Edited by
Nectarios G. Limnatis

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

Continuum Studies in Philosophy

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

Continuum Studies in Philosophy
Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, USA

Continuum Studies in Philosophy is a major monograph series from Continuum. The series features first-class scholarly research monographs across the whole field of philosophy. Each work makes a major contribution to the field of philosophical research.

Aesthetic in Kant, James Kirwan
Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Aaron Preston
Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, Christopher Brown
Augustine and Roman Virtue, Brian Harding
The Challenge of Relativism, Patrick Phillips
Demands of Taste in Kant's Aesthetics, Brent Kalar
Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, Justin Skirry
Descartes' Theory of Ideas, David Clemenson
Dialectic of Romanticism, Peter Murphy and David Roberts
Duns Scotus and the Problem of Universals, Todd Bates
Hegel's Philosophy of Language, Jim Vernon
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, David James
Hegel's Theory of Recognition, Sybol S.C. Anderson
The History of Intentionality, Ryan Hickerson
Kantian Deeds, Henrik Jøker Bjerre
Kierkegaard, Metaphysics and Political Theory, Alison Assiter
Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil, David A. Roberts
Leibniz Re-interpreted, Lloyd Strickland
Metaphysics and the End of Philosophy, H.O. Mounce
Nietzsche and the Greeks, Dale Wilkerson
Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Delbert Reed
Philosophy of Miracles, David Corner
Platonism, Music and the Listener's Share, Christopher Norris
Popper's Theory of Science, Carlos Garcia
Rationality and Feminist Philosophy, Deborah K. Heikes
Role of God in Spinoza's Metaphysics, Sherry Deveaux
Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, James Delaney
Rousseau's Theory of Freedom, Matthew Simpson
Spinoza and the Stoics, Firmin DeBrabander
Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind, Tammy Nyden-Bullock
St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War, John Mark Mattox
St. Augustine of Hippo, R.W. Dyson
Thomas Aquinas & John Duns Scotus, Alex Hall
Tolerance and the Ethical Life, Andrew Fiala

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic

Edited by
Nectarios G. Limnatis

Continuum International Publishing Group
The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane
11 York Road Suite 704
London SE1 7NX New York, NY 10038

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-4411-0955-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The dimensions of Hegel's dialectic / edited by Nectarios G. Limnatis.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-4411-0955-2 (HB)
ISBN-10: 1-4411-0955-2 (HB)
1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831. 2. Dialectic.
I. Limnatis, Nektarios.
B2949.D5D56 2010
193–dc22

2009037196

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India
Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group

Contents

Notes on Contributors vii
Acknowledgements x

Introduction 1
Nectarios G. Limnatis

1. Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel's *Logic* Begin? 12
Angelica Nuzzo

2. Dialectic as the "Self-Fulfillment" of Logic 31
Dieter Wandschneider

3. Dialectic and Circularity: Is Hegelian Circularity a New Copernican Revolution? 55
Tom Rockmore

4. The Dialectic of the Absolute: Hegel's Critique of Transcendent Metaphysics 76
Markus Gabriel

5. Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel's Thought 97
Klaus Düsing

6. The Dialectic of the Inverted World and the Meaning of *Aufhebung* 123
Klaus Brinkmann

7. Skepticism, Modernity, and the Origins of Hegelian Dialectic 140
Allen Speight

8. Doubt and Dialectic: Hegel on Logic, Metaphysics, and Skepticism 157
Dietmar H. Heidemann

9. The Dialectic of Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, and Objectivity in Hegel's System 173
Nectarios G. Limnatis

10. The Greening of Hegel's Dialectical Logic 193
Joseph Margolis

11. What Can We Learn from Hegel's Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom? 216
Vittorio Hösle

12. From Hegel's Dialectical Trappings to Romantic Nets: An Examination of Progress in Philosophy 237
Elizabeth Millán

Bibliography 252
Index 269

Notes on Contributors

Klaus Brinkmann is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. His publications include Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic (co-translator, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), *Idealism Without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity* (Dordrecht: Springer 2010), and *German Idealism: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 4 vols. (editor, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).

Klaus Düsing is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cologne, Germany. His publications include *Fundamente der Ethik. Unzeitgemäße typologische und subjektivitätstheoretische Untersuchungen* (Stuttgart: Frommann und Holzboog, 2005), *Selbstbewußtseinsmodelle. Moderne Kritiken und systematische Entwürfe zur konkreten Subjektivität* (München: Fink, 1997), and *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik* (3. erw. Aufl. Bonn: Bouvier, 1995).

Markus Gabriel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bonn, Germany. His recent publications include *Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism* (co-author, New York/London: Continuum, 2009), *An den Grenzen der Erkenntnistheorie – Die notwendige Endlichkeit des Wissens als Lektion des Skeptizismus* (Freiburg/München: Alber, 2008), and *Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift* (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2006).

Dietmar H. Heidemann is Professor Philosophy at the University of Luxemburg. His recent publications include *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus: Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), *Ethikbegründungen zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus* (co-editor, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), and *Warum Kant Heute?: Systematische Bedeutung Und Rezeption Seiner Philosophie in Der Gegenwart* (co-editor, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003).

Vittorio Hösle is the Paul G. Kimball Professor of Arts and Letters in the Department of German and Russian Languages and Literatures, and

concurrent professor in the Department of Philosophy and in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. His publications include *Der philosophische Dialog. Eine Poetik und Hermeneutik* (München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2006), *Moral und Politik* (München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1997; English translation University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), and *Hegels System: Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität* (2 vols., Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag: 1987).

Nectarios G. Limnatis teaches philosophy at Hofstra University in New York. His recent publications include *German Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), and *Prospettive sul Postmoderno*: vol. 1. *Profili Epistemichi*; vol. 2. *Ricerche Etiche e Politiche* (co-editor, Milano: Edizioni Mimesis, 2006).

Joseph Margolis is the Laura H. Carnell Professor of Philosophy at Temple University in Philadelphia. His publications include *Culture and Cultural Entities* (2nd edition, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), *The Arts and the Definition of the Human: Toward a Philosophical Anthropology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), *The Unraveling of Scientism: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), and *Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Conceptual Primer for the Turn of the Millennium* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

Elizabeth Millán is Associate Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University in Chicago. Her publications include *Das neue Licht der Frühromantik*, (co-editor, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008) and Manfred Frank, *The Philosophical Foundations of Early-German Romanticism* (translator, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).

Angelica Nuzzo is Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College and at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Her publications include *Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), *Kant and the Unity of Reason* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005), and *System* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2003).

Tom Rockmore is McAnulty College Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. His recent publications include *Kant and Idealism (*New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), *In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (*Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2006), *Hegel, Idealism and Analytic Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), and *On Constructivist Epistemology* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

Allen Speight is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Religion at Boston University. His recent publications include *Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Heidelberg Writings: Journal Publications* (co-editor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Dieter Wandschneider is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Aachen, Germany. His previous publications include *Das Geistige und das Sinnliche in der Kunst. Ästhetische Reflexion in der Perspektive des Deutschen Idealismus* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), *Das Problem der Dialektik, (*Bonn: Bouvier, 1997), and *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik: Rekonstruktion und Revision dialektischer Kategorienentwicklung in Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik' (*Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995).

Acknowledgements

It is known that solutions to the most difficult problems arise often from the most unexpected and seemingly irrelevant situations. I am grateful to many people whose invaluable intellectual and moral support (in various and often indirect but no less efficient ways) kept me going at difficult moments, particularly to Monika Ekiert, Tom Rockmore, Luigi Pastore, Warren Frisina, and Ralph Acampora. In putting together this volume, I had the privilege to work with an outstanding team of contributors. I am grateful to them for the patience, understanding, and flexibility they showed at the various stages of putting together this volume. I am no less grateful to my three translators, Anthony Jensen, Timothy Brownlee, and Andrés Colapinto for their painstaking and meticulous work in rendering into English the intricacies of the German texts by Dieter Wandschneider, Vittorio Hösle, and Klaus Düsing respectively. Continuum's editors Sarah Campbell and Tom Crick struck me not only by the warmth with which they embraced this project from the start, but also by their incredible efficiency and responsiveness when it came down to solving practical issues. Finally, in more ways than usually, I am obliged to my copy-editor Rathna Maria Muthayya. I don't think this volume would be in any way close to being presentable without her work.

Introduction

Nectarios G. Limnatis

Hegel has long been one of the most influential thinkers of the past two centuries. He has recently become even more influential through the analytic rediscovery of the interest of Hegel's response to Kant. This book brings together a series of fresh contributions written especially for this collection by leading commentators, centering on the epistemological import of Hegelian dialectic in the widest sense.

Dialectic is a commonly employed notion pertaining to a way of thinking, a wide-ranging research method, a description of the real, and so on. In all cases the reference is to antithetical, oppositional, and contradictory movements or features. The question with regard to dialectic is not whether dialectic *is*; the existence of oppositions and contradictions in the world is a fact evident to everyone. The question is whether these properly belong to the world, and, most importantly, how to reason about them. It is thus natural that dialectical ideas broadly understood can be found in almost every philosophical system in both Eastern and Western thought alike. But it is Ancient Greek philosophy that is said to be the proper birthplace of dialectic, for at least two reasons. First, dialectical ideas are omnipresent in the thought of that period, and become pivotal in the formation of diverse philosophical systems. For instance, Herakleitus famously made dialectical claims regarding an eternal flux of things that reverts opposites to each other, and Empedocles described the world as circular motion of conflicting powers, love and strife. In diametrically opposite ontological doctrines, such as that of the Eleatic school, the dialectic as method was still in the center of discourse as Zeno's celebrated aporias show. And the ancient skeptics also used dialectic in order to bring out the contradictions of claims to knowledge. Second, and most significant, it is in ancient Greek philosophy that the conscious debate around dialectic takes its origins. The identification of the term (*διαλεκτική*, from the verb *διαλέγεσθαι*) is generally ascribed to Socrates who universalized its use through his famous maieutic method. The Sophists, some argue that Socrates was just one of them, thoroughly

employed dialectical reasoning as a means to promote their relativistic view of things. Plato made systematic use of dialectic in his dialogues, and acknowledged it as an inherent feature of the world of becoming. But he strictly separated that world, and dialectic, from the world of true being. Aristotle also viewed dialectic as an art of questioning called to apply logical check (ἔλεγχος) to arguments, and separated it from sophistic (σοφιστική) and eristic (ἐριστική) approaches. He identified Zeno as the inventor of dialectic, and criticized Heracleitus' earlier ontological claims. Yet despite such criticism, and unlike Plato, Aristotle maintained a dynamic outlook in his teleological description of being which he fused with becoming, something that was later highly esteemed by Hegel.

In modern philosophy, it is German idealism, Hegel in particular, that is said to have made significant innovative steps in redefining the meaning, scope, and use of dialectic, transferring it to the very explanatory center of philosophical discourse. It was Kant who first, already in his precritical period, raised concerns regarding the capacity of common logic to get to the bottom of the questions of metaphysics. In his critical period, he introduced transcendental logic as a separate "logic of truth" pertinent to the categorical background of thought. In the Transcendental Dialectic, the second part of Transcendental Logic in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kantian reason arrives at dialectical contradictory conclusions which it is unable to solve. Based on the strict separation between the thing-in-itself and the phenomena and hence the separation between thought and being, Kant came to the conclusion that the dialectic of reason is both inevitable and illusory. In an ambiguous way, dialectic came thus to the center of the debate. This ambiguity was done away with two decades later when Fichte, trying to rescue Kant from skeptical criticism and propelling what he believed was the correct way to read transcendental philosophy, turned the tables: he identified thought and being, and naturally concluded that dialectic is not an illusion, but reason's inherent capacity. Modern dialectic was given thus a new thrust. Building upon Fichte's insights as well as Schelling's improvements, Hegel also made dialectic a central part of his philosophical system.

Before turning directly to Hegel, a few words must be said about his tremendous influence. This extends not only to his followers but often to several of his critics as well. Kierkegaard, for instance, despite his anti-Hegelian passion was obviously influenced by Hegel's dialectic. Karl Marx not only famously attempted to "put Hegel on is feet," but also acknowledged himself as a student of Hegel, called dialectic "critical and revolutionary," and made conscious use of it in his *opus magnum, Das Kapital.* Two generations later, Lenin wrote in his 1915 *Philosophical*

Notebooks that it is impossible to understand *Das Kapital* without scrupulous study of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, and concluded that no Marxist had understood Marx for half a century.

On the whole, Hegel's influence on practically the entire spectrum of twentieth-century European philosophy is in no doubt. In Anglo-American analytic philosophy there has been more criticism and less appreciation of Hegel's dialectic, even less effort to understand its hermeneutical framework and the problems it is called upon to solve. Bertrand Russell, who early in his career was influenced by Hegel, later discarded Hegel's position as based on a series of trivial logical mistakes. And Karl Popper, who reproduced Adolf Trendelenburg's earlier critique from the second half of nineteenth century, defended formal logic against dialectic, and also connected Hegel's dialectical totality to twentieth-century totalitarianism. This is not to say that Hegel had no impact on Anglo-American philosophy. Aside from British idealism and the beginning of the twentieth century, Hegel's influence can be traced in classical Pragmatism, particularly Dewey and Peirce, and also analytic Neopragmatism, to mention just a few trends.

Nothing in Hegel is straightforward and easy to read, least of all his conception of dialectic. But it is at least arguable that dialectic lies at the very heart of his position. If there is one concept running throughout Hegel's writings, it is perhaps his often mentioned, but not often studied conception of dialectic. It is a striking fact that despite the immense and steadily growing Hegel discussion, dialectic is not frequently addressed in a systematic and comprehensive way in the English-speaking world. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no large-scale examination of Hegel's conception of dialectic in English in the past two decades. More so, with the exception of a few journal articles, there are only a small handful of systematic book-length studies of this crucial topic available in English in general. At the same time, the task of making sense of Hegel's dialectic is as difficult as it is fundamental, not only for historical and hermeneutic reasons, but also for pragmatic ones. Not the least of them is the need to clarify the legacy of Hegel in the current debate.

The present collection constitutes an effort by different observers to recover Hegel's conception of dialectic by distinguishing it from misunderstandings which predominate in the discussion. This collection contains contributions directed to a broad range of themes concerning Hegelian dialectic: the pivotal importance of the distinction between intellectual (*verständlich*) and rational (*vernünftig*) explanation in dialectic, its circular procedure and praxeological nature, the relationship of dialectic to ontology, metaphysics, skepticism, and so on.

I am extremely privileged to have been able to bring together a distinguished group of authors, some of the best-known senior specialists with the highest international recognition, along with some of the most promising names among the younger generation of students of German idealism. It is my hope and expectation that this volume will trigger further discussion around one of the most key aspects of Hegel's doctrine, and exercise influence in the perception of Hegel in helping to render Hegel's dialectic more accessible.

Hegel's dialectic is not formal but always concrete and historical, and this is the way it is addressed in this book. Contributors engage with Hegel in ways that are critical, innovative, and provocative, but always sensitive toward the tradition. Hegel's dialectic is not only put in the context of German idealism and the history of philosophy in general, but it is also brought to dialogue with current discourses.

In the sea of bibliography on Hegel's philosophy, the relationship between reason and understanding strikingly stands out as one frequently mentioned but extremely rarely addressed as such. The present volume opens with a fascinating discussion of that issue by Angelica Nuzzo in "Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel's *Logic* Begin?" (Chapter 1). Nuzzo targets the mere moment of purity in Hegel's system, the "realm of shadows" or "pure essentialities" that the *Science of Logic* portrays, and emphasizes that Hegel transforms understanding and reason from subjective faculties to moments of objective thinking, *das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige*, to disembodied ontological aspects of every logical formation whose interaction makes the *Logic* inherently dynamic. Only subsequently, in other parts of Hegel's system, do these two moments revert to the faculties of reason and understanding. The static and fixated moment of the understanding yields to the rational, but not before staging a last rebellion at the beginning of the *Logic*. Nuzzo proposes a provocative interpretation of the beginning of the *Logic*, according to which Hegel's enterprise can get going only by setting a non-dialectical moment of thinking as its start: dialectic begins not with pure being but with mere nothingness; not the pure nothing that interacts with pure being in Hegel's narration, but nothingness *qua* nothingness. The movement of nothing is just the non-dialectical beginning of dialectic, not its presupposition or condition. It represents the non-dialectical understanding's last rebellion against reason, Nuzzo writes. Nothingness goes its own way, Parmenides' Forbidden Way; but nothingness does not become something. It remains as such outside the logical space of dialectic; it has no directionality, defies any determination or propositional form; it precedes and first institutes the space of dialectical truth

(although truth is foreign and meaningless to it). The beginning of dialectic out of the movement of nothing, according to Nuzzo, is Hegel's critical transformation of the theological and metaphysical problem of creation. *That* non-dialectical movement of nothing *qua* nothing is the beginning of the proper dialectical process, *das Verständige* brought in motion and interaction with *das Vernünftige,* making thought inherently dialectical from its very inception.

But what is, after all, dialectic, and how is it related to logic? This issue is addressed by Dieter Wandschneider in "Dialectic as the 'Self-Fulfillment' of Logic" (Chapter 2) on the example of the categories of being and nothingness, and in part by revising Hegel's procedure. The attempt to determine being inevitably involves non-being through which being is related as its negation. Wandschneider shows that the elaboration of such reasoning gives rise to an argument with antinomical structure, and argues that these two categories, being and nonbeing, are not contradictory but complementary: what the antinomical structure denotes is the need for the emergence of a broader synthetic category (here, the *Dasein*) as both determining the conditions of *and* "fulfilling" the preceding antithesis. At the same time, *Dasein* as such involves a new dimension of meaning that needs itself to be explicated, and this leads to a new round of dialectical reasoning (here, between the *Sosein* and *Anderssein*), and so on. In making visible the basic structures of dialectical argumentation, Wandschneider clarifies that he does not aim at formalizing the dialectic: each round of the outlined procedure depends on the specific available content. The point is different, and this makes up the second part of Wandschneider's interpretation: dialectic turns out to be essential for the fundamental logic. What is meant by fundamental logic is *not* any formal logical system, but the transcendental conditions of the possibility of any such construction, the fundamental conditions of any argumentation at all. At the same time, it is easy to see that the fundamental logic is *implicitly* presupposed in dialectical argumentation. But it needs to be made *explicit.* And this is the function of dialectic in Wandschneider's interpretation, the systematic development of the fundamental logic, its "self-fulfillment" through a progressive self-explication of its basic categories.

On this and on other accounts, the dialectical procedure is circular. The issue of circularity as such is targeted by Tom Rockmore in "Dialectic and Circularity. Is Hegelian Circularity a New Copernican Revolution?" (Chapter 3). Circularity had been alluded at, but for the most part rejected, throughout the history of philosophy, up to and including Kant and his first critics. According to Rockmore, it is with Fichte that circularity begins to be

taken seriously again through his contention that the first foundational principle of his theory is indemonstrable; it can only be understood circularly. Hegel develops this position starting with the *Differenzschrift*, where he identifies the claim of the subject-object identity as a restatement of Kant's Copernican revolution, and harshly criticizes Reinhold's foundationalism in favor of circularity. This approach is carried through Hegel's later works. Hegel's anti-foundationalism holds that any attempt to raise the question of the *a priori* conditions of knowledge must concede that we are always already on that road. In Rockmore's interpretation, Hegel builds on while modifying Kant's own Copernican revolution, and proposes a holistic phenomenological program, according to which the subject actively constructs knowledge *a posteriori* in a dialectical and historical process of ever broader and more progressive theories.

The question that comes up now has to do with the nature of the Hegelian absolute, of which Hegel is the equally notorious champion. Markus Gabriel takes up this question in "The Dialectic of the Absolute: Hegel's Critique of Transcendent Metaphysics" (Chapter 4), and criticizes Heidegger's famous rendering of Hegel's position as ontotheology. Discussing Hegel's place in the development of post-Kantian discourse, Gabriel arrives at a definition of the absolute as a concept used to define the totality of relations of determinacy, and hence all possible worlds as relational networks. From that standpoint, he elucidates the dialectic of the absolute in the corresponding chapter of Hegel's Logic of Essence, and Hegel's critique of previous attempts to determine the absolute as either transcendent entity or immanent substance in Platonist, Neoplationist and Spinozistic metaphysics. The latter is obviously closer to Hegel by virtue of its immanent positive procedure, but still fails to demonstrate the dialectic between the absolute infinite substance and finitude. Plausibly calling Hegel a Spinozist of absolute subjectivity, Gabriel then moves on to discuss Hegel's Doctrine of the Concept, and concludes that what Hegel means by the absolute must be understood in a deflationary manner. It can be best rendered as the Absolute Idea *qua* absolute method, as a dialectical self-referential absolute form, which as such can only be at the same time the content itself. The absolute is in no way a transcendent beyond; it rather always determines itself through our determining, through the privileged position of philosophical reflection that aspires to understand the concept of the world as totality. Once the absolute manifests itself only through finite thinkers and is bound by historical conditions, then its exposition becomes the infinite task of philosophy.

The Hegelian absolute must thus be understood not as being merely outside of the real world but rather in or through it. Dialectic necessarily turns to be an ontology, more precisely, a dialectical ontology. The intricacies of this side of Hegel's position are taken up by Klaus Düsing who is as highly regarded a Hegelian scholar as he is little translated into English. In "Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel's Thought" (Chapter 5), Düsing starts by examining a threefold break with traditional thinking regarding the law of noncontradiction that takes place in the development of Hegel's philosophy. At first, in his early essays, Hegel identifies the contradictions occurring when the understanding tries to think the infinite and the divine, but grants that divine life is the object of faith. Later he moves on to identify contradictions in the definitions of the understanding that belong to that faculty essentially, and realizes that the understanding is not adequate for the cognition of truth. Finally, from 1804/05 onwards, Hegel does away with the finite determinations of the understanding, moves toward his speculative dialectic, and perceives the infinite, the metaphysical absolute, as being is present in the contradictions of the finite. It is at that last stage, and with respect to the metaphysical absolute, that the principle of noncontradiction does not hold for him. Düsing argues that dialectic is the developmental principle of Hegelian philosophy, and methodically traces its application through a discussion of the first part of the *Science of Logic,* the Objective Logic which takes the place of *metaphysical generalis* and *metaphysica specialis.* In there, particularly in the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel penetrates, as Düsing puts it, the very contradiction which Plato avoids in his dialectical explication of the idea of being. In carrying through the speculative dialectic, Düsing continues, the decisive question is how opposition and contradiction can be meaningful as parts of a higher unity. This points to the second part of the *Science of Logic,* the Subjective Logic. Düsing shows that Hegel's ontological determinations transform Kant's "I think" to a theory of pure absolute subjectivity thinking itself which he parallels to the Aristotelian *noesis noeseos.* In various parts of his chapter, Düsing characterizes Hegel's ontology as dialectical, idealistic, paradigmatic, process, and constitutive ontology (*Konstitutionsontologie*). He concludes that Hegel's groundbreaking insights can enrich modern discourse on ontology, as well as stimulate the discussion of the relationship between ontology and epistemology.

The unfolding of Hegel's dialectical method is further elaborated by Klaus Brinmkann in "The Dialectic of the Inverted World and the Meaning of *Aufhebung*" (Chapter 6). Brinkman discusses one of the central

problems of Hegel's method, that of dialectical sublation (*Aufhebung*), by focusing on some of the arguably most perplexed passages ever written: the chapter on Force and Understanding of the *Phenomenology*. When perception becomes understanding in the *Phenomenology*, consciousness identifies the 'inner side' of things, an ideal inverted supersensible world, and an opposition opens up between that world and its particularizations in forces and laws. This is a new type of opposition as the opposites are now not only opposites with relation to one another, but also opposites of themselves. By containing the opposite in itself, each opposite is at the same time united with the other. The negation of the negative relationship of the two opposites results in their unity. But this is for the understanding in the *Phenomenology* a conceptual conundrum. Driven by the principle of non-contradiction, the understanding speaks now of two supersensible worlds opposed to each other. According to Brinkmann, this is actually an opposition *within* the inverted world itself, and brings up the core of Hegel's dialectic and the dialectical structure of the *Begriff*, Hegel's genuine reality: an ideality which is at the same time reality, and reality that is likewise ideality. Hegel calls to think antithesis *within* antithesis itself, the negation of negation, which is, as Brinkmann writes, the single most important feature of Hegel's dialectic. In his interpretation, the one opposite of the antithesis is in sequence attracted, repelled, and dominated by the other. This last movement demonstrates the asymmetry of the opposites, which leads to their dialectical negation or sublation and the solution of the existing contradiction. Besides showing that Hegel does not violate of the principle of noncontradiction, this movement also shows that there is little hope of ever formalizing Hegel's dialectic.

One of the most original sides of Hegel's epistemology is the way it attempts to overcome skepticism through dialectic. Allen Speight in "Skepticism, Modernity, and the Origins of Hegelian Dialectic" (Chapter 7) addresses this problem as it emerges in Hegel's thought in radical ways: skepticism is not only a *necessary* part of philosophy, but also necessary as *thoroughgoing*, self-completing skepticism. The typical interpretation of Hegel's position is that he responds to the Cartesian-Humean challenges by involving the dialectic in order to target the instability and contradictions of finite claims, and provide a solution that is both comprehensive and presuppositionless. The correctness of this epistemological account notwithstanding, Speight maintains that there is also a practical inflection in all of Hegel's writings on skepticism, from his early Jena years to the later Berlin lectures. This aspect is not captured in existing discussions, but is required in order to make sense of Hegel's position, particularly his valorizing of ancient skepticism

over modern. Speight draws on Carl Friedrich Stäudlin whose account of the history of skepticism had a direct influence on Hegel; not only in Hegel's historical take on the problem, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in conveying the social and existential anxiety that skepticism reflects. This was relevant to both the crisis of the ancient world and to the crisis of authority at Hegel's time. Thus, Speight concludes, Hegel comes to involve skepticism in his dialectic not only to address epistemological questions, but also to maintain a specific respect to ordinary consciousness, its freedom and independence.

Continuing the same discussion, Dietmar Heidemann in "Doubt and Dialectic: Hegel on Logic, Metaphysics, and Skepticism" (Chapter 8) pursues the development of Hegel's thought from his early works until the *Encyclopedia*, and argues that skeptical doubts play a twofold role in Hegel's system: a destructive role in unveiling the contradictions of the understanding's attempts to address metaphysics, and a constructive role within Hegel's dialectical articulation of metaphysics. For the speculative-dialectical position of identification between logic and metaphysics, as Heidemann shows, the skepticism of the understanding is both inevitable and one-sided, and is complemented by dialectical-speculative reason. In this way, as Hegel's famously argued, skepticism becomes a genuine part of every true philosophy. At the same time, Heidemann continues, Hegel's mature system is presuppositionless, which means that Hegel can no longer hold onto the *Phenomenology* as introducing the *Science of Logic*. Still, he has to provide a sufficiently justified entry point to his system, which, in turn, would justify his dialectical logic and refute skepticism. Heidemann argues that Hegel fails to do that. And even if one renders Hegel's *Logic* as series of self-referential determinations of absolute subjectivity, that rendering leaves open the question of the connection between absolute and finite subjectivity. Heidemann concludes that Hegel remains vulnerable to skeptical attacks.

Nectarios G. Limnatis in "The Dialectic of Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, and Objectivity in Hegel's System" (Chapter 9), first traces the problem in the development of the post-Kantian discussion and then examines Hegel's epistemological strategy of the establishment of subjectivity in the *Phenomenology*. Closely following Hegel's text, Limnatis argues that Hegel's strategy is circular, immanent, and, most importantly, based on a well thought of and thorough dialectic; only through that dialectic can Hegel's position be appreciated. Subjectivity is established in the *Phenomenology* in tandem with the intersubjective dimension, and this intersubjective perspective is the way through which objectivity is understood. But this is only half of Hegel's

dialectical story, Limnatis continues. In the same way in which the absolute knowing at the end of the *Phenomenology* points to the pure objective determinations of the *Science of Logic*, in that same way the *Logic* must have its counterpart in reality. Limnatis then moves on to examine that reverse procedure, and argues that the supposedly transcendent absolute portrayed in the *Logic* is an absolute subject that necessarily breaks down and dialectically comes to be what it is through natural and historical reality of which the absolute is at the same time truth; thus, once again, the objective must be understood through the intersubjective and the subjective.

The attention that Hegel has received by certain sections of recent analytic philosophy has been mentioned already. The present volume concludes with three chapters addressing that welcomed Hegel renaissance. In "What Can We Learn from Hegel's Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom?" (Chapter 11) Vittorio Hösle begins with a discussion of Sellars, and then highlights a number of ideas in the work of McDowell and Brandon that recall those of Hegel. The angles of approach to Hegel differ between the two. McDowell reads Hegel from the standpoint of the relation between nature and spirit. Brandom starts off from the problem of intersubjectivity, while remaining dedicated to methodological individualism. Although for both McDowell and Brandom, as well as for Hegel, reality is not independent of conceptual representation, their interpretation of Hegel, Hösle argues, is oversimplified, partial, and insensitive. It takes up only isolated issues from Hegel's position that are relevant to analytic pursuits; it proposes no functional equivalent to Hegel's synthetic dialectic of concept formation, its systemic requirements, and the subordination of the concepts in terms of their complexity and depth; it is formal and makes no attempt to interpret essential features of reality; it proposes no theory of the origins of the concepts as Hegel had done. The recent analytic engagement with Hegel had departed from the critique of the Myth of the Given, yet remains today captured within another Given, the concept.

Joseph Margolis in "The Greening of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," (Chapter 10) addresses what he calls the effort to melt Hegel's conceptual recourses with certain attractive proposals of analytic and pragmatist origin. By that, he means Sellars and Brandom's inferentialism, the attempt to derive a robust canon of reasoning that is already implicit in the practice of material inference. Margolis grants that it is plausible to accept particular instances of material inference within entrenched social practices but *without* being possible to confirm their correctness or venture generalized rules. Hegel's position, he continues, is a paradigm akin to but very different

from material inference in the sense of Sellars or Brandom. Hegel champions the truth, but never actually grants it in any finite application. It is thus incorrect to equate the necessity of Hegel's formal concept of truth with the imputed necessity of any sequence of concrete steps toward it. Those steps emerge out of the concrete and contingent practices of cultural life, but cannot be captured or become explicit from within those practices. Hegelian necessity, according to Margolis, is vacuous at any finite point, which means that the dialectical process is at least in some sense freewheeling, informal, spontaneous, and improvisational. What Hegel aims at is dispensing the fears of accessibility of the world through the defense of a rational (*vernünftig*) grasp of reality in an open and infinite process. Comparing his interpretation of Hegel to that of Cassirer, to Peirce's fallibilism, and to classical pragmatism in general (although he makes clear that Hegel is not a pragmatist), Margolis concludes that Hegel's vision is incompatible with the classic forms of analytic philosophy, and incompatible with the programs of Brandom and Sellars who fall below both Hegel and Pragmatism.

Along with several other interpretations in the present book, Margolis's reading rests on a deflationary understanding of the Hegelian absolute which he can freely even juxtapose to Hegel. But even if one reads Hegel close to the letter and not the meaning, and accepts the traditional reading of Hegel as the champion of the crystal clear portrayal of the metaphysical Absolute, and thereby the champion of absolute truth, the least once can do is to be hermeneutically sensitive and accurate in interpreting Hegel's position. Elizabeth Millán in "From Hegel's Dialectical Trappings to Romantic Nets: An Examination of Progress in Philosophy" (Chapter 12) targets Karl Popper whose known critique of Hegel she shows to be partisan and out of context. Now, Popper's partisanship notwithstanding, the concern may nevertheless be genuine: would the claim of absolute knowing be tantamount to the claim of infallibility? Interpreting Hegel as the champion of a closed in itself totality, Millán sides here with the romantics. She argues that the goal of philosophy should be an open-ended system that is not alien to improvement, uncertainty, and the idea that truth may never be fully grasped. The romantic position blends the borders between philosophy, poetry, and science. Instead of trying to bring philosophy to an end, it retains philosophy as an infinite activity with no hope of closure.

Chapter 1

Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel's *Logic* Begin?

Angelica Nuzzo

The concept of "dialectic" frames the project of Hegel's *Logic* as the discipline meant to overcome, in the inclusive and progressive movement of *Aufhebung*, both traditional formal logic and Kant's transcendental logic. Dialectic is the form of a *process* of thinking and determining: at stake is neither the static enumeration of all the understanding's concepts nor a proof of their "objective validity" once that list of concepts is enacted by the appropriate procedures of a presupposed "I think." The task is instead the dynamic production of thinking's own forms, the staging of the process in and through which thinking becomes objective as well as subjective true and meaningful thinking. At stake is a dialectical "deduction" of logical forms framed, this time, in terms of the process of their "genesis."[1] Moreover, the dialectical process in its logical formality is *content-determined*; logical form is always objectively specific; form and content dialectically implicate each other. While Hegel directs the claim of logical dynamism against general logic and Kant's transcendental logic seeing them both characterized by the static fixity of inert categories, he inherits from Kant the idea that content belongs to logical form as condition of its truth.[2]

In this chapter, I discuss the role that "understanding" and "reason" play in the development of Hegel's *Logic* precisely in regard to the two objectives of processuality and content-determination.[3]

I show, first, how Hegel transforms "understanding" and "reason" from subjective mental "faculties" to formal "moments" of "objective thinking,"[4] to internal functions responsible for the deployment of the logical dynamism. *Verstand* becomes *das Verständige*, *Vernunft* becomes *das Vernünftige*. Reduced to moments of a broader process, understanding and reason loose the autonomy that they still retained for Kant. Their activity is specified in relation to the successive stages of the objective process in which they intervene and of which they are part. They are always *das Verständige* or *das*

Vernünftige of something ("of every logical-real formation"), and they are placed *at a particular systematic level* in the development of the whole. What makes Hegel's logic *immanently move* is the *interaction between* the intellectual and the rational aspect of each thought determination.

Second, I propose a provocative reconstruction of the beginning of the *Logic* in light of the discussed interaction of understanding and reason. Instead of bringing to the fore the *dialectical* movement that opens the *Logic* and leads on to its first determination (the common task of all interpretations of this passage), I point to the radically *un-dialectical* moment present at the beginning—namely, to the claim that the understanding raises *against reason* and yet also *with reason*. My contention is that the "presupposition-less" process of dialectic can begin only at the condition of setting the un-dialectical moment of thinking (*das Verständige*) in motion, of making it interact with reason (*das Vernünftige*). *This* is the beginning of the logical movement. Moreover, such beginning is the test for Hegel's radical attempt to "disembody" understanding and reason, namely, to show that their interaction can indeed give rise to a logical movement without appealing to a thinking subject to which understanding and reason belong (as faculties). It is only after understanding and reason have been tested in their "disembodied" (or impersonal) form as *das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige* within the logical process, that they can be taken up, this time indeed as *Verstand* and *Vernunft* in Hegel's philosophy of spirit.

I. *Verstand* and *Vernunft—das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige*

In the preface to the *Phenomenology* Hegel subjects the understanding to vehement criticism. And yet, he rehabilitates its activity once it is taken *in interaction* with reason. The understanding in its isolation is incapable of using its inherent negativity to generate the movement of dialectic. It can only retort its negativity against itself. Kant's philosophy is proof thereof. In itself the understanding is an utterly static, indeed even a self-destructive power. Its negativity is made "absolute"—absoluteness indicating the stubbornness of a fixed position of self-proclaimed truth that refuses confrontation; the Absolute is nothing but sheer indeterminacy and incapacity to advance toward determination and meaning. In other words, *Verstand* by itself is unable to reach the dialectical "determinate negation." It rather generates the sterile fixations of the *Verstandeslogik* (formal and transcendental logic). Based on this diagnosis, the challenge consists in

pulling the understanding out of its autarchic isolation and in transforming its negativity from a paralyzing, self-destructive force to a productive power within the broader process of thinking. Once integrated within Hegel's dialectical project, the understanding is recognized as a constitutive function. The static of absolute negation is transformed into the dynamic of determinate negation.

But how can *Verstand* be turned from enemy to ally of *Vernunft*? How can the static of thinking and the destructiveness of negativity be transformed into the dynamic of a process that puts negativity to a productive and creative use?

Outlining the phenomenological path to science as its necessary beginning, Hegel confronts the prevailing views that proposing Truth or the Absolute as the inception of philosophy considers any negative preparation to science as useless or utterly wrong. Such is the position brought forth by Schelling's pistol-shot that plunges us into the immediacy of an intellectual intuition for which all development out of the Absolute is sacrificed to the effortless possession of an untested truth. But it is also the position of the *Verstandeslogik*, which claims an unchangeable truth maintained pure of falsity. At stake, in this connection is both the relationship between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, and the proposal of a form of thinking that is fundamentally discursive and dynamic. Hegel formulates the task as that of "bringing fluidity to the fixed thoughts" or, alternatively, as that of "realizing and spiritualizing the universal by overcoming the fixed, determined thoughts."[5]

Thinking is set in movement when the "the pure consciousness of itself makes abstraction from itself,"[6] namely, when pure thinking yields to the negative power that characterizes its own activity, and instead of persisting in its autarchic position, consents to becoming a "moment" of a more comprehensive process. Once this change of perspective has been effected, it becomes clear that truth belongs to the larger process (the "whole"),[7] that each partial moment owes its truth to the whole of which it is part, and that each partial moment, taken in isolation, is simply false. For the experiencing subject, which Hegel here designates as the "pure consciousness of itself" to make abstraction from itself means that thinking must abandon "the fixity" of its self-conferred autarchic position.[8]

The initial standpoint of science is the result of a development in which knowledge and consciousness achieve truth only by mediating their initial immediacy, thereby activating the negative power of the self, and losing their alleged fixity. To recognize that knowledge in its immediate position is not complete or true yet, means to recognize that a fundamental

"*Ungleichheit*" or "*Unterschied*"[9] still separates consciousness from its content (or the subject from its substance). Now, it is precisely this lack of identity between consciousness and object—this lack of truth, as it were—that determines the "fluid," process-like character of thinking on its path to science. Such difference, Hegel suggests, is the "negative" as the motor of the phenomenological process. In this way Hegel draws to the center what traditional logic has always labored to keep out. For the negative is by definition a "lack," is the falsity that general logic, being necessarily concerned with truth (and *only* with truth), must block out of thinking. To claim that a "difference" separates consciousness from its object or that negativity determines such relationship is to claim that an "*Ungleichheit*" affects substance in its relation to itself. To eliminate such difference requires the recognition that what appears as a mere external "action" that substance only suffers is truly *its own* action. Only at this point substance is proved subject: namely, when suffered external action is turned into one's own free action or self-determination. This is precisely the transition from understanding to reason, that is, the movement that overcomes the understanding's fixation in the broader dimension of reason. Within this dimension, the understanding's negativity is able to exercise a new, productive function.

With this argument, Hegel turns the understanding into a moving force of dialectic. While traditional *Verstandeslogik* using the understanding as the force of "positivity," has persisted in the illusion of excluding falsity, negativity, and contradiction from its sphere (or, with Kant, has pushed the unsolvable antinomy into the domain of a paralyzed and ineffective reason), dialectic recognizes that the power of negativity belongs to the understanding, and that such power is crucial to the fluid process of thinking. And yet, the tendency to separate itself from reason still belongs to the understanding as one of its possible activities. This is what makes it the understanding.

In the "*Vorbegriff*" of the 1830 *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel presents three sides of "*das Logische*"—form and content of the incipient discipline of logic. These moments are "(a) the abstract or intellectual, (b) the dialectic or negative-rational, (c) the speculative or positive-rational."[10] Hegel warns us to consider these "sides" as "moments of every logical-real formation (*jedes Logisch-Reelle*[*n*]), that is, of every concept and of every truth," and not as three distinct "parts" of logic. These three sides do not belong to logic *alone*, for their validity is much more general. Nor should they be considered in a succession, for they coexist in all real formations and are distinct only logically; their status is specifically that of "moments" of a dynamic process.

Reduced to "*das Verständige*" at the threshold of the *Logic*, the understanding is fully integrated within the structure and method of Hegel's narrative. What characterizes this moment is its holding fast to "fixed determinateness" and to its "distinction" against its other. This procedure is no longer paralyzing thinking in an untenable contradiction or antinomy; rather it is now recognized as necessary within the development of each logical-real form. Hegel's point, however, is that although the understanding's fixation of determination is necessary, this moment, being simply a moment, is also necessarily overcome by the specifically dialectical gesture of the "transition into the opposite" that belongs to reason. There is a contradiction in the understanding's procedure whereby the intellectual abstract moment is led beyond itself consenting to its own inner *Aufhebung*. As determination is fixed and isolated from the process of reality, it becomes pure indeterminateness because it looses any real possibility of distinction against other. The procedure of fixation is self-defeating; meaning is achieved only in the "transition" to the opposite.[11] If the problem of dialectic is the problem of instituting thinking as a *process* of determination, this is possible only by daring to perform the transition to one's opposite, that is, by taking change upon oneself (as form and not only as content of thinking). This, however, is the first, negative moment of reason: understanding yields to reason or becomes itself reasonable recognizing how untenable its position is. Understanding consents to transform itself into reason. Finally, the positive moment of rationality constitutes the unity of the opposites, the basis of which is that same transition achieved by the negative moment of reason.[12]

Thus, in Hegel's logic, dialectical-speculative reason institutes thinking as a process by leading the understanding to perform the transition into the opposite. The understanding, on its part, is amenable to such transition. On the basis of the result of the *Phenomenology*, it does not remain stuck to its conceptual untenable fixations but consents to the transition into the opposite. Understanding is already defeated or alternatively persuaded by reason and reduced to moment—*das Verständige*. And yet the understanding remains a moment of reason, never fully absorbed into reason or reduced to it. *Das Verständige* is a fundamental moment of "every logical and real formation." This is the final achievement of the *Phenomenology*, which discloses the dimension of logic as speculative science and thereby prepares it to actually *begin*. And yet, even once the threshold of the *Logic* has been reached, we should not forget that the tendency to separate itself from reason (to become un-reasonable, as it were) still belongs to the understanding as one of its possible activities.

What is, then, the respective contribution of understanding and reason to the beginning of the *Logic*?

II. *Vernunft* and *Verstand*: How to Begin Hegel's *Logic*

Turning to the movement of *Sein-Nichts* that opens Hegel's *Logic*, I am concerned with *what* constitutes the *dialectical* element, the core or motor of such movement. I am concerned with the *beginning* of the movement, and with the possibility (or necessity) that the non-dialectical intervention of the understanding or its resistance to reason be implicated in such beginning. My suggestion is that, although the understanding has been brought under the command of reason for the *Logic* to begin, the understanding must display a last act of rebellion against reason. It is with this act that dialectic properly begins.

Instead of following Hegel in presenting *Sein* as beginning, I approach the problem from the side of *Nichts*. *Nichts* seems inescapably dialectical. It has been dialectical for all the philosophers who have attended to it and have been caught in its movement. Nothingness seems to move.[13] But *how* does nothing move? And *what* is it that nothing moves? Hegel recognizes that the beginning of philosophizing is in Parmenides. Since Parmenides, nothing has been a problem because it has been a problem *for thinking and speaking*: what is not is both unthinkable and unnamable, not being there to be thought or named. The Way of Nothing is the Forbidden Way, barred to the gods themselves, of speaking the unspeakable, of speaking where there can only be silence. The Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion are perhaps the forerunners of un-dialectical reason and understanding—two paths with no point of contact. Parmenides' prohibition is the first attempt to block the movement of nothing, to avoid being caught in the slippage implied by it. But can Parmenides' prohibition really be met? Can the movement of nothing, its resurging claim to being, be halted? This is the task that the understanding sets to itself, yet another example of its non-dialectical logic. However, if nothing is in itself inescapably dialectical, then thinking, which for Parmenides is necessarily thinking of being, is precisely what nothing requires from us: by negating nothing thinking immediately satisfies its demand.

After Parmenides the issue is how to move on—out of being and out of nothing. The prohibition instituted by the Forbidden Way must be broken. For the problem of dialectic is *movement*—neither being nor nothing,

neither thinking nor speaking of them, but *performing* the movement required by both.[14] By uncovering the necessary dialectic of nothing, that is, by showing the necessity of its movement, Hegel reveals that thinking is always already confronted with it or rather immersed in and sustained by it. Yet, at the beginning of the *Logic* it is *nothingness itself* (not our thinking of it) that moves in the sheer absence of thinking. For here thinking is itself the same as nothing. The movement of nothing is an *immanent* movement. In it and of it, there is no thinking or saying. *Nothing is utterly disembodied*, that is, nothing moves in the absence of thinking and speaking, in the absence of a subject or a substrate capable of supporting its movement. Nothing must be "disembodied" in order to move. Yet, if nothing is unconcerned with thinking, for thinking nothing becomes a problem. This confirms that if the understanding is at work here, as I shall argue, the understanding is no longer a function of subjective thinking but *das Verständige* as "objective" moment of every logical determination.[15]

My starting point is the immanent movement of pure being-nothing—or of being-nothing as a pure movement occurring in the absence of and (logically) before all thinking. My endpoint is the way in which the movement of being-nothing shapes with its demand the thinking and speaking for which nothing becomes a problem. Thus, my trajectory goes from the pure logical movement of nothing to its problematization by thinking. The question of dialectic is framed by these two issues. At stake is the role played by the un-dialectical moment of the understanding and its interaction with dialectical-speculative reason in this process. At the end of the *Logic*, the thinking for which being-nothing becomes a problem is the "subject" of Hegel's philosophy of spirit. It is at this level, after having worked in the disembodied, objective form of *das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige*, that *Verstand* and *Vernunft* re-gain a "psychological" identity within dialectic.

I shall distinguish the dialectical and the non-dialectical movement of nothing—a distinction that may strike as strange and unsettling. For usually the problem consists in conceiving the dialectic of nothing, not in underlining its non-dialectical possibilities. The latter seems ruled out by the simple claim that "nothing is" (already a dialectical proposition). On the contrary, and here is my provocation, I argue that the movement of nothing with which Hegel's dialectic begins is in itself a non-dialectical movement—it is a position that fully represents *das Verständige*; that it must be non-dialectical in order for dialectical thinking to begin (to begin absolutely or 'out of nothing', so to speak)—for *das Verständige* to make a transition into its opposite. But how are we to understand this distinction? How does the non-dialectical nothing relate to nothing's dialectical movement? Clearly,

what we have here is a specific instance of the larger problem of the interaction between understanding and reason. At stake is the issue of the beginning of a process achieved by overcoming the fixation of determination: it is from the confrontation with non-dialectical thinking that dialectic begins, and understanding and reason (as *das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige*) are shown to be internal "moments" of every thought-determination.

I frame my reading in terms of the difference between "pure" and what I call "embodied" thinking—or the difference between *das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige* as logical moments on the one hand, and *Verstand* and *Vernunft* as related to a thinking subject on the other. How is thinking transformed throughout the *Logic* from its utter absence at the beginning—its nothingness, as it were—to its emergence in the Absolute Idea—thinking that faces the nothingness of the end and a new systematic transition?

1. Questioning the beginning

With what *must* the science begin? This crucial issue famously occupies Hegel in the introduction to the *Science of Logic*. The question is essential for a logic that is presented as "presuppositionless" and addressed to "pure" thinking. After a discussion of the relationship between the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology* aimed at assessing the peculiar "element"[16] of the logical science (presupposing "the liberation from the opposition of consciousness" pure logical thinking replaces phenomenological consciousness),[17] when we reach the beginning of the Objective Logic the issue seems finally settled on "being" (pure and immediate).[18] But in fact it is not.

How *does* Hegel's *Logic* in fact begin? This is a different question. "*Sein, reines Sein.*" What are we being told here? *Nichts* is Hegel's answer in spelling out—in a sort of in-the-margins comment—what *Sein* is. For "*Sein, reines Sein*" is neither properly a saying (propositional, meaningful, truthful or falsifiable) nor truly being. The beginning is not with being as Hegel promised in the introduction, but with nothing. Truly, however, it is also not with nothing, at least not with the *nihil* that we know from a long-standing tradition; and not with the *Nichts* that Kant analyzes in the "Table of Nothing"[19] appended to the Analytic of the first *Critique*. Despite Hegel's appeal to the philosophical and theological traditions (Western and Eastern) nothing is not what metaphysics has heretofore assumed under that title. Nothing is neither *ens* nor "substrate"[20] (not even an entirely negative one); is neither a thought or an intuition (not even an empty one) nor a word (neither a merely thought word nor an uttered one or rather its sheer absence). Nothing is the purely logical movement of the beginning.

It is precisely because it is pure logical movement that nothing opens Hegel's *Logic*. Can such nothing imply or betray the presence of the understanding?

"Being, pure being." As being holds fast to the purity of "its indeterminate immediacy" and the "pure indeterminacy" of its utter "emptiness" and vacuity, being vanishes into nothing.[21] "Nothing, pure nothing." Since total emptiness and indeterminacy amount to the same "determination or rather lack of determination" as pure being, nothing vanishes into being. Properly, however, neither being nor nothing vanishes or disappears into the indistinguishable other, which is not other. Being-nothing *is* immediately the logical movement of disappearing and nothing else than disappearing. There is no "substrate" *to which* the disappearing may happen or *in which* it takes place;[22] just as there is no thinking or intuiting *for which* such disappearing occurs. There is no subject—propositional or existential—of which vanishing can be predicated. Being-nothing is a vanishing that is so instantaneous—even without taking time into consideration—that vanishing is immediately already having vanished.[23] Language cannot keep up with its movement. Thus, the beginning of the *Logic* stages nothingness as a purely logical movement in the very act of moving, that is, as a movement that can be performed but not expressed. Such movement is *immanent* because of its logical self-sufficiency: there is no residue of nothingness or being outside and beyond pure vanishing in its uninterrupted path.[24] There is nothing that vanishes but only pure vanishing. Nothingness moves because of its sheer indeterminacy and immediacy—in their purity, however, indeterminacy and immediacy cannot even lend subsistence to the negativity of nothing. Nothing moves because it is not—or rather: it simply moves, "without why" to put it with Eckhart, and without direction. Presented in this way, nothing is the most radical challenge to the logic of the understanding—which is static, propositional, referred to objects and substrates, and cannot bear the threat of meaninglessness.

This reading differs from the generally accepted interpretation of the dialectic of being and nothing. The core of such interpretation (its many variations notwithstanding) can be put as follows: we cannot think of being in its absolute indeterminateness without turning it into nothing; we cannot think of nothing without lending it being; or alternatively, to say what pure being is amounts to say nothing; but to say nothing (or that nothing is not) is to say that and what it is.[25] The standard interpretation seems at first glance plausible. For one thing, it is not directly refuted in the lengthy remarks with which Hegel accompanies these sections because they deal primarily with the confusion between nothing and determinate nothing

(nothing of something). For another, such interpretation seems rather implied by the wording of the initial sections (in being "there is nothing to intuit"; "to intuit or think nothing has therefore a meaning"): in it Hegel seems to be speaking the language of the understanding.[26]

My claim, that nothing makes the actual beginning of the *Logic* as the purely logical movement of vanishing, differs from the standard interpretation in two respects. First, it insists on the *immanence* of the *movement* of nothing against its dependence on our thinking of it (or impossibility thereof). This is the gesture whereby Hegel recognizes the fundamental significance of the un-dialectical understanding and yet, at the same time, puts nothing out of the reach of *Verstand* and its logic. Second, it does not rely on the implicit *dialectic* of being-nothing, that is, on the inescapable reciprocal implication of the two terms in which all philosophers since Parmenides have remained entangled. At stake, in my view, is precisely the gesture that transforms the understanding into an immanent moment of every thought-determination necessarily bound to *das Vernünftige*. In other words, I am interested in the conditions that allow Hegel to convert the un-dialectical *Verstand* into the dialectical *Verständiges*. In the second part of this discussion I will come back to the first point—the issue of the thinking implicated in the movement of nothing. But first I address the question that arises in relation to the second, more controversial point. Since I claim that nothing is immanent movement (or vanishing) but seem to avoid appealing to its dialectical relationship to being, is the immanent movement of vanishing *not* a properly dialectical movement? If this were the case, we could here pinpoint the rebellious intervention of the understanding as the necessary condition for the beginning of dialectic.

To follow up in our questioning of the beginning: ***With what* does Hegel's *dialectical* logic begin?** *Werden* is the answer. There is no proper "transition" to becoming as the movement of nothing is itself nothing but becoming. I suggest that because of its immediacy, *the movement of nothing is not yet a dialectical movement* (not at least in the sense that dialectic has in the successive logical development). In its indeterminateness the movement of nothing is not "indeterminate" in the dialectical sense of leading on to determination. *The non-dialectical movement of nothing is, however, the beginning of the properly dialectical process*. Furthermore, the movement of nothing *must be non-dialectical* in order to be the beginning of dialectic (or in order for dialectic to actually begin). This is the properly *verständiges* moment displayed by the *Logic*.

To sum up my claim so far: Hegel's *Logic* begins with the *movement* of nothing—neither with being nor with nothing as *ens*. Such movement is

non-dialectical, and precisely *because* it is non-dialectical it is the beginning of dialectic proper—*Werden*. I must now justify the non-dialectical character of the movement of nothingness from which the complex character of the beginning of Hegel's *Logic* follows. Since the understanding represents the non-dialectical force to be converted into negative motor of the process, the paradigmatic significance of this initial moment of the logic for our topic is clear.

First, the movement of nothing is non-dialectical because it cannot be captured by the propositional form—neither by that which characterizes the logic of the understanding nor by the "speculative proposition" of the *Phenomenology*. What we have here is the root of all possible activity of the understanding. It has rightly been noted that the fragmentary language of "*Sein, reines Sein*," "*Nichts, reines Nichts*" does not articulate logical language but the space of possible signification. The movement of nothing is the pre-linguistic movement that grounds all discursive language. There is no Logos or Word in the logical beginning.

Second, the movement of nothing logically precedes and first institutes the space of truth. Truth, however, is foreign to it and meaningless in it. Hegel's being is not Parmenides veritative being, just as nothing is not falsity. The movement of nothing leads to (is one with) *Werden*. As the point of convergence ("unity") of the flux of being and nothing,[27] becoming is the "first truth" established once and for all and thereby foundational with regard to the successive development, i.e., to all successive truth. It follows that, in its immediacy, the movement of nothing is non-dialectical because it lies outside of the logical space of dialectic.[28]

Third, if dialectic is the logic that upholds the fundamental validity of determinate negation, the movement of nothing in its utter indeterminateness is the only instance that defies (because it logically precedes) all determination. Nothing is not "opposed" to something, Hegel insists, but to the (same) nothingness that pure being is (hence no opposition, not even a mere distinction is drawn). On Hegel's reading, not even Parmenides has been able to place nothing in the dimension of absolute "indeterminateness." Parmenides' inconsistency is to place nothing in the dialectical space of determinate thinking and speaking, and then to try negating its dialectic. Thereby, Parmenides' "nothing turns into something."[29] Hegel does exactly the opposite: he recognizes the non-dialectic nothing as the point from which dialectic—hence all successive determinate negation—obtains. Nothing is utterly indeterminate movement, not relation. This is the reason why it is non-dialectical.

Finally, the movement of nothing is non-dialectical because it has no directionality. It is a flux of vanishing in which being and nothing immediately and indifferently exchange position. Direction first emerges with the dialectical movement of becoming. "Coming-to-be" and "ceasing-to-be" dialectically replace the indistinctness of the movement of nothing.[30]

I suggested that the movement of nothing *must* be non-dialectical—hence non-linguistic (or pre-linguistic), foundational with regard to truth and error, the only exception to determinate negation, and non-directional as movement—in order for the logical process of dialectic to begin as a process that unfolds linguistically, is concerned with truth, proceeds through determinate negation, and unfolds its progressive determination in a directional way. I want to further qualify this implication. The movement of nothing is the non-dialectical *beginning*, not the *presupposition* or the *condition* of dialectic. For a dialectical-speculative logic to be truly presuppositionless the beginning itself must be non-dialectical. For the understanding to become *as understanding* moment of all "logical-real formation" its first activity must be non-dialectical—otherwise understanding would already be reason. The first and foremost challenge for dialectic is to come out of the indeterminate non-dialectical movement of nothing (*not* to begin after "Absolute Knowing" has been achieved, as the introduction to the *Logic* seems to suggest). It is here that Hegel's claim of the radical lack of presupposition is put to the most difficult test. But this is also the point where the creativity of dialectic displays its full power.

***From what* does *dialectical* logic begin?** Dialectical logic begins *with* the movement of becoming, but the process of dialectic itself *comes out of* or *arises from* the non-dialectical movement of nothing—or from the non-dialectical understanding. In this sense, dialectic is truly presuppositionless. For Kant, the distinction between "beginning *with*" and "arising *from*"[31] defines the spontaneity of thinking (of the understanding) as well as transcendental freedom. For Hegel, the distinction characterizes the immanence—i.e., the spontaneity and freedom—of the dialectical movement. At stake is the distinction between un-dialectical and dialectical understanding. For Kant, freedom as spontaneity is the capacity to begin a course of events "from itself." Self-*determination* is freedom's creative act. For Hegel as well, dialectic as determination-process begins "from itself" or also *from nothing*, i.e., immediately from the utterly indeterminate movement of nothing. The beginning *from* nothing (unlike the beginning *with* nothing) is the first dialectical move staged by the *Logic*. Thus, there are two moments in the beginning: the beginning *with* nothing (truly, with becoming) is *das Verständige* of the beginning: here dialectic proper has not yet

begun. The beginning *from* nothing is *das Vernünftige* of the beginning. Dialectic begins as reason turns the understanding's beginning into the creativity of the beginning *from nothing*. The first *Critique* proposes the idea of freedom as spontaneity as the solution of the cosmological antinomy. The beginning of dialectic out of the movement of nothing is Hegel's critical transformation of the theological and metaphysical problem of creation. Read retrospectively in terms of the "absolute method" the question of the beginning is dialectical when it asks: how shall the beginning be made in order for the process to move on; that is, whence becoming? This is the birthplace of dialectic.

2. Pure thinking, embodied thinking

The relevance of the distinction that I have drawn within the logical beginning—non-dialectic *womit* as *das Verständige* and dialectic *woraus* as *das Vernünftige*—becomes apparent once it is brought to bear on the function of thinking in the *Logic*—first "pure" thinking, then what I shall call "embodied" thinking. This is the case precisely because thinking vanishes into nothing in the movement of being-nothing *qua immanent* movement.

Traditionally, logic is defined as the science of pure thinking.[32] This elicits the question: Where is pure thinking in the beginning of the *Logic*? Or: How does pure thinking think in the beginning; how does it endure the nothingness that opens the logic? I suggested that thinking is absent in the beginning—thinking is one with the nothingness that begins. What we have are the omnipresent moments of "every *Logisch-Reelle[s]*": *das Verständige* and *das Vernünftige*. It is precisely because thinking is itself nothing that the movement of nothing is immanent. To be reduced to nothing is the first *demand* that nothing puts on thinking. In Hegel's *Logic*, thinking is "pure" because it satisfies the demand of being-nothing. The non-dialectical beginning is the radical, intra-logical purification of thinking with which the *Logic* begins (it is the understanding's absolute negativity). This is the additional purification that the *Logic* must effect beyond the liberation from the opposition of consciousness achieved by the *Phenomenology*. As the *Logic* starts, thinking is put to an extreme test: in order to prove itself dialectical, that is, able to carry on the process (not just to begin but to advance), thinking must accept the demand of nothing. By contrast, in rejecting this demand Parmenides has begun (philosophy and its history) but was unable to think the movement of being-nothing through: he could not perform the transition to becoming. Thinking must be rendered fully disembodied; it must renounce thinking and speaking, intuiting and representing; it must

deprive itself of intentionality: all this in order to gain them again through a creative act of freedom. *Nichts* is not nothing *for thinking* (for our *discursive* thinking, for our thinking *of something*); rather, thinking (*all* thinking) is nothing *for nothing itself*. It is only once the radical "sacrifice" of thinking is performed that dialectic can begin. Raising its non-dialectical contention to a beginning, *Verstand* must follow through its claim of absolute negativity in order to be reduced to *das Verständige*. At the outset, however, the sacrifice of thinking is only the irony of sacrifice. For no thinking is properly there to be sacrificed. Even its reduction to nothing is empty and meaningless. Thus, dialectical thinking begins only with becoming. For this is the "first truth" of pure thinking. Here we achieve the transition from the abstract moment of the understanding to the dialectic-speculative moment of reason.

On the different response of thinking to the demand of nothing we can measure the distance that separates Hegel's *Logic* from Kant's. Concluding the Analytic of the first *Critique*, Kant spells out the different meanings of the concept of "nothing" in a table that mirrors the table of the understanding's categories (in its thinking of "something"). Kant goes back to the *beginning*. He argues that the "highest concept" from which transcendental philosophy makes its beginning ("*anzufangen pflegt*") is the "division in the possible and impossible."[33] All division, however, presupposes the higher concept to be divided, which in our case is the problematic concept of an object in general—the concept leaving undecided whether the object "is something or nothing." Since the categories are the only concepts that refer to objects, the decision as to whether an object is something or nothing must refer to the order of the categories. In transcendental philosophy nothing is always the possible nothingness of the thought object. Hence, since nothing has meaning only in relation to thinking, it is divided according to the forms of thinking: *ens rationis* (concept without object), *nihil privativum* (the concept of the absence of an object), *ens imaginarium* (the mere form of an intuition which itself is not object), *nihil negativum* (the self-contradictory concept, the impossible). Transcendental thinking is always and necessarily thinking of either something or nothing; but is never itself reduced to nothing. Since nothing exercises no power or demand on thinking, the ultimate horizon of transcendental thinking (its beginning) is the possible and impossible.

By contrast, the pure thinking of Hegel's *Logic* addresses the more original level in which the opposition between nothing and something is itself reduced to nothing. While for Kant nothing is meaningful only in relation to thinking, for Hegel it is thinking that is meaningful and productive of

meaning only in relation to nothing. Thereby Hegel overturns Kant's table of nothing presenting it, this time, as the nothingness of thinking itself. The movement of nothing in which the understanding is extinguished, is the most original horizon of dialectical thinking. Nothing is neither *nothing of something* (determinate nothing) nor *thinking of nothing* (determinate thinking according to the categories).

But if thinking is itself nothing, how does thinking—and its dialectic—emerge out of the movement of nothing? How does thinking, in its logical purity, gain intentionality and advance in the process of determination? The answer is in the "first truth" of *Werden. Pure thinking begins by becoming*—by becoming dialectical thinking through determination and negation (*das Verständige*), by using the linguistic expression for the most abstract negation: "*nicht.*"[34]

However, the pure thinking that emerging out of the non-dialectical nothingness of the beginning *becomes*, is disembodied thinking. It is the pure thinking that develops in a "realm of shadows."[35] Thinking is one with the pure form of its object. Its truth is articulated linguistically but does not refer to anything outside of itself. Pure thinking develops linguistically although no voice is uttered or heard. If pure thinking speaks, its voice immediately vanishes into nothingness. Within the *Logic* there is no otherness to mark the difference necessary for the logical voice to be heard.[36] As the most original horizon of speculative logic, nothing surrounds the determination process of pure thinking sustaining it in its immanence.[37] Such thinking develops immanently throughout its determinations precisely because it is surrounded by nothing: at every stage of the process, the renewed task is to avoid the pull of indeterminateness, the absolute void of the beginning, the non-dialectical fixation of the understanding.

Despite the resurgent threat of nothing, pure thinking succeeds in moving on in its immanent determination process because it is disembodied thinking. As such, it never confronts real otherness. Having arisen from the non-dialectical movement of nothing, pure thinking encounters only dialectical negations. Leaving the beginning behind, it does not attempt to think or say the indeterminate, non-dialectical nothingness of the beginning. With becoming, determination has given direction to the process once and for all. In sum, pure thinking arises out of the movement of nothing, is moved by it to becoming but does not face nothingness as a "problem" (as Parmenides did). Nothing becomes a problem first for embodied thinking.

At the level of the "absolute idea," the forward-moving process away from the indeterminateness of the beginning is revealed as the regressive foundation of that very beginning.[38] Thereby, the circularity of method brings

pure thinking back to the beginning. But is this the non-dialectical beginning or is it the dialectical movement of becoming—the understanding as moment of the process? Only now a "reflection" on the beginning becomes possible: nothing becomes a problem for thinking. But what kind of thinking is the thinking that is brought back to nothingness? Has the non-dialectical stance of the understanding been left behind once and for all?

Defining the absolute idea as the result of the preceding development, Hegel argues:

> Logic presents the self-movement of the absolute idea only as the original word, which is an expression/exteriorization (*Äußerung*)—yet one that as external has always already immediately vanished to the extent that it is. Accordingly, the idea is only in this self-determination: *to hear itself*. The idea is in *pure thinking*. In it the difference is still not *otherness* but is and remains entirely transparent to itself.[39]

The original word is not at the beginning but at the end. It is first as absolute idea that logical thinking is able to utter the word in a meaningful, veritative sense.[40] As this word is "expression," it implies exteriority. Yet such expression, being still *only logical* and taking place *only* within "pure thinking," is immediately caught in that vanishing which is the movement of nothingness. The word is swept away in the moment it is uttered because, being disembodied or being only the word of pure thinking, it offers no resistance, hence it does not make a "difference." Thus, the idea is absolutely self-referential: it speaks to and hears only itself. To the extent that thinking is still only logical thinking, its uttering the original word is inscribed in the movement of nothing of the beginning.

In the expression of the original word, logical thinking reaches the end of its determination process, and going back to the movement of nothing from which it has arisen, it finally becomes embodied. At this point, the exteriority of thinking and speaking becomes *real exteriority*—"the exteriority of space and time," existence "outside" of the concept.[41] Within such extra-logical exteriority the uttered word is spoken and heard for the first time. Speaking is no longer submerged in silence or merely self-referential; the word is now heard as a living utterance in the real medium of the world. Here is the transition from the *Logic* to the *Realphilosophie*.

Embodied thinking speaks a language that is not (only) the language of pure concepts developed by the *Logic* but is (also) the language of representation. While in the former concept and object are one, in the latter reference becomes a problem. Herein logical truth is "realized." Kant's

question of whether the object thought under a concept is something or nothing, possible or impossible can now be addressed. It is at this point that Parmenides can formulate his thesis: "It is necessary that saying and thinking are; for being is but nothing is not."[42]

Facing nothingness after the conclusion of the *Logic*, embodied thinking meets a hard alternative. It is, once again, the alternative between an understanding that accepts to be reduced to "moment" of the process of reason, and an understanding that stubbornly chooses to remain fixed to its own inconclusive negativity. At stake herein is the freedom of thinking itself. Either it becomes *dialectical* thinking accepting yet again the challenge of nothingness' own movement, traversing the suffering of the negative, and performing the transition to the opposite. Or else embodied thinking may remain engulfed in the indeterminateness of nothing, refuse to move, and succumb to the impossibility that nothingness is. In this case nothingness extinguishes thinking, marking the limit of the impossible, the irrepresentable, the unthinkable.

If embodied thinking does not accept the dialectical demand of nothingness, namely, to *become itself dialectical* in its thinking of the world, to be moved by indeterminateness, immediacy, and indifference to pursue determination, mediation, and difference, then thinking remains engulfed in the logic that paralyzes it, unable to proceed in a *Realphilosophie*—in thinking of nature and spirit.

I have shown how the movement of nothing is the non-dialectical beginning on which the process of dialectic in its utmost freedom and creativity is built. This is the point where the understanding abandons its un-dialectical pretensions and becomes a moment of the process along with reason. The creativity of dialectic is measured on the extent in which it is able to move, yet again, from nothingness to determinateness. Nothing remains the underlying 'threat' or the resurging 'risk' that challenges thinking at different junctures in its development. It is the reminder that indeterminateness, immediacy, and the destructive "fury" of vanishing can be overcome only by dialectical thinking. And they *must* be overcome lest thinking itself meets the irrevocable destruction that Kant aptly named the self-inflicted "*Eutanasie der Vernunft.*"[43]

Notes

[1] See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 577; G.W.F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and H.M. Michel, Frankfurt, a.M.: Surhkamp, 1969–71 (henceforth cited as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 6, p. 246.

[2] See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 61; *Werke*, 5, 59.
[3] Here I dwell on the first objective.
[4] See Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991, §25.
[5] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 20; *Werke*, 3, 37.
[6] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 20; *Werke*, 3, 37.
[7] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 11; *Werke*, 3, 24.
[8] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 20; *Werke*, 3, 37.
[9] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 21; *Werke*, 3, 39.
[10] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §79, Remark.
[11] Ibid., §81.
[12] Ibid., §82.
[13] Transitively and intransitively.
[14] See the discussion of Heraclitus and Zeno—both concerned with the issue of change or, alternatively, of movement and dialectic—in Angelica Nuzzo, "Dialectical Reason and Necessary Conflict—Understanding and the Nature of Terror," in Paul Ashton, Toula Nicolacopoulos and George Vassilakopoulos, eds, *The Spirit of the Age: Hegel and the Fate of Thinking*, Melbourne: re.press, 2008, pp. 21–37.
[15] As discussed in Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §79.
[16] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 68; *Werke*, 5, 67.
[17] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 49; *Werke*, 5, 43.
[18] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 70; *Werke*, 5, 69.
[19] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, B347/A291.
[20] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 83; *Werke*, 5, 84.
[21] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 82; *Werke*, 5, 82.
[22] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 83f.; *Werke*, 5, 84f.
[23] See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 82f.; *Werke*, 5, 83.
[24] Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006, pp. 277–278. Although Houlgate rejects the reading of the beginning based on the perspective of thinking, he privileges the standpoint of being as nothing, while I claim it should be integrated with that of nothing as being—being-nothing as movements.
[25] See Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, pp. 274–277.
[26] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 82f.; *Werke*, 5, 82f.
[27] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 85; *Werke*, 5, 86.
[28] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 82f.; *Werke*, 5, 83.
[29] See Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., trans. H. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, vol. I, p. 252 (*Werke* 18, 288); Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 83; (*Werke*, 5, 84).
[30] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 105; *Werke*, 5, 112.
[31] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B1/A1.
[32] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 43ff.; *Werke*, 5, 36ff.
[33] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B346/A290.
[34] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 83; *Werke*, 5, 84.
[35] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 58; *Werke*, 5, 55.

[36] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 825; ibid., 6, 550.
[37] In the *Wesenslogik* the "identical speaking" of *Nichts* transforms the undifferentiated nothingness of the beginning into "absolute difference," essential moment of identity. This "speaking," however, is identical with the nothingness that it speaks—Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 417; *Werke*, 6, 46.
[38] See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 841; *Werke*, 6, 570.
[39] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 825; *Werke*, 6, 550.
[40] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 825; *Werke*, 6, 549.
[41] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 843; *Werke*, 6, 573.
[42] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, I, 252 (translation modified); *Werke*, 18, 288.
[43] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B433.

Chapter 2

Dialectic as the "Self-Fulfillment" of Logic

Dieter Wandschneider
Translated by Anthony Jensen

I. Introduction

Without a doubt, the term "dialectic" refers to one of the most controversial themes of philosophy. Whereas Plato saw in it the possibility of ultimate grounding, the very highest goal of philosophy, for Aristotle it held the rank of a mere method of dialogical investigation. And in the two thousand years of Western philosophy since then, divergences in the concept and meaning of dialectic cannot easily be disentangled. Even today not only is the relevance of dialectic debated, but also what the dialectic even is.

What this ongoing controversy shows after all is that dialectic does not deal with any secondary questions. In the modern period, Kant had assigned dialectic a prominent place in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; with Hegel the theme returned to the very center of philosophy. And after the rise of positivist-analytic philosophy, dialectic remains—even today—a philosophical stumbling block.[1] In particular, the rediscovery of Hegel at the start of the twentieth century has led to intensified occupation with the problem of dialectic. Hegel's objective-idealistic program is so closely tied to the possibility of a dialectical logic that the program itself stands or falls thereon. In this sense it is important to gain clarity about the *exactitude* of the dialectical form of argumentation. This, however, is possible only upon the foundation of a *theory* of dialectic. Here lies one of the main concerns of the present investigation.

At the same time, a question arises about the basic value of the *logic* employed for such an enterprise. For this must have already been demonstrated in advance; that is, the logical conditions of argumentation for a theory of dialectic are already presupposed and drawn upon. Of course, this counts for every form of argumentation and denotes no problem in "normal cases" since the logic itself is not in question. But when it comes to the question of *dialectical logic*—since a theory of dialectic aims at *it*—logic

itself becomes the topic, and this requires a fundamental reflection on the logical means utilized—naturally, once again, with logical means. But can logic at the same time fulfill and ground itself? We now see another fundamental problem of a theory of dialectic. My own thesis is that a "Self-Fulfillment" [Selbst-Einholung] of logic is in fact possible, and is indeed just the form of a *dialectical logic*.

On the question of dialectic there have appeared a series of interesting analyses of parts of the Hegelian *Logic*; beyond these, some approaches to a *theory* of dialectic itself have been formulated. Besides older works, for example, by Jonas Cohn, Robert Heiss, Gotthart Günther, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and others, some important contributions have appeared more recently by Klaus Hartmann, Wolfgang Wieland, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Dieter Henrich, Michael Rosen, Thomas Kesselring, and Vittorio Hösle, among others.[2] To their efforts we owe new insights into the structure of dialectical argumentation. On their attempts to find a convincing theory of dialectic we can rely for certain already-clarified determinations.[3] Some further investigations on the *formalisability* of dialectic or else on a *formal* dialectic also deserve mention, for example those of Mike Kosok, Newton C. A. da Costa, Thomas M. Seebohm, and Rainer Hegselmann.

In connection with these investigations, I have also presented a sketch of a dialectical theory,[4] which aimed primarily at a reconstruction of the logic of quality at the opening of Hegel's *Logic*. I will revisit these considerations here, but will restrict myself as much as possible to the beginning of the dialectic of being and nothingness as a paradigm. To avoid misunderstanding, I should mention that this is not presented as a faithful interpretation of the Hegelian text, but as an attempt to develop a strict and defensible line of argumentation that would not fear departing from Hegel's own line—should it prove necessary. My proposed reconstruction can thus be characterized as a *revision* of Hegelian arguments.

The scope of my considerations here is defined along two lines, which seem to me of essential relevance for a theory of dialectic. On the one hand, the form of negation that—as self-referring negation—gains a quasi-semantic expulsory force [Sprengkraft] and therewith a forwarding [weiterverweisende] character; on the other, the notion that every logical category is defective insofar as it does not encapsulate the entirety of possible meanings.

The first line concerns the special role of *negation*. As *self-referential* negation,[5] it has, as can be shown, an *antinomical character*. Thomas Kesselring has tried to interpret the dialectic from this perspective, though admittedly without being able to work this out any further in a systematic sense. These approaches

are doubtlessly correct; I will develop here in detail just how antinomical structures play a key role in dialectics.

