

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996



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Human advance is conditioned by our conception of progress. The *Human Development Report* series has been dedicated, since its inception in 1990, to ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone. The paradigm shift in favour of sustainable human development is still in the making. But more and more policymakers in many countries are reaching the unavoidable conclusion that, to be valuable and legitimate, development progress both nationally and internationally—must be people-centred, equitably distributed and environmentally and socially sustainable.

This year's *Human Development Report* explores in detail the complex relationship between economic growth and human development. It provides both a mirror, reflecting present patterns of global imbalance, and a telescope, showing the more positive futures possible. In the past 15 years the world has become more economically polarized—both between countries and within countries. If present trends continue, economic disparities between the industrial and developing nations will move from inequitable to inhuman.

Although in pure economic terms the 1980s were a "lost decade" for nearly 70 countries, remarkably, almost all these countries managed to maintain, and some to improve, their growth in levels of human development. This is good news because it shows that deliberate, well-targeted policies can make a critical difference when implemented with dedication, even in the most difficult circumstances. But there can be little doubt that these improvements will not hold unless soon reinforced by restored economic growth.

Economic growth and human development thus exhibit a degree of independence, especially in the short term. But there are longer-term links—human development helping economic growth, and economic growth helping human development. Contrary to earlier theories, new theory and evidence suggest that growth and equity need not be contradictory goals. Nor do growth and participation. And there is strong historical evidence from East Asia that heavy national investment in human development—spreading skills and meeting basic social needs—has been a springboard for sustained economic growth over decades.

The central message of *Human Development Report 1996* is clear: there is no automatic link between economic growth and human development, but when these links are forged with policy and determination, they can be mutually reinforcing and economic growth will effectively and rapidly improve human development. Government policies are vitally important. We now know, for example, the limits of trickledown economics.

What must now be done? The script for human development in the 21st century is still unwritten. It will begin to be written by the policy choices we make even as this century closes. Ideally, these choices will accept the premise that economies exist for people—not people for economies.

Human Development Report 1996 is principally addressed to what countries can do for themselves. It makes important recommendations. All countries must strive to improve the nature and quality of their economic growth. In many countries the immediate needs also include increase in economic growth. Of course, policies must be tailored to national circumstances. The global community can, and must, also help countries effect their own strategies of sustainable human development.

This is the International Year of Poverty Eradication, heightening the moral commitment that we at UNDP and the other international development agencies give to helping the poorest of the world's poor. Eliminating poverty requires a holistic approach to human development. Not hand-outs, but empowerment. Not Band-Aids, but the preconditions for self-help.

UNDP remains firmly committed to using its unique worldwide network of resources and country offices to support countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development. The goals and commitments of the recent series of global summits-from Rio and Cairo to Copenhagen and Beijing-provide a powerful new framework and many concrete specifics for concerted action. We have both an opportunity and a moral imperative to reverse the negative trends of recent times and to reinforce the positive patterns of sustainable human development. This should be the vision guiding us into the next century.

As with earlier Human Development Reports, the views expressed in this year's Report have emerged from the professional analysis of an independent team of eminent consultants working under the guidance of my two Special Advisers and the chief architects of the Report, Mahbub ul Haq and Richard Jolly. Dr. Haq was in charge of the process until the end of 1995, when Dr. Jolly took over. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Director of the Human Development Report Office, ensured continuity through the change-over.

The views in this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDP, its Executive Board or member governments of UNDP. The real contribution of the series of Human Development Reports lies in their intellectual independence and professional integrity. I am confident that the analysis in this Report will enrich the global dialogue on the issues of human development and economic growth. Certainly this is our intention and wish.

New York March 1996

Jann Antare Spett James Gustave Speth

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Thankful for all the support that they have received, the authors assume full responsibility for the opinions expressed in the Report.

ABBREVIATIONS

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDI	Gender-related development index
GEM	Gender empowerment measure
HDI	Human development index
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Least developed countries
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	Purchasing power parity
SNA	System of National Accounts
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

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OVERVIEW



Growth for human development?

Human development is the end—economic growth a means. So, the purpose of growth should be to enrich people's lives. But far too often it does not. The recent decades show all too clearly that there is no automatic link between growth and human development. And even when links are established, they may gradually be eroded—unless regularly fortified by skilful and intelligent policy management.

This year's *Human Development Report* explores the nature and strength of the links between economic growth and human development. Two disturbing findings. Growth has been failing over much of the past 15 years in about 100 countries, with almost a third of the world's people. And the links between growth and human development are failing for people in the many countries with lopsided development with either good growth but little human development or good human development but little or no growth.

The Report concludes that more economic growth, not less, will generally be needed as the world enters the 21st century. But more attention must go to the structure and quality of that growth—to ensure that it is directed to supporting human development, reducing poverty, protecting the environment and ensuring sustainability.

Over the past 15 years the world has seen spectacular economic advance for some countries—and unprecedented decline for others.

Since 1980 there has been a dramatic surge in economic growth in some 15 countries, bringing rapidly rising incomes to many of their 1.5 billion people, more than a quarter of the world's population.

Over much of this period, however, economic decline or stagnation has affected 100 countries, reducing the incomes of 1.6 billion people—again, more than a quarter of the world's population. In 70 of these countries average incomes are less than they were in 1980—and in 43 countries less than they were in 1970. Over 1990–93 alone, average incomes fell by a fifth or more in 21 countries, mostly in Eastern Europe and among the CIS countries.

Although many are aware of this economic stagnation and decline, the full extent and gravity are too often obscured because of the stunning success of the fastgrowing countries, because most of the richer countries have maintained their growth and because of repeated hopes that many of the economies with falling incomes are poised to resume growth. After 15 years of such disappointing performance, international policy-makers need to question whether that optimism is warranted.

The advances have often been at rates exceeding anything seen since the start of the industrial revolution some two centuries ago. The declines have also been unprecedented, far exceeding in duration, and sometimes in depth, the declines of the Great Depression of the 1930s in the industrial countries.

In much of this success and disaster, many of the poor have missed out, and even the better off have often been left vulnerable to unemployment and downsizing—to cutbacks in health and welfare services. Although per capita incomes in the OECD countries now average \$20,000, surveys reveal growing insecurity and considerable dissatisfaction. Human development is the end—economic growth a means

Widening disparities in economic performance are creating two worlds ever more polarized.

The world has become more polarized, and the gulf between the poor and rich of the world has widened even further. Of the \$23 trillion global GDP in 1993, \$18 trillion is in the industrial countries—only \$5 trillion in the developing countries, even though they have nearly 80% of the world's people.

• The poorest 20% of the world's people saw their share of global income decline from 2.3% to 1.4% in the past 30 years. Meanwhile, the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% to 85%. That doubled the ratio of the shares of the richest and the poorest—from 30:1 to 61:1.

• The assets of the world's 358 billionaires exceed the combined annual incomes of countries with 45% of the world's people.

• During the past three decades the proportion of people enjoying per capita income growth of at least 5% a year more than doubled, from 12% to 27%, while the proportion of those experiencing negative growth more than tripled, from 5% to 18%.

• The gap in per capita income between the industrial and developing worlds tripled, from \$5,700 in 1960 to \$15,400 in 1993.

Increasing polarization is reflected in the growing contrasts in regional performance. Most of Asia, with more than half the world's people, experienced accelerating and often spectacular per capita income growth over the 1980s. OECD countries generally maintained slow but steady growth in per capita income. But failed growth was the dominant experience in four groups of countries.

• In Sub-Saharan Africa declines mostly began in the late 1970s. Many reform efforts have been launched, often spurring recoveries, but 20 countries are still below their per capita incomes of 20 years ago.

• Among the Latin American and Caribbean countries, several began to recover slowly in the late 1980s, but 18 of them are still below their per capita incomes of 10 years ago.

• Eastern Europe and the CIS countries maintained at least slow growth over most

of the 1980s, but then suffered steep declines in per capita income—which fell on average by a third from the peaks in the mid-1980s.

 Many Arab states also suffered sharp declines in income in the 1980s, with falling oil prices and other setbacks in the world economy.

Although very rapid population growth explains part of the negative per capita income growth, blaming population growth for all or even most of the decline is too simple. Even with lower fertility and slower population growth, per capita incomes would have fallen in many countries.

Everywhere, the structure and quality of growth demand more attention—to contribute to human development, poverty reduction and long-term sustainability.


Policy-makers are often mesmerized by the quantity of growth. They need to be more concerned with its structure and quality. Unless governments take timely corrective action, economic growth can become lopsided and flawed. Determined efforts are needed to avoid growth that is jobless, ruthless, voiceless, rootless and futureless.

• Jobless growth—where the overall economy grows but does not expand the opportunities for employment. In the OECD countries in 1993 the average unemployment rate was 8%—ranging from 2.5% in Japan to 10% in the United Kingdom, 18% in Finland and 23% in Spain. In the developing countries too, jobless growth has meant long hours and very low incomes for the hundreds of millions of people in lowproductivity work in agriculture and the informal sector.

• *Ruthless growth*—where the fruits of economic growth mostly benefit the rich, leaving millions of people struggling in everdeepening poverty. During 1970–85 global GNP increased by 40%, yet the number of poor increased by 17%. While 200 million people saw their per capita incomes fall during 1965–80, more than one billion people did in 1980–93.

 Voiceless growth—where growth in the economy has not been accompanied by an

Policy-makers are often mesmerized by the quantity of growth



When did countries with failed growth first reach their present per capita income?

1960 or before

Armenia Central African Rep. Chad Georgia Ghana Haiti Iraq Kuwait Liberia Madagascar Nicaragua Niger Rwanda Senegal Sudan Tajikistan Venezuela Zaire Zambia In the 1960s Bahamas

Bolivia

Estonia

Guyana

Australia

Bangladesh

Austria

Belgium

Botswana

Cambodia

Cape Verde

Belize

Chile

China

Cyprus

Denmark Dominica

Colombia

Costa Rica

Côte d'Ivoire

Antigua and Barbuda

Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Togo In the 1970s Albania Algeria Argentina Bahrain Brunei Darussalam Cameroon Comoros Djibouti El Salvador Gabon Gambia Guatemala Guinea-Bissau

Honduras

Fiji

France

Greece

Guinea

India

Grenada

Hong Kong

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Korea, Rep. of

Lao People's Dem. Rep.

Germany

Equatorial Guinea

Countries with per capita incomes in the 1990s higher than ever before

Kiribati

Lithuania

Peru

Mauritania

Saudi Arabia

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

São Tomé and Principe

Iran, Islamic Rep. of Jamaica Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Malawi Mali Mexico Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Poland Romania Tanzania Trinidad and Tobago Turkmenistan Ukraine United Arab Emirates Uzbekistan Vanuatu Zimbabwe In the 1980s

Azerbaijan Barbados Belarus Benin

Lesotho

Maldives

Mauritius

Netherlands

New Zealand

Papua New Guinea

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Malta

Nepal

Norway

Pakistan

Portugal

Saint Lucia

Oman

Luxembourg Malaysia

Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Canada Congo Czech Rep. Dominican Rep. Ecuador Egypt Ethiopia Finland Hungary Iceland Jordan Kenya Mongolia Morocco Myanmar Panama Paraguay Philippines Slovakia Suriname Swaziland Syrian Arab Rep.

Saint Vincent

Solomon islands

Sevchelles

Singapore

Sri Lanka

Switzerland

Sweden

Thailand

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Uruguay


Viet Nam

USA

United Kingdom

Spain

BOLIVIA 800 Incom 600 400 1993 income 200 1971 1970 1980 1960 1990 SAUDI 10,000 ARABIA 8,000 Inco 6,000 4,000 1992 2,000 income 1968 0 1962 1970 1980 1990 600 400 Income GHANA 200 0




1980

1990

1970

1960



a. Industrial countries only

b. Includes Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Turkey.

Note: GDP per capita figures are in constant prices. Data are the latest available, 1995 for OECD countries, 1993 for most others. Source: For OECD countries, UN 1996; for all others, World Bank 1995e.



30 years of change-income and human development GDP per capita, 1993 US\$

1,000

extension of democracy or empowerment. Political repression and authoritarian controls have silenced alternative voices and stifled demands for greater social and economic participation.

Policy-makers once debated whether they should choose economic growth or extensive participation, assuming that these were mutually exclusive. That debate is dead. People do not want one or the other—they want both. But too many people are still denied even the most basic forms of democracy, and many of the world's people are in the grip of repressive regimes.

Voiceless growth can also be growth that gives women only a minor role in an economy's management and direction. As *Human Development Report 1995* showed, human development, if not engendered, is endangered.

• *Rootless growth*—which causes people's cultural identity to wither. There are thought to be about 10,000 distinct cultures, but many risk being marginalized or eliminated. In some cases minority cultures are being swamped by dominant cultures whose power has been amplified with growth. In other cases governments have deliberately imposed uniformity in the pursuit of nation-building—say, with a national language.

This can be dangerous. The violence in the former Soviet Union and in the Balkan states of former Yugoslavia is a tragic legacy of culturally repressive governance. The nations that have held together best, from Switzerland to Malaysia, are often those that have recognized cultural diversity and decentralized economic and political governance to try to meet the aspirations of all their people.

 Futureless growth—where the present generation squanders resources needed by future generations. Rampant and uncontrolled economic growth in many countries is laying waste to forests, polluting rivers, destroying biodiversity and depleting natural resources.

This damage and destruction is increasing, driven overwhelmingly by demand in the rich countries, inadequate conservation in the developing countries and the pressure of poor people pushed onto marginal lands in poor countries. On past trends, global production will triple by about 2030. Unless serious conservation and pollution controls are in place soon, production will be long past the point of sustainability.

In sum: Development that perpetuates today's inequalities is neither sustainable nor worth sustaining.

Progress in human development has mostly continued—but too unevenly.

Despite the economic downturns and difficulties, key indicators of human development have advanced in almost all developing countries. Indeed, developing countries have made much more progress in human development than in income. Between 1960 and 1993 the North-South gap in life expectancy was more than halved, from 23 years to 11 years.

Human progress has nevertheless been very slow in some regions, and in some cases it even deteriorated. In the past 15 years the primary enrolment ratio stagnated in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and in 17 countries it declined by 37–50%. And while the human development index (HDI) of most regions has improved, in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries it has declined sharply.

Overall, countries already in the high human development category (with an HDI of more than 0.800) have been able to reduce their HDI shortfall (the difference between the maximum possible HDI of 1 and the value achieved) by nearly 2.7% a year. For low human development countries (with an HDI of less than 0.500) the reduction was only 0.9% a year. So, there was a clear widening of the gap in human development as well.

Countries with similar levels of income and growth can have very different rates of advance in human development. During the past three decades both Tunisia and Congo enjoyed the same economic growth from similar starting points of income and human development. But Tunisia reduced its HDI shortfall by 60%, Congo by only 16%.

Development that perpetuates today's inequalities is neither sustainable nor worth sustaining This record contains a warning. Unless economic growth is restored for countries in decline, their gains in human development may be ever more difficult to sustain—and present disparities will grow. At present rates of progress, it will take a century or more for the low human development countries to reach high human development.

There are striking contrasts in today's relationship between human development and per capita income.

• Rankings by the human development index do not always match income rankings— For 37 countries in 1993 their ranking by the HDI is more than 20 places higher or lower than their ranking by per capita income, highlighting the far from perfect correlation between income and human development in many countries.

• *Higher human development at lower income*—Some countries fall in the category of high human development despite modest per capita incomes. These include Colombia, with a per capita income of \$1,400, and Thailand, with \$2,100.

• Lower human development at higher income—Other countries have remained at medium levels of human development despite the advantage of greater incomes. These include South Africa, with a per capita income of nearly \$3,000, and Gabon, with nearly \$5,000.

• Striking contrasts within countries—In Mexico the HDI for indigenous people is only 0.700, compared with 0.890 for the rest of the population.

• Human development weaknesses in OECD countries—Despite high per capita incomes (\$20,000), more than 100 million people in OECD countries live below national poverty lines, and more than 5 million are homeless.

These and numerous other indicators in this Report spotlight the dangers of complacency. Many policy-makers assume that a rapidly expanding economy will sweep poverty and deprivation away. They are wrong. The challenge is broader and deeper—and demands close attention to a range of policy actions. This Report examines these actions in detail and reaches the following main conclusions.

Short-term advances in human development are possible—but they will not be sustainable without further growth. Conversely, economic growth is not sustainable without human development.

Improvements in human development have clearly been possible even in times of economic setback. But such advances can be sustained over a long time only if supported by economic growth. At the same time, for economic growth to be sustained, it must be constantly nourished by human development. Human development and economic growth should move together, strongly linked.

The record of economic growth and human development over the past 30 years shows that no country can follow a course of lopsided development for such a long time —where economic growth is not matched by advances in human development, or vice versa. Lopsided development can last for a decade or so, but it then shifts to rapid rises in both incomes and human development, or falls into slow improvements in both human development and incomes. Countries follow one of four patterns:

• Slow economic growth and fast human development. Countries achieving human development with only slow economic growth in one decade either increased economic growth in the next (the Republic of Korea in the 1960s and China and Indonesia in the 1970s) or slipped back into poor economic growth and slow human development (Cameroon, Sierra Leone and others in the 1980s).

• *Fast economic growth and slow human development*. Lopsided development tilted against human development is a dead end, with economic growth petering out after a decade or so of fast growth (such as Brazil and Egypt in the 1980s). No country with fast growth and slow human development maintained fast growth and accelerated human development.

Human development and economic growth should move together, strongly linked Mutually reinforcing growth and human development. Some countries enjoyed rapid improvements in both human development and incomes, sustained over three decades, in a mutually reinforcing virtuous circle.

• Mutually stifling growth and human development. Other countries suffered slow advances in human development and slow economic growth.

There need be no conflict between growth and equity.

The traditional view that economic growth in the early stages is inevitably associated with deteriorating income distribution has been proved false. The new insight is that an equitable distribution of public and private resources can enhance the prospects for further growth.

The assertion that the benefits of growth in the early stages would inevitably be skewed towards the rich rested on two principal arguments. The first came from Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets, who said that inequality would first rise, as workers left agriculture for industry, and then fall as industrial production became more widespread. The second was advanced by Nicholas Kaldor, who emphasized the importance of savings. He argued that the only way to finance growth would be by channelling the initial benefits into the pockets of rich capitalists. Since they have a higher propensity to save, only they could provide the funds for investment.

These hypotheses have been disproved by recent evidence of a positive correlation between economic growth and income equality (as represented by the share of the poorest 60% of the population). Japan and East Asia pioneered this form of equitable development, and China, Malaysia and Mauritius have been following a similar route more recently.

The discovery of this reinforcing relationship between equity and growth has farreaching implications for policy-makers. Well-developed human capabilities and well-distributed opportunities can ensure that growth is not lopsided and that its benefits are equitably shared. They can also help in getting the most growth.

For policy-makers everywhere, the focus must be on strengthening the links between economic growth and human development.

To ensure that these links work efficiently and effectively in both directions, policymakers need to understand how the links connect. Some of the most important issues determining how growth contributes to human development:

• *Equity*—The more equally GNP and economic opportunities are distributed, the more likely that they will be translated into improved human well-being.

• Job opportunities—Economic growth is translated into people's lives when they are offered productive and well-paid work. An important way to achieve this is to aim for patterns of growth that are heavily labourintensive.

• Access to productive assets—Many people find their economic opportunities stifled by a lack of access to productive assets—particularly land, physical infrastructure and financial credit. The state can do much in all these areas by stepping in and levelling the playing fields.

• *Social spending*—Governments and communities can greatly influence human development by channelling a major part of public revenue into high-priority social expenditure—particularly by providing basic social services for all.

• Gender equality—Fairer opportunities for women and better access to education, child care, credit and employment contribute to their human development. They also contribute to the human development of other family members and to economic growth. Investing in women's capabilities and empowering them to exercise their choices is the surest way to contribute to economic growth and overall development.

• *Population policy*—Education, reproductive health and child survival all help lower fertility, thus creating the conditions for slower population growth and lower

Investing in women's capabilities and empowering them is the surest way to contribute to economic growth and overall development education and health costs in the longer run.

• *Good governance*—When those in power give high priority to the needs of the whole population, and when people participate in decision-making at many levels, the links between economic growth and human well-being are likely to be stronger and more durable.

• An active civil society—Non-governmental organizations and community groups also play a vital part in enhancing human development. They not only supplement government services, extending them to people and groups who would otherwise remain unserved. They also play a vital advocacy role, mobilizing public opinion and community action and helping shape human development priorities.

A determined effort to expand human capabilities—through improved education, health and nutrition—can help transform the prospects for economic growth, especially in the low-human-development, lowincome countries. A World Bank study of 192 countries concluded that only 16% of growth is explained by physical capital (machinery, buildings and physical infrastructure), while 20% comes from natural capital. But no less than 64% can be attributed to human and social capital. An extensive analysis of earlier experience in the Asian industrializing tigers, including Japan, comes to similar conclusions.

New approaches are needed to expand and improve employment opportunities, so that people can participate in growth—and benefit from it.

Without growth, it is difficult to create jobs and increase wages. With growth, job opportunities normally expand. But again, the process is not automatic. Witness several recent periods of "jobless growth". And even when jobs have been created, they have not met the aspirations of people in search of job security, remunerative work or creative work. They have also bypassed whole groups of society—including women, young adults, the uneducated, the unskilled and people with disabilities.

To forge a strong link between economic growth and employment requires employment-generating growth strategies. The experience of the fast-growing Asian economies-Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (province of China)-shows how sustained long-term growth can expand employment (by 2-6% a year), reduce unemployment (down to less than 2.5%) and raise productivity and wages. This in turn reduced inequality and poverty. Such growth was led by smallscale agriculture in Taiwan (province of China) and by labour-intensive exportoriented manufacturing in Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea and Singapore.

The Latin American experience stands in stark contrast. During the 1960s and 1970s the average annual growth in per capita income was more than 4% in Brazil, 3.5% in Mexico and 2.5% in Costa Rica. But this growth was not accompanied by the creation of enough jobs to absorb the growing labour force or by increases in productivity. The region's productivity growth during the past three decades was only 0.5% a year, an eighth that of the Asian tigers' 4%. Growth was concentrated in capital-intensive activities-mining and import-substitution industries. Employment expanded, but mostly in the service sectors and without a sustained increase in productivity.

A strategy for economic growth that emphasizes people and their productive potential is the only way to open opportunities. Although most of the action must be taken at the country level, it is increasingly clear that new international measures are also needed to encourage and support national strategies for employment creation and human development.

Some of the specifics:

• A political commitment to full employment—The countries achieving the greatest success in employment have generally been those that deliberately set out do so. Rather than assuming that employment would materialize automatically, they have publicly identified it as a central policy objective.

• Enhancing human capabilities—Highemployment economies have generally A strategy for economic growth that emphasizes people and their productive potential is the only way to open opportunities The imbalances in economic growth, if allowed to continue, will produce a world gargantuan in its excesses and grotesque in its human and economic inequalities invested heavily in the development of human capabilities—particularly education, health and skills. They also have constantly upgraded technical skills to enable workers to adapt to rapidly changing international conditions. The Republic of Korea invests \$160 per person a year in health and education, Malaysia \$150. India, by contrast, invests only \$14, Pakistan \$10 and Bangladesh \$5.

Strengthening small-scale and informal sector production-In many countries such production has demonstrated the potential for generating employment and incomes for millions of people while providing a wide range of the basic goods and services needed in daily life. It needs to be encouraged and supported, not restricted. Some countries have increased opportunities for employment-particularly self-employment-by extending access to credit. There are many encouraging examples among small farmers, microenterprises and poor and marginal communities. And extension services and other mechanisms to enable small-scale producers to get better and quicker access to technology and information can often make a big difference in their productivity.

• Broader and more egalitarian access to land—Numerous studies show that small farmers achieve higher output per hectare than large farmers. So, providing greater access to land can increase productivity, employment and growth while reducing poverty and easing the pressure on scarce resources.

• Research and development—Another part of successful employment strategies is intensive investment in research and development for labour-intensive technology, including the adaptation of imported capital-intensive technologies to fit local needs.

New patterns of growth will need to be developed and sustained well into the 21st century—to prevent ever more extreme imbalances and inequalities in the world economy.

The imbalances in economic growth over the past 15 years are clear enough. But if allowed to continue well into the next century, they will produce a world gargantuan in its excesses and grotesque in its human and economic inequalities.

• Poverty in Sub-Saharan African and other least developed countries would deepen, with per capita income falling to \$325 by 2030.

• Meanwhile, per capita income in the OECD countries would rise to nearly \$40,000.

• Although East Asia would catch up to the incomes of the OECD countries in 15–25 years, it would take China about 50 years, and India a century or more.

Such scenarios do not pretend to be a forecast. They simply suggest what could happen if current trends continued, to emphasize the need for purposeful action —both national and international. Much attention is now given to the rapid rates of population growth. Equal attention needs to be given to the much larger and more rapidly growing imbalances in the growth of consumption and resource use.

New mechanisms must be developed to help the weak and the vulnerable seize the opportunities of the new global economy, while protecting them from marginalization.

Globalization is one of the most dramatic developments of recent years. During 1965-90 world merchandise trade tripled, and global trade in services increased more than fourteenfold. Meanwhile, financial flows have reached unimaginable dimensions. More than a trillion dollars roam the world every 24 hours, restlessly seeking the highest return. This flow of capital is not just offering unprecedented opportunities for profit (and loss). It has opened the world to the operation of a global financial market that leaves even the strongest countries with limited autonomy over interest rates, exchange rates or other financial policies.

Many developing countries have seized globalization as an opportunity. Countries that combine low wages with hightechnology skills have out-competed more established countries. In just ten years India has expanded its software development industry, centred on "Silicon Bangalore", to become the world's second largest software exporter. Other developing countries need to escape their debilitating dependence on exports of low-value primary products by combining their natural resources with their human capital. In the 21st century rapid strides in technology and communications will open the prospect of "leapfrogging" several decades of development—but only for the poor countries that can master the new skills and compete.

While globalization has often helped growth in the strong countries, it has bypassed the weak. The poorest countries, with 20% of the world's people, have seen their share of world trade fall between 1960 and 1990-from 4% to less than 1%. And they receive a meagre 0.2% of the world's commercial lending. Although private investment flows to developing countries increased between 1970 and 1994 from \$5 billion to \$173 billion, three-quarters of this went to just ten countries, mostly in East and South-East Asia and Latin America. Countries elsewhere, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been left behind.

The agenda to achieve the new patterns of growth for human development would have four priorities:

First, three groups of countries need faster economic growth, especially after the declines of the 1980s.

• The low human development countries—With nearly two billion people, these countries must accelerate their human development, backed by rapid economic growth. A massive expansion of education and health must be at the core, especially when half the population often lacks these most basic requirements. Each of these countries has to revamp its domestic social and economic policies, with stronger priorities for human development, economic growth and poverty reduction. And most will also need a new level of long-term international commitment for debt relief, more and betterfocused financial assistance and actions to open export markets and move to sustained economic growth. All the least developed countries need to reach a minimum annual economic growth rate of 3% per capita, with a higher rate in countries still below their per capita incomes of a decade or more ago.

• The formerly socialist countries, now in transition—With their per capita incomes having fallen by about a third since 1990, these countries must restart growth and sustain it for several decades. Domestic reforms backed by loans and other international economic and social support can help achieve this and end the free fall of many of these economies.

• The middle range of developing countries —Most countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and South and South-East Asia need an acceleration in growth to support human development.

Second, in two groups of countries the priority is to improve the quality of growth and to sustain—rather than increase—the rate of growth.

• The fast-growing developing countries— For China and the countries of East and South-East Asia the challenge is not so much to accelerate growth further. It is to ensure the long-term sustainability of this growth and to give more attention to poverty reduction and human development.

• *The OECD countries*—With very high incomes and growth averaging about 2% per capita during the 1980s, the human development challenge for the OECD countries is to move to new approaches to employment, equity and satisfying life styles in ways consistent with steady growth. Another part of that challenge is to provide support for health care, pensions and other social services—for children, the working poor and the growing numbers in their post-retirement years.

The limits to growth and material consumption will become more obvious as countries reach higher levels of income but there are no limits to human creativity, human compassion and the human spirit. All the least developed countries need to reach a minimum annual economic growth rate of 3% per capita Third, global action is needed to support national efforts to expand employment opportunities.

Both developing and industrial countries need international support if their national efforts towards full employment are to succeed. New forms of international action are required, and the United Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations should work together to devise them. This Report recommends:

• New measures to support countries in reversing downward employment trends, including more effective multilateral and bilateral debt relief, reformed development assistance backed by concessional resources, and access to export markets, often through trade preferences.

• A global commission to study and propose international measures for national policy and action for full employment.

Fourth, a global safety net should be created to move all countries with low levels of human development to medium levels in the next ten years.

National and international efforts for human development may have continued over time—but those supporting it with economic growth and resources have too often failed. A major international priority must be to move all countries to at least medium levels of human development in the next ten years—laying a human foundation for accelerating growth, reducing poverty and achieving more equitable development in the 21st century.

• High-profile monitoring and reporting on the situation of the poorest and least developed countries, at least until rapid growth in human development and incomes is achieved.

• Serious and sustained support for any least developed country that has a plan for

widespread and solid human development.

Often this assistance needs to be accompanied by a radical overhaul of the domestic management of their economies. But not always. A good number of the poorer and weaker economies have already taken far-reaching measures to reform and restructure their economies, but with little growth to show for their efforts.

Richer countries need to provide greater support—with an international safety net, fashioned perhaps through compacts between poor and rich nations. The poor nations can demonstrate their willingness to invest in their people and in their economies. The rich nations can offer a package of resources (through aid, debt relief and trade concessions) sufficient to generate a respectable rate of growth and to provide universal coverage of basic social services. This will strengthen the link between economic growth and human development, both nationally and internationally.

. . .

In a fast-changing global economy there are no simple answers, no easy rides. And as this Report so graphically demonstrates, inertia is not an option. Economic growth should lead to fuller choices for all peoplerather than few choices for most people or many choices for a few. But it is never enough to wait for economic growth automatically to trickle down to the poor. Instead, human development and poverty reduction must be moved to the top of the agenda for political and economic policymaking. And even when links between economic growth and human development have been painstakingly established, they must be protected against being blown apart by sudden shifts in political power or market forces.

In a fast-changing global economy there are no simple answers, no easy rides

CHAPTER 1



Trends in growth and human development

The past decade's record of economic growth is unparalleled. It includes spectacular performance in some countries and regions-unprecedented stagnation and decline in others. Nearly 1.5 billion people-more than a fourth of the world's population, mostly in East Asia-enjoyed per capita income growth of more than 7% a year during the 1980s, a record exceeding anything experienced. But nearly a billion people, about a fifth of the global total, saw their incomes shrink as per capita incomes fell in almost 70 countries for a decade or more. Most of these countries were among the least developed countries (LDCs) and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Two worlds.

The level of human achievement is rising in all countries. Because of this rise during the past three decades, the number of people in high human development countries rose from 429 million to 1.2 billion, and the number of those living in low human development countries fell from 1.9 billion to 1.7 billion. East Asia has a life expectancy of nearly 70 years, and Latin America an adult literacy rate of nearly 87%. Meanwhile, most LDCs remain in the low human development category as classified by the human development index (see the definition of the HDI on page 28). Their HDI is only slightly more than a third of that for high human development countries. Again, two worlds.

From a human development perspective, economic growth is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end—enlarging people's choices. So, it should be evaluated for its impact on people. How many people have their income expand? Is the income disparity among groups of people narrowing? What does growth mean for the poor?


Growth's spectacular records—and disasters

During the past three decades countries with high human development, as measured by the HDI, have experienced rapid economic growth and expanding incomes (figure 1.1 and tables and figures on pages 14 and 15). But growth in this group as a whole slowed in the 1980s, mainly because faster growth in some developing countries was offset by a slowdown in industrial countries, which dominate the high human development category. Despite starting with modest growth in the 1960s, medium human development countries too have maintained strong economic growth, largely because of China's spectacular growth.


By contrast, low human development countries (excluding India) have not raised the annual growth in their per capita income above 1.5% in the past 33 years. And without India, whose strong performance accounts for the 2.3% peak in the 1980s, their growth rate for the decade becomes 0.4% a year. Of the 48 countries in the low human development category in 1993, 30 had their per capita incomes fall in the 1980s.

The association between economic growth and human development becomes clear in a longer view (box 1.1). The growth-human development nexus raises two fundamental questions for policymakers: Does a close association between economic growth and human development imply an automatic link between the two? Do the benefits of economic growth automatically trickle down into people's lives? The answer to both questions, explored in detail in chapter 3, is no.

FIGURE 1.1 Income growth and human development



Source: Human Development Report Office.



BOX 1.1

Economic growth and human development: a larger canvas

growth rates higher than that of any

other industrial country. These two

countries also invested significantly in

human capital and achieved high literacy

rates and enrolment ratios before 1900.

countries in the past three decades has

been more spectacular. The more than

7% average annual per capita income

growth rate of East Asia in the 1970s

and 1980s is the most sustained and

widespread development miracle of the

years achieved progress in human devel-

opment that took industrial countries

more than 100 years. Living standards

for hundreds of millions have risen.

Basic education and literacy have

spread significantly, along with mass

communication. Mortality rates for

infants, children and women have

fallen. Access to safe water and sanita-

tion has greatly increased. And the gen-

der gap in basic human capabilities has

narrowed considerably, even though sig-

nificant gaps in opportunities remain.

The developing countries have in 30

20th century, perhaps all history.

Economic growth in developing

Global output increased more than elevenfold between 1850 and 1960, from \$611 billion to \$6,936 billion, in 1993 dollars. The world population more than doubled, rising from 1.2 billion in 1850 to 3 billion in 1960. The net outcome: a nearly fivefold increase in per capita income.

• The goods and services produced in the industrial countries, mostly in Europe and North America, expanded nearly thirtyfold—from \$212 billion to \$6,103 billion. And population in these countries grew from 300 million to 850 million.

• For non-industrial countries in this period, population increased by 2.5 times—from 870 million to 2.2 billion. But their total income only doubled—from \$399 billion to \$833 billion, in 1993 dollars. Their share of world output—65% in 1850—was down 12% by 1960.

Long-term growth rates in industrial countries ranged widely (box table 1.1). For a long period both Japan and Sweden enjoyed per capita income

Source: Patel, Ahuja-Patel and Patel 1995.

BOX TABLE 1.1

Long-term growth in industrial countries (annual percentage growth)

Country	Period	Income	Population	Per capita income
Britain	1785-1965	2.2	1.0	1.2
France	1835-1965	2.0	0.3	1.7
USA	1838-1965	3.6	2.0	1.6
Germany	1854-1965	2.7	1.1	1.7
Sweden	1865-1965	3.2	0.6	2.6
Denmark	1867-1965	2.9	1.0	1.9
Norway	1867-1965	2.8	0.8	2.0
Canada	1872-1965	3.5	1.8	1.7
Japan	1876-1965	4.0	1.1	2.9

Per capita income growth-a regional picture

Between 1960 and 1993 global income increased from \$4 trillion to \$23 trillion, and per capita income more than tripled. And developing countries as a group enjoyed per capita income growth of 3.5% a year. But among developing regions East and South-East Asia remain far out in front, with South Asia struggling to catch up. At the other end of the scale is Sub-Saharan Africa, where per capita income has fallen since the early 1980s.

How many people lived in countries with satisfactory growth in per capita income? At 3% a year, which doubles per capita income in a generation, the proportion of the world's people enjoying satisfactory growth fell from 54% to 37% between 1965–80 and 1980–93. The proportion enjoying growth of more than 5% a year more than doubled, from 12% to 27%, while that experiencing negative growth more than tripled, from 5% to 18%—a clear polarization (figure 1.2).

The polarization is even greater for countries with shrinking income. Between 1965–80 and 1980–93 the number of people in countries with negative growth increased from 200 million to almost one billion. Of these nearly 70 countries, 27 are LDCs.

Three-fourths of the LDCs—with more than 400 million of the 550 million people in this group of countries—suffered negative growth in the 1980s. Their average per capita income declined from \$229 (in 1993 dollars) in 1980 to \$210 in 1993. Of the 48 LDCs, 39 are in the low human development category. Their average HDI of 0.331 is less than three-fifths of that for the developing world (0.563).

Nor is all well in the OECD countries, despite their average per capita income of \$20,000. More than 100 million people live below the official poverty line, and the numbers are rising in the United Kingdom and the United States, among others. Nearly 30 million people are unemployed, and more than 5 million are homeless. More than 200 drug crimes are committed for every 100,000 people. And with ageing populations, the health and welfare systems of the OECD countries are under great financial—and political—pressure.

Growth has turned sour in most of the countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS, which as a group enjoyed per capita income growth of more than 5% a year during 1960–80. In the 1980s their per capita income growth slipped to 1.3% a year. Then, with the political and economic changes in the late 1980s, their per capita income declined by more than 11% a year during 1990–93, and their total GDP by a third. This deep erosion of the purchasing power of people in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries has undercut many of their past human development achievements.

International income distribution

The largest share of global production is in the industrial countries. Of the \$23 trillion of global GDP in 1993, \$18 trillion is in the industrial countries—only \$5 trillion in the developing countries, even though they have nearly 80% of the world's population.

Over the past 30 years the global growth in income has been spread very unequallyand the inequality is increasing. Consider the relative income shares of the richest and poorest 20% of the world's people. Between 1960 and 1991 the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% of global income to 85%-while that of the poorest declined from 2.3% to 1.4%. So, the ratio of the shares of the richest and the poorest increased from 30:1 to 61:1. All but the richest quintile saw their income share fall, so that by 1991 more than 85% of the world's population received only 15% of its income-vet another indication of an even more polarized world.

One useful way of comparing incomes internationally is to look at the poorest 20% in each country. The average income of Japan is 36 times that of Tanzania, but the per capita income of the poorest 20% in Japan is 130 times more than that in Tanzania.

This imbalance can also be viewed in more personal terms. Today, the net worth of the 358 richest people, the dollar billionaires, is equal to the combined income of the poorest 45% of the world's population—2.3 billion people. This of course is a comparison of wealth and income. But a contrast of wealth alone, if it were possible, would be even starker, since the wealth of the poorest people is generally much less than their income.

Whether international or national, increasing income inequality is a major constraint to sustaining both economic growth and human development. Intragenerational equity is as important as intergeneration equity (see the special contribution on page 16 by Nobel laureate Robert M. Solow).

Income distribution within countries

How the average per capita income of the poorest compares with the national average shows just how marginal they are (table 1.1). The poor are more marginal in Brazil, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau and the United States—less in Bangladesh, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan and Nepal.

The per capita income of the poorest 20% in the United States is less than a fourth of the country's average per capita income—in Japan it is nearly half. In Guatemala the per capita income of the poorest 20% is only a tenth of the average per capita income, while in Bangladesh it is nearly half. Interestingly, the marginalization of the poorest bears little relation to national income. In Bangladesh the smaller

TABLE 1.1 Per capita income of the poorest 20%, 1993

(PPP\$)	Average	Per capita
Country		income of the poorest 20%
USA	24,240	5,814
Japan	20,850	9,070
Netherlands	17,330	7,105
United Kingdom	17,210	3.958
Korea, Rep. of	9,630	3,563
Chile	8,400	1,386
Hungary	6,050	3,297
Brazil	5,370	564
Guatemala	3,350	352
Indonesia	3,150	1,370
Nigeria	1,400	357
India	1,220	537
Bangladesh	1,290	613
Nepal	1,020	464
Guinea-Bissau	840	88
Tanzania	580	70

Source: Basu 1995.

The global growth in income has been spread very unequally—and the inequality is increasing

TABLE 1.2

Average annual growth in real per capita income by human development category, 1960–93

U	р	er	C	91	n	C)	
2							

Country or group	1960-70	197080	1980-93
High human development	4.3	2.8	1.5
Excluding industrial countries	3.9	3.7	2.5
Medium human development (excluding China)	2.5	4.1	1.1
China	1.8	9.1	8.1
Low human development (excluding India)	1.5	0.7	0.2
India	1.6	0.8	3.1
World	2.6	2.8	2.9

TABLE 1.3


Average annual growth in real per capita income by region, 1960–93 (percent)

Region or country group	1960-70	197080	1980-90	1990-93
World	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.4
Industrial countries	4.6	2.9	1.9	-3.1
OECD	4.3	2.6	2.0	1.0
Eastern Europe and the CIS	5.2	5.2	1.3	-11.5
Developing countries	2.0	2.8	3.5	4.3
Arab States	2.0	3.6	-0.8	-1.3
East Asia	2.0	4.3	7.2	10.6
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.9	3.7	-0.7	1.0
South Asia	1.8	0.7	3.3	1.2
South-East Asia and the Pacific	2.1	4.1	2.8	4.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.4	0.9	-1.0	-1.2
Least developed countries	0.8	-0.1	-0.1	-1.0

FIGURE 1.3

Growth in regional incomes-stunning advance and dismal decline

Real GDP per capita (index, 1960=100)



Source: Calculated by the Human Development Report Office on the basis of data from World Bank 1995c, 1995f and 1995g.

504 East Asia

TABLE 1.4

Improvements in global and regional HDI, 1960-93

Region or country group	HDI 1960	HDI 1970	HDI 1980	HDI 1993
World	0.392	0.459	0.518	0.746
Industrial countries	0.798	0.859	0.889	0.909
OECD	0.802	0.862	0.890	0.910
Eastern Europe and the CIS	0.625	0.705	0.838	0.773
Developing countries	0.260	0.347	0.428	0.563
Arab States	0.228	0.295	0.410	0.633
East Asia	0.255	0.379	0.484	0.633
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.465	0.566	0.679	0.824
South Asia	0.206	0.254	0.298	0.444
South-East Asia and the Pacific	0.284	0.372	0.469	0.646
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.201	0.257	0.312	0.379
Least developed countries	0.161	0.205	0.245	0.331


TABLE 1.5 Changes in HDI by human development category, 1960–93

Country group	HDI 1960	HDI 1970	HDI 1980	HDI 1993
High human development	0.856	0.867	0.890	0.901
Medium human development	0.659	0.589	0.653	0.647
Low human development	0.247	0.313	0.375	0.396

FIGURE 1.4

Human development has improved steadily in most regions—but faster in some than in others

Human development index



Source: Human Development Report Office.

marginalization can be seen as the distribution of poverty—in Japan as the distribution of wealth.

Countries with a smaller ratio between their average income and the income of the poorest 20% also had faster than average growth in the per capita income of the poorest 20%—Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea. Where the ratio was larger—Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, the United Kingdom and the United States—per capita income growth was below average for the poorest 20%. In Sri Lanka the richest 20% earn only four times more than the poorest 20%, in Indonesia five times more and in Morocco seven times more. But the disparities can also be sky-high—in Guatemala and Panama the richest earn 30 times more, and in Brazil 32 times more. In the developing world as a whole the poorest 20% of the people on average get nearly 7% of total income, but in Latin America they tend to do poorest, with only 3%.

Are these disparities shrinking or growing? Changes in the distribution of income in some developing and industrial regions



Intergenerational equity, yes-but what about inequity today?

Everyone now seems to agree on the desirability of sustainable development. Even pure technological optimists accept the importance of sustainability—they just believe that human ingenuity will naturally find a way to achieve it (a risky position, but not nonsensical). I have the uncomfortable feeling, however, that most of this talk about sustainability is so vague as to be meaningless, or just warm and fuzzy, or perhaps a cover to validate pet projects.

One source of my discomfort is the fact that sustainability, when you begin to analyse it carefully, turns out to be a very difficult concept. Our understanding cannot support nearly as much conversation as we hear. The second source is more directly connected to the specific concerns of this Report, and that is what I want to write about here.

If "we"-the people making economic decisions now-have any sort of obligation to steer economic growth in a sustainable direction, it must be because we think it would be unfair or unsound to use limited resources for current benefit, in ways that will impoverish future generations. A decision to seek sustainability is thus a decision to avoid a certain kind of inequality. It is not a good thing that "we" should be well off, or get better off, if that entails that our (distant) descendants will be much poorer than we are. If "human development" is the underlying goal of economic growth, human development should be equitably shared between the present and future.

That sounds nice, and probably it is nice. But there is something strange about focusing on the goal of sustainability, defined and justified in that way. The odds are very good that, a thousand years from now, the inhabitants of Europe and North America will be enjoying an average standard of living very much higher than that achieved today by most of the people of Africa and Latin America. Not everyone would agree with that statement, but I think it is plausible and I will hold to it for the sake of argument. (Notice that I have not bothered to guess whether "our" descendants will be better or worse off than "we" are today.)

But now you can see the paradox connected with the popularity of sustainability. If the underlying reason has to do with dislike for inequality, there is at least as strong a case for reducing contemporary inequality (and probably stronger) as for worrying about the uncertain status of future generations. Those who are so urgent about not inflicting poverty on the future have to explain why they do not attach even higher priority to reducing poverty today.

The analogy between intertemporal inequality and interregional inequality comes easily to mind, but it is not the only one. Even within the rich regions of Europe and North America there are, of course, extremes of wealth and poverty. In the United States, and to a lesser but significant extent in some nations of the European Union, the inequality of income and wealth seems to be increasing. Why is it so important that we protect the distant future from a fate that arouses so little concern and action when experienced by contemporaries? If we agree that human development is the goal and economic growth is the means, current productive capacity is just as eligible a means. But the governments—and people—of the advanced economies of the world do not seem at all anxious to think about equity when it comes to the use of current resources. It would be easy to provide a cynical interpretation of this observation, but no doubt there are others.

I hope no one will think that I mean to downgrade sustainable development as a social goal and as a guiding concept for economic growth. It is important that we find ways to advance human development with less strain on the limited resources and environmental amenities that we must share with future generations. But sustainability intertemporal equity—is one goal among several. It is subject to trade-offs against other goals, just as those other goals are.

To the extent that we can manage to do so, economic policy should be made all of a piece, taking all the goals and all the constraints into account, balancing intertemporal, interregional and intraregional objectives against one another. It would be too bad if sustainability were fashionable not despite its vagueness—but because of its vagueness.

> Robert M. Solow Nobel laureate, economics, 1989

with data for 1960–90 reveal a mixed picture.

• *Asia*. In Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan (province of China) income became more equitably distributed. In Indonesia and the Philippines the distribution remained unchanged. In Bangladesh and Thailand it deteriorated.

• *Latin America*. Income distribution improved only in Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay. It deteriorated in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela.

• *Eastern Europe and the CIS countries*. In many countries in this region—including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia and the Baltic states—the Gini coefficient increased from about 0.25 to more than 0.30 in only five years, from 1989 to 1994. (A Gini coefficient of 0 means that everybody has the same income—a figure of 1 that one person has all the income.)

• Industrial countries. Income distributions are also skewed in industrial countries—though generally less so. Among the largest disparities are those in Australia and the United Kingdom, where the richest 20% earn ten times more than the poorest 20%. In Switzerland and the United States the richest 20% earn nine times more.

Has the distribution of income been worsening in the industrial countries? Again, the picture is mixed. Between the 1960s and the 1990s the Gini coefficient of income improved in Canada and stayed the same in Japan. In the United Kingdom, however, the income distribution has become more unequal—with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.25 to 0.32.

Assets are also distributed unequally. In Sweden 1% of households own about 20% of assets. And in some countries the disparity in ownership is widening. In the United States between 1975 and 1990 the richest 1% of the population increased its share of assets from 20% to 36%.

Human progress and misery

Human development embraces a broad range of choices in economic, social and political arenas. It covers more than knowledge, a long and healthy life and a decent standard of living. Issues like freedom, democracy and human security are also important.

But even from a narrow view, human development over the past 30 years is a mixed picture of unprecedented human progress and unspeakable human misery of human advances on several fronts and retreats on several others. Every region made progress in human development as measured by the HDI over the past three decades—though the extent of improvement varied.

Indeed, the developing countries have in many respects covered as much distance in their human development during the

The "lost decade"-totally lost?

The decade of the 1980s is often referred to as the "lost decade" for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Several indicators register the decline. Per capita income in Latin America was 7% lower in 1990 than in 1980. Consumption fell by 6%, and investment by 4%. Inflation reached an average of 1,500% in 1990. By 1987 the region's total external debt was three times more than its exports.

In Sub-Saharan Africa per capita GNP fell by nearly 10% between 1980 and 1990. The real world prices for major exports—tea, cocoa, coffee and cotton—fell by 50%. Capital investment fell by more than 50% in real per capita terms, and by 1989 the region's debt-GNP ratio reached 97%, by far the highest in the world. Many countries attempted to deal with the situation through structural adjustment, which in many cases meant trying to balance the economy at the cost of unbalancing people's lives.

But was the lost decade totally lost? Both Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa faced severe problems on the economic front. But what was happening on the human development front? In Latin America there were considerable improvements, in part as a result of deliberately accelerated efforts. Between 1980 and 1990 life expectancy increased from 63 to 67 years, adult literacy improved from 80% to 86%, and infant mortality declined by a third, from 69 per thousand live births to 45. Although the situation was worse in Sub-Saharan Africa, conscious efforts on some human development fronts brought continuing improvements despite economic problems. Between 1980 and 1990 life expectancy increased by five years, from 46 to 51, and infant mortality decreased by a fifth, from 121 per thousand live births to 97. Thus, even under seriously adverse conditions, some improvement in human development was possible in Sub-Saharan Africa—though its progress lags behind that in other regions.

BOX 1.2

On the economic front too, not all was bleak. Merchandise exports in Latin America grew at an average annual rate of 3% in the 1980s, and by the end of the decade the region was attracting nearly a third of the private capital flows to developing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa such countries as Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland were able to generate yearly GDP growth during the 1980s.

On the political front, in Latin America more than 125 parliamentary elections were held, and since 1980, 18 countries have made the transition from a military to a democratic government. The Esquipulas Declaration of August 1987 marked a milestone for peace and development in Central America. In Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, nearly 30 multiparty presidential elections have been held—in 21 cases for the first time. In 31 countries opposition parties have been legalized.

Source: ILO 1992, UNDP 1995c and Human Development Report Office.

past 30 years as the industrial world managed over one century. The infant mortality rate has been more than halved. Combined primary and secondary school enrolment has more than doubled. And people on average now live 17 years longer. In our preoccupation with trends in pure economic indicators, we sometimes lose sight of the achievements in human lives (box 1.2).

BOX 1.3

Social costs of transition

The collapse of communism has provided new possibilities for freedom and for participation. But it has been accompanied by high social costs.

In all but a few of the Eastern European and CIS countries production has been disrupted, and since 1990 average annual growth has been negative for most. Georgia has the worst record (-28% a year), followed by Armenia and Azerbaijan (-16%). A few of the CIS countries have managed to bring inflation rates down to double digits (mostly the Baltic states), but others still suffer from hyperinflation. In 1994 inflation was 7,380% in Georgia, 2,000% in Armenia and Azerbaijan and 1,875% in Belarus.

Unemployment and underemployment continue to increase, although official statistics still show relatively low unemployment rates. In Lithuania, as in most other CIS countries, many people are registered by enterprises as employed, even though they do not work full-time or are on forced unpaid leave. In 1993 unemployment reached 23% in Albania, 17% in Bulgaria and 13% in Hungary.

No less evident is the inequality in income distribution. In Kyrgyzstan in early 1994 the income of the richest 10% of the population was 1.5 times as large as that of the poorest 10%. By the end of 1994 it was 10 times higher. In Russia the nominal incomes of the richest 10% of households increased by 30%, while those of the poorest 10% rose by only 5%.

Most of the Eastern European and CIS countries face serious social distress. In Latvia the number of violent crimes more than doubled between 1990 and 1994, from around 1,060 to 2,360. In Bulgaria during the 1980s the number of reported crimes averaged 50,000 a year—but it grew to 223,000 by 1994.

The widespread decline in income and rising unemployment have pushed many people into poverty—its incidence has risen from 6% to 32% in Romania.

The transition has also meant worsening health and mortality indicators. Both adult and infant mortality rates have risen. Although estimates vary, more than 450,000 adult deaths can be attributed to suicides, alcoholism and increased incidence of coronary disease and strokes.

Malnutrition and undernutrition are also on the rise. In Ukraine the average daily intake has declined from 3,517 calories per capita in 1989 to 2,860 in 1993.

Women have been adversely affected by the changes in these economies. They used to play prominent roles in work and in professional, social and cultural spheres. But now the unemployment rate among women is 14%, compared with 9% among men. In Bulgaria women under 30 make up 70% of all unemployed women.

Children have also been severely affected. New cases of diphtheria among Russian children increased from 500 in 1989 to more than 15,000 in 1993.

A major challenge for Eastern Europe and the CIS countries is to turn these social trends around. Doing this requires the right kind and level of economic growth coupled with fast human development.

Source: UNICEF 1993a and 1994a and data from national human development reports for Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.

But there is still a long way to go. Today, more than one billion people in developing countries lack access to basic health and education, safe drinking water and adequate nutrition. And one person in three lives in poverty. As global communication grows, people expect more—and the ethical contradiction of closing one's eyes to world poverty also grows.

Even the industrial countries still have major human development concerns: millions of people live in constant insecurity menaced by crime, drugs, pollution, unemployment and homelessness.

The overall progress and deprivation during the past 30 years in industrial and developing countries are summarized in two balance sheets (pages 20–21).

To highlight the major regional variations in human progress and human deprivation over the past three decades, five regional balance sheets have been prepared for the same period (pages 38–42). These balance sheets are, of course, just snapshots—no substitute for more elaborate analysis of regional human development. Because Eastern Europe and the CIS countries are still in a transition that is causing sharp and sudden changes, it is difficult to prepare a similar balance sheet of human development for them, but it is still possible to indicate the magnitude of the social costs that these countries have had to bear (box 1.3).

Life expectancy

Between 1960 and 1993 life expectancy in developing countries increased by more than a third—from 46 to 62 years. Indeed, more than 30 developing countries now have life expectancies of 70 years or more.

In East Asia and Latin America the regional average is nearly 70 years, while in Sub-Saharan Africa the average life expectancy is only 51 years. In the industrial world 24 countries have a life expectancy of 75 years or more.

Much of the progress in life expectancy reflects improvement in the longevity of women. Between 1970 and 1990 women's life expectancy increased by nine years— 20% more than the increase for men. All things being equal, women have a biological advantage, and should live longer than men. But as a result of neglect of girls, it is women who have the shorter life expectancy in three countries—Bangladesh, the Maldives and Nepal. In some countries of Asia and North Africa the natural sex ratio is defied, and more than 100 million women are estimated to be "missing".

In Eastern Europe and the CIS countries one of the most striking symptoms of social and economic upheaval is a fall in life expectancy. Male life expectancy in several countries has declined in the past five years—by five years in Russia by some estimates.

In the industrial countries life expectancy has continued to increase, so much so that there has been a significant ageing of the population. Today, around 150 million people—13% of the population—are over 65 years of age. And of these, more than 30 million are 80 years or older.

While the rising life expectancy represents remarkable success for human development, it also creates two major challenges. The first is providing enough health and other care for people who become less selfreliant as they grow older. The second is generating enough revenue from the working population to pay for the social protection of a growing proportion of retired people. But societies have to recognize that older people still have much more to contribute—by making better use of their experience and skills to enrich society. Thus, people's perception of ageing needs to change.

Health

Health standards in developing countries have greatly improved in the past 30 years. Between 1960 and 1993 the average infant mortality rate fell by more than half—from 150 per thousand live births to 70. But in South Asia the rate is 84, and in Sub-Saharan Africa 97—more than five times the rate for East Asia (excluding China).

Progress has been similar in under-five mortality, which in developing countries fell from 243 deaths per thousand live births to less than 100 during 1960–94. But again, some countries are lagging behind. In SubSaharan Africa the rate is 174—while in the Arab States it is 73.

Broader access to health services, safe water and sanitation and the mobilization of private services, such as for immunization, have made the difference. During 1960–93 public spending on health in developing countries increased from 0.9% of GDP to 2.0%. Eighty percent of people in developing countries now have access to health services—70% to safe water.

Alongside all this progress, however, is much deprivation. Many people still lack health services or safe water, and more than half of them live in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. And for many people the chances of seeing a doctor can be quite low. In Latin America there is one doctor for every 1,000 people—in Sub-Saharan Africa one for every 18,000. And almost all these services tend to be much worse in rural than in urban areas.

Deprivation in health is on the rise in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. In Russia and Ukraine the infant mortality rate has risen by more than 13%. Indeed, health standards in these economies are now sometimes lower than in some developing countries. In Georgia 30% of pregnant women now suffer from anaemia—twice the level in El Salvador.

The very young remain most vulnerable. True, more than three-quarters of one-yearolds in developing countries are now immunized against the most common childhood diseases—with coverage ranging from 60% in Africa to more than 90% in East Asia. But even so, more than 12 million children under five still die each year, and in most cases their deaths can be linked to malnutrition. More than half the malnourished children are in South Asia.

Women are another vulnerable group, and for them the most critical period is pregnancy and childbirth. In 1990 more than half the pregnant women in developing countries were anaemic, and about half a million women die every year from causes related to childbirth. The average maternal mortality rate for developing countries is 384 per 100,000 live births, with the rates varying considerably—from 95 in East Asia to nearly 1,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Deprivation in health is on the rise in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries

Balance sheet of human development-developing countries

PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION
HEA	ин самаатаа
 In 1960–93 average life expectancy increased by more than a third. Life expectancy is now more than 70 years in 30 countries. Over the past three decades the population with access to safe water almost doubled—from 36% to nearly 70%. 	 Around 17 million people die each year from curable infectious and parasitic diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria and tuberculosis. Of the world's 18 million HIV-infected people, more than 90% live in developing countries.
• Between 1960 and 1991 net enrolment at the primary level increased by nearly two-thirds—from 48% to 77%.	 Millions of children are still out of school—130 million at the primary level and 275 million at the secondary level.
FOOD AND	NUTRITION
• Despite rapid population growth, food production per capita increased by about 20% in the past decade.	 Nearly 800 million people do not get enough food, and about 500 million people are chronically malnourished.
INCOME AN	D POVERTY -
• During 1960–93 real per capita income in the develop- ing world increased by an average 3.5% a year.	 Almost a third of the population—1.3 billion people—lives in poverty.
WON	AEN
 During the past two decades the combined primary and secondary enrolment ratio for girls increased from 38% to 78%. During the past two decades fertility rates declined by more than a third. 	 At 384 per 100,000 live births, maternal mortality is still nearly 12 times as high as in OECD countries. Women hold only 10% of parliamentary seats.
CHILD	REN
 Between 1960 and 1993 the infant mortality rate fell by more than half—from 150 per thousand live births to 70. The extension of basic immunization over the past two decades has saved the lives of about three million children a year. 	 More than a third of children are malnourished. The under-five mortality rate, at 97 per thousand live births, is still nearly six times as high as in industrial countries.
ENVIRO	IMENT
• Developing countries' contribution to global emissions is still less than a fourth that of industrial countries, though their population is four times the industrial world's.	 About 200 million people are severely affected by desertification. Every year some 20 million hectares of tropical forests are grossly degraded or completely cleared.
POLITICS AND	CONFLICTS
• Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the people in developing countries live under relatively pluralistic and democratic regimes.	 At the end of 1994 there were more than 11 million refugees in the developing world.
Source: See bibliographic note on page 116.	

PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION	
HEAL	TH	
• By 1992 life expectancy was more than 75 years in 24 of 25 industrial countries.	Nearly two million people are infected with HIV.	
EDUCA	rion	
• Between 1960 and 1990 the tertiary enrolment ratio more than doubled—from 15% to 40%.	 More than a third of adults have less than an usecondary education. 	ipper-
INCOME AND E	MPLOYMENT	-
 Between 1960 and 1993 real per capita GNP grew by more than 3% a year. The average annual rate of inflation during the 1980s was less than 5%. 	 The total unemployment rate is more than 8%, an rate among youths nearly 15%. More than 30 million ple are seeking work. The poorest 40% of households get only 18% of income. 	n peo-
WON	EN	-
 Between 1970 and 1990 the number of female tertiary students per 100 male tertiary students studying science and technology more than doubled—from 25 to 67. Women now account for more than 40% of the labour force and about a quarter of administrators and managers. 	 The wage rate for women is still only two-thirds th men. Women hold only 12% of parliamentary seats. 	at fo
SOCIAL S	CURITY	
 Social security expenditures account for about 15% of GDP. 	• More than 100 million people live below the opverty line, and more than 5 million are homeless.	
SOCIAL	ABRIC	-
• There are more than five library books and one radio for every person, one TV set for every two people. One person in three reads a newspaper.	 Nearly 130,000 rapes are reported annually in th group 15–59. 	e age
ENVIROI	IMENT	
 Aggressive conservation measures and more appropri- ate pricing policies dramatically reduced energy use per \$100 of GDP between 1965 and 1991—from 166 kilo- grams of oil equivalent to 26 kilograms. 	 Each year damage to forests due to air pollution leave conomic losses of about \$35 billion—equivalent GDP of Hungary. People in industrial countries consume nearly nine as much commercial energy per capita as people in oping countries, though they constitute only a fifth world's population. 	to the time devel

The spread of HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS has become one of the world's leading public health problems and for many countries a major setback in human development. So far, 18 million people worldwide have been infected with HIV, and 2.5 million have died of AIDS. Every day 6,000 new infections occur, one every 15 seconds. Although 90% of all new infections are in developing countries, the industrial countries have no cause for complacency. In both Europe and North America AIDS is now the leading cause of death for adults under 45.

HIV/AIDS presents difficult health problems. There is as yet no cure or vaccine. AIDS is assumed to be almost always fatal. And there is a long incubation period between infection and illness.

The most obvious and direct impact of HIV/AIDS on human development is

HIV/AIDS stunts progress in human development

The scale of the setback to human development from HIV/AIDS has been confirmed by a recent UNDP study carried out by researchers at Columbia University and the Harvard Institute for International Development. This study concludes that between 1980 and 1992 a sample of 56 countries from all regions of the world lost on average 1.3 years of human development progress. And in some countries the setback was particularly severe-for Zambia more than ten years, Tanzania eight years, Rwanda seven years and the Central African Republic more than six years. Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and Zimbabwe lost between three and five years.

BOX 1.4

The method used compares the actual 1980 and 1992 human development index (HDI) with the estimated 1992 HDI that would have occurred in the absence of AIDS. The losses will continue to mount, especially in such countries as India, Myanmar and Thailand, where the AIDS crisis is becoming increasingly visible. The impact of HIV/AIDS on the HDI operates mainly through the dramatic reduction of life expectancy. More than 85% of HIV/AIDS deaths worldwide occur

Source: Bloom, Bennet, Mahal and Noor 1996.

among people between 20 and 45 years old. The study found only a marginal impact on the other components of the HDI. But because HDI is only a partial measurement of human development, the impact of HIV/AIDS goes far beyond what this study shows.

The study used the same method to measure the impact of tuberculosis. Even though this disease has claimed far more lives since 1980, AIDS has had a greater impact on human development precisely because AIDS deaths are concentrated in the age group 20–45. This finding is significant. It shows that it is now out of date to argue that HIV/AIDS is an exaggerated health crisis diverting attention and funding from more important, though less spectacular, health problems of developing countries.

Governments that do not take the AIDS threat seriously now, or shy away from action because of cultural or religious sensitivities, will pay the price later. More resources, political commitment and innovation need to be brought to bear against this pandemic, while still maintaining adequate attention to other health challenges. through sickness and death. In some countries it is causing a sharp drop in life expectancy. Without HIV/AIDS the average life expectancy in Africa in 2000 would have been 62 years. Instead, it is likely to fall to 47 years. This drastic effect is beginning to show up in declining human development indices for many countries (box 1.4).

Statistics on the rapid spread of the epidemic and its impact may cause alarm. But numbers and predictions should not hide the fact that HIV/AIDS is a personal tragedy for many individuals and families. People living with HIV and AIDS have to deal not only with a lethal disease, but also with the stigma and discrimination often associated with being infected. A humane approach to helping people who are living with HIV and AIDS and involving them in education and prevention programmes is essential for creating an environment in which open dialogue can limit the further spread of the epidemic. Inhumane and discriminatory treatment of those infected will create an atmosphere of fear and ignorance, fuelling the AIDS epidemic.

Educational attainment

Investment in social services in developing countries shows up in higher literacy rates and greater numbers of children enrolled in school.

Between 1970 and 1993 the literacy rate in developing countries increased by nearly half—from 43% of those over 15 to 61%. Indeed, 25 countries now have literacy rates of 90% or more. Latin America has a rate of 86%, while Sub-Saharan Africa has one of 55% and South Asia 49%.

There have also been significant improvements in school enrolment. Between 1960 and 1991 in developing countries, the net enrolment ratio increased from 48% to 77% at the primary level and from 35% to 47% at the secondary level. Tertiary enrolment remains low at 16%.

Different regions are at different stages. In South Asia the increases in enrolment ratios were more at the primary and secondary levels—in Latin America and East Asia more at the secondary and tertiary levels. In Sub-Saharan Africa primary enrolment ratios fell over the 1980s, declining by 37–50% in 17 countries.

Some of the biggest advances have been for women. Between 1970 and 1992 the female primary and secondary enrolment ratio increased from 38% to 68%. And in some regions it is approaching that of the industrial countries, notably in East Asia (83%) and in Latin America (87%). But South Asia (55%) still has a long way to travel.

There have been similar improvements in female literacy—which during the past two decades increased by more than twothirds in developing countries. Even regions less advanced in female education have made progress. In the Arab States between 1970 and 1990, the female literacy rate increased from 20% to 40%.

Eastern Europe and the CIS countries have always prided themselves on high standards of education. But it seems that standards are slipping. Over the past five years the primary and secondary enrolment ratios fell by 4% in Russia and by 6% in Bulgaria.

The industrial countries have much higher enrolment ratios and literacy rates. But some of them worry about declining standards, fearing that they may start falling behind the faster-growing developing countries. One major concern is technical education. In the industrial countries fewer than a third of students now enrol for applied or natural science. For students in Argentina, Chile and Mexico the proportion is above 40%.

Political participation

Today, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the world's people live under relatively pluralistic and democratic regimes. In East Asia and South-East Asia more than 30 general elections have been held since 1980, and in South Asia 34 parliamentary elections. In Africa more than half the states are now undertaking democratic reforms and renewing civil society. Since 1990, 27 multiparty presidential elections have been held—21 for the first time. In 31 countries opposition parties have been legalized. In Latin America 18 countries have made the transition from a military to a democratic government since 1980. Several Arab states have undertaken political reforms to strengthen their multiparty systems. All these opened opportunities for people to influence the process that shapes their lives.

People are also exerting influence by increasingly taking part in institutions of civil society—such as non-governmental organizations. In developing countries such organizations are not only increasing in number, they are also taking on a bigger role in voicing people's aspirations and working as pressure groups.

Trade unions have always been strong institutions of civil society. But except in such Scandinavian countries as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, where union membership has risen significantly in the past two decades, union membership among workers has been falling in most industrial countries in recent years (the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States). In developing countries a smaller proportion of the workforce tends to be unionized than in most industrial countries because there are fewer workers in the formal sector.

Political space has always been monopolized by men. Although women constitute half the electorate, they hold only 12% of the seats in parliaments and 6% in national cabinets. Women are relatively better represented at local levels. In 46 countries women's representation in local governments surpasses their representation in national parliaments. In 1994 India reserved a third of Panchayat (local council) seats for women. As a result, at least 800,000 women entered the local political pipeline from which national leaders emerge.

Human security

Human security represents safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—in homes, workplaces and the community.

In poor nations and rich, human life is increasingly threatened by crime, accidents and violence. During the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s reported crimes worldwide increased by 5% a year—faster than the Political space has always been monopolized by men growth in population. Many countries report disturbing trends in crime. In the United States there are two million victims of violent crimes every year. Four children are murdered every day in Brazil, where the killings of minors increased by 40% in 1992.

Industrial and traffic accidents also present great risks. In industrial countries traffic accidents are the leading cause of death for people aged 15–30. In developing countries they account for at least 50% of accidental deaths.

Among the worst personal threats are those to women. It is estimated that a third of married women in developing countries are battered by their husbands. In Germany up to four million women suffer from domestic violence every year. And nearly 130,000 rapes are reported annually in industrial countries in the age group 15–59.

Children, who should be most protected in any society, are subject to many abuses. In the United States nearly three million children are reported to be victims of abuse and neglect every year. More than 200,000 children live on the streets in Brazil. Each year an estimated one million children, mostly girls in Asia, are forced into prostitution. An estimated 100 million girls, mostly in Africa, have suffered genital mutilation.

Over the years the survival of indigenous people in different countries has been threatened in one way or another. The lives of 300 million aboriginal people in 70 countries are subject to continuing vulnerability. In Canada nearly half the indigenous people living on reservations now rely on transfer payments for their basic needs. Among all households in Guatemala, two of three are poor-but among indigenous families, nine of ten are poor. During the drought of the 1970s, 125,000 Tuareg nomads in the Sahara starved to death. And violence, depression and despair are all too common among indigenous people, further threatening their survival.

Housing

More than one billion people live in inadequate shelter—without piped water, electricity, roads or, in most cases, security of tenure. Between 30% and 60% of the people in developing countries live in illegal or irregular settlements. And there are thought to be around 100 million homeless—sleeping in the streets or in public buildings or moving in and out of night shelters.

Conditions like these inevitably undermine progress in human development and leave people constantly exposed both to chronic diseases and to sudden new threats. The 1994 outbreak of plague in the relatively wealthy Indian city of Surat was an unnerving reminder of the dangers of poor water supply, sanitation and drainage.

Inadequate and overcrowded shelter is the most visible manifestation of poverty, and improved housing conditions have an immediate and direct impact on human development (box 1.5). Adequate housing is strongly correlated with progress in health, literacy and longevity and with the social stability of communities. Improvements in housing boost material and psychological well-being and health—and thus work productivity and school performance. And appropriate location of settlements can expand job opportunities.

Housing means much more than shelter from the elements. It can be a source of security and stability, especially for the urban poor. It can also be a centre of informal employment—everything from vegetable gardening to dressmaking to radio repair.

Conflict

Since the Second World War the number of conflicts in the world has increased more than fivefold, more than 90% of them internal. Bombs, bullets and land-mines might be thought the greatest risks in conflict, but many more people die from indirect causes-such as the disruption of food or water supplies or the destruction of health services. In today's conflict zones more than 100 million people are chronically malnourished. In the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s, mortality and disease rates were more than 20 times as high as normal. This takes a terrible toll on children. While under-five mortality is 120 deaths per thousand live births in South Asia and 175 in

Children, who should be most protected in any society, are subject to many abuses

Human development, Habitat II and human settlements

The goal of the second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), to be held in Istanbul in June 1996, is to make the world's cities, towns and villages healthy, safe, equitable and sustainable. Its two main themes: adequate shelter for all, and sustainable human settlements in an urbanizing world.

An urbanizing world: bane or opportunity for human development?

The world is becoming urban. Between 1950 and 1995 the proportion of the global population living in towns and cities increased from 29% to 43%, and by the year 2005 it will be well over 50%.

Almost all this urbanization is taking place in developing countries. In the industrial countries city populations are stabilizing and in some cases declining. But urban areas in the South are growing by one million inhabitants a week—the equivalent of a whole new city the size of Brussels or Harare. And there are no signs that the pace is slackening.


Policy-makers have realized that the urban boom is inevitable, although some measures can slow it down. And while cities are centres of deprivation, they are also centres of opportunity. Rural arrivals may not find the streets paved with gold, but cities offer a chance of better-paid employment. A high density of people and resources offers economies of scale and a concentration of creative energy, and opportunities for both economic and non-economic dimensions of human development (box figure 1.1). Cities have less than half the world's population, but contribute nearly two-thirds of the world's wealth.

Since cities will continue to grow, the task now is to make them function better as centres of human development. Key issues for the future include improving the quality of informal sector employment, providing adequate housing and delivering services on a more equitable basis to rich and poor neighbourhoods.

Enabling environment for better housing

Governments have tried to bolster security for city dwellers and improve their living conditions by building low-cost public housing. But this has rarely achieved much even the lowest-cost houses may be beyond the reach of the poorest and have often been seized by the middle classes in "downward raiding". The best people to generate affordable housing are the poor themselves—whose energy and enterprise have created homes and thriving communities in the most difficult circumstances. And the best contribution that governments can make is to offer support when needed and to create an enabling environment for communitybased settlement and shelter improvement.

This means, for example, ensuring a competitive but regulated market in land—



people will not develop housing on illegally occupied land if they can afford legal plots of their own. Governments can also ensure a free market in building materials and housing finance. And they can remove bureaucratic barriers that set unrealistic building standards.

Yet too few municipal governments have fully implemented an "enabling" strategy, leaving a gap between policy rhetoric and action. Special interest groups that profit from monopoly control over land or construction—and bureaucratic unwillingness or inability to cope with local communities—get in the way. The issue of municipal governance—in accountability and incompetence—needs to be addressed.

Adequate housing as a human right?

The right to adequate shelter is one of many development-related rights set out in international instruments of human rights law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, universally accepted as binding "customary" international law, states that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including ... housing ... " (Article 26). This right is reiterated in a number of subsequent conventions, in particular the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The central issue, however, is not the definition of "rights" or "obligations". It is the certainty that by agreeing to declarations and ratifying treaties, countries have firmly committed themselves to improving housing conditions as part of their commitment to people-centred and equitable development. The key challenge is not for legal experts to interpret legal texts, but for policy-makers to take the necessary action to honour their commitment to the people and to the community of nations. If international law can be one way of focusing attention on the need for action, then so much the better.

Priorities for the follow-up to Istanbul

Five follow-up actions will determine whether Habitat II has a lasting impact. Each country needs to:

1. Adopt the globally agreed goals and adapt them to its own situation.

 Prepare a national plan of action with the main municipalities preparing local plans.

3. Set in motion a range of local activities to meet these goals, organized locally in ways that provide full opportunities for social mobilization and participation and control by local communities.

4. Explore with community leaders how existing resources can be better used, with some resources from central budgets for catalytic support.

5. Set up a process of monitoring, both to assess progress towards the goals and to provide feedback, accountability and encouragement to communities.

Mayors and community leaders in many cities have demonstrated remarkable capacity for creative leadership and community mobilization, transforming the lives of millions of urban people, including many of the the poor. Such leadership is most effective when it is anchored in a participatory approach, tackling problems in ways that draw on the energy and creativity of men, women, children and community groups to improve their lives and situations.

Source: ADB 1994, Cheema, Rabinovitch and Work 1995, UNCHS 1987, 1991 and 1996, UNDP 1991a and UN 1995g.

Sub-Saharan Africa, it is more than 250 in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

The connection between conflict and human development runs both ways. Years of internal warfare undermine standards of human development. And long periods of neglect of human development, especially for particular racial or ethnic groups, can eventually provoke violent conflicts.

One way of looking at the association between violent conflict and human development is through the number of refugees. At the end of 1994 conflicts around the globe had left nearly 27 million refugees and displaced persons (an elevenfold increase since 1970). Today, one of every 200 people in the world is either a refugee or displaced within his or her own country. Almost all countries in which conflict has produced a significant number of refugees and internally displaced people have a low human development index (table 1.6).

Peace opens opportunities for human development—in the West Bank and Gaza the beginnings of peace improve the prospects for more trade, more external assistance and more effective public action for accelerating human development.

TABLE 1.6 Conflict and human development (as of December 1994)

Country or group	Refugees	HDI value
High human development countries	None	0.901
Medium human development countries Iraq Azerbaijan Armenia	702,000 299,000 202,000	0.647 0.599 0.665 0.680
Low human development countries Afghanistan Rwanda Liberia Somalia Sudan Burundi Angola Sierra Leone Mozambique Chad Myanmar	2,744,000 2,257,000 795,000 536,000 397,000 389,000 284,000 275,000 234,000 211,000 204,000	0.396 0.229 0.332 0.311 0.221 0.359 0.282 0.283 0.283 0.219 0.261 0.291 0.251
Subtotal Others (countries in which conflict had created fewer than 200,000 refugees) Total	9,259,000 5,229,000 14,488,000	-

Source: UNHCR 1995.

The connection between conflict and human development runs both ways

Environment

The environmental threats that people around the world face stem from a combination of the degradation of local ecosystems and that of the global system.

Developing countries are confronting increasing problems of water scarcity, deforestation, desertification, pollution and natural disasters. Today in developing countries, the water supply per capita is only a third of what it was in 1970. Some eight million to ten million acres of forest land are lost each vear. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone in the past 50 years, 65 million hectares of productive land turned into desert. Air pollution is also a serious problem. About 700 million people, primarily women and children in poor rural areas, are affected by indoor smoke from the use of biomass fuel. And during 1967-93 natural disasters affected three billion people in developing countries-with more than seven million deaths and two million injuries.

In industrial countries one of the major environmental threats is air pollution. The deterioration of Europe's forests from air pollution causes economic losses of \$35 billion a year. The estimated annual loss of agricultural production due to air pollution is \$1.5 billion in Sweden, \$1.8 billion in Italy, \$2.7 billion in Poland and \$4.7 billion in Germany.

Some forms of environmental degradation migrate across borders. Polluted air drifts inexorably across national frontiers, with sulphur dioxide emissions in one country falling as acid rain in another. About 60% of Europe's commercial forests suffer damaging levels of sulphur deposition. The production of greenhouse gases also has a global effect. Although the United States and the former Soviet Union account for nearly a third of global emissions of greenhouse gases, sometimes the greatest impact could be on poorer countries. Bangladesh, which produces only 0.3% of global greenhouse emissions, could see its land area shrink by 17% with a one-metre rise in sea level partly due to global warming.

Biological diversity is more threatened now than at any time in the past. It has been estimated that at current rates of loss, up to 15% of the earth's species could disappear over the next 25 years.

Income poverty-and capability poverty

The foregoing discussion shows considerable progress in human development, alongside deep human deprivation and poverty.

Poverty is usually thought of as a lack of income—because it is income that is largely assumed to determine one's material standard of well-being. Thus, if \$1 a day is taken as the poverty line, 33% of the developing world's population, or 1.3 billion people, is poor. Nearly half, more than 550 million, live in South Asia, 215 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and 150 million in Latin America.

But "income poverty" is only part of the picture. Just as human development encompasses aspects of life much broader than income, so poverty should be seen as having many dimensions.

This year's Report thus introduces a new, multidimensional measure of human deprivation, the capability poverty measure (CPM). Intended to complement income measures of poverty, it focuses on human capabilities, as the human development index does. But rather than examining the average state of people's capabilities, it reflects the percentage of people who lack basic, or minimally essential, human capabilities.

The CPM considers the lack of three basic capabilities. The first is the capability to be well nourished and healthy-represented by the proportion of children under five who are underweight. The second is the capability for healthy reproduction-proxied by the proportion of births unattended by trained health personnel. The third is the capability to be educated and knowledgeable-represented by female illiteracy. The index is noteworthy for its emphasis on the deprivation of women, which is severe in some countries. It is now well known that deprivation of women adversely affects the human development of families and of society.

For each country these measures are added together and divided by three to give

a simple arithmetic mean. The lower this mean, the less the capability poverty. (The analytical framework of the CPM, the full method and the complete results are in technical note 3.) The CPM could also incorporate other variables, but for international comparisons, keeping it simple increases its usefulness.

Table 1.7 presents the results of the CPM for a selection of countries—along with the "headcount poverty index" from the World Bank's *Trends in Developing Economies 1995*, which uses a high national poverty line that reflects both moderate and extreme poverty. The headcount index is estimated as the proportion of people under the poverty line.

According to the national income poverty lines, 21% of the people in developing countries live below the poverty line. The corresponding figure for capability poverty is 37%. In other words, 900 million people in developing countries are income poor, but 1.6 billion people are capability poor.

• *South Asia*—In most countries capability poverty is more widespread than income poverty. In Pakistan only a third of the population is income poor, but more than three-fifths are capability poor. And in

Country	People who are capability poor (CPM) 1993	People who are income poor (headcount index) ^a
Bangladesh	76.9	47.5
India	61.5	25.4
Pakistan	60.8	34.0
Guinea-Bissau	56.6	49.0
Morocco	49.7	13.1
Uganda	45.9	55.0
Indonesia	42.3	16.7
Ghana	39.3	35.9
Kenya	33.8	37.0
Tunisia	29.9	14.1
Peru	25.7	32.0
Zimbabwe	22.3	25.5
Thailand	21.1	21.8
Sri Lanka	19.3	22.4
China	17.5	10.9
Venezuela	15.2	31.3

a. Most recent year available.

Source: Human Development Report Office and World Bank 1995c.

The capability poverty measure complements income measures of poverty




FIGURE 1.5

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Bangladesh 55 million people are income poor, but 89 million are capability poor. In Sri Lanka, by contrast, capability poverty is less than income poverty.

• *South-East Asia*—Thailand has built up the capabilities of its people over time, so capability poverty there is lower than income poverty. But Indonesia, while successful at reducing income poverty, still has much more to do in developing people's basic capabilities. This disparity is reflected in the human development index: Thailand is ranked 52, Indonesia 102.

• *Arab States*—Capability poverty often exceeds income poverty, though the difference varies. It is greater in Morocco, for example, than in Tunisia.

• *Sub-Saharan Africa*—Here the story is different. Income poverty is so extensive that in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe it exceeds capability poverty—though the gap between the two is generally small. And deprivation is so severe that in Guinea-Bissau almost three-fifths of the people are capability poor.

• Latin America—Many countries have built up their people's capabilities quite effectively—as reflected in their HDI values—but they have been less successful in alleviating income poverty. In Peru and Venezuela income poverty is higher than capability poverty.

So, poverty cannot be eradicated merely by boosting income. It will also take a broad expansion of basic human capabilities and the productive use of those capabilities.

What the 1996 HDI reveals

Since 1990 the *Human Development Report* has presented the human development index to capture as many aspects of human development as possible in one simple composite index and to produce a ranking of human development achievements—a ranking that reveals considerable regional variation (figure 1.5 and tables 1.8 and 1.9).

The concept of human development is much deeper and richer than what can be captured in any composite index or even by a detailed set of statistical indicators. Yet it is useful to simplify a complex reality—and that is what the HDI sets out to do. It is a composite index of achievements in basic human capabilities in three fundamental dimensions—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Three variables have been chosen to represent

TABLE 1.8 HDI ranking for industrial countries, 1993

1993				
Country	HDI value	HDI rank	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank ^a
Canada	0.951	1	7	6
USA	0.940	2	2	0
Japan	0.938	3	9	6
Netherlands	0.938	4	22	18
Norway	0.937	5	10	5
Finland	0.935	6	25	19
France	0.935	7	14	7
Iceland	0.934	8	17	9
Sweden	0.933	9	21	12
Spain	0.933	10	31	21
Australia	0.929	11	18	7
Belgium	0.929	12	12	0
Austria	0.928	13	15	2
New Zealand	0.927	14	24	10
Switzerland	0.926	15	4	-11
United Kingdom	0.924	16	23	7
Denmark	0.924	17	11	-6
Germany	0.920	18	16	-2
Ireland	0.919	19	29	10
Italy	0.914	20	20	0
Greece	0.909	21	41	19
Israel	0.908	24	28	4
Luxembourg	0.895	27	1	-26
Malta	0.886	28	34	6
Portugal	0.878	35	35	0
Czech Rep.	0.872	37	44	6
Slovakia	0.864	41	55	14
Hungary	0.855	46	51	5
Latvia	0.820	55	61	7
Poland	0.819	56	65	10
Russian Fed.	0.804	57	64	8
Belarus	0.787	61	71	10
Bulgaria	0.773	62	70	8
Estonia	0.749	68	83	15
Kazakhstan	0.740	72	79	7
Romania	0.738	74	78	4
Ukraine	0.719	80	90	11
Lithuania	0.719	81	95	15
Turkmenistan	0.695	90	92	3
Armenia	0.680	93	123	31
Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of	0.679 0.665 0.663	94 96 98	104 117 108	11 22 11
Kyrgyzstan	0.663	99	111	13
Georgia	0.645	101	128	28
Albania	0.633	104	115	12
Tajikistan	0.616	105	137	33

a. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank, a negative the opposite.


TABLE 1.9 HDI ranking for developing countries, 1993

Country	HDI value	HDI rank	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank ^a	Country	HDI value	HDI rank	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank	
Hong Kong	0.909	22	6	-16	Guatemala	0.580	112	85	-26
Cyprus	0.909	23	30	7	Mongolia	0.578	113	122	10
Barbados	0.906	25	36	11	Honduras	0.577	114	120	7
Bahamas	0.895	26	26	0	El Salvador	0.576	115	109	-5
Korea, Rep. of	0.886	29	39	9	Namibia	0.573	116	79	-37
Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	0.885 0.884 0.883 0.882 0.881	30 31 32 33 34	47 54 49 42 13	16 23 16 8 -21	Nicaragua Solomon Islands Vanuatu Gabon Viet Nam	0.569 0.563 0.562 0.557 0.540	117 118 119 120 121	112 113 106 74 147	-4 -12 -46 27
Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	0.872 0.872 0.866 0.866 0.864	36 38 39 40 42	19 43 27 67 8	-17 4 -12 20 -34	Cape Verde Morocco Zimbabwe Congo Papua New Guinea	0.539 0.534 0.534 0.517 0.504	122 123 124 125 126	125 88 120 101 103	4 -34 -23 -22
Panama	0.859	43	52	9	Cameroon	0.482	127	114	-12
Venezuela	0.859	44	45	0	Kenya	0.473	128	136	9
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.858	45	40	-6	Ghana	0.467	129	124	-4
Fiji	0.853	47	57	10	Lesotho	0.464	130	150	21
Mexico	0.845	48	48	-1	Equatorial Guinea	0.461	131	126	-4
Colombia	0.840	49	53	4	São Tomé and Principe	0.459	132	171	39
Qatar	0.839	50	3	-47	Myanmar	0.451	133	168	35
Kuwait	0.836	51	5	-46	Pakistan	0.442	134	118	-15
Thailand	0.832	52	50	-3	India	0.436	135	141	7
Malaysia	0.826	53	45	-9	Zambia	0.411	136	144	9
Mauritius	0.825	54	33	-21	Nigeria	0.401	137	134	-2
Brazil	0.796	58	58	0	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	0.340	138	135	-2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.792	59	38	-9	Comoros	0.399	139	143	5
Seychelles	0.792	60	62	3	Togo	0.385	140	148	9
Saudi Arabia	0.792	63	32	-31	Zaire	0.371	141	174	33
Ecuador	0.764	64	68	4	Yemen	0.366	142	133	-8
Dominica	0.764	65	75	10	Bangladesh	0.365	143	139	-3
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	0.755	66	59	-7	Tanzania, U. Rep. of	0.364	144	170	26
Belize	0.754	67	66	0	Haiti	0.360	145	145	1
Algeria	0.746	69	56	-13	Sudan	0.359	146	138	-7
Jordan	0.741	70	69	-1	Côte d'Ivoire	0.357	147	131	-15
Botswana	0.741	71	60	-10	Central African Rep.	0.355	148	145	-2
Saint Vincent	0.738	73	84	11	Mauritania	0.353	149	132	-16
Suriname	0.737	75	82	7	Madagascar	0.349	150	164	14
Saint Lucia	0.733	76	77	1	Nepal	0.332	151	149	-1
Grenada Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	0.729 0.727 0.726 0.716	77 78 79 82 83	94 63 97 37 97	18 -14 19 -45 15	Rwanda Senegal Benin Uganda Cambodia	0.332 0.331 0.327 0.327 0.325	152 153 154 155 156	161 129 130 151 140	9 -23 -23 -3 -15
Turkey	0.711	84	72	-12	Malawi	0.321	157	163	6
Paraguay	0.704	85	86	2	Liberia	0.311	158	154	-3
Jamaica	0.702	86	91	6	Bhutan	0.307	159	157	-2
Dominican Rep.	0.701	87	81	-6	Guinea	0.307	160	126	-33
Samoa (Western)	0.700	88	97	10	Guinea-Bissau	0.297	161	152	-8
Sri Lanka Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon	0.698 0.694 0.690 0.666 0.664	89 91 92 95 97	96 87 73 102 106	8 3 -19 8 10	Gambia Chad Djibouti Angola Burundi	0.292 0.291 0.287 0.283 0.282	162 163 164 165 166	142 165 160 166 167	-19 2 -4 1
South Africa	0.649	100	93	-6	Mozambique	0.261	167	169	2
Indonesia	0.641	102	88	-13	Ethiopia	0.237	168	173	5
Guyana	0.634	103	119	17	Afghanistan	0.229	169	156	-13
Egypt	0.611	106	76	-30	Burkina Faso	0.225	170	159	-11
Maldives	0.610	107	115	9	Mali	0.223	171	172	1
China Iraq Swaziland Bolivia	0.609 0.599 0.586 0.584	108 109 110 111	110 155 100 104	3 -24 -9 -6	Somalia Sierra Leone Niger	0.221 0.219 0.204	172 173 174	162 152 157	-10 -20 -17

a. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank, a negative the opposite.

these three dimensions—life expectancy, educational attainment and income.

The HDI value for each country indicates how far it has to go to attain certain defined goals: an average life span of 85 years, access to education for all and a decent standard of living. The HDI reduces all three basic indicators to a common measuring rod by measuring achievement in



each indicator as the relative distance from the desirable goal. The maximum and minimum values for each variable, which are fixed, are reduced to a scale between 0 and 1, with each country at some point on the scale.

The HDI is constructed by measuring a country's relative achievement in each of the three basic variables and taking a simple average of the three indicators. (The detailed method for constructing the HDI is explained in technical note 1.) The HDI shows the distance the country has to travel to reach the maximum possible value of 1 and also allows intercountry comparisons. The difference between the maximum possible value achieved by a country shows the country's shortfall in HDI. A challenge for every country is to find ways of reducing this shortfall.

The ranking of countries by their HDI values leads to the following observations, the highlights of this year's exercise:

• Of the 174 countries for which the HDI was calculated, 57 are in the high human development category, 69 in the medium category and 48 in the low category.

• Canada, the United States and Japan lead the HDI rankings. Among developing countries and areas, Hong Kong, Cyprus and Barbados lead the rankings.

• The HDI ranking of countries differs significantly from their ranking by real GDP per capita (see the last column of tables 1.8 and 1.9). Sixteen countries have an HDI

Country	HDI value	GNP per capita (US\$)
	10011000	
New Zealand	0.927	12,600
Switzerland	0.926	35,760
Argentina	0.885	7,220
Costa Rica	0.884	2,150
Bulgaria	0.773	7,780
Ecuador	0.764	1,200
South Africa	0.649	2,980
Indonesia	0.641	740
Solomon Islands	0.582	740
Gabon	0.557	4,960
Viet Nam	0.523	170
Congo	0.517	950
Nepal	0.332	190
Senegal	0.331	750

Source: Human Development Report Office

rank 20 places higher than their GDP rank. Among them are Costa Rica and Viet Nam, which effectively translated the benefits of economic growth into the lives of their people. For 21 countries the GDP rank is 20 places higher than their HDI rank, implying considerable scope for distributing the benefits of economic growth more equitably. Thus, countries can have similar incomes but different human development achievements—or similar HDIs but very different incomes (figure 1.6 and table 1.10).

Disaggregation of the HDI


A disadvantage of national HDIs is that they are averages—and can thus give a misleading picture of life where human development levels differ greatly for different groups, distinguished by gender, perhaps, or by race, ethnic group or region. The solution is to draw up HDIs disaggregated by region, race or ethnic group. Earlier *Human Development Reports* have done this for Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Turkey and the United States.

In recent years there have been other disaggregation exercises. Some are part of national human development reports (the Philippines). Others have been undertaken as part of academic work (Mexico and South Africa). There have also been attempts to disaggregate the HDI at a level below regions or provinces, as for districts in Madhya Pradesh, the largest state in India. The results show enormous variation in the level of human development among the 95 districts in the state. Indore (0.619) and Bhopal (0.609), which are more developed, have HDIs four times as high as those of backward districts, such as Tikamgarh (0.156).

Disaggregation results are discussed for the Philippines, Mexico, South Africa and Venezuela to identify possible flashpoints (figure 1.7).

• *The Philippines*—A disaggregation of the HDI for 13 regions of the Philippines ranks the National Capital Region at the top with an HDI value of 0.871, next to Trinidad and Tobago (38). It puts West Mindanao at the bottom with an HDI value of 0.410, next to Zambia (136). West Mindanao has the lowest life expectancy (55 years) and adult literacy rate (81%), and more than 55% of its people live in poverty, compared with only 15% in the National Capital Region.

• Mexico—Human Development Report 1994 disaggregated Mexico's HDI by region. Last year an attempt was made to disaggregate its HDI by indigenous and non-indigenous populations. The results show that the HDI of the non-indigenous people is 0.887, 1.3 times as high as that for indigenous people, placing them ahead of the Republic of Korea (29). The HDI of indigenous people places them next to the Dominican Republic (87). Their human development is lower mainly because they have less access to social services and basic infrastructure, leading to lower literacy rates, higher infant mortality and a higher HDIs disaggregated by region, race or ethnic group give a clearer picture of life where human development levels differ greatly



Gender equality is not necessarily associated with high economic growth incidence of poverty. For example, the incidence of poverty among indigenous people is 81%, compared with 18% among nonindigenous people.

· South Africa—When the HDI is disaggregated for nine South African provinces, the strong correlation between regional disadvantage and ethnic origin becomes obvious. In North Transvaal, whose HDI value of 0.450 ranks it next to Myanmar (133), more than 90% of the population is black. In Western Cape, the province with the highest HDI value-0.791, ranking it next to Belarus (61)-only 17% of the population is black. The difference in HDI values between the two provinces is due mostly to income disparity. Western Cape's per capita income of \$6,000 (PPP\$) is five times as high as North Transvaal's \$1,190. This income disparity can be traced mainly to the absence of economic opportunities for the blacks in North Transvaal.

• *Venezuela*—Venezuela is in the lower half of the high human development category, but it has significant regional disparities. Disaggregating its HDI by province puts Delta Amacuro at the bottom with the lowest life expectancy (63 years) and the lowest adult literacy rate (77%) in the country. Its HDI value of 0.659 ranks it next to Kyrgyzstan (99). As in so many countries, the province that contains the capital city, the Federal District, tops the list with an HDI value of 0.887, ahead of the Republic of Korea (29). This ranking reflects a resource flow bias towards the capital city, Caracas.

These disaggregation results signal the need for timely, appropriate measures to address disparity—whether provincial or regional, between ecological zones or between ethnic groups—to avoid explosions down the road. The measures could include multiparty dialogue, better resource allocation, reduction of inequality in income distribution, antipoverty programmes, and improved regional planning, monitoring and implementation.

The gender-related development index

The gender-related development index (GDI), introduced in *Human Development*

Report 1995, attempts to capture achievement through the same set of basic capabilities included in the HDI—life expectancy, educational attainment and income—but adjusts the HDI for gender inequality. For this Report the GDI has been calculated for 137 countries, seven more than last year (table 1.11). (The method for constructing the GDI is described in technical note 2, and the full results of the exercise are in indicator table 2.)

Of the five top-ranking countries in the GDI, three are from the Nordic belt— Sweden (rank of 1), Norway (3) and Finland (5). The other two are Canada (2) and the United States (4). Compared with last year, Canada has moved from ninth position to second, mainly because more reliable data now available on female and male income shares indicate a higher female share than was reflected last year.

Several developing countries and areas also do quite well in the GDI ranking: Barbados (16), Bahamas (18), Hong Kong (25), Uruguay (26), Singapore (29), the Republic of Korea (31), Costa Rica (32) and Thailand (33). These countries have succeeded in building the basic human capabilities of both women and men, without substantial gender disparities.

The bottom five places are occupied by Niger, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Burkina Faso and Mali, in ascending order. Women in these countries face a double deprivation: overall human development achievement is low in these societies, and women's achievement is lower than men's.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the GDI rankings.

First, no society treats its women as well as its men. This is obvious from the GDI values. A value of 1 reflects a maximum achievement in basic capabilities with perfect gender equality. But no society achieves such a value. As many as 43 countries have a GDI value of less than 0.500, showing that women suffer the double deprivation of gender disparity and low achievement. And only 37 countries have a GDI value above 0.800, underscoring the point that substantial progress in gender equality has been made in only a few societies. Second, comparing the GDI ranks of countries with their income levels confirms that removing gender inequalities is not dependent on having a high income. In the GDI Uruguay (26) outranks Qatar (58) by 32 places, but its per capita income (PPP\$) is slightly more than a fourth of Qatar's. Romania (53) is 60 ranks ahead of the Central African Republic (113), even though their per capita incomes (PPP\$) are similar. So, gender equality can be pursued —and has been—at all levels of income. Third, gender equality is not necessarily associated with high economic growth. During the past two decades Botswana and Thailand enjoyed high per capita income growth and also maintained GDI ranks higher than their HDI ranks. But the Republic of Korea and Syria, despite good growth rates, had GDI ranks lower than their HDI ranks. Denmark, Spain and Sri Lanka experienced moderate economic growth during the past two decades, but had good achievements in the GDI relative

	ender disparity—G I rank	HDI HDI rank	d HDI ranks HDI rank minus GDI rank	GDI	rank	HDI rank	HDI rank minus GDI rank	GD	Frank	HDI rank	HDI rank minus GDI rank
1 2 3 4 5	Sweden Canada Norway USA Finland	9 1 5 2 6	8 -1 2 -2 1	47 48 49 50 51	Mauritius Estonia Brazil Fiji Kazakhstan	48 58 52 41 61	1 10 3 -9 10	93 94 95 96 97	Guatemala Papua New Guinea	94 88 97 85 95	1 -6 2 -11 -2
6 7 8 9 10	Iceland Denmark France Australia New Zealand	8 17 7 11 14	2 10 -1 2 4	52 53 54 55 56	Bahrain Romania Botswana Kuwait United Arab Emirates	35 62 60 45 37	-17 9 6 -10 -19	98 99 100 101 102	Cameroon Lesotho	99 100 98 101 102	1 -2 0
11 12 13 14 15	Netherlands Japan Austria United Kingdom Belgium	4 3 13 16 12	-7 -9 0 2 -3	57 58 59 60 61	Lithuania Qatar Cuba Jamaica Turkey	65 44 64 68 66	8 -14 5 8 5	103 104 105 106 107	Zambia Comoros Lao People's Dem. Rep.	104 105 108 107 103	1 1 3 -4
16 17 18 19 20	Barbados Germany Bahamas Switzerland Spain	23 18 24 15 10	7 1 6 -4 -10	62 63 64 65 66	Sri Lanka Armenia Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan Ecuador	70 73 77 75 56	8 10 13 10 -10	108 109 110 111 112	Zaire Togo Tanzania, U. Rep. of	106 110 109 113 114	-2 1 -1 2 2
21 22 23 24 25	ltaly Greece Czech Rep. Slovakia Hong Kong	20 21 33 36 22	-1 -1 10 12 -3	67 68 69 70 71	Paraguay Tunisia Georgia Philippines Dominican Rep.	67 63 79 74 69	0 -5 10 4 -2	113 114 115 116 117	Madagascar Mauritania Bangladesh	117 119 118 112 116	4 5 -4 -1
26 27 28 29 30	Uruguay Ireland Hungary Singapore Portugal	28 19 40 30 31	2 8 12 1 1	72 73 74 75 76	Peru Libyan Arab Jamahiriya South Africa Iran, Islamic Rep. of Indonesia	71 53 78 57 80	-1 -20 4 -18 4	118 119 120 121 122	Uganda Senegal Malawi	115 123 121 124 111	-3 4 1 3 -11
31 32 33 34 35	Korea, Rep. of Costa Rica Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Brunei Darussalam	25 27 46 34 32	-6 -5 13 0 -3	77 78 79 80 81	Lebanon Guyana China Maldives Algeria	76 81 84 83 59	-1 3 5 3 -22	123 124 125 126 127	Nepal Guinea Guinea-Bissau	122 120 125 126 127	-1 -4 0 0
36 37 38 39 40	Poland Colombia	49 50 43 38 51	13 13 5 -1 11	82 83 84 85 86	Syrian Arab Rep. Mongolia Swaziland Saudi Arabia Bolivia	72 89 86 55 87	-10 6 2 -30 1	128 129 130 131 132	Burundi Angola Mozambique	128 130 129 131 132	0 1 -1 0 0
41 42 43 44 45 46	Malaysia Chile	39 54 47 29 26 42	-2 12 4 -15 -19 -4	87 88 89 90 91 92	Egypt El Salvador Nicaragua Honduras Viet Nam Zimbabwe	82 91 92 90 93 96	-5 3 0 2 4		Burkina Faso Afghanistan Sierra Leone	135 134 133 136 137	2 0 -2 0 0

Note: HDI ranks have been recalculated for the universe of 137 countries. A positive difference between a country's HDI and GDI ranks indicates that it performs relatively better on gender equality than on average achievements alone.

to the HDI. And slower per capita income growth did not prevent Jamaica from building the capabilities of both its women and its men.

Fourth, the countries showing a marked improvement in their GDI ranks relative to their HDI ranks are fairly diverse. They include industrial countries, such as Denmark and Sweden; Eastern European and CIS countries, such as Latvia, Poland and Kyrgyzstan; and developing countries, such as Thailand, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Barbados. Thus, gender equality can be achieved across different income levels, political ideologies, cultures and stages of development.

