THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

Political Identity Beyond the Nation-State



Darren J. O'Byrne

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The Dimensions of Global Citizenship

Political Identity Beyond the Nation-State

DARREN J.O'BYRNE

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables viii
Foreword ix
Acknowledgements xi

1. The Rediscovery of Citizenship
Introduction 1
Citizenship: Some Definitions 3
The Four Components of Citizenship 5
Membership 5
Rights 6
Duties 7
Participation 8
The Origins of Citizenship 9
Alternative Citizenships 10
World Citizenship 11
'Non-Modern' Citizenship 12
Introduction to the Book 13
Summary 20

2. Citizenship and the Nation-State
Citizenship and the Modern Nation-State 26
Citizens and States 27
The Liberal Tradition 29
The Communitarian Tradition 30
The Republican Tradition 31

Citizenship and Modern Society 31
The Pluralist Perspective 32
The Marxist Perspective 33
The New Right Perspective 33
The Limitations of Citizenship: Inclusion and Exclusion 34
Citizenship and Social Class 35
Citizenship and Gender 37
Citizenship, Culture and Ethnicity 38
Nationalism, Nation and State 40
Summary 44

3. World Citizenship

Introduction 51
The Origins of World Citizenship 52
From Socrates to Seneca 52
Religious Universalism 54
Modernity: The Politicization of World Citizenship 55
The Two Projects of Modernity 57
Moral Universalism and Human Rights 60
Kant and Moral Universalism 60
The Idea of Human Rights 63
World Federalism and Functionalism 69
The Transformation of World Citizenship 71

4. Modernity, Globality and Globalization

The Challenge of Globalization 79
Globalization 81
Globality 85
Modernity 91
Modernity and Globality 94
Summary 100

5. Global Citizenship

Introduction 111

Beyond the Social Contract? 112

Membership of a Global Community 114

Types of Global Citizen 116

Citizenship and the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere 118

Performative Citizenship 119

Rethinking the State 121

The Challenge of Radical Democracy 123

A Social Theory of Global Citizenship? 126

6. Global Citizenship as Organizational Practice

Global Citizenship and Social Movements 133

The World Government of World Citizens 135

The Philosophical Orientation of the Organization 140

The Organization as Representative of Global Citizenship 148

Summary 154

7. The Construction of Political Identity

Introduction 158

World Citizenship as a Nation-State Construction 160

Nation-State Citizenship as a Local Construction 162

Cultural Identity/Political Action 165

Local Citizenship as a Global Construction 169

Summary 170

8. Globality and Everyday Life

Introduction 175

On Globality 178

Globality: Between Home and the Outside World 179

Globality: Between the Self and the Outside World 181

On Nationalism and the Nation-State 184

On Rethinking Political Identity 189
Living the Global City 194
Summary 197

9. **The Dimensions of Global Citizenship**

Introduction 200
Participation: From Liberal Democracy to Information Society 202
Duties: From the National Interest to the Survival of the Planet 209
Rights: From Citizenship to Humanity 214
Membership: From Political State to Multicultural Society 219
Summary 223

10. **Active Citizenship Today**

Introduction 227
Globalism, the Nation-State and Values 228
Modernity and Its Conditions 231
Education for Global Citizenship 233
Information Technology 235
Environmental Education 236
Multicultural Education 237
Human Rights Awareness 238
Globalization and Inequalities 239
Active Citizenship Now and In the Future 241

Bibliography 245
Index 258

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Robertson's 'Global Field' 89
Figure 2. The transformation of modernity 104
Figure 3. Mapping the key components of global change 105
Figure 4. Positive and negative outcomes of global democratic shifts 126

Table 1. Transforming the components of citizenship from nation-state to global 202

Foreword

Citizenship has always been a contested concept, with views differing on whether it refers to a purely legal relation defined in terms of rights and duties between the individual and the political community or an active condition based on participation in civil society. Although these two conceptions of citizenship—which roughly correspond respectively to the liberal and communitarian traditions—differ, they share the assumption that citizenship entails membership of a political community and that this is a condition of equality. The primary goal of citizenship was equality between members of a tightly defined polity. The territorial limits of the polity, generally equated with the nation-state, were rarely questioned and neither was the cultural dimension of group membership. The traditional conceptions of citizenship on the whole did not consider the question of the problem of cultural diversity and competing conceptions of the common good.

It has increasingly been recognized that the question of diversity has entered the discourse of citizenship which now must reconcile the pursuit of equality with the recognition of diversity. Inevitably, this has led to debates on the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Ever since the late 1980s feminists and proponents of multicultural citizenship have been important in re-politicizing citizenship in this direction of radical pluralism. Only very recently, in the aftermath of the great global transformations since 1989, has an additional discourse of citizenship emerged, namely global citizenship.

The idea of global citizenship, the subject of this valuable book, has entered the contemporary political imagination for several reasons. The interest more generally in citizenship is undoubtedly due to the crisis in neo-liberalism, the rise of new kinds of globally organized anti-systemic movements, the growing consciousness that globalization entails new kinds of questions for political membership, global responsibilities for the future and new conceptions of personhood. The territorial boundaries of political community have been rendered diffuse as a result of legal cosmopolitanism in areas of human rights, which have changed the nature of membership making it more difficult to differentiate insiders from outsiders,

International Non-Governmental Actors and other kinds of advocacy governance. Citizenship is no longer a bundle of rights and duties but has a wider and more transformative dimension. The concept of citizenship has been disembedded from national societies; it is no longer equated with the condition of nationality, that is, membership of a particular national polity, and may even be in tension with it.

The reality of global citizenship cannot be denied. Darren O'Byrne argues persuasively for the contemporary relevance of citizenship having a global dimension. Global citizenship, he argues, is not reducible to particular institutional arrangements, such as a world government; it is rather a response to the growing consciousness of the interconnected nature of the world and the fact that the responsibilities of citizenship extend beyond particular polities to the wider world. Global citizenship is clearly related to globalization and the growing recognition that citizenship extends beyond the horizons of the nation-state to encompass global forms. One school of thought rejects the very notion of citizenship beyond the nation-state as neither possible nor desirable. Others see opportunities for citizenship in areas of governance and new transnational spaces beyond the level of the nation-state. It would be a mistake to see global citizenship as an alternative to other kinds of citizenship, such as a national and local citizenship; it should instead be conceived of as an additional dimension of citizenship that has come into existence today along with the extension of democratization. Combining perspectives in social and political theory, sociology and political science, this book offers a defence of global citizenship as a pragmatic response to real problems.

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1
The Rediscovery of Citizenship

Citizenship is now a popular 'buzz word' in sociological circles. New challenges, and new perspectives, have given a new lease of life to a hitherto stagnant concept. But we still do not have a shared, recognizable and satisfactory definition of 'citizenship'.

INTRODUCTION

The interest among sociologists in the hitherto largely taken-for-granted concept of citizenship seemed to resurface during the 1980s and grew in significance throughout the 1990s.[1] Up until that point, much of the debate over citizenship rights took the form of a static discussion between liberals, who were largely either defending or building upon Marshall's classic theory of citizenship, and Marxists, who were largely critical of the idea. As sociology sought to offer its variety of responses and explanations to the period of contemporary social change experienced on a global scale, so the assumptions which fuelled both ends of this debate became increasingly contested.

Underlying many of the global social changes which gave birth to this revived interest in citizenship was the notion of the New World Order. Various factors, including the growing interdependence of states, and the increasing authority of super-national political and economic bodies such as, in Europe, the European Parliament, have, it is argued, eroded the centrality of the nation-state. Developments towards the integration of Europe within the context of the European Community, for example, pose significant questions for the ideals and practices associated with citizenship in member countries.[2]

For some, citizenship needed to be reconsidered because it had, in effect, lost its foundational base, that is, the nation-state. Challenges to the modern ideals of national sovereignty and national identity, based on the emergence of global political and economic organizations and practices, 'new' ethnic identities not reducible to standard models of citizenship, and cultural practices which spanned the globe itself, suggested that the model

of political belonging found in modern citizenship theory was flawed. Academics had come to refer to these processes as 'globalization', and many set out to show how they had altered the very basic taken-for-granted concepts upon which previous sociological theorizing had relied.

Another challenge to the Enlightenment ideal of citizenship emerged from the postmodernists, whose arguments tended to assume that the global expansion of daily life was part of a transformation in the very nature of society, in which 'grand narratives' and artificial boundaries—which over time had contributed to the dominant myth of universalism and absolutism—were being broken down in favour of uncertainty, pluralismand relativism. From such a perspective, then, citizenship as a concept was meaningless.

But another set of changes led to a positive reappraisal of the citizenship idea, particularly among sociologists concerned with Durkheim's emphasis on community and morality, and Parsons's reassessment of the Hobbesian problem of order. The uncertainty that resulted from the breakdown of the former Soviet Bloc in eastern Europe made it clear among experts that the idea of citizenship could act as a moral glue in such times of crisis. Newly independent countries searching for national identity turned to ideas of civil society and citizenship to overcome the problem of social order.[3] Even highly developed countries such as the United States had experienced something of a crisis of collective national identity as a result of the growing uncertainty in world politics.[4]

These introductory notes are covered in greater depth in other volumes.[5] The questions they raise have led, however, to largely unexplored territories. This is, in part, due to the tradition in which the language of citizenship has been developed; a tradition whose roots are embedded within modernity and the nation-state. Citizenship is a form of belonging; but it is a specific form of belonging, reliant upon certain rights and duties which betray its contractarian assumptions. This remains true even if the notion of contract is not mentioned explicitly.

Citizenship is now a popular word not only in academic circles, but also in political and everyday-life discourse. It surfaces in debates over immigration, regional identity, Europe and competitive sport, to name just a few. It seems to be a sufficiently vague term to cover all of these areas without the need for further clarification as to exactly what it is supposed to mean. Some would say that it is about membership of a community, while others would stress that such a community must be a political one. Some would say that membership is not enough: there has to be some degree of active participation. Others would define it as the condition achieved by the balancing of rights and duties within such a community.

However, it is important to state that, although the discourse of citizenship has been dominated by modernity, there is a larger tradition in the West which goes back to the Greeks, for whom citizenship was viewed

as the active realization of the ideal community. In this sense, citizenship can be understood as a form of political identity. I use the term 'political' here *not* to refer to the particular form of rationality associated with administration, bureaucratization,, and the centralization of the means of violence. I mean instead the development of political consciousness, associated with the 'practical reason' of the moral-political sphere. Accordingly, our political identity is not limited to any specific form of state administration. So, the way this discourse has developed so as to assimilate citizenship within wider discourses about the emergence of the modern nation-state can be understood critically as a form of what Habermas calls the 'colonization of the lifeworld'. Hidden deep beneath these taken-for-granted assumptions is the reality of citizenship as socially constructed and *not* reliant upon any project of nation-building or modernization.

CITIZENSHIP: SOME DEFINITIONS

Although the language of citizenship is commonly associated with the language of the nation-state, the idea of the reciprocity of rights and duties *vis-à-vis* the community in fact predated the territorial concept of the modern nation-state.[6] We should, therefore, bear in mind that citizenship has never only been about nationhood. There have always been contrasting uses of the term, which have not drawn upon such territorial factors. I focus on two such uses below. One is the idea of world citizenship, and the other, for want of a better term, I call non-modern citizenship. World citizenship extends the territoriality of national citizenship to include the whole world and all its (human) inhabitants, while 'non-modern' citizenship attributes to the citizen primary membership and sense of allegiance to a non-territorialized (usually culturally defined) group. However, these interpretations have been rendered marginal by the centrality of one dominant understanding which has tended to assume a relationship between citizenship and the idea of the state.

That citizenship is a form of relationship between an individual and a state is explicit in most definitions of it. For example, *Colliers Encyclopaedia* sees it as the most perfect form of membership in a political community. A citizen owes unqualified allegiance to his or her state and, subject to certain limitations imposed by age, sex, or other condition, possesses complete civil and political rights. These rights and duties are thus usually more extensive than those of other persons within the jurisdiction of that state, such as aliens, or persons residing in some colonial area or dependency who, while not enjoying the status of full citizenship, are none the less regarded under international law as nationals of the state.[7]

The *Encyclopaedia Americana* describes citizenship as

> a relationship between an individual and a state involving the individual's full political membership in the state and his permanent allegiance to it. Other persons may be subject to the authority of the state and may even owe it allegiance, but the citizen has duties, rights, responsibilities, and privileges that the non-citizen shares to a lesser degree or not at all. The status of the citizen is official recognition of the individual's integration into the political system.[8]

'Integration into the political system' seems to reflect an American attitude towards citizenship, and such an attitude inspired Parsons's liberal defence of the idea.[9] If much American sociology has been part of the project of nation-building, then democratic theory, and in particular the idea of citizenship as active, political involvement, has been a crucial element. The *Encyclopaedia Americana* goes on:

> In a modern democratic state, the rights and duties of citizenship are inseparable, as each stems from the other. Democratic theory holds that the state deserves, gains, and retains the loyalty of its citizens by affording them the opportunity—through their influence on the political system—to gain the maximum achievement of their own goals.[10]

Thus involvement is central to the citizenship idea. Citizenship is the reward for entering into an unwritten contract by which a national agrees to 'play by the rules'. The favours allowed by citizenship can be removed (as, perhaps, in the case of prisoners) if the citizen fails to abide by that contract. Such a perspective shifts the emphasis from an equal relationship between individual and state, to a top-heavy one in which the state is granted the larger share of power. According to C.C. Hyde,

> Citizenship, as distinct from nationality, is a creature solely of domestic law. It refers to rights which a state sees fit to confer upon certain individuals who are also its nationals.[11]

Such a limited perspective on citizenship actually detracts us from fully appreciating or understanding the emancipatory potential of the idea. I will attempt to argue in what follows not only that this particular definition of citizenship has lost its foundations, but that these foundations were inevitably based on flawed, artificial distinctions, and upon restricted interpretations.

Complications in achieving a clear and accurate definition of the word 'citizenship' clearly arise out of distinctions made between political and cultural factors, and between institutionalist and subjectivist appropriations of the term. Citizenship has largely been conceived of in

institutionalist terms. To be a citizen of a country means to have achieved a certain position within the institutional framework of that country, whereby the country itself is, effectively, prepared to accept you as 'one of its own'. To be a citizen, you are thus considered to be a member of your society. You are given the opportunity to participate in how that society is managed. You are allocated certain rights, in accordance with the laws of that society. And you are expected to respect certain duties and responsibilities which fall upon you as a member of that society.

I take a somewhat different approach to the understanding of citizenship to this dominant, 'top-down' model. Citizenship for me is as much about identification with a society or social group as it is about such institutional definitions. It is about belonging and social identity. Although the components of citizenship remain the same, the emphasis is different. To be a citizen, in this sense, you must consider yourself to be a member of your society, as well as be considered to be so. Your participation in its politics must be active, at least in the sense of being aware, rather than passive. This involves access to, and participation in, the public sphere. The rights you have must be rights which reflect your status as a member of that society, rather than those allocated arbitrarily by positive law. Your duties must reflect your orientation to act in the interests of that society or social group. The end-product of such a model of citizenship is, ideally, a reconstructed notion of civil society. But the questions which are raised are fundamental to sociological discourse: What is my 'society'? Why do I consider myself to be a part of that society? And how do I go about showing my identification with it?