The second of these two lines stems from a notion formulated by Wolfgang Wieland[6] and further explicated by Vittorio Hösle.[7] According to them, every logical category (with the exception of a possible terminal category [Abschlussbestimmung])[8] includes what I call a *semantic-pragmatic discrepancy*. This consists in the fact that the *explicit meaning* of a category does not express everything that is *already implicitly presupposed* for its meaning. In fact, the whole apparatus of logical categories and principles must be always already available and utilized for the explication of a meaning so that in each case what is presumed about the meaning is always much more than what is made explicit at that time. Thus, at the pragmatic level the act of explication presupposes much more than this already relatively explicit meaning, and contains, as it were, a certain meaning-surplus that requires its own explication, and so forth—referring back to the program of logical explication or, as I have called it above, to the *self-fulfillment* of logic.

Both lines are tightly interwoven. And this is something I would like to make clear through the example of the dialectic of being and nothingness at the beginning of the Hegelian *Logic*. In what follows, I will first make visible the *basic structures of dialectical argumentation* (sections II—III), in order to then analyze their function for a *self-explication of logic* by logical means (sections IV–VI)—whereby, as was mentioned, certain revisions are to be expected in comparison with Hegel's actual argument.[9]

II. The dialectic of being and non-being

The inception of the *Logic* with the category of being [Sein], according to Hegel's well-known argument, is grounded upon the very concept of beginning [Anfang]: that with which we begin must itself *be* something, though still in no way a determinate something. The beginning must be only such that it marks a difference with what had been there before it begun. Indeed, that this pure being is yet indeterminate means, on closer inspection, the same as *nothingness* [*Nichts*] and, conversely, nothingness means the same as pure being. Admittedly, the *expression* of the achieved result is incomplete if only the *identity* of being and nothingness is asserted.[10] Such an assertion, as Hegel states, "is self-contradictory and cancels itself out,"[11] since in it being and nothingness are indeed *distinct*. Hence it is necessary that the opposing proposition also be added, that being and

nothingness are *not the same*. The account thus presents the form of an *antimony* [Antinomie],[12] an insoluble contradiction: a logically most problematic structure.

So goes Hegel's line of argument.[13] It certainly suggests that the initial category of logic, pure being, should be *identical* with the absolutely negative, nothingness, because of its complete indeterminacy. But the first category would thus be identified as a *negative* and thus—in so far as the negative is meaningful only as the negation of a given positive—it would manifestly be a *mediation* [*ein Vermitteltes*]. This is why a primarily positive sense of being is to be kept up. Yet Hegel's argument for the identification of being and nothingness is not to be dismissed so easily. Paradoxically, *both* seem to be accepted necessarily—i.e., the identity *and* difference of being and nothingness—something that would in fact amount to an *antinomical structure*.

What has arisen meanwhile is nothing other than the "*inseperateness* and *inseparability*" of the opposing determinations of pure being and nothingness.[14] Neither has its subsistence for itself; each emerges only with the other. In this sense, according to Hegel, they require the introduction of a *new category* which contains in itself both determinations, *both* as identical *and* as opposed. But how is this inseparability of these determinations to be understood in connection with the apparent antinomical structure? Let us make this *justification explicit*.

As a start: the fact that the negative always presumes the positive means that we cannot begin with the category of nothingness, since it already assumes the category of being. "*Non-being*" [*Nichtsein*] seems to me a better designation for this case. In the following reconstruction of the dialectic of being and nothingness, I will prefer this term—non-being—since Hegel himself had no objection to it.[15]

In following Hegel, we begin with pure being, without any further determination about what can be grasped in the proposition that something *is the case*. Here nothing determinate is stated. Instead, what is expressed is, first, only the condition of a possible determining.[16] Furthermore, that something is the case is stated already with respect to the possibility of the opposite—that something is *not the case*. The *negation*, then, belongs essentially to the conditions of the possible determining.

Being and non-being are understood here primarily in a predicative sense, i.e., in the sense of the copula "is" or "is-not" respectively. But naturally "to be the case" and "to not be the case" always refers to an *existential* sense too[17]—where being admittedly may not be restricted, as it was by Kant, to physical-empirical being in a decisionistic manner.

I have designated the principle of the cohesion of the positive and negative the "*complementarity-principle*" [*Komplementaritätsprinzip*][18]: *complementary*-opposing concepts are not simply *contradictory*, wherein the negation is completely undetermined (e.g., not-red). Moreover, "complementary" does not mean "*contrary*" [*konträr*] in the sense of remote extremes, such as "black" and "white" which admit inter-possibilities ("gray"). "*Complementary*" opposites are rather those that, as it were, "hinge on each other" without inter-possibilities, yet still—in distinction to a contradictory opposition—fulfill a delimited and well-determined "semantic-space", such as "furnished" and "unfurnished", which corresponds to what Hegel labels a "determinate negation." It lies only in the full indeterminacy of the initial determinations being and non-being that the complementary opposites here coincide with the contradictory, something no longer given in the further progress of the dialectical development of the *Concept*.[19]

In what follows, the conceptual content of a category, its *meaning* or *intension*, should be designated distinctively with angled brackets, such as ‹Being› and ‹Non-Being›. The *properties* [*Eigenschaften*] of a category are to be distinguished from the meaning. For example, the concept "red" has the meaning ‹red›; however, at the same time it has properties, some conceptual character perhaps, which is thus an immaterial being, etc. But as a *concept* it certainly does not have the *property* of being red. Conversely, the property of a rose's being red is not the *meaning* ‹red›. Rather, it is *corresponding* to ‹red›, or, as I wish to say briefly in the following, it is ‹red›-corresponding. One might say in a Platonic fashion that it *participates* in the *Idea* of Redness, or in a more familiar expression, it corresponds to the concept or to the definition of ‹red›.

With this, we return to the categories of ‹being› and ‹non-being›. As we argued, if this is to be understood as the first and most elementary condition of a possible determining, then what comes next is the question about the *relationship* between the two. The answer itself is obvious: ‹being› and ‹non-being› (with the abbreviations ‹B› and ‹N› respectively and "=" for an equivalency of meaning) are complementary determinations which can be represented as:

(1) ‹B› = ‹not-N›

which in any case implies:

(2) ‹B› *is not* equivalent to ‹N›.

With this "is not," a *property* is now asserted of the category ‹being›, namely that it is *not* its opposing category of ‹non-being›. Thus, ‹being› of itself has something of non-being in it, or in the above-introduced terminology, ‹being› is correspondent to ‹non-being› with respect to its own properties,

(3) ‹B› *is* ‹N›-corresponding.

However, the incidental "is" now indicates that, with respect to the category ‹B›, something is the case (namely that ‹B› inheres the quality '‹N›-corresponding'), that ‹B› thus possesses a property of being [Seinseigenschaft] and therewith the very same property through which ‹B› itself is defined,

(4) ‹B› *is* ‹B›-corresponding.

Because of the complementarity of ‹B› and ‹N› in the sense of (1), the following also holds:

(5) "is ‹B›-corresponding" implies "is not ‹N›-corresponding",

therefore also from (4)

(6) ‹B› *is not* ‹N›-corresponding

and therefore an *opposing* proposition to (3). As before with the move from (2) to (3), what results on the grounds of the again-recurring 'is not' is the proposition

(7) ‹B› *is* ‹N›-corresponding

and so forth. The predication continuously overturns into its opposite: that, however, is the mark of an *antinomical structure*.[20]

As can be shown,[21] an *antinomical concept* lies at the base of the antinomical structure, which in the present case possesses the form

(8) ‹N› = ‹*not* ‹N›-corresponding›.

Such a concept exactly reproduces the above-explicated antinomical overturning of one predicate into its opposite: the property "not ‹N›-corresponding" for instance is correspondent to the conceptual content

of the antinomical concept in (8) (shown on the right side), wherewith we have "‹N›-corresponding" (shown on the left side of (8) with the expression ‹N›). This quality is in turn *not* correspondent to the antinomical concept ‹N› in (8), thus "not ‹N›-corresponding." This again is in regard to (8) "‹N›-corresponding," and so forth.

The substantially antinomical character of the concept in (8) emerges immediately if the opposing relationship (1) is kept in mind. Thus with (8) results

(9) ‹B› = ‹not-N› = ‹not-not- ‹N›-corresponding› = ‹ ‹N›-corresponding ›.

Therefore (according to (1)), ‹B› is not only *opposing* to ‹N›, but has *at the same* time the meaning of "‹N›-corresponding"—a strange, contradictory ambiguity that reflects the antinomical character of the concept (8).

III. The dialectical contradiction

The emergence of an antinomical structure in the relation of ‹being› and ‹non-being› must seem quite alarming. Would an argument that contains such a contradiction be remotely convincing? For if the contradiction is permitted, then, as is well-known, any proposition can be "proven."[22] But then argumentation itself would become a pointless undertaking.

Fortunately, this is not the case here. Upon closer examination it will be clear that, because of its antinomical character the dialectical contradiction[23] is not a "normal" contradiction, but one that is actually only an *apparent* contradiction. While the reciprocally overturning predications *appear* to contradict each other, they actually relate to *different aspects* of the argument: In (2) the emerging "is not" leads to the categorization through ‹N› and with it to the predication "is ‹N›-corresponding" in (3). This predication *thereupon* gives rise to a new predication: the now-resulting "is" leads to a categorization through ‹B› and so results in the opposing predication "is ‹B›-corresponding" in (4) or else, because of the oppositional relationships of (1) and (5) respectively, "is not ‹N›-corresponding." Here the resulting "is not" *of itself* leads to categorization through ‹N› and with it again to the opposing predication "is ‹N›-corresponding," and so forth. Each predication leads *through categorization* of its inherent "is" or "is not" to a new predication, this predication to another in turn, and so on. Each predication presumes the preceding one and forms out of itself the basis of a new induced predication, etc. It arises, in other words, from a reflection

upon the respectively realized form of predication and its own subsequent categorization and is in such a way the result of a *reflexive transition* to a new level of predication. The antinomically overturning predications are thus located on *different predication levels* and therefore, when rightly understood, do not contradict each other. What first appeared as a contradiction in fact turns out to be merely an *apparent* contradiction and thus does *not* affect the argument.

Now it should be noted that the *antinomical character* of the continually reciprocal-overturning [Ineinanderumschlagens] of the predication is based substantially on implication (5), according to which "is ‹B›-corresponding" can be converted to "is not ‹N›-corresponding" (naturally the justification for this rests in the opposing relationship (1); in fact, this is only clear because "is ‹N›-corresponding" and "is ‹B›-corresponding" are not only *distinct*, but also *complementary* predications.). *Without* this possibility, the "is" in the predication "is ‹B›-corresponding" would only lead to a categorization through ‹B› and thereupon to "is ‹B›-corresponding," and so on with this new predication, etc. This means that the argument would provide nothing new at all. Yet, this is not the last word. Because the predication "is ‹B›-corresponding" (which is not perpetuating *per se*) can be converted to "*is not* ‹N›-corresponding," the argument can almost begin afresh with an "is not"-predication (cf. the move from (2) to (3)). The recourse to implication (5), which for its part is based on the opposing relationship (1), turns the argument back to its beginning and thereby provides the circular structure of the continually reciprocal-overturning [Ineinanderumschlagens] that is characteristic of antinomical predications. To summarize: The move from "is ‹B›-corresponding" to "is not ‹N›-corresponding," as was formulated in (5), is decisive for the essentially *antinomical character* of dialectical argumentation. Or, in different terms:

(10) "Being" with respect to ‹B› implies "non-being" with respect to ‹N›.

Hence, there is a link between "being" and "non-being," but *in different respects*—naturally, because the two categories are complementary to each other: what the one signifies, the other does not signify, and vice versa. So it is precisely the *opposition* between the two that at the same time grounds their *conjunction* [*Verbindung*] (albeit in different relationships). The pair can be unified without contradiction. What was thought an ambiguity of meaning actually concerns different aspects. Rightly understood, there can be no talk of *contradiction*.

Moreover, it is clear that being in the one respect and non-being in the opposite respect are *inextricably linked*—the being of the key is *at the same time* the non-being of the keyhole, so to speak. This refers to a new sense of "being" that is "respect-dependent" [hinsichtsabhängig]—a sense that permits differing respects and is thereby an *in-itself differentiated being*. For this new kind of being Hegel uses the category ‹*Dasein*›[24] (determinate being) which I take over here. ‹Dasein›, in the sense of the argument we have so far developed, designates a being that is differentiated in itself. It is on the one hand being *opposite* to non-being and yet on the other hand is also non-being at the same time, the latter, however, in another respect. ‹Dasein› thus represents the *synthetic unity* of opposition and association of ‹being› and ‹non-being›. The antinomical-dialectical overturning is rightly understood as the expression of the inextricable connectedness between the opposition and conjunction of the two categories (in different respects), and in this way requires the *formation of a synthesis* [*Synthesebildung*].

According to *Hegel's* argument in the *Science of Logic*, the synthetic unity of ‹being› and ‹non-being› (what Hegel calls ‹Nichts›) is initially the category of ‹becoming›, while in the present context is immediately passed over into ‹Dasein›. Elsewhere I have discussed this position extensively.[25] The main points of my argument concern the temporality that is bound to ‹becoming›. But, as a characteristic of natural reality, it still has no place here. Were ‹becoming› understood non-temporally, however, perhaps as a "conceptual transition," it still would not pertain to the inception of the *Logic*, but to the methodological reflection of the dialectic. Ultimately, it is a being that at the same time *is* a non-being, hence a kind of being which is more accurately categorized as ‹Dasein› (while according to Hegel's definition, Dasein is a "quiet result" of the "ceaseless disquietude" of becoming,[26] which appeals to the concrete intuition and which thus cannot actually be called an argument).

For there to be such an in-itself differentiated being that binds together being and non-being, it would have to be *determinate*. Indeed a thusly-determined being [so-bestimmtes Sein] is already at the same time the non-being of an otherwise-determined being [anders-bestimmten Sein]. Determinateness is here the *condition* of the formation of a synthesis and thus requires the introduction of a further category ‹*determinateness*› [Bestimmtsein]. This explicates the condition under which ‹Dasein› is the synthesis of opposition and conjunction of the conceptual pairing of ‹being›/‹non-being› and can for that reason be designated an *explicative*

category [explicative Bestimmung]. If the synthetic category ‹Dasein› is the *fulfillment* of the demand of a synthesis that emerges out of the dialectical argument, then the relevant *conditions of fulfillment* will be explicated through the explicative category ‹determinateness›. Indeed, both belong together.

Along with the explicative category there appears at the same time a *new dimension of meaning*. Indeed, the synthetic category ‹Dasein› already contains something new, namely, a "new form of being [neue Seinsart]", which is still comprehensible in terms of the earlier categories ‹being› and ‹non-being›: as a being that is equally non-being in a different respect. With the explicative determination ‹determinateness›, being—precisely as a *determinate* thing—will be bound expressly as a being different from other kinds of being. With it is now posited a *new opposition*: A "thusly-determined" being is everything that an "otherwise-determined" being is not. The explicative category ‹determinateness› thus immediately "dissociates" [dissoziiert] into two new opposing categories: ‹being-thus›[27] and ‹being-other› [‹Sosein› und ‹Anderssein›].

To summarize: the synthetic category brings together the previously opposing determinations. The explicative category brings *new opposing categories* into play—and indeed in service of the antecedent formation of a synthesis, which requires, as seen, *different respects* for the synthetic, contradiction-free reconcilability of the opposition and equivalence of the previously opposed categories. The dialectical argument thus moves outward from the oppositional pair ‹being› and ‹non-being›, through the synthetic category ‹Dasein› and the explicative category ‹determinateness›, to a new oppositional pair, ‹being-thus› and ‹being-other›.

It is important to see that in this way only the premises of the argument have "fulfilled" themselves by their explication. Since, as we have seen, the argument depends rather decisively on the fact that the category ‹being› is *not* the category ‹non-being›, and is not so because both categories are actually *determined* differently and are therefore themselves already *case examples* of ‹determinateness›, ‹being-thus›, and ‹being-other›. Thus the dialectical development of categories—this must be stressed—does not depend on arbitrary incidences and contrivances, but is only the explication of what is already presupposed for the argument.

The fact that new opposing categories emerge here—‹being-thus› and ‹being-other›—renders structural correspondences visible. As can be shown,[28] the relationship between these two opposing categories leads to a further antinomical structure. Out of this comes the resulting demand to form a synthesis and to introduce an explicative category as the condition

of its fulfillment. This now leads to a new differentiation into opposing categories, and so forth. As the argument *repeats* itself in this way, it effectively runs through a *dialectical cycle*, which is characterized through four categories: the two opposing categories, the synthetic, and the explicative category. In place of the classical three-part schema—thesis, antithesis, synthesis—we have a four-part one.[29] I have more thoroughly detailed this schema elsewhere,[30] so would here only mention it in passing.

It is be important to note here that the argument cannot be carried out *schematically* in essential parts. That especially affects the retrieval of the explicative category. But it also affects what perhaps seemed to be the genuinely schematic part of the dialectical argument. In the work mentioned above,[31] the reconstruction of the four-cycle dialectical category-development has shown that the dialectic of the opposing categories is developed differently in every cycle. This means that, for a start, an intuitive understanding of contextual content must be reached before it can be converted into a demonstrable argument.

The argument developed here may have suggested the semblance of a *formalization* of dialectic. But the appearance is deceiving. Of course, practically everything can be formalized after it has been understood. But to give rise to such an understanding in the first place—that is just the point in performing the dialectical concept-development.[32]

IV. Implicit utilization [Implizite Inanspruchnahme] of the fundamental logic

We must now return to the logical means introduced in our argument. By that we mean the fundamental conditions for the possibility of argumentation generally, which as such have a *transcendental* character. In what follows, I term this complete fundamentally-transcendental logical structure as *fundamental logic* (as I had in earlier works[33]). I turn now to the second of the two main objectives of this study mentioned in the introduction. First, however, some general considerations.

So that I am not misunderstood: What is characterized as "fundamental" logic is not one of many "logics" by which one understands the various systems of formal logic. These in fact concern *constructs*, which as such always contain *conventional* elements. Fundamental logic, on the other hand, inheres a *transcendental* character; that is, it is to be understood as a condition of the possibility of argumentation in general, and thus in the end as always forming the basis of those various "logics."

There arises thus a basic problem with the fundamental logic: For its investigation it must be argued in advance. But the "means for argumentation" are themselves elements of this fundamental logic, which ought to have been cognized first. The very first thing to be cognized must evidently already be assumed for its own cognition—a typically recurring problem, as soon as cognition sets out to cognize the transcendental conditions of cognition itself.[34]

In the introduction to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel argued that cognition could not step out of itself in order to ground itself from the outside at the same time; this is something it does not need to do anyway, since it has, "its own criterion in itself."[35] Such explanations are formulated very generally. So let us examine a *concrete example*: the verdict postulated by skepticism that "truth is impossible." This position is well-known as demonstrably self-contradictory in the sense that it requires precisely what it denies—truth—for that denial itself; a contradiction that proves such position itself untenable[36]—according to the principle of non-contradiction.

Now, the *principle of noncontradiction* [*Widerspruchsprinzip*] itself is not explicitly grounded here as a principle of argumentation and, insofar, is not explicitly available for the argument here. Hence, it has not been explicitly taken up in the explanation either. Nevertheless, the significance of the violation of the principle of noncontradiction [Widerspruchsausschluss] is evident. Why?

The contradiction cannot be permitted since it would level the difference between assertion and negation, and remove with it the possibility of demarcation and determination.[37] If both assertions—"truth is possible" and "truth is impossible"—are permitted in the same way, then the predicates "possible" and "impossible" would no longer be differentiated; and so on in all other cases ("red"/"not-red," "good"/"not-good," etc.). In short, there would be no negation at all. But without negation, there can be no determination since all determination, per Spinoza, is demarcation.[38] Accordingly, there could not be concepts with determinate content; that is, the possibility of meaning would be negated overall. Determination and meaning can only exist if negation exists, and this can only exist if contradiction itself remains prohibited. In other words, whoever uses sensible, meaningful concepts *has* always already prohibited contradiction *implicitly*, without having had to formulate this *explicitly* as a principle of argumentation. The principle of non-contradiction is *exercised implicitly* in all argumentation; it is in a certain way "latently" ["untergründig"] efficacious.

With this, a question arises. If the conditions stated for the principle of noncontradiction can hold generally, is the fundamental logic efficacious

in an entirely latent way? This question appears to be unanswerable insofar as it treats the fundamental logic in its entire, yet still unknown complexity. On the other hand, were the fundamental logic not always already efficacious *as a whole* in all argumentation, nothing could be argued for anyway, since that requires not only the principle of non-contradiction, but—basically—the *entire* fundamental logic. But can there be doubt about the possibility of argumentation, even in principle? This would admittedly concern even this doubt itself; that is, it too could not have been doubted even once – since whoever doubts must already argue, must already use sensible concepts, etc. Such a radical doubt is thus self-defeating. In the sense of this general transcendental argument, one can thoroughly see that argumentation is possible and—basically—that the entire fundamental logic is already involved and implicitly "efficacious" therein. The consequence is that it can be argued stringently without the entire logical instrumentation being *explicitly* available—how, for instance, it is also possible to prove through mere counting that one and one is two without having to explicitly resort to the Peano-Axioms (which are of course implicitly utilized in counting). This is a significant fact, since it means that cognition itself, although it does not *explicitly* dispose of the entire fundamental logic, can still draw on a latent potential that does lend soundness to its argumentation.

The question we have formulated concerning the cognition of the fundamental logic itself can be answered thusly: What should only be cognized must and can already be implicitly operative for cognition. And at the same time it thereby becomes possible to extend our limited knowledge of the fundamental logic. After what has been said about limited explicit knowledge, it is to be understood that what is efficacious *implicitly* in such arguments becomes increasingly *explicit*. The cognition of the fundamental logical structures is to be understood as their explication by implicit fundamental logical means and as such is a sort of *self-explication* of the fundamental logic.[39] Just insofar, cognition has only a "discharging" [entbindende], explicating function: to fulfill [einzuholen] and to explicate, that by which it is implicitly always already led and determined—a genuinely Hegelian perspective.

V. Dialectic as progressive self-explication of the logic

What in particular does this mean for our previous discussion of the dialectic of ‹being› and ‹non-being›? Concerning the explication of the fundamental logic, the question first arises how an *entrance* to it can

be found at all. Or, in Hegel's well-known formulation, "With What Must the Science begin?"[40]

Now, a usual characteristic of the beginning is typically the *lack of presuppositions* [*Voraussetzungslosigkeit*]. According to what has been said, however, that appears to be a misunderstanding. Since for all argumentation, the entire fundamental logic (as the transcendental condition of the possibility of argumentation) is always already *presupposed*. All the more should the question of the beginning be understood as a question of a beginning relative to the *explication* of the fundamental logic: so, what would be supposed as the first step of explication?

But first, what actually is "explication?" Apparently, it is the expression of what is implicitly the case—whereby a first thing that is already put out is explicated, namely: in the process of explication what receives expression is that something *is the case*, or, in short, that something *is*. Without the existential determination [Seinsbestimmung] "is" nothing can be explicated. This explication—that ‹being› (in the sense of ‹being the case›) is above all the condition of the possibility of explication—thus constitutes the beginning of the explicating.

With the explication of ‹being› we now have a first explicit, and this means also that a *determinate* category is generated. ‹Being› indeed has the *meaning* of indeterminate being, but is as such a perfectly determinate category. And as a *determinate* category, it is related to the category of its *opposing determination*: ‹non-being›. In other words, the explicit introduction of the category ‹being› immediately requires the introduction of the opposing determination ‹non-being›. ‹Being› means something indeterminate, indeed; but it is also, through this establishment of meaning, something determinate that is at the same time determined as opposite to its determinate opposite which it thus *presupposes*.

With this duplicity of the explicated determinations ‹being› and ‹non-being›, a *new constellation* has developed, which implies the same question we saw before about the *relationship* between the two determinations. The emerging *antinomical structure* has already been worked out in detail in section II; it would be useful to revisit its underlying argument afresh.

First, it is important to note that each one is the negation of the other. This means that the category ‹being› *is not* the category ‹non-being›. Immediately ‹being› itself turns out to be a case of ‹non-being›. It still *means* ‹being› but is shot through with "non-being" since it *is not* the meaning of ‹non-being›. ‹Being› has at the same time the *property* of non-being in itself and, insofar, is "in the mode of non-being"; I will call this "non-being-like" ["nichtseinartig"]. Admittedly: to the extent that ‹being› *is* "non-being-like,"

it again takes on the property of *being* and is thus "being-like" [seinsartig]. "Being-like" in turn *is not* "non-being-like," so that it again takes on the property of "non-being," and so forth. The category ‹being› alternately reflects the qualities of being and non-being. To the extent that it, as it were, *oscillates* simultaneously between "being-like" and "non-being-like", it actually possesses an antinomical character.

As demonstrated (section II), this oscillating in the category ‹being› at the *property-level* has the consequence that even the *category* ‹being› itself has an *antinomical* character and that means that it is not only opposed to the category ‹non-being›, but is also affinitive to it. This proves that ‹being› is inextricably bound with ‹non-being› and vice versa. As demonstrated, too, this necessitates the introduction of a new *synthetic* category ‹Dasein› and further to the *explicative* category ‹determinateness›: The Dasein of something that is determined is already at the same time a non-being, in the sense that it is-not an otherwise determined thing—a connection pointed out in Plato's *Sophist*.[41] Parmenides' central thesis that being can never be non-being has become obsolete for Plato[42]: his—metaphorical—"patricide" upon Parmenides.[43]

So while thus-determinateness [So-Bestimmtsein] and not-thus-determinateness [So-nicht-Bestimmtsein], i.e., otherwise-determinateness [Anders-Bestimmtsein], belongs to the sense of "determinateness", a new *oppositional pair* of categories is engendered therewith, one which can be termed ‹*being-thus*› and ‹*being-other*› [‹*Sosein*› und ‹*Andersein*›]. With the emergence of this new pair of opposites, the question concerning the relationship of these two categories to one another presents itself anew, with the consequence—something that cannot be more thoroughly detailed here[44]—that an antinomical structure emerges anew and hence, as before, proves the necessity of a synthetic conjunction of opposing categories, and so forth.

This *process of successive explication* of the fundamental logical categories thus always leads to antinomically structured opposing categories, which demand a new synthetic and explicative category that for its part "dissociates" anew into antinomical opposing categories. At base, the process has—as per Hegel—the form of a dialectical conceptual development [Begriffsentwicklung]. However, an essential difference of the procedure sketched here in comparison to Hegel, is to be seen in the systematic revelation of *antinomical structures*. These provide, as I have detailed elsewhere,[45] only a *ground and justification* of the formation of a synthesis. It is significant that herewith is basically found a *procedure* of explication of the system of fundamental logic that at first was merely implicit. Let us consider

these developed considerations once again while keeping in mind this *procedural-aspect*.

The act of explication can always explicitly fall back only on what is already quite explicitly available. As was detailed above, the argument also necessitates the usage of other, at first still implicit, elements of the fundamental logic. But in order to be *provable*, the procedure must abide by that what is explicitly available. Now the beginning is characterized precisely through the fact that it is not yet explicit. But then how can the procedure begin at all? The answer given here is based on the explication of the possibility of explication itself: what this explicates must in any case "be the case," or in short: it must "be," no matter how we describe it. The claimed here category ‹being› is thus to be understood as the first explicit category of the fundamental logic. With this first explicatory step, however, a second is already initiated: As the *determined* category which "being" categorizes, it is *not* its opposite ‹non-being›—whereby the category of non-being is also immediately engendered: the explication of "being" unavoidably entails that of "non-being."

At the same time, there emerges a *new constellation* of explicit elements: after the *two* explicit categories are now at hand, the question about their *relationship* arises. As said, this leads to a complex structure that upon closer inspection bears an *antinomical* character. The next step is thereby indicated: The antinomical relationship between ‹being› and ‹non-being› implies that both belong inseparably together and in such a way that requires the introduction of a *synthetic* relationship that *binds* the sense of ‹being› with that of ‹non-being›—an effectively new sense of ‹being›, which is conceptualized as ‹Dasein› and as its condition of fulfillment ‹Determinateness›. That is, as a being that as the being of a thus-determined thing is at the same time the non-being of an otherwise-determined thing. ‹Being› in the sense of ‹Dasein› and ‹Determinateness› therefore requires the introduction of a new oppositional pair, ‹being-thus› and ‹being-other›, that for their part make visible an antinomical structure which in turn necessitates a new synthesis and explication, and so on. In this way, the process of dialectical conceptual explication [Begriffsexplikation] provides a sequence of categories in the sense of a progressive explication of semantically fundamental categories.[46]

That this approach is *not arbitrary*—for otherwise it would lack explanatory value—arises from the fact that in its reflexive employment it takes up only what had become explicit in the preceding step of the procedure. Accordingly, it is essential that *even through the act of explication itself* a new

situation is created. A new explicit element, so to say, appears on the stage of explication and therewith a new constellation of explicit elements is realized: a new state of affairs which for its part is *not yet* conceptually grasped and insofar still has an *implicit* character itself. So, every step of explication at the same time generates a new implicit case, which as such now posits the *next task for explication* and with it motivates a new step of explication. In other words, every step of explication itself always further induces a *discrepancy* between what has just become explicit and what—through the newly instantiated implicit aspect—now further demands a new step of explication. This incongruence—that directs the explication-procedure of each explicit object and of the newly produced implicit object, which is produced at the same time by the act of explication itself—is what I designate an "*explication-discrepancy*" [*Explikations-Diskrepanz*].

Under *this* aspect, let us observe once more the initial category ‹being›. First, it does have the *meaning* of indeterminate being. However, as the *categorization* of this meaning it possesses the *property* of determinacy, which brings the *determinate* category ‹being› onto the scene with its opposing *determinate* category ‹non-being›. With this opposition of ‹being› and ‹non-being›, however, a new implicit case is instantiated, namely, that the category of ‹being› *is not* ‹non-being›. Thus, irrespective of its *meaning* ‹being›, its emerging *property* is "non-being-like" ["nichtseinsartig"]: an *explication-discrepancy* that gives rise to a new step of explication and that, as was shown, leads to the synthesis of ‹being› and ‹non-being›.

VI. The perspective of finite knowing

Here it can be recognized that the diaelectical explication procedure is determined *out of itself* and thus—strictly speaking—all arbitrariness is erased. Every step of explication is determined by the preceding one. So, not just *any* implicit content becomes explicit, but precisely that implicit content which had become *generated* at each step of the procedure itself, through which it is concretely apprehensible and further directs the procedure through the thusly instantiated explication-discrepancy.[47]

The dialectic therefore in no way stands under the unrealizable condition that it must have in mind already, as a guiding-principle, the *final goal*—the completed system of fundamental logic, which for Hegel is the *Absolute*. The self-referent reflexive employment of the procedure upon the previous step at each stage is in fact decisive, thereby capturing the specifically

emerging explication-discrepancy on every explication level, and sublating it by a new act of explication—which, admittedly, always induces a new explication-discrepancy.

The cognitive act, therefore, constantly includes "along the way" an act of reflexive self-verification [Selbstvergewisserung] with respect to the *completeness* of cognition at each of its levels. But why should such a completeness be sought? Evidently, because the Absolute asserts itself underhandedly, as it were, forming the furtive motive of cognition. The logic—in the sense of Fundamental logic—is asserting itself implicitly by means of itself; in the very act of thinking we have already assumed its absolute power, willingly or unwillingly. All the cunning of cognition, in trying to seize hold of the Absolute, would be idle and in vain according to Hegel's famous formulation in the *Phenomenology*, "if it were not and wasn't necessarily in and for itself already with us."[48]

Essential for the dialectical procedure is thus the reflection upon the implicit state of affairs through which each previous step of explication had first been generated, that is, upon the logical specifications that have been carried out in the immediately previous step of explication through the procedure itself. These specifications are thus themselves to be understood as the transcendental condition of the next step of the procedure. A logical potential, so to speak, is induced with every step of the procedure that, while it is reflected thereon, provides the argument with new material content and drives the process along thereby: a *methodologically regulated reflection*. It is reflected not in a private speech-act that as such could promise immediate certainty,[49] but in the very *logic* that is effectively implicit within it.

Out of this, however, no "immediate" knowledge can be had, no "immediate" evidence, so that the *possibility of error* cannot really be ruled out. From here some light falls on the question of the *fallibility* of knowledge: Not that the intentions accompanying my speech-acts, which are immediately accessible and evident to me, could count as a criterion of knowledge. Such a criterion can only be the universally accessible and objectively comprehensible logical confirmation [Ausweisung] of knowledge which as such, however, is admittedly also *prone to error*. Hegel notes that Plato altered the *Republic* seven times; for the task of editing the Hegelian *Logic*, Hegel would have been happy to have had, "the free leisure to have been able to work through it seventy-seven times."[50]

Incidentally, the knowledge developed in the *dialectical* argument can be no "final" knowledge, since it is process-dependent knowledge that is *in principle able to be overtaken*—able to be further developed, able to be made

more precise. But the possibility of the determinations being overtaken does not hinder the *exactitude* of its dialectical reconstruction. And that means also that categories that can be overtaken are not "false" categories. The "correct" meaning of a category is rather that which belongs to *each respective state of the procedure*. The determination belonging to a progressive state of the procedure is not the correct category, but only the more determinate one. And the argument that underlies it is in no way more exact than what we had in the case of an earlier category.

It is essential that the clarification of the applied concepts must correspond to the *stage of the procedure*. So, for example, one can argue quite exactly with a still thoroughly indeterminate concept of truth (even with respect to the possibility of absolute truth), without needing to have *definitively solved* the problem of truth before handling those various theories of truth: for the disproof of the skeptical objection to know it appears sufficient that a proposition is always bound to a truth claim (section IV). Or: in the developed dialectical argument, it has been repeatedly asserted that something is *correspondent to a concept*. But what is a *concept*? There are some thoroughly different notions about that. "Concept" for Hegel has a completely different sense than it does for Wittgenstein. But that is besides the point for our purposes. In what concerns us here, where we have supposed that there is something like a "*correspondence* with a concept", it is implied that a *norm-character* [*Normcharakter*] accords to the concept—by definition; since only with respect to a "norm" can talk of "correspondence" be meaningful. Doubtlessly, this is no sophisticated determination of what "concept" means, but—and this is decisive—the characterization of "concept" is manifestly sufficient in view of the context of the argument addressed here ("to be correspondent to a concept"). In this context, an absolutely complete and exact definition is just not necessary.

Essential to the task of reconstructing the fundamental logic, it is at last certain that in the course of reconstruction *all* presuppositions are "fulfilled" in the end, that is, explicated and legitimized—hence also, for example, the constantly presupposed principle of noncontradiction. Only through the total reconstruction of the fundamental logic, through all logical means (as these must be already laid out "along the way" in the execution of every single argument) can these individual arguments *finally* be legitimated too. Their *ultimate* justification refers to the *termination* [*Abschluss*] of the entire endeavor in whose service they stood. Hegel's thought that the proof for the correctness of the *Science of Logic* can only be its fully achieved system certainly strikes a central note for the

reconstruction of the fundamental logic. Only if it concludes itself in the end in *the* way that *all* the required for reconstruction logical means are thereby reconstructed as well, only then can we say that the pursued project of reconstruction of the fundamental logic *by its own means* has been successfully carried out, and that means its *self-fulfillment*.

The way to this end is the self-grounding, continual determination of the dialectical argument out of itself, which leaves behind all arbitrary incidences and presuppositions. The dialectical development of the fundamental logical structures in its systematic coherence is thus the self-reconstruction of the fundamental logic as a *system* in the sense of a *self-supporting whole*.[51] This internal closedness [Geschlossenheit] is the expression of the *absoluteness of the fundamental logic*, i.e., the impossibility of founding it through anything other than itself, insofar as the founding itself is of an unavoidably logical nature. In the sense of the current debate over "ultimate-groundings,"[52] this would count as the *ultimate grounding* of the fundamental logic: *dialectic as the ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic*—a broad and still wide open field of philosophical research!

Notes

[1] See, for example, Karl Popper "What is Dialectic?" in *Conjectures and Refutations*, London: Routledge, 1976, pp. 312–335.

[2] In his impressive magnum opus, Manfred Wetzel (*Dialektik als Ontologie auf der Basis selbstreflexiver Erkenntniskritik. Neue Grundlegung einer 'Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins' und Prolegomena zu einer Dialektik in systematischer Absicht*, Freiburg/München: Alber, 1986; see also *Reflexion und Bestimmtheit in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, Hamburg: Fundament-Verlag Sasse, 1971) where he goes entirely his own way, which leads him to position the dialectic in the scope of a "self-reflexive critique of cognition". Wetzel's concern is above all aimed at a "new foundation of a 'science of the experience of consciousness.'" His analyses on the dialectic are accordingly epistemologically oriented and in this sense are above all a "Prolegomena" to a dialectical logic still to be worked out. In the present context, however, it is decidedly all about the concrete structure—even and just in regard to the process—of such a dialectical logic (see title formulations in *Dialektik als Ontologie auf der Basis selbstreflexiver Erkenntniskritik*).

[3] For a good overview of the present attempts, see Thomas Kesselring, *Die Produktivität der Antinomie. Hegels Dialektik im Lichte der genetischen Erkenntnistheorie und der formalen Logik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1984, 22ff. See also the recently published investigation by Christian Krijnen, *Philosophie als System. Prinzipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2008, Ch. 3.

[4] Dieter Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik. Rekonstruktion und Revision dialektischer Kategorienentwicklung in "Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik"*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 1995.

[5] See Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Grundoperation. Eine Einleitung in die 'Wissenschaft der Logik'", in Ute Guzzoni, Bernhard Rang, and Ludwig Siep, eds, *Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart. Festschrift für Werner Marx zum 65. Geburtstag*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1976, pp. 208–230; Dieter Henrich, "Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 213–229.

[6] Wolfgang Wieland "Bemerkungen zum Anfang von Hegels Logik," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Franfkfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 194–212.

[7] Vittorio Hösle, *Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität*, 2 Bde., Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987, Ch. 4.1.2.

[8] In accordance with the author's wishes, both "Bestimmungen" and "Kategorien" are translated throughout as "categories." –*Tr.*

[9] Bernd Braßel is illustrative on this point (see "Vorzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik," in Vittorio Hösle and Wolfgang Neuser, eds. *Logik, Mathematik und Naturphilosophie im objektiven Idealismus. Festschrift für Dieter Wandschneider zum 65. Geburtstag*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004, pp. 91–112). As a basic clarification in this context, see also his excellent investigation *Das Programm der idealen Logik*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005, which especially focuses on the possibility of a logical "ultimate grounding" through transcendental argumentation.

[10] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 90; Hegel, G.W.F.: *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 5, p. 92.

[11] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 90; *Werke*, 5, 93.

[12] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 92; *Werke*, p. 5, 94.

[13] Instructive here is Ruth-Eva Schulz-Seitz. See "'Sein' in Hegels Logik: 'Einfache Beziehung auf sich,'" in Helmut Fahrenbach, ed., *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion. Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag*, Pfullingen: Neske Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 365–383**.**

[14] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 91; *Werke*, 6, 94.

[15] H*egel's Science of Logic*, p. 83; *Werke*, 5, 84.

[16] John Burbidge, *On Hegel's Logic. Fragments of a Commentary*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981, p. 38; Krijnen, *Philosophie als System*, p. 140.

[17] Michael Theunissen (see *Sein und Schein. Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1980, 385ff.) discusses the various types of copula (predicative, existential, veritative, identicative: "is", "is existing," "is true," "is identical"). Yet the predicative form is always included with all of these types and in this sense is to be considered *fundamental.*

[18] Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*, p. 55.

[19] For more on this point, see *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*, chapters 3.2 and 4.6.

[20] For more detail, see Dieter Wandschneider, "Das Antinomienproblem und seine pragmatische Dimension," in Herbert Stachowiak, ed. *Pragmatik*, Bd. IV: *Sprachphilosophie, Sprachpragmatik und formative Pragmatik*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1993, pp. 320–352.

[21] Ibid., section 3ff.

[22] If we accept as true the contradictory conjunction $A \wedge \neg A$, then from that follows the validity of A and the validity of $\neg A$, and consequently the validity of the implication (*) $\neg A \rightarrow X$ for any proposition X. On the other hand the validity of $\neg A$ also follows from the admitted contradictory conjunction and in such a way, together with the implication (*), the arbitrary proposition X.

[23] Note that the concept of *dialectical contradiction* is also used in another sense. For example, see Vittorio Hösle, "Begründungsfragen des objektiven Idealismus," in Wolfgang R. Köhler, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, and Peter Rohs, eds. *Philosophie und Begründung*, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987, pp. 212–267, 253f., where dialectical contradiction is perhaps understood as an "essentially performative contradiction."

[24] Cf., for example, Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 109ff.; *Werke*, 5, 115ff.

[25] Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*, Ch. 3.3.

[26] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 106; *Werke*, 5, 113.

[27] "Being-thus" ["Sosein"] is here naturally not understood as the opposite of "being-that" ["Dassein"], thus not in the sense of "essence" ["Wesen"], but quite literally as a "thus-determined" being ["so-bestimmtes" Sein].

[28] Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*, Ch. 3.5

[29] It is interesting in this context that Hösle in his excellent investigation *Hegels System*, argues for a principally *tetradic* structure.

[30] Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*, Ch. 4.8.

[31] Ibid.

[32] At any rate, formal means are not to be rejected out of hand. They can help to form the coherence of the argument more transparently. In certain cases they can also contribute to its verification. It can thus be shown, for example, in a very formal way —something that cannot be detailed here—that the sequence of the first four dialectical cycles form a *systematic unity* in the sense that with it a certain argumentative completeness is reached (Dieter Wandschneider, "Letztbegründung und Dialektik," in Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, ed., *Diskurs und Leidenschaft. Festschrift für Karl-Otto Apel zum 75. Geburtstag*, Aachen: Verlag der Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1996, pp. 317–336).

[33] For example, *Wandschneider, Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik.*

[34] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 46–47; *Werke*, 3, 69; similar to Plato's *Theatetus*, 196d–e.

[35] Hegel's *Phenomenology*, p. 53; *Werke*, 3, 76.

[36] Admittedly this holds only if the "third" is excluded. Thus even the principle of *tertium non datur* holds here. However, this principle appears obsolete in view of the existence of *polyvalent* logics in which "the third" is no longer excluded. An example is the *reflexion logic* with six truth-values developed by *Ulrich Blau*; this was developed to deal with logical indeterminacy and paradoxes (cf. Ulrich Blau, "Die Logik der Unbestimmtheiten und Paradoxen," in *Erkenntnis* 22, 1985, pp. 369–459). Generally it is being discovered that such polyvalent logics are constructs in which certain validity-possibilities are *settled by convention*. It is essential that even such constructs presume fundamental logical means on the *meta-level* – namely, for their introduction and functional determination. At this level, however, at least the logic operating on each highest meta-level is *bivalent*. Since here (and I adopt this argument from a personal conversation with Blau)

there is again only the alternative "true" and "false," perhaps with respect to the question as to whether or *not* a third truth value *accords* to a proposition in the scope of a trivalent logic: since again there cannot be a third term. But the "highest" meta-level—in the founding theoretical perspective relevant here—is the transcendental logical level. In the sense of these considerations, the fact that it is plainly irreducible means that its logic is *bivalent* and therein the *principle of the excluded third* holds. In terms of transcendental logic, therefore, this principle is just as inviolable as the non-contradiction principle and the principle of the non-equivalence of affirmation and negation. The recourse to the principle of the excluded middle in the preceding considerations is thus legitimated transcendentally.

[37] Following Aristotle. See in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, *Metaphysics*, Γ 3–6.

[38] "Determinatio negatio est" (cf. Hösle, *Hegels System*, p. 195).

[39] Cf. Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*, Ch. 6.3, and Dieter Wandschneider, "Ist das System der Fundamentallogik *ohne* das System der Fundamentallogik rekonstruierbar?" in Ludwig Nagl and Rudolf Langthaler, eds., *System der Philosophie? Festgabe für Hans-Dieter Klein*, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2000, pp. 225–240.

[40] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 67; *Werke*, 5, 65.

[41] For example, Plato, *The Sophist: A Translation with a Detailed Account of Its Theses and Arguments*, trans. James Duerlinger, New York: Peter Lang, 2005, 256d ff.

[42] See also Klaus Düsing, "Dialektikmodelle. Platons 'Sophistes' sowie Hegels und Heideggers Umdeutungen," in Dieter Wandschneider, ed., *Das Problem der Dialektik*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1997, pp. 4–18.

[43] See Plato, *Parmenides*, 241d.

[44] See Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik*.

[45] Ibid., ch. 2 & 3.

[46] At this point, the question concerning the *completion* of such an explicatory process must remain open. On this, see the considerations of Karen Gloy, *Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit. Eine Strukturanalyse des 'und'. Systematische Untersuchungen zum Einheits- und Mannigfaltigkeitsbegriff bei Platon, Fichte, Hegel sowie in der Moderne*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981, 166ff., 174ff.; Dieter Wandschneider, "Die Absolutheit des Logischen und das Sein der Natur. Systematische Überlegungen zum absolut-idealistischen Ansatz Hegels," (*Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Bd. 39, 1985, pp. 331–351), 343ff.; Dieter Wandschneider, "Das Problem der Entäußerung der Idee zur Natur bei Hegel," in *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, Heinz Kimmerle, Wolfgang Lefevre, Rudolf W. Meyer, eds, Bochum: Germinal Verlag, 1990, pp. 25–33, section 2; Hösle, *Hegels System*, 196f.

[47] Robert Brandom has shown in detail that the function of logical terms consists in making explicit what is implicitly presupposed in the practice of discourse. He himself here recognizes his Hegelian perspective (e.g., Robert B. Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994; see also Robert Brandom, *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). All the same, the difference with our position here is not to be overlooked: Brandom is not concerned, as we are here, with the project of a *systematic*

development of the implicit to be made explicit, whereby in the present context the real point is its *procedure-dependent generation* [*verfahrensbedingte Generierung*]. In contrast, Brandom treats the inferential potential contained implicitly in (empirical) concepts, which he understands as socially constituted. The systematic development of (fundamental-)logic is just not his issue. (See my detailed argument in Dieter Wandschneider, "'In-expressive Vernunft'. Abschied vom 'sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus' in Robert B. Brandoms pragmatistischem Positivismus," in Brady Bowman and Klaus Vieweg, eds., *Die freie Seite der Philosophie. Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Perspektive*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2006, pp. 199–216).

[48] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 47; *Werke*, 3, 69.

[49] Transcendental Pragmatism (Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, among others) sees in it the possibility of *infallible* knowledge.

[50] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p.42; *Werke*, 5, 33.

[51] On the sense and possibility of a systematic philosophy today, see Christian Krijnen, *Philosophie als System*, esp. Ch. 6.

[52] For example, Vittorio Hösle, *Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie. Transzendentalpragmatik, Letztbegründung, Ethik*. München: C. H. Beck, 1990; Dieter Wandschneider "Letztbegründung und Dialektik,"; Dieter Wandschneider, "Letztbegründung unter der Bedingung endlichen Wissens. Eine Hegelsche Perspektive," in Wolf-Jürgen Cramm, Wulf Kellerwessel, David Krause, and Hans-Christoph Kupfer, eds, *Diskurs und Reflexion. Wolfgang Kuhlmann zum 65. Geburtstag*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2005, pp. 353–372.

Chapter 3

Dialectic and Circularity: Is Hegelian Circularity a New Copernican Revolution?

Tom Rockmore

Despite the huge dimensions of the rapidly growing Hegel discussion, Hegel's contribution to the problem of knowledge is still not well known. Various reasons can be advanced. These include the belief that his position has been rendered untenable through modern science,[1] the conviction that idealism cannot be defended,[2] and the return to Kant whose continuing influence turns attention away from Hegel.

This chapter considers the still relatively unfamiliar but crucial theme of epistemological circularity in Hegel's theory of knowledge.[3] I will be suggesting that as early as the beginning of his career through his appeal to circularly Hegel is already concerned to offer an alternative to Kant's critical philosophy. I will further be raising the question of whether Hegel should be read as proposing a new Copernican revolution.

I. Early philosophical views of epistemological circularity

Circularity, which is one of the many available ways to justify claims to know, is understood by contrast to linearity. The figures of the circle and the line arose in ancient geometry before later coming into the philosophical debate. By "circularity" I have in mind the familiar geometrical definition of a circle as "that plane figure for which every point on the circumference is equidistant from its center." In theory of knowledge, the figure of the circle is sometimes invoked to justify claims to know. The decision for or against a circular approach to knowledge is a basic option in epistemology.

The philosophical theme of circularity is very old. Heracleitus, who mentions circularity repeatedly, says that the way up and the way down are the same[4] and that on the circumference of the circle the beginning and

the end come together.[5] In his poem, Parmenides distinguishes between the way of opinion, which is linear, and the way of truth, which is circular. He points to what later, through the invention of epistemological foundationalism, becomes a basic difference between linear and circular epistemological strategies in the modern tradition.

Plato is already concerned with different epistemological strategies, including models of epistemological justification. The *Republic* describes direct intuition of the real, the *Phaedo* introduces the notorious theory of ideas as an alternative to causal explanation featured in the natural sciences, and the *Theaetetus* describes a related series of approaches to knowledge culminating in a true claim plus an account. In the *Timaeus*, he suggests the world is spherical and the soul comes to know through circular motion,[6] in short, through the supposed correspondence between epistemological circularity and cosmological circularity. This is a further version of the Parmenidean view of knowledge as requiring the identity of thought and being, which is restated much later as the philosophy of identity (Identitätsphilosophie) in German idealism.

The early interest in epistemological circularity is countered by Aristotle, who forcefully criticizes circular thought. In *Prior Analytics*, he objects to circular reasoning as proof by assuming the conclusion.[7] And in *Posterior Analytics*, he draws attention to the impossibility of providing a circular demonstration, which amounts to taking the same thing as prior and posterior.[8]

Most later thinkers agree with Aristotle in regarding circularity as vicious, though what that means is unclear. Circular reasoning is often said either to beg the question or to be a *petitio principii*. In instances of circular reasoning, the conclusion is supposedly included surreptitiously in the premises. Some forms of circular reasoning are regarded as acceptable, but objections arise when it is invoked to evade the burden of proof.

Circular reasoning was widely proscribed around the time of Kant, when the suspicion of a *petitio principii* sufficed to refute a theory. Kant regularly stigmatizes circular reasoning as in principle mistaken. But the same charge was raised against Kant by a variety of commentators. J. F. Flatt objected that Kant deduced the moral law from freedom and freedom from the moral law.[9] Under the influence of Hammann,[10] Herder suggests that any claim that pure reason could sit in judgment on itself was patently circular.[11] Similarly, Schulze, a contemporary skeptic writing under the pseudonym Aenesidemus, criticizes Reinhold's pioneering effort to restate Kant's critical philosophy in foundationalist form. According to Schulze, Reinhold

cannot demonstrate the primacy of his law of consciousness without engaging in circular reasoning.[12]

II. Fichte's rehabilitation of epistemological circularity

In this context, Fichte, who rehabilitates epistemological circularity in Kant's wake, opens a new era in which circular forms of argumentation begin to be taken seriously again. He transforms circularity from a negative designation of the failure of the cognitive process to the positive description of an "ineliminable" element of any approach to knowledge. According to Fichte, philosophical explanation is intrinsically circular.[13]

A fuller account of Fichte's position, which would surpass the limits of the present text, would show the rapid transformation of his view of circular reasoning from the standard identification of an irremediable defect to a necessary characteristic of any theory. In "Concerning the Concept of the *Wissenschaftslehre*," he studies the familiar idea of philosophy as a scientific system. According to Fichte, any system based on a basic principle is circular, since a basic principle (Grundsatz) is also the final result.[14] The result is a necessary circle that cannot be avoided.[15] In the *Wissenschaftslehre*, he repeats this claim in different ways with respect to the circular relation between first principles and results,[16] reasoning and the laws of logic,[17] and the necessary relation to the mind-independent thing in itself that exists only for us.[18]

Fichte's reflections on circularity, which remain on the level of observations about different themes, never coalesce in a single detailed statement. The key claim that emerges is that, since circularity is unavoidable, its existence does not point to an error in reasoning.

The significance of this result for the grasp of Fichte's and Hegel's positions can be quickly anticipated. Though Fichte's position arises in his effort to think through Schulze's (Aenesidemus) objections to Reinhold, his relation to the latter is not well understood. Fries, for instance, suggests Fichte merely develops Reinhold's basic concepts in falling more deeply into his errors.[19] Fichte certainly shares Reinhold's acceptance of the basic rationalist model of system in terms of an initial principle. But as a direct consequence of his rejection of the view that this principle can be established as correct, Fichte makes the very circularity which Reinhold sought to avoid as a mistake in reasoning, constitutive of the process of knowledge. For Fichte, any claim to knowledge must forever remain hypothetical, since it is necessarily limited by the relation of a theory to its indemonstrable initial principle.

Hegel was aware of this debate, and of the views of Reinhold and Fichte. He sides with Fichte against Reinhold, hence against Kant, in contending that knowledge is an essentially circular process. But he denies the resultant inference that the outcome of the process is in any way less than the full form of knowledge, which has always been sought in the philosophical tradition. From the perspective of the endeavor to reconstruct the critical philosophy, Hegel's attempt to demonstrate that knowledge in the full sense can be attained through a circular system can be regarded as a third argument, alongside those of Fichte and Reinhold. And it can further be regarded as an effort to attain the goal fixed by Reinhold by means of the counterargument advanced by Fichte, which would seem precisely to foreclose this possibility.

III. Hegel's *Differenzschrift*

Hegel's analysis of circularity is advanced in the *Differenzschrift*, his first philosophical publication. Hegel here interprets and criticizes Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, whom he regarded as the leading philosophers of the period, and Reinhold, whom he regarded as a leading nonphilosopher. Since Hegel never draws a line between the history of philosophy and philosophy,[20] his own position is inseparable from his reading of the ongoing debate.

The *Differenzschrift*[21] is the birthplace of a position he later extends and deepens, but never basically alters. Here Hegel analyzes the views of his philosophical contemporaries as a series of reactions to the critical philosophy. Like the post-Kantian German idealists, like Hegel, many of Kant's contemporaries thought that the most important contemporary task was to carry Kant's view of knowledge beyond the point he left it. A common commitment to this task, interpreted in very different ways, links Kant and such later post-Kantian German idealists as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. German idealists are generally united in a common effort by many hands to approach the problem of knowledge on a Kantian basis. Fichte, Schelling, and Reinhold, the three authors whom Hegel considers in this text, are all Kantians of different persuasions. All are at least concerned to carry further and complete the critical philosophy if not according to its letter at least according to its spirit.

Hegel's intervention in the post-Kantian debate on knowledge is closely related to Fichte, other than Kant at the time the dominant philosophical figure. Fichte's importance for the very young Hegel is obvious. Hegel's interest in Fichte is based on his own importance as well as his importance

as a self-styled orthodox Kantian in a moment in which Kant still dominated the debate. Further, Schelling, with whom Hegel was closely linked early in his period in Jena, was still "officially" a Fichtean.

At the time, many thinkers made the claim to be the only one to read the critical philosophy correctly. Fichte's claim was accepted by the young Schelling and the young Hegel. Fichte's influence determines Hegel's approach to Kant: Hegel reads Kant through Fichte's interpretation, and continues to do so all his life.

In this text, Hegel, who criticizes Kant's effort to deduce the categories, attributes to Fichte the correct identification of the spirit of the critical philosophy as the speculative identity of subject and object. The speculative identity of subject and object is a restatement of Kant's Copernican revolution. In accepting this point as the spirit of the critical philosophy, Hegel, who identifies with Fichte's effort, which he also criticizes, is implying Fichte goes further than Kant down the Kantian road.

Though he criticizes Fichte, Hegel agrees with Fichte's critical reaction to Kant's initial approach to knowledge through representationalism, or the normative understanding of knowledge as requiring the analysis of the relation of representations to mind-independent external objects. In the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), Fichte's misnamed deduction of representation is in fact a detailed critique of Kant's view from a constructivist point of view. Constructivism is the second-best theory Kant adopts after representationalism in suggesting we can only reliably claim to know what we in some sense "construct."

In reformulating Kantianism, Fichte's simply turns away from Kant's representationalism and concentrates on his constructivism. In focusing on the role of the subject in constructing what it knows, he gives up any vestige of the thing in itself as Kant understands it. Hegel, under Fichte's influence, carries this approach further. He works out a further version of Kant's Copernican revolution in the form of an explicitly phenomenological approach to knowledge.

Fichte builds directly on Kant. Schelling, who was initially Fichte's disciple, builds on Fichte's effort to build on Kant. In the *Differenschrift*, Hegel builds on both Fichte and Schelling in treating the latter, as he at the time understood himself, as a Fichtean.

In this text, Hegel differs from Fichte, in two ways. On the one hand, he follows Schelling's suggestion to supplement Fichte's transcendental philosophy through a philosophy of nature. On the other hand, he differs basically with Fichte about the proper approach to Reinhold. Fichte, who criticizes Reinhold, but is also influenced by him, takes him seriously. Hegel,

who considers Reinhold to be an outstanding example of a nonphilosopher, a view also expressed differently by Maimon,[22] sharply rejects Reinhold's position.

Hegel is correct to dismiss Reinhold's own philosophical intentions, but incorrect to overlook his role in the evolution of the post-Kantian context. Reinhold, whose philosophical views are unimportant, is important as the first to undertake the post-Kantian task of reformulating the critical philosophy. In the *Differenzschrift*, in approaching this process from a historical perspective, Hegel literally invents the concept of post-Kantian German idealism through attention to Fichte's, Schelling's, and Reinhold's efforts to develop and complete the critical philosophy.

The title of Hegel's text, whose short form is the *Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy* (Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie),[23] refers to Hegel's conviction that philosophy originates in difference. A form of this difference concerns the relation of the post-Kantian positions of Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling to the critical philosophy. According to Hegel, Fichte and Schelling, who differ from the critical philosophy as well as from each other, share the spirit of Kant's position. In the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel analyzes the positions of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling as related, but different efforts to realize a single basic philosophical approach.

According to Hegel, in his recent work, *Contributions to the easy survey of the state of philosophy at the beginning of the new century* (Beiträge zur leichteren Übersicht des Zustands der Philosophie zu Anfang des neuen Jahrhunderts), Reinhold fails to grasp either Fichte's and Schelling's positions or the main distinctions between them. His desire to progress beyond Kant on a genuinely Kantian basis is undercut by his failure to understand the nature of the debate. Since he has not understood Kant, he does not grasp the specific sense in which Fichte's system is genuine speculation, therefore philosophy. He further fails to grasp the difference between Schelling and Fichte. In introducing a philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*), Schelling counterposes it to Fichte's subjective subject-object, in a word to his transcendental philosophy, and unites them both in a single exposition. Hegel's suggestion is not to turn away from prior thought. After Reinhold, our appreciation of the history of philosophy must not be abandoned, but rather deepened. We must grasp the specificity of the views of the significant philosophical predecessors with respect to human knowledge in order to improve on them through further specific points of view.

IV. Reinhold and epistemological circularity

Hegel's treatment of Reinhold emphasizes two main aspects: the identification of a series of basic errors in the latter's interpretation of contemporary philosophy and critical analysis of his epistemological foundationalism. Hegel's remarks on Reinhold's interpretation of contemporary philosophy, which he regards as simply inept, are withering. Reinhold undertook his effort to reformulate the critical philosophy in his "Letters on the Kantian Philosophy" (*Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie*) beginning in 1786, which he later expanded into two volumes.[24] In the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel concentrates on the first part of Reinhold's slightly more recent *Beyträge* (1790, 1794) in pointing out—this is the "excuse" for Hegel's text—that the latter fails to detect the difference between Fichte's transcendental idealism and Schelling's position. Reinhold further reverses Schelling's view of the relation between the absolute, subjectivity, and objectivity. Reinhold errs in other ways in his reading of Fichte as well, such as his failure to grasp that subjectivity is the first principle of all philosophy. But Reinhold's most significant error lies in not grasping the nature of speculative philosophy, hence philosophy as Hegel understood it in Kant's wake. Reinhold comprehends philosophy as grounding knowledge established through analysis. Speculation, whose task consists in sublating the difference between subject and object, is simply meaningless for Reinhold. Since he understands philosophy from the angle of vision of absolute opposition, he completely overlooks the speculative approach consisting in absolute unification (Vereinigung)[25] exemplified by Fichte and Schelling. Hence, by implication, he overlooks philosophy. In other words, Reinhold, who is not a philosopher, is a nonphilosopher.

Reinhold's position, as Hegel notes, is extremely labile. He has more than once announced the final revolution presaging the end of philosophy, most recently, as Hegel sarcastically writes, in the final end of the endings. This consists in the founding and grounding tendency, which transforms philosophy into the formal element of cognition, in a word, into logic.[26] In the context of the post-Kantian concern to reformulate the critical philosophy, this comment is significant for two reasons. First, it points to the insuperable difficulty of working out an epistemologically foundationalist approach to cognition, which Hegel now criticizes and rejects. Second, it provides Hegel with a forum to state his own positive alternative to epistemological foundationalism.

Epistemological foundationalism is associated with a number of important thinkers, perhaps most prominently with Descartes. Cartesian foundationalism can be quickly described through two related claims. First, there is a single principle known to be true, in Descartes' case the *cogito*, or subject. Second, the remainder of the theory, which can be rigorously deduced from this principle, is for that reason also known to be true. In his account of Reinhold, Hegel rejects epistemological foundationalism without mentioning Descartes.

Hegel's rejection of foundationalism follows Fichte's idea, mentioned above, that philosophy, which cannot prove or define its first principle, cannot found itself. As Hegel points out, if philosophy must be founded or grounded, then, since that task is infinite, no road leads from the initial act of founding or grounding to philosophy. In other words, the task of making what Hegel, following Lessing, calls "the run" up becomes simply infinite, so that one never gets over the ditch as it were and into philosophy.

The insuperable difficulty of completing the foundational task in order to move beyond the conditions of philosophy to philosophy itself can be verified in the critical philosophy. From the foundationalist perspective, the inability to found or ground philosophy implies that it ends in epistemological skepticism. It is fair to say that Kant, like his enthusiastic exponent Reinhold, is an epistemological foundationalist. His critical philosophy is intended to ground knowledge in different ways, perhaps most prominently in the transcendental deduction of the categories. We recall his basic distinction between the conditions of the possibility of philosophy, which he expounds in various places, including the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, as well as his theory of the future metaphysics. That latter theory is never formulated and, hence, never expounded. Further, there is no way to go as it were from an analysis of the conditions of philosophy to philosophy. As Hegel later notes in his critique of a transcendental approach to knowledge, the conditions of philosophy cannot be isolated from philosophy.[27]

On the other hand, Hegel now takes the occasion to state against Reinhold and, more distantly Kant, a rival anti-foundationalist conception of philosophy. Epistemological foundationalism refers to a particular strategy for justifying claims to know. Hegel, who applies his conception of identity theory to the problem of knowledge, sketches the outlines of a circular approach to epistemology in a seminal passage. Here it is:

> Science claims to found itself upon itself by positing each one of its parts absolutely, and thereby constituting identity and knowledge at the

> beginning and at every single point. As objective totality knowledge founds itself more effectively the more it grows, and its parts are only founded simultaneously with this whole of cognitions. Center and circle are so connected with each other that the first beginning of the circle is already a connection with the center, and the center is not completely a center unless the whole circle, with all of its connections, is completed: a whole that is as little in need of a particular handle to attach the founding to as the earth is in need of a particular handle to attach the force to that guides it around the sun and at the same time sustains it in the whole living manifold of its shapes.[28]

In view of its importance for Hegel's conception of knowledge, it will be useful to paraphrase this seminal passage very closely. Hegel's positive theory touches successively on the concept of identity, the relation of part and whole, the problem of the beginning point of a philosophical theory, and an analogy between theory of knowledge and the Newtonian explanation of Copernican astronomy.

According to Hegel, a scientific, or speculative approach to knowledge consists in what, following Fichte, he calls positing. In a foundationalist approach, for which any positive claim always comes too soon, it is always, for that reason, impossible to begin. In its place, Hegel recommends the view that science founds or grounds itself, which simply obviates, or suppresses, any distinction between science and an analysis of its conditions in general. It is then not possible to distinguish, as Kant distinguishes, between an analysis of the general conditions of the possibility of knowledge as he understands it and the road to knowledge. In other words, as Hegel points out, any attempt to raise the question of the conditions of knowledge must concede that we are always already on that road.

The correspondence theory of truth is the natural consequence of the Parmenidean claim, running throughout the entire later history of philosophy, that knowledge requires the identity of thought and being. Hegel takes this insight further in claiming that a scientific approach to knowledge necessarily posits the constitution of an identity and knowledge in the beginning and at every point. As a so-called objective totality, the development of theory increasingly grounds knowledge based on it.

This point appears to be straightforward, even noncontroversial. Copernican astronomy is, for instance, substantiated by later developments, above all, as Kant observes, through Newtonian mechanics that would not otherwise have been possible.[29] The individual parts of the theory are justified, or grounded, through the formulation, development and

completion of the entire theory. Each of its parts already refers to the entire theory. From Hegel's perspective, even in the initial stages of the research leading to a shift from geocentric to heliocentric astronomy, Copernicus is already implicitly pointing toward Newtonian mechanics. According to Hegel, very much like a solar system, a theory has a central point, around which it revolves. This central point is established so to speak, hence is fully justified, only when the larger theory, which turns on it and in which it is embedded, is fully worked out. To continue the analogy, the basic hypothesis underlying Copernican astronomy—the sun is the center of the solar system—is more fully constituted after Galileo and still more after Newton than after Copernicus. Finally, as Hegel points out, philosophy, like natural science, needs no handle as it were. An epistemological foundation would function as a kind of handle, or external support. Yet, to complete the analogy, Hegel notes that cognition no more needs a handle than the earth requires one for the force that leads it around the sun. In other words, since the cognitive process is self-justifying, it does not require any form of epistemological foundationalism to justify its cognitive claims.

V. Circularity and phenomenology

Hegel's conviction that philosophy is intrinsically circular is one of his earliest and deepest insights. This normative view is restated in different ways in later writings, including the *Encyclopaedia*, which is as close as he ever comes to presenting the "official" version of his position. Here he discusses his conception of philosophical science as without presuppositions,[30] hence circular, his view of philosophy as a self-enclosing circle that closes in on itself so to speak[31] or again as a circle with no beginning that returns into itself.[32]

It is not surprising, since Hegel is a highly systematic thinker, that epistemological circularity is linked to a series of other themes in his approach to knowledge. One of them is the vexed problem of the beginning point, which he alludes to several times, and which he addresses in detail in a chapter at the beginning of the *Science of Logic*. Since, as Hegel again notes, science is circular, there is not and in fact cannot be a starting point in the same sense as for other forms of cognition.[33] Another is his specifically phenomenological approach to knowledge.

Hegel's conception of phenomenology is not well understood for several reasons. One is the fact that he never uses the term "phenomenology" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, hence does not use it to refer to his own position.

Another is the Husserlian claim, which is widely reported in the literature,[34] that Husserl invented phenomenology, which intentionally but incorrectly implies that it did not exist prior to his intervention in the debate.

Phenomenology is, of course, older than Husserl and even older than Hegel, certainly older than the emergence of the term. When it originates depends on how one understands "phenomenology." It is often thought to begin in Lambert's *Das neue Organon* (1764). Lambert, who is influenced by Francis Bacon, understands "phenomenology" as false appearance. Kant, who corresponded with Lambert, uses the term in a series of different senses. In the Herz letter, where he discusses an early plan of what later became the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he distinguishes between phenomenology and metaphysics. At this point, he understands phenomenology as prolegomena with respect to metaphysics, or theory of knowledge.[35] An argument can be made that in some of his moods Kant's conception of phenomena commits him to a phenomenological approach to knowledge. It is only later in such writers as Hegel and Husserl that attention is specifically drawn to phenomenology as theory of knowledge.

Phenomenology was in the air at the turning of the nineteenth century. It was, for instance, adopted by Reinhold,[36] whom Hegel strongly criticized, and only slightly later by Fichte,[37] whom he admired. Reinhold is distantly following such predecessors as Lambert. Like Lambert, Reinhold here describes phenomenology, whose task consists in explaining so-called rational realism, his position at the time, through the application of its principles to true appearances, as distinguished from false appearances. In the preliminary statement preceding this text, he defines phenomenology with respect to so-called rational realism as follows: "[Phenomenology] completes the exposition of rational realism through the application of its principles to the phenomena, which it teaches us, with the help of these principles, to distinguish and separate from mere appearance."[38] Phenomenology provides criteria for the distinction of real appearances from mere false appearances. Experience is basically experience of nature. Phenomenology must return to the ground of nature in order to state the pure principles of the general theory of nature (Naturlehre). It follows that for Reinhold phenomenology is pure philosophy of nature.[39]

Phenomenology, which is not yet present in Hegel's *Differenzschrift*, is later added in the *Phenomenology* where Hegel presents his mature approach to the problem of knowledge as it comes to him in German idealism. For Hegel, neither Kant, nor Reinhold, nor Fichte successfully responds to the problem of knowledge, which requires a phenomenological approach. His phenomenology builds on earlier, but according to Hegel failed efforts by

Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and other contemporaries to formulate a theory of knowledge. It is his own distinctive solution to difficulties he identifies in the contemporary epistemological debate.

Kant's representational approach to knowledge fails since it relies on a causal analysis of the relation of representations to the unknown and unknowable mind-independent world. Hegel follows Fichte in eliminating Kant's own view of the thing in itself, but not the view of the mind-independent world.

Hegel's task lies in arriving at an epistemological approach, which gives up cognitive reference to the world as it is, which simply cannot be made out, while maintaining the difference between what appears and what is, not in itself, but rather, as Aristotle would say, for us. Hegel takes over from Kant the seminal idea, whose proximal origin he does not acknowledge, but on which his own position depends, that we "construct" what we know, and from Fichte he borrows the view that a grasp of the cognitive object crucially depends, not on a merely logical epistemological subject, but on the finite subject's activity. In that sense, Hegel participates in the post-Kantian shift away from a transcendental analysis of the *a priori* conditions of knowledge toward a description of knowledge as resulting from *a posteriori* process that plays out in the social and historical context.

Hegel rehabilitates phenomenology, which, for instance in Lambert, was earlier confined to false appearance, hence mere appearance, as distinguished from truth. As a result, Hegel transforms what for Kant in the Herz letter is still a mere prolegomenal stage prior to and apart from the process leading to truth into its main source. Kant's critical philosophy depends on a sharp distinction between noumena and phenomena, between what is true but cannot appear and what appears and is not true.[40] Hegel, who "relativizes" the distinctions between falsity, appearance and truth, calls attention to appearance as a stage on the way to truth. Mere falsity, which is not truth, is replaced by conception of appearance (Schein) that under the right circumstances, becomes true appearance (Erscheinung), or truth.

Hegelian phenomenology provides his account of how human beings progressively come to know their surroundings and themselves. It has been suggested that Hegel's achievement finally lies in assembling ideas, all of which are due to others, in a grand synthesis.[41] Like most generalizations, this one is only partly correct. Since the philosophical discussion never begins again without precedent, any or almost any philosophical claim is in some sense anticipated somewhere by earlier writers. With sufficient ingenuity, one can always find some kind of precedent. Yet in pointing arguably for the first time to the way in which finite human beings in fact

transform earlier, imperfect claims to know into progressively better, hence relatively more acceptable epistemological claims, Hegel discovers a novel dialectical phenomenological approach to the problem of knowledge.

The term "dialectic" is used in many different ways by a long series of writers. As used in reference to Hegel, it refers to his conviction that in the cognitive process the subject matter develops autonomously, that is, without any contribution by us.[42] Hegelian phenomenology features a dialectical interaction between theories and cognitive objects within the limits of conscious experience. Hegel distinguishes between what is and what we experience in describing how we can reliably claim to know what is given in experience.

Hegel's phenomenological approach to knowledge is presented in outline form in the introduction and developed throughout the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Like Fichte, but unlike Kant in his representational mode, Hegel's approach is specifically phenomenological. He restricts cognitive claims to the contents of consciousness understood as mere phenomena, which do not refer beyond themselves to noumena. Hence, unlike Kant, who analyzes the preconditions of consciousness, and such later writers as Freud, and perhaps also Nietzsche and Marx, depending on how they are interpreted, Hegel makes no claim to know what lies beyond the plane of consciousness.

At the dawn of the modern era, Montaigne and Descartes draw attention to subjectivity as the unavoidable path to objectivity. Such later phenomenologists as Husserl and, following him Heidegger are concerned to go to things themselves (zu den Sachen selbst). Hegel's cognitive ambition is more modest. Unlike Kant, he is not concerned with claims about things in themselves. He follows Fichte in grasping objectivity from the perspective of the subject, in Hegel's case through a distinction between subject and object within consciousness.[43]

For Kant, as well as for all correspondence theories of knowledge since Parmenides, the criterion of knowledge is the identity of subject and object, knower and known. Hegel parts company with Kant's *a priorism* in basing his view of theory on the contents of conscious experience. Hegel's empirical commitment is visible in his attention to empirical phenomena as prior to theories about them, in other terms to the subordination of theory to practice.

For Hegel, knowledge is not the result of a simple "constatation," or determination of what is, for instance an identification of what is as it is at a given temporal instant. It is rather the result of a cognitive process in which theories are formulated on the basis of experience, and then compared

(and contrasted) with cognitive objects. A theory is a claim for knowledge, formulated on the basis of experience, which can be validated or confirmed, or undermined, hence disconfirmed, by testing it in further experience.

This point can be generalized. In discussing knowledge, Hegel is not working out a theory of what must be the case but rather describing everyday epistemological practice. Claims to know never knowingly grasp the mind-independent world as it is. They are rather confined to phenomena within the conceptual process of conscious experience. In constructing phenomena, we literally "construct" our world. Phenomena are not "constructed freely," without limit, as the result of mere fantasy, but rather in a limited way, in the process of attempting to work out a theory by comparing our view to what is given in experience. Later theories build on earlier theories in the cognitive process of arriving at a comprehensive theory that accounts for any and all items of experience.

Knowledge concerns phenomenal objects that are literally "constructed" as a by-product of the formulation of theories about conscious experience. What we call the cognitive object, or the world is never a mere given but rather depends on theories about the world. Claims to know are thus adjudicated through simple comparison between the concept of the object and the object of the concept within consciousness.[44] Talk about truth does not concern a mind-independent external object, but phenomena given in consciousness, which in turn functions as the standard in terms of which to construct theories about it.[45]

According to Hegel, we test the relation of our concept or theory about the cognitive object within conscious experience. In simplest terms, conscious experience includes a concept of the object and the object of the concept, both of which are contained within consciousness, within which we distinguish and compare them.[46] Now there are only two possible outcomes of an examination of the relation of concepts and experience. Either the result agrees with our expectations, since the theory describes, or corresponds to, what we find in experience or it does not. In the former case, the theory is acceptable until a later time at which information arises that calls it into question. In the latter case, the theory must be reformulated and then tested.

