


Reconfiguring the Fifteenth-Century Crusade

Edited by

Norman Housley



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Norman Housley
August 2016

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AStV	Archivio di Stato, Venezia
ASV	Archivio segreto Vaticano
CFC	<i>The Crusade in the Fifteenth Century: Converging and Competing Cultures</i> , ed. Norman Housley (London: Routledge, 2017)
DRA	<i>Deutsche Reichstagsakten</i>
MGH	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica</i>
PG	<i>Patrologia Graeca</i> , ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 161 vols (Paris, 1857–1866)
PL	<i>Patrologia Latina</i> , ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris, 1844–1866)
RIS	<i>Rerum italicarum scriptores</i>
RIS NS	<i>RIS New series</i>
Setton, <i>Crusades</i>	<i>A History of the Crusades</i> , ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989)
Setton, <i>Papacy</i>	Kenneth M. Setton, <i>The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571</i> , 4 vols (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976–1984)

Introduction

Norman Housley

In 2012 the Leverhulme Trust awarded a grant which made possible the collaborative activities of the international network of scholars who wrote the eight chapters that follow. There is no better way to introduce the collection than by describing the project which, as prospective Principal Investigator, I outlined to the Trust four years ago. The project title was “Reconfiguring the Crusade in the Fifteenth Century: Goals, Agencies and Resonances.” Its background was the resurgence of interest since the 1970s in the crusade planning and activity that followed the Mamluk conquest in 1291 of the last remaining Christian outposts in the Holy Land. Particularly telling evidence for this resurgence was afforded by Daniel Baloup’s program for the Centre national de la recherche scientifique on crusading in the late Middle Ages, which came to an end just before the Leverhulme network began work. The volumes of essays that resulted from Baloup’s series of conferences have been appearing at intervals during the work of the network and they have informed reflections and discussions at network meetings held in Leicester (2013) and Rome (2015).¹ Also significant was the international conference which met under the Trust’s auspices in London in 2014, whose proceedings have also been published.² Finally, network members benefited from a workshop on

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“Italy and Crusading in the Fifteenth Century” which took place at the Accademia di Romania in Rome in October 2015.

In one way or another, all of these meetings and publications have played their part in shaping the chapters that follow. More important, however, was the threefold research program which I set out in 2012, because this was fundamental in shaping both the character of the network and the essay topics which its members proposed as their contributions. It derived from my conviction that in the 1400s, unlike the 1300s, crusading was a synergy of the old and the new. Ways of thinking and behaving that had originated in the time of Innocent III (1198–1216) and even that of Urban II (1088–1099) were given fresh impetus and vitality by new ideas, values and techniques. Telling examples of the latter, all of which had received substantial attention by 2012, were the Italian humanists, the Franciscan Observants and the impact of printing. Much of the fascination of studying the crusade in this period lies in observing how those groups most closely associated with it—popes, preachers and military Orders among others—adapted traditional responsibilities, outlooks and ways of operating, often applying considerable ingenuity and resourcefulness in their search for the effective.

It was logical in the first instance to consider the question of goals. As is well known, the two major targets of crusading in the 1400s were the Ottoman Turks and the Hussites. Of course, there were others, peripherally and occasionally the Muscovites and the Moors of Granada, but there is no doubt that the bulk of the discourse, whether it took place at the papal *curia*, the Imperial diets or the courts of intending commanders, related to the Turks and the Hussites, and in considering the latter, we should not ignore crusading against George Poděbrad in the 1460s. But how were such goals arrived at and what were the implications of targeting these groups? A number of the contributors to this collection address these questions. It makes sense to start with Benjamin Weber’s chapter. In his recent study of papal crusading programs in the fifteenth century, *Lutter contre les Turcs*, he displayed nuance and sensitivity in his judgment of why and how the popes from Eugenius IV through to Sixtus IV decided to deploy the crusade against the Turks.³ Military threat interwove with vulnerability to pressures coming from within the Catholic community to persuade the heads of a reunified Church to revive the crusade. Weber possesses a rare ability to describe how specific circumstances and traditional patterns of thought converged, and it is on display in his chapter here. In it he traces the process by which the popes from Eugenius IV

through to Alexander VI pursued the idea of bringing non-Catholic powers into an alliance against the Turks.

Weber sees this process as occurring in three phases. Initially, between c. 1400 and 1439, papal missions were the natural accompaniment to the painfully slow movement toward Church Union that eventually succeeded at the Council of Florence. After the achievement of that Union, at first in competition with the Council of Basel and then in reaction to the fall of Constantinople, Eugenius and his successors—especially Calixtus III—became more proactive and there was substantial outreach activity. It reached its peak with the ambitious alliance schemes of the 1460s and 1470s, when there was much optimism about persuading non-Catholic rulers in the East to open a “second front” against the Ottomans. Weber detects a substantial shift with the onset of the age of discoveries. At first glance, the latter seem to have been tailor-made for the realization of the dreams of Eugenius IV and Calixtus III, but Innocent VIII and Alexander VI no longer had the authority to do more than sanction and ratify the discoveries and conquests which were brought to their attention. Weber goes further, however. He argues that even before the 1480s, the emphasis placed by Eugenius and Calixtus on the recovery of the Holy Land was a sign that, for all the heady excitement induced by Church Union, it was only by laying emphasis on the holy places of Palestine that the popes could make full reference to their traditional crusading authority, as opposed to their more recent role as the primary source of “crusade validation” for the grinding war against the Turks. In other words, even at their most ambitious and enterprising, the fifteenth-century popes possessed limited room for maneuver, at least compared with their predecessors.

My own chapter is complementary to Weber’s, because I examine the internal counterpart to external mission and alliance. This was religious reform. Whereas Weber examines the series of popes who presided over the reunified Church, my focus is the Church councils, especially Constance and Basel. I pose the question whether crusade and reform remained, as they had been so often in the past, complementary goals. Undoubtedly there were idealists at Constance who hoped that the ending of the schism would usher in a period of far-reaching reform, and that this would be accompanied by a crusade against the Turks and to recover the Holy Land. Martin V made the same connection about the work of the council of Pavia/Siena and the fathers at Basel pursued a reforming agenda alongside a program of Church Union that included crusade plans. But as early as the anti-Hussite crusades of the 1420s, the tensions between crusade

and reform were making themselves felt. The series of legates dispatched by Martin V and Eugenius IV to preach the crusade against the Hussites were simultaneously tasked with reforming the German Church, but that feature of their mission largely fell by the wayside. There are grounds for arguing that when Eugenius won the contest against Basel for the negotiation of Church Union, it was predicated on the unspoken assumption that reform could be shelved: union and crusade were prestigious enough to replace reform as priorities. For later popes, the demand for reform became a stick with which hostile rulers might threaten the *curia*, usually in association with a demand for another Church council.

Promoting a crusade in the fifteenth century invariably revolved around the systematic preaching of indulgences. While reformers like Giuliano Cesarini argued passionately that this could be done without opening the door to abuses, the range of issues thrown up by indulgences remained probably the most contentious feature of crusading. To the extent that the goal of crusade was the saving of souls as well as the achievement of military objectives, this was bound to exercise the minds of theologians who considered the matter, and Pavel Soukup takes this as his subject in a chapter based on a number of hitherto unexamined manuscripts. Soukup detects a clear trend among his authors. Those who wrote in response to the preaching of the crusade against King Ladislav of Naples by Pope John XXIII viewed the preaching as an abuse which, no less than the Schism itself, called for thoroughgoing eradication. The men who followed them were reformers eager to make indulgences compatible with respectable penitential practice, partly because they were responding to Hussite manifestos which took vigorous and loud offense at the use of crusade against the *utraquists*. A later group of commentators concerned themselves mainly with technicalities. Wherever they fitted on this spectrum, Soukup's theologians often harked back to earlier treatments of the indulgence, sometimes revisiting questions which had been settled in the thirteenth century. His chapter reminds us that theologians in the fifteenth century did not necessarily consider a judgment by Aquinas as definitive—assuming that they even knew of it.

The network's second theme was agencies and in this respect we were fortunate to have the participation of Jürgen Sarnowsky. No consideration of agency can exclude the military Orders and Sarnowsky has the expertise to discuss with authority both of the international Orders which remained active in the fifteenth century, the Knights of St John and the Teutonic Knights. He chose as his topic the central question of how the two

Orders adapted to the changing religious and military challenges of the period. In this way, the question of goals converged pleasingly with that of instrumentality. Sarnowsky emphasizes that the strategic scenario facing the Knights Hospitaller at Rhodes was more favorable than that confronting their sister Order in Prussia and Livonia. The Knights of Rhodes were well placed to engage in hostilities against both the Ottomans and the Mamluks: their dilemma was one of alternative fronts, and Sarnowsky shows that the Knights regarded the Mamluk Sultanate as a powerful and dangerous foe right up to the Sultanate's extinction by its Ottoman rival. In the north, the Teutonic Order faced a more forbidding conundrum: the absence of a clear mission following the conversion of the Lithuanians and the Samaitans. Sarnowsky describes the engagement of the Teutonic Knights with campaigning against the Mongols of the Golden Horde, the Turks and the schismatic Muscovites, as well as referring to more ambitious plans to resettle members of the Order on the Danube.

There is considerable evidence that shows both military Orders promulgating what amounted to propaganda in connection with their campaigning, and some of it was ambitious in both its range and intention. It is regrettable that neither Order bequeathed sources that disclose internal debates about policy formation, because these might show how sensitive their oligarchies were to external pressures. To some extent, the reports of the Teutonic Order's procurators at the papal *curia* fill this gap, but they tended to focus on relaying information and danger signals, and these were not necessarily acted on or even given credence by the Order's decision-makers. This forms an interesting contrast with the Venetian Republic. Its Senate decrees and the voting patterns which lay behind them have long been identified as a highly revealing source. It is important to stress that the republic enjoyed a very significant crusading history, for there is still a tendency to view the Venetians as reluctant or even duplicitous crusaders. It was not an image which the Venetians had of their past and present roles. When the republic decided on war against the Ottoman Turks, it fought with determination and perseverance. But as Stefan Stantchev shows in his study of Venice and the Ottomans, it took the republic longer than is often supposed to view the Ottoman sultans as the principal enemies of its commercial lifelines east of the Adriatic.

Stantchev is well aware of the sophisticated ways in which religious goals interwove with commercial activity. His recent study of trade embargos against enemies of the Church was a forceful reassertion of the primacy of pastoral intentions—in essence, saving the souls of Christian

traders—as the dynamo behind the Papacy’s highly ambitious program of curtailing trade with infidel powers.⁴ But this does not blind him to the central significance for Venice of its commercial prosperity, without which the republic was doomed to decline. In making its decisions about peace and war, the Venetian patriciate could not afford to ignore practical realities. Stantchev carefully charts the evolution of Venice’s response to growing Turkish power, and he concludes that right up to the fall of Negroponte in 1470, the Republic persisted in seeing the Genoese and Catalans as its most important foes in the Mediterranean’s northern waters. Furthermore, both its trade with the Mamluk territories and its expansion on the Italian *terraferma* took precedence over the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea in the thinking of the ducal council and Senate. A striking feature of Stantchev’s chapter is his argument that historians have been too prone to see “grand designs” behind Venetian policy, which was usually heavily circumstantial. Perhaps they have been misled by Venetian public relations, which portrayed the Republic as steadfast in the pursuit of its commercial objectives and unwavering in defending its citizens and their possessions abroad. There is a pattern here: the papal *curia*, the military Orders and Venice were not as clear-cut and consistent in their assessment of what the advance of the Ottomans entailed for the Christian faith as their own sources—especially those written with hindsight—would have us believe.

A strength of the network working on this program was the inclusion of two Romanian historians, Dan Ioan Mureșan and Emanuel Antoche. They were able to bring to bear an authoritative Balkan perspective, one moreover which came from different but complementary vantage points. In his chapter, Mureșan uses an episode in the long life of Cardinal Basilios Bessarion—the printing of his *Orations against the Turks*—to examine how an appeal for a crusade that was rooted in an intimate knowledge of the history and plight of the eastern, Orthodox world was communicated to western, Catholic powers in 1470–1471. The context for this latest appeal for a united response to the Ottoman threat was the fall of Venetian Negroponte to Mehmed II in July 1470, which opened the central Mediterranean to Ottoman sea power and, in conjunction with the first Turkish raids into Habsburg lands, revealed the scope of Ottoman ambitions and—implicitly—the number and diversity of the threatened Christian powers. Mureșan investigates the links between Bessarion’s extensive friendship network, the dissemination and impact of the cardinal’s eloquent *Orations* in France and the Holy Roman Empire, and the

debates at the *Große Christentag* of Regensburg. His contribution adds to a growing corpus of research which emphasizes the geographic range of the lobbying process, and the energy and sophistication of its protagonists, in the decades that followed the fall of Constantinople.

Antoche, by contrast, focuses on a single military encounter for which he claims the status of a Balkan Hattin. Like Saladin's great triumph over the army of the king of Jerusalem in 1187, the second battle of Kosovo in October 1448 paved the way for the Turks to reach the Danube. It also made the Ottoman sultan secure in the central Balkans, enabling him to pose a threat to the Adriatic coast and beyond it to Italy. In terms of the development of crusading ideas in the Renaissance, Kosovo therefore demands comparison with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and Negroponte in 1470. But even without this resonance, for Antoche, the sheer scale of the encounter makes it a decisive battle, more so than the better-known defeat suffered by the Christians four years previously at Varna. Antoche painstakingly assembles the patchy and sometimes contradictory sources about Kosovo to reconstruct an encounter which lasted several days and cost each side massive casualties. From his chapter, we gain insights into the logistics, reconnaissance, battlefield command and tactics of the Christians and Turks, and the warp and weft of major campaigns in the middle decades of the fifteenth century. Thanks to the work of Antoche and other military historians, we are beginning to develop a more firmly grounded sense of how warfare in the Danube basin and the lands between it and the Aegean Sea differed from war in Central and Western Europe. The result should be a fuller grasp of the difficulties facing the popes and their advisors as they struggled to comprehend how best to mobilize and direct crusading resources, both on land and at sea.

The network's third theme, resonances, is represented in the main by Nancy Bisaha's contribution. Bisaha is well known for her work on the way in which Italian humanists engaged with crusading past and present. In her contribution to this collection, she considers whether the response to the Ottoman subjugation of the Orthodox and Catholic populations of south-eastern Europe marked a step forward in perceptions of the inherent right of civilians to be treated decently by their conquerors. Bisaha is well aware of the breadth of her research question and of the eclecticism of the sources testifying to changing sensibilities about how civilians and their property should be treated in wartime. She takes into account earlier stances based on custom and law, and makes comparisons with the situation in contemporary Italy, where the non-military population suffered

grievously on occasions like the sack of Piacenza in 1447. Bisaha advances several intriguing suggestions about why the fall of Constantinople in particular exerted such a big impact on Western Europe. Hitherto the question of how crusading influenced the juridical approach toward human conflict has been looked at principally from the viewpoint of the legal authority to start a war (*ius ad bellum*); the legal issues thrown up by military operations (*ius in bello*) have been almost wholly neglected and Bisaha's chapter will help correct this imbalance.

The theme of resonances of course comprises not just contributions to future developments such as human rights, but also echoes in spheres of contemporary life which at first glance seem devoid of crusade connotations. From this perspective, a number of contributions have new things to say. Mureşan revisits the debate about how far and in what ways the new art of printing could be harnessed to spread crusading propaganda. Weber's analysis of the aims and methods of the papal *curia* in relation to the extension of crusading goals beyond Europe has an important bearing on many other policy objectives of the Renaissance Papacy well into the sixteenth century—and, no less importantly, where to locate personnel skilled and resourceful enough to carry them through. My own attempt to establish the links and tensions between reform and crusade has a bearing on the failure of the Church to make substantial progress on implementing reform in the decades before the Reformation. Exploring and adding to such resonances unquestionably forms part of the agenda of the thriving community of researchers currently engaged in the study of crusading in the fifteenth century.

NOTES

1. *La noblesse et la croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge (France, Bourgogne, Bohême)*, ed. Martin Nejedlý and Jaroslav Svátek (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Midi, 2009); *Les projets de croisade: géostratégie et diplomatie européenne du XIVe au XVIIe siècle*, ed. Jacques Paviot (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Midi, 2014); *Partir en croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge: financement et logistique*, ed. Daniel Baloup and Manuel Sánchez Martínez (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Midi, 2015); *Histoires et mémoires des croisades à la fin du Moyen Âge*, ed. Martin Nejedlý and Jaroslav Svátek (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Midi, 2015).

2. *CFC*.
3. Benjamin Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs: Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XV^e siècle* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013).
4. Stefan Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality: Papal Embargo as Cultural Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Toward a Global Crusade? The Papacy and the Non-Latin World in the Fifteenth Century

Benjamin Weber

At that time, some envoys of the king of Babylon were in our camp. When they saw the wonders that God had accomplished through His servants, they glorified Jesus, son of Holy Mary, who could overcome the most powerful tyrants with his poor [servants]. These envoys assured us of the grace and good will of their king and showed us his kindness toward Egyptian Christians and toward our pilgrims. They were thus sent back with our envoys, and asked to discuss a treaty and friendship with the king.¹

Among the various sources recording contacts between the Fatimid sultan and the army of the First Crusade in 1098—including Muslim chronicles and a contemporary letter from Stephen of Blois—Raymond of Aguilers is the only one to specify that the Egyptian embassy was sent back together with Christian envoys. It is possible that this Egyptian initiative was triggered by an overture from the Christian army itself while crossing Anatolia or even before its departure.² The encounter outside the walls of Antioch, limited to a quick note in most of the sources, would then

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become a real diplomatic encounter, with a mutual exchange of letters and ambassadors, planned treaties and hopes for a joint offensive. This project of Frankish–Muslim alliance during the First Crusade was short-lived because it was based on an almost complete miscomprehension: the desire of each party to gain control over Jerusalem. It proves, however, that from the very beginning, the crusade should not be considered as a basic contest between two monolithic groups: Christianity and Islam. A complete list of the diplomatic overtures that followed would take us at least as far as the alliance between Suleiman the Magnificent and Francis I in 1536,³ but such an enumeration would be as tedious as it would be futile—it would only show that the practice of war always comprises accommodations and concessions, provided that they help to bring about an easier victory, if not a more complete one. Theory is very different. As a specific form of holy war, the very principle of the crusade hinged on a struggle between Christianity and Islam, even, from some eschatological perspectives, a confrontation between Christian believers and their foes to hasten the coming of the last days. As division among Christians grew, this conception evolved into a war to ensure the victory of Latin Christianity, loyal to the Papacy, against *all* its enemies. This enlargement permitted the extension of the crusade to expeditions against heretics, schismatics and political enemies of the Holy See. From a papal point of view, the theory was thus clear: crusading was a terrestrial avatar of the fight between good and evil, and as such could support no nuance or concession. It was of course inconceivable to make an alliance with Muslims to facilitate victory, but it was also out of the question to cooperate with Pagans or false Christians. This was the struggle of the warriors of Christ, united behind His vicar on earth against all who would oppose His final victory.

However, the Papacy quickly understood that such a conception of the crusade had to be shadowed with a praxis that lay closer to strategic realities. The failure of every expedition in the twelfth century demonstrated that God's support alone was insufficient for Western warriors and that additional allies had to be found. Attempts at securing union with the Greek Church and connections with Eastern Christians must be understood in this context, even if they were not guided solely by strategic considerations. At the same time, the Latins in the Levant discovered the existence of hitherto unknown lands and peoples which considerably enlarged papal horizons. We know that an "Indian bishop" visited Calixtus II in 1122.⁴ Even if the identity, status and geographic origin of this visitor remain unclear, he helped inform the *curia* of the extent of the world

and the existence of Christians beyond Muslim domination. This knowledge gave birth to new hopes of alliances with far-away Christians, which can be seen in the popularity of the legend of Prester John, the powerful Christian king, eager to help the West defeat the Muslims and conquer Jerusalem. As Charles Beckingham has rightly noted, the first mention of Prester John, in the chronicle of Otto of Freising in 1145, was not particularly hopeful: it detailed how the king, initially victorious against the king of Media and Persia, was unable to cross the Tigris and lost a large part of his army waiting for the river to freeze.⁵ The legend nevertheless gave birth to one of the most enduring strategies conceived by the Christians in order to defeat the Muslims: a combined attack, by sea from the West and by land from the East. The formation of the Mongol Empire in the first decades of the thirteenth century gave concrete form to these dreams, even if none of them were ever fully realized. In the course of 150 years between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries, the papal strategic program was completely transformed. Its geographic horizons were broadened and its very foundations were altered: to achieve Christian victory, it was possible, or even necessary, to form an alliance with Christians who until then had been considered as heretics, and even with non-Christian powers.

The importance of this period for the global conception of the *curia*, and for its crusading strategies, has frequently been pointed out.⁶ But it is often conceived as a dead-end, a historical parenthesis that quickly closed. It is assumed that rivalries between the growing European states, the Great Schism, the conciliar crisis and the difficulties the popes increasingly faced in enforcing their power within Christianity would have led the Papacy to focus its attention on the West, neglecting other horizons. During the same period, the shift of the principal crusading fronts toward Anatolia and Europe following the growth of Ottoman power there would surely have led to a purely defensive strategy, one aimed solely at containing these new conquerors. Yet the end of the Middle Ages saw no slowing down of Western exploration of the world, culminating with the voyages of Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus. These explorations are usually perceived as secular undertakings, sponsored by the Iberian powers. The Papacy, it is assumed, played a very secondary role, one limited to the provision of financial and spiritual support by granting authority over the newly conquered lands.⁷

I do not intend to deny the importance of the thirteenth century in widening papal horizons, or the narrower ambitions of fifteenth-century

papal policy. However, the prevailing view of a Papacy that was interested only in Western affairs or the Ottoman front in the Balkans should be corrected. An analysis of relations between the Papacy and non-Latin powers will demonstrate not only the range and diversity of papal crusading hopes, but also their realism and their capacity to adapt themselves to changing political circumstances. In common with all their predecessors, the popes of the fifteenth century did not consider the crusade as a binary opposition between Christendom and Islam. They benefited from the improvement of geographic knowledge, and included in their strategies rulers who did not recognize—or at least did not *fully* recognize—their authority. Although there were few concrete results, these projects reveal how crusading in the fifteenth century cannot be considered as a simple defensive war along the Danube or in the Aegean. Crusading was “global” in a twofold sense. From a geographic point of view, the war conceived by the Papacy extended to the entire world, including lands about which very little was known. From a strategic point of view, the evolution of papal embassies reveals substantial movement, from a vast number of fronts against *all* the enemies of Christendom to one large, global alliance against a single enemy: the Ottoman Turks.

THE SOURCES, THE METHODS AND THEIR LIMITS

From the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Papacy was among the first Western institutions to experiment with the systematic conservation of its administrative documents. It gave birth to one of the world’s most important archival collections, one that is particularly rich the closer one gets to the end of the fifteenth century. The huge quantity of this documentation is not, however, without accompanying technical and theoretical problems. The general logic underpinning the papal archives was very different from modern conceptions, and it remains to be studied in detail for the fifteenth century.⁸ Diplomacy was not perceived as an independent activity: legates and envoys were only acting instead of the pope in a different place, their activities were not regarded as specific, and its records were therefore archived alongside every other act of daily administration.⁹

This study is mainly based on two archival funds: the registration volumes of papal letters (the so-called *Registri Vaticani*) which comprise more than 1,000 volumes for the fifteenth century; and the volumes of accounts (the *Introitus et Exitus*) which represent more or less one volume for each year. Because of this huge quantity of documentation, only

the first decades of the century, up to the 1480s, have been studied in detail. Even for the first part of the century, it must be kept in mind that some documents have been lost¹⁰ and that many were never recorded. The impression of completeness given by the accounts is misleading because the *Introitus et Exitus* only recorded the payments made in Rome by the Apostolic Chamber—the major papal financial institution—and therefore excluded all expenses incurred and payments made outside the pope’s city, which included most of the diplomatic outlay. On the other hand, only bulls that the papal administration considered it useful to record were copied into the *Registri Vaticani*, and the logic behind this decision is still to be explored. A lot of daily acts were simply not registered, not to mention less important affairs, treated by the shorter kind of letters—briefs—which were not systematically archived until the pontificate of Paul II (1464–1471). The global view of papal administration given in this study is thus a minimalist image, hopefully valid from a qualitative point of view, but no doubt deficient in its quantitative aspects. A lot of minor papal envoys did not leave any trace in the papal archives and it is impossible to examine their operations.

It is also important to keep in mind the overall vagueness of papal documentation. In the first place, this was because papal administration had no need for precision: it was very often sufficient to note that four golden ducats were given to an envoy without mentioning his destination, or to copy a safe-guard to “certain places in the world” (“ad nonnullas mundi partes”) according to the established expression. But the general vagueness could also have some highly political motives. As papal field representatives, envoys and legates were the most visible manifestation of the institution’s universal reach. They were deliberately given very large jurisdictions to highlight their prestige and make clear papal universality. In June 1464, for example, Pius II sent Cristoforo da Viterbo, a brother in the *societas peregrinantium*, to liaise with Christians under Turkish dominion, “in particular in the cities of Caffa and Pera, and the lands of the Saracens, pagans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Cumans, Ethiopians, Iberians, Alans, *Basarorum* [?], *Bottorum* [?], Ziks, Ruthenians, Scyths, Jacobites, Nubians, Nestorians, Georgians, Armenians, Indians, *Moleschitarum* [inhabitants of Mosul?], Tatars, Kurds, Hungarians from Greater Hungary and others who do not as yet receive the sacrament of our faith.”¹¹ Similar lists can be found in numerous nomination bulls.¹² They give precious information on papal world conceptions,¹³ but provide us with few useful details to study concrete diplomacy.

The last and most certainly the principal difficulty in studying papal activity outside Christendom lies in the conception of diplomacy itself. With a few notable exceptions—in particular, the duchy of Milan—nothing existed in the fifteenth century that bears comparison with modern diplomatic practice.¹⁴ Diplomacy was not considered as a separate branch of politics generally. It is also a modern point of view to isolate envoys who went beyond Latin Christendom from those who stayed within it. From the point of view of the popes, their universal power gave them the right to intervene in Christian affairs all over the world and to intervene in every kingdom as far as the fate of Christianity was more or less concerned. But dealing with lands that were very distant brought about specific problems. It was these that in practice made papal diplomacy in the non-Latin world quite different from its counterpart within Christendom. At the papal court, nobody was an ambassador and almost everyone could become one, to the extent that he was in the right place at the right moment—and was trustworthy enough, of course. The more distant the projected embassy was, the more difficult it became to find a suitable envoy. Unlike the rulers of France, Germany or England, the Papacy could seldom afford to send specific envoys to Ethiopia, Georgia or even Constantinople. It had to rely on people who were traveling there for another reason: a foreign ambassador returning home, a missionary, a pilgrim or a simple merchant. The technical skills of some of these agents enabled them eventually to become real specialists, to whom the Pope could systematically refer to deal with certain lands or matters. Cristoforo Garatone, for example, carried out at least six trips to Constantinople and almost as many in Hungary before his death at the battle of Kosovo in 1448.¹⁵ Moïse Giblet probably arrived in Italy during the Council of Florence and was in charge of four successive missions in Egypt, Palestine and Syria for Calixtus III and Pius II.¹⁶ Undoubtedly such men can be described as papal ambassadors. On the contrary, the Spanish pilgrim Pero Tafur asserts that while traveling in Rome, he was charged by Eugenius IV with collecting as much information as he could during his trip to Jerusalem.¹⁷ The Franciscan vicars of Mount Sion in Jerusalem were sometimes asked to deliver letters to oriental addressees. Is this enough to regard them as papal ambassadors? It seems more appropriate to reserve the designation “ambassador” for men who were *directly* sent by the Papacy, leaving aside occasional travelers in charge of a specific mission.

Eugenius’ request to Pero Tafur, and the work of the Franciscans in Jerusalem nonetheless remain relevant for our topic, since they disclose

the popes' desire to gather information on, and increase their contacts with, Eastern princes in order to prepare a future crusade. This leads to the last, and maybe the main, problem of this study on papal crusading ambassadors: defining a crusading mission and thus defining the crusade itself. This is not the place for any exposition of this difficult question. It will be enough to recall that the various forms of papal intervention outside Latin Christendom were closely linked with each other and very often operated together. Unlike what happened in the West, few envoys were exclusively asked to organize or prepare a military expedition. Relations with these distant lands were infrequent, so envoys were expected to function *inter alia* as reformers, preachers, missionaries, letters- or gift-bearers and political ambassadors. Although most of the papal bulls do not mention the crusade, it hovers in the background of almost all the missions. Discussions over Church union with the Byzantines or other Christian communities were perceived as the necessary precondition for a general offensive against the Turks.¹⁸ Missionary activity, whether aimed at converting infidels or supporting Eastern Christians, was conceived by the Papacy as a mean of enforcing papal authority and uniting Christians against a common foe.¹⁹ *A fortiori*, ordinary missions, such as bringing back relics from the West or organizing marriages, must be read as an aspiration to bring foreign rulers into the war against the enemies of the faith by asserting papal universalism and creating the necessary conditions for the definitive victory of Christianity. Of course, there was a big difference between such missions as delivering guns to Uzun Hassan or inviting the Eastern patriarchs to submit to papal authority, but ultimately the whole of papal policy in the East was aimed at uniting all peoples under papal authority in order to assure the victory of the Christian faith over its enemies. Since St John's Gospel, uniting one flock under one single shepherd had always been regarded as the best way to protect it against the wolves.²⁰

This study thus takes into account *all* papal envoys outside Latin Christendom, the sole exceptions being friars sent to the Balkans or to Genoese colonies to reform convents or pursue heretics, Franciscans dispatched to the Holy Land for the specific purpose of managing the convents at Jerusalem and Beirut, and certain envoys whose brief was so sparsely documented that it remains impossible to be sure about their destination and role. The resulting collection represents more than 50 missions. Due to the limitations outlined above, it cannot be considered as a complete conspectus of papal diplomacy, but rather as a broad image of each pope's conception of his role outside Latin Christendom. The

difficulty—even the impossibility—of realizing papal projects in the far distance has often been emphasized,²¹ but the popes still possessed large ambitions, wide horizons and global strategic conceptions. A chronological examination of these plans will allow us to locate them in a precise context and to elucidate how papal strategies evolved over the course of the fifteenth century.

THE FIRST DECADES: A BYZANTINE HORIZON, 1400–1430

For the first quarter of the fifteenth century, we possess few sources and even fewer studies. Any judgment on this period must thus be advanced tentatively, but it seems that papal horizons remained rather restricted. The low level of papal diplomatic activity during these years was mainly due to practical reasons. The Great Schism had disorganized papal administration, taken it away from its main archives—almost all of them left in Avignon—and excised the diplomatic structures that had been set up in the course of previous centuries. The popes of the century's first decades simply did not have at their disposal a sufficient network of qualified persons to acquire a precise knowledge of distant lands or sovereigns, all the more so to actually travel there. Crusading diplomacy was thus necessarily limited. It is striking that the Papacy was completely excluded from the numerous relations between various Western powers and the Turco-Mongolian conqueror Tamerlane (Timūr) at the very beginning of the fifteenth century. Though some Christians might have been in contact with Tamerlane as early as 1395 (most of all Genoese, maybe French), contacts really began after the battle of Nicopolis in 1396 and more importantly after his conquest of Damascus in 1401 and his victory over the Ottomans in 1402. Official embassies and letters were exchanged with the French, English and Castilian courts and the Genoese colonies of Pera and Chios.²² Even if these contacts were often driven by commercial perspectives—the reopening of the Black Sea road toward Central Asia and China—they were also motivated by crusading ambitions, the revival of the old dream of the Latin–Mongol alliance against Mediterranean Muslim enemies, be they Mamluks or Ottomans. The popes, whether at Rome or Avignon, were regularly in contact with these sovereigns, but they never considered the possibility of such an alliance. The deeds of Tamerlane were known at Avignon through a very negative letter written to Benedict XIII in 1403 by the King of Aragon, Martin I, in which he portrayed the conqueror

as a barbarous and bloodthirsty savage. Significantly, no early fifteenth-century copies of the more accurate views of Tamerlane conveyed by John of Sultanieh's *Libellus de Notitia Orbis*, by Beltramo de' Mignanelli's *De Ruina Damasci* or by the narration of Ruy González de Clavijo's embassies of 1404 seem to have circulated either in Rome or at Avignon. In 1405, Tamerlane was still viewed as an enemy by the Roman Pope Innocent VII, who tried to enlist the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II in a joint crusade with the Italian cities and Hungary against him.²³ The Papacy simply lacked a sufficiently informative network on the situation in the East to elaborate larger and more up-to-date crusading plans.

The popes of the first quarter of the fifteenth century therefore confined their crusading project to a very ancient horizon: that of union with the Greek Church. Since the eleventh century, the imperial ambitions of the Papacy and the Byzantine emperors had been in conflict with each other, but the papal attitude toward Byzantium was always highly ambiguous. The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were a time of hesitation between a sincere desire for union to promote a joint crusade against the Muslims and an imperative wish to protect the Latin territories conquered after 1204 by proclaiming crusades against the Greeks.²⁴ The imminence of Ottoman conquest and the progress of discussions over Church Union favored a more systematic policy of reconciliation.²⁵ Once again, however, the first years of the fifteenth century were characterized by very subdued diplomatic activity. The years 1400–1403 were marked by Emperor Manuel II's trip to the West to gather help and support against the Ottomans.²⁶ Various letters were exchanged between the emperor and Boniface IX in Rome and Benedict XIII in Avignon, discussing a common crusade. Both popes issued indulgences to encourage financial help to the Byzantine Empire.²⁷ But although the emperor sent his son-in-law Hilario Doria as his representative to Rome, and Constantinos Vranas to meet Benedict in Avignon, no papal embassy is recorded toward the emperor (or indeed to Constantinople) during this time. It is quite unclear whether a meeting took place between the emperor and the pope: if it did happen, it was only on his return trip, in 1403, that Manuel II met Boniface IX in Florence.²⁸ These limited contacts show how much papal prestige had sunk at the very beginning of the century. But it is also the consequence of the lack of an available emissary at this point, when the Avignoneses and Roman courts could muster at best a limited number of reliable personnel.

Contacts between the Papacy and the Byzantine Empire did not disappear, however, and direct diplomacy started again as soon as unified

papal authority was restored with the election in 1420 of Martin V. Just a few weeks after ascending the papal throne, the pope entrusted Cardinal Giovanni Dominici with the restoration of Church Union with the Hussites in Bohemia and the Greeks in Constantinople.²⁹ Even though the legate died in Buda and never reached the Byzantine capital, the embassy shows Martin's will to extend to the Eastern Church the unification process begun at the Council of Constance. Two years later, a very similar mission was given to Pedro de Fonseca. He was to travel to Aragon in order to resolve the schism of the antipope Pedro de Luna—formerly Benedict XIII—who was entrenched in the fortress of Peñíscola, then pursue the route to Constantinople to discuss a general council.³⁰ The Ottoman siege of Constantinople once again prevented a papal emissary from reaching his final destination, but the close link between papal authority in the West and in the East recurs clearly in Fonseca's embassy.

During the first half of the century, no fewer than ten different papal ambassadors were sent to Constantinople. Church Union was the main motor of this diplomacy, to organize the council up to 1439, and to enforce its decrees afterward, but war against the Turks was constantly in the background to the discussions. The Greeks conceived it as a necessary prerequisite for Union, whereas the popes imposed the recognition of their authority as an imperative precondition for any armed expedition.³¹ Papal diplomacy was often accompanied by tangible—though quite insufficient—military help: in 1439, Cristofore Garatone was leading two war galleys and 300 crossbowmen recruited in Crete and, in 1452, Isidore of Kiev arrived with 200 men-at-arms from Chios. The Greek Empire was also the only place outside Latin Christendom during the entire fifteenth century to which cardinal-legates were sent.³² This is a strong indication both of the importance of Byzantine diplomacy for the Papacy and of the ambiguous status of the Greek lands, since cardinal-legates were usually sent only to Latin lands. Breaking with the papal hesitations of previous centuries, fifteenth-century popes fully incorporated the Byzantine Empire into their crusading strategies, treating it on a par with Latin Christendom. Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople in 1453 put an end to this diplomacy: the papal *curia* maintained some epistolary contacts with the despots of Morea and—maybe—the emperor of Trebizond, but it never sent an ambassador there. These lands possessed neither the strategic interest nor the symbolic importance of Constantinople.

OPENINGS TOWARD THE EASTERN WORLDS, 1430–1460

With the exception of Francisco de Pistorio, sent in 1429 to free some Christian prisoners in Cairo,³³ all papal embassies outside Latin Christendom until the 1430s went to Constantinople. However, these years marked a clear—even if gradual—turning point in papal policy. Immediately after his election in 1431, Eugenius IV asked the general chapter of the Franciscan Order to choose six friars who might serve as papal envoys in the Holy Land.³⁴ Three years later, Cristoforo Garatone, one of the main papal negotiators with the Greeks, had his jurisdiction extended to the Armenians. The following year, Pero Tafur was asked to gather as much information as possible during his pilgrimage to Jerusalem and, in 1437, Niccolò da Ferrara and Giacomo de' Primadizii were sent to Jerusalem and Caffa.³⁵ During the summer of 1439, Moïse Giblet left Rome for Syria, Alberto da Sarteano for Egypt, Ethiopia and India, and Isidore of Kiev for Russia. During the following decades, numerous embassies were sent to Russia, Ethiopia, India, Armenia and Lebanon.

What were the causes of this quite remarkable opening-up of papal horizons? As a Venetian (Gabriele Condumer), Pope Eugenius might have had a wider view of the world and been more eager to contract far-off alliances, but the evolution had deeper and more overtly political reasons. In 1431, the pope had to flee Rome to escape a popular riot and he sought refuge in Florence. This exile offered him the opportunity considerably to reinforce his international networks by encountering humanist geographers and people traveling from distant lands to the commercially active city of Florence.³⁶ At the same time, the *curia's* political position was improving. As the opposition of the Council of Basel gradually lost much of its influence, negotiations with the Greek led to an agreement in 1434 to summon a common council in Italy. This council had to be as ecumenical as possible to underline the Papacy's universal power. Eugenius thus looked outwards to as many Christian communities as possible; toward the Black Sea region, to gather the other Orthodox populations, and toward the Holy Land, Syria and Egypt, to reunite under his authority various communities of “heretical” Christians. All these emissaries were thus mainly charged with enforcing Church Union. But this project cannot be disconnected from the crusade. The Pope was reviving the hopes of his thirteenth-century predecessors to promote the conquest of Muslim lands by seeking alliances among fellow Christians.

Moving away from Constantinople, papal embassies of the 1430s were directed toward the south, the Holy Land and then Syria, Egypt and Ethiopia, all traditional goals of the crusade to Jerusalem. Although the main crusading fronts had for some decades moved northwards toward Anatolia and Europe, and although Eugenius himself was engaged in a general offensive against the Ottomans on the Danube together with Venice, Burgundy and Hungary, papal *diplomacy* was mainly directed toward a very different front. During the 1430s and 1440s, Western strategy against the Ottomans was based on an alliance with the Turkish emirate of Karaman in southern Anatolia. A combined attack with this Muslim ruler would have facilitated a two-front land offensive against the Ottomans, while the enemy's internal communications would have been cut by a naval blockade of the Dardanelles Strait. Yet no papal envoy toward Karaman is recorded during the period. That project was entirely conceived and carried on by Venetian diplomacy.³⁷ On the northern front, papal legates in Russia and Lithuania—above all Isidore of Kiev—were not charged with any military negotiations: winning Muscovy over to the war against the Turks was not part of the agenda followed in these years.

The apparent contradiction between the thrust of papal diplomacy and the actual war fronts against the Ottomans can be explained in various ways. The first one, already mentioned, was the fact that papal networks remained rudimentary. Papal diplomacy during the central years of the fifteenth century relied almost entirely on the Franciscans.³⁸ These friars were well equipped to lead embassies to Syria or Egypt, and even to undertake the journey to Ethiopia, thanks to their Order's ancient missionary tradition and the ongoing presence of their brethren in Beirut and Jerusalem. But they were of no use for political negotiations with Anatolian princes. Significantly, when the Papacy finally decided, in the 1450s, to make direct contact with the Karaman princes, it had to turn to non-Roman ambassadors, the Syrian Moïse Giblet and the Venetian Giovanni Mocenigo, who had already traveled to Karaman during the previous decade on behalf of the *Serenissima*.³⁹ But the ongoing difficulty of finding capable personnel in the *curia* is not a sufficient explanation. The Sienese merchant Beltramo de' Mignanelli had spent several years in Syria, spoke fluent Arabic and had a good diplomatic experience—in the West. Although he was quite close to Pope Eugenius IV, who asked him to write a crusading treatise and used his skills as translator during the Council of Florence, he was never sent to the East as an ambassador.⁴⁰ The near-exclusivity granted to Franciscan emissaries, and the focus on the south-eastern Mediterranean, is

explained too by the narrow link between crusade, mission and Church Union. From the thirteenth century, papal relations with non-Christian rulers were always accompanied by conversion proposals, partly because it was the pope's duty to diffuse Christianity and partly because this point of view facilitated the development of an autonomous network of ambassadors across the world, parallel and rival to the Imperial one.⁴¹ From a papal point of view, all relations with a non-Latin ruler—whether schismatic, heretic or pagan—were related both to mission and crusade, because a victorious expedition against the enemies of Christian faith could not be conceived unless Christendom was unified under the papal banner. Due to this way of thinking, papal diplomacy during the first part of the century was centered on those areas where Christians who might be gathered into the bosom of Church were the most numerous: the lands of the Maronites, the Jacobites and the Copts.

This brings us to the last explanation for this focus on the south-eastern Mediterranean: the symbolic role of Jerusalem and the unique prestige of the Holy Land in medieval Christendom, which remained very strong in the fifteenth century.⁴² In spite of the northwards movement of threats and fronts, which the Papacy understood very well, crusade could not be limited to a defensive war in the Aegean or on the Danube. War against the Ottomans was a secular affair, led by the princes and supported by the Papacy. But papal projects had to go further, and they remained focused on Jerusalem. One of the main roles of papal ambassadors was to embody the pope's universal power. They could not confine themselves to the management of basic activity like negotiating alliances, especially with non-Christian rulers like the emir of Karaman. They had to work toward a much nobler goal, one worthy of a pope's ambitions: the achievement of union between all Christians and the recovery of Jerusalem, which would be the last step before Christ's return to earth and Christendom's definitive triumph. The effort that the popes invested in diplomacy relating to the Holy Land did not result from their inability to adapt to changing geopolitical situations, nor was it a stale copy of their predecessors' policy. On the contrary, it was the consequence of a very different conception of diplomacy, one not primarily aimed at supporting any specific policy, but rather at making visible a power that theoretically extended to the entire *Orbis terrarum*.

This does not mean that papal diplomacy remained unchanged during the central decades of the fifteenth century. On the contrary, it went through a major transformation, thanks to the *curia's* growing knowledge of Eastern

realities. When Alberto da Sarteano left Rome in August 1439, he was given credential letters for “Prester John, the emperor of Ethiopia” and “Thomas, the emperor of the Indies.”⁴³ Associating the king of Ethiopia with Prester John had been common since the very end of the thirteenth century, and the role of the apostle Thomas as evangelist of India was a classic theme in Western literature. These addressees are telling proof that Eugenius’ diplomacy went far beyond enforcing Church Union: it was also a demonstration of papal universal power and was thus consciously inserted into a semi-legendary vision of the world. In addition, it showed how extraordinarily vague the *curia*’s geographic knowledge could be. Even if Alberto was really meant to travel as far as Ethiopia, the pope knew nothing more about these lands than what he could have learnt from pilgrim narratives written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

But this epistemological vacuum would soon be filled. When Alberto set out, the pope was resident in Florence, which as noted above was a great center of knowledge, and shortly afterwards the recovery of Rome’s prestige—thanks above all to pilgrimages—facilitated contact with numerous travelers coming from the East. The role of the Greek diaspora in establishing a superior knowledge of Eastern realities has repeatedly been demonstrated.⁴⁴ But the fifteenth century also witnessed the arrival in Rome of travelers from much more distant lands. In a few years, between 1439 and 1442, the pope gathered information from Niccolò de’ Conti, a Venetian who had traveled in India and maybe as far as the Moluccas Islands, from a Chinese Christian, who communicated thanks to an Armenian interpreter, from an Ethiopian monk, sent to the pope by the Italian geographer Toscanelli, from Moïse Giblet, who most probably represented the patriarch of Antioch at the Council of Florence, and finally from the Coptic and Ethiopian delegations to the same council, who were carefully interrogated by a papal commission.⁴⁵ Papal envoys also brought fresh news from the East when they returned: Pero Tafur, Alberto da Sarteano, Ludovico da Bologna and many others brought back precious knowledge which assisted the evolution of papal crusading policy.

Crusading projects thus became more precise and concrete. The missions of the pope’s ambassadors evolved from negotiations about Church Union, in which the crusade was but a secondary objective, to genuine military discussions. Moïse Giblet’s first mission was to win the Eastern patriarchs over to the pope’s authority, but he was twice sent back to Syria in 1457 and 1460 to convince Eastern Christians—including the Druze!—to rebel against their Muslim masters and to persuade two Islamic princes, Ibrahim Bey of

Karaman and a so-called prince *Garbi*, to participate in a papal offensive against the Ottomans.⁴⁶ The identity of this last sovereign remains mysterious: in Arabic, *Al-Gharb* means the West, so if this is his name's etymology, he could be the leader of any tribe from the Syrian coast or the western Anatolian peninsula. The letters he sent to Rome together with Ibrahim Bey reveal a clear inflexion of papal policy, openly negotiating a military offensive and an alliance with non-Christian rulers.

The letter wrote by Calixtus III to Zar'a Ya'eqob, King of Ethiopia, in December 1456 is also revealing about this gradual and complex evolution.⁴⁷ Unlike his predecessor, Calixtus knew his addressee's name and even this name's meaning in Geez—Ethiopia's ancient language—which was "Seed of Jacob." His letter was not just recommending an ambassador, but proposing a wholesale military alliance, requesting the king to join his fleet in order to destroy the Ottomans and recover the Holy Land. The letter is rich in paradox. The pope was seeking an alliance against Mehmed II with a ruler whose lands lay thousands of kilometers away from Ottoman borders. He related in detail the military operations at the siege of Belgrade in 1456 and asked the king to cut off the waters of the Nile in order to deprive the Egyptian crops of essential water. This surprising blend of sources and information, alternately precise and fantastic, concrete and legendary, constitutes a telling summary of papal diplomacy. Calixtus' aims might seem illogical: resisting the Ottomans while attacking the Mamluks; fighting on the Danubian border and in the Aegean without giving up the symbolic importance of Jerusalem; organizing the defense of Europe with mercenaries and guns while imagining a dam to cut the course of the world's longest river. In fact, the twofold aspect of papal diplomacy, outlined above, readily explains these apparent contradictions. In common with other popes since at least the thirteenth century, Calixtus was trying to reconcile and combine two very different objectives: concretely planning a crusade while symbolically projecting his worldwide authority.

During the 1430s, the gradual reinforcement of the papal position both in the West and in the Byzantine Empire allowed the Papacy to expand the horizons of its crusading projects. In the following decades, a deepening knowledge of the situation in the East gave birth to more precise projects, such as the alliance with the princes of Karaman in south-western Anatolia, and to the more concrete presentation of the pope's universal domination. The large number of embassies sent toward the Holy Land or Ethiopia at the same time as papal armies fought in the Balkans or the Aegean

must be understood in this context. The Popes were ready for alliances with Muslim powers like the Karamanids, but the Mamluks remained traditional enemies, because they held Jerusalem and stood in the way of Christianity's definitive triumph. This contradiction slowly disappeared from the 1460s, with a new focus of papal strategies in the north.

THE TIGHTENING OF ALLIANCES, 1460–1480

Among the various factors which contributed to persuade the Papacy to dismiss its traditional diplomatic fronts in the Holy Land and to focus its attention on the northern territories, the role of one man must not be dismissed: Ludovico da Bologna.⁴⁸ In 1454, this Observant Franciscan had asked Nicholas V for permission to travel to Ethiopia with two other friars. The pope granted this authorization, which was confirmed by Calixtus III the following year. He was asked to meet the king of Ethiopia “in order to ask him for help and assistance against the barbarian infidels, the most impious Mahometans.”⁴⁹ Ludovico never reached Ethiopia, but came back to Rome together with eight Ethiopian friars, sent by the abbot of the Ethiopian convent of Jerusalem.⁵⁰ Desperately seeking a direct contact with Ethiopia, the pope sent him back in December 1457, still pursuing the old dream of an alliance against the Mamluks. But during his first trip, Ludovico had also traveled to the land of “Christians of Persia and Georgia who are called Franks,” or at least he told the pope he had done so.⁵¹ A Christian realm since the fourth century, Georgia was well known in the West since at least the beginning of the twelfth century, and up to the 1330s various plans had been elaborated by the Papacy for a joint expedition toward Jerusalem.⁵² Two Georgian ambassadors attended the Council of Florence in 1438–1439, but we have no indication that any political, far less military, discussions took place on this occasion.⁵³ Ludovico da Bologna was to bring Georgia back into the Papacy's strategic purview. During his second trip, he was recommended to the Christian kings of Georgia and Persia, a distinction that might be explained by the existence of various—and rival—Georgian duchies in the second half of the fifteenth century. But he also carried a letter for Ianssa, King of Assyria and Prince of Babylon, whose identity remains wholly obscure.⁵⁴ In any case, Ludovico's second embassy stretched from Ethiopia to the Caucasus and Persia, more than 4,000 kilometers in all. This vastness is partly due to papal ignorance of actual distances in this region, better known but still loosely mapped. It also reflects a still vaguer appreciation of the political situation of

west-central Asia at that time. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Mongol dominion had more or less unified Persia and Mesopotamia, and it became possible to travel quite safely between Ethiopia and Georgia, through the Tigris valley and the Arabian-Persian Gulf. Calixtus III seems not to have realized that the dislocation of Tamerlane's empire put an end to this possibility. Nonetheless, Ludovico's mission in 1457 shows the duality of papal strategy, which oscillated between a resumption of the old crusading front against the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt, and the tightening of alliances around Anatolia against the Ottomans.

The practicability of this mission never became an issue because Ludovico apparently did not leave before Calixtus' death in August 1458. His successor Pius II confirmed the embassy in October, but with a significant modification. The new pope had long been interested in geography and had worked with various cartographers, and he was able to give Ludovico a more precise mission. The Franciscan friar was instructed to travel to the patriarchs of the Greeks, the Maronites, the Armenians and the Jacobites, toward the Babylonians, the Eastern Chaldeans, and toward the kings of Persia, Georgia, *Mengrabie* (Mingrelia?), the emperor of Trebizond and "some Persian peoples."⁵⁵ Still immensely large in order to enhance papal universality, Pius' nomination bull might seem as hazy as that of his predecessor. In fact, it was significantly tighter and more specific. Ethiopia was no longer mentioned and the people whom Ludovico was supposed to meet were distributed around Anatolia, underlining the shape of papal strategy. The Ottomans were to be crushed by a common offensive coming from all sides, a Latin army in the West and a large coalition of non-Christian princes in the East. Unfortunately, we have no evidence about which places or rulers Ludovico actually visited during the course of this trip. All we know is that he arrived back in Venice in December 1460, a year and a half later, together with two Georgians, ambassadors from the rulers of Samtskhe/Mingrelia and Karli/Imereti. An envoy from the emperor of Trebizond, one from Uzun Hassan and Murat, "the ambassador of Varturech, lord in Armenia," joined him soon afterwards.⁵⁶ Much has been written about these embassies. It is unlikely that all the travelers were officially mandated by their sovereigns, but they did come from the lands where they claimed to originate. All of them were able to bring precious intelligence for the pope's crusade. Retelling yet again the story of Ludovico's trip to France and Burgundy and the extraordinary impression created there by these ambassadors from the East would add little to the theme of this study, nor would details about

Ludovico's repudiation by Pius II, though it is worth pointing out that this arose as a result of his usurpation of a patriarchal title rather than from papal doubts about the authenticity of the various embassies. On the other hand, the geographic origin of the ambassadors calls for closer examination. All of them came from the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia; Syria, Egypt and Ethiopia, which had been the main focus of papal interest since the 1430s, no longer featured.⁵⁷ Their exclusion was symptomatic of the pope's new strategic approach, one initiated in part by Ludovico da Bologna himself. If an alliance with Georgia can be considered as traditional in papal crusading plans, a newcomer now made his entrance in Western strategies. This was Uzun Hassan, Turcoman prince of northern Mesopotamia, whose support became for the next two decades the central hope of crusading strategies.

An alliance between the West and Uzun Hassan was mainly a Venetian affair: it had been initiated by the *Serenissima* since 1460 and was chiefly associated with Venetian military power.⁵⁸ But the Papacy also played a part in its planning and organization. At least two embassies from Uzun Hassan visited Rome,⁵⁹ and no fewer than five Roman ambassadors made the trip to eastern Anatolia.⁶⁰ These embassies gave birth to the most concrete project of the century: cannons and other firearms were sent from Venice to Iran, and a Christian fleet tried to combine with Uzun Hassan's army in southern Anatolia in 1471–1472. This strategy was not a simple re-enactment of old thirteenth-century dreams. Although the failure to combine forces, and the defeat of Uzun Hassan by Mehmed II, quickly brought the well-known episode to an end, it remains the most significant evidence for the evolution of papal strategies toward the north and the development of alliances against the Ottomans. Soon after Ludovico's embassy, the balance of power had shifted in eastern Anatolia. Mehmed II conquered Trebizond in 1461. The Georgian principalities, divided and under pressure both from the Ottomans and from Uzun Hassan himself, were no longer capable of bringing any significant military aid to bear. The 1460 embassy was the last recorded contact between the Papacy and Georgia in the fifteenth century. Uzun Hassan's strength made him the last possible candidate for an alliance against the Ottomans which would subject them to a powerful assault from two directions.

The Papacy, however, persisted with its search for new allies and looked in another direction: northward to the Black Sea. Since the conquest of Constantinople, the Black Sea was closed to Western ships and it was gradually becoming an Ottoman dominion. The Papacy quickly understood

how useful it could be to enter into a relationship with other states endangered by this new strategic situation. Since the end of the 1430s, the khanate of Crimea had been officially independent from the Golden Horde. Although a Muslim state, it enjoyed good relations with the West because most of its revenues came from trade with the Genoese colony of Caffa. In 1465, Ludovico da Bologna appeared at the Polish court claiming to be an ambassador of Pope Paul II to Hacı Giray, Khan of Crimea. This embassy, however, is only recorded by a single source, the Polish historian Jan Długosz. No papal document confirms it or even mentions any direct relation with the khanate of Crimea. Given Ludovico's ability to exaggerate his personal credibility,⁶¹ it is perfectly possible that he assumed a title that the pope never gave him just to secure a better reception at the Polish court. Either way, Ludovico had once more shown himself to be highly perceptive in his grasp of the strategic importance of the Black Sea region. The Papacy would follow him, though not before the following decade.

The papal *curia* was in contact with these northern territories well before the end of the century. Delegates from Wallachia and Moldavia, the two Romanian principalities on the Danube, attended the Councils of Constance and Florence, during which Damian, metropolitan of Wallachia, subscribed to the decree of union with the Roman Church.⁶² An ambassador of the prince of Moldavia was also present at this last council and most probably mentioned the war against the Ottomans. As early as the summer of 1439, this relationship was advanced by the legation of Isidore of Kiev to Muscovy. But Church Union was never implemented in Moldavia and Walachia. The two principalities remained outside Latin Christendom and they mostly followed a pro-Ottoman policy. They were not initially integrated into papal crusading plans. In 1442, for example, friar Denys of Wylak was made "commissar" for Moldavia and "the Scythian regions," but he had a purely religious role and this was a response to a Franciscan initiative.⁶³ Then, in the 1460s, Ottoman pressure against these regions grew and favored a reconfiguration of alliances. In Moldavia, Stephen III "the Great" rebelled against Mehmed II, and his ambitions synergized with the papal search for an ally in the Black Sea region. The Greek community at Rome, under the patronage of Cardinal Bessarion, most probably played an important role in drawing the pope's attention toward these northern Christians, in Muscovy as well as Moldavia.⁶⁴ The contacts reached a concrete conclusion in 1472 with a double marriage, the first between Grand Prince Ivan III of Muscovy and Sophia (Zoe) Palaiologina, daughter of the last Byzantine emperor

of Constantinople, and the second between Stephen the Great and Maria Assanina Palaiologina, from the Trebizond imperial family. These alliances were intended to integrate the two rulers with Roman Christianity—even though they remained “Orthodox”—and offer them a dynastic legitimacy which would prompt them to recover the Byzantine Empire, which meant fighting against the Ottomans. Although these were parallel projects, the role of the papacy in bringing them about was not uniform. Sophia’s wedding was magnificently celebrated in St Peter’s on June 1, 1472, and she left for Moscow together with a papal legate, Antonio Bonumbre, who was also given authority at Caffa and in Pomerania.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Maria Assanina’s wedding was entirely promoted by the Roman Greek community, particularly by Iohannes TzAMPLAKŌN, and there was no direct papal intervention. The outcome of both initiatives was also completely different. Overtures toward Muscovy came to nothing, but Moldavia was fully integrated into papal crusading plans. Stephen III’s victory against the Ottomans in 1475 and his rapprochement with Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, prompted Sixtus IV in April 1476 to extend the Jubilee indulgence to all inhabitants of Moldavia who visited the cathedral church and contributed to the war against the Turks according to their financial capacities.⁶⁶ One year later, Iohannes TzAMPLAKŌN was sent back to Moldavia as an “orator” to Stephen III.⁶⁷ Unfortunately, we do not know the exact goal of this mission, but most probably it was intended to plan a joint offensive against Mehmed II. In 1478, the Pope sent some money to support the struggle in Moldavia, but the entire project finally came to nothing, mainly due to the persistent animosity between Stephen and Matthias Corvinus. Although none of them were very successful, the embassies of the 1460s and 1470s point toward a large alliance that would be directed against the Ottoman Empire: the Latin West would ally with one or two Muslim rulers, Uzun Hassan—and maybe the khan of Crimea—and two Orthodox princes, Stephen III and Ivan III. Confronted with accelerating Ottoman conquests, the crusade had evolved. It had left behind its traditional and historical objective, Jerusalem, and had lost one of its most important political aspects, the union of true Christians against all their enemies under the direction of one pastor. It was slowly becoming a circumstantial alliance against one precise enemy, the Ottoman Empire, in which all rulers were welcome, whether they recognized papal superiority or not, as long as they shared an interest in fighting against the Turks.

This new strategy did not suddenly put an end to traditional papal policy and interest in other parts of the world. Embassies to the Holy Land or Ethiopia had a strategic but also—and above all—a symbolic role. The pope remained the pastor of the entire Christian flock; it was still his duty to gather them and direct them to the final victory against their enemies. Together with these hoped-for alliances against the Ottomans, other papal embassies reveal the breadth of these ambitions. Through the Franciscan friars of Beirut, the Maronite Christians of Lebanon had maintained close links with Rome. The embassies of Gryphon of Flanders⁶⁸ and Ludovico da Riperio⁶⁹ seem to have had no other scope than that of keeping contact with these far-away believers. But the liturgical objects sent to the Maronite patriarch in 1475 were also a means of asserting papal presence during mass in Lebanon, and thus of demonstrating the Papacy's universal power. A similar logic can be detected in the contacts with Ethiopia in the early 1480s. In January 1482, Sixtus IV sent Iacopo da Rosate to evangelize infidels in India.⁷⁰ Without any further information on this mission, it is impossible to be sure of its precise goal, but it must be placed within the context of a renewal of interest in this distant region after the journey of an Ethiopian embassy in Rome in 1481.⁷¹

The Ethiopian delegation which met the pope was not an official embassy and it quickly left Rome, without any papal ambassador.⁷² But the year after, the pope mentioned to the vicar of the Franciscan Observants *in partibus cismontanis* his intention to send six friars to Ethiopia.⁷³ He also wrote a letter to the king of Ethiopia, promising to send priests, theologians and craftsmen, a blessed sword and a crown, as soon as the king sent him a proper embassy.⁷⁴ Sixtus IV made no mention of any military cooperation, but the promised objects clearly indicate his intention to impose his sovereignty over Ethiopia, in a symbolic but visible way.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, we do not know who brought this letter to Ethiopia, or even if it reached its addressee. But these overtures afford evidence of the Papacy's persisting interest in Ethiopian and Indian horizons and of its confinement to symbolic features. The conquest of Otranto by the Ottomans in 1480 had convinced the *curia* that crusading efforts had to be focused against the sultan, thereby confirming the diplomatic turn of the 1460s. But asserting the universal power of the pope still remained a political necessity, and it implied the maintenance of diplomatic activity toward what in the Middle Ages was viewed as the center of the world—the Holy Land—as well as its edges, Ethiopia and India.

CONCLUSIONS

The pope was not the only European ruler trying to reach Ethiopia. Throughout the century, Portuguese kings had sponsored expensive expeditions in order to establish direct contact with eastern Africa by penetrating the largest rivers (Senegal, Niger, Congo), by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope or even by the “classical” route through Cairo and the Red Sea. These projects were broadly supported by the Papacy and ambassadors frequently informed the popes of the Portuguese advance, laying claim to new privileges for their king.⁷⁶ At the accession of Innocent VIII in 1484, Vasco Fernandes de Lucena traveled to Rome to confirm Portuguese obedience, and he delivered a long oration detailing the Portuguese wars in North Africa, their discoveries along the African Coast and the journey they intended to undertake toward Ethiopia.⁷⁷ The so-called “European discoveries” were considered as a new route to old objectives: war against the Muslims and alliances with Ethiopia to recover Jerusalem. They were thus strictly parallel with the projects nurtured by the popes from the beginning of the fifteenth century. Vasco Fernandes de Lucena’s oration, however, also represented an important difference. This diplomatic initiative was not supervised by the Papacy; it was initiated by a lay ruler, who asked for papal support in order to legitimate his dominion. With the Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa by Bartolomeu Dias in 1488 and then Vasco da Gama in 1498, old dreams were coming true; a direct and safe road toward Ethiopia and India was established, plans were made to recover Jerusalem and war would soon be waged against the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea.⁷⁸ But the Papacy had no direct role in these projects and its envoys stayed away from these newly penetrated lands. A similar pattern can be found on the northern front against the Ottomans. In 1485, Giovanni Dario was sent by the Venetian *bailo* in Constantinople to meet Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid Empire, who was to become one of the main enemies of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century and one of the greatest Western hopes for a twofold alliance. Three years later, a Persian ambassador was received in Venice.⁷⁹ Even though these embassies came to nothing because of Venice’s struggle against the French and Italian League of Cambrai, it remains noteworthy that no papal ambassador was involved in the discussions. Papal plans were thus pursued in the last decade of the fifteenth century, but paradoxically without papal supervision.

Whether led by the popes or by lay rulers, these projects invite some final remarks about crusading in the fifteenth century. The growth of the Ottoman threat against Western Christendom necessitated a transfer of the military front toward the Aegean and the Balkans. But the primary objective of the crusades, the Holy Land, did not disappear. Given the importance of Jerusalem in late medieval spirituality, this shift in crusading strategy could not be absolute and recovery projects were never completely abandoned. For the Papacy, Jerusalem was important for another reason. It was the main element in a process of legitimation, the demonstration of papal ability to lead Christendom to the final triumph over its enemies. The more papal power was challenged in the West by antipopes, emperors or kings, the more the Papacy had to show how much it cared about the Holy Land to justify its power. Far from compelling the popes to focus on the West, the competition between the popes and rival Western powers prompted them to widen their horizons. Sending ambassadors out to the whole world was one of the best ways to give substance to papal claims to wield universal power.

Continuity does not exclude some forms of evolution. The Ottoman advance and the impossibility of uniting Christian rulers offered the Papacy a more direct role in warfare against the Turks. From the beginning of the 1440s, papal diplomacy began a major transformation. Destinations moved northward toward the Black Sea region, Georgia or Persia. The perception of these foreign rulers from the Roman point of view also changed completely. Infidels or schismatics were not by definition enemies to be fought or brought back under Roman rule; they could become allies and bring precious help against the Ottomans. Whereas papal envoys from the thirteenth century always had a twofold mission (diplomatic and religious), trying systematically to convert their addressees or at least to teach them the basis of Christian law, the ambassadors of the second half of the fifteenth century were in charge of specific and urgent missions: setting up an alliance, elaborating a concrete common strategy and bringing support, whether symbolic, financial or military.

It would be too simplistic to consider this evolution as the triumph of a purely strategic project, the replacement of a religious movement by a military expedition, the end of the crusade and the beginning of the anti-Turkish wars. The old conception of unifying all Christians for the final struggle against their common enemy remained vivid until the end of the century. Most of all, since the Frankish-Fatimid encounter outside Antioch with which we began, the crusade had never been a simple and

binary religious opposition. The transformations of papal diplomacy were only one of the consequences of the new role acquired by the Papacy in the crusades. As the military frontline came nearer to Western Christendom, the popes involved themselves more directly and concretely in the waging of the war itself. The accommodations that had existed in every expedition since the First Crusade were simply continued by the Papacy. But, as in the eleventh century, this did not entail the disappearance of a religious conception of the struggle or of its universal meaning. The gap between theory and praxis in the case of the crusade was decreasing because both were now gathered into the hands of the Holy See. But it still existed because the Papacy needed both. Its ambassadors were in charge of a two-fold mission: the war against the Turks to protect Europe and the crusade to confirm papal superiority over Christendom.

NOTES

1. “Erant in eo tempore in nostris castris legati a rege Babyloniorum, qui videntes mira quae Deus per servos suos operabatur, Jesum Mariae virginis filium glorificabant, qui per pauperes suos potentissimos tyrannos conculcabat. Hi autem legati gratiam et benevolentiam apud regem suum nobis promittebant, praeterea plura beneficia regis in Christianos Aegyptios et peregrinos nostros referebant. Itaque remissi sunt cum illis legati nostri qui foedus amicitiamque cum rege inirent”: Raymond of Aguilers in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux*, vol. 3 (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1866), 247.
2. Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, “Relations between Muslim and Frankish Rulers 1097–1153 A.D.,” in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 190–214.
3. Among a very abundant bibliography, one should refer to the overview edited by David Thomas and John Chesworth, *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, 7 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2009–2015). See also *Les relations diplomatiques entre le monde musulman et l’Occident latin (XIIe–XVIIe siècles)*, ed. Denise Aigle and Pacal Buresi (*Oriente Moderno* n°88/2, Rome, Brill, 2008); and Michael Köhler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East: Cross-Cultural Diplomacy in the Period of the Crusades* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

4. Bernard Hamilton, "Continental Drift: Prester John's Progress through the Indies," in *Prester John, the Mongols and the Ten Lost Tribes*, ed. Bernard Hamilton and Charles F. Beckingham (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 237–269; Thomas Tanase, "*Jusqu'aux limites du monde*": *La papauté et la mission franciscaine de l'Asie de Marco Polo à l'Amérique de Christophe Colomb* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2013), 67.
5. Charles Beckingham, "The Achievements of Prester John," in *Prester John*, ed. Hamilton and Beckingham, 1–22; Tanase, "*Jusqu'aux limites du monde*," 67–68.
6. Antonio García Espada, "The Geographical Enlargement of the Crusade Theory after 1291. Its Subaltern Roots," in *Les projets de croisade: Géostratégie et diplomatie européenne du XIVe au XVIIe siècle*, ed. Jacques Paviot (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 2014), 109–124, though with some nuances; Tanase, "*Jusqu'aux limites du monde*" offers a new approach compared to Jean Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen Âge (XIIIe–XVe siècles)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1977) and has an up-to-date bibliography.
7. See e.g. Charles-Marie de Witte, "Les bulles pontificales et l'expansion portugaise au XVème siècle," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 48–53 (1953–1958); James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 105–152. Tanase, "*Jusqu'aux limites du monde*" offers another viewpoint, but, despite his title, his work gives very few details on the fifteenth century.
8. Though a number of studies have yielded a fairly clear understanding of the system in the thirteenth century and the Avignonese period, the fifteenth century still lacks any comprehensive overview. Some useful information can be found in Adolf Gottlob, *Aus der Camera Apostolica des 15. Jabrunderterts* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1889); Martino Giusti, *Studi sui registri di bolle Papali* (Vatican City: Archivio Vaticano, 1979); Thomas Frenz, *I documenti pontifici nel Medioevo e nell'età moderna* (Vatican City: Scuola Vaticana di Palaeografia, Diplomatica e Archivistica, 2008 [Stuttgart, 1986]).
9. Sixtus IV (1471–1484) did innovate in creating specific registers to archive the bulls granting powers to his legates (currently ASV, Registra Vaticana [hereinafter Reg. Vat.] 679–680), but the practical

- activity of these legates was not registered together with the bulls. Also, his innovation was not continued by his successors.
10. In particular, almost all letters received by the Papacy, which were burnt during the sack of Rome by Charles V's army in 1527.
 11. "In civitatibus Caffè et Pere et in terris Sarracenorum, Paganorum, Gregorum, Bulgarorum, Cumanorum, Ethiopium, Iberorum, Alanorum, Basarorum, Bottorum, Zizorum, Brutenorum, Sitorum, Iacobitarum, Nubianorum, Nestorianorum, Beorgianorum, Armenorum, Indorum, Molescitorum, Tartharorum, Kardorum, Hungarorum maioris Hungarie et aliorum qui nondum sacramenta fidei perceperunt": ASV, Reg. Vat. 519, fols 116v–119r (at fol. 117r).
 12. See e.g. the nomination bulls of Jacopo dei Primadizzi and Niccolò da Ferrara, both from 1437, in *Bullarium franciscanum continens constitutiones epistolas diplomata romanorum pontificum Eugenii IV et Nicolai V ad tres ordines SPN Francisci spectantia, 1431–1455*, ed. Ulrich Hüntermann, vol. 1 (Florence: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1929), no. 300 and ASV, Reg. Vat. 374, fols 176r–177v.
 13. Felicitas Schmieder, "Cum hora undecima: The Incorporation of Asia into the Orbis Christianus," in *Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals*, ed. Guyda Armstrong and Ian Wood (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 259–268; Thomas Tanase, "L'universalisme romain à travers les registres de la papauté avignonaise," *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome—Moyen Âge*, 123 (2011): 577–595.
 14. The bibliography on late medieval diplomacy is huge. Old syntheses like Donald Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) are still very useful, but must be completed with more recent views. Stéphane Péquignot, "Les diplomaties occidentales, XIIIe–XVe siècle," in *Les relations diplomatiques au Moyen Âge: Formes et enjeux* (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 2011), 46–66 gives a clear historiographical synthesis. For a general view, see Jean Marie Moeglin, "La place des messagers et des ambassadeurs dans la diplomatie princière à la fin du Moyen Âge," in *Le diplomate en question (XVe–XVIIIe siècles)*, ed. Eva Pibiri and Guillaume Poisson (Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, 2010), 11–37; Stéphane Péquignot, "Les diplomaties occidentales et le mouvement du monde," in *Histoire*

- du monde au XVème siècle*, ed. P. Boucheron, vol. 2 (Paris: Pluriel, 2012), 536–559; Isabella Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). For the specific case of the Papacy, see Pierre Blet, *Histoire de la représentation diplomatique du Saint-Siège, des origines à l'aube du XIXème siècle* (Vatican City: Archivio Vaticano, 1982), 159–202; Luca Ricardi, “An Outline of Vatican Diplomacy in the Early Modern Ages,” in *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy: The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450–1800*, ed. Daniela Frigo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 95–108; Bernard Barbiche, “Les diplomates pontificaux du Moyen Âge tardif à la première modernité. Offices et charges pastorals,” in *Offices et papauté (XIV–XVIIème siècles, charges, hommes, destins)*, ed. Armand Jammé and Olivier Poncet (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2005), 357–370; *Legati, delegati e l'impresa d'Oltremare (secoli XII–XIII)/Papal Legates and Delegates and the Crusades (12th–13th Century)*, ed. Maria-Pia Alberzoni and Pascal Montaubin (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014).
15. Luigi Pesce, “Cristoforo Garatone trevigiano, nunzio di Eugenio IV,” *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 38 (1974): 23–93.
 16. Benjamin Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs: Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XVème siècle* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013), 85–88; Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*,” 701–702 contains some inaccuracy about Moïse Giblet.
 17. Pero Tafur, *Viaje a Oriente*, in *Viajes medievales*, ed. Joaquín Rubio Tovar, vol. 2 (Madrid: Fundación José Antonio de Castro, 2006), 239–320.
 18. Joseph Gill, *Le concile de Florence* (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1964); Benjamin Weber, “Union religieuse, unité politique et alliance militaire. Les légats pontificaux en Orient au temps du concile de Florence,” in *Italy and Europe’s Eastern Border (1204–1669)*, ed. Iulian M. Damian (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012), 345–358.
 19. Benjamin Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches Toward the Muslims* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*,” 176–178, 766–771.
 20. John 10:11–16.
 21. Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2; Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar (1274–1580)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 80–117; Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs*, 519–531.

22. Antoine-Isaac Silvestre de Sacy, "Mémoire sur une correspondance inédite de Tamerlan avec Charles VI," *Histoire et mémoire de l'institut royal de France. Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres* 6 (1822): 470–522; Adam Knobler, "The Rise of Tīmūr and Western Diplomatic Response 1390–1405," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 3(5) (1995): 341–349; Michele Bernardini, "Jacques du Fay, un Français à la cour de Tamerlan," in *De Samarcande à Istanbul: étapes orientales. Hommages à Pierre Chuvin*, ed. Véronique Schiltz (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2015), 205–210; Michele Bernardini, "Tīmūr and the 'Frankish' Powers," in *CFC*, 109–119. However, Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 204–208 and Tanase, "Jusqu'aux limites du monde," 662–664, argue that Western enthusiasm for an alliance with Tamerlane might not have been so important.
23. *Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum codicem iuris canonici orientalis, Fontes*, vol. 3, XIII, 1, no. 139, 278–282, mentioned in Tanase, "Jusqu'aux limites du monde," 663.
24. Felicitas Schmieder, "Enemy, Obstacle, Ally? The Greek in Western Crusade Proposals (1274–1311)," in *The Man of Many Devices Who Wandered Full Many Ways: Festschrift in Honor of János M. Bak*, ed. Balázs Nagy and Marcell Sebők (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 357–371; Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 9–49.
25. Nuances and details about this assertion can be found in Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs*, 127–135.
26. John Barker, *Manuel II Paleologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1969), 123–199.
27. *Ibid.*, 158–160, 183, 195–198; Setton, *Papacy*, 1:370.
28. Barker, Manuel II, 510–512.
29. Gill, *Le concile de Florence*, 28; *Epistolae pontificiae ad concilium florentinum spectantes*, ed. Georg Hofmann (Rome: Pontificum Institutum Orientalium studiorum, 1940), no. 1, 3.
30. Gill, *Le concile de Florence*, 28–36; *Epistolae pontificiae*, ed. Hofmann, no. 8, 6.
31. Gill, *Le concile de Florence*, 312–346 can be completed with Marie-Hélène Blanchet, "L'Église byzantine à la suite de l'union de

- Florence (1439–1445). De la contestation à la scission,” *Byzantinische Forschungen* 24 (2007): 79–123.
32. They were Giovanni Dominici and Pedro de Fonseca (already mentioned), Nicholas Cusanus from 1438 and Isidore of Kiev in 1452.
 33. ASV, Reg. Vat. 359, fol. 51r–v, published in Odoricus Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, ed. Augustin Theiner, vol. 28 (Bar-le-Duc, Ludovic Guérin, 1874), *ad annum* 1429, para. 21.
 34. Angelo Bargellesi-Severi, “Nuovi documenti su Fr. Lodovico da Bologna, al secolo Lodovici Severi, nunzio apostolico in Oriente (1455–1457),” *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 119 (1976): 3–22, at 5.
 35. Pesce, “Cristoforo Garatone”; ASV, Reg. Vat. 374, fols 176r–177v (Niccolò da Ferrara).
 36. On the role of Florence in the assembly and diffusion of geographic knowledge, see *Firenze e la scoperta dell’America: Umanesimo e geografia nel ‘400 fiorentino*, ed. Sebastiano Gentile (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1992).
 37. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:76–77; Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978 [1953]), 22–40. On the role of Karaman in Western strategies, see György Székely, “La Caramanie anatolienne dans les projets anti-ottomans à deux fronts,” in *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna. Studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto, vol. 2 (Genoa: G. Brigati, 1997), 1187–1198.
 38. The importance of the Franciscan Order in papal policy in the East in the fifteenth century has been emphasized by Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*,” 696–704.
 39. On Giovanni Mocenigo, see ASV, Archivum Arcis [hereinafter AA], Armadio [hereinafter Arm.] I–XVIII, vol. 1443, fol. 21r; and Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs*, 87.
 40. Nelly Mahmoud Helmy, *Tra Siena, l’Oriente e la Curia, Beltramo di Leonardo Mignanelli e le sue opere* (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano, 2013).
 41. Thomas Tanase, “Les envoyés pontificaux en Orient au XIIIe siècle: ambassadeurs ou missionnaires?,” in *La figure de l’ambassadeur entre mondes éloignés: Ambassadeurs, envoyés officiels et représentations diplomatiques entre Orient islamique, Occident latin et Orient chrétien (XIe–XVIIe siècle)*, ed. Nicolas Drocourt (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 19–32.

42. On Jerusalem in the fifteenth century, see Colin Morris, *The Sepulchre of Christ in the Medieval West, from the Beginning to 1600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 295–327; Norman Housley, “Holy Land or Holy Lands? Palestine and the Catholic West in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance,” *Studies in Church History* 36 (2000): 228–249.
43. *Epistolae pontificae*, ed. Hofmann, nos 208–209.
44. Jonathan Harris, *Greek Emigrés in the West, 1400–1520* (Camberley: Porphyrogenitus, 1995).
45. Francesco Surdich, “Conti, Niccolò de’,” in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 28 (Milan: Treccani, 1983); Didier Marcotte, “Diodoro Siculo e Poggio Bracciolini, dall’India all’Etiopia,” *Sileno* 40 (2014): 135–151; Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*,” 675–689.
46. ASV, AA, Arm. I–XVIII, vol. 1443, fols 21r–23v. On the role of Eastern patriarchs, see Joseph Gill, “The Condemnation of the Council of Florence by Three Oriental Patriarchs in 1443,” in *Personalities of the Council of Florence* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), 213–221.
47. ASV, Reg. Vat. 445, fols 272v–274v, published in Osvaldo Raineri, *Lettere tra i pontefici romani e i principi etiopici (secoli XII–XX)* (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2003), 37–41.
48. Many studies have dealt with the career and travels of Ludovico da Bologna, but they offer very different appreciations. See Anthony Bryer, “Lodovico da Bologna and the Georgian and Anatolian Embassy of 1460–1461,” *Bedi Karthlisa* 19–20 (1965): 178–198; Angelo Bargellesi Severi, “Nuovi documenti”; Richard, *La papauté et les missions d’Orient*, 274–278 (see note 34); Jean Richard, “Louis de Bologne, patriarche d’Antioche et la politique bourguignonne envers les États de la Méditerranée orientale,” in *Publications du centre européen des études burgundo-médianes* (Basel: Brepols, 1980), 63–69; Thierry Ganchou, “La date de la mort du basileus Jean IV Komnénos de Trébizonde,” in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 93 (2000): 113–124; Angelo Piemontese, “L’ambasciatore di Persia presso Federico da Montfeltro, Ludovico Bononiense, OFM e il cardinale Bessarione,” in *Miscellanea bibliothecae apostolicae vaticanae* 11 (Studi e Testi 423) (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2004), 539–566; Paolo Evangelisti, “Politica e credibilità personale. Un diplomatico francescano tra

- Tabriz et la Borgogna (1450 ca.–1479),” *Quaderni storici* 118 (2005): 3–40; Paolo Evangelisti, “Ludovico da Bologna,” *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 66 (2006): 403–406; Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*,” 702–704.
49. ASV, Reg. Vat. 429, fol. 87r–v (Nicholas V); “auxilia ab eo et favores contra barbaros infideles spurcissimos machometanos impetrare”: ASV, Reg. Vat. 450, fol. 123r–v.
 50. ASV, Reg. Vat. 450, fol. 123r–v.
 51. “Cristianis qui Franchi appellantur in Regione Persie et Georgiae constitutis”: ASV, Reg. Vat. 449, fol. 270r–v.
 52. The bibliography on medieval Georgia is very poor, even worse for its relations with the West. See Nodar Assatiani and Alexandre Bendianachvili, *Histoire de la Géorgie* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 157–175; Alexander Mikaberidze, *Historical Dictionary of Georgia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 20–22, 334. For crusading plans with the Papacy in the thirteenth century, see *MGH, Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis Pontificum Romanorum selectae*, nos 251–253.
 53. ASV, Camera Apostolica [hereinafter Cam. Ap.], Introitus et Exitus [hereinafter Intr. et Ex.], no. 403, fol. 111r; ASV, Cam. Ap., Intr. et Ex., no. 404, fol. 84v; Gill, *Le concile de Florence*, 104.
 54. *Supplementum ad bullarium franciscanum*, ed. Cesare Cenci, vol. 1 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2001), no. 1318. Scholars usually identify Ianssa with Uzun Hassan, which seems unlikely given that Uzun Hassan, a simple tribal leader until 1460, was probably not known in the West at this time.
 55. “Quidam populi ex Persis”: ASV, Reg. Vat. 468, fol. 46r–v.
 56. “Orator[e] dilecti filii nostri nobilis viris Verthurech in Armenia domini”: ASV, Reg. Vat. 479, fol. 67r–v, published in Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici, ad annum 1461*, §35. All the envoys were identified by Bryer, “Lodovico da Bologna” and they have been reviewed in later studies: see e.g. Jacques Paviot, *Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l’Orient* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris Sorbonne, 2003), 265–266; Evangelisti, *Ludovico da Bologna*, 404. The Armenian Murat, however, might not, as Bryer suggested, be an envoy of the emir of Adana (in Little Armenia), but could have come from Greater Armenia, which would give the embassy much greater geographic coherence.

57. A so-called “ambassador from Prester John” (i.e. from the emperor of Ethiopia) only joined Ludovico’s procession after his departure from Italy, en route from Milan to France. His presence was more a matter of displaying the Papacy’s universal power than facilitating a military venture: see Benjamin Weber, “Vrais et faux Éthiopiens en Occident au XVe siècle. Du bon usage des connexions,” *Annales d’Éthiopie* 27 (2012): 107–126.
58. Guglielmo Berchet, *La repubblica di Venezia e la Persia* (Torino: G.B. Paravia, 1865), 1–21; Ludwig von Pastor, *Histoire des Papes depuis la fin du Moyen Âge*, vol. 4 (Paris: Plon, 1924), 175, 209–210; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:222–223, 272, 310, 314–317, 320; Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 298–299, 302–328; Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, 224–230; Giorgio Rota, “Venetian Attempts at Forging an Alliance with Persia and the Crusade in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in *CFC*, 120–132. For papal participation, see Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs*, 91–94.
59. Three envoys reached the *curia* in August 1471 (ASV, Cam. Ap., Intr. et Ex., no. 487, fol. 97v) and the Jewish physician Isaac arrived in November 1472 (ASV, Reg. Vat. 660, fol. 130v). See Angelo Piemontese, “The Nuncios of Pope Sixtus IV in Iran,” in *Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar*, ed. Kambiz Eslami (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 90–108.
60. Ludovico da Bologna in 1472 and 1478, Antonio Manzoni in 1471, Mariano da Ragusa in 1473 and Isaac in 1474: Piemontese, “The Nuncios of Pope Sixtus IV.”
61. Evangelisti, “Politica e credibilità personale,” *passim*.
62. Charles Auner, “La Moldavie au concile de Florence,” *Échos d’Orient* 7 (1904): 321–328, and 8 (1904): 5–12, 129–137.
63. *Supplementum ad bullarium franciscanum*, no. 936. See also Tanase, “*Jusqu’aux limites du monde*,” 693–694.
64. Dan I. Mureşan “Girolamo Lando, titulaire du Patriarcat de Constantinople (1474–1497), et son rôle dans la politique orientale du Saint-Siège,” *Annuario dell’Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia* 8 (2006): 153–258. On the role of the Greeks in crusading plans, see Harris, *Greek Emigrés*, 85–117.
65. ASV, Reg. Vat. 660, fols 314v–316r. On the entire Russian project, see Paul Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siège: Études diplomatiques*,

- vol. 1 (Paris: Plon, 1906), 130–185; Oscar Halecki, “Sixte IV et la Chrétienté orientale,” in *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant*, vol. 2 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1964), 241–264; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:318–320. On A. Bonumbre, see Giulio Coari, “Antonio Bonumbre,” in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 12 (Rome: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, Treccani, 1972). For the Romanian principalities, see Sergiu Iosipescu, “The Romanian Concept of Crusade in the Fifteenth Century,” in *CFC*, 187–205.
66. *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, ed. Augustin Theiner, vol. 2 (Rome: Typis Vaticanis, 1860), no. 636, 449–451. On the papal–Moldavian alliance, see Alexandru Simon, “The Use of the ‘Gate of Christendom’. Hungary’s Mathias Corvinus and Moldavia’s Stephen the Great, Politics in the Late 1400s,” *Quaderni della Casa Romana* 3 (2004): 205–224.
67. ASV, Reg. Vat. 666, fol. 397v. He may have left together with Iohannes Rhales, who received on the same day a *littera passus* to go *ad diversas mundi partes* with his family: ASV, Reg. Vat. 666, fol. 413v.
68. This important figure of contact between Rome and the East still lacks a definitive study. See Benjamin De Troeyer, “Gryphon,” in *Dictionnaire d’Histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*, vol. 22 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1988), 453–455. For his role as intermediary between the pope and the patriarch of the Maronites, see ASV, Reg. Vat. 540, fols 71r–73r.
69. ASV, Reg. Vat. 678, fols 698r–699v; *Bullarium Franciscanum*, vol. 3, nos 753, 754, 840. Ludovico felt ill in Venice and was replaced by Alessandro Ariosti.
70. *Bullarium Franciscanum*, vol. 3, no. 1530.
71. This complex episode has been studied by Pietro Ghinzoni, “Un’ambasciata del Prete Gianni a Roma nel 1481,” *Archivio Storico Lombardo* 6 (1889): 145–154; Renato Lefevre, “Giovanni Battista Brocchi da Imola e i suoi viaggi in Etiopia,” *Annali Lateranensi* 9 (1945): 407–444; Marco Bonechi, “Four Sistine Ethiopians? The 1481 Ethiopian Embassy and the Frescoes of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican,” *Aethiopica* 14 (2011): 121–135; Giancarlo Fiacadori, “A Marginal Note to Four Sistine Ethiopians,” *Aethiopica* 14 (2011): 136–144; Weber, “Vrais et faux Éthiopiens.”

