiest citizen even if he often failed to control its politics.⁹¹

A measure of the Duke's success was the modesty of the estate of his older brother who watched the family fortune steadily diminish during his

lifetime. José María Narváez died two days before his brother on 21 April 1868 and left an estate to be divided among his six children that amounted to three *cortijos* near Loja, five *hazas* and olive orchards, the sixth part (78 hectares) of a *cortijo* owed to the deceased in the town of Algarinejo, and, finally, another small *cortijo* in Priego that belonged to a chaplaincy founded in Loja by an ancestor, a priest, Alonso de Algar, in 1595.⁹² Being the elder son of a noble line offered no special material advantages in Liberal Spain, while the spectacular economic success of a *secundón* was a measure of the opportunities opened by the Liberal property revolution.

The death of Narváez of pneumonia at 7.30 a.m. on 23 April 1868 after a 3-week illness removed the inspiration and force behind Loja's moral revival, itself a microcosm of a broader Catholic institutional revival experienced throughout Spain between 1864 and 1869.⁹³ The Duke asked for news of his deteriorating health to be telegraphed to Benigno Carrión in Loja who passed the word on to the family, a measure of the importance the Bishop had assumed for the Duke, both as a pastoral influence at the centre of his once divided family and as the guiding light in Loja's moral revival.⁹⁴

Although the Duke died without heirs, his widow María-Alejandra Tascher, like Isabel Bourbon, survived the century, to die in 1901. Narváez dictated his will on his deathbed to a notary in the presence of his executors, Marfori and Seijas Lozano, specifying that his heirs should 'in perpetuity provide the sufficient for sustaining the *Asilo de Pobres* entitled San Ramón which was created and funded by His Excellency in the City in a manner that can sustain constantly the same number of poor as existed in the said establishment on the day of his death'. The costs of running the Hospicio, to include the conservation of the church, the garden and the patios, would be supported in part from his private estate and in part from the national treasury. Each year on the day of San Ramón a religious service would be held in honour of the saint and the poor would be given

an extraordinary meal, composed of abundant and varied dishes and wine, the cost of which would be included in the budget of the asylum, and the Señor Duque had the full confidence that all of his relations resident in Loja would preserve the pious habit of serving the poor during the said meal, as it came to be done when the Duke was last in Loja on the day of San Ramón

The will provided that a 'modest chapel' be built next to the church of the Asilo where 'the sepulchres would be housed which contain the remains of his beloved parents, the sepulchre that contains the body of the said Señor Duque, and that which will contain the remains of the girl Consuelo'.⁹⁵

The Duke's death left a vacuum in Loja that Queen Isabel must have hoped would be filled by Carlos Marfori upon whom she bestowed the title Count of Loja on 1 May.⁹⁶ However, Marfori's interests and friendships in

the region were small in comparison with his cousin's extensive network of loyalties, embracing family, friends, the armed forces and the Church.⁹⁷ Narváez's death removed the only figure with the authority and determination to halt Prim's conspiracy in the armed forces, while his successor Luis González Bravo ensured, by his clumsy handling of that conspiracy, that a Revolution would end the 30-year reign of Queen Isabel.

Part IV

'La Gloriosa': Democrat Victory, Republican Defeat, 1868–1891

This page intentionally left blank

12

The Revolution of September 1868 in Western Granada

The Revolution of September 1868 was the second of Pérez's 'Two Andalusian Revolutions', the title of his memoir published in Seville in 1872. July 1861 and September 1868 were 'revolutions', rather than 'riots' or 'insurrections', because the people took control of their towns and established a new democratic order, even if only for a short time.¹ The 'Two Revolutions' followed an identical choreography: animated, if not armed citizens marching upon municipal seats behind wind bands playing the Hymn of Riego.² For a moment during each revolution it seemed that Sixto Cámara's promise in the Zaragoza Manifesto of April 1857, that a revolution would be achieved by the people marching from their villages and mountains to occupy plazas and central places, joined by women and children coming out of their homes, confronting an army that was powerless to resist, had been fulfilled. Republican conspirator Nicolás Estévez recalled the intoxicating atmosphere in the streets of Madrid in late September and early October 1868; the old order finally swept away, people firing their guns in the air (and not at each other), publicly celebrating the liberties and freedoms promised since 1812.³ The 'Two Revolutions' shared the same unsuccessful outcomes: Loja's rebels were crushed by the army; Prim ordered the *juntas revolucionarias* and 'Volunteers of Liberty' to be disbanded, determined to prevent the convocation of a national assembly of juntas that would have changed the political shape of Spain.⁴

In spite of the failure of September Revolution to fulfil Pérez's utopian dreams, 'La Gloriosa' nevertheless marked a major political watershed. Over the subsequent six years, the vacuum left by the fall of the Bourbon monarchy and the 'regimes of the Generals' caused a maelstrom of swiftly changing political alignments, new party labels and political actors (such as the Socialist International), and attempts at radically different forms of government, ranging from an imported Piedmontese Prince to extreme Federal Republicanism. The final two chapters explore how Democrats in Loja, Alhama and Antequera, and their surrounding towns, who had organised conspiracies

and insurrections during the reign of Queen Isabel, fared under the new regime of universal suffrage.

Like Riego's Revolution in 1820, the September Revolution spread from Cádiz to Málaga and Seville before being embraced by the 'Nation'. Loja's blacksmith played an important part in broadening of Seville's initially narrowly military *pronunciamiento* under Liberal Unionist (and hitherto reactionary) General Rafael Izquierdo into a popular movement with a radical programme. The initial mobilisation of Democrats at Cádiz on 10 August behind José Paúl Angulo had failed because the *pronunciamiento* timed for that day was delayed. When the Revolution eventually came in Cádiz on 17–19 September, it was an exclusively *progresista* and Liberal Unionist affair led by Prim, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla and Juan Bautista Topete y Carballo, with no Democrats to be seen. Seville was the next city to pronounce on 19 September under General Izquierdo, who secured the city without opposition and at first opposed any popular mobilisation. However, Spain's third city possessed a well-organised and battle-hardened Democrat party which had attempted several insurrections and suffered continual persecution since 1856.

Since leaving Loja in July 1863, Pérez had settled in Seville with his family and practised his trade in the Plaza de Terreros.⁵ By 1868 he was a member of the *junta directiva* of Seville's 'Centro Demócrata', along with the surgeon Federico Rubio, who had posted bail and helped pay his fines when facing persecution in Loja in 1862. The *junta directiva* maintained relations with co-religionists throughout Andalucía, in exile and with agents of Prim in Cádiz. Out of respect for having led the uprising in 1861, Pérez was placed in charge of the clandestine organisation of Seville's Democrat party, comprising groups of armed *paisanos* divided into sections under chiefs.

When on 19 September General Izquierdo summoned his troops to the Plaza Nueva to hear the *pronunciamiento*, they were joined by *paisanos demócratas* commanded by Pérez.⁶ To the General's insistence that regular forces would suffice to keep order, Pérez replied that the people of Seville would not retire because they had taken to arms in order to defend their liberty. Pérez and Izquierdo then engaged in 'a spectacular and fraternal embrace to the accompaniment of enthusiastic *vivas* to the Army and to the People' after which a proclamation, drafted by Democrat journalist Francisco Díaz Quintero, was read out from the balcony of the Ayuntamiento, amounting to the full Democrat agenda:

... universal suffrage and without any restrictions, liberties of the press, education, conscience, commerce and industry, reform of tariffs and freedom of commerce, abolition of the death penalty, inviolability of the home and correspondence, the Constitution of 1856 as an interim legality, getting rid of the articles relating to the monarchical form of government, abolition of *quintas* and *matriculas de mar*, a volunteer army,

abolition of the salt and tobacco monopolies, equalisation of rights and the convocation of a Constituent Cortes.⁷

This programme was imitated by revolutionary juntas throughout Spain.⁸

By 28 September, at the decisive victory at Alcolea near Córdoba, Pérez del Alamo had 1,700 volunteers at his command. He was joined on the battlefield by 300 men from Córdoba led by Francisco de Leiva, Democrat journalist and doctor who, like Pérez, had mobilised *paisanos* in Córdoba earlier in the month, an act that had given the September Revolution in that city a popular patina.⁹

Three days after seeing their confrère secure the revolution in Seville, Granada's Democrat committee ordered barricades to be built anticipating that the regular army garrison would at least not oppose them. However, General Enrique Enríquez chose at first to suppress the uprising at the cost of several lives and many wounded. Five days later Prim and Serrano convinced Narváez's former aide de camp to hand over the city to the revolutionaries. Again, Democrats took to the streets, built barricades and demanded the release of political prisoners, an act that prompted the interim authorities to pronounce. Fearing reprisals, Enríquez fled with the Málaga battalion.¹⁰

Apart from Paúl y Angulo's failed uprising at Cádiz in August, the *jornadas* in Granada on 21 and 26 September were the only civilian uprisings occurring without the involvement of a military conspiracy during the September Revolution in Andalucía. Only four other purely civilian uprisings occurred in Spain's larger towns and cities in September 1868: at Alcoy, Béjar, Alicante and Santander (there of course countless municipal takeovers by *juntas* throughout Spain, some of them spawning *partidas* and *guerrillas*).¹¹ Elsewhere uprisings resulted from military *pronunciamientos* with armed civilians occasionally brought in to confer legitimacy to the Revolution. Of course, Granada's Democrats took to the streets in the expectation that the army garrison would either support them or at least remain in the barracks. But recent police persecution, that had resulted in the imprisonment of many of their *confreres*, was the chief spur to action. Much still remained of the clandestine conspiratorial ties originating in the Bienio. Indeed, the September Revolution in eastern Andalucía followed a similar choreography to the cycle of abortive insurrections that had commenced in the immediate aftermath of O'Donnell's coup in July 1856.

On 22 September a revolutionary movement of Iznájar catalysed town uprisings throughout western Granada, much as in June 1861, although Loja did not pronounce until 28 September.¹² This was through no lack of revolutionary enthusiasm but out of appreciation that once the uprising in Granada had been suppressed Loja would be next in line. This proved to be

the case: on 22 September Enríquez despatched 200 troops to Loja, an action that sparked the province of Granada's first successful *pronunciamiento*.

On 23 September remote Algarinejo, Democrat stronghold since the 1850s, pronounced, sending (as in July 1861) a column of volunteers led by a wind band to defend Loja against 'non-revolutionary troops that were descending on Loja from Granada'. Rather than enter this force remained in the Sierra above the city until 28 September when Loja pronounced. The junta in Algarinejo also sent commissions to Iznájar, Rute and Priego in southern Córdoba to cooperate with the establishment of 'a column that could help the efforts of the never-to-be-vanquished and liberal Granada'.¹³ Apart from removing the *moderado* Council and sending out columns of volunteers, Algarinejo's revolutionary junta expelled the parish priest, appointing his coadjutor, 'a subject of great example, knowledge and respect', and replaced the schoolmaster with 'a person of more incentive for his merits and liberal antecedents'.¹⁴ A week later Algarinejo's 'junta revolucionaria', speaking also on behalf Montefrío, petitioned Granada for the reestablishment of its *juzgado de primera instancia* which had been suppressed in 1867, calling for the reappointment as judge of Rafael de Cáliz Rubio, 'victim of oppressive tyranny ... ignored and scorned by his political enemies and influential allies of General Narváez who when in power allowed them to make him the target of their spite, cruelty and malevolence'.¹⁵ This pattern of administrative upheaval was followed by towns throughout the province.

Other towns in western Granada, however, were more cautious, awaiting the *pronunciamiento* in the provincial capital on 27 September before establishing their own juntas and proclaiming for the Revolution. Alhama, Villanueva de Mesías, Huétor Tajár, Yllora, Montefrío and Salar all established revolutionary juntas on 28 September to the accompaniment of patriotic celebrations. Manuel Vega, aging *progresista* president of Montefrío's revolutionary junta, described 'the jubilation and enthusiasm of the inhabitants (who are) parading the streets with the Band of Music intoning the Hymn of Riego, carrying the portrait, as if in triumph, of our fearless General His Excellency Don Juan Prim, while observing the greatest order and composure'.¹⁶ That very night Serrano's revolutionary forces triumphed at Alcolea leaving the road to Madrid open for the revolutionaries.

Apart from regaining control of local justice, Algarinejo and Montefrío expected spiritual benefits from the Revolution. Manuel Vega proposed the creation of new parish, nominating a priest and two sacristans, to accommodate the town's 'great territorial extension' and bring 'incalculable benefits'.¹⁷ Attentive also to the town's economic interests, Vega requested that those receiving seed corn from the *pósito* for winter planting should not be asked to pay their territorial contribution in advance, as was the custom, due to the 'general poverty of the inhabitants' and should be allowed to delay payment for a further three months.¹⁸ From his jittery hand Vega was evidently a man of advanced age, confirmed by his membership of the

progresista Committee; a younger man would have joined the Democrats. On 27 October, Vega resigned the presidency of the provisional junta due to 'the political situation becoming more normalised, the delicate state of my health and the private affairs that prevent me from dedicating myself with constancy to the government of this town'.¹⁹

Although the despatch of an armed force from Granada deterred Loja from pronouncing before 28 September, the city experienced mounting disorders from 22 September after the Civil Guard detachment was ordered to the provincial capital to help with the suppression of the Democrat uprising. Word of the *pronunciamiento* in Granada on 27 September reached Loja at 11 p.m. by the evening train and was confirmed in a telegram from the governor at midnight. By 4 a.m. on the next day Loja's streets had filled with crowds, bands of music and groups of armed men. The doors of the Council building were opened before a crowd of 3,000 jubilant revellers that had gathered in the Plaza de la Constitución. Portraits of the Queen, the princes and the Duke of Valencia were removed from the Council chamber.²⁰ Loja's leading *Progresistas* and Democrats came out on to the balcony 'to a unanimous shout of Long Live Liberty! Long Live Free Loja! The municipal band and other bands of music formed by various enthusiasts struck up patriotic hymns, with such jubilation taking hold of the population that not the remotest divergence was permitted'.²¹

A junta of 15 'individuals from the liberal party... representing all of the people' was then chosen and greeted by 'an infinity of *Vivas á la Libertad!*, to the people of Loja, and to the Illustrious Generals who had initiated the *pronunciamiento*'. Reminiscent of the rebel occupation of Loja in early July 1861, bands of music were sent through the streets of Loja to rally more support. 'In spite of the inconvenience of the hour' ever more *lojeños* left their houses and followed the 'músicas' back to the Council building to witness 'the improvised junta constitute itself into a provisional junta of government' comprising a mixture of *Progresistas* and Democrats.²²

Presidency of the junta was given to Mariano Ceballos y Henríquez, commander of Loja's Militia battalion and promoter of the workers' reading room in the convent of La Victoria in 1855. Of the 15 members of the junta, eight had belonged to Loja's Democrat Committee between 1863 and 1867. Comprising lawyers, pharmacists, owners of oil mills, hat, shoe and clothing shops, the junta represented Loja's middle class.

On the first day of the Revolution the junta faced disorders within the municipal jurisdiction reminiscent of the Loja Revolution. Bands of *paisanos* from Algarinejo, Iznájar, Zafarraya, Alfarnate, Saucedo, Villanueva de Trabuco, Villanueva del Rosario, Colmenar and Archidona invaded the Royal Salt Factory at Salinas in anticipation of the abolition of the salt monopoly, one of the promises of the Revolution. In the evening fighting broke out as *paisanos* attempted to disarm the Salt Guard resulting in the wounding and later death of a young man. Detaining two officers of the

Salt Guard, a detachment of *paisanos* marched to Loja with their captives to request help.

After such a prolonged *jornada* of euphoric celebration, the arrival late in the evening of a column of *paisanos* holding two captured uniformed officers caused considerable alarm in Loja. At the sound of a bugle the column was promptly surrounded by Loja's own 80-man *guardia de paisanos*, mustered and commanded by Francisco Montero, a prominent rebel leader in 1861. After a short deliberation, the junta resolved to send two doctors to attend to the wounded man at Salinas, to muster a force to prevent further thefts of salt and to relieve the Salt Guard of its duties.²³

During the first days of the Revolution, Loja's junta paid scrupulous attention to security to prevent opposition forces mounting a challenge. Even workers employed in road building were enlisted to assist the force of *paisanos* in their 'rounds and patrols' while the disorders at Salinas were being settled. On the same day the Captain General of the province arrived by train from Granada, to be greeted by a great fanfare of wind bands that led through the streets to attend a public session of the junta. As during the Bienio, every effort was made to present an image of order, moderation and patriotism to higher authorities in spite of the countryside around Loja being up in arms.²⁴

Meanwhile the force of *paisanos* established by the junta, backed by the Civil Guard under Juan Nofuentes, travelled to Salinas to dislodge 'more than three hundred persons of both sexes, mostly armed and from other jurisdictions, who were found loading up and carrying off salt on three hundred draft animals of all kinds'. An attempt to charge the rebels 24 reales/kilo for the salt they were commandeering as their prize for revolution failed utterly. By the time the multitude had retreated to their towns three-quarters of the salt stocks had been removed with what remained was sodden due to damage to the warehouses and the autumn rain. As protection from future theft and damage, it was decided to bring the salt for safety to the city. In early October, 216 mule loads carrying 338 sacks of salt weighing 434 *fanegas* were transported to the *pósito* in the centre of Loja.²⁵

Not content with commandeering salt stocks, Loja's revolutionary junta dismissed the entire administration of the salt factory and its guard appointing in their stead Francisco del Rosal y Badía (head of Loja's Council and Militia during the Bienio), who handed out key positions at the salt factory and its guard to former members of the disbanded National Militia. One of Rosal's first acts as president of Loja's first Council elected by universal suffrage was to transfer his command of the Salinas guard to a loyal friend and Democrat Félix Ortiz Cantano.²⁶ Apart from controlling the guard the Council intended to maintain the salt works as a valuable source of revenue.²⁷

The prompt action taken by the junta in matters of security had critical consequences for the September Revolution in Loja, shielding the city

against the counter-revolutionary backlash of the kind led by the commander of the Salt Guard at Fuente de Piedra that deposed the Republican Council in Antequera in January 1869. Rosal did not need to be reminded that in July 1861 it was the Salt Guard at Salar that prevented rebels from Salar, Alhama and further afield from joining Pérez at Loja.

Meanwhile Loja's *junta provisional* sent its President and Vice-President, Mariano Ceballos and Anastasio Ortega (the pharmacist so reviled by Narváez), to Granada to present city's adherence to the provisional revolutionary junta and to negotiate the equipping and arming of a popular militia. By 1 October all of Loja had learned that the Queen had left Madrid for the border, that the Revolution had succeeded, and that a new provisional government had been installed under General Serrano. On the same day 'symptoms of a popular movement' were reported from Loja's dependency of Zagra, 'with a part of the town wanting to come to this city (Loja) with the object of pronouncing'. By 3 October, Zagra had formed its own junta 'to give voice to *Viva la Libertad* and to adhere to the glorious *pronunciamiento*'.²⁸

Alhama de Granada pronounced on 28 September, the same day as its neighbour Loja. The 'Junta Popular Provisional Alhameña' was composed of Democrats, including renowned 'garibaldino', Manuel Rodríguez Carbello (a) 'El Americano', who had organised the secret society in 1861. Alhama's *pronunciamiento* also had a military dimension. The Rural Guard established by Narváez in 1867 was disbanded and the command of the reconstituted militia company was conferred upon Francisco Guerrero García (a) 'General Veredas', the tavern keeper who had led the rebel contingent to the city of Loja on 1 July 1861.²⁹ The parish priest, the judge and procurator were also run out of town.³⁰ The first act of the new Council under Eduardo Montes was to dismiss the directors of the primary schools for boys and girls whose 'political opinions do not conform to the current state of things'.³¹

News of the Revolution arrived in Santa Cruz de Alhama at 2 a.m. on 30 September when various groups of *vecinos* demanded the staffs of office from the incumbent mayor. Among the crowd was Gregorio Morán Díaz, comedian, innkeeper and Santa Cruz's leading Democrat during the abortive uprising of 1864, and Nicolás de Fuñes Rodríguez (a) 'El Chilindrín', who had marched to Loja in July 1861 later to receive a Royal pardon. By 8 in the morning, the crowd had transformed itself into the 'Junta Revolucionaria de Santa Cruz del Comercio'. Three weeks later Morán had been voted as mayor and Fuñes as councillor in Santa Cruz's first election through universal suffrage.³²

Helping Morán consolidate control over Santa Cruz was Granada Democrat Joaquín Isidoro Gómez, who had fought heroically at the barricades in the capital on 22 September, receiving (like Garibaldi at Aspromonte) a bullet in the foot. On the night of the uprising he sought sanctuary in Santa Cruz where he had served as secretary of the Council between 1857

and 1860.³³ On 19 October he organised the first popular elections in the town. Eight months later Morán and Gómez presided over an elaborate ceremony, attended by wind bands and dignified by lengthy speeches, to swear allegiance to the new constitution.³⁴

In nearby Jatar, Francisco Olmos Arrabal, the town's leading Democrat in 1861 and 1864, was chosen as President of the *Junta Revolucionaria* on 29 September. Two weeks later, disqualified for election to the Council under universal suffrage due to illiteracy, his brother, Juan Rodríguez Olmos, was elected instead.³⁵ In neighbouring Arenas del Rey on 5 October, Juan Molina Morales, 'chief of the affiliates for the Loja uprising', was chosen as President of the *Junta Revolucionaria* 'by the faithful and loyal liberals, sons of the happy present situation'.³⁶ This was much to the disgust of José Moreno Ramos, mayor of Arenas who in 1864 had organised an auxiliary force of landowners to prevent Molina Morales's landless Democrats from seconding the abortive uprising in that year. On 15 October, backed by 43 signatures (mostly 'Ramos' or 'Moreno') Moreno Ramos demanded a new election under universal suffrage in place of the one held on the previous two days, he claimed amidst violence and intimidation.³⁷ The Junta Provincial sent a delegate to preside over new elections promising 'a force of *Nacionales* if necessary'. Meanwhile Manuel Moreno Ramos (*teniente* of his brother in 1864) was imposed as President of the Junta later to be elected by universal suffrage as mayor.³⁸ The reign of the Democrat, Juan Molina Morales, in Arenas del Rey had lasted just over a fortnight, defeated it seems by the demographic preponderance enjoyed by the Moreno and Ramos families under universal suffrage.

The September Revolution in Zafarraya ended an unbroken period of political influence enjoyed by Manuel Moreno, recipient since 1862 of Narváez's patronage and largesse. On 30 September Pedro Moreno Navarro and Santiago Moreno Alba, leading Democrats and 'garibaldinos' during the early 1860s, were chosen as President and Vice-President of Zafarraya's *Junta Provisional*.³⁹ On 7 October Pedro Moreno informed the President of the Junta Provisional that 'five hundred to a thousand *vecinos*' had chosen a Council which would hold 'its ordinary sessions on the Sunday of each week, on coming out of the last Mass, which is said to be around 10 o'clock' (in Zafarraya's new neo-classical parish church built thanks to Narváez's support).⁴⁰ In Ventas de Zafarraya Democrats Manuel Luque Cañizares and Juan Moreno Tejada followed suit 'amidst much enthusiasm' converting their presidency of the Junta Provisional into leadership of a popularly elected Council.⁴¹ One of Luque's first acts was to replace the incumbent secretary of the *ayuntamiento* and tobacconist (*estanquero*) with his brother Antonio Luque Cañizares and Antonio Castillo y Pascual, 'persons worthy of the confidence of all liberal men of the neighbourhood'.⁴²

Not all towns in the district were able to secure triumph of Democrats after the Revolution of September 1868. In Agrón, a town populated almost exclusively by *jornaleros* dependent for employment on the estates of the Marqués de Mondéjar, the Revolution from the start was controlled by incumbent Mayor Antonio Muñoz Montoro, who refused to hand over the staffs of office to Antonio Saavedra, elected by universal suffrage to form Agrón's junta, or to 'any person of liberal ideas'.⁴³ Saavedra and his Democrat confreres, who claimed to have had suffered persecution at the hands of 'the party of oppressors' since the Revolution of Loja (when Saavedra had nearly lost his life), begged the Junta Revolucionaria in Granada to send a force of 'Nacionales' without which 'no-one will be able to pronounce in this town where everyone has proclaimed that we should have Liberty, the Saintly cause that can release the Nation from the heavy irons with which the tyrants oppress it'.⁴⁴ Yet the 'party of oppressors' triumphed in Agrón. On 19 October Antonio Muñoz Giménez, now president of the *junta revolucionaria*, secured the election of a Council composed almost entirely of members of his own family.⁴⁵

Throughout October, Progresistas and Democrats consolidated their hold over Loja laying the foundations for the order and stability that would characterise Loja during the Sexenio, in contrast to the violence and divisions experienced in Antequera and other Andalusian cities. On 2 October, Loja's postal officials were replaced by men of 'liberal antecedents, probity and good conduct': Sergio Quintana Calle as administrator, Miguel Calvo Rosales as supervisor and Fermín Pazeti Maroto and Juan María Cerrillo Barranco as distributors of the mail.⁴⁶ That such seemingly banal offices should be given to such long-standing and patrician members of Loja's Democrat Committee is a measure of the strategic importance of the telegraph and postal service. Even the municipal bandmaster, appointed by Narváez in 1863 to train 40 orphaned boys housed in the Asilo de San Ramón, was relieved of his post and replaced by José Gómez Fernández (who retained the post until 1894).⁴⁷ Meanwhile, Lic. Francisco Pascual Navarro was appointed to the *Juzgado de 1a Instancia*, 'a good liberal of the glorious *pronunciamento* of Cádiz', who had participated in the first revolutionary assembly on 28 September when 'he was one of the assistants who helped the Democrat and *progresista* Committee to keep order'.⁴⁸

Excitement in Loja would have increased on 4 October with the arrival of news that long-absent Democrat leader, Rafael Pérez del Alamo, was approaching from Antequera at head of 700 Seville volunteers. After declining a promotion to Colonel from Prim following the battle of Alcolea, Pérez had been sent to keep order in various cities including Carmona and Antequera.⁴⁹ His motives for marching east to Loja are not clear, although after seven years of exile from his native city he must have been curious to observe his compatriots enjoying the freedoms for which he had fought in July 1861.

Leaving his troops on the edge of the town the blacksmith rode to the Council building to request lodging and supplies for 700 men and 30 officers, to which the junta acceded, inviting the Seville volunteers to parade in the main square to the accompaniment of the municipal band.⁵⁰ The troops were then lodged in the Convent of La Victoria, still occupied by Bishop Benigno Carrión.⁵¹ Equipped with new *alpargatas* Pérez and his volunteers returned via Antequera to Seville where he remained in command of city's 'Volunteers of Liberty' until they were disbanded on 26 December (along with those of Jérez).⁵² Before disbandment Pérez convened a parade of 'eighteen to twenty thousand Democrats', formed into 50 squads, to commemorate the 'martyrs of Utrera' shot in Seville in 1857 on Narváez's orders. The French consul reported that portraits of the martyrs were carried through the city by members of the association of weavers 'amidst a most solemn silence'.⁵³ Pérez remained a leading figure in Seville's Federal Republican party throughout the Sexenio, his economic situation improving noticeably in 1869 after obtaining 20,000 escudos extracted from Carlos Marfori to compensate for the fines and judicial persecution suffered in 1862.⁵⁴

Meanwhile Ceballos and Ortega, leaders of Loja's junta, visited Granada where they were greeted by an enthusiastic welcome and given weapons to equip the city's 'milicia ciudadana'.⁵⁵ Throughout October and early November, elections for officers were held and all *lojeños* of between 22 and 50 were enlisted.⁵⁶ The Council's request for 4,000 carbines suggests a more ambitious militia than during the Bienio.⁵⁷ This was a tense time in Loja. In late October 'some individuals who do not enjoy the best reputations in the city' galloped and attempted to trample Alcalde Ramón García Fregenal, Alderman Antonio Paceti and the Council secretary. On 5 November a serious disturbance occurred in the prison.⁵⁸ Enlistment extended beyond the city to include the *partido* of Río Frío where a 'milicia ciudadana' was organised and officers elected on 8 November. A commission comprising Loja's mayor, aldermen and captain of the first company (Anastasio Ortega) was also sent to Loja's dependency of Zagra to supervise the enlistment and election of officers for Zagra's company of 269 men.⁵⁹

On 7 January, just as Loja's 'milicia ciudadana' was reaching full strength, an order arrived from the Captain General to disband in emulation of Granada's Militia which when depositing its weapons had 'demonstrated a gentleness and sensitivity worthy of the highest praise'.⁶⁰ Repeated on 28 January, Loja's Council disregarded the order.⁶¹ In late February, Loja's 'Battalion of Volunteers of Liberty' was reported still to be holding its regular Sunday parades.⁶² In March the Battalion was reported to be supporting the Civil Guard in the pursuit of 'suspicious people' in the countryside.⁶³ In April, Loja's 'Señores Oficiales y Voluntarios de la Libertad' participated in the Holy Week processions along with 'confraternities, brotherhoods, *sacramentales*, and other bodies'.⁶⁴ In May and June the Council intensified efforts

to fully equip the Battalion.⁶⁵ On 1 July, in the presence of *lojeño* Civil Governor José Castellón, 'the Council, the Chiefs and Officers of the Volunteers of Liberty and other Employees' ceremoniously swore in the new constitution. The Battalion was still at full force in October when Republicans staged a national uprising.⁶⁶ Although Loja's officers and men pledged loyalty to the government, this was not sufficient to prevent disbandment on 10 October.

Loja's success in keeping a citizens' militia at full strength for a full year after militias were disbanded elsewhere is a measure of the effectiveness of the city's revolutionary junta in restoring order so promptly in September 1868, the moderation of Loja's Council elected by universal suffrage, and the strategic value to Civil Governor Castellón of having a strong militia on the province's western flank.⁶⁷

Along with the disbandment of the militia, Loja's Council was also dismissed in October 1869 for containing members with declared Republican sympathies, and replaced by the *progresista* Council dismissed in July 1856 under Francisco Rosal y Badía.⁶⁸ This purge of Democrats was quite cosmetic. Eleven *alcaldes del barrio*, among them Cristino Pérez del Alamo, submitted their resignations in October on grounds that they were in 'complete agreement with the Republican opinions of the Municipal Corporation the renunciation of which has been accepted by the Exmo Sr. Captain General of this Province'. Yet the Council voted (8 to 4) not to accept the resignations 'in view of the unimpeachable antecedents of the said *alcaldes del barrio*, such worthy Citizens, such proven defenders of order, and the exactitude, probity and wisdom in which they have carried out their offices'.

The survival of this Democrat-Progressista consensus in Loja owed much to the organisation and discipline of the city's Democrats over a decade of repression. Since 1864 'Individualists' had prevailed over 'Socialists' on the Democrat Committee and Loja lacked the rowdy and at times violent fringe of Republicanism which the authorities could always cite in Antequera to justify repression. This moderation was demonstrated by the way the revolutionary junta dealt with portraits of the monarchs and the Duke of Valencia removed from the Council building on 28 September. Narváez's portrait was returned to his closest of kin, Queen Isabel was painted over with a coat of arms and the portraits of the princes were kept for possible future use.⁶⁹

Apart from the reenlistment of the militia and the return of the Council to Democrats and Progresistas, what else changed in Loja as a result of the September Revolution? On 8 October 1868 the *junta revolucionaria* reclaimed the Convent of La Victoria from the Bishop Benigno Carrión establishing in place of the missionary training college an 'Academy of Drawing and a School for Adults' with an emphasis on practical vocational education.⁷⁰ Cristino Pérez del Alamo and leading Democrat Valentín Cerezo were commissioned to launch

a class of preparatory line drawing for the arts and mechanical crafts, another for the perfection of arithmetic and elements of geography and another for useful and educational reading... to ensure that more and more sons of this noble town reach the path of wisdom, order and morality which instinctively has placed the most enlightenment people at the summit of nations.⁷¹

Two days later, the junta ordered the closure of the 'Society of Ladies of St Vincent of Paul' and the 'Society of Gentlemen' of the same order who had been operating a primary school in the Convent of San Francisco, establishing a 'Free School for Young Girls' there instead. Another girls' school operated by the nuns was closed and reopened under different direction in the Council's ex-convent of La Victoria.⁷² On 21 October the Council opened an infants' school in the same building with a budget of 12,000 reales.⁷³

With its legal obligation to provide primary schooling, still unavailable for most children in Loja, the Council's could not secularise everything. On 15 November 'concerned by the abandonment in which the Barrio of San Francisco has remained until today with regard to the education of youth', the Council invited the Sisters of Mercy to open a boys' school in the barrio alongside the girls' school which they already operated, to be funded by a private donation of 293 escudos from Damian Roldán Comino (whose boys' elementary school had been ordered to be closed three weeks earlier).⁷⁴ Yet the junta was alert to the political dangers of allowing too much of the Catholic revival to stay in place. On 14 October the Junta abolished a brotherhood known as 'La Santa Infancia' and confiscated its funds and archives, informing parish priests of their action.⁷⁵

On 2 December an inauguration ceremony was held in the Convent of La Victoria for 'Academies and free schools... where one day enlightened men, honourable citizens, distinguished artists will graduate', attended by the full Council, the *Juzgado de 1a Instancia*, the *procurador fiscal*, Chief of the Civil Guard, the archpriest and all of Loja's parish priests, railway engineers, doctors, telegraph operators and school teachers. The Council's moderation and conciliatory attitude towards the Church was demonstrated by the choice of archpriest Juan Nepomuceno Negri for the principal oration. President of the Council, Mariano Ceballos y Henríquez, who had established the reading room in the same building during the Bienio, and Juan López de Cózar, also gave speeches.⁷⁶

Loja's 'Academies and free schools' were part of the broader movement of *Libre enseñanza* throughout Spain following the September Revolution. After relinquishing his command of the Volunteers of Liberty late in 1868, Pérez de Alamo taught veterinary practice in a new veterinary school established in Seville in 1869, becoming Director of the establishment during the First Republic. Libelled by Marfori for the humbleness of his occupation, the courses Pérez taught at the college – General Anatomy, Descriptive Anatomy,

The Exterior of the Horse, Physiology, Veterinary Hygiene, Operations and Dressings, Veterinary Mercantile Law, Chemical Pathology, Obstetrics and Legal Medicine – confirm that Pérez del Alamo was more of a veterinarian, even a doctor, than a blacksmith. By February 1874, 116 pupils had matriculated from Seville's Free Veterinary School and 723 had been examined in various disciplines. The school was closed following the Sexenio when the teaching of veterinary sciences was concentrated at Córdoba.⁷⁷

What other changes did the Revolution of 1868 bring to Loja? The political restoration of Loja's Democrats and Progresistas encouraged the settling of old scores. On 21 October, Francisco M. Osa and José Ezequiel Ruiz Mata, Bienio *progresista* councillors who had lost their wealth and property as a result of the lawsuit orchestrated by Narváez in 1857, petitioned for the return of their estates and the compensation for the 18,798 escudos they had been forced to repay to Loja's *pósito*. The Junta in Granada agreed a full indemnification, current owners of the confiscated properties to be reimbursed at the original auction prices.⁷⁸

The September Revolution raised agrarian expectations that had been behind the Loja Revolution in 1861. Desperate for revenue, the provincial government pressed Loja throughout 1869 to complete the *desamortización*, the Council always resisting, declaring all of its *propios* to have been sold leaving only common land use 'since time immemorial' for pasturage.⁷⁹ Yet the boundaries between Loja's commons and privatised former municipal *propios* remained unclear and the Council received several complaints in November 1868 from farmers and shepherds that their access to commons was being obstructed. One involved the notorious case of the disputed boundaries of land claimed by Francisco García Iturriaga in the Sierra of Hacho Alto y Sierrasuela de Agicampe that had caused so much conflict on the eve of the Loja Revolution. In November 1868 three shepherds, who had petitioned Narváez on his deathbed, requested a survey and the marking of boundaries in this disputed *sierrezuela*. Another petition on behalf of the 'wandering goatherds of Loja' urged the Council to survey the boundary between the city's commons and a *cortijo* belonging to a Juan Collado Mendoza.⁸⁰

The Council knew that a complete survey of boundaries throughout its vast and rugged, 731 square mile jurisdiction was beyond its capacity, quite apart from the likelihood of this reopening dormant or still festering disputes. It chose therefore to continue its policy of balancing different local interests. Hence, rather than reinstate the expensive and unpopular Rural Guard established by Narváez, landowners were permitted to appoint their own guards on condition that their duties were confined exclusively to guarding their own properties, not to policing the commons. Meanwhile, owners of *cortijos* were explicitly forbidden from cultivating disputed land while *rozeros* were permitted to occupy vacant land in the interest of avoiding unemployment and 'public calamity'.⁸¹

There was little the September Revolution could do about the meteorological cycle. In March and April 1869 the slack period in the agricultural calendar coincided with a prolonged drought, mounting employment and dearth, reaching 'calamity' point at the end of April with *jornaleros* and artisans demonstrating noisily in front of the Council building.⁸² In the time-honoured fashion the Council declared an *alojamiento* billeting *jornaleros* on private *cortijos*, employing them on public works, raising a loan to pay their wages requesting help from the civil governor with repairing earlier flood damage.⁸³

The only distinctively 'agrarian' action during the Sexenio came on 17 September 1869 on the eve of the Republican uprising. Seven hundred 'individuals of the poorest classes representing the most needy' petitioned the Council for title to plots that had been illegally enclosed by private landowners from the city's commons, proposing 'a survey of all the titles of estates bordering the common and waste land of the city, and, by measuring this land, plots will found for those who own no property among those that do'. This land would then be

sold to *jornaleros* as national property, paid for over ten years, providing property to those who lack it and saving them from having to seek *alojamiento* however hard the times, for with this guarantee credit will be available, along with a source of comfort if not wealth, while the State will be able to take its tithe as well as the territorial tax.

The Council agreed to convene interested parties 'to mark out in detail the land on which these intrusions exist with a view to resolving the differences'.⁸⁴

It is not known whether the Council proceeded with a survey of land bordering its commons or made over unclaimed land to *jornaleros*. Frequent complaints from landowners of illicit cultivation on land they claimed to own (or to enjoy rights of access to), particularly crop planting by squatters on the sheep runs above the city that obstructed the movement of livestock, show that there was a continuing process of informal land occupation for agricultural purposes, with *rozeros* taking advantage of the city's large expanse of common land and the uncertain and disputed boundaries of many private estates.⁸⁵ It is unlikely that the Council carried out a detailed survey of boundaries given the vastness of Loja's municipal territory. A survey for purpose of selling off excess lands to *jornaleros*, apart from revealing a general tendency for estates to exceed their legally titled boundaries, would have resulted in a collision between the landed interests upon which the Council depended for its revenue and the citizen-*jornaleros* who were represented in the petition.