Hegel's conception of phenomena is dialectical as these have a dual status both within and outside consciousness. In the first instance, they are clearly within consciousness, where they depend on the construction of conceptual schemes, or theories, to cognize conscious experience. But they are also in a sense outside consciousness in that theories are tested in confronting them with conscious experience, which either agrees, or

corresponds with, or fails to correspond with, hence in a sense resists our theories about it. Everyone is familiar with theories that, when confronted with experience, fail the test and must be reformulated. In the latter sense, what we seek to know acts as an external, or empirical standard on our theories about it.

Kant illustrates the widespread philosophical conviction that there is unmodifiable knowledge, independent of time and place. Yet it is rare, if ever, that we arrive at a result of this kind, that is, at a theory that does not later need to be modified. In most cases, the theory, or working concept of the cognitive object, is refuted by experience that reveals a distinction between what, on the basis of our theory, which is our working hypothesis, we expect and what in practice we find. This is the case for all kinds of epistemological investigation from astronomy to zoology, in which our conjectures can always fail the test of experience. Newtonian mechanics, which Kant took as the correct theory of physics, was later partially superceded by Einstein's theories of relativity. There is no reason to infer that quantum mechanics, which many now regard as the final theory, will not later be superceded.

Sometimes the theory provisionally adopted appears, or at least initially appears, before other, more stringent tests are devised, to accord with experience. This suggests that knowledge and truth coincide, since our view of what is the case in fact correctly identifies the character of future experience. Although this need not ever occur, if this happened, the cognitive process would reach its end, or epistemological closure.[47]

If, as is more often the case, our expectations are thwarted in some way, if there is a discernable difference between what the theory suggests and what we find in experience, then the theory must be altered to "fit" experience. There is nothing novel about Hegel's insistence that our views must be altered if they are refuted in practice. Most observers, including all empiricists, insist on the importance of respecting the verdict of experience. Kant, who thinks it is possible to work out a theory of knowledge that is *a priori*, hence immune to experience, is an exception.

Those who believe that knowledge depends on formulating a theory to "fit" the world, often believe there is a way the world is. Different theories refer to the same world, which is independent of claims about it.[48] In this respect, Hegel innovates in his conviction that, when we alter the theory by adjusting it to "fit" experience, then the cognitive object, which depends on the theoretical framework, is also altered. In effect Hegel denies there is a single determinate way the mind-independent world is, to which we adjust our theories. He rather believes that what we mean by "world" depends on

the theory about it. If cognitive objects are not independent of, but rather dependent on, the theories about them, a change in the theory results in a corresponding change in the cognitive object. In other words, a new cognitive object, or new phenomenon, is literally constructed as a result of the change in the theory.[49]

VI. Is Hegelian circularity a new Copernican revolution?

We began by raising a question, to which we can now respond. In the above-cited passage from the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel compares his epistemological holism to Newton's invisible force, which Kant mentions in connection to Copernicus. Even in this early stage, Hegel assumes a complex stand with relation to Kant's critical philosophy. He accepts the spirit of the critical philosophy, which he interprets as the speculative identity Fichte makes the basis of his position. But Hegel rejects the letter of the critical philosophy, in this case any effort to justify, found or ground cognition *a priori*, in favor of a justification *a posteriori*. Unlike Kant, Hegel believes that claims for knowledge are not justified once and for all prior to the cognitive process. On the contrary, they are progressively justified only within the unfolding of the cognitive process. Kant's Copernican revolution illustrates his effort, after the failure of his representational approach to knowledge, to formulate a different, constructivist approach to cognition. Hegel's passage on circularity can be read as obliquely suggesting that his holistic, non-foundational epistemological approach is an alternative to Kant's Copernican revolution.

Kant can be interpreted as introducing a Copernican revolution in the B preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Here he suggests that the different cognitive domains depend on the introduction of a basic methodological innovation justifying once and for all the claim to universal and necessary knowledge. Each of the different cognitive domains depend on the introduction of a specific methodological innovation justifying the claim to universal and necessary knowledge. According to Kant, modern empirical science depends on the insight, which he traces back to Copernicus' introduction of a heliocentric astronomical approach in place of geocentrism, that "reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design."[50]

Kant controversially suggests the introduction of an analogous methodological innovation to make possible the future science of metaphysics. With respect to the theme of epistemological justification, Kant can be read

as making two related claims. First, we can reliably claim to know if and only if we can be said in a way which remains to be specified to "construct" the cognitive object. This is a second best approach, that is, second best with respect to Kant's original interest in a representational approach to knowledge. Kant only invokes constructivism in the B preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* after the failure to make out the representational approach to knowledge originally described in the famous Herz letter. Second, and in order for knowledge claims to be universal and necessary, they must be formulated *a priori*. In short, Kant's Copernican approach to knowledge consists in insisting that claims to know require that the subject "construct" an *a priori* identity of subject and object, knower and known.

Hegel's counterclaim consists in three related points. First, he accepts a form of Kant's epistemological constructivism in suggesting we in fact "construct" what we know in the course of cognitive process. For Hegel, in the epistemological process we "construct" both the cognitive objects and the theories about them. Second, the justification of claims to know is not arrived at prior to the process and is not instantaneous. It is rather a progressive result of the unfolding of the theory itself. This point, which suggests that epistemological justification cannot be *a priori*, further breaks with the foundationalist epistemological model that inspires Kant's *a priori* approach. Third, theory cannot have and does not need a justification prior to nor apart from itself, since it is self-justifying. The development of a theory, its confrontation with different items of experience, the development of its capacity to integrate different points within the framework of an overall conceptual structure, for instance in explaining features already accounted for by more limited theories, progressively justifies it.

Hegelian circularity, which is perhaps unfamiliar, is more familiar under the heading of epistemological holism. Holism is understood in many different ways.[51] Epistemological holism, which is associated with such twentieth-century thinkers as Duhem, Carnap, and Quine, is often understood as some version of the claim that the unit of evaluation is the entire theory.[52] Hegel tacitly accepts this point, since he holds that a theory which fails the test of experience must be reformulated. He adds a further, crucial point with respect to the justification of a theory. A theory, any theory, is more strongly supported, hence better justified as a function of the degree to which it is worked out.

Hegel's new Copernican revolution does not merely disregard, but rather builds on while modifying Kant's own Copernican revolution. Kant's insistence on the construction of cognitive identity is preserved, correctly in my view, in the way the cognitive process justifies its cognitive claims in the

dialectical and historical process of formulating theories on the basis of experience, which are then tested and, if necessary reformulated, through the encounter with further experience. Kant desires to bring the philosophical tradition to a close in a position, which he contends, is correct and can never later be modified. Kantian *a priorism* is in that sense linear, intended both to begin as well as to end the debate. In abandoning linearity for circularity, Hegel, on the contrary, draws attention to the genuine resources of the ongoing debate, which simply cannot be brought to an end, and to which all positions, including his own, necessarily belong.

Notes

[1] According to Gadamer, Hegel is unable to include modern science in his *a priori* system. But Hegel is not an *a priori* thinker. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, p. 25.

[2] Both Marxism and Anglo-American analytic philosophy arose by refuting idealism. This interdiction has never been lifted. It is significant that the current analytic return to Hegel has not so far considered his relation to idealism. See Tom Rockmore, *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

[3] See, for discussion, Tom Rockmore, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

[4] See Heracleitus, fr. 60, in *A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia*, edited, with Introduction by Patricia Curd, trans. Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995, p. 36.

[5] See Heracleitus, fr. 64, in *A Presocratics Reader*: *Selected Fragments and Testimonia*, p. 36.

[6] Plato, *Timaeus* 37A-C, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997, pp. 1240–1241.

[7] See *Prior Analytics*, II, 5, 19–21, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, I, p. 92.

[8] P*ost. Ana.* I, 3, 72B 25–73A 20, in Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, p. 117.

[9] See his reviews in Tübinger Anzeige, February 16, 1786, and May 13, 1786.

[10] See J. G. Hamann, *Metakritik über den Purismus der reinen Vernunft*, 1788, rpt. in *Hammanns Schriften*, ed. F. Roth, Berlin: G. Reimer, 1821–1843, VII.

[11] See Johann Gottfried Herder, "Verstand und Erfahrung. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft," in *Herders sämmtliche Werke*, ed. B. L. Suphan, Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1913, vol. 21, p. 18.

[12] See *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik*, 1792, rpt. ed. Arthur Liebert, Berlin: Verlag von Reuther und Reichard, 1911, p. 47.

[13] See Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, 1796–99), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 89.

[14] Fichte, *Early Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 116–117; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke in 11 Bd.*, hrsg. v. I.H. Fichte, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971, vol. I, p. 59.

[15] See Fichte, *Early Philosophical Writings*, p. 118; see also, *Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 119; *Fichtes Werke*, I, p. 61. See also *Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 62.

[16] See Fichte, *Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslhere) with First and Second Introductions*, ed. and tr. Peter Heath and John Lachs, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 93; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, 1, 91.

[17] See Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, pp. 93–94; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, 1, 91–92.

[18] See Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, pp. 247–248; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, 1, 287–288.

[19] See *Reinhold, Fichte, und Schelling*, in *J. F. Fries Werke*, ed. Gert König and Lutz Goldsetzer, rpt. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967–1969, XXIV, p. 329.

[20] This is reproduced in Croce. See Benedetto Croce, *What is Living and what is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel ?*, trans. Douglas Ainslie, Kitchener, OT: Batoche, 2001.21. This text is not often studied. See, for an exception, Walter C. Zimmerli, *Die Frage nach der Philosophie: Interpretationen zu Hegels Differenzschrift*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1974.

[22] Maimon defended his view against Reinhold in an early text. See Salomon Maimon, *Streifereien im Gebiete der Philosophie, Erster Theil*, Berlin: Wilhelm Vieweg, 1793.

[23] Hegel, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. Henry. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. The full German title reads Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie in Beziehung auf Reinhold's Beyträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustands der Philosophie zu Anfang des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 1 stes Heft.

[24] See Karl Leonhard Reinhold, *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, ed. Karl Ameriks, trans. James Hebbeler, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[25] See Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, p. 177; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol 2, p. 120.

[26] See Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, p. 179; *Werke*, 2, 122.

[27] See Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, §10, Remark, p. 34; *Werke*, 8, 53–54.

[28] Hegel, *Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, p. 180; *Werke*, 2, 122: "Wenn die Philosophie als Ganzes sich und die Realität der Erkenntnisse ihrer Form und ihrem Inhalt nach in sich selbst begründet, so kommt dagegen das Begründen und Ergründen in seinem Gedränge des Bewährens und Analysierens und des Weil und Inwiefern und Dann und Insoferne—weder aus sich heraus noch in die [82] Philosophie hinein. Für die haltungslose Ängstlichkeit, die sich in ihrer Geschäftigkeit immer nur vermehrt, kommen alle Untersuchungen zu bald, und jeder Anfang ist ein Vorgreifen sowie jede Philosophie nur eine Vorübung. Die Wissenschaft behauptet, sich in sich dadurch zu begründen, daß

sie jeden ihrer Teile absolut setzt und hierdurch in dem Anfang und in jedem einzelnen Punkt eine Identität und ein Wissen konstituiert; als objektive Totalität begründet das Wissen sich zugleich immer mehr, je mehr es sich bildet, und seine Teile sind nur gleichzeitig mit diesem Ganzen der Erkenntnisse begründet. Mittelpunkt und Kreis sind so aufeinander bezogen, daß der erste Anfang des Kreises schon eine Beziehung auf den Mittelpunkt ist, und dieser ist nicht ein vollständiger Mittelpunkt, wenn nicht alle seine Beziehungen, der ganze Kreis, vollendet sind,—ein Ganzes, das sowenig einer besonderen Handhabe des Begründens bedarf als die Erde einer besonderen Handhabe, um von der Kraft, die sie um die Sonne führt und zugleich in der ganzen lebendigen Mannigfaltigkeit ihrer Gestalten hält, gefaßt zu werden."

[29] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, B xxi n, p. 113.

[30] See Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §1.

[31] See ibid., §15.

[32] See ibid., §17.

[33] See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 71; *Werke*, 5, 70.

[34] See, for a recent instance, Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.

[35] See Kant's letter to Marcus Herz, dated February 21, 1772, in Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 132.

[36] In the study of the situation of philosophy at the turn of the new century, which attracted Hegel's attention and served as the pretext for the *Differenzschrift*, Reinhold entitles the fourth part "Elements of Phenomenology or the Explanation of Rational Rationalism through Its Application to True Appearances" ("Elemente der Phänomenologie oder Erläuterung des rationalen Rationalismus durch seine Anwendung auf die Erscheinungen"). Karl Leonhard Reinhold, *Beyträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Heft IV, Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1802.

[37] See J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowing: Fichte's 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre*, trans. Walter E. Wright, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 107; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, 2, 207.

[38] Reinhold, *Beyträge*, Heft IV, p. IV.

[39] See Ibid., p. 110.

[40] See "On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into *phenomena* and *noumena*," in Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B294–316/A235–261, pp. 354–365.

[41] See Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 11.

[42] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, §85–6, pp. 54–5; *Werke*, 3, 77–78.

[43] On Fichte's interpretation, Reinhold's basic claim is that representations are related both to subject and object, but distinguished from both. Anesidemus, according to Fichte, objects that the relation of the representation to subject and object is different in each case. Fichte reformulates the same objection in a different language as the claim that "the representation is related to the object

as the effect to the cause, and to the subject as the accident to substance" (Fichte, *Review of Aenesidemus*, in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds., *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 136–157, here p. 149; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, vol. I, p. 18). But he disagrees with, in fact finds unthinkable Aenesidemus' assumption that the critical philosophy depends on a mind-independent thing in itself, that is, on something independent from a capacity for representation.

[44] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §84, p. 53; *Werke*, 3, 76–77.

[45] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §84, p. 53.

[46] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §85, p. 54; *Werke*, 3, 77–78.

[47] For Hegel as for such later thinkers as Putnam, truth is a limiting, or ideal concept. See Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 216.

[48] This view can be illustrated by Putnam's internal realism. See Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*.

[49] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §85, p. 54; *Werke*, 3, 77–78.

[50] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B xiii, p. 109.

[51] See, for example, Jerry Fodor and Ernest LePore, *Holism: A Shopper's Guide*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

[52] Quine, for instance, holds that the unit of evaluation is the whole theory. See "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in Willard Van Orman Quine, *From A Logical Point of View*, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 41.

Chapter 4

The Dialectic of the Absolute: Hegel's Critique of Transcendent Metaphysics

Markus Gabriel

Heidegger famously criticized Hegel's philosophy for being an ontotheological system. The snag Heidegger finds in ontotheology is that it hypostatizes a first principle on which, to quote from Aristotle, "the universe and nature depend."[1] According to Heidegger, Hegel presupposes an absolute in the form of an absolute subjectivity from the very outset of his system; an absolute principle, which accounts for the teleology in the various histories Hegel subsequently reconstructs. Heidegger attacks Hegel because he believes that Hegel draws on a determinate version of the ontological difference which, eventually, leads him to define being as an absolute, self-transparent *Geist*, and beings as its spiritual manifestations.[2] If Heidegger were right in his interpretation of Hegel, Hegel would actually be defining being as spirit and would, therefore, be determining it as a hyperbolic kind of thing instead of understanding it as the process of alterations within the ontological difference that Heidegger envisages with his concept of being.

In order to reassess this criticism one needs to first look at Hegel's concept of the absolute. In what follows, I shall argue that Hegel's conception of the absolute is based on a detailed exposition of the dialectical failure of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel denies that there is an absolute beyond or behind the world of appearance. The world we inhabit is not the appearance of a hidden reality utterly inaccessible to our conceptual capacities. But this claim does not entail any kind of omniscience on the part of the philosopher, as many have suspected. It rather yields the standpoint of immanent metaphysics without any first principle on which totality depends. Moreover, Hegel does not claim to finish the business of philosophy once and for all; on the contrary, his conception of the absolute entails that philosophy is awarded the infinite task of comprehending one's own time

in thought. Hegel himself conceives of the absolute as of a process which makes various forms of conceptualizing totality possible.

Unlike Heidegger, I do not believe that the concept of the absolute in post-Kantian Idealism entails a denial of the finitude that looms large in Kant's own system, as Heidegger acknowledges in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.[3] One possible way of interpreting the overall internal development of post-Kantian Idealism is to regard it as an extended commentary on Kant's concept of the "unconditioned" in the first *Critique*. In fact one could easily argue that the whole post-Kantian movement ought to be understood as a development of the Kantian exposition of the "transcendental ideal of pure reason."[4] The epistemological and metaphysical enterprise that is awakened by Kant's analysis of the dialectical consequences of the transcendental ideal primarily depends on a theory of determinacy. Given that determinacy cannot be restricted to being a property of concepts, such a theory of determinacy must ultimately be both logical and ontological. Determinacy must be in some way out there, in the things themselves, because even if we denied the determinacy of the world, this would still presuppose its intelligibility *qua* undetermined or unmarked something. Indeed being an unmarked something is as much a determinate predicate as being a particular something.[5] There is no way to oppose mind (concepts, consciousness) and the world without, at the same time, relating them to one another. Both, mind and world, i.e., the logical and the ontological order have to be determined, at least over against their respective other. In this sense, they depend on each other, a principle Putnam explicitly concedes to Hegel in claiming that "the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world."[6] The logical space in which mind and world are both distinguished and interdependent can be called the "unconditioned," the "absolute," or the "infinite." It is in this respect that we can consider post-Kantian Idealism to be a commentary on the Kantian "unconditioned."

A broadly Kantian theory of determinacy is the key to the development of Fichte's, Schelling's, and Hegel's thought ever since their Jena period. One of the characteristic moves in the post-Kantian critical evaluation of Kant's system at that time was the standard claim that Kant did not clearly identify the principle upon which the whole architectonic of his system was based. In the eyes of the post-Kantian idealists, the alleged absence of methodological self-consciousness led Kant to his misconception of the thing-in-itself as a hidden reality behind or beyond the appearances. Post-Kantian idealists believe that Kant himself drew a distinction between mind

and world, form and content or, in their words, between the for-us and the in-itself. But such a distinction is for-us and therefore, the in-itself is in some yet to be determined sense in-itself-for-us. This dialectic lies at the basis of Hegel's dialectic of the absolute which, unlike what Heidegger suspects, is not incompatible with finitude and immanence. It rather renders finitude intelligible and unavoidable, including the finitude of any determinate conception of the absolute as a determinate principle.

If we were to search for the absolute in Kant, there would be many candidates: the transcendental apperception in the Transcendental Deduction, the Categorical Imperative, the ethico-teleological unification of theoretical and practical reason in the third *Critique*. This spurned the later Fichte's criticism according to which Kant postulated three absolutes without ever identifying their common ground as the real absolute which would have to be the monistic principle of disjunction in its three manifestations.[7] Hegel makes a similar observation in the *Difference* essay, where he attributes a "subjective subject-object,"[8] i.e., a subjective absolute to Kant and Fichte, which he claims was later corrected by Schelling's "objective subject-object"[9] in his *Naturphilosophie*, and finally synthesized in Hegel's master-concept of "identity of identity and nonidentity."[10]

If we ask the question: what corresponds to the absolute in Hegel's mature system?—we will barely get a clear-cut answer. Is it absolute knowing, the absolute idea, or absolute spirit? Before we can even try to answer the question concerning the absolute in Hegel, we shall have to fix a criterion for singling it out. In full awareness of this problem, Hegel himself presents his *Science of Logic* as a sequence of "definitions of the absolute."[11] Yet, none of the definitions make the grade but one. In this sense the whole enterprise of the *Logic* can be read as an attempt to define the absolute, an attempt whose success cannot be guaranteed from the outset.[12] And the essential outcome is that the absolute cannot be defined, lest it were understood as a distinct and distinctive object. As we shall see, the absolute can only be attained as a process of manifestation which Hegel calls (among other things) "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*). This process manifests itself as a history of being à la Heidegger, i.e., as a history of transcendental signifieds which transform the absence of the absolute into the presence of its manifestations in various disguises.

In what follows I first argue (I.) that this is the result of the dialectic of the absolute in the chapter on "The Absolute" in the Doctrine of Essence. I reconstruct the argument of the chapter in some detail in order to show that Hegel unveils the underlying dialectic of all concepts that define the absolute in opposition to the relative. I thereby show how Hegel rejects

every theory of the absolute that tries to define it within the range of the inaccessible in-itself or the beyond. Second (section II), I sketch an interpretation of the relation between the absolute idea, which I understand as the process of elucidation which is the *Science of Logic* itself, and the absolute spirit at the end of the *Encyclopaedia*.

I. The dialectic of the absolute in the Doctrine of Essence

The general aim of the Doctrine of Essence is to spell out the ontological difference between appearance and being insofar as this difference is constitutive of any metaphysical system that defines its principle, its absolute, in opposition to a world of appearances.[13] It is obvious that the primary target of Hegel's dialectical analysis of the absolute is Platonist metaphysics broadly construed.[14] As Hegel puts it, Platonism draws a distinction between "*two worlds*."[15] In its classical versions, the realm or world of forms, which are objects of the intellect, is opposed to the realm or world of the sensible objects, which are objects of perception, an idea essential to Plato's epistemological remarks in the *analogy of the divided line*.[16] The relation between the two worlds is interpreted as an asymmetrical relation of participation such that every item in the sensible world is what it is only insofar as it is the deficient appearance of an item in the intelligible world. In this sense, the two worlds add up to "*two totalities* of the content, one of which is determined as *reflected into itself*, the other *as reflected into an other*."[17]

This relation is *essential* in Hegel's terminology: it is a relation of appearing, where one relatum is defined as being and the other as appearance, one as eternal and unchangeable, the other as finite and mutable. However, Platonism is not aware of the role reflection plays in the constitution of this ontological difference that has been characteristic of classical metaphysics from the time of the Presocratics onwards. The relation of appearing is blind with regard to the reflection that motivates its formulation. Every metaphysical system that draws a distinction between two worlds is forgetful of this very operation of reflection and hypostatizes it in the "form determination"[18] of two worlds which build but "*one* absolute totality,"[19] namely the totality of metaphysical reflection. The two worlds only come to be opposed *in* metaphysical reflection, something not accounted for in Platonism. Therefore, the ontological difference between the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us amounts only to a simple negation which has to be supplemented by the negation of

the negation implicit in metaphysical reflection. The simple negation which establishes an essential relation between the two worlds must become the object of a further reflection in order to make its dialectic explicit.[20]

This movement of the negation of negation is precisely what takes place in the chapter on "The Absolute" in the *Logic*, the introduction and first subchapter (A.) of which proceed in three steps. First the absolute is determined as absolute transcendence, or as absolute identity which outstrips our conceptual capacities. It can only be paradoxically determined by the negation of all predicates. Second this movement, which is a movement of reflection, is made transparent *as* reflection. In order to steer clear of the problem of absolute transcendence, the finite is determined as an image of the absolute, which has being far more than any finite being due to its pure positivity, a position Hegel ascribes to Spinoza. However, this threatens to dissolve the finite into the absolute. Third this whole movement is presented as a process by which we eventually arrive at the form determination of the absolute form, where form and content of reflection coincide in the "self-exposition" of the absolute, i.e., in the reflection of reflection.

Before we can approach the text in the light of this sequence, it is important to bear in mind that "the absolute" is a concept that is used to define the totality of relations of determinacy and, hence, all actual and possible worlds, *as* worlds, i.e., as relational networks. According to the famous principle of determination, namely that determination is negation, the world *as* world can only be posited if we determine it by negation. The absolute is, therefore, introduced as the negation of the world, of the world we try to determine *as* such. This is why any given totality of relations refers us to something that is not part of the relational network in the same way that the relata are. The world is defined in its opposition to the absolute precisely because the absolute functions as a *concept of contrast*: we come to see the world *as* world only if we define some unmoved mover, some fixed point towards which everything aspires and on which everything depends.[21] Whatever the absolute is, it serves as a foil for making us aware of the conditioning of our conceptualizing the world as such.

Various forms of defining this absolute have been recorded. One of the most general ways to distinguish metaphysical systems is to divide them up into *transcendent* and *immanent metaphysics*. Transcendent metaphysics defines the absolute as entirely different from totality and therefore as transcendent. The absolute is categorically not part of this world. Immanent metaphysics, on the contrary, understands the absolute as a totality differentiating itself. Neoplatonism is perhaps the most prominent example

of transcendent metaphysics, whereas Spinoza and Hegel are the most resolute defenders of immanent metaphysics. This is why Hegel joins Spinoza against transcendent metaphysics in the chapter on the absolute, aiming however, at the same time, to surpass Spinoza in his methodology.[22]

Let us now approach the three moments more closely.

(1) Given that transcendent metaphysics conceives the absolute as the entirely other that transcends the totality of determinations, it cannot characterize it through any positive predicate.[23] For this reason, the transcendent absolute is traditionally dealt with in terms of an absolute oneness or absolute identity which cannot positively be described, as this would make it something determinate and, hence, part of the world, part of the network of determinate beings. As Hegel has it,

> The simple substantial identity of the absolute is indeterminate, or rather in it every determinateness of *essence* and *Existence*, or of *being* in general, as well as of *reflection*, has dissolved itself. Accordingly, the process of *determining what the absolute is* has a negative outcome, and the absolute itself appears only as the negation of all predicates and as the void.[24]

It is obvious that the negation of all predicates cannot be a reflection performed by the negative absolute itself. Otherwise we would have to ascribe some sort of self-determining activity to it which would contradict its alleged absolute identity. Hence, it is our own reflection that accomplishes the negation of all predicates. However, this entails that the absolute is already determined in opposition to our reflection as that which does not accomplish the negation itself. This in turn implies that our reflection has merely been an "external reflection"[25] up to this point. Reflection opposes itself by positing an absolute: it posits the absolute as if it were not posited by reflection. Yet it is, hereby, already determined by reflection.[26] This motivates a countermove.

(2) If it makes sense to talk about the absolute at all, we cannot define it in opposition to reflection. Reflection must not "stand *over against* the absolute identity of the absolute".[27] This is why the absolute needs to be understood as the "*ground*"[28] of totality. The correct determination of the absolute has to be "the *absolute form*"[29] which is in and for itself "the absolute content,"[30] as Hegel puts it. Such an absolute can only be the movement of pure thought performed by the *Science of Logic* itself. The *Logic* itself is the unfolding, the exposition of the absolute. The

absolute is both the form and content of the *Logic* and is, hence, not something prior to its manifestation in logical thought.

No transcendent absolute could possibly satisfy the logical demands of an absolute form as long as it is opposed to reflection. But the negation of all predicates that is the method of the classical negative dialectics of the One is already a process of reflection. According to Hegel this implies that the absolute is posited as the positivity out of reach, the "beyond"[31] of the movement of negativity revealed as the movement of reflection. The second, "*positive* side"[32] of the dialectic of the absolute is, thus, triggered by the insight that the absolute is pure positivity, the ground of the movement of negation, an insight which reflection had somehow in view without ever having been able to attain it.

This motivates another standard move of transcendent metaphysics: everything, every determinate being is related to the absolute. The absolute is the absolute substance, that which does not change because it transcends time and finitude altogether. In order to avoid the trap of absolute transcendence, the transcendent metaphysician introduces the further determination that every determinate being is only a partial manifestation of the absolute which constantly withdraws in this very manifestation to the beyond. Finitude is thus determined as an appearance of the infinite. But again, if we determine the infinite as the pure void, as the negation of all predicates, the only thing we come to grasp in determining finitude in opposition to the negative absolute is: nothing. If the totality of being which is our world is determined as "illusory being,"[33] it is *ipso facto* related to the absolute by being its reflection, its appearance. Thus Hegel asserts, "this positive exposition thus arrests the finite before it vanishes and contemplates it as an expression and image of the absolute."[34]

The strategic withdrawal to positivity does not solve the initial problem of transcendence. If we circumvent the trap of transcendence which posits an unattainable absolute beyond our conceptual grasp, an indeterminable something-nothing beyond logical space, we do not make any progress in relating the finite to this vacuity. By relating the finite to the unspecifiable transcendent absolute we rather destroy the finite. Everything vanishes into nothing once it returns to its origin, the absolute Oneness which is nothing determinate at all:

> the transparency of the finite, which only lets the absolute be glimpsed through it, ends by completely vanishing; for there is nothing in the finite which could preserve for it a distinction against the absolute; it is a medium which is absorbed by that which is reflected through it.[35]

The apparent positivity gained by determining the finite as an image of the absolute vanishes once we realize that we have transposed the negation of all predicates from the absolute to the content manifested in finite determinations. Those determinations cannot preserve any determination against the absolute. The determination which now determines the absolute as pure positivity beyond our conceptual grasp and the finite as its inane manifestation stays once more "external to the absolute."[36] The absolute, "which is only *arrived at*"[37] in the movement of reflection, remains essentially "imperfect."[38] For, once again, "the absolute that is only an *absolute identity*, is only the *absolute of an external reflection*. It is therefore not the absolute absolute but the absolute in a determinateness, or it is the *attribute*."[39]

(3) Hegel's dialectical critique of transcendent metaphysics results in the necessity of Spinozistic monism and, hence, of an entirely immanent metaphysics. The absolute determines itself as attribute in Spinoza's sense, i.e., as one of the infinite manifestations of the absolute positivity of substance.

In the subchapters B. and C. Hegel sketches the dialectic of the absolute in Spinozistic immanent metaphysics. Immanent metaphysics sets out to determine the absolute identity in its manifestation. Spinoza famously argues that the two Cartesian substances are in fact nothing but aspects of the one substance which has infinitely many attributes, only two of which are (contingently) known to us: thought and extension.[40] Again, the totality of manifestations or attributes is only conjoined in one absolute, in the one substance, by a "*reflective movement* [Scheinen]."[41] This reflective movement is the very thought which relates the substance to its infinitely many manifestations as ground of their unity. The opposites themselves—say, extension and thought—are in themselves "*without the return into itself* [i.e. into the absolute, M.G.]."[42] They remain external to the absolute and are never fully identical with it. In this sense, they do not return to the absolute. They are only related to it in our reflection, which is a reflection in the mode but not in the attribute.

Hence, the absolute identity of the absolute is contingent on its manifestations which are related to the absolute in *our* act of reflection. But this reflection only takes place in the mode of the absolute, i.e., in our thought which conjoins the manifestations and returns them to their unity. Totality is established in thought. This fact is not reflected in Spinoza's theory of the absolute, for Spinoza's substance is characterized by "an *immediate* subsistence of its own":[43] it is what it is by simply being what it is. In Def. 6

of the first part of his *Ethics* Spinoza unmistakably asserts that God's absolute infinity "involves no negation" (*negationem nullam involvit*).[44] Hegel's trouble with this explanation is that it cannot account for the particularization of the infinite so long as negation is not intrinsic to the very totality, i.e., God or Nature.[45] If negation is external to the absolute, then why is there anything finite at all?

The supposed immediacy of substance is only determined as "simply affirmative"[46] over against the "reflected immediacy"[47] of reflection. It is the very essence of substance to be what it is independently of its accidental determinations. But this opposition between substance and accidents is an essential relation established in reflection. Therefore, the substance depends on the reflective movement shining through in its mode, in our thought. It is the reflecting subject which posits the absolute in opposition to its positing it. This very act of "determining"[48] is what retroactively generates the absolute substance. The substance, therefore, is a presupposition of the reflective movement in the terminological sense of the Doctrine of Essence: it is a *pre*-supposing which posits the substance as that which is grasped in the reflection of the absolute.[49] Contrary to the merely negative approach to the absolute other of transcendence, immanent metaphysics resorts to "a determining which would make it [the absolute, M.G.] not an *other* but only that which it already *is*, the transparent externality which is the *manifestation* of itself, a movement *out of* itself."[50]

At this point, Hegel makes use of Spinoza's construction of the *amor dei intellectualis* which he interprets from a dialectical vantage point.[51] The intellectual striving to see everything *sub specie aeternitatis* is the absolute's movement itself and not a process of external reflection. The absolute determines itself in our determining it. Every dialectically consistent form of determining the absolute has to be compatible with this self-referential insight which reflects on the conditions of possibility for grasping the absolute. Hegel's label for this self-referential structure is "absolute form," a form which is the content of itself. The content of the exposition of the absolute is, thus, the exposition itself. There is nothing beyond this exposition, beyond this manifestation. Hence, form and content coincide in the absolute. "Or," as Hegel suggests, "the content of the absolute is just this, *to manifest itself*. The absolute is the absolute form which, as the diremption of itself is utterly identical with itself, the negative *as* negative [. . .]. The content, therefore, is only the exposition itself."[52] The absolute does not manifest anything which outruns our conceptual capacities; it is the "absolute is manifestation not of an inner, nor over against an other, but

it *is* only as the absolute manifestation of itself for itself. As such it is *actuality*,"[53] or as Hegel sometimes puts it, "self-manifestation."[54]

The absolute is, to be exact: the manifestation that something is manifest, that there is something rather than nothing. Without pursuing this correspondence here, one could even argue that the absolute's self-manifestation corresponds to Heidegger's concept of ontological truth, i.e., of the facts' unconcealedness (*Unverborgenheit*), which necessarily antecedes propositional truth. For Hegel, the absolute is a means of reflection in a twofold sense. On the one hand, it is a moment of the movement of speculative metaphysical reflection. On the other, it functions like a mirror (*speculum*) which reflects our fundamental ways of conceptualizing totality vis-à-vis the unconditioned. All of this means that the absolute is an indispensable notion of metaphysical reflection. But it must not be interpreted as any special sort of object or as a transcendent being. *Hegel's absolute is a rather deflationary concept, a harmless, yet necessary presupposition of metaphysical reflection insofar as it aspires to unfold the concept of totality implicit in the important and utterly indispensable notion of the world.*

We do not need to go into Hegel's further development of actuality here, the line of reasoning issuing from the thought that the distinction between form and content collapses into the immediacy of actuality, which generates another opposition, namely possibility. We do not have to follow Hegel's whole dialectical path to the Doctrine of the Notion. In order to give an answer to the delicate question concerning what the absolute in Hegel's system is, after all, it is sufficient to state the important fact that it has to satisfy the conditions of absolute form without collapsing into an immediate unity of form and content. Given the exposition of the concept of the absolute so far, it is evident that the absolute can only be the totality of the self-exposition of the Notion as it appears at the very end of the *Logic*. There is but one dialectically consistent definition of the absolute, which is the *Science of Logic* itself.

II. Absolute idea and absolute spirit

There are at least three prominent candidates for a closure of the Hegelian system and which correspond to the three possibilities of the Hegelian absolute: absolute knowing, the absolute idea, and absolute spirit. Apart from the intricate historical question regarding the degree to which Hegel might simply have changed his view in his development, I believe that for

systematic reasons, the absolute idea *qua* "absolute method"[55] has to be the adequate candidate for the Hegelian absolute. While absolute knowing implodes, as it were, into the indeterminate being of the beginning of the *Logic*, absolute spirit is after all the self-referential insight that the whole of nature and spirit is an exposition of the self-determination, the *Urteil* of the absolute idea.[56] The absolute idea, therefore, discloses itself in absolute spirit which is not a "super-mind" endowed with the power of omniscience. Absolute spirit is, rather, the concrete, realized self-awareness of the absolute idea in its actuality, i.e., philosophy.

If we try to address the problem of the relation between the absolute idea and the totality of nature and spirit, we must not undermine the logical standards of the *Science of Logic*. One violation of those logical standards would be the Neoplatonic conception of emanation, which Hegel explicitly rejects in the chapter on the "Absolute idea":

> the advance is not a kind of *superfluity*; this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth already the absolute; the advance consists rather in the universal determining itself and being *for itself* the universal, that is, equally an individual and a subject. Only in its consummation is it the absolute.[57]

This consummation ultimately takes place in absolute spirit, which is present as the individual subject thinking logical thoughts. This subject has to become aware of its position in the concrete totality of nature and spirit in order to exhibit the absolute idea because its exhibition can only consist in its self-awareness in finite thinkers.[58]

Absolute spirit is, after all, the unification of subjective and objective spirit: individual subjects have to perform the reconstruction of the absolute idea. But they can only do so in the wider context of objective spirit and its virtual reality (i.e., mutual recognition and, hence, normativity) which transcends natural immediacy. This again presupposes the existence of nature as the backdrop for the self-establishment of the realm of freedom. This whole story is told from the standpoint of absolute spirit, which grasps its own activity in the medium of the absolute form. The self-referential comprehension of the absolute idea *qua* concrete individual reconstructing its position in totality can only be realized if we attempt to determine the absolute as such. But, as we have seen, this act should not be one of external reflection. The determination of the absolute *as* absolute must be its self-constitution, a constitution which displays itself in the process of the exposition of the absolute. This exposition is carried out by individual thinkers reconstructing

the conditions of their being there at all. However, this reflection is bound by historical conditions. Therefore, it could not occur that the exhibition of the absolute ever came to an end in such a manner that there were no further content of its actuality transparent to finite thinkers. Even the *Science of Logic* has to be its "time comprehended in thought."[59]

Yet, if the absolute idea "contains *all* determinateness within it,"[60] we have to give up determining the absolute "only as a sought-for beyond and an unattainable goal."[61] The Hegelian absolute is rather always already with us insofar as we determine it in reflection. It is reflection's determining itself. If the absolute idea is the unfolding of logical space and if the *Science of Logic* displays this evolution, there can be no absolute beyond the absolute idea.[62] Hence, nature and spirit "are in general different modes of displaying *its being there*."[63] The absolute idea does not exist outside of its finite manifestations as a given logical order ready to be discovered by finite thinkers who aim to reunite with their origin. This is the very essence of Hegel's absolute idealism and of his thoroughgoing anti-representationalism.

The relation between the absolute idea as absolute form and its exposition, its being there in the modes of nature and spirit, cannot be an essential relation, to wit a metaphysical relation of being and appearance. Therefore, nature and spirit are not mere appearances of the absolute idea but rather modes of its exposition. The "emergence of *real difference*, *judgment*, the *process of determining* in general"[64] is not an external manifestation of some hidden metaphysical realm of forms but a self-exposition of actuality. There is nothing beyond or behind the manifestation of the absolute in its attributes: nature and spirit, and its modes, i.e., in finite beings. In this sense, Hegel is a Spinozist of absolute subjectivity. Whereas Spinoza determines nature and spirit as attributes of the *una substantia*, Hegel sees them as form *determinations* of the absolute idea which is absolute subjectivity or as Hegel says: "*pure personality*."[65]

The crucial point of Hegel's dialectic of the absolute is that metaphysical reflection must not be external reflection. We cannot determine the absolute as absolute substance ontologically anteceding our conceptualization of it. Otherwise we would fall victim to the dialectic of the absolute in the Doctrine of Essence. Therefore, reflection has to become absolute, i.e., self-referential. Only in the mode of self-reference can we determine the act of determination as self-constitution. For this reason, the relation between the *Logic* and the *Realphilosophie* has to be a conceptual relation, namely the relation of judgment captured by the notorious German wordplay on "Urteil," which Hegel famously "translates" as "the *original division* of the original unity."[66]

The absolute idea is only grasped in the context of a theory of self-constitution of logical space, i.e., of *the* concept in an eminent singular. This is why Hegel is perhaps the most astute critic of any variety of Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism posits some paradoxical nothing, a pure unity beyond being without reflecting on this very act of positing it. Its absolute is posited as if it were not posited, a dialectical contradiction exposed by Hegel—whence emerges his conception of the absolute as a *result* of metaphysical enquiry.[67] Hence, even if there were transcendence it could and should not be shaped by any determining reflection or, in Hegel's terminology, by external reflection.[68] "The answer, therefore, to the question: how does the infinite become finite? is this: that *there is not* an infinite which is first of all infinite and only subsequently has need to become finite, to go forth into [*herausgehen*] finitude; on the contrary, it is on its own account just as much finite as infinite."[69]

Hegel's point about infinity is basically the same as the one employed in the overall dialectic of the absolute: the true infinite must not be determined over against the finite.[70] If the question is "*how [. . .] the infinite becomes finite,*"[71] then this question cannot be answered by presupposing an infinite which is in-and-for-itself, i.e., always already the infinite, for such infinity would be indeterminate and as such determined over against the determinacy of totality. For this reason, Hegel conceives the infinite or absolute as an ongoing process of self-constitution which is not determined over against anything external to this very process.[72]

The overall end of the Hegelian system in the *Encyclopaedia* is the absolute idea in its actuality, that is, the reflected connection of the absolute idea in its yet to be determined universality with its manifestation, its being there. As Hegel writes, "this notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth aware of itself (§236)—the logical system, but with the signification that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality."[73] It is crucial, for any reading of Hegel, to recognize that the self-thinking idea needs approval by concrete content. Otherwise it would be reduced to the abstract structure of logical space, the "realm of shadows,"[74] as Hegel calls it thereby inverting the Platonic hierarchical order. In order to attain actuality, the idea is strictly speaking dependent on nature and spirit. It has to form a system, which can only occur in the historically bound situation of finite thinkers. In this manner, Hegel avoids determining the abstract structure of logical space over against the totality of realized determinations. Logic is not opposed to concrete content, since it is not a purely formal business. For if we oppose form and content, we already invoke a logical distinction in Hegel's sense: namely the distinction between

form and content which is itself one of the categories of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

Hegel orients this whole line of thought towards his notoriously obscure doctrine of the three syllogisms of philosophy.[75] Without pursuing the technical question of which logical forms underlie the three syllogisms of philosophy, I suggest that Hegel's use of syllogism should be understood in the literal sense of a gathering together, of a *Zusammenschluß*. The three terms of the syllogisms correspond to the three parts of the system: logic, nature, and spirit. The simplest way of understanding the form of the three syllogisms renders them as follows:

1. Logic, **Nature**, Mind.
2. Nature, **Mind**, Logic.
3. Mind, **Logic**, Nature.

Setting aside exegetical questions, I suggest understanding the three syllogisms as follows.

1. The first syllogism corresponds to the standard way of interpreting the sequence of *Logic*, Nature, and Mind as a succession. It seems as though the logical, absolute idea in some way or other emanates into nature which then progresses towards mind.
2. The second syllogism is already more reflective. It is based on the insight that the first syllogism is an activity of the mind penetrating nature with regard to its logical foundations, its being structured in an intelligible way. The mind becomes aware of the fact that it presupposes the logical categories as principles of the intelligiblity of natural processes.
3. Eventually, the third syllogism draws on the self-referential insight that the very reflection of the second syllogism presupposes the logical form of the absolute idea, since this expresses the highest formal standard of metaphysical reflection according to the *Logic*. Therefore, it is the absolute idea which returns to itself in our penetrating nature with regard to its intelligibility. In this sense, nature and spirit are manifestations of the absolute idea. As Hegel has it,

> the self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances (§§575, 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason's) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:—it is the nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea, in

> full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute spirit.[76]

Here, absolute spirit does not refer to any transcendent entity or teleological guarantee concealed by the potentially misleading appearances. It is nothing but the activity of putting the system together. In other words, there is no absolute God-like mind in which finite thinkers might participate once they reach the status of enlightenment. Any Neoplatonic story of this sort is incompatible with Hegel's dialectic of the absolute and his conception of absolute form, the truly infinite.

The idea behind the three syllogisms of philosophy is the absolute idea insofar as it is the absolute method. It is the method that construes itself in such a manner that it finally grasps itself as the actuality of the system, as that which does the job of conceptualizing totality. The activity of conceptualizing displays itself in the form of nature and spirit, i.e., in the form of the absolute idea's being there. According to Hegel, everything that there is intelligible, for everything is determined in the overall conceptual network of logical space.[77] Since there can, in principle, be nothing outside of logical space, the reflection of logical space on itself is the only absolute available. Given that this absolute reflection takes place in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel can claim to expose the absolute, to make it explicit. The exposition of the absolute does not represent the absolute in the potentially distorting medium of language. On the contrary, it deconstructs language's reference to a given world order external to reflection. There is no absolute beyond the absolute form which is the form of language becoming aware of its speculative role.[78] Therefore, the system gathers together the totality of form determinations belonging to the absolute form which necessarily leads to a self-referential insight into this very activity. Hegel's claim to totality does not hypostatize the absolute. The absolute does not stand still but continues to manifest itself as that which performs the shifts from one determinate conception of the absolute to another. This very insight however does not change in the same way as the definitions of the absolute change. Hegel thus tries to secure the critical position of philosophy by, at the time, subjecting it to the patterns of change that it discovers in critical self-reflection.

Notes

[1] Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, 1072b13–14.

[2] "The Absolute, for Hegel, is Spirit: that which is present and by itself in the certainty of unconditional self-knowledge. Real knowledge of beings as beings now means the absolute knowledge of the Absolute in its absoluteness." Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience. With a Section from Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. K. R. Dove, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, p. 28). Heidegger even ascribes representationalism to Hegel (ibid., pp. 30–49). According to Heidegger the *Science of Logic* contains "the ontological theiology of the Absolute" (ibid., p. 139) Cf. also Heidegger's lectures on German Idealism (Martin Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 29. ed. C. Strube, Frankfurt a.M.: Vitorrio Klostermann 1997). In Markus Gabriel, 'Endlichkeit und absolutes Ich—Heideggers Fichtekritik' (forthcoming in: *Fichte-Studien*) I argue against Heidegger's claim that the whole post-Kantian movement amounts to a denial of finitude on the basis of a reading of Fichte's enterprise as an analytic of finitude.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997.

[4] This corresponds to the Schelling's later interpretation of the Post-Kantian development. Cf. Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, hg. v. K.F.A. Schelling, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1856–1861, vol. XI, p. 283. On this topic cf. Markus Gabriel, *Der Mensch im Mythos. Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie und Selbstbewußtseinsgeschichte in Schellings "Philosophie der Mythologie"*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006, §5; Wolfram Hogrebe, *Prädikation und Genesis. Metaphysik als Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings "Die Weltalter"*, Frankfurt a.M..: Suhrkamp 1989. The discussion of the transcendental ideal looms large in Hegel's defense of the ontological proof in his *Lectures on the Proof of the Existence of God*. For Hegel's interpretation of the Kantian reason qua faculty of the unconditioned see Béatrice Longuenesse, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, trans. N. J. Simek, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, pp. 167–171.

[5] From a logical point of view the predicate of not having a predicate is an ordinary predicate which notoriously creates problems at the limits of expression and conception in the tradition of negative theology. A very illustrative exposition of the logical dimension of these problems can be found in: Graham Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, in particular, pp. 23–25 and 61–64.

[6] Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981, p. XI.

[7] See J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowing: Fichte's 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre*, trans. Walter E. Wright, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, pp. 31–33; Fichte, *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Zweiter Vortrag im Jahre 1804*, ed. by Reinhard Lauth and Joachim Widmann, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986, pp. 19–22.

[8] F. Hegel, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. Henry S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany: State University New York Press, 1977, p. 155; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 2, p. 93.

[9] Ibid., p. 155.

[10] Hegel, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, p. 156; *Werke*, 2, 96.

[11] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, London: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 74; *Werke*, 5, 74.

[12] I argue for this in more detail in Markus Gabriel, "Schelling, Hegel und die metaphysische Wahrheit des Skeptizismus," *International Yearbook of German Idealism* 5 (2007), pp. 126–156.

[13] As Hegel himself puts it in the *Lesser Logic*: "the theory of Essence is the most difficult branch of Logic. It includes the categories of metaphysic and of the sciences in general. These are the products of reflective understanding, which, while it assumes the differences to possess a footing of their own, and at the same time also expressly affirms their relativity, still combines the two statements, side by side, or one after the other, by an 'also', without bringing these thoughts into one, or unifying them into the notion." See Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic* (together with the Zusätze), Part I of the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* with the Zusätze G. W. F. Hegel. A new translation with introduction and notes by T. F. Geraets, Indianapolis: Hackett 1991, §114. Slavoj Žižek and I have recently argued that the thought of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel crucially depends on their reinterpretation of the relation between appearance and the real. See Markus Gabriel, and Slavoj Žižek, *Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism*, New York and London: Continuum Press, 2009.

[14] In Hegel's reading, the Kantian distinction between the thing in itself and the appearances is a modern variety of Platonism. When Hegel attacks Platonism broadly construed he includes Kant's epistemology within the range of that concept.

[15] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 529; *Werke*, 6, 186.

[16] Plato, *Republic*, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997, 509D–513E.

[17] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 529; *Werke*, 6, 186.

[18] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 529; *Werke*, 6, 186.

[19] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 529; *Werke*, 6, 186.

[20] It is important to insist that Hegel's recourse to the tradition of the ontological proof (and therefore to ontotheology) is not to be read as backsliding into precritical metaphysics. On the contrary, it rather rests on a meta-critical move. Hegel believes that Kant's critique of metaphysics was not thorough enough precisely because Kant winds up with a set of dualisms without reflecting on the fact that they are only opposed in metaphysical reflection.

[21] Cf. Wolfram Hogrebe, "Das Absolute," in, *Echo des Nichtwissens*, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2006, pp. 155–169; Markus Gabriel, *Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift*, Bonn: Bonn University Press 2006.

[22] On Hegel's critique of Neoplatonism cf. Gabriel, Markus, "Hegel und Plotin," in Dietmar Heidemann and Christian Krijnen, eds., *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, pp. 70–83.

[23] As far as I know, Plotinus first introduced the concept of the "entirely different (to diaphoron pantê)." See Plotinus, *Enneads*, trans. Stephen MacKenna, New York: Larson Publications,vol. 5, book 3, 10.

[24] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 530; *Werke*, 6, 187.

[25] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 530; *Werke*, 6, 187.

[26] "But we have to exhibit what the absolute is; but this 'exhibiting' can be neither a determining nor an external reflection from which determinations of the absolute would result; on the contrary, it is the *exposition*, and in fact the *self*-exposition, of the absolute and only a *display of what it is*" (Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 530).

[27] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 531; *Werke*, 6, 189.

[28] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 532; *Werke*, 6, 189.

[29] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 531; *Werke*, 6, 188.

[30] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 531; *Werke*, 6, 188.

[31] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 531; *Werke*, 6, 188.

[32] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 532; *Werke*, 6, 189.

[33] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 532; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[34] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 532; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[35] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 532; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[36] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 532; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[37] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 533; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[38] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 533; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[39] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 533; *Werke*, 6, 190.

[40] "As regards the attributes of which God consists, they are only infinite substances, each of which must of itself be infinitely perfect. That this must necessarily be so, we are convinced by clear and distinct reasons. It is true, however, that up to the present only two of all these infinites are known to us through their own essence; and these are thought and extension" (Benedictus de Spinoza, *Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being*, New York: Russell & Russell Inc. 1963, translated and edited, with an introduction and commentary and a Life of Spinoza by A. Wolf, p. 52).

[41] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 535; *Werke*, 6, 193.

[42] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 535; *Werke*, 6, 193.

[43] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 533; *Werke*, 6, 191.

[44] E*thics*, part I, def. VI, expl., in Spinoza, *Ethics and On the Improvement of the Understanding*, ed. Games Gutman, New York: Haffner Press, 1949, p. 41.

[45] Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza," in *God and Nature. Spinoza's Metaphysics*, Leiden, New York: Brill 1991, pp. 79–96, here: p. 91.

[46] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 533; *Werke*, 6, 191.

[47] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 533; *Werke*, 6, 191.

[48] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 536; *Werke*, 6, 194.

[49] Hegel develops his concept of "presupposing" (*Voraussetzen*) in the subchapter on "Positing Reflection." See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 400–402; *Werke*, 6, 25–28.

[50] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 536; *Werke*, 6, 194.

[51] Cf. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California Press 1988, p. 392 (*Werke*, 17, 187): "God is self-consciousness; he knows himself in a consciousness that is distinct from him, which is implicitly the consciousness of God, but is also the divine consciousness explicitly since it knows its identity with God, an identity that is mediated, however, by the negation of finitude. It is this concept that constitutes the content of religion. We define God when we say that he distinguishes himself from himself and is an object for himself but that in this distinction he is purely identical with himself—that he is *spirit*." Cf. also Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, translated from the 1830 edition, together with the Zusätze by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2007, §564.

[52] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 536; *Werke*, 6, 194.

[53] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 536; *Werke*, 6, 194.

[54] *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 541; *Werke*, 6, 201.

[55] *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 829; *Werke*, 6, 555.

[56] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, §577. I generally agree with Nuzzo's solution of the problem in Angelica Nuzzo, "The End of Hegel's Logic: Absolute Idea as Absolute Method," in: David Gray Carlson, ed., *Hegel's Theory of the Subject*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, pp. 187–205, here: p. 188: "the term absolute for Hegel is no longer substantive but only adjectival, as such absoluteness is predicated of each one of the final moments of his system: *absolute knowing (absolutes Wissen), absolute idea (absolute Idee), absolute spirit (absoluter Geist)*."

[57] Carlson, ed., *Hegel's Theory of the Subject*; *Werke*, 6, 555–556.

[58] Hegel explicitly acknowledges this fact in *Annotations on Absolute Spirit*, p. 36 (on §476 of the Heidelberg *Encyclopedia*): "Einzelne Individuen sind, welche philosophiren. Das Nacheinander des philos[ophischen] Inhalts gehört zu dieser Erscheinung."

[59] "As for the individual, every one is a son of his time; so philosophy also is its time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to fancy that any philosophy can transcend its present world, as that an individual could leap out of his time or jump over Rhodes (Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein *Sohn seiner Zeit*; so ist auch die Philosophie, *ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt*. Es ist ebenso töricht zu wähnen, irgendeine Philosophie gehe über ihre gegenwärtige Welt hinaus, als, ein Individuum überspringe seine Zeit, springe über Rhodus hinaus)" (Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, translated by S.W. Dyde, Kitchener: Batoche 2001, p. 19; *Werke*, 7, 26).

[60] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 824; *Werke*, 6, 549.

[61] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 824; *Werke*, 6, 548–549.

[62] Cf. Anton Friedrich Koch's reading of the *Science of Logic* in terms of a "Evolutionstheorie des logischen Raums" (Anton Friedrich Koch, "Die Selbstbeziehung der Negation in Hegels Logik," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 53 (1999), pp. 1–29, here: p. 15).

[63] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p, 824. The translation is slightly corrected from "existence" (Miller) for "Dasein" to "being there." The German text reads: "Die

Natur und der Geist sind überhaupt unterschiedene Weisen, *ihr Dasein* darzustellen" (*Werke*, 6, 549). I entirely agree with Angelica Nuzzo's, "The End of Hegel's Logic: Absolute Idea as Absolute Method," in David Gray Carlson, ed., *Hegel's Theory of the Subject*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 187–205, here: p. 195: "the absolute idea is no content but a mere form, purely self-referential expression with nothing to express except its own formality. This form, indeed an absolute one, is the first side of the method; the method as formal mode (*Art und Weise*), as modality or mode of being and knowledge at the same time. Thereby the claim that the absolute idea is method corrects Spinoza's metaphysical claim addressed in the logic of essence that the Absolute is mode."

[64] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 830; *Werke*, 6, 556.

[65] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 841; *Werke*, 6, 570. For a reading of the whole enterprise of the *Science of Logic* in terms of a theory of absolute subjectivity cf. Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Systematische und Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik*, 3rd extended edition, 1995, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995.

[66] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 625 (translation modified); *Werke*, 6, 304.

[67] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 537: "but the absolute cannot be a first, an immediate; on the contrary, the absolute is essentially *its result.*"; *Werke*, 6, 196 Cf. also Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 69; *Werke*, 5, 68.

[68] For this very reason, Schelling develops an original conception of transcendence dispensing with external reflection. For more detail cf. Gabriel, *Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift.*

[69] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 153; *Werke*, 5, 170.

[70] The false infinite, on the contrary, is defined over against the finite. Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 139–140 (*Werke*, 5, 152) where Hegel claims that the contradiction between the finite and the false infinite "occurs as a direct result of the circumstance that the finite remains as a determinate being opposed to the infinite, so that there are *two* determinatenesses; *there are* two worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in the relationship the infinite is only the *limit* of the finite and is thus only a determinate infinite, an infinite which is itself finite."

[71] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 152; *Werke*, 5, 168–169.

[72] An original discussion of Hegel's concept of the "true infinite" can be found in Rüdiger Bubner, "Hegels Lösung eines Rätsels," in Francesca Menegoni and Luca Illeterati, eds, *Das Endliche und das Unendliche in Hegels Denken*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 2004, pp. 17–32. See also Houlgate's excellent commentary in Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic. From Being to Infinity*, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 2006, pp. 414–420.

[73] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §574.

[74] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 58; *Werke*, 5, 55.

[75] For illuminating discussions cf. Thomas Sören Hoffmann, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Eine Propädeutik*, Wiesbaden: Marix-Verlag 2004, pp. 479–498, and Angelica Nuzzo, "Hegels Auffassung der Philosophie als System und die drei Schlüsse der Enzyklopädie," in *Hegels enzyklopädisches System der Philosophie*, ed. by Hans-Christian Lucas, Burkhard Tuschling, and Ulrich Volgel, Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog 2004, pp. 459–480.

[76] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §577.

[77] Cf. Béatrice Longuenesse, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, pp. 110–159.

[78] Cf. Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Die absolute Form. Modalität, Individualität und das Prinzip der Philosophie nach Kant und Hegel, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991, who further develops the basic ideas of Josef Simon, *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer-Verlag 1966.

Chapter 5

Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel's Thought

Klaus Düsing
Translated by Andrés Colapinto

Hegel's dialectic is grounded in his logic, which, in its essentials, is an ontology. It represents, among the diverse dialectical models developed in the history of philosophy, a conception of particular renown, one whose various filiations extend to the present day. Its philosophical underpinnings lie in a systematic approach to ontology and the theory of subjectivity, in which Hegel brings together various forms of ontology and distances himself from others. A detailed representation of the variety and foundational character of these insights and arguments can surely enrich the possibilities and prospects of current dialectical and ontological endeavors.

Hegel's dialectic—by turns vigorously championed, neutrally considered, or else severely criticized for its logical inconsistencies or epistemic claims—was not created in one stroke. It is best understood when one also considers the phases of its formation and the arguments behind it. Accordingly, the first part of this chapter examines Hegel's threefold break with tradition regarding the law of contradiction, a break which resulted from the formation of his dialectic. The second part outlines the theory of categories which Hegel presents and implements in the section on Objective Logic of the *Science of Logic*, as well as the type of ontology underlying this theory (with its various ontological forms), and the functioning of dialectic itself as the developmental principle of the theory. The task of the third part will then be to show how the entire dialectical sequence of categories is grounded in an "I think," which Hegel—unlike Kant—reinterprets metaphysically as absolute subjectivity. The chapter concludes with the question: In what does foundational "First Philosophy" consist—in ontology and metaphysics, or in an (albeit critical) epistemology?

I. The development of the dialectic. Hegel's threefold break with traditional thought

The remarkable train of thought in Hegel's fully developed dialectic is grounded on three tectonically layered breaks with traditional thought and traditional logic. These breaks can be discerned in the history of the development of Hegel's thinking in his Frankfurt period (1797–1800) and Jena period (1801–1807). In the early "theological" Frankfurt texts, Hegel identifies the infinite, One Being and Life as the ultimate ground of religion, particularly Christian religion. According to the early idealist conception which Hegel held at the time, this absolute must indeed be presupposed, but is not graspable through conceptual thought; it can only, for him, be experienced in a feeling of unity, or become evident through an immediate intellectual intuition. Finite, reflecting understanding, however, fails when it attempts to think it. For Hegel "everything expressed about the divine in the language of reflection is *eo ipso* contradictory (*widersinnig*)"; and "distracts (*zerüttet*) the understanding which takes it up and for which it is a contradiction (*Widerspruch*)."[1] Such contradictoriness does not arise from the understanding thinking through its finite determinations, which are immanent to it, but rather in its attempt to think infinite life. This does not mean, however, that the infinite and divine should therefore be considered nonexistent and meaningless. Herein lies Hegel's first break with traditional thought; the principle of (non-) contradiction does not hold universally for him. Taken by themselves, the finite determinations of understanding or reflection must of course accord with this logical principle, if they are to attain intelligible validity. However, for the relation of finite thinking to the infinite, or more specifically, for an insight into the contradiction of finite determinations in their relation to each other, over against the infinite that underlies them, contradiction does not count as the annihilation of meaning; such contradiction rather indicates the meaningful, negative significance and presence of the infinite in the finite.

In his early Jena drafts (1801–1803), this basic idea is further developed by Hegel on the basis of a new systematic conception. For Hegel the absolute can now no longer be merely the inapprehensible and inconceivable content of a feeling or of an intellectual, mystical intuition; it must, on his view, be conceivable as the ground—apprehensible in terms of content—of religion, but also of nature as well as the activities of Spirit in general, and must be explicable in its foundational significance. Hegel thus proposes the project of a rational metaphysics (*Vernunftmetaphysik*) of the absolute and the infinite, a project whose beginnings he had already indicated at the very

end of his Frankfurt period (1800). One cannot, however, begin abruptly with an exhibition of the absolute and infinite. A justificatory introduction and propaedeutic is necessary, and this consists, according to Hegel's earlier Jena conception, in a logic of finite reflection, or of the finite, thinking I. This logic is not yet speculative; its task, which for Hegel was lacking in Kant, is to systematically unfold the finite, pure determinations which are immanent to the understanding or to reflection—i.e., to develop these determinations through oppositional pairings and their respective relational interconnection, thus bringing about yet another oppositional pair. In this way, according to Hegel, one can remove the obstacles on the part of finite intellectual thinking (*endliches Verstandesdenken*)[2] which stand in the way of a speculative attainment of the absolute. Hegel uses the term "antinomies" to refer to these oppositions of finite determinations of the understanding, or of the finite, reflecting I; with this concept, however, Hegel does not, as does Kant, mean an opposition of propositions, but rather of pure, logical concepts; and at this point the method for the elaboration of such concepts is, for Hegel, dialectic.[3]

Because finite, pure determinations of the understanding set up "antinomies" of this sort in that, for instance, they oppose one another as predicates in judgments about the same subject (the being [*Seiende*], as one should add) and therefore lay claim to validity in equal measure while also nullifying (*aufheben*) the validity of the other, Schelling named such a logic—clearly with Hegel's early logic in mind—"scientific skepticism."[4] In this conception of logic we now see Hegel's second break with traditional thinking. It is not only in thinking the infinite that intellectual thinking (*Vestrandesdenken*) ends up in contradictions; in the systematic construction and development of its own finite determinations, those that belong to it essentially, contradictions already result. According to the principle of (non-) contradiction, such contradictory terms can neither exist nor be meaningfully thought. For Hegel, each of these opposed pure determinations of the understanding are of course, taken on their own, invalid; but they are not rendered meaningless. Rather, in the overall elaboration and nullification (*Aufhebung*) of opposed finite determinations, the infinite is for him already present in a negative way.

Hegel's first break with traditional thinking consisted in the claim that, while the understanding, in thinking the infinite and divine, is toppled and "shattered" in immanent contradictions, the infinite is not thereby viewed as nonexistent or meaningless. The second break with traditional thinking consists in the further claim that the understanding, in methodically thinking through its own finite determinations, ends up in "antinomies" and

contradictions that belong to it essentially, whereby it realizes that it cannot be an adequate faculty for the cognition of truth. Its determinations cannot, according to the principle of contradiction, lay claim to true validity; but for Hegel they are not thereby meaningless. Rather, in them and in their contradictions the negative presence of the in-finite is manifested. It is present and effective precisely in the "antinomies" and contradictions of finite understanding or finite reflection. Hegel preserves the logical sense of the principle of contradiction insofar as the mutually contradicting finite determinations cannot be valid on their own. Metaphysically, however, he oversteps the principle when he nevertheless grants them meaning with his claim that the infinite is present in these oppositions and contradictions of the finite. According to Hegel, this insight is attained by reason in the negative sense. Such a reason applies itself, as does Kantian reason in the Transcendental Dialectic, to "antinomies" and contradictions which it can't avoid, which, in fact—otherwise than in Kant—it cannot even resolve; but it recognizes, going beyond mere fixating understanding, that, in these oppositions of the finite, the infinite manifests itself.

Hegel's early concept of dialectic remains thoroughly focused on this logic of the finite and on the negative side of the infinite. He envisages only a negative dialectic as the method of developing the finite determinations of the understanding through "antinomies." The positive counterpart—a cognition of the absolute as it is really determined in itself—demands or "postulates," according to Hegel's conception at the time, a higher cognitive faculty, namely an intellectual intuition of the divine and the infinite[5]; and if these contents of intellectual intuition are to be developed into conscious metaphysical knowledge through a philosophical system of the absolute, then what is needed is a synthesis of intellectual intuition and a subordinate but indispensable finite reflection.

In this notion of a constitutive, although subordinate, function of finite reflection in the systematic cognition of the absolute, Hegel distinguishes himself, at the outset of his metaphysics of the absolute, from Schelling. Schelling joins Hegel in supporting this metaphysics in principle, but nonetheless does not consider reflection of this sort to be necessarily required for it, accepting rather only intellectual intuition as cognition of the absolute. For Hegel, as we have seen, this positive cognition of the absolute and infinite presupposes the logic of finite reflection as a propaedeutic, as well as negative dialectic, and the cognition of the negative presence of the infinite in the conflict of the finite.[6]

However, in such a cognition of the absolute through the synthesis of intellectual intuition and reflection, intellectual intuition remains a bald,

unproven assumption. Soon thereafter, therefore (beginning with the system outline of 1804/05), Hegel comes to dissociate himself from this idea of two sources of cognition, in favor of the theory that a higher speculative unity can be developed out of the opposition of finite determinations in one and the same line of argument. In this way the dialectic is no longer merely negative, but rather becomes speculative.

In the execution of this conception we see that Hegel carries out a third break with traditional thinking. First, as has already been discussed, the understanding arrives at contradictions when it attempts to think the infinite, which however does not for this reason become in any way meaningless. It is then demonstrated that, in thinking through its own finite determinations, the understanding is thrown into "antinomies" and contradictions. The principle of contradiction is still logically valid in this domain, so that these finite determinations, caught in a contradiction, can lay no claim to validity; but it does not hold in a metaphysical sense; the determinations are not meaningless, because in them the infinite is significant in a negative way. In his conception of method from 1804/05 onwards, Hegel now also does away with this logical sphere of finite determinations of the understanding, seen as a self-contained realm in which the principle of contradiction is still logically but not metaphysically valid, and thus carries out the third and final break with traditional thinking, one which leads to speculative dialectic.

According to this new methodological approach, one begins from a still immediately universal, not yet differentially developed determination, e.g., as in the *Logic* of 1804/05, from the category of quality as such.[7] If this is then thought of as a determinate category, the result is first of all the category of reality. Alongside this category, taken as a determinate, limited, and therefore finite meaning, there is set an opposite determination, which is likewise finite. It does not, for Hegel, remain opposed only as contradictory (as non-reality in the example above) but rather constitutes—as the opposed determination which in its content is itself a category of quality—the contrary of reality, qualitative negation, something like deficit. Thus Hegel transforms, often quite consistently, contradictory oppositions into contrary ones, which Trendelenburg,[8] in his criticism, holds to be impossible. The finite determinations attained in this way constitute, due to their conceptual status and not to their specific noematic content, opposed characteristics as internal differentiations of the original, universal category from which they issued. Hegel stresses in the *Encyclopedia* that, after the first step of positing an immediate universal determination, the second step, namely the differentiation of opposed particular determinations, belongs

to the sphere of finitude.[9] It is here that negative-dialectical opposition takes place, as the first negation within a methodical progression through a group of categories.

It is the third step, the negation of this negation, what is decisive for the new conception. The mutually opposed particular determinations—in our example, reality and qualitative negation—are negatively related to each other, contradicting each other as determinations of the original whole. But in this oppositional relation each determination has its opposed determination in itself. Reality is not negation, and is therefore itself negative; qualitative negation, insofar as it itself signifies something with a determinate content, is a reality of some sort. According to the argument thus outlined, an argument which Hegel later refines, the opposed determinations of quality constitute a new unity, in itself negative, which as a second negation in turn negates the first oppositional one. In the example of the above-mentioned logic of quality of the Jena period, this is limit (*Grenze*) or limitation (*Limitation*), as the internally opposed unification of reality and qualitative negation. Thus, in one and the same methodological process, a higher unity of mutually contradictory determinations is reached; no longer must another source of cognition, an intellectual intuition, be "postulated" to this end. The cost for this, of course, is that the principle of contradiction no longer retains its own realm but rather, in the second phase of the methodological progression, has at best (in a purely logical fashion) the transitory significance of rendering the mutually opposed determinations invalid in their finitude, without however making them meaningless or nonexistent. Already in the *Skepticism* essay of 1802, Hegel explains, in the context of his negative assessment of the second part of Plato's *Parmenides* and its multiple "antinomies": "The so-called principle of contradiction therefore holds so little truth—of even a formal kind—for reason, that, on the contrary, every proposition of reason regarding concepts must contain in itself a violation of that principle."[10]

Hegel maintains this outlook later as well: according to the *Science of Logic*, for example, "the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Concept."[11] Against Trendelenburg's formal-logical critique of Hegel's violation of, for example, the prohibition of contradiction, Rosenkranz attempts to rescue Hegelian dialectic in the face of formal logic by classifying Hegelian contradiction as real or metaphysical rather than logical contradiction.[12] This type of criticism of Hegel, as well as the rescue attempt, has since been undertaken again many times, in various forms. The formal-logical criticism tends not to grapple in detail with the way in which the metaphysical foundation Hegel provides for logic is the real reason, as

Hegel himself in fact indicates, for his violation of the principle of logic. The Rosenkranzian rescue attempt, on the other hand, misses Hegel's critique of formal logic as a logic of merely finite determinations. The decisive systematic question for Hegel's speculative dialectic surely consists in asking whether and how a higher unity—which is attained through negation of negation, and which preserves, in their mutual contradiction, the immediately preceding finite determinations as dependent moments—can itself be coherently thought. In any case, the above-outlined history of the development of Hegelian dialectic as an argumentative sequence helps clarify how and why Hegel could arrive at this theory of dialectic in the first place. The layered, threefold break with traditional thinking, which ultimately leads to speculative dialectic, is based, as has been shown, on ever more highly positioned, but also more elaborately developed claims regarding systematic and rational knowledge of the absolute, which is essentially thought of as the infinite.

II. Forms of ontology and dialectic in Hegel's Objective Logic

Already in Hegel's Jena drafts, dialectic was fundamentally the methodological development of pure logical and ontological determinations. In the *Science of Logic* (1812–1816, 2nd ed. 1832), Hegel now explains that his new Objective Logic "takes the place" of hitherto existing ontology, that is, of *metaphysica generalis* as well as *metaphysica specialis* regarding soul, world, and God.[13] He thereby adopts, first, the fundamental determination of ontology—whose name was first coined in the early seventeenth century from the Greek *to on* (being [*Seiende*])—as a foundational science, as it was already conceived by Plato in the *Sophist* and Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*; according to this conception, there exists a science of pure, basic determinations of being as such, belonging to it intrinsically, regardless of whether it may be determined in terms of real contents, as e.g., inanimate, or animate, or mental, or however else. Being as such underlies all these specific determinations in its universality. According, therefore, to this classical designation of the fundamental character of ontology, it is not decided from the outset, as is sometimes the case today, that a being (*Seiende*) is essentially a bare perceptual object; for the claim that only this can be a being cannot be presupposed, but must rather, if it is to succeed at all, be specifically proven. Second, Hegel adopts in his Objective Logic the decisive determinations of *metaphysica specialis* in its three realms, as they

were more precisely distinguished systematically (by Kant in particular), namely as rational psychology, cosmology, and theology. Tied to this is the fact that Hegel, as much as Kant, takes over the partition of metaphysics into *metaphysica generalis* and *specialis*,[14] yet reunites them in his logic in one unified foundational science.

Hegel's Objective Logic, then, in this sense "takes the place"[15] of ontology and *metaphysica specialis*, since Hegel calls for significant modifications which he sees as improvements. He accordingly purges ontological as well as special-metaphysical determinations of thought of the contents of sensible intuition with which they had traditionally been commingled. Kant had already undertaken this for the universal ontological determinations or categories, eliminating from them, e.g., space, time, and intuitable movement, and Hegel in general follows him in this regard; but for the special-metaphysical noematic contents, in particular for soul and world, it is Hegel who first carries out the purification of admixed sensible, temporal, and spatial determinations. Out of these special-metaphysical determinations, he brings into relief (*heraushebt*) the pure categorial determinations of thought; this allows him to reunite ontology and special metaphysics. Thus in his Objective Logic Hegel explicates not only determinations of thought that are in themselves simple and non-relational, but also increasingly complex categories of essence and relation; that is, he develops, in nonsensuous, purely intellectual contents, both ontological and special-metaphysical determinations as sequences of categories pertaining to being and essence. In this connection, Hegel adopts from Aristotle and also from Kant the term "category" for a determination of being or essence, and qualifies its purely ontological sense as "objective," since such determinations should at first count as being (*seiend*) in themselves—as yet without the supplement of how, and through which subject, they are thought. Hegel does not, however, assume the sense of judgment that is bound up with the term "category" for Aristotle and Kant, namely that categories, excepting *ousia* or *substantia*, are predicates in judgments about beings.[16] For Hegel, the structure of a judgment, with separated concepts and the empty, simple copula, is in principle not in a position to adequately express the speculative contents of thought.

From this, then, there results for Hegel a further, decisive modification and improvement with respect to traditional *metaphysica generalis* and *specialis* as well as the Kantian theory of categories. He reproaches the latter—as do all idealists—for a lack of systematic development.[17] As should be clear from the discussion above, however, a systematic explication of this sort cannot, for Hegel, be carried out following the pattern of the forms of judgment;

accordingly, the method for the unfolding of his ontology is not for Hegel the logic of judgment. Rather, the method for the systematic development of pure ontological and metaphysical determinations of thought is speculative dialectic, which also, according to Hegel, guarantees the completeness of the determinations. Hegel conceives, therefore, a dialectical ontology. The ontological pure determinations of thought, as the foundation of all specific determinations of that which exists at various levels of being, can for Hegel be systematically and thoroughly developed only through such a dialectic. With this method, an ontological determination is first posited immediately with the conceptual status of universality. It must then be grasped as something determinate in its meaning, to which an equally determinate category, issuing from the same sphere of content, is contrarily opposed—as was seen above, e.g., in the case of reality and qualitative negation—that is, as an "antinomy" of two particularities that are opposed according to their conceptual status. From this, there results through the negation of this phase of opposition of finite determinations a return to unity and wholeness, which however has now been further developed and includes in itself the opposition and contradiction of these finite determinations as a higher, more differentiated unity. According to Hegel, its conceptual status is singularity, which in itself is once again universality. This then becomes the point of departure for further sequences of categories, until this very dialectical development of thought is itself reached as a thematic content, which for Hegel, as will be discussed below, is pure thinking itself.