THE FOUR COMPONENTS OF CITIZENSHIP

However one is using the term, the four essential components remain the same: membership, rights, duties and participation.[12] This emphasis upon identification complicates matters somewhat because it impinges upon all of the other four. It is important at this early stage to explain exactly what is meant by each of these components.

Membership

Clearly, as we have already seen from the cited passages from both *Colliers Encyclopedia* and the *Encylopedia Americana,* citizenship has to be in no small part about membership. Of course, the question is often asked as to who actually constitutes a member of a political community. Clearly, national boundaries alone are not definitive. There are always those living within such boundaries who are considered 'non-citizens'. Similarly, there are citizens whose status as such is either temporarily or permanently removed, such as prisoners. It would appear, then, that citizenship is akin

to membership of a club - your application can be denied if you do not possess the appropriate credentials, or your membership terminated if you break the rules. It is not a large step to take from here to questioning the role of those who make the laws which deny or terminate membership. Even in Ancient Greece, from where ideas such as citizenship and democracy are usually credited as coming, membership in the club was never universal—far from it! Slaves, women and foreigners were among those whose entry into the club would have been refused, had they asked for it.

So, as Hall and Held state, the politics of citizenship emerge essentially from debates over inclusion and exclusion. This is no less the case in modern democratic societies than it was in Ancient Greece. Clearly, the issue of class is central here (and sets up its own tension with the ideal of citizenship), but these struggles over membership go beyond class politics alone. The role of women has been questioned at length, particularly with regard to their alleged status as 'second-class citizens'. Similarly, the advances made by new social movements in extending citizenship rights to other minority groups need to be considered, as do the new complex politics of identity and identification in contemporary social life, even though these politics of difference seem to be contrary to the universalizing, homogenizing core of modern citizenship. But I will not dwell any further on these questions of inclusion and exclusion at this point, as they will constitute a later section of this chapter.

Rights

We take it for granted that rights are an essential component of citizenship, although this has not always been the case; some early uses of the term prioritized participation over rights or duties. For Dicey,[13] rights were solely constitutional. For Marshall,[14] of course, rights were crucial to the nature of citizenship. Marshall divided them into three types:

1. Civil rights, that is, those rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice, which are provided for, Marshall argued, by the legal system.
2. Political rights, such as the right to participate in the exercising of power as a member of a governing body or an elector of such a body, allowed for by the nature of the democratic system.
3. Social rights, such as the rights to welfare, education, security and well-being, as befits a member of civil society, and allowed for by the Welfare State.

Such definitions clearly change, and, as Blackburn and others stress, these distinctions tend to reflect ideological differences across political parties on

the question of human nature.[15] Whereas neo-liberals and neo-conservatives on the Right emphasize individual freedom and self-management above community or society involvement, those on the Left invert the distinction. In all cases, though, issues have been raised time and again on those concerns which are excluded from the discourse on citizenship rights. Marxist critics of Marshall have pointed to the absence of economic rights from his list, and the liberal American sociologist Talcott Parsons has suggested the addition of cultural rights.[16] Breezing through the chapter headings in Blackburn's collection, one comes across more than a few of these familiar challenges: the role of women, privacy, health care, employment, housing, racial equality, disability access, education, legal advice, freedom of expression and so on. Do these constitute rights at all, some would ask? And if they do, at least under a broader framework, can they be seen as rights of citizenship?

The fluent and arbitrary nature of citizenship rights is, it would seem, part of the problem, especially when counterpoised with the stricter use of the term employed in international human rights law.

But citizenship rights have always tended to be civil liberties. That is, they are 'assigned' by the State, even though they allegedly represent something which extends beyond the power of the State. Held refers to them as *entitlements* which 'are "of right" and can only be abrogated by the state under clearly delimited circumstances (for example in the case of imprisonment)'.[17] They are thus distinct from human rights, which are considered universal and inalienable. Human rights are not grants from political bodies which can be taken back, nor are they relativized by the presence of corresponding duties. Citizenship rights, by contrast, are subject to the whims of governments.

Duties

It is perhaps fair to say that the issue of duties has been less discussed, and its implications less documented, than has any of the other three key components. In most cases it is treated hand-in-hand with rights. Of course, duties do not necessarily mean that there must be corresponding rights (and vice versa). In an authoritarian state, one might have duties without rights. Similarly, in some non-Western cultures, where the language of citizenship is not spoken, there is an accepted sense of duty to the community which is not balanced by any specific rights.

Within the context of citizenship, though, we should be aware when discussing duties of the need to clarify exactly whom the duties are to. Are they to the State, as symbol of power and protection? Or to the community, as comprised of other citizens? This takes us into the distinction (which will be elaborated on below) between *republican* and *communitarian* models of citizenship (in the sense, at least, of traditions deriving from Hobbes and

Rousseau, respectively). Clearly, such a distinction is crucial for us to accept the legitimacy of the respective body (state or community) to expect us to perform such duties. But, given that citizenship is not defined according to universal rules, duties, like rights, can be arbitrary. Is national service a duty of citizenship? Not in all nations, for sure, but in some. Who would such a duty be to? What about conscription in time of war? Would this be for the good of the State (as a political body), the community of people therein, or both? Clearly, the lines are often blurred. The same can be said for the duty to obey the rules of the State. Such laws are laid down, allegedly, on behalf of the people. It is thus the responsibility of each citizen to obey them, or suffer the appropriate punishment. One such punishment is imprisonment, and herein the right to liberty is relativized by the duty to obey the law. Another example of a blurring of rights and duties is in the process of voting itself. While we often cite it as a *right* to vote, in some democratic countries this 'right' is enforced by law, such that non-voting is a criminal offence. A clearer example of a duty (to the State, but, again, on 'behalf' of the people) is taxation. We are obliged to pay so that the State can (in principle) work on our behalf.

The discourse of citizenship appears automatically to view rights and duties as reciprocal. But even arguments for universal rights often carry with them an unwritten flip-side: the duty to obey the rights of others, without which the rights themselves, some argue, lose salience. This particular 'duty', though, seems to find a more comfortable home in the language of civil society. Indeed, it might be argued that what we sometimes assume to be duties (and thus often unconsciously legitimate the nation-state) are in fact simply matters of *trust* (which itself might emerge from an understanding of cultural norms). As Calhoun says, 'living together as citizens of a democracy is very largely a matter of trust'.[18]

Participation

The inclusion of participation in any such definition seems at first hand to betray the assumption of a relationship between citizenship and democracy. In the Ancient Greek use of the term, as employed for example by Aristotle, citizenship was always primarily about participation, that is, about empowerment to become active in the governing of a society.

Such a relationship needs some clarification, as democracy is itself a complex term.[19] We need to distinguish between representative democracy, wherein individuals are elected by citizens to make decisions on their behalf, and direct democracy, wherein the individual citizen is himself or herself involved in the decision-making process itself. In either case, though, it is the inclusion of participation as a component of citizenship which distinguishes the citizen from the subject. The latter term is usually applied

to members of states wherein absolute power is held by a sovereign; autocracies.

Suffice to say at this stage that the significance of participation for the debate on citizenship arises primarily from discussions focusing on the role of the public sphere in civil society. The idea of the public sphere is limited neither to the nation-state nor to modernity, let alone to democracy *per se*. Keane describes a public sphere as a body which is

> brought into existence whenever two or more individuals…assemble to interrogate both their own interactions and the wider relations of social and political power within which they are always and already embedded. Through this autonomous association, members of public spheres consider what they are doing, settle how they will live together, and determine…how they might collectively act.[20]

According to this view, it is the public sphere which allows for the formation, from a state of nature, of a genuine civil society. The Kantian trend which understands the social contract in terms of rights and civil society is important because it questions the very heart of much political theory, that is the tradition, deriving from Hobbes and Locke, which places at its core the relationship between the individual and the State. Participation in such a society need not, necessarily, be at all linked to the role of the State, nor must it necessarily invoke claims of democracy. The blurring of these issues—participation, civil society, the nation-state, citizenship, and democracy—has been achieved throughout the evolution of modernity. Accordingly, the public sphere has been transformed—robbed, if you like, ofits 'ideal' status—and the subsequent privatization of resources and space is restrictive to the emancipatory potential of citizenship.[21] I will say more about this and related transformation in the ideal of citizenship below. It is important to recognize at this stage that a claim which will resurface throughout this volume is that citizenship *can* be reconsidered and returned its initial potential *if* we reconstruct the notion of the public sphere.

THE ORIGINS OF CITIZENSHIP

The origins of citizenship are perhaps as hard to pin down as a specific meaning of the term, given that various forms of citizenship have clearly existed in a number of societies, in all corners of the globe, throughout history. Political historians usually look to the classical tradition to find what they consider to be the origins of the term as we understand it in Western society today.

The word citizen derives from the Latin, *civitas,* but, as Clarke points out, the 'idea of citizenship, understood as active membership of and

participation in a body politic, is generally regarded as emerging first in Greece at about 600–700 BC'.[22] Itemerged along with the *polis,* the city-state, in which the political collective regulated certain economic activities, allowing citizens the freedom to participate in what is possibly the earliest form of political system.

Although we commonly acknowledge the origins of citizenship and democracy in early Greece, the system was hardly one which we would recognize today. Clarke states how it was at a time of economic dissatisfaction with the aristocracy that led Solon to lay down the laws which spelled out notions of citizenship and equality, but these were far from equal. They allowed for a limited right of appeal, limited participation in collective affairs, and self-management, but a strict distinction was made between citizens and non-citizens, such that only those deemed citizens were considered human.[23]

The Greek system was based on notions of 'being' and 'becoming'. The human was seen in terms of realizing either inner essences or external values, or a combination thereof. Either way it was only as a citizen that one could 'become' fully human. In contrast to this model, Roman citizenship, which developed at around 500 BC, stressed citizenship as legal status (such as the right to mobility). As in Greece, the Roman model was heavily stratified, with few citizens being given rights or duties regarding their participation in political life, but it did give the term a more positive meaning. Dual citizenship, producing often divided loyalty to both birthplace and empire, wasnormal, quite in contrast to the Greek tradition which saw citizenship as all-important. In Rome, it was a means of achieving security and status.[24]

This brief history serves to remind us that the citizenship ideal predated the modern nation-state, even if legal definitions tend to presume that citizenships can only apply to the relationship between individuals and nation-states. Alternative interpretations are not new, although it is the task of this book to suggest that the post-1945 era has ushered in a new model. The citizenship ideal which began in Greece and subsequently influenced later civilizations spawned various such interpretations. Not all of these interpretations are territorial. I will now introduce two such alternative models. One locates the individual within a greater humanity, and the other considers the role of the individual within a transnational cultural community.

ALTERNATIVE CITIZENSHIPS

As I argue in greater depth later on, citizenship has to be seen as a kind of socially constructed political identity which relies upon a variety of influences and definitions. At this point, then, I should briefly discuss what I mean by 'world' and 'non-modern' citizenship, both of which take a variety

of forms and both of which have existed throughout, and indeed, in many cases, prior to, modernity and the rise of the modern nation-state.

World Citizenship

It seems inappropriate to refer to world citizenship as a *challenge* to the nation-state model. Its roots lie in the classical Greek tradition, and some of its most important refinements were made by Roman and early Christian scholars. It is important to recognize, though, that significant changes have taken place within this idea which have emerged wholly as a result of changes in wider society brought about by modernity. And as modernity can be characterized first and foremost by the dominance of the nation-state system, the contrasting idea that one can be a citizen of the world is very much a challenge to this norm.[25]

World citizenship wears many faces. Throughout history it has meant a variety of things, and been adopted as a goal by a diverse array of organizations and individuals. As Heater writes:

> In Western countries the ideas of man [*sic*] belonging to a single community and/or needing a global political structure has been constantly reiterated from the Stoics to contemporary environmentalists. Each age has produced its own interpretation of the basic theme, inevitably in reflection of its individual political and moral assumptions, experiences and concerns.[26]

Heater's book is an attempt to chart the history of this movement, and the author is well qualified to undertake such a task, having himself been a long-time critic of nationalism and a sympathetic commentator on the potential of world citizenship. As Heater notes, the idea has been with us for some two and a half millennia, and it can be found in the classical texts of Occident and Orient. Concentrating solely on Western political thought, Heater states in his introduction that world citizenship—'an individual's consciousness of belonging to a community of the whole of mankind'[27]—can be traced back to the Stoics, and was refined during the Enlightenment, with its focus on expansion and humanism. It has resurfaced in this day and age in part due to the global concerns of ecological disaster and the threat of vnuclear annihilation.

I discuss this idea in greater depth later in the book. In doing so, I will outline three 'stages'—each of which corresponds to a different form of world citizenship—which show how the idea has changed throughout modernity, as a reflection of wider processes:

1. During the period of Enlightenment, universalism, stemming from an Idealist philosophy and advocated in different ways by Kant and Paine,

in which the emphasis is very much on the lifeworld, andon common humanity, human rights, and human worth.
2. From the end of the nineteenth and during the first half of the twentieth century, varieties of functionalism and federalism, in which the emphasis was on the (inevitable) move of the system towards a unified world society, and which thus operated within a systems (and in many cases a nation-state) framework, and thus sought to improve human conditions and advocate world citizenship within the system as opposed to the lifeworld.
3. Post-1945, a pragmatism which sought to blend the best elements of the two traditions, and which can thus be seen as an attempt to reverse the 'colonization of the lifeworld' (see below), butwhich is clearly biased in favour of universalism in that it emphasizes a strong sense of world citizenship from below (this will be the subject of following chapters).

'Non-Modern' Citizenship

I would also like to introduce, briefly, the idea that citizenship need not be bound by territorial restrictions. In other words, there has always been a type of citizenship which is primarily cultural. Identification has always been very important for this type of citizenship. This is a citizenship which does not conform to the contractualist, political, state-bound citizenships of modernity. This seems particularly true in those 'nations' which had not reached the stage of 'nation-state-ness' which for many defines Western modernity. What is modern for some has always appeared to others to be distanced from reality. How can a pauper or a slave identify with a nation-state or with the world when she or he may not even be aware of which 'nation' they are supposed to be part of? Affiliations of this kind are common. One might identify locally, with a village or a family. One might also, and perhaps at the same time, identify transnationally, with a religious or ethnic community.