A much less problematic course for the Council was simply to reaffirm common rights of access to Loja's mountains and commons. This had the merit of not offending powerful landed interests while showing some good

will to the landless. In November 1869 the Council reaffirmed the exemption of the Sierras around Loja from the *desamortización* and ordered a cessation of the auctioning of grazing rights 'given that these sierras are conceded to the commons of the *vecinos* of Loja'.⁸⁶ Hence, the September Revolution brought no 'reparto' and Loja retained its large population of landless *jornaleros* for whom the Council was obliged to supervise *alojamiento* until well into the 1880s, when emigration began to relieve pressure upon the city's resources.⁸⁷

Alhama, 1868–1871

Democrat control of the Revolution in Alhama was short lived compared to Loja where a Republican Council survived for a full year following the September Revolution. With the formation of a provisional government in Madrid under General Serrano on 8 October, provincial juntas were ordered to dissolve and hand authority back to civil administrations and municipal governments, much to the disgust of Democrats who had proposed a central junta in Madrid composed of representatives of provincial and local juntas.⁸⁸ On 10 October, Luis Dávila, Liberal Unionist President of Granada's Junta Provincial, ordered all juntas in the province to resign their powers, once they had nominated municipal councils.

On 14 October, Alhama's Junta named a new Council under Eduardo Montes.⁸⁹ The absence of Democrat Manuel Rodríguez (a) El Americano, and Francisco Guerrero (a) Vereda's allegation of improprieties in the nominating procedure, show that radicals were sidelined in Alhama much as in Madrid.⁹⁰ One of the new Council's first acts was to reinstate the Rural Guard, the first victim of the Revolution, as a counterpoise to Francisco Guerrero's company of National Militia (which had still received no weapons or uniforms from Granada, as in the *Bienio Progresista*!).⁹¹

In spite of the exclusion of Democrat firebrands, the Council nevertheless began to implement some of the Revolution's agenda. On 3 November excise taxes were abolished and replaced by a progressive income tax with the male population assessed according to 'Superior', 'Medium' and 'Inferior Fortune'.⁹² On 25 October, after a 'long and heated discussion' the Council resolved to disband the recently reconstituted municipal rural guard.⁹³ On the next day a commission was appointed to revise the muster lists in preparation for arming the '*milicia ciudadana*'.⁹⁴ This was too much for the demobilised rural guards who rioted on the night of 31 October and into the following day, firing shots and generally alarming the city. Only the timely intervention of Eduardo Montes, who organised voluntary patrols, prevented a more serious disturbance. As was evident during the *Bienio*, a '*milicia ciudadana*' answerable to a *progresista* or Democrat Council was seen by the landed elite more as threat than a guarantee of social order, given the greater gulf in Alhama between landed families and the mass of *jornaleros*, and the smallness of the middle class.

Any advantage gained by Francisco Guerrero's 'milicia ciudadana' from the disbandment of the rural guard was short lived. Although Republicans triumphed in municipal elections in Granada in late December, militias were disbanded throughout the province in early January.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, Democrats did well in Alhama in the Council election, with Manuel Rodríguez, leader of the September *junta*, returned as alderman under Montes as mayor. Hence Republicanism entered Alhama's associational life and, throughout 1869, a 'Republican Committee' met each Thursday and Sunday in the theatre (much to the annoyance of the elite's 'Junta Literaria Recreativa de Alhama' which had requested permission to use the theatre for its 'scientific and declamatory work' on the same days).⁹⁶

Apart from abolishing the hated *consumes*, Montes's Council attempted to introduce a more socially equitable *Quinta*, chastened perhaps by anti-draft riots in Jérez on 16 March that resulted in over 300 casualties, with 600 sent to *presidios* in Ceuta.⁹⁷ Observing 'the repugnance felt towards the *quintas*, and the lack of resources of the poor in being able to redeem those of theirs who are chosen for service', the Council resolved to organise a public subscription to redeem the city's poor from the draft, while allowing its wealthier citizens the freedom to take whatever action they considered convenient for exempting their own relatives. The public subscription proved inadequate to fund the redemption of the 12 *alhameños* selected for the *quinta* and the decision to use public funds to buy the poor out of military service was annulled.⁹⁸ By April the Council was facing more urgent demands from 'crowds of unemployed *jornaleros*' to which it responded by declaring *alojamiento* of 'those who are found without resources' on the estates and in the houses of the 'well-to-do class of this city' until the weather improved.⁹⁹

Apart from attending to the material needs of Alhama's unemployed the Council respected Catholic rituals and sought improvements in pastoral care. In March, Montes accepted an invitation from the Confraternity of the *Virgen de las Angustias* to participate in a procession in honour of Her Lady. On the same day he urged the Archbishop to send a priest to replace the one that had fled the city on 28 September, reminding the prelate that

the City of Alhama is eminently Catholic and resents extremely seeing the municipality in such punishable abandonment, most especially during the sacred time of Lent, during which time the *Ayuntamiento* should be redoubling the efforts of the Lord's ministry; for if this is not done with the zeal and constancy that is to be expected from a parish priest, if public behaviour degenerates and the good religious principles which this population so boasts are bastardised, he (the priest) will be to blame for the failure to fulfil his obligations.¹⁰⁰

If the *progresista*/Republican Council appreciated the utility of a pastorally active clergy, it also recognised the importance of continuing to protect and enhance Alhama's historic claims over its commons and to respond to claims of illegal enclosures and obstruction to common access. In January 1869 the Council received a petition from 'various *vecinos*' requesting reestablishment of 'common use of various sites in the municipal territory that today are considered private properties'. While admitting the difficulty of proceeding on this matter, both for lack of information and 'because the private interests which the Council is obliged to respect and protect might be prejudiced and resentful', the Council, nevertheless, was prepared to brook such resentment in order to placate popular resentment of what many considered to be illicitly expanded holdings at the expense of Alhama's commons. Hence, a commission was established to 'enlighten and clarify the popular rights of this city'.¹⁰¹

In contrast to the agrarian situation in Loja where private estates, however illegally enlarged, were still quite small, Alhama had witnessed during the first half of the nineteenth century the consolidation of several very extensive estates from former *señorios* and *mayorazgos*. Throughout 1869 a Council commission examined the boundaries and common access to grazing land on the estates of several of the wealthiest landowners. In March a survey was ordered of the boundaries of the estates of Alhama's greatest landowner, Francisco Rojas, resident of Antequera and relative of Narváez, in the belief that much of the grazing on the land enclosed should be available for public use.¹⁰² In September the Council responded to a petition protesting 'the abuse and malicious arbitrariness committed by D. Juan Luis Trescastro during the last year in which he was mayor (1868) enclosing and taking possession of a road that leads from the *ejido* to the crossroads at Los Remedios, next to his property', thereby blocking access to the city's common grazing. The Council ordered Trescastro, an important beneficiary of the ecclesiastical disentailment during the late 1830s and early 1840s, and Alhama's ninth wealthiest landowner in 1860, to vacate the land within eight days.¹⁰³ In September 1869 the Council ordered José Toledo y Muñoz, Alhama's second wealthiest landowner, who, like Francisco Rojas, lived away from Alhama in Granada, to paint within eight days the wall of his house – named 'El Castillo' – which still faces the main park.¹⁰⁴

While these incidents illustrate Council's willingness to take on the rich, most of the actions relating to commons involved backing the city's influential 'Junta de Ganadería' in protecting the city's extensive commons from encroachment by small farmers.¹⁰⁵ Throughout 1869 and the early 1870s the Council successfully resisted pressures from Madrid to auction its commons.¹⁰⁶ Alhama also sustained its historic struggle to collect rents from and resist encroachment by Zafarraya's agriculturalists, resulting in several violent incidents.¹⁰⁷ The Council also successfully blocked claims by graziers from Alfarnate on the Sierra de Loja.¹⁰⁸

The dismissal of the Republican Council following the Republican national uprising in October 1869, and the restoration of the *progresista* Council of 1856, brought no change in the city's determination to reassert fiscal control over and to protect and expand the boundaries of its commons.¹⁰⁹ However, the return of Progresistas returned the city to more patrician ways and left Republicans somewhat stranded. The theatre returned to become a centre of liberal patrician sociability. In October 1869 the 'Sociedad de Amigos del País', which in 1842 had funded the construction of the theatre and adjoining 'casino', was resurrected.¹¹⁰ Meanwhile the new Council closed the 'tertulia republicana' in the same theatre on grounds that 'it had become impossible to use the building for any other purpose'. The liquor store established by Manuel Hinojosa in the theatre, a magnet for Republican sociability, was also closed.¹¹¹

The First Republic and the Restoration in Loja

Although men from Iznájar and Alhama joined the Republican uprising in October 1869, Loja's Democrats, as we have seen, peacefully ceded ground to Progresistas rather than take to rebellion. Defending himself against accusations of cowardice for not joining the uprising, Pérez del Alamo explained his decision on three grounds: the majority of Republicans in the Cortes was opposed to rebellion, Emilio Castelar had advised him personally against joining the rebellion and Republicans in Seville were disorganised and poorly armed.¹¹² By 1872 Pérez's idealism was tempered by realism. The First International was drawing working-class support from the Republican parties. Calling for 'fraternal' collaboration with the 'Internationalists', Pérez, now a Federal Republican, presenting his party as

... eminently practical; the utopia of today and the reality of tomorrow is the International. Internationalists! Don't be suicidal: don't kill the present in order to close off the future or, at least, to retard it. Remember that the mission of the human being is to be a man; as a famous German philosopher has said with profound feeling: neither God, nor beast. We wish to achieve what our ardent southern brains imagine, and this is our downfall: let us be practical and we will be like the North American, not bewildered visionaries like the French. Let us esteem men of government more than orators, and don't let us be fascinated by rhetorical marvels, but by acts conducive to the happiness of the *patria*.¹¹³

Pérez's moderation and diplomatic skills would have been tested in Loja during the First Republic. With the declaration of the Republic on 11 February 1873 familiar names returned to the Ayuntamiento: José María Corrales, Anastasio Ortega Palacios, Manuel González García, Isidro Fregenal Jiménez, José María Cantano, Rafael Ruiz Mata, Francisco de Paula Cerrillo Barranco,

all members of the Democrat Committee during the 1860s.¹¹⁴ The hated *consumos* were once more abolished. Three thousand rations of bread were distributed among the poor. The Battalion of National Militia was re-enlisted and a commission was sent to Granada to request armament. Meanwhile order was maintained by a force of 30 '*vecinos* known for their liberal convictions' which the Council invested with authority over all public and private rural guards within the jurisdiction with the right to 'arm the people' in case 'enemies of the Republic came to employ force'. A Carlist uprising at Salar on 10 March reminded the municipal authorities of the political danger of leaving this town un-policed. On 7 April, Loja's 'Battalion of Republican Volunteers' at last received 200 rifles from the Ministry of War.

The hectic changes in national government during June and July 1873 were reflected in Loja in three different Councils culminating on 5 July in the declaration of an independent '*cantón*' which would last just over a month.¹¹⁵ Loja's *cantón* was distinct from its counterpart in Granada where radical elements in the militia took control of the city from the start, deposing the civil governor and ruling through a 'committee of public safety'.¹¹⁶ Declaring an independent *cantón* enabled Loja's moderate Republican Council to keep its distance from Granada's more radical canton and to resist the provincial capital's attempt to establish authority over the entire province (Baza established an independent *cantón* for the same reason).

Loja's pragmatic cantonalism was dramatised on 23 July when the city offered only lukewarm reception to two battalions of Republican volunteers marching from Granada to confront General Pavía's army sent from Madrid to suppress cantonalist uprisings throughout Andalucía. In contrast to the welcome offered to the chain of *granadino* prisoners that passed through Loja in September 1867, the city was slow to provide food, clothing and lodging and there was no offer of support from the city's Battalion of Volunteers. Dispirited, Granada's dejected volunteers returned by train to the provincial capital on 24 July.¹¹⁷ General Pavía's column entered Loja on 10 August without resistance. Two days later Granada fell without loss of blood. So relieved was Pavía at not having to face resistance from a city with such a belligerent reputation that he was moved to praise Loja's 'patriotism', along with that of Utrera, another city with a reputation for Republican insurrection (in 1857).¹¹⁸

Such praise from the architect of the Bourbon restoration would have embarrassed Loja's Republican Council and caused Pérez del Alamo to blush. But what was the alternative? Loja's *progresista* Council during the Bienio and Republican Council during the Sexenio had prevented external intervention, from Granada or from Madrid, by cultivating a reputation for moderation and maintaining order. Pérez's Revolution in July 1861 followed the same principles. Joining forces with Granada's radical militias to take on General Pavía was altogether too risky at a time when Loja was experiencing deepening political divisions, both among Republicans and as a consequence of

the growth of support for the Socialist International among Loja's workers, whom Democrats had claimed to represent since the 1850s.

As early as 1870, Loja contained a 'federation' of the International Association of Workers. Madrid propagandist Anselmo Lorenzo visited Loja in March 1872, describing 'the small number of comrades' that he met as 'oscillating between Socialism and Politics'.¹¹⁹ From a nucleus of 100 affiliates in July 1872, Loja's federation grew to 300 by the declaration of the Republic, second only to Granada's 490 (Alhama established its own local federation in 1873). The first act of the new Republican Council in February 1873 was to expel 108 Internationals from the city, persecution that intensified during the *cantón* in July.¹²⁰

With the Bourbon restoration in January 1875, Loja's Council and Cortes representation became the domain of Conservative-Liberals and Dynastic-Liberals, former Moderados with names such as Campos y Varona, Narváez, Cardenete and Fernández de Córdoba. In April 1883 Carlos Marfori, now Marquis of Loja, returned to represent the city in the Cortes, becoming for many years Loja's 'only candidate', much like Francisco Romero Robledo in Antequera. In opposition, Republicans remained as divided as they had been at the end of the Sexenio. In June 1881 the 'Progressive Democrat' Committee presided over by Santiago Ceballos Henríquez met in the Café de los Romeros (as Pérez's supporters had done on the eve of the Loja Revolution). In June 1882, Monarchical Democrats created a local committee under the presidency of Rafael Rico Torres. On 11 February 1886 the three Republican parties in Loja, 'Históricos' headed by Silverio Ruiz, 'Federalists' under José Cerillo Barranco, and 'Progresistas' under Santiago Ceballos, organised a demonstration to commemorate the anniversary of the First Republic. All three men had been involved in the Revolution of Loja in July 1861.

Loja's federation of the International Association of Workers initially grew under the Bourbons counting 956 members by 1881, 795 of whom were 'agriculturalists' (*jornaleros?*), divided into five sections.¹²¹ This was the peak in the development of the International in Loja. In the wake of the Mano Negra affair in 1883 the federation was dissolved by the mayor, Loja's workers returning to their accustomed clandestinity.¹²² During the 1900s Loja's workers and their representatives, in spite of being divided among Liberals, Republicans, Socialists, Anarcho-Sindicalists and Anarchists, still met together at the 'Centro Obrero', No. 1, Calle de la Caridad.¹²³ Ten years later Fernando de los Ríos described Loja's workers as 'very impressionable and very sentimental, this town follows the goldfinch (*jilguero*) that sings the best'.¹²⁴

If Loja's workers pragmatically shifted their political allegiances, the city as a whole by the 1880s was reported to have become 'ridiculously enslaved by spiritism', 'not only among the "pueblo" taking advantage of their ignorance and superstition, but among the more cultured and educated classes... (including)... a great part of the most illustrious families of Loja,

with names that evoke the *époque* of the Catholic Kings'.¹²⁵ In April 1883 Conservative Mayor, Ramón de Campos y Varona (nephew of Narváez), under pressure from Don Ezequiel Ruiz Mata (the Bienio counsellor who had reclaimed his confiscated properties in 1868), was obliged to allow the construction of a special precinct in the cemetery with a separate gate to accommodate those choosing to be buried without religious rites.

In the following year Ruiz Mata was among the first to be buried in Loja without Catholic rites. Setting off from Juan Morales Sementi's pharmacy (Loja's centre of Republican sociability since before the Loja Revolution), Ruiz Mata's funeral cortege was eventually dispersed by the authorities when one of the many speeches given in the new graveyard was judged to have attacked 'our religion'.¹²⁶ The Catholic revival faced an uphill struggle in Loja. Before arriving to conduct a *novena* in March 1896, Jesuit missionary Francisco de Paula Tarín was warned that Loja was a 'centre of impiety, spiritism and masonry, perhaps the most terrible in Spain'.¹²⁷

13

The Sexenio Revolucionario in Antequera: From Federal Republicanism to the Socialist International, 1868–1880

If Loja and Alhama experienced relatively ordered revolutions in September 1868 and politically untroubled Sexenios, Antequera underwent an intensification of the conflict that had marked the city's politics since the Bienio Progresista. This final chapter examines the attempt by the Aguilars to translate the influence they had gained over the city's working class through mutualist and *carbonari* societies into electoral strength under universal suffrage. Democrats (now Federal Republicans) behind Francisco Joaquín Aguilar triumphed in the Antequera's first elections by universal suffrage, for the *junta definitiva* on 12 October and for the Council on 18 December 1868. But in contrast to Loja, where Republicans controlled the Council and successfully resisted orders to disband the citizens' militia through until the autumn of 1869, Antequera's Republican Council was removed in a coup in January 1869. Francisco Joaquín Aguilar's Republican Council was blocked again in the summer of 1869 when it attempted to resume its mandate, driving many *antequeranos* into joining the national rebellion in October. Although his brother Manuel María Aguilar returned to lead the Council during the First Republic, the counter-revolution had effectively triumphed in Antequera within three months of the September Revolution.¹ The chapter explores the place of organised violence in the politics of Antequera during the Sexenio and concludes the study by charting the route taken by Antequera's working class from Federal Republicanism to the Socialist International during the early Bourbon restoration.

Centre of *malaqueño* conspiracy since the Bienio, bailiwick of the Aguilar family in whose Madrid residence the Democrat party had been founded in 1849, Antequera played a leading part in the September Revolution.² Following Izquierdo's *pronunciamiento* in Seville on 19 September, other coastal cities (Cartagena, Almería, Málaga, Alicante and Valencia) proclaimed on 20–21 September. Málaga's Junta Provincial chose José Antonio Aguilar as

its spokesman to travel by steamer to meet with Serrano, Prim and Topete at Cádiz. Francisco Joaquín Aguilar established the *junta revolucionaria* in Antequera on 22 September (the day of Granada's first failed attempt).³

Antequera's *jornada* coincided with a similar movement in Vélez ensuring that the Axarquía towns lying between the two cities, Casabermeja, Colmenar, Viñuela and Benamargosa, also joined the revolutionary movement at this early stage (Loja and Alhama only proclaimed on 28 July).⁴ Archidona followed suit, the revolution there (as in Seville and Córdoba) headed by a doctor-surgeon, José Luciano Miranda Almohalla, who joined José Antonio Aguilar as Archidona's representative on the Junta provincial in Málaga.⁵ His brother, Luis Miranda Almohalla, lawyer and Archidona's leading Democrat in 1861, was appointed as the city's Registrar of Property, charged with mediating unresolved agrarian disputes arising from the *desarmortización*.⁶ Within three days, the extensive archipelago of towns that the Aguilars had planned to raise in revolt in July 1861 had come under the control of revolutionary juntas.

Coming after months of hunger and social unrest resulting in numerous deportations to *presidios*, the September Revolution in Antequera shared the radicalism of Seville's movement. Because of its central location in Andalucía and the progressive reputation of the Aguilars, Antequera was seen in the wider region as a bulwark against reaction and repression. On 6 October citizens of Casariche (Seville) begged Antequera's *Junta Revolucionaria* to free them from their tyrannical cacique and mayor, 'one opposed to the liberal party over twenty three years'.⁷

The district of Antequera experienced substantial disorder on 22 September.⁸ Francisco Joaquín Aguilar, president of the *junta revolucionaria*, later admitted that 'the sufferings caused to all classes of society, and especially to the poor during the despotic government of Doña Isabel de Borbón, was bound to bring an explosion difficult to contain'.⁹ In January 1869, Aguilar's opponents remembered the night of the *pronunciamiento* as one of terror, claiming that 23 houses in Antequera and the surrounding district were entered on 22 September by armed men in search of weapons. Only one soldier lost his life. However, the attack on the house of outgoing mayor, Ildefonso de Arses Rojas, cousin of Narváez, wealthy landowner and beneficiary of the *desamortización*, resembled the attempt by a 'Garibaldino' on the life of José María del Pino in May 1862, then the city's richest man, a reminder of the violent fringe of *antequerano* Democracy.¹⁰ The September Revolution also reopened long-standing local agrarian struggles such as Valle de Abdalajís where, immediately upon learning of the *pronunciamiento*, cultivators occupied land contested since the civil *desamortización* in 1855, a pattern evident in Colmenar and throughout the Axarquía.¹¹

On 3 October renewed violence accompanied news of Isabel's abdication, Serrano's entry to Madrid and the Democrat victory in the provincial elections in Málaga. Private households and public buildings associated with

political oppression were targeted by crowds.¹² To restore order Aguilar appointed Pedro Bernal, leader in 1861 of the weavers affiliated to the Garibaldino Society, as head of the night watch on a salary of 219 escudos.¹³ Reports of ‘injuries and some deaths’ in Antequera prompted the despatch of Rafael Pérez del Alamo, now grandiosely named ‘Jefe Superior de las Fuerzas Populares para la Defensa de la Libertad y el Orden’, at the head of 700 Seville volunteers to maintain order.¹⁴ During his two short spells in Antequera in early October (before and after his return to Loja) Pérez del Alamo’s forces received generous forage from Antequera’s *junta revolucionaria*.¹⁵

Violence returned in mid-October in the lead up to the election, by universal suffrage, of a *junta definitiva* to replace the *junta provisional*. On the morning of 9 October an attempt was made on the life of vice-presidential candidate Antonio de la Cámara Aguilar whose band of volunteers had liberated Villanueva del Rosario on 22 September.¹⁶ Francisco Joaquín Aguilar immediately ordered all armed citizens to assemble at the Council house and to form patrols under the authority of the city’s *alcaldes del barrio* adding that ‘those forces or persons who do not form up into patrols will be considered opposed to the actual situation and disarmed’.¹⁷ Elections, violence and the possession of arms were becoming increasingly intertwined. The election of a Republican *junta definitiva* on 12 October consolidated Aguilar’s control of Antequera: Manuel María and Francisco Joaquín received 1,321 and 1,333 votes respectively as Honorary President and President; José González Berdún and the recently wounded Antonio de la Cámara Aguilar received 859 and 473 votes as Vice-Presidents. Veterans of the Bienio Progresista, all four had been imprisoned in 1861 on suspicion of involvement in the Loja Revolution.¹⁸

The Aguilars’ success in Antequera echoed Democrat victories in elections for provincial *juntas definitivas* in Seville and Málaga. Only 20 of Spain’s 49 provincial juntas held elections for *juntas definitivas*. Of these only Seville and Málaga registered a substantial shift to Democrat majorities. The other 18 juntas saw no change in their original political composition which had reflected the revolutionary coalition (Progresista and Unionist), except Teruel and Tarragona whose original Democrat majorities were confirmed.¹⁹ Temporarily buoyed by Democrat success in the provincial capital, Francisco Joaquín Aguilar would eventually succumb to Madrid’s campaign to curtail Andalusian Republicanism in late December and early January 1869. In the mean time the *Junta Revolucionaria* tightened security in the wider district.

Aguilar appreciated that Republican control of Antequera required the effective policing of the *vega* and subject towns of Mollina, Humilladero, Alameda and Fuente de Piedra, policed before the September Revolution by the Civil Guard, private estate guards, a periodic cantonment of regular military and the *resguardo* of the salt works at Fuente de Piedra. As at Loja, the *junta revolucionaria*’s first move was to take control of the *resguardo de sal* (Salt Guard) which on 26 September Aguilar placed under the command of

Eleuterio Granados Luque whose flying column swiftly took control of the district.²⁰

Following the conversion of the *junta revolucionaria* into the municipal Council on 20 October, and the resumption of full authority by the provincial administration and the Ministry of Government, Aguilar's military authority was reduced to a citizens' militia (which was small and never regularised, unlike Loja's *milicia ciudadana*) and the Council's *vigilancia*. Granados Luque's Salt Guard, under the command of the new Civil Governor, Carlos Massa Sanguinetti, sent by Madrid to tame the revolution in Málaga, now posed a direct challenge to Aguilar's authority. As a counterpoise, Aguilar expanded Pedro Bernal's night watch into a new force to be called the 'Guardias de la Ley' recruited from army veterans who had taken an active part in the 'revolutionary movement' and from citizens who had 'put themselves at the head of the popular forces'.²¹ After Aguilar's removal from the mayorship in January 1869, the 'Guardias de la Ley', suitably purged, would contribute to the consolidation of his conservative rival Antonio Granados Espinosa in power.

Beyond matters of security, Aguilar's *junta revolucionaria* also addressed Antequera's long-standing deficit in secondary education. On 29 October the 'Luis Gonzaga', fee paying religious secondary school, established by the cleric Manuel María Arjona since 1864, was closed, leaving its 27 students to find private tutors. A month later a new secondary school founded on Krausist principles of 'Libre Enseñanza' was launched by Juan Quirós de los Ríos with Council backing, 'offering classes for adults in linear drawing, design and decoration so necessary for all the productive classes, especially for the worker and the artisan'. Children of the poor would be admitted free. The school enrolled 20 students, five of them from poor backgrounds, and operated for eight months before being closed on 1 July 1869, victim of the anti-Republican purge. Antequera lacked a secondary school between July 1869 and September 1870 when a priest who had taught in the 'Luis Gonzaga' before the Revolution received Council backing for a school run on similar lines. The involvement of a clergyman as director disqualified the school from achieving status as an 'Instituto de Libre Enseñanza' although it operated with Council backing on condition that at least eight children from poor families were admitted. The school survived with Council backing throughout the Sexenio, briefly acquiring an adult class during the First Republic.²²

Throughout November Málaga participated in the national upsurge in Republican propaganda following Nicolás Rivero's declaration for monarchy on 12 November, which ended the fragile consensus within the Democrat party and precipitated its division into two separate parties: Monarchical Democrats behind Rivero and Olózaga, who favoured remaining in the ruling coalition in spite of being excluded from Cabinet positions in the provisional government, and Federal Republicans behind Fernando Garrido

and Pi y Margall (when he returned from exile in February 1869), who sought to refashion the Spanish state from the bottom up. A more radical element turned at the end of 1868 to the Bakunist Socialist International. Enraged at Rivero's capitulation in favour of a monarchy, Federal Republicans proved the most energetic propagandists. Garrido, Castelar, Orense and Málaga's Romualdo Lafuente toured the country drawing large crowds.²³

Meanwhile conflict mounted between Málaga's Republican Council and governor Sanguinetti, whom Serrano had sent to Málaga with instructions to stop the demolition of convents, protect the Church and purge the militia of popular elements.²⁴ On 19 October, Sanguinetti ordered Granados Luque to march to Valle de Abdalajís to arrest those who had been threatening the 'comfortably off *vecinos*' since September.²⁵ Sanguinetti then appointed Antonio Caracueles to Antequera's *juzgado* to lead an enquiry into the disorders of 22 September and 3 October. Although Aguilar and municipal syndic Luis Talavera César refused to cooperate, and Caracueles was soon withdrawn following Sanguinetti's resignation on 25 November, over the next 10 months the disorders accompanying the September – supposedly 'Glorious' (non-violent) – Revolution became basis of the opposition's campaign against the Republican Council.²⁶

On 19 November moderate and radical Democrats in Málaga signed a Republican manifesto supported by the Ayuntamiento that precipitated Sanguinetti's resignation. Republican propaganda in Málaga now faced fewer constraints, with Garrido and Lafuente drawing enormous crowds in the provincial capital and in Alora (now reached easily by train from Málaga) in early December.²⁷ The more radical order was brought home to *antequeranos* on 18 November when Aguilar gave the monks of Madre de Dios 48 hours to vacate their convent, enforcing the demolition order of the *junta revolucionaria* of Málaga in mid-October but suspended by Sanguinetti.²⁸ Six days later 7,000 Republicans assembled in Antequera's bullring, matching the crowds of 40,000 in Barcelona and 30,000 in Madrid.²⁹ Republican leaders throughout Spain strove to maintain strict orderliness, acutely aware that the provisional government would use any sign of violence or disorder as a cue to repress Republican organisations, particularly the Volunteers of Liberty who had contributed to the early success of the Revolution in Andalucía.

Yet republican ascendancy in Antequera was accompanied by a wave crime and disorder throughout the district. Attacks on properties were reported in Valle de Abdalajís (19 October), Ollo de Alemanes (25 October), Mollina (9 November) and Villanueva del Rosario (11 November).³⁰ In response, many farmers, large and small, were granted permits to carry arms and allowed establish their own *partidas*.³¹ These failed to deter a wholesale invasion of private olive estates by gleaners and the illegal harvesting of crops and felling of trees planted on recently privatised commons.³² On 30 November Aguilar was obliged to call upon the Civil Guard for help.³³

That the theft of olives was no random affair is suggested by the case of José Rodríguez Barroso, prominent leader of the Garibaldino Society in 1861, detained on 13 December 1 on suspicion of the theft of 12 fanegas of olives deposited at the Molino de Martín, and of another 20 fanegas found at his home at the Molino de Santa Catalina, on grounds that he possessed a license that limited him to collecting only 6 fanegas.³⁴ The picture conveyed by such incidents is less one of the hungry poor clamouring for access to their former gleaning rights, more of entrepreneurs, such as Rodríguez Barroso, a man of proven Democrat political credentials who had used his oil mill for signing up affiliates to the Garibaldino secret society in 1861, receiving stolen goods and profiting from olives gleaned from private estates.

The arrest near Campillos of two *paisanos* from Antequera, José Padilla Vilches and Pedro Vilches Padilla, and two other men from Cuevas de San Marcos, armed with pistols and daggers, provides further evidence of the overlap between criminal connections, radical political affiliation and a keen eye for personal gain among those seeking to profit from the olive harvest. Aguilar confirmed that Padilla and Vilches, 'men of bad moral conduct', had already been tried and imprisoned for robbery, and showed 'little inclination to working at their occupations'.³⁵ Indeed in November 1862 José Padilla had been arrested 'carrying half a *fanega* of chestnuts' (gathered from the estate of Francisco Joaquín Aguilar's brother, José Antonio!) along with Francisco Vilches who had stolen olives from a neighbouring estate. Earlier in the year, both men had been cited as members of the Garibaldino Society.³⁶ Their different treatment at the hands of the law (Padilla was released and Vilches was charged) is explained by a recent municipal band that limited gleaning to those with permits, and only after the completion of the harvest. Custom still permitted the gathering of chestnuts on former commons, although licenses had to be sought.³⁷

However threatening and insecure Antequera's countryside may have been during November and December 1868, the incidents reported rarely concerned landownership. Valle de Abdalajís was the only conspicuous agrarian trouble spot, a reputation going back to the 1850s. More often the conflicts were tussles arising from different understanding over customary access, vagueness over boundaries of recently privatised municipal commons, and competition over the gleaning and marketing of valuable commodities, such as olives and chestnuts. Much as Aguilar's opponents liked to paint a picture of mounting disorder, Antequera's landowners were not facing social revolution during the winter of 1868.

Violence in Antequera in the lead up to the municipal elections in mid-December was more obviously politically motivated: on 6 December all 11 guards of Aguilar's night watch were needed to calm a riot, on 9 and 11 December troops stationed in the city were attacked and their regimental drum stolen, on 9 December Granados Luque was insulted and threatened, the commander of the Salt Guard cautioning Aguilar that in the future he

would be obliged to use force against his assailants, on 14 December the house of Manuel Ortiz Tallante (political ally of Aguilar with whom he had been incarcerated in Málaga in July 1861) was attacked and cash extorted.³⁸

Violence in Antequera accompanied mounting pressure from the provisional government on Republican strongholds in Andalucía, particularly Cádiz, Málaga, Jérez and Seville. Under the euphemism of 'reorganisation' of popular militias, Serrano used 'unrest relating to purely local questions' at Puerto de Santa María and San Fernando as a justification for disarming and demobilising Cádiz's Volunteers of Liberty, known for their Republican sympathies.³⁹ Buoyed by this success, Serrano then instructed General Caballero de Rodas to disarm and demobilise other Republican militias in Andalucía. After successfully disarming the militias of Seville (commanded by Pérez) and Jérez on 26 December 1868 with only slight disturbances, the General turned his attention to Málaga which since Sanguinetti's departure had become a magnet for radicals. A deputation of *malaqueño* Democrats travelled to Madrid to plead with the provisional government to withdraw its order to disarm the city's Volunteers of Liberty. But Republican triumphs throughout Spain in the municipal elections at the end of December hardened Serrano's resolve to confront this redoubt of Andalucian Republicanism. On 1 January 1869, Rodas engaged Málaga's Volunteers of Liberty commanded by Romualdo Lafuente. Málaga's militias fought bravely for three days against superior government forces, backed by a naval bombardment, losing 1,200 in dead and wounded before accepting defeat.⁴⁰ Only those pledging loyalty to the government were allowed to retain their arms while Federal Republicans were disarmed and their leaders, including Lafuente, sent into exile.⁴¹

Meanwhile Aguilar's Republican administration in Antequera came under increasing pressure. On 18 December, election day, the conflict between Aguilar and Granados Luque's Salt Guard came out into the open. Furious correspondence between Aguilar and the civil governor reveals a sustained campaign by Granados Luque to fan disorders that would justify annulling the results of elections which Aguilar was tipped to win. Aguilar was particularly concerned to prevent the city's Federal Republican activists, who had sustained the Garibaldino Society since the early 1860s, from falling into this trap. To this end he forbade arms from being carried in the city to prevent intimidation and coercion and ordered the arrest of Lorenzo Rojas Palomas, 'army deserter, jailbird and homicide' (whose brother had organised the strike of *jornaleros* in June 1861), who had been parading with a group of *confrères* calling 'vivas to the Federal Republic!'.⁴² Rojas escaped arrest with help from Granados Luque and together they continued the parade 'calling death to the Aguilers'.⁴³ The scenes continued on the second day of elections, Granados Luque again encouraging noisy demonstrations, 'shielded by the immunity which he claims (as commander of the Salt Guard) and with the

force that he has at his disposition'.⁴⁴ On 19 December the 'Milicia Popular' at Valle de Abdalajís came under attack from 'enemies of the public order'.⁴⁵ Granados Luque refused Aguilar's request to send a detachment of Salt Guard to protect Valle's beleaguered popular militia, which lacked arms, obliging Antequera's mayor to request help from Archidona's Civil Guard.⁴⁶ On 20 December, underlining the extent to which his authority had evaporated, Aguilar fulminated at the continued liberty of the Federal Republican hothead, Lorenzo Rojas Palomas, who could be observed 'signing inflammatory broadsheets'.⁴⁷

Aware that reporting the disorder accompanying the elections would play into the hands of his enemies, on 21 December Aguilar informed the civil governor that the municipal elections had been concluded 'in the greatest tranquillity'.⁴⁸ Confidentially, however, he wrote cataloguing Granados Luque's 'crusade against the Aguilar family under the Federal Republican flag', even allowing armed men to intimidate electoral colleges in several parts of the city.⁴⁹ It was these disorders, deliberately orchestrated by the force that was supposed to ensure order, that were invoked in January to justify the suspension of Aguilar's newly elected Republican Council.

Granados Luque's encouragement of the Federal Republican crowd during the election was not aimed at defeating Aguilar at the polls but at ensuring that there was enough evidence of electoral disruption committed by Federal Republican firebrands to be deployed against Aguilar after his victory. The violent demobilisation of Málaga's Volunteers of Liberty on 1–3 January signalled the start of a concerted assault upon Republicans throughout the province that would continue until the declaration of the First Republic in the summer of 1873.