72. Giovanni Battista of Imola went to Ethiopia at this time, but he does not seem to have had an official mandate from the pope.
73. *Bullarium Franciscanum*, vol. 3, no. 1568.
74. The letter is published by Raineri, *Lettere tra i pontefici*, 42–43.
75. From the middle of the fourteenth century, the pope sent a blessed sword each Christmas to a Christian ruler whom he considered particularly devoted to the *curia*: Eugène Müntz, “Les épées d’honneur distribuées par les papes pendant les XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles,” *Revue de l’art chrétien* 32 (1889): 408–411 and 34 (1990): 281–292; Elisabeth Cornides, *Rose und Schwert im päpstlichen Zeremoniell von den Anfängen bis zum Pontificat Gregors XIII.* (Vienna: Geyer, 1967).
76. António Brásio, “As relações da Cúria Romana com o Imperador da Etiópia na Época Henriquina: O seu porquê e suas consequências,” in *Congresso internacional de la historia dos descobrimentos*, vol. 5–1 (Lisbon: Comissão executiva das comemorações do V centenario da morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1961), 85–91; Luis Filipe Thomaz, “O projecto imperial de D. João II,” in *Congresso Internacional Bartolomeu Dias e a sua época: actas*, vol. 1 (Porto: Universidade do Porto, 1989), 81–98; Manuel João Ramos, “O destino Etiope do Presto João: A Etiópia nas Representações Cosmógraficas Europeias,” in *Condicionantes Culturais da Literatura de Viagens: Estudos e Bibliografias*, ed. Fernando Cristóvão (Lisbon: Cosmos, 1999), 235–259. I have not yet been able to read Matteo Salvatore, *The African Prester John and the Birth of Ethiopian-European Relations, 1402–1555* (London: Routledge, 2016).
77. Francis Rogers, *The Obedience of a King of Portugal* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); Geo Pistarino, “I Portoghesi verso l’Asia del Prete Gianni,” *Studi Medievali* 3(2) (1961): 75–137.
78. Luis Filipe Thomaz, “L’idée impériale manuéline,” in *La découverte, le Portugal et l’Europe: Actes du colloque de Paris des 26, 27 et 28 mai 1988*, ed. Alfredo Pinheiro Marques (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenian, 1990), 35–105.
79. Berchet, *La repubblica di Venezia*, 22–26.

Crusade and Reform, 1414–1449: Allies or Rivals?

Norman Housley

For what spectacle could be more glorious on earth and more deserving in God's sight than that of the faithful taking up arms in one part of the world to fight for the Catholic faith against heretics, while in another the mitred fathers of the Church are witnessed passing just decrees for its reform? (Pope Martin V to the archbishop of Trier, December 24, 1422)¹

The links between crusade and the reform of the Church were strong and persistent. The accommodation of violence within the Gregorian reforming program formed part of the background to the First Crusade, though the precise relationship between the radical ideologues and Urban's II conception of crusade remains difficult to establish.² Clearer in character is the link created in the early thirteenth century, when Pope Innocent III pursued policies of crusade and reform with equal vigour. "Among all the good things which our heart can desire," Innocent wrote in his summons to the Fourth Lateran Council, "there are two in this world which we value above all: that is to promote the recovery of the Holy Land and

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the reform of universal Church.”³ The pope saw in crusade a key instrument to achieve the Church’s goals in the world, in particular to defend the faith, preserve the Holy Land and save the souls of believers through penitence and devotion.⁴ In his vision of a fully Christian world, it played a holistic, inclusive and purgative role, justifying an unprecedented extension of papal authority. It was surely no coincidence that the last decree of his great Lateran Council in 1215 was the crusading one, *Ad liberandam*.⁵ This decree set the seal on over a century of intensive treatment of crusade by popes and canonists, and its measures formed the template for countless crusade bulls for generations to come. As Maureen Purcell showed, both the First and Second Lyons Councils took *Ad liberandam* as the model and inspiration for what they tried to achieve.⁶ Like their predecessors at Rome in 1215, the churchmen who assembled at Lyons in 1245 and 1274 addressed a program that set the defence of the Holy Land firmly alongside reform. It was a program with lasting appeal. As John of Ragusa put it in a powerful sermon delivered before the pope at S. Maria Maggiore, at the summons of the Council of Pavia on December 7, 1422, when confronting external threat from non-believers and internal threat from heresy, schism and corruption, the Church must reform itself if it was to mount an effective defence.⁷ This dialectic underpinned the more straightforward symmetry referred to by Martin V in his letter two weeks later.

By 1300, however, crusade and reform alike were in full crisis. The Council of Vienne (1311–1312) had an agenda that bore comparison with those that had convened in Rome and Lyons, and William Durand, the Bishop of Mende, proposed the adoption of a conciliar rhythm—general councils every tenth year and provincial ones every third year—which would sustain the reforming momentum. Again, it was probably no coincidence that Durand was an advocate of crusade.⁸ But the trauma of the Templar trial and fraught relations between the Papacy and France meant that Clement V, and his successors who ruled from Avignon, pursued an approach toward both crusade and reform that was more piecemeal and less inclusive than that of their predecessors. Increasingly, such crusading as the papal *curia* sponsored or sanctioned was negotiated bilaterally, in discussions conducted amidst mutual and corrosive suspicion.⁹ As for reform, it was approached selectively and inconsistently, with an emphasis on the religious Orders rather than the secular clergy. Philip the Fair’s adroit manipulation of assemblies instilled a fear of Church councils which inevitably made the *curia* view Durand’s proposal with horror. At Vienne,

Clement V took over those decrees not yet ready for formal issue, showing that the council's role was purely advisory, and the pope's death before the decrees could reach the universities threw the status of the Vienne decrees into doubt. John XXII modified them and sent them out with a bull, *Quoniam nulla*, which stressed the need for authority to enforce reform.¹⁰ John and his successors believed general councils were not just dangerous but also unnecessary, so Vienne was the last one before Constance. Most importantly, the centralized and fiscally driven administration that was created by John and became Avignon's hallmark caused reformers to abandon hope that the Church could be reformed from the top (*a capite*). As a result, the association between reform and crusade—above all, the Holy Land crusade—retreated from the mainstream of contemporary politics into more esoteric thought worlds. Some strident critics of the regime at Avignon, like Catherine of Siena, saw a return to Rome as the essential first step toward a crusade to recover the lost Holy Land.¹¹ Others sought refuge in prophetic programs which envisaged the reform of the Church as a drastic and sometimes violent cleansing of the Augean stables, carried out by a messianic individual whose career would culminate in a grand *passagium* which would take back Jerusalem.¹²

The outbreak of the Great Schism in 1378 inevitably reduced still further the prospects of meaningful reform, whether pursued in isolation or in conjunction with crusade. There was no shortage of crusading activity, but it followed radically different paths and neither of them had reforming associations. Each pope sponsored crusading against his rival with the goal of ending the schism by force (the *via facti*), enlisting for his cause whatever individuals or groups would lend him the military muscle required for the task. Meanwhile those authorities confronting non-Christian enemies—the kingdom of Hungary, the Spanish monarchies and the Teutonic Order—carried on with their struggle, sometimes with the assistance of enthusiastic volunteers who periodically arrived from Christendom's interior. Authorities and volunteers alike made minimal reference to the papal obedience which they notionally supported. Abuses meanwhile plummeted to unprecedented depths, especially in the practice of simony at the rival courts and in the way in which both papal obediences ruthlessly promoted indulgences to try to plug the gaping holes in their revenues. Contemporary critics were unsparing in their denunciation, and some, above all Wyclif and Hus, saw in the use of crusading indulgences to combat fellow Christians one of the worst misuses of power afflicting the Church.¹³

When the fathers assembled at Constance in 1414, their primary task was to end the schism. But reform was also viewed as essential. Heinrich von Langenstein, an early advocate of a conciliar remedy to the schism (the *via concilii*), argued that the disaster was God's way of forcing a council into existence "so that at the council assembling for this reason the Church might be reformed both in this respect and in others."¹⁴ The need to guard against a recurrence of the disputed elections was obvious, and a reforming agenda was explicit or implicit in discussions about withdrawing obedience to lever the rivals into laying down their office (the *via cessionis*). At the Council of Pisa in 1409, a conservative approach still dominated, the hope being that pope and council would work together for reforming ends. But the additional scandal of a third obedience taking shape persuaded contemporaries to adopt more radical stances, and John XXIII's flight from Constance in March 1415 accentuated this trend still further. The Church fathers declared that they would not return home "until the current schism has been absolutely destroyed and the Church reformed in faith and in behavior, in head and in members."¹⁵ Discussion was facilitated by reform proposals: we shall have occasion to note Pierre d'Ailly's *Capitula agendorum* of 1413¹⁶ and his *De reformatione ecclesie* of 1416, Dietrich von Niem's *Avisamenta pulcherrima* and Job Vener's *Avisamentum*. When King Sigismund was away from the council between July 1415 and January 1416, reform was addressed without his steering, and a reforming committee (*reformatorium*) was established.

What emerged from this, following Martin V's election in November 1417, was a series of concordats agreed between the pope and the different nations. This "territorial reform" was a kind of halfway house between reform *in capite* and *in membris*, and while it went with the grain of European political life, many found it deeply disappointing. The size and complexity of the task of reform, the opposition of vested interests and above all the exhaustion which set in once Catholic unity was achieved had prevented Constance from becoming a major reforming body. Historians have differed in their assessment of this failure. Walter Brandmüller was the harshest, condemning the council for not engaging fully with the challenge to the faith posed by the views of Wyclif and Hus. Whereas the Fourth Lateran Council reforms were cited 350 years later at Trent, those decreed at Constance did not see out the century.¹⁷ Others have been more sympathetic toward the problems the council confronted, and more appreciative of its deeds. Above all, the decree *Frequens* (October 1417) laid down that general councils would assemble on a regular basis and

address reforming issues. In *Frequens* the link between avoiding schism and promoting reform was made crystal clear. Regular councils, the text stated, were the best safeguard against heresy, error and schism, through the correction of fault and the reform of corruption.¹⁸ This was straightforward: much less easy to define was the relationship between pope and council, and the much-debated wording of *Haec sancta*, the decree of March 1415 affirming the council's authority in the face of John XXIII's desertion, was ambivalent enough to store up trouble for its successors. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the fathers at Constance believed in and pursued reform.

That some of them also favored crusade may at first sight be surprising. The council met at a low point in the trajectory of the Ottoman threat: between the disastrous defeat that Timur inflicted on the Turks at Ankara in 1402 and the recovery of power by Murad II in the 1430s. There was no compelling need for a crusade against the Turks between 1414 and 1418. That said, the Ottomans were deeply entrenched in Europe and an aspiration to recover the Holy Land was embedded in the age's political and religious discourse. While the patriarchal cities of Constantinople and Jerusalem were less to the forefront of discussion than Rome, they were still present. The council's leading figures certainly made frequent reference to the crusade. When John XXIII declared his hope that a *passagium* would set out to recover the Holy Land after the council ended, we can assume that this singularly corrupt pope seized on such a universally respected trope because he saw that if there was any chance of his hanging on to his position, it lay here.¹⁹ More importantly, hopes of leading a Holy Land *passagium* recurred constantly in the pronouncements of King Sigismund. To give one example, in July 1415 the envoys of the University of Cologne reported on Sigismund's speech on the eve of his departure for Narbonne. Sigismund, who was an effective orator, declared that he wanted not just peace within the Church (i.e. an end to the schism), but peace across the breadth of Christendom, so that a general passage could recover the Holy Land and replace the rule of blasphemers with that of the true followers of Christ.²⁰ Not long ago, such remarks would have been dismissed as mere rhetoric, but historians are starting to treat Sigismund's crusade aspirations in a less dismissive way—which is not the same as taking them at face value.²¹ The arrival of Greek envoys reminded the fathers at Constance to consider the needs of the East. In February 1416, the bishop of Lodi stated in a memorandum that Union must feature on the agenda of the next council, and one of

the last measures decreed by Martin V before the council dispersed was to grant indulgences for the defense of the Hexamilion fortifications in Greece. As Raymond-Joseph. Loenertz commented, in doing so Martin “continuait la ligne de conduit de ses prédécesseurs,” showing goodwill to the Byzantines as a means of paving the way for Union.²²

It is the churchmen who attended or wrote for the council whose views are most revealing. In crusading terms, the most emphatic was Pierre d’Ailly.²³ Both in his *Capitula agendorum* of 1413 and in his *De reformatione ecclesie* of 1416, d’Ailly portrayed a crusade as a part of the reform program. In the *Capitula*, closing his consideration of how the schism should be ended, he advocated a general passage akin to the one decreed at the Council of Lyons in 1274. This was the best way to restore peace between Christian princes. The Second Lyons Council appealed to d’Ailly as a precedent: its agenda of reform, crusade and Union closely matched the situation which contemporaries faced, and he even advocated copying Gregory X’s procedure of calling for memoranda, which a group of experts (*certi commissarii*) to be appointed by John XXIII would sift through before the council met. It was an approach which d’Ailly had first advocated in a letter to the pope in 1411.²⁴ In 1416 he again referred to Lyons, recommending the study of the *Opus tripartitum*, Humbert of Romans’ advice to Gregory X before that council convened.²⁵ Peace between Christians should be followed by a crusade “against the Saracens and other opponents of the faith.”²⁶ We can detect several strains of thought in d’Ailly’s texts. On the one hand, they share with Sigismund’s various Holy Land statements a vision of peace within the Church and between the princes, which would be epitomized by a general passage. It was a vision which had enjoyed currency since the 1380s and is most closely associated with Philippe de Mézières.²⁷ Almost inevitably, it recurred in texts directed first and foremost toward ending the schism. There is also a heightened sense of external threat, above all to Constantinople, but through a kind of domino effect the debilitated western Empire and Church as well. “Unless we act quickly there is a danger that the empire of Constantinople, already the victim of numerous wounds and torments, will be totally destroyed; then the Roman empire, already divided and on the brink of total ruin, will be invaded; and thus the Church, already torn by schism, will be destroyed.”²⁸ Most strikingly, though, *De reformatione ecclesie* is exactly what its title implies, a detailed program of reform embracing clergy and laity alike, a reminder that, at least for d’Ailly and his group, the approach followed at the Fourth Lateran Council was far from being outmoded.

Indeed, it had never been timelier, for in d'Ailly's eyes the condition of crisis described generations earlier by St Bernard had in the meantime become a good deal worse.²⁹

Other French clerics may not have argued for a crusade, but they did hold past crusading in high regard. This emerged in the council's closing stages, when the Poles tried to discredit the Teutonic Order by launching a heresy charge against one of the Order's lobbyists, the Dominican Johannes Falkenberg. Crusading resonances are audible in the French nation's consideration of the accusations against Falkenberg. In his outrageous and ill-advised tract *Satira*, Falkenberg had declared that Polish crimes were so horrendous that King Władysław deserved to be killed, and the Poles protested that this was an incitement to murder without due legal process. The Franciscan vicar-general, Johannes de Rocha, was sympathetic toward the Dominican. It was not always practicable, he argued, to secure legal sanction for deeds of violence: if this was always to be a requirement, then St Louis, Godfrey of Bouillon, King Baldwin I, Christian kings and princes who shared borders with pagans, and brethren of the military Orders would all be culpable.³⁰ In Hartmut Boockmann's felicitous phrase, Rocha "threw three hundred years of crusade onto the weighing scale" in Falkenberg's support.³¹ Rocha was not advocating lynch justice; rather, he was implying that when all these men fought against non-believers, their cause had already been validated by the pope.

German advocates of reform at Constance similarly brought crusade into their framework of action. Dietrich von Niem, in his *Avisamenta pulcherrima de unione et reformatione*, went back to the time of the First Crusade. Then too, he reminded his readers, there was schism in the Church, "big enough and growing more dangerous." Urban II's action in declaring "a general passage for the liberation of the Holy Land from the hands of the Saracens" should be repeated, and a three-year tenth collected throughout Christendom. It would be a useful way of disposing of the evil men [sc. mercenaries] who were plaguing Christian lands. And God would restore peace to his people and union to his Church, just as he had done under Urban through the good offices of Countess Matilda of Tuscany, who was so generous in her gifts to St Peter.³² A German perspective is visible too in Job Vener's *Avisamentum*. Vener did not advance a specific crusade proposal, but he came close to blaming the catastrophes afflicting the Christian world, including the loss of the Holy Land and so many other regions in the East, on 200 years of control of the Papacy by the French and Italians.³³ Here was the potentially divisive counterpoint

to the predictable appeals for peace and unity: the argument that these laudable goals could only be attainable if deep changes were made, including a more equitable distribution of the Church's offices, leading to a more balanced use of its resources.

Because the fathers at Constance did not directly address the question of how best to mobilize men and money for a crusade, the issue which was so close to Vener's heart, and which he addressed with cutting humor, did not become a matter of overt contention. More generally, recreating the flow of reform discussion at the council is made extremely difficult both by its complex procedure and by the problems which attach to the surviving evidence.³⁴ Nonetheless, a certain amount can be deduced from the ways in which the twin questions of taxation and indulgences were handled at the council and in the reforming literature written for its delegates. Inevitably, the impact of reform on crusade mainly related to the circumstances in which taxation should be sanctioned and indulgences preached, and, just as importantly, under whose authority and subject to what procedures of control and audit. In his *Capitula agendorum*, d'Ailly wanted to place constraints on when jubilee indulgences could be granted and argued "that the Papal tenth should not be sought unless the cardinals counselled it and for specified causes, such as the recovery of the Holy Land or to prevent the lands of the Church being overrun."³⁵ The anonymous author of an *Avisamentum* written in 1415 insisted that in future, no tenths should be assigned to princes just to keep their goodwill. They should be reserved for the defense of the faith and the ransoming of captives.³⁶ Dietrich von Niem was more realistic, accepting that tenths would have to be assigned to local rulers to keep them quiet.³⁷ In his 1416 tract, d'Ailly inveighed against the "monstrous abuse" of prelates exchanging *arma spiritualia* for *arma corporalia* (perhaps a swipe at Bishop Despenser's notorious bellicosity in 1383) and argued for the reform of the military Orders.³⁸ Vener complained about the abuse of indulgences, alongside many other practices driven by fiscal motives.³⁹ Attention focused on avoiding future schism and in particular stopping any one nation from monopolizing the papal office. The 1415 *Avisamentum* suggested a rotation system, which could include the Greeks if Union were achieved, "and it remains to be seen where the seat [of the Papacy] will be, whether it goes with the nation or stays at the center."⁴⁰ With hindsight, we can see that the first option was impracticable, though within two decades the author's fears that a return to Rome would have the effect of marginalizing most nations were being borne out, as Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini would observe with regard to the Germans.⁴¹

The outcome on issues relating to the crusade was similarly conservative and piecemeal. The *reformatorium* advised that the norm for jubilee indulgences should be every 50 years and that the pope should not impose tenths “except at a general council and with the assent of that council,” though he could ask for voluntary subsidies if hard-pressed. Abusive indulgences granted during the schism should be abolished. The commission was eager to rein in papal jurisdiction over lay people even if they were *crucesignati*, though it acknowledged that this would not be practicable at the time of a general passage, when many *crucesignati* would be passing through the *curia* on their way to the Holy Land.⁴² Martin V was conciliatory on tenths: they would be granted only “with substantive and pressing cause and for a matter that concerns the universal Church.” In individual states, collection would require the majority consent of the clerics and would be handled by them rather than by papal collectors.⁴³ The same eagerness to conciliate characterized the national concordats. The clause about Rome not getting involved with crimes committed by *crucesignati* “except at the time of a general passage” was applied to the German nation, which was also assured that indulgences would in future be more cautiously distributed.⁴⁴ The French Church, suffering heavily from war, was excused payment of a half of the customary annates.⁴⁵ In the English concordat, it was left to diocesans to petition for the annulment of indulgences which they viewed as excessive.⁴⁶ None of this would prove hard to circumvent.

In his groundbreaking study of the council’s reforms, Phillip Stump brought to light the echo of a debate within d’Ailly’s sub-committee on indulgences. The sub-committee recommended the revocation of existing jubilee and crusade indulgences, “to restrain the ambitious and stop the Church’s treasure being debased by excessive use,” and making the specific point that the ban should cover “the preaching of the word of the cross and the seeking of subsidies or any kind,” but the following significant qualifier was added: “unless they are deployed against heresies or schisms, or for the defense of the faith against unbelievers.” In the event, thanks to national disagreements, none of d’Ailly’s text made it into the recommendations of the *reformatorium*.⁴⁷ Possibly the addition reflected disagreement about the imminent deployment of crusade against the Hussites, but the evidence is too fragmentary to be certain. The Hussites later claimed that the council initiated the crusade against them,⁴⁸ in fact, the crusade postdated the council by two years, though it seems probable that many at Constance saw it on the horizon. The qualifier quoted may

indicate that it had its supporters at the council. Having labored to end the schism, the fathers were hardly likely to look dispassionately on the spread of ultraquism. The fact was that containing Hussitism by force, like responding to the Ottoman threat, lay just beyond their purview. Thanks to the clamorous presence of advocates and lobbyists from Kraków and Marienburg, the council could hardly fail to be aware of the crisis facing the crusade in a third theater, the Baltic. But until the Falkenberg process began, it had no decisions to make in that regard with the exception of handing the conversion of Žemaitija (Samogitia) to the Poles and Lithuanians, and important as that decision was, it carried no costs and thus no reform implications.⁴⁹ It would be different with the Greeks. In February 1418 an unknown preacher waxed lyrical “on the expansion of the Church through the conversion of the Žemaitijans who recently embraced the faith, and the hoped-for submission [*reductio*] of the Greeks ... concluding with a peroration against simony and usury, which have grown stronger in the most recent times.”⁵⁰ What the preacher probably did not grasp was that a future council might be faced with tough choices between expanding the Church and reforming it.

In the 1420s, crusade and reform became thoroughly interwoven, but in a manner that applied mainly to Central Europe. This may be considered typical of the period, to the extent that the universal reform aspirations expressed at the Councils of Constance and Basel were at odds with the tumultuous diversity of Europe’s regions,⁵¹ while the equally universal character of crusade had in practice to be modified to suit the interests and potential input of individual states.⁵² The reason why the regionalist tendency was so pronounced in the years of the Hussite crusades was the perception of the part of the papal *curia* and its legates that one of the most important reasons why heresy flourished in the Bohemian crown lands was the acute failings of the Church there and in neighboring Germany. These were criticized in severe terms throughout the period of the crusades, culminating in Cesarini’s bleak prediction in January 1432 that if nothing was done to counter clerical “*deformitas et dissolutio*,” the laity would copy the Hussites and turn on the clergy.⁵³ From the start, therefore, the response to Hussitism was conceived as a twofold one: military repression organized as crusade, and the simultaneous pursuit of reform in the regular and secular Church as well as in the devotional practices of the laity. The synergy of the approach was most elegantly described in Martin V’s letter to the archbishop of Trier quoted at the start of this chapter in relation to the upcoming council at Pavia. As Birgit Studt showed, the

reforming program was pursued in a variety of ways: by calling on the help of sympathetic rulers like Albrecht II of Austria, enlisting enthusiasts in observant branches of the religious Orders, and relying on networks of reformers at episcopal courts, universities, centers of lordship, provincial synods and the *curia* itself. While this eclectic approach yielded patchy results, it remained one of the century's best examples of attempted reform *in membris*.⁵⁴ The aspect that concerns us here is the extent to which the series of legates dispatched by Martin V and Eugenius IV to assist with the five unsuccessful crusades incorporated reform into their promotion of the expeditions.⁵⁵

The legate who stands out for his engagement with both reform and crusade was Branda da Castiglione, who managed the second and third crusades in 1421–1423. Castiglione was very able and experienced, and he played a major role at the diets where the crusade was promoted. He was equipped with no fewer than 56 faculties and he made ample use of them.⁵⁶ There is evidence that he was sensitive in the way he managed the preaching of the crusade, not least because reformers were ready to express their criticism about abuses.⁵⁷ In accordance with concerns about indulgences being sold, personal or at least surrogate service rather than financial donations was encouraged; Job Vener called for strict adherence to the formula used in *Ad liberandam*.⁵⁸ Liturgical practices for the Hussite crusades were crafted with care and spelled out in impressive detail: in the case of few previous crusades had so much been prescribed. A low ceiling was placed on what preachers could ask *crucesignati* to pay for hearing their confessions. Reports that the secular clergy were so poorly educated that they could not preach the crusade properly lay behind the recruitment of renowned preachers like Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl.⁵⁹ The crusades seem to have been preached without the sort of excesses which had characterized the *via facti* crusades of the schism, notably Despenser's Flanders crusade and the crusade against Ladislas of Naples—the latter famously arousing the indignation of the Prague reformers. It is noticeable that collection chests were not called for in *Omnium plasmatoris*, Martin V's first bull for the Hussite crusades (March 1, 1420), whereas they were in *Rex regum*, his crusade bull against the Turks, issued just four months later. Perhaps the situation in Sigismund's Hungarian lands called for less sensitivity than Germany.⁶⁰ But circumstances as well as policy could have been behind this: there were plenty of German nobles and some commoners who were eager to take the cross in person to combat the Hussites, so recruitment was not generally a problem. The most appropriate

conclusion might be that procedures inherited from earlier crusades were tightened up and more carefully monitored rather than being systemically overhauled.

The preaching practices that Castiglione set up were copied by his successors, Orsini, Beaufort and Cesarini.⁶¹ The bulls continued to include safeguards against abuses: when Cesarini set a ceiling for what confessors could accept as payment in *In hac terrestri patria*, his bull of January 11, 1431, he added that this applied “even if offered spontaneously, and without any pressure.”⁶² However, the most remarkable of Martin V’s legates, Cardinal Beaufort, made radical changes when he appeared on the scene in 1427. Beaufort found that the financial situation had become critical and in order to deal with it, he instituted a justly renowned tax. The plan was to assemble its proceeds at five Imperial cities, from where they could be taken to Nürnberg for use in the fourth crusade. It was on this tax that the breach with reform came, because Beaufort was prepared to grant partial indulgences for paying the tax.⁶³ Studt was correct to see in this a movement from indulgence as pastoral device to indulgence as practical instrument, and to identify it with Beaufort’s background in raising money for the Lancastrian war in France.⁶⁴ It was very difficult to square either carrot (indulgences as the reward for payment) or stick (spiritual penalties imposed for non-payment) with reform, and in February 1428 the archbishop of Mainz took the decision to drop the penalties on the basis that the laity responded better to encouragement than to coercion.⁶⁵ Beaufort’s linking of payment with indulgences and censures was not just a non-starter in practical terms and an affront to reform, it was also a spectacular gift to the Hussite propagandists and surely contributed to the disenchantment noted by Cesarini three years later—though less so than two further crusading defeats, and these the most humiliating of all. But it was also indicative of probably the most serious obstacle to making crusade march in step with reform, which was the cost of war.

The prolific and inquisitive Augustinian chronicler Andrew of Regensburg, whose monastery of St Mang, nestling at the foot of the town bridge, afforded an excellent base for collecting information, gives us outstanding insight into what Studt’s *Doppelstrategie* entailed in the case of one important city and its diocese. One of Andrew’s strengths as an historian was his inclusion of numerous texts, and a large percentage of these relate either to crusade or to reform. His usual practice was to incorporate them into a narrative framework, and this gives us an excellent sense of how policies were transmitted down the Church’s chain of command, and

the impact they then had on communities. Thus, his *Concilium provinciale*, a short but telling work, begins with the letter which the archbishop of Salzburg sent to the bishop and clergy of Regensburg in September 1418, praising councils as the drivers of reform and summoning a provincial synod to meet two months later. In April 1419, Bishop Albert called a diocesan synod for May 1419, enclosing the statutes that had been agreed at Salzburg. These included a grant of 40 days of enjoined penance for people who joined in each Friday's recitation at None (mid-afternoon) of either Psalm 21 or the *Pater noster*. So a year before the promulgation of the first crusade against the Hussites, believers in Regensburg were being encouraged in their Christological devotion and rewarded for it with indulgences. That said, Andrew passes the comment that while the decree was properly passed in synod, it was not observed everywhere. The Orders in particular resisted reform, and Andrew concludes the *Concilium provinciale* with the tragic anecdote of a fellow Augustinian at Prüvening who committed suicide in the abbey choir because, as he put it, he was already doing the best he could to adhere to his vows.⁶⁶

It was, however, on the Hussite crusades that Andrew provided the most valuable testimony. In the first place, he bequeathed to posterity a substantial number of texts that illuminate Castiglione's *modus operandi*, including the liturgy used when the legate handed the crusade banner to Sigismund (who passed it on to his representative Frederick of Brandenburg) in September 1422.⁶⁷ He also details the various contributions that Regensburg made to the crusades. His 1421 entry is the richest: "Our city of Regensburg sent its armed soldiers, cavalry and infantry, on this campaign and requested a contribution to the business in wagons and horses from the city's churches and monasteries." St Mang itself contributed a horseman, which Andrew complained was a heavy burden compared with what other religious houses were told to provide. Andrew lists the three men from Regensburg who perished at the siege of Žatec, "the mercenary Johannes Wiltingär, a man of good repute, Peter Ingelstetär a citizen from the suburb from the order of the archers, and Peter the vineyard laborer, who set out at his own expense, fired by zeal for the faith."⁶⁸ In October 1422, "the bishop of Regensburg dispatched his armed men, *crucesignati*, from Regensburg cathedral, against the Hussites."⁶⁹ On June 27, 1427, Regensburg witnessed a procession and sermon "for the *crucesignati*," followed on July 7 by the departure of the bishop's troops and on July 8 by the city's contingent (*armata civium*). They were followed on July 15 by "some devout poor people ... at their own expense" and on

July 17 by Henry, Duke of Bavaria/Landshut “with his armed band.”⁷⁰ This repeated preaching was interwoven with ongoing attempts to sustain the post-Constance reform mission. In September 1426, alongside a weekly mass and procession to beseech God’s help against the heretics and the levy of a 600 fl. tax to pay for troops, the diocesan synod reiterated the 1418 Salzburg decree about Friday None prayers. This, Andrew observed “had not been observed by all, especially in the cathedral church”; a full eight years after the decree was first promulgated, the cathedral bell was finally rung to announce it.⁷¹

In addition to preserving much significant data and providing local color, Andrew gives his own commentary on events. His interpretation of why all the crusading efforts failed, which he sewed into his various narratives but also fleshed out in an imaginary dialogue, is multi-faceted and subtle.⁷² One senses his bafflement at the disparity between the sanctity of the Catholic purpose and the effort invested in the crusades—not least by his own city—and the consistently disappointing results. On the 1431 fiasco, for example: “This was the fourth great, general campaign into Bohemia. What more should I write about it? What is worth remembering? Everything is sad and full of pain.”⁷³ He was under no illusions about the poor example offered by the elites, both in Church and in state. It was commonly rumored, he wrote, that Pope Eugenius IV did not want to crown Sigismund at Rome because of his failure to regain Bohemia.⁷⁴ He reported with cold disdain the debacle of the Catholic attempt to recover the fortified monastery of Třebíč in Moravia in 1425: “Sigismund the king hid himself from the army, Duke Albert abandoned the siege without glory, and the Christians suffered much damage, as I heard tell, at Sigismund’s instigation, through many villages near to Brno being burned.” When Louis, Count Palatine of the Rhine went on pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1426 and was knighted in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, popular opinion condemned him for travelling so far when his service was needed against the Hussites; Andrew reported—with civic pride—Regensburg’s veteran captain Erasmus Sattelbogen dressing down the prince-electoral in language that could have come from the pope and the cardinals.⁷⁵ And there is a strikingly modern feel to his speculation about why the pope neither sanctioned nor condemned the celebration of a jubilee in 1423. Nobody knew for sure, he remarked, but it could be because Martin feared alienating the French,⁷⁶ did not want Bohemia’s Catholic neighbors to leave their frontiers undefended while they went on pilgrimage to Rome, wanted to avoid a clash with the Council of Pavia or

even hoped that he would be able to hold the jubilee in Prague as a way of celebrating the city's recovery by the Catholics.⁷⁷

In the course of this massive, strenuous and frustratingly unsuccessful warfare, the cause of reform inevitably suffered. One clear example, Beaufort's hybrid tax of 1427, we have already noted. Another was the heavy burdens placed on the German Church. Even though the set-piece expeditions against the Hussites relied heavily on voluntary service, some of it as we have seen self-funded, the ongoing defense of Catholic areas against Hussite raids was costly. In December 1422 Martin V told the German episcopacy that containing the Hussite threat was the special duty of German clerics. The recent Nürnberg diet had agreed that to provide for "the constant war against the heretics," troop quotas would be needed. No system existed for it, so they were to devise one, "either through armed troops, or through the provision of some other subsidy." If they could not work one out for themselves, Castiglione would impose one on them.⁷⁸ Princes engaged in the struggle expected that the Church would help bear their costs, as in Bavaria in the autumn of 1426, when the dioceses of Bamberg, Eichstätt and Regensburg were taxed for a tenth on behalf of Duke John.⁷⁹ It was not a question of whether or not these impositions were justified: fear of heretical contagion and Hussite raiding were alike pervasive. The problem was that high-ranking clerics would pass on the costs, with detrimental effects to morale and reforming zeal in a parish clergy that already felt put upon. In May 1427, for example, the archbishop of Trier was told that in order to pay the expenses of the war, he could impose a toll on clerics in his lands.⁸⁰ Some months later, when Martin V heard details of the rout of the fourth crusade at Tachov, he tore into the corrupt ways of the German clergy, bitterly criticizing the archbishop of Cologne and the bishop of Würzburg for fighting against Christian neighbors rather than the heretics.⁸¹ These were easy and justified targets, but even well-meaning clerics faced with the heavy demands that the Hussite wars made on their revenue, personnel and time were hardly likely to engage in systematic reform.

In the war zone, of course, the pressures were far worse. One of the most somber letters issued by the papal *curia* during the Hussite wars concerned the conduct of clerics accompanying the crusading armies. It was dated February 13, 1422 and in it Martin referred to irregularities committed by priests, including the celebration of the divine offices in unsuitable locations. Atrocities were commonplace during the Hussite wars and the language used in this text comes close to stating that clerics

had been implicated, ‘doing certain things which led to the death of the heretics’ (“nonnulla eciam alia ad ipsorum hereticorum perditionem eciam committendo”). Whether this was the case or not, the dispensation granted by the pope to the culpable was welcomed: six copies have survived from the fifteenth century, including texts at Prague, Brno and Vienna.⁸² Petitions presented at Rome show that the exigencies of the border warfare forced the Church to soften the rigor which reform demanded. In April 1428 the dukes of Silesia petitioned that their subjects should be absolved from excommunication and interdict imposed on them for non-payment of dues owed to the Church. It would encourage them in their resistance against the heretics. The pope agreed to a two-year suspension “while they are taking part in a campaign against the Bohemians,” a caveat which at least shows that the Church was trying to forestall abuse.⁸³ Just a few weeks later, another Silesian lord asked that the sanctions imposed on Brzeg, which had acted as his loan guarantor, should be remitted, given that he was constantly in arms against the Hussites; this request too was granted.⁸⁴ The frontline bishop of Meissen was allowed several requests to draw on unorthodox sources of funding “for the time being” because of his loss of normal revenues.⁸⁵

Some suffered not just indebtedness and shrinking revenues but also the loss of residence and expulsion. Many entries in Martin V’s supplication registers document the need to offer emergency support to shattered and scattered communities.⁸⁶ A common request was for indulgences, and such petitions were often favorably received. In this the Czech lands were far from alone: bombarded with pleas from every part of the Christian world, Martin was generous with indulgences.⁸⁷ But it is probably true to say that the regions affected by the Hussite wars did better than any other region, including Sigismund’s Hungarian lands. A good example is a grant made to the Franciscans at Jihlava in February 1427. The friars sought an annual commemoration including free meals for the indigent as a way of thanking God for a Catholic victory there. But their church was virtually in ruins, so they requested indulgences for taking part in processions or visiting the church on the day of commemoration, as a stimulus toward devotion leading to assistance in the building’s reconstruction. It is easy to see why this would have pleased the *curia*: it fitted in with the general mobilization of indulgences against heretics renowned for scorning them and it fused the commemoration of an—all too infrequent—Catholic success with the task of reconstruction.⁸⁸ Such instances could even revive the hope that the collateral damage resulting from crusade need not

impede the pursuit of reform. The human stories recorded in the supplication registers are less straightforward in their implications. Take the case in 1425 of a Cistercian from Nepomuk called Leonard, who had been on a mission at another of his Order's houses when Nepomuk suffered total destruction. Somewhere had to be found for Leonard to practice his vocation "lest to the detriment of his soul and the reputation of his Order he should apostatize, wander around and be compelled to beg."⁸⁹ Five years later, the pope received a petition from Nicolaus Haberalanth and Johannes Schak of Schönberg, two clerics from the diocese of Meissen who had been driven away by the heretics. They had subsisted at Rome itself for three years, hauling sand and stones for building work.⁹⁰ Cumulatively, such tragic cases create a picture of a fractured if not collapsing Church infrastructure, the danger of apostasy, pastoral neglect and a resulting drift toward apathy or Hussite conversion. It was the opposite of what Martin V had undertaken to achieve when he was elected at Constance.⁹¹

When the last of the papal legates to conduct a Hussite crusade, Cesarini, arrived in Germany in 1431, he could hardly avoid seeing and hearing about the extent of the dislocation caused by over a decade of fighting.⁹² Cesarini deserves to be flagged up. Here was a man who pursued crusade and reform with equal conviction and stamina; indeed, nobody showed more proof of actually believing in the programmatic link of the two goals than Cesarini.⁹³ His legatine commission for the council about to assemble at Basel under his presidency emphasized the need to deal with Hussitism through reform, "proposing, deciding, concluding and carrying out all those measures through which heresies and errors may be thoroughly eradicated, both in Bohemia and in other kingdoms, wherever they may be."⁹⁴ Cesarini's work at Basel revealed him as one of the century's most adroit and patient diplomats, but arguably even more impressive was his readiness to absorb painful lessons and turn his back on approaches that had no future. In this he rose above the dogmatic stance nursed at the *curia*, which clung fruitlessly to the blanket rejection of discussions with the heretics, in part undoubtedly because the same council which had condemned the beliefs of the Hussites had restored papal authority. Immediately following the shocking debacle at Domažlice in August 1431, Cesarini embraced the prospect of a negotiated settlement with the Hussites, investing Basel with a reunion-reform program in place of the discredited crusade-reform one. It would be hard to exaggerate the significance of this strategic move: throughout the years of painful discussion that followed, Basel's envoys refused to listen to the

hawks who offered to renew the war if the Church would provide the funding for it.⁹⁵

It is tempting to see in Basel's pursuit of peace with the Hussites an irenic predisposition toward dialogue and the rejection of force.⁹⁶ This would probably be simplistic, but there were implications for the council's reform agenda and in particular for its relations with Eugenius IV. Just one month separated the issuing of an invitation to the Hussites on October 15, 1431 and the papal decision to transfer the council south of the Alps in order to better handle the negotiations with the Greeks. Cesarini knew that such a transfer would be detrimental both to the reform agenda and to hopes for peace in Central Europe. In a powerfully expressed plea against transfer on January 13, 1432, he claimed that the alternative to talks was the collapse of the Church in Germany, and reported annoyance on the part of the Germans that they were being overlooked in favor of the Greeks, "and that this ballad [*cantilena*] about the Greeks has been going on for three hundred years now, and gets renewed every year."⁹⁷ There was clearly a clash between, on the one hand, the urgent needs of Central and Northern Europe and, on the other, the priorities of a Venetian pope and a predominantly Italian court, whose attention was focused on the Mediterranean and the East. Cesarini was attuned to both sets of interests and in his speech of welcome to the Hussite delegates in January 1433, he asked them to "look around you: everywhere the Christian people is being ground down and consumed by Turks, Saracens, Tatars and barbarians."⁹⁸ But there is little doubt that Basel's commitment to pursue reform gave its envoys kudos in dealing with the Hussites. And not just with the Hussites. In an interesting exchange at Vienna in February 1435, a doctor of theology at the university heaped praise on the council for its open-mindedness: in relation to Jews, Greeks and ultraquists alike, it was ready to make concessions to bring about progress. The council's reform agenda was also commended, but the envoys were beseeched on no account (*nullatenus*) to allow the laity to take communion in both kinds. In a tactful reply, Gilles Charlier affirmed Basel's commitment to reform—"thus far the holy synod has lost no time in pressing on with greater matters"—while assuring the anxious academics that nothing would be done "to the prejudice of the faith or the honor of the Church."⁹⁹

Success in the discussions with the Hussites gave the council a powerful advantage when it came to talks with the Greeks. The Greek envoys arrived at Basel in July 1434, two months after the definitive defeat of the radical Hussites at Lipany cleared away the last big obstacle to a settlement with

the ultraquists. In *Sicut pia mater*, the position statement which it issued on September 7, 1434, the council boasted about the scale of its success with the Hussites: many people had said that the discussions were futile, but in fact they had achieved more than a series of mighty armies. Now the time had come to engage with the schism, and hopefully Union in that regard would bring about the conversion of many of the Muslims.¹⁰⁰ The reunion_reform program which had carried Basel through the Hussite talks would now implicitly acquire an additional dimension, that of crusade, because weighty military assistance would be expected by the Greeks. In practice, Union with the Greeks was the triumph of Eugenius and his council at Florence, and their success in July 1439 proved to be the beginning of the end for Basel. Arguably its cause was lost when Cesarini made the decision to quit the council in January 1438. In broad terms it is apparent that the chances of Basel winning over the Greeks were always slender, given the rival attractions (primarily proximity and more generous subsidies) that Eugenius was able to offer, though it did not help that the divisions aroused by the relocation issue became so acrimonious. The question we shall address is whether the demands made by Union/crusade proved to be incompatible with those of reform.

Basel certainly passed a considerable volume of reforming decrees, the bulk of them between July 1433 and March 1436.¹⁰¹ The one which would have exercised the most radical impact, had it been implemented, was the abolition of annates (June 9, 1435).¹⁰² This would have proved serious for papal finances, but it is open to debate whether it would have affected crusade funding. On the one hand, this had come to hinge on the payment of tenths. On the other, we shall see that the proceeds of annates were sometimes used, and, more importantly, if annates were denied to the papal *camera*, it might have needed to draw on tenths to meet its ordinary expenditure. We have observed that there was some discontent about tenths at Constance, and their non-appearance as a reform issue at Basel might indicate that the clergy had become reconciled to them. Nor did Basel generally show much concern about indulgences, though the Germans under the bishop of Lübeck lodged their protests.¹⁰³ In focusing on the eradication of abuses *in capite*—that is, at the papal *curia*—the council laid itself open to the charge that it had let its reforming trajectory be shaped by its deteriorating relations with Eugenius IV, and its creation of a bureaucracy to rival that of Rome similarly fed claims that this so-called reforming council was duplicating the papal system rather than challenging it. This was grist to the mill of Eugenius' apologists. It

could be said that Basel fell between two stools. On the one hand, disappointed observers saw a gathering which looked more and more like a rival obedience, an impression which crystallized with the election in November 1439 of the council's pope, Felix V—a disastrous step which forever stamped Basel as the council which brought schism back into the Church. On the other hand, Basel lacked all the advantages of tradition, continuity and cultic reverence enjoyed by Eugenius IV. And it had no Papal State, which meant that financially it was always on the back foot.¹⁰⁴

To a large extent, it was these considerations that fashioned the council's management of the Union/crusade issue. With *Sicut pia mater*, Basel threw its hat into the ring as the Catholic authority that would negotiate Union with the Greeks. The text was compiled with evident care. The council was willing to reconvene at another city which the Greeks would find more acceptable, provided its envoys were first allowed to try to convince Emperor John VIII Palaiologos and his counselors of the advantages of meeting at Basel. Envoys would go to Constantinople on behalf of Basel with 8,000 ducats to subsidize an assembly of the Orthodox Church to debate Union. In addition, Basel would pay the expenses of four large galleys to transport the Greeks westwards; John VIII would have 15,000 ducats toward his costs; the 700 Greeks expected would receive reasonable expenses. The military assistance to be given to Constantinople was similarly itemized: two large and two smaller galleys, 300 crossbowmen and 10,000 ducats “to guard the city.”¹⁰⁵ This was beyond anything that Constance had envisaged doing. In his monumental history of the council, John of Segovia provided much detail on the conciliar flotilla of 1437, which was commanded by the Savoyard Nicod de Menthon. An appropriate ceremony was devised for the handing over to de Menthon of his baton of office and the banner of the Church—white keys on a red field—and the four conciliar envoys all took the cross from the hands of the archbishop of Lyons “after he had celebrated Mass and solemnly blessed the cross, as specified in the pontifical.”¹⁰⁶

On his return from Constantinople in the spring of 1438, the Eugenian Bishop Peter of Digne summarized Basel's position to the rival council assembled at Ferrara. He said that the fathers at Basel had told John VIII that “they would give him a substantial naval force [*armata*] against the Turks, and the council would grant a *cruciata*, that is to say, the sign of the cross with indulgences for everybody expressing the wish to drive away the Turks.”¹⁰⁷ Could a general council take it upon itself to promote a crusade in this way? It was a question that exercised minds at Basel a good deal.

Clearly one way in which expenses on the scale of those described in *Sicut pia mater* might be met was through the preaching of indulgences. The matter was discussed in the spring of 1435 and John of Segovia left some fascinating reportage:

After a review of the various options on how to bring this about, the majority opinion was that the most appropriate way would be for the holy synod to grant plenary as well as partial indulgences. But some among the fathers resisted, arguing that the Pope alone could grant a plenary indulgence. So heated did the discussion become—whether for spiritual or material reasons is hard to say—that it rocked the council’s mighty pillars, threatening to bring the council itself to ruin.¹⁰⁸

The council reached decisions through the work of four deputations—Peace, Faith, Reform and Common Matters—but on this issue they came to different conclusions. Debate was thorough and at times short-tempered. It seems to have been Cesarini who drove the matter forward. His arguments were varied and ingenious. As a funding method, he thought indulgences were preferable to tenths because they were voluntary; provided they were granted in association with confession and penance, they were also salutary. This was his answer to the anti-indulgence lobby and it was largely borne out by the Hussite crusades. As for the importance of the cause, this was beyond question. In the past, indulgences had been granted for such causes as the repair of bridges, buildings and monasteries. Cesarini also referred to the Hussite crusades and to the granting of indulgences to individual petitioners at the Roman *curia*. None of these causes—not even the Holy Land crusade (“passagium terre sancte”)—could compare with Union with the Greeks, which affected so many thousands of souls.¹⁰⁹ The decree on indulgences, which was read out on April 14, 1436, incorporated Cesarini’s argument about the importance of Union. Souls mattered more than land. Money was clearly the point of the exercise and, as usual, it was to be collected in chests; the full indulgence was made available—once at the point of contribution and again on the donor’s deathbed—in exchange for a week’s household grocery bill, or its equivalent in the case of religious and individuals who grew their own food. No doubt trying to placate the Germans, who lodged a protest against the indulgence as well as the twentieth which the council held in reserve in the event that the indulgence revenue proved insufficient, the decree included in the process a lengthy penitential prescription.¹¹⁰ Predictably, Eugenius IV complained

about the intrusion on his authority, to which the council replied that the Council of Siena of 1423–1424 had behaved in similar fashion, and that Basel would be happy to issue a joint decree. The papal objection that indulgences were inappropriate was countered with references to the long history of crusading, including the recent Hussite ventures. And the money collected would be scrupulously safeguarded against fraud.¹¹¹

The most distinguished recent historian of the Council of Basel has commented that crusading thought played a minor role there, suggesting that energies had been dissipated (*verpufft*) by the Hussite expeditions. As a consequence, the council did not mount a challenge to Eugenius IV's *curia*, where plans for a crusade held greater sway, just as they did in Poland and Hungary.¹¹² The contrast is appealing, but the volume of evidence relating to the council's attempted intervention in the Union talks, especially its flotilla and indulgences, indicates the need for a degree of nuance. True, there was not exactly a meeting of minds with the Greeks. There was a language barrier, the Greeks did not understand Basel and most of the conciliar fathers had only a hazy grasp of the range of differences that lay behind the schism—their familiarity with utraquism had been much deeper. Much of the Unionist activity stemmed from Cesarini, and so it slumped after his departure in 1438. That said, it was circumstantial factors like these that stopped Union/crusade making due progress, rather than the prioritization of reform, let alone repugnance for crusade. The pope's achievement of Union at Florence (*Laetentur coeli*) trumped the reconciliation with the Hussites, as Eugenius knew it would: it is no coincidence that 310 copies of the decree survive.¹¹³ But it is easy to overlook the fact that the council survived for another decade and that for much of this time, the Catholic world was divided in its allegiance between pope and council. It is therefore necessary, in the final part of this chapter, to examine events in the post-Florence world to see how Eugenius capitalized on Church Union to turn the tide against the Basel fathers.

Naturally a large part of the explanation lies in the revival of Ottoman ambitions. Together with the continuing thrust toward bringing the eastern Churches into unity, news reports and lobbying about the Turks' successes in the Balkans enabled Eugenius to develop a strong program of Union/crusade which enveloped the Council of Ferrara-Florence and only ended with the Varna disaster in 1444. The new narrative provided a shield behind which the *curia* could sideline reform and finesse its caricature of Basel as a factional and self-serving rump.¹¹⁴ To counteract the cynicism

implicit in that reading of events, it helps to keep two things in mind: first, Eugenius could hardly avoid responding to the Turks; and, second, the key player in the lead-up to Varna was Cesarini, whose work on behalf of reform at Basel had been both well-intentioned and unstinting.

When he summoned the Council of Ferrara in the autumn of 1437, Eugenius defined its goals as Union, reform and peace.¹¹⁵ This was essentially still the Basel agenda,¹¹⁶ but Union negotiations dominated, and even before it was achieved, the associated costs were pushing the pope into miscellaneous fundraising measures. In June 1438 he announced indulgences for the defense of Constantinople during Emperor John VIII's absence in the West, sharing the proceeds 50:50 with the Cluniac chapel at Mont Roland (Dole); he also reserved the revenues of the vacant see of Poznan for a year.¹¹⁷ A month later, the pope resorted to fining prelates for failure to attend at Basel and Ferrara, and on September 1 he levied a tenth to cover his rising costs.¹¹⁸ Indulgences soon followed, as did the reservation of the revenues of the sees of Seville and Leon.¹¹⁹ But the expenses of Union would obviously be overshadowed by those of organizing large-scale military aid for the Greeks, including naval activity.¹²⁰ On October 7, 1439, in the bull *Exultare in domino*, the pope granted a plenary indulgence in exchange for "as much money as would pay for a crossbowman to serve for a full month, two, three or more, depending on the resources available to the donor, or the conscience and judgment of their confessor," with collection taking place in chests placed in churches.¹²¹ When Cosimo and Lorenzo de' Medici lent Eugenius 12,000 ducats for dispatch to Constantinople two days later, the pope had to promise repayment from ordinary *camera* receipts, such as annates and small services.¹²² Some of these measures probably worried reformers, but concerns could be set off against the euphoria of Union. In August 1439 the Franciscan Alberto da Sarteano was authorized to set up fraternities, whose members would receive plenary indulgences, to help him carry out an ambitious mission of Union in Ethiopia and the Indies.¹²³ In November 1439 came the Union of the Armenians, a coup scarcely less remarkable than the earlier Union with the Greeks.¹²⁴ And in February 1442 the Copts came into communion with the Church.¹²⁵

Against this rapidly changing background, anxious yet optimistic, and above all urgent, it is easy to understand how reform came to play such a small role at Ferrara-Florence. We cannot ignore the fact that councils that convened north of the Alps were preoccupied with reform and

heresy, while Eugenius' councils were taken up with Union and crusade. The concern shown by the Council of Siena for the Hussite crisis acts as a corrective to a reductive geographic interpretation, but some decades ago Heinrich Koller posited an interesting parallel development within the Holy Roman Empire. Koller argued that at the time of Constance and Basel, there was much inconclusive debate about how to reform the Empire; the search for a viable Imperial heartland for Luxembourg rule—first Hungary and then Bohemia being the obvious candidates—could even be seen as the counterpart to ecclesiastical debates about the reform of the Roman *caput*. In the summer of 1439, however, this all changed when Albrecht (Albert) II prioritized the defense of his Hungarian lands against the Turks. Under Albrecht and then Frederick III, the Empire's historic associations with crusade were reaffirmed and reform discussions stalled. Koller regarded this as a retrogressive development, “ein schwerer Fehler.”¹²⁶

Albrecht was King of the Romans for just 18 months and it would be misguided to read too much into his 1439 campaign, which he may in any case have waged as King of Hungary (by marriage) rather than as ruler of the Empire. What is unquestionable is that by that point, Turkish pressure on the middle Danube had brought Hungary into the heart of the debate about a crusading response to the Turks, complicating the scenario not just because of the difficulty of squaring Hungarian with Greek needs, but also because of the disputed succession in Hungary following Albrecht's death. All the way through to the disaster at Varna, the *curia* did its best to support the kingdom. Most importantly, on January 1, 1443 it levied a tenth on the entire Church for the cause of crusade, bringing into a single frame Church Union, Hunyadi's victories in 1442 and the Muslim threat to Cyprus, Rhodes and the Peloponnese. *Postquam ad apicem* was the first universal tenth since Constance, so it is unsurprising that every front was referenced, culminating in a somber rhetorical question: “What more can we say? Almost the entire Christian east, and a large part of the north, either has to endure servitude worse than that of Pharaoh, or faces such a prospect in the near future, unless God assists.”¹²⁷ The subtext is apparent: if this was not the occasion to resort to heavy taxation, what was? The corollary, the crusade bull *Pia mater ecclesia*, is dated May 28, 1443 and the Franciscans Alberto da Sarteano and Iacobus de Montebondono were commissioned to preach. Francesco Condulmer, the pope's nephew, was in charge of the fleet and Cesarini was accompanying the land army.

Whereas *Exultare in domino* had focused on raising money, *Pia mater ecclesia* seems to be seeking recruits, who were expected to fight for six months.¹²⁸

Pia mater ecclesia contained a finely tuned tariff of delinquency and expected service, a strikingly rigorous innovation and one that was sharply at odds with crusading traditions. But another feature of the bull takes the reader even more by surprise, and this is its reference to the Holy Land. The Saracens, “inflamed by their savagery,” have desecrated images of Christ, the Virgin and other saints. Once Condulmer and Cesarini have defended the people threatened by the Turks, “provided God’s mercy persists, the recovery of the [Holy] Sepulcher ... could follow.”¹²⁹ It is not easy to account for this introduction of the Holy Land into a strategic scenario that was already challengingly diverse.¹³⁰ A tempting, albeit mystical explanation would be that the pope saw in the embrace of Union by so many of the eastern Churches an eschatological sign that the lost holy places were about to be recovered, but there is no reference to this in the bull. It may have been directed at the Burgundians, participants of note in Eugenius’ program, whose envoy at Ferrara, the abbot of Clairvaux, had waxed lyrical in November 1438 about a reunited Christendom recovering Jerusalem.¹³¹ But a more plausible interpretation would relate to Basel. Frederick III, who at this point remained neutral, made moves in 1443 to convene a diet at Nürnberg which would try to heal the schism in the Church; exceptionally, Charles VII of France was invited to attend.¹³² Naturally the Habsburgs were unhappy with Eugenius’ generous support for Władysław of Poland, and while they could hardly oppose the crusade plans, they did what they could to place obstacles in their path, including spreading disinformation to the effect that the whole exercise was a sham.¹³³ In August 1443 the pope rejected Frederick’s intervention and as an alternative proposed that he send envoys to Rome to hold talks “on the reform of the Church, bringing peace to the Empire, freeing Europe from Turkish savagery, recovering the Holy Land, and many other things relating to your office and honor”; in other words, a revival of the old Sigmundian (Imperial) program of unity, reform and crusade.¹³⁴ It is likely that Eugenius’ mobilization of the Holy Land’s kudos in *Pia mater ecclesia* was, at least in part, a reaction to the burgeoning threat of a conciliar–Imperial alliance.

Two texts written in very different milieus in the mid- to late 1430s illustrate how focusing ambitions on the Holy Land could spell danger

for the re-establishment of a full papal monarchy. The first was the set of reform proposals composed at the request of Cesarini by Johannes Schele, Bishop of Lübeck, in 1433. Up until his death in 1439, Schele was one of the heavyweights in the German delegation at Basel, and his proposals were briskly expressed, radical and at times eccentric: he wanted to end clerical celibacy and made the Dubois-esque suggestion that Sigismund should transform the crown of Bohemia into domain lands of the Holy Roman Emperor. He favored a general passage “for the recovery of the Holy Land,” defining this as a “Papal and Imperial *passagium*” and calling for fundamental reforms before it set out. Echoing Job Vener, Schele wanted the Papacy itself to be freed from national and dynastic control, and its Italian lands released from the venal grip of each pope’s kin. He calculated that this would gain the pope 500,000 ducats per annum, which would reduce his need for external funding. Schele disliked indulgences or, more specifically, “misleading and dangerous indulgences, which are proclaimed without documentation, for gain, and using the formula ‘from pain and guilt’.”¹³⁵ A more marginal figure than Schele was the Venetian merchant Emmanuele Piloti. He completed a full-scale Holy Land recovery treatise a few years after the bishop wrote his text, and a conspicuous feature of Piloti’s work is a hard-hitting critique of Eugenius’ Italian policies, one that matches that of Marino Sanudo a century previously. Piloti claimed that the Holy Land could be recovered with an expenditure of just 200,000 ducats, and this sum could easily have been accumulated in the course of the ten years that had gone by since he spoke to the pope (evidently Martin V) on the topic, just by saving 5,000 ducats each month, “the equivalent of keeping some benefice vacant for a small period.” Instead of which, papal income to the value of two million ducats had been “thrown into the sea.” Piloti demanded thoroughgoing reform of the papal *curia*, including the establishment of an ambassadorial system through which Christendom’s rulers could make their views known on a regular basis—and, implicitly, keep the pope in line.¹³⁶

There were clear dangers for the papal position in such proposals, not just the subversion of the Papacy’s fragile position at Rome and in the Papal State, but also the seizure of the Basel indulgence proceeds; the pope hoped to channel these into his anti-Turkish crusade while the Habsburg court proposed using them to end the schism.¹³⁷ One response to Frederick’s unwelcome initiative was a remarkable letter that Cesarini wrote to Kaspar Schlick, the Imperial chancellor, on May 21, 1444, just

weeks before he set out on the ill-fated Varna campaign. We know that Cesarini had not just commissioned but had also actually read Schele's 1433 treatise, because he wrote marginal comments in the manuscript.¹³⁸ Now he tried to deploy the idea of an Imperial *passagium* to divert Frederick from lobbying for reform. Through Schlick, Cesarini praised Frederick's efforts for peace and expressed his hope that he could organize "some *passagium* against the impious Saracens, the enemies of the saving cross." The use of the term *Saraceni* implies that Cesarini was thinking about the Holy Land, as does his reference to the need for ships, which the pope and Venice could provide, to transport Frederick's troops. The whole thing could be funded through taxes and indulgences, "from which a good deal of money could be raised," and Cesarini came close to advocating a renewal of Beaufort's 1427 experiment: "These are the projects which become Christian princes, above all the nation which holds the Empire. Perhaps you will laugh at our musings, but it is better to keep your mind occupied with these issues, than with noxious and idle ones."¹³⁹ By the latter phrase, the legate surely meant impeding his own crusade against the Turks and meddling in the schism. As he battled with the complex logistics of organizing a campaign that would be able to exploit the success of 1443's unprecedented winter campaign, Cesarini must have found the Habsburg interventions very trying. But Schlick's (in practice Piccolomini's) reply was unrepentant as well as subtly coded. The Hungarians were strong, but they could not drive out the Turks by themselves, whereas in the case of a full-scale crusade, commanded by the emperor as was his right, "I would hope not just for the release of Greece from Mohammed's clutches but for the liberation of Asia."¹⁴⁰ The toxic issue of the Hungarian succession thus interwove with the schism and the associated reform question, finding expression in two contrasting approaches toward crusade.

Much was at stake in the spring of 1444. It was not just a question of an Imperial diet asserting the emperor's right to settle the schism and the reopening of the reform program which this would surely entail. Joachim Stieber has suggested that the Germans did not even accept Union with the Greeks because it had not been achieved at Basel.¹⁴¹ Cesarini's legate brief in 1442 included detaching the Polish Church from its allegiance to Basel, which hindered Władysław's deployment of Polish resources.¹⁴² The shape and perhaps even the validity of Eugenius' crusade program were prejudiced. From this viewpoint, reform, which by the early 1440s

constituted Basel's strongest remaining card, had indeed come into collision with crusade. This was not because of a clash of goals—the consistency of Cesarini's position throughout the period 1431 to 1444 is sufficient to disprove that—or the way in which the *curia* brought into play the more problematic features of crusade mechanics; we have seen how much care the pope put into justifying the 1443 tax, while his indulgences were still subject to restraint, probably as much as those against the Hussites had been. Rather, the issue was the way the obediences which polarized Catholic Christendom in the years following 1439 grouped around reform on the one side—including aspirations for a Holy Land *passagium*—and Union/crusade on the other. This was something that had been missing during the Great Schism, which had been more overtly a struggle for power.

After 1449, when the Council of Basel was finally dissolved, the possibility again arose of reform and crusade running in tandem, the ideal espoused by various thirteenth-century popes as well as by Martin V and his legates during the Hussite crusades. It is worth concluding by briefly considering why this prospect did not materialize. To take crusade first, the fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave fresh momentum to the revival of crusade which Eugenius IV had initiated vigorously after 1439. Indeed, the entrusting of much crusade preaching to the Franciscan Observants, an important Eugenian initiative, offered a means by which resistance to the Ottoman Turks might fruitfully synergize with lay penitence. A good example is the pope's grant of indulgences in January 1445 to visitors to the Observant church at Şumuleu Ciuc in Transylvania, which Hunyadi had founded in thanksgiving to the Virgin for his victory at the battle of Sibiu in March 1442.¹⁴³ The celebrity which Giovanni da Capistrano enjoyed when he preached the crusade in Germany, Austria and Hungary far surpassed what preachers against the Hussites, even Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl, had managed. The result was a widespread revival of enthusiasm for crusading which lasted through to the failure of Pius II's expedition in 1464. Thereafter the movement stalled, and while the persistence of the Ottoman threat meant that crusade became embedded in papal activity through to the Reformation and beyond, it accumulated connotations that were mainly negative, such as unrelenting taxation and the siphoning-off of funds. Above all, crusade offered some of the worst instances of the misuse of indulgences, as the relative restraint which we have observed

in the first half of the century gave way to practices that rivaled those of the Great Schism. The career of the most famous *Ablasskommissar*, Raymond Perault (Peraudi), sums up the tensions that resulted. There is overwhelming evidence that Perault was genuinely dedicated to promoting crusade, but the only way he could do this was by pushing the marketing of indulgences to the limit. And he was well aware that even if he succeeded in raising enough money to make a crusade viable, the proceeds would fall victim to fraud, irrespective of any safeguards he might devise.¹⁴⁴ In their attempt to control Basel's indulgence in 1437, the Germans sought an assurance that if the Greek negotiators did not appear, the collected money should be used "for pious causes and uses which are both public and necessary, in the locations and nations where they were collected."¹⁴⁵ Such guarantees were worthless in the 1430s and proved to be so again 60 years later.

As for reform, while historians of conciliarism have rightly stressed that reform was not the same thing as belief in conciliar government, nobody would deny that the prospects of substantial reform "in capite et membris" suffered a crushing blow with Basel's failure.¹⁴⁶ Reform became fragmented, reliant on visitations rather than decrees and for the most part disappointing. Committed reformers sensed what had been lost and some despaired, others fell back on interior renewal and a few sought refuge in wishful thinking. In his *Reformatio generalis* (c. 1458/1459) Nicholas of Cusa argued that the cardinals constituted a sort of standing council: "they therefore represent an ongoing, inclusive council of the Church, like delegates of the nations, and they are parts and members of our corporate mystical body ... and they are in us, just as a church is in its high priest, and we are in them, just as a bishop is in his church." All the more important, he reasoned, that the cardinals should act independently.¹⁴⁷ Powerful rulers who were at odds with the pope perceived the threat of a general council to be one of their most useful tactical weapons. In his *Julius exclusus*, Erasmus had an irascible Pope Julius II declare that 100 schisms were preferable to a reforming council.¹⁴⁸ In 1512, cornered by Louis XII and his Council of Pisa, Julius grudgingly convened his own council at Rome, and this Fifth Lateran Council duly aped its illustrious predecessor of three centuries earlier with an agenda of peace, unity, reform and crusade. Under Leo X, Julius' successor, the crusade at least was treated seriously, but the wording adopted at the council's twelfth session in March 1517 showed all too clearly that the cupboard was bare.

Self-consciously imitating Nicholas V, Calixtus III and Pius II, Leo levied a universal three-year tenth, “together with all of the measures which are necessary for such an expedition, and which were customarily decreed for similar expeditions, with the agreement of the holy council.”¹⁴⁹ On the eve of the Reformation, the question of whether crusade and reform were allies or rivals had become irrelevant, for both had lost the potential to function as animating forces in the life of the Church.

NOTES

1. “Quod enim fieri potest spectaculum gloriosius super terra magisque dignum deo quam si in una mundi parte armati fideles contra hereticos dimicare pro fide catholica, in altera mitrati patres ecclesiastici pro reformatione ecclesie decreta iusta sancire conspiciantur?": *Das Konzil von Pavia–Siena, Band 1 Darstellung, Band 2 Quellen*, ed. Walter Brandmüller, 2 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1968–1974), 2:33.
2. The debate on this revolves around the contribution of Carl Erdmann, on which see Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Erdmann and the Historiography of the Crusades, 1935–1995,” in *La Primera cruzada novecientos años despues: el concilio de Clermont y los orígenes del movimiento cruzado*, ed. Luis García-Guijarro Ramos (Madrid: Castelló d’Impressió, 1997), 17–29.
3. Quoted in Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 433.
4. Christoph T. Maier, “Mass, the Eucharist and the Cross: Innocent III and the Relocation of the Crusade,” in *Pope Innocent III and His World*, ed. John C. Moore et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 351–360.
5. *Conciliariorum oecumenicorum decreta*, ed. Josephus Alberigo et al., 3rd edn (Bologna: Istituto per le scienze religiose, 1973) [herein-after COD], 267–271 (canon 71).
6. Maureen Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy 1244–1291* (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 23–31, 187–199.
7. *Das Konzil von Pavia–Siena*, 2.89–124, and cf. his sermon delivered at the opening of the council on April 23, 1423 (*ibid.*, 125–157).

8. Antony Leopold, *How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 38.
9. Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), esp. Chapter 3.
10. *Quellen zur Kirchenreform im Zeitalter der grossen Konzilien des 15. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Jürgen Miethke and Lorenz Weinrich, 2 vols (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995, 2002), 1:7–11.
11. Paul Rousset, “Sainte Catherine de Sienne et le problème de la croisade,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 25 (1975): 499–513; *Epistolario di Santa Caterina da Siena*, ed. Eugenio Dupré Theseider, vol. 1 (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1940), esp. nos 74, 78–82, 88.
12. Marjorie Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
13. See the chapter by Pavel Soukup in this volume.
14. *Quellen*, 1:15 note 35.
15. *COD*, 407 and see also 408.
16. There has been dispute over the authorship of *Capitula agendorum*, but I find Miethke’s arguments for d’Ailly as chief author convincing and shall ascribe it to him: *Quellen*, 1.26–27.
17. Walter Brandmüller, *Das Konzil von Konstanz 1414–1418*, 2 vols (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1991, 1997), 2.415–436.
18. *COD*, 438–443.
19. *Acta concilii Constanciensis*, ed. Heinrich Finke, 4 vols (Münster: Regensbergische Buchhandlung, 1896–1928), 1:91.
20. *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, ed. Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, 5 vols (Paris, 1717, reprint Farnborough: Gregg, 1968–1969), vol. 2, cols 1639–1641, at 1640.
21. See e.g. Franz-Reiner Erkens, “...‘und wil ein grosse Reise do tun’. Überlegungen zur Balkan- und Orientpolitik Sigismunds von Luxemburg,” in *Studien zum 15. Jahrhundert*, ed. Johannes Helmuth et al. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 739–762, esp. 758–759 (a useful collection of references to the *passagium ad Terram Sanctam*). New work by Mark Whelan will stimulate reconsideration of Sigismund.

22. Raymond-J. Loenertz, “Les Dominicains byzantins Théodore et André Chrysobergès et les négociations pour l’union des églises grecque et latine de 1415 à 1430,” in *Archivum fratrum predicatorum* 9 (1939): 5–61, at 22, 30–31. For the grant, see *Acta Martini V (1417–1431)*, ed. Aloysius L. Tăutu, Pontificia Commissio Codici Iuris Canonici Orientalis Recognoscendo, 1 vol. in 2 parts (Rome: Tipografica Poliglotta Vaticana, 1980), no 63.
23. For d’Ailly, see Bernard Guenée, *Between Church and State: The Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages*, English trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102–258.
24. *Ibid.*, 1:200 and see also 190.
25. *Ibid.*, 1:346.
26. *Ibid.*, 1:372.
27. See most recently Philippe de Mézières, *Une Epistre lamentable et consolatoire*, ed. Philippe Contamine and Jacques Paviot (Paris: Société de l’histoire de France, 2008).
28. “Si non celeriter obvietur, timendum est, ne Constantinopolitanum imperium, iam ab eis multipliciter laceratum et vexatum, penitus destruat, ac deinde Romanum imperium, iam divisum et pene ad ruinam preparatum, invadant et sic ecclesiam destruant iam scismatice laceratam”: *Quellen*, 2:347.
29. *Ibid.*, 1:338.
30. *Acta concilii*, 4:402–410, at 409.
31. Hartmut Boockmann, *Johannes Falkenberg, der Deutsche Orden und die polnische Politik: Untersuchungen zur politischen Theorie des späteren Mittelalters* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 271.
32. *Quellen*, 1:268 and see editorial comments at 28–29.
33. *Ibid.*, 1:384–386, 388, with editorial comments at 39–41.
34. Philip H. Stump, *The Reforms of the Council of Constance (1414–1418)* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), with flowchart at 52.
35. *Quellen*, 1:226, 240.
36. *Ibid.*, 1:320.
37. *Ibid.*, 1:268.
38. *Ibid.*, 1:358, 364.
39. *Ibid.*, 1:414.

40. Ibid., 1:316.
41. *Monumenta conciliorum generalium saeculi decimi quinti*, 4 vols (Vienna, 1857–1935) [hereinafter *MC*], 2:105, 111.
42. *Quellen*, 1:426, 438, 442–444, 446–448.
43. Ibid., 1:512.
44. Ibid., 1:522–524, 530.
45. Ibid., 1:534 and note that in the clause on cases being heard in the Roman *curia* (536), the crusade clause is absent, perhaps showing that this was an issue that concerned the Germans most.
46. Ibid., 1:538–40.
47. Stump, *Reforms*, 69–70, 373–374, including note re. line 21. Stump comments (at 70) that “the fate of [d’Ailly’s draft] decree remains a mystery.”
48. *MC*, 1:387, later denied by the Basel delegates (ibid., 424) “non sic audivimus, nec legimus a narrantibus gesta concilii.”
49. Boockmann, *Falkenberg*, passim; Paulius Rabikauskas, “La cristianizzazione della Samogizia,” in *La Cristianizzazione della Lituania* (Rome: Libreria editrice Vaticana, 1989), 219–233.
50. Loenertz, “Les Dominicains,” 33.
51. See the concluding remarks of Johannes Helmrath, *Das Basler Konzil 1431–1449: Forschungsstand und Probleme* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1987), 499–500.
52. See my *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, 1453–1505* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 215–216.
53. *MC*, 2:95–107, at 97.
54. Birgit Studt, *Papst Martin V. (1417–1431) und die Kirchenreform in Deutschland* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 705–722.
55. Generally on legates, see Werner Maleczek, “Die päpstlichen Legaten im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert,” in *Gesandtschafts- und Botenwesen im spätmittelalterlichen Europa*, ed. Rainer C. Schwinges and Klaus Wriedt (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2003), 33–86.
56. Studt, *Martin V.*, 445–452 and see too 460–462; Maleczek, “Legaten,” 43–46.
57. The key text is reproduced with commentary in Alois Madre, “Kardinal Branda an Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl: eine Anweisung zur Kreuzzugspredigt gegen die Hussiten,” in *Von Konstanz nach Trient: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kirche von den Reformkonzilien bis zum Tridentinum* (Munich: Schöningh, 1972), 87–100.

58. Studt, *Martin V*, 512–513.
59. *Acta Martini V. Pontificis Romani*, ed. Jaroslav Ersil, 1 vol. in 3 parts (Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1996–2001), nos 1656, 1715 (Dinkelsbühl).
60. *Acta Martini*, ed. Ersil, no. 565; *Acta Martini*, ed. Tăutu, no. 155.
61. See e.g. Andreas von Regensburg [hereinafter AR], “Chronica Husitarum,” *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. G. Leidinger (reprinted Aalen: Scientia, 1969) [hereinafter SW], 424.
62. Johannes Cochlaeus, *Historiae Husitarum libri duodecim* (Mainz, 1549), bk 6, pp. 266–269, at 269.
63. *DRA*, 9:91–110, translated in *Documents on the Later Crusades*, trans. Norman Housley (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 123–130.
64. Studt, *Martin V*, 650.
65. *DRA*, 9:117–118, translated in *Documents*, 130–132.
66. AR, “Concilium provinciale,” *SW*, 287–299.
67. AR, “Chronica Husitarum,” *SW*, 377–378, trans. in *Documents*, 115–117.
68. *Ibid.*, 370.
69. AR, “Diarium sexennale,” *SW*, 306.
70. *Ibid.*, 340.
71. *Ibid.*, 336–337.
72. See Norman Housley, “Explaining Defeat: Andrew of Regensburg and the Hussite Crusades,” in *Gesta dei per Francos*, ed. Michel Balard et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 87–95.
73. AR, “Fortsetzung der Chronica pontificum et imperatorum Romanorum,” *SW*, 476.
74. *Ibid.*, 481.
75. *Ibid.*, 431–432.
76. The rationale for celebration was that 33 years had passed since the 1390 jubilee, which had been proclaimed (for reasons of financial gain) by the anti-French Pope Urban VI.
77. AR, “Diarium sexennale,” *SW*, 310–311; AR, “Chronica Husitarum,” *SW*, 420.
78. *Acta Martini*, ed. Ersil, no. 1010; and cf. *DRA*, 8:181–182, translated by Thomas Fudge in his *The Crusade against Heretics in Bohemia, 1418–1437* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 174–175.
79. *Acta Martini*, ed. Ersil, no. 1657.
80. *Ibid.*, no. 1802.

81. Ibid., no. 1875.
82. Ibid., no. 900, esp. p. 370; cf. *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hussitenkrieges*, ed. František Palacký, 2 vols (Prague: Tempsky, 1873), 1:179–183 (inaccurately dated). For comparison, *Acta Martini*, ed. Täutu, no. 504 permitted the archbishop of Monreale (Sicily) to lead soldiers against Moorish raiding parties, “and if by chance he should kill one of them, he will not incur irregularity.”
83. *Acta Martini*, ed. Ersil, no. 1940.
84. Ibid., no. 1976.
85. Ibid., nos 2102, 2227–2229.
86. Ibid., pp. 910–912, index entry: “Hussitae ... destructio bonorum ecclesiasticorum, persecutio ... per Hussitas spoliati [individuals] ... per Hussitas detenta, occupata, devastata, igne concremata, combusta, depopulata, destructa, exhausta [churches, religious houses etc].”
87. *Acta Martini*, ed. Täutu, passim.
88. *Acta Martini*, ed. Ersil, nos 1717–1718 and see also nos 1364, 1762.
89. Ibid., no. 1382.
90. Ibid., no. 2215.
91. A remarkable case that bucks the trend is recorded in *Acta Martini*, ed. Täutu, no. 407: a Czech Augustinian called Blasius de Radiniz who was expelled by the Hussites and, ending up in the Croatian lands, ministered to the religious needs of Christians there who had been dispossessed by the Turks.
92. Ibid., nos 2234–2235, 2240–2241.
93. Gerald Christianson, *Cesarini: The Conciliar Cardinal: The Basel Years, 1431–1438* (St Ottilien: Eos, 1979).
94. *Acta Martini*, ed. Ersil, no. 1252.
95. *MC*, 1:539, 544, 570, 2:96.
96. This issue is discussed by Olivier Marin in “Pourquoi débattre avec les Hussites: le tournant stratégique balois à la lumière du *Tractatus de iustificacione vocationis Bohemorum* (1432),” *La Coexistence confessionnelle en France et dans les mondes germaniques du Moyen Âge à nos jours* (forthcoming).
97. *MC*, 2:95–107, quote at 105.
98. Ibid., 2:315 and cf. 1:398.
99. *MC*, 1:525, 578 (Rokycana calls for “reformacio ecclesie in vita, moribus et fide”), 581 (the reply: *reformacio* is in hand).

100. *COD*, 478–485, at 478–479.
101. Helmrath, *Das Basler Konzil*, 331–341, at 332.
102. *COD*, 488–489. For discussion, see Gerald Christianson, “Annates and Reform at the Council of Basel,” in *Reform, Representation and Theology in Nicholas of Cusa and His Age*, ed. Lawrence H. Bond and Gerald Christianson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 73–89.
103. *MC*, 2:785.
104. Helmrath, *Das Basler Konzil*, 18–70, esp. 52–54; Joseph Gill, “The Cost of the Council of Florence,” in his *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), 186–203.
105. *COD*, 479–82.
106. *MC*, 2:912–914, 916, 937.
107. “... darent sibi magnam armatam contra Turchos, et concilium daret unam cruciatam, id est, signum crucis cum indulgentiis omnibus volentibus expugnare Turchos”: *Fragmenta protocolli, diaria privata, sermones, Concilium Florentinum*, series A, vol. 3, fasc. 2, ed. Georgius Hofmann (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1951), 50–60, at 58.
108. “Ad illam habenda, varios excogitantes modos illum congruere magis arbitrati sunt, ut per sanctam synodum plenaria alieque indulgencie concederentur; sed inter patres nonnulli obstitere, affirmante ad personam pape dumtaxat pertinere indulgenciam plenariam concedere. Materia hec vehementi spiritu adveniente, utrum de celo vel terra non dicitur, adeo excrevit ut concussit magnas columpnas concilii et quod concilium ipsum vix ad interitum usque deduxit”: *MC*, 2:784.
109. *MC*, 2:784–786, 867–871.
110. *Ibid.*, 2:872–881. For German protests, see *Acta Nicolai Gramis: Urkunden und Aktenstücke betreffend die Beziehungen Schlesiens zum Baseler Konzile*, ed. Wilhelm Altmann, *Codex diplomaticus Silesiae* 15 (Breslau: J. Max, 1890), 23–24, no. 20.
111. *MC*, 2:885–890.
112. Helmrath, *Das Basler Konzil*, 183 and note 10.
113. *Ibid.*, 382.
114. Especially in the major statement of September 4, 1439, *Moses vir Dei*, with its focus on the figure of Moses and its association of Basel with the biblical schism of Koras, Dathan and Abiron:

- COD, 529–534. See Thomas M. Izbicki, “The Council of Ferrara-Florence and Dominican Papalism,” in *Christian Unity: The Council of Ferrara-Florence 1438/39–1989*, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991), 429–443.
115. *Epistolae pontificiae ad concilium florentinum spectantes*, ed. Georgius Hofmann, 3 vols (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1940–1946) [hereinafter *EP*], nos 95–96 and cf. no. 114. For Ferrara-Florence, see Joseph Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
116. COD, 456–457.
117. *EP*, nos 143, 145.
118. *Ibid.*, nos 146, 150.
119. *Ibid.*, nos 152, 154.
120. *Ibid.*, no. 217.
121. *Ibid.*, no. 220.
122. *Ibid.*, no. 221.
123. *Ibid.*, no. 207 and cf. no. 213.
124. *Ibid.*, no. 224; Gill, *Florence*, 305–310.
125. *EP*, no. 258; Gill, *Florence*, 321–326.
126. Heinrich Koller, “Kaiserliche Politik und die Reformpläne des 15. Jahrhunderts,” in *Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel*, vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 61–79, esp. 74ff. For a rather different view, see Claudia Märtil, “Der Reformgedanke in den Reformschriften des 15. Jahrhunderts,” in *Reform von Kirche und Reich zur Zeit der Konzilien von Konstanz (1414–1418) und Basel (1431–1449)*, ed. Ivan Hlaváček and Alexander Patschovsky (Constance: Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 1996), 91–108, esp. 105–106.
127. *EP*, no. 261. Hofmann was unable to locate this text in the Vatican Archives and had to use an earlier transcription, so the Latin could be flawed.
128. *Ibid.*, no. 265.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
130. Domenico Caccamo, “Eugenio IV e la crociata di Varna,” *Archivio della Società romana di storia patria* 78 (1955): 35–87, at 82–85. A comparable situation developed under Calixtus III in the wake of 1453: Housley, *Crusading*, 27–29.
131. *Fragments*, 63–70, at 69–70.

132. *Die Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini, I Abteilung: Briefe aus der Laienzeit (1431–1445), II Band: Amtliche Briefe*, ed. Rudolf Wolkan (Vienna: A. Hölder, 1909), no. 14. Texts for Frederick’s 1443 invitation and its impact are in *DRA*, 17, pt 3, with references to the Holy Land at 23, 140, 174–178. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, still new to Habsburg service, reviewed the project somewhat sceptically in his *Pentalogus*, ed. Christoph Schingnitz, *MGH*, Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters, VIII. Band (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2009), 110–122.
133. *Die Briefwechsel*, nos 23–24.
134. *DRA*, 17, pt 3, 178.
135. *Quellen*, 2:202–236, quotes at 210, 234. “A pena et a culpa” was misleading because an indulgence only remitted the penalty of sin (*poena* or *pena*), not its guilt (*culpa*), which was removed through absolution on the basis of Christ’s sacrifice at Calvary.
136. Norman Housley, “Emmanuele Piloti and Crusading in the Latin East”, in *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe*, ed. Karl Borchart et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 139–150, quotes at 148.
137. See e.g. Piccolomini, *Pentalogus*, 126 note 275.
138. On the government of the papal lands, for example, “non regantur terre ecclesie per affines pape”: *Quellen*, 2:204 note 6.
139. *Der Briefwechsel*, 145–146 note.
140. *Ibid.*, no. lxxxviii, pp. 144–150, at 149.
141. Joachim W. Stieber, *Pope Eugenius I, the Council of Basel and the Secular and Ecclesiastical Authorities in the Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 342.
142. *Ibid.*, 200. See also Caccamo, “Varna,” 73–74 for the difficulty of collecting the tenth.
143. *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, ed. Augustin Theiner, 4 vols (Rome: Vatican Press, 1860–1864), 2:226, no. 380. The church remains a popular shrine, hosting an annual pilgrimage in honor of the Virgin. For the battle, see Emanuel Antoche and Günes İşiksel, “Les batailles de Sibiu (22 mars 1422) et de la rivière de Ialomita (2 septembre 1442). Essai de reconstitution d’après les sources de l’époque,” in *Extincta est lucerna orbis: John Hunyadi and His Time*, ed. Ana Dumitran et al. (Cluj-Napoca: IDC Press, 2009), 405–426.

144. See my *Crusading*, passim, esp. Chapter 6.
145. *Acta Nicolae Gramis*, 24, no. 20.
146. Johannes Helmuth, “Reform als Thema der Konzilien des Spätmittelalters,” in *Christian Unity*, ed. Alberigo, 75–152.
147. *Quellen*, 2:468–498, at 488, 490. As Jürgen Miethke remarked (*ibid.*, 74), it is pointless (*müßig*) to debate whether the text would have made any difference if both its author and Pius II had not died in August 1464.
148. *Collected Works of Erasmus, Literary and Educational Writings* 5, ed. A.H.T. Levi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 155–197, at 184–185.
149. *COD*, 593–655, esp. 650–655, with quote at 654.