The dialectically explicated fundamental determinations of thought have an ontological significance and encompass different, distinctly layered noematic contents of being (*Sein*) or a being (*Seinde*) as such, since for Hegel it holds as a principle of knowledge that, "What is thought, is; and what is, exists only insofar as it is thought."[18] Hegel advocates, therefore—similarly to Descartes or even Plato, but with significant modifications due to his dialectic—an epistemological rationalism. He argues this explicitly in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, namely in his theory of the human cognitive faculty and its internal structures, which however presupposes his logic and ontology as already valid. Hegel does not expound his epistemological conception in a theory of knowledge that is still prior to this logic and ontology, as Locke and in particular Kant demanded: this would mean that only when it is epistemologically proven that human thinking is capable of *a priori*, purely intellectual knowledge (which Kant of course doubts) can pure determinations of thought also be developed as valid determinations of a being as such. Hegel, however, takes the investigation

of the possibilities and, when necessary, the limits of the human cognitive faculty to be a component part of philosophical psychology, which logic and ontology precede as its fundament. It can here only be pointed out that, amidst all the specific differences and similarities between their theories of knowledge, the fundamental systematic disagreement between Kant and Hegel[19] concerns which theory should count as first, foundational philosophy: epistemology as the theory of the accomplishments of the cognitive faculty, which corresponds to Kant's theory, or rather ontology and—as remains to be seen—philosophical theology as the basis for more concrete theories of nature and mind, which is Hegel's conception.

Since, for Hegel, logic—as ontology and ontotheology—is first philosophy, and since it is to be developed systematically, the question of which determination it can begin with is of considerable importance to it. The *Phenomenology* leads, according to Hegel, only to the position of pure ontological thinking as such. The first immanent contents of thought, however, must in themselves be fully presuppositionless and free of mediation, and thus may not already contain other, underived determinations. This logic can therefore begin neither with the concept "I" nor with the concept "God," since these concepts are much too substantial and complex.[20] Even the very concept of beginning, distinguished, for example, from continuation, cannot be the content of the first category, since this concept is also too complex. Only that noematic content which is thought with the beginning, and which contains no mediation and no determination of content whatsoever, can be conceived as the first thought; and for Hegel, this has the meaning: being. For Hegel it serves as the categorial fundament of the bare "it *is*" in everyday speech. It can only be thought as "indeterminate immediacy."[21] These negative expressions indicate that what is thought here is what is radically void of content, that is, noematically: nothing. Being and nothing are in this respect identical; according to Hegel they are, however, also opposed to each other. This can only be understood if one assumes that, already at the beginning of the logic, the dialectical method is not only performed on pure determinations of thought, but is itself thought as noematic content; dialectic, since it is still at the very beginning, is here thought in its most simple immediacy. It then follows that being and nothing should also be grasped as immediately opposed, and that from this opposition the turning of these determinations into each other, becoming, arises. The specific form of dialectic is at this juncture not yet the "transition" (*Übergehen*) of a distinct, determinate category of being into another one, but rather a fully immediate "accomplished transition" (*Übergegangensein*)[22] of one determination of thought into the other.[23] Thus the first, initiatory

development of the determinations of being is not a connection of intellectual contents which already exist in themselves, but rather the dialectical process at its lowest, still wholly immediate level, which is thought in these very determinations and movements of thinking. As modes of being, or better, of process, these determinations also precede the more complexly determined categories of "something" (*Etwas*) or "determinate being," (*Daseiende*) which for Hegel correspond to the Platonic *on* (being).

It is with something as such, or determinate being, that Hegel begins his explication of singular ontological categories as they also appear, with comparable significance, in traditional ontology or first philosophy. Determinate being or Platonic "on," however, is not for Hegel an originally simple, highest genus, but rather a determination which has already been synthetically constructed, and whose elements, as discussed above, are the initial ontological determinations of logic provided at the outset by Hegel.

Determinate being, or something in general, is then dialectically developed. Thus it must be thought—according to the axiom *Omnis determinatio est negatio*, which Hegel generally accepts—as a determinate category, which is opposed to that which it is not; this is at first, as one can elucidate, the contradictorily opposed not-something. Yet this not-something belongs in terms of content to the sphere of determinate being; and that not-something which in its content is a determinate being, is the other. In this way the contrary that is required in the dialectic is clearly and visibly constituted through this categorial development.[24] Thus, something and other are situated in this opposition as finite ontological determinations, moreover with the conceptual status of particularity. In the dialectical development they constitute the phase of finitude. Now, something and other are each in this opposition others to each other; there remains no simple something; something rather transitions into other. From this ensues the other in itself, or the other of itself, as the entire meaning of the moments of this transition, or as their universality, henceforth differentiated in itself.

This other as such, as the other of itself, is for Hegel, as he first adds in the second edition of the *Science of Logic*, "to *heteron* of Plato, who opposes it as one of the moments of totality to the One, and in this way ascribes to the other a *nature* of its own."[25] In the background stands Plato's *Sophist*, in which a sketch is developed for history's first pure ontology, one which no longer mixes cosmological or natural-philosophical determinations into the concept of the "being" as such. Thus parallels can be drawn between determinate being and the *on*, between the determinate something or "one" and the *tauton*, the simple self-identical, and between the other as such and the *thateron* or *to heteron*, all as "moments of the totality." Hegel of

course fundamentally alters the Platonic meaning of *thateron* with his definition of other as such or the other of itself. While for Plato the other or the different (*thateron*) always stands, in the *Sophist*, in relation to an other which is distinct from itself,[26] and thus is not something different in itself, for Hegel it signifies, as the other of itself, the other that has opposition in itself, in which the preceding opposed determinations "something" and "other"—thus the finite moments of determinate being as such, which contradict each other in the progression of thought—are preserved. In this dialectical development, and in the discussion of the resulting speculative unity, Hegel perpetrates the very contradiction[27] which Plato specifically avoids in his dialectical explication of the highest genera as the most universal determinations of the "idea of being."[28] The conception of speculative dialectic is thus for Hegel the basis, in terms of method and content, for the meaning of these ontological determinations and their development. Hegel calls the specific form of dialectic for such simple and non-relational, but not fixed, categories "transition"; one meaning passes over into the following one, and does not remain unchanged in this conceptual development. A remark of Hegel's in fact indicates that this dialectical metamorphosis of ontological, "objective" determinations of thought, or categories, is headed towards a determinate meaning or goal; for him, something (*Etwas*) is "only the beginning of the subject," which first attains a more differentiated and concrete significance in the pure concept thinking itself.[29] This indicates that the methodical development of ontological determinations leads to a theory of a higher level, namely to a theory of pure subjectivity thinking itself.

However, if—without this foreknowledge—the development of ontological categories is considered only for itself, it can be classified under the idea of a universalist ontology. Such an ontology explicates only the pure determinations of a being as such, irrespective of its possible specifications of content, and thus of whether, for example, it is inanimate, animate, mental, or the like. Such a universalistic ontology is already outlined by Plato in the *Sophist*, as well as by Aristotle in the *Categories* and in parts in the *Metaphysics*, or by Kant as the pure structure of thoughts, or rather of categories. It will become clear, however, that Hegel locates this type of ontology in a different metaphysical context.

The decisive problem in carrying through speculative dialectic consists in the question of how opposition and contradiction can be generated and become logically consistent parts of the resulting higher unity. This problem was apparent above in the progression of opposed determinations from something and other to the other of itself. In the "determinations of

reflection"—from identity to contradiction—belonging to essence, Hegel discusses it specifically and thematically; what was previously only copresent in carrying out the method is now itself categorially explicit. In these "determinations of reflection," Hegel takes on the traditional logical axioms and, within his dialectical ontology, reinterprets them—independently of their propositional form—in terms of their essential contents.

Thus for him identity does not in fact mean A = A, but rather absolute equality-with-itself (*absolutes Sich-Gleichsein*), which does not separate itself from what is different from it, but rather contains it in itself.[30] Out of this, Hegel develops difference (*Unterschied*), diversity (*Verschiedenheit*), and then, in a difficult line of thought which should here at least be summarized, opposition and contradiction. Opposition is for Hegel the synthetic relation that finally emerges from absolute identity, namely the opposition of, on the one hand, the identical as the like (*Gleiche*) that withdraws itself (*sich abhebt*) from the "other" and therein relates itself to itself, and on the other hand its opposite, the nonidentical as the unlike (*Ungleiche*), which negates this "like" and therein relates itself to itself. These two poles of opposition are, however, the "positive" and the "negative."[31] These are, according to Hegel, no longer distinguished through outer reflection, as are like and and unlike; rather, this distinguishing and negative relating to each other now enter into the meaning-components themselves. Thus the "positive" is that 'like' which is itself, in its meaning, distinguished from what is opposed to it, and therefore stands in a negative relation to it and is in this way itself negative. The "negative" is likewise that unlike which, in its meaning, contains the negative relation to the "positive," but for this very reason obtains its own meaning, existing for itself, and is therein positive.

Among the complex and richly varied arguments that ensue from this, one thought, crucial in my opinion, should be highlighted here. To both opposed moments, there belongs, at first, only the negative *relation* to the respective other, and this negative *relation* is certainly an internal meaning-component of each of the two moments. However, this does not yet ensure that the related, opposed moment *itself* enters into the internal meaning-content of either the "positive" or the "negative." Hegel tries to show that this is also necessary, in the subsequent considerations which lead to the category of contradiction: On the one hand, the "positive" is, through its negative relationship to what is opposed to it, itself negative, and in this respect is also the "negative"; it posits the "negative" in itself, but simultaneously excludes it from itself as what is opposed to it, and is therefore contradictory. On the other hand, the "negative" attains, through its relation to the "positive," its own independent, determinate meaning; it is therefore

positive and in this respect is the "positive," which it posits in itself but simultaneously excludes from itself as what is opposed to it, thus rendering itself contradictory. According to Hegel, then, each moment has in itself not only the negative relation to the other, but also the meaning of this other as posited and negated *in* itself. The concept of contradiction as such then ensues as the entire relation of these moments, which are themselves essentially formed in this way, i.e., as contradictory. Since, however, the "positive" and the "negative," as well as their contradictory sense, are themselves ontological categories, Hegel can formulate an axiom as offensive to the understanding as: "everything is inherently contradictory."[32]

It makes sense to say that the negative relation of the "positive" to its opposed moment can be included in its internal meaning; this holds also for the negative relationship of the "negative" to what is opposed to it. It does not yet follow, however, that the specific meaning-content of the corresponding opposed determination is itself to be included in the meaning of either the "positive" or the "negative"; that is, it does not yet follow, as Hegel claims, that "each is itself and its other."[33] This thought presupposes, rather, that in the whole sequence of "determinations of reflection," an absolute identity is to be differentially developed which, as the absolute, contains difference, diversity, and indeed opposition and contradiction in itself. The basis for this is Hegel's model of the absolute, which for him is essentially the infinite.[34] As Hegel had already asserted earlier, the infinite comprehends in itself everything finite, but in a peculiar manner, namely in that it is negatively present in the finite as its omnipresent contradiction. Hegel's intricate line of thought regarding opposition and contradiction is thus difficult to see as a reasoned proof, one whose result is the necessity of thinking contradiction and contradictory moments within absolute identity; rather, it is clearly rife with presuppositions. What is presupposed, and formative for the entire line of thought, is that absolute identity or the infinite, which contains in itself the finite determinations or moments and their contradictory meaning, is to be thought as the underlying basis for every stage and every differentiation.

This conception of the infinite and, more specifically, of absolute identity also forms, for Hegel, the basis, first, for the claim that the traditional logical and ontological axioms—from the principle of identity, through the principle of diversity and the principle of opposition, to the principle of contradiction and of ground—can be traced back to the pure categorial determinations of thought that are immanent to them, independently of the outer form of sentences, and second, that these are to be brought into a systematic and speculative interrelation through a process of conceptual

development. For neither the logical and ontological axioms, nor their underlying categories as "determinations of reflection" belonging to essence, can simply coexist indifferently to each other. Finally, in this process of development, thematic determinations of thought are discussed which are themselves crucial steps in the dialectical method made explicit at the end of the *Science of Logic*, namely identity, difference and opposition, contradiction and—as the unity which results—ground. These determinations, from identity to contradiction and ground are thus central for the conception and progression of Hegelian dialectic.

In the development of these "determinations of reflection," and in the Logic of Essence in general, the specific form of dialectic is no longer, as it was for the internally simple categories of being, a "transition," but rather an illusory, negative "shining into another" (*Scheinen in Anderes*).[35] The categories of essence developed here are relational categories; and the very negative relation of the "positive" and the "negative"—in which each moment negates the other, i.e., posits it as "shine" (*Schein*), but therein attains and retains its own meaning—exhibits such a "shining into another." In this type of dialectical progression, one determination of thought does not simply transition into the other, opposed one, as occurs, e.g., in "something" and "other," but rather maintains itself in its negative relation to its other; and it is only the further categorial process that first yields a transformation and development of meaning. With this manner of dialectical progression, whether it be "transition" or negative "shining into another," Hegel's ontology in the "Objective Logic" proves itself to be a process ontology. The dialectical movement brings about a metamorphosis of categories, in which they have no fixed, rigid meaning, but rather represent only noematic points or phases in this process of categorial development. One such phase is the relationship between substance and accident; in a substance ontology, as opposed to a process ontology, this is conceived as a fundamental relationship. It can also be conceptualized in Hegel's process ontology, but only as a transitory phase in a progression through relational categories. The fundamental determination of ontology remains, for Hegel, process.

III. Hegel's logic of the concept and the theory of absolute subjectivity

With the development of the categories of the Objective Logic—the Hegelian version of ontology and various parts of special metaphysics—speculative logic is, however, not yet complete. Beyond these categories of

relation, one must also develop pure determinations of thought regarding relationship to self (*Selbstrelation*)—not only an existing or persisting self-relation (*Selbstbeziehung*), but a spontaneous, intellectual one. It is in these determinations, according to Hegel, that the "Concept" and its increasingly differentiated determinations are to be thought, as explicated in the "subjective logic," and more precisely in the Logic of the Concept. "Concept" here denotes not only a noematic meaning-content of thought but equally the spontaneous activity of thinking that constitutes it. Since this can only be carried out by a subject, Hegel also embraces the Kantian pure "I think." Just as this thinking I, or this pure apperception, is for Kant the principle of logical forms and of the categories, Hegel regards the "concept," which for him signifies such a pure, self-related "I think," as the principle underlying pure determinations of thought and of categories.

Yet Hegel's notion of the "concept," as the logical determination of the pure "I think" or of pure subjectivity, distinguishes itself essentially from Kant's in two interrelated respects.[36] First, Hegel's thinking subjectivity does not relate itself to a given manifold of intuition, and is thus not, as it is for Kant, characterized by such finitude and limitedness; rather, it first of all constitutes this manifold (which it forms intellectually) on its own, namely as its own conceptual determinations and the relationships between them. Second, this "I think" does not relate itself, with its categories and determinations of thought, to an object that is different from itself (e.g., to an object of nature) but rather purely to itself; in it, it thinks only itself. Such a self-thinking subjectivity is for Hegel in the end no longer finite, but rather proves itself to be infinite, divine subjectivity. The necessity of examining this subjectivity follows naturally, for Hegel, both from the increasingly differentiated meaning-enrichment of the categories, which already comprehend the infinite, and from the fact that the preceding "objective" sequence of pure determinations of thought is grounded in a pure thinking, indeed ultimately in an infinite thought thinking of itself. Hegel sees a historical precursor for this in the idea of divine *Noesis Noeseos*, first of all in Aristotle, then also in Plotinus as well as—on Hegel's interpretation—in Christian theology, when it attempts to grasp God in a purely philosophical manner.[37] Hegel, however—in a modern fashion—conceives of *Noesis Noeseos* as a spontaneous, productive activity of an absolute subjectivity relating itself to itself.

In the Objective Logic it was shown that pure determinations of being and essence, taken in themselves, have only an ontological significance, and can be regarded as component parts of a universalistic ontology. Starting, however, with the logic of the pure "I think," and, as it is further

developed, with the logic of an absolute, "infinite" subjectivity which "overgrasps" its opposite[38] the categories can be seen—with the exception of the corresponding oppositional determinations, which as such remain finite—as "the *metaphysical definitions of God*."[39] Thus the absolute as infinite, divine subjectivity also receives ontological determinations, such as determinate being, and it thinks and recognizes itself in them. The absolute, or God thinking himself, cannot however be adequately grasped through merely ontological determinations, an objection Hegel also levels, for example, against Proclus' idea of God as the One that exists above all (*überseiend*), or against Spinoza's conception of God as the One Substance. Something comparable can be seen in Heidegger's attempt to think historically towards God, through a pure thinking of being as event (*Ereignis*) rather than substance, and of the beings that emerge from it. The long journey in which the significance of the categories is enriched through dialectical development—from being and determinate being, up to absolute subjectivity thinking itself in the cosmos of thought, as the philosophical concept of God—cannot be forgone. It then becomes clear, however, that being, determinate being, being-for-itself (*Fürsichseiendes*), substance (*Substantielle*), etc. are ontological meaning-contents, in which infinite, divine subjectivity purely thinks and determines itself, but whose contents it, as concept and idea, transcends. It is in this way the true being, is consummate in its meaning, i.e., the paradigmatic being. An ontology which specifies this as its principle, and which makes less complete beings dependent on it, is a paradigmatic ontology in type. Hegel's speculative logic thus develops a universalistic ontology for ontological determinations considered for themselves; their categories, however, are sublated (*aufgehoben*) and transformed by the thinking and self-thinking of absolute subjectivity, which also grasps itself through these ontological determinations, but just as much through intellectual determinations which transcend them. In other words, the universalistic ontology is ultimately incorporated into a paradigmatic ontology, which comprises a pure philosophical theology of subjectivity. Ontology and philosophical theology are thus not, for Hegel, two separate realms of pure thinking, but rather only methodologically distinct phases in the explication of the paradigmatic being.

As opposed to a realist ontology of the given (*Gegebenheitsontologie*), for which the being that is to be known is principally understood as something real, pregiven outside of the concept and of thinking, Hegel's logic proves moreover to be an idealist constitutive ontology. The meaning-contents of the ontological determinations of being and essence are not simply ready to hand as existing, but are rather first constituted by the pure thinking

subject, the paradigmatic being; they signify intellectual moments of itself that it has spontaneously brought about. In these pure determinations of thought which it has generated, it recognizes itself thinking itself.

In the Logic of the Concept or "subjective logic," where the self-relational, immanent determinations of thinking and self-thinking subjectivity are explicated, the dialectical process is not "transition," nor negative "shining in another," but rather "development" (*Entwicklung*).[40] This signifies that a universal noematic conceptual content, which is also accorded determinate, thinking self-relation, enters into differentiations and oppositions, yet maintains, in the negative relation of these to each other, its consistency and self-relation, and in this self-determination consequently shapes or develops a higher conceptual unity and wholeness that is internally differentiated; in this unity, furthermore, both the original universality and this oppositionality of particulars are preserved as moments in itself.

Thus the dialectic, which is differentiated, according to the stages of the genesis of categories, into three forms—"transition," negative "shining into another," and "development"—entails the following general method of pure thought: First, as the initiation of a movement, a determination of thought is posited in an as-yet undifferentiated unity and immediacy and—with respect to its conceptual-logical status—in an initial universality. This universal determination is then specified and thereby divided into opposed finite determinations, which together make up the opposition pertaining to this type of movement and process, and which have the conceptual-logical status of determinacy or particularity. Finally, unity is once again attained at a higher, more differentiated level, out of the opposition and contradictory sense of these particular determinations; that is, it constitutes an absolute identity that preserves opposition and contradiction speculatively in itself, and which has the conceptual-logical status of singularity (*Einzelheit*), but which contains in itself an enriched and more structured version of that original universality. Both the decisive "determinations of reflection" belonging to essence—identity, opposition, and contradiction—as well as the determinations of the concept—universality, particularity, and singularity—are involved in this process.[41]

Hegel also characterizes this dialectical progression in a speculative-syllogistic manner, namely (1) as the progression from the universal to the particular (U – P), or more precisely: to opposed particularities, (2) as the progression from the particular, thus understood, to the singular (P – S) and (3) as a return to a henceforth differentiated universality (S – U). It is not the case, however, that a particular syllogistic form needs to be followed here. As component parts of the content of the syllogism (which is thus not

to be understood in a formal sense) the determinations of the concept in this way already encompass concrete universality in all its various orientations, which are then to be brought to a comprehensive and fully differentiated concrete universality through a speculative-syllogistically formed dialectic. Viewed in its metaphysical completion, however, this universality, and with it the dialectical movement of pure determinations of thought, is subjectivity thinking and recognizing itself in the categorial determinations it has generated.[42]

Thus, as has been argued, dialectic and its forms (which are distinguished according to their stage of categorial development) are united in this absolute or infinite subjectivity thinking itself, along with the ontology-forms: dialectical ontology, process ontology, and paradigmatic ontology—which incorporates universalistic ontology into itself—as well as idealistic constitutive ontology. The basis for this combination of dialectical and ontological forms, however, consists in Hegel's conception of thinking the absolute at different levels as the infinite, an infinite that does not stand over against the finite, but rather contains in itself everything finite, with all its oppositions and contradictions; and the completed determination of this infinite proves to be absolute subjectivity thinking itself.

Conclusion: Hegel's groundbreaking and productive arguments regarding dialectical and ontological forms and their interconnections can doubtless enrich contemporary discourse on ontology, its stock of basic determinations, and their systematic-methodological development. From Hegel's theory one can at least extract and reformulate paradigmatic possibilities for such present-day endeavors. Thus an ontology, for example, need not only determine what is characteristic of a being insofar as it appears in perceptions or in the context of perceptions. Over against this presupposed limitation, an ontology should rather explicate the notion of a being as such in its pure thought-determinations, and develop these determinations systematically and methodologically. It is in principle the task of an epistemology to investigate—antecedently or subsequently—what legitimations exist, for example, for the cognition of perceptual objects, and in which horizons one can attain representations and cognitions of the pure being as such that go beyond the perceptual.

Standing in the background is the above posed fundamental question of what constitutes the content of first philosophy: epistemology, as results in particular from Kant's theory, or ontology, connected if necessary to a philosophical theology, as was Hegel's conception, and the conception of a considerable part of the tradition. Hegel offers his theory of the possibilities and achievements of the cognitive faculty, from sensuous intuition to

thinking, in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit; and this assumes his ontology as its prior basis. The question here arises of how the cognitive character of the pure determinations of being and essence can be secured if epistemology first arises in the system after ontology, and presupposes it. Kant, on the other hand, provides the theory of human knowledge at the outset, according to which, then, the only possible ontology is one restricted to appearances in space and time. But the basic determinations of even this sort of ontology—essentially, for Kant, the categories—must already be developed. These can consequently only be pure contents of thought which are still without ontological meaning, since this meaning is first disclosed in relation to the appearances to which it is restricted. Such a neutral, not yet ontological meaning is admittedly not easy to demonstrate for the *termini ontologici* that are the traditional categories; their noematic content clearly implies ontological meanings, which however one is initially supposed to disregard. Such problems regarding the relationship between ontology and epistemology, the priority of one over the other or vice versa, or their mutual interdependence, call for renewed philosophical investigation.

Notes

[1] G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 256; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 1, 372. (Translation modified: Knox has 'intellect' for 'Verstand,' whereas "understanding" is now the more standard translation.)

[2] A more literal translation of "das Verstandesdenken" would be "the thinking of (i.e., characteristic of) the understanding." As this is grammatically awkward, and as there is no English adjective form for "understanding," "intellectual thinking" was chosen as the closest approximation. –*Tr.*

[3] This sense of dialectic in the early Hegel of Jena can only be attained reconstructively from the scarce mentions of "Dialektik," as Hegel himself conceived it. For example, it is claimed, without further clarification, in the "Naturrechts" essay (1802): "Dass das Verhältnis überhaupt nichts an sich ist, hat . . . die Dialektik zu erweisen" (*Werke*, 2, 476). Dialectic puts forth specific, mutually opposed finite determinations and "proves," as Hegel here seems to indicate, that the oppositional relation of such finite determinations has no substantial existence or being-in-itself. For further mentions of dialectic in the early Jena period, and an interpretation of them, please see the author's discussion in: Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Systematische und Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik*, Hegel-Studien Supplement 15, 3rd extended edition, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995, p. 102ff. among others; cf. also commentary in Ignaz P.Vital Troxler, *Schellings und Hegels*

erste absolute Metaphysik (1801/02). Zusammenfassende Vorlesungsnachschriften von I.P.V. Troxler, ed. with introduction and interpretation by Klaus Düsing, Köln: Dinter, 1988. Esp. p. 63, 70, 159ff. 171ff., among others. On Hegel's early diaelectic, cf. Manfred Baum, *Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik* 2nd ed., Bonn: Bouvier, 1989, esp. p. 6ff., pp. 225–235; Rainer Schäfer, *Die Dialektik und ihre besonderen Formen in Hegels Logik. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und Systematische Untersuchungen*, Hegel-Studien Supplement 45, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001, esp. pp. 1–90. On Hegel's break with traditional thinking see Klaus Düsing, "Hegels Dialektik. Der dreifache Bruch mit dem traditionellen Denken." *Philosophia perennis. E. Heintel zum 80. Geburtstag*, ed. H.-D. Klein und J. Reikerstorfer, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1993, pp. 126–138.

[4] Schelling, *On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966, p. 63; Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856–1861, v. 5. p. 269. For more on the problem of skepticism in the early Hegel of Jena, cf. Massimiliano Biscuso, *Hegel, lo scetticismo antico e Sesto Empirico*, Napoli, La città del sole, 2005, esp. pp. 55–114, and, in the context of an illuminating discussion of the distinct types of skepticism, Dietmar Heidemann, *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007, esp. pp. 162–195 among others. On Hegel and Schelling in Jena, cf. Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität* (see fn. 3) p. 100ff., pp. 134–149.

[5] Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. Henry S. Harris and Walter Cerf., Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977, p. 111ff.; *Werke*, 2, 42ff.

[6] Hegel's overall concept here is different from that of Adorno's "negative dialectic," which—as a precursor of the postmodern—begins with the priority of the non-identical and of difference, however one is to conceive it, and envisages no positive grasp of the infinite whatsoever. Cf. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton, New York, Seabury Press, 1973.

[7] Cf. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1971, v. 7. *The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics*, trans. J. W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni, introduction and notes by H. S. Harris, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986, p. 5ff. On identity and contradiction in the outline of "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie" (1804/05), cf. Leo Lugarini, *Orizzonti hegeliani di comprensione dell' essere. Rileggendo la Scienza della logica'*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 1998,esp. p. 65ff. Cf. also the author's own discussion: Klaus Düsing, "Identität und Widerspruch. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Dialektik Hegels," *Giornale di Metafisica*, 6 (1984) p. 328ff.

[8] Cf. Adolf Trendelenburg: *Logische Untersuchungen*, v. 1. 3rd ed., Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1870, p. 43ff. An additional, significant example of Hegel's transformation of contradictory opposition into contrary opposition—which admittedly does not follow clearly for every opposition of categories, but does nonetheless evidently correspond to a general conception of Hegel's—is to be found in the sequence: something (*Etwas*) or determinate being in general (*Daseiendes*), determinate something (*bestimmtes Etwas*), opposed then by a not-something which in terms of content is itself a determinate being, that is, by the other, and ending finally,

since determinate something and other are only others to each other, with the other of itself. (see below, section II).

[9] Cf. Hegel *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, §85: 135.; *Werke*, 8, 180 (1830 edition of the *Enzyklopädie*, §85). Hegel does not always carry this through in strict detail.

[10] Hegel, "Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One," trans. H. S. Harris, in George Di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds. *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, p. 325. *Werke*, 2, 229.

[11] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 835; *Werke*, 6, 562 (Miller has "Notion" for "*Begriff*"; "Concept" is now the more standard translation –*Tr.*).

[12] Cf. Adolf Trendelenburg, *op cit.* 44ff.; for a similar criticism that is more recent, cf. Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?" *Conjectures and Refutations*, New York: Routledge, 1976, pp. 312–335; on achieving compatibility with the principle of contradiction, cf. Karl Rosenkranz, *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee, Part 1*, Königsberg: Verlag der Gebr. Bornträge, 1858/59, esp. xxxiiff., pp. 300–323. On Hegel's dialectic cf., the more recent Enrico Berti, *Contraddizione e dialettica negli Antichi e nei Moderni*, Palermo: L'Epos, 1987, esp. pp. 177–222; Terry Pinkard: *Hegel's Dialectic. The Explanation of Possibility*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, esp. p. 21ff., p. 31ff. For more literature on Hegel's dialectic cf. Agnes Dürr, *Zum Problem der Hegelschen Dialektik und ihrer Formen*, Berlin: Verlag für Staatswissenschaften und Geschichte, 1938, esp. 1–40; Andries Sarlemijn, *Hegelsche Dialektik*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971, esp. 3ff. among others. Cf. also Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität* (see fn. 3). esp. 25ff., as well as 376ff., 388ff., and on speculative dialectic cf. pp. 313–335. On early, immediate confrontations with Hegel's logic in the nineteenth century, cf. Bernd Burkhardt, *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik im Spannungsfeld der Kritik*, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1993.

[13] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 63; *Werke*, 5, 61.

[14] From the seventeenth century onwards, this partition was debated repeatedly, and was passed down in this fashion to Kant; cf. Elena Ficara, *Die Ontologie in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006, esp. p. 84ff., also p. 109ff. It was, however, already established, with different arguments, in the fourteenth century by Francesco de Marchia; cf. Sabine Folger-Fonfara, *Das Super-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziskus von Marchia*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, esp. pp. 89–125.

[15] See fn. 13; on Hegel's adoption of *metaphysica generalis* and *specialis*, cf. Leo Lugarini, "La trasformazione hegeliana della problematica categoriale," in *Hegel dal mondo storico alla filosofia*, 2nd ed., Milano: Guerini e associati, 2000, esp. p. 221ff.

[16] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 409ff.; *Werke*, v. 6, 35ff. Hegel often uses the term "Kategorie" for his ontological determinations of thought. On the meaning of "Kategorie" in Hegel, cf. Andre Doz, *La logique de Hegel et les Problèmes Traditionnels de l'Ontologie*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1987, 26ff.

[17] Cf. "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One," trans. Henry .S. Harris, in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, pp. 311–362, here p. 353; *Werke*, 2, 269, 147 (latter reference not translated into English –*Tr.*). See also Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 613, 789 (*Werke*, 6, 288, 504), among others. The idealists could not know that Kant, in letters and reflections, had formulated attempts at such a systematic development.

[18] Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, transl. from the 1830 edition, together with the Zusätze by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon, 2007, p. 227; *Werke*, 10, 283 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §465). Wallace renders the passage differently: "What is thought, is; what is, exists in and for thought." The original reads "dass, was *gedacht* ist, *ist*, und dass, was *ist*, nur *ist*, insofern es Gedanke ist." Cf. also: "[I]t is in the determinations of thought and the Concept that [the object] *is* what it *is*." Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 833; *Werke*, 6, 560. –*Tr.*]

[19] On Hegel's dispute with Kant's critical epistemology, cf. the following selections: Ingtraud Görland, *Die Kantkritik des jungen Hegel*, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1966; Leo Lugarini, "La 'confutazione' hegeliana della filosofia critica," *Hegel interprete di Kant*, ed. Valerio Verra, Napoli: Prismi, 1981, pp. 13–66; Valerio Verra, "Immaginazione trascendentale e intelletto intuitivo,", pp. 67–89; Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, esp. p. 6ff., pp. 16–41, p. 80ff., 175ff. among others. Cf. also Klaus Düsing, "Constitution and Structure of Self-Identity: Kant's Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 8, 1983, pp. 409–431, Klaus Düsing, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, esp. pp. 196–242 (with additional references) and Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik* (see fn. 3), pp. 109–120, 233–243, p. 380ff. among others.

[20] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 67–78; *Werke*, 5, 64–78. On the problem of the beginning, cf. esp. Dieter Henrich, "Anfang und Methode der Logik," *Hegel im Kontext*, ed., Dieter Henrich, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971, pp. 73–94; cf. also related portions of Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism* (see fn. 19) pp. 182–188.

[21] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 81; *Werke*, 5, 81.

[22] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 81ff.; *Werke*, 5, 81ff.

[23] Cf. on this topic Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Idea of Hegel's Logic," (1971), in *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. C. P. Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 87ff. Hegel takes specific ontological principles from past theories as the background for these "categories," namely: Parmenides' doctrine for "being" and Heraclitus' for "becoming," while for "nothing" he identifies Buddhism.

[24] Adolf Trendelenburg, and many who followed him, criticized this transformation of contradictory into contrary opposites; see fn. 8, above.

[25] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 118; *Werke*, 5, 125–126. In mentioning the "One," Hegel clearly is not alluding to Plato's *Parmenides* (cf. Michael Theunissen, *Sein und Schein. Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,

1980, p. 262ff., but see also p. 250ff.); elsewhere, Hegel also often opposes the "One" rather than the Same (*tauton*) to the "Other"; and like Plato in the *Sophist*, he ascribes the "Other" (*thateron*), as one of the highest genera, its own "Nature." For details and related issues, cf. Klaus Düsing, "Ontologie und Dialektik bei Plato und Hegel," *Hegel-Studien* 15, 1980, 95–150, esp. 136ff.; Klaus Düsing, "Hegel und die klassische griechische Philosophie (Platon, Aristoteles)," in *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. Dietmar Heidemann and Christian Krijnen, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, pp. 46–69, esp. p. 55ff.

[26] Cf. Plato, *The Sophist: A Translation with a Detailed Account of its Theses and Arguments*, trans. James Duerlinger, New York: Peter Lang, 2005, p. 255d.

[27] Hegel believes, as is clear from his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, that he remains here in agreement with Plato, for example, when he "translates" that "what is the other (*heteron*) is the same, and what is the same (*tauton on*), is an other, and indeed in the same regard and from the same point of view," (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, v. 2, 64. –translation modified; *Werke*, 19, 72), whereas Plato, precisely to avoid contradiction, distinguishes the two regards. (cf. *The Sophist*, 259 c–d.)

[28] Plato, ibid., 254a.

[29] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 115; *Werke*, 5, 122.

[30] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 411ff.; *Werke*, 6, 37ff. Behind this idea ultimately lies Hegel's conception of the Absolute as the Infinite (see below). Due to the complexity of argumentation, the exposition of the "determinations of reflection" of Essence belong for Hegel to "[the] part of the logic, which is the most difficult one," and which "contains principally the categories of metaphysics and of the sciences generally." Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 179 (translation modified); *Werke*, 8, 235 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §114 remark).

[31] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 424ff.; *Werke*, 6, 54ff. There has been much commentary and—at times critical—interpretation of logic of "reflection" and the "determinations of reflection" from Identity to Contradiction and Ground, particularly with respect to Opposition and Contradiction; cf. for example John McTaggart and Ellis, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (1910), New York: Russell & Russell, 1964, esp. p. 108ff. A shorter commentary is furnished in Geoffrey R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, 1950, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984, esp. pp. 96–105; more detailed, largely immanent commentaries and interpretations of Hegel's complex train of thought can be found in Joel Biard, et al., *Introduction à la lecture de la "Science de la logique" de Hegel. La doctrine de l'essence*, Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1983, esp. pp. 75–101; Leo Lugarini, *Orizzonti hegeliani di comprensione dell' essere. Rileggendo la "Scienza della logica"* (see fn. 7) esp. pp. 288–307; Philippe Soual, *Intériorité et réflexion. Étude sur la Logique de l'essence chez Hegel*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 2000, esp. pp. 263–350; Christian Iber, *Metaphysik absoluter Rationalität. Eine Studie zu den beiden ersten Kapiteln von Hegels Wesenslogik*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990, esp. pp. 370–440, 441–485. On the genesis and development in Hegel of the dialectical sequence from identity to contradiction, cf. Düsing, "Identität und Widerspruch. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Dialektik Hegels," *Giornale di Metafisica*, 6 (1984), 315–358. On Hegel's theory of contradiction in general cf. Vittorio Hösle, *Hegels System.*

Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität. 2 vols., Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987, v. 1. 161–179.

[32] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 439; *Werke*, v. 6, 73. Cf. also 440 (*Werke*, 6, 75): "Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self"; cf. also fn. 12 above, and the corresponding text.

[33] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 425; *Werke*, v.6, 56.

[34] Cf. for example, Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 439, 150 among others (*Werke*, 6, 74, and 5, 165). Hegel conceives of a type of metaphysics in which the Absolute is grasped as the Infinite, which contains the Finite in itself, as opposed to a type of metaphysics which considers the Absolute to be a fully transcendent One that is above all else (*überseiend*), as is the case for the Neoplatonists, and as opposed to a type of metaphysics which sees the Absolute as the Good in itself, as did Plato or Pseudo-Dionysius.

[35] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, pp. 237–238; *Werke*, 8, 307 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §161). Cf. also Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 184; *Werke*, 8, 241 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §118).

[36] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 583ff., 589ff., 776ff. *Werke*, 6, 252ff., 259ff., 487ff. For (selected) discussions of Hegel's dispute with Kant's principles of theoretical philosophy, see fn. 19, above.

[37] Cf. for example, Walter Kern, "Die Aristotelesdeutung Hegels. Die Aufhebung des Aristotelischen 'Nous' in Hegels 'Geist,'" *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 78 (1971), 237–259; Leonardo Samonà, "Atto puro e pensiero di pensiero nell' interpretazione di Hegel," in *Hegel e Aristotele. Atti del Convegno di Cagliari*, ed. Giancarlo Movia, Cagliari: Edizioni AV, 1995, pp. 203–252; Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, esp. 118ff., 125ff.; cf. also the discussion, and further indications of literature, in Klaus Düsing, "Hegel und die klassische griechische Philosophie" (see fn. 25) esp. 62ff.

[38] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 290; *Werke*, 8, 371 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §215 remark).

[39] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 135; *Werke*, 8, 180 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §85).

[40] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic* pp. 237–238; *Werke*, 8, 307 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §161). Cf. also, for example, Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, translated from the 1830 edition, together with the Zusätze by W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007 (see fn. 18) 183; *Werke*, 10, 233 (*Enzyklopädie* 1830, §442).

[41] Cf. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 824–844; *Werke*, 6, 547–572. Hegel's general portrayals of his dialectical method first attain argumentative power, and virtuosic conceptual plasticity, when they are carried through for singular categories or groups of categories. Among the numerous interpretations of the "absolute Idea" or of the dialectical method, cf. for example the detailed commentary in Ludovicus De Vos, *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Die absolute Idee*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1983. On responses to Hegel's dialectic, see fn. 12, above. On the different forms of dialectic, cf. for example Rainer Schäfer: *Die Dialektik und ihre besonderen Formen in Hegels Logik* (see. fn 3) esp. p. 202ff., 295–322. On the speculative-syllogistic version of dialectic in Hegel's characterization of the absolute method cf. Hans-Friedrich Fulda, "Hegels Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und Darstellungsweise," *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, esp. 154ff.; cf. also Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität*

in Hegels Logik (see fn. 3) esp. p. 326ff. and "Syllogistik und Dialektik in Hegels spekulativer Logik," *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion*, ed. Dieter Henrich, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986, pp. 15–38.

[42] In the methodical development, the "negativity" of Contradiction, as the "*turning point* of the movement of the Concept" is the "innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses . . . ; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublating of the opposition between Concept and reality, and the unity that is truth" (Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 835 –translation modified; *Werke*, 6, 562).

Chapter 6

The Dialectic of the Inverted World and the Meaning of *Aufhebung*

Klaus Brinkmann

I. Introduction

In what follows, I identify an important aspect of Hegel's dialectical method through a close reading of the so-called inverted world in the chapter on Force and Understanding in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. I will suggest that Hegel's *Aufhebung* requires the asymmetrical unity of two essential but contrary determinations, in which one of the contraries (for instance, the finite and the infinite) is "stronger" than the other and contains the other within itself. *Aufhebung*, that is, means the coexistence of two opposites of unequal value in a unity, one of which also functions as the unifying concept.

Some way into Force and Understanding, there opens up an opposition between "the inner world as a simple unity"[1] and the specific laws "in which the differences are expressed as independent moments."[2] The two cannot comfortably be kept apart, however, once science discovers seemingly paradoxical phenomena that suggest an irreducible dualism within reality itself. Thus magnetism and electricity exhibit a polar nature for which no unified origin seems imaginable. Typically, a plus pole cannot exist independently of a minus pole and vice versa.[3] While this sounds like a repetition of the unity of opposite forces discussed earlier in that chapter, it is not. The two opposites are not only, Hegel wants to argue, opposites vis-à-vis each other but opposites *of* themselves, or each is not only the opposite of an other but also its own opposite. The earlier opposition of soliciting and solicited forces has thus been sharpened to become a contradiction. To illustrate, if it is really the case that a magnetic pole is radically inseparable from its opposite, then the idea that there could be a pole that is only positive or only negative must be rejected even though on the surface, i.e., in appearance, any given pole is either the one or the other. Instead,

following this line of reasoning we seem compelled to accept the idea that the positive pole is in itself also the negative pole and vice versa. In other words, the two must coexist not just as two different aspects of a third element that keeps them together, but each must literally *be* both itself and its opposite. Each opposite thus carries an "*inner* difference" within itself.[4] Moreover, while each opposite has its opposite within its own self, each is also opposed to the other opposite that likewise carries *its* opposite within itself. Each thus possesses both an internal and an external opposite. It "repels" its internal opposite in the sense that in its manifestation it can be only negative or positive but not both, and it "attracts" its external opposite. But likewise it attracts its internal opposite simply because it is its own opposite, and it repels its external homologue. From this complex opposition there results the unified reality of a magnet.

For the understanding, this situation is a conceptual conundrum, but for Hegel it expresses the dialectical structure of infinity or of the Notion.[5] What we have here is a negation of the negative relation of two opposites resulting in a stable unity. Both opposites carry the same inner difference of a positive and a negative aspect and are in this respect identical, and both relate to each other as opposites that attract one another. The understanding thus learns, Hegel explains, that

> it is a *law of appearance itself,* that differences arise which are no differences, or that what is *selfsame repels* itself from itself; and similarly, that the differences are only such as are in reality no differences and which cancel themselves; in other words, what is *not selfsame* is *self-attractive*".[6]

It is important to understand that with this experience *difference* or opposition has penetrated into the inner being or the inner world—i.e., the (first) supersensible world that emerged earlier in the chapter from the play of forces—, insofar as the latter is the true ground of appearances.[7] The inner being of things is no longer a "tranquil kingdom of laws,"[8] but affected by "the principle of change and alteration."[9] What is more, a contradiction has entered into the realm of laws for which there does not seem to be an immediate solution. If the *identity* of something consists in the fact that (a) it is simultaneously positive and negative and (b) cannot exist without uniting with an opposite that is equally both positive and negative, then the understanding, which is committed to the principles of (tautological) identity and external difference, finds itself severely challenged. Hegel discusses three solutions to this situation. To the first he gives the name of the "inverted world."[10] The second represents his own dialectical "sublation" or

superseding of the contradiction.[11] These two solutions are addressed in sequence in the following sections. The third proposal is not clearly identified by name, but the formulation of the text suggests very strongly that it is Schelling's identity philosophy that Hegel has in mind.[12] I will not dwell on this part of Hegel's analysis. Suffice it to say that Schelling's position is criticized and unceremoniously dismissed as the result of "fretting" over a pseudo-problem. Force and Understanding ends with the argument that the position reached with Hegel's proposed solution corresponds to the Fichtean version of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, i.e., the idea that the original unity of self-consciousness is an absolute I which reveals itself to itself as the ground of all reality.[13] At the end of Force and Understanding, the experience of consciousness has caught up with the beginning of the Copernican revolution in philosophy.

II. Hegel's "inverted world"

The inverted world is notorious among Hegel scholars for its obscurity.[14] It is called a "second supersensible world," and is supposed to be the inversion not of the world of appearances but of the first supersensible world.[15] In order to get closer to resolving the enigma of the inverted world, I suggest that we look first at its genesis. It arises through the just mentioned incorporation of duality or opposition into the first supersensible world. In other words, the inverted world is on the one hand the inversion of the first supersensible world, but on the other it contains the latter within itself.[16] As such it is at the same time the mirror image of the world of appearance, which exhibits the same dualism and contradiction, albeit in an unexplained, immediate fashion. Just like the first supersensible world, however, the inverted world is supposed to be the explanatory ground of the sensible world, and because it mirrors the latter it is both its duplicate *and* its ground, i.e., it has completely absorbed the sensible world into itself while at the same time supplying its foundation. Since the inversion now exists within the immanence of the second supersensible world, everything that is like itself in the first supersensible world is in truth unlike itself in the second and everything that is unlike itself in the first is in truth like itself in the second:

> Expressed in determinate moments, this means that what in the law of the first [supersensible] world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour,

> what in the former is black is, in the other, white. What in the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet is, in its other, supersensible in-itself [. . .], the south pole.[17]

If we consider that both supersensible worlds are not externally opposed but opposed within the immanence of one supersensible world or the in-itself, we can see the problem arising for the understanding. Since the first supersensible world was already the in-itself of the sensible world, the very essence of things has now become contradictory. Things are now endowed with *two* essential determinations that are polar opposites of one another. It is no use, Hegel argues, to distribute the "repelled differences" again and have them "shared afresh between two substances such as would support them and lend them a separate subsistence,"[18] for this would only mean a return to the previous opposition between the sensible and the (first) supersensible world, only now with an inverted *first* supersensible world. In that case, what would be a punishment in this world would actually be a blessing in the supersensible world, what would be black in this world would actually be white in the other and vice versa.[19] But clearly, a *just* punishment in this world would need to be a just punishment also in the other world. Otherwise, the supersensible world would become the caricature of the sensible world and we would be witnessing the satire of two comically inverted worlds. This, however, would no longer be the inverted world that resulted from the introduction of contradiction into the first supersensible world. The true inversion, Hegel suggests, consists in the fact that what is right in this world is the right of a wrong in *both* worlds, and what is wrong in that world is the wrong of a right also in this world. A crime, for instance, is the negation of itself across all possible worlds. It is not a crime in one world and an act of virtue in another. It carries its negation within itself as something that ought not to be and that is positively negated by its appropriate punishment. In Hegel's words,

> the crime, as regards its content, has its reflection-into-self, or its inversion, in the *actual* punishment; this is the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the crime. [And likewise], the *actual* punishment has its *inverted* actuality present in it in such a way that the punishment is an actualization of the law, whereby the activity exercised by the law as punishment *suspends itself,* and, from being active, the law becomes again quiescent and is vindicated, and the conflict of individuality with it, and of it with individuality, is extinguished.[20]

Wrongdoing, as Socrates pointed out, is *self-subverting*. It does not stand in any world. By causing trouble it also "asks for trouble" in the form of a just punishment and thus it ideally *undoes* again what it set out to do, i.e., it negates itself. Moreover, just punishment is another subversion of the conflict between the crime and the law and the reestablishment of the just order. In this way, punishment is the negation of the opposition between the criminal deed and the law brought about by the criminal deed itself.

Hegel's solution to the supposed dualism of the two essential but opposed characteristics within a single *per se* determination consists in pointing out that the inverted world implicitly contains its own inversion within itself. That is to say, "it is *for itself* the inverted world, i.e., the inversion of itself."[21] The impasse for the understanding arises from the fact that it does not recognize this inversion as internal to the inverted world. Instead, driven by the principle of noncontradiction, it takes refuge in "the sensuous idea of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element."[22] In other words, the understanding distributes the two opposed essences among two worlds, a first and a second supersensible world, so that the inverted world is inverted not for itself but only from the point of view of the first supersensible world (and thus remains external to it). If, however, Hegel can show that the inversion that for the understanding exists between the two opposed supersensible worlds actually already exists in the inverted world itself, the external opposition between the two supersensible worlds becomes redundant and falls away. The inverted world would then reveal itself as the *true* supersensible world, and, moreover, as one that contains the superseded sensible world within itself. It would then remain to be seen what happens to the contradiction within the one supersensible inverted world.

In approaching this solution, the first thing to remember is that an opposite that has an *inner* difference (like the positive pole of a magnet "hiding" a negative pole within itself) is not only the opposite of an *other* opposite (viz. the negative pole of the magnet) but is also the opposite of itself because it carries its opposite within itself. In a rare moment of generosity towards the struggling reader Hegel explains the logic of this otherness of the same by explicitly correcting a possible misunderstanding:

> in the difference which is an inner difference, the opposite is not merely *one of two*—if it were, it would simply *be,* without being an opposite—but it is the opposite of an opposite, or the other is itself immediately present in it. [Now the potential misunderstanding:] Certainly, I put the "opposite" here, and the "other" of which it is the opposite, there; the "opposite", then, is on one side, is in and for itself without the other

> [i.e. the two are essentially two separate things that are merely diverse, but are not opposed in their own nature]. [Correction of the potential misunderstanding:] But just because I have the "opposite" here in and for itself, it is the opposite of itself, or it has, in fact, the "other" immediately present in it.[23]

Something that is *essentially* opposed to an other—or is *defined* as an opposite, like the pole of a magnet must for that reason contain oppositeness or the *nature of being an opposite*, i.e., its own otherness within itself, or else it would just be something essentially unaffected by its opposition and merely accidentally opposed to something else; i.e., it would thus "simply *be*, without being an opposite." But if so, it must combine its being *this* thing with its being opposed to another thing. Surely, it could not just be oppositeness without being anything else since then there would not be two *different* opposites. Consequently, what is essentially the opposite of an other must be both itself as well as its own opposite. In other words, once we realize that the external opposite is an essential and not just an accidental opposite, we have included it in the first opposite (and vice versa). With this, the externality of the relationship between the two opposites falls away, and the external opposite becomes an internal opposite. However, the difference between the two opposites does not vanish for that matter. It is just as essential because the phenomenon only exists by virtue of this difference. Without it we would be relapsing into the atomic essentialism at the end of the chapter on Perception. As a result, Hegel can say that the relationship between the two opposites is such that

> their being is . . . to posit themselves as not-being and to suspend themselves in the unity. The two distinguished moments both subsist; they are *implicit* and are *opposites in themselves,* i.e. each is the opposite of itself; each has its "other" within it and they are only one unity.[24]

Moments that posit each other as different within a unity and at the same time mutually override their difference constitute for Hegel the core of the dialectic and the nature of the Concept or Notion.[25] The latter represents what Hegel understands by genuine reality, viz. ideality that is at the same time a reality and reality that is likewise ideality. Like the poles of the magnet, the sensible reality carries its opposite, ideality, within itself as a negation, but it is equally true that this inner ideality could not even exist without inhering in its opposite whose independence and separateness it also negates or makes ideal *(ideell)*. The embodied soul goes together with

an ensouled body. Neither the one nor the other can be absent without destroying the reality of the phenomenon. Outside their unity, both of them are abstractions and are no longer what they are within it.

Looking once more at the example of the crime and its punishment, we may be able better to understand the detail of the dialectic at work here. A crime is a wrong against a right, a violation of the proper order. On Hegel's analysis, the crime does not have its opposite, the right, outside it. If we were to look at things in that light, punishment of the crime would not be provoked by the crime itself but by external circumstances. Punishment would then be accidental to the crime, i.e., contingent or arbitrary. But the punishment is intrinsic to the crime itself and therefore necessary. In other words, the necessity of its negation is required by the crime itself as something that cannot stand. While the crime is being planned and committed it already harbors the opposite within itself that it tries to repel and evade. When the punishment comes, it comes as the *inversion* of the crime, not as its annihilation, since the deed that has been done cannot be undone.[26] The inversion consists in negating the pretense of the crime to have created not only a new positive (physical, material, emotional, or moral) *fact* but a *new reality*. To be sure, a fact was created by the crime, and the world was irrevocably changed. But because from its inception in the criminal's intention the crime already carries its negation within itself, these facts, "real" as they are, do not have the value of a true or genuine reality. Their factual reality, pernicious and painful as it may be, is ideally negated from the start. The crime is essentially its own opposite. Its existence is denied actuality from the start.

But the criminal deed is so far negated *only* ideally, not in reality. The crime *ought* not to have occurred, but it has. The ideality of this "ought" needs to be transformed into an "is." The punishment brings about this transformation, but not in an immediate manner, since clearly the punishment can never undo the crime. Thus, even where the damage is only material and full restitution is made in terms of monetary value, the immaterial value of the object for the owner cannot be matched because the original is either lost or damaged and its attachment value is irreplaceable. Hence, when the ideality of the "ought" is transformed into an "is," the resulting "is" is not just another state of affairs in the world. While the punishment certainly is a physical event just like the crime, its significance cannot be captured by its material effect. For one thing, the necessity of the punishment is not an external, mechanical necessity but an inevitability or fate. Hegel views it as the culmination of the general idea of lawfulness.[27] And for another, the punishment does not "pay back in kind."[28] It does not

literally do to the criminal what the criminal did to others, it only corrects the crime. It subverts the crime's claim to have posited a new reality, a new order of legitimacy.[29] It may sound surprising that a crime can even claim to institute a new legitimacy. But this is in fact the criminal's inner conviction. In his mind, the criminal is convinced that his crime rights a wrong. Here we can grasp with our hands the inversion that the crime represents in and of itself and that constitutes its very definition. In the mind of the criminal, the deed he contemplates or has done is the righting of an injustice that was supposedly done to him. This is obviously the *first inversion* (the original sin, so to speak) and at the same time a negation of the proper order (sc., of the first supersensible world). In terms of Hegel's argument, it is this inversion that represents the introduction of difference and contradiction into the first supersensible world (the tranquil reign of the law) and thus the appearance of an inverted world within the supersensible world. What is needed to right this wrong, to overcome the violation of justice, is an inversion of this first inversion.[30] This is brought about by the condemnation of the crime and the vindication of justice through punishment. The condemnation reestablishes or reaffirms the proper order, i.e., the reign of the law. But it does so not by annihilating the criminal deed nor by retaliating in kind. Instead, it *invalidates* the crime by negating its pretense of legitimacy. The inversion of the inversion represents the reaffirmation of the ideality of the proper order as the true reality. The criminal deed and its consequences are not undone as a result, nor is the punishment merely an act of retaliation. Instead, through the act of reaffirming the validity of the law, the condemnation and the punishment of the crime de-legitimize the crime in actuality. They thereby give reality to the ideal validity of the law (i.e., the ideal ought). It is the act of de-legitimizing the violation of the proper order that constitutes the "sublation" or "supersession" of a factual reality that nonetheless cannot be physically undone. This inversion of the inversion is for Hegel the nature of idealism broadly conceived. The evil deed that was done is not undone. It is invalidated through a real act with real consequences but an ideal *(ideell)* significance. Through the condemnation and punishment of the crime (i.e., the inversion of the first supersensible world) ideality, or the first supersensible world, (re-) establishes itself as the in-itself of the sensible world by way of the inversion of the inverted world.

The analysis of the dialectic of crime and punishment may explain why Hegel sees in life the image or a concrete manifestation of the inversion of the inversion and an expression of what in terms of the *Logic* he calls being-for-itself, infinity, or the (absolute) Notion. Generally speaking, life

has the paradoxical feature of recreating the difference between (physical) reality and (organic) ideality through negating it. It feeds on the nonidentity of self and other in order to convert both into their opposite and thus maintain itself as a universal. The difference is thus as necessary as is its supersession. But the difference must be understood, as Hegel emphasizes several times, as an "inner difference", i.e., a difference that is nondisruptive and subservient to the unity that contains it. It is through the incorporation of difference that something is genuinely self-determining. Moreover, it is important to realize that this interpretation of the concept of life only works, if the two "moments" within this self-differentiating, self-referential, self-replicating process are defined as essential opposites. Only then can the two aspects or factors be said to be both opposed and identical, i.e., to form an intrinsically determined, internally differentiated unity or whole. With the validation of this conceptual structure as real, Force and Understanding reaches a certain climax. Hegel's language accordingly celebrates the moment of the affirmation of the supersensible in the sensible world in a series of colorful metaphors:

> This simple infinity, or the absolute Notion [i.e., the right that has in principle eternally overcome its essential opposite], may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest.[31]

In more formal terms, Hegel repeats that this intrinsically determined, internally differentiated structure is accordingly a "relation-to-self" that is equally a "self-sundering", and a self-sundering that is equally "a pure, self-identical essence that has no difference in it."[32] The fact that the unity is a unity of opposites accounts for the self-sundering or difference while the fact that the opposites are essential or intrinsic opposites of each other is responsible for their unity. The dialectical triad that started with the first supersensible world has now reached its conclusion.

III. On *Aufhebung*

Let us now reflect on the question what all this means for the internal structure of the dialectic of *Aufhebung*. The major advance that occurs in Force and Understanding is the insight that the essential nature of the opposites

cannot be ignored. Both opposites are necessary, consequently they must both reside at the core of the supersensible world itself. It is one reality that originally, i.e., *ab ovo*, contains within itself the essential opposites, each of which carries its opposite within itself. However, this is logically possible only, if ultimately one of the two opposites prevails over the other. Hegel's requirement that we think antithesis within the antithesis thus concerns the single most important feature of Hegel's dialectic, i.e., the aspect of sublation or supersession *(Aufhebung)* of a contradiction, or the negation of negation. The solution to the inverted world paradox is precisely the point at which this logical move becomes thematic after having been operative from the start.

We can easily see why this contradiction is so hard for thinking to overcome. Thinking seems to be asked to embrace rather than reject the contradiction, a step that would have the meaning of violating the principle of noncontradiction. There should be no doubt, however, that a violation of that principle is out of the question, dialectic or no dialectic. It is precisely because two supersensible worlds within one world would constitute a violation of the principle of noncontradiction that the inverted world must itself again be inverted and thereby superseded in favor of one "universe of discourse" in which only one truth is valid.[33] Indeed, when Hegel seems to make fun of the understanding's mistaken attempts to unify these realities he is making fun of the violation of the principle of noncontradiction.[34] More importantly, however, if the two moments or aspects are both of equal value, the result will be the unceasing alternation of the true and the false. But as we saw in Hegel's example of the self-sublation of the criminal act, crime is never true nor is the just ever wrong. Crime only pretends to be a valid reality, but this pretense is undermined even before the crime has been committed. On the other hand, it is difficult to think of a reality in which crime would be completely absent. Hence the reality of the negation of justice cannot be ignored, it must be accepted as more than a contingent matter. As we see, then, supersession cannot mean to grant equal validity to both opposites within the unified reality. Instead, one of the opposites must be assumed to be more essential than the other. It will be the "normal" or dominant one, while the other is a noncontingent but less essential disturbance or violation of this normality. Even the best of all possible worlds necessarily contains evil, and yet evil must not prevail. In the terms of our example, justice must be assumed to gain the upper hand *as a rule*. Hegel's standard formula to express this insight is to say that the sublation represents the truth of the earlier contradiction. It remains nonetheless true that without this disturbance there would be no normality,

just as it remains empirically true that the disturbance may contingently become disruptive such that we relapse into earlier contradictions. The latter observation also means that Hegel's dialectic is not downward compatible, so to speak, only upward compatible. Contradictions are not eliminated at the lower level even though by them we are logically compelled to move on to their supersession. In a context in which crime is not considered inherently invalid justice becomes retributive, i.e., the criminal deed is just as valid or invalid as the retaliation against it depending on the point of view, and the latter does not have the meaning of a sublation of the former.

It is true that Hegel's language occasionally seems to suggest the equipollence of both opposites in a synthesis, as if identity contains difference just as much as difference contains identity:

> The different moments of *self-sundering* and of *becoming self-identical* are . . . only this movement of *self-suppression;* for since the self-identical . . . is an abstraction or is *already itself* a sundered moment, its self-sundering is therefore a supersession of what it is, and therefore the supersession of its dividedness. Its *becoming self-identical* is equally a self-sundering; what becomes identical with itself thereby opposes itself to its self-sundering, i.e. it thereby puts itself on one side, or rather it *becomes* a *sundered moment.*[35]

From this comment it would seem that to be self-identical is to be self-sundering and, "equally", to be self-sundering is to be identical. It is clear, however, that the contradiction between identity and opposition, or same and other, can be contained only, if the moment of *identity* is stronger than that of opposition, for otherwise we would either remain stuck in the "dialectical see-saw" of an interminable back and forth without resolution or the unity would dissolve altogether. If, to speak metaphorically, the positive pole of the magnet is to attract its external negative pole, it must "hide" or dominate the internal negative pole it carries within itself. Nor can the internal opposite of a magnet be neutralized by the dominant pole, for then the magnet would be demagnetized, i.e., no longer be a magnet. Consequently, the internal opposite is (a) attracted, (b) repelled, and (c) dominated by its opposite. In short, it is subordinate. While (a) and (b) are symmetrical reciprocal relationships, (c) contains an asymmetry. In other words, the two "moments" of the dialectical unity (identity and difference, same and other, attraction and repulsion, positive and negative, etc.) are not of equal logical force.

One of the classical loci for studying the meaning of supersession or *Aufhebung*, i.e., the inclusion of the other in the same, is Hegel's discussion of genuine infinity in the *Logic* as a unity of the finite and the infinite.[36] Thus Hegel says that in the unity of the finite and the infinite

> there is revealed the specific nature of speculative thought, which consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their unity. Each moment actually shows that it contains its opposite within itself and that in this opposite it is united with itself; thus the affirmative truth is this immanently active unity . . . —the relation to self which is not immediate but infinite.[37]

Here, too, it might at first seem as if the finite and the infinite are two moments of equal right and force.[38] It is, after all, customary to explain the third stage of Hegel's dialectical triad of immediacy, opposition, or determinate negation, and negation of negation as the combination of the two preceding opposites. However, this way of portraying what Hegel means by supersession or *Aufhebung* leaves the crucial thing unsaid, as the following passage from the *Encyclopaedia* makes clear. Having demonstrated the "nullity of the antithesis set up by the understanding between the finite and the infinite"[39] Hegel continues that one might now

> easily fall back upon the expression that the finite and the infinite are therefore *One,* that the True, or genuine Infinity, is determined and expressed as the *unity* of the infinite and the finite.[40]

While such an expression would no doubt "contain something correct," it would, however, only represent one side of the truth and therefore be "misleading and false."[41] Consequently, Hegel continues that

> in the above expression ("The Infinite is the *unity* of the infinite and the finite") the finite appears to be left as it was; it is not explicitly expressed as *sublated.*—Or, if we were to reflect on the fact that the finite, when posited as one with the infinite, could surely not remain what it was outside of this unity . . ., then the same would happen to the infinite, which as the negative . . . would . . . also be blunted upon the other . . . But the genuine Infinite . . . preserves itself; the negation of the negation is not a neutralization; the Infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is sublated. (Ibid)

The detailed discussion of the dialectic at the end of the *Science of Logic* contains just a hint of this internal structure of the superseded opposite. Referring to the negation of negation as "the negative," which is also the "turning point of the method" and a "self-superseding contradiction," Hegel comments:

> The negative appears as the *mediating* element, since it includes within it itself and the immediate whose negation it is.[42]

In other words, the negative as negation of negation becomes the new immediacy that contains the first immediacy as well as itself. The second negation is asymmetrically the *unity* of itself and its opposite. The second negation that negates the first immediacy (which is already "*implicitly* the negative", i.e., itself its opposite, but only implicitly, not yet explicitly[43]) is both second moment *and* the unity of the first and the second moment.[44] This asymmetrical situation in which the second moment is both moment and unity of itself and its other accounts for the dominance of the second moment, the fact that it is not equipollent but "stronger" than the first. It also suggests that there is little hope of ever formalizing Hegel's dialectic with the tools of contemporary logic, since in Hegel's dialectical unity one of the two essential moments is more essential than the other. I submit that this is how Hegel avoids the violation of the principle of noncontradiction.

And yet, what I have said so far is still inadequate to count as a correct construal of the structure of the dialectic. As we know from Hegel's actual dialectical transitions, the second moment that becomes the unity of itself and its opposite is not identical with the second moment as it is initially posited. In other words, the second moment that originally emerges as the opposite of the first immediacy is *not synonymous* with the second moment that forms part of the new dialectical unity. For instance, the true or genuine infinite that is both the unity of the finite and the infinite, is not synonymous with the spurious or "bad" infinite that is initially opposed to the finite. This must mean that the second moment undergoes a transformation from being an immediate opposite or a mere other to being an other that is mediated by the first and then, in a reflexive turn, incorporates the first. The other of the something must change from being merely another something to being the otherness of the something, i.e., of itself; the infinite must change from being merely an endless repetition of the finite to being a genuine infinite; the inverted world must change from being a mere counterworld of the first supersensible world to being the inner truth

of the world of appearances. Only in virtue of this transformation of the second moment can the required synonymy between the second moment and the new unity be achieved.

Fortunately, Hegel seems in fact to confirm our stipulation not only through the actual dialectical transitions, but also in his discussion of the dialectical method towards the end of the *Science of Logic*. The second moment, he comments, may be regarded as "a simple determination" at first, but in its truth it is a *relation* or *relationship*; for it is the negative, *but the negative of the positive*, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent [as when first posited as a "simple determination", K.B.] . . . —rather it is the *other in its own self,* the *other of an other*; therefore it includes *its* own other within it and is consequently *as contradiction,* the *posited dialectic of itself.*[45]

Here we see the transformation of what is initially a mere opposite (e.g., the spurious infinite) into an infinite that contains the finite within itself and that in virtue of what is now an *internal* contradiction, i.e., internal to the infinite, becomes the genuine infinite and thus the unifying third moment. Because at this stage the second moment includes the first within itself, its dialectic "consists in positing the *unity* that is contained in it."[46] The positing of this unity is apparently what Hegel means by apprehending "the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the *affirmative* that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition."[47]

Notes

[1] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, §151, p. 92; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 5, p. 92.

[2] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §152, p. 92; *Werke*, 3, p. 122.

[3] It was reported not too long ago that scientists have apparently managed artificially to isolate one magnetic pole. I am not competent to judge whether this invalidates the traditional belief in the inseparability of the polar opposites or whether the isolated pole is in fact a so-called monopole that can still be called magnetic.

[4] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §157, p. 96; *Werke*, 3, 128; §161, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 131.

[5] Cf., Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §160, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 130.

[6] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §156, p. 96; *Werke*, 3, 126–127.

[7] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§155, p. 95; *Werke*, 3, 126.

[8] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §157, p. 96; *Werke*, 3, 127.

[9] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §157, p. 97; *Werke*, 3, 128.

[10] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§157–159, pp. 96–98; *Werke*, 3, 127–130.

[11] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§160–162, pp. 98–101; *Werke*, 3, 130–133.

[12] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §162, pp. 100–101; *Werke*, 3, 132–133. See also Gustav-H. Falke, *Begriffene Geschichte. Das historische Substrat und die systematische Anordnung der Bewußtseinsgestalten in Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes." Interpretation und Kommentar*, Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 1996, pp.125–130.

[13] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §164–165, pp. 101–103; *Werke*, 3, 134–136.

[14] Gadamer's account seems to me to be the least persuasive: see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies*, translated and with an Introduction by C. P. Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. For a more recent treatment and comments on other interpretations see Henry S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*. Vol. I: *The Pilgrimage of Reason*. Vol. II: *The Odyssey of Spirit*. Indianapolis-Cambridge: Hackett, 1997, here vol. I, pp. 294–300, and footnotes 38–43.

[15] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §157, p. 96; *Werke*, 3, 128.

[16] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §160, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 131: ". . . the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched the other [sc. supersensible] world and has it within it . . . ." Hegel rejects the view that the opposition between the first supersensible world and the inverted world is only external, as if the first supersensible world were now a world of appearance and the inverted world contained the true 'in-itself' of the first supersensible world: "Looked at superficially, this inverted world is the opposite of the first [sc. supersensible world] in the sense that it has the latter outside of it and repels that world from itself as an inverted *actual world:* that the one is appearance, but the other the in-itself . . ." (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §159, p. 97; *Werke*, 3, 129). If this were the case, duality and contradiction would not yet have *entered into* the supersensible world. We would just have produced an inverted version of the sensible world, i.e., a caricature (see below).

[17] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §158, p. 97; *Werke*, 3, 128. As an interpretive addendum Miller's translation puts "viz. in the earth" in the bracketed space above. This may be misleading since the reference is not to the sensible but the first supersensible world.

[18] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §159, p. 98; *Werke*, 3, 129.

[19] The play by Ludwig Tieck entitled *Die verkehrte Welt* ("The Inverted World") published in 1800, which is often cited as the model for Hegel's discussion obviously represents an inversion of the sensible world, not of the supersensible world, and is thus merely a version of the caricature of Hegel's inverted supersensible world (the play begins with a "symphony," the prologue is spoken by the Epilogue, the actors want to be spectators, the spectators want to rewrite the play etc. etc.). The correct interpretation and resolution of the conflict within the supersensible world is laid out in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§160–162, which also contains a reference to Schelling's principle of indifference and rejects it, not because it represents a caricature à la Tieck, but because it offers a mistaken solution to the conflict within the inverted supersensible world (§162). A superb example of such an inverted world (and perhaps a much better one than the play by Tieck) is Molière's *Amphytrion*, a firework of paradoxical inversions of identity especially in the character of Sosias. Marivaux is also particularly good at this. Generally speaking, the era of the French enlightenment is full of plays of

mistaken and inverted identities, often coupled with change of gender. Other examples of such inverted duplications of reality such as Mozart's *Così fan tutte* could easily be added to the list.

[20] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §159, p. 98; *Werke*, 3, 130.

[21] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §160, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 131.

[22] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §160, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 131

[23] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §160, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 130–131.

[24] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §161, pp. 99–100; *Werke*, 3, 131–132.

[25] Cf. what Hegel says about the turning point in the dialectic in Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 836; *Werke*, 6, 564.

[26] Cf. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §97: "The violation of the right *qua* right that has occurred exists, to be sure, positively, as an external fact which, however, is null and void in itself."

[27] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §161, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 131.

[28] Or if it did it would be revenge, not punishment. Revenge is the futile attempt to undo a crime. See Hegel's discussion of revenge and punishment in Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §§97–103. Hegel had worked out his understanding of the self-subversive nature of the crime already during his time as headmaster in Nürnberg: see *Nürnberger Schriften*, in *Werke*, 4, 242–244.

[29] See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. A.V. Miller, with Foreword by J.N. Findlay, Oxford, 1971, §500: In the criminal deed "the agent . . . sets up a law—a law, however, which is nominal and recognized by him only—a universal which holds good *for him*, and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action."

[30] Cf. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §97 *Addition:* "The criminal act is not a first, something positive, to which the punishment is joined as a negation; rather, it is something negative, such that the punishment is only the negation of a negation."

[31] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §162, p. 100; *Werke*, 3, 132.

[32] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §162, p. 100.

[33] I am largely in agreement with Robert Pippin's construal of the dialectic ("Hegel's Metaphysics and the Problem of Contradiction," in Jon Stewart, ed., *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 239–252.) and his attempt to show that Hegel does not violate PNC (pp. 249–250). For other explanations of why Hegel employs but does not violate PNC see Klaus Hartmann, "Zur neuesten Dialektikkritik," in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 55 (1973), pp. 220–242, and Dieter Wandschneider, *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik. Rekonstruktion und Revision dialektischer Kategorienentwicklung in Hegels, "Wissenschaft der Logik."* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 1995. Hartmann's explanation of the second negation as a limitative negation has been neglected and should be rediscovered and discussed. I also find Robert Hanna's interpretation of the dialectic very helpful and persuasive (see Robert Hanna, "From an Ontological Point of View: Hegel's Critique of the Common Logic," in Jon Stewart, ed., *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 253–281). Recently, Robert Brandom has also sided with those who argue

that Hegel uses but does not violate the principle of noncontradiction (see Robert Brandom, "*Holism and Idealism in Hegel's Phenomenology*," *Hegel-Studien*, 36 (2001), pp. 57–92, here p. 59).

[34] To this extent the argument in the inverted world episode is indeed a *reductio*, as Joseph C. Flay has argued, but it is only one part of the argument, one of the two red herrings that should not be pursued, the other being Schelling's principle of indifference (see Joseph Flay, "Hegel's Inverted World," in *The Review of Metaphysics* 23 (1970), pp. 662–678). To that extent, Siep's comment on Flay (Ludwig Siep, *Der Weg der "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Ein einführender Kommentar zu Hegels "Differenzschrift" und "Phänomenologie des Geistes,"* Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000, p. 95, footnote 16) would need to be amended. See also Flay's comments on a number of other interpretations in Joseph Flay, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984, pp. 296–297, footnote 41.

[35] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §162, p. 100–101; *Werke*, 3, 133.

[36] See Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 143–152 (*Werke*, 5, 156–168) for *Aufhebung* at work, so to speak. The other classical case study for *Aufhebung* in Hegel is the dialectic of something and an other (*Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 117–122; *Werke*, 5, 125–131. Hegel comments explicitly on *Aufhebung* at *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 106–108 (*Werke*, 5, 113–115) in connection with the superseding of Becoming. But neither of these passages clearly delineates the exact structure of the unity of the superseded moments.

[37] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 152; *Werke*, 5, 168.

[38] This is suggested by the language in *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 151–152 (*Werke*, 5, 167–168) where Hegel seems to focus entirely on the equipollence of the two moments again. We will see presently that this impression is corrected by passages such as the one in the Remark to Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. §95.

[39] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §95 R, p. 151.

[40] Ibid., §95, p. 152.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 836; *Werke*, 6, 564.

[43] Cf. *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 835; *Werke*, 6, 563.

[44] It is the identity of identity and difference in Hegel's well-known formula.

[45] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 835; *Werke*, 6, 563.

[46] H*egel's Science of Logic*, p. 835.

[47] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §82.

Chapter 7

Skepticism, Modernity, and the Origins of Hegelian Dialectic

Allen Speight

There is little question that Hegel saw a significant philosophical connection between his conceptions of dialectic and skepticism: as he says in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* "the relation of skepticism to philosophy is . . . that the former is the dialectic of all that is determinate."[1] Among Hegel's interpreters, however, there is less consensus on the question of precisely *what concern* with skepticism was most animating for the development of his dialectic. Recent work on Hegel's epistemology has undertaken from two important historical sides an investigation into the significance of skepticism for the origin of the distinctive Hegelian notion of the dialectic. On the one hand, Hegel's valorization of ancient Pyrrhonist skepticism—as opposed to the modern skeptical modes associated particularly with the epistemological approaches of Hume and Descartes—has been explored, leading to an understanding of the vital function which the ancient notion of equipollence played in the development of Hegel's mature system. On the other hand, Hegel's pursuit of skeptical concerns stemming from Kant's critical project has been examined with an eye on how Hegel is to be construed as engaged in a successor form of Kant's transcendental procedure.