On 4 January the provincial authorities suspended Aguilar's newly elected Council and replaced it with Monarchists and Moderados under Antonio Granados Espinosa as interim Alcalde.⁵⁰ A member of the *junta revolucionaria* and the popularly elected Council in October, Granados Espinosa had rallied Aguilar's opponents in the Council and contributed to the unrest and insecurity in Antequera during December.⁵¹ In an address to *antequeranos* on 9 January he justified the suspension of the Republican Council:

It was absolutely necessary that the alarm and disturbances cease and that order, without which liberty is impossible, return; is it necessary that disagreeable events are not repeated in this cultured and liberal city, and exaggerated doctrines are prevented from alarming the people, always simple and susceptible to being led astray, not comprehending the sinister intentions of what they are told, inculcating in them the idea that they are going to be deprived of the liberty and the rights that were conquered in the revolution of September.⁵²

Meanwhile Aguilar fled to Archidona where he received a tumultuous welcome organised by the Republican Committee. Fearing a disturbance during imminent elections which Republicans feared they would lose, the mayor of Archidona sent for help, prompting Aguilar's swift departure.⁵³

Throughout January and February, to ensure that Aguilar's Council was not reinstated, Granados served a series on writs and indictments on Aguilar and associates containing exaggerated accounts of excesses committed during the September Revolution, the December elections and following Aguilar's return to Antequera in February.⁵⁴ Aguilar would have been encouraged by the compact, albeit minority Federal Republican representation in the national Cortes to discuss the new constitution convened between 11 and 22 February 1869. Although Unionists and Progressives enjoyed a comfortable majority, Monarchical Democrats received a generous share of ministerial appointments with Rivero elected as President of the lower chamber. Among the 69 Federal Republican deputies was Fermín Salvoechea, recently released from a 12-year sentence for his part in the Cádiz uprising of the previous December. Federal Republicans were elected from Barcelona, Gerona, Valencia, Alicante, Zagarzo, Lérida, Huesca, Córdoba, Seville, Málaga, Murcia and several other provinces, giving the former Democrat party an unprecedented representation in the Cortes, from which they had been excluded over the previous 20 years. Leaders from the great eastern archipelago that had sustained Democrat conspiracies and clandestine politics since the Bienio could now take the floor of the Cortes and contribute to the drafting of a new constitution.⁵⁵

Granados Espinosa responded to Aguilar's return to Antequera by intensifying the persecution of his Republican opponents. This took the form of blocking a judicial enquiry into electoral intimidation by the opposition to Aguilar in December, harassing and jailing visiting Republican leaders, and imprisoning throughout the spring and summer 22 men who had formed a *partida* under the command of Antonio de la Cámara Aguilar during the first days of the September Revolution.⁵⁶

Throughout April and May Granados intensified his judicial pursuit of Aguilar and his supporters in the face of intensified Republican propaganda and rumours of rebellion accompanying the revived Carlist threat and anti-draft riots throughout Spain (resulting in Jérez in several hundred deaths and injuries).⁵⁷ A measure of Granados's intolerance was the arrest and expulsion from Antequera of Juan Sanz, a Protestant evangelist whose visit to Antequera on 5 May had provoked a minor scuffle when his supply of 'books propagating the doctrines of Protestantism' had run out. In his account to the civil governor, Granados presented the episode as a consequence of the 'excessive and riotous' instincts of the city's crowd and its violent search for subversive literature.⁵⁸

Although Granados could rejoice on 21 May at the news of the Cortes vote in favour of Monarchy, by the end of the month he had received an

unwelcome order that Aguilar's Council be restored.⁵⁹ The interim mayor immediately went into top gear with a broadside of exaggerated reports detailing Aguilar's unruly following, including a personal fight at the railway station between the returning Aguilar and Eleuterio Granados, resulting in Aguilar suffering two gunshot wounds, 'although not gravely'.⁶⁰ Aguilar's return coincided with the completion of the case against Antonio de la Cámara Aguilar who was sentenced to exile from Antequera thereby removing the militia leader best equipped to support Aguilar's restoration by providing some counterweight to the Salt Guard.⁶¹

Granados resolved not to publicise or celebrate the promulgation of new 'Constitution of the Spanish Nation' in early June (181 deputies voted for a monarchy, 64 for a Federal Republic).⁶² Indeed Antequera's juzgado, joined by *Fiscalia Militar* of the province, increased pressure on Republicans throughout June with several arrests of those accused of attacks on property on 22 September 1868.⁶³

Not to be intimidated, in mid-June, a fortnight after meeting up with Republican *confrères* at Córdoba to sign the federalist pact, Aguilar returned again to Antequera to petition the Cortes for the reinstatement of the Republican Council and for fresh municipal elections.⁶⁴ The Cortes declared the December elections annulled and called new elections for 6–8 July and Aguilar's Republican Committee launched its campaign. Judicial measures having failed, Granados now turned to force. Behind the cover of an epistolary broadside to the civil governor detailing the electioneering excesses of Aguilar's supporters, Granados Espinosa deployed the Salt Guard, backed by a gang of thugs, to intimidate the opposition, culminating on 3 July in an attack on Aguilar's house violently breaking up an electoral meeting.⁶⁵ Appreciating that provincial governors had the discretion to apply the draconian martial law of 17 April 1821 to deal with any disturbances, Granados called for regular troops to be sent to Antequera, insisting that they should arrive by 1 July, a week in advance of the elections.⁶⁶

Granados would not trust *antequeranos* with their first experience of universal male suffrage. First he declared that he was short of 4,000 voting licenses, as the ones used in December had been lost. Then he refused to accept 'a multitude' of requests for voting licenses from Aguilar's supporters, while stepping up police patrols to intimidate voters.⁶⁷ The election was then called off, Granados justifying this action later in the month on grounds as it was forbidden 'to propagate ideas that were contrary to the constitution of the monarchy', a cynical claim, given that Spain currently possessed no monarch and that the government was facing a Carlist uprising in Catalonia.⁶⁸

Denied access to the ballot box, Republicans in Antequera, and throughout Spain, returned to the politics of conspiracy. During the summer and autumn Granados closely policed the activities of the Aguilars and comings and goings around the Aguilar residence at La Quinta. With

Francisco Joaquín's appointment as President of the 'Pacto Andaluz, Extremeño-Murciano' in June, Antequera returned to be the conspiratorial centre of Andalusian Federal Republicanism; La Quinta its command headquarters.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, Antequera's workers took advantage of their newly gained constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association, in the face of continual resistance from Granados.⁷⁰ Nine mutual aid societies were licensed by the Council during the autumn, part of a wave of workers' cooperatism and mutualism throughout the country. Many more were established informally.⁷¹ The largest and most enduring was 'La Fraternidad, Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas' (founded in 1855) which had provided cover for the 'Garibaldino' Society during the 1860s. Following the September Revolution the regulations of 'La Fraternidad' were modified to cover support during an illness for more than 30 days, the membership quota doubling to 2 reales a week. Antonio Acedo Montero, a textile dyer who had been active in the Garibaldino Society in 1861, was elected as President. The Society included a night school where members were permitted to read newspapers, providing they did so 'with the greatest order'. So flourishing was the Society by December 1869 that it was necessary to lease the bullring for its general meeting.⁷²

Blocked from exercising his legitimate mandate, Aguilar had every justification for joining the national Republican insurrection against the Sagasta government in October 1869. Since July, using the law of 17 April 1821, civil and military authorities had been allowed to proceed at will against any kind of Republican political activity: banners, demonstrations, associations and clubs.⁷³ Although only a minority of Republicans in the Cortes favoured insurrection, fiery propaganda from Castelar and Figueras, general indignation at government repression, and, above all, the deliberate provocation of the government, led many Federal Republicans throughout the country to take to arms. Much as before 1868, when Democrats saw insurrection as a means to demonstrate their ability to mobilise a selfless, patriotic and youthful citizenry, the October insurrection offered Republicans a way of dramatising the failure of the government to deliver on the promises of the September Revolution. They would not have rated their chances of success very highly. Yet at least 70,000 Federal Republicans took to arms. Even in failure rebellion sent a strong moral and political message.

The uprising broke out in Catalonia on 25 September and lasted until late October. Lacking any central coordination, failure was assured early on once Madrid's Volunteers of Liberty resolved not to rise up in support of their Catalan *confrères*.⁷⁴ Although the rebellion in Valencia, the most substantial of all the Republican uprisings, survived until mid-October, the disintegration of the insurrection in Catalonia into local insurgency by the end of September shifted attention to Andalucía. With the disarming in January

of Republican militias in the provincial capitals and larger cities (Cádiz, Málaga, Jérez, Granada and Seville) it fell to the smaller towns to spearhead the Republican uprising. Uprisings in Carmona and Utrera proved no match for the combined forces of Civil Guard and the regular army.⁷⁵ Senior Republican leaders, José Paúl y Angulo, Pedro Bohorques, Rafael Guillén and Fermín Salvochea, took to the Sierra de Cádiz 'in an attempt to rouse the hill people against the centralised state', with no more success.⁷⁶

Meanwhile in Antequera, Granados intensified persecution rounding up Republican sympathisers in several swoops throughout the first ten days of October.⁷⁷

Until now Granados had controlled Antequera through tight policing and selective deployment of the *porra*. In the face of the Republican insurrection Granados assumed the mantle of Commander of Arms and quickly established a junta comprising commanders of the garrison and Civil Guard and prominent *vecinos*, to decide measures for the defence of the city against 'a revolutionary attempt, from within or without'. Eleuterio Granados's Salt Guard was charged with guarding the heights above and entries to the city, while Antequera's internal security would be provided by 12 'fuerzas de paisanos', each numbering between 15 and 25 men, commanded by prominent noblemen from their own residences, who would patrol the centre of the city. The Council also deployed its full squad of *alcaldes del barrio* to conduct evening walkabouts, accompanied by 'Guardias de la Ley', with instructions to keep a close eye on favoured Republican cafés and drinking houses. Here, then, was the active and united *antequerano* nobility whose divisions and ineffectiveness Guerola had so lamented during the later 1850s and early 1860s.⁷⁸

At this unpromising moment Aguilar took to arms.⁷⁹ With Antequera so tightly policed, only the *campiña* of Córdoba to the north, and Sierra Bética to the south and east, offered any promise of support. On 11 October, Aguilar travelled north to Aguilar de la Frontera to take charge of the Republican uprisings in Alta Andalucía. Aguilar, like other towns of the *campiña* of Córdoba such as Montilla and Fernán Nuñez, possessed a strong Republican Party, and, much like Antequera, had been controlled since January by Monarchists helped by 'partidas de la porra'.⁸⁰ From Aguilar, Francisco Joaquín moved south-east to the borderlands of Córdoba and eastern Málaga, hearth of the Loja revolt. Although there are no diaries or published account of Aguilar's revolt, Granados's correspondence with mayors throughout the region indicates a similar choreography to the Loja Revolution.

Alhama de Granada was reported to have sent contingents. The 'Milicia Ciudadana' in Loja declined to rise up, in spite of the city being visited by a rebel force with instructions to offer 2 *duros* to each Republican and 8 *reales* a day for joining the insurrection. Iznájar also declined to join the insurrection, although there was reported to be much support for it in the *caseríos*.

Benameji, Puente Genil, Cuevas de San Marcos, Cuevas Altas, Cuevas Bajas, Villanueva de Cauche, Villanueva de Rosario and Archidona reported rebel movements and certain towns, Villanueva de Cauche and Villanueva del Rosario, experienced brief rebel occupations.⁸¹ The defeat on 11 October of a column from Cútar led by a priest, Don Estévan Rivas, reduced Aguilar's options to move further south into the Axarquía. Closer to home, Aguilar received support from José Luciano Miranda who, accompanied by his 15-year-old son, was reported to have left Archidona on 12 October on a white horse destined for 'the house of the Aguilars or one of their farms'. The largest contingents to join Aguilar came from west of Antequera. Several hundred Republicans in Valle de Abdalajís and Campillos responded to Aguilar's call to arms, as did many from Mollina, Humilladero and Alameda.

Overall, Granados estimated that Aguilar had between 4,000 and 6,000 men at arms (albeit very poorly armed), similar to the numbers estimated to have converged on Loja in July 1861. News of the defeat of the Valencia uprising on 16 October would have dampened rebels' spirits. Granados used the news as a cue for detaining eight 'instigators of the republican masses' including one 'Onetti, of Italian nationality', Antonio Guerrero Cuenca (a Filusa), Antonio Gallardo and Francisco Tortosa (the latter three instigators of the Garibaldino Society in 1861). He also ordered the houses of Antequera's principal Republicans to be searched: Francisco Joaquín, José Antonio and Manuel María Aguilar, weaver Pedro Bernal and his son, Manuel Giménez Belloto, Juan Zurita Durán and Antonio Anaya Mena.⁸² Evidence found in these searches, backed by interrogation of 'the parents, siblings, wives, and servants' of the Aguilar brothers, was used later to charge these men with conspiracy. All were reported still to be absent from the city in early November, Granados commenting to the judge that the only Aguilars left in Antequera were 'the three Aguilar sisters who live in La Quinta de Valdealanes'.⁸³

During the rebellion Federal Republican deputies had withdrawn from the Cortes in protest against the banning of Republican political meetings, the state of emergency and suspension of constitutional guarantees. This left Prim free to forge ahead with plans for a new monarchy. On 9 November the Cortes lifted the suspension of guarantees and at the end of the month Republicans returned to the Cortes. The state of siege was finally lifted in the province of Málaga on 17 December although by early November all Republican armed activity had ended and Antequera's authorities had returned to the annual duty of policing the chestnut and olive harvests.⁸⁴

Chestnut thefts were especially common this November as a consequence of the continued dispersal of Republican *partidas* throughout the region. Thefts also extended to livestock. On 15 December, 55 goats were stolen from the sheepfold on an Aguilar property which the family had recently acquired through the *desamortización*, a reminder that the Aguilars, for two

generations leaders of Antequera's advanced Progresistas, Democrats and now Federal Republicans, also formed part of the city's landed elite.⁸⁵

Increasing wealth did not deter the Aguilars from promoting the Federal Republican cause both in Antequera and the wider Andalucian context. With Francisco Joaquín exiled for his part in the rebellion, leadership passed to Manuel María and to José González Berdún, veterans of the Bienio. In March 1870, in response to Pi Margall's convocation of the first national Federal Republican assembly in Madrid, Manuel María Aguilar invited Federal Republicans from the entire district to assemble in the bull ring, to be followed by a procession through the centre of the city ending at the Council building.⁸⁶ Planning a public meeting on the same day was the Carlist Catholic Monarchical Party recently established by the Marqués de San Martín and other members of the city's elite.⁸⁷ Predictably, Granados allowed the Carlists to meet but refused permission to the Republicans on grounds that 'Socialists' were among those petitioning to hold the meeting.⁸⁸

Barred from holding meet, Federal Republicans abstained from the Council and provincial elections of January 1871, Monarchical Liberals duly triumphing.⁸⁹ Yet Granados remained under challenge, from the Left, with the growth of support for the Socialist International (or at least appearance in Antequera of posters promoting it), and from the Right, with the challenge from Carlists and old Moderados, such as Narváez's old protégé Rafael Chacón, who reappeared as Restorationists.⁹⁰ In July 1872, with customary exaggeration, Granados Reported Antequera to be living in fear of 'seeing repeated the scenes of desolation and ruin that took place in the first days of the revolution of September, and like those that have recently been witnessed in Jerez de la Frontera'.⁹¹ Throughout the summer Málaga was struck by a rash of strikes (37 overall) with industrial and agricultural workers taking advantage of the less repressive political environment and greater freedom to exercise their new rights of association.⁹² Antequera avoided labour conflict in 1872. Yet not even the tightly policed Granados regime could survive the second abdication in four years and the proclamation the First Republic in February 1873.

With the declaration of the First Republic in February 1873, Granados Espinosa fled Antequera. Manuel María Aguilar was appointed Alcalde, taking command of the re-constituted 'Voluntarios de la Libertad'.⁹³ José Antonio was named ambassador to Turkey.⁹⁴ The Aguilar's dream of a Republican Antequera had been realised. A police investigation carried out after Aguilar's removal from office in July 1874 describes the arrival of the Republic in Antequera as a moment of unbridled terror.⁹⁵ The report presents a profile of the Aguilars' political machine that helps to explain why, since the 1850s, their version of social *progresismo* had proved so hard for the opposition to counter or to accept, and why Granados considered it necessary to deploy the *porra* in order to confront Federal Republicanism in Antequera.

The Republican takeover was led, the report claimed, by:

José (sic) Francisco y Manuel Aguilar, brothers, authors and promoters of all the disorders occurring here since the *pronunciamiento* of 1868, under whose shadow all the incendiaries, robberies, assassinations and beatings have been committed that have crushed the infinity of our fellow residents; and it they who personally sustain the alarm in which we live.

'Don Joaquín Francisco' and 'Don Manuel María' were aided by their brother 'Don José Antonio', who brought 'three to four hundred of the poorest and most abject' men from Málaga to secure the Republic in Antequera. Next in command, 'under the orders of the Aguilars', was 'Don Salvador González Herrero', who 'has been the general agent of all the infamies committed here and in which he convinced the masses to promote all the disorders'.

The link between the patrician leadership and the working masses was provided by Pedro Bernal:

who was and is one of the most trusted instruments of the Aguilars for moving the masses, also the leader of the Carbonarios known as Garibaldinos, who organised the meetings at the Quinta with the chiefs of the *decurie* in order to sustain the alarm and to be ready for a cantonal movement; and it was he who in the Calle de Cantareros in the middle of the day of 21 February 1873 beat Pedro Matas, concierge of the ayuntamiento.

Pedro Bernal was assisted by his brother, Antonio Bernal, and by former police official, Antonio Martínez.

The police report went on to list 21 incidents of beatings administered by the Aguilars and their municipal policemen on their political enemies following the declaration of the Republic on 21 February,⁹⁶ identifying a further 36 subjects 'disposed to rebel against the Government and to repeat the attempts which they have committed previously and to give themselves to the theft and looting of whatever takes their desire'.⁹⁷ Attached to the report of the beatings that had occurred, and the list of those prepared to repeat such arbitrary and public punishments, is a list of 60 'Individuals of Bad Antecedents' containing addresses and annotations, such as 'watch out' (*ojo*) repeated three times in certain cases, 'regular', 'in prison' or 'stupid' (*tonto*).

What these police reports describe is the brusque handover from a Council controlled by Granados, who for four years had used the police, the *porra* and the *juzgado* to intimidate the Republican opposition, to a Council composed of Federal Republican followers of the Aguilars, who for four years had been at the receiving end of 'palizas' (beatings) administered by Granados's henchmen. The events of 21 February 1873 were a settling of

scores, not a Jacobin Terror. The beatings described in the report, like the similar events of September and October 1868, mostly involved punishments administered by the incoming police upon members of the outgoing force. They were conducted in public and in broad daylight. No life was lost. Yet they are evidence of institutionalised violence, particularly the Council's abuse of its police powers and the pervasiveness of the *porra* that attended the onset of representative government through universal suffrage. That Francisco Romero Robledo had served as Granados Espinosa's personal secretary throughout his four years as Mayor suggests that this experience of the low-intensity violence directed at the opposition, aimed at limiting electoral competition, provided an instructive apprenticeship for Spain's most enduring Restoration cacique.⁹⁸

However violent the takeover of power in February 1873, Manuel María Aguilar did not court further conflict during the subsequent 16 months as Antequera's Republican mayor. Long experience of Antequera's vulnerability to hostile military columns convinced him not to join his Federal Republican *confrères* in Málaga in declaring an independent canton during the summer of 1873.⁹⁹ In contrast to the swift and violent demobilisation of Málaga's Volunteers of Liberty in December 1868, in August and September 1873 the Republican government adopted a softer approach with the Málaga canton, once radical elements under Eduardo Carbajal had been brought under control by Francisco Solier, civil governor and Cortes deputy for Málaga. The Málaga *cantón*, which held out between 21 July and 19 September (longer than any other apart from Cartagena), received additional cover from Eduardo Palanca, Málaga's Cortes deputy who occupied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Salmerón's government. Palanca succeeded in delaying confrontation with government forces during Pavía's 'pacification' of Andalucía in July and August 1873, having convinced the General that Málaga's *cantón* had no expansionist intentions.

Aguilar was further deterred from declaring a *cantón* of Antequera by conflicts within Málaga's Republican Party. Solier faced a continual struggle with more radical 'intransigent' republicans under Eduardo Carbajal and with leaders of the Socialist International such as Miguel del Pino and Dr. José García Viñas.¹⁰⁰ In early August 1873, at the height of the *cantón*, seven of Málaga's most important Internationalist leaders were arrested and transported to Melilla.¹⁰¹ This was a signal for workers in Málaga and Antequera to return to the clandestine organisation that had prevailed 1856 and 1868, doubly necessary after the Restoration in January 1875 until the fall of the repressive Cánovas regime in February 1881.

During the Restoration the localised culture of electoral exclusion and low level violence (*porrismo*) operated by Granados for much of the ill-named 'sexenio democrático' was incorporated into a wider system of top-down control of electoral nominations (*caciquismo*) and circulation of power (*turnismo*) between Liberal and Conservative monarchical parties.

At every election between 1876 and 1905, Liberal Conservative Francisco Romero Robledo, 'El Pollo de Antequera', was re-elected as Antequera's Cortes deputy. Meanwhile Antequera's Council fell ever more deeply into debt with the material improvements, educational and welfare services anticipated by Progresistas and Democrats since the Bienio Progresista suffering from terminal neglect by the time of Romero Robledo's 'pompous' funeral in 1906 (the costs of which caused the Council to spiral further into debt).¹⁰²

The first Restoration government headed by Antonio Cánovas maintained a consistently repressive policy towards workers' associations and clandestine societies. In the face of this repression and the official proscription of Republicanism, Antequera witnessed a continuation of conspiratorial activity among Federal Republicans peaking during the mid-summer months. In June 1875, as in earlier years, conspirators took advantage of the eight-day festival of Corpus Christi to demonstrate their political colours. As the procession crossed the Calle de la Encarnación

an alarming murmuring could be heard from a group gathered in front of the house of Santiago Pérez Rech, known for his federal ideas ... hanging from the said house were some pendants on which appeared a nymph surrounded by a Phrygian cap and below it an inscription which says 'Republic'.

The group was promptly broken up, Pérez was arrested and sent to the municipal prison.¹⁰³ Native of Alcoy, *vecino* for many years of Antequera, on 9 October Pérez was declared 'a person of bad conduct and antecedents, known for his cantonalist ideas, and author of attacks upon distinguished persons of this population'. Exiled to Madrid, Pérez Rech's departure was delayed by a beating received at the railway station that rendered him unconscious.¹⁰⁴ Pérez was just one of many Federal Republicans banished to neighbouring provinces during the last year of the Republic and the first years of the Restoration.¹⁰⁵

During the early Restoration the Federal Republican party was kept alive by the Aguilars, albeit with diminishing energy as their agricultural enterprises prospered.¹⁰⁶ Some of their former working-class clientele shifted allegiance to the Socialist International which by July 1877 had developed a local federation in the city.¹⁰⁷ However, most textile and agricultural workers remained Federal Republican in sympathy and still looked to the Aguilars for leadership. A police investigation in July 1880 not only confirmed the presence of the International in the city but also documented the endurance of patterns of sociability and association rooted in the Bienio. This was part of a national crack-down on the Socialist International following two years of severe dearth in Andalucía when the International had begun to instruct its members 'to adopt measures that would lead them

finally to the social revolution': the requisitioning and distribution of grain and other food stocks, incendiary attacks of the properties of the newly propertied rich, the burning of notarial archives, and the punishment of police informers.¹⁰⁸ The biggest catch was Miguel del Pino, native of Málaga, leading member of the International in the provincial capital during the early 1870s.¹⁰⁹

During the early Restoration Del Pino had moved to Antequera to work in an iron foundry. A search of his lodgings revealed numerous documents relating to the International and correspondence that showed him to be 'the leader or the most influential person among the affiliates of this population'.¹¹⁰ Further arrests revealed a close association between Del Pino and leading members of the Federal Republican working class, mainly woollen weavers involved in 'La Fraternidad, Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas', Antequera's oldest mutualist association, and its associated 'Sociedad Industrial de Artistas de Lana', founded in 1870. Interrogation and house searches revealed that Del Pino was believed by these men to be leader of the International in Antequera and confirmed that in 1879 he had been active in distributing propaganda, in particular copies of an incendiary broadsheet issued by Federal Commission in May 1879 'To the workers of the fields of Andalucía and to workers in general', and issues of a Barcelona newspaper *El Municipio Libre, Hoja Socialista Revolucionaria*. Yet the house searches of detainees also found standard Federal Republican paraphernalia: several copies of the 'Catechism of Democratic Republican Federation' published in 1872, copies of Federal Republican newspapers *El Globo* and the *La Ilustración Republicana Federal*, a lieutenant's cap from service in the 'Volunteers of the Republic' and various anticlerical texts. One weaver, José Postigo, convenor and keeper of the archive of the 'Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos', possessed a Bible and was active on his parish Council, as were several other weavers who had dealings with Del Pino.¹¹¹

The arrests extended beyond Antequera to one Pérez, a railway employee who lived in an inn opposite the station at Bobadilla, where the Antequera branch line joins the main Málaga-Córdoba line, believed to be 'the carrier to this city of subversive and clandestine broadsheets'.¹¹² Railway workers, it will be recalled, were prominent in the democratic conspiracies during the 1860s. Overall, the investigation confirmed that Del Pino had become integrated within Antequera's clandestine network, by frequenting the same taverns, such as La Taverna de Levante, by supplying barbers with pamphlets and newspapers, and by associating with workers who were closely involved in the city's principal mutualist associations. It is evident from his own testimony, and that of other detainees, and confirmed by their reading matter and patterns of association, that the International in Antequera blended with, rather than displaced, existing Federal Republican allegiances.

The outcome of the Del Pino case is not known. Sagasta had already restored the laws guaranteeing freedom of assembly, although they would not come into force in September 1880. Under these laws the activities of Del Pino and his associates in Antequera were not illegal. It is likely therefore that all were soon released. Del Pino died shortly after, remembered by his long time *malagueño* associate José García Viñas:

Miguel Pino, courageous and very intelligent, a fitter and a mechanic, full of faith and abnegation, he was part of the Federal Commission, leaving it exhausted and disheartened by the minutiae which he was always having to deal with. Such was his condition when he sought me out in Málaga in 1881 or 1882, to receive treatment for advanced tuberculosis that ended such a precious existence.¹¹³

The arrest of Miguel del Pino and other leaders for spreading ‘socialist revolutionary propaganda’ did not deter workers and artisans in Antequera from forming a successful branch of *Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española* (Workers’ Federation of the Spanish Region/FTRE). The fall of the repressive Cánovas government in February 1881 and the return of the more liberal Sagasta signalled, momentarily, an end to a ten-year cycle of repression and violence in the Andalusian countryside. Relaxation of the laws on association prompted a rapid increase in FTRE membership and allowed a more conciliatory leadership to emerge in the anarchist movement, concerned with organising union activity, and opposed to individual or collective acts of violence. By the FTRE’s first congress held in Seville in September 1882, Antequera’s branch ‘counted 3,973 affiliates; 1971 agricultural workers, 1,166 textile workers, 334 bricklayers, 100 shoemakers, 100 tanners, etc.’, a substantial proportion of the overall manual workforce in the city (the 1887 census counted 8884 agricultural workers, 1,293 factory workers and 2,472 employed in ‘artes y oficios’).¹¹⁴ Similar numbers from the same occupations had joined the Garibaldino Society during the 1860s. It is reasonable to conclude that the FTRE had accommodated itself to the city’s associationist traditions and that Antequera’s workers preferred liberty and free association to the repression, clandestinity and the nihilist preaching of distant national leaders of the 1870s.

The FTRE’s condemnation of common criminal acts as a means for attaining their goals failed to convince the propertied classes in Andalucía who continued to believe that the social order faced an imminent threat of upheaval, orchestrated by a secret society that had spread its tentacles throughout Andalucía. A prolonged drought during the summer of 1881 brought the return of the severe subsistence crisis that had been at the root of the social unrest and political violence in 1878–1879.¹¹⁵ During the first half of 1883, a succession of police swoops and mass arrests throughout the provinces of Cádiz and Seville culminated in a series of

show trials of supposed members of the 'Mano Negra', a nihilist revolutionary secret society. The repression that preceded it, the 'great fear' that prompted the repression, the stage-managed and politically motivated show trials, the gruesome executions and mass sentencing to overseas *presidios* of agricultural workers, small farmers, veterinarians and schoolteachers, all closely resemble the prologue and aftermath of the Loja Revolution.¹¹⁶ That Antequera escaped the repression is further evidence of the moderation of the city's Federation and workers' associations. Perhaps also the presence of Romero Robledo as Antequera's cacique, who had demonstrated such skill in calming the city's workers in 1862 before the Queen's visit, helped shield Antequera from repression suffered by workers elsewhere in Andalucía.

The success of the FTRE in signing up Antequera's *jornaleros*, factory workers and artisans marked the end of the Aguilar's long association with the city's working class. For workers, this was a pragmatic response to the defeat of Federal Republicanism during the Sexenio. Yet the Aguilars continued to provide the main opposition to Romero Robledo's *cacicazgo* throughout the Restoration. Antequera's Republicans continued to capitalise on the city's strategic centrality that had made the centre of Democrat conspiracy since the 1850s. In 1883 the Aguilars hosted the first Andalucian regionalist conference at La Quinta de los Valdealanes at which a constitution of Andalucía was drafted.¹¹⁷

In February 1891 Francisco Joaquín and Manuel María Aguilar, now in their sixties, stood as candidates for the Republican Coalition in the Cortes elections, the first through universal suffrage, challenging the incumbent Romero y Robledo. Coming after two years of mounting labour militancy and prolonged strikes, the elections were highly contested and Republicans rallied in Antequera, as elsewhere in the country. On the eve of the election a 'Casino de Unión Republicana de Antequera' was inaugurated in the Calle de Estepa by Manuel María Aguilar, remaining active until well into the twentieth century. Serving on the Republican Committee was Antonio Méndez López, vice-president of 'La Fraternidad. Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artistas' founded originally in February 1855.¹¹⁸ Only systematic fraud and violence orchestrated by the henchmen of the Conservative party prevented a Republican victory in Antequera.

In the municipal elections that followed in May, Antequera's Republicans abstained in protest, but their co-religionists triumphed in numerous cities throughout the Peninsular, including Granada and Jaén.¹¹⁹ Yet, winning control of indebted and impoverished municipalities was little consolation in a system now firmly controlled from the centre through caciques such as Romero Robledo, served by the 'partida de la porra'. Further gains in municipal elections in 1893 confirmed Republican electoral effectiveness under universal suffrage, although their Cortes representation remained small (10 per cent). In response to government-directed fraud, falsification

of electoral rolls, and the persecution and removal of their party's recently elected councillors in Barcelona, Republicans in the Cortes voted to resign their seats and return to the insurrectional path last attempted in 1885–1886.¹²⁰ Although these uprisings, as with all previous Democrat–Republican insurrections since 1857, failed, they maintained the myth of heroic sacrifice and dramatised Spain's constitutional shortcomings and political fragility.¹²¹

Conclusion

My principal study is now Spain. So far I have swotted up, mainly from Spanish sources, the 1808–14 and the 1820–23 periods. Am now coming to the years 1834–43. The thing is not without complexity. It is rather more difficult to discover exactly the springs behind developments. At any rate I made a timely start with *Don Quixote*.

2 September 1854, Karl Marx, London, to
Friedrich Engels, Manchester.¹

This study has explored how towns and villages in Spain became more directly involved in national politics between the July Revolution in 1854 – the revolution that Marx believed might become Spain's 1848 – and the early Bourbon Restoration, as people grappled with a swiftly changing world. Change was experienced particularly acutely in the borderlands of the provinces Granada, Córdoba and Málaga; due to a secular decline in Catholic pastoral provision, particularly in rural areas, coinciding with the arrival of Democrat and Protestant evangelists, a rapid growth of population that remained dependent upon a fragile subsistence base frequently visited by meteorological crises, the abrupt onset of modern communications (telegraph, roads and railways), and, most significantly in the shaping of political behaviour, a sustained increase in the diffusion of news and ideas through the press.

The study has traced how Democrats and advanced Progresistas were able to break the patrician mould of politics that since the end of absolutism in 1833 had been the exclusive preserve of the two 'historic' Liberal parties. By the 1850s competition between Moderados and Progresistas, particularly intense in this region due the influence (both when present and absent) of *moderado* chieftain Ramón María Narvéz, had created a highly factionalised political environment. Democrats exploited this explosive context

by promoting a more inclusive politics. They achieved this by engaging ever more people in an expanding public sphere, shaped by newspaper and pamphlet readership, letter writing, petitioning and public subscriptions, by membership of party committees, secret societies and mutual and self-help associations, and by participation in (or abstention from) elections, conspiracies, rebellions and revolutions.

Democrats were helped by a weak and partisan Monarchy ever more exposed to Neo-Catholic and Ultramontane influences. Democrat support was also boosted by an exhilarating international climate provided by the Risorgimento and what seemed a pan-European, even global struggle of oppressed peoples, evidenced by the Indian Mutiny, the growth of Irish nationalism, the Polish revolt, Mexico's resistance to the French Intervention, the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery. But it was the Democrat programme, broadcast in manifestos and catechisms, promising universal male suffrage, freedom of conscience, the abolition of socially discriminatory military draft and excise taxes, and a broad charter of individual rights and guarantees, that proved so attractive to the mass of ordinary Spaniards. The historic Liberal parties defined themselves in elitist, patrician and oppositional terms, believing in their right to rule by virtue of their wealth, education or patriotism. They felt no need to be popular, merely decent, firm, exemplary and not visibly corrupt. The popularity of Democrats transformed the terms of political debate, making them the party to be feared. Between 1849 and the late 1860s Democrats had their opponents (and even their advanced *progresista* allies!) forever on the back foot. Although by the end of the period a new generation of Conservative Liberals had learned how to control this expanded political nation from the centre under a restored and reformed Bourbon Monarchy, Spaniards of all classes now engaged in national politics, even if this involved electoral abstention or support for parties and movements that were persecuted and proscribed, such as Federal Republicans and the Socialist International.²

This study has focussed on identifying regional and local leaders, for the most part at the lowest tier of constitutional representation, the municipality. The reader has been expected to master several 'micro' political contexts, not only the three main towns studied – Loja, Alhama and Antequera – but other towns as well, such as Archidona, Iznájar and Colmenar, as well as numerous smaller settlements, not to mention the provincial capitals of Granada and Málaga. Even if these places slip from memory, it is hoped that readers will now question Pablo Fusi's view of the nineteenth-century Spain as:

... a country of centralism in theory but localism and *comarcalismo* in practice. Spain for many years was simply a network of ill-connected *comarcas*, poorly integrated with each other.³

This study has demonstrated that towns and districts in this region were not 'ill connected' or 'poorly integrated' but closely linked with each other, with their provincial capitals, and Seville and Madrid, by the exogamous marriage patterns of their local elites, by their open, agriculturally based and proto-industrial economies, by the constant movement of people and by political and administrative ties which operated horizontally as well as vertically.

Apart from understanding the external relations of these towns, the reader has also been asked to master a sense of place, and to become familiar with municipal issues and institutions such as the implementation (or not) of the *desamortización*, the management of commons, *propios* and *pósitos*, the funding of education, health care, poor relief, *alojamiento* of *jornaleros* during periods of dearth, the provision of security through various politically charged bodies such as the National Militia, Volunteers of Liberty and the Rural Guard, and the organisation of local elections, festivals and petitions. Beyond this relatively transparent arena of local politics, visible from Council minute books, much of this study has focussed on the clandestine sphere, involving, on the one hand, networks of patronage that linked towns to each other and with Madrid, typified by Narváez's aspiration to control Loja and the wider region, and, on the other, the *carbonari* network that spread throughout the region in response to the repression following the Bienio Progresista.

Here, as Karl Marx found in the British Museum during the hot London Summer of 1854, it was 'more difficult to discover exactly the springs behind developments'. In Pérez del Alamo we were fortunate in having the political career of a local leader who wrote tirelessly to Democrat press and published a memoir in 1872 (itself exceptional for a Spanish political leader at any level). But, apart from prominent Progresistas and Democrats, such as Francisco Rosal y Badía in Loja, Luis Miranda in Archidona, Joaquín Narváez in Iznájar and the Aguilar brothers in Antequera, other local careers were less visible. We were able to identify 'capataces', linkmen and rabble-rousers, such as Manuel Rodríguez Carbaló (a) 'El Americano', leader of Alhama's Democrats, Pedro Bernal, chief of Antequera's woollen weavers, Francisco Mellado Fernández of Loja, Pérez's standard bearer in July 1861, and Francisco Palomas Rojas (a) 'El Niño del Limbo', master of the 'Garibaldino' crowd in Antequera. But the people these leaders sought to emancipate or to control remain obscure, referred to collectively as 'riotous', or forming up 'into squads' ('en tropel'), or stirred into states of 'excitement' or 'happiness' by Democrat propaganda or by news of great events, such as the return of Espartero in July 1854, the fall Bourbons in Italy in 1859, Garibaldi's feats in southern Italy, Prim's landing at Cádiz in September 1868, the proclamation of the Constitution in June 1869 and the declaration of the Republic in February 1873.

We occasionally find the voice of the people, unmediated by the utopianism of Democrats, the condescension of Progresistas, or the paranoia of

the Right, for example in newspaper reports of rebel testimonies during the 'July days' Loja in 1861, or in popular subscriptions for funding the return of pardoned rebels or the education of the children of martyred Democrats. The collective clamours of *jornaleros* are audible in Council minutes throughout the period, especially between January and April. But the main source for the 'voice of the people' are the reports of local judges and the police, the correspondence of *moderado* statesmen and functionaries such as Narváez and Antonio Guerola, and the Conservative and Neo-Catholic press that throughout this period saw Catholic Spain as teetering on the edge of a precipice.

If the Conservative press routinely painted an alarmist picture of moral disintegration, local authorities were more measured and specific about what particular combination of institutional, economic and personal factors contributed to the moral and political temper of their jurisdictions. As we saw in Chapter 10, reports from town mayors during the lead up to the aborted insurrection of 2 May 1864 reveal a wide spectrum of local political cultures across the district of Alhama. These ranged from a fully drilled and mobilised Democrat clandestine organisation in the district capital that had signed up most adult males, to towns such as Arenas del Rey that were divided between a well-armed 'party of order' in control of the Council and a cohort of 'apuntados' (mainly artisans, small farmers and *jornaleros*), to naturally 'democratic' towns of small peasant proprietors such as Zafarraya but where Democrat leaders had been neutralised by the financial backing of Narváez for the incumbent mayor, to towns such as Jatar where the combination of a philanthropic and enterprising landowner and a zealous priest – a local man – had shielded a hard-working population of *colonos* from the democratic contagion. These reports confirm the importance of local leadership and demonstrate that rural politicisation took a variety of different forms. Research at this local level, as much as on the district or the region, will provide the key to understanding how people experienced the widening context of politics during this crucial period in Spain's formation as a modern nation state.