The countries with sharply reduced GDI ranks compared with their HDI ranks include Argentina and a number of the Arab States. Over the past two decades the Arab

BOX 1.6

Disaggregated GDI for India

In no country is the GDI value greater than the HDI value, confirming that in every country there is gender inequality in capabilities. But such inequality may not be only between men and women. There may also be disparities in female capabilities among regions or ethnic groups in a country, or between urban and rural areas. A disaggregated GDI, like a disaggregated HDI, may reflect this phenomenon. It is not possible, however, to measure how much of the difference in GDI values among regions is due to disparity in female capabilities and how much to gender inequality.

India, with a GDI value of 0.410, ranks 103 among the 137 countries for which the GDI has been constructed. A disaggregated GDI recently constructed for 16 Indian states indicates significant disparities among these states in basic female capabilities. At the top of the list is Kerala with a GDI value of 0.597, which puts it next to the Maldives in the global ranking—at 80 of 137 countries. But Uttar Pradesh, at the bottom with a GDI value of 0.310, is next to Benin, with a global ranking of 123. Looked at from another angle, the GDI value of Uttar Pradesh is only half that of Kerala.

An in-depth look at the components of the GDI shows some interesting

Source: Shiva Kumar 1996.

results. Women's share of earned income in Kerala is only 12%, while their share in Himachal Pradesh is 38% and in Maharashtra 30%. In Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka their share is more than 25%. Yet Kerala ranks at the top because the disparity between its female and male adult literacy rates is the lowest among the 16 states. The female literacy rate in Kerala is 81%, only 11 percentage points lower than for males, while in most of the 16 states the gender disparity in adult literacy is more than 30 percentage points. Thus, a higher share in income for women may be a necessary-but not a sufficient-condition for gender equality. Equality in other basic capabilities is also needed.

Such states as Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have GDI values so low that they can be compared only with those in such impoverished countries as Haiti, Nepal and Yemen—indicating the extremely low level of female human development in a large part of India. Women in India suffer on two counts first, because the society as a whole is impoverished, and second, because they are women. States have made significant progress in female education. But much investment in basic human capabilities, particularly female capabilities, is needed before women can catch up with men.

Just as disaggregating the HDI for a country by region or ethnic group can reveal interesting insights about inequality within that country, so can disaggregating the GDI. A recent disaggregation of the GDI for 16 provinces of India shows the female achievements in human development, taking gender inequality into account across regions, in addition to the overall inequality in male and female capability formation (box 1.6).

The gender empowerment measure

The gender empowerment measure (GEM), also introduced in *Human Development Report 1995*, concentrates on participation, measuring gender inequality in key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. It thus differs from the GDI, an indicator of gender inequality in basic capabilities.

The GEM is estimated for 104 countries (table 1.12). (The method for constructing the GEM is described in technical note 2, and the full results of the exercise are in indicator table 3.)

No country has a GEM equal to or exceeding 0.800. Only 10 countries have a GEM higher than 0.600. And 29 countries have a GEM of less than 0.300. The low values make it clear that many countries have much further to travel in extending broad economic and political opportunities to women than the distance they have already travelled in building their basic capabilities.

In the GEM ranking Norway and Sweden are at the top, followed at a distance by Denmark and Finland. The Nordic countries are not only good at strengthening the basic capabilities of women. They have also opened many opportunities for women to participate in economic and political fields.

The ranking shows that some developing countries outperform much richer industrial countries in gender equality in political, economic and professional activities. Barbados is ahead of Switzerland, Australia and Belgium. Trinidad and Tobago is ahead of the United Kingdom. And the Bahamas is ahead of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Industrial countries such as Japan and France are behind China, Costa Rica, Botswana and Colombia. Greece has a GEM of 0.370, only 60% that of Barbados (0.597).

The creation of opportunities for women does not necessarily depend on a country's income level or economic growth rate. The absence of a link between per capita income and opportunities for women becomes evident if one looks at some of the Arab States. China, Indonesia and Malaysia have enjoyed good economic growth rates during the past two decades, and they also have relatively high GEM values. The Republic of Korea and Singapore have also experienced good economic growth, but they have relatively low GEM values. And Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—have maintained good opportunities for women despite moderate growth. But France failed to translate its moderate

iEM rank	GDI rank	HDI rank	GEM rank	GDI rank	HDI rank
1 Norway	3	5	53 Thailand	29	41
2 Sweden	1	8	54 Ecuador	47	47
3 Denmark	6	16	55 Iraq	69	67
4 Finland	5	6	56 Brazil	39	45
5 New Zealand	9	13	57 Cape Verde	66	75
6 Canada	2	1	58 Bolivia	61	69
7 Germany	16	17	59 Chile	36	29
8 Netherlands	10	4	60 Greece	21	20
9 USA	4	2	61 Indonesia	55	62
10 Austria	12	12	62 Swaziland	60	68
11 Barbados	15	23	63 Burundi	88	99
12 Switzerland	18	14	65 Mauritius	38	43
13 Italy	20	19	66 Haiti	81	92
15 Australia	8	10	68 Paraguay	48	56
16 Belgium	14	11	69 Cameroon	72	80
17 Trinidad and Tobago	30	32	70 Fiji	40	37
18 United Kingdom	13	15	71 Maldives	58	65
19 Bahamas	17	24	72 Ghana	71	81
20 South Africa	53	61	73 Gambia	87	98
21 Cuba	44	54	74 Kuwait	42	40
22 Hungary	24	36	75 Sri Lanka	46	58
23 Ireland	23	18	76 Morocco	70	76
24 Portugal	26	31	77 Bangladesh	84	91
25 Spain	19	9	78 Korea, Rep. of	27	26
29 China	57	66	79 Algeria	59	50
30 Costa Rica	28	27	80 Egypt	62	64
31 Mexico	37	38	81 Zambia	75	86
32 Guyana	56	63	82 Sudan	85	93
33 Botswana	41	51	83 Burkina Faso	92	102
35 Lesotho	73	82	84 Tunisia	49	53
36 Colombia	32	39	85 Malawi	86	97
37 Japan	11	3	86 Ethiopia	90	101
38 Panama	33	34	88 United Arab Emirates	43	33
39 Philippines	50	60	90 Iran, Islamic Rep. of	54	48
40 France	7	7	91 Mali	91	103
11 Poland	31	44	92 Turkey	45	55
12 El Salvador	63	72	93 India	74	85
13 Mozambique	89	100	94 Papua New Guinea	68	79
14 Singapore	25	30	96 Zaire	79	90
15 Zimbabwe	65	77	97 Central African Rep.	82	94
46 Malaysia 47 Guatemala 48 Dominican Rep. 49 Uruguay 50 Honduras 51 Peru 52 Venezuela	35 67 51 22 64 52 34	42 70 57 28 71 59 35	98 Nigeria 100 Togo 101 Pakistan 102 Mauritania 103 Comoros 104 Niger	78 80 77 83 76 93	87 89 84 95 88 104

The creation of opportunities for women does not depend on a country's income level or economic growth rate

Note: GDI and HDI ranks have been recalculated for the universe of 104 countries.

growth into expanding opportunities for women, as is apparent in its relatively low GEM value. New Zealand and the Philippines have achieved relatively good GEM values despite slow per capita income growth during the past two decades.

In the GDI and GEM rankings there have been shifts in the ranks of some countries. For the GEM these are partly due to the nature of the variables included. As flow variables, such as the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women, they are subject to short-term fluctuations. But overall the shifts in ranks in both the GDI and the GEM are due more to changes in data series (box 1.7).

Growth and human development —the future scenario

The future is never a continuation of the past. But even simple projections can identify possible problems—and stimulate thinking about what might happen and what policy-makers might do in response.

To highlight the extreme imbalances in the growth patterns of the past 15 years, a simple exercise was undertaken to show what the world would look like if the growth

BOX 1.7

Rank changes in the GDI and the GEM

This year's Report includes GDI estimates for ten new countries, primarily in Eastern Europe and the CIS. It excludes three countries that were in the 1995 exercise because of outdated estimates. Comparing the GDI ranks for 1996 with those for 1995 shows that the ranks of 42 countries have either improved or worsened by more than five places since the 1995 Report.

The GEM exercise has been reduced by a tenth in its coverage since 1995 and now includes 104 countries. Of these, 35 have ranks that have improved or worsened by more than five places since 1995.

The rank changes in the GDI and the GEM reflect changes in the basic information and sources in the underlying data sets. (The rank changes in the

Source: Human Development Report Office.

GEM are also partly due to the volatility of the indicators used—for example, women's shares of parliamentary seats.) These rank changes are largely due to new estimates of labour force participation (for 21 cases in the GDI and 7 cases in the GEM), refined real GDP per capita data (9 cases in the GDI and 1 in the GEM) and revised wage data (6 in the GDI and 4 in the GEM). The need to refine the methodology for constructing the GDI and the GEM is recognized, as is the need to improve the data set and expand the coverage of countries.

With improved methods and the greater availability and accuracy of data, policy-makers will be in a better position to identify, analyse and address the needs of their people. trends of the past 15 years continued until 2030.

If the trends continue, global GDP would more than double—from \$23 trillion (in 1993 dollars) in 1993 to \$56 trillion in 2030. But the share of developing countries in world GDP would change dramatically. From a meagre 16% in 1993, their share would increase to nearly 33% in 2030, when their share of world population would be more than 85%.

Global imbalances would increase even more. If Sub-Saharan Africa's negative growth rate of the past 15 years continues, its share in world GDP would decline to 0.4% at the end of 2030—from 1.2% in 1993. If the region recovers to grow at its rate for 1960–80, its share in world GDP would still be less than 2% in 2030. And even if it manages to grow at 6%, its share of world GDP would be less than 5% in 2030.

If the least developed countries maintain their growth of the past 15 years, their share in 2030 would be a mere 0.3%. Projecting a longer trend (1960–90) does not change the picture much: their share would be only 0.7%.

For Eastern Europe and the CIS countries, continuation of the trend of the past 15 years would mean that their share in global GDP would be no more than 3% in 2030. But this region is expected to recover.

Trends in the OECD countries and East Asia (excluding China) might suggest that their per capita incomes could continue rising indefinitely. But experience shows that this does not happen. Between 1960 and 1970 Japan increased its per capita income by 2.5 times through annual per capita income growth of more than 9%. But then it moved to a "soft landing", when growth in per capita income slowed. Malaysia and the Republic of Korea-and no doubt some other countries-have also looked ahead to a time when their rapid growth will slow and they will begin to move into a more mature pattern of growth. Their economies will grow at a slower rate, and the focus will need to be on the quality of life. Malaysia's perspective plan for 2020 projects that it will by then be an industrial country, with growth continuing but slower.

From a human development perspective, it is interesting to project how long it would take for medium and low human development countries to graduate to high human development. What if both the medium and the low human development countries continue to reduce their HDI shortfall (defined as the difference between the maximum value of 1 and the actual HDI value achieved) following the trends of the past 15 years? Medium human development countries would take 17 years to reach the high human development category (figure 1.8). But low human development countries would take more than 200 years. China would graduate to high human development within 25 years, but India would take more than a century.


These projections show the urgent need for action to change the trends of recent vears. Unless the poorest and least developed countries greatly accelerate their rates of human development and economic growth, the global economy of the 21st century will be marked by ever more grotesque imbalances-with a small group of industrial and formerly developing countries reaching average incomes in the range of \$30,000 to \$50,000 or more, while the least developed countries, including most of Sub-Saharan Africa, languish at levels of a few hundred dollars. Global human development requires a decisive rejection of such an inhuman outcome.

What problems will slower growth pose for employment, for income distribution and for support for the younger and older members of society, especially in industrial countries? These issues need to become the subject of international debate, not merely of discussion on the sidelines in a few countries. The United Nations first raised the issue of a growing world population in the late 1940s, almost 50 years ago. It took three decades before it became a mainstream focus of international debate and international policy action. Today, rising consumption, especially in the richer countries, needs to become a matter for frank and creative discussion-while there is still time to consider how the priorities of human development, poverty eradication and continuing growth in poor areas can be pursued without exceeding the planet's carrying capacity.

The next three chapters explore the links between economic growth and human development—along with the implications for public policy. Chapter 2 examines changes in economic thought—from growth as the end of development to growth as a means to human development. Chapter 3 discusses, both analytically and empirically, how the links between economic growth and human development can be strengthened. And chapter 4 focuses on one critical link—employment—showing how people can use their capabilities to translate the benefits of economic growth into greater human development.

FIGURE 1.8 When will the developing countries reach high human development?

Year in which high human development is attained at present rate of progress



Source: Human Development Report Office.

Balance sheet of human development—Arab States

PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION
HEA	цтн
• In 12 of the 19 countries in the region life expectancy is more than 65 years, compared with an average of 45 years in 1960.	 Only half the people in rural areas have access to safe water, and only a third have access to basic sanitation.
EDUCA	ATION
 During the past two decades the adult literacy rate almost doubled—from 30% in 1970 to 54% in 1992. Between 1960 and 1990 the primary enrolment ratio more than doubled, from 38% to 77%, and the secondary enrolment ratio nearly tripled, from 18% to 51%. 	 About 60 million of the region's 240 million people are illiterate. Nine million children are out of primary school, and 15 million are out of secondary school.
INCOME AN	D POVERTY
 Between 1960 and 1993 real per capita income grew by nearly 3% a year. In 1980–90 the agricultural growth rate was nearly 5% a year—the highest among the developing regions. 	 About 73 million people still live below the poverty line and more than 10 million are underfed.
WON	/EN
 At the secondary level the number of girls per 100 boys rose from 47 to 77 between 1970 and 1990, and at the tertiary level it rose from 34 to 65. Of women enrolled at the tertiary level, about 30% are in natural or applied sciences. 	 Only 25% of Arab women participate in the formal labou force, compared with 39% in the developing countries at a group. Women hold only 4% of parliamentary seats, well below the 10% average for the developing world.
CHILD	PREN
 Between 1960 and 1993 the infant mortality rate declined by more than three-fifths—from 167 per thousand live births to 66. More than three-quarters of one-year-olds are immunized. 	 At 73 per thousand live births, the under-five mortality rate is still more than four times as high as that in industria countries.
ENVIRO	MENT
 Between 1965 and 1991 energy use per \$100 of GDP declined by two-thirds, from 228 kilograms of oil equiv- alent to 76. 	 With less than 1,000 cubic metres of water per capita available each year, about 55% of the population suffe from serious water scarcity.
POLITICS AND	
 During the past two decades six countries have held multiparty parliamentary elections, and since 1990 there have been 18 general elections. In 1994, 250,000 refugees in the region returned to their country of origin. 	 At the end of 1994 more than one million people were refugees.
urce: See bibliographic note on page 116.	

builder of human development - Day	st Asia and South-East Asia and the Pacific
PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION
HEA	H
 By 1993 life expectancy in the region as a whole was more than 85% of that in the industrial countries. And in East Asia (excluding China) it was 71 years—only four years less than that in the industrial countries. 	 More than two million people are infected with HIV. In the rural areas of South-East Asia and the Pacific only 55% of the people have access to safe water, and only 41% access to basic sanitation.
• Between 1960 and 1991 the tertiary enrolment ratio in South-East Asia and the Pacific rose from 4% to 16%.	 In East Asia more than 100 million boys and girls are our of school at the secondary level.
INCOME AN	D POVERTY
• During 1960–93 per capita income in East Asia grew more than 5% a year—the highest rate in the world.	 In East Asia in 1990 nearly 170 million people were living below the poverty line.
WON	AEN
 Women are 19% of parliamentary representatives in East Asia—1.6 times the proportion in the industrial countries. The female tertiary enrolment ratio doubled between 1970 and 1990 in South-East Asia and the Pacific. 	 In East Asia (excluding China) one million women are illiterate. Maternal mortality is 442 per 100,000 live births in South East Asia and the Pacific, but only 95 in East Asia.
CHILD	REN
 In East Asia between 1960 and 1993 infant mortality declined from 146 per thousand live births to 42. Nearly 95% of one-year-olds in South-East Asia and the Pacific are immunized. 	 In South-East Asia and the Pacific more than a third of children under five are malnourished. Nearly one million children in East Asia die before age five
POPULATION AND	URBANIZATION
• During 1960–92 the fertility rate declined more in East Asia and South-East Asia and the Pacific than in the industrial countries.	 In East Asia (excluding China) the population will be 79% urban by the year 2000—up from 36% in 1960—increas ing the pressure on urban infrastructure.
ENVIRO	NMENT
• In South-East Asia and the Pacific between 1965 and 1991 energy use per \$100 of GDP declined from 137 kilograms of oil equivalent to 37.	 In South-East Asia and the Pacific between 1981 and 1990 more than three million hectares of tropical forest were lost.
POLITICS AN	CONFLICTS
• Since 1990 there have been 24 national general elec- tions.	 At the end of 1994 more than 400,000 people were refugees.

PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION
HEAI	ЛН
 By 1993 life expectancy had reached an average of 69 years, about 90% of that in the industrial countries. There is one doctor for every 1,000 people—compared with one doctor for every 6,000 in the developing world as a whole. 	 In urban areas 90% of the people have access to safe water, but in rural areas only 56% do. Two million people are infected with HIV.
EDUCA	TION
 Between 1960 and 1990 secondary and tertiary enrolment increased nearly eightfold. At the tertiary level the net enrolment ratio increased more than fourfold over the past three decades—from 6% to 27%. 	 Less than half the entrants to grade 1 reach grade 5. At the secondary level nearly 20 million boys and girls are out of school.
INCOME AN	D POVERTY
 During the past two decades real GDP increased by more than four-fifths. Of the \$585 billion in private resource flows to developing countries in 1989–94, 30% went to Latin America. 	 In 1990 about 110 million people were below the poverty line. The Gini coefficient of land distribution is more than 0.75 and in many countries the income share of the richest 20% of the population is 15 or more times as much as that of the poorest 20%.
WON	IEN
 Women make up a third of the formal labour force. At the secondary level the ratio of girls to boys is 97%, and at the tertiary level there are as many female students as male. 	 Women occupy only 7% of parliamentary seats, compared with the global average of 10%. At 180 per 100,000 live births, the maternal mortality rate is still five times as high as that in the industrial countries
CHILD	REN
 Between 1960 and 1993 the infant mortality rate fell by more than half—from 107 per thousand live births to 45. At 10%, the proportion of underweight children is the lowest in the developing world. 	 In some Latin American metropolises more than 100,000 children live on the streets. There are still nearly six million malnourished children in the region.
ENVIRON	MENT
• At nearly 7% of total land area, the share of nationally protected natural areas is the highest in the developing world.	 Only 10% of forest land is designated for soil and water conservation and only 35% for wildlife protection.
POLITICS AND	CONFLICTS
• Between 1974 and 1995 there were 144 parliamentary elections. And since 1980, 18 countries have switched from military to democratic governments.	 At the end of 1994 more than 100,000 people were refugees.

Source: See bibliographic note on page 116.

PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION
HEAI	ЛН
 Between 1960 and 1993 life expectancy increased from 44 to 60 years. Public expenditure on health more than doubled as a share of GDP between 1960 and 1990—from 0.6% to 1.4%. 	 There are nearly two million HIV-infected people, and the number may reach four million by 2000. About 250 million people lack access to safe water, and 850 million lack access to even basic sanitation.
EDUCA	TION
• Net enrolment at the primary level increased from 48% to 79% between 1960 and 1991, and at the secondary level from 19% to 44%.	 About 420 million people are still illiterate. Only half the entrants to grade 1 reach grade 5.
FOOD AND	NUTRITION
• Between 1965 and 1992 per capita calorie intake increased from 88% to 103% of daily requirements.	 About 600 million people suffer from chronic malnutri- tion.
INCOME AN	D POVERTY
 During 1980–93 GDP grew at an average annual rate of more than 5%, and per capita GDP by 3%. Merchandise exports grew at an annual rate of nearly 7% in 1980–92. 	 The region is home to more than 560 million poor people, nearly half the world's poor population. Nearly 85 million children under five are malnourished.
WON	AEN
• During the past two decades female illiteracy was reduced from 81% to 67%.	 About 80% of pregnant women suffer from anaemia—the highest rate in the world.
СНИЦ	REN
 The infant mortality rate declined from 164 per thousand live births to 84 between 1960 and 1993. About 85% of one-year-olds are immunized. 	 About 48 million children are out of primary school, and 94 million are out of secondary school. About a third of newborn babies are underweight.
POPULATION AND	DENVIRONMENT
• Over the past three decades the fertility rate declined from more than six live births per woman to four.	 Every year about four million hectares of land are deforested. Between 1960 and 2000 the urban population is expected to nearly double as a share of the total population, from 17% to 30%, putting mounting pressure on urban infrastructure.
POLITICS AND	CONFLICTS
 Since 1980 there have been more than 34 general par- liamentary elections. 	 At the end of 1994 nearly four million people were refugees.

Source: See bibliographic note on page 116.

PROGRESS	DEPRIVATION
HEA	ЛН
 Between 1960 and 1993 life expectancy at birth increased from 40 to 51 years. In the past decade the proportion of the population with access to safe water nearly doubled—from 25% to 43%. 	 There is only one doctor for every 18,000 people, compared with 6,000 in the developing world as a whole and 390 in the industrial countries. More than ten million people are infected with HIV, two thirds of all those infected in the world.
EDUCA	TION
 During the past two decades adult literacy more than doubled—from 27% to 55%. Between 1960 and 1991 the net enrolment ratio at the primary level increased from 25% to 50%, and at the secondary level from 13% to 38%. 	 Only about half the entrants to grade 1 finish grade 5. At the primary and secondary levels more than 80 millior boys and girls are still out of school.
INCOME AN	D POVERTY
• Over the period 1980–92 five countries—Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland—had an annual GDP growth rate of more than 5%.	 About 170 million people (nearly a third of the region' population) do not get enough to eat. During the past three decades the ratio of military to socia spending increased, from 27% in 1960 to 43% in 1991.
WON	1EN
 Between 1960 and 1991 the female enrolment ratio at the secondary level quadrupled—from 8% to 32%. Women hold 8% of parliamentary seats, nearly double their 5% share in South Asia. 	 The region has the world's highest maternal mortality rate—929 per 100,000 live births (compared with 33 in the OECD countries). There are six HIV-infected women for every four infected men.
CHILD	REN
• Over the past three decades the infant mortality rate dropped from 167 per thousand live births to 97.	• About 23 million children in the region are malnourished and 16% of babies are underweight.
ENVIRO	IMENT
• At less than 1,000 hectares a year, combined logging in primary and secondary forests is the lowest in the developing world, far lower than the 2,500 hectares a year in Asia and Latin America.	 During the past 50 years desertification has claimed ar average 1.3 million hectares of productive land a year.
POLITICS AND	CONFLICTS
 Since 1990, 27 multiparty presidential elections have been held—in 21 cases for the first time. Since 1980 opposition parties have been legalized in 31 countries. 	 In 1994 there were still 16 governments representing a single-party system or a military regime. At the end of 1994 nearly six million people—1% of the population—were refugees.

CHAPTER 2



Growth as a means to human development

Is economic growth a meaningful goal? Or is human development the real objective? If it is human development, growth should be judged not by the abundance of commodities it produces, but by how it enriches people's lives.

For many years growth has been a major economic goal of policy-makers—and political leaders—based on the deeply ingrained view that delivering a larger and larger quantity of goods and services is the best way to improve people's standard of living. And growth is often seen as a solution to other problems, such as building military strength, increasing employment and reducing budgetary deficits.

But the questioning of such assumptions has become more insistent, and criticisms of the fixation on the quantity of growth more vocal. The critics are not just environmental groups, but also a broad range of people who recognize from the deteriorating quality of their lives that growth is not the answer to everything. The quality of people's lives can be poor even in the midst of plenty.

In low-income countries economic growth is not an option. It is imperative for reducing poverty and generating the resources required for basic human development. But even in these countries the critical question remains, what kind of growth? What are the benefits to human development, and what are the costs? Who benefits, and who pays? These countries have to find the most efficient ways of converting income gains into advances in human development.

Policies that are merely "pro-growth" ignore the real purpose of growth. By the same token, to criticize the nature of growth in a country and to question whether it serves human development is not to be "antigrowth". It is to place growth in its proper perspective and to measure it on a human scale.

This Report moves beyond the debate on whether economic policies are "progrowth" or "antigrowth" by addressing the central issue of the quality of growth whether it is genuinely serving human development in a country, in a region or in the world.

Is the character of growth advancing people's human security, freedom and empowerment? Is it promoting equity today and between generations? Does it respect nature and its life-supporting functions? And is it leading to greater social cohesion and cooperation among people not greater conflict and social disintegration? These are the important questions (see the special contribution by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil).

Growth is not the end

The doubts about economic growth may seem new, but they have persisted for two centuries or more—since the birth of industrial capitalism. The revolutionary methods of production used by this system did generate fabulous new wealth. And the priesthood of accumulation—the industrialists, the bankers, the politicians and the economists—saw this increase in wealth as a way, for the first time in human history, to eliminate scarcity.

But from the outset the benefits were concentrated in the hands of small, elite groups in a few rich countries. For many other people the reality was a form of enslavement. In the industrializing countries during the 19th century the developThe quality of people's lives can be poor even in the midst of plenty ment of technology, from the steam engine onwards, turned men, women and children into instruments of accumulation—toiling in the "dark satanic mills". And those working in the colonies on the periphery of the world economy saw their countries and their lives harnessed to the supply of raw materials to the rich nations.



Humanizing growth-through equity

When we juxtapose the current debate on economic growth with the notion of human development, the first impression is that the two concepts belong to different worlds that they don't connect. It is as if the demise of real socialism coincided with some kind of Marx's "revenge". The economy reigns supreme, determining political choices and the limits of social action. And the free market emerges as a leading ideology, fostering competition and an exaggerated, narcissistic individualism that equate the realm of values with the dictates of efficiency.

Realism obliges us not to ignore efficiency. But for any development to be human, we must go beyond the logic of economics. If growth is an indispensable prerequisite, particularly in poor countries, human development will have to be sustained by values that show how economic gain acquires social meaning.

The problem is that growth based on modern technology does not always generate employment, and adopting social safety nets of a corporatist nature may jeopardize competitiveness. These difficulties are compounded by the need to reform the state, which is traditionally responsible for welfare policies and actions. Although the economic environment can change the size and management of the state, the purpose of modern governance-the well-being of citizens-must never be forsaken. Despite the criticisms and despite the weakening of social solidarity, constructing a "state that cares for the well-being of citizens" is a necessity. True for developed countries, this is even more true for developing countries. which are far from a welfare state.

Another significant issue is that solutions to social problems are no longer only national. Globalization limits state action and has ambivalent consequences for the development of national societies. For example, the easy transfer of capital flows can enable better resource allocation at the global level, but their volatility can provoke speculative runs on currencies, threatening the stability of entire countries. So, we face a paradox: the demand for equity is on the increase, partly as a result of the globalization of information, yet it is directed to a state that is reducing its functions and has less control over its economic policy options.

This demand for equity—a key concept in the transition from the imperatives of economic efficiency to the realm of values—is not new. As a result of the Enlightenment, which propagated the very idea of human progress, one of the traits of Western civilization has been its permanent dissatisfaction with its social conditions.

Inherent in the ideal of progress is equity, seen as the convergence of standards of equality of opportunities—or social justice. This idea of equality has nurtured all modern utopias—from the liberal, centred on political equity, to the socialist, concerned with socio-economic equality.

Today's demand for equity—denser, more powerful—is searching for new institutional vehicles. It is no longer the monopoly of one group or class. It is now a collective task—to give a human sense to development. It is a dispersed, fragmented exercise—a composite of partial utopias.

The development concept has to be amplified to include the protection of human, ecological and social rights. Such complexity must be sustained by a wide participation, enabling a variety of social groups to be heard. The multiplication of non-governmental organizations, the contribution of social movements, the renewal of the meaning of political representation—all should contribute to society's redefinition of development as a way of truly humanizing growth.

Democracy and freedom, the keys for a balanced transition from growth to human development, have broadened the demand for equity—which is no longer the province of a few privileged owners. Equity is a wideranging social construct, and to respond to it is fundamental for building modern legitimacy. In the 1960s the Third World countries searched for a new international economic order to correct the roots of international inequality, with limited success. Today, global North-South negotiations have lost force exactly when the economy is being globalized, and a homogenizing superstructure more concerned with the freedom of flows than with the reduction of inequalities is emerging. At the international level, must we accept that the economic reality predetermines the realm of values? Globalization is an economic given. But it is essential to ensure that it attains a human dimension and responds to the demand for equity.

Obviously we cannot return to the ideas of the 1960s. The world has changed. The possibilities for mobilization have shifted, particularly because the Third World's own ability for action has weakened. And yet inequalities have not been reduced.

The role of states in the international community and the way they manage multilateral institutions remain fundamental. Consider the UN global conferences, which to some extent offered hope to the poorer countries. Their ideals are almost always impeccable. Their great challenge is implementing them to transform reality by reducing inequalities in a world where paths are chosen through uncountable, fragmented decisions, proposed by numerous actors, both public and private, both national and international.

The biggest challenge for multilateral organizations is to reinvent the sense of community and to give room for international solidarity. We need a real democratization of international relations. It will not be easy, given the individualism of our time. But it is the only way to ensure that history's greatest transformations will be ethical. It is the only way development will again have a human face.

> Fernando Henrique Cardoso President of Brazil

The classical economists helped to justify this process. They identified labour as just another commodity alongside capital and manufactured goods. It had value only to the extent that it produced profits, reducing people to means, serving the objective of greater production.

Even from the earliest years, however, critics-in the North and in the Southargued that human beings should be the ends of development rather than mere means. Such ideas can be traced back through the writings of most major philosophers. Aristotle provides one example: "Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." And Immanuel Kant another: "So act as to treat humanity . . . in every case as an end, never as a means only." These same concerns were the focus of such political economists as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall.

The great Bengali writer and Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore sounded a similar warning: "We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariot-drive was progress, and the progress was civilization. If we ever ventured to ask, 'progress towards what, and progress for whom', it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path."

The early socialists were also vociferous critics of capitalist exploitation. But while they despised the capitalist system, they were still enamoured of the machinery of accumulation. Despite rhetoric about workers becoming the masters of production, ownership of the machinery was merely transferred from capitalists to the state.

Other critics saw the problem as rooted in industrialization itself. In Europe Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin and Leo Tolstoy rejected the modernizing movement as dehumanizing. Mahatma Gandhi also penned a powerful critique of modern machine technology. In 1907, in *Hind Swaraj*, he distilled the experience of indentured Indians in South Africa, as well as that of Indians under British rule in India. Rejecting both industrialization and capitalism as exploitative, he argued that "the earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need but not every man's greed."

The altar of production

Such views were largely set aside in the pursuit of increased production. Capitalism often treated people as little more than cogs in a huge machine, and when the machine started to sputter in the 1930s, it readily cast them aside onto the scrap heap of unemployment. While socialism in the Soviet Union aspired to higher ideals, in practice it too sacrificed people, often brutally, on the altar of increased accumulation.

The aftermath of the Second World War was a period of taking stock and of new approaches. The world community adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, celebrating the victory of human freedom and reasserting strongly and clearly that the principal objective of development was human well-being. In subsequent years there followed a series of UN conventions and conferences establishing the principles of people-centred development.

The postwar period was also the time that many developing countries fought for independence. These struggles were not just for political freedom but also to improve human welfare. To accomplish this, many of the new countries took up variants of socialism. Some took their inspiration from the orthodox Soviet model. Others looked to China as an alternative. Mao Zedong rejected the idea that development was determined by the level of "productive forces" and argued instead that "the people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history".

Later Cuba offered another socialist path. And in Africa countries from Tanzania to Guinea and Algeria opted for socialism as a way of ensuring that the benefits of "The earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need but not every man's greed."

> —Mahatma Gandhi

growth were equitably distributed. All these models aspired to treating people as ends. As President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania put it: "Every proposal must be judged by the criterion of whether it serves the purpose of development—and the purpose of development is the people."

Countries with more mixed economies, such as India, still assumed that the state would take a dominant role in harnessing growth for the benefit of people—as had been assumed in many countries in Latin America, from Argentina to Mexico. In these cases, however, the motive force for development was seen to be the state rather than the people.

A faith in growth

Elsewhere, countries developed along more overtly capitalist lines, as in Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia and Liberia. But for both socialist and capitalist countries the key to development benefiting people and eradicating poverty was assumed to be faster economic growth. Even at that stage, however, many economists and development planners knew that economic growth was not an end in itself, but a performance test to see whether the means for development were being achieved. In 1955 the Nobel Prize-winning West Indian economist Arthur Lewis defined the purpose of development as widening the "range of human choice"-as did the first Human Development Report in 1990. The difference was that Lewis tended to equate wider choice merely with greater income-and had more faith that economic growth would inevitably lead to human development.

The faith in growth was based on the assumption that its benefits would eventually be widely spread. In the early stages policy-makers in the more liberal economies accepted that the rich might get richer and the poor might have to tighten their belts. But they hoped that rewarding the rich in this way would give them the incentive to innovate, to save, and to accumulate capital—and that this would ultimately benefit the poor.

Giving theoretical support to this view of the likely path for capitalist developing countries was the "Kuznets curve", named after Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets. The statistical association creating that curve showed inequality rising during the early stages of growth, as labour begins to leave agriculture for industry. Then inequality reaches a peak and finally falls as labour becomes more concentrated in industry.

Beyond the presumption that inequality would eventually fall, there was also a presumption that, during the period of rising inequality, governments would step in to mitigate the suffering of the poorest. They would create temporary social safety nets or, in more liberal systems, use progressive taxation and subsidized social services to distribute the benefits more fairly.

Misplaced optimism

Neither of these optimistic assumptions matched reality. First, economic growth alone did not distribute resources more equally. That happened in only a few countries (and not just socialist ones) whose governments took deliberate steps to increase equality, such as radical programmes of land reform, and committed themselves to mass education and health care. Second, few governments took adequate steps to cushion the impact on the poor. Many were dominated by people with close social, economic and political links to the rich, who benefited from growth and had no desire to see their wealth transferred to the poor.

Why would inequality and poverty remain high in many countries despite economic growth? One reason was the initially very unequal access to land and education. Another was the diversion of resources to the cities, which caused rural development to be slower than expected. The rise in agricultural productivity that was a precondition for widespread progress in industry never occurred. And millions of desperate people in the expanding rural population left their villages in the hope of a better life in the cities. But they found few new jobs there. To some extent the lack of urban employment was due to slow growth, but it was also due to labour-displacing technology from the industrial countries.

The faith in growth was based on the assumption that its benefits would eventually be widely spread

The employment option

Faced in the 1960s with ever-larger numbers of poor people—and the apparent increase in open or disguised unemployment in the midst of growth—many development theorists and practitioners grew disillusioned with economic growth as a panacea. They turned their attention to "jobs and justice". Even so, many people quickly concluded that the main problem in developing countries was not unemployment but a lack of productive and remunerative jobs.

In practice, the concept of unemployment pertains only to industrial countries, where a worker, supported by social security benefits, can afford to spend time unemployed. Many workers in poorer countries do not have that option. They must work at anything they can, no matter how unproductive, no matter how badly paid. Many work long hours for low rewards in the "informal sector"—a broad spectrum of generally unregistered workers (street traders, garbage pickers, casual workers) as well as small-scale producers (blacksmiths, carpenters, weavers).

The problem was thus redefined as the "working poor". Among them, women were found to be even harder pressed than men, often working in agriculture or the informal sector while also working long hours in the home—managing the household, caring for children, cooking, cleaning and performing other household duties.

Low-productivity work predominates in developing countries partly because workers are hampered by poor nutrition, health and education. But workers can also be held back by an unsupportive environment. They usually lack adequate access to credit facilities, marketing organizations and labour exchanges—and in rural areas they often face an unequal system of land ownership or tenancy that provides neither the means nor the incentives for efficient production.

Government policies may also be biased against maximizing employment. In the organized sector, policies may overprice labour and underprice capital, while sustaining an overvalued exchange rate that discourages labour-intensive exports. To placate the urban populace, governments often try to keep food prices low—thus discouraging small-scale, labour-intensive food production.

Under these conditions even creating a few formal sector jobs can cause more problems than it solves. People in the rural areas hear about these well-paid jobs and are even more tempted to migrate in search of them, further swelling the ranks of the urban poor.

From redistribution to Basic Needs

Given these difficulties, the focus of the development debate shifted from formal employment towards income distribution. One of the landmarks was a 1974 book, *Redistribution with Growth*, which suggested ways in which the increments of growth could be used for investment in services and assets for the poor, thereby improving distribution without reducing the incomes and assets of the rich.

A more direct approach was developed in the mid-1970s. Known as Basic Needs, it emphasized ensuring for all people the basic means of well-being: food, health, education. In many ways this was a return to fundamentals. Such pioneers as Pitambar Pant in India said in the 1950s that development must be concerned with meeting minimum, or basic, needs. But in the following decades the debate sometimes got lost in technical discussions of growth rates, savings ratios, capital-output ratios and so on-concentrating on the means, losing sight of the end. Basic Needs returned to the central purpose of development-promoting human well-being, especially that of the poor.

Basic Needs had three main parts. First, it emphasized the importance of increasing incomes through efficient, labour-intensive production—for countries with a labour surplus. Second, it assigned a key role in reducing poverty to public services—mass education, safe water, family planning and health services. Third, it started to shift people's attention to participation—public services were to be financed by the government, often through international aid, but their planning and delivery should take The Basic Needs strategy emphasized ensuring for all people the basic means of wellbeing: food, health, education place with the participation of the beneficiaries. The shorthand description of Basic Needs was Incomes + Public Services + Participation.

In practice, however, many governments and agencies focused only on the middle item—the delivery of basic public services. As a result, Basic Needs came to be criticized as a prescription to "count, cost, and deliver"—count the poor, cost the bundle and deliver it to them. It thus became strongly identified with top-down state action. It was also criticized for leaving out the less material dimensions of human well-being and for not empowering the poor economically, since it did not stress their access to productive assets and credit.

The Basic Needs strategy became controversial for a second reason. Some developing countries regarded industrial countries' support for Basic Needs as a means to divert attention from discussion of international policy and the need for a new international economic order. In fact, international reform had always been seen as part of the strategy for ensuring basic needs, though the measures that should constitute that reform were inevitably a matter of lively debate.

The era of "structural" adjustment

Whether or not these criticisms were valid, the Basic Needs strategy was soon overtaken by events. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the slowdown of growth, the debt crisis and worsening terms of trade overwhelmed many countries—and most thoughts of human-centred development were pushed into the background as programmes of stabilization and later of structural adjustment took centre stage.

Initially, the aim of these programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to help developing countries respond to external shocks—the rise in oil prices, the decline in growth in the industrial countries, the rise in interest rates and the drop in capital inflows. The "stabilization" measures of the IMF and the World Bank aimed at reducing both budget deficits and trade deficits and usually involved cutting public spending, reducing wages and raising interest rates. Restoring growth, an objective on paper, was rarely achieved in practice. Although these policies reduced deficits in some countries, they often did so at the cost of inducing recession. In short, they often balanced budgets by unbalancing people's lives.

Soon, however, the emphasis switched to longer-term "adjustment", a fundamental realignment of developing country economies along free-market lines. This involved reducing the role of the state, removing subsidies, liberalizing prices and opening economies to flows of international trade and finance. Whether this was actually "structural" was another matter. It excluded many measures previously identified as critical for changing social and economic structures—such as land reform or a radical redistribution of power.

For many countries the age of adjustment brought other external pressures and changes in economic philosophy. Countries came under strong outside pressure to privatize state-owned industry and to end central planning. State control of industry and centralized planning, after some initial successes, proved increasingly inefficientimposing substantial burdens on government budgets. And attempts at radical egalitarianism often bore little fruit. Despite laudable ideals, managed communal living experiments-such as autogestion (self-management) in Algeria and ujamaa (freedom) villages in Tanzania-proved less popular than expected.

Experiments in workers' self-management in the former Yugoslavia did not provide a viable alternative. Even China, one of the more successful socialist experiments, started to break up its 50,000 agricultural communes after 1979 and link rewards more directly to individual effort. And Viet Nam, which had fought a long and bitter war to defend a socialist system, started to transform itself into more of a market socialist economy—with a mix of socialism and capitalism.

In many countries more limited forms of social democracy are still flourishing, combining bottom-up cooperative organizations with public provision of basic social

Adjustment policies often balanced budgets by unbalancing people's lives services. Forms of central planning that are indicative rather than directive also continue to be used with great success, notably in the high-growth countries. The model of development followed by Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, for example, has used industrial policy to channel resources into the sectors of the economy with the most growth potential.

The human factor

During this whole process of liberalization, adjustment and privatization, concern for the poor was pushed into the background. Policy-makers assumed that even if poverty increased in the short term, this was a price that had to be paid for long-term stability and growth.

Many voices were raised in protest, including those of trade unions, churches, non-governmental organizations, the International Labour Organisation and UNICEF, which published Adjustment with a Human Face. While not questioning the need for some kind of adjustment, UNICEF called on the IMF and the World Bank to give more attention to poverty and to human concerns. Among a wide range of proposals, it argued for maintaining basic minimum services, especially for the most vulnerable, and for sharing the burden of adjustment more fairly. But the underlying principle was that human concerns should not be "added on" to an otherwise unchanged package of adjustment policies. Instead, they should be incorporated into a new, integrated framework of long-term, people-centred development.

Some of the calls for new approaches to adjustment came from the women's movement. Women often had to bear the brunt of adjustment, yet their needs and concerns were rarely considered in making adjustment policy. Single-parent families, usually headed by women, were among the hardest hit. All this emphasized the need for "engendering adjustment policies".

Throughout this period the cause of the poor and the need to focus on human concerns was aided tremendously by the theoretical work of Amartya Sen and his central concept of promoting human "capabilities". In his view a society's standard of living should be judged not by the average level of income, but by people's capabilities to lead the lives they value. Nor should commodities be valued in their own right they should instead be seen as ways of enhancing such capabilities as health, knowledge, self-respect and the ability to participate actively in community life.

Sen also emphasized that at the core of human well-being is freedom of choice. Both the fasting monk and the starving pauper may be hungry—the difference is that one exercises a free choice, and the other does not. The expansion of human capabilities implies greater freedom of choice—so that people can explore a wider range of options that they find worthwhile.

Enter human development

In 1990 UNDP took up the challenge of incorporating these and other ideas in a new development vision when it published the first Human Development Report. The times were ripe for a broader approach to improving the human condition-an approach that would cover all aspects of human development, for industrial and developing countries, for men and women, for current and future generations. Human development went far beyond income and growth to cover the full flourishing of all human capabilities. It emphasized the importance of putting people-their needs, their aspirations, their choices-at the centre of the development effort.

Human development can be expressed as a process of enlarging people's choices. Obtaining income is certainly one of the main means of expanding choices and wellbeing. But too often the expansion of income is confused with the enhancement of human capabilities.

Investigations of the priorities of poor people have often discovered that they put a high value on many things besides higher income—including adequate nutrition, accessible safe water, better medical services, more and better schooling for their children, affordable transport, adequate shelter, secure livelihoods and productive and satisfying jobs. Generating private Human development went far beyond income and growth to cover the full flourishing of all human capabilities income helps meet some of these needs, but it certainly does not guarantee all of them.

Beyond these needs, people also value benefits that are less material. These include, for example, freedom of movement and speech and freedom from oppression, violence and exploitation. People also want a sense of purpose in life, along with a sense of empowerment. And as members of families and communities, people value social cohesion and the right to assert their own traditions and culture. Money alone cannot buy these choices.

The choices cannot, however, be unlimited, since one person's freedom can constrain that of many others. The acceptance of this principle is evident from the recent reaction in many countries against the extreme individualism of the free market and the desire for a more socially responsible and communitarian form of development. Choices without limits and constraints can become mindless and destructive. Choices must be combined with obligations—rights with duties.

One of the concerns of the first *Human* Development Report was to define the relationship between human development and economic growth. It countered the conventional wisdom by asserting that there is no automatic link between the two. Economic growth might be essential for human development, but specific policy measures are

BOX 2.1

The new growth

theories confirm

position that the

driving force of all

economic growth is

the human

people

development

Why is income part of the human development index?

If income is only a means to human development, why is it part of the human development index? Average per capita income is meant to register "the command over resources to enjoy a decent standard of living".

Longevity and education are clearly valuable aspects of a good life, but "command over resources" is more a means to a good life. Many important capabilities, such as being well nourished or enjoying a comfortable life, depend crucially on a person's economic circumstances. The income that people receive, especially close to the

Source: Anand and Sen 1996.

poverty line, can tell something about these circumstances.

Longevity and education cannot serve as proxies for all basic capabilities. Going hungry, for example, is a deprivation serious not only because of its tendency to reduce longevity, but also because of the suffering it directly causes. Similarly, resources needed for shelter and for travel may be quite important in generating the corresponding capabilities. Thus, the income component of the HDI is used as an indirect indicator of capabilities not reflected in the other two components of the index. needed to translate economic progress into human progress. This Report builds on that beginning analysis.

The 1990 Report also presented a new way of measuring human progress—the human development index (box 2.1). Ranking countries by this index produced very different results from ranking them by per capita GNP. Relative to their income rankings, some countries—such as Brazil, Nigeria and Pakistan—slipped down the list when it came to human development. And some countries with more modest incomes—such as Costa Rica, Cuba and Sri Lanka—climbed up the rankings when evaluated by the HDI.

New growth theories and human development

During the late 1980s and early 1990s new theories of economic growth underpinned the human development position that the real motive force of economic progress is people. Developed by such economists as Paul Romer and Robert Lucas, these theories tested the effect of human capital on countries' long-term growth rates. The theories did not consider the full range of human capabilities, merely people's productive capacities.

The earlier, conventional "neoclassical" theory of growth had held that economic growth was a result of the accumulation of physical capital and an expansion of the labour force—combined with an "exogenous" factor, technological progress, that makes capital and labour more productive. But it could not explain how to accelerate technological progress.

In the new theories what increases productivity is not an exogenous factor, but "endogenous" ones—related to the behaviour of people responsible for the accumulation of productive factors and knowledge. Significantly, this behaviour can be changed by policy.

Some of the new models argue that one of the crucial factors is an across-the-board increase in human capital. Others argue that the key source of productivity growth is research and development (R & D) though this too depends on human capital. The human capital models show how education allows the whole production process to benefit from "positive externalities". Educated people use capital more efficiently, so it becomes more productive. They are also more likely to innovate—to devise new and better forms of production. Moreover, they spread the benefits to their co-workers, who learn from them and also become more productive. Thus, the rising level of education causes a rise in the efficiency of all factors of production.

This helps explain part of the disparity in income between rich and poor countries. It also partly explains why poor countries are not catching up, or are even slipping back. They are failing to make investments in human capital that can raise productivity and enable the workforce to adopt new technology. In many cases they lack resources—either domestic savings or external finance. And some have been deprived of resources by onerous debt repayments or capital flight.

The spillover benefits of education also help account for important aspects of the relationship between growth and physical capital. Past growth theories assumed that capital has diminishing marginal returns that as more capital is accumulated, overall efficiency declines and growth rates slow. But many countries that have accumulated capital have achieved high growth rates and sustained them. The human capital models help explain this by showing how decreasing marginal returns to capital are offset to some extent by increased efficiency from education.

The growth theories that emphasize R & D also underline the importance of human capital—but suggest that its effects are more indirect. These R & D models argue that the long-term rate of growth is better explained by investment in research and development. R & D can clearly increase the productivity of the firms making the investments. But here too there can be positive externalities. Many innovations are difficult to keep secret, so other firms learn of these advances, and total factor productivity rises.

Both types of models depend heavily on expanding human capabilities. Even if

innovations come from R & D, they require an educated workforce—both people with higher skills to carry out the research and those with more basic skills to put the results into practice. The new growth theories thus confirm the human development position that the driving force of all economic growth is people.

Both sets of new growth theories have important policy implications, since they suggest ways that growth might be stimulated—by altering private incentives, for example, or by undertaking certain public investments.

But the new growth theories examine only a limited set of easily quantifiable factors. Other factors—such as people's habits, their social groups and networks, and the nature of institutions and government policies—are more difficult to measure but nonetheless vitally important in explaining differences in growth rates across countries. The family and the formal education system, for example, help impart many skills beyond literacy and numeracy. Such skills—they could be called "operacy" —include self-discipline, taking pride in one's work and being flexible, openminded and willing to cooperate.

Social reproduction and growth

A limitation of the new growth theories is that they treat workers as though they appear magically each day, ready-made for their jobs. Nor can they account for how the next generation of workers is prepared for productive employment. Preparing workers, both present and future, is part of "social reproduction", which encompasses a broad range of activities. It includes bringing forth a new generation-from giving birth to caring for and raising children. Most of this work is done by women, who also undertake the bulk of other caring work-managing the household and looking after those who cannot work, such as the sick or the elderly (box 2.2).

The contribution of women to social reproduction is not confined to the home. They are also responsible for certain kinds of community work. A recent study in the United States found that, even though men Preparing workers, both present and future, is part of "social reproduction" and women do an equal amount of socially valuable voluntary work in the community, there are clear differences in the kind of work they do. Men are more active in civic, political and professional groups—women in social support activities in charitable, health and education organizations. In the United Kingdom the community care schemes that have appeared since the 1980s rely mostly on women. And in Lebanon it is women who have formed the networks of street organizations that provide many vital social services.

The social importance of household and community labour transcends its economic impact. This work "reproduces" society, not just workers. And in this sense it has an intrinsic human value that cannot be reduced to units of money or of time. Thanks to these activities, family and community relations are enriched, cultural traditions are maintained, and human development is enhanced. This is social reproduction in the broad sense.

The new growth theories can deal with these activities only as inputs into produc-

BOX 2.2

Accounting for unpaid work

Much work in society goes unrecognized and unvalued—work in the household and in the community. And most of it is done by women. In industrial countries roughly two-thirds of women's total work time—but only a third of men's—is unrecorded. In developing countries the proportion is similar for women, but for men it declines to less than a quarter.

Human Development Report 1995 estimated that, in addition to the \$23 trillion in recorded world output in 1993, household and community work accounts for another \$16 trillion. And women contribute \$11 trillion of this invisible output.

In most countries women do more work than men. In Japan women's work burden is about 7% higher than men's, in Austria 11% higher and in Italy 28% higher. Women in developing countries tend to carry an even larger share of the workload than those in industrial countries—on average about 13% higher

Source: UNDP 1995c and UN 1995f.

than men's share, and in rural areas 20% higher. In rural Kenya women do 35% more work than men.

In some countries women's work burden is extreme. Indian women work 69 hours a week, while men work 59. Nepalese women work 77 hours, men 56. In Moldova women work about 74 hours a week, and in Kyrgyzstan more than 76 hours.

Efforts are under way to begin incorporating household work into the United Nations System of National Accounts. The 1993 revision of the accounts includes as economic output all goods produced in households for their own consumption. This revision proposes setting up satellite accounts to record the full extent of non-market work, including household services.

Only when household and community work is fully quantified and its monetary equivalent value estimated will women's work receive the full recognition it deserves. tion—as some kind of "social capital" or a broad form of "human capital". The human development approach, by contrast, is vitally concerned with them as crucially important social activities.

Growth and equity

In addition to an expanded view of the relationship between economic growth and human capital, there now is a deeper understanding of the relationship between growth and equity. Human capital has more impact on growth, for example, if it is equitably distributed.

It previously was thought that a tradeoff existed between growth and equity that distributing income too equally would undermine incentives and thus lower everyone's income. The assumption was that the rich needed special encouragement to save and invest more.

Recent evidence suggests that this conventional wisdom is wrong. Many economies in Asia—Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan (province of China) and Thailand have had both rapid growth and relatively low inequality. Between 1960 and 1993 the East Asian economies, excluding China, had annual per capita growth of 7.6%, while income inequality remained stable or declined. Japan and Sweden have also combined rapid growth with low inequality (boxes 2.3 and 2.4).

These are important findings, since they contradict the conventional view that it is better to channel income to the rich, who tend to save and invest more.

The key to East Asia's success was a relatively equal distribution of private and public assets—countries there concentrated on redistributing not income but wealth. What generates income is productive wealth—including human capital. Some new growth theories claim that redistributing income more equitably takes income away from people with capital, lowering their profits and thus supposedly reducing growth. In fact, a progressive redistribution of assets tends to boost growth because it has a broad, positive effect on people's incentives. One study

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Human Development Report Office 336 East 45th, Uganda House • Fifth and sixth floors • New York, New York 10017 tel (212) 867-4551 • fax (212) 867-3692 concluded that if in 1960 the Republic of Korea had had Brazil's inequality, its GDP in 1985 would have been 15% lower.

Some countries in East Asia, such as the Republic of Korea, initiated growth through large-scale land reforms that broke up feudal class structures and through the building of rural infrastructure. But all stressed broadly based investment in education particularly in primary and secondary education. In 1985 the Republic of Korea, which has enjoyed fairly equitable growth, devoted only 10% of its education budget to tertiary education, while Venezuela, where growth has been more inequitable, devoted 40% to the tertiary level.

Besides increasing the pace of growth, mass education can ensure that its benefits are more equitably distributed. When a small elite of workers loses its education monopoly, it can no longer command a high premium for its skills-so wage inequality is reduced. In the Republic of Korea between 1976 and 1985 the premium that those with higher education could enjoy over those with only primary education fell from an additional 100% to 66%. This helped reduce wage inequality over this period. In Brazil, by contrast, where education expenditures tend to favour the rich, the premium for higher education scarcely changed, and wage inequality rose over the same period.

But education will not ensure equitable growth on its own. People also need the opportunity to use their skills. Otherwise, society loses valuable resources, and people will not invest in education in the first place. East Asian economies have established this connection between the supply of skilled labour and the demand for it by first promoting such labour-intensive sectors as manufactured exports and agriculture. This provided widespread employment and raised everyone's wages.

The role of agriculture in East Asia's success is often ignored. In Taiwan (province of China) in the 1950s and early 1960s it was not exports but agriculture that took the lead in generating domestic demand and employment. The income generated in agriculture creates more demand for agricultural inputs and basic consumer goods—both of which require labourintensive production. So, employment multiplies throughout the economy. Indeed, in East Asia a 1 percentage point increase in agricultural growth tended to generate a 1.5 percentage point increase in the growth rate of the non-agricultural sector.

Discussions that link equity with growth have frequently neglected the demand side of the economy. A more equal

Japan—a century of growth and equity in opportunities

Japan's postwar recovery combined record and sustained economic growth with leaps forward in human development. In 1955-70 real GDP per capita was rising at around 10% a year. At the same time there was a big reduction in poverty and a narrowing of income gaps. Between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s the share of national income received by the wealthiest 20% of households fell from 50% to around 45%, while that of the poorest 20% rose from 5% to 10%. One crucial reason for this double success in growth and human development was a commitment to equity in opportunities.

The base for this egalitarian development was built in the postwar period, when radical reforms were introduced to ensure that fascism did not resurge and to transform Japan into a more democratic society. Reforms included the abolition of the aristocracy, a new constitution based on democratic government, land reform, a wealth tax and equal rights for women.

The postwar government based its macroeconomic policy on low interest rates, mild inflation and a disciplined policy of budget surpluses, along with protective tariffs and preferential credit for selected industries. It also aimed at low unemployment, promoting vigorous job creation by fostering countless small enterprises. Throughout the period of very rapid growth, at least 55% of nonagricultural workers belonged to enterprises with fewer than 100 employees. And wage levels rose steadily with productivity.

Through a virtuous circle, progress in human development has both been stimulated by economic growth and contributed to it. In many respects human development was already high.

Source: Ishikawa 1995.

Beginning with the Meiji reform in 1868, primary school enrolment was raised from 28% of school-age children in 1873 to 96% in 1905, providing a solid foundation for rapid modernization.

BOX 2.3

After the Second World War the government continued to invest in the social sectors, helped by keeping defence spending to a minimum (below 1% of GDP). This produced dividends in education and health. Between 1960 and 1990 the proportion of the workingage population completing secondary or higher education doubled. Since the late 1950s infant mortality has fallen almost tenfold, from around 40 per thousand live births to 4.3, one of the lowest rates in the world. Life expectancy increased from less than 70 years in 1958 to 80 years in 1993. And today, those who need social safety nets tend to be disabled rather than poor.

In 1990 Japan's public expenditure on education and health was among the highest on a per capita basis—about \$2,208, while the world average was only \$336. The emphasis on education extends to a strong emphasis on research and development and on training workers in industry.

Japan's record is not perfect, however, and challenges lie ahead. Growth has slowed, and unemployment is now rising above 3%. Inequality is also on the rise—with a growing number of elderly poor. Japan lags behind in gender equality, and women's participation in decision-making outside the home remains low. Environmental concerns also challenge policy-makers, though more progressive measures are now being pursued. And the Japanese people may choose more leisure rather than long hours of work. distribution of income changes the composition of demand towards more labourintensive products—and this stimulates both growth and employment. Public policy must therefore be directed not only at building up people's capabilities, but also at matching these capabilities with opportunities—linking the supply of human capital with the demand for it. Jamaica, the Philippines and Sri Lanka have enhanced basic capabilities but still had low growth,

BOX 2.4

Sweden-an early model of growth with equity

In the century following 1870 Sweden's successes in economic growth and human development were spectacular and sustained. Its per capita income growth rate was second only to Japan's—and its progress in human development even more notable.

In the early stages export industries—timber, iron ore, paper and steel—were the country's engine of growth. Most export revenues were invested domestically, to strengthen the economy and promote human development. Economic growth was remarkably stable, averaging more than 3% a year from 1890 to 1930.

This success depended on laying a solid foundation of basic human development during the late 19th century. The number of primary school students more than doubled between 1850 and 1870, and universal literacy was achieved by 1875. Technical education also expanded rapidly during this period.

The Great Depression of the 1930s and its aftermath marked a dramatic change in the Swedish model of development. In 1932 the Social Democratic Party swept to victory, ushering in a new era of equitable growth, low unemployment and expanded social protection (pensions, child allowances, rent controls and health insurance). The state intervened in the labour market and to help workers find new jobs. As a result, unemployment remained below 3% until the 1990s.

From 1930 through the early 1970s Sweden experienced a golden era of development characterized by both rapid growth and increasing equity

Source: de Vylder 1995a.

through substantial redistribution of income. Sweden's Gini coefficient fell from 0.31 in 1967 to a historic low of 0.20 in 1982.

The government actively intervened in the economy to keep downturns infrequent and moderate. It maintained a liberal trade regime, strong incentives for business investment and an activist industrial policy, channelling credit into priority sectors.

But in the 1970s warning signals began to appear that such development could not be sustained. Public spending, already high at 43% of GDP in 1970, ballooned to 67% by 1982. Transfer payments, such as family allowances and housing subsidies, grew rapidly.

Slow economic growth could not support continued increases in government deficits. While Sweden's rate of per capita income growth was 3.4% from 1961 to 1974, it slipped to only 0.6% in 1974–93. By the early 1990s Sweden was plunged into an unprecedented socioeconomic crisis. Growth turned negative, and unemployment leapt from 1.7% in 1990 to 8.2% in 1993.

Despite the slowdown in growth and an overhaul of the welfare state, human development remains high in Sweden. In the past 30 years advances in human development have outpaced increases in income. The country ranks among the top ten in the human development index. It has one of the most impressive records of equitable development, especially in gender equality. It ranks number one in the gender-related development index and number two in the gender empowerment measure. in part because of insufficient demand for people's skills.

When the supply of human capital and the demand for it are in balance—when capabilities match opportunities—a dynamic process of cumulative causation is set in motion that can raise growth and lower inequality.

Confusion with human resource development

Many people often confuse the human development concept with human resource development. The phrases may appear similar, but there is a world of difference. While the new growth theories focus on human capital, the human capabilities that are the focus of human development are broader than productive abilities.

The key distinction is between means and ends. Human resource development considers human beings merely as a means to a greater output of commodities. Human development, by contrast, identifies people as ends—seeing their well-being as the ultimate and only purpose of development.

Human resource theory treats people as "human capital"—merely another productive input on a par with physical capital or natural resources. Thus, when governments "invest" in, say, health or education, the value of this investment is judged by its economic rate of return, either to individuals or to society.

Those who advocate human development take a different view. Certainly, they welcome improvements in health or education. But they regard these as valuable in their own right, whether they increase production or not. Human capabilities, such as health or knowledge, are more than *means* of achieving human well-being. They are essential *components* of human well-being.

Despite the fundamental differences between human resource development and human development, there are areas of common interest. Indeed, it might be argued that if both would result in, say, better health or education, the distinction is immaterial. The motives might be different, but the outcome would be the same.

But there are many circumstances in which the different motives would result in

different choices. The human development perspective would be concerned, for example, with all members of society—highly productive, less productive, even nonproductive. This applies to the old, the infirm, the chronically sick and those with disabilities. With the decline of the extended family, such people are often abandoned unless the state assists them.

Human development and human resource development could also take different approaches to education. Both would argue for basic literacy and numeracy. But they might well diverge when it comes to higher education. Human resource development sees education as making people fit to work, and so is likely to favour technical or vocational subjects. Human development, by contrast, regards learning as having value in its own right. So, as well as promoting science, it would value the humanities as a means of deepening understanding of the natural and social world.

There could also be different approaches to health and nutrition. Human development sees these capabilities as ends in themselves and might advocate certain investments in health and nutrition even if their conventional economic rates of return turned out to be zero.

Ultimately, the fundamental distinction is between means and ends. For human resource advocates the end is the production of goods and services—while for human development advocates the capabilities are ends in themselves. Capabilities can certainly result in increased productivity and income, but these are of value only if they genuinely add to human well-being. Human development sets the priorities right.

Dimensions of human development

Human development has been an evolving concept. Each year the *Human Development Report* has re-examined it in light of criticisms or analysed it in greater detail. In recent years this work has included extended discussion of such issues as participation, sustainability and gender equity. As a result, the basic approach has been broadened and deepened. The concept now includes the following dimensions:

• Empowerment—Basic empowerment depends on the expansion of people's capabilities-expansion that involves an enlargement of choices and thus an increase in freedom. But people can exercise few choices without freedom from hunger, want and deprivation. In principle, everyone is free to buy food in the market, for example, but this freedom means little if people are too poor to afford it. Everyone may be free to read a newspaper, but exercising this freedom depends on literacy. And everyone may be free to travel around the country, but not if bedridden with illness.

Empowerment carries an additional connotation—that in the course of their daily lives people are able to participate in, or endorse, the decision-making that affects their lives. People's capabilities could be expanded by, for example, receiving primary health care, but they might have little say in how that expansion takes place. People should not be passive beneficiaries of a process engineered by others. They should be active agents in their own development.

• *Cooperation*—People live within a complex web of social structures—from the family to the state, from local self-help groups to multinational corporations. They are social beings who value participation in the life of their community. This sense of belonging is an important source of wellbeing. It gives enjoyment and direction, a sense of purpose and meaning.

Human development necessarily involves a concern with culture—the ways people choose to live together—for it is the sense of social cohesion based on culture and shared values and beliefs that shapes individual human development. If people live together well, if they cooperate in a mutually enriching way, this enlarges their individual choices. So, human development is concerned not just with people as individuals but also with how they interact and cooperate in communities.

• *Equity*—Equity is usually thought of in terms of wealth or income. But human development takes a much broader view— seeking equity in basic capabilities and opportunities. In this view everyone should have the opportunity to be educated, for

Basic empowerment depends on the expansion of people's capabilities "Good" economic growth is growth that promotes human development in all its dimensions example, and to lead a long and healthy life. This applies in particular to women, who face substantial discrimination. They make a major contribution to society, in the household and in the community (as well as at the workplace). But since most of their work is not paid, it often goes unrecognized.

Promoting equity may in some cases call for an unequal sharing of resources. The poor, for example, may require more state help than the rich. Some people, such as the sick or the disabled, may require more resources than others to support the same level of capability.

• Sustainability—Sustainable human development meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. It thus involves considerations of intergenerational equity. But what needs to be passed on is not so much a specific stock of productive wealth as the potential for a particular level of human development. What should this level be? Basically, it must involve the absence of poverty and deprivation. What needs to be sustained are people's opportunities to freely exercise their basic capabilities.

• *Security*—Millions of people in developing countries live on the edge of disaster. And even in industrial countries people are constantly at risk from crime or violence or unemployment. Joblessness is a major source of insecurity, undercutting people's entitlement to income and other benefits.

For too long the idea of security has referred to military security or the security of states. One of the most basic needs is security of livelihood, but people also want to be free from chronic threats, such as disease or repression, as well as from sudden and hurtful disruptions in their daily lives. Human development insists that everyone should enjoy a minimum level of security.

Growth for human development

The dimensions of human development can be used to evaluate the quality of economic growth. What is "good" economic growth? It is growth that promotes human development in all its dimensions—growth that: • Generates full employment and security of livelihoods.

• Fosters people's freedom and empowerment.

Distributes benefits equitably.

• Promotes social cohesion and cooperation.

Safeguards future human development.

These are objectives, and countries may be succeeding in promoting some and not others. What is important is to see them as yardsticks by which to judge progress. Successful countries are efficient in converting increases in income into advances along these dimensions of human development.

At every stage policy-makers should question where growth is leading. Who is benefiting from it? Is it creating employment? Is it sustaining opportunities for future generations? Are people participating? Is it responsive to cultural diversity? Policy-makers—often mesmerized by the quantity of growth—should instead remain acutely conscious of its quality.

Growth of what and for whom?

New ideas take a while to be absorbed, and human development is no exception. Many governments pay lip service to human development but in practice feel that the immediate priority should still be economic growth.

This temptation is understandable, but it is much too narrow an approach. And its value has regularly been contradicted by experience.

The real questions should thus be: Growth of what, and for whom? Growth of pollution that calls for more antipollution devices? Growth in crime that employs armies of lawyers? Growth in car crashes requiring more repair workers? Growth of incomes only for the richest? Growth of military weapons? This is not what most people want, yet all of these can result in a rise in GNP. Clearly, something is wrong with this form of measurement. Growth in national income is far too general and abstract a concept to be a sensible policy objective (box 2.5).

To be fair, GNP was never designed to be a measure of human well-being. It is intended to measure flows of production income and expenditures, which can be means to human well-being. More direct measures of human development are needed to determine whether ends are being achieved.

Some of the deficiencies of GNP as a measure of economic activity can in theory be corrected. It is possible for national income accounting, for example, to impute a value to the depletion of non-renewable raw materials. But other weaknesses are less easily remedied. Many elements of choice defy monetary measurement. The enjoyment of an unspoiled wilderness, the satisfaction from our daily work, the sense of community that grows out of engagement in social activities, and the freedom, peace and sense of security that are common in a good society-all these are impossible to quantify. They cannot be reduced to dollars or rupees, to deutsche marks or pesos. Yet they form part of the essence of human development.

Jobless growth-or job-creating

A vital component of human development is a secure livelihood. For most people that means a job. But one of the most disturbing trends in both industrial and developing countries is that economic growth has not been creating enough employment. In addition to depriving people of a livelihood, a lack of employment robs them of opportunities to develop their abilities and undermines their dignity and self-respect.

In some cases jobs may be lacking simply because growth has been too low to generate employment. Countries undergoing stabilization and structural adjustment, for example, have frequently been plunged into recession, putting many people out of work.

But even economies that have been growing faster have often failed to generate enough jobs. In both the industrial and the developing worlds many countries are suffering from jobless growth.

This is evident in national trends in the relative growth of employment. A number of developing countries have had growth but have generated little employment. In Pakistan from 1975 to 1992, real GDP grew by about 6.3% annually, but employment by only 2.4%. In India from 1975 to 1989, yearly GDP growth was about 5%, while yearly employment growth lagged behind at 2%. While GDP growth was accelerating, employment growth was declining. During 1977–90 the annual increase in employment in Egypt was only 2%, while that for GDP was 6.6%. In Ghana between 1986 and 1991, GDP grew by 4.8%, but employment dropped by more than 13%—a stark example.

Other countries, by contrast, have achieved rapid growth of both income and employment. Among countries with annual per capita income growth of more than 3% between 1980 and 1990, several also had high annual rates of employment growth— Botswana, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Turkey. In all of them, employment grew faster than the labour force. Some combined employment growth with significant growth in productivity—China, Malaysia, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Much of this was based on investments in human capital.

GNP-navigating with a faulty instrument

BOX 2.5

GNP needs to be improved to reflect all important economic transactions. But even with such improvement, it cannot be taken as a measure of human wellbeing, mainly because its focal variable is inappropriate for this purpose. It measures means, not ends. In addition, GNP has the following limitations:

 It registers only monetary exchanges. GNP counts only goods and services that can be exchanged for money. Thus, it leaves out of consideration the large amount of work done within the family and community. Last year's Report estimated that, on average, two-thirds of women's work and a quarter of men's work never enter into GNP calculations.

• It equates goods and bads. It considers valuable services such as care for children or the elderly as having the same significance as the manufacture of, say, cigarettes or chemical weapons.

• It counts both addictions and cures. Addictive eating and drinking, for example, are counted twice: once when the food and alcohol are consumed, and again when large sums are spent on the diet industry and cures for alcoholism.

• It considers natural resources to be free. Environmental degradation, pollution and resource depletion are not accounted for. The earth is treated, it has been said, "like a business in liquidation".

• It places no value on leisure. When GNP records the lower income associated with, say, fewer working hours or earlier retirement, it does not compensate by adding increased leisure hours to the other side of the ledger. Nor does it subtract the leisure lost when people are forced to take on second jobs.

 It ignores human freedom. National income accounting puts no value on freedom, human rights or participation. It would, for example, be perfectly possible to attain high per capita incomes and satisfy all material needs in a wellmanaged prison state. The question of whether democracy is good or bad for growth is beside the point

Developing countries have substantial opportunities for investing in human capabilities. Greater human capital can initiate a virtuous circle in which labour productivity rises and triggers an increase in real wages, which in turn allows greater investment in human capital. The other half of the picture is encouraging growth that is labour-intensive (chapter 4). In most countries labour is the most abundant resource. In some the best employment opportunities arise from developing agriculture. In others the key may be to look to export markets. Indeed, most of the successful growth models have involved industrial policies that deliberately targeted sectors in which growth could be labour-intensive.

In industrial countries unemployment has been rising despite the recovery in the world economy in the 1990s. In the European Union unemployment has been rising since 1974 and was about 11% in 1995. Even in such countries as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, where unemployment has traditionally been low, joblessness is on the rise. In the United States unemployment has remained lower-fluctuating around 6%-but the proportion of lowwage service sector jobs has climbed. Jobs are being created, but many are dead-end, temporary jobs-without security and without a future. As a result, productivity has suffered.

High unemployment in industrial countries can result from inadequate growth in

BOX 2.6

Is democracy a luxury? Who has famines?

Some policy-makers maintain that governments should concentrate on meeting basic needs, such as food, shelter and clothing, rather than ensuring people the right to vote. They regard political rights and freedoms as "luxuries" that poor countries can ill afford.

But economic and political opportunities tend to reinforce each other. As Amartya Sen has pointed out, serious famines rarely occur in independent, democratic countries with a free press. One simple reason is that although famines can kill millions of people, they

Source: A. Sen 1995.

do not kill rulers. Kings and presidents, bureaucrats and bosses, generals and police chiefs—these people never starve.

If there are no elections, no opposition parties, no forums for public criticism, those who rule do not have to worry about the political consequences of failing to prevent a famine. That Botswana and Zimbabwe have been successful in preventing famine, and Ethiopia and Sudan have not, is testimony to the importance of political participation and democracy in helping people meet their basic needs. demand—due to inordinate fears of inflation or to balance of payments crises. Or it can be traced to technological change or to low-cost imports from developing countries. Whatever the cause, it is creating a polarized society in which millions of people are deemed superfluous.

Policies must be reoriented to boost employment as a top priority. Full employment is a feasible objective: until very recently such countries as Japan and Sweden maintained very low joblessness. When employment is insecure, society cannot long remain secure.

Voiceless growth—or participatory

Economic growth is not always accompanied by greater participation, empowerment and democracy. Many states that have promoted economic growth have been far from democratic. The East Asian economies have shown that trade unions may be repressed and workers' rights denied even where incomes are rising rapidly and are fairly equitably distributed.

But forgoing democracy is certainly not necessary for growth. Many of the industrial countries combined democracy with development. And many developing countries such as Barbados, Botswana, Costa Rica and Mauritius—have had democratic regimes and good growth records.

Some argue that an emphasis on the rule of law and on political accountability conflicts with the value systems of some cultures. This argument carries little weight. As one example, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the human rights activist and Nobel laureate from Myanmar, cites the Buddhist view of responsible kingship: "The Ten Duties of Kings are: liberality, morality, self-sacrifice, integrity, kindness, austerity, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance, and non-opposition to the will of the people."

Active democracy can aid economic growth in several ways. More open and transparent forms of governance can reduce corruption and arbitrary rule. But in many ways the question of whether democracy is good or bad for growth is beside the point. The real issue is whether growth helps democracy. Democracy, participation and empowerment are valued in themselves—whether they enhance growth or not. The movements for change in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were the result of parallel quests for democracy and improved economic conditions, each valued independently.

Many people argue that too much is made of the virtues of democracy—and that the freedom to eat is more important than the freedom to vote (box 2.6). True, freedom from material want does liberate people to take greater control over their lives. But much also depends on how greater material welfare is achieved and on the patterns of production and consumption it encourages.

When it comes to production, growth may result in a form of enslavement if it means that people have to do demanding jobs in dangerous conditions—and have little control over their working environment, without independent trade unions or workers councils to defend their interests. They can also be required to work excessively long hours, leaving little time to spend with their families or participate in community life. Political democracy must be complemented by economic democracy.

Some people assume that the battle for democracy has basically been won. More than two-thirds of the world's people now live under formally pluralistic and democratic regimes. In 1993 alone, 43 countries held national elections for the first time. But progress is uneven, and the gains remain fragile—often more form than substance.

Ballot box elections do not necessarily signal a healthy democracy. People also participate in decision-making through the myriad of institutions that make up civil society—in the people's organizations that are the cradle of real democracy. But in many countries these vital organizations are in decline. Trade unions are an example. In the Netherlands union membership fell from 39% of the organizable workforce in 1978 to 25% in 1991. In the United States there has been a three-decade slide in union membership, from 30% to 15%. In many developing countries the share of the workforce unionized remains pitifully small: in India, Kenya, Malaysia and Pakistan it is less than 10%.

Consumption too can become a form of enslavement, turning people into nations of passive consumers rather than active participants in their society. One study in the United States suggests that the spread of television, which now takes up 40% of the average American's free time, is responsible for a sharp reduction in voluntary activity. Over the past 30 years participation has declined by 25–50% in such voluntary organizations as parent-teacher associations, the League of Women Voters and the Red Cross.

How can growth best be translated into empowerment? In advocating participation, it is important to avoid both the paternalistic and the populist fallacies. Participation cannot be imposed from above by governments. But, equally, it does not emerge spontaneously from below. The state does have an important role in supporting democratic initiatives—through actions by the executive branch, legislative bodies or the judicial system, or by regional authorities. Such action can ensure that many other institutions of civil society—

Liberalization and inequality

BOX 2.7

Globalization is a two-edged sword. A number of countries in East Asia are success stories of export-led development—combining rapid growth with low inequality and high human development. By contrast, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have become increasingly marginalized by global forces.

There are also winners and losers within countries. Income inequality is clearly on the rise in many countries that have opened their economies.

In 1970 income inequality was fairly low in Sri Lanka: the Gini coefficient was 0.35. (This coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 being perfect equality and 1 complete inequality.) When the country began to liberalize its economy in the late 1970s, inequality rose dramatically. By 1990 the Gini coefficient was 0.51 an increase of almost half.

Source: Tabatabai 1995 and Berry 1995.

In the late 1970s China began to unleash market forces, privatize its economy and rapidly open up to international trade and finance. In 1979 its Gini coefficient was 0.33—lower than that in any other East Asian country. By 1988 it had risen to 0.38—surpassing those of Indonesia and the Republic of Korea. And inequality continues to rise, especially along the coast, which is most directly tied to the world economy.

Income inequality has also increased in Mexico, which liberalized its economy rapidly beginning in the mid-1980s. In 1984, before the reforms, its Gini coefficient was 0.43, but by 1992 it had risen to 0.48. And in Chile, one of the most open economies in Latin America, income inequality has been rising markedly since the 1970s. In 1970 its Gini coefficient was 0.45, but by 1990 it had increased by 27% to 0.57. from trade unions to community groups to non-governmental organizations—are permitted to flourish.

Ruthless growth-or egalitarian

In many countries economic growth has been accompanied by widening disparities—the rich get richer in the midst of widespread poverty. This is ruthless growth. In many countries rising inequality is associated with increased integration with the

BOX 2.8

Malaysia—equitable growth for human development

Malaysia's real GDP growth averaged 6.9% a year between 1960 and 1985, and more than 8% in the past decade, among the highest in the world. Growth has been associated with full employment, low inflation and Malaysia's economic transformation from a producer of primary commodities to a manufacturer of sophisticated industrial goods. It is the world's third largest exporter of semiconductors, after Japan and the United States.

In a continuous chain of cause and effect, rapid growth and human development have been mutually reinforcing. Health standards improved—with life expectancy rising from 53 to 71 years between 1960 and 1993, and infant mortality dropping from 72 to 13 per thousand live births. In education, primary enrolment increased by about a third between 1956 and 1960. Almost every child between 6 and 11 years old was enrolled in primary school by 1993.

Gaps between ethnic groups widened after independence in 1957. While the richest tenth of the population (mostly of Chinese background) increased its share of national income by 18% in 1957-70, the poorest half (mostly Malays) saw its share fall by almost a third. By 1970 the per capita income of Malays (54% of the population) was about half that of non-Malays, and they accounted for only 25% of industrial employment. Economic and human development disparities between ethnic groups were seen as the root cause of the racial tensions culminating in the riots of 1969.

After the riots the government took a two-pronged approach to translating

rapid economic growth into human development for all. It adopted a 20year perspective plan for promoting growth and human development, reducing poverty and increasing equity, all with quantitative targets. The government also made efforts to end racial discrimination in employment.

Government policy targeted Malays and others for human development and antipoverty programmes. Scholarships and racial quotas helped increase their enrolment in schools and universities. Antipoverty measures (irrigation, land reclamation) focused on the rural poor rubber and coconut smallholders, estate workers and fishermen, as well as padi farmers, 90% of whom did not earn enough to meet their basic needs.

Growth, the expansion of people's capabilities and poverty reduction programmes helped reduce the proportion of poor households from 49% in 1970 to 14% in 1993. The real incomes of Malays increased by 89%, compared with 60% for Malaysians of Chinese origin and 50% for those of Indian background. The income of the poorest 40% of the population increased by 9% a year in 1973–93.

Greater equity helped boost growth. It contributed to social stability and harnessed the contributions of all Malaysians for their collective development. With the success of the first 20year perspective plan, Malaysia developed further plans in 1990, within the long-term perspective of "Vision 2020". Growth with equity continues to characterize Malaysia's rapid progress as it aims for the status of a fully developed nation by the year 2020.

Source: Bruton 1992, Isa 1995, Mehrotra and Jolly forthcoming and Yoke and Leng 1992.

world economy, as the forces of globalization intensify disparities within countries (box 2.7).

Some countries in Latin America provide examples of ruthless growth. Few of the region's countries have made serious attempts at land reform, and schooling policies have generally helped the wealthy, not the poor. Moreover, until recently industrial policy had been based on import substitution, often involving capital-intensive production and a bias against agriculture. Not surprisingly, the incidence of poverty in the region rose from 23% to 28% in 1985–90 alone—a period of economic recovery.

Many East Asian countries, by contrast, have based their growth on the redistribution of assets, on investments in human capital and on employment that is both skill- and labour-intensive—helping them make rapid strides in reducing poverty. Indonesia reduced its incidence of absolute poverty from 29% to 17% between 1980 and 1990. And Malaysia reduced its poverty incidence from 49% to 14% between 1970 and 1993 (box 2.8).

One way of seeing how growth affects the poor is to consider the "growth elasticity of poverty reduction", derived by dividing the percentage decrease in the number of poor people by the percentage increase in per capita income. The higher the elasticity, the better.

Countries in Latin America have some of the lowest elasticity figures—0.9 in Brazil and Panama, for example, and about 0.7 in Guatemala and Honduras. Several African countries do somewhat better: the elasticity for Ghana is 1.7, but for Nigeria, whose growth has been less pro-poor, it is 1.4. At the other end of the scale is East Asia, where the elasticities tend to be well above 2—for Indonesia the elasticity is 2.8, for Malaysia 3.4 and for rural China 3.0.

Both the percentages of poor and the elasticity figures may offer useful ways of looking at poverty—but they are limited because they look only at the lack of income. Human deprivation has many other dimensions: poor people also tend to be unhealthy, malnourished and uneducated. This is "poverty of capabilities", captured in the new multidimensional measure of poverty introduced in chapter 1-the capability poverty measure (CPM).

Some countries perform much better when ranked by the CPM than when ranked by income—Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Mongolia, China and Viet Nam (figure 2.1). But even for some of these countries the CPM shows that capability deprivation is more widespread than income deprivation. In China 11% of people are income poor, while 17.5% are capability poor.

Several countries could use their resources more efficiently to reduce deprivation—among them Guatemala, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Morocco 13% of the people are income poor, while about 50% are capability poor. And for Pakistan the corresponding figures are 34% and 61%.

But even such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and Mauritius, which have had relatively equitable growth policies, could do better in reducing deprivation. While 17% of the people are income poor in Indonesia, 42% are capability poor. Rapidly growing countries such as Botswana, Thailand and Turkey could also do much more.

According to national income poverty lines, 21% of the people in the developing world are poor (figure 2.2). The results for the CPM suggest, however, that 37% of the people are capability poor. Excluding China, the figure is 45%. The 21% is based on high national poverty lines that reflect moderate poverty, not just extreme poverty. Although results for individual countries come from similar World Bank studies, they are not strictly comparable. But the sharp contrast between income poverty and capability poverty indicates that income poverty is significantly underestimated.

For certain regions the contrast between the two measures is very sharp. In South Asia about 29% of the people are income poor, while more than 62% are capability poor. In India 229 million are identified as income poor, but more than twice as many, 554 million, are capability poor. In Bangladesh the corresponding numbers are 55 million and 89 million. Clearly, South Asia needs to concentrate on developing people's basic capabilities. Capability poverty results from a lack of opportunity, such as lack of access to basic health services. Such poverty tends to be more prevalent in rural areas because of the low coverage of such services (box 2.9).

As indicated earlier in this chapter, ruthless growth is neither desirable nor efficient. Far from being essential, it is counterproductive.

Rootless growth-or enriching culture

Another effect of many forms of modern economic growth has been to homogenize diverse cultures. There are thought to be about 10,000 distinct cultures—but many are being marginalized or eliminated, some deliberately. Some national leaders thought that traditional cultures were a drag on modernization and development. National boundaries may have been drawn without regard for ethnic groups. And in the pursuit of nation-building, many countries tried to artificially fuse different ethnic groups into one cohesive nation by submerging cultural differences.

A pattern of growth that is inclusive and participatory can nurture and enhance cultural traditions. And it can open tremendous opportunities for people to share their cultures in a mutually enriching way. But a pattern of growth that is exclusive and dis-





FIGURE 2.1

The capability poverty measure shows variations in poverty reduction by income level



Ranks are for the 101 countries in technical note table 3.1

criminatory can destroy cultural diversity and thereby impoverish the quality of everyone's lives. Gandhi eloquently expressed his view of cultural diversity: "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any."

Soviet policy in Central Asia exemplified cultural intolerance. Islam had flourished in the region for centuries, with great centres of learning and culture in such cities as Samarkand and Bukhara. But the Soviet drive for rapid industrialization left little room for cultural freedom. Islam was suppressed. Many mosques and shrines were destroyed. And the use of the Arabic script was forcibly discontinued.

As a result, the breakup of the Soviet Union unleashed several ethnic conflicts in its former Asian republics. In 1989 there

BOX 2.9

Equality of access to health services

The capability to lead a healthy, wellnourished life or to give birth under safe and healthy conditions depends on access to health services. A well-functioning society provides people this basic opportunity. Thus, poverty can be measured not only directly (by lack of capabilities), but also indirectly (by lack of opportunities).

In many developing countries there is a strong urban bias in access to potable water, adequate sanitation and health clinics. In Sierra Leone 90% of the urban population has access to health facilities, compared with only 20% of the rural population. Even in a higher-income country such as Argentina, 77% of the people in urban areas, but only 29% of those in rural areas, have access to safe water.

To illustrate this disparity, an "equally distributed health services index" was calculated for the percentage of the urban and rural populations having access to safe water, adequate sanitation and health facilities. For 50 countries with recent data the index was constructed in a way similar to the gender empowerment measure in *Human Development Report* 1995. The percent-

age of the total population with access to each of the three services was discounted by the degree of disparity in access between the urban and rural populations. The three discounted percentages were then added together with equal weight.

The top five countries in this limited sample are Trinidad and Tobago (0.983), the Republic of Korea (0.977), Tunisia (0.901), Costa Rica (0.884) and Syria (0.858). The bottom five are Zaire (0.201), Liberia (0.212), Sierra Leone (0.213), Mozambique (0.270) and Madagascar (0.272).

For a sample of the 50 countries, the health services index was compared with 1993 real GDP per capita. Relative to income level, the countries most successful in providing people with basic opportunities to lead a healthy life are the Republic of Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Cuba, the Philippines and Tanzania. Costa Rica, Syria and Zimbabwe also have good records. Relative to the resources at their disposal, Argentina, Ecuador, Morocco, Zambia and Zaire have been the least successful in providing people with access to critical health services.

Source: UNDP 1995c, UNICEF 1996 and Human Development Report Office data.

was a major clash between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, and in 1990 gun battles broke out between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Kyrgyz city of Osk. Worst of all, a civil war erupted in Tajikistan, killing more than 50,000 people.

More important than government repression of cultures today is the effect of market forces. Globally marketed consumer products and the media are superimposing a uniform and stultifying view of the world. While the world's more than 1.2 billion TV sets can help spread knowledge and understanding and help hold governments accountable for their actions, they can also be a new form of cultural domination through the incentives and values they inculcate. The United States exports more than 120,000 hours of television programming to Europe alone, and the global trade in programming is growing by more than 15% a year.

Does this matter? Not everything about traditional cultures should be an object of uncritical adulation. Indeed, some practices—such as female genital mutilation, infanticide and the burning of widows violate universal standards of ethics and human rights. But many other aspects of cultural homogenization represent a serious loss, for people who lose their heritage and for society.

In some Latin American countries indigenous cultures are still considered an impediment to development. Guatemala has never recognized any indigenous language as an official language even though more than 60% of its population is indigenous. Nor has Peru, where more than 50% of the population is indigenous. In Mexico the percentage of people who can speak an indigenous language has been falling dramatically. Of the 68 indigenous languages still spoken in that country, 26 are spoken by fewer than a thousand people and are likely to disappear in the future. By contrast, while Romansch is spoken by only 1% of the population of Switzerland, it is still one of the country's four national languages.

Mauritius is an example of a rapidly growing developing country that has been strengthened by its ethnic diversity. The country is a densely populated "rainbow" nation of the descendants of immigrants from Asia, Africa and Europe who practice most of the world's major religions— Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam. Rather than trying to impose uniformity, the country prides itself on its diversity and social and religious tolerance.

Just as the diversity of plant and animal species in the natural world represents a valuable resource, the diversity of cultures and languages in human society offers a treasury of different ways of looking at the world and of living together.

Of course, different cultures can often be sources of conflict. And in recent years cultures have been pitted against one another as part of increasing ethnic and national conflicts in multi-ethnic states. Many of these conflicts are due as much to an unfair distribution of resources between groups as to intolerance of different ways of life. But they underline the importance of promoting tolerance and respect among different cultures.

Futureless growth—or sustainable development

Growth can be physically destructive—laying waste to forests, polluting rivers, depleting natural resources. While these effects are undesirable enough for people living today, there are even greater concerns for future generations—based on a fear that this form of growth cannot last. Growth may be consuming its foundations. People in many countries are already in debt to future generations (box 2.10).

Issues of sustainability go beyond the environment. What is needed in general is a flexible and resilient social and economic system, resistant to shocks and crises, that can safeguard the possibilities for the wellbeing of future generations. Protecting possibilities for tomorrow also means not burdening future generations with internal or external financial debts, and not bequeathing them an unstable, undemocratic political system. This demands foresight and leadership from today's policy-makers, since future generations do not have a vote on current decisions. To illustrate general issues of sustainability, this section focuses on the environment.

Even countries to be lauded for combining economic growth with advances in human development have a history of rapidly depleting their natural resources. Indonesia in the 1980s had an annual deforestation rate of 1%, resulting in a loss of 1.2 million hectares of forest a year. It responded by outlawing the export of raw logs in the 1980s, but critics claim that logging operations continue to expand in the 1990s. Thailand too has been stripping its countryside: between 1961 and 1988 it reduced forest cover from 55% of the country to 28%. Faced with disastrous flooding, Thailand officially banned logging in 1989, but it appears to continue. To counteract

The greening of national accounts

Conventional national income accounts do not fully cover the depletion of natural resources and the degradation of the environment. They thus send the wrong signals to policy-makers.

To correct this, the Statistical Division of the United Nations has been working to supplement the System of National Accounts with a satellite system of integrated economic and environmental accounting. These experimental accounts contain some innovations. One of the most important concerns expenditure for environmental protection. Since such spending compensates for the negative impact of economic growth, it is considered to be a cost, to be deducted from national income.

These satellite accounts involve supplementing both standard balance sheets and income accounts. The first step for each country is to draw up a comprehensive balance sheet of natural resources measured in physical quantities. For some, but not all, it is also possible to impute a monetary value that can be added to physical capital to form an expanded capital account. If the resources are not scarce, their value is zero.

Depletion of capital can now include not just depreciation of physical capital but also depletion of natural resources,

Source: Bartelmus 1995.

along with the deterioration of environmental quality. When drawing up national income accounts, these environmental losses can then be subtracted to produce a new measure of growth environmentally adjusted domestic product.

Once these deductions have been made, environmentally unsound production and consumption patterns can be identified—offering early warnings of economic growth that may be leading to unsustainable human development.

This new system has been tested in several countries. For Mexico in 1986–90 it was found that the environmentally adjusted domestic product was 13% less than the conventionally measured net domestic product. The new accounting measures also showed that net investment—which conventional measures showed as positive, at 4.6 billion pesos—was a negative 700 million pesos. Net savings, also assumed to be positive, were actually close to zero.

A case study for Papua New Guinea over the same period produced similar results. There, consumption exceeded output, so net savings were negative.

When such findings are more widely known, both by the public and by economic policy-makers, the nature of economic growth can be evaluated in new and more realistic terms. powerful commercial interests, concerted public action is needed.

Some of the East Asian economies also have had flawed records in air and water pollution—although recently they have been attempting to reform their environmental policies. In Taiwan (province of China) less than 1% of human waste

BOX 2.11


A new measure of national wealth

The World Bank is experimenting with a new way of measuring national wealth. Although the methods of valuation are crude, they have produced some startling results.

Economists had long assumed that the main component of a country's productive wealth is physical capital ("produced assets"). But according to the World Bank's assessment for 192 countries, physical capital on average accounts for only 16% of total wealth. More important is natural capital, which accounts for 20%. And more important still is human capital, which accounts for 64%.

The dominance of human capital is particularly marked in high-income countries. In some, such as Germany, Japan and Switzerland, it accounts for as much as 80% of total capital. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, where human resources are poorly developed, more than half the wealth is still in natural resources. This underlines the importance in poor countries of using income from natural resources to develop human capabilities.

The Bank has also begun to apply a way of assessing whether total wealth is rising or falling. This measure of sustainability, called "genuine saving", represents what a country adds to or subtracts from its net worth. From out-



put, the measure subtracts consumption, depreciation of physical capital and net depletion of natural resources. Depletion of human capital, unfortunately, is not included.

The countries with the best records include Hong Kong, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Indeed, East Asia has had a rapidly increasing genuine savings rate since the early 1980s, rising in the late 1980s to 15% of GNP. South Asia too has had a positive rate, though somewhat lower. At the other end of the scale, Sub-Saharan Africa has been dissaving since the late 1970s. By the late 1980s its annual rate of dissaving had reached an astounding 13% of GNP. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean also were dissaving.

While the wealth measure is illuminating, it has shortcomings. Of natural capital, for example, it measures only land, water, forests and subsoil assets and considers their value to humankind only in monetary terms. It thus excludes such items as species diversity, which has no recognized economic function. A further weakness is that human resources are not estimated directly. Instead, a country's future income is estimated, then a discount rate is applied to calculate current total capital.

But there is a more fundamental limitation to the whole exercise. Equating people's well-being with the monetary value of their capital risks making the same mistake as equating income with human development. Productive wealth has to be converted into human wealth—enhancing people's capabilities to lead healthy, well-nourished, educated and satisfying lives. It cannot simply be reduced to a monetary value, whether of income or of wealth. receives sewage treatment—leading to one of the highest incidences of hepatitis B in the world. The Republic of Korea has similar problems. Much of the tap water is unfit to drink—contaminated with heavy metals and other pollutants—and Seoul has been rated as one of the five worst cities in the world for air pollution.

This kind of pollution and destruction highlights the dangers of pursuing economic growth without regard for long-term consequences. Growth cannot be a sensible object of policy because it is too abstract and unbounded—it implies infinite time horizons and unlimited increases in income. By contrast, the planet's carrying capacity has definite limits.

Many governments are attempting to reform their policies to minimize environmental pollution and destruction. China has demonstrated a strong political commitment to increasing forest cover. It has had an ambitious programme of afforestation over four decades, has recently boosted the survival rates of tree plantings and expects to plant 57 million more hectares of trees during the 1990s.

In many countries grass-roots organizations have played a big part in increasing tree cover. The Greenbelt Movement in Kenya, organized by the National Council of Women, has worked with farmers and schoolchildren to plant millions of trees. Burkina Faso has used a participatory approach in which community-based committees organize tree plantings, pasture improvement and soil conservation.

The costs of unreformed policies are high. Desertification's costs, for example, are estimated to be \$9 billion a year in Africa alone, \$42 billion a year globally. A quarter of the world's land area, 3.6 billion hectares, is affected.

Some mistakenly believe that conservation efforts should be aiming for "sustainable growth" as an end in itself—by maintaining some stock of physical capital, such as factories or infrastructure, and by preserving natural capital, such as oil reserves or forests.

But the real objective should not be sustainable growth. It should be sustainable human development—a goal that is specific, bounded and attainable. Achieving this would mean, to begin with, taking a much broader approach to national accounts—incorporating not just physical capital, but also natural capital and human capital, along with the institutional capital necessary to organize and maintain the process of production.

The World Bank is already experimenting with a fuller set of asset accounts (box 2.11). The initial results are revealing. Many countries are consuming more than they produce—"dissaving". Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, was dissaving up to 13% of GNP by the late 1980s—in part because of debt repayment and capital flight.

Evaluating the total stock of productive assets is a good start. But it does not go far enough, because it does not consider how those assets are being used. They should be devoted to human development—which means that future generations should be afforded at least the same capacity for human well-being as the present generation.

This means going beyond questions of monetary accounting—setting nonmonetary standards, such as those based on the human development index and the capability poverty measure, to ensure that everyone has the means to lead a decent and satisfying life. These standards also have to ensure that ecological and environmental limits are not violated—especially important because we do not know the long-term implications of disturbing many natural systems. Some damage is irreversible. Sustaining many natural systems supports life and is integral to sustaining human development—they are not separable.

Eliminating poverty is also closely related to sustainability. Concern about equity between generations implies that the lack of equity within the present generation cannot be ignored. Patterns of growth that perpetuate current levels of poverty are neither sustainable nor worth sustaining.


If some members of society are enjoying the benefits of its productive wealth at the expense of the basic human development of others, why sustain this situation? It is both inequitable and damaging to the environment. Many poor people rely heavily on natural resources that are in short supply. Meanwhile, the rich have few incentives to limit their consumption to a level sufficient for their own well-being.

The best solution is to invest in the human development of the poor—by building their human capital and giving them access to credit and to such productive assets as land. This can have a dramatically positive effect on the environment. Patterns of growth that perpetuate current levels of poverty are neither sustainable nor worth sustaining

Links between growth and human development

Economic growth expands the material base for the fulfilment of human needs. But the extent to which these needs are met depends on the allocation of resources among people and uses and the distribution of opportunities, particularly employment. As argued earlier, the link between economic growth and human development is not automatic. But that link can be strengthened through sensible policy actions.

There is also a key link back. Human development requires, among other things, considerable investment in education,



Note: To assess how effectively countries convert income into human capabilities, this exercise focuses on the elements of the HDI that do not automatically go up with income (HDI*). But because of the many human capabilities that are crucially dependent on a person's economic circumstances, the HDI with all its dimensions should generally be used when assessing human development, and only exercises such as this one justify using more limited versions. The divisions in this figure represent the approximate averages for the countries included, and 3% GDP per capita growth is the rate that would double per capita income in a generation. *Source*: Human Development Report Office and World Bank 1994a. health and nutrition. The result is a healthier and better educated population that is capable of being economically more productive. Indeed, many modern growth theories explain economic growth primarily in terms of expanded human capital. Growth can also be linked to many other elements of human development—such as political freedom, cultural heritage and environmental sustainability. While these additional links are important, they are not analysed here.

The links between human development and economic growth can make them mutually reinforcing. When the links are strong, they contribute to each other. But when the links are weak or broken, they can become mutually stifling as the absence of one undermines the other. Unbalanced links are the result of rapid human development with little growth or of fast growth with slow human development.

In the long run economic growth and human development generally move together and tend to be mutually reinforcing. A cross-country study found that economic growth has a positive impact on several human development indicators (technical note 4). This is not to say, however, that economic growth will invariably and automatically translate into human development if other important factors are not in place.

Countries differ in how well they translate income into human development their "human development efficiency".

With 3% annual growth in real GDP per capita in 1960–92, Indonesia achieved a nearly 50% reduction in the shortfall of the non-income components of the human development index (HDI*), while Pakistan achieved only a 26% reduction (figure 3.1). And with GDP per capita for Guinea, Senegal and Sri Lanka around \$600, their HDI* levels nevertheless differ markedly, with that of Sri Lanka more than three times that of Guinea and Senegal (figure 3.2).

At each general level of income are countries that convert income into capabilities more effectively than others, countries that constitute the "human development frontier" of efficiency—among them Canada, China, Costa Rica and Sri Lanka. These countries, together with others that lie very close to the frontier, such as Chile and Jamaica, have the highest efficiency.

Countries can improve their efficiency of translating growth into human development. China, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Tunisia and Turkey had remarkable increases in efficiency between 1960 and 1992. Other countries, such as Costa Rica and Sri Lanka, which have the highest efficiency among developing countries, experienced only moderate growth in efficiency after 1960, and their advances in human development are beginning to slow. And one group of countries had fairly high efficiency in 1960 but has shown little improvement since. Among them are Argentina, Hong Kong, Paraguay and Singapore.


Other countries have an "efficiency shortfall" relative to their income. Italy falls short among the industrial countries, and Hong Kong and Singapore, even with incomes comparable to those of many industrial countries, fall far short. Several countries that have been growing rapidly such as Botswana and Mauritius—do not show corresponding achievements in capabilities. Among the least efficient at converting income into human development are Congo, Gabon, Guinea and Senegal.

The efficiency of transforming income into human development shows that similar levels of human development can be achieved with markedly different levels of income. But human development's main concern is with the range of human capabilities available to an individual, and income is relevant only in helping to enhance those capabilities.

This chapter clarifies two chain reactions in the economic growth-human development cycle (figure 3.3). One leads from economic growth to human development-growth for people. The other leads from human development to economic growth. The first shows how economic growth contributes to human development-the second how human development contributes to economic growth. In each case the links are strong but neither perfect nor perfectly efficient. But together they can form circles of reinforcing causality, which at their best can help a country advance strongly in human development and economic growth. But if the links are weak or out of balance, a country can go through periods of lopsided human development and lopsided growth.


Links from growth to human development

The chain towards human development has two main sets of links—the influence of household activity and spending on human development, and the influence of government policies and expenditures.



Household activity and spending

Household activities-though mostly unpaid and therefore largely invisible in national accounts-contribute greatly to human development. Women do the most-managing the household, raising children, caring for the sick and elderly. In addition, their work in voluntary community organizations contributes to nutrition, health and education. The value of this work-much of it contributing directly to human development-was estimated last vear at \$11 trillion, a large part of the \$16 trillion in non-monetized global output from such unpaid work. Households also contribute to human development by using their income to purchase food, medicines, schoolbooks and other means for improving capabilities.



The effects of a family's income on human development depend not just on the size of the income but also on how the family chooses to spend it. Poor households spend a large share of extra income on food. But not all goes to additional calorie consumption. Studies in Brazil, India and the Philippines show that some is used to switch to foods that are more nutritious or less monotonous or that take less time to prepare.

Households also share increases in income with other members of the community. And much is spent on children's education. The Republic of Korea, which over the past three decades has had the largest increase in mean years of schooling in the world, achieved much of this through private spending. Between 1966 and 1975 households provided 65% of total education spending.

Studies in Bolivia, Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru and the Philippines all point to the positive effects of higher family income on schooling. In Brazil it has been estimated that a 10% increase in income is associated with a 5–8% improvement in educational attainment. Families can spend more on school materials, for example, or are more likely to send children to school. And as families' incomes rise, they are in a better position to exert political pressure for better public schools.