Crusading against Christians in the Fifteenth Century: Doubts and Debates

Pavel Soukup

Christendom entered the fifteenth century troubled and divided. The Great Schism was not settled until 1417, and by that time, the splitting-off of the Bohemian adherents of Hussitism from the Roman Church was imminent if not accomplished. The diverse ecclesiastical conflicts of the late Middle Ages gave multiple opportunities to justify religious warfare. Attempts to use the crusade as an instrument in the struggle of the two (and, from 1409, three) obediences were made from the very beginning of the Great Schism in 1378 and continued until the second decade of the fifteenth century. There was little doubt that the preaching of the cross against schismatics were politically motivated, even if the respective popes tried to employ accusations of disbelief and heresy. Shortly after the schism was over, a large-scale crusading enterprise became the reality in Bohemia. The heretical status of the Hussites was not contested by anyone but the Hussites themselves. Two waves of crusades against Bohemia in 1420–1431 and 1467–1471/1479 made Central Europe the main venue of anti-heretical crusading in the fifteenth century. The problem was all the more serious in that it coincided with the Ottoman advance in the Balkans. Other than that, we find only isolated attempts to use

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crusading indulgences in wars between Christians in the second half of the fifteenth century. The most serious enterprise was the local crusade against the Waldensians in Savoy in 1488.¹

“Internal” crusades against heretics and political opponents of the Papacy were nothing new. Holy war within Christendom developed from the eleventh century onwards; in 1135, the Holy Land indulgence was transferred for the first time to a war against a Christian enemy, namely to the fight against King Roger of Sicily. The elaboration of the ideological and practical framework for crusading against Christians reached its peak with Innocent III’s Albigensian Crusade and the subsequent authoritative regulation of the matter at the Fourth Lateran Council. In the thirteenth century, crusade was a common weapon against political opponents of the Papacy in Italy.² The Great Schism brought abundant opportunity for granting crusade indulgences to allies of the competing popes, especially the Houses of Anjou and Durazzo. From the very beginning, internal crusading attracted criticism, with special attention given to the killing of baptized Christians and the appropriateness of the Church waging war. Pierre d’Ailly considered the possibility of resolving the Great Schism with force as early as 1381, yet he warned against using it because the heresy of the opponent was not proven. Two years later, John Wyclif added the bishop of Norwich’s Flemish crusade against the Clementists to his list of attacks on the Papacy.³

In the fifteenth century, criticism did not disappear. In his extensive crusading project from 1420 to 1438, Emmanuele Piloti criticized papal support of internal wars within Christendom because “ducats which should be spent against pagans are spent against Christians.” The root of this evil he saw to be the secular rule of the Church: the ecclesiastical governor of the given province usually falls into the disfavor of his subjects, who then start a rebellion and must be suppressed with the help of expensive mercenaries.⁴ Although criticism of the Church’s temporal dominion forms a point of connection between Piloti and the Hussites, the Bohemians’ rejection of the crusade had a different pedigree and aim. One would expect that when the Hussites became the target of the crusade, they would submit it to harsh criticism. Their satires and manifestos from the first phase of the wars denounced the crusaders for their cruelty and mocked them for their military ineffectiveness, but the Hussites did not produce any comprehensive treatise that would systematically refute the principles of crusading. Foreign sympathizers of Hussitism voiced their disapproval of the anti-Hussite military action. Gilles Mersault denounced

the lies of the preachers of the cross in his extensive leaflet promoting Hussite beliefs in the town of Tournai in 1423; the English Lollard Ralph Mungyn was accused of rejecting the anti-Hussite crusade in 1428 on the grounds of the commandment “Thou shalt not kill”—but neither man offered a longer discussion of the key aspects of crusading.⁵

This chapter will not focus on pacifist critique or on rejection of the crusade stemming from the party under attack. It will rather deal with the “internal” debate around the fifteenth-century crusades against Christians. Crusading texts of different sorts are preserved from this period. The sources used here are the treatises *de cruce signatis*, which represent a theoretical reflection on the crusade. They employ the scholarly language of the period, build on theological as well as canonist knowledge and witness to contemporary debate on the subject. This debate has not been studied, even in its general contours. Most of the sources are unedited and many of them have been unknown to modern scholars. The treatment of crusading in these texts often revolves around the indulgence. This issue was a point of contact between theological elaboration and ecclesiastical administration of the crusade on the one hand, and the active and passive participants as well as the broader “audience” of the crusade on the other. As such, the indulgence could provoke doubts and internal critique.⁶ The theoretical refinement of indulgences in the first 150 years of crusading lagged behind the practice of their use. Some simplifying terms like “remission of sins” (instead of remission of penance) or indulgence “a poena et culpa” (whereas guilt could be forgiven only by the sacrament of penance) continued to be used in the fifteenth century.⁷ This exposed the indulgence to skepticism and criticism—and perhaps this is why many of the texts analyzed below include a very basic discussion of how an indulgence works. In three chronological cross-sections of 1411–1413, 1420–1431 and 1467–1468, this chapter will trace the doubts that the crusades against Christians in general, and the indulgences related to them in particular, provoked in authors of theoretical treatises.

THE CRUSADE AGAINST THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES

In September 1411, John XXIII, the pope from the Pisan line, proclaimed a crusade against the King of Naples, Ladislav of Durazzo. His reasons for this were purely political. Ladislav supported the “Roman” Pope Gregory XII. Given the worsening military situation in the peninsula, John considered the crusade to be an important boost for the enforcement of his obedience.

He was, however, disappointed in this expectation. Although crusades against political opponents of the Papacy in Italy had a long tradition, the Naples crusade of 1411 provoked disapproval on a level that had not been seen since the Despenser's crusade, if not before that. It was in Prague that the indulgence commissioners met with the most resolute rejection. Wenceslas Thiem and Pace Fantuzzi were commissioned to preach the cross in Austria, Bohemia and Meissen. In the spring of 1412, they left Austria for Prague. In the Bohemian capital, opposition against certain ecclesiastical practices and institutions had a long tradition. Moreover, the reform movement led by Master Jan Hus had already reached a high level of excitement. A sharp conflict over the teachings of John Wyclif had come under legal scrutiny two years before and had sensitized Hus' adherents to breaches of what they understood to be evangelical commandments. When the collectors arrived and began to negotiate the campaign with local authorities, Hus raised his voice against the trafficking in grace which was being prepared. He spoke against the papal crusading bull from the pulpit and wrote several short leaflets. A summary of his arguments against the crusading indulgences appeared in his extensive *quaestio* dated June 17, 1412.⁸

Hus' answer to the central question of whether it was permitted, appropriate and in accordance with Christ's law to approve the papal crusade against Ladislav was negative. He first spoke generally about the plenary indulgence and subsidies for war. The indulgence appeared suspect to him. He much preferred sacramental remission, the process whereby the priest encouraged contrition, heard confession, but left the remission of sin to God's deliberation. He denied that anyone was able to offer an indulgence that would guarantee full remission. As for the war, Hus admitted that the Church had the right to ask for armed assistance and call the faithful to war against "infidels, the obstinate and barbarians." He also adduced the example of Augustine, who advised war against the Donatist heretics. What Hus considered illicit was a war that the pope conducted in his own interest and for secular dominion. Thus, as far as crusading against Christians was concerned, Hus theoretically approved the crusade against heretics, but disapproved of crusading against the political opponents of the Papacy. The problem in the present case was that, although it was presented as an anti-heretical crusade, the error of King Ladislav of Naples was not proven, but only asserted. Evaluation of the circumstances of the 1412 campaign forms the third part of the *quaestio*. The severe condemnation of the adherents of Ladislav and Gregory XII and the strict mandate

to exterminate them formed just one target of Hus' critique. Another was the simoniacal traffic in indulgences. Pardon for those who contributed money and, worse, a pardon tailored to the amount they spent was for Hus manifest simony. In the papal bull, he could not find any reward for prayers and fasting—all was oriented toward profit. His most fundamental objection against indulgences, however, was based on the notion of predestination, which represented a core idea of Hus' Wycliffite concept of the Church. How could the pope possibly forgive all sins and promise salvation if salvation and damnation were determined through eternal divine decision?⁹

Many of Hus' attacks were caused by the fact that the crusading documents—the papal bull and the instruction issued by the commissioners—spoke about full remission of sin and not about a relaxation of penance, which would be more correct.¹⁰ The Naples crusade nevertheless found its proponents in Bohemia who would defend papal authority on principle, including the right of raising the cross. Stephen of Pálec, Hus' former friend and now adversary, wrote, on behalf of eight doctors of theology, a treatise which was intended as material for one of the meetings between the Wycliffite and Roman parties in Bohemia. In this text, called the *Tractatus gloriosus*, he incorporated a slightly earlier defense of indulgences, the *Probacio et fundacio doctorum defendens et probans indulgencias papales*. In their text, the doctors pointed to the tradition of crusading bulls: the same form had been used, with the consent of cardinals and doctors, for a long time. It would be foolish to oppose papal decrees. The *plenitudo potestatis* allowed the pope to forgive sins, issue indulgences and invite to the defense of the Church. His right to ask secular powers for help in defending Church property surrounding the city of Rome was proven through the example of belligerent heroes of the Old Testament—Moses, Phinehas, Mattathias and others—as well as of the erstwhile Popes Gregory I and Leo IV. And priests could impose penance at their discretion in any form, including subsidies to the Apostolic See.¹¹

Jan Hus replied to this defense of crusading with his treatise *Contra octo doctores* in 1413. He repeated and expanded the objections he had raised in the *quaestio* from the previous year. He insisted on his central idea that every Christian can and must critically evaluate papal decrees instead of obeying them blindly. He said that this was exactly what he was doing and that he had no choice but to raise his voice in order not to participate in the crime. In *Contra octo doctores*, he criticized the bloodthirsty and profit-seeking motivation of the bull against Ladislav of Naples. What

disturbed him most was that the crusade aimed at the extermination of Christians. God's law did not prescribe such a thing, nor did the defense of the Church require it. Hus conceded again the pope's right to exhort believers to partake in just wars and quoted the example of Leo IV's call to arms against the Saracens. Yet this certainly did not mean that the present pope or bishops could call for the extermination of Christians. The Old Testament examples alleged by Pálež were, according to Hus, models for spiritual battle during the Christian era. This was where the prelates should invest their efforts, not in acquiring property and secular lordship through violence.¹²

Another Prague advocate of the Naples crusade was Master Maurice Rvačka. This anti-Hussite theologian wrote, probably in the first half of June 1412, a short statement against those who hindered the work of indulgence commissioners. In the first part of this work, he defended the pope's right to proclaim war for the protection of the Church. Moreover, he presented it as the pope's duty and recalled the example of the Maccabees, who were supreme pontiffs and fought in person against kings. For such a war, the pope rightly offered indulgences, based on the power of the keys. Maurice recalled here the *thesaurus ecclesie*, a concept that Jan Hus never mentioned. Maurice went even further in his endorsement of the crusading campaign, saying that it was perfectly licit if the pope imposed pecuniary satisfaction, set fix sums necessary for acquiring remission and spent the proceeds on hiring mercenaries. To these quickly sketched arguments, a second part was attached which draw further argumentation from Causa XXIII of the *Decretum Gratiani*. Maurice presented more models of belligerent prelates: Popes Gregory I and Leo IV, as well as Ambrose of Milan and Thomas of Canterbury, got credit for defending ecclesiastical property by force.¹³

The Prague dispute over the crusade against Ladislav of Durazzo faded with the exile and eventual execution of Jan Hus at Constance. Both of the main advocates of the crusade, Stephan of Pálež and Maurice Rvačka, attended the council. Their papalism decreased noticeably, their loyalty to John XXIII disappeared and they sided with the Polish case against the crusading Teutonic Order.¹⁴ With the resolution of the Great Schism, the mutual excommunications of claimants to the Papacy and the proclaiming of the cross ceased. But it was not long before the next incentive for debates about holy war against erring Christians appeared: the crusade against Jan Hus' heirs, the Hussites.

THE CRUSADES AGAINST THE HUSSITES

Resolving the problem of the Wycliffite heresy in Bohemia with the help of a crusade was an idea that emerged even before the Council of Constance assured the international notoriety of Hussitism. Authors like Dietrich von Niem in 1411 and Jean Gerson in 1414 left no doubt that iron and fire were the right means for exterminating heresy.¹⁵ The council itself resorted to capital punishment following the trials of Jan Hus and Jerome of Prague. Still in Constance, Pope Martin V confirmed the council's measures against Hussitism. Two years later, on March 1, 1420, at the request of the heir to the Bohemian throne, Sigismund of Luxembourg, the pope proclaimed a crusade. Sigismund's expedition to his kingdom failed. In the course of the 1420s, further crusades attempted the extermination of the Hussites. The spiritual leadership of the Papacy and organizational efforts of a series of papal legates combined with the military involvement of Sigismund and the princes of the Empire. The conflict was tentatively terminated when the Council of Basel, against the will of Pope Eugenius IV, achieved a compromise with the Bohemians (called the *Compactata*) during the negotiations of 1431–1436.¹⁶ Before that, Martin's bulls emphasized the necessity of an armed defense of the faith. The sufficient reason for exterminating the Hussites was their alleged heresy, which through its contagiousness proved dangerous for Christendom. The first crusading bull took for granted that the Hussites wanted to "suppress the Catholic Church and overthrow the orthodox faith."¹⁷ The subsequent crusading letters appointing respective legates lamented the spread of heretics in the kingdom of Bohemia and pointed to their murdering Catholics and plundering churches, but added little of substance to the legitimization of the crusade against erring Christians.

Naturally, there was no space for doubts or discussion in the crusading bulls. But, much as during the Great Schism, there was discussion about crusading bulls themselves—though not as passionate and explicit as in Prague in 1412. Soon after the anti-Hussite crusading campaign flared up, a debate about indulgences for non-combatants developed. The first bull of 1420 promised remission of sins to those who would march against the heretics in person, be it at their own expense or at someone else's, as well as to those who would bear the costs of a marching soldier. A fourth category, namely those who contributed as much as they could to the expedition, whether materially or through counsel, were not included in the bestowed grace, although traditionally they had been among the

recipients of crusading indulgences since the Fourth Lateran decree *Ad liberandam*.¹⁸ Whatever the pope's reasons for excluding minor donors from the indulgence,¹⁹ after the disastrous defeat of the 1420 crusade, he realized that all kinds of effort would have to be combined and stimulated. In the crusading bull dated April 13, 1421, by which legate Branda da Castiglione was given crusading faculties, donors of every sort were included. Those who could not pay so much as the expenses of one active warrior, but were able to fast and pray for victory or contribute a smaller amount, achieved remission of 60 days of penance. The privileges of crusaders as set by *Ad liberandam* were evoked and applied to the participants of the anti-Hussite expedition.²⁰

Cardinal Branda took charge of his office vigorously. In May 1421 he attended the Rhine electors' meeting in Oberwesel and publicized the crusade. His instructions for preaching and signing with the cross found a broad echo in the German-speaking lands. Branda devised the wording of absolution for three categories of supporters: those who took the cross to partake in person; those who promised a contribution corresponding to their abilities; and those who contributed much less than they were able to. The first two groups deserved a plenary indulgence, the third an indulgence set by the pope (i.e. 60 days). When specifying the provisions of the papal bull, Branda was rather liberal. He said that a full pardon belonged to anyone who would dispatch a crusader "himself or together with one or more other persons." A 60-day indulgence should be granted for every single day of prayer.²¹

Quite a liberal interpretation of the 1421 indulgence was provided in a letter of the electors dating from the end of May. The princes who had assembled at Oberwesel wrote to towns of the Empire that a full remission of sins was granted to "all who march, fight and battle against the aforementioned unbelieving heretics or provide their help or give advice for this."²² It was this and other applications of the papal pardon that induced Job Vener to express himself on the indulgences granted for the struggle against the Hussites. A member of an important family from Strasbourg, Job studied *artes* and law in Paris, Heidelberg and Bologna (where he was licentiate of canon law in 1395). He held high offices in the diocese of Speyer, served in the chancery, council and diplomatic service of the Counts Palatine, and maintained contacts with the University of Heidelberg. Job was active at the Council of Constance and was devoted to the reform of the Church and of the Benedictine order in particular. He took part in sentencing and executing some German-speaking Hussites in

1425. Among other works, he authored an exhortation against the Hussite communion under both kinds and translated Bernard of Clairvaux's *De laude* into German. He died in 1447.²³

In 1421, Job Vener penned an expert opinion on the anti-Hussite indulgences, undoubtedly with the intention of influencing the Oberwesel assembly's exploitation of the papal pardon.²⁴ His was the approach of a canonist who compares different norms and decrees in order to establish the right use of a legal instrument, in this case the graces bestowed on crusaders. Vener's work is marked by an endeavor to restrict the conditions for acquiring crusading indulgence and privileges as much as possible. His special target was those who did not participate in the military expedition but only subsidized it. In the beginning, Job quoted Innocent III's Lateran council decree *Ad liberandam*, including those parts that had not entered the canon of the same name in the *Liber extra*.²⁵ Yet he said that for the evaluation of the present case, the exact wording of Martin V's bull was the only relevant criterion. Job's aim was to limit the spiritual benefits of those who contributed less than was necessary for sustaining one soldier. Apparently he was not happy with Cardinal Branda's instruction, namely with its widening from an individual contributor to a group of contributors. "It does not suffice for achieving the indulgence," he argued, "that several people [unite] with equal or unequal shares to dispatch a fit warrior." His understanding of the bull was that for a plenary remission, it was necessary to sponsor at least one or more fighters. For "those who simply want to contribute to the extermination of the Hussites with no respect to any special warrior" but just out of "loyalty to the business" ("ad pietatem negocii"), Job had an unexpected suggestion. They should be instructed from the pulpits to seek out certain persons appointed by the local bishop or simply deposit the money in special locked chests; the bishop would use it for devout purposes. He considered it possible even to give the contribution to someone else, following the advice of a confessor. In any case, he strove to take the whole area of small contributions out of the indulgence traffic administered by the Papacy and bring it under episcopal control.²⁶

The concept behind this effort becomes more discernible further on in Job's text. With all due respect, he criticizes the provision of a (now lost) memorandum of the electors concerning where the cross should be preached. He suggests a restricted list of venues for taking the cross, which would consist of the central places of the local ecclesiastical administration. Even more restricted should be the circle of clerics authorized to hear confessions and absolve of sins. The papal bull granted to clerics who

were selected by the legate the right to absolve even from serious crimes where absolution was normally reserved to the pope. Job tried to expound this *passus* in the sense that such clerics should be selected by the king or another secular leader when the expedition set out. The bull itself gave little support for this, but perhaps a reformist approach was responsible for Vener's interpretation. In an effort to reduce interventions into the jurisdiction of local churchmen, one of the reform proposals drafted during the Council of Constance had set limits on the legal exemptions of the crusaders. Their special privileges should be valid only for the exact period of the expedition, and its actual beginning would depend on the secular leader's decision.²⁷ Moreover, Job asserted that legal privileges usually given to crusaders to the Holy Land should not be extended to this particular crusade. He claimed that the present bull did not mention these privileges. However, this was not true: the 1421 bull set up papal protection of crusaders' families and properties with reference to the classical privileges granted by the Fourth Lateran Council. Job nevertheless considered the respective regulation of *Ad liberandam* to be dependent on the time of its origin (*temporalis*) and now to have expired.

Vener's intellectual background becomes obvious here: he refers to the debate in Constance about the abuse of crusading privileges. Although he mentioned possible misuse by the *crucesignati*, he apparently feared papal abuse even more. Under the pretext of a crusade, the *curia* encroached upon purely secular cases. The Constance concordat with the German nation forbade precisely this practice.²⁸ Vener proved his debt to the Constance reform spirit. In his approach to crusading, he tried to limit papal agency and enhance the role of local clergy. He conceded that the Holy Land indulgence was transferable to the fight against heretics, but he did not want to see its legal privileges transferred to the anti-Hussite crusade. He even preferred to limit the indulgence to cases where personal participation (and with it a penitent spirit and sufficient satisfaction) was secured. The unfortunate legacy of the Great Schism cast a shadow on the Hussite crusade. Churchmen and thinkers enthusiastic for ecclesiastical reform feared that excessive remission of sin and an overly profit-seeking approach would discredit the whole anti-heretical campaign.

It was clear to Vener and others that the military efficiency of an anti-heretical crusade would be weakened if its spiritual dimension was compromised. This was particularly dangerous in the war against the Hussites, which proved to be long and arduous. Whether it was because of Vener's memorandum or not, Branda da Castiglione abandoned the view that a

number of people could combine their resources to achieve the plenary indulgence. During his second legation to Central Europe, he renewed the crusading campaign. In a letter to the bishop of Regensburg from May 15, 1423, he asked for a new appointment of preachers of the cross. He referred to his two-year-old instruction, but rephrased the definition of different groups of indulgence beneficiaries. He did not mention that more people could unite to dispatch a warrior; he left out the category of those helping with small amounts or advice, and he remitted 60 days of penance for prayer once for the entire duration of the crusade (and not 60 days of penance for each day of prayer).²⁹

The reformist scruples of a Job Vener seem to have been resolved in the early 1420s. Later in the decade, those authors who touched upon the indulgence for crusading against heretics showed little doubt about its granting and validity. The Augustinian friar Oswald Reinlein was not a high-ranking diplomat or counsellor, but he was no less a reformist than Vener. The prolific prior of Nuremberg and Vienna gave a series of crusading sermons in the Austrian capital in 1426.³⁰ His discussion of the indulgence raised four questions: whether someone who is in mortal sin can acquire the indulgence; whether someone who dies an untimely death with a firm resolution to join the crusade acquires the indulgence; whether the indulgence benefits clerics and religious; and how people should prepare themselves for participation in the grace in question. The first three questions are taken from Augustine of Ancona's *De potestate ecclesiastica*, and from the same source Oswald copied the answers (negative to the first and affirmative to the other two questions), including the entire argumentation.³¹ The fourth paragraph, which concerns the anti-Hussite crusades specifically, was probably composed by Oswald himself. He insisted that beneficiaries of the anti-Hussite indulgence must be perfectly contrite and confessed. For those who had doubts about how to confess, he formulated five conditions which represent the usual requirements of penitential practice. A person who had turned eternal punishment for mortal sins into temporal penance through confession and joined the army assembled against the Hussites attained full remission of that temporal punishment.³²

Oswald may have shared the concerns of Branda da Castiglione, Job Vener and others about the reforming effect of the crusade and its impact on the spiritual renewal of believers. However, he was not worried at all about the excessive granting of grace or any other possible abuse. Nor did the killing of fellow Christians disturb him. For him, the extermination of heretics was a clear imperative. Again he sought advice in Augustine

of Ancona. In Augustine's Exposition on Matthew, he found a triple reason for killing heretics: they falsify the faith, separate themselves from the Church and infect other believers. Oswald's only addition to the matter was the following: much as St Jerome had said about Arius, Jan Hus was a spark that, because it was not extinguished in time, infected the whole land.³³ Oswald saw no problem in applying the Old Testament models of religious violence to present circumstances. Regarding Exodus 32, where Moses calls for the extermination of the idolatrous Israelites, Reinlein remarked: "A similar combat is now imminent for us, to kill every single adherent of the perverted Hussite depravity."³⁴

In crusading sermons, a straightforward approach to killing heretics was commonplace. It should be noted, however, that the same stance was present in the university milieu as well. The Heidelberg professor of theology Nicholas Magni of Jawór authored a *quaestio* on heretics, possibly in 1425 when he was a member of a committee in charge of the process against the Hussite Johannes Drändorf. He advocated a "corporal segregation" of heretics, i.e. their extradition to a secular authority for execution. He used the same canon with Jerome's quote as Reinlein, only he likened Arius to Wyclif, who infected Jan Hus and Jerome of Prague. He admitted that heretics who do not infect others could (but need not) be tolerated and that persons firm in the faith could communicate with them in order to correct them according to the biblical precept (Titus 3:10). He asserted that heretics were still fellow humans and, as such, they should be loved. But he insisted that the error must be destroyed. A relapsed heretic should not be refused sacraments, but must be sentenced to death.³⁵

It was only the Council of Basel which, led by conciliar ideals and practical necessity alike, resorted to negotiation with heretics, thus putting an end to the first wave of anti-Hussite crusades. But before this happened, Catholic polemicists had one more opportunity to express themselves about crusading indulgences. In 1430, the Taborite captains sent a letter to a number of towns in the Empire. The manifesto enjoyed a surprisingly wide circulation, perhaps thanks to the universal expectations on the eve of the Council of Basel. Ten reactions from different parts of Latin Christendom survive.³⁶ Their authors answered individual propositions of the Taborite manifesto, which included several paragraphs related to the crusades. The Hussites criticized clerical involvement in the call to arms and the granting of indulgences for fighting. Assured with their previous victories, they invited lay people to abandon war and to send the clerical warmongers alone to Bohemia where they would get indulgences to their

heart's content.³⁷ All the anti-Hussite polemicists defended the right of the Church to encourage the secular arm to defend the faith and pointed to the theory of two swords. Viennese theologians reacted to the Hussites' address to the laity in kind: they addressed secular lords with a fierce appeal for war that used similar rhetoric to Reinlein's crusading sermons (including Exodus 32). "While we pray, you will win like Moses against Amalek," they wrote.³⁸ An anonymous author at the University of Cambridge wrote a lofty, wordy refutation of the manifesto. He employed an interesting, specifically "Anglo-Saxon" exegesis of Luke 22:38 ("Look, Lord, here are two swords"): "Under the name of 'sword' you will beware of English arrows, hatchets and lances," he assured the hypothetical Hussite, "as well as daggers or Saxon seaxes of an ancestral sort. Although you will perhaps not find them literally in the gospel, you will feel them in your forehead, heart and other vital body parts."³⁹

The Portuguese humanist Valesius Hispanus formulated a no less beligerent exhortation to the German princes. He pointed out the ecclesiastical support for the war, by which he certainly meant crusading indulgences, votive masses and the like: "Which of you resting would sleep if the Church decides to incite you to such a war, provide help, and the entire world assisted with pious acts [*suffragia*]?"⁴⁰ Other authors were more realistic about the military situation and were also more inclined to start negotiations of certain kind. The Nuremberg Dominican Johannes Nider advocated talks with the Hussites if they were carefully organized. In his lengthy reply to the Taborite manifesto, he also included a section on indulgences. In their denial of the indulgences, Nider said, the heresy of the Hussites was more manifest than anywhere else. He adduced canon law and the Fourth Lateran legislation in order to show that the indulgence for fighting heretics was equivalent to the Holy Land indulgence. In an extensive discussion of indulgences, Nider was able to list 12 benefits (*militates*) that fighters for the faith enjoy over other people. They live in charity and brim with strength; when they die, they follow Christ's sacrifice; they avoid purgatory and enjoy the status of martyrs. In contrast to Valesius and others, Nider's account of anti-heretical warfare is not a fierce call to arms, but rather a portrayal of the fight against heretics as an act of love and self-sacrifice.⁴¹

While most of the works mentioned so far were politically motivated or polemically provoked and not spontaneous stances on crusading, the anonymous *Questio de cruce signatis contra hereticos* is a theoretical reflection on one aspect of the crusade. The reference to Cardinal Henry Beaufort as an

anti-Hussite legate allows us to date it to 1427 or shortly thereafter. The two surviving manuscripts, one in Dresden and the other originally from Görlitz (now in Wrocław), suggest a provenance from the region north of the Bohemian border. The *quaestio* asks “whether crusaders, aroused by full remission of sins and going against heretics yet dying before the battle, achieve plenary remission of sins because of their primary intention.”⁴² In the first part of his work, the author explains what an indulgence is, how the Church’s treasury (*thesaurus ecclesiae*) works, and how the power of granting indulgences can be delegated by the pope to bishops. The second part of the work explains plenary and partial remission as well as some technical terms connected to these. Among the means for achieving plenary remission, the author mentions pilgrimage to the Holy Land as well as crusade. He objects to some opinions on indulgences, which he calls heretical. One opinion is that an indulgence remits penance only in this life and not in purgatory; another is that no one of lower authority can absolve a penalty inflicted by a higher authority (especially by God). The solution to the main question turns out to be simple: the wording of the privilege is decisive and therefore, if the grace is given to *transeuntes*, it is achieved by those who die on the way too. To support this, a decree of Nicholas IV from 1291 is quoted,⁴³ as well as an unspecified bull of Martin V to King Sigismund and a recent bull of Cardinal Beaufort.⁴⁴ A corollary of the reasoning is that crusaders driven by the sole intention to seize heretics’ property do not achieve the indulgence. It is only these closing passages of the *quaestio* that show some relation to historical events. Nevertheless, its very topic connects this short piece to the second Hussite war of 1467. The same question of whether untimely deceased crusaders achieve remission of sins was asked several times in the 1460s.

THE SECOND HUSSITE WAR

The first phase of the Hussite wars was concluded with the *Compactata* of 1436. The Hussite King George of Poděbrady, elected in 1458, himself a Utraquist, considered this agreement to be a legal basis for his rule. However, his conception of a “double faith” did not enjoy universal endorsement. Internal opposition against the king formed in Bohemia and even more in the adjacent lands of the Bohemian crown. The Lower Silesian city of Wrocław became the centre of this opposition. From the early 1460s onward, representatives of Wrocław endeavored to persuade the Papacy that crusade was an appropriate means of coping with the

heretical king. Even though the *Compactata* were proclaimed null by Pius II in 1462, a crusade against Bohemia seemed to the pope an excessive step which would enfeeble the anti-Ottoman preparations. Yet the relationship between Poděbrad and the *curia* gradually deteriorated. In 1465, Paul II summoned George to his court; at the end of the following year, he declared him deposed and in April 1467 the crusade was proclaimed by the papal legate Rudolf of Rüdesheim in Wrocław. In the spring of 1468, the conflict acquired an international dimension when the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus entered the war. In 1471, George of Poděbrady died, yet military actions continued until Matthias, who had proclaimed himself king of Bohemia in 1469, reached an agreement with George's successor Vladislav II.⁴⁵

It is no surprise that it was only Bohemian authors who raised substantive objections against the crusade. A manifesto from New Year's Day 1469 called the crusade an "indecent custom." The pope "sets all nations and tongues of adjacent lands against us through his legates," the manifesto claimed, "through anathemas and proclaiming the cross against us, through suspending divine services and through other various and indecent traditions, promising them many graces and the remission of sins and that whoever marches against us will be in heaven right away."⁴⁶ Another reaction to the crusade came from John of Rabštejn, a Czech Catholic nobleman, prelate and humanist with experiences from Italy. In his *Dialogus* from 1469, John presented a distanced view of the religious war in Bohemia. He found the crusade to be an inappropriate means of dealing with Utraquism. He pointed to practical difficulties of such an enterprise and especially to needless violence and atrocities. His critique of the papal crusade was rather circumstantial. "No one doubts," he said, "that the Church, whose key does not err, can declare war on heretics." Yet he insisted that taking up the cross was a voluntary affair and that nobody should be threatened with ecclesiastical punishments for staying out of the war. "Have you ever seen," he asked his fellow discussants, "anyone compelled to take up the cross against heresy or infidels?" His advice was that heresy should be expelled "not by way of sword and fire but by prudence and humanity." Eventually, however, he would obey the papal decision: "We confess this to be our doom, but may the will of the supreme pontiff and the Apostolic See be done!"⁴⁷

The literary output of non-Bohemian Catholic authors is quite different in form and content, yet no less intriguing. They did not contest the validity and applicability of the crusade, and still they were concerned about

some aspects of crusading. I know of three writings connected directly to the 1467 crusade which take the form of learned treatises. They all are unedited and have not been examined by modern scholars. They were produced independently of each other in German-speaking regions in the vicinity of the kingdom of Bohemia. Unlike the replies to the Taborite manifesto commented on above, they were neither provoked by Hussite propaganda nor written as polemic against heretical views. They bear witness to an internal debate in the crusaders' camp. Although no direct contact among them is attested, their authors share some characteristics. They possessed university training and belonged to religious orders (Dominican, Carthusian and Celestine). They were prolific authors who organized their writings in autograph manuscripts. In their oeuvre, large works appear side by side with shorter statements and recommendations written in response to controversial topics of the day. The anti-Bohemian crusade was just one among many subjects that held their interest, including related topics such as Hussitism or indulgences in general.

The first of these authors to be mentioned is the Austrian Dominican Leonhard Huntpichler. He came from Tyrol and studied in Vienna and Leipzig. In 1423, he attained the degree of Master of Arts and served as schoolmaster in Brixen. In 1439 or earlier, he entered the Dominican house in Vienna; he began to study theology in Cologne and Vienna and in 1449 he graduated as master of theology. A year later he became university professor of theology and regent of the Dominican *studium* in Vienna. From 1453, he also held the office of inquisitor; he died in 1478. He was a promoter of the Dominican observance, a partisan of Frederick III and an opponent of Basel conciliarism. He wrote a number of works; many of them react to topical problems or were written on request. His favorite form seems to have been a collection of inquiries that built on his school lectures. Among the topics he was asked or felt compelled to elaborate upon was the Bohemian heresy. In the summer of 1454, he completed his treatise on communion under both kinds. He refuted this central Hussite tenet with reference to the binding character of Church tradition. Another writing on the *quaestio Bohemica* is his commentary on Pius II's 1462 speech to Bohemian ambassadors about the *Compactata*. In August 1467, the Waldensian "bishop" Stephen of Basel, who was well connected to the Hussites, suffered death by burning at the stake in Vienna. Huntpichler reacted with a collection of 26 inquiries about heretics.⁴⁸

The skirmishes with Bohemian mercenaries in Austria and the proclamation of a crusade against George of Poděbrady gave Huntpichler

another incentive to literary activity. A certain Achacius, a chaplain of the lords of Walsee who was expected to preach the cross, asked Huntpichler for instructions. These survive in the form of a letter dated to August 28, 1467 and containing six articles, to which eight other articles are appended. Huntpichler, who was himself commissioned to recruit Viennese students, gave advice about what to preach to potential crusaders. He focused on the duty of noblemen who should set an example to commoners, but the latter must not excuse themselves if the lords proved reluctant to go on crusade. He not only called the Bohemians “brothers of demons”; he held all those who refused to fight heretics as demons and offered evidence that abortive crusaders were not human.⁴⁹

Another, much larger piece of writing which originated in the context of the Bohemian crusade is Huntpichler’s two-part treatise on crusaders and predestination, called *Tractatus de cruce signatis et de predestinacione* or *Inquisiciones de predestinacione et de cruce signatis*.⁵⁰ It is organized in paragraphs of varying size, presented as questions and answers and called *inquisiciones*. They are numbered continuously from 1 to 72, but the first part on crusaders, consisting of eight questions, is separated from the part on predestination by an explicit and incipit. It says that the treatise was compiled from Leonhard’s ordinary and extraordinary lectures. The discussed problematic is abstract and demanding, especially when it comes to predestination. References to authorities are mostly kept short, yet Huntpichler also has a predilection for short stories and inserts a number of narrative illustrations taken from collections like *Vitae patrum* or Gregory the Great’s Dialogues.

The work starts with a discussion of the sign of the cross itself. Huntpichler says that the cross is not only a symbol of Christ’s passion and redemption of humankind but can also be useful as a weapon against man’s enemies, i.e. sins. More dignity belongs to the crusaders’ sign than to any other cross because it is connected with an obligation to the most meritorious deed of spiritual strength—martyrdom. The author proceeds to an explanation of the sign’s effects and says that crossing oneself is a good reinforcement against demons. Under demons he also subsumes their servants, i.e. “pagans, heretics and other infidels, as well as pernicious and malicious believers.”⁵¹ This demonological passage is adorned with demonstrative stories, but has little to do with actual crusading. The only exception, when the author seems to be reminded of his subject, is the discussion of righteousness brought to people through the cross. Leonhard recommends asceticism and warns of the opposite: “Some arro-

gant and greedy people marching against the infidels seek their own temporal things, whence they often perish by the hand of the impious.”⁵²

After this long-winded theoretical and spiritual introduction, Huntpechler comes quickly to practical crusading matters. The lengthy Chapter 6 is entirely devoted to the question of whether a crusader is granted an indulgence if he dies before he sets out. The chapter is announced with a rubric saying that what follows is taken from Thomas’ *Quodlibet*. Huntpechler indeed took Aquinas’ discussion of the subject and rearranged it slightly, dividing the material into more conclusions, but adding nothing substantial.⁵³ A related question is whether the pope can grant an indulgence to only a few people or just one, which Huntpechler holds to be possible, even if it is not common. The next chapter deals with a problem which leads the author far away from the original subject and serves as a transition between the first part *de cruce signatis* and the much longer *de predestinacione*. Here, the question is as follows: is a person who is absolved of all penalties through a crusading indulgence predestined, i.e. eternally saved? It would seem that the answer is in the affirmative, Huntpechler says. After all, the pope releases from all penalties present and future, and so no further punishment can henceforth be imposed on the person. Although the crusaders pursue not only salvation but also other goals, namely the glory of God and the defense of the faith, they would be deceived if salvation did not follow. If the indulgence served only the predestined ones, nobody would strive for it.

But the evidence for the negative answer is more conclusive, Huntpechler says. Of course, there are also members of the foreknown (*presciti*) among those who acquire a plenary indulgence. The absolution from future guilt does not guarantee future perseverance: a man can still sin. What an indulgence can guarantee is a state that, if it lasts, will bring a person salvation. This grace is, however, given only conditionally: the person must persist in the sinless state that was achieved through indulgence. Whether he or she does or does not persist is not influenced by the indulgence, but given through predestination. However, it is not true that by predetermining someone to salvation or damnation, God makes human agency irrelevant. God offers the means to achieve salvation, and it is man’s task to use or to spurn them—even though God knows the result. It is not God or the pope who deceives the recipients of the indulgence; they deceive themselves if they do not persevere in grace.⁵⁴

By touching upon this complex subject, Huntpechler drifts away from the topic of crusading to the realm of speculative theology. In Chapters

13–16 he explains that the papal indulgence bull is not false if it promises liberation from all penalties, but cannot ensure the absence of punishment in the future. Question 30 is concerned with the absolution “from penalty and guilt” and explains that an indulgence releases from penalty, but includes or is connected to sacramental remission, which is the only way to abolish guilt.⁵⁵ He does not explicitly mention the crusading indulgence in this discussion, but we can assume that he had it in mind even while writing the latter parts of the *Tractatus* concerned mostly with predestination. In question 29, the crusade re-emerges. He asks whether the *crucesignati* should be honored more than others because they have taken the cross. His answer is yes: just as clerics are honorable because they have committed themselves to imitate the confessors, crusaders have chosen to imitate the martyrs. They deserve respect because of the privileges they receive from the pope and because of the cross with which they are marked. Here Huntpichler tells the story about Emperor Tiberius II, who venerated the cross so much that he never stepped on the sign if he saw one on the floor in any form. When he had a floor plaque with a cross removed, he found a treasure underneath it.⁵⁶

The *Tractatus de cruce signatis et de predestinacione* is a peculiar work mixing abstract speculation with popular short stories and marvels. Huntpichler was most probably instigated to write this work by the proclamation of the crusade against George of Poděbrady. He may have been interested in indulgences even before that if his *Tractatus de indulgenciis* really is a pre-1465 work.⁵⁷ What made the bull against George different from other indulgences were the cross and the plenary remission of penance. The crusading aspect of the proclaimed grace provided Huntpichler with the occasion to talk about the sign of the cross. The plenary remission led him to considerations about the mechanism of salvation in the context of predestination and free will. He showed great admiration for those who would volunteer in the war against the “infidels.” He was not worried about the fact that these enemies were Christian heretics. The extent to which the crusaders shared Huntpichler’s concerns about what exactly is pardoned and how it agrees with the eternal predisposition of an individual is difficult to say, although one would assume that those comprising crusading armies did not contemplate such elevated topics.

Another author who expressed himself about the crusade against George of Poděbrady was Johannes Hagen. Born around 1415, he entered the Carthusian monastery at Salvatorberg near Erfurt in 1440. In the 1450s and 1460s he served as prior in the Charterhouses of Eisenach,

Erfurt, Frankfurt an der Oder and Stettin. The last decade of his life he spent in Erfurt, where he died in 1475. As a young man, he had studied law at the University of Erfurt. His legal expertise is visible in his works, but he was no less interested in practical theology and spirituality. He seems to have been the kind of man who wrote every day. The number of extant works he wrote, of varying lengths, is over 500.⁵⁸ Among the topical problems of the day he addressed with his letters or expert opinions were the crusade and the Bohemian heresy. He commented on Pius II's crusading bull *Ezechielis prophetae*, dealt with the indulgences of Nicholas V for Cyprus and other problems connected to indulgences, and also wrote about the Ottoman threat.⁵⁹ His works concerning the Bohemian question include comments on the *Compactata*, writings on the election and deposition of King George, a polemic with the Burgundian Dominican Nicolas Jacquier about how to refute correctly the Hussite communion under both kinds, letters on the Bohemian heresy addressed to the parish priest Schaffhein in Cottbus and to the margrave of Brandenburg, as well as a number of excerpts and articles.⁶⁰ In one of his numerous personal manuscript miscellanies written in a cursory, nearly illegible script, he copied the papal commission to the legate Rudolf of Rüdeshheim as well as the legate's sub-delegation of preaching the crusade, and commented on the extent of the delegate's authority with respect to absolution.⁶¹

One of Hagen's writings, called *Circa cruciatam, que data est anno 1467 contra hereticos, ubi Paulus papa II^{us} concedit plenarias indulgencias*, deals specifically with the crusade against heretics.⁶² It is an expert opinion on a rather narrowly defined subject. The author first states that Paul II granted a plenary indulgence for fighting heretics, but also a dispensation from irregularity, unauthorized officiating at divine services, apostasy and unlawful revenues, as long as these revenues are converted for the purpose of the crusade. Some people doubt, Hagen says, whether it is possible, based on this bull, to achieve a dispensation from gaining a benefice in a simoniacal way and to be provided with the same benefice again. His answer is a resolute "no." The first part of his writing offers evidence for this negative answer. He stresses that the bull speaks only about illicit revenues and that there is no word about resignation and the new provision of a benefice; if the pope meant to include this, he certainly would have mentioned it explicitly. Since this is not the case, it is impossible to extend a confessor's jurisdiction to such cases. The present crusading bull offers reconciliation with respect to unrightfully received revenues. The

only right thing to do is to give these revenues to the crusading cause, and if it is not clear to whom a wrongfully acquired thing should be restored, it should be given for the expedition too, or for another pious purpose.

The second part of the treatise is concerned with refuting possible objections. It is introduced with the words “Some others say” (“*Alii dicunt*”), namely that it was the pope’s intention to give dispensation to simoniacs through this very bull. The six counter-arguments of the anonymous *alii* are rebutted with ample citations from canon law, especially from the *Liber extra*, but also with references to some authorities of jurisprudence such as Hostiensis, William Durandus, Thomas Aquinas and even the nearly contemporary Panormitanus. Hagen insists that dispensation can be bestowed only if it is explicitly permitted (in contrast to absolution, which can be given any time unless prohibited). He disagrees that the illicit taking of revenues is a consequence of the simoniacal acquisition of a benefice and that the cause (i.e. simony) should be pardoned together with the consequence (i.e. the taking of revenues). He does not concede that a papal legate can pardon simoniacs; the legate would need a special commission for this, because simony is a crime the judgment of which is reserved to the pope. He also disproves that a bishop could pardon a simoniac secretly and provide him with the same benefice again. In the closing part of the short treatise, he deals with the absolution according to the crusading bull. He emphasizes the right wording, which should be short and precise. It must not be added that punishment in purgatory is relaxed; it is enough to mention that the remission is plenary. He recalls the plenary indulgence issued by the Fourth Lateran Council for fighting heretics and stresses that it was equivalent to the Holy Land indulgence.⁶³

Although Hagen does not mention any names or other specifics, his writing certainly gives the impression that the crusading bull of 1467 was used for disputable purposes that did not have much to do with crusading in terms of military expedition. Apparently some clerics tried to profit from the grace and free themselves from suspicion of simony or even legalize their wrongly acquired benefices. Moreover, argumentation was developed in certain circles that was intended to defend this practice. Hagen’s treatise is thus a witness to a thematic ramification of the debate over anti-Hussite crusading indulgences. This particular debate revolved around legal issues connected with indulgence and remission, and especially that which concerned clerics, like simony and irregularity. In one of his books, Hagen left a note on killing heretics. He quoted a decree of Martin V from 1422 in which the pope assured clerics who took part in the Bohemian expeditions

that they did not incur a penalty for killing Hussites. Hagen noted that it was seemingly against the law, yet he explained that all doctors of law as well as some great theologians say that a pope can relieve irregularity incurred for homicide.⁶⁴ Even here he was more concerned with resolving theoretical legal questions than with wasting human lives.

Probably the most complex theoretical reflection of the second Hussite war is a treatise with the incipit *Signa thaw super frontes virorum gemencium*. In the only codex known to me, it bears the title *Tractatus de cruce signatis* and is dated to the week after St Martin (November 12–18), 1468.⁶⁵ The entire codex, now in the Prague National Library, was written by the hand of Master Johannes Cotbus of Sommerfeld, a monk of the Celestine monastery at Oybin Castle in Upper Lusatia. Johannes entered the order in the mid-1440s and pursued his literary activity at least through the latter part of the 1460s.⁶⁶ At first sight, the treatise itself does not reveal much about its provenance. Only in Chapter 11, and thus in the middle of the treatise, does the author reveal something of his specific concerns. In our times, he says, many people from Wrocław died fighting for the faith and for their fathers' law against the heretics. And in Chapter 14 he praises the merits of exterminating Bohemian heresy and schism.⁶⁷ Based on these indications, we can safely assume that November 1468 is when the *Tractatus de cruce signatis* was composed and that its historical context is the second wave of anti-Hussite crusades. The only specific reference to a location in the text is that of Wrocław, but it is not compelling enough to situate the tract there. The evidence provided by the manuscript itself (which was produced at Oybin) is no less relevant. Wrocław, as the largest city in the crown lands attached to the kingdom of Bohemia, played a key role in the opposition to George of Poděbrady. Given the geographic, cultural and political proximity of Lusatia and Silesia, it would be no surprise that a monk at Oybin would commemorate Catholic warriors from Wrocław. In the light of all this, I believe that Johannes of Sommerfeld's authorship is most likely.⁶⁸

The treatise is divided into 19 chapters. Based on the opening line, "Set a mark (taw) upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry for all the abominations" (Ezekiel 9:4), it starts with a discussion of military distinctions and claims that a special sign—the cross—is needed in the fight against infidels and heretics. The author goes on to explain that the pope has the right to summon Christian people for defense against the enemies of the Church. Thereafter he focuses specifically on the word "men" and endeavors to demonstrate that it can figuratively subsume women too. In

the subsequent chapters Johannes of Sommerfeld expands on crusaders, their qualities and motivations. He criticizes extensively those who come to the “business of the cross” (“*crucis negocium*”) driven by worldly affections and seeking profit or fame. From crusaders he demands a virtuous life in accordance with biblical models and precepts. Only moral qualities can secure the success of crusading troops. However, the author is rather conciliatory when it comes to morally unqualified crusaders. They should be admitted to the army, for even if their victory does not help them to attain salvation, it helps other Christians. For defeated crusaders, he provides the usual consolation with reference to martyrdom, the Maccabees and earlier crusading history, and the classical explanation through their own sinfulness. In the subsequent text, the author points out the eternal reward for the crusading enterprise and attempts to persuade the reader to take the cross or support a crusade.

The sources Johannes Cotbus used point clearly to his monastic background and education. Among the extensively excerpted authors feature Augustine, Gregory the Great, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and especially Bernard of Clairvaux. A whole-page quote from Bernard’s *De consideratione* reflecting upon the failure of the Second Crusade is used to bring consolation to anti-Hussite crusaders. To establish a context, the author offers a brief account of the crusade of 1147 based on the *Cronica Martiniana* (Martinus Polonus).⁶⁹ Chapter 9, a fictional dialogue about Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, draws silently on the *Parabolarium* by Galand of Reigny, a contemporary of St Bernard.⁷⁰ Many topics that Cotbus deals with had been among the classic themes of crusading discourse for centuries. He touches upon the motif of the *militia Christi* and stresses the importance of spiritual combat before a physical war. Building upon the idea of martyrdom, he portrays death in combat against infidels or heretics as victory. He also emphasizes the spiritual benefits of the Holy Land indulgence, praising it as a great incentive for his crusading contemporaries.⁷¹

Not everything designed for the Holy Land was easily transferable to late medieval Central European reality. For example, the classical discussion of women and crusade, taken mostly from the *Liber extra*, may have had limited impact on the war of the Silesians and Hungarians against the king of Bohemia.⁷² The most obvious link to classical crusading remained the Holy Land indulgence bestowed for fighting Bohemian heretics. Johannes Cotbus of Sommerfeld points out how great a power this grace had. Although he considers crusades to the Holy Land to be a thing of the

distant past (the indulgence “once used to be given for the recuperation of the Holy Land,” he says), he makes it clear that the current indulgence has the same effect. He is quite open about its utility for the impenitent: “So whoever recognizes himself as insufficient for suitable penitence should strive to acquire this indulgence for his satisfaction.”⁷³ In his final chapter dealing with redemptions, commutations and freeing oneself from the crusading vow, Johannes states that “what has been said about the overseas crusaders should apply in a similar way to those who take the cross in order to go against heretics, because just as they are granted a similar indulgence, so do they suffer a similar punishment for transgression of the vow.”⁷⁴

Another classical motif which found employment was the topos *peccatis exigentibus*. Just after quoting the famous speech of Judas Maccabeus that the strength of an army lies not in the multitude but comes from heaven (1 Maccabees 3:18–19), Sommerfeld adds: “If only our heroes listened and would choose such men, sign them with the cross and lead them to war, of whom they would assume to possess merits before God rather than strength of the body! No doubt they would win more frequently.”⁷⁵ The defeat of the warriors of Wrocław is unequivocally ascribed to their sinfulness. “We hope, however,” the author says, “that they will be crowned with ampler joy and glory for their faith and steadfastness.”⁷⁶ He also recalls the fallen Maccabee warriors who secretly wore amulets of the idols under their coats. “Don’t they wear idols under their coats, whose God is their belly, of which kind are all gluttonous, drunk and wanton?” Cotbus says and adds: “There is no wonder if such people run away from their enemies and others deservedly succumb to the same enemies.”⁷⁷ Also interesting is his remark that the fall of the crusading army should not be ascribed to the preachers who urged them to war, but only to the sins of the warriors. This may be an echo of the situation in Wrocław where the radical anti-Poděbradian preachers were at odds with a more moderate party.⁷⁸

If we ask what kind of questions contemporary crusading provoked Johannes Cotbus of Sommerfeld to ask, we need to look at the closing parts of his treatise. Chapter 15 offers answers to some doubts that may have arisen from the previous text. For the most part, they are classical *dubia* that had been connected with crusading for centuries, and Cotbus resolves them explicitly with the help of Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Augustine of Ancona and others. Among the possible doubts he lists are the following: does someone who takes the vow but falls ill or dies before

the expedition obtain the indulgence? Is an active crusader obliged to penitence if he commits sin on the way? Does someone who dies on the way back from a crusade enjoy a larger benefit? Is someone who falls on the way a martyr? Is a martyr only the one who dies for the faith? And how about a crusader who is killed by heretics? Can a Christian who dies grumbling achieve martyrdom? And, finally, is taking the cross more useful than entering a religious order?⁷⁹ While the last question may have been provoked by Johannes' own interest, in the case of martyrs killed by heretics, he obviously touched upon a topical problem. Naturally, he granted a fallen anti-heretical crusader the status of a martyr, unless he was in mortal sin.

In subsequent chapters, too, Johannes Cotbus of Sommerfeld was preoccupied with crusading against heretics. Chapter 18 deals with the confiscation of heretical property. In Chapter 17, he asks against whom the cross should be preached. The answer of Hostiensis was: against Saracens and heretics, yet this does not seem sufficient to him. In legal texts, schismatics and rebels were missing, but he insists that not everything must be stated explicitly in law. Schismatics should be dealt with analogously to heretics. Disobedient Christians sin more than Saracens, because they reject faith that they had accepted, and also there is no schism without heresy.⁸⁰ It seems that Sommerfeld cared a good deal about crusading against "schismatics," and he obviously meant the Hussites. In Chapter 14 he includes among compelling reasons (*persuasiones*) for taking the cross the following: dividing the Church and introducing a schism is the worst harm that can occur. Consequently, laboring to extirpate "the heresy and schism of the Bohemians" was the greatest good.⁸¹

The author was not explicit about why he insisted on the legitimacy of a crusade against schismatic and disobedient Christians. We can speculate that it was the *Compactata* with the Council of Basel that cast doubt on the heretical status of the Hussites. Religious accommodation removed the stain of heresy from the Bohemians, so it was safer to consider them as offenders against Church obedience and unity rather than as transgressors of the principles of the faith. In any case, it is interesting to notice that for Johannes of Sommerfeld, war against heretics was not a problem at all. He took for granted the legitimacy of crusading both in the Holy Land (against "Saracens") and against heretics. Noting briefly that champions of anti-heretical crusades enjoy the same rights as *transmarini* (crusaders to the Holy Land) was enough. Only the transfer of crusading privileges from the war against heretics to fighting rebellious Christians deserved

special discussion. Of all the problems associated with contemporary crusading, Sommerfeld gave priority to the modalities of the indulgence. Most of the legal questions he posed had a thirteenth-century pedigree and had been answered two centuries earlier. He felt the need to address these topics again. His major concern, however, seems to have been the moral qualification of anti-Hussite crusaders, which would guarantee the long-desired victory. The crucial thing was to carry out the crusade correctly in all possible respects. The wide range of topics, both classical and contemporary, that the *Tractatus de cruce signatis* addressed corresponds to this.

CONCLUSION

Crusading against heretics certainly aroused controversy in the fifteenth century. This was especially the case in Central Europe. Bohemia played a double role in this. In the final phase of the Great Schism, indulgences announced for war against the rival obedience created disapproval among Prague reformists that materialized in a number of treatises arguing for and against the crusade. The same reformist movement, now grown to dimensions that brought most of the kingdom into rebellion, became the target of a series of crusades and thus the most important theatre of crusading against heretics in the fifteenth century. Again, indulgences issued for fighting heterodoxy invited reflection. Did the doubts provoke a real debate, as implied in the title of this chapter? We can certainly answer in the affirmative about Prague in 1412. Here we have a series of written statements reacting to one another, and we know that their authors were in direct contact and that the discussion continued, with a certain shift in focus, until the next year. A similar situation, albeit with much less intensive contact, arose in the 1420s. Job Vener's treatise not only reacted to documents issued by leaders of the crusade; he also quoted another document which suggests that there was more discussion about the first anti-Hussite crusading bulls than has survived.⁸² Hussite opponents of the crusade succeeded once again in eliciting opinions on holy war from Catholic apologists in 1430, with the propagandistic letter of the Taborite captains. If this was a debate, it only went one round: a reply from the Hussites was not expected. The treatises from the second Hussite war, although important in number and length, strike one as isolated statements. Discussion seems to have evaporated. The texts do not react to each other, but at most to certain practices or their justifications. Johannes

Hagen refuted some concrete arguments, but we do not know whose; Leonhard Huntpichler wrote a good deal about indulgence and predestination, but it seems unlikely that he was reacting to the treatment of the same topics by Jan Hus.

As the character of the debate developed over time, so too did the nature of the doubts. The most fundamental question—whether it was admissible to kill Christians—was asked only by dissidents like Hus. Later authors were satisfied with a short reference to the danger of heresy (like Oswald Reinlein) or to the papal aegis which made such violence licit (like Hagen), or they passed over the problem in silence. Only Nicholas Magni devoted a longer discussion to this topic. Although advocating capital punishment for heretics, he conceded their human status (unlike Huntpichler, who portrayed them as demons). Even when the question of killing heretics was resolved, it remained to be established who *was* a heretic. Johannes Cotbus of Sommerfeld further hesitated about a crusade against schismatics, which he eventually approved. The focus of the debate moved during the course of the fifteenth century from dealing with the enemy to the spiritual benefits of the crusaders. It was clear to almost everyone that crusaders against heresy enjoyed the same indulgence as those sailing to the Holy Land. Job Vener had doubts about the applicability of some privileges, but for the most part the debate revolved around technical aspects of the indulgence. Some questions pervaded the whole period. Such was the case with the conundrum as to whether a crusader benefited from the indulgence if he died before the expedition. Although it was resolved by Aquinas in a way that satisfied most of the authors,⁸³ it was still discussed by Reinlein, the anonymous *Questio*, Huntpichler and Sommerfeld.

Whatever practical urgency this question may have had, it indicates the shift of interest towards the effectiveness of indulgence, amounting to technical considerations that had little relation to military operations. A diachronic view gives a clear picture of development. In 1412, the discussion was about exterminating Christians. The heretical status of the enemy was contested not only by those affected, but also by members of the same obedience. This led to questioning the very fundamentals of crusading against heresy. Doubts concerning the efficacy of the indulgence as such resulted from the doctrine of the Prague Wycliffites. Inside the crusading camp, different questions were asked, yet still in relation to the misconduct of the Church hierarchy. Theorists as well as some churchmen of the 1420s were anxious about administering the indulgence in the correct

way. The abuses of the Schism period served as a deterrent. The reformist approach to crusading prevailed at Constance as well as afterwards. The debate around the crusades against the Hussites was influenced by the fact that they took place between two reform councils. Misuse of the crusade for private political purposes and the scandalous administration of indulgences aimed only at profit were to be eliminated.⁸⁴ In 1467–1468, the authors of crusading treatises did not entirely lose the reformist spirit. Johannes Cotbus of Sommerfeld, for example, was concerned with the moral quality of warriors. But the focus of discussion changed. The main topic now was the mechanism of forgiveness and legal aspects of the indulgence. These treatises were clearly tailored for both combatants and non-combatants, and sometimes explicitly for clerics. The situation in Central Europe was now different from that in the 1420s. People in adjacent regions did not feel compelled to exterminate heresy in Bohemia; war was the business of those immediately concerned, be it Silesian Catholics or a Hungarian king striving for the Bohemian crown. What appeared to be an attractive opportunity for everyone else was the acquisition of the plenary indulgence through monetary contributions. The crusade against heretics, albeit in a neighboring country, was approached and exploited in much the same way as the anti-Ottoman crusade.⁸⁵

The surviving theoretical texts on crusading against heresy attest to an interest in the topic in the fifteenth century. Could these texts contribute to a “reconfiguring” of the crusade? In some sense, the treatises show a conservative approach. They unanimously refer to crusades to the Holy Land as a model. They use classical motifs of crusading literature—the idea of martyrdom, prefigurations from the Old Testament or the explanation of defeat through one’s own sins. The primary vehicle of tradition was canon law: *Causa XXIII* and especially the collection of decretals. Another important source transmitting thirteenth-century crusading ideas was Thomas Aquinas. Questions debated in the period of the classical Jerusalem crusades were evoked even when there was no link to the topical problems of present-day anti-heretical crusading. This may be one of those instances where the “hiatus between theology and practice” becomes visible, as is typical for medieval indulgences.⁸⁶ Yet in the case of crusading indulgences, the gap did not have to be unbridgeable if the theorists could reach the ears of a responsible prelate. What did they propose to change?

The Hussites denied the crusades as a whole together with papal supremacy, so that there was no space left for reconfiguring them. In their

attempt to purify Christian warfare, the Catholic reformists mostly envisaged a return to the Fourth Lateran constitutions. An exception was Job Vener, who contested the validity of certain provisions of *Ad liberandam*. His vision of a crusade against heretics was that of a campaign where plenary remission would be limited to active participants and financial contributions would be controlled by local clergy rather than by papal collectors. This was a project indebted to the spirit of conciliarist reform, yet it was questionable to what extent a crusade could be detached from the Papacy if its central and most debated aspect was the plenary indulgence. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Papacy regained its position. The authors of crusading tracts did not necessarily need to be strict papalists to think of a crusade less radically than Vener. They wanted to see truly penitent *crucesignati*—both the warriors whose moral standards could guarantee military success and the donors who would not enjoy the pardon otherwise. And they wanted as many people as possible to benefit from the extraordinary grace connected to a crusade, with all the relevant norms of canon law meticulously observed.

Rather than a reconfiguration, this was the outcome of a longer process that started with Innocent III's simultaneously promoting a large anti-heretical crusade and laying the foundations for large-scale participation in crusading by non-combatants. Yet the fifteenth-century context was different from the one in which Innocent had institutionalized the crusade against heretics, and so were the doubts and debates. It might seem unnecessary to debate problems that had been resolved two centuries previously, or at least discussed for a long time—especially if most of the fifteenth-century theorists did not want to go beyond Fourth Lateran anyway. But late medieval society had a dynamic of its own that fostered such a debate. It was not only because the Great Schism introduced problems that called for criticism; it was also conciliarism, with its reform proposals and all the academic debate that was vital to it, which led some to rethink the role of crusading in Christian society. And, no less important, broader circles were involved in the debate—the lower clergy, princes who sought scholarly advice and citizens who pursued active policies. When the Church reacted to heresy with an old instrument, these people would ask questions. Crusading treatises tried to offer some answers.⁸⁷

NOTES

1. Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 247–259; for crusading indulgences during the Great Schism, see Nikolaus Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter*, 3 vols (reprint, Darmstadt: Primus-Verlag, 2000), 3:166–167.
2. Norman Housley, “Crusades against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216,” in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), 17–36; Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
3. Robert N. Swanson, “The Way of Action: Pierre d’Ailly and the Military Solution to the Great Schism,” *Studies in Church History* 20 (1983): 191–200; *John Wyclif’s Polemical Works in Latin*, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg, Wyclif’s Latin Works 2, 2 vols (London: Trübner 1883), 2:588–632. On the Lollard stance on crusade, see Anne Hudson, *The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 368–369; and Robert N. Swanson, *Indulgences in Late Medieval England: Passports to Paradise?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 294–315. Surprisingly, the use of Wyclif’s *Cruciata* in Jan Hus’ works against the crusading bull (see below) is not attested.
4. *Traité d’Emmanuel Piloti sur le Passage en Terre Sainte* (1420), ed. Pierre-Herman Dopp (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1958), 173. Cf. Norman Housley, “Emanuele Piloti and Crusading in the Latin East,” in *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*, ed. Karl Borhardt, Nikolas Jaspert and Helen J. Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 139–150, esp. 148–149.
5. František M. Bartoš, “Manifesty města Prahy z doby husitské,” *Sborník příspěvků k dějinám hlavního města Prahy* 7 (1933): 253–309, esp. 290–291; *The Register of Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury (1414–1443)*, ed. Ernest F. Jacob, 4 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937–1947), 3:197 and 203.
6. On the criticism of indulgences, see Wilhelm Ernst Winterhager, “Ablaßkritik als Indikator historischen Wandels vor 1517: Ein Beitrag zu Voraussetzungen und Einordnung der Reformation,”

- Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 90 (1999): 6–71, esp. 36–37 for the anti-Ottoman campaigns.
7. On the formation of the crusading indulgence, see Ane L. Bysted, *The Crusade Indulgence: Text, Context, and Culture* (Leiden: Brill, 2015); on fifteenth-century discussion in England, see Swanson, *Indulgences*, 315–328.
 8. For the chronology of events and further literature, see Ota Pavlíček, “The Chronology of the Life and Work of Jan Hus,” in *A Companion to Jan Hus*, ed. František Šmahel and Ota Pavlíček (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 9–68, esp. 48–52; Pavel Soukup, *Jan Hus* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2014), 131–147.
 9. *Magistri Iohannis Hus Questiones*, ed. Jiří Kejř, *Magistri Iohannis Hus Opera Omnia* 19a, *Corpus christianorum: Continuatio mediaevalis* 205 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 79, 86, 100–103 and 120–122.
 10. *Acta summorum pontificum res gestas Bohemicas aevi praehussitici et hussitici illustrantia*, ed. Jaroslav Eršil, 2 vols (Prague: Academia 1980), 361–363, no. 561 and 378–380, no. 604; Johann Loserth, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der husitischen Bewegung 5. Gleichzeitige Berichte und Actenstücke zur Ausbreitung des Wiclifismus in Böhmen und Mähren von 1410 bis 1419,” *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 82 (1895): 327–418, esp. 367–370.
 11. Johann Loserth, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der husitischen Bewegung 4. Die Streitschriften und Unionsverhandlungen zwischen den Katholiken und Husiten in den Jahren 1412 und 1413,” *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 75 (1889): 287–413, esp. 333–339. For parts omitted in this edition, see the manuscript Praha, Národní knihovna ČR, XI E 3, fols 137r–139r.
 12. *Magistri Iohannis Hus Polemica*, ed. Jaroslav Eršil, *Magistri Iohannis Hus Opera omnia* 22, *Corpus christianorum: Continuatio mediaevalis* 238 (Turnhout: Brepols 2010), 459, 541, 560 and 567–568.
 13. Maurice’s work is edited and analysed in Pavel Soukup, “Mařík Rvačka’s Defense of Crusading Indulgences from 1412,” in *The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, vol. 8, ed. Zdeněk V. David and David R. Holeton (Prague: Filosofia, 2011), 77–97.
 14. Pavel Soukup, “Die böhmischen Konzilsteilnehmer zwischen Häresiebekämpfung und Kirchenreform. Die Konstanzer Predigten von Mauritius Rvačka, Stephan von Pálec und Matthäus von

- Königsaal,” in *Das Konstanzer Konzil als europäisches Ereignis. Begegnungen, Medien und Rituale*, ed. Gabriela Signori and Birgit Studt (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2014), 173–217.
15. Jean Gerson, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, 10 vols (Paris: Desclée, 1960–1973), 2:162; Georg Erler, “Dietrichs von Niem Schrift Contra dampnatos Wiclivitas Pragae,” *Zeitschrift für vaterländische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 43 (1885): 178–198, esp. 195.
 16. Recent accounts of the Hussite wars are František Šmahel, *Die Hussitische Revolution*, 3 vols, MGH Schriften 43 (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2002); and Petr Čornej, *Velké dějiny země Koruny české*, vol. 5 (Prague: Paseka, 2000).
 17. *Monumenta Vaticana res gestas Bohemicas illustrantia* 7, ed. Jaroslav Eršil, 2 vols (Prague: Academia 1996–1998), 1:247, no. 565.
 18. *Conciliorum oecumenicorum generaliumque decreta*, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo, 3 vols (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 2/1:204.
 19. Norman Housley, “Indulgences for Crusading, 1417–1517,” in *Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merits: Indulgences in Late Medieval Europe*, ed. Robert N. Swanson (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 277–307, esp. 280, suggests that warriors who fought in person were needed more in the Hussite wars than in other crusades.
 20. *Monumenta Vaticana* 7:311–313, no. 734.
 21. *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hussitenkrieges*, ed. František Palacký, 2 vols (Prague: Friedrich Tempsky, 1873), 1:108–116. On Branda’s instruction and its reception, see Birgit Studt, *Papst Martin V. (1417–1431) und die Kirchenreform in Deutschland* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 507–517. A witness to the implementation of these instructions is the discussion of Abbot Ludolf of Žagaň: see Johann Loserth, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der husitischen Bewegung 3. Der Tractatus de longo schismate des Abtes Ludolf von Sagan,” *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 59 (1880): 343–561, esp. 535–541.
 22. *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Sigmund*, vol. 8, ed. Dietrich Kerler (Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 1883), 62, no. 49.
 23. Hermann Heimpel, *Die Vener von Gmünd und Strassburg 1162–1447. Studien und Texte zur Geschichte einer Familie sowie des gelehrten Beamtentums in der Zeit der abendländischen*

- Kirchenspaltung und der Konzilien von Pisa, Konstanz und Basel*, 3 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982).
24. Heimpel, *Die Vener*, 1354–1365, with summary of the content and a thorough commentary at 898–912.
 25. X. 5, 6, 17, *Corpus iuris canonici*, ed. Emil Friedberg, 2 vols (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1879), 2:777–778.
 26. Heimpel, *Die Vener*, 1360–1361.
 27. I follow here the suggestion of Heimpel, *Die Vener*, 908. See *Monumenta Vaticana* 7:313; *Magnum oecumenicum Constantiense concilium*, ed. Hermann von der Hardt, 6 vols (Frankfurt: Christian Gensch, 1697–1700), 1:670. Phillip H. Stump, *The Reforms of the Council of Constance (1414–1418)* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 161 suggested that Job Vener may have been involved in compiling the *Reformatorii decretales*.
 28. Heimpel, *Die Vener*, 1364; cf. *Quellen zur Kirchenreform im Zeitalter der großen Konzilien des 15. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Jürgen Miethke and Lorenz Weinrich, 2 vols (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995–2002), 1:522–524.
 29. *Deutsche Reichstagsakten*, 8:291–293, no. 243; see also Studt, *Martin V.*, 515 and 530.
 30. On Reinlein’s life and the preaching campaign, see Pavel Soukup, “Augustinian Prior Oswald Reinlein: A Biography of an Anti-Hussite Preacher,” in *The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, vol. 9, ed. Zdeněk V. David and David R. Holeton (Prague: Filosofia, 2014), 98–110.
 31. *Augustini Triumphi Anconitani Summa de potestate ecclesiastica* (Rome: Giorgio Ferrari, 1584), 186–89 (qu. 31, art. 1–3).
 32. Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. I 78, fols 71rb–72vb.
 33. Cent. I 78, fols 111ra–111rb. Cf. Augustinus de Ancona, *Expositio super Matthaicum*, cap. 13, lect. 2, qu. 2: Praha, Národní knihovna ČR, VIII B 19, fols 137ra–137rb. For Jerome, see C. 24, 3, 16, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 1:995.
 34. Cent. I 78, fol. 69ra.
 35. Adolph Franz, *Der Magister Nikolaus Magni de Jawor: Ein Beitrag zur Literatur- und Gelehrten-geschichte des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder’sche Verlagshandlung, 1898), 221–223 and also 114–119.

36. See Dušan Coufal, *Polemika o kalich mezi teologií a politikou 1414–1431. Předpoklady basilejské disputace o prvním z pražských artikulů* (Prague: Kalich, 2012), 263–264.
37. *Neun Texte zur Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung in Deutschland während des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Alexander Reifferscheid (Greifswald: Julius Abel, 1905), 4.
38. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 4268, fol. 62r.
39. “Sub nomine etiam gladii sagittas caveris Anglicanas, secures et lanceas atque sicas seu saxas avito more Saxonicas. Et si non ad litteram in ewangelio forsitan inveneris, senties Deo vindice in fronte, in vitalibus et in corde”: Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner 86, fol. 23r.
40. “Et si vos ad huiusmodi bellum ecclesia excitari senserit, sua præstabit auxilia et universus orbis suffragia reddet, qui vobis quiescentibus dormitat?”: Praha, Knihovna Národního muzea, VIII E 67, fol. 66r.
41. Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, E I 9, fols 413rb–418va.
42. Dresden, Sächsische Landesbibliothek—Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Mscr. Dresd. App. 2300, fols 287va–291rb; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Mil. II 59, fols 308r–310r.
43. Mscr. Dresd. App. 2300, fol. 290va–290vb (in the manuscript, Nicholas III is mentioned by mistake); cf. *Bullarum, diplomatum et privilegiorum sanctorum Romanorum pontificum Taurinensis editio*, ed. Francesco Gaude and Luigi Tomassetti, 25 vols (Turin: Franco, Fory et Dalmazzo, 1857–1872), 4:113–114 (August 1, 1291).
44. The wording is not entirely clear; possibly two different legates are meant: “Et patet similiter de bulla nunc presentis domini nostri pape Martini quinti prius directa regi Sigismundo, et nunc similiter de presenti bulla anno pontata [sic, pro: ad nos portata?] a legato sedis apostolice, et presertim domini cardinalis Heinrici Vintoniensis vulgariter nominati.” Mscr. Dresd. App. 2300, fol. 290vb. On Beaufort’s legation, see Studt, *Martin V*, 636–659.
45. Otakar Odložilík, *The Hussite King: Bohemia in European Affairs 1440–1471* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 135–262; Frederick G. Heymann, *George of Bohemia: King of Heretics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 443–558; Petr Čornej and Milena Bartlová, *Velké dějiny země Koruny české*, vol. 6 (Prague: Paseka, 2007), 200–272; Antonín Kalous, *Matyáš*

- Korvín (1443–1490): Uherský a český král* (České Budějovice: Veduta, 2009), 122–153. On the genesis of the crusade, see Ernst Laslowski, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des spätmittelalterlichen Ablaßwesens* (Breslau: Müller & Seiffert, 1929), 43–59.
46. *Archív český*, vol. 20, ed. František Dvorský (Prague: Bursík & Kohout, 1902), 558.
 47. *Jana z Rabštejna Dialogus*, ed. Bohumil Ryba (Prague: Orbis, 1946), 74–76, 90 and 102.
 48. On Huntepichler's life and works, see Isnard W. Frank, "Leonhard Huntepichler O. P. († 1478). Theologieprofessor und Ordensreformer in Wien," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 36 (1966): 311–388.
 49. The work is edited and commented upon in Pavel Soukup, "Leonarda Huntepichlera návod ke kázání kříže proti českým kacířům," *Acta Universitatis Carolinae—Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis* 56(1) (2016): 65–80.
 50. I use the manuscript Wien, Dominikanerkonvent, Cod. 132/101, fols 72ra–120vb (the part on crusaders ends at fol. 85ra).
 51. "Sicut autem aliqui homines dii nunccupantur propter imitationem et participacionem aliquam specialem, ita servi demonum demones nunccupari possunt, quales sunt pagani, heretici et alii infideles et atque eciam perniciosi et maliciosi fideles, qui nunc multi sunt et non pusilliores in gremio matris sancte ecclesie": Cod. 132/101, fol. 76vb.
 52. "Quo contra aliqui faciunt superbi et avari, qui eundo contra infideles se querunt temporaliter, unde et sepe manibus impiorum perierunt": Cod. 132/101, fol. 77va.
 53. Cod. 132/101, fols 78rb–82rb. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 8, a. 2, in *S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones quodlibetales*, ed. Raimondo Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1956), online edn by Roberto Busa and Enrique Alarcón, www.corpusthomicum.org/q02.html, nos 67183–67194 (updated 2011, accessed November 17, 2016).
 54. Cod. 132/101, fols 82rb–85rb.
 55. Cod. 132/101, fols 91rb–93ra and 103ra–103va.
 56. Cod. 132/101, fols 102rb–103ra. The tale is taken from Dietrich Engelhus' *Nova chronica: Scriptorum Brunsvicensia illustrantium tomus secundus*, ed. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (Hannover:

- Nikolaus Förster, 1710), 1049, and followed by two other stories.
57. Frank, “Leonhard Huntpehler,” 375.
 58. Joseph Klapper, *Der Erfurter Kartäuser Johannes Hagen: Ein Reformtheologe des 15. Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols (Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1960–1961), 1:11–12; Stephen M. Metzger, “The Manuscripts of Writings by Ioannes Hagen de Indagine, O. Cart.,” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 50 (2008): 175–256.
 59. Klapper, *Der Erfurter Kartäuser*, 1:85; 2:59–87 and 135.
 60. *Ibid.*, 1:86–87; 2:46–53 and 136–138; *Les traités anti-bussites du dominicain Nicolas Jacquier (†1472): Une histoire du concile de Bâle et de sa postérité*, ed. Olivier Marin (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 2012), 28.
 61. Erfurt, Bistumsarchiv, Bestand Domarchiv, Hs. Hist. 1, fols 129r–134r (documents) and 134r–143v (Hagen’s comments); Klapper, *Der Erfurter Kartäuser*, 2:88; see the papal commission of Rüdesheim in *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter Georgs von Podiebrad*, ed. Hermann Markgraf, *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum* 9 (Breslau: Josef Max & Comp., 1874), 233–235, no. 365.
 62. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hamilton 54, fols 289v–291v.
 63. Hamilton 54, fol. 291v; Hagen cites the same absolution phrase in Hs. Hist. 1, fol. 134r. For the Fourth Lateran indulgence, see X. 5, 7, 13, § 4, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 2:788.
 64. Hs. Hist. 1, fol. 43v. The contradictory norms Hagen quotes are *Monumenta Vaticana*, 7:369–71, no. 900 and D. 50, 8, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 1:179–80.
 65. Praha, Národní knihovna ČR, IV E 15, fols 68v–85v.
 66. Gustav Sommerfeldt, “Johann Cotbus von Sommerfeld, Cölestiner auf dem Oybin bei Zittau, um 1450,” *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 33 (1909):156–166 and 597–599.
 67. IV E 15, fols 79r and 81v; for details, see below.
 68. The possibility that Sommerfeldt only copied a treatise composed by an anonymous Wrocław author cannot be entirely ruled out, yet there are no manuscripts known to me coming from Wrocław or from anywhere else other than Oybin. Sommerfeldt, “Johann Cotbus,” 158 apparently did not believe in Cotbus’ authorship.

69. IV E 15, fols 78^{bis}_v–79_r; Bernardus Claraevallensis, *De consideratione* 2, 1–3, in: *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. Jacques Leclercq and Henri Marie Rochais, 8 vols (Rome: Editiones cistercienses, 1957–1977), 3:410–412; *MGH Scriptores*, vol. 22, ed. Georg Heinrich Pertz (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1872), 469; Martin von Troppau, *Chronicon Pontificum et Imperatorum*, ed. Anna-Dorothee von den Brincken, MGH, online edn, www.mgh.de/ext/epub/mt (updated July 2014, accessed November 17, 2016), fol. 24r, a.a. 1138.
70. IV E 15, fols 77_r–78_v; Galand de Reigny, *Parabolaire*, ed. Colette Friedlander, Jean Leclercq and Gaetano Raciti, Sources chrétiennes 378 (Paris: Édition du Cerf, 1992), 394–408. Galand’s text—his entire *Quaestio de sancta Cruce* (parable 31)—stretches over four pages, thus forming 90 per cent of Cotbus’ chapter.
71. IV E 15, fols 69_v, 78^{bis}_v and 81^{bis}_r.
72. IV E 15, fols 71_v–72_v; cf. X. 3, 34, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 2:589–596. Cf. James A. Brundage, “The Crusader’s Wife: A Canonistic Quandary,” *Studia Gratiana* 12 (1967): 425–441.
73. “Quisquis ergo insufficientem se ad dignam penitentiam agnoverit, pro sua satisfaccione hanc indulgenciam acquirere studeat, per quam se a penis pro peccatis debitis exuat et vitam eternam acquirit, tormenta purgatorii evadit et gloriam magnam in Dei regno obtinebit”: IV E 15, fol. 81^{bis}_r.
74. “Et hoc, quod dictum est de crucesignatis transmarinis, intelligendum est suo modo de hiis, qui crucem sumunt, ut eant contra hereticos, quibus sicut similis indulgencia conceditur, ita et similis pena pro transgressione voti infligitur”: IV E 15, fol. 85_v.
75. “Utinam hoc et similia nostri tyrones attenderent et tales eligerent et cruce signarent talesque secum ad bellandum ducerent, de quorum meritis apud Deum magis quam de robore corporum presumerent! Haut dubium, quin frequencius vincerent ...”: IV E 15, fol. 73_v.
76. “Quoniam ecce, Vratislavienses pro fide et lege paterna fideliter contra hereticos pugnantes miserabiliter ceciderunt, et hoc ex occulto (MS: occulte) Dei iudicio. Speramus autem, quod ampliori leticia et gloria coronabuntur pro eorum fide et constancia. Nec itaque casus eorum aut aliorum cristifidelium alicui predicatori eos ad hoc exspetantis inputandus est, sed potius peccato pugnancium ...”: IV E 15, fol. 79_r.

77. “An non ydola sub tunicis portant hii, ‘quorum Deus venter est’ [Philippians 3:19], cuiusmodi sunt omnes gulosi, ebriosi atque luxuriosi? Quod enim unusquisque summe diligit et colit, hoc procul dubio pro Deo sibi ipsi constituit. Non est ergo mirum, si tales coram inimicis suis currant et alii eorum de merito similiter succumbant”: IV E 15, fol. 79v.
78. IV E 15, fol. 79r. On the situation in Wrocław, see Jan Drabina, *Rola argumentacji religijnej w walce politycznej w późnośredniowiecznym Wrocławiu* (Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1984), 15–33; Martin Čapský, *Město pod vládou kazatelů. Charizmatičtí náboženští vůdci ve střetu s městskou radou v pozdně středověkých českých korunních zemích* (Prague: Argo, 2015), 79–103.
79. IV E 15, fols 81^{bis}r–83v.
80. IV E 15, fols 84r–85r.
81. IV E 15, fol. 81v.
82. Heimpel, *Die Vener*, 909–910.
83. Thomas said that the wording of the respective papal bull was decisive, i.e. whether the pardon was given *promittentibus* or *transfrentantibus*. See note 53 above.
84. I raised this thesis in previous papers: “Preaching the Cross against the Hussites, 1420–1431,” in *Partir en croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge. Financement et logistique*, ed. Daniel Baloup and Manuel Sánchez Martínez (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Midi, 2015), 195–212, esp. 212; and “Religion and Violence in the Hussite Wars,” in *The European Wars of Religion: An Interdisciplinary Reassessment of Sources, Interpretations, and Myths*, ed. Wolfgang Palaver, Harriet Rudolph and Dietmar Regensburger (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 19–44, esp. 40.
85. Norman Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, 1453–1505* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 100–127 and 174–210.
86. Thomas Lentès, “Nikolaus Paulus (1853–1930) und die ‘Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter,’” in Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses*, 1:XVII.
87. This study was supported by a grant from the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR) “Cultural Codes and Their Transformations in the Hussite Period” (P405/12/G148).

The Military Orders and Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: Perception and Influence

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Since their origins in the twelfth century, the military Orders played an important role in the history of the crusades. In the Holy Land, along the Baltic coast and in Spain, they supported the crusader states and sent their own well-organized contingents to join the crusading armies.¹ Though the brethren were actually not allowed to go on crusade themselves, the Orders were engaged in a kind of permanent crusade, enjoying crusaders' privileges for their own activities.² This continued after the fall of Acre in 1291 and the suppression of the Templars in 1312, when the Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights had acquired their own "Order states,"³ while the Spanish military Orders were increasingly controlled by the Spanish monarchies.⁴ Nevertheless, it is subject to question whether crusading ideas remained important, despite the background changing considerably, especially during the fifteenth century. This question will be the focus of this chapter. First, I shall examine the way in which the military Orders were seen by others and how crusading ideas were perceived by the Orders' members themselves, in the first place for the Teutonic

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Knights and in the second for the Hospitallers, while the third part of the chapter will ask how far these ideas still influenced the Orders' policies and will offer—at least in part—a comparison between the military role of the Teutonic Order and the Hospitallers in the fifteenth century.⁵

The term “crusade” remains subject to debate, especially in the case of the fifteenth century with its variety of crusading.⁶ Crusades were not limited to military campaigns initiated by a papal appeal and endowed with crusading privileges;⁷ the term could also be applied to many other activities to defend Christianity against its external (or also internal) enemies, and it was especially “the rise of the Ottoman Turks [which] transformed the crusade into a mechanism for the defense of Christendom.”⁸ This wider conception of crusading can be found especially in regions with a strong crusading tradition, such as Hungary with its (self-)perception as an *antemurale* of Christianity, but also on the Iberian peninsula with the continuous preaching of the *crusada*.⁹ More generally, a crusade became a war “sanctioned by God [which] had a sacred, defensive character” and in which the Papacy played a central role.¹⁰

Even though the term “crusade” was a late medieval invention,¹¹ it is rarely employed in texts from the fifteenth century that refer to the military Orders. Also, although the popes were formally the heads of the military Orders, they quite often had only an indirect role. Crusading ideas can be found mostly in two central arguments concerning the military Orders' fulfilment of their original aim of “fighting against the pagans” and/or referring to their role as defenders or “shields” of Christianity. Therefore, the influence of crusading ideas both on the perception of the military Orders by others as well as on the self-perception of the Orders' members becomes mostly evident in criticism of the Orders, and in texts which directly or indirectly discussed the tasks and aims of the Orders in their contemporary context. Both the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights faced criticism during the earlier fifteenth century and this influenced the Orders' policies. Thus, the goals of the Teutonic Knights as a military Order were subject to question during the Council of Constance, while the Cretan merchant Emmanuele Piloti criticized the Hospitallers for their lack of activity on Rhodes.¹² The Teutonic Knights tried to return to their roots as described in their historiography, while the Hospitallers emphasized their role as defenders of Christianity, still active in crusading plans, and based on their role on Rhodes.

In the case of the Teutonic Knights, the Christianization of Lithuania by the formal union with Poland in 1386 was an important starting point for criticism against the Order and for many problems of the fifteenth century. When Pope Boniface IX confirmed the Order's right to present its priests for the churches under its patronage in May 1396, he still stressed that "the master and the brethren of the hospital of St Mary of the Germans at Jerusalem fervently and constantly expose themselves and their possessions for the defense and spread of the Catholic faith,"¹³ but in 1404 he finally forbade any further crusading against the Lithuanians.¹⁴ As early as the mid-fourteenth century, in exchange for their Christianization, the Lithuanians had demanded the transfer of the Teutonic Knights to their southern borderlands, while they wanted to take over Prussia and Livonia.¹⁵

In August 1396, Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen had to defend himself and the Order at the Roman *curia* against the reproach "as if the Order would wage war against the newly-converted Christians and not against the pagans, also, as if he would intend to fight just because of land and not because of faith or of Christianity."¹⁶ At this time, the Order had already started negotiations with Vytautas, the Duke of Lithuania and cousin of King Władysław Jagiełło of Poland. As the grand master stressed in his letter to the proctor-general at the Roman *curia*, Johann vom Felde, he held the meeting with Vytautas "to see and listen to the truth" because "many of the Poles dare to speak against the truth."¹⁷ Vytautas and his lands had promised the Knights that they finally "wanted to be good Christians,"¹⁸ but the Order demanded securities: Vytautas should help to build fortresses of the Order, and he and his nobles should provide hostages and give oaths that they would keep to the Christian faith. The Order's representatives also asked Vytautas to be obedient to the Roman Church and to the Roman Empire and to keep to the privileges granted to the Order.

These negotiations led to the Treaty of Salynas Sallinwerder in October 1398.¹⁹ For a long time, modern historiography has interpreted this treaty as part of a long-term strategy of territorial expansion adopted by the Teutonic Knights because Vytautas ceded to the Order the western part of Lithuania, Samogitia. As Sebastian Kubon has recently shown, during the negotiations, Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen focused on the final Christianization of Lithuania—of course under the auspices of the Teutonic Knights—while it was mainly the duke of Lithuania who followed his own strategy in offering Samogitia and who finally helped the Order in its conquest.²⁰ Vytautas favored an alliance with the Order

for his plans in the south-east of Lithuania, but when a campaign against the Mongols failed in 1399, he changed sides again, as after the peace of Raczan in 1404.²¹ Even though the recovery of Samogitia became an important factor in the grand master's policies after the uprising of 1401, von Jungingen still set the basic task of protecting and expanding Christianity into the first place. As he put it in his instructions for his envoy to the Roman King Wenzel as early as April 1397, his main aim was "the protection for Christianity."²²

While the original tasks and aims of the Teutonic Knights and crusading ideas remained influential around 1400, the situation became more difficult after the Order's defeat in the famous Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. The conflicts and controversies with Poland and Lithuania, as well as later on with the Prussian estates, centered around the maintenance and protection of the Order's rights and privileges. Already the debates at the Council of Constance (1414–1418) developed into a lawsuit. For the Polish side, the theologian and canonist Paulus Wladimiri from Kraków claimed that it was not legitimate to deprive the pagans of their property and government, even if they were to resist peaceful Christianization. He summarized his legal arguments in 52 theses which assert that pagans could exercise territorial lordship and that even popes or emperors could not give away heathen territories.²³

From this perspective, the enforced Christianization of Prussia by the Teutonic Knights and the subjection of the heathen Prussians were illegitimate from the beginning and were not covered by their "struggles against the pagans." Therefore, in February 1416, the Polish diplomats suggested that the Order should be employed against Mongols and Turks to follow its foundational tasks. In October 1418, the Polish king went one step further, at least according to a report of the bailiff (*Vogt*) of the Neumark (the eastern part of Brandenburg), Sander von Machwitz. He wrote to Grand Master Michael Kuchmeister that Władysław Jagiełło had begun secret negotiations with the Danish King Erik of Pomerania and "that they wanted to take up the Order in Prussia and to set it close to the king of Cyprus and the master of Rhodes," that is to say, close to the Hospitallers in the Aegean.²⁴

During the Council of Constance, the Teutonic Knights reacted by employing different legal and theological experts, though without success. Thus, the canonist Johannes Urbach confirmed the legality of the Order's wars against the pagans, especially when these adored idols, disturbed the Christians and/or hindered the spread of the Gospel.²⁵ A far more extreme defense of the Order's policies was put forward by the Dominican

Johannes Falkenberg, who accused the Polish side of idolatry and impiety, but this ended up in a scandal.²⁶ In the Order itself, it is likely that the brethren tended to stress their successes in Prussia. Thus, a fictitious eulogy of the Order's lordship also written in about 1416 refers to "the beautiful towns, the wonderful castles and the many fortifications that were built with the help of God for the protection of the faithful against the pagans."²⁷ As in the case of the Hospitallers on Rhodes, the Order's original task was thus related to its territorial lordship.