'Non-modern' citizenship, which is defined as such solely because it does not rely upon any presupposition of the conditions of modernity ('nation-state', 'humanity', etc.), thus has a long history as an alternative to the national model. We should bear in mind the criticisms made of white, Western interpretations of the 'modern experience' which treated it as if it were a universal fact. While I have focused on the development of citizenship from the ancient Greeks through the emergence of the modern West, alternative affinities have emerged within other cultures and civilizations. Tribal or spiritually based forms of identification come to mind here. As the framework I am working within seems most applicable to the transformations which have taken place within Western societies (a limitation which is equally true of Habermas's own work), I will not dwell

on such affinities unnecessarily. However, this particular type of citizenship is important because, as we shall see later, it has a considerable bearing on the development of global citizenship through the importance of multiculturalism, 'disembedding' and the emergent 'global society'. Indeed, part of the distinction between global citizenship and world citizenship is precisely that the former brings together aspects of the modern *and* the non-modern; the Western *and* the non-Western.

Important examples of such a citizenship might include membership of a transnational black community or a Jewish community, such that 'transnational' or 'diasporic' might be useful substitutes for 'non-modern'. However, theydo carry more specific meanings than would be appropriate in all such cases. Many of these groups are decentred, but, again, not necessarily so. Clearly, though, members of these groups owe their primary allegiance not to a nation-state identity, and equally not to the world as a whole. Their citizenship transcends national boundaries, but this in no way means they identify with the world. Paul Gilroy's *Black Atlantic*[28] is a useful analysis of this particular type of identification, as is the considerable amount of work done in recent years on ethnic identity.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK

What I have discussed so far in this opening chapter forms the rationale for the book. In order to challenge assumptions about the relationship between citizenship and the nation-state, I am herein primarily concerned with how the notion of 'world citizenship', which goes back at least to the ancient Greek philosophers, (1) hasoperated as a form of resistance to the dominant model throughout modernity; and, in greater depth, (2) has itself been transformed under the impact of an increase in globality in the post-1945 period. I now turn to a brief description of the structure which this book will take.

This book is divided into a number of distinct but interconnected chapters. I seek to combine sociology with aspects of history and political philosophy. While much of this work is primarily theoretical, it draws heavily on various forms of empirical research, such as semi structured interviews carried out with activists and laypersons. The former serve as narratives for the philosophy of a particular organization which is central to my argument. The latter serve as an illustrative-purposive sample, used to illustrate and clarify some of my theoretical claims. Various individuals and a few social movements are encountered along the way. Each of these can be understood within its own context, but also contributes to the wider argument.

Because, as I have said, citizenship is itself a term which has various, contested uses and meanings, I begin, in Chapter 2, to show how citizenship is often equated with the nation-state. However, there is

nothing inherent in such notions as rights, duties, participation and membership, which necessarily link the citizenship ideal to the nation-state. Primarily, perhaps, citizenship involves participation in the public sphere, civil society, and thus has always been restricted by the privatization of resources and space. Herein lies its often complex relationship to such issues as class, gender and ethnicity.

Having offered this working definition of citizenship, I then go on to challenge the common tendency to think of citizenship solely in terms of its relationship to the nation-state. To do so is to overlook the inaccuracies and contradictions which constitute such an assumption. However, even the language of citizenship is often imbued with the consequences of this assumption, which permeate each of the major traditions within political theory—the liberal, communitarian and republican traditions—from which much of the discourse on citizenship, and on its relationship with various forms of social inequality, comes.

In truth, the idea of citizenship is not at all necessarily linked to the idea of the nation-state. Indeed, the nation-state as we understand it is a relatively modern phenomenon, considerably pre-dated by the idea of citizenship. Furthermore, we could question the extent to which citizenship needs to relate to a constituted political unit. The Aristotelian tradition suggests that citizenship is achieved through membership of a wider community. Pre-modern citizenship usually took one of two forms—that pertaining to the 'city-state' (or the locality), or that pertaining to the 'universe' or the 'world'. The emergence of nation-states in early modernity allowed for a centralization of political administration and power, such that the political community of which the citizen was a member could be easily identified and had clear boundaries. Accordingly, citizenship was defined by and large in terms of corresponding rights and duties, thus clearly binding the individual citizen to the political unit.

At the same time, the arrival of modernity allowed for a significant transformation in the idea that we can all be citizens not only of nation-states, but also of the world. This is the subject matter of Chapter 3. As I have already suggested, world citizens existed before the coming of the modern state. The onset of this particular form of territorial administration allowed for a re-evaluation of the idea of world citizenship. In short, this notion, which had existed by and large as an abstract, an ideal, became politicized. The philosophical ideals of the Stoics and the religious universalism associated with the view that the world is one 'city of God' made way for a moral universalism centring on the notion of human *rights*. The political implications of this philosophy are staggering, but in fact it remained impotent as no formal procedures were in place for it to impact upon national law.

In Chapter 4, I turn to the idea of 'globalization', and the linked—more useful, in my view—notion of 'globality'. I begin by offering a survey of the

theoretical perspectives which cover this area, and proceed to criticize three of the major perspectives: those of Robertson, Giddens and Albrow. However, the idea of some kind of post-war social transformation is central to my argument. A useful theoretical tool with which to understand these transformations and their relationship with modernity is found in the writings of Jürgen Habermas.[29] It could be argued that, through the years, in building his extensive and impressive grand theory, Habermas has in fact preempted much of the contemporary 'global jargon'. In *Communication and the Evolution of Society,*[30] he introduces a number of themes which are central to his work, including his theory of communicative action; his theory of moral development; his defence of the Enlightenment project of reason; his reconstruction of historical materialism; and his theory of legitimation crisis. A re-reading of these allows for certain themes which are relevant to the study of globalization to become clear. These include the international reach of the capitalist system, the emergence of world-views from local to global, the decline of national identity and distinctions made along the lines of national characteristics, the reconstruction of identities, the centrality of reflexivity in the late modern world, and the notion of world citizenship. The task is to apply these to a theory of globalization, drawing especially on Habermas's analysis of the twin projects of modernity. In other words, how might we take these processes and concepts which seem relevant for the debate on globalization, and locate them within a wider historical framework?

Habermas understands modernity to be about two distinct projects—one of technological, political and economic expansion which he associates with the idea of the 'system', and the other of human emancipation and self-discovery which he associates with the idea of the social and cultural 'lifeworld'. The emergence and subsequent dominance of the nation-state system and its associated form of citizenship forms part of the former project, while the development of human rights is associated with the latter. These two projects conflict, such that the very assertion that one can be a citizen of the world is necessarily a challenge to the hegemony of the system. So, despite the importance of world citizenship as a moral and political project during this phase of modernity, its powerless status corresponds to what Habermas refers to as the 'colonization of the lifeworld' by the system. Indeed, this model also helps us understand how the limited empowerment of the idea of human rights took place only when the (nation-state) system was under threat during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth. It could be argued that the system appropriated the language of world citizenship and human rights through the philosophies of federalism and functionalism, which understand the world to be a system of nation-states forming part of a wider system of world society. Significantly, these philosophies did not necessarily call for the idea of the nation-state itself to be questioned.

If, then, this earlier phase of modernity was characterized by these two distinct definitions of world citizenship, it was also characterized by the central role played by the nation-state in social relationships. During the period immediately following the end of the Second World War, this centrality of the nation-state was beginning to wear away. Indeed, it is my assertion that we live in an age of pragmatism, wherein our relationship with the world is unmediated by the nation-state. Post-war events have served to heighten our sense of globality—that is, our appreciation of, and relationship with, the world as a single place. Awareness of global destruction, through nuclear war or environmental damage, transcends national boundaries, and emerged almost hand-in-hand with new technologies which allowed for closer global interdependence. While social relationships could be maintained, and entered into, regardless of space and time, so too was the nation-state facing a crisis of legitimacy due to its own inability to protect its citizens from destruction. Also, increasing multiculturalism and interconnectedness inspired commentators to challenge any assumptions of authenticity and 'belonging' in terms of national identity.

Rather than see this transformation in world-views as signalling a break with modernity *per se,* it is useful instead to recognize the heightening of globality as being an extension of the earlier commitment to moral universalism and human rights. The difference lies chiefly in the change from an abstract commitment to a single, universal, humanity, to a pragmatic, real, and specific response to a global condition which directly impacts upon our lives. Such a citizenship is both pragmatic and political, forming part of what Giddens terms 'life politics'.[31] In other words, the idea of world citizenship has itself been transformed because of this pragmatic globality, such that it seems more appropriate to talk about global—as opposed to world—citizenship. Thus, following on from the earlier phases, already identified, of moral universalism and functionalism and federalism., the commitment of a world citizen in this later modern period is best described as one of pragmatism.

Thus, the impact of globality upon world citizenship makes possible *global* citizenship, which is the subject matter of Chapter 5. Academics such as Turner and Falk have sought to understand what such a global citizenship might involve.[32] In my view, neither has been able to do so satisfactorily, due in no small part to their mutual inability to understand any clear distinction between *it* and earlier forms of world citizenship. They are thus unable to offer a positive, and politicized, definition of it. Seeking to overcome this deficit, I turn, in Chapter 6, towards a particular social movement to show how the global citizenship I am advocating can and does exist. This is the World Government of World Citizens, founded by Garry Davis.

Clearly, organizations exist—as they have for some time—which operate within the framework of these earlier phases of world citizenship, either as universalists defending human rights, or federalists advocating a reformed United Nations. Neither approach necessarily takes on board the suggestion that the nation-state system itself is not only largely redundant, but can be held responsible for many of the problems which are now of concern. The World Government of World Citizens, though, is an organization which *has* responded directly to this pragmatic turn, and which reflects the current philosophy of global consciousness. The organization understands and prioritizes the unmediated relationship between individual and globe, and seeks to move the agenda not in the direction of a reformed world federation, but backto the individual both as sovereign and as citizen of the world. It is not just about recognition of, or even identification with, the world and/or its peoples. It is about individuals understanding the dynamic and direct relationship they have with the globe as a site of action, and being able to locate themselves firmly within this relationship as a matter of course. I have now reached a definition of a *global* citizen—one influenced by the heightening of globality —which distinguishes it from a *world* citizen.

Garry Davis, the founder of this organization, is adamant that citizenship today must be pragmatic. For Davis, to be a citizen of anything other than the world itself is a meaningless assertion, because to claim citizenship empowers one to act in a direct relationship with that which impacts upon his or her security and well-being. In the post-1945 era, that unit is not the nation-state but the world itself. Davis adopts a position akin to certain forms of social constructionism when he stresses the importance of identifying and claiming one's status as a citizen of the world. Thus, Davis's form of global citizenship is a type of *performative* citizenship: by identifying and claiming our citizenship status, and thus by recognizing our relationship to the world, we are making the statement true. Albrow suggests that performative citizenship is an appropriate model for what he calls the 'global age'.[33] Initially associated with the Oxford 'ordinary language philosophy' school, this idea also came to influence Habermas, whose theory of communicative action, and what he calls 'universal pragmatics', goes some way towards influencing a theory of citizenship as intersubjective and meaningful,[34] which I argue are crucial components of a 'global' citizenship.

Of course, all this may be correct, but it might also be argued that we are running ahead of ourselves. Can we say, in truth, that this globality is so important in the everyday lives of individuals? In order to answer this question, we must consult individuals themselves. As I have already stated, citizenship must always contain a subjective component. It is now apparent that this subjective component *has* to be present in order for me to justify the relationship between citizenship and globality. Davis's commitment to

global performative citizenship suggests nothing less. We thus return, in Chapter 7, to those themes—pragmatism, identification, recognition—which have appeared regularly throughout the book. Furthermore, I would state that political identity has always been socially constructed, negotiated and re-negotiated through the practices of daily life. It is flexible and transient, and devised through a diverse range of strategies adopted by people. As such, the nation-state has *never* been the sole source of political identity. People draw from various levels to construct their sense of citizenship. Given the post-war relationship between individual and globe, the global level must now be seen to be as important, if not more so, in such a process.

Even so, it is one thing to show that organizations have responded to this 'pragmatic shift' in their operations, and another to show that globality has indeed infiltrated the daily lives of individuals as they go about constructing their political identities. It is not easy to 'test' the extent to which this is true. It is important to remember that an identification as a world citizen need not, as has ever been the case, be set in opposition to a national identification. Roland Robertson has suggested four 'responses' to globalization, which, at first, would appear to be useful here.[35] Certainly, the use of pragmatism as I have outlined it allows for a recognition that such decisions about identity are never so clear-cut, but without an unnecessary and unhelpful advocacy of relativism. By charting the responses of interviewees about the ways they construct their political identity, one can make connections with Robertson's typologies which show the diverse ways in which people are influenced by globality. But Robertson is constrained by his reliance upon the universalizing tendencies of modernization, and by extension the globalizing ones. His theory does not account for the kind of transformation I have outlined. Despite this, he would agree that even the construction of the most local, or national, of political identities is itself a rich source of information about the emergence of a new form of 'global' citizenship. My central claim here is that individuals construct their sense of citizenship in accordance with multiple factors. Reading the discourse of individuals shows us, for example, how 'world citizenship' as an identity can itself be constructed primarily *through* the language of the nation-state, how national citizenship as an identity can be constructed *through* the language of the local, and how cultural identity can be developed as a strategy for political action.

So, as I have already suggested, it is possible to show that global transformations affect us all, and in a variety of different ways. The kind of pragmatism I have already discussed allows, however, for a new kind of global recognition: one in which the relationship between individual and world is seen directly, and not mediated by the nation-state. Having already suggested some of the ways in which political identity is constructed, I then turn, in Chapter 8, to an analysis of how globality might

have infiltrated the everyday lives of the aforementioned respondents. Interestingly, the things they have to say about the nature of global awareness, the role of the nation-state, and the possibility of a 'post-national citizenship', take us back to some of the theoretical arguments already discussed in earlier chapters. They take us into an internal critique of Robertson's use of globality, which is limited and not always useful in helping us to grasp the spirit of the contemporary age. Of more use, it seems to me, is the extent to which they take us back to Habermas's theorization of modernity as divided into twin projects associated with system and lifeworld, and of his detailed account of the colonization of lifeworld by system throughout modernity.

Habermas suffers in similar fashion to Robertson, from an over-reliance upon seeing modernization as universalization, but even so, his theory of the colonization of the lifeworld is useful in seeking to understand how the language of the nation-state and of the globe might have infiltrated the everyday lives of individuals. Indeed, the experiences of these individuals challenge any assumption of the centrality of the nation-state in people's lives. Both Robertson and Habermas recognize, or would recognize, that a rejection of globality might still imply a strong sense of it, regardless. I have already, elsewhere, used Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital to analyse the inequalities in the transmission of globality as a form of such a capital.[36] But the experiences and influences discussed in this chapter cannot be taken to suggest that these individuals are acting as global citizens; merely that the influence of globality allows for conditions to exist within which such a citizenship might fully emerge.