A similar mix of effects is evident from a study in Pakistan of the relationship between household income and pupils' school performance. For younger children a 10% higher income is associated with an 8% improvement in cognitive achievement. But only about a third of this improvement is due to the formal education process. More important is the ability of richer families to create an environment more conducive to learning at home and at school. So, the usual way of assessing the effect of income on education—by considering only improvements in school enrolment—may understate the benefits.

Higher incomes also help improve health. Studies in Brazil, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire and Nicaragua show that an increase in household income is associated with improvements in such health indicators as height-for-age ratios, survival rates and life expectancy at birth—and with reduced illness among children. In North-East Brazil a doubling of household spending increases the probability that a child will survive by 6.4% in rural areas.

These studies also show the importance of combining income with greater education. Cross-country analysis identifies per capita income and adult literacy as the most important determinants of life expectancy. In several studies the income effects on health appear to be larger for urban than for rural areas. Why? Possibly because urban areas have more health care facilities, rural areas fewer. So, although increased household income can improve health, the full benefits cannot be realized if health services are not widely available.

The importance of combining improvements in income with better education and better access to health services is graphically illustrated by the experience of the Pacific island state of Nauru, which for many years had the world's highest per capita GNPthanks to its enormous revenues from phosphate exports. But it used little of this income to improve its education and health services. Instead, mining of phosphates degraded the environment. And as a result of the lack of education, dietary habits worsened as people switched from local produce to imported canned food. Life expectancy is only 59 years-less than that in Bolivia, which has less than a tenth of Nauru's per capita income.

Some families naturally make better use than others of higher incomes. Their choices depend partly on personal preferences and on education—and are conditioned by community knowledge and customs. Crucial is who controls the purse strings.

Several studies suggest that income is more likely to be spent on human development when women control the cash. In the Philippines the greater the share of household income earned by women, the greater the consumption of calories and protein. In Brazil both women's income and men's improve the nutritional status of families, but women's income has an effect about seven times that of men's. In Ghana too, the greater the share of cereals under women's control, the greater households' consumption of calories.

When women have a say, money is also less likely to be squandered on cigarettes and alcohol. In Côte d'Ivoire it has been calculated that if women had as much control over cash income as men, the share of food in household spending would go up by 9%, while that of cigarettes would fall by 55% and that of alcohol by 99%.

Women's control over funds can also directly improve child survival. A study in Brazil shows that an increase in the nonlabour income of women raises the probability of child survival 20 times as much as a comparable increase in non-labour income for men.

Improving the position of women also has strong positive effects on their children. Many studies-including some in Bolivia, Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines and the United States-show that better education for parents, especially for mothers, increases the likelihood that their children will be educated. The effects also show up in children's health and nutritional status. In rural Côte d'Ivoire 24% of children whose mothers received no education were stunted, compared with only 11% of children whose mothers had some primary schooling. And mothers' education was an important contributor to the impressive health achievements by China, Costa Rica and Sri Lanka, despite these countries' low incomes.

Government policies and expenditures

By contributing to economic growth, government action can add to the material resources for human development. For example, between 1965 and 1975 GDP growth averaged 6.7% a year in Malaysia and 4.1% in Argentina. A constant share of GDP allocated to public and private spending on health, education and other human development concerns would have doubled the resources to these areas in Malaysia, while in Argentina they would have increased by less than 50%. But whether the additional resources are actually used to Income is more likely to be spent on human development when women control the cash enhance human development depends largely on the pattern of growth and on the distribution of private and public resources and of the rewards from growth. These factors are interdependent and are affected by government actions.

As discussed in the next chapter, policies can encourage patterns of growth that create jobs, increase real wages and raise market demand for human capital—and thus for the health care and education that enhance this capital. So, by contributing to growth and influencing its patterns, governments influence both the supply of and the demand for human capital.

Human development has great intrinsic value and thus in itself warrants supportive government action. But there are also strong economic arguments for such action. Government intervention may be needed, for example, to rectify market failures that tend to inhibit investments in human development.

Failures in the capital market and in the flow of information reduce households' incentive and ability to invest in human development. Credit for human development is often lacking because lenders cannot easily stake a future claim on human capital (as they can with other types of capital when used as collateral). As a result, people who might be willing to borrow for school or health care because of the high private returns often cannot do so, especially if they are poor.

Failures in information flows often mislead the poor and the uneducated and prevent full awareness of the future returns to themselves and their children from education and preventive health care. As a result, they invest less in schooling and health care than they might if they were aware of these returns. Governments can encourage private investment in human development by making loans accessible and improving information about future returns. By addressing these and other coordination problems, government actions can accelerate a country's progress in human development at low cost.

A very important market failure is attributable to the externalities of human

capital. Households and firms base their investment decisions on private returns, which do not reflect the spillover benefits to those who interact with the direct beneficiaries of the investment. For example, through education a person increases not only her own income but also the income of those with whom she works, because work is often a collaborative effort in which the knowledge of each worker complements that of others.

Several dimensions of human development have social benefits not directly compensated for monetarily. For example, the education of the populace helps contain infectious diseases, and the education of mothers contributes to the health and wellbeing of their children.

Because of the intrinsic value and positive spillover effects of investments in human development, governments, acting on society's behalf, should make more such investments than individuals or households acting alone.

In principle, governments in wealthier countries could give more support to human development—since the greater the GNP, the more funds available for government spending on human development. But this is not always so—actual spending and the way it is used vary enormously for countries with similar GNPs. Consider some government expenditure ratios introduced in *Human Development Report 1991* (figure 3.4):


• The public expenditure ratio—The percentage of national income that goes into public expenditure in developing countries averages about 20–30% of GDP and ranges from 5% to more than 60%. This ratio depends largely on the ability and willingness of governments to collect taxes. As a proportion of GDP, taxes in developing countries are usually 10–20%, only about half the figure for industrial countries.

These low figures result in part from tax evasion. In India a 1985 study estimated that the unrecorded, and therefore untaxed, economy amounted to around 20% of GDP. Studies in other countries (including Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria) have also revealed widespread evasion.

There are strong economic arguments for government action in support of human development • The social allocation ratio—The percentage of public expenditure earmarked for social sectors, such as health, education, social security, water supply and sanitation is strongly and positively correlated with progress in human development. In 1993 the social allocation ratio—reflecting central government spending on health and education as a share of total central government spending—averaged about 20% for the 61 countries for which data are available. Costa Rica had the highest ratio, with nearly half its central government expenditure going to health and education.

 The social priority ratio—The percentage of social expenditure devoted to basic social services—such as basic education, basic health care and nutrition and low-cost water supply and sanitation—depends on the government's political objectives and how much it yields to the pressure of different interest groups. For a sample of 12 developing countries for which data are available, the social priority ratio reflecting only spending on basic education and primary health care—for various years in the 1980s averaged about 24%, ranging from about 11% to 55%.

Generally, the more basic social services the government supports, the better off the poor will be. But even if the proportion of national income going to human development concerns remains unchanged, countries can make more resources available for human development purely from growth in income. In 1960 Botswana and Kenya had virtually the same GDP per capita, and for the next three decades both spent on average 9% of their GDP on health and education. But because Botswana's GDP growth rate was 6.5%, while Kenya's was only 1.6%, by 1992



Botswana was spending five times as much per person on health and education as Kenya. Fast-growing countries thus have the potential—often not realized—for strengthening the chain from economic growth to human development.

Without government action and expenditure, this potential is not likely to be realized. Empirical evidence has shown, for example, that government expenditures on health and education have a significant effect in increasing life expectancy and reducing child mortality (technical note 4). The importance of this relationship is also evident from a cross-country study that found that per capita income and life expectancy rise together. But this positive correlation disappeared once public expenditures on health and the proportion of the population living in poverty were taken into account-showing that economic growth is important only in helping to expand public services and reduce poverty.

In the absence of economic growth, it is certainly possible to engineer significant short-term improvements in human development. Several countries have managed to increase public spending during periods of economic decline. Between 1980 and 1990 Nicaragua increased health spending from 3.2% of GDP to 4.9%, while GDP declined by an average 2.2% a year. But in the long term these improvements cannot be sustained without economic growth.

Diversion of government spending

The social allocation and social priority ratios depend on the government's commitment to human development, as well as on the demands of competing items. In some cases these items may also make a valuable contribution to human development, making it difficult to set priorities. Basic infrastructure, for example, may have a high priority because, as in the case of rural roads, it can boost the incomes of the poor.

But most countries squander huge sums on budget items that do nothing for human development—and frequently undermine it. Probably the worst of these is military expenditure—which in 1994 totalled about \$778 billion. Though industrial countries spent the lion's share (82%), the human development opportunities forgone because of such spending were particularly felt in poorer countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa is still heavily, and expensively, militarized. Between 1960 and 1994 the proportion of the region's GDP devoted to military spending rose from 0.7% to 2.9%. The region's military expenditure is now around \$8 billion—this, in a region where 216 million people live in poverty, more than 120 million adults are illiterate, and 253 million have no access to health services. South Asia does no better—in 1994 it spent \$14 billion on the military, while 562 million of its people lived in absolute poverty.

In making decisions on the collection and allocation of resources, governments are subject to pressures both domestic and international.

At home, governments are often subject to heavy pressure from political and economic elites, who, in promoting their interests, skew government expenditure in favour of the rich.

Subsidies to tertiary education often absorb much public spending at the expense of primary education. This is inequitable, as students in tertiary education are typically from higher-income groups. It uses scarce public money for purposes that private spending could cover. And it makes particularly little human development or economic sense when much of the population is illiterate.

One solution is to insist that people pay more for their own tertiary education often politically sensitive, but certainly possible. Between 1990 and 1993 the proportion of recurrent costs for higher education funded from tuition fees increased from 8% to 16% in Brazil and Mexico and from zero to 21% in Viet Nam. And fees can be introduced in parallel with scholarships for the poorer students, to provide a measure of equity.

There are similar problems in health services. Spending is often skewed towards high-tech hospitals offering high standards of treatment for the diseases of the affluent, leaving most people without even the most basic health care, particularly in rural areas.

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Most countries squander huge sums on budget items that do nothing for human development—and frequently undermine it For basic health care, preventive or curative, the evidence suggests that user fees should not be charged. A small contribution can be useful, and communities could contribute. But full-cost user fees can greatly discourage the use of basic health services, especially among poor families, which often need the services the most.

Political and economic elites, in addition to skewing government spending towards their own interests, sometimes drain public finances more directly through widespread corruption. Former President Marcos of the Philippines is accused of siphoning \$3 billion into the New York property market and Swiss bank accounts. In Haiti the Duvalier dynasty accumulated enormous wealth on the backs of some of the world's most desperately poor people. But corruption is by no means limited to the poorest countries.

Even governments with the best of intentions can find their human development aspirations frustrated by pressures originating far beyond their national frontiers. Demands for the repayment of debt are a major problem for many developing countries and nowhere more so than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1990 and 1993 debt servicing cost this region more than \$13 billion annually-considerably more than its combined spending on education and health. And if governments had met their payment schedules, they would have paid twice as much. Instead, the payments were rolled over, and debt accumulated-doubling between 1990 and 1993.

What else could African governments have done with that \$13 billion? UNICEF estimates that the total additional annual cost of meeting basic human needs for health, education, nutrition and reproductive health for everyone in Sub-Saharan Africa is only around \$9 billion.

Debt problems are also serious elsewhere. With foreign debt of \$11 billion, Nicaragua has the highest per capita debt in the world—each Nicaraguan owes six years of his or her income to foreign banks.

Aid donors, often providing a substantial share of resources, also influence the allocation of funds in many developing countries. Yet they often show too little interest in social services and even less interest in basic health services, allocating only a small proportion of aid to human development. In 1993 commitments of bilateral aid to education, health and family planning services were on average 13.6% of the aid commitments of 21 major donors.

There is enormous potential for restructuring aid to enable developing countries to increase spending in these crucial areas. The 20:20 initiative promises to increase both national and international resources directed towards the provision of basic social services (box 3.1).

BOX 3.1

Mobilizing resources for human development the 20:20 initiative

Developing countries are a long way from providing universal access to basic social services. One of the main problems, of course, is finance. UN agencies have estimated that meeting these needs by the end of the decade would require an extra \$30 billion to \$40 billion a year—for basic education, basic health care and nutrition, low-cost water supply and sanitation and reproductive health.

This seems a huge sum—but it is barely a quarter of what developing countries spend annually on their military or to service their debt. And most of the money needed could be mobilized by restructuring existing budgets. To achieve this, *Human Development Report 1994* suggested a "human development" compact, through which 20% of aid flows and 20% of developing country budgets would be earmarked for basic social services.

Drawing on that suggestion, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA and WHO launched the 20:20 initiative, and in 1995 the World Summit on Social Development and the Fourth World Conference on Women encouraged interested parties to adopt it. The proposal does not impose any universal recipe for allocations to specific programmes. But it does offer indicative spending targets that would help both developing country governments and aid donors review their programmes and move towards the goal of providing basic social services for all.

Where does implementation stand? The first obstacle is getting an information base for monitoring allocations from aid budgets and in national budgets. Effective methods of monitoring achievement of the 20:20 principle are needed at both national and international levels.

Reporting systems differ from one country to another—and often do not analyse expenditures by the required sectors. Among donors, almost none report on aid allocations to the basic social services defined by the 20:20 initiative. Very few even report aid commitments to basic health and education. Those that do are able to identify only minimal allocations to these basic social sectors.

If governments and donors used internationally standardized expenditure categories, this would make possible more serious monitoring of progress and dissemination of relevant information.

Reports on the allocation of developing country spending should reflect expenditure at all levels—national, regional and local. And in addition to spending by the "social" ministries, they should include relevant spending by other ministries—such as those for rural or urban development. They should also include not only capital but also recurrent expenditure—particularly important for sustaining basic social services.

The 20:20 proposal, if carried through with conviction, could make an enormous contribution both to human development and to the eventual eradication of poverty.

Making expenditure effective

Increased spending on nutrition or education may be welcome, but it is not the whole story. Just as important are selecting priorities and using resources effectively.

• *Decentralization*—Handing down the responsibility for public services to local government can make them more efficient and offer local people a greater say in planning and running them (box 3.2).

• *Efficient allocation*—Expenditure on basic services usually has greater impact on human development and economic growth than expenditure on tertiary education or curative medical services. It is estimated that the social rate of return for all developing countries averages 24% for primary schooling, 15% for secondary schooling and 12% for post-secondary schooling. The social returns to schooling are highest in developing countries with lower levels of schooling. Africa, for example, has estimated social returns of 26% for primary

BOX 3.2

Decentralizing government services

The degree to which public services are decentralized affects the way that government expenditure is translated into human development. Decentralization, widely advocated to improve access to services, has been extended in countries from Pakistan to the Philippines, from Bolivia to the United States.

In principle, decentralization has advantages. One is efficiency: decisionmakers who live locally are likely to know more about local conditions, so they should be able to match resources and needs more precisely. Another is accountability: when decision-makers live and work in close contact with users, they are exposed to more effective scrutiny and are under greater pressure to deliver the goods. There are also more opportunities for local people to participate in planning services, and to pay for some of them through local taxes.

Experience also shows that local governments tend to give a higher priority than central governments to human development. This may reflect the functions that have been delegated to them. But it may also reflect local preferences. Studies in Indonesia found that both the social allocation ratio and the social priority ratio were much higher at the local level, and similar findings emerged from studies in Chile and Zimbabwe. In Bangladesh, however, decentralization was associated with lower social allocation ratios.

In practice, decentralization has been fairly successful in Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Indian state of Karnataka, but less so in Argentina, Bangladesh and Brazil. The weaknesses often arise from a shortage of skills: local officials may have had little responsibility and so received less training than national officials. Moreover, local elites often seize the power that devolves to the lower levels-to the detriment of the poor. But a more general brake on decentralization is that central governments have been reluctant to release to the local level either funds or decision-making power.

Source: Behrman 1995b, Tanzi 1994 and 1995, Klugman 1992, Ranis and Stewart 1994 and Prud'homme 1995.

schooling, 17% for secondary and 13% for tertiary.

• Complementary inputs—The input with the greatest power is education. The provision of safe water, for example, often needs to be combined with increased education to be fully effective. Education also affects health and life expectancy because it equips people with the knowledge and means to choose healthier diets, behaviours and life styles.

Educating girls, worth doing for its own sake, also has important spin-off benefits. Educated women are better able to ensure their children's survival and more likely to have fewer children. In a study of the links between education and fertility in 14 African countries from the mid-1980s onwards, secondary education vielded the most consistent benefit-invariably reducing fertility. Primary education was also frequently beneficial-with an effect in half the countries. The three recent success stories in reducing fertility-Botswana, Kenva and Zimbabwe-had the highest levels of female schooling, the lowest child mortality rates and the most vigorous family planning programmes.

Strengthening the links from growth to human development

The strength of the links between income growth and increases in human development depends on several factors. The most important:

• *Equity*—The more equal the distribution of resources, the more likely that income growth will be reflected in an improvement in the life of each individual (technical note 4).

• *Priority social spending*—Governments can greatly influence the state of human development by channelling a high proportion of public revenue into priority social expenditures—particularly through universal provision of basic social services.

• *Income-earning opportunities*—Economic growth is finally translated into improvements in human development through the expansion of income-earning opportunities. Successful pursuit of this objective requires employment-generating patterns of growth. · Access to productive assets-For most

people access to economic opportunities is

constrained by poor access to productive

assets-particularly land, credit and physi-

growth and when people participate extensively in public life, there is likely to be a much stronger link between economic growth and improvements in human lives.

• *Community action*—When people act together through institutions, they play a vital part in enhancing human development (box 3.3). Many non-governmental organizations and community groups supplement government activities—extending services to many people who would otherwise remain unserved. But just as important, they play a vital advocacy role, mobilizing public opinion and helping shape human development priorities.

The links between economic growth and human development can be strengthened through a series of well-directed policy actions that address the unequal distribution of private and public resources.

Links from human development to growth

The many ways in which human development contributes to economic growth have often been emphasized. And in recent years more and more studies have documented the strength and diversity of the links between the two. As chapter 2 explains, recent economic analysis has incorporated many of these links into new theories of growth.

A basic fact: Healthy, well-educated people make an economy more productive. But this does not mean that the only purpose of investments in health and education is to improve productivity—or that one should not make investments that do not improve productivity. No one would seriously suggest abandoning investments in health and education even if economic analysis found that such investments had low economic returns. The development of human capabilities is an end in itself. Moreover, many investments that might seem economically unproductive have high human development dividends. Educating older people well beyond retirement is worth doing in its own right, as is helping the terminally ill lead lives as satisfying as possible. Neither investment adds greatly to the productivity of the economy—but both contribute much to human development.

Many other types of investment in human development do have a positive impact on the economy. Productivity can be increased by improving the capacity and organization of workers and management, enabling the use of higher levels of technol-

People acting together

When people have been together for a long time—developing shared norms, values and beliefs that enrich the way they live and work—they possess social capital. This complements physical and human capital—enabling them to be used and managed more efficiently. Creating a climate of trust and cooperation, for example, reduces the transaction costs of doing business and creates an environment in which investment, saving, and employment can grow. Thus, it makes a significant contribution to economic growth.

Even more important, social capital is crucial to human development. People acting as a strong, cohesive community—whether through community groups or other non-governmental organizations—can achieve more than individuals. And this also tends to offer more space for those who otherwise would be weak and powerless.

When people work together in this way, they help develop a virtuous circle as one form of social capital builds on another. The alternative—when social capital decays into individualistic, selfseeking behaviour—is more of a vicious circle, leading to greed, violence and crime.

A secure communal identity also encourages sustainability. When people identify with their community today, they want to see it survive. This gives people a longer-term perspective and so encourages types of development that are more sustainable.

Source: Coleman 1988, Putnam 1993 and de Vylder 1995a.

But beyond its contribution to community life, social capital has a much wider influence—affecting the whole process of governance. When local and national institutions are firmly grounded in shared norms and values, they are more likely to be run in an open and transparent fashion, reducing the chances of inefficiency and corruption.

BOX 3.3

Social capital has played an important part in the human development success of many countries. In Sweden, for example, decades of successfully combining economic progress and advances in human welfare were based on a broad consensus among many parts of society-including churches, trade unions, employers, political parties and government. In Japan the extraordinary advances of the past 30 years were deeply rooted in social customs of cooperation. Other countries have had a less happy experience: part of the reason for the Soviet Union's collapse was the lack of any kind of effective "civic space" outside the government system.

So, how can social capital be developed? In many respects this is not a matter for government—most forms of cooperation are spontaneous and thrive without outside government influence. But governments can contribute, both through expenditure on education that gives people the capabilities to act together, and by ensuring that the many disparate parts of civic society have the space and freedom to develop their full potential. ogy, attracting foreign investment and technology and strengthening institutions both private and public, including the government and the legal and financial systems.

Human development alone cannot transform an economy. Even skilled and vigorous people need machinery, buildings and infrastructure. Yet here too human development has a bearing, since the quality of investment decisions and policymaking is bound to be influenced by the capacity of managers and policy-makers.

Some of the clearest economic benefits of human development arise from making workers, especially poorer workers, more productive by improving their nutrition, health and education.

• *Nutrition*—Studies indicate that an increased calorie intake can lead to gains in labour productivity of up to 47%—for farmers in Sierra Leone, sugar cane workers in Guatemala and road construction workers in Kenya. Most of the studies show that when workers get more calories or micronutrients, such as vitamins or minerals, their productivity improves almost immediately.

Other studies show long-term benefits. Some in Bangladesh, Brazil, India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka have demonstrated the value of investing in child nutrition, which results in stronger adult workers. In Chile providing children with nutritional supplements generated productivity benefits six to eight times the cost of the original intervention. In Cali, Colombia, a health and nutrition programme for children increased their lifetime earnings considerably—by up to nine times the yearly wage of an illiterate worker.

• *Health*—The overall contribution of a healthy population to economic growth is evident from a cross-country study showing that a 10% increase in life expectancy, equal to 5.7 years in 1970, raises the growth rate by an estimated one percentage point a year. Studies in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana show the economic cost of sickness: men who had been ill reported lower hourly wage rates and less employment than those who had been well.

Education—The positive effects of schooling show up in many empirical stud-

ies. Research suggests that increasing the labour force's average education by one year raises GDP by 9%. But this holds only for the first three years of extra education. After that, the returns to each additional year diminish to around 4% of GDP. This spotlights a major opportunity. Countries with low initial schooling stand to gain enormously by investing in primary education. But even countries with higher initial schooling can still make substantial gains.

In rural areas the benefits can often be seen in agricultural output. In Ghana, Malaysia and Peru one extra year of schooling for a farmer is associated, on average, with an increase in output of 2–5%.

The broader benefits of education are evident from country comparisons. In 1960 Pakistan and the Republic of Korea had similar incomes. But they had very different primary school enrolment ratios—30% in Pakistan, 94% in the Republic of Korea one of the main reasons that over the next 25 years the per capita GDP of the Republic of Korea grew to three times that of Pakistan. Indeed, if the enrolment ratio in the Republic of Korea had stayed the same as that in Pakistan, its per capita GDP would have been around 40% lower than it is now.

The high economic rates of return to schooling do not decline rapidly with the level of development. Also clear is that the kinds of education investment that bring the highest returns tend to enhance equality. The returns appear to be highest for basic schooling (primary, and later secondary), for which further expansion will mainly involve enrolling more children from poor families. It has been estimated that a one percentage point increase in the share of the labour force with secondary education is associated with increases of 6-15 percentage points in the share of income received by the poorest 40%. And the total returns are higher for women than for men, another consideration for equity.

Human development and technology

The productivity benefits of education vary according to the technology available. Studies in Thailand, for example, found

The high economic rates of return to schooling do not decline rapidly with the level of development that farmers with four or more years of schooling were three times as likely to adopt modern fertilizers and other inputs as were farmers with three or fewer years of schooling. In Nepal the completion of at least seven years of schooling increased productivity in wheat by more than a quarter and in rice by 13%. In India and Pakistan too similar levels of education have been found to increase productivity by 10% or more. Education helps farmers not so much because it provides them with more information—but because it enhances their ability to learn from their experience or that of others.

For industrial production too the new technologies depend critically on an educated and flexible workforce. The success of the East Asian economies depended much on their absorption of foreign technology. Singapore and Taiwan (province of China) raised technology levels by encouraging direct foreign investment. The Republic of Korea put more emphasis on licensing technology, implementing design improvements provided by foreign buyers and importing machinery and copying it through reverse engineering.

None of this would have made a difference if the workers had not been sufficiently educated to adapt the technology and disseminate it. Initially they might have had only simple assembly tasks, but later they were flexible enough to accommodate new technological and market conditions. Particularly important is specific, on-the-job training by employers.

At higher levels of technology it is also important to combine educated personnel with research and development. Where firms have been small, as in Taiwan (province of China), governments have supported them with public science and technology institutes and industrial parks. But where industry has been more concentrated, as in the Republic of Korea, government support has been more through tax incentives that encourage firms to carry out in-house research and development.

To be emphasized is that such research activity can be exploited only if it is linked to market demands—and if local firms are open to new ideas and technologies. India has educated personnel and many highlevel research institutes. But they have not contributed as they should have to rapid productivity growth—partly because of prevailing economic policies and a restrictive attitude towards foreign technology.


India's textile institutes are technically the peer of any in the world, yet they have had relatively little impact. The reason? The government fixed the textile firms' total output, so they had little incentive to expand. It also protected firms from competitive pressures, so they were less concerned about increasing productivity —even by incorporating knowledge on such mundane but critical matters as how to reduce the number of yarns broken during spinning. These controls and regulations are now being removed as a part of India's current liberalization drive.

Human development and trade

One less-emphasized result of the interaction between human development and technology is that it changes a country's pattern of trade—in particular, whether it exports primary products or manufactures. Even "unskilled" workers in a modern factory need the literacy, numeracy and discipline learned in primary and lower-secondary school—skills that give countries with well-educated people an advantage in exporting manufactures.

These skills are particularly important for countries with few natural resources, which have a direct incentive to develop an alternative form of comparative advantage. Japan and Singapore, with few natural resources but an educated workforce, have developed the strongest comparative advantage in manufacturing. But in some parts of Africa the combination of good natural resources and low levels of education limits exports to unprocessed primary products. Many Latin American countries occupy the middle ground: with moderate education and abundant natural resources, they tend to favour processed primary products.

In the long run the terms of trade tend to move against primary products and towards manufactures (now more than 70% of world merchandise trade). Even within One lessemphasized result of the interaction between human development and technology is that it changes a country's pattern of trade



Source: Wood 1995

FIGURE 3.5

manufactures, they move in favour of more skill-intensive products, explaining why countries are keen to climb the skill ladder.

Generally, the North's manufactured exports to the South have greater skill content than the South's exports to the North. Even in services the North tends to export skill-intensive products, such as insurance, design and medical care, while the South exports labour-intensive services, such as shipping, tourism and routine data processing (figure 3.5).

Human development, savings and investment

One of the hallmarks of the developing countries that have grown rapidly and promoted human development is their success in mobilizing domestic savings for productive investment. The global average for gross domestic savings as a proportion of GDP is 22%. But in Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand the ratio is between 35% and 40%—and in Singapore it is 47%.

Other countries might claim that they do not have the income to achieve high savings rates—often an inadequate excuse. A poorer country like China manages 40%. The real problem in many countries is that so much of their savings leaves the country in the form of capital flight, debt repayment or profit remittances.

If governments wish to raise domestic savings rates, they need first to maintain positive real interest rates. But they also need to ensure that there are enough productive uses for savings, perhaps by offering firms incentives for the more productive investments, such as research and development. But governments should also offer public goods that complement private sector activity—particularly basic education, basic health and such physical infrastructure as roads, irrigation works and communications systems.

Households make productive investments in future opportunities. For example, when they send their children to school, they are often forgoing income—either because of the cost of education or because of the loss of their children's labour—to finance greater consumption in the future, for themselves or for their children. As Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union showed, high rates of saving and investment do not guarantee sustained growth. Only when combined with the appropriate mix of human ingenuity and technology, along with a supportive policy and institutional environment, can they make a major contribution.

One way of stimulating this environment is by encouraging foreign investment. Total capital flows to developing countries tripled between 1987 and 1994. The composition shifted markedly away from official development assistance (ODA) and towards private capital flows, which increased from 37% of total flows to 76%. In real terms ODA fell between 1985 and 1993 by 9%.

The stagnation of ODA is especially unfortunate since, for the poorest and least developed countries, it remains the main form of foreign exchange support and the largest source of financing for public expenditures. Aid is also one of the most direct ways of investing in human development. In Burundi aid provided 56% of total expenditure on health and education in 1988. The proportion was also high in Chad (53%), Uganda (48%), Somalia (38%) and Ethiopia (35%).

The sevenfold expansion of private flows might seem to offset this to some extent (figure 3.6). But private funds have mostly ignored the most capital-scarce developing countries, heading instead for the semi-industrialized "emerging markets". Of total flows in 1993, 68% went to Argentina, China, Mexico, Singapore and Turkey. Also concentrated is foreign direct investment, which does more than provide fresh capital-it also brings higher levels of technology. A record 37%, or \$84 billion, is estimated to have gone to developing countries in 1994. Nearly 40% of this went to China. Another 24% went to Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa received only 3.6%, and the least developed countries only 1%.

This bias is understandable. Companies wishing to produce goods of international quality are attracted to locations where they do not have to invest in training workers from scratch. The United Nations has collected detailed evidence on firms' location decisions that suggests that the crucial factor is a country's level of human development.

Strengthening the links for economic growth

The strength of the links from human development to economic growth depends, first, on the accumulation of human capital through investments in health and nutrition, education and skill training, and research and development. It depends, second, on accessible opportunities for people to contribute to economic development through social, political and economic participation. Opportunities for economic participation are the focus of chapter 4.

Strong, weak and unbalanced links

High levels of human development promote economic growth, which in turn can promote human development. Conversely, weak human development is likely to result in low growth, further undermining the prospect of future human development.

The strength of a chain depends on the strength of each link. Weak links can provoke a vicious circle or at least result in development that is lopsided. The chain towards human development relies, for example, on effective public expenditure. But if the social priority ratio is low, economic growth-even if high-may not generate significant improvements in human development, so development is lopsided. Similarly, if income distribution is skewed, many households will not have enough money for food, education and health care, again slowing human development. Egypt, Lesotho and Pakistan are examples of unbalanced links-fairly good growth but slow human development (see figure 3.1 on page 66).

Weak links can also unbalance development in the other direction. In the chain towards economic growth the weak links could arise from government mismanagement, such as policies that introduce factor market distortions discouraging employment-generating production and exports or savings or investment. Another possible weak link is a lack of science and technology geared to the needs of the economy. Costa Rica, Jamaica and Sri Lanka are examples of countries with exceptionally good human development but only moderate growth—again, lopsided development.

Once identified, lopsided development can be corrected, though some imbalances are easier to correct than others. It generally is easier to deal with the "good human development and poor growth" problem than with the opposite—poor human development with good growth. Many of the changes to make better use of existing human capabilities, such as new trade or technology policies, can be made quite easily if the political will is there. But correcting for weakness in human development requires a much longer-term effort.

This is not to underestimate the task of strengthening some of the links in the chain towards economic growth, particularly the need to develop appropriate institutions and regulatory environments. As many of the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS are discovering, this is no easy task.

Typology of country cases

For the analysis here, countries have been classified by how much they have grown and how they have used growth for human development.

Strong links-In countries in this category both economic growth and human development have advanced rapidly, reinforcing each other through policy links (upper right quadrant of figure 3.1). Resources generated by economic growth have financed human development and created employment, while human development has contributed to economic growth. Among the most prominent examples in this category are the highperforming Asian economies: Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea (box 3.4) and Singapore. Some industrial countries are also here-such as Spain and Portugal-as is Botswana.

• *Weak links*—In countries in this category economic growth has been slow or negative, and human development progress also slow, one undermining the other (lower




FIGURE 3.6

Source: UN 1995d

left quadrant of figure 3.1). Without economic growth, resources to invest in human development are lacking—and with poor standards of health, education and nutrition, rapid economic growth becomes very difficult. Most of the least developed countries are in this category, such as Bangladesh, Niger and Tanzania.

BOX 3.4

The Republic of Korea—human development fostering equitable growth

Behind the Republic of Korea's rapid advance in human development has been mutually reinforcing growth in education and in employment opportunities. Until the early 1960s the Republic of Korea was a poor country dependent on foreign aid and with high population growth. But by the 1980s GDP had reached middle-income levels and was growing at 9.2% a year, thanks to a well-directed strategy of export orientation, high savings and investment rates and extensive government controls over the economy and labour.

The Republic of Korea's focus on education started at the end of the Second World War. In 1945 only 13% of adults had any formal schooling. By 1960, 56% had primary education and 20% some secondary schooling. Between 1960 and 1990 an average of more than five years of additional schooling was provided for all children. The biggest increase in the world, this brought average years of schooling to 9.9 years (higher even than in OECD countries). There were also big advances in quality: Korean children have some of the highest scores on international scholastic tests.

Why was education pursued so vigorously? In a fairly homogenous postwar society (with few differences of race, culture or language) parents saw education as a good way of achieving social status and mobility for their children. And they were willing to pay for it. A large share of the infrastructure and running costs was met initially by the US Army military government (which financed about two-thirds of the costs of primary schools) and later by foreign aid. Even so, this still left a substantial share for parents. From the 1960s onwards, the push came from the

Source: Lee 1995a.

demands of an export-oriented economy: jobs requiring higher education were better paid.

The government also helped by expanding vocational training. Between 1967 and 1980 it established 26 public training institutes. It also granted subsidies to employers to train their workforces. In the 1980s, with the demands of more advanced technology, the government increased support for colleges and universities.

Also increasing the demand for education was the equality in distributing the fruits of economic growth. In 1947 and 1949 there were substantial land reforms. And after the Korean War, which destroyed most physical capital, assets were distributed fairly evenly. Income distribution remained relatively equitable even through the economic boom between 1965 and 1990.

Rising incomes meant that more parents could afford to pay for education. In 1990, for example, 37% of secondary education was in private schools. This contributed to a big increase in secondary school enrolment between 1960 and 1990—from 27% to 88%.

Just as the education boom was stimulated by export-oriented economic growth, so the economy benefited from a more highly qualified workforce. The government was determined to raise technological know-how and offered subsidies for the import of advanced technologies. Educated workers were able to respond flexibly to the changing demands, and Koreans have moved into many new technological fields with remarkable speed. They are now worldclass in the manufacture of automobiles and semiconductors and in telecommunications, aerospace and civilian nuclear energy.

• Unbalanced links—Development in this group has been lopsided, with rapid economic growth but slow human development (lower right quadrant of figure 3.1). Links have been weak in translating economic growth into human development. Examples of countries in this category include Egypt, Lesotho and Pakistan.

Development can also be lopsided with rapid human development but slow or negative economic growth (upper left quadrant of figure 3.1). Although achieving human development despite slow growth is commendable, this scenario is not sustainable in the long run and causes social tensions because of such imbalances as unemployment among the educated. This category includes such countries as Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru and Sri Lanka and the state of Kerala in India (box 3.5).

Countries with strong or weak links may continue on the same tracks for a long period. But those with unbalanced links are in a much less stable position. Social or political upheaval may well lead to weak links. Or appropriate policy action can propel economic growth and human development so that both move forward in a dynamic and mutually reinforcing way.

Decade-by-decade analysis

Although there is no automatic link between human development and economic growth, as is evident in lopsided development, the lopsidedness does not appear to continue for long (figure 3.7). Decade-by-decade analysis shows that while some countries consistently appear in the strong or weak links quadrant in each of the three decades from 1960 to 1992, no country remains in an unbalanced links quadrant. Human development and economic growth eventually converge towards strong or weak links.

Six high-performing East Asian countries—Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand —and Israel, Portugal and Spain appear in the strong links quadrant during each of the three decades. In contrast, several Sub-Saharan African countries—such as Niger, Sudan and Zambia—remain in the weak links quadrant. Some, like Zimbabwe, accelerated human development through considerable investments in basic services (box 3.6). But because of the absence of growth, their efforts were unsustainable.

A number of countries move between quadrants over the three decades:

• Botswana and Sri Lanka—move from weak links to strong as human development and growth become mutually reinforcing. In Botswana political commitment helps translate proceeds from diamond exports into gains in health and education. And investments in basic health and education in Sri Lanka in the 1970s bear fruit in the 1980s as industrial growth accelerates. Their progress offers a message of hope to many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia still suffering from poor human development and slow growth.

• *China and Indonesia*—start in 1960–70 with fast human development and slow growth. As human capital accumulates, economic growth accelerates, and they move to the strong links quadrant in 1970–80 and towards even faster growth in 1980–92.

• Argentina and Honduras—accelerate human development during the 1980s, despite persistent slow growth. They move to lopsided development in 1980–92 as human development accelerates while growth remains slow.

• *Barbados and Mexico*—experience rapid economic growth in the 1960s that falters in the 1970s and ceases in the 1980s. Although human development improves at above-average rates throughout the three decades, failure to restart growth could threaten future human development. The links between growth and human development must be constantly nurtured to remain mutually reinforcing.

• India—remains in the weak links quadrant with low human development and low growth during the 1960s and 1970s. It moves to lopsided development in 1980–92 as growth accelerates while progress in human development remains slow.

• Cameroon, Malawi, Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Trinidad and Tobago—alternate between unbalanced links with high growth and low human development and weak links. Throughout, they maintain slow human progress and as a result are unable to sustain growth.

• Brazil, Egypt and Lesotho—experience relatively high economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s with below-average human development. They are unable to fully translate their growth into better education and health, however, and by the 1980s their lack of broadly based human capital acts as an important brake on their rapid growth. Faster human development in these countries in the 1980s promises

BOX 3.5

Kerala-sustaining human development through public action

With a population as large as Canada's (30 million), and despite decades of low income and low-productivity growth, Kerala has made human development gains that outstrip those of other Indian states and many developing countries.

The critical conditions for Kerala's progress are replicable: mass literacy, agrarian reform, improvement in the status of the oppressed castes and enlightened attitudes towards girls' and women's education and status. All these have been supported by public policy at the state level.

Kerala's HDI ranks it highest among Indian states and more than 20 places higher than India. Its health indicators are similar to those of high human development countries. Male life expectancy (69 years) is 10 years higher than the Indian average and equal to Hungary's. Female life expectancy (74) is 15 years higher than the Indian average and higher even than Russia's. And there are no great disparities between urban and rural areas.

A critical factor in health has been good nutrition. Kerala, although not self-sufficient in food, has the best public food distribution system in India.

Education has had a strong and consistent political commitment in the state. As far back as 1819 the ruler of Travancore in south Kerala called for the state to meet the cost of education. Universal literacy was achieved in 1991.

Women in Kerala have shared the benefits of education and health with men to a far greater extent than elsewhere in India. Women's status in Kerala is reflected in its 1991 sex ratio of 104 females to 100 males, higher than Japan's 103 to 100. Matrilineal social structures and lack of organized social opposition to women's education and social and economic advancement contributed to women's progress, although gender discrimination still persists in many areas.

The breakdown of the oppressive and hierarchical caste culture has also been crucial in Kerala's progress. Its people were once burdened with one of the most brutal caste systems, including untouchability and extending to inapproachability and unseeability. Social reforms in the early 20th century ended these practices. They were helped by strong peasant movements and the leftled state government.

A pressing challenge remains the crisis in employment and production. After years of little growth since 1970, per capita income in Kerala is below the Indian average.

But the tide of growth seems to be turning. Between 1987 and 1992 Kerala's annual rate of growth in per capita income (6.2%) was almost twice that of India (3.8%). Industrial growth improved, and stagnation in agriculture gave way to 7.5% annual growth.


The next challenge for Kerala is to accelerate productivity growth to raise living standards and sustain economic opportunities. But it cannot rely on income growth alone. It must build on the human development gains of public action—by people, their organizations and the state.

Source: Ramachandran forthcoming, Shiva Kumar 1996 and Dreze and Sen 1995.

to reverse the decline in their growth rates.

After impressive advances in basic human development and rapid growth, Eastern Europe and the CIS countries suffered from weak links during the first half of the 1990s. Russia, for example, experienced a downward spiral of declining human development and reduced growth (box 3.7).

During 1960-92 not a single country succeeded in moving from lopsided devel-



Income and human development progress by decade (percent)

Country	GDP per capita growth rate			HDI* shortfall reduction		
	1960-70	197080	1980-92	1960-70	1970-80	1980-92
Pattern 1						
Botswana	2.4	11.4	6.0	10.9	15.0	21.1
Sri Lanka	2.1	2.8	3.0	10.1	15.2	22.1
Pattern 2						
China	1.7	4.1	10.0	24.9	23.4	23.3
Indonesia	1.5	4.8	4.0	16.2	17.9	25.7
Pattern 3						
Argentina	2.5	1.2	-0.7	9.0	13.6	19.5
Honduras	1.5	2.2	-0.8	13.0	17.6	20.3
Pattern 4						
Barbados	6.4	2.5	0.1	17.6	18.3	26.5
Mexico	3.7	3.5	0	15.0	16.5	19.3
Pattern 5						
India	1.6	0.8	3.0	8.5	10.2	13.3
Pattern 6						
Cameroon	-0.3	5.1	-2.1	8.5	10.2	14.0
Pattern 7						
Brazil	3.3	6.0	-0.7	11.4	12.9	15.5
Egypt	2.9	5.7	2.3	9.1	10.1	14.8

opment with slow human development and rapid growth to a virtuous circle in which human development and growth can become mutually reinforcing. Every country that has been able to combine and sustain both rapid human development and rapid growth did so by accelerating advancements in human development.

Policy recommendations for countries with weak links

Countries with weak links need a major effort to generate and accelerate growth through investment in human development. Growth is needed to sustain improvements in human capabilities, and these in turn are needed to accelerate growth.

Experience suggests that no country undergoes a structural transformation of the economy without raising basic education levels. The well-known links between female education and fertility, between education and productivity and between mother's education and children's educational attainment all explain why this is so.

From a policy perspective, a basic level of human development, particularly minimum literacy and universal primary education, must set the stage for the process of transformation and sustainable growth. This need has become even more compelling as the global economy becomes more integrated and countries must compete more in the global market. Without a labour force with basic skills, a country cannot adapt to changing market conditions and climb the ladder to the production of goods requiring higher skills.

The rapid growth in the 1960s in some African countries with weak links was shortlived because it was based on a commodity price boom and undiversified economies. These countries need to accelerate their economic growth to initiate and sustain improvements in human development. Although many have achieved significant improvements in human development with modest growth, the pace of improvement slackens with economic decline. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, primary school enrolment grew steadily from the 1960s to 1979. But it began to taper off, and by the 1990s the growth in primary enrolment was no longer keeping up with the increase in the school-age population.

At the rates of progress that prevailed between 1970 and 1993, these countries will not achieve the HDI of industrial countries for nearly 65 years. At the rates prevailing during the same period in a country such as Mozambique or Niger, it would take more than two centuries to reach the HDI level of industrial countries.

Countries in South Asia that experienced both slow human development and slow economic growth during the 1970s should work to translate their nowaccelerating economic growth into enhanced human capabilities. Efforts should be directed to enhancing the quality of the growth, by improving the distribution of income and by focusing on employment creation and poverty reduction.

Accelerating the pace of progress calls for policy change—and a long-term commitment by the leaders and the people to pursue universal education, literacy and minimum standards of health. National, regional, local, community and family goals must be set.

Financing this acceleration will require restructuring both public and private resources. There is scope for such restructuring: military spending is on the rise in some of these countries. For Sub-Saharan Africa it totals \$8 billion, nearly enough to achieve universal primary education and provide basic health care, nutrition and family planning. In several countries the annual deficits of loss-making public enterprises far exceed the budgetary provisions for health and education. The budgetary allocations for social services can sometimes be doubled or tripled by selling off such enterprises.

Resources also need to be reallocated within sectors, away from prestigious development projects and towards human development priorities that benefit the people broadly. Budgetary subsidies should be reserved for social programmes that reach the masses rather than those that benefit a few elites—for primary health care services rather than urban hospitals, for basic education rather than universities. A useful exercise in all countries would be to prepare a transparent breakdown of their budgets to show the real beneficiaries of budgetary allocations. Additional resources are always desirable, but the immediate challenge is to reallocate exist-

Zimbabwe-two steps forward, two back

After independence in 1980 Zimbabwe invested heavily in human development, devising several innovative programmes for accelerated action in education, health, housing and water and sanitation. But in the late 1980s this investment faltered under the pressure of adjustment and because the government failed to develop economic opportunities to use the people's improved capabilities. Between 1980 and 1987 Zimbabwe's human development index increased from 0.386 to 0.576; by 1990 it had dropped back to 0.398.

Zimbabwe's first majority government adopted a policy of "growth with equity" and emphasized social development. Health was high on the list. Before independence per capita spending on health for whites was seven times that for rural blacks, and infant mortality among rural blacks was ten times that among whites. The new government concentrated on primary health care in rural areas. In its first two years it raised health expenditure by more than 60% and maintained it at around 5% of spending throughout the 1980s. It expanded immunization and other priority health actions. Infant mortality fell from 82 per thousand live births in 1980 to 67 by 1990. And life expectancy rose from 54 to 58 years.

There was a similar push in education. Before independence black school enrolment was 50% or less. The new government made primary education free and compulsory for all, and built thousands of new schools. To allow rapid expansion of the teaching force, it developed the innovative ZIMTEC programme for training teachers on the job. School enrolment shot up to 100% of eligible children.

At first this social spending was financed from an economic boom. In 1980 and 1981, thanks to good rainfall, high world commodity prices and agricultural pricing policies that rewarded producers and helped stimulate domestic demand, Zimbabwe's GDP increased by 7% a year.

BOX 3.6

The boom was short-lived, however, and two years of drought and declining per capita GDP followed. Then came a revival and another decline. This boombust pattern is due in part to the vagaries of weather. But the severity of the bust periods is also due to extensive government controls that reduced the economy's productive efficiency. The problems were compounded by high public sector spending that for most of the 1980s produced fiscal deficits of more than 10% of GDP.

Job creation too was inadequate. In 1980–89 formal sector jobs grew from 1 million to only 1.25 million, while the labour force increased from 2.5 million to 4 million. This increased the inequality of income, and the Gini coefficient rose to 0.72.

This poor record was the result of slow economic growth. But it was not helped by policies that made capital cheap relative to labour and encouraged labour substitution. Nor did the government manage to redistribute productive resources effectively.

Faced with slow growth and a high budget deficit, the government embarked on a structural adjustment programme in 1991. This undermined many gains in social development-but has not yet delivered better economic performance. The introduction of user fees for health services, for example, along with rising food prices, has affected health standards. By 1993 infant mortality was still 67 per thousand live births and life expectancy had fallen to 53 years. And in education, budget cuts and the introduction of school fees have reduced both enrolment and completion rates.

Source: Mumbengegwi 1995 and Loewenson and Chisvo 1995.

ing resources. This can be difficult and painful. But the long-term gains are enormous—as shown by the now fast-growing countries, which made early investments in human development.

Massive investment in human development can change countries' comparative advantage in external trade and thus promote growth. Many countries now have a major imbalance between (scarce) human and social capital and (plentiful) natural

BOX 3.7

Russia-into reverse

By international standards the Soviet Union achieved many impressive advances in basic human development over much of the 20th century. Even so, its human development index in 1990 (0.862) was below that of countries with lower incomes, such as Chile, the Republic of Korea, Trinidad and Tobago and Urug ay.

Since 1991 Russia's growth and human development have plummeted. Deep recession and hyperinflation sharply increased unemployment and poverty and exacerbated income inequality. Life expectancy, mortality and morbidity have worsened dramatically. Russia is now struggling to rebound from this downward spiral.

In the late 1980s only about 10% of Russians were living below the official poverty line—set at half the national per capita income. Since 1991 that percentage has more than tripled despite a lowering of the poverty line. Income inequalit as soared, and the Gini coefficient rose from 0.26 in 1991 to 0.41 in 1994. In 1991–94 average real wages dropped by more than a third, and agricultural wages by more than half. The working poor have been hit hard: in 1990 the minimum wage was 23% of the average wage, in early 1995 only 6%.

Actual wages (rather than official figures) are often even lower. Many wages are paid three or four months late, in some cases never. And inflation has eroded their real value—as it has for pensions and unemployment benefits. In early 1995 the minimum pension was only about 30% of subsistence income.

While official unemployment is less than 3%, one in five workers is probably

Source: Standing 1995.

out of work. Many workers are not recorded as unemployed because they are on long-term "unpaid leave". Other workers are not paid. Many are not laid off because enterprises would owe them two or three months' severance pay.

There has been a catastrophic fall in life expectancy, particularly for men. In 1989–90 male life expectancy was 64 years; by early 1995 it was 57.3, and female life expectancy had fallen by more than four years, to 70. No other industrial country has experienced such a sustained decline, and no country has a greater gender gap (almost 13 years) in life expectancy.

The Russian population is shrinking rapidly as birth rates decline and death rates rise. There has been a worrying rise in infant mortality, now four times as high as that in the United States. Mortality among young and middleaged men has risen dramatically largely because of the stress of wrenching structural adjustment, the rising incidence of cardiovascular disease and industrial pollution. Homicides, suicides and accidental deaths are on the increase.

The Russian education system is also deteriorating. There has been a sharp drop in teachers' salaries. Secondary and tertiary enrolment has declined. About 17% of teenagers (aged 15–19) were neither studying nor employed in 1994.

Some argue that all such calamities were necessary to lay the foundation for a new society and real economic growth. But need the transition have been so abrupt or so bad? And if growth is revived, will the new order be structured to foster human development? capital, condemning them to the export of low-value unprocessed primary products. Recent technological developments can help level the playing field for international opportunities—if countries make the effort to acquire new technical skills.

Policy recommendations for countries with strong links

The challenge for countries enjoying a virtuous circle of rapid improvement in both human development and income is to give even greater attention to human development—including poverty reduction, human rights and environmental conservation and regeneration. These countries should ensure that their high growth rates are fully used for human development.

Although they have achieved considerable human development progress in the past three decades, the human development levels of some of these countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore—still fall below those of other countries with similar per capita incomes. To bridge this gap, they should target segments of the population that have not fully benefited from overall human development and growth, such as women.

In addition to fully meeting the basic needs of their people, countries in this group need to aim at advancing the higher levels of human development, such as tertiary education. This should ensure their international competitiveness and thus sustain their income growth in the future.

Policy recommendations for countries with unbalanced links

FAST GROWTH AND SLOW HUMAN DEVEL-OPMENT. A more equitable distribution of public and private resources is needed to address the lopsided development of countries with fast growth and slow human development. More participatory patterns of economic growth, in most cases emphasizing job creation and productivity growth, would help. So would redistributing productive assets and income and emphasizing human rather than physical capital. Redistributing productive assets has long been recognized as the most efficient way of promoting equity without hurting growth.

The recent literature on equity and growth suggests that such a redistribution may enhance economic growth. More egalitarian distribution of human capital through investment in education is among the more socially feasible and assured ways of promoting growth by increasing equality.

Improving the equality of distribution of private resources should enable more people to invest in developing their capabilities. For public resources, inequitable and inefficient allocation—rather than the lack of such resources—is often the reason for their limited impact on human development. Reallocating public expenditures within and between sectors to ensure that basic needs are met should enhance the impact of spending on human development. These countries too should give a transparent breakdown of their budgets to show who the real beneficiaries are.

SLOW GROWTH AND FAST HUMAN DEVEL-OPMENT. To harness the human capabilities in countries with slow income growth and fast human development, a stronger link between human resource development and the economy needs to be established. Demand for available human resources should be augmented through investment in productive activities corresponding to the skill composition of the population.

For countries with faster human development, skill-intensive productive activities should be considered. Such countries can benefit from the experience of East Asia, where the effect of rising education on growth was augmented through government actions. These included an emphasis on manufactured exports to generate demand for labour—and increasingly for skilled labour. Government action is also needed to strengthen the links between science and technology institutions and the needs of the economy.

Public action along these lines could establish a virtuous circle that would increase both the demand for and the supply of education. One of the most important ways of achieving and maintaining this virtuous circle is ensuring that people have a full range of opportunities to match their growing capabilities, the focus of the next chapter. More egalitarian distribution of human capital through investment in education is among the more socially feasible and assured ways of promoting growth by increasing equality

CHAPTER 4



Translating growth into employment opportunities

Economic growth has the potential to enhance human capabilities and enlarge people's choices. But for this potential to be realized, there must be a steady expansion in opportunities, to enable people to make improved choices. And for people to have greater freedom to choose among different ways of living, the opportunities need to be more equitably distributed-between men and women, between rural and urban areas, between ethnic minorities and dominant groups, and among all members of society. At the same time, without growth, striving for an equitable distribution of opportunities could well result in a zero-sum gamebetter opportunities for some but a loss of opportunities for others. This is akin to redistribution of poverty. The goal is to equal-

BOX 4.1

Commitment to rights to development

International agreements and declarations on rights to development are explicit and far-reaching. Under them, all people have the right of access to opportunities and resources and the right to participate in (and contribute to) national development. These are positive rights that require action—in contrast to negative rights that involve refraining from action. Most political and civil human rights are negative rights—the right not to be tortured, for example.

How can states guarantee such rights when they lack the necessary resources? Treaties and declarations recognize that these rights are goals and objectives to be achieved progressively. What is important is to recognize that these are indeed universal goals.

And how serious are states' commitments to equal rights? Many have not

Source: United Nations Centre for Human Rights 1995.

even signed and ratified the conventions that they agreed to in global debate. Only the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been close to universal ratification (see indicator table 48). One hundred eighty-four states have ratified this document, four have signed but not yet ratified it (including the United States), and four have done neither.

The impressive success of the Convention on the Rights of the Child can be contrasted with the slow ratification of other treaties. Only 133 states ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 132 the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 149 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Countries committed to human rights should work to ratify all the conventions—and then to implement them. ize opportunities while expanding them.

The opportunities that are vital in human life are of many different kinds: access to jobs, information and technology, access to productive assets such as land and credit, access to proper shelter, safe drinking water, basic education and health services, and access to physical infrastructure such as good roads, electricity and adequate communications. Equally important are opportunities to move about and speak freely, to pursue cultural and religious beliefs, to participate without discrimination in political processes and in activities of civil society, to be free from exploitation and to lead a life of self-determination and self-respect as a member of a community.

These opportunities are of three broad types—economic, social and political. But the three categories are closely interrelated, and expanding one type of opportunity often helps expand others. Promoting access to education, for example, expands job opportunities (economic), helps people improve their status in society (social) and often empowers them in the community and society (political).

Everyone should have access to these opportunities to participate in economic, social, cultural and political life. They are a basic right. When the world's leaders drew up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947, they incorporated a holistic vision of rights—extending beyond free political and civil participation to economic, cultural and social development: "Everyone is entitled to the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality" (box 4.1). Since 1947 a series of conventions and declarations have defined the content of these rights.

Opportunity for productive work —the key

This chapter focuses on employment—on job creation—because it is the main bridge between economic growth and the opportunities of human development.

The most fundamental of all economic opportunities, employment—or work provides people with incomes that enable them to establish command over a range of goods and services needed to ensure a decent standard of living.

Employment here means all ways of securing a livelihood, not just wage employment. Many people in developing countries work on their own farms or are otherwise self-employed, often in the informal sector. Nor is work limited to paid employment. People engage in many unpaid activities in the household or community that make a valuable contribution to society—raising children and caring for the sick and elderly, or participating in voluntary organizations or religious groups (chapter 2).

People value their work for many reasons beyond income. Work allows them to make a productive contribution to society and to exercise their skills and creativity. It brings strong recognition that fosters selfrespect and dignity. And it gives them opportunities to participate in collective effort and to interact socially.

Work is also closely tied to a way of life, and people elect to do one kind of work rather than another as a life choice. The Tuareg nomads in West Africa manage their cattle—that is their "job", but it is also a way of life. Moreover, the right kind of employment opens a broad range of opportunities —empowering people not just economically but also socially and politically. For women, earning an income is often critical in gaining more say in decision-making in the family and community.

Growing income and expanding opportunity

Ensuring that economic growth expands employment opportunities that meet people's aspirations should be restored as a top policy objective in all countries. It also

South Africa's challenge and example

Mandela

In the history of nations generations have made their mark through their acumen in appreciating critical turning points and, with determination and creativity, seizing the moment. A new and better life will be achieved only if we shed the temptation to proceed casually along the road—only if we fully take the opportunities that beckon.

We must unite in a New Patriotism to achieve the goal of creating a new society.

The potential for economic growth and development is better than it has been for many decades. But let us be brutally frank.

Despite the welcome growth, very few jobs have been created. In fact, against the backdrop of new entrants into the job market, there has been a shrinkage in opportunities. We need a national vision to lift us out of this quagmire. If we do not act together in the public and private sectors to develop and implement such a national strategic vision, the danger is that even the modest growth we have attained will peter out in a matter of a few years, as the strains of limited capacity, skill shortages and balance of payments and other constraints start to gather momentum, and as increasing unemployment and accelerating poverty bear down on our society.

The task of government is to harness the energies of the people into a material force for growth and development. What is required is a partnership, among communities, government and the private sector.

> Nelson Mandela President of South Africa

needs to be made a global objective. Meeting this challenge has in recent years become more difficult, and the determination to meet the challenge less sure (see the special contribution by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa).

Unemployment is high and growing, particularly in industrial countries. It has been rising in almost all OECD countries, and in 1993 ranged from 2.5% in Japan to 23% in Spain. Unemployment affects 35 million people, and there are another 4 million or so "discouraged workers" who do not register as unemployed because they have given up hope of finding an acceptable job. Millions of others are employed only part-time. Women figure prominently among both discouraged and part-time workers. They constitute up to 77% of discouraged workers in Australia and 72% of involuntary part-time workers in Japan. Unemployment is also concentrated among the young: youth unemployment is 20% in France and 25% in Ireland and Italy.

In Eastern Europe and the CIS countries unemployment has ballooned (from zero) since the start of reforms in 1990, with wage employment falling sharply—by as much as 30% in Bulgaria and Hungary.

Even many fast-growing developing countries are struggling to expand employment fast enough to keep up with their growing populations, especially in urban areas. The challenge in coming years is great even for China, which has dramatically lowered its population growth rate and is creating many jobs through a growth strategy based on labour-intensive industries.

In other developing countries, with the notable exception of the fast-growing economies in East and South-East Asia and a handful of others, unemployment problems are acute although different in nature. Unemployment ranges widely, both within and between regions-from 2% in the Republic of Korea to 19% in Trinidad and Tobago. Official unemployment statistics in most developing countries, however, have limited meaning, because much of the employment is in rural areas and in the urban informal sector, both of which are poorly covered in official statistics. But open unemployment is severe and growing in many urban areas, particularly among the youth. In Kenya it has risen to 29%-compared with an average of 10% in urban areas-and in Algeria to 21%.

The jobs that are available are less and less satisfactory. Job security is being eroded. Employment is increasingly parttime and in piecework in industrial countries and in the informal sector in developing countries. In Latin America three-fourths of the jobs created are now in the informal sector. People employed in the informal sector must struggle to use their creativity and entrepreneurship, usually with little capital, few skills and limited technology.

In Eastern Europe and the CIS countries people long accustomed to secure and full employment suddenly face increasing insecurity and unemployment as the public sector restructures and the private sector lags in generating new jobs. Even where the economy is growing, wages are declining. Eastern Europe's five strongest economies —the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia—grew by an average 3–5% in 1994. But except in the Czech Republic, nominal wages in industry fell in 1994 and early 1995.

Nowhere is the issue of job security more acute than in the United States, where the economy is growing and unemployment is low, but job security is declining. In a recent survey a third of respondents had had their lives disrupted because they or a member of their household had been laid off.

All this is cause for public concern and debate—from Harare to Paris to Beijing. Politicians promise action but have found it difficult to deliver.

Unemployment today is not just an issue of poor economic growth, particularly in the OECD countries. The old assumption that economic growth would automatically expand employment and wages is increasingly questioned. People are asking why, if the economy is growing at a healthy pace, is unemployment increasing and job security being eroded? And why can people afford less leisure, even as they work harder? Some call it the "end of work" where the link between economic growth and employment expansion has been weakened, if not broken.


Does economic growth expand opportunities?

Does economic growth expand opportunities? Is jobless growth a reality? Where was there job-creating growth, and how was it achieved?

If employment grows faster than the labour force, there will be some expansion in work opportunities. Although a crude and simple measure, opportunity expansion implies greater chances for people to find work. An analysis of the experience of expanding opportunities during the 1980s, based on data available for 69 countries, came to two major conclusions.

First, growth in employment opportunities is strongly and positively correlated with both GDP per capita growth and reduction in HDI shortfall (figure 4.1). A 1 percentage point increase in the average annual GDP per capita growth rate was associated with an 0.18 percentage point increase in the growth rate of opportunities. And a 1 percentage point reduction in the HDI

FIGURE 4.1 Expanding opportunities coupled with strong growth means human development progress



Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various editions, World Bank 1994a and UNDP 1994a.


shortfall was associated with a 0.09 percentage point increase in the growth rate of opportunities. These results show that the expansion of employment opportunities depends on economic growth and on the expansion of basic human capabilities.

But income growth will not invariably and automatically translate into expansion of employment opportunities if certain supportive policies are not also in place. Countries with similar rates of growth in per capita income had strikingly different results in opportunity expansion. Put another way, the same opportunity expansion can be achieved with slow or fast per capita growth.

Second, as shown in chapter 1, the 1980s were a difficult decade for growth in Africa, Latin America and the Arab States. Most of the countries in the sample studied fared even worse in expanding opportunities (figure 4.2). Only about a third (27) achieved both an increase in per capita income and growth in opportunities. In another 19 countries opportunities contracted despite growing income. This was true, for example, for Pakistan, which had a healthy growth rate of more than 3% a year (figure 4.3). The other 23 countries had declines in per capita income, so it is not surprising that opportunities contracted in many of them. But in some of these countries employment opportunities expanded. This was only possible through the addition of a large number of low-productivity jobs.

These trends, based on official employment and labour force data, probably overstate the poor opportunity expansion for most developing countries because they omit what has happened in the informal sector. If the informal sector were taken into account, several countries—especially in Latin America and the Caribbean would probably be characterized as having jobs with growth or even growthless jobs. One such country is Jamaica, where per capita GDP grew by 1.3% a year, opportunities grew at a modest 0.5%, and productivity stagnated.

Even where opportunities expand, job growth might not be enough to absorb the backlog of unemployment, especially in urban areas. The rapid urbanization taking




place creates strong pressure for employment creation, particularly for the youth. An analysis focusing only on urban areas might identify many more cases of growth without opportunity expansion and opportunity expansion without growth.


These trends also show the impact of population growth in developing countries (figure 4.4). In many cases of jobless growth lots of employment was being created, but not fast enough to match the rapid growth in the labour force—such as in India, where employment expanded by 2%, Pakistan (3.5%), Colombia (3%) and Burundi (2.7%). Many countries that generated jobs with growth and productivity increases also had high rates of labour force expansion, such as Botswana (3.4%), Turkey (3%), Malaysia (2.9%) and Chile (2.7%).


Productivity improvements are necessary for both sustained growth in GDP and wage increases. Productivity increases were registered in almost all countries that achieved growth with opportunity expansion. This is an ideal scenario: sustained economic growth contributes to opportunity expansion, reducing unemployment and spreading productivity gains among the growing number of employed. But produc-

FIGURE 4.3 Same employment growth, different labour force growth



Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various editions, and World Bank 1994a.





tivity also rose in some countries that experienced jobless growth, such as Colombia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe among the developing countries and Austria, France, Italy, Norway and Sweden among the industrial countries (figure 4.5). In this situation income and productivity growth benefited only those lucky enough to be employed, while unemployment grew and disparities between the employed and the unemployed widened. In Sweden per capita income rose by 1.7%, productivity by 1.5% and employment by 0.5%. But with labour force growth at 1%, opportunities shrank by 0.5%.

A country's total productivity can rise even when there is stagnation and unemployment. This could arise from the elimination of low-productivity jobs. Such productivity gains come at the expense of employment, as is often the case with stabilization policies, causing pain today in the hope of recovery tomorrow. In Benin and Ghana, for example, which implemented major public sector retrenchment programmes during a recession, total employment shrank, as did per capita incomes. Employment opportunities contracted by 5% a year in Benin and by 7% in Ghana. But productivity rose by 5% and 6%.

Employment-creating growth—and the synergy with capability expansion

What lessons can be drawn from these divergent experiences? Economic growth is a major determinant of expanding opportunities, but that is not the end of the story. The 27 countries achieving growth with opportunity expansion include 12 industrial countries with moderate growth, among them Canada, Switzerland and the United States. The rest are mostly the high-growth East Asian economies and others now following high-growth strategies, such as Chile, China, Mauritius and Turkey.


These developing countries had high growth (more than 3% per capita a year), but their growth pattern clearly favoured sectors with high potential for both job creation and productivity increases. Some of these, such as the Republic of Korea and Singapore, adopted such a strategy well before the 1980s and succeeded in reducing unemployment. Another important element was the synergy created when this type of growth was combined with rapid improvement in the skills of workers.

Thus, whether growth expands the opportunities for work—and contributes to human development—depends not just on the rate of growth but also on its pattern. It depends on what is produced, by whom and how, on the composition of output and the technology used, on the organization of production and on the distribution of such productive assets as land and financial capital. All these affect the amount and kind of employment generated. And all are responsive to policy (figure 4.6).

So, in pursuing growth, countries have choices—between growth that generates much employment and growth that generates little or none at all, between growth that raises wages and growth that suppresses them, between growth that improves working conditions and growth that keeps them miserable and between growth that secures livelihoods and growth that makes life precarious. In short, countries have a choice between growth that improves the quantity and quality of work opportunities and growth that does neither.

The quality of work is especially important. Much work is hard, exploitative and dangerous—more burden than blessing. Child labour is an extreme case of such exploitative work (box 4.2). So, if work is to enhance human development, it must also be creative, safe and secure, and it must meet people's choices and aspirations. Where sustained economic growth was combined with opportunity expansion, high growth translated not only into more jobs but also into higher wages. During 1960–90 real wages rose by nearly 8% a year in the Republic of Korea (figure 4.7).

At the same time, education expanded rapidly. Production was shifted progressively to higher-skill and higher-wage sectors. These shifts to higher-productivity sectors were made possible by the progressive improvement in workers' education and skill levels, investments in research and



The unjust employment of children

BOX 4.2

Millions of children are put to work in ways that deny them their right to childhood. These children invariably work long hours every day in poor, unhealthy and hazardous conditions-knotting carpets, packing matches into boxes, picking garbage, carrying molten glass-without respite and recreation. Such work frequently leads to chronic illnesses, destroyed evesight, physical and intellectual stunting and, in many cases, even premature death. Most of these children belong to marginal communities and to socially and economically deprived groups. The worst consequence of all may be that child labour keeps children out of school, thereby preventing the development of their capabilities-a priority for a longrun solution to poverty and exploitation.

The unjust employment of children, unlike unemployment and underemployment, has received little attention until very recently. Estimates of the number of employed children vary from 14 million to 100 million in India, 2 million to 19 million in Pakistan, 5 million to 15 million in Bangladesh, 2 million to 7 million in Brazil, 1.3 million to 13 million in Mexico and some 12 million in Nigeria. In Africa more than 20% of children are considered to be working, and in Latin America between 10% and

Source: ILO and UNICEF data.


25%. Some of the most widespread forms of child labour—domestic help, agricultural and bonded workers, especially girls—are largely invisible.


Child labour is not an economic compulsion of all poor families. It is the consequence of extreme social and economic exploitation. How can it be eliminated? By prevention.

The only way to prevent child labour is to recognize that children's rightful place is in school, not in the workplace or in the house. So, the first step is to ensure compulsory primary education for all children. Historically and worldwide, wherever child labour has been abolished, this is how it has been done.

At the same time, a set of complementary measures need to be put into place: income enhancement programmes for the poor, payment of minimum wages, the empowerment of women, enactment and enforcement of appropriate laws, and social services for the families of child workers.

More broadly, public action must be mobilized along all fronts: among nongovernmental organizations, trade unions, the media, human rights activists, trade associations, employers organizations and children, to change attitudes towards child labour and to build public pressure against hiring children.





Source: Tokman and Infante 1995.

development and progressive technological advance. Birdsall, Ross and Sabot explain how in the Republic of Korea, the rapid rise in employment and incomes fuelled the demand for education. Families had more disposable income, but they also saw the potential returns to investing in their children's future as the wage differential between skilled and unskilled jobs increased.

This pattern of growth—with full employment and rising wages—was one reason behind the reduction in poverty and inequality that accompanied high growth in Japan, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea and Singapore.

This experience contrasts with that of such Latin American countries as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico. These countries too achieved high growth during 1960–80, ranging from 2.5% to 8.7% a year, but growth faltered in the 1980s.

Employment expanded in the modern manufacturing sector, but not fast enough to absorb the growing labour force. Employment also grew in the service sector, and the informal sector grew exponentially. But most of the jobs in these sectors were not high productivity, increasing the segmentation of the labour market-between the modern sector with high-wage jobs and good working conditions, and the informal sector, service sector and agriculture, all with much lower productivity. In Mexico productivity per worker in agriculture was 20% of productivity in industry in 1960, 21% in 1980 and 28% in 1990. But even the higher rate in 1990 is much less than the 57% in the Republic of Korea for that year. This pattern of growth does not promote reduction in inequalities.

Policies for employment-creating growth

There clearly is no universal recipe for combining growth with the expansion of opportunities in an "employment-friendly" growth strategy. Even so, lessons from successful countries show some of the major components that can be combined in such a strategy.

1. A clear political commitment to full employment

Where employment creation has been most successful, it has generally been the result of a deliberate strategy. Rather than assuming that employment would materialize automatically, political leaders have identified it as a central policy objective.

Back in 1947, when world leaders were still haunted by memories of mass unemployment and hunger marches in the 1930s, guaranteeing full employment was at the top of national and international agendas. These leaders saw unemployment as a threat to individual livelihoods—and to world peace and security.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is specific about the right to work. Article 23 of the declaration states that "everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, and to protection against unemployment." ILO Convention 122 on employment policy further reinforces the promotion of "full, productive and freely chosen employment" as a major policy goal.

And historically, the countries most successful in expanding opportunities emphasized employment growth as a policy goal and as an integral part of a growth strategy. Most important, they sustained this policy objective through a long-term vision and commitment. Mauritius adopted full employment as a top priority on its independence in 1968 and pursued it until it was achieved in 1990 (box 4.3). In Japan and Sweden, which maintained the lowest unemployment rates among industrial countries through business cycles and economic ups and downs, there was a longterm national commitment-by government, politicians, trade unions and employers-to protecting employment.

The priority given to employment has driven the choice of development strategy and led to reversals of long-standing policies. Facing rising unemployment in the early 1960s, Singapore adopted a development strategy based on labour-intensive manufacturing industries. China reversed its policy of investment in capital-intensive industries to favour investment in labourintensive production, especially for export, and the expansion of the private sector and rural industries (box 4.4). It also reversed agricultural policies, to give greater encouragement to small family plots.

Employment needs to be restored to its place among the top policy concerns of economic management. The macroeconomic frameworks agreed to between governments and the Bretton Woods institutions need to focus on employment—not just inflation, GDP growth, short- and mediumterm reforms and short-term fiscal and budgetary targets. They need to set employment targets, which are essential to human development and to sustained future growth.

2. Faster employment-led growth

Countries that combined growth with opportunity expansion opted for growth strategies led by labour-intensive sectors in early development stages, when there was surplus labour. They identified the sectors that made the best use of the abundant unskilled and semi-skilled labour and used various policy instruments to promote them. Mauritius established an export processing zone, and Singapore granted tariff protection to labour-intensive, exportoriented manufacturing industries and others that also generated many jobs.

But staying in labour-intensive, lowskill sectors does not improve productivity and incomes. Long-term development strategies must set out to move from lowskill, low-productivity sectors to more skill-intensive, higher-productivity ones. Singapore adopted a strategy for industrial restructuring under its 1979 New Economic Policy, shifting to activities that require more skill-intensive technologies for higher-value-added products, such as semiconductors and communications equipment.

Countries with different resources and at different stages of development will find that different sectors have the most potential for job creation. Skills, surplus labour and wages are key elements in this choice. Manufactured exports were central in many success stories—China, Malaysia, Mauritius and the Republic of Korea. This sector creates many jobs for relatively unskilled workers and for women, and it has the added advantage of promoting faster learning and technology upgrading than, say, mining. Computer software and data processing may be the job-generating sectors of the 1990s and beyond, as India has shown.

But other sectors should not be neglected. For many developing countries

Mauritius-commitment to opportunity expansion

Mauritius has consistently given top priority to both capability and opportunity expansion since its independence in 1968. Government policies were aimed at equitable growth through the expansion of productive jobs, full employment and equal access to education. Since 1968 GDP has grown at 5% a year, income inequality has declined (the Gini coefficient fell from 0.42 in 1975 to 0.38 in 1992), life expectancy rose from 62 to 70 years, and the population over age five never attending school fell from 52% to 11%.

When Mauritius came to independence in 1968, the island nation was a one-crop (sugar) economy, suffering from stagnating economic growth, high population growth and widespread unemployment. Yet 65% of men and 51% of women had achieved literacy by 1960, and primary school enrolment had reached 100% for boys by 1950 and for girls around 1970. Commitment to open opportunities began in the colonial times, through the 1946 Ten-Year Development Plan, which was characterized as "an attack on the Mauritian people's two great handicaps-ill health and inadequate education"-and aimed at democratizing educational opportunities.

The strategy that brought rapid economic growth after independence was built around labour-intensive sectors expanding the sugar sector by negotiating for European markets under the Lomé Convention, promoting tourism and establishing an export processing zone. Employment expanded rapidly, more than doubling between 1962 and 1991. Women in particular took advantage of the new opportunities, and the share of women working grew from 18% in 1962 to 35% in 1991. In manufacturing women hold 56% of jobs.

BOX 4.3

In education too, access was made more equitable as secondary education became free in 1976 and tertiary education in 1988. Other efforts were also made to equalize opportunities, such as improving standards in low-achieving primary schools and guaranteeing access to secondary school for two pupils in any school from which no child otherwise qualified. Government policy protected these priorities during structural adjustment programmes, resisting options to cut spending and impose fees.

Today, the country continues to make concerted efforts to "climb the skill ladder", to increase productivity and to diversify into higher-skill industry with policies in:

 Technology—Incentives have been granted to enterprises using higher levels of technology and skills, even those outside the export processing zone that are manufacturing for the local market.

• *Training*—A 1% levy has been placed on basic salaries for a fund to provide incentive grants for vocational training.

• *Education*—The system is to be overhauled to improve vocational and technical education. Education is to be compulsory to age 15.

 Credit—Government controls have been relaxed to improve access to financing for small and medium-scale enterprises.

Source: Dommen and Dommen 1995, World Bank 1992a, Gulhati and Nallari 1990 and Hein 1988.

small-scale farming and industry still offer potential for increasing rural employment and productivity. Many of the poorest countries—once exporters of food—are now net importers with good potential to increase production. Agricultural development strategies can favour small over large holdings, following the considerable evidence that small holdings produce higher yields than large, mechanized holdings (box 4.5).

BOX 4.4

China-new economy, new jobs

Until the 1980s there was virtually no unemployment in China. After 1979 and the upheaval of economic reform, however, it became evident that up to half the labour force in some rural areas had been unemployed or underemployed. And in urban areas up to 25 million were out of work in 1979.

Since then China has reversed longstanding policies and adopted an employment-led growth strategy. Between 1978 and 1993 urban employment increased by 3.5% a year—from 95 million to 159 million. Rural employment increased by 2.5% a year—from 306 million to 443 million.

With the lifting of restrictions on businesses, much of the new urban employment is in the private sector. Unofficial sources suggest that the urban private sector accounts for around a third of all employment—and that it will soon replace the state as China's main creator of new jobs.

Reforms have also benefited employment in rural areas—particularly through the expansion of township and village enterprises. Between 1978 and 1993 these enterprises increased their share of gross national industrial production from 12% to 39%. And by 1995 the township enterprises and other businesses provided almost 35% of rural jobs.

In both rural and urban areas the rise in output and employment is due chiefly to the expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing. In the 30 years before reform most investment went into capital-intensive production. But since the late 1970s China has adopted policies to change the structure of production and investment in favour of labour-intensive

Source: Zhang 1995a.

goods, together with open trade and export-led policies. These policies included identifying pillars of industrial output and employment, dismantling restrictive trade regulations and encouraging foreign investment and the subsequent growth of the non-state sector.

The results of the policies are apparent. The share of labour-intensive manufactures in total exports rose from 36% in 1975 to 74% in 1990, while the share of capital-intensive manufactures dropped from 50% to 19%. Employment increased significantly. Between 1985 and 1993 employment in textiles increased by 20%, in clothing and fibre products by 43%, in plastic products by 51%. China is now a major exporter of labour-intensive products to many industrial countries.

The government has been taking an active role in the labour market—helping workers develop skills, promoting re-employment and upgrading employment services. An unemployment insurance scheme has been set up—95 million workers now contribute, and around a third of the officially unemployed receive benefits.

For all its dynamic job creation, China still faces a formidable employment challenge. Economic reforms have released a "floating population" of around 80 million, most of whom are seeking work. The State Planning Commission estimates that some 20 million workers will be shed from state enterprises over the next five years and that 120 million more will leave rural areas hoping for work in the cities. Labour-intensive economic growth will need to continue at a rapid pace if all these people are to find work. Other labour-intensive activities are rural infrastructure development and rural industries. In Botswana, another country that combined growth with jobs, government spending on infrastructure, education, public services and other development programmes accounted for 25–30% of employment in the 1980s. Rural industries absorb much labour, often relatively unskilled, and create employment for the rural poor.

In Taiwan (province of China) growth was led by small-scale agriculture. In Japan and the Republic of Korea investment in small-scale agriculture in the early stages of growth kept labour in the rural areas, expanding incomes broadly and equitably. In Japan even today more than 60% of workers are employed in firms with 100 or fewer employees. In these economies the period of rapid economic growth saw a continuous birth and rebirth of such small firms as government policy promoted labourintensive, small-scale enterprises through special credit facilities and protective government regulations.

By contrast, many countries have promoted capital-intensive sectors, such as extractive mining, or supported large mechanized farms rather than small family holdings. The result is a dualistic economy with a modern sector integrated into the global economy existing side by side with a lowerproductivity informal sector.

Many countries have also adopted policies that discourage employment creation, such as overvalued exchange rates and negative real interest rates, which encourage capital-intensive technology. In Pakistan industrial growth has not meant more jobs, partly because small-scale industries suffer discrimination in access to inputs and financing. Large-scale manufacturing industries using capital-intensive technologies have been the main beneficiaries of trade and exchange rate policies-and of credit rationing under artificially low interest rates. And perversely, some of the most capitalintensive industries (industrial chemicals, petroleum products and iron and steel) were highly protected while labour-intensive products (rubber and tobacco) had low or even negative protection.

3. Sustained investments in people—to climb the ladder of skills, productivity and wages

It is not enough to just generate jobs. The aim must be to improve the wages and productivity of all those working, by progressively adopting technologies and moving to sectors requiring higher skills. The effect is to climb the ladder of wage and productivity increases through skill improvements and the progressive expansion of employment in higher-productivity sectors. These new jobs need to be matched by new skills; employment and human capabilities must advance in tandem.

As wages rise, countries need to continuously upgrade their skills and technology and shift the composition of output from unskilled to skill-intensive products—from shoes and wigs to cars and semiconductors.

The ascent is difficult. Increasing the supply of highly skilled labour requires costly tertiary education. It also requires research and development. And it requires industrial policy to ensure that jobs are available for graduates to acquire skills and experience.

High-employment economies have invested heavily in the development of just such human capabilities-from basic education and health to technical education to research and development to in-service training. The Republic of Korea invests \$160 per person a year in education and health, Malaysia \$150. India, by contrast, invests only \$14, Pakistan \$10 and Bangladesh \$5. But beyond formal education, further skill training targeted to productivity increase is needed, in vocational institutions and in research and development (R & D). Asia now has 1.23 million scientists engaged in R & D, more than in Europe (1.1 million) or in North America (0.9 million), but less than in the CIS countries (1.7 million). But most important is training workers in the workplace so that they can master the ever-changing technology and continuously enhance their creative abilities and productivity. The competitiveness of the Japanese automobile industry, for example, is attributed largely to management techniques and worker training by the employer. Techniques developed in the industry—such as "the quality circle", which mobilizes workers' creativity to improve productivity—are now spreading internationally.

4. Pro-employment incentives and other interventions in the labour market

Labour markets do not work as smoothly as commodity markets. Intervention is needed to help people adjust to changing labour markets, and for markets to adjust to human needs.

BOX 4.5

Small farms-for more employment and more output

output

Small farms make more efficient use of resources than large farms. This proposition has one well-known policy implication: an agricultural development strategy that promotes small rather than large farms can serve both growth and distribution objectives.

Evidence from countries as diverse as Brazil and India indicates an inverse relationship between farm size and output and labour per unit of area. A land survey in North-East Brazil showed that farms of 0-10 hectares had production of \$85 per hectare, while the largest farms, those over 500 hectares, had a gross output of only \$2 per hectare. And a survey in India revealed that farms of 0-5 acres had output of 737 rupees per acre, and farms over 25 acres only 346 rupees per acre. The decisive factor in this inverse relationship is the way factor markets work, particularly rural labour markets. The most important reasons for this relationship:

• *Land use intensity*. As farm size increases, the proportion of land in productive use declines.

• Labour intensity. There is an inverse relationship between farm size and the amount of labour used per unit of area.

Small farmers face a low opportunity cost of labour because of family labour combined with relatively high prices for land and capital, while large farmers face a higher price for hired labour combined with relatively low prices for land and capital. Because of these differences in relative factor prices, small farmers commit more labour to production than large farmers, and large farmers treat land as a

Source: Ellis 1993, Lipton 1995 and Berry and Cline 1979.

relatively abundant resource and substitute machines for labour.

Small farmers could be even more productive if they could acquire land or credit at reasonable prices. They require relatively small quantities of additional non-labour resources to achieve large gains in output. By contrast, large farms require large quantities of capital to achieve the same yield increases using mechanized technology. Since capital is a scarce resource, this is a socially inefficient alternative for increasing output in agriculture.

In some countries a precondition for pursuing a strategy centred on small farms is a massive change in the land ownership structure. Because the private ownership of land is so heavily skewed towards large holdings, no amount of manipulation of relative prices or taxes can shift land allocation towards smaller holdings.

As land is redistributed from big to small farms, not only family labour per hectare can increase sharply. So can hired labour. And beneficiaries of land reform often divert family labour from the job market to their own farms. For both reasons, the employment situation improves even for those who remain landless after the land reform.

The main conclusion: an agricultural development strategy centred on small farms rather than large simultaneously increases the social efficiency of resource use in agriculture and improves social equity through employment creation and the more equal income distribution that small farms generate. Government interventions in the labour market have traditionally been oriented to regulation. Some of these—such as severance pay, or a minimum wage out of line with labour market realities—have had the

BOX 4.6

Mexico-globalization and employment

Less than a decade after acceding to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Mexico has already experienced both the benefits and the costs of an increasingly global economic system. In the 1980s it began rapid economic diversification and liberalization and became an important recipient of foreign direct investment. Long-term capital flows were invested mainly in manufacturing, expanding employment and strengthening export capacity.

Much of the foreign investment went into the automotive industry, which, with a skilled labour force, has become one of the world's most efficient. Its high productivity has allowed expanded production for the export market, creating thousands of jobs for Mexican workers.

Even before the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico's trade expanded considerably. Exports grew by 24% a year between 1990 and 1994. But aided by an overvalued exchange rate, imports grew even faster, creating a large current account deficit and displacing many Mexican producers. The current account deficit was financed by international capital flows, two-thirds of which were short-term speculative capital.

Although NAFTA hurt many small businesses, agriculture has been relatively unaffected because agricultural tariffs are to be phased out over a tenyear period. The poorest segment of the labour force, Mexican farmers cultivate corn on low-productivity, labour-intensive farms and are unable to compete against cheaper grain from the capitalintensive farms of the American Midwest. To ease the transition to an open economy, the Mexican government gives farmers cash benefits to help them switch from subsistence crops to commercial crops, while gradually reducing subsidies.

In 1994 Mexico suffered several political shocks. These, together with

Source: Data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática and Banco de Mexico.

changes in the international financial environment, caused a sharp fall in the country's foreign reserves. By the end of 1994 the exchange rate was no longer sustainable, and the government was forced to devalue the peso, plunging the country into the deepest recession in recent Mexican history and causing the worst unemployment of the past six decades.

What conclusions can be drawn from Mexico's recent experience with the globalization of trade and finance? Globalization can expand employment opportunities by opening new markets for a country's exports and bringing foreign direct investment that adds to its productive base. But it will displace workers unready to face international competition. And because capital moves so quickly and freely in the new global environment, governments that do not pursue sound policies risk severe economic disruptions. Mexico made the mistake of pursuing incompatible monetary and exchange rate policies, which ultimately led to a severe recession and to an enormous contraction in employment opportunities.

But to say that NAFTA and globalization are to blame for Mexico's social and economic problems would be a mistake. Because of NAFTA, Mexico has continued liberalizing its economy and has expanded exports considerably since the 1994 devaluation, moving ever more firmly towards a solid economic basis for sustained economic and employment growth. NAFTA has locked in that policy approach, making it irreversible even when painfully tested.

Globalization presents risks and opportunities to people and countries alike. The challenge lies in seizing the opportunities for income and employment expansion and in helping those who might be marginalized or displaced to acquire the skills they need to compete in the new global environment. perverse effect of discouraging employment creation. But labour regulations to enforce decent working conditions and prevent exploitation are needed more than ever. In addition, government should take a rigorous facilitating role, to smooth adjustment by enhancing information flows and encouraging the retraining of workers—as Mauritius did in the 1970s and 1980s and as China has begun to do now. In the context of global competition the constant upgrading of skills to keep up with technological change is even more important (box 4.6).

Worker retraining can be promoted not only through public training programmes, but also through financing schemes such as special funds. Publicly funded employment subsidy schemes—such as public works schemes—have played an important role in expanding employment in such diverse conditions as Chile in the 1970s and Maharashtra in India since 1972 (box 4.7).

Employment policy was one of the pillars of Sweden's successful postwar development. The state kept unemployment low by encouraging workers to move to new sectors and locations and to adapt to changing economic demand. But there were also special tax privileges to encourage companies to set aside profits during good times for investing later, when there was a downturn.

Smoothing labour market adjustments is the responsibility not just of governments, but also of employers. Social compacts between workers and employers can ensure that conditions of work respect the dignity of the worker. Alongside government intervention, such compacts can also foster the adoption of new technology, positive in the long term but disruptive for people in the short term, by supporting retraining and other measures to counter short-term displacement of workers.

In Sweden there was a solid compact between workers and employers: trade unions were strong, relations with employers were harmonious, and there were relatively few strikes. In Japan the compact between workers and managers played a big part in its record of maintaining unemployment below 3% until 1995, despite business cycles. The life-long employment system in large companies contributed to this stability, with bonuses allowing for flexible pay to adjust to ups and downs in business profitability. The system is based not only on a legal contract but also on trust and confidence—social capital—between workers and employers. While most observers predict a breakdown of this system, it is still the predominant form of employment for large employers (see box 4.10 on page 102).

5. Encouragement of the informal sector

The informal sector can be a major source of employment in developing countries. A recent study shows that the informal sector accounts for nearly 80% of all employment in Cotonou, Benin, and Ibadan, Nigeria, 68% in Bombay, India, and 66% in Douala, Cameroon. In Latin America an estimated 59% of the urban poor and 67% of the destitute derive their income from the informal sector. The informal sector is also where women mostly work.

Much job creation takes place in the informal sector. In Latin America during 1980-93, 82 of every 100 new jobs were generated in the informal sector. Informal sector employment grew by 8% a year, doubling previous trends and surpassing the growth of the urban labour force. In Brazil in 1980-93 the informal sector's share of non-agricultural employment grew from 34% to 56%. In Colombia it grew to 60%, and in Costa Rica from 36% to 53%. Municipalities in many countries have found that procurement from the informal sector and subcontracting to microenterprises have both saved on resources and reduced poverty.

Government policies often discourage the expansion of the informal sector, either inadvertently or because of concerns about enforcing tax and health laws and other industrial regulations. Conditions that tend to stifle the urban informal sector include zoning laws, laws prohibiting informal firms from selling their products in the most profitable locations and harassment by local police seeking bribes. Moreover, government interventions in labour, raw material and capital markets can distort prices in

Maharashtra-guaranteeing employment

The Employment Guarantee Scheme of Maharashtra in India has been widely recognized as a model employment safety net for those without work.

Maharashtra's scheme began in 1972 with the aim of providing, on request, a guarantee of employment at a stipulated wage within 15 days and no more than 5 kilometres from the applicant's village home.

Despite a recent decline, the scheme created about 89.4 million person-days of work in 1990–91. It provided employment to about 2.5% of the state's labour force and eliminated some 7% of the state's rural unemployment.

The programme pays the official minimum wage, somewhat higher than the market wage (around \$1 a day). When it was not possible to provide employment, an unemployment allowance was paid. In 1991 the programme cost 2.4 billion rupees (\$103 million),

Source: Dev 1993.

favour of formal businesses, reducing the competitive edge of informal firms.

A more positive approach would be to recognize the valuable contributions of the informal sector to employment—and to take actions that encourage it to expand.

Improving the productivity and working conditions of small-scale producers and microenterprises will be key. A microenterprise promotion programme in Cali, Colombia, has been extremely successful because it recognizes that poor people moving into the city are resourceful, creative and hard-working and have a propensity to save. Interventions must build on the entrepreneurial vitality of the informal sector to ensure quick results in improving living conditions and employment opportunities. Such interventions should create an enabling environment for informal sector growth through deregulation, assistance to microenterprises and access to raw materials, markets and technology. But also necessary is institutional development, so that informal sector operators can collectively negotiate regulations and services that support rather than undermine their activities.

more than 60% of which went to wages.

About 62% of workers in the programme come from households below the poverty line.

The programme has helped to mobilize the rural poor as a political force. It has developed backwards and resourcepoor areas. It has also acted as a check on the power of local officials. It is one of the most cost-effective schemes anywhere for helping the poor.

The scheme has several weaknesses, however. With its focus on employment generation through labour intensity, it has sometimes neglected the formation of productive assets in rural areas. The scheme aims to build up a stock of ready-to-go investment projects, but this has not always been achieved. And there have been some corruption and leakages. Even so, there is no denying that the scheme has helped create employment and reduce poverty.

6. Equitable access to productive assets

Lack of access to productive assets, particularly land and capital, is the main constraint for the rural and urban poor in developing countries, who are concentrated in smallscale agriculture and the informal sector.

ACCESS TO CAPITAL. Many people are self-employed, own small businesses or work in family enterprises or farms, the incubators of employment opportunities. But they get a small share of institutional credit. In the Philippines in 1991 small enterprises received barely 8% of institutional credit. And enterprises in the informal sector find it particularly difficult: in Costa Rica they get less than 15% of formal credit, and in Kenya barely 5%, considerably limiting their potential. Small enterprises in Ghana report that shortages of working capital leave up to 50% of their capacity idle.

Women have the worst access. In many African countries women account for more than 60% of the agricultural labour force and contribute up to 80% of total smallscale food production-yet receive less than 10% of the credit to small farmers and only 1% of total credit to agriculture. Although women make up 18% of the selfemployed in developing countries, they are only 11% of the beneficiaries of formal credit programmes in Latin America and 10% in the Philippines. The bias is similar in loans from international sources. In 1990 multilateral banks allocated about \$6 billion for rural credit to developing countries, but only 5% reached rural women.

This discrimination against small entrepreneurs is surprising. They account for up to two-thirds of the labour force in some countries—making the largest contribution to value added and doing so fairly efficiently. But commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans to them because of the perceived lower likelihood of repayment and the cost of administering many small loans.

There are exceptions and innovations. South Africa's largest commercial banks have begun a bold experiment to provide simple banking services to the poor. India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan now impose minimum quotas for small enterprises in the lending portfolios of commercial banks. And in Botswana the Financial Assistance Policy is aimed at job creation by encouraging investment in small industry.

Most of the recent innovations in credit provision to the poor have come from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In Bangladesh, for example, most rural microcredit programmes are operated by rural development NGOs.

ACCESS TO LAND. A family with some land can achieve not only a reasonable income but also a sense of ownership, recognition and social stature. But in many parts of the world land distribution is profoundly unequal. The Gini coefficient of land distribution—which ranges from 0 to 1 (the closer to 1, the more unequal the distribution)—is 0.57 in Jordan, 0.62 in Sri Lanka, 0.64 in Chile, 0.70 in Colombia, 0.83 in Saudi Arabia, 0.84 in Panama, 0.84 in Uruguay and 0.94 in Paraguay.

Disturbingly, the Gini coefficient is getting worse in some countries. In Uganda between 1962 and 1984 it rose from 0.47 to 0.59, in Pakistan between 1960 and 1980, from 0.41 to 0.54, and in Turkey between 1963 and 1980, from 0.47 to 0.52.

Radical land redistribution, the elimination of absentee land ownership, the imposition of ceilings for holdings and programmes of resettlement can be powerful forces for improving access to opportunities and empowering the dispossessed. Socialist states such as Algeria, China, Cuba and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen established collective or cooperative farms—doomed to poor productivity because agricultural production requires flexibility and skills lacking in centrally planned production.

Redistributing land to small family holdings had better results, and many other countries have attempted or are pressing ahead with such programmes. These programmes are complex and face political constraints. Even committed governments like that of Zimbabwe after independence could not fully implement such programmes. But many countries are pressing ahead, and such

Lack of access to productive assets, particularly land and capital, is the main constraint for the rural and urban poor countries as Brazil and South Africa are making progress. Kenya enjoyed a good measure of success with its land settlement programmes launched at independence more than 66,000 families settled on farmland previously owned by 1,000.

But land reform takes more than merely redistributing land. Mexico's Agrarian Reform Programme was the most extensive effort. Over three decades starting in 1936 nearly 43% of agricultural land was distributed, benefiting 44% of rural families. Did this empower the peasants economically, socially and politically-as it was intended to do? No, because the associated development was inadequate. And a chronic weakness of most agrarian reforms is that they discriminate against women. In El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico during the past two decades, fewer than 25% of beneficiaries have been women. The governments gave land titles to men-assuming them to be the household heads.

Indeed, there is a general bias against women in agricultural development. In Kenya a woman has access to land only if she has a living husband or son, and she stands less chance of benefiting from government agricultural extension services, such as training programmes or the distribution of seeds or fertilizers. This bias shows up in staffing: in the developing countries in the late 1980s only 13% of agricultural field agents were women.

7. Equal access to social services

Ensuring equal access to social services is also essential for opportunity expansion. When education and health facilities are not universally provided, it is the poor who are most disadvantaged. Access is particularly uneven for people living in rural areas. The poor are usually those with less access to education (figure 4.8). Chapter 3 establishes the links between education, health and economic growth. The point to be emphasized here is the direct impact of access to education and health care on job opportunities.


Equal access to education for all is the best way to ensure open access to jobs and through that, the economic empowerment of all people. In the Republic of Korea at the beginning of its period of rapid growth, everyone was equally poor, and education was the route to higher income and social status. This prospect strengthened the links between growth, education and productivity. Parents invested their savings in the education of their children, who were prepared to take on more technologically advanced activities.


When people are sick, they cannot work, so improved access to primary health care is a condition for secure employment and a responsibility of the state and employers. Many health problems are caused by a lack of access to sanitation. Even in middle- and upper-income countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela almost 30% of the population lacks adequate access to sanitation. And fewer than a third of the people in Afghanistan, Chad, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar and Mozambique have access to safe water. More than 70% of the population in Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Chad, Mali and Niger cannot reach a health facility within one hour by local transport. The problem is generally much worse in rural areas than in urban. In Mozambique and Niger the entire urban population has access to health services, but only 30% of the rural population is served.

8. Expanded opportunities for disadvantaged groups

Some groups of people face discrimination—because of race, ethnicity, gender, age or physical attributes. In India literacy among the general population is 52%, but among the communities classified as scheduled castes or tribes it is only 30%. In apartheid South Africa opportunities were unequally divided by race, with the white minority getting the largest share of the pie in education, health, land, credit and highpaying jobs. Equalizing opportunities and expanding them through economic growth is the number one challenge for the new South Africa.

Unequal opportunities for women are marked throughout the world—*Human Development Report 1995* concluded that "in no society do women enjoy the same





Source: World Bank 1995f.

opportunities as men". In all countries the gender-related development index is lower than the human development index, reflecting lower achievements in human development for women than for men. Gender gaps in education and health are closing, but opportunities for economic and political participation are severely limited for women. Women occupy only 12% of seats in parliament, and only 14% of administrative and managerial positions. With the average gender empowerment measure 0.391, all countries have a long way to go before reaching equality.

In work, women face constraints in opportunity that men do not. Women take

BOX 4.8

Unequal opportunities for the young and the aged

Even if opportunities are narrowly defined in terms of employment, two groups are still at a disadvantage—the young and the aged. In most industrial countries youth unemployment is in the double digits. In Spain it is 36% for males and 47% for females, in Italy 26% for males and 36% for females. In countries such as Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel, Poland and Sweden it is more than 20%. In most industrial countries youth unemployment is almost twice overall unemployment.

Things are just as bad in developing countries, especially among educated young people. More than 20% of young people with primary education were unemployed in the early 1990s in Algeria and Tunisia—and more than 20% of those with secondary education in Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya. More than 10% of young people with tertiary education did not have a job in Ghana and India. This is a terrible waste of an important asset.

Even though the share of older people in the population has increased significantly in recent years, their labour force participation has declined. In the past 20 years the economic activity of men declined by more than two-thirds in Austria, France and the Netherlands, by more than half in Finland and New Zealand and by 30–40% in some other countries. This decline was due in part to older workers' taking retirement. But many more were made redundant or laid off.

Source: ILO 1992 and 1995e.

Indeed, older workers often are the first victims of enterprise restructuring. They are seen as more expensive than the young, because of higher remuneration, seniority rights, fringe benefits and social security contributions. But their performance and their accumulated knowledge more often than not compensate for their higher costs, and their earnings do not necessarily continue to rise until the end of their working life.

Because of the shortage of jobs, some people feel that the old should give way to the young. But new entrants to the labour market often lack the experience and know-how needed in jobs vacated by older workers. Often those jobs just disappear. Another commonly held view-that older workers are less productive than younger onesdoes not always stand up to facts. Studies have found that declines in productivity are gradual, so that the productivity of workers in their late fifties often exceeds that of workers in their teens and early twenties. And declines in performance may be falsely attributed to age when they are due instead to skill obsolescence or a "burnout" that can occur at any age. All these myths restrict the employment opportunities of the aged-and lead to a missed opportunity, because society can benefit greatly from their knowledge, experience and productivity.

the lion's share of responsibility for the family and community and spend threequarters of their time in unpaid work. These responsibilities conflict with incomeearning work. Not surprisingly, 70% of the world's 1.3 billion poor are female, and around the world women's earnings average 75% of men's. Women have fewer opportunities to secure livelihoods because of constraints to land ownership and lack of access to credit. In industrial countries unemployment averaged 8.1% for women in 1993 but 7% for men, with the highest gap in Spain, where unemployment is 24% for women and 10% for men. And in Europe there are more women than men among involuntary part-time workers.

Expanding access to jobs and to productive assets for women is thus a priority for human development around the world. Access to opportunities must also be made more open for three other groups: the old, the young and the disabled. In today's world of rapid restructuring and redundancies, older workers are often the first to be let go and the last to be rehired. With no experience, the youth also find employment opportunities limited. Youth unemployment is more than double the national average—at 17% for women and 16% for men in industrial countries (box 4.8).

People with disabilities also suffer limited access to opportunities. Society is often prejudiced against them and does not make the necessary arrangements for people with disabilities to make full use of their capabilities (box 4.9).

Prospects

Expanding employment opportunities to meet people's new needs and aspirations is among the top priorities for human development in the years to come. It will be a large and daunting task. Opportunities must be expanded enough to reverse the tide of growing unemployment, absorb the growing labour force and improve the productivity and incomes of the poor. In the past decade only a quarter of countries achieved satisfactory expansion of opportunities, minimizing unemployment and raising wages and productivity. If current global trends continue, polarization will increase within countries and between countries—between workers who have secure and well-paying jobs and those who do not, between countries that are growing fast and whose people are climbing the skill and wage ladder and those that are left out of the global competition. Most affected will be those who are weak—the long-term unemployed, women, the unskilled and many of the young and the old. Among countries, it will be those least integrated and competitive in the growing world economy.

The need for growth or the need to redefine work

Policy-makers can devise growth strategies that generate employment. But without growth, unemployment will increase or, at the very best, low-productivity jobs will proliferate-the situation in nearly 70 countries in the 1980s. Many of these countries, especially those in Latin America and some in Eastern Europe, are reviving growth. But too many are still stuck in economic stagnation or decline. In such countries-mostly Sub-Saharan African and other least developed countries (LDCs)-regenerating employment-led growth is a prerequisite for human development. But this growth must be accompanied by a rapid improvement in basic human capabilities.

In all countries the challenge is to forge strong links between growth and employment by adopting employment-generating growth patterns and ensuring rapid improvement in human skills.