At least with its supporters, the emperors or Roman kings, the German princes and the nobility of the Empire, the Teutonic Knights succeeded in maintaining a positive perception. When the Roman and Hungarian King Sigismund finally confirmed the Order's possession of the Neumark in September 1429, his charter stated that the Order "was instituted as a shield of Christianity and to extend the holy faith continuously by shedding their blood," and it referred to the conquest of Prussia and the growth of the Order so that "holy Christianity has been living behind them by their labor, toil and care as behind a strong shield in good peace up to this time and has been refreshed as in a quiet garden. Also the borders of the same holy Christianity have been extended by them, pagan misdeeds have been tempered, many expelled, many invited to baptism by their swords and many hosted in holy faith so that the whole of Christianity is now in consolation and delight."²⁸ The text—which was probably inspired by the Order—also stresses the devotion of the brethren in their daily services and the benefit, protection and shield "which holy Christianity may enjoy by them ... in future times."²⁹

The fulfilment of the original tasks was then related to the grant of the Neumark. Since the Order and Prussia had been weakened for many years by quarrels, wars and other stresses and strains, the possession of the Neumark would ensure help, strength and additional incomes, and it would be a gate and a safe road for all German princes, lords and knights rushing to help the brethren in their conflicts.³⁰ A similar line was drawn by the priest-brother Andreas Pfaffendorf in April 1433 when he defended the Order against Polish attacks in a speech at the Council of Basel. He started by recounting the Order's merits during its engagement in the Baltic, which were achieved from a firm territorial basis. According to him, it was only by the gift of Kulmerland (by Konrad of Mazovia in 1230)—and by the support of the French, the English, the Germans and the whole of Christianity—that the brethren managed to establish a firm bulwark against the heathen, from which Poland had drawn much profit.³¹ Nevertheless, King Władysław Jagiełło unceasingly tried to weaken the

Teutonic Knights and even allied with heretics, while the Order only demanded the untroubled possession of its territories. In 1434, this was followed by appeals to the Council of Basel from Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf, the brethren and the supporters of the Order to free the Teutonic Knights from the assaults of the Poles and from other strains, because they were engaged in a continuous war against infidels and heretics.³²

Pffaffendorf, the grand master and the others insinuated here that the Order had been prevented from further engagement by the Polish attacks, and this argument was taken up from the Polish side after the outbreak of the next war between the Teutonic Knights and the Polish-Lithuanian Union, the Thirteen Years' War of 1454–1466. According to the “Gdańsk Chronicle of the Prussian Union” (the *Danziger Chronik vom Bunde*), during the peace negotiations in 1455, it was the new Polish King Kasimierz IV who accused the Order of having hindered the Poles from fighting against the Turks and other pagans. The Teutonic Knights “have fought and struggled very little against the infidels for 200 years or more, but when the crown of Poland fought against the Turks and the infidels, this was prevented by the Knights, who wrongfully invaded the lands of Poland which they burnt down, devastated and severely weakened.”³³

This statement came at a time of existential crisis for the Order and its rule over Prussia. Its subjects, notably the German citizens of the towns and the German and Polish nobility in the Kulmerland and the neighboring areas, rose in revolt against it after the Prussian Union of the Estates had been declared unlawful by Emperor Frederick III in December 1453.³⁴ The Estates occupied many of the Order's castles, expelled the brethren and soon found support from the Polish king, who incorporated Prussia into his kingdom. It was only by mercenaries brought in from the Empire that the Knights could hold the eastern part of their territories. Marienburg Castle was lost when the mercenaries who held it in pawn sold it to Poland and the Estates in 1457.

Even in this difficult situation, the Order's members tried to keep to their original tasks and aims, though these had to be adapted to their daily experiences. This can be gathered, for example, from the so-called “Histories because of a Union” probably written by a brother living between 1454 and 1457 in Marienburg Castle.³⁵ While the brethren always act righteously and as true Christians, the members of the Estates are portrayed as treacherous and evil, like the mercenaries who changed sides because of outstanding payments. This is demonstrated by the celestial support received by the Knights, for example, when attacking Polish

soldiers were “well received with God’s help,”³⁶ and even the smallest success is taken as proof of the right attitude of the brethren.

On several occasions it was the Virgin Mary, the Order’s patron, who was offering assistance. Thus, in April 1454, when the brethren had chosen *Unser liebe frouwe* as the motto of the day, they succeeded in defending themselves against an attack on Marienburg Castle.³⁷ Much more important was the victory of the Order at Konitz in September 1454, which was the major cause for the war’s long duration. While the Polish army under King Kasimierz was besieging the town held by small contingents of the Knights, the Order’s mercenaries came from the West, and the Poles were put to flight. They even left behind the royal treasure, archive and banners.³⁸ This success is immediately related to celestial support: “Almighty God and his honorable mother Mary looked with immense mercy at the Germans who had come into the country to their honor and praise and to save the Order of the Virgin Mary, gave them strength and power and good mind to resist the Polish.”³⁹ The “Histories because of a Union” link this with a miracle allegedly reported by Polish captives. Though there were only a few fighters in Konitz itself, the Poles had supposedly witnessed mighty, well-armed troops coming out from the town.

The direct intervention of God and St Mary is even extended in the First Continuation of the so-called “Older Grand Master’s Chronicle” (*Ältere Hochmeisterchronik*).⁴⁰ Again, a miracle is allegedly reported by the Polish captives. This time, an image of the Virgin in white clothing appeared in the sky above the Order’s contingents and put the Poles to flight. Some credit was also given to the help of St Barbara, whose head was kept in the commandery of Althaus-Kulm.⁴¹ This celestial support is obviously offered as proof of the brethren’s adherence to their original ideals and aims—the defense of Christianity against interior and exterior enemies—and it may be no accident that the Order’s chronicles end before the second peace of Toruń in 1466.⁴²

After 1466, when the situation in Prussia became more difficult, the members of the Order were obviously looking for new ways to adapt their foundational tasks and aims to the present. In fact, a new approach was brought forward by two chronicles from the bailiwicks in the Empire. At the end of the fifteenth century, a brother from the bailiwick of Franconia composed the so-called “Chronicle of the Four Orders of Jerusalem” (a modern name).⁴³ Here, the self-perception of the Teutonic Knights is constituted by the common origin of four institutions related to Jerusalem, namely the canons of the Holy Sepulcher, the Hospitallers, the Templars

and the Teutonic Order. They are closely related, so that even the militarization of the Teutonic Knights is pre-dated to the period in Jerusalem when in reality there was only a German hospital under the tutelage of the Hospitallers.

In around 1500, the so-called “Younger Grand Master’s Chronicle” (*Jüngere Hochmeisterchronik*) originated probably in the bailiwick of Utrecht.⁴⁴ It followed a model adapted from the Hospitallers in presenting a pre- and early history of the military Orders starting from the time of the Maccabees, but their real beginning is the foundation of two hospitals by the Empress Helena, the mother of Constantine, on mount Sion. The one for the Romance-speaking pilgrims became the founding house of the Knights of St John, the other one for the German-speaking people the center of the Teutonic Knights, whose militarization is correctly described.⁴⁵ While in the “Chronicle of the Four Orders of Jerusalem” the recent history of the Knights is mentioned, it no longer receives the attention it had in the older chronicles. The Order’s role as defender of Christianity seems purely historical, and its privileges were earned earlier.

The same rather nostalgic note can be found in a late medieval death-dance scene from the house of the Dominicans in Berne, Switzerland. In this wall painting, a brother of the Teutonic Knights says when turning to Death: “I have fought with Turks and pagans, suffered much from the infidel, but I did not grapple with someone stronger than Death who defeated me.”⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the crusading tradition of the Teutonic Order continued well into the early modern period. The reformed statutes of 1606 demanded that younger brethren should serve for at least three years in the Order’s castles at the border with the Ottoman Empire, while in around 1600, the Knights were regularly contributing between 500 and 1,000 men to the Imperial forces,⁴⁷ and Grand Master Archduke Maximilian I (1585/1590–1618) became a leading figure in the Habsburg campaigns against the Turks.⁴⁸ Thus, throughout the fifteenth century, the Order’s foundational aims and tasks—the struggle against the pagans and the defense of Christianity—never lost their importance; rather, they were adapted according to time and circumstances. So the Order’s conflicts with the Polish-Lithuanian Union led to a close relationship between the defense of Christianity and the Knights’ rule over Prussia, and after the Order’s defeat and the second peace of Toruń in 1466, the brethren returned to their original aim of fighting the pagans, defining their roots in terms of the Holy Land and the history of the crusades.

While the Teutonic Knights had reached the peak of their reputation at the time of their Lithuanian campaigns in the fourteenth century, the Hospitallers won further public prestige during the fifteenth century through their successes against Mamluk and Ottoman attacks on Rhodes, culminating in the raising of the siege of 1480. A further difference between the two surviving greater military Orders lay in the intensity of papal influence, which was much more substantial in the case of the Hospitallers. At least since the deposition of Master Foulques de Villaret in the convent on Rhodes in 1318 and since the takeover of the possessions of the Templars at the same time, the Knights of St John were strongly related to papal crusading policies.⁴⁹ This continued well into the fifteenth century, especially during the campaigns and plans of Nicholas V, Calixtus III and Pius II. The Papacy saw the “struggle against the pagans” as the foundational task of the Hospitallers. As Nicholas V put it in a bull for Charles VII of France and the Hospitallers in May 1451, the Order “existed from its first foundation in its regular habit as a knighthood against the perfidy of the infidel, the enemies of the cross of Christ, Turks and Saracens.”⁵⁰

In the years preceding and following 1400, criticism of the Order came to focus on its role within the crusading movement. In the 1390s, Philippe de Mézières, the former chancellor of King Peter I of Cyprus, stated that the members of the Order who came to Rhodes for some time did this only because they wanted to be rewarded with offices in the European priories which guaranteed them a great income; after that, they would never come back to the East. He also accused them of having no interest in the recovery or defense of the Holy Land,⁵¹ thus neglecting the original aims of the Order.

The Venetian merchant Emmanuele Piloti from Crete added a more concrete reproach in his massive work on crusading dating from 1420/1441.⁵² He thought that the Order had promised to maintain at least a fleet of ten ships after it had conquered Rhodes. While this commitment was kept in the beginning, as in the naval league of 1334, Piloti noted that since then, the number of ships had been steadily reduced, sometimes coming down to a single galley in service, like the “galley of Rhodes” in 1403. He thus accused the Knights of neglecting their duties in the defense of Christianity.

Step by step, the Hospitallers reacted by declaring their daily business to be part of the defense of Christianity. For example, according to a letter of conduct for a mission to exchange Muslim prisoners against Christians dating from April 1450, the Order was fighting endless wars “against the

infidel enemies of the Christian faith and name.”⁵³ In May 1459, when the tongue of Provence decided on the administration of properties in the priory of St Gilles, the brethren were described as “staying in the convent on Rhodes under true obedience in the service of immortal God and the Christian faith,”⁵⁴ thus alluding to the observance of the Order’s original ideals.

Similar arguments were used more frequently in the period around 1500, for example, for the collation of offices or for the summons of brethren to Rhodes. A particularly interesting example dates from May 1504, when George Dundas was granted the preceptory of Torphichen in Scotland. Perhaps because the decision was disputed, he is styled “as being well-experienced and meritorious for our Order and the whole of Christianity because of the services he offered in the East under our regular habit for the protection of the Catholic faith and people against the Turks.”⁵⁵ But this is not a unique document. The nomination of Pedro Marino as preceptor of Bamba in July 1511 points to the “praiseworthy service which you performed in the East for our Order in defense of the Catholic faith.”⁵⁶ In general, it was service on Rhodes which gave rise to references to the Order’s foundational tasks and aims. In December 1501, Hugues de Halencourt was allowed to leave the convent to look after his preceptories, but he had to return to Rhodes in the following year “to help the town of Rhodes and ... the Catholic faith.”⁵⁷ When the English prior Thomas Docray was summoned to Rhodes in September 1510, he was to take part in the Order’s conflicts against the Muslims “for the honor of God and for the exaltation of the most holy Catholic faith.”⁵⁸ Another letter of summons from the same period explicitly refers to “the defense of the holy Catholic faith.”⁵⁹

In consequence, it was a serious offence when brethren failed to pay their responsions (taxes) which served to finance the convent on Rhodes and the Order’s activities in the East. This was not only impressed upon the brethren during the chapters general, but also by many papal letters. From time to time, the popes also turned to other ecclesiastical and secular authorities for help against disobedient officials of the Order, who—as Pope Eugenius IV wrote in December 1433—“set aside their Order’s advantage and honor as well as the dignity of the Christian republic, for which the master and convent of the same Hospital are set on the island of Rhodes like a bulwark of the faith, to protect [it] against the perfidious enemies, Turks and other infidels.”⁶⁰ A similar note was adopted by Pius II in March 1463 when he confirmed the decisions of a chapter general

on Rhodes. He emphasized the carnage that the “prince of the Turks and others had inflicted on the Christian cult and name.”⁶¹ The strong link between the Order’s tasks and the payment of responsions and other dues is also made clear in internal documents. In October 1510, Master Émery d’Amboise nominated Jean Donay as his proctor for the houses in the French priories which were part of the *camera* or *mensa magistralis*. Their importance is made clear by the remark that “from them we not only maintain our state in the East, but we also bolster [sc. help pay] the expenses for the defense of the Catholic faith.”⁶²

During the fifteenth century, the Order’s importance for the defense of Christianity became part of its propaganda in the West, especially since the actual danger of attacks by the Mamluks and the Ottomans increased. This started with the attack of a Mamluk fleet on Rhodes and its neighboring islands in 1440. Already in November 1440, Master Jean de Lastic reported in detail on the Mamluk attack in a letter to the Castellan of Amposta, Juan de Villagut, a text which was probably intended for circulation in the West.⁶³ The sultan of Egypt is described as “our enemy and that of the whole Christian faith” who started this attack secretly, thus breaking the truce, “hoping to impose eternal shame on us and the whole Christian people.”⁶⁴ This is followed by a report on the events and on the indignation of Sultan Al-Zahir (Sayf-ad-Din Jaqmaq, 1438–1453) after the failure of the campaign. According to the letter, he was convinced that once he had submitted Rhodes to his rule, he would enjoy victory over all other Christians in the East.⁶⁵

The master also pointed out that the Mamluk sultan had entered into an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan, Murad II, his former enemy, and that the two Islamic rulers were now aiming at the downfall of Christianity. Therefore, Christian princes should not fight to obtain control over kingdoms and provinces; instead, they should be persuaded to help the Christian faith so that they could receive appropriate rewards from God. If they failed to respond to this appeal, the Order would be free from blame and, if necessary, the brethren would offer their lives for Christ.⁶⁶ The argument is clear: Rhodes is the cornerstone for the defense of Christianity; should it fall, the whole Latin East will follow, and soon all other Christians will be in danger. Therefore, the Knights of St John are true crusaders and defenders of Christianity, not sparing their own lives.

This viewpoint was also taken up by the Papacy. In April 1444, when Rhodes was threatened by a second Mamluk campaign, Pope Eugenius IV appealed to the Knight-brethren to come to Rhodes as reinforcements.

There, the adversaries are described as “the perfidious enemies of Christ, those Saracens subject to the Sultan of Egypt.”⁶⁷ In December 1451, Pope Nicholas V demanded the payment of responsions, referring to the Order’s debts. These had been incurred as a result of the Mamluk invasions of 1440 and 1444, “because of the serious attacks in former times by the perfidious Saracens, the enemies of Christ.”⁶⁸

The Hospitallers followed this line when they reported their success in the siege of Rhodes town in 1480. As early as September 1480, Master Pierre d’Aubusson sent a detailed letter to Emperor Frederick III,⁶⁹ in which he at first underlined the fortunate outcome of the siege “for the honor of the Christian name.”⁷⁰ Aubusson gives a vivid description of the different operations, like the battle around St Nicholas’ Tower at the entrance to the harbor, and the clashes at certain parts of the city walls, for example, close to the Jewish quarter or at the zone defended by the Italian *langue* (tongue). During the struggle, Aubusson ordered that the flags of the Knights be raised, including one showing the image of Jesus Christ, and when the Order’s contingent resisted the Turkish assault, he ascribed this to divine assistance: “We do not doubt that God sent help from the Heavens so that the small people venerating Christ would not be infected by the superstition of the Muslims.”⁷¹

Guillaume Caoursin, the Order’s vice-chancellor, went even further in his description of the siege, the *Obsidionis Rhodiae Urbis Descriptio*, which was widely circulated.⁷² According to him, in the decisive moment of the siege, the Knights were especially supported by the Virgin Mary, St John the Baptist and their celestial contingents.⁷³ He reports that even before the beginning of the siege, the famous image of St Mary from the monastery on Mount Philereos was taken down to Rhodes town and carried around it in a procession to invoke the help of the Virgin. As Aubusson had already remarked in his letter to the emperor, during the decisive battle the master had ordered that the flags of the Order be raised, together with another flag representing Christ on the cross, also depicting St Mary and St John the Baptist, the Order’s patron. This was probably related to an event similar to the celestial phenomenon at Konitz in 1454. According to Caoursin, Turkish captives later reported that they had seen a golden cross in the sky, the Virgin dressed in white and armed with shield and spear, as well as St John the Baptist and other celestial contingents.⁷⁴ As in the case of the Teutonic Knights, such celestial support confirmed that the Order still followed its original aims and tasks.

This continued well into the period around 1500. One of the last greater military operations of the Knights of St John before the fall of Rhodes to the Ottomans in 1522 was a naval campaign against a Mamluk fleet under the command of the sultan's nephew, supported by the Ottomans and collecting timber for ship-building along the Syrian coast in 1510. Though the operation was also intended to help the Portuguese who expected the building of a Mamluk fleet for the Indian Ocean,⁷⁵ it was accompanied by intensive crusading rhetoric.

In the instructions of Master Émery d'Amboise for the commanders, the Seneschal Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam and the Chancellor Andrea d'Amaral—himself Portuguese—the departure itself was placed under celestial support. Thus, they would start “in the name of God and the glorious Virgin Mary under the protection of Saint John the Baptist our patron,” and for their operation they were to commend themselves to “our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all victories proceed,” to St Mary and to St John the Baptist. Following their vows, the brethren would fight for “the defense of our holy faith ... and for the exaltation of the Christian name.”⁷⁶ When Villiers was rewarded for the success of the expedition by his nomination as capitular bailiff of the Morea in March 1511, the victory was ramped up even further. It was declared to be a strong contribution “to the honor of our Order, the exaltation of the orthodox community, the glory of the Christian name and the peace of the Christian faithful living in and coming to the East.”⁷⁷

Changes in the self-perception of the Order are also reflected in the most influential, albeit very short piece of historiography emanating from the Knights of St John, the introduction to the statutes which presented the Order's early history. Though its reliability had been questioned, for example, by Guglielmo di San Stefano in around 1300, it remained practically unchanged until the fifteenth century, aside from minor variations in the manuscripts.⁷⁸ Finally it became the new version of the *Stabilimenta* from 1489/1493, which also included a revised early history of the Hospitallers.⁷⁹

Although the text adheres to the foundation of a first hospital in Jerusalem by the Maccabees, there is no suggestion that the institution predated Gerard, the first known administrator of the hospital. Hospitality and military service are treated equally, and for the first time, the Order's militarization becomes an important part of the story. Following in the footsteps of the Maccabees, Gerard and his companions are shown founding a new hospital dedicated to St John the Baptist, in which they cared for the

poor and the sick, administered the sacraments, refreshed the pilgrims and freed prisoners. But soon others came to the hospital “for the zeal of the defense of the Catholic faith induced by God” and took up arms to protect “the pilgrims and places from the incursions of the barbarians.”⁸⁰ Thus, the brethren became the true successors to Judas Maccabeus and Johannes Hyrcanos. This continued under Raymond de Puy, who instituted the RULE which was then approved by Pope Eugenius III. The Order was then joined by many nobles and common people, clerical and lay, and grew in terms of both property and fame. Raymond’s successors followed with many other distinguished actions, and then “the Jerusalem knighthood, hospitality and observance was moved to Rhodes.”⁸¹ Crusading ideas, the defense of Christianity and the protection of pilgrims and the holy places are all related to the Maccabean tradition of the military Orders.

After the siege of Rhodes in 1480, the defense of Christianity became more and more focused on resistance to the Ottomans. This is reflected in a “Treatise on the Expedition against the Turks” (*Tractatus expeditionis faciende contra Turcum*) written by François de Bourdon, a Hospitaller priest and canon lawyer at the Roman *curia* in the time of Pope Julius II (1503–1513). Bourdon probably intended his text for internal circulation and it survives only in an abridged or fragmentary version.⁸² After the standard remark that the external dangers confronting Christianity are the result of its sins, the author first reverts to the ideal of the First Crusade. For a campaign against the Ottomans, the pope will have to revive Christian spirituality, muster a great army of crusaders and up to 50,000 mercenaries, and make provision for its supplies. In addition to logistics, finances, the supply of weapons and medical care receive special attention. A special chapter is devoted to the foundational task of the military Orders, and the fight against the pagans and its legitimization. Starting with the persecution of the early Christians, Bourdon concludes with the Ottoman threat, referring in addition to the defense of Rhodes against the Ottomans at the time of Master Pierre d’Aubusson.

While in Bourdon’s treatise, the defense of Christianity is more generally directed against the Ottomans, in the arguments of the Knights of St John, it is quite often strongly linked with the defense of Rhodes as a cornerstone for the defense of Christianity. This allowed for a more pragmatic approach when any effort had to be made for the preservation of the Order’s territorial lordships. Not only did the Hospitallers conclude truces or seal peace treaties with their Muslim neighbors,⁸³ but from time to time they even formed alliances, like that in 1516–1517 with the Mamluks, whom they probably even furnished with artillery. Nevertheless, crusading

ideas remained crucial both for the Order's members and for its supporters, popes and princes.

* * *

Both the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers thus adhered to their foundational aims and tasks, though they did so in the changing context of fifteenth-century crusading, which leads us to ask how far this adherence influenced the policies of the two Orders and their participation in military campaigns and conflicts. During the 1400s, the Teutonic Knights and Hospitallers faced very different military challenges, which in turn created different preconditions for their participation in crusading activities. While the Teutonic Knights were for many years at war with the Polish-Lithuanian Union, the Hospitallers were increasingly forced into the defense of their base on Rhodes against Mamluks and Ottomans alike. After the rebellion of their subjects in the Thirteen Years' War of 1454–1466, the Teutonic Knights lost much of their territory and strength, and could not send substantial contributions to the crusades waged by the Polish kings. Only later did they support the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans. The Hospitallers participated in crusading schemes in the earlier fifteenth century, but soon experienced serious problems, especially financial ones. They reached the height of their reputation after their successful defense of Rhodes in 1480, a situation which persisted up to the loss of their island lordship in 1522.

Around 1400, both Orders were still involved in activities for the defense of Christianity. In this period, the Hospitallers were weakened by the consequences of the Great Schism, in which the convent on Rhodes was only supported—at least until 1409—by the provinces belonging to the Avignonese obedience. Nevertheless, the Order took part in several campaigns in Greece, as well as to defend the Byzantine territories on the Peloponnese around Mistra. For some time, they took over the responsibility for the principality of Achaia and they defended Corinth as the central bulwark for the passage to the Peloponnese.⁸⁴ A contingent of the Order under Philibert de Naillac travelled to join the crusade of King Sigismund of Hungary in 1396.⁸⁵ After the Nicopolis crusade, the Hospitallers also supported the French Marshal Boucicaut with one or two galleys during his naval operations to defend Constantinople.⁸⁶

But Smyrna (Izmir) played an even more important role. Urged on by Pope Gregory XI, the Order had taken over its administration in 1374. Around 1402, when the danger for Greece, Smyrna and Rhodes was increasing, the brethren debated how to set their priorities.⁸⁷ It was decided

that they should concentrate on Rhodes, its neighboring islands and Smyrna. After Timūr conquered the town—following his victory against the Ottomans in the Battle of Ankara—in December 1402, the brethren continued to fight for a stronghold on the Turkish coast. In 1407, Master Philibert de Naillac started to erect a new tower close to Smyrna, but this was soon destroyed. Finally, in 1407/1408, the Knights were offered a location for a new castle close to the ancient site of Halikarnassos at St Peter (today Bodrum).⁸⁸ The Castle of St Peter was finally held until 1522, though the Hospitallers scaled down their activities there after 1409.

About the same time, the Teutonic Knights continued their campaigns against Lithuania even though the country had formally been Christianized by the Polish-Lithuanian Union of 1386. The Order tried to achieve the acceptance of Christianity in Lithuania on its own terms, and thus entered into negotiations only if there was an opportunity for that. Thus, from a first contact between Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen and the Lithuanian Duke Vytautas in June 1395, they concluded several truces, concluding with the Treaty of Sallinwerder in 1398.⁸⁹ It is no accident that Samogitia, the western part of Lithuania on the coast of the Baltic, was excluded from these truces. For a long time, it had maintained a certain independence from the Lithuanian rulers—even from Vytautas—while it had probably been granted to the Teutonic Knights as early as 1253 by the first Lithuanian king, Mindowe.⁹⁰ Thus, since the mid-1390s, Samogitia became the main target for the Order's crusading activities, during its conquest in 1400 and its reconquest in 1405 in close cooperation with Vytautas, who made the successes possible.⁹¹ After that and after the Battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald in 1410, crusading in Prussia slowly drew to an end.⁹²

It was the Treaty of Sallinwerder which opened up new possibilities. Vytautas needed support for his plans against the Mongols of the Golden Horde, and for this, the Order was a welcome ally. Already before peace was concluded, the Order sent probably about 60 men under Eberhard von Wallenfels, a former adjutant of the grand master, to fight the Mongols.⁹³ When Vytautas prepared a larger campaign in 1399, the Order mobilized a group of knight brethren, more than 300–400 men, and over 1,600 horses under the commander of Ragnit, Marquard von Salzbach.⁹⁴ The contingent came from different parts of Prussia and was financially supported by the grand master.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the Polish army was four times larger, and there were many Orthodox Christians and Mongols under Lithuanian rule. This host, composed of Catholics, “schismatics” and

“pagans,” even received a crusading bull from Pope Boniface IX.⁹⁶ The expedition ended in complete disaster. The army moved into the south-east of Lithuania, where it reached the Vorskla, a tributary of the Dnjepř. When Vytautas had to withdraw his troops from a Mongol fortification, his enemies pursued him, and they succeeded in defeating and scattering the heterogeneous force. Many men died, including nine knights of the Order, while Marquard von Salzbach, Vytautas, his brother, and others enjoyed a narrow escape.⁹⁷

This failure brought to a close cooperation between the Teutonic Knights and Vytautas against the Mongols. But after the peace of Raciąz in 1404 and the reconquest of Samogitia in the following year, cooperation was renewed in campaigns against the “schismatics,” that is, the principalities of Pskov and Moscow. In July 1406, Vytautas attacked Moscow, which had joined Pskov and Novgorod against Lithuania. In this, he was supported by a Prussian contingent under the commander of Ragnit, Graf Friedrich von Zollern, and the bailiff of Samogitia, Michael Kűchmeister.⁹⁸ The host moved into Moscow territories, where it stayed ravaging for 15 weeks without any major encounter, and the Prussian troops returned home without losses. A second campaign was conducted in September 1408, again supported by a Polish army and a Prussian contingent, this time under the commander of Brandenburg, Marquard von Salzbach. The Russians had received reinforcements from Mongol troops, and for some time both hosts stayed close to each other, until finally a truce was agreed.⁹⁹

Cooperation with Vytautas ended because of the second Samogitian rebellion against the Order—which Vytautas supported—and from 1409 because of the conflict between the new grand master, Ulrich von Jungingen, and the Polish-Lithuanian Union. After the meditation of the Bohemian (and Roman) King Wenzel failed, the two armies met in the famous Battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald on July 15, 1410, in which the grand master, many of the leading officials and about 300 brethren were killed. Though the Polish-Lithuanian army failed to capture Marienburg, the first peace of Toruń (1411) did not bring about a long-term solution. New military conflicts followed in 1414, 1416, 1419, 1421 and 1430–1433,¹⁰⁰ all of them fought on Prussian soil, bringing severe destruction to towns, villages, churches and fields. This was stopped by further peace treaties in Melnosee (1422) and Brest (Brześć Kujawski, 1435), but the Order had lost much of its earlier appeal, and both events and internal problems caused alienation amongst the Order’s subjects.

In the 1410s and 1420s, the Hospitallers too reached a low point in their history. The Order seemed inactive, focused only on Rhodes and its lordship in the Aegean. It may be no coincidence that the first surviving contracts on the *corso* date from this period, specifically the years 1413 and 1416.¹⁰¹ They reflect a lower level of warfare against the Order's Muslim neighbors, fought practically at no cost—indeed, the corsairs brought additional income to Rhodes.¹⁰² Christian captains or individual Hospitallers received letters of marque and reprisal that allowed them to attack Muslim ships, but only in limited areas and under certain conditions. This form of warfare continued into the early modern period. The brethren probably perceived the *corso* as part of their “struggle against the infidel.”¹⁰³

When the Mamluk and Ottoman attacks began, the Order's reputation gradually improved. This started with the Mamluk assault on Cyprus in 1426, in which the Hospitaller properties at Kolossi were devastated and King Janus I was taken captive.¹⁰⁴ The Order contributed to his release and also renewed its truce with the Mamluks in 1428. Nevertheless, other Mamluk fleets attacked Rhodes in 1440 and 1444. In 1440, the Egyptians first ravaged the Order's outpost on the island of Castellorizzo, east of Rhodes, and then turned to Rhodes itself. The Order had been forewarned and it mustered a fleet of seven galleys and ten other ships. After a sea battle, the Mamluk fleet withdrew to the Turkish coast, having concluded an alliance with the Ottomans. Even though the waters were not deep enough, the Order's fleet attacked again so that the Egyptians turned away, again attacking the Order's properties on Cyprus.¹⁰⁵ When the diplomatic efforts of the Order failed, a second Mamluk fleet appeared before Rhodes in August 1444. This time, Rhodes town was besieged for 40 days. The defense of Rhodes thus became slowly identical with the defense of Christianity, and the Knights of St John were able to prove that they were still following their foundational tasks and aims.

This kind of proof was much more difficult for the Teutonic Knights to advance. True, the Order still had properties in Greece, close to the territories of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁶ But the few houses there were too far away from the Order's centers in the Baltic and too weak to be used as bases for any kind of military operation. In 1411, the Order tried to sell the bailiwick of *Romania* to Venice, but in vain.¹⁰⁷ As early as the period 1422–1432, many of the possessions in the bailiwick of *Romania*, including the main house at Mostenitz, were lost to the Byzantines of Mistra. After that, the Order often used its remaining house in Modon as a kind

of camp for gamblers and drinkers, though it was also visited by pilgrims on the way to the Holy Land.¹⁰⁸ It was finally lost when Venetian Modon was conquered by the Ottomans in 1500.

As early as 1397, the Hungarian King Sigismund had tried to re-establish the Teutonic Knights in Hungary, in the territory lost in 1225 and known as the Burzenland.¹⁰⁹ Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen welcomed this offer, but also enquired about the condition of the castles in the area. This came to nothing, but after the peace of Melnosee (1422), when the Knights seemed free from external dangers, Sigismund, now also King of the Romans, repeated his invitation several times starting in 1426. Finally, when it came to the permanent conveyance of the Neumark in 1429, Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf agreed to pursue the idea. The Order sent out six brethren under Nicolaus von Redwitz and a small military contingent, and also craftsmen to build ships on the Danube and to fortify the castles.¹¹⁰

Sigismund had endowed the Order with the territories around Severin (Szörényvár), close to the "Iron Gate" of the Danube, which had to be defended against the Ottomans.¹¹¹ In May 1430, Redwitz and his companions had taken over a larger dominion and seemed well established, according to a report to the Papacy.¹¹² He even thought to open up diplomatic relations with the Ottomans.¹¹³ But soon the situation deteriorated. The income from the castles proved inadequate, and the Hungarian nobility prevented the Knights from fortifying their castles. When they were attacked by Ottoman troops, they were even not supported by the Hungarians.¹¹⁴ This became even more apparent during an Ottoman campaign in Wallachia and southern Hungary, in 1432 when most of the Order's castles were lost and many of its men died. Redwitz and the remaining contingents managed to hold out in three castles under very poor conditions until 1434, but finally had to withdraw,¹¹⁵ probably due to the renewed war with Poland and Lithuania.

The Order's resources were not sufficient for supplying a contingent of brethren far away from its own territories. Thus, the Teutonic Knights' venture in Hungary was not revived after the 'Eternal Peace' of Brest in 1435, probably also because of the increasing internal problems both in Prussia and within the Order. When many of the Order's subjects rose against its rule early in 1454, took and destroyed its castles, and placed themselves under the control of the king of Poland, the Order could only react by bringing in mercenaries from Germany and Bohemia. The mercenaries won the Battle of Konitz in September 1454, but in the end

the Order could only defend the eastern parts of its territories where they were supported by the Prussian nobility. The second peace of Toruń in 1466 then signaled a dramatic contraction of the Order's strength in Prussia.¹¹⁶

From the 1440s to the 1460s, the Hospitallers also experienced severe internal conflicts, especially between the three French *langues* and the other tongues in the convent on Rhodes, a clash which came to an end only after the formal division of the Spanish *langue* in 1462.¹¹⁷ The popes intervened to initiate reforms by summoning two chapters general to Rome, in 1446 and 1466–1467, though without lasting success.¹¹⁸ Despite this, the Order succeeded in financing the fortification and defense of Rhodes, and in participating in the crusading activities which started after the fall of Constantinople to Mehmed II in 1453. Thus, in 1450 and 1460, the Knights sent out galleys to support Cyprus and the legitimate heir to the throne, Charlotte,¹¹⁹ though they could not prevent the accession of James II, supported by the Mamluks.¹²⁰ In 1457, Cardinal Ludovico Trevisan, the papal legate, came to Rhodes to organize crusading activities against the Ottomans, and was helped by the Order.¹²¹ When Pope Pius II focused on a new crusade after his election in 1458, the Knights of St John formed part of the programs, finally promising four galleys under Master Pere Ramon Zacosta for the crusading fleet in 1464.¹²²

After 1453, Mehmed II several times demanded the payment of tribute, but the Order could not accept this, even for the sake of Rhodes' security, and the brethren only once sent him a "voluntary" gift. Indeed, the Knights contributed to the defense of other Christian territories in the Aegean, for example, in 1470, when the Ottomans attacked Venetian Negroponte. They immediately sent out two galleys under the command of Joan de Cardona, bailiff of Mallorca, though with little success. In the operations that ensued in the Aegean and along the Cilician coast in 1472, the Hospitallers contributed a further two galleys under Rudolf von Werdenberg, the bailiff of Brandenburg, to a fleet organized by the Pope, Venice and Naples.¹²³

The Ottoman advance seemed unstoppable, so an attack on Rhodes was only a matter of time. A first contingent landed in December 1479, and a Turkish army of 70,000–100,000 men on 100–160 ships followed in May 1480. The Hospitallers could only muster about 300 knights, 300 other members of the Order, and 3,000–4,000 mercenaries, including a contingent under Benedetto de la Scala from Verona.¹²⁴ So they concentrated on the defense of Rhodes town, which was heavily besieged. At first, the fight-

ing concentrated on St Nicholas' Tower, at the entrance to the harbor, which was defended even though it was partially demolished. Parts of the wall were also damaged by bombards, but were also held by the personal intervention of Grand Master Pierre d'Aubusson.¹²⁵ The peak of the attacks was reached on July 27–28, with more than 3,500 dead Turks that day alone. The conflict finally ended on August 17, when the Ottoman forces were withdrawn in favor of an operation against Otranto in southern Italy.

The Knights of St John used their success to enhance their reputation in the West, as they retold the story of the siege and showed their renewed fortifications to an increasing number of pilgrims making their way to Jerusalem.¹²⁶ Also in the years after 1480, important events led to a more peaceful situation on Rhodes. Mehmed II died in 1481 and the succession of his oldest son, Bayezid II, was contested by his younger brother Djem. When Djem finally lost the struggle against his brother, he turned for help to the Hospitallers and surrendered to them in July 1482. The Knights negotiated terms with Bayezid, who agreed to pay 35,000 ducats annually for the support of his brother. Djem was brought to the West, where he travelled from one house of the Order to another; finally he was handed over to the pope.¹²⁷ At least until his death in 1495, the Order enjoyed a period of relative peace.

On the contrary, the situation of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia became even worse after 1466.¹²⁸ The Order had not only lost the major—and richer—part of its territories, it had also incurred heavy debts and thus was forced to pay the mercenaries by granting them its remaining lands and incomes. The plans for a reconquest of western Prussia failed. The War of the Priests (*Pfaffenkrieg*) in 1477–1479 as well as the War of the Riders (*Reiterkrieg*) in 1519–1521—despite an alliance with Moscow concluded in 1517—changed nothing,¹²⁹ nor did the election of grand masters from great noble houses of the Empire, the dynasties of Wettin and Hohenzollern.

Nevertheless, the Order had to follow when the Polish kings prepared campaigns against the Ottomans and demanded its support. Thus, in 1485, when the Turks had devastated Wallachia, Kasimierz IV summoned the grand master to come with his troops. Martin Truchsess von Wetzhausen appeared with 500 men, but his contingent was judged too small and was sent home.¹³⁰ In 1497, King John Albert forced Grand Master Hans von Tiefen to send the Order's host for a campaign to the Black Sea. This time, the Order had mustered about 1,500 men with their horses and their attendants, altogether about 4,000 men. The troops

moved through Poland until they reached Lemberg (Lwów) by the end of August. By then, the aging grand master was already seriously ill and when he died, most of the Order's officials followed his body back to Prussia.¹³¹ The contingent remaining with the Polish king suffered a crushing defeat by a Moldavian-Ottoman army near Koźmin in the Bukovina, and many of the men died.¹³² Thus, at the end of the fifteenth century, the Order's conflicts against the infidel were not successful, a situation which would change only with its engagement on the side of the Habsburg dynasty.¹³³ This became even more important after the last grand master in Prussia, Albrecht von Brandenburg, took the country over as duke and vassal of the Polish crown in the Treaty of Kraków in 1525.¹³⁴

In the period around 1500, the Teutonic Knights thus lost their territorial lordship after a period of weakness and conflicts; by contrast, the Hospitallers maintained their strength, fighting against Mamluk fleets in 1506 and 1510. Their relations with the Ottoman Empire worsened after the accession of Selim I in 1512. Selim aimed at the defeat of his neighbors, and in 1516–1517 he conquered the Mamluk Empire and brought it under Ottoman rule; Mamluks and Hospitallers had concluded a defensive alliance in 1516. After the early death of Selim, it was his son Suleiman I who took the decision to initiate a second siege of Rhodes. In spring 1522, a Turkish fleet with more than 400 ships and 100–200,000 men came to Rhodes. This time, the Order had only about 290 knights, 300 other armed brethren and 900 mercenaries on its side. The siege started again with an attack on the harbor, and the fortifications, which had been extended since 1480, came under heavy bombardment. When a portion of the wall along the English section of the fortifications collapsed into the moat on September 4, the Order was able to defend the gap. On September 24, a massive attack followed. After its failure, the Turkish troops intensified their undermining of the walls, but another assault failed in late November. At this point, the Ottoman army had already suffered severe losses, while the defenders were weary from the endless attacks. Thus a truce was concluded from December 11 to 13, but Suleiman was only prepared to accept a surrender, under whose terms both the Hospitallers and the citizens would be allowed to leave, together with their property. Finally, on December 17, the Spanish tower fell. Since there was no hope of relief, Grand Master Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam surrendered on December 22.¹³⁵ On January 1, 1523, the Knights were allowed to leave Rhodes on five ships, while the inhabitants of Rhodes were granted safety for their lives and properties, and religious freedom. Lacking a secondary focal point for their operations, the Hospitallers

experienced even more trauma from the loss of Rhodes than the Teutonic Knights did from the loss of Prussia. It took them several years to reorganize their Order's structures, at least until the chapter general of Viterbo in 1527.¹³⁶ Finally, the grant of Malta, Gozo and Tripoli by Charles V opened up new perspectives.

* * *

In sum, both of the greater military Orders of the fifteenth century still adhered to their original aims and tasks, which continued the traditionally close connection between military Orders and crusading. This becomes clear both from the perception by others—even though this was intermingled with criticism—as well as by the members of the Orders themselves. The 'struggle against the infidel' remained at the core of crusading ideas within the Orders, and it was strongly connected to the ideal of defending Christianity. For both Orders, the defense of their own territories became an important aspect of their role in defending Christianity as a whole. The Teutonic Knights claimed that they could not participate in the defense of Christianity without their lordship in Prussia, while in the case of the Knights of St John, the threatened conquest of Rhodes by their Muslim enemies was described as a first step for a major campaign against the Christian faith. While in around 1400, both Orders intensively participated in crusading activities, the Teutonic Order became more and more involved in wars against the Polish-Lithuanian Union. This left little room for campaigns against the Mongols, the "schismatics," or the Ottomans at the Hungarian border, though there were at least some smaller expeditions. At the same time, the Hospitallers were able to improve their reputation by their successful defense of Rhodes against both the Mamluks and the Ottomans. While the Teutonic Knights, especially after 1466, could only muster smaller contingents which did not contribute much to the armies of the Polish kings, the Hospitallers profited from their rule over the islands in the eastern Mediterranean. Even smaller fleets could be effectively employed against the larger forces of their enemies; only when the Ottomans had finally gathered a very large fleet and army in 1522 did they succeed in conquering Rhodes. Thus, the Knights of St John could increasingly claim to act as a shield for Christianity.

We do not know much about the decision-making process in either Order, in particular the extent to which it was influenced by original ideas as opposed to pragmatic considerations.¹³⁷ Nevertheless, it seems that the arguments used in the discussions about the activities of the Orders were more than mere rhetoric. This holds true even when both

Orders had to manage a reorientation after the loss of their territories, the Teutonic Knights now focusing on Germany itself—with their center in Mergentheim—while the Hospitallers took over the defense of Malta, Gozo and Tripoli. In this process also, their foundational aims and tasks were adapted to the new situation.

NOTES

1. For a survey, see Alan Forey, *The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Centuries* (London: Macmillan, 1992); Alain Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ: Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge XI^e–XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 2002). See also the articles in *The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick*, ed. Malcolm Barber (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994); *The Military Orders. Vol. 2: Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Judy Upton-Ward (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); *The Military Orders. Vol. 3: History and Heritage*, ed. Victor Mallia-Milanes (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); *The Military Orders. Vol. 4: On Land and by Sea*, ed. Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), as well as the volumes of the series or (from 2012) journal *Ordines Militares*. I wish to thank the participants of the Leverhulme Trust workshop held at the British School at Rome for their helpful suggestions and remarks.
2. See e.g. Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Der Johanniterorden und die Kreuzzüge,” in *Vita Religiosa im Mittelalter: Festschrift für Kaspar Elm zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Franz J. Felten and Nikolas Jaspert, *Berliner Historische Studien* 31; *Ordensstudien XIII* (Berlin: Juncker & Humblot, 1999), 345–367, at 359–364.
3. For a comparison between the territories of the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers, see Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Military Orders and Power—Teutonic Knights, Hospitallers, and their ‘Order State,’” in Jürgen Sarnowsky, *On the Military Orders in Medieval Europe: Structures and Perceptions*, *Variorum Collected Studies Series*, 992 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), no. X.
4. A survey on the Spanish military Orders is Carlos de Ayala Martínez, *Las ordenes militares hispanicas en la edad media* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, Ediciones de historia, 2003); they are omitted here because their situation in the fifteenth century was different from the greater military Orders and would require a separate study.

5. I have already discussed these problems, albeit from a different perspective, in Jürgen Sarnowsky, "The Late Medieval Military Orders and the Transformation of the Idea of Holy War," in *On the Military Orders in Medieval Europe*, no. V; see also Sarnowsky, "Der Johanniterorden und die Kreuzzüge."
6. See e.g. Norman Housley, "Introduction," in *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: Message and Impact*, ed. Norman Housley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1–12.
7. See the classical definition in Christopher Tyerman, *The Crusades: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14–16.
8. John France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000–1714* (London: Routledge, 2005), 252.
9. Housley, "Introduction," 9–11.
10. James M. Powell, "The Crusades: An Introduction," in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan Murray, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), xliii–lx, at lix.
11. See e.g. Nikolas Jaspert, *The Crusades*, trans. Phyllis Jestice (London: Routledge, 2006), 23.
12. Cf. below. the text to nn. 23, 52
13. "Dilecti filii magister et fratres hospitalis beate Marie Theotonicorum Ierosolimitani pro defensione et propagacione catholice fidei fervencius ponunt iugiter se et sua": *Tabulae Ordinisi Theutonici*, ed. Ernst Strehlke (Berlin: Weidmann, 1869; reprinted Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), no. 692, pp. 437–438, dated May 11, 1396.
14. Jürgen Sarnowsky, *Der Deutsche Orden* (Munich: Beck, 2012), 87.
15. The demands of the Lithuanians following an appeal of Emperor Charles IV to convert to Christianity are related by Hermann von Wartberge in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der preußischen Vorzeit bis zum Untergange der Ordensherrschaft* [hereinafter *Scriptores*], ed. Theodor Hirsch, Max Toeppen and Ernst Strehlke, vols 1–5 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1861–1874; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1965); vol. 6, ed. Walther Hubatsch and Udo Arnold (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), at 2:79–80; cf. Kurt Forstreuter, "Der Deutsche Orden und Südosteuropa," in *Kyrios—Vierteljahrsschrift für Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte Osteuropas* 1 (1936): 245–272, at 258–259; Herbert Grundmann, "Das Schreiben Kaiser Karls IV. an die heidnischen Litauer-Fürsten

- 1358,” in *Folia Diplomatica*, vol. 1, ed. S. Duskov (Brno: University of Brno, 1971), 89–103, esp. 96–99.
16. “Ab der orden hilde das orloyge wedir die nuwen christen und nicht wedir die heydenschaft, ouch als ab her meynte, czu orloygen alleyne umb die land und nicht umb den gelouben noch umb das christenthum ...”: in *Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordens an der Kurie*, vols 1–4,2, ed. Kurt Forstreuter and Hans Koeppen, Veröffentlichungen der niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung, 12, 13, 21, 29, 32, 37 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961–1976), vol. 1, no. 246, p. 356, letter of the grand master to the Order’s proctor-general at the Roman *curia*, Johann vom Felde, dated August 8, 1396.
 17. “Vil undir den Polan torren sprechen wedir die worheit, durch der sochen willen hilde wir den tag czu vorseen und vorhoren die worheit”: *ibid.*
 18. “Wytawte mit sienen landen wellen gute cristen sien, als sie sprechen”: *ibid.*, 357; for the following conditions cf. also *ibid.*
 19. For the Treaty of Sallinwerder of October 12, 1398, see the German text of Vytautas’ charter in *Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert*, ed. Erich Weise, vol. 1, 1398–1437 (Königsberg: Gräfe & Unzer, 1939; reprinted Marburg: Elwert, 1970), 9–12.
 20. Sebastian Kubon, “Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Ordens unter Hochmeister Konrad von Jungingen (1393–1407),” (PhD dissertation, Hamburg, 2015), esp. 94–110 (for the Treaty of Sallinwerder) and 173–174 (for a general analysis of the grand master’s policies).
 21. For the peace of Raczanz (Raciążek), see *ibid.*, 143–159.
 22. In the text both as *sicherunge des cristenthums* and as *sicherunge der cristenheit*, which had to be supported by Vytautas, *Codex Diplomaticus Prussicus: Urkundensammlung zur älteren Geschichte Preußens*, ed. Johannes Voigt, vol. 6 (Königsberg: Bornträger, 1861; reprinted Osnabrück: Zeller, 1965), no. 39, pp. 43–45.
 23. See *Die Staatsschriften des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1, ed. Erich Weise (Veröffentlichungen der Niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung, 27) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), pp. 130–149, with reference to the fundamental work of Stanisław Belch, *Paulus Wladimiri and His Doctrine Concerning International Law and Politics*, 2 vols (The Hague: Mouton, 1965).

24. "Das sie den orden zcu Prußen welden uffnemen unde welden in seczen bii den koning von Cypren unde by den meister von Roddys": *Berichte der Generalprokuratoren*, vol. 2, no. 300, p. 576, note 5, partly edits the document in *Regesta Historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525*, ed. Erich Joachim and Walther Hubatsch, vol. I, 1–3, II and index (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948–1973), here vol. I, 1, no. 2807, p. 176, letter of October 2, 1418. See also Kurt Forstreuter, *Der Deutsche Orden am Mittelmeer* (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 2) (Bonn: Wissenschaftliches Archiv, 1967), 221; Karl Heinz Lampe, "Die europäische Bedeutung des Deutschen Ordens," *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 88 (1951): 110–149, at 118.
25. *Staatsschriften*, vol. 1, ed. Weise, 281.
26. For Falkenberg, see Hartmut Boockmann, *Johannes Falkenberg, der Deutsche Orden und die polnische Politik: Untersuchungen zur Politischen Theorie des späteren Mittelalters* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 45) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975).
27. "Eyn geczunnisse geben die schonen stete, kostliche huzere und vil festen, welche mit gotis hulfe czu beschirmunge der globien wedir dy heiden gebuet syn," in Boockmann, *Falkenberg*, 52, note 5.
28. "Die gesaczt sind zu einem schild der kristenheit und den heiligen glauben mit vergiessung ires plutes steticlich meren ... daz die heilig kristenheit durch ir mue, arbeyt und sorgveltikeit hinder in, als hinder einem vesten schild biß uff dise czit in gutem frid gessen und als in eynem garten der rue erquicket ist; es sind ouch die ende derselben heiligen kristenheit durch sy gepraitet worden, die heidenisch undyet getempfet, vil durch ir swert zu der tauf geladen und vil in den heiligen glouben gekrezemt, des alle kristenheit heutt disz tages trost und freut hat": *Tabulae*, ed. Strehlke, no. 213, at pp. 204–205, dated September 7, 1429.
29. "Daz der heiligen kristenheit noch in kumfftigen zeiten durch sy gros nutz, beschirmung und beschuczung entspriessen mag": *ibid.*, p. 205.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Summary in *Berichte*, 4,2, no. 516, p. 550.
32. Cf. the letters summarized in *Berichte*, 4,2, nos 535, 612 and 630, pp. 571, 672, 690–691.

33. According to the chronicle, he said that the Knights “haben aber in 200 iaren und do boben weynigk gefochten und gestreten widder dy uncristen. Sunder wor dy crone von Polen widder dy Turken unde uncristen gestreten haben, so haben dy creuzciger sy vorhyn-dert, und in dy lant zcu Polen gezcogen mit unrechte, sy vorbrant und vorheret und groslich geschwechet”: *Scriptores*, 4:439.
34. For the background, see Sarnowsky, *Der Deutsche Orden*, 102–105; Klaus Militzer, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2005), 152–153.
35. *Geschichte von wegen eines Bundes*, in *Scriptores*, 4:71–211; cf. Frauke Schmitz, “Eine Deutschordenschronik berichtet. Beschreibung von Gruppen und Personen in der ‘Geschichte wegen eines Bundes’,” in *Bilder—Wahrnehmungen—Vorstellungen: Neue Forschungen zur Historiographie des hohen und späten Mittelalters*, ed. Jürgen Sarnowsky (Nova Mediaevalia, 3) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 165–201; Udo Arnold, “Geschichte von wegen eines Bundes,” in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters: Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 16–17.
36. “Mit hylffe gottes wol worden empfangen”: *Geschichte von wegen eines Bundes*, 129.
37. *Ibid.*, 120–121.
38. Marian Biskup and Gerard Labuda, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen, Wirtschaft—Gesellschaft—Staat—Ideologie* (1986, trans. H. Heyde, U. Kodur; *Klio in Polen*, 6) (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2000), 441–442.
39. “Der almechtige gott und syne werde mutter Maria mit grunde-loser barmhertzigkeit sohen an die Teutschszen, die inn zu eere und zu lobe ins land zu Preussen komen woren und den orden der jungfrow Maria retten wolten, goben inen krafft und macht und gutt gemietete den Polen zu widersten”: *Geschichte von wegen eines Bundes*, 137.
40. *Ältere Hochmeisterchronik, Erste Fortsetzung*, in *Scriptores*, 3:637–700 (for 1433–1455), here at 679–680.
41. For the importance of St Barbara for Althaus-Kulm, see Jürgen Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen (1382–1454)* (Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preußischer Kulturbesitz, 34) (Cologne: Böhlau, 1993), 258.

42. For this peace, see Biskup and Labuda, *Geschichte*, 447–448; Sarnowsky, *Der Deutsche Orden*, 105.
43. *Chronik der vier Orden von Jerusalem*, in *Scriptores*, 6:106–164; see also Udo Arnold, “Deutschordenshistoriographie im Deutschen Reich,” in *Die Rolle der Ritterorden in der mittelalterlichen Kultur*, ed. Zenon H. Nowak (Ordines militares, Colloquia Torunensia Historica, III) (Toruń: Universitas Nicolai Copernici, 1985), 65–87, at 74–76.
44. *Die Jüngere Hochmeisterchronik*, in *Scriptores*, 5:1–148; for the chronicle, see Arnold, “Deutschordenshistoriographie,” 78–80; Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Historical Writing in the Military Orders,” in *V Encontro sobre ordens militares, Palmela, 15th to 18th February 2006: Military Orders and Orders of Knighthood between Occident and Orient*, ed. Isabella C. Fernandes Ferreira (Coleção Ordens Militares, 2) (Palmela: Câmara municipal de Palmela, 2009), 109–119.
45. *Die Jüngere Hochmeisterchronik*, 48–55.
46. “Mit Türcken und heyden han ich gestritten, von ungläubig vil erlitten, aber mit keinem sterckeren han ich grungen, der mich alls der tod hab betzwungen”: *Scriptores*, 2:178, formerly on a wall of the Dominican convent, now lost.
47. See Marian Tumlner and Udo Arnold, *Der Deutsche Orden von seinem Ursprung bis zur Gegenwart*, 4th edn (Bad Münstereifel, 1986), 69.
48. Forstreuter, “Der Deutsche Orden und Südosteuropa,” 261–266. For the Grand Master Archduke Maximilian I (1585/1590–1618), who was a leading figure in the Habsburg campaigns against the Turks, see Heinz Noflatscher, *Glaube, Reich und Dynastie: Maximilian der Deutschmeister (1558–1618)* (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 11) (Marburg: Elwert, 1987).
49. Clement VI had already threatened to deprive the Order of part of its possessions (and to create a new military Order) if they did not follow papal plans: *Codice diplomatico dell’Ordine Gerosolimitano*, ed. Sebastiano Paoli, vol. 2 (Lucca: Marescandoli, 1737), 86–87, August 8, 1343; Innocent VI followed the same line.
50. “A primana fundacione eorum sub regulari habitu milicie adversus perfidos infideles, crucis Christi inimicos, Theucros et Sarracenos

- ... existentes”: National Library of Malta, Valletta [hereinafter NLM], Arch. 14, no. 16, May 11, 1451.
51. See Philippe de Mézières, *Le Songe du Vieil Pèlerin*, ed. George W. Coopland, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 258–260.
 52. Anthony Luttrell, “Emmanuele Piloti and Criticism of the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes 1306–1444,” (first published 1962) in Anthony Luttrell, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West, 1291–1440* (Collected Studies Series 77) (London: Variorum, 1978), no. XXIV, 4–5. For Piloti, see also Norman Housley, “Emmanuele Piloti and Crusading in the Latin East,” in *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*, ed. Karl Borchardt, Nikolas Jaspert and Helen Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 139–150.
 53. “... per occasione delle guerre havemo continuamente sequite contra infidel inimici dela fede et nome christiano”: NLM Arch. 362, fol. 179(180)r, letter of conduct by Master Jean de Lastic for the Genoese captain Steffano Morreu, dated April 9, 1450.
 54. “... ad immortalis Dei et fidei Christiano obsequia Rodi in conventu sub vera obediencia commorantes”: NLM Arch. 369, fols 44v–45r, chancery note by Melchior Bandini, dated May 10, 1459.
 55. “Tanquam ancianus et de nostro ordine atque christiana republica bene meritus ob servitia per eum prestita in oriente in tuitionem fidei catholice et plebis contra Turcos sub nostro regulari habitu”: text in *The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in Scotland*, ed. Ian B. Cowan, P.H.R. Mackay and Alan Macquarrie (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1983), 93–95, at 95, letter of the lieutenant master, the admiral Ludovico de Scalinghe, and the convent dated May 24, 1504; see also the abstracts of other letters concerning Torphichen and Dundas at 172–175.
 56. “... laudabilia obsequia per vos nostre religioni in defensionem fidei catholice in oriente prestita”: NLM Arch. 400, fol. 45r, dated July 12, 1511.
 57. He was ordered “iterum de anno immediato secuturo cum navigiis sacre religionis aut aliis armatis Rhodum accedendi in subsidium urbis Rhodi et ... fidei catholice”: NLM Arch. 393, fol. 5v, dated December 13, 1501.

58. "... ad honorem Dei et exaltationem sacrosancte fidei catholice": NLM Arch. 400, fols 143r–144r, followed by a long description of the Order's naval operations against Muslim ships.
59. The master and convent demanded "... ut Rhodum pro defensione sancte fidei catholice personaliter accedant cum navibus et passagiis religionis nostre": NLM Arch. 400, fol. 10r (–v), letter to the prior of Aquitaine, Reginald de Saint Simon, dated October 1, 1510.
60. In NLM Arch. 8, no. 5, dated December 6, 1433, the debtors of the treasury are described as "sue religionis utilitatem et honorem ac christiane rei publice dignitatem postponentes, ad quam tuendam contra perfidos inimicos Turchos et alios infideles magister et conventus Hospitalis eiusdem in Rhodo insula velut in propugna fidei constituti existunt." For similar bulls of Eugenius IV from 1440 to 1441, during the Mamluk attacks, see *ibid.*, nos 6, 8, 10.
61. The bull mentions "strages, quas annis fere undecim prope decursus Turchorum princeps et alii Christiani cultus ac nominis eversiones prothdolor periculis intulerunt": ASV, Reg. Vat. 509, fols 381r–385v, dated March 1, 1463, at fol. 381r.
62. "Decet ut circa recuperationem illorum, que nostre mense magistrali sunt deputata et ascripta, simus diligentiores, quum ex his non solum statum nostrum in oriente manuteneamus, sed etiam expensis defensionis fidei catholice suppleamus": NLM Arch. 400, fol. 168r, dated October 10, 1510; similar wording is found in a mandate to the Order's depositor in Lyon, *ibid.*, fol. 180r, from the same date.
63. See the letter of November 6, 1440, *Codice diplomatico*, ed. Paoli, 121–123; for the context, see Ettore Rossi, "The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1421–1523," in Setton, *Crusades*, 3:314–39, at 319 (with the inaccurate detail of a Mamluk attack on Cos; in fact, the Mamluk fleet turned toward Cyprus after its military engagement with the Order's fleet close to the Turkish coast).
64. "Soldanus Babiloniae, hostis ac inimicus noster ac totius Christianae fidei, existimans nobis et toto populo Christiano dedecus perpetuum inferre, secreto modo ... fregit treguas": *Codice diplomatico*, ed. Paoli, 121.
65. "Firmiterque illum dixisse aiunt: Si modo Rhodium insulam sub iugum mittere posset se non dubitare, quin reliquum Christianitatis in hac orientali plaga superet et convincat": *ibid.*, 122.

66. “Si [principes Christiani] caute fidei Christianae succurrant, ab ipso immortalī Deo condigna merita capient; sin minus, nos culpa vacabimus, et primi vitam pro Christo, si oportuerit, offeremus”: *ibid.*
67. The Pope began his letter: “Dilecti filii magister et conventus Hospitalis ... nos per nuntios proprios per hos dies nuntiare curaverunt perfidos Christi hostes Saracenos Soldano Babilonie subiectos”: ASV, Reg. Vat. 376, fol. 77r–77(bis)v, at fol. 77r, dated April 13, 1444.
68. “... propter gravissimos insultus ... retro actis temporibus a perfidis Sarracenis christiani nominis inimicis”: ASV, Reg. Vat. 397, fols 300(bis)r–301r, at fol. 300(bis)r, dated December 22, 1451.
69. *Codice diplomatico*, ed. Paoli, 2:149–153, dated September 13, 1480.
70. At first, Aubusson informs the emperor that “ad hanc diem pugnae ad honorem Christiani nominis felicem exitum adeptae sint”: *ibid.*, 149.
71. “Misit enim Deus, non ambigimus, de Coelo auxilium, ne plebecula Christum colens Machometis spurcitiis inficeretur”: *ibid.*, 152.
72. Printed in Latin at least nine times between 1480 and 1482, also in Ulm in 1496”; the publication is not complete, up till now 11 vols “Abbey of the Holy Ghost” to “Hord, Jobst”, more online, so please just leave it; the numbers 06003-13 are cited correctly (online version: www.gesamtkatalogderwiegendrucke.de, accessed July 18, 2015). For a modern edition, see *Tous les deables d’enfer: Relations du siège de Rhodes par les Ottomans en 1480*, ed. Jean-Bernard de Vaivre and Laurent Vissière (Geneva: Droz, 2014), 374–475, at 464–466. See also Antony Luttrell, “The Hospitallers’ Historical Activities: 1400–1530” (first published 1967), reprinted in *idem*, *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers, and the Crusades, 1291–1440*, Variorum Reprints, London: Ashgate, 1982, no. II, 145–50, at 149.
73. For the following, see Sarnowsky, “Der Johanniterorden und die Kreuzzüge,” 361; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:349–50, 359.
74. See the woodcut in the *Opera* of Caoursin printed at Ulm in 1496, in *Caoursin’s Account of the Siege of Rhodes in 1480*, translated into English by John Kay, the poet-laureate to King Edward IV (modernized version), ed. H.W. Fincham (Historical Pamphlets, 2) (London: St John’s Gate Clerkenwell, 1926), 21, 31.

75. See the letter to King Henry VIII of England dated September 28, 1510, in *Codice diplomatico*, ed. Paoli, 2:174–175; and see also Mathis Mager, *Krisenerfahrung und Bewältigungsstrategien des Johanniterordens nach der Eroberung von Rhodos 1522* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2014), 277–278.
76. “Partendo voi da Rhodi al nome di Dio et della gloriosa Virgine Maria sotto protezione de Sancto Joanne Baptista nostro patrone ... Et quando piacere a Dio che sereti pervenuti al loco desiderato, dove sera la inimica armata, racomandandovi al nostro signor Jesu Christo, dalquale procedano tutte victorie, et invocato il sanctissimo nome della gloriose vergine et di Sancto Joanni/(225r) combattereti discretamente come homini sani et pratici et virilmente come cavallieri et gentilhomini deputati alla defensione della sancta fede nostra, racordandovi della vestra professione contra infideli ad exaltatione del nome christiano”: NLM Arch. 400, fols 224v–225r, instruction of Master Émery d’Amboise dated August 6, 1510.
77. According to the bull, the victory contributed “ad honorem religionis nostre, exaltatione rei publice orthodoxe, christiani nominis gloriam et Christi fidelium Orientem incolentium et frequentantium quietem”: NLM Arch. 400, fols 5v–6r, bull of the master and convent dated March 18, 1511.
78. See Sarnowsky, “Historical Writing,” 112–113.
79. *Stabilimenta Rhodiorum militum: Die Statuten des Johanniterordens von 1489/1493*, ed. Jyri Hasecker and Jürgen Sarnowsky (Nova Mediaevalia, 1) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht Unipress, 2007), 97–100.
80. “Quo fit, ut frequentia devotarum personarum peregrinorum sacre domus obsequiis sese dedicant ac pro catholice fidei defensione zelo dei inducti arma capessunt, peregrinos quoque et loca a barbarorum incursionibus tutantur. Veri igitur et clarissimi Iude Machabei et devotissimi Ioannes imitatores hospitalitatem et pro cultu divino catholiceque fidei defensione arma omni studio exercent”: *ibid.*, 99.
81. “*Militia Hierosolymitana, hospitalitas et hec sancta observatio ad Rhodios transmigraverit*”: *ibid.*, 100; the story is cut short with a reference to *Rhodiorum gestorum commentaria*, maybe a work about the Order’s history which is now lost.
82. As far as I know, the treatise survives only in Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano, Ottob. lat. 2939, fols 87r–98v, for

- which see Sarnowsky, “Der Johanniterorden und die Kreuzzüge,” 366–67. François de Bourdon was called to the *curia* in 1505 and again in 1511: see Iacomo Bosio, *Dell’istoria della sacra religione et illustrissima militia di S. Giovanni Gerosolimitano*, vol. 2, 2nd edn (Rome: Stamperia Apostolica Vaticana, 1629), 585–586; and NLM Arch. 400, fol. 6r.
83. See e.g. Rossi, “Hospitallers,” 320, 322–323, 327, 329, 333.
 84. For this, see especially the articles of Anthony Luttrell, “Popes and Crusades: 1362–1394,” (first published 1980) reprinted in idem, *Latin Greece*, no. XIV, 575–585; idem, “The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century,” (first published 1965) reprinted in *ibid.*, no. XVI, 122–154; idem, “The Hospitallers of Rhodes Confront the Turks, 1306–1421,” (first published 1988) reprinted in idem, *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and Their Mediterranean World* (London: Variorum, 1992), no. II, 80–116 and others.
 85. Luttrell, “The Hospitallers of Rhodes Confront the Turks,” 97; Setton, *Papacy*, 1:356.
 86. Ettore Rossi, *Storia della Marina dell’Ordine di Gerusalemme, di Rodi e di Malta* (Rome: Società editrice d’arte illustrata, Milano, 1926), 17.
 87. See Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Die Johanniter und Smyrna 1344–1402,” *Römische Quartalschrift* 86 (1991): 215–251, at 232; 87 (1992): 47–98, at 93–94.
 88. *Ibid.*, 86 (1991): 233.
 89. The negotiations are followed in detail by Kubon, “Außenpolitik,” 55–86.
 90. Manfred Hellmann, “Das Großfürstentum Litauen bis 1569,” in *Handbuch der Geschichte Rußlands, vol. 1.II: Bis 1613. Von der Kiever Reichsbildung bis zum Moskauer Zartum*, ed. Manfred Hellmann (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1989), 717–851, at 740; it has been debated whether the relevant charters were later forgeries.
 91. Kubon, “Außenpolitik,” 115–116, 162–163.
 92. See Werner Paravicini, *Die Preußenreisen des europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, Beihefte der Francia, 17,2 (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1989), 41, 44.
 93. *Scriptores*, 5:226 (a fragment of 1412/1413 preserved in the chronicle of Paul Pole). The employment of Prussian contingents in 1398 is confirmed by Johannes von Posilge in *Scriptores*, 3:222. For the career of Eberhard von Wallenfels, see George A. von

- Mülverstedt, "Die Beamten und Conventsmitglieder in den Verwaltungs-Districten des Deutschen Ordens innerhalb des Regierungsbezirks Marienwerder," *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins für den Regierungsbezirk Marienwerder* 8 (1883): 1–48, at 33.
94. The fragment of 1412/1413 (*Scriptores*, 5:226) speaks of 1,600 horses and many good men, which seems to refer to the whole contingent of the Order; the core of the Order's troops is described by Johannes von Posilge as *hundert gleyen* (*Scriptores*, 3:230). The *Glevenien* or *Spieße* meant groups of three to four men armed with crossbows: see *Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411*, ed. Sven Ekdahl (Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 23/1) (Cologne: Böhlau, 1988), 19 and 26, note 12.
 95. The origin of the troops can be gathered from the payments to the Order's subjects after the defeat in 1400; they came from the areas of Danzig, Königsberg, Elbing, Balga, Brandenburg, Christburg and Osterode: see *Das Marienburger Treßlerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409*, ed. Erich Joachim (Königsberg: Thomas & Oppermann, 1896; reprinted Bremerhaven: Otto Knieß, 1973), 69, 75, 79. Before departure, their commander had received 425 marks in Bohemian money as financial aid: *ibid.*, 34.
 96. Cf. Hartmut Boockmann, *Der Deutsche Orden*, 2nd edn (Munich: Beck, 1982), 175.
 97. See the accounts of Johann von Posilge, the *Annalista Thorunensis* and the continuation of Detmar, *Scriptores*, 3:229–231.
 98. See the report in the continuation of Johann von Posilge, *Scriptores*, 3:282–283; and see also Kurt Forstreuter, *Preußen und Rußland von den Anfängen des Deutschen Ordens bis zu Peter dem Großen* (Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 23) (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1955), 46–47.
 99. Also in the continuation of Johann von Posilge, *Scriptores*, 3:291; for the costs of the campaigns, see Sarnowsky, *Wirtschaftsführung*, 395, 690.
 100. Militzer, *Geschichte*, 147–150; Sarnowsky, *Der Deutsche Orden*, 95–97.
 101. Anthony Luttrell, "The Earliest Documents on the Hospitaller Corso at Rhodes 1413 and 1416," (first published 1995) reprinted in Anthony Luttrell, *The Hospitaller State at Rhodes and Its Western*

- Provinces, 1306–1462* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), no. VIII, at 183–184.
102. For the special customs for corsairs, see Jürgen Sarnowsky, *Macht und Herrschaft im Johanniterorden des 15. Jahrhunderts: Verfassung und Verwaltung der Johanniter auf Rhodos (1421–1522)* (Vita regularis, 14) (Münster: Lit, 2001), 78–79, 497–498.
103. For the perception of the Order’s piracy in Jacobus Fontanus’ report on the siege of Rhodes in 1522, see Mager, *Krisenerfahrung*, 269–270.
104. For the attack on Cyprus in 1426, see Harry Luke, “The Kingdom of Cyprus 1369–1489,” in Setton, *Crusades*, 3:361–395, at 372–374.
105. *Codice diplomatico*, ed. Paoli, 2:122.
106. On the bailiwick of *Romania*, see Forstreuter, *Deutscher Orden am Mittelmeer*, 71–86.
107. *Ibid.*, 79.
108. See the letter of the administrator of the bailiwick of *Romania*, Peter Tuhinger (1451/1452) in *ibid.*, 238–239.
109. See *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, ed. Voigt, 6:552–554, no. xlix, instruction to the commander of Rheden, Graf Rudolf von Kyburg, relating to a mission to Hungary concerning the restitution of the “Worczlant” (Burzenland) and the gift of other territories as well as other matters: without exact date, but probably before October 21, 1397: see Erich Joachim, “König Sigmund und der Deutsche Ritterorden in Ungarn 1429–1432,” *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 33 (1912): 87–119, at 88–89.
110. *Ibid.*, 98; Forstreuter, *Deutscher Orden am Mittelmeer*, 222. For the brethren and their financial support, see *Regesta historico-diplomatica*, vol. I,1, no. 5096, p. 318; *Acten der Ständetage Preußens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens*, ed. Max Toeppen, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1878: Duncker & Humblot; reprinted Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1973), no. 389, 516–518.
111. For the endowment (and initial problems), see Joachim, “König Sigmund,” 99–101, 108–113. The brethren had reached Severin via Bratislava and Buda: see the calendars in *Regesta historico-diplomatica*, vol. I,1, nos 5148 and 5197, 322 and 325.
112. “Dominus Claus Redevicz semper est cum rege et bene stat et omnes alii domini de ordine sunt potentes, et dedit eis adhuc

- unum novum dominium magnum cum multis vilis, silvis, pratis, terris et aquis et muneribus, et sunt in magna gracia regis ...”: *Berichte der Generalprokuratoren*, vol. 4,1, no. 131, 174–176, a letter to the proctor general in Rome dated May 26, 1430; cf. Joachim, “König Sigmund,” 101.
113. Nicolaus von Redwitz asked the grand master for dogs to be sent to the Turkish “Emperor” in a letter of May 14, 1430, partly edited in *Liv-, Est- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch*, ed. Hermann Hildebrand, vol. 8 (Riga, Moscow, 1884; reprinted Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1974), no. 208, pp. 124–125.
 114. The letter is edited by Joachim, “König Sigmund,” 116–118.
 115. See the letter of Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf to Nicolaus von Redwitz, dated January 2, 1434, in Joachim, “König Sigmund,” 103–105, 118–119.
 116. Sarnowsky, *Der Deutsche Orden*, 104–106.
 117. Cf. Sarnowsky, *Macht und Herrschaft*, esp. 149–151.
 118. *Ibid.*, 175.
 119. *Ibid.*, 80.
 120. See Rossi, “Hospitallers,” 321–322; Luke, “Kingdom of Cyprus,” 379–384.
 121. For the cardinal’s activities, see Setton, *Papacy*, 2:184–190; the correspondence is in ASV, Armarium XXXIX, 7.
 122. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:184–190, 245; Rossi, *Marina*, 22; Sarnowsky, “Der Johanniterorden und die Kreuzzüge,” 357. The participation of the Order was discussed in council on February 8, 1464: NLM Arch. 73, fols 110(123)r–111(124)r.
 123. Rossi, “Hospitallers,” 322–323; Sarnowsky, *Macht und Herrschaft*, 286.
 124. Rossi, “Hospitallers,” 324.
 125. As described in Caoursin’s Report in *Tous les deables*, 458–460.
 126. See Jyri Hasecker, *Die Johanniter und die Wallfahrt nach Jerusalem* (Nova Mediaevalia, 5) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 198–206.
 127. Nicolas Vatin, “L’affaire Djem (1481–1495),” in *Le Banquet du Faisan, 1454: L’Occident face au défi de l’Empire ottoman*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Caron and Denis Clauzel (Arras: Artois presses université, 1997), 85–96.
 128. For the Order’s situation, see Lothar Dralle, *Der Staat des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen nach dem II. Thorner Frieden:*

- Untersuchungen zur ökonomischen und ständepolitischen Geschichte Altpreußens zwischen 1466 und 1497* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1975).
129. For diplomatic relations between the Order and Moscow, see Meike Sach, *Hochmeister und Großfürst: Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Deutschen Orden in Preußen und dem Moskauer Staat um die Wende zur Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002).
 130. According to the report in the *Danziger Chronik vom Pfaffenkriege*, *Scriptores*, 4:687–688, where the Polish army is estimated at 600,000 men (!).
 131. See the report of his secretary, Liborius Naker, in his *Tagebuch* (“Diary”), in *Scriptores*, 5:289–314; cf. the continuation of the *Danziger Chronik vom Bunde*, *ibid.*, vol. 4, 445; and the *Danziger Chronik vom Pfaffenkriege*, *ibid.*, 689; see also Forstreuter, *Deutscher Orden am Mittelmeer*, 223. For Naker, see Matthias Thumser, “Schriftlichkeit in der Spätzeit der preußischen Deutschordensherrschaft. Kanzleitätigkeit und Aufzeichnungen des hochmeisterlichen Sekretärs Liborius Naker (†1502/1503),” in *Schriftkultur und Landesgeschichte: Studien zum südlichen Ostseeraum vom 12. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert* (Mitteldeutsche Forschungen, 115), ed. Matthias Thumser (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), 155–218.
 132. For the Prussians who died in the campaign, see Naker’s *Tagebuch*, *Scriptores*, 5:314 and also Bernt Stegmann’s *Hanseatische Chronik*, *ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 498; for the context, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century)* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 27.
 133. See above, at nn 47–48.
 134. See e.g. Biskup and Labuda, *Geschichte*, 509–532.
 135. For the siege of 1522, see Nicolas Vatin, *L’Ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l’Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes, 1480–1522* (Collection Turcica, 7) (Paris: Peeters 1994), 329–360; Rossi, “Hospitaliers,” 335–338.
 136. In general, see Mager, *Krisenerfahrung*.
 137. The *Libri Conciliorum* of the Hospitallers mostly concentrates on the decisions themselves.

Venice and the Ottoman Threat, 1381–1453

Stefan Stantchev

This chapter examines the Venetian ruling elite's view of the nature and scope of the Ottoman impact on Venice's maritime empire between the conclusion of the republic's last great war with Genoa in 1381, which was fought over control of the Straits, and the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, which gave the Sultanate control over this vital naval corridor.¹ The Ottoman Empire emerged from inconspicuous nomadic origins in the north-western corner of Anatolia in the early fourteenth century to become the paramount imperial power of

This chapter is part of a broader project on Venice's relations with the Ottomans. Calendared decisions of the Senate make the starting point of inquiry. While recent editions of documents have been incorporated, earlier compilations of senatorial decisions have been rendered obsolete by *Progetto Divenire* and have thus not been referenced. Original texts are cited only when uncalendared information is used or relevant discrepancies need to be pointed out. Except for expanded standard abbreviations, evocatively worded expressions have been presented in the original, unnormalized Latin or Italian. The author would like to thank all contributors to this volume as well as Fariba Zarinebaf, Mike Carr and Rudi Lindner for reading and commenting upon earlier drafts of this chapter.

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the Mediterranean by the early sixteenth century.² Often reduced to the undifferentiated Turks or even sub-human hordes of polemical primary sources while simultaneously treated as a well-oiled war machine,³ the pre-1453 Ottoman polity had an administrative structure which is difficult to reconstruct. What is certain is that it successfully incorporated many Balkan strongmen and that Ottoman warlords conducted semi-autonomous operations in the peninsula throughout much of the period.⁴ By the same token, it has proven somewhat difficult to analyze Venetian foreign policy without ascribing a certain modernity to the mechanics of Venetian statecraft and to the mental habits underpinning them. While Venice could boast a central government that was unusually strong by the standards of the time, its *Stato da Mar* was characterized by “fragmented geography and political differentiation,” which “led to a fragile and often interrupted institutional control over territories.”⁵

The Venetian maritime empire, which “more than doubled its territory and population” in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries,⁶ undoubtedly served multiple purposes like resource exploitation, multi-faceted logistical support of long-distance navigation, the provision of supporting resources and manpower, and information gathering, to say nothing of the polyvalent role played by Venice’s most valued possession, the island of Crete.⁷ This chapter, however, questions current interpretations of the expansion of Venice’s maritime empire as the outcome of “long-term, patient, and deliberate strategizing”⁸ or of “a systematic policy of annexing islands ... motivated by strategic and defensive considerations.”⁹ Instead, it proposes that when examined in their totality, the decisions taken by the Venetian Senate in relation to *Romania* portray the expansion of the *Stato da Mar* as rather haphazard (as it was chiefly reactive), half-hearted (newly acquired and long-time possessions alike were defended by the lowest number of troops at the lowest cost) and repeatedly halted or altogether reversed by financial as well as other concerns (not least among which was an unwillingness to disrupt relations with the Ottomans).

The deliberations of the Senate expose its *modus operandi* as the provision of ad hoc responses to economic and political challenges as they arose. The Venetians opportunistically acquired territories in the context of the political and military history of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, which was particularly chaotic even by the standards of post-1204 *Romania*. Sometimes, Venetian actions in the fifteenth century related to long-standing Venetian goals and interests. Notably, this

was the case of acquisitions in the Adriatic and Dalmatia. In the Aegean, however, the Senate oscillated between exceptional caution and outright gambles, providing a hodge-podge response to chaos rather than a calculated attempt to counter any particular power, be that the Ottomans or the Genoese.

For all its commercial and naval strength, Renaissance Venice could match neither the fiscal capabilities of a modern state nor the Ottoman ability to both attract and commandeer men and resources on a grand scale. The peace of Turin, which ended the last great war between Venice and Genoa in 1381, had devastating long-term financial effects that were felt across the entire spectrum of economic, social and political life. The war wore heavily on the Venetian elite itself, wiping out a quarter of the patricians' wealth.¹⁰ A lesser, yet relevant implication of the war was an increased fiscal burden for Venetian *Romania*.¹¹

As Antonio Morosini's diary notes under 1402, "there appeared in the west a sign in the night which is called a comet ... as an indication of the destruction of these two dominions, namely that of the Duke of Milan and that of Bayazid the Turk," the latter being "a most wonderful piece of news throughout the Christian world."¹² While both powers recovered from the hoped-for ashes, their relevance to Venetian interests was thereafter quite unequal, with Italy taking center stage. Venice's newly acquired taste for Italian adventures conducted via sizable numbers of costly mercenaries led the republic to undertake a new round of extreme fiscal measures that produced deep rifts within the patrician elite. Aside from all current expenses, fifteenth-century Venice paid, or was supposed to pay, nearly a quarter million ducats a year to service its already-accumulated debt. In turn, the reason why Venice recovered from the War of Chioggia at all and was able to expand in Italy is to be found in the profits from long-distance trade with Mamluk lands.¹³

Egypt and Syria dominated Venice's commercial interests to an extent rarely acknowledged in studies that focus on the Aegean and Black Seas. Italy, meanwhile, commanded the Serenissima's economic, political and military resources. Thus, fifteenth-century *Romania* did not enjoy the central position that scholarship habitually awards it on account of both earlier and later times. While it is true that the island of Crete, the heart and soul of the *Stato da Mar*, but also an administrative, social and economic exception within it, remained of paramount importance, it was not considered to be seriously threatened by Ottoman expansion until 1462.¹⁴ If Venice had something like a "*Romania* policy" between 1381

and 1453 at all, it was that of extracting the most while spending the least, all the while operating within short temporal horizons.

This chapter offers an understanding of the Ottomans' relevance to Venice in multiple, interconnected, yet also self-sufficient sections that trace the tenor of formal treaties, Venice's perception of the nature and scope of threats to its interests in *Romania*, and the breadth and depth of its diplomatic and military responses to these threats. Although the consideration of economic factors falls beyond the scope of this chapter, it should be noted that isolating one set of economic interactions while allowing for their in-depth examination distorts the overall picture by overemphasizing one part of a broader story.¹⁵ Venetian attitudes to the Ottomans were informed by the nature and scope of Venetian economic interests in the Aegean and Black Seas; the economic relevance of the seas to the Venetian elite was dwarfed by that of Egypt and Syria. Between 1381 and 1453, Venice undertook massive land operations against Milan and armed dedicated war fleets against Genoa. The Serenissima, meanwhile, preferred to counter Ottoman power through active diplomacy and the waging of a perpetual war on any Ottoman war vessels in the Aegean by way of its annually armed patrol fleet. For the Venetian elite, between 1381 and 1453, the Ottoman Empire was neither an overwhelming threat nor a substantial opportunity, but rather a minor trade partner and a secondary geopolitical concern.

DIPLOMACY: VENICE'S PREFERRED TOOL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Venetian–Ottoman relations lay on a bedrock of formal treaties that each side seems to have taken more seriously than the rather chaotic history of *Romania* might make one think. The first concern of Venice was to establish diplomatic relations on an *inter pares* footing. By the late fourteenth century, Ottoman sultans were accustomed to playing the role of overlords awarding privileges to vassals. In 1388, the Senate had to address the particularly grave issue that in “Murad I's imagination” he had been promised Venetian troops on Venetian expenses, a most blatant recognition of vassal status. The misunderstanding was to be blamed on the interpreter.¹⁶ Aided by the Ottoman civil war, the Venetians were successful in ensuring that the treaties' actual dispositions regarding land and sea would not reflect Ottoman claims to superiority.

The formal treaties concluded between Venice and the Ottomans show that the Venetians sought peace and trade as well as control over the Aegean Sea. Trade was “the driving force behind Latin-Turkish relations in the fourteenth century and the reason for treaty relations.”¹⁷ In 1384, Venice sought chiefly the right to export grain, ideally “freely and without the payment of any dues,” as well as alum, at the lowest possible tax rate, to establish a colony in Ottoman territories and to obtain the release of some captured Venetians.¹⁸ In 1390, Bayezid, having conquered the key Anatolian ports of Palatia and Altoluogo (Ephesus), confirmed the Venetian privileges once obtained from the emirs of Menteshe and Aydin and proclaimed that all Venetians were allowed to trade in all his possessions, in Greece as well as in Turkey, on land and at sea.¹⁹ However, a focus on the diplomatic and commercial relations between two sides should not result in overestimating these connections’ overall relevance. Ottoman lands were but one of many areas where the Venetians could obtain grains and it was the Genoese, rather than the Venetians, who made fortunes on the alum trade. At this time, Ottoman lands offered Venice nothing indispensable or of great value.

In the aftermath of Bayezid’s disastrous defeat at Ankara in 1402, the focus of Venetian–Ottoman treaties turned from primarily economic to mainly strategic concerns. In 1403, Suleyman, hard-pressed to establish himself as the leading contender for his father’s inheritance, concluded a peace treaty with a bouquet of Christian powers, including Venice. This treaty contained the two staple concessions on which the Venetians would base all their subsequent diplomatic relations with the Porte. First, Suleyman allowed the unlimited export of grains. Second—and this would be a cornerstone of subsequent Venetian policy—Suleyman agreed that no Turkish oared vessels (i.e. those capable of military operations) were to leave the Straits: should an oared vessel do so and consequently suffer damage, this would not affect the state of peace.²⁰ Venice, in other words, could police the Aegean as it saw fit without provoking Ottoman retaliation. This far-reaching provision remained surprisingly relevant throughout the first half of the fifteenth century.