This being the case, where does it take us in practical terms? In other words, if the concept of citizenship as a nation-state form of political identity is now possibly redundant, or at least no longer primary, how can we draw meaning from the idea of citizenship in the contemporary, globalized., world? Following the assertions made by Davis concerning the performative and pragmatic nature of citizenship, it seems clear that it is not enough to replace it with the abstract notion of moral universalism alone. It must reflect the pragmatism of our age. I attempt to deal with this problem in the final two chapters. In Chapter 9 I offer a tentative model of a 'post-national citizenship'. Here, I draw once again on the working definition I have already introduced of the term, as something which involves membership, rights, duties and participation. My claim is that we are now able to take our accepted definitions of citizenship and transfer them on to a global level which is both meaningful and pragmatic. This involves understanding:

1. Membership in terms of a multicultural society instead of a political state.

2. Rights as shifting *from* citizenship and civil liberties *towards* the 'public sphere' of humanity.
3. Duties which are not to the national interest but to the survival of the planet.
4. Participation which moves beyond liberal democracy towards the possibility of a discursive, *direct* democracy through the information society.

Such a model would, I hope, assist us in using the resources at hand, reconsidering our moral and political relationships, and reclaiming the sovereignty which has been stolen from us, re-empowering us as citizens of a 'one-world community'.[37] Furthermore, to return to Habermas, it would take us along the path towards what Habermas claims would be the completion of the modern project: that is, the emergence of a genuinely intersubjective reason. Note, though, that these transformations occur within *one* aspect of modernity, and that the expansive and divisive projects of the economic and political spheres continue. It is with such a project in mind that I maintain throughout this book that the *globalized* or *globalizing* age in which we live is *still* modern, and that the transformations I have discussed are developments of, albeit quite distinct from, their precursors.

So far, then, I have sketched a possible means of redefining citizenship based on (1) the transformation of our relationships to the world and to our nations post-Second World War, and (2) the responses to these changes from objective individuals. Of course, things are not that simple: inequalities persist in access to the means of both globality and compression, between and within nation-states, and the nation-state itself still has a role to play in defining our political identity. It is not dead as a political, economic, or cultural force, even though its role has shifted. Accordingly, any discussion of global citizenship which claims to be in any way pragmatic needs to recognize these inequalities, and the role played by nation-states in establishing programmes concerned with welfare, education, and so on. This is the subject matter of the concluding chapter, Chapter 10.

SUMMARY

This book is thus an attempt to show how world citizenship has, under globalized conditions, made way for a new, *global* citizenship, and that the primary distinction lies in the shift from abstract to pragmatic action. This global citizenship, I argue, is not only a theoretical possibility, it is a pragmatic reality. But it does not involve the establishment of a world government to replace nation-state governments. Nation-states may be losing some degree of sovereignty, but we are unlikely to find ourselves

entering a new age in which nation-state governments have collapsed in favour of such a new 'world government'. This may not even be a desirable outcome. In this sense, we have not moved 'beyond modernity', as some would argue. The dynamics of the modern age, such as capitalism and the nation-state system, are very much features of the contemporary globalized era. Indeed, nation-states, and their governments, might still have an important role to play in the development of this global citizenship.

Thus, through super-national bodies, it would appear that nation-states, if they are to act at all pragmatically under such globalized conditions, need to move beyond being the tired old defenders of limited national interests, and look instead to being representatives of their citizens in a global political arena. Under-development, poverty, famine, tyranny and oppression are all problems which, while occurring within given nations, nevertheless affect the world. In a truly global polity, it could be argued that it is the duty of national and super-national political organizations to work against these problems. There is, of course, a considerable amount of literature available from activist organizations advocating this.

I will not be addressing such claims in any great detail in this book. This is not intended as a document for policy, nor as polemic. My task is to provide a sociological analysis of contemporary conditions. It is often the case, though, that subjective opinions are conflated with academic arguments. This seems, to me at least, inevitable given that sociology is not, cannot be, and should not even seek to be, a 'value-free science'. I locate myself within a tradition which holds that an academic understanding of the conditions within which social action is possible is inseparable from the moral intentions of the author to use that understanding for practical purposes. It is necessary to clarify this in this opening chapter.

Nevertheless, the theoretical perspective outlined above suffers in part from a bias towards a western, or northern, lifestyle. While there may be some truth in this charge, which in the case of this book might be extended to include my choice of fieldwork and interviewee material, I would argue that such a criticism essentially misses the point. The important point is that, post-1945, the whole world is affected by these transformations because they are global transformations. There is no escaping this reality. The extent to which an awareness of this infiltrates the world-views of individuals, is seen to impact directly upon their lives and becomes the source of a transformed identification on their part is, of course, dependent upon all sorts of other factors, notably socio-economic, both intra- and inter-national. It is with these factors in mind that one has to address the question of access to resources, and perhaps turn to a critical perspective in order to study inequalities in the processes of global change. Indeed, understanding these inequalities in access to both the means of compression (economic capital so as to take advantage of cheaper

communication and travel) and the means of globality (cultural capital fostering a world-view not restricted to localism or nationalism) seems to call for the use of a methodology influenced by historical materialism. Such a methodology, I would argue, would view global change in terms of the coming together of the cultural (globality) and material (compression) factors. My earlier use of Bourdieu, coupled with such a dialectical theory of globalization, helped me to make some sense of these inequalities.[38] To develop these arguments in too much detail would be to take us too far away from the theme of this book. I mention them because it is always important to be aware of the limitations of theory. Once again, the distinction is between a theoretical analysis of conditions which make social action possible, and an empirical analysis of the structural inequalities in the performance of such action.

With this dialectical perspective in mind, however, we need to remind ourselves that there is a sharp distinction between what Brecher, Brown Childs and Cutler term 'globalization-from-above', and what they call 'globalization-from-below'.[39] If the former is about capitalist expansion and political interdependence *between* nation-states, a 'New World Order' which benefits only the wealthy and powerful, then the latter is about the creation of a 'one-world community' drawn from the grassroots movements which occupy the sphere of civil society, whose ideals and actions reflect the resistance of the lifeworld to systemic colonization, and which form part of the contemporary variant of what Marcuse dubbed the 'new historical subject'.[40] As Muto Ichiyo says: 'The slogan at the beginning of the twentieth century was progress. The cry at the end of the twentieth century is survival. The call for the next century is hope.'[41] Such slogans seem at first to be devices of rhetoric, used by activists who advocate a given moral-philosophical perspective, and thus lacking in academic value. However, if any academic value is to be found in this book, it is in the exploration of a set of conditions which such slogans presuppose. My claim is that these conditions are *real,* and that they make it possible for a wholly global citizenship to emerge.

I stress the word 'possible' here. I do not say that they will inevitably do so, nor do I believe that this global citizenship is the only possible response to these conditions. My analysis, quite simply. follows Habermas in distinguishing between the objective world of external nature, the normative world of social interaction, and the subjective world of internal nature. Globality as a world-view has to emerge from the individual consciousness but has to take account also of normative, intersubjective conditions. Such conditions are grounded, however, in the 'real' world of external nature. By analysing these external conditions, and thus making the claim that they are 'real', one is better placed to make normative judgements pertaining to appropriate action, and to understand the structure within which subjective consciousness operates. They are the

conditions which make possible various responses to global change. My belief, using Habermas's theory of communicative action which relies upon judging statements against validity claims—of which one is truth, which pertains to the objective world—is that global citizenship is the only response that is theoretically valid. Perhaps one might wish to write a book developing an argument intended to show how the changes in these conditions make possible new forms of nationalism, or regionalist identity. This would be a worthy project, as there is no doubt in my mind that while the conditions I describe challenge the supremacy of the nation-state, they do not necessarily make way for any singular, alternative dominant model. Many outcomes are possible. Each is worthy of analysis. I have chosen to consider how such changes make possible a new form of global citizenship.

NOTES

1. See, for example, J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988); Bryan S.Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate Over Reformism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Turner, 'Preface' and 'Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship', in *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London: Sage, 1993), pp. vii-xii and 1–18; Maurice Roche, *Rethinking Citizenship: Welfare, Ideology and Change in Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage, 1997), Chapter 4; Nick Ellison, 'Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity', *Sociology* 31, 4 (1997), pp. 697–717.
2. See Elizabeth Meehan, *Citizenship and the European Community* (London: Sage, 1993).
3. Piotr Sztompka, 'Civil Society and Public Space: The Dialectics of Post-Communist Systems', paper delivered to the Thirteenth World Congress of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 18 July 1994.
4. Jeffrey Alexander, 'Culture and Political Crisis: Watergate and Durkheimian Sociology', in Jeffrey Alexander (ed.), *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
5. See especially Turner, 'Contemporary Problems'.
6. See Carl Brinkmann, 'Citizenship', in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 471–4.
7. Arnold J.Zurcher, 'Citizenship', in *Colliers Encyclopedia,* Vol. 6 (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 447.
8. Murray Clark Havens, 'Citizenship', in *Encyclopedia Americana,* Vol. 6 (Danbury, CT: Grolier Inc., 1986), pp. 742–5.
9. Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Talcott Parsons and Gerald M.Platt, *The American University* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973).
10. Havens, 'Citizenship', p. 742.
11. C.C.Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States,* 2nd edn, 3 vols (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), p. 1066.

12. Stuart Hall and David Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds), *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1989), pp. 175–6. The authors list the 'three leading notions' as: membership, rights and duties in reicprocity, and real participation in practice. See also, David Held, 'Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship', in Geoff Andrews (ed.), *Citizenship* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991). My model is thus only a slight deviation from that which these commentators have usefully outlined.
13. Albert Venn Dicey, 'The Parliament Act 1911 and the Destruction of All Constitutional Safeguards', in Sir William R.Anson, F.E.Smith, Lord Willoughby de Broke, A.V.Dicey, Viscount Midleton, Sir Robert Finlay, Lord Hugh Cecil and the Earl of Selbourne (eds), *Rights of Citizenship: A Survey of Safeguards for the People* (London: Warne, 1912).
14. T.H.Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).
15. Robert Blackburn, 'Introduction: Citizenship Today', in Robert Blackburn (ed.), *Rights of Citizenship* (London: Mansell, 1993).
16. Parsons and Platt, *American.*
17. Held, 'Between State and Civil Society', pp. 20–1; Hall and Held, 'Citizens', p. 177.
18. Craig Calhoun, 'Civil Society, Nation-Building and Democracy: The Importance of the Public Sphere to the Constitutional Process', paper presented to the First International Symposium on the Making of the Eritrean Constitution, 7–12 January 1995, Asmara, Eritrea, p. 18.
19. The word itself, of course, comes from the Greek: *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule).
20. John Keane, *Public Life and Late Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 2–3; quoted in John S. Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 37.
21. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* Vol. 2, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). Habermas equates the evolution of the *modern* public sphere with the separation of state and society. Its decline is in part brought about by the emergence of a market economy, and a consumer culture, in place of a 'culture-debating' public (ibid., p. 159). The *Hellenic* public sphere encouraged, within its own limitations, active participation, discussion and excellence within the *polis,* in a manner far removed from the *bourgeois* public sphere of the modern age, wherein the role of the public sphere took on political, legal and technical meanings with the rise of the modern (nation) state and its separation from civil society.
22. Paul Barry Clarke (ed.), *Citizenship* (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 4.
23. Ibid., pp. 5–6. The Greek system is usually defined as such, probably because of the influence it has had on Western political theory and practice ever since. Clearly, though, there were political systems in operation in other societies; both China and India had systems based in part on a sense of duty to a collective body.
24. Ibid., pp. 7–9.

25. I am not suggesting that the challenge to the nation-state model arises 'out of modernity' as if out of a vacuum. The *idea* of world citizenship predates the modern, but the *politicization* of it forms part of what Habermas calls the 'modern project'. I will develop this argument later.
26. Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. x.
27. Ibid.
28. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London:Verso, 1993).
29. Habermas is a brilliant but complex and often difficult theorist. A good introduction to his thought is William Outhwaite, *Habermas: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
30. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984).
31. Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
32. Turner, 'Contemporary Problems'; Richard Falk, 'The Making of Global Citizenship', in Jeremy Breecher, John Brown Childs and Jill Cutler (eds), *Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1993); Richard Falk, 'The Making of Global Citizenship', in Bart van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship* (London: Sage, 1994). This is a revised version of Falk (1993).
33. Martin Albrow, *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
34. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* Vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (London: Heinemann, 1984); Habermas, *Communication.*
35. Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).
36. Darren J.O'Byrne, 'Working-Class Culture: Local Community and Global Conditions', in John Eade (ed.), *Living the Global City: Globalization as Local Process* (London: Routledge, 1997).
37. Brecher, Brown Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions.*
38. O'Byrne, Working-Class Culture'.
39. Brecher, Brown Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions.*
40. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964).
41. Muto Ichiyo, 'For an Alliance of Hope' in Brecher, Brown Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions,* p. 147.

2
Citizenship and the Nation-State

We have a tendency to think of citizenship in terms of its relationship to the nation-state, and to overlook the inaccuracies and contradictions which constitute such an assumption.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE MODERN NATION-STATE

As Turner points out, although the idea of citizenship can be traced back to classical origins, and remained significant throughout the middle ages and early modern times, it is essentially a modern concept.[1] Its evolution is linked in part to post-French Revolution 'democratic ideals' and based on a series of processes of social change which sociologists often accept as defining the emergence of modernity.[2] Among these, Turner lists urbanization, secularization, the shift from particularism to universalism, the emergence of a public realm, the decline of particularistic commitments, and the growth of a nation-state administration which was bureaucratic and centralized. It is this last point which is most significant:

> As the concept developed after the French Revolution, it came to mean an active participation in a republic, that is, a nation-state built around some dominant ideology, typically nationalism. Citizenship was a secular solidarity which within the context of nationalism was replacing religious solidarity and religious symbolism.[3]

Similarly: '[T]he practical emergence of modern understandings of citizenship in the West was associated particularly with the advent of capitalism and of centralized nation-states in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries.'[4]

Habermas stresses that the re-emergence of the idea of the public sphere came about through the rise of the modern State and the separation of state from civil society.[5] In such conditions, the public sphere served as a bridge between the two, and developed legal. political and technical functions

which differentiated it from previous incarnations. Similarly, as Bobbio points out, the establishment of the modern nation-state allowed for the concretization of otherwise abstract ideals of citizenship within the context of positive law.[6] Territory is also a significant factor, as political administrations were able to enforce such laws by assuming the role of legitimate authority within a clearly defined and, in many cases, accepted, spatial zone. Brinkmann also argues that the modern concept developed within the nation-state, in which pre-modern ideas were appropriated and honed by national traditions.[7] He goes on to say that the purposive forging of individuals into national citizens through claims of duties towards the nation-state and the granting of certain political rights has been a major trend since the 1800s. Indeed, Marshall, whose work on the subject is still considered to be seminal, took for granted the role of the nation-state in establishing citizenship rights, the components of which included a distinct national culture, a national capitalist economy, and a national polity.[8] Citizenship developed especially alongside the emergence of the Welfare State in the twentieth century. For Marshall, according to Roche, the shaping of modern citizenship is closely connected to the efforts to forge an integrated nation-state system: 'national functionalism'.[9]

This chapter considers how the concept of citizenship has been bound up within this dominant tradition, that is, the tradition of the nation-state. First of all, it outlines approaches within political philosophy that consider the relationship between the citizen and the state, or the community. It is from such approaches that much of our considerations on the question of rights and duties has been informed. Then it moves on to current debates about the role of citizenship in contemporary society, particularly with regard to its potential as an integrative force in society, and its assumptions about human nature. Following this, it turns to ongoing debates about the limitations of citizenship, centring on questions of inclusion and exclusion. Then, it addresses the thorny issue of nationalism, and considers the contemporary relevance of this within the wider discourse on citizenship and nation-building.