The high-growth economies of East and South-East Asia need to stay the course and continue to climb the ladder of employment, skills and wages. They need to pay special attention to the quality of jobs and to equality of access to those jobs—particularly for women. And in the long term they need to prepare for a "soft landing", to maintain employment and opportunities, even as economic growth slows.

The Latin American and South Asian countries whose economic growth is strong or recovering will need to adopt new pat-

Disability-opportunities denied

Worldwide there are 500 million people with disabilities, 400 million in the developing world. In industrial countries more than 10% of people have a disability. In developing countries internal conflicts have greatly increased the number of people with disabilities. Each month 120 Angolans are killed or injured by land-mines; in Cambodia the number is 300.

People with disabilities have many capabilities. But they face obstacles to using their capabilities and to developing further-prejudice in society denies them opportunities. In Hong Kong in the early 1980s a quarter of people aged 15-24 with disabilities had no schooling, compared with only 2% of the total population. In Australia at the same time, more than half the working age men with disabilities were not in the labour force, compared with only 13% of all working-age men. And almost three-quarters of Australian women with disabilities were not in the labour force.

Women with disabilities face severe barriers to opportunities. In the Philip-

Source: Haber and Dowd 1994 and UN 1990.

pines 80% of women with disabilities have no paid work, and the 20% who work earn \$10 a month—roughly a third of the World Bank–defined income poverty line.

Disability is part of life, particularly as people grow older. Estimates have been made for several countries of the average number of years of life that people will live with disability, as a share of life expectancy at birth and at 65 years of age. In Australia, for example, the average number of years lived with disability is 20% of life expectancy at birth. Women tend to live longer with disability. In the Netherlands average years with disability are 25% of life expectancy for women, 18% for men. The share of life expectancy with disability is much higher at age 65 than at birth. In Australia it is 55% for men and 54% for women, and in the Netherlands 37% for men and 58% for women. Planning for life with disability means keeping doors open, work and recreation integrated and public areas safe and accommodating for all.

terns of growth with stronger links to employment and skills. These countries need to draw lessons from the 1960s and 1970s on what the pattern of growth can mean for employment and poverty reduction. Some countries, such as Bangladesh and Chile, have in recent years made good progress in moving towards growth that expands opportunities.

The OECD countries are struggling to address their growing unemployment, deteriorating job security and increasing wage disparities. The cause of these growing problems is unclear. Is it a slowdown in growth? Is it structural change due to a new technological revolution? Is it the pressure of globalization and competition with developing countries? Or a combination of all three?

For OECD countries the rapidly advancing technological revolution promises higher productivity and a liberation from drudgery. But the labour-displacing effects of technological advance and the competitive pressures of globalization will put many people out of their current jobs and, if they cannot adapt, rob them of livelihoods. Technology would benefit some but leave out many.

A recent ILO report shows that during 1975–82 every percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate translated into half a percentage point increase in the employment growth rate, and in 1982–93 to slightly more—0.63 percentage point. But these data do not put to rest the concerns about "jobless growth". Data for the most recent year or two for many industrial countries show a decline in employment's relationship with growth—a slowdown in employment creation.

Whatever the cause, the solution is not simply more growth to create more jobs and

BOX 4.10 Sweden and Japan—record-breakers facing new challenges

Sweden and Japan hold the industrial countries' record for long-sustained growth. And they share another record—for the lowest sustained unemployment, well below 3% for 40 years. Both countries protected employment and insulated it from the ups and downs of the business cycle and growth.

This employment policy was a building block for equitable growth—in both countries the Gini coefficient declined as the economy grew. But Sweden and Japan followed different distributive approaches. Sweden depended on the redistribution of income and the mechanisms of a welfare state. Japan redistributed land and wealth, and then protected small agriculture and promoted small firms.

In both, a social order protected employment through a consensus between employers and employees unions, between politicians and government administration, between small and large enterprises, between private business and the government. Employer-employee relations were marked by commitment and trust and by few violent disputes. And workers enjoyed a significant measure of security, which also encouraged a more positive attitude towards technological change, important in raising productivity.

Source: de Vylder 1995a, Ishikawa 1995 and Ito 1992.

Now facing lower growth and increasing competition in a global economy, the systems that worked so well for 40 years are under stress. Both countries find public subsidies a growing burden—those for agricultural incomes in Japan and for the welfare state in Sweden. Unemployment has been on the rise—in Sweden jumping from 1.6% in 1990 to 8.2% in 1995, and in Japan hitting a postwar record of 3.4% in December 1995.

The rules of the game are changing. In Sweden the restrictions against shedding redundant labour have been abandoned, and there have been massive layoffs, even in the civil service. In Japan corporations are reviewing relations with smaller supplier firms in favour of foreign imports, and the lifetime employment system may be eroding.

The impetus for change comes not only from the shifting economic environment, but also from questions people are beginning to ask about life styles. Shouldn't there be more time for leisure? Should women in Sweden continue to depend on others to look after their children? Shouldn't men in Japan do more for the family? New models combining equity, growth and human development may have to be built less around growth and more around new life styles.

more income. Economic growth must translate more effectively into satisfactory job choices-not just reducing unemployment but improving working conditions with growth and technological advance. People are less secure, working harder and under more pressure-often for the same or lower wages. And it is more difficult to secure care for those who need it-older people, young children and the sick. Despite per capita incomes of \$20,000 and economies that are still growing, people's working lives are not getting better. New institutional arrangements are needed to achieve goals important for human development. That means more job security and more equity-especially gender equity in work and pay. And it means more leisure time for personal development, more time for family and community work and more assurance that care is available for the old, the young and the sick. Developing new life styles and institutional arrangements should be a subject of public debate and a goal for public policy (box 4.10).

The global economy and international action

Today's employment challenges have to be met not in the postwar context of the 1950s and 1960s, with a stable world economy of fixed exchange rates and trade barriers and aid flows motivated by cold war interests. Instead, they must be met in the context of "globalization", where the lives of five billion people, more than 180 states and thousands of transnational businesses are closely intertwined—with connections proliferating through international flows of trade, capital, information and culture.

The liberalization of trade and the development of regional trading arrangements have expanded world trade and, through it, global economic interdependence. Trade in goods and services has grown tremendously, from 25% of world GDP in 1970 to about 45% in 1990. Capital has become more mobile, with private investment flows to developing countries rocketing from \$5 billion in 1970 to about \$175 billion today.

A growing world economy can create the environment for each country's growth

and employment. The total effect of expanding global trade and capital flows will be positive. But not all countries or all people will benefit equally from the global gains. And the powerful forces of world economic expansion pose new problems that today's global institutions are poorly equipped to handle.

One risk is that countries that are poorly integrated in the world economy will be further marginalized. The Uruguay Round, for example, is expected to produce global benefits estimated at \$200 billion annually. But it will do little for people and countries not producing for the global economy. It has been estimated that the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa would lose \$8 million in exports a year. Clearly, the international community's efforts to bring LDCs into the global economy have fallen short of what is needed—indeed, far short of the commitments made in 1990 (box 4.11).

Some developing regions owe their current prosperity and human development to international trade. But others have been vulnerable to its vagaries. The East Asian economies maintained annual export growth of more than 12% over the past two decades, and South Asia is trying to catch up. But many of the Arab states and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, which remain producers of primary commodities with declining terms of trade, trail behind. Similar disparities show up in international capital flows. Of the cumulative private capital flows of \$585 billion to developing countries in 1989-94, 40% went to East Asia, followed by Latin America with 30%. South Asia received only 3% of these flows, and Sub-Saharan Africa barely 1%.

The risk is not just that the benefits of globalization will bypass these nations. The risk is that these countries will become increasingly marginal as their shares of world trade and international capital flows continue to decline. This will further delay the structural transformation of their economies, needed to strengthen them against the vagaries of the market and climate. Sub-Saharan Africa's exports remain narrowly based on primary commodities, and little progress has been made in diversifying into non-traditional exports, especially manufactured goods. Manufacturing value added has been growing by only 2–3% a year since the early 1980s, and now contributes only 10% of GDP.

A second risk is that the people least able to adapt to changing market conditions and take up new technology or new skills will also be further marginalized. The World Bank's *World Development Report 1995* shows two possible scenarios for wage trends. The first is a "divergent" scenario in which wage gaps between skilled and unskilled workers within countries, and wage gaps between countries and regions,

BOX 4.11

The LDC Programme of Action-commitments unmet

In 1990 the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) adopted a Programme of Action for the LDCs for the 1990s. The key commitments were to generate accelerated and sustained economic growth for LDCs, to speed up efforts to improve education, training, health and sanitation, to allocate more donor GNP to aid, to enhance access for exports from LDCs and to significantly reduce their debt burden.

Performance has fallen far short of these commitments. A mid-term review assessing progress in 1995 found this:

• Economic growth. The LDCs' average annual growth in real GDP was only 1.6% in 1990–93, compared with 2.2% in 1980–90. Allowing for population growth, their real GDP per capita fell by 1.2% annually in 1990–93, compared with 0.3% in 1980–90. Average income per capita is thus declining at an accelerating pace in the LDCs, suggesting grim prospects for future development. To some extent this reflects lack of progress in implementing the programme of action.

• *Human resource development.* The adult literacy rate increased from 42% in 1985 to 47% in 1993, and life expectancy at birth from 50 years in 1990 to 52 years in 1993. But the pace of such improvements has been slowing, and the very weak performance in economic growth brings into question their sustainability. A determined revival of the programme of action is thus needed to reverse the worrying trends.

Source: UN 1991 and UNCTAD 1995.

• *Aid.* Donors were to allocate a minimum of 0.15% of their GNP to official development assistance (ODA) for LDCs by 1995, increasing to a minimum of 0.20% by 2000. But aid to LDCs fell from 0.09% of donor GNP in 1990 to 0.07% by 1993. Only four donor countries—Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands—had reached the 0.20% target by 1993, and Portugal had reached the 0.15% target. The total net flow of ODA to LDCs fell from \$16 billion in 1990 to \$15 billion in 1993, implying a steep drop in per capita ODA—from \$32 to \$27.

· Trade. Industrial countries reduced their tariffs on industrial products imported from LDCs by 25%. But their tariffs on such imports from other industrial countries fell by as much as 40%, undercutting much of the advantage for LDCs. Tariff reductions are significantly reducing LDCs' overall margin of preference, seriously eroding their competitiveness. Moreover, the LDCs have had to accept the many obligations in the Uruguay Round outcome-some of which would hardly have been acceptable to industrial countries only a few years ago-though LDCs have been accorded some flexibility in the timing of their compliance.

• *Debt*. Despite debt relief measures in the LDCs' favour since 1990, their total external debt increased from \$114 billion in 1990 to an estimated \$127 billion in 1993. New initiatives are required to make faster progress (box 4.12).

would become more pronounced. By 2010 wages would grow by 15% for unskilled workers in OECD countries but by 47% for skilled workers, 3% for the unskilled and 29% for the skilled in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries, and -3% for the unskilled and 45% for the skilled in Latin America.

In a more optimistic "convergent" scenario incomes would rise in all regions and countries and inequality would fall. Even so, the unskilled in Africa would see wages rise by 44% by 2010, compared with 81%

BOX 4.12

Making external debt work for development

Debt repayments often absorb a quarter to a third of developing countries' limited government revenue, crowding out critical public investment in human development. The problem is worst for the 32 severely indebted low-income countries (SILICs), many of which are also low human development countries. In four of these countries (Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Zaire and Zambia) debt service due ranges from three to six times public expenditure on education. High debt and unpaid arrears also discourage foreign private investment and encourage the flight of domestic savings-both critical sources of the financing needed for human development, economic growth and improved living standards.

Some steps have been taken in recent years to address the debt problem. Multilateral institutions and bilateral donors have supported commercial debt reduction schemes. Official (government) creditors have cancelled grant debt owed to them. And creditor governments have agreed on a series of measures such as the Toronto terms, the Trinidad terms and, in 1995, the Naples terms. Although these measures have helped reduce debt, many SILICs are still left with the bulk of their debt. What's more, these measures are not enough.

Analysis of recent World Bank data shows that even if all existing debt relief measures were fully applied, 23 of the 32 SILICs and 4 similarly indebted countries would still have unsustainable debt burdens (with the ratio of the net

Source: World Bank 1994b.

present value of debt to exports exceeding 200–220%). This group includes such countries as Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia.

Technically feasible solutions to the debt problem have been proposed. But implementation lags, even for SILICs that have made great efforts in implementing economic policy reform and structural adjustment. At the latest count, only \$7 billion of the debt of Sub-Saharan Africa had been forgiven, leaving \$150 billion to be dealt with.

In the words of the Secretary General of the United Nations, "debt is a millstone around the neck of Africa", holding back human development and economic growth. Urgent international actions are needed to provide a sufficient and durable solution to the SILICs' debt problems. These should include:

 Parallel measures to deal rapidly and comprehensively with all outstanding debt—commercial, bilateral and multilateral.

 Commitments to use part of the benefits of debt forgiveness for massive investment in human development.

 More straightforward and public monitoring, to enable concerned citizens to see the progress for individual countries and for the SILICs and Sub-Saharan African countries as a group.

• A small but high-level political meeting, with representation from both SILICs and creditor countries, to devise a strategy for more rapid action. for the East Asian skilled workers. The international wage gap between the richest and poorest—skilled industrial workers and African farmers—would fall, but only from 60:1 in 1992 to 50:1 in 2010.

Globalization makes it more difficult for national policies to forge strong links between growth, employment and human development. All countries find job creation increasingly difficult in today's environment. Increased competition for market shares and capital flows puts a premium on productivity, wage restraint, balanced budgets, export expansion and pared-back social services. And it leaves national governments less room to manoeuvre in designing proemployment policies and such social provisions as pensions, unemployment insurance and compensation for unpaid work, such as caring for the sick or the elderly.

These risks of the marginalization of people and countries demand international attention and solutions at the global level.

First, international measures to support national policy and action for full employment. Full employment should no longer be treated as a residual in international policy objectives. The postwar commitment to full employment led the United Nations to set up a special commission of five distinguished economists. They prepared a pathbreaking report in 1949, National and International Measures for Full Employment. Taking the full employment pledge of the UN Charter (Article 55) as its starting point, this report analysed the domestic and international implications and developed recommendations for the major domestic policy areas, including fiscal policy, control of the volume of investment and the stimulation of demand.

The international measures recommended by the report start with creating a workable system of international trade for a stable and expanding world economy, eliminating trade barriers and restoring currency convertibility. They also cover the need to "accelerate the orderly economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world". And they highlight the importance of preventing the international propagation of fluctuations in effective demand. These purposes were to be achieved through more targeted foreign investment, supported by new, more active policies by the World Bank and IMF.

A similar initiative is needed today—to assess national policy options and to formulate supportive international measures for full employment in today's vastly changed environment of global economic integration and technological progress.

Second, international initiatives to raise skill and education levels in the low human development countries. This goal is important in itself, but it is also a precondition for these countries' integration into the global economy. As the 1995 UNIDO global report concludes: industrial competitiveness now depends on technology and skills, less on such factors as raw materials and capital. Without basic literacy and numeracy, people's ability to adapt to changing production methods and technologies is severely constrained.

Reducing military spending would be one way for national governments to generate some of the necessary funds. And initiatives by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions to reduce the \$150 billion debt of Sub-Saharan Africa could go a long way towards releasing the \$9 billion needed annually to provide universal access to basic social services. But progress has been painfully slow. Debt relief measures have dealt with only \$7 billion of the debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, leaving \$150 billion to resolve (box 4.12).

Third, international mechanisms to prevent the marginalization of the least developed countries. Aid is the main institutional mechanism currently in force. And that is on a precipitous decline, falling from \$62 billion in 1991 to \$57 billion in 1993 (in 1992 dollars).

The critical needs of Sub-Saharan Africa were recently recognized by the system of UN organizations in a new commitment to help accelerate development in Africa. The "UN System-wide Special Initiative on Africa," announced in March 1996, consists of: • A set of major coordinated development actions centred on a commitment to help provide universal basic education and improved community health services within the next decade.

• A new emphasis on assisting efforts to improve governance (including strengthening peacemaking), increase the security of household water and food supply and strengthen civil society in Africa.

• A special mobilization of political commitment and support for Africa's development, involving the participation of the heads of all UN agencies.

• A new approach to donor relationships with African countries aimed at increasing the coherence of aid efforts, more clearly placing African plans at the centre of the process and broadening the consultation process to include the private sector.

An estimated \$25 billion in external resources will be needed—to come from new aid and redirected resources of UN agencies, bilateral donors and nongovernmental organizations. A restructuring of domestic resources is also expected as a key part of the programme. With education and health initiatives alone expected to account for more than 85% of the resources of the special initiative, the effort involves a strong impetus towards reorienting external and domestic resources towards human development.

The forces of expanding global trade and technological advance promise new advances in economic growth in the years to come. But to have meaning for human progress, this growth must translate into human development. It must also reduce inequality and poverty. And it must ensure sustainability, participation and peace. We need to reverse the failed growth in almost 100 countries, and the failure of growth to translate into human development in many others. Only much deeper global and national commitments can forge stronger links between growth and human development. Without basic literacy and numeracy, people's ability to adapt to changing production methods and technologies is severely constrained

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
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The Human Development Report has endeavoured since its inception in 1990 to present data on broad aspects of human development. This requires a far-ranging array of statistics reflecting the well-being and opportunities that people actually enjoy.

Human Development Report 1995 introduced important improvements in the selection, use and presentation of statistics. Greater attention was paid to coordination with international statistical bodies and to harmonizing the selection of indicators with the data reported by those bodies. Some statistical series published in previous Reports were dropped, such as the allocation of donor aid to basic social services. The 1995 Report also provided more thorough documentation and referencing of the international statistical sources selected. In the indicator tables extensive footnotes were introduced to indicate the choice of series and the calculations made and explain data limitations and exceptions.

These improvements are continued in *Human Development Report 1996*. Further efforts to improve the selection and presentation of statistical indicators are ongoing.

As a standard practice, this Report, like earlier ones, relies on national estimates reported by the United Nations and its agencies and by other internationally recognized organizations, and thus on the standardization and consistency of data produced by these offices. The few exceptions in which data from other sources have been used—such as for parliamentary representation—are noted in the relevant tables.

Data standards and methodology

Even when standardized international sources are used, a number of problems exist that must be addressed in any statistical analysis. Despite the considerable efforts made by the specialized agencies in collecting, processing and disseminating economic and social statistics, and in standardizing definitions and data collection methods, important limitations remain in the coverage, consistency and comparability of data across time and countries. The use of statistical data must be subject to a general understanding of these limitations.

The consistency and comparability of human development indicators, which are mostly derived from national censuses or surveys, are also subject to qualification. One source of weakness is the use of outof-date censuses or surveys, or of old models and assumptions with new data. And because of infrequent updating in the past, dramatic shifts and breaks in statistical series can occur when new data and methods are introduced.

Many of these concerns arise in preparing the human development index (HDI). For example, in the 1994 revision of the United Nations' "World Population Prospects Database 1950–2050", the Population Division derived estimates and projections from population censuses supplemented with information from national survey data—using specialized demographic techniques. A new survey or census in a country that has provided no national information for ten or more years may result in significant adjustments in the UN population estimates for that country.

These population estimates have an effect on other indicators-for example, school enrolment ratios calculated by UNESCO. The UNESCO estimates are dependent on the estimates of age- and sexspecific populations by the United Nations Population Division. They are also affected by fluctuation in estimates of the number of people attending school based on data from administrative registries, population censuses and educational surveys. UNESCO has also made methodological changes in the way that it produces its own estimates and projections of literacy and enrolment, independent of the variations in population estimates used in the denominator. Thus, there is potential fluctuation in both the numerator and the denominator of rates of literacy and educational enrolment that must be taken into consideration in any comparison of countries across time.

The way in which national data are collected and computed also affects comparability across countries. For example, because many people enrolled early in the school year drop out later in the year, the timing of data collection on enrolment affects the results. Enrolment ratios estimated at the beginning of the year are likely to be much larger than those calculated at midyear or later. Scant information is available on the timing and magnitude of absenteeism and school drop-outs in international data sets.

Estimates of income used in the HDI are also fraught with measurement difficulties. Economic data are initially reported in the domestic currencies and then converted into a common currency such as the US dollar. Because extreme fluctuations in exchange rates make comparisons across countries difficult, purchasing power parity rates in US dollars (PPP\$) have been used for conversion by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But even the PPP\$-based estimates of GDP present problems of comparability, because of differences in the International Comparison Programme (ICP) survey procedures and in the methods used in producing the estimates.

Another major problem is the extremely limited availability of data on such important human development issues as poverty, gender equality, crime, violence, HIV/AIDS, maternal mortality and the environment.

The transition in the Eastern European and CIS countries has led to a break in most of their statistical series, so the data available for recent years present problems of reliability, consistency and comparability at the international level and are often subject to revision.

Data availability is also uneven across country groups. Some issues, such as literacy, are well documented in the developing countries but less so in the industrial countries, or vice versa. In such cases the Report presents the limited data available, primarily from official national reporting systems and compiled by the United Nations, with the caveat that these data may not be readily used for international comparisons. Yet these data require increased attention if human development statistics are to improve.

Country classification

The main criterion for classifying countries is the HDI. Countries are classified into three groups: high human development countries, with HDI values of 0.800 and above; medium human development countries, with HDI values of 0.500 to 0.799; and low human development countries, with HDI values below 0.500. For analytic purposes, aggregate measures for the medium and low human development countries are also computed after excluding China and India from their respective groups because the magnitudes of their population, GDP and other measurements overwhelm those of the smaller countries.

The regional classification of countries corresponds to the Regional Bureaux of UNDP and the income classification to the definitions in the World Bank's *World Development Report* 1995.

Indicator tables

In the indicator tables countries and areas are ranked in descending order by their human development index. Where estimates have been calculated using established international statistical series, the estimates are footnoted and the sources given in the notes at the bottom of the table. These notes also give the data sources for each column. The first source listed is the main international source for the indicator. When a second agency has published the data in a more convenient form, the original source is given in brackets after the main source. The indicator tables no longer include estimates derived from sources other than the documented sources, except for table 1 (human development index). Short citations of sources are given, corresponding to the full references in the complete list of data sources used in preparing the indicator tables. This list appears after the indicator tables.

NOTE ON STATISTICS IN THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT

Not all countries have been included in the indicator tables, owing to the lack of comparable data.

Unless otherwise stated, the summary measures for the human development, income and regional groups of countries are weighted by population or some other appropriate value. Summary measures are not presented in cases in which there were no data for the majority of countries in a group or appropriate weighting procedures were unavailable. Where appropriate, the summary aggregate is presented as the total for the region, rather than as a weighted average.

In the absence of the phrase "annual", "annual rate" or "growth rate", a hyphen between two years indicates that the data were collected during one of the years shown. A slash between two years indicates an average for the years shown. The following signs have been used:

- .. Data not available
- (.) Less than half the unit shown
- (..) Less than one-tenth the unit
 - T Total

Improving human development statistics

A major goal of the Report is to encourage national governments, international bodies and policy-makers to participate in improving statistical indicators of human development. There are many areas where data collection urgently needs to be improved because of its importance to the national and international monitoring of human development trends. Age-specific literacy rates in all countries and economic activity outside the expected age ranges (child labour and older workers) are examples of such areas.

The Report has identified many potentially valuable sources of data for monitoring human development that need further coordination and harmonization. One such data source is the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) report, which monitors official development assistance. Attention to this source is particularly important given the joint call by UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO to increase transparency in the allocation of official development assistance to basic social services.

Another such international initiative is the International Comparison Programme. This is an effort to develop internationally comparable measures of real GDP and its components, by converting national currency estimates into a common currency (such as the US dollar) for estimating purchasing power parity (PPP) rates rather than exchange rates. The ICP is increasing its coverage of countries and even of entire regions. Important methodological questions concerning appropriate concepts, classifications and methods to be applied in this and other new initiatives remain unresolved.¹

Very few developing countries can afford to fully participate in an ICP assessment, however, and estimates for nonparticipating countries increase the bias in the results because of the large weights of industrial and more developed countries. Major lacunae have also developed in the statistical series of countries in transition or in social conflict or war.

The *Human Development Reports* will continue to refine statistical data and to generate pressure on countries and the global community to provide attention and support to the production and analysis of better human and social data.

Notes

The indicator tables are also available in electronic form. For information, please contact the Human Development Report Office, 336 East 45th Street, Uganda House, New York, New York, 10017, USA.

1. See, for example, Wagner 1995; also see OECD 1993a, p. 98, for a review of conceptual problems in estimating aid for social allocation.

Human development index

All countries

HDI	rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1993	Adult literacy rate (%) 1993	Combined first-, second- and third- level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Life expectancy index	Education	GDP	Human development index (HDI) value 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank ^a
	human development	73.8	97.2	79	14,922	5,908				0.901	
1 2 3 4	Canada USA Japan Netherlands	77.5 76.1 79.6 77.5	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	100 ^b 96 78 89	20,950 24,680 20,660 17,340	5,947 5,973 5,947 5,931	0.88 0.85 0.91 0.88	0.99 0.98 0.92 0.96	0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98	0.951 0.940 0.938 0.938	6 0 6 18
7 8 9	Norway Finland France Iceland Sweden	77.0 75.8 77.0 78.2 78.3	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	90 96 88 82 80	20,370 16,320 19,140 18,640 17,900	5,946 5,913 5,943 5,941 5,937	0.87 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.89	0.96 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.93	0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98	0.937 0.935 0.935 0.934 0.933	5 19 7 9 12
10 11 12 13 14	Spain Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand	77.7 77.8 76.5 76.3 75.6 75.0	98.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	87 79 85 85 89	13,660 18,530 19,540 19,115 16,720	5,901 5,940 5,944 5,942 5,914	0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.84	0.94 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.91	0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98	0.933 0.929 0.929 0.928 0.927 0.926	21 7 0 2 10 -11
15 16 17 18 19 20	Switzerland United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	78.1 76.3 75.3 76.1 75.4 77.6	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 97.4	75 83 87 79 84 70	22,720 17,230 20,200 18,840 15,120 18,160	5,950 5,928 5,946 5,941 5,909 5,938	0.88 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.88	0.94 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.88	0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98	0.928 0.924 0.924 0.920 0.919 0.914	7 -6 -2 10 0
21 22 23 24 25	Greece Hong Kong Cyprus Israel Barbados	77.7 78.7 77.1 76.6 75.7	93.8 91.5 94.0 95.0 97.1	78 71 76 76 76 78	8,950 21,560 14,060 15,130 10,570	5,825 5,948 5,904 5,909 5,850	0.88 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.84	0.89 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.91	0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97	0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.908 0.908	19 -16 7 4 11
26 27 28 29 30	Bahamas Luxembourg Malta Korea, Rep. of Argentina	73.2 75.8 76.2 71.3 72.2	98.1 99.0 87.0 97.6 96.0	75 57 76 81 80	16,180 25,390 11,570 9,710 8,350	5,913 5,975 5,878 5,837 5,814	0.80 0.85 0.85 0.77 0.79	0.90 0.85 0.83 0.92 0.91	0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.96	0.895 0.895 0.886 0.886 0.886	0 -26 6 9 16
31 32 33 34 35	Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore Portugal	76.4 72.6 73.9 74.9 74.7	94.5 97.0 94.7 90.3 86.2	68 76 71 68 79	5,680 6,550 8,900 19,350 10,720	5,680 5,769 5,824 5,943 5,853	0.86 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.83	0.85 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.84	0.94 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.97	0.884 0.883 0.882 0.881 0.878	23 16 8 -21 0
36 37 38 39 40	Brunei Darussalam Czech Rep. Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda	74.3 71.3 71.7 71.7 74.0	87.0 99.0 97.6 84.1 96.0	70 67 67 84 76	18,414 ^d 8,430 ^c 8,670 15,500 5,369 ^e	5,940 5,815 5,820 5,910 5,369	0.82 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.82	0.81 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.89	0.98 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.89	0.872 0.872 0.872 0.866 0.866	-17 6 4 -12 20
41 42 43 44 45		70.9 73.9 72.9 71.8 <i>70.0</i>	99.0 78.2 90.0 90.6 90.0 ⁹	71 81 69 69 78	5,620° 20,940' 5,890 8,360 9,340	5,620 5,947 5,738 5,814 5,831	0.77 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.75	0.90 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.86	0.93 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96	0.864 0.864 0.859 0.859 0.858	14 -34 9 -6
	Fiji Mexico Colombia	69.0 71.6 71.0 69.4 70.6	99.0 90.6 89.0 90.6 78.5	67 79 65 68 74	6,059° 5,530 7,010 5,790 22,910 ^h	5,748 5,530 5,783 5,729 5,962	0.73 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.76	0.88 0.87 0.81 0.83 0.77	0.95 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.99	0.855 0.853 0.845 0.840 0.839	5 10 -1 4 -47
55	Thailand Malaysia Mauritius Latvia Poland	75.0 69.2 70.9 70.4 69.0 71.1 67.4	77.4 93.6 82.2 81.7 99.0 99.0 98.7	53 54 61 60 72 76 79	21,630' 6,350 8,360 12,510 5,010 4,702° 4,760°	5,949 5,762 5,814 5,893 5,010 4,702 4,760	0.83 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.71	0.69 0.81 0.75 0.74 0.90 0.91 0.92	0.98 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.83 0.77 0.78	0.836 0.832 0.826 0.825 0.820 0.819 0.804	-46 -3 -9 -21 7 10 8
Med	lium human development	67.0	80.7	62	3,044	3,044	- 39			0.647	19.5
59 60	Belarus	66.5 63.4 71.0 69.7 71.2	82.4 73.7 88.0 ⁹ 97.9 93.0	72 88 61 79 65	5,500 6,125 ⁱ 4,960 ^e 4,244 ^c 4,320 ^c	5,500 5,752 4,960 4,244 4,320	0.69 0.64 0.77 0.74 0.77	0.79 0.78 0.79 0.92 0.84	0.91 0.95 0.82 0.70 0.71	0.796 0.792 0.792 0.787 0.787	0 -9 3 10 8
63 64	Saudi Arabia Ecuador Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of	69.9 69.0 72.0 67.7 73.7	61.3 89.0 94.0 ^g 66.1 70.0 ^g	55 72 <i>77</i> 67	12,600 ⁰ 4,400 3,810 ^e 5,380 4,610 ^e	5,894 4,400 3,810 5,380 4,610	0.75 0.73 0.78 0.71 0.81	0.59 0.83 0.88 0.66 0.69	0.98 0.72 0.62 0.89 0.76	0.771 0.764 0.764 0.754 0.754	-31 4 10 -7 0

Human development index (continued)

HDI	rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1993	Adult literacy rate (%) 1993	Combined first-, second- and third- level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Life expectancy index	Education	GDP	Human development index (HDI) value 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank ^a
68	The second s	69.2	99.0	78	3,610°	3,610	0.74	0.92	0.59	0.749	15
69		67.3	58.8	66	5,570	5,570	0.71	0.61	0.92	0.746	-13
70		68.1	84.8	66	4,380	4,380	0.72	0.79	0.72	0.741	-1
71		65.2	68.0	71	5,220	5,220	0.67	0.69	0.86	0.741	-10
72		69.7	97.5	65	3,710	3,710	0.74	0.87	0.61	0.740	7
73	Saint Vincent	71.0	91.09	78	3,552°	3,552	0.77	0.87	0.58	0.738	11
74	Romania	69.9	96.9	62	3,727°	3,727	0.75	0.85	0.61	0.738	4
75	Suriname	70.5	92.5	71	3,670	3,670	0.76	0.85	0.60	0.737	7
76	Saint Lucia	72.0	82.09	74	3,795°	3,795	0.78	0.79	0.62	0.733	1
77	Grenada	71.0 ^c	98.0	78	3,118°	3,118	0.77	0.91	0.51	0.729	18
78	Tunisia	68.0	64.1	66	4,950	4,950	0.72	0.65	0.82	0.727	-14
79	Cuba	75.4	95.2	65	3,000 ^h	3,000	0.84	0.85	0.49	0.726	19
80	Ukraine	69.3	95.0	76	3,250 ^c	3,250	0.74	0.89	0.53	0.719	11
81	Lithuania	70.3	98.4	72	3,110	3,110	0.76	0.89	0.51	0.719	15
82	Oman	69.8	35.0	60	10,420	5,848	0.75	0.43	0.97	0.716	-45
83	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	71.2	95.0	75	3,000	3,000	0.77	0.88	0.49	0.714	15
84	Turkey	66.7	81.1	62	4,210	4,210	0.69	0.75	0.69	0.711	-12
85	Paraguay	70.1	91.5	62	3,340	3,340	0.75	0.82	0.55	0.704	2
86	Jamaica	73.7	84.1	64	3,180	3,180	0.81	0.78	0.52	0.702	6
87	Dominican Rep.	69.7	81.2	64	3,690	3,690	0.74	0.75	0.60	0.701	-6
88 89 90 91 92	Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka Turkmenistan Peru Syrian Arab Rep.	67.8 72.0 65.1 66.3 67.3	98.0 89.6 97.7 87.8 68.7	74 66 77 80 65	3,000 3,030 3,128 ^d 3,320 4,196 ^d	3,000 3,030 3,128 3,320 4,196	0.71 0.78 0.67 0.69 0.71	0.90 0.82 0.91 0.85 0.68	0.49 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.69	0.700 0.698 0.695 0.694 0.690	10 8 -3 -19
93	Armenia	72.8	98.8	78	2,040	2,040	0.80	0.92	0.33	0.680	31
94	Uzbekistan	69.4	97.2	73	2,510	2,510	0.74	0.89	0.41	0.679	11
95	Philippines	66.5	94.2	77	2,590	2,590	0.69	0.89	0.42	0.665	8
96	Azerbaijan	70.7	96.3	72	2,190	2,190	0.76	0.88	0.35	0.665	22
97	Lebanon	68.7	91.7	74	2,500	2,500	0.73	0.88	0.40	0.664	10
98	Moldova, Rep. of	67.6	96.49	76	2,370°	2,370	0.71	0.90	0.38	0.663	11
99	Kyrgyzstan	69.2	97.0	70	2,320	2,320	0.74	0.88	0.37	0.663	13
100	South Africa	63.2	81.0	78	3,127°	3,127	0.64	0.80	0.51	0.649	-6
101	Georgia	72.9	94.99	68	1,750	1,750	0.80	0.86	0.28	0.645	28
102	Indonesia	63.0	82.9	61	3,270	3,270	0.63	0.76	0.53	0.641	-13
103	Guyana	65.4	97.7	70	2,140	2,140	0.67	0.88	0.34	0.633	17
104	Albania	72.0	85.0	59	2,200	2,200	0.78	0.76	0.35	0.633	12
105	Tajikistan	70.4	96.7	69	1,380	1,380	0.76	0.88	0.22	0.616	33
106	Egypt	63.9	49.8	69	3,800	3,800	0.65	0.56	0.62	0.611	-30
107	Maldives	62.4	92.8	70	2,200	2,200	0.62	0.85	0.35	0.610	9
111	China	68.6	80.0	57	2,330	2,330	0.73	0.72	0.38	0.609	3
	Iraq	66.1	55.7	55	3,413	3,413	0.68	0.55	0.56	0.599	-24
	Swaziland	57.8	74.9	70	2,940	2,940	0.55	0.73	0.48	0.586	-9
	Bolivia	59.7	81.5	68	2,510	2,510	0.58	0.77	0.41	0.584	-6
	Guatemala	65.1	54.6	45	3,400	3,400	0.67	0.52	0.56	0.580	-26
114 115 116	Mongolia Honduras El Salvador Namibia Nicaragua	63.9 67.9 66.8 59.1 67.1	81.7 71.4 70.4 <i>40.0</i> 65.0	62 61 54 83 61	2,090 2,100 2,360 3,710 2,280	2,090 2,100 2,360 3,710 2,280	0.65 0.72 0.70 0.57 0.70	0.75 0.68 0.65 0.54 0.64	0.34 0.34 0.38 0.61 0.37	0.578 0.576 0.576 0.573 0.568	10 7 -5 -37 -4
	Solomon Islands	70.5	62.0	46	2,266 ^d	2,266	0.76	0.57	0.36	0.563	-4
	Vanuatu	65.4	65.0	52	2,500	2,500	0.67	0.61	0.40	0.562	-12
	Gabon	53.7	60.3	47	3,861 ^e	3,861	0.48	0.56	0.63	0.557	-46
	Viet Nam	65.5	92.5	51	1,040 ^h	739	0.68	0.79	0.11	0.523	27
	Cape Verde	64.9	68.1	62	1,820	1,820	0.67	0.66	0.29	0.539	4
124 125 126	Morocco Zimbabwe Congo Papua New Guinea human development	63.6 53.4 51.2 56.0 56.0	41.7 84.0 72.1 70.5 48.9	44 70 56 35 46	3,270 2,100 2,750 2,530 1,241	3,270 2,100 2,750 2,530 1,241	0.64 0.47 0.44 0.52	0.43 0.79 0.67 0.59	0.53 0.34 0.45 0.41	0.534 0.534 0.517 0.504 0.396	-34 -3 -23 -22
127 128 129 130	Cameroon Kenya Ghana Lesotho Equatorial Guinea	56.3 55.5 56.2 60.8 48.2	60.8 75.7 62.0 69.5 76.4	48 56 45 55 60	2,220 1,400 2,000 980 1,800	2,220 1,400 2,000 980 1,800	0.52 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.39	0.57 0.69 0.56 0.65 0.71	0.36 0.22 0.32 0.15 0.29	0.396 0.481 0.473 0.467 0.464 0.461	-12 9 -4 21 -4
135	São Tomé and Principe	67.0	60.0	57	600 ¹	600	0.70	0.59	0.08	0.458	39
	Myanmar	57.9	82.4	49	650 ^e	650	0.55	0.71	0.09	0.451	35
	Pakistan	61.8	36.4	37	2,160	2,160	0.61	0.37	0.35	0.442	-15
	India	60.7	50.6	55	1,240	1,240	0.60	0.52	0.19	0.436	7
	Zambia	48.6	76.2	49	1,110	1,110	0.39	0.67	0.17	0.411	9

All countries

HDI rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1993	Adult literacy rate (%) 1993	Combined first-, second- and third- level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Life expectancy index	Education	GDP	Human development index (HDI) value 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank ^a
137 Nigeria	50.6	54.1	52	1,540	1,540	0.43	0.53	0.24	0.400	-2
138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.	51.3	54.6	50	1,458°	1,458	0.44	0.53	0.23	0.400	-2
139 Comoros	56.2	56.2	38	1,130	1,130	0.52	0.50	0.17	0.399	5
140 Togo	55.2	49.2	51	1,020	1,020	0.50	0.50	0.15	0.385	9
141 Zaire	52.0	75.2	39	300 ^d	300	0.45	0.63	0.03	0.371	33
142 Yemen	50.4	41.1	45	1,600	1,600	0.42	0.42	0.25	0.366	-8
143 Bangladesh	55.9	37.0	40	1,290	1,290	0.52	0.38	0.20	0.365	-3
144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	52.1	65.5	34	630	630	0.45	0.55	0.09	0.364	26
145 Haiti	56.8	43.4	30	1,050	1,050	0.53	0.39	0.16	0.359	1
146 Sudan	53.2	43.8	31	1,350	1,350	0.47	0.40	0.21	0.359	-7
 147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal 	50.9	37.8	39	1,620	1,620	0.43	0.38	0.26	0.357	-15
	49.5	56.0	37	1,050	1,050	0.41	0.50	0.16	0.355	-2
	51.7	36.7	35	1,610	1,610	0.45	0.36	0.25	0.353	-16
	56.8	45.8 ^k	34	700	700	0.53	0.42	0.10	0.349	14
	53.8	26.3	57	1,000	1,000	0.48	0.37	0.15	0.332	-1
152 Rwanda	47.2	58.0	39	740	740	0.37	0.52	0.11	0.332	9
153 Senegal	49.5	31.4	31	1,710	1,710	0.41	0.31	0.27	0.331	-23
154 Benin	47.8	34.3	34	1,650	1,650	0.38	0.34	0.26	0.327	-23
155 Uganda	44.7	59.7	35	910	910	0.33	0.51	0.14	0.326	-3
156 Cambodia	51.9	35.0	30	1,250	1,250	0.45	0.33	0.19	0.325	-15
157 Malawi	45.5	54.7	47	710	710	0.34	0.52	0.10	0.321	6
158 Liberia	55.6	36.4	17	843°	843	0.51	0.30	0.13	0.311	-3
159 Bhutan	51.0	40.2	31	790	790	0.43	0.37	0.12	0.307	-2
160 Guinea	44.7	33.9	24	1,800 ⁰	1,800	0.33	0.31	0.29	0.306	-33
161 Guinea-Bissau	43.7	52.8	30	860	860	0.31	0.45	0.13	0.297	+8
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	45.2 47.7 48.4 46.8 50.3	36.6 46.0 44.2 42.5 33.7	34 27 19 32 31	1,190 690 775° 674 ^d 670	1,190 690 775 674 670	0.34 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.42	0.36 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.33	0.18 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10	0.292 0.291 0.287 0.283 0.282	-19 2 -4 1
167 Mozambique	46.4	37.9	25	640	640	0.36	0.34	0.09	0.261	2
168 Ethiopia	47.8	33.6	16	420	420	0.38	0.28	0.05	0.237	5
169 Afghanistan	43.7	29.8	18	800	800	0.31	0.26	0.12	0.229	-13
170 Burkina Faso	47.5	18.0	19	780	780	0.38	0.18	0.11	0.225	-11
171 Mali	46.2	28.4	16	530	530	0.35	0.24	0.07	0.223	1
172 Somalia	47.2	24.9 ^k	7	712ª	712	0.37	0.19	0.10	0.221	-10
173 Sierra Leone	39.2	29.6 ^k	28	860	860	0.24	0.29	0.13	0.219	-20
174 Niger	46.7	12.8	15	790	790	0.36	0.13	0.12	0.204	-17
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	61.5 51.0 50.9 74.3 63.0	68.8 46.5 55.0 98.3 76.3	55 34 42 82 60	2,696 898 1,288 15,136 5,428	2,696 898 1,288 5,909 5,428				0.563 0.331 0.379 0.909 0.746	

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 Note: Figures in italics are Human Development Report Office estimates. Countries with the same HDI value are ranked on the basis of the fourth decimal place, not shown here.
 a. A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank, a negative the opposite.
 b. Capped at 100.

 c. Preliminary results of the European Comparison Programme, conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the OECD, Eurostat and the Austrian Statistical Office. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1996.
 d. Human Development Report Office estimate based on the latest available update of the Penn World Tables.

 e. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991.

 f. World Bank 19956.

 h. World Bank 1995d.

 i. Human Development Report Office estimate.

N. World Bank 1995d.
 Human Development Report Office estimate.
 Figures are from UNDP 1995c. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991.
 K. Human Development Report Office estimate based on national sources.
 Source: Column 1: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995e; *column 2*: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1995b; *column 3*: UNESCO 1995d; *column 4*: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995h.

Gender-related development index

		Gender- related development index	Life expect at bin (year 199	ancy th s)	Ad literac (%	y rate 6)	Combined seconda tertiary enrolme (%	ary and gross nt ratio	Earn incor shai (%) 199	ne re	GDI	HDI rank minus GDI
HDI	rank	(GDI) rank	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	value	rankb
High	n human development		77.2	70.4	96.8	97.6	79.6	77.9	34.8	65.2	0.855	2443
1 2 3 4 5	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	2 4 12 11 3	80.8 79.4 82.6 80.5 80.4	74.3 72.6 76.5 74.5 73.7	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	100.0 ^c 98.3 77.2 86.5 91.0	100.0 ^c 93.5 79.3 91.4 88.9	37.1 40.1 33.1 33.2 41.5	62.9 ^d 59.9 66.9 ^d 66.8 58.5	0.927 0.923 0.897 0.898 0.926	-1 -2 -9 -7 2
6 7 8 9 10	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	5 8 6 1 20	79.7 80.9 80.9 81.2 80.6	71.8 73.1 75.9 75.5 74.7	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 98.0	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 98.0	100.0 90.2 80.1 81.6 90.3	91.4 86.1 84.0 78.8 83.6	41.2 38.3 39.2 44.9 28.4	58.8 61.7 60.8 55.1 71.6 ^d	0.921 0.913 0.920 0.929 0.866	1 -1 2 8 -10
11 12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	9 15 13 10 19	80.7 79.8 79.3 78.7 81.3	74.9 73.1 73.1 72.6 74.8	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0	80.6 85.3 83.6 91.0 71.7	77.7 85.2 86.9 87.9 77.5	38.8 32.9 33.8 38.0 29.9	61.2 67.1 66.2 ^d 62.0 70.1	0.912 0.885 0.887 0.906 0.869	2 -3 0 4 -4
16 17 18 19 20	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	14 7 17 27 21	78.8 78.2 79.1 78.2 80.7	73.7 72.5 72.8 72.7 74.3	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 97.4	99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 97.4	83.6 88.3 77.3 85.5 70.8	82.1 85.1 81.1 82.9 69.4	34.2 41.6 34.7 24.8 30.3	65.8 58.4 65.3 75.2 69.7 ^d	0.886 0.913 0.883 0.835 0.856	2 10 1 -8 -1
21 22 23 24 25	Greece Hong Kong Cyprus Israel Barbados	22 25 16	80.2 81.9 78.0	75.1 75.7 73.0	89.0° 87.1	97.0° 95.8 97.9	78.3 70.6 76.0	78.0 70.9 79.2	30.4 26.9 39.1	69.6 73.1 60.9 ^d	0.853 0.843 0.884	-1 -3 7
26 27 28 29 30	Bahamas Luxembourg Malta Korea, Rep. of Argentina	18 31 45	78.0 75.0 75.8	68.9 67.5 68.7	97.8 96.1 95.9	98.4 99.1 96.0	76.4 76.7 81.8	73.8 84.9 78.6	39.4 26.9 20.3	60.6 ^d 73.1 79.7 ^f	0.879 0.816 0.766	6 -6 -19
31 32 33 34 35	Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore Portugal	32 26 44 29 30	78.7 75.7 77.5 77.5 78.1	74.1 69.3 70.5 72.5 71.2	94.6 97.4 94.5 85.0 81.0 ^e	94.4 96.6 95.0 95.6 89.0 ^e	66.9 81.2 70.4 66.5 82.5	68.1 71.0 71.2 69.3 75.6	26.1 32.5 20.7 30.5 33.5	73.9 67.5' 79.3' 69.5 66.5	0.813 0.837 0.767 0.833 0.833	-5 2 -15 1 1
36 37 38 39 40	Brunei Darussalam Czech Rep. Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda	35 23 34 52	76.4 74.9 74.1 74.2	72.6 67.8 69.4 69.9	81.6 99.0 96.6 77.6	91.7 99.0 98.6 88.2	69.9 67.2 67.3 85.9	69.4 66.2 67.0 82.8	26.1 39.0 28.5 13.3	73.9 ^d 61.0 71.5 ^d 86.7 ^d	0.808 0.853 0.809 0.726	-3 10 0 -17
43	Panama Venezuela	24 56 39 41	75.4 75.5 75.1 74.8	66.4 73.0 71.1 69.0	99.0 78.2 89.5 89.9	99.0 78.2 90.6 91.4	72.1 84.8 70.6 71.0	70.6 78.2 67.8 67.6	40.6 8.9 26.5 25.6	59.4 ^d 91.1 ^d 73.5 ^d 74.4 ^d	0.850 0.710 0.792 0.784	12 -19 -1 -2
46 47 48 49 50	Fiji Mexico Colombia	28 50 46 38 58	73.8 73.8 74.1 72.4 74.3	64.4 69.6 68.0 66.5 68.9	99.0 88.1 86.4 90.6 78.2	99.0 93.1 91.1 90.7 78.6	67.5 78.7 64.3 70.6 76.0	65.7 79.7 66.2 65.7 72.4	39.2 18.5 23.8 32.1 8.7	60.8 81.5 ^d 76.2 67.9 ^f 91.3 ^d	0.835 0.734 0.755 0.797 0.700	12 -9 -4 5 -14
51 52 53 54 55 56 57	Thailand Malaysia Mauritius Latvia Poland	55 33 43 47 36 37 40	77.3 72.0 73.1 73.9 74.9 75.7 73.5	73.4 66.4 68.8 67.1 63.1 66.7 61.4	73.6 91.4 76.3 77.2 99.0 99.0 98.7	80.7 95.9 88.2 86.3 99.0 99.0 98.7	52.1 54.9 61.5 60.7 74.8 77.2 82.1	53.0 54.0 59.7 59.0 69.5 74.6 75.8	18.1 37.2 29.4 24.7 42.4 38.5 41.3	81.9 ^d 62.8 70.6 ^d 57.6 ^d 61.5 ^d 58.7 ^d	0.719 0.811 0.772 0.740 0.806 0.802 0.790	-10 13 4 13 13 13
Med	lium human development	11	68.9	65.1	72.7	87.1	58.4	63.9	34.2	65.8	0.615	44
58 59 60 61	Seychelles	49 73 42	68.9 65.3 75.1	64.1 61.9 64.3	82.0 59.3 99.49	82.6 86.3 99.79	71.3 87.4 81.1	72.0 88.7 77.8	28.6 14.2 41.7	71.4 ⁱ 85.8 ^d 58.3 ^d	0.739 0.633 0.778	3 -20 12
62	Bulgaria	255	58	(18)	200	**		. 100	122	1.8 to	211) 211)	11
63 64 65 66	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of	85 66 75	71.6 71.6 68.3	68.6 66.6 67.2	47.6 87.5 56.4	70.4 91.4 75.5	51.8 71.1 61.3	57.4 73.5 71.9	7.5 17.3 16.3	92.5 ^d 82.7 ^f 83.7 ^d	0.551 0.661 0.618	-30 -10 -18
67	Belize	2990	22	194	194	**	10.5	10	100	- 64	4.5	**

		Gender- related development index (GDI)	Life expect at bin (year 199	ancy th s)	Adi literac (%	y rate	Combined seconda tertiary enrolme (%	ary and gross nt ratio	Earne incor shar (%) 1993	ne re	GDI	HDI rank minus
HDI ra	ink	rank	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	value	GDI rank ^b
69 A	stonia Ilgeria	48 81	74.8 68.5	63.6 66.2	99.0 45.8	99.0 71.6	80.9 61.1	74.4 70.9	42.3 15.7	57.7 ^d 84.3 ^d	0.740 0.596	10 -22
71 E	ordan Iotswana Gazakhstan	54 51	67.0 74.0	63.3 65.1	57.8 99.59	79.4 99.7 ⁹	73.2	69.3 64.4	39.3 39.2	60.7 ^d 60.8 ^d	0.723	6 10
73 S	aint Vincent Iomania	53	73.4	66.6	96.99	98.99	62.1	62.6	37.4	62.6 ^d	0.726	ÿ
76 S	uriname jaint Lucia				**	**	**	79 77	**	**		**
	Grenada									** 70 54		**
79 0	unisia Tuba Jkraine	68 59	68.9 77.4	67.1 73.6	51.6 94.6	76.4 95.7	62.5 67.2	69.8 62.2	23.5 29.7	76.5 ^d 70,3 ^d	0.647 0.699	-5 5
31 L	ithuania Dman	57	76.0	64.7	98.4	98.4	74.7	68.5	40.8	59.2 ^d	0.709	8
	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of urkey	f 61	68.8	64.7	70.9	91.0	54.9	68.9	31.5	68.5	0.680	5
85 P	araguay	67	72.0	68.2	89.9	93.1	61.1	61.9	22.4	77.6	0.649	0
	amaica Dominican Rep.	60 71	75.9 71.8	71.5 67.7	88.3 81.2	79.9 81.2	65.9 64.9	63.1 62.5	39.2 22.4	60.8 ^d 77.6 ^d	0.693 0.641	8 -2
89 5	iamoa (Western) iri Lanka urkmenistan	62	74.3	69.8	86.2	93.1	67.2	65.6	33.1	66.9	0.679	8
91 F	Peru Syrian Arab Rep.	72 82	68.2 69.4	64.4 65.4	81.6 53.0	93.9 84.3	74.6 60.4	85.5 70.0	21.6 18.3	78.4 ^d 81.7 ^d	0.634 0.591	-1 -10
93 /	Armenia	63	75.8	69.7	99.5 ^g	99.7º	82.6	73.4	40.1	59.9 ^d	0.677	10
	Jzbekistan Philippines	70	68.4	64.7	93.9	94.6	78.4	76.2	30.2	69.8 ^d	0.644	4
96 A	Azerbaijan ebanon	65 77	74.6	66.6 66.8	99.59 89.4	99.7ª 94.3	70.1 74.8	73.0 73.0	36.4	63.6 ^d 78.6 ^d	0.661	10
	Moldova, Rep. of			1	100							
	Gyrgyzstan South Africa	64 74	73.0 66.3	65.2 60.3	99.5 ⁹ 80.8	99.79 81.3	71.5 79.6	67.7 77.1	39.1 30.5	60.9 ^d 69.5 ^d	0.661	13
01 0	Georgia ndonesia	69 76	76.8 64.8	68.6 61.3	99.0 76.9	99.0 89.1	69.6 58.2	66.1 63.7	39.1 31.9	60.9 ^d 68.1 ^d	0.646	10
03 (Suyana Albania	78	68.2	62.6	97.0	98.4	70.1	69.3	25.4	74.6 ^d	0.604	3
05 1	ajikistan		(436) (436)	994 1931		044 194			94. 441	**	(44 (44	244
	gypt Maldives	87 80	65.1 61.1	62.7 63.7	37.0 92.6	62.4 93.0	62.0 70.3	74.7 70.2	23.1 35.1	76.9 64.9 ^d	0.545	-5
08 (Thina	79	70.6	66.8	70.9	88.7	54.1	60.1	37.9	62.1 ^d	0.601	5
09 1	raq Swaziland	96 84	67.6 60.1	64.6 55.5	42.3	68.8 76.3	48.0 68.3	61.8 71.9	12.5 34.7	87.5 ^d 65.3	0.486	-11
11 E	Bolivia	86	61.2	58.0	73.9	89.4	62.2	73.1	26.3	73.7	0.549	1
	Guatemala	94	67.6	62.7	47.6	61.7	41.5	48.9	18.9	81.1 ^d	0.506	-6
14 H	Mongolia Honduras El Salvador	83 90 88	65.3 70.3 69.0	62.5 65.6 64.5	75.6 71.2 68.5	87.8 71.5 72.5	65.0 61.6 54.4	58.4 59.6 54.3	39.1 22.6 26.5	60.9 ^d 77.4 ^d 73.5 ^d	0.572 0.542 0.544	6 0 3
16 1	Namibia Nicaragua	89	68.8	65.4	65.9	64.0	61.6	60.3	29.5	70.5 ^d	0.544	3
18 5	Solomon Islands /anuatu	44 12			142 142	14 14	11	11 22	12 12		24 14	222 1940
20 (Gabon	91	67.6	63.1	89.5	95.8	49.2	53.2		52.7		2
22 (Viet Nam Cape Verde	93	65.7	63.7	59.6	78.8	60.3	64.5	47.3 32.1	67.9 ^d	0.539 0.517	1
24 2	Morocco Zimbabwe	97 92	65.3 54.7	61.9 52.1	28.8 78.6	54.7 89.6	36.8 65.1	51.5 74.0	27.1 37.5	72.9 ^d 62.5 ^d	0.486 0.525	-2 4
	Congo Papua New Guinea	95	56.9	55.4	60.6	79.7	31.1	38.4	34.6	65.4 ^d	0.490	ž
	uman development		56.9	55.5	36.1	61.5	39.0	53.7	27.3	72.7	0.379	44
	Cameroon Kenya	100 98	57.8 57.1	54.8 54.1	49.0 66.8	73.1 84.7	42.7 54.6	53.5 57.0	29.8 41.6	70.2 ^d 58.4	0.455	-2
29 (Ghana	99	58.0	54.4	50.5	73.9	38.8	50.1	43.5	56.5 ^d	0.459	1
	Lesotho Equatorial Guinea	101	63.3	58.3	60.0	79.7	59,9	50.1	30.4	69.6	0.454	0
	São Tomé and Principe	M	**		<u>tt.</u>				**			e
33	Myanmar	102	59.6	56.3	76.6	88.3	47.8	49.4	36.7	63.3 ^d	0.447	0
34 35	Pakistan ndia	107 103	62.9 60.7	60.9 60.6	23.0 36.0	48.6 64.3	23.9 46.4	49.1 62.8	18.6 24.8	81.4 ^d 75.2 ^d	0.383 0.410	-4
	Zambia	104	49.4	47.7	68.7	84.2	44.9	52.5	39.0	61.0	0.405	1

Gender-related development index (continued)

	Gender- related development index	Life expect at bi (year 199	ancy rth ˈs)	Ad literac (%	y rate	Combined seconda tertiary enrolme (%	ary and gross int ratio	Earn incor shai (%) 199	re		HDI rank minus
HDI rank	(GDI) rank	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	GDI value	GDI rank ^b
 137 Nigeria 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 139 Comoros 140 Togo 141 Zaire 	108 106 105 110 109	52.2 52.8 56.7 57.0 53.7	49.0 49.8 55.7 53.4 50.4	43.8 42.1 49.1 34.3 64.9	64.7 67.7 63.2 64.7 85.1	45.3 42.1 35.1 37.9 30.5	57.8 58.9 41.6 63.7 46.4	29.6 39.4 35.4 32.3 36.7	70.4 ^d 60.6 ^d 64.6 ^d 67.7 ^d 63.3 ^d	0.380 0.387 0.391 0.364 0.364	-2 1 3 -1
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	122 116 111 112 118	50.6 55.9 53.5 58.5 54.6	50.1 55.9 50.5 55.1 51.8	26.0 25.0 53.9 40.5 32.0	50.0 48.3 77.8 46.5 55.7	22.5 34.0 33.1 28.7 27.3	65.2 44.8 35.1 30.6 35.1	22.9 22.8 47.5 36.1 21.2	77.1 ^d 77.2 52.5 63.9 ^d 78.8 ^d	0.311 0.336 0.359 0.354 0.327	-11 -4 2 -3
 147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal 	117 113 115 114 124	52.3 52.0 53.3 58.3 53.3	49.6 47.0 50.1 55.3 54.3	27.4 47.9 25.3 <i>41.8</i> 13.0	47.6 64.9 48.6 49.8 39.4	31.1 27.3 29.5 32.9 42.9	47.5 47.7 39.5 34.2 70.6	25.4 38.9 37.0 37.8 32.2	74.6 ^d 61.1 63.0 ^d 62.2 ^d 67.8 ^d	0.328 0.346 0.338 0.346 0.308	-1 4 3 5 -4
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	120 123 119	50.5 49.5 46.0	48.5 46.1 43.4	21.5 23.2 47.7	41.3 45.9 72.1	25.4 21.8 30.4	36.4 45.4 39.7	34.9 41.1 40.7	65.1 ^d 58.9 ^d 59.3 ^d	0.314 0.311 0.318	1 -1 4
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	121 125 126	46.1 45.2 45.3	44.9 44.2 42.1	39.8 20.1 40.1	70.8 47.8 66.1	43.7 14.8 21.1	49.2 32.3 38.5	42.5 40.4 32.9	57.5 ^d 59.6 ^d 67.1 ^d	0.312 0.286 0.281	3 0 0
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	127 128 130 129	46.8 49.3 48.4 52.0	43.6 46.1 45.2 48.5	23.1 32.4 28.0 20.9	50.7 60.1 56.0 47.7	26.9 16.3 29.4 27.5	40.8 37.9 34.2 34.7	37.3 37.0 39.3 42.3	62.7 ^d 63.0 ^f 60.7 ^d 57.7 ^d	0.275 0.275 0.270 0.270 0.271	0 0 -1 1
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	131 132 135 134 133	48.0 49.4 44.2 49.0 47.8	45.0 46.2 43.2 45.9 44.6	21.4 23.5 13.5 8.4 20.8	55.3 43.6 45.2 27.9 36.6	20.7 12.6 9.2 14.7 11.8	28.8 18.3 26.0 24.0 19.9	42.0 33.4 27.4 39.7 39.4	58.0 ^d 66.6 ^d 72.6 ^d 60.3 ^d 60.6 ^d	0.245 0.227 0.196 0.211 0.215	0 -2 0 2
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	136 137	40.8 48.3	37.7 45.1	16.7 6.1	43.3 19.8	22.4 10.8	34.0 19.0	28.5 37.1	71.5 ^d 62.9 ^d	0.196 0.192	0 0
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	6 6 10 10 10 10	62.9 52.1 52.5 78.6 64.6	60.3 50.0 49.3 71.2 61.4	59.8 36.1 45.4 98.5 69.6	77.6 57.5 64.7 98.7 82.5	50.6 29.5 37.2 84.3 55.6	59.7 40.1 45.9 81.8 63.0	31.0 32.8 35.6 37.0 32.4	69.0 67.2 64.4 63.0 67.6	0.530 0.318 0.366 0.868 0.600	++) 4+ 4+ 4+ 4+

Note: Figures in italics are Human Development Report Office estimates. a. 1993 or latest available year. b. The HDI ranks used in this column are those recalculated for the universe of 137 countries. See table 1.11 in chapter 1. A positive figure indicates that the GDI rank is better than the HDI rank, a negative the opposite. c. Capped at 100. d. No wage data available. An estimate of 75%, the mean for all countries with wage data available, was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage.

d. No Wage data available. An estimate of 75%, the mean for all countries with wage data available, was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage.
 e. World Bank 1994c.
 f. Wage data based on Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1992.
 g. Calculated on the basis of UNESCO 1995c.
 Source: Columns 2 and 3: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from UN 1995e; columns 4 and 5: Human Development Report Office calculations based on estimates from UNESCO 1995b; columns 6 and 7; UNESCO 1995d; columns 8 and 9: Human Development Report Office calculations based on estimates from UNESCO 1995b; for real GDP per capita (PPP\$), World Bank 1995b; for share of economically active population, ILO 1995a and 1995f; and for female wages as a percentage of male wages, ILO 1995f, UN 1994b and Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1992.

3 Gender empowerment measure

All countries

HDI rank	Gender empowerment measure (GEM) rank	Seats held in parliament (% women) ^a	Administrators and managers (% women) ^b	Professional and technical workers (% women) ^h	Earned income share (% to women) ^{b,<}	GEM value	HDI rank minus GEM rank ^d
High human development	al-fairs	(% women)* 13.1	(% women)* 25.3	47.2	(% to women)**	0.528	
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan 4 Netherlands	6 9 37 8 1	18.0 10.4 6.7 28.4 39.4	42.2 42.0 8.5 15.0 30.9	56.1 52.7 41.8 44.2 57.5	37 40 33° 33 41	0.685 0.645 0.445 0.646 0.786	-5 -7 -34 -4 4
6 Finland 7 France	4 40	33.5 5.9	26.4 9.4	62.3 41.4	41 38	0.710 0.437	2 -33
8 Iceland 9 Sweden 10 Spain	2 25	40.4 14.6	38.9 12.0	64.4 48.1	45 28 ^e	0.779 0.490	-16
 Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland 	15 16 10 5	13.5 15.4 23.2 21.2 16.7	43.3 18.8 19.2 32.3 27.8	25.0 50.5 48.6 47.8 23.8	39 33 34 ^e 38 30	0.590 0.580 0.641 0.685 0.594	-5 -5 2 8 2
16 United Kingdom 17 Denmark 18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy	18 3 7 23 13	7.8 33.0 25.5 12.8 13.0	33.0 20.0 19.2 17.3 37.6	43.7 62.8 43.0 48.0 46.3	34 42 35 25 30°	0.530 0.718 0.654 0.504 0.593	-3 13 10 -5 6
21 Greece 22 Hong Kong 23 Cyprus 24 Israel 25 Barbados	60 64 28 11	6.0 3.6 9.2 18.4	12.1 10.2 18.7 37.0	44.2 40.8 54.1 52.1	30 27 31 39°	0.370 0.359 0.485 0.597	-40 -43 -6 12
26 Bahamas 27 Luxembourg 28 Malta 29 Korea, Rep. of	19 14 78	10.8 20.0 2.0	26.3 8.6 4.2	56.9 37.7 45.0	28° 29 27	0.525 0.590 0.282	5 11 -52
30 Argentina 31 Costa Rica 32 Uruguay 33 Chile 34 Singapore 35 Portugal	30 49 59 44 24	14.0 7.0 7.2 3.7 8.7	21.1 25.3 17.4 34.3 36.6	44.9 62.6 34.0 16.1 52.4	26 32' 21' 31 28	0.475 0.413 0.380 0.427 0.491	-3 -21 -30 -14 7
 36 Brunei Darussalam 37 Czech Rep. 38 Trinidad and Tobago 39 Bahrain 40 Antigua and Barbuda 	17	20.6	23.3	53.3 	28e	0.559	15
 Slovakia United Arab Emirates Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis 	88 38 52	09 8.3 6.3	1.6 27.6 17.6	25.1 49.2 55.2	09e 26e 26	0.253 0.441 0.394	-55 -4 -17
46 Hungary47 Fiji48 Mexico49 Colombia50 Qatar	22 70 31 36	11.4 5.8 13.9 9.3	58.2 9.6 20.0 27.2	49.0 44.7 43.6 41.8	39 18° 24 32'	0.507 0.325 0.471 0.447	14 -33 7 3
51 Kuwait 52 Thailand 53 Malaysia 54 Mauritius 55 Latvia 56 Poland	74 53 46 65 41	09 4.8 11.1 2.9 13.0	5.2 21.8 11.9 14.3 15.6	36.8 52.4 44.5 41.4 60.4	18° 37 29° 25° 38°	0.308 0.390 0.425 0.357 0.431	-34 -12 -4 -22 3
57 Russian Federation	+ 2		500				
Medium human development 58 Brazil 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 60 Seychelles 61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria	56	13.2	12.8	44.3 57.2 57.0	34 29 ¹	0.428	-11
63 Saudi Arabia 64 Ecuador 65 Dominica	54	4.5	31.5	48.0	17'	0.388	-7
66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 67 Belize	90 34	3.4 10.3	3.5 36.6	32.6 38.8	16 ^e 17	0.239 0.458	-42 15

Gender empowerment measure (continued)

IDI	rank	Gender empowerment measure (GEM) rank	Seats held in parliament (% women)*	Administrators and managers (% women) ^b	Professional and technical workers (% women) ^b	Earned income share (% to women) ^{b,c}	GEM value	HDI rank minus GEM rank ^s
68	Estonia	214			16797 G 120771170	+1	17461	140
	Algeria	79	6.7	5.9	27.6	16 ^e	0.280	-29
70 71	Jordan Botswana	33	10.0	36.1	61.4	290	0.464	18
72	Kazakhstan	20 20	39	0000	(iii)	20		**
73	Saint Vincent	94	13	244		а —	100	
74 75	Romania Suriname	67	5.9	21.5	69.9	24	0.347	-15
	Saint Lucia	2	2	24				44
77	Grenada				1.7.6		0.057	
78 79	Tunisia Cuba	84 21	6.7 22.8	7.3 18.5	17.6 47.8	23° 30°	0.257 0.522	-31 33
30	Ukraine		**					- T-T- (99)
31 32	Lithuania Oman	94 	24	**	(988)	**		
33	Korea, Dem. People's Rep.	of	2.5	(44.)	(34		
34	Turkey	92	1.8	6.6	29.3	32	0.235	-37
35 36	Paraguay Jamaica	68	5.6	14.5	50.9	22	0.340	-12
7	Dominican Rep.	48	10.0	21.2	49.5	22"	0.422	9
38	Samoa (Western)		49		1991	-1	-0	-
39 90	Sri Lanka Turkmenistan	75	5.3	16.9	24.5	33	0.306	-17
91	Peru	51	10.0	20.0	41.1	2.2 ^e	0.407	8
92	Syrian Arab Rep.		÷*			22		
93 94	Armenia	99	24	580		34		300
95	Uzbekistan Philippines	39	9.5	33.7	62.7	30"	0.438	21
96	Azerbaijan	24	1.1. 1.1.	12	.1229	22	522	122
17	Lebanon		<u> </u>	520	49		1.1	-
18	Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan	22	27 			77		
00	South Africa	20	23.7	17.4	46.7	30 ^e	0.523	41
01 02	Georgia Indonesia	61	12.2	6.6	40.8	32°	0.367	1
	Guyana	32	20.0	12.8	47.5	25°	0.465	31
04	Albania		14	1.00			(44)	
05 06	Tajikistan Egypt	80	2.2	16.0	28.7	23	0.280	-16
07	Maldives	71	6.3	14.0	34.6	17 ^e	0.324	-6
)8	China	29	21.0	11.6	45.1	38°	0,478	37
	Iraq Swaziland	55 62	10.8 8.49	12.7 14.5	43.9 54.3	17 ^e 35	0.386 0.366	12
11	Bolivia	58	9.6	16.8	41.9	17'	0.380	11
	Guatemala	47	7.5	32.4	45.2	19°	0.422	23
	Mongolia Honduras	50	7.0	30.6	49.8	23°	0.408	21
	El Salvador	42	10.7	25.3	44.5	26 ^e	0.428	30
	Namibia Nicaragua	27	18.1	20.8	40.9	19	0.485	46
	Solomon Islands	99	2.1	2.6	27.4	30	0.196	-25
19	Vanuatu		2.1	2.0	27.4			-20
	Gabon Viet Nam	2	53		-	10	**	-
	Cape Verde	57	7,6	23.3	48.4	32 ^e	0.381	18
	Morocco	76	0.6	25.6	31.3	27ª	0.299	0
	Zimbabwe Congo	45 95	14.7	15.4	40.0 28.5	27°	0.425	32
	Papua New Guinea	95	1.6 0 ^g	6.1 11.6	28.5	36 35°	0.213 0.230	-17 -15
_	human development	30	7.6	4.0	21.7	27	0.235	
27	Cameroon	69	12.2	10.1	24.4	30 ^e	0.339	11
28	Kenya	72		144	1947		**	
	Ghana Lesotho	72 35	8.0 11.2	8.8 33.4	35.7 56.6	32" 30"	0.317 0.448	9 47
	Equatorial Guinea	89	7.5	1.6	26.8	28	0.243	-б
	São Tomé and Principe			(**)				
	Myanmar Pakistan	101	1.6	3.4	20.1	19°	0.165	-17
35	India	93	8.0	2.3	20.5	25 ^e	0.235	-8
36	Zambia	81	6.7	6.1	31.9	25	0.270	5

HDI rank	Gender empowerment measure (GEM) rank	Seats held in parliament (% women)*	Administrators and managers (% women) ^b	Professional and technical workers (% women) ^b	Earned income share (% to women) ^{b.c}	GEM value	HDI rank minus GEM rank ^d
137 Nigeria	98	2.09	5.5	26.0	30 ^e	0.198	-11
138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.139 Comoros140 Togo141 Zaire	103 100 96	2.49 1.2 5.0	0.1 7.9 9.0	22.3 21.2 16.6	35° 32° 29°	0.156 0.182 0.209	-15 -11 -6
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	77 66 82	10.6 3.0 ⁹ 8.2	5.1 32.6 2.4	23,1 39,3 28,8	23 36" 21°	0.291 0.349 0.260	14 26 11
147 Côte d'Ivoire148 Central African Rep.149 Mauritania150 Madagascar151 Nepal	97 102	3.5 0ª	9.0 7.7	18.9 20.7	39 18 ^e	0.205 0.163	-3 -7
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	87	4.3	8.2	32.1	41 	0.253	9
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	85	5.6	4.8	34.7	33° 	0.255	12
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	73 63	7.89	15.5 13.4	23.7 30.4	37 ^e 42 ^e	0.310	25 36
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	43 86 83 91	25.2 5.0 3.7 2.3	11.3 11.2 13.5 19.7	20.4 23.9 25.8 19.0	42° 33° 40° 12°	0.427 0.255 0.257 0.237	57 15 19 12
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	104	3.6	 8.3	0.1	37"	0.102	 0
All developing countries Least developed countri Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	es	10.8 7.7 9.9 14.5 12.2	10.0 8.5 10.2 27.4 14.0	36.3 23.6 27.9 47.8 38.9	31 33 36 37 33	0.351 0.269 0.279 0.569 0.391	- 44 - 44 - 44 - 44

a. Data are as of 30 June 1995. A value of 0 was converted to 0.001 for purposes of calculation. b. Data are for latest available year. c. The manufacturing wage was used for the Central African Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the Syrian Arab Republic. d. The HDI ranks used in this column are those recalculated for the universe of 104 countries. See table 1.12 in chapter 1. A positive figure indicates that the GDI rank is better than the HDI ranks, a negative the opposite. e. No wage data available. An estimate of 75%, the mean for all countries with wage data available, was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage. f. Wage data based on Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1992. g. Data are as of 30 June 1994. Source: Column 2: [PU 1995; columns 3 and 4: ILO 1994c and 1995f and UN 1994b; column 5: Human Development Report Office calculations based on estimates from the following: for real GDP per capita (PPP\$), World Bank 1995h; for share of economically active population, ILO 1995a and 1995f; and for female wages as a percentage of male wages, ILO 1995f, UN 1994b and Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1992.

4 Profile of human development

		Life	Populat Health	ion with Safe	access to	Daily calorie	Adult literacy	Combined first-, second- and third- level gross	Daily news- papers	Televisions	Real GDP	GNP per
HDI	rank	expectancy at birth (years) 1993	services (%) 1985-95		Sanitation (%) 1990-95	supply per capita 1992	rate (%) 1993	level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1993	(copies per 100 people) 1992	(per 100 people) 1992	per capita (PPP\$) 1993	
High	human development	71.2	83	84	71	2,889	92.7	67	17	17	8,054	4,509
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	78.7 77.1 75.7 73.2 71.3	99ª 100	100 93	88 100	3,144 3,782 3,223 3,298	91.5 97.1 98.1 97.6	71 76 78 75 81	82 11 16 13 41	28 15 28 23 21	21,560 14,060 10,570 16,180 9,710	18,060 10,380 6,230 11,420 7,660
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	72.2 76.4 72.6 73.9 74.9	71 80ª 82 97 100	71 92 75ª 85 100ª	68 97 61ª 83 99ª	2,880 2,889 2,750 2,583	96.0 94.5 97.0 94.7 90.3	80 68 76 71 68	14 10 24 34	22 14 23 21 38	8,350 5,680 6,550 8,900 19,350	7,220 2,150 3,830 3,170 19,850
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	74.3 71.7 71.7 73.9	100	97 95	79 77	2,745 2,589 	87.0 97.6 84.1 78.2	70 67 84 81	7 14 8 20	24 42 36 11	8,670 15,500 5,369 ^b 20,940 ^c	3,830 8,030 6,540 21,430
43 44 45 47 48	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji Mexico	72.9 71.8 71.6 71.0	80ª 78	83 79 83	88 59 50	2,239 2,622 3,092 3,181	90.0 90.6 90.0 ^d 90.6 89.0	69 69 79 65	9 21 4 12	17 16 21 2 15	5,890 8,360 9,340 5,530 7,010	2,600 2,840 4,410 2,130 3,610
49 50 51 52 53 54	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	69.4 70.6 75.0 69.2 70.9 70.4	60 100 90	87 86ª 78 99	63 74 94 99	2,678 2,535 2,443 2,884 2,696	90.6 78.5 77.4 93.6 82.2 81.7	68 74 53 54 61 60	6 16 24 7 12 7	12 45 31 11 15 22	5,790 22,910° 21,630° 6,350 8,360 12,510	1,400 15,030 19,360 2,110 3,140 3,030
	ium human development Excluding China	67.2 65.7	89 83	69 72	40 62	2,731 2,734	79.5 78.7	61 65	<u>.</u>	6 10	2,946 3,746	900 1,485
58 59 60 63 64	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	66.5 63.4 69.9 69.0	 97 88	87 97ª 95ª 71	83 98* 86* 48	2,824 3,310 2,751 2,587	82.4 73.7 88.0 ^d 61.3 89.0	72 88 55 72	6 2 4 5 6	21 10 9 27 9	5,500 4,960 ^b 4,400	2,930 6,280 1,200
65 66 67 69 70	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	67.7 73.7 67.3 68.1	80 98 97	84 79 89	67 77 95	2,861 2,670 2,897 3,031	94.0 ^d 66.1 70.0 ^d 58.8 84.8	67 68 66	2 2 4 6	7 6 17 8 8	3,810 ^b 5,380 4,610 ^b 5,570 4,380	2,720 2,450 1,780 1,190
71 73 75 76 77	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	65.2 70.5 71.0 ^a	89ª 	93ª	55	2,288 2,548 2,407	68.0 91.0 ^d 92.5 82.0 ^d	71	3 10	2 14 13 19 33	5,220 3,552 ^b 3,670 3,795 ^b 3,118 ^b	2,790 2,120 1,180 3,380 2,380
78 79 82 83 84	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	68.0 75.4 69.8 71.2 66.7	90* 98 96	99 93 63 80	96 66 78	3,333 2,833 2,834 3,429	64.1 95.2 81.1	66 65 60 62	5 12 5 22 7	8 16 73 2 18	4,950 10,420 4,210	1,720 4,850 2,970
85 86 87 88 89	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	70.1 73.7 69.7 67.8 72.0	63 90 80 93ª	35 86 76	62 89 78 61	2,670 2,607 2,275	91.5 84.1 81.2 89.6	62 64 64 74 66	4 7 4 	8 13 9 4 5	3,340 3,180 3,690 3,030	1,510 1,440 1,230 950 600
91 92 95 97 100	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	66.3 67.3 66.5 68.7 63.2	75ª 90 76 95	71 85 85 94 70	57 83 69 63	1,883 3,175 2,258 3,319 2,705	87.8 68.7 94.2 91.7 81.0	80 65 77 74 78	7 2 5 18 3	10 6 5 32 10	3,320 2,590 3,127 ⁶	1,490 850 2,980
107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	63.0 65.4 63.9 62.4 68.6	80 99 92	62 80 67	51 50 24	2,755 2,385 3,336 2,624 2,729	82.9 97.7 49.8 92.8 80.0	61 70 69 70 57	2 10 4 1	6 4 12 3 3	3,270 2,140 3,800 2,330	740 350 660 820 490
111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	66.1 57.8 59.7 65.1 63.9	93 67 34 95	44 55 62 80	70 55 60 74	2,122 2,706 2,100 2,255 1,899	55.7 74.9 81.5 54.6 81.7	55 70 68 45 62	3 2 5 2 9	7 2 10 5	3,413 ¹ 2,940 2,510 3,400 2,090	1,190 760 1,100 390

		116-	Populat	ion with	access to	Daily		Combined first-, second-				
HDI	rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1993	Health services (%) 1985-95	Safe water (%) 1990-95	Sanitation (%) 1990-95	calorie supply per capita 1992	Adult literacy rate (%) 1993	and third- level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1993	(copies per 100 people) 1992	Televisions (per 100 people) 1992	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	
114 115 116 117 118	Honduras El Salvador Namibia Nicaragua Solomon Islands	67.9 66.8 59.1 67.1 70.5	64 40 62 83	65 55 57 58	75 81 34 60	2,306 2,663 2,120 2,296 2,222	71.4 70.4 65.0 62.0 ^d	61 54 83 61 46	3 9 14 2	7 9 2 7 1	2,100 2,360 3,710 2,280	600 1,320 1,820 340 740
119 120 121 122 123	Vanuatu Gabon Viet Nam Cape Verde Morocco	65.4 53.7 65.5 64.9 63.6	90 ^a 90 70	68ª 36 55	22 41	2,744 2,511 2,250 2,985	60.3 92.5 68.1 41.7	52 51 62 44	2 1 1	1 4 (.) 7	2,500 3,861 ^b 1,040 ^e 1,820 3,270	1,230 4,960 170 920 1,040
124 125 126	Zimbabwe Congo Papua New Guinea	53.4 51.2 56.0	85 83 96	77 38ª 28	66 22	1,989 2,297 2,615	84.0 72.1 70.5	70 35	2 1 2	3 1 (.)	2,100 2,750 2,530	520 950 1,130
Low	human development Excluding India	57.0 53.2	70 54	68 55	32 35	2,250 2,097	49.4 47.5	47 38	2 1	4 3	1,269 1,306	299 299
127 128 129 130 131	Cameroon Kenya Ghana Lesotho Equatorial Guinea	56.3 55.5 56.2 60.8 48.2	70 77 60 80	50 53 56 52	50 77 42 28	1,981 2,075 2,206 2,201	60.8 75.7 62.0 69.5 76.4	48 56 45 55	(.) 1 2 1 (.)	2 1 2 1	2,220 1,400 2,000 980	820 270 430 650 420
132 133 134 135 136	São Tomé and Principe Myanmar Pakistan India Zambia	67.0 57.9 61.8 60.7 48.6	60 55 85 75*	38 79 81 50	36 33 29 37	2,598 2,316 2,395 1,931	82.4 36.4 50.6 76.2	49 37 55 49	1 1 3 1	(.) 2 4 3	650 ^b 2,160 1,240 1,110	350 430 300 380
137 138 139 140 141	Nigeria Lao People's Dem. Rep. Comoros Togo Zaire	50.6 51.3 56.2 55.2 52.0	66 67 61 26	40 45 63 27	35 27 23 23	2,125 2,259 1,897 2,243 2,060	54.1 54.6 56.2 49.2 75.2	52 50 38 51 39	2 (,) (.) (.)	3 1 (.) 1 (.)	1,540 1,458 ^b 1,130 1,020	300 280 560 340
142 143 144 145 146	Yemen Bangladesh Tanzania, U. Rep. of Haiti Sudan	50.4 55.9 52.1 56.8 53.2	38 45 80 50 70	55 97 50 28 60	65 34 64 24 22	2,203 2,019 2,021 1,707 2,202	37.0 65.5 43.4 43.8	45 40 34 30 31	2 1 1 2	3 (.) (.) (.) 8	1,290 630 1,050	220 90
147 148 149 150 151	Côte d'Ivoire Central African Rep. Mauritania Madagascar Nepal	50.9 49.5 51.7 56.8 53.8	30* 45 63 65	72 18 66ª 29 46	54 45 3 21	2,491 1,691 2,685 2,135 1,957	37.8 56.0 36.7 45.8 ⁹ 26.3	39 37 35 34 57	1 (.) (.) (.) 1	6 (.) 2 2 (.)	1,620 1,050 1,610 700 1,000	630 400 500 220 190
152 153 154 155 156	Benin Uganda	47.2 49.5 47.8 44.7 51.9	80 40 18 49 53	66 52 50 34 36	58 58 20 57 14	1,821 2,265 2,532 2,162 2,021	58.0 31.4 34.3 59.7 35.0 ^d	31 34 35	(.) 1 (.) (.)	4 1 1 1	740 1,710 1,650 910	210 750 430 180
	Liberia Bhutan Guinea	45.5 55.6 51.0 44.7 43.7	80 39 65 80 40	47ª 46 55 53	53 30 21 21	1,827 1,640 2,390 2,556	54.7 36.4 40.2 33.9 52.8	47 24 30	(.) 1 1	2 1	710 790 860	200 500 240
164 165	Gambia Chad Djibouti Angola Burundi	45.2 47.7 48.4 46.8 50.3	93 30 30ª 80	48 24 32 70*	38 16 51	2,360 1,989 1,840 1,941	36.6 46.0 44.2 33.7	34 27 19 32 31	(.) (.) 	(.) 5 1 (.)	1,190 690 775 ^b 670	350 210 780
167 168 169 170	Mozambique Ethiopia	46.4 47.8 43.7 47.5 46.2	39 46 29 90 30	33 25 12 78 37	20ª 19 18 31	1,680 1,610 1,523 2,387 2,279	37.9 33.6 29.8 18.0 28.4	25 16 18 19 16	1 (.) 1 (.) (.)	(.) (.) 1 1 (.)	640 420 780 530	90 100 300 270
172 173	Somalia Sierra Leone Niger	47.2 39.2 46.7	27 ^a 38 32	37* 34 54	18ª 11 15	1,505 1,695 2,257	29.6 12.8	28 15	(.) (.)	1 1 (.)	860 790	150 270
All c	developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Istrial countries	63.3 51.5 51.4 74.5 64.8	80 50 57	70 52 45	39 31 37	2,546 2,027 2,096	70.6 47.3 56.0	55 35 42 82 60	5 1 2 29 11	6 3 3 53 16	2,703 894 1,385 15,211 5,545	970 210 555 16,394 4,570

a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. b. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. c. World Bank 1995f. d. UNICEF 1996. e. World Bank 1995f. f. Figures are from UNDP 1995c. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. g. Based on national census data. *Source: Column 1:* UN 1995e; columns 2; 3 and 4: calculated on the basis of data from UNICEF 1996; column 5: FAO 1994; column 6: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1994b and UN 1995e; column 10: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1994b and UN 1995e; column 11: World Bank 1995f.

		P-(Populat	ion withou	t access to	Illiterate	Illiterate	Children	Mal- nourished	Children
HDI	rank	Refugees by country of asylum (thousands) 1993	Health services (millions) 1985-95	Safe water (millions) 1990-95	Sanitation (millions) 1990-95	adults (age 15 and above; millions) 1995	females (age 15 and above; millions) 1995	not in primary school (thousands) 1992	children under age five (thousands) 1985-95	dying before age five (thousands) 1994
High	human development	223T	50T	53T	.99T	20T	10T	(481)	4,510T	190T
	Hong Kong	2	0.1ª	542	0.7	0.4	0.3	110	12	(.)
23 25	Cyprus Barbados	0			10	()	()	3	ï	(.)
26 29	Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	0	35. 35.	3.1		() 0.7	() 0.6	2 		(.) 7
30	Argentina	12	9.8	9.8	10.8	0.9	0.5	22	63	18
31 32	Costa Rica Uruguay	25 0	0.7*	0.3 0.8ª	0.1 1.2 ^a	0.1	0.1	56 35	25 19	1
33	Chile	0	0.4	2,1	2.4	0.5	0.3	285	13	4
34	Singapore	(.)	10.0		()	0.2	0.2			(.)
36	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago		42	()	0.3	() ()	() ()	4 20	9	(.)
39	Bahrain	10			4.0	0.1	()	65	÷	(.)
40 42	Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	0	(.)	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	22.0 ++ 5		(.)
43	Panama	1	0.5ª	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	30	21	1
44	Venezuela	2	196	4.4	8.6	1.Z	0.7	461	124	14
45 47	Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji		**		4.6	()	()	44		
48	Mexico	52	19.8	15.3	45.0	6.2	3.8	503	1,666	79
49	Colombia	1	13.6	4.4	12.6	2.0	1.0	1,010	458	15
50 51	Qatar Kuwait	24	++			0.1	()	3	11	(.)
52	Thailand	104	5.8	8.1*	15.0	2.6	1.8	+1	1,417	35
53 54	Malaysia Mauritius	1	275), (14)	4.Z ()	1.2	2.1	1.4	30. 1	665 25	8
/ledi	um human development Excluding China	3,778T 3,490T	210T 120T	670T 270T	1,240T 330T	300T 130T	200T 80T		44,710T 25,400T	2,760T 1,830T
58	Brazil	6	000	20.3	26.6	18.3	9.3	3,215	1,241	233
59 60	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles	1	(14)	0.2ª	0.14	0.7	0.5	302	15	20
63	Saudi Arabia	24	0.5	0.9*	2.44	3.9	2.1	952	(.)	22
64	Ecuador	0	1.3	3.2	5.7	0.7	0.4	447	236	18
65 66	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of	2,495	12.8	10.3	21.2	11.9	7.6	200	1,640	(.)
67	Belize	9							2	(.)
69 70	Algeria Jordan	219	0.5	5.6 0.5	6.1 0.2	6.6 0.4	4.3	534 60	334 54	50 5
71	Botswana	1	0.2ª	0.1*	0.6	0.3	0.2	9		3
73	Saint Vincent		340		(10)	1.0		90	10	(.)
75 76	Suriname Saint Lucia	0	310	10- 10-	0.00	()	()	10	14 14	6
77	Grenada		10	38	166				11	(.)
	Tunisia	0 4	0.9*	0.1	0.3	1.9	1.3	48	108	7
79 82	Cuba Oman	4	0.2	0.8	3.7 0.4	0.4	0.2	66 50	93	2 2
83 84	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	23		11.9			5.5		775	17 88
85	Turkey Paraguay	0	1.7	3.1	1.8	7.2	0.1	33	27	5
86	Jamaica	0	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1		19	1
87 88	Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western)	1	1.5	1.8	1.7	0.9	0.4	11	100	9 (.)
	Sri Lanka	(.)	1.3*	8,4	7.0	1.2	0.8	979) 100	688	7
91	Peru	1	5.7*	6.6	9.8	1.7	1.3	159	305	36
92 95	Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines	12	1.4 15.6	2.1 9.7	2.3 20.1	2.3 2.2	1.7	22	306 3,024	21
97	Lebanon	2	0.1	0.2	1.0	0.2	0.1	347	11	3
	South Africa	250		11.9		4.7	2.4			84
	Indonesia Guyana	2	38.3	72.8	93.9	21.5	14.6	516	8,768 21	518
06	Egypt	7	0.6	12.1	30.2	19.0	11.8	37.) 19.	756	90
	Maldives China	288	95.7	394.8	909.2	() 166.2	() 119.6	2,375	19,317	1 925
09	Iraq	108	1.4	10.9	5.8	4.8	3.2	180	392	52
	Swaziland	46	20	-6.5		0.1	0.1	23	13	3
10		1	23	3.7	3.2	0.7	0.5	786	172	28
10 11 12	Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	1 5	2.3 6.6 0.1	3.2 3.8 0.5	3.2 4.0 0.6	0.7 2.6 0.3	0.5 1.5 0.2	286 735	172 575 38	28 27 5

	Refugees	Populat	ion withou	t access to	Illiterate adults	Illiterate females	Children not in	Mal- nourished children	Children dying
HDI rank	by country of asylum (thousands) 1993	Health services (millions) 1985-95	Safe water (millions) 1990-95	Sanitation (millions) 1990-95	(age 15 and above; millions) 1995	(age 15 and above; millions) 1995	primary school (thousands) 1992	under age five (thousands) 1985-95	before age five (thousands) 1992
114 Honduras115 El Salvador116 Namibia117 Nicaragua118 Solomon Islands	0 0 1 6	1.9 3.3 0.6 0.7	1.9 2.5 0.6 1.7	1.3 1.0 1.0 1.6	0.9 1.0 0.8	0.4 0.5 0.4	61 379 50 155	172 93 62 88	11 10 4 11 (.)
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	1 5 0	0.1ª 7.1 7.8	0.4ª 45.6 11.7	55.6 15.3	0.3 2.9 0.1 9.7	0.2 2.1 () 6.0	60 3 1,645	4,413 306	(.) 7 101 1 42
 124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea 	237 14 8	1.6 0.4 0.2	2.5 1.5 ^a 3.0	3.7 3.2	0.9 0.4 0.7	0.6 0.2 0.5	165	284 108 182	34 12 13
Low human development Excluding India	7,790T 7,530T	520T 390T	560T 390T	1,190T 550T	530T 240T	330T 150T	17 2	107,720T 45,940T	9,220T 6,120T
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	44 302 150 0	3.8 6.1 6.6 0.4	6.3 12.4 7.2 0.9	6.3 6.1 9.5 1.4	2.7 3.2 3.4 0.3 ()	1.8 2.2 2.3 0.2 ()	466 102 	293 1,111 802 50	55 105 89 11 3
132 São Tomé and Principe133 Myanmar134 Pakistan135 India136 Zambia	1,480 260 141	17.8 59.8 135.2 2.2ª	27.7 27.9 171.3 4.5	28.5 89.1 640.0 5.6	4.9 48.7 290.7 1.1	3.3 28.2 183.1 0.7	301	(.) 2,326 9,409 61,775 418	(.) 158 740 3,101 80
137 Nigeria138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.139 Comoros140 Togo141 Zaire	5 1 487	35.8 1.5 1.5 30.5	63.2 2.5 1.4 30.1	68.4 3.4 3.0 31.7	26.1 1.2 0.1 1.1 5.2	16.4 0.8 0.1 0.7 3.8	183 148 722	6,975 176	913 29 4 23 365
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	54 199 565 745	8.2 63.4 5.6 3.4 8.0	5.9 3.5 14.0 5.0 10.7	4.6 76.0 10.1 5.2 20.8	45.1 5.2 2.4 8.5	26.1 3.6 1.3 5.2	4,785 2,405 70	769 10,994 1,285 355	73 479 192 31 129
 147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal 	252 44 47 0 85	9.3ª 1.7 0.8 4.8	3.7 2.6 0.7ª 9.8 11.2	6.1 1.7 13.4 16.4	4.3 0.8 0.8	2.5 0.5 0.5 5.4	963 216 613 1,100	336 169 990	100 23 17 99 97
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	300 73 156 287 0	1.5 4.7 4.2 10.2 4.6	2.6 3.8 2.5 13.2 6.2	3.2 3.3 4.1 8.6 8.3	1.7 3.1 1.8 4.2	1.1 1.8 1.1 2.8	511 626 366	394 280 952	46 39 35 191 74
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	714 150 577 16	2.1 1.7 0.6 1.3 0.6	5.6ª 1.5 2.8 0.5	4.9 2.0 5.0 0.8	2.6 1.0 0.6 2.3 0.3	1.8 0.6 0.3 1.4 0.2	1,060 693 78	553 97	116 29 12 71 10
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	2 0 34 11 272	0.1 4.2 7.2 ^a 1.2	0.5 4.6 7.0 1.8 ^a	0.6 8.6 3.0	0.4 1.9 0.2 2.2	0.2 1.2 0.1	67 551 45 437	20 435	10 53 3 154 49
167 Mozambique168 Ethiopia169 Afghanistan170 Burkina Faso171 Mali	0 248 39 8 15	9.2 28.0 12.6 1.0 7.1	10.1 38.9 15.6 2.2 6.4	12.1ª 42.0 8.0 7.0	5.3 19.1 8.2 4.6 3.9	3.4 10.9 4.9 2.6 2.2	1,045 5,660 527 980 1,165	4,749 529 622	190 504 232 77 110
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	0 16 9	6.5 ^a 2.7 5.8	5.6ª 2.8 3.9	7.3ª 3.8 7.3	1.7 4.1	1.1 2.2	959	225 628	96 60 143
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	11,790T 5,220T 5,440T 3,790T 15,580T	790T 260T 210T	1,280T 270T 290T 	2,530T 360T 290T	850T 150T 120T 	540T 90T 80T 	24 43 43 44 44	156,940T 26,740T 22,460T	12,160T 4,080T 4,120T 280T 12,450T

a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. Source: Column 1: UNHCR 1995; columns 2, 3, 4 and 9: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNICEF 1996 and UN 1995e; columns 5 and 6: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1993b; column 8: WHO 1995e and UN 1995e.

6 Trends in human development

		expec at b	fe ctancy pirth ars)	mor ra (per	ant tality te 1,000 sirths)	with a		chil un age	weight dren der five %)	Ad liter ra (9	te	Gro enroli ratio all le (% age	ment for evels	per o	GDP capita PP\$)
HDI rank		1960	1993	1960	1993	1975-80		1975	1985-95	1970	1993	1980	1990	1960	1993
High human developmen	it	56.7	71,1	88	28	58	86	19	14	79	91	60	62	2,188	7,869
22 Hong Kong 23 Cyprus 25 Barbados		66.2 68.7 64.3	78.7 77.1 75.7	44 30 74	7 8 9	99	100		11. 14. 14.		** **	59 67	69 67	2,323 2,039	21,560 14,060
26 Bahamas 29 Korea, Rep. of		63.2 53.9	73.2 71.3	85	11	66	93	04 544	14	88	98	70 66	74 74	690	9,710
30 Argentina 31 Costa Rica 32 Uruguay 33 Chile		64.9 61.6 67.7 57.1	72.2 76.4 72.6 73.9	60 85 51 114	24 13 20 15	72 70	92 85	3 10 6 2	2 6 7 1	93 88 93 89	96 95 97 95	65 55 63 65	82 56 73 66	3,381 2,160 4,401 3,130	8,350 5,680 6,550 8,900
34 Singapore 36 Brunei Darussalam		64.5 62.3	74.9	36 63	6			-77. 19	77			53 64	68 67	2,409	19,350
38 Trinidad and Tobage39 Bahrain40 Antigua and Barbur		63.5 55.5	71.7	56 130	17 18	93	97	14	7	22 22 22	200 (400) (400)	59 58	66 75	4,754	8,670
42 United Arab Emirat		53.0	73.9	145	18	44			24		4.0	44	73	-	
43 Panama 44 Venezuela 45 Saint Kitts and Nevi	5	60.7 59.6	72.9 71.8	69 81	25 23	77 79	83 79	14 14	7 5	81 75	90 91	66 58	62 63	1,533 3,899	5,890 8,360
47 Fiji 48 Mexico		59.0 57.1	71.6 71.0	71 92	23 35	62	83	19	14	74	89	63 68	70 62	2,354 2,870	5,530 7,010
49 Colombia 50 Qatar		56.6 53.0 59.6	69.4 70.6 75.0	99 145 89	37 20 18	64	87	19	12	78 54	91 77	53 60	55 78	1,874	5,790
51 Kuwait 52 Thailand 53 Malaysia 54 Mauritius		59.6 52.3 53.9 59.2	75.0 69.2 70.9 70.4	103 73 70	36 13 18	25 99	86ª 99	36 31 32	26 25 24	79 60	94 82	49 54 48	45 58 57	985 1,783 2,113	6,350 8,360 12,510
54 Mauritius Medium human develop Excluding China	ment	47.7 48.4	66.9 65.6	143 135	48	45	74	29 33	19 22	54	75	51 52	50 59	902 1,217	3,009 3,993
58 Brazil 59 Libyan Arab Jamahi	riva.	54.7 46.7	66.5 63.4	116	57	62 87	87 97*	18	7	66 37	82 74	54	60	1,404	5,500
60 Seychelles 63 Saudi Arabia	nya	44.4	69.9	170	28	64	95ª	10	**	ÿ	61	36	50	4 4	75
64 Ecuador		53.1	69.0	124	49	36	71	20	17	72	89	69	68	1,461	4,400
65 Dominica 66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 67 Belize	F	49.6	67.7	169	34	51	84	43	16	29	66	46	61	1,985	5,380
69 Algeria 70 Jordan		47.0 47.0	67.3 68.1	168 135	54 35	77	79	23 18	9	25 47	59 85	52 75	60 73	1,676 1,328	5,570 4,380
71 Botswana 73 Saint Vincent		45.5	65.2	116	42			12		41	68	51	64	474	5,220
75 Suriname 76 Saint Lucia		60.2	70.5	70	27		**	2 7			**	61	69	2,234	3,670
77 Grenada		10.4			42			4.72						1.204	4.050
78 Tunisia 79 Cuba 82 Oman		48.4 63.8 40.1	68.0 75.4 69.8	159 65 214	43 12 29	35	99	17	10	31 87	64 95	50 72 28	62 63 61	1,394 2,040	4,950 10,420
83 Korea, Dem. People's 84 Turkey	s Rep. of	53.9 50.1	71.2 66.7	85 190	24 64	68	80	15	10	52	81	44	52	1,669	4,210
85 Paraguay86 Jamaica87 Dominican Rep.		63.8 62.8 51.8	70.1 73.7 69.7	66 63 125	38 14 41	13 86 55	35 86 76	9 14 17	4 7 10	80 97 67	92 84 81	49 67 60	52 61 66	1,220 1,829 1,227	3,340 3,180 3,690
88 Samoa (Western) 89 Sri Lanka		62.0	72.0	71	17	19	53	58	38	77	90	58	68	1,389	3,030
91 Peru 92 Syrian Arab Rep. 95 Philippines		47.7 49.8 52.8	66.3 67.3 66.5	142 135 80	64 39 43	77 77 14		17 20 39	11 12 33	71 40 83	88 69 94	65 60 61	74 66 64	2,130 1,183	3,320 2,590
97 Lebanon 100 South Africa		59.6 49.0	68.7 63.2	68 89	34 52	85 396	1955 (±40	55. 45	~	69 	92	67	65	2,984	3,1270
102 Indonesia 103 Guyana 106 Egypt 107 Maldives		41.2 56.1 46.2 43.6	63.0 65.4 63.9 62.4	139 100 179 158	56 47 66 58	11 75	62 80	51 23 17	40 22 9	54 35	83 50	51 61 51	58 65 66	490 1,630 557	3,270 2,140 3,800
108 China		47.1	68.6	150	44	44		26	17	44 :	-	50	43	723	2,330
109 Iraq 110 Swaziland 111 Bolivia 112 Guatemala 113 Mongolia		48.5 40.2 42.7 45.6 46.7	66.1 57.8 59.7 65.1 63.9	139 157 167 125 128	58 74 74 48 59	66 34 39	44 55 62	19 14 17 30	12 10 16 34	34 57 44	56 82 55	67 59 54 35 60	62 64 55 41 56	1,182 1,142 1,667	2,940 2,510 3,400

	expec at b	fe ctancy birth ars)	Infa mort ra (per 1 live b	te 1,000	Popul with a to s wa	access afe ter	chi ur age	rweight Idren nder e five ‰)	Ad liter ra	acy te	enrol ratio all le	oss ment o for evels e 6-23)	Real per c (PP	apita
HDI rank	1960	1993	1960	1993	1975-80	1990-95	1975	1985-95	1970	1993	1980	1990	1960	1993
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia 117 Nicaragua	46.5 50.5 42.5 47.0	67.9 66.8 59.1 67.1	160 130 146 140	42 44 59 50	41 53 46	65 55 58	23 22 20	19 11 12	53 57	71 70	47 47 53	50 51 53	901 1,305 1,756	2,100 2,360 2,280
118 Solomon Islands	50.3	70.5						12	104	**				.,200
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	40.8 44.2 52.0 46.7	53.7 65.5 64.9 63.6	171 147 110 163	93 42 49 67	20 20 20 20	4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0	55 19	45 9	33	60 42	52 45 38	52 49 37	1,373 854	3,861 ^b 3,270
124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	45.3 41.7 40.7	53.4 51.2 56.0	110 143 165	67 84 68	38 20	38ª 28	25 43 39	16 24 30	55 35 32	84 72 71	41 28	66 30	937 1,092 1,136	2,100 2,750 2,530
Low human development Excluding India	41.9 39.8	56.0 52.8	168 172	92 100	22	50	44	48 40	31 26	49 48	37 33	41 32	656 716	1,270
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	39.3 44.7 45.0 42.9 36.8	56.3 55.5 56.2 60.8 48.2	163 124 132 149 188	62 69 80 78 116	17 35 17	53 56 52	19 25 35 20	14 22 27 16	33 32 31	61 76 62	48 62 48 52 57	52 58 46 58 64	736 635 1,049 346	2,220 1,400 2,000 980
 132 São Tomé and Principe 133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan 135 India 136 Zambia 	43.8 43.1 44.0 41.6	57.9 61.8 60.7 48.6	158 163 165 135	82 89 81 103	17 25 42	38 79 50	41 47 71 17	37 40 53 25	71 21 34 52	82 36 51 76	39 19 40 46	39 24 50 47	341 820 617 1,172	650 ^b 2,160 1,240 1,110
 Nigeria Lao People's Dem. Rep. Comoros Togo Zaire 	39.5 40.4 42.5 39.3 41.3	50.6 51.3 56.2 55.2 52.0	190 155 165 182 158	84 96 88 85 92	 16 19	63 27	30 25	36 24 	25 17 42	54 49 75	50 44 45 61 46	37 42 34 54 38	1,133 411	1,540 1,020
142 Yemen143 Bangladesh144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of145 Haiti146 Sudan	36.4 39.6 40.5 42.2 38.7	50.4 55.9 52.1 56.8 53.2	214 156 147 182 170	119 106 85 85 77	39 12	50 28	33 84 25 26	30 66 25 34	24 22 17	37 43 44	30 44 25	32 32 27	621 272 921	1,290 630 1,050
 147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal 	39.2 38.5 35.3 40.7 38.4	50.9 49.5 51.7 56.8 53.8	166 175 191 220 187	91 101 100 91 98		46	18 39 30	12 48 39	18 16 13	38 56 26	39 33 19 60 28	37 35 25 40 41	1,021 806 930 1,013 584	1,620 1,050 1,610 700 1,000
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	42.3 37.3 35.0 43.0 42.4	47.2 49.5 47.8 44.7 51.9	150 172 185 133 146	110 67 86 115 115	68 36 34 35	66 52 50 34	37 19 28	29 20 23	32 12 16 41	58 31 34 60	33 24 34 25	39 30 30 41	538 1,136 1,075 371	740 1,710 1,650 910
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	37.8 41.3 37.3 33.6 34.0	45.5 55.6 51.0 44.7 43.7	207 184 203 203 201	142 124 122 133 139	51 14 10	47ª 55 53	19 	27	18 14	36 34	33 7 21 27	38 11 19 25	423	710
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	32.3 34.8 36.0 33.0 41.3	45.2 47.7 48.4 46.8 50.3	213 195 186 208 153	131 121 114 123 101	17 29	32 70*	27	38	11 20	46 34	23 16 19 54 11	29 29 24 32 30	411 785 473	1,190 690 670
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	37.3 36.0 33.4 36.2 34.8	46.4 47.8 43.7 47.5 46.2	190 175 215 205 210	147 118 163 129 158	8 9 25	25 12 78	45 34 36	48 30 31	22 8 8 8	38 30 18 28	29 16 20 8	24 17 13 17	1,368 262 290 541	640 420 780 530
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	36.0 31.5 35.3	47.2 39.2 46.7	175 219 192	121 165 123	38 14	37ª 34	22 50	29 36	13 4	30 13	30 12	29 14	871 604	860 790
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries	46.0 38.8 40.1	61.5 51.1 51.0	150 173 167	70 110 97	40 21 25	68 38 43	40 51 31	30 45 31	43 28 27	61 47 55	46 31 39	47 31 36	915 561 990	2,709 887 1,379
World			- 100 - 100	27. 39	in differ f									

a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. b. Figures are for 1992. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. Source: Columns 1-4: calculated on the basis of estimates from UN 1995e; columns 5 and 6: calculated on the basis of data from UNICEF 1996, UN 1995e and WHO 1993b; columns 7 and 8: WHO 1995a; columns 9 and 10: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1995b; columns 11 and 12: UNESCO 1993b; columns 13 and 14: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995h.