Epilogue

Following his expulsion from Loja in 1862, Rafael Pérez del Alamo made his permanent home in Seville where his veterinary-blacksmith business prospered. As we have seen, by 1868 he had become a leading member of Seville's Democrat Committee, remaining prominent in the city's Republican movement until the late 1890s.¹ At the end of the century Pérez moved to Arcos de la Frontera (Cádiz) where he continued to practice his trade until his death in 1911. This town's official website commemorates the Loja Democrat and Seville Federal Republican as a 'Veterinarian and Anarcho-Syndicalist'.²

By the turn of the century Pérez had become the object of veneration among younger generation of Republicans. In 1932, gathering material for a biographical sketch, fellow *granadino* Natalio Rivas heard from Seville lawyer Felipe Cubas Albervis how on his way home from the *Escolapío* school he would stop to converse with Pérez at his bench in the Plaza de Terreros, listening 'with admiration' to stories of 'the revolutionary movement' of July 1861 and how Queen Isabel had travelled to Loja expressly to attract the blacksmith to the monarchical cause, remembering the blacksmith as 'a man of very good faith and a great character... although his education was not great, he had a natural talent, expressed himself very well and attracted those who listened to him'. Another lawyer in Arcos recalled Pérez 'with sympathy, as a venerable old revolutionary with a white beard and a well turned-out presence'.³

In March 1906, Benito Pérez Galdos, replying to Pérez's offer to send him 'hundreds of pages' that he had written on his life, expressed delight that he was in good health in spite of his 77 years, urging him to reach 100 to serve 'as a living example to educate this sickly and puny generation'.⁴ Two years later Pérez wrote to the Socialist activist and historian, Juan José Morato, reflecting on his bucolic youth before the Andalusian countryside became divided between the 'señoritos' and the landless:

When I was sixteen (in 1844) there were still common lands (*dehesas boyales*). The poor man could plant them, take firewood and brushwood,

gather esparto grass including sometimes charcoal and coal. You could also hunt partridges or any other animal. As a result, although one knew poverty, one did not know what it was like to be hungry. Today these lands have been converted into private estates and if you take something which is not yours you are sent to prison.⁵

During his final years in Arcos Pérez remained active, practising his trade in the Calle Corredera, founding a 'Centro Obrero' in a building that had once housed the Bishop's palace, administering a friendly society ('La Fraternidad Obrera') and operating a housing cooperative that helped unemployed workers restore ruined buildings to be auctioned among themselves or sold on with profits to be divided among the members.⁶

On 15 January 1911 at 10.06 a.m., Pérez died at home aged 82 of pneumonia, having outlived his wife María Regina, survived by two of their four children, María and Concepción. In the same month Arcos's Council resolved unanimously to name a street after 'Señor Profesor Veterinario Don Rafael Pérez del Alamo', a decision only implemented ten years later when Domingo de la Rosa, president of 'La Fraternidad Obrera', recalled Pérez as

... one of the greatest figures of our *patria* in the 19th Century, not only for his great love of liberty and unblemished patriotism, but more than all this, for his altruism, honour and greatness of soul which he demonstrated in all of his acts. Chief of a great popular movement he ruled a region (*comarca*) for many days knowing how to make his followers respect possessions, honour and lives, a fine example that leaders of the masses must always imitate. Generous and always good, I have watched him at almost hundred years of age working for a family to which he was not related by any ties except those which great souls take upon themselves with the less fortunate.⁷

Notes

Introduction

1. La Carrera was named after the annual race held since 1503 to test Loja's best stallion, Rosal and Derqui (1957), p. 167.
2. Révész (1953), p. 255.
3. Estévanez (1984), pp. 78–79.
4. Narváez served as First Minister for 103 of the 288 months between May 1844 and April 1868: 3/5/44–12/12/45; 6/3/46–5/4/46; 4/10/47–19/10/49; 20/10/49–14/1/51; 12/10/56–21/10/57; 16/9/64–21/6/65; 10/7/66–13/4/68.
5. Gilmore defines 'señoritos' as landowners with estates of over 200 hectares farmed under managers. The term was understood pejoratively as it implied that the landowner had acquired the land illicitly, Gilmore (1980), *passim*.
6. Pascual (1994), pp. 120–147.
7. Pabón (1983), *passim*; Révész (1953), *passim*.
8. Boyd (1997); Juliá (2004).
9. Nadal (1975).
10. Molina (2005); Jacobsen (2004); Alvarez (2001a); Boyd (1997).
11. Riquer (1994); Ortega (1977); Tussell (1976); Shubert (1992); Moreno Luzón (2007).
12. For criticisms of the 'pathology of failure' approach, Shubert (1990), pp. 1–7; Ringrose (1996); Burdiel (1998); Burguera and Schmidt-Nowara (2004); Millán and Cruz (2004).
13. Fradera (1999, 2005); Blanco (2004).
14. Santerso (2008), p. 334.
15. Esdaile (2000), pp. 94, 155.
16. Ortega (1964), pp. 112–113.
17. Alvarez (1996), pp. 85–86.
18. Weber (1991), p. 139.
19. See two biographical collections of prominent Progresistas, Democrats and Republicans, Pérez (2008); Burdiel (2000).
20. Inarejos (2008), p. 355.
21. Taylor (2000); Thomson (2002).
22. Peyrou (2006), p. 1.
23. Agulhon (1970, 1997); Duarte (1988); Guereña (1991, 2001); Canal (1997); Pécout (1997); Maza (1995).
24. Kaplan (1977), p. 101.
25. Inarejos (2008), pp. 75–87; Pécout (1997), p. 96.
26. Darnton (1995).
27. Callahan (1979), pp. 231–240; Callahan (1984); Jackson (1955).
28. BRAH (Narváez I, II).
29. Guerola (1986, 1993a and b, 1995, 1996).
30. Council minutes were consulted for Loja, Alhama, Antequera, Archidona, Alora, Periana, Villanueva de Tapia and Zafarraya. The provincial archive for Málaga was destroyed in a fire in the roof of the Customs House where it was kept. The

Provincial Deputation archive in Granada is well organised albeit sketchy for the nineteenth century.

31. Caballero and Romero (2006).
32. The Cadiz constitutional promised universal male suffrage, a free press, a single legislative chamber, a national militia, elected *ayuntamientos* and provincial deputations, Millán and Cruz (2004), p. 291.
33. Castro (1979).
34. Peyrou (2006), p. 52; Pérez (1978).
35. Peyrou (2004); Cruz (2004); Fuentes (2002), pp. 444–448.
36. Alvarez (1988).
37. Biagini (2003); Thomson (2007).
38. For rural guards in Castile and La Mancha during this period, Inarejos (2008), pp. 291–232.
39. Jover (1976), p. 341.
40. Juliá (1996), p. 12; Díaz (1984), pp. 85–86.
41. Antequera fell to Infante Don Fernando in 1410, Archidona in 1461, Alhama (the Nazarí kingdom's breadbasket) fell to Isabella in 1482 and Loja, gateway to the vega of Granada, was conquered four years later. Granada and the Moorish Kingdom fell in 1492.
42. Malpica (1981); Barrios (1986).
43. Herr (1989); Martín (1982); Martínez (1995), pp. 251–308; Ramírez (2001); Ferrer (1982), p. 350; Instituto (2001).
44. Herr (1989); Martínez (1995); Ferrer (1982); Gómez (1983, 1985); Fernández (1996); Parejo (1998).
45. Arenas (1996), pp. 76–87.
46. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 63; for an anthropologist's view of 'bóticás' as centres of progressive sociability in *malagueño* towns with high levels of illiteracy, Fraser (1973), p. 115.
47. Ortega (1964), pp. 112–113.

1 The Bienio Progresista in Eastern Andalucía, 1854–1856

1. Adolfo Royannes in *El Pueblo*, 13/9/60.
2. Kiernan (1966), p. 52.
3. *El Clamor Público*, 11/7/61.
4. Kiernan (1966), pp. 46–81; Lida (1972), pp. 47–76; Solé and Aja (1990), pp. 47–52.
5. Shubert (1992), pp. 170–171.
6. Castro (1979), p. 176.
7. Solé and Aja (1990), p. 42.
8. Varela (1977), p. 405; Pérez (1982), p. 102.
9. Baxter (1852), p. 146; Loja, *Actas*, 1852–1854, *passim*.
10. BARH, Narváez II, 23/7 and 8, 4/11/51 and 2/1/52, Pepe to Duke.
11. BARH, Narváez I, 59, 26/7/52, Enríquez to Narváez.
12. BARH, Narváez I, 59.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Esdaille (2000), p. 99.
15. BARH, Narváez II, 9/8136, 76/1, 19/11/43, Ayuntamiento to Duke; 72/73, 20/11/43, 83 *lojeños* to Duke; 76/15, 27/11/43, Duke to Council; Rosal and Derqui (1957), pp. 164–165; Pérez (1982), pp. 58–59.

16. Pabón (1983), pp. 252–278.
17. BARH, Narváez II, 60; 23/7, 17 and 20/7/50, Pepe to Duke; 23/16, 17/11/50, Pepe to Duke.
18. Pabón (1983), pp. 58–63, 83–84, 212–213, 291–300.
19. BRAH, Narváez II, 66/12.
20. *Ibid.*, 9/8111.
21. Loja, Actas, 28/10/53, Council to Narváez.
22. Loja, Actas, 30/6/53, 10/11/53 and 11/12/56; Loja, 198, Varios 1; BARH, Narváez II, 23/12, 26/2/57, Pepe to Duke; Rosal and Derqui (1957), *passim*.
23. BARH, Narváez II, 60/35, 2 and 7/9/57, Contreras to Narváez.
24. BARH, Narváez II, 9/8135, 20/10/56, 15 and 22/12/56, 29/12/57, 20/1/58, 1/3/58, Yevenes to Narváez.
25. BARH, Narváez II, 75, 105, 27/3/57, Salvador Josef to Narváez.
26. BARH, Narváez II, 59/48, 12 and 29/5/56, 4/7/56, 16/10/56, Caro to Duke.
27. Callahan (2000), pp. 59–62; García (1983), pp. 91–122.
28. Lawrence (2006), p. 4.
29. Loja, Actas, 17/1/52 and 4/2/52.
30. Rubio (1996), p. 60; BRAH, Narváez I, 59, 1 and 12/11/53, Enríquez to Narváez.
31. Loja, Actas, 30 and 31/3/52.
32. *Ibid.*, 22/4/52.
33. BRAH, Narváez I, 59, 2/10/52, Enríquez to Narváez.
34. Burdiel (2008), pp. 143–144; Blasco (1891), III, pp. 282–283.
35. Loja, Actas, 22/7/54.
36. *Ibid.*, 23/7/54.
37. *Ibid.*, 29/7/54.
38. *Ibid.*, 29/12/55.
39. Loja, Actas, July–November 1854.
40. *Ibid.*, 7/10/54, Rosal to Diputación; Varios, 198, 25.
41. Jiménez (1994), p. 119.
42. Loja, Actas, 27/1/55, 16/2/56, Council to Governor.
43. *Ibid.*, 16/2/56, Council to Governor; Varios, 198, 1.
44. Jovellanos (1979), pp. 359–360.
45. Rubio (1996), p. 59.
46. Loja, Varios, 95/6, 2/5/44, García to Council; Varios, 117/61; 118/4; Varios, 195/4, 19/4/44, Fonseca, Lora to Council; Varios, 155/22, 21/2/45, Fonseca to Council.
47. Guerrero (1979), II, pp. 196–197.
48. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12, 6/9/64, Montero to Narváez.
49. Loja, Actas, 14/12/54, 20/2/55, 26/10/54, 17/4/57, 6/1/61, 2/3/61.
50. Loja, Actas, 26/10/54.
51. Pabón (1983), p. 100.
52. Loja, Actas, 3/3/61.
53. Loja, Actas, Sessions of January 1855.
54. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 11, 17/7/61, Pepe Narváez to Duke; Aguado (1984), II, p. 207.
55. Garrido (1997), pp. 41–69.
56. Loja, Actas, Sessions of December 1854.
57. Inarejos, (2008), pp. 174–76.
58. Loja, Actas, 12/9/54.
59. *Ibid.*, 19/2/53.

60. Okazumi (1992).
61. Garrido (1997), pp. 45–46.
62. Loja, Varios, 256, Cuentas y Presupuestos, 1861.
63. Loja, Varios, 195/61, 16/2/47; Actas, January and February 1854.
64. BARH, Narváez II, 64/27, 25 and 27/2/50, López to Duke.
65. BARH, Narváez II, 72/58, 23/2/54, Sanz to Duke.
66. AHML, Varios, 198, folder of land titles (1855).
67. Loja, Actas, January and February 1854.
68. ADPG, 17/1, 17/3, 14/11/47.
69. Alhama, Actas, 10/10/69.
70. *Ibid.*, 19/12/54, 31/12/53.
71. *Ibid.*, 30/6/61.
72. *Ibid.*, 30/7/54, 6/8/54.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*, 4/9/54.
75. *Ibid.*, 15/10/54.
76. *Ibid.*, 19/12/54.
77. *Ibid.*, 13/1/55.
78. *Ibid.*, 18/1/55.
79. *Ibid.*, 13/1/55.
80. Lida (1972), p. 67.
81. Alhama, Actas, 15/1/55.
82. AHM (Madrid), 2a4a, 207, 8/1/55, Hoyos to Minister.
83. *Ibid.*, 12 and 16/1/55, Hoyos to Minister.
84. Alhama, Actas, 19/6/55.
85. *Ibid.*, 21 and 23/1/55.
86. *Ibid.*, 24/1/55.
87. *Ibid.*, 5/2/55.
88. *Ibid.*, 29/11/55.
89. *Ibid.*, 1/6/56.
90. *Ibid.*, 19/11/56.
91. *Ibid.*, 12/8/55.
92. Zafarraya, Actas, 22/5/72.
93. *Ibid.*, 11/11/52.
94. José Sartorius, the Conde de San Luis, Minister of Government under Narváez between 1847 and 1851 and First Minister in 1853–1854, was married to the daughter of Antequera's Marqués de Cela. Sartorius's brother-in-law, Rafael Chacón, future Marqués de Cela, was *moderado* Cortes deputy for Antequera during the 1850s. Sartorius was also cousin of Antequera's Conde de la Camorra. Antequera's Conde de Cartaojal was nephew of Cayetano de Urbina y Daoiz, Minister of War under Bravo Murillo in 1852. Antonio Aguilar Correa, Marqués de la Vega y Armijo, Conde de Bobadilla, was Minister of Development under O'Donnell in the early 1860s. Finally, three prominent members of Antequera's elite: Ildefonso de Arrese Rojas, Marqués de Cauche, mayor of Antequera in 1868 and during the Restoration; the Conde de la Camorra; and Juan Casasola Fonseca, Cortes deputy for Antequera during Moderate Decade, were first cousins of Narváez, Parejo (1998), 149–150.
95. Parejo (1998), p. 165.
96. Kiernan (1966), pp. 15–16.
97. Díaz (1876).

98. Eiras (1961), pp. 170–171; Antequera, *Orden Público*, 154, 18/5/47, Aguilar to Ayuntamiento.
99. Parejo (1987b), pp. 357–396.
100. Antequera, Actas, Sessions of July and August 1854.
101. *Ibid.*, 21, 23, 27 and 28/7/54, 3 and 17/8/54.
102. Parejo (1987b), p. 355; Eiras (1961), pp. 183–185; Parejo (1979), p. 222.
103. Parejo (1979), p. 226; Parejo (1987b), p. 387.
104. Kiernan (1966), p. 95; Antequera, Actas, 24/8/54.
105. Lida (1972), pp. 58–59.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
107. Antequera, Actas, 14 and 18/12/54; García (1980), pp. 265–288.
108. Parejo (1979), p. 233; Parejo (1983), pp. 372–373.
109. Parejo (1987b), p. 355.
110. *El Clamor Público*, 26/10/54 and 7/12/1854; Antequera, Actas, 10/10/54.
111. Antequera, Actas, 30/10/55.
112. Parejo (1983), p. 373.
113. Parejo (1983), p. 373; Parejo (1979), p. 223.
114. Parejo (1983), p. 373.
115. Antequera, Actas, 21, 23 and 28/7/54, 3 and 19/8/54.
116. Antequera, *Policía*, 517, ‘Ciudad de Antequera, Año de 1854, ‘Alistamiento General de la Milicia Nacional’.
117. Antequera, Actas, 21/12/54.
118. Antequera, Actas, 2/10/56, 6/6/56; AHM, 2a/4a, 207, 18/12/54, Captain General to Minister.
119. AHM, 2a 4a, 207, 11/1/55, Hernández to Captain General; 16/1/55, Hoyos to Captain General.
120. Antequera, Actas, 27/11/54, 21/12/54.
121. *Ibid.*, 15/1/55.
122. Antequera, Actas, 21 and 25/1/55.
123. *Ibid.*, 8 and 19/2/55.
124. Inarejos, (2008), pp. 193–208.
125. *Ibid.*, 5/3/55, 24 and 28/4/55, 10 and 31/5/55.
126. *Ibid.*, 10/5/55.
127. Muñoz and García (1998), pp. 164–5. Antequera, Actas, 14/5/55.
128. Antequera, Actas, 5/3/55, 23/4/55.
129. Azagra (1978), pp. 54–55; Kiernan (1966), pp. 26, 44, 86, 175.
130. Antequera, Actas, 6 and 12/6/55.
131. *Ibid.*, 25/9/55.
132. *Ibid.*, 19 and 31/8/54.
133. *Ibid.*, 5/9/55.
134. *Ibid.*
135. *Ibid.*, 9/11/55.
136. *Ibid.*, 26 and 30/6/55, 12/7/55.
137. *Ibid.*, 11/2/56.
138. *Ibid.*, 21/5/55.
139. Fernández and Heredia (1996), *passim*.
140. Antequera, Actas, 11/2/56.
141. *Ibid.*, 26/1/54, 14/12/55.
142. *Ibid.*, 23/4/55.
143. *Ibid.*, 14/1/54, 3/4/56.

144. *Ibid.*, 9/11/55, 14/1/55, 11/2/56.
145. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 381.
146. Antequera, *Actas*, 27/3/56.
147. *Ibid.*, 12/9/54, 12/10/54.
148. *Ibid.*, 5/3/55.
149. *Ibid.*, 20 and 25/2/55, 13/3/55.
150. *Ibid.*, August–November 1855.
151. *Ibid.*, 24/10/55, 10/12/55.
152. *Ibid.*, 2/4/61.
153. *Ibid.*, 16/2/54, 30/6/54; Parejo (1998), pp. 172–182; Fernández (1996), p. 21.
154. Antequera, *Actas*, 28/4/55, 10 and 21/5/55.
155. *Ibid.*, 1/10/55.
156. *Ibid.*, 9/11/55.
157. *Ibid.*, 28/9/54, 29/11/55.
158. *Ibid.*, 22/11/55.
159. *Ibid.*, 25/10/55, 13/11/55.
160. *Ibid.*, 6/9/55.
161. *Ibid.*, 15/1/56.
162. *Ibid.*, 27/5/56.
163. *Ibid.*, 16/4/56; Kiernan (1966), pp. 138–139.
164. *Ibid.*, 2 and 17/5/56.
165. *Ibid.*, 14/4/56, 27/5/56.
166. *Ibid.*, 26/6/56.
167. *Ibid.*, 28 and 29/7/56, 7 and 10/8/56.
168. *Ibid.*, 10/8/56.
169. *Ibid.*, 17 and 30/5/56.
170. Inaraejos, (2008), pp. 173–192, 259–290.

2 The Moderado Restoration and Democrat Conspiracy, 1856–1857

1. Kiernan (1966), p. 215.
2. García (1863), pp. 321–332.
3. Inaraejos, (2008), pp. 175–176.
4. AHM (Madrid), 2a/4a, 203, 23/7/56, Captain General to Minister.
5. *Ibid.*
6. AHM (Madrid), 2a/4a, 203, 20/7/56, Captain General to Minister.
7. Kiernan (1966), pp. 233–234.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
9. Castro (1979), p. 172.
10. Lida (1972), p. 83.
11. Loja, *Actas*, 5/8/55; AHM (Madrid), 2a/4a, 203, 2/8/56, Blanco to Minister.
12. Pérez (1982), p. 59.
13. Loja, *Actas*, 7/8/56.
14. Pérez (1982), p. 59; BARH, Narváez II, 9, 19/7/57, Enríquez to Narváez.
15. BARH, Narváez I, Box11, 8.
16. BARH, Narváez I, 9/7859, 10/9/56, Nocedal to Narváez.
17. Loja, *Actas*, 19/10/56, Narváez to Council.
18. *Ibid.*, 13/10/56.
19. Pérez (1982), pp. 59–64.

20. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12, 21/10/56, 5 and 15/11/56, Montero to Narváez.
21. BARH, Narváez II, 76/44, 15/11/56, López to Governor; 15/11/56, Narváez to Minister; 76/53, 29 and 30/11/56, Captain General to Minister.
22. BARH, Narváez I, 41, 5/11/56, Hermila to Narváez.
23. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12, 15/11/56, Montero to Narváez.
24. ADPG, Actas del Consejo Provincial, 1857, Vol. 1487, 27/3/57.
25. Rosal and Derqui (1957), p. 167.
26. Loja, Actas, 2/12/56.
27. Loja, 198, 'Varios', 1.
28. Loja, Actas, 17/1/57.
29. Parejo (1981), p. 59.
30. Loja, Actas, 2/12/56.
31. Loja, Actas, 11/12/56.
32. BARH, Narváez II, 76/43, 24/12/56, Rosal to Queen.
33. Ibid., 24/12/56, Rosal to Narváez.
34. Ibid., 24/12/56, López to Duke.
35. Ibid., 29/12/56, Duke to López.
36. Loja, Actas, Letter of January 1857, Rosal to Civil Governor.
37. Loja, Actas, 14/11/57.
38. Pérez (1982), p. 60.
39. BARH, Narváez II, 66, 12.
40. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12, 20 and 21/8/57, annotation on margin of letter from Montero to Narváez.
41. Loja, Actas, 30/10/58.
42. Ibid., 27/1/65.
43. Alhama, Actas, 9/10/56, 8/11/56.
44. Ibid., 2/12/57.
45. Antequera, Actas, 8/1/57.
46. Ibid., 1/2/57.
47. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 1/12/57, Governor to Travado.
48. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 12/12, 10/3/57, Ortega to Travado; *Policía*, 519, 16/3/57, Cosado and Arrabal to Travado.
49. BARH, Narváez II, 60, 3/11/52, 20/10/56, Casasola to Narváez.
50. Ibid., 3/2/57, Casasola to Narváez.
51. Ibid., 27/3/57, Casasola to Narváez.
52. Ibid., 15/3/57, Casasola to Narváez.
53. Ibid., 27/3/57, Casasola to Narváez.
54. Wheat prices in Antequera during January and February oscillated between 82 and 94 reales/fanega, almost treble the mean price for normal years, remaining in the 90s until the harvest in July 1857, Parejo (1981), p. 59; Antequera, 518, *Policía*, 21/3/57, Travado to Governor.
55. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 11/4/57, Travado to Governor; 14 and 17/4/57, Barcena to Travado; 17/4/57, Delgado to Travado; BARH, Narváez II, 60, 12/4/57, Casasola to Narváez.
56. Alora, 245, 11/12/57, Barcena to Alcalde.
57. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 23/4/57, Barcena to Travado.
58. BARH, Narváez II, 60, 28/4/57, Casasola to Narváez.
59. Antequera, *Secretaria*, 952, 30/5/57, Travado to Governor; *Policía*, 518, 3/5/57, Travado to Comandante.
60. Thomson (2007), *passim*.

61. Hales (1956); Spitzer (1971); Castells (1989).
62. Mack (1994), pp. 89–105.
63. Castro (2001), pp. 13–34.
64. Morales (1999), p. 48; Maluquer (1977), p. 301; Lida (1972), pp. 82–83; Arcas (1985), pp. 32–35; Morales (1989), pp. 19–27.
65. Castells (1989), *passim*.
66. Rodrigo (2002).
67. Borrego (1855); Gutiérrez (1982), pp. 196–197.
68. AHM (Madrid), p. 175, 2a 4a, 'De la organización del partido democrático en Cataluña'.
69. Tresserra (1856); Eiras (1961), pp. 224–225.
70. Eiras (1960).
71. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1154.
72. Parejo (1983), p. 374.
73. Pérez (1982), p. 64.
74. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1083.
75. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1173; AHM (Madrid), 2a/4a, 175, 28/4/57.
76. Fernández (1986), p. 216; Vilar (1994), p. 346; AHM (Madrid), 2a/4a, 175, 28/4/57.
77. Fernández (1986), pp. 214–222.
78. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1173.
79. A product of confused intelligence reports, 'Aragó y Garnier Pagés' was a probably a compound of two prominent French Democrats, Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès (1803–1878) and Etienne Arago (1802–1892).
80. (BARH), Narváez II, 79/70, 612/56, Nocedal to Governor.
81. Pascual (2001), p. 355.
82. Fernández (1984), pp. 140–150.
83. BARH, Narváez II, 76/54, 16/1/57, Campos to Captain General; 20/1/57, Narváez to Nocedal.
84. BARH, Narváez II, 9/59, 27/1/57, Narváez to Nocedal.
85. BARH, Narváez II, 76/63, n.d., Campos to Narváez.
86. BARH, Narváez II, 79/70, 1857, 'papelito', n.d.
87. Thomson (2007), pp. 41–42.
88. Fernández (1984), p. 51; Vilar (1994), pp. 191, 357.
89. Fernández (1986), pp. 214–222; Vilar (1994), p. 346; AHM (Madrid), 2a/4a, 175, 28/4/57; Arcas (1985), p. 35.
90. Vilar (1994), p. 191.
91. BARH, Narváez, II, 79/73, 3/5/5, Campos to Narváez; Lida (1972), pp. 83–84; Moliner (1995).
92. Lida (1973), pp. 117–122.
93. AMAE, 2861, 20 April 1857, Cámara to Chiefs.
94. AMAE, 2861, 21/4/57, Cámara to Ortiz; 21/4/57, Cámara to Germán.
95. In response, Narváez issued an amnesty for those who had taken part in the last Carlist rebellion, AMAE, 2861, 17/3/57, Cámara; Blasco (1891), III, p. 214.
96. AMAE, 2861, 'Revolución de 1857'.
97. AMAE, 2861, 21/4/57, Cámara to Ramírez; AMAE, 2866, 30/4/57, Barcena to Consul, Lisbon.
98. BARH, Narváez II, 79/73, 5 and 27/4/57, 2/5/57, Campos to Nocedal.
99. BARH, Narváez II, 79/73, 5/4/57, Campos to Nocedal; BARH, Narváez II, 79/98138, 28/4/57, 1/5/57, Barcena to Campos.

100. AMAE, 2861, 8 and 21/4/57, Cámara to Del Rio; 17/5/57, Cámara to Zaragoza and Teruel.
101. BARH, Narváez II, 79,98138, n.d. Barcena to Campos; BARH,Narváez II, 79/67, 28/4/57, Necedal to Campos; 22/4/57, Guerra to 'Amigo Juan'.
102. Narváez, II, 79/48, 'Nota con relación de varios pueblos de Andalucía'.
103. Spitzer (1971); Margadant (1979); Agulhon (1983).
104. AMAE, 2861, 'Instrucciones por el alistamiento de la columnas de voluntarios'.
105. *La Discusión*, 10/7/57.
106. *La Discusión*, 4 and 7/7/57.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Zamoyski (1999), p. 391.
109. BARH, Narváez II, 79/59, 25/6/57, Narváez to Necedal.
110. Lida (1972), p. 84.
111. Lida (1972), p. 83; Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 528.
112. BARH, Narváez I, Box 35, 1, 2, 3 and 4/7/57, Muñoz to Narváez.
113. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, Consejo de Guerra de 1857, 'Causa contra Dn Manuel María Caro, Dn.Gabriel La Llave, et al.'; AHM (Segovia), Cancelados, Joaquín Serra y Asencio, Cayetano Morales and Manuel María Caro y García; Bernal (1979), p. 439.
114. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 528; Vilar (1994), pp. 191–192.
115. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, Consejo de Guerra de 1857, 'Causa contra Dn Manuel María Caro, et al.'.
116. Lida (1972), pp. 117–122.
117. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, Consejo de Guerra de 1857, 'Causa contra Dn Manuel María Caro, et al.'; *La Discusión*, 14/7/57.
118. *Ibid.*
119. BARH, Narváez I, 11 (9), 6/7/57, Pérez to Narváez.
120. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 216–217.
121. Estrada and Segalerva (1970), III, p. 28; Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 6/7/57, Travado to Alcalde; BARH, Narváez I, 35, 2 and 27/7/57, Arce to Narváez; 6/8/57, Narváez to Arce; AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/175, 5/7/57, Hoyo to Minister.
122. Guichot (1870), VIII, p. 82.
123. Garrido (1862), p. 30; *La Discusión*, 15/7/57.
124. Guichot (1870), VIII, p. 81; Bernal (1979), p. 440.
125. Vilar (1994), pp. 191–192.
126. Garrido (1862), p. 30; Bernal (1979), pp. 436–438; Fernández (1984), p. 139.
127. BARH, Narváez, II, 79/58, 24/6/57, 'Instrucciones que deben observar las autoridades'; Bernal (1979), p. 440.
128. Three civil governors – Madrid (Marfori), Granada (Campos) and Seville (Derqui) – were nephews of Narváez in 1857, *La Discusión*, 5, 10 and 14/7/57.
129. BARH, Narváez II, 9/8135,74/4, 'Sucesos de Andalucía 1857'.
130. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12, 11/7/57, Montero to Narváez.
131. Loja, Actas, 25/6/57, 16/7/57, 13/8/57, 15/9/57, 10/10/57.
132. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 5/7/57, Pareja to Travado.
133. BARH, Narváez II, 60,10/7/57,Casasola to Narváez.
134. BARH, Narváez I, 35, 1, 2, 3 and 4/7/57, Muñoz y Andrade to Narváez.
135. Antequera, *Policía*, 520; *Policía*, 159, 21/12, 22/7/57, Gefe de Ronda to Travado.
136. *Ibid.*, 16/10/57, Travado to Barcena; 12/12/57, Travado to Military Governor.
137. BARH, Narváez II,60, 25/9/57, Casasola to Narváez.

3 Ballots, Conspiracies and Insurrection in Málaga and Granada, 1857–1859

1. Maluquer (1981), p. 795.
2. Lida (1972), pp. 80–81; Zamoyski (1999), p. 391.
3. Eiras (1961), p. 237; Rouré (1927), I, pp. 255, 280.
4. Eiras (1961), p. 237.
5. Lida (1972), pp. 123–128.
6. Eiras (1961), p. 241.
7. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1068–1069.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 1067.
9. Antequera, 518, *Policía*, 30/12/57, Gasset to Alcalde; *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1065–10671.
10. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1069–10671.
11. Aguilar (1991), p. 304.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
13. Eiras (1961), p. 242; Aguilar (1991), p. 307.
14. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1414.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 1002.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 1414.
17. Pérez (1982), pp. 69–70.
18. BARH, Narváez II, 9/8106, 39/10, 19/10/58, Marfori to Narváez.
19. *Ibid.*, 14/12/58, Marfori to Narváez.
20. *Ibid.*, 16/10/58, Marfori to Narváez.
21. BARH, Narváez II, 76/43, 20/5/58, Rosal to Narváez; 25/5/58, Narváez to Rosal.
22. BARH, Narváez II, 59, 15–19, 22/5/58, Cantero to Duke; Loja, Actas, 3/10/58.
23. BARH, Narváez II, 9/8106, 39/10, 16/10/58, Marfori to Narváez.
24. BARH, Narváez II, 29/38, 29/39, 18/6/57, Narváez to Diputado; *La Discusión*, 16/7/57.
25. Pérez (1982), p. 70.
26. Pérez (1982), pp. 69–70; *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1039–1040.
27. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1039–1040, 1392–1398.
28. Solé and Aja (1990), p. 41; González (1978), p. 97; Durán (1979), pp. 105–108.
29. *La Discusión*, 5/5/60.
30. In September 1860 blind newspaper sellers in Madrid were forbidden from proclaiming news of Garibaldi's victories, *El Pueblo*, 16/9/60.
31. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 633–634.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 633.
33. Martínez (2001), pp. 84–85.
34. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, pp. 222–224.
35. *La Discusión*, 19/6/59; for an analysis of town subscriptions in Castilla-La Mancha, Inarejos, (2008), pp. 182–183.
36. *Ibid.*, 23/4/59.
37. *Ibid.*, 23/7/59, 18 and 25/9/59; Martínez (2006), p. 48.
38. *Ibid.*, 29/4/59.
39. *Ibid.*, 29/4/59.
40. *Ibid.*, 2/1/60.
41. *Ibid.*, 30/6/59.
42. *Ibid.*, 19/6/59.

43. *Ibid.*, 17 and 24/6/59.
44. *El Reino*, 12/8/61; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1173; *La Discusión*, 24/6/9.
45. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 47, 71.
46. *La Discusión*, 31/7/59.
47. *Ibid.*, 23/4/59.
48. *Ibid.*, 19/6/59.
49. Garrido (1970), p. 18.
50. Ventosa (1860), p. 353.
51. Elorza (1975), pp. CXVI–CXXII; Garrido (1970), p. 18.
52. Maluquer (1981), p. 793.
53. Elorza (1975), p. CXXI.
54. <http://es.geocities.com/sustitutodeweboficial/alamo.htm>
55. Pérez (1979), p. 15.
56. Loja, *Actas*, 3 and 26/2/59; Pérez (1982), pp. 70–72.
57. Pérez (1982), pp. 64–67.
58. Pérez (1979), p. 15; The number of taverns in Loja increased from 12 in 1855 to 15 in 1860, although the number of establishments selling wine and *aguardiente* declined from five to two and the number of *posadas* (where alcohol was also consumed) declined from 12 in 1855 to seven in 1867, Loja, 198, *Varios* (3) (1855); 14(6) (1860); *Varios*, 199 (48) (1867).
59. Peyrou (2006), pp. 60–63.
60. Eiras (1961), p. 237–248.
61. Lida (1972), p. 85; Garrido (1868–1869), III, p. 359.
62. *La Discusión*, 24/4/59.
63. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 227–232.
64. García (2002).
65. Garrido (1868–1869), III, pp. 359–362; AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176; *La Discusión*, 4/5/59.
66. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176; *La Discusión*, 4/5/59.
67. López-Cordón (1981), pp. 842–843.
68. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, pp. 529–536.
69. Inarejos (2008), p. 185.
70. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 530.
71. Headrick (1981), p. 43.
72. *La Discusión*, 1 and 15/6/59.
73. Díaz (1876), p. 158; *La Discusión*, 2 and 10/5/59.
74. *La Discusión*, 21/7/59.
75. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176.
76. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 531.
77. *La Discusión*, 22/6/59, 27/7/59; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1073.
78. Garrido (1868–1869), pp. 386–387; AHM (Madrid) 2a/3a/176, 18/7/59, Pavía to Minister.
79. Lida (1972), pp. 85–86.
80. *La Discusión*, 21/7/59.
81. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, 7/12/59, Pavía to Madrid.
82. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, pp. 533–534.
83. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, 10/7/59, Pavía to Minister; 18/7/59, Guardia Civil to Minister; Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 535.
84. *La Discusión*, 27/8/59; AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, 9/9/59, Captain General to Minister; 28/7/59, Pavía to Minister.

85. AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, 1/9/59, Pavía to Minister; Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 535.
86. *La Discusión*, 12 and 27/7/59, 4/8/59, 4 and 6/9/59; AHM (Madrid), 2a/3a/176, 22/9/59, Pavía to Minister; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1073.
87. Rodríguez-Solís (1894), II, p. 529.
88. *El Pueblo*, 12 and 20/6/61, 19/7/61; *La Discusión*, 14/6/61.
89. Maluquer (1977), p. 302; Pascual (1997).
90. *La Discusión*, 9/7/59.
91. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1073.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 983.
93. Pérez (1982), p. 182.

4 The Advance of Democracy in Eastern Andalucía, 1860–1861

1. In May 1860 Loja owed 109,069 reales on the Territorial tax and 15,721.5 reales on the Industrial tax while the deficit on the municipal budget stood at 28,992.5 reales, Loja, Actas (1860), 22/4/6, 6/5/60.
2. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 247.
3. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 129–130, 250; *La Correspondencia*, 11/6/61.
4. Loja, Actas, 19/8/58.
5. *Memoria de Granada*, pp. 129–130.
6. Pérez (1982), p. 70–72.
7. Loja, Actas, 3 and 26/2/59.
8. *Ibid.*, 3/7/59.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 9 and 14/4/59.
11. Gonzalo Henríquez de Luna organised Loja's Battalion of Volunteers that fought the French at battle of Bailén on 22 July 1808, Pabón (1983), p. 105; *La Discusión*, 12/6/59; Loja, Actas, 15 and 17/6/59.
12. Loja, Actas, 8, 15 and 22/1/60.
13. *Ibid.*, 22/4/60, 6/5/60.
14. *Ibid.*, 4/11/60.
15. *Ibid.*, 11 and 13/7/60.
16. *Ibid.*, 8/7/60.
17. *Ibid.*, 15/7/60.
18. ADPG, 1439, Actas, 9/6/60.
19. Loja, Actas, 22/4/60, 6/5/60.
20. *La Epoca*, 3 and 4/7/61.
21. Loja, Varios, 198, No. 3, Matrícula (1855).
22. Loja, Varios, 14/6, Matrícula (1860).
23. *El Diario Español*, 19/7/61.
24. Loja, Actas, 18/5/60.
25. ADPG, Actas, 17/3/60.
26. Loja, Actas, 22/10/60, 4/11/60.
27. *El Pueblo*, 19/11/60.
28. BARH, Narváez I, 59, 10 and 11/7/60, Enríquez to Duke; Narváez II 39, 10/12, 27 and 29/12/58, Marfori to Duke.
29. *La Discusión*, 30/9/60.
30. *Ibid.*, 3/10/1860.

31. BARH, Narváez I, 14, 31/8/60, María Cristina to Duke; 5/9/60, Narváez to María Cristina.
32. *La Discusión*, 17/10/60.
33. BARH, Narváez I, 59, 17/10/60, Enríquez to Duke.
34. BARH, Narváez II, 23/15, 27/12/60, Pepe to Duke; 21/16, n.d., Marfori to Pepe.
35. BARH, Narváez II, 23/16, 18/1/61, Arce to Pepe.
36. Loja, Actas, 27/1/61.
37. BARH, Narváez II, 23/15, 27/12/60, Pepe to Duke.
38. *Ibid.*
39. BARH, Narváez II, 23/16, 15/1/61, Pepe to Duke.
40. *Ibid.*, 18/1/61, Arce to Pepe.
41. *Ibid.*, 30/1/61, Pepe to Duke.
42. *Ibid.*, 13/2/61, Pepe to Duke.
43. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 21/4/61; 23/5/61; 1, 5, and 26/6/61; 1/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
44. *La Alhambra*, 16/6/61.
45. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 20, 26/6/61, Diez Canseco to Duke.
46. *La Alhambra*, 29/6/61.
47. *La Correspondencia de España*, 19/7/61.
48. *El Pueblo*, 19/2/61, 11/3/61.
49. *La Discusión*, 17/3/61.
50. *Ibid.*, 26/2/61.
51. *Ibid.*, 9/3/61.
52. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1075.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 1077.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 479–480.
55. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1072–1073; *La Discusión*, 15 and 19/6/59; Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 3/12/61, Martínez to Alvarez; 3210, 20/6/59, Bessieres to military commander; 21/6/59, military commander to Bessieres.
56. ADPG, Actas, 1439, 21/7/60.
57. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1077.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 1083–1084.
59. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 169–172, 275–324.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 247–270; Alora, 245, 2 and 6/5/61; 11/6/61, Guerola to Alcalde.
61. Archidona, Actas, 7/6/61; Artola (1978), p. 71.
62. Calero (1982), p. 12.
63. Archidona, Actas, 28/4/61.
64. *Ibid.*, 7/7/61.
65. Guillen (1983), pp. 677–682; Aguilar (1991), p. 361; Galera (1983); García (1979), pp. 357–366.
66. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1136; Alvarez (1996), pp. 45–47.
67. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1137–1138.
68. Pérez (1982), pp. 72–73; *El Pueblo*, 7/5/61.
69. *El Pueblo*, 7/5/61.
70. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1137.
71. *El Pueblo*, 25/5/61.
72. *Ibid.*, 7/5/61.
73. Ortega (1974), pp. 13–20, 167.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
75. Aguilar (1991), pp. 257, 415.