CITIZENS AND STATES

Thus far we can identify a clear relationship between the idea of citizenship and the presence of a political state. We have also identified a link between the language of citizenship and the emergence of the modern nation-state, and the assumption that citizenship needs to be linked at all to such a political construct will be questioned in the chapters that follow. Theoretical approaches to the study of citizenship in the age of modern political theory cannot be easily divorced from their nation-state foundations. However, the significance of social contract theories in the study of citizenship cannot be overstated.

Habermas identifies two central strands of theorizing about active citizenship: the 'liberal' and the 'communitarian' traditions.[10] Both traditions were most fully developed by the contractarian theorists. Van Gunsteren includes a third, the 'republican' tradition, which can be traced back to Cicero and Roman law, Calvin, and much Western philosophy.[11] So it might be argued that such theories have laid many of the foundations for modern theories of the relationship between the 'State' and the individual, rights and duties, and citizenship. Indeed, the controversy over the idea of the social contract has been at the heart of political philosophy since Thomas Hobbes revitalized the discipline. Much recent political philosophy has been shaped in some way by the contributions of the classical contractarians: Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.[12] For example, from Hobbes and Locke we have differing views on the individual/state relationship which cut across theoretical traditions and continue to serve as the foundations for the ever-heated debate over the role of the State.[13] For many, Locke is the founding father of modern liberalism. His influence is clear in the writings of the classical economists and the liberal utilitarians, who argued for minimal state interference in the economic and/or social spheres. Citizenship could be defined in terms of moral and financial security.

Hobbes, meanwhile, has been adopted by those seeking to justify a stronger state, and (unfairly) by those advocating authoritarianism. Of course, there is nothing necessarily authoritarian about a strong state, although Hobbes himself was a believer in absolute state power, free from the challenges of external bodies such as the Church or the legal system. For Hobbes such a state was essential for the protection of the citizen's life. It served to centralize violence in a common structure made manifest by the State, thus protecting citizens from the anarchic 'war of all against all'. Thus,

> he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys to this other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted, hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills of particular men into unity and concord…Now union thus made is called a city or civil society.[14]

Hobbes then sought to differentiate between a 'citizen' and a 'civil person'. A citizen, as subordinate to the one person who represents, by contractual consent, the common will (the 'city')? is also the subject. Citizens, 'by permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons…[but] …Such like societies… are civil persons subordinate to the city.'[15]

The traditions that came from the Lockean and Hobbesian perspectives thus sought to justify the sovereignty of the individual, on the one hand, and the supreme power of the State, on the other. It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who contributed the most important reasoning for citizenship to be related directly to the sovereign general will of the people, an appeal to which he argued was essential to combat the inequalities which were arising in society at the time. Rousseau's account, like that of Hobbes, emphasized the centrality of power relations (as opposed to socio-economic relations, which formed the basis of Locke's theory of human nature), and thus he countered the notion of civil society with one of political order. As Touraine says, 'In practice, the State, which is a community of citizens, is an essential counterweight to the social differentiation that results from modernization itself. Rousseau's anti-modernism is both revolutionary and communitarian.'[16] In a line of thinking which came to influence Durkheim's theory of modernization as differentiation, Rousseau preferred the existence of small communities over the emerging large societies, which he argued were corrupted by the 'division of labour and the search for profit'.[17] Of course, such communities could themselves be nation-states, and Rousseau's theory, like that of Hobbes, is in many respects as much a republican one as it is communitarian, particularly in its concern with national integration.

Thus the dominant contrasting perspectives on citizenship arose initially from these contractarian thinkers. Locke inspired the liberal tradition which stresses the power of the sovereign individual, while Hobbes, with his emphasis on the one, supreme community, has affinities with the republican tradition (although Hobbes, like Macchiavelli before him, was no republican in the modern sense). Rousseau, in some respects a precursor to republicanism, is better understood within the context of a communitarian tradition that may be traced back to Aristotle. So, what do these traditions imply?

The Liberal Tradition

The liberal tradition—otherwise referred to as the utilitarian, instrumentalist, or individualist tradition—sees the citizen as, in van Gunsteren's terms, a 'calculating bearer of rights and preferences'.[18] Following Locke, citizenship is interpreted as membership securing legal status, allowing the individual to go about his or her daily exchanges. Thus, the individual is external to the State, but involved in active exchanges with it for the attainment of benefits (for example, rights and duties). So, participation in the State is beneficial (for example, in order to secure rights). In its pure utilitarian version, the central concept is this maximization of benefit by rational courses of action. A related version weighs up such self-interest with regard to the rights of others.[19] Both

versions see citizenship and rights as relative and secondary to the utilitarian principle of benefit-maximization, and assume a rational concept of contract or exchange between the individual and the State.

The most common criticism of such a perspective concerns the very concept of individualism. For Locke (and Hobbes) and those following in this tradition, humans are essentially individuals who only enter into association for self-benefit. This clearly overlooks the very social and collective nature of much human behaviour. Also, utilitarians have been criticized for their liberal naivety (or even implicit conservatism) in overlooking the power relations between people or classes which may affect the outcomes of much decisionmaking. Nevertheless, this tradition enjoys considerable influence, among both academics and politicians; classical utilitarianism is very much a forerunner of the wave of individualistic New Right thinking during the past 30 years.

The Communitarian Tradition

While utilitarianism stresses competition, the communitarian strand takes an ethical stance, and suggests that individuality and self-identity derive from the associated set of values of a community membership. Here, then, the citizen is first and foremost 'a member of a community'.[20] Early communitarians, such as Laski, have argued that the emergence of mass society has limited the participatory nature of the citizenship ideal, which is in part due to the triumph of consumerism and individualism, and an over-emphasis on the economic rights of the citizen-consumer, on duty and community involvement.[21] Instead, citizenship is viewed as achieved membership of an ethical community. Communities survive through the individual members' sense of loyalty and strength, and individuals gain support and strength from being part of that community.[22] At first, this perspective seems to apply to a moral-social, as opposed to political. condition. However, the citizens are considered to be an integral part of the political system. Participation in the State is essential for the maintenance of active citizenship, as it is the mutual benefits of the collectivist community which citizenship seeks to achieve. Thus there is an assumption within this perspective of shared values, a moral conscience collective.

There are a number of problems with this perspective. Its assumption of consensus leads it to overlook possible deviation or conflict. It adopts a 'taken-for-granted' definition of a community. Also it leads to the danger of limiting individual freedoms for the sake of the community.[23] Nevertheless the communitarian perspective has considerable advantages over the utilitarian one. It stresses duties as much as—indeed, more than—rights, and thus avoids the overly individualistic portrait of human nature presented by the utilitarians. The communitarian tradition has returned to

the fore of social theory through the contributions of Amitai Etzioni and Robert Bellah *et al*.[24]

The Republican Tradition

The republican tradition is allied to the communitarian view, but it emphasizes a single community: the 'public community' or republic, from which individuality, utilitarian maximization and community strength all emerge.[25] However, it is a problematic position insofar as it can become overly nationalistic, patriotic, jingoistic and masculine; it is also overly political at the expense of economic factors; and it is ignorant of diversity between communities.[26] Even so, such a tradition draws popular support from both Right and Left. Touraine states that the modern Left in France is still indebted to the tradition inspired by Rousseau—which in this case is arguably a *republican* one in that it stresses national integration—in that it is 'suspicious of the notion of society and prefers the idea of popular sovereignty, as embodied in the Nation-State'.[27] While the liberal-utilitarian and communitarian perspectives differ on the weight each allocates to rights and duties, they agree on certain themes, most notably the active process that is 'being a citizen', and that this sense of being actually means something real to the relationship one has with one's state or community. Both also fit into the broad rubric of the liberal political paradigm. The republican tradition shares a number of features in common with both, but starts from a different position. Other classical writers, critical of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and their associated traditions, have been less optimistic about the potential for citizenship in modern societies. For example, radicals such as Karl Marx viewed civil rights as illusory, 'bourgeois rights', while conservatives such as Max Weber and Robert Michels, noticing an inevitable process from mass democracy to bureaucratic rationalization and elitism, argue that citizenship and 'true' democracy amount to very little indeed in modern societies.[28]

CITIZENSHIP AND MODERN SOCIETY

The three traditions represented by Marx, Weber and Michels share a concern with the political structure of a state, and the implications of this for the meaning of citizenship. Differing perspectives also exist on the role of citizenship within the nation-state, based not only on different views on its potential but also on different assumptions about the nature of society. For the purposes of this chapter, I wish to divide current perspectives in this debate into three camps: liberal pluralist, Marxist and New Right. This list is not exclusive of all such perspectives, but serves the purpose of convenience here.

The Pluralist Perspective

Debates over the nature and extent of citizenship have, traditionally, taken place within the liberal pluralist theoretical tradition. Pluralist theories of citizenship accept some of the assumptions made by the liberal-utilitarians (and, insome cases, the communitarians), but these perceptions have been shaped by more sociological insights on modern industrial society offered by such scholars as Saint-Simon, Tocqueville, Weber and Schumpeter. In general, such theories assume that citizenship plays some (usually significant) role in reducing conflict and providing opportunities for integration in society. They emerge from the liberal and social democratic strands in political theory. My category 'liberal pluralist' thus includes both 'pluralist' and 'liberal-democratic' or 'reformist' strands.[29] Granted, such a category covers much ground in bringing together writers such as Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, Reinhard Bendix, T.H.Marshall and Ralf Dahrendorf. However, these writers do share an acceptance of the general possibilities of capitalist industrial society, as distinct from Marxists, who emphasize the contradictions in the capitalist system itself, and New Right theorists, who stress the dangers of welfare and the need for extreme economic rationalism.

From within the liberal tradition, the work of T.H.Marshall is regarded by many as the pivotal contribution to the debate on citizenship in recent years.[30] Indeed, Marshall's insights have provided the theoretical foundations for the 'dominant paradigm' of citizenship analysis.[31] Because of the centrality of his ideas, Marshall's work is explored in depth in almost all of the subsequent texts on citizenship. As such, it is not necessary to deal with them in any such depth here. Suffice to say that central to Marshall's philosophy is the role of the Welfare State, which he argued would bridge the divide between liberal and radical ideologies. Thus he is sometimes seen as a representative of the British Fabian tradition of social reformism.[32] Marshall saw the development of citizenship in capitalist democracies in evolutionist terms, leading to the emergence of the three sets of rights: civil, political and social.

Marshall's model has been subject to criticisms by most subsequent contributors, in many cases beyond the simple question of how he came to define 'rights' and, more significantly, what he might have excluded from such a list. His evolutionism has been particularly susceptible to criticism,[33] as has his over-emphasis on the integrative capacity of citizenship.[34] Furthermore, it is argued that Marshall's rights of citizenship relied upon such assumptions as full employment, a nuclear family set-up with a sexual division of labour and an effective system of social welfare, which begs the question: How applicable is it to contemporary post-welfare society? Nevertheless it served as the foundation for many post-war theorists of

citizenship, within not only both the liberal and radical variations of the pluralist tradition, but also the Marxist one.[35]

The Marxist Perspective

Marshall was unwilling, or unable, to clarify the relationship between citizenship and the structural processes of capitalism. From an alternative perspective, citizenship can be linked to the materialistic hierarchy which emerged as part of the capitalist system, and thus as a means of limiting civil —that is class—unrest by offering political concessions of limited involvement through democratic processes, assisting in the maintenance of the capitalist system.[36] From such a perspective both citizenship and the concept of modern democracy can be seen to have arisen from the development of capitalism.

In contrast to pluralism, Marxist theory has claimed that it is insufficient to define societal membership in merely political or legal terms. Following Gramsci, such commentators have preferred to discuss 'civil society' in order to distance their contributions from the liberal citizenship debate. Gramsci's insights remain probably the most significant contributions to the citizenship debate from within the Marxist tradition. Following Marx, 'orthodox' Marxists have been critical of the very concept of citizenship as a bourgeois one, but more recent interpretations have moved beyond this economic dogmatism towards a form of radical pluralism based around such non-Marxist terms as rights. Because of this, it is difficult to locate Marxism, in its 'pure' sense, in contemporary critical theory, but it still offers significant insights which many writers in this tradition adopt.

Gramsci's writings on these themes emerge from his critique of the failures of the capitalist system to ensure freedom, equality and political participation. Rather than allowing subjects to become citizens, 'equal in their rights and duties',[37] the bourgeois state became, for Gramsci, a 'barracks state'. The sovereignty of law serves only to legitimate the power of the State. Rampant capitalism has produced a society 'cut loose from any kinds of collective bonds and reduced to its primordial element of the citizen-individual', so that 'every citizen becomes a gladiator' in the market-war of all against all.[38] Following the traditional Marxist position, Gramsci calls for a socialist society in which 'the "citizen" is displaced by the "comrade"; social atomism by social organization'.[39]

The New Right Perspective

Gramsci's Marxian naivety notwithstanding, his views touch on the central problem of the role of the citizen in a neo-liberal market capitalist society. Rather than criticize the individualism that Gramsci believes is making a mockery of the notion of civil society, New Right philosophies celebrate it

as the cornerstone of economic rationalism. While Gramsci and other Marxists were calling for the citizen to be replaced with the comrade and seeking to usher in an age of collective, communitarian responsibilities, neo-liberals have emphasized the importance of individual rights over social rights. In New Right philosophy the citizen is replaced instead by the consumer.

Like Marxism, New Right theory has an ambivalent relationship with citizenship. In its most identifiable form, under the influence of politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan, it merges classical liberal economics with an authoritarian conservatism. This involves, somewhat paradoxically, both a radicalized Lockean libertarianism, to the extent that the citizen is an active, competitive individual in a (virtually) stateless society, and a Hobbesian belief in a strong state on matters such as defence, and law and order.[40] This interpretation is a modified form of conservative theory, as classical conservative theories had little to say on the concept of citizenship. In this sense the individual rights of 'citizens' are stressed as consumers in a market-led society, while there is also an emphasis on the need to reduce state-provided welfare.[41]

The experience of widespread economic rationalism in the West has sought, on the one hand, to promote this idea of individualistic consumerism, while attempting to appropriate the concept of citizenship for its own ends. As Hall and Held observe, the project of Thatcherism —'the dismantling of the welfare state, the growing centralisation of power, the erosion of local democracy, of free speech, trade-union and other civil rights'—seems to be the 'natural enemy of citizenship in its modern, welfare state form'.[42] However, the Thatcherite project, with its commitment to moral values as well as to economic liberalism, fearful of the breakdown of social cohesion in the wake of this rampant individualism, sought to re-introduce the idea of the 'active citizen', as a stabilizing force, albeit in the form of individuals performing private acts of philanthropy and charity and, thus, through personal choice.