Upon the conclusion of the Ottoman civil war and Venice’s brief conflict with Mehmed I, the treaty of 1419 portrays Ottomans and Venetians as the dominant powers on land and at sea, respectively, stipulating that Venice would not harass unarmed Ottoman vessels plying the Aegean, that Ottoman armies would not attack 38 named Venetian possessions, and that Venice would pay (token) tributes for Lepanto (100 ducats a

year) and three Albanian fortresses (200 ducats a year).²¹ Upon the conclusion of the War of Thessalonica (1423–1430), Murad II confirmed the same agreements, cutting the tribute for Albania to 136 ducats as one of the three castles had been conquered from the Venetians. In the process, he referred to the Doge, as least according to the Italian version of the treaty, as an equal (“mio fratello el Doxe”).²² Mehmed II renewed the same stipulations in the aftermath of the crusade of Varna. Notably, the euphemism that established custom applied to Turkish war vessels leaving the Straits remained an acknowledgment that Venetian vessels could attack Turkish ones in the Aegean without breaking the general state of peace between the signatories.²³

However, until the solidification of Ottoman control over the Balkans under Murad II, formal treaties hardly guaranteed Venetian immunity from the consequences of Ottoman campaigns. Accordingly, Venice sought to orchestrate political relations in the Aegean as best it could. Its relations with the Byzantine Empire expose the Senate’s mild preference for the status quo. At a time when the fall of Constantinople was feared, the Venetians supplied foodstuffs (1394), delivered cash subsidies from France (1398) and promised exile to the Byzantine Emperor and the despot of Mistra should they be chased from their lands (1400). They mediated, or attempted to mediate, between Ottomans and Byzantines. As part of these efforts, the Venetians encouraged peaceful relations between Latins and Byzantines while opposing any plans that would position them unfavorably against any power in any fashion.²⁴

The Venetian participation in the 1396 crusade of Nicopolis was typical. Venice insisted that at sea it waged a perpetual war with the Turks anyway, but that its apparent neutrality on land could actually make it easier to deliver provisions to Constantinople.²⁵ Morosini claims that on this occasion, Venetians and Genoese came together, forming a fleet of 44 galleys under Venetian command, and he takes pride in the fear that the alleged fleet supposedly inspired among the Turks.²⁶ While Morosini’s statement is intriguing, the recorded decisions of the Senate do not substantiate it; as Setton has stressed, Venice promised Sigismund of Hungary/Luxembourg that it “would provide one-fourth [of a combined Christian fleet] not exceeding twenty-five galleys—that is, Venice would provide six galleys.”²⁷ The decisions of the Senate speak only of the Gulf fleet.²⁸ In the spring of 1397, Venice sought Bayezid’s recognition of its incorporation of Argos, Nauplion, Athens, Durazzo and Scutari into the *Stato da Mar*,

while insisting that it could not agree to any peace at sea.²⁹ While a part-time crusader, Venice had fought a war with Genoa that was both fruitless and very damaging to its economy over the island of Tenedos, strategically located at the mouth of the Dardanelles; hence, it opposed Genoese and Hospitaller ideas to fortify the island as a base for anti-Ottoman operations.³⁰ The goal of the Senate was to obtain maximum benefit to Venice and assure minimum gains to its rivals through extensive diplomacy and very limited military expenditure. Any and all powers in *Romania* were actual or potential rivals, and all of them—with the notable exception of the Genoese—were actual or potential allies.

The fact that the Ottomans were but one of Venice's rivals explains the Senate's position. On the one hand, the discourse of crusade was dominant in diplomatic relations and it left Venice with no choice but to quickly expound its verbal support to Christian rulers. On the other hand, getting the Senate to provide any backing that required financial expenditure was a wholly different story. Venice could not supply more than the two galleys it had already provided for the defense of Constantinople (1402).³¹ It was not possible to provide Manuel II with any galleys because piracy required vigilance (1407).³² Whether in 1402 or in 1450, Venetian willingness to expend substantial military support was predicated upon sharing the burden with other powers.³³ For example, in the context of the recently concluded Ottoman civil war and re-established Ottoman central authority (1417), Venice proposed to Byzantine envoys that the Christians put a maritime league to work: Venice was to supply two galleys, while the Byzantines, the Hospitallers, the Genoese of Chios and those of Lesbos, and the duke of the Archipelago were to supply one galley each.³⁴ While Venice refused any substantial and/or continuous support to the beleaguered Byzantine Empire, it did not fail to confront the Byzantines whenever and wherever it felt its commercial and/or strategic interests threatened. Thus, in 1450, Venice proclaimed itself ready to abandon Constantinople for Pera should the emperor fail to guarantee the safety of Venetian merchants there and abolish a newly imposed tax.³⁵ The status quo suited Venice, but the Senate was not willing to spend much in its defense.

While Venice approached the Ottoman–Byzantine struggle through a half-hearted preference for the status quo, its diplomatic relations with other powers pursued the acknowledgment of Venetian territorial acquisitions in *Romania* and aimed at convincing Christian powers to cooperate against the Ottomans, while denying passage to Ottoman

troops. Venetian acquisitiveness, after all, provoked resentment. A good example is the transfer of Patras to Venice in 1408. Venice hastened to convince Suleyman that this was simply a lease and that Venice would pay the customary tribute.³⁶ The prince of Achaia, meanwhile, was to be told that Venice had acted upon a request from the archbishop himself. The annual tribute to the Turks would be collected in the customary fashion and the rights of the prince would be respected.³⁷ The following year, Venice had to address Suleyman's protestations regarding its occupation of Lepanto, Patras and Angelokastron. This was a time when the senators could imagine themselves actually conducting the somewhat cacophonous affairs of the Aegean: should Suleyman prove intractable, the envoy was to convoke the Council of Twelve in Constantinople and discuss the sultan's replacement with Mehmed Celebi.³⁸

While at the time of an Ottoman civil war Venice had some success convincing the Ottomans and others to accept its acquisition of new territories, its attempts to persuade minor political fry to resist Ottoman demands for logistical and/or direct military support seem to have been mostly fruitless. In 1385, the Senate worried that Nerio Acciaiuoli "causes many vessels of the Turks to come annually to the region of Megara."³⁹ Three years later, the *bailo* of Negroponte was ordered to address the issue of Nerio Acciaiuoli's letting Turkish raiders pass through his territories on their way to Venetian domains.⁴⁰ In 1398, Venice warned the duke of the Archipelago, who had just concluded a treaty with the Turks, not to accept any conditions that would require him to resupply Turkish vessels.⁴¹ Convincing local rulers to cooperate against the Turk was a constant thrust of Venetian policy in *Romania* until 1423.⁴²

However, by the time that the War of Thessalonica concluded in 1430, conditions in *Romania* had changed. The Ottomans had reasserted the dominant political and military position they had enjoyed in the 1390s, but they also attained a mutually beneficial *modus vivendi* with Venice. As the Ottoman polity evolved and its central administration became more willing and capable of exercising a tighter control over its lands, Venetian–Ottoman relations attained a short-lived balance that reflected well the tenor of formal treaties and that seems to have suited both the Venetian elite and Murad II: Ottomans ruled the land, while Venetians controlled the sea. Yet this relative stability was preceded by half a century of chaos, which required Venice to employ more than diplomatic means of conflict resolution.

THE VENETIAN RESPONSE TO CHAOS: EXPANSION

The military thrusts in the Balkans that marked Ottoman expansion in the late fourteenth century had a ripple effect throughout the peninsula, assuring a continuously kaleidoscopic picture. Expansionism, as highlighted by Freddy Thiriet's classic, was Venice's most remarkable response to chaos between 1381 and 1430. The Venetians, whose attitude was one of "guarded courage," constructed a veritable dike of possessions that ran from northern Albania to the northern Sporades. This dike aimed at "interdicting access to the sea to the new masters of the continent."⁴³ The construction of fortifications throughout Venice's (fairly limited) possessions in Messenia in the early fifteenth century seemingly substantiates Thiriet's thesis. Christine Hodgetts and Peter Lock have found "no evidence that before the fifteenth century the Venetians fortified any of the villages in the land dependent on the two city ports of Coron and Modon." However: "By the 1430s, it was said that Coron and Modon had seven subsidiary castles ..." Unlike Thiriet, Hodgetts and Lock attribute Venice's newly found taste for acquisitions to the threat posed by both Turks and Genoese.⁴⁴ Ruthy Gertwagen, in turn, identifies the Genoese, rather than the Ottomans, as the chief reason behind Venice's acquisitiveness.⁴⁵ Benjamin Arbel stresses that overall: "Territories were acquired for various reasons, and acquisition was not the driving force of Venetian policy." The safety of sea lanes, geostrategic concerns and natural resources were the key motors of Venetian expansion.⁴⁶ Finally, functional explanations, as pointed out by Monique O'Connell, should not preclude us from seeing a different side of the story, the self-fashioning (if somewhat haphazard) of an imperial persona, "the city's possession and maintenance of a maritime empire was a point of pride and an essential part of Venetian self-representation."⁴⁷ A close examination of the decisions of the Venetian Senate suggests that the acquisitions made after 1381 cannot be attributed to the determined pursuit of any well-formulated goals of foreign policy. The expansion of the Venetian *Stato da Mar* between 1381 and 1423 is best seen as the outcome of ad hoc decision-making in the context of political chaos generated first by Ottoman expansionism and then by the Ottoman civil war, and exacerbated by Venice's traditional rivalry with Genoa.

The major Venetian acquisitions were those of Corfu, Dalmatia, Durazzo (and the strategically located fortress of Butrinto, across the channel in Epirus), Argos, Nauplion, Zonchio (Pylos, Old Navarino,

Anavarin) in Messenia, as well as the temporary occupations of Athens and Patras.⁴⁸ In 1409, notably, King Ladislas sold to Venice Zara and his royal rights over all of long-coveted Dalmatia.⁴⁹ This was a major development, but while it had everything to do with traditional Venetian aspirations in the Adriatic, it had nothing to do with Ottoman expansionism.

As well argued by Gertwagen, the Genoese were often the rival to forestall in *Romania*. Venice was particularly concerned with potential Genoese control of Zonchio, located not far from the Venetian naval bases of Coron and Modon. Genoese possession of it would represent a great danger (“maximum preiudicium et damnum”) to the Venetian bases, claimed the Senate in 1384–1385.⁵⁰ The same issue re-emerged in 1406. Centurione Zaccaria, the Prince of Achaia, might be willing to sell Zonchio to the Genoese, who would be a bad neighbor (“non facerent locis nostris Coroni et mothoni bonam viciniam”).⁵¹ The problem was addressed continuously until the fortress came into Venetian hands in 1423.⁵²

For all their perceived power, the Genoese were hardly the only concern in the lagoon. In 1388, the Senate proclaimed that the acquisition of Argos or Nauplion by either the despot of Mistra or Nerio Acciaiuoli, called a “most cruel tyrant” who constantly plotted the destruction of Venetian territories, must be prevented.⁵³ Venice obtained rights to Athens in 1394 and held the city until 1403.⁵⁴ To the Senate, the chief troublemaker in Attica was Antonio Acciaiuoli, whose utter destruction was to be pursued (“ut fiat omnis provisio possibilis ad dannum et exterminium domini Antonii”).⁵⁵

In other cases, Venice stepped in to avoid not so much the seizing of a given fortress by a specific power as to respond to a particularly chaotic situation. This was notably the case of Patras, Clarenza and Vostitza in 1402 in the wake of the death of Pierre de Saint-Supéran, the Prince of Achaia. Venice held Patras from the Latin archbishop of the city, Stefano Zaccaria, between 1408 and 1419.⁵⁶ In the Morea, as Setton suggests, Venice would have preferred to be left alone, but it found itself entangled in hostile relations between others.⁵⁷ The expansion of Venice into Messenia, noted by Hodgetts and Lock, was a response to the constant fighting between the Latin principality of Achaia and the Byzantine despotate of the Morea. While Venetian actions in the Morea in 1401–1402 stemmed from raids carried out by the Turks, the latter were not Ottoman raiders, but rather mercenaries in the pay of Centurione Zaccaria. Other initiatives originated in fears that the Genoese and the Hospitallers might

attempt to take control of the Morea.⁵⁸ Finally, the rhetoric of senatorial deliberations stressing the devastation of the countryside needs to be checked against Venetian reluctance to fully commit to the repairs and garrisoning of a centrally located fortification.⁵⁹

To the contrary of what arguments about determined Venetian empire-building or active anti-Ottoman defensive policy require, Venice often backpedaled once a potential acquisition risked irritating the Ottoman sultan. This was the case with major towns like Monemvasia, Corinth and Megara in the 1380s.⁶⁰ Even more importantly, the Senate was not unduly concerned with maintaining control over any of the newly acquired territories, its occasionally loud protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. In 1407, for example, Venice brushed away a Byzantine proposal that it donate to the emperor the town of Nauplion under the pretext that Venice lacked the habit of ceding its possessions to others.⁶¹ A year later, however, Venice returned Glarentza to the Centurione Zaccaria.⁶² Although Patras was defined as an important commercial center in 1394—the value of the merchandise stored there in 1401 was estimated at 60,000–70,000 ducats and the town's territory was said to be bursting with wine and barley in 1411—Venice duly offered Patras back to its reluctant lord in 1413.⁶³ In 1385, the Senate voted to offer the castle of Karystos in Negroponte to the highest bidder so as to relieve the commune from excessive expenditure.⁶⁴ Similarly, in 1406, the senators voted to transfer the islands of Tinos and Mykonos, which were said to bring nothing to Venice, to the brother of the lord of Bodeniza.⁶⁵ Even more tellingly, the Senate rejected a proposal by the syndics of Tinos-Mykonos to transfer the islands to Marco Bembo, who was considered an excellent sailor. Instead, the islands were to go to the highest bidder.⁶⁶ Financial concerns trumped worries about the defensibility of territories.

Venice therefore did not purposefully erect an anti-Ottoman dike. The Ottoman threat was, of course, real, culminating in events like the long-remembered destruction of Argos in 1397 and the famine that raids provoked in Venetian Messenia, whose inhabitants were said to be unable to live in the open countryside in 1402.⁶⁷ In some cases, the Senate did indeed state a concern with the potential fall of specific territories into Ottoman hands, as with Lepanto in 1402.⁶⁸ In the same year, it even toyed with the idea of purchasing the crucial port town of Gallipoli, a measure that would have greatly hampered Ottoman excursions at sea.⁶⁹ Yet, Venetian acquisitiveness between 1381 and 1423 can hardly be seen as aimed at creating against the Ottomans the sort of Maginot Line that

the dike metaphor of the great French historian invites one to imagine. Venetian expansion was ad hoc, half-hearted and aimed not so much at counter-balancing Ottoman power as at coping with the generally chaotic situation created first by Murad I's and Bayezid I's successful conquests in the eastern and central Balkans, and then exacerbated by the latter's devastating defeat at Ankara. Morosini's work well sums up the situation: the Venetians rejoiced at the news of the acquisition of several fortified places from the principality of Achaia in 1417 so that they would not fall into the hands of "Genoese and Turks, nor of Greeks of the Empire, or of other people."⁷⁰

It may appear at first glance that the conflict between Venice and the Ottomans over control of Thessalonica between 1423 and 1430 represented such a commitment that it must preclude us from relegating *Romania* and the Ottomans to the backstage of senatorial concerns. Accepted with the consent of roughly two-thirds of the senators after lively debates, the city's acquisition was "a strategic miscalculation which led to great financial losses for Venice."⁷¹ There is some disagreement about the role the newly elected doge Francesco Foscari and the related rise of a "hawkish" party in the Senate played in Venice's acceptance of the offer to assume control of Thessalonica.⁷² The Venetians, Freddy Thiriet notes, waged a vigorous if futile campaign.⁷³ Setton's view, however, is less complimentary: "The Venetians never made adequate provision for the defense of Thessalonica against the Turks."⁷⁴ In fact, Camillo Manfroni had already provided a comprehensive and accurate review of the decisions of the Senate and the diary of Morosini, exposing the Senate's half-hearted and flip-flopping attitude throughout the war.⁷⁵ Venice had no Thessalonica policy and no related naval strategy.

The Senate hoped that the Ottomans would agree to its move in the Aegean and diplomacy remained its preferred tool of dispute resolution throughout the conflict. For example, in the context of a stalemate and significant expenditures in Italy, Venice became amenable to common anti-Ottoman actions and offered Sigismund of Hungary to hire troops in Venetian territories, to borrow 200,000 ducats from Venice and to enjoy a truce that would last until the loan's repayment.⁷⁶ Peace with the Ottomans, however, remained preferable to a common anti-Ottoman front. In 1426, the senators were hopeful that a draft treaty worked out with the governor of Gallipoli might appeal to the sultan: Venice would keep Thessalonica in return for a cut of its revenues.⁷⁷ As the peace was almost a done deal, a typically optimistic Senate deliberated, no formal engagements were to

be made with respect to Sigismund.⁷⁸ In addition to perennial attempts at diplomatic solution, the Senate continuously supported pretenders to the Ottoman throne. These included a certain Ismail, who claimed to be of Ottoman descent, who was to be deployed in either Europe or Asia for the purpose of causing an insurrection in 1424, Juneyd, called Lord of Theologo, Palatia, and all of Asia (Minor), and Mustafa, who was said to call himself a son of Bayezid.⁷⁹ While attempts at diplomacy and subversion cost little, the Venetian elite never received any tangible returns from employing these tools of foreign policy.

Although it expanded a considerable effort in provisioning the city, which posed substantial difficulties,⁸⁰ the Senate did not commit to the defense of Thessalonica the kind of human and material resources it proved willing to deploy in Italy. Venice, above all, expected the city's own revenues to pay for its defense.⁸¹ The Senate's defensive measures consisted of the promise of 50 crossbowmen to be summoned from Crete in case of need and the hiring of up to 100 Greek or Vlach mercenaries for no more than six months. This translated into a de facto refusal to provide for the city's defense.⁸² Thus, the Senate balked at the news that the newly minted *provveditori* might have provided for a garrison totaling over 700 men:

These expenditures seem to our government to be most excessive, so if you have made them as described above we ... enjoin you that you should well and diligently consider the said expenditures, and should examine and revise them, confining yourselves from time to time in regard to the security of the said place only to necessary expenditures, and to the smallest amount which is appropriate.⁸³

While Venice followed the first indications of Ottoman hostility with a naval demonstration in the Straits, this, as Manfroni would have it, was a parody of a naval campaign that laid waste the shores and the possessions of non-belligerents in the hope that this would induce the sultan to negotiate.⁸⁴ It was only in 1425 that Venice, now compelled by the Ottoman detention of its envoy to consider itself at war with the Ottomans, dispatched a fleet that carried out actual military operations. These included the capture of fortifications that controlled access to Thessalonica as well as the fortress of *Cristopoli*.⁸⁵ Then, however, the captain left 80 men, unsupported by a single galley, to defend the place against the inevitable Ottoman counter-attack, which wiped out the garrison soon afterwards.⁸⁶ Throughout the rest of the conflict, Venetian naval forces achieved little more than the capture of

small Turkish trade and fishing boats. The most Venice could muster in the face of the large-scale Ottoman preparations in 1429 was to dispatch a large round-ship with a crew of 250, a captain with 50 men and a small number of galleys to reinforce the Venetian forces.⁸⁷ Several galley captains openly disobeyed their admiral when he attempted to attack the Ottoman naval base at Gallipoli. These captains, who according to law unsurprisingly deserved the death penalty, got away with largely symbolic punishments (and some were absolved).⁸⁸ While Manfroni seems to have taken almost personal offense at their behavior, there is nothing unsound about his reading of the episode as an egregious example of military dysfunction. However, the interesting and unanswered question is not whether this event should be seen as a symptom of decay but whether on-field behavior reflected deeper internal rifts among the Venetians. Be that as it may, that the Venetians were remarkably underprepared for what they undertook is not simply a modern observation; it was abundantly clear to the contemporary author of the main Greek source of the events.⁸⁹

Jones rightfully points out that Thessalonica brought Venice nothing but the outlay of cash. However, one should be wary of attributing Venice's defeat to financial exhaustion per se. While in 1428, the Senate was indeed deliberating about excessive and unbearable expenses (“*excessivas et insupportabiles expensas*”),⁹⁰ the reason for this had little to do with the Balkans. For all its interest in Thessalonica, the Senate's attention was redirected to the Italian mainland within a year of the adventure's outset. With the affairs in the Aegean completely unsettled, Venice armed a large river armada in the Po designed to counter Milanese influence.⁹¹ Soon Venice found itself in open war with Milan in 1425–1426 and 1427–1428, a conflict that lingered on, involving the payment of massive mercenary armies.⁹² Whereas a few hundred men were to defend Thessalonica, Venice agreed with Florence to arm 8,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry in 1425, and the republic's condottiere actually led an estimated 20,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry into battle against the Visconti armies in 1426.⁹³ The most credible estimate of Venice's total expenses on the War of Thessalonica is 60,000 ducats per year for a total of about 420,000. Even if we accept Morosini's estimate of 740,000 ducats over seven years, which is the highest (the lowest being just 200,000), the sum pales in comparison with what Venice spent against Milan. In 1431, the next round of the war with Milan was said to have cost the supposedly exhausted Venice some 70,000 ducats—per month.⁹⁴ In 1426–1427, forced loans alone had raised over 1,000,000 ducats.⁹⁵ Venice's massive operations against Milan

on land and Milanese-ruled Genoa at sea in 1431, to which we shall turn in due course, show that the Serenissima did not abandon its quest to control Thessalonica because it ran out of funds. Even if they came at a fraction of the cost, adventures in *Romania* took backseat to exploits in Italy.

The unwillingness of the Senate to follow through its own decision to accept Thessalonica is not surprising. Venice challenged Murad II over a city the commercial relevance of which is easily exaggerated. While it has been labeled a “principal center of the Venetian Republic’s trade in the Levant,” Thessalonica had in fact long “ceased to be a major port of call and transshipment station and was relegated to a secondary role within the framework of trans-Mediterranean traffic.”⁹⁶ In turn, the fact that Venetian involvement helped reduce Thessalonica to demographic and economic irrelevance that lasted for several decades⁹⁷ did not preclude patrician economic interest in *Romania* from reaching its zenith precisely in the 1430s. Nor was the conquest of Thessalonica the apex of a grand anti-Ottoman strategy. As Manfroni succinctly and accurately points out on the basis of both senatorial decisions and Morosini, what Venice feared was that unless it accepted the city, it would be offered to the Ottomans—or would fall into the hands of other Christians.⁹⁸

Major Venetian narrative sources further undermine any efforts to explain Venetian interventionism in the northern Aegean through a crusade paradigm. The Turk is a secondary if constant actor in Marin Sanudo’s work.⁹⁹ In Morosini’s diary, Thessalonica receives a bit more notable attention during the first year of Venice’s rule over the city, largely due to the incorporation of letters written by Venetians informing the Signoria of the situation in *Romania*. However, as soon as the conflict in Italy begins, Thessalonica’s status in the narrative is downgraded to background noise. Although they clearly distinguish between Christians and Turks, the statement-of-fact works of Sanudo and Morosini denote no clash of civilizations and the narratives are hardly colored by suggestive adjectives or remarks.¹⁰⁰ With the war’s conclusion, the Ottomans fall almost entirely off Sanudo’s chronicle, making only an occasional appearance until the crusade of Varna. As for Morosini, the fall of Thessalonica may have prompted him to reflect upon the loss of blood and cash, and to contemplate the roles of fortune and the sins of Christendom. Nevertheless, he is also quick to follow a report about the event with news of the auction for the *Romania* galleys, all three of which found takers.¹⁰¹ Unaffected by the status of Thessalonica (and indeed unburdened by a commercially unnecessary stop), Venetian big business went on as usual.

Thus, between 1381 and 1430, Venice acquired a variety of territories ranging from strategically located fortresses to one of the largest towns in *Romania*. However, Venice's actions show that defense against the Ottomans was but one factor that motivated Venetian expansion. To the senators, the Ottoman sultan was neither the only nor necessarily the least favored actor in the complicated play of Balkan power relations that they sometimes hoped, however briefly and in vain, to orchestrate.

DEFENSE ON LAND: THE OTTOMANS AS NUISANCE

Until the 1450s, Freddy Thiriet argues, Ottoman conquests did not reduce Venetian power. Ottoman expansion even led to an improvement in the relations between the ruling Latin Catholics and the subject Orthodox Greeks. Venice, notably, recognized the rights of the leading strongmen of Corfu, maintained established customs and respected the rights of the Greek notables in Argos and Nauplion, and confirmed all the privileges of the inhabitants of Thessalonica. The Venetian colonial empire evolved toward a federation, as highlighted by the fact that the inhabitants of various Venetian territories frequently sent embassies with requests to the lagoon. Thiriet then qualifies the picture thus painted. Venetians dominated the important offices and the army; pay was unequal. Venice tolerated the Greek clergy, but favoring Catholicism was a way for the city to boost the security of its hold over Greek territories.¹⁰² There is, however, more to this side of the story than Thiriet's argument can accommodate. We will see in this section that for all the emphasis on collaboration with princes in the process of acquiring new territories, and with local strong men for the purpose of exercising control over them, the Senate refused to expand more than the bare minimum for the defense of the colonies. Venice maintained defensive forces the composition and size of which did not allow for protecting anything other than key ports and fortresses. It may well be that "Venice embarked from the 1520s onward on a systematic organization of civil militias ... mostly peasant militias, in its overseas territories, on the model of a similar organization that had already been established in the Venetian *terraferma*,"¹⁰³ but between 1381 and 1453, the Senate consistently preferred to weaken its colonies' ability to withstand external threats to the prospect of granting the local Greeks a significant role in their defense.

For Setton: "It was the Turks, who created the major problem which Venice faced in the Levant."¹⁰⁴ As was well pointed out by Morosini,

Venice suffered damages even when no harm was done to Venetian possessions because of the hostilities' immensely negative impact on trade.¹⁰⁵ The Ottomans, however, held no monopoly over either kind of Venetian troubles. The acquisition of Argos and Nauplion in 1388 provoked a prolonged conflict with both Despot Theodore and Nerio Acciaiuoli.¹⁰⁶ In 1396, the men of Theodore were said to have taken animals away from Venice's subjects in Argos.¹⁰⁷ In 1406, while fighting the Latin prince of Achaia, the Byzantine troops of the despot pillaged the territories of Coron and Modon.¹⁰⁸ Byzantine troops were also a concern in 1420, 1422, 1427, 1428, 1445, 1450 and 1453.¹⁰⁹ In 1395, Carlo Tocco was a source of trouble to Venetian Argos and Athens; he was accused of carrying away people and animals and causing damages to the tune of 30,000 ducats.¹¹⁰ The men of the duke of Cephalonia, were, in turn, a threat to Venetian interests at Patras and Lepanto in 1408.¹¹¹ Thus, although the Ottomans (whether through conquest or defeat and civil war) were what set all other pieces of the puzzle in motion, the Venetian sources fail to paint the kind of simple dichotomy that studies might lead one to expect.

The Senate's treatment of the defense of the large island of Negroponte during the tumultuous 1420s typifies the Venetian response to threats in *Romania*. Until 1422, the island's defense relied in part on a cavalry force of 25 Greek *stratiotai* that cost Venice 3,600 ducats per year, now considered one among various unnecessary and superfluous expenses ("spexe superflue e non necessarie") to be annulled. The horsemen's number was reduced to eight, who must not be citizens or possess any land either on the mainland or on Negroponte ("non diebano esser ni cittadini ni homeni che habiano terreni in possession ni in la terra ni in la isola nostra de Negroponte").¹¹² At the height of Venetian engagement in nearby Thessalonica, legations from the island raised the issue of its defensibility. At one point, Venice promised to hire as many as 200 *stratiotai*, should peace with the sultan not be concluded, to repair all castles and to provide for any necessary repairs. The Senate, however, kept procrastinating, reduced the number of the promised horsemen and apparently concluded the War of Thessalonica without increasing its cavalry force in Negroponte. Citing again a concern with the elimination of *expensas superfluas*, the Senate meanwhile ordered the infantry decreased to 90 from 110: all crossbowmen, foreigners and Catholics ("omnes esse debeant balistarii et forenses et catholici qui non teneant legem grecam sed latinam").¹¹³ Thus, even at the time of its only large-scale conflict with the Ottomans prior to 1463, the island's defensibility against external threats does not seem to have been Venice's chief concern.

The attitude displayed at Negroponte in the 1420s was the norm. Venice preferred to maintain small garrisons and to dispatch companies (typically 20 men each) to bolster them in times of need. These companies, in turn, were quickly disbanded once the threat had subsided.¹¹⁴ The event that prompted Venice to substantially increase its land forces in *Romania* was the conflict with Genoa in 1431, when the manpower at Modon and Coron totaled 400 men instead of the usual 160.¹¹⁵ Similarly, although a document from 1394 speaks of the provision of inhabitants of Argos and Nauplion with crossbows,¹¹⁶ the Venetian reluctance to incorporate Greeks in the defense of its colonies was not peculiar to Negroponte. While this reticence was grounded in a rhetoric of Greek ineffectiveness, one wonders if the distaste for paying Greeks was not rooted in senatorial fears for the internal stability of Venetian rule. The Senate was certainly steadfast, if typically unsuccessful, in its attempts to ensure that Greeks played little to no part in the defense of Venetian territories. In 1430, the castellan of Modon informed the Senate that Greeks served in companies in place of Latins, receiving equal pay. The Greeks must not be paid more than two-thirds of what the Latins were paid and Latins should not be replaced by Greeks, under the hefty penalty of 100 pounds for a castellan who dared to fill a vacancy with a Greek.¹¹⁷ However, the recruitment of Latins for service in *Romania* proved too challenging to meet even Venice's modest needs. In 1444, the two companies that made up the garrison of Coron were composed mostly of Greeks. The new castellan was to arrive with a company of Latins and to reform the existing ones into a single company devoid of any Greeks.¹¹⁸ Similarly, Modon's larger garrison, made up of six companies or 120 men, was one of Greeks, yet Latin companies would better guarantee the safety of the place ("si sunt latine maior securitas erit ipsi loco"). Therefore, the new castellan was to arrive with two new companies, reform the existing six into four, and fire the Greeks and the useless ("et de sex banderiis que ibi sunt fiant banderie quatuor et cassentur greci et inutilis").¹¹⁹ Returning to Negroponte, it was said in 1449 that a plague had killed most soldiers on the island, who had thus been replaced by Greeks. Thus, the republic incurred expenses while gaining little security ("de quibus habetur expensa cum modica securitate illius loci"). Two companies of infantrymen were to be dispatched to Negroponte, while two of the existing ones were to be disbanded.¹²⁰ Ensuring the stability of Venice's rule seems to have been the only senatorial concern that took precedence over expenditure. Fittingly, during the final Ottoman assault of Thessalonica, "the Venetians, who were unsure of the loyalty of the

Greeks separated the Venetians from the Greek defenders placing between the two of them groups of bandits.”¹²¹

The Venetian possessions in *Romania* typically relied on small garrisons in an attempt to keep costs low. Thus, in the early 1430s, the permanent combined land forces at Negroponte and Modon-Coron must have amounted to eight cavalymen and 250 crossbowmen stationed in several castles. Yet, although these troops did not amount to a force that could take the open field, they still cost the republic at least 7,000 ducats per year in salaries alone, which was significant enough to result in delayed salaries. Therefore, in times of significant pressures on the treasury, Venice sought to diminish this expense and thus its already meager permanent troops. Demonstrating a traditional Venetian business approach more than a concern with empire-building as a goal in itself, the Senate was eager to increase the revenue from colonies whenever the opportunity presented itself, while quickly eliminating military and administrative jobs when colonies ran deficits.¹²²

The mediocre number of soldiers that made up the permanent garrisons between 1381 and 1453 finds interesting parallels with the size of garrisons of comparable fortresses after the region’s conquest at the hands of Mehmed II. Under Selim I, the main focus of whose attention lay in the East, the fortress of Navarino (Anavarin, Pylos) relied on a garrison of 121; thus, the latter’s size in the 1510s was virtually identical to that of nearby Venetian Modon between 1381 and 1453. However, when the region was considered to be threatened by the Venetians during the subsequent reign of Suleiman I, the garrison ballooned to 643 troops, including an elite force of 295 janissaries.¹²³ Venice, by contrast, does not seem to have considered an equally intensive military response to “Turkish” threats to its possessions in the Morea between 1381 and 1453. The fact that Venice deployed a temporary 400-man-strong garrison at Modon and Coron at the outset of a major naval campaign against Milanese-ruled Genoa in 1431 clearly reveals that Genoa, not the Ottoman Empire, remained the key perceived threat to the main Venetian overseas possessions. On the whole, as Ruthy Gertwagen has put it, the senators tended to “prevaricate and spend as little as possible”; this attitude, which made sense from the point of view of the Venetian elite, applied even to ports, which were rarely improved and of which only those of Candia and Modon were fortified.¹²⁴

The Senate’s attitude toward soldiers and structures reveals the goals that the Venetian elite pursued in *Romania*, belies the notion of an overwhelming Ottoman threat to its interests, and exposes the hollowness of

generalizations that portray late medieval Venice as if it operated like a modern state. The size and the composition of the Venetian forces shows their purpose: to preserve the strategic ports and fortresses. The half-hearted measures against raids on land could not prevent the loss of lives and properties among Venice's subjects to which the deliberations of the Senate, and thus also Sanudo's chronicle, allude. For example, Sanudo reports that 1,260 subjects were taken during a raid in 1425, alongside 6,020 Greeks from the Byzantine portions of the Peloponnese.¹²⁵ So far as one can judge from documents that rarely feature the voice of the Venetian subjects themselves, these raids were both a serious and an almost quotidian threat to Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians under Venetian rule as well as to local Catholics, like "la universitade di citadini fidelissimi Latini vestri de Coron che ha possessione de fuora dal castello in la jurisdicio de Coron," on behalf of which a plea for help against Turkish raids was made in Venice.¹²⁶ No wonder, then, that legations from the colonies asked the *Dominante* to commit more obviously to their defense, by which they meant the population and its properties. However, to the Venetian elite in the lagoon, such raids were but a nuisance. They rarely escalated into concerns acute enough to compel the senators to increase Venice's military presence in the colonies, and even when this happened, the garrisons' only purpose was that of defending the ports and fortresses that made the lifeline of the Venetian "empire."

This is not to suggest that the Senate was uninterested in the countryside and the fate of its subject populations. However, financial and human resources were to be expended elsewhere. Venice's possessions in *Romania* had to rely on alternative measures. The farthest-reaching one was the repopulation of devastated territories. In 1402, inhabitants of continental Greece, especially Albanians, were said to be willing to settle in Negroponte with their horses; they were to receive state land and to be exempted from any labor obligations.¹²⁷ In 1425, the regimen of Negroponte was authorized to accept some 300 Albanian families from the duchy of Athens and others who would like to settle on the island.¹²⁸ In 1398, the Senate congratulated the *podestà* of Nauplion for settling Albanians on the territory of Argos, depopulated by Turkish raids.¹²⁹ Half a century later, a legation from Argos complained that the Albanians settled there in 1397, when the Turks had burnt the city and reportedly taken 14,000 captives, were overly favored by the Venetian authorities.¹³⁰ While Venice was able to attract refugees from Byzantine territories, it was not necessarily able to keep them. A package of tax breaks was to alleviate this problem in the

territories of Coron and Modon in 1437.¹³¹ Economic incentives were indeed a tool frequently employed by the Venetian authorities. In 1399, all those who had escaped successfully from the Argos raids were invited to return. They were promised a five-year exemption from labor obligations other than guarding the city walls, and a free distribution of houses and terrains.¹³² In 1401 and 1414, the Venetian response to Ottoman raids against the territories of Coron and Modon was a reduction in the tax burden; the same applied to Tinos-Mykonos in 1432.¹³³ The main strategic fortifications aside, Venetian *Romania* was to be largely defended through whatever demographic and economic resources it was able to generate.

Until Murad II's re-establishment of Ottoman central authority, Venice took a two-pronged approach to the defense of its colonies. With Crete outside any actual danger, Venice focused on guaranteeing the safety of the ports and strategic fortresses that facilitated the logistics of a naval power. The Senate carried out this effort at the lowest possible level of commitment as measured in troops and expenditure, while steadfastly opposing the incorporation of subjects into the formal defense forces of the colonies. In contrast to Thiriet's argument, the chief perceived enemy, after all, may well have been the one within.

“IN MARI SEMPER SUMUS IN GUERRA CUM TURCHIS”¹³⁴

Benjamin Arbel's claim that in the early modern period “Venice's chief enemy on the maritime front was the Ottoman Empire, with whom, between 1396 and 1718, the Republic had to engage in 11 military conflicts, all of them somehow related to the *stato da mar* (from 1423 all of them directly related to it)” aptly sums up the dominant view.¹³⁵ Yet, it also needs to be slightly revised because this was not the case prior to c. 1470. Threats to navigation, in the first place, were always multiple.¹³⁶ Turkish raids may well have been the key threat to Venetian subjects in the Aegean Sea between 1381 and 1453. However, with respect to the type of navigation on which the wealth of Venice's elite depended,¹³⁷ the chief sources of trouble were the Genoese and the Catalans on the one hand, and shipwreck on the other.

Venice maintained a permanent (or rather annually armed) navy since the early fourteenth century, the first state to do so.¹³⁸ Although it was by no means limited to operations in the Adriatic, the fleet's title reflected Venice's hegemonic claims over that sea: the Galleys of the/Our Gulf, commanded by a Captain of the/Our Gulf.¹³⁹ By contrast, a war fleet

armed in times of open war with a major naval power was commanded by a Captain General of the Sea. Between 1381 and 1423, the size of the Gulf fleet varied from 4–6 to 15 vessels, with 10 representing the most common number. Venice usually provided the largest number of galleys, while Crete armed up to four galleys, Negroponte armed one; Nauplion and Tinos-Mykonos armed one galley or a smaller *galiota* each.¹⁴⁰ All these vessels did not necessarily operate as a fleet. Patrolling was often the primary purpose of the vessels armed in Negropont, Nauplion and Tinos-Mykonos. In the Aegean, the Gulf fleet protected Venetian islands from sea-borne attack and chased pirates. Throughout the period, the Gulf fleet, which albeit armed annually remained at sea over the winter months only in cases of utmost necessity, was deemed sufficient to cope with any danger the Ottomans could pose at sea.¹⁴¹

Uncertain about their goals, the Senate tracked the movement of Ottoman war fleets. In 1392, the Senate was informed of significant Ottoman naval preparations against Sinope. The fleet was said to be commanded by the Byzantine emperor. Since the population of Venetian colonies in *Romania* was more favorable to Greek than to Latin lords (“*greci plus desiderant dominium grecorum quam latinorum*”), the fleet might thus attack the Venetian colonies instead. The movements of the fleet were to be tracked and the Aegean islands defended.¹⁴² This was not an isolated episode. The Senate closely monitored Turkish fleets in 1398, when it feared that Bayezid would try to conquer Negropont, in 1407, when the Captain of the Gulf was to track a Turkish fleet said to be aimed at Altoluogo and Palatia, and in 1410, when the chaos generated by the Ottoman civil war seemed to justify escorting the *Romania* line galleys through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, a small naval force of three galleys armed in Negroponte, Nauplion and Tinos-Mykonos could be considered enough to counter any threats to the *Romania* galley line and to Venetian islands even in the face of significant Turkish naval preparations in 1414.¹⁴⁴ What caught the senators’ attention was the occasional appearance in the sultan’s fleet of advanced naval vessels, as was the case of two cogs in 1411.¹⁴⁵

While Venetian vessels monitored the movements of Ottoman ones, there was only one large naval battle between Venetians and Ottomans in the entire fifteenth century (the Venetians never actually fought the Ottomans at sea during the conflict of 1462–1479). This was the 1416 encounter at Gallipoli described by the Captain of the Gulf Fleet Pietro Loredan, whose letter was incorporated into Morosini’s work. Loredan’s

fleet was made of ten galleys, of which six were armed in Venice, two in Crete and one each in Negropont and Nauplion. The Ottoman fleet was made of a lesser number of galleys and a larger number of *galeote* featuring a varying number of benches (20, 22, 23 and 29). Six of the galleys and nine of the *galeote* ended up in Venetian hands. Loredan reported the loss of 12 men in combat; in addition, 340 Venetians were wounded. The Ottoman fleet was a microcosm of the Ottoman Empire. The commanders and the combatants were Turks, the oarsmen were Greeks and Bulgarians, and the specialists were mostly westerners—Genoese, Catalans, Sicilians, Provençals, as well as men from Venetian Candia itself, including the “rebel” George Calergi, an exponent of a family that had long troubled the Venetian authorities. The Venetians “cut to pieces” the Turks, the “bad Christians” (that is, Catholics) who had gone over to the “infidels” for pay and, of course, the Calergi. The Greeks and the Bulgarians constituted the mass of the captives whose lives were spared.¹⁴⁶ The outcome of this event must have pleased the Venetian elite, but the danger that Venice faced at sea on an annual basis did not arise from battle fleets.

Long-distance trade was carried out chiefly by convoys of merchant galleys boasting very large crews of armed men and by large cogs with boards tall enough to make them almost impregnable by galleys. Thus, the “Turkish” threat at sea came chiefly in the form of virtually constant danger to islands and local/regional navigation. This threat was countered by adjustments in the operation of existing naval units. Naval warfare was a hand-to-hand affair and the simplest measure was to increase the number of the crossbowmen assigned to each vessel.¹⁴⁷ Another typical measure was the dispatch of a single armed vessel (either a trireme or a smaller longboat) to specific areas and the provision of escort to private vessels—and some senators saw even this minimal policing effort as superfluous.¹⁴⁸ Individual galleys also delivered food and armaments.¹⁴⁹ In the late fourteenth century, pairs of galleys were also frequently employed and deemed sufficient to keep the Turks at bay.¹⁵⁰ Only rarely did the Senate find it necessary to clear the sea of pirates through actual fleets—and even then the Genoese loomed larger than the Turks in its deliberations. In 1403 it was said that Turkish boats (“alique barche Turcorum que vadunt ad cursum”) inflicted “multa mala” on Venetian merchants, causing them to avoid the gulf of Patras. The Captain of the Gulf was to re-establish normal conditions in the area—so long as the Genoese were not too dangerous.¹⁵¹ When in 1414 the Senate considered Negroponte itself threatened by the Turks, it ordered three Cretan galleys to be dispatched there.¹⁵² In

1434, Crete was supposed to arm galleys or round-ships against “pirate diverse nationis,” any prisoners were to be immediately executed; similar measures were taken at Corfu and Modon-Coron.¹⁵³

These permanent, if rather small-scale naval efforts were supported through a number of (sometimes equally half-hearted) logistical measures. One was the provision of arsenals in the colonies.¹⁵⁴ Another was the support of anti-Ottoman actions initiated by others, like Nerio Acciaiuoli in 1383 and 1386, and the fostering of direct communication between its colonies and interested parties, as was the case of Crete and Rhodes in 1402.¹⁵⁵ When Pietro Zeno, the Hospitallers of Rhodes and the Genoese of Chios and Lesbos concluded a defensive league in 1415, Venice agreed to provide two galleys.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, the Venetians seem to have made some use of corsairs of their own. In 1429, it was reported that two Greek *asapi* had been overtaxed by the rectors of Thessalonica.¹⁵⁷ The Venetians, at the same time, proved a difficult sponsor even for their closest allies, like the dukes of the Archipelago and the lord of Andros. Not only was Venetian financial support always limited, but the Serenissima sometimes refused to provide galleys and timber to the duke of the Archipelago altogether under the pretext that he was not a Venetian citizen.¹⁵⁸

Venetian confidence sometimes backfired. The capture of two Cretan galleys in 1400 was said to have exalted the Turks (“erunt multum exaltati”) and put Negroponte in danger.¹⁵⁹ In 1423, Sanudo narrates, two Turkish galleys attacked a Venetian one; five crewmen were killed and its captain lost an eye.¹⁶⁰ During the conflict over Thessalonica, an Ottoman fleet of 30 *fuste* (a Venetian *fusta* had 18–20 benches with 72–80 rowers) sought to raid Crete; it came across an anchored Venetian cog loaded with wine and cheese. The cog’s crew disembarked and the vessel was pillaged.¹⁶¹ In 1425, Turks were said to have captured a small *griparia* returning from Alexandria with spices as well as another one loaded with wine.¹⁶² In 1448, the *galiota* of Nauplion was lost. This was to be replaced by a war galley.¹⁶³ In 1411, the Senate discussed the fact that in accordance with the existing treaty, the Ottomans had returned three captured *naves* and their crews, but not the merchandise that the vessels carried.¹⁶⁴ However, an episode from 1428 well exposes the Venetian perception of Ottoman naval might at this time. Sanudo narrates that three Venetian cogs were attacked in the Dardanelles by 21 Turkish vessels (*legni*) accompanied by an Anconitan cog carrying “600 Turkish warriors.” Two were captured, while the third escaped to Chios. Notably, Sanudo blames the misfortune on the (Turks aboard the) Anconitan cog and the deceitful behavior of the latter’s crew,

which allegedly had assured the Venetians of its good intentions toward them.¹⁶⁵ The construction of round ships and light galleys, on the one hand, and the overall matter-of-fact approach that Sanudo had toward the “Turks,” on the other hand, should make us cautious about dismissing his claim as an attempt to belittle a cultural and religious Other. More importantly, the fact that three cogs had passed right by the Ottoman naval base, unescorted, at a time when the Ottomans were clearly at war with Venice shows by itself how little respect Venetian captains of large vessels had for Ottoman sea power. The Aegean may have been “infested” by Turkish boats, but although they had their moments, in this period the low-lying Ottoman vessels rarely posed danger to the interests of well-to-do Venetians at sea, which were protected by the large crews of merchant galleys and the high boards of round ships.

While the Ottomans posed little threat to the interests of Venice’s elite at sea between 1381 and 1453, the same cannot be said of non-Ottoman actors. The works of Sanudo and Morosini show that the Venetians constantly tracked the movements of their greatest rivals at sea throughout the Mediterranean. Vessels belonging to Genoese owners (which is not to be equated with vessels belonging to Genoa, executing orders of the commune, or even acting with its tacit permission) injured Venice’s material well-being and honor alike. The list includes a number of feats only rarely accomplished by Ottoman vessels: setting a Venetian cog on fire in Corfu, capturing a Venetian cog sailing back from Tana alongside a Genoese one, pillaging a number of Venetian vessels at once, robbing a Venetian cog off Cyprus or even capturing a (high-board) ship with a (low-lying) galley.¹⁶⁶ Catalan vessels posed an equivalent danger: for example, they caused an increase of the number of crossbowmen on the vessels sailing to Syria in 1409, took a small Venetian cog (*cochina pizola*) carrying typical Black Sea merchandise, including slaves, from Caffa in 1423, and even obstructed navigation in the Adriatic itself in 1418 and 1423 when Catalan galleys took aim at “our Gulf to rob as best they could.”¹⁶⁷ Moreover, in 1444, a Venetian round-ship was pillaged by an armed round-ship and two heavy galleys belonging to the Hospitallers of Rhodes.¹⁶⁸ The presence of Genoese and Catalans was met with the armament of more significant naval forces than those employed against Turkish light galleys. For example, three cogs were to police the seas of Albania in 1420, the Senate worried about Spinola pirate cogs in 1421, and in 1434 the Gulf fleet was to escort the *Romania* line galleys all the way to the Dardanelles. Notably, the pursuit of pirates throughout the Adriatic and the Aegean was initially

the main goal of the Venetian fleet armed in support of the crusade of Varna in 1444.¹⁶⁹

Similarly, the naval encounters that shamed and worried the Venetians in this period had nothing to do with the Ottomans. In 1449, the Senate lamented the infamous loss of three round-ships to the Catalan pirate Juan de Neva, whose ships took them in Venice's own port of Modon. The best response to cogs and carracks were not galleys, but other large round-ships, of which the state itself had none. Thus, the Senate pressed into service three large private Venetian round-ships (either cogs or, in this period, possibly even carracks).¹⁷⁰ Separately, two ships from Barcelona captured another Venetian round-ship, which was carrying to *Romania* soap, oil, tin, silks, woolens and other merchandise, worth a total of 15,000 ducats; these were then offered for sale in Hospitaller Rhodes, by then a well-established "centre of pirate trading activity."¹⁷¹ One wonders if the "infamy" caused by the acts of Catalan pirates had something to do with the establishment of a small policing fleet made of large round-ships (well-attested for the 1460s).

While the Catalans were a particularly irritating danger to individual Venetian vessels, the Genoese, whose relevance in the fifteenth-century Aegean is often downplayed, remained in fact Venice's chief perceived maritime adversary. As attested by numerous decisions of the Senate, narrated at length by Morosini and well summarized by Eliyahu Ashtor, Venice had yet another conflict with Genoa in the early fifteenth century, this time caused by the latter's French governor, Marshal Boucicaut. It took years to reach the peace in which both sides, Boucicaut himself aside, were interested.¹⁷² However, the most ambitious maritime preparations undertaken by Venice between the 1380s and the 1460s were those against Genoa in 1431. Recent failure in the War of Thessalonica and the pressure of war expenses in Italy notwithstanding, in the wake of a great Milanese victory over Florence in February 1431, the Senate ordered the rectors of its colonies to confiscate the goods of Genoese merchants and to treat as enemies any Genoese crews who showed hostility at sea. The Senate first ordered the armament of 15 galleys before doubling that number and electing a *Capetanio Zeneral* (an Admiral of the Fleet).¹⁷³ The campaign was waged through suggestive rhetoric just as much as through numerous vessels: Venice was not really making war on Genoa, but rather was sincerely working for its liberation from the tyranny of the Visconti. The galleys sent to the Riviera were to boast Genoese insignia and flags with *libertas* inscribed in large letters.¹⁷⁴ Not content with

a victory over nine Genoese galleys off Portofino,¹⁷⁵ the Senate doubled down by arming a second fleet. This consisted of three galleys and 11 round-ships aimed at Genoese Chios.¹⁷⁶ While the Genoese held on to the island, tensions ran high enough to prompt the Senate to order the election of a Captain General of the Sea and the armament of yet another war fleet.¹⁷⁷ Finally, in 1436, the senators could congratulate one another with what they portrayed as the successful subtraction of Genoa from Filippo Maria Visconti at the hands of the Venetian–Florentine alliance.¹⁷⁸ At no time until well into Mehmed II’s reign did the Ottomans cause Venice to engage in naval preparations similar in scope to those undertaken against Milan and Genoa in the 1430s.

Sergej Karpov has argued that one or another form of military action at sea, chiefly at the hands of the Genoese, accounted for most of the risks faced by the *Romania* galley line.¹⁷⁹ However, distinguishing between latent danger and actual losses suggests that neither the Ottomans nor even the Genoese or the Catalans could compete with bad weather in their ability to inflict losses on mainline Venetian shipping. Morosini’s diary and Sanudo’s chronicle regularly inform us of particularly significant shipwreck like the 8–10 grain ships lost off Apulia in 1410; similarly, it was a storm that devastated Venice’s war fleet in Genoese waters in 1431, when heavy winds caused the 24 galleys to violently bump into one another, disabling two-thirds of them.¹⁸⁰ We can only speculate about the overall losses that the vessels used in local and regional trade, which were a great deal less sea-worthy than cogs and merchant galleys, must have suffered; this sort of shipwreck was not relevant enough to Venice’s patriciate to be written into history.

As in the case of threats to Venetian *Romania* on land, so in that of dangers from the sea, the Senate’s perspective should not be confused with that of the local populations over which Venice ruled. Although we can doubt the extent of claimed losses, Venice does not appear to have been too concerned to counter the Turkish raids of which its non-Latin subjects in *Romania* regularly complained. In 1416, a legation from Negroponte deplored the loss of 1,500 souls and the destruction of property. The way in which the envoys sought to drive the point home was by translating the human loss into a tangible fiscal one—some 1,500 ducats per year.¹⁸¹ In 1430, another legation complained that Turks had been pillaging the island for eight years, i.e. for the whole duration of the War of Thessalonica, abducting over 5,000 inhabitants.¹⁸² Similarly, in 1449, yet another legation from Negroponte complained that Turks had been carrying away

inhabitants and destroying livestock for years. Ostensibly, this was done in the name of the son of the sultan (thus Mehmed II as opposed to Murad II), who was said to be in Anatolia and at war with Venice (“de consentimento del fuol del gran Signor che sta in Turchia elqual ha guerra cum la vostra Signoria”).¹⁸³ In 1450, an envoy from Tinos lamented the loss of people, animals and boats to Turks and Catalans; the inhabitants could no longer afford to pay their taxes.¹⁸⁴ The senators may have been genuinely worried about the loss of subjects and tax revenues, but the latter must have been a drop in the ocean in comparison to the expenditure that the proper defense of whole islands would have required.

Thus, while it is sometimes said that Murad II challenged Venice at sea¹⁸⁵ and while it may have suited Venice to stress in diplomatic correspondence that it considered itself at permanent war with any Ottoman vessels in the Aegean, the senators rarely considered Ottoman vessels a serious threat between 1381 and 1453. Individual galleys or pairs of galleys in the role of permanent patrol vessels and, in cases of significant tension, the annually armed Fleet of the Gulf were considered sufficient measures to counter the Ottoman threat at sea. The Genoese, by contrast, caused the armament of Venice’s largest fleet in the period, the Catalans committed acts of piracy so bold as to prompt the senators to speak of shame and infamy, and bad weather caused stinging shipwreck.

IN CONCLUSION: PEACE OR TOTAL WAR

For a decade prior to the crusade of Varna, relations between Venice and Murad II had been excellent. The Ottomans posed little danger to Venetian interests at sea and patrician investor sentiment in *Romania* reached heights not seen since the mid-fourteenth century.¹⁸⁶ Thus, for Venice, the crusade of Varna came at a rather inopportune moment. The Venetians sincerely participated in the event, but expected the Papacy to pay, as Thiriet has argued.¹⁸⁷ As Setton puts it: “The extent of Venice’s investment in the crusade of 1444 has probably not been sufficiently appreciated, perhaps because the fleet achieved so little in the end.”¹⁸⁸ While delayed at first, Venetian participation was indeed ultimately substantial. Venetian diplomatic correspondence is filled with attempts to explain to foreign powers that Venice needs either peace or a military campaign prepared well enough to succeed. These words need to be taken seriously. There was a great deal of value that knights and, to a lesser extent, even popes and kings could extract from a militarily disastrous

crusade. However, given the nature of its economy and the geography of its possessions, Venice needed either stability in its own relations with the Ottomans or the latter's complete expulsion from the scene. What the Serenissima could ill afford was its embroilment in what was, for its interests, the vicious circle of on-again, off-again military conflicts into which popes and kings tried to draw the republic.

In an expression of the balance Venice sought between expansion and good relations with the Ottomans, the Senate voted in 1443 to acquire the fortresses of Valona, Janina and ArgYROCASTRO—should the Turks consent (“cum bona voluntate teucrorum”).¹⁸⁹ At the outset of the crusade, a cautious Senate argued to the duke of Burgundy that 10 papal and four Burgundian galleys would suffice to provide what had come to be perceived as the best form of naval support for land operations against the Ottomans: a fleet that would patrol the Straits and seek to prevent the passage of Ottoman troops from Asia to Europe.¹⁹⁰ The Senate pushed for a speedy campaign and upfront papal payments for the fleet that Venice was to arm, an issue that would vex Venetian–papal relations long after the abortive crusade.¹⁹¹ In February 1444, the Senate voted down a motion that would have sent its Captain of the Gulf on a mission to Gallipoli, and instead asked its admiral to clear the seas of pirates.¹⁹² Five months later, however, in the context of optimistic assessments of the land campaign's progress and the mood in the Ottoman camp, the Senate provided the Venetian commander of the papal fleet with control over the fleet of the Gulf as well. While the Venetians thus created a sizable crusader fleet, they also worried about the delays already accrued in the process.¹⁹³

Once they fully committed to the crusade, the senators switched gear. Venice expressed an interest in the possession of Thessalonica and Gallipoli. The Senate also renewed its interest in the acquisition of Valona and ArgYROCASTRO—on the condition that the Turks evacuate them. Venice would pay the Turks (sizable) pensions, depending on their rank.¹⁹⁴ Venetian correspondence with crusade leaders rationalized the newly ballooned ambitions. Should the Turks be expelled from Greece, it would be necessary to protect it from Turkish attempts at reconquest. No Christian power can handle this task better than Venice, which would shoulder the significant expenses for the defense of Thessalonica and Gallipoli.¹⁹⁵ However, in another six months, the crusade was over, while the Senate of Venice and the Venetian pope escalated their dispute over meeting the fleet's expenses.¹⁹⁶ On February 25, 1446, Venice renewed its peace with Murad II on the basis of the agreement of 1430.¹⁹⁷

While Venice did not commit to the crusade of Varna the kind of naval resources expended on anti-Milanese/Genoese actions a decade earlier, its participation, in contrast to what Murad II was to be told, was eventually both direct and fairly substantial. Meanwhile, the Senate had to remind the pope that while Venice was still willing to fight for Christianity, the precedents had not been encouraging.¹⁹⁸ War or peace, the only constant in Venice's approaches to the Ottomans between 1381 and 1453, was the principle that had underlined Venetian expansion since the eleventh century: the attempt to make the most of whatever opportunity presented itself.

Faced with Mehmed II's ambitions, Venice would eventually reconceptualize the geostrategic situation in *Romania*, would become alarmed that its own colonies might be next in line and would embrace the discourse and apparatus of the crusade.¹⁹⁹ However, for all the devastation they caused to Venice's subjects, between 1381 and 1453, the Ottomans were rarely more than a nuisance to the senators. Small patrol fleets, minimal fortress garrisons and typically relentless optimism about the ability of diplomatic efforts to deliver desirable solutions undermine generalizations about the early Ottoman polity's place in Mediterranean affairs at large. Thus, while it may be tempting to portray pre-1453 Ottoman expansion as either a great threat or a great opportunity to Venice, the Venetian elite's own perspective appears to have been more prosaic: it could well live with or without the Ottoman polity, but not in constant warfare with it.

NOTES

1. To speak of an undifferentiated Venetian "ruling elite" is not to partake in historiographical myth-making, but to focus on the decisions that the Senate of Venice took and attempted to enforce in the former Byzantine territories in the Aegean, leaving axes of consensus and discord to historians of Venetian social life and political institutions.
2. For an overall introduction to the Ottoman Empire, see Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 [2002]). For the early Ottomans, see above all Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1983), *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007) and also his "What

- Was a Nomadic Tribe?” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (1982): 689–711. See also Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
3. Perhaps the most sentimental—if also the most understandable, given the author’s own political context—major example of this approach is George Ostrogorsky’s still highly useful *History of the Byzantine State* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 533–572. On the late medieval western perceptions of the Turks that continue to influence the way studies approach the subject, see, for an overview, Benjamin Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs: Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XVe siècle* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013), 33–49. For the humanists, see Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). For the formation and operation of legal doctrines on the subject of relations between Catholic Christians and others, see Stefan Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality: Papal Embargo as Cultural Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and, in turn, Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). For the reflection of Sunni normative texts in Ottoman narrative sources, see Colin Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
 4. Rossitsa Gradeva, *Rumeli under the Ottomans, Fifteenth–Eighteenth Centuries: Institutions and Communities* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004), esp. 23–51; Gábor Ágoston, “A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 9 (2003): 15–29; Melek Delilbaşı, “Christian *Sipahis* in the Tirhala Taxation Registers (Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries),” in *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005), 87–114.
 5. Monique O’Connell, *Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice’s Maritime State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 1.
 6. *Ibid.*, 22.
 7. Freddy Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age: Le développement et l’exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles)* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1959); Freddy Thiriet, “Problemi

- dell'amministrazione veneziana nella Romania XIV–XV secolo,” in *Etudes sur la Romanie greco-vénitienne (Xe–XVe siècles)* (London: Variorum, 1977 [1973]), XIV; Freddy Thiriet, “De l'importance des mers dans la système romaniote de Venise,” *Bulgaria Pontica Medii Aevi 1/Byzantinobulgarica 7* (1981): 73–86; Ruthy Gertwagen, “The Venetian Colonies in the Ionian and Aegean Seas in Venetian Defense Policy in the Fifteenth Century,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 12 (2002): 351–384; Ruthy Gertwagen, “Venice’s Policy Towards the Ionian and Aegean Islands, c. 1204–1423,” *International Journal of Maritime History* 26 (2014): 529–548. On Venetian Crete, see Sally McKee, *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).
8. O’Connell, *Men of Empire*, 18.
 9. Gertwagen, “Venice’s Policy,” 531.
 10. Gino Luzzatto, *Il debito pubblico della repubblica di Venezia dagli ultimi decenni del secolo XII alla fine del XV* (Milan: IEC, 1963), 133–176; Gino Luzzatto, *Storia economica di Venezia dall’XI al XVI secolo* (Venice: CIAC, 1961), 140–145.
 11. David Jacoby, “Un aspect de la fiscalité vénitienne dans le Péloponnèse aux XIVe et XVe siècles: le ‘zovaticum,’” in *Société et démographie à Byzance et en Romanie latine* (London: Variorum, 1975 [1965]), IV.
 12. *The Morosini Codex*, ed. Michele Pietro Ghezzi, John R. Melville-Jones and Andrea Rizzi (Padua: Unipress, 1999–), 3:8–9.
 13. Dennis Romano, *The Likeness of Venice: A Life of Doge Francesco Foscari, 1373–1457* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Luzzatto, *Il debito pubblico della repubblica di Venezia*, 177–265; Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 103–269.
 14. See O’Connell, *Men of Empire* for Crete’s unique position; and my “*Devedo*: The Venetian Response to Sultan Mehmed II in the Venetian-Ottoman Conflict of 1462–1479,” *Mediterranean Studies* 19 (2010): 43–66 for the Venetian assessment of Mehmed II as a threat to Crete.
 15. Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice: Istituto ellenico di studi bizantini e postbizantini, 1983); Kate Fleet,

European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

16. ASTV, SDMisti, Reg. 40, ff. 126v–127r, *Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, ed. Freddy Thiriet (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1958–1961), I, no. 742 (July 24, 1388). This series features continuous numeration of documents and is henceforth referred to as RDSV; documents are cited by number, not pages.
17. Kate Fleet, “Turkish-Latin Diplomatic Relations in the Fourteenth Century: The Case of the Consul,” *Oriente Moderno* n.s. 22 (2003): 605–611, at 611.
18. *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum*, ed. George Martin Thomas (New York: Burt Franklin, 1966 [1880–1899]), II, no. 116 (July 22, 1384) [hereinafter DVL]. See Kate Fleet, “Ottoman Grain Exports from Western Anatolia at the End of the Fourteenth Century,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40 (1997): 283–293, especially 289.
19. DVL, II, no. 134 (May 21, 1390).
20. DVL, II, no. 159 (1403); for a translation, see John R. Melville-Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica 1423–1430: The Venetian Documents* (Padua: Unipress, 2002), 3–6; Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 368.
21. DVL, II, no. 172 (November 6, 1419). See also Setton, *Papacy*, 2:8.
22. Translation in Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 232–235.
23. DVL, II, no. 198 (February 25, 1447—note that DVL lists this under 1446 because it retains the *more veneto* dating).
24. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 693 (April 18, 1385), no. 868 (December 23, 1394), no. 928 (March 9, 1397), no. 946 (August 8, 1398), no. 978 (February 27, 1400), no. 1007 (March 22, 1401), no. 1028 (September 16, 1401), no. 1608 (March 31, 1416), no. 2591 (September 14–17, 1442).
25. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 892 (December 9, 1395). On the crusade, see Aziz Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London: Methuen & Co, 1934); and Setton, *Papacy*, 1:341–369.
26. *The Morosini Codex*, ed. Ghezzi, Jones and Rizzi, 2.194–5.
27. Setton, *Papacy*, 1:344, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 870 (March 10, 1395).

28. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 43, ff. 117r/v, 127v–128r, 158r/v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 901 (March 1, 1396), no. 909 (May 18, 1396), no. 917 (October 29, 1396).
29. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 932 (April 7, 1397).
30. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 928 (March 9, 1397), no. 1194 (September 21, 1405). On Tenedos, see Freddy Thiriet, “Venise et l’occupation de Ténédos au XIVE siècles,” in *Etudes sur la Romanie*, II [1953]; and Ruthy Gertwagen, “Venice, Genoa and the Fights over the Island of Tenedos (Late Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries),” *Studi Veneziani* n.s. 67 (2013): 329–381.
31. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1055 (May 8, 1402).
32. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1290 (December 8, 1407).
33. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1055 (May 8, 1402), no. 1063 (July 6, 1402), no. 2881 (February 14, 1452).
34. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1635 (January 12, 1417).
35. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2834 (August 17, 1450).
36. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1327 (November 15, 1408).
37. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1329 (November 15, 1408).
38. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1347 (March 26, 1409), see also no. 1311 (July 20–21, 1408).
39. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca: Documents for the History of the Peloponnese in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. Julian Chrysostomides (Camberley: Porphyrogenitus, 1995), no. 29 (July 7, 1385).
40. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 741 (July 23, 1388). On the incorporation of Negroponte into the Venetian *Stato da Mar*, see David Jacoby, “La consolidation de la domination de Venise dans la ville de Négropont (1205–1390): un aspect de sa politique coloniale,” in *Latins, Greeks and Muslims: Encounters in the Eastern Mediterranean, Tenth–Fifteenth Centuries* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009 [2002]), IX.
41. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 942 (May 31, 1398).
42. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 44 (August 26, 1388), Thiriet, RDSV, no. 879 (July 13, 1395), no. 882 (July 23, 1395), no. 1877 (April 18, 1423), no. 1901 (August 13, 1423).
43. Thiriet, *La Romanie Vénitienne*, 354.
44. Christine Hodgetts and Peter Lock, “Some Village Fortifications in the Venetian Peloponnese,” in *The Archaeology of Medieval*

- Greece*, ed. Peter Lock and G.D.R. Sanders (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1996), 77.
45. Gertwagen, “Venice’s Policy,” 546–548; see also Gertwagen, “The Venetian Colonies,” 353.
 46. Benjamin Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period,” in *A Companion to Venetian History*, ed. Eric R. Dursteler (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 137–139, at 137.
 47. O’Connell, *Men of Empire*, 5.
 48. On Corfu, see Ruthy Gertwagen, “The Island of Corfu in Venetian Policy in the Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries,” *International Journal of Maritime History* 19 (2007): 181–210. On Durazzo, see O’Connell, *Men of Empire*, 25–27.
 49. O’Connell, *Men of Empire*, 27–31, Setton, *Papacy*, 1:403.
 50. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, nos 25–26 (November 16, 1384, January 23, 1385), AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 39, 33v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 688. On these fortresses, see Kevin Andrews, *Castles of the Morea: Revised Edition* (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2006 [1953]), 40–48 (Navarino), 11–23 (Coron), 58–83 (Modon).
 51. AStV, SDSecreti, Reg. 3, 30v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1222 (July 3, 1406).
 52. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1318 (August 28, 1408), no. 1402 (January 27, 1411), no. 1779 (July 9, 1420), no. 1874 (March 3, 1423).
 53. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 45; Thiriet, RDSV, no. 744 (December 12, 1388). On Argos and Nauplion, see Andrews, *Castles of the Morea*, 90–115.
 54. Setton, *Papacy*, 1:471–473. For Nerio’s testament, see *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 160 (September 17, 1394).
 55. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 46, 38v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1069 (August 22, 1402).
 56. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 369; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:14.
 57. *Ibid.*, 2:11–12.
 58. Hodgetts and Lock, “Some Village Fortifications in the Venetian Peloponnese,” 78–80.
 59. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 288 (September 4, 1407).
 60. *Ibid.*, no. 22 (March 29, 1384), no. 135 (March 5, 1394), no. 172 (August 20, 1395), no. 173 (August 26, 1395), no. 193 (April 1,

- 1397), no. 195 (April 29, 1397). On Monemvasia, see Andrews, *Castles of the Morea*, 192–210.
61. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1290 (December 8, 1407).
 62. *Ibid.*, no. 1295 (February 7, 1408).
 63. *Ibid.*, no. 847 (April 7, 1394), no. 1030 (September 21–25, 1401), no. 1427 (June 23, 1411), no. 1513 (December 19, 1413). The first two are fully published in *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, nos 138 and 238.
 64. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 700 (July 7, 1385).
 65. *Ibid.*, no. 1227 (July 20, 1406).
 66. *Ibid.*, no. 1246 (February 21, 1407).
 67. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, nos 197–198 (July 26, 1451, June 3, 1397, July 5, 1397) and nos 260–261 (June 18/August 31, 1402).
 68. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1052 (April 20, 1402).
 69. *Ibid.*, no. 1070 (September 22, 1402).
 70. *Il Codice Morosini. Il mondo visto da Venezia (1094–1433)*, ed. Andrea Nanetti (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 2010), 2.723.
 71. Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 27–40, quotation at 235; *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.964–65.
 72. Compare Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 24–25 and Setton, *Papacy*, 2:19 with Romano, *The Likeness of Venice*, 58–59.
 73. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 371–372.
 74. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:29.
 75. Camillo Manfroni, “La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco, 1423–30,” *Nuovo Archivio Veneto* n.s. 20 (1910): 5–68.
 76. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2006 (October 30–31, 1425); and Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 137–138; the latter reports the loan amount as 200,000 ducats, which is correct; AStV, SDSecreti, Reg.9, 45v.
 77. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2018 (April 20, 1426), no. 2027 (July 7, 1426); Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 141–142 and 147–152.
 78. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2047 (January 24, 1427). See also no. 2066 (July 24, 1427); Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 169–170.
 79. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1931 (April 17, 1424), no. 1943 (June 28, 1424), no. 1949 (July 16, 1424), no. 1980 (April 2, 1425); *Marin Sanudo il Giovane, Le Vite Dei Dogi, 1423–1474*, ed. Angela Caracciolo Aricò and Chiara Frison (Venice: La Malcontenta,

- 1999), 1.37. Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 81–82, 86–87 offers a translation of AStV, SDSecreti, Reg.8, 158v–159r, Thiriet RDSV, no. 1943 twice, with minor stylistic differences. The other two documents are translated in Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 91–96 and 99–110; see also 71–74. On Sanudo’s works, see Angela Caracciolo Aricò, “Marin Sanudo il Giovane: le opere e lo stile,” *Studi Veneziani* 55 (2008): 351–390.
80. Speros Vryonis, Jr., “The Ottoman Conquest of Thessaloniki in 1430,” in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1986), 281–321, at 307.
 81. Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 53.
 82. Manfroni, “La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco,” 11–12.
 83. Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 61. Jones’s edition features a typographical error in one of the constituent numbers, that of guards, which is given as 40 men, whereas the number is actually 400: AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 54, 153r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1908 (October 20, 1423).
 84. Manfroni, “La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco,” 14–25.
 85. Usually identified as Kavalla, but Manfroni might be right at identifying it instead with the whereabouts of Alexandroupoli at the mouth of the Maritsa; Manfroni, “La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco,” 32.
 86. *Ibid.*, 32–34.
 87. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2122 (February 9, 1429), nos 2126–2127 (March 16–29, 1429), no. 2132 (May 6, 1429), no. 2134 (May 10, 1429); Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 178–179 (speaking of a “large galley” with a 250-man crew fuses information from AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 57, 71r, which is about a large galley, and 74v, which is about a great round-ship with a crew of 250), 183–185.
 88. Manfroni, “La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco,” 48–58.
 89. Vryonis, “The Ottoman Conquest of Thessaloniki in 1430,” 289.
 90. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 56, 189r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2086 (May 27, 1428); Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 175. See also Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2105 (August 17, 1428); Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 176.
 91. Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 45.
 92. Romano, *The Likeness of Venice*, 52–116.

93. *Ibid.*, 67–71; Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 146.
94. *Ibid.*, 214, 220; Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 92; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:29–30 and n. 93; Romano, *The Likeness of Venice*, 108.
95. Romano, *The Likeness of Venice*, 75.
96. Respectively, Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 10; and David Jacoby, “Foreigners and the Urban Economy in Thessalonike, ca. 1150–ca. 1450,” in *Latins, Greeks and Muslims*, VII [2003], esp. 103–105, quotation at 105. See also Freddy Thiriet, “Les vénitiens à Thessalonique dans la première moitié du XIV^e siècle,” in *Etudes sur la Roumanie*, I [1952].
97. Vryonis, “The Ottoman Conquest of Thessaloniki in 1430.”
98. Manfroni, “La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco,” 10.
99. Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 14, 16, 18, 20–21, 25–27, 35, 37–38, 58–59, 71–72, 76, 78–79, 82, 84–86.
100. *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.957–1128, 3.1129–1420.
101. *Ibid.*, 3.1413–1415, 1421; the former is translated in Jones, *Venice and Thessalonica*, 219–220.
102. Thiriet, *La Roumanie vénitienne*, 395–410.
103. Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period,” 205.
104. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:37.
105. *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.962.
106. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, passim; referenced here are chiefly no. 46 (December 22, 1388), no. 51 (June 22, 1389), no. 77 (April 23, 1390) and no. 84 (September 1, 1390).
107. *Ibid.*, no. 183 (March 21, 1396).
108. *Ibid.*, nos 280–281 (October 14–16, 1406).
109. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1766 (April 19, 1420), no. 1840 (April 2, 1422), no. 2049 (February 28, 1427), no. 2103 (August 4–7, 1428), no. 2686 (April 20, 1445), no. 2840 (October 10, 1450), no. 2913 (March 3, 1453).
110. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 173 (August 26, 1395) and also no. 175 (September 2, 1395) and no. 184 (March 21, 1396).
111. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1328 (November 15, 1408).
112. AStV, SDMisti, Reg 54, 19r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1839 (April 1, 1422).

113. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 57, 81v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2124 (March 10, 1429).
114. For example, *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, nos 171 (August 3, 1395) and 176 (September 10, 1395), no. 202 (January 9, 1399), no. 262 (January 26, 1403); Thiriet, RDSV, no. 962 (May 16, 1399), no. 1074 (October 9, 1402), no. 1153 (March 26, 1404), no. 1205 (March 11, 1406), no. 1621 (July 5, 1416), no. 2563 (January 15, 1442).
115. Thiriet, RDSV, #2238 (6 Jun 1431).
116. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 150 (August 4, 1394).
117. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 57, 199v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2182 (March 2, 1430); Freddy Thiriet, *Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie* (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1966–1971), no. 1263 (May 11, 1423).
118. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 1, 228r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2641 (March 29, 1444).
119. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 1, 230r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2642 (April 22, 1444).
120. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 3, 115v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2798 (May 7, 1449).
121. Vryonis, “The Ottoman Conquest of Thessaloniki in 1430,” 291.
122. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2505 (July 20, 1439), no. 2193 (May 3, 1430), no. 2236 (May 23, 1431), no. 2238 (June 6, 1431), no. 2477 (June 13, 1438), no. 2563 (January 15, 1442), no. 2641 (March 29, 1444), no. 2642 (April 22–23, 1444). On finance, see Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period,” 217–220.
123. Fariba Zarinebaf, John Bennet and Jack L. Davis, *A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece* (Athens: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2005), 20.
124. Ruthy Gertwagen, “Fiscal and Technical Limitations on Venetian Military Engineering in the *Stato da Mar* in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” in *Military Engineers and the Development of the Early-Modern European State*, ed. Bruce P. Lenman (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2013), 155–177, at 177. On the Venetian attitude toward ports, their characteristics and function, see Ruthy Gertwagen, “The Concept of Ports in the

- Medieval Eastern Mediterranean: Construction and Maintenance on Crete to the End of the Fifteenth Century,” *International Journal of Maritime History* 12 (2000): 177–241.
125. Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 35.
 126. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 304 (October 13, 1407).
 127. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1051 (April 20, 1402).
 128. Ibid., no. 1985 (May 22, 1425).
 129. Ibid., no. 950 (September 7, 1398).
 130. Ibid., no. 2865 (July 26, 1451); *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 197; see also no. 200 (September 7, 1398) and no. 207 (July 27, 1399).
 131. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2446 (June 12, 1437).
 132. Ibid., no. 967 (July 27, 1399).
 133. Ibid., no. 1013 (April 22, 1401), no. 1545 (August 20, 1414), no. 2286 (June 10, 1432).
 134. AStV, SDSecreti, Reg. E, 120r (December 9, 1395).
 135. Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period,” 199.
 136. See in particular Sergej P. Karpov, “The Black Sea Navigation of the Italian Maritime Republics in the 14–15th Centuries. Risk Factors and Degree [in Russian],” *Bulgaria Pontica Medii Aevi* 3 (1985): 77–87.
 137. On the naval vessels in question and their use, see Lillian Ray Martin, *The Art and Archaeology of Venetian Ships and Boats* (London: Chatham, 2001); Ulrich Alertz, “The Naval Architecture and Oar Systems of Medieval and Later Galleys,” in *The Age of the Galley: Mediterranean Oared Vessels since Pre-classical Times*, ed. Robert Gardiner (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995), 142–162; John H. Pryor, “The Mediterranean Round-Ship,” in *Cogs, Caravels, and Galleons. The Sailing Ship, 1000–1650*, ed. Robert Gardiner and Richard W. Unger (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1994), 59–76; John H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology, and War. Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John H. Pryor, *Commerce, Shipping and Naval Warfare in the Medieval Mediterranean* (London: Variorum, 1987); Sergej P. Karpov, *La navigazione veneziana nel Mar Nero XIII–XV sec.* (Ravenna: Edizioni del Girasole, 2000), 21–37,

- 148–151; Frederick C. Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979 [1934]), 1–53; Bernard Doumerc, “Le galere da mercato,” in *Storia di Venezia*, vol. 12 *Il Mare*, ed. Albero Tenenti and Ugo Tucci (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1991), 357–395; Ugo Tucci, “La navigazione veneziana nel duecento e nel primo trecento e la sua evoluzione tecnica,” in *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, ed. Agostino Pertusi (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1973), 2.821–841; Luzzatto, *Storia economica di Venezia*, 41–49, 75–77; Freddy Thiriet, “Quelques observations sur le trafic des galées vénitiennes d’après des chiffres des *incanti* (XIV–XVe siècles),” in *Etudes sur la Romanie*, VIII [1962].
138. Luciano Pezzolo, “The Venetian Economy,” in *A Companion to Venetian History*, ed. Dursteler, 261.
139. On the management of the fleets at sea, see *The Book of Michael of Rhodes. A Fifteenth-Century Maritime Manuscript*, ed. Pamela O. Long, David McGee and Alan M. Stahl (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 2.324–347.
140. A Senate document from 1419 speaks of *galeotte* as having 20–22 benches: Alan Stahl, “Michael of Rhodes: Mariner in Service to Venice,” in *The Book of Michael of Rhodes*, 3.70.
141. Thiriet, RDSV, nos 613, 636, 673, 690, 706, 722, 747, 765, 783, 805, 810, 824, 839, 852, 869, 891, 907, 922, 939, 959, 976, 983, 998, 1023, 1030, 1034–1036, 1085, 1177, 1199, 1215, 1226, 1241, 1262, 1274, 1296, 1314, 1341, 1348, 1387, 1405, 1431, 1440, 1540, 1573, 1584, 1588, 1595, 1610, 1631, 1640, 1649, 1683–1684, 1710, 1728, 1752, 1761, 1797, 1816, 1828, 1854–1855, 1864, 1903, 1917, 1965, 2017, 2125, 2231, 2277, 2325, 2579, 2817, 2882.
142. AStV, SDMisti, no. 42, 55r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 813 (April 26, 1392).
143. *Ibid.*, no. 952 (October 19, 1398), no. 1283 (September 2, 1407), no. 1387 (August 8, 1410).
144. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 50, 143r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1546 (August 20, 1414).
145. AStV, SDSecreti, Reg. 4, 182r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1423 (June 4, 1411).
146. *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.669–681.

147. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1322 (September 28, 1408), no. 1571 (March 23, 1415); see also Doumerc, "Le galere da mercato," 388.
148. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 91 (February 21, 1391), Thiriet, RDSV, no. 970 (November 27, 1399), no. 1225 (July 15, 1406), no. 1265 (June 14, 1407), no. 1302 (April 17, 1408), no. 1326 (November 14, 1408), no. 2331 (October 22, 1433).
149. *Ibid.*, no. 1037 (January 20, 1402).
150. *Ibid.*, no. 682 (October 15, 1384), no. 786 (March 6, 1391); *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 21 and also nos 30–31 (February 6–22 and August 10, 1386) and no. 42 (July 24, 1388).
151. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 46, 96r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1124 (August 11, 1403). *Ligna piratarum* had apparently begun wreaking havoc in the Gulf of Patras in 1387: *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 115 (July 2, 1392).
152. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1555 (October 11, 1414).
153. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 59, 56r, 66v. The summaries of both documents, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2352 (June 13, 1434), no. 2360 (July 29, 1434), confuse the typology of naval vessels.
154. Candia's arsenal was established in 1282; Ruthy Gertwagen, "The Venetian Port of Candia, Crete (1299–1363): Construction and Maintenance," in *Mediterranean Cities: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Irad Malkin and Robert L. Hohlfelder (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 153. Modon's arsenal probably dated from the late fourteenth century; Ruthy Gertwagen, "Venetian Modon and its Port (1358–1500)," in *Mediterranean Urban Culture, 1400–1700*, ed. Alexander Cowan (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000), 143.
155. *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 30 (February 6–22, 1386); Thiriet, RDSV, no. 639 (February 20, 1383), no. 1042 (February 16, 1402).
156. *Ibid.*, no. 1589 (August 31, 1415).
157. *Ibid.*, no. 2131 (May 6, 1429).
158. *Ibid.*, no. 841 (January 22, 1394), no. 1476 (March 3, 1413), no. 1565 (February 6, 1415).
159. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 45, 27r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 989 (August 19, 1400).
160. Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 13, 21.

161. Ibid., 59; *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 3.1134–1135.
162. Ibid., 2.1059 (also on 1054).
163. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 3, 52v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2769 (March 30, 1448) merges this and a subsequent decision into one summary, but speaks of a galley instead of a *galiota* and provides only the folio number for the subsequent decision.
164. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 49, 25v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1424 (June 7, 1411).
165. AStV, SDSecreti, Reg. 10, 174r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2111 (August 31, 1428); Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 71–72.
166. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 763 (December 23, 1389), no. 1174 (January 23, 1405); *The Morosini Codex*, ed. Ghezzi, Jones and Rizzi, 3.111, 4.109; *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.955–956.
167. Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 15; *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.978; Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1358 (August 2, 1409), no. 1681 (January 13, 1418), no. 1838 (March 24, 1422).
168. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 1, 213r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2632 (February 27, 1444) is imprecise with respect to the nomenclature of the vessels involved.
169. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1795 (October 11, 1420) and no. 1796 (November 18, 1420); AStV, SDSecreti, Reg. 7, 204r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1800 (February 11, 1421), no. 2361 (July 29, 1434), no. 2630 (February 8, 1444).
170. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 3, 48r–49v. Thiriet’s summary, RDSV, no. 2765 (March 4, 1448) speaks of three *petites galères* while the word is of three *naves* intended for a voyage to Flanders. The latter fact and the calculations of their pay make it clear that these must have been among the largest naval vessels in Venetian hands.
171. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 4, 6v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2837 (September 28, 1450); Ruthy Gertwagen, “Is There a Typology of Pirate Crews and Ships across the Byzantine and Medieval Mediterranean (11th to 15th Century)?,” in *Seeraub in Mittelmeerraum: Piraterie, Korsarentum und maritime Gewalt von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit*, ed. Nikolas Jaspert and Sebastian Kolditz (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink/Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013), 69.
172. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, 216–20. See *The Morosini Codex*, ed. Ghezzi, Jones and Rizzi, 3.9–33.
173. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2227 (February 6, 1431), no. 2229 (February 16, 1431), no. 2232 (April 13, 1431), no. 2237 (May 27–30,

- 1431). Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 96 speaks of 21 galleys joined by three large Florentine galleys and lists the commanding officers of the *armada* (at 108–109).
174. Thiriet, RDSV, nos 2241–2242 (June 9–21, 1431).
175. Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 97–99; Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 265.
176. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2257 (August 23, 1431) and see also no. 2260 (September 1, 1431) and no. 2262 (September 20, 1431).
177. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 59, 15v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2336 (November 26, 1433).
178. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2405 (February 25, 1436).
179. Karpov, *La navigazione veneziana*, 39–66, esp. 64–65.
180. *The Morosini Codex*, ed. Ghezzi, Jones and Rizzi, 3.5, 4.15, 103, 147; *Il Codice Morosini*, ed. Nanetti, 2.983, 1034; Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 33, 80, 83, 96, 302, 391; *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, ed. Chrysostomides, no. 191 (January 16, 1397).
181. AStV, SDMisti, Reg. 51, 94r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 1598 (February 4, 1416) renders ducats as perpers.
182. *Ibid.*, no. 2211 (July 25, 1430).
183. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 3, 105r, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2795 (March 17, 1449).
184. *Ibid.*, no. 2845 (December 18, 1450).
185. Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 51.
186. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, 118–119 (Table VI), 262 (Table XXVII), and 319–320 (Table XXXI).
187. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 377–379.
188. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:86.
189. AStV, SDMar, Reg. 1, 202v, Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2623 (December 23, 1443).
190. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2639 (March 23, 1444). On Burgundian naval participation, see Jacques Paviot, *Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l'Orient: fin XIVe siècle–XVe siècle* (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003).
191. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2608 (May 25, 1443), no. 2615 (August 3, 1443), no. 2618 (September 10, 1443), nos 2627–2628 (February 2–6, 1444), no. 2624 (January 15, 1444), no. 2647

- (May 25, 1444), no. 2648 (June 4, 1444). See also Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs*, 154–155.
192. Thiriet, RDSV, nos 2629–2630 (February 6–8, 1444).
193. *Ibid.*, no. 2651 (June 17, 1444); Sanudo, *Le Vite dei Dogi*, 403; Colin Imber, “A Note on ‘Christian’ Preachers in the Ottoman Empire,” *Journal of Ottoman Studies* 10 (1990): 59–67. On the chain of events, see Thiriet, RDSV no. 2631 (February 13–14, 1444), no. 2638 (March 23, 1444), no. 2645 (May 12, 1444), no. 2655 (July 4, 1444); Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 378–379.
194. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2659 (July 14, 1444).
195. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2656 (July 4, 1444), *Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XVe siècle*, ed. Nicolae Iorga, III (Paris: E. Leroux, 1902), 177–178.
196. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2675 (February 15, 1445), no. 2678 (March 12, 1445), no. 2681 (March 18, 1445).
197. DVL, II, no. 198; Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 379.
198. Thiriet, RDSV, no. 2734 (October 25, 1446).
199. See in detail Robert S. Lopez, “Il principio della guerra veneto-turca nel 1463,” *Archivio Veneto*(15) (1934): 45–131; and my “*Devedo*: The Venetian Response to Sultan Mehmed II.” For a broader perspective, see Norman Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, 1453–1505* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs*.