76. BARH, Narváez, II, 74, 6, 'Revolución Socialista de Loja'.
77. *El Reino*, 11/7/61.
78. *El Reino*, 11/7/61; Pérez (1979), p. 16.
79. *La Correspondencia de España*, 17/6/61; Zafarraya, *Actas*, 7/3/61; *El Reino*, 5/7/61.
80. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1084.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 1085.
82. *La Correspondencia*, 10/6/61.
83. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 463–470.
84. Antequera, *Policía*, 19–521, 2/2/61, Guerola to Council.
85. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 155; for the momentous cost of funding rural guards in Castilla-La Mancha, Inajeros, (2008), pp. 291–320.
86. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159.
87. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 155, 18/5/61, Guerola to Camacho; 9/6/61, Alvarez to Guerola; *Policía*, 521.
88. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1081.
89. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 3/1/62, Jiménez to Alcalde Corregidor; Antequera, *Actas*, 9/1/62.
90. *El Reino*, 10/7/61; *El Pueblo*, 12/7/61.
91. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1090, 1177.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 1170, 1210; *El Diario Espanol*, 19/6/61.
93. *La Discusión*, 11/5/61; *El Pueblo*, 12/6/61.
94. *Ibid.*, 14 and 20/6/61.
95. *Ibid.*, 20 and 21/6/61.
96. *El Diario Español Político y Literario*, 3/7/61.
97. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 16, 19/19, 15/6/61, Guerola to Alvarez.
98. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1100.
99. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 19/6/61, Blasco to Comandante.
100. Estrada y Segalerva (1970), II, p. 314; Nadal (1974), p. 59; Pérez (1982), p. 81; *La Correspondencia*, 30/6/61.
101. Pérez (1982), p. 81.
102. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 66.
103. Hijano (1994), p. 137.
104. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1029–1030.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 577.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 580–581.
107. Antequera, *Actas*, 27/4/61.
108. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 5/5/61, García et al. to Guerola.
109. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 579–580.

5 The Loja Revolution

1. BARH, Narváez II, 38/10.
2. Pérez (1982), p. 78.
3. *El Pueblo*, 20/6/61.
4. *La Alhambra*, 25/1/61, 14/3/61.
5. Pérez (1982), p. 78.
6. *El Pueblo*, 16, 19 and 21/11/60.
7. D. Castro (1996), pp. 30–39.
8. Pérez (1982), pp. 81–83.
9. *El Diario Espanol*, 10/7/61.

10. Pérez (1982), pp. 81–83.
11. *El Pueblo*, 9/7/61.
12. Pérez (1982), p. 83.
13. Aroca (1983), pp. 362–363.
14. Pérez (1982), p. 84.
15. *La Iberia*, 9/7/61.
16. For a fuller account of the historiography, Thomson (2008), pp. 160–164.
17. *El Pueblo*, 3 and 4/2/64.
18. *El Pueblo*, 23/7/61.
19. Estévez (1984), pp. 78–79.
20. Garrido (1868–1869), III, p. 544; Morayta (1895), VII, p. 218.
21. *La Epoca*, 1/7/61.
22. *El Diario Español Político y Literario*, 3/7/61.
23. *Crónica de ambos mundos*, 10/7/61; *La Correspondencia*, 22/7/61.
24. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 26/7/61, Arce to Duke; Calero (1982), p. 42.
25. Campos (1951).
26. For the contemporary meaning of *unión* among Córdoba's agricultural labourers, Martínez (1971) *passim*; for a moral economy approach, Okazumi (1983, 1987, 1992).
27. Díaz (1984), pp. 77–78; Carrión (1975), pp. 56–57; Bernaldo (1986); Tusell (1976), p. 421; Carr (1966), pp. 288–294; Gildea (1987), p. 155; Bernal (1974), p. 121; Tuñón (1977), II, p. 128; Eiras (1961), p. 258; Millan (1979), II, pp. 7–12; Mintz (1994), pp. 4–7; Kaplan (1977), pp. 206–212; Maurice (1990), pp. 7–16; Gutiérrez (1982), pp. 200–202; Calero (1982), pp. 9–47; Lida (1997), pp. 3–23; Lida (1972), pp. 87–98.
28. For the five-day occupation of Loja, *El Contemporáneo*, 12/7/61; for a diary of events between 29 June and 21 July, BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo tubo la curiosidad de ir escribiendo en la sublevación que tubo lugar en la Ciudad de Loja en junio de 1861' (henceforth 'Memoria que un amigo').
29. Zamoyski, (1999), pp. 262–263.
30. BARH, Narváez II, 64, 30, 29/7/61, Rafael Narváez to Duke.
31. *Ibid.*, undated fragment of letter in the handwriting of Pepe Narváez.
32. This session is missing from Loja's Council minutes.
33. BARH, Narváez II, 23, 20, n.d., Pepe to Duke.
34. Pérez (1982), p. 84; *El Contemporáneo*, 12/7/61.
35. *Ibid.*
36. BARH, Narváez II, 23, 20, n.d. Pepe to Duke.
37. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 16, 11/7/61, Pepe to Duke; 85, 18, 6/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
38. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
39. *El Reino*, 19/7/61.
40. *La Epoca*, 3/7/61.
41. Guerola reported that Díaz managed furtively to continue sending messages 'for two or three days he was giving us news on what was happening in Loja: confidential, laconic, interrupted reports that greatly helped the authorities here know what was happening there', *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1141–1142.
42. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
43. Later during the occupation, walls of street paving were built at the intersection of the main streets, and 'five enormous trenches' constructed: one on the road to Málaga, one on the road to Granada, two north of the city across the river facing Granada and another between the lower and the higher towns, *El Pueblo*, 5/7/61.

44. BARH, Narvaez, II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. *El Contemporaneo*, 16/7/61.
48. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
49. Pérez's first act on 30 June was to take over the administration of gunpowder, tobacco and salt monopolies, proposing to sell salt at 30 reales/fanega (although this clashed with one of the initial slogans of the rebellion: 'Free Salt!'), Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. *El Contemporaneo*, 16/7/61.
53. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
54. *El Contemporaneo*, 16/7/61.
55. Ibid.
56. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
57. Ibid.
58. *El Contemporaneo*, 16/7/61.
59. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'; another witness recorded that Pérez instructed his followers to defend themselves from rooftops or be labelled as traitors, *El Contemporaneo*, 16/7/61.
60. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
61. *El Contemporaneo*, 12/7/61.
62. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
63. Pérez (1982), p. 84.
64. Zafarraya, *Actas*, 3/7/61.
65. Zafarraya, *Actas*, 7/7/61; *La Alhambra*, 9/7/61.
66. *El Reino*, 8/7/61.
67. Pérez (1982), p. 84.
68. *La Alhambra*, 16/7/61.
69. *El Pueblo*, 10/9/61.
70. *La Alhambra*, 11/7/61.
71. *El Reino*, 10/7/61.
72. *El Diario Español*, 16/7/61.
73. *Diario Español Político y Literario*, 3/7/61; *La Alhambra*, 27 and 28/9/61; Greene (1862), pp. 73–79; Menéndez (1881), pp. 683–684; Vilar (2003), pp. 69–76.
74. *El Contemporaneo*, 12/7/61.
75. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
76. *El Pueblo*, 16/7/61; *El Contemporaneo*, 1/7/61.
77. *El Contemporaneo*, 12/7/61; *Alhama, Actas*, 18/8/61.
78. *El Reino*, 19/7/61.
79. *La Iberia*, 6/7/61.
80. *El Pueblo*, 5/7/61.
81. BARH, Narvaez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
82. Ibid.
83. *El Contemporaneo*, 12/7/61.
84. Pérez (1982), p. 84.
85. *El Contemporaneo*, 16/7/61.
86. Carrión (1975), p. 20.
87. *La Correspondencia de España*, 11/11/61.
88. *El Reino*, 6/7/61.

89. *La Alhambra*, 16/7/61.
90. *La Regeneración*, 29/8/61.
91. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 16, 11/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
92. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 580–581.
93. BARH, Narváez II, 74, 6, ‘Revolución Socialista de Loja’.
94. BARH, Narváez II, 38, 10, 6/7/61, Gutiérrez to Narváez.
95. Ramírez (2002), p. 77.

6 The Council of War in Loja

1. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 2/7/61, Marfori to Narváez; *La Epoca*, 2 and 3/7/61.
2. Garrido (1868–1869), III, p. 524.
3. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1167.
4. *La Alhambra*, 15/6/61.
5. AGM (Segovia), 2a, 8a, 31, 10/7/61, Bessieres to Minister.
6. *El Reino*, 5/7/61.
7. *La Alhambra*, 14/7/61.
8. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 6/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
9. BRAH, Narváez II, 64, 30, 5/7/61, Lora to Duke.
10. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 8/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
11. *El Reino*, 3/7/61.
12. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1097; Boyd (2000), p. 69.
13. *La Correspondencia*, 15 and 17/7/61.
14. *El Reino*, 10/7/61.
15. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 5/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
16. BRAH, Narváez II, 64, 30, 5/7/61, Lora to Duke.
17. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 5 and 6/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
18. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 7, n.d., Marfori to Duke.
19. Pérez (1982), p. 86.
20. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 7, n.d., Marfori to Duke.
21. BRAH, Narváez II, 23, 18, 8/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
22. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 26/761, Arce to Duke.
23. During the Bienio Progresista Mariano Ceballos was commander of the Militia, helped establish the reading room in the Convent of La Victoria, and for a time was regarded as the intellectual leader of Loja’s moderate Democrats, BRAH, Narváez II, 23, 16 and 17/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
24. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 10/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
25. BRAH, Narváez II, 23, 16, 11/7/61, Narváez to Duke.
26. BRAH, Narváez II, 85, 14, 15/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
27. *La Alhambra*, 13/7/61.
28. *La Iberia*, 9/7/61.
29. AHMS, 2a/9a/17, 7/7/61, Alcalá to Minister.
30. BRAH, Narváez II, 85/18, 10/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
31. AHMS, 2a/9a/ 33, 10/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
32. *Ibid.*
33. BRAH, Narváez II, 23/18, 8/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
34. *El Contemporaneo*, 12/7/61; *El Pueblo*, 16/7/61; *El Reino*, 9/7/61.
35. AHMS, 2a/9a/33, 9/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
36. *Ibid.*, 9/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
37. *Ibid.*, 10/7/61, Serrano to Minister.

38. Ibid., 13/7/61, Minister to Serrano.
39. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 18, 10/7/61, Marfori to Narváez; AHMS, 2a/9a/33, 23/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
40. AHMS, 2a/9a/17, 19/7/61, Alcalá to Minister.
41. AHMS, 2a/9a/33, 25/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
42. Loja, Actas, 18/7/61, 25/8/61.
43. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 14, 15/7/61, Marfori to Duke.
44. BARH, Narváez II, 23, 16, 18/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
45. Ibid., 31/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
46. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 'Memoria que un amigo'; AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 19/7/61, Caro et al. to Isabel.
47. BARH, Narváez II, 23, 16 and 17/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
48. *La Correspondencia*, 22/7/61.
49. AHMS, 2a/9a/33, 14/7/61, Nofuentes to Hoyos.
50. Ibid., 9/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
51. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1110.
52. BARH, Narváez II, Legajo 85, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
53. Ibid.
54. BARH, Narváez II, 23/16, 19/7/61, Narváez to Duke.
55. *La Correspondencia*, 7/8/61.
56. *La Alhambra*, 27/8/61; *La Correspondencia*, 7/8/61.
57. Mellado was heard calling from his cell 'I will tell all! You rogues have finished me!'. Later in the presence of the clergy he was heard to say repeatedly, 'Off with you, I have good friends!', which the diarist took as a sign that Mellado still expected his fellow Society members to rise up and save him 'as they were bound to do by oath', BARH, Narváez II, 85, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
58. *El Pueblo*, 29/7/61.
59. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
60. Ibid.
61. BARH, Narváez II, 85/11, 17/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
62. AHMS, 2a/9a, 17, 7/7/61, Minister to Alcalá; AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 26/7/61, Serrano to O'Donnell.
63. AHMS, 2a/9a, 33, 3/8/61, Alcalá to Minister.
64. Ibid., 20/8/61, Serrano to Minister.
65. Ibid.
66. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 26/7/61, Serrano to Duke of Tetuan.
67. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
68. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 22/7/61, Salvador Josef to Isabel.
69. Ibid., 23/7/61, Campos et al. to Isabel; *El Pueblo*, 29/7/61.
70. AHMS, 2a/9a 50, 25/7/61, Davila to O'Donnell; *El Reino*, 29/7/61.
71. AHMS, 2a/9a 117, 27/7/61, Calderon to Minister.
72. *La Alhambra*, 18/7/61.
73. AHMS, 2a/9a, 31, 'Relación nominal de los individuos'.
74. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 26/7/61, Serrano to O'Donnell.
75. AHMS, 2a/9a, 31, 25/7/61, Ygón to Alcalá.
76. Ibid., 29/7/61, Minister to Alcalá.
77. BARH, Narváez II, 85/12, 3/8/61, Montero to Duke; for confirmation enlistment on a *cortijo* at Salinas on the day of the execution at Salar, *La Alhambra*, 27/8/61.
78. BARH, Narváez II, 85/11, 19/7/6, Narváez to Duke.
79. *La Correspondencia*, 20/8/61.

80. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 26/7/61, Serrano to O'Donnell.
81. *Ibid.*
82. *La Alhambra*, 13/12/61.
83. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 26/7/61, Arce to Duke; *El Pueblo*, 29/7/61; *La Discusión*, 20/7/61.

7 The Sierra Bética: Conspiratorial Región

1. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
2. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 29/7/61, Rodríguez to O'Donnell.
3. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1093–1094.
4. Guerola acknowledged that *vecinos* from Archidona, Periana, Alfarnate, Alfarnetejo, Almogía, Cútar, Vélez, Borge, Comares, Colmenar, Humilladero, Valle de Abdalajís, Mollina, Fuente de Piedra, Villanueva de Cauche, Casabermeja and the Montes de Málaga 'left for the mountains, some to go to Loja, others to wait and second the revolutionary movement that they believed was going to break out everywhere', *Ibid.*, pp. 1094, 1100–1101.
5. *La Correspondencia*, 14/7/61.
6. AGMS, 2a, 8a, 31, 10/7/61, Bessières to Minister; *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1099, 1105; Aroca (1985), p. 35; Estrada y Segalerva (1970), III, p. 66.
7. *El Reino*, 10/7/61.
8. *La Correspondencia*, 12/7/61.
9. *El Reino*, 18/7/61; *La Correspondencia*, 14, 16, 18 and 19/7/61.
10. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1097.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 1103.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 1104.
13. *Ibid.*
14. AHMS, 2a/9a 33, 7/8/61, Bessières to Minister; *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1106–1107.
15. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1113–1114.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 1108–1109.
17. AHMS, 2a/9a, 33, 6/8/61, Alcalá to Minister.
18. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 18/8/61, Alcalá to Minister.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 64.
21. *Alora*, 245, 7/7/61, Guerola to Marqués; 11/7/61, Rodríguez to Marqués.
22. *Ibid.*, 12 and 24/8/61, Marqués to Fiscal.
23. *Ibid.*, 245, 1 and 10/9/61, Guerola to Alcalde.
24. *Ibid.*, 245, 22 and 24/10/61; 3/11/61, Guerola to Alcalde.
25. *El Pueblo*, 16/10/61.
26. *Alora*, 245, 29/8/61, Guerola to Alcalde.
27. AHMS, 2a/9a 33, 21/7/61, Bessières to Minister; AHMS, 2a/9a 117, 'Estado de las causas'.
28. Parejo (1998), p. 166.
29. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1034, 1183.
30. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 10/7/61, Reyna to Alvarez.
31. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 'Estado de las causas'; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 57.
32. AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 'Estado de las causas'.
33. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 11/7/61, Guerola to Alvarez; AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 'Estado de las causas'.

34. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1111, 1119.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 1177.
36. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 19/19, 3/10/61, Giménez to Alvarez; *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 12/10/61, Muñoz to Alvarez; 13/10/61, Martínez to Alvarez; *Actas*, 17/10/61.
37. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1162.
38. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 4/3/62, 8/4/62, 17/6/62, Jiménez to Alcalde Corregidor.
39. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 57–58, 1110–1111, 1177.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 1177.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 1183.
42. AHMS, 2a/9a, 3, 'Relación nominal de los individuos', 17/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
43. *El Pueblo*, 21/8/61; *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1111–1112, 1173.
44. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1173.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 1183.
46. AHMS, 2a/9a, 33, 27/7/61, Alcalá to Minister; AHMS, 2a/9a, 31, 'Relación nominal de los individuos'; AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 'Estado de las causas'.
47. *La Discusión*, 3/10/61.
48. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1173.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71.
50. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1174; BARH, Narváez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
51. *El Reino*, 9/7/61.
52. Estrada y Segalerva (1970), III, p. 47; *La Alhambra*, 11/7/61.
53. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1174.
54. *La Alhambra*, 11/7/61.
55. Nuñez and Ruiz (2006), p. 350.
56. AHMS, 2a/9a 33, 23/761, Serrano to Minister; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1111.
57. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1174.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 1177.
59. AGMS, 2/9, 33, 12/8/61, Alcalá to Minister.
60. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1110; *La Discusión*, 15, 21 and 25/9/61.
61. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 9, 'Memoria que un amigo'.
62. *El Pueblo*, 23/8/61.
63. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1174–1175; AGMS, 2a/9a, 33, 1/8/61, Bessières to Minister; 5/9/61, Alcalá to Minister; *El Reino*, 12/8/61; *La Discusión*, 3/10/61.
64. AGMS, 2a/9a 33, 6/9/61, Alcalá to Minister.
65. AGMS, 2a/9a, 31, 17/7/61, Serrano to Minister; Estrada y Segalerva (1970), III, p. 81.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
67. *El Pueblo*, 16/10/61.
68. Estrada y Segalerva (1970), III, p. 344.
69. *El Pueblo*, 16/10/61; *La Discusión*, 7/10/61.
70. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1100.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 1131, 1359.
72. Archidona, *Actas*, 5 and 19/5/61, 30/6/61.
73. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1183; Archidona, *Actas*, 19/5/61.
74. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1134.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 1133–1137.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 1138.

77. Archidona, Actas, 9/8/61.
78. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1111.
79. *El Clamor Público*, 30/10/61.
80. *El Reino*, 4/10/61.
81. *El Pueblo*, 3/10/61.
82. Antequera, Actas, 26/5/54.
83. Otero (1996), passim.
84. Castro (1979), p. 176.
85. BARH, Narvaez II, 85–87, 20/6/61, Márquez to Narváez.
86. *La Alhambra*, 26/6/61.
87. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 67.
88. BARH, Narvaez II, 85–87, 30/6/61, Márquez to Narváez.
89. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 68.
90. BARH, Narvaez II, 85–87, 30/7/61, Márquez to Narváez; Tapia, Actas, 1861.
91. Tapia, Actas, 1/7/61.
92. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1107–1111; Tapia, Actas, 1861 and 1862; AHMS, 2a/9a, 117, 10/8/61, Alcalá to Minister; *La Discusión*, 10/9/61.
93. BARH, Narvaez II, 85–87, 30/7/61, Márquez to Narváez.
94. Aroca (1983), pp. 353–365.
95. BARH, Narváez II, 74, 6, 'Revolución Socialista'.
96. *La Alhambra*, 9 and 16/7/861.
97. BARH, Narváez II, 74, 6, 'Revolución Socialista'.
98. Ibid.
99. Aroca (1983), p. 365.
100. BARH, Narváez II, 74, 6, 'Revolución Socialista'.
101. Ibid.
102. *La Correspondencia*, 12/7/61; *El Pueblo*, 9/7/61.
103. *El Pueblo*, 8/8/61.
104. Aroca (1983), pp. 361–363.
105. *La Correspondencia*, 20/8/61.
106. AHMS, 2a/9a 30, 23/7/61, Serrano to Minister; BARH, Narváez II, 85, 33, 19/7/61, Pepe to Duke.
107. AHMS, 2a/9a, 31, 'Noticia numérica de los Reos...'; *La Discusión*, 6/8/6; Aroca (1985), p. 364.
108. *El Pueblo*, 27/7/61.
109. *La Alhambra*, 18/7/61.
110. Aroca (1985), p. 361.
111. AHMS, 2a/9a 30, 6/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
112. Aroca (1985), p. 357.
113. *La Alhambra*, 11/7/61.
114. Aroca (1985), p. 361.
115. *El Diario Español*, 10/7/61
116. *La Alhambra*, 3 and 6/7/61.
117. *La Iberia*, 9/7/61; Loja, Actas, 11/8/61.
118. Alhama, Actas, 30/6/61.
119. Ibid.
120. García (1994).
121. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1110; *La Correspondencia*, 20/7/61; AGMS, 2a/9a, 33, 21/7/61, Serrano to Minister.
122. Alhama, Actas, 3/6/61.

123. *Diario* (1862), I, pp. 444–445.
124. AGMS, 2a/9a, 33, 16, 20 and 23/7/61, Serrano to Minister; *La Discusión*, 14/8/61.
125. AGMS, 2a/9a, 33, 15/8/61, Galiano to Minister; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1110.
126. AGMS, 2a/9a, 33, 2/8/61, Galiano to Minister.
127. ADPG, Actas, 4 and 18/12/54.
128. *El Pueblo*, 8/6/61.
129. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 67.
130. *El Pueblo*, 29/7/61; Estrada y Segalerva (1970), III, p. 326.
131. *La Discusión*, 6/8/61; *El Pueblo*, 6/7/61; *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 411, 1126–1128; AGMS, 2/9/33, 20/10/61, Alcalá to Minister.
132. BARH, Narváez I, 34, 9/11/66, Friedrich to Duke.

8 Combating Clandestinity in Antequera, July 1861–December 1862

1. *El Pueblo*, 3/7/61.
2. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1100–1101.
3. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 8/7/61, Jiménez to Alvarez.
4. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 155, 3/7/61, Jiménez to Alvarez.
5. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 155, 2/7/61, Jiménez to Alvarez; *Subdelegación de Policía*, 518, 4/7/61, Jiménez to Alvarez.
6. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 19/9, 23/9/61, Jiménez to Alvarez; 29/9/861, Alvarez to Jiménez; *Orden Público*, 159, 3/7/61, Guerola to Alvarez; 11/7/61, Del Pozo to Alvarez.
7. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 28/9/6, Guerola to Alvarez; ‘Reservado’, 1/10/61, Alvarez to Guerola.
8. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 22/3/62, Jiménez to Alvarez.
9. Antequera, Actas, 11/8/61.
10. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 12/7/61, Guerola to Alvarez.
11. *El Contemporáneo*, 27/7/61.
12. *El Pueblo*, 9/7/61.
13. Antequera, Actas, 6/7/61.
14. Antequera, *Secretaría*, 952, 6/7/61, Aguilar to Alvarez.
15. Antequera, *Policía*, 518, 11/7/61, Muñoz to Alvarez; Actas, 4/8/61.
16. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1117–1118; AHMS, 2a/9a, 33, 1/8/61, Bessières to Minister.
17. *La Discusión*, 2/9/61.
18. *La Regeneración*, 2/9/61.
19. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 17/10/61.
20. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 1/9, 7 and 8/8/61, Guerola to Alvarez; 9 and 18/8/61, Alvarez to Guerola.
21. *La Discusión*, 22/9/61.
22. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 12/7/61, Jiménez to Alvarez.
23. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 14/7/61, Alvarez to Jiménez; *Subdelegación de Policía*, 520, ‘Alistamiento General... 1854’.
24. Antequera, Actas, 14/8/61.
25. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 19/19, 7/8/61, Guerola to Alvarez; Actas, 8/8/61.
26. Antequera, Actas, 14/8/61; *Orden Público*, 59, 21/4, 2/2/62, Alcalde Corregidor to Juzgado; *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1108.
27. Antequera, Actas, 14/8/61.

28. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 19/19, 8/9/62, Abad to Alcalde Corregidor.
29. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1109, 1111, 1119.
30. *La Discusión*, 3/10/61.
31. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 12/10/61, Alvarez to Bessieres.
32. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 19/19, 26/8/61, Muñoz to Alvarez.
33. *El Clamor Público*, 30/10/61; Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 19/19, 19/11/61, Jiménez to Alvarez.
34. AHMS, 2a/9a, 17, 1/11/61, Alcalá to Minister.
35. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 16/12/61, Guerola to Alvarez.
36. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 1150–1151.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 1162.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 493.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 1164–1170.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 1167.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 1165–1166.
42. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 3/1/62, Jiménez to González; *Actas*, 9/1/62.
43. *Ibid.*, 21/1/62, Jiménez to González.
44. *Ibid.*, 23/1/62, Muñoz to González.
45. *Ibid.*, 24/1/62, Martínez to González; 25/1/62, Martínez to González; 21/2/62, Muñoz, to González.
46. *Ibid.*, 21/1/62, Jiménez to González.
47. Antequera, *Actas*, 2/9/62.
48. Parejo (1998), pp. 161–162; Antequera, *Elecciones (1862–1863)*, p. 112, ‘Lista de Electores’, 25/10/62.
49. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 66.
50. Antequera, *Subdelegación de Policía*, 520, ‘Ciudad de Antequera, Alistamiento General ... 1854’.
51. Antequera, *Actas*, 8 and 12/10/54, 21/12/54.
52. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/9, 31/7/61, Jiménez to Comandante; 2/8/61, Guerola to Alvarez; 3/8/61, Alvarez to Guerola; Lida (1972), p. 37.
53. Antequera, *Actas*, 854, 14 and 26/1/54; 28/7/54; 10/8/54.
54. Antequera, *Actas (1854–1855)*, *passim*.
55. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 166–167.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
57. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 21/1/62, Jiménez to González.
58. *Ibid.*; *Vigilancia*, 518, n.d., González to Guerola.
59. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 24/1/62, Civil Guard to González.
60. *Ibid.*, 21/1/62, Martínez to González.
61. *Ibid.*, 21/1/62, Jiménez to González.
62. *Ibid.*, 20/2/62, Jiménez to González.
63. *Ibid.*, 9/1/62, González to Guerola.
64. Antequera, *Secretaría General*, 888, 24/1/62, González to ‘Antequeranos’.
65. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 5/1/62, ‘Presidente del Consejo particular de las conferencias de San Vicente de Paul’ to Parish Priests.
66. *Ibid.*, 13/2/62, González to Guerola; 10/2/62, Guerola to González.
67. *Ibid.*, 11/2/62, Jiménez to González; 15 and 16/2/62, Muñoz to González; 16/2/62, González to Jiménez.
68. *Ibid.*, 5/3/62, González to Guerola.
69. *Ibid.*, 30/5/62, González to Jiménez.
70. *Ibid.*, 4/2/62, González to Muñoz; 25/3/62, Jiménez to González.

71. 31/8/62, Aguilar to González.
72. Antequera, Actas, 9/2/62.
73. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1432.
74. Parejo (1987a), p. 293; Parejo (1998), pp. 163–164.
75. Antequera, Actas, 14 and 18/9/54.
76. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1433.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 1439.
78. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 12/9/62, Guerola to González.
79. *Ibid.*, 31/5/62, Jiménez to González.
80. Antequera, *Secretaría General*, 888, 21/4, 17/5/62, Guerola to Jiménez.
81. *Ibid.*, *Borrador de Oficios* (1862), González.
82. Antequera, 156, 20/12, 4/6/62, Muñoz to González.
83. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 20/12, 1/6/2, González to Jiménez; 3/6/62, Jiménez to González.
84. *Ibid.*, 26/4/62, Muñoz to González.
85. *Ibid.*, 9/5/62, González, 'Reglas'.
86. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 20/17, 2/6/62, Burgos to González.
87. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/4, 16/5/62, González to Jiménez; 20/5/62, Jiménez to González.
88. *Ibid.*, 10/7/62, Jiménez to González.
89. *Ibid.*, 20/6/62, Elizalde to González.
90. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 20/17, 3 and 16/6/62, Valle to González.
91. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 2/4, 17/7/62, Checa to González.
92. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 20/17, 4/6/62, González to Guerola; 3/6/62, Muñoz to González.
93. Antequera, *Secretaría General*, 1888, 13/6/62, Guerola to González.
94. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/18, 16/6/62, Muñoz to González; 17/6/61, González to Guerola; *Orden Público*, 159, 2/4, 17/6/62, Muñoz to González.
95. *La Discusión*, 5 and 11/7/62.
96. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/8, 3 and 21/7/62, Guerola to González.
97. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 159, 21/10, 31/8/62, Aguilar to Alcalde Corregidor.
98. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 20/17, 12/9/62, Guerola to Alcalde Corregidor.
99. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1233; Reyes and Cobos (1994), p. XIII.
100. Aguilar (1894), II, pp. 109–120.
101. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 316, 1233–1235.
102. Franquelo (1862), p. 8.
103. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 1236.
104. *Ibid.*
105. *Ibid.*, p. 1239.

9 Narváez's Return and Queen Isabel's Visit to Loja in 1862

1. *La Alhambra*, 13/12/61.
2. BRAH, Narváez I, 14, 28/3/62, Narváez to María Cristina.
3. BARH, Narváez II, 23, 15, 10/8/60, 10/6/61, Pepe to Duke.
4. Reyes and Cobos (1994), pp. XIII–XIV; Llorca (1984), pp. 217–219.
5. BARH, Narváez II, 85, 11, 16/10/61, 'Fathers, Mothers and Wives of the unhappy Militiamen of this City' to Duke; 85, 11, 11/11/61, Triguero et al. to Duke; 85, 11, 18/12/61, wives and mothers of prisoners to Duke; 85, 22, 2/8/63, 'varios provinciales' to Duke.

6. ADPG, Actas (1862), pp. 1440, 17/3/62.
7. *La Discusión*, 13/5/62.
8. *Ibid.*, 3/5/62.
9. BARH, Narváez I, 9/7859, 21/2/57, Necedal to Narváez; BARH, Narváez II, 75,105, 22/8/57, Salvador Josef to Narváez.
10. Loja, Actas, 15/6/61.
11. BARH, Narváez II, 117/26, 30/3/62, Ponti to Duke.
12. BARH, Narváez II, 29/66, 12/1/57, Campos to Duke.
13. BARH, Narváez II, 60/61, 10/1/57, Castellero to Duke.
14. *Ibid.*, 27/8/57, Castellero to Duke.
15. *Ibid.*, 24/9/ n.y (1857), Castellero to Duke.
16. *Ibid.*, 20/7/59, Castellero to Duke.
17. BARH, Narváez II, 75/105, 18/4/62, Salvador Josef to Duke.
18. *Ibid.*, 23/6/62, Duke to Minister.
19. BARH, Narváez II, 59/48, 31/6/62, Caro to Duke.
20. BARH, Narváez II, 76/2, 2/3/62, Ríquez to Duke.
21. BARH, Narváez II, 59/2, 28/8/62, 2/9/62, Enríquez to Duke.
22. *La Alhambra*, 13/10/61.
23. BARH, Narváez II, 38/1, 19/7/62, Gutiérrez to Duke.
24. Loja, Actas, 10/8/62.
25. Loja, Actas, 14/12/62.
26. Durán (1979), pp. 117–119.
27. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 259–272.
28. Durán (1979), pp. 241–250.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
30. Lida (1972), pp. 93–94.
31. *La Discusión*, 13 and 28/5/62.
32. BARH, Narváez II, 38/11, 25 and 28/7/62, Gutiérrez to Duke.
33. Castro (1994b), p. 74.
34. Garrido (1862), p. 34.
35. Eiras (1961), pp. 263–267.
36. Mack (1994), pp. 163–164.
37. BARH, Narváez II, 38/11, 18/8/62, Gutiérrez to Narváez.
38. Llorca (1984), p. 187.
39. Claret (1985), p. 350.
40. *Diario* (1862), I, pp. 52–53, 210, 418–421, 444–445.
41. BRAH, Narváez II, 38/11, 3/9/62, Gutiérrez to Narváez.
42. AHM, 2a/9a, 117, Circular No. 39, 22/9/62, Yztariz to Minister.
43. *La Discusión*, 9 and 25/9/62, 19/11/62.
44. *Ibid.*, 6/9/62.
45. *Ibid.*, 10/9/62.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*, 16 and 18/9/62.
48. *Ibid.*, 24/10/62.
49. *Ibid.*, 21/10/62.
50. *Ibid.*, 6/9/62.
51. *Ibid.*, 19/9/62.
52. *Ibid.*, 10/10/62.
53. *Ibid.*, 5/10/62.
54. Loja, Actas, 10/8/62.

55. Ibid.
56. Reyes and Cobos (1862), p. XI.
57. Ibid., p. 94.
58. Jean-Baptiste Robert Auget, Baron de Montyon (1733–1820), French philanthropist, devised his system of ‘prizes for virtue’ during the 1770s. Abolished by the Convention, Auget revised the system in 1815 with the Restoration, *La Discusión*, 30/9/56.
59. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 325–349.
60. *La Alhambra*, 21, 22, 23/3/61, 19, 20, 25/4/61, 1, 15/5/61, 12/6/61.
61. Ibid., pp. 9–100.
62. Ibid., p. 154.
63. *El Porvenir*, 26/10/62.
64. *El Porvenir*, 16/10/62.
65. *La Discusión*, 24/10/62; *La Andalucía*, 18/10/62.
66. Reyes and Cobos (1862), p. 157.
67. Claret (1985), p. 350; Aguilar (1894), II, p. 119.
68. Reyes and Cobos (1962), p. 157.
69. Ibid., pp. 157–163.
70. BARH, Narváez II, 38/11/34, 18/11/62, Gutiérrez to Duke.
71. Salamanca’s newspaper *El Porvenir* confirmed that the Alcalde Corregidor had invited *indultado* leaders to gather others to greet the Queen ‘teaching them the chorus which they should intone’ admitting that Narváez had equipped them with the palm leaves and olive branches, *La Discusión*, 19/11/62; Pérez (1982), p. 97.
72. *La Andalucía*, 18/10/62.
73. Pérez (1982), pp. 98–100.
74. Ibid., p. 99.
75. BARH, Narváez II, 139/13, 25/11/62, Marfori to Duke.
76. Pérez (1982), p. 100.
77. BARH, Narváez II, 38/11/38, 25/11/62, Gutiérrez to Duke.
78. BARH, Narváez II, 23, 20, 27/12/60, Pepe to Duke; 38/11/38, 25/11/62, Gutiérrez to Duke; *La Discusión*, 10/9/62.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 26/11/62, Gutiérrez to Duke.
81. BARH, Narváez II, 139/13, 29/11/62, Marfori to Duke.
82. BARH, Narváez II, 38/11/38, 25/11/62, Gutiérrez to Duke.
83. Pérez (1982), p. 101.
84. Ibid., p. 103.

10 ‘The Second Loja’: Garibaldi and the Limits of Democracy in Eastern Granada, 1863–1864

1. *Memoria de Sevilla*, p. 197.
2. *El Espíritu Público*, 19/2/64.
3. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 273–275.
4. Vallejo and Ojeda (2002), p. 28.
5. Aguilar (1991), p. 322; Blasco (1891), III, pp. 377–378.
6. *Gaceta de Madrid*, 26/6/63.
7. Ibid., 14/8/63.
8. Ibid., 21/8/63.

9. Eiras (1961), pp. 275–278.
10. BARH, Narváez II, 85/7, 3/3/63, Gil de Montes to Duke.
11. BARH, Narváez II, 85/7, 4/3/63, Antonio Lora to Francisco Lora; ADPG, Actas, 27/8/62.
12. ADPG, 604/1, Telegraphs, 1, 19 and 28/4/63, Rodríguez to Alonso; Blasco (1891), III, p. 303.
13. ADPG, 604/1, 23/4/63, Alonso to Minister.
14. ADPG, 604/1, 'Reservado', 19/4/63, Ordoñez to Alonso.
15. *Memoria de Cádiz*, p. 152; *El Pueblo*, 2/1/64.
16. ADPG, 604/1, 19, 25 and 26/4/3, Ordoñez to Alonso; 25/4/63, Alonso to Ordoñez; Pérez (1982), p. 83.
17. ADPG, 604/1, 1/7/63, Juzgado to Alonso.
18. *Memoria de Málaga*, p. 199.
19. AMAE, 2866, 13/3/63, Consul General to Minister; 7/4/63, Consul to Minister; 14/4/63, Minister to Ambassador; 30/4/63, Ambassador to Minister.
20. Mack (1994), p. 165.
21. *Memoria de Sevilla*, p. 197.
22. ADPG, 3977/1, 5, 8, 15 and 19/7/63, Minister to Alonso.
23. ADPG, 604/1, 9/7/63, Guerola to Alonso.
24. *Memoria de Málaga*, pp. 267–268.
25. Zamoyski (1999), pp. 405–422.
26. Lida (1972), p. 103.
27. ADPG, 64/1, 1/7/63, Alonso to Castillo.
28. BARH, II, 60/12, 29/9/63, Casasola to Duke.
29. BARH, Narváez II, 38/24, 30/9/63, Gutiérrez to Duke.
30. BARH, Narváez II, 66/13/2, 12/10/63, Moreno to Duke.
31. BARH, Narváez II, 66/13/1, 8/9/63, Moreno to Duke.
32. BARH, Narváez II, 38/24, 1/11/64, Duke to Gutiérrez.
33. *Memoria de Granada*, pp. 57–61.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
35. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12/25, 28/11/63, Montero to Narváez.
36. BARH, Narváez II 76/54, 9/12/63, Pérez Ordoñez et al. to Duke; *Manifiesto que el comité granadino de unión liberal dirige á todos los españoles y especialmente á los habitantes de esta provincia*, Granada, 14 November 1863.
37. *La Democracia*, 19/1/64.
38. BARH, Narváez II, 38/3 and 13, 9 and 20/3/64, Gutiérrez to Duke.
39. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 277–280.
40. Eiras (1961), p. 286.
41. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 280–281.
42. Eiras (1961), pp. 284–285; *La Democracia*, 26/1/64.
43. ADPG, 604/2, 22/1/64, Military Governor to Civil Governor; ADPG, 604/2, 1/3/64, 'Gefes e instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.
44. *El Pueblo*, 9 and 16/11/63; 25/12/63; 7 and 12/1/64.
45. Mack (1994), pp. 165–169.
46. Thomson (2007), pp. 45–47.
47. Pascual (2001), pp. 378, 394.
48. Pascual (1994), pp. 120–147.
49. Livermore (1966), p. 291; Oliveira (1969), II, p. 69.
50. Oliveira (1969), II, pp. 71–72; Pascual (2001), *passim*.
51. *El Pueblo*, 2/10/61; Lida (1972), p. 99.