Each of these approaches gives Hegel a distinctive place within the tradition of philosophical responses to skepticism, but the connection between them has remained an important source of debate in contemporary research in the field. Hegel himself of course clearly acknowledged the importance of *both* historical antecedents: thus, on the one hand, he derives the notion of dialectic from Plato and the skeptical schools that were heirs to his philosophical approach, the Pyrrhonists and Academics; on the other hand, he insists that the modern resurrection of the notion of dialectic can be attributed to Kant and his employment of antinomies.[2] But the philosophical question of how Hegel's philosophy should be viewed in relation to skeptical challenge—whether the Hegelian dialectic should be seen

ultimately as *refuting*, *incorporating*, or somehow allowing us to *ignore* skepticism altogether—remains a central point of discussion among Hegel scholars.

In what follows, I examine the relation between dialectic and skepticism as it emerges in Hegel's thought first (section I) by exploring a perhaps initially puzzling claim that runs through much of Hegel's writing about skepticism, from his very earliest essays to the mature *Logic*: that genuine skepticism should not be understood primarily as engaged in the activity of *doubt*—at least if one means by doubting a temporary suspension of belief. Hegel understands his own engagement with skepticism instead to require ultimately the more comprehensive elements of what comes to be his dialectical approach, as for example, in his well-known claim in the "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the task is to effect a "thoroughgoing" or (more literally translated) 'self-completing skepticism' (*sich vollbringende*[*r*] *Skeptizismus*).[3] In order to examine Hegel's claim for this more thorough kind of skeptical engagement (section II), I look at Hegel's exploration of skepticism in his early Jena essay on the *Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy*, which has been at the center of a number of reinterpretive studies over the past 20 years that have emphasized anew the importance and sharpness of Hegel's engagement with epistemological questions. Central to these issues for all of the new reinterpretations of Hegel's epistemology is the status of what Hegel variously calls the "ordinary understanding" (*der gemeine Verstand*), "common human understanding" (*der gemeine Menschenverstand*), or "ordinary consciousness" (*das gemeine Bewußtsein*).[4] Is skepticism's challenge on Hegel's view one which is ultimately reactionary or revolutionary with respect to ordinary belief? And does he envision philosophy's engagement with skepticism as one which opens up an essential gulf between ordinary thought and philosophy, or one which, in a more Wittgensteinian manner, allows therapeutically for some return to ordinary thought? John McDowell, for example, has recently claimed that Hegel's vision is to avoid the pitfalls associated with philosophical attempts to address the panic such skeptical worries can induce and instead to offer "a clear-sighted awareness of groundlessness, bringing with it the understanding that *all* such attempts at grounding are misguided."[5] I suggest in section III of this essay a way of looking at the relation among skepticism, philosophy, and ordinary belief in Hegel that takes into account a distinctive anxiety associated with modernity and places that anxiety in the context of the ultimate historical work of the dialectic—a context which has sometimes gone missing in contemporary readings of Hegel's attitude toward skepticism.

I. Beyond "doubt": Framing Hegel's Jena encounter with skepticism

If a skeptic is often thought, by philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, to be primarily someone who *doubts* things, it is indeed remarkable that Hegel repeatedly insists in his major discussions of skepticism throughout his career that the real skeptical challenge to philosophy must be understood in another way. Hegel's claim about the importance of "thoroughgoing" or "self-completing skepticism" in contrast with "mere" doubting emerges perhaps most clearly in the context of the methodological discussion in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*:[6]

> The road can . . . be regarded as the pathway of *doubt* [*Zweifel*], or more precisely as the way of *despair* [*Verzweiflung*]. For what happens on it is not what is ordinarily understood when the word "doubt" is used: shilly-shallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to that truth again, after the doubt has been appropriately dispelled—so that at the end of the process the matter is taken to be what it was in the first place. On the contrary, this path is the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, for which the supreme reality is what is in truth only the unrealized Notion. Therefore this self-completing skepticism [*dieser sich vollbringende Skeptizismus*] is also not the skepticism which an earnest zeal for truth and Science fancies it has prepared and equipped itself in their service: the intention [*Vorsatz*] in Science not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, upon mere authority, but to examine everything for oneself and follow only one's own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself, and accept only one's own deed as what is true.

Most of Hegel's readers would probably agree that the notion of a "self-completing skepticism," effected over the long process of a "way of despair," offers a useful window onto what Hegel might mean by dialectic and how the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, at least, is dialectically structured. Within recent Hegelian scholarship, there has also certainly been substantial agreement from a number of philosophical perspectives that the epistemological project Hegel outlines in his description of this "self-completing skepticism" represents a significant challenge to Cartesian attempts to offer a philosophical response to skepticism. Thus, despite their philosophical and interpretive differences as readers of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Michael Forster, Robert Pippin, and Robert Brandom have all stressed in different ways the *non-Cartesian* approach to epistemology that Hegel offers in the *Phenomenology*.[7]

What is Hegel offering instead? To begin with, the imagery of this passage suggests a contrast between a form of immediate testing and a more involved methodological procedure. Hegel's term "shilly-shallying" for the momentary form of testing that he associates with the Cartesian meditations is literally a sort of *shaking* or *jolting* of something that is putatively regarded as true (*ein Rütteln an dieser oder jener vermeinten Wahrheit*). Suspension of doubt under such circumstances can provide no real immunization against the skeptic, in Hegel's view; only the more complete or thoroughgoing skeptical approach that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* sets in motion can offer the sort of invulnerability that is needed—a distinction which Hegel carefully returns to not only in the unfolding shapes of consciousness in the *PhG*, but in the later systematic context of discussions of skepticism and dialectic.[8]

Behind this "thoroughgoing" skeptical method lie several important commitments that will deserve attention in the discussion of Hegelian dialectic's connection to skepticism: (1) that finite claims of cognition encounter *instability* or opposition; (2) that such opposition can be employed methodically, toward a *comprehensive* stance in opposition to any such finite claim; and (3) that such a method could be "presuppositionless" in allowing each of these moments to articulate a *self-contradiction* without the imposition of some external criterion. It has been recently argued that the first of these commitments employs something very like the ancient skeptical practice of *equipollence*; the second and third commitments, while representing a clear further Hegelian development beyond ancient skepticism, nonetheless may be interestingly compared to it.[9] It is now widely acknowledged in the scholarly literature that an important background for these commitments of the *Phenomenology* can be found in Hegel's earlier Jena writing, particularly an essay which Hegel devoted precisely to the issue of the relation between ancient and modern skepticism. While this early essay comes from a developmentally distinct period in Hegel's philosophical life and therefore (as will be seen) differs in crucial respects from the *Phenomenology* in its account of the relation between philosophy and skepticism, it nonetheless offers an essential window onto the *Phenomenology* and Hegel's emerging account of the relation between ancient and modern skepticism.

II. Origins of dialectic in Hegel's early engagement with ancient and modern skepticism

Hegel's essay *The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy* (more fully: *The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy: Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One*) appeared in March

1802 as a review article in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* that Hegel had begun coediting with his friend Schelling. Hegel's point of attack in this essay is Gottlob Ernst Schulze's 1801 *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy*, which continued the putatively skeptical assault Schulze had launched against the defenders of the critical philosophy in his work *Aenesidemus*, which had been published nine years earlier.[10] The primary issue, as Hegel frames it in the title of the 1802 essay, is precisely one of *relation*: the relationship between skepticism and philosophy, as Hegel argues, is not (as Schulze has articulated it) a relationship between skepticism and *dogmatism*—between, that is, competing claims of *doubt* and *certainty*—but rather: "skepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy, and hence that there is a philosophy which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once."[11]

The connection between this early discussion of philosophy's relation to skepticism and the *Phenomenology*'s "self-completing skepticism" can be quickly seen in the sharp distinction Hegel draws between ancient forms of skepticism and Schulze's "modern" skepticism. In the context of that distinction, Hegel makes an early use of exactly the distinction between "doubt" and more thoroughgoing skepticism that he employs in the *Phenomenology*: here, Hegel claims, the very term "doubt" (*Zweifel*) used in connection with ancient skepticism is "always awkward and inappropriate" (*schief und unpassend*) and a "*more perfect and self-sustaining document and system of genuine skepticism*" can be found in the ancient world—particularly, thinks Hegel, in a dialogue like Plato's *Parmenides*, because it

> embraces the whole domain of that knowledge through concepts of understanding, and destroys it. This Platonic skepticism is *not concerned with doubting* these truths of the understanding which cognizes things as manifold, as wholes consisting of parts, or with coming to be and passing away, multiplicity, similarity, etc., and which makes objective assertions of that kind; rather it is intent on *the complete denial of all truth to this sort of cognition*. This skepticism does not constitute a particular thing in a system, but it is itself the negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly presupposes Reason as the positive side . . . This skepticism that comes on the scene in its pure *explicit* shape in the *Parmenides* can, however, be found *implicit* in every genuine philosophical system; for it is the free side of every philosophy . . .[12]

In developing this contrast between Schulze's modern skepticism and the ancient skeptical approach of Plato or the Pyrrhonists, Hegel makes clear

why Schulze's skepticism is not deserving of the name: whereas the ancient Pyrrhonists, for example, used the method of equipollence (*isosthenia*, the placing of equally-weighted claims in opposition to one another) to avoid an assertion or conviction, Schulze's putative skepticism defends the convictions (*Überzeugungen*) associated with immediate empirical experience:

> For this [ancient] skepticism it is not a matter of a conviction [*Überzeugung*] of [the existence of] things and of their properties. The criterion of skepticism, as Sextus expresses it, is what appears (*phainomenon*), by which we, in fact, understand its appearance (*phantasian auto*) hence the subjective; for since it [the appearance] lies in the conviction (*peisei* ["in being persuaded"], but not a persuasion of [the existence of] a thing) and in an involuntary being affected [*einem unwillkürlichen Affiziertsein*], there is no room for inquiry; it is *azētētos* [not to be inquired into] . . .[13]

The roots of the first of the three moments we emphasized above can be clearly seen in Hegel's interpretation of ancient skepticism: the ancient skeptical practice of *equipollence* was precisely a way of exploring the instability of finite claims. But it is not entirely clear how Hegel's critique of Schulze and the broader contrast between ancient and modern skepticism—with its valorizing of the Pyrrhonist's method of equipollence and "life by appearances" in order to achieve freedom from disturbance (*ataraxia*, or peace of mind)—should be construed. For while there has been substantial agreement, as we noticed earlier, about the generally non-Cartesian character of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*'s engagement with skepticism and of the underlying importance of skepticism in shaping the resulting notion of dialectic, there is still considerable disagreement about how to read the significance of Hegel's earlier contrast between ancient and modern skepticism in the *Skepticism* essay. I briefly look at three lines of interpretive response to these questions that have emerged in recent scholarship.

(i) Michael Forster, whose 1989 *Hegel and Skepticism* in many ways marks the emergence (especially among anglophone readers of Hegel) of renewed recent interest in Hegel's early *Skepticism* essay, reads Schulze as a figure who embodies for Hegel the modern skeptical approaches of Descartes and Hume. What characterizes the Cartesian and Humean approaches to skepticism as distinctively modern, in Forster's view, is their reliance on a notion of "problematic" as opposed to "methodological"

interest in skeptical query: "[t]ypically, the modern skeptic's specific problems concern the legitimacy of proceeding from claims about a certain kind of subject matter, the knowledge of which is assumed to be absolutely or relatively unproblematic" (of particular importance here is the putative certainty associated with one's own mental states alleged by "veil of perception" skeptics) "to claims about a second kind of subject matter which is not felt to be unproblematic in the same way" (for the "veil of perception" skeptics, claims about the external world).[14] By contrast, the ancient skeptic's method of equipollence is "a method in the sense of being a quite general procedure for attacking claims or beliefs regardless of their content."[15]

(ii) Paul Franks objects to Forster's reading that Schulze was not in fact a "veil of perception" skeptic, but rather a kind of "direct realist." On Franks' view, what Hegel means to attack in Schulze is a claim at once of post-Kantian naturalism (in his "common sense" defense of "facts of consciousness" as grounding sciences like physics or astronomy) and of post-Jacobian foundationalism (in his resort to the immediate, a move which Jacobi also makes as a way to avoid the problems of nihilism that Jacobi saw inherent in Spinozistic naturalism).[16] The appeal of Franks' account is that it finds some evidence for the motivation behind Hegel's notion of dialectic in the *desideratum* of a *nonnaturalistic* philosophical method that might avoid the mechanical and reductive worldview that Jacobi saw with horror in Spinoza (and, in an "inverted" way, in Fichte's subjectivism). Thus it takes into account an important element that can be otherwise ignored in a focus on Hegel's interest in Pyrrhonist *ataraxia*: the sense of skepticism as a mode of "complete denial" of or "despair" over the finite claims of cognition, which, as we saw, was important to Hegel's characterization of the ultimate dialectical path of the *Phenomenology*.[17]

(iii) More recently, William Bristow in *Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique* has been concerned to show what differences start to emerge during Hegel's development between the time of the early *Skepticism* essay and the time of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Bristow reads Hegel's Schulze as a "stand-in primarily for the skepticism of Kantian critique in relation to metaphysics."[18] Bristow is especially concerned to give an account of the significant shift that Hegel's thought underwent in Jena between the 1802 essay and the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*—a shift that, as most interpreters now acknowledge, involves a renewed engagement with a more Kantian/Fichtean line of philosophical thought.[19]

Although each of these three interpretations catches an important strand of the importance of skepticism in Hegel's development, they do not go far enough for our purposes in addressing sufficiently the issue of *dialectic*'s origin. Partly what is at issue (given the important differences in Hegel's developing view of philosophical method between 1802 and 1807) is that Hegel does not yet in the *Skepticism* essay explicitly put forward a notion of "dialectic"—in fact, there is only one initial published reference to "dialectic" in the early Jena years, in the *Natural Law* essay, published in November/December 1802.[20] More broadly, however, there is a *practical*—as opposed to a merely epistemological—inflection in all of Hegel's writing on skepticism (from the Jena essay through the *Phenomenology* to the Berlin lectures) that is not always captured in this discussion and that is required if we are to make sense of some of Hegel's later appropriations of ancient skepticism—not only Skepticism as a shape of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, which of course emerges precisely in the wake of the master/slave dialectic and is said to be "the actual experience of what the *freedom of thought* is," but also the later claims of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, where (despite Hegel's 1802 *opposition* between ancient skeptical *ataraxia* and modern skeptical *certainty*) the skeptic is now said to be "*certain* of all untruth" and "*certain of itself*."[21] The practical or normative dimension of Hegel's stress on the skeptic's freedom and self-certainty are related to further questions about the *historical* context in which claims about skepticism, philosophy, and ordinary consciousness are made.[22] I turn now to these issues.

III. The practical, the historical, and ordinary consciousness

The notion of "perfect" (genuine, complete, thoroughgoing) skepticism in fact played a significant role for many figures in post-Kantian philosophy.[23] Schulze was not the only one who had construed the importance of the critical philosophy in terms of the challenge of skepticism, nor even the only contemporary to make a significant appeal to ancient skepticism as a point of contrast or resource.[24] Both Hegel's friend Immanuel Niethammer, and Friedrich Schlegel, had translated Sextus Empiricus, and the first genuinely critical (not merely tendentious) history of skepticism, Carl Friedrich Stäudlin's *Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus*, had appeared in 1794.[25]

It is important to mention Stäudlin in this context, not only for the general achievement that his *History* represents and for the direct influence

he clearly had on Hegel's essay on *Skepticism*,[26] but also as a piece of documentary evidence that the way in which Hegel takes up ancient skepticism may not be as entirely precedent-setting as one may think. In fact, there appear to be a number of commonalities between Stäudlin's treatment of skepticism and Hegel's, just as there are commonalities in their intellectual, cultural, and religious backgrounds.[27] As Klaus Vieweg has noted, both Stäudlin and Hegel are particularly interested in the question of what should count as "genuine" skepticism—and hence whether there is something that could be regarded as "philosophical skepticism." Both also highlight the difference between ancient and modern (*neuere*) skepticism, while privileging the former, and likewise stress the importance of the ancient Pyrrhonist skeptic's method of equipollence or *isosthenia* as well as the importance of the ultimate goal of *ataraxia*, or freedom from disturbance, achieved as a result of that method. Stäudlin also very much agrees with Hegel's contrasting assessments of the "new" and the "old" Aenesidemuses[28] and, what is especially important for our purposes, seems to employ (though with an ultimately different inflection and purpose) the distinction Hegel makes in the *Phenomenology* between *Zweifel* and *Verzweiflung*. The passage is worth citing: "A perfect [*vollkommener*] condition of doubt [*Zweifel*] is not possible in the human soul—in fact a higher degree of it often comes closer either to the condition of faith and acceptance or turns into despair [*Verzweiflung*], madness [*Wahnsinn*], and sometimes suicide [*Selbstmord*]."[29]

What is the importance of this roughly contemporary connection between doubt and despair in two diverse thinkers as Stäudlin and Hegel who nonetheless share a number of common perspectives on the question of skepticism? Stäudlin—whose prodigious historiographical output happens also to include not coincidentally a history of suicide[30]—makes use of the relation as part of a general cultural and philosophical diagnosis of the dangers of skepticism and a defense of a more "moderate" skeptical stance. By contrast, Hegel makes use of the distinction between doubt and despair to insist that a radicalization of skeptical experience is in fact required.

Yet despite their different senses of how radical one can actually *be* as a skeptic, what Stäudlin and Hegel share in the most general terms is a vital, seemingly new, interest in the problem of the *history* of skepticism as such. Stäudlin, as Richard Popkin has put it, sees the history of philosophy as "the dialectic between skepticism and the dogmatic attempts to answer skepticism":[31] on his view, it is skepticism's provocation of dogmatic positions which provides the energy for the history of philosophy, and the most

threatening of skepticism's challenges historically is not ancient skeptical ataraxia but what Richard Bernstein has called the more existentially frightening experience of modern skepticism.[32] Hegel's own ultimate treatment of skepticism's place in the history of philosophy has a somewhat different character; as we have noted, the official story of the early *Skepticism* essay is that the more thoroughgoing form of skepticism is ancient, not modern. But there is something about the sense of existential anxiety or despair in the accounts in Popkin, Bernstein, and Stäudlin that is indeed relevant for Hegel's account of skepticism, both in the early essay and later in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—an element touched on in Franks' appeal to Jacobian nihilism, but one which I will interpret in a slightly different fashion in the light of the historical significance of the problems of skepticism.

Hegel actually seems to have amalgamated *two* problems together in the notion of "thoroughgoing" skepticism and a "pathway of despair": what makes a *radical* or *complete* or *genuine* skepticism is on the one hand a matter of how ordinary consciousness is related to it—and in that sense, as Forster has framed the issue, Hegel sees in the ancient skeptics allies who are concerned with a much more radical posture than modern skepticism, which wants in the end to stick with certain claims of ordinary belief. The ancient skeptics are thus revolutionaries in the face of ordinary belief, not reactionaries.[33] On the other hand, however, it is a question not merely of the preservation of ordinary belief in the face of skeptical query but what Bristow has called a more general *threat against finitude itself*—and the more existentially anxious concerns involved with this issue have to be acknowledged as distinctively *modern* rather than ancient.

Forster has recently offered an interesting qualification to his reading of the ancient skeptics, suggesting that while the "revolutionary" picture of ancient skepticism is in the main correct, the "reactionary" readers of ancient skepticism are nonetheless at least partly right, in that the Pyrrhonists saw themselves as reacting not against belief in general but rather against a specific notion of belief that had arisen historically at a particular time: a specifically *dogmatic* belief, affirmed in conscious exclusion of competing alternatives, something which had not characterized the more holistic and communal Homeric worldview.[34] Forster's elaboration of the Homeric issues that spill out of Sextus Empiricus might also provide a window onto how we should view *Hegel's* stance with respect to ordinary moral belief. In particular, it raises the question about how a modern skeptic should come to terms with the notions of "conventional" or "ordinary" moral life.

It is Hegel's achievement, I would claim, to have appropriated not just one but two of the essential moments in which the *crise Pyrrhonienne* made

its appearance in modern European thought. As Popkin has noticed, the period in which Pyrrhonist skepticism first made its reappearance—after being almost unknown in the West for centuries—corresponded precisely with the crisis of authority that characterized the Protestant Reformation. And this first moment of the *crise* came, second, to involve a claim about authority and certainty of a distinct sort: as Popkin notices, Luther claims—contra the appropriation of Pyrrhonism that Erasmus offers—that *certainty* is precisely a virtue of one who has faith.[35]

The post-Jena Hegel came to make an important analogy between Luther's skeptical crisis in the Reformation and the skeptical crisis surrounding the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Hegel's analogy is best seen in his well-known remark about the nature of Luther's claim to *conscience* (*Gewissen*): "It is a great obstinacy [*Eigensinn*], the kind of obstinacy which does honor to human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes anything which has not been justified by thought—and this obstinacy is the characteristic property of the modern age, as well as being the distinctive principle of Protestantism."[36]

On Hegel's view, Luther's claim to conscience presaged the philosophical achievements of the critical philosophy in two ways: first, as a demand of the *finite* human being that only he or she can ascertain the truth of any claim; second, that no mere *authority* can be cited without question, and hence that there are no fixed grounds for any assertion without some appeal to conscience judgment.[37] The importance of these moments can be seen in a twofold way: first, in the *Phenomenology*'s programmatic responsiveness to the essentially normative acknowledgment of the individual's "absolute independence" and "right to demand that Science should . . . provide him with the ladder to this standpoint [of Absolute Knowing]"; second, in the striking claim mentioned above that Skepticism as a shape of consciousness is now construed as "the actual experience of what the *freedom* of thought is."[38] It is a longer story than can be told here, but the *Phenomenology* thus connects ancient skeptical *ataraxia* ultimately with post-Kantian *Gewissen*: the ancient skeptic's experience of *ataraxia* is made a crucial turning point within the larger story of the origin of modern freedom, even if the ancient skeptic did not construe his experience in those terms himself.

The historical significance of this point in the context of Hegelian dialectic returns us to the issue with which we began in this essay: how philosophy, skepticism, and ordinary consciousness relate. Hegel's ultimate view of the relation between philosophy and skepticism (as we have seen articulated both in the early Jena essay and the *Phenomenology*) is one on which skepticism is more *incorporated* into philosophy than *ignored* or *refuted*

by it. The upshot of that view for ordinary consciousness is that Hegel has a philosophical stance on which ordinary consciousness is respected in a significant way since, within his Pyrrhonist-inspired dialectic, each finite moment of cognition speaks in its own voice, as it were, without some external claim being imposed. But (as opposed to a view on which philosophy may *ignore* the worries of the skeptic) Hegel does not take it as his philosophical aim somehow to *return* to ordinary consciousness. In fact, on his view we can make no appeal to "ordinary" consciousness without some form of historical contextualization *of* that claim about what ordinary belief is. Hegel was keenly aware that there is a crucial difference between Homeric and Hellenistic "ordinary" moral belief and likewise between pre-Reformation and post-Kantian "ordinary" moral belief. And such differences matter to us philosophically because an awareness of them prohibits the attempt to return to some putatively ever-available notion of "ordinary" or "common-sense" belief that always stands over against our philosophical attempts at construing what belief is about. The importance of such a crucially historical inflection is, after all, one of the insights that most distinguishes the emergence of Hegel's views on skepticism and dialectic from his earliest reflections at Jena to the larger philosophical project of his mature years.

Notes

[1] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., trans. H. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, vol. II, p. 330; *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Werke in* 20 *Bänden*, ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969–71 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 19, p. 358.

[2] See Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §81A, where Hegel insists that "Plato is termed the inventor of dialectic," but that "in modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of dialectic, and restored it to its post of honor"; *Werke*, 8, 173.

[3] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, §78; *Werke*, 3, 71. "Thoroughgoing" is A. V. Miller's translation (see below).

[4] Hegel also speaks of "healthy common sense" (*der gesunder Menschenverstand*), a term which has ties to the Scottish "common sense" tradition; see Hegel's classical early explication of these terms in the Jena "Introduction" for the *Critical Journal*, and the 1802 review essay "How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (As Displayed in the Works of Mr. Krug)"; translations of these two essays can be found in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, trans. and ed., *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 272–291 and 292–310.

[5] John McDowell, "Zur Deutung von Hegels Handlungshteorie im Vernunftkapitel der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," in *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes: Ein kooperativer Kommentar zu einem Schlüsselwerk der Moderne*, ed. Klaus Vieweg and Wolfgang Welsch, Frankfurt, a.M: Suhrkamp, 2008, pp. 369–393.

[6] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §78; *Werke*, 3, 71–72. I give here Miller's translation with several adaptations.

[7] Michael Forster stresses the importance for Hegel of the contrast between the Cartesian understanding of skepticism and ancient Pyrrhonism, *Hegel and Skepticism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), Pippin the contrast between Cartesian and transcendental concerns with skepticism (*The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), and Brandom the difference between a (Cartesian) philosophical concern with the hold that we can have on a particular claim and a (Kantian) concern with the hold that various claims may have on us (*Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

[8] Cf., e.g., Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §109, and Hegel's use of similar language contrasting momentary "doubt" and a more methodologically involved "way of despair" in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*: "Skepticism should not be looked upon merely as a doctrine of doubt (*Zweifelslehre*). It would be more correct to say that the skeptic has no doubt of his point, which is the nothingness of all finite existence. He who only doubts still clings to the hope that his doubt may be resolved, and that one or the other of the definite views, between which he wavers, will turn out solid and true. Skepticism properly so called is a very different thing: it is *complete hopelessness* (*vollkommene Verzweiflung*) about all which understanding counts stable, and the feeling to which it gives birth is one of unbroken calmness and inward repose" (Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §81A; *Werke*, 8, 175).

[9] Although the claim about *self*-contradiction is distinctively Hegelian, Forster has noticed that there was at least *some* ancient suggestion for Hegel's point, for example, in the apparent strategy of some Academic skeptics to use as counter-arguments to dogmatic claims the arguments of the dogmatists themselves—something Carneades had in mind when he likened dialectic to an octopus which consumes the tentacles it has itself grown (cf. Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, 199 n57 and 208 n3). The ancient skeptics likewise did not claim, as Hegel offers on their behalf, a *proof* of the exhaustiveness of their stance (see Hegel, *On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy*, trans. Henry. S. Harris, in George di Giovanni, and Henry S. Harris, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of German Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, p. 228, and Forster's discussion of Hegel's adaptation of ancient skepticism on this point [*Hegel and Skepticism*, 37ff.], as well as Bristow's account of the development of the distinctive *Phenomenology of Spirit* response to the epistemological demand for a "ladder" from individual consciousness' standpoint [Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §26]).

[10] A*enesidemus* had played a significant role in the development of German Idealism for its attack on Karl Reinhold's attempt to ground the critical philosophy in what Reinhold called the "fact of consciousness": that "in consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object and relates it to both." Schulze argued, among other things, that if Reinhold's "fact of consciousness"

were indeed the first principle of philosophy, it would be based on an infinite regress—since the subject needs to have a representation of itself, and there would need to be a representation of that, and so on. Schulze's attack on Reinhold's attempted grounding of the critical enterprise resulted not only in a decisively negative turn for Reinhold's career, but also gave a particularly strong impetus to Fichte, whose review of *Aenesidemus* can be read as a first working-out of the need for a different point of departure within idealism, one that Fichte would root not in any fact (*Tatsache*) of consciousness but rather, non-representationally, in an *action* (Fichte's coinage *Tathandlung*).

[11] Hegel, "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy," trans. H. S. Harris, in George di Giovanni, and Henry S. Harris, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of German Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 311–362, here 322–23; *Werke*, 2, 227.

[12] Hegel, "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy," pp. 323–324; *Werke*, 2, 228–229 stresses mine.

[13] Hegel, "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy," p. 321; *Werke*, 2, 224.

[14] Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, 11.

[15] Ibid., p. 10.

[16] "Ancient Skepticism, Modern Naturalism, and Nihilism in Hegel's Early Jena Writings," *Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 52–73.

[17] One of the difficulties in Franks' position is in his attempt to map moments of "ancient" skepticism onto their appropriate "modern" counterparts. Although his later view of the matter in the *History of Philosophy* lectures is somewhat different, Hegel appears in the early essay to claim *both* that Agrippa's five tropes (as opposed to the ten tropes of the earlier skeptics) represent a *degeneration* from earlier skepticism *and* that they comprise the "genuine arsenal" of weapons against specifically *philosophical* cognition (Hegel, *On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy*, p. 334). For differing views on the role of Agrippa in Hegel's account, see Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, pp. 33–35; Klaus Vieweg, *Philosophie des Remis: der junge Hegel und das "Gespenst des Skepticismus,"* München: Fink, 1999, p. 144; and Franco Chiereghin, "Platonische Skepsis und spekulatives Denken bei Hegel," in *Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels*, ed. Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996, pp. 29–49. Franks' appeal to the figure of Agrippa plays a central role in his own reappraisal of the significance of the Agrippan (or, in Albert's recasting, Munchhausen) trilemma in post-Kantian thought (Paul Franks, *All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism in German Idealism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 8–10. On the issue of the Agrippan tropes and Hegel's appropriation of the ancient skeptical problem of criterion, see also Kenneth R. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemological Realism. A Study on the Aim and Method of Hegel's* Phenomenology, Boston: Kluwer, 1989, pp. 11–17.

[18] William F. Bristow, *Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, p. 123 n7.

[19] On Bristow's reading, the *Skepticism* essay envisions ancient skepticism as the "negative" side of the stance of speculative philosophy: its role is one which, as we have seen in the claim about Plato's *Parmenides*, completely annihilates the

whole range of finite claims made by the ordinary consciousness. By contrast, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has as one of its central methodological purposes the providing of a "ladder" for ordinary consciousness to the standpoint of speculative science; Hegel claims both that it is the *right* of the ordinary consciousness to demand such a ladder and that such a ladder is required for Science to be what it is (§26).

[20] "[D]ialectic has to prove that relation is nothing whatever in itself" (*Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975, p. 88; *Werke* 2, 475). This mention of dialectic (in the context of Hegel's examination of the concept of coercion as "nothing in itself") corresponds, as Harris has suggested, to a more explicit dialectical working out of categories that characterizes Hegel's method in the unpublished contemporaneous work *System of Ethical Life*. The notion that dialectic concerns an exploration of what is inherent in *relation* has a clear connection to the *Skepticism* essay's account of the skeptical tropes ("partly it concerned relationship in general, or the face that everything actual is conditioned by another, and in that measure it expresses a principle of Reason," p. 332; *Werke*, 2, 240). As Forster, Düsing and Baum have shown, the dialectic in Hegel's early Jena years has an essentially limited and negative function with respect to the emerging Hegelian speculative system as a whole: its task is showing the destruction of finite modes of understanding, but it does not have a function within the larger metaphysical project of philosophy proper (Michael Forster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method," in *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick Beiser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 130–170; Manfred Baum, *Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1986; and Klaus Düsing, "Spekulation und Reflexion. Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegels in Jena," in *Hegel-Studien* 5 (1969), 95–128).

[21] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §202, *Werke*, 3,158; Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 2, 333; *Werke*, 19, 362.

[22] This practical side of Hegel's engagement with skepticism is discussed in Klaus Vieweg, "Die 'freie Seite jeder Philosophie'—Skepsis und Freiheit" and Brady Bowman, "Skeptizismus als 'Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins': Hegels Auslegung des Pyrrhonismus und ihre konzeptuelle Hintergründe," both in *Die freie Seite der Philosophie: Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Philosophie*, ed. Klaus Vieweg and Brady Bowman, *Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie* ,10 (2006), 9–52.

[23] Already in his "Habilitation Theses" at Jena in 1801 Hegel had chosen to defend the thesis that Kant's philosophy represented an "imperfect" skepticism: see Henry S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801–1806)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 49.

[24] In the most general terms, the attempts by Reinhold and others to effect a grounding for the critical philosophy seem to have been a provocation for many to rethink the relation of skepticism and philosophy. According to Dieter Henrich, a renewed skepticism directed against Kant was "among the most important events in the development of post-Kantian philosophy" (Dieter Henrich, *Der Grund im Bewußtsein: Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken (1794–1795)*, Stuttgart: 1992, p. 790 n104).

[25] For a discussion of Stäudlin's importance to the history of philosophy, see the essays on "Carl Friedrich Stäudlin in Context," in Johan van der Zande and

Richard Popkin, eds, *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science, and Society*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.

[26] Hegel's reference to Stäudlin's *History* in the *Skepticism* essay actually has a negative tone, since it is part of a swipe taking Schulze to task for his use of Stäudlin's "idle chatter" about the difference between the Middle and New Academies (Hegel, *On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy*, 327). As Klaus Vieweg has pointed out, the parallels between Hegel and Stäudlin suggest that the latter's work was a resource or provocation for Hegel, however different their ultimate concerns with the nature and challenge of skepticism may have been (Vieweg, *Philosophie des Remis*, 71).

[27] Stäudlin was, like Hegel, a Schwabian who studied at Tübingen, where, as Vieweg has shown, an intensive concern with skepticism and particularly ancient skepticism is very much in evidence throughout the 1790s: see, for example, the list of magister *specimina* that had titles concerned with skepticism during these years (Vieweg, *Philosophie des Remis*, p. 59 n125). There were also apparently fairly close family connections between Hegel and Stäudlin (see Henry S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight (1770–1801)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, 59 and n2).

[28] Carl F. Stäudlin, *Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion*, Leipzig: Siegfried Lebrecht Crusius, 1794, 24ff.

[29] Ibid., 74 [*sic*]; this quotation actually occurs on the second of two page 74s in the original printing of this work.

[30] Stäudlin, Carl F., *Geschichte der Vorstellungen und Lehren vom Selbstmorde*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1824. See the discussion in Vera Lind, "Skepticism and the Discourse about Suicide in the Eighteenth Century: Traces of a Philosophical Concept," in Johan van der Zande and Richard Popkin, *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science and Society*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 297–314.

[31] Richard Popkin, "Some Thoughts about Stäudlin's History and Spirit of Skepticism," in Johan van der Zande and Richard Popkin, *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science and Society*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, p. 342.

[32] Bernstein says this specifically about Cartesian skepticism (Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, Philadelphia: 1985, pp. 16–20).

[33] Forster contrasts the more "radical" reading of ancient skepticism that he attributes to Hegel and Myles Burnyeat with the more "moderate" or reactionary view he attributes to Kant and Michael Frede (Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, 16ff. and *Kant and Skepticism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 76ff.). Compare in this context the question raised by Jonathan Barnes and Robert J. Fogelin about whether the ancient skeptics should be viewed as "urbane," thus believing what most ordinary people do, but directing their skeptical energies toward specifically scientific or philosophical theories, or "rustic," maintaining a life that makes no belief commitments at all (see Robert Fogelin, *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 and Jonathan Barnes, "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, eds. E. J. Kenny and M. M. MacKenzie, pp. 2–29, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[34] "Hegelian vs. Kantian Interpretations of Pyrrhonism: Revolution or Reaction?" in *Die freie Seite der Philosophie: Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Perspektive, Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie* 10, ed. Brady Bowman and Klaus Vieweg, Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 2006, pp. 53–70.

[35] Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*, Assen, Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 1960.

[36] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §12; *Werke*, 7, 26.

[37] This passage and its importance for Hegel's history of moral philosophy is discussed more fully in my "Hegel on Conscience and the History of Philosophy," in *Hegel: New Directions*, ed. Katerina Deligiorgi, Chesham: Acumen, 2006, pp. 17–32.

[38] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §26 and §202; *Werke*, 3, 28 and 158.

Chapter 8

Doubt and Dialectic: Hegel on Logic, Metaphysics, and Skepticism

Dietmar H. Heidemann

I. Introduction

When analyzing Hegel's discussion of skepticism one might arrive at the conclusion that without skepticism one cannot enter his speculative system, and with skepticism one cannot remain in it. This seemingly paradoxical view is specifically due to the relation Hegel establishes between skepticism and the most fundamental constituent of his mature philosophy: dialectic. At numerous places, Hegel points out that there is an intrinsic connection between dialectic or dialectical thinking and skepticism. Most prominently, in §81 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic* he states that "philosophy [. . .] contains the skeptical as a moment within itself—specifically as the dialectical moment." Equally in *Encyclopedia* §78 he emphasizes that "skepticism" as "the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science."[1] The connection between skepticism and dialectic seems to be natural and unintelligible at once. On the one hand, the connection is obvious since Hegel claims that skepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by anti-skeptical knockdown arguments: skepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking, i.e., plays a *constructive* role therein. On the other hand, skepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., skepticism plays a *destructive* role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality.

In what follows, I argue that in Hegel's system the *constructive* and the *destructive* role of skepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since skepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic. In order to show in what sense we have to conceive of skepticism as being an intrinsic feature of dialectic, the first section of this chapter sketches the development of the relation between logic and metaphysics in Hegel's thought (Section II). The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in "skeptical" consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding, but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute. For reasons to be explored, Hegel later replaces the introductory function of logic by the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and assigns logic itself the status of metaphysics. Throughout the developmental changes in the relationship between logic and metaphysics Hegel holds onto the view that with respect to finite thinking skepticism is destructive in that skeptical doubts attack the possibility of knowledge. However, with regard to metaphysics skepticism plays a constructive role since from the point of view of logic skeptical doubts have to be construed in terms of dialectic. The chapter's section III shows in more detail how Hegel conceives of this dialectical significance of skepticism, especially in *The Encyclopaedia Logic*. Two questions have to be answered here: First, what is it that makes skepticism constructive with respect to dialectic? Second, is constructive skepticism fundamentally different from our common understanding of what skepticism is? I argue that it is the (ancient) skeptical technique of counter-position or "negation" that makes skepticism constructive, and that for Hegel constructive skepticism with respect to dialectic meets our common understanding of skepticism. In the concluding part of this chapter I address a fundamental objection to this view.[2]

II. Logic and metaphysics in the development of Hegel's philosophy

In his 1801 essay *On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy* Hegel distinguishes "the Skepticism that is one with philosophy" from "skepticism that is sundered from it." The latter "can be divided into two forms,

according to whether it is or is not directed against Reason."[3] Thus he has the following breakdown before his eyes:



For Hegel "genuine skepticism," let's call it "philosophical skepticism," is "skepticism that is one with philosophy" because this form of skepticism expresses the "negative side" each true philosophy has in that it is "directed against everything limited," or "the whole soil of finitude."[4] However, the sphere of this form of skepticism is not limited to sense-perception and finite theoretical reflection. Since philosophical skepticism is all comprising, it also concerns speculative reason, though, unlike the "skepticism that is sundered from philosophy," it does not attack speculative reason. The form of all comprising philosophical skepticism prefigures Hegel's mature conception of skepticism that is intrinsically connected with dialectic. Now, in order to understand how he arrives at this conception it is necessary to clarify the philosophical position he held around 1800, and how it further developed.

As can be seen from his *Early Theological Writings*, Hegel around 1797 became an adherent of Hölderlin's (and Sinclair's) metaphysics of unification. According to this metaphysics, the opposition and separation of related concepts within the finite presuppose a preceding union. However, this union cannot be grasped through reflection, i.e., through the faculty of understanding. In attempting to cognize absolute union finite understanding rather "subverts" it: absolute union is to be conceived as divine union

that reveals itself through religious faith and is apprehended through intellectual intuition. Along with Hölderlin (and Sinclair), the young Hegel at that time believed the finite to be intrinsically characterized through its opposition to the divine or absolute as "pure life":

> Plurality is nothing absolute. The pure life is the source of all separate lives, impulses, and deeds. But if it comes into consciousness as a *belief* in life, it is then living in the believer and yet is to some extent posited outside him. [. . .] The whole field of determinacy falls away, and beyond this consciousness of determinacies there is only empty unity of the totality of objects as the essence dominating determinacies.[5]

Though "it is only in inspired terms that the divine can [properly] be spoken of" "since the activity of the divine is only a unification of spirits [. . .] and [o]nly spirit grasps and embraces spirit in itself,"[6] finite thinking is not entirely expelled from becoming aware of the absolute on a theoretical level. For divine unity manifests itself negatively in a derivative mode within finite consciousness as the opposition of determinacies. However, the opposition between finite and infinite only exists for human consciousness that establishes it by limiting the sphere of the former through the latter. Under these premises, it is understandable that Hegel identifies truth and the divine, whereby the divine or absolute exists beyond the disuniting finite reflection and is comprehended only through the unifying intellectual intuition.[7] This conception originates in a religious-theological way of thinking which operates with a model that opposes the finite and the infinite. Since the opposition is established by finite reflection, it has to be overcome in the direction of the divine. Unlike what one might expect, this "self-elevation of man [. . .] from finite life to infinite life, is religion," not metaphysics.[8] The philosophy of the one life does not oppose the infinite to the finite for this form of opposition would be untrue since it would be the product of finite thinking itself. Divine life rather is to be construed in terms of a Spinozist-pantheist idea of all comprising union, as Hegel paradoxically formulates it: "Life is the union of union and non-union."[9] This union is superior, since it does not exclude finite understanding but rather comprises it in order to unify everything. It is important to see that according to this conception the sphere of philosophy ends where finite life is elevated to infinite life. Hence philosophy is subordinated to religion in that it "has to disclose the finiteness in all finite things and require their completion by means of reason."[10] "Completion" simply means to join and hence unify opposing concepts by producing oppositions like

"finite-infinite," or "thinking-non-thinking." The absolute, divine infinite would then be the most "complete."[11]

The idea of "completion" or, respectively, unification is also prominent in the famous fragment *Faith and Being* (*Glauben und Sein*) from approximately 1797/98. Here Hegel characterizes the unification of opposites with the help of the concept "antinomy," probably taken up from Kant's first *Critique*. According to this fragment, the unification of opposites presupposes, on the one hand, that the "elements of the antinomy" are "felt" or "cognized." The structure of an antinomy has to be known in order to make the unification of opposites conceivable. However, the unification itself cannot be comprehended through conceptual-discursive cognition but only through religious "faith." On the other hand, the opposites can only be cognized if they "already are unified" since "unification is the criterion by means of which the comparison takes place, by means of which the opposites as such appear as dissatisfied."[12] But the "unification" itself cannot be "proven" for proving, as Hegel opines, is the methodological procedure of finite, reflexive cognition of human understanding. "Unification" can only be represented through "faith," and "faith" presupposes "Being": "Unification and Being are tantamount."[13]

With respect to dialectic, two points are of importance here. First, this early metaphysical conception essentially includes the idea of irreconcilable conflict or opposition within the finite. As we will see below, this idea prefigures the motive of skeptical conflict that is developed more clearly in Hegel's later writings from 1800 onwards. Second, in the *Early Theological Writings* Hegel still believes that the absolute or divine cannot be rationally cognized since it is the object of religious faith. Hence, philosophy does not provide access to it. It is with respect to this constraint of the sphere of philosophy and reason that Hegel fundamentally changes his position around 1800/01.

For reasons that cannot be discussed here in detail, Hegel around 1800 downgrades the systematic status of religion in that he replaces it by metaphysics, and assigns logic the function of introducing metaphysics. In this new conception, logic is supposed to fulfill the function of a preparatory introduction to metaphysics by showing the immanent deficiencies of finite cognition, i.e., by exhibiting contradictions inherent in reflection. The method logic applies is the skeptical procedure of counter-positing that guides reason in producing antinomies. In establishing antinomies, skepticism reaches beyond finite reflection and touches upon speculative reason as the negative side of the cognition of the absolute. The negative side of the cognition of the absolute presupposes its positive side that is

itself cognized through intellectual intuition (a cognitive faculty that Hegel takes up from the contemporary discussion, however, without providing an appropriate justification of its structure). This position is based on a developmental conception of speculative cognition according to which cognition proceeds from the annihilation of the finite to the infinite, absolute without finite reflection being able to conceptually conceive of the transition. Hegel describes the underlying idea in the following way: "The understanding only sees oppositions, is conditioned. It strives to emulate the absolute in its identity, and gets caught in contradictions."[14] Hence, finite reflection's striving for identity compels the understanding to set up antinomies without being able to resolve them. This is because the "identity" conceived of through finite reflection is "nothing but negation, exclusion of the opposed," i.e., what is contradicting itself cannot be identical for the understanding.[15] Thus, according to Hegel, the understanding cannot cognize the true identity of opposed because, unlike reason, finite cognition does not have as its disposal the methodological concept of absolute identity by means of which it would be able to establish this identity. The identity of the opposed has to be conceived of in terms of unification, and is justified through reason's nullification of the finite form of cognition. The nullification is supposed to explain how the identity of the opposed can be achieved. On the one hand, for finite reflection the identity of the opposed appears as manifest contradictions between propositions, i.e., as antinomies. On the other hand, for Hegel these contradictions or antinomies are negative representations of the infinite.[16]

The above-outlined account of the relation between logic and metaphysics in the philosophy of the young Hegel has many problems. In particular, it is unclear how contradicting forms of cognition or propositions can be unified, and therefore how a superior form of infinite cognition that supersedes finite cognition can be justified. Further, Hegel's conception of "logic" seems to be rather peculiar in this context since formal logic, which is for Hegel basically Aristotelian logic, does not allow for contradictions. However, the logic Hegel has in mind is not formal or symbolic logic. Logic as a preparatory introduction to metaphysics rather is the logic of finite cognition, i.e., relates to Kant's transcendental logic and its implications of the transcendental dialectic, and, moreover, to the arguments of the second part of Plato's *Parmenides*. When talking about internal contradictions of finite cognition, Hegel refers to Kant's antinomies and the paradoxes of the *Parmenides*. With respect to the method of opposition as well as of the equivalence of arguments and proofs, he views them as similar to the aporias of ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism.[17] In this sense, antinomies and

paradoxes document internal contradictions of finite cognition that arise when assessing the cognitive capacities of finite understanding. Hegel sees this idea forestalled in Plato's *Parmenides*, the "perfect and self-sustaining document and system of genuine skepticism":

> The Platonic skepticism is not concerned with doubting these truths of the understanding [. . .]; rather it is intent on the complete denial of all truth to this sort of cognition. This skepticism does not constitute a particular thing in a system, but it is itself the negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly presupposes Reason as the positive side.[18]

Hegel holds similar views on Kant's antinomies as documents of skepticism. Thus it is not surprising that in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) he connects skepticism with dialectic: Plato's *Parmenides*, this "document and system of genuine skepticism" is "the greatest artistic achievement of ancient dialectic."[19]

However, by the year of the publication of the *Phenomenology* Hegel had already given up the conception of logic as a preparatory introduction to metaphysics. The reasons for this renewed change are not clear but very likely have to do with his collaboration with Schelling in Jena since 1801. Like Schelling, and following Spinoza's philosophy, Hegel at that time conceived the absolute as substance. At around 1804 he realized that to conceive of the absolute as substance is to leave it crucially underdetermined. He specifically became aware of the problem that the absolute is not a static object of thought (substance), but rather comprises complex logical, self-referential relations that can only be developed in an independent discipline. It is this independent discipline that later became the speculative science of logic. As a consequence, Hegel gives up the idea of the absolute as substance and replaces it with the conception of absolute subjectivity that incorporates self-referential logical structures. At this crucial turning point in his philosophy, he conjoins logic and metaphysics as the new "science of the absolute."[20]

The question now arises of whether the unification of logic and metaphysics makes a systematic introduction to metaphysics dispensable. Hegel denies this question as, according to his idealism, if the absolute is to be made an object of knowledge, then this knowledge has to be systematically developed. It is the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that now takes on the function of introducing to metaphysics as the science of the absolute by means of what Hegel calls "self-fulfilling skepticism,"[21] a form of skepticism that systematically guides consciousness through a series of just tentatively true

knowledge claims until the shape of absolute, true knowing is obtained. The shape of "absolute knowing," skeptically generated within the dialectical experience of consciousness, finally opens the gateway to the science of logic as metaphysics. However, skepticism's *destructive* function as the methodological procedure of the *Phenomenology* is not exhausted once consciousness makes the transition to logic as pure thinking. It is most crucial that in his mature philosophy Hegel assigns skepticism the *constructive* function of bringing about the dialectical movement of speculative thinking beyond the internal contradictions of finite cognition. This constructive function still reflects Hegel's early conception according to which logic uses skepticism as its method of nullification of the domain of finite thinking. In what follows, I address the question of what the constructive element in skepticism is with respect to dialectic.

III. Dialectic, negation, and skepticism

With respect to the relation between skepticism and dialectic Hegel makes two crucial claims: (a) "philosophy [. . .] contains the skeptical as a moment within itself—specifically as the dialectical moment,"[22] and (b) "skepticism" as "the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science."[23] Both of these claims have to be understood in the light of the problem of "total presuppositionlessness."[24] The problem of "total presuppositionlessness" is subsequent to the problem of a systematic introduction to metaphysics or logic. For Hegel acknowledges the skeptic's claim that the demonstration of "Science"[25] must not make any unjustified presuppositions. But employing skeptical doubt as the method of a systematic introduction to science would be question begging since "Science" itself is supposed to be self-reliant, i.e., cannot depend on a preceding justification through skepticism. Hence, it cannot be legitimate to construe the demonstration of "Science" as a procedure of skeptical justification. This, of course, means that Hegel can no longer hold onto the conception of the *Phenomenology* as a systematic introduction to metaphysics or "Science."[26]

From the fact that skepticism, particularly *Phenomenology*'s "self-fulfilling skepticism," cannot perform the function of a systematic introduction to metaphysics or "Science" two questions arise: First, is there an alternative way of getting access to "Science," a systematic way that does not violate the claim of "presuppositionlessness?" Second, if skepticism cannot

accomplish the task of a systematic introduction wouldn't skeptical doubt be independent of, and therefore be a fundamental threat to, "Science?" Hegel's answer to the first question is that we can get access to "Science" without making presuppositions "by the freedom that abstracts from everything, and grasps its own pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking—in the resolve to think purely."[27] It is by no means clear what the "resolve to think purely" consists in, not least because at this point Hegel cannot rely on the *Phenomenology*'s justification of metaphysical, "absolute knowing" since the "resolve" is independent of any kind of preceding justification. But he seems to believe that this concept represents the appropriate methodological procedure enabling an individual to get immediate access to the proper content of "Science" by pure thought. For the sake of argument, let us assume that "Science" can indeed be grasped by this procedure. How then does Hegel respond to the second question? He clearly denies that independent skepticism is threatening to "Science" since, according to his theory, skepticism is contained within philosophy as "the dialectical moment."[28] In order to see Hegel's point, one has to recall his conception of "Science" or logic as metaphysics. In Hegel's speculative idealism, logic represents "the pure truth itself."[29] As such, it contains "objective thoughts" that "express the essentialities (Wesenheiten) of the things," however, not as a collection of abstract terms but as dialectically evolving "thought-determinations." Since Hegel's logic therefore is to be construed in traditional terms of ontology, it "coincides with metaphysics."[30] The "Science" of logic hence develops a system of categories by means of pure thought.

Now in order to meet the claim that truth can be cognized through pure thought it has first to be shown that the finite "forms of cognition" are deficient for otherwise logic or metaphysics wouldn't represent the only possible "Science" of "the pure truth itself."[31] This accords with what we have seen in section 1 of this chapter, namely, with the nullification of the finite "forms of cognition" by means of skeptical doubt. But note that this does not conflict with the view that skepticism cannot function as an introduction to metaphysics. For here Hegel explicitly refers to the destructive role of skepticism in regard to the finite "forms of cognition": "The high skepticism of antiquity accomplishes this by showing that every one of those forms contained a contradiction within itself."[32] As we will soon see, "showing that every one of those forms contained a contradiction within itself" indicates the point of intersection between dialectic and skepticism in Hegel's conception of logic as metaphysics.

In the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences,* the task of the annihilation of the finite "forms of cognition" is assigned not to skepticism but to the three "Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity."[33] The function of the three "Positions" is to accomplish a preparatory exposition "in order to clarify the meaning of Logic and to lead into the standpoint that is here given to it."[34] But Hegel does not assign them the role of a justificatory introduction to metaphysics. The three "Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity" are (1) (pre-kantian, rationalist) "Metaphysics,"[35] (2) "Empiricism" and "Critical Philosophy,"[36] and (3) (in particular Jacobi's) "Immediate Knowing."[37] According to Hegel all of the three "Positions" fail to establish "total presuppositionlessness." In the end, only the "resolve to think purely"[38] provides us with a "presuppositionless" access to metaphysics or "Science."

Nonetheless, skepticism's inaptitude of introducing metaphysics does not exempt philosophy from the problem of skepticism itself. For the question of whether metaphysics cannot be overthrown by skeptical doubts for the moment remains. At this point Hegel refers back to an argument he already made in his Jena work. In *On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy* he argues that skepticism is innocuous "since every genuine philosophy has this negative side."[39] The "negative side" of "every genuine philosophy" is not a destructive but a constructive, systematic component "implicit in every genuine philosophical system." In Hegel's eyes, Plato's *Parmenides* along with Spinoza's *Ethics* are ideal representatives of this skeptical, "free side of philosophy." Here "the principle of skepticism: panti logôi logos isos anti-kaitai ['against every argument there is an equal one on the other side'] comes on the scene at its full strength."[40]

The presentation of skepticism as true philosophy's "negative side" indicates Hegel's mature view of positively integrating skepticism into philosophy by assimilating it with dialectic. By means of this integrative strategy Hegel intends to immunize metaphysics or, more broadly, philosophy against skeptical attacks. This connection between skepticism and dialectic is not at all arbitrary but systematically motivated. Accordingly, finite cognition is exhausted by fixation of its concepts, i.e. (esp. Kantian) categories. On the other hand the pure fixation of finite concepts is one-sided. It is Hegel's claim that furthermore the determinations of finite understanding have to be opposed, like in Kant's antinomies, and finally sublated by their unification through speculative thought. The *Encyclopaedia* describes this procedure in the order of three steps as "three sides" the "logical has": (a) "the side of abstraction or of the understanding," (b) "the dialectical or negatively rationale side," and (c) "the speculative

or positively rational one"[41]. It is the "dialectical moment" where skepticism has its systematic place:

> The dialectical, taken separately on its own by the understanding, constitutes scepticism, especially when it is exhibited in scientific concepts. Scepticism contains the mere negation that results from the dialectic.[42]

The connection of skepticism and dialectic is then obviously justified by means of "negation," i.e., in Hegelian terms, through contradiction. Skepticism is not identical with dialectic though. Dialectic shows the "one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding"[43] and this means their "negation." This is also accomplished by skepticism in that the skeptic raises doubts and therefore negates epistemic claims by opposing them according to the aforementioned principle "panti logôi logos isos antikeitai." Unlike dialectic, skepticism does not go any farther than demonstrating the "negation" of the "determinations of the understanding." However, skepticism is capable of recognizing the positive content of its "negation." Consequently, skepticism and dialectic coincide only in as much as both reveal finite understanding's intrinsic negativity. Nonetheless, finite understanding cannot be aware of dialectic itself but exclusively of the skeptical negation of epistemic claims. Since finite understanding is incapable of reaching dialectical insights, it has to accept skepticism as a fundamental threat to its epistemic claims. By contrast "genuine philosophy" itself is not affected by skeptical doubts:

> Scepticism should not be regarded merely as a doctrine of doubt; rather, it is completely certain about its central point, i.e., the nullity of everything finite. [. . .] But then philosophy does not stop at the merely negative result of the dialectic, as is the case with scepticism. The latter mistakes its result, insofar as it holds fast to it as mere, i.e., abstract, negation. When the dialectic has the negative as its result, then, precisely as a result, this negative is at the same time the positive, for it contains what it resulted from sublated within itself, and it cannot be without it.[44]

Hence, skepticism and dialectic accord with respect to "negation" while being vitally distinct at the same time. Though both likewise rely on "negation," skepticism performs "abstract negation" by simply doubting, i.e., nullifying epistemic claims, whereas from the point of view of dialectic the "result" of the "negation" preserves the positive content "what it resulted from." Here Hegel draws on the *Phenomenology*'s distinction between two

kinds of negation. Skepticism's, i.e., finite understanding's ("abstract") negation confines itself to "wait[ing] to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss."[45] By contrast, true, "determinate negation" realizes that "nothingness is, in a determinate fashion, specifically the nothingness of that from which it results. For it is only when it is taken as the result from which it emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content."[46] Therefore destructive skepticism ignores what constructive skepticism acknowledges as the dialectical outcome of contradiction, i.e., a new positive content.

Consequently, it is the method of counter-position or negation that makes skepticism dialectical, i.e., a constructive element of human rationality. From the immanent point of view of human understanding, skeptical counter-position or negation of epistemic claims has devastating consequences for human rationality since finite understanding's cognitive performances lead naturally and inescapably to skeptical doubt. For finite understanding it looks like as if the skeptic, by means of counter-position or negation, is able to refrain the human mind from successfully achieving positive metaphysical knowledge. Hegel does not deny the destructive consequences skepticism has for finite understanding. However, he criticizes this destructive view of skepticism as one-sided. For him, the true constructive meaning of skepticism is the "dialectical moment," i.e., skepticism's ability to nullify finite reflection by means of skeptical doubt in order to promote speculative knowledge, though speculative knowledge itself is being achieved through absolute reason. It is important to see that Hegel is not operating with two distinct types of skepticism, destructive (negative) skepticism, on the one hand, and constructive (philosophical) skepticism, on the other. On the contrary, destructive and constructive skepticism are identical. It is one and the same skeptical doubt that—on the level of finite understanding—nullifies reflection while—on the level of dialectic—promotes metaphysical knowledge. This distinction itself is, of course, made from the metaphysical philosophical point of view of logic, i.e., it is an insight that cannot be achieved from within finite reflection. This is how destructive and constructive skepticism are reconcilable in Hegel's theory. Though skeptical doubt is destructive with respect to finite knowledge claims, it is constructive with respect to "Science" in that it positively contributes to the insight in metaphysical truth. Hence, Hegel would not repudiate that skepticism is a fundamental, and to a certain extent *natural* problem for finite reflection. But from a dialectical angle skeptical doubt has to be taken as the documentation of true philosophical knowledge.

IV. Conclusion

Many interpreters are more than positive about Hegel's "dialectical" solution to the problem of skepticism.[47] However, the question of whether "dialectical" skepticism is at all an original form of skepticism cannot be ignored. An obvious objection would be that skeptical doubt does not coincide with dialectical negation because the conception of dialectical negation presupposes the truth of dialectical logic, i.e., metaphysics, something the skeptic calls into doubt. Since the contents of skeptical doubt and dialectical negation are fundamentally different, then Hegel's assimilation of skeptical doubt and dialectical negation seems to be a change of subject. Whereas skeptical arguments are supposed to support the claim that we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, dialectical negation is designed to bring about metaphysical knowledge. Hence the skeptic would insist that doubt and dialectic are intrinsically incompatible. In order to defend his view, Hegel would, of course, once more draw upon his argument that the skeptic's insistence is symptomatic for finite understanding's incapacity to judge metaphysical truth. The standpoint of "Science" shows that this view is limited to a finite perspective, and that it has to be overcome in direction of true speculative philosophy. From the Hegelian angle the effort to repudiate skeptical doubts would even be inefficacious since skepticism is, in a sense, a *natural*, inescapable problem for human cognition, a problem, however, that is not to be solved but rather correctly interpreted and understood from within a dialectical framework, i.e., from within logic.

In the end, this Hegelian line of argument gets back to the heart of the problem of "presuppostionlessness." As we have seen in section 2, the central argument Hegel offers in favor of the solution to this problem is "the resolve to think purely."[48] If this "resolve" would successfully offer immediate access to pure thought, or logic, which dialectic is a vital part of, Hegel would be in a position to justify his dialectical take on skepticism. But he fails to offer a pertinent clarification of the theoretical status of the "resolve." On the other hand, Hegel's conception of logic as a theory of absolute subjectivity, i.e., a theory that expounds the self-sufficient development of logical content on the basis of self-referentially structured relations between categories, looms large as the promising solution to this problem. However, the theory of absolute subjectivity, presented in the *Science of Logic*, would also have to explain how finite subjects relate to speculative knowledge since in Hegel's metaphysics the finite is not separate from the infinite. Here the question of how finite subjects like us can have metaphysical insights of this kind emerges once again. As argued

above, Hegel's conception of logic as metaphysics does not convincingly respond to this question. This is why one has to remain skeptical with respect to Hegel's claim that doubt and dialectic coincide from a logical point of view.

Notes

[1] Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Gerates, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, 1991. (Unless otherwise mentioned, references to the German text are from G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971, henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number). On skepticism as the nature of dialectic or dialectical thinking cf. also *Enc*, §11.

[2] I shall not discuss Hegel's account of skepticism as such but mainly with respect to dialectic. On Hegel's view of skepticism in general see Michael N. Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, and Dietmar H. Heidemann, *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.

[3] Cf., G. W. F. Hegel, "On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy. Exposition of his Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One," trans. H. S. Harris, in: George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds., *Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development Of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 311–362, here 330; *Werke*, 2, 237.

[4] Cf. Hegel, "On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy," pp. 322–323. *Werke*, 2, 226–227.

[5] Cf. G. W. F. Hegel: *The Spirit of Christianity*, in *G .W. F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox and R. Kroner, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, pp. 254–255; *Werke*, 1, 371.

[6] Cf. Hegel, *The Spirit of Christianity*, p. 255; *Werke*, 1, 372.

[7] Cf. Hegel, *The Spirit of Christianity*, pp. 261–264, 268–270; *Werke*, 1, 375–380, 383–386.

[8] Cf. Hegel, *Fragment of a System*, in G .W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 311; *Werke*, 1, 421.

[9] Hegel, *Fragment of a System*, p. 312; *Werke*, 2, 422.

[10] Hegel, *Fragment of a System*, p. 313 (translation modified); *Werke*, 1, 423.

[11] Hegel, *Fragment of a System*, p. 318; *Werke*, 1, 426–427.

[12] Cf. Hegel, *Glauben und Sein*, in *Werke*, 1, 250 (my translation).

[13] Cf. Hegel, *Glauben und Sein*, in *Werke*, 1, 250 (my translation). Cf. Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik*, 3rd extended edition, 1995, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995, 50ff. On Hegel's philosophy of "unification" see also Panajotis Kondylis, *Die Entstehung der Dialektik. Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1979, esp. 409ff., 441ff., 512ff. Düsing and Kondylis present different accounts of

Schelling's significance for the development of Hegel thought. On this point cf. also Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, vol. 2, Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, 655ff.

[14] Cf. *Schellings und Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik (1801/02). Zusammenfassende Vorlesungsnachschriften*, von I. P. V. Troxler, ed. with introduction and interpretation by Klaus Düsing, Köln: Dinter 1988, p. 63 (my translation).

[15] Cf. ibid., p. 63.

[16] See also Hegel's clear outline of this conception in the fragment *Logica et Metaphysics* from 1801/02. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Schriften und Entwürfe (1799–1808)*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. im Auftrag der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 5, ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt R. Meist. Hamburg 1998, 272–274.

[17] On Hegel's discussion of ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism see Michael N. Forster, "Hegel on the superiority of ancient over modern skepticism," in Hans Friedrich Fulda, and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, eds., *Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1996, pp. 64–82, and Heidemann: *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus*, chapter II.

[18] Hegel, "On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy," p. 323, *Werke*, 2, 227.

[19] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1977, p. 44; *Werke*, 3, 65.

[20] Cf. again Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, chapter 3.

[21] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 50, *Werke*, 3, 71 (translation modified). See Dietmar H. Heidemann, "Substance, Subject, System. The Justification of Science and the History of Self-Consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in Dean Moyar and Michael Quante, eds., *Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit. *A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 1–20.

[22] Cf. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §81.

[23] Cf. ibid., §78.

[24] Cf. ibid.

[25] Cf. ibid.

[26] For reasons not to be discussed here Hegel, after 1807, in fact gives up the view that the *Phenomenology* serves as such an introduction though he does not give up the *Phenomenology* itself. I have discussed the details of Hegel's later reappraisal of the relation between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* in my *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus*, pp. 327–339.

[27] Cf. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §78 (translation modified).

[28] Cf. ibid., §81.

[29] Cf. ibid., §19.

[30] Cf. ibid., §24.

[31] Cf. ibid., §19.

[32] Ibid., §24, addition 3.

[33] Cf. ibid., §§26–78.

[34] Cf. ibid., §25.

[35] Cf. ibid., §§26–36.

[36] Cf. ibid., §§37–60.

[37] Cf. ibid., §§61–78. On Hegel's views of (Descartes' rationalist) metaphysics, empiricism, critical philosophy, and Jacobi especially in his *Lectures on the History*

of Philosophy, see the articles by Pätzold, Heidemann, Engelhard, deVos, and Jonkers in Dietmar H. Heidemann, and Christian Krijnen, eds. *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007.

[38] Cf. Hegel: *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §78 (translation modified).

[39] Cf. Hegel, "On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy," p. 325; *Werke*, 2, 229.

[40] Cf. Hegel, "On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy," 324f., *Werke*, 2, 228–229. By "principle of skepticism" Hegel alludes to Sextus Empiricus: *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 12. The use of "antinomy" not only refers to the antinomies of the *Parmenides* but certainly, as already mentioned above, to the antinomies of pure reason in Kant's first *Critique* and possibly to the antithetical structure of the principles in Fichte's *Doctrine of Science*.

[41] Cf. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §79.

[42] Ibid., §81.

[43] Cf. ibid.

[44] Cf. ibid., addition 2.

[45] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 51; *Werke*, 3, 73.

[46] Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 51 (translation modified); *Werke*, 3, 73. On the "creative" meaning of "determinate negation," cf. Jean Hyppolite, *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, Paris: Aubier 1956, p. 20.

[47] For example, Heinz Röttges, *Dialektik und Skeptizismus. Die Rolle des Skeptizismus für Genese, Selbstverständnis und Kritik der Dialektik*, Frankfurt, a.M.: Athenäum 1987.

[48] Cf. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §78.

Chapter 9

The Dialectic of Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, and Objectivity in Hegel's System

Nectarios G. Limnatis

The philosophical claim to objectivity typically denotes that what is claimed belongs to the object proper, independently of how the subject thinks about it. It is further argued that the subject becomes possible only together with other subjects, and objectivity is thus deflected through intersubjective lenses. But this leaves open the question of objectivity, can lead to historical relativism and, epistemologically, to skepticism. While being a historical relativist, and indeed one of the pioneers of intersubjectivity, Hegel is nevertheless not a skeptic. His response to this perplexity is dialectical and can be understood as such. First, the ultimate object, and absolute objectivity is rendered by Hegel as an absolute subject which posits the object as its otherness. It seems that subject and object reverse positions here. Second, and most important, such absolute subject is rendered dialectically: it is a self-negating, self-referring, and self-recollecting subject that necessarily comes to be through its otherness, part of which is the finite subject understood intersubjectively. This chapter argues for the crucial importance of *dialectic* in connecting Hegel's conception of objectivity to subjectivity and intersubjectivity. I start by providing a sketchy layout of some of the Kantian dualisms that provoked the German idealist debate and led to Hegel's grand synthesis (section I). Then I will turn to the *Phenomenology*, which I take to be the introduction to Hegel's mature system, and argue that subjectivity and intersubjectivity appear through an immanent circular dialectic, and can only therewith be understood (section II). Finally, I will turn to the *Logic* and examine the reverse procedure from the same angle, namely, that the objective is rendered as subjective and intersubjective (section III).

I. Contextualizing the problem: From Kant to Schelling

It is hardly disputable that the primary concern of Kant's venture is to avoid skepticism without falling into dogmatism. This debate had been articulated in the preceding discussion as the debate between rationalism and empiricism.[1] The issue with empiricism is that it unavoidably leads to philosophical skepticism, as this was shown primarily by Hume.[2] Just like Hume, Kant acknowledges that experience is always fragmentary and cannot grant conceptual universality and certainty, and introduces the thing-in-itself to underline the finite nature of human knowledge. But unlike Hume, Kant maintains that *a priori* reasoning can be synthetic. He thus responds to the question of objectivity of knowledge by retreating to the subjective conditions of it through his Copernican revolution and the deduction of the categories as the necessary noematic background of possible experience.

Kant's dualist position did not satisfy his contemporaries on a number of issues, which for the sake of my focus in this chapter I summarize in the following way.[3] First, on a narrower account, the claim to unconditioned epistemological certainty (and thus to objectivity of finite claims) can be defended if the proposed categories are valid *intersubjectively,* i.e., are valid beyond the individual subject which expresses them, and are applicable to other subjects that think and act based on the same fundamental rational background. Kant rather presupposes than makes this case. His appeal to the genus in the *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose*, as well as his pointing to the *sensus communis* in the third *Critique,* are presented as reasonable hypotheses, as guesses, rather than argumentatively supported principles. The Kantian categories are property of the *subject*, the famous Kantian "I think" that must accompany all representations.[4] Kant takes this subject only in the "problematic" sense,[5] creating the impression that he assigns to it a modest existential function. However, such function *must* also be assertive epistemological,[6] as Kant at the same time pursues objectivity, considers his task positively accomplished, and claims to have put philosophy on the secure path of science like logic, geometry, and theoretical physics.

Second, on a broader account, certainty can be warranted if categories adequately describe reality *in the philosophical sense.* It is important to emphasize this moment. The role of philosophy must thus be different than that of the sciences, it must be meta-scientific. This opens the question of how philosophy can ground its claims, and in that sense, philosophy is bound to respond to the question of metaphysics or of objective truth beyond that

which is presented by science. Kant is well aware of that problem.[7] As we know, God, freedom, and immortality are "the unavoidable tasks of pure reason."[8] Yet Kant studies metaphysics "according to its subjective possibility,"[9] as his introduction of the thing-in-itself prevents any other course of action. That is, any possible attempt at future metaphysics and objective truth must "cope" with the subjectively imposed transcendental form, with the subjective conditions of it, the categories this attempt *a priori* involves. Kant has very little to say as to where these categories come from, why there is correspondence between the *a priori* form and the *a posteriori* content, and why there is the famous Kantian "harmony" between the understanding and experience. Sensitivity and understanding are "two stems of human knowledge . . . which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root." And elsewhere: "This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce *a priori* unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only form of our intuition."[10] It is clearly not enough to empirically point to the categories or rely on any set of *a priori* rules for their deduction, for these rules are themselves supposed to be warranted by the categories.[11]

As Kant is being torn apart by his critics, Fichte, a convinced Kantian, finds the only consistent way to defend transcendentalism in doing away with the epistemological weight of the thing-in-itself. In a far more radical than Kant manner, Fichte now postulates a first principle, a Reinholdian *Grundsatz*, which in a Cartesian way will ground his entire system. This first proposition is the *intuitively* revealed human self, the finite subject. Fichte can offer no proof of such subject but only empirically point to it,[12] just like Kant had done, or even take it as "faith."[13] But the stakes now are higher for this is no more the half-existential half-epistemological subject that Kant had pointed at. As conscious Fichte is of the subjective nature of his starting point, so forceful he is on defending absolute, unconditional, and unqualified certainty and objectivity. His *epistemological monism* provides him with the vantage point to see dialectic for the first time in a positive light, where Kant had seen it as 'the logic of illusion.' Once the thing-in-itself is done away with, the road to the solution of the Kantian antinomies of pure reason lays open. It is *the subject,* the self that posits the antinomies, being equipped with an inherent dialectical capacity. The same can be argued about Fichte's deduction of the categories. In sum, Fichte's insights will prove to be absolutely critical in the further development of dialectic in German idealism.[14] At the same time, Fichte remains entangled in the

Kantian *ontological dualism* which is now empowered by his epistemological assertiveness, for he essentially attempts to account for *object*-ivity without the object.

Vigorously asserting the I (which is easily associated with the individual subject) as the axiomatic starting point, Fichte must then establish intersubjectivity, the theoretical justification of the other.[15] It seems that in the *Wissenschaftslehre* the other comes from the outside of the self, as if Fichte defends a version of social contract theory.[16] Intersubjectivity is addressed by Fichte in his 1794 *Foundations of Natural Right*.[17] Without abandoning the axiomatic procedure, Fichte explores now the *necessity* of the not-I, and posits the self as *only* possible through the other. Further, even in a transcendental sense, Fichte now talks about the "sensible" object and sensible other that was unquestionably bracketed out in the *Wissenschaftslehre*. Thus, the rational being posits itself "as an *individual,* as one among several rational beings," and "*if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more than one.*"[18] The subject presupposes and posits the concept of another free rational being outside itself, the two being "mutually determined and conditioned" so that "individuality is a *reciprocal concept.*"[19] The striking similarities between Fichte's and Hegel's narratives are obvious. But this should not overshadow their equally substantial *methodological* differences. I return to this question in the following section.

For now, let us briefly turn to Schelling whose contribution to the epistemological debate is both critical and on the whole underestimated, as he is typically seen as the outdated metaphysician who restores the vain pursuit of philosophy. As a matter of fact, "from his early years Schelling saw something that many of his contemporaries, and many still today, fail to appreciate. He recognized that the solution to the fundamental problems of epistemology requires nothing less than metaphysics."[20] From his early works of the mid-1790s, Schelling is aware that the self that stands at the beginning of any cognitive act must be something more than the Fichtean finite human self. While being on the whole a disciple of Fichte, Schelling is emphatic about an "absolute intelligence,"[21] which he identifies with God, and which by implication warrants the transcendental project. Obviously, Schelling's position amounts to a potential *reversal* of Fichte and Kant; but it is not until 1802 that Schelling openly admits this implication, and abandons the transcendental project for the sake of metaphysical philosophy. The Kantian subject plainly becomes in Schelling the absolute metaphysical subject, and the search for the absolute substitutes now the Kantian "unconditioned." This absolute comes to be through nature and forms the background of human rationality and human knowledge. It thus

warrants epistemology which, by that time, is not the main concern of Schelling at all. Instead of trying to isolate the forms of certain knowledge from their content, and knowing very well the futility of all hitherto attempts, including the post-Kantian discussion, the mature Schelling is clear-sighted about the objective of philosophy: that it must examine "why is there something rather than nothing."[22] But once the absolute becomes the final ground of all being, how can finite human rationality grasp the absolute? It is important to have this in mind in order to properly understand Hegel's epistemological pursuit, and his relation to Schelling's metaphysics. Contrary to Hegel, Schelling's absolute is postulated intuitively at the beginning of knowledge, and reveals itself to human rationality in ways that can never be fully rational and transparent. The 1803 *Philosophy of Art*, the *Ages of the World* that come a few years later, and several years after that the *Philosophy of Revelation* and the *Philosophy of Mythology*, all represent Schelling's attempts to tackle this problem by maintaining a moment of transcendence on the side of the absolute, some space that is beyond natural existence and beyond human rational capacities. And *that* will be his main difference from Hegel. Rather than abandoning Schelling's absolute, Hegel modifies its nature and the way it can be determined: through a thorough, systematic, and fully transparent dialectic.