Bessarion's *Orations against the Turks*
and Crusade Propaganda at the *Große*
Christentag of Regensburg (1471)

Dan Ioan Mureşan

In recent times, rhetorical texts relating to the crusade in the Renaissance period have aroused welcome interest.¹ To their study, the historian of the later crusades brings his particular obsession, which is that of context. Due allowance should be made for research inspired at its heart by “the linguistic turn,” analyzing the rhetorical devices and representations forged by authors to trigger a specific meaning. But at the same time, we must also explore the *public* character of narratives placed in the service of a medieval idea—the crusade—revisited during the fifteenth century in terms of the categories of a classical civilization that was in the process of being reappropriated. This brings us back, time and again, to the importance of chronology and the ties of cause and effect between historical phenomena. The point needs to be ceaselessly reiterated that only context breathes life into a text.² The case study that follows explores the resonances of the crusading message, meshing two themes: the diffusion of meaning and the means by which it was diffused, touching in consequence a broad and complex topic—the rise of printing. The impact of the new

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craft on the geopolitical, military and religious challenges posed by the rise of Ottoman power adds yet another feature to the complex of innovative forms of papal crusade developed in the course of the *Quattrocento*.³

Nothing could better illustrate this methodological choice than *Orations against the Turks*, the last work of Cardinal Bessarion.⁴ Thanks to the research of John Monfasani—who identified in codex *Vatican. lat.* 5356 a witness to the first redaction of these *Orations*—the gestation of this work has at last been clarified.⁵ The capture of the Venetian colony at Negroponte by the Ottomans on July 12, 1470 exercised a major impact on contemporaries: the republic's fleet lost its control over the seaways and the maritime route to Italy lay open.⁶ For more than one reason, Bessarion was severely affected by this event. Amongst other things, since 1261, Negroponte had in practice been the seat of the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople, which he held from 1463 onwards. On August 5, 1470, the cardinal of Nicaea addressed a letter from Rome to his friend, Abbot Bessarion of San Severino, who had informed him that King Ferdinand of Naples was ready to respond to Ottoman aggression. After an initial moment of discouragement, Bessarion acknowledged that the Italian powers were beginning to wake up to the scale of the danger that faced them, and he put the disaster to good use. To Pope Paul II and the Italian ambassadors gathered at Rome, he sent two *Orations*, the first on the threat that Mehmed II now posed to Italy itself and the second on the need for unity between the Italian states so that they could confront this danger. He accompanied them with a translation of Demosthenes' *First Olynthiac*, one of his attacks on Philip of Macedon. This original composition, presented to the envoys of the Italian states at Rome, included a preface and an epilogue dedicated to Pope Paul II. Bessarion dispatched the whole collection to Doge Cristoforo Moro on August 25. Perceiving their impact, Bessarion revised the texts, this time addressing them to the Italian princes collectively. Following the strenuous appeal made by Paul II, the envoys were sent back to their princes and were told to return to Rome to discuss their common defense, this time equipped with a mandate to commit their masters to action. On December 22, 1470, the "general league" (*lega generale*) of the Italian powers was renewed at Rome under papal auspices, on the juridical basis of the peace of Lodi sealed back in 1454 by Nicholas V.⁷ It was this final version of the text that Bessarion sent to Guillaume Fichet at Paris. During the course of 1471, the *Orations* were rapidly printed by the Sorbonne's press.⁸

BESSARION AND THE VENETO-BURGUNDIAN NETWORK

So Bessarion's *Orations* were initially disseminated in a somewhat old-fashioned way, via manuscript copies. Nonetheless, they played a crucial role in persuading the princes of Italy, in the wake of so many false starts, to embrace an anti-Ottoman league. Leaving to another occasion a more searching analysis of the work's content,⁹ the central idea of these orations was the need for the Italian princes to relinquish conflict between themselves and instead to pursue a war against the Turks. While admitting that the theme is a topos of this literary genre, we should not ignore our text's specificity. At several points, its author refers to himself as "the patriarch of Constantinople."¹⁰ Highlighting this title was not a coincidence; it gave weight and authority to the appeal, coming as it did from the religious head of those Orthodox Christians who found themselves under Ottoman rule. In contrast to so much output of this type, it was not a question of an oration by an outsider equipped with little knowledge of the Christian East, but a well-informed insider—indeed, a man whose whole life, personal and public alike, had been shaped by the turmoil caused by the Ottoman advance.

We possess a detailed knowledge of the characteristics of the Latin edition thanks to the research of Anatole Claudin¹¹ and, more recently, the exemplary analysis bestowed on it by Margaret Meserve.¹² However, at the end of a study that is extremely learned and full of insight, the latter's conclusions are somehow frustrating. Building on the fact that Bessarion's first letter to Guillaume Fichet does not include an explicit request that the *Orations* be printed, Meserve concludes that the initiative for taking the work to the press lay entirely with Fichet. From this point of view, inspired though Fichet was by noble ideals, his first concern was to climb up the university hierarchy and to attract the attention of the political leaders of his time. Logically enough, Meserve finished by questioning whether the printing of this work can really be said to have constituted crusade propaganda. She does not entirely rule it out, accepting that this may have been part of the picture, but only a minor one. More recently, Meserve has expressed this argument in a more general way in her analysis of the literature produced after the fall of Negroponte, the first event of international significance to impact on the "press" of the time, which of course had only just been born. According to her interpretation, "it seems far more likely that the decision to print originated with the authors themselves or their close friends, and that their motives for having them printed included bringing themselves to the attention of the great and the good."¹³

Without entirely denying Meserve's stimulating hypothesis or excluding the evidence pointing toward social ambition, our purpose is to present arguments which indicate that Guillaume Fichet's ultimate goal was that of crusade propaganda.

To start with, we need to emphasize the fact that in the same year (1471), Bessarion's *Orations* went into an Italian edition; its translator was Ludovico Carbone¹⁴ and its printer was Christopher Valdarfer of Venice.¹⁵ So from the outset, Bessarion's initiative went further than the person of Guillaume Fichet and his ambitions. The virtually simultaneous appearance of an Italian translation of the same text, in a context marked by the establishment in December 1470 of the anti-Ottoman Italian league, indicates that something of broader significance was in the offing. To get a clearer sense of the author's personality, we need to nuance the image sometimes presented of Bessarion as an isolated figure at Pope Paul II's court. When the pope set up a special commission for crusading affairs in 1465, he appointed Bessarion alongside Guillaume d'Estouteville and Juan de Carvajal. The commission was given the task of managing the *Depositeria della crociata*, which enjoyed regular revenue from the Tolfa alum, tenths and crusading indulgences.¹⁶ From this position of influence, the Greek cardinal occupied himself with the crusade in the broadest sense of the word. He was a member of the commission that denounced George of Poděbrady as a heretic in 1465, an act that led to the king's deposition from the throne of Bohemia and opened the way for the crusade against the Hussites managed by Matthias Corvinus.¹⁷ At Viterbo in 1466, Bessarion welcomed George Sphrantzes, the former first minister of the last Byzantine emperor, who at that point was probably the best possible source of information about eastern affairs.¹⁸ Finally, in 1468, the cardinal of Nicaea sent his envoy Georges Tarchaniotès to Moscow to contact Grand Prince Ivan III about his marriage to Zoe Palaeologina, with the goal of bringing Russia into crusading projects being fashioned at Rome.¹⁹ Such examples show that Bessarion was far from being exclusively absorbed by philosophical disputes. And even in the case of the latter, we need to bear in mind the political aspect of the polemics. Bessarion's opponent George of Trebizond had travelled to Constantinople between the summer of 1465 and March 1466 and had written the short works *On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat* and *On the Divinity of Manuel* with the goal of showing that Mehmed II was the "king of kings" destined to govern the entire world. He did this in the hope of converting the sultan to Christianity, but his actions reinforced the hostility of Bessarion, for whom

this risky approach was perilously close to betrayal during an open war against the Ottoman Empire.²⁰ In addition, thanks to his posture of “dean of the cardinals,” the titular patriarch of Constantinople had become “a Christi vicario facile secundum,” to use the inspired formula of Guillaume Fichet,²¹ who was number two in Paul II’s government. Given this self-image of an *homme d’État* carrying heavy responsibilities, Bessarion had not waited for the fall of Negroponte to continue his wide-ranging program of activity serving the idea of crusade, a program that he had been pursuing since 1439 and under a series of popes.

The initiative for the correspondence between Bessarion and Fichet lay with the former. He sent Fichet two letters carrying the same date of December 13, 1470: the first related to the debate then raging between Platonists and Aristotelians, while the second alerted Fichet to the dispatch of a copy of the *Orations* which had been delivered for the benefit of the Italian princes.²² Six weeks later, Fichet received a packet containing the text, thanks to the offices of Nicolas Leroux, Abbot of Saint-Corneille at Compiègne, at the moment when the city of Paris closed its gates because of the war which had broken out between Louis XI and Charles the Bold.²³ These hostilities between France and Burgundy—known as “the campaign of the Somme towns”—lasted from January to April 1471, ending with the truce of Amiens of April 4.²⁴

At this point, Fichet was of no great importance, and we may well ask what it was that drew Bessarion’s attention to the man, not just bringing him to Bessarion’s notice but also giving the cardinal the confidence to send Fichet such a precious manuscript. Without doubt, it was because Fichet, professor of philosophy and rhetoric, rector of the Sorbonne in 1467 and its librarian between 1469 and 1470, had together with his colleague Jean Heynlin persuaded three German printers to come to Paris in 1470. They resided in the city until 1473, and their names were Ulrich Gering, Michael Friburger and Martin Crantz.²⁵

Bessarion confirms that the individual who had told him about Fichet was Guillaume Baudin, a member of the French delegation sent to Rome to negotiate in the matter of Cardinal Balue and, in addition, a fellow (*socius*) of the college of the Sorbonne.²⁶ Jean Balue had been accused by Louis XI of high treason in favor of the duke of Burgundy and had been thrown into prison, which unleashed a diplomatic scandal.²⁷ The French mission led by Guillaume Cousinot had arrived in Rome in December 1469 and it had been received in the palace of the cardinal of Nicaea himself.²⁸ At precisely the same time— from the end of December 1469

to the start of 1470—Fichet was conducting a mission at Milan, again on business relating to Balue's imprisonment.²⁹ Louis XI had charged Fichet with expounding to Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza the need to bring an end to the abuses practiced at Rome by convening a general council.³⁰ The fact remains that one of the major points of discussion was precisely the promotion of a crusade against the Turks and the struggle against Hussite heresy.³¹ While Bessarion and Fichet were on opposite sides in the ecclesiological dispute, they had at least one conviction in common: the need to assemble a crusade against the Turks.³²

The University of Paris as an institution had not played a role in the introduction of printing, simply consenting that the workshop could be installed in the residence which Jean Heylin occupied as a professor. The financial resources came from Guillaume Fichet himself, who had the means thanks to his ecclesiastical income and a gift of 200 ducats received from Galeazzo Maria Sforza.³³ The proclaimed goal of the initiative was the revival of Latinity at Paris, which at this point was in crisis. The installation of the printing works must have been ongoing from the start of 1470, because not long after Fichet's return from his Milanese mission, the first books issued from the press, in July–August 1470 and again in December: these were an epistolary and a treatise on Latin orthography by the Bergamo rhetorician Gasparino Barzizza (1360–1431). Right at the start of 1471, several historical works appeared: Sallust's *De Catilinae conjuratione* and *De bello Iugurthae* de Salluste, as well as Florus' *Epitoma de historia Titi Livii*.³⁴ This remarkable series of incunabula made Paris the first city outside Germany to embrace the new art.

Fichet's involvement in the arrival of the printing press at Paris was clearly the main thing that drew him to Bessarion's attention, not least because the cardinal was himself a keen advocate of printing.³⁵ In 1469, he had brought about the publication of his *magnum opus*, the philosophical and theological treatise *In calumniatorem Platonis*, which was printed at Subiaco by Sweynheim and Pannartz, the first printing press to appear in Italy.³⁶ This printed edition had been the crucial factor in Bessarion's triumph over his adversary George of Trebizond, whose works were never printed.³⁷ While this philosophical dispute does not form part of our discussion, it clearly reveals Bessarion's awareness of the radical importance of the printing revolution, and of the ways in which it could be mobilized to effect the diffusion and favorable reception of ideas. From every angle, thanks to his French contacts, Bessarion could not fail to

be aware of Fichet's significance as the man who introduced Paris to the printing press.

We can see that the edition of the *Orations against the Turks* was prepared with haste throughout the Franco-Burgundian war of January–April 1471 because the book was issued as soon as calm was restored.³⁸ Analysis of the letters which accompanied the dispatch of the Latin edition has shown that this edition had been printed, dedicated and illustrated between April 24 and the end of August 1471. Chronological proof derives from the date of the very first printed copy of the *Orations*, which was offered with a dedication to Cardinal Jean Rolin (1408–1483) on April 24 (*VIII kalendae Maias*) 1471.³⁹ Four months later, on August 31, the author's copy had still to reach Bessarion. Alarmed by rumors of war, the cardinal wrote to Fichet to ascertain whether the manuscript of his work had reached Paris, expressing his surprise that he had not yet received anything. He had actually been informed by a secretary of the French king who had arrived at Rome that the *Orations* had been printed, because the secretary had seen several copies in different hands.⁴⁰

We may well ask why Jean Rolin enjoyed the honor of heading the list of those who received dedicated copies of Bessarion's work. One part of the answer can be found in the letter that Fichet sent to Bessarion on February 13, 1471. In effect, it was Cardinal Rolin who had prepared the way by talking enthusiastically to Fichet about Bessarion's excellent qualities.⁴¹ And the reason why Rolin did this was that his own ties with the Savoyard humanist were of a special character. Here are the terms deployed by Fichet in the dedication attached to the *Rhetoric*, published several months later:

I hope, most excellent father, that our work on rhetoric will bring you pleasure. It cannot match the kind deeds which you have showered on me, but it is a testimony to my recognition of what I owe to you above all others, because for ten years you have constantly supported me in the most generous fashion [*sumptus amplissimos abhinc decennium ad hunc usque diem continuo suppeditasti*].

The letter concludes with an eloquent flourish: "Farewell father, thou nourisher of my talent" ("Vale parens, alitorque mei ingenii").⁴² In the conclusion to the letter to Pope Sixtus IV accompanying the same *Rhetoric*, Fichet placed Jean Rolin alongside Bessarion, and even before him, in the role of patron.⁴³ It follows that the ties between the Savoyard

humanist and the Burgundian cardinal went back as far as 1461. Since their first encounter at Autun, the cardinal had given Fichet an annual payment of 44 *lions d'or*.⁴⁴ This stable financial support had allowed Fichet to dedicate himself entirely to his career, undertaking the slow ascent of the academic ladder which led to his becoming rector of the University of Paris in 1467.⁴⁵ The cardinal had made him a gift of two works described as “latinissimi et gravissimi,” which Evencio Beltrán identified as Cicero’s *Orations* and treatise on rhetoric (*De oratore*), books whose influence on Fichet’s rhetoric has been rightly judged to constitute “a veritable leap forward.”⁴⁶ According to A. Claudin, such evidence leads one to deduce “that Cardinal Rolin played his part in the setting up of the Sorbonne’s press, and that he must have assisted Fichet in his generous undertaking.”⁴⁷ Such influence would fully explain why it was the Burgundian cardinal before anyone else who was the first recipient of Fichet’s printed edition of the *Orations*.⁴⁸

Although the influence of Cardinal Rolin on the printing of Bessarion’s work has always been recognized, its full significance has not been appreciated. Jean Rolin⁴⁹ was the son of the chancellor Nicolas Rolin, first counsellor to Duke Philip the Good (1419–1467). In 1436, he became bishop of Autun, the most important of Burgundy’s dioceses. On several occasions (1433, 1434 and 1437), he took part in the Council of Basel, where the Burgundian delegation had followed a political line that favored the Papacy: in 1437, in particular, Philip the Good’s envoys refused to support the council’s anti-Eugenian stance on the negotiation of Union with the Greeks.⁵⁰ Rolin’s enthusiasm for crusading may have been stimulated by meeting Giovanni da Capistrano when the latter visited Burgundy in 1442–1443.⁵¹ In 1449, he was elevated to the cardinalate by Nicholas V—at Duke Philip’s prompting—with the title of S. Stefano al Monte Celio,⁵² and for a time he became confessor to the dauphin Louis. Later, however, he chose to remain loyal to Charles the Bold, at the cost of losing the king’s favor.

The cardinal adhered to the political position adopted by his father: stabilizing the duchy through good relations with France while pursuing the ideal of crusade. At the famous Feast of the Pheasant (February 17, 1454), Chancellor Nicolas Rolin had made a vow to arm a military detachment and send one of his sons on the crusade proclaimed by Nicholas V. At the start of the same year, Cardinal Jean Rolin was mandated by the pope with giving the cross to Philip the Good and all those who would follow him on his enterprise. But Rolin proved unable to secure

Charles VII's agreement to protect the duchy during the expedition, while Philip the Good also failed to win the support of Frederick III at the diet of Regensburg in April 1454.⁵³ Hopes for a crusade revived under Calixtus III, who renewed Cardinal Rolin's commission to bestow the cross on March 10, 1455,⁵⁴ and again on January 2, 1457 following John Hunyadi's victory at Belgrade.⁵⁵ In 1459, the cardinal accompanied Pius II to the Congress of Mantua, where he greeted the Burgundian delegation.⁵⁶ Thanks among other things to the mediation of Bessarion and Jean Rolin, the pope renewed Nicholas V's concessions to the duke. On September 15, 1459, Philip also received a three-year grant of one-third of the profits from indulgences, the remaining two-thirds also to be set aside for crusading uses.⁵⁷ In 1463, Rolin supported the Burgundian company of paid troops led by Géraud Deschamps who fought alongside King Matthias Corvinus at the capture of Jajce in Bosnia.⁵⁸ Finally, on August 25, 1470, Pope Paul II sent Jean Rolin a letter informing him of Mehmed II's seizure of Negroponte and underlining the immediate threat that faced Christendom as a result of this advance. The pope requested him to beseech the duke of Burgundy to provide effective support for Venice in its war against the Turks.⁵⁹

This last point is crucial. Throughout his career, Jean Rolin had been heavily involved in Burgundian crusading policy. It is not going too far to infer that between Paul II's appeal to Rolin in 1470 and the printing at Paris in 1471 of Bessarion's *Orations*, under the cardinal's patronage, there must have been a relationship of cause and effect. An event as resounding as the fall of Negroponte called for a substantial gesture, and the Burgundian cardinal was well aware of the energetic personality of his "spiritual son" Guillaume Fichet. The cardinal was familiar with both his enterprise and his rhetorical skill because he had done so much to encourage both. We can readily imagine the way in which the book was received by its first French readers: reading between the lines of the eloquent critique of Italy's intestinal conflicts, they would see a commentary on the Franco-Burgundian war, and this—a real masterstroke—emanating from Paris itself. For obvious reasons relating to the reaction of King Louis XI, Fichet could not make too much of the Burgundian cardinal's role in an undertaking which challenged the ideological underpinning of a war as just as that being waged against Charles the Bold. That said, the work placed the truce of Amiens of April 4, 1471 within a frame of reference which was more generally Christian. By bringing about the printing of Bessarion's *Orations* at Paris, Jean Rolin was responding to the pope's

request, spreading as broadly as he could in France a strong message of peace between Christian princes—in this instance the rulers of France and Burgundy—and advocating their union to combat the Turks.

Burgundy exercised a pivotal role between France and the Empire.⁶⁰ The region was home to an important crusading tradition and had direct links to the member states of the Italian league. Since 1463, Burgundy and Venice had been allies,⁶¹ leading to Venice's first permanent diplomatic mission north of the Alps, a crucial post held by a series of brilliant diplomats: Antonio Dandolo (1468–1470), Bernardo Bembo (1470–1474) and Marcantonio Morosini (1474–1478).⁶² In response to an appeal made on February 18, 1471 by Ferdinand of Naples, on August 15, 1471 Burgundy entered a second anti-Turkish alliance. And on June 4, 1472, the duchy's long-standing alliance with Venice was renewed.⁶³

It was therefore no coincidence that the Italian edition of the *Orations* was published at Venice. The lagoon city was one of the principal centers south of the Alps for the diffusion of Gutenberg's invention. Johannes de Spira set up the first press there in 1469 and after his death, the venture was taken over by his disciple Nicholas Jensen, as well as by Christopher Valdarfer, both of whom were already active in 1470.⁶⁴ Valdarfer only worked at Venice for a year, but he was responsible for at least 11 publications of capital importance. Five of them were prepared by Ludovico Carbone, a humanist at the Este court, and two carry dedications to Borso d'Este, Duke of Modena and Ferrara (1450–1471). Ludovico Carbone's *proemion* for the Italian edition of the *Orations* enables us to date it with precision.⁶⁵ Since the entire print run of this translation was dedicated to Borso d'Este, it must have pre-dated his death, which occurred on August 20, 1471 following a sudden illness.⁶⁶

But the preface penned by Ludovico Carbone is in equal measure an extraordinary *apologia* for Bessarion's election as pope. It is hard to believe that anyone would have dared make such a case during the reign of a pope as jealous of his power as Paul II, so the text was probably written after Paul's unexpected demise on July 26, 1471.⁶⁷ Since there is in addition no mention of Pope Sixtus IV, we are led to place its redaction during the interregnum, before Sixtus' election on August 9, 1471.⁶⁸ It follows that the *proemion* was completed between July 26 and August 9, 1471, or at the very latest during the first ten days of the new pontificate. With this dating, the work's Italian edition becomes a piece of propaganda for the election of Bessarion as the next pope. Now, the book is addressed to Borso d'Este, who was a vassal in the papal state and a friend of Venice, without

doubt in the hope that Borso would use his influence to help Bessarion achieve the office of pope. When the conclave took place in 1471, Venice lobbied hard on behalf of Bessarion; he was after all an honorary citizen of the republic and happily described himself as *Venetus*.⁶⁹ We are justified in adding the Italian edition of the *Orations* to the list of means that Venice employed to advance its candidate's cause. The Venetian authorities kept a close eye on all the public and even private doings of its citizens, above all in the circumstances of the long war of 1463–1479 against the Turks. A publication so in tune with the politics of the time, simultaneously targeting the justification of the war against Mehmed II and the candidature of the cardinal most acceptable to the Serenissima, could not have been published without the *imprimatur*, if not the active involvement, of the Venetian government.

John Monfasani drew attention to the fact that the *scholia* in Fichet's edition are identical to those in Carbone's, inferring that "it would seem that Carbone had the latter edition before him." But the dating of the Carbone *proemion* makes this inference questionable. It is hard to believe that Carbone, writing before August 19, could have got hold of one of the copies printed at Paris, given that even Bessarion did not have one in his possession on August 31. We are forced to conclude that the Italian translator worked with a Latin manuscript of Bessarion's text,⁷⁰ including the same *scholia* as the manuscript sent to Paris—in other words, a manuscript "good for print." Without doubt, since the bulk of the translation had been done before the *proemion* was written, Carbone rushed to get the work published when news arrived of Paul II's unexpected death, with the explicit goal of promoting Bessarion's candidature.

We must not forget that Bessarion remained a Byzantine, practicing an epistolary art that was intricately coded, and whose rules prescribed that the message should never become overt. This makes the things that are *not* stated in Byzantine epistolography fully as significant as those that are. The real message is always subtly introduced, camouflaged by a rhetoric which includes clues enabling the reader to decrypt it. Now, the reference to *In Calumniatorem Platonis*, a book already in print, which occurs both in Bessarion's first letter to Fichet and in the Carbone preface, remains today the key to understanding the author's meaning, just as it was in the fifteenth century. If *the* dean of the cardinals of the Roman Church sent to two pioneers of printing his orations about this major event and requested that they be diffused, it would be hard to find a better reason for proceeding with their publication.

Anatole Claudin showed in effect that the dedicatory letter to the monks of Cluny proves that Fichet had acted “in accordance with the cardinal’s request.”⁷¹ This letter says explicitly that “in recent months he [sc. Bessarion] sent to me in France the *Orations* which he had made public throughout Italy, and ordered me by letter to do what I could to facilitate their reading by princes and others, who by their prayers and by their weapons might assist the Christians and oppose the Turks.”⁷² Fichet for one could decode the “Byzantinism” of Bessarion’s letters.

Bringing together all the elements, one may conclude that the virtually instantaneous publication of the *Orations against the Turks* at Paris and at Venice enables us with hindsight to discern a skillfully coordinated instrument of propaganda, originating in the Veneto-Burgundian axis which since 1463 had given structure to the anti-Ottoman crusade. Dedicated entirely to the idea of a crusade against the Ottoman Empire, Bessarion had to resort in the first place to this alliance to bring his project into being.

BESSARION AND THE GREAT DIET OF CHRISTENDOM IN 1471

To understand Bessarion’s motivation for hurrying his work into print, we have to set out the situation in its entirety, and this means expanding the geographical parameters. For it has not to date been noticed that the context for the editions of the *Orations* included the great *Reichstag* which met at Regensburg in 1471.⁷³ Previous years had witnessed the first Ottoman incursions into the Holy Roman Empire in Carniola (Krain). Like Italy, the Empire was for the first time directly threatened by the Ottomans, hence the need arose to coordinate the defense of the Empire, a responsibility which fell to Frederick III. This was why, on the same day that the Italian peace was sealed—December 22, 1470—the emperor convoked a diet to meet at Regensburg in Bavaria on St George’s Day, April 23, 1471.⁷⁴

Subjected to demands that he deal with the Empire’s internal and external issues, Frederick III had to respond to offers of support coming from two powerful monarchs. On the one hand, the duke of Burgundy was offering the hand of his only daughter to Prince Maximilian, Frederick’s son, while on the other, the king of Hungary wanted to marry Frederick’s daughter. In exchange, both rulers asked for the same thing: the title of

king of the Romans. Philip the Good wanted a royal title which would add the finishing touch to his power, while Matthias Corvinus sought to legitimate his rule by linking himself to one of the great European dynasties. The two rulers both craved the Imperial title, which was why Frederick deployed delaying tactics.⁷⁵ The importance of the matters announced for discussion led to the arrival at the *Reichstag* not just of the members of the Empire, but also of plenipotentiaries sent by the pope, the kings of Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Naples, and Venice, that is, every power with a direct stake in halting Ottoman expansion. For this reason, the assembly ended up being regarded as a great diet of the whole of Christendom (*Große Christentag*). For the first time since the Nürnberg diet of 1444, the emperor attended in person, ending an absence of 27 years from the Empire's public debates.⁷⁶ In addition to the internal conflicts of the German states, the Regensburg meeting would be dominated by three items: (1) Turkish attacks on Imperial lands and the need to assemble an army to deal with them; (2) George of Poděbrady's death on March 22, 1471 and the contest which this unleashed for the crown of Bohemia between the kings of Hungary and Poland; (3) the war between France and Burgundy, the latter being a constituent member of the Empire.

The two disputes on the Empire's western and eastern borders posed an obstacle to the coordination of all its forces in answer to the new threat to its southern flank and the defense of the frontier lands there. At the same time, by absorbing the resources of the two powers capable of responding to Ottoman aggression, Hungary and Burgundy, these disputes hamstrung any offensive program against Mehmed II. The death of Pope Paul II in the midst of the discussions was a further, unexpected complication. All in all, the diet of Regensburg became the center of attention for everybody who wanted a crusade against the Ottoman Turks.

The *Christentag* was therefore the backcloth, Europe's central event, throughout the period between April and August 1471 when the *Orations* were being printed. One point is particularly striking: the envoys coming from Italy were to a man close friends of Bessarion. Among the papal delegation, there was Cardinal Francesco Todeschini-Piccolomini, nephew of Pius II and the future Pope Pius III (1503), who was very well briefed on German affairs and one of Bessarion's allies at the heart of the college of cardinals.⁷⁷ He was accompanied by the humanist bishop Giannantonio Campano, a member of Bessarion's academy.⁷⁸ Alongside the jurist Bartolomeo Cipolla, the Venetian delegation comprised the patrician

Paolo Morosini, noted above all for having persuaded Bessarion in 1468 to offer his famous library to the *Serenissima*.⁷⁹ The Neapolitan delegation was led by another close friend of Bessarion, the humanist Narciso de Verduno.⁸⁰ Finally, the man representing King Matthias Corvinus was Bishop Albert Vétesí of Veszprém. At Regensburg, he would read to the diet a letter appealing for help from Archbishop John Vitéz of Esztergom, another humanist and friend of Bessarion.⁸¹ We should add that while the diet was at work, Baldassare da Piscia, a member of Bessarion's inner group (*familia*), arrived at Regensburg in the capacity of an extraordinary papal nuncio.⁸²

The presence at Regensburg of these members of Bessarion's circle was bound to evoke the special ties which linked the Greek cardinal to Germany. Many of the German princes nourished memories of his legation of 1460–1461.⁸³ This long stay had given the cardinal a direct acquaintance with the reality of German political life and even the country's language.⁸⁴ His personal ties to Frederick III were even closer. On January 24, 1452, Bessarion had welcomed Frederick to Bologna, when he was travelling to his Imperial coronation at Rome. In turn, in 1460, the cardinal had enjoyed Frederick's hospitality at Vienna, helping to bring about the emperor's first reconciliation with King Matthias. On that occasion, Bessarion had baptized the infant Maximilian of Habsburg, the future Emperor, thereby forming an attachment of spiritual affinity with the German Caesars. The ties created were very well symbolized in the miniature in Antonio Minucci's *Libri feudorum*, which represents the author dedicating this work to Frederick III and Bessarion.⁸⁵ When the emperor undertook his second trip to Rome in 1468, it was again Bessarion who introduced Frederick to Paul II.⁸⁶ Bearing this in mind, we can see that Bessarion must have shaped proceedings at Regensburg despite the fact that he was not there in person.

These proceedings made slow progress because it was only on June 16 that Frederick III made his appearance at the diet. He was accompanied by Duke Ludwig of Bavaria-Landshut, who hosted the assembly and for this reason bore the title "custodian of the diet."⁸⁷ The deliberations were commenced in the presence of the emperor and the papal legate on June 24 and lasted until August 21, on which date the diet was transferred by Imperial decree to Nürnberg. It would be futile to give a synthesis of the works dedicated to this diet, the biggest one yet convened. But one should signal the main currents of thinking which the various delegations brought to bear on the Ottoman question. The overall flow of discussion

can be followed thanks to the detailed reports compiled by Agostino Patrizi Piccolomini, secretary to the papal legate, and by a number of other participants.⁸⁸

In order to direct the debate toward questions of general concern, Cardinal Todeschini-Piccolomini set the tone by reminding his audience in several orations that in the course of two decades, that is, since the accession of Mehmed II, Christendom had incurred the loss of Bosnia and Negroponte. Unless there was an adequate response, Austria, Bavaria and the rest of Germany would soon be threatened.⁸⁹ Letters were read out from the estates of Carniola and the archbishop of Esztergom on the destruction inflicted by the Turkish raiding parties. The Burgundian delegation seized on this to denounce Louis XI's aggression at the start of 1471, accusing him of hindering Charles the Bold's ardor for crusading.⁹⁰ The Venetian envoys, seconded by those from Naples, emphasized in their interventions that the Serenissima had for long been resisting the Turks, describing the inexorable advance of the latter. The republic had made strenuous efforts to maintain a substantial fleet, henceforth in alliance with the king of Naples, and the time had now arrived for the Empire to make an equivalent contribution to the war on land.

The new conflict over the Bohemian crown sparked off a serious split. The Czech delegation, led by Henry Poděbrad, son of the deceased king, rallied to the Poles under Andreas Oporowski. They demanded recognition of the recent coronation of Vladislav Jagiełło, the son of Casimir IV of Poland, as Catholic King of Bohemia, for good measure supporting his claims to the crown of Hungary. To gain the diet's agreement, they also advanced an anti-Ottoman project, arguing that it would have more chance of success than the one proposed by the Hungarians. The Hungarian delegation and the Czech Catholics, accompanied by Bishop Lorenzo Roverella, papal legate in Hungary, in turn presented King Matthias' willingness to fight on two fronts: against the Turks—who were attacking Matthias' realm from three directions, that is, Transylvania, Dalmatia and Belgrade—and at the same time against the Bohemian “heretics.” They insisted on the fact that if Frederick III wanted a more consistent Hungarian commitment against the Ottomans, he had to favor “his son” Matthias, helping him to obtain the Bohemian crown so that he could concentrate his military efforts on the south.⁹¹

These interventions brought about the diet's first act: Frederick's proclamation on July 24 of a general peace (*Landfrieden*) throughout the Empire, to last for four years.⁹² On the following day, the papal legate

supported with severe ecclesiastical sanctions this Imperial decision, taken “at the diet of the princes of the renowned German nation convened in the city of Regensburg on St George’s day to resist the power of the Turks.”⁹³ Making practical arrangements was another matter. The emperor had proposed the formation of a corps of 10,000 paid troops, a third on horse and the rest on foot, to bring help to Carniola as soon as possible.⁹⁴ But in tough discussions, the troops which would be provided by the Empire failed to exceed 4,000. With one voice, the ambassadors from Hungary, Naples and Venice emphasized that such a force was simply inadequate. It was imperative that Germany should come up with a force that matched its capability, to contribute to a land war against the Turks which thus far had been waged mainly by Hungary.⁹⁵

It was at this point that discussion was thrown into confusion by Paul II’s death on July 26, news of which arrived at the diet on August 7. Sixtus IV was elected on August 9 and news of that event only reached Regensburg on August 23. To manage the anxiety created by the vacancy at Rome, the legate Todeschini-Piccolomini underlined the fact that the crusading question was a concern of the college of cardinals and that the new pope would be obliged to promote the anti-Ottoman agenda.⁹⁶ Far from being discouraged by the crisis, the Hungarian, Venetian and Neapolitan envoys sought to make use of it, taking center stage with the goal of forcing into existence the proclamation of an expedition *in Turchos* which would engage the whole of Germany. On August 14, at a plenary session and in the presence of the emperor and princes, the representatives of Naples and Venice presented the detailed plan for an expedition which would liberate the Balkans. They began by lamenting the dispute which was emerging between the kings of Poland and Hungary, whose land forces possessed broad experience of fighting the Turks, and called for an alliance between the two rulers. They then outlined the plan of campaign of a crusading army as far as Constantinople.⁹⁷

To convince the German princes of the need for an expedition against the Turks, the humanist and bishop Giannantonio Campano, who was helping the papal legate, had put much effort into an oration, *In Conventu Ratisponensi ad exhortandos principes Germanorum contra Turcos*.⁹⁸ He followed, and hoped to surpass, the model of Bessarion’s *Orations*, though when the two works are compared, it is the cardinal’s which carries the palm.⁹⁹ Thanks to the emperor’s late arrival, Campano had not been able to deliver his oration, but it was assuredly circulated at the diet in written form. On the other hand, through the letters that Campano sent

from Regensburg to Bessarion himself, to his secretary Domizio Calderini and to Cardinal Ammanati, the cardinal of Nicaea was constantly kept informed about the progress of debates at the diet.¹⁰⁰ It was during the course of the discussions about a crusade that followed Paul II's death that Bessarion's name was advanced as the most worthy successor to St Peter's throne. While bringing Bessarion up to date on the efforts that the Roman delegation was making at Regensburg, Campano informed him that after the pope's death, the German princes affirmed their hope that Bessarion would succeed him: "The princes want a pope who will be dedicated to such a great expedition, they all revere you and they place their ultimate hope in that [sc. in your election]."¹⁰¹ In the letter to Domizio Calderini, Campano gave full vent to the atmosphere which prevailed at Regensburg during the interregnum:

Christendom is safe if Bessarion, who is the most important figure in everything that embraces the human spirit, becomes so in office as well. Otherwise, we sail amidst the billows and with dubious winds ... If only I were there! Do you ask what I would do? I would shout, I would fight, I would loudly plead to stop [the cardinals] losing their way and depriving our religion of the sole support that is left to it. The Greeks, the Latins, Hungary, all of Germany with one voice ask for him [*illum Graeci, illum Latini, illum Pannonia, illum voce una tota Germania postulat*]. How great was my delight, when yesterday I heard King Ferdinand's envoy, Narciso [de Verduno], speaking before the Emperor, acclaim Bessarion on four occasions with such high praise that no mortal but he could deserve.¹⁰²

Specialists have estimated Fichet's print run of Bessarion's *Orations* as around 100 copies,¹⁰³ and we have knowledge of almost 60, of which 20 are extant.¹⁰⁴ Judging by the number printed, the book was targeted at an elite audience, especially decision-making centers which had a particular interest in resisting the Ottomans. Now the presence of Bessarion at Regensburg "in spirit," thanks to his friends and followers, allows us to consider this point in detail. Why did Guillaume Fichet print Bessarion's work on April 24, 1471? Since the month of December 1470—the point at which Bessarion had sent his manuscript to France—the whole of Europe was aware of the convocation of the Imperial diet, which was to assemble on the feast day of St George: April 23. Fichet had close ties with Germany and he would certainly be aware that outside France, it was Regensburg that would host a public gathering with the strongest potential interest in a work with anti-Ottoman content like that of Bessarion.

This explains the significance of Fichet's preparing a copy of the *Orations* for the Emperor Frederick III—completed in August 5, 1471¹⁰⁵—another for Ludwig, known for having been “custodian of the diet” at Regensburg,¹⁰⁶ and others for unspecified German princes.¹⁰⁷ Regrettably, these copies have not survived, but the existence of some of them is proved by prefatory letters in Fichet's epistolary: we still possess those addressed to Charles the Bold,¹⁰⁸ to Duke Amedeo of Savoy¹⁰⁹ and to Prince Charles of Baden,¹¹⁰ all of them leading authorities in the Holy Roman Empire.

On January 21, 1472, Guillaume Fichet informed Bessarion that while the *Orations* were already circulating in France, this was not yet the case in Germany. It was only thanks to the good offices of Charles Fromontus (de Froment), a professor at the University of Ingolstadt,¹¹¹ that he could at last send to the emperor, the duke of Bavaria and other German princes the copies which he had prepared for them.¹¹² On February 13, Bessarion thanked Fichet for having printed and distributed the *Orations*. Finally, on April 20, Fichet was able to treat as a *fait accompli* the dispatch of copies to Frederick III, Louis XI and other princes in Germany, France and England.¹¹³

In addition to these rulers, it is likely that Matthias Corvinus was also sent a copy of Bessarion's work. To show that successful resistance to the Ottoman advance remained possible, the cardinal of Nicaea had cited Hunyadi's victory at Belgrade in 1456 and that of Matthias himself at Jajce in 1463–1464. Matthias could not be ignored, particularly when a work was being sent to Christian rulers who were expected to help in an expedition against Mehmed II. Janus Pannonius, Bishop of Pecs and royal counsellor, was also the author of a translation of the *Oratio Demosthenis contra regem Philippum*, concluded, it is believed, after the arrival in Hungary of a copy of Bessarion's work. It is worth noting that Pannonius had been a friend of Ludovico Carbone and that both men had been pupils of Guarino da Verona. In 1473, when Ludovico Carbone sought fame and fortune at Matthias' court, he could promote his cause by reference to the work he had published at Venice, which glorified the feats of arms of the king and his father.¹¹⁴ By the same token, at least one further copy seems to have reached Poland.¹¹⁵

Thus, in the course of several months, Bessarion's *Orations* were able to exercise an effect on a significant proportion of the political and ecclesiastical elite of the time, men who were well placed to contribute to the promotion of an anti-Ottoman crusade. We must admit that for the period,

its impact in quantitative terms was impressive. True enough, the books printed by Guillaume Fichet during the sessions of the Regensburg diet did not succeed in reaching their recipients before the start of the following year. But the fact remains that the intention seems to have been there from the outset. We have to admire the entrepreneurial spirit of an editor who succeeded in publishing in record time a manuscript received in January 1471 and then in identifying across the breadth of Europe a public which would be interested in a topic of a highly specific nature. It would be harsh to criticize Fichet for the fact that delivery was delayed for several months. Even today, publishers and retailers could find much to admire in Fichet's operation.

The question remains whether the dissemination of the work in this way, detached from Bessarion's person, gained in cutting edge, persuasiveness and effectiveness. The fact that not a single one of the known recipients of the *Orations* ever took part in even the smallest campaign against the Ottomans may lead us to doubt it. One piece of evidence allows us to gain insight into the immediate effect which a book of this genre could have on its recipient. From the royal castle at Amboise Fichet described in this way the reception at which he personally offered Bessarion's work to Louis XI.

I handed over to his royal Highness your *Orations*, which I had had decorated as finely as I could. I spoke a few words, both on the need for Christian princes to maintain peace between themselves, and on the urgency of making war on the enemies of the cross; I omitted nothing which I thought the king should hear in your name. He took your book with a gracious air, and he quickly read the short preface which I placed at the start of your work. Then, flicking through the pages, he paid much attention to the decoration and illuminations with which the margins were full. Then he read your short commentaries which were written in letters of gold and various colours. While reading, he asked me several short questions which I answered without hesitation. Finally, coming back to the start of the book, he read three or four times the following couplet which he saw written at the foot of his royal image: "Oh king, receive from Bessarion this gift which will be a happy augury for your undertakings both at home and abroad." His secretary was present and he received the book from the king's hand to look after it. Then the king thanked me for the gift of your work. To speak the truth, the king uttered not one word about peace at home or the need for war abroad.¹¹⁶

The disappointment is obvious. Fichet puts on his best face, but for all his efforts, the impression of royal indifference cannot be disguised. The

scant reverence which Louis XI showed toward Bessarion when the latter arrived as legate *a latere* in France, during their meeting at Château Gontier on August 22, 1472, shows that the *Orations* had been far from royal bedside reading in the meantime.¹¹⁷ On that occasion, Louis XI even accused Bessarion of being a supporter of the duke of Burgundy.¹¹⁸ It was an outrageous accusation, formulated in response to the critique par excellence of the *real* partisanship that threatened the unity of Christendom. And proof of the Greek cardinal's impartiality is the fact that Charles the Bold directed the same charge against Bessarion in terms of his favoring France.¹¹⁹ We may suppose that Charles de Froment made no more lasting an impression when he presented the same book to Frederick III, who subsequently did all he could to impede the crusading efforts of his rival Matthias Corvinus. The lukewarm reception accorded to the *Orations* is testimony to the accuracy of the author's diagnosis of the political crisis of the European monarchies which had done so much to facilitate Ottoman success.

* * *

The fact remains that in persuading at least the Italian rulers to embark on the road which for so long had seemed illusory—the formation of a peninsular league—Bessarion's *Orations* had had an effect, and one achieved when it was circulating solely in manuscript form. The idea naturally arose of amplifying this effect through the use of the printing press, in the very region that had given birth to Gutenberg's revolution: the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Hence, it was no accident that—outside France's borders—the bulk of the print run for the Latin edition of 1471 had been directed toward the Empire's political elite, starting with the emperor himself. It was a region that was absorbing the message of the great diet at Regensburg, an assembly dedicated to finding solutions to the inexorable Ottoman advance.

It is true that from a strictly military standpoint, this great assembly proved less than fruitful. This was due to the massive fissures dividing the prince-electors, who were paralyzed above all by the conflict between Bavaria and the Palatinate. On this basis, those princes who were not electors, together with the towns, were able to gain ground, slowly but surely establishing the principle that all decisions should rest on unanimity. The outcome was that all papal influence on the Empire was blocked, and with it any real chance of forging an anti-Ottoman alliance.¹²⁰ From the viewpoint of ideas, the diet of 1471 nonetheless crystallized German consciousness of the European dimensions to the Ottoman question. The representatives

of the Empire's estates received at first hand, from Italian, Hungarian and Polish orators, information on a problem which hitherto had largely been the concern of southern and eastern Europe.

From this point onwards, it becomes easier to understand why Bessarion's godson, Emperor Maximilian I, would sustain throughout his eccentric reign the dream—never realized—of a crusade against the Ottomans.¹²¹ It is worth adding that the House of Austria was obliged to commit itself to such a program in a more concrete way after 1526, when Hungary's downfall opened up the road to Vienna to Suleiman the Magnificent. In the same period, Francis I allied with Suleiman to counterbalance the power of the world empire of Charles V, the great-grandson of Frederick III and Charles the Bold. In the turbulent setting of the sixteenth century, the relevance of Bessarion's *Orations* would on occasion be rediscovered in Germany and Italy. For amidst the vast literature dedicated in this period to the Ottoman question,¹²² Bessarion's incunabulum continued to distinguish itself not just as the pioneering text, but also because of the depth of its analysis, the precision of its verdicts and, last but not least, its visionary character.

Recently we argued that the twofold Christian victories at Rhodes and Otranto in 1480–1481—before and after the death of Mehmed II—constituted a *post mortem* triumph for Bessarion in both the strategic and symbolic senses. Acting in his capacity as a permanent member of the commissions of crusade and—from 1463 onward—as dean of the college of cardinals, he had promoted a new conception of the anti-Ottoman war. In the immediate aftermath of 1453, Bessarion showed that the principal thrust of the Ottoman sultan was toward Italy and Rome, and throughout the reigns of several popes he put in place a strategy of containment, the ultimate goal being to check Mehmed's expansion and the more immediate one being that of deferring and hindering the sultan's *grand projet*. His forces tied up by campaigning in theaters of war in the Balkans and Anatolia which were of secondary significance, Mehmed II only succeeding in attacking Italy a quarter of a century later, when the favorable circumstances created by Constantinople's fall had dissolved and the sultan himself was on his deathbed. When everything is taken into account, the tally of glittering but ultimately shallow victories that characterized his long reign cannot disguise the failure of his program of world domination.¹²³

Whatever the verdict on this interpretation, it seems that the central role played by Bessarion in the double victory that marked the close of Sixtus IV's pontificate did not escape the attention of contemporaries. In 1482,

a team of artists whose work would later be eclipsed by Michelangelo completed the first stage in the painting of the new Sistine Chapel inaugurated by Sixtus IV. Still visible today are two frescoes inspired by the life of Jesus (north wall) and two others from the life of Moses (south wall). Cosimo Rosselli was probably responsible for the best known of these, *The Destruction of Pharaoh's Army in the Red Sea*, and he used it to portray a double allegory of the papal victory over the Ottoman armies, won at Rhodes by the Hospitaller grand master, Pierre d'Aubusson, on August 17, 1480 and at Otranto by Cardinal Paolo di Campofregoso on September 10, 1481. Without doubt, Moses, leader of the Chosen People and the agent of the divine miracle that is annihilating in agony Pharaoh's army, stands for Pope Sixtus IV, who as Christ's vicar was responsible for the fate of *Christianitas*. But behind Moses is the dignified figure of an impressive old man, with a voluminous white beard and the red cloak of a cardinal. He seems to be speaking into the left ear of Moses and the prophet is paying him particular attention. The identity of this mysterious individual baffled historians of art, but Kenneth Setton, with his keen eye for the historically specific, saw who he really was: "Toward the left of the picture, just behind Moses' left shoulder, stands the bearded figure of Cardinal Bessarion, holding the silver-gilt reliquary containing the revered head of S. Andrew, in a pose which thousands had seen in April, 1462, at the reception of the relic into the Vatican. Bessarion had died a decade before this fresco was painted, but he still remained the symbol of the anti-Turkish crusade."¹²⁴

NOTES

1. James Hankins, "Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 111–207; Margaret Meserve, "Italian Humanists and the Problem of the Crusade," in *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: Message and Impact*, ed. Norman Housley (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 13–18, 183–188; Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
2. We are here adopting the viewpoint expounded by Martin Lowry, "Diplomacy and the Spread of Printing," in *Bibliography and the*

- Study of Fifteenth-Century Civilization*, ed. John Goldfinch and Lotte Hellinga (London: British Library, 1987), 124–137.
3. Recently examined by Norman Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, 1453–1505* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Benjamin Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs: les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XV^e siècle* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013).
 4. Henri Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion (1403–1472). Étude sur la Chrétienté et la Renaissance vers le milieu du XV^e siècle* (Paris: Coulommiers, 1878); Ludwig Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann*, vol. 1 (Paderborn: Schönningh, 1923); Giuseppe Coluccia, *Basilio Bessarione: lo spirito greco e l'Occidente* (Florence: Olschki, 2009). For a short but excellent introduction, see Lotte Labowsky, “Bessarione,” in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* [hereinafter *DBI*], vol. 9 (Rome: Treccani, 1967), 686–696. Three recent collections of studies have revitalized our perception of the cardinal of Nicaea’s historical role: *Bessarione e l’umanesimo. Catalogo della mostra: Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, 27 aprile–31 maggio 1994*, ed. Gianfranco Fiaccadori et al. (Naples: Vivarium, 1994); *Bessarione e la sua Accademia*, ed. Andrzej Gutkowski and Emanuela Prinziavalli (Rome: Miscellanea francescana, 2012); “*Inter graecos latinissimus, inter latinus graecissimus*.” *Bessarion zwischen den Kulturen*, ed. Claudia Märkl et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013).
 5. John Monfasani, “Bessarion *Latinus*,” *Rinascimento* 21 (1981): 165–209 (=idem, *Byzantine Scholars and Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other Emigrés. Selected Essays*, (Aldershot: Variorum Reprints, 1995), study II), 179–181, 196–204.
 6. Margaret Meserve, “News from Negroponte: Politics, Popular Opinion, and Information Exchange in the First Decade of the Italian Press,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 59 (2006): 440–480.
 7. Giuseppina Nebbia, “La lega italica del 1450: sue vicende e sua rinnovazione nel 1470,” *Archivio storico lombardo*, n.s. 4 (1939): 117–135; Riccardo Fubini, “The Italian League and the Policy of the Balance of Power at the Accession of Lorenzo de’ Medici,” *Journal of Modern History* 67 (1995): 166–99.
 8. *Bessarionis cardinalis Epistolae et orationes de arcendis Turcis a christianorum finibus* (Parisiis: Ulricus Gering, Martinus Grantz and Michael Friburger, 1471), in-4°. The text was edited by Migne

in *PG*, vol. 161, cols 647–676 under the more descriptive title *Cardinalis Bessarionis ad principes Italiae de christianorum clade in Chalcide Euboeae, de periculis Italiae imminentibus expugnato Hydrunto, de sedantis discordiis et decernendo bello in Turcas, Orationes quibus subjicitur persuasio ex Demosthenis Olynthiaca*, and follows the Rome edition of 1537, which omitted the author's *scholia*.

9. See, for the moment, Vast, *Bessarion*, 385–392; Meserve, “Italian Humanists,” 31–38; Thomas Rickliln, “Bessarions Türke und andere Türken interessierter Kreise. Von der Schwierigkeit, ein Feindbild gelehrt zu plausibilisieren,” in “*Inter graecos latinissimus*,” 301–346; Salvatore Leaci, “Il pericolo ottomano, Venezia e le strategie propagandistiche del cardinale Bessarione,” *Studi storici* 55 (2014): 917–935. For a particularly insightful analysis, see Han Lamers, *Greece Reinvented: Transformations of Byzantine Hellenism in Renaissance Italy* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 92–132.
10. In recent years, Bessarion has been studied with particular reference to his many roles at the papal *curia*: not just as a cardinal (Duane Henderson, “Bessarion, Cardinalis Nicenus: A cardinalial *vita* between Ideal Conceptions and Institutional Structures,” in “*Inter graecos latinissimus*,” 123–150), but also as patriarch of Constantinople in exile (Dan Ioan Mureșan, “Bessarion et l’église de rite byzantin du royaume de Hongrie (1463–1472),” in *Matthias Corvinus und seine Zeit: Europa am Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit zwischen Wien und Konstantinopel*, ed. Christian Gastgeber et al. (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), 77–92), as well as dean of the college of cardinals (idem, “La croisade en projets. Plans présentés au Grand Quartier Général de la croisade, le Collège des cardinaux,” in *Les projets de croisade. Géostratégie et diplomatie européenne du XIVe au XVIIe siècle*, ed. Jacques Paviot (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 2014), 247–286). On the role of the titular patriarchs of Constantinople—in communion with the Church of Rome—and the later crusade, see our initial considerations in idem, “Girolamo Lando, titulaire du Patriarcat de Constantinople (1474–1497), et son rôle dans la politique orientale du Saint-Siège,” *Annuario dell’Istituto romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia* 8 (2006): 153–258; and in a more general sense, idem, “Le Patriarcat latin de Constantinople comme

- paradoxe ecclésiologique,” in *Reduire le schisme? Ecclésiologies et politiques de l'Union entre Orient et Occident (XIIIe–XVIII siècles)*, ed. Marie-Hélène Blanchet and Frédéric Gabriel (Paris: Collège de France, 2013), 277–302.
11. Anatole Claudin, *The First Paris Press: An Account of the Books Printed for G. Fichet and J. Heynlin in the Sorbonne 1470–1472* (London: Chiswick Press, 1898); Anatole Claudin, *Les origines de l'imprimerie à Paris. La première presse de la Sorbonne* (Paris: A. Claudin, 1899). On numerous points, especially the chronology, Claudin corrects the work of Jules Philippe, *Origine de l'imprimerie à Paris, d'après des documents inédits* (Paris: Charavay), 1885.
 12. Margaret Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda at the First Paris Press: Guillaume Fichet and the First Edition of Bessarion’s Orations against the Turks,” *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 97 (2003): 521–588.
 13. Meserve, “News from Negroponte,” 467.
 14. On Carbone (1430–1485), see L. Paoletti, “Carbone, Ludovico,” *DBI*, vol. 19 (Rome: Treccani, 1976), 699–703.
 15. *Oratione de Bessarione Cardinal Niceno e Patriarcha di Constantinopoli a tutti gli Signori d’Italia confortandogli a pigliar guerra contro il Turcho, vulgarizate per Lodovico Carbone* (Venice: Christopher Valdarfer, 1471), in-4°.
 16. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:275; Iulian M. Damian, “La Depositeria della Crociata (1463–1490) e i sussidi dei pontefici romani a Mattia Corvino,” *Annuario dell’Istituto romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia* 8 (2006): 135–152.
 17. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:295.
 18. Georgios Sphrantzes, *Memorii 1401–1477*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1966), XLIII, 1–3, pp. 130–132.
 19. Laura Ronchi de Michelis, “Della Volpe, Giovambattista,” *DBI*, vol. 38 (Rome: Treccani, 1990), 7–9. In June 1468, Tarchaniotès received the money needed for his mission to Russia from the papal treasury: Silvia Ronchey, “Malatesta/Paleologhi. Un’alleanza dinastica per rifondare Bisanzio nel Quindicesimo secolo,” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 93 (2000): 521–567, at 561, note 188.
 20. See John Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 131–136 for his writings on Mehmed II and 184–188 for the voyage to

- Constantinople; John Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond* (Binghamton, NY: Renaissance Society of America, 1984), no. 144, pp. 492–563, 564–574; John Monfasani, “The Pre- and Post-history of Cardinal Bessarion’s 1469 *In calumniatorem Platonis*,” in “*Inter graecos latinissimus*,” 367–389. Paul II’s involvement in this mission appears certain, but remains obscure. Bessarion had discovered two letters in Latin sent to George by Mehmed II, which show that the former had gone much further than the mandate eventually given him by the pope in the hope of converting the sultan. See Angelo Mercati, “Le due lettere di Giorgio da Trebisonda a Maometto II,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 9 (1934): 65–99. The result was that despite the fact that George was Paul II’s former professor, the pope had to yield to pressure from his cardinals and agree to his imprisonment in Castel Sant’Angelo between mid-October 1466 and mid-February 1467.
21. *Cent-dix lettres grecques de François Filelfe*, ed. Émile Legrand (Paris: Leroux, 1892), “Lettres inédites du cardinal Bessarion et de Guillaume Fichet,” no. 3, p. 227.
 22. *Cent-dix lettres*, nos 1–2, pp. 223–225, 226 (Bessarion’s letters), 226–230 (Fichet’s answer).
 23. *Ibid.*, no. 7, p. 234. For Nicolas Leroux, see Henri-Dominique Saffrey, “Description d’un incunable imprimé à la Sorbonne,” in *Humanisme et imagerie aux XV^e et XVI^e siècles. Études iconologiques et bibliographiques* (Paris: Vrin, 2004), 218–228, at 221. Leroux too was closely associated with the University of Paris.
 24. Jean-Marie Cauchies, *Louis XI et Charles le Hardi. De Péronne à Nancy (1468–1477): le conflit* (Brussels: DeBoeck, 1996), 35–45.
 25. The credit for recruiting the three printers belongs to Jean Heynlin: Jacques Monfrin, “Les lectures de Guillaume Fichet et de Jean Heynlin d’après le registre de prêt de la Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne,” in *Études de philologie romane* (Geneva: Droz, 2001), 713–740, at 733–735.
 26. Saffrey, “Description,” 221; for Guillaume Baudin, see also J. Lesellier, “Un historiographe de Louis XI demeuré inconnu: Guillaume Danicot,” *Mélanges de l’École française de Rome* 43 (1926): 1–42, at 22.
 27. Henri Forgeot, *Jean Balue, cardinal d’Angers, 1421?–1491* (Paris: Bouillon, 1895), 85–91.

28. Joseph Combet, *Louis XI et le Saint-Siège: 1461–1483* (Paris: Hachette, 1903), 85–86.
29. For Guillaume Fichet, see Jules Philippe, *Guillaume Fichet, sa vie, ses œuvres* (Annecy: Dépollier, 1892); Lauro-Aimé Colliard, *Un ami savoyard du cardinal Bessarion: Guillaume Fichet, ancien recteur de l'université de Paris* (Paris: Sorbonne, 2004); Monfrin, “Les lectures,” passim. When he was back in Paris, Fichet returned his books to the Sorbonne library to March 2, 1470 (*ibid.*, 721–722, note 27).
30. In his capacity as rector of the University of Paris, Fichet had protested in 1467 against the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction: Combet, *Louis XI*, 89–91. For the context to this demand, see Hubert Jedin, “Sanchez de Arevalo und die Konzilsfrage unter Paul II,” *Historisches Jahrbuch* 73 (1954): 95–119; Josef Maček, “Le mouvement conciliaire: Louis XI et Georges Podiebrady, en particulier dans la période 1466–1468,” *Historia* 15 (1957): 5–63.
31. S. Moufflet, *Étude sur une négociation diplomatique de Louis XI, roi de France* (Marseille, 1884), especially in the second oration, 12–27, 86–90; Pietro Ghinzoni, “Galeazzo Maria Sforza e Luigi XI, a proposito dell’opera: *Étude sur une négociation diplomatique de Louis XI, roi de France, par S. Moufflet*,” *Archivio Storico Lombardo* 2(2) (1885): 17–32, at 19.
32. Meserve, “Italian Humanists and the Problem of the Crusade,” showed clearly that in humanist discourse, Church reform and crusade formed two aspects of the same project: the renovation of Christianity.
33. Claudin, *Les origines de l'imprimerie*, 52–55: Paris’ first printing workshop seems to have been situated in the rue de Sorbonne, in the space which runs from today’s place de la Sorbonne to the alley bearing the same name, the bottom of the road being then occupied by gardens.
34. Claudin, *The First Paris Press*, 49–51; Claudin, *Les origines de l'imprimerie*, 14, 18, 19–20; Jeanne Veyrin-Forrer, “Hommage aux premiers imprimeurs de France. 1470–1970,” *Bulletin des Bibliothèques de France* 16 (1971): 65–80.
35. Concetta Bianca, “Bessarione e la stampa,” in Bessarion, *La natura delibera: la natura e l’arte*, ed. Pier Davide Accendere, Ivanoe Privitera (Milan: Bompiano), 249–260.

36. Bernhard Alexander Uhlendorf, "The Invention of Printing and its Spread till 1470: With Special Reference to Social and Economic Factors," *Library Quarterly* 2 (1932): 179–231, at 213–217; Monfasani, "The Pre- and Post-history of Cardinal Bessarion's 1469 *In Calumniatorem Platonis*," 347–366. The work is edited by Ludwig Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann. 2, Bessarionis In Calumniatorem Platonis libri IV* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1927) and is now also available in Italian translation: Basilio Bessarione, *Contro il calunniatore di Platone*, ed. Eva Del Soldato and Ivanoe Privitera (Rome: Ed. di storia e letteratura, 2014).
37. Maury D. Feld, "Sweynheym and Pannartz, Cardinal Bessarion, Neoplatonism: Renaissance Humanism and Two Early Printers' Choice of Texts," *Harvard Library Bulletin* 30 (1982): 282–335; John Monfasani, "A Tale of Two Books: Bessarion's *In Calumniatorem Platonis* and George of Trebizond's *Comparatio Philosophorum Platonis et Aristotelis*," *Renaissance Studies* 22 (2007): 1–15.
38. Saffrey, "Description," 218–228.
39. *Cent-dix lettres*, no. 15, p. 256; the letter concludes in characteristic manner: "Vale, studiorum meorum educator, et reliquorum (si quae fortassis maiora succedent) excitator bonorum meorum magnificus." It was written "Ædibus Sorbonae Parisii scriptum VIII kalendas maias." Cf. Claudin, *Les origines de l'imprimerie*, 22, note 1; Claudin, *The First Paris Press*, 9–10, 27–29; Meserve, "Patronage and Propaganda," 536–538.
40. *Cent-dix lettres*, no. 5, pp. 232–233.
41. *Ibid.*, no. 3, p. 227: "Idque cum ab omnibus qui te novissent, tum a patre meo et studiorum meorum altore Eduensi cardinali sæpius audiveram, qui græcam omnem latinamque sapientiam summis virtutibus et integerrimæ vitæ sociam te fecisse laudabat." The terms used to characterize Rolin repay close attention.
42. Jeanne Veyrin-Forrier, "L'Atelier de la Sorbonne et ses Mécènes, 1470–1473," in *L'Art du livre et l'Imprimerie Nationale* (Paris, 1972), 33–53, at 45. From the copy of Fichet's *Rhetoric* (Bibliothèque nationale de France [hereinafter BNF], Rés. Z 1683).
43. *Ibid.*: "Quod profecto si iocundum alterutri fuerit, non mihi gratia vel minima quidem debeatur sed aut patri cardinali Eduensi qui

- diuturna meis alimenta studiis suppeditavit aut patri Niceno qui prior mihi libros litterasque funeravit” (BNF, Rés. Z 1472–1473, *Epistolae* of Guillaume Fichet, letter no. 28, August 31, 1471).
44. According to Fichet’s own testimony: Evencio Beltrán, “Un opuscule inédit de Guillaume Fichet: les *Exordia epistolarum*,” in *Du Copiste au collectionneur. Mélanges d’histoire des textes et des bibliothèques en l’honneur d’André Vernet*, ed. Donatella Nebbiai-Dalla Guarda and Jean-François Genest (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 239–246, at 245.
 45. Cardinal Rolin congratulated him on this on June 24, 1467 in a letter (BNF, *Paris. lat.* 16228, fol. 254) written with “une affection vraiment paternelle”: Evencio Beltrán, “Les sources de la *Rhétorique* de Fichet,” *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance* 47 (1985): 7–25, at 14. Beltrán observed (*ibid.*, 11) that on other occasions, Fichet “entretenait des relations presque filiales” with Cardinal Rolin.
 46. *Ibid.*, 12–14.
 47. Claudin, *Les origines de l’imprimerie*, 23–24, note 2.
 48. See Claudin, *The First Paris Press*, letter 3, p. 75.
 49. Jean Régnier, *Les évêques d’Autun* (Autun: Letouzey et Ané, 1988), 129–135; Jean Bernard de Vaivre, “La famille de Nicolas Rolin,” in *La Splendeur des Rolin: Un mécénat privé à la cour de Bourgogne. Table ronde 27–28 février 1995*, ed. Brigitte Maurice-Chabard (Paris: Picard, 1999), 19–35, at 22–23; Sophie Cassagnes-Brouquet, “Le cardinal Rolin, un mécène fastueux,” *Publication du centre européen d’études bourguignonnes* 38 (1998): 169–185; Marie-Thérèse Berthier and John-Thomas Sweeney, *Le chancelier Rolin, 1376–1462. Ambition, pouvoir et fortune en Bourgogne* (Précy-sous-Thil: Armançon, 1998), 393–395; Fabienne Joubert, “Tel un prince en son diocèse, Jean Rolin, Cardinal-évêque d’Autun,” in *L’Artiste et le clerc: la commande artistique des grands ecclésiastiques à la fin du Moyen Âge (XIV^e–XVI^e siècle)*, ed. Fabienne Joubert (Paris: Sorbonne, 2006), 105–132. For an intellectual profile of the cardinal on the basis of his library, see Isabelle Guyot-Bachy, “L’inventaire des livres de Jean Rolin trouvés en son hôtel parisien en 1483,” in *La Splendeur des Rolin*, 247–254.
 50. Joseph Toussaint, *Les relations diplomatiques de Philippe le Bon avec le Concile de Bâle (1431–1449)* (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’université, 1942), 254–258, 249, and esp. 151–152.

51. Guyot-Bachy, "L'inventaire," 253, note 40: his library seems to have included a copy of Capistrano's *Vita* of San Bernardino da Siena.
52. Georges Bourgin, "Les cardinaux français et le Diaire caméral de 1439–1486," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome* 24 (1904): 277–319, at 287, and see 289–290 for Rolin's arrival at Rome.
53. Berthier and Sweeney, *Le chancelier Rolin*, 289–294, 300–302. For the ways in which the cultural tone at the Burgundian court looked favorably on crusade, see Armand Grunzweig, "Philippe le Bon et Constantinople," *Byzantion* 24 (1954): 47–61; *Le Banquet du faisan: 1454 – l'Occident face au défi de l'Empire ottoman*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Caron and Denis Clauzel (Arras: Artois Presses Université, 1997); Jean Devaux, "Le Saint Voyage de Turquie: croisade et propagande à la cour de Philippe le Bon (1463–1464)," in *À l'heure encore de mon écrire: Aspects de la littérature de Bourgogne sous Philippe le Bon et Charles le Téméraire*, ed. Claude Thiry (Louvain: Les Lettres Romaines, 1997), 53–70; Marie-Thérèse Caron, *Les vœux du faisan, noblesse en fête, esprit de croisade: le manuscrit français 11594 de la Bibliothèque nationale de France* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003); Kelly R. DeVries, "The Failure of Philip the Good to Fulfill His Crusade Promise of 1454," in *The Medieval Crusade*, ed. Susan J. Ridyard (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), 157–170; Rima Devereaux, "Reconstructing Byzantine Constantinople: Intercession and Illumination at the Court of Philippe le Bon," *French Studies* 59 (2005): 297–310; David Joseph Wrisley, "The Loss of Constantinople and Imagining Crusade at the Fifteenth-Century Court of Burgundy," *Al-Abhath* 55 (2007–08): 81–115.
54. Heribert Müller, *Kreuzzugspläne und Kreuzzugspolitik des Herzogs Philipp des Guten von Burgund* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 82 and note 4.
55. Jacques Paviot, *Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l'Orient (fin XIV^e siècle–XV^e siècle)* (Paris: Sorbonne, 2003), 146–147.
56. For Rolin's presence at the Congress of Mantua in 1459–1460, see Bourgin, "Les cardinaux français," 293; *Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy*, ed. G. Du Fresne de Beaucourt, vol. 2 (Paris: Renouard, 1863), 386–391; Paviot, *Les ducs*, 155.
57. Henri Stein, "Un diplomate bourguignon du XV^e siècle: Antoine Haneron," *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 98 (1937): 283–348,

- at 315–16. The document was sealed by the Pope in the presence of “*très reverendz peres en Dieu messieurs les cardinaulx de [N]icene, de Rouen, des Ursins, d’Ostun, d’Avignon, de Boulongne et de Zamorensis,*” that is, Bessarion, d’Estouteville, Orsini, Jean Rolin, Alain de Coëtivy, Filippo Calandini and Jean de Mella.
58. Paviot, *Les ducs*, 174.
 59. *Ibid.*, 184; this personalized letter must have accompanied the general one sent on August 25, 1470 by Paul II to all the Catholic powers to announce the fall of Negroponte: Ludwig von Pastor, *The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages*, vol. 4 (London: Trübner, 1900), 178.
 60. Richard J. Walsh, “Charles the Bold and the Crusade: Politics and Propaganda,” *Journal of Medieval History* 3 (1977): 53–86; Paviot, *Les ducs*, 184–185, 336–337; Müller, *Kreuzzugspläne*, 126–133 (“Ausblick: Karl der Kühne und der Kreuzzug”).
 61. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:261–263.
 62. Lowry, “Diplomacy,” 126. The Veneto-Burgundian alliance explains why the work of Coriolano Cippico (1425–1493), *Mocenici imperatoris gestorum libri III*, Venetiis, per B. Pictorem et E. Ratdolt de Augusta, 1477, in-4°, praising the great achievements of the Venetian fleet in the East in 1472–1473, was dedicated to Marcantonio Morosini, Venice’s ambassador to Burgundy.
 63. Walsh, “Charles the Bold,” 57–58. On this occasion, the ambassador Guillaume de Rochefort delivered before the Venetian senate an oration excusing Charles the Bold for not honoring the long-standing alliance on the grounds that his crusading projects were being impeded by the coalition which the kings of France and England had formed against him: Lowry, “Diplomacy,” 131.
 64. For Venice’s links with early printing, see Martin Lowry, *Power, Print, and Profit: Nicholas Jenson and the Rise of Venetian Publishing in Renaissance Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Uhlendorf, “The Invention of Printing,” 218–220.
 65. Cf. Monfasani, “Bessarion *Latinus*,” 181, specifying only “before the year [1471] was out”; Meserve, “News from Negroponte,” 469, Carbone “had the whole collection printed by Valdarfer before the end of 1471.” Meserve added (*ibid.*, note 107) that “Bessarion seems to have had nothing to do with its publication.”
 66. Lowry, *Power, Print, and Profit*, 61–62; Martin Lowry, “Cristoforo Valdarfer tra politici veneziani e cortigiani estensi,” in *Il Libro a*

- Corte*, ed. Amedeo Quondam (Rome: Bulzoni, 1994), 273–284, at 280–281. For Borso d’Este, see *DBI*, 13:134–143.
67. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, 4:189–91.
 68. *Ibid.*, 199–201. Borso d’Este had been granted the title of Duke of Ferrara by Paul II on April 14, 1471, with a sumptuous ceremony of investiture: *ibid.*, 183–188. Dating from before Borso’s death, the publication of the *Orations* cannot be considered, as it was by Lowry, in connection with the threat of civil war which seemed imminent between Borso’s nephew Niccolò and the deceased duke’s brother, Ercole. The only major competition which preceded Borso’s death was the papal election of 1471.
 69. See in general Marino Zorzi, “Bessarione e Venezia,” in *Bessarione e l’umanesimo*, 197–228; and in particular Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 1:418; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:312–313: as soon as the Venetian Senate heard the news of Paul II’s death, it put similar pressure on Federico da Montefeltro, the Duke of Urbino, as well as on the college of cardinals, in the latter case by means of letters sent by special envoy. We should not underestimate the influence that could be exerted by the Italian powers on the Roman *curia*: according to Pastor, *History*, 4:201–204, the duke of Milan’s ambassador played a crucial role in securing the election of Francesco della Rovere (Sixtus IV).
 70. It is worth noting that Ludovico Carbone’s preface seems to imply this. Meserve, “News from Negroponte,” 469 accepts this idea: “[Carbone] received a *manuscript copy* of the cardinal’s orations in the late 1470.”
 71. Claudin, *The First Paris Press*, 9 and 39, note 36.
 72. *Cent-dix lettres*, no. 30, p. 287: “Ille [Bessario] superioribus mensibus, lucubrationes quas christianae salutis causa per Italiam edidisset, ad me diligenter in Gallias misit, litteratorieque mandavit ut principibus et aliis qui christianis prodesse, obesse Turco precibus armisve possint, earum foret legendarum opera mea potestas.”
 73. Jakob Reissermayer, *Der grosse Christentag zu Regensburg 1471*, 2 vols (Regensburg: Demmler, 1887–1888) and the monumental edition of the diet’s acts: *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III. Abt. 8. 1. Hälfte, 1468–1470*, ed. Ingeborg Most-Kolbe; *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III. Abt. 8. 2. Hälfte, 1471*, ed. Helmut Wolff; *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter*

- Kaiser Friedrich III. Abt. 8. 1468–1471: Verzeichnisse und Register*, ed. Gabriele Annas and Helmut Wolff (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973, 1999, 2001) [DRA 22/1, 22/2, 22/Register].
74. DRA, 22/2, no. 91, pp. 309–310. Also sent to the pope, the kings of Denmark and Hungary, archbishops, bishops, prince-electors and others, counts and Imperial towns (including the Swiss cantons).
 75. Émile Toutey, *Charles le Téméraire et la Ligue de Constance* (Paris: Hachette, 1902), 34–36.
 76. For the significance of the Ottoman question in the discussions of the fifteenth-century Imperial diets, see Johannes Helmrath, “The German *Reichstage* and the Crusade,” in *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Housley, 53–89, 191–203.
 77. For ties of friendship between the future Pius III and the closest collaborators of his uncle Pius II, the cardinals Nicholas of Cusa and Bessarion, see above all Alfred A. Strnad, “F. Todeschini-Piccolomini. Politik und Mäzenatentum im Quattrocento,” *Römische Historische Mitteilungen* 8/9 (1964/1965–1965/1966): 101–425, at 81ff.
 78. Flavio Di Bernardo, *Un Vescovo umanista alla Corte Pontificia: Giannantonio Campano, 1429–1477* (Rome: Università Gregoriana, 1975), 200–206: relations between Campano and Bessarion seem to date from the Congress of Mantua, but they acquired particular momentum between 1468 and 1471, with the former’s participation in the initial activities of the *Accademia Bessarionea*. For Campano at Regensburg, see *ibid.*, 244–292.
 79. Giovanni degli Agostini, *Notizie istorico-critiche intorno la vita et le opere degli scrittori veneziani*, vol. 2 (Venice: Simone Occhi, 1754), 179–188; Margaret L. King, *Venetian Humanism in an Age of Patrician Dominance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 412–413.
 80. Maria Papanicolau, “Chi erà il *Likenkiatos* della epistola 10 di Teodoro Gaza? (Profilo biografico di Narciso da Berdún),” in *Pan. Studi del Dipartimento di Civiltà Euro-Mediterranee e di Studi Classici, Cristiani, Bizantini, Medievali, Umanistici* 22 (2004): 351–386.
 81. Karl Nehring, *Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friederich III. und das Reich. Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1975), 52–53.

82. *DRA*, 22/2, 680. For the inclusion of *Baltassar da Piscia presbyter Lucane diocesis decretorum doctor* in Bessarion's *familia*, see the list discovered and published by Concetta Bianca, *Da Bisanzio a Roma. Studi sul cardinale Bessarione* (Rome: Roma nel Rinascimento, 1999), 169–172, where he appears at the top of the list. The monk *Bissarion de Malvitiis, clericus bononiensis*, the dedicatee of the first *Oration* in the anti-Ottoman corpus, also appears on the list, at no. 67.
83. Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 1:292–303; Erich Meuthen, “Zum Itinerar der deutschen Legation Bessarions (1460–1461),” *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 37 (1957): 328–333; Setton, *Papacy*, 2:216–218; Claudia Märzl, “Kardinal Bessarion als Legat im Deutschen Reich (1460/1461),” in “*Inter graecos latinissimus*,” 151–166.
84. Alfred A. Strnad, “Bessarion verstand auch Deutsch. Zur Sprachenkenntnis des griechischen Kardinals,” in *Römische Kurie, kirchliche Finanzen, Vatikanisches Archiv. Studien zu Ehren von Hermann Hoberg*, ed. Erwin Gatz, vol. 2 (Rome: Università Gregoriana, 1979), 869–881.
85. The image is reproduced by F. Lollini, “L'iconografia di Bessarione: *Bessarion pictus*,” in *Bessarione e l'umanesimo*, fig. 96, p. 281 (the manuscript is lost, but was Lucca, Biblioteca capitolare, cod. 427).
86. Bologna 1452: Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 1:266; the German legation: Vast, *Bessarion*, 242–254 and Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 1:292–303; Bessarion as Maximilian's godfather: Vast, *Bessarion*, 248–249.
87. *DRA*, 22/2, 359.
88. *DRA*, 22/2, no. 112, pp. 650–691. For what follows, we shall draw solely on Agostino Patrizi; more detailed accounts of the same events, in sources that reflect different viewpoints, may be found in the critical edition.
89. *Ibid.*, 652.
90. *Ibid.*, 653. Giannantonio Campano, who records the Burgundian complaints, maliciously suggested that this was no more than a pretext to avoid a more serious commitment to the crusade: Di Bernardo, *Un Vescovo umanista*, 272–273.
91. *DRA*, 22/2, 684.
92. *Ibid.*, no. 127 a–b, pp. 867–877: decree of Frederick III, in German and Latin.

93. Ibid., no. 127 f, pp. 881–885.
94. For practical arrangements, see *ibid.*, the dossier *Turkensache*, 770–819.
95. Ibid., 682.
96. Ibid., 683: “expeditionem in Turchos non esse decretam a Paulo tantum, sed a sacro ecclesiae cardinalium senatu,” the result being that “nullum futurum pontificem, qui huic expeditioni non sit ardentissimus, apostolicae sedis decreto inconcussa ac firma esse, ardor vero pontificum ad tutandam religionem omnium par et augeri foverique a sacro senato.” The implications of this distinction between the roles of the pope and the college of cardinals in organizing a crusade are discussed in Mureşan, “La croisade en projets,” *passim*.
97. *DRA*, 22/2, 686–687.
98. Johannes Antonius Campanus, *Opera* (Rome: Eucharius Silber, 1495), 192–202.
99. Vast, *Bessarion*, 393–394.
100. Letters published in the sixth book of Campano’s epistolary: Campanus, *Opera*, 360–375.
101. Ibid., 371: “Principes Pontificem cupiunt huius tantae expeditionis studiosum, te omnes venerantur, in eoque spem postremam reponunt.”
102. Ibid., 371–372; translated and slightly modified in Vast, *Bessarion*, 396–397; *DRA*, 22/2, 699. It is clear that these references were bound to be omitted in Todeschini’s report. His was an official report for the eyes of Sixtus IV and it would have been indelicate to recall the high esteem enjoyed by his former rival Bessarion.
103. Anne Basanoff, “L’emploi du papier à l’Université de Paris (1430–1473),” *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et de Renaissance* 26 (1964): 305–325, at 319–321.
104. Following the estimate of Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 538 with note 41, 540, with a description of all the known examples at 575–586; she corrects the estimate previously given by Saffrey, “Description,” 224.
105. Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 577–578, no. 2; Otto Mazal and Konstanze Mittendorfer, *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Inkunabelkatalog, ÖNB-Ink*, Band I, A–B, (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2004), 470–471, no. B-314: Österreichische

- Nationalbibliothek, Ink. III H 12. See also the letter in the copy kept by Fichet: *Cent-dix lettres*, 257–260.
106. Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 577–579, no. 3: Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Inc. IV 139 (dedicatory letter of January 21, 1472): and see the letter published by Legrand, *Cent-dix lettres*, no. 19, pp. 268–270.
 107. Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 582, no. 10: Halle, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, Ink. A 80 (with a copy of the letter to Emperor Frederick III); Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 585, no. 19: Erfurt, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha, Ink. 69 (2); Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 585–586, no. 21: Freiburg im Breisgau, Universitätsbibliothek, Ink. K. 4941 (just the prefatory letter to Frederick III).
 108. *Cent-dix lettres*, no. 17, pp. 260–262.
 109. *Ibid.*, no. 18, pp. 262–268.
 110. *Ibid.*, no. 20, pp. 270–271.
 111. Charles Fromontus, professor of law and vice-chancellor of the University of Ingolstadt, founded by Ludwig IX of Bavaria in 1472: Rainer Albert Müller, “Ludwig IX. der Reiche, Herzog von Bayern-Landshut (1450–1479) und die Gründung der Universität Ingolstadt 1472,” in *Attempto—oder wie stiftet man eine Universität*, ed. Sönke Lorenz et al. (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999), 129–145.
 112. *Cent-dix lettres*, 268–270 (letter to Ludwig of Bavaria: *XII Kalendas Februarias* (January 21); *ibid.*, 235–238.
 113. *Ibid.*, 243–250.
 114. Marianna Birnbaum, *Janus Pannonius* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti I umjetnosti, 1981), 53, 180, based on the work of J. Huszti, *Janus Pannonius* (Pécs: A Janus Pannonius Társaság Kiadása, 1931). In 1473, Ludovico Carbone printed in Hungary a *Dialogus de laudibus rebusque regis Matthiae*, edited in *Analecta monumentorum Hungariae historicorum literariorum maximum inedita*, ed. Ferenc Toldy and Geisa Érszegi (Budapest: Bibliothecae Academiae scientiarum Hungaria, 1986), 165–194; for an online version, see <http://carbo.mtak.hu/en/start.htm> (accessed November 22, 2016).
 115. Meserve, “Patronage and Propaganda,” 585, no. 20: Włocławek, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego, Inc. Qu. 685 (lacking the first pages).

116. *Cent-dix lettres*, no. 10, pp. 239–243, at 240; trans. Philippe in *Guillaume Fichet*, 105–106.
117. Paul Ourliac, “Louis XI et le Cardinal Bessarion,” in *Études d’histoire du droit médiéval*, vol. 1 (Paris: Picard, 1979), 491–505.
118. *Ibid.*, 501.
119. Richard Walsh, *Charles the Bold and Italy (1467–1477): Politics and Personnel* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005), 77–78, 80–81.
120. John B. Toews, “Pope Sixtus IV and the Empire: A Study in the Politicization of the Later Fifteenth-Century Papacy,” *Canadian Journal of History* 1 (1966): 1–21.
121. Larry Silver, *Marketing Maximilian: The Visual Ideology of a Holy Roman Emperor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 109–145.
122. Carl Göllner, *Turcica: die Europäischen Türkendrucke des XVI Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1 (1501–1550), vol. 2 (1551–1600), vol. 3 *Die Türkenfrage in der öffentlichen Meinung Europas im XVI Jahrhunderts* (Bucharest–Berlin–Baden-Baden, 1961–1978 [new edn, Baden-Baden, 1994]).
123. Mureşan, “La croisade en projets,” 274–281; see also the concluding remarks of Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat*, 211–216.
124. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:379–380 (esp. note 53). Apparently, he was unaware that Ernst Steinmann, *Die Sixtinische Kapelle, I: Bau und Schmuck der Kapelle unter Sixtus IV* (München: Bruckman, 1901), 441–448 had made the same identification. See lastly on the topic Marco Bonechi, “Four Sistine Ethiopians? The 1481 Ethiopian Embassy and the Frescoes of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican,” *Aethiopica* 14 (2011), 121–135; Gianfranco Fiaccadori, “A Marginal Note to ‘Four Sistine Ethiopians?’,” *Aethiopica* 14 (2011): 136–144.

Hunyadi's Campaign of 1448 and the Second Battle of Kosovo Polje (October 17–20)

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An article recently published in the *Slavonic and East European Review* looks set to stimulate discussion about Hunyadi's campaign against the Turks in 1448 and its culminating event, the Second Battle of Kosovo Polje (Campus Merularum, Rigómezö, Câmpia Mierlei, Amselfeld).¹ The author gives an English translation of the report which Pascal de Sorgo composed in Hunyadi's camp at Subotica on 11 September 1448. First brought to light by the Serbian researcher Mita Kostič, the report was analyzed by Nicolae Iorga and the Ottomanist Aurel Decei.² Have historians appreciated the text to the full? This new account by a British researcher opens up a number of aspects which must be taken into consideration³ if we are to evaluate to the fullest extent the range of sources relating to this campaign and the bibliography which it has generated.

Pascal de Sorgo was a privileged witness and he provides invaluable information about the ethnic composition, organization and equipment of the crusading force. It is clear that works which fail to take it into account, following the publications of Mita Kostič and Nicolae Iorga—the latter

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writing in French⁴—lose value by neglecting it.⁵ And the older studies suffer from a further defect.⁶ They exaggerate Ottoman strength to such an extent that their conclusions become invalid. Military historians who have not studied the classic works of Hans Delbrück or Ferdinand Lot are invariably handicapped by reproducing the overlarge estimates offered by the chroniclers. Delbrück showed that a movement carried out easily by a force of 1,000 men would have been a difficult task for 10,000, an even trickier one for 50,000 and an outright impossibility for 100,000.⁷ As for the contributions of Turkish scholars, who pay particular attention to data provided by their own chroniclers,⁸ they tend to reflect the victor's perspective.⁹ Understanding Kosovo Polje calls for precision: the sources are contradictory and they demand a highly critical method, while the issues surrounding the forces which fought and the exceptional duration of the fighting—which lasted for several days—constitute formidable obstacles for any historian who sets out to present an account of the military operations which is both accurate and detailed.

In Chalkokondyles' history, the events of 1448 take center stage, and this is how he explains John Hunyadi's decision to begin his campaign: "Janko began his campaign against Murad for the following reason: At the battle of Varna he had seen the Turks fleeing after coming to blows with him and then yielding, so he immediately came to the conclusion that even then it would have been easy for him to master the situation, were it not for the foolishness of King Wladislaus, and that next time it would not be difficult to overcome the enemy."¹⁰ The conditions under which Sultan Murad II's army had crossed the Strait, the quality of the troops raised to harass the Turks and the *débâcle* which overcame the Ottoman left wing during the battle after the death of the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, Karadjapacha, are well-known features.¹¹ Nonetheless, the Ottomans carried the day. On the opposing side, news of the defeat caused shock at Buda and Kraków. The two greatest powers in eastern Europe, Hungary and Poland, finally brought together to save Constantinople from Ottoman encirclement, had both lost their king, while the crusade had been shattered in a single encounter.

Hunyadi himself was under no illusions about the difficulty of the task, as we know from the comments recorded by the Burgundian knight Walerand de Wavrin on October 1, 1445 at Rahova, the Turkish fortress leveled at the time of another unsuccessful crusade, the Nicopolis campaign of 1396: "I am mindful of last year, and of how we lost our King at the Battle of Varna, along with a whole host of lords and men of Hungary.