THE LIMITATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP: INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

As Yuval-Davis rightly points out, existing models of citizenship, and in particular the liberal tradition, tend to make a distinction between citizenship as a status shared by all members of a community, and issues of difference, such as with regard to social class, gender and ethnicity, which exist within that community.[43] Citizenship seems to transcend such differences with its assimilationist pretensions. Clearly, though, this not only moves the debate over citizenship away from that concerning welfare, but it also detracts from the very real societal conditions that citizenship should be addressing. It is fair to say, though, that sociologists interested in

the idea of citizenship have sought to analyse it critically in the light of these distinctions and conditions, and it is necessary here to outline some of the major debates that have taken place within this discourse.

Citizenship and Social Class

It is perhaps unfortunate that, from within both the dominant pluralist and the Marxist (and, to a lesser extent, the New Right) traditions, the issue of citizenship has been bound up with issues of social class. Unfortunate because, as Hall and Held state, despite the obvious significance of class,

> this has set up a tension within the idea of class itself. For, as the politics of citizenship has been absorbed into class politics, so the citizenship idea has lost some of its specific force.[44]

Marshall's influence is clear here. His examination of citizenship concentrated on both its integrative and its conflict resolutive capacities in Western capitalist democracies. Hence, due to his overwhelming centrality in the discourse, it is this class-citizenship relationship that has interested both pluralists and Marxists alike.[45] Marshall's view was that, put quite simply, the concepts of class and citizenship are actually opposed to one another. Both are products of the capitalist system, but the oppositional achievement of subordinated groups—such as the working class in highly stratified capitalist societies—in achieving citizenship rights is a direct assault upon the capitalist prerequisite of inequality. For Marshall, the emergence of civil and political rights did not pose too great a threat to the capitalist system—indeed, capitalism welcomed their introduction as necessary for its own logic. Only in the twentieth century, with the emergence of social rights and the Welfare State, has capitalism been in opposition to citizenship rights.[46]

This is partly where the confusion in Marshall's position originates. On the one hand, he is willing to concede that certain rights serve the State; on the other, he is pointing to conflict between the two. It may be argued, however, that the State was itself willing to concede these rights to its citizens in order to appropriate the language of citizenship, and thus control its development, hence avoiding the dangers that would emerge were the working classes to seek to achieve these rights themselves through revolutionary struggle. By conceding such rights -having appropriated their terminology—the State further subordinates the revolutionary potential of the oppressed groups. This position thus opposes the liberal, social-democratic philosophy of reformism, in which progress and emancipation are seen as coming about through social reforms within the political system.

Social reformists might point to the improvements in the living conditions of the working class—partly through the extension of citizenship rights and

partly through the democratic struggles of the trade union movement—as a defence of their position. The extent to which these living conditions have changed because of the extension of citizenship rights remains a matter of debate. If anything, it has been the social and political climate and, of course, economic changes, that have worked gradually to erode the 'orthodox' class system, partly through challenging subjectivist notions of class-identity (false consciousness). But, instead of serving to include and integrate the working class into society, it has in fact merely discorporated 'the oppressed group' into a plurality of oppressed groups; there is as much tension and conflict as before, but it cannot be located within the struggles of any one identifiable mass. This is most identifiable with regard to those groups who are socially excluded through non-economic reasons, such as environmentalists, 'hippies' and new age travellers, radical intellectuals, homosexuals and others who do not conform to the dominant cultural image. However, in the controversial discourse of the 'underclass', we can see that there are still economically based examples of exclusion which do not fit this traditional 'class' image.

So, while debates continue about the nature of citizenship, particularly with regard to 'first-' and 'second-class' citizenship (and, hence, inclusion and exclusion), there has been a shift away from traditional class analysis (in the Marxist sense) of who actually *are* the 'second-class' citizens. Interest has become focused primarily on the exclusion of the poor; the continued existence of poverty is seen by commentators as being in total opposition to the very concept of full citizenship.[47] The heated debate over the existence of this 'underclass'[48] takes us away from this classical paradigm because, as Dahrendorf suggests, the 'underclass' (1) constitutes a minority and (2) has no powers or sanctions and thus does not pose a threat to the established order.[49]

However, Dahrendorf himself does not like to consider the 'underclass' as a class problem because 'classes are conflict groups based on common interest conditions'.[50] Yet the 'underclass' does not fit easily into a status category either. This confusion over what the 'underclass' is in sociological terms accounts in some respects for the level of disagreement that exists within the debate over its alleged existence.

The view taken by conservative thinkers is that there is no 'underclass' problem as such—only a problem of individuals exhibiting laziness, lack of will-power, poor social and family values, low intelligence and even biological or psychological traits, which prevent them from active involvement in society.[51] Thus, for these scholars, attention is shifted away from the rights of the poor and towards their duties and obligations. This conservative view appears to echo the views of the majority of people in the USA and possibly the UK as well.[52] Such attitudes may very well be seen as the intended outcome of a gradual process of welfare deterioration, the project of the New Right, and its hegemonic influence upon public

opinion through the cultural system. Such opinions nevertheless need to be challenged, and a challenge to them from within 'orthodox' Marxist or pluralist perspectives does not seem sufficient:

> [C]itizenship is not simply about class relationships since modern social movements have addressed the problems of women's rights, environmentalism, the status of children and ethnicity. Citizenship can be conceived as a series of expanding circles which are pushed forward by the momentum of conflict and struggle.[53]

Similarly, Hall and Held call for a re-evaluation of the 'politics of citizenship' to take into consideration

> the role which the social movements have played in expanding the claims to rights and entitlements to new areas. It must address not only issues of class and inequality, but also questions of membership posed by feminism, the black and ethnic movements, ecology (including the moral claims of the animal species and of Nature itself) and vulnerable minorities, like children. But it must also come to terms with the problems posed by 'difference' in a deeper sense: for example, the diverse communities to which we belong, the complex interplay of identity and identification in modern society, and the differentiated ways in which people now participate in social life. The diversity of arenas in which citizenship is being claimed and contested today is essential to any modern conception of it because it is inscribed in the very logic of modern society itself.[54]

Citizenship and Gender

Some of the issues raised by these commentators are now being addressed by academics working on issues of citizenship. Feminism and gender issues are beginning to take their place in the debate.[55] Vogel, in particular, has pointed out that women have been traditionally excluded from the debate over citizenship, or seen as subordinate to male citizens, and that this has been especially true of married women, who have been viewed almost as the 'property' of their husbands. Walby supports this view, pointing, for example, to Mann's focus on white, working-class adult males as representative of the extension of citizenship rights.[56] Much of this ignorance of the position of women is linked to the distinction between the public and the private, and to the misunderstandings that have evolved from that distinction.[57]

Walby also criticizes the tendency to focus on the relationship between citizenship and class, with regard to either the class-based restrictions of citizenship,[58] or the potential of citizenship for promoting social

cohesion.[59] Such writers have thus reduced citizenship to 'a narrow form of class analysis'.[60] This kind of analysis has been criticized throughout wider sociological literature for offering an extremely limited definition of work, such that the work done by many women within the household has been reduced to the domain of the private, and, ergo, the irrelevant. Thus, there is the tendency to assume that citizenship operates primarily (at best) within the public domain. Walby accepts Marshall's insights as a starting ground, but takes issue with his perception of the evolution of citizenship., reminding us that, by the time Marshall believed citizenship rights to have extended to include social rights, women still had not achieved basic civil or political rights. Walby also stresses that in some cases political rights emerged before civil rights for women, and served as a necessary power-base for them.[61] Against this, she argues that different groups may achieve different stages of citizenship rights at different times. Vogel offers a sharper critique of Marshall's perspective, pointing out that the exclusion of women from the citizenship 'fraternity' was a *direct*. consequence of the emergence of such entitlements for men. From such a perspective, then, the very notion of citizenship can be linked to theories about the patriarchal nature of modern Western societies, in a similar vein to the Marxist critique of social democracy and citizenship rights as conflict-reducing but system-serving attempts to gloss over more structural inequalities. Yuval-Davis points out that the citizenship rights of Victorian women were removed when they were married (they became 'property') and especially (even until 1948) when they married foreigners.[62]

Walby adds that second-class status for women can be eroded by 'the entry of women into the public sphere…and…women's presence in the private realm of caring [being] accommodated'.[63] She stresses the centrality of political citizenship, particularly with regard to the different positions held by women compared to men. Women tend to be viewed as carers in the private sphere, and although they may receive disproportionate benefits from the welfare system it is not enough to erode the social inequalities experienced by women. She argues that 'Citizenship is about a transition from private to public patriarchy, not only the civilising of capitalism'.[64] In a similar vein, Phillips argues that democracy might be improved (and, thus, that the idea of citizenship might be democratized so as to incorporate the contributions of women) not by 'dissolving distinctions between public and private but in more actively revitalizing the public sphere'.[65]

Citizenship, Culture and Ethnicity

Another form of social and political exclusion that is not necessarily reducible to social class definitions involves the position of ethnic minorities in the political community. Earlier definitions of citizenship

tended to accept what is often referred to as the assimilationist frame. This takes us back to the question of membership, and to the idea of citizenship as a form of integration into the political community. The implications of such an understanding clearly lead to an essentialist assumption about the culture of any given nation-state society. If such an assumption rests upon the question of colour, or of religion., then the implications for those who do not conform to such a stereotype is that they are included only insofar as they agree to do so, if at all.

Increasingly multicultural societies must be equipped not only to deal with the danger of increased tension between ethnic and 'racial' groups, but also to problems of citizenship. One problem with a utilitarian system of democracy is that, in principle at least, it allows for extremist political parties or representatives being elected to positions of influence. We must remember that the Nazi party in Germany prior to the War was freely elected. The definition of citizenship, as it stands, needs to extend beyond the assimilationist frame to include the rights of minorities whose religious, cultural and social practices do *not* conform to a national stereotype.

The shift towards a common European identity opens up new ways of redefining citizenship identity. The experiences of a British citizen will not be the same as those of a French citizen. This is true regardless of whether the citizen is male or female, black or white. The opportunity, perhaps, exists to build a citizenship based on difference rather than assimilation. However, despite this growing interconnectedness between European nations, one thing that is not being sufficiently addressed and confronted by politicians and commentators is the growing racial and ethnic unrest sweeping across Europe. So, in the 'new Europe', 'public opinion has swung against the refugee, the immigrant and the black citizen'.[66]

The question of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers is one that poses significant problems to the taken-for-granted concept of citizenship. In this respect, these problems are, it seems, unique to the nation-state model which has been dominant in the citizenship discourse. In terms of law and politics, refugees and asylum seekers tend to find themselves in an ambiguous position. Even though refugees are theoretically protected under the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,[67] and 'represented' on the global stage by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, they are not entitled to citizenship status in any given country. Thus basic entitlements and rights that accompany such a status are often not accorded to them. Citizenship is still very much a selective process. While, in the general use of the phrase, a citizen is usually seen as any member of a given community, there are in fact more non-citizens than we might at first assume. The 'contract' of citizenship—to abide by certain duties in return for certain rights—thus becomes a process of selection made by a political elite, often based on arbitrary individual characteristics, in particular, the wealth which a refugee might be bringing

with her or him, thus contributing towards the economy of the host nation.

The question of access to 'externals' is even more complex. This applies even to requests for entry made by British subjects, even though it is understood that UK citizens are entitled to be let into their own country without let or hindrance.[68] Until 1962, any Commonwealth citizen or British subject had the right to enter Britain, but the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 and 1968., and the Immigration Act of 1971 defined those who had such a right in more specific terms. These immigrants tended to be from the old Commonwealth (and thus largely the white population), and the debate used the language of 'belonging' and 'right of abode'. Debates over racism reflected the realities of the situation: those who suffered most were Asians from East Africa and, in response to criticism from the European Commission on Human Rights, the government at the time sought to extend entry to these peoples. In 1981 the Nationality Act changed the definition of Commonwealth citizens, who became British overseas citizens with no specific rights of abode. This was apparently intended to bring nationality law more in line with immigration law—which Nicol describes as a case of tail wagging dog.[69] Since 1981, right of abode has been restricted to British citizens and citizens of the Commonwealth who had established patriality before the Act went into effect in 1983. EC nationals have right of entry under EC law.

The positions of women, members of ethnic minority groups and refugees in the political game of citizenship fall outside of the traditional paradigm. Other issues have developed. Questions of ecology are also coming to the attention of academics.[70] The concept of human rights is once again being considered as a potentially valid basis for citizenship rights.[71] Clearly, what writers such as Turner, Hall and Held are calling for is the liberation of citizenship not just from dogmatic class politics, but also from restrictive and outdated nation-state politics. Without saying so, they are calling for a form of world citizenship, as the world is clearly the only arena upon which such fundamental questions of identity, identification and difference can be staged. They are also highlighting some fundamental aspects of the crisis of the modern nation-state. This is part of a process that has altered the perceptions of individuals during the post-war era. It echoes a gradual shift in values and outlooks away from the nation-state, towards the globe.

NATIONALISM, NATION AND STATE

We should not, however, be too quick to dismiss the nation-state completely. While we can accept, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, that it has lost its centrality in the way people live, partly because of its inability to fully protect its citizens, and partly due to its inadequacy as a

total frame for their aspirations, there is still much for the nation-state to do. Also, nationalist movements continue to be a major force in world politics—indeed, increasingly so. Such movements often (but not always) make a call for culturally defined regions to be granted autonomous political recognition; that is, to become nation-states.

What role is to be played by the nation-state in an increasingly globalized world? How does one read the rise of nationalism under such conditions? These questions can only be answered if one takes apart the taken-for-granted language of the nation and remembers that, while the State is a political machine—the product of a kind of instrumental, rationalizing, divisive modernity—the nation is the collective representation of a kind of cultural consciousness. Nationalism is thus a form of cultural expression, quite distinct from jingoistic patriotism which seems to be a blind allegiance to a false god, although there are reasons for their interwoven relationship.