II. Objectivity as intersubjectivity as subjectivity, and *vice versa*: the circular dialectic of Hegel's *Phenomenology*

Such is, on a very sketchy account, the situation that Hegel is involved in. Fichte's defense of intersubjectivity in the *Foundations of Natural Right* contains the idea of the unity between theoretical and practical reason, something which Hegel makes good use of. Methodologically, however, Hegel's establishment of subjectivity drastically differs from Fichte. Hegel appeals to immediacy, to experience, as the beginning of cognition and aims at setting aside the one end of the transcendentalist trouble, the relationship between concept and intuition. The same move implies that instead of the subject, which will be only later revealed, the starting point of the narration is naïve consciousness taken in a rather existential mode. Hegel's procedure is immanent, and non-foundational or circular. By taking consciousness in its most immediate and naïve sense, as simply existing and not as an in advance postulated epistemological principle, Hegel avoids the difficulties of foundationalism. If one starts with an initial foundational proposition, that proposition must itself be proven, and this leads to an

infinite regress[23] or to the eventual acceptance of a spurious principle or act. For Descartes, this was the self-evident nature of the *cogito*. For Kant it was the unity of apperception in both epistemological and existential senses. And Fichte and Schelling (each on his own grounds) had postulated the self through intellectual intuition.

Consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology* comes to acknowledge what it through a number of circles which will lead it to consecutively abandon sense-certainty, rely on perception, become understanding, realize itself as self-consciousness, as reason, intersubjective spirit, and religion, until the notorious absolute knowing of the end of the book is revealed. Through this famous "ladder," Hegel will build the entry point to the *Science of Logic* which is the center of his system, the mere *moment* of purity, which, dialectical as it is, must *immediately* break down to its constituents, and must be understood solely along with them. The structuring of the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* is indicative of this circle: from the *Logic,* one moves to the *Philosophy of Nature,* to the *Philosophy of Mind* (in which the *Phenomenology* naturally reappears as a sublated moment of the system as a whole), and back to the *Logic*.

The search for truth and objectivity in the *Phenomenology* naturally begins with the appeal to immediate reality, to the object. Consciousness is taken in the form of sense-certainty, and the question is "whether in sense-certainty itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that sense-certainty proclaims it to be."[24] The occurring well-known dialectic of the "This," the "Now," and the "Here," leads consciousness to think that "the object, which was supposed to be the essential element in sense-certainty, is now the unessential element"[25] so the emphasis is moved now to the *subject*, to consciousness. A series of circles take place and express a back-and forth movement of consciousness: from itself to the object, and from the object to itself. Now, this back and forth is generated by the clash between universality or truth, and particularity as this is "instantiated" in sensual experience(s). Consciousness is forced to abandon sense-certainly as the source for truth and becomes perception, humanized sense, which "takes what is present to it as universal."[26] At first, for perception, "'I' is universal and the object is universal."[27] But the dialectic shows up again: the universal is no true universal unless it includes in itself the particular. Thus, the object of consciousness as universal is at the same time particular: it is the *one* thing that has *many* properties. The salt "*is* white, *also* cubical, and *also* tart, and so on."[28] The thing is a subsistence of the many properties, but once these are taken as separate ones, the thing is lost. And when the thing is taken as oneness, then the properties are lost. When consciousness focuses

on the one side, it looses the other and vice versa. It does not yet realize the *dialectic* in which it is entangled, and its "behavior consists in apprehending the object as self-identical."[29] A new series of circles and disappointments occurs; on a new level this is "the same as happened in the case of sense-certainty,"[30] and is all around the same issue as to whether the truth is in the object or in the subject, in consciousness. The realization of the unity of these two moments amounts to the "*unconditioned absolute universality*, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding."[31] This is a turning point in the narration: what gradually becomes evident is the *ideality* of truth.

With the emergence of the understanding, "for consciousness, the object has returned into itself from its relation to an other and has thus become Concept *in principle*; but consciousness is not yet *for itself* the Concept, and consequently does not recognize itself in that reflected object."[32] On the one hand, the understanding represents the unconditioned universality, the realized capacity of consciousness to think in and through ideal universal schemes. On the other hand, consciousness is still attached to the object and seeks universality in there: it "has for its content merely the objective essence and not consciousness as such."[33] It is clear that universality can never be extracted from the empirical contact with the object, but this moment is not yet realized by the understanding.

The understanding's 'unconditioned universal' is expressed as Force, as a "supersensible," intangible ideal background of natural events. Such unconditioned universality is a pure form, which, as dialectic commands, must communicate itself in a "*plurality* of the diverse universals" or matters of which the unconditioned universal is the essence. In a new series of circles, force splits into diverse forces or laws, and is "posited as the substance of these differences."[34] Hegel's idealism becomes more and more evident: in the play of forces "the truth of the Force remains only the *thought* of it," and it is through that interplay that the understanding gains access to the "*true background*" of things, that is, their ideality. In that sense, "the realization of the Force is at the same time the loss of reality."[35] However, the understanding still "converts its truth again into an objective *inner*, and distinguishes this reflection of Things from its own reflection into itself."[36] It sees that inner as a mere beyond, it does not see itself in it: "the inner world is, for consciousness still a *pure beyond*, because consciousness does not as yet find itself in it."[37] The pure beyond is the unknown, the in-itself. For Hegel, as well as for Fichte before him, there is no point of positing the in-itself as merely unknown;[38] this is a defeatist strategy for "then nothing would be left to us but to stop at the world of appearance, to perceive

something as true which we know is not true."[39] As such, the beyond is only an absolute void posited and determined by us, it "*comes from* the world of appearance that has mediated it . . . appearance is its essence and, in fact, its filling."[40] Thus, "we must fill it up with reveries, *appearances,* produced by consciousness."[41]

The proposed here scheme is thoroughly and profoundly *dialectical*, and works only as such: in that same way the beyond is taken *qua* beyond by the subject, in that exact way the beyond must be posited as *appearing* in the here, and the universal must negate and externalize itself in the particular: "negation is an essential moment of the universal, and negation, or mediation in the universal, is therefore a *universal difference.*"[42] This is a pulsating antithetical movement in which both sides are equally necessitated by each other and exclude each other. "The *selfsame* really repels itself from itself, and what is not selfsame really posits itself as selfsame."[43] Once again, the key message conveyed by the author of the *Phenomenology*, what pervades the entire narration with regard to knowledge, is the dialectic: "We have to think pure change, or *think antithesis within the antithesis itself,* or *contradiction.*"[44] Only in such a way can infinity be grasped as infinite movement, as difference "itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as *inner* difference, or difference *in its own self,* or difference as *infinity.*"[45]

The realization of infinity or of the infinite process of uniting and differentiating, and of the balancing between subject and object, will have dramatic effects on the understanding. The emphasis *must* finally be placed on *pure concepts* and their dialectic. The sides of each antithesis must be thought as "*in and for themselves* each an opposite—*of another*; thus in each moment the 'other' is at the same time expressed; or each is not the opposite of an 'other' but only a *pure opposite.*"[46] Although the understanding "falls short of infinity as such" because it remains focused on the object and its identity, the problem is made clear to the reader: "What is, for the Understanding, an object in a sensuous covering, is *for us* in its essential form as pure Concept."[47] The exposition of this Concept, of concept *qua* concept, of pure essentialities, "belongs to Science."[48] We see here that the *Science of Logic* is already announced along with Hegel's idealism.

When infinity becomes an object for consciousness, it is then acknowledged that consciousness finds only *itself* in the object: "The [mere] *being* of what is merely 'meant,' the *singleness* and the *universality* opposed to it of perception, as also the *empty inner being* of the Understanding, these are no longer essences, but are moments of self-consciousness."[49] Exactly *that* is for the *idealist* philosopher "the native realm of truth."[50] Consciousness now

becomes self-consciousness, and it is at this point that the famous subject-object identity is being established; but it is established in a *dialectical* way and through the medium of intersubjectivity.

The subject has recollected itself *through* the object. The account with objectivity having been settled, subjectivity is at once transferred to intersubjectivity, and self-consciousness is from the get go grasped in unity of with another, that other being also a self-consciousness. The moment seems Fichtean, but, unlike Fichte's foundationalist strategy, the subject in the *Phenomenology* has come to acknowledge itself only *post festum*. Furthermore, what comes up in Hegel's narrative is not the individual subject, but the *universal* human subject; not a single individual consciousness versus another that comes from the outside of the first *à la* Fichte. Hegel does not simply juxtapose the self to the not-self, not one particular to another particular, but the particular to the universal, and thus takes *both* the self and not self as exemplifications of that broader dimension.

Hegel occupies the phenomenological vantage point of intersubjective spirit,[51] and presents an account of a universal human consciousness dialectically grasped. Once this account is dialectical, then the intersubjective must be broken down to its constituents: individual consciousnesses opposed to one another. Thus, consciousness is grasped as Life which is "the splitting up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences":[52] "Life points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which Life exists as this unity, or as genus."[53] The famous "struggle for recognition" follows as a necessary consequence, but this is an empirical issue for intersubjectivity has already been established. This is why Hegel includes "from the start, not only a field of moral tensions but also the social medium by which they are settled through conflict."[54] And the idea of objectivity is always deflected through such intersubjective dimension.[55]

In the meantime, self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology* becomes reason or rational consciousness. Reason is now the universal, the genus, the category, whereas "the singular individual is the transition of the category from its Concept to an *external* reality, the pure *schema* which is both consciousness, and since, it is a singular individual and an exclusive unit, the pointing to an 'other.'"[56]

On the one hand, the external object *qua* self-sufficient source of truth has now disappeared, and reason proudly pronounces itself to be "the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality," a claim that Hegel repeats on every page in an entire chapter.[57] Yet dialectical reason finds this claim incomprehensible if this comes about as a mere assertion without showing

its path and particular shapes (as was the case of preceding idealistic doctrines, e.g., in Kant and Fichte). Hegel's idealism must *demonstrate* its circular path, the movement from immediate reality to the concept, not merely *assert* its ideality: "The idealism that does not demonstrate that path but starts off with this assertion is therefore, too, a pure *assertion* which does not comprehend its own self, nor can it make itself comprehensible to others."[58]

Thus, on the other hand, the natural object retains its existence and validity as, so to say, the vessel of the coming to be of subjectivity. But the object *qua* object cannot have truth or, more precisely, *philosophical* truth. As Schelling had ironically put it in his early works, if the object knew about itself, it would be a subject.[59] The object thus has both a subordinate and absolutely necessary role in the scheme of absolute idealism. It is only through the object that absolute idealism comes to be.

In the *Phenomenology*, reason soon becomes spirit with its full-blown intersubjective dimension, and Hegel's narration focuses on historical events and their meaning for the absolute. That intersubjective dimension is for Hegel the only possible dimension for the objective, the absolute to exist. Once again, the absolute is *dialectical*. It must necessarily break down and disperse into reality. Anything beyond *that,* that is, beyond the specific, limited, and relative ways that the absolute is portrayed, is an emptiness, "a whim, a dream, a non-thought."[60] It is precisely because of the *dialectical* rendering of the absolute that finite cognition becomes possible, and, at the same time, it is because of such rendering that finite cognition is warranted: it is warranted by the absolute.

Hegel's Concept is equivalent to the absolute, the true. The search for unqualified certainty and unqualified objectivity or truth *in the philosophical sense*, inevitably brought up this question. But the novelty of the movement of the *Phenomenology* is that it proceeds dialectically and reciprocally. On the one hand, it moves from consciousness (in the forms of sense-certainty, perception, and understanding) to self-consciousness, to reason, to spirit, to religion, and to absolute knowing. On the other hand, to the same extent that each preceding moment collapses into the following, up until absolute knowing, to that same extent the absolute, the Concept that knows itself, must be rendered as self-negating, self-sundering, and self-recollecting.[61] The Concept thus is just the *moment* of purity in Hegel's system, and it actually exists only in its coming-to-be what it is through its opposite. Now we can understand what Hegel meant in the preface to the *Phenomenology* by writing that the absolute "is essentially a *result,* that only in the *end* is what is

truly is";[62] and that the true is dialectical, "the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk."[63]

III. Objectivity as subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the *Science of Logic*

One might think that the way knowledge is rendered in the *Phenomenology* excludes objectivity: the subject gets disappointed in the infinite process of the rendering of the object, and turns to itself for knowledge (realizes that in the object it sees itself, another subject). From subjectivity one moves to intersubjectivity and its historical unfolding. Absolute knowing, then, can be understood only as an absolute way of historically restricted knowing.[64] The plausibility of this reading notwithstanding, its incompleteness is also clear. If this were the case, then the *Logic* would either be obsolete, or a speculative madness or a part of an entirely different project. One must have in mind the all-pervasive *dialectic* of Hegel's position in order to see that, on the one hand, the *Phenomenology* is warranted by the absolute, and on the other hand, that the *Logic*, the moment of purity of the system which portrays the absolute, must have its counterpart in natural and historical reality. The *Logic* is the center and all-encompassing framework of Hegel's system, but, as this system is dialectical and circular, the *Logic* must pass into reality, and reality must lead back to the *Logic*.

It is the "ladder" that the *Phenomenology* had built that justifies the *Logic*. Thus, large parts of Hegel's discussion in the preface to the *Logic* summarize the strategy that the *Phenomenology* had followed. The principle of *Logic* is now "*pure knowing,* the unity of which is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in it the opposition in consciousness between a self-determined entity, a subject, and a second such entity, an object, is known to be overcome," and the object has now "vanished."[65] *Logic* is thus "the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities."[66] It can justify itself as logic, as the science of pure thought, if it "frees itself from the necessary opposition between thought and object," but not in a *formal* way, in separating the one from the other. Rather, *Logic* must incorporate the object that it is *thought of*, and the *truth* of the object consists now in its *ideality*. Thus, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are "the content and the ultimate truth itself."[67] The forms of thought are at the same time the *content* of truth, of objectivity. In order to get at least some idea of this, one must "discard the prejudice that truth must be something tangible."[68]

It is the task of reason, of the rational/speculative ability, not of the understanding,[69] to expose "things *thought*."[70] At the same time, rather than demonstrating a truth *beyond* reality, the *Logic* exposes the truth *of* and *in* reality. Hegel challenges the separation of form and content of knowledge, claims that logic and reality must be taken together, and that when examining the forms of thought the question of truth cannot be left aside.

Hegel famously writes that the *Logic* depicts the situation in the godhead before the creation of nature, and claims about the cognition of God are spread throughout Hegel's writings. At the same time, it is a peculiar God or absolute that Hegel has in mind. Talking of God as the sum total of all realities, the sum total of all individual things, and thus the sum total of all negations, Hegel writes:

> in the end, the sum total of all realities simply becomes absolute contradiction within itself. Ordinary—but not speculative—thinking, which abhors contradiction, as nature abhors a vacuum, rejects this conclusion; for in considering contradiction, it stops short at the one–sided *resolution* of it into *nothing,* and fails to recognize the positive side of contradiction where it becomes *absolute activity* and absolute ground.[71]

Hegel makes it clear that he has in mind God, but not as the traditionally understood self-identical transcendent entity. He rather renders that entity as self-determining, self-negating,[72] and passing over into natural and historical reality. It is that self-determining, self-negating, and returning into itself absolute, Spinoza's substance rendered now as subject, what forms the *dialectical monistic* background which warrants the objectivity of subjective judgments against skepticism.

It can be said that intersubjectivity in the *Science of Logic* is presupposed by default in the form of intersubjectively valid categorical knowledge. The categories of that work, on Hegel's own acknowledgment, take the place of the categories of Kant's Transcendental Logic, and accomplish the Kantian/Fichtean endeavor of avoiding subjectivism and defeating skepticism by warranting the categories both through the appeal to the dialectical and self-negating absolute, as well as through the demonstration of the unity of the transcendental and the real. The categories of the *Logic* thus "serve for the more exact determination and discovery of *objective relations*" (*gegenständliche Verhältnisse*).[73] They have an ontological function, to adequately describe being. The *Logic* presents a description of the *ideal* make up or the truth of the *real. Logic* is thus metaphysics. But it was Kant who first had reduced metaphysics to the logical investigation of the

concepts it *a priori* involves.[74] Yet Kant had ascribed the categories to a vague "*subjective ego*,"[75] and failed to demonstrate their internal logic as well as their ontological justification, and their objectivity.

The two major parts of the *Science of Logic* are called Objective Logic and Subjective Logic. In the Objective Logic, which includes the Doctrines of Being and Essence, being passes over into determinate being and withdraws into essence. Essence then reveals itself as determining itself (as ground) and becomes existence, actualizes itself as substance, and withdraws into Concept (the *truth* of actuality). That move leads to the Subjective Logic where the Concept is treated as such.

The Doctrine of Essence exposes the contradictory nature of the absolute, the true. But essence is not a mere transcendence of the reality of being. Essence in the *Logic* returns to the surface, it becomes appearance, and then actuality as unity of essence and existence (or actually existing essence, actually existing absolute). Thus, the section on appearance of the *Logic* contains a chapter called "Existence," and a subchapter called "The thing and its properties." And in the following chapters, Hegel also discusses "matter," "force," and several other notions reminiscent of the *Phenomenology*. What I want to bring up here is that in an onto-logic like Hegel's the object never disappears. Even in the science of "simple essentialities" that the *Logic* claims to be, Hegel still maintains that "essence is existence; it is not distinct from its existence."[76] That is, essence *must* "pass over"[77] into a really existing thing. Of course, this does not happen in the *Logic* itself but Hegel makes sure that we understand the necessity of such a move as this will actually take place in the subsequent parts of the system. The absolute as Concept must *both* break down and disperse to reality, *and* recollect itself from within reality. It is not by accident that in these passages of the *Logic* an extensive attack on the Kantian thing-in-itself is launched.[78] If the thing in itself has no mediation, then we don't know that it exists, but if it *appears,* then we already know something about it. Kant assumes that the thing-in-itself exists, accepts that it appears, but still maintains we do not know anything about it. For Hegel's all-pervasive dialectic, such position is not consistent. In the same way in which the *Phenomenology* had argued, the merely acknowledged thing-in-itself is a beyond which is both *empty* and a *thought*. And in Hegel's dialectical rendering, both these Fichtean insights come together. First, truth as thought, as idea, is what idealism is about. Second, in Hegel's system there is no empty beyond, and no empty infinite. These must be viewed as *dialectical* thoughts. From the standpoint of dialectic as logic (which is, I believe, Hegel's overall position), there is a logical inconsistency in the traditional formal view of these issues: a mere beyond

which is not at the same time here, *is* a here which is, so to say, beyond. An infinite which is not at the same time finite is another finite next to the one it is supposed to negate (this is what Hegel famously terms "bad infinite"). And an absolute which does not incorporate the relative is a mere relative next to the one that is supposed to be overcome.

When essence in the *Science of Logic* becomes actuality, the Concept is acknowledged as subject. From this vantage point, the Doctrines of Being and Essence were representing "the *genetic exposition of the Concept*," they were "the moments of its *becoming*."[79] We reach thus the second major part of the *Science of Logic,* the Subjective Logic or Doctrine of the Concept. From the standpoint of what we are interested in this article, objectivity now *passes over* into subjectivity. This is not merely human subjectivity, but also *absolute* subjectivity.[80] And just like everything else, such absolute subject is dialectical: "every determination, every concrete thing, every Concept, is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which, by virtue of the *determinate, essential difference*, pass over into contradictory moments."[81] The Concept is a universality which necessarily splits itself into (and includes) particularity and individuality. And *vice versa*: "The particular contains universality, which constitutes its substance; the genus is *unaltered* in its species, and the species are not different from the universal but only *from one another*."[82]

Thus, *within* the Subjective Logic, the absolute as subject is first articulated through the theory of judgment and syllogism (the first section of the Subjective Logic which is called Subjectivity), and then necessarily passes over or returns to Objectivity (the second major section of the Subjective Logic). Objectivity takes now the forms of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. In that process, the Concept will reconstruct itself once again as subjectivity *from within* objectivity, and will pass over into the Idea (the third and last section in the Subjective Logic). "The Idea is the *adequate Concept,* that which is objectively *true,* or the *true as such . . . something possesses truth only in so far as it is Idea.*"[83] Although this position may initially strike us like a rigid, metaphysical idealism, Hegel is far from that. Just like in the *Phenomenology*, he again criticizes metaphysical idealism for being one-sided, and for failing to demonstrate the unity between idea and nature, and only then demonstrate its superiority as idealism. For the *absolute* idealist Hegel, "the idea is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity."[84] This claim is so important for Hegel that he repeats it on almost every page in the entire chapter on the Idea. And just as was the case in the *Phenomenology*, in the *Logic*, too, the Concept becomes Life, it sunders "itself *into itself as subjective individuality and itself as indifferent universality.*"[85] The living individual is "the

idea in the form of *individuality,* as simple but negative self-identity."[86] That is, the individual subject (and its intersubjective dimension) is related connected to the universal absolute subject to the same extent that the universal subject sunders itself apart and perpetually comes to be through subjectivity and intersubjectivity. As Hegel puts it,

> though the individual is indeed *in itself* genus, it is not *explicitly* or *for itself* the genus; what is *for* it is as yet only another living individual; . . . The identity with the other individual, the individual's universality, is thus as yet only *internal* or *subjective;* it therefore has the longing to posit this and to realize itself as a universal. But this *urge* of the genus can realize itself only by sublating the single individualities that are still particular relatively to one another.[87]

We see again that Hegel takes objectivity *qua* subjectivity *qua* intersubjectivity. The one passes over into the other in a process of unity and contradiction. It is through natural and historical reality that the Concept must come to be individuality and then develop itself as Concept. Hegel's goal is not to argue for empiricism or anything of this sort, but to demonstrate the dialectical *unity* of the empirical, the transcendental, and, if I may, the transcendent. But, let us not be misguided when we involve the transcendent: in the same way in which the truth of the finite thing is the Idea, in that same way the truth of the Idea *is* through finite things, in an eternal circle of being *and* becoming, or of coming to be what it at the same time is. There is no either/or. Once again, *this* is the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk.

Notes

[1] For a recent well-informed introductory discussion of German Idealism from this angle, see Will Dudley, *Understanding German Idealism*, Stockfield, UK: Acumen 2007.

[2] For instance, Hume negates even the notion of personal identity (and so does Kant), and even Locke who is on the whole not a skeptic, acknowledges that with regard to substance one can form only a vague idea.

[3] For a more detailed discussion, see Nectarios G. Limnatis, *German Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, ch. 1.

[4] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, B132.

[5] Ibid., A347/B405.

[6] For more on the epistemological–existential dilemma in Kant see Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Fate of Autonomy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[7] "However much Kant objects to the Leibnizian synthesis and the ideal of knowledge by way of concepts alone as 'dogmatic metaphysics' and however much he refuted that project by means of his *Critique*, he still certainly understands himself within the metaphysical horizon of questioning." See Hans Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, p. 158.

[8] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B7.

[9] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forth as Science*, trans. G. Hatfield in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, A183, p. 150.

[10] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, B29, B145–146.

[11] Kant is aware of the circularity of any such attempt. See ibid. A346/B404.

[12] Fichte finds Descartes' *cogito, ergo sum*, and Reihnold's later *repraesento, ergo sum* as already containing determinations of existence. For him, the *first* step of knowledge is the simple *sum ergo sum*, "I am therefore I am." Such self-awareness is conceived through intellectual intuition and no proof is possible thereof: "Whoever so wishes can always ask himself what he would know if his I were not an I, if he did not exist, and if he could not distinguish something not-I from his I." See Fichte, *Early Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. D. Breazeale, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 94–135, here 119; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke in 11 Bd.*, hrsg. v. I. H. Fichte, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971, vol. I, p. 62.

[13] "Our philosophy therefore begins with an item of faith, and it knows that it does this." See his discussion of the self as willing in Fichte, *The System of Ethics*, trans. and ed. Dan Breazeale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 30–34, here p. 31; Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, IV, 24–30, here, 27.

[14] For more detailed discussion, see Nectarios G. Limnatis, *German Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge*, pp. 73–125.

[15] Husserl will later clearly identify the challenge for transcendental ideal descriptions: departing from the self, they must be demonstrated as "eidetic" or "universal" (See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, esp. pp. 70–75), and avoid solipsism. Husserl is at pains to avoid solipsism in the fifth meditation which covers almost half of the book.

[16] It is thus unclear whether Fichte supports the social contract theory or not. For some good discussion see Dan Breazeale and Tom Rockmore, eds, *Rights, Bodies, and Recognition: New Essays on Fichte's, Foundations of Natural Right*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, chapters 1–4.

[17] Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre*, trans. M. Baur, ed. F. Neuhouser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. For a discussion from the standpoint of intersubjectivity, see Hohler, T. P. *Imagination and Reflection: Intersubjectivity. Fichte's* Grundlage *of 1794*. The Haage/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

[18] Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, pp. 9, 37; Fichte, Fichtes *Werke*, III, 9, 40.

[19] Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, pp. 40, 45; Fichte, Fichtes *Werke*, III, 43, 48.

[20] See Frederick Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1791–1801*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 466. Cf. also Dudley, *Understanding German Idealism*, p. 137: "Schelling did not simply replace transcendental idealism with the philosophy of nature, but rather joined the two, giving each a necessary place as one half of the philosophy of identity, which aimed to explain both why subjectivity must emerge from objectivity, and why objectivity must be experienced by subjects in the way that it is."

[21] See Schelling, *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794–1796)*, trans. F. Marti, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1980.

[22] Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke in 14 Bänden*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856–61, vol. 7, p. 174. In the early period until the 1800 *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling was identifying the highest task of transcendental philosophy as that of unifying the subjective with the objective.

[23] See Hegel's discussion in the *Phenomenology*: "in ordinary proof . . . the reasons given are themselves in need of further reasons, and so on *ad infinitum*." (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 40; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 3, p. 61.

[24] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 59; *Werke*, 3, 84.

[25] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 61; *Werke*, 3, 86.

[26] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 67; *Werke*, 3, 93.

[27] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 67; *Werke*, 3, 94.

[28] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 68; *Werke*, 3, 95.

[29] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 70; *Werke*, 3, 97.

[30] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 72; *Werke*, 3, 99.

[31] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 77; *Werke*, 3, 104.

[32] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 79; *Werke*, 3, 107–108. Miller's rendering of *Begriff* as "Notion" has been replaced throughout with "Concept."

[33] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 80; *Werke*, 3, 108.

[34] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 82; *Werke*, 3, 110.

[35] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 86; *Werke*, 3, 115–116.

[36] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 87; *Werke*, 3, 116.

[37] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 88, *Werke*, 3, 117.

[38] This kind of reasoning is already acknowledged (but not shared) by Aristotle. In dialectic, he writes, it is spuriously argued that not-being has being on the basis that not-being is not-being, and that the unknown is known to *be* as unknown (επιστητόν δέ τό άγνωστον, έστι γάρ επιστητόν το άγνωστον ότι άγνωστον—*Rhetoric*, 1402a). For Hegel, the mere unknown is empty, and it starts to be known from the moment it is posited by consciousness.

[39] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 88, *Werke*, 3, 118.

[40] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 89, *Werke*, 3, 118.

[41] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 89.

[42] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 90; *Werke*, 3, 120.

[43] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 96; *Werke*, 3, 128.

[44] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 99; *Werke*, 3, 130.

[45] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 99; *Werke*, 3,131.

[46] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 100; *Werke*, 3, 132.
[47] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 102; *Werke*, 3, 134.
[48] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 102.
[49] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 105; *Werke*, 3, 138.
[50] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 104; *Werke*, 3, 138.
[51] For a discussion of Hegel's understanding of spirit, see Peter G. Stillman, ed., *Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.
[52] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 108; *Werke*, 3, 142.
[53] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 109; *Werke*, 3, 143.
[54] Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, trans. Joel Anderson, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 18. Cf. Ludwig Siep, *Annerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie*, München: Karl Alber, 1979, esp. 223–255 where Siep emphasizes the teleological nature of Hegel's concept of recognition that reflects the teleological structure of spirit.
[55] Cf. here John Russon, *Reading Hegel's Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 84: "The ideal of objectivity arises, . . . in the context of intersubjectivity, and it arises in response to the need to reconcile the contradiction that is definitive of self-identity."
[56] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 143; *Werke*, 3, 183.
[57] See "V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason," in Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 139–145; *Werke*, 3, 178–185.
[58] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 141; *Werke*, 3, 180.
[59] "[N]o object ever realizes itself . . . never determines its own necessity." Schelling, *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen*, in F. W. J. Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke in 14 Bänden*, hrsg. v. ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856–61, vol. 1, pp. 164–165.
[60] These are words of Fichte from his programmatic *Aenesidemus* review back in 1792. See Fichte, *Review of Aenesidemus*, in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp.136–157, here p. 147. Fichte wrote them with regard to the thing-itself, which is, on Hegel's account, too, nothing but another empty beyond.
[61] From this vantage point, one can see the one-sidedness of both the classical "top down" metaphysical, and more recent "bottom up" non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel. See the discussion in Marina Bykova, "Spirit and Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in Kenneth Westphal, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009, pp. 265–295, here p. 267.
[62] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 11; *Werke*, 3, 24.
[63] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 27; *Werke*, 3, 46.
[64] For a recent splendid discussion of Hegel's concept of absolute knowing, see Allegra De Laurentiis, "Absolute Knowing," in Kenneth Westphal, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 246–264.
[65] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p 60; *Werke*, 5, 57.
[66] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 58; *Werke*, 5, 55.
[67] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 50; *Werke*, 5, 44.

[68] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 50; *Werke*, 5, 44. Cf. also Fichte: "For ordinary people and from the point of view of common consciousness, there are only objects and no concepts: the concept disappears in the object and coincides with it" (Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, p. 6).

[69] For some good discussion on dialectical speculation (reason and infinite thought, instead of finite understanding) as addressing the issues of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, see Jean-Marie Lardic, "Hegel classique ou spéculation et dialectique du transcendental," in Jean-Christophe Goddard, ed., *Le Transcendantal et le Spéculatif dans l'Idéalisme Allemand*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1999, pp. 115–135.

[70] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 45; *Werke*, 5, 38.

[71] *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 442; *Werke*, 6, 78; See also Hegel's discussion of the ontological argument in *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis,: Hackett, 1991, §193, pp. 270–271. Commentators usually focus on is Hegel's defense of that argument. But Hegel also charges against its formalism, and writes that the mere assertion of the perfect being in that argument is "presupposed," "abstract," and "assumed as in itself only," lacking the necessary diversity, diverse determinations, and real existence which Hegel's speculative dialectic demonstrates. But it is in such process that the absolute looses its typical nature.

[72] "The absolute is a subject only by enduring the test of the denial of its identity." See Bernard Mabille, "Idéalisme spéculative, subjectivité et negations," in Jean-Christophe Goddard, ed., *Le Transcendantal et le Spéculatif dans l'Idéalisme Allemand*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1999, pp. 151–171, here p. 164. According to Mabille, negation has ontological significance for Hegel: although Hegel is not a philosopher of subjectivity, subjectivity *is* the way of presentation as the product of negation *within* the system.

[73] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 35; *Werke*, 5, 24.

[74] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 51; *Werke*, 5, 45.

[75] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 62; *Werke*, 5, 59.

[76] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 483; *Werke*, 6, 128.

[77] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 483.

[78] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 484–498; *Werke*, 6, 129–139.

[79] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 577; *Werke*, 6, 245; See also in *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis,: Hackett, 1991, §59.

[80] Hegel substitutes the ambiguous Kantian subject with absolute subjectivity. This is what warrants judgment, syllogism, logic, and knowledge in general. On the question of Hegel's theory as theory of subjectivity, see Klaus Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Systematische und Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik*, 3rd extended edition, 1995, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995; In English by the same author see "Constitution and Structure of Self-identity: Kant's Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 8: *Contemporary Perspectives on the History of Philosophy*, eds. Peter French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983, pp. 409–431.

[81] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 442; *Werke*, 6, 79.

[82] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 605–606; *Werke*, 6, 280.

[83] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 755; *Werke*, 6, 462.
[84] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 756. *Werke*, 6,464; See also Hegel's, *Philosophy of Mind*, translated from the 1830 edition, together with the Zusätze by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2007, §437, *Zusatz*.
[85] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 764; *Werke*, 6, 474.
[86] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 765; *Werke*, 6, 475.
[87] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 773; *Werke*, 6, 485.

Chapter 10

The Greening of Hegel's Dialectical Logic

Joseph Margolis

I

If we think of "formal logic" or deduction as syntactically defined, semantically indifferent or uninterpreted, occupied exclusively with entailments among paired propositions (or, coordinately, with conditionally necessary inferences), we soon discover that we cannot, proceeding thus, ensure the relevance or match of any pertinently devised would-be deductive canon applied to any semantically or pragmatically familiar part of a natural language, informally selected. The reason is simply that there is and can be no rule by which to specify a *necessary* match between the syntactic rules of a deductive canon and the interpreted embedded syntax of our specimen sentences drawn from a language in actual use, such that by applying the rules envisioned we would be able to mark additional matchings reliably among other as yet uninterpreted specimens drawn from the same language. Even Aristotle's syllogism threatens to become problematic on this score, as the puzzles of intentional operators confirm.

Nevertheless, in noting the fact, I hardly mean to deny that we *can* devise a deductive canon to fit in a cautious way the surface uniformities of delimited runs of familiar discourse. It's been done of course. Even here, however, we admit, the modeling of special logics (for instance, deontic and epistemic logics) may go haywire where syntactic and semantic distinctions are not easily separated or where there may not be an adequate, purely syntactically defined rule to be had. Also, we know only too well that so-called inductive logics cannot be isolated in any way that would count as a suitable analogue of a deductive syntax; the reason, of course, is that induction depends, in however informal and improvisational a way, on epistemological and methodological considerations that cannot be reliably subsumed under any would-be formal "syntax" of science. It's for reasons of this kind that Charles Peirce, for instance, restricts all attributions of

strict necessity to deductive logic—that is, against presumptions in favor of inductive and what Peirce calls "abductive" logic, the logic of guessing at fruitful hypotheses.[1] The plausible implication is that a great deal of quotidian argument and inference is inherently informal, though orderly enough within the bounds of ordinary discourse.

This means that to speak of the logic of ordinary thought is already to think in terms of what may be innocently termed a "material" logic or the would-be rules of one or another form of "material inference"—that is, the form of the "logic" of semantically or conceptually rich runs of natural-language discourse deeply embedded in their enabling cultural ecologies. Such logics are bound to address specimens in which (a) syntactic and semantic factors cannot be easily segregated (or segregated at all) in the manner deductive canons favor; (b) the elements of an inferential network may be of heterogeneous kinds, rely on contextual relevance in a strong way, and include more than isolated propositions or short arguments of canonical form; and (c) modes of reasoning that feature the singularities of argumentative contexts and informal constraints of rationality of either the theorizing or practical sort are likely to be inhospitable to the kind of regularity "inferentialists" favor. Here, we still rely on socially shared intuitions of reasoning "logically," though without assurances of building in any cumulative way toward an extended canon of propositional inference. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens, as among narrowly entrenched practices of legal reasoning or in playing chess, that something approaching a heuristic canon cannot be entirely discounted. At a first pass, the search for a deductive canon favors a contextless approach, and the search for the rules of "material inference" concedes the ineliminable effect of changeable, individual, and imprecisely defined contexts of discourse—but it still seeks to elude the restrictive limitations of thoroughly "concrete" reasoning.

A surprisingly systematic picture of what I am calling material inference tempts us here—perhaps too quickly. I shall treat the idea more as an oblique start at characterizing Hegel's logic than in its own right—by way of scanning recent efforts at mapping a seemingly similar but very differently conceived logic. It's rather fashionable now to think of melding Hegel's conceptual resources with certain attractive proposals of analytic and pragmatist origin. In any case, the idea draws us toward the seemingly larger inferential regularities of practices thought to yield paradigms of actual argument more readily or more reliably than the usual syntactic and semantic dissection of inert propositions. Robert Brandom for instance, claiming both analytic and pragmatist backing, favors such a strategy, drawn

(he says) from a pointed reading of Hegel's analysis of social practices (additionally mediated, let it be said, by his reading of Wilfrid Sellars on "material inference"). He prefers an "expressive" (a "Hegelian" sort of pragmatist) account of inference over a "Darwinian" (in effect, a classic pragmatist) account of interactive and self-transforming episodes of socially shared reasoning:[2]

> [The pragmatists, Brandom claims] follow Hegel in thinking of concepts in terms of the way they develop by being applied in practice, rather than in terms of their representational content. With Hegel, they draw holist conclusions from this way of thinking: the various capacities that make up our practical and cognitive life are intelligible only in concert with their fellows, in terms of the role they play and the contribution they make to our overall functioning. . . .[Nevertheless, in treating means-end reasoning as the model of thought itself, in their Darwinian, instrumentalist, fallibilist, experimental spirit,] they rejected Hegel's rationalism, the central role he accords to the expressive rationality that consists in making what is implicit in practice explicit as principle.[3]

What Brandom says here is not uninteresting, but it posits a disjunctive choice between Hegel and the classic pragmatists that cannot be more than a contrivance. Both Peirce and Dewey were Hegelians of a sort *and* of course Darwinians; but Peirce was hardly a Deweyan instrumentalist and Hegel's logic is hardly confined to an inferential (or propositional) logic. Furthermore, Hegel is not a pragmatist.

Brandom and Sellars deform Hegel—precisely by their respective efforts at explicating the logic of "material inference": *they* seek a canon that is in some robust sense already implicit in the practice of material inference in admissible argumentative specimens. They converge with Hegel in innocuous ways in the effort to expand the scope of logic to include the conditions of valid inference in the inquiries of a live science and in the search for a foundationless or "presuppositionless" discipline. But *they* are bent on the discovery of something approaching a separable canon in the sense of unearthing the operative rules by which, finally, to sort correct and incorrect forms of material reasoning; whereas Hegel intends his explication to identify a process of "concrete" but "systematic" reasoning capable of confirming the matched structure of true thought about what is actual and of the formative process of reality itself, which thinking grasps by following its public, progressive realization of both thought and being.

This is indeed the theme of the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (and, as Hegel explicitly says, of the *Phenomenology* itself) and the counterpart theme of the *Science of Logic* and the Introduction to the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, the opening paragraphs of its Preliminary Conception, and the whole of the *Encyclopaedia* itself. The theme may be glimpsed in the following remark drawn from the Preface to the *Phenomenology*:

> Science, the crown of a world of Spirit, is not complete in its beginnings . . . [Spirit] is the whole which, having traversed its content in time and space, has returned into itself, and is the resultant *simple Notion* of the whole. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in those various shapes and forms which have become its moments, and which will now develop and take shape afresh, this time in their new element, in their newly acquired meaning.[4]

Hegel presents his vision again and again in remarkably varied ways. But the point of contrasting the efforts of Sellars and Brandom with Hegel's is to draw attention to the pregnant but difficult finding that *they* seek to isolate the *presupposed* canon of material inference by way of a *presuppositionless* reflection on discrete argumentative specimens, which, though presumably isolated in inferential contexts, stands, if successful, as a separable canon; whereas *Hegel's* thought is that the discerned structure of the very process of thinking about what is ultimately real (which matches the dialectical "becoming" of actuality itself) is never canonically isolable from the concrete process in which both take form and are seen to be ultimately one and the same. *If* what is phenomenologically "given" in contingent experience counts as a "presupposition" for Hegel, it is nevertheless stripped of any foundational or privileged presumption throughout the developing process in which thinking sublates the meaning (of what is thus given) within the evolving, inclusive "system" that Science or Spirit finally achieves.

Hegel somewhat anticipates Sellars's and Brandom's venture—effectively repudiates any such stopgap, treats it as no more than a misguided reliance on a merely abstract "principle" (drawn from what is given) that (for that very reason) can "only [belong at] the beginning" of the dialectical recovery of the entire "concrete" system that includes the final unity of thought and being. Rightly read, Sellars and Brandom are in search of a canon that functions criterially, in however accommodating a manner; whereas Hegel is convinced of no more than that the process he describes will finally yield a valid sense of the identity of thought and being at the limit of "absolute knowing": it cannot be counted on criterially to identify the correct import

of any sublated findings on the way to its completion. The two ventures invite very different challenges.

Brandom aligns himself with Hegel's "rationalism" here—*as* himself a "pragmatist" against "the pragmatists": that is, he emphasizes

> the way in which social practices that are discursive—in being articulated by relations of justification and evidence, in taking the form of giving and asking for *reasons*—transform merely *natural* creatures into distinctively *cultural* ones, beings whose *history* now plays the role that their *nature* plays for non-discursive beings.

He concludes that "Hegel's [dialectical] logic was intended to give us the tools to understand that process, so as to be able to engage in it self-consciously"—in effect, to promote a certain form of "ambitious, systematic philosophical theorizing" that the classic pragmatist alternative thwarts.[5] I take Brandom to be mistaken here: there's no evidence at all that Hegel thought his "logic" could claim any final necessity before the end of *geistlich* reflection (*Nachdenken*); and the "end," taken strictly, exceeds any finite cognitive capacity. The resources of Reason are indeed greater than those of Understanding, but they are limited nevertheless. In any case, the resources of *Vernunft* are not cognitional in the Kantian way.

To guess at Brandom's motivation (his philosophical cunning, so to say), I surmise that he supposes it would be easier to justify drawing a determinate inferential canon from culturally entrenched discourse than from animal continuities. But what difference would that make in claiming to find anything like a canon of "material inference" if, as I believe and as Brandom seems to signal, Hegel's logic must be close to the source of his own line of speculation? We must surely allow the open question: *Is material inference essentially informal as a socially entrenched practice (an inferential practice, of course) or can it be shown to yield an explicit body of rules (of whatever flexibility or complexity we imagine we need)?* Brandom seems both more concessive and more confident than Sellars; though, ignoring philosophical politics, it may just be true that material inference (*a fortiori*, Hegel's logic) remains insuperably informal, tacit, socially entrenched, habituated (in Peirce's nice sense), rulelike (perhaps) but *not explicitly rule-bound*. I'm convinced that this last is by far the more compelling option.

We see, therefore, how the contest that stretches from Frege on deductive models to, say, Sellars's version of the unity of science program could easily be "revived," like Rorty's revival of pragmatism, as a contest about the right reading of Hegel. Still, Hegel's "logic" cannot but be insuperably

informal—and stronger for it. I have no wish to make Hegel out to be a pragmatist. He is not a pragmatist; though Peirce and Dewey were Hegelians of an attenuated kind *and* were closer to the purpose of Hegel's own logic than were Sellars and Brandom. To see that much is to begin to see a perspicuous way of contesting the extravagances of Hegel's vision—while allowing it.

I find Brandom's position errant, inflated, less than perspicuous: because, for one thing, Peirce can hardly be said to share Dewey's strong attraction to the means-ends model of reasoning and because the infinite continuum of inquiry obviates any and every finite canon; because adopting the model of social practices viewed under conditions of historied change would oblige Brandom to come to terms with the larger informalities of the pragmatist vision; because complying with evolving practices of reasoning need never confirm the existence of any provisionally closed canon of inference; because Hegel's treatment of discursive practices is hardly a pragmatist maneuver; and because Hegel himself does not (and, I believe, cannot) provide a detailed account of his own executive logic.

There's no need to quarrel: the pivot of the issue Sellars and Brandom share concerns the difference between our being able, as members of a discursively apt society, *to understand the reasoning of our fellows and ourselves* in singular contexts, whether or not such an understanding can be "made explicit" as *a material canon*. If Brandom and Sellars cannot provide a testable canon (as seems likely), then, in my opinion, all their supporting arguments must lose ground in pursuing their cause and in co-opting Hegel's logic.

"In analytic philosophy," Brandom affirms, "the pragmatic arguments of Quine, Sellars, and Davidson led to a kind of conceptual holism, and Kuhn's work in the philosophy of science led to an appreciation of the essentially historical character of concepts."[6] ("Led," in the first clause, cannot have more than a distinctly local import. Its use in the second clause marks a genuinely revolutionary turn; but it's a turn that undermines the purport of the first.) Of course, if one reads Peirce and Ernst Cassirer with care—both Hegelianized Kantians neither of whom "counts" in Brandom's recovery of the connection between pragmatism and Hegel's logic—one might suppose that Sellars's reflections on material inference, as well as Quine's and Davidson's work, did indeed set analytic philosophy a more difficult task than Brandom imagines.[7]

Cassirer grasps the essential "Hegelian"/"Peircean" lesson in a way that compellingly challenges Sellars's and Brandom's hopes about a canon (idealized algorithms, perhaps) of material inference at its root. In theorizing

about an adequate conception of "the ultimate, absolute elements of reality," we find ourselves, Cassirer remarks, in

> a never-ending process through which the relatively necessary takes the place of the relatively accidental and the relatively invariable that of the relatively variable. We can never claim [he warns] that this process has attained to the ultimate invariants of experience . . Rather, the possibility must always be held open that a new synthesis will instate itself and that the universal constants, in terms of which we have signalized the "nature" of certain large realms of physical objects, will come closer together and prove themselves to be special cases of an overarching lawfulness.
>
> [We provisionally postulate what to regard as] the ideal limit of the diversely changing theories [of the physical object; but every imputed new law of nature governing such conjectures] must expect to be recognized in its merely contingent universality and replaced by a still broader universal relation.[8]

If we read these concessions in accord with Peirce's fallibilism,[9] which seems more than reasonable though disputatious—note Cassirer's wording, "contingent universality"—we see how unlikely it is that an explicit "material" canon could possibly be drawn from any pertinent inquiry. Brandom mentions two concessions at least that, as far as I can see, seriously weaken any such prospect without at all damaging our aptitude for grasping how we and others reason within the social practices we suppose we share: neither holism nor history (certainly not historicity) are concessions likely to yield a convincing canon. Both holism's and historicity's pertinence count as insurmountable barriers against *any* canon of "material inference." Yet in failing here, we still succeed in identifying the informal rigor of material inference itself. The mercy is that an actual canon is unnecessary—even an inconvenient deflection in the midst of life.

It's also true—and this is the point of my coupling Hegel with Peirce and Cassirer—that the variant form of dialectical reasoning that I've just cited from Cassirer, which in its original form was so essential to Hegel's radical critique and historicized continuation of Kant's transcendental project, counts, through the convergent power of Peirce's pragmatism and Cassirer's neo-Kantian turn, as a surprising extension of Hegel's "logic." Both feature in a particularly impressive way the significance of the continuum of finite/infinite inquiry within the evolving stages of the physical sciences, which, in the Hegelian spirit, plainly undercuts Kant's *apriorism*: as in speculative reason's relative autonomy from the constraints of the data of sensory

experience (abduction, in Peirce's idiom); and, as in the provisional conversion of the content of what is phenomenologically "given," as independent mathematical functions freely fitted to the apparent data of the sciences (collecting, for instance, the pioneer discoveries of Hertz and Helmholtz in favor of higher-order covering laws, according to Cassirer's well-known account).[10]

I have the highest regard for Hegel's spectacular proposal; but it must be reined in straitly, along the lines bruited by Cassirer, if it is ever to be effectively revived within contemporary analytic (and allied) philosophies. There can be no criterial assurance in the telic presumption of the regulative idea of "absolute knowing" *and* there can be no self-evident confirmation in the improvised conjectures of *Vernunft* functioning at an explanatory level initially freed from the Kantian constraints of *Verstand*: ineluctably, the *a priori* takes an *a posteriori* form and its approximation to the True or Real can be assessed (if confirmed at all) only by the causal or predictive or interpretive fit of the contingent content of perception and experience—expressly transformed for the purpose. Here we glimpse the inescapable informality of Hegel's dialectical logic—the plain and simple reason Sellars and Brandom are so far off the mark, and Peirce and Cassirer so prescient.

II

I have introduced Sellars and Brandom, of course, as stalking horses. Apart from the intrinsic interest of their reflections, they contribute a completely unintended warning as we begin to board the deeper difficulties of Hegel's dialectical logic. I find their insistence immensely instructive, although it counts entirely against the discovery of a material canon *if* that canon is made to depend on Hegel's vision. I have only a little more to add, assuredly, along these lines before turning to Hegel.

Sellars observes, in countering "regulism," that norms simply are rules and that, if they are rules they must be explicable as such—an argument known to generate an awkward regress of its own. According to Brandom, Sellars's resolution rests with the enabling dictum, "The mode of existence of a rule is as a generalization written in flesh and blood, or nerve and sinew, rather than in pen and ink."[11] This is appealing but misleading. Brandom explains Sellars's would-be solution in telltale terms he wrongly supposes would be acceptable to both Wittgenstein and

Sellars, and, apparently, Hegel:

> there is [he says] a need for a *pragmatist* conception of norms—a notion of primitive correctnesses of performance *implicit* in *practice* that precede and are presupposed by their *explicit* formulation in *rules* and *principles*.[12]

But the truth is, the intended explanation is driven by the need to escape the regress that is itself no more than an artifact of an unsuitable explanation. Certainly, the mature Wittgenstein would never agree with Brandom's proposal. Brandom opts, therefore, for a model that escapes the regress and the reduction of norms to mere regularities—but without ever demonstrating that there must be a canon of material inference to be had:

> The regulist [he says] starts with a notion of norms explicit in principles and is obliged then to develop an account of what it would be for such things to be implicit in practice. The pragmatist starts rather with a notion of norms implicit in practice and is obliged then to develop an account of what it would be for such things to become propositionally explicit, as claims or rules.

The latter, Brandom tells us, counts as "one of the primary tasks" of the book before us.[13]

But surely, this begs the essential question: *there is no evidence that there are, in principle, canonical rules of material inference to be discovered*, however tempting it may be to cast the supposed regularities in the heuristic guise of rules "written in flesh and blood." The analogies of argument may be firm enough to justify our sense of some sort of normative tolerance in moving from case to case; but an aggregate of such singularities may, and indeed can, never yield any generalized discovery strong enough to validate our finally rendering the central mass of implicit "proprieties" of inference *as* explicit "rules" of inference. Brandom is perfectly right to insist that the "[regulist] must make room for the permanent possibility of mistakes";[14] but so must Brandom—at a higher level of generality. The entire labor risks being no more than arbitrary and question begging—distorting and unnecessary.

I concede the characteristic normativity of general practices and the subaltern normativity of acceptable inference in discrete instances of "material" reasoning; but I see no actual or existing rules or any strict canon lurking there even if, for special reasons, there appear to be pockets of rule-governed behavior here and there. To insist otherwise, as Sellars and

Brandom do, is to violate the largely improvisational nature of practical life itself. It confuses and conflates heuristic models of human reasoning with the flat claim that material inference *is*, finally, rule-governed. I cannot find in Sellars or Brandom (or, for that matter, in Wittgenstein, Peirce, Dewey, Cassirer, Kuhn, Quine, Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger—or Hegel himself—or, say, among the champions of decision theory) the least evidence that there is a pertinent canon to be *discovered* in the spontaneous practices of societal life. That we sometimes impose such rules in certain local stretches of inquiry—in the law, for instance, among the protocols of the scientific laboratory—seems to me to confirm the point, not to defeat it.[15] In effect, Brandom "misreads" both Peirce's and Cassirer's instruction—*a fortiori*, Hegel's.

It's perfectly plausible to suppose that, in particular instances of material inference, we are prepared to treat a given string of reasoning as unproblematically acceptable within the space of entrenched or shared practices, *without* ever being able to confirm *its being "correct"* in any stronger exclusionary sense, *without* being able to disallow alternative possibilities incompatible with the option thus presented, *without* being able to venture a generalized rule to cover what we suppose is a set of very similar specimen cases, *without* being convinced that there is any rule to be discovered that rightly ranges over such singularities or that cannot be "overturned" or "superseded" by evolving history.

My intuition has it that Hegel's dialectical logic is a hugely powerful paradigm of a kind of material reasoning akin to, but very different from, "material inference" in the sense Sellars and Brandom pursue—in which, once again, we begin with the historically contingent shared practices of reasoning that have *made us* culturally apt in the first place, in spite of our not being able to specify normative "proprieties" approaching the rigor of any inferential canon of Sellars's or Brandom's sort. We are obliged to fall back, then, to informal limitations on what to expect to find in asking ourselves whether and in what sense we can or cannot validate Hegel's logic.

Put another way, one may say rhetorically that Hegel's dialectical logic "is" the essential, necessary, uniquely *inclusive* logic that marks the "identity" of all the forms of "difference" that I have been collecting here: that *that is* what the Introduction to the *System of Logic* means to affirm. But let's see if such a reading can be found to be convincing in a passage like this:

> But the *goal* [of the logic, or the "education," or the "ascent" of experience, to some all-inclusive unity of thought] is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer

> needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion. Hence the progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations on the way. Whatever is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by something else, and this uprooting entails its death [that is, its eclipse by a more inclusive, a more secure approach to some form of rational and total unity]. Consciousness, however, is explicitly the *Notion* [*Begriff*] of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself. With the positing of a single particular the beyond is also established for consciousness . . .[16]

What might this mean, once we go beyond Hegel's extraordinary rhetorical flourishes, is that the figurative divinity of mortal thought or the analogy between one of Hegel's sublimely confident *geistlich* conjectures and the assured mystery of Christ is perhaps only a lovely bit of bombast.

Fortunately, there is another reading advanced in J. N. Findlay's Foreword to Miller's translation of the *Phenomenology*, that tolerates, if it does not actually support, my reading of the passage cited. Findlay acknowledges that Hegel's conception of the necessary structure of progressive knowledge by way of the continual "negation" of what, contingently, appears to be the "absolute truth . . . might seem to go too far." But then he adds:

> Hegel will, however, marvellously *include* in his final notion of the final state of knowledge the notion of an endless progress that can have no final term.[17]

He certainly means no more than that Hegel presents the transient and accidental in the guise of the necessary and essential. But *that* entails that Hegelian "necessity" *is* vacuous at any finite point at which dialectical reasoning must be freewheeling—though not, for that reason, inhospitable to dialectical adventures epistemically of the sort championed by Peirce and Cassirer *applying* Hegel in any *wissenschaftlich* inquiry.[18]

Findlay affords a clue to the sense in which Hegel, as well as Peirce and Cassirer, may be read as congenial to a pragmatism larger than that of the original conjectures of the classic pragmatists. We must bear in mind that Peirce never permitted his own conception of pragmatism to disallow the infinite import of any finite inquiry, though Deweyan instrumentalism would have had to find a drastically different formulation by which to

approach the Hegelian theme ("warranted assertibility" for instance, in place of truth).

We grasp the concept of the infinitely elusive goal of the ultimately inclusive identity of truth and being that we cannot grasp in any finite evidentiary way: we are, therefore, continually adrift within the bounds of consensual tolerance and collective conviction—which, because it cannot be bettered, counts as the human form of an objective inquiry. But if so, then there cannot be an actual rule of material reasoning though we possess the concept of what it would require. When Hegel says, therefore, that "the consideration of truth [as] agreement with itself constitutes the proper concern of logical thinking," he is affirming nothing more than what is formally entailed by his own commitment to the idea that "*logic* coincides with *metaphysics*, with the science of *things* grasped in *thoughts* that used to be taken to express the *essentialities* of . . . *things* [now sublated, raised up, converted, interpreted, *from* what we first conjecture passes for objectivity in empirical understanding *to* what we now rationally surmise is truly actual]."[19] We cannot equate the necessity of Hegel's formal concept of truth with the imputed necessity of any sequence of concrete steps in accord with Hegel's material logic by which we claim to pass from sensuous content to rational conception or from conjectures of what is objective in experience to what is actual at the limit of "absolute knowing":

> God alone is the genuine agreement between Concept and reality; all finite things, however, are affected with untruth; they have a concept, but their existence is not adequate to it.[20]

This explains why it is that

> Thinking it over [*Nachdenken*] *changes* in the way in which the content is at first [given] in sensation, intuition, or representations; thus, it is only *through the mediation* of an alteration that the *true* nature of the *object* comes into consciousness.[21]

But this hardly means that *whatever* passes "through the mediation" and remains an object for consciousness (redundantly: an "object" [*Gegenstand*] *is* indeed what "it" would be for infinite or absolute consciousness).

All the essential clues of Hegel's conception are embedded here. The point is that he is speaking of how logic—*all of it*: formal, informal, material, originary, presuppositionless, systematic, practical, theoretical, conceptual, dialectical, provisional, transient, historicized, concretely relevant, evolving,

finite and infinite—*emerges out of the contingent practices of cultural life* and, reaching for inclusive closure, outstrips its seemingly assured capacity. If our reflections on the very Concept of logic begin innocently and spontaneously, as the *Phenomenology* signifies inquiry does—risking radical contingency and arbitrariness—we find ourselves inexorably confronted, *everywhere*, with the need to overtake the threat thus posited, and to demonstrate, if we can, that we can indeed grasp the concept of the *necessary* (the inclusive: the all in all, the holistic, total, reflexive, self-comprehending "absolute") truth about logic; that is, "truth" in that final sense in which Thought and Being are one and the same—whole and one, incorporating all ephemera.

That is what Hegel actually says—*and* claims—can resolve our conceptual fears about the world's intelligibility without yet mastering the evidentiary sources by which such a feat may be concretely demonstrated. There's reasonable evidence that Hegel believes in the possibility of such an achievement and even that we "progress" towards its "infinite" realization, by way, only, of our finitely delimited, *vernunftig* grasp of whatever, evidentiarily, we are convinced is finally actual. I find this to be an extraordinary conviction.

But there is no reason to think that, even where his conception of logic—his conception of the systematized Concept [*Begriff*] of the whole of logic—is fully articulated, Hegel's own "absolute" vision *is* finitely and operatively accessible (and known to be) to human understanding (*Verstand*) or (at a higher level) to human reason (*Vernunft*). Hegel explicitly opposes the first possibility and shows the second to be profoundly problematic. There are all sorts of difficulties with grasping Hegel's conception adequately or correctly. Certainly, it is possible to *think* (perhaps, equivocally, to conceive and believe) or perhaps to *hope* (within the scope of *Vernunft*) that this or that application of what is often informally termed Hegel's "dialectical logic"—the subject of the *System of Logic* and of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*—actually meets the strictest constraints of his system.

I find the actual confirmation impossible to complete and in any case alien to what Sellars and Brandom have proposed. Certainly, Sellars (Brandom, more equivocally) favors the formal *closure* of the space of any would-be system of material inference; whereas Hegel thinks of his own logic as entirely open-ended—short of reaching the *absolute* inclusion of all alternative systems of logic fitted to whatever sectors of actuality we suppose we find.

An essential difference, then, between Sellars's and Hegel's proposals lies with Hegel's presumption that the "correctness" or "truth" (*Wahrheit*) of

what is "materially" affirmed in accord with the *method* of his logic cannot be confirmed until we reach the "absolute" inclusion of all that is "actual" [*wirklich*] conformably with the formula (which Hegel himself cites) drawn from the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*: namely, that *"What is rational is actual, and what is actual, is rational*"; or, in effect, conformably with what is "most actual," with what Hegel calls God, the "one," who "alone is genuinely actual."[22]

Formulations of this last sort must be reinterpreted for contemporary philosophical tastes if we are ever to recover the fine-tuning of Hegel's logic. For Hegel nowhere doubts that we must, in effect, *rely* on our finite competences: it's only that, given that thinking is itself historied, every finite assertion or belief will be superseded by the force of evolving experience—"sublated," as Hegel affirms. But that means that the "holism" of Absolute Knowing is entirely regulative, never substantively operative in formulating anything that is confirmably true. At one stroke, we both retire the infamous doctrine of truth as the internal coherence of what answers to the absolute totality of "what Is" *and* define the point of the essential difference between Sellars and Brandom's conception of material inference and Hegel's conception of dialectical logic. The first theme goes "pragmatist" in our time, in a distinctly narrow sense; and the second collects the deep provisionality of doxastic practice within the boundaries of the first. There's the meaning of that most important Hegelian pronouncement: "everything finite is . . . its own sublation."[23] Sellars and Hegel are irreconcilable.

My claim is that Sellars and Brandom *fail* because *their* systems of material inference *cannot be made explicit in terms of the would-be rules of a closed system of application drawn from the living practices of one or another society*; but I also claim that Hegel *succeeds* in formulating a conception of a material logic keyed primarily to *the adequacy of our concepts* rather than to *the inferential "content" of our propositions*: keyed, that is, to the adequacy of our *ideas* [*Ideen*] rather than to the syntactic adequacy of our argument forms. As I say, Hegel construes the Absolute as "the total process of the self-articulation of meaning and of what is meaningful"—of our ultimate *Begriff* "realized" in accord with actuality (as just construed).[24] But Sellars and Brandom never seriously address Hegel's picture of our finite grasp of the open-endedness of history.

Hegel's *Logic*, then, addresses the structure of reasoning and argument, but it is not in the strictest sense *meant to be a canon of material inference* at all, though it makes room for inference. On the contrary, it is inherently informal, improvisational through and through; it's only that at the "absolute," humanly inaccessible limit of inquiry, addressing the inclusive whole of

actuality [*Wirklichkeit*], it "would" display a process of reasoning deemed *necessary* in virtue of reaching the (one) ultimate truth.

Here, Hegel would have failed utterly if he *had* supposed that, in the *Philosophy of Right* (say) or in the *Aesthetics*, he had truly reached the one actuality (God, perhaps) by way of alternative approaches to the various singular and exclusive world-histories of "what is." *Here* I hold that the "dialectic" applies materially—in conjecture, in belief, in "hope" (as Peirce, following Hegel in his rather cautious way, might say.)[25] There cannot be any uniquely correct or secure way, open to mortal beings, to reach the final telic discovery of God's reality.

The deepest lesson of the cultural world I take to be this: that its significative or semiotic features—what in the Hegelian idiom is "rational," whether in infinite inquiry or with regard to Absolute *Geist*, what is "symbolic" in terms of Cassirer's theory of symbolic forms or instantiative of "Thirdness" in Peirce's vision—are characteristically determinable but not expressly determinate; in effect, they are intrinsically and diversely interpretable. But, of course, if *that* is true, as the interpretation of history, action, art, and language strongly confirm, then Sellars and Brandom have taken a wrong turn, and the rigor of Hegel's dialectical logic may be seen to accord best with the endlessly evolving, insuperably perspectived, historicized, moderately relativistic congruities favored by the entrenched practices of cultural fluency itself. I need only add that such a conception of the functional resilience of cultural life and consensual tolerance fits our actual practices remarkably well—and that its opponents are palpably unsuccessful in confirming their own stricter proposals. The reason for the running comparison with Sellars's and Brandom's analysis of material inference is simply that their effort counts as the current exemplar of analytic labors expressly meant to reconcile Hegel's resources with the thrust of analytic inquiries.

To admit this is to admit that the material logic Hegel champions—which, in concept, captures what, for Hegel, constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition of Truth—never actually yields what is necessary in any finite application. Furthermore, to admit that is to admit as well that the "infinite" application of Reason's logic *belongs entirely to the finite work of rational human conjecture* though not to empirical Understanding (*Verstand*) or, *a fortiori*, the Kantian transcendental. The objective import of the finite work of human Understanding (*Verstand*) itself belongs to Reason's autonomous grasp of "infinite things" bound by the inherent limitations of human conjecture (*Vernunft*).

I see no reason to regard Hegel's version of material reasoning as a failure. It's an astonishing success—but more modest in its final presumption than

may appear. It explains what we could possibly mean in claiming that the contingent limitations of human reason *are*, *qua* finite, sufficient to support our mortal knowledge of what is real, under the very auspices of the "absolute": that is, what through finite understanding and conjectural reason we can never equate with the "infinite [boundlessly realized] object" (beyond all "negation") that is unconditionally real.

Hegel is concerned to make serious use of the paradox, not to treat it as an illusion. He would have failed, hands down, if he supposed he *had* overcome the limitation managed here as a paradox. Accordingly, the logic of material reasoning must concede its insurmountable limitation: *must go completely informal, completely conjectural*. Yet true to Hegel's conception of dialectical logic, it must also present its best conjectures—in fact, all of its transient conjectures and beliefs—as necessary "parts" of the truth that answers to the final unity of thought and being. It's here that Sellars and Brandom go completely wrong: first, because they assign their canon to what would answer to the powers of *Verstand* rather than *Vernunft*; and second, because they conflate their gathering collection of would-be rules of inference with the radical contingency of knowledge at every point of seeming certitude. They cannot confirm the rules they seek, conformably with Hegel's vision. The "rules" of material inference, or reasoning, in Hegel's sense, can never be more than heuristic.

But *if* Hegel concedes the paradox of "absolute knowing," as I believe he does, then the supposed "necessities" of the phased progression of the *Phenomenology* and the conceptual "necessities" of the *Encyclopaedia Logic* must, ultimately, be rhetorical *if* (as must be true, to make the case) the very concept of material reasoning is presented as if it were already recovered dialectically as the phased, concretely realized progression that it can only anticipate. No one, to my knowledge, has shown a way to escape the *aporia*. As I say, Peirce and Cassirer assuredly grasp the need for a more modest model for our age: I think they are right, and I am persuaded that Hegel would "agree." The convergent "pragmatism" of Peirce and Cassirer, I am convinced, shows us how best to use Hegel's logic in our own time.

I must recast the developing picture more pointedly than I have. It may even be necessary to go over the same distinctions a number of times, from different vantages, in order to come closer to grasping Hegel's vision of the inclusive logic he condenses in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*. Certainly, the right way to begin is to be aware that the "science of logic" belongs entirely to the range of competence of the power of Reason (*Vernunft*) rather than of mere Understanding (*Verstand*) in the Kantian sense. Hence, it is in a way no longer committed to the transcendental or indeed the facultative

powers alleged to be incorporated within the empirical work of the Kantian Understanding or, for that matter, within the comparable efforts of Hegel's *human* investigators who begin with "sense certainty" or "perception" among the ascending constructions of "consciousness" in the *Phenomenology*.

Here, too, the philosophical interpretation of what is originally "given" phenomenologically is always and already infected by the *a posteriori*, historical and historicized conceptions of *vernunftig* reflection.[26] I take the admission to challenge in the profoundest way the would-be force of Hegel's "progression" from sense-certainty to perception to understanding, in the opening sections of the *Phenomenology*: what Hegel offers is *not* a progression of "concrete" negations of actual inquiry but rather a heuristic account of how the would-be armature of the logic rightly guides our finite reasoning correctly: a shadow exercise cast by Hegel's narrating the contrived details of the model he advances, as if it were already applied to our mortal labors. The point of the objection is simply this: the "rehearsal" of the play of dialectical negation offers no grounds at all for believing that the role of *Vernunft* assigned to this initial lowly phase of the entire ascent rests on *any* demonstrable necessities that would lead us, by necessary negations, to the final *telos* of the "system" of reasoning already claimed, for instance, in §80 of the *Phenomenology*. All of these necessities, I say, are rhetorically invented. I am not opposed to Hegel's magisterial ramble; but it cannot literally deliver the "necessities" it claims; or, its claimed necessities form an idiom for honoring the insuperable but perfectly reasonable contingencies of material thinking. If Hegel had gone further, he would have been philosophically mad.

III

We may now collect in a rough and ready way our scattered findings about the informality of Hegel's logic by partitioning the question between the beginning and end of *vernunftig* intervention from what transpires between those limits. The *telos* of "absolute knowing" is no *telos* at all but an infinitely inaccessible target that can neither be violated nor realized by rational means: it functions only as a reminder, at once abstract and concrete, that all our guesses at objective truth commit us to reconciling, evolvingly, the meaning of "all" that we experience through history. So that, at the endlessly redefined "limit" of reason, we yield again and again to the encountered diversity of our "one" coherent world.

Hegel is remarkably clear about this, wherever he compares the doubtful powers of finite understanding (*Verstand*) cast largely in Kantian terms with the "infinite" powers of reason (*Vernunft*) summarized for instance at §§76–82 of Hegel's own *Encyclopaedia Logic*. The "falsity" or "error" of whatever may be drawn from the space of Kantian *Verstand* stands in need of being interpretively "negated" by *Vernunft* in order to bring it "closer" to "absolute" or "infinite" truth:

> *truth is for the spirit*—so much so that it is through reason alone that man subsists, and this reason *is the knowledge of God*. But since mediated knowledge is supposed to be restricted simply to a finite content, it follows that reason is *immediate knowing, faith*.[27]
>
> What this immediate knowing knows [he adds] is that the Infinite, the Eternal or God, that is [present] in our *representation* also is—that within our consciousness the certainty of its *being* is immediately inseparably combined with our *representation* of it.[28]

These extraordinary remarks, which inflate their true meaning to the point of reversal, spell out, when rightly decoded, what Hegel means, quite modestly, by "objectivity" or objective truth informed by our faith" in our necessary adherence to the admitted *telos* of absolute knowing. What for instance we perceive as existing *already* "represents" for that reason the "infinite [inaccessible] object" of *vernunftig* inquiry, which *Verstand* cannot reach: whatever we thus introduce must accommodate *every* dialectical conjecture (bar none) that inevitably falls short of its inaccessible *telos*.

Hegel is surely not reviving any form of Cartesian certainty: just the reverse! He says in his purple language that God is "in" us, because "the thought of God" is in us, and the "objectivity" of God's *being* is inseparable from the (*vernunftig*) "subjectivity" of the *thought of God*. [29] This appears to be a labile, rather offhand use of the ontological argument applied not merely to God but to the *Cogito* and "external things."

Paraphrased in the sparest way and shorn of its peculiar bombast, this seems to mean that what we take to be finally "real" in the fullest sense is never more than a rational construction tested and adjusted according to the lights of our evolving rational faith in the unity of reality.

Hegel characterizes the adventure of human inquiry as "absolute," "infinite," "necessary," "essential," "rational," "real," and "true"; but what he means, *I* conjecture, is that the whole affair is a glorious uniquely human construction contingent and provisional to its core but good enough to count as our own corner of divinity. In effect, that is our "faith." There is no

other judge to appeal to! Hegel's logic is *keyed to the endless open-ended evolution of our rational reflection on our experience of the world.* But *if* one grants Hegel's mode of play, then the "formal" rigor of dialectical or material logic goes up in smoke. *Not* the rigor of interpretive invention guided by resisting "presuppositions" (partiality or privilege) provisionally fixed at *any* particular moment in the process of Reason as it claims to overcome every form of "contradiction" on its way to its infinite *telos.*[30]

This is indeed the precise sense in which I've been suggesting that Peirce and Cassirer afford a rather elegant, thoroughly naturalistic paraphrase of the epistemological import of Hegel's otherwise terribly troublesome idiom. I don't deny that Hegel insists, both in the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, that the progression from the beginning to the end of his philosophical system "is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression [from sense-certainty to absolute knowing]." But I see no way to support Hegel's claim.[31] There is no possible solution unless we postpone forever the final match between *truth* and *being.* Conceding that, Hegel is effectively committed to some form of constructive realism. This brings his theory extraordinarily close to Peirce's fallibilism and Cassirer's Hegelianized Neo-Kantianism, except that Hegel may have an even more daring penchant for historicity and relativism. I emphasize the difference, because it confirms the sense in which pragmatism and Neo-Kantianism must cleave to Hegel's philosophical courage—and, in doing that, distance themselves from the fatal deceptions of metaphysical realism (which of course have attracted both Sellars and Brandom).[32]

According to Hegel, then,

> The *dialectical* moment [of the *Logic*, which must not be treated separately from its other "moments" (since that would lead only to skepticism)] is the self-sublation of [all the] finite determinations [of what the understanding makes of what we experience] and their passing into their opposites . . The dialectic . . . is [then] the *immanent* transcending, in which the one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding displays itself as what it is, i.e., as their negation. That is what everything finite is: its own sublation.[33]

Put even more confrontationally—*contra* Kant's empirical realism:

> All that is of interest here [says Hegel] is to know that this immediate knowing of the *being* of external things is deception and error, and that there is no truth in the sensible as such, but that the *being* of these

> external things is rather something-contingent, something that passes away, or a *semblance*; they are essentially this: to have only an existence that is separable from their concept of their essence.[34]

Kantian realism is *constituted* under the indefensible conditions of transcendental Idealism; *metaphysical* realism is essentially pre-Kantian; and *Hegelian* realism is best *represented* as a construction of Ideal reason that admits the insuperable inaccessibility of absolute truth, abandons all transcendentalist presumption, and is applied to what is "given" phenomenologically (presuppositionlessly) in experience but would be read erroneously if its "objects" were cast, phenomenally, as "separable" or "external things":

> The mere *logic of the understanding* [Hegel says] is contained in the speculative Logic and can easily be made out of the latter; nothing more is needed for this than the omission of the dialectical and the rational . . . [the] finitude [of the things of the first] count [then] for something infinite [in the second].[35]

I take this to be a vindication of the superiority of Hegel's logic, as now read, over the logic of "material inference"; accordingly, it confirms as well the insuperable informality of both logics. Once we abandon Kant's strict requirement of the systematicity or closure of our transcendental categories formulated in the second Preface to the first *Critique*, epistemology (*a fortiori*, metaphysics) goes completely informal, historicized, moderately relativistic, and holist. There's the deeper meaning of Hegel's rational *telos* of objective inquiry—very plausibly paraphrased along Peirce's and Cassirer's lines of simplification.

On this reading, Absolute Idealism, pragmatism, and a Hegelianized Neo-Kantianism share the strongest philosophical forces of twentieth-century thought: *a fortiori*, the best prospects for the new century. Correspondingly, metaphysical and empirical realism, the strongest currents of analytic and Kantian philosophy spanning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have effectively lost their best promise. The attempt to recover material inference, then—the leanest possible analytic basis on which to attempt a reconciliation of the views of Hegel, Kant, and analytic philosophy—may well be the last stand of an exhausted hegemony. Simply stated, *Hegel's vision is incommensurable, as well as incompatible, with the classic forms of analytic philosophy*, just as it is incommensurable and incompatible with Kant's transcendentalism. It's the same gerrymandering that guides Brandom, Brandom and Richard Rorty's Sellars, Sellars and Brandom's

Hegel, Brandom and Rorty's pragmatism, and John McDowell's very differently contrived reconciliation of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Max Weber, Gadamer, and Aristotle![36]

Notes

[1] See *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 8 vols., eds Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1958, vol. 2, bk. iii, chs. 5, 8; vol. 5, bk. ii, lectures 6, 7; vol. 6, bk. ii, ch. 5; vol. 7, bk. ii, ch. 3.

[2] See, Robert B. Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, Ch. 2; and Italo Testa, "Hegelian Pragmatism and Social Emancipation: An Interview with Robert Brandom," *Constellations* 10/4 (2003). See, also, Wilfrid Sellars, "Inference and Meaning," in J. Sicha (ed.), *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds: The Early Essays of Wilfrid Sellars*, Reseda: Ridgeview Publishing, 1980.

[3] Testa, "Hegelian Pragmatism and Social Emancipation," pp. 554–555.

[4] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, §12; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 3, p. 19

[5] Testa. "Hegelian Pragmatism and Social Emancipation," p. 555 (italics in the original).

[6] Ibid., p. 556.