The kingdom, nobility and people are now in my charge, and I do not wish to put them at risk because if I were struck down the kingdom would be lost. Anyone who wishes to conquer the Turks must fight them cunningly in an underhand way, because they are a crafty people.”¹² Would he later remember these words? He was chosen as regent for the kingdom during the minority of Ladislas the Posthumous at the diet convened at Rákos in June 1446. Once his domestic position was strengthened by the armistice agreed with Frederick III on June 2, 1447, Hunyadi speeded up preparations for a new campaign.¹³ To gain access to the funds needed to hire mercenaries, he had asked Venice for its help.¹⁴ But the Serenissima had concluded an advantageous peace with the Ottomans in February 1446 and hoped to use their support against George Castriota Skanderbeg, who was threatening their bases at Dagno (Danj, Danja) and Durazzo.¹⁵ The only crowned head in Catholic Europe who had committed himself to fund the war against the Turks was Alfonso V “the Magnanimous,” King of Aragon and Naples. And Alfonso was far from being disinterested: as heir to Joan II of Naples, he claimed to be King of Hungary. Constantin Marinescu gave a detailed account of the negotiations which led to the Aragonese ratification of the Treaty of Casoli on November 6–7, 1447. Hunyadi guaranteed Alfonso the throne of Hungary in exchange for 100,000 florins, the sum needed to pay 16,000 mercenaries. Following the death of Filippo Maria Visconti, a war of succession for the duchy of Milan had broken out in August 1447. Together with the proclamation of the Ambrosian Republic, this distracted Alfonso V from the crusade, for he had to provide military help on land and at sea against Venice and Florence.¹⁶ Still, on 3 September 1448, the king wrote to Hunyadi assuring him of his support and encouraging him to embark on hostilities.¹⁷

The text of the Treaty of Casoli provides details of the military force which Hunyadi envisaged as necessary to defeat the sultan’s armies in a pitched battle: 16,000 combatants comprising the contingents of the Hungarian army and a further 16,000 paid by the king of Aragon, “and in addition to all these people he will lead 10,000 men from Wallachia free of charge. So the Christian army will without doubt comprise 42,000 men.”¹⁸ Several clauses directly relate to Serbia and Wallachia, though their suzerain princes were not consulted. Caught between the Ottoman anvil and the Hungarian hammer, it was a matter of survival for them to play the one off against the other, a balancing act between the dictates of their dual vassal status. These were the politics of the seesaw, keenly practiced by George Branković, above all through appropriate marriage

alliances (such as those of Mara and Catherine Branković in 1435) and through a scrupulous respect for treaties, at the cost of appearing highly dubious in Catholic eyes. In Hunyadi's opinion, freedom from "Ottoman servitude" carried a price, which was the 100,000 florins lent by the king of Aragon. For the repayment of this money would become Branković's responsibility: "that once this has been carried out in the first year, the king will receive the said money, which he is contributing, from the lord despot of Serbia!"¹⁹

Wallachia's situation seemed more complex and developments there would undoubtedly shape the position ultimately assumed by the despot. The fate of Vlad Dracul, who was killed by Hunyadi's men, had been settled well before the Aragonese ratification of the Treaty of Casoli,²⁰ otherwise how can we explain the presence of 10,000 Wallachian troops mentioned in the text as being at the heart of the projected crusading army? Hunyadi had attacked Wallachia by surprise, a campaign which took place between November 23 and December 4, 1447.²¹ It was not only the peace reached with the Ottomans, several months beforehand, which had brought about Vlad Dracul's fall, but also the fact that he had sealed off his country to Hungarian specie.²² Since January 1448, Wallachia had been ruled by Vladislav II Basarab (the son of Dan II), the prince who fought at Kosovo Polje at the head of the Wallachian contingent.²³

Hunyadi's intervention in Wallachia was followed, between the end of February and the beginning of April 1448, by another expedition, this time to neighboring Moldavia. The troops were commanded by Csopor de Monoszló, a Croatian noble in the regent's pay, and they restored to the Moldavian throne Peter II (1447; 1448–1449), a cadet son of the late Alexander the Good, who had married one of Hunyadi's sisters. The new prince ceded to his protector the fortress of Chilia (Kilia, Kili),²⁴ which Bayezid II would famously describe as "the key and the gate to the whole of Moldavia, Hungary and the Danube."²⁵ At last, Hunyadi had in his control a port-city which he might use without difficulty to reach Constantinople, but the crusader fleet which had fought in the area in 1444–1445 was no longer there. Hunyadi lacked the naval arm which was vital to support another land-based offensive in the direction of the lower Danube and the Black Sea coast, the route followed by the Varna crusade. On the other hand, the army was just starting to assemble in the region of Timisoara, without as yet having a well-defined strategic objective apart from an incursion into Serbian territory.

Henceforth, the initiative belonged to the other side. Toward the end of spring 1448, Murad II led an expedition into Albanian territory against Skanderbeg, Alfonso V's ally in his war against Venice, whose troops had in the past inflicted many defeats on Ottoman armies. Murad was aware of the strategic possibilities which the seizure of Chilia opened up for Hunyadi, and had put in place a diversionary operation to secure his rear bases. A short Byzantine chronicle, written before 1453, tells us that the Ottoman fleet had attacked the "new port" of Kontoskalion at Constantinople on the feast day of Peter and Paul (June 29). Encountering strong resistance, this fleet proceeded northward into the Black Sea, to take the fortress of *Kellion*, identified by Matei Cazacu and Petre Ștefan Năsturel as Chilia. The move failed²⁶ and the offensive on the Albanian front achieved little more. We may deduce that the "ancient alliance" formed between Hunyadi and Skanderbeg in 1440, and renewed in the spring of 1448,²⁷ was already beginning to yield benefits! After capturing Kodjadjik in Macedonia, the Ottoman army was about to lay siege to the Albanian fortress of Croia (Krujë). Informed of the military preparations proceeding in the banate, the sultan ordered a retreat before August 24.²⁸

The army was assembling at Kovin (Köve Cuvin) on the banks of the Danube,²⁹ and it was from here that Hunyadi wrote on September 8 to Pope Nicholas V that he could no longer delay the campaign and that he had been misled by the fruitless promises of the Catholic powers.³⁰ The regent's urgency had finally stirred the pope into action and right up to the last moment, he had tried to mobilize men and resources for the war against the Turks. On April 8, 1448—late in the day, it must be said—the papal bull *Admonet nos ille* proclaimed a crusade "in aid of the faith"; the sums raised from the sale of indulgences were intended for the hiring of mercenaries.³¹ For his part, Hunyadi saw things differently: the armistice concluded with Frederick III would expire in June 1449; winter was approaching and he did not favor dismissing an army that was ready to march to engage an enemy thought to be already beaten, thanks to the setback on the Albanian front. Hunyadi's reply to Nicholas has the ring of a political testament: "men show more hope and more courage when they attack than when they defend ... I would prefer to die amid the clash of armor and weaponry than to watch from afar the suffering of our people, being confident of glory if people praise my good luck as one who loyally conquers or bravely perishes."³²

Two days later, on September 10, the soldiers crossed the Danube, setting up camp on the opposite bank at Subotica, an extensive plain lying

between the fortified town of Smederevo (Szendrő, Semendire), the residence of the despot of Serbia, and the mouth of the Morava. This we learn from the letter of Pascal de Sorgo, composed on September 11 and sent to his Sicilian friend Nicholas Ansalo, who was living at Arta.³³

This impressive assembly of men and military equipment was perhaps the finest army which the regent of the kingdom of Hungary had commanded in the entire course of his career in arms:³⁴

I can scarcely think of another army better in its array and, in our time, more heavily armed to have existed. And for the setting up of camp safely and well, a wagon, together with those which are in the tabur [*in tabaro*] (that is, five in number, of which each wagon has six horses to drive and govern, and three men: these wagons [are known] by the name tabur), is encamped, and they are arranged over a space of four miles in order to surround the army and to protect it in a beautiful formation.³⁵

An anonymous account written at Constantinople on December 7, 1448 and discovered by Nicolae Iorga in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* mentions the “seven to eight hundred wagons tied together with chains, in which the said *Blanc* and his host sleep every night, and these wagons are called *vaghembours*, and they contain a multitude of cannon (*veuglaires*) and culverins (*colouvrrines*). And in this way the said *Blanc* and his host crossed the river Danube.”³⁶ For his part, Chalkokondyles estimated that Hunyadi had at his disposal around “two thousand wagons with supplies and weapons. On each wagon were two infantrymen, a regular soldier and an artilleryman. The wagons also carried a large number of cannons called *zarobotane*. They had prepared for war in that way and had crossed the Danube.”³⁷ The two editions of Blaise de Vigenère, from 1577 and 1585, must have circulated in Parisian intellectual *milieus* because Montaigne too praised the tactical usefulness of the *tabor*.³⁸

It is hard to estimate the number of wagons which made up the *tabor*, because the only figure that we have is the one given by the anonymous of Constantinople.³⁹ In Pascal de Sorgo’s account, each team comprises three combatants, while in Chalkokondyles, we find just two: a marksman and a man armed with a shield.⁴⁰ Presumably this was a long Hussite shield, the *pavéza* (from which are derived the German *pfafesen*, the Polish *pawez*, *pawezà*, and the Romanian *pavăză*).⁴¹

The patrician of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) uses the word *scopiectae* (in the plural) to describe three firearms of different caliber: “those bombards

which are called *scopiectae*, the 300 largest of which discharge heavy missiles of lead and iron, and the smaller 300 of which are used to drive lead and iron pellets 20 *stadia* and further; and other very small *scopiectae*, of which around 1000 are carried.” It is a confused passage. Mark Whelan is right when he tries to give us the correct form, the Venetian *schiopetto* (singular)⁴² and the Italian *schioppo* (*schioppi*). The heaviest piece seems to correspond to a small field cannon, the *zarabotana* described by Chalkokondyles,⁴³ equivalent to the Hussite *tarasnice*, the Italian *cerbotana* and the German *Blasrohr*. The other two firearms fall into the category of *bombardae manualis*, *pixides manuales* or *haquebuttes*. Among the Hussites, this meant the *hakovnice* and its lighter counterpart, the *ručnice* (in Polish *rusznica*).⁴⁴ On the other hand, we possess no information about the heavier field pieces, the *bombardae parvae*, the *houfnice* of the Hussites (in German *Haufnitze*, *Haubitze*, Polish *hufnice* or *hufnicza*).⁴⁵ However, they are mentioned by Chalkokondyles as present during the attack directed by Hunyadi during the night of October 18–19 against position held by the *kapukulu*, during which encounter the *yeniçeri* (janisaries) fought courageously.⁴⁶

Pascal de Sorgo offers this summary of the infantry: “the foot-soldiers, armed with various weapons, number 15,000 lances. All the foot-soldiers [have been] armed with long spears, *stamberchini* throwing weapons, great shields, and each one having a stake the length of a man’s height, which can be secured in the ground at leisure.”⁴⁷ In his treatise on the art of war, the *Strategicon adversum Turcos*, Lampo Birago is very precise on this type of crossbowman:

It is important that all the crossbows be of good quality and robust, either made of wood—which are held to be the best—or of iron, which have the advantage of not losing their force at impact even when they remain wound up for a long time, or indeed of horn, which the Germans call *stabcchine* and which they use with great dexterity on horseback.⁴⁸

Just like the English archers, armed with the formidable longbow, the crossbowmen of the crusading army used stakes to protect themselves in open terrain against cavalry. The German and Czech mercenaries are mentioned by Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini: “he had hired many Germans and Bohemians.”⁴⁹ The Czechs figure too in the account given by Długosz, the one attributed to the Venetian Stefano Magno, as well as in the Ottoman chroniclers.⁵⁰ There were Poles too, a contingent sent by the

king, Casimir IV Jagiello, “from Poland another 3,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry.”⁵¹

The cavalry, heavy (*equites gravis armaturae, bitaxides*) and light (*vexillarii equites, hippobalistae*),⁵² the cutting edge of the crusader forces, originated in three systems of recruitment: the *banderías* (the contingents of the nobility), the *generalis exercitus* (the general levy of the lesser nobility) and the *militia portalis*. We know that 8,000 mounted men were “levied from many and divers regions of Hungary, whom the people of Hungary furnish with pay and provisions.”⁵³ Bonfinius describes how “numerous nobles took the field.”⁵⁴ Amongst the magnates of the nobles of the kingdom who took part in the campaign, we should note the presence of János of Zredna, Bishop of Nagyvárad (Oradea); Imre Pelsőczy Bebek, the governor (*voivode*) of Transylvania (1446–1448) with his cousin László (Ladislás); the Grand Bailiff Imre Marcali; Rajnáld Rozgonyi, the Count (*ispán*) of the Székelys (1449–1453) and Grand Treasurer (1470–1471); Tamás Szécsi, brother of Cardinal Dénes, the queen’s treasurer (1438–1442) and the Castellan of Komárom; Franko Tallóczy, the governor (*ban*) of Croatia; the brothers István (Stephen) and Nicholas Bánffy of Alsólendva (Donja Lendava), Lords of Zala; Benedek Losonczy (of Lučenec), one of the great magnates of Transylvania; the two brothers-in-law of Hunyadi, his “right arm” Michael Szilágyi and János Székely of Szentgyörgy, the governor of Slovenia;⁵⁵ and Cristoforo Garatoni, papal nuncio and former Bishop of Coron. Garatoni had played a decisive role in the preparation of the *longum bellum* of 1443, and he led numerous crusaders and volunteers who enlisted for the campaign.⁵⁶

At the side of “many nobles of Hungary, and the sons of nobles,” we find “many strong and great princes of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, of whom it would be tiresome to relate in words the nature of their magnificent equipment.”⁵⁷ The majority of the military nobility who supported Hunyadi came from Transylvania, Maramureş and Banat; they were his followers and vassals (*familiares*), in particular the *cnézes* (*kenéz*), the Romanian noble elite from whose ranks Hunyadi himself sprang. Many of them had distinguished themselves in warfare against the Ottomans since the days of Sigismund, gaining thereby lands and other privileges. Their substantial representation in Hunyadi’s campaigns is solidly evidenced in the period’s documentary sources and he invariably rewarded them according to their merits and devotion.⁵⁸ Armed with double-edged swords, spears and shields, they were protected by coats of mail over which they wore leather surcoats, reinforced by mail gussets

(breastplates). Evolving from mounted standard-bearers (*vexillarii equites*), their main tactical role was to counter the mounted *sipahis* from the sultan's European (sc. Rumelian) and Anatolian provinces. During the battle, at a critical point in the engagement, when Hunyadi was thrown to the ground, the *kenéz* Todor (Theodore), from the county of Hunyad (Hunedoara), protected the regent with his body while offering him his horse.⁵⁹

Pascal de Sorigo is precise on the number of combatants who came from Moldavia and Wallachia: "Also from Moldavia, 3,000 cavalry levied from the best class and excellently equipped with weapons. In addition to them, the Prince of the Wlachs himself followed with an army of 4,000 archers, and others, from the same place, following of their own free will."⁶⁰

In the translation of Chalkokondyles provided by Vasile Grecu, reference is made to 8,000 "Dacians" (*Daces*), an archaizing word used by this Byzantine chronicler to denote Wallachians.⁶¹ The estimate is close to that given by the patrician of Ragusa: "if we include both the Moldavians and the Wallachians."⁶² Like other writers unfamiliar with Pascal de Sorigo's account, Tamás Pálosfalvi thinks that the figure applies only to combatants who originated in the principality of Wallachia.⁶³ They were mounted archers who fought in the traditional manner. We cannot say the same about the Moldavians, because we possess no additional information on the way in which they were armed.⁶⁴

How large was the army assembled by Hunyadi on the plain of Subotica? Estimates varied. Bonfinius: "once help from the Wallachians had arrived, he led an army 22,000 strong"; Thuróczi: "But with 24,000 combatants or a little more, the Hungarians were too few"; the anonymous of Constantinople: "a number reaching 40,000 men, foot and horse, from Hungary and Poland, Wallachia, and other lands"; Stefano Magno: "45,000 men, of whom 10,000 cavalry came from the king of the Romans, 5,000 from the count of Cilli, 2000 'Wallachians' and 2,000 Bohemians"; Chalkokondyles: "The Hungarians and Wallachians were, altogether, forty thousand men plus seven thousand cavalry"; Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini: "John's army was 70,000 strong, while that of the Turks numbered 200,000"; Pascal de Sorigo: "this brought the total number of men in the army up to 72,000."⁶⁵ The majority of those who have studied the campaign have supported the figure of 24,000 men suggested by Thuróczi,⁶⁶ but we should give equal credence to Tamás Pálosfalvi's estimate of around 30,000 combatants,⁶⁷ as Aurel Decei proposed.⁶⁸ According to Pascal de Sorigo, "regarding the army which will

move through Serbia the Despot ... is clearly worried.”⁶⁹ Given that we are dealing with a crusade which had been hastily engaged in, it remains the case that mobilization appears to have been better managed than in the case of the *longum bellum* of 1443. On that occasion, the army raised to attack the Ottoman dominions had reached around 35,000 combatants, including the Serbian contingent.⁷⁰ It was also better managed than the campaign of 1444, when disaster overwhelmed “an enterprise conceived on a vast scale and conducted, to a certain point, by pan-Christian collaboration.”⁷¹

But one essential tactical element was, numerically, cruelly lacking in this impressive force. This was the mounted soldier capable of firing an arrow at the gallop, with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of 100 meters.⁷² It was an equestrian maneuver at which the *sipahis* both from Rumelia and from Anatolia, as well as the *akıncı* (*akındjis*),⁷³ were experts thanks to ceaseless practice. The Ottoman *sipahi* was superbly versatile on the battlefield and in this respect had no rival in Christian Europe until the arrival of the winged Polish hussar. We can view him in full splendor in the Musée des Invalides in Paris, photographed by Professor Nicoară Beldiceanu in a work dedicated to his armor.⁷⁴ With disconcerting dexterity, he wielded the *gönder* and above all the *kılıç*, a saber that slashed rather than cutting with its blade, and in the blink of an eye severed helmets, breastplates, heads and other body parts.⁷⁵

In the region of Philippopolis (Plovdiv), where he had fallen back with the bulk of his troops, Murad II awaited the beginning of the enemy offensive. As at other difficult points in his reign, he rose to the challenge and displayed a remarkable grasp of strategy.⁷⁶ Spies were dispatched to observe enemy movements, among them the *martolos* Dogan mentioned in the Ottoman chronicles.⁷⁷ The same sources tell us about the breadth of Murad’s military preparations, while the Venetian courier sent from Constantinople on October 13 reported that “every day there pass from Turkey into Greece Turks young and old and of every condition, gathered together and making their way towards him.”⁷⁸ The *azab*, infantry (*yaya*), *sipahis* from Rumelia and Anatolia, and a body several thousand strong of *akındjis*⁷⁹ made up the reinforcements. By virtue of a treaty concluded in 1444 with Murad II, a detachment of cavalry, presumably *yürük*, had been sent by the emir of Karaman (the *Karamanoglu*).⁸⁰ The sultan’s personal army, (the *kapukulu ocakları*), the backbone of the Ottoman battle formation,⁸¹ was equipped with an imposing quantity of field artillery. As for portable firearms, the *bombardae manualis, fistulae, sclopetae*, described at

Varna in 1444, they were evenly distributed among the companies of janissaries, the sultan's elite infantry. Introduced, according to Paul Wittek, in the period 1440–1443, their fundamental and definitive adoption took place slowly and incrementally over the course of the fifteenth century.⁸²

The study of this process of technological acculturation was advanced by Stephen Christensen and Gábor Ágoston,⁸³ and treatment of it would be incomplete without touching on the problem surrounding the Ottoman adoption of the *tábor*, the *tábur çengi* of the sultan's *kapukulu* troops. War chariots sheltering field artillery, *top'arabaları* (“chariots,” or “coaches with cannon”),⁸⁴ as they are described in the chronicle of Orujd bin Adil, formed part of the Ottoman defensive disposition on the day of the battle,⁸⁵ a crucially important detail first noted by Colin Imber:

When the Hungarians again encountered the Ottomans at the second battle of Kosovo in 1448, they found that the sultan had drawn up his ranks behind a “castle-like” fortification of carts and spiked shields, which the Janissaires defended with guns. Once the Ottoman army had begun to use this tactic, the Hungarians no longer enjoyed a strategic advantage, and the outcome of the battle was a decisive Ottoman victory.⁸⁶

While some writers have agreed with the viewpoint set out by the British Ottomanist,⁸⁷ others have evinced skepticism about the employment of this defensive tactic: “it was not yet the Hungarian-style wagon laager that the Ottomans employed.”⁸⁸ But the presence of field artillery and firearms certainly reveals the high level of organization of the Ottoman army, as well as the extent of preparatory measures taken to oppose this new crusade. As for the size of the army reported by the *Chroniques anonymes*—between 50,000 and 60,000 combatants⁸⁹—it has been confirmed by recent historians who have studied military operations.⁹⁰ There is no need to read Folard, Jomini or Maurice of Saxony to reach the conclusion that a numerical ratio that was almost 2:1 in favor of the Ottomans was of capital importance in carrying the day in open country.

Hunyadi's campaign plan was based on the military collaboration of the Serbs. Together, the coalition forces would have had to execute a march of around 300 km across Serbia to effect a junction with Skanderbeg's troops on the plain of Kosovo. Certain commentators have concluded that the strategic goal of the campaign was to dominate Macedonia and above all to recover the port of Thessalonica, which Murad II had captured in 1430.⁹¹ But there is limited point in debating the strategy which *might*

have been pursued after a confrontation with the Ottoman army, the condition *sine qua non* for carrying on with the war. As for the offensive march in the direction of Kosovo, it was a high-risk strategy,⁹² dangerous because it took no account of the actual size of any force that Skanderbeg might muster, or of the intentions of the opposing army, or of the equivocal stance of Branković, who would play the determining role in the way in which events unfolded.

When Hunyadi summoned Branković to take part in the campaign in the summer of 1448, the despot responded by pleading the military weakness of the Serbs. We know that at this point, in August–September, his troops were fighting the Bosnians of Stjepan Tomaš for possession of Zeta and Srebrenica.⁹³ In reality, this latent animosity between the regent and “the aged despot whose remarkable personality enshrined his nation’s tormented destiny”⁹⁴ went back to the *longum bellum* of 1443.⁹⁵ It was also clear that Branković would revert to his policy of 1444 and would refuse to join forces with the crusade. It was in order to put pressure on him that Hunyadi had crossed the Danube with the bulk of army at Kovin, which was close to the Serbian capital, Smederevo.

The crusading army had arrived suddenly and unexpectedly at the frontier of a country that was Orthodox and therefore schismatic. On such occasions, it was possible for discussions to proceed without incident. In September 1444 at Nicopolis, Vlad Dracul had committed Wallachia to the crusade even if it cost the lives of his children, Vlad and Radu, whom the Turks were holding as hostages.⁹⁶ “If the King should insist on going ahead with the campaign, the Voivode promises to send him his son with his whole army, and also a pair of very powerful horses and two men who know the country and so can get him out of any tight corner.”⁹⁷ On the other hand, the struggle against the Turks, waged under the banner of a “make believe crusade,” could serve as the pretext to oust a suzerain prince and take over his country, as happened in the campaign undertaken against Moldavia in 1497 by the King of Poland, John Albert.⁹⁸

We have seen how Vlad Dracul was “thanked” by the regent for taking part in the campaign of 1444. Branković had learnt his lesson from these events and he had good reason to fear for his life. He was an unconditional supporter of Hunyadi’s foe, Ulrich of Celje (Cilli), his support resting on a solid dynastic marriage. He had his doubts about the legitimacy of the war, as it had been conceived and prepared by Hunyadi. His perspective, in the version preserved for us by Constantin Mihailović of Ostrovitza, deserves to be given due consideration.⁹⁹

Branković was so concerned about the renewal of hostilities that he tried to reconcile the two parties, all the more so as Murad II did not want a direct confrontation with the crusading army. In addition, the despot was prepared to back the strength of the Ottomans, and shied away from engaging in an adventurous line of policy.¹⁰⁰ With the goal of negotiating a favorable outcome, he had sent to the crusading camp a man he trusted, Pascal de Sorgo. In the letter addressed to Nicholas Ansalo, Pascal makes reference to the role which Branković had played during the negotiations:

the Despot [of Serbia] is openly still undecided as to whether to follow the army; I think as long as it is within his power, as long as he is able to remain neutral, he will take care to stay in the middle. I am in the army on account of this strategy, and three times already, I have acted as an orator for the pursual of this strategy (which I had not achieved to this date).¹⁰¹

For his part, Hunyadi did not want the conflict to be settled peacefully. Długosz gives us very interesting details on the negotiations, originating with the Dean of Kraków, Nicholas Łąsocki, who had previously served as envoy to Venice and Rome to request money and troops:¹⁰²

As he [Hunyadi] is preparing to cross the Danube, the Sultan, Murad, through the rulers of Serbia, sends proposals for peace, offering to liberate the whole of Bulgaria, which he and his predecessors have ruled for many years, and to pay a considerable sum. Hunyadi discusses the proposals with the Dean of Cracow, Nicholas Łąsocki, and some of the Hungarian nobles and then asks for considerably more; namely that the Turks vacate Romania and withdraw within their own bounds to Anatolia. This the Turks refuse and talks are broken off.¹⁰³

It is easy to reproach Branković for not possessing political vision and for not seeing the need to help his country escape from the threat constantly posed by Ottoman might. But could he have foreseen, at that precise moment, the decisive turn which military operations would take, and the fact that his son-in-law Murad II, once victorious, would abdicate a second time in favor of his son, the future Sultan Mehmed II? Or that this new ruler would proceed to seize Constantinople in 1453, and that in September–October 1454, Serbian forces would stand alone, facing Turkish armies flushed with success, in the same region of Kosovo, at Leskovac and Trepanja?¹⁰⁴

The talks at Smederevo delayed the start of the offensive for ten days, which provided valuable breathing space that enabled Murad II to accelerate his preparations for war. In the opposing camp, too much money, prestige and pride were at stake for any change to be made to the plan of operations. As late as September 28, when Hunyadi's army arrived near Niš (Nich) with the firm intention of seizing the town, the crusading forces were given free license to pillage and burn villages and small towns encountered on the march.¹⁰⁵ This activity so infuriated Branković that he eventually sent Pascal de Sorgo to the sultan to pass on all the information known to the despot about the marauding army. A few months later, following his defeat, Hunyadi described to the Ragusans what their fellow countryman had done, stressing that this mission on behalf of the despot of Serbia was one of the major causes of the catastrophe. As a consequence of Hunyadi's complaint, the senate at Ragusa forbade all of the town's citizens who were serving foreign rulers from acting as envoys to other powers.¹⁰⁶

According to the Ragusan chroniclers, the Serbs had blocked the mountain passes to hold up the junction between the crusaders and the Albanians.¹⁰⁷ Freed from the Ottomans, Skanderbeg had recommenced military operations against Venice, with which he had been at war since 1445 over the possession of Dagno. Faced by an attack which threatened Alessio (Lezhë), on October 4, 1448, the *Serenissima* was forced to reach peace beneath the very walls of the besieged city.¹⁰⁸ Skanderbeg had no more than 13 days to make his way "in person, with whatever army he can manage, to join forces with lord John."¹⁰⁹ In the oration which Hunyadi delivered on the eve of the battle, at least as given by Bonfinius, Skanderbeg's arrival with reinforcements was imminent: "various types of guns and munitions are on their way which they do not possess. Besides which, Skanderbeg will join us very soon with substantial help."¹¹⁰ It is certainly the case that after the defeat, it was the survivors who fled southward who stood the best chance of escape; it was here, two days later, that they met up with Skanderbeg's advance guard.¹¹¹

That said, who were the Albanian envoys who feature in Pascal de Sorgo? "Moreover, the Albanian rulers sent ambassadors to Duke János, in order to promise to assist in this expedition to the number of 20,000 armoured men, whom he politely and honourably received, and sent them back laden with gifts, since he had decided instead that the army should be refused since [it was] less fit and appropriate for war."¹¹² This cannot mean Skanderbeg, because his name does not occur in this passage in the

letter. Are we dealing with military support offered by a rival faction? The numbers are undoubtedly exaggerated, even though Hunyadi's ally still had formidable enemies amongst the Albanian nobility.¹¹³

Following the capture of Niš on September 28, the crusading army crossed the Morava, changing direction toward the south-west, and seizing first Prokuplje, then, following the course of the Toplica, the town *Kursumlija* (presumably the ancient Kursunlu-Klisse, which in Turkish means "the church of lead"). Its straggling columns of troops, weighed down by their baggage trains, must then have negotiated the pass of Jankova Klissura, a natural obstacle blocking access to the valley of the Lab. On October 15, mounted elements of the advance guard reached Pristina, the former residence of the twelfth-century princes of Serbia. South-east of this town and out of sight lay "the field of blackbirds" (*Kosovo polje*), the name bestowed on the upper valley of the Sitnica. Extending 40 km from north to south and between 14 and 17 km from east to west, it is an area dotted with hills, which barely exceed 500 m, and surrounded by mountains varying in height from 1,000 to 1,300 m.¹¹⁴ Bonfinius was precise in his identification of the locality: "Now both had reached a plain, extending far and wide in the regions of Serbia and Bulgaria alike, and which the Hungarians call Rigómezö, the Serbs Kosovo, interpreted by us as the field of blackbirds."¹¹⁵ Even today, the intriguing silhouette of a pyramid of stone can be viewed there. Those fighters who saw it learned that it was a funerary monument to Sultan Murad I, victor over the Serbs at the First Battle of Kosovo, the famous encounter which took place on the same spot on June 15, 1389.¹¹⁶

Since its assembly on the plain of Subotica, which it had left on September 21, the crusading army had traversed a distance of about 320 km, marching an average of 17 km a day.¹¹⁷ Knowing nothing about the movements of the Ottoman army, Hunyadi conjectured that it was still a long way away, somewhere near Edirne or Plovdiv. His scouts confirmed that at all events, the road to the south was free of the enemy. In reality, Murad's troops were concentrated at Sofia!¹¹⁸ It was at Sofia that the sultan received intelligence from Branković about the size of his enemy's army and the route it was taking. The Ottoman commanders could not avoid making a decision about how military operations would proceed from this point: they must firmly seize the strategic initiative and, making optimal use of their numerical superiority, force battle on the crusading army before it managed to join forces with its Albanian reinforcements.

A second decision was made at Sofia, or even earlier, when the soldiers were assembling at Plovdiv. This was the launch of a substantial strategic diversion on the lower Danube, specifically against Wallachia. The attack was entrusted to the *bey*s (lords) of the Danube frontier, in particular those of Nicopolis and Vidin. Pascal de Sorgo's report and the Ottoman chroniclers recount the armed clashes that took place in this region, at the end of August and the beginning of September, with Wallachian troops bolstered by a contingent from the Hungarian army under the command of Michael Szilágyi.¹¹⁹ These encounters attracted the attention of Matei Cazacu. In an article published in 1971, he succeeded in proving the existence of a first reign in Wallachia by Vlad the Impaler, who was placed in control in October and November 1448 by the *bey* of Nicopolis.¹²⁰ Among the documents which Cazacu used was a letter sent by Vlad on October 31 to the mayor and senators of Braşov (Corona, Kronstadt). This is a source very close to the events, in fact the closest that we still have, carrying a date just ten days after the battle.¹²¹ What a way for this man, later endowed with worldwide fame by the pen of Bram Stoker, to make his entrance on the historical scene!

The surprise of the crusade's commanders may be imagined when, in the afternoon of on Thursday October 17, there burst onto the plain of Kosovo not Albanian reinforcements, but the advance guard of the Ottoman army. Rather than trying to piece together combats which spread over four consecutive days (October 17–20), we shall confine ourselves to commenting on the most disputed episodes.

October 17: The valley of Sitnica was dominated on the river's northern shore by a sloping hill, called Plementina (height 584 m), which could be made into an excellent defensive position for the crusading army's *tabor*.¹²² Before the Ottoman advance guard had time to react, Hunyadi ordered his squadrons of light cavalry to seize hold of this key position, thereby denying the enemy access to the road which went northward to Pristina. Murad II had witnessed this maneuver and fully grasped the tactical importance of its objective. He threw his advance guard's cavalry into action. The crusader cavalry reached the plateau first and after a furious skirmish drove away the Turks. This combat between the cavalry comprised the only clash on October 17.

Daytime on October 18: In his synthesis on the art of war in the Middle Ages, the military historian Charles Oman wrote à propos of Kosovo:

The second battle of Kossovo (1448) is one of the most interesting fights from the point of view of the history of tactics. It was not—like Nicopolis or Varna or Mohacs—a wild cavalry attempt to break the Turkish line by a headlong onset. John Huniades, whom long experience had made familiar with the tactics of his enemy, endeavoured to turn against Sultan Murad a scheme of a new sort. To face the Janissaires he drew up in his centre a strong force of German and Bohemian infantry, armed with the hand-guns whose use the Hussites had introduced. The foot on both sides appear to have stockaded themselves.¹²³

This blockage at the center led to a concentration of effort on the flanks, which manifested itself as massive clashes of mounted troops. It suited the battle technique of the Ottomans as well as the tactical methods which both the *sipahis* and the *akindjis* had evolved. It was clear that Murad II would commit his mounted troops again and again, his goal being the progressive degradation of the enemy's fighting capacity. The daylight hours of October 18 were filled with clashes between the two wings of the crusader army, commanded by Benedek Losonczi (right wing) and by the brothers Bánffy and Vladislav II (left wing), and the armies of Rumelia and Anatolia.¹²⁴ The Ottoman cavalry suffered heavy losses and several times was actually overcome, but their flanks, albeit dislocated, were not destroyed. Hunyadi drew on his reserves to try to force a decision, but nightfall put an end to the clashes.¹²⁵ According to Chalkokondyles:

When the Hungarians advanced, the Turks would draw near and then flee as fast as they could in order to exhaust the pursuing horses of the Hungarians and thus render them useless. Then, when the Turks had fled a sufficient distance, they would take a stand and shoot at the horses; then they would come back against the Hungarians and kill them. For more of the Turks were mounted on far better horses and they used this technique to accomplish the most in battle, so they had the better of the Hungarians.

On the first day many of the Hungarians fell in battle, but many of the Turks were also killed by the Hungarians. Both sides fought for the whole of the day and it was a draw ... But the sultan and the Turks, for their part, had taken heart and were no longer as afraid of the Hungarians as before. Full of courage they prepared to fight the next day and rout the Hungarians.¹²⁶

The night of October 18/19: the balance sheet for October 18 (the Feast of St Luke) was not encouraging for the crusader camp. The “miracle” of Varna, where the Ottoman wings had given way before midday, had

not recurred. In the course of the council of war which was held in the evening, the regent listened to the reasoning of “Davud, the son of Savci and grandson of Murad [I], of the Ottoman family,”¹²⁷ who advised him not to delay in attacking the center of the enemy’s line, the sector held by the *kapukulu*:

We have attacked the armies of Asia and Europe enough. If we continue to turn our attention to them and do not bring the battle to Murad himself, we are laboring in vain ... I believe that we should move our entire camp, along with the wagons on which we have placed our cannons and firearms, and engage in close combat with the Porte this very night ...

Davud’s words were persuasive, and they acted accordingly. They immediately attacked the sultan’s camp with their wagons, in the first watch of the night. When they came near to the sultan’s Porte, they terrified the janissaires with their cannons and firearms and bombarded the sultan’s camp. They fought fiercely, for their part, until the crack of dawn.¹²⁸

In a dispatch sent to Nicholas Łąsocki on December 30, 1448, Hunyadi too alluded to this nocturnal fighting: “until dusk fell nobody sounded the retreat, and [while] the night that followed interrupted the furious clash of arms, wherever battlelines could be quickly reformed, the struggle continued throughout the night using devices and equipment.”¹²⁹ According to Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the combat had been so intense that some of the crusader infantry fled the scene, which infuriated the regent.¹³⁰ Chalkokondyles’ account, the most detailed that we possess on this episode, is revealing about the art of war in the fifteenth century: he describes one of the earliest uses of field artillery and portable firearms during a battle taking place at night.¹³¹ The chronicler affirms that the attack on the *kapukulu* position was launched under the protection of the wagons of the *tabor*. This confirms their ability to function in an offensive capacity, an ability already attested by Bonfinius in his account of the Battle of Ialomița River, fought in Wallachia on September 2, 1442, where Hunyadi won a victory over the army of Chehâbeddîn, the governor (*beylerbey*) of Rumelia.¹³²

Daytime on October 19: the disposition of the crusader army was the same as on the previous day, except that the left wing was reinforced by several squadrons of heavy cavalry under the command of János Székely.¹³³ The Turks were more disposed to make changes. The corps of *sipahis* and *akındjis* from Thessaly, commanded by Turakhan-bey,¹³⁴ was detached

from the army of Rumelia and, after a long detour behind the Ottoman lines, was placed in an ambush position on the right wing, not far from the Anatolian cavalry. Murad II had conceived a plan to encircle and annihilate Székely's cavalry.

This decisive move, launched apparently in the morning and disguised by a general counter-attack along the whole line of battle, was the tipping point which gave victory to the Ottomans.¹³⁵ It caught the crusader cavalry completely off guard. They were already engaged in grueling combat with the Anatolian army. The Wallachian, Moldavian and Hungarian cavalry were cut to pieces by the mounted troops from Thessaly, who gave no quarter. Székely lost his right hand to a saber slash and many nobles were left dead on the battlefield.¹³⁶ During their retreat to the Plementina *tabor*, the crusaders were pursued by the Turks, who continued to inflict heavy losses.

Both Chalkokondyles and the anonymous of Constantinople insisted that the Wallachians were guilty of treachery, which rendered them responsible for the defeat! The Byzantine chronicler concocted a lengthy narrative in which Vladislav II's men begged the sultan for mercy, but Murad, suspecting a trap, ordered his troops to kill them all. The Wallachians grabbed their arms and fought to the last man.¹³⁷ Some historians have concluded that this defection was the main cause of the Christian defeat.¹³⁸ But we should pay heed to Pascal de Sorgo, who says that the Wallachians numbered just 4,000 men, together with 3,000 Moldavians. Now, following the account of the grand vizir, it was only the principality of Wallachia which embraced the crusader cause following the accession of Vladislav II. After two days of endless fighting, was this contingent still strong enough to exert such an impact on the outcome of the battle? To this we should add that neither Bonfinius, nor Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, nor Thuróczi, nor Długosz, who were all reasonably well informed, speak of treachery or the surrender of the Wallachians. As for Hunyadi, in his letter to Nicholas Łasocki, he confirms that the main reason for the defeat was the crushingly superior numbers of the enemy.¹³⁹

October 20: Information provided by Vlad Dracul (Vlad the Impaler) illuminates the fighting which occurred on the last day, the last stand of the crusading host after the *kapukulu* had taken their *tabor* by storm:

Fr. Nayph arrived here from Nicopolis, and reported it as certain that Murad, lord of the Turks, had fought a battle lasting three days without pause against lord governor John, and that on the last day he had hemmed

him in among the wagons of the tabor (*inter curros taboritarum*), and that the Sultan dismounted amidst his janissaries and that they struck and killed everybody both inside and outside the wagons.¹⁴⁰

The janissaries attacked in the morning, but it was only several hours later that they managed to seize the position, during a furious *mêlée* of hand-to-hand fighting that took place on the wagon barricade itself. Most of the sources narrate this episode in the battle and they emphasize the intensity of the encounter.¹⁴¹ Dracul's letter furnishes one detail which deserves mention: Murad II himself was in the midst of the janissaries when they rushed into action. So the encounter unfolded under the eyes of the sultan and of his entourage, the *çavuş*. This source corroborates the description afforded by the janissary of Serbian origin, Constantin Mihailović, on the style of fighting employed by the *kapukulu* as well as the high morale of the infantry as they formed up for the assault:

The emperor's drummers also beat, so that between them there is such a cry and uproar that the earth fairly shakes. Courtiers on armoured horses are then sent to them by the emperor in order to observe who is doing any brave deed and how the battle is going. And each of these holds a bozduhan or mace in his hand, urging [them] into battle. They are called czaussy, and wherever they are, it is as if the emperor himself were there. And everyone fears them, for whomever they praise before the emperor will get on well, and whomever they criticize, woe to him. Their hetman is called a czausbassa.

Such is the heathen formation during pitched battles. Nor does the emperor himself go anywhere, but is here among the Janissaries until the battle ends.¹⁴²

The losses suffered by the two sides differ in the contemporary accounts. Bonfinius offers the figure of 8,000 crusaders killed as against 30,000 Turks. Chalkokondyles reverses the figures to the advantage of the sultan's army (4,000 Turkish dead), while a body count of the fallen enemy conducted after the battle reached around 17,000 corpses.¹⁴³ According to the Turkish chroniclers, Murad II remained at Kosovo Polje for three more days and then, on October 23, began the return journey to Edirne.¹⁴⁴ "Following this relentless struggle, the Sultan gathered together the heads of the defeated and constructed a great pyramid, an ancient Asiatic custom which we find as late as the nineteenth century."¹⁴⁵

Byzantium's fate was now sealed, and nobody was more conscious of this than the Emperor John VIII Palaeologos: "news of the defeat of John Hunyadi by the Ottomans at the second battle of Kosovo (1448) struck the final blow against the frustrated John, who died on 31 October of the same year."¹⁴⁶ There no longer existed an army capable of assisting the ancient imperial city, of launching an offensive which might compare with those of 1396, 1442, 1443 and 1444. The threat of a crusade, which had hung over the Ottoman Empire's European frontier for half a century, had disappeared overnight. Murad's victory at Kosovo was as complete as that of Saladin in 1187 at Hattin, which just months later led to the Muslim recovery of Jerusalem. For the Ottomans, the triumph had another dimension, which was the long-term consolidation of their state institutions. Murad II was able to abdicate a second time, without making his subjects discontented, in the absence of external threats—remembering the precedent in 1444¹⁴⁷—in favor of his son, the Sultan Mehmed II (1444; 1451–1481). To Murad's successor fell the task of seizing Constantinople in 1453, which Hunyadi no longer possessed either the financial or the military means to prevent.¹⁴⁸ Before the road to Rome, the last imperial capital of old Europe and last cradle of Christianity, became open to invasion,¹⁴⁹ it fell to Hunyadi once more to fight, and this time to defeat, the remarkable army of the Porte (*kapukulu ocakları*), in 1456 beneath the walls of Belgrade. In three previous encounters, he had failed: at Zlatica in 1443, at Varna in 1444 and at Kosovo Polje in 1448.

NOTES

1. Mark Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo and the Second Battle of Kosovo (1448): A Translation," *Slavonic and East European Review* 94 (2016): 126–145.
2. Mita Kostič, "Opis voiske Jovana Hunyadija pri polasku u boji na Kosovo," *Glasnik Skopskog Naučnog Društva* 1 (1925): 79–91; Nicolae Iorga, "Du nouveau sur la campagne turque de Jean Hunyadi en 1448," *Revue Historique du Sud-est Européen* 3 (1926): 13–27; Aurel Decei, "Oastea lui Iancu Huniade înainte de bătălia de la Kosovo (1448). Scrisoarea lui Pasquale de Sorgo," *Revista Istorică Română* 16 (1946): 40–50.
3. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 128.
4. It is worth noting that Iorga returned to Pascal de Sorgo in another work published in the same year, *Les aventures "sarrazines" des*

- Français de Bourgogne au XV^e siècle* (Cluj: Université de Cluj, 1926), 18.
5. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 131: “Camil Mureșanu did not draw upon de Sorgo’s letter when assessing the events of 1448 in his biography of John Hunyadi, and the same can be said for the work of Joseph Held, and the letter is generally absent in survey works on the military history of the period.” In addition to the authors cited by Whelan, there are others who do not mention this source: József Bánlaky, *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme*, X/1 “*Hunyadi János*” (Budapest, 1936), 199–210; Lajos Elekes, *Hunyadi* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1952), 368–381; Tamás Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig 1396–1526* (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2005), 97–105, chapter on the battle translated into English in *For the Homeland unto Death—1100 Years. Hungary in the Carpathian Basin*, ed. Lajos Gubesi (Budapest: Zrínyi Média, 2011), 170–177. Pálosfalvi shows that even now Pascal de Sorgo’s report remains unknown to Hungarian historians! For a critical analysis of the bibliography on Hunyadi, see Radu Lupescu, “Istoriografia română și maghiară referitoare la Ioan de Hunedoara,” *Studii și materiale de istorie medie* 26 (2008): 139–162; 27 (2009): 311–332.
 6. Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l’Empire ottoman depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours*, ed. M. Dochez, vol. 1 (Paris: Béthune et Plon, 1844), 210–211; H.J. Ronay, *Magyar Hadi Kronika*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1891), 282–286; L. Kis, “À rigómezei hadjárat,” *Hadtörténelmi közlémenyek* 8 (1895): 1–42, 157–181, 339–349, 454–486; Leopold Kupelwieser, *Die Kämpfe Ungarns mit den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 1526* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1895), 166–183; T. Nicolau, *Ioan Huniade Corvin* (Bucharest, 1925), 72–82.
 7. Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Stilke, 1900), 7. See also the article by R. Rosetti, “Considérations sur quelques effectifs d’armées opérant dans le sud-est de l’Europe pendant l’antiquité et le Moyen Age,” in Ferdinand Lot, *L’art militaire et les armées au Moyen Age en Europe et dans le Proche Orient*, vol. 2 (Paris 1946), 450–464, translated by C. Marinescu.
 8. We will mention only those who seem to be most representative: Orujd bin Adil, “Tevârîh-i âl-i Osman,” in *Cronici turcești privind*

- țările române. Extrase (XIV^e–XVII^e siècles)*, ed. M. Guboglu and M.A. Mehmet, vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1966), 57–58; anonymous chronicles “Tevarîh-i âl-i Osman,” *ibid.*, 184–185; Sa’adeddin, “Tadj-üt-Tevarih,” *ibid.*, 316; Aşikpaşazade, “Tevarîh-i âl-i Osman,” *ibid.*, 91, this last a participant in the battle. See also the German editions: Uruj b. Adil, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, ed. Franz Babinger (Hanover, 1925), 58–61; Aşikpaşazade, *Vom Hirtenzelt zur Hohen Pforte: Frühzeit und Aufstieg des Osmanenreiches nach der Chronik “Denkwürdigkeiten und Zeitläufte des Hauses ‘Osman’” von Derwisch Ahmed, genannt “Aşik-paşa-sohn,”* ed. Richard Kreutel (Graz: Styria, 1959), 188–189. “Comme d’habitude, les renseignements de source ottomane sont vagues et exagérés”: Iorga, “Du nouveau,” 14.
9. Necati Salim, *Türk ordusunun eski seferlerinden bir imha muharebesi İkinci Kosova. 1448* (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1932), 5–27; I.H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1947), 221–222; *Varna (1444), İkinci Kosova (1448) Meydan Muharebeleri ve II. Murad* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih Ve Stratejik Etüd Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1986), 66–89; N. Genç, *II. Kosova Savaşı* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, 1993); F.M. Emecen, “Kosova Savaşları,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi Genel Müdürlüğü*, vol. 26 (Ankara, 2002), 223–224; F.M. Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş* (Istanbul, 2010), 139–143.
 10. Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *The Histories*, trans. Anthony Kaldellis, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) [herein-after “Chalkokondyles”], 2:129, an essential source which is unknown to Whelan. Two further editions which we consulted are *Histoire de la décadence de l’Empire grec et établissement de celui des Turcs ...*, ed. Blaise de Vigenère (Paris, 1577, 1585); and *Expuneri istorice*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest, 1958).
 11. *Gazavât-ı sultân Murâd b. Mehemmed hân: İzladi ve Varna savaşları (1443–1444) üzerinde anonim gazavât-name*, ed. Halil Inalcik and Mevlud Oğuz (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1978), English translation “The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Son of Sultan Mehmed Khan,” in *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–1445*, ed. and trans. Colin Imber (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 90–101; Martin Chasin, “The Crusade of Varna,” in Setton, *Crusades*, 6:276–310;

- Emanuel C. Antoche, “Les expéditions de Nicopolis (1396) et de Varna (1444): une comparaison,” *Mediaevalia Transilvanica* 4 (Satu Mare, 2002), 28–74.
12. Jehan de Wavrin, “Extract from the *Anciennes Chroniques d’Angleterre*,” in *The Crusade of Varna*, ed. Imber, 164.
 13. János Thuróczi, *Chronicle of the Hungarians*, ed. Frank Mantello et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) [hereinafter “Thuróczi”], 147–149; Mihail P. Dan, *Ceși, slovaci și români în veacurile XIII–XVI* (Sibiu, 1944), 111–12; Pál Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526*, ed. Andrew Ayton (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 288–291.
 14. Nicolae Iorga, *Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XV^e siècle*, 6 series (Paris and Bucharest, 1899–1916), 2:221, 229, a collection of essential sources which escaped the attention of Whelan.
 15. Francisc Pall, “Les relations entre la Hongrie et Scanderbeg,” *Revue Historique du sud-est Européen* 10 (1933): 111–141, at 129; John V.A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 555–558; Constantin Marinescu, *La politique orientale d’Alfonse V d’Aragon, roi de Naples (1416–1458)* (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1994), 155; Oliver J. Schmitt, *Skanderbeg: Der neue Alexander auf dem Balkan* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet: 2009), 63–64.
 16. Marinescu, *La politique*, 147–149; V. Fraknői, “Alfonso re di Napoli, candidato di Giovanni Hunyadi al trono di Ungheria dopo la battaglia di Varna,” *Corvina* 2 (1922): 50–59; Joseph Held, *Hunyadi: Legend and Reality* (Boulder, NY: Columbia University Press, 1985), 215.
 17. *Codex diplomaticus comitum de Frangepanibus*, ed. Lajos Thallóczy and Samu Barabás, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1910), no. 356, pp. 362–363.
 18. *Ibid.*, no. 344, p. 350.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 352. According to Marinescu, *La politique*, 148, note 1, Branković owed this sum to Hunyadi. When the latter was held prisoner after the defeat, he had to relinquish its repayment as the price of his release.
 20. Sergiu Iosipescu, *Carpații sud-estici în evul mediu târziu (1166–1526). O istorie europeană prin pasurile montane* (Brăila, 2013), 290.

21. This observation belongs to Francisc Pall, "Intervenția lui Iancu de Hunedoara în Țara Românească și Moldova în anii 1447–1448," *Studii. Revista de Istorie* 16 (1963): 1054–1059.
22. Matei Cazacu, *Dracula* (Paris: Tallandier, 2004), 82–85; Iosipescu, *Carpații*, 291–93; Constantin Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică a domnilor din Țara Românească și Moldova* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2001), I (sec. XIV–XVI), 96–98.
23. Note the error made by John Jefferson, *The Holy Wars of King Wladislas and Sultan Murad: The Ottoman-Christian Conflict from 1438–1444* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 487: "Hunyadi made another attempt in 1448 to put together a coalition and defeat the Turks at Kosovo ... Hunyadi's own resources were at this time quite considerable. He successfully raised a large army and in the end received the support of his Wallachian ally Dan"! On this work, a doctoral thesis published by a prestigious publishing house, see the review by L. Veszprémy in *Hadtörténelmi közlémenyek* 126 (2013): 647–649. For a similar error, see Dominique de Courcelles, "Le Roman de Tirant lo Blanc et le Vœu du Faisan: le pouvoir de la parole entre politique et littérature," in *Le banquet du Faisan. 1454 Lille – Arras: deux capitales princières bourguignonnes face au défi de l'empire ottoman*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Caron and Denis Clauzel (Arras: Artois Presses Université 1997), 179: "le chevalier Jean Hunyade, voïvode de Hongrie, qui en 1448 remporte sur les Turcs une grande victoire et éloigne pour quelque temps le péril turc de Constantinople et des îles grecques." According to the same author, Hunyadi was "mortally wounded" at the Battle of Belgrade!
24. Pall, "Intervenția," 1062–1065; Rezachevici, *Cronologia*, 499–502, 505–508.
25. *Acta et diplomata ragusina*, ed. Jovan Radonic, vol. I/2 (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1934), 757. On this subject, see in particular Francisc Pall, "Stăpînirea lui Iancu de Hunedoara asupra Chilieii și problema ajutorării Bizanțului (1448–1465)," *Studii. Revista de Istorie* 18 (1965): 619–638; and Serban Papacostea, "The Black Sea in the Political Strategies of Sigismund of Luxemburg," *Transylvanian Review*: "Worlds in Change: Church Union and Crusading in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,"

- ed. Christian Gastgeber et al., XVIII/suppl. 2 (Cluj-Napoca 2009), 279–289.
26. Matei Cazacu and Pierre S. Năsturki, “Une démonstration navale des Turcs devant Constantinople et la bataille de Chilia (1448),” *Journal des Savants* 3 (1978): 197–210. The same identification is made in Ivan Đurić, *Le crépuscule de Byzance* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larosse, 1996), 358, who likewise studies this attack without citing the contributions made by French historians.
 27. Oliver J. Schmitt, “Die Allianz der Häuser Hunyadi und Kastriota im Krieg mit der Osmanen,” *Transylvanian Review*, “Worlds in Change,” 310–311.
 28. Chalkokondyles, 125–127; Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 228; Pall, “Les relations,” 128–129.
 29. Information also confirmed by the *Chroniques anonymes, Cronici turcești*, 184. On the etymology of Kovin, see Iorga, “Du nouveau,” 19.
 30. György Fejér, *Genus, incunabula et virtus Joannis Corvini de Hunyad. Regni Hungariae Gubernatoris* (Buda: Buda University Press, 1844), no. 43, pp. 116–119.
 31. Iorga, “Du nouveau,” 24; Iulian M. Damian, *Ioan de Capestrano și Cruciada Târzie* (Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română, 2011), 209.
 32. For a French translation, see Iorga, “Du nouveau,” 26, following the Latin text reproduced in Fejér.
 33. Decei, “Oastea lui Iancu Huniade,” 40. Ciriaco d’Ancona was passing through the town and witnessed the burial of the despot Charles II: Francisc Pall, “Ciriaco d’Ancona e la crociata contra i Turchi,” *Académie Roumaine. Bulletin de la Section Historique* 20 (1938), 52, Jean Colin, *Cyriaque d’Ancône* (Paris: Maloine, 1981), 366.
 34. *The Annals of Jan Długosz. Annales seu cronicae incliti regni Poloniae*, ed. Maurice Michael and Paul Smith (Chichester: IM Publications, 1997) [hereinafter “Długosz”], 503: “Confident that his army can defeat an enemy more powerful than the Turks.” Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire*, 210: “l’armée la plus belle et la mieux disciplinée que la Hongrie eût encore levée.” See also Held, *Hunyadi*, 30. For Hunyadi’s practice of the art of war, see especially György Elekes, “Hunyadi Hadserege,” *Századok* 1 (1950): 86–119; Mihail P. Dan, “Armata și arta militară a lui Iancu de Hunedoara pe baza cronicilor contemporane,” *Studii și cercetări*

- de istorie* I (1957): 69–117. We shall often be drawing on this last study, which is very precise and takes into account both previous work and Pascal de Sorgo's report. There is another reconstruction of the battle in Mihail P. Dan, *Un stegar al luptei antiotomane— Iancu de Hunedoara* (Bucharest: Editura militară, 1974), 129–137.
35. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 142–143. On this subject, see Dan, "Armata," 95–6, notes 122, 124; Elekes, "Hunyadi," 189; as well as the older studies of Z. Tóth, "A Huszita eredetű szekérvár," *Hadtörténelmi közlémenyek* 17 (1916): 265–311; Z. Tóth, "A huszita szekérvár a magyar hadviselésben," *Hadtörténelmi közlémenyek* 19 (1918): 1–32, 159–185. On the Hussite *tabor*, see the classic study by Jan Durdík, *Husitské vojenství* (Prague: Naše vojsko, 1954), 89–90, 96–97, 116–117, 122–125.
 36. Iorga, *Les aventures "sarrazines,"* 38; this text is often cited as "the anonymous of Constantinople." As for "the said *Blanc*," see the explanation by Iorga, "Du nouveau," 3: "c'est-à-dire 'le Blaque,' le Valaque Jean Hunyadi." On this subject, see Sándor Csernus, "Mítosz, propaganda és népi etimológia. Hunyadi János: 'Fehér' vagy 'Vlach' lovag?," *Acta Historica* 128 (2011): 3–33.
 37. Chalkokondyles, 127–129.
 38. Montaigne, "Des coches," in *Essais*, ed. Pierre Villey (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1965) bk 3, Chapter 6, p. 901, a text highlighted by L. Kropf, "A régi magyar szekérvár," *Hadtörténelmi közlémenyek* 15 (1914): 297–299.
 39. See the analysis by Dan, "Armata," 90, note 129, 108; Emecen, "Kosova Savaşları," 223–224, has between 800 and 2,000.
 40. Which we see in the edition of Blaise de Vigenère, 1577, 468: "un rondellier, et un mosquetaire, pourveu de plusieurs grosses harqueboustes toutes prestes à tirer les unes après les autres, sans perdre temps à recharger."
 41. Karel Titz, *Obhlasy husitského valčnictví v Evropě* (Prague, 1922), 57–59. See also R. Urbánek, "Husitské válečnictví a cizina," in *Codally naše země Evropě a Lidstvu*, ed. V. Mathesius (Prague, 1939), 102–107; Emanuel C. Antoche, "Du *tábor* de Jan Zizka et de Jean Hunyadi au *tábur çengi* des armées ottomanes. L'art militaire hussite dans l'Europe Orientale, le Proche et le Moyen Orient (XV^e–XVII^e siècles)," *Turcica* 36 (2004): 91–124.

42. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 142, a form already offered in Antoche, “Du *tábor* de Jan Zizka,” 112.
43. L. Kropf, “Zarobotana,” *Hadtörténelmi közlémenyek* 15 (1914): 471–473; Pálosfalvi, *For the Homeland*, 170. For the etymological variations of *zarobotana* and the firearms of the Ottoman infantry, see note 82.
44. Technical details in Durdík, *Husitské vojenství*, 72–86, information used by Dan, “Armata,” 87, 91–92; Dan, *Un stegar al luptei antio-tomane*, 77–78.
45. Dan, “Armata,” 90, note 129 takes further the analysis of Lajos Kis, estimating that Hunyadi had at his disposal 60 field pieces.
46. Chalkokondyles, 141–143, night combat confirmed by Thuróczi, 154–155 and by the *Chroniques anonymes*, *Cronici turcești*, 184. See also Gábor Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800,” *Journal of World History* 25 (2014): 85–124, at 90–91, note 17.
47. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 142.
48. Birago, *Strategicon adversum Turcos*, Italian translation by Iulian M. Damian (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, forthcoming), para. 52. See also another study by Damian in which the same subject is discussed: “La disfatta di Solgat (Crimea) e i suoi echi nei trattati d’arte militare rinascimentale,” *Ephemeris Dacoromana* 13 (2011): 37–39.
49. Letter of November 25, 1448, sent to Pope Nicholas V, *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini. II. Abteilung: 1447–1450*, ed. Rudolf Wolkan, *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum. Diplomataria et Acta Bd 67* (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1912), 74, also mentioned in another account of the battle by Piccolomini: E.S. Piccolomini, *Europe (c. 1400–1458)*, ed. Robert Brown, Nancy Bisaha (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 90–93.
50. Długosz, 503; les *Chroniques anonymes*, Asîkpaşazade, Sa’adeddin, in *Cronici turcești*, 91, 184, 315. Two thousand combatants in “Cronaca veneziana dall’origine della Città sino all’anno 1555,” ms. 513–514 (7879–7884) of the *Biblioteca Marciana*, cited by Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 233, note 1. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 132–133, does not seem convinced that Czech mercenaries were present. See, however, Decei, “Oastea lui Iancu Huniade,” 47,

- note 3, and the critical analyses of Dan, "Armata," 72, note 8; Dan, *Cești, slovaci și români*, 130–32, note 177.
51. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 143. See also Długosz, 503; les *Chroniques anonymes* and Asikpaşazade, 91, 184, in addition to the anonymous of Constantinople, Iorga, *Les aventures "sarrazines,"* 38.
 52. Dan, "Armata," 82–83.
 53. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 142 and his comments at 133–135.
 54. Antonio Bonfini (Bonfinius), *Rerum Hungaricarum Decades*, ed. József Fögel et al. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1941) [hereinafter "Bonfinius"], vol. 3, p. 159.
 55. Ibid.; Thuróczi, 151–152; Kis, "À rigómezei hadjárat," 474.
 56. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 143: "There is, along with the aforementioned Duke János, a legate of our most great pope in the army, Christopher Garatonich, one-time bishop of Korona"; see also *ibid.*, 130, note 14; Iorga, "Du nouveau," 22. On the essential role that Garatoni played in the crusade of 1448, see Damian, *Ioan de Capestrano*, 213–214. The crusaders and volunteers receive attention in Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 136. For a general overview, see Dan, "Armata," 77–82.
 57. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 143.
 58. "Ce n'est pas sans raison que l'anoblissement massif des kenéz roumains se rattachait au nom de János Hunyadi, puisque le grand général, ayant été élevé dans leur milieu, savait comprendre les ambitions de cette couche avide d'ascension sociale. Outre ses clients hongrois et sicules ... il admit dans sa suite bon nombre de kenéz roumains, et ce furent précisément ces fidèles intimes qui bénéficièrent plus particulièrement des faveurs de leur puissant protecteur": Gábor Barta in *Histoire de la Transylvanie*, ed. Béla Köpeczi (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1992), 226–227. On this subject, see T.G. Bulat, "Contribuția românească la opera de cruciat a lui Ion Hunyadi," *Revista istorică* 12 (1926): 57–68; Adrian A. Rusu, *Ioan de Hunedoara și România din vremea sa. Studii critice* (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Presa Universitară, 1999); Ioan Drăgan, *Nobilimea românească din Transilvania. 1440–1514* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2000).
 59. See Dan, *Cești, slovaci și români*, 130, note 177, again citing Pascal de Sorgo, as well as the documented study of Ștefan Pascu with a

- list of the *cnèzes* who took part in the 1448 expedition, “Rolul cnezilor din Transilvania în lupta antiotomană a lui Iancu de Hunedoara,” *Studii și cercetări de istorie* 1 (1957): 55–57.
60. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 142. His translation of *Flaccorum princeps* (Latin text, 138) as “the Prince of the Vlachs” does not seem wholly appropriate because it can lead to confusion. For one example, see Jefferson, *Holy Wars*, 202: “Perhaps the most significant population (numbering about 100,000) with respect to the anti-Ottoman struggle in Transylvania at this time were the ‘Vlachs.’ The name is used here to distinguish them from the residents of Wallachia ... Though Hunyadi’s family origins might be debated, there is no doubt that he had a personal affinity to the Vlachs. The county of Hunedoara was located in the midst of the ethnically Vlach region”! As for the following: “the size of the Romanian and Moldavian contribution to Hunyadi’s force in 1448” (Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 130), its author would have done well to consult the classic study of Robert W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934; 2nd edn, 2015)!
 61. Chalkokondyles, 209, note 1. In the English translation by Kaldellis, the “Dacians” are throughout replaced by “Wallachians”!
 62. Ștefan Andreescu, “Une information négligée sur la participation de la Valachie à la bataille de Kossovo (1448),” *Revue des Études sud-est Européennes* 6 (1968): 87, note 12. However, they number just 2000 in the chronicle of Stefano Magno: Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 233.
 63. Pálosfalvi, *For the Homeland unto Death*, 170–171: “Nonetheless, the backbone of the army remained the armoured cavalry, which must have numbered some 15,000. Supplementing these were some 8,000 light cavalry, mostly from Wallachia.” The comment by Engel, *The Realm*, 291 seems more appropriate: “The Hungarian army, reinforced with Romanian troops”—to whom we must add the Poles!
 64. On the evolution of their tactics, see Emanuel C. Antoche, “Effrayer pour mieux vaincre. L’impact psychologique des armées moldo-valaques sur leurs adversaires (XIV^e–XVI^e siècles),” *Revista de Istorie Militară* 131–132 (2012): 68–92.

65. Bonfinius, 159; Thuróczi, 154; Iorga, *Les aventures "sarrazines,"* 38; Iorga, *Notes et extraits,* 233; Chalkokondyles, 127; *Der Briefwechsel,* 77; Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 142.
66. Bánlaky, *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme,* 197–198: "Hunyadi hadserege, amelyet aze z évi hadjáratra kiállíthatott, mintegy 24.000 főből állot," with analysis of the sources; Elekes, *Hunyadi,* 367–369; Held, *Hunyadi,* 128; Dan, *Un stegar al luptei antiotomane,* 130. The same number is cited in Camil Mureșan, *Iancu de Hunedoara* (Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1968), 153.
67. "The total strength of the army was thus around 30,000, and not only was it larger than four years previously, it had a structure better favoured to an attacking campaign." Pálosfalvi, *For the Homeland,* 171.
68. Decei, "Oastea lui Iancu Huniade," 47. See also Emecen, "Kosova Savaşları," 223–224: 30,000–35,000 soldiers plus 8,000 Wallachians; Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş* (Istanbul: Timaş, 2010), 138–139.
69. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorgo," 145.
70. Francisc Pall, "Le condizioni e gli echi internazionali della lotta antiottomana del 1442–1443, condotta da Giovanni di Hunedoara," *Revue des Études sud-est Européennes* 3 (1965): 454–462; Emanuel C. Antoche, "La croisade de 1443 dans les Balkans. Anatomie d'un échec," in *Italy and Europe's Eastern Border (1204–1669)*, ed. Iulian M. Damian et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 15–17.
71. Francisc Pall, "Un moment décisif de l'histoire du Sud-Est européen. La croisade de Varna," *Balkanica* 7 (1944): 118.
72. For the roots of this military practice, see Tadeusz Sulimirski, "Les archers à cheval, cavalerie légère des anciens," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* 12 (1952): 447–461; Paul E. Klopsteg, *Turkish Archery and the Composite Bow: A Review of an Old Chapter in the Chronicles of Archery and a Modern Interpretation* (2nd edn, Lanham, 1993).
73. For a description, see Georges de Hongrie, *Traité sur les mœurs, les coutumes et la perfidie des Turcs*, ed. Joël Schnapp (Toulouse: Anacharsis, 2003), 58–61. See also M.Z. Pakalin, "Akıncılar ve Akıncılar," *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası* 8(47) (1918) 286–305.

74. Nicoara Beldiceanu and Christian Villain-Gandossi, “*Geçim*: une armure pour homme et cheval,” *Turcica* 12 (1980): 169–173. On the Ottoman armies, aside from bibliography already cited, see *Memoirs of a Janissary. Konstantin Mihailović*, ed. Benjamin Stolz and Svat Soucek (Anna Arbor: University of Michigan, 1975), another source largely ignored by Mark Whelan. In addition, V.J. Parry, “La Manière de Combattre,” in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. V.J. Parry and Malcolm E. Yapp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 218–256; Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare, 1300–1453,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 1: Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453*, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 192–226.
75. Georg W. von Valentini, *Traité sur la guerre contre les Turcs*, ed. L. Blesson (Berlin, 1830), 29–30. Several examples can be found exhibited in the same museum.
76. Gábor Ágoston, “Murad II,” in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 399–401.
77. Asîkpaşazade, *Cronici turcești*, 184; Sa’adeddin, *ibid.*, 315. The *martolos* (from the Greek *armatolos*, i.e. armed man) was charged with the surveillance and defense of the frontiers: Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare,” 216. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini notes that Hunyadi had captured a spy in the pay of the Turks, and following Scipio’s example before the battle of Zama, sent him back unharmed after showing him his camp, *Der Briefwechsel*, 74.
78. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 233; Sa’adeddin, *Cronici turcești*, 315; and Orujd bin Adil, *Cronici turcești*, 57. According to the anonymous of Constantinople, the Sultan “envoya messages par toute son obeissance, tant en la Gresse comme en son pays de Turquie, plus grant et plus exprès mandement que oncque n’avoit fait en son temps, et tant assambla gentz, que viex, que jouenes.” Iorga, *Les aventures “sarrazines,”* 38–39.
79. *Ibid.*, 38–39: 10,000 *azabes*, 8,000 janissaries and 30,000 *akindjis*, estimates which seem excessive. He adds porters (*cerehor*, *serehor/sarabor*), who doubtless numbered several thousand.
80. Asîkpaşazade, *Cronici turcești*, 184; Halil Inalcik, “The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329–1451,” in Setton, *Crusades*, 7:275.

81. Fodor, "Ottoman Warfare," 206–210; Ismail H. Uzuncarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapukulu Ocakları*, 2 vols (Ankara, 1943–1944); Stephen T. Christensen, "The Heathen Order of Battle," *Violence and the Absolutist State: Studies in European and Ottoman History*, ed. Stephen T. Christensen (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1990), 75–138, a work based on the memoir of Constantin Mihailović of Ostrovitza (see note 74).
82. Paul Wittek, "The Earliest References to the Use of Firearms by the Ottomans," Appendix II in David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1956), 143. In the terminology analyzed by V.J. Parry, "Bārūd," *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1975), 1093, we frequently come across the words *zabtâna*, *zarabotanas*, *zarabattane*, *zerbottaneri*, "termes dont la signification est incertaine, mais qui désignent peut-être l'arquebuse." On artillery and portable firearms, see also Emecen, "Kosova Savaşları," 35–36; Ágoston, "Firearms," 88–90; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (London: Palgrave, 2002; 2nd edn, 2009), 267–274.
83. Stephen Christensen, "European-Ottoman Military Acculturation in the Late Middle Ages," in *War and Peace in the Middle Ages*, ed. Brian P. McGuire (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1987), 227–251; Gábor Ágoston, "Behind the Turkish War Machine: Gunpowder Technology and War Industry in the Ottoman Empire, 1450–1700," in *The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Brett Steele and Tamera Dorland (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 103–08; Gábor Ágoston, "The Ottoman Empire and the Technological Dialogue between Europe and Asia: The Case of Military Technology and Know-How in the Gunpowder Age," in *Science between Europe and Asia: Historical Studies on the Transmission, Adoption and Adaptation of Knowledge*, ed. Feza Günergun and Dhruv Raina (New York: Springer, 2011), 28–30.
84. Of these words, *top* = cannon or piece of artillery and *araba* = wagon or cart. Their use and maintenance were managed by the *top arabacıları*: Parry, "Bārūd," 1093; Uzuncarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapukulu Ocakları*, vol. 2: "Cebeci, Topçu, Top Arabacıları, Humbaracı, Lâgımci Ocakları ve Kapukulu

- Suvarileri” (1944), 95–113. For the etymology of *tabur*, see H. Eren, “Türkçe istabur kelimesi üzerine,” *Bellesten* 10 (1956): 145–152.
85. Orujd bin Adil, *Cronici turcești*, 57 and the German edn (Babinger), 58, 60.
 86. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, 269; and Antoche, “Du *tábor* de Jan Zizka et de Jean Hunyadi,” 114–116, in which the historical dimensions of this battle are emphasized.
 87. *Ibid.*; Emecen, “Kosova Savaşları,” 74; Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC—Clio 2009), 29; Albrecht Fuess, “Les janissaires, les mamelouks et les armes à feu. Une comparaison des systèmes militaires ottoman et mamelouk à partir du milieu du XV^e siècle,” *Turcica* 41 (2009): 210–211.
 88. Ágoston, “Firearms,” 92. The Hungarian historian does not mention Orujd bin Adil and does not cite Colin Imber’s classic study.
 89. *Chroniques anonymes*, in *Cronici turcești*, 184.
 90. Held, *Hunyadi*, 130: 60,000 men; Mureşan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, 156: between 50,000 and 60,000 combatants, to which must be added a significant number of auxiliary troops; Emecen, “Kosova Savaşları,” 223: about 50,000 soldiers; Pálosfalvi, *For the Homeland*, 173: “the Ottoman army must have had a total strength of at least fifty thousand.”
 91. *Ibid.*, 171; Mureşan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, 148; Damian, *Ioan de Capestrano*, 214; Nicolae Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité Orientale*, vol. 4 (Bucharest, 1937), 115.
 92. Gyula Rászó, “Hungarian Strategy against the Ottomans (1365–1526),” in *From Crécy to Mohács: Warfare in the Late Middle Ages (1346–1526)*. *Actes du XXII^{ème} Colloque de la Commission Internationale d’Histoire Militaire* (Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, 1997), 232.
 93. Stjepan Tomaš was the candidate imposed on the throne by Hunyadi: Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, 555; Damian, *Ioan de Capestrano*, 100.
 94. Pall, “Un moment décisif,” 114–115.
 95. Antoche, “La croisade de 1443,” 22–23.
 96. Vlad Dracula (Vlad Țepeş, Vlad the Impaler) and Radu the Fair, who subsequently ruled in Wallachia.

97. Długosz, 494. On this episode, see Cazacu, *Dracula*, 75–76; Antoche, “Les expéditions,” 45; see also Ncolae Stoicescu and Petre P. Panaitescu, “La participation des Roumains à la bataille de Varna,” *Revue Roumaine d’Histoire* 4 (1965): 225.
98. Emanuel C. Antoche, “Quelques considérations en marge de l’expédition du roi Jean I^{er} Albert en Moldavie (août—octobre 1497),” *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie “A. D. Xenopol,”* 49 (2012): 35–54.
99. *Memoirs of a Janissary*, 83. In the Venetian chronicle of Stefano Magno, Hunyadi threatened to impale him if he returned victorious: Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 233, note 1.
100. On this point the sources are unanimous: Chalkokondyles, 468–489; Bonfinius, 158–160; *Memoirs of a Janissary*, 83–85, etc. See also Momčilo Spremić, “La famille serbe des Branković—considérations généalogiques et héraldiques,” *Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’études byzantines* 41 (2004): 443, who is categorical on the despot’s political stance: “Comme aucun souverain avant lui, Djurdaj réussit à rétablir son État en 1444 pour rester jusqu’à la fin de ses jours un loyal vassal de la Turquie. C’est la raison pour laquelle il n’a pas rejoint en 1448 la campagne mal préparée de Jean Hunyadi écrasée à Kosovo par le sultan Murat II.” We have not been able to consult the same historian’s biography of Branković, *Despot Đurađ Branković i njegova doba* (Belgrade: Clio, 1994; 2nd edn, 1999). On Branković’s diplomacy, see also Decei, “Oastea lui Iancu Huniade,” 44; and Damian, *Ioan de Capestrano*, 100–103.
101. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 145.
102. Whelan (ibid., 143, notes 104 and 105) speculates on the identity of an individual who had been governor of Hungary during the campaign of 1444! On Łasocki, see Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 229; Iorga, “Du nouveau,” 22–23.
103. Długosz, 503.
104. *Memoirs of a Janissary*, 101.
105. Thuróczi, 151: Hunyadi “cruelly attacking the kingdom of Rascia on his way through, because its lord, summoned to join the expedition, had not done so. He moved into enemy lands and subdued them with fire and sword, passing through not like one intended to carry off plunder, but like one ready to occupy a kingdom.” Setton, *Papacy*, 2:99 underscores the hostile attitude of the cru-

- saders toward the local population: “the impatient Hunyadi marched through Serbia, burning and pillaging as though Branković and the Serbs were his enemies instead of the Turks.” See also Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, 554.
106. Decei, “Oastea lui Iancu Huniade,” 44, who takes further the findings of Kostič.
 107. Pall, “Les relations,” 130.
 108. *Ibid.*, 129; Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, 557; Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 227–228, note 1; Schmitt, *Skanderbeg*, 68.
 109. Text of the treaty in *Listine o odnošajih izmedju juznoga slavenska i mletačke republike*, ed. Sime Ljubić, “Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum Meridionalum” XXI (=IX of the *Listine*) (Zagreb, 1890), 276.
 110. Bonfinius, 162.
 111. According to Schmitt, *Skanderbeg*, 68, this happened 30 km from the battlefield. See also Mureșan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, 166.
 112. Whelan, “Pasquale de Sorgo,” 143.
 113. This contradicts Whelan’s comment (*ibid.*, 135–136): “Although de Sorgo does imply close contact between Hunyadi and Skanderbeg in September 1448, noting that messengers (*legatos*) from Albania were present in the Hungarian camp, he goes on to record that Hunyadi had decided to reject the offer of help from the Albanian ruler. Perhaps Hunyadi’s rapid march into Ottoman territory was not rash at all, as he never intended to wait for Skanderbeg’s help in the first place.”
 114. Dan, *Un stegar al luptei antiotomane*, 133–134; Mureșan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, 159; Pálosfalvi, *For the Homeland*, 172–173.
 115. Bonfinius, 160.
 116. Pálosfalvi, *For the Homeland*, 172–173. About 7–8 km north-west of the center of Pristina, a small town called Obilić keeps alive the memory of the young Serb who stabbed the sultan. On this funerary monument, see Hamza Gündoğdu, “Kosova’da meşhed-i hüдавendigâr ve ilk devir osmanli mimarisinde türbe geleneği,” *Turkish Studies* 9/10 (2014): 615–638. On the First Battle of Kosovo, see *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas A. Emmert (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1991).
 117. Estimates by Kis, “À rigómezei hadjárát,” 172.
 118. Emecen, “Kosova Savaşları,” 223.

119. Whelan, "Pasquale de Sorigo," 144–145, as well as the Ottoman chroniclers cited above. For the fighting, see also Iosipescu, *Carpații*, 295–297.
120. Matei Cazacu, "La Valachie et la bataille de Kossovo (1448)," *Revue des Études sud-est Européennes* 9 (1971): 131–139; Cazacu, *Dracula*, 101–104, 454–455.
121. Published by Ioan Bogdan in *Documente privitoare la relațiile Țării Românești cu Brașovul și cu Țara Ungurească în sec. XV și XVI*, vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1905), no. 63, pp. 85–87. Published again in *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, ed. Franz Zimmermann and Carl Werner, vol. 5 (reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2007), no. 2451, where Vladislav II is still credited with authorship of the letter! On the importance of this source, see Cazacu, *Dracula*, 103–104; Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains*, 115–116.
122. Several authors have tried to reconstruct the battle: see the works cited in notes 5, 6 and 34 above. As far as the sources go, we have used above all the accounts of Chalkokondyles and Bonfinius.
123. Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 2nd edn, vol. 2 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1924), 356. For his part, Mureșan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, 157 considered Kosovo to be one of the first battles in modern military history.
124. The Anatolians were commanded by their *beylerbey*, Skuras pacha, Albanian by origin, while the Rumelians found themselves under the orders of the Grand Vizir Candarli Halil pacha (1438/1439–1453). See Ismail H. Uzuncarşılı, *Candarlı Vezir Ailesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969). According to Emecen, "Kosova Savaşları," 224, the army of Anatolia was not engaged in the battle.
125. According to the anonymous of Constantinople (Iorga, *Les aventures* "sarrazines," 39), the fighting took place "jusques entre 4 et 5 eures après mydy."
126. Chalkokondyles, 137–139, as well as the version given by Bonfinius, 163.
127. Chalkokondyles, 139.
128. *Ibid.*, 139–141.
129. Fejér, *Genus*, no. 47, pp. 126–129, reprinted in E. Hurmuzaki et al., *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor (1346–1450)*, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Göbl, 1890), pt 2, no. 623, p. 755.

130. *Der Briefwechsel*, 76; Held, *Hunyadi*, 133.
131. Note the precedent established in the night of December 21–22, 1421, during the Battle of Kutná-Hora, a victory of the Hussite troops commanded by Jan Žižka over the crusading army of Sigismund of Luxembourg. See Lot, *L'art militaire*, 2:188–189; Durdík, *Husitské vojenství*, 164–167.
132. Bonfinius, 125, a tactical function brought to light by Dan, “Armata,” 101–102; Aydın Taneri, *Osmanlı Kara ve Deniz Kuvvetleri* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), 176; Emanuel C. Antoche and Güneş İşiksel, “Les batailles de Sibiu (22 mars 1442) et de la rivière de Ialomița (2 septembre 1442). Essai de reconstitution d’après les sources de l’époque,” in “*Extincta est lucerna orbis.*” *John Hunyadi and His Time*, ed. Ana Dumitran et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română, 2009), 423–424. For his part, John Jefferson, “The Ottoman-Hungarian Campaigns of 1442,” *Journal of Medieval Military History* 10 (2012): 144–145 deplores the lack of sources for this battle, the reason for this being that the account given by Bonfinius is pure fantasy, a creation of the author!
133. Only Bonfinius, 164 mentions this change of command.
134. This man had assumed high responsibilities at the heart of the Ottoman high command during the *longum bellum* of 1443–1444: see Antoche, “La croisade de 1443,” 20, 24.
135. The anonymous of Constantinople, in Iorga, *Les aventures “sarrazines,”* 40: the fighting stopped around 2–3 pm in the afternoon.
136. See the account in Bonfinius, 164–165.
137. Iorga, *Les aventures “sarrazines,”* 40; Chalkokondyles, ed. Kaldellis, 145–147 and ed. Grecu, 214–215.
138. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:100; Emecen, “Kosova Savaşları,” 224; Gilles Veinstein, “The Ottoman Conquest in Europe,” in *Europe and the Islamic World: A History*, ed. John Tolan et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 130; Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923* (London: John Murray, 2005), 84; Matthew Bennett, *The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient and Medieval Warfare* (Oxford: Helicon, 1998), 182. According to Mureșan, *Iancu de Hunedoara*, 165, the Wallachians were wiped out during the fighting and the survivors were forced to surrender. Note also the comment of Pálosfalvi,

- For the Homeland*, 173: “The Christian forces, including the Wallachians, were caught in the pincers and destroyed. It is also possible that the latter surrendered without serious resistance”!
139. See note 129.
140. Cited in note 121.
141. Orujd bin Adil, *Cronici turcești*, 57; *Der Briefwechsel*, 76; Bonfinius, 165; Chalkokondyles, 149–151; Długosz, 504: “The following night, that between Friday and Saturday, the Hungarians weaken and then take to flight, leaving most of the Poles and Czechs with the waggons: but these fight on from dawn to dusk of that Saturday, protected by their guns and crossbows; at last the Turks close in and they are utterly defeated, the Turks capturing their prisoners, weapons and booty.”
142. *Memoirs of a Janissary*, 167.
143. Bonfinius, 165; Chalkokondyles, 149–151. The anonymous of Constantinople in Iorga, *Les aventures “sarrazines,”* 40 estimates the losses of the crusading army, including prisoners, at around 6,000–7,000 men. According to *Der Briefwechsel*, 76: “They say that the Germans and Bohemians fell to a man, [while] of the Hungarians around 30,000 died, and of the Turks three times as many, but indeed this may be consoling the vanquished, so that they may believe that they did not give their enemy an easy victory”!
144. Cazacu, “La Valachie,” 138.
145. Cazacu, *Dracula*, 86, as well as his study “La mort infâme. Décapitation et exposition des têtes à Istanbul (XV^e–XIX^e siècles),” in *Les Ottomans et la Mort. Permanences et Mutations*, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 245–289.
146. Alexios G.C. Savvides, “John VIII Palaiologos (1392–1448),” in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan V. Murray (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC—Clio, 2006), 690. On the death of the emperor of Byzantium, see also Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, 230, note 1; and Đjurić, *Le crépuscule de Byzance*, 357–358. On the battle’s historic importance, see Bennett, *Hutchinson Dictionary*, 182: “resulting in the loss of Constantinople (modern Istanbul, Turkey) to the Turks in 1453”; Antoche, “Du tábor de Jan Zizka,” 116; Jean W. Sedlar, *East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000–1500* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 248.

147. Franz Babinger, “Von Amurath zu Amurath. Vor-und Nachspiel der Schlacht bei Varna (1444),” *Oriens* 3 (1950): 229–265.
148. Francisc Pall, “Byzance à veille de sa chute et Janco de Hunedoara (Hunyadi),” *Romanoslavica* 1 (1969): 119–126.
149. On this subject, see the remarkable study by Dan I. Mureşan, “La croisade en projets. Plans présentés au Grand Quartier Général de la croisade, le Collège des cardinaux,” in *Les projets de croisade: Géostratégie et diplomatie européenne du XIV^e au XVII^e siècle*, ed. Jacques Paviot (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 2014), 247–286.

Reactions to the Fall of Constantinople and the Concept of Human Rights

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When Byzantine Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the city was thoroughly pillaged and thousands of its citizens were killed, or seized, abused and forced into slavery. Details of the sack immediately circulated in Western reports and became the subject of a host of reactions by European writers, suggesting that the treatment of the population was as shocking as the loss of this great Christian capital and defensive “bulwark” against the Ottomans. This is particularly striking given the violent military history of medieval and Renaissance Europe. Why was the outcry against Ottoman atrocities so forceful and sustained—particularly among humanists? Was this simply a case of rhetorical exaggeration or were 1453 and reactions to it somehow unique in the history of pre-modern warfare? This chapter will examine responses to the sack of Constantinople in the context of pre-modern attitudes toward acceptable conduct in war, holy war and the plight of civilians in wartime. It will also look ahead to some

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modern articulations of human rights and consider whether reactions to 1453 can be seen as an early shared notion of some these rights, particularly concerning non-combatants.

Given the emergence of human rights as a very recent and well-articulated response to the atrocities of the Second World War, scholars understandably tend not to look very far into the past for similarities.¹ Moreover, the similarities between twentieth-century and fifteenth-century views can only be partial, as humanists do not speak specifically of other key notions of human rights such as universality or equal application of rights to all sides in any given conflict. With this very much in mind, this chapter will not attempt to draw a straight line of development or to claim equivalency between 1453 and 1948.² What it does seek to explore is whether responses to 1453 represent a break with prior views of war and civilian rights, and if these responses in turn may have influenced a trend in how early modern thinkers like Desiderius Erasmus, Alberico Gentili, and Hugo Grotius perceived war. Was there more than a hint of comparison to later, fully developed efforts to place an ideological shield around non-combatants? The question at hand centers on whether humanist reactions to the fall of Constantinople invited, or even begged, a deeper consideration on limitations of violence through the emotional and persuasive use of rhetoric.³

Before turning to an analysis of humanist responses to 1453, it is useful to examine some of the views that preceded theirs in the Christian and chivalric traditions. One potentially useful area of inquiry is the long tradition on just war going back to St Augustine. Was it justifiable, Christian thinkers asked, to wage war at all and, if so, under which circumstances and restrictions?⁴ Despite the repeated calls to refrain from force in the New Testament, early Christian thinkers found it hard to preach an anti-war message. Instead, they adapted to the challenges of proselytizing in the Roman Empire and accommodated soldiers and rulers without asking them to abandon their military calling.⁵ The ongoing conversion of other warlike peoples only increased the need to adapt religious and juridical principles to war. By the High Middle Ages, canon and civil lawyers had built up an impressive array of legal precepts on the subject of warfare and rights, both the right to make war (*ius ad bellum*) and right within war (*ius in bello*).

Important though this body of legalistic thought would be to later thinkers like Gentili and Grotius, strong evidence has not yet emerged that humanists turned to treatises on just war for inspiration in their works in the wake of 1453. Clearer influences for the humanists were likely found

in the realms of history and rhetoric: accounts of actual sacks described in chronicles or histories, and literary tropes, largely classical ones, on the tragedies of sacks. These types of works will be the focus in this essay.

Of the many possible examples of sacks in history that humanists may have called to mind as they processed the news of 1453, I would note three. First, the sack of Rome in 410, which several humanists invoked as a parallel to 1453; the sack of Jerusalem in 1099, because of its massive violence and its role in the history of holy wars; and the sack of Limoges in 1370, because Froissart's treatment of it raises questions about the law of arms and perceived rights (or the lack thereof) of civilians in the century prior to 1453. Accounts of and reactions to these famous sacks may provide a sense of the inherited notions and expectations of warfare, and the treatment of non-combatants that preceded 1453.

While the city of Rome was sacked several times, for humanists, the most troubling attack came in 410 at the hands of Visigothic troops. After a two-year siege of the city, during which time their leader Alaric tried to pressure the senate and the emperor into paying him the sum promised by Stilicho, he ordered a three-day sack. Probably best known to humanists were the responses of St Jerome and St Augustine. Jerome lamented the famine that forced inhabitants before the sack even began to turn to cannibalism, and the beatings and threat of rape that ensued when the pillagers went from home to home searching for loot. In Book I of *The City of God*, Augustine spoke of the killings and rapes that occurred, even of nuns, in the sack of Rome.⁶ At the same time, both Jerome and Augustine noted that churches and the people who gathered there were regarded as off-limits, showing the respect or fear that holy places held for the Arian Visigoths. Orosius went even further, glossing over both famine and violence.⁷ The sack of 410 would be invoked by humanists in interesting ways; while they mourned the loss of prestige to the once-great capital, they were also cognizant of the relative restraint of the Visigoths. This event occurred over a millennium before the Ottomans took Constantinople, and the conduct of warfare would change significantly in the intervening centuries, but it is worth noting because, at least for the humanists, it provided a powerful touchstone for their expectations.