For Ernest Gellner, nationalism is 'a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones'.[72] Thus, it is dependent upon the existence of both a nation and a state. Following Weber, the State is defined as the political institution that centralizes control over the means of violence.[73] A nation can be defined in two ways. First, there is some presumption of the existence of a common culture, which can be understood as 'a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating'.[74] Second, there seems to be the need for members of a nation to recognize that shared culture and identity, which in effect is a loyalty to, and a consciousness of, the idea of the nation. These two definitions Gellner calls the 'cultural' and the 'Voluntaristic'.[75] Gellner thus takes a somewhat functionalist view of nationalism, by seeking to understand it in terms of both a cultural system and a recognition of voluntary action. Craig Calhoun, by contrast, suggests that:

> The history of nationalism, in short, is not a story of the inheritance of primordial ethnic identities. Nor is it a narrative in which purely arbitrary boundaries are imposed by sheer force of will of indifferent populations. It is, rather, an aspect of the creation of social integrated political communities in which a large scale, identity-forming collective discourse was possible.[76]

Calhoun goes on to suggest a number of factors that influenced this transformation. One was ideological, that is, the transformation of categories (such as 'the people') altering understanding of the 'sources of political legitimacy'. A second was material, or technological, as advances in transport and communications allowed people to stay in touch with friends and family around the nation. An economic factor and a political

factor—the growing administrative power of the State—were also key influences. According to Calhoun, nationalism emerged through spheres of political publics, whose identities 'were formed and revised partly through their participation in the public sphere, not settled in advance'.[77]

Herein lies the contradiction: nationalism has often assumed the existence of political identity before public life, and has 'become sharply repressive of claims to various competing identities'.[78] Its language has sought to encourage 'sameness instead of the recognition of and respect for difference'.[79] Indeed, it might be argued that the nation has to be a unified mass, and that the relationship between the nation and the State is a reciprocal one, in that a nation requires a political system (the State) to provide stability, while the State requires the services and support of the collective (the nation) for its legitimacy.[80] A Weberian perspective would understand this in terms of the mutually beneficial co-existence of different forms of rationality. Nationalism thus provided democracies with 'a tacit assumption of the boundaries of the political community, and democratic theory had—and has—little coherent answer to why such boundaries should exist'.[81]

David Held has argued that the emergence of citizenship rights and duties in the West has coincided with the development of democracy. Accordingly, national identities have to be seen in the context of these political developments:

> The consolidation of state sovereignty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped foster the identity of people as political subjects—citizens. It meant that those subject to a state's authority were slowly made aware of their membership in a community and the rights and obligations such membership might confer…The formation of national identities was often the result both of a struggle for membership in the new political communities, and of a struggle by political elites and governments to create a new identity to legitimate the modern state itself.[82]

Perhaps Held is guilty here of placing too much emphasis on the political, and not enough on the cultural. National identities as cultural identities not bound up in allegiance to any particular nation-*state* surely preceded membership of political communities. The nation-state is, as I have already said, a relatively new institution. While Held is right to suggest that there is a dialectical relationship between citizens and political decision-makers, his suggestions concerning the emergence of citizenship *per se* seem limited to the institutional level, and unhelpful if we are to follow the line that assumes that citizenship need not specifically relate to a state.

National identities are not purely political inventions, but they have been achieved through historical struggles: they are constructed, not

primordial.[83] As Miller says, the primacy given to the nation as a source of identity is a relatively recent phenomenon. Previously, kinship or village identification was as, or more, important. This is in contradiction to the conservative, essentialist perspective—the view, for example, of De Maistre, and those such as Marsland, who have championed him—which sees the emergence of the nation as 'natural' and thus primordial.[84] Furthermore, it is by no means the only basis for individual identity, although the closure of the public sphere led to a restriction of available sources for such an identity. However, as Calhoun (following Simmel) states, where some form of democratic public sphere exists, people construct their identities through a variety of group affiliations and cultural categories, such as gender, religion, family, community, occupation and politics, as well as nation.[85] National identity itself is constructed through such other traits as language and territory,[86] and as such is always being reconstructed and renegotiated through cultural and social interaction. Through such interaction, the adult ego-identity allows the citizen to construct new identities in situations of conflict and to successfully manage and blend these identities into a life-history.[87] Indeed, national identities have been eroded, so that internal and external 'enemies' can no longer be identified, or distinctions of any kind made, easily, through national characteristics.[88] In such a democracy, it is usually only in 'extreme circumstances' (such as war) that the nation takes priority:[89] 'Nationalism encourages the identification of individuals not with the locality *per se,* not with the webs of their specific interpersonal relationships, but with an abstract category.'[90] The decline of the democratic public sphere means a closure of such a notion of civil society, and thus a closure of opportunities for communication, the exchange of ideas and knowledge; resulting perhaps in parochialism, jingoistic intolerance, and nationalism, in the more common (political) sense. It would thus follow that the expansion of the public sphere, to what might be called a 'global civil society', opens up the possibility for discourse over issues of difference.

Held, like Anthony Giddens, considers the emergence of modern communications technologies to be crucial to cultural identity; this follows on from his own concern (drawn largely from Habermas) with democracy, civil society and the public sphere. The globalization of communications technologies erodes national identity by shifting citizens' attentions away from purely national or local concerns.[91] Certainly, national identities are, for the most part, sufficiently strong to withstand the challenge of global homogenization, but new technologies do open up new forms of identification; global belongings which transcend nation-state boundaries as well as generating awareness of difference and diversity. A total global culture is unlikely, though, and nation-state identities will remain important.

In the modern world-system of states, these boundaries are crucial for the establishment of a political community.[92] Globalization, as a form of

cultural resistance to the world-system of capitalism and the world-system of nation states, allows for the emergence of new nationalisms,, and allows also for a reconstructed public sphere in which identities are developed and differences respected. It opens up this nationalist discourse as a challenge to global capitalism. But, while the nation is both beneficial for, and benefits from, globalization, the nation-state—the largely artificial political construct that is the product of a restrictive *instrumental* modernity—is a hindrance:

> all of us have a number of different dimensions to our social identity… we each have a local, a national, a European identity…and an identity as a member of the human species. What the nation state does is to single out one of these identities, and assign it sole political validity, make it the exclusive basis of political allegiance. In doing so it denies the increasing interdependence of the world's peoples.[93]

Nationalism as a form of cultural identity is thus quite distinct from jingoistic patriotism. Furthermore, nationalism does not exclude the possibility of a citizen acknowledging an identification with the wider world, or of some other cultural grouping. Cultural conservatism, in assuming some primordial 'truth' or essence to national identity, rejects what it considers to be a liberal view that an individual must strip away the bondage of national identity in order to become a more 'complete' citizen—a citizen of the world. Commentators such as Andrew Roberts, of the *Daily Mail,* have stated that this stripping away of national identity will only result in existential angst, and loss of purpose and meaning. Such a view has been rightly criticized by, for example, Suzanne Moore, in the *Guardian,* who states that this stripping away actually leads to the emergence of new identities.[94] Identities, national or otherwise, have never been singular. They have always been shaped by circumstance, usually by conflict. National identity is not lost; instead, we recognize it as only one of a number of competing identities, which together shape the individual's sense of self; just as no nation can exist at the structural level without responding, be it positively or negatively, to the influences of other nations.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the ways in which the idea of citizenship has come to be associated with that of the modern nation-state. It has been argued that there is nothing inherent in the condition of citizenship that requires such an association. Membership, rights, duties and participation all pre-date modern political institutions and can exist independently of them. Indeed, the reconstruction of citizenship and its relationship to civil society and the public sphere has been as much about

the rise of the modern nation-state, and thus the centralization and technical rationalization of power and politics, as it has been about democratization and public debate. Citizenship in the modern, nation-state sense emerged as a political tool, used for nation-building and as a means of excluding 'outsiders'. The conflation of nation with state has allowed for a confused form of nationalism—as much, if not more, political than cultural—to evolve. At the same time, nation-state citizenship has been neglectful in matters of gender, class and ethnicity, despite its integrationist claims.

While citizenship does not require the presence of a modern nation-state *per se,* it does involve a political dimension. Citizenship itself is a political term because it is an empowering one. It is in this respect that citizenship is quite distinct from identity, where identity is understood solely in cultural or social terms. However, citizenship as identification and empowerment clearly represents a form of political identity. Nothing here necessarily requires the presence of a state in the accepted sense of the term. In fact, for citizenship to mean membership and empowerment within a civil society is as meaningful—and truer to its origins—as for it to mean a contract made between an individual and a political state. Furthermore, the degree to which this form of political identity can enable the empowerment of the individual seems to rely very much on the degree to which citizenship discourse is allowed to take place within a revitalized public sphere. Similarly, for nationalism to mean respect for one's culture is as meaningful, and almost certainly more important, than for it to mean obedience to one's political structure; but again, for this to become politically empowering, it requires conditions that make public debate possible. We will return to this question of politicization at a later point, and see how it is acted out by people in everyday life.

The chapters that follow will take up many of the points raised herein. Beyond this historical analysis lies a sociological understanding of the transformation of a specific type of citizenship identity that does not require one to assume the primacy of the nation-state. Writers and activists who have declared themselves to be 'citizens of the world' have still been using 'citizenship' in its fullest sense, even without recognition of a political structure that governs the territory to which they claim to belong. Similarly—harking back to the exclusion of women, refugees and ethnic minorities from the 'traditional' paradigm, and to the re-interest in human rights as a basis for citizenship rights—we can identify a desperate need to recognize the failings of this paradigm, and—if only in order to rethink the idea of national citizenship—to look beyond the nation-state to identify other forms of citizenship identity which have, perhaps, remained truer to its original spirit.

NOTES

1. Turner, 'Introduction', p. vii.
2. Ibid.
3. Turner, 'Outline of a Theory of Human Rights', in *Citizenship and Social Theory,* p. 177.
4. Roche, *Rethinking Citizenship,* p. 16.
5. Habermas, *Communicative Action,* Vol. 2.
6. Norberto Bobbio, *The Age of Rights* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 20.
7. Brinkmann, 'Citizenship', pp. 471–2.
8. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class,* discussed in Maurice Roche, 'Citizenship and Modernity', *British Journal of Sociology* 46, 4 (1995), pp. 715–33.
9. Roche, *Rethinking Citizenship,* p. 22.
10. Jürgen Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity', in Bart van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship* (London: Sage, 1994) following Charles Taylor, 'The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', in N. Rosenblum (ed.), *Liberalism and the Moral Life* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
11. Herman van Gunsteren, 'Four Conceptions of Citizenship', in van Steenbergen, *Condition.* See also Yuval Davis, *Gender and Nation,* Chapter 4, and Michael Ignatieff, 'Citizenship and Moral Narcissism', in Andrews, *Citizenship.* Van Gunsteren goes on to suggest a fourth tradition, which he calls 'neo-republicanism', which draws on the other three.
12. See David Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds), *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls* (London: Routledge, 1994).
13. See Michael Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
14. Quoted in Paul Barry Clarke (ed.), *Citizenship* (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 89.
15. Ibid., pp. 89–90.
16. Alain Touraine, *Critique of Modernity,* 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 20.
17. Ibid.
18. Van Gunsteren, 'Four Conceptions', p. 38.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 41.
21. Clarke, *Citizenship,* pp. 23–4.
22. Van Gunsteren, 'Four Conceptions', p. 41.
23. All listed in van Gunsteren, 'Four Conceptions'.
24. Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda* (New York: Crown, 1993); Robert N.Bellah, Richard Madson, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M.Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). Etzioni has particularly criticized the way in which American society has moved so far in the direction of rights as to have neglected the responsibilities that come with

them. He stresses the dangers of rights without responsibilities, calling for a 'return to a language of social virtues, interests, and, above all, social responsibilities [which] will reduce contentiousness and enhance social co-operation' *(Spirit of Community,* p. 7). Among the changes Etzioni and his contemporaries believe to be necessary to bring about a 'new America' are those involving the family, the education system and the community. For example, he is critical of the modern individualistic family for its failure to assume adequate responsibility for the needs of children. He also stresses that the school should play an essential part during formative years in teaching moral values, so that the children 'will graduate to become efficient workers, citizens, and fellow community members' (ibid., p. 90). More 'community involvement' should also be encouraged. Etzioni's communitarianism, although conservative, has come to influence politicians in both the major parties in the US, and the 'new' Labour Party in Britain.

25. Van Gunsteren, 'Four Conceptions', p. 42.
26. Ibid., pp. 42–3.
27. Touraine, *Critique,* p. 20.
28. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism,* p. 106.
29. Stuart Hall, 'The State in Question', in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (eds), *The Idea of the Modern State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984).
30. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class;* T.H.Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1973).
31. Roche, *Rethinking Citizenship*.
32. Vic George and Paul Wilding, *Ideology and Social Welfare* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).
33. Anthony Giddens, 'Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship Rights', in Anthony Giddens, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1982).
34. Barry Hindess, *Freedom, Equality and the Market* (London: Tavistock, 1987).
35. Pluralists indebted to Marshall include: Parsons, *System of Modern Societies;* Parsons and Platt, *American University;* Reinhardt Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order* (New York: Wiley, 1964); Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968); A.H. Halsey, 'T.H. Marshall: Past and Present 1893–1981', *Sociology,* 18, 1 (1984), pp. 1–18; John Goldthorpe, The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account', in Fred Hirsch and John Goldthorpe (eds), *The Political Economy of Inflation* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978); David Lockwood, 'For T.H. Marshall', *Sociology,* 8, 3 (1974), pp. 363–7. Marxists influenced by him include Tom Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965).
36. Michael Mann, 'Ruling Class Strategy and Citizenship', *Sociology* 21, 3 (1987), pp. 339–54.
37. Antonio Gramsci, *Pre-Prison Writings,* edited by Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 87.
38. Ibid., p. 88.
39. Ibid., p. 89.

40. See Andrew Gamble, *The Free Market and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).
41. Charles Murray, *Losing Ground* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
42. Hall and Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', pp. 173–4.
43. Yuval Davis, *Gender and Nation,* p. 74.
44. Hall and Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', p. 175.
45. See Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism;* Jack Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988).
46. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism,* pp. 24–5.
47. Ruth Lister, *The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor* (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1990); Roche, *Rethinking Citizenship,* p. 42.
48. William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Wilson, 'Citizenship and the Inner City Ghetto Poor', in van Steenbergen, *Condition of Citizenship,* pp.49–65; Lydia Morris, *Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 1994).
49. Ralf Dahrendorf, 'The Changing Quality of Citizenship', in van Steenbergen, *Condition of Citizenship,* pp. 10–19.
50. Ibid., p. 15.
51. Lawrence Mead, *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Free Press, 1986); George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty* (London: Buchan & Enright, 1982); Charles Murray, *Losing Ground* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
52. Wilson, 'Citizenship and the Inner City', following Kevin Melville and John Doble, *The Public's Perception on Social Welfare Reform* (New York: Public Agenda Foundation, 1988), and Commission of the European Community, *The Perception of Poverty in Europe* (Brussels: EEC, 1977).
53. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism,* p. xii.
54. Hall and Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', p. 176.
55. Sylvia Walby, 'Is Citizenship Gendered?', *Sociology* 28, 2 (1994), pp. 379–85; Ursula Vogel, 'Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship', in van Steenbergen, *Condition of Citizenship,* pp. 76–89; Anne Phillips, 'Citizenship and Feminist Politics', in Andrews, *Citizenship,* pp. 76–88; Caroline Ellis, 'Sisters and Citizens', in Andrews, *Citizenship,* pp. 235–42.
56. Mann, 'Ruling Class Strategy'.
57. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation,* pp. 78–83.
58. Marshall, *Citizenship;* Mann, 'Ruling Class Strategies'; Turner, *Citizenship.*
59. David Marquand, *The Unprincipled Society: New Demands and Old Politics* (London: Fontana, 1988).
60. Walby, 'Is Citizenship Gendered?', p. 384.
61. Ibid., p. 385.
62. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation,* p. 79.
63. Walby, 'Is Citizenship Gendered?', p. 387, following Ruth Lister, 'Women, Economic Dependency and Citizenship', *Journal of Social Policy,* 14, 1 (1990), pp. 445–68.
64. Walby, 'Is Citizenship Gendered?', p. 392.
65. Anne Phillips, *Democracy and Difference* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), p. 13, quoted in Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation,* p. 86.