[7] See for instance, Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 3, trans. Ralph Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, Pt. III. Cassirer is glad to embrace the Hegelian themes (which are also interpreted by Peirce, whom Cassirer acknowledges in passing). Karl Popper embraces Peirce's views quite openly in "Of Clouds and Clocks." See Karl R. Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks," *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1972. But what's worth pondering is the import of Cassirer's and Popper's very different treatments of themes that accord with Peirce's fallibilism: the first along historicized lines, the second along evolutionary lines; the first yielding on Hegelian themes, the second not at all. Cassirer's reading is stronger and more convincing by far—I would say—as a consequence of its reception of Hegelian themes. Both Peirceans and Sellarsians would benefit from a close reading of Cassirer.

[8] Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 3, trans. Ralph Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, p. 476.

[9] See my "Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 43 (2007).

[10] The key discovery about the import of late nineteenth-century physics on the subsequent work of the twentieth century, beginning with Hertz and Helmholtz, belongs of course to Cassirer rather than to Peirce, though it is entirely compatible with Peirce's theory of signs, the laws of nature, and fallibilism itself. See Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*.

[11] Wilfrid Sellars, "Language, Rules, Behavior," in Jeffrey Sicha, ed., *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds: The Early Essays of Wilfrid Sellars*, Reseda: Ridgeview, p. 155; cited by Brandom.

[12] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 21.

[13] Ibid., p. 26.

[14] Ibid., p. 27.

[15] See, for instance, Brandom's summary of Sellars's treatment of the rules of material inference, *Making It Explicit*, pp. 102–104. Compare Harold L. Brown, "Sellars, Concepts and Conceptual Change," *Synthese*, 60 (1986); and "Epistemic Concepts: A Naturalistic Approach," *Inquiry*, 34 (1991). That Sellars originally posed the question Brandom pursues here points to the deeper issue of how to characterize the human agent: that is, the self or person. The analysis of material inference cannot rightly advance without a proper account of the human factor, which is noticeably scanted by both Sellars and Brandom. Notoriously, Sellars produced, as a thought-experiment, an extreme form of eliminativism in which the conditions of his own and Brandom's analysis of material inference are rendered null and void. See Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," *Science, Perception and Reality*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. As far as I know, Sellars never provided an answer regarding how to adjudicate the differences between these two sides of his own work; and Brandom, who explicitly links his own speculations to a recovery of Hegel's account of history and culture, nowhere brings Hegel's dialectical challenge to bear on his own account of "making it explicit."

[16] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §80 (p. 51); *Werke*, 3, 74.

[17] J. N. Findlay, "Foreword," to Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. xiv.

[18] See Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 3, Pt. III, leading for instance to pp. 475–476; and Margolis, "Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism."

[19] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, §24.

[20] Ibid., Addition 2, p. 60; *Werke*, 8, 86.

[21] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §22.

[22] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §6, (p. 29); *Werke*, 8,47.

[23] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §81, p. 128; ibid., 8,172.

[24] The explanation of the key terms follows Geraets's "Notes to the Glossary," *The Encyclopaedia Logic*.

[25] See Margolis, "Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism."

[26] See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§80–89; *Werke*, 3, 74–81.

[27] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §63.

[28] Ibid., §64.

[29] See Ibid.; compare the remark added to §76.

[30] There is, let it be said, no formal criterion of a "contradiction" in Hegel's sense. But if not, then there is no formal criterion of Hegel's so-called "circular reasoning" in his epistemology. Compare here Tom Rockmore, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

[31] I've cited the passage before (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, §80; *Werke*, 3,74); but, read literally, its inconsistency with my reading of Hegel's notion of *Vernunft*, ("reason"

or "reasonableness," as Findlay offers) can no longer be ignored. Compare *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §163: "Every moment of the Concept [of the whole] is itself the whole Concept." (Iimagine that *this* may be read as implicating the ontological argument everywhere!) Findlay champions the literal reading, though it cannot be easily reconciled with the passage already cited (above) from Findlay's Foreword. In any case, here is what Findlay says: "while Hegel undoubtedly thought that the sequence of thought-phases described in the *Phenomenology* . . . was a necessary sequence, he still did not think it the only possible necessary sequence or pathway to [the] Science [of the whole], and certainly not the pathway to Science that would be taken by men in the future, or that might have been taken in other cultural and historical settings" (pp. v–vi). But the "necessity" of the progression from one phase of the *Phenomenology* to the next and the very meaning of the process of dialectical "negation" on which that progression depends have become so dubious that this decisive feature of Hegel's argument *cannot* now be convincingly defended or taken for granted. Furthermore, I see no way to justify a literal reading of the dialectical necessity of the *Phenomenology*, and (therefore) of the material logic that it introduces. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to believe that Hegel could not have held the usual view. I certainly see that the thesis that "everything finite is . . . its own sublation" (*The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §81) is meant to be analytically true, as well as the sign of the operative principle of Hegel's material logic. But I cannot see how that could possibly be counted on to validate the substantive necessities of the progression of the *Phenomenology*. If what I've just said is *not* Hegel's view, then Peirce and Cassirer have surely bettered Hegel!

[32] See Robert B. Brandom, "Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," in *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 178–209. There is a sustained discussion of Brandom's reading of Hegel, perhaps one of the earliest, in Tom Rockmore, *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, Ch. 2. Rockmore's account touches only glancingly on the logic of inferentialism and Hegel's dialectical logic, a topic that seems to me to afford the decisive clue to the superiority of Hegel's model of "material" reasoning (as finally construed) over Sellars's and Brandom's treatments of material inference. Otherwise, we are drawn back to largely textual matters, which risk befuddling the relationship between logic and metaphysics.

[33] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §81.

[34] Ibid., §76.

[35] Ibid., §82.

[36] Compare John McDowell, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Chapter 11

What Can We Learn from Hegel's Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom?

Vittorio Hösle
Translated by Timothy Brownlee

For Walter Haug (1927–2008), friend, mentor, and scholarly and human model since time immemorial in gratitude for his provocative critique of Hegel.

That the continental or, better, holistic and the analytic style of philosophizing are divergent does not mean that they are incompatible with one another. It could very well be that the two approaches are complementary, and that only their cooperation can therefore produce really satisfying results.[1] The aims and ways of thinking of an architect and a civil engineer are distinguishable, though both are required in order to build a beautiful and durable house. In this sense, it is a hopeful indication that in recent decades a new interest in Hegel's philosophy, the paradigm of the holistic approach, has emerged within the analytic tradition.[2] This turn should strike us as particularly amazing when we recall that the struggle against British Hegelianism and its idealism and monism (as was proposed by J. M. E. McTaggart) was a constitutive event for the English school of analytic philosophy and the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.[3]

This turn is, however, less surprising if we consider the possibility that specific fundamental philosophical positions, including objective idealism, regularly recur in the history of philosophy according to a cyclical pattern.[4] Richard Rorty's critique of representationalism[5]—the view which sees the best model for cognition in the mirroring of objects, and which, in so doing, forgets that we can never observe the representation relation from the outside—is certainly one of the most important sources for the turn back

to Hegel in John McDowell's *Mind and World*[6] and Robert Brandom's *Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*.[7] In spite of their significant differences, these works, which appeared in the same year, stand in agreement on their openness to the basic ideas of objective or absolute idealism, in particular to Hegel.[8] In their explicit references to Hegel's objective idealism, Brandom and McDowell distinguish themselves fundamentally from Rorty, who famously concluded from his critique of representationalism that philosophy ought to bid *adieu* to foundationalist enterprises and to concentrate rather on edifying activities. In any case, McDowell's and Brandom's dependence on Rorty provides evidence for the general validity of the theory that objective idealism constitutes an attempt to answer a skeptical crisis. The same holds for Plato, who conceived of his own philosophy as a response to the challenges of the sophists (McDowell has both translated and written a competent commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*[9]), and also for the proponents of German idealism. These proponents understood themselves, sincerely and, as I hold, correctly, to be the legitimate heirs to Kant, whose dogmatic slumbers were famously interrupted by Hume's skeptical doubt.[10] Of course, with this comparison, I do not intend to suggest that Rorty's work is qualitatively comparable to that of Hume, who gave as a young man the best presentation of his skeptical position in his first book, and subsequently produced a wealth of works that are both significant and, even from the literary standpoint, innovative.

In what follows, I shall first approach several ideas at work in the writings of Brandom and McDowell that recall those of Hegel. In so doing, I shall also touch on the differences that we find between the approaches of the two contemporary philosophers and friends, which present two different possibilities for an actualization of Hegel's objective idealism (section I). In any case, however, it appears to me that Hegel wants much more than McDowell and Brandom. Indeed, Hegel certainly wants *too much*. Still, his theory of concepts contains elements that ought to be taken more seriously in the twenty-first century than they have been taken by McDowell and Brandom. I shall therefore go on, first, to consider the extent to which the analytic discussion of "natural kinds" enables us to understand Hegel's project better, and, second, to raise a problem that has hitherto been ignored in the analytical Hegel Renaissance, but which is no less the decisive problem of the Hegelian theory of concepts—namely, the problem of how we come to have the concepts that we do in the first place (section II).

I

Next to Rorty, the most important common source for Brandom and McDowell in twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy is Wilfrid Sellars, in particular his most original work, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Sellars counts as one of the few analytic philosophers who had no fear of contact when it came to Hegel.[11] Already in the first sentence of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, the idea of givenness that will be criticized is restated in terms of the concept of immediacy,[12] and Sellars traces that concept back to Hegel, "that great foe of 'immediacy.'"[13] Later Sellars allows a fictive critic to describe his views as "your incipient *Mediations Hegeliènnes*,"[14] in an obvious allusion to Husserl's *Meditations Cartésiennes*, whose concern is the diametrical opposite of Sellars's own endeavors.[15] We cannot here proceed to analyze Sellars's complex nexus of arguments, including his brilliant analysis of the logic of "looks" and his reconstruction of the logic of private episodes, which explains, in original ways, how a public language can be established in relation to private episodes. Even so, we find here interesting points of contact with Hegel. Sellars's central thesis, that the concept "looks green" presupposes the concept "is green,"[16] would be expressed by Hegel in the following way: "Looking" is a relation of reflection[17] which, as a determination of the logic of essence, presupposes the category of quality that we find in the logic of being. Hegel would also agree with Sellars that colors are essentially properties of natural objects—think of the famous §320 of the *Encyclopedia* with its unfair critique of Newton's optics. Sellars's fundamental rejection of a *privileged* position for private episodes (whose *existence* is not thereby in any way denied) recalls finally the explicit view of Hegel's that our thinking essentially depends upon language: "We *think* in names."[18] In the spoken additions edited by Ludwig Boumann that correspond to the same paragraph of the *Encyclopedia*, we read: "Words thus attain an existence animated by thought. This existence is absolutely necessary for our thoughts. We only know our thoughts, only have definite, actual thoughts, when we give them the form of objectivity, of a being distinct from our inwardness, and therefore the shape of externality."[19] For Sellars, as for Hegel, only a conceptual and thus also linguistically articulated access to what we call the "interior side" [*Innenseite*] can possess cognitive relevance. Problems that, in principle, admit of no solution are not legitimate problems. The same holds for Hegel as held for the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* 6.5: "Those questions that philosophy does not answer are answered in that they should not be posed in that form [*daß sie nicht so gemacht werden sollen*]."[20]

But this chapter does not aim at the complex structure of the whole of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. I must rather concentrate on a single argument that is central for McDowell's and Brandom's extensions of Sellars's ideas, and which de Vries and Triplett call Sellars's "master argument."[21] Sellars's chief opponent is the theory according to which either *subjective sense data* or their *reports* are the fundamental and infallible Given which forms the foundation of our knowledge. The first possibility is eliminated on the grounds that only propositionally structured hypotheses can ground knowledge. Against the second thesis, that reports constitute the kind of Given relevant for empirical cognition, Sellars objects that, on the one hand, in order to be knowledge, those reports would have to be authoritative; on the other hand, this authority would have to be known by the person stating the report. This is the decisive assumption: If the authority of the report "that is green" consists in the fact that, under standard conditions, it can be inferred from it that there is something green, then only the individual who can draw this *inference* can claim to know the authority of the report. However, that means that no one can have a single concept, without also having a wealth of other concepts.[22] Sellars generally formulates his critique of the Myth of the Given in this way: characterizing an episode or a state as knowledge is not an empirical description. Rather, in so characterizing it, "We are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says."[23]

For Sellars, as for McDowell and Brandom, epistemic properties are normative in nature—"naturalizing" them, reducing them to nonnormative properties, as, for example, we find in Quine's holism, is fundamentally ruled out. On this point, the majority of intuitionists, Chisholm, for example, would agree with them. Yet, critics of the Myth of the Given are of the view, shared by Quine, that concepts and reports can never function alone, but rather only as parts of an inferentially structured web.

Given this agreement, we ought to ask what distinguishes the two Hegelianizing adepts of Sellars from each other. Two of McDowell's central insights correspond to Hegelian ideas, but so far as I can see, only one has an explicitly Hegelian starting point.

I begin with the second insight, the theory of the unboundedness of the conceptual, which he develops in the second lecture of *Mind and World*, and to which the rejection of nonconceptual content in the third lecture corresponds. McDowell's starting point is Kant's famous claim: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[24] McDowell takes this claim to mean that, on the one hand, concepts must take up experiences of reality. On the other hand, they must

remain concepts, that is, they must belong to the "space of reasons," which is alone the realm of freedom.[25] It is not easy to see how this could be possible. Rather, there appears to be only a choice between the Scylla of coherentism, which decouples thoughts from reality, and the Charybdis of an appeal to the Given "in the sense of bare presences that are supposed to constitute the ultimate grounds of empirical judgments."[26] This latter appeal fails on account of Sellars's critique of the Myth of the Given, in particular since such *bruta facta* would be pure causal impingements, not parts of the logical space of reasons, and thus could not constitute the foundation of claims to knowledge. McDowell's liberating move out of this dilemma is well-known: He sees conceptual capacities at work not only in judgments, but already in the experiences on which judgments are founded. That things are thus and so constitutes the content of experience, no less than the content of judgment. The decisive claim, however, is that this fact (that things are thus and so) is also an aspect of the world. That is the point at which McDowell breaks with Kant and appeals to Hegel. In what way?

Extensively simplified, we can say that, for Kant, our concepts are merely draped over authentic reality, that is, things in themselves, and we thereby distort that reality, even if this is inevitable as long as we desire knowledge.[27] However, the matter is yet more complex, since for Kant this distortion is a consequence of the schematization of concepts. But since cognition can never emerge without this schematization, the statement that this distortion is inevitable is essentially correct. McDowell objects to this view. On the one hand, it is misleading to understand reality as something that exists outside of the conceptual sphere. McDowell rejects the model according to which corrections in our system of concepts follow from an external comparison of the world with our concepts. "It cannot be a matter of picturing the system's adjustments to the world from sideways on: that is, with the system circumscribed within a boundary, and the world outside it."[28] This holds also when we attempt to understand someone else, and *a fortiori* it is entirely impossible to get a "sideways view" of oneself. This is the case because we are only able to achieve knowledge and to have experiences because of conceptual structures. We can therefore only ever compare a conceptually interpreted reality with systems of concepts, never a reality "in itself." Kant's transcendental perspective suffers because, while from the standpoint of experience, it binds intuitions to concepts, at the same time, it situates the noumenal world outside of the conceptual sphere—better: outside of the schematized conceptual sphere. Unfortunately, McDowell does not discuss the function of the chapter on the antinomies, which provides the proper argument for the subjective nature of our

categories, and which we do not yet find in the "Analytic." Presumably McDowell would agree with Hegel, who attempts to prove the circular nature of the Kantian proofs of the antinomies in the *Science of Logic*.[29] Nor does McDowell discuss the decisive motive for Kant's transcendental idealism—the desire to find a way out of determinism. This motive plays no greater role in Hegel's thought, since he seems to be a compatibilist.[30] In any case, Kant's philosophy is idealistic in the sense of subjective idealism[31]—and thus McDowell agrees with Hegel's critique of Kant.[32]

At the same time, McDowell defends, with great emphasis, the claim that his position is not idealistic in this subjective sense. There must be a third position that is neither the subjective idealism of Kant nor the view that reality can make claims on our thought only if it is situated outside of the conceptual sphere. McDowell finds one source of confusion in the fact that the word "thought" can have a double meaning. On the one hand, it can refer to the act of thinking, and on the other, to the content of this act. The independence of reality from thoughts only means its independence from the act of thinking, and it in no way rules out that "facts in general are essentially capable of being embraced in thought in exercises of spontaneity."[33] This idea approaches Hegel's absolute idealism.[34] While we find only one reference to the *Phenomenology* in McDowell's text, the idea is omnipresent in Hegel. Hegel comes closest to McDowell's differentiation of the meanings of "thought" in the "Preliminary Conception" in the encyclopedic *Science of Logic*: "In accordance with these determinations, thoughts can be called *objective* thoughts . . . To say that there is understanding, or reason, in the world [*Daß Verstand, Vernunft in der Welt ist*] is exactly what is contained in the expression 'objective thought.' But this expression is inconvenient precisely because 'thought' is all too commonly used as if it belonged only to spirit, or consciousness, while 'objective' is used primarily just with reference to what is not spiritual."[35]

We find the second point on which McDowell's view comes into contact with Hegel in the fourth lecture on "Reason and Nature." It is true that we find no explicit appeal to Hegel, and that the properly systematic thoughts that McDowell develops are sketchy and programmatic. We also find an important difference between McDowell and Hegel here, since McDowell employs the concept of nature in such a way that that concept also comprehends what Hegel calls "spirit" [*Geist*]. However, he differentiates between human and nonhuman nature—as does Hegel, though in a more general form—by use of the concept of second nature.[36] McDowell's attempt, on the one hand to recognize the achievement of the modern concept of nature as a realm of natural laws, and on the other to think of nature in

such a way that there is room within it for the activities of conceptual spontaneity, is important to his thinking about the concept of nature. He rejects both the position that he calls "bald naturalism," which is characterized by the view that the logical space of reasons could be reduced to the realm of natural laws, as well as a supernaturalistic "rampant Platonism," which cannot explain how the human mind could win entry into the autonomous space of reasons.[37] The third position, which he endorses, appeals to Aristotle, who was no naturalist in the modern sense, but for whom openness toward the normative is a central part of (human) nature. McDowell's aim is a concept of nature which reconciles reason and nature,[38] and which would enable us to grasp nature as more than the realm of natural laws. McDowell's formulations of this concept recall, in a striking way, the natural philosophy of German idealism. The decisive thought of the idealists was to think of nature as oriented toward the spirit. Only in this way could the human capacity to make claims to validity be reconciled with the fact that that same capacity has itself emerged from nature. Already for the Kant of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, and for Schelling and Hegel, a concept of nature of this kind presupposes the insight that the conception of nature lying at the foundations of modern natural science (the concept of a whole to be understood purely in causal-scientific terms) is an abstraction, and is therefore not the whole truth.

Since I have analyzed the complex architectonic of Brandom's *Making it Explicit* elsewhere, I may but briefly articulate that architectonic here.[39] Brandom agrees with McDowell concerning the objective-idealistic and holistic interpretation of concepts. His inferentialist theory of concepts claims to overcome the dualisms that, for Kant, oppose concepts to intuitions in three different ways (which were not clearly distinguished by Kant himself): those of form and content, universal and particular, and products of spontaneity and products of receptivity. (As was McDowell's, Brandom's presentation of Kant's view is surely a simplification; nor does it do justice to the nature of pure intuition.) Brandom insists that those material inferences that are peculiar to a concept constitute the content of that concept. He thereby claims a priority for judgments (for which alone reasons can be given and demanded) in relation to concepts, and assigns an inferential role to subsentential expressions, in that their substitution will have different consequences for the validity of the inferences. However, singular terms also possess substitution-inferential significance, even when this significance, unlike in the case of the predicates, is symmetrical in nature. Finally, even deictic tokenings, in whose application we are most receptive, are conceptually articulated, since it is only through anaphor

that they receive meaning when used in the game of giving and asking for reasons. The decisive statement claims: "*Particularity is as much a conceptual matter as generality*,"[40] and it is not difficult to recognize therein a further consequence of the Hegelian theory of concepts. For Hegel, the individual is not opposed to the concept, but is rather its third and synthetic determination.[41]

What differentiates *Making it Explicit* from *Mind and World* most conspicuously is the *social* dimension which the former introduces. Philosophy of logic, epistemology, philosophy of language, and hermeneutics are equiprimordial in Brandom's first philosophy, because he is concerned with the constitution of validity claims through social practice within the bounds of a normative pragmatism. Absent are extensive reflections on the concept of *nature* as we find in McDowell's book. Brandom is thus more justified than McDowell in being concerned mainly with the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, rather than that of the *Encyclopedia*. For while the thematic of intersubjectivity is largely repressed in Hegel's later work,[42] one can read the *Phenomenology* in such a way that it is not only concerned with a reciprocal penetration of the subject and the object, but also with the transition from the I to the We—or better: it is concerned with the reciprocal penetration of the subject and object by establishing a thorough-going intersubjectivity which includes the earlier stages of consciousness.[43] Within the *Phenomenology*, Hegel first articulated this intersubjective dimension in the "Self-Consciousness" chapter, and he saw the truth of the subject-object relation in the subject-subject relation.[44] The Hegelian conceptual development in this chapter aims at a transition from the relation between two independent self-consciousnesses—an I and a thou—into a unity, in which the difference between I and thou is still to be perceived, though no longer that between I and we, between the isolated and the social I. Hegel calls this unity "Spirit": "What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'."[45] On the contrary, Brandom holds fast to the claim that I-we relations are in no way more fundamental than I-thou relations: "It is a manifestation of the orienting mistake [. . .] of treating *I-we* relations rather than *I-thou* relations as the fundamental social structure."[46] Certainly, Brandom's book, in the end, speaks about "saying 'We'";[47] but it is centrally concerned with the fact that we ascribe discursive practices to one another.

Brandom's dedication to methodological individualism has two consequences. Since he does not have at his disposal a functional equivalent of

Hegel's concept of objective and absolute spirit, he must reconstruct the difficult process of reciprocal undertaking and attributing commitments that constitutes a conversation—and he thereby comes to a plethora of meaningful insights with which Hegel does not provide us. By this means, he throws light on a genre with which the tradition of objective idealism was, from the beginning, familiar, and which Hegel treats with little care—the philosophical dialogue.[48] On the other hand, Brandom's claims are characterized by the fact that the different positions remain in their irreducibility. We scarcely find in Brandom's writings the thought, shared by Hegel and in an embryonic form already by Kant, that it is possible to bring one-sided positions to a synthesis (McDowell, by contrast, introduces his own position as a third alternative). Nor do we find the idea that determinate concepts are the synthesis of others—Brandom essentially recognizes only relations of subordination and exclusion between concepts. But it is this thought and this idea that constitute the essence of dialectical thinking, and thus Brandom misses its central point. In fact, the logic which Brandom wishes to found is formal, despite his appeals to prior material inferences. This is because the concepts he employs make no claim to uncover essential structures of reality.[49] Hegel would not use the word "concepts" for many of the concepts that Brandom marshals—"scarlet" or "Winesap"—but would rather identify these as "representations" [*Vorstellungen*], with which common life must satisfy itself.[50] His concept of representation is not, on this account, a form of "representationalism"; for also *Vorstellungen* in the Hegelian sense are connected by inferential relations. What, then, are *Vorstellungen* for Hegel? They are what we could call in contemporary speech, concepts which grasp no essential level of reality, and of whose genesis we are unable to give an account.[51]

II

The recent Anglo-American interest in Hegel's objective idealism is doubtless a significant philosophical-historical event. One will not hold it against the author of this text that this interest achieves a double confirmation of his views. On the one hand, it confirms his cyclical philosophy of the history of philosophy, which aims not only to explain the past, but also appears to possess predictive force. On the other hand, it confirms his defense of objective idealism as a thoroughly rational philosophical position, consistent with the age. However, just what makes the contemporary Anglo-American, analytically inspired Neo-Hegelianism so fascinating and living—namely

that it is not a philosophical-historical reconstruction, but understands itself as a systematic position—is also the cause of its weakness: It takes up those aspects of Hegel's thought that touch systematically on prior discussions within analytic philosophy, and ignores the rest. In one sense, that is unavoidable, since not everything in Hegel can be actualized; much is forever past. However, the systematic nature of Hegel's thought makes it difficult to isolate individual parts, since these parts stand in stricter connection with others which one might want to shed than the philosopher who wants to use the former ones realizes.

Sellars's and Brandom's holistic theory of concepts ignores in particular a problem that is decisive for Hegel. Even though contemporary inferentialism networks concepts with one another, it cannot answer two strongly related questions. First, as already indicated, it is obvious that not all concepts play an equal role in grasping reality. While all concepts are distinguished by relations of inclusion and exclusion, one concept's being more important than another cannot stem simply from these relations. The distinction of *essential* and *accidental* characteristics is the starting point of Plato's and Aristotle's essentialism, and Hegel doubtless stands in the same tradition. An inferentialist theory of concepts that does not attempt to conceptualize any of the fundamental intuitions of essentialism can scarcely claim to appropriate Hegel's heritage and to possess it anew. Second, Hegel claims that his own theory of concept formation goes beyond the intuition of ideas in Plato and Aristotle. This is exactly the point of Hegel's dialectic. No functional equivalent of dialectic is to be found in McDowell and Brandom, who thus neglect the decisive feature of Hegel's conception of logic.

To what extent is Hegel an essentialist? According to one popular misunderstanding of the nature of Hegel's idealism that reads his system exclusively from the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel is a radical conceptualist, for whom reality only counts as a creation of the human mind. To be sure, like every intelligent thinker, Hegel recognized the fact that it is human beings who form concepts, pass judgments, and make inferences. In his *Encyclopedia*, the categories[52] concept, judgment, and inference have their place in two different locations—first in the 30 paragraphs of the "Logic of the Concept" (§§163–192), and second in a single paragraph of the "Psychology" (§467). In the note to §467, Hegel states: "In *Logic* there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itself in this opposition-lacking [*gegensatzlosen*] medium. . . Here reason is as the truth of the opposition [*Gegensatz*], as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits."[53] It is here recognized that the possibility of opposition, which

means also the possibility of making mistakes concerning the authentic determinations of reality, essentially belongs to the human mind. It goes without saying that Hegel ascribes fallibility to his own efforts at categorization (including those within the *Science of Logic*), as is proved by his continuing corrections in the new editions of his work. However, he holds the view that the human mind is, in principle, capable of truth, and this precisely because we apply concepts in our judgments and desire to unite our judgments by means of inference. The human mind thereby corresponds to the authentic structure of reality.[54]

However—and this is the decisive point—not all concept formations correspond to reality in an equal degree. It is not simply a matter of applying just any concepts, or, as Hegel would put it, representations, which allows us to grasp reality, for there are many alternative categorizations of reality, of which some are mutually exclusive. *What really matters is whether the concepts that we have are the correct ones.* However, how can we decide this question? It is not to be answered by showing that those concepts that grasp the essence of reality are inferentially structured, since inferential structure belongs to *all* alternative concept systems. Nor does it help to emphasize that the superior concept system is the one that will get reality right, since for Hegel, McDowell, and Brandom, there is no reality independent of concept systems. Alternative "realities" would then correspond to alternative concept systems. For Hegel, the criterion of truth can therefore only lie in the nature of the concept systems themselves—a system of concepts is *in itself* more plausible than others, and *for that reason* it is more likely that it corresponds to reality.

A quick comparison with Heidegger can make the relevant point clearer. We can identify the central point of Heidegger's philosophical history of philosophy in the following way: the greatest upheavals in intellectual history have their origin in shifts in our category systems—a thought that is basically analogous to Thomas S. Kuhn's conception of the history of science, even if formulated in an entirely different language. A similar conception is thoroughly familiar to Hegel: "All revolutions, in the sciences no less than in world history, originate solely from the fact that Spirit, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to possessing itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more intimately, and more in unity with itself."[55] The terms "more truly," "more deeply," "more intimately," and "more in unity with itself" are decisive at this point. From the Heideggerian standpoint, these terms would have hardly any sense for the simple reason that Heidegger's being (entirely like Kant's "thing-in-itself") is not conceptually articulated. For Hegel, there

are determinate category systems which are intrinsically better, and, for this reason, it is more likely that they will correspond to reality, which is itself conceptually structured, and to which the concept-forming mind necessarily belongs.

However, is it not obvious that every privileging of one concept formation against another is senseless, since there are countless different categorizations, which all have their own right? First, it is important to recognize that answering the question of whether one concept formation is better than another in the affirmative in no way implies that there is *only one single legitimate concept formation*. It should also be conceded that not all, but still many different attempts at categorization of a sphere of objects are compatible with one another. One often encounters the opinion that concepts grasp the properties of real things, but that, since the world is unforeseeably complex, every concept system only selects specific properties. One can appeal either to the differences between the concept systems belonging to different epochs, as does historicism, or to the differences between systems of concepts that synchronously coexist, as does analytic philosophy, in particular. The widely held thesis that the *purposes* of the concept-former are the decisive criterion for the selection of determinate properties is based on the latter approach. Following J. Dupré, T. E. Wilkerson names this position "promiscuous realism."[56] This position also constitutes a form of realism, since the existence of those properties to which concepts correspond is not denied. At the same time the thesis that the classifications of organisms by a taxonomist, by a cook, or a gardener are all equally justified is defended, since, we read, all these classifications arise from different interests.

This last thesis is either trivially correct or false. It is correct if one accepts the point that interests stand behind every act—and reflection, too, is an act. The botanist who categorizes plants has an interest, namely in the taxonomy of plants. However, this thesis proves false if it is supposed to state that the interest in categorization is always subservient to more obvious interests that human beings have as organisms. The division of organisms according to their degree of edibility is decisive for a cook, but a taxonomist who proposed a criterion of division of this kind would make herself laughable. Already in the *Statesman*,[57] in establishing the distinction between *meros* and *eidos*, Plato proposed that, in contrast to the division of human beings into men and women, the ethnocentric division of human beings into Greeks and barbarians is a nonnatural classification.[58] As Wilkerson claims, "natural" classifications are neither logically anthropocentric, as are the names of artifacts, which are what they are through the fulfillment

of a human purpose; nor are they causally anthropocentric, that is, they have not been developed with reference to a practical purpose, as, for example, the concept "fruit."[59] Hegel himself stresses an analogous thought in the first two paragraphs of the *Philosophy of Nature*, when he distinguishes practical consideration, which begins "from particular, *finite* ends,"[60] from theoretical consideration, which "does not start from determinations which are external to nature, like those ends already mentioned; and second, it is directed to a knowledge of the *universal* aspect of nature, a universal which is also *determined* within itself—directed to a knowledge of forces, laws, and genera, whose content must not be a simple aggregate, but arranged in orders and classes, must present itself as an organism [*Organisation*]."[61] The appeal to laws indicates that Hegel concedes a higher status also to those categorizations which make possible the establishment of natural laws, in a way similar to modern theorists of natural kinds.[62]

In fact, it could hardly be denied, at least by anyone who has learned to think scientifically, that concepts like "inert gas" or "marsupial" grasp something more essential than a classification of elements and animals according to color. This is not to deny that classifications of the latter kind are useful and legitimate in specific situations, since they too have a basis in reality. However, this basis rather concerns the surface of reality. A similar example can be found in the humanities. A librarian who is responsible for shelves of different sizes acts correctly when she categorizes literary works according to the size of the books in which they were published. However, the literary critic may—indeed should—make use of the triad epic-lyric-dramatic genre on which Hegel's treatment of poetry in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* is based, and she can thereby claim to have penetrated deeper into the essence of literature than the librarian's classification. This claim is not refuted by the fact that this division is a relatively late one, from the historical perspective, or that, in the *Poetics*, Aristotle concentrates on epic poems, tragedy, and comedy. The literary critical revaluation of lyric as an equally justified genre has to do with the discovery of modern subjectivity, and thus with one of those revolutions in the formation of categories, which are established on a quite abstract level, but which then inevitably affect the efforts at categorization of individual disciplines. However, the fact that a category is grasped relatively late from the historical perspective in no way implies the historicality of the corresponding object. Lyric is very ancient and natural laws are timeless, even if the concept of a natural law was only lately conceived. Also where a phenomenon is historically late, such as the novel, this in no way implies that the corresponding logical concept is historical. The novel is that branch of the epic genre which

emerges where subjectivity seeks escape from the closed world of epic poems: That is its *timeless essence*, even if its *instantiation* presupposes a longer historical development of literary forms.

As Hegel defends a thoroughgoing belief in *a priori* knowledge that recalls Leibniz, within the sciences, he would certainly ascribe a special distinction to those concept formations which secure for a scientific theory a thoroughgoing *a priori* status. The theory of special relativity and the Darwinian theory of evolution are regarded, among contemporary scientific theories, as theories for which such *a priori* interpretations are not to be lightly dismissed.[63] For this reason, the concept formations that form the basis of these theories would possess a special distinction for Hegel in relation to other competing theories. Since Hegel recognizes the significance of mathematical concept formations for the development of natural scientific theories,[64] he would have a further interest in investigations into concept formation in mathematics.[65]

All of this can relatively easily be connected to contemporary discussions. The case becomes more difficult when one considers Hegel's view that concepts are legitimated not only insofar as they lead to high-output theories, but also that determinate concepts are already "rational" in themselves and seek instantiation for this reason.[66] For Hegel, concepts can themselves be true—however, not individual concepts, but only a network of concepts. Hegel in no way denies that judgment is a central locus of truth or that the truth of a judgment can be decided through a comparison with experience. A good philosophy ought not to contradict experience. Even less does he deny that the concept formations of philosophy, as far as the context of their genesis is concerned, are stimulated by the empirical sciences.[67] What, then, is the sense of his thesis that concepts can already be true prior to their "saturation?"

The central point of departure for the entirety of German idealism is Kant's proof that empiricism about concepts cannot be true. This is one of the central motives for the ingenious concept formation techniques that we find with Hegel and which constitute the rational kernel of his dialectical method.[68] That the question of how we come to our concepts has today been thoroughly neglected is so baffling since empiricism about concepts is advocated neither by scientists nor by philosophers. If, as Albert Einstein writes, "the concepts which arise in our thought and in our linguistic expressions are all—when viewed logically—the free creations of thought" and cannot "inductively be gained from sense-experiences,"[69] theories about the origin of our concepts ought to be welcomed. I cannot *discuss* at any length here the requirements of such a theory, requirements which Hegel

tried to fulfill. By way of conclusion, I satisfy myself by *naming* four of those requirements which remain sensible even if they play no significant role for Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom.

First, Hegel is familiarly of the view that concept formation makes use of processes of *opposition* and *mediation*.[70] Let us begin with his basic triadic division. If what Hegel names "Logic" corresponds to that which Sellars calls "the logical space of reasons," while "nature" names that to which McDowell refers as "the realm of law," Hegel insists that there must be something which has an ontological status cognate with nature, but which at the same time has an explicit relation to the logical. This is what he calls "spirit," which is, according to McDowell, a privileged part of nature: "The contrast leaves it possible for an area of discourse to be in the logical space of causal relations to objects without thereby being shown not to be in the logical space of reasons."[71] Already Kant had ordered his 12 categories in four triadic groups, within which the third element united features of the first and the second element. However, the subdivisions of the *Critiques* are all dichotomic, not trichotomic. Hegel generalizes Kant's approach to the categories and does not limit it to logical categories, but conceives the conceptual structure of *Realphilosophie* as well according to this triadic pattern. The basic concepts of both nature and spirit are ordered in such a way that an opposition follows an original unity, which is then recovered on a more complex level. Since sometimes the antithetical structure is in opposition not only to the original unity, but forms in itself a dual structure, Hegel can arrive at four, instead of three, elements of a dialectical process.

Second, Hegel aims to present reality, and thus the series of corresponding concepts and sciences, as an *order of stages*, in which more complex stages follow from more simple ones.[72] As an endeavor to order the world undertaken by beings that belong to it, minded behavior does not simply fall from heaven. Rather, it is the apex of a process that forms subjective centers within the world, which Hegel discusses in "Organics," the third part of his *Philosophy of Nature*. That which distinguishes the organic from the inorganic and which anticipates the essentially active nature of spirit is its capacity to constitute itself: "It is only as this self-reproductive being, not as a mere being [*nicht als Seiendes*], that the living creature *is* and *preserves itself*; it only is, in making itself what it is, and is the antecedent End which is itself only result."[73] For Hegel, what is affirmative in this concept consists in this being-against the temporality which threatens it.

Third, the possibility of grounding the further differentiation of a concept consists in the *analysis* of what is implied in that concept, for example,

through *the combination of the elementary concepts*. As an example, I shall identify a thought which could not be worked out by Hegel on account of the condition of the biology of his day, but which is compatible with his phenomenologically impressive analyses of the differences between plant and animal—classical categories of natural description—and which places these analyses on a plausible foundation. It is characteristic of organic subjectivity that it "excludes from itself, as an objectivity confronting it . . . physical nature in its universal and individual forms. But at the same time, it has in these natural powers the condition of its existence, the stimulus, and also the material of its process."[74] It therefore is plausible that we should, following the introduction of the category of the organism, distinguish organic metabolism according to whether it has inorganic or organic processes at its foundation, thus whether we are dealing with an autotrophic or heterotrophic organism.

Fourth, it is one of the central requirements of Hegel's doctrine that the concepts with which we describe ourselves and our concept-forming activities must themselves be a part of a complete system of concepts. Along with Karl-Otto Apel, we can speak of a principle of auto-apprehension [*Selbsteinholung*] or with Brandom of "explicit interpretive equilibrium."[75]

Are these four requirements sufficient to arrive at the system of concepts of the *Encyclopedia*? Of course they are not. Since this system of concepts in its totality cannot be ours, this negative answer may encourage us not to dismiss these four requirements too quickly. The price of ignoring them is high: *while Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom have overcome the Myth of the Given, they thereby risk making concepts themselves something Given*. The sphere of brute facticity is actually left behind only when concepts are not merely taken up, but also stand in a reasonable context of foundation. Only then does the world of concepts become a realm of freedom.

Notes

[1] The hermeneutic theories of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Donald Davidson provide a familiar example of the convergence of these two streams. On this point, see Vittorio Hösle, Truth and Understanding. Analytical Philosophy (Donald Davidson), Phenomenology (Hans-Georg Gadamer), and the Desideratum of an Objective Idealist Hermeneutics, in *Between Description and Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Turn in Phenomenology*, ed. Andrzej Wierciński, (Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press, 2005), pp. 376–391.

[2] See the recent collection *Hegel's Erbe*, ed. Christoph Halbig, Michael Quante, and Ludwig Siep, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004.

[3] For one aspect of Russell's confrontation with Hegelianism, see Rolf-Peter Horstmann, *Ontologie und Relationen: Hegel, Bradley, Russell und die Kontroverse über interne und externe Beziehungen*, Königstein/Ts.: Anton Hain, 1984.

[4] On this point, see Vittorio Hösle, *Wahrheit und Geschichte. Studien zur Struktur der Philosophiegeschichte unter paradigmatischer Analyse der Entwicklung von Parmenides bis Platon*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1984).

[5] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

[6] John McDowell, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. In the Preface, McDowell claims "I made my first sketches of the kind of formulation I have arrived at here during the winter of 1985–86, in an attempt to get under control my usual excited reaction to a reading—my third or fourth—of Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. I think it was an earlier reading of Rorty that put me on to Sellars; and it will be obvious that Rorty's work is in any case central for the way I define my stance here." *Mind and World*, p. ixf.

[7] Robert B. Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. This work is dedicated to Sellars and Rorty.

[8] See McDowell, *Mind and World*, ix.

[9] Plato, *Theaetetus*, trans. with a commentary by John McDowell, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

[10] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forth as Science*, trans. G. Hatfield in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 57; *Werke in 12 Bänden,* hrsg. v. Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1968, vol. 5, p. 118.

[11] Quine, on the contrary, never referred to Hegel, even though both thinkers advocate forms of holism. See the interesting comparison of the two by Ludwig Steinherr, *Holismus, Existenz und Identität: ein systematischer Vergleich zwischen Quine und Hegel*, St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1995.

[12] "The philosophical idea of givenness or, to use the Hegelian term, immediacy." I cite the treatise that first appeared in 1956, and which was re-published in 1963 with additional material according to the newest annotated edition that includes the complete text of Sellars's essay published as *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given. Reading Wilfird Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,"* ed. Willem. A. de Vries and Tim Triplett, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000, pp. 205–276. The quotation cited above appears on 205. An earlier edition of the text (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) included an introduction by Rorty, and an extensive study guide assembled by Brandom.

[13] Sellars, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given*, p. 205. Sellars likely has in mind in particular §§61–78 from the "Preliminary Conception" [*Vorbegriff*] of *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991, pp. 108–124; *Werke,* 8, 147–168.

[14] Sellars, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given*, p. 227. The accents are reproduced here as they are in the edition used.

[15] That does not prevent him from separating his own fallibilistic theory of cognition from an intuitionist as much as from a reflexive foundational model: "One

seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge which has its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do." Sellars, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given*, p. 250.

[16] Sellars, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given*, p. 225.

[17] Compare Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §147A, p. 191; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol. 7, p. 295: "Faith and trust arise with the emergence of reflection, and they presuppose representations and distinctions [*Vorstellung und Unterschied*]. For example, to believe in pagan religion and to be a pagan are two different things."

[18] G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, translated from the 1830 edition, together with the Zusätze by W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2007, §462A, p. 220. (*Werke*, 10, 278). All references are to the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia*. For a similar view, see Gottlob Frege, "Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffschrift" (1882) in *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980, pp. 91–97. Here 92: "Denn in Worten denken wir."

[19] Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §462Z, 221; *Werke*, 10, 280.

[20] Hegel, "Aphorismen aus Hegels Wastebook [1803–1806]," in *Werke*, 2, 547.

[21] Sellars, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given*, p. xxxff. and pp. 67–107, in particular the reconstruction at 104f.

[22] Ibid., p. 247.

[23] Ibid., p. 248. The suspicion of circularity is cleverly rejected at 248f.

[24] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, A51/B75.

[25] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 5.

[26] Ibid., p. 24.

[27] Compare Brandom, *Making it Explicit*, p. 616.

[28] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 34.

[29] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, pp. 190–192 and pp. 234–238 (*Werke*, 5, 216–227 and 271–276). Particularly drastic is the claim that "This apogogical proof, like the others, contains the direct and unproved assertion of what it was supposed to prove" (p. 236). See already the "Anhang über die Antinomien" in the "Logik für die Mittelklasse," in *Werke*, 4, 184ff. This criticism does not prevent Hegel from accepting still more antinomies than Kant (Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §48A, 93–94 (*Werke*, 8, 127f.) and Hegel, *Medieval and Modern Philosophy*, Vol. 3 of *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), p. 448; *Werke*, 20, 356).

[30] For Hegel, freedom is rational self-determination. Thus "the true and rational concept of freedom" includes "necessity sublated within itself." See Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §182Z, 259; *Werke*, 8, 334. That does not exclude the possibility

that Hegel's theory leaves room for contingency. Doubtless, for Hegel there are events that cannot be deduced *a priori*, and perhaps even events that are not determined through antecedent conditions and deterministic natural laws. However, the essence of freedom does not depend on such events.

[31] McDowell, *Mind and World*, 41ff.

[32] Compare Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §§44–46, 87–89; *Werke*, 8, 120ff. See in particular §46A, 89; *Werke*, 8, 123: "The Kantian critique is only a *subjective* (vulgar) *idealism*."

[33] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 28.

[34] Ibid., 43ff.

[35] Hegel, *Encylopaedia Logic*, §24–24A, 56; *Werke*, 8, 80ff. [Translation slightly modified by the author. – *Tr*].

[36] McDowell, *Mind and World*, 84ff. and Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §§4 and 151; *Werke*, 7, 46 and 301.

[37] McDowell, *Mind and World*, 77f. and 83.

[38] Ibid., p. 86.

[39] Vittorio Hösle, "Inferentialism in Brandom and holism in Hegel" in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 27/1 (2006), 61–82. Compare also the intelligent critique of Dieter Wandschneider, "'In-expressive Vernunft.' Abschied vom 'sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus' in Robert B. Brandoms pragmatischem Positivismus," in *Die 'freie Seite der Philosophie'*, ed. Brady Bowman and Klaus Vieweg, Würzburg: Könighausen und Neumann, 2005, 199–215.

[40] Brandom, *Making it Explicit*, p. 620.

[41] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 619; *Werke*, 6, 296f. See also the critique of Kant on 619 (*Werke*, 6, 267): "A content such as is here spoken of, *without the Notion*, is something notionless, and hence without essential being; certainly we cannot ask for the criterion of the truth of such a content."

[42] On this point, see Vittorio Hösle, *Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität*, 2 Bde, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, Verlag, 1987.

[43] Compare the fascinating interpretation of Ramon Valls Plana, *Del yo al nosotros*, Barcelona: Laia, 1979.

[44] Hegel, *Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 110; *Werke*, 3, 145.

[45] Hegel, *Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 110; *Werke*, 3, 145.

[46] Brandom, *Making it Explicit*, 38f.

[47] Ibid., 643ff.

[48] See only the review of Tieck's and Raumer's edition of Solger, in particular Hegel, "Solger's Posthumous Writings and Correspondence," trans. D. I. Behler in *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and Critical Writings*, ed. E. Behler, New York: Continuum, 1990, 310ff.; *Werke*, 11, 268ff.

[49] See, however, Brandom, *Making it Explicit*, 633ff.

[50] Compare on this point Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 406f. (*Werke*, 6, 406f.) and Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §3, 26f. (*Werke*, 8, 44f).

[51] Compare on this point Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 651 (*Werke*, 6, 336) on the difference between the judgments "The rose is red," and "The rose is a plant."

[52] I am aware that Hegel sometimes only calls the determinations of the logic of being "categories": Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 555; *Werke*, 6, 219. But I use the term in a wider sense, as Hegel himself occasionally does.

[53] Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §467A, 226; *Werke*, 10, 285 [translation modified by the author. – *Tr*].

[54] Compare also Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, III 6, §39, 327: "I don't know why you and your associates always want to make virtues, truths and species depend upon our opinion or knowledge. They are present in nature, whether or not we know it or like it."

[55] Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, §246Z, 11; *Werke*, 9, 20f.

[56] Terence E. Wilkerson, *Natural Kinds*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, 126ff.

[57] Plato, *The Statesman*, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997, 262Aff.

[58] In *Eupalinos*, his dialogue inspired by Plato, Paul Valéry has his Phèdre tell his Socrates: "From the smallest event, you have drawn the thought that human creations can be reduced to the conflict of two types of order, the one of which, being natural and given, endures and supports the other, which is the act of the needs and the desires of human beings." *Eupalinos. L'Âme et la Danse. Dialogue de l'Arbre*, Paris: Gallimard,1945, p. 75.

[59] Wilkerson, *Natural Kinds*, p. 59.

[60] Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, §245, 4; *Werke*, 9, 13.

[61] Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, §246, 6; *Werke*, 9, 15.

[62] Compare Wilkerson, *Natural Kinds*, p. 33: "The first condition is that membership of a natural kind is determined by a real essence, a property or set of properties necessary and sufficient for membership of the kind. If that condition is to be interesting, it must be stiffened by a second condition, namely that natural kinds, and their real essences, lend themselves to scientific generalizations. And the third condition is that, since scientific generalization involves exploring the causal powers of things, and since causal powers must be constituted or realized by intrinsic properties, the real essences of natural kinds must be intrinsic rather than relational properties." The third condition is, in my opinion, the most questionable.

[63] On this point, see Dieter Wandschneider, *Raum, Zeit, Relativität*, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1982 and Franz von Kutschera, *Jenseits des Materialismus*, Paderborn: Mentis, 2003, 157f.

[64] Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover, 1956, 64f.; *Werke*, 12, 87f.

[65] On this point, see the ninth chapter of Jacques Hadamard, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945.

[66] Compare Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 734f.; *Werke*, 6, 437. Klaus Hartmann's thesis that Hegel's logic is a doctrine of categories and no existence-positing metaphysics (*Hegels Logik*, ed. Olaf L. Muller with a foreword by Klaus Brinkmann, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999, for example 33) is thus, in principle, correct. However, it overlooks the fact that Hegel's system as a whole *is* existence-positing and that, for Hegel, *Realphilosophie* more or less follows from logic. For Hegel, reality is necessarily such that in it the rational concepts are instantiated.

[67] Compare Hegel, *Medieval and Modern Philosophy*, 176f.; *Werke*, 20, 79f.

[68] In the different editions of his *Dialektik*, Friedrich Schleiermacher has passages with the explicit title "Concept Formation" (*Dialektik [1811]*, ed. Andreas Arndt,

Hamburg: Meiner, 1986, 40ff.; *Dialektik [1814/15]. Einleitung zur Dialektik [1833]*, ed. Andreas Arndt, Hamburg: Meiner, 1988, 84ff.)

[69] Albert Einstein, "Remarks on Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge," trans. and ed. P. A. Schilpp in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, New York: Harper & Row, 1963, pp. 278–290, here p. 287.

[70] Those difficult questions concerning dialectical method which have been raised since Trendelenburg cannot be discussed here. Dieter Wandschneider proposes one of the most notable attempts at a rational reconstruction of the dialectic in *Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik: Rekonstruktion und Revision dialektischer Kategorienentwicklung in Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik,"* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995.

[71] McDowell, *Mind and World*, 71, fn. 2.

[72] Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, §249, 20; *Werke*, 9, 31.

[73] Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, §352, 356; *Werke*, 9, 435.

[74] Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, §342, 299; *Werke*, 9, 367.

[75] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 716, fn. 35.

Chapter 12

From Hegel's Dialectical Trappings to Romantic Nets: An Examination of Progress in Philosophy

Elizabeth Millán

In the good company of Karl Marx one can read Hegel's *Phenomenology* as a valuable account of the appearance of spirit [*Geist*] in human history, and Hegel's dialectic as a method to make the historical forms in which this spirit appears transparent to human reason. Alas, not all readers of Hegel have been as receptive to Hegel's dialectical method. A strident contrast to Marx's reception of Hegel's thought is found in Karl Popper's, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. In this work, Karl Popper characterized Hegel's philosophy as one of the enemies of an open society. An open society is guided by the ideas of reason, freedom, and equality; Popper finds Hegel's philosophy to be a "despicable perversion" of each of these ideas. In particular, he is not receptive to Hegel's dialectical method, and in the vein of overstatement that flavors *Open Society*, Popper even claims that, "Hegel's success was the beginning of the 'age of dishonesty.'"[1] Popper's condemnation of Hegel's thought stands in stark contrast to Popper's receptive gesture towards the early German Romantics, to Novalis in particular. Popper opens *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* with the following words from Novalis: "Hypotheses are nets: only he who casts will catch." These words are a motto for Popper's book, a book dedicated to presenting his views on how our knowledge grows and develops, in short, how it progresses.[2] Popper does not cite Novalis' claim fully; the reference, from Novalis' *Dialogen und Monolog* of 1798/99 continues; "Wasn't America itself found through a hypothesis? High and above all else lives the hypothesis, only it remains, eternally new, whenever it also merely defeats itself."[3] In his 1959 preface to *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Popper voiced a similar point, claiming that "whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it."[4]

Such claims prompted Gilbert Ryle to describe Popper's take on the "heartbeat of science" as nothing less than "a hypothesis killed by fact."[5] If this is an accurate description of Popper's view (and I think it is), then we can already see why something as sweeping as Hegel's dialectic would be unattractive to Popper. In his work, Popper emphasizes the role of trial and error in the growth of our knowledge, a growth made possible by criticism and testing, so that false claims can be eliminated. For Popper scientific method is essentially a method of elimination, and any theory that cannot eliminate false claims, any theory that is immune to refutation, is no scientific theory at all.[6] As we shall see, this notion of philosophy as an unending task, fueled by hypotheses that are perpetually proved wrong as our knowledge grows, keeping philosophers forever on their toes with no comfortable resting place, will play a central role in Popper's rejection of Hegel's dialectic and his embrace of Novalis' romantic nets.[7]

Popper's welcoming reception of Novalis, a central figure of early German Romanticism, whose work until recently was not even acknowledged by most philosophers to have any philosophical value at all, contrasts sharply with Popper's rejection of Hegel, a canonical figure of the German tradition. This contrast is intriguing and worth exploring. Why would Popper a most rigorous, "scientific philosopher," endorse the likes of Novalis, a whimsical, "poetic philosopher?" After all, in one of his most famous poems, Novalis elevates kissing and singing above the numbers and figures of the scientific experts as elements to understand the world.[8] And why would Popper dismiss, Hegel, one of the German-language tradition's greatest system builders?

I think that getting clear about this matter of why a thinker like Novalis, who used romantic nets in his attempt to capture reality, appealed to Popper whereas Hegel's dialectical method was received by Popper with suspicion will help us to see that system building and "scientific" philosophy can be at odds with one another. As might already be clear, I share Popper's sympathy for Novalis and his romantic nets. I also share Popper's concerns regarding the implications of Hegel's dialectical method, even while I reject his aggressive way of expressing his reservations against that method, his tendency to overstate its dangers[9] and to make Hegel's philosophy appear an "enemy" of the open society.

In what follows I present (section I) the main features of Popper's decidedly discontented view of Hegel's dialectic, for this will enable us to appreciate why Popper would turn away from Hegel and his method of doing philosophy, finding more affinity with the early German Romantics and their method of approaching philosophical problems. Then I tackle

(section II) the differences between Hegel's approach to philosophy and that of the early German Romantics. Finally, I argue (section III) that the early German Romantics embraced a method that was indeed more progressive than Hegel's dialectical method and which has more affinities with the sort of "scientific" philosophy that took shape in the twentieth century.

I. Dialectic and scientific method

It may seem hazardous to refer to Popper at all in a piece dedicated to a serious discussion of Hegel's dialectic, for no less a Hegel scholar than Walter Kaufmann tells us that Popper's treatment of Hegel's work "contains more misconceptions about Hegel than any other single essay."[10] In particular, he warns against Popper's "quilt quotations" and the patchwork view of Hegel that emerges from Popper's decontextualized citations of Hegel's work. Kaufmann claims that "Popper writes like a district attorney who wants to persuade his audience that Hegel was against God, freedom, and equality—and uses quilt quotations to convince us."[11] For Kaufmann, there is no evidence to support Popper's claim that Hegel is the "missing link" between Plato and totalitarianism.[12] Yet, as we shall see, there is an important connection between Plato and Hegel: the role that inherently static forms play in the system of each thinker. The early German Romantics reject any such static forms.

Popper's presentation of Hegel is clearly a partisan one, but I don't think we need to dismiss it altogether. Indeed, some of the details that irritate Popper are details that a much more charitable reader of Hegel brings up as well. Hans Georg Gadamer was aware of the snares of Hegel's dialectic, though the conclusions that Gadamer draws from his observation of these snares are much less caustic than Popper's. Let's begin with a look at Popper's sketch of Hegel and why he believed that Hegel's approach was antithetical to "scientific" philosophy.

In a rather unsurprising move, given the roots of dialectic in ancient Greek philosophy, Popper connects Hegel's views to those of Heracleitus, and in his description of that relation, isolates what he believes to be a central strand of Hegel's dialectic: "the war of opposites, and their unity or identity."[13]

Popper is not entirely dismissive of Hegel's method, but he is outraged by Hegel's alleged support of contradiction:

> I am quite prepared to admit that this [three-beat rhythm of thesis-antithesis-synthesis] is not a bad description of the way in which a critical discussion,

> and therefore also scientific thought, may sometimes progress. For all criticism consists in pointing out some contradictions or discrepancies, and scientific progress consists largely in the elimination of contradictions wherever we find them. This means, however, that science proceeds on the assumption that *contradictions are impermissible and avoidable*, so that the discovery of a contradiction forces the scientist to make every attempt to eliminate it; and indeed, once a contradiction is admitted, all science must collapse. But Hegel derives a very different lesson from his dialectic triad. Since contradictions are the means by which science progresses, he concludes that contradictions are not only permissible and unavoidable but also highly desirable. This is a Hegelian doctrine which must destroy all argument and all progress. For if contradictions are unavoidable and desirable, there is no need to eliminate them, and so all progress must come to an end.[14]

This is a good place to allow Hegel to speak up and defend himself. In the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (which, we do well to keep in mind, was the first part of a larger work, entitled, *System der Wissenschaft/ System of Science*). Hegel quite clearly indicates that truth is his goal, and he explicitly shuns any celebration of error:

> Without a more precise definition of [the] nature and limits [of cognition], we might grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth.[15]

Much like Popper, Hegel acknowledges the role that error plays in our search for truth. In the following passage Hegel warns us against a fear of error that would paralyze our search for truth:

> Meanwhile, if the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust of Science, which in the absence of such scruples gets on with the work itself, and actually cognizes something it is hard to see why we should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust. Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just error itself?[16]

Hegel clearly is aware of the role that error must play in any philosophical inquiry. And his view of science, as he describes it in the *Phenomenology*, is not so very far removed from Popper's. Consider the following claim:

> . . . the resolve, in Science, [should be] not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, upon mere authority, but to examine everything for

> oneself and follow only one's own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself, and accept only one's own deed as what is true.[17]

Hegel's embrace of fallibility and openness to error is entirely absent from Popper's loaded portrait of Hegel as an "enemy" of open society. For the sake of interpretative justice, it is important to acknowledge that Popper's notion of progressive philosophy is in synch with the spirit of Hegel's claim that one should never surrender to the authority of others. Nonetheless, already in the above cited claim, one detects the cracks which would hinder any close affinity between the two thinkers: namely, in the phrase, "better still, to produce everything oneself and accept only one's own deed as what is true" [besser noch, alles selbst zu produzieren und nur die eigene Tat für das Wahre zu halten]. Hegel's dialectic is part of the structure of his idealism, and this idealism, rooted as it is in static forms, is not empirical enough for a thinker like Popper, and certainly not provisional enough either.[18] Popper shuns totalizing claims as tyrannical and finds a quest for absolute knowledge to be at odds with the open scientific method he endorses. Hence, claims from Hegel like the following would make Popper suspicious:

> The experience of itself which consciousness goes through, can, in accordance with its Notion, comprehend nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of Spirit . . . And finally, when consciousness itself grasps this its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself.[19]

Because Hegel's dialectical method is aimed at capturing "nothing less than the entire system of consciousness" or "the entire realm of the truth of spirit" so that the "nature of absolute knowledge" can be signified, on Popper's reading, it is bound to overlook its own fallibility and deal in the infallibility that gives rise to intellectual despotism. In the end, on Popper's reading, Hegel's dialectical method stands at odds with a progressive method for philosophy, and so is not a philosophical method in synch with an open, democratic society. Popper concludes his diatribe against Hegel's dialectical method with the following comments, suggesting he is sincerely disappointed in the path where Hegel's dialectical method inevitably leads us:

> I have described how, starting from a point that appears to be progressive and even revolutionary, and proceeding by that general dialectical method of twisting things which by now will be familiar to the reader, Hegel finally reaches a surprisingly conservative result.[20]

Popper cannot accept a philosophy that is not progressive and open to correction. Any clinging to an unchanging pattern to explain change in the world, any acceptance of a dogmatic method in philosophy (i.e., a method that is too elastic to be refuted) is a most conservative act of faith that a progressive thinker would do well to shun. For Popper, Hegel's dialectic is a source of irritation, leaving his sense of logic offended. Unlike Gadamer, who admits such frustration as well, Popper feels no thrill of "speculative exhilaration" upon working through the puzzling art that is Hegel's dialectic.[21]

Part of what draws Gadamer into Hegel's vexing dialectic is his desire to uncover the "wealth of insight" that he intuited could be found within it. Where Popper finds a path to a nonprogressive, conservative world of ideas, Gadamer sees promise. Gadamer enters the puzzling world of Hegel's dialectic with the hope of "bringing the productive unclarity of dialectical thought to life with all clarity of mind, and of learning to exemplify this productive unclarity using the substance of dialectic, the phenomena which are its content." Even such a dedicated reader of Hegel as Gadamer admits that it is difficult to come to terms with Hegel's dialectic:

> It was difficult to maintain the mean between the Scylla of logical objections in the form, "I know better than you," on the one hand, and the Charybdis of unreserved surrender to the dialectical play on the other.[22]

Hegel's dialectic continues to threaten and confuse philosophers, trapping them, as it were, between a rock and a hard place. If one wants to understand Hegel's dialectic, one is well-advised to turn to Gadamer's gentle, understanding approach to this vexing "method or non-method of thought."[23] But I don't think that Popper's aggressive, unsympathetic reading of Hegel's dialectic should be ignored, for he does raise some legitimate issues and can help us to reexamine what is to count as "scientific" philosophy. I have no desire to either bury or to praise Hegel, but simply to use Popper's insights to shed light on some of the limitations of his method and to illuminate some of the features of the net casters to whom Popper was more receptive.

II. Organized structures v. heaps of ruins in our search for truth

The tale of the relation between the early German Romantics, thinkers with a most ambiguous tie to system-building (famously, Schlegel claimed

that it was equally fatal for the spirit to have and not have a system, so some way of reconciling the two needed to be found),[24] and Hegel, one of the great system builders of philosophy, has recently been raised in the Anglophone world.[25] Frederick Beiser has brought attention to the early German Romantics, calling them the hares to Hegel's tortoise, and highlighting their original contributions to philosophy, contributions often overshadowed by the plodding, system-builder Hegel.

Both Schlegel and Novalis accept openness in philosophical method, for they believe that our search for truth is open-ended. An acceptance of philosophy as open-ended is part of the reason why hypotheses and hypothesis makers [*Hypothetiker*] are highly valued by the early German Romantics. Certainly, the following endorsement of hypotheses as expressed by Novalis is not articulated as Popper would have articulated the same idea.[26] Nonetheless, Novalis' words endorse the very sort of scientific method that Popper saw as essential to healthy, progressive philosophizing:

> The true hypothesis-maker is none other than the inventor, who from his invention has, however darkly, the discovered land floating before his eyes. He with the dark images over the observation, whose attempt wavers—and only through free comparison—through a manifold of touch and friction of his ideas with experience, at last meets the idea, which conducts itself from negative to positive experience, so that both for always cohere—and a new celestial light shines upon the force that has come to the world.[27]

Coherence, a hovering, and a groping toward truth, even if that truth will never be fully grasped: a good hypothesis provides guidance in our search for truth, a search that is never-ending. Following Popper's views, good philosophy is scientific because scientific philosophy embraces an open method, a method open to correction because guided by the principle of human fallibility and the uncertainty inevitably born of this fallibility. An openness to the possibility of error makes any quest for the sort of absolute knowledge promised by Hegel impossible: any searches for the Absolute will be unended and transform philosophy into an infinite activity with no hope of closure or systematic totality.

Once we accept that the "entire system of consciousness" or "the entire realm of the truth of spirit" lies beyond our reach, then a conception of philosophy entirely different from the one offered by Hegel is born, one which will accommodate openness, a certain degree of uncertainty, and the hovering between that known and the unknown. A central feature of

the romantic conception of philosophy is the blending of borders between philosophy and poetry. Yet, while the Romantics have until recently been rejected as unrigorous and antiscientific because of their embrace of poetry, their project of fusing the borders between philosophy and poetry was done in order to help the cause of progress and truth.

The romantic approach to philosophy has affinities with Popper's approach to philosophy, inasmuch as both accept the mess surrounding philosophy:

> A scientist engaged in a piece of research, say in physics, can attack his problem straight away. He can go at once to the heart of the matter: to the heart, that is, of an organized structure. For a structure of scientific doctrines is already in existence; and with it, a generally accepted problem-situation. This is why he may leave it to others to fit his contribution into the framework of scientific knowledge.
>
> The philosopher finds himself in a different position. He does not face an organized structure but rather something resembling a heap of ruins (though perhaps with treasure buried underneath). He cannot appeal to the fact that there is a generally accepted problem-situation; for that there is no such thing is perhaps the one fact which is generally accepted.[28]

Hegel's dialectic is an attempt to provide an organized structure instead of accepting the messy "heap of ruins," that the Romantics have no trouble acknowledging. Hegel appeals to his dialectical method as something that can solve any philosophical problem that comes its way. In contrast, the romantic nets are a method put in place to deal with the heap of ruins and to search for the treasure buried underneath. The Romantics accept openness in philosophy and reject any closed system that would confine our search for truth.

An acknowledgment that there are aspects of our epistemological framework that remain elusive, that is, not open to our gaze, despite our most critical approach to philosophy, is something that the early German Romantics openly endorse, but not, as has sometimes been claimed, as a detour away from the rationality celebrated by the Enlightenment thinking of Kant and his ilk, but rather as a humble acceptance of the limits of human cognition. Hegel's dialectic is part of his project to push for a crystal clear view of the Absolute as part of his effort to purify philosophy, understood as *Wissenschaft*, of any menacing shadows, anything that would not be open to our gaze. The conviction that we can grasp the Absolute, and may even use

it as the foundation for a philosophical system, sets Hegel and other Idealists of the period apart from their romantic colleagues. The early German Romantics had a marked distaste for a philosophy shaped by a drive for perfection and completeness.

For Hegel dialectic is the method that brings all aspects of his thought together, endowing his thought with systematic unity, making his philosophy *scientific*. The early German Romantics did not have systematic unity as a goal for their philosophical contributions in part because they did not seek to make philosophy scientific. Yet, ironically (and not in the romantic sense of this term), on Popper's reading anyway, romantic philosophy is more *scientific* than Hegel's absolute idealism.

III. The progressive Romantics

If we take our cue on scientific philosophy from Popper, then it follows that part of why romantic philosophy is scientific is because it is progressive. The early German Romantics cast their nets with the goal of progress and revolution in mind. Consider Schlegel's famous *Athenäum Fragment* 116, "Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry."[29] The progression that Schlegel has in mind comes when philosophy, poetry, and science are blended, as called for in Critical Fragment Nr. 115, "The whole history of modern poetry is a running commentary on the following brief philosophical text: all art should become science, all science art: poetry and philosophy should be made one."[30] The Romantics bid farewell to the hierarchies endorsed by both Kant (calling philosophy the Queen of all Sciences) and Hegel (philosophy positioned above both poetry and religion); for the early German Romantics there is a horizon of approaches in our search for truth, not a pure philosophical method that stands above the rest. A good hypothesis is necessary to guide us in our pursuit of knowledge, but philosophy certainly does not have any special claim to lay on the formation of good hypotheses, or to speak with Popper, on "the growth of knowledge." Indeed, philosophers should not be specialists, says the author of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*.[31]

Hegel clearly and unabashedly had systematic ambitions based on a view of philosophy as a discipline that should aspire to be like a science [*Wissenschaft*] and which is driven by the goals of absolute perfection and completeness: the literary form that Hegel uses is not open or playful (even while it is innovative): it guides the reader via strict argumentation to the conclusions that will authoritatively establish the theses defended.

As Walter Kaufmann emphasizes in his article, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," for Hegel, "philosophy did not stand between religion and poetry but above both. Philosophy was, according to him, its age comprehended in thought, and—to exaggerate a little—the philosopher's task was to *comprehend* what the religious person and the poet *feel*."[32] This view of philosophy's task is at odds with the romantic conception of philosophy, where philosophy is completed in and as poetry. For the early German Romantics, there is no hierarchy that grants a privileged place to philosophy, and certainly, religion and poetry do not fall below philosophy as they do in Hegel's ordering of the disciplines. Indeed, the Romantics call for a collapse of the borders between poetry, philosophy, and science.

Part of what drives Schlegel and Novalis to merge the borders of philosophy and poetry is their conviction that healthy, progressive philosophy must contain a good dose of contingency and incompleteness. The early German Romantics were not interested in closed systems and incompleteness was not seen as an imperfection: quite the contrary. Consider Novalis' claim in his Logological Fragments that: "Only what is incomplete can be comprehended—can take us further [. . .]."[33] In the *Allgemeine Brouillon* (1798/99), Novalis tells us that "an absolute drive towards perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the *imperfect*, the incomplete [. . .]."[34] Many of the fragments published in *Das Athenäum*, the journal edited by Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel between 1798 and 1800, reflect a skeptical attitude concerning the "proper starting-points" of any scientific investigation and the possibility of certain results and so of complete systems for the presentation of those results. In short, the full satisfaction of our hunger for knowledge [*Wißbegierde*] is simply not a goal for the early German Romantics. Indeed, for Schlegel a *complete* satisfaction of our hunger for knowledge would take the wind out of the sails of our search for truth. Philosophy, after all, consists of activity; were that activity to end, so would philosophy. The absolute drive for perfection and completeness alluded to by Novalis would mean the end of philosophy as an activity. The satisfaction of the absolute drive for perfection and completeness is ultimately destructive of philosophy itself and so amounts to a kind of philosophical pathology.

Instead of a closed system presumptuous enough to offer a last word on the nature of knowledge, what the philosopher has is a tendency, a path she follows to greater and greater degrees of probability, but never to certain truth, working within limits, but also always going beyond those limits. The Romantics' move to put philosophy and art in closer relation, a move reflected in the use of more open literary forms such as the fragment, of

playful literary devices such as irony, is not a move to an unintelligible, nonsensical realm. The melting of the boundaries between philosophy and poetry is part of the project to make the world romantic and to keep philosophy progressive. Consider Novalis' famous imperative:

> The world must be made Romantic. In that way one can find the original meaning again. To make Romantic is nothing but a qualitative raising to a higher power. In this operation the lower self will become one with a better self. Just as we ourselves are such a qualitative exponential series. This operation is as yet quite unknown. By endowing the commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious respect, the known with the dignity of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I am making it Romantic. The operation for the higher, unknown, mystical, infinite is the converse—this undergoes a logarithmic change through this connection—it takes on an ordinary form of expression. Romantic philosophy. *Lingua romana*. Raising and lowering by turns.[35]

What does it mean to speak of a philosophy that endows the known with the "dignity of the unknown" or the "finite with the appearance of the finite"? Such a philosophy is one that is at peace with openness and uncertainty, with a search for truth that will never be *fully satisfied*.

Rüdiger Bubner stresses that the Romantics, more concerned than their idealist contemporaries with commentary, criticism, and interpretation, also developed a different model of system than Hegel did. For the early German Romantics, "[t]he relevant model [. . .] is not a godlike creation of a system *ex nihilo*, as it was for the early idealists, but rather an actively sympathetic response of the part of the critic and the philologist to the significant creative works of the past."[36] Bubner's reference to a "godlike system" recalls Novalis' critique of the "absolute drive for perfection and completeness," for certainly only a godlike creation could possibly satisfy that drive. Schlegel, for his part, does indeed explicitly reject attempts to ground philosophy "ex nihilo" in ahistorical first principles, stressing the intimate relation philosophy has to history and tradition, and searching, all too often in vain for an active and sympathetic response to his own work, which was at best slow in coming, and often did not come at all. Both Schlegel and Novalis welcome contingency and incompleteness as important elements of progressive philosophizing. One root of Popper's disdain of Plato (who he reads as Socrates' Judas) and Hegel is their reliance on inherently static forms—this reliance on static forms distinguishes German

Idealism from early German Romanticism (the early German Romantics reject static forms).

IV. Concluding remarks

Bubner's point that the progressive, universal poetry endorsed by Schlegel and Novalis, would "gradually lead to the dissolution of all distinctions of genre, to the unification of art and philosophy, and to the intensification of social communication [. . .],"[37] is linked to the nets that caught Popper's attention. The project of unification heralded by Schlegel and Novalis amounts to a romantic transformation of philosophy: a project aimed at keeping philosophy open and healthy. The dissolution of distinctions of genre, the merging of boundaries between philosophy and poetry, is the result of an insight that our search for knowledge will always remain a work in progress and that philosophy is in a constant state of becoming, never fully reaching completion. This sort of philosophy is progressive. Hegel's dialectical method was simply not suited to capture reality in the way that the Romantics thought reality might best be captured. The Romantics themselves never voiced this critique of Hegel's dialectic, but in a surprising turn, Popper, a kindred spirit from the twentieth century, did see the promise of progress in the romantic method and the trap Hegel's dialectic set for progress in philosophy.

Notes

[1] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 27–28.

[2] Compare this motto to the words from Descartes that Popper uses in his article, "What is Dialectic?": "There is no theory or opinion, however absurd or incredible, which has not been maintained by some one or other of our philosophers." Popper finds Hegel's dialectic to fall on the side of the worst of those "absurd and incredible philosophic theories" to which Descartes refers (Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?" *Mind*, Vol. 49, No. 196, October 1940, 403–426, at p. 420).

[3] In Friedrich Novalis, *Schriften, Das philosophische Werk I.* eds. Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim Mähl and Gerhard Schutz, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965, Volume 2, p. 668. The German text is: "Hypothesen sind Netze, nur der wird fangen, der auswirft. / Ist nicht America selbst durch Hypothese gefunden? / Hoch und vor allen lebe die Hypothese—nur sie bleibt/Ewig neu, so oft sie sich auch selbst nur besiegte." (The translation is mine).

[4] Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. xix.

[5] Gilbert Ryle, review of *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, *Mind*, Vol. 56, No. 222 (April 1947): 167–172, here p. 167.

[6] Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?" *Mind*, Vol. 49, No. 196, October 1940, 403–426.

[7] In what follows, the voice of Friedrich Schlegel will join that of Novalis to fill in the picture of romantic method in philosophy. Schlegel and Novalis were the leading philosophers of *Frühromantik* or early German Romanticism.

[8] See "Zahlen und Figuren" in Novalis, *Schriften* I, 344. The first stanza goes as follows: "Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren/Sind Schlüssel alle Kreaturen,/ Wenn die so singen, oder küssen,/Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen/Wenn sich die Welt ins freie Leben,/Und in die 'freie' Welt wird zurückbegeben,/Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten/Zu echter Klarheit wieder gatten/Und man in Märchen und Gedichten/Erkennt die 'alten' wahren Weltgeschichten,/Dann fliegt von Einem geheimen Wort/Das ganze verkehrte Wesen fort."

[9] In his review of *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Gilbert Ryle, with his characteristic elegance, described the stylistic weakness of Popper's rant against Hegel as follows: "Dr. Popper hates Hegel as much as he hates Hegelians. His comments, in consequence, have a shrillness which detracts from their force. It is right that he should feel passionately. The survival of liberal ideas and liberal practices has been and still is in jeopardy. But it is bad tactics in a champion of the freedom of thought to use the blackguarding idioms characteristic of its enemies. His verdicts are, I think, just but they would exert a greater influence if they sounded judicial" (167–62, here p. 171).

[10] Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 21–60, here p. 24.

[11] Ibid., p. 26.

[12] Ibid., p. 32.

[13] Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, p. 37.

[14] Ibid., p. 39.

[15] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 46; Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1969–1971 (henceforward quoted as *Werke*, followed by volume and page number), vol 3, p. 68. The German text is: "Ohne die genauere Bestimmung seiner Natur [die Natur des Erkennens] und Grenze [werden] Wolken des Irrtums statt des Himmels der Wahrheit erfasst."