South-North gaps

							=100 (see not aily	(e)			
		expec	fe tancy birth		ult	cal	orie oply apita	Acce		Unde	er-five tality
HDI	ank	1960	1993	1970	1993	1965	1992	1975-80	1990-95	1960	1994
ligh	human development	83	95	86	96	83	91			36	74
22	Hong Kong	96	100+	**			~	99	100+	79	100+
	Cyprus Barbados	99 93	100 + 100 +	**	(44)	306	×4	+ 0	0.0	10.1	-
	Bahamas	93	98						1.0	363	**
	Korea, Rep. of	78	96	95	100+	77	100+	66	96	33	100+
	Argentina	94	97	100+	100+	96	92			60	67
31 32	Costa Rica Uruguay	89 98	100+ 97	95 100+	99 100+	84 85	93 88	72	95	36 87	100+ 86
	Chile	83	99	96	99	87	83	70	88	30	100+
34	Singapore	93	100+	**	200	38		31	-	100+	100+
36	Brunei Darussalam	90	100	**					100	n.25	
38 39	Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain	92 80	96 96		-4.8	83	83	93	100	56	90
40	Antigua and Barbuda				**	10	**		149 S 149 S	365 	**
42	United Arab Emirates	77	.99		44	194		44	162	17	90
43	Panama	88	98	88	94	79	72	77	86	39	90
44 45	Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis	86	96	81	95	76	84	37	**	58	75
47	Fiji	85	96	**		10		**	**	25.) Heist	
	Mexico	83	95	80	93	90	100+	-	182	28	56
49	Colombia	82	93	84	95	76	86	64	90	31	95
50 51	Qatar Kuwait	77 86	95 100+	58	81	3.0	**		3980	32	100+
	Thailand	76	93	85	98	77	78	25	89	28	56
	Malaysia	78	95	65	86	81	93		100	39	100+
	Mauritius	86	94		(ii)	83	87	99	100+	49	78
ledi	um human development Excluding China	69 70	90 88	58	80	71 74	87 87	**		21 23	37 32
58	Brazil	79	89	71	86	81	91	62	90	23	30
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	68	85	40	77	67	100+	87	100	15	19
60 63	Seychelles Saudi Arabia	64	94	10	64	64	88	64	98	14	50
	Ecuador	77	93	78	93	67	83	36	73	23	32
65	Dominica	10	17								
66 67	Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize	72	91	31	69	70	92	51	87	18	35
69	Algeria	68	90	27	62	58	93	77	81	17	28
70	Jordan	68	91	51	89	75	97	+1	9e	27	72
71	Botswana	66	88	44	71	71	73			24	33
	Saint Vincent Suriname	87	95	-	144		14 A4	44 44	4.0	**	. **
76	Saint Lucia	342	0.00	e. 	(11)	0.00	44		10	0.02	
77	Grenada	394	011	21				(11)	397	995	**
	Tunisia	70	91	33	67	76	100+	35	100 +	17	53
	Cuba Oman	92 58	100+ 94	94	100	82	91	244. 241	4.6	82 14	100+ 67
83	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	78	96	**		80	91	а. 1	-14	34	58
112	Turkey	73	90	56	85	85	100+			19	33
85 86	Paraguay Jamaica	92 91	94 99	86 100+	96	90 81	86 84	13 86	36 89	45 54	53 100+
	Dominican Rep.	75	99	72	88 85	01	04	55	78	27	40
88	Samoa (Western)										0.5
	Sri Lanka	90	97	83	94	81	73	19	55	31	95
	Peru Svrian Arab Rep.	69 72	89 90	77 43	92 72	79 72	60 100+	22.1	25	17 20	31 47
	Philippines	76	89	90	99	66	73	200	10	40	32
	Lebanon South Africa	86	92	75	96	80	100+	340		48	45
	South Africa	71	85			86	87		0. C 4	32	26
	Indonesia Guyana	60 81	85 88	58	87	65	88	11	64	19	16
06	Egypt	67	86	38	52	78	100+	75	82	16	35
	Maldives	63	84	**	in the second se	60	00			20	42
	China	68	92		 E 0	69	88		AE.	20	42
	Iraq Swaziland	70 58	89 78	37	58	72	68	66	45	24	25
10		62	80	62	85		67	34	57	16	16
11	Bolivia Guatemala	66	87	48	57	62 75	72	39	64	20	26

	Daily										
		fe tancy iirth		lult racy	cale sup	orie oply apita	Acce safe v			er-five tality	
HDI rank	1960	1993	1970	1993	1965	1992	1975-80	1990-95	1960	1994	
14 Honduras 15 El Salvador 16 Namibia	67 73 61	91 90 79	57 62	75 74	70 65	74 86	41 53	67 57	20 19 20	3 32 23	
17 Nicaragua 18 Solomon Islands	68 73	90 95	49- 19-	10 10	86	74	46	60	20	26	
19 Vanuatu 20 Gabon 21 Viet Nam	59 64	72 88	36	63	65	81	. 45. 16	44. 34	14 19	12 39	
22 Cape Verde 23 Morocco	75 68	87 85	24	44	78 74	72 96		44) 940 940	19	39	
24 Zimbabwe 25 Congo	65 60	72 69	59 38	88 75	70 81	64 74	38	39	23 19	22	
26 Papua New Guinea ow human development	59	75	35	74	58	84	20	29	16	19 13	
Excluding India	57	71	29	50	71	67	55 53	87.0 27.0	16	12	
27 Cameroon 28 Kenya 29 Ghana	57 65 65	76 74 75	38 35 33	64 79 65	81 79 70	64 67 71	17 35	55 58	15 20 19	17 20 14	
30 Lesotho 31 Equatorial Guinea	62 53	82 65	در 		72	71	17	54	20	12	
32 São Tomé and Principe 33 Myanmar	63	78	77	86	72	83	17	39	17	17	
34 Pakistan 35 India	62 64	83 81	23 37	38 53	61 72	74 77	25	81	18 17	13 15	
36 Zambia 37 Nigeria	60 57	65 68	56 27	80 57	73	62 68	42	52	19 20	9	
38 Lao People's Dem. Rep.39 Comoros	58 62	69 75		200	69	73		285	18	13	
40 Togo 41 Zaire	57 60	74 70	18 45	52 79	81 79	72 66	16 19	65 28	15 14	14 10	
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	53 57 59	68 75 70	26	39	73 69	65 65	39	52	12 17 16	16 15 11	
145 Haiti 146 Sudan	61 56	76 71	24 18	45 46	71 64	55 71	12	29	16 14	14 15	
47 Côte d'Ivoire 48 Central African Rep.	57 56	68 66	19 17	40 59	82 73	80 54	7		14 14	12 10	
149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar	51 59	69 76	5.00 (200) (200)		71 87	86 69	20 20 20	200	13 11	9	
151 Nepal 152 Rwanda	55 61	72 63	14 35	28	70 59	63 58	8 68	47 68	21	15	
153 Senegal 154 Benin	54 51	66 64	13 17	33 36	84 71	73 81	36 34	54 52	13 13	16 13	
55 Uganda 56 Cambodia	62 61	60 70	44	63	77 79	69 65	35	35	19 19	10 10	
57 Malawi 58 Liberia	55 60	61 75	19	38	73 76	59 53	**	*	11 14	8	
159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	54 49 49	68 60 59	15	35	65	77	14 10	57 55	13 12 12	9 8 8	
62 Gambia 63 Chad	47 50	61 64	12	48	80	64			11	8	
164 Djibouti 165 Angola	52 48	65 63		+0	65	59	17	33	12	6	
66 Burundi 67 Mozambique	60 54	68 62	22 24	35 40	83 69	62 54	29	72	16 12	10	
168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan	52 48	64 59	9	31	62 73	52 49	8 9	26 12	14 11	9 7	
170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	52 50	64 62	9	19 30	73 67	77 73	25	80	13 10	11 8	
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	52 46 51	63 53 63	14 4	31 13	74 64 69	48 54 72	40 4 a 4 a	- 109 - 544 - 544	14 11 13	9 6 6	
All developing countries Least developed countries	65 56	82 68	48 32	66 50	72 72 72	81 65		20	20	28	
Sub-Saharan Africa ndustrial countries	58 100	68 100	30 100	57 100	75 100	67 100		42 6	17 100	12 100	
World						.51					

Note: North refers to the industrial countries. All figures are expressed in relation to the North average, which is indexed to equal 100. The smaller the figure the bigger the gap, the closer the figure to 100 the smaller the gap, and a figure of 100+ indicates that the country is better than the North average. Source: Columns 1 and 2: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995e; columns 3 and 4: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995e; columns 5 and 6: calculated on the basis of data from UNICEF 1996.

8 Rural-urban gaps

		Population with access to services (%)									in convicos
	Rural population		Hea	alth	Safe	water	Sanit	ation		ban disparity ural-urban parity	
HDI	rank	(as % of total) 1993	Rural 1985-95	Urban 1985-95	Rural 1990-95	Urban 1990-95	Rural 1990-95	Urban 1990-95	Health 1985-95	Safe water 1990-95	Sanitation
High	human development	33	2	742	74	91	55	78	1221	81	50
	Hong Kong	5			96	100	50	90		96	56
23	Cyprus	47	**	197					÷.		
25 26	Barbados Bahamas	54 15	12	144	200	(200	10	+ 2	(++)	22	25
29	Korea, Rep. of	21	100	100	76	100	100	100	100	76	100
30	Argentina	13	21	80	29	77	37	73	26	38	51
31	Costa Rica	51	63ª	100ª	99	85	94	100	63ª	116	94
32 33	Uruguay Chile	10 16		144	5ª 37	85ª 94	65ª 5	60ª 84	**	6ª 39	108ª 6
34	Singapore	0	1.52	100	144	100ª	-	99ª	1221		22
36	Brunei Darussalam	42							- 75		
38	Trinidad and Tobago	29	99	100	91	99	98	99	99	92	99
39 40	Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda	11 64		-44		2281		**		22	
42	United Arab Emirates	17	10		CRE	10	22	93	(84)		24
43	Panama	47	64ª	95ª	5.4	4.4	73	99	67ª	+4	74
44 45	Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis	8 59	i.e	244	75	80	30	64	5945	94	47
47	Fiji	60		144	. 0.e. 			44 C	**	5 m -	24 22
48	Mexico	26	60	80	62	91	17	70	75	68	24
49	Colombia	28		144	74	98	33	76	54) 	76	43
50 51	Qatar Kuwait	9						100	173.		
52	Thailand	81	90	90	874	98*	72	80	100	89*	90
53	Malaysia	48	100	1.00	66	96	00		100	69	100
	Mauritius	60	100	100	100	95	99	99	100	105	100
Vied	ium human development Excluding China	61 48	86	98	55 54	92 88	17 39	76 78	86	60 61	31 54
58	Brazil	23		122		- 24	-	4		40	
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	15	1.644	544	804	1003	85ª	100*		80"	85#
60 63	Seychelles Saudi Arabia	47 21	88	100	744	100*	30*	100*	88	74ª	30*
64	Ecuador	43	20	70	55	82	38	56	29	67	68
65	Dominica	0			stt	-++		++	:++-	+1	
66 67	Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize	42 53	65	95	77	89	38	89	68	87	43
69	Algeria	46	95	100	60	96	61	93	95	63	66
70	Jordan	30	95	98	044			344.5	97	30	1.4
71	Botswana	74	854	100ª	91ª	100ª	41	91	85ª	91*	45
73 75	Saint Vincent Suriname	55 51	. 9.4	4.0	2.4.4	4.1-		**	**	44	
76	Saint Lucia	53	242		i azi Tazi			14 (14)	11	34 34	
77	Grenada	0	24			48				+1	i e
78	Tunisia	44	80*	100ª	89	100	94	98	80*	89	96
79 82	Cuba Oman	25 88	96 94	99 100	85	96	51	71	97 94	89	72
83	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	39		100	2.892	198.1		1951 A 197		34 40	
84	Turkey	34	(95)		59	91	201		**	65	
85	Paraguay	49 47	38	90	24	50	67	56	42	48	120
86 87	Jamaica Dominican Rep.	37	67	84	46	96	80 83	100 76	80	48	80 109
88	Samoa (Western)	79	14	- 10		360		395	200	++	14
89	Sri Lanka	78		10	49	87	60	67	++	56	90
91 92	Peru Syrian Arab Rep.	29 49	84	96	28	88	25 82	58 84	88	32 85	43 98
92	Philippines	49	74	77	78 77	92 93	62	79	96	83	78
97	Lebanon	14	85	98	88	96	8	81	87	92	10
0.0	South Africa	50						25		.tt	11
02	Indonesia Guwana	67 65	(10.0)	-	54	79	40	73	100	68	55
	Guyana Egypt	56	99	100	61	97	26	80	99	63	33
07	Maldives	74	144	4.0	2.44		7				
	China	71	89	100	56	97		74	89	58	9
	Iraq Swaziland	27 71	78	97			37	85	80	44.5	44
111	Bolivia	41	52	77	22	78	32	72	68	28	44
112	Guatemala	59	25	47	43	92	52	72	53	47	72
	Mongolia	40	20		58	100	47	100	122	58	47

				Populatio	on with ac	cess to se	rvices (%)		Rural-u	ban disparity	in services
		Rural population	He	alth	Safe	water	Sanit	ation		ural-urban parity	
IDI ra	ank	(as % of total) 1993	Rural 1985-95	Urban 1985-95	Rural 1990-95	Urban 1990-95	Rural 1990-95	Urban 1990-95	Health 1985-95	Safe water 1990-95	Sanitation 1990-95
	Honduras	57	56	80 80	53	81 78	61	96 91	70 50	65 49	64 71
	El Salvador Namibia	56 65	40 47	80	38 42	87	65 12	77	54	49	16
	Nicaragua	38	60	100	23	81	34	77	60	28	44
	Solomon Islands	84				<u>ie</u>	-	98	41	<u>.</u>	
	Vanuatu Gabon	81 52		88 22		90°		**		56ª	
	Viet Nam	80	80	100	32	53	16	47	80	60	34
	Cape Verde Morocco	50 53	50	100	18	94	18	69	50	19	26
	Zimbabwe	69	80	96	64	99	48	99	83	65	48
	Congo	43	70	97	2ª	92ª			72	2ª	
	Papua New Guinea	84	15		17	84	11	82	60	20	13
ow h	iuman development Excluding India	74 74	66 44	95 86	64 49	78 71	20 27	64 58	68 52	82 69	34 48
	Cameroon	57	39	44	43	57	36	64	89	75	56
	Kenya	74	40	07	49	67	81	69	40	73	117
	Ghana Lesotho	65 78	45	92	49 64	70 14	36 25	53 42	49	70	68 60
	Equatorial Guinea	60	14	99 22		2.4		-+2.		144	
32	São Tomé and Principe	55	(22)				24			144	a a construction of the co
33	Myanmar	75	47	100	39	36	35	39	47	108	90
	Pakistan India	66 74	35 80	99 100	71 79	96 85	19 14	62 70	35 80	74 93	31 20
	Zambia	57	50*	100	11	91	12	75	50ª	12	16
37	Nigeria	62	62	85	26	63	30	40	73	41	75
38	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	80			43	57	14	97	17	75	14
	Comoros Togo	71 70	60	90	58	74	10	56	67	78	18
	Zaire	71	17	40	23	37	11	46	43	62	24
	Yemen	68	32	81	47	89	60	87	40	53	69
	Bangladesh	83 77	73	94	97 46	99 67	30 62	75 74	78	98 69	40 84
	Tanzania, U. Rep. of Haiti	70	15	94	23	37	16	42	/0	62	38
	Sudan	76	40	90	41	84	4	79	44	49	5
	Côte d'Ivoire	58	114	61ª	81	59	51	59	18ª	137	86
	Central African Rep.	62	22	72	18	18	599	24	16	100 97ª	
	Mauritania Madagascar	49 74	33 65	72 65	65ª 10	67ª 83	3	34 12	46	12	25
	Nepal	88	10		43	90	16	70		48	23
	Rwanda	94	140	482	62	75	56	77	33	83	73
	Senegal	59	2.44	14	28	85 41	40 6	83 54		33 129	48 11
	Benin Uganda	70 88	42	99	53 32	41	52	94	42	68	55
	Cambodia	81	50	80	33	65	8	81	63	51	10
	Malawi	87		r č	420	91ª	51	71		46ª	72
	Liberia Bhutan	56 94	30	50	13	79	4	56	60	16	7
	Guinea	72	70	100	56	50	10	84	70	112	12
61	Guinea-Bissau	79		200	57	38	17	32	++	150	53
	Gambia Chad	76 79	1.0	64	17	67 48	28	54	341	35	52
	Djibouti	18		04	1.2	40	22 22	144	**		
65	Angola	69			15	69	8	34		22	24
66	Burundi	93	79	100	69ª	100*	51	60	79	69 ^a	85
	Mozambique	69	30	100	40	17	11ª 7	61ª	30	235	18ª 7
	Ethiopia Afghanistan	87 81	17	80	19 5	91 39	7	97 13	21	21	1
70	Burkina Faso	77	89	100			11	42	89	125	26
	Mali	74	E.	-	38	36	21	58	11.	106	36
	Somalia	75	154	50ª	29ª	50ª	5ª	44ª	30°	584	11ª
	Sierra Leone Niger	65 84	20 30	90 99	21 55	58 46	8	17	22 30	36 120	47
	eveloping countries	64	76	96	60	87	20	72	78	69	35
	Least developed countries	79	70	90	48	65	24	61	70	74	38
	Sub-Saharan Africa	70	50	81	35	63	30	56	63	56	55
1.00	strial countries	27	**		85					85	

Note: The figures in the last three columns are expressed in relation to the urban average, which is indexed to equal 100. The smaller the figure the bigger the gap, the closer the figure to 100 the smaller the gap, and a figure above 100 indicates that the rural average is higher than the urban average. a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. Source: Column 1: calculated on the basis of estimates from UN 1995h; columns 2-7: UNICEF 1996; columns 8, 9 and 10: calculated on the basis of data from UNICEF 1996.

Women and capabilities

			Female net				male students	Fer	nale life			Maternal
		P	rimary	Se	condary	Per		expecta	ancy at birth	Tota	l fertility	mortality rate
HDI	rank	Ratio	Index (1980=100) 1992	Ratio	Index (1980=100) 1992	100,000 people 1992	Index (1980=100) 1992	Years 1993	Index (1970=100) 1993	Rate 1992	Index (1970=100) 1992	(per 100,000
High	human development	94	102	62	118	1,022	198	74	116	2.6	52	119
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	99 88 96 100	99 91 100	96 75 89 85	109 88 131	1,320 859 1,885 2,866	182 336 114 338	82 79 78 78 75	110 109 110 113 120	1.2 2.5 1.8 2.0 1.7	35 95 58 64 39	7 5 43 100 130
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	95 88 93 84	98	62 38 55	88	142) 1441 1445 1446	20 20 20 20 20	76 79 76 78 78	108 114 105 119 109	2.8 3.1 2.3 2.5 1.7	90 61 79 62 56	100 60 85 65 10
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	86 88 100 99	105 95 132 132	64 67 87 79	119 105 171	440 2,011 1,185	99 371 268	76 74 74 76	112 110 116	3.1 2.4 3.8 4.2	55 66 59 64	60 90 60 26
43 44 45	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis	92 90	103	53 24	108 150			75 75	112 112 111	2.9	55 61	55 120
47 48	Fiji Mexico	100	109	63 63	(e 3a	1,333	146	74 74	113 116	3.0 3.2	65 49	90 110
49 50 51 52 53 54	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	78	94 119	72	138	1.578 3,072 1,569 2,138 640 313	174 183 118 197 482	72 74 77 72 73 74	116 119 114 119 116 115	2.7 4.3 3.1 2.1 3.6 2.4	49 63 43 38 65 64	100 29 200 80 120
	ium human development Excluding China	92 88	116 116	39 39	62 62	378 845	238 241	69 67	119 123	2.7 3.6	48 62	185 306
58 59 60 63	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia	96 57	154	30	188	1,220 1,486	107 417 310	69 65 72	113 123 134	2.9 6.4 6.4	58 85 88	220 220 130
64 65 66 67 69 70	Ecuador Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	93 95 89 89	 125 98	 37 50 37		764 844 1,906	398 307 161	72 68 75 69 70	121 126 112 127 126	3.5 5.0 4.2 3.9 5.6	56 74 67 52 71	150 120 160 150
	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	100	122	45	265	280	354	67 73	125	4.9	73 48	250
79	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. Rep. of Turkey	93 98 71	129 103 222	40	222	869 2,134 413 1,111	290 139 380	69 77 72 74 69	127 108 150 120 118	3.2 1.8 7.2 2.4 3.4	49 46 100 38 64	170 95 190 70 180
86 87 88	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	96 100 83	112 103 114	29 68 29 	100	832 663 402	 158	72 76 72 69 74	107 109 119 118 113	4.3 2.4 3.1 4.5 2.5	71 45 50 60 58	160 120 110 35 140
92 95 97	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	92 93	115	39 49	130	1,419 3,140 2,482 1,168	147 111 118	68 69 68 71 66	124 122 117 107 119	3.4 5.9 3.9 3.1 4.1	54 76 68 57 72	280 180 280 300 230
103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	95 82 95	114	34 60	9 9 9 11	751 499 1,056 132	331 178 101 236	65 68 65 61 71	133 111 125 126 114	2.9 2.6 3.9 6.8 2.0	54 47 64 97 37	650 170 95
111 112	lraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	74 93 87	79 118	30 27	97 193	311	120	68 60 61 68 65	121 125 127 127 121	5.7 4.9 4.8 5.4 3.6	80 75 74 83 62	310 560 650 200 65

			Female net	enrolme	ent		male students	For	nale life			Maternal
		P	rimary	Se	condary	Per	students		ancy at birth	Tota	l fertility	mortality
HDI	rank	Ratio 1992	Index (1980=100) 1992	Ratio	Index (1980 = 100) 1992	100,000 people 1992	Index (1980=100) 1992	Years 1993	Index (1970=100) 1993	Rate	Index (1970=100) 1992	(per 100,000
115 116 117	Honduras El Salvador Namibia Nicaragua Solomon Islands	91 71 93 81	117 109	 35 28	112	726 1,281 382 819	132 564 80	70 69 60 69 73	129 116 124 125 118	4.9 4.0 5.3 5.0 5.4	68 63 88 72 78	220 300 370 160
120 121 122	Vanuatu Gabon Viet Nam Cape Verde Morocco	 99 53	113 113		150	225 715	239	68 55 68 66 65	125 121 131 113 123	4.7 5.3 3.9 4.3 3.8	71 126 66 61 54	280 500 160 610
125	Zimbabwe Congo Papua New Guinea	100 100 100	11. 11. 14.	15 12 14	44 90 44	320 190	198 151	55 54 57	105 111 123	5.0 6.3 5.1	68 101 83	570 890 930
Low	human development Excluding India	50 50	122 122	10 10	108 108	68 68	198 198	57 54	123 120	4.9 6.0	78 89	717 886
128 129	Cameroon Kenya Ghana Lesotho Equatorial Guinea	71	111 96 	22	 129	102 54 209 41	340 92 111	58 57 58 63 50	126 110 114 123 120	5.7 6.3 6.0 5.2 5.9	92 78 89 91 104	550 650 740 610 820
135	São Tomé and Principe Myanmar Pakistan India Zambia	- 54 - 64 - 64 - 64 - 64	 	**	992) 992) 993) 993) 993)	149	139	60 63 61 49	119 128 126 103	4.2 6.2 3.8 6.0	71 89 68 89	580 340 570 940
137 138 139 140 141	Lao People's Dem. Rep. Comoros Togo	57 46 58 47	97 78	13 12	44 45 44 44	192 60 14 60	214 113	52 53 57 57 54	118 126 121 124 115	6.5 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.7	101 109 101 100 108	1,000 650 950 640 870
142 143 144 145 146	Bangladesh Tanzania, U. Rep. of Haiti	66 51 26	138 78 70	12	200	147 132 245	169 292	51 56 54 59 55	123 129 114 120 124	7.6 4.4 5.9 4.8 5.7	100 63 87 82 85	1,400 850 770 1,000 660
147 148 149 150 151	Mauritania Madagascar	46	112		144 1441 1444 1441	55 104 278 270	458 267	52 52 53 58 53	114 116 121 125 128	7.4 5.7 5.4 6.1 5.4	100 100 83 92 90	810 700 930 490 1,500
	Senegal Benin Uganda	71 42 35	125 140	7	199 199 199 199	19 117 60 63	380 130 102 315	49 51 50 46 53	106 125 122 96 120	6.6 6.1 7.1 7.3 5.3	81 87 101 106 90	1,300 1,200 990 1,200 900
158 159	Malawi Liberia Bhutan Guinea Guinea-Bissau	48	126	2	148 147 147 147	37 28	109 18	46 57 53 45 45	113 120 129 122 121	7.2 6.8 5.9 7.0 5.8	99 100 100 100 109	560 560 1,600 1,600 910
165	Chad Djibouti	46 26 47	139 294	12 4	200		173	47 49 50 48 52	125 125 120 126 115	5.6 5.9 5.8 7.2 6.8	86 98 86 111 100	1,100 1,500 570 1,500 1,300
167 168 169 170	Mozambique Ethiopia	37 14 24 14	112 127 218	5 5 3	250 250	16 25 102 28 19	320 227 232 280 136	48 49 44 49 48	111 119 119 117 122	6.5 7.0 6.9 6.5 7.1	100 103 97 101 100	1,500 1,400 1,700 930 1,200
173	Somalia Sierra Leone Niger	18	2 h. 1 m		150		180	49 41 48	117 114 121	7.0 6.5 7.4	100 101 93	1,600 1,800 1,200
All o	developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Istrial countries	84 50 54 97 87	118 122 113 101 112	33 10 18 87 52	86 116 51 50 72	365 70 236 3,515 1,139	227 214 228 133 208	63 52 53 78 65	121 120 116 106 119	3.5 5.8 6.3 1.8 3.1	60 88 95	384 1,015 929 28 307

Source: Columns 1, 3 and 5: UNESCO 1995c; columns 2, 4 and 6: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1995c; columns 7-10: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995e; column 11: WHO and UNICEF 1996.

10 Women and political and economic participation

		a	strators nd agers	and te	ssional chnical kers		al and vorkers		vice rkers	W	omen in goverr	2724 127
HDI	rank		Female as % of male 1990	Female (%) 1990	Female as % of male 1990	Female (%) 1990	Female as % of male 1990	Female (%) 1990	Female as % of male 1990	Totalª (%) 1995	At ministerial level ^a (%) 1995	At sub- ministerial level ^a (%) 1995
	human development	18	23	46	87	47	93	56	135	9.5	10.7	10.1
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	16 10 37 26 4	19 11 59 36 4	42 41 52 57 45	72 69 109 132 82	51 50 65 70 44	104 100 184 235 79	41 45 57 62 61	70 83 132 162 156	4.5 22.9 33.9 1.5	7.7 33.3 20.0 3.4	3.2 24.1 38.3 1.2
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	21 25 17 34	27 34 21 52	45 63 34 16	82 167 52 19	40 46 46	68 85 86	59 68 73 41	146 210 263 69	3.2 20.8 2.9 12.2 5.1	0 14.8 0 15.8 0	3.6 24.0 5.0 10.0 7.1
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	11 23 2	13 30 2	35 53 25	54 114 	52 59 8	109 144 8	40 53 25	67 112 	2.3 13.6 0 30.0	0 20.0 0 0 0	3.2 9.8 0 47.4 0
43 44 45 47 48	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji Mexico	28 18 10 20	38 21 11 25	49 55 45 44	97 123 81 77	58 46 38 42	135 84 62 71	56 58 48 45	126 136 93 82	10.7 6.0 21.4 9.8 6.7	11.1 3.6 10.0 8.7 14.3	10.5 9.1 27.8 10.7 3.7
49 50 51 52 53	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	27 1 5 22 12 14	37 1 6 28 14 17	42 27 37 52 45 41	72 37 58 110 80 71	46 6 19 57 31	84 7 23 134 44	70 27 46 56	229 36 85 128 70	24.7 1.7 6.0 4.4 5.8 7.4	10.5 0 3.8 7.7 4.0	29.0 2.5 9.4 4.5 4.7 8.2
	um human development Excluding China	13 14	15 18	44 43	83 85	38	66	48	105	7.8 8.1	6.3 6.3	9.0 9.5
58 59 60 63	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia	17 29	21 40	57 58	133 139	 59	 143	 59	141	13.1 0 21.3 0	3.6 0 30.8 0	14.7 0 19.4 0
64	Ecuador	32	46	48	92	41	70	64	174	9.8	6.7	10.4
65 66 67 69 70	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	36 4 37 6	56 4 58 6	57 33 39 28	130 48 63 38	5 11	5 13	69 7 19	200 8 23	31.4 0.4 9.8 1.6 1.6	8.3 0 0 3.2	38.5 0.5 13.5 3.0 0
71 73 75 76 77	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	36 22 32	57 27 46	61 70 53	159 232 113	60 49 64	151 96 178	70 60 58	238 150 140	10.9 25.0 13.6 4.5 19.4	0 10.0 0 7.7 10.0	15.4 50.0 20.5 0 23.8
78 79 82 83 84	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	7 19 7	8 23 7	18 48 29	21 91 42	16				5.3 8.4 3.7 0.8 5.2	3.4 3.6 0 1.2 2.9	6.5 9.7 4.2 0.6 5.9
85 86 87 88 89	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	15 21 12 17	17 27 14 20	51 60 50 47 25	104 147 98 88 33	46 53 22	86 113 28	72 72 54 38	255 255 118 61	3.3 13.4 11.5 7.1 8.7	0 5.6 3.4 6.7 12.5	4.4 16.3 15.5 7.4 7.9
	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	20 34 17	25 51 21	41 63 47	70 168 88	52 63	109 168	38 58 66	60 138 196	9.7 3.7 23.9 0 7.0	5.6 6.8 8.3 0 9.4	11.4 1.6 26.3 0 5.9
103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	7 13 16 14 12	7 15 19 16 13	41 48 29 35 45	69 90 40 53 82	44 29 25 39	79 40 33 65	58 8 12 52	135 9 14 107	1.8 16.2 2.2 10.1 4.0	3.6 11.1 3.2 5.3 6.4	1.4 21.1 1.7 11.0 3.5
110 111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	13 15 17 32	15 17 20 48	44 54 42 45	78 119 72 82	7 54 65 54	7 116 183 118	16 45 73 72	19 82 263 261	0 7.1 9.4 18.2 4.7	0 0 18.8 0	0 13.0 10.3 17.9 8.7

	a	istrators nd lagers	and te	ssional chnical rkers		al and vorkers		vice	W	omen in goveri	nment
HDI rank		Female as % of male 1990		Female as % of male 1990		Female as % of male 1990		Female as % of male 1990	Total ^a (%) 1995	At ministerial level ^a (%) 1995	At sub- ministerial level ^a (%) 1995
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia	31 25 21	44 34 26	50 45 41	99 80 69	60 60	147 148	72 72	263 261	17.0 18.4 6.6	10.5 5.9 9.5	21.4 25.0 5.7 10.4
117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands	3	3	27	38	27	37	40	65	10.5	10.5 0	0
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde	13	15 30	35 48	54 94	63	170	57	134	0 6.0 3.9 11.5	0 3.2 6.5 12.5	0 10.5 2.4 10.0
122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	26	34	31	46				134	1.2	0	1.9
124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	15 6 12	18 7 13	40 29 30	67 40 42	34	52	30	42	10.8 4.3 1.6	3.0 6.3 0	18.8 0 3.1
Low human development Excluding India	4	5	22 24	30 36			14 12	**	6.4 6.4	7.9 8.0	7.0 7.0
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya	10 9	11	24	32	37	59	31	46	5.4 4.7	2.7	6.8 6.0
129 Ghana 130 Lesotho	33	10 50	36 57	56 130	59	144	68	209	10.5 13.8	10.7	10.4 16.3 0
131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe	2	2	27	37		15		**	2.5 4.3	3.8	11.1
133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan 135 India	3	4 2	20 21	25	3	3	14	16	0 1.6 6.1	0 3.7 4.2	0 1.0 6.3
136 Zambia	6	7	32	26 47	58	136	22	29	8.5	7.4	8.8
137 Nigeria 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 139 Comoros	6	6	26 22	35 29	58	140	11	13	4.1 2.7 2.5	3.7 0 6.7	4.3 4.1 0
140 Togo 141 Zaire	: 8 9	9 10	21 17	27 20			**		2.7	4.2 3,4	0
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	5	5	23	30	4		46	87	0 3,4 9,1	0 4.5 15.6	0 3.0 5.4
145 Haiti 146 Sudan	33 2	48 3	39 29	65 40	88	752	65	188	13.8 0.8	17.4	11.4 1.2
147 Côte d'Ivoire148 Central African Rep.149 Mauritania	: 9 8	10 8	19 21	23 26	59 25	146 33	12 45	13 81	2.9 4.9 4.7	8.0 5.3 3.6	0 4.5 5.0
150 Madagascar 151 Nepal			77	**		·**			0	0	0
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal	8	9	32	47	32	48	26	35	10.2 2.3	7.7	13.0
154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	997) 1997 1997 :	**	19 14 14		** ** **		945) 945	14. 14.	10.3 9.8 5.1	15.0 12.5 0	5.3 8.0 6.6
157 Malawi 158 Liberia	5	5	35	53	33	58	28	39	6.1 8.8	4.5 9.5	7.4 7.7
159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau		52 52	24. 26	**	44. 44	**	24		5.0 4.8 11.6	12.5 14.8 8.3	0 0 15.8
162 Gambia	16	18	24	31		++			6.7	22.2	1,8
163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola	2	2	20	25	**)	***	200 200	43	2.5 1.4 6.2	5.0 0 7.4	0 1.7 5.6
166 Burundi	13	16	30	44	344				4.3	7.7	0
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan	11	13 13	20 24	26 31	4.4 4.4	4 p 4 p 4 h	14 14 14	40 44	13.2 10.5 0	3.6 11.5 0	14.9 10.2 0
170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	14 20	16 25	26 19	35 23	63 57	168 130	22 41	28 71	9.6 6.9	11.1 9.5	9.3 0
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger		: 9 9	32	47	66	191	15	18	0 4.9 9.1	0 3.8 9.5	0 5.2 9.0
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa	10 9 10	12	36 24 28	65 42	+ # + 5 	- 14 - 15 - 14		795 (14	7.6 7.0 7.7	7.7 8.6 7.9	8.5 7.7 9.0
Industrial countries World	27 14	44 18	48 39	95 71	544) (644)	34 34	**		10.8 8.7	12.6 9.1	11.3 9.6

a. Including elected heads of state and governors of central banks. For countries for which the value is zero, no women ministers were reported by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, this information could not be reconfirmed by the Human Development Report Office. Source: Columns 1-8: UN 1994b; columns 9, 10 and 11: calculations by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, based on data from Worldwide Government Directories 1995.

11 Child survival and development

HDI	rank	Pregnant women aged 15-49 with anaemia (%) 1975-91	Births attended by trained health personnel (%) 1983-94	Low- birth- weight infants (%) 1990	Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 1993	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 1993	Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 1994	Mothers breast- feeding at 6 months (%) 1980-92	Oral rehydration therapy use rate (%) 1990-94	Under- weight children under age five (%) 1985-95
High	human development		81	10	119	28	25	54	70	14
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	29 12	100 89	8 9	7 5 43 100 130	7 8 9 23 11	6 10 10 28 9	17	22 22 23 24	
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	32 57	87* 93 96 98 100	6 6 7 7	100 60 85 65 10	24 13 20 15 6	27 16 21 15 6	36 38 33 18ª	80 78 96 90	2 6 7 1
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	041 (915) (41) (41)	98 99	10 6	60 90 60 26	8 17 18 18	10 20 20 23 20	49ª	75 81	
43 44 45 47 48	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji Mexico	52 ^a 57 40	96 69 77	10 9 12	55 120 90 110	25 23 23 35	20 24 41 27 32	53 3 50°	70 80 81	7 5 14
49 50 51 52 53	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	8 48 36	81 99 71 87 85	10 7 13 10 9	100 29 200 80 120	37 20 18 36 13 18	19 24 14 32 15 23	65ª 80 55	40 10 65 47	12 26 25 24
	ium human development Excluding China	144 144 144	82 65	11 12	185 306	48 51	55 65	67 75	75 63	20 22
58 59 60 63 64	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	23	95 76 90 84	11 7 11	220 220 130 150	57 67 28 49	61 95 20 36 57	43ª 55 57 73ª	63 80 90 70	7 6 17
65 66 67 69 70	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	28	70 15 87	9 9 7	120 160 150	34 32 54 35	21 51 41 65 25		85 27 53	16 9 6
71 73 75 76	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	20 22 63	78	8	250	42 27	54 23 33 22 34	90ª 	64 	14 14 14 14
78 79 82 83 84	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	38	69 90 60 100 76	8 9 10 8	170 95 190 70 180	43 12 29 24 64	34 10 27 31 55	33 91	22 80 72 85 57	10 24 10
86 87 88	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	62	66 82 92 94	8 11 16 25	160 120 110 35 140	38 14 41 63 17	34 13 45 55 19	69ª 82 45ª	52 10 37 76	4 7 10 38
97	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	48 	52 61 53 45ª	11 11 15 10	280 180 280 300 230	64 39 43 34 52	58 38 57 40 68	87* 40 	31 95 63 45	11 12 33
103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	74 58 75ª	36 41 94	14 10 9	650 170 95	56 47 66 58 44	111 61 52 78 43	95ª 83ª 60ª	78 34 84	40 22 9 17
110 111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	44 44 46 47 47	50 47 51 99	15 12 14 10	310 560 650 200 65	58 74 74 48 59	71 107 110 70 76	45 87ª 84 79ª	70 63 24 65	12 10 16 34 12

HDI	rank	Pregnant women aged 15-49 with anaemia (%) 1975-91	Births attended by trained health personnel (%) 1983-94	Low- birth- weight infants (%) 1990	Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 1993	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 1993	Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 1994	Mothers breast- feeding at 6 months (%) 1980-92	Oral rehydration therapy use rate (%) 1990-94	Under- weight children under age five (%) 1985-95
115 116 117	Honduras El Salvador Namibia Nicaragua Solomon Islands	14 30	81 66 68 73	9 11 16 15	220 300 370 160	42 44 59 50 26	54 56 78 68 32	28 77ª 86ª 25	70 45 75 40	19 11 26 12
119 120 121 122	Vanuatu Gabon Viet Nam Cape Verde Morocco	87 48ª	80 95 31	17 9	280 500 160 610	46 93 42 49 67	59 151 46 73 56	88	25 52 48	45 9
125	Zimbabwe Congo Papua New Guinea	-15	70 20	14 16 23	570 890 930	67 84 68	81 109 95	92ª 98ª 99	82 67 51	16 24 30
Low	human development Excluding India	4.4 	33 33	27 22	717 886	92 100	144 163	84 93	45 54	46 38
128 129	Cameroon Kenya Ghana Lesotho Equatorial Guinea	40ª	64 54 59 40	13 16 17 11	550 650 740 610 820	62 69 80 78 116	109 90 131 156 177	95 92" 92	84 76 44 78	14 22 27 16
135	São Tomé and Principe Myanmar Pakistan India Zambia	60 88	57 35 33 51	16 25 33 13	580 340 570 940	82 89 81 103	82 109 137 119 203	88ª 75ª 99ª	37 59 37 90	17 37 40 53 25
138		65ª 47	37 54	16 18 20 15	1,000 650 950 640 870	84 96 88 85 92	191 138 126 132 186	99ª 98 87° 99	35 55 33 46	36 24
	Bangladesh	58 50	16 10 53 20 69	19 50 14 15 15	1,400 850 770 1,000 660	119 106 85 85 77	112 117 159 127 122	97 90 90	30 91 76 20 47	30 66 25 34
149	Côte d'Ivoire Central African Rep. Mauritania Madagascar Nepal	34ª 24	45 46 40 56 6	14ª 15 11 17	810 700 930 490 1,500	91 101 100 91 98	150 175 199 164 118	81 82 95	15 24 54 29 49	12 48 39
155		53 46	26 46 45 38 47	17 11	1,300 1,200 990 1,200 900	110 67 86 115 115	139 115 142 185 177	97 91* 89 88* 93	47 18 77 45 6	29 20 23
158 159	Malawi Liberia Bhutan Guinea Guinea-Bissau	78ª 30ª	55 58 7 36 27	20 21 20	560 560 1,600 1,600 910	142 124 122 133 139	221 217 193 223 231	75ª 70 100	50 15 85 82 26	27 38
164 165	Gambia Chad Djibouti Angola Burundi		80 15 15 19	 19 	1,100 1,500 570 1,500 1,300	131 121 114 123 101	213 202 158 292 176	 92 ⁸	51 15 48 49	23 38
168 169 170	Mozambique Ethiopia Afghanistan Burkina Faso Mali	58ª 55 50ª	25 14 9 42 32	20 16 20 21ª 17	1,500 1,400 1,700 930 1,200	147 118 163 129 158	277 200 257 169 214	93 98 95ª	60 68 26 15 10	48 30 31
173	Somalia Sierra Leone Niger	45 57	2 25 15	16 17 15	1,600 1,800 1,200	121 165 123	211 284 320	78	78 60 17	29 36
All d	developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Istrial countries	9 9 9 9 9	63 29 39 99 69	19 23 16 6 18	384 1,015 929 28 307	70 110 97 13 63	97 171 174 18 86	76 94	63 57 49 	32 43 31 4 31

a. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. Source: Columns 1 and 7: UN 1994b; columns 2, 3, 6 and 8: UNICEF 1996; column 4: WHO and UNICEF 1996; column 5: UN 1995e; column 9: WHO 1995a.

12 Health profile

	One-year fully immu again	unized	AIDS	Malaria	Population	Population	People with disabilities		olic diture ealth
HDI rank	Tuberculosis (%) 1990-94	Measles (%) 1990-94	cases (per 100,000 people)# 1994	cases (per 100,000 people) 1992	Population per doctor 1988-91	Population per nurse 1988-91	(as % of total population) 1985-92	As % of GNP 1960	As % of GDF 1990
High human development	95	91	6.4		1,661	1,782		1.2	2.0
22 Hong Kong 23 Cyprus 25 Barbados 26 Bahamas 29 Korea, Rep. of	99 72	77 	0.6 1.2 44.1 131.4 (.)	44 45 44	585	1,538	0.8 2.3	0.6 3.0 0.2	1.1
30 Argentina 31 Costa Rica 32 Uruguay 33 Chile	100 97 99 96	95 88 80 96	5.6 4.7 3.7 1.5	218	329 1,136 943	1,786 2,222 3,846	(11) (11) (12) (14) (14) (15)	1.3 3.0 2.6 2.0	2.5 2.5 3.4
 34 Singapore 36 Brunei Darussalam 38 Trinidad and Tobago 39 Bahrain 40 Antigua and Barbuda 42 United Arab Emirates 	98 98	87 79 90	1.7 (.) 19.7 0.9 7.3 (.)		725 1,370 775 1,042	568	0.4	1.0	1.1
43 Panama 44 Venezuela 45 Saint Kitts and Nevis 47 Fiji 48 Mexico	95 95 98	84 94 94	7.2 2.4 10.9 0.3 4.2	29 105 18	562	1,064	1.4 3.8 0.9	3.0 2.6 1.9	2.0
49 Colombia50 Qatar51 Kuwait52 Thailand53 Malaysia54 Mauritius	99 98 97 87	87 96 86 81 85	3.3 1.4 0.2 17.5 0.4 0.8	296 196	1,064 4,762 2,564 1,176	2,632 1,064 398	1.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 2.6	0.4 0.4 1.1 1.5	1.8 1.1 1.3
Medium human development Excluding China	93 93	87 86	5.0 5.0	1 M M	3,454	2,679	2890 1990	0.7	2.3
58 Brazil 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 60 Seychelles 63 Saudi Arabia 64 Ecuador	92 99 94 100	76 89 92 100	7.3 0.1 7.6 0.2 1.0	396 117 383	847 962 704 671	3,448 328 310 1,818	1.8	0.6 1.3 0.6 0.4	2.8 3.1
65 Dominica 66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 67 Belize 69 Algeria 70 Jordan	100 92	97 65 91	5.7 (.) 4.5 0.3 0.1	123 2,684	1,064	641	6.6	0.8	1.5 5.4 1.8
71 Botswana 73 Saint Vincent 75 Suriname 76 Saint Lucia 77 Grenada	92	71	65.6 7.1 4.7 9.1 6.7	343	4,762	469	4.0	1.5	
78 Tunisia 79 Cuba 82 Oman 83 Korea, Dem, People's Rep. o 84 Turkey	80 99 96 f 100 72	93 97 99 76	0.5 0.8 0.8 (.) 0.1	 777 32	1,852 332 1,176	407 180	0.9 1.7 1.4	1.6 3.0 0.5 0.8	3.3 1.5
85 Paraguay 86 Jamaica 87 Dominican Rep. 88 Samoa (Western) 89 Sri Lanka	97 100 64 86	79 82 87 84	0.5 13.5 4.0 (.)	28 9 2,260	1,587 7,143 935 7,143	7,143 9,091 1,754	0.4	0.5 2.0 1.3	1.2 2.1 1.8
91 Peru 92 Syrian Arab Rep. 95 Philippines 97 Lebanon 100 South Africa	91 100 89 95	75 84 87 73 76	1.7 (.) 0.1 0.4 9.1	245 3 174	1,031 1,220 8,333 413	1,031	0.2	1.1 0.4 0.4 0.5	1.9 0.4 1.0 3.2
102 Indonesia 103 Guyana 106 Egypt 107 Maldives 108 China	100 95 94	92 90 89	(.) 9.5 (.) 0.5 (.)	4,914 6	7,143	2,857	1.1 3.9 1.6 4.9	0.3	0.7 1.0 2.1
109 Iraq 110 Swaziland 111 Bolivia 112 Guatemala 113 Mongolia	90 91 70 90	98 86 66 80	0.1 13.2 0.2 1.1 (.)	97 355 591	1,667 9,091 2,564 4,000 389	1,370 595 7,692 7,143 209	0.9 2.6 3.8	1.0 0.4 0.6	2.4 2.1

	One-year fully immu again	inized	AIDS	Malaria	Population	Dopulation	People with disabilities	Put expen on he	diture
HDI rank	Tuberculosis (%) 1990-94	Measles (%) 1990-94	cases (per 100,000 people)* 1994	cases (per 100,000 people) 1992	Population per doctor 1988-91	Population per nurse 1988-91	(as % of total population) 1985-92	As % of GNP 1960	As % of GDP 1990
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia	95 83 100	94 81 68	13.7 6.7 (.)	1,368 84	1,266 1,563 4,545	4,545 3,333 339	25 25 25	1.0 0.9	2.9 2.6
117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands	89	74	0.8	679 44,711	2,000	3,125		0.4	6.7
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon	97	65	(.) 15.3	8,490	2,500	1,471		0.5	1993) 1970
121 Viet Nam	95	96	0.1	304	247	1,149	5.7		1.1
122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	93	**	2.3 0.3	ž	77		4.3 1.6	1.0	0.9
24 Zimbabwe	90 94	77	96.7	-12	7,692	1,639		1.2	3.2
125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	94	70 39	58.4 0.6	. 99. 199	3,571	1,370 1,587	**	1.6	2.8
ow human development Excluding India	80 69	70 58	8.7 8.7		7,642 14,053	5,869 9,319		0.6 0.7	1.5 1.7
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya	46 92	31 73	11.3 24.8	44	12,500 20,000	1,852 9,091		1.0	1.0
129 Ghana	61	49	13.7		25,000	3,704	н 11	1.1	1.7
130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	59	74	1.8 3.3	**	25,000	2,000	**	1.0	
132 São Tomé and Principe			0.9		12 500	185	0.7	o ii	
133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan	83 78	77 65	0.5	288 80	12,500 2,000	3,448	0.4 4.9	0.7 0.3	1.8
135 India 136 Zambia	96 100	86 88	(.) 17.3	240	2,439	3,333 5,000	0.2	0.5	1.3 2.2
37 Nigeria	46	41	0.5	144	5,882	1,639		0.3	1.2
138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 139 Comoros	69	73	0.1	935	4,545 10,000	3,448	22 23	0.5	1.0 3.3
140 Togo 141 Zaire	73 43	58 33	32.8 8.3	24- 44	11,111 14,286	3,030 1,351		1.3	2.5
42 Yemen	61	45	(.)	234	4,348	1,818	si.	**	1,5
143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	95 86	95 75	(.) 8.7	103	12,500	20,000	0.8	0.5	1.4 3.2
145 Haiti 146 Sudan	42 78	24 76	(.) 0.7	199	7,143	9,091	5.3	1.0	3.2
147 Côte d'Ivoire	49	49	44.6		11,111	3,226	د.د	1.5	1.7
148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania	82 93	44 53	1.6		25,000 16,667	11,111 2,273	-44 	1.3 0.5	2.6
150 Madagascar 151 Nepal	81 61	54 57	0.1	115	8,333	3,846 33,333	3.0	1.4	1.3
152 Rwanda	32	25	(.)	115	16,667	8,333	5.0	0.2	1.9
153 Senegal 154 Benin	71 90	49 75	6.5	44 1	16,667 14,286	12,500 3,226	+*	1.5 1.5	2.3
155 Uganda	100	77	23.2		25,000	7,143		0.7	1.6
156 Cambodia 157 Malawi	78	53 98	0.1	968	50,000	33,333	2.9	0.2	2.9
158 Liberia	84	44	(.)	1 077	(277)	**	12	0.8	
159 Bhutan 160 Guinea	96 75	81 70	(.) 7.1	1,827	11,111 7,692	6,667	**	1.0	2.3
161 Guinea-Bissau	95	65	23.5		5443		* 1	34	
162 Gambia 163 Chad	98 43	87 23	5.5 20.2		33,333	50,000		0.5	4.7
164 Djibouti 165 Angola	48	44	42.7		25,000	**			7
166 Burundi	62	43	2.4		16,667		1997 1997	0.8	1.7
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afabasistan	78 50	65 29	3.1 10.7	**	33,333 33,333 7,602	5,000 14,286	3.8	0.7	4.4 2.3
169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso	44 63	40 45	(.)	84 14	7,692 33,333	11,111 10,000	2.0	0.6	7.0
171 Mali 172 Somalia	67 48	46 35	5.8	÷1	20,000	5,882	2.8	0.6	2.8
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	48 60 32	46 19	0.5	**	50,000	3,846	-		1.7
All developing countries	32	78	6.7	**	5,767	4,715	198	0.2	3.4
Least developed countries	71	60	8.3		18,496	13,790	177) 1872	0.8	1.8
Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries	64 87	51 83	12.4 9.2	•• ••	18,488 344	6,504	(**)) #*	0.7	2.4
World	86 w in adults and shill	79	7.7	340	4,968				30

a. The number of reported AIDS cases in adults and children. Source: Columns 1 and 2: UNICEF 1996; column 3: WHO 1996; column 4: WHO 1993a; columns 5 and 6: calculated on the basis of estimates from WHO 1993b; column 7: UN 1993a; columns 8 and 9: World Bank 1993c and UNDP 1994a.

13 Food security

		Food production per capita index	Agricultural production	Food consumption (as % of total household	Daily calorie supply	Food in (as 9 mercha impo	6 of andise	Cereal imports (thousands of metric	Food aid in cereals (thousands of metric
HDI	rank	(1979-81=100) 1993	(as % of GDP) 1993	consumption) 1980-85	per capita 1992	1970	1993	tons) 1993	tons) 1992/93*
High	human development	105	8		2,889	16	7	29,980T	230T
22	Hong Kong	87	(.)	0.60	3,144	20	6	640	
23 25	Cyprus	94 64	14	222	3,782 3,223	241	++		
25	Barbados Bahamas	64	10	990 380	3,223	1991	1.0		
29	Korea, Rep. of	94	7	35	3,298	17	6	11,271	
30	Argentina	94	6	35	2,880	6	5	8	
31 32	Costa Rica Uruguay	104 113	15	33 31	2,889 2,750	11	8	535 110	95
33	Chile	118	5	29	2,583	15	6	983	З
34	Singapore	47	(.)	27		16	6	798	
36	Brunei Darussalam	100	2		2,745	12		222	12
38 39	Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain	85	3	19	2,589	11	15	232	61
40	Antigua and Barbuda		14	1999 L	1.84	2441	64. 24		**
42	United Arab Emirates	941	2	(44.5)	586	16	λ.	583	2.1
43	Panama	87	10	38	2,239	10	10	159	3
44 45	Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis	101	5	23	2,622	10	11	2,314	-
	Fiji	97			3,092		14 12		
	Mexico	94	8	35 ^{b,c}	3,181	7	8	6,223	45
49	Colombia	114	16	29	2,678	8	8	1,702	17
50 51	Qatar Kuwait		(.)		2,535	20	13	251	11
52	Thailand	102	10	30	2,443	5	5	638	60
53	Malaysia	203		23 ^b	2,884	22	7	3,288	4
	Mauritius	99	10	24	2,696	36	13	240	5
Med	um human development Excluding China	133 118	15 13	(44)	2,731 2,734	13	10	62,510T 55,180T	4,120T 4,010T
50		114			and inclusion	10/01	22.01	7,848	11
58 59	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	81	11	35	2,824 3,310	11	10	7,040	4.1
60	Seychelles								
63 64	Saudi Arabia Ecuador	340 110	12	30	2,751 2,587	33	5	5,186 428	14
		110	12	50	2,567			420	1
65 66	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of	126	24	37	2,861	7	10 10	4,840	31
67	Belize	95		(a.a.)	2,670	++	**	++	11
69 70	Algeria Jordan	119 121	13	35	2,897 3,031	13 31	29 20	5,821 1,596	15 254
71	Botswana	69	6	25	2,288			133	10
73	Saint Vincent	69	0	23	2,200	44		133	10
75	Suriname	81			2,548	**	**	22	28
76	Saint Lucia Grenada	78	17	17.	2,407	1775	**	57	3
11121	Tunisia	123	18	37	3,333	28	8	1,044	100
	Cuba	65		37	2,833			1,044	5
82	Oman	14	3	+ 7		2	19	369	24
83 84	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	76 102	15	40	2,834 3,429	8	6	2,107	2
	Paraguay	102	26	30	2,670	19	11	82	
86	Jamaica	111	8	36	2,607	18	14	429	206
87	Dominican Rep.	104	15	46	14	14	22	961	7
88 89	Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	81	25	43	2,275	47	16	1,149	1 248
_	Peru		11	35	1,883	20	20	1,920	378
92	Syrian Arab Rep.	89			3,175		8		15
	Philippines Lebanon	88 186	22	51	2,258 3,319	11		2,036	53
	South Africa	74	5	34	2,705	6	6	2,275	3
	Indonesia	145	19	48	2,755	96	7	3,105	40
103	Guyana	94			2,385	19.0		**	58
	Egypt Maldives	114 84	18	49	3,336 2,624	23	24	7,206	482 2
	China	145	19	61 ^{b,c}	2,024	1421	3	7,332	107
109	Iraq	87	14	227	2,122				80
110	Swaziland	82	14	145	2,706				40
	Bolivia Guatemala	107 94	25	33 ^b 36	2,100 2,255	20	9 11	298 486	227 109
116	Mongolia	63	21	30	1,899	1.1	1.1	182	9

	Food production per capita index (1979-81=100)	Agricultural production (as % of GDP)	Food consumption (as % of total household consumption)	Daily calorie supply per capita	Food in (as % mercha impo	6 of indise	Cereal imports (thousands of metric tons)	Food aid in cereals (thousands of metric tons)
HDI rank	1993	1993	1980-85	1992	1970	1993	1993	1992/93*
114 Honduras	89	20	39	2,306	12	11	197	64
115 El Salvador 116 Namibia	95 72	9	33	2,663 2,120	14	15	286 141	131 26
117 Nicaragua	64	30		2,296	10	23	125	85
118 Solomon Islands	88			2,222	1.0	200	12.2	
119 Vanuatu	80			2,744	- 44	44		94
120 Gabon	78	8		2,511	14		77	
21 Viet Nam	133	29		2,250	22	99 (289	84
22 Cape Verde 23 Morocco	106	14	38	2,985	21	17	3,653	45 234
					21			
124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo	78 79	15	40 37	1,989 2,297	20	18	538 148	900 7
126 Papua New Guinea	103	26		2,615	20	2.52	227	
ow human development	112	35		2,250	18	8	14,230T	5,570T
Excluding India	100	39		2,097	14	14	13,530T	5,290T
27 Cameroon	79	29	24	1,981	142	44.5	281	1
128 Kenya	83	29	38	2,075	6	8	569	287
29 Ghana	115	48	50 ^b	2,206	21	447	396	75
30 Lesotho 31 Equatorial Guinea	70	10		2,201	-	22.0	131	45 3
	0	**	11	**				
32 São Tomé and Principe 33 Myanmar	107	63		2,598	Ť			6
34 Pakistan	118	25	37	2,316	21	14	2,893	188
35 India	123	31	52	2,395	21	4	694	276
36 Zambia	99	34	36	1,931	11	392	353	535
37 Nigeria	129	34	48	2,125	8		1,584	4.0
38 Lao People's Dem. Rep.		51	144	2,259	1.0		8	8
39 Comoros 40 Togo	83 106	49	22	1,897	23	23	63	6 3
40 logo 41 Zaire	100	49		2,243 2,060	2.5	2.5	60	27
42 Yemen	75	21		2,203	63		1,843	21
43 Bangladesh	97	30	59	2,019	60	15	1,175	719
44 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	76	56	64	2,021	7		215	35
45 Haiti	67			1,707		(11)	000 #	74
46 Sudan	76	22	60 ^b	2,202	++	++	22	238
47 Côte d'Ivoire	89	37	39	2,491	16	1992	590	.41
148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania	94 81	50 28	345	1,691 2,685	17	191	32 286	5 42
150 Madagascar	86	34	59	2,005	23	11	111	58
151 Nepal	114	43	57	1,957	1.44	142	27	15
152 Rwanda	70	41	29	1,821	19	147	115	82
153 Senegal	111	20	49	2,265	29	29	579	71
54 Benin	119	36	37	2,532	18		134	19
155 Uganda	109	53	12	2,162	7		76	59
56 Cambodia	141			2,021	**			82
157 Malawi	70 58	39	30	1,827	18	100	514	635
158 Liberia 159 Bhutan	58	1941) 1941)	100	1,040			12.2	156 3
160 Guinea	98	24		2,390	27		335	30
161 Guinea-Bissau	110	45	344	2,556	31	Selection	70	9
162 Gambia	76	28	1921	2,360	32	222	87	6
163 Chad	99	44		1,989	21	544	59	3
164 Djibouti	72		1221	1.040			522	21
165 Angola 166 Burundi	72 92	52		1,840 1,941	21		22	111 4
	77				41			
67 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia	86	33 60	49	1,680	9	6	507	958
169 Afghanistan	59	00	49	1,523		0	100	172
170 Burkina Faso	132			2,387	20	0.00	121	30
171 Mali	91	42	57	2,279	29		83	34
172 Somalia	53	144		1,505		198		318
173 Sierra Leone	86	38	56	1,695	26	14	136	29
174 Niger	77	39	144	2,257	14	11	136	26
All developing countries	122	15	-	2,546	13	7	106,710T	9,920T
Least developed countries	92	48		2,027	8	15	6,640T	4,680T
Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries	97 96	19 3		2,096	17	11	11,140T 99,370T	4,460T
The second state in the second state is a second state in the second state is a second state in the second state is a se	117	6	19.0		16	10	206,080T	13,970T

a. The time reference for food aid is the crop year, July to June. b. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading. c. Includes beverages and tobacco. Source: Columns 1 and 4. FAO 1994; columns 2 and 5-8: World Bank 1995f; column 3: World Bank 1993c.

14 Education imbalances

				-				1	Public expen	diture on	
	Primary	-teacher atio Secondary	technical enrolment (as % of total secondary)	enrolment (as % of total tertiary)	students abroad (as % of those at home)	R & D scientists and technicians (per 1,000 people)	(as % c	ation of GNP)	Education (as % of total government expenditure)	Primary and secondary education (as % of all levels)	(as % of all levels)
HDI rank	1992	1992	1988-91	1992	1985-92	1988-92	1980	1992	1992	1992 77	1992
High human development	25		16.0	32	112.537	0.6	3,6	4.2	18.1	66	30
22 Hong Kong 23 Cyprus	19	13	10.0 6.6	35 26	50.2	0.4	3.5	4.0	12.5	88	6
25 Barbados	17	20	144	8	11.2	11	6.5	7.0	16.9	75	19
26 Bahamas 29 Korea, Rep. of	21 33	16 24	18.6	40	41.1	2.3	4.4 3.7	3.6	14.8	83	7
30 Argentina	16	8		.62	0.4	0.5*	2.7	3.1	15.7	77	18
31 Costa Rica	32	22	22.2	18	1.6	0.5	7.8	4.4	21.4	60	36
32 Uruguay 33 Chile	21	17	16.3 37.5	22 41	1.1 3.7	0.6 ^b	2.3	2.8	15.4 12.9	66 71	25 21
33 Chile 34 Singapore	26	22	57.5	54.1	25.0	1.8 ^b	2.8	2.9	12.5	11	21
36 Brunei Darussalam	16	13	4.6		-	0.5 ^b	1.2		144	50	10
38 Trinidad and Tobago	26	20	0.8	45	38.0	0.4	4.0	4.0	11.6	79	12
39 Bahrain 40 Antigua and Barbuda	18	15 15	12.7	39	20.3	68. 69	2.9	14	244	10.	
42 United Arab Emirates	17	13	0.8	13	23.8		1.3	2.0	15.2	++ :	
43 Panama		47	25.6	21	3.5		4.8	5.5	18.9	52	26
44 Venezuela 45 Saint Kitts and Nevis	23	8	17.6	~	1.1	0.2ª	4.4	5.3	23.5	80	12
47 Fiji	31	20	9.1	25	21.6	0.2 ^b	5.1	5.6	18.6	88	9
48 Mexico	30	17	12.2	34	0.8	0,5	4,7	4.9	11		
49 Colombia	28	21	21.5	31	0.6	0.1	1.9	3.1	10.9	81	19
50 Qatar 51 Kuwait	10 16	7	2.7	24 29	12.0 14.0	0.6 ^b	2.6 2.4	3.4 6.1	11.4	982	1.0
52 Thailand	17	18	18.5	19	1.1	0.21	3.4	4.0	19.6	76	16
53 Malaysia 54 Mauritius	20 21	19 21	2.2	27 16	28.3 78.9	0.4	6.0 5.3	5.5 3.7	16.9 11.8	76 81	16 7
54 Mauritius Medium human development	24	17	1.4	30	3.1	1.3	4.0	3.9	16.7	68	20
Excluding China	27	19	11.8	25	2.4	1.3	4.0	4.7	19.7	67	20
58 Brazil	23	13		22	0.1		3.6	4.6		56	26
59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	12	12	17.2	12	2.1	0.6	3.4	8.5	12.9	69	10
60 Seychelles 63 Saudi Arabia	18 14	13	29.0 2.8	16	3.4	0.3	5.8 4.1	6.4	17.0	80	20
64 Ecuador	31	13	33.8	21	2.7	0.4	5.6	2.7	19.2	66	23
65 Dominica	29		1.1	42		- 7	12	5.8	10.6	87	3
66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 67 Belize	32 27	28 15	4.6	37	10.5	0.1	7.5	4.6 5.7	28.2 15.5	75	15
69 Algeria	27	17	7.0	50	7.1	**	7.8	8.1	27.0	4.4	
70 Jordan	22	20	23.3	29	17.5	0.1	-	б.5	13.3	64	33
71 Botswana 73 Saint Vincent	29 20	20 25	4.6 2.8	28 26	14.5 16.4	· · ·	7.0	8.3 6.7	18.7 13.8	80	12
75 Suriname	23	20	27.1	6	10.4	**	6.7	7.3	12.0	75	9
76 Saint Lucia	27	18	(99)	÷+.	70.7	1.0	7.7	**	8	72	13
77 Grenada	23	27	2.5	**	+1.	0.53	11 A	· ··	13.5	79	19
78 Tunisia 79 Cuba	26 12	18	3.5 32.2	27 23	12.2 0.4	0.5"	5.4 7.2	6.1 6.6	12.3	65	14
82 Oman	27	17	2.2	21	21.1	**	2.1	3.8	16.2	93	6
83 Korea, Dem. People's Rep. 84 Turkey	28	27	24.5	23	0.2 3.2	0.2	2.8		14		64 64
85 Paraguay	24	11	6.9	25	1.4	0.2 ^h	1.5	2.6	11,9	67	19
86 Jamaica	33	22	3.5	22	12.9	(.)	7.0	4.7	11.8	63	21
87 Dominican Rep.88 Samoa (Western)	34	21		11	0.9	**	2.2	1.6 4.2	8.9 10.7	942	**
89 Sri Lanka	29	20	/55	34	10.0	0.2	2.7	3,3	8.8	82	14
91 Peru	28	19	144	29	0.7	**	3.1				
92 Syrian Arab Rep.	24 34	18	5.9	29	5.1	0.15	4.6	4.2	14.2 10.5	74	23
95 Philippines 97 Lebanon	21	33	(.)	26	0.3	0.1	1.7	1.9	12.5	(21) (44)	**
100 South Africa	27	26			1.0	0.4	2.4	7.0	22.1	83	14
102 Indonesia	23	14	12.0	22	1.0	0.0	1.7	2.2	9.4	2440	
103 Guyana 106 Egypt	22	19	3.4 20.9	45 18	14.9 0.8	0.3	9.7 5.7	7.8	8.9	64	37
107 Maldives		94	1.0					6.6			
108 China	22	15	9.1	47	5.7	1.6	2.5	2.0	12,2	69	19
109 Iraq 110 Swaziland	22 33	20 18	13.7	43	1.5		3.0 6.1	6.0	22.5	62	21
111 Bolivia	25	18	1.4	32	2.0	0.4	4.4		**		
112 Guatemala	32 28	16 19		**	1.8	0.2	1.8	1.5 8.5	11.6	45 78	17 22
113 Mongolia	28	19		**	6.7		2.5	0.0	**	10	22

114 Honduras 37 115 El Salvador 38 116 Namibia 32 117 Nicaragua 37 118 Solomon Islands 21 119 Vanuatu 19 120 Gabon 44 21 Viet Nam 36 122 Cape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development Excluding India 46 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39	technic enrolme (as %) of tota seconda 1988-9 28 30.2 1.9 30 9.1 17 17.3 19 6.9 25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 4.5 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 22 3.6	ent science enrolment (as% of ry) total tertiary) 1 1992 25 19 3 40 	students abroad (as % of those	R & D scientists and technicians (per 1,000 people) 1988-92 0.3 0.3 ^h 0.2 ^b	1980 3.2 3.9 1.6 3.4 5.6 2.7 6.1	ation if GNP) 1992 4.1 1.6 4.2 4.5 4.2 5.8	Education (as % of total government expenditure) 1992 15.9 7.9 18.8 19.9	Primary and secondary education (as % of all levels). 1992 66 	Higher education (as % of all levels) 1992 18
114 Honduras 37 115 El Salvador 38 116 Namibia 32 117 Nicaragua 37 118 Solomon Islands 21 119 Vanuatu 19 120 Gabon 44 21 Viet Nam 36 122 Cape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development Excluding India 46 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39	28 30.2 1.9 9.1 17 17.3 19 6.9 25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 41.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	25 19 3 40 34 25 12 26 26 26	2.6 1.2 4.5 38.1 2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	0.3 0.3 ^h 0.2 ^b	3.2 3.9 1.6 3.4 5.6 2.7 6.1	4.1 1.6 4.2 4.5 4.2	15.9 7,9 18.8 	66 86 87	18 14
115 El Salvador 38 116 Namibia 32 117 Nicaragua 37 118 Solomon Islands 21 119 Vanuatu 19 120 Gabon 44 121 Viet Nam 36 122 Cape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development Excluding India 46 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 <th>1.9 30 9.1 17 17.3 19 6.9 25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6</th> <th>19 3 40 34 25 12 - 26 26</th> <th>1.2 4.5 38.1 2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4</th> <th>0.3 0.3^h 0.2^b</th> <th>3.9 1.6 3.4 5.6 2.7 6.1</th> <th>1.6 4.2 4.5 4.2</th> <th>7,9</th> <th>86 87</th> <th></th>	1.9 30 9.1 17 17.3 19 6.9 25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	19 3 40 34 25 12 - 26 26	1.2 4.5 38.1 2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	0.3 0.3 ^h 0.2 ^b	3.9 1.6 3.4 5.6 2.7 6.1	1.6 4.2 4.5 4.2	7,9	86 87	
117 Nicaragua 37 118 Solomon Islands 21 119 Vanuatu 19 120 Gabon 44 121 Viet Nam 36 122 Gape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development Excluding India 46 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	30 9.1 17 17.3 19 6.9 25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	40 	4.5 38.1 2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	0.26	3.4 5.6 2.7 6.1	4.2 4.5 4.2	7,9 18.8 	86 87	14
118 Solomon Islands 21 119 Vanuatu 19 120 Gabon 44 121 Viet Nam 36 122 Cape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development Excluding India 46 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 30 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	17 17.3 19 6.9 25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6		38.1 2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	0.26	5.6 2.7 6.1	4.2 4.5 4.2	18.8	86 87	14
120 Gabon 44 121 Viet Nam 36 122 Cape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development Excluding India 46 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	25 20.6 21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.00 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	34 25 12 26 26	38.1 2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	0.2 ^b	2.7 6.1	4.2	**		3
121 Viet Nam 36 122 Cape Verde 33 123 Morocco 28 124 Zimbabwe 38 125 Congo 63 126 Papua New Guinea 31 Low human development 46 Excluding India 43 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	21 5.6 30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	34 25 12 26 26	2.7 13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	0 44 44	6.1	4.2	**		3
122Cape Verde33123Morocco28124Zimbabwe38125Congo63126Papua New Guinea31Low human development Excluding India46127Cameroon51128Kenya31129Ghana29130Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Principe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	30 7.5 15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	34 25 12 26 26	13.9 3.7 32.3 9.4	34 44	6.1	4.2	10.0	195	
123Morocco28124Zimbabwe38125Congo63126Papua New Guinea31Low human development Excluding India46127Cameroon51128Kenya31129Ghana29130Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Principe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	15 1.5 28 1.7 31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	34 25 12 	3.7 32.3 9.4	- 44 - 24	6.1		19.9	72	3
125Congo63126Papua New Guinea31Low human development Excluding India46127Cameroon51128Kenya31129Ghana2930Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Principe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	31 6.7 24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	12 26 26	32.3 9.4		6.0		26.7	84	16
126Papua New Guinea31Low human development Excluding India46 43127Cameroon51128Kenya31129Ghana29130Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Príncipe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	24 11.6 29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	26 26	9.4	1 00	6.6	9.1	19.4	84	12
Low human development Excluding India46 43127Cameroon51128Kenya31129Ghana29130Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Principe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	29 3.0 24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	26 26			7.0	8.6	44	64	244
Excluding India 43 127 Cameroon 51 128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Príncipe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	24 4.5 29 18.0 17 1.6 18 2.5 21 3.6	26			3.4	3.5	8.4		
128 Kenya 31 129 Ghana 29 130 Lesotho 51 131 Equatorial Guinea 132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	171.6182.5213.6		7.9		3.4 4.1	3.1	14.5	77	14
129Ghana29130Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Principe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	18 2.5 21 3.6	28	25.2		3.2	3.1	16.9	87	13
130Lesotho51131Equatorial Guinea132São Tomé and Principe35133Myanmar36134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	21 3.6	22 32	20.3 38.8	1.3	6.8 3.1	5.4 3.1	16.1 24.3	77	17
132 São Tomé and Principe 35 133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39		16	5.5	14	5.1	6.0	17.6	81	16
133 Myanmar 36 134 Pakistan 41 135 India 48 136 Zambia 1 137 Nigeria 39 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39	14		41	1.4	1.0	1.8		**	
134Pakistan41135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	23 1.4	24		64	8.0	- 7	242		1.4
135India48136Zambia137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	19 1.2 19 1.6	**	0.4	0.1	1.7	2.4		**	1.0
137Nigeria39138Lao People's Dem. Rep.29139Comoros39	33 1.6		1.0	0.3*	2.8	3.7	11.9	65	15
138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 29 139 Comoros 39		25	9.5		4.5	2.6	8.7	66	17
139 Comoros 39	27 3.9		1.7	0.1	6.4	25	44		4
	12 2.9 24 1.4		24.9		77	2.3	22.0	86 73	16
	43 6.7	16	22.4		5.6	6.7	21.6	60	12
	22 27.4		9.9	11	2.6	- 35	200	25	14
142 Yemen	3.6 28 0.7		15.9 1.3	24	1.5	2.3	7.8	88	8
	28 0.7 20		42.3	**	4.4	5.0	11.4	74	17
145 Haiti 29	20		22.9		1.5	1.8	20.0	72	9
	23 4.1	16	13.3	11 - C	4.8	(iii)		44	**
	22 9.8 38 7.1		15.4 27.7	0.10	7.2	2.8	e**	67	22
	20 2.6		50.2	0.1	5.0	2.0		76	20
	20 5.0		8.8	0.1 ^b	4.4				
IN ST DURCESS	34		3.2	(.)	1.8	2.9	13.2	62	28
	14 23 3.3		35.6 21.0	(.)	2.7	3.8 4.2	25.4	82 70	16 24
154 Benin 40	29 6,1		19.1	0.2	4.2	14.04	(84)		
ALC Combadia	15 2.5		6.9	343	1.2	2.0	15.0	4.0	**
156 Cambodia 157 Malawi 68	27 2.4		12.8	30	3.4	3.3	10.3	66	19
157 Malawi 68	27 2.4		12.8	**	5.7	3.3	10.5	00	19
159 Bhutan 31	13		1.1.178		75		14		
160 Guinea 49 161 Guinea-Bissau	29 9.5		19.8	0.3	27.) +1	2.4	175	65	18
162 Gambia 30	29				3.3	2.7	12.9	64	9
163 Chad 64	35 4.8		24.1	(#8) (#8)	11	2.3	10	68	8
164 Djibouti 43 165 Angola 32	23 15.9		38.5	1.4	30.5	3,8	11.1 10.7	75 96	14
	25 12.8		17.4	0.1 ^b	3.0	3.7	11.9	73	25
Sector Restriction and the sector of the sec	40 6.0		34.3	ia -	4.4	6.Z	12.0	66	10
168 Ethiopia 27	32 0.5	43	20.4	1.0	3.3	5.1	12.9	80	12
169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso 60	39 7.6		12.8 28.3		2.0	2.7	17.5	88 68	12 32
171 Mali 47	16 13.4		30,1		3.8	2.8	17.2		
172 Somalia			9.4	241		-	. 41	- 41-	+ >-
173 Sierra Leone 34	18 5.3		19.0	241	3.8	1.4	199	- 92	
174 Niger 38	35 1.1		27.0	0.9	3.1	2.0	15.7	71	10
All developing countries 33 Least developed countries 45	22 7.3 26 5.1		3.1 8.8	0.8	3.8 3.2	3.9	15.7	71	18
Sub-Saharan Africa 39				100	2.6	3.0	12.1	78	14
Industrial countries 18 World 30	25 6.6 14	. 21	12.8	4.6	5.1 5.4	3.0 5.7 5.4	19.9		

a. UNESCO estimate. b. Full-time plus part-time research and development personnel. Source: Columns 1, 2, 7 and 8: UNESCO 1995c; column 3: UNESCO 1993b; column 4: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1995c; columns 5 and 6: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1994b; columns 9, 10 and 11: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1994b; columns 9, 10 and 11: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1994b; columns 9, 10 and 11: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1995c.



15 Communication profile

HDI	rank		Televisions (per 1,000 people) 1992	Registered public library users (thousands) 1986-92	Book titles	Printing paper consumed (metric tons per 1,000 people) 1992	Post offices (per 100,000 people) 1991	Main telephone lines (per 100 people) 1991	Inter- national telephone calls (minutes per person) 1990-92	Fax machines (per 100 people) 1992	Mobile cellular telephone subscribers (per 100 people) 1992
High	human development	419	165	30,010T	16	9.9		11.7		0.3	0.6
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	668 293 876 542 1,002	281 149 280 225 211	2,226 26,369	74 7 6 57	32.2 22.2 8.5 5.7 22.3	7.7	45.9 39.2 30.2 23.8 33.3	81 75	3.4 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.7	4.0 1.3 0.3 1.0 0.6
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	683 258 604 344 646	221 141 232 210 379	294 27	17 7 25 11	8.2 4.5 7.9 6.0 66.5	8.4 24.2	9.8 9.8 14.5 7.4 40.2	9 24	0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.7	0.1 0.1 0.5 4.3
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	270 494 538 417 326	237 416 356 111		9 17	4.4 2.5 6.0	4.6 19.6 17.3 10.0	14.8 14.1 19.4 28.8 29.5	92 47 36	0.4 0.1 0.7	1.5 0.1 1.8 2.7
43 44 45 47 48	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji Mexico	224 448 648 616 255	167 163 206 16 149	37 25	16 	4.4 6.7 9.2 8.1	18.2	9,3 8,1 6,2 7,0	10	0.3 0.2	 E.O
49 50 51 52 53 54	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	177 444 365 192 430 360	117 452 310 114 150 218	5 1,015 8	4 70 11 13 19 5	6.0 5.5 5.7 3.0 14.5 7.5	7.3 12.4 9.4	8.0 21.9 16.1 2.8 9.9 6.0	54 	0.2 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2	0.8 2.9 0.4 1.1 0.3
Med	ium human development Excluding China	205 232	63 102	10,100T 10,100T	б	4,4 3.7	344 444	2.2 3.9	044 542	44 44	
58 59 60 63 64	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	386 226 472 304 318	208 100 85 268 85	17	 7	5.6 2.2 5.4 1.8	7.9 7.1 4.9	6.6 11.8 8.4 4.5	224	0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2	(.) 0.1
65 66 67 69 70	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	589 232 584 234 256	72 63 166 76 82	7,062 20 7	8 21 2 16	3.4 2.0 2.4 8.9	10.6	19.4 4.1 10.4 3.4 6.4	6 41	0.4 (.) 0.2 (.) 0.1	 () ()
	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	122 698 639 759 598	17 144 132 190 331		7 	1.8 6.8	12.8	2.6 13.9 9.4 12.7 17.8	91	(.) 0.3 0,1 0.3	0.1
	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	200 345 637 122 161	80 162 730 18 176	334 719	14 7 1	3.8 4.6 3.8 (.) 3.3	-000 1100 1000 1000 1000	4.1 3.2 7.6 3.6 14.3	28	0.1 (.) 0.1	(.) (.) 0.2 0.1
85 86 87 88 89	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	171 421 171 481 200	82 134 87 40 49	 98		1.5 3.2 4.2 0.7 1.3	7.2	2.7 4.7 5.6 2.5 0.7	1965 1983 1984 1984 1985	(.) 0.1 (.) 0.1 (.)	(.) 0.3 0.1 (.)
95 97	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	254 255 139 835 304	98 61 45 324 98	". 1,595 	3 4 1 8	4.5 1.3 2.8 8.0 11.7	4.0	2.6 3.9 1.0 11.1 8.8	27. 27. 28. 28.	(.) (.) 0.1 0.1	0.1 0.1 0.1 (.)
103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	147 493 328 119 182	60 40 119 25 31	2	3	3.1 0.4 3.8 0.9 5.0	5.4 12.4	0.7 2.0 3.6 3.5 0.7	2005 2005 2005 2005 2005	(.) (.) (.)	(.) 0.1 (.) (.)
110 111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	216 163 613 66 132	73 20 103 52			1.7 2.7 0.2	8.3 2.8 6.5	3.6 1.9 2.5 2.1 3.0	35 	0.1	(.) (.)

HDI rank		Televisions (per 1,000 people) 1992	Registered public library users (thousands) 1986-92			Post offices (per 100,000 people) 1991	Main telephone lines (per 100 people) 1991	Inter- national telephone calls (minutes per person) 1990-92	Fax machines (per 100 people) 1992	Mobile cellular telephone subscribers (per 100 people) 1992
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia 117 Nicaragua	387 413 127 262	73 93 21 66	22	9	3.2 2.5 0.3	5.2	1.8 2.5 3.8 1.3	- 44 - 44 - 44	** ** **	17 14 14
118 Solomon Islands 119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	120 287 143 104 164 210	6 10 37 42 3 74			1.2 0.9 1.5	8.5 16.8	1.4 2.0 1.8 0.1 2.3 1.9	1 24	0.1 (.) (.)	() () ()
124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	84 114 73	27 6 3	152 22 46	1	0.7 0.2	2.8	1.2 0.7 0.9	ž	(.) (.) (.)	1993) 1993) 1993) 1993)
Low human development Excluding India	94 108	26 15	160T 160T	1	0.9 0.4	13.8	0.6 0.4	**	44	**
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	146 87 269 33 420	24 10 16 6 10	56 1	1	0.4 1.6 0.3	 6.5 	0.3 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.4	47 6	(.) (.) (.)	(.) (.)
132 São Tomé and Principe 133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan 135 India 136 Zambia	269 82 91 80 82	2 18 37 26	22 (24) 24) 24)	(.) 1	0.1 0.7 1.2 0.5	9.1 11.5 17.6	1.8 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.8	** ** **	0.1 (.) (.) (.)	ö
137 Nigeria 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 139 Comoros 140 Togo 141 Zaire	173 125 128 211 97	33 6 0 6 1	47	1 2	0.3 0.2 0.3 (.)	4.0 4.9 1.3	0.2 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.1		() () ()	(.)
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	28 44 25 47 250	28 5 2 5 77	40 11 12 14	î	(.) 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1	3.7 2.0	1.1 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.2	80 1	(.) (.) (.)	(.) (.)
147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal	142 69 144 200 34	59 5 23 20 2	94 34 34 34	 (.)	0.4	3.0 8.0	0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3	23	244 244 244 244 244	25. 26. 26. 26.
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	64 115 90 109 112	37 5 10 8	 1 6 	 13	0.4 0.4 (.) 0.1	1.9 3.9	0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1	 18 	(.) (.) (.)	11 12 12 12
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	221 226 16 42 40	18 7	5	10 - 11 - 12 - 12 - 12 - 12 -	(.) (.) 	5.5	0.3 5.7 0.2 0.2 0.6		(.) (.)	241 244 244 244
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	171 244 88 29 62	1 54 6 1	1 20	1	(.) 0.4 0.1	0.6 0.7 0.6	1.6 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.2	23 18 25 82	(.) (.) (.)	(.)
167 Mozambique168 Ethiopia169 Afghanistan170 Burkina Faso171 Mali	47 187 107 22 44	3 3 8 5 1	12	(.) 10	0.1 0.1 (.)	1.6	0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1	44	(.) (.) 	100 100 100 100 100
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	38 224 61	12 10 5	**	 (.)	(.) 0.1	2.0 0.8	0.2 0.4 0.1	1441 1447 1447	(.) (.)	
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	176	56 9 23 533 151	40,260T 50T 360T 84,160T 124,420T	5 43 13	3.5 1.5 61.9 14.1		2.3 0.3 1.0 37.2 9.9		1.7	2.5

Source: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 5: UNESCO 1994b; column 4: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1994b and UN 1995e; columns 6 and 7; ITU 1995; columns 8, 9 and 10: UN 1995b.

16 Employment

	Real ear per emp	nploye
HDI rank 1990 1990 1960 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 High human development 43 36 54 32 37 41 62 25 Grups 45 36 54 32 37 41 62 25 Grups 46 39 61 18 10 35 55 26 Bahamas 50 46 39 61 18 10 35 28 47 20 Argentina 38 28 21 126 18 22 45 55 31 Cotats Rea 38 30 30 19 30 25 39 56 32 Chila 32 24 11 34 22 44 45 77 34 Singapore 49 36 70 64 44 46 14 22 27 42 65 44	annual g rate	
22 Hong Kong 51 37 8 1 52 37 41 62 23 Cypus 48 38 42 14 52 37 31 56 25 Bahamas 50 46 20 5 25 55 55 79 29 Korea, Rep. of 46 39 61 18 10 35 28 47 20 Korea, Rep. of 46 39 61 18 27 50 47 31 Cotal Rica 38 28 51 26 18 27 50 59 33 Chile 38 30 19 30 25 34 31 74 36 Branei Darusslam 41 32 34 2 35 24 24 45 57 37 38 Branei Darusslam 41 32 24 26 44 57 44 Mantin 37 31 33 12 24 25 48	1970-80	1980
22 Gyrås 48 38 42 14 27 30 31 56 25 Barbados 51 46 20 5 25 15 59 26 Barbados 50 46 20 5 25 15 55 79 20 Argentna 38 28 21 12 34 32 45 55 30 Argentna 38 28 21 12 34 32 45 55 31 Cota Rica 38 28 21 12 34 32 45 55 31 Gota Gata 39 35 22 11 34 32 44 57 38 Bahrain 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 39 32 23 51 26 14 16 35 58 40 Antigua and Barbucia 47 46 81 75 8 71 27 42 25 48<	195	
25 Bahamas 50 46 26 7 27 23 46 70 25 Bahamas 50 46 20 5 25 75 25 79 20 Korea, Rep. of 46 39 61 18 10 35 28 77 30 Argentina 38 28 51 26 18 27 50 59 34 Singapore 49 38 30 19 30 25 36 70 64 35 Trinida and fobapo 45 17 14 2 45 30 42 68 40 Artigua and Bahuda 47 46 81 77 68 81 21 77 43 Punama 37 31 51 26 14 42 65 88 44 Veneral and fobapo 37 31 51 26 17 15 58 58 43 Veneral and fobapo 37 31 51 26 <	1+1	4.8
26 Bahmas 50 46 20 5 25 15 55 79 20 Korea, Rep. of 46 39 21 12 34 32 45 55 30 Argentina 38 28 21 12 34 32 45 55 31 Cota Rica 38 28 21 14 29 27 50 59 32 Unuquay 44 39 21 14 29 27 50 56 36 Brunei Danussalam 41 32 25 24 70 64 38 Trinicad and Tobapo 39 35 22 11 34 32 44 57 40 Antigua and Barbucha 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 77 41 Venceula 37 31 31 22 27 42 25 48 44 Venceula 37 29 55 28 17 15 23 39 </td <td>100</td> <td>2</td>	100	2
30 Argentina 38 28 21 12 34 32 45 55 31 CotaR Rica 38 28 21 12 34 32 45 55 32 Cinguay 44 30 30 19 30 27 50 55 34 Singuoy 44 32 34 2 35 24 31 74 35 Brunel Darussalam 41 32 34 2 35 24 31 74 32 44 57 6 8 71 74 24 32 44 57 6 8 71 74 2 45 33 42 68 8 73 73 33 12 22 27 44 61 55 8 44 Vencueal 37 31 33 12 22 27 44 61 45 55 50 23 39 30 50 55 50 52 23 30 50 50 51	-1.4	λ 5
31 Cofte Rica 38 28 51 26 18 27 30 47 32 Uruguay 44 38 30 30 19 30 27 50 59 33 Singapore 49 38 70 23 36 70 64 36 Brunel Dauxslam 41 32 34 2 35 24 31 74 36 Brunel Mol Tobago 45 17 14 2 35 24 31 74 39 Bathain 45 17 14 27 45 88 29 27 42 65 40 Actigua and Bathuda 37 31 33 12 22 17 44 61 35 58 88 39 36 17 15 23 39 36 50 24 13 17 15 23 39 36 51 44 41 14 12 22 26 66 51 44 41 12 <	10.0	8.4
32 Unuquay 44 39 21 14 29 27 50 59 33 Chile 38 30 30 19 30 25 39 56 34 Singapore 49 38 7 0 23 36 70 64 38 Trinidal and Tobago 39 35 22 11 34 32 44 57 39 Bahrain 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 40 Antipua and Babuda 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 42 United Anabe Trinites 37 31 33 12 22 27 44 61 35 58 43 Panama 39 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 44 Vencuela 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 45 Colombia 40 36 50 27 <t< td=""><td>-2.1</td><td>-2.2</td></t<>	-2.1	-2.2
33 Chiế 38 30 19 30 25 39 56 34 Singapore 49 38 7 0 23 35 24 31 74 38 Trinidad and Tobago 39 35 22 14 2 34 53 64 38 Trinidad and Tobago 39 35 22 14 24 34 57 66 30 41 57 39 Bahrain 47 16 81 72 6 30 12 65 40 Antiguand Barbuda 47 46 81 72 82 22 27 42 65 43 Panama 39 32 51 22 17 15 23 39 24 25 46 17 15 23 30 50 44 Weixco 37 21 1 1 34 25 65 50 23 14 12 22 30 50 50 50 51 <td< td=""><td>320</td><td></td></td<>	320	
34 Singapore 49 38 7 0 23 36 70 64 36 Brunel Darussalam 41 32 34 2 35 22 11 34 32 31 74 39 Bahrain 45 17 14 2 45 30 42 68 41 Outrigue and Barbuda 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 42 Dunited Arab Emirates 51 12 29 55 28 19 24 65 44 Venezuela 37 31 33 12 22 27 44 61 45 Saint Kits and Newis 37 31 33 12 22 27 48 62 48 64 41 12 24 23 30 50 55 28 13 30 40 22 23 48 24 12 22 53 48 44 25 54 44 25 55 24	8.1	-2.
38 Trinidad and Tobago 39 35 22 11 34 32 444 57 39 Bahrain 45 17 14 2 45 30 42 68 40 Antipua and Barbuda 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 42 United And Emirates 31 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 43 Panama 39 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 44 Venezuela 37 29 55 28 19 24 22 30 50 50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 32 59 65 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 64 14 12 22 22 35 40 44 99 36 63 27 12 23 30 54 41 12 22 23 25 50	3.0	5,
38 Trinidad and Tobago 39 35 22 11 34 32 444 57 39 Bahrain 45 17 14 2 45 30 42 68 40 Antipua and Barbuda 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 42 United And Emirates 31 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 43 Panama 39 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 44 Venezuela 37 29 55 28 19 24 22 30 50 50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 32 59 65 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 64 14 12 22 22 35 40 44 99 36 63 27 12 23 30 54 41 12 22 23 25 50		
40 Antigua and Barbuda 47 46 81 75 6 8 12 17 42 United Arab Emirates 51 12 29 8 29 27 42 65 43 Panama 39 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 44 Venezuela 37 31 33 12 22 27 44 61 45 Saint Kirsand Nevis 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 24 25 48 50 Qatar 57 11 7 27 14 22 22 35 50 51 Kuvairt 42 22 74 84 64 44 14 22 23 35 40 44 30 40 35 65 62 13 20 21 38 40 44 40 35 51	++ -	
42 Unitéd Arab Emirates 51 12 29 8 29 27 42 65 43 Panama 39 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 44 Venezuela 37 31 33 12 22 27 42 61 45 Saint Kits and Nevis 37 23 60 46 17 15 23 39 48 Mexico 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 23 30 50 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 24 41 12 22 25 50 51 41 30 40 77 62 9 17 14 22 22 23 30 54 53 Brazil Muranteselopment 51 41 77 62 9 9 17 14 22 23	(F)	
43 Panama 39 32 51 26 14 16 35 58 44 Venzuela 37 31 33 12 22 27 44 61 45 Saint Kits and Nevis 37 23 60 46 17 15 23 39 47 Fiji 34 23 60 46 17 15 23 39 48 Mexico 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 24 25 50 51 Kuwait 42 23 17 1 34 25 50 53 Malaysia 39 36 63 27 12 23 25 50 54 Mauritus 41 30 40 35 65 42 13 20 21 38 58 Brazil Athantikus 40 35 51 11 7	434	
44 Venezuela 37 31 33 12 22 27 44 61 45 Saint Kitts and Nevis 34 23 60 46 17 15 23 39 47 Fiji 34 23 60 46 17 15 23 39 48 Mexico 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 23 30 50 50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 32 59 65 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 22 64 74 53 Malaysia 39 36 63 27 12 23 25 50 54 Mauntius 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 55 Diagn Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 29	0.2	2.0
45 Saint Kits and Nevis 34 23 60 46 17 15 23 39 48 Mexico 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 23 30 50 50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 22 54 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 25 64 74 52 Thaland 57 47 84 64 44 12 22 53 Mauritus 41 30 40 17 26 43 35 40 Vecturumman development 51 41 37 65 42 13 20 21 38 58 Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 61 tars, Islamic Rep. of 29 21 54 39 23 23 23 39	0.2 4.9	-5.4
48 Mexico 37 29 55 28 19 24 25 48 49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 23 30 50 50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 32 59 65 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 25 64 74 52 Thailand 57 47 84 64 4 14 12 22 54 Mauritus 41 30 40 17 26 43 35 40 Vecturn uman development 51 41 77 62 9 17 14 22 58 Brazil 40 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 60 Seychelles	115	
49 Colombia 40 36 50 27 19 23 30 50 50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 32 59 65 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 34 42 50 64 74 52 Thalland 57 47 84 64 4 14 12 22 50 50 54 Mauritius 41 30 40 17 26 43 35 40 Vectum human development 51 41 77 62 9 17 14 22 58 Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 59 Ibyan Arab Jamahinya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 64 64 Ecuador 35 25 9 31 18 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 24 24 14 48	12.5	1
50 Qatar 57 11 17 3 24 32 59 65 51 Kuwait 42 23 1 1 1 34 25 64 74 52 Thailand 57 47 84 64 4 14 12 22 53 Mauritus 39 36 63 27 12 23 25 50 54 Mauritus 30 40 35 65 42 9 17 14 22 23 35 40 Vedium human development Excluding China 51 41 77 62 9 17 14 22 38 59 13 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 59 13 41 0 71 19 10 20 19 61 61 120 71 19 10 20 19 61 62 120 13 21 43 39 23 </td <td></td> <td></td>		
51 Livavit 42 23 1 1 1 34 25 64 74 52 Thailand 57 47 84 63 27 12 23 25 50 Sa Malaysia 39 36 63 27 12 23 25 50 Medium human development 51 41 30 40 17 26 43 35 40 Vedium human development 40 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 58 Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 60 Seychelles	-0.2	1.0
52 Thailand 57 47 84 64 4 14 12 22 53 Malaysia 39 30 40 17 26 43 35 50 Mauritus 41 30 40 17 26 43 35 40 Medium human development Excluding China 51 41 77 62 9 17 14 22 58 Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 56 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 66 63 Saudi Arabia 34 10 71 19 10 20 19 61 64 Ecuador 35 25 59 33 18 19 23 23 23 39 65 Dominica	7.0	-1.6
54 Mauritius 41 30 40 17 26 43 35 40 Medium human development Excluding China 51 41 77 62 9 17 14 22 58 Brazil 40 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 66 63 Saudi Arabia 34 10 71 19 10 20 19 61 64 Ecuador 35 25 59 33 18 19 23 48 65 Dominica	16.	1000
Metium human development Excluding China 51 41 77 62 9 17 14 22 58 Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 59 Ubyan Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 66 60 Seychelles - <td>2.0</td> <td>2.3</td>	2.0	2.3
Excluding China 40 35 65 42 13 20 21 38 58 Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 66 Seychelles	1.8	0.4
B Brazil 44 35 52 23 18 23 30 54 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 66 59 Saudi Arabia 34 10 71 19 10 20 19 61 64 Ecuador 35 25 59 33 18 19 23 48 65 Dominica <t< td=""><td>225</td><td>12</td></t<>	225	12
59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 29 18 53 11 17 23 30 66 60 Seychelles <	4.	-1.2
60 Seychelles	5.0	-2.4
63 Saudi Arabia 34 10 71 19 10 20 19 61 64 Ecuador 35 25 59 33 18 19 23 48 65 Dominica .	325	7
65 Dominica 1 1 23 23 23 23 39 66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 29 21 54 39 23 23 23 39 67 Belize 31 21 42 34 24 19 34 48 69 Algeria 28 20 67 26 12 31 21 43 70 Jordan 27 18 45 15 26 23 29 61 71 Botswana 44 46 93 46 2 20 5 33 73 Saint Vincent	10.	2
66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 29 21 54 39 23 23 23 39 67 Belize 31 21 42 34 24 19 34 48 69 Algeria 28 20 67 26 12 23 29 61 71 Botswana 27 18 45 15 26 23 29 61 71 Botswana 44 46 93 46 2 20 5 33 73 Saint Vincent	3.3	-0.7
67 Belize 31 21 42 34 24 19 34 48 69 Algeria 28 20 67 26 12 31 21 43 70 Jordan 27 18 45 15 26 23 29 61 71 Botswana 44 46 93 46 2 20 5 33 73 Saint Vincent 34 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 75 Suriname 34 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 76 Saint Lucia	442	
69 Algeria 28 20 67 26 12 31 21 43 70 Jordan 27 18 45 15 26 23 29 61 71 Botswana 44 46 93 46 2 20 5 33 73 Saint Vincent	567	-6.8
70 Jordan 27 18 45 15 26 23 29 61 71 Botswana 44 46 93 46 2 20 5 33 73 Saint Vincent <	-1.3	
73 Saint Vincent 34 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 75 Saint Lucia 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 76 Saint Lucia 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 77 Grenada 35 29 56 28 18 33 26 39 78 Tunisia 35 29 56 28 18 33 26 39 70 Cuba 45 36 36 18 24 30 41 51 82 Oman 26 12 67 45 12 24 20 32 83 Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 50 45 64 38 19 31 17 31 84 Turkey 45 33 79 53 10 18 11 29 85 Paraguay 37 28 64 25 13 29 24 46		-3.5
73 Saint Vincent 34 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 75 Saint Lucia 34 30 29 21 22 18 49 61 76 Saint Lucia 35 29 56 28 18 33 26 39 78 Tunisia 35 29 56 28 18 33 26 39 70 Grenada 26 12 67 45 12 24 20 32 81 Turkey 45 36 36 18 29 53 10 18 11 29 82 Oman 26 12 67 45 12 24 20 32 84 Turkey 45 33 79 53 10 18 11 29 85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 46 86 Jamaica 49 46 42 25 13 29	-	_
76 Saint Lucia	11	
77 Grenada <t< td=""><td>1221</td><td></td></t<>	1221	
78 Tunisia 35 29 56 28 18 33 26 39 79 Cuba 45 36 36 18 24 30 41 51 82 Oman 26 12 67 45 12 24 20 32 83 Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 50 45 64 38 19 31 17 31 84 Turkey 45 33 79 53 10 18 11 29 85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 39 85 Paraguay 37 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 85 Paraguay 40 24 57 48 13 21 30 31 87 Dominican Rep. 40 34 57 48 13 21 30 31 91 Peru 35 27 52 36 20 18 28	155	2
79 Cuba 45 36 36 18 24 30 41 51 82 Oman 26 12 67 45 12 24 20 32 83 Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 50 45 64 38 19 31 17 31 84 Turkey 45 33 79 53 10 18 11 29 85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 39 85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 39 85 Paraguay 37 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 86 Jamaica 40 34 57 48 13 21 30 31 97 Sri Lanka 40 34 57 48 13 21 30 31 91 Peru 35 27 52 36 20 18 28		
82 Oman 26 12 67 45 12 24 20 32 83 Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 50 45 64 38 19 31 17 31 84 Turkey 45 33 79 53 10 18 11 29 85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 39 86 Jamaica 49 46 42 25 22 23 37 52 87 Dominican Rep. 40 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 88 Samoa (Western)	**	
84 Turkey 45 33 79 53 10 18 11 29 85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 39 86 Jamaica 49 46 42 25 22 23 37 52 87 Dominican Rep. 40 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 88 Samoa (Western)	996	
85 Paraguay 37 28 57 39 19 22 24 39 86 Jamaica 49 46 42 25 22 23 37 52 87 Dominican Rep. 40 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 88 Samoa (Western)	10	- 1
86 Jamaica 49 46 42 25 22 23 37 52 87 Dominican Rep. 40 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 88 Samoa (Western) 40 34 57 48 13 21 30 31 91 Peru 35 27 52 36 20 18 28 46 92 Syrian Arab Rep. 28 23 54 33 19 24 46 95 Philippines 40 37 64 46 14 15 22 39 97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62	6.1	3.(
87 Dominican Rep. 40 28 64 25 13 29 24 46 88 Samoa (Western) 40 34 57 48 13 21 30 31 91 Peru 35 27 52 36 20 18 28 46 92 Syrian Arab Rep. 28 23 54 33 19 24 27 43 95 Philippines 40 37 64 46 14 15 22 39 97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62	0.2	-1.5
88 Samoa (Western) 34 57 48 13 21 30 31 91 Peru 35 27 52 36 20 18 28 46 92 Syrian Arab Rep. 28 23 54 33 19 24 27 43 95 Philippines 40 37 64 46 14 15 22 39 97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62	+0.2 -1.1	* 1.12 3
91 Peru 35 27 52 36 20 18 28 46 92 Syrian Arab Rep. 28 23 54 33 19 24 27 43 95 Philippines 40 37 64 46 14 15 22 39 97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62		
92 Syrian Arab Rep. 28 23 54 33 19 24 27 43 95 Philippines 40 37 64 46 14 15 22 39 97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62		1,4
95 Philippines 40 37 64 46 14 15 22 39 97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62	1991	,
97 Lebanon 31 27 38 7 23 31 39 62	1.0	E .
	-3.7	5.2
	2.7	0.2
02 Indonesia 44 39 75 55 8 14 18 31	5.2	4.3
03 Guyana 40 31 38 22 27 25 35 53		
06 Egypt 35 27 58 40 13 22 29 38	4.1	-3.(
107 Maldives 41 42 70 32 17 31 13 37 108 China 59 45 83 72 6 15 10 13	144	
	142	
109 Iraq 26 16 53 16 18 18 29 66 110 Swaziland 34 37 75 39 9 22 16 38	6	
11 Bolivia 40 36 55 47 24 18 21 36	1.7	-0.8
12 Guatemala 35 24 67 52 13 17 20 30	-3.2	-1.6
13 Mongolia 47 46 61 32 19 23 20 45		1

	Labour	Women's share of adult		Perc	entage of	labour fo	rce in		per en	arnings ployee
	force (as % of total	labour force (age 15	Agricu	ulture	Indu	stry	Serv	ices		growth e (%)
HDI rank	population) 1990	and above) 1990	1960	1990	1960	1990	1960	1990	1970-80	1980-92
114 Honduras	34	28	70	41	11	20	19	39		83
115 El Salvador 116 Namibia	36 42	33 41	62 71	36 49	17	21 15	21 16	43 36	2.4	22
117 Nicaragua	34	36	62	28	16	26	22	46	-2.0	
118 Solomon Islands	51	46	85	77	4	7	12	16		
19 Vanuatu		10	22	68	ii ii	8		24	<i>a</i>	
120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam	49 51	44 50	85	52 71	6	16 14	8 14	33 15		÷
22 Cape Verde	37	39	82 57	31	22	30	21	40		73
123 Morocco	38	33	66	45	12	25	22	31	5.4 5.4	-2.5
24 Zimbabwe	46	45	81	68	10	8	9	24	1.6	0.1
125 Congo	42	43	68	49	10	15	21	37	2.0	**
126 Papua New Guinea	49	41	90	79	4	7	6	14	2.9	**
ow human development. Excluding India	44 45	35 39	78 82	66 68	9 7	13 10	13 11	21 22	6 2	55 55
27 Cameroon	40	36	89	70	4	9	7	21		
128 Kenya	48	46	88	80	5	7	8	13	-3.4	-2.1
129 Ghana	47	51	63	59	14	13	23	28	-14.8	20
130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	40	37	47	40 77	33	28 2	19	32 21		
132 São Tomé and Principe		- 1+					335	- 1		
133 Myanmar	51	44	81	73	5	10	14	17		
134 Pakistan	35	23	61	52	18	19	21	30	3.4	
135 India 136 Zambia	43 42	31 45	74 85	64 75	11	16 8	15 10	20 17	0.4 -3.2	2.5 3.8
137 Nigeria	40	36	73	43	10	7	17	50	-0.8	
138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.	50	46	82	78	4	6	14	16	-0.8	
139 Comoros	44	42	86	77	6	9	8	13	5	140
140 Togo	42	39	80	66	8	10	12	24	63	325
141 Zaire	43	44	79	68	9	13	11	19		
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh	30 49	28 41	76 86	61 65	8	17 16	16	22 18	-3.0	-0.7
144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	52	50	93	84	2	5	5	11	-5.0	-0.7
145 Haiti	45	43	80	68	6	9	14	23		15.
146 Sudan	36	26	86	69	4	8	10	22	910	÷*
147 Côte d'Ivoire	37	31	84	60	4	10	12	30	-0.9	100
148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania	49 46	47 44	93 92	80 55	2	4	5	16 34		
150 Madagascar	48	44	86	78	4	7	10	15	-0.8	122
151 Nepal	47	39	95	94	2	0	3	6	**	144
152 Rwanda	52	48	95	92	2	3	3	5		
153 Senegal	45	42	84	77	5	8	11	16		122
154 Benin 155 Uganda	46 51	48 48	85 93	64 85	4	8 5	11	28 11		1.0.0
156 Cambodia	50	54	83	74	3	8	14	19		0.00
157 Malawi			94	87	3	5	4	8	**	
158 Liberia	41	39	83	72	9	6	9	22		200
159 Bhutan	51	39	95	94	2	1	3	5	546 -	1941
160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	49 48	48 40	94 91	87 85	1	2	6 8	11 13	122	**
162 Gambia	50	44	94	82	5	8	1	11	142	
163 Chad	49	44	96	83	2	4	3	13		
164 Djibouti	10	M		1.0	121	188	22	18	-11	Lttr
165 Angola 166 Burundi	54	49	95	92	2	3	100	6	-7.5	115
167 Mozambique	53	49	88	83	5	8	7	9		
168 Ethiopia	44	49	93	86	2	2	5	12	**	
169 Afghanistan	41	34	72	70	10	11	18	19	1221	14
170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	54 50	47 46	92 94	92 86	3	2	6	6 12	5485 7005	-
172 Somalia	44	48	84	75	5	8	11	16		
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone	37	43 35	84	67	5	15	9	17		
174 Niger	49	44	94	90	2	4	4	6		100
All developing countries	47	39	76	61	9	16	15	23		
Least developed countries	47	43	87	76	4	9	9	15	100	
Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries	44 49	42 44	81 26	66 10	7	9 33	11 38	25 57	10 M	1900
World	49	40	61	49	17	20	22	31		1.044

Note: Percentage shares of labour force in agriculture, industry and services do not necessarily add to 100 because of rounding. Source: Columns 1-8: calculated on the basis of data from ILO 1995a; columns 9 and 10; World Bank 1995f.