66. Refugee Council, *Refugees and the New Europe,* promotional brochure (1993), p. 1.
67. The UN Declaration ensures the right to life, free of danger and hunger, and to seek asylum in any country, although it is worth pointing out that no country is *obliged* to give asylum.
68. Andrew Nicol, 'Nationality and Immigration', in Robert Blackburn (ed.), *Rights of Citizenship* (London: Mansell, 1993), p. 266.
69. Ibid.
70. See, for example, Fred Steward, 'Citizens of Planet Earth', in Andrews, *Citizenship,* pp. 65–75; Bart van Steenbergen, Towards a Global Ecological Citizen', in van Steenbergen, *Condition of Citizenship,* pp. 141–52; Maurice Roche, 'Ecology and Citizenship', Policy Studies Centre Working Paper, University of Sheffield, 1988.
71. Bryan S.Turner, 'Outline of a Theory of Human Rights', in Turner, *Citizenship and Social Theory,* pp. 162–90.
72. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.
73. Ibid., p. 3.
74. Ibid., p. 7.
75. Ibid.
76. Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism and the Public Sphere,* Lectures and Papers in Ethnicity, 14 June 1994, Toronto, Robert F.Handley Professorship and Program in Ethnic Immigration and Pluralism Studies, p. 55.
77. Ibid., p. 56.
78. Ibid.
79. Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination', *International Sociology* 8, 4 (1993), p. 405.
80. David Beetham, The Future of the Nation State', in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (eds), *The Idea of the Modern State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984), p. 217.
81. Calhoun, *Nationalism and the Public Sphere,* p. 56.
82. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), pp. 121–2.
83. Calhoun, 'Civil Society, Nation-Building', p. 395; David Miller, 'Reflections on British National Identity', *New Community,* 21, 2 (1995), p. 154.
84. David Marsland, 'Nations and Nationalism in Sociological Theory: A History of Neglect and Prejudice', paper presented to the British Sociological Association Conference, University of Reading, 1996.
85. Calhoun, 'Civil Society, Nation-Building', p. 403.
86. Miller, 'Reflections', p. 156.
87. Habermas, *Communication,* pp. 90–1.
88. Ibid., p. 197.
89. Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Civil Society', p. 403.
90. Ibid., p. 407.
91. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order,* pp. 124–5; Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
92. Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Civil Society', p. 390.
93. Beetham, The Idea of the Modern State', p. 220.

94. Suzanne Moore, 'Flying the Flag of Convenience', *Guardian,* 20 July 1995, p. 5.

3
World Citizenship

Modernity has allowed for the politicization of the idea that we can all be citizens not only of nation-states, but also of the world.

INTRODUCTION

My purpose here is not to talk about the end of the nation-state *per se*. It is not a search for a form of citizenship that might come after the nation-state. Rather, I want to develop the thesis that citizenship has not always been just about nationhood. There have, as I have already stated, always been conflicting models. In this chapter I focus on the idea of world citizenship. In particular, I analyse it with respect to the theory of modernity put forward by the German social philosopher, Jürgen Habermas. Central to this is the useful distinction between 'system' and 'lifeworld'.[1] Related to this, according to Habermas, is the distinction we can make between two conflicting projects of modernity. At the system level, we can identify a process of administrative rationalization and capitalist expansion, while at the lifeworld level, the project is one of increased human understanding and emancipation. The domination, and colonization, of lifeworld by system has been the central feature of the modern age. However, this other modernity,

> though repressed, is none the less presupposed in everyday communication and makes its presence felt not only in oppositional, protest movements but also in the inherent instability of repressive social institutions.[2]

According to this theory, nation-state citizenship can be seen as an extension of the system of what I call 'instrumental modernity', which connects to Roche's idea of national functionalism.[3] World citizenship is thus viewed in relation to the lifeworld of what I refer to as 'abstract modernity'. However, as we have seen, citizenship itself is not a product of

modernity; later in this chapter I will seek to show that the 'projects of modernity' allowed for the politicization of citizenship.

THE ORIGINS OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP

The historical survey of world citizenship offered by Derek Heater serves as a useful source for much of this section. Although flawed, it is a thorough and very useful contribution from within the discipline of the history of political ideas. It falls to me to offer a brief summary of that history here.[4] This is, however, *only* a summary. The discourse on world citizenship among classical and medieval scholars cannot be reduced to those selected for discussion below. The purpose of this discussion is merely to signpost some of the more familiar arguments put forward concerning world citizenship by pre-modern scholars. The debate among these scholars and others like them is multifaceted, and while it is the task of Heater's book to examine them in detail, my intention here is merely to indicate that there was such a discourse prior to modernity, and that this discourse changed with the advent of modernity.

From Socrates to Seneca

It is Socrates who is most often cited as the original 'citizen of the world', but according to some sources, the idea emerged even before his teachings.[5] For example, Baldry suggests that both Hesiod and Homer recognized a commonality among humans which set them apart from other animals, and —given their moral sense of justice—made possible the idea of all humans living together. This recognition combined the scientific recognition of humanity as 'one species' and a moral recognition of humans as 'fellow citizens' according to natural law. Indeed, as Heater points out, Hellenistic philosophy, which assumed state and society to be synonymous, had very little to say about politics *per se:* 'The cosmopolis was not conceived as an organised political system: no one, as far as we know, tried to write a constitution for a universal state'.[6] It relied instead upon the belief that

> all social and cultural distinctions are superficial in comparison with the essential sameness of all members of the human race. As a consequence, all should behave as if they were citizens of the world or universe and in obedience therefore to natural law.[7]

Here, then, we have the origins of what has been called moral universalism. Socrates himself declared that his city was the whole world, and subsequent writers, such as Plutarch, Cicero and Epictetus, show how Socrates referred to himself as a 'cosmian'.[8] This term might, more appropriately, be translated as of the universe rather than of the world.

Significantly, Socrates never abandoned his Athenian citizenship. His cosmopolitanism was based on this kind of abstract moral universalism. More political than Socrates were the Cynics, and it is Diogenes who is credited with inventing the term 'cosmopolitan' *(kosmopolites)*.[9]

The other great precursor to modern debates about world citizenship is Aristotle, despite his apparent commitment to the idea of the *polis* as the city-state.[10] It is argued that, in a letter to his student, Alexander the Great, Aristotle suggested his desire for a world united under 'one rule and one kingdom',[11] above and beyond all cities and countries, and able to ensure peace. Such an idea—which predates the extensive history of world federalism to which I shall return—has a familiar ring to it as we find our way through the new millennium. Alexander sought to achieve this through a world empire. Whether or not, then, Alexander can be considered to have been a genuine cosmopolitan is the subject of debate. Some writers believe that supporters of Alexander's cosmopolitan ideals, such as Plutarch, were merely reflecting the dominant views of their time, although it does seem as if Alexander supported the idea of a multicultural mix, and was an advocate of bringing together citizens and cultures from different states, and different 'races'.[12]

The most important subsequent crystalization of the idea of a 'cosmopolis' is found in the basic philosophy of Zeno, founder of the Stoics, which, according to Plutarch, declares that

> all inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice in separate cities and communities, but… should consider all men to be of one community and one polity.[13]

Heater is right to suggest that, however controversial this philosophy might have been, it at least introduces, in more concrete form than before, the idea of universality, and adds to it the idea of a unified world state (polity), answerable to natural law.[14] Indeed, it was through the Stoics that such ideas became more than abstract philosophies. The revival of Stoic thinking in Rome saw it develop in the hands of lawyers and politicians, such as Cicero, who most clearly develops the idea of natural law and a common human identity. As a lawyer, Cicero recognized circumstances wherein a citizen's allegiance would be to a higher authority than the State. And, while his Greek predecessors had often equated the idea of 'world citizenship' with that of wisdom, it is Cicero who makes clear the importance of 'reason and speech… teaching and learning… communicating and discussing' in the ideal of citizenship.[15] This philosophy seems to resonate with a timeless relevance.

Finally, for the purposes at least of this brief summary of world citizenship in classical thought, we come to Seneca, the other great Roman Stoic. In declaring that 'the whole world is my country' and that 'the

human race have [*sic*] certain rights in common', Seneca was calling for the replacement of earlier abstract moral philosophies of world citizenship with more concrete, practical, and political ones revolving around duty.[16] But herein lies the contradiction that, according to Heater, is at the heart of Stoic thought: the inconsistency or tension between one's moral duty as a citizen of the world, and one's civic duty as a patriot to a state.[17] For the Romans, he argues, there was no such contradiction, as, for Seneca and others, there are different duties which correspond to each 'commonwealth'. As long as the cosmopolis is perceived as a universal city wherein humans are answerable to their gods, it is apparent that the Stoic philosophy of world citizenship does not reach as far as the idea of world government with which we would be familiar.

Religious Universalism

Indeed, this preoccupation with a spiritual commonality came to dominate much cosmopolitan political thought throughout the Holy Roman Empire, the new 'empire of the world'.[18] By the thirteenth century, it was widely held that the Pope, and the Catholic Church, was responsible for the governance of the world, although this was met with opposition from supporters of the Emperor. For a while, though, such disputes seemed irrelevant, as cosmopolitan thinking was apparently undermined by the emergence in Europe of nation-states, *c.* 1300. Even so, Dante had already declared himself to be a 'citizen of the world', and gone on to make suggestions for a world government under the Roman Emperor, even prior to the publication, in 1313, of his *On Monarchy*—which Heater considers to be one of the most important books ever written on cosmopolitan thinking and world government.[19] This book, which was written as an attack on the Church from the point of view of the Empire, developed the concept of an 'administered humanity'.[20] Dante had proposed a pyramidal structure: 'A household needs a neighbourhood; a neighbourhood needs a city; a city needs a kingdom; kingdoms, therefore, need an empire.'[21] Aspects of Dante's thesis predate a perspective that I will discuss in greater depth below; that of federalism. Significantly, and in contrast to later federalists, Dante's world empire is discussed not in relation to the State, but to the idea of human society; in similar fashion to Khaldun's Islamic socio-theology, Dante's vision is related to, but distinct from, the (Christian) religious universalism of his time.[22] This religious universalism tended to restate the argument put forward some nine hundred years previously, by St Augustine of Hippo, in his *City of God:*

> This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and

> institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace.[23]

Of course, the extent to which this particular philosophical strand was ever truly 'universalist' is open to debate. If we see in the nation-state passport a means of securing exclusivity based on political-territorial divisions,[24] we can see in the use of the 'Christian passport' a similar means of exclusion based on religion.[25]

Despite this, religious universalism was, and remains, one of the most forceful and important philosophies of world citizenship. Because it holds on to a belief that all people are equal before God, it challenges the nation-state assumptions which dominated modernist thought. Throughout modernity and indeed into the current, late-modern age, which is characterized by a pragmatic globality, such beliefs have come to encourage cosmopolitan beliefs and actions. There is a rich modern history of cosmopolitan thinking among religious movements, from the Jesuits to the Moonies, and perhaps above all the Baha'i movement, which is wholly based on cosmopolitan ideals. Nevertheless, such ideas have remained, for the most part, abstract, and modernity brought with it the separation of the moral and religious spheres from the political one.

Modernity: The Politicization of World Citizenship

So, while abstract ideas about being citizens of the world existed some time before the advent of what we call modernity, my claim is that this epochal transformation brought about a dramatic shift in the nature of world citizenship. Essentially, it politicized the ideal. For many, this is associated with different forms of rationalization. Certainly, the Enlightenment belief in the power of reason was central in transforming the idea of world citizenship. For Bobbio, this transformation has been closely connected with the process of individualization which he associates with modernity, and which has altered the pre-modern relationship between citizen and state.[26] It was brought about in part by the Enlightenment belief in scientific explanation, and in human progress. Immanuel Kant, above all others, is the most important representative of this shift in perspective:

> This theme of a universal civil society, which is so well expressed by the key term *Weltbürgertum,* originated with the stoics, but was transformed by Kant from a naturalistic concept into a teleological concept of history.[27]

I will go on to argue that two distinct forms of world citizenship emerged which corresponded, roughly, with the early- and mid-portions of the

modern age. As Heater suggests, the significance of cosmopolitan thinking at this time can be explained, in part, by the awareness of the horror of war and the unity of humankind, and by the triumph of Lockean over Hobbesian thought.[28] In this respect, there was no suggestion that the idea of the nation-state itself was to be opposed, only the blind love of one's country:

> The problem…was not so much to replace the state by a universal republic, but rather, by fostering world citizenry attitudes and behaviour, to reduce the incompatibility between the current state system and the ideal of human unity. Individuals, it was argued, are in fact able to combine the dual roles of patriot and world citizen, albeit with difficulty.[29]

Such an ideal, though, lacked political force; hence the need to develop a more practical and grounded cosmopolitan philosophy. Heater mentions two examples of such a philosophy, which roughly correspond to those I will be using. The first of these I call moral universalism, and the second has been referred to as federalism.[30] Moral universalism is a continuation of many pre-modern ideals, and is rooted in the idea of universal human rights and natural law. Federalism is a recognition of the interdependent nature of the world system of nation-states. It has been the subject of much debate since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, as to whether the subjects of international law should be humans (as bearers of rights) or states. The Treaty itself called in part for some means of arbitration and ensuring collective security. On the whole, the theoretical support for the federalist model came from the suggestion that each individual nation-state owed some kind of allegiance to a 'natural international society of states'.[31] Both traditions were indebted to Locke's theory of civil society and natural law. Indeed, the Swiss lawyer Emmerich de Vattel, in *The Law of Nations* (1758), used the theory of natural law to show how a world society of states exists because each state has a responsibility to uphold the civic nature of universal society,[32] while the related ideas of human rights and moral universalism betray an obvious debt to the Lockean idea of an innate human civility and dignity.

Before I discuss these traditions in more depth, however, I want to make something of a theoretical interlude. I want to introduce the theoretical framework which I believe best serves the intentions of this book; that is, that modern world citizenship has been a counterpart to, and in conflict with, the traditional paradigm of nation-state citizenship. This theoretical framework is Jürgen Habermas's theory of the twin projects of modernity.

THE TWO PROJECTS OF MODERNITY

Central to Habermas's understanding of the evolution of societies is his distinction between two projects of modernity. On the one hand, he identifies the modernity associated with the rationalization