[16] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 47. The German text is: "Inzwischen, wenn die Besorgnis, in Irrtum zu geraten, ein Mißtrauen in die Wissenschaft setzt, welche ohne dergeleichen Bedenklichkeiten ans Werk selbst geht und wirklich erkennt, so ist nict abzusehen, warum nicht umgekehrt ein Mißtrauen in dies Mißtrauen gestzt und besorgt werden soll, daß diese Furcht zu irren schon der Irrtum selbst ist" (*Werke*, 3, 69).

[17] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 50. The German text is: ". . . in der Wissenschaft [hat man den Vorsatz] auf die Autorität sich den Gedanken anderer nicht zu ergeben, sondern alles selbst zu prüfen und nur der eigenen Überzeugung zu folgen oder, besser noch, alles selbst zu produzieren und nur die eigene Tat für das Wahre zu halten" (*Werke*, 3, 72–73).

[18] Consider the following claim: "*Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it*, this *dialectical* movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called *experience*" (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 55). The German text is: "Diese *dialektische* Bewegung, welche das Bewußtsein an ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem Gegenstande ausübt, *insofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand* daraus *entspringt*, ist eigentlich dasjenige, was *Erfahrung* genannt wird" (*Werke*, 3, 78).

[19] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 56–57. The German text is: "Die Erfahrung, welche das Bewußtsein über sich macht, kann ihrem Begriffe nach nichts weniger in sich begreifen als das ganze System desselben oder das ganze Reich der Wahrheit des Geistes . . . und endlich, indem es selbst dies sein Wesen erfaßt, wird es die Natur des absoluten Wissens selbst bezeichnen" (*Werke*, 3, 80–81).

[20] Karl Popper, *The Society and Its Enemies* , p. 49.

[21] Hans Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies.* translated and with an introduction by C. P. Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 3. The reference to Hegel's dialectic as a source of irritation is taken from Gadamer, who writes in his foreword to *Hegel's Dialectic*, that, "Hegel's dialectic is a continual source of irritation. Even one who has succeeded in making his way through the tumultuous logic of Plato's *Parmenides* has mixed feelings about it—his sense of logic is offended, yet he feels speculative exhilaration at the same time" (p. 3).

[22] Ibid., pp. 3–4.

[23] Ibid., p. 3.

[24] Friedrich Schlegel, *Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe*, ed. E. Behler, Jean Jacques. Anstett, Hans Eichner, Paderborn: Schöningh, 1958 ff., II, p. 173, Nr. 53. Cf. Ibid., II, p. 80, Nr. 614. A selection of Schlegel's fragments have been translated by Peter Firchow in *Friedrich Schlegel Philosophical Fragments*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, here p. 24.

[25] In Germany, discussions of Hegel's relation to the early German Romantics are nothing new. Otto Pöggler discusses the relation between Hegel and the early German Romantics in his, *Hegels Kritik der Romantik*, München: Fink Verlag, 1954/55; new edition, München: Fink Verlag, 1998. For a discussion of Hegel's critique of the early German Romantics, see Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, "Hegel und die Romantik," in *Das neue Licht der Frühromantik*, ed. Bärbel Frischmann and Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009, pp. 39–49.

[26] In his article on dialectic, Popper claims that "it is a necessity and even a duty for everyone who wants to promote truth and enlightenment to train himself in the art of expressing things clearly and unambiguously, even if this means giving up certain niceties of metaphor and clever double meanings" ("What is Dialectic?", p. 411). Clearly, the early German Romantics never gave up niceties of metaphor or clever double meanings, yet neither did they derail progressive philosophy in the way that Popper ascribed to Hegel.

[27] "Der ächte Hypothetiker ist kein andrer als der Erfinder, dem von seiner Erfindung oft schon dunkeln das endtdeckte Land vor Augen schwebt—der mit dem dunkeln Bilde über der Beobachtung, dem Versuch schwebt—und nur durch freye Vergleichung—durch mannichfache Berühung und Reibung seiner Ideen mit der Erfahrung endlich die Idee trift, die sich negativ zur positiven Erfahrung

verhält, dass beyde dann auf immer zusammenhängen—und ein neues himmlisches Licht die zu Welt gekommene Kraft umstrahle" (Novalis, *Schriften*, p. 669).

[28] Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Preface to the First Edition, 1934, London: Routledge, 2002), pp. xv–xvi.

[29] Firchow, *Friedrich Schlegel Philosophical Fragments*, p. 31.

[30] Schlegel, *Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe*, II, Kritische Fragment Nr. 115; Firchow, *Friedrich Schlegel Philosophical Fragments*, p. 14.

[31] In the Preface to the 1959 edition of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Popper writes: "For myself, I am interested in science and philosophy only because I want to learn something about the riddle of the world in which we live and the riddle of man's knowledge of that world." See Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, p. xxvi.

[32] Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," p. 21.

[33] Novalis, *Schriften*, I, p. 559, Nr. 151. Some of this has been translated by Margaret Mahony Stoljar, in Friedrich Novalis, *Philosophical Writings*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, here, p. 65, Nr. 86.

[34] Novalis, *Schriften*, II, p. 384, Nr. 638/Novalis, *Philosophical Writings*, p. 131, Nr. 33.

[35] Novalis, *Schriften*, I, p. 545, Nr. 105/Stoljar, p. 60, Nr. 66.

[36] Rüdiger Bubner, *The Innovations of Idealism*, trans. Nicholas Walker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 33.

[37] Ibid., pp. 32–33.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor, *Hegel: Three Studies*, trans. S. W. Nicholsen, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.

—*Negative Dialectics,* trans. E. B. Ashton, New York, Seabury Press, 1973.

Ameriks, Karl, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

—*Kant and the Fate of Autonomy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Arndt, Andreas, *Dialektik und Reflexion. Zur Rekonstruktion des Vernunftbegriffs*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994.

Arndt, Andreas, Iber, Christian, and Kruck, Günter, eds, *Hegels Lehre vom Begriff, Urteil und Schluss*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006.

Barnes, Jonathan, "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist," in E. J. Kenny and M. M. MacKenzie, eds, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 2–29.

Baum, Manfred, *Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1986.

Beiser, Frederick, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

—*The Fate of Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

—*German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1791–1801*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Bencivenga, Ermanno, *Hegel's Dialectical Logic*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Bernstein, Richard J., *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985.

Berti, Enrico, *Contraddizione e Dialettica negli Antichi e nei Moderni*, Palermo: L'Epos, 1987.

Biard, Joel, Buvat, D., Kervegan, Jean-Francois, Kling, J. F., Lacroix, Alain, Lecrivain, Andre, and Sublici, M., *Introduction à la lecture de la 'Science de la Logique' de Hegel. La Doctrine de l'Essence*, Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1983.

Biscuso, Massimiliano, *Hegel, lo Scetticismo Antico e Sesto Empirico*, Napoli: La città del sole, 2005.

Blau, Ulrich, "Die Logik der Unbestimmtheiten und Paradoxen," *Erkenntnis*, 22 (1985), 369–459.

Bowman, Brady, "Skeptizismus als 'Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins': Hegels Auslegung des Pyrrhonismus und ihre konzeptuelle Hintergründe," in Bowman, Brady and Vieweg, Klaus, eds, *Die freie Seite der Philosophie: Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Philosophie*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006, pp. 27–52.

Brandom, Robert B., *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

—"Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," *Hegel-Studien*, 36 (2001), 57–92.

—"Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*," in *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 178–209.

—*Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Braßel, Bernd, *Das Programm der idealen Logik*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005.

—"Vorzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik," in Vittorio Hösle and Wolfgang Neuser, eds, *Logik, Mathematik und Naturphilosophie im objektiven Idealismus. Festschrift für Dieter Wandschneider zum 65. Geburtstag*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004, pp. 91–112.

Breazeale, Daniel and Rockmore, Tom, eds, *Rights, Bodies, and Recognition: New Essays on Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.

Bristow, William F., *Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

Brown, Harold L., "Epistemic Concepts: A Naturalistic Approach," *Inquiry*, 34 (1991), 323–351.

—"Sellars, Concepts and Conceptual Change," *Synthese*, 60 (1986), pp. 275–307.

Bubner, Rüdiger, *Dialektik und Wissenschaft*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973.

—"Hegels Lösung eines Rätsels," in Francesca Menegoni and Luca Illeterati, eds, *Das Endliche und das Unendliche in Hegels Denken*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004, pp. 17–32.

—*The Innovations of Idealism*, trans. Nicholas Walker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Burbidge, John, *On Hegel's Logic: Fragments of a Commentary*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981.

—"Where is the Place of the Understanding?" in George di Giovanni, ed., *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990, pp. 171–182.

Burkhardt, Bernd, *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik im Spannungsfeld der Kritik*, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1993.

Butler, Clark, *Hegel's Logic: Between Dialectic and History*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996.

Bykova, Marina, "Spirit and Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in Kenneth Westphal, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009, pp. 265–295.

Carlson, David G., ed., *Hegel's Theory of the Subject*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Cassirer, Ernst, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit. Zweiter Band: Die Nachkantischen Systeme*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 3, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999.

—*Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit. Dritter Band: Die Nachkantischen Systeme*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 4, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000.

—*The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 3, trans. Ralph Manheim, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957.

Chiereghin, Franco, "Platonische Skepsis und spekulatives Denken bei Hegel," in Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, eds, *Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996, pp. 29–49.

Clark, Malcolm, *Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from 'Vorstellung' to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Croce, Benedetto, *What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel?*, trans. Douglas Ainslie, Kitchener, OT: Batoche, 2001.

Curd, Patricia, ed., *A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia*, trans. Richard D. McKirahan Jr, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995.

De Laurentiis, Allegra, "Absolute Knowing," in Kenneth Westphal, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009, pp. 246–264.

Demmerling, Christoph and Kambartel, Friedrich, eds, *Vernunftkritik nach Hegel. Analytisch-kritische Interpretation zur Dialektik*, Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1992.

deVries, Willem A., *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

deVries, Willem A. and Triplett, Timm, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given. Reading Wilfird Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" Including the Complete Text of Sellars's Essay*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000.

De Vos, Ludovicus, *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Die absolute Idee*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1983.

di Giovanni, George, ed., *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.

—"Reflection and Contradiction: A Commentary on Some Passages of Hegel's Science of Logic," *Hegel Studien*, 8 (1973), 131–161.

Doz, Andre, *La Logique de Hegel et les Problèmes Traditionnels de l'Ontologie*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1987.

Doz, Andre and Dubarle, Dominique, *Logique et Dialectique*, Paris: Libraire Larousse, 1972.

Dudley, Will, *Understanding German Idealism*, Stockfield: Acumen 2007.

Dürr, Agnes, *Zum Problem der Hegelschen Dialektik und ihrer Formen*, Berlin: Verlag für Staatswissenschaften und Geschichte, 1938.

Düsing, Klaus, "Constitution and Structure of Self-Identity: Kant's Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 8 (1983), pp. 409–431.

—*Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Systematische und Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und zur Dialektik*, 3rd extended edition, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995.

—"Dialektikmodelle. Platons 'Sophistes' sowie Hegels und Heideggers Umdeutungen," in Dieter Wandschneider, ed., *Das Problem der Dialektik*, Bonn: Bouvier 1997, pp. 4–18.

—"Hegels Dialektik. Der dreifache Bruch mit dem traditionellen Denken," in Hans-Dieter Klein and Johann Reikerstorfer, eds, *Philosophia perennis*, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang 1993, pp. 126–138.

—*Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007.

—"Hegel und die klassische griechische Philosophie (Platon, Aristoteles)," in Dietmar Heidemann and Christian Krijnen, eds, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, pp. 46–69.

—"Identität und Widerspruch. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Dialektik Hegels," *Giornale di Metafisica*, 6 (1984), 315–358.
—"Ontologie und Dialektik bei Plato und Hegel," *Hegel-Studien*, 15 (1980), 95–150.
—"Spekulation und Reflexion. Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegels in Jena," *Hegel Studien*, 5 (1969), 95–128.
—"Syllogistik und Dialektik in Hegels spekulativer Logik," in Dieter Henrich, ed., *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986, pp. 15–38.
Einstein, Albert, "Remarks on Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge," trans. P. A. Schilpp, in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, New York: Harper & Row, 1963, pp. 278–290.
Ferrarin, Alfredo, *Hegel and Aristotle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Falk, Hans-Peter, *Das Wissen in Hegels* "Wissenschaft der Logik," Munich: Karl Alber, 1983.
Falke, Gustav-H., *Begriffene Geschichte. Das historische Substrat und die systematische Anordnung der Bewußtseinsgestalten in Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Interpretation und Kommentar*, Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 1996.
Ficara, Elena, *Die Ontologie in der, Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Zweiter Vortrag im Jahre 1804*, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Joachim Widmann, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986.
—*Early Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed., Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.
—*Fichtes Werke in 11 Bd.*, hrsg. v. I. H. Fichte, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971.
—*Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre*, trans. Michael Baur, ed. Fred Neuhouser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
—*Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, 1796–99)*, trans. Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.
—*Review of Aenesidemus*, in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp.136–157.
—*The Science of Knowing: Fichte's 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre*, trans.Walter E. Wright, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.
—*Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslhere) with First and Second Introductions*, ed. and tran.Peter Heath and John Lachs, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
—*The System of Ethics*, trans. and ed. Dan Breazeale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Flay, Joseph, "Hegel's Inverted World," in *The Review of Metaphysics*, 23 (1970), pp. 662–678.
—*Hegel's Quest for Certainty*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.
Fodor, Jerry and LePore, Ernest, *Holism: A Shopper's Guide*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
Fogelin, Robert, *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Folger-Fonfara, Sabine, *Das Super-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziskus von Marchia*, Leiden: Brill, 2008.
Forster, Michael, *Hegel and Skepticism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

—"Hegel's Dialectical Method," in Beiser, Frederick, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 130–170.
—"Hegel on the superiority of ancient over modern skepticism," in Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, eds, *Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1996, pp. 64–82.
—"Hegelian vs. Kantian Interpretations of Pyrrhonism: Revolution or Reaction?" in Brady Bowman and Klaus Vieweg, eds, *Die freie Seite der Philosophie: Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Philosophie*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006, pp. 53–70.
—*Kant and Skepticism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Franks, Paul, *All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism in German Idealism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
—"Ancient Skepticism, Modern Naturalism, and Nihilism in Hegel's Early Jena Writings", in Frederick Beiser, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 52–73.
Frege, Gottlob, "Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffschrift," in *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980, pp. 91–97.
Fries, Jacob Friedrich, *Reinhold, Fichte, und Schelling*, in *J. F. Fries Werke*, Gert König and Lutz Goldsetzer, eds, rpt. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967–1969, XXIV, p. 329.
Fulda, Hans-Friedrich, "Hegels Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und Darstellungsweise," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 124–174.
Fulda, Hans-Friedrich, Holz, Hans Heiz, and Pätzold, Detlev, *Perspektiven auf Hegel*, Köln: Dinter, 1991.
Gabriel, Markus, *Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift*, Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2006.
—*Der Mensch im Mythos. Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie und Selbstbewußtseinsgeschichte in Schellings "Philosophie der Mythologie,"* Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006.
—"Die metaphysische Wahrheit des Skeptizismus bei Schelling und Hegel," *International Yearbook of German Idealism*, 5 (2007), 126–156.
—"Hegel und Plotin," in Dietmar Heidemann and Christian Krijnen, eds, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, pp. 70–83.
Gabriel, Markus, "Schelling, Hegel und die metaphysische Wahrheit des Skeptizismus," *International Yearbook of German Idealism*, 5 (2007), 126–156.
Gabriel, Markus and Žižek, Slavoj, *Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism*, New York and London: Continuum Press, 2009.
Gadamer, H. G., *Hegel's Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies*, translated and with an introduction by C. P. Smith, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976.
—*Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.
Gloy, Karen, *Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit. Eine Strukturanalyse des 'und'. Systematische Untersuchungen zum Einheits- und Mannigfaltigkeitsbegriff bei Platon, Fichte, Hegel sowie in der Moderne*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981.
Görland, Ingtraud, *Die Kantkritik des jungen Hegel*, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1966.

Gottschlich, Max and Wladika, Michael, eds, *Dialektische Logik. Hegels* "Wissenschaft der Logik" *und ihre realphilosophischen Wirklichkeitsweisen*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005.

Grau, A., *Ein Kreis von Kreisen. Hegels postanalytische Erkenntnistheorie.* Paderborn: Mentis, 2001.

Grier, P. T., "Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's *Logic*," in George di Giovanni, ed., *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990, pp. 59–75.

Grosos, Philippe, *Système et Subjectivité. Etude sur la signification et l'enjeu du concept de système Fichte, Hegel, Schelling.* Paris: J. Vrin, 1996.

Günther, Gotthard, "Das Problem einer Formalisierung der Transzendental-dialektischen Logik. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Logik Hegels," *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 1, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1964, pp. 65–123.

—*Grundzüge einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in Hegels Logik*, 2nd ed., Hamburg: Meiner, 1978.

Hadamard, Jacques, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945.

Hahn, Susan, *Contradiction in Motion: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Halbig, Christoph, Quante, Michael, and Siep, Ludwig, eds, *Hegel's Erbe*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004.

Hamann, Johann Georg, *Metacritique of the Purism of Reason*, trans. Kenneth Haynes, in James Schmidt, ed., *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996, pp. 154–167.

—*Metakritik über den Purismus der reinen Vernunft*, in *Hammanns Schriften*, ed. F. Roth, Berlin: G. Reimer, 1821–1843, vol. 7.

Hanna, Robert, "From an Ontological Point of View: Hegel's Critique of the Common Logic," in Jon Stewart, ed., *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 253–281.

Harnischmacher, Iris, *Der metaphysische Gehalt der Hegelschen Logik*, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001.

Harris, Errol E., *Formal, Transcendental & Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1987.

Harris, Henry S., *Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801–1806)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

—*Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight (1770–1801)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

—*Hegel's Ladder.* Vol. I: *The Pilgrimage of Reason.* Vol. II: *The Odyssey of Spirit.* Indianapolis, IN: Cambridge: Hackett, 1997.

Hartkopf, W. S., *Der Durchbruch zur Dialektik in Hegels Denken*, Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hein, 1976.

—"Die Anfänge der Dialektik bei Schelling und Hegel," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 30 (1976), pp. 545–566.

—"Die Dialektik Fichtes als Vorstufe zu Hegels Dialektik," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 21, (1967), pp. 173–207.

Hartmann, Klaus, ed., *Die Ontologische Option: Studien zu Hegels Propädeutik, Schellings Hegel-Kritik, und Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976.

Hartmann, Klaus, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View," in A. MacIntyre, ed., *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 101–124.

—*Hegels Logik*, ed. Olaf L. Müller with a foreword by Klaus Brinkmann, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999.

—"Zur neuesten Dialektikkritik," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 55 (1973), 220–242.

Hartmann, Nicolai, *Die Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. Henry S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977.

—*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and Critical Writings*, ed. E. Behler: New York: Continuum, 1990.

—*The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encylopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991.

—*Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1971) v. 7, p. 3ff.

—*Hegels Notizen zum absoluten Geist*. Eingeleitet und herausgegeben von H. Schneider, *Hegel-Studien*, 9 (1974), 9–38.

—*Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, translated from the 1830 edition, together with the Zusätze by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2007.

—*Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

—*Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities Press, 1969.

—*Heidelberg Writings: Journal Publications*, ed. by Brady Bowman and Allen Speight, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

—"How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (As Displayed in the Works of Mr. Krug)," in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, trans. and ed., *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 292–310.

—*The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics*, trans. J. W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni, introduction and notes by H. S. Harris, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986.

—*Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., trans. H. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.

—*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. and trans. by Peter C. Hodgson Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

—*Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

—*Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975.

—*On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One*, trans. Henry S. Harris, in George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, eds, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 311–362.

—*Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

—*The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover, 1956.
—*Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde, Kitchener: Batoche, 2001.
—*Schriften und Entwürfe (1799–1808)* in: *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. im Auftrag der | Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 5, ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt R. Meist. Hamburg 1998, 272–274.
—*Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969–1971.
—*Werke in 12 Bänden*, hrsg. v. Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968, vol. 5, p. 118.
—, and Schelling, Joseph, "The Critical Journal, Introduction: On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally, and its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy," in di Giovanni, George, and Harris, Henry S., trans. and ed., *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism,* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 272–291.
Heidegger, Martin, *Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 29. C. Strube, ed., Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.
—*Hegel's Concept of Experience. With a Section from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. K. R. Dove, New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
—*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
—*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. M. Heim, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
Heidemann, Dietmar, *Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.
—"Substance, Subject, System. The Justification of Science and the History of Self-Consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in Dean Moyar, and Michael Quante, eds, *Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit. *A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 1–20.
Heidemann, Dietmar and Krijnen, Christian, eds, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Darmstadt: WBG, 2007.
Henrich, Dieter, ed. "Anfang und Methode der Logik," *Hegel im Kontext*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971, 73–94.
—*Der Grund im Bewußtsein: Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken (1794–1795)*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992.
—"Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels.* Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 213–229.
—"Hegels Grundoperation. Eine Einleitung in die 'Wissenschaft der Logik,'" in Ute Guzzoni, Bernhard Rang and Ludwig Siep, eds, *Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart: Festschrift für Werner Marx zum 65. Geburtstag*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1976, pp. 208–230.
—*Hegel im Kontext*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975.
—*Hegels Logik der Reflexion. Neue Fassung*, in Dieter Henrich, ed., *Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1978, pp. 203–324.
Henrich, Dieter, ed., *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Formation und Rekonstruktion*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986.

Herder, Johann Gottfried, "Verstand und Erfahrung. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft," in *Herders sämmtliche Werke*, ed. B. L. Suphan, Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1913, vol. 21.

Hoffmann, Thomas Sören, *Die absolute Form. Modalität, Individualität und das Prinzip der Philosophie nach Kant und Hegel*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991.

—*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Eine Propädeutik*, Wiesbaden: Marix-Verlag, 2004.

Hogrebe, Wolfram, *Prädikation und Genesis. Metaphysik als Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings "Die Weltalter,"* Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1989.

—*Echo des Nichtwissens*, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 2006.

Hohler, Thomas P., *Imagination and Reflection: Intersubjectivity. Fichte's Grundlage of 1794*. The Haage/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition*, trans. Joel Anderson, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

Hortsmann, Rolf-Peter, *Die Grenzen der Vernunft. Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und Motiven des Deutschen Idealismus*, Frankfurt a.M.: Alton Hein, 1991.

—*Ontologie und Relationen: Hegel, Bradley, Russell und die Kontroverse über interne und externe Beziehungen*, Königstein/Ts.: Anton Hain, 1984.

Hortsmann, Rolf-Peter, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels,* Franfkfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978.

Hösle, Vittorio, "Begründungsfragen des objektiven Idealismus," in Wolfgang R. Köhler, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, and Peter Rohs, eds, *Philosophie und Begründung*, Frankfurt a.M.: Surkamp, 1987, pp. 212–267.

—*Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie. Transzendentalpragmatik, Letztbegründung, Ethik*, München: C. H. Beck, 1990.

—*Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität.* 2 Bde. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987.

—"Inferentialism in Brandom and holism in Hegel," in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 27/1 (2006), pp. 61–82.

—*Wahrheit und Geschichte. Studien zur Struktur der Philosophiegeshichte unter paradigmatischer Analyse der Entwicklung von Parmenides bis Platon*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1984.

—"Wahrheit und Verstehen. Davidson, Gadamer und das Desiderat einer objektividealistischen Hermeneutik," in Wolfgang Neuser and Vittorio Hösle, eds, *Logik, Mathematik, und Naturphilosophie im objektiven Idealismus. Festschrift für Dieter Wandschneider*, Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2004, pp. 265–283.

Houlgate, Stephen, *Freedom, Truth and History. An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy.* New York: Routledge, 1991.

—*The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006.

—"A Reply to John Burbidge," in George di Giovanni, ed., *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990, pp. 183–189.

Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Mediations*, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.

Hyppolite, Jean, *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, Paris: Aubier 1956.

—*Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman, Evanston, IL: Northestern University Press, 1974.

—*Logic and Existence*, trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amir Sen, New York: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Iber, Christian, *Metaphysik absoluter Rationalität. Eine Studie zu den beiden ersten Kapiteln von Hegels Wesenslogik*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.

Illeterati, Luca and Menegoni, Francesca, eds, *Das Endliche und das Unendliche in Hegels Denken*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.

Ilyenkov, Evald V., *Dialectical Logic: Essays on its History and Theory*, trans. H. Campbell, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979.

Kainz, Howard P., *Paradox, Dialectic, and System: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the Hegelian Problematic*, University Park and London: Penn State University Press, 1988.

Kang, Soon-Jeon, *Reflexion und Widerspruch. Eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche und systematische Untersuchung des Hegelschen Begriffs der Widerspruchs*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1999.

Kant, Immanuel, *Correspondence*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

—*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

—*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forth as Science*, trans. G. Hatfield, in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

—*Werke in 12 Bänden*, hrsg. v. Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968.

Kaufmann, Walter, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed., *Hegel. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 21–60.

Kern, Walter, "Die Aristotelesdeutung Hegels. Die Aufhebung des Aristotelischen, Nous' in Hegels Geist", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 78 (1971), 237–259.

Kesselring, Thomas, *Die Produktivität der Antinomie. Hegels Dialektik im Lichte der genetischen Erkenntnistheorie und der formalen Logik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1984.

—*Entwicklung und Widerspruch. Ein Vergleich zwischen Piagets genetischer Erkenntnistheorie und Hegels Dialektik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1981.

Kimmerle, Heiz V., *Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens. Hegels System der Philosophie in den Jahren 1800–1804*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1970.

Klemm, David E. and Zöller, Gunter, eds, *Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute and Others in Classical German Philosophy*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Koch, Anton Friedrich, "Die Selbstbeziehung der Negation in Hegels Logik," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 53 (1999), pp. 1–29.

Kondylis, Panajotis, *Die Entstehung der Dialektik. Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979.

Kosok, Michael, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed., *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 327–287.

Krijnen, Christian, *Philosophie als System. Prinzipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2008.

Krohn, Wolfang, *Die Formale Logik in Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik". Untersuchungen zur Schlusslehre*, Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1972.

Kroner, Richard, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Tübingen: Mohr, 1. Bd. 1921; 2. Bd. 1924.

Kulenkampff, Arend, *Antinomie und Dialektik. Zur Funktion des Widerspruchs in der Philosophie*, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1970.

Kutschera, Franz von, *Jenseits des Materialismus*, Paderborn: Mentis, 2003.

Lardic, Jean-Marie, "Hegel classique ou spéculation et dialectique du transcendental," in Jean-Christophe Goddard, ed., *Le Transcendantal et le Spéculatif dans l'Idéalisme Allemand*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1999, pp. 115–135.

Lauth, Reinhard, *Hegel, Critique de la Doctrine de la Science de Fichte*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1987.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Limnatis, Nectarios G., *German Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2008.

Lind, Vera, "Skepticism and the Discourse about Suicide in the Eighteenth Century: Traces of a Philosophical Concept," in Richard Popkin and Johan van der Zande, eds, *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science and Society*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998, pp. 297–314.

Longuenesse, Beatrice, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, trans. N. J. Simek, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Lugarini, Leo, ed., *Hegel dal mondo storico alla filosofia*. 2nd ed., Milano: Guerini e associati, 2000.

—"La ,confutazione' hegeliana della filosofia critica," in Valerio Verra, ed., *Hegel interprete di Kant*, Napoli: Prismi, 1981, pp. 13–66.

—*Orizzonti hegeliani di comprensione dell' essere. Rileggendo la Scienza della logica*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 1998.

Lukács, Georg, *Der junge Hegel*, vol. 2, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, pp. 655ff.

The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. Rodney Livingston, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975.

Mabille, Bernard, "Idéalisme spéculative, subjectivité et negations," in Jean-Christophe Goddard, ed., *Le Transcendantal et le Spéculatif dans l'Idéalisme Allemand*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1999, pp. 151–171.

MacIntyre, Alasdair, ed., *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Anchor Books, 1972.

Maimon, Salomon, *Streifereien im Gebiete der Philosophie, Erster Theil*, Berlin: Wilhelm Vieweg, 1793.

Maker, William, *Philosophy Without Foundations. Rethinking Hegel*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Malabou, Catherine, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic*, trans. L. During, New York: Routledge, 2005.

Marconi, Diego, ed., *La Formalizzazione della Dialettica (Hegel, Marx e la Logica Contemporanea)*, Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1979.

Margolis, Joseph, *Culture and Cultural Entities*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.

—*Pragmatism Without Foundations: Reconciling Relativism and Realism*, 2nd ed., London and New York: Continuum, 2007.

—"Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 43 (2007), 229–249.

Marquet, J-F., *Restitutions. Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie allemande*, Paris: J. Vrin, 2001.

McCumber, John, *The Company of Words: Hegel, Language and Systematic Philosophy*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1983.

McDowell, John, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.

—"Zur Deutung von Hegels Handlungshteorie im Vernunftkapitel der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," in Klaus Vieweg and Wolfgang Welsch, eds, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes: Ein kooperativer Kommentar zu einem Schlüsselwerk der Moderne*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2008, pp. 369–393.

McTaggart and Ellis, John, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, New York: Russell & Russell, 1964.

Menahem, Rosen, *Problems of the Hegelian Dialectic. Dialectic Reconstructed as a Logic of Human Reality*, Boston: Kluwer, 1992.

Moran, Dermot, *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.

Mure, Geoffrey R. G., *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, 1950, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984.

Nancy, Jean-Luc, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, trans. J. Smith and S. Miller, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

Narski, Igor S., *Dialektischer Widerspruch und Erkenntnislogik*, Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1973.

Novalis, Friedrich, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. Margaret Mahony Stoljar, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.

—*Schriften*, vol. 1: *Das dichterische Werk*, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel Heinz Ritter and Gerhard Schulz. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960.

—*Schriften*, vol. 2: *Das philosophische Werk I.* ed. Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim Mähl, and Gerhard Schulz. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965.

Nuzzo, Angelica, "Dialectical Reason and Necessary Conflict—Understanding and the Nature of Terror," in: Paul Ashton, Toula Nicolacopoulos, and George Vassilakopoulos, eds, *The Spirit of the Age: Hegel and the Fate of Thinking*, Melbourne: re.press, 2008, pp. 21–37.

—"The End of Hegel's Logic: Absolute Idea as Absolute Method," in Carlson, David G., ed., *Hegel's Theory of the Subject*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 187–205.

—"Hegels Auffassung der Philosophie als System und die drei Schlüsse der Enzyklopädie," in *Hegels enzyklopädisches System der Philosophie*, ed. Hans-Christian Lucas, B. Tuschling, and U. Volgel, Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 2004, pp. 459–480.

—"The Language of Hegel's Speculative Philosophy," in Surber, J., ed., *Hegel and Language*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 75–91.

—"The Truth of *Absolutes* Wissen in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in Denker, A. and Vater, M., eds, *Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit*: New Critical Essays*, Amherst, MA: Humanities Books, 2003, pp. 265–293.

—"Verstand und Vernunft: Zu Hegels Theorie des Denkens," in Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, eds, *Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994, pp. 261–285.

Peirce, Charles Sanders, *Collected Papers*, 8 vols., Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, eds, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1958.

Pinkard, Terry, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

—*Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of a Possibility*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988.

Pippin, Robert, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

—"Hegel's Metaphysics and the Problem of Contradiction," in Jon Stewart, ed., *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 239–252.

Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997.

—*Theaetetus*, trans. with a commentary by John McDowell, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Plotinus, *Enneads*, Stephen MacKenna, trans., New York: Larson Publications, 2004.

Pöggeler, Otto, *Hegels Kritik der Romantik*, München: Fink Verlag, 1999.

Popkin, Richard H., *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*, Assen, Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 1960.

— and van der Zande, Johan, eds, *The Skeptical Tradition around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science and Society*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.

Popper, Karl, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London: Routledge, 2002.

—*Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1972.

—*The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

—"What is Dialectic?" in *Conjectures and Refutations*, London: Routledge, 1976, pp. 312–335.

—"What is Dialectic?" *Mind*, 49, 196 (October), 1940, 403–426.

Priest, Graham, *Beyond the Limits of Thought*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

—*In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent*, Boston, MA: M. Nijhoff, 1987.

Puntel, Bruno L., *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur. Untersuchungen zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G.W.F. Hegels*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1973.

—"Verstand und Vernunft in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik," in Dieter Henrich, ed., *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Formation und Rekonstruktion*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986, pp. 229–241.

Putnam, Hilary, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981.

Quine, Willard Van Orman, *From A Logical Point of View*, New York: Harper and Row, 1963.

Redding, Paul, *Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

—*Hegel's Hermeneutics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

—*The Logic of Reflection*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, *Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen*, 2 vols, edited and with an introduction by Faustino Fabbianell, Hamburg: Meiner, 2003–2004.

—*Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, ed. Karl Ameriks, trans. James Hebbeler, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Renault, Emmanuel, *Hegel: La Naturalization de la Dialectique*, Paris: J. Vrin, 2001.

Rockmore, Tom, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

—*Hegel, Idealism and Analytic Philosophy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

—*On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996.

Rorty, Richard, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Rosen, Michael, *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Rosenkranz, Karl, *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee, Part 1*, Königsberg: Verlag der Gebr. Bornträge, 1858/1859.

Röttges, Heinz, *Dialektik und Skeptizismus. Die Rolle des Skeptizismus für Genese, Selbstverständnis und Kritik der Dialektik*, Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 1987.

Russon, John, *Reading Hegel's Phenomenology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.

Ryle, Gilbert, Review of *The Open Society and its Enemies*, *Mind*, 56, 222 (April 1947), 167–172.

Samonà, Leonardo, "Atto puro e pensiero di pensiero nell' interpretazione di Hegel," in Giancarlo Movia, ed., *Hegel e Aristotele. Atti del Convegno di Cagliari*, Cagliari: Edizioni AV, 1995, pp. 203–252.

Sans, Georg, *Die Realisierung des Begriffs. Eine Untersuchung zu Hegels Schlusslehre*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004.

Sarlemijn, Andries, *Hegelsche Dialektik*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971.

Schäfer, Rainer, *Die Dialektik und ihre besonderen Formen in Hegels Logik. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und Systematische Untersuchungen*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001.

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, *On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966.

—*Sämtliche Werke*, 14 vols, hrsg. v., ed. by K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta 1856–1861.

—*System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. P. Heath, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1978.

—*The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794–1796)*, trans. F. Marti, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1980.

Schick, Friederike, *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: metaphysische Letztbegründung oder Theorie logischen Formen?* Munich: Karl Alber, 1994.

Schlegel, Friedrich, *Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe*, vol. II, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichnern Paderborn: Schöningh, 1958.

—*Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Peter Firchow, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich, *Dialektik (1811)*, ed. Andreas Arndt, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.

—*Dialektik (1814/15) & Einleitung zur Dialektik (1833)*, ed. Andreas Arndt, Hamburg: Meiner, 1988.

Schulz-Seitz, Ruth-Eva, "'Sein' in Hegels *Logik*: 'Einfache Beziehung auf sich'", in Helmut Fahrenbach, ed., *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion. Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag*. Pfullingen: Neske Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 365–383.

Schulze, Gottlob Ernst, *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik*, 1792, rpt. ed. Arthur Liebert, Berlin: Verlag von Reuther und Reichard, 1911.

Seebohm, Thomas M., "The Grammar of Hegel's Dialectic," *Hegel Studien*, 11 (1976), 149–180.

Sedgwick, Sally, ed., *The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Sellars, Wilfrid, *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds: The Early Essays of Wilfrid Sellars*, edited and introduced by Jeffrey Sicha, Reseda: Ridgeview Publishing, 1980.

—*Science, Perception and Reality*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.

Siep, Ludwig, *Annerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie*, München: Karl Alber, 1979.

—*Der Weg der "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Ein einführender Kommentar zu Hegels "Differenzschrift" und "Phänomenologie des Geistes,"* Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000.

Simon, Josef, *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer-Verlag 1966.

Solomon, Robert, "Hegel's Epistemology," in *From Hegel to Existentialism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 18–36.

Soual, Philippe, *Intériorité et réflexion. Étude sur la Logique de l'essence chez Hegel*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000.

Spinoza, Benedictus de, *Opera*, im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. C. Gebhardt, Heidelberg: Winter, 1925 (reprint 1972).

—*Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being*, translated and edited with an introduction by A. Wolf, New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1963.

Speight, Allen, *Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

—"Hegel on Conscience and the History of Philosophy," in Katerina Deligiorgi, ed., *Hegel: New Directions*, Chesham: Acumen, 2006, pp. 17–32.

Stäudlin, Carl F., *Geschichte der Vorstellungen und Lehren vom Selbstmorde*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1824.

—*Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion*, Leipzig: Siegfried Lebrecht Crusius, 1794.

Steinherr, Ludwig, *Holismus, Existenz und Identität: ein systematischer Vergleich zwischen Quine und Hegel*, St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1995.

Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin, *Hegels Analytische Philosophie. Die* Wissenschaft der Logik *als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung*, Munich: Schönnigh, 1992.

—"Hegel und die Romantik," in Bärbel Frischmann and Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, eds, *Das neue Licht der Frühromantik*, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009, pp. 39–49.

—"Verstand und Vernunft. Zu den Grundbegriffen der Hegelschen Logik," in Christoph Demmerling and Friedrich Kambartel, eds, *Vernunftkritik nach Hegel. Analytisch-kritische Interpretation zur Dialektik*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992 pp. 139–197.

Stillman, Peter G., ed., *Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.

Testa, Italo, "Hegelian Pragmatism and Social Emancipation: An Interview with Robert Brandom," *Constellations* 10/4 (2003), pp. 554–570.

Theunissen, Michael, *Sein und Schein. Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik*. Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1980.

Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf, *Die Logische Frage in Hegels System*, Leipzig: Brochhaus, 1843.

—*Logische Untersuchungen*, 3rd ed., Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1870.

Troxler, Ignaz P. V., *Schellings und Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik (1801/02). Zusammenfassende Vorlesungsnachschriften von I.P.V. Troxler*, edited with introduction and interpretation by Klaus Düsing, Köln: Dinter, 1988.

Tuschling, G. "Nessesarium est idem simul esse et non esse. Zu Hegels Revision der Grundlangen von Logik und Metaphysik," in Lucas, Hans-Christian and Planty-Bonjour, Guy, eds, *Logik und Geschichte in Hegels System*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1989, pp. 199–226.

Valls Plana, Ramon, *Del yo al nosotros*, Barcelona: Laia, 1979.

Verra, Valerio, ed., *Hegel interprete di Kant*, Napoli: Prismi, 1981.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean Luis, *Hegel et l'idéalisme allemand*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1999.

Vieweg, Klaus, "Die 'freie Seite jeder Philosophie'– Skepsis und Freiheit," in Brady Bowman, and Klaus Vieweg, eds, *Die freie Seite der Philosophie: Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Philosophie*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006, pp. 9–26.

—*Philosophie des Remis: der junge Hegel und das "Gespenst des Skepticismus,"* München: Fink, 1999.

Wandschneider, Dieter, "Das Antinomienproblem und seine pragmatische Dimension," in Herbert Stachowiak, ed. *Pragmatik*, Bd. IV: *Sprachphilosophie, Sprachpragmatik und formative Pragmatik*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1993, pp. 320–352.

—ed., *Das Problem der Dialektik*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1997.

—"Das Problem der Entäußerung der Idee zur Natur bei Hegel," in *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, Heinz Kimmerle, Wolfgang Lefevre, and Rudolf W. Meyer, eds, Bochum: Germinal Verlag, 1990, pp. 25–33.

—"Die Absolutheit des Logischen und das Sein der Natur. Systematische Überlegungen zum absolut-idealistischen Ansatz Hegels," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Bd. 39 (1985), 331–351.

—*Grundzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik: Rekonstruktion und Revision dialektischer Kategorienentwicklung in Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik,"* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995.

—"'In-expressive Vernunft'. Abschied vom 'sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus' in Robert B. Brandoms pragmatistischem Positivismus," in Bowman, Brady and Vieweg, Klaus eds, *Die freie Seite der Philosophie. Skeptizismus in Hegelscher Perspektive*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006, pp. 199–216.

—"Ist das System der Fundamentallogik ohne das System der Fundamentallogik rekonstruierbar?" in Ludwig Nagl and Rudolf Langthaler, eds, *System der Philosophie? Festgabe für Hans-Dieter Klein*. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2000, pp. 225–240.

—"Letztbegründung und Dialektik," in Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, ed., *Diskurs und Leidenschaft. Festschrift für Karl-Otto Apel zum 75. Geburtstag*. Aachen: Verlag der Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1996, pp. 317–336.

—"Letztbegründung unter der Bedingung endlichen Wissens. Eine Hegelsche Perspektive," in Wolf-Jürgen Cramm, Wulf Kellerwessel, David Krause and Hans-Christoph Kupfer, eds, *Diskurs und Reflexion. Wolfgang Kuhlmann zum 65. Geburtstag*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005, pp. 353–372.

—*Raum, Zeit, Relativität*, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1982.

Westphal, Kenneth R., *Hegel's Epistemological Realism. A Study on the Aim and Method of* Hegel's Phenomenology, Boston: Kluwer, 1989.

Wetzel, Manfred, *Dialektik als Ontologie auf der Basis selbstreflexiver Erkenntniskritik. Neue Grundlegung einer "Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins" und Prolegomena zu einer Dialektik in systematischer Absicht*, Freiburg/München: Alber, 1986.

—*Reflexion und Bestimmtheit in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, Hamburg: Fundament-Verlag Sasse, 1971.

Wieland, Wolfgang, "Bemerkungen zum Anfang von Hegels Logik," in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ed., *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Franfkfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 194–212.

Wilkerson, Terence E., *Natural Kinds*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1995.

Winfield, Richard Dien, "Conceiving Reality without Foundations: Hegel's Neglected Strategy for *Realphilosophie*," *The Owl of Minerva*, 15 (1984), 183–198.

—*From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.

—"The Method of Hegel's *Science of Logic*," in George di Giovanni, ed., *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990, pp. 45–57.

White, Alan, *Absolute Knowledge. Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1983.

Wolff, Michael, *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie zur Dialektik Kants und Hegels*, Königstein/Ts.: Hein, 1981.

—"On Hegel's Doctrine of Contradiction", *The Owl of Minerva*, vol. 31, 1 (Fall 1999), 1–22.

—"Über Hegels Lehre vom Widerspruch," in Dieter Henrich, ed., *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Formation und Rekonstruktion*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986, pp. 107–128.

Yovel, Yirmiyahu, *God and Nature. Spinoza's Metaphysics*, Leiden/New York: Brill 1991.

Zeleny, Jindrich, "Verstand und Vernunft in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik und in der materialistischen Dialektik," in Dieter Henrich, ed., *Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. Formation und Rekonstruktion*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986, pp. 209–228.

Zimmerli, Walter, *Die Frage nach der Philosophie: Interpretationen zu Hegels Differenzschrift*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1974.

Index

absolute 6–7, 10–11, 13, 48, 61, 76–96, 98–100, 103, 109–10, 113, 115, 120–1, 144, 158, 160–3, 176–7, 182–6, 191, 207–10, 243–4
  as self-referential 6, 9, 27, 47, 80, 84–90, 95, 163, 169, 184
  idea 19, 26–7, 78, 85–90, 94–5
  indeterminate 13–14, 19, 22, 79–81, 83, 6
  immanent vs. transcendent 6–7, 10, 76–80, 82–4
  knowing 10–11, 23, 78, 91, 150, 164–5, 178, 182–3, 190, 196, 200, 204, 206, 208–11, 241, 243
  manifestation of 6, 76, 78, 82–5, 87–90, 100
  method 6, 24, 86, 90–1, 94–5
  subject(ivity) *see* subject(ivity)
  truth *see* truth
actuality 78, 85–8, 90, 126, 129–30, 185–6, 196, 205–7
Adorno, Theodor 117, 252
Ameriks, Karl 73, 188, 252, 265
analytic philosophy 1, 3, 10–11, 31, 72, 194, 198, 200, 207, 212, 215–18, 223–5, 227
  vs. continental 216–18
antinomy 15–16, 24, 32–9, 45–6, 99–102, 105, 140, 161–3, 166, 172, 175, 220–1, 233
  as structure, antinomical 5, 32–4, 36–40, 44–6
antithesis 1, 5, 8, 41, 132, 134, 172, 180, 230, 239
Appel, Karl-Otto 52, 54, 231, 268
a priori and a posteriori 6, 66–7, 69–72, 105, 174–5, 185, 200, 209, 222, 229, 234
appearance *see also* phenomenon 65–6, 76–7, 82, 89–90, 92, 116, 123–5, 130, 136–7, 145, 179–80, 247
  and being *see* being
  and essence 185
apperception, transcendental unity of 7, 12, 78, 97, 112, 125, 174–5, 178
Aristotle 2, 7, 31, 53, 56, 66, 72, 76, 90, 103–4, 120–1, 162, 189, 193, 213, 222, 225, 228, 252
Arndt, Andreas 235–6, 252, 266
Ashton, Paul 29, 263
ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) 145–50
authoritative report 219
auto-apprehension 231
autonomy 11, 67, 199, 207, 222

Barnes, Jonathan 53, 72, 90, 155, 252
Baum, Manfred 117, 154, 171, 252, 259
becoming, coming to be 2, 14, 21–7, 39, 106, 119, 139, 144, 182, 186, 196, 248
  and being *see* being
being 2, 5, 7, 17, 19–22, 27, 33–6, 38–40, 43–7, 49, 52, 76, 78, 80–2, 85–6, 95, 98–9, 103–8, 111–13, 115–16, 119, 124, 128, 130, 161, 177, 180, 184, 187, 189, 191, 204, 210–11, 218, 226, 230, 234
  and appearance 79, 87, 92
  and becoming 2, 20–2, 39, 106, 119, 187
  and essence 104, 112–13, 116, 185–6
  and thought 2, 56, 63, 195–6, 205, 208
  and non-being 6, 33–40, 43–7, 189
  and nothing, nothingness 4–5, 17–30, 32–4, 106
  Dasein, being-there, determinate being 5, 39–40, 45–6, 52, 81–2, 86–8, 90, 94–5, 107–8, 113, 117, 185
Beiser, Frederick 84, 153–4, 189, 243, 252, 256
Bencivenga, Ermanno 262
Bernstein, Richard J. 149, 155, 252
Berti, Enrico 118, 252
Biard, Joel 120, 252
Biscuso, Massimiliano 117, 252
Blau, Ulrich 52, 252
Bowman, Brady 54, 154, 156, 234, 252, 256, 258, 267
Brandom, Robert B. 10, 11, 53–4, 138–9, 142, 152, 194–202, 205–8, 211–19, 222–6, 230–4, 236, 253, 260, 267

Braßel, Bernd 51, 253
Breazeale, Daniel 73, 188, 253, 255
Brinkmann, Klaus 8, 123, 235, 258
Bristow, William F. 146, 149, 152–3, 253
Brown, Harold L. 214, 253
Bubner, Rüdiger 95, 247–8, 251, 253
Burbidge, John 51, 117, 253, 258, 260
Burkhardt, Bernd 118, 253
Butler, Clark 253
Buvat, D. 252
Bykova, Marina 190, 253

canon 10, 193–202, 208
Carlson, David G. 94–5, 253, 263
Cassirer, Ernst 11, 198–200, 202–3, 207–8, 211–15, 253
categories 2, 5, 12, 25–6, 32–41, 44–7, 49, 51, 59, 62, 80, 89, 92, 97, 101–2, 104–14, 116–21, 154, 165–6, 169, 174–5, 181, 184–5, 212, 218, 221, 225–8, 230–1, 234–5
certainty 48, 91, 144, 147, 150, 174–5, 181–2, 210–11
  dialectic of sense-certainty in Hegel's *Phenomenology* 48, 178–9, 182, 209, 211
Chiereghin, Franco 153, 254
Circularity 1, 3, 5–6, 9, 26, 38, 55–75, 173, 177–9, 182–3, 187–8, 214, 221, 233
Clark, Malcolm 254
coherence, coherentism 206, 209, 220, 243
concept 11, 15–16, 25, 27, 35–7, 39, 41, 49, 54, 57, 76–8, 80, 85, 88–90, 99, 101–2, 104–8, 110–16, 121–3, 128, 144, 159–62, 165–7, 174, 176, 179–80, 185–6, 195, 198, 205, 227–8
  and experience, intuition, object, reality, representation 10, 21, 27–8, 68–71, 77, 174–82, 185–7, 204, 220–6
  conceptual revolutions 226
  conceptualization, concept formation 10, 35–7, 41–3, 45–7, 49, 76–7, 80, 82–5, 87, 90, 98, 108, 110–12, 124, 174–82, 185–9, 193–231
  doctrine of in the *Science of Logic* 10, 35, 111–16, 118–19, 122, 185–9, 225
  purposes of concept-former 227
  unboundedness (universality) of 88, 105, 115, 174–8, 186, 199, 219–22
conscience 150
consciousness, self-consciousness 8–9, 14–15, 19, 24, 50, 57, 67–8, 77, 94, 125, 141, 143, 146–7, 149–54, 160, 163–4, 177–83, 189, 191, 203–4, 209–10, 221, 223, 241, 243, 250
contradiction *see also* antithesis, opposition 1–2, 5, 8–9, 15–16, 33–5, 37–42, 52, 81, 95, 97–103, 105, 107–11, 114–15, 117, 119–27, 130, 132–3, 135, 137, 161–5, 167–8, 180, 184–7, 190, 211, 214, 239–40
  dialectical 37–41, 52, 88, 168
  law of non- 7–8, 42–3, 49, 53, 98, 100, 102, 110, 118, 127, 132, 135–6, 139, 143, 152
contrariety 35, 80, 101, 105, 107, 117, 119, 123
Cramm, Wolf-Jürgen 54, 268
crime and punishment, in Hegel's *Phenomenology* 126–7, 129–30, 132–3, 138
Croce, Benedetto 73, 254
Curd, Patricia 72, 254

Davidson, Donald 198, 202, 231, 260
De Laurentiis, Allegra 190, 254
Deligiorgi, Katerina 156, 266
Demmerling, Christoph 254, 267
Denker, Alfred 263
Descartes, René (Cartesius) 8, 62, 67, 83, 105, 140, 142–3, 145, 152, 155–6, 171, 175, 178, 188, 210, 218, 248, 261, 264
despair 142, 146, 148–9, 152
determinacy, determinateness 6, 13, 16, 20–2, 26, 28, 34–5, 39–40, 45–7, 52, 77, 80–1, 83, 87–8, 95, 114, 160
De Vos, Ludovicus 121, 254
deVries, Willem A. 219, 232, 254
difference 15, 27–8, 42, 45, 60–1, 66, 76, 79, 87, 92, 109–11, 123–4, 126–8, 131, 179–81, 186
  and identity *see* identity
divine, divinity *see also* God, absolute 7, 94, 98–100, 112–13, 159–61, 203, 210
doubt *see also* skepticism 9, 141–4, 148, 152, 158, 163–70, 217
Doz, Andre 118, 254
dualism 92, 123, 125, 127, 173–4, 176, 222
Dubarle, Dominique 254
Dudley, Will 187, 189, 254
Dürr, Agnes 118, 254
Düsing, Klaus 7, 53, 95–6, 116–21, 154, 170–1, 191, 254, 267

Einstein, Albert 69, 229, 236, 255
empiricism 54, 67, 69, 75, 145, 175, 179, 181, 187, 204, 207, 209, 219–20, 241
  about concepts 229
  and rationalism 166, 171, 174
  and transcendentalism 187
  empirical science 70, 229
  Kant's empirical realism 211–12
epistemology 1, 7–9, 50, 55–7, 61–2, 64, 66–72, 77, 79, 92, 97, 105–6, 115–16, 119, 140–2, 147, 152, 173–8, 188, 193, 211–12, 214, 223, 244
equipollence (*isostheneia*) *see also Pyrrho, Pyrrhonism* 140, 143, 145–6
error *see also* fallibility 23, 48, 57, 61, 210–11, 238, 240–1, 243
essence 4, 52, 87, 93, 104, 109, 111, 114, 126–8, 131, 160, 164–5, 178–80, 183, 185–6, 204, 212, 224–6, 228–9, 235, 241
  and appearance 180
  and being *see* being
  Doctrine of, in Hegel's *Science of Logic* 6–7, 78–85, 87, 90, 92, 95, 111, 114, 120, 185–6, 218
essentialism 128, 225
explication, self-explication (dialectical, logical) 5, 7, 33, 36, 39–41, 43–9, 53, 104–5, 107–8, 112–15, 195

Fahrenbach, Helmut 51, 266
Falk, Hans-Peter 255
Falke, Gustav-H. 137, 255
fallibility, fallibilism *see also* error 11, 48, 195, 199, 211, 213, 226, 232, 241, 243
Ferrarin, Alfredo 121, 255
Ficara, Elena 118, 255
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 2, 5, 53, 57–63, 65–7, 70, 73–5, 77–8, 91–2, 117, 125, 146, 153, 172, 175–9, 181–2, 184–5, 187–8, 190–1, 252–3, 255–60, 262, 266
finite (finitude) and infinite (infinity) 6–8, 9, 11, 47, 62, 66, 76–80, 82–4, 86–8, 90–1, 93–5, 98–103, 105, 107–8, 110, 112–17, 123–4, 134–6, 143–6, 149–54, 158–69, 173–77, 180, 182–3, 185–7, 191, 197–9, 203–12, 215, 228, 243, 247
Flay, Joseph 139, 255
Fodor, Jerry 75, 255
Fogelin, Robert 155, 255
Folger-Fonfara, Sabine 118, 255
Fornet-Betancourt, Raúl 52, 268
Forster, Michael 142, 145–6, 149, 152–5, 170–1, 256
foundation, foundationalism *see also* ground 6, 22–3, 26, 31, 50, 56, 61–4, 70–1, 89, 97–8, 102–6, 125, 146, 177, 181, 195–6, 217, 219–20, 222, 231–2, 245
Franks, Paul 146, 149, 153, 256
freedom 9, 23–5, 28, 56, 86, 145, 147–8, 150, 165, 175, 220, 223, 231, 233–4, 237, 239, 249
Frege, Gottlob 197, 233, 256
Fries, Jacob Friedrich 57, 73, 256
Frischmann, Bärbel 250, 266
Fulda, Hans-Friedrich 32, 121, 153, 171, 254, 256, 264

Gabriel, Markus 6, 76, 91–2, 95, 264
Gadamer, Hans Georg 32, 72, 119, 137, 188, 213, 231, 239, 242, 250, 256, 260
Gloy, Karen 53, 256
God *see also* absolute, divine 17, 84, 90, 93–4, 103, 106, 112–13, 175–6, 184, 204, 206–7, 210, 239, 247
Goddard, Jean-Christophe 191, 262
Görland, Ingtraud 119, 257
Gottschlich, Max 257
Grau, Alexander 257
Grier, Philip. T. 257
Grosos, Philippe 257
ground 31–3, 38, 42, 45, 50–1, 61–3, 65, 70, 78, 81–3, 97–8, 110–12, 124–5, 141, 146, 152–4, 174–5, 177, 184–5, 230, 247
Günther, Gotthard 32, 257

Hadamard, Jacques 235, 257
Halbig, Christoph 231, 257
Hamann, Johann Georg 72, 257
Hanna, Robert 138, 257
Harnischmacher, Iris 257
Harris, Errol E. 257
Harris, Henry S. 29, 73, 75, 91, 94, 117–19, 137–8, 151–5, 170, 190–1, 214, 232–3, 255, 257–9
Hartkopf, Werner 257
Hartmann, Klaus 32, 138, 235, 258
Hartmann, Nicolai 258
Heidegger, Martin 6, 53, 67, 76–8, 85, 91, 113, 202, 226, 254, 259

Heidemann, Dietmar 9, 92, 117, 120, 157, 170–2, 254, 256, 259
Henrich, Dieter 32, 51, 119, 122, 154, 255, 259–60, 264, 268
Herder, Johann Gottfried 56, 72, 260
historicism, historicity 3–4, 6, 10, 60, 66, 72, 85, 87–8, 113, 147–51, 173, 183–4, 187, 198, 199, 202, 204, 206–7, 209, 211–12, 214–15, 227–9, 237, 247
Hoffmann, Thomas Sören 95–6, 260
Hohler, Thomas P. 188, 260
holism 70–1, 195, 198, 199, 205–6, 212, 216, 219, 222, 225, 232, 234
  vs. intuitionism 219
Holz, Hans Heiz 256
Honneth, Axel 190, 260
Hortsmann, Rolf-Peter 51, 117, 121, 153, 171, 232, 254, 256, 258–9, 264, 268
Hösle, Vittorio 10, 32–3, 51–4, 121, 216, 231–2, 234, 253, 260
Houlgate, Stephen 29, 95, 260
Hume, David 8, 140, 145, 174, 187, 213, 217
Husserl, Edmund 65, 67, 74, 188, 218, 261, 263
hypothesis 237–8, 243, 245, 248
Hyppolite, Jean 172, 261

Iber, Christian 120, 252, 261
idealism 7, 55, 72, 98, 104, 113, 115, 119, 130, 163, 165, 179–80, 182, 186, 221–2, 225, 241, 245, 247
  absolute 87, 182, 212, 217, 221, 245
  British 3, 216
  German, post-Kantian 2, 4, 56, 58, 60, 65, 77, 152–3, 174–5, 182, 217, 222, 229, 247–8
  metaphysical 186
  objective 10, 32, 216–17, 222, 224
  subjective 221
  transcendental 61, 189, 212, 221
identity 18, 62–3, 71, 124, 180–1, 187
  absolute 80–1, 83, 94, 109–11, 114
  and difference, opposition, contradiction 30, 34, 78, 109–11, 114, 117, 120, 124, 130–1, 133, 139, 162, 190–1, 202, 239
  of being and nothing 33
  of subject and object 6, 59, 62, 67, 70–1
  of thought and being 15, 56, 63, 196, 204
  philosophy of 56, 189
Illeterati, Luca 95, 253, 261
Ilyenkov, Evald V. 261
inference 58, 193–4, 197–8, 201, 206, 208, 219, 224–5
  material 10–11, 194–9, 201–2, 206–8, 212, 214, 222, 224–6
inferentialism 10, 54, 194, 215, 219, 222, 225–6
infinite (infinity) *see* finite and infinite
intersubjectivity 9–10, 173–92, 223
intuition 19–21, 24–5, 39, 41, 56, 98, 104, 112, 175, 177, 194, 204, 222, 225, 232
  intellectual 14, 98, 100, 102, 119, 160, 162, 178, 188
  sensible, sensuous 104, 115, 177, 219–20, 222
intuitionism 219
inversion, inverted world (in Hegel's *Phenomenology*) 7, 8, 123–39

Jacobi, Friedrich 146, 149, 166, 171
judgment 56, 86–7, 89, 99, 104–5, 175, 184, 186, 191, 220, 222, 225–6, 229, 234

Kainz, Howard P. 261
Kambartel, Friedrich 254, 267
Kant, Immanuel 1–2, 5–7, 9, 12–13, 15, 19, 23, 25–31, 34, 55–63, 65–7, 69–75, 77–8, 91–2, 97, 99–100, 104–6, 108, 112, 115–16, 118–19, 121, 125, 140, 146–7, 150–4, 156, 161–3, 166, 170, 172–8, 182, 184–5, 187–8, 190–1, 197–200, 207–13, 217, 219–22, 226, 229–30, 232–4, 244–5, 252, 254–62, 265–8
Kaufmann, Walter 239, 246, 249, 251, 261
Kellerwessel, Wulf 54, 268
Kenny, E. J. 155, 252
Kern, Walter 121, 261
Kervegan, Jean-Francois 120, 252
Kesselring, Thomas 32, 50, 261
Kimmerle, Heiz V. 53, 261, 267
Klein, Hans-Dieter 53, 117, 254, 267
Klemm, David E. 261
Kling, J. F. 120, 252
Koch, Anton Friedrich 94, 261
Köhler, Wolfgang R. 52, 260
Kondylis, Panajotis 170, 261
Kosok, Michael 32, 262
Krause, David 54, 268
Krijnen, Christian 50–1, 54, 92, 120, 172, 254, 256, 259, 262
Krohn, Wolfang 262
Kroner, Richard 170, 262
Kruck, Günter 252
Kuhlmann, Wolfgang 52, 54, 260, 268
Kulenkampff, Arend 262

Kupfer, Hans-Christoph 54, 268
Kutschera, Franz von 235, 262

Lacroix, Alain 120, 252
Langthaler, Rudolf 53, 267
language, philosophy of *see* analytic philosophy
Lardic, Jean-Marie 191, 262
Lauth, Reinhard 91, 255, 262
law 8, 56–7, 124–7, 129–30, 138, 179, 199–200, 202, 213, 230
  Hegel's *Natural Law essay* 147
  natural 221–2, 228, 234
  of contradiction *see* contradiction
Lecrivain, Andre 120, 252
Lefevre, Wolfgang 53, 267
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 188, 229, 235, 262
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 2
LePore, Ernest 75, 255
life 7, 11, 98, 130–1, 145, 149, 155, 160, 181, 186, 195, 199, 202–3, 205, 207, 224, 242
Limnatis, Nectarios G. 1, 9, 172, 187–8, 262
Lind, Vera 155, 262
logic 2, 4–5, 9, 11, 13, 15–22, 24, 26–8, 31–54, 57, 61, 66, 77, 82, 86–91, 97–114, 120, 132–3, 135, 157, 161–70, 174–5, 184–5, 193–215, 218, 223–5, 228–30
  dialectical *see also* speculation 9–10, 16, 21–6, 31–2, 50, 169, 185–6, 193–215
  fundamental 5, 41–50, 52, 54
  transcendental 2, 11, 13, 53
logical space of reasons 219–22, 230
Longuenesse, Beatrice 91, 96, 262
Lucas, Hans-Christian 95, 263, 267
Lugarini, Leo 117–20, 262
Lukács, Georg 171, 262
Luther, Martin 150

Mabille, Bernard 191, 262
MacIntyre, Alasdair 249, 258, 261–2
MacKenzie, M. M. 155, 252
magnetism, magnet (in the *Phenomenology*) 123–4, 126–8, 133, 136
Maimon, Salomon 60, 73, 262
Maker, William 262
Malabou, Catherine 262
Marconi, Diego 263
Margolis, Joseph 10–11, 192, 214, 263
Marquet, *Jean-François* 263
Marx, Karl 2–3, 67, 72, 237, 248, 263–4
master/slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology* 147
McCumber, John 263
McDowell, John 10, 141, 152, 213, 215–26, 230–4, 236, 263–4
McTaggart, Ellis John 120, 216, 255
Menahem, Rosen 263
Menegoni, Francesca 95, 253, 261
metaphysical realism 211–12
metaphysics 2–3, 5–7, 9, 11, 19, 24, 62, 65, 70, 76–98, 100–5, 108, 111, 113, 115, 118, 120–1, 146, 154, 157–72, 174–7, 184, 186, 188, 190, 204, 211–12, 215, 235
Meyer, Rudolf W. 53, 267
Millán, Elizabeth 11, 237, 250, 266
Mind 57, 59, 66, 68, 69, 75, 77, 80, 86, 89–90, 106, 168, 222, 225–7
monism 78, 83, 175, 184, 216
Moran, Dermot 74, 263
Movia, Giancarlo 121, 265
Moyar, Dean 171, 259
Mure, Geoffrey R. G. 120, 263

Nagl, Ludwig 53, 267
Nancy, Jean-Luc 263
natural classifications 217, 227–9
negation (of negation, dialectical, determinate), negativity *see also* sublation 5, 8, 13–16, 17, 19–28, 32–5, 42, 44, 53, 79–85, 98–103, 105, 107, 109–11, 114, 117, 124–35, 138, 144, 153–4, 158–64, 167–9, 172–3, 180, 182, 184, 186–7, 191, 203, 208–11, 215
Neoplatonism 6, 80, 86, 88, 90, 92, 121
Neuser, Wolfgang 51, 231, 253, 260
Nicolacopoulos, Toula 29, 263
Niethammer, Friedrich 147
nothing, nothingness *see also* being and nothing 4–5, 17–30, 32–4, 82, 85, 88, 106, 109, 152, 168, 177, 184
Novalis, Friedrich 237–8, 243, 246–9, 251, 263
Nuzzo, Angelica 4–5, 12, 29, 94–5, 263

object, objectivity 4, 7, 9–11, 15, 18, 20, 25–9, 31, 47–8, 56, 58–9, 61, 63, 66–71, 74, 78–9, 85, 94, 103–4, 111–12, 115, 119, 129, 160, 163, 165–6, 173–92, 199, 203–4, 208, 210, 212, 216, 218, 221, 227–8, 230–1, 250
  and subject(ivity) *see* subject

Objective Logic (in Hegel's *Science of Logic*) 7, 19, 97, 103–4, 111–12, 185
objective thought, thinking 4, 10, 12, 18, 48, 63, 104, 108, 112, 144, 165, 174–5, 184, 186, 204, 207, 212, 221
ontology 2–4, 7, 76–7, 79, 85, 87, 91–2, 97–122, 165, 176, 184–5, 191, 210, 215, 230
ontotheology 6, 76, 92, 106
opposition *see also* antithesis, contradiction 1, 7–8, 16, 18, 22, 24–5, 28, 33–41, 44–7, 52, 61, 77–85, 88, 92, 95, 99–102, 105–11, 113–17, 119–29, 131–7, 140, 143, 145, 147, 159–62, 166–7, 180–3, 205, 211, 222–3, 225, 230, 239
order of stages, in theorizing the real 230
  antinomical *see* antinomy
  structure 5, 8, 16, 32–4, 38, 40–1, 43, 46, 50, 52, 71, 84, 88–9, 104–5, 108, 114, 124, 131, 135, 139, 142, 161–3, 169, 178, 190, 195–6, 203, 206, 219–20, 223–4, 226–7, 230, 241–2, 244

Parmenides 4, 17, 21–2, 24, 26, 28, 45, 53, 56, 63, 67, 102, 119, 144, 153, 162–3, 166, 172, 232, 250, 260
particular and universal 8, 14, 70–1, 77, 84, 86, 88, 98, 101–8, 112–15, 131, 138, 144, 163, 174, 178–88, 199, 203, 211, 222–3, 228, 231
Pätzold, Detlev 172, 256
Peirce, Charles Sanders 3, 11, 193–5, 197–200, 202–3, 207–8, 211–5, 263–4
phenomena, phenomenology 2, 6, 14–15, 19, 59, 64–8, 70, 74, 123, 128–9, 142, 181, 196, 200, 209, 212, 228, 231, 242
Pinkard, Terry 118, 264
Pippin, Robert 119, 138, 142, 152, 264
Planty-Bonjour, Guy 267
Plato, Platonism 2, 6, 31, 35, 45, 48, 52–3, 56, 72, 79, 88, 92, 102–3, 105, 107–8, 119–21, 140, 144, 151, 153, 162–3, 166, 217, 225, 227, 232, 235, 239, 247, 250, 254–6, 260, 264
Plotinus 92–3, 112, 256, 264
Pöggeler, Otto 250, 264
Popkin, Richard H. 148–50, 155–6, 262, 264
Popper, Karl 3, 115, 118, 213, 237–45, 247–51, 264
pragmatism 3, 10–11, 33, 54, 193–236
Priest, Graham 91, 264
private episodes 218
process 5–6, 7, 11–16, 18–19, 21–4, 26–8, 44–6, 48, 50, 53, 57–8, 60, 64, 66–72, 76–82, 84, 86–9, 102, 107, 110–11, 114–15, 131, 142, 180, 183, 186–7, 191, 195–7, 199, 206–7, 211, 215, 224, 230–1
progress, progressive 5–6, 11–12, 23, 35, 43, 46, 49, 66–7, 70–1, 89, 102, 108, 111, 114, 195, 202–3, 205, 208–9, 237, 239–49
Protestantism 150
Puntel, Bruno L. 264
Putnam, Hilary 75, 77, 91, 264
Pyrrho, Pyrrhonism 117, 140, 144, 145–6, 148–52, 154–6, 162, 171

quality 32, 36–7, 45, 101–2, 105, 218
Quante, Michael 171, 231, 257, 259
Quine, Willard Van Orman 71, 75, 198, 202, 219, 232, 264, 266

rationalism 57, 105, 166, 171, 174, 195, 197
  and empiricism *see* empiricism
reason, *Vernunft see also* speculation 2, 9, 56, 70, 77–8, 89, 91, 100, 102, 144, 154, 172, 174–5, 177, 178, 181–2, 184, 191, 197, 205, 214–15, 221–2, 225, 238
  and understanding 4, 7–9, 12–30, 98–102, 144, 154, 158–63, 167–8, 178–82, 191, 197, 205, 207–12, 221
recognition 86, 181, 190
Redding, Paul 264
regulism 200–1
Reikerstorfer, Johann 117, 254
Reinhold, Karl Leonhard 6, 56–62, 65–6, 72–4, 152–4, 175, 256, 265–6
relativism, relativity 2, 66, 69, 92, 173, 207, 211, 229
religion 94, 98, 148, 160–1, 178, 182, 233, 245–6
Rockmore, Tom 5, 6, 55, 72, 188, 214–15, 253, 265
Rohs, Peter 52, 260
Romantics, Romanticism 11, 237–51
Rorty, Richard 197, 202, 212–13, 216–18, 232, 265
Rosen, Michael 32, 265
Rosenkranz, Karl 102–3, 118, 265
Röttges, Heinz 172, 265
Russell, Bertrand 3, 216, 232, 236, 255
Russon, John 190, 265
Ryle, Gilbert 238, 249, 265

Samonà, Leonardo 121, 265
Sans, Georg 265
Sarlemijn, Andries 118, 265
Schäfer, Reiner 117, 121, 265
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 2, 14, 58–61, 73, 77–8, 91–2, 95, 99–100, 116–17, 125, 137, 139, 144, 154, 163, 170–1, 174, 176–8, 182, 187, 189–90, 222, 255–62, 265–7
Schick, Friederike 265
Schlegel, Friedrich 147, 242–3, 245–51, 265
Schleiermacher, Friedrich 235, 266
Schulze, Gottlob Ernst 56–7, 144–7, 152–3, 155, 266
Schulz-Seitz, Ruth-Eva 51, 266
Sedgwick, Sally 266
Seebohm, Thomas M. 32, 266
Sellars, Wilfrid 10–11, 195–8, 200–2, 205–8, 211–16, 218–20, 225, 230–3, 253–4, 266
Sextus Empiricus 117, 145, 147, 149, 172
sideways view 220
Siep, Ludwig 51, 139, 190, 231, 257, 259, 266
Simon, Josef 96, 266
skepticism *see also Pyrrho, Pyrrhonism* 1–3, 8–9, 42, 49, 56, 62, 99, 117–18, 140–72, 174, 184, 187, 211, 217, 246
  constructive vs. destructive role of 157–8
  Hegel's *Skepticism Essay* 102, 117–19, 141, 143–9, 154–5, 158–9, 166, 171–2
  self-completing skepticism (*sich vollbringender Skeptizismus*) 141, 142, 144
  veil of perception skepticism 146
Solomon, Robert 266
Soual, Philippe 120, 266
speculation, speculative *see also* reason 7, 9, 15–16, 18, 22–3, 25–6, 59–61, 63, 70, 85, 90, 99, 101, 103–5, 108, 110–11, 113–15, 118, 121, 134, 153–4, 157, 159, 161–6, 168–9, 183–4, 191, 197, 199, 212, 214, 242, 250
Speight, Allen 8–9, 140, 258, 266
Spinoza, Benedictus de 6, 42, 80–1, 83–4, 87, 93, 95, 113, 146, 160, 163, 166, 184, 266, 268
Stachowiak, Herbert 51, 267
Stäudlin, Carl F. 9, 147–9, 154–5, 266
Steinherr, Ludwig 232, 266
Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin 250, 266
Stewart, Jon 138, 257, 264
Stillman, Peter G. 190, 267
subject, subjectivity 6, 9, 13–15, 18–20, 59, 61–2, 66–7, 75, 84, 86, 99, 104, 108, 112, 114, 145, 169, 173–92, 205, 210, 228–9, 231
  absolute 7, 9–10, 61, 76, 87, 95, 97, 111–16, 122, 163, 169, 173, 176, 186–7, 191
  and intersubjectivity 9–10, 173–92, 223
  and object, objectivity 6, 9–10, 59, 61, 67, 71, 74, 78, 86, 152–3, 173–92, 223
Subjective Logic (in Hegel's *Science of Logic*) 7, 112, 114, 185–6
sublation, supersession, *Aufhebung see also* negation, dialectical 7–8, 11, 16, 99, 113, 123–39, 162, 166–7, 178, 196–7, 202, 204, 206, 211, 215, 233
Sublici, Michael 252
substance 6, 15, 75, 82–4, 87, 93, 104, 111, 113, 126, 163, 179, 184–7, 223
  and accident 75, 84, 111
Surber, Jere P. 263
syllogism 89–90, 114–15, 121, 186, 191, 193
synthesis, synthetic 5, 10, 39–41, 45–7, 66, 78, 100, 107, 109, 133, 173–4, 188, 199, 223–4, 239

teleology 2, 76, 78, 90, 186, 190
Testa, Italo 213, 267
Theunissen, Michael 51, 119, 267
totality 3, 6, 11, 63, 76–7, 79–86, 88, 90, 107, 160, 206, 231, 241, 243
Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf 3, 101–2, 117–19, 236, 267
Triplett, Timm 219, 232, 254
Troxler, Ignaz P. V. 116–17, 171, 267
truth, truthfulness 2, 4–5, 7, 10–15, 17, 19, 22–7, 42, 52–3, 56, 63, 66, 68–9, 75, 85, 88, 100, 102, 122, 132, 134–6, 142, 144, 147, 150, 160, 165, 168–9, 174–5, 178–87, 203–12, 222–3, 225–6, 229, 234–5, 240–7, 250
  absolute 11, 49, 203, 205, 210, 212
Tuschling, Burkhard 95, 263, 267

understanding (*Verstand*) 7–9, 92, 98–101, 110, 116, 123–8, 131–2, 134, 141, 144, 152, 166, 169, 175, 184, 204
  and reason *see* reason
universal *see* particular and universal

Valls Plana, Ramon 234, 267
van der Zande, Johan 154–5, 262, 264
Vassilakopoulos, George 29, 263
Vater, Michael 263
Verra, Valerio 119, 262, 267
Vieillard-Baron, Jean Luis 267
Vieweg, Klaus 54, 73, 148, 152–6, 234, 252, 256, 263, 267

Wandschneider, Dieter 5, 31, 50–4, 138, 231, 234–6, 253, 255, 260, 267
Welsch, Wolfgang 152, 263
Westphal, Kenneth R. 153, 190, 253–4, 268
Wetzel, Manfred 50, 268
White, Alan 268
Wieland, Wolfgang 32–3, 51, 268
Wilkerson, Terence E. 227, 235, 268
Wladika, Michael 257
Wolff, Michael 268

Yovel, Yirmiyahu 93, 268

Zeleny, Jindrich 268
Zimmerli, Walter 73, 268
Žižek, Slavoj 92, 256
Zöller, Gunter 261