52. AMAE, 2866, 25/3/64, Méndez to Minister.
53. AMAE, 2866, 10/4/64, Ribera to Minister.
54. *Ibid.*, 29/3/64, Ribera to Minister.
55. ADPG, 604/2, 3/10/63, Málaga to Granada; 26/10/863, Castillo to Governor.
56. Pascual (2001), pp. 299–313, 396–406, 523–532.
57. ADPG, *Orden Público*, 604/3, 4/5/64, Jefe to Comandante.
58. Pascual (2001), pp. 404–405.
59. *La Discusión*, 1/11/63.
60. Pascual (2001), pp. 415–419.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 414–415.
62. ADPG, 604/3, 17/4/64, Jefe to Military Governor; *La Regeneración*, 31/5/64.
63. Durán (1979), pp. 287–288.
64. Eiras (1961), pp. 285–287; Durán (1979), pp. 287–288; Blasco (1891), III, p. 303.
65. ADPG, 604/2, 22/1/64, Military Governor to Governor.
66. ADPG, 604/3, 14/4/64, Nofuentes to Governor.
67. Rosal and Derqui (1957), p. 179.
68. Pascual (2001), p. 398.
69. ADPG, 604/3, 5/5/64, Castillo to Governor; 8 and 10/5/64, Alcalde to Governor; 10/5/64, Audiencia to Governor.
70. ADPG, 604/3, 13/5/64, Ordoñez to Governor.
71. *Ibid.*
72. ADPG, 604/3, 26/4/64, Sillero to Ordoñez.
73. ADPG, 604/3, 14/4/64, Nofuentes to Governor.
74. AMAE, 2866, 21/9/64, Vidal to Minister; 28/1/65, Valera to Minister.
75. Pascual (2002), p. 418.
76. Madrid (1993), p. 33.
77. Pascual (1994), pp. 139–145.
78. AMAE, 2866, 11 and 14/4/64, 'Fermín' to Ambassador; 12/4/64, Ambassador to Minister.
79. AMAE, 2866, 26/4/64, Ambassador to Minister.
80. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 303–304.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Ferrer (1982), p. 67.
83. *El Pueblo*, 13/5/64.
84. ADPG, 604/3, 12/5/64, Ordoñez to Governor.
85. ADPG, 604/3, 7/5/64, Commander to Governor; 12/5/64, Alcalde to Governor.
86. ADPG, 604/3, 10 and 12/5/64, Ordoñez to Governor; 10 and 12/5/64, Governor to Ordoñez.
87. ADPG, 604/3, 20/5/64, Ordoñez to Governor.
88. ADPG, 604/3, 31/5/64, Captain General to Governor.
89. 604/3, 28/5/64, Comandante to Captain General.
90. ADPG, 604/3, 18/6/64, Governor to Minister.
91. *La Regeneración*, 9/6/64.
92. Eiras (1961), p. 93.
93. *La Democracia*, 3/3/64.
94. ADPG, 604/2; 604/3.
95. ADPG, 604/2, 23/7/64, Minister to Governor.
96. BARH, Narváez II, 38, 13/5, 6/7/64, Gutiérrez to Duke.
97. ADPG, 604/2, 31/1/64, Civil Governor to Castillo; 3/2/64, Castillo to Civil Governor.

98. *Ibid.*, 17/2/64, Joaquín Pérez to Civil Guard Commander.
99. ADPG, 604/2, 'Gefes é instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ibid.*
104. Moreno (1987), pp. 22–33.
105. ADPG, 604/2, 'Gefes é instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.
106. *Ibid.*
107. *Ibid.*
108. ADPG, 604/2, 16/3/64, Moreno to Castillo.
109. ADPG, 604/2, 22/8/64, Ordoñez to Governor.
110. BARH, Narváez II, 38/3, 1/1/64, Gutiérrez de la Vega to Duke.
111. Pabón (1983), p. 84.
112. Blasco (1891), III, p. 283.
113. Pabón (1983), p. 85.
114. BARH, Narváez II, 39/21, 11/8/64, Narváez to Marfori.
115. BARH, Narváez II, 38/6, 12/8/64, Gutiérrez to Narváez.
116. ADPG, 604/2, 22/8/64, Ordoñez to Governor.
117. *La Democracia*, 1/6/64.
118. Eiras (1861), pp. 286–293; Hennessy (1962), pp. 19–26.
119. *La Democracia*, 1 and 17/6/64.
120. *Ibid.*
121. ADPG, 604/2, 21/8/64, Governor to Minister.
122. *Ibid.*
123. Narváez II, 38/3, 9/3/64, Gutiérrez to Duke; ADPG, 604/2, 8/3/64, Salvador Josef to Governor.
124. ADPG, 604/2, 16/10/64, 30 'vecinos de Pinos de Genil to Governor.
125. *La Democracia*, 2/6/64.
126. ADPG, 604/2, 21/8/64, Governor to Minister.
127. *Ibid.*

11 Narváez and Democracy in Eastern Andalucía, 1864–1868

1. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 282–283.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 283–291.
3. BARH, Narváez II, 39, 21/1, 11/4/65, Marfori to Duke.
4. Pabón (1972), pp. 34–40.
5. Baquer (1983), pp. 155–156.
6. Blasco (1891), III, p. 324.
7. Carr (1966), p. 297.
8. Blasco (1891), III, p. 328.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 330.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 331.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
13. Eiras (1961), pp. 322–323.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
15. Aguilar (1991), pp. 386, 396.
16. Blasco (1891), III, p. 343.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
18. BARH, Narváez II, 29/6, 6/7/66, Campos to Narváez; 7/6, 20/7/66, Calero et al. to Narváez; 40, 1/33, 28/5/67 and 6/6/1867, Santos to Narváez.
19. BARH, Narváez II, 75/12, 9/8135, 3/3/65, 2/5/65, 20/6/65, 11/12/66, 2 and 31/1/68, Pérez to Narváez; García (1983), pp. 134–137.
20. BARH, Narváez II, 66/12, Letters, 1864–1866, Montero to Narváez.
21. *La Democracia*, 21/2/64; *El Pueblo*, 22/2/64.
22. Cuenca and Miranda (1979), *passim*, I, p. 314.
23. Castro (1994b), pp. 78–85.
24. BARH, Narváez II, 58/9; Carr (1966), p. 294; Pérez (1982), p. 83.
25. BARH, Narváez II, 58/9, 30/11/63, Calvo to Duke; ADPG, 604/2, 11/11/64, Minister to Governor.
26. ADPG, 3977/7, 5/9/65, Governor to Minister; 8/9/65, Nuñez to Governor.
27. Vilar (1994), pp. 350–373.
28. Pérez (1982), p. 119.
29. BARH, Narváez II, 29/88, 20/9/66, Campos to Narváez.
30. BARH, Narváez II, 72/69, 31/10/66, Lora to Fonseca; 29–72/7, 9/5/67, Campos to Narváez.
31. BARH, Narváez II, 40–41, 6/5/67, Santos to Narváez.
32. *Ibid.*, 25/5/67, Santos to Narváez; 29–71, 28/5/67, Narváez to Campos.
33. BARH, Narváez II, 29–72, 7/6/67, Campos to Narváez.
34. *Ibid.*, 16/5/67, Campos to Narváez.
35. BARH, Narváez II, 29–72/7, 7/6/67, Campos to Narváez.
36. BARH, Narváez II, 29–78, 19/6/67, Pérez to Narváez; 22/6/67, Muriel to Narváez.
37. *Ibid.*, 28/6/67, Campos to Narváez.
38. BARH, Narváez II, 29–77/6, 7 and 11/8/67, Campos to Narváez.
39. BARH, Narváez II, 29–72, 10 and 30/4/67, Campos to Narváez.
40. BARH, Narváez II, 29–77/6, 7 and 11/8/67, Campos to Narváez.
41. *Ibid.*, 5/9/67, Campos to Narváez.
42. Hennessy (1962), pp. 32–33.
43. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 347–348.
44. BARH, Narváez II, 41, 17/9/67, Santos to Narváez.
45. *Ibid.*, 9/9/67, Santos to Narváez.
46. BARH, Narváez II, 41, 22/8/67, Santos to Narváez.
47. BARH, Narváez II, 29–83, 21/9/67, Campos to Narváez.
48. BARH, Narváez II, 40–1/66, 23/9/67, Santos to Narváez.
49. BARH, Narváez II, 72–46, 10/9/67, Council to Narváez; 29–82/1, 24/9/67, Campos to Narváez.
50. BARH, Narváez II, 29, 82/1, 26/9/67, Campos to Narváez.
51. BARH, Narváez II, 40–1/66, 25/9/67, Narváez to Santos.
52. *Ibid.*; *El Pueblo*, 10/9/61.
53. BARH, Narváez II, 29, 82, 30/9/67, Campos to Narváez.
54. *Ibid.*, 4/10/67, Narváez to Campos.
55. BARH, Narváez II, 29, 86/3, 8/10/67, Campos to Narváez.
56. *La Correspondencia de Granada*, 9/10/67.
57. BARH, Narváez II, 40, 1/69, 1/71, 6 and 11/10/67, Santos to Narváez.
58. BARH, Narváez II, 40, 69, 8/10/67, Narváez to Santos.
59. BARH, Narváez II, 40, 1/70, 11/10/68, Santos to Narváez.
60. Loja, Actas, 11/12/67.
61. Loja, Actas, 13/12/67; BARH, Narváez II, 84/4, 13/12/67, Campos to Narváez; 40, 1/80, 13/12/67, Santos to Narváez.

62. Loja, *Actas*, 13/12/67.
63. BARH, Narváez II, 40, 80, 16/12/67, Narváez to Santos.
64. BARH, Narváez II, 40–4, 1/1/68, Santos to Narváez.
65. BARH, Narváez II, 60/26, 25/11/67, Cobos to Narváez.
66. Loja, *Actas*, 16/12/67.
67. BARH, Narváez II, 72/8, 19/12/67, Campos to Narváez; 84/4, 18/12/67, Council to González Zorrilla.
68. BARH, Narváez I, 41, 26/1/68, 41, 8, 13 and 14/2/68, Governor to Narváez; 11/2/68, Galdón to Governor.
69. BARH, Narváez II, 34, 23/1/68, 8, 26, 27, 28 and 29/2/68, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 17, 19 and 23/3/68, Enríquez to Narváez; 72/10, 23/3/68, Benigno to Narváez; 25/3/68, Narváez to Benigno; 7/4/68, Benigno to Narváez; Narváez II, 58/5, 25/3/68, 7/4/68, Caridad Campos to Narváez; 27/3/68, Narváez to Caridad Campos.
70. BARH, Narváez II, 84/4, 28/3/68, Enríquez to Narváez.
71. BARH, Narváez II, 60–12/20, 28/11/64, Casasola to Narváez.
72. BARH, Narváez II, 60–12, 4 and 19/10/64; 28/11/64, Casasola to Narváez.
73. BARH, Narváez II, 60–27/1, 16/6/67, Cobos y Zaragoza to Narváez.
74. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 1867, 2/6/67, Arce to Comandante.
75. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 158, 3/6/67, Aguilar to Comandante.
76. *Ibid.*, 19/12/67, Juzgado to Arce; 12/9/67, Arce to Comandante.
77. Parejo (1980), p. 59.
78. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 158, 8/8/67, Arce to Comandante; 26/9/67, Civil Guard to Comandante.
79. *Ibid.*, 26 and 27/9/67, Arce to Comandante.
80. *Ibid.*, 14/11/67, Friedrich to Comandante.
81. *Ibid.*, 3/9/61 and 4/10/67, Arce to Comandante; 1 and 12/10/67, Friedrich to Comandante.
82. *Ibid.*, 20/9/67, Friedrich to Comandante.
83. BARH, Narváez II, 75/97, 3/8/67, Carrión to Narváez.
84. *Ibid.*, 2/10/67, Carrión to Narváez.
85. *Ibid.*, 27/9/67, 1/11/67, González to Carrión; 301/76, 30/9/67, Santos to Narváez; 5/7, 20 and 23/11/67, Barzanallana to Narváez.
86. *Ibid.*, 18/12/67, Narváez to Ministers.
87. *Ibid.*, 25/11/67; 5/12/67, Carrión to Narváez.
88. Rosal and Derqui (1957), p. 76.
89. Loja, *Actas*, 7/2/68, 21/2/68, 1 and 27/3/68, 14/4/68, 3/5/68.
90. BARH, Narváez II, 72–69, 31/10/66; 4/2/67, Lora to Narváez.
91. Ramírez (2002), pp. 183–184.
92. Loja, 177/4, ‘Testimonio... José María Narváez y Campos’.
93. Callahan (2000), p. 61.
94. Pabón (1983), p. 318.
95. Loja, 177, 7274, Ramón María Narváez (copy of will).
96. Llorca (1984), p. 219.
97. BARH, Narváez II, 39/26, 8/5/68, Council to Queen; 9/5/68, Council to Marfori.

12 The Revolution of September 1868 in Western Granada

1. Pérez (1982), p. 81.
2. Reclus (2007), pp. 43–64.
3. Estévez (1975), pp. 157–162.

4. Pérez (1982), p. 147.
5. Hennessy (1962), pp. 55–56.
6. Fuente (2000), pp. 174–176.
7. Blasco (1891), III, p. 375.
8. Fuente (2000), pp. 57–59, 177; Blasco (1891), III, pp. 374–375; Pérez (1982), pp. 136–137.
9. Fuente (2000), pp. 59–62.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.
11. *Ibid.*, 40–43.
12. Loja, Actas, 28/9/68, 5/10/68.
13. ADPG, 604/6, 28 and 29/9/68, 3/10/68, Cádiz to Junta.
14. ADPG, 604/6, 1/10/68, Cádiz to Junta.
15. ADPG, 604/7, 29/9/68, Cádiz to Junta.
16. ADPG, 604/11, 28/9/68, Vega to Junta.
17. *Ibid.*, 9/10/68, Vega to Junta.
18. *Ibid.*, 14/10/68, Vega to Junta.
19. *Ibid.*, 27/10/68, Vega to Junta.
20. Loja, Actas, 2/11/68.
21. *Ibid.*, 28/9/68.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Loja, Actas, 28/9/68.
24. *Ibid.*, 29 and 30/9/68 and 3/10/68.
25. *Ibid.*, 2 and 4/10/68.
26. ADPG, 604/11, 12/10/68, Rosal to Governor.
27. Loja, Actas, 3/10/68.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Alhama, Actas, 28/9/68; ADPG, 604/8, 28/9/68, Rodríguez to Governor.
30. ADPG, 604/8, Alhama, 12/10/68.
31. Alhama, Actas, 17/10/68.
32. ADPG, 608/8, 19/10/68, López to Junta Provincial.
33. *Ibid.*, 12/10/68, Gómez to Junta Provincial.
34. *Ibid.*, 27/6/69, 'Acta'.
35. ADPG, 604/8, 19/10/68, Olmos to Junta Provincial.
36. *Ibid.*, 9/10/68, Molina to Junta Provincial.
37. *Ibid.*, 14/10/68, Molina to Junta Provincial; 15/10/68, Moreno Ramos et al. to Governor.
38. *Ibid.*, 18/10/68, Governor to Arraca; 23/10/68, Ramos to Junta Provincial.
39. *Ibid.*, 30/9/68, Moreno to Junta Revolucionaria.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, 1/10/68, Luque to Junta Revolucionaria.
42. *Ibid.*, 17/10/68, Luque to Junta Revolucionaria.
43. Ferrer (1982), pp. 382, 411–412.
44. ADPG, 604/8, 18/10/68, Saavedra to Junta Revolucionaria.
45. *Ibid.*, 1, 5 and 19/20/68, Muñoz to Junta Revolucionaria.
46. Loja, Actas, 2/10/68.
47. Loja, Actas, 8/10/68; Loja, Secretaria, Personal, 197.
48. *Ibid.*, 6/11/68.
49. Calero (1982), p. 37.
50. Loja, Actas, 5/10/68.
51. *Ibid.*, 7/19/68.

52. *Ibid.*
53. Maurice (1990), pp. 104–105.
54. De la Fuente (2000), p. 58.
55. Loja, Actas, 5/10/68.
56. *Ibid.*, 7/10/68.
57. *Ibid.*, 2/11/68.
58. *Ibid.*, 2 and 5/11/68.
59. *Ibid.*, 8/11/68.
60. *Ibid.*, 7/1/69.
61. *Ibid.*, 28/1/69.
62. *Ibid.*, 21/2/69.
63. *Ibid.*, 25/2/69.
64. *Ibid.*, 21/3/69.
65. *Ibid.*, 6/5/69, 25/7/69.
66. *Ibid.*, 4/10/69.
67. ADPG, 604/11, 12/10/68, Rosal to Castellón.
68. *Ibid.*, 8, 10 and 12/10/69; Loja, Actas, 15/10/69.
69. Although it is possible that the paintings of the monarch and her sons had been defaced on 27–28 September, at least they were not burned as occurred in Barcelona, Loja, Actas, 2/10/68; Reclus (2007), p. 24.
70. Loja, Actas, 8/10/68, 15 and 22/11/68.
71. *Ibid.*, 19/11/68.
72. *Ibid.*, 12/10/68.
73. *Ibid.*, 17/10/68.
74. *Ibid.*, 22/10/68, 15/11/68.
75. *Ibid.*, 14/11/68.
76. *Ibid.*, 2/12/68.
77. BRAH, Archivo de Rivas, 118884.
78. ADPG, 604/7, 21/10/68, Osca to Junta de Gobierno; 24/10/68, Junta de Gobierno to Alcalde.
79. Loja, Actas, 15/9/68.
80. *Ibid.*, 22 and 29/11/68.
81. *Ibid.*, 14 and 28/1/69.
82. Lida (1970), pp. 182–196.
83. Loja, Actas, 22, 25, 26 and 27/4/69.
84. Loja, Varios, 199, 68, 17/9/69, ‘individuos de las clases pobres’ to Council.
85. Loja, Actas, 1 and 10/6/54, 4/3/69.
86. *Ibid.*, 11/11/69.
87. Rosal and Derqui (1957), pp. 198, 204.
88. Pérez (1982), p. 147.
89. ADPG, 604/8, 14/10/68, Montes to Governor.
90. *Ibid.*, 19/10/68, Guerrero to Junta definitiva.
91. Alhama, Actas, 15/9/68.
92. *Ibid.*, 25 and 26/10/68, 1 and 3/11/68.
93. *Ibid.*, 25/10/68.
94. *Ibid.*, 26/10/68.
95. *Ibid.*, 1/1/69; Pérez (2001), p. 285.
96. Alhama, Actas, 3/1/69; 7/3/69.
97. Kaplan (1977), pp. 93–94.
98. Alhama, Actas, 28/3/69; 12/4/69.

99. *Ibid.*, 25/4/69.
100. *Ibid.*, 7/3/69.
101. Alhama, *Actas*, 14/2/69.
102. Ferrer (1982), pp. 569–572.
103. Alhama, *Actas*, 12/9/69; Ferrer (1982), p. 421.
104. Ferrer (1982), pp. 424–429; Alhama, *Actas*, 26/9/69.
105. Alhama, *Actas*, 12 and 25/3/69, 17/1/70, 11/3/70.
106. *Ibid.*, 12 and 24/10/69, 1/11/69.
107. *Ibid.*, 28/8/69; Zafarraya, *Actas*, 22/5/72, Moreno to Governor; ‘Correspondencia del alcalde’, 22/5/72, Moreno to Minister.
108. Alhama, *Actas*, 12 and 17/10/69, 14/11/69.
109. *Ibid.*, 3 and 9/10/69.
110. *Ibid.*, 10/10/69.
111. *Ibid.*, 31/1/70.
112. Pérez (1982), pp. 176–182.
113. *Ibid.*
114. Rosal and Derqui (1957), p. 194.
115. Calero (1973b), p. 87.
116. *Ibid.*, 85.
117. *Ibid.*, 87.
118. Pavía (1878), p. 16.
119. Lorenzo (1974), p. 237.
120. Nettlau (1969), p. 192.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 375.
122. Calero (1973a), p. 137.
123. González (1986), p. 139.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
125. Ayala (1951), p. 520; Rosal and Derqui (1957), pp. 199–200; Abend (2004).
126. Rosal and Derqui (1957), p. 199–200.
127. Ayala (1951), p. 520.

13 The Sexenio Revolucionario in Antequera: From Federal Republicanism to the Socialist International, 1868–1880

1. Electoral exclusion and violence was evident throughout Catalonia and elsewhere in Spain during the Sexenio, Janué (2002).
2. Parejo (1983), pp. 369–370.
3. Antequera, *Actas*, 22/10/68.
4. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 9/10/68, Casamayor to President.
5. Arcas (1985), p. 48.
6. Archidona, 359, Personal, 1868.
7. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 6/10/68, Alcalá et al. to President.
8. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 3/2/69, Veras to Alcalde.
9. Parejo (1983), pp. 378–379.
10. Parejo (1998), pp. 180–181.
11. Bernal (1974), pp. 132–133; Baena (1983c), p. 55.
12. Parejo (1983), p. 379.
13. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 168.
14. Hennessy (1962), p. 57; González (1972).
15. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 16, 25/10, 3/11/68, Aguilar to Sanguinete.

16. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 29/10/68, Caracueles to Alcalde.
17. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 9/10/68, Decree.
18. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 168, 24/4, 12/10/68.
19. De la Fuente (2000), pp. 124–134.
20. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 20 and 26/9/68, Granados to Aguilar.
21. *Ibid.*, 20/10/69, Ayuntamiento to Governor.
22. Fernández and Heredia (1996), *passim*.
23. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 397–398.
24. Hennessy (1862), p. 60.
25. Bernal (1974), pp. 132–133.
26. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 22, 27 and 29/10/68, Caracueles to Alcalde; 28/10/68, Aguilar to Caracueles; 2/11/68, Talavera to Caracueles.
27. Hennessy (1962), p. 60.
28. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 18/11/68, Alcalde to Archpriest.
29. Blasco (1891), III, pp. 397–398; Parejo (1983), p. 389.
30. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 19/10/68, Sanguinetti to Granados; 9/11/68, Palomino to Alcalde; 11/11/68, Alcalde to Alcalde, Villanueva del Rosario.
31. *Ibid.*, 25/10/68, Molina to Alcalde; 14/11/68, Checa to Alcalde; 18/11/68, Aguilar to Montero; *Orden Público*, Varios, 3210, 5/11/68, Sánchez to Alcalde.
32. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 1/12/68, Triño to Alcalde; 27/11/68, Aguilar to Judge; 7/12/68, López to Alcalde.
33. *Ibid.*, 30/11/68, Alcalde to Commander.
34. *Ibid.*, 13/12/68, Juzgado to Alcalde.
35. *Ibid.*, 5/12/68, Juzgado to Alcalde.
36. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 156, 20/27, 6/11/62, González to Alcalde.
37. *Ibid.*, Band of 1/1/62.
38. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 6/12/68, Ronda to Alcalde 9/12/68, Granados to Alcalde; 14/12/68, Bernal to Alcalde.
39. Blasco (1891), III, p. 399; Kaplan (1977), pp. 66–72.
40. Hennessy (1962), p. 62.
41. Hennessy (1962), pp. 60–61; Blasco (1891), III, pp. 399–405; Garrido (1869), III, pp. 1331–1353.
42. *Ibid.*, 18/12/68, Edict 18/12/68, Prat to Aguilar.
43. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10, 19/12/68, Aguilar to Governor; 19/11/68, Aguilar to Granados; 9/12/68, Granados to Alcalde.
44. *Ibid.*, 19/12/68, Aguilar to Governor.
45. *Ibid.*, 17/12/68, Bravo to Aguilar.
46. *Ibid.*, 18/12/68, Aguilar to Comandante; 18/12/68, Aguilar to Civil Guard.
47. *Ibid.*, 20/12/68, Aguilar to Juzgado.
48. *Ibid.*, 21/12/68, Aguilar to Governor.
49. *Ibid.*, 22/12/68, Aguilar to Governor.
50. Vilches (2001), p. 83.
51. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 25/10/68; 31/12/68, Aguilar to Juzgado.
52. Parejo (1983), p. 380.
53. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 13/1/69, Tiesar to Alcalde; *Orden Público*, Varios 3210, 14/1/69, Alcalde to Governor.
54. *Ibid.*, 11, 12 and 14/2/69, Granados to Governor; Parejo (1983), pp. 380–383.
55. Blasco (1891), III, p. 406.

56. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 26/2/69, Ravaneda to Alcalde; 6/3/69, Granados to *Diario Mercantil*; 25/3/69, Alcaraz to Alcalde; 31/5/69, Villalobos to Granados; *Orden Público*, 158, 24/2/69, Minister to Granados.
57. *Ibid.*, 12/4/69, Granados to Villalva; Kaplan (1977), pp. 93–94.
58. Vilar (1994), pp. 352–354; Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 5/5/69, Granados to Villalva.
59. *Ibid.*, 21/5/69, Granados to Serrano.
60. *Ibid.*, three letters of 30/5/69, Granados to Villalva.
61. *Ibid.*, 31/5/69, Villalobos to Alcalde.
62. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 65, 22/6, 6/6/69, Villalva to Granados; *Orden Público*, 162, 12/6/69, Granados to Villalva.
63. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 16/6/69, Ruiz to Alcalde; 1/6/69, Granados to Fiscalia Militar.
64. Arcas (1985), p. 48.
65. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 3/7/69, Ruiz to Alcalde; 14 and 26/6/69, Granados to Villalva; 3/7/69, Aguilar to ‘Antequeranos’; 3/7/69, Ruiz to Alcalde.
66. *Ibid.*, 26/6/69, Granados to Villalva; Hennessy (1962), p. 115; Termes (1977), p. 57.
67. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 165, 3/7/69, Talavera to Alcalde.
68. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 20/7/69, Alcaraz to Alcalde.
69. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 65, 22/6/69, 21, 23 and 25/7/69, Granados to Villalva; *Orden Público*, 162, 29/7/69, Granados to Governor; *Orden Público*, 162, 6 and 22/8/69, Granados to Governor.
70. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 165, 27/7, ‘Sociedad Agrícola Antequerano’; *Orden Público*, 159, 26/5, 24/12/69, Mata to Granados.
71. Parejo (1983), pp. 380–382; Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, ‘1870’.
72. Morales (1994), pp. 422–430.
73. Parejo (1983), p. 383.
74. Estévez (1975), pp. 176–195.
75. González (1972), p. 130; Hennessy (1962), pp. 116–117.
76. Kaplan (1977), p. 94.
77. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 1, 6 and 13/10/69, Ruiz to Granados.
78. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 10/10/69, Granados to Junta.
79. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 23/9/69, Granados to Governor; *Ibid.*, 1, 6 and 13/10/69, Ruiz to Granados.
80. Díaz (1984), pp. 81–85.
81. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 165, 27/4, 14/10/69, Espejo to Granados.
82. *Orden Público*, 162, 17/3/69, Lahe to Alcalde; *Orden Público*, 165, 27/4, ‘Partidas Republicanas, disposiciones y providencias tomadas’, *passim*.
83. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 26/2, 9/11/69, Juzgado to Alcalde; 18/11/69, Alcalde to Camacho.
84. *Ibid.*, 4/11/69, Casero to Juzgado; 24/11/69, Ariza to Juzgado.
85. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 162, 15/12/69, Ruiz to Alcalde; Parejo (1998), p. 165.
86. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 27/11, 19/3/70, González Berdún et al. to ‘Antequeranos’; 15/12/69, Ruiz to Alcalde.
87. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 165, 27/7, 23/3/70, San Martín to Granados.
88. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 161, 27/11, 24/3/70, Granados to Governor; 19/3/70, Quirós et al. to Alcalde; 24/3/70, Granados to Governor.

89. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 'Estadística de las elecciones... Enero de 1871.
90. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 166, 22/7/72, Granados to Minister.
91. *Ibid.*
92. Calero (1987), p. 21.
93. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 29/3, 5/6/73, Alcalde to Audiencia.
94. Parejo (1983), pp. 369–370.
95. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 'Reservado 1875–76'.
96. *Ibid.*
97. *Ibid.*
98. Juliá (1996), p. 12.
99. Calero (1973b), pp. 81–90.
100. *Ibid.*, pp. 81–83.
101. Termes (1977), p. 230; Nettlau (1969), pp. 209–210.
102. Parejo (1987b), pp. 372–378; *Memoria* (1907).
103. Antequera, 3210, 29/3, 7/6/75, Alcalde to Governor.
104. *Ibid.*, 29/14, 9/10/75, Sub-Governor to Governor; 23/2/76, Governor to Sub-Governor.
105. *Ibid.*, 29/3, 22/10/75, Governor to Sub-Governor.
106. *Ibid.*, 29/14, 11/10/75, Governor to Sub-Governor; 11/10/75, Sub-Governor to Governor.
107. Nettlau (1969), p. 291; Morales (1994), pp. 430–431.
108. Termes (1977), p. 281; Nettlau (1969), pp. 311–314.
109. Kaplan (1977), pp. 116–117; Nettlau (1969), pp. 109, 120, 238.
110. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 'Antecedentes sobre los detenidos por la causa sobre la Internacional', 7/7/80, Alcalde to Juzgado; 7/7/88, Alcalde to Governor; Termes (1977), pp. 282–283.
111. Antequera, *Orden Público*, 3210, 'Antecedentes sobre... la Internacional'.
112. *Ibid.*
113. Nettlau (1969), p. 238.
114. Morales (1994), p. 431.
115. Díaz (1984), p. 134.
116. Kaplan (1977), pp. 114–134; Lida (1969), pp. 315–352; Maurice (1990), pp. 115–127.
117. Acosta (1983), pp. 42–43.
118. Morales (1994), pp. 429–430.
119. Campos (1994), pp. 75–116.
120. López (1996), pp. 217–218; Sánchez-Solís (2007).
121. Alvarez (1988), pp. 177–212.

Conclusion

1. MECW, Vol. XXXIV, p. 479.
2. López-Cordón (1975), pp. 116–117.
3. Quoted in J. Alvarez (2001a), p. 35.

Epilogue

1. López (1996).
2. Pérez (1982), p. 103.

3. BARH, Rivas, 118884, 2/6/32, Cubas to Rivas.
4. <http://es.geocities.com/sustitutedeweboficial/alamo.htm>.
5. 29/7/08, Pérez to Morato, Marvaud (1975), p. 77.
6. <http://es.geocities.com/sustitutedeweboficial/alamo.htm>.
7. *Ibid.*

Bibliography

- L. Abend (2004) 'Specters of the Secular: Spiritism in Nineteenth-Century Spain', *European History Quarterly*, XXIV, 507–534.
- J. Acosta Sánchez (1983) *La Constitución de Antequera, Estudio teórico-crítico. Democracia, federalismo y andalucismo en la España contemporánea* (Seville: Grupo Editorial Sur).
- M. Agulhon (1970) *La république au village. Les populations du Var de la Révolution à la IIe République* (Paris: Plon).
- M. Agulhon (1983) *The Republican Experiment, 1848–1852* (Cambridge: CUP).
- M. Agulhon (1997) 'Reflexiones sobre la imagen del burgués francés en vísperas de 1848: Monsieur Prudhomme, Monsieur Homais y Monsieur Bamatabois', *Historial Social*, 29, 73–88.
- M. Aguilar (1894) *Vida Admirable de Siervo de Dios P. Antonio María Claret* (Madrid: Tipográfico San Francisco de Sales), 2 Vols.
- E. Aguilar Gavilán (1991) *Vida Política y Procesos Electorales en la Cordoba Isabelina (1834–1868)* (Cordoba: Monte de Piedad).
- F. Aguado Sánchez (1984) *Historia de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: Planeta), 2 Vols.
- M. Alonso Baquer (1983) *El Modelo Español de Pronunciamiento* (Madrid: Rialp).
- F. Alvarez Curiel (1996) *Villanueva del Rosario Historia y Vida* (Málaga: Diputación Provincial).
- J. Alvarez Junco (1988) 'Leftist Militarism and Anti-Militarism, 1875–1936', in R. Bañón Martínez and T. M. Barker, eds, *Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present* (New York: Columbia).
- J. Alvarez Junco (1996) 'Redes locales, lealtades tradicionales y nuevas identidades colectivas en la España del Siglo XIX', in A. Robles Egea, ed., *Política en Penumbra Patronazgo y clientelismo políticos en la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Siglo XXI).
- J. Alvarez Junco (2001a) 'El Nacionalismo Español: la insuficiencia en la acción estatal', *Historia Social*, 40, 29–52.
- J. Alvarez Junco (2001b) *Mater Dolorosa. La Idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus).
- F. Arcas Cubero (1985) *El Republicanismo Malagueño Durante la Restauración, 1875–1923* (Córdoba: Diputación Provincial).
- A.A. Lara (1983) 'Iznájar en el levantamiento de Pérez del Alamo', *Actas III Coloquio Historia de Andalucía* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad), Vol. I, 353–365.
- J. Arenas Roper (1996) *Zagra Apuntes Históricos* (Granada: Ayuntamiento de Zagra).
- M. Artola et al. (1978) *El latifundio Propiedad y Explotación Siglos XVIII–XX* (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura).
- P. M. Ayala (1951) *Vida documentada del P. Francisco de P. Tarín S. I.* (Seville: Gráficas La Gavidia).
- J. Azagra Ros (1978) *El Bienio Progresista en Valencia Análisis de una situación revolucionaria a mediados del siglo XIX (1854–1856)* (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia).
- J. Baena Reigal (1983a) 'Los sucesos revolucionarios de 1868 en Málaga', *Jábega* XII, 43–52.
- J. Baena Reigal (1983b) 'Los sucesos revolucionarios de 1868 en Málaga', *Jábega*, XIII, 5–64.

- Baena Reigal, José (1983c) 'Los sucesos revolucionarios de 1868 en Málaga', *Jábega*, XLIV, 33–42.
- M. Barrios Aguilera (1986) *Moriscos en la tierra de Loja* (Granada: Ayuntamiento de Loja).
- C. A. Bayly (2003) *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- W. E. Baxter (1852) *The Tagus and the Tiber or Notes of Travel in Portugal, Spain and Italy in 1850–1* (London: William Edward), 2 Vols.
- A. M. Bernal (1974) *La propiedad de la tierra y las luchas agrarias andaluzas* (Barcelona: Ariel).
- A. M. Bernal (1979) *La lucha por la tierra en la crisis del antiguo régimen* (Madrid: Taurus).
- C. Bernaldo de Quiros (1986) 'El Espartaquismo Agrario Andaluz', in C. Bernaldo de Quiros, *Colonización y subversión en la Andalucía de los siglos XVIII–XIX* (Seville: Editoriales Andaluzas Unidas).
- E. F. Biagini (2003) 'Neo-roman liberalism: "republican" values and British Liberalism, ca. 1860–1875', *History of European Ideas*, XXIX, 55–72.
- A. Blanco (2004) 'La Guerra de África en sus textos: Uno momento en la búsqueda española de la modernidad', *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos*, XXXVIII, 403–424.
- V. Blasco Ibañez (1891) *Historia de la Revolución Española* (Barcelona: La Enciclopedia Democrática), 3 Vols.
- A. Borrego (1855) *Estudios Políticos de la Organización de los Partidos en España* (Madrid: A Santo Coloma Editor).
- C. Boyd (1997) *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- C. Boyd (2000) 'The Military and Politics', in J. Alvarez Junco, ed., *Spanish History since 1808* (London: Arnold).
- M. Burguera and C. Schmidt-Nowara (2004) 'Backwardness and Its Discontents', *Social History*, XXIX, 279–283.
- I. Burdiel (1998) 'Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism', *Journal of Modern History*, LXX, 892–912.
- I. Burdiel (2000) with M. Pérez Ledesma, eds. *Liberales, agitadores y conspiradores* (Madrid: Espasa).
- I. Burdiel (2008) 'La ilusión monárquica del liberalismo Isabelino: notas para un estudio', in A. Blanco and G. Thomson, eds. *Visiones del liberalismo Política, identidad y cultura en la España del siglo XIX* (Valencia: Universitat de València).
- M. Caballero and C. Romero Salvador (2006) 'Oligarquía y caciquismo durante el reinado de Isabel II (1833–1868)', *Historia Agraria*, XXXVIII, 7–26.
- A. Cabral Chamorro (1990) *Socialismo Utópico y Revolución Burguesa: el Fourierismo Gaditano, 1834–1848* (Cádiz: Diputación Provincial).
- A. M. Calero (1973a) *Historia del Movimiento obrero en Granada* (Granada: Tecnos).
- A. M. Calero (1973b) 'Los cantones de Málaga y Granada', in M. Tuñón de Lara et al., eds. *Sociedad, política y cultura en la España de los siglos XIX–XX* (Madrid: Edicusa).
- A. M. Calero (1982) 'Introducción', in Rafael Pérez del, ed., *Apuntes sobre dos revoluciones andaluzas* (Granada: Aljibe), 9–47.
- A.M. Calero (1987) *Movimientos sociales en Andalucía (1820–1936)* (Madrid: Siglo XIX).
- W. J. Callahan (1979) *Church, Society and Politics in Spain, 1750–1874* (Oxford: OUP).
- W. J. Callahan (1984) 'Was Spain Catholic?', *Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispánicos*, VIII, 159–182.
- W. J. Callahan (2000) 'Church and state, 1808–1874', in J. Alvarez Junco and A. Shubert, eds. *Spanish History since 1808* (London: Arnold).