Nearer in time to 1453 and closer in motivation to the Ottoman conquest, as it took place within the context of holy war, was the capture of Jerusalem by the crusaders in 1099. One of the main reasons for the crusade, at least judging from Pope Urban II's call for it, was the protection of the Holy Land and the defenseless Eastern Christians who were said to

be regularly attacked by the Muslim Turks. The very idea of aiding civilians can be seen as a departure for eleventh-century knights, whose concerns in warfare were quite different up until this point. The medieval warrior aristocracy typically defined *ius in bello* (or rights within war) strictly in terms of their own needs. They sought to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and to define codes of conduct that increased the safety of warriors—not civilians—in battle. In regards to the right to make war (*ius ad bellum*), it was rarely questioned or put on the table for discussion at this time.⁸ It appears, then, that the goal was to protect men of the same rank and property, but not to extend these considerations to the vulnerable classes who lived far beneath them on the social ladder. When Pope Urban II preached the First Crusade, the clergy had already begun to push back on these notions and were working to curb the abuses of warriors.

In the decades leading up to 1095, Frankish bishops first proclaimed the “peace of God” in the hope of restraining the landless members of the warrior class who regularly attacked peasants and townspeople and plundered church property. Peaceful non-combatants, they declared, were not to be harmed by warriors under pain of excommunication. This idea appealed to royal officials as well, and it spread to other parts of Europe. The “truce of God,” barring warfare on certain sacred days of the week and year, also sought to protect non-combatants. One such proclamation from the Council of Clermont stated: “It is enacted that monks, clerics, women, and those who may be with them [children?] shall remain in peace every day.”⁹ The aim of this proclamation was to protect the families and lands of nobles who would depart for the Holy Land on crusade, but it could have paved the way toward greater consideration of the plight of the defenseless.

Can a claim be made for the First Crusade as a moment of shifting attitudes toward civilian rights? Judging by the second-hand accounts of the pope’s call for crusade, warriors were repeatedly urged to defend the weak and abused eastern Christians from their Turkish rulers and, in the process, to remove violent warfare from Europe. Many of these accounts portray Turks in the Holy Land not just as aggressive, but as bloodthirsty savages.¹⁰ The perceived plight of eastern Christians was described most graphically in Robert the Monk’s version of Urban’s sermon at Clermont (1095): “a race utterly alienated from God ... has invaded the lands of those Christians and has depopulated them with sword, pillage, and fire; it has led away a part of the captives into its own country, and a part it has destroyed by cruel tortures.” He goes on to describe circumcisions,

evisceration and other types of execution in gory detail, drawing the line only at the rape of women, of which he claims to be unable to speak.¹¹ Meanwhile, a sense of connection with eastern Christians is stressed; one version by Baldric of Dol quotes Urban calling them “blood-brothers.”¹² At moments like these, the rhetoric attributed to Urban at Clermont bears a similarity to later human rights initiatives where men were summoned to defend the weak and oppressed in another part of the world.¹³ This is all the more impressive when one considers the differences between the Franks and eastern Christians: they were separated by thousands of miles, confessional differences and, in the case of the Greeks, schism. Hardened warriors, whose current occupations were much more self-interested, were asked to put themselves in harm’s way to fight for a higher cause, and they went in droves.

However, the behavior of the first crusaders after they responded to Urban’s call clearly prevents us from claiming it as a forerunner of modern humanitarian intervention.¹⁴ Despite the compassion we see for eastern Christians, in theory and often in practice, bloodlust for the Muslims was celebrated as a virtue rather than accepted as an unfortunate side-effect. Muslims became not just the enemy, but in many cases, the anti-Christ. Nor did crusaders save their ire for Muslim men at arms. They were, on many occasions, as merciless toward Muslim and Jewish non-combatants as the Turks had supposedly been to the Christians. This brings us back to July 15–16, 1099, when the holy city was sacked after a five-week siege. Other examples of brutality to civilians preceded the sack of Jerusalem, from the slaughter of the Rhineland Jews by a band of departing crusaders (1096) to the sack of Antioch (1097), but the capture of the holy city stands apart for the relentlessness of the violence. In terms of civilian casualties, few medieval cases surpass the sack that accompanied the conquest. Were all these events permissible according to the medieval “law of arms,” a customary practice which entitled armed captors to do as they pleased with cities and their populations?¹⁵

Every Christian report of the siege ends by describing a bloodbath. Raymond of Aguilers, an eyewitness, famously stated: “Our men followed [the defenders], killing and slaying even to the Temple of Solomon, where the slaughter was so great that our men waded in blood up to their ankles.”¹⁶ Despite the efforts of some leaders to offer protection to surrendering civilians, both Raymond and Peter Tudebode, another eyewitness, describe soldiers decapitating both men and women who had gathered at the Temple, a place of sanctuary. Fulcher of Chartres, who

visited Jerusalem the following December and commented on the stench of the bodies even five months later, states: “Not one of them was allowed to live. They did not spare the women and children.”¹⁷ As David Little succinctly put it, in the First Crusade “very little heed was paid to non-combatant immunity.”¹⁸ Benjamin Kedar’s thorough examination of sources on 1099 provides some important details. While his investigation of the numbers killed shows an estimate of 3,000 Muslims and Jews (as opposed to others of 10,000 and up to 70,000), this is still a huge toll if we consider that the population was between 20,000 and 30,000, many of whom were attempting to surrender or escape. Second, he demonstrates that the violence the crusaders showed in such a thorough massacre was, in the words of eyewitnesses and contemporaries, unprecedented.¹⁹

What is perhaps most striking about these accounts, even that of the more restrained later writer William of Tyre (c. 1130–1186) who grew up in the Holy Land, is that almost no participant or contemporary Christian writer seems ashamed of the indiscriminate slaughter of women, children and the elderly.²⁰ None of the writers tries to minimize the slaughter—in fact, they magnify it with rivers of blood. Nor do they hide the fact that Jews and other civilians tried to surrender and were given guarantees of safety, which other attackers then abrogated. The capture of the city is described as a bloody cleansing, an idea that would become so ingrained that, following the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 to Saladin, offers of a peaceful return of the holy city by treaty were scorned as unworthy of God’s justice.²¹ In short, to modern eyes, and even to contemporaries, who praised the massacre, there is more than a hint of genocide in these frenzied attacks, which is the polar opposite of human rights.

How do we reconcile the crusaders’ bloodlust against some populations with their desire to protect fellow Christians as an act of charity? To some extent, we may attribute this ferocity to a xenophobic incomprehension of “the Other,” which permitted actions abroad that were unthinkable at home. But other forces were clearly at work that enabled crusaders to twist Christ’s message so profoundly. Richard Kaeuper’s take on the appeal of the crusades to the Frankish warrior aristocracy helps to explain this disjuncture beyond the simple “us versus them.” He demonstrates the paradox between chivalry, a concept built upon military prowess and honor, and the religion of Christ, which preaches peace. Ironically, crusaders, the holiest of knights, evaded this difficulty because they were not called upon to temper their violence, but only to take it elsewhere; nor were they ordered to avoid the profitable wartime activity of looting.²²

They saw their task as fighting on Christ's behalf and suffering for him, either through injuries, extreme deprivation or martyrdom—for these men, the bloodier the battle, the greater their own personal sacrifice and commitment to God. By this rationale, so long as they avoided fighting other Christians, the crusades offered knights surprising freedom and independence, which were in decreasing supply at home as kings sought to centralize and the clergy sought to curb their actions. Hence, among the ideals that Kaeuper finds articulated in holy war, protection of the innocent is not one of them.²³ This notion squares with a recent study by Susanna Throop on vengeance as a central tenet of crusading.²⁴ Crusaders either found a loophole in Urban's original message, or the invitation to wield excessive violence and vengeance was there from the start; certainly by the early twelfth century—when chroniclers like Robert the Monk and others recorded events of the First Crusade, including Urban's sermon at Clermont—the military success of the crusade was viewed as legitimizing their tactics.

Another example from the crusade era that should be noted more briefly is the culmination of the Fourth Crusade, which was called to relieve the Holy Land, but ended in the disastrous sack of Christian Constantinople in 1204. The crusaders experienced money problems from the start; a few months in, the majority felt compelled to answer a call from the Byzantine prince, Alexios Angelos, to help put him and his deposed father, Isaac, on the throne in return for an astronomical (and unrealistic) payment, aid for their crusade and union with the Roman Catholic Church.²⁵ The appearance of this army frightened the citizens into backing Alexios and his father's claim, but a few months later the frustrated crusaders, still awaiting their payment, attacked in full force upon hearing that Alexios had been assassinated. Maddened for loot and convinced by their priests that the "schismatic" and now regicidal Greeks were a legitimate target, they broke through the city walls and ran amok for three days (April 13–15).²⁶ In terms of casualties, the sources are mixed. According to the Greek writer Nicetas: "No one was without a share in the grief. In the alleys, in the streets, in the temples, complaints, weeping, lamentations, grief, the groaning of men, the shrieks of women, wounds, rape, captivity, the separation of those most closely united."²⁷ Pope Innocent III, who was angered by the news, prophetically said that all hope for a union was lost. He corroborated much of what Nicetas had said in a letter to the papal legate: "As for those who were supposed to be seeking the end of Jesus Christ, not their own ends, whose swords, which they were supposed

to use against the pagans, are now dripping with Christian blood—they have spared neither age nor sex. They have committed incest, adultery, and fornication before the eyes of men. They have exposed both matrons and virgins, even those dedicated to God, to the sordid lusts of boys.”²⁸ He goes on to condemn their despoiling of churches and theft of relics. Participants would reveal a different story. Geoffrey of Villehardouin claimed that the sack was just because the current emperor was a usurper and a murderer; he depicted the Latin clergy who were present assuring the crusaders that all the Greeks were schismatics.²⁹ He went on to describe the careful agreements that were made ahead of time as to how booty would be taken and divided; after the sack, some men were executed not for abusing the civilians, but for keeping more than their share. Indeed, the one-sided “law of arms” prevailed there, but Villehardouin is very quiet regarding violence to civilians during the sack. While the truthfulness of the crusaders may be doubted, it is clear that the casualties were nowhere near as heavy as those in Jerusalem; the main focus of the sack was full-on looting, perhaps exacerbated by the inclusion among the army of “vengeful ex-residents” or Latins who had been expelled from the city in August 1203 and swelled the crusaders’ camp.³⁰ The stripping of Constantinople’s wealth, private and public, profane and sacred, is very well known. The loss of this wealth and the devastation of large portions of the city during the Latin attacks and occupation were damages from which the empire would never recover even after the Greeks regained the city in 1261; the loss of vast territories in the mainland and islands to the Latins further weakened the Byzantine state.

What is interesting here about 1204, especially in contrast to 1099, is that participants like Villehardouin did not boast about slaughter or abuse of civilians; in fact, he says very little about murder at all and nothing about rape and other abuses. Either he was ashamed of such acts and suppressed them, or the Fourth Crusaders felt no need for spiritual “cleansing” among the Greeks. Indeed, even as Pope Innocent roundly chastised the legate, he was forced to publicly approve the conquest since it led to a long-awaited union with the Greeks. The response of Latin Christians to the news of the capture (and sack) of Constantinople is also of interest to us for what it may reveal about attitudes to *ius in bello*. The general feeling in Western Europe was one of elation—the conquest brought the Greeks (or so they thought) back into the fold of the Roman Catholic Church, along with a flood of coveted relics into Western Europe, and incredible wealth and land to many of its participants.

Both 1099 and 1204 might be viewed as examples of heightened hostility to outsiders or peoples who were regarded as infidels or schismatics. We should ask, then, if Western soldiers generally behaved better to fellow (Latin) Christians in similar circumstances. John Finnis, for one, has argued that it was “an exceptionless moral norm that innocents must not be deliberately killed.” Citing Aquinas (1225–1274), who wrote a short but authoritative treatise on war, Finnis believes that “there is no doubt that he held that norm to be applicable to war.”³¹ The literary ideal of noble knights helping the oppressed can also be seen at least as early as twelfth-century romances. Still, norms and poetic ideals tell us nothing about their observance in practice. If this norm were widely accepted, why does the subject receive more and not less attention from Christian writers over time? As we turn to the Hundred Years War (1337–1453) between France and England, we find a growing number of writers who reflected on the consequences of war on the larger population. For decades on and off, two powerful Christian nations brutally fought each other, disrupting agriculture and commerce, ransoming or killing captives, and harming countless civilians along the way, bringing a greater sense of urgency to questions on how to limit such violence. Honoré Bonet (c. 1340–1410), a monk from the knightly class, and the courtier Christine de Pisan (1364–1430) wrote while the campaigns raged. Bonet’s *Tree of Battles* has been called “the earliest expression of a full idea of *ius in bello*, synthesizing the churchly and chivalric contributions, with both an elaborated conception of noncombatant immunity and a requirement of proportional restraint in combat.”³² Hence, in the fourteenth century, a fuller articulation of restraint in war begins to develop, even as the practice increasingly diverged from the ideal.³³

The famous chronicler Jean Froissart wrote about the Hundred Years War ostensibly to celebrate the conduct of the noble participants. As he states in his prologue: “In order that the honourable enterprises, noble adventures and deeds of arms which took place during the wars waged by France and England should be fittingly related and preserved for posterity, so that brave men should be inspired thereby to follow such examples, I wish to place on record these matters of great renown.”³⁴ But this was certainly not the whole story. Froissart was writing against the backdrop of a growing language and ideology of chivalry as seen in Geoffrey de Charny’s *Book of Chivalry* (c. 1350), yet as Kaeuper has shown, medieval contemporaries measured a knight’s “chivalry” by his effectiveness, even ruthlessness in combat, rather than the *gentillesse* and restraint more

familiar to romantic Victorian notions of the word.³⁵ Literary figures of medieval romance like Chretien de Troyes' Yvain who put aside his ego and helped weak individuals in distress did not find many real-life counterparts. Froissart shows us shining feats of valor, but we see no heroes riding to the defense of the common folk at darker moments. In fact, one of the best-known stories of mercy comes at the "womanly" intervention of the pregnant Queen Philippa who alone manages to stay the hand of the wrathful Edward III when he plans to execute the burghers of Calais.³⁶

Scenes of knightly prowess on the field of battle dominate the chronicle, but Froissart also shows us several examples of soldiers mowing down or abusing civilians: fellow Christians who followed the same liturgy and often spoke the same language. Froissart tells of an attack on Southampton one Sunday during mass, where Normans and Genoese "entered the town and pillaged and looted it completely. They killed many people and raped a number of women and girls, which was a deplorable thing."³⁷ Here Froissart juxtaposes the piety and defenselessness of the victims against their powerful attackers; clearly this was no fair field of battle. Even more chilling is the scene of terrible slaughter at Limoges in 1370, where the Black Prince takes his fury out on the traitorous bishop by ordering his men to massacre everyone in the town; more than 3,000 men, women and children were "dragged out to have their throats cut."³⁸ Froissart is careful to provide details that reveal the level of disregard for innocent life: "There were pitiful scenes. Men, women, and children flung themselves on their knees before the Prince, crying: 'Have mercy on us, gentle sir!' But he was so inflamed with anger that he would not listen." In one of the most moving statements in the entire chronicle, Froissart exclaims: "I do not understand how they could have failed to take pity on people who were too unimportant to have committed treason. Yet they paid for it, and paid more dearly than the leaders who committed it."³⁹ This senseless atrocity is juxtaposed on the very next page with the treatment of aristocratic enemies at Limoges. Froissart describes a handful of nobles fighting hand to hand in the square in a fine display of manhood and agility; the scene was so inspiring that the mere sight of it made the raging Black Prince grow calm. These nobles were allowed to surrender and be treated "according to the law of arms"—right after the cries for mercy of those who could not defend themselves went brutally unheeded.⁴⁰ This scene so richly drawn by Froissart reveals the darkest side of the Black Prince, whose bravery shone so brightly at the Battle of Poitiers. However, it is difficult to know if Froissart was basically reporting what he heard from reliable (or biased)

sources or if he purposely embellished the events in order to elucidate the failings of chivalry and the needless sufferings of civilians.⁴¹

Were attacks such as these rare or were they considered typical practice in medieval warfare? According to Maurice Keen, sieges were often turning points in a war: "Perhaps this goes some way to explaining what is most striking about the laws which governed siege warfare, their unusual and savage severity."⁴² Using chronicles as his main source base, Keen convincingly shows that behavior we would consider to be outrageous and illegal today was considered acceptable according to a vague, but broadly shared notion of the law of arms: "In a city taken by storm almost any license was condoned by the law. Only churches and churchmen were technically secure, but even they were not often spared. Women could be raped and men could be killed out of hand."⁴³ Looting was also completely acceptable and could be done in the heat of capture or with cold-blooded precision. The point is that a town taken by siege could rightfully be put to punishment for its refusal to capitulate, even if its citizens tried to surrender after the fact. By contrast, men could surrender on the field of battle, presumably at any time, without shame or loss of life according to the same law of arms.⁴⁴

To men at arms, this may have seemed sensible, as clemency to surrendering townspeople would, theoretically, only give them greater reason to revolt or resist capture in the future, but to men like Froissart, born of the Third Estate and able to see the war between France and England from both sides, the hypocrisy was clear. As such, Froissart's text presents us with a fascinating intersection: first, he reveals that atrocities occurred among Christians and were accepted as just under certain circumstances; and, second, he shows that at least some writers were beginning to publicize and criticize these attacks. By the late fourteenth century, then, we see a growing awareness of the horrors of war against the powerless and a rising dissatisfaction with the way in which European leaders ignored or even encouraged the savagery.⁴⁵

Froissart's sensitivity and rhetorical skill on the sufferings of non-combatants would seem to herald a turning point in medieval views of warfare. But how widespread was this outcry? Was Froissart's indignation at such atrocities shared by many other writers at this time? According to some scholars, we see very little dialogue on the issue of just war until 1530, with the work of Francisco de Vitoria writing about the Americas; in fact, James Turner Johnson discusses no writers between Bonet and Pisan in the fourteenth century and Vitoria and Suárez in the sixteenth

century.⁴⁶ This picture of almost two centuries of nothingness in between Bonet and Vitoria is misleading. To be fair, scholars examining just war and early notions of human rights were focusing their attention on theoretical and legal sources rather than literary, historical and rhetorical genres that dominate humanist works. Nor do they consider the importance of chronicles like that of Froissart, whom Johnson also ignores. While the methodological focus of their examination is understandable, such a limitation causes us to overlook both events and texts of great significance.

Without diminishing the importance of the previous examples treated in this chapter, the chorus of outrage that the one event of 1453 unleashed truly sets it apart at this time. As Margaret Meserve has stated: “The Turkish sack struck those who witnessed it, and those in Europe who heard of it soon afterward, as a calamity almost unprecedented in the history of civilization.”⁴⁷ It is hard to think of another sack that drew such strong written reactions in the previous three centuries and, if we confine ourselves to Europe, in the previous millennium. Yet, as noted, this moment has been curiously ignored by historians of just war and human rights, perhaps because it does not fit so easily into schemas of Christian, juridical or chivalric thought; indeed, the humanists’ greatest spurs were classical texts and reports on the Ottoman threat. But the previous discussion helps to remind us of the diverse historical and chivalric sources that may also have informed their thinking, and it cautions us against drawing hard lines between different types of texts and experiences of war. These earlier treatments will also offer useful comparisons going forward.

The dramatic seven-week siege of Constantinople has been described and analyzed at length, from the strategic genius of Sultan Mehmed II and his generals, to the dilatory response of Western powers who failed to send aid in time, to the courage on both sides of the battle, but our focus is on the sack and the attention it received from Western writers and audiences.⁴⁸ In a previous study I explored how the fall of Constantinople in 1453 stands as a watershed moment in perceptions of the Turks. Before this stunning loss, writers expressed concerns about defeats to the Turks like Nicopolis (1396), Varna (1444) and other events, but with 1453 we see a response on an unprecedented level.⁴⁹ The city had over 40,000 civilians when it fell to a well-trained army of about 80,000—all of whom had been promised a three-day sack. When the army breached the walls, they first ran through the city, cutting down a largely defenseless population as they had imagined resistance would be fierce. When it became clear that few had the means to fight them, they took to rounding the citizens

up for ransom and enslavement, killing anyone who resisted, and beating and raping many of the inhabitants in the process.

One early, widely read account was a letter to Pope Nicholas V by the Genoese Archbishop of Mytilene, Leonardo of Chios, who came to Constantinople in the company of the papal legate in 1452 and witnessed the conquest. Despite his biases toward the Greeks and the Turks, and his grief for the loss of the city, Leonardo is a fairly trustworthy reporter who gives credit to the Ottomans and their young leader for superior strategy and determination. Compared to many of the early, erroneous reports, Leonardo's had "literary merit, appealed to ecclesiastical and humanistic circles alike, and set the record straight."⁵⁰ He survived the sack with some rough treatment by the soldiers, but was largely uninjured. He was soon released and even managed to buy books that the soldiers were selling.⁵¹ Still, the horrors of the sack left him quite shaken, as he wrote in a letter to Nicholas V: "The soldiers ran eagerly through [the city], putting to the sword all who resisted, slaughtering the aged and the feeble-minded, the lepers and the infirm, while they spared the rest who surrendered to them ... All the valuables and other booty were taken to their camp, and as many as sixty thousand Christians who had been captured." In addition to expounding at length on the pillage and desecration of churches, including Hagia Sophia, where many civilians had fled to safety and were rounded up for capture, he describes terrible abuses: "Women were raped, virgins deflowered, and youths forced to take part in shameful obscenities. The nuns left behind, even those who were obviously such, were disgraced with foul debaucheries."⁵² Greek nobles faced no better fate: the majority of the men were executed after Mehmed had initially ransomed them from their captors; many Venetians who fought at Constantinople, including the high-ranking *baili*, were also executed in punishment for resisting Mehmed's attack.

Similarly, Nicolò Barbaro, a Venetian patrician, surgeon and eyewitness, stated in his account that the first wave of Turks who entered the city "went rushing about ... and anyone they found they put to the scimitar, women and men, old and young, of any condition. This butchery lasted from sunrise, when the Turks entered the city, until midday ... Those of our merchants who escaped hid themselves in underground places, and when the first mad slaughter was over, they were found by the Turks and were all taken and sold as slaves." He goes on to describe the captivity and rape of women: "They sought out the monasteries, and all the nuns were led to the fleet and ravished and abused by the Turks, and then sold

at auctions for slaves throughout Turkey, and all the young women also were ravished and then sold for whatever they would fetch, although some of them preferred to cast themselves into the wells and drown rather than fall into the hands of the Turks, as did a number of married women also.” While less prone to rhetorical flourish than Leonardo, Barbaro also claims that “blood flowed in the city like rainwater in the gutters after a sudden storm” and bodies were thrown into the Dardanelles “where they floated out to sea like melons along a canal.”⁵³ Even the more balanced account written by the Greek Kritoboulos, who was not present at the siege, but notes the sultan’s grief at the destruction of the city and excuses many of his actions, still describes the sack as worse than Troy, Babylon, Carthage, Rome or Jerusalem for its mistreatment of the inhabitants.⁵⁴

While violence toward civilians was not uncommon when Christians took a city, as the previous examples have shown, enslavement was another story. For centuries, the practice had declined in Western Europe as the economic and political structures of the Roman Empire disappeared and the Church discouraged the enslavement of fellow Christians. While slaves were not absent in fifteenth-century Europe, we see nothing like the scale of what took place among the Ottomans, who frequently took captives in raids in the countryside as well as in sieges of towns.⁵⁵ The shock of Christian contemporaries therefore seems genuine. The Greek historian Doukas lamented that enslaved families were separated, sometimes by long distances: “The husband was taken to Paphlagonia and the wife to Egypt. The children were dispersed in other places and they converted from one language to another, and from piety to impiety, and from sacred scriptures to uncouth writings.”⁵⁶ Some victims were able to write their own stories of their lives turned upside down, like the Greek dignitary George Sphrantzes, who was held captive for several months. While he was able to gather a ransom for himself and his wife, he was too late to save his young son and daughter, who died in Mehmed’s seraglio. The boy was executed for conspiracy to murder the sultan and the girl died of disease.⁵⁷ Some individuals and families escaped capture or were quickly ransomed, but the number of individuals enslaved, for several months, to years, to the remainder of their lives appears quite high.

The old adage that history is written by the victors did not apply for Christian writers and audiences in 1453. The firestorm of outrage and laments that this event would unleash in Western and Eastern Europe engaged the distinctly uncomfortable perspective of history written by the vanquished. For the first time in centuries, large numbers of Europeans

were focused on an event in which they were made to identify with the victims. Considering how many contemporaries were engrossed by the history, literature and art of the victorious Roman Empire, this was indeed a change of pace. And if any contemporaries compared the triumphant crusader accounts of 1099, they would have been struck by the reversal of roles, without, of course, the wholesale, deliberate slaughter of the earlier sack.

Humanists in Western Europe responded to the tragedies of Constantinople in such numbers that the genre was dismissed by some scholars as an insincere fad.⁵⁸ But as I and others have shown, these rich responses are well worth closer examination.⁵⁹ Previously, I focused on these texts to understand cultural constructs of the Turks and a growing sense of “Europe” vs. “Asia,” but in this chapter, I wish to look more closely at some of their responses to reports of atrocities and human bondage. The rhetoric they used to describe the sack became so widespread and formulaic that it established a discourse of barbarism and savagery.⁶⁰ Cardinal Bessarion, a Greek metropolitan who supported union with the Roman Church and rose to great rank and influence, wrote from Bologna upon hearing the news:

the head of all Greece, the splendor and glory of the East, the school of the best arts, the refuge of all good things, has been captured, despoiled, ravaged, and completely sacked by the most inhuman barbarians and the most savage of enemies of the Christian faith, by the fiercest of wild beasts. The public treasure has been consumed, private wealth has been destroyed, the temples have been stripped of gold, silver, jewels and relics of the saints, and other precious ornaments. Men have been butchered like cattle, women abducted, virgins ravished, and children snatched from the arms of parents. If any survived so great a slaughter, they have been enslaved in chains so that they might be ransomed for a price, or subjected to every kind of torture, or reduced to the most humiliating servitude.⁶¹

Venetian humanist Lauro Quirini, who was residing in Crete, wrote to the pope on July 15. The letter is an extended and eloquent lament on the loss of this ancient Christian capital and center of learning, characterizing it as a shift from the heights of civility to the depths of destructive barbarism.⁶² Speaking specifically of the human costs, he states: “Those citizens, descended from the Romans, were savagely slaughtered before the eyes of their parents. The noblest virgins, honorable boys, dignified matrons, and

venerable nuns were seized, killed, and raped.”⁶³ Other humanists like the Florentines Niccolò Tignosi and Poggio Bracciolini also highlighted the cruelty and bloodshed of the sack, with Tignosi making a pun on the name of the Turks (*Teuceri*) by saying that the term “butchers” (*truces*) would be more appropriate.⁶⁴

Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini—humanist, bishop, secretary to Emperor Frederick III, and later Pope Pius II—reflected on the fall of Constantinople in several letters, orations and histories. His work is especially important because it circulated widely around Europe in both manuscript and (later) print versions. The impact of this event on Aeneas was life-changing, marking the beginning of a personal campaign to defeat the Ottoman Turks and push them out of Europe that would become the central work of his papal reign.⁶⁵ One of his earliest written reactions was a letter to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (July 21, 1453). It is a tour de force, with reflections on the military aspects of the siege; losses to the Christian faith in churches, sacred relics and other items; the destruction of countless books, which leads him into a long discussion of the Ottomans as enemies of learning; and plans for a Europe-wide crusade. But here I wish to focus on his characterization of human losses, which reflects the exaggerated reports that first reached Western Europe in the initial weeks of panic and despair: “He [Mehmed II] had issued edicts that all persons of both sexes above the age of six years of age should be killed. The emperor of New Rome ... is reputed to have been beheaded ... Priests and all the monks were mutilated with diverse torments and killed. All the rest of the common people were given over to the sword. There was such an effusion of blood that rivers of gore flowed through the city.” Then, reflecting on the founding of the city by Constantine, he adds: “The first Rome, too, had stood for as long a time or a bit more when it first was invaded by the Goths. Alaric invaded it in the years 1164 from the founding of the city [410], but he decreed that the basilicas of the saints should not be broken open.”⁶⁶ At one point, he asserts that the level of violence unleashed in the sack and its aftermath was something modern, presumably “civilized,” men had not seen for ages, stating that Mehmed “afflict[ed] the Christian people with great slaughters which, I think, were unheard of for many centuries before our own.”⁶⁷

In a letter of September 25, 1453 to Leonardo Benvoglianti, Aeneas adds further embellishment: “What utter slaughter in the imperial city would I relate, virgins prostituted, boys made to submit as women, nuns raped, and all sorts of monks and women treated wickedly?” He even goes

on to relate an apocryphal story about Mehmed raping a girl and a boy of “royal blood” on the high altar of Hagia Sophia and ordering them killed; the emperor was, in fact, childless.⁶⁸ Some aspects of this story would change for Aeneas over time as it became better known that not everyone over six, for instance, was executed, nor was the story of Mehmed publicly raping two royal children more than lurid gossip. When he wrote his *De Europa* (1458), which circulated in many manuscript and print versions in German and Italian as well as Latin, the siege and sack were discussed at length. His tone here was more restrained, but the image of Ottoman atrocities had not greatly improved. If anything, it had solidified: “As soon as they had captured the city and killed everyone who dared to resist, they took to pillaging. The victors, whose numbers were beyond count, showed utter depravity in their lust and cruelty: neither rank, nor age, nor sex protected anyone. Rape was mixed with butchery, and butchery with rape. Old men of advanced age and women worthless as booty were dragged off just for sport. When a mature young woman or a male of conspicuous good looks fell into the hands of the looters, they were torn to pieces and finally drove the plunderers themselves to murder one another.”⁶⁹

At first glance, there is nothing surprising about the humanists’ dismay, use of strong rhetoric or even their early credulity about some of the wilder stories they had heard. Constantinople had been considered a key city in the defense of Christendom against the Ottoman advance, the one strategic outpost that could break the link between the Turks’ Asian and European territories. It was also a Christian city and pilgrimage destination, filled with shrines and relics. Finally, it was a city of civilians, not a garrison of soldiers or a battlefield. Yet, when placed in the context of centuries of warfare in Europe and the relative silence or brevity about the impact of specific sieges on civilians (Froissart and a few others notwithstanding), some sort of shift in thinking seems to have taken place. All of a sudden, it seems, humanists (as well as vernacular writers, politicians and clergymen) had awoken to the ravages of war.

It has been argued that contemporaries like Aeneas should not have been shocked given previous examples in the Bible, Homer and histories of the ancient world, not to mention the abuses that occurred when the Fourth Crusade went off the rails and Constantinople was *first* sacked by Latin Christians in 1204.⁷⁰ There are several problems with this argument. The author cites examples that are at least two and a half centuries before the humanists wrote—most of them much older. The case of 1204 is complicated for reasons discussed earlier, and the sack of Rome in 410 was

often invoked by humanists like Aeneas to say that 1453 was far worse; at least the “barbarians” of the fifth century spared churches and all who fled to them, whereas the new barbarians of the fifteenth century heeded no restraints. So, while shocking precedents to 1453 were known to humanists, they cannot be compared as equivalent in their minds. Perhaps other sacks like those of Cesena (1377) or Piacenza (1447), which will be discussed, could be compared by modern historians for the scope of the atrocities. Yet, for some reason, they received little attention by more than one or two writers.

What was it about the Ottoman sack of Constantinople that made it stand out and receive so much attention at this time? It could have something to do with the frequent yet comparatively limited nature of warfare in Renaissance Italy. Before the dreadful wars of the sixteenth century, sacks of this scale were probably quite rare. Michael Mallett argued that “there are in fact very few examples in fifteenth-century Italian warfare of cities being treated entirely ruthlessly even after assault. A slaughtered civilian population and a destroyed city ceased to be a valuable prize.”⁷¹ Unless we look back to some of the responses to the sack of Rome in 410 or chroniclers’ vague assertions of atrocities in the Holy Land prior to 1095—largely echoes of Pope Urban’s rhetoric—I can think of no single instance that drew as much attention and consternation as 1453 and the Ottoman sieges that followed, such as Negroponte (1470), Otranto (1480) and Vienna (1529). The sheer amount of writing that survives on these sacks (especially that of 1453) puts them in a class by themselves that was not to be matched until the dreadful uprisings and wars of the sixteenth century.

However, there is one answer that truly stands above the rest: the sack of 1453, unlike that of Limoges or other local sacks, was committed (largely) by a religious and cultural “other.”⁷² I would argue that this perceived “otherness” simultaneously increased European contemporaries’ horror and made it easier for them to discuss and vilify many of the same practices that were committed by fellow Christians and countrymen, without fear of offense or retribution. It also enabled them to form a unified and lasting discourse of moral outrage—almost no one defended the Ottoman’s right to sack by “the law of arms” in regard to 1453. Yet, from the Ottoman standpoint, Mehmed was (rightfully) punishing a vassal state that had issued a lightly veiled threat to abet a rebellion and refused to hand over the city when he demanded it.⁷³ Granted, the scale of 1453 was larger than anything they had seen in living memory and the mass enslavement

of civilians was a perverse spectacle for them, but in many other ways, they were decrying familiar realities of warfare. Perhaps, like Froissart, there were many times when they wished to revile cruel Christian soldiers and callous generals, but if one wanted to censure the English, French or Milanese, they would have to tread more carefully; they could only go so far before running afoul of a powerful supporter or relative of the side they were vilifying. For humanists especially, their livelihood depended on the changing world of patronage. Remembering this context north of the Alps as well makes Froissart's bold words about his own patrons and neighboring powers decades earlier all the more impressive.

The Ottomans presented no such ideological barrier in fifteenth-century Western Europe. They were a safe target for recrimination.⁷⁴ As such, I would argue that the Ottomans offered a test case for early human rights discourse. They gave Western writers, particularly humanists, the perfect opportunity to explore ideas about which battles were unjust, how far warfare should extend and, most importantly, the devastating and unconscionable impact on non-combatants. Other humanists may have criticized certain wars, as seen in Petrarch's letters on the Hundred Years War and the Genoese-Venetian conflict, but they tended to stop short of extensive descriptions of specific sacks and their atrocities.

As humanists continued to digest the events of 1453, they reflected on this question more expansively. To return to Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini's *Europe*, he writes that: "The victors, whose numbers were beyond count, showed utter depravity in their lust and cruelty: neither rank nor age nor sex protected anyone ... And since this immense and ill-sorted army, comprised of native Turks, allies, and foreigners, held such a diversity of languages, customs, and desires, and each man differed in his sense of right and wrong, for three full days there was nothing in Constantinople that was not permitted."⁷⁵ This response is more nuanced than earlier ones that painted the Ottoman army as fully Turk and fully barbarian; here some recognition of the diversity of Mehmed's troops (and perhaps empire) is duly noted. But this diversity is also treated as a source of the sultan's inability to control his army. In any case, we see the same urge to export the problem of wartime atrocities elsewhere by suggesting that where Aeneas and his fellow readers lived, the law of arms (toward non-combatants) was actually observed and protected certain people from violence. Aeneas may have been right to suggest that rank (and the ability to pay high ransoms) often saved certain people, but when sacks occurred, all townspeople in Europe were vulnerable and would become increasingly

so as the use of mercenary armies meant that men were brought in from afar, fighting for pay and/or booty, and often comprised a motley army.⁷⁶ What is interesting is that he projects the expectation of higher standards elsewhere, like Europe. Despite the ambiguities in our field of vision, for European writers of the time, the Ottomans offered a rich opportunity to seize the moral high ground. Norman Housley has examined these tropes in the repeated use of the term *immane genus* (inhuman race or people) to apply to the Turks. This was a powerful term, he notes, because it was the “lexical opposite of *humanitas*,” showing the humanists’ imprint on broader perceptions of the Turks.⁷⁷ So successful and vivid a trope did Turkish inhumanity and unbounded aggression become that “Turk” was soon applied to Christians as a harsh polemic when their behavior sank to that level.⁷⁸

We should also consider the timing of the fall of Constantinople and how that may have amplified the sense of outrage and discussion of the rights of civilians: it came at a moment when communications were reaching an unprecedented level in Italy. First, there was an advanced network of information already at work in Renaissance Italy, allowing word of important developments to travel very fast. Print was not yet commonly used in 1453, but Leonardo of Chios’ letter, for example, was copied and circulated widely, acting as a source for several, also widely circulated secondary accounts.⁷⁹ As Meserve has noted: “A sophisticated, politically engaged, and informed system of public discourse was already at work in the urban centers of Italy before print arrived.” If we consider the enormous interest the Ottoman advance generated, in some ways we see an early version of Habermas’ “public sphere.” As printing increased in Italy and other areas, the Turkish advance was already a popular topic. Therefore, when the disastrous loss of the Venetian colony of Negroponte in Greece occurred in 1470, the response in print was swift.⁸⁰ Surprisingly, the fall of Constantinople also continued to be a subject of great interest for printers decades after the event.⁸¹

Nor was this response confined to humanists and readers of Latin, as can be seen in surviving vernacular laments, sermons, tales and artwork.⁸² The circulation of these ideas in an era just as print was taking hold is significant and denotes a public that was eager for news of the Ottoman advance and hopeful for Christian victories—rare though the latter were. While it is still too early to speak of journalism in any formal sense, the network of information on the Ottomans c. 1453 shares similarities with the way in which newspapers helped publicize Ottoman atrocities in the

nineteenth century. Gary Bass has pointed to the role that publicity of Ottoman atrocities in nineteenth-century Greece and Bulgaria played in calls for humanitarian intervention in England.⁸³ Nor is it a coincidence that Gladstone evoked images of Turkish barbarism in the nineteenth century in terms very similar to those of fifteenth-century humanists—they were operating under the same notion of Western “civility” and the privilege of thinking that their own countrymen were above such acts. In short, one could argue that 1453 enabled Europeans to examine and deconstruct atrocities for the first time in centuries as a shared, cross-national endeavor. For Europeans to begin this broad conversation just as they were about to embark on decades of horrifying and unrestrained warfare within their own boundaries is important timing.

Turning our gaze back to Europe, this outcry had broader consequences than creating a two-dimensional discourse on Turkish inhumanity. While the sack of Constantinople afforded Europeans the chance to feel morally superior, some saw the hypocrisy of this outrage and turned the lens on the behavior of fellow Christians in battle. We see a very early and fascinating example of this in Francesco Filelfo’s *Sforziad*, begun in 1453. As Diana Robin’s study shows, Filelfo, a humanist who was living in Milan and seeking patronage, decided to write this epic poem about the deeds of the condottiere and current ruler, Francesco Sforza—less to celebrate the duke than to showcase his own abilities as a writer.⁸⁴ Among the moments Filelfo treats in the *Sforziad* are the capture and brutal, lengthy sack of Piacenza. A client city of Milan under the previous duke, Filippo Maria Visconti, Piacenza threw off its Milanese overlordship and transferred its loyalty to Venice just after Visconti passed away in 1447. The new Milanese government hired Sforza to take the city and, after a seven-week siege, Piacenza was stormed on November 16. As Michael Mallett has shown, in terms similar to those used by Maurice Keen, a city that was disloyal to its overlord or patron could “rightfully” be subject to harsh retribution, although, as noted above, large-scale sacks were rare.⁸⁵ In Piacenza the “law of arms” prevailed and led to a devastating sack where the populace was subject to murder, robbery, harassment and rape—the troops in this case stayed for six months, terrorizing the population and despoiling without check. Filelfo himself witnessed some of this when he visited the town in December 1447.⁸⁶ He shed a harsh light on the destruction, looting, plunder of churches and abuse of the citizens, but drew special attention to the terrible and widespread rape: “The sound of sad weeping rises in the air. Over here a young girl is dragged off; and

right over there a pure wife submits, with her husband watching her, to whatever lust and madness dictate. For when sad victory is won, covered with such bloodshed, what leader could restrain the maddened soldiers?" Nuns, too, he adds, "endure every evil and dark dishonor ... even the eucharist lies on the ground as though it were a shameful thing."⁸⁷ A contemporary reading this passage could not help but be reminded of the stories circulating about the dreaded Turks. Filelfo boldly shows how Christian soldiers and generals could be every bit as bad as their "barbaric" counterparts.

Is there a connection between this portion of the *Sforziad* and the fall of Constantinople? While we cannot date Filelfo's commencement of the epic more precisely than the year 1453, the timing and the similarities to rhetoric about the Turks strongly suggest that the news and reactions circulating about the sack of Constantinople brought the atrocities of Piacenza back to his mind with a fresh vengeance. Why should the neglectful Sforza and his despicable men not be called to account for their own lack of humanity?⁸⁸ Filelfo was certainly more daring than most of his contemporaries in revealing details of Sforza's glorious victories that other court writers, such as Giovanni Simonetta and Pier Candido Decembrio, chose to conceal.⁸⁹ Filelfo's bold stance reveals the conflict that the Roman heritage could evoke for humanists when writing on war. How did one square a culture that celebrated total conquest and domination with Christian mercy and humility?⁹⁰ Perhaps humanists found it a relief to vent publicly against Ottoman atrocities; it enabled them to explore the evils of empire without criticizing one of their own or rejecting the benefits to the "deserving" victors. Filelfo was certainly unusual among his fellow, more circumspect humanists when it came to writing about local rulers, and his career often suffered for it.

Another possible example of the changes that 1453 brought to perceptions of warfare, especially sacks, may be found in the Florentine humanist and chancellor Benedetto Accolti's history of the First Crusade (1464).⁹¹ The Ottoman advance of the fifteenth century and his own strong support of an anti-Ottoman crusade motivated Accolti to look back to the triumphal reconquest of the Holy Land as an example of what Christians might still accomplish. Yet, he does not seize the opportunity to celebrate the mass killing of the infidel or "barbarians" as he calls them, exporting a humanistic term onto past enemies of the faith. As Kedar has shown, Accolti acknowledges the slaughter of civilians in 1099 at Jerusalem, but reveals a sense of unease all but unseen in writers of the twelfth century.

In fact, he invents a scene where the crusaders, entering the Temple area, find many Muslims with hands outstretched in supplication. They throw down their arms and prostrate themselves in surrender, yet the crusaders kill them all. He states that “neither tears, nor entreaties, nor the sanctity of the place, were of use for the Barbarians,” reflecting his belief that the Temple should have given them sanctuary.⁹² Not only does Accolti not hide the violence of the crusaders, but he magnifies their inhumanity and excess by depicting victims showing universal gestures of surrender.

The humanist Flavio Biondo, who completed his *Decades* in 1453, took the opposite approach and consciously erased some of the crusaders’ savagery. He depicts the crusaders forbidding one another from attacking the inhabitants after nightfall of the first day and then shows them sparing many of the Muslims on the second day—ideas that other humanist historians uncritically repeated, perhaps out of preference for a merciful portrait of the crusaders.⁹³ What these two humanist revisions of the First Crusade have in common is their discomfort with the ferocious slaughter of the First Crusaders: Accolti subtly condemns it, while Biondo conjures up a fiction that completely reverses their actions. Perhaps the Ottoman advance had rendered them unable to see that victory in Jerusalem in the same triumphant terms as earlier generations. Did this shift in the portrayal of Muslim victims of war in 1099 bring Europeans a step closer to the notion of universal rights for civilians? Perhaps. It certainly seems that reports of Ottoman atrocities in 1453 undermined the triumphal ideals of 1099. They also may have generated a sense among humanists that contemporary Christians should be comporting themselves better in wartime.

In the decades that followed 1453, the Ottoman advance continued under Mehmed the Conqueror, extending fuller control over the Balkans and islands in the Mediterranean as well as further eastward into Anatolia. Ottoman troops even landed in Italy, captured the Apulian coastal town of Otranto in 1480 and held it for a year, until news of Mehmed’s death combined with a long-delayed relief force finally precipitated their exit. Italy, however, would soon experience greater threats from external forces looking to stake their claims: France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. The massive French army that marched through Italy under Charles VIII to claim Naples in 1494 raised comparisons with barbarian invasions, even from the pragmatist Machiavelli. Yet, the French army accomplished more by fears of its sheer size than by open battles or raids, of which there were few. The greatest impact was felt at the top levels of government in areas

like diplomacy, military arrangements and public finance rather than on the ground in pillage or physical destruction.⁹⁴

However, the invasion of 1494 heralded terrible long-term consequences for the stability and peace of the peninsula as foreign armies continued to arrive, at the short-sighted invitation of local powers seeking to protect or expand their interests. A series of major battles, sieges and even sacks took place, like the devastation of Prato in 1512. But the greatest and most horrifying of all was the sack of Rome in 1527 by German Imperial and Spanish troops, resulting from a lack of leadership when the commander of the army, Charles of Bourbon, was killed just as his men were scaling the walls. Clergy of all ranks, laymen, women and even children were tortured by soldiers in an attempt to extort as much money as possible from them. The presence of Lutheran *landsknechts* in the army contributed to the sacrilege and abuse of Roman clergy, but it cannot explain the general lawlessness and savagery practiced by Lutheran and Catholic soldiers alike, or their leaders' unwillingness to impose order more quickly—the Imperial troops remained in Rome for ten months. Indeed, Mehmed II's grant of a three-day sack to his troops seems far more orderly and less devastating in comparison, although it is hard to weigh the damages of an extended sack against slavery and the loss of one's family.

It is difficult for us in many ways to compare the two sieges, but the humanist Pietro Alcionio, who witnessed the dreadful sack, was unafraid to make that allusion, stating “we have seen practiced upon priests tortures from which a victorious Carthaginian or Turk indisputably would have abstained.”⁹⁵ On the other hand, it has been argued by Kenneth Gouwens and others that the sack was not as disruptive or devastating in the long term to the city of Rome as has been thought, although it did signal a change in papal prestige.⁹⁶ What strikes me is how few humanists at the time seem to have made a comparison to the Turks at all, much less to the fall of Constantinople.⁹⁷ Alcionio's brief comment and the Florentine humanist Luigi Guicciardini's evocation of 1453 and other sieges to say that Rome in 1527 was far worse may suggest that the devastation was too painful and immediate to take comfort in the trope of the barbaric, distant Turk, even to vilify the perpetrators.⁹⁸ Perhaps unlike 1453, there was no comfort of a single villain or group that all parties could agree upon: the Holy Roman Emperor himself was complicit, and the pope made political miscalculations that led to this moment while failing to protect his city. The French did not protect their ally the pope,

and all the ravages were perpetrated by Christian upon Christian. Once again, it thrusts into relief the “otherness” of the Ottomans; it was easier to condemn their every action than to cast blame on so many Christian leaders and soldiers a few decades later.

Clearly, Italian and European thinkers were faced with new, larger and more troubling examples of war that obscured the Turkish threat from view; Germany was already experiencing horrific uprisings, as would France in the decades to come.⁹⁹ Much would be written on warfare and its impact on society from a variety of angles, and theories on just war verging on human rights (in the Americas as well as Europe) would be taken up by scholastic and legal scholars like Francisco Vitoria, Alberico Gentili and, later, Hugo Grotius. Without underestimating the variety of texts and historical moments that informed sixteenth- and seventeenth-century concepts of war and the rights of non-combatants, I would argue that greater consideration should be given to perceptions of the Ottoman threat as part of that debate—certainly for Central and Eastern Europeans, the threat did not subside until nearly 1700, and the Mediterranean was very unstable for Western powers until the Battle of Lepanto (1571). On that note, I can think of no better figure to conclude with than the Dutch humanist and clergyman Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536), who wrote extensively on war and peace, as well as the Ottoman Turks who were rapidly expanding into Eastern Europe and threatening Austria and Germany.

As a student of humanism who spent three years in Italy, Erasmus was no doubt acquainted with fiery humanist rhetoric on the Turks.¹⁰⁰ Yet, like Filelfo before him, he could not avoid examining the abuses in warfare taking place in Europe. He wrote so frequently and passionately against war that he has been claimed by many as a pacifist. However, as Ronald Musto has shown, his activities are more accurately described as “Christian peacemaking.”¹⁰¹ One of his earliest compositions on both warfare and the Turks is his letter to Anthony of Bergen (1513), which would later be expanded into his well-known *Dulce bellum inexpertis* (1515). Writing about war preparations from London, he expresses amazement at the general eagerness for battle and the economic hardship it is already creating. He calls war “a state so destructive, so hideous, and so base, that even when it is founded on a just cause, it can never be pleasing to a good man.” It is carried out by “a herd of cut-throats, debauchees, gamesters, profligate wretches from the stews, the meanest and most sordid of mankind ... these are your fine fellows in war.”¹⁰² After expounding on the role of government to build, not destroy, and Christ’s invocation to bear

injuries patiently, he speaks of the Turks. He does not call on Christians to fight them instead of each other (as Pope Urban II did in 1095), but rather asks: “What do you suppose the Turks think, when they hear of Christian kings raging against each other, with all the madness of so many evils let loose? And raging for what? Merely on account of a claim set up for power, for empire, and dominion.”¹⁰³

Erasmus expands on his disapproval of crusade in his 1518 letter to Paul Volz, which was used as the preface to an edition of the *Enchiridion* or *Handbook for the Militant Christian*. Rather than kill the Turks or seize their lands and possessions, he argues, Christians should be trying to convert them through peaceful interaction and, above all, example.¹⁰⁴ He was adamant, at least at this point in time, that the only approach to be made to the Turks was a peaceful one. As Housley has shown, Erasmus was most concerned that Christians reflect on their own sins and motivations before they took up the sword in any cause, lest they too become “as Turks.” Very pointedly, he used the term “barbarian” to describe violent Christian soldiers such as mercenaries.¹⁰⁵

Erasmus’ attitude would shift after the siege of Vienna (1529) nearly ended with an Ottoman victory and further incursions into Central Europe. As a result, he wrote in his “On the War against the Turks” (*De bello turcico*) in 1530 that a defensive war against the Turks was allowable even to God, going so far as to engage at the start of the work in humanist commonplaces. He calls the Turks a “race of barbarians, whose very origin is obscure” and goes on to cite their “atrocities” and “reign of terror.”¹⁰⁶ His goal was to show that thinkers like Luther (who was actually beginning to change his tune) were wrong when they argued that God’s scourge was just and should not be resisted. But Erasmus could only indulge so much in humanist tropes of Turkish barbarism, which he found most hypocritical: “whenever the ignorant mob hear the name of ‘Turk,’ they immediately fly into a rage and clamour for blood, calling them dogs and enemies to the name of Christian; it does not occur to them that, in the first place, the Turks are men, and, what is more, half Christian.”¹⁰⁷ Challenging the moral indignation behind this clamoring, he argues that popular pictures showing Turkish cruelty should remind Christians “how reluctant we should be to make war against anyone at all, since similar ‘amusements’ have been common in all the wars in which, over so many years, Christian has wickedly fought Christian ... For however cruel the deeds of the Turks, the same deeds committed against his

fellow by a Christian are still more cruel. What a sight it would be if men were confronted with paintings of the atrocities which Christians have committed against Christians in the last forty years!”¹⁰⁸ This phrase evokes the popular wood cuts of Turkish atrocities showing impalings and the murder of children circulating in Europe at the time, and responds with a challenge to examine the abuses taking place closer to home.

What kinds of European atrocities did Erasmus have in mind? He discussed this at length 13 years earlier in his popular *Complaint of Peace* (1517), calling attention to the sufferings of common people when their leaders go to war. If the country is flourishing before a war, he argues, all this will be destroyed and chaos will follow:

And on the other hand, when you see devastated cities, deserted villages, burned churches, abandoned fields—a ruined countryside—and judge this spectacle to be as wretched as it is, reflect that these are the fruits of war. If you think it a poor idea to bring into your kingdom a gang of cutthroat murderers who will batten on your subjects, enslave them, and attract your allegiance while you must cringe and commit yourself and your safety to their tender mercies—think then that these are the conditions of war ... For how can an angry man be expected to shrink from killing a single individual when at a word from his commander he is bound to kill thousands? If neglect of the law poses an immediate threat to society, the voice of law is always drowned out by the clatter of arms. If you deplore rape, incest, and crimes worse than these, war is the teacher of them all.¹⁰⁹

Taken as a whole, Erasmus’ views of warfare and the Turks show his belief that Christian Europeans should stop railing against the atrocities of the “barbarians” and focus on eradicating their own crimes, even in war against the Turks, whose beliefs were “half Christian” as he claimed in *De bello turcico*.¹¹⁰

Erasmus therefore provides the consistent self-reflection so important to modern notions of human rights—an idea only hinted at by earlier humanists. He does not let anyone off the hook for abuses in wartime or for going to war in most every case. In terms that we can appreciate today, he exposes the privilege most Europeans operated under when they went to war and shows how the powerful made rash decisions that ruined the lives of many and the lower classes most of all. While his general goal in *De bello turcico* was to show support for a defensive war, his larger message becomes one of self-examination, restraint and humanity. In short, for him, humanist rhetoric on Ottoman atrocities enabled him to open a more honest conversation about wartime practices in Europe. Earlier humanists may have

felt unable to attack their own countrymen or neighbors for their wartime atrocities, but they gave Erasmus the means to do so a few decades later.

Yet, for some reason, Erasmus, like the humanists two generations before him, has received very little attention in studies on the history of just war or early notions of human rights. The problem, as I see it, is an emphasis on certain genres of writing (analytical and legalistic) as being more worthy of consideration, while others (literary, rhetorical and historical) are not. As mentioned earlier, Jean Froissart, despite his fascinating depictions of injustice in war and his thoughtful analyses, has received almost as little attention as the humanists. However, Maurice Keen uses him and other chroniclers heavily in helping to determine what constituted the “law of arms.” On the rules of sack quoted above, he noted “I have found no legal authority for these rules, but the chronicles make clear what they were.”¹¹¹ This small aside speaks volumes of the gap between theory and practice: some of the worst and most common practices of war in Europe were held as legitimate, but could be found in no civil or canon law code as acceptable. Hence, chronicles and histories need to be taken more seriously as both reflecting and challenging notions of just war and rights. Froissart deserves particular attention in this regard because his work had a moral agenda that stigmatized the vices of “presumptuousness, arrogant pride, tyranny ... and factiousness.”¹¹² Keen has argued that his goal, like that of other chivalric writers, was “to stimulate men to virtue and right conduct”—a pursuit that brings him into comparison with humanist historians like Leonardo Bruni.¹¹³

The humanists also cherished their role in stirring men to moral conduct and lives of virtue in the highest classical and Christian traditions. Their outrage about the atrocities of the Ottomans (which Erasmus and others would use as a foil against European depredations) should be considered as a cry for higher standards of morality and restraint during warfare. Lynn Hunt has argued that novels written during the eighteenth century helped foster a sense of empathy for the experience of others and to expose a wider reading audience to notions of the natural rights of humans that were thought to be the province of philosophers and statesmen.¹¹⁴ Given this, we should consider how the emotional descriptions and rhetoric of Leonardo of Chios, Cardinal Bessarion, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini and others would awaken Europeans to the atrocities not just of the Ottomans, but of invading troops in general.

It is beyond the purview of this chapter to analyze in any detail the work of early theoreticians on international law like Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius.

However, a few broad gestures might be made. All three authors were clearly familiar with Erasmus and the larger humanist tradition.¹¹⁵ While their most direct sources on warfare were scholastic, legal and theoretical, part of the inspiration to take on this topic may have come from absorbing Erasmus' passionate rhetoric on the horrors of war and his break with the classical celebration of it—a position that markedly intersects with humanist responses to Ottoman atrocities. Ironically, they may have also internalized some earlier humanist outrage against the Ottomans; both Gentili and Grotius defended the notion of a joint European war, if not a crusade, against the Ottoman Turks, whom they regarded as implacable, aggressive enemies of Christians.¹¹⁶

In the end, what 1453 and the shocked reactions of humanists may have done for the first time was to offer a target of unalloyed moral indignation. Perhaps the scale of the conquest of Constantinople or the spectacle of thousands of Christians being enslaved was the reason, but more than any of these things, I would argue that the religious and cultural otherness of the Ottomans gave humanists the freedom to condemn the perpetrators in one voice and, in the process, to beg the question of why Europeans did not also reject atrocities against non-combatants committed by Christian rulers and their armies.

NOTES

1. A couple of studies that look earlier are Gary Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Vintage Books, 2009); and Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2007).
2. The beginnings of the human rights movement are generally traced to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). See Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010), 2. See Moyn's argument on how "earlier history left open diverse paths into the future, rather than paving a single road toward current ways of thinking and acting." *Ibid.*, 5.
3. On the notion of equal application and how it may be seen in an early form in the works of Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius, see Adam Roberts, "The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle under Pressure," *International Review of the Red Cross* 90(872) (December 2008): 931–962.
4. See *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious Perspectives*, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); James

- Turner Johnson, "The Historical Roots of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture," in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 3–30.
5. David Little, "'Holy War' Appeals and Western Christianity: A Reconsideration of Bainton's Approach," in *Just War and Jihad*, ed. Kelsay and Johnson, 121–122.
 6. Jerome, letter to Principia (412), in *Select Letters of St. Jerome*, trans. F.E. Wright (London: W. Heinmann, 1933), 462–464; Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 4; 21–22.
 7. Paulus Orosius, *The Seven Books of History against the Pagans*, trans. Irving Woodworth Raymond (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), book 7, chs 39–40. Modern historians see the overall damage of the sack as rather limited. See Peter Heather, *Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 216; Matthew Innes, *Introduction to Early Medieval Europe, 300–900* (London: Routledge, 2007), 86; Roger Collins, *Early Medieval Europe 300–1000* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), 56–57.
 8. Johnson, "Historical Roots and Sources," 12. For more on just war thought in the medieval period, see John Finnis, "The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition" in *Ethics of War and Peace*, ed. Nardin, 15–39.
 9. *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, ed. Edward Peters, 2nd edn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 41; see Johnson, "Historical Roots," 12–13 on the evolution of the peace of God.
 10. Political division and disorder led to an increase of brigandage, which some groups of pilgrims recounted in the decades preceding the First Crusade. This likely contributed to the inflated perception of persecution of Christians. See, for example, Lambert of Hersfeld's account of the Great German Pilgrimage (1064–1065) in *The Portable Medieval Reader*, ed. and trans. James Bruce Ross and Mary Martin McLaughlin (New York: Penguin, 1977), 430–437.
 11. *The First Crusade*, ed. Peters, 27.
 12. *Ibid.*, 29.

13. Gary Bass examines these themes as central motivating factors in nineteenth-century interventions in *Freedom's Battle*.
14. Arriving at a clear sense of what exactly Urban said is complicated in and of itself. There is no way to know if Urban would have advocated restraint against Muslim civilians, as he did with Christian civilians. All accounts of his sermon at Clermont were written well after Jerusalem was conquered, and several contain exhortations to "cleanse" Jerusalem. Whether this was Urban's stated instruction or one that was later read into his speech after the bloody conquest is impossible to say. See Benjamin Kedar, "The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades," *Crusades* 3 (2004): 15–75.
15. See Maurice Keen, *The Laws of War in the Middle Ages* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 121.
16. *The First Crusade*, ed. Peters, 255. Other scholars have viewed this as a great exaggeration, citing the similarity of the image to Apocalypse 14:20, but Benjamin Kedar has convincingly argued that other accounts talk of blood up to the crusaders' ankles or knees, or the knees of their horses, none of which appears in that verse, but certainly do point to tales of an enormous amount of bloodshed. See Kedar, "The Jerusalem Massacre," 65.
17. *The First Crusade*, ed. Peters, 91, 248, 256.
18. David Little, "Holy War: Appeals and Western Christianity: A Reconsideration of Bainton's Approach," in *Just War and Jihad*, ed. Kelsay and Johnson, 126.
19. Kedar, "The Jerusalem Massacre," 68, 74.
20. The most notable exception is Albert of Aachen, a writer who also showed pity and outrage at the slaughter of the Rhineland Jews in 1096, but was not present on crusade. He received reports from the contingent of Lorrainers who accompanied Godfrey of Bouillon and returned to Europe, and he is the only writer who plainly speaks of a third day of wanton slaughter of pleading non-combatants. See Kedar, "The Jerusalem Massacre," 22–23. William of Tyre does nothing to minimize or excuse the slaughter, but may be seen as acknowledging its excess by his use of the words "disgust" and "horror." Yet he goes on to describe it as God's just judgment nonetheless. See Kedar, "The Jerusalem Massacre," 26.

21. The most prominent examples were the offers made to Christian leaders during the Fifth Crusade and Frederick II's successful, but reviled, negotiation for the city.
22. Most accounts of Urban's speech show him admonishing the same Christian knights he was addressing for their frequent attacks on one another as well as the weak and defenseless.
23. Richard Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 4–7, 83–95.
24. Susanna Throop, *Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095–1216* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011). Elizabeth Siberry has also written on perceptions of crusading by medieval Christians and has argued persuasively that there was very little (at least surviving or public) condemnation of crusade on the grounds that it was an abomination of Christ's message of peace; in fact, there seems to have been little challenge to it at all. See Elizabeth Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095–1274* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 207–212.
25. See Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 149–160; Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd edn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
26. Riley-Smith, *Crusades*, 159; Queller and Madden, *Fourth Crusade*, Chapter 12.
27. *Christian Society and the Crusades 1198–1229*, ed. Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 17–18.
28. See *ibid.*, 23–34. See also Queller, *Fourth Crusade*, 149.
29. Geoffroy de Villehardouin, *The Conquest of Constantinople in Chronicles of the Crusades*, ed. and trans. Margaret Shaw (New York: Penguin, 1988), 85.
30. Riley-Smith, *Crusades*, 159.
31. Finnis, “The Ethics of War and Peace,” 26. Gratian, author/compiler of the *Decretum*, also provided significant material for theories on just war and the protection of civilians in the twelfth century.
32. Johnson, “Historical Roots and Sources,” 15. On the subject of civilians, Bonet contends: “I hold firmly, according to ancient law, and according to the ancient customs of good warriors, that it is an

- unworthy thing to imprison either old men taking no part in the war, or women, or innocent children. Certainly it is very bad custom to put them to ransom as it is common knowledge that they can have no part in war." See *The Tree of Battles*, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), 185.
33. Keen, *Laws of War*, 8; Johnson, "Historical Roots and Sources," 16.
 34. Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, trans. and ed. Geoffrey Brereton (London: Penguin, 1978), 37.
 35. See Richard Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
 36. On the siege of Calais, see Froissart, *Chronicles*, 108–109. There are, of course, examples of high-born ladies being defended and knights graciously accepting the surrender of their high-born counterparts. See *ibid.*, 75, 153–154.
 37. *Ibid.*, 61.
 38. *Ibid.*, 178.
 39. *Ibid.*
 40. *Ibid.*, 179.
 41. Malcolm Barber, "Jean Froissart and Edward the Black Prince," in *Froissart: Historian*, ed. J.J.N. Palmer (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1981), 33–34.
 42. Keen, *Laws of War*, 119.
 43. *Ibid.*, 121.
 44. *Ibid.*, 122–124.
 45. There are other examples of brutal sacks from this time. One that stands out is the sack of Cesena in 1377 during the War of the Eight Saints, in which papal mercenaries were ordered or allowed by Cardinal Robert of Geneva to massacre the population in revenge for the murder of some of their cohort. Their leader, John Hawkwood, is said to have saved some of the population, but 5,000 were killed. The Florentines used this incident as propaganda against the Papacy. One work that Peter Partner mentions is the *De casu Cesenae* penned by an anonymous notary of Romagna or the Marche. Partner calls it "one of the first literary protests in European history against an 'atrociousness.'" See Michael Mallett, *Mercenaries and Their Masters* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield,

- 1974), 40–41; Peter Partner, *The Lands of St. Peter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 365.
46. Johnson, “Historical Roots and Sources,” 16.
 47. Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 29.
 48. For details on the siege and sack, see Marios Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011); Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2; Steven Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople: 1453* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
 49. Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Chapter 2. See also the important study by Robert Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453–1517)* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1967). It is interesting to note that the capture of the Veneto-Greek city of Thessalonica in 1430 entailed similar attacks on and the enslavement of the population, but perhaps because of the smaller size of the operation, the lesser significance of the city or the lack of eyewitness accounts that circulated compared to those of 1453, the tragic event received far less attention.
 50. Marios Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonardo Giustiniani and His Italian Followers,” *Viator* 29 (1998): 198, 349–383.
 51. *Ibid.*, 201.
 52. Leonardo of Chios, Letter to Pope Nicholas V, “History of the Loss and Captivity of the City of Constantinople” in *The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts*, ed. and trans. J.R. Melville Jones (Amsterdam: Alfred M. Hakkert, 1972), 38–39.
 53. Nicolò Barbaro, *Diary of the Siege of Constantinople 1453*, trans. J.R. Jones (New York: Exposition Press, 1969), 66–67.
 54. Kritoboulos, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, ed. and trans. Charles T. Riggs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 76–78.
 55. See Stefan Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality: Papal Embargo as Cultural Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23 and 27–29 on the Church’s measures against the enslavement of Christians and their impact in the Middle Ages. It should be noted

- that, on a much smaller scale, Europeans kept non-Christian slaves at this time. Steven Epstein has explored the slight rise in the use of slaves in Italy in the High and Late Middle Ages; see *Speaking of Slavery: Color, Ethnicity, and Human Bondage in Italy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). Other examples of Ottoman enslavement on a large scale can be found in Ciriaco of Ancona's account of raids of the Peloponnesus in the 1440s and the aforementioned siege of Thessalonica. See Ciriaco of Ancona, *Later Travels*, ed. and trans. Edward W. Bodnar with Clive Foss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 13–15. For more on the Ottoman practice of enslavement, see Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1600: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 130–142.
56. Doukas, *The Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, trans. and ed. Harry Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 239.
 57. George Sphrantzes, *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire*, trans. Marios Philippides (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 70–75. See also Setton, *Papacy*, 2:129–134 and Runciman, *Fall of Constantinople*, 145–162 for more on capture and enslavement at Constantinople.
 58. See Myron P. Gilmore, *The World of Humanism: 1453–1517* (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), 21.
 59. See Schwoebel, *Shadow of the Crescent*; Robert Black, *Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); James Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 111–207; Bisaha, *Creating East and West*; Meserve, *Empires of Islam*.
 60. Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 62; Leslie F. Smith, “Pope Pius II's Use of Turkish Atrocities,” *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 46 (1966): 412.
 61. Cardinal Bessarion, Letter to the Doge of Venice, in *The Portable Renaissance Reader*, ed. and trans. James Bruce Ross and Mary Martin McLaughlin (New York: Penguin, 1977), 71.
 62. For more on Quirini and this letter, see Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 65–68.
 63. *Testi inediti e poco noti sulla caduta di Costantinopoli*, ed. Agostino Pertusi (Bologna: Pàtron, 1983), 72.

64. See Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 63.
65. Aeneas' responses to 1453 are discussed in my *Creating East and West* and in the introduction and text of his *Europe (c. 1400–1458)*, eds. Bisaha and Brown (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2013).
66. *Reject Aeneas, Accept Pius: Selected Letters of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II)*, intr. and trans. Thomas M. Izbicki, Gerald Christianson and Philip Krey (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 310.
67. *Ibid.*, 315.
68. See Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 63. Agostino Pertusi, *La caduta de Costantinopoli*, vol. 2 (Milan: Arnaldo Mondadori, 1976), 64, 66.
69. *Europe (c. 1400–1458)*, eds. Bisaha and Brown, 98. For other examples of humanist responses to 1453, see Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, Chap. 2; Schwobel, *Shadow of the Crescent*, Chap. 1.
70. Smith, "Pope Pius II's Use of Turkish Atrocities," 414.
71. Mallett, *Mercenaries*, 194.
72. Mehmed's army was not uniformly "Turkish"; it contained many Christian renegades and allies. Rhetoric on the Hussites, speaking of religious others, sometimes achieved a similar pitch. See Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 2.
73. See Doukas, *Decline and Fall*, 192–193. While the circumstances and power dynamics are admittedly different, one is reminded of W.E.B. DuBois' comments on the violent outrage shown against blacks when they committed the same crimes that whites more frequently got away with. See "The Souls of Black Folk," in *W.E.B. DuBois, Selections from His Writings*, ed. Bob Blaisdell (Mineola, NY: Dover Thrift Editions, 2014), 168–169.
74. A few, complicated, exceptions should be noted: Francesco Filelfo, Giovanni Mario Filelfo and George of Trebizond. See Bisaha, *Creating East and West* for their praise of Mehmed II (as well as their criticisms and rhetoric against him).
75. Piccolomini, *Europe (c. 1400–1458)*, eds. Bisaha and Brown, 98.
76. See, for example, Froissart's description of Edward III's proclamation at Caen once the city was taken that "none should dare, on the pain of the gallows, to start a fire, kill a man or rape a woman." This allowed the pillage to proceed in a more orderly fashion, but,

nonetheless, “there were many cases of murder and pillage, of arson and robbery, for in an army such as the King of England was leading it was impossible that there should not be plenty of bad characters and criminals without conscience.” See *Chronicles*, 76–77. Froissart also notes how many “A pretty townswoman and many a nun” were rescued from rape by the intervention of the gallant Sir Thomas; *ibid.*, 75. Diana Robin notes examples of Italian commanders taking steps to ensure the safety of women during sacks and laws that existed against rape and other abuses in wartime, but it is hard to know how well such standards were honored. See Diana Robin, *Filelfo in Milan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 78–79.

77. Housley, *Religious Warfare*, 134.
78. *Ibid.*, 141.
79. Philippides, “Bishop Leonardo Giustiniani,” 204ff.
80. Margaret Meserve, “News from Negroponte: Politics, Popular Opinion, and Information Exchange in the First Decade of the Italian Press,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 59 (2006): 473 and *passim*.
81. See Schwoebel, *Shadow of the Crescent*.
82. See Pertusi, *La caduta*, vol. 2; Carl Göllner, *Turcica* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1961–1978).
83. Bass, *Freedom’s Battle*, Chapter 2.
84. Robin, *Filelfo*, 3–5.
85. Mallett, *Mercenaries*, 191–195; Robin, *Filelfo*, 64.
86. Robin, *Filelfo*, 66–67.
87. *Ibid.*, 77–78.
88. Filelfo also published a letter to Sforza in his *Epistolae* about an earlier sack by Sforza’s troops of his hometown, Tolentino, using similar rhetoric about “every sort of moral and physical abuse” using the term *immane* at one point. But dating the final version of the letter is also difficult. The given date is October 8, 1438, but the collection itself, which was subject to substantial revisions, cannot be dated more precisely than “well after 1451.” Robin, *Filelfo*, 45–47.
89. Granted, as Robin argues, Sforza was not likely part of Filelfo’s “target audience,” given the soldier’s lack of scholarly interest or support for men of learning. His interest in Sforza was one of subject matter, while his goal was to attract other princely patrons. *Ibid.*, 58–63. Still, we can appreciate how risky it was, given the potential retribution by Sforza or his allies, or disdain from like-

- minded warrior princes who did not appreciate such honest portrayals of themselves.
90. Kaeuper points to this in *Holy Warriors*, 198–199.
 91. For more on Accolti, see Black, *Benedetto Accolti*.
 92. Kedar, “The Jerusalem Massacre,” 36; see *Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux* vol. 5, pt. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1895), 608–609.
 93. Kedar, “The Jerusalem Massacre,” 37.
 94. Lauro Martines, *Strong Words: Writing and Social Strain in the Italian Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 250.
 95. Kenneth Gouwens, *Remembering the Renaissance: Humanist Narratives of the Sack of Rome* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), xviii.
 96. See *The Pontificate of Clement VII: History, Politics, Culture*, ed. Kenneth Gouwens and Sheryl Reiss (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).
 97. The comparison does not seem to arise very much in the humanists Gouwens has studied. Erasmus, for instance, evoked the Scythians, Vandals, Huns and Goths, using similar language to that of humanists on 1453, but he does not mention the Turks. Letter to Jacopo Sadoleto (October 1, 1528). *Collected Works: Correspondence*, vol. 14, trans. Charles Fantazzi, annot. James Estes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 2059.
 98. Luigi Guicciardini, *The Sack of Rome*, trans. James H. McGregor (New York: Italica Press, 1993), 7–8.
 99. Johnson, “Sources,” 22.
 100. Erasmus clearly read Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini’s *De Europa* on the Turks and cited it in *De bello Turcico*, although we cannot know how early he first read the work; see Michael Heath, “Erasmus and the Infidel,” *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 16 (1996): 19–33. See *Europe*, eds. Bisaha and Brown, 72–73 for the original passage Erasmus cited.
 101. Ronald G. Musto, “Just Wars and Evil Empires: Erasmus and the Turks,” in *Renaissance Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Eugene F. Rice Jr.*, ed. John Monfasani and Ronald Musto (New York: Italica Press, 1991), 197–200.
 102. “Letter to Anthony a Bergis” in *The Pacifist Conscience*, ed. Peter Mayer (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), 55.

103. Ibid., 58. Erasmus does, briefly and weakly, allow for war with the Turks as a redirection of energies in his *Complaint of Peace* (1517): “Still, if war can’t be totally eliminated, war with the Turks would certainly be a lesser evil than internecine war between Christians. Since mutual charity does not bring Christians together, it’s just possible that a common object of hatred may do so. It wouldn’t be a real reconciliation, but it might be a sort of compromise.” See *Praise of Folly and Other Writings*, ed. and trans. Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton & Co., 1989), 109.
104. See *Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings of Erasmus*, ed. and trans. John C. Olin (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), 112–113.
105. Housley, *Religious Warfare*, 150–151.
106. “On the War against the Turks,” trans. Michael J. Heath in *The Erasmus Reader*, ed. Erika Rumel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 314–317.
107. Ibid., 317.
108. Ibid., 318. See also Michael Heath’s useful article “Erasmus and the Infidel,” 19–33. Heath points to Erasmus’ lack of interest in Islam or Turkish barbarism and his greater interest in Christian principles which Europeans serially ignored and abused; *ibid.*, 26ff.
109. “Complaint of Peace,” in *Praise of Folly and Other Writings*, ed. Adams, 111.
110. “On the War against the Turks,” 325. For more on Erasmus’ view on warfare and the Ottoman Turks and writers he may have influenced, see Andrei Pippidi, *Visions of the Ottoman World in Renaissance Europe* (London: Hurst & Company: 2012), Chapters 3–4.
111. Keen, *Laws of War*, 121, note 3. Kaeuper has also noted the value of chronicles in understanding what messages they took from clerical exhortations and how they truly applied the theories, or did not. See Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors*, 81.
112. Peter Ainsworth, *Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 76–78.
113. Maurice Keen, “Chivalry, Heralds, and History,” in *The Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Richard William Southern* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 393–394.
114. Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights*, 26–34.

115. Gentili interestingly uses Pius' *Commentaries* at several points, although more for European politics and wars than on the Ottomans. See *De iure belli libri tres*, trans. John C. Rolfe, introd. Coleman Phillipson, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933).
116. See Franklin L. Baumer, "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom," *American Historical Review* 50 (1944): 26–48, at 29–31. Hugo Grotius, *On the Law of War and Peace*, ed. Stephen C. Neff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Book II, Chapters 15, 12 (at 235). Interestingly, Grotius also makes pronouncements about the illegality of rape (Book III, 4, 19 (at 356)) and rights of prisoners of war and slavery (Book III, 7 (at 368–73)) that fall in line with humanist condemnations of Ottoman practices.

Conclusion: The Future Study of Crusading in the Fifteenth Century

Norman Housley

We longed to declare war against the Turks and to put forth every effort in defense of religion, but when we measure our strength against that of the enemy, it is clear that the Church of Rome cannot defeat the Turks with its own resources ... We are far inferior to the Turks unless Christian kings should unite their forces. We are seeking to effect this; we are searching out ways; none practicable presents itself ... no one believes what we say. Like insolvent tradesmen we are without credit. Everything we do is interpreted in the worst way, and since all princes are very avaricious and all prelates of the Church are slaves to money, they measure our disposition by their own.¹

In this way, Pope Pius II summed up his frustration and powerlessness in the spring of 1462. The pope's *Commentarii* have long provided elegant and telling evidence for the view that crusading in the fifteenth century was in terminal decline. Pius' bleak assessment of his inability to arouse Christendom's ecclesiastical and secular elites gains credibility from his

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own commitment to fighting the Turks: nobody knew better than Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini how thankless the task had become. It was a constant refrain from his time at Basel and the Habsburg court through to his reign as pope. There was an element of tragedy in Pius' crusading endeavors, reinforced by his death at Ancona in August 1464 while waiting for Venetian ships to transport his crusaders across the Adriatic.² The topos of crusade as hopeless cause used to dominate the literature and it is easy to see why. After all, most of the period's crusading programs did fail, not just those directed against the Turks but also the attempts made to suppress the Bohemian Hussites by force. This can easily buttress the assumption that the crusade, because it was shackled to an increasingly suspect papal office—"without credit," as Pius strikingly expressed it—became subject to the same debilitating constraints as the Renaissance Papacy itself, thereby losing its capacity to tap into the devotional reservoir of the Catholic faithful. This in turn could readily mesh with a broader paradigm, the essentially teleological interpretation of the fifteenth century which Johan Huizinga (1872–1945) expounded most vividly in his classic *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* (1919), usually translated as the "autumn" or "waning" of the Middle Ages.

Recent research has not entirely subverted this image of decline or decay: there is too much contemporary evidence that reinforces or expands on the message Pius II communicated in 1462. All those who tried to mobilize Christian energies with the help of crusade faced an uphill struggle. But the more their efforts have been studied, the more we discover versatility alongside resilience, innovation accompanying persistence. We can see such qualities in Pius' own crusading program, making one suspect that in the *Commentarii* he was indulging to some extent in the fashionable world-weariness of Italian humanism. Analyzing activity rarely leaves the impression of lassitude. The initiatives and programs of the papal *curia*, the energetic activity of its legates both at the courts and diets of Christendom and on campaign, and the ingenious methods and tactics of preachers and collectors tend to counter-balance the topos of pre-ordained failure. Moreover, crusading was far from being a mechanism assiduously cranked into motion by the papal *curia* and its agencies. It had many locations, ideological formations and shades of meaning. The crusade as viewed from Buda, Paris, Rhodes, Venice, Vienna and even Constantinople/Istanbul differed in subtle but significant ways from the crusade discussed at Rome. These regional perspectives give the topic a diversity which has now begun to be acknowledged, endowing it with

a more rounded character than the one reflected in past scholarship. Detailed study of what the papal court and its emissaries were trying to do is likely to retain a central place in the research agenda, but further work on the crusade and its repercussions beyond that sphere is a desideratum, and in these concluding pages I wish to point to just a few areas which seem especially promising.

The first is the operation of crusade in the Balkan lands which were being overrun by the Turks. In this respect we are still at a comparatively early stage in the research cycle. Much of the basic chronology of the campaigning in the Danubian principalities and along the Danube frontier, together with that of Turkish raiding into Transylvania, Bosnia, Croatia and the Italian and Austrian borderlands, still has to be established. Only when that has been achieved can the extent and character of the campaigning and raiding, and the way they were woven into appeals for support from Rome and the western powers, as well as the diverse nature of the support that was granted, be fully appreciated. Bound up with that is the question of how crusade was portrayed and recorded by the region's clerical and secular elites. Intriguing recent publications on the way in which the dominant discourse of the *antemurale* was adopted throughout the regions threatened by the Turks comprise a useful first approach toward a much broader task of establishing how areas as varied in religious and cultural terms as Albania, Hungary and Moldavia fashioned links between their military predicaments and crusading ideology.³ One suspects that Franciscan Observants, embryonic humanists and diplomats will feature as key agents in this process.

In the second place, there is the way in which the opposition was regarded. The image of the Turk has long been studied, notably in the seminal works of Schwoebel and Göllner on the subject.⁴ But the image was complex and evolving, and it varied according to the creators and their audience. The way in which the Turks were depicted in early print has recently received comprehensive treatment.⁵ Margaret Meserve has emphasized the West's ability to fashion an image of "the good Muslim" who could be an ally against the Ottomans,⁶ and others have traced the alliances that came close to working.⁷ But the Turk was just one enemy, albeit arguably the normative one. There was also the image of the schismatic Muscovites, the heretical Hussites, the Moors and even Christians who rebelled against the pope.⁸ Research that is currently in progress on *In coena domini*, the Holy Thursday bull in which contact with such groups was ritually denounced and subject to the most severe penalties, should

elucidate how Catholic Christianity in this period portrayed its foes as a collectivity. In turn, we should reach a clearer and more rounded view of how Christians saw themselves. It is well established now that the struggle against real and perceived Ottoman imperial designs played a major part in fashioning the emerging European identity, with its connotations of civilization and gentility alongside the Christian faith.⁹ But one suspects that there remains a good deal more to discover about the various ways in which this process worked.

In the sixteenth century, Europe's Christian identity was fractured by confessional division—indeed, the fracturing began even earlier, with the effective secession of the utraquist Czechs. In the past, some historians of crusading were tempted to explore the links and parallels between their subject and the early modern wars of religion.¹⁰ In recent years, the subject has attracted renewed attention, and our much improved understanding of the crusade in the early sixteenth century means that we are now in a position to move beyond hypotheses and generalizations, and to establish a more specific research agenda. The situation is promising not least because early modern historians are increasingly intrigued by the period's confessional clashes as a leading example of religious warfare.¹¹ What is required in the first instance is detailed study of the ways in which Christendom's internal rupture impinged on the military defense of the eastern and central European lands. In the sixteenth-century volumes of his *Papacy and the Levant*, Kenneth Setton carried out fundamental work on the topic, but he was not able to incorporate all the archival sources.¹² Already some scholars of the Order of St John have broken with the paradigm of decline and are approaching with fresh eyes its engagement with the dual crisis of its territorial losses north of the Alps and its debilitating war in the Mediterranean.¹³ But military and diplomatic affairs constitute only two aspects of the subject. There is again the question of image, the interactions between the new formulations of what it meant to be Protestant and Catholic, and the concept of "turkishness," which by the time of the Reformation had become deeply entrenched in the consciousness of many Europeans. The scale of the question is challenging and it may dictate a selective approach focusing on case studies of religious violence, such as the sack of Rome in 1527 and the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572.

One thing common to both the emerging confessional divide of the 1500s and the various attempts to mobilize Catholic resources for crusade in the 1400s was the massive volume of debate they generated,

much of it polemical in tone. Further analysis of this debate, including its locations and occasions, the training its protagonists enjoyed, the mode of discourse and the range of arguments, exempla, promises and veiled threats deployed, constitutes the last area which I would like to highlight for future research. In the past, historians have been misled by the teleological view of decline outlined earlier, and this has led them to disregard the debates or to dismiss them as a form of elaborate play-acting. Thankfully, this has already started to change, and we are more appreciative of the significance of public discussion in its own right as a primary means of persuasion.¹⁴ In the course of such discussion, common values were celebrated and enhanced, reputations for oratorical prowess forged, pre-conceived outlooks challenged and new strategic evaluations set out and accepted. Crusade featured in two respects, both of which have been explored but could be taken further. The first was as a responsibility of faith, rooted alike in belief, history and social expectation, a duty so unquestioned that it amounted to what sociologists term a habitus. The other, implicitly politicized and naturally forming a substantial part of the brief of papal legates and diplomatic envoys, was as propaganda, an argumentation which exploited habitus, but took it in a direction which served certain interests. Because they so clearly oscillated between these two poles, debates relating to crusading endeavors, irrespective of location, lend themselves particularly well to analysis of the roles, forms and effectiveness of communication. We are now much more attuned to the military ambitions and successes of crusading in the 1400s, but it was arguably in the sphere of debate that the enthusiasts and lobbyists of crusading showed themselves at their most inventive, and perhaps it was here that their impact on European public life was most pronounced.

NOTES

1. Setton, *Papacy*, 2:235.
2. Ibid., 2.270. For Pius II and the crusade, see Norman Housley, "Pope Pius II and Crusading," *Crusades* 11 (2012): 209–247 and bibliography cited therein.
3. For *antemurale* scholarship, see Emir O. Filipović, "The Key to the Gate of Christendom? The Strategic Importance of Bosnia in the Struggle against the Ottomans," in *CFC*, 151–153 with references.

4. Robert Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk* (Nieuwkoop: B. de Graf, 1967); Carl Göllner, *Turcica: die Türkenfrage in der öffentlichen Meinung Europas im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bucharest and Baden-Baden: Editura Academiei RSR; Koerner, 1978).
5. Karoline Dominika Döring, *Türkenkrieg und Medienwandel im 15. Jahrhundert*, Historische Studien, Bd 503 (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2013).
6. Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 203–237.
7. Giorgio Rota, “Venetian Attempts at Forging an Alliance with Persia and the Crusade in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries”, in *CFC*, and bibliography cited therein.
8. For the Muscovites, see Anti Selart, “Switching the Tracks: Baltic Crusades against Russia in the Fifteenth Century,” in *CFC*; for rebels, see Norman Housley, “Ideology, Careerism and Civic Consciousness: the Crusade against Basel, 1482–1485”, *English Historical Review* 547 (2015): 1392–1417.
9. Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
10. Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 194–205, with bibliography cited.
11. See now *The European Wars of Religion: An Interdisciplinary Reassessment of Sources, Interpretations, and Myths*, ed. Wolfgang Palaver et al. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016).
12. Given the extent of the source material, much praise is due to those scholars who have devoted time to assembling the evidence relating to crucial events and themes, e.g. *Monumenta rusticorum in Hungaria rebellium anno MDXIV*, ed. Antonius Fekety Nagy and others (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979); *Hungary as “Propugnaculum” of Western Christianity: Documents from the Vatican Secret Archives (ca. 1214–1606)*, ed. Edgár Artner et al. (Budapest and Rome: Gondolat Kiadó: PPKE Egyháztörténeti Kutatócsoport, 2004).

13. Gregory O'Malley, *The Knights Hospitaller of the English Langue 1460–1565* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also the series *The Military Orders*, 5 vols to date (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 1994–).
14. For a recent exploration of this issue, see Daniel Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity before Print: Jean Gerson and the Transformation of Late Medieval Learning* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

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Note: *The following abbreviations are used.*

a archbishop [of]; b bishop [of]; c count [of]; card cardinal; d duke [of]; e emir [of]; emp Emperor [of]; gm grand master [of]; gp grand prince [of]; k king [of]; kdm kingdom [of]; m master [of]; p Pope; q queen [of]; s Sultan [of]; page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

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