Wealth, poverty and social investment

				Incom	e share			Social security	Publ expendit	
		Real GDP per capita	GNP per capita	Lowest 40% of households	Ratio of highest 20% to	People ir (%) ()	benefits expenditure (as %	Education (as %	Health (as %
HDI	rank	(PPP\$) 1993	(US\$) 1993	(%) 1981-93	lowest 20% 1981-93	Urban 1990*	Rural 1990*	of GDP) 1993	of GNP) 1992	of GDP) 1990
High	human development	8,054	4,509			.4.4			4.2	2.0
	Hong Kong	21,560	18,060	16.2	8.7			(88)	++	1.1
23 25	Cyprus Barbados	14,060 10,570	10,380 6,230	248	2.5	39			4.0	
26	Bahamas	16,180	11,420		1.814	996) 396)	346		3.6	
29	Korea, Rep. of	9,710	7,660	19.7	5.7	5	4	2.3	4.2	2.7
30	Argentina	8,350	7,220		1.0	15	20	4.5	3.1	2.5
31 32	Costa Rica Uruguay	5,680 6,550	2,150 3,830	13.1	12.7	24 10	30 23	14.8	4.4	2.5
33	Chile	8,900	3,170	10.2	18.3	10	2.5	14.0	2.9	3.4
34	Singapore	19,350	19,850	15.0	9.6	202		7.2	2000 12	1.1
36	Brunei Darussalam	0 670	2 020	0.00	1000	395	10	(304)	4.0	12
38 39	Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain	8,670 15,500	3,830 8,030		-	48) 24	40		4.0	**
40	Antigua and Barbuda	5,369 ^b	6,540		2440	100			5.5 1.1	
42	United Arab Emirates	20,9404	21,430	See.		4.6			2.0	ΥŘ
43	Panama	5,890	2,600	8.3	29.9	36	52	552	5.5	a. 8
44 45	Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis	8,360 9,340	2,840 4,410	14.3	10.3	30	42		5.3	2.0
45	Fiji	9,340	2,130	100	196		**	(99)	5.6	
48	Mexico	7,010	3,610	11.9	13.6	23	43	100	4.9	1.6
49	Colombia	5,790	1,400	11.2	15.5	40	45	2.4	3.1	1.8
50	Qatar	22,910 ^d	15,030	3.6	250	285	3881	100	3.4	++-
51 52	Kuwait Thailand	21,630° 6,350	19,360 2,110	15.5	8.3	ž	29	0.1	6.1 4.0	1.1
53	Malaysia	8,360	3,140	12.9	11.7	8	23	2.3	5.5	1.3
54	Mauritius	12,510	3,030	587	10	10 -		3.6	3.7	10
Medi	um human development	2,946	900	1441	1942	- 60°	(44)		3.9	2.3
58	Excluding China Brazil	3,746	1,485	7.0	22.1				4.7	2.3
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	5,500	2,930	7.0	32.1	38	66	A.6	4.0	2.0
60	Seychelles	4,960 ^b	6,280		175	255			8.5	- Y
63 64	Saudi Arabia Ecuador	4,400	1,200		144		255	200	6.4 2.7	3.1
65	Dominica	3,810 ^b	2,720						5.8	
66	Iran, Islamic Rep. of	5,380	(34)	1.0		44		1.5	4.6	1.5
67	Belize	4,610 ^b	2,450	17.0	c 7	3.4	25	146	5.7	E 4
69 70	Algeria Jordan	5,570 4,380	1,780	17.9 16.8	6.7 7.3	4.4	25	0.6	8.1 6.5	5.4 1.8
71	Botswana	5,220	2,790	10.5	16.4	30	64	**	8.3	
73	Saint Vincent	3,552b	2,120		7.4			44	6.7	1
75	Suriname Saint Lucia	3,670 3,795 ^b	1,180 3,380	12	(77)	12			7.3	÷.
	Grenada	3,118 ^b	2,380		1	2000 1000	(44)			10
78	Tunisia	4,950	1,720	16.3	7.8	16	31	4.1	6.1	3.3
79	Cuba	110	995	1.001.00	(10)	1.0			6.6	
82 83	Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	10,420	4,850		100				3.8	
84	Turkey	4,210	2,970	100		1996) 1996)	44	4.9	22 24	1.5
85	Paraguay	3,340	1,510	-		44		24	2.6	1.2
86	Jamaica	3,180	1,440	15.9	8.1	10-	144	+-	4.7	
87	Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western)	3,690	1,230	12.1	13.2		144		1.6	2.1
	Sri Lanka	3,030	950 600	22.0	4.4	15	36	2.5	4.2 3.3	1.8
91	Peru	3,320	1,490	14.1	10.5	52	72			1.9
92	Syrian Arab Rep.	100 March 100 Ma	5.000 B				54	1.2.2	4.2	0.4
	Philippines Lebanon	2,590	850	16.6	7.4	40	54	1.2	2.9	1.0
	South Africa	3,127 ^b	2,980	9.1	19.2	40	100	151) 1997	7.0	3.2
	Indonesia	3,270	740	20.8	4.9	20	16		2.2	0.7
	Guyana	2,140	350	385			24		7.8	. 2
	Egypt Maldives	3,800	660 820	1990		34	34	2445	5.0 6.6	1.0
	China	2,330	490	17.4	6.5	100	12	**. **	2.0	2.1
	Iraq	3,413e	(A)		223			(22)		
10	Swaziland	2,940	1,190	· · · · · · ·			4.4		6.0	1.11
	Bolivia	2,510	760	15.3	8.6		86	1.6		2.4
	Guatemala	3,400	1,100	7.9	30.0	60	80		1.5	2.1

				Incom	e share			Social security	Publ	
		Real GDP per capita	GNP per capita	Lowest 40% of households	Ratio of highest 20% to	(9	Concernant I	benefits expenditure (as %	Education (as %	Health (as %
HDI rank		(PPP\$) 1993	(US\$) 1993	(%) 1981-93	lowest 20% 1981-93	Urban 1990*	Rural 1990*	of GDP) 1993	of GNP) 1992	of GDP) 1990
114 Honduras		2,100	600	8.7	23.5	74	80	40	4.1	2.9
15 El Salvador 16 Namibia		2,360 3,710	1,320 1,820	++-	22 22			*** :	1.6	2.6
17 Nicaragua		2,280	340	12.2	13.2		2	227		6.7
18 Solomon Islands	ř.		740		*1	4.0	**		4.2	
19 Vanuatu 20 Gabon		2,500 3,861 ^b	1,230 4,960				57 44	275). 140	4.5	35
21 Viet Nam		1,040 ^d	170	19.2	5.6	155	53 22			1,1
22 Cape Verde 23 Morocco		1,820 3,270	920 1,040	17.1	7.0	28	32	1.8	4.2 5.8	0.9
24 Zimbabwe		2,100	520	10.3	15.6			(##)	9.1	3.2
25 Congo		2,750	950	44		36	+1	-44	8.6	
26 Papua New Guir	10000	2,530	1,130		10	11	24	300		2.8
ow human developm Excluding India	nent	1,269 1,306	299 299	440 522	**	144	2	**	3.5 3.1	1.5 1.7
27 Cameroon		2,220	820				â.		3.1	1.0
28 Kenya 29 Ghana		1,400 2,000	270 430	10.1 18.3	18.2	59	54	0.7	5.4 3.1	2.7
30 Lesotho		980	650	9.3	20.7	29		0.1	6.0	1.1
31 Equatorial Guine	ea		420	(4.6)	28.85	28		281	1.8	100
32 São Tomé and P 33 Myanmar	rincipe	650 ^b	350		14.		385	968	2.4	15
34 Pakistan		2,160	430	21.3	4.7	20	31		2.7	1.8
35 India 36 Zambia		1,240	300 380	21.3 15.2	4.7 8.9	38	49	0.3	3.7 2.6	1.3 2.2
37 Nigeria		1,540	300	15.2	9.6			. 14		1.2
38 Lao People's De	m. Rep.	1,458 ^b	280	13.2	9.0	14 12	**		2.3	1.0
39 Comoros		1,130	560		10			1 1	4.1	3.3 2.5
40 Togo 41 Zaire		1,020	340	12			**	1.1	6,7	0.8
42 Yemen		->					30	-11		1.5
43 Bangladesh		1,290	220	22.9	4.1	56	51	-	2.3	1.4
44 Tanzania, U. Rep 45 Haiti	D. OT	630 1,050	90	8.1	26.1	65	80		5.0	3.2 3.2
46 Sudan		34	44	244	4.0			0.7		0.5
47 Côte d'Ivoire		1,620	630	18.0	6.5	-	1948		2.0	1.7
148 Central African 1 149 Mauritania	кер.	1,050	400 500	14.2	13.2	**	**	0.9	2.8	2.6
150 Madagascar		700	220			21	37	04		1.3
151 Nepal		1,000	190	22.0	4.3	19	43	24	2.9	2.2
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal		740	210 750	22.8 10.5	4.0 16.7		177		3.8	1.9 2.3
154 Benin		1,650	430	0.000	27025075	19		5.85	1404	2.8
155 Uganda 156 Cambodia		910	180	20,6	4.9	25	33		2.0	1.6
157 Malawi		710	200				187		3.3	2.9
158 Liberia		14.0		3.0		+ 1		- 10		10
159 Bhutan 160 Guinea		790	500	3.5		2 e :	-		2.4	2.3
161 Guinea-Bissau		860	240	8.6	28.0	44.) G2.(4.5.4	
162 Gambia		1,190	350					11	2.7	
163 Chad 164 Djibouti		690 775 ⁶	210 780		2.881	22	100	17.	2.3	4.7
165 Angola		11.5	760			855 290		0.2	1.6.4	11 25
166 Burundi		670	180	++	00		244	0.4	3.7	1.7
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia		640 420	90 100	21.3	4.8	40	70	1.7	6.2 5.1	4.4 2.3
169 Afghanistan		420	100	21.3	4.8	**	048 148			
170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali		780 530	300 270			44	**	0.6	2.7	7.0 2.8
172 Somalia			-						. 4	0.9
173 Sierra Leone		860	150				42		1.4	1.7
174 Niger	telas	790	270		11	22	H.	0.4	2.0	3,4
All developing coun Least developed		2,703 894	970 210	**		315	2.6%	81 22	3.9	2.0
Sub-Saharan Af		1,385	555		**				5.7	2.4
Industrial countries World		15,211 5,545	16,394 4,570	53. 25	**		6 14	**	5.4 5.1	44. 54

a. Latest year available; around 1990. b. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. c. World Bank 1995d. e. Figures are from UNDP 1995c, Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. Source: Column 1: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995h; column 2: World Bank 1995f; columns 3 and 4: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f; columns 5 and 6: ILO 1994b; column 7: ILO 1995e; column 8: UNESCO 1995c; column 9: World Bank 1993c.

18 Resource flow imbalances

			lotal mal debt	servic (debt as % of	ebt e ratio service exports oods	assista	official deve nce received, et disbursement	1994	Export- import ratio	Terms	Current account balance before official
HDI	rank	US\$ billions 1993	As % of GNP 1993		ervices) 1993	US\$ millions	As % of 1993 GNP	Per capita (US\$)	(exports as % of imports) 1993	of trade (1987=100) 1993	transfers
High	human development	410T	33	26	18	2,370T	0.3	6.7	96	96	-38,314T
23 25 26	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas		** ** **		44 44 44	27 44 -1	(.) 0.6 -0.1	5.7 48.2 3.8 7.5	98	87	
30 31 32	Korea, Rep. of Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay	47.2 74.5 3.9 7.3 20.6	14 30 55 58 47	20 37 29 19 43	9 46 18 28 23	-114 225 76 86 157	(.) 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.4	0.8 8.3 30.0 38.4 12.8	98 78 69 72 88	100 116 94 114 104	526 -7,363 -537 -252 -2,418
33 34	Chile Singapore	20.0	47	45	23	17	(.)	8.2	87	94	2,253
36 38 39 40	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda	2.1	44	7	- 4.4 - 4.4 - 4.4 - 4.4	5 21 44 451	0.1 0.4 1.0 106.1	18.2 5.5 7.5 46.2	111	92	123
42 43 44	United Arab Emirates Panama Venezuela	6.8 37.5	103 63	6 27	3 23	-7 40 31	(.) 0.6 0.1	31.1 2.3	105 25 121	98 87 93	-136 -2,216
45 47 48	Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji Mexico	118.0	35		32	4 40 431	(.) 2.5 0.1	261.9 77.8 4.4	 60		-23,393
52 53	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia	17.2 45.8 23.3	35 37 39	16 19 6	29 19 8	127 3 6 578 68	0.3 (.) (.) 0.5 0.1	3.0 5.7 1.7 10.7 5.2	72 146 80 103	68 86 103 99	-2,220 6,474 -6,959 -2,100
	Mauritius ium human development Excluding China	1.0 650T 570T	30 38 52	9 25 28	6 23 29	14 19,340T 16,110T	0.4 1.0 1.3	35.7 8.2 14.8	76 96 98	108 101 101	-96 -52,470T -40,570T
	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	132.7	29 107	63 34	24 26	336 7 13 20 217	0.1 (.) 2.9 (.) 1.6	1.5 1.2 138.9 1.8 21.6	152 145 113	97 98 90	-608 -13,278 -490
65 66 67 69	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	20.5 25.8 7.0		7 27 8	7 77 14	16 131 29 420 370	8.2 0.1 5.8 0.9 7.6	140.8 2.2 137.3 12.4 64.2	54 132 35	96 95 123	-3,765 361 -472
71 73 75 76	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	0.7	17	2	5.95 5.95 5.96 5.96 5.96	89 7 60 27 9	2.5 2.4 (.) 6.0 4.1	79.9 127.3 198.1 194.2 97.8	72	152	
82	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. o Turkey	8.7 2.7	58 25 38	15 6 28	21 10 28	105 47 95 6 163	0.7 0.3 1.0 (.) 0.1	27.5 2.9 38.7 0.7 7.7	61 132 53	100 84 109	-1,023 -1,087 -7,113
86 87 88	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	1.6 4.3 4.6	23 122 50 63	19 19 25	15 20 12	103 114 68 49 595	1.5 3.4 0.8 5.0 5.6	28.3 46.0 30.9	41 50 26 69	112 109 130 	-492 -247 -241 -541
91 92 95 97	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	20.3 35.3	60 64	45 27	59 25	416 745 1,057 235 294	1.2 4.7 1.9 8.2 (.)	24.5 12.3 22.9 47.0 4.9	102 59 123	90 117 105	-2,217 -3,590 1.743
02 03 06 07	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	89.5 40.6 83.8	64 109 15	14 15 4	32 15 11	1,642 80 2,695 30 3,232	1.2 35.6 7.3 15.5 0.6	10.6 104.2 37.4 130.3 2.7	120 27 89	90 99 101	-2,298 208 -11,898
109 110 111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	4.2 3.0 0.4	78 27 56	35 8	59 13 4	259 56 578 224 184	1.3 6.0 10.6 2.0 19.5	8.7 69.2 80.7 20.1 48.3	60 52	78 93	-693 -689 -40

			otal nal debt	service (debt s as % of	ervice exports	assistan	official develoce ce received, disbursements	1994	Export- import	Torme	Current account balance before official
HDI r	ank	US\$ billions 1993	As % of GNP 1993	of ge and se		US\$ millions	As % of 1993 GNP	Per capita (US\$)	ratio (exports as % of imports) 1993	Terms of trade (1987=100) 1993	(US\$ millions) 1993
114	Honduras El Salvador	3.9 2.0	121 28	21	32 15	298 316	9.3 4.5	58.9	77 29	73 88	-496 -299
116 117	Namibia Nicaragua	10.4	746	22	29	138 600	5.3 42.2	113.6 81.9	37	94	-299 179 -853
	Solomon Islands	30	591	ξi.		47	18.0	180.8	ùi	14	-4.6
120 121	Vanuatu Gabon Viet Nam	3.8 24.2	76 200	18	6 14	42 182 897	21.2 3.6 7.5	198.8 81.7 4.5	275	106	-284 -1,063
	Cape Verde Morocco	21.4	81	33	32	118 631	34.0 2.3	313.5 23.3	59	114	-679
	Zimbabwe	4.2	74	4	31	561	9.7	39.9	79	89	-295
	Congo Papua New Guinea	5.1 3.2	211 65	11 14	11 30	362 326	15.6 7.0	54.4 87.3	206 138	98 91	-532 323
	numan development Excluding India	280T 180T	54 90		10. 14	23,630T 21,310T	4.7 8.9	13.4 24.6	70 66	84 82	-15,470T -14,780T
	Cameroon	6.6	64	15	20	731	7.6	51.3	164	77	-794
29	Kenya Ghana	7.0 4.6	106 66	21 13	28 23	676 546	10.0 7.8	35.2 37.9	80 61	81 65	59 -828
	Lesotho Equatorial Guinea	0.5	39	2	5	117 30	9.3 18.6	67.9 134.6	12	**	-376
32	São Tomé and Principe		15		55	51	124.4	378.0			
	Myanmar Pakistan	5.5 26.0	48	25 18	25	162 1,606	(.) 3.0	2.3 8.0	72 70	111	-3,688
35	India	91.8	35	9	28	2,324	0.9	1.7	95	96	-685
	Zambia Nigeria	6.8 32.5	206	25	33	719	22.8	90.8 2.0	134	98 99	-471
38	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	2.0	153	44 22	10	218	16.8	43.0	23	39	-117
	Comoros Togo	1.3	92		9	40 126	14.7 9.5	84.0 32.2	77	97	-129
41	Zaire			- ñ		245	3.0	4.6			
	Yemen Bangladesh	5.9 13.9	160 54	23	8 14	172	2.5 6.8	25.5 11.8	27 57	88 94	-1,441 -535
44	Tanzania, U. Rep. of	7.5	301	26	21	968	38.4	34.9	28	85	-935
	Haiti Sudan	995) 1997 -	244 244	32 32	55 88	601 412	24.2 6.5	18.6 18.2	44 9.0		
	Côte d'Ivoire	19.1	228	39	29	1,594	18.4	63.1	173	79	-1,402
	Central African Rep. Mauritania	0.9	70 200	5 17	5 27	166 269	13.1 24.7	57.0 153.2	75 67	91 115	-139 -177
	Madagascar Nepal	4.6 2.0	153 50	17 3	14 9	289 448	9.5 14.1	26.6 17.3	59 44	68	-326 -263
	Rwanda	0.9	57	4	5	713	47.6	52.2	24	73	-360
53	Senegal	3.8	66	29	8	644	11.0	62.8	59	106	-545
	Benin Uganda	1.5 3.1	68 90	6 17	6 144	257 753	11.7 21.6	50.7 35.5	32 35	133 49	-212 -369
	Cambodia	10	115	20.	77	337	29.3	32.3	112	55	2
	Malawi Liberia	1.8	87	28	22	470 63	23.1 6.1	47.9 42.5	59	86	-221
59	Bhutan	14.30	19.8	340	*5	77	29.3	42.0	4.6	11	- 23
	Guinea Guinea-Bissau	2.9 0.7	90 346	20	10 23	360 177	11.4 76.0	66.6 95.3	73 26	84 92	-67 -80
	Gambia	0.4	97 58	6	14	70	18.8	92.1	34	95	-35
64	Chad Djibouti	0.8	58	8	7	215	17.2 28.3	38.3 235.2	59	101	-264
	Angola Burundi	1.1	97	10	36	4 310	0.1 26.8	29.2 45.8	32	52	-190
67	Mozambique	5.3	376		21	1,231	89.5	76.5	14	122	-820
	Ethiopia Afghanistan	4.7	54	7	9	1,070 228	17.2 3.9	23.3 12.7	25	67	-433
170	Burkina Faso Mali	1.1 2.7	39 98	6	7	435 442	14.9 16.1	43.6 35.7	23 72	106 102	-493 -374
	Somalia				12	538	64.4	98.4	44	4	
	Sierra Leone Niger	1.4 1.7	198 74	23 22	12 31	276 376	42.7 16.3	44.7 39.1	80 85	76 105	-128 -165
All d	eveloping countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa strial countries d	1,330T	40 78 73 ^b	23 18 10 ^b	21 17 15 ^b	60,930T ^a 16,240T ^a 18,890T ^a	1.4 13.4 10.5	10.6 28.3 31.5	91 60 86 105	96 81 90 104	-106,250T -9,120T -8,020T 57,520T

a. OECD 1996. b. World Bank 1994b. Source: Columns 1, 2 and 8: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f; columns 3, 4, 9 and 10: World Bank 1995f; column 5: OECD 1996; columns 6 and 7: calcu-lated on the basis of estimates from OECD 1996 and UN 1995e.

19 Military expenditure and resource use imbalances

			D	efence e	expendit	ure		expe	ilitary enditure	convention	rts of al weapons prices) ^a	Tot armed	
		(199	millions 3 prices)	G	% of DP	(US\$; 19	capita 993 prices)	educ health (f combined ation and expenditure)	US\$ millions	Index (1990 =100)	Thou- sands	Index (1985 = 100)
HDI	human development	1985 30,850T	1994 37,820T	1985 3.5	1994 2.8	1985 107	1994	1960	1990-91	1994 1,570T	1994	1994 1,770T	1994
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	114 16 48 8,268	359 13 17 13,153	3.6 1.4 5.1	5.4 0.8 0.5 3.6	172 64 194 201	495 51 63 294	273	10 17 5 60	613	89	10.0 0.6 2.6 633.0	100 60 520 106
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	4,758 38 223 1,632 1,561	3,262 36 289 1,906 2,982	3.8 0.7 2.5 7.8 6.7	1.7 0.5 2.5 3.5 4.8	156 15 56 135 610	97 11 91 137 1,043	62 17 40 60 11	51 5 38 68 129	263 70	130 18	69.8 25.6 93.0 54.0	65 80 92 98
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	269 96 198 2,685	233 81 246 3 2,055	6.0 1.4 3.5 7.6	4.5 1.4 5.5 0.8 5.7	1,203 81 476 1,954	806 63 439 49 1,149		125 9 41 44	 8 389	2	4.4 2.6 8.1 0.1 61.5	107 124 289
43 44 45 47	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji	118 1,083 18	85 925 27	2.0 1.3	1.2 1.6	58 63 26	33 43 35	2 40	34 33 37	147	147	0.7 79.0 3.9	6 161 144
48 49 50 51 52 53 54	Mexico Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	1,631 557 394 2,360 2,462 2,318 3	1,694 1,178 294 3,009 3,313 2,652 11	0.7 1.6 6.0 9.1 5.0 5.6 1.7	0.7 2.3 3.8 12.2 2.6 3.9 0.4	21 20 1,251 1,380 48 149 24	18 559 2,019 56 135 10	23 57 96 48 4	5 192 88 71 38 4	80	28	175.0 146.4 10.1 16.6 256.0 114.5 1.3	136 221 168 138 109 104 130
Med	ium human development Excluding China	129,830T 103,740T	86,280T 58,600T	7.5 7.4	4.3 3.8	75 137	42 64	3+ 5+	540 144	6,510T 6,510T	104 106	9,140T 6,210T	90 100
58 59 60 63 64	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	3,088 1,774 11 23,603 373	6,551 1,062 10 13,917 589	0.8 6.2 2.1 19.6 1.8	1.6 3.7 2.9 11.2 3.2	23 471 162 2,045 40	40 210 142 1,109 53	72 29 150 104	23 71 151 26	217 1,602	108 65	336.8 70.0 0.8 158.0 57.5	122 96 67 253 135
65 66 67 69 70	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	18,689 5 1.252 791	2,237 11 1,249 422	36.0 1.8 1.7 15.9	3.8 1.9 2.7 7.1	419 32 57 226	37 51 44 96	141 31 464	38 11 138	780 20	101 5	513.0 1.0 121.7 98.6	168 167 72 140
76	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	49 11	131 13	1.1 2.4	4.6 2.8	45 15	93 27	12 (21 (21 (21)	22 27	11 15 17 17		7.5 1.8	188 90
78 79 82 83 84	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	548 2,098 2,834 5,461 3,016	219 292 1,854 5,412 5,242	5.0 9.6 20.8 23.0 4.5	1.4 2.7 15.9 26.6 3.2	77 208 1,771 268 60	25 27 991 234 86	45 64 153	31 125 293 87	13 2,135	2 2 266	35.5 106.0 42.9 1,128.0 503.8	101 66 1,716 135 80
85 86 87 88 89	Jamaica Dominican Rep.	79 26 67 300	81 27 112 504	1.3 0.9 1.1 3.8	1.4 0.9 1.1 4.7	21 11 10 19	17 11 15 28	94 147 17	42 8 22 107	1487 144 144 144 144		16.5 3.3 24.5 126.0	115 157 110 583
95 97	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	842 4,577 623 263 3,774	730 2,358 855 301 3,893	4.5 16.4 1.4 9.0 2.7	1.8 8.6 1.4 4.4 3.3	45 436 11 99 113	31 168 13 75 94	59 329 44 26	39 373 41 41	194 	693	115.0 408.0 106.5 44.3 78.5	90 101 93 255 74
103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	3,076 26 3,394 26,083	2,256 6 2,641 27,680	2.8 9.7 7.2 7.9	1.4 1.4 5.9	19 75 70 	11 8 47 23	207 117 387	49 21 52 114	1,370 2	182 2	276.0 1.7 440.0 2,930.0	99 26 99 75
109 110 111 112	Iraq Swazīland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	16,909 167 259 45	2,628 127 129 17	25.9 2.0 1.8 9.0	14.6 1.4 1.1 2.8	1,064 26 33 23	132 16 13 8	128 105 45	271 11 57 31		2 4 10 10 10	382.0 33.5 44.2 21.3	74 121 139 65

		De	efence e	xpendit	ure		expe	litary nditure		rts of al weapons prices) ^a	Tot armed	
		millions 3 prices)		% of DP	Per c (US\$; 199		educa	f combined ation and xpenditure)	US\$ millions	Index (1990 = 100)	Thou- sands	Index (1985 =100)
HDI rank	1985	1994	1985	1994	1985	1994	1960	1990-91	1994	1994	1994	1994
114 Honduras115 El Salvador116 Namibia117 Nicaragua118 Solomon Islands	95 331 837	42 152 49 38	2.1 4.4 14.2	1.3 1.9 2.2 2.0	22 69 256	7 27 31 9	38 34 100	92 66 23 97	** ** **	** ** **	16.8 30.7 8.1 15.2	101 74 24
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	104 3,154 5 842	118 837 3 1,197	1.8 19.4 0.9 5.4	2.3 5.7 0.9 4.3	104 51 15 38	93 12 8 44		51	181	 163	3.2 572.0 1.1 195.5	133 56 14 131
124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	223 74 47	191 47 53	3.1 1.9 1.5	3.5 1.7 1.1	27 39 13	17 18 12	ĩ	66 37 41	**	55 57 44	46.9 10.0 3.8	114 115 119
Low human development Excluding India	19,000T 10,770T	15,930T 8,610T	2.8 2.7	3.1 3.5	13 15	9 10	94 138	65 65	1,920T 1,140T		3,270T 2,000T	111 119
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	209 336 83 60 4	115 180 80 18 2	1.4 3.1 1.0 4.6 2.0	1.4 2.2 0.9 3.2 1.4	21 17 7 39 11	9 6 5 9 5	63 8 22	48 24 12 48	anni Talain Talain Talain	14 14 14 14 14	14.6 24.2 6.9 2.0 1.3	200 177 46 100 59
 132 São Tomé and Principe 133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan 135 India 136 Zambia 	640 2,728 8,230 53	415 3,426 7,321 37	7.0 6.9 3.0 1.1	3.1 6.9 2.8 1.0	17 28 11 8	 9 27 8 6	241 393 68 42	222 125 65 63	248 819 773	126 110 48	286.0 587.0 1,265.0 24.0	154 122 100 148
137 Nigeria138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.139 Comoros	1,644 72	1,139 111	1.0 7.8	3.1 7.9	5 20	10 23	11	33	140 146 146	0K 000 14	76.5 37.0	81 69
140 Togo 141 Zaire	25 106	30 114	1.3 0.9	2.7 1.9	8 3	7 3	544 194	39 71	5885 1894	- 50 - 50	7.0 28,1	194 59
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	643 329 184 41 494	401 463 103 34 298	8.9 1.4 4.4 1.5 3.2	5.2 1.8 3.5 2.2 3.5	64 3 8 7 37	29 4 5 11	 4 100 52	197 41 77 30 44	75	47	66.0 115.5 49.6 7.3 118.5	103 127 123 106 209
 147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal 	100 23 68 71 47	68 24 35 28 41	0.8 1.4 6.5 2.0 1.5	0.8 2.0 2.7 0.8 1.1	10 9 40 7 3	5 7 16 2 2	8 8 67	14 33 40 37 35		142 144 144 144	8.4 2.7 15.7 21.0 35.0	64 117 185 100 140
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	43 83 28 70	113 88 25 87 59	1.9 1.1 1.1 1.8	7.7 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.3	7 13 7 5	15 11 5 6	13 28	25 33 18	14. 14. 14. 14.		5.0 13.4 4.5 50.0 88.5	96 133 100 250 253
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea	28 37 68	20 34 42	1.0 2.4	1.1 2.5 	4 17 11	2 14 7	73	24 47 37	*** 55 84	1.4 1.8 1.6	10.4 5.0 9.7	196 74 98
161 Guinea-Bissau	14	8	5.7	3.3	16	8		44		е 64	7.3	85
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	3 49 42 850 46	13 30 25 501 31	1.5 2.9 7.9 22.5 3.0	3.7 2.6 6.2 8.7 3.0	4 10 124 172 10	13 5 42 46 5		11 74 208 42	24 14 15		0.8 25.4 8.4 82.0 10.5	160 208 280 166 202
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan	314 587 377	102 106	22.5 17.9 8.7	7.1 2.6	23 14 21	6 2	107	121 190	19 15	**	2.0 120.0	13 55
170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	45 39	42 64	1.1 1.4	1.6 3.0	6	4 7	29 57	30 53	75 58 64	**	5.8 7.4	145 151
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	60 7 16	35 20	6.2 1.0 0.5	4.4 0.9	11 2 2	8 2	43	200 23 11		44 44 44	6.2 5.3	200 241
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	5,590T 9,540T 612,590T		5.5 4.0 2.1 4.1 4.3	3.6 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2	52 14 21 718 171	34 7 14 525 141	143 27 97 104	60 43 33 37	10,000T 320T 7,840T 17,840T	83 90 97 89	14,170T 1,270T 810T 7,850T 22,020T	97 121 95 83 93

a. Figures are trend indicator values. Source: Columns 1-6 and 11. IISS 1995, columns 7 and 8: IISS 1993, UNDP 1994a and World Bank 1993c; column 9: SIPRI 1995; column 10: calculated on the basis of estimates from SIPRI 1995; column 12: calculated on the basis of estimates from IISS 1995.

20 Growing urbanization

			Urban		ann			n in cities re than ,000	I	Largest city		
LID!		(as	opulatio % of tot	al)	growt (%	6) 1993-		As % of urban population	City	Population (thousands)	(9	th rate %)
HDI		1960	1993	2000	1993	2000	1990	1990	City	1995		1990-95
-	human development	45 85	67 95	71 96	3.5	2.2	31 94	47	Line Kenn		2.6	0.8
23	Hong Kong Cyprus	36	53	57	1.9	2.0	94	100	Hong Kong	5,574	2.0	0.8
25	Barbados	35	46	50	1.2	1.7	14		0.6			
26 29	Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	74 28	86 79	89 86	3.2 5.0	1.9 2.3	48	65	Seoul	11,641	4.9	2.0
30	Argentina	74	88	89	2.0	1.5	42	48	Buenos Aires	10,990	1.6	0.7
31	Costa Rica	37	49	53	3.9	3.3	25	53	San Jose	760	3.5	2.9
32	Uruguay	80	90	91	1.0	0.8	42	47	Montevideo	1,326	0.1	0.6
33 34	Chile Singapore	68 100	84 100	85 100	2.5	1.6	35 100	42	Santiago Singapore	5,065 2,848	2.7	2.0
36	Brunei Darussalam	43	58	59	4.7	2.2						
38	Trinidad and Tobago	65	71	74	1.6	1.8			0.955 - 298		÷*	1882
39 40	Bahrain Antiqua and Barbuda	82 40	89 36	92 37	4.1	2.9	1.4		(+)	(4.9.)		
40	United Arab Emirates	40	83	86	0.3	1.2	14 14	144		20 C	4.4 6.4	(184) (199)
43	Panama	41	53	55	3.3	2.4	34	67	Panama City	948	2.3	2.8
44	Venezuela	67	92	94	4.1	2.5	30	34	Caracas	2,959	2.2	1.3
45 47	Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji	28 30	41 40	46 43	0.6	0.8	**			24	11	
48	Mexico	51	74	78	3.9	2.5	30	41	Mexico City	15,643	4.3	0.7
49	Colombia	48	72	75	3.6	2.2	28	40	Bogota	5,614	4.8	2.9
50	Qatar	72	91	93	8.6	2.2	5.1	53	Sec. 1	1.000	4.0	0.0
51 52	Kuwait. Thailand	72 13	97 20	98 22	6.7 3.8	0.5	51 11	53 57	Kuwait City Bangkok	1,090 6,566	4.0	0.0
53	Malaysia	27	52	58	4.8	3.6	6	13	Kuala Lumpur	1,238	7.1	2.0
	Mauritius	33	40	42	2.2	1,5	ιά.	**	(44)		44)	- 4.4
Medi	ium human development	24 30	39 52	45 57	3.7	3.4 3.2	14 20	38 38	- 0	-		
50	Excluding China	45	77	81		2.4	32		São Daulo	15 417	4.1	2.0
58 59	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	23	85	88	4.0	4.0	77	42 93	São Paulo Tripoli	16,417 3,272	10.5	4.6
60	Seychelles	25	53	59	4.1	2.4			11 June 1			
63 64	Saudi Arabia Ecuador	30 34	79 57	82 62	7.6	3.6	20 25	26 46	Riyadh Guayaguil	2,576	11.0	5.3 2.8
65	Dominica	24	51		-4.4	2.2	23	40	Guayadan	1,616	4.4	2.0
66	Iran, Islamic Rep. of	34	58	62	5.0	3.1	20	35	Teheran	6,830	5.2	1.5
67 69	Belize	54 30	47 54	47 60	2.0	2.5	12	74	Alaiam	2 707	4 2	4.0
70	Algeria Jordan	43	70	75	4.6 4.9	3.6 4.7	12 22	24 33	Algiers Amman	3,702 1,183	4.2 5.1	4.0 4.3
71	Botswana	2	26	33	12.3	6.6			24		14	(22)
73	Saint Vincent	14	45	52	4.9	2.9	-		24			7227
75	Suriname Saint Lucia	47 39	49 47	54 51	1.2	2.5	-	- 44	44		1	44
	Grenada						175		.47	+*		
78	Tunisia	36	56	60	3.6	2.7	22	39	Tunis	2,037	3.2	3.1
79 82	Cuba Oman	55 4	75 12	78 16	2.3	1.2	20	27	Havana	2,241	0.9	1.1
	Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	40	61	63	3.6	2.3	10	17	Pyongyang	2,470	6.0	2.0
84	Turkey	30	66	75	4.9	3.7	22	37	Istanbul	7,817	5.1	3.7
	Paraguay	36 34	51	56	4.1	4.0	543	- 346	30		25	(44)
	Jamaica Dominican Rep.	34	53 63	56 68	2.6	1.7	43	71	 Santo Domingo	2,580	5.1	3.2
88	Samoa (Western)	19	21	22	1.6	1.9	16		in the second			14.8
	Sri Lanka	18	22	24	2.4	2.7	122					
	Peru Syrian Arab Rep.	46 37	71 51	75 55	3.9 4.4	2.5 4.4	30 27	43 54	Lima Damascus	7,452 2,052	4.5	2.8
	Philippines	30	52	59	4.3	3.9	15	30	Metro Manila	9,280	6.9	3.1
	Lebanon South Africa	40 47	86 50	90 53	3.7	2.9	21	42	Cano Tours	2 674	3.7	2 1
	South Africa		1025	10.022	2.8	3.1	21	43	Cape Town	2,671		3.1
	Indonesia Guyana	15 29	34 35	40 40	4.7	4.2 2.9	12	38	Jakarta	11,500	4.1	4.4
106	Egypt	38	44	46	2.9	2.6	23	51	Cairo	9,665	2.6	2.2
	Maldives China	11 19	26 29	28 35	5.4	4.2 3.8	10	38	Shanghai	15,082	0.5	2.3
- Partie	Iraq	43	74	77	4.9	3.6	22	31	Baghdad	4,478	6.5	2.0
110	Swaziland	4	29	36	9.5	5.9	22	51	· · ·			144
	Bolivia	39 32	59 41	65	3.5	3.9	16	28	La Paz	1,246	3.3	3.6
	Guatemala			44	3.6	4.1	9	23	Guatemala City	946	1.6	2.3

		Urban		Urb popul ann	ation ual	of mor	on in cities re than ,000	La	irgest city		
		opulations % of tot		growt (9		As % of total	As % of urban population		Population (thousands)		th rate %)
HDI rank	1960	1993	2000	1993	2000	1990	1990	City	1995	1970-75	1990-95
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador	23 38	43 45	47 47	5.2 2.8	4.4 2.9	4.6	144.5		2442	322	445
116 Namibia	15	35	43	5.3	5.6		-	44	44	4.0	**
117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands	40 9	62 16	66 20	4.5 5.4	4.3 6.4	26	44	Managua	1,195	5.3	4.3
119 Vanuatu	9	19	21	5.6	3.8		25.	35	12		77
20 Gabon 21 Viet Nam	17	48 20	54 22	6.2 3.2	4.4	7	33	Ho Chi Minh City	3,555	3.3	1.9
22 Cape Verde 23 Morocco	16 29	51 47	63 51	5.6 4.0	5.9 3.0	17	36	 Casablanca	3,289	3.4	3.1
24 Zimbabwe	13	31	36	6.0	4.6	9	30	Harare	854	5.5	4.0
25 Congo	32	57 16	63	4.6	4.4	36	66	Brazzaville	1,009	2.8	4.8
126 Papua New Guinea .ow human development	3	26	18 30	8.0 4.1	4.0		37			-	
Excluding India	12	27	31	5.1	5.1	10	39				
27 Cameroon	14	43	49	6.2	4.9	16	22	Douala	1,322	5.3	5.6
28 Kenya 29 Ghana	7 23	26 35	32 39	7.6 4.0	6.0 4.5	6 9	27 28	Nairobi Accra	2,079 1,687	4.9 3.3	6.3 3.7
130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	3 26	22 40	27 48	8.4 2.6	6.0 5.5	1840	380	1997) 1988)	(51) (51)	175	577
132 São Tomé and Principe	16	40	51	5,4	3.6		30			2885 7840	
133 Myanmar	19	26	28	3.1	3.7	8	32	Yangon	3,851	4.3	3.1
134 Pakistan 135 India	22 18	34 26	38 29	4.3 3.4	4.6	16 9	49 36	Karachi Bombay	9,863 15,093	4.9 3.3	4.3
136 Zambia	17	43	45	6.1	3.4	12	29	Lusaka	1,327	6.5	6.1
137 Nigeria138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.	14 8	38 20	43 25	5.8 5.3	5.0 5.9	9	27	Lagos	10,287	9.8	5.7
139 Comoros	10	30	34	6.7	5.8			34. 22	34. 10	**	
140 Togo 141 Zaire	10 22	30 29	34 31	6.4 3.8	4.9 4.4	9	33	Kinshasa	4,214	4.7	4.0
142 Yemen	9	32	38	6.8	6.6			H.	1. March 1.		
143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	5	17 23	21 28	6.3 8.2	5.4 5.9	8	52 27	Dhaka	7,832	7.9 9.8	5.7 3.8
145 Haiti	16	30	35	3.9	4.1	16	56	Port-au-Prince	1,266	4.4	3.9
146 Sudan 147 Côte d'Ivoire	10	24	27	5.3 6.4	4.7	8	35	Khartoum	2,492	6.0	4.5
 Côte d'Ivoire Central African Rep. 	23	39	42	3.9	3.6	18	45	Abidjan	2,797	11.0	2.4
149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar	6 11	51 26	59 31	9.4 5.7	4.6 5.8	**	<i></i>	22	12		
151 Nepal	3	13	17	6.8	6.9			83 77	11 77	10	
152 Rwanda	2	6	7	6.0	4.7		r 12	Delas	1.000	F 0	4.2
153 Senegal 154 Benin	32 9	41 30	45 34	3.6 6.3	4.0	22	55	Dakar	1,986	5.0	4.2
155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	5 10	12 19	14 24	6.2 3.7	5.6 5.9	4	38	Kampala	954	3.2	4.7
157 Malawi	4	13	16	6.8	5.0		10 11				
158 Liberia	19	44	48	5.8	4.7	16	24				10
159 Bhutan 160 Guinea	3 10	6 28	8 34	4.7 5.4	6.0 5.7	20	76	 Conakry	1,508	8.0	5.8
161 Guinea-Bissau	14	21	25	3.4	4.6	14	14			÷+	94
162 Gambia 163 Chad	12	24 21	29 23	5.5 5.6	5.6	**		11		77	÷.
164 Djibouti	50	82	84	7.6	2.5			**			
165 Angola 166 Burundi -	10 2	31 7	36 9	5.7 6.1	6.0 6.7	18	63	Luanda	2,207	7.5	5.9
167 Mozambique	4	31	41	9.0	7.4	11	41	Maputo	2,227	7.2	7.1
168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan	6 8	13 19	15 22	4.7 4.3	5.2 8.2	4	31 57	Addis Ababa Kabul	2,209 2,034	4.8	4.0 5.2
170 Burkina Faso	5	23	38	7.5	9.8	12		<u>0</u>	с. 11	-	-22
171 Mali 172 Somalia	11	26	30 28	5.2	5.7 4.3	9	37	Mogadishu	982	7.0	4.6
173 Sierra Leone	13	35	40	5.1	4.6				962	7.0	4.0
174 Niger	6	16	19	6.5	5.9	1.4			223	25	
All developing countries Least developed countries	22	36 22	40 26	3.8 5.2	3.5 5.3	14	39 47	94 () 94	997) 940		
Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries	15 61	30 73	34 75	5.0 1.4	4.9 0.7	10 29	34 41	2.5	39.5	4.0	
World	34	44	47	2.7	2.5	17	39	**		9.90 100	

Source: Columns 1, 3, 10 and 11: UN 1995h; columns 2, 4-7 and 9: calculated on the basis of estimates from UN 1995h.

21 Demographic profile

		Estimate populatio (millions)	n	growt	opulation h rate	Population doubling date (at current	Crude birth	Crude death	Total fertility	Contraceptive prevalence rate, any method
HDI rank	1960	1993	2000	1960- 1993	1993- 2000	growth rate) 1993	rate 1993	rate 1993	rate 1992	(%) 1986-93
High human development	160T	340T	380T	2.3	1.5	2041	22.7	5.9	2.6	62
22 Hong Kong 23 Cyprus 25 Barbados 26 Bahamas 29 Korea, Rep. of	3.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 25.0	5.8 0.7 0.3 0.3 44.1	6.0 0.8 0.3 0.3 47.1	1.9 0.7 0.4 2.7 1.7	0.4 1.0 0.4 1.4 0.9	2172 2064 2153 2043 2066	11.0 18.6 16.2 18.9 16.5	5.7 7.4 9.2 5.1 6.3	1.2 2.5 1.8 2.0 1.7	81 55 62 79
 30 Argentina 31 Costa Rica 32 Uruguay 33 Chile 34 Singapore 	20.6 1.2 2.5 7.6 1.6	33.8 3.3 3.1 13.8 2.8	36.6 3.8 3.3 15.3 3.0	1.5 3.0 0.7 1.8 1.6	1.2 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.9	2052 2025 2117 2040 2073	20.2 26.0 17.0 21.7 15.8	8.2 3.7 10.3 5.7 5.8	2.8 3.1 2.3 2.5 1.7	75
 Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates 	0.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1	0.3 1.3 0.5 0.1 1.8	0.3 1.4 0.6 0.1 2.1	3.7 1.3 3.8 0.5 9.5	1.9 1.1 2.4 0.6 2.1	2030 2056 2021 2100 2025	23.8 20.5 27.8 22.7	3.5 6.1 4.0 2.7	3.1 2.4 3.8 4.2	53 53 53
 43 Panama 44 Venezuela 45 Saint Kitts and Nevis 47 Fiji 48 Mexico 	1.1 7.6 0.1 0.4 36.9	2.5 20.9 (.) 0.8 90.0	2.9 24.2 (.) 0.8 102.4	2.5 3.1 -0.6 2.0 2.7	1.7 2.1 -0.3 1.6 1.9	2034 2026 2037 2030	24.7 27.1 23.5 27.5	5.3 4.7 4.5 5.3	2.9 3.3 3.0 3.2	49ª 41ª 53
49 Colombia 50 Qatar 51 Kuwait 52 Thailand 53 Malaysia 54 Mauritius	15.9 (.) 0.3 26.4 8.1 0.7	34.0 0.5 1.8 57.6 19.2 1.1	37.8 0.6 1.8 61.9 22.3 1.2	2.3 7.8 5.8 2.4 2.6 1.5	1.5 1.9 0.3 1.0 2.1 1.1	2038 2029 2195 2060 2025 2055	23.8 20.4 24.5 19.0 28.4 21.0	5.9 3.4 2.1 6.1 5.1 6.7	2.7 4.3 3.1 2.1 3.6 2.4	66 32 35 66 48 75
Medium human development Excluding China	1,100T 450T	2,190T 990T	2,420T 1,140T	2.1 2.5	1.4 1.9	2041 2029	22.7 28.4	7.4 7.4	2.7 3.6	71 53
58 Brazil 59 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 60 Seychelles 63 Saudi Arabia 64 Ecuador	72.6 1.3 (.) 4.1 4.4	156.5 5.0 0.1 17.1 11.0	174.8 6.4 0.1 21.3 12.6	2.4 4.1 1.6 4.4 2.8	1.6 3.4 1.0 3.1 2.0	2036 2013 2065 2015 2027	24.4 41.8 35.2 28.0	7.4 7.9 4.6 6.2	2.9 6.4 6.4 3.5	66 53
65 Dominica 66 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 67 Belize 69 Algeria 70 Jordan	0,1 21.6 0.1 10.8 1.7	0.1 64.2 0.2 26.7 4.9	0.1 74.6 0.2 31.2 6.4	-1.0 3.4 2.4 2.8 3.3	0 2.2 2.7 2.2 3.8	2025 2019 2024 2011	34.8 34.6 28.7 38.9	6.5 4.7 6.3 5.4	5.0 4.2 3.9 5.6	50 65 47 47 35
 71 Botswana 73 Saint Vincent 75 Suriname 76 Saint Lucia 77 Grenada 	0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1	1.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1	1.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1	3.3 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.1	3.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 0.3	2016 2071 2056 2047 2218	37.0 25.1	6.5 5.8	4.9 2.7	33 58 47 54
78 Tunisia 79 Cuba 82 Oman 83 Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 84 Turkey	4.2 7.0 0.6 10.8 27.5	8.6 10.9 2.0 23.0 59.6	9.7 11.4 2.6 26.0 67.7	2.2 1.4 3.9 2.3 2.4	1.8 0.7 4.0 1.7 1.8	2032 2098 2010 2033 2030	25.2 16.8 43.7 24.1 27.0	6.3 6.8 4.8 5.3 7.4	3.2 1.8 7.2 2.4 3.4	50 70 9 63
85 Paraguay 86 Jamaica 87 Dominican Rep. 88 Samoa (Western) 89 Sri Lanka	1.8 1.6 3.2 0.1 9.9	4.7 2.4 7.5 0.2 17.9	5.6 2.5 8.5 0.2 19.5	3.0 1.2 2.6 1.2 1.8	2.6 0.8 1.7 1.6 1.2	2020 2084 2033 2035 2049	32.7 21.7 26.7 37.3 20.6	5.4 6.2 5.5 6.0 5.8	4.3 2.4 3.1 4.5 2.5	48 67 56 62
 Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa 	9.9 4.6 27.6 1.9 17.4	22.9 13.7 64.8 2.8 39.7	26.1 17.3 74.6 3.3 46.2	2.6 3.4 2.6 1.3 2.5	1.9 3.4 2.0 2.3 2.2	2030 2013 2027 2023 2024	27.2 40.9 30.2 26.8 31.1	6.8 5.7 6.4 7.0 8.8	3.4 5.9 3.9 3.1 4.1	59 40 50
102 Indonesia 103 Guyana 106 Egypt 107 Maldives 108 China	96.2 0.6 27.8 0.1 657.5	191.7 0.8 60.3 0.2 1,196.4	212.7 0.9 69.1 0.3 1,284.6	2.1 1.1 2.4 2.7 1.8	1.5 1.1 2.0 3.2 1.0	2039 2054 2028 2014 2061	24.4 25.0 28.7 41.7 18.0	8.3 7.1 8.0 8.5 7.3	2,9 2.6 3.9 6.8 2.0	50 46 83
109 Iraq 110 Swaziland 111 Bolivia 112 Guatemala 113 Mongolia	6.8 0.3 3.4 4.0 1.0	19.5 0.8 7.1 10.0 2.3	23.8 1.0 8.3 12.2 2.7	3.2 2.8 2.3 2.9 2.7	2.9 2.8 2.4 2.9 2.0	2017 2018 2022 2017 2028	38.0 38.4 35.7 38.5 26.8	6.7 10.5 10.1 7.6 7.2	5.7 4.9 4.8 5.4 3.6	14 20 30 23

Developing countries

		Estimate populatic (millions)	n	growt	opulation h rate 6)	Population doubling date (at current	Crude birth	Crude death	Total fertility	Contraceptive prevalence rate, any method
HDI rank	1960	1993	2000	1960 1993	1993- 2000	growth rate) 1993	rate 1993	rate 1993	rate 1992	(%) 1986-93
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia 117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands	1.9 2.6 0.6 1.5 0.1	5.3 5.5 1.5 4.1 0.4	6.5 6.4 1.8 5.2 0.4	3.2 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.4	2.8 2.2 2.6 3.3 3.3	2017 2024 2019 2014 2014	37.0 33.4 36.8 40.2 37.4	6.1 7.0 10.4 6.6 4.4	4.9 4.0 5.3 5.0 5.4	47 53 29 49
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	0.1 0.5 34.7 0.2 11.6	0.2 1.2 71.3 0.4 25.9	0.2 1.5 82.6 0.4 29.6	2.8 2.9 2.2 1.9 2.5	2.5 2.8 2.1 2.8 1.9	2020 2017 2025 2018 2029	35.1 37.3 30.6 36.4 28.9	7.3 15.4 7.8 8.5 8.0	4.7 5.3 3.9 4.3 3.8	53 42
124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	3.8 1.0 1.9	10.7 2.4 4.1	12.5 3.0 4.8	3.2 2.8 2.3	2.2 2.8 2.3	2024 2017 2023	38.8 44.8 33.3	12.1 15.0 10.6	5.0 6.3 5.1	43
ow human development Excluding India	800T 360T	1,770T 870T	2,080T 1,060T	2.4 2.7	2.3 2.9	2023 2018	35.8 43.0	11.8 13.9	4.9 6.0	31 16
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	5.3 8.3 6.8 0.9 0.3	12.5 26.4 16.4 1.9 0.4	15.2 32.6 20.2 2.3 0.5	2.6 3.6 2.7 2.5 1.2	2.9 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.5	2017 2016 2016 2019 2020	40.6 44.4 41.5 36.8 43.5	12.1 11.8 11.6 9.8 17.9	5.7 6.3 6.0 5.2 5.9	16 33 13 23
132 São Tomé and Principe 133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan 135 India 136 Zambia	0.1 21.7 50.0 442.3 3.1	0.1 44.6 132.9 901.5 8.9	0.1 51.5 161.8 1,022.0 10.8	2.1 2.2 3.0 2.2 3.2	2.0 2.1 2.8 1.8 2.7	2027 2026 2017 2031 2019	32.4 40.7 28.9 44.3	11.0 9.1 9.9 15.3	4.2 6.2 3.8 6.0	12 43 15
137 Nigeria 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 139 Comoros 140 Togo 141 Zaire	42.3 2.2 0.2 1.5 15.3	105.3 4.6 0.6 3.9 41.2	128.8 5.6 0.8 4.8 51.1	2.8 2.3 3.2 2.9 3.0	2.9 2.8 3.6 3.1 3.1	2017 2017 2012 2015 2015	45.4 45.3 48.6 44.6 47.6	15.3 15.1 11.6 12.8 14.5	6.5 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.7	6 12 8
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	5.2 51.4 10.2 3.8 11.2	13.2 115.2 28.0 6.9 26.6	17.1 134.4 34.1 8.0 32.1	2.8 2.5 3.1 1.8 2.7	3.7 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.7	2011 2024 2017 2026 2019	49.3 35.5 43.0 35.2 39.7	15.3 11.5 13.6 11.8 13.0	7.6 4.4 5.9 4.8 5.7	7 40 10 10 9
 147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal 	3.8 1.5 1.0 5.4 9.4	13.3 3.2 2.2 13.9 20.8	16.8 3.7 2.6 17.3 24.8	3.9 2.2 2.4 2.9 2.4	3.3 2.4 2.6 3.2 2.6	2014 2021 2020 2015 2020	50.0 41.6 39.7 43.6 39.3	15.2 16.6 14.3 11.6 13.2	7.4 5.7 5.4 6.1 5.4	3 17 23
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	2.7 3.2 2.2 6.6 5.4	7.6 7.9 5.1 19.9 9.7	9.0 9.5 6.3 24.6 11.6	3.1 2.8 2.5 3.4 1.8	2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.7	2019 2019 2016 2016 2016 2019	44.2 42.8 48.8 51.9 43.3	16.7 15.9 17.8 19.3 14.1	6.6 6.1 7.1 7.3 5.3	21 7 5
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	3.5 1.0 0.9 3.1 0.5	10.5 2.8 1.6 6.3 1.0	12.1 3.6 1.8 7.8 1.2	3.4 3.1 1.9 2.1 2.0	2.1 3.3 2.1 3.0 2.1	2026 2014 2026 2016 2025	50.1 47.4 39.8 50.7 42.8	19.9 14.1 15.2 20.2 21.2	7.2 6.8 5.9 7.0 5.8	13 6
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	0.4 3.1 0.1 4.8 2.9	1.0 6.0 0.6 10.3 6.0	1.3 7.3 0.6 13.1 7.3	3.3 2.1 5.9 2.3 2.2	3.1 2.8 2.1 3.5 2.9	2015 2017 2026 2013 2017	43.4 43.9 37.6 51.5 46.0	18.7 17.9 16.0 19.1 15.6	5.6 5.9 5.8 7.2 6.8	12 9
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	7.5 22.8 10.8 4.5 4.4	15.1 51.9 17.7 9.8 10.1	19.0 63.8 26.7 11.7 12.6	2.2 2.5 1.5 2.4 2.6	3.3 3.0 6.0 2.6 3.1	2014 2016 2004 2019 2015	45.5 48.6 51.1 46.8 50.9	18.6 17.9 22.0 18.1 19.0	6.5 7.0 6.9 6.5 7.1	4 5
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	3.8 2.2 3.0	9.0 4.3 8.6	10.8 5.1 10.8	2.6 2.0 3.2	2.7 2.4 3.4	2019 2022 2013	50.7 49.2 52.3	18.5 25.0 18.8	7.0 6.5 7.4	 4
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	2,070T 240T 210T 930T 3,000T	4,300T 550T 520T 1,210T 5,510T	4,880T 670T 640T 1,240T	2.2 2.5 2.8 0.8 1.9	1,8 2.8 2.9 0.4 1.5	2032 2018 2017 2163 2039	28.1 42.9 44.8 13.2 24.8	9.1 14.9 15.1 10.0 9.3	3.5 5.8 6.3 1.8 3.1	55 19 15 73 58

a. Data refer to a period other than that specified in the column heading. Source: Columns 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9: UN 1995e; columns 4, 5 and 6: calculated on the basis of estimates from UN 1995e; column 10: UN 1994c.

22 Natural resources balance sheet

			Forest and	Arabia	Irrigated	Deferer	Annual	Pafarar	of fue	uction I wood narcoal	Internal renewable water	Ann fresh v withdr	water
HDI	rank	Land area (1,000 ha) 1993	woodland (as % of	(as % of	land (as % of arable land area) 1993	(1,000 ha per year) 1980-89	defores- tation (%) 1980-89	Refores- tation (1,000 ha per year) 1980-89	(1,00	30 m ³ year) 1993	resources per capita (1,000 m ³ per year) 1992	As % of water resources 1980-89	
High	human development	894,970T	27.6	9.2	19.7	485	1.3	30	84,640T	104,7707	13.5	24	657
22 23 25 26	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas	104 925 43 1,388	21.2 13.3 11.6 23.3	5.8 11.9 37.2 0.6	33.3 35.5	(44) (44) (44) (44)	900 900 900 900 900	Te e e	164 24	193 18 		60 51	812 117
29 30 31 32 33 34	Korea, Rep. of Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile	9,902 276,689 5,110 17,741 75,695 62	65.2 18.4 30.7 5.2 21.8 4.8	19.0 9.0 5.6 7.1 5.3 1.6	71.1 6.8 42.1 11.1 31.8	55 50	3.1 0.7	67 40 5 74	6,452 5,608 2,243 2,513 5,300	4,491 4,288 3,210 3,044 9,627 120	1.5 21.0 29.8 18.9 34.4 0.2	17 3 1 4 32	299 1,042 780 241 1,623 84
36 38 39 40 42	Singapore Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	577 513 68 44 8,360	78.0 45.8 11.4	0.5 14.6 1.5 18.2 0.3	33.3 29.3 100.0 17.2	1	0.4	1	79 16	79 22	4.0	3	13 148 735 414
43 44 45 47	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji	7,552 91,250 36 1,827	43.2 32.9 16.7 64.9	6.6 3.5 22.2 9.9	6.4 5.9 0.6	36 245 2	0.9 0.7 0.2	19 7	708 578 22	927 1,032 37	57.3 42.4 38.6	1 	744 387 41
48 49 50 51 52 53 54	Mexico Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	195,820 113,891 1,100 1,782 51,312 32,975 204	24.9 43.9 0.1 26.3 67.6 21.6	11.8 3.4 0.6 0.3 34.3 3.2 49.0	26.3 13.5 40.0 25.0 32.7 17.0	615 890 397 310 (.)	1.3 1.7 2.5 1.5 3.3	22 8 24 20 (.)	11,752 13,441 29,001 6,711 24	15,769 17,220 35,313 9,375 2	4.1 32.0 (.) 2.0 24.3 2.0	15 174 18 2 16	875 172 234 11 600 768 410
Med		4,180,360T 3,224,260T	28.7 33.3	6.8 5.9	32.1 21.7	1,552	0.8	188		719,440T 519,380T			478 498
58 59 60 63 64	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	851,197 175,954 45 214,969 28,356	57.3 0.5 11.1 0.8 55.0	4.9 1.0 2.2 1.7 5.7	6.7 25.9 11.9 34.1	3,650 340	0.7	449 31 4	150,432 536 5,549	194,270 536 4,231	33.7 0.1 0.1 28.4	1 374 106 2	248 692 15 321 567
65 66 67 69 70	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	75 164,800 2,296 238,174 8,921	66.7 6.9 91.5 1.7 0.8	9.3 10.1 2.0 3.1 3.5	56.5 4.4 7.6 20.0	20 40	0.5 0.6 2.3		2,323 79 1,427 4	2,525 126 2,060 7	1.9 80.8 0.7 0.2	39 16 41	14 1,362 104 160 173
71 73 75 76 77	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia Grenada	58,173 39 16,327 62 (.)	45.6 35.9 91.9 12.9 8.8	0.7 10.3 0.3 8.1 32.4	0.5 25.0 20.0	20 3	0.1 (.)	(j) 	901 26	1,351 19	0.8 456.6	1	100 108 1,155 89 16
78 79 82 83 84	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. o Turkey	16,361 11,086 21,246 of 12,054 77,945	4.1 23.5 61.1 25.9	18.3 23.5 0.1 14.1 31.4	12.9 34.9 85.9 15.0	5	1.7 0.1	3 11 200 82	2,406 2,801 3,714 15,698	3,236 2,535 4,230 9,750	0.5 3.2 1.2 3.0 3.2	53 23 22 21 18	317 870 561 687 434
85 86 87 88 89		40,675 1,099 4,873 284 6,561	31.6 16.8 12.3 47.2 32.0	5.4 14.1 20.5 19.4 14.2	3.1 22.6 23.0 59.1	212 2 4 58	1.1 3.0 0.6 3.5	1 1 13	4,294 7 769 70 7,305	5,432 355 976 70 8,703	20.8 3.4 2.7 2.5	4 15 15	110 159 443 503
	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	128,522 18,518 30,000 1,040 122,104	66.0 3.5 45.3 7.7 6.7	2.6 27.6 18.4 20.8 10.1	37.6 17.7 28.6 39.8 10.3	300 143	0.4	6 50 63	6,166 22 26,320 448 7,116	7,237 20 35,980 489 7,210	1.8 0.6 5.0 1.7 1.3	15 9 16 18	301 434 693 271 410
103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	190,457 21,497 100,145 30 956,100	58.7 76.8 3.3 13.5	9.9 2.2 2.4 10.0 9.6	24.3 27.1 53.6	920	0.8 (.)	131 (.) 2 4,552	115,525 15 1,672 154,666	149,063 14 2,292 200,060	13.2 298.3 0.1 2.4	1 2 97 16	95 7,564 1,213 462
109 110 111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	43,832 1,736 109,858 10,889 156,650	0.4 6.9 52.8 53.4 8.8	12.0 10.8 1.9 12.2 0.9	48.6 35.8 8.3 9.4 5.7	117 90	0.2 2.0	5 1 8	75 543 1,020 8,724 1,350	105 560 1,407 11,142 445	1.8 8.8 39.9 11.9 10.7	43 4 1 2	4,575 408 184 139 273

Developing countries

		Forest		Irrigated	5.4	Annual		Produ of fuel	wood	Internal renewable water	Ann fresh v withdra	vater
HDI rank	Land area (1,000 ha) 1993	and woodland (as % of land area) 1993	(as % of	land (as % of arable land area) 1993	Defores- tation (1,000 ha per year) 1980-89	rate of defores- tation (%) 1980-89		(1,000) m ³	resources per capita (1,000 m ³ per year) 1992	As % of water resources 1980-89	Per capita (m ³) 1980-89
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia	11,209 2,104 82,429	53.5 4.9 21.8	15.0 26.9 0.8	4.4 21.2 0.9	90 5	2.3 3.2 0.2		3,804 5,214	5,844 6,347	11.6 3.5 5.9	1 5 2	510 245 84
117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands	13,000 2,890	24.6 84.8	8.5 1.4	8.0	121 1	2.7 (.)	1 (.)	2,315 102	3,397 138	44.3 130.7	ī (.)	370 18
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde	1,219 26,767 33,169 403	75.0 74.3 29.1 0.2	1.6 1.1 16.6 10.7	1,4 33.8 7.0	15 173	0.1	1 29 1	24 1,766 21,960	24 2,803 28,984	132.6 5.4	 1 20	57 81 147
123 Morocco 124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea	44,655 39,076 34,200 46,284	20.1 22.5 61.7 90.7	20.7 7.0 0.4 0.1	13.6 7.0 0.7	13 80 22 23	0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1	13 4 (.) 2	1,062 5,207 1,520 5,393	1,448 6,269 2,220 5,533	1.1 2.2 76.4 197.5	37 5 (.)	499 138 19 28
Low human development Excluding India	2,721,710T 2,392,960T	28.9 30.0	12.8	22.9 17.4	374 211	1.2	30 7	598,890T	845,630T	4.9 8.0	100	547 474
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	47,544 58,037 23,854 3,035 2,805	75.5 28.9 33.1 46.3	12.5 6.9 11.7 10.5 4.6	0.4 1.7 0.2 0.9	190 39 72 3	0.8 1.7 0.8 	1 10 2 1	7,378 23,406 11,284 463 421	11,785 36,710 15,512 651 447	17.0 0.6 3.3 2.2 81.3	7 1 1	37 50 35 31 15
132 São Tomé and Principe133 Myanmar134 Pakistan135 India136 Zambia	96 67,658 79,610 328,759 75,261	47.9 4.4 20.8 38.1	2.1 14.2 26.1 50.5 7.0	11.1 82.3 28.9 0.9	677 9 1,500 70	2.1 0.4 2.3 0.2	 7 138 2	14,433 16,683 201,956 8,411	19,156 25,021 262,782 12,952	24.8 2.4 2.1 11.1	33 18	10 101 2,053 612 86
 137 Nigeria 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 139 Comoros 140 Togo 141 Zaire 	92,377 23,680 223 5,679 234,486	12.2 52.8 17.9 15.8 74.1	32.3 3.3 35.0 36.5 3.1	3.2 16.0 0.3 0.1	400 130 1 12 588	2.7 1.0 3.1 0.7 0.3	26 1 (.)	72,169 2,965 532 25,244	109,789 4,254 1,097 41,293	2.3 60.4 3.1 25.6	1 1 1	37 260 14 28 22
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh 144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 145 Haiti 146 Sudan	52,797 14,400 94,509 2,775 250,581	3.8 13.2 35.4 5.0 17.7	2.6 65.6 3.2 20.2 5.1	26.2 32.8 5.0 13.4 15.1	8 130 2 504	0.9 0.3 3.8 1.1	17 9 13	252 22,941 21,953 4,605 15,335	324 31,774 33,963 5,932 22,488	0.2 11.4 2.7 1.6 1.1	1 1 14	211 36 7 1,092
147 Côte d'Ivoire 148 Central African Rep. 149 Mauritania 150 Madagascar 151 Nepal	32,246 62,298 102,552 58,704 14,080	22.0 75.0 4.3 39.5 40.8	7.6 3.1 0.2 4.4 16.5	2.8 23.9 42.1 36.6	510 55 13 156 84	5.2 0.2 2.4 1.2 4.0	6 (.) 12 4	6,663 2,486 6 5,339 13,732	10,888 3,250 8,051 19,440	5.7 44.4 0.2 3.1 8.3	1 10 41 2	66 25 494 1,642 151
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	2,634 19,672 11,262 23,588 18,104	20.9 53.1 30.2 23.3 64.1	32.5 11.8 12.7 21.4 13.0	0.5 3.0 0.7 0.2 3.9	5 50 67 50 30	2.3 0.5 1.7 0.8 0.2	3 3 (.) (.) 2	4,519 3,099 3,569 9,197 4,246	5,392 4,333 5,234 13,500 5,880	0.8 3.0 5.3 3.5 10.0	2 4	23 202 26 20 68
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	11,848 9,775 4,700 24,586 3,612	31.2 17.4 66.0 58.8 29.6	14.1 1.3 2.4 2.5 8.3	1.7 1.5 29.6 15.2 5.7	150 46 1 86 57	3.5 2.3 0.1 0.8 2.7	1 2 1 (.) (.)	5,521 3,861 1,027 2,678 422	9,546 5,118 1,364 3,969 422	0.9 84.3 58.9 37.0 30.8	2	20 56 14 140 11
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	1,130 128,400 2,320 124,670 2,783	24.8 25.2 0.3 41.6 3.1	15.9 2.5 2.4 40.8	8.3 0.4 2.5 1.2	5 80 94 1	2.4 0.6 0.2 2.7	(.) (.) : 3 3	894 2,731 3,946 3,144	937 3,667 5,652 4,558	3.3 6.6 0.6 16.0 0.6	2 3	29 34 29 52 20
167 Mozambique 168 Ethiopia 169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	80,159 110,076 65,290 27,400 124,019	17.5 22.7 2.9 50.4 5.6	3.7 10.9 12.1 13.0 2.0	4.0 1.6 37.9 0.6 3.1	120 88 80 36	0.8 0.3 1.7 0.5	4 10 2 1	12,188 32,085 4,763 6,461 3,902	15,022 45,254 6,113 9,090 5,753	3.9 2.1 2.6 2.9 6.3	1 2 52 1 2	53 49 1,706 18 162
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	63,766 7,174 126,700	25.1 28.4 2.0	1.6 6.8 2.8	18.0 6.0 1.8	14 6 67	0.1 0.3 2.6	1	6,302 2,316 3,361	8,939 3,188 5,130	1.3 36.6 1.7	7 1	119 96 41
All developing countries Least developed countrie Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World a. UN 1994a.	7,797,0401	28.7 30.7 32.6 35.1	9.2 5.6 6.2 11.3 10.0	26.2 11.6 3.8 9.9 18.7	866 214 162 15,517 ^a	1.1 0.9 0.9 0.4 ^a	797 6 11	1,253,900T 256,450T 306,730T 132,240T 1,386,140T	1,669,840 369,040 452,580 204,530	0T 6.5 0T 10.8 0T 7.3 0T 10.9		520 242 122 1,150 641

a. UN 1994a. Source: Columns 1, 8 and 9: FAO 1994; columns 2, 3 and 4: calculated on the basis of data from FAO 1994; columns 5, 6 and 7: UN 1993b; column 10: World Resources Institute 1994; columns 11 and 12: UN 1994a.

23 Energy consumption

			Productic % of nati		ene	nercial ergy uction	ene	nercial ergy mption	Co	ommercia (oil ec	al energy quivalent)	use		nercial imports
		en	ergy rese Natural	Crude	ave annual	rage growth e (%)	avei annual	rage growth e (%)		grams capita	output	DP per kg S\$)	(as merch	% of andise orts)
HDI	rank	Coal 1991	gas 1991	oil 1991	1971-80	1980-93	1971-80	1980-93	1971	1993	1971	1993	1971	1993
High	human development		144	1447		442			711	1,586	1.0	3.5	8	9
22	Hong Kong			1	44	1	7	7	850	2,278	1.2	8.3	3	2
23 25	Cyprus Barbados		38. 11	**	**	20). 11		**		1	**	24 	-	
26	Bahamas Karas Ban of		1985	1571	5					2,863	0.6	2.6	16	18
29 30	Korea, Rep. of Argentina	0.2	(.)	(.)	3	8	11	10	507	1,351	1.1	5.6	4	3
31	Costa Rica	0.2		12.0	7	6	6	4	443	558	1.4	4.2	5	12
32 33	Uruguay Chile	0.2	1.3	2.0	1	7 2	1	1	749 709	715	1.3	5.8 3.5	15 5	12
34	Singapore		1.5	2.0		2. 	8	8	1,396	5,563	0.8	3.6	21	13
36	Brunei Darussalam	(.)	3.0	4.0	15	-	72	14						
38 39	Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain	(.)	2.2 2.9	9.3 17.0	6	0	4	3	2,735	4,696	0.3	0.8	60	14
40	Antigua and Barbuda	0.00	122250	1.84	1.0.0			- ***					**	
42	United Arab Emirates	(.)	0.4	0.9	7	6	27	11		16,878		1.2	2	
43 44	Panama Venezuela	0.6	0.7	1.5	17 -5	10 2	05	0 2	834 2,072	599 2,369	0.9	4.3	63 1	51 1
45 47	Saint Kitts and Nevis	34	(4)43	(64)		30		(44)	148	544	0.	300	0.00	1.0
47	Fiji Mexico	0.6	1.3	2.3	17	ž	10	3	653	1,439	1.2	2.7	6	4
49	Colombia	0.5	3.5	7.7	-2	12	4	4	444	694	0.8	2.3	1	5
50 51	Qatar Kuwait	(.)	0.2	3.7	-6	-2	ž	-4	7,264	4,217	0.7	3.0	(24) (24)	1
52	Thailand	1.5	3.7	4.8	10	26	7	11	178	678	1.1	3.2	16	9
53 54	Malaysia Mauritius	(.)	0.9	8.9	19 2	12	8	10 3	436 225	1,529	0.9	2.2	10	4
128010	ium human development Excluding China	25	340						299 332	648 681	1.1	2.5 3.3	12	10 13
58	Brazil	0.2	3.4	8.2	б	8	8	4	361	666	1.4	4.9	13	11
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	(,)	0.7	2.3		10.	**	244	1.241	2442	1.00	465	Sel-	544
60 63 64	Seychelles Saudi Arabia Ecuador	(.) (.)	0.7	1.1 7.5	8 29	1 4	21 16	5 3	1,061 202	4,552 561	1.0 1.3	2.3	9	69 1
65 66	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of	0.7	0.2	1.3	-8	7		ï	714	1,235		94. 11		4.0 . 1 4
67 69	Belize Algeria	(.)	1.3	2.1	5	5	15	5	255	955	1,4	1.9		1
70	Jordan	177					14	5	228	766	1000	1.4	31	37
71	Botswana	307	0.0	24.0	9	0	11	3	243	388	0.7	7.0		
73 75	Saint Vincent Suriname	(44) (44)	1997 - 19	998 1948		100	**	244	244) 244	244	**	344 300 0	546 546	2.64
76 77	Saint Lucia Grenada				54	-		100	- 6.4	- 4.4	22			
78	Tunisia	(,)	(.)	2.3	5	1	10	4	262	582	1.2	2.9	8	13
79	Cuba								44				-	
82 83	Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	(.) 15.0	1.0	6.1 (.)	1	8	41	10	119	2,408	3.4	2.4		1
84	Turkey	0.6	(.)	8.5	6	4	8	5	377	983	0,9	3.0	11	26
85 86	Paraguay Jamaica	3882	251	2882	14	46	10	6 2	94 996	214	2.9	6.8 1.4	15 10	30
87	Dominican Rep.				22	-0	5	1	235	340	1.6	3.7	9	1.44
88 89	Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	(44)		144	8	7	ž	2	80	110	2.3	5.3	**	13
91	Peru	(.)	0.2	12.0	13	-4	4	-1	429	332	1.4	5.4	1	8
92	Syrian Arab Rep.	(.)	0.2	12.0	++	As :	**			1.64		1.0		1.44
95 97	Philippines Lebanon	0.5	(.)	(.)	31	6	5	4	222	328	0.9	2.5	14	19
	South Africa	0.3	(.)	(.)	8	3	4	3	1,993	2,399	0.4	1.2	9	144
102	Indonesia Guyana	0,1	2.6	10.0	8	4	13	8	71	321	1.1	2.3	30	6
106	Egypt	(.)	2.2	5.4	14	4	9	6	200	539	1.2	1.2	10	6
	Maldives China	0.9	1.4	4.3	8	5	ï	5	278	623	0.4	0.6		6
109	Iraq	(.)	0.1	0.7					270	02.5	0.14	0.0		
110	Swaziland	1443		122		(h)÷(14	**	100		0.0
	Bolivia	(.)	2.6	4.0	4	1	10	1	173	310	1.5	2.5	1	8
111 112	Guatemala			++	21	4	7	2	155	159	2.4	7.1	2	26

Developing countries

		Productic % of nati		ene	nercial ergy uction	ene	nercial ergy mption	Co		al energy quivalent)	use		nercial imports
	en	ergy rese Natural	rves Crude	ave annual	rage growth e (%)	avei annual	rage growth e (%)		jrams apita	output	DP : per kg S\$)	(as ' merch	% of andise orts)
HDI rank	Coal 1991	gas 1991	oil 1991	1971-80	1980-93	1971-80	1980-93	1971	1993	1971	1993	1971	1993
114 Honduras			30	13	3	6	2	185	180	1.5	3.5	8	16
115 El Salvador 116 Namibia		144	1946) (144)	17	4	8	2	160	222	1.8	6.2	2	39
117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands		1944 1944	100	3	3	4	2	248	241	1.6	1.8	7	61
119 Vanuatu	8			52	12	<i>w</i>	(44)					14	
120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam	(.) 3.3	(.) (.)	17.0	6 11	6 10	-9	2 3	805 165	769 77	0.9	5.6 2.4	1	÷
122 Cape Verde	22	0.55	5475	3	-3	8	4	155	299	1.8	3.4	8	24
123 Morocco 124 Zimbabwe	11	199	544	0	-3	0	6	442	471	0.7	1.1		15
125 Congo	(.)	(.)	7.2	33	7	1	2	176	165	1.4	5.9	4	
126 Papua New Guinea Low human development	(.)	0	(.)	12	20	7	2	136 89	238	2.1	5.2 2.3	9	
Excluding India	94 44		940 100		24 12	260		58	97	3.8	4.4	8	44. 44
127 Cameroon	(.)	(.)	14.0	47	5	8	2	59	87	3.1	10.2	6	14.45
128 Kenya 129 Ghana	а 55			16 7	16 2	4	3 3	114 107	99 96	1.3 2.6	2.2 3.8	15 5	14
130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea									**	**	**		**
132 São Tomé and Principe													
133 Myanmar 134 Pakistan	(.) 0.6	0.4	(.)	8	-2 7	3	-1 7	56 103	39 209	1.4 1.5	1.9	9 11	24
135 India	0.4	1.5	3.9	5	7	5	7	111	242	1.0	1.2	8	36
136 Zambia		0.0		7	-3	1	-3	335	146	1.1	2.8	5	
137 Nigeria 138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.	(.)	0.2	3.9	3 40	2 -1	19 -3	2 3	39 55	141 39	6.6	2.1 7.4	3	
139 Comoros 140 Togo	44	12		8	÷.	9	ï	51	47	2.7	6.9	5	110 110
141 Zaire	(.)	(.)	12.0						14	2.7			
142 Yemen 143 Bangladesh	(.) (.)	(.) 1.4	1.7	11	12	8	8	111 18	285 59	5.2	3.4 3.5	9	26
144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	(.)	1.144	(.)	5	5	2	1	53	35	1.9	2.4	11	
145 Haiti 146 Sudan	945) 9011	22 17	*		20 30	6 12		**			500	22	
147 Côte d'Ivoire	342	11	64	22	-6	6	0	152	109	1.8	6.4	4	
148 Central African Rep.149 Mauritania	941		4	5	3	-1 5	3	40 105	29 105	2.5	13.4	25	1440
150 Madagascar	940) 940)		**	-1	6	-4	2	64	34	2.7	7.1	9	44
151 Nepal 152 Rwanda	**			12	14	7	8	6 11	22	12.6	6.5 7.2		(32)
153 Senegal	·**		5	3		18 5	0	121	115	1.7	6.3	6	
154 Benin 155 Uganda	**			-4	11	2 -7	-3	39 58	20 21	3.1 (.)	20.4	7	(277) (277)
156 Cambodia							- 170 - 115	191	*	1997 19	2.881		199
157 Malawi 158 Liberia	1.0	55	**	11	4	8	2	37	35	2.1	5.4	8	-
159 Bhutan	(44) (44)	99 99			2	2 39	44 55			**		100 C	1946 1946
160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	14345 14465	44 13		14	4	2	1	69 35	66 37	4.1	7.7 6.4	47	24
162 Gambia	14	22	2	23		15	1	35	57	3.4	6.1	4	-
163 Chad 164 Diibouti	**			2000 2000	**	4	1	18	16	5.2	12.1	32	44
165 Angola	(.)	(.)	9.9	27 22					74		67	10	
166 Burundi 167 Mozambigue	(**)	20	2	23	-16	-2	-3	8	24 43	9.4	6.7 2.2	10	355
168 Ethiopia		**	**	6	-16	-2	-3	103	23	385) 301	2.2	11	**
169 Afghanistan 170 Burkina Faso		50 54	**	20 		13	ï		16	7.4	17.7	22	
171 Mali				8	5	8	2	16	20	4.2	13.1	13	
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone	020 1000		41 22			 0	ö	133	74	1.2	2.3	5	
174 Niger	**	**			9	12	2	17	38	9.6	6.8	7	+E
All developing countries	377		15	100	222			255	536	1.2	2.8	10	14
Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa		(44) (44)	40 40		1.00		**	42 251	50 288	2.3	6.4 3.7	7	**
Industrial countries World	0.4ª	**	2.2ª		**	**		4,211	4,589 1,421 ^b	28.	5.1 3.1 ^b		11
a. UN 1994a	****		2.16					<u>66</u>	and the state			141	

a. UN 1994a. b. World Bank 1995f. Source: Columns 1, 2 and 3: UN 1994a; columns 4-11: World Bank 1995f; columns 12 and 13: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f.

24 National income accounts

						Consu	mption	Gross	Gross		Central		
HDI	rank	GDP (US\$ billions) 1993	Agri- culture (as % of GDP) 1993	Industry (as % of GDP) 1993	Services (as % of GDP) 1993	Private (as % of GDP) 1993	Govern- ment (as % of GDP) 1993	domestic investment (as % of GDP)* 1993	domestic	Tax revenue (as % of GNP) 1993	dovernment expenditure (as % of GNP) 1993		Imports (as % of GDP) 1993
High	human development	1,510T	8	35	57	65	11	27	28	17	20	32.1	35.3
22	Hong Kong	90.0		21	79	60	9	27	31			150.3	154.1
23 25	Cyprus Barbados	10.00	**	93 93	**	000 000	44 C	88 17	**	1966 1944	е 12	99 33	
26	Bahamas	(+*)	**	24	99 19			22 10	**			94	
29	Korea, Rep. of	330.8	7	43	50	54	11	34	35	17	17	24.9	25.3
30 31	Argentina Costa Rica	255.6 7.6	6 15	31 26	63 59	84 59	17	18 30	25	23	27	5.1 26.4	6.6 38.4
32	Uruguay	13.1	9	27	64	72	14	16	14	28	29	12.5	17.5
33 34	Chile Singapore	43.7 55.2	()	37	63	66 43	10 9	26 44	24 47	21 17	23 20	21.4 134.2	24.3 154.5
36	Brunei Darussalam												1.0.110
38	Trinidad and Tobago	4.5	3	43	55	66	12	13	22	1000		35.9	32.3
39 40	Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda	4.8	88			08	4.0	#8 	89	- 0	**	*	1000
42	United Arab Emirates	34.9	2	57	40	49	18	25	33	144 144	11	58.7	55.9
43	Panama	6.6	10	18	72	59	17	25	24	21	32	8.4	33.3
44 45	Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis	60.0	5	42	53	73	9	19	18	15	19	22.1	18.3
47	Fiji									**			
48	Mexico	343.5	8	28	63	75	9	22	16	2.55	55	8.8	14.6
49 50	Colombia Qatar	54.1	16	35	50	70	12	22	18	0.022	12	13.0	18.2
51	Kuwait	22.4	(.)	55	45	37	32	23	30	1	55	45.8	31.4
52 53	Thailand Malaysia	124.9 64.4	10	39	51	54 49	10 13	40 33	36 38	16 21	16 27	29.5 73.1	36,9 70.8
54	Mauritius	2.8	10	33	57	65	11	29	24	20	22	46.7	61.7
Med	ium human development	1,840T	15	39	47	63	14	27	26	14	21	17.6	19.1
50	Excluding China	1,420T	13	36	51	67	16	22	22	17	25	16.4	17.5
58 59	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	444.2	11	37	52	79		19	21	19	26	8.7	5.7
60	Seychelles	0	7b,c	52 ^{b,c}	41 ^{b,c}					0.55	1		23.2
63 64	Saudi Arabia Ecuador	121.5 14.4	12	38	50	40 71	33 8	24 21	27 22	16	15	33.6 20.1	17.8
65 66 67	Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize	107.3 ^b	24 ^b	29 ^b	47 ^b	55	15	29	30	8	20	15.6	28.6
69	Algeria	39.8	13	43	43	54	17	29	28		64 - 15	25.7	19.5
70	Jordan	4.4	8	26	66	90	24	30	-13	28	36	27.7	79.7
71 73	Botswana Saint Vincent	3.8	6	47	47			14	1	31	40	45.2	62.7
75	Suriname							55	77				-
76 77	Saint Lucia Grenada	225			0.00	125	225	33	1 2		11	77	10
0.00	Tunisia	12.8	18	31	51	63	16	29	20	24	33	29.7	48.6
79	Cuba	997		88	2.99	1996	1000	++	++	200			. 16.00
82 83	Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	11.7	3	53	44	34	39	17	27	10	64	46.5	35.2
84	Turkey	156.4	15	30	55	65	13	27	22	14	26	9.8	18.7
85 86	Paraguay	6.8 3.8	26 8	21 41	53 51	77	9	22	14	9	13	10.2	24.7 54.8
87	Jamaica Dominican Rep.	9.5	15	23	62	61 77	13 5	35 22	26 18	. 4.6	64 24	27.4	22.3
88 89	Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	9.4	25	26	50	75	9	25	16	17	27	30.9	45.1
91	Peru	41.1	11	43	46	76	8	19	16	9	14	8.4	8.3
92	Syrian Arab Rep.	17.2 ^{b,c}	30 ^{b,c}	23 ^{b,c}	48 ^{b,c}	79 ^b	14 ^b	16 ^b	7 ^b		27 ^b	12.57 ++	
95 97	Philippines Lebanon	54.1	22	33	45	76	9	24	16	15	18	20.5	34.7
	South Africa	105.6	5	39	56	60	21	15	19	27	33	21.6	17.6
102	Indonesia	144.7	19	39	42	60	10	28	31	16	19	23.2	19.4
103 106	Guyana Egypt	35.8	18	22	60	80	14	17	6	26	47	6.3	22.8
107	Maldives	44.5			199	1.64	(1)		<i>ii</i>			12	1.44
108	China	425.6	19	48	33	51	9	41	40	4	9	21.6	24.2
109 110	lraq Swaziland			11 22			**		44 64	142		а С	
111	Bolivia	5.4	Fi			81	13	15	6	11	27	13.5	22.4
	Guatemala Mongolia	11.3 0.5	25 21	19 46	55 33	85 66	6 18	17 19	9 16	24	25	11.9	23.0
1000		1.5.5.5		10 T		24	107.0	075			1.12	77	10

Developing countries

						Consu	mption	~	~		C 1 1		
HDI	rank	GDP (US\$ billions) 1993	Agri- culture (as % of GDP) 1993	Industry (as % of GDP) 1993	Services (as % of GDP) 1993	Private (as % of GDP) 1993	Govern- ment (as % of GDP) 1993	Gross domestic investment (as % of GDP)* 1993		Tax revenue (as % of GNP) 1993	Central government expenditure (as % of GNP) 1993	Exports (as % of GDP) 1993	Imports (as % of GDP) 1993
115 116 117	Honduras El Salvador Namibia Nicaragua	2.9 7.6 2.1 1.8	20 9 10 30	30 25 27 20	50 66 63 50	70 88 63 91	12 10 33 17	27 17 10 17	19 2 4 -8	9 31 28	11 40 40	28.4 7.3 14.8	36.9 25.2 40.4
	Solomon Islands	1-	14				-			77	55		
		5.4 12.8	8 29	45 28	47 42	48 84	16	22 21	36	23	34	42.4	15.4
	Morocco	26.6	14	32	53	65	18	23	17	**	95 40	15.0	25.4
125	Zimbabwe Congo Papua New Guinea	5.0 2.4 5.1	15 11 26	36 35 43	48 53 31	64 70 51	19 22 21	22 14 20	17 8 29	29 22	36 36	23.7 46.8 35.2	30.1 22.7 25.5
Low	human development Excluding India	420T 200T	35 39	24 21	40 40	70 75	13 15	21 17	18 10	12 13	20 27	13.5 18.0	15.9 22.6
128 129	Lesotho	11.1 4.7 6.1 0.6	29 29 48 10	25 18 16 47	47 54 36 43	73 66 90 112	12 13 12 30	15 16 15 76	15 21 -1 -42	11 20 13 23	18 29 21 32	16.4 29.3 17.3 17.9	10.0 36.5 28.4 153.2
135	São Tomé and Principe Myanmar Pakistan India Zambia	46.4 225.4 3.7	63 25 31 34	9 25 27 36	28 50 41 30	89 74 66 75	14 11 11	12 21 24 15	11 12 24 14	5 13 11	12 24 17	 14.3 9.6 31.7	20.5 10.1 23.6
137	Nigeria Lao People's Dem. Rep.	31.3 1.3	34 51	43 18	24 31	63	18	15	19	÷		37.9 6.0	26.4 26.5
	Comoros Togo	1.2	49 	18	33	86	17	6	-2	**		25.8	33.5
142 143 144 145	Yemen Bangladesh Tanzania, U. Rep. of	12.0 24.0 2.1	21 30 56	24 18 14	55 52 30	68 79 82	29 14 9	20 14 51	3 8 10	17 	51	5.4 9.5 20.1	20.1 16.7 73.0
	Sudan	40.	34 ^b	17 ^b	50 ^b			34 10	5445 (344)	990. 1997	44. 21	395) 201	aa ja
	Mauritania Madagascar	8.1 1.2 0.9 3.1 3.6	37 50 28 34 43	24 14 30 14 21	39 36 42 52 36	63 89 79 91 80	20 10 10 7 9	9 9 24 12 21	16 1 11 2 11	 7 8	16 19	35.6 10.6 52.4 8.5 11.0	20.6 14.1 78.0 14.5 24.8
155		1.4 5.8 2.1 3.0	41 20 36 53	21 19 13 12	38 61 51 35	87 80 85 89	22 12 11 14	15 14 15 15	-10 7 3 -2	12	32	5.0 12.8 5.4 5.9	21.2 21.9 16.9 17.0
158 159	Malawi Liberia Bhutan Guinea	1.8 0.2 ^b 3.2	39 42 ^b 24	18 27 ^b 31	43 31 ^b 45	81 	17 7	12 16	2			17.7 13.9	30.2 18.9
161		0.2	45	19	36	93	7	26				6.6	25.7
	Chad Djibouti	0.3	28 44	15 22	58 35	74 93	18 17	20 9	-10	ï	32	26.4 15.5	77.2 26.5
	Angola Burundi	0.9	52	21	27	90	13	18	-3	11	41 . 41 -	7.9	24.8
	Mozambique Ethiopia Afohanistan	1.4 5.8	33 60	12 10	55 29	94 86	17 11	41 12	-11 3	-44 -44	24 B	9.7 3.5	69.9 13.7
170	Afghanistan Burkina Faso Mali	2.7 2.7	44 ^b 42	20 ^b 15	37 ^b 42	81 81	17 13	22 22	2 7			5.4 12.9	23.8 17.9
173	Somalia Sierra Leone Niger	0.9 ^b 0.7 2.2	65 ^b 38 ^b 39	9 ^b 16 ^b 18	26 ^b 46 ^b 44	84 82	11 17	: 9 6	5	15	23	17.9 12.8	22.3 14.9
All d	developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Istrial countries	3,780T 80T 240T 19,150T 22,930T	15 48 19 3 6	35 15 33 37 36	50 37 48 60 58	65 81 67 62 63	13 15 18 17 16	26 17 16 21 21	26 5 15 21 22	14 13 24 26 24	21 36 31 34 31	23.0 10.8 23.8 14.1 15.5	25.3 23.0 22.5 14.0 15.8

Note: The percentage shares of agriculture, industry and services do not necessarily add to 100 because of rounding. a. Includes public and private investment. b. Data refer to a year other than that specified in the column heading. c. GDP and its components are at purchaser values. Source: Columns 1-8 and 10: World Bank 1995f; columns 9, 11 and 12: calculated on the basis of data from World Bank 1995f.