- J. Campos Rodríguez (1994) 'Elecciones en Antequera: Los Generales y Las Municipales de 1891', *Revista de Estudios Antequeranos*, II, 75–116.
- A. Campos Fernández de Córdoba (1951) 'De Loja y Narváez', *Flor entre Espinas Número Extraordinario. Homenaje at Excmo. Sr. D. Ramón María Narváez y Campos, Primer Duque de Valencia* (Loja: Ayuntamiento).
- J. Canal (1997) 'Maurice Agulhon: historia y compromiso republicano', *Historia Social*, 29, 47–53.
- R. Carr (1966) *Spain 1808–1939* (Oxford: OUP).
- P. Carrión (1975) *Los Latifundios en España. Su Importancia, Origen, Consecuencias y Solución*, 2nd edn (Madrid: Ariel).
- I. Castells (1989) *La utopía insurreccional del liberalismo. Torrijos y las conspiraciones liberales de la década ominosa* (Barcelona: Crítica).
- C. Castro (1979) *La Revolución Liberal y los municipios españoles* (Madrid: Alianza).
- D. Castro Alfin (1994a) 'Orígenes y primeras etapas del republicanismo en España', in N. Townson, ed., *El Republicanismo en España (1830–1977)* (Madrid: Alianza).
- D. Castro Alfin (1994b) 'Unidos en la Adversidad, Unidos en la Discordia: El Partido Demócrata, 1849–1868', in Nigel Townson, ed., *El republicanismo en España (1830–1977)* (Madrid: Alianza).
- D. Castro Alfin (1996) 'Republicanos en armas, Clandestinidad e insurreccionalismo en el reinado de Isabel II', *Bulletin d'Histoire Contemporaine de de l'Espagne*, XXIII, 29–40.
- D. Castro Alfin (2000) 'The Left: From Liberalism to Democracy', in J. Alvarez Junco and A. Shubert, eds, *Spanish History since 1808* (London: Arnold).
- D. Castro Alfin (2001) 'La cultura política y la subcultura política del republicanismo español', in J. Casa Sánchez and F. Durán Alcalá, eds, *1º Congreso El Republicanismo en La Historia de Andalucía* (Priego: Patronato Niceto Alcalá-Zamora y Torres), 13–34.
- A. Claret (1985) *Autobiografía* (Barcelona: Claret).
- M. Cruz Romero (2004) 'Los mundos posibles del liberalismo progresistas', in E. La Parra López and G. Ramírez Aledón, eds, *El primer Liberalismo: España y Europa, una perspectiva comparada* (Valencia: Generalitat).
- J.M. Cuenca Toribio and S. Miranda (1979) 'Correspondencia Narváez-Arazola', in *Actas 1 Congreso Historia de Andalucía Diciembre 1976* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad), Vol. I, 243–323.
- R. Darnton (1995) 'Diffusion vs. Discourse: Conceptual Shifts in Intellectual History and the Historiography of the French Revolution', in Carlos Barros, ed., *Historia a debate*, III, 179–192.
- G. De la Fuente Monge (2000) *Los revolucionarios de 1868 Elites y poder en la España liberal* (Madrid: Marcial Pons).
- N. Díaz y Pérez (1876) *José Mazzini Ensayo histórico sobre el movimiento político de Italia* (Madrid: Imprenta Principal).
- Cortes Generales. Congreso (Spain) (1862) *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes Diputados 8 noviembre de 1861–31 Octubre 1862* (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional).
- J. Díaz del Moral (1984) *Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas* (Madrid: Alianza).
- A. Duarte (1988) 'El republicanismo decimonónico (1868–1910)', *Historia Social*, 1, 120–126.
- N. Durán (1979) *La Unión Liberal y la modernización de la España isabelina. Una convivencia frustrada, 1854–1868* (Madrid: Akal).
- A. Eiras Roel (1960) 'La democracia socialista del ochocientos español', *Revistas de Estudios Políticos*, 110, 131–158.

- A. Eiras Roel (1861) *El Partido Demócrata Español (1849–1868)* (Madrid: Rialp).
- A. Eiras Roel (1962) 'Sociedades secretas republicanas en el reinado de Isabel II', *Hispania*, LXXXVI, 276–285.
- A. Elorza (1975) *El Fourierismo en España* (Madrid: Revista de Trabajo).
- C. Esdaile (2000) *Spain in the Liberal Age from Constitution to Civil War, 1808–1939* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- N. Estévez (1975) *Mis Memorias* (Madrid: Tebas).
- J. L. Estrada y Segalerva (1970) *Efemérides Malagueñas* (Málaga: Gráficas San Andrés), 4 Vols.
- J. M. Fernández (1984) *Sixto Cámara un utopista revolucionario* (Vitoria: Universidad del País Vasco).
- G. Fernández Campos (1984) *Pasado, presente y futuro de los Protestantes Andaluces* (Seville: Editoriales Andaluzas).
- G. Fernández Campos (1986) *Reforma y Contrarreforma en Andalucía* (Seville: Editoriales Andaluzas).
- R. Fernández Carrión (1996) 'Antequera a mediados del siglo XIX. Estudios de estructuras y comportamientos sociales', *Revista de Estudios Antequeranos*, VII and VIII, 11–80.
- M. Fernández Paradas and V. M. Heredia Flores (1996) 'La segunda enseñanza en Antequera (1844–1928): Los Colegios de San Luis Gonzaga', *Revista de Estudios Antequeranos*, VII–VIII, 81–178.
- J. Ferrer Benimeli (1982) 'Garibaldi y España: Un Centenario Olvidado', *Historia*, 16, 59–68.
- A. Ferrer Rodríguez (1982) *Paisaje y propiedad en la tierra de Alhama (Granada siglos XVIII–XX)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada).
- J. M. Fradera (1999) *Gobernar colonias* (Barcelona: Península).
- J. M. Fradera (2005) *Colonias para después del imperio* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra).
- R. Franquelo (1862) *La Reina en Málaga, descripción de los arcos de triunfo, monumentos, adornos y vistas más notables que ha habido en Málaga y en el límite de su provincia, durante la estancia en ella de S.M. La Reina Doña Isabel II y su familia real en octubre de 1862* (Málaga: Imprenta del Correo de Andalucía).
- R. Fraser (1973) *The Pueblo. A Mountain Village on the Costa del Sol* (London: Allen Lane).
- J. Fuentes (2002) 'Milicia Nacional', in Javier Fernández Sebastián and Juan Francisco Fuentes, eds, *Diccionario político y social del siglo XIX español* (Madrid: Alianza).
- M. Galera Sánchez (1983) *Juan Valera, Político* (Córdoba: Diputación).
- A. García Balaña (2002) 'Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la guerra de Africa en Cataluña (1859–1860)', in E. M. Corrales, ed., *Marruecos y el colonialismo español (1859–1912)* (Barcelona: Bellaterra).
- A. García Cruz (1979) 'Don Juan Valera (la Raíz de un Dilettante)', in *Andalucía Contemporánea (siglos XIX y XX)* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad), I.
- A. García Maldonado (1994) 'Alhama histórica. Alhama y su Comarca hace siglo y cuarto', *Conmarcal II*, 21, 3–5.
- C. García Montoro (1980) 'Anti-maquinismo en Antequera a mediados del siglo XIX: los sucesos del verano de 1854', *Baetica*, III, 265–288.
- E. García Ruiz (1863) *Dios y el Hombre* (Madrid: Imprenta de José Antonio Ortigosa).
- M. L. García Valverde (1983) *Los problemas económicos de la Iglesia en el siglo XIX. El parroquial de Granada (1840–1900)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada).
- F. Garrido (1860) *Biografía de Sixto Cámara, extractada de las obras escogidas de –, adornada con sus retratos* (Barcelona: Manero).

- F. Garrido (1862) *Propaganda Democrática El Socialismo y la Democracia ante sus adversarios, procedida por una carta de José Mazzini*, 3rd edn (London).
- F. Garrido (1864) *Historia de las asociaciones obreras en Europea y las clases trabajadoras regeneradas por la asociación* (Barcelona: Manero), 2 Vols.
- F. Garrido (1868–9) *Historia del Reinado del Ultimo Borbón de España* (Barcelona: Manero), 3 Vols.
- F. Garrido (1970) *La Federación y el Socialismo* (Barcelona: Las Ediciones Liberales).
- L. Garrido González (1997) 'La configuración de una clase obrera: los jornaleros', *Historia Social*, 28, 41–69.
- J. Ortega y Gasset (1964) *Obras Completas* (Madrid: Alianza), IV, 112–113.
- R. Gildea (1987) *Barricades and Borders Europe 1800–1914* (Oxford: OUP).
- D. Gilmore (1980) *The People of the Plain Class and Community in Lower Andalusia* (New York: Columbia).
- M. Gómez Oliver (1983) *La Desamortización de Mendizábal en la provincia de Granada* (Granada: Universidad).
- M. Gómez Oliver (1985) *La Desamortización de Mádóz en Granada* (Granada: Universidad).
- F. R. González (1986) *Caciques, Burgueses y Campesinos Loja, 1900–1923* (Loja: Ayuntamiento).
- M. González Jiménez (1972) 'La Revolución de 1868 en Carmona', *Archivo Hispalense*, LV, 113–167.
- M. A. González Muñoz (1978) *Constituciones, Cortes y Elecciones españolas. Historia y anécdota (1810–1936)* (Madrid: Júcar).
- W. Greene (1862) *Manuel Matamoros and his Fellow-Prisoners; A Narrative of the Present Persecution of Christians in Spain Compiled from Original Letters Written in Prison* (London: Morgan and Chase).
- J. Guereña (1991) 'Hacia una historia socio-cultural de las clases populares en España (1840–1920)', *Historia Social*, 11, 147–164.
- J. Guereña (2001) 'El "espíritu de asociación". Nuevos espacios y formas de sociabilidad en la España decimonónica', in J. F. Fuentes and L. Roura i Aulinas, eds, *Sociabilidad y liberalismo en la España del siglo XIX* (Lérida: Editorial Milenio), 225–238.
- A. Guerola (1986) *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Cádiz como gobernador de ella desde 31 de marzo hasta 31 de mayo de 1863* (Cádiz: Caja de Ahorros de Cádiz).
- A. Guerola (1993a) *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Sevilla como gobernador de ella desde 11 de junio hasta 24 de octubre de 1863* (Seville: FSE).
- A. Guerola (1993b) *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Sevilla como gobernador de ella por Segunda vez desde el 1 de marzo 1876 hasta 5 de agosto de 1878* (Seville: FSE), 3 Vols.
- A. Guerola (1995) *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Málaga como gobernador de ella desde 6 de diciembre de 1857 hasta 15 de febrero de 1863* (Seville: FSE), 4 Vols.
- A. Guerola (1996) *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Granada como gobernador de ella desde 27 de noviembre de 1863 hasta 25 de enero de 1864* (Seville: FSE).
- E. Guerrero (1979) *Historia de la Educación en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación), 3 Vols.
- J. Guichot y Parody (1870–1871) *Historia General de Andalucía desde los tiempos más remotos hasta 1870* (Seville: Eduardo Perié & Félix Perié), 8 Vols.
- F. Guillen Robles (1983) *Historia de Málaga y Su Provincia* (Málaga: Editorial Arguval).

- F. Gutiérrez Contreras (1982) 'Caracterización de la "revolución" de Loja de 1861 como movimiento social', in R. Pérez del Alamo, ed., *Apuntes sobre dos revoluciones andaluzas* (Granada: Aljibe).
- E. Hales (1956) *Mazzini and the Secret Societies The making of a Myth* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode).
- D. Headrick (1976) 'Spain and the Revolutions of 1848', *European Studies Review*, VI, 197–223.
- D. Headrick (1981) *Ejército y Política en España (1866–1898)* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos).
- C. A. M. Hennessy (1962) *The Federal Republic in Spain, 1868–1874* (Oxford: OUP).
- R. Herr (1989) *Rural Changes and Royal Finances in Spain at the End of the Old Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- M. Hijano de Río (1994) 'El analfabetismo en Antequera (1841–1877)', *Revista de Estudios Antequeranos*, II, 133–142.
- J. A. Inarejos Muñoz (2008) *Ciudadanos, propietarios y electores en la construcción del liberalismo español: el case de las provincias castellano-manchegas (1854–1868)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva).
- Instituto de Estadística de Andalucía, 'Evolución de los efectivos totales de población por partidos judiciales según los censos de población, 1842–2001', www.juntadeandalucia.es/institutodeestadistica/ehpa/fich/011.xls, 2 August 2009.
- M. Janué i Miret (2002) 'El Fracaso del Sexenio en Cataluña', in R. Serrano García, ed., *España, 1868–1874 Nuevos enfoques sobre el sexenio democrático* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León).
- J. Jiménez Guerrero (1994) *Los Sucesos de Diciembre de 1854 en Málaga* (Málaga: Diputación).
- G. Jackson (1955) 'The Origins of Spanish Anarchism', *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XXXVI, 135–147.
- S. Jacobsen (2004) '“The head and the heart of Spain”: New Perspectives on Nationalism and Nationhood', *Social History*, XXIX, 393–407.
- G. de Jovellanos (1979) (16 November 1809) 'Bases para la formación de un Plan General de Instrucción Pública', in Enrique Guerrero, ed., *Historia de la educación en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia), I.
- G. M. Jovellanos (1809) 'Bases para la formación de un Plan General de Instrucción Pública', in E. Guerrero, ed., *Historia General de Educación en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación), Vol. 1.
- J. M. Jover (1976) *Política, Diplomacia y Humanismo Popular en la España del Siglo XIX* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe).
- S. Juliá (1996) 'Anomalía, dolor y fracaso de España', *Claves de Razón Práctica*, 66, 10–21.
- S. Juliá (2004) *Historia de las Dos Españas* (Madrid: Taurus).
- T. Kaplan (1977) *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868–1903* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- V. G. Kiernan (1966) *The Revolution of 1854 in Spanish History* (Oxford: OUP).
- M. Lawrence (2006) 'Popular Radicalism and 1848 in Spain', unpublished conference paper, University of Liverpool.
- C. E. Lida (1969) 'Agrarian Anarchism in Andalucía: Documents on the *Mano Negra*', *International Review of Social History*, XIV, 315–352.
- C. E. Lida (1970) 'Republicanism federal y crisis agraria en el primer año de la revolución', in C. E. Lida and I. M. Zavala, eds, *La Revolución de 1868. Historia, pensamiento, literatura* (New York: Las Americas).
- C. E. Lida (1972) *Anarquismo y Revolución en la España del XIX* (Madrid: Siglo XXI).

- C. Lida (1973) *Antecedentes y desarrollo del movimiento obrero español (1835–1888)* (Madrid: Siglo XXI).
- C. E. Lida (1993) 'Los Discursos de la Clandestinidad en el Anarquismo del XIX', *Historia Social*, 17, 63–74.
- C. E. Lida (1997) '¿Que son las clases populares? Los modelos europeos frente al caso español en el siglo XIX', *Historia Social*, 27, 3–23.
- C. E. Lida (2002) 'The Democratic and Social Republic and its Repercussions in the Hispanic World', in Guy Thomson, ed., *The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas* (London: University of London).
- H. V. Livermore (1966) *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge: CUP).
- C. Llorca (1984) *Isabel II y su tiempo* (Madrid: Vicente Llorens).
- M. López-Cordón (1975) *El Pensamiento político-internacional del federalismo español* (Madrid: Planeta).
- M. López-Cordón (1981) 'Los instrumentos de la política internacional: Instituciones, Hombres, Ideas', in R. Menéndez Pidal, ed., *La Historia de España* (Madrid: Calpe), Vol. XXXIV.
- A. López Estudillo (1996) 'El republicanismo de la década de 1890: la reestructuración del sistema de partidos', in J. A. Piqueras and Manuel Chust, eds, *Republicanos y repúblicas en España* (Madrid: Siglo XXI).
- A. Lorenzo (1974) *El proletariado militante* (Madrid: Alianza).
- D. Mack Smith (1994) *Mazzini* (London: Yale University Press).
- F. Madrid Santos (1993) 'El garibaldinismo en España en el siglo XIX', *Spagna contemporanea*, 3, 23–45.
- A. Malpica Cuello (1981) *El Consejo de Loja (1485–1508)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada).
- J. Maluquer de Motes (1977) *El Socialismo en España 1833–1868* (Barcelona: Grijalbo).
- J. Maluquer de Motes (1981) 'La Formación de la Clase Obrera', in Ramón Menéndez Pidal, ed., *Historia de España. La Era Isabelina y el Sexenio Democrático, 1834–74* (Madrid: Espas-Calpe), XXXIV.
- P. A. de Alarcón, et al. (1863) *Manifiesto que el comité granadino de unión liberal dirija á todos los españoles y especialmente á los habitantes de esta provincia* (Granada, 14 November 1863).
- E. W. Margadant (1979) *French Peasants in Revolt: The Insurrection of 1851* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- J. Martínez Alier (1971) *Labourers and Landowners in Southern Spain* (Oxford: OUP).
- J. Martínez Gallego (2001) *Conservar progresando. La Unión Liberal (1856–1868)* (Valencia: Instituto de Historia Social).
- F. Martínez López (2006) *Los republicanos en la política almeriense del siglo XIX* (Málaga: Unicaja).
- M. Martínez Martín (1995) *Revolución Liberal y Cambio Agrario en la Alta Andalucía* (Granada: Universidad de Granada).
- M. Martín Rodríguez (1982) *Historia económica de la Vega de Granada (siglos XV–XX) Una propuesta de interpretación malthusiana* (Granada: Editorial don Quijote).
- A. Marvaud (1975) *La Cuestión Social en España* (Madrid: Editorial Heroes).
- J. Maurice (1990) *El Anarquismo Andaluz Campesinos y Sindicalistas, 1868–1936* (Barcelona: Crítica).
- E. Maza Zorrilla (1995) 'Tradición y control en la España Isabelina. El mutualismo domesticado del interior: Valladolid', in J. Donezar and M. Pérez Ledesma, eds, *Antiguo Régimen y Liberalismo: Homenaje a Miguel Artola* (Madrid: Alianza), 3 Vols.

- Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Antequera (1907) *Memoria relativa la situación económica del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Antequera en 30 de junio de 1907* (Málaga: Imprenta Fin de Siglo).
- M. Menéndez Pelayo (1881) *Historia de los Heterodoxos Españoles* (Madrid: Imprenta de F. Maroto e hijos), 3 Vols.
- J. L. Millan Chite (1979) 'Los democratas andaluces en la alta edad contemporánea', *Actas del Congreso de Historia de Andalucía. Andalucía Contemporánea (Siglos XIX y XX)* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad), 2 Vols.
- J. Millán and M. Cruz Romeo (2004) 'Was the Liberal Revolution Important to Spain? Political Cultures and Citizenship in Spanish History', *Social History*, XXIX, 284–300.
- J. Mintz (1994) *The Anarchists of Casa Viejas* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- F. Molina Aparicio (2005) 'Modernidad e identidad nacional. El Nacionalismo español del siglo XIX y su historiografía', *Historia Social*, 52, 147–172.
- A. Moliner Prada (1995) 'La frustrada insurrección armada republicana de mayo de 1857', in Javier M. Donezar and Manuel Pérez Ledesma, eds, *Antiguo Régimen y Liberalismo: Homenaje a Miguel Artola. Economía y Sociedad* (Madrid: Alianza), Vol. 2.
- M. Morales Muñoz (1989) *Málaga, la Memoria Perdida: Los Primeros Militantes Obreros* (Málaga), 19–27.
- M. Morales Muñoz (1994) 'El mutualismo popular y obrero en la comarca de Antequera, 1853–1936', *Revista de Estudios Antequeranos*, 2, 421–488.
- M. Morales Muñoz (1999) *El Republicanismo Malagueño en el Siglo XIX, Propaganda doctrinal, practicas políticas y formas de sociabilidad* (Málaga: Asukaría Mediterránea).
- M. Morayta (1895) *Historia General de España* (Madrid: Calle de San Rafael), Vol. 8.
- I. Moreno (1977) *Andalucía Subdesarrollo, clases sociales y regionalismo* (Madrid: Manifiesto Editorial).
- J. Moreno (1987) *Zafarraya. El Polje y Su Cultura* (Zafarraya: Imprenta Ave María).
- J. Moreno Luzón (2007) 'Political Clientelism, Elites, and Caciquismo in Restoration Spain (1875–1923)', *European History Quarterly*, XXXVII, 417–441.
- M. Morán Orti (1990) 'España e Italia: historiografía sobre el primer tercio del siglo XIX', in F. García Sanz, ed., *Españoles e Italianos en el mundo contemporáneo* (Madrid: CSIC).
- M. Mugnaini (1990) 'Un esempio di circolazione delle élites: Italia e Spagna dal 1808 al 1860, rassegna della storiografia italiana', in Fernando García Sanz, ed., *Españoles e Italianos en el mundo contemporáneo* (Madrid: CSIC).
- F. Muñoz Hidalgo and A. R. García Cañero (1998) *Crónica de Fuente de Piedra y su laguna salada* (Málaga: Diputación).
- J. Nadal (1975) *El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España* (Barcelona: Ariel).
- A. Nadal Sánchez (1974) 'Málaga en la Revolución de Loja de 1861', *Jábega*, 7, 57–64.
- M. Nettlau (1969) *La Première Internationale en Espagne (1868–1888)* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel).
- Rafael Nuñez and Santiago Diego Ruiz García (2006) *Historia de Periana* (Málaga: Diputación Provincial).
- M. Okazumi (1983) 'Estudio sobre la sublevación de Loja de 1861 Movimiento campesino andaluz en vísperas de la Ia Internacional en España', *Estudios de Historia de España*, 1, 2–19.
- M. Okazumi (1987) 'Problemas de la Tierra en Andalucía del siglo XIX. Reparto de la tierras consejiles en Loja (1834–74)', *Bulletin of the College of UBE*, 24, 81–93.
- M. Okazumi (1992) 'Medidas de Socorro tomadas para jornaleros parados en Andalucía Rural: caso de Loja (1834–1874)', *Boletín de la Facultad de Estudios Extranjeros de la Universidad de Kitakyusyu*, 72.

- A. de Oliveira Marques (1969) *History of Portugal* (New York: A. A. Knopf), 2 Vols.
- F. Ortega Alba (1974) *El Sur de Córdoba Estudio de Geografía Agraria* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad), 2 Vols.
- J. Ortega y Gasset (1964) *Obras Completas* (Madrid: Editorial Revista de Occidente), IV.
- I. Otero Cabrera (1996) *Aproximación a la Historia de Villanueva de Tapia* (Málaga: Imprenta Ave María).
- J. Pabón y Suárez de Urbina (1972) *España y la Cuestión Romana* (Madrid: Moneda y Crédito).
- J. Pabón y Suárez de Urbina (1983) *Narvéez y su época* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe).
- A. Parejo Barranco (1979) *La Industria textil antequerana del siglo XIX 1833–1868* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, Málaga).
- A. Parejo Barranco (1980) 'La crisis de 1857 en Antequera' *Jábega*, 31, 52–60.
- A. Parejo Barranco (1981) 'La Crisis de 1857 en Antequera', *Jábega*, 30, 59.
- A. Parejo Barranco (1983) 'Demócratas, federales y proletarios andaluces del siglo XIX; aproximación al estudio de las relaciones pequeña burguesía-clase obrera en Antequera (1840–1870)', *Actas del Primer Congreso del Andalucismo Histórico* (Seville: Fundación Blas Infante).
- A. Parejo Barranco (1987a) *Industria Dispersa e Industrialización en Andalucía El textil antequerano, 1750–1900* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga).
- A. Parejo Barranco (1987b) *Historia de Antequera* (Antequera: Caja de Ahorros).
- A. Parejo Barranco (1998) 'Revolución liberal y elites locales', in A. Gómez Mendoza and A. Parejo, eds, *De Economía e Historia* (Málaga: Junta de Andalucía).
- I. S. Pascual Sastre (1994) 'L'esperienza garibaldina di Leonardo Sánchez Deus (Un Carteggio inédito)', *Bollettino della Domus Mazziniana*, XL, 120–147.
- I. S. Pascual Sastre (1997) 'La legione iberica. Progetti e realtà di due democrazie mediterranee nell'ottocento', *Il Risorgimento*, XXXIX, 299–326.
- I. S. Pascual Sastre (2001) *La Italia del Risorgimento y la España del Sexenio Democrático (1868–1874)* (Madrid: CSIC).
- M. Pavía (1878) *Pacificación de Andalucía* (Madrid: Minuesa).
- G. Pécout (1997) 'Cómo se escribe la historia de la politización rural. Reflexiones a partir del estudio del campo francés en el siglo XIX', *Historia Social*, 29, 89–110.
- P. Pegenaute Garde (1979) 'La "Revolución", de Loja. Nuevas Fuentes para su estudio', *Actas del Congreso de Historia de Andalucía* (Córdoba: Monte De Piedad).
- R. Pérez del Alamo (1982) *Apuntes sobre dos revoluciones andaluzas* (Granada: Aljibe).
- B. Pérez Galdós (1979) *La Vuelta al Mundo en la 'Numancia'* (Madrid: Alianza).
- J. S. Pérez Garzón (1978) *Milicia Nacional y Revolución Burguesa* (Madrid: CSIC).
- M. Pérez Ledesma (2008) with I. Burdiel, eds. *Liberales eminentes* (Madrid: Marcial Pons).
- C. Pérez Roldán (2001) *El partido republicano federal, 1868–1874* (Madrid: Ediciones Endymion).
- F. Peyrou (2004) 'Discursos concurrentes de la ciudadanía: del doceañismo al republicanismo (1808–1843)', *Historia Contemporanea*, XXVIII, 267–283.
- F. Peyrou (2006) *La Comunidad de los Ciudadanos, El Discurso Democrático-Republicano en España, 1840–1868* (Pisa: Pisa University Press).
- M. J. Quin (1823) *A Visit to Spain* (London: Hurts, Robinson and Co.).
- C. B. de Quirós (1986) 'El Espartaquismo Agrario Andaluz', in B. de Quirós, ed., *Colonización y subversión en Andalucía de los siglos XVIII–XIX* (Seville: Biblioteca de la Cultura Andaluza).
- F. Ramírez Gamiz (2001) *Comportamientos demográficos diferenciales en el pasado. Aplicación del método de reconstrucción de familias a la población de Iznájar (siglos XVIII–XX)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada).

- F. Ramírez Gamiz (2002) *La población lojeña en la Edad Contemporánea* (Loja: Ayuntamiento).
- E. Reclus (2007) *Impresiones de un viaje por España en tiempos de Revolución* (Logroño: Piedra de Rayo).
- A. Révész (1953) *Un Dictador Liberal: Narváez* (Madrid: Aguilar).
- E. de los Reyes and F. J. Cobos (1994) *Crónica del viaje de sus majestades y altezas reales por Granada y su provincia en 1862* (Granada: Ediciones Albalida).
- D. R. Ringrose (1996) *Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish Miracle', 1700–1900* (Cambridge: CUP).
- B. de Riquer I Permanyer (1994) 'La faiblesse du processus de construction nationale en Espagne au XICe siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 42, 353–366.
- A. Rodrigo (2002) *Mariana de Pineda* (Granada: Editorial Comares).
- R. del Rosal Pauli and F. Derqui del Rosal (1957) *Noticias Históricas de la Ciudad de Loja* (Loja: Ayuntamiento).
- E. Rodríguez-Solís (1894) *Historia del Partido Republicano Español* (Madrid: Imprenta de Fernando Cao y Domingo de Val. 1894 y 1893), 2 Vols.
- M. Rolandi Sánchez-Solís (2007) 'Aportación a la historia del republicanismo y el federalismo español del s. XIX: V: Las últimas insurrecciones armadas de Cartagena y Madrid (1885–1886)', *Cuadernos republicanos*, 64, 147–192.
- C. Rouré (1927) *Recuerdos de mi larga vida* (Barcelona: Biblioteca de 'El Diluvio'), 3 Vols.
- M. A. Rubio Gandía (1996) *Desamortización Eclesiástica en Granada, 1836–37* (Granada: Método Ediciones).
- J. Sánchez Jiménez (1976) *Vida rural y mundo contemporáneo Análisis socio- histórico de un pueblo del sur* (Barcelona: Planeta).
- M. Santerso Rodríguez (2008) *Progreso y Libertad: España en la Europa Liberal 1830–1870* (Madrid: Ariel).
- A. Shubert (1992) *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Routledge).
- J. Solé Tura and E. Aja (1990) *Constituciones y períodos constituyentes en España (1808–1936)* (Madrid: Siglo XIX).
- A. Spitzer (1971) *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes. The French Carbonari against the Bourbon Restoration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
- M. Taylor (2000) 'The 1848 Revolutions and the British Empire', *Past and Present*, 166, 146–180.
- J. Termes (1977) *Anarquismo y sindicalismo en España La Primera Internacional (1864–1881)* (Barcelona: Grijalbo).
- G. Thomson, ed. (2002) *The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies).
- G. Thomson (2007) 'Mazzini y España, 1832–1872', *Historia Social*, 59, 21–54.
- G. Thomson (2008) 'La revolución de Loja en julio de 1861: la conspiración de los carbonarios y la democracia en La España moderna', in A. Blanco and G. Thomson, eds, *Visiones del Liberalismo. Política, identidad y Cultura en la España del siglo XIX* (Valencia: Universitat de València).
- C. Tresserra (1856) *Carta de un demócrata confinado dirigida al Excelentísimo Sr. D. Juan Zapatero y Capitán General del Ejército y Principado de Cataluña* (Granada).
- M. Tuñón de Lara (1977) *El Movimiento Obrero en la Historia de España. 1832–1899* (Madrid: Taurus), 2 Vols.
- J. Tusell (1976) *Oligarquía y caciquismo en Andalucía (1890–1923)* (Madrid: Planeta), 2 Vols.

- I. Vallejo and P. Ojeda (2002) 'Pedro Calvo Asensio (1821–1863) "La esperanza de un partido"', in R. Serrano García, ed., *España, 1868–1874 Nuevos enfoques sobre el sexenio democrático* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León).
- J. Varela Ortega (1977) *Los Amigo Políticos: Partidos, Elecciones y Caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875–1900* (Madrid: Alianza).
- E. Ventosa (pseudonym, F. Garrido) (1860) *La Regeneración de España* (Barcelona: Manero).
- J. B. Vilar (1994) *Intolerancia y Libertad en la España Contemporanea. Los Orígenes del Protestantismo Español Actual* (Madrid: Istmo).
- J. B. Vilar (2003) *Manuel Matamoros Fundador del Protestantismo Español Actual* (Granada: Comares).
- J. Vilches (2001) *Progreso y Libertad El Partido Progresista en la Revolución Liberal Española* (Madrid: Alianza).
- E. Weber (1976) *Peasants into Frenchmen The Modernisation of Rural France 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- E. Weber (1991) *My France Politics, Culture, Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
- A. Zamoyksi (1999) *Holy Madness: Romantics, Patriots, and Revolution, 1776–1871* (London: Viking).

Index

- Acedo Montero, Antonio, 169, 284
agrarian protest, 12, 30, 37, 102, 111,
121–2, 155, 160, 180, 265–6, 269,
275, 279
see also municipal government,
desamortización, workers and
working class politics, day
labourers, *jornaleros*
- Aguilar family of Antequera, 32, 38, 60,
180, 246, 274–6, 280, 283–93
Aguilar brothers, 63, 163, 166, 246,
286, 288, 297
Aguilar, Francisco Joaquín, 31–9,
274–6, 279, 284–8, 293
Aguilar, José Antonio, 31–8, 70, 167,
168, 246, 274–6, 286–8
Aguilar, Manuel María, 31, 42, 112,
173, 274, 288–9, 293
Aguilar y Puerta, Manuel María
(1785–1867), 31, 38
see also Quinta de Valdealanes
- Aguirre, Joaquín, 213
Aguilhon, Maurice, 5
Alameda (Antequera), 34, 96, 276, 286
Alarcón, Pedro Antonio (1833–91), 208
Albuñol (Granada), 143, 213, 217
Alcalá Galiano, Félix, 129, 146
Alcolea, battle of (28 September 1868),
255–6, 261
Alcoy (Valencia), 255, 290
Alfarnatejo (Málaga), 153
Alfarnate (Málaga), 9, 115, 136, 149,
153, 160, 170, 195, 213, 257, 269
Algarinejo (Granada), 24, 70, 72, 75, 86,
113–14, 120, 147, 161, 162, 196,
197, 213, 214, 237, 249, 256, 257
Alhama de Granada, 6, 9, 11, 12, 17,
28–34, 37, 40, 43, 50–1, 56, 61, 73,
91–5, 108, 109, 113–22, 129, 132,
143, 147, 151, 160–1, 166, 202,
208–9, 211, 213, 216–23, 227, 237,
242, 244, 253, 256, 259, 267–70,
272, 274–5, 285, 296–8
Alhama Teba, José, 59, 99, 108, 119
Alhaurin el Grande (Málaga), 34
Almogía (Málaga), 63, 94, 100, 149–50,
153, 180
alojamiento, *see* municipal government
Alonso, Joaquín, 204, 207–8
Alora (Málaga), 9, 70, 94–6, 101, 143–8,
177–8, 278
Alvarez Santullano, Benito, 99, 101–2,
166–70, 173, 181
Andalucía, vii, 1, 3, 4, 6, 12, 16, 42–4,
47, 50–7, 59–62, 64–7, 74, 76, 81,
85, 103, 111, 123, 127, 137, 141,
149, 174, 187, 193–6, 202–6, 233,
236, 238, 247, 254, 255, 271, 275,
276, 280, 284, 289–93
Alta (eastern) Andalucía, 1–9, 26, 27,
29, 76, 103, 122, 166, 182, 208,
212, 215, 217, 255, 285
Antequera (Málaga), 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 17,
31–9, 42, 56, 57, 61, 66, 208
conspiracies, protests, strikes and
insurrections, 27–31, 32–3, 51–4,
66, 68, 80, 84, 91–103, 114,
121–2, 147, 166–84, 213–14, 219,
242–6, 274–94
*La Fraternidad, Sociedad de Socorros
Mutuos*, 33, 284, 291, 293
policing, exile and amnesties, 65, 75,
145, 181–4, 245, 246, 274–94
social and political divisions, 31, 32,
34, 52, 69–70, 73, 96, 177–8, 285
woollen industry and the working
class, 57, 91–4, 166–84, 290–4
see also Carbonari, Garibaldino Society
- Aragón, 4, 214, 236, 239, 240
Arce, Félix de, 70, 90, 127, 142, 245
Arce, Manuel de, 39
Archidona (Málaga), 6, 9, 12, 36, 38, 61,
63, 73, 92, 95–7, 110, 114, 143, 147,
154, 156, 163–4, 168, 175, 177, 180,
183, 213, 216, 257, 275, 281–2, 286,
296, 297
Arcos de la Frontera (Cádiz), 76, 299–300
Ardales (Málaga), 9, 211

- Arenas del Rey (Alhama), 29, 61, 160, 221–3, 260, 298
- Aroca Lara, Angel, 159
- Arrazola y García, Lorenzo (1797–1873), 209, 224, 233–4
- Arreses Rojas, Ildefonso, 275
- associations, *see* Carbonari; sociability
- Axarquía (Málaga), 57, 61, 75, 100, 121, 147, 149–53, 160, 216, 275, 286
- Badajoz (Extremadura), 79, 80, 206, 214
- banditry, *see* crime and punishment
- Barcelona, 16, 23, 26, 32, 42, 56, 59, 60, 73, 79, 92, 204, 217, 238, 278, 282, 291, 294
- Barcena, Juan de, 53
- Becerra, Manuel (1829–96), 42, 231, 232
- Belda, Martín, Marqués de Cabra (1815–82), 233
- Belgium, 4, 112, 207, 215, 217
- Benamargosa (Málaga), 275
- Bernal Pérez, Pedro, 172, 175, 276, 277, 286, 288, 297
- Bobadilla (Antequera), 34, 291
- Bohorques, Pedro, 285
- Borge (Málaga), 149
- Branchat y Maestre, Salvador, 28, 29
- Britain, 4, 31, 67, 192, 193
- Brú, Tomás, 74, 76, 194
- Burgos, 26, 231
- Caballero de Rodas, General Antonio (1816–66), 280
- Caciques and caciquismo, x, 3, 9, 16, 19, 22, 61, 72, 163, 178, 188, 189, 207, 233, 275, 289, 293
see also Narváez, Ramón María
- Calderón Collantes, Saturnino (1799–1864), 137
- Calvo Asensio, Pedro (1821–63), 204
- Calvo de Jiménez, Ramón, 96, 109, 114, 116, 117, 129, 135, 138, 154, 195, 199, 201, 204–7, 213–17, 226, 235, 241
- Camacho, Francisco Javier, 99
- Cámara Aguilar, Antonio de la, 276, 282–3
- Cámara, Sixto, *see* Sáenz de Cámara, Sixto de
- Campos family (Loja), 272
- Campos, Caridad de, 137
- Campos, Joaquín de, 90, 117, 127, 189, 234–46
- Campos, José María, 58
- Campos, Matilde, 189
- Campos, Manuel de, 89, 115
- Campos y Varona, Ramón de, 273
- Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio (1828–97), 15, 16, 67, 90, 154, 177, 289, 290, 292
- Cantero, Jacinto, 72, 88, 110, 199
- Carbajal, Eduardo, 289
- Carbonari, x, xi, 2–9, 25, 31, 51, 54–7, 61–7, 70, 78, 80, 84, 91–109, 122–3, 142–84, 206–7, 212, 218, 235, 274, 288, 297
- Garibaldino Society of Antequera and *espontaneamiento*, 57, 91–3, 99, 143, 149, 166–84, 187, 210, 245–6, 275, 279–92, 297
- La Venta Nacional (Granada), 56–7, 76, 107–8, 171
- Sociedad de Habitantes Pacíficos (The Society) Loja, 25, 46, 57, 70–8, 84, 87, 90–3, 103, 112–14, 122, 127, 129, 133, 136–43, 214
- Carlism, *see* wars
- Caro, Victoriano, 21, 131–3, 137, 189, 190
- Caro y García, Manuel María, 62–3
- Carrasco y Luque, Gaspar, 33
- Carrión, Bishop Benigno de, 246, 249, 262–3
- Cártama (Málaga), 94, 95
- Casabermeja (Málaga), 9, 94, 99, 100, 133, 148–9, 150, 163–4, 177, 275
- Casarabonela (Málaga), 26
- Casariche (Seville), 275
- Casasola Fonseca, Juan, 51–3, 65, 66, 208, 245
- Castejón López, Francisco, 75, 153
- Castelar, Emilio (1832–99), 80, 209, 213–27, 230, 232, 270, 278, 284
- Castellón, José, 134
- Castille, 4, 38, 98, 182, 196
- Castillón, José, 263
- Catalans, 57, 59, 151, 214, 230, 236, 284
- Catalonia, 4, 44, 55, 68, 79, 182, 205, 207, 236, 239, 283, 284