25 Trends in economic performance

		GNP (US\$	GNP annual growth rate	Gf per c ann growt (%	apita iual h rate	annua of inf	rage al rate lation %)	Exports as % of GDP (% annual	Tax revenue as % of GNP (% annual	bu surplu	erall dget s/deficit of GNP)
HDI	rank	billions) 1993	(%) 1980-93	1965-80	1980-93	1980-93	1993	growth rate) 1980-93	growth rate) 1980-92	1980	1993
High	human development	1,560T	4.4	4.1	2.5	78.6	9.7	3.5	-0.3	0.9	- 10
22 23 25 26 29	Hong Kong Cyprus Barbados Bahamas Korea, Rep. of	110.3 7.5 1.6 3.1 337.9	5.7 -0.1 2.3 8.7	6.2 3.5 1.0 7.3	5.4 4.9 0.5 1.4 8.2	7.9 5.2 4.3 4.2 6.3	8.8 2.9 1.9 -1.8 4.6	7.0 1.4 2.3	0.2	-2.3	0.6
30 31 32 33 34	Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Singapore	245.5 7.0 12.5 43.8 56.2	1.0 3.3 -0.4 4.6 7.6	1.7 3.3 2.5 (.) 8.3	-0.5 1.1 -0.1 3.6 6.1	374,3 22,1 66,7 20,1 2,5	7.2 11.6 45.2 12.1 4.0	2.5 4.3 4.1 2.2 2.9	1.4 2.2 -1.8 0.3	-2.6 -7.8 5.6 2.2	-0.2 0.6 2.1 12.6
36 38 39 40 42	Brunei Darussalam Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda United Arab Emirates	4.9 4.3 0.4 38.7	-0.8 0.8 5.4 0.2	3.1 -1.4 0.6	-2.8 -2.9 5.2 -4.4	-5.1 4.8 -0.3 5.9	9.9 -1.1 1.5	9.7		7.6	-0.2
43 44 45 47 48	Panama Venezuela Saint Kitts and Nevis Fiji Mexico	6.6 59.3 0.2 1.7 335.8	2.5 1.6 4.7 1.8 1.9	2.8 2.3 4.0 4.2 3.6	-0.7 -0.7 5.4 0.5 -0.5	2.1 23.9 6.3 5.6 57.9	3.5 32.4 2.3 8.8 9.7	0.5 1.0 4.4	0.6 -2.1 -0.8	-5.7 -3.1	4.4 -3.0
49 50 51 52 53 54	Colombia Qatar Kuwait Thailand Malaysia Mauritius	49.5 7.9 35.7 122.7 59.9 3.3	3.2 -1.4 -0.1 7.9 6.4 5.9	3.7 0.6 4.4 4.7 3.7	1.5 -7.2 -4.3 6.4 3.5 5.5	24.9 4.3 2.2 8.8	21.9 3.4 1.8 9.0	2.8 5.4 4.2 1.6	1.7 -0.9 1.2	-1.8 50.2 -4.9 -6.2 -10.4	-26.1 2.1 1.7
	ium human development Excluding China	1,810T 1,230T	4.9 3.0	3.9 3.7	5.5 1.4	114.6 140.3	539.3 673.9	3.7 3.9	-0.2	-5.2	-2.2
58 59 60 63	Brazil Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Seychelles Saudi Arabia	458.0 0.5 13.2	1.6 3.9	6.3 0.6 4.6 0.6	0.3 3.4 -3.6	0.2 3.2 -2.1	2,207.9 -0.1	5.7	-1.3	-2.6	-1.0
64 65 66 67 69 70	Ecuador Dominica Iran, Islamic Rep. of Belize Algeria Jordan	0.2	2.6 4.6 3.3 4.9 2.0	-0.8 2.9 3.4 4.2 5.8	4.6 2.9 -0.8	40.4 5.5 17.1 3.4 13.2	38.4 1.6 37.5 5.2 13.9 4.9	3.3 6.8 4.5 1.2	2.7	-1.5 -13.7	-1.4 -0.5
71 73 75 76 77	Botswana Saint Vincent Suriname Saint Lucia	3.9 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.2	9.5 6.0 8.7	9.9 0.2 5.5 2.7 0.1	6.2 5.0 -2.0 4.4 3.8	12.3 4.6 11.8 3.5 4.6	9.0 -0.7 136.3 0 1.6	245 245 249) 249	1,1	-0.2	11.2
	Tunisia Cuba Oman Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Turkey	15.0 10.6 177.1	3.8 9.3 5.5	4.7 0.6 9.0 0.6 3.6	1.2 3.4 2.4	7.1 -2.3 53.5	4.5 -7.1 67.7	0.9	-0.4 -3.0 0.4	-2.9 0.5 -3.8	-2.6 -17.4 -7.0
85 86 87 88 89	Paraguay Jamaica Dominican Rep. Samoa (Western) Sri Lanka	7.1 3.5 9.3 0.2 10.7	2.6 1.4 3.0 4.6	4.1 -0.1 3.8 2.8	-0.7 -0.3 0.7 2.7	25.0 22.4 25.0 11.2 11.1	18.7 34.6 4.2 8.2	5.4 1.0 1.8	-0.5 (.) -0.5	0.3 -17.1 -2.7 -18.4	-6,4
91 92 95 97	Peru Syrian Arab Rep. Philippines Lebanon South Africa	34.0 55.2 118.2	0.1	0.8 5.1 3.2 0.6 3.2	-2.7 -0.6 -0.2	316.1 15.5 13.6 14.7	46.5 6.8 11.3	0.1	-4.9 5.5 1.6 2.0	-2.5 -1.4 -2.5	-1.8 -1.5 -4.4
102 103 106 107	Indonesia Guyana Egypt Maldives China	140.2 0.4 37.2 0.2 577.4	6.0 -1.8 4.6 9.6	5.2 0.7 2.8 1.8 4.1	4.2 -3.0 2.8 7.2 8.2	8.5 34.5 13.6 10.0 7.0	19.3 16.8 10.4 14.9 12.3	-1.9 0.1 0.5 2.9	-1.2	-2.3 -12.5	0.7 -4.1 -2.3
111 112	Iraq Swaziland Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia	1.0 5.4 11.0 0.7	4.1 1.3 1.5 2.3	0.6 3.7 1.7 3.0 0.6	2.3 -0.7 -1.2 0.2	13.3 187.1 16.8 13.8	11.7 7.6 13.8 332.4	2.9 -2.3 -6.6	** ** **	-3.9 	-2.1 -2.0

Developing countries

	GNP (US\$	GNP annual growth rate	ann	apita nual h rate	Avera annual of infla (%)	rate	Exports as % of GDP (% annual	Tax revenue as % of GNP (% annual	buc surplus	erall dget s/deficit of GNP)
HDI rank	billions) 1993	(%) 1980-93	1965-80	1980-93	1980-93	1993	growth rate) 1980-93	growth rate) 1980-92	1980	1993
114 Honduras 115 El Salvador 116 Namibia 117 Nicaragua 118 Solomon Islands	3.2 7.3 2.8 1.4 0.3	2.7 1.3 1.7 -2.1 6.6	1.1 1.5 0.6 -0.7 5.0	-0.3 0.2 0.7 -5.7 2.6	8.2 17.0 11.9 664.6 12.1	8.9 14.1 7.4 20.2	-1.8 -0.4 1.7	-1.7 -1.6	-5.9 -7.3	-0.8 -4.8 0.5
119 Vanuatu 120 Gabon 121 Viet Nam 122 Cape Verde 123 Morocco	0.2 5.0 12.1 0.3 26.6	0.1 4.9 2.9	5.6 0.6 2.7	0.5 -1.6 3.0 1.2	5.3 1.5 8.7 6.6	0.5 1.0 14.3 5.9 3.8	2.3 -1.1 1.5	-1.3 1.0	6.8 -10.0	-1.8
 124 Zimbabwe 125 Congo 126 Papua New Guinea 	5.6 2.4 4.9	3.1 4.0 3.7	1.7 2.7 0.6	-0.3 -0.3 0.6	14.4 -0.6 4.8	36.2 -4.3 3.2	0.6 1.4 2.7	3.0 -0.1	-11.1 -5.8 -2.0	-7.0 -6.4
Low human development Excluding India	470T 200T	4.4 3.2	1.3 1.1	2.1 0.8	11.4 15.2	11.1 15.5	2.0 1.2	142		44 24
127 Cameroon 128 Kenya 129 Ghana 130 Lesotho 131 Equatorial Guinea	10.3 6.6 7.0 1.3 0.2	1.1 2.7 2.7	2.4 3.1 -0.8 6.8	-2.2 0.3 0.1 -0.5 1.2	4.0 9.9 37.0 13.8 -0.6	1.1 24.5 25.2 10.6 -1.5	4.7 2.5 0.9 -1.0	-1.9 1.4 4.1	0.5 -4.6 -4.2 -3.7	-2.0 -3.8 -2.5 -0.3
132 São Tomé and Principe133 Myanmar134 Pakistan135 India136 Zambia	(.) 54.0 263.0 3.3	-2.6 2.1 6.1 5.0 1.0	3.3 1.6 1.8 1.5 -1.2	-3.6 3.1 3.0 -3.1	24.0 16.5 7.4 8.7 58.9	20.1 29.2 8.6 8.1 180.0	1.4 4.0 3.5 2.4 -0.4	-4.1 -0.8 1.1	1.2 -5.8 -6.5 -20.0	-3.1 -7.4 -4.8
137 Nigeria138 Lao People's Dem. Rep.139 Comoros140 Togo141 Zaire	29.0 1.3 0.3 1.4	1.8 2.5 -0.5	4.2 0.6 0.6 1.7 -1.3	-0.1 -0.4 -2,1	20.6 5.2 3.7 	24.9 6.3 1.4 -2.8	-3.2 9.5 -3.3 		-2.0	**
142 Yemen143 Bangladesh144 Tanzania, U. Rep. of145 Haiti146 Sudan	3.7 25.6 2.5 1.9	4.5 2.7 -1.9	5.1 -0.3 0.8 0.9 0.8	2.1 0.1	8.6 24.3 9.5 42.8	0.2 22.5 19.6	3.9 -0.5		2.5 -8.4	-20.6
147 Côte d'Ivoire148 Central African Rep.149 Mauritania150 Madagascar151 Nepal	8.4 1.3 1.1 3.0 4.0	-1.0 0.3 1.8 -0.1 4.6	2.8 0.8 -0.1 -0.4 (.)	-4.6 -1.6 -0.8 -2.6 2.0	1.5 4.2 8.2 16.1 11.5	-0.4 1.5 4.9 13.0 10.3	0.3 -3.5 0.6 -1.4	1.1 -4.7 1.7	-11.4 -3.5 -3.0	-5.9 -6.3
152 Rwanda 153 Senegal 154 Benin 155 Uganda 156 Cambodia	1.6 5.7 2.2 3.4	1.4 2.3 3.0	1.6 -0.5 -0.3 -2.2 0.6	-1.2 -0.4	3.4 4.9 1.4	9.7 0.4 1.6 30.7 108.3	0.4 0.4 -4.6 	0.8	-1.7 0.9 -3.1	-9.1
157 Malawi 158 Liberia 159 Bhutan 160 Guinea 161 Guinea-Bissau	2.1 0.3 3.2 0.2	2.9 7.6 4.6	3.2 0.5 0.6 1.3 -2.7	-1.2 2.8	15.5 8.1 58.7	21.8 9.7 8.1 53.5	-1.7 -10.3	-2.6	-17.3	 -3.3
162 Gambia 163 Chad 164 Djibouti 165 Angola 166 Burundi	0.4 1.3 0.4	4.0 5.0 3.6	2.3 -1.9 0.6 2.4	-0.2 3.2 0.9	16.2 0.7 3.6 4.6	-1.5 0.6 3.0 7.7	-0.3 -4.6 1.3	10 11 11	-4.7	-7.5
167 Mozambique168 Ethiopia169 Afghanistan	1.4 8.8	-0.2	0.6 0.4 0.6	-1.5	42.3	46.5 13.3	-2.6		24 15 14	44 44 44
170 Burkina Faso 171 Mali	2.9 2.7	3.4 1.5	1.7 2.1	0.8 -1.0	3.3 4.4	2.0 3.0	-1.5 3.6	**	0.3 -4.7	8-6
172 Somalia 173 Sierra Leone 174 Niger	0.7 2.3	0.6 -1.4	-0.1 0.7 -2.5	-1.5 -4.1	49.7 61.6 1.3	32.9 -0.1	-6.6 -4.1	-1.3	-13.2 -4.8	-5.0
All developing countries Least developed countries Sub-Saharan Africa Industrial countries World	3,840T 80T 250T 19,740T 23,580T	4.6 2.7 1.5 2.4 2.8	2.9 0.4 1.5 3.1 3.0	3.9 0.5 -0.6 1.2 3.3	86.0 19.8 13.9 6.3 18.5	289.3 18.8 15.1 70.6 103.3	3.3 1.4 0.3 2.1 2.3			 -4.4

Source: Column 1: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995d and UN 1995e; columns 2-6: World Bank 1995e; columns 7 and 8: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f; columns 9 and 10: World Bank 1995f.

Profile of human development

		Life	Maternal mortality rate	Popu-	scientists and	Combined first-, second- and third- level gross enrolment	ful equ g enro	rtiary I-time iivalent gross olment atio	Daily	Talavisions	Real	GNP
HDI ra	ank	expectancy at birth (years) 1993	(per 100,000 live births) 1993	lation per doctor 1993	(per 1,000 people) 1988-92	ratio (%) 1993	Total (%) 1991	Female (%) 1991	(copies per 100 people) 1992	(per 100 people) 1992	 GDP per capita (PPPS) 17,182 20,950 24,680 20,660 17,340 20,370 16,320 19,140 18,640 17,900 13,660 18,530 19,540 15,120 26,200 18,840 15,120 26,390 11,570 10,720 8,430° 5,620° 5,010 4,702° 4,760° 3,150 4,244° 4,320° 3,610° 3,710 2,040 2,510 2,320 1,750 2,320 1,750 1,380 2,703 15,211 5,545 24,305 4,192 17,574 13,877 	per capita (US\$) 1993
High I	numan development	75.3	22	342	5	84	45	46	30	55	17,182	18,874
2 3 4	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	77.5 76.1 79.6 77.5 77.0	6 12 18 12 6	446 398 309	3 7 4 ^b 5 ^h	100* 96 78 89 90	66 66 39 35 62	71 72 41 33 67	22 24 58 30 61	64 82 61 49 42	24,680 20,660 17,340	19,970 24,740 31,490 20,950 25,970
7 8 9	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	75.8 77.0 78.2 78.3 77.7	11 15 0 7 7	405 333 395 262	4 ^b 5 5 6 ^b 1	96 88 82 80 87	58 39 47 31	67 42 55 33	52 21 52 51 11	51 41 32 47 40	19,140 18,640 17,900	19,300 22,490 24,950 24,740 13,590
12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	77.8 76.5 76.3 75.6 78.1	9 10 10 25 6	298 521 585	4 ^b 2 2 ^d 4	79 85 85 89 75	40 32 29 39 28	43 35 27 38 20	26 31 40 30 39	48 45 48 44 41	19,540 19,115 16,720 22,720	17,500 21,650 23,510 12,600 35,760
17 18 19 20	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	76.3 75.3 76.1 75.4 77.6	9 9 22 10 12	360 633 211	5 ^b 2 2	83 87 79 84 70	26 32 22	26 34 24 24 19	38 33 19 11	44 54 56 30 42	20,200 18,840 15,120 18,160	18,060 26,730 23,560 13,000 19,840
24 27 28	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	77.7 76.6 75.8 76.2 74.7	10 7 0 0 15	313	(.) 1	78 76 57 76 79	20	24	14 24 38 15 5	20 27 27 74 19	15,130 25,390 11,570	7,390 13,920 37,320 7,970 9,130
41 9 46 1 55 1 56 1	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	71.3 70.9 69.0 69.0 71.1 67.4	15 40 19 75	312 467	3 2 2 7	67 71 67 72 76 79	12 16	12 16	28 19 16	41 45 30 37	5,620° 6,059° 5,010 4,702°	2,710 1,950 3,350 2,010 2,260 2,340
Mediu	ım human development	69.8	65	351	(188)	71		144	23	21	3,150	1,511
62 68 72	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	69.7 71.2 69.2 69.7 69.9	37 27 41 80 130	282 315 552	4 5 2	79 65 78 65 62	44 54 55 55	200 200 200 200 200	16 32	26 35 20	3,610° 3,710	2,870 1,140 3,080 1,560 1,140
81 90 93 /	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia	69.3 70.3 65.1 72.8	50 36 55 50	259		76 72 78		** ** **	22	38	2,040	2,210 1,320 660
96 98 99 101 104	Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan	69.4 70.7 67.6 69.2 72.9 72.0 70.4	55 22 60 110 33 65 130	730	2	73 76 70 68 59 69			5	4 9	2,190 2,370° 2,320 1,750	970 730 1,060 850 580 340 470
All dev	veloping countries rial countries	63.3 74.5 64.8	384 28 307	5,767 344 4,968	1 5 	55 82 60	144 144	000 042 042	5 29 11	6 53 16	2,703 15,211	970 16,394 4,570
Easter Weste OECD Europ	America n Europe and CIS rn and Southern Europe ean Union c countries	76.2 69.0 76.9 75.8 76.8 76.9	11 62 14 33 13 8	446 378 309 496 301 373	 3 3 3 5	96 74 82 81 82 87	66 30 46 30 49	72 30 47 30 55	24 21 24 27 25 49	80 33 45 53 45 45	4,192 17,554 18,152	24,261 1,992 20,551 20,169 19,815 24,233

a. Capped at 100. b. Includes auxiliary personnel. c. Preliminary results of the European Comparison Programme, conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the OECD, Eurostat and the Austrian Statistical Office. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1996. d. Provisional or estimated data. e. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. Source: Column 1: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995e; column 2: WHO and UNICEE 1996; column 3: calculated on the basis of estimates from WHO 1994 and UN 1995e; column 4: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1994b and UN 1995e; column 5: UNESCO 1995d; columns 6 and 7: UNESCO 1993b; columns 8 and 9: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1994b; column 10: calculated on the basis of estimates from WHO 1994 and UN 1995e; column 5: UNESCO 1995d; column 11: World Bank 1995f.



Profile of human distress

Industrial countries

	Upomolou	unemp	uth loyment e (%)	Adults with less than upper- secondary	Ratio of income of highest 20% of	Aver	al rate	Injuries and death from road accidents
	Unemploy- ment rate (%)	Male (age 15-24)	Female (age 15-24)	education (as % of age 15-64)	households to lowest 20%	of infl (%	6)	(per 100,000 people)
HDI rank	1993	1991-93	1991-93	1991	1981-91	1980-93	1993	1990-93
ligh human development	7.4	16.4	17.2	34		5.7	33.6	901
1 Canada	11.2	20.2	14.9	24	7.1	3.9	1.1	2 267
2 USA 3 Japan	6.8 2.5	14.3	12.2	17	8.9 4.3	3.8	2.0	2,367
3 Japan 4 Netherlands	6.5	9.7	9.7	44	4.5	1.7	1.6	73
5 Norway	6.0	12.7	10.4	21	5.9	4.6	1.0	201
6 Finland	17.9	31.4	29.3	40	6.0	5.8	2.3	122
7 France	11.7	21.5	28.4	49	7.5	5.1	2.2	239
8 Iceland	5.3	(100)	200	64 64	4.0	25.4	2.9	381
9 Sweden	8.2	21.6	14.9	33	4.6	6,9	2.6	159
10 Spain	22.7	39.9	47.4	78	4.4	8.4	4.4	202
11 Australia	10.9	20.2	16.8	44	9.6	6.1	1.1	14
12 Belgium	12.0	17.4	19.6	57	4.6	4.0	4.4	547
13 Austria	4.2	4.0	3.0	33		3.6	3.6	531
14 New Zealand	9.5	18.4	15.9	10	8.8	8.5	0.9	274
15 Switzerland	4.5	6.9	6.7	19	8.6	3.8	2.1	324
16 United Kingdom	10.2	20.8	13.2	35	9.6	5.6	3.4	395
17 Denmark	12.4	14.4	14.7	39 18	7.1	4.6	1.2 3.9	165 477
18 Germany 19 Ireland	8.9 15.6	8.1 27.0	8.3 23.0	60	5.8	4.8	3.9	181
20 Italy	10.3	26.7	35.6	72	6.0	8.8	4.4	299
	9.7	20.1*	38.8ª		10.002	17.3	12.6	214
21 Greece 24 Israel	10.0	21.0	25.0	**	6.6	70.4	11.0	214
27 Luxembourg	2.1	5.0	3.8		0.0	5.0	6.2	1,180
28 Malta	4.5	142				2.3	3.3	2,868
35 Portugal	5.6	9.8	14.9	93		16.4	7.4	517
37 Czech Rep.	3.5			27	14		15.6	244
41 Slovakia	12.7						15.2	
46 Hungary	12.1	2.81			3.2	12.8	21.5	191
55 Latvia	5.8	25.05	22.01	81 -	2.0	23.8	74.2	130
56 Poland 57 Russian Federation	16.4 1.1 ^b	25.0ª	32.0ª	24	3.9 11.4	69.3 35.4	31.1 873.5	128 121
	6.2					30.5	1,824.0	80
Medium human development		336	4.5	30.	×4			100 M
61 Belarus	1.4 ^b	10	See	44	47	30.9	1,428.7	72
62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia	16.4 ^b 1.9 ^b	1.00		34) 	4.7	15.9 29.8	57.5 81.2	83 85
72 Kazakhstan	1.0 ^b	-		**		35.2	1,255.5	93
74 Romania	10.6 ^b	**			**	22.4	225.9	
80 Ukraine						37.2	3,691.2	79
81 Lithuania	1.6 ^b		12			35.2	342.7	116
90 Turkmenistan						16.5	10	
93 Armenia	6.2 ^b	1.0	- 14		**	26.9	1,480.7	26
94 Uzbekistan	199	14	**	12	**	24.5	914.5	96
96 Azerbaijan	1444	64) (4)	(24)	02	34	28.2	714.5	
98 Moldova, Rep. of	0.7 ^b	44	1947	60	1.1	32.4	10	55
99 Kyrgyzstan	0.2 ^b	6.0	++?	4.6	22.8	28.6	792.2	337
101 Georgia 104 Albania	2.0 ^b 19.5 ^b		122		+4	40.7	105.7	
105 Tajikistan						26.0	1,251.7	**
	- 0				÷1			
All developing countries	7 4	16.4	17.2	1773	+1	86.0	289.3	360 814
ndustrial countries World	7.4	16.4			**	6.3 18.5	70.6	787
10.311071	7.0			10	77 F	12000	0.000010.0	0.237
North America	7.3	14.9	12.5	18	300	3.8 35.5	1.9	2,367
Eastern Europe and CIS Western and Southern Europe	11.0	20.3	25.0	46	38.0	35.5 5.4	3.4	115 321
OECD	8.2	15.9	16.4	34		5.0	2.8	1,084
European Union	11.1	20.7	23.7	47		5.5	3.5	331
Nordic countries	10.8	20.1	16.9	34	442	5.9	1.9	162

a. ILO 1995e. b. Official unemployment rate. Registered unemployment only. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1995b. Source: Columns 1, 2 and 3: OECD 1995d; column 4: UNDP 1994a; column 5: calculated on the basis of data from World Bank 1994c; column 6: World Bank 1995f; column 7: calcu-lated on the basis of data from World Bank 1995e; column 8: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1995a.

Violence and crime

Industrial countries

		(per 1	oners 00,000 ople)	Homicid in selected (per 100,000)	cities	Drug crimes (per 100,000	Total number of reported adult rapes		cides)00 people)
HDI r	ank	1987	1993	City	1990	people) 1980-86	(thousands) 1986	Male 1989-93	Female 1989-93
High	human development		-	1.00			129.1	28	8
1 2 3 4	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	 37 46	45 51 60	Toronto Tokyo Amsterdam Oslo	6.1 1.6 38.0 9.3	225 234 31 38 116	20.5 90.4 1.8 1.2 0.3	21 20 22 14 21	6 5 11 7 8
7 8 9	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	89 28 51 70	62 86 39 66 115	Helsinki Stockholm Madrid	15.3 15.9 2.7		0.3 2.9 1,0 1.5	45 30 22 11	11 11 10 4
12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	67 98 	72 91 81	 Vienna 	5.0 	403 40 77 129	2.3 0.5 0.5 0.4	21 32 24 30	5 11 6 11
17 18 19	United Kingdom Denmark Germany ^a Ireland Italy	96 62 85 55 61	92 71 81 60 89	London Copenhagen West Berlin	2.5 10.5 6.8	176 6	0.6 (.) 0.7	29 23 17 12	16 9 3 4
24 27 28	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	41 96 15 84	68 108 111	Jerusalem Lisbon	3.1 (.)	25 13	0.6 0.4 (.) 0.2	6 11 12	2 4 4
41 46 55 56	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation		165 136 132 160	Budapest Riga	2.7 12.1	975 983 983 985 985 985	1.1 1.9	28 55 72 25 66	10 18 17 5 13
Media	um human development	22	548	142		322	0.7	31	8
62 68 72	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111	99 200			52 52 77 77	0.7	49 25 65 38	10 10 15 9
81 90 93	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	9 97 92 14 14	275	Kiev	4.0 	88.) 94) 98) 98)	** ** ** **	38 74 9	9 14 1 3
98 99 101 104	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan		12) 12) 14) 14) 14)			44 14 14 14 14 14		 2 5	 1 2
All de	veloping countries trial countries	44 44 44		- 28 - 28 - 44		201 201 201 201 201	129.8	29	8
Easter Weste OECD Europ	America in Europe and CIS irn and Southern Europe lean Union c countries	73 80 77 53	85 79 87 65	10 10 10 10 10 10	7.7 13.3	233	110.9 10.2 125.7 9.5 2.2	20 47 20 21 20 28	5 10 8 7 7 11

a. Data refer to the former Federal Republic of Germany. Source: Columns 1 and 2: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1995b; column 4: UNCSDHA 1995; column 5: UNDP 1994a; column 6: UN 1994b and UNCSDHA 1995; columns 7 and 8: WHO 1994.

Health profile

Industrial countries

		٨	dults			Likelihood after ag		g		People with disabilitie	Health	Public expendi- ture on	Private expendi- ture on	То	tal
		who	smoke	Alcohol consumption per capita		t disease 000 people)		ncer 00 people)	cases (per 100,000	(as % of total	paid by public insurance	health (as % of total public	(as % of total health	expen	diture ealth
HDI	rank	Male 1986-94	Female 1986-94	(litres)	Male 1990-93	Female 1990-93	Male 1990-93	Female 1990-93	people)* 1994	lation) 1985-92	(%) 1991	expenditure) 1989-91		1960	1991
High	human development	44	23	8.1	314	306	230	151	9.5	122	77	16.3	34.4	3.8	6.0
1 2 3 4 5	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	31 ^b 30 66 41 ^b 42 ^b	28 ^b 24 14 33 ^b 32 ^b	7.1 7.0 6.3 8.2 4.1	213 279 340	264 285 314	247 291 222	157 191 160	4.6 22.7 0.2 3.0 1.7	15.5 12.0 2.3 11.5	82 61 87 71	14.6 14.8 30.7 10.4 13.0	27.8 56.1 28.0 26.9 3.4	5.3 5.3 3.0 4.0 3.2	9.9 13.3 6.8 8.7 8.4
6 7 8 9 10	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	35 ^b 49 ^b 26 58	17 ^b 26 ^b 30 27	7.4 11.9 3.9 5.5 10.4	366 220 388 235	351 244 357 277	212 289 209 239	151 179 165 139	0.9 9.3 1.1 2.2 16.0	17.0 12.0 15.0	82 75 93 94 90	14.7 13.2 19.3 11.1 11.8	19.1 26.1 13.0 22.0 17.8	3.8 4.3 3.4 4.7 1.6	8.9 9.1 8.3 8.8 6.5
11 12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	37 ^b 35 33 ^b 35 ^b 46 ^b	30 ^b 21 22 ^b 29 ^b 29	7.7 9.4 10.3 7.8 10.7	342 379 347 322	370 403 337 347	252 247 248 281	174 181 183 189	4.6 2.3 2.1 1.2 8.0	15.6 22.7 13.0	70 86 84 90 91	15.4 12.2 11.2 15.7	32.2 11.1 32.9 21.1 31.7	4.8 3.4 4.4 4.2 3.3	8.6 8.1 8.5 7.7 8.0
16 17 18 19 20	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	36 49 39 ^b 46 ^b	32 38 32 ^b 18 ^b	7.4 9.9 10.9 7.4 8.4	320 350 349 257	305 359 324 280	252 243 235 263	202 184 186 174	2.7 4.5 2.6 1.5 9.3	14.2 12.0 8.4 3.5 2.7	93 85 92 90 75	12.2 9.0 12.3 12.0 14.8	16.7 18.5 28.2 24.2 22.5	3.9 3.6 4.9 3.8 3.6	6.6 7.0 9.1 8.0 8.3
21 24 27 28	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta	54 ^b 38	13 ^b 25	8.6 0.9 12.3	294 340 448	311 324 502	219 183 180	122 156 109	1.8 0.6 3.5 1.4	64 14 12	85 91	12.2 10.3	23.0 8.6	2.6	4.8 4.2 6.6
35	Portugal	37 ^b	10 ^b	11.6	182	187	181	124	5,1	11.0		9.8	38.3	2.3	6.2
37 41 46 55 56 57	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	50 63 ^b	25 29 ^b	10.5 7.1	331 283 398 240 365	313 283 393 201 359	233 221 165 188 164	171 168 99 124 97	0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 (.)	 15.7 9.9		21 22 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24	17. 18. 18. 18.	2.9 2.6 3.5	5.9 6.0 5.1 3.0
Med	ium human developm	ient		aa .	377	343	107	76	144				144		4.5
61 62 68 72 74	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	 48 ^b	 13 ^b	7.8	394 349 422	399 351 453 	151 119 	82 82 	(.) 0.1 0.1 (.) 2.0	0.4				2.0	3.2 5.4 4.4 3.9
80 81 90 93 94	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	245 245 245 246 246	** ** **	740) 940) 940) 940)	304 475 508	297 	133 105 89	75 69 61	00000	5 5 8 8 8	** : 5* : 6* : 60 :	65 65 63 63 63	14 14 14 14	18. 19. 19. 19.	3.3 3.6 5.0 4.2 5.9
	Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan	94 14 14 14 14 14	14 14 14 14		 364 304 364	404 307 378	163 102 103	103 51 60	(.) (.) (.) (.) 0.1 (.)	*****	54. 54 54 52 52 52				4.3 3.9 5.0 4.5 4.0 6.0
All d	leveloping countries istrial countries	44 	23	8.0	326	310	208	142	6.7 9.2				100 100 100	3.6	5.6
East Wes	th America ern Europe and CIS tern and Southern	30 	24	7.0	353	333	147	99	20.9	90 40	63 	14.8	53.2	5.3	11.6 4.8
OEC	rope D opean Union dic countries	46 43 44 36	24 23 25 29	10.0 8.1 9.6 6.6	315 312 312 354	304 296 303 337	237 239 235 223	171 168 171 169	6.7 9.2 6.2 2.3	**	83 77 85 88	12.7 16.3 12.5 11.8	24.4 34.4 23.3 17.1	3.7 3.9 3.8 3.8	7.7 8.0 7.5 8.3

a. The number of reported AIDS cases in adults and children. b. Data refer to years before 1986. Source: Columns 1 and 2: UN 1994b; column 3: ARF 1994; columns 4-7: WHO 1994; column 8: WHO 1996; column 9: UN 1993a; columns 10-14: World Bank 1993c.

30 Education profile

		Full-time students per 100 people	Secondary full-time net enrolment ratio (%)	Upper- secondary technical enrolment (as % of total upper	Tertiary net enrolment ratio (as % of	Tertiary natural and applied science enrolment (as % of total tertiary)		expenditure per tertiary	Public expenditure on education (as % of GNP)	expen on edu	tal iditure ucation of GDP)
HDI	rank	(age 5-29) 1992	1992	secondary) 1992	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992	1960	1991
High	human development	53	85	51	28	21	22.0	9,734	5.3	4.4	5.9
1	Canada	58	96	44	24 ^b	16	27.9	12,350	7.6	4.6	7.4
23	USA Japan	54 56	91 95	28	39	17 22	24.1	11,880 11,850	5.3 4.7	5.3 4.9	7.0 5.0
4	Netherlands	54	97	70	20	24	31.9	8,720	5.9	4.9	5.8
5	Norway	55	93	60	20 ^c	20	16.9	8,720	8.4	4.6	7.6
б	Finland	61	95	54	23°	38	27.6	8,650	7.3	4.9	6.6
7	France	58	92	54	29	19	14.1	6,020	5.7	3,6	6.0
8	Iceland	E0			136	16	14.9	7 1 2 0	5.8 8.3	5.9	6.0 6.5
9	Sweden Spain	50 57	89 76	41	13 ^c 23	29 26	15.9 16.0	7,120 3,770	4.6	1.1	5.6
	NOT CONTRACT	57						1.100 B. 1.11			
11 12	Australia Belgium	54	79 97	25 59	42 31	26 24	29.5 16.4	6,600 6,850	5.5 5.2	4.8	5.5 5.4
13	Austria	54	97	76	3.1	29	18.7	5,820	5.8	2.9	5.4
14	New Zealand	56	88	19	26	20	36.7	6,080	7.1	2.2	5.8
15	Switzerland	49	85	73	13°	32	19.4	12,900	5.2	3.3	5.4
16	United Kingdom	52	75	58	18	28	20.7	15,060	5.2	3.4	5.3
17	Denmark	55	92	56	20 ^c	27	18.4	6,710	7.4	4.0	6.1
18	Germany	50	95 ^d	80	17 ^{b.c}	39	20.0	6,550	c 2	2.4	5.4
19 20	Ireland Italy	56 50	88	67		31 28	20.9	7,270 5,850	6.2 5.4	3.0	5.9 4.1
	National States and St	0.00					10.5			139175	
21 24	Greece Israel	50	88	2440	24	37 27	19.5 17.3	0.64	3.1 5.8	2.0	3.0 6.0
27	Luxembourg			184		21	3.3		4.1	(64) (44)	5.8
28	Malta					13	17.9		4.6	44	4.4
35	Portugal	**	44			31	15.5	14	5.0	1.8	5.5
37	Czech Rep.	51	87	54		42	13.0	3,590	4.6		
41	Slovakia			122		47	15.0		6.6		
46	Hungary	49	75	75	10	29	15.3	9,690	7.0	2.44	6.7
55 56	Latvia Poland	53	85	75	134	46 28	16.9	1.93	6.7 5.6	3.8	4.9
57	Russian Federation	45	60	44	15	51	10.9	0.00	4.0	5,0	4.5
-1.	ium human development			1.1010		47	12.0		6,7		
	CANADA CONTRACTOR OF	<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>		14				199		(11)	
61	Belarus	**	144			40 37	12.2 13.7		6.6 5.9	14.4	5.4
62 68	Bulgaria Estonia	12 22	**			36	15.9		5.8		.5.4
72	Kazakhstan					26	. 5.5	14	7.7		
74	Romania					57	9.6		3.6	2.9	3.1
80	Ukraine					52	12.6		7.8		++
81	Lithuania		282	115		4.5	14.9	25	5.5	1.400	**
	Turkmenistan	**	98	365		C etc.		28	7.9	0.00	
	Armenia	13		- 104		0.09	244		7.3	266	10
94	Uzbekistan	**	1.0				544	- 16			344
96	Azerbaijan Maldaua Pan of			10	**	51	10.4		7.7	246	
98 99	Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan	100	-4.8-	-	**		11.1		6.5 6.9	200	344
101	Georgia	**		24		**		1.4	0.5	1.66	
104	Albania		221			30	14			1.22	++
105	Tajikistan		44.1	-		4.4	1/2			122	
	eveloping countries				**	30	18.0		3.9		
Indu	strial countries				**	21	22.0		5.4	4.4	5.9
Wor	d	22	17.21			25	21.0		5.1	**	
	h America		25	: 46		17	24.0	11,927	5.5	5.2	7.0
Easte	ern Europe and CIS	**	5845-			38	14.0		5.2		- 12
	tern and Southern Europe	22	(++)	- (+)		26	18.0	6,296	5.7	3.4	5.4
	D										
OEC	D pean Union	**	-	**	÷+	21 26	22.0	9,853 7,589	5.4 5.6	4.4	5.4

Communication profile

Industrial countries

HDI rank	Radios (per 1,000 people) 1992	Televisions (per 1,000 people) 1992	Annual museum visits (per person) 1981-91	Registered public library users (thousands) 1986-92	Book titles published (per 100,000 people) 1990-92	Printing and writing paper consumed (metric tons per 1,000 people) 1992	Main telephone lines (per 100 people) 1991		Mobile cellular telephone subscribers (per 100 people) 1992
High human development	1,078	547	1002010.1111	51,340T	49	64.5	41.5	1.7	2.5
	110000000	1.1.2		51,5401	49	10000	15,07(855)	6.0.6	1115 511
1 Canada 2 USA	1,030 2,118	640 815	0.9		19	84.9 86.6	58.6 55.3	1.7	3.5
3 Japan	908	614	0.6	16,038	12	75.9	45.4	4.4	1.4
4 Netherlands	907	488		425	78	72.9	47.7	2.4	1.1
5 Norway	795	424	1.4	14	95	37.9	51.5	2.8	6.5
6 Finland	997	505	0.8		163	96.0	54.4	2.1	7.0
7 France	889	408	0.2	16,497	79	54.5	51.1	1.1	0.8
8 Iceland	788	319	1.7	12	399	16.2	52.7	1.5	5.8
9 Sweden 10 Spain	877 312	469 402	1.7	4,089	114 95	54.9 36.2	68.7 34.0	3.5	7.5 0.5
AND SUCCESSION STREET		1000		4,005	35	43.3	46.4	2.3	2.8
11 Australia 12 Belgium	1,273 769	482 453	1.0	1.1	139	43.3	41.0	1.5	0.6
13 Austria	617	480	2.4	960	43	22.5	43.2	1.7	2.2
14 New Zealand	931	443	0.1		**	47.8	43.6	1.1	2.9
15 Switzerland	843	407	7.6	**	208	82.9	60.3	1.9	3.0
16 United Kingdom	1,146	435			140	56.2	44.5	1.7	2.6
17 Denmark	1,033	537	1.9	1000	157	55.7	57.7	3.3	4.1
18 Germany	885	558	7.22	881	227	62.7	42.0	1.5	1.2
19 Ireland 20 Italy	637 791	304 421	14	808 254	47	29.6 47.4	30.0 40.0	2.1	1.2
		2000							
21 Greece 24 Israel	421 471	201 271	0.3	1,737	22	20.0 25.8	41.3 34.9	0.1	0.7
27 Luxembourg	635	267	295	**	111	25.0	51.1	1.3	0.3
28 Malta	526	744		102	78	52.9	39.0	0.6	1.0
35 Portugal	229	188	0.4	381	65	27.9	27.3	0.3	0.4
37 Czech Rep.		++	12	10	347	5681		0.3	(.)
41 Slovakia	569	91S			58	100		0.3	(.)
46 Hungary	599	414	0.1	1,646	75 44	15.0	10.7 23.9	0.2	0.2
55 Latvia 56 Poland	597 435	448 295	0.6	699 6,826	24	0.1	9.3	(.)	(.)
57 Russian Federation	327	370	0.0	0,020	15	0.0	15.0	0.1	ö
Medium human development				32,820T	12		12.6	144	4
61 Belarus			0.5	2010001	16		16.3	. (.)	
62 Bulgaria	445	257	0.9	1,609	10	3.7	24.6	0.1	50 - 10
68 Estonia	449	351	100		72	0.7	21.0	0.1	0.3
72 Kazakhstan	11		~	24.1	7		11.1	.27	
74 Romania	199	196	0.1	5,183	16	1.9	10.5	(.)	2.0
80 Ukraine	44		0.4	25,800	7		15.6	(.)	177
81 Lithuania	380	375		4.9	41 10	(.)	21.6 6.3	0.1	(.)
90 Turkmenistan 93 Armenia				441	10		17.7		**
94 Uzbekistan		**					7.1	12	
96 Azerbaijan					7	14	9.0		
98 Moldova, Rep. of	25	40	**	10.	16		11.3	(.)	(.)
99 Kyrgyzstan		2000 12		-4.3-		244	7.3	10.0	
101 Georgia	4.42		22	220	12	. 7	10.3	13	85 -
104 Albania 105 Tajikistan	176	88	+1	229	11	1.4	1.3 4.8	(.)	3.0
	176	EE.	22	40.2601	E			68	
All developing countries Industrial countries	176	56 533	**	40,260T 84,160T	5 43	3.5 61.9	2.3 37.2	1.7	2.5
World	349	151		124,420T	13	14.1	9.9	1.7	40
North America	2,009	797		7445	19	86.4	55.6	2.2	4.2
Eastern Europe and CIS	2,005	131	200 100	41,990T	18	00.4	13.2	14	*+.Z
Western and Southern Europe	753	445		26,130T	84	52.9	43.7	1.2	1.5
OECD	1,098	528	0.5	42,790T	48	58.6	42.3	1.8	2.2
European Union	813	444	. 2	26,030T	92	53.1	43.4	1.2	1.6
Nordic countries	921	482	1.5		134	60.4	59.9	3.0	6.4

Source: Columns 1-4 and 6: UNESCO 1995a; column 5: calculated on the basis of estimates from UNESCO 1994b and UN 1995e; column 7: ITU 1995; columns 8 and 9: UN 1995b.

Employment

Industrial countries

		Labour force (as % of total	Percentage	of labour	force in	Future labour force replacement	Real earnings per employee annual growth rate	fo unio	oour rce nized %)	Weekly hours of work	Expenditure on labour market programmes
HDI ra	ink	population) 1990	Agriculture 1990	Industry 1990	Services 1990	ratio 1993	(%) 1980-92	1970	1990	(per person in manufacturing) 1993	
High h	uman development	49	8	32	60	96	1.4	33	26	39	1.7
1 (Canada	53	3	25	71	98	0.1	31	36	39	2.6
2 1	JSA	50	3	26	71	107	0.4	23	16	41	0.7
3 J	apan	52	7	34	59	79	1.9	35	25	38	0.4
4 1	Netherlands	46	5	26	70	85	1.7	38	26	40	3.8
5 1	Norway	50	6	25	68	95	2.3	51	56	37	2.9
6 F	inland	52	8	31	61	93	2.6	51	72	38	6.7
	rance	44	5	29	66	98		22	10	39	3.3
	celand	56	11	27	62	121		68	78		5.5
	Sweden	54	4	30	66	94	1.2	68	83	37	5.7
	Spain	41	12	33	55	85	1.2	27	11	36	3.6
	Australia	50	6	26	68	103	0.5	50	40	38	2.7
	Belgium	41	3	28	70	88	0.5	46	51	32	4.3
	Austria	46	8	38	55	84	2.0	62	46	35	1.9
	New Zealand	48	10	25	65	114	0.1		45	42	2.9
15 5	Switzerland	53	6	35	60	82	24	30	27	32	1.9
16 L	United Kingdom	50	2	29	69	96	2.5	45	39	43	2.2
17 E	Denmark	57	6	28	66	81	-0.3	60	71	32	7.0
18 0	Sermany	50	4	38	58	76		33	33	38	3.8
19 1	reland	37	14	29	57	129	2.0	53	50	40	4.3
20 I	taly	43	9	31	60	74	5.8	36	39		1.8
21 0	Greece	42	23	27	50	86	0.8	36	34	41	1.2
	srael	39	4	29	67	156	-1.6			41	
	uxembourg	43	4	27	69	80		47	50	41	1.1
	Malta	37	3	35	63	108		47	50	41	1.4
	Portugal	49	18	34	48	96	0.5	61	32	38	2.0
		1457.77					0.5	9)	52		
	Izech Rep.	53	11	45	43	96	**			40	0.3
	lovakia	51	12	33	55	117		566	2445		0.9
	Hungary	46	15	38	47	91	1.7	1442	++	36	1.9
	atvia	55	16	40	44	104		10.0	24-		
	Poland	49	27	36	37	118	-0.8	1247	14	34	2.3
57 F	Russian Federation	52	14	42	45	107		1.00			
Mediu	m human development	47	24	37	39	138					
61 E	Belarus	52	20	40	40	111			++)	++)	
62 E	Bulgaria	51	13	48	38	95	**	10.00	3.40	++	0.7
68 E	stonia	54	14	41	44	105	**		2940	34	
	Gazakhstan	47	22	32	46	154				34	
74 F	Romania	46	24	47	29	106	24		1845	8	10
80 L	Jkraine	50	20	40	40	102		- 92	5565		-
	ithuania	52	18	41	41	109	2	Carlo -	1442		
	urkmenistan	41	37	23	40	223			122		
	Armenia	48	18	43	39	153			144		62
	Jzbekistan	39	35	25	40	229					
DC /	hand all an	42	24	20	40	100				100	
96 A	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of	42 49	31 33	29 30	40 37	166 136	**	122	11	28	50 - C
		41			41		**	2840		20	22
	Kyrgyzstan Georgia	49	32 26	27 31	41	207 120		1.0	2860	0.0	10 A
	Albania	49	55	23	22	160	85		(44)		23
	ajikistan	36	41	23	36	258	**	10	++	**	**
							200	++-	100	84-	24
	eloping countries	47	61	16	23	181	**			(**)	
	rial countries	49	10	33	57	102	**	33	26	(22)	1.7
World		47	49	20	31	163	**	++	10	.443	
North	America	51	3	26	71	106	0.4	24	18	41	0.9
Eastern	n Europe and CIS	49	20	39	42	121				**	
	n and Southern Europe	46	7	33	60	84	2.9	36	32	37	3.4
OECD		47	9	29	62	106	1.4	32	26	39	1.7
	ean Union	46	6	32	62	86	2.8	37	33	39	3.3
	countries	53	6	29	65	91	1.3	60	73	36	5.6

Note: Percentage shares of labour force in agriculture, industry and services do not necessarily add to 100 because of rounding. Source: Columns 1-4: calculated on the basis of data from ILO 1995c; column 5: calculated on the basis of estimates from UN 1995e and UNDP 1995c; column 6: World Bank 1995f; columns 7 and 8: OECD 1994; columns 9 and 10: OECD 1995d.

Unemployment 33

Industrial countries

			Line	mploy-	unempl	uth oyment ite		idence of inemploy			Dis- couraged workers	Involuntary	Unemploy- ment
		Total unemploy	mer	nt rate	(0	%)		e than onths		e than onths	(as % of total	part-time workers	expenditure (as % of total
HDI rank	people (thousands) 1993	ment rate 1993	Male 1993	Female 1993	Male (age 15-24) 1991-93	Female (age 15-24) 1991-93	Male 1993	Female 1993	Male 1993	Female 1993	labour force) 1993	(as % of total labour force) 1993	expenditure) 1991
High human development	35,180T	7.4	7.0	8.1	16	17	45	42	28	27	(11)	0.00	2.1
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan 4 Netherlands 5 Norway	1,649 8,734 1,660 415 127	11.2 6.8 2.5 6.5 6.0	11.8 7.1 2.4 6.0 6.6	10.6 6.5 2.6 7.3 5.2	20 14 5 10 13	15 12 5 10 10	31 23 40 77 45	33 17 28 82 47	14 14 21 53 25	16 9 13 52 30	0.9 0.9 2.2 0.6 1.2	5.5 5.0 1.9 5.6	8.1 1.5 0.7 4.5 2.2
6 Finland 7 France 8 Iceland 9 Sweden 10 Spain	444 2,929 6 326 2,260	17.9 11.7 5.3 8.2 22.7	19.5 10.0 3.6 9.9	15.7 13.7 5.4 23.8	31 22 22 40	29 28 15 47	54 54 34 64	51 62 29 76	34 32 12 43	26 36 9 58	1.5 0.2 2.0 0.2	2.9 4.8 6.2 1.0	3.6 3.2 0.8 7.0
11 Australia 12 Belgium 13 Austria 14 New Zealand 15 Switzerland	939 550 222 157 163	10.9 12.0 4.2 9.5 4.5	11.5 9.7 6.7 10.0 4.4	10.1 17.4 6.9 8.9 4.7	20 17 4 18 7	17 20 3 16 7	59 65 57 47	54 75 45 48	40 46 38 18	32 59 26 23	1.6 1.5 1.0	6.9 3.8 6.3	4.0 5.8 1.8 0.4
 16 United Kingdom 17 Denmark 18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy 	2,891 349 2,720 294 2,799	10.2 12.4 8.9 15.6 10.3	12.4 11.3 8.0 18.8 8.1	7.5 13.7 8.4 19.5 17.3	21 14 8 27 27	13 15 8 23 36	67 43 56 80 75	55 49 64 72 78	47 24 37 63 55	33 27 44 53 60	0.6 1.6 0.5 2.6	3.2 4.8 1.5 3.3 2.3	1.7 5.5 3.0 6.3 1.0
 21 Greece 24 Israel 27 Luxembourg 28 Malta 35 Portugal 	398 195 4 6 258	9.7 10.0 2.1 4.5 5.6	6.4 8.5 1.5 5.2 4.6	15.2 12.1 1.9 2.5 6.5	20ª 21 5 10	39ª 25 4 15	65 53 41	75 68 49	42 26 39	57 37 47	0.3	3.1 1.8	14. 15. 14. 14.
 37 Czech Rep. 41 Slovakia 46 Hungary 55 Latvia 56 Poland 57 Russian Federation 	200 306 632 77 2,890 578	3.5 12.7 12.1 5.8 16.4 1.1 ^b	3.1 12.7 14.2 5.2 15.0 0.4	4.6 11.7 10.1 6.4 17.9 1.1	 25ª	 32ª	****	**	**	1 1 1 1	****		46 94 94 94 94 94
Medium human development	2,190T	6.2						**					
61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia 72 Kazakhstan 74 Romania	66 626 16 78 1,165	1.4 ^b 16.4 ^b 1.9 ^b 1.0 ^b 10.6 ^b	1.7 8.1	2.1 12.6			10 10 10 10 10 10	11 12 13 13 14		**	20 20 20 20 20	55 55 66 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64	0995 0995 1995 1995
80 Ukraine 81 Lithuania 90 Turkmenistan 93 Armenia 94 Uzbekistan	66	1.6 ^b 6.2 ^b	3.8	3.3	44 46 49		**			1 1 1			44) 44 44 44
96 Azerbaijan 98 Moldova, Rep. of 99 Kyrgyzstan 101 Georgia 104 Albania 105 Tajikistan	19 14 3 140	0.7 ^b 0.2 ^b 2.0 ^b 19.5 ^b	**	100 200 200 200 200 200 200	- ** - ** - ** - **	22 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2		55 55 55 55 55 55	11 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1			5 5 7 8 8	1991 1995 1995 1995 1995
All developing countries Industrial countries World	37,370T	7.4	7.0		16	17	**			**	44) 427 44	50 54 58	**
North America Eastern Europe and CIS Western and Southern Europe OECD European Union Nordic countries	10,380T 6,880T 14,270T 30,290T 16,860T 1,250T	7.3 5.2 11.0 8.2 11.1 10.8	7.6 8.6 7.6 9.4 12.6	6.9 13.5 8.9 12.8	15 20 16 21 20	13 25 16 24 17	24 60 45 62 42	19 67 42 65 41	14 40 28 42 22	10 47 27 45 21	** ** ** **	22 22 22 22 22 20	2.0 3.0 2.1 2.9 2.8

a. ILO 1995e. b. Official unemployment rate. Registered unemployment only. Source: Column 1: ILO 1995e; column 2: OECD 1995b and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1995b; columns 3-10: OECD 1995d and ILO 1995e; column 11: ILO 1993; columns 12 and 13: OECD 1995d.

4 Women and capabilities

Industrial countries

			Female ne	t enrolm	lent	Fem		F	emale xpectancy			Maternal
			Primary	Si	econdary	tertiary s		ine e	t birth	Tota	I fertility	mortality
HDI	rank	Ratio	Index (1980=100) 1992	Ratio	Index (1980=100) 1992	Per 100,000 people 1992	Index (1980=100) 1992	Years 1993	Index (1970=100) 1993	Rate	Index (1970=100 1992	rate (per 100,000 live births) 1993
High	human development	97	101	88	50	3,606	113	79.0	106	1.7	77	22
1 2 3 4 5	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	97 100 100 96 99	101 103 100 102 100	90 90 87 90	107 106 105	7,424 5,834 1,861 3,038 4,120	141 110 140 151 224	80.8 79.4 82.6 80.5 80.4	106 106 110 105 104	1.9 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.9	85 92 74 68 77	6 12 18 12 6
6 7 8 9 10	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	99 100 100	100 103 100	94 89 91 92	109 107 124	3,856 3,605 2,812 2,783 3,328	160 146 128 209	79.7 80.9 80.9 81.2 80.6	107 107 105 105 107	1.9 1.7 2.2 2.1 1.2	103 69 73 105 41	11 15 0 7 7
11 12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	99 97 91 98 95	99 99 103 98	82 90 91 89 77	115 106 107	3,435 2,621 2,560 4,512 1,490	171 147 177 227 188	80.7 79.8 79.3 78.7 81.3	108 107 107 105 107	1.9 1.6 1.5 2.2 1.6	70 75 66 73 78	9 10 10 25 6
16 17 18 19 20	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	100 98 83 90	103 103 99	84 88 86 84	104 99 105	2,291 3,147 1,813 3,195 2,782	218 157 243 169	78.8 78.2 79.1 78.2 80.7	105 103 107 106 108	1.8 1.7 1.3 2.1 1.3	79 81 66 55 55	9 9 22 10 12
21 24 27 28 35	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	94 99 100	97 101 100	89 82	119 119	1,884 3,131 1,236 2,264	184 122 889 256	80.2 78.5 79.4 78.4 78.1	109 108 108 109 111	1.4 2.9 1.7 2.1 1.6	60 77 81 99 57	10 7 0 15
37 41 46 55 56 57	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	92 80 96 96	97 98	77	171 109	974 1,173 1,113 2,775 1,680 3,307	122 93 77	74.9 75.4 73.8 74.9 75.7 73.5	102 103 102 101 103 100	1.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.5	87 76 84 84 84 75	15 30 40 19 75
Medi	um human development	77	82	70	86	1,309	129	73.5	106	2.3	70	65
61 62 68 72 74	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	79 80 76	82	62 77 73	86	3,060 2,189 2,475 939	92 171 129	75.1 74.9 74.8 74.0 73.4	100 102 101 108 104	1.7 1.5 1.6 2.5 1.5	74 69 77 70 53	37 27 41 80 130
80 81 90 93 94	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	н 	200 200 201 201 201		64 ++ 22 44	2,954 3,097		74.2 76.0 68.6 75.8 72.4	100 101 108 102 109	1.6 1.8 4.0 2.6 3.9	80 79 64 80 64	50 36 55 50 55
98 99 101 104	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan		14 17 18 18 19 19		57 57 49 49 49	2,453 722	129	74.6 71.7 73.0 76.8 75.0 73.2	104 105 110 106 110 112	2.5 2.1 3.7 2.1 2.9 4.9	54 80 76 81 59 72	22 60 110 33 65 130
All de	eveloping countries strial countries	84 97 87	118 101 112	33 87 52	86 50 72	365 3,515 1,139	227 133 208	62.8 77.9 64.6	121 106 119	3.5 1.8 3.1	60 76 63	499 29 444
Easte West OECE Europ	n America rn Europe and CIS ern and Southern Europe o pean Union ic countries	100 93 94 98 95 99	103 96 100 102 101 102	90 76 89 89 88 91	11 116 101 43 102 104	5,991 2,594 2,777 3,829 2,698 3,221	113 92 186 170 191 160	79.5 73.8 80.1 77.8 79.8 80.1	106 104 107 110 107 105	2.1 1.9 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.9	91 75 64 73 65 94	11 62 14 33 13 8

Source: Columns 1, 3 and 5: UNESCO 1995c; columns 2, 4, and 6: calculated on the basis of data from UNESCO 1995c; columns 7-10: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995e; column 11: WHO and UNICEF 1996.

Women and political and economic participation

Industrial countries

	а	istrators nd agers	and te	ssional chnical rkers		al and workers		vice kers	Wo	men in govern	ment
HDI rank	Female (%) 1990	Female		Female as % of male 1990		Female as % of male 1990		Female as % of male 1990	Total ^a (%) 1995	At ministerial level ^a (%) 1995	At sub- ministerial level ^a (%) 1995
High human development	27	44	48	95	59	162	60	159	13.3	15.4	13.2
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan 4 Netherlands 5 Norway	42 42 9 15 31	73 72 9 18 45	56 53 42 44 58	128 111 72 79 135	68 67 50 52 66	209 201 101 109 192	57 60 54 70 75	133 150 118 238 301	19.1 30.1 8.3 19.7 44.1	19.2 21.1 6.7 26.3 40.9	19.1 30.7 8.8 17.0 45.7
6 Finland 7 France 8 Iceland 9 Sweden 10 Spain	26 9 39 12	36 10 64 14	62 41 64 48	166 71 181 93	67 77 47	207 335 90	71 77 59	250 333 141	16.3 8.8 8.1 33.3 9.7	35.0 6.5 13.3 47.8 15.0	10.0 9.3 6.4 25.6 7.1
 Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland 	43 19 19 32 28	76 23 24 122 39	25 51 49 48 24	33 102 95 43 31	19 64 76 	24 178 325	77 71 67	339 243 207	23.7 8.3 6.8 16.8 7.0	13.3 10.5 21.1 7.4 16.7	26.7 7.3 4.0 20.0 4.4
 16 United Kingdom 17 Denmark 18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy 	33 20 19 17 38	49 25 24 21 60	44 63 43 48 46	78 169 75 92 86	61 52	155 107	73 52	263 106	8.4 19.0 6.8 11.1 9.6	9.1 30.4 16.0 18.2 3.4	8.3 17.4 5.4 8.5 11.8
 Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal 	12 19 9 37	14 23 9 58	44 54 38 52	79 118 61 110	44 55 48 48	79 121 93 91	44 57 72 66	77 135 256 190	6.3 9.8 7.7 1.5 17.5	0 13.0 16.7 0 9.1	10.4 9.0 3.7 1.9 19.1
 37 Czech Rep. 41 Slovakia 46 Hungary 55 Latvia 56 Poland 57 Russian Federation 	58 16	139 18	49 60	96 152	75	307	 75 	 306 	1.2 12.8 7.7 15.5 8.0 2.1	0 13.6 5.3 5.6 6.3 2.8	1.6 12.5 8.1 17.3 8.8 2.0
Medium human development				112	022	72			4.7	5.2	5.8
61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia 72 Kazakhstan 74 Romania	29	41	57	132	79	373	76	320	4.4 8.5 10.4 1.1 3.3	8.1 9.1 6.3 2.7 0	3.1 8.3 11.8 0 4.0
80 Ukraine 81 Lithuania 90 Turkmenistan 93 Armenia 94 Uzbekistan		+ + - + + - + + - + + - + + -	 		34 34 34 34 34	22 23 23 23	 	**	1.0 8.6 3.9 2.0 2.9	0 4.3 0 2.8	1.3 11.8 3.6 3.1 2.9
96 Azerbaijan 98 Moldova, Rep. of 99 Kyrgyzstan 101 Georgia 104 Albania 105 Tajikistan		44 44 44 44 44	11 12 64 77 75	10 10 10 10 10	44 42 42 43 44 44 44			44 24 24 25 25 25	5.3 3.5 8.0 3.3 12.3 4.0	4.0 0 4.3 0 0 6.9	6.0 5.3 11.1 4.7 16.1 2.9
All developing countries Industrial countries World	10 27 14	12 44 18	36 48 39	65 95 71	(* 44 44	-0 	**	**	7.6 10.8 8.7	7.7 12.6 9.1	8.5 11.3 9.6
North America Eastern Europe and CIS Western and Southern Europe OECD European Union Nordic countries	42 21 26 23 30	72 29 41 32 45	53 46 46 46 62	113 88 88 87 167	67 54 54 53 69	202 136 141 134 240	60 64 55 63 74	148 199 139 194 293	25.9 5.4 13.1 15.2 12.2 22.7	20.0 5.6 20.1 16.9 18.3 34.9	26.5 6.2 11.8 15.0 11.1 19.3

a. Including elected heads of state and governors of central banks. For countries for which the value is zero, no women ministers were reported by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, this information could not be reconfirmed by the Human Development Report Office. Source: Columns 1-8: UN 1994b; columns 9, 10 and 11: calculations by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, based on data from Worldwide Government Directories 1995.

Wealth, poverty and social investment

Industrial countries

				Share of	Incom	e share	Social	Public	Public
HDI	rank	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	GNP per capita (US\$) 1993	Share of total industrial country GNP (%) 1993	Lowest 40% of households (%) 1981-93	Ratio of highest 20% to lowest 20% 1981-93	security benefits expenditure (as % of GDP) 1992	expenditure on education (as % of GNP) 1992	expenditure
High	human development	17,182	18,874	98.7			14.3	5.3	6.1
1 2 3 4	Canada USA Japan Netherlands	20,950 24,680 20,660 17,340	19,970 24,740 31,490 20,950	2.9 32.4 19.8 1.6	17.5 15.7 21.9 21.3	7.1 8.9 4.3 4.5	21.7 10.5 11.5	7.6 5.3 4.7 5.9	7.4 6.2 5.2 6.8
5	Norway	20,370	25,970	0.6	19.0	5.9	19.6	8.4	7.6
6 7 8 9	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	16,320 19,140 18,640 17,900 13,660	19,300 22,490 24,950 24,740 13,590	0.5 6.6 1.1 2.7	18.4 17.4 21.2 22.0	6.0 7.5 4.6 4.4	30.5 38.3	7.3 5.7 5.8 8.3 4.6	7.0 7.3 6.9 6.2 5.7
11 12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	18,530 19,540 19,115 ^a 16,720 22,720	17,500 21,650 23,510 12,600 35,760	1.6 1.1 0.9 0.2 1.3	15.5 21.6 15.9 16.9	9.6 4.6 8.8 8.6	24.5 20.2 14.0	5.5 5.2 5.8 7.1 5.2	5.8 7.3 6.0 5.9 6.8
19	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	17,230 20,200 18,840 15,120 18,160	18,060 26,730 23,560 13,000 19,840	5.3 0.7 9.6 0.2 5.7	14.6 17.4 18.8 18.8	9.6 7.1 5.8 6.0	29.5 24.7 19.4	5.2 7.4 6.2 5.4	5.9 5.5 6.0 5.1 6.2
21 24 27 28 35	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	8,950 15,130 25,390 11,570 10,720	7,390 13,920 37,320 7,970 9,130	0.4 0.4 0.1 (.) 0.4	18.1	6.6	11.8 9.0	3.1 5.8 4.1 4.6 5.0	4.3 6.3 4.1
37 41 46 55 56 57	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	8,430 ^a 5,620 ^a 6,059 ^a 5,010 4,702 ^a 4,760 ^a	2,710 1,950 3,350 2,010 2,260 2,340	0.1 0.1 (.) 0.4 1.8	25.7 23.0 14.0	3.2 3.9 11.4	11.1 13.3 17.3 9.1 17.0	4.6 6.6 7.0 6.7 5.6 4.0	
Med	ium human development	3,150	1,511	1.3				6.7	
61 62 68 72 74	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	4,244* 4,320* 3,610b 3,710 3,727*	2,870 1,140 3,080 1,560 1,140	0.2 0.1 (.) 0.1 0.1	21.4	4.7 	12.0 19.8 16.9	6.6 5.9 5.8 7.7 3.6	20 21 22 22 20
80 81 90 93 94	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	3,250 ^a 3,110 2,040 2,510	2,210 1,320 660 970	0.6 (.) (.) 0.1	490 490 490 490 490	11 51 52 52 53 53 53		7.8 5.5 7.9 7.3	11 14 14 14
98 99 101 104	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan	2,190 2,370° 2,320 1,750 1,380	730 1,060 850 580 340 470	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	9.6	22.8	3.1 5.5	7.7 6.5 6.9	0. 11. 12. 14. 14.
All d	eveloping countries strial countries	2,703 15,211 5,545	970 16,394 4,570	100.0		**	47 47	3.9 5.4 5.1	** ** **
Easte West OECI Euro	h America ern Europe and CIS ern and Southern Europe D pean Union lic countries	24,305 4,192 17,554 18,152 17,377 18,526	24,261 1,992 20,551 20,169 19,815 24,233	35,3 3,9 33,6 95,7 37,0 2,9	20 21 20 20 20	1. 1. 1. 7. 7.	11.4 14.0 30.8	5.5 5.2 5.7 5.4 5.6 7.9	6.3 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.5

a. Preliminary results of the European Comparison Programme, conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the OECD, Eurostat and the Austrian Statistical Office. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1996. b. Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons, as described in Summers and Heston 1991. Source: Column 1: actualted on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995h; column 2: World Bank 1995f; column 3; 4 and 5: calculated on the basis of data from World Bank 1995f; column 6: ILO 1995e; column 7: UNESCO 1995c; column 8: OECD 1995e.



	develop	et official ment assis A) disburse		ODA as %	ODA per		Government	Aid to least
	US\$	As % o	f GNP	of central government	capita of donor country	Multilateral ODA as %	subsidies to NGOs (US\$ millions;	developed countries
HDI rank	millions 1994	Average 1983/84	1994	budget 1992/93	(1993 dollars) 1993/94	of GNP 1993-94	1993-94 prices) 1993-94	(as % of GNP) 1993-94
High human development	59,160T	0.34	0.30	-	77	0.10	7.66	0.10
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan 4 Netherlands 5 Norway	2,250 9,927 13,239 2,517 1,137	0.48 0.24 0.33 0.96 1.06	0.43 0.15 0.29 0.76 1.05	1.63 1.82 1.35	82 38 94 162 247	0.15 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.32	207 136 256	0.01 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.44
6 Finland 7 France 8 Iceland 9 Sweden 10 Spain	290 8,466 1,819 1,305	0.34 0.59 0.82 0.06	0.31 0.64 0.96 0.28	1.51 0.97	60 279 201 33	0.11 0.07 0.24 0.02	4	0.12 0.14 0.31 0.03
11 Australia 12 Belgium 13 Austria 14 New Zealand 15 Switzerland	1,088 728 655 110 982	0.47 0.58 0.26 0.26 0.31	0.35 0.32 0.33 0.24 0.36	1.27 0.73 0.36 3.13	55 75 73 28 121	0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08	19 2 3 1 120	0.07 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.11
16 United Kingdom 17 Denmark 18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy	3,197 1,446 6,818 109 2,705	0.34 0.79 0.47 0.21 0.24	0.31 1.03 0.34 0.25 0.27	2.51	52 260 166 52 50	0.07 0.39 0.07 0.04 0.04	54 6 98 43	0.08 0.36 0.09 0.09 0.07
 21 Greece 24 Israel 27 Luxembourg 28 Malta 35 Portugal 	 59 308	0.12	0.40	80) 244 - 250 - 250 - 244 -	** ** **	0.06	10 10 10 10 10 10	0.06 0.22
 Slovakia Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation 	11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1	121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121			14 14 15 15 15			10 10 11 11
Medium human development		347					296	
61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia 72 Kazakhstan 74 Romania		244 244 244 244 244 244	** ** ** **	99 (91 (91 (91) (91) (91) (91) (91) (91)	48 43 44		10 10 10 10 10	19 19 10 10 10
80 Ukraine 81 Lithuania 90 Turkmenistan 93 Armenia 94 Uzbekistan		** ** **	11 12 11 12				100 100 100 100	(49) (55) (55) (55)
96 Azerbaijan 98 Moldova, Rep. of 99 Kyrgyzstan 101 Georgia 104 Albania 105 Tajikistan	**	98) 940 940 940 940 940			40 44 44 44	24 46 49 49		
All developing countries Industrial countries World	59,160T				0 10 10		94 17 17	20 27 77
North America Eastern Europe and CIS Western and Southern Europe OECD European Union Nordic countries	12,180T 29,340T 59,160T 30,420T 4,690T	0.44	0.42	- 205 - 405 	97 95 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	280 140 146 146 146		

Source: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 5-8: OECD 1996; column 4: OECD 1995a.

8 Resource flow imbalances

Industrial countries

HDI	rank	Export- import ratio (exports as % of imports) 1993	Export growth rate as % of import growth rate 1980-93	Trade dependency (exports plus imports as % of GDP) 1993	Terms of trade (1987=100) 1993	Net workers' remittances from abroad (US\$ millions) 1993	Gross international reserves (months of import coverage) 1993	Current account balance before official transfers (US\$ millions) 1993
High	human development	105	89	29	104	- (+)	2.1	62,260T
3 4	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	110 77 150 110 133	102 85 67 102 218	58 17 14 86 54	97 101 119 101 97	-7,660 -353 -234	1.0 2.3 2.4 2.4 3.1	-23,506 -85,525 135,350 13,243 3,534
6 7 8	Finland France Iceland	130 102	100 94	56 33	91 103	-1,530	2.1 1.7	-527 15,613
9 10	Sweden Spain	117 80	97 71	56 30	103 114	90 1,495	3.4 4.5	-244 -9,112
13 14	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	101 90 83 109 108	132 105 112 98	29 113 49 46 51	98 100 93 109	-365 44 256 -2,007	2.4 2.8 2.7 6.7	-9,955 14,574 -639 -885 17,329
17 18 19	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	88 122 109 134 115	77 138 72 184 86	47 56 38 116 32	106 104 100 95 104	-4,375 432	1.4 2.1 2.6 1.2 2.1	-9,145 5,086 -1,222 979 17,008
27	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	39 65 63	79 123 106	45 54 47	101 99 104	2,360 3,844	3.0 2.2 8.7	-4,832 -5,268 -1,926
46 55 56	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	96 86 71 136 74 133	288 100	84 107 56 17 38 23	95	06 28 28	3.7 2.2	369 -532 -4,284 -5,927 2,700
Medi	um human development	116		23				-4,740T
68 72	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	95 96 75 120 76	360	6 80 21 11 44		246) 1420 1420 1420 1420	6.1 2.9	-404 -523 -60 -1,479 -1,281
81 90 93	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	134 143 154 15 115	55 55 55 55	10 27 37 10 13	15 11 17 14	277) 211 255 244	(20) (27) (28) (28) (28)	-970 -81 927 -184 -405
98 99 101 104	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan	146 83 100 48 70	**	12 9 6 23 25	8 11 12 13 13 14	278	50 940 541 541 541 541 544	503 -164 -123 -191 -304
All de	eveloping countries strial countries	91 105 	89	47 29 32	96 104	** **	3.1 2.1 2.4	-106,250T 57,520T -48,730T
Easte West OECE Europ	n America rn Europe and CIS ern and Southern Europe o pean Union ic countries	110 105 106 105 99 123	102 94 88 87 130	20 30 43 29 43 55	97 99 101 104 103 100		1.0 3.2 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.9	-109,030T -12,410T 68,860T 44,690T 38,860T 7,850T

Source: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 5: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f; columns 4, 6 and 7: World Bank 1995f.

Military expenditure and resource use imbalances

Industrial countries

			Defe	nce exp	enditu	re	- Mage		ilitary inditure	ODA	conve weap	orts of ntional oons to g countries	Tota armed f	
			nillions prices)		; % GDP	((capita JS\$; prices)	educa	f combined ation and expenditure)	disbursed (as % of defence	US\$	prices)# Share ^b	Thou-	Index (1985
HDI	rank	1985	1994	1985	1994	1985	1994	1960	1990-91	expenditure) 1994	millions 1994	(%) 1994	sands 1994	=100) 1994
High	human development	602,830T	634,060T	4.0	3.1	737	611	122		12		4	6,580T	81
1 2 3 4 5	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	10,284 339,229 28,240 7,814 2,719	9,242 278,730 44,600 6,901 3,333	2.2 6.5 1.0 3.1 3.1	1.7 4.3 1.0 2.1 3.1	405 1,418 234 540 655	329 1,074 356 450 771	66 173 17 67 48	15 46 12 22 22	24 4 30 37 34	135 6,222 108	1.0 47.3 0.8	78 1,651 238 71 34	94 77 98 67 91
6 7 8 9 10	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	1,974 42,918 4,194 9,900	1,919 42,724 4,818 7,416	2.8 4.0 3.3 2.4	2.0 3.3 2.5 1.6	402 778 502 256	377 739 549 187	25 131 (.) 30 126	15 29 (.) 16 18	15 20 38 18	324	2.5	31 410 64 207	118 88 97 65
11 12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	7,155 5,409 1,696 849 2,536	7,275 3,843 1,818 529 4,082	3.4 3.0 1.2 2.9 2.1	2.3 1.7 0.9 1.1 1.6	454 549 225 261 393	401 382 228 151 579	46 49 20 29 45	24 20 9 16 14	15 19 36 21 24			62 63 51 10 30	88 69 94 81 149
16 17 18 19 20	Germany Ireland	41,891 2,747 46,330 420 22,576	33,861 2,667 34,848 607 20,632	5.2 2.2 3.2 1.8 2.3	3,4 1,9 2,0 1,2 2,1	741 537 610 118 395	583 513 428 172 357	96 37 67 24 39	40 18 29 12 21	9 54 20 18 13	960 462 132	7.3 3.5 1.0	254 27 367 13 322	78 91 77 95 84
21 24 27 28 35	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	3,060 6,638 84 21 1,610	4,224 6,543 120 27 2,221	7.0 21.2 0.9 1.4 3.1	5.7 9.5 1.2 1.0 2.6	308 1,568 229 59 157	406 1,230 301 73 225	145 85 19 156	71 106 10 10 32	49 14	** ** ** **	44 44 44 47	159 172 1 2 51	79 121 114 238 70
37 41 46 55 56 57	Latvia Poland	4,970 7,567	908 301 645 105 2,197 106,927	4.7 7.2 8.1	2.6 2.5 1.6 3.8 2.5 9.6	467 203	88 56 63 40 57 718	60 31 41 134	17 18 30 132		474 145 2,306	3.6 1.1 17.5	93 47 75 3 284 1,714	70 89
Med	lium human development		4,010T		2.6	22	23	č.	-44-1	547	14	44	1,260T	146
61 62 68 72 74	Bulgaria Estonia	7,632	479 274 80 404 743	14.1 4.5	2.2 2.5 3.8 3.5 2.9	852	46 33 51 25 33	70	29 	**	1 1 1 1 1	1 I I I	93 102 3 40 231	69 122
80 81 90 93 94	Armenia	- 42 - 54 - 56 - 56 - 56	868 137 63 69 317	**	2.1 3.9 1.1 3.1 2.4	10 10 10 10	17 37 16 18 14	**	90) 30 30 30 30	940 940 940 940 940	23	1.7 ** 	517 9 28 33 45	. ** . ** . ** . **
104	Moldova, Rep. of	248	245 38 48 133 41 66	5,3	8.7 3.8 1.4 2.4 2.7 4.0	 84	33 8 11 23 12 11	3 4 4 4 5 F	51			144 141 141 141 141	56 11 12 10 73 3	
All	developing countries istrial countries	612,540T	140,030T 638,070T 778,100T	5.5 4.1	3.6 3.1 3.2	52 718 171	34 525 141	143 97 104	60 33 37	43e 440 440	44 14 15	1995) 1996) 1996)	14,170T 7,850T 22,020T	97 83 93
East Wes OEC Euro	th America ern Europe and CIS tern and Southern Europe D ^c opean Union dic countries	349,510T 156,010T 588,280T	287,970T 115,090T 142,200T 523,350T 168,620T	6.1 8.5 3.0 3.9 3.4	4.1 8.0 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.4	1,316 502 651 540 516	540 454	163 103 96 83 33	43 96 30 28 17	4 21 12 19 37	•	40 44 44 44 45	1,730T 3,480T 1,900T 4,870T 2,090T 160T	77 80 81 79 92

a. Figures are trend indicator values.
 b. Share of country in total exports of conventional weapons that go to developing countries.
 c. Excluding Mexico and Turkey.
 Source: Columns 1-6 and 12: IISS 1995; columns 7 and 8: IISS 1993, UNDP 1994a and World Bank 1993c; column 9: calculated on the basis of estimates from IISS 1995 and OECD 1996; column 10: SIPRI 1995; column 11: calculated on the basis of estimates from IISS 1995.

40 Urbanization

Industrial countries

		Lishan		Urł popu anr	lation iual	in cities	lation of more 50,000		Largest c	ity	
		Urban opulati s % of to	on	growt (9	6)	As % of total	As % of urban		Population	Growt	th rate
HDI rank	1960	1993	2000	1960- 1993	1993- 2000	1990	population 1990	City	(thousands) 1995	1970-75	1990-95
High human development	64	76	78	1.3	0.7	31	41	1.64	-44		
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan	69 70 63	77 76 77	77 78 78	1.8 1.3 1.5	1.2 1.2 0.4	36 41 37	48 55 48	Toronto New York Tokyo	4,483 16,329 25,013	1.8 -0.4 3.7	3.5 0.3 1.4
4 Netherlands 5 Norway	85 50	89 73	90 74	1.0 1.7	0.7 0.7	14	16	Amsterdam	1,109	-1.0	1.0
6 Finland 7 France 8 Iceland	38 62 80	63 73 91	65 73 92	1.9 1.2 1.6	1.0 0.5 1.2	18 23	28 31	Helsinki Paris	1,059 9,469	2.2 0.9	3.9 0.3
9 Sweden 10 Spain	73 57	83 76	83 78	0.9 1.7	0.5 0.4	17 18	21 24	Stockholm Madrid	1,545 4,072	2.2 2.5	0.7 -0.5
 Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand 	81 93 50 76	85 97 55 86	85 97 56 87	1.8 0.4 0.6 1.5	1.2 0.4 0.8 1.4	59 12 27 26	69 12 48 31	Sydney Brussels Vienna Auckland	3,590 1,122 2,060 945	2.1 1.0 0.5 2.8	0.4 -0.5 0.1 1.5
15 Switzerland 16 United Kingdom 17 Denmark	51 86 74	60 89 85	62 90 86	1.3 0.4 0.8	1.4 0.4 0.2	12 23 26	20 26 31	Zurich London Copenhagen	897 7,335 1,326	0.1	-0.3
18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy	76 46 59	86 57 67	88 59 67	0.7 1.3 0.7	0.4 0.7 0.1	43 26 24	51 46 37	Essen Dublin Naples	6,481 911 4,603	-0.4 1.6 0.2	0.4 -0.1 -1.3
21 Greece 24 Israel 27 Luxembourg	43 77 62	64 91 88	68 91 91	1.9 3.3 1.8	1.1 2.1 1.5	43 38	68 43	Athens Tel-Aviv	3,693 1,921	1.7 3.2	1.1 1.4
28 Malta 35 Portugal	70 22	89 35	91 38	1.2 1.7	0.9 1.3	19	50	Lisbon	1,863	2.3	2.3
37 Czech Rep. 41 Slovakia	46 34	65 58	66 61	1.3 2.4	0.3 1.2	12	18	Prague	1,225	0.9	0.2
46 Hungary 55 Latvia 56 Poland 57 Russian Federation	43 57 48 54	64 72 64 75	67 75 67 78	1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7	0.4 -0.3 0.9 0.3	20 35 22 20	31 48 35 27	Budapest Riga Katowice Moscow	2,017 924 3,552 9,233	0.6 1.6 1.8 1.4	0.0 0.1 0.6 0.4
Medium human development	41	58	61	2.2	1.1	15	25			144	++2
61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia	32 39 58	70 70 73	75 73 75	3.0 2.2 1.5	0.9 0.3 -0.2	16 15	24 22	Minsk Sofia	1,788 1,384	3.7 1.7	1.4 1.1
72 Kazakhstan 74 Romania	45 34	59 55	62 58	2.5 2.1	1.4		12 17	Alma-Ata Bucharest	1,262 2,090	2.5 2.3	1.7 0.4
80 Ukraine 81 Lithuania 90 Turkmenistan	47 40 46	69 71 45	73 75 46	1.8 2.6 2.7	0.6 0.7 2.5	18	27	Kiev	2,809	3.0	1,3
93 Armenia 94 Uzbekistan	51 34	68 41	70 43	2.8 3.4	1.7 2.8	36 10	54 25	Yerevan Tashkent	1,305 2,288	3.2 2.8	1.5 1.6
96 Azerbaijan 98 Moldova, Rep. of 99 Kyrgyzstan	48 23 34	55 50 39	58 56 41	2.4 3.5 2.7	1.7 1.8 2.4	25	45	Baku	1,853	2.3	1.1
101 Georgia 104 Albania 105 Tajikistan	43 31 33	58 37 32	61 40 33	1.7 2.8 3.0	1.1 2.1 3.2	24	42	Tbilisi 	1,353	2.0	1.2
All developing countries Industrial countries World	22 61 34	36 73 44	40 75 47	3.8 1.4 2.7	3.5 0.7 2.5	14 29 17	39 40 39	39 77 99			#0) 72) #1
North America Eastern Europe and CIS Western and Southern Europe	70 47 64	76 66 75	77 68 76	1.4 1.9 1.0	1.2 0.7 0.5	41 18 27	54 27 36	- 93) - 444 - 149	**	**) (14) **)	981) 1991 1991
OECD European Union Nordic countries	65 68 61	76 78 77	78 79 78	1.5 0.9 1.2	1.1 0.4 0.6	33 27 20	44 35 25	10. 10. 12.	24 24	10 + + 1 + + 1 - + 1	44 44 44

Source: Columns 1, 3, 10 and 11: UN 1995h; columns 2, 4-7 and 9: calculated on the basis of data from UN 1995h.

Demographic profile

		Estimated population (millions)			ual lation h rate 6)	Total	Contraceptive prevalence rate, any	Dependency	Population aged 65 and above (as %
HDI rank	1050		2000	1960-	1993-	fertility rate	method (%)	(%)	of total population)
High human development	1960 810T	1993 1,030T	2000 1,060T	1993	2000	1992	1986-93	1993 49.5	1993
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan 4 Netherlands 5 Norway	17.9 180.7 94.1 11.5 3.6	28.8 257.9 124.5 15.3 4.3	31.0 275.1 126.5 15.9 4.4	1.5 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.6	1.1 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.4	1.9 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.9	74 64 76 76	48.0 52.9 43.2 45.6 54.5	11.6 12.7 13.2 13.1 16.1
6 Finland 7 France 8 Iceland 9 Sweden 10 Spain	4.4 45.7 0.2 7.5 30.5	5.1 57.5 0.3 8.7 39.5	5.2 59.0 0.3 9.0 39.8	0.4 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.8	0.4 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.1	1.9 1.7 2.2 2.1 1.2	81	49.4 52.5 54.4 56.4 46.9	13.9 14.6 10.6 17.5 14.3
11 Australia 12 Belgium 13 Austria 14 New Zealand 15 Switzerland	10.3 9.2 7.0 2.4 5.4	17.6 10.0 7.9 3.5 7.1	19.2 10.2 8.1 3.8 7.5	1.6 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.8	1.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.9	1.9 1.6 1.5 2.2 1.6	76 79	49.6 50.4 48.5 53.0 46.2	11.5 15.6 15.0 11.3 14.3
16 United Kingdom 17 Denmark 18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy	52.4 4.6 72.7 2.8 50.2	57.9 5.2 80.9 3.5 57.1	59.0 5.2 81.7 3.6 57.3	0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4	0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0	1.8 1.7 1.3 2.1 1.3	81 78 75	53.7 47.9 45.5 58.5 44.9	15.6 15.4 15.1 11.3 15.4
21 Greece 24 Israel 27 Luxembourg 28 Malta 35 Portugal	8.3 2.1 0.3 0.3 8.8	10.4 5.3 0.4 0.4 9.8	10.6 6.1 0.4 0.4 9.8	0.7 2.8 0.7 0.4 0.3	0.3 2.1 1.1 0.6 0.0	1.4 2.9 1.7 2.1 1.6	 66ª	48.5 64.6 44.2 49.6 50.0	15.1 9.4 13.7 10.8 13.7
 37 Czech Rep. 41 Slovakia 46 Hungary 55 Latvia 56 Poland 57 Russian Federation 	9.6 4.1 10.0 2.1 29.6 120.1	10.3 5.3 10.2 2.6 38.3 147.8	10.3 5.5 9.9 2.5 38.8 145.6	0.2 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.6	0.1 0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.2 -0.2	1.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.5	69 74 73	48.5 52.7 48.5 51.2 52.7 49.9	12.6 10.7 13.8 12.8 10.6 11.3
Medium human development	120T	180T	180T	1.2	0.5	2.3	1447	58.1	9.7
61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia 72 Kazakhstan 74 Romania	8.2 7.9 1.2 10.0 18.4	10.2 8.9 1.6 17.0 23.0	10.1 8.6 1.5 17.7 22.6	0.7 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.7	-0.2 -0.5 -0.5 0.6 -0.3	1.7 1.5 1.6 2.5 1.5	 57	51.9 49.6 50.7 59.2 49.1	11.8 14.0 12.3 6.6 11.2
80 Ukraine 81 Lithuania 90 Turkmenistan 93 Armenia 94 Uzbekistan	42.9 2.8 1.6 1.9 8.6	51.6 3.7 3.9 3.5 21.9	51.0 3.7 4.6 3.8 25.4	0.6 0.9 2.8 1.9 2.9	-0.2 -0.1 2.2 1.3 2.2	1.6 1.8 4.0 2.6 3.9	1977) 1979 1970 1970 1970	51.7 51.3 78.6 58.3 81.0	13.3 11.7 4.0 6.7 4.3
96 Azerbaijan 98 Moldova, Rep. of 99 Kyrgyzstan 101 Georgia 104 Albania 105 Tajikistan	3.9 3.0 2.2 4.2 1.6 2.1	7.4 4.4 4.6 5.4 3.4 5.8	8.0 4.5 5.1 5.5 3.6 7.0	2.0 1.2 2.3 0.8 2.3 3.1	1.1 0.3 1.6 0.2 1.0 2.7	2.5 2.1 3.7 2.1 2.9 4.9		61.1 56.4 75.2 53.2 59.7 90.0	5.4 8.9 5.5 10.6 5.4 4.1
All developing countries Industrial countries World	2,070T 930T 3,000T	4,300T 1,210T 5,510T	4,880T 1,240T 6,120T	2.2 0.8 1.9	1.8 0.4 1.5	3.5 1.8 3.1	55	50.7	12.7
North America Eastern Europe and CIS Western and Southern Europe OECD European Union Nordic countries	200T 300T 270T 700T 320T 20T	290T 390T 320T 960T 370T 20T	310T 400T 330T 1,010T 380T 20T	1.1 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.4	0.9 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.4	2.1 1.9 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.9	74 71 	52.4 53.7 47.9 51.6 48.7 52.6	12.6 10.6 14.8 12.3 15.0 15.9

a. Data refer to 1979-80. Source: Columns 1-5, 8 and 9: calculated on the basis of estimates from UN 1995e; column 6: UN 1995e; column 7; UN 1994c.

Natural resources balance sheet

Industrial countries

			Forest	Arabla	Irrigated	Internal renewable	Annual fre withdra	
HDI ra	ank	Land area (1,000 ha) 1993	and woodland (as % of land area) 1993	Arable land (as % of land area) 1993	land (as % of arable land area) 1993	water resources per capita (1,000 m ³ per year) 1992	As % of water resources 1980-89	Per capita (m ³) 1980-89
High I	numan development	4,951,710T	37.9	10.4	8.3	12.3		1,149
2 3 4	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	997,614 980,943 37,780 3,733 32,390	49.5 29.2 66.4 9.4 25.7	4.6 18.9 10.7 24.3 2.7	1.6 11.1 69.1 61.8 10.9	106.0 9.7 4.4 0.7 94.5	2 19 16 16	1,684 1,952 733 993 490
7 8 9	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	33,813 55,150 10,300 44,996 50,478	68.6 27.1 1.2 62.2 32.0	7.6 33.1 0.1 6.2 29.7	2.5 8.1 4.1 23.0	22.0 3.0 653.9 20.3 2.8	3 24 2 41	605 783 366 356 1,184
12 13 14	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	771,336 8,385 27,099 4,129	18.8 38.6 27.2 30.3	6.0 16.9 9.0 9.6	4.6 0.3 11.6 6.3	19.5 0.8 7.2 114.9 6.2	5 72 2 2	1,280 917 279 585 170
17 18 19	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	24,488 4,309 35,691 7,028 30,127	10.0 10.3 30.0 4.6 22.5	24.8 58.9 32.7 13.1 30.0	1.8 17.1 3.9 30.0	2.1 2.1 1.2 14.3 3.1	12 9 55 2 30	253 228 1,274 235 984
24 27 28	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta Portugal	13,199 2,106 32 9,239	19.8 6.0 35.7	18.3 16.6 37.5 25.5	54.4 51.4 8.3 26.7	4.4 0.3 2.7 (.) 3.5	12 88 1 92 16	720 441 159 66 1,075
41 46 55 56	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	7,886 4,901 9,303 6,450 31,268 1,707,540	33.3 40.6 19.0 44.0 28.1 45.6	40.2 30.3 51.0 26.2 45.7 7.6	0.8 5.4 4.3 0.7 3.1	0.6 5.7 1.3 27.1	6 5 30	379 502 472
Mediu	im human development	551,300T	9.7	18.8	18.4	2.4		22
62 68 72	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	20,760 11,091 4,510 271,730 23,750	33.7 35.0 44.8 3.5 28.1	29.4 36.6 25.0 12.7 39.3	1.6 30.4 6.4 33.2	3.3 2.0 6.9 4.1 1.6	7	1,600 1,144
81 90 93	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	60,370 6,520 48,810 2,980 44,740	17.1 30.7 8.2 14.1 2.9	55.2 34.6 2.9 16.2 9.2	7.8 92.9 59.4 97.6	1.0 3.4 0.3 1.8 0.4	88 88 88 80 80	20 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
98 1 99 1 101 0 104 7	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan	8,660 3,370 19,850 6,970 2,875 14,310	11.0 12.5 3.5 38.7 36.5 3.8	18.5 51.8 7.1 10.0 20.1 5.7	62.5 17.8 64.3 57.1 59.1 78.9	1.1 0.3 10.8 9.8 3.0 8.5	1	94
All de	veloping countries trial countries	7,797,040T 5,503,010T 13,300,050T	28.7 35.1 31.3	9.2 11.3 10.0	26.2 9.9 18.7	6.5 10.9 7.6	 8ª	520 1,150 641
Easter Weste OECD Europ	America n Europe and CIS rn and Southern Europe ean Union c countries	1,978,560T 2,318,640T 343,000T 3,455,990T 320,640T 125,810T	39.4 36.7 34.9 33.2 35.1 47.8	11.7 11.1 20.7 11.8 23.7 7.0	9.3 9.0 16.2 11.7 15.1 8.1	19.1 12.1 5.2 9.4 3.2 36.8	** ** ** **	1,926 727 951 1,134 862 405

a. UN 1994a. Source: Column 1: FAO 1994; columns 2, 3 and 4: calculated on the basis of estimates from FAO 1994; column 5: World Resources Institute 1994; columns 6 and 7: UN 1994a.



Energy consumption

Industrial countries

			Productio % of nati		ene	nercial ergy uction		nercial ergy mption	Cor		omercial energy use (oil equivalent) GDP output		Comn energy	
		ene	ergy reser Natural	rves Crude	average grow	e annual th rate %)	average	annual h rate		rams apita	per ki	output logram S\$)	(as merch	% of
HDI		Coal 1991	gas 1991	oil 1991	1971-80	1980-93	1971-80	1980-93	1971	1993	1971	1993	1971	1993
High	human development	22	53		325			322	4,305	4,908	0.8	5.2	12	11
1	Canada	0.8	3.4	11.0	3	4	4	2	6,233	7,821	0.7	2.4	5	4
2	USA	0.4	11.0	10.0	1	1	2	ĩ	7,633	7,918	0.7	3.1	7	13
3	Japan	1.0	6.1	(.)	3	5	З	3	2,553	3,642	0.9	9.3	20	14
4	Netherlands	(.)	4.1	17.0	6 30	0	2	1	3,900	4,533	0.8	4.5	12	8
5	Norway	(.)	2.1	8.9	1 - 225 ().	9	4	2	3,565	5,096	0.9	4.7	12	2
67	Finland	5.8	4.1	16.0	3	3 7	3 2	2	3,982	5,635	0.7	2.9 5.4	13 13	10 9
8	France Iceland			16.0				2	3,025	4,031	1.0	5.4		
9	Sweden			21	10	5	2	1	4,521	5,385	1.0	4.0	11	8
10	Spain	2.3	8.3	(.)	5	5	5	3	1,264	2,373	1.0	5.1	26	13
11	Australia	0.2	4.6	18.0	5	6	3	2	4,079	5,316	0.9	3.1	5	6
12	Belgium	0.2	(.)	(.)	3	3	1	2	4,127	4,989	0.7	4.Z	4.	. 4.5
13	Austria				0	1	2	1	2,557	3,277	0.9	7.1	10	6
14	New Zealand	2.3	4.3	8.2	5	8	3	5	2,434	4,299	1.1	2.9	7 7	6
15	Switzerland		20			3		2	2,742	3,491	1.5	9.4	ii	4
16	United Kingdom	2.5	8.2	16.0	8	0	0	1	3,790	3,718	0.7	4.4	12	6
17 18	Denmark Germany	(.)	3.4 3.0	6.7 5.5	14	-1	1	1	3,866 3,953	3,861 4,170	0.9	6.8 5.7	14 8	5
19	Ireland	(.)	12.0	(.)	2	3	2	2	2,357	3,016	0.7	4.5	12	4
20	Italy	2.9	6.4	6.5	-1	2	2	2	2,141	2,697	1.0	6.4	16	9
21	Greece	1.8	(.)	(.)	8	6	6	3	1,034	2,160	1.2	3.3	21	24
24	Israel			1.7	-46	-10	3	4	2,073	2,607	1.0	5.1	9	11
27	Luxembourg	55	(S)	08	32	22	225		38 - G225	N 142	5420	(12)	0.9	322
28	Malta		++	33		2	12	22	774	4 704		10	45	
35	Portugal			**	2	2	5	5	721	1,781	1.2	4.9	15	13
37 41	Czech Rep. Slovakia	22	250	51	1.55	25	755						222	100
46	Hungary	0.4	4.1	8.2	2	0	5	-1	1,872	2,385	0.3	1.6	10	19
55	Latvia		380	345	0.75			70 (1942		1,717		1.0		
56	Poland	0.5	1.9	(.)	4	-2	5	-2	2,493	2,390	33	0.9		20
57	Russian Federation	10	39	330	202		4× .	- 65	340	4,438	148	0.5	49.	<u>e</u>
Med	ium human development		- 10-2 -	39		0		3.4	742	2,734		0.5		έ÷.
61	Belarus		- 8		144	-	14	4.5	(11)	3,427	122	0.8	1621	11
62	Bulgaria	0.8	(.)	(.)	4	0	5	-3	2,223	1,954		0.6	2.	-
68 72	Estonia Kazakhstan	28		28.	.25	27.5	37	10	34	4,435	25	0.3	144	55
74	Romania	1.0	14.0	4.3	3	-5	6	-3	1,955	1,765		0.6		34
80	Ukraine			10000	604	545	0.59			3,960		0.5		
81	Lithuania	226 1440	(195)			005	18873	15 42		2,596		0.4		43
90	Turkmenistan	000		++		100		ě.		2,268				
93	Armenia	$(\pm b)$		++	**	100	(44)	æ	4.6	958	44	0.7	2.4.5	20
1000	Uzbekistan	197	202	44	÷2	(4) <		<u>a</u>	- 23	2,033	14	0.5	200	30
96	Azerbaijan	100	144	363	÷	14.5	÷	44		2,470	44	0.3		3
98 99	Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan	++	**	445	2		***	**	144	1,345 965	**	0.7		41
101	Georgia			**	12				14	891		0.6		
104		3.6	6.2	8.7	5	-5	10	-3	604	455	2			1
105	Tajikistan	:12:	(1995) (1997)	1.2555 (Mil	**	111			244	634	50 88	0.7	0.00	31
All d	eveloping countries				++	(++)			255	536	1.2	2.8	10	14
Indu	strial countries	30			** **				4,211	4,589		5.1		11
Wor	ld	0.4ª	1.6ª	2.2ª	α					1,421 ^b		3.1	2.00	11
	h America	**				144			7,501	7,908	0.7	3.0	7	12
	ern Europe and CIS	**	244	(44)		1440	++	22	2 001	3,356		0.6	15	
Wes	tern and Southern Europe		***	-440					2,904	3,583	1.0	5.6 5.2	13 12	11
		**				**			4,008 3,044	4,560 3,588	0.8	5.4	13	8
	pean Union		4.0		**									

a. UN 1994a. b. World Bank 1995f. Source: Columns 1, 2 and 3: UN 1994a; columns 4-11: World Bank 1995f; columns 12 and 13: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f.

Environment and pollution

Industrial countries

		Greenh gas emi (CO ₂ emi	ssions	Major protected	Spent fuel	Hazardous waste	Municipal	Population served by municipal	Waste re (as % of a consum	pparent
HDI	rank	Thousands of tons 1993ª	Share of world total 1993*	areas (as % of national territory) 1993 ⁶	produced (metric tons of heavy metal) 1993	production (1,000 metric tons) 1991-94	waste generated (kg per person) 1992	waste services (%) 1993 ^a	Paper and cardboard 1990-93	Glass 1990-93
High	human development	10,852,280T	49.70		8,424T	337,780T	540	97	42	43
1 2 3 4 5	Canada USA Japan Netherlands Norway	459,390 5,128,734 1,146,360 178,950 38,490	2.10 23.50 5.25 0.82 0.18	8.9 10.6 7.3 10.2 17.1	1,690 2,400 876 15	7,786 276,000 1,430 151	660 730 410 500 510	100 100 100 100 97	32 34 51 53 32	75 22 56 76 67
6 7 8 9 10	Finland France Iceland Sweden Spain	56,330 416,140 2,763 55,440 258,034	0.26 1.91 (.) 0.25 1.18	8.1 9.7 8.8 6.6 8.4	68 1,250 230 156	560 4,000 6	620° 470 560 370° 360	75 100 95 100 90	45 42 30 50 78	46 46 75 59 29
11 12 13 14 15	Australia Belgium Austria New Zealand Switzerland	286,283 116,782 62,580 30,220 49,295	1.30 0.54 0.29 0.14 0.23	7.7 2.5 23.9 22.8 17.7	84 85	426 27,529 668 110 837	690 400 430 400	100 99 99	50 11 78 54	36 55 68 78
16 17 18 19 20	United Kingdom Denmark Germany Ireland Italy	564,354 61,190 921,740 34,360 435,281	2.59 0.28 4.22 0.16 1.99	20.3 32.2 25.8 0.7 7.6	1,080 490 ^d	1,957 91 6,633 ^d 66 3,387	460 360° 350	100 100 100	32 36 46 3 47	29 62 70 29 52
21 24 27 28	Greece Israel Luxembourg Malta	80,320 11,815	0.37	1.7 13.9		450 86	310 490	100	30	20
35	Portugal	49,900	0.23	6.3	18	1,365	330	89	41	29
37 41 46 55 56 57	Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Latvia Poland Russian Federation	64,325 343,210	0.29 1.57	13.5 20.7 6.2 9.8		795 3,444	390 340	63 55	11 12 13 14 14	
Med	ium human development				0.	001				**
61 62 68 72 74	Belarus Bulgaria Estonia Kazakhstan Romania	**					248 248 248 248 248	4 4 4 4 4	99 27 26 24	8 11 11 11 11
80 81 90 93 94	Ukraine Lithuania Turkmenistan Armenia Uzbekistan	20) 20) 20) 20) 20)		(19) 1961 1961 1961	20 15 15 15 14	11. 11. 12. 13.		20 20 20 20		
96 98 99 101 104 105	Azerbaijan Moldova, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Georgia Albania Tajikistan	44) 402 444 444 444 444				** 1 44 ** **		14 17 17 14 14	17 17 18 18 18	
All d	eveloping countries strial countries	21,825,770T	14 14 14		** ** **	337,780T				
Easte West Euro OECI Euro Nord		5,924,840T 2,829,410T 10,943,510T 3,303,230T 214,210T	25.60 50.14 15.13 1.00	900 100 100 100 100 100	4,090T 2,378T 8,424T 3,373T 298T	283,790T 47,260T 333,540T 48,220T 810T	630 	100 98 99 98 99	34 47 42 45 42	26 57 43 52 59

a. 1993 or latest year available from 1990 on. b. National classifications may differ. Includes only areas greater than 10 square kilometers except for islands. c. 1990. d. Former territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Source: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 6-9: OECD 1995g; columns 4 and 5: calculated on the basis of data from OECD 1995g.