- Catholic church
 anti-clericalism, 60, 90, 278
 Concordat, *desamortización* and
 Church State relations, 3, 5, 11,
 21, 43, 141, 173, 209, 233, 264
 de-Christianisation and Catholic
 revival, 3, 6, 11, 21, 22, 35, 131,
 136, 164, 187, 238, 246, 264, 273
- Cauche, Villanueva de (Málaga), 11
- Ceballos y Henríquez family (Loja)
 Ceballos y Henríquez de Luna,
 Miguel, 75
 Ceballos y Henríquez, Mariano, 25,
 87–8, 127, 257, 259, 262, 264
 Ceballos y Henríquez, Santiago, 272
 Henríquez y Soldevilla, José, 86–9,
 109, 112, 113, 117, 126, 127, 129,
 142, 166
- Cerillo y Barranco family (Loja)
 Cerillo y Barranco, Francisco de
 Paula, 241
 Cerrillo y Barranco, José, 119, 272
- Cervera, Antonio Ignacio (1825–60), 32,
 76, 78
- Chacón, Rafael, 53, 70, 96, 208, 287
- Chao, Eduardo (1821–87), 239
- Cholera, 17, 23, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 40
- clandestinity, *see* Carbonari, nicknames
- Colmenar (Málaga), 32, 37, 57, 61, 75,
 95–6, 99, 130, 133, 145, 149–53,
 160, 163, 165, 170, 213, 257,
 275, 296
- Comares (Málaga), 100–1, 133, 146,
 149, 153
- Communism, 64, 66, 124
- Conejo Somosierra, José, 168
- consumos, *see* Taxation
- Córdoba, 11, 20, 33, 38, 57, 61, 62, 73,
 77, 97, 98, 103, 142, 147, 156, 158,
 217, 233, 234, 255, 256, 282, 285,
 295, 566
- crime and punishment
anónimos, x, 44, 52, 54, 173
 banditry, 8, 44, 246
 executions, 42, 60, 64, 66, 67, 81,
 124–5, 129–42, 149, 152, 153,
 158, 159, 194, 196, 232, 235,
 244–5, 293
 homicides, 53, 54, 74, 75, 157, 169,
 176, 219, 280
presidio sentences, 38, 91, 125, 129,
 133, 136, 140, 148–62, 169–71,
 181, 194–7, 209, 221, 235, 240,
 243, 268, 275, 293
 thefts, 27, 35, 51, 63, 172, 173, 246,
 258, 279, 286, 288
- Cuervos, José, 47
- Cuevas Altas (Antequera), 34, 156,
 164, 286
- Cuevas Bajas (Antequera), 34, 37, 96,
 180, 286
- Cuevas de San Marcos (Málaga), 96,
 279, 286
- Cútar (Málaga), 75, 149, 151–3, 286
- Darnton, Roger, 5–6
- Dávila, Luis, 70–2, 81, 85, 86, 137,
 161, 267
- Democrat party (Partido Demócrata
 Español)
 clandestinity, 54–7, 67–8, 77, 78,
 84, 94–103, 107–84, 187,
 202–28
 Federal Republican Party, 253, 262,
 270, 274, 277, 278, 280–4,
 286–93, 296
 foundation, divisions among,
 leadership, Cortes representation,
 2, 17, 31, 69, 70, 194, 195
 internationalism, insurrectionism and
 armed citizenship, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8,
 15–16, 32, 42, 44, 55, 57–66, 67,
 69, 79, 80–3, 84, 107–84, 193,
 202–28, 253–8
 manifestos, 15–16, 53, 57, 59, 67, 68,
 110, 239, 253
 press, propaganda and local
 leadership, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 19,
 24, 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 39, 46, 50,
 55–9, 74–6, 80, 107–84, 119, 188,
 195, 199–201, 202–28
 relations with Progresistas, 6, 39, 40,
 42, 46, 47, 50, 54, 72, 73, 84, 85,
 88–90, 188, 192, 202–10, 229–50,
 253–4
- desamortización*, *see* municipal
 government
- Díaz Pérez, Nicolás, 80–1
- Díaz Quintero, Francisco, 254
- Dolfi, Giuseppe (1818–69), 212, 215

- Duke of Valencia, General Ramón María Narváez (1800–1868)
 businesses and railway contracts, 17, 20, 27, 45, 86, 88, 141, 247–9
cacicazgo, patronage, elections and lawsuits, 19, 20, 28, 31, 39, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 61, 71–3, 77, 89, 90, 187, 199–201, 208, 209, 220, 260, 265
 church, charities and poor relief, 2, 18, 22, 28, 36, 189–91, 229–50
 Consuelo (daughter), 88, 188, 224, 249
 exile, 2, 19, 20, 22, 44, 88, 124, 163, 187
 family, 20, 44, 112, 126, 188, 224, 248–50, 273, 275
 First Ministry and leadership of Moderados, 2, 16, 20, 22, 44, 45, 51, 52, 62–7, 89, 165, 188, 209, 225, 229, 232–3, 236, 245
 hospicio (Asilo de San Ramón), xi, 18, 36, 189, 190, 195, 196, 198, 234, 249, 261
 palaces and country house, 1–2, 18, 19, 21, 22, 45, 72, 88, 116, 127, 187–9, 197, 198, 201, 234, 248
 petitions and relations with the Monarchy, 22, 45, 46, 48, 49, 89, 131–5, 188, 193–9, 224, 225, 265
 portrait, 18, 263
 repression of Democracy and Socialism, 2, 19, 53–65, 79, 194, 229–50, 262
 statue, 20, 48
 wife (María Alejandra Tascher), 20, 249
- education
 church, 3, 21, 22, 233
 latin, 23–24, 26, 36, 168
 primary, 5, 17, 36, 40, 68, 102, 173, 191, 299
 secondary and higher, 12, 40, 138, 158, 191, 263–4, 277
 workers and Adult, 5, 24–5, 76, 78, 87
see also Loja, professionals, sociability
- elections, 6, 16, 28, 32, 34, 43, 52, 69–78, 84–9, 96, 103, 108, 141, 154, 160, 161, 177, 178, 203, 204, 207, 215, 230, 233–5, 245, 259–62, 268, 274–83, 287, 290, 293, 296–7
- Enríquez family (Vélez Málaga)
 Enríquez, Manuel, 20
 Enríquez y Campos, Miguel, 20, 21
 Enríquez y García, Enrique, 20, 190, 244, 245, 255, 256
- España, José, 243
- Espartero, Marshal Baldomero, Duque de la Victoria (1793–1879), 16, 17, 22, 39, 40, 42, 90, 159, 192, 215
- Estremadura, 4, 79, 80, 81
- Federal Republican Party, *see* Democrat Party
- Fernández de Córdoba family (Loja), 20, 46, 70, 193, 272
 Córdoba y Casaley, Dolores, 20
 Fernández de Córdoba, Concepción, 20, 188
 Fernández de Córdoba, Francisco, 46, 86, 89, 116–17
 Fernández de Córdoba, General Fernando, 193
- Fernández de León (a) ‘La Muerte’, Manuel, 168–9, 176
- Fernández de los Rios, Angel (1821–88), 230
- Fernández Negrete, Santiago (1799–75), 128
- Figueras, Estanislao (1819–82), 284
- Fonseca, Mariano, 208
- Fourierism, 76
- France, 3, 4, 15, 79
 invasions, 3, 7
 Spanish exiles in, 45, 54, 61, 127, 206, 212, 239
- Friedrich, Carlos de, 245
- Fuente de Piedra (Antequera), 34, 35–6, 65, 102, 149, 167, 171, 184, 246, 259, 276
- Fuentes de Cesna (Loja), 110, 114, 140, 157, 161, 162, 172
- García, Bernardo, 55, 62
- García Iturriaga, Francisco, 86, 265
- García Pérez (a) ‘El Herrador’, Juan (Colmenar), 75, 150, 151
- García Pérez, Juan (Valle de Abdalajís), 148
- García Ruiz, Emilio (1819–83), 42, 88, 204, 209

- García Tortosa, Juan, 34, 174, 175
- García Viñas, Dr. José (1848–1931), 289, 292
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807–82), 2, 7, 73, 82, 84, 88, 91–3, 108–10, 118, 119, 143, 149, 157, 160, 187, 193, 194, 195, 202–19, 228, 241
see also Carbonari, Garibaldino Society of Antequera
- Garrido, Fernando (1821–83), 32, 42, 64, 67, 76, 78, 80, 81, 108, 111, 124, 193, 205–7, 210, 212, 214, 215, 226, 277, 278
- Gibraltar, 55–60, 68–9, 100, 103, 111, 154, 168, 212, 214, 216, 217, 224, 236
- Gómez Sillero, José, 23
- González Berdún, José, 32, 34, 174, 276, 287
- González Bravo, Luis (1811–71), 89, 91, 230, 232, 250
- González de Asarta, Antonio, 176–8, 180, 181
- González del Pino family (Antequera), 102
- González del Pino, Joaquín, 173, 178, 208
- González del Pino, José María, 52, 172, 173, 178
- González (a) El Cojo, Tomás Manuel, 57, 75, 150–3, 163, 164
- González Herrero, Salvador, 288
- Granada
 city, 6, 9, 11, 19–24, 28, 30, 34, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 51, 53, 55–61, 72–6, 80, 83, 85, 87, 88, 91–2, 100, 107, 142–5, 150, 151, 160, 163, 164, 171, 182, 188, 191, 195–9, 204, 207–9, 233–6, 239–45, 255, 256, 261, 271, 272, 275, 285, 293, 296
- diocese, 21, 131, 132, 164, 189, 190, 201, 207
- province, 1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 20, 49, 50, 58, 65, 67, 73, 77, 103, 107, 109, 115, 123, 132, 151, 153, 154, 194, 205–29, 240, 244, 247, 255, 295
- Granados Espinosa, Antonio, 277, 281–3, 289
- Granados Luque, Eleuterio, 277–8, 280–1
- guards, defence forces and police
 alcaldes del barrio, x, 38, 263, 276, 285
- Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), 7, 8, 16, 19, 32, 38, 43, 51, 52–3, 63, 97–101, 109, 110, 123, 132–3, 138, 145, 146, 158, 166, 167, 175, 193, 204, 214, 217, 227, 240, 243, 244, 246, 257–8, 262, 264, 276, 279, 281, 285
- excise guards (*Carabineros*), x, 7, 8, 26, 110, 116, 132, 145, 244
- Guardias de la Ley (Antequera), 277, 285
- Partida de la Porra, xi, 8, 90, 215, 285, 287–9, 293
- policía de vigilancia* (Antequera), xii, 7, 181, 277
- rural guards, 7, 16, 35, 43, 52, 65, 99, 148, 166, 240, 243, 246, 259, 265, 267, 268, 271, 297
- Salt Guard, 7, 8, 65, 132, 167, 246, 257–9, 276, 277, 280–5
- Guerola, Antonio (1817–98), 6, 12, 56, 68–70, 73, 74, 82, 91–103, 143–65, 166–84, 202, 205, 206, 208, 227, 285, 298
- Guerra, Eladío Manuel, 61
- Guerrero Cuenca (a) ‘Filusa’, Juan Antonio, 169, 286
- Guerrero (a) ‘Vereda’, Francisco, 161, 216, 218
- Guillén, Rafael, 285
- Gutiérrez de la Vega, José (1824–1900), 107, 122, 191, 199–201, 209, 217–18, 227, 228
- Gypsies, 11, 129
- Henríquez y Soldevilla, José, *see* Ceballos y Henríquez family
- Herrera, Higinio, 70, 86
- Huétor Tajár (Granada), 73, 161, 213, 216, 256
- Humilladero (Antequera), 34, 102, 147, 149, 170, 171, 173, 276, 286
- Iberianism, 76, 79–82, 210–11, 214
- Iglesias, Manuel (a) ‘El Sastre’, 148

- Isabel II (1830–1904)
 favourites, advisers, confessors and appointments, 15, 16, 19, 51, 193, 209, 225, 229–32, 249, 250, 263
 petitions, pardons and amnesties, 48, 65–7, 70, 72, 84, 93, 124, 134–7, 141, 146, 147, 153, 162, 168, 170, 178, 181, 182, 187, 192, 193–9, 211, 218, 220, 230, 259, 298–9
 royal tour of Andalucía (October 1862), 166, 178–84, 187, 194, 196–201
- Italy, 2, 31, 54–5, 79–82, 84, 88–9, 92, 102, 108, 109, 111, 157, 160, 193, 202, 203, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 230, 297
see also Garibaldi, Dolfi, Mazzini, Mazzoni, Pisacane, wars
- Iznájar (Córdoba), 6, 9, 48, 72, 73, 97–8, 103, 109–10, 113, 114, 119, 120, 133, 136, 138, 140, 143, 145, 147, 155–9, 160, 163, 164, 209, 213, 234, 237–8, 242–4, 248, 255–7, 270, 285, 296, 297
- Jaen, 15, 43, 55, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 73, 77, 107, 190, 195, 196, 206, 217, 293
- Jiménez, Judge Manuel, 173–81
- Jornalero*, *see* workers and working class politics
- justice
 Audiencia of Granada, 46, 50, 65, 72, 194
Juzgado de primera instancia, (local justice), xi, 4, 8, 16, 20, 48, 50, 54, 93, 101, 109, 140, 154, 155, 177, 201, 208, 234, 256, 261, 264, 278, 283, 288
 Ministry of Justice, 96, 128, 154, 224, 225, 234
 Supreme Court, 167
see also military
- La Carolina (Córdoba), 61–2
- Lafuente-Alcántara, José, 95–7
- Lafuente, Romualdo, 55, 60, 68, 81, 180, 205, 211, 217, 278, 280
- La Llave, Gabriel, 62–3
- Lanjarón (Granada), 154
- Lara y Pedrosa, Francisco de, 36, 168, 174
- Leiva, Francisco de, 255
- Liberal Union (Unión Liberal), 43, 44, 46, 50, 67, 69–73, 78, 84, 89–101, 108, 124, 127, 131, 141, 163, 173, 187–9, 191, 192, 202–4, 207, 209, 229–35, 245, 254, 267
- Loja, 1–12, 17–18, 20, 21–8, 44–51, 84–91, 107–23, 124–42, 187–201, 202–28, 229–50, 253–7
 ex-convent of La Victoria, 25, 26, 87, 114, 135, 191, 196, 234, 238, 246, 247, 257, 262–4
see also Carbonari, Sociedad de Habitantes Pacíficos
- López Cózar family (Loja), 71
 López Cózar, Francisco, 119, 208
 López Cózar, Juan, 264
- López Vinuesa, Juan de Raya, 29
- Lora, Antonio, 204
- Lora, Francisco, 125, 204
- Lorenzo, Anselmo (1842–1914), 272
- Loulé, Marquis of (Nuno José Severo de Mendoça Rolim de Moura Barreto, 1804–75), 210–11, 214
- Madrid, 2–9, 15–16, 19, 20, 22, 26, 28, 31–46, 49, 55, 58, 60, 62, 67, 68, 73, 76–96, 100, 103, 108, 111, 112, 118–24, 127, 135, 137, 140, 154, 163, 164, 167, 173, 178, 187, 188, 193–5, 199, 201–20, 224, 225, 229–38, 245, 248, 253, 256, 259, 267, 269–80, 284, 287, 290, 297
- Málaga (city), 6, 11, 12, 19–20, 23, 26, 30, 33–40, 43, 46, 52–61, 65, 68, 73–5, 80, 85, 87, 91–100, 108, 111–14, 125, 136, 141, 142–84, 195, 198, 205, 208, 211, 213–19, 225, 234, 235, 241, 246, 255, 274–94, 296
- Málaga (province), 6, 9, 15, 23, 33, 44, 51, 56, 57, 61, 68–9, 73, 75, 77, 82, 92, 103, 107, 109, 115, 121–3, 142–84, 196, 202, 206, 208, 216, 221, 236, 242, 245, 254, 275–94, 295

- Marfori, Carlos (1821–92), 70–2, 78, 84, 85, 89, 126–31, 163, 188, 199–201, 208, 210, 224, 225, 230–5, 249, 262, 264, 272
- María Cristina Borbón (1806–78), 16, 19, 229
- Marseilles, 206, 214, 215, 217, 230, 245
- Martín Casco, Francisco, 168, 174, 175
- Martínez, Alfonso, 33
- Martínez, Ricardo, 235, 237
- Martos, Cristino, 232, 239
- Marx, Karl (1818–83), 295, 297
- Massa Sanguineti, Carlos, 277, 278, 280
- Mas y Abad, Celestino, 108, 142
- Matamoras, Manuel (1834–66), 56, 108, 119, 209, 236
- Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–72), 7, 31, 43, 54–9, 67, 80–2, 157, 193, 202, 206, 210, 212, 215
- Mazzoni, Giuseppe (1808–80), 212, 215
- Mellado, Antonio, 196
- Mellado Fernández, Francisco, 114, 130, 133–41, 142, 195, 297
- Merino brothers (Sierra Morena), 60, 62, 206
- Merino, León, 43
- Mesías, Villanueva de (Granada), 11
- Mexico, viii, 9, 79, 192, 193, 206, 296
- middle class, 1, 24, 35, 40, 70, 88, 108, 123, 134, 160, 163, 174, 191, 200, 257, 267
- see also* professionals
- military
- councils of war, military commissions and tribunals, 12, 62, 75, 124–86, 192, 193, 209, 232, 233, 261
 - coups and *pronunciamientos*, 15, 16, 22, 25, 31–4, 39, 42, 55, 59, 61, 78, 145, 150, 214, 231, 254–9, 261, 274, 275, 288
 - martial law (17 April 1821), 125, 128–9, 138, 145, 167, 170, 194–5, 283, 284
- National Militia and Volunteers of Liberty (*Voluntarios de la Libertad*), 2, 6, 7, 8, 15–41, 42–61, 64–8, 74, 75, 78, 87, 88, 162, 169, 174, 217, 257–63, 267, 268, 271, 274, 277–87, 297
- recruitment and *quintas*, 17, 26, 60, 68, 79, 162–3, 254, 268
- reserves and *provinciales*, 80, 110, 129, 162, 215
- Miranda family (Archidona)
- Miranda Almohalla, Dr. José Luciano, 275, 286
 - Miranda Almohalla, Luis, 96, 97, 154, 155, 163, 275, 297
- Moderados (Conservatives), xi, xii, 2, 6, 7, 12, 17, 19, 20, 24, 29, 31, 34, 43, 46, 59, 66, 69, 70, 88, 91, 108, 111, 123, 124, 127, 134, 141, 142, 163, 173, 187, 188, 191, 193, 202–10, 229–34, 272, 281, 287, 295
- Doctrinarios, xi, 203
- Polacos, 19, 45, 90, 123, 134, 208
- Puritanos, xii, 67, 191
- Modernity, 3–5, 8, 32, 40, 177, 211, 295, 298
- Mollina (Antequera), 34, 53, 101, 102, 109, 147, 149, 170–4, 246, 276–8, 286
- Mon, Alejandro (1801–82), 209, 229
- Montefrío (Granada), viii, 9, 61, 70, 72, 113, 143, 147, 161, 162, 242, 256
- Montero Rodríguez, Lorenzo, 20, 46, 47, 49, 64, 88, 89, 90, 140, 208, 234
- Montes, Eduardo, 118, 259, 267, 268
- Morales, Cayetano, 62
- Morales Mostazo (a) Abatais, Antonio, 130, 151, 152
- Morales Sementi, Juan, 129, 138, 213, 224, 236, 273
- Moreno Alba, Santiago, 260
- Moreno, José Trinidad, 211, 216
- Moreno Navarro, Pedro, 260
- Moreno Ruiz (a) El Estudiante, José, 79–81
- Moreno Sánchez, Manuel, 208, 220, 260
- Moriones, General Domingo, 204, 239
- Motríl (Granada), 34, 60, 213, 236
- mountains, *see* Sierras

- Moyano, Claudio (1809–90), 89, 191, 199
- municipal government
- alojamiento*, x, 6, 19, 27, 28–31, 51, 86, 89, 244, 247, 248, 266, 267, 268, 297
 - desamortización* (seigniorial, ecclesiastical and civil disentailment), xi, xii, 1, 6, 11, 12, 17, 21, 24, 27, 28, 30, 37, 40, 43, 52, 64, 68, 69, 77, 79, 85, 86, 88, 94, 95, 98, 111, 122, 123, 160, 180, 248, 265, 267, 275, 286, 297
 - pósitos*, xi, 23, 28, 47–50, 53, 86, 87, 117, 177, 195, 247, 254, 258, 265, 297
 - propios*, x, xii, 24, 28, 30, 37, 85–7, 98, 102, 148, 177, 265, 297
- Narváez family (Loja)
- Narváez, José María (Conde de la Cañada Alta), 18, 72, 90, 131, 249
 - Narváez Ortiz (a) Mellado, Joaquín, 114, 157–9, 163, 164, 297
 - Narváez, Pepe, 20, 86, 88–90, 112, 113, 126–7, 131–4, 140, 148, 158, 200
 - Narváez, Rafael, 20, 90, 112, 126, 156
 - Narváez, Ramón María, *see* Duke of Valencia (1800–68)
- Neo-Catholics, 36, 101, 181, 193, 194, 200, 203, 217, 231–3, 296, 298
- nicknames (aliases), 129, 132, 138, 148, 150, 151, 153, 156, 158, 161, 169, 176, 177, 179, 211, 213, 216, 218, 219, 246, 259, 261, 267, 286, 297
- Núñez del Prado, José, 89
- O'Donnell, Enrique, 33
- O'Donnell, General Leopoldo (1809–67), 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 33, 39, 42–6, 50, 55, 59, 67, 70, 72, 79, 91, 103, 107, 111, 119, 124, 131, 137, 140, 141, 181, 182, 191–4, 197, 198, 202–4, 229–35, 255
- see also* Liberal Union
- Okazumi, Masahide, 27
- Olmedo, José, 89
- Olózaga, Salustiano (1805–73), 212, 215, 239, 277
- Orejón, José María, 20, 85, 86, 115, 127
- Orense, José María (1803–80), 31, 74, 78, 108, 239, 278
- Ortega, Anastasio, 236, 241, 259, 262, 270
- Ortiz Tallante, Manuel, 280
- Palanca, Eduardo, 289
- Palencia, 26
- Palomas Rojas (a) 'El Niño del Limbo', Francisco, 175, 179, 180, 246, 297
- Palomas Rojas, Lorenzo, 280
- Pando Fernández de Pinedo, Manuel, Marqués de Miraflores (1792–1872), 203, 209, 233
- Pascual Navarro, Lic Francisco, 261
- Pascual Pérez, Francisco (a) El Papelero, 129, 137–40
- Paúl y Angulo, José (1838–92), 254–5, 285
- Pavía, General Julián Juan, 81
- Pavía y Albuquerque, General Manuel (1828–95), 271, 289
- Pérez del Alamo, Rafael (1829–1910)
- correspondence for *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*, 76, 88, 89, 91, 97, 98, 194, 199
 - elections and council posts, 71–3, 78, 87–9, 103, 163, 263
 - exile, 188, 201, 205, 254
 - judicial harrassment, 96, 97, 109, 154, 160, 199–201
 - leadership in Loja and 'The Society', 2, 8, 25, 57, 76, 77, 90–2, 96, 97, 107, 109, 118, 127, 135, 154, 157, 161, 193–5, 205, 210
- María Regina Pérez Ortiz Romero (wife), house and family, 1–2, 163, 188, 300
- memoirs (1872) and ideas and practice of Revolution, 46, 49, 72–3, 77, 82, 83, 86, 111, 119, 122, 125, 226, 233, 253, 270, 276, 297
- National Militia and Volunteers of Liberty, 44, 75, 110, 247, 254, 255, 261, 262, 280
- portrait, 70
 - retirement and memory, 299–300
 - royal pardon, 124, 182, 187, 194–9, 299
 - veterinarian and blacksmith business, 1, 2, 87–9, 200, 254, 264, 265

- Pérez del Alamo, Cristino, 89, 114, 263
 Pérez del Alamo, Juan Antonio, 87, 89
 Pérez Galdos, Benito (1843–1920), 77, 78, 299
 Pérez Navarro, José, 28, 30
 Pérez Ordoñez, José, 205, 225
 Pérez Rech, Santiago, 290
 Periana (Málaga), 9, 114, 129, 130, 133, 136, 140, 146, 149, 151–3, 160, 164, 165, 170, 213, 221
 Peyrou, Florencia, 5
 Pierrad, General Blas, 231, 239
 Pineda, Mariana (1804–31), 55, 151, 163
 Pino, Miguel del, 289, 291, 292
 Pisacane, Carlo (1818–57), 61–2, 82, 108
 Pi y Magall, Francisco (1824–1901), 67, 78, 226
 Pizarra (Málaga), 94, 95, 148
 Portugal, 4, 15, 31, 55, 60, 62, 80, 152, 158, 187, 210–17, 235
 Posada-Herrera, José (1815–85), 69, 73, 89, 90, 99, 103, 108, 128, 141, 146, 147, 181, 182, 188, 203
pósitos, *see* municipal government
 press
 El Clamor, 25
 El Globo, 291
 El Látigo, 25
 El León Español, 45
 El Municipio Libre (Barcelona), 291
 El Pensamiento Español, 101
 El Pueblo, 5, 42, 53, 76, 77, 88, 97, 98, 108, 111, 163, 178, 199, 204, 209, 218
 El Reino, 91, 100, 121, 200, 201
 El Trabajador, 32
 Gil Blas, 209
 La Andalucía, 111, 199, 200
 La Crónica, 111
 La Democracia, 5, 209, 218, 226, 230
 La Discusión, 5, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 89, 101, 111, 132, 150, 152, 157, 163, 178, 181, 188, 194, 195, 199, 200, 204, 209, 217, 218, 226
 La Epoca, 25
 La España, 101
 La Iberia, 25, 209
 La Ilustración (Málaga), 75, 111, 150, 151
 La Ilustración Republicana Federal, 291
 La Nación, 45, 46
 La Regeneración, 76, 194, 200
 La Soberanía Nacional, 58, 62
 La Unión, 209
 La Unión Ibérica, 210
 La Verdad (Granada), 76
 newspaper reading, selling and
 propaganda, 2, 5, 7, 25, 26, 32, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 53, 55, 57, 58, 69, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 82, 84, 88, 89, 101–2, 112–14, 126, 128, 132, 150, 160–3, 175, 178, 191–5, 200–4, 209, 215–19, 222, 228, 237, 259, 284, 291, 295, 296, 297
 press laws and press freedom, 15, 39, 44, 45, 69, 73–6, 110, 111, 233
 Prim, Juan (1814–1870), 212, 215, 217, 229–31, 236–9, 244, 250, 253–6, 259, 261, 264, 275, 286, 297
 professionals and performers
 doctors and pharmacists, 8, 12, 24, 30, 33, 38, 58, 78, 87–8, 129, 150, 152, 158, 163, 200, 224, 255, 258, 264, 265, 273, 275
 musicians, 8, 39, 57, 110, 120, 160, 161, 168, 196, 218
 school teachers, 8, 95, 147, 158, 161, 164, 264, 293
 theatrical performers, 8, 57, 80
 veterinarian-blacksmiths, 1, 2, 8, 12, 25, 46, 57, 75, 87, 113, 130, 150–2, 156, 160, 161, 163, 200, 201, 205, 218, 265, 299
 Progresistas, xi, 2, 6, 7, 12, 15–41, 40–54, 56, 58, 64–6, 69, 70, 72–80, 84–9, 92, 103, 107, 108, 110, 124, 126, 127, 131, 134, 135, 141–2, 145, 154, 158, 160–3, 166–9, 173–5, 177, 188–93, 202–17, 220, 225, 226, 229–39, 248, 254–7, 261, 263, 265, 267, 269–72, 276, 287, 290, 295, 296, 297
 Manifiesto del Manzanares (July 1854), 15, 16, 40, 59, 119
 Manifiesto to the Nation (September 1863) and *retrainimiento* (electoral abstention), 202–9, 211, 215, 216, 230, 231, 235
 Patrios, 90, 123

- Protestantism, 6, 56, 57, 59, 62–6, 76, 100–3, 108, 111, 119, 124, 131–8, 141–2, 174, 191, 193, 209, 224, 235–6, 282, 295
- Quiles, Antonio, 76, 78, 80, 83, 108
- Quinta de Valdealanes, 38, 167, 234, 246, 283, 286, 288, 293
see also Aguilar family of Antequera
- Quintana family (Loja), 225
- Quintana, Sergio, 142, 261
- Quirós de los Ríos, Juan, 277
- railways, *see* transport and communications
- Retraimiento*, *see* Progresistas
- revolutions and insurrections
- 2 de Mayo conspiracies (1863–64), 202–28
- Cantonalist uprisings (1874), 271, 290
- Federal Republican uprisings (October 1869), 263, 270, 284–6
- La Gloriosa (September 1868), xi, 1, 4, 7, 8, 12, 26, 55, 166, 187, 253–87
- Mano Negra affair (1883), 272, 293
- Night of St Daniel (April 1865), 230
- revolution (July 1854), 4, 15–41
- revolution of Loja (July 1861), 1–2, 16, 107–84
- revolutions (1848), 1, 2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 63, 112, 121, 198, 215, 224, 232, 295
- San Gil ‘sergeants revolt’ (June 1866), 231
- Sixto Cámara’s conspiracies and insurrections, 54–66, 79–83, 1856–9
- Ríos Rosas, Antonio de los (1812–73), 191, 233
- Risorgimento, *see* Wars
- Rivero, Nicolás (1814–78), 67, 74, 78, 108, 194, 199, 201, 203, 204, 226, 232, 277
- rivers
- Genil, 97, 110, 113, 117, 216
- Guadalhorce, 93–5, 147–9
- roads, *see* transport and communications
- Robledo, Vicente, 32
- Rodríguez Carbello, (a) ‘El Americano’, Manuel, 29, 161, 211, 219, 259, 267, 268
- Rodríguez de la Borbolla, Pedro, 80
- Rodríguez, José María, 96, 97, 154, 155, 163, 177
- Rodríguez Vaamonde, Florencio, 203
- Rojas Díaz de Tejada, Francisco, 28, 269
- Rojas Díaz de Tejada, Francisco, 28, 52, 269
- Romero Robledo, Francisco (1836–1906), 177, 178, 208, 245, 272, 289, 290, 293
- Ronda (Málaga), 9, 36, 53, 60, 61, 63, 68, 145, 206, 217, 236
- Rosal y Badía, Francisco, 19, 22–8, 44, 47, 48, 49, 70, 75, 84, 89, 90, 127, 258, 259, 261, 263, 297
- Rubio, Federico, 254
- Ruiz Mata, Ezequiel, 265, 273
- Ruiz Mata, Rafael, 270
- Ruiz Pons, Eduardo (1819–65), 81, 193, 210–12, 215
- Ruiz, Silverio, 115, 272
- Ruiz Zorrilla, Manuel (1833–95), 254
- Rumi, Juan, 55
- Sáenz de Cámara, Sixto (1825–59), 42–3, 58–84, 107–8, 122, 193, 231, 253, 276
see also revolutions and insurrections
- Sagasta, Práxedes Mateo (1827–1903), 192, 232, 254, 284, 292
- Salamanca, José de (1811–83), 85, 91, 108, 141, 187, 208, 211
- Salar (Granada), 73, 86, 87, 92, 99, 113, 114, 121, 129–33, 138, 140, 151, 160, 161, 197, 213, 240, 256, 259, 271
- Salmerón, Nicolás (1838–1908), 289
- Salvochea, Fermín (1842–1907), 282, 285
- Sánchez Deus, Leonardo, 210, 212, 215
- Santa Cruz del Comercio (Alhama), 143, 151, 160, 161, 164, 213, 216, 219, 220, 259
- Santos y Méndez, José de los, 237, 240–4, 247
- Sartorius, José Luis, Conde de San Luis, (1820–71), 15, 31

- Seijas Lozano, Manuel (1800–68),
199, 249
- Serrano, General Luis, 117–38
- Serrano y Domínguez, General Francisco
(1810–85), 15, 42, 139–46, 162,
192, 233, 255, 256, 259, 267, 275,
278, 280
- Seville, 11, 20, 43, 44, 59–66, 74–81, 107,
111, 115, 124, 187, 188, 194, 196,
199–208, 213, 214, 236, 238, 247,
253, 261–76, 280, 282, 285, 292,
297, 299
- Sierras
- Sierra Bética, 9, 57, 95, 143, 154, 285
 - Sierra de Alpujarra, 213, 217
 - Sierra de Cádiz, 63, 285
 - Sierra de Hacho Alto y Sierrasuela de
Agicampe (Loja), 86, 265
 - Sierra de Júrtiga (Alhama), 118,
119, 222
 - Sierra de Loja, 30, 77, 86, 110, 115–18,
120, 121, 125, 151, 216, 269
 - Sierra del Torcal (Antequera), 37, 52,
100, 102, 148
 - Sierra de Málaga and Montes de
Málaga, 57, 59, 63, 94, 147
 - Sierra de Ronda, 53, 60, 63, 68,
206, 217
 - Sierra Morena (Córdoba), 43, 60,
62, 206
 - Sierra Nevada (Granada), 217
- Sierra y Asencio, Joaquín, 62, 63
- sociability
- banquets, 114, 212, 224, 225, 231, 240
 - barricades, 43, 56, 59, 67, 113, 116,
117, 120–2, 231, 255, 259
 - cafés, 1, 2, 12, 46, 65, 93, 174, 175,
204, 213, 225, 227, 272, 285
 - casinos, x, 5, 12, 26, 28, 30, 63, 74,
214, 227, 270, 293
 - lagares* (oil presses), 148, 150, 153
 - mutual aid societies, 32–4, 40, 78, 109,
138, 156, 164, 175, 274, 284,
291, 296
 - pharmacies, 12, 24, 78, 129, 200, 273
 - reading rooms, 2, 5, 24–6, 32, 39, 40,
191, 257, 264
 - restaurants and fondas, xi, 56, 80, 200,
207, 214, 215, 241
 - schools, xi, 3, 11, 17, 22, 24, 35, 36,
76, 190, 191, 238, 277
 - taverns, 2, 12, 33, 52, 58, 78, 93, 157,
160, 161, 167, 169, 175, 179, 214,
218, 221, 259, 291
 - wind bands, 12, 22, 23, 113–20, 162,
197, 253–60
- Socialism, 4, 19, 31, 32, 64, 103, 111,
124, 141, 174–5, 187, 193, 204, 207,
226, 241, 272
- Solier, Francisco, 289
- Spanish Reformed Church, *see*
Protestantism
- Spiritualism, 74, 272–3
- Talavera Cesár, Luis, 172–8, 278
- Tapia, Villanueva de (Málaga), 9, 11, 96,
113, 154, 155, 157
- taxation
- excise taxes (*consumos*), xi, 6, 17,
26, 29, 32, 68, 119, 163,
218, 271
 - salt monopoly, 7, 12, 20, 34–6, 40, 68,
89, 115, 117, 119, 132, 218, 255,
257, 276
- Teba (Málaga), 9
- Telegraph, *see* transport and
communications
- Toledo y Muñoz, Francisco de, 28, 29
- Toledo y Muñoz, José, 28, 269
- Topete y Carballo, Juan Bautista, 254
- Torres de Aguilar (a) Maia,
Antonio, 169
- Trabuco, Villanueva de (Málaga), 11
- transport and communications
- railways, 12, 19, 22, 38, 55–6, 72, 85,
91–5, 109, 123, 141, 147, 156,
182, 187–8, 195, 206, 211, 217,
220, 223, 236, 238, 241, 264,
291, 295
 - roads, 11, 12, 38, 51, 95, 109,
156, 162, 182, 241, 242,
244, 295
 - telegraph, 109, 114, 127, 137, 145,
249, 261, 264, 295
- Trescastro, Juan Luis, 269
- Tresserra, Ceferino (1830–80), 56, 59, 67,
76, 78, 108
- Trigo Bustamante, Miguel, 236
- Tubino, Francisco María, 199, 200

- Unión Liberal*, *see* Liberal Union
- Valdés Busto, José Francisco, 149, 171, 176
- Valencia, 23, 26, 39, 60, 74, 75, 138, 204, 230, 239, 274, 282, 284, 286
- Valencians, 74, 138, 290
- Valladolid, 16, 23, 26, 33
- Valle de Abdalajís (Málaga), 95, 103, 147, 148, 171, 180, 275, 278, 279, 281, 286
- Vélez, 20
- Vergara Benítez, Antonio, 167, 169
- Villafranca de los Barros (Estemadura), 80
- Villalón Morillo (a) 'El Manco Morillo', Antonio, 169
- Villamil, Cruzada, 208
- Villanueva de Algaidas (Málaga), 9, 11, 96, 154, 155, 156
- Villanueva de Cauche (Antequera), 34, 286
- Villanueva del Rosario (Málaga), 9, 11, 96, 114, 145, 146, 154, 155, 257, 276, 278, 286
- Villanueva de Trabuco (Málaga), 9, 11, 96, 101, 110, 113, 130, 145, 154, 155, 257
- Viñuela (Málaga), 275
- Voluntarios de la Libertad, *see* military
- wars
- Carlism and Carlist uprisings, 4, 5, 34, 38, 60, 68, 192, 271, 282, 283, 287
 - European Intervention in Mexico (1862), 9, 192, 193, 206, 296
 - Italian Risorgimento, 7, 9, 73, 84, 103, 163, 187, 211, 296
 - Moroccan War of 1859 (Guerra de Africa), 9, 79, 87, 107, 119, 152, 192, 203
- Weber, Eugen, 4
- women, 28, 35, 53, 58–9, 63–4, 68, 74–5, 76, 80, 94, 109, 116–18, 121, 136, 150, 156, 158, 163–4, 193, 224, 253, 286
- workers and working class politics
- day labourers (*jornaleros*), xii, 8, 19, 23, 26–33, 40, 48, 51, 62, 86, 95, 101, 102, 140, 159, 160, 161, 164, 166, 167, 169, 172, 175, 178, 179, 218, 227, 236, 237, 242–4, 246, 247, 261, 266–8, 272, 280, 293, 297, 298, 300
 - Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española* (FTRE), ix, 292–3
 - hatmakers and sellers, 59, 102, 147, 149, 175, 196
 - International Association of Workers (Socialist International), 253, 270, 272, 274, 278, 287, 289–91, 296
 - strikes and labour protests, 26, 32, 40, 90–103, 143, 164, 170–2, 177, 178, 246, 280, 287, 293
 - unión*, xii, 103, 111, 164, 176
 - weavers and spinners, 32, 33, 56, 60, 91–3, 99, 101–3, 168–84, 262, 276, 286, 291, 297
- Yévenes, Francisco, 21, 198
- Ygón, Hilario de (Auditor de Guerra), 136, 139–40, 146
- Yllora (Granada), 70–3, 256
- Zafarraya and Ventas de Zafarraya (Alhama), 30, 31, 91, 113, 118, 120, 129, 147, 151, 160, 208, 211–13, 216, 220–1, 223–5, 234, 257, 260, 269, 298
- Zagra (Loja), 9, 114, 140, 161–2, 188, 259, 262
- Zapatero y Navas, General Juan (1810–81), 42, 56
- Zaragoza, 4, 16, 23, 26, 53, 55, 57–9, 68, 193, 195, 253
- Zavala, General Juan, 129