National income accounts

					Consu	mption	2 107.001	-		C			
HDI rank		GDP (US\$ billions) 1993	Agri- culture (as % of GDP) 1993	Industry (as % of GDP) 1993	Services (as % of GDP) 1993	Private (as % of GDP) 1993	Govern- ment (as % of GDP) 1993	Gross domestic investment (as % of GDP) [#] 1993		Tax revenue (as % of GNP) 1993	Central government expenditure (as % of GNP) 1993	Exports (as % of GDP) 1993	Imports (as % of GDP) 1993
High human d	evelopment	18,900T	3	37	61	62	17	21	21	26	33	14	14
1 Canada 2 USA 3 Japan 4 Netherlar 5 Norway	nds	477.5 6,259.9 4,214.2 309.2 103.4		41 28 35	 57 68 62	61 68 58 61 52	22 17 10 15 22	18 16 30 19 20	18 15 33 24 26	20 18 46	26 24 54	30 7 9 45 31	28 10 6 41 23
6 Finland 7 France 8 Iceland 9 Sweden		74.1 1,251.7 166.7	5 3 2	31 29 31	64 69 67	57 61 55	23 19 28	14 18 13	20 20 17	31 38 33	45 46 54	32 16 30	24 16 26
10 Spain 11 Australia 12 Belgium 13 Austria 14 New Zea 15 Switzerla		478.6 289.4 210.6 182.1 43.7 232.2	3 22 3	29 35	67 62	63 62 55 60 59	18 15 19 15 14	20 18 25 21 22	19 19 23 26 24 27	29 22 42 33 31	35 28 51 40 37	13 15 53 22 24 26	16 15 59 27 22 24
16 United Ki 17 Denmark 18 Germany 19 Ireland 20 Italy		819.0 117.6 1,910.8 43.0 991.4	2 4 1 8 3	33 27 38 10 32	65 69 61 82 65	64 52 58 56 62	22 26 20 16 18	15 14 22 14 17	14 21 22 28 20	33 35 30 39 41	43 46 34 47 53	22 31 20 67 17	25 25 18 50 15
21 Greece24 Israel27 Luxembo28 Malta35 Portugal	burg	63.2 69.7 85.7	18	32	50 	71 59 65	19 27 17	20 22 27	10 14 18	23 32 30	43 44 42	13 21 18	32 32 29
37 Czech Re 41 Slovakia 46 Hungary 55 Latvia 56 Poland 57 Russian F	A	31.6 11.1 38.1 4.6 85.9 329.4	6 7 15 9	40 44 28 32 39 51	54 49 66 53 55 39	54 54 62 57 65 52	26 23 27 19 22 15	17 25 20 11 16 26	20 22 11 24 13 32	39	42	41 49 23 10 16 13	43 57 33 7 22 10
Medium huma	an development	250T	29	44	28	69	17	19	15			9	9
61 Belarus 62 Bulgaria 68 Estonia 72 Kazakhst 74 Romania		27.5 10.4 5.1 24.7 26.0	17 13 8 29 21	54 38 29 42 40	29 49 63 30 40	51 66 57 62 66	22 17 19 28 12	35 20 26 31 27	27 17 23 10 22	29 27 26 33	33 48 27 40	3 39 9 6 19	3 41 12 5 25
80 Ukraine 81 Lithuania 90 Turkmen 93 Armenia 94 Uzbekist	istan	109.1 4.3 5.2 2.2 20.4	35 21 32 48 23	47 41 31 30 36	18 38 37 22 41	80 76 44 91 44	13 13 23 22 22	8 18 46 14 29	7 11 33 -14 34	19	20	6 16 22 1 7	4 11 15 9 6
96 Azerbaija 98 Moldova 99 Kyrgyzsta 101 Georgia 104 Albania 105 Tajikistan	i, Rep. of an	5.0 4.3 3.9 3.0 0.7 2.5	22 35 43 58 40 33	52 48 35 22 13 35	26 18 22 20 47 32	54 104 52 89 170	20 16 9	14 7 25 32 10	26 -4 32 2 -70		11 11 12 20 20	7 4 3 7 10	5 3 15
All developing Industrial cour World		3,780T 19,150T 22,930T	15 3 6	35 37 36	50 60 58	65 62 63	13 17 16	26 21 21	26 21 22	14 26 24	21 34 31	23 14 16	25 14 16
North America Eastern Europ Western and S OECD European Unio Nordic countri	e and CIS Southern Europe	6,740T 760T 6,220T 18,820T 6,700T 460T	15 3 3 3	45 33 36 33 31	39 65 62 65 66	68 60 63 60 54	17 18 19 16 19 25	16 22 20 21 19 15	15 22 21 21 20 21	18 35 26 35 33	24 43 33 43 50	9 14 22 14 22 31	11 14 21 14 21 25

Note: Percentage shares of agriculture, industry and services do not necessarily add to 100 because of rounding. a. Includes private and public investment. Source: Columns 1 and 9-12; calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f; columns 2-8: World Bank 1995f.

6 Trends in economic performance

Industrial countries

		GNP (US\$	GNP annual growth rate	per o anr growf	NP apita nual th rate %)	Aver annua of infl (%	l rate ation	Exports as % of GDP (% annual growth	Tax revenue as % of GNP (% annual growth	buo surplu:	erall dget s/deficit of GNP)
HDI ra	nk	billions) 1993	(%) 1980-93	1965-80	1980-93	1980-93	1993	rate) 1980-93	rate) 1980-92	1980	1993
High h	uman development	19,490T	2.4	3.1	1.6	5.7	33.6	2.2	1.4	-4.4	-4.4
	anada	575	2.2	3.3	1.4	3.9	1.2	3.2	1.2	-3.6	-3.8
	ISA	6,388	2.4	1.8	1.7	3.8	2.0	2.8	(.)	-2.8	-4.0
	apan	3,903	3.6	5.1	3.4	1.5	0.8	1.6	2.0	-7.0	
	letherlands	320	1.9	2.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	2.2	0.3	-4.5	-0.9
5 N	lorway	112	2.6	3.6	2.2	4.6	1.0	2.9	-0.5	-2.0	1971
6 F	inland	98	1.1	3.6	1.5	5.8	2.3	1.7	0.9	-2.2	-15.4
	rance	1,293	1.8	3.7	1.6	5.1	2.2	1.9	0.4	-0.1	-3.8
	celand	7	2.0	44	1.2	25.4	2.9	-0.2	4.4	é+	100
	weden	215	0.9	2.0	1.3	6.9	2.6	2.5	2.0	-8.1	-12.2
10 S	pain	536	2.4	4.1	2.7	8.4	4.4	3.6	2.9	-4.2	-3.7
11 A	Australia	308	2.7	2.2	1.6	6.1	1.1	3.9	2.1	-1.5	-2.3
	lelgium	218	1.7	3.6	1.9	4.0	4.4	2.4	0.2	-8.2	-7.0
	Austria	185	2.0	4.0	2.0	3.6	3.6	2.4	0.1	-3.4	-3.9
	lew Zealand	44	1.8	1.7	0.7	8.5	0.9	2.3	0.9	-6.8	0.1
1.62	witzerland	252	1.5	1.5	1.1	3.8	2.1	1.3	185	-0.2	281
	Inited Kingdom	1,046	2.0	2.0	2.3	5.6	3.4	1.1	1.0	-4.6	-5.1
	Penmark	137	1.8	2.2	2.0	4.6	1.2	2.4	0.7	-2.7	-2.4
	Bermany	1,903	2.8	3.0	2.1	2.8	3.9	-0.1	0.4	120	-2.4
	reland taly	46 1,133	3.1	2.8	3.6 2.1	4.8 8.8	3.6 4.4	4.7 2.8	1.6 2.8	-12.9	-2.3
						the state of the s	1100.000				
	ireece	78	1.3	4.8	0.9	17.3	12.6	4.8	0.8	-4.8	-15.6
	srael uxembourg	73 15	4.4	3.7	2.0	70.4	11.0	1.1	-5.4	-16.1	-1.7
	Aalta	3	3.2 3.8	**	2.8 3.2	5.0 2.3	6.2 3.3	1.0		**	
	ortugal	88	2.6	4.6	3.3	16.4	7.4	3.7	1.4	-8.7	-2.2
	zech Rep.	28			1.5.57		15.6	10000			2.6
	lovakia	11	**	18	**	52	15.0	0.00	1225	55	
	lungary	36	0.4	5.1	1.2	12.8	21.5	-0.3	0.1	-2.9	20
	atvia	6	-2.7		-0.6	23.8	74.2			- 5777	
56 P	oland	86	0.7	199	0.4	69.3	31.1	3.2	040	**	
57 R	ussian Federation	346	-1.8		-1.0	35.4	873.5	1.00			10
Aediu	m human development	260T	-0.9		-1.0	30.5	1,824.0	1975	140	22	
61 B	elarus	29	1.8	122	2.4	30.9	1,428.7			22	-2.9
	lulgaria	10	0.2		0.5	15.9	57.5	-11.0		10	-12.9
	stonia	4	-3.9		-2.2	29.8	81.2				-2.0
72 K	azakhstan	24	-2.0		-1.6	35.2	1,255.5		**	**	1000
74 R	omania	26	-2.3		-2.4	22.4	225.9	-1.2	1841	14	-4.7
80 L	Ikraine	114	-0.5	- 14	0.2	37.2	3,691.2			14	
81 L	ithuania	5	-3.9	19	-2.8	35.2	342.7			**	0.6
	urkmenistan			3.8		16.5	:44		100	44	
	rmenia		-14.8	548	-4.2		1,480.7	- 0	96	éé.	10
94 L	Izbekistan	22	1.7		-0.2	24.5	914.5			éè	
	zerbaijan	5	-4.5		-3.5	28.2	714.5	194	144	**	24
	Aoldova, Rep. of	5		22	-2.0	32.4	707 -	1.22	122	51	
	yrgyzstan	4	0.2	25	0.1	28.6	792.2			64	
	leorgia Ibania	3	-9.4	34	-6.6 -3.2	40.7	105.7	-2 7	4.0	10	100
	ajikistan	2	-1.5		-3.6		1,251.7	-2.7		77	
					2060	Transia -					
	eloping countries ial countries	3,840T 19,740T	4.6	2.9	3.9 1.2	86.0 6.3	289.3 70.6	3.3 2.1	1.4	<u>e</u>	-4.4
Norld	iai courrires	23,580T	2.8	3.0	3.3	18.5	103.3	2.3	1.4	50 	
X012 X 16-2	America	Press and and a		141-342		1.	The second	2011/2	1.111		
	America	6,960T	2.4	1.9	1.7	3.8	1.9	2.8	1.2	-2.9	-4.0
	n Europe and CIS m and Southern Europe	770T 6,640T	-1.1 2.1	5.1 3.4	-0.8	35.5 5.4	1,025.4 3.4	1.8	0.1	-4.8	-5.0
DECD	n and southern Europe	19,410T	2.5	3.4	1.9	5.4	2.8	2.2	1.3	-4.8	-5.0
	an Union	7,310T	2.1	3.2	2.1	5.5	3.5	1.7	1.1	-4.5	-4.5
	countries	570T	1.5	2.7	1.7	5.9	1.9	2.4	1.0	-4.6	-9.9

Source: Column 7: World Bank 1995d; columns 2-5, 9 and 10: World Bank 1995f; column 6: calculated on the basis of data from World Bank 1995e; columns 7 and 8: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995f.

47 Regional aggregates of human development indicators

All countries

	Sub- Saharan Africa	Arab States	South Asia	East Asia	East Asia excl. China	South- East Asia and Pacific	Latin America and the Carib- bean	Least developed countries			Industrial countries ^a	World
Table 1: Human development index ^b Life expectancy Adult literacy rate Combined 1st, 2nd and 3rd	50.9 55.0	62.1 53.0	60.3 48.8	68.8 81.0	71.3 95.9	63.7 86.0	68.5 85.9	51.0 46.5	61.5 68.8	69.2 97.6	74.3 98.3	63.0 76.3
level enrolment Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) Human development index	42 1,288 0.379	56 4,513 0.633	52 1,564 0.444	58 2,686 0.633	78 8,336 0.877	59 3,216 0.646	69 5,756 0.824	34 898 0.331	55 2,696 0.563	74 4,164 0.773	82 15,136 0.909	60 5,428 0.746
Table 2: Gender-related development	index											
Life expectancy Female Male	52.5 49.3	64.1 61.5	60.5 60.1	70.8 66.8	74.8 67.8	66.0 62.2	71.2 65.9	52.1 50.0	62.9 60.3	74.2 64.2	78.6 71.2	64.6 61.4
Adult literacy rate Female Male	45.4 64.7	40.4 65.6	35.0 61.7	71.9 89.1	94.3 98.3	82.6 91.4	84.2 87.0	36.1 57.5	59.8 77.6	98.7 98.9	98.5 98.7	69.6 82.5
Combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment Female	37.2	51.0	43.2	55.0	75.5	58.1	68.2	29.5	50.6	76.5	84.3	55.6
Male Share of earned income Female	45.9 35.6	63.4 20.0	59.6 23.9	61.0 37.5	82.1 27.3	60.9 35.0	68.9 26.1	40.1 32.8	59.7 31.0	72.4 40.2	81.8 37.0	63.0 32.4
Male Gender-related development index	64.4 0.366	80.0 0.513	76.1 0.410	62.5 0.610	72.7 0.808	65.0 0.621	73.9 0.722	67.2 0.318	69.0 0.530	59.8	63.0 0.868	67.6 0.600
Table 3: Gender empowerment measu				10.2			1112		10.0	4.5.7	3 3 F	12.2
Seats in parliament Administrators and managers Professional and technical workers Earned income share	9.9 10.2 27.9 35.6	5.2 13.0 30.0 20.0	6.5 3.0 21.3 23.9	19.3 11.3 45.1 37.4	2.0	8.2 14.7 46.6 35.1	11.6 20.4 49.4 26.0	7.7 8.5 23.6 32.9	10.8 10.0 36.3 31.0	40.2	14.5 27.4 47.8 37.0	12.2 14.0 38.9 32.5
Gender empowerment measure	0.279	0.290	0.234	0.471	0.282	0.386	0.416	0.269	0.351	0.453	0.569	0.391
Table 4: Profile of human development				22/05		121212			1000	024.024	202	
Life expectancy Access to health services	51.4 57 45	62.9 85	60.5 77	68.8 92	71.0 100 93	64.1 80 62	68.8 73	51.5 50	63.3 80	69.0	74.5	64.8
Access to safe water Access to sanitation	45	72 59	81 32	68 27	93	51	80 68	52 31	70 39	75)	- 77	(7.7)
Daily calorie supply per capita Adult literacy rate Combined 1st, 2nd and 3rd level	2,096 56.0	2,820 53.2	2,356 49.6	2,751 80.7	3,102 96.1	2,541 86.4	2,757 86.8	2,027 47.3	2,546 70.6	95.5	**	36 36
enrolment Daily newspapers Televisions	42 2 3	57 4 11	52 3 4	58 37 4	79 37 16	60 3 7	69 9 17	35 1 3	55 5 6	74 21 33	82 29 53	60 11 16
Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) GNP per capita (US\$)	1,385	4,645 1,725	1,575 309	2,680 825	10,689 8,494	3,249	5,822 2,966	894 210	2,703 970	4,192	15,211 16,394	5,545 4,570
Table 5: Profile of human deprivation	(millions u		nerwise st	ated)								
Refugees (thousands; total) No health services (total)	5,439 205	1,230 36	4,558 286	290 96	2	122	125 74	5,220 262	11,787 788	656	3,793	15,580
No safe water (total)	285	67	248	398	4	180	92	265	1,282	44		
No sanitation (total)	293	98	850	911	1	229	147	359	2,527			
Illiterate adults (total) Illiterate females (total) Children not in primary school	121 75	59 37	416 257	167 121	1	38 26	42 23	152 92	851 544	2	44.5 46.5	- 44
(thousands) Malnourished children under five		3.5	3.0	199		3(#)	H.	245	285	245	300	- 6.0
(thousands; total) Children dying before age five	22,464	3,138	84,603	19,355	38	20,795	5,805	26,736	156,935	475	34.5	(44)
(thousands; total)	4,115	617	4,783	954	29	1,048	557	4,080	12,162	196	284	12,446
Table 6: Trends in human developmen Life expectancy	it											
1960 1993	40.1 51.0	45.2 62.1	43.6 60.3	47.5 68.8	54.5 71.3	45.4 63.7	55.4 68.5	38.8 51.1	46.0 61.5	66.8 69.2	68.7 74.3	49.9 63.0
Infant mortality rate 1960 1993	167 97	167 66	164 84	146 42	83 18	127 53	107 45	173 110	150 70	:++: :+1		
Access to safe water 1975-80 1990-95	25 43	69 76	27 71	70 94	70 94	15 63	60 81	21 38	40 68) 490	88)	- 14
Underweight children (under five) 1975	43	20	69	26	. 94	46	16	51	40	144	-	
1985-95 Adult literacy rate	31	11	51	17		37	10	45	30	-		
1970	27	29	31	88	88	65	71	28	43	200		e.
1993 Enrolment ratio, all levels (% age 6-2		55	48	98	98	86	85	47	61		100	1-8
1980 1990 Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)	39 36	48 55	37 45	51 44	65 73	51 54	59 62	31 31	46 47		24) 94	**
1960 1993	990 1,379	931 4,263	698 1,576	729 2,681	869 11,088	732 3,680	2,138 5,816	561 887	915 2,709	546 546	(64) (64)	22 22

47 Regional aggregates of human development indicators (continued)

	Sub- Saharan Africa	Arab States	South Asia	East Asia	East Asia excl. China	South- East Asia and Pacific	Latin America and the Carib- bean	Least developed countries	All develop- ing countries	Europe	Industrial countries ^a	World
Table 7: South-North gaps (expressed as	s % of ave	rage for	North)									
Life expectancy 1960	58	65	63	69	78	66	80	56	65		100	
1993	68	83	81	92	96	86	92	68	82		100	44) 24
Adult literacy							200		0.0		522	
1970 1993	30 57	31 57	35 51	17.	177	70 90	78 90	32 50	48 66	**	100	37
Daily calorie supply per capita	37	27	21	结		90	50	00	00	**	100	30
1965	75	71	71	70	78	70	82	72	72	14	100	3.8.5
1992 Access to safe water	67	89	76	88	96	81	88	65	81		100	222
1975-80	2942	200	29		29.00	100	÷+;	344		10	22	3473
1990-95	442	**	73		++2	368 S	**			e.+.	**	300
Under-five mortality 1960	17	17	17	21	35	24	30	15	20		100	331
1994	12	32	17	44	80	30	49	12	28	22	100	1220
Table 8: Rural-urban gaps	1000	-	0.02		1000	10000		122	1.320	100		1222
Rural population (% of total)	70	50	73	69	26	68	27	79	64	34	27	56
Access to health services Rural	50	70	73	89				0.41	76			10.0-5
Urban	81	94	99	100	2492	39.2	55	(44)	96	64	17	1483
Access to safe water Rural	35	51	78	56	75	55	51	48	60		85	61
Urban	63	95	87	97	100	79	87	65	87			
Access to sanitation	1.1.1.1.1								2.0			
Rural Urban	30 56	33 85	18 71	8 77	94 99	41 70	36	24	20 72	22	-	4.4
Rural-urban disparity	50	05		//		10	N. 9	01	16	**	10	
Health services	63	81	72	90			-	7.4	78		05	C 0
Safe water Sanitation	56 55	54 45	90 26	58 18	75 92	70 63	59 44	74 38	69 35	**	85	69
Table 9: Women and capabilities		42	20	10	24	60	No.	50				
Female net enrolment												
Primary	F 4	70	714	05	100	0.4	0.0	50	0.4	0.2	07	07
1992 Index (1980=100)	54 113	78	71 137	95 100	100	94 114	86 105	50 122	84 118	93 96	97 101	87 112
Secondary										0.7		
1992 Index (1980 - 199)	18 51	44	12	85	85	34 0	44 53	10	33 86	76	87 50	52 72
Index (1980=100) Female tertiary students	21	100	176	131	131	0	22	116	00	116	20	12
1992	236	925	326	234	2,866	733	321	70	365	2,594	3,515	1,139
Index (1980=100) Female life expectancy	228	222	207	240	324	271	137	214	227	92	133	208
1993	52.5	63.5	60.5	70.8	74.5	65.6	71.2	52.1	62.8	73.8	77.9	64.6
Index (1970=100)	116	124	126	114	120	126	116	120	121	104	106	119
Total fertility rate 1992	6.3	4.9	4.2	2.0	1.9	3.3	3.1	5.8	3.5	1.9	1.8	3.1
Index (1970=100)	95	70	71	37	39	59	59	88	60	75	76	63
Maternal mortality rate	929	392	576	95	100	412	180	1,015	384	62	28	307
Table 10: Women and political and eco Administrators and managers	nomic pa	rticipati	on									
% female	10	13	3	11	207	15	20	9	10		27	14
female as % of male	12	15	3	13	6	19	26	596	12	**	44	18
Professional and technical workers % female	28	30	21	45		47	49	24	36		48	39
female as % of male	42	45	29	81	65	92	106	2-4	65		95	71
Clerical and sales workers				10			40					
% female female as % of male			5	40 66		22. 14	48		10		2	
Service workers	(77)				125							
% female		122	26	52	- 4.9	57	56	122	11	221	57 I	.00
female as % of male Share of women	1225		48	108	100	28.	153	(22)	12	51	10	8 1 1)
in government	7.7	2.6	4.7	2.4	1.4	7.1	13.6	7.0	7.6	5.4	10.8	8.7
at ministerial level	7.9 9.0	4.4	6.5	3.2	1.8	6.5 8.1	10.7 15.5	8.6 7.7	7.7	5.6 6.2	12.6	9.1 9.6
at sub-ministerial level Table 11: Child survival and developme		2+1	4.7	2.5	1.4	0.1	10.0	1.1	0.3	0.2	11.2	5.0
Pregnant women with anaemia	ent	- 24	2400			62		4.4	10	22	34.5	3442
Births attended by trained health												
personnel Low-birth-weight infants	39 16	46	33 32	94 9	93	56 15	83	29 23	63 19	100 7	99 6	69 18
Maternal mortality rate	929	392	576	95	100	442	180	1,015	384	62	28	307
Infant mortality rate	97	66	84	42	18	53	45	110	70	25	13	63
Under-five mortality rate Mothers breast-feeding at 6 months	174 94	73	119 80	42 60	21	81 91	46 51	171	97 76	36	18	86
moniels preast-recurry at a months		49	47	84	83	64	64	57	63	7.5 57	72	(**)
Oral rehydration therapy use rate Underweight children under five	49	49	47	04	00	04	04	- F F			.2.5	31

ş	Sub- Saharan Africa	Arab States	South Asia	East Asia	East Asia excl. China	South- East Asia and Pacific	Latin America and the Carib- bean	Least developed countries	All develop- ing countries	Europe	Industria countries	
Table 12: Health profile												
One-year-olds fully immunized												
against tuberculosis	64	86	92	93	85	94	93	71	86	88	87	86
against measles	51	79 0.5	83 0.5	89 0.6	94	87	83	60	78	89	83	79
AIDS cases Malaria cases	12.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	3.8	5.0	8.3	6.7	0.6	9.2	7.7
	8,488	1,509	3,767	1,169	1,169	6,210	1,039	18,496	5,767	378	344	4,968
	6,504	991	5,548	1,479	1,479	2,153	3,500	13,790	4,715			
People with disabilities	**			20000	20102-01 10							
Public expenditure on health												
as % of GNP	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.2	0.5	1.2	0.8	0.9		122	
as % of GDP	2,4	2.9	1.4	2.2	2.3	1.0	2,4	1.8	2.0	35		**
Table 13: Food security												
Food production per capita index	97	118	119	142	87	128	103	92	122	93	96	117
Agricultural production	19	12	30	14	7	23	9	48	15	15	3	6
Food consumption Daily calorie supply per capita	2,096	2,820	2,356	2,751	3,102	2,541	2,757	2,027	2,546	244		**
Food imports	2,000	2,020	2,000	21131	5,102	2,041	6,131	2. 10.12.1	2,340	(+1)	**	¥4
as % of merchandise imports												
1970	7	22	20	13	19	14	10	8	13	4	17	16
1993	7	15	8	5	6	7	9	15	7	10	11	10
			10,778	19,425		10,389	25,326		106,714	28,671	99,367	206,081
and the second	4,464	1,783	1,654	116	9	332	1,564	4,675	9,915	4,053		13,968
Table 14: Education imbalances												
Pupil-teacher ratio	20	24	47	22	22	27	26	45		10	10	20
Primary Secondary	39 25	24 18	47	22	32 24	27 19	26 15	45 26	33 22	19 14	18 14	30 20
Secondary technical enrolment	6.6	9.9	1.7	9.5	17.8	10	18.1	5.1	7.3			
Tertiary natural and applied science	0.0		1.41	0.0	17.0	10	10.1	2.1	1.0	100	10	**
enrolment	30	26	26	44	40	23	28	23	30	38	21	25
Tertiary students abroad	13	6	2	5	4	2	1	9	3	2	1	2
R & D scientists and technicians	2991		0.3	1.6	24	. 69	940	**	0.8	500	4.6	24
Public expenditure on education												
as % of GNP	E 1	4.1	4.3	2.0	37	2.0	2.7	2.2	2.0	2.0	E A	EO
1980 1992	5.1	6.4	4.3 3.8	2.9	3.7	2.8	3.7 4.2	3.2	3.8 3.9	3.9 5.2	5.4	5.0 5.1
as % of total government	3.1	0.4	5.0	2.0	4.5	2.4	4.2	.5.0	2.9	3.2	5.4	5.1
expenditure	19.9	20.5	16.9	13.1	14.8	14.1	16.0	12.1	15.7	15.5	13.7	14.0
Public expenditure on												
primary and secondary education	79	74	69	73	79	76	64	78	71	73	72	72
higher education	15	25	15	16	12	16	23	14	18	14	22	21
Table 15: Communication profile												
Radios	144	255	87	212	680	153	345	94	176	2.99	1,048	349
Televisions	23	107	33	38	156	60	162	9	56		533	151
Registered public library users	355	1.4	7.160	20 505	20 505	7 601	733	50	10 250	41.007	04 162	124 421
(thousands; total) Book titles published	222	14	7,160 2	28,595	28,595	2,681	155	53	40,258	41,992	84,163 43	124,421
Printing and writing paper consumed	1.5	2.8	1.2	5.7	22.4	3.3	5.9		3.5		61.9	14.1
Post offices	122		16.9	0.97	201	6				192	1997	
Main telephone lines	1	3.7	0.8	2.1	24.2	1.5	6.5	0.3	2.3	13.2	37.2	9.9
International telephone calls	44		++	4.4				1	77			**
Fax machines Mobile cellular telephone subscribers		22.		22	2.9	11	0.1			125	1.7	***
		44		325	35		2.68		++	2,41	2.5	
Table 16: Employment		22	4.75			4.7		4.72	477	10		
Labour force Women's share of labour force	44 42	33 25	42 31	59 45	47 41	47	40 33	47 43	47 39	49 47	49	47
Labour force in agriculture	42	20	21	40	41	42	33	45	29	47	44	40
1960	81	65	74	82	58	77	49	87	76	41	26	61
1990	66	39	63	70	23	59	27	76	61	20	10	49
Labour force in industry												
1960	7	12	11	7	17	7	20	4	9	30	35	17
1990	9	21	16	16	34	14	23	9	16	39	33	20
Labour force in services	22	1252	20	2.5		2.2						
1960	11	23	15	11	25	16	30	9	15	28	38	22
1990 Real earnings growth rate	25	40	21	14	43	27	50	15	23	42	57	31
neal carrierus arowin rate												
1970-80	0.00	+7.1	0.5	1995	++ 2	841		99.2	2.0	1.0	2.94	10

47 Regional aggregates of human development indicators (continued)

	Sub- Saharar Africa	Arab States	South Asia	East Asia	East Asia excl. China	South- East Asia and Pacific	America and the Carib-	Least developed countries			Industrial	World
Table 17: Wealth, poverty and social	l investmen				0.0			202.0		Section.	50 Jack 10 10	10.000
Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) GNP per capita (US\$) Income share	1,385 555	4,645 1,725	1,575 309	2,680 825	10,689 8,494	3,249 1,089	5,822 2,966	894 210	2,703 970	4,192 1,992	15,211 16,394	5,545 4,570
Lowest 40% of households Ratio of highest 20%	215	**	**			-64	4.0	1.0	++-	25	-91	55
to lowest 20%	395		36	10	20	241	360	2005	0.982	89.3	5.6±	1.0
Urban people in poverty Rural people in poverty Social security benefits expenditure	000 040	24 54	47	4.0	10 10	144		4.0 4.0) 44) (44)		2.89 (10)	69 16
(as % of GDP) Public expenditure on education	ес 3443	÷.	17	240	11			-1.0	144		44	
as % of GNP	5,7	6.4	3.8	2.8	4.3	3.4	4.2	3.0	3.9	5.2	5.4	5.1
Public expenditure on health as % of GDP	2,4	2.9	1.4	2.2	2.3	1.0	2.4	1.8	2.0	.0		**
Table 18: Resource flow imbalances												
Total external debt US\$ billions (total)	200°	112	161	131	48	229	489	83	1,332	192		
as % of GNP	730		38	15		52	41	78	40	27	39	55. FX
Debt service ratio 1980	10 ^c	21	12	12	20	15	39	18	23	13		
1993	15 ^c	37	25	10	20	19	29	17	21	6	2.44	**
Total net ODA received	10.000					-		1000000				
US\$ millions (total) as % of GNP	18,890 ^d 10.5	6,877	7,196	3,335	103 19.5	5,485 1.3	5,785 0,4	16,240	60,930 1,4	1.6		**
per capita (US\$)	32	29	6	3	19.5	12	13	28	11	1.0	244	
Export-import ratio	86	98	72	95	98	98	83	60	91	105	105	
Terms of trade Current account balance	90	98	96	95	92	100	99	81	96	99	104	
(US\$ millions; total)	-8,022 -	10,937	-9,477	-11,412	486	-13,551	-45,737	-9,120	-106,249	-12,413	57,517	-48,732
Table 19: Military expenditure and r			nces									
Defence expenditure (US\$ millions, 1985 (total)			30,700	39 857	13 774	14 740	18,545	5,588	179,671	22 250	612,544	797 220
1994 (total)			13,992	46,262	18,582	13,793	18,423	3,514	C 0 0 5 5 7 5 1 5		638,068	
as % of GDP	2.1	17.0	7.0	7.9	- 3	3.9	1.0	4.0	r r.		x +	4.7
1985 1994	2.1	12.5 7.6	7.6 3.4	7.7	7.4	4.7 2.6	1.8 1.6	4.0	5.5	8.0	4.1	4.3 3.2
per capita	Sec. 1 ad	1.0	2.4		4.0	A-157	1.52	Ko of	0.0	0.0	2.1	-
1985	21	357	33	36	217	36	47	14	52	202	718	171
1994 as % of education	14	170	11	36	264	28	39	7	34	292	525	141
and health expenditure												
1960	27	129	113	343	273	110	55		143		97	104
1990-91 Imports of conventional weapons	43	91	72	85	49	61	25	1771	60		33	37
US\$ millions (total)	194	3,844	2,447	628	626	318	627	323	9,999	59	7,837	17,836
Index (1990 = 100)	-64	72	75	43	47	53	124	90	83	5	97	89
Total armed forces (thousands) Thousands (total) Index (1985=100)	810 95	2,286	2,642	4,712 88	1,782	1,803 86	1,407 105	1,272	14,173 97	3,479 95	7,845 83	22,018 93
Table 20: Growing urbanization	55	107	121	0.0	121	00	105	121	97	95	00	22
Urban population (% of total)												
1960	15	30	17	20	36	18	50	9	22	47	61	34
1993 2000	30 34	50 54	27 30	31 37	74 79	32 37	73 77	22 26	36 40	66 68	73 75	44 47
Urban population growth rate												
1960-93	5.0	4.4	3,7	3.2	4.2	4.1	3.6	5.2	3.8	1.9	1.4	2.7
1993-2000 Population in cities of more than 7	4.9	3.5	3,5	3.5	2.1	3.9	2.4	5.3	3.5	0.7	0,7	2.5
as % of total population	10	20	10	12	40	11	31	8	14	18	29	17
as % of urban population	34	40	39	41	56	36	42	41	39	27	40	39
Population of largest city as % of urban population	28	31	11	9	36	26	24	37	18	13	15	17
Table 21: Demographic profile Population (millions)			10 M				100101			0.99-90 U	16757	
1960 (total)	209	96	596	697	40	227	214	241	2,068	296	929	2,996
1993 (total)	522	241	1,272	1,272	75	472	460	552	4,299	391	1,209	5,508
2000 (total) Population growth rate	637	286	1,466	1,366	82	533	519	671	4,876	395	1,244	6,120
1960-93	2.8	2.8	2.3	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.2	0.8	0.8	1.9
1993-2000	2.9	2.5	2.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	1.7	2.8	1.8	0.2	0.4	1.5
Population doubling date Crude birth rate	2017 44.8	2021 34.2	2027 31.4	2061	2052	2033 27.0	2034 25.8	2018 42.9	2032 28.1	2411 13.7	2163 13.2	2039 24.8
Crude death rate	15.1	8.5	9.9	7.2	6.0	8.0	6.7	14.9	9,1	11.3	10.0	9.3
Total fertility rate	6.3	4.9	4.2	2.0	1.9	3.3	3.1	5.8	3.5	1.9	1.8	3.1
Contraceptive prevalence rate	15	34	41	83	79	51	58	19	55	65	73	58

	Sub- Saharan Africa	Arab States	South Asia	East Asia	East Asia excl. China	South- East Asia and Pacific	Latin America and the Carib- bean	Least developed countries	All develop- ing countries	Europe	Industrial countries ^a	World
Table 22: Natural resources balance shee	et			or seen			1. C		A		Line and	
	2,098	1,265	678	1,135	179	500	2,042	2,044	7,797	2,319	5,503	13,300
Forest and woodland	32.6	6.4	14.5 33.1	13.8	15.4	54.8 12.3	44.8 6.0	30.7 5.6	28.7 9.2	36.7	35.1 11.3	31.3
Arable land Irrigated land	6.2 3.8	4.3 23.3	36.6	8.5 53.9	57.7	22.9	13.8	11.6	26.2	9.0	9.9	18.7
Deforestation per year	162	224	814			534	1,967	214	866	5.0		15,517
Deforestation rate	0.9	1.4	1.6			1.2	0.9	0.9	1.1	20		0.4
Reforestation per year	11	25	103	4,453	140	72	207	6	797	4.4	44	14,713
Production of fuel wood	<i>a</i>											
and charcoal (millions of cubic metres		20	0.714	100	17	2.2.7	220	350	1.754	17	122	1.200
1979-81 (total) 1993 (total)	307 453	30 42	271 358	166 209	12	227 294	238 304	256 369	1,254	12	132 205	1,386
Internal renewable water resources	400	42	220	209	9	2.94	504	509	1,070	05	205	1,074
per capita (thousands of cubic												
metres)	7.3	0.7	3.2	2.4	2.3	13.0	23.5	10.8	6.5	12.1	10.9	7.6
Annual fresh water withdrawals												
as % of water resources	100		F.F.			**	**			**		8e
per capita	122	1,008	753	460	421	264	518	242	520	727	1,150	641
Table 23: Energy consumption												
Production as % of national energy res	erves											
Coal	0.00	0.66	EX.	300	98	89			1.00	2.9		0.4e
Natural gas	0.9	200	10	22	44	59	11	1.0	244	240	÷>	1.6 ^e 2.2 ^e
Crude oil Commercial energy production			**			**	4.4	**	4.4	9.0	Ð	2.2
annual growth rate												
1971-80				520	<u></u>		222		722			
1980-93				44	40.					5.5		14
Commercial energy consumption												
annual growth rate												
1971-80	244.5			22.2	22.5			23				
1980-93	2002	1.0	88.	+3	255	34	211	8 B	2.0	20.2	22.1	22
Commercial energy use per capita 1971	251	328	123	290	548	142	592	42	255		4,211	1,185
1993	288	1,227	267	711	2,719	380	918	50	536	3,356	4,589	1,421
GDP output per kg	200	11221	201	2.1.1	E1112	200	210	50	220	3,230	1,000	14.16-1
1971	2.3	22	1.4	0.6	1442	1.0	1.2	**	1.2	1.0	3.45	2.2
1993	3.7		1.5	1.9	3.9	2.7	4.0	6.4	2.8	0.6	5.1	3.1
Commercial energy imports												
as % of merchandise exports							0		4.0			
1971	7		8	9		19 9	9		10 14	44	11	11
1993	100		34	9	-1.1	9	0	77	14		11	11
Table 24: National income accounts				0.10	100	100			2 770	755	10 1 10	22.027
GDP (US\$ billions; total)	236	323	415	848	422	462	1,338	83	3,778	755	19,149 3	22,927
Agriculture as % of GDP Industry as % of GDP	19 33	12 40	30 26	14	37	23 34	9 33	48 15	15 35	15 45	37	6 36
Services as % of GDP	48	49	43	46	58	46	57	37	50	39	60	58
Private consumption												
Government consumption	67	51	65	53	55	57	77	81	65	60	62	63
Provide the second s	67 18	51 25	65 12	53 10	55 11	57 10		81 15	65 13			63 16
Gross domestic investment	18 16	25 24	12 24	10 37	11 32	10 33	77 10 20	15 17	13 26	60 18 22	62 17 21	16 21
Gross domestic savings	18 16 15	25 24 23	12 24 23	10 37 37	11 32 34	10 33 34	77 10 20 19	15 17 5	13 26 26	60 18	62 17 21 21	16 21 22
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP	18 16	25 24	12 24	10 37	11 32	10 33	77 10 20	15 17	13 26	60 18 22	62 17 21	16 21
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure	18 16 15 24	25 24 23 17	12 24 23 10	10 37 37 9	11 32 34 17	10 33 34 17	77 10 20 19 18	15 17 5 13	13 26 26 14	60 18 22 22	62 17 21 21 26	16 21 22 24
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP	18 16 15 24 31	25 24 23 17 39	12 24 23 10	10 37 37 9	11 32 34 17	10 33 34 17 20	77 10 20 19 18 24	15 17 5 13 36	13 26 26 14 21	60 18 22 22	62 17 21 26 34	16 21 22 24 31
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP	18 16 15 24 31 23.8	25 24 23 17 39 30.8	12 24 23 10 19 12.1	10 37 37 9 13 36.5	11 32 34 17 17 51.7	10 33 34 17 20 45.5	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7	15 17 5 13 36 10.8	13 26 26 14 21 23.0	60 18 22 22 	62 17 21 26 34 14.1	16 21 22 24 31 15.5
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5	25 24 23 17 39	12 24 23 10	10 37 37 9	11 32 34 17	10 33 34 17 20	77 10 20 19 18 24	15 17 5 13 36	13 26 26 14 21	60 18 22 22	62 17 21 26 34	16 21 22 24 31
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0	16 21 22 24 15.5 15.8
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total)	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 nce 254	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0	16 21 22 24 15.5 15.8
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total)	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 nce 254	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 nce 254 1.5	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358 4.6	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325 1.7	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2.4	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.8
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93 Average annual rate of inflation	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 nce 254 1.5 -0.6	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3 2.6 0.8	12 24 23 10 12.1 17.3 358 4.6 1.4 2.9	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3 4.2 8.2	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6 5.1 7.5	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0 3.6 3.6	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325 1.7 3.9 -0.1	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7 0.4 0.5	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6 2.9 3.9	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1 5.1 -0.8	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2,4 3.1 1.2	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.8 3.0 3.3
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93 Average annual rate of inflation 1980-93	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 10 254 1.5 -0.6 13.9	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3 2.6 0.8 8.6	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358 4.6 1.4 2.9 11.2	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3 4,2 8,2 6,9	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6 5.1 7.5 6.9	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0 3.6 3.6 7.1	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325 1.7 3.9 -0.1 251.7	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7 0.4 0.5 19.8	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6 2.9 3.9 86.0	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1 5.1 -0.8 35.5	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2.4 3.1 1.2 6.3	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.8 3.0
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93 Average annual rate of inflation 1980-93 1993	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 254 1.5 -0.6 13.9 15.1	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3 2.6 0.8 8.6 9.2	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358 4.6 1.4 2.9 11.2 16.7	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3 4.2 8.2 6.9 12.0	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6 5.1 7.5 6.9 11.6	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0 3.6 3.6 7.1 11.1	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325 1.7 3.9 -0.1 251.7 872.1	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7 0.4 0.5 19.8 18.8	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6 2.9 3.9 86.0 289.3	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1 5.1 -0.8 35.5 1,025.4	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2.4 3.1 1.2 6.3 70.6	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.8 3.0 3.3 18.5
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93 Average annual rate of inflation 1980-93 1993 Exports as % of GNP, growth rate	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 254 1.5 -0.6 13.9 15.1 0.3	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3 2.6 0.8 8.6 9.2	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358 4.6 1.4 2.9 11.2 16.7 3.9	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3 4.2 8.2 6.9 12.0 3.1	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6 5.1 7.5 6.9 11.6 3.4	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0 3.6 3.6 7.1 11.1 2.0	77 10 20 19 18 24 9,7 11.4 1,325 1.7 3.9 -0.1 251.7 872.1 3.9	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7 0.4 0.5 19.8 18.8 1.4	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6 2.9 3.9 86.0 289.3 3.3	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1 5.1 -0.8 35.5 1,025.4	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2.4 3.1 1.2 6.3 70.6 2.1	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.8 3.0 3.3 18.5 2.3
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93 Average annual rate of inflation 1980-93 1993 Exports as % of GNP, growth rate Tax revenue as % of GNP, growth rate	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 254 1.5 -0.6 13.9 15.1	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3 2.6 0.8 8.6 9.2	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358 4.6 1.4 2.9 11.2 16.7	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3 4.2 8.2 6.9 12.0	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6 5.1 7.5 6.9 11.6	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0 3.6 3.6 7.1 11.1	77 10 20 19 18 24 9.7 11.4 1,325 1.7 3.9 -0.1 251.7 872.1	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7 0.4 0.5 19.8 18.8	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6 2.9 3.9 86.0 289.3	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1 5.1 -0.8 35.5 1,025.4	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2.4 3.1 1.2 6.3 70.6	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.8 3.0 3.3 18.5
Gross domestic savings Tax revenue as % of GNP Central government expenditure as % of GNP Exports as % of GDP Imports as % of GDP Table 25: Trends in economic performar GNP (US\$ billions; total) GNP annual growth rate GNP per capita annual growth rate 1965-80 1980-93 Average annual rate of inflation 1980-93 1993 Exports as % of GNP, growth rate	18 16 15 24 31 23.8 22.5 254 1.5 -0.6 13.9 15.1 0.3	25 24 23 17 39 30.8 29.1 233 2.3 2.6 0.8 8.6 9.2	12 24 23 10 19 12.1 17.3 358 4.6 1.4 2.9 11.2 16.7 3.9	10 37 37 9 13 36.5 38.5 1,026 9.3 4.2 8.2 6.9 12.0 3.1	11 32 34 17 51.7 52.9 449 8.6 5.1 7.5 6.9 11.6 3.4	10 33 34 17 20 45.5 50.1 454 6.0 3.6 3.6 7.1 11.1 2.0	77 10 20 19 18 24 9,7 11.4 1,325 1.7 3.9 -0.1 251.7 872.1 3.9	15 17 5 13 36 10.8 23.0 82 2.7 0.4 0.5 19.8 18.8 1.4	13 26 26 14 23.0 25.3 3,835 4.6 2.9 3.9 86.0 289.3 3.3	60 18 22 22 14.3 14.2 768 -1.1 5.1 -0.8 35.5 1,025.4	62 17 21 26 34 14.1 14.0 19,743 2.4 3.1 1.2 6.3 70.6 2.1	16 21 22 24 31 15.5 15.8 23,578 2.3 3.0 3.3 18.5 2.3

Note: Columns 1-9 are for developing countries only. a. Includes Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. b. Aggregates for table 1 differ from those for other tables because table 1 includes a number of Human Development Report Office estimates that are presented and used only in the calculation of the human development index. These estimates are not used in other indicator tables. c. World Bank 1994b. d. OECD 1996 e. UN 1994a. f. The percentage shares of agriculture, industry and services do not necessarily add to 100 due to rounding.

48 Status of selected international human rights instruments

	International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights 1966	International covenant on civil and political rights 1966	International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination 1969	Convention on the prevention and punish- ment of the crime of genocide 1948	Convention on the rights of the child 1989	Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 1979	Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 1984	Convention relating to the status of refugees 1954
Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola	•	•	0 0 b	•	0 0 0	•	0 0	•
Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria	• • •	0' 0'	0 0 0 0	•	• • •	0	0 0 0 0	•
Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados	•	•	•	:	0 0 0	•		•
Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan	•	0	0	•	0 0 0	0 0 0	• •	•
Bolivia Bosnia Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam	•	0 0	•	•	•	•	•	• • •
Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon	• • •	0 0 0	0 0 0	•	• • •	•	•	• • •
Canada Cape Verde Central African Rep. Chad Chile	0 0 0		• • •	•	• • • •	0 0 0	0	•
China Colombia Comoros Congo Costa Rica	•	•	• •	:	•	•	•	:
Côte d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Rep.	•	0	• • •	•	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	•
Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador	•	0	•b	•	0 0 0	•	•	•
Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia	•	•	•		0 0 0	0	•	•
Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon	0	•		•		0 0 0	• • •	•
Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece	•	0' 0 0'	•	0 0 0		0	•	•
Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana	0 0 0	•	0	٠	0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	•	•

	International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights 1966	International covenant on civil and political rights 1966	International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination 1969	Convention on the prevention and punish- ment of the crime of genocide 1948	Convention on the rights of the child 1989	Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 1979	Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 1984	Convention relating to the status of refugees 1954
Haiti Holy See Honduras Hungary Iceland	•		0 0 0 0		•		•	•••••
India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Rep. of Iraq Ireland	•	•	•	•		:	0	•
Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan	•				•		•	•
Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Dem. People's Rep. c Korea, Rep. of	● of ●	•	•	•	0 0 0	•	•	•
Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People's Dem, Rep. Latvia Lebanon	•	•	•	•	• • •	•	•	
Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein Lithuania	•		0 0	00000	0 0 0	0 0 0	•	•
Luxembourg Macedonia FYR Madagascar Malawi Malaysia	0 0 0	0° 0 0	0 0	•	•	0000	0° 0	•
Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Mauritius Mexico Moldova, Rep. of Monaco Mongolia	•	•	0 0 0	•	•	•	•	•
Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru	•	•	•		•	•	•	•
Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger	• • • • •	0 0 0		•	•	•	• • •	•
Nigeria Niue Norway Oman Pakistan	•	•	0 0 ⁰	•	•	•	•	•
Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru	•	•	•	•	•	0 0 0	•	•
Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania	•	•	0000	•	•	•	•	•

Status of selected international human rights instruments (continued)

	International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights 1966	International covenant on civil and political rights 1966	International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination 1969	Convention on the prevention and punish- ment of the crime of genocide 1948	Convention on the rights of the child 1989	Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 1979	Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 1984	Conventior relating to the status of refugees 1954
Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis	8	•	•	•			•	•
Saint Lucia Saint Vincent	•			•				
Samoa (Western) San Marino São Tomé and Principe	•	•			•	•		•
Saudi Arabia Senegal	•	•	• ^b	•	•	•	•	•
Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore	•	•	•	•	•		•	:
Slovakia Slovenia	•	01 01	•					
Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa		•	•		•		•	
Spain Sri Lanka				•				
Sudan Suriname Swaziland		•	•		•	٠	0	•
Sweden Switzerland		•	•	٠	•	0	•	0
Syrian Arab Rep. Tajikistan Tanzania, U. Rep. of	•	•		•	•		•	
Thailand Togo	•	•	•	•			•	
Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey	•	0	•	•	0	•	0	•
Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine	:	•			•	:	:	•
United Arab Emirates United Kingdom	•	•		•	•	•	● ^d	
JSA Jruguay Jzbekistan /anuatu	•	0	0 0 ^b	•		0	0 0 0	٠
Venezuela		•	•	•	ě	ě	•	
Viet Nam Yemen Yugoslavia	•	•	•	•	•	•		•
Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe	0			0				0
Total states parties Signatures not followed	133	132	145	117	187	149	93	124
by ratification Ratification accession and	4	4	6	3	2	5	13	0

 Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance or definitive signature.
 Signature not yet followed by ratification.
 a. Declaration recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee under Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 b. Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under Article 14 of the International Covvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of Racial Discrimination. c. Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee against Torture under Articles 21 and 22 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

Declaration net competence of the committee update interesting of the committee update in

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1. Computing the human development index

The HDI is based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (twothirds weight) and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios (one-third weight); and standard of living, as measured by real GDP per capita (PPP\$).

For the construction of the index, fixed minimum and maximum values have been established for each of these indicators:

- · Life expectancy at birth: 25 years and 85 years
- Adult literacy: 0% and 100%
- Combined enrolment ratio: 0% and 100%

 Real GDP per capita (PPP\$): PPP\$100 and PPP\$40,000.

For any component of the HDI, individual indices can be computed according to the general formula:

Index =
$$\frac{\text{Actual } x_i \text{ value } - \min x_i \text{ value}}{\text{Maximum } x_i \text{ value } - \min x_i \text{ value}}$$

If, for example, the life expectancy at birth in a country is 65 years, the index of life expectancy for this country would be:

Life expectancy index =
$$\frac{65-25}{85-25} = \frac{40}{60} = 0.667$$

The construction of the income index is a little more complex. The average world income of PPP\$5,711 is taken as the threshold level (y^*), and any income above this level is discounted using the following formulation based on Atkinson's formula for the utility of income:

$$W'(y) = y^* \text{ for } 0 < y < y^*$$

= $y^* + 2[(y - y^*)^{1/2}] \text{ for } y^* \le y \le 2y^*$
= $y^* + 2(y^*)^{1/2} + 3[(y - 2y^*)^{1/3}] \text{ for } 2y^* \le y \le 3y$

To calculate the discounted value of the maximum income of PPP\$40,000, the following form of Atkinson's formula is used:

$$W'(y) = y^* + 2(y^{*1/2}) + 3(y^{*1/3}) + 4(y^{*1/4}) + 5(y^{*1/5}) + 6(y^{*1/6}) + 7(y^{*1/7}) + 8[(40,000 - 7y^*)^{1/8}]$$

This is because PPP\$40,000 is between $7y^*$ and $8y^*$. With the above formulation, the discounted value of the maximum income of PPP\$40,000 is PPP\$6,040.

The construction of the HDI is illustrated with two examples—Greece, an industrial country, and Gabon, a developing country.

Country	Life expectancy (years)		Combined enrolment ratio (%)	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)
Greece	77.7	93.8	78	8,950
Gabon	53.7	60.3	47	3,861

Life expectancy index

Greece =
$$\frac{77.7 - 25}{85 - 25} = \frac{52.7}{60} = 0.878$$

Gabon =
$$\frac{53.7 - 25}{85 - 25} = \frac{28.7}{60} = 0.478$$

Adult literacy index

Greece =
$$\frac{93.8 - 0}{100 - 0}$$
 = $\frac{93.8}{100}$ = 0.938
Gabon = $\frac{60.3 - 0}{100 - 0}$ = $\frac{60.3}{100}$ = 0.603

Combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio index

Greece =
$$\frac{78 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.780$$

Gabon =
$$\frac{47 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.470$$

Educational attainment index

Greece = $[2(0.938) + 1(0.780)] \div 3 = 0.885$

Gabon = $[2(0.603) + 1(0.470)] \div 3 = 0.558$

Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) index

Greece's real GDP per capita, at PPP\$8,950, is above but less than twice—the threshold. Thus, the adjusted real GDP per capita for Greece would be PPP\$5,825 because 5,825 = [5,711 + 2(8,950 - 5,711)1/2].

Gabon's real GDP per capita, at PPP\$3,861, is less than the threshold, so it needs no adjustment.

The adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) index for Greece and Gabon would be:

$$\text{Greece} = \frac{5,825 - 100}{6,040 - 100} = \frac{5,725}{5,940} = 0.964$$

$$Gabon = \frac{3,861 - 100}{6,040 - 100} = \frac{3,761}{5,940} = 0.633$$

Human development index

The HDI is a simple average of the life expectancy index, educational attainment index and the adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP\$) index. It is calculated by dividing the sum of these three indices by 3. The HDI values for Greece and Gabon are calculated using this formula:

Country		Educational attainment index		HDI
Greece Gabon	0.878 0.478	0.885 0.558	100 States 1	0.909 0.557

2. Computing the GDI and the GEM

For comparisons among countries, the gender-related development index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM) are limited to data widely available in international data sets. Data disaggregated by gender are scarce, however, and for some indicators we have used the latest available estimate. In addition, for some indicators there are variations in how broadly categories are defined.

For this year's Report we have endeavoured to use the most recent, reliable and internally consistent data. As a result, there have been significant changes in ranking for a few countries compared with last year's Report, most stemming from new estimates of real GDP per capita, wages, labour force participation rates, men's and women's shares of administrative and managerial positions or their shares of professional and technical positions.

Collecting more extensive and more reliable genderdisaggregated data is a challenge that the international community should squarely face. We continue to publish results on the GDI and the GEM—based on the best available estimates—in expectation that it will help increase the demand for such data.

The gender-related development index

The GDI uses the same variables as the HDI. The difference is that the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men. For this gender-sensitive adjustment we use a weighting formula that expresses a moderate aversion to inequality, setting the weighting parameter, \in , equal to 2. This is the harmonic mean of the male and female values.

The GDI also adjusts the maximum and minimum values for life expectancy, to account for the fact that women tend to live longer than men. For women the maximum value is 87.5 years and the minimum value 27.5 years; for men the corresponding values are 82.5 and 22.5 years.

Calculating the index for income is fairly complex. Female and male shares of earned income are derived from data on the ratio of the average female wage to the average male wage and the female and male percentage shares of the economically active population aged 15 and above. Where data on the wage ratio are not available, we use a value of 75%, the weighted mean of the wage ratio for all countries with wage data. Before income is indexed, the average adjusted real GDP per capita of each country is discounted on the basis of the disparity in the female and male shares of earned income in proportion to the female and male population shares.

The indices for life expectancy, educational attainment and income are added together with equal weight to derive the final GDI value.

Illustration of the GDI methodology

We choose Paraguay to illustrate the steps for calculating the gender-related development index. The parameter of inequality aversion, \in , equals 2. (Any discrepancies in results are due to numbers' being rounded up.)

Life expectancy Females 72.0 years Males 68.2 years STEP ONE

Computing indices for life expectancy and education

	ex		

Females (72.0 - 27.5)/60 = 0.7417Males (68.2 - 22.5)/60 = 0.7617Adult literacy Females (89.9 - 0)/100 = 0.899Males (93.1 - 0)/100 = 0.931Combined enrolment Females (61.1 - 0)/100 = 0.611Males (61.9 - 0)/100 = 0.619Educational attainment Females 1/3(0.611) + 2/3(0.899) = 0.803Males 1/3(0.619) + 2/3(0.931) = 0.827

STEP TWO

Computing proportional income shares

 Percentage share of economically active population

 Females
 27.6

 Males
 72.4

 Percentage share of total population

 Females
 48.9

 Males
 51.1

Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage: 75.5% Adjusted real GDP per capita: PPP\$3,340

Ratio of female wage to average wage (W) and of male wage to average wage (W): W = 0.276(0.755) + 0.724(1) = 0.9324Female wage to average wage: 0.755/0.9324 = 0.8098Male wage to average wage: 1.000/0.9324 = 1.0725

Share of earned income

Note: [(female wage/average wage) x female share of economically active population] + [(male wage/average wage) x male share of economically active population] = 1. Females 0.8098 x 0.276 = 0.2235 Males 1.0725 x 0.724 = 0.7765

es 1.0725 x 0.7.

 Female and male proportional income shares

 Females
 0.2235/0.489 = 0.45705

 Males
 0.7765/0.511 = 1.51957

STEP THREE Applying weighting parameter ($\in = 2$)

The equally distributed income index $[0.489(0.45705)^{-1} + 0.511(1.51957)^{-1}]^{-1} = 0.7066$ $0.7066 \ge 3,340 = 2,360$ (2,360 - 100)/(6,040 - 100) = 0.380 The equally distributed educational index $[0.489(0.803)^{-1} + 0.511(0.827)^{-1}]^{-1} = 0.815$

The equally distributed life expectancy index $[0.489(0.7417)^{-1} + 0.511(0.7617)^{-1}]^{-1} = 0.752$

STEP FOUR

Computing the gender-related development index 1/3(0.380 + 0.815 + 0.752) = 0.649

The gender empowerment measure

The GEM uses variables constructed explicitly to measure the relative empowerment of men and women in political and economic spheres of activity.

The first two variables are chosen to reflect economic participation and decision-making power: women's and men's percentage shares of administrative and managerial positions and their percentage shares of professional and technical jobs. These are broad, loosely defined occupational categories. Because the relevant population for each is different, we calculate a separate index for each and then add the two together. The third variable, women's and men's percentage shares of parliamentary seats, is chosen to reflect political participation and decision-making power.

For all three of these variables we use the methodology of population-weighted $(1-\epsilon)$ averaging to derive an "equally distributed equivalent percentage" (EDEP) for both sexes taken together. Each variable is indexed by dividing the EDEP by 50%.

An income variable is used to reflect power over economic resources. It is calculated in the same manner as for the GDI except that unadjusted real GDP per capita is used, rather than adjusted real GDP per capita. The maximum value for income is thus PPP\$40,000 and the minimum PPP\$100.

The three indices—for economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources—are added together with equal weight to derive the final GEM value.

Illustration of the GEM methodology

We choose Mexico to illustrate the steps in calculating the gender empowerment measure. The parameter of inequality aversion, \in , equals 2. (Any discrepancies in results are due to numbers' being rounded up.)

STEP ONE

Calculating indices for parliamentary representation and administrative and managerial, and professional and technical, positions

 Percentage share of parliamentary representation

 Females
 13.9

 Males
 86.1

 Percentage share of administrative and managerial positions

 Females
 20.0

 Males
 80.0

 Percentage share of professional and technical positions

 Females
 43.6

 Males
 56.4

 Percentage share of population

 Females
 50.1

 Males
 49.9

Calculating the EDEP for parliamentary representation $[0.499(86.1)^{-1} + 0.501(13.9)^{-1}]^{-1} = 23.90$

Calculating the EDEP for administrative and managerial positions $[0.499(80.0)^{-1} + 0.501(20.0)^{-1}]^{-1} = 31.96$

Calculating the EDEP for professional and technical positions $[0.499(56.4)^{-1} + 0.501(43.6)^{-1}]^{-1} = 49.168$

Indexing parliamentary representation 23.90/50 = 0.4780 Indexing administrative and managerial positions 31.96/50 = 0.6392 Indexing professional and technical positions 49.168/50 = 0.9834

Combining the indices for administrative and managerial, and professional and technical, positions (0.6392 + 0.9834)/2 = 0.8113

STEP TWO Calculating the index for share of earned income

Percentage share of economically active population Females 29.4 Males 70.6

Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage: 75% Unadjusted real GDP per capita: PPP\$7,010

Ratio of female wage to average wage (W) and of male wage to average wage (W): W = 0.294(0.75) + 0.706(1) = 0.9265Female wage to average wage: 0.75/0.9265 = 0.8095Male wage to average wage: 1.00/0.9265 = 1.0793

Share of earned income

 Note: [(female wage/average wage) x female share of economically active population] + [(male wage/average wage) x male share of economically active population] = I.

 Females
 0.8095 x 0.294 = 0.2380

 Males
 1.0793 x 0.706 = 0.7620

Female and male proportional income sharesFemales0.2380/0.501 = 0.4750Males0.7620/0.499 = 1.5271

Calculating the equally distributed income index $[0.499(1.5271)^{-1} + 0.501(0.4750)^{-1}]^{-1} = 0.7239$ $0.7239 \ge 7,010 = 5,074$ (5,074 - 100)/(40,000 - 100) = 0.1247

STEP THREE

Computing the gender empowerment measure 1/3(0.4780 + 0.8113 + 0.1247) = 0.471

3. The capability poverty measure

A person's material standard of living is generally assumed to determine his or her well-being. Consistent with this, poverty is conventionally defined as an unacceptably low material standard of living, either relative to the standard of others in a society or on the basis of some absolute minimum. The standard of living is usually measured using current expenditure or income, and a cut-off line is selected below which people are considered poor.

Since both expenditure and income are measured in money, the choice of the cut-off, or poverty, line is always somewhat arbitrary. There is no clear-cut reason for choosing one value over another. And opinions invariably differ on how much money is necessary to escape poverty. One reason is that money is merely an approximate way to measure the value of goods and services, which are no more than means to human well-being.

What is needed is a more people-centred measure of poverty that recognizes that human deprivation occurs in a number of critical dimensions. Lack of income is just one dimension, and it is focused on means rather than ends. The capability poverty measure (CPM) is a multidimensional index of poverty focused on capabilities.

Basic capabilities

Human development is defined by the expansion of capabilities. Unlike income, capabilities are ends, and they are reflected not in inputs, but in human outcomes—in the quality of people's lives. Deprivation is reflected in a lack of basic capabilities—when people are unable to reach a certain level of essential human achievement or functioning.

Leading a life free of avoidable morbidity is one such capability, being informed and educated another, and being well nourished a third. Signalling failures in these capabilities are ill health, illiteracy and very low weight. Another basic capability, one all too often ignored, is healthy reproduction.

Ideally, in measuring deprivation in capabilities, indicators should be used that directly reflect capability shortfalls. But these are often unavailable, and substitute indicators must be used that reflect the means to form or use capabilities. The availability of trained health personnel to attend births is one such indicator. Others are access to health services, to potable water and to adequate sanitation. Another is potential access to food across a population, as reflected in the average per capita calorie supply.

But indicators of actual access are more useful than those of potential access. To monitor the effectiveness of the public health system, for example, rates of immunization or use of oral rehydration therapy are preferable to data showing whether a primary health care centre is within an hour's travel time.

Deprivation in capabilities is the result of lack of opportunity—signifying that society has not provided people with access to the means to develop or maintain essential human capabilities. For example, adequate health services might not be available to ensure that people are protected against avoidable morbidity, or schooling might not be available to ensure literacy and numeracy. Removing barriers to access or ensuring that access is not merely potential or formal is the responsibility of society.

If indicators of the full range of essential capabilities were available, there would be little need to use an indirect monetary indicator such as income or expenditure to monitor deprivation. These indirect monetary measures are useful for indicating a person's command over the direct means to ensure a decent material standard of living, such as basic food, clothing and shelter and essential energy and transport. Because indicators for these direct means to material welfare are not widely available, income is used as a proxy for these means—as in the human development index.

What is the capability poverty measure?

The capability poverty measure is a simple index composed of three indicators that reflect the percentage of the population with capability shortfalls in three basic dimensions of human development: living a healthy, wellnourished life, having the capability of safe and healthy reproduction and being literate and knowledgeable. The three corresponding indicators are the percentage of children under five who are underweight, the percentage of births unattended by trained health personnel and the percentage of women aged 15 years and above who are illiterate. Technical note table 3.1 presents the CPM and its three components for 101 developing countries. It also compares each country's rank by the CPM with its rank by GDP per capita.

The CPM differs from the HDI in that it focuses on people's lack of capabilities rather than on the average level of capabilities in a country. In addition, the HDI uses income, but the CPM does not. Comparing results of the CPM with those of the HDI would show that some countries have done relatively better in raising average capabilities than in reducing capability poverty—and others have done relatively better in reducing capability poverty than in raising average capabilities.

In the CPM the problem of aggregation across the three variables is solved by choosing variables expressed in terms of the percentage of the relevant population that is poor. The threshold for defining poverty is based on the standard international definition for each variable. Standard definitions for underweight, for trained health personnel and for literacy are already in common use. Other variables with standard definitions, such as the percentage of low-birth-weight babies or the percentage of one-year-olds immunized, could also be used in a capability poverty measure.

The CPM's three variables are given equal weight in the composite index. This assumes that one basic capability is not a substitute for another that is lacking. For such "foundational" capabilities, this is a reasonable assumption, and it implies that policy should not seek to trade one off against another. If flexibility in weights is desired, respondents to household surveys could be asked to assign weights to each capability by allocating a fixed total.

When the percentages for the CPM's three variables are added together, an estimate is derived of the average capability poverty in a country. In Viet Nam, for example, about 20% of the people are capability poor, on average, in all three dimensions. For some dimensions the percentage may be lower, such as unattended births (5%), and for others it may be higher, such as underweight children (45%). But added together, Viet Nam's record in each dimension is equivalent to a situation in which 20% of the people are deprived in all three dimensions.

A multidimensional measure such as the CPM is a useful tool for analyzing poverty at the household level. By noting the number of households that are poor in a particular dimension, say, in education or nutrition, policy-makers can more effectively target their interventions. In addition, the seriousness of poverty in each household can be assessed by the number of dimensions in which household members are deprived. Households poor in a number of different dimensions should receive priority from policy-makers.

The three variables

The three variables in the CPM cover substantial ground—indications of nutrition and health for the population as a whole (underweight children), access to reproductive health services and a concrete test of access to health services in general (unattended births), and basic educational attainment plus information on gender inequality (female adult illiteracy). Through female illiteracy, for example, countries are evaluated by their treatment of the most deprived group. Rather than trying to be comprehensive by reflecting deprivation in all human priority areas, the index emphasizes critical areas where progress is needed most.

Female literacy signifies the percentage of women aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. The rate of illiteracy among women is an informative variable for assessing the general poverty situation in a country. As is now well known, educating women has a powerful multiplier effect on the well-being of families and on a society's general level of human development. As women become literate, fertility rates fall, infant and child health improves, children's educational level increases and household nutritional and sanitary conditions improve.

The threshold for underweight children is weight that is lower than two standard deviations from the median weight-for-age of an international reference group. This is a powerful variable reflecting lack of opportunity in a number of areas, most important among them health services, safe water, sanitation and adequate food. As an outcome variable, it registers the effect of many input variables.

The percentage of births unattended by trained health personnel is an input variable, but one that is a reliable predictor of such important outcome variables as the maternal mortality rate. The index uses it as a proxy for the capability of safe and healthy reproduction. The definition of trained personnel is broad: it includes physicians, nurses, midwives, trained primary health care workers and trained traditional birth attendants. Despite the broad definition, many countries still record very high percentages of unattended births.

For a few countries estimates had to be generated for the percentage of underweight children or the percentage of unattended births. To estimate the percentage of underweight children, a regression model was used that includes as explanatory variables the percentage of lowbirth-weight babies and the under-five mortality rate. For unattended births the explanatory variables are the maternal mortality rate and the infant mortality rate.

TECHNICAL NOTE TABLE 3.1 Capability poverty measure

CPM rank	Capability poverty measure (CPM) value	Births unattended by trained health personnel (%) 1983–94	Underweight children under age five (%) 1985–95	Female illiteracy rate (%) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus CPM rank ^a
1 Chile	2.8	2	1	5.5	8,900	8
2 Trinidad and Tobago	4.1	2	7	3.4	8,670	8
3 Uruguay	4.7	4	7	2.6	6,550	12
4 Costa Rica	6.1	7	6	5.4	5,680	16
5 Argentina	6.3	13	2	4.1	8,350	8
6 Barbados	6.5	10 ^b	6	3.6	10,570	1
7 Panama	7.2	4	7	10.5	5,890	11
8 Hong Kong	7.3	0	9 ^b	12.9	21,560	-6
9 Singapore	7.7	0	8 ^b	15.0	19,350	-5
10 Cuba	7.8	10	8	5.4	3,000	32
11 Korea, Rep. of	8.6	11	11 ^b	3.9	9,710	-3
12 United Arab Emirates	9.9	1	7	21.8	20,940	-9
13 Brazil	10.0	5	7	18.0	5,500	9
14 Kuwait	10.8	1	5	26.4	21,630	-13
15 Jamaica	12.3	18	7	11.7	3,180	24
16 Dominican Rep.	12.4	8	10	18.8	3,690	16
17 Mongolia	12.6	1	12	24.4	2,090	41
18 Colombia	13.4	19	12	9.4	5,790	1
19 Jordan	14.2	13	6	23.3	4,380	8
20 Ecuador	15.0	16	17	12.5	4,400	6
21 Venezuela	15.2	31	5	10.1	8,360	-10
22 Paraguay	15.9	34	4	10.1	3,340	13
23 Mexico	16.9	23	14	13.6	7,010	-9
24 China	17.5	6	17	29.1	2,330	26
25 Guyana	18.4	30 ^b	22	3.0	2,140	30
26 Sri Lanka	19.3	6	38	13.8	3,030	15
27 Viet Nam	20.1	5	45	10.5	1,040	50
28 Mauritius	20.6	15	24	22.8	12,510	-22
29 Malaysia	20.6	13	25	23.7	8,360	-17
30 Thailand	21.1	29	26	8.6	6,350	-14
31 Turkey	21.2	24	10	29.1	4,210	-3
32 Zimbabwe	22.3	30	16	21.4	2,100	24
33 Honduras	22.4	19	19	28.8	2,100	24
4 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	22.9	24	4	40.7	6,125	-17
35 Nicaragua	24.3	27	12	34.1	2,280	16
36 Lebanon	24.9	55	9	10.6	2,500	12
37 Swaziland	25.1	39 ^b	10	26.4	2,940	6
38 Saudi Arabia	25.1	10	13	52.4	12,600	-33
39 El Salvador	25.6	34	11	31.5	2,360	10
40 Peru	25.7	48	11	18.4	3,320	-4
41 Gabon	28.4	20	15	50.1	3,861	-11
42 Philippines	28.8	47	33	6.1	2,590	3
43 Iran, Islamic Rep. of	29.8	30	16	43.6	5,380	-20
44 Tunisia	29.9	31	10	48.4	4,950	-19
45 Botswana	30.4	22	27	42.2	5,220	-21
46 South Africa	30.4	29 ⁶	43	19.2	3,127	-6
47 Bolivia	31.6	53	16	26.1	2,510	0
48 Syrian Arab Rep.	32.7	39	12	47.0	4,196	-19
49 Cameroon	33.5	36	14	51.0	2,220	3
50 Kenya	33.8	46	22	33.2	1,400	18
51 Myanmar	34.4	43	37	23.4	650	45
52 Zambia	35.1	49	25	31.3	1,110	22
53 Maldives	35.5	43 ^b	56	7.4	2,200	0
54 Madagascar	36.7	44	39	27.0	700	38
55 Gambia	38.0	20	17	76.9	1,190	18
56 Lesotho	38.6	60	16	40.0	980	24
57 Ghana	39.3	41	27	49.5	2,000	2
58 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	39.4	47	25	46.1	630	40
59 Iraq	39.9	50	12	57.7	3,413	-26
60 Congo	41.7	65 ⁶	24	36.2	2,750	-16
61 Cambodia	42.0	53	38	35.0	1,250	10
62 Indonesia	42.3	64	40	23.1	3,270	-25
63 Egypt	43.7	59	9	63.0	3,800	-32
64 Malawi	44.1	45	27	60.2	710	27
65 Sudan	44.3	31	34	68.0	1,350	4

TECHNICAL NOTE TABLE 3.1 Capability poverty measure (continued)

CPM rank	Capability poverty measure (CPM) value	Births unattended by trained health personnel (%) 1983–94	Underweight children under age five (%) 1985–95	Female illiteracy rate (%) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus CPM rank ^a
66 Zaire	44.7	66 ^b	33	35.1	300	35
67 Guatemala	45.0	49	34	52.4	3,400	-33
68 Togo	45.4	46	24	65.7	1,020	10
69 Uganda	45.9	62	23	52.3	910	12
70 Central African Rep.	46.0	54	32	52.1	1,050	5
71 Côte d'Ivoire	46.7	55	12	72.6	1,620	-8
72 Liberia	47.1	42	20	79.3	843	12
73 Algeria	49.5	85	9	54.2	5,570	-52
74 Morocco	49.7	69	é	71.2	3,270	-36
75 Papua New Guinea	49.8	80	30	39.4	2,530	-29
76 Senegal	50.9	54	20	78.5	1,710	-15
77 Rwanda	51.5	74	29	51.4	740	12
78 Nigeria	51.6	63	36	56.2	1,540	-12
79 Benin	51.9	55	24	76.8	1,650	-17
30 Lao People's Dem. Rep.	54.6	52 ^b	54	57.9	1,458	-13
31 Guinea	56.0	64	24	79.9	1,800	-21
32 Guinea-Bissau	56.6	73	37 ^b	59.9	860	1
33 Haiti	57.8	80	34	59.5	1,050	-7
34 Mali	59.4	68	31	79.2	530	15
35 Burkina Faso	59.7	58	30	91.6	780	3
36 Mauritania	60.8	60	48	74.7	1,610	-22
37 Pakistan	60.8	65	40	77.0	2,160	-33
38 Chad	61.2	85	31	67.6	690	5
89 India	61.5	67	53	64.0	1,240	-17
90 Sierra Leone	62.3	75	29	83.3	860	-8
91 Yemen	62.7	84	30	74.0	1,600	-26
92 Somalia	63.7	98	39	54.0	712	-2
93 Angola	64.0	85	35	72.0	674	1
94 Burundi	66.1	81	38	79.1	670	1
95 Mozambique	66.9	75	47	78.6	640	2
96 Bhutan	68.2	93	38	73.8	790	-9
97 Ethiopia	70.1	86	48	76.5	420	3
98 Niger	71.7	85	36	93.9	790	-12
99 Afghanistan	72.5	91	40	86.5	819	-14
00 Bangladesh	76.9	90	66	75.0	1,290	-30
01 Nepal	77.3	94	51	87.0	1,000	-22

a. A positive figure indicates that the CPM rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank, a negative the opposite. b. Human Development Report Office estimate. Source: Column 2: UNICEF 1996; column 3: WHO 1995a and UN 1992; column 4: UNESCO 1995b; column 5: calculated on the basis of estimates from World Bank 1995h.

4. Links between economic growth and human development

A cross-country econometric exercise was carried out to examine the strength of the link between human development and economic growth. The first part of the exercise examined the effect of economic growth, social expenditure and income distribution on the levels of and changes in two human development indicators—life expectancy and child mortality. The second examined the inverse links, by looking at the effect of life expectancy, gross domestic investment and income distribution on growth. The results confirm the positive, two-way relationship between human development and economic growth. They also show the importance of other factors, such as social expenditure and income distribution, in determining the levels of and the rates of improvement in human development indicators.

The analysis used lags of the original variables as instruments to remove the bias that would result from applying the ordinary least squares technique to the system of equations, which have a clear, two-way flow of influence. Lag values are reasonable candidates as instruments because the correlation between the two periods analysed in the residuals in the human development and growth regressions is never substantial.

Equation 1 regresses the percentage reduction in life expectancy shortfall (from a maximum of 85 years) between 1970 and 1992 on the average real GDP per capita growth rate in 1960–70, average social expenditure in the 1970s (defined as the percentage of GDP invested in health and education) and the average income share of the poorest 20% of the population in 1960–70. Equation 2 regresses the percentage reduction in the child mortality rate between 1980 and 1993 on the log of the child mortality rate in 1980 and the real GDP per capita growth rate, average social expenditure and average income share of the poorest quintile in 1970–80.

Equations 3 and 4 regress the logs of life expectancy in 1992 and child mortality in 1993 on the log of GDP per capita in 1980 and average social expenditure and average income share of the poorest quintile in 1970–90. Equation 5 regresses the average real GDP per capita growth rate for 1970–92 on the log of GDP per capita in 1960, the log of life expectancy in 1967, average gross domestic investment in 1970–75 and the average income share of the poorest 20% of the population in 1960–70. The data used in the analysis are from the World Bank (1994a) and UNICEF (1995).

From economic growth to human development

(ordinary least squares; t-statistics are given in parentheses)

1. Percentage reduction in life expectancy shortfall

= 0.21 + 2.22 GDP/n growth rate (3.7) (3.4)
+ 0.95 social expenditure (2.0)
- 0.97 income share of poorest 20% (-1.3)
Adj. R² = 0.24 n = 58

- 2. Percentage reduction in child mortality
 - $= -5.38 + 0.62 \log (child mortality rate)$ (-4.1) (3.5)
 - + 16.51 GDP/n growth rate (2.7)
 - + 23.99 social expenditure
 - (3.7)
 - + 13.2 income share of poorest 20% (1.93)
 - Adj. $R^2 = 0.25$ n = 54
- 3. log (life expectancy)
 - $= 3.14 + 0.13 \log (GDP/n)$
 - (39.5) (11.1) + 0.03 social expenditure
 - (0.1)
 - 0.31 income share of poorest 20%
 (-0.7)
 - Adj. $R^2 = 0.77$ n = 66

4. log (child mortality)

= 12.21 - 0.99 log (GDP/n) (22.2) (-13.8) - 3.53 social expenditure (-1.98) - 7.04 income share of poorest 20% (-2.5) Adj. R² = 0.794 n = 81

From human development to economic growth

- 5. Average GDP/n annual growth rate
 - = -0.30 0.02 log (GDP/n) (-4.2) (-3.3)
 + 0.11 log (life expectancy) (4.5)
 - 0.01 gross domestic investment (-0.4)
 + 0.16 income share of poorest 20% (1.0)
 Adj. R² = 0.371 n = 38

Equations 1 and 2 show that a 1 percentage point increase in the average growth rate of GDP per capita is estimated to reduce the life expectancy shortfall by 2.2 percentage points and the child mortality rate by 16 percentage points. This means, for example, that a 2 percentage point increase in the GDP per capita growth rate of a country with an average life expectancy in 1970 of 57 years would increase its life expectancy by an additional 1.5 years. And a 1 percentage point increase in the GDP per capita growth rate of a country with a child mortality rate of 115 per thousand live births in 1980 would reduce child mortality by an additional 18 deaths per thousand live births.

The share of GDP invested in health and education also has a significant and positive effect on the rates of improvement in human development indicators. A 1 percentage point increase in the average share of GDP invested in health and education is estimated to reduce the life expectancy shortfall by 1 percentage point and the child mortality rate by 24 percentage points. Thus, if a country with the average life expectancy and child mortality rate in 1970 increases social expenditure by 3 percentage points, its life expectancy would increase by one additional year and its child mortality rate would decrease by 83 deaths per thousand live births.

A more equal income distribution was also shown to have a positive and significant effect on the rate of improvement in the child mortality rate. A 1 percentage point increase in the income share of the poorest quintile is associated with a 13 percentage point reduction in the child mortality rate.

Income per capita, social expenditure and income distribution are also significantly correlated with the levels of these indicators. A 1% increase in GDP per capita is associated with a 0.13% increase in the 1992 life expectancy and a 1% reduction in the 1993 child mortality rate. A 1 percentage point increase in social expenditure is associated with a 3% reduction in the child mortality rate, and a 1 percentage point increase in the income share of the poorest quintile with a 7% reduction.

The analysis also tested the links from human development to economic growth. The results show that the effect of human development on economic growth is also positive and significant. A 10% increase in life expectancy, equal to 5.7 years in 1970, is estimated to raise the average GDP per capita growth rate by 1.1 percentage points a year. Results for other human development indicators also show a positive and significant effect on the income per capita growth rate. The results are consistent with many other cross-country studies on the determinants of income growth.

These empirical results show that growth in income, increases in social expenditure and a more equal income distribution are all important determinants of human development. The higher the growth rate of income and the share of GDP invested in health and education, and the more equal the distribution of income, the higher the rate of improvement in human development indicators is expected to be. The higher the GDP per capita, the lower the child mortality rate and the higher the life expectancy at birth. And the higher the social expenditure and the more equal the distribution of income, the lower the child mortality rate.

In turn, human development was found to be an important determinant of the rate of income growth the higher the life expectancy, the higher the per capita income growth rate. The importance of analysing the determinants of income growth lies, of course, in the fact that many human capabilities are crucially dependent on people's economic circumstances. Thus, although certain basic human capabilities, such as life expectancy, enter as inputs into the growth equation, they are primarily ends in themselves, while economic growth is the means for further expanding capabilities.

Selected definitions

Administrators and managers Includes legislators, senior government administrators, traditional chiefs and heads of villages and administrators of special interest organizations. It also includes corporate managers such as chief executives and general managers as well as specialized managers and managing supervisors, according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1968).

Alcohol consumption per capita Derived from sales data for beer, wine and spirits, each of which is converted to absolute alcohol based on its alcohol content. The total absolute alcohol is then divided by the population to get per capita consumption.

Births attended The percentage of births attended by physicians, nurses, midwives, trained primary health care workers or trained traditional birth attendants.

Budget surplus/deficit (overall surplus/deficit) Central government current and capital revenue and official grants received, less expenditure and net government lending.

Central government expenditures Expenditures, both current and capital, by all government offices, departments, establishments and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country.

Cereal imports All cereals in the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2, Groups 041–046. This includes wheat and flour in wheat equivalent, rice, maize, sorghum, barley, oats, rye, millet and other minor grains. Grain trade data include both commercial and food aid shipments but exclude trade between the member states of the European Union and within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Cereal imports are based on calendar-year data reported by recipient countries.

 CO_2 emissions by source Anthropogenic (human-originated) carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from energy use only. It includes oil held in international marine bunkers, with quantities assigned to the countries in which bunker deliveries were made. It also includes peat, but it excludes oil and gas for non-energy purposes, and the use of biomass fuels.

Commercial energy Commercial forms of primary energy—petroleum (crude oil, natural gas liquids, and oil from nonconventional sources), natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite and other derived fuels) and primary electricity (nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal and other) —all converted into oil equivalents.

Commercial energy consumption Refers to domestic primary commercial energy supply before transformation to other end-use fuels (such as electricity and refined petroleum product) and is calculated as indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and international marine bunkers. Energy consumption also includes products consumed for non-energy uses, mainly derived from petroleum. The use of firewood, dried animal manure and other traditional fuels, although substantial in some developing countries, is not taken into account because reliable and comprehensive data are not available.

Commercial energy production Refers to the first stage of commercial production. Thus, for hard coal, the data refer to mine production; for briquettes, to the output of briquetting plants; for crude petroleum and natural gas, to production at oil and gas wells; for natural gas liquids, to production at wells and processing plants; for refined petroleum products, to gross refinery output; for cokes and coke-oven gas, to the output of ovens; for other manufactured gas, to production at gas works, blast furnaces or refineries; and for electricity, to the gross production of generating plants.

Contraceptive prevalence rate The percentage of married women of child-bearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception, whether modern or traditional.

Crude birth rate Annual number of births per thousand population.

Crude death rate Annual number of deaths per thousand population.

Current account balance The difference between (a) exports of goods and services (factor and non-factor) as well as inflows of unrequited transfers but exclusive of foreign aid and (b) imports of goods and services as well as all unrequited transfers to the rest of the world.

Daily calorie supply per capita The calorie equivalent of the net food supplies in a country, divided by the population, per day.

Debt service The sum of principal repayments and interest payments on total external debt.

Defence expenditure All expenditure, whether by defence or other departments, on the maintenance of military forces, including for the purchase of military supplies and equipment, construction, recruitment, training and military aid programmes.

Deforestation The permanent clearing of forest lands for shifting cultivation, permanent agriculture or settlements; it does not include other alterations such as selective logging.

Dependency ratio The ratio of the population defined as dependent—those under 15 and those over 64—to the working-age population, aged 15–64.

Disbursement The release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or services for, a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. For activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded gross (the total amount disbursed over a given accounting period) or net (less any repayments of loan principal during the same period).

Discouraged workers Individuals who would like to work and who are available for work, but are not actively seeking work because of a stated belief that no suitable job is available or because they do not know where to get work. The number of discouraged workers is used as an additional measure of labour market slack by the OECD.

Doctors Refers to physicians and includes all graduates of any faculty or school of medicine in any medical field (including practice, teaching, administration and research).

Earnings per employee All remuneration to employees expressed in constant prices derived by deflating nominal earnings per employee by the country's consumer price index.

Economically active population All persons

of either sex who supply labour for the production of economic goods and services as defined by the UN System of National Accounts, during a specified time-reference period. According to this system, the production of economic goods and services should include all production and processing of primary products, whether for the market, for barter or for own-consumption, the production of all other goods and services for the market and, in the case of households that produce such goods and services for the market, the corresponding production for ownconsumption.

Education expenditures Expenditures on the provision, management, inspection and support of pre-primary, primary and secondary schools; universities and colleges; vocational, technical and other training institutions; and general administration and subsidiary services.

Employees Regular employees, working proprietors, active business partners and unpaid family workers, but excluding homemakers.

Enrolment ratio (gross and net) The gross enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education, whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level, as a percentage of the population in the relevant age group for that level. The net enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education who belong in the relevant age group, as a percentage of the population in that age group.

Exports of goods and services The value of all goods and non-factor services provided to the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel and other non-factor services.

Female-male gap A set of national, regional and other estimates in which all the figures for females are expressed in relation to the corresponding figures for males, which are indexed to equal 100.

Fertility rate (total) The average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime, if she were to bear children at each age in accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.

Food aid in cereals Cereals provided by donor countries and international organizations, including the World Food Programme and the International Wheat Council, as reported for that particular crop year. Cereals include wheat, flour, bulgur, rice, coarse grain and the cereal components of blended foods.

Food consumption as a percentage of total household consumption Computed from details of GDP (expenditure at national market prices) defined in the UN System of National Accounts, mostly as collected from the International Comparison Programme phases IV (1980) and V (1985).

Food production per capita index The average annual quantity of food produced per capita in relation to that produced in the indexed year. Food is defined as comprising nuts, pulses, fruit, cereals, vegetables, sugar cane, sugar beets, starchy roots, edible oils, livestock and livestock products.

Future labour force replacement ratio The population under 15 divided by one-third of the population aged 15–59.

Government consumption Includes all current expenditure for purchases of goods and services by all levels of government. Capital expenditure on national defence and security is regarded as consumption expenditure.

Greenhouse index Net emissions of three major greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane and chlorofluorocarbons), with each gas weighted according to its heat-trapping quality, in carbon dioxide equivalents and expressed in metric tons of carbon per capita.

Gross domestic investment Outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.

Gross domestic product (GDP) The total output of goods and services for final use produced by an economy, by both residents and non-residents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. It does not include deductions for depreciation of physical capital or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Gross national product (GNP) Comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labour and capital), less similar payments made to non-residents who contribute to the domestic economy.

Gross national product (GNP) per capita growth rates Annual GNP per capita is expressed in current US dollars, and GNP per capita growth rates are average annual growth rates computed by fitting trend lines to the logarithmic values of GNP per capita at constant market prices for each year in the period.

Health expenditure Public expenditure on health comprises the expenditure, both current and capital, by all government offices, departments, establishments and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country on hospitals, maternity and dental centers, and clinics with a major medical component; on national health and medical insurance schemes; and on family planning and preventive care. The data on health expenditure are not comparable across countries. In many economies private health services are substantial; in others public services represent the major component of total expenditure but may be financed by lower levels of government. Caution should therefore be exercised in using the data for cross-country comparisons.

Health services access The percentage of the population that can reach appropriate local health services on foot or by local means of transport in no more than one hour.

Homicides Includes intentional deaths (purposely inflicted by another person, including infanticide), non-intentional deaths (not purposely inflicted by another person) and manslaughter but excludes traffic accidents resulting in death.

Human priority areas Basic education, primary health care, safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, family planning and nutrition.

Immunized The average vaccination coverage of children under one year of age for the antigens used in the Universal Child Immunization (UCI) Programme.

Income share The distribution of income or expenditure (or share of expenditure) accruing to percentile groups of households ranked by total household income, by per capita income or by expenditure. Shares of population quintiles and the top decile in total income or consumption expenditure are used in calculating income shares. The data sets for these countries are drawn mostly from nationally representative household surveys conducted in different years during 1978-92. Data for the high-income OECD economies are based on information from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), the Luxembourg Income Study and the OECD. Data should be interpreted with caution owing to differences between income studies in the use of income and consumption expenditure to estimate living standards.

Infant mortality rate The annual number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births. More specifically, the probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age times 1,000.

Inflation rate Measured by the growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator for each of the periods shown. The GDP deflator is first calculated by dividing, for each year of the period, the value of GDP at current values by the value of GDP at constant values, both in national currency. This measure of inflation, like others, has limitations, but it is used because it shows annual price movements for all goods and services produced in an economy. International reserves (gross) Holdings of monetary gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the reserve positions of members in the IMF and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and services these could pay for at the current level of imports.

Involuntary part-time workers Refers directly to the ILO concept of visible underemployment and includes three groups of workers: those who usually work full-time but are working parttime because of economic slack; those who usually work part-time but are working fewer hours in their part-time job because of economic slack; and those working part-time because full-time work could not be found. The number of involuntary part-time workers is used as an additional measure of labour market slack by the OECD.

Labour force See Economically active population.

Least developed countries The least developed countries are those recognized by the United Nations as low-income countries encountering long-term impediments to economic growth, particularly, low levels of human resource development and severe structural weaknesses. The main purpose of constructing a list of such countries is to give guidance to donor agencies and countries for allocation of foreign assistance.

Life expectancy at birth The number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life.

Literacy rate (adult) The percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.

Low-birth-weight infants The percentage of babies born weighing less than 2,500 grams.

Maternal mortality rate The annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births.

Military expenditure See Defence expenditure.

Multilateral ODA Funds contributed in the form of ODA to an international institution with governmental membership that conducts all or a significant part of its activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. A contribution by a donor to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency. ODA received by aid recipient countries is considered multilateral if it comes from multilateral agencies such as multilateral development banks (the World Bank, regional development banks), UN agencies and regional groupings (certain European Union and Arab agencies).

Municipal waste Waste collected by municipalities or by their order, including waste originating from households, commercial activities, office buildings, such institutions as schools and government buildings, and small businesses that dispose of waste at the same facilities used for waste collected by municipalities.

Nurses All persons who have completed a programme of basic nursing education and are qualified and registered or authorized by the country to provide responsible and competent service for the promotion of health, prevention of illness, care of the sick and rehabilitation.

Occupation The classification of occupations brings together individuals doing similar work, irrespective of where the work is performed. Most countries have supplied data on the basis of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The actual content of occupational groups may differ from one country to another owing to variations in definitions and methods of data collection.

Official development assistance (ODA) Grants or loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) that are undertaken by the official sector, with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective—and at concessional financial terms (if a loan, at least 25% grant element). Figures for total net ODA disbursed are based on OECD data for DAC countries, multilateral organizations and Arab states.

Oral rehydration therapy use rate Percentage of all cases of diarrhoea in children under age five treated with oral rehydration salts or an appropriate household solution.

Population density The total number of inhabitants divided by the surface area.

Population served by waste water treatment plants National population connected to public sewage networks with treatment.

Poverty line Based on the concept of an "absolute" poverty line, expressed in monetary terms: the income or expenditure level below which a minimum, nutritionally adequate diet plus essential non-food requirements are not affordable. National estimates that rely on a relative poverty line (such as share of food in total expenditures) are excluded, as are those that rely on a poverty line defined exclusively in relation to another variable (such as the minimum wage) rather than the satisfaction of the food and non-food needs at a minimally acceptable level. Poverty estimates are based on data from

an actual household budget, income or expenditure survey. Exceptions include some African and small island countries or territories for which otherwise virtually no observations would have been available.

Primary education Education at the first level (International Standard Classification of Education—ISCED—level I), the main function of which is to provide the basic elements of education, such as elementary schools.

Primary intake rate Number of new entrants into first grade, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official admission age for the first level of education.

Primary school completion rate The proportion of the children entering the first grade of primary school who successfully complete that level in due course.

Private consumption The market value of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars, washing machines and home computers), purchased or received as income in kind by households and non-profit institutions. It excludes purchases of dwellings but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings.

Production as a percentage of national energy reserves The data on production of energy refer to the first stage of production; thus, for hard coal and lignite, the data refer to mine production, and for crude oil and natural gas, to production at oil and gas wells. The data for reserves refer to proved recoverable reserves of coal, crude oil and natural gas-that is, the tonnage of the proved amount in place that can be recovered (extracted from the earth in raw form) in the future under present and expected economic conditions and existing technological limits. The ratio of production to reserves is the annual production of energy commodities as a percentage of the total proved recoverable reserves.

Professional and technical workers Physical scientists and related technicians; architects, engineers and related technicians; aircraft and ships' officers; life scientists and related technicians; medical, dental, veterinary and related workers; statisticians, mathematicians, systems analysts and related technicians; economists; accountants; jurists; teachers; workers in religion; authors, journalists and related writers; sculptors, painters, photographers and related creative artists; composers and performing artists; athletes, sportsmen and related workers; and professional, technical and related workers not elsewhere classified, according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1968).

Purchasing power parity (PPP\$) The purchasing power of a country's currency: the number of units of that currency required to purchase the same representative basket of goods and services that a US dollar (the reference currency) would buy in the United States (or a similar basket of goods and services). Purchasing power parity could also be expressed in other national currencies or in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) The GDP per capita of a country converted into US dollars on the basis of the purchasing power parity of the country's currency. The system of purchasing power parities has been developed by the United Nations International Comparison Programme (ICP) to make more accurate international comparisons of GDP and its components than those based on official exchange rates, which can be subject to considerable fluctuation.

Reforestation The establishment of plantations for industrial and non-industrial uses; it does not, in general, include regeneration of old tree crops, although some countries may report regeneration as reforestation.

Refugees According to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, refugees are persons who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion", are outside the country of nationality, and are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of their former habitual residence, are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. According to UNHCR, refugees also include selected groups of internally displaced persons, returnees and others of concern to or assisted by UNHCR.

Rural-urban disparity A set of national, regional and other estimates in which all the rural figures are expressed in relation to the corresponding urban figures, which are indexed to equal 100.

Safe water access The percentage of the population with reasonable access to safe water supply, including treated surface water, or untreated but uncontaminated water such as that from springs, sanitary wells and protected boreholes.

Sanitation access The percentage of the population with reasonable access to sanitary means of excreta and waste disposal, including outdoor latrines and composting.

Science graduates Tertiary education grad-

uates in the natural and applied sciences, including medicine.

Scientists and technicians Scientists refers to scientists and engineers with scientific or technological training (usually completion of thirdlevel education) in any field of science who are engaged in professional work in research and development activities, including administrators and other high-level personnel who direct the execution of R & D activities. *Technicians* refers to persons engaged in scientific research and development activities who have received vocational or technical training for at least three years after the first stage of second-level education.

Secondary education Education at the second level (ISCED levels 2 and 3), based on at least four years' previous instruction at the first level, and providing general or specialized instruction or both, such as middle school, secondary schools, high schools, teacher training schools at this level and vocational or technical schools.

Secondary technical education Education provided in second-level schools aimed at preparing the pupils directly for a trade or occupation other than teaching.

Social protection Refers to OECD member countries' provision of social welfare in the areas of health, pensions, unemployment benefits and other income support schemes. This provision is intended not just to assist those in need, but also to meet economic goals by covering the social costs of economic restructuring.

Social security benefits expenditure Compensation for loss of income for persons who are ill and temporarily disabled; payments to the elderly, persons with permanent disability and the unemployed; family, maternity and child allowances; and the cost of welfare services.

South-North gap A set of national, regional and other estimates in which all figures for developing countries are expressed in relation to the corresponding average figures for all the industrial countries, indexed to equal 100.

Sulfur and nitrogen emissions Emissions of sulfur in the form of sulfur oxides and of nitrogen in the form of its various oxides, which together contribute to acid rain and adversely affect agriculture, forests, aquatic habitats and the weathering of building materials.

Tax revenue Compulsory, unrequited, nonrepayable receipts for public purposes —including interest collected on tax arrears and penalties collected for non-payment or late payment of taxes—shown net of refunds and other corrective transactions.

Terms of trade The ratio of a country's index of average export prices to its index of average import prices.

Tertiary education Education at the third level (ISCED levels 5, 6 and 7), such as universities, teachers colleges and higher professional schools—requiring as a minimum condition of admission the successful completion of education at the second level or evidence of the attainment of an equivalent level of knowledge.

Total external debt Total external debt is defined as the sum of public, publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed long-term external obligations, short-term debt and use of IMF credit. The data on debt are from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System, supplemented by World Bank estimates. The system is concerned solely with developing economies and does not collect data on external debt for other groups of borrowers or from economies that are not members of the World Bank. Dollar figures for debt are in US dollars converted at official exchange rates.

Transition from first- to second-level education Number of new entrants into secondary general education, expressed as a percentage of the total number of pupils in the last grade of primary education in the previous year.

Under-five mortality rate The annual number of deaths of children under age five per thousand live births averaged over the previous five years. More specifically, the probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age.

Underweight (moderate and severe child malnutrition) The percentage of children under age five who are below minus two standard deviations from the median birth-weight-for-age of the reference population.

Unemployment The unemployed comprise all persons above a specified age who are not in paid employment or self-employed, but are available and have taken specific steps to seek paid employment or self-employment.

Urban population Percentage of the population living in urban areas as defined according to the national definition used in the most recent population census.

Waste recycling The reuse of material that diverts it from the waste stream, except for recycling within industrial plants and the reuse of material as fuel. The recycling rate is the ratio of the quantity recycled to the apparent consumption.

Water resources, internal renewable The average annual flow of rivers and aquifers generated from endogenous precipitation.

Water withdrawals Includes those from non-renewable aquifers and desalting plants but does not include losses from evaporation.

Classification of countries

Countries in the human development aggregates

High human development (HDI 0.800 and above)

Antigua and Spain Barbuda Sweden Argentina Australia Thailand Austria Bahamas Tobago Bahrain Barbados Emirates Belgium Brunei Uruguay Darussalam USA Canada Venezuela Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Fiji Finland France Germany Greece Hong Kong Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Tapan Korea, Rep. of Kuwait Latvia Luxembourg Malaysia Malta Mauritius Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Panama Poland Portugal Oatar Russian Federation Saint Kitts and Nevis Singapore Slovakia

Albania Algeria Switzerland Armenia Azerbaijan Trinidad and Belarus Belize United Arab Bolivia Botswana United Kingdom Brazil Bulgaria Cape Verde China Congo Cuba Dominica Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia Gabon Georgia Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Indonesia Iraq Iamaica Iordan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Lithuania Maldives Moldova, Rep. of Mongolia Morocco Namibia Nicaragua Oman

Paraguav

Romania

Saint Lucia

Peru

Medium human development (HDI 0.500 to 0.799)

Saint Vincent Samoa (Western) Saudi Arabia Sevchelles Solomon Islands South Africa Sri Lanka Suriname Swaziland Syrian Arab Rep. Taiikistan Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine Dominican Rep. Uzbekistan Vanuatu Viet Nam Zimbabwe Iran, Islamic Rep. of Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Papua New Guinea Philippines

Low human development (HDI below 0.500)

Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Rep. Chad Comoros Côte d'Ivoire Diibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti India Kenva Lao People's Dem. Rep. Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda São Tomé and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania, U. Rep. of Togo Uganda Yemen Zaire Zambia

Countries in the income aggregates

High-income (GNP per capita above \$8,625 in 1993) Middle-income (GNP per capita \$696 to \$8,625 in 1993)

Australia Austria Bahamas Belgium Brunei Darussalam Canada Cyprus Denmark Finland France Germany Hong Kong Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Kuwait Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Qatar Singapore Spain Sweden Switzerland United Arab Emirates United Kingdom USA

Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Barbados Belarus Belize Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Cameroon Cape Verde Chile Colombia Congo Costa Rica Cuba Czech Rep. Djibouti Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Estonia Fiji Gabon Georgia Greece Grenada Guatemala Hungary Iran, Islamic Rep. of Iraq Jamaica Iordan Kazakhstan Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Lithuania Malaysia Maldives Malta Mauritius Mexico

Moldova, Rep. of Morocco Namibia Oman Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent Samoa (Western) Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Slovakia Solomon Islands South Africa Suriname Swaziland Syrian Arab Rep. Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela

Low-income (GNP per capita \$695 and below in 1993)

Afghanistan Albania Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Central African Rep. Chad China Comoros Côte d'Ivoire Egypt Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras India Indonesia Kenva Lao People's Dem. Rep. Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mongolia Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda São Tomé and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Tajikistan Tanzania, U. Rep. of Togo Uganda Viet Nam Yemen Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe

Least developed countries

All developing countries

Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cape Verde Central African Rep. Chad Comoros Diibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti Lao People's Dem. Rep. Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Maldives Mali Mauritania Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Niger Rwanda Samoa (Western) São Tomé and Principe Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tanzania, U. Rep. of Togo Uganda Vanuatu Yemen Zaire Zambia

Afghanistan Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Rep. Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire Cuba Cyprus Djibouti Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Fiji Gabon Gambia Ghana

Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guvana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Rep. of Iraq Jamaica Iordan Kenya Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Kuwait Lao People's Dem. Rep. Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Madagascar Malawi Malavsia Maldives Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan

Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Qatar Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent Samoa (Western) São Tomé and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Syrian Arab Rep. Tanzania, U. Rep. of Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda United Arab Emirates Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe

Industrial countries

Albania Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Canada Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Moldova, Rep. of Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Romania **Russian** Federation Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine United Kingdom USA Uzbekistan

Countries in the regional aggregates

Sub-Saharan Africa	Arab States	Asia and the Pacific and Oceania	Latin America, the Caribbean and North America	Europe
		DEVELOPING COUNTRIES		
Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central Africa Rep. Chad Comoros Congo Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Niger	Algeria Bahrain Djibouti Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syrian Arab Rep. Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen	East Asia China Hong Kong Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Mongolia South-East Asia and the Pacific Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Fiji Indonesia Lao People's Dem. Rep. Malaysia Myanmar Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa (Western) Singapore Solomon Islands Thailand Vanuatu Viet Nam South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan	Latin America and the Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominica Dominica Dominica Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia	Southern Europe Cyprus Turkey INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Czech Rep. Estonia Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova, Rep. of Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Tajikistan Turkmenistan
Nigeria Rwanda São Tomé and Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Swaziland Tanzania, U. Rep. of Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe		India Iran, Islamic Rep. of Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka INDUSTRIA Australia Israel Japan New Zealand	Saint Vincent Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela L COUNTRIES North America Canada USA	Ukraine Uzbekistan Western and Southern Europe Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy

Malta Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland

European Union

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom

OECD

Canada

Finland

France

Greece

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey

Luxembourg

United Kingdom

USA

Denmark

Germany

Australia Austria Belgium

Nordic countries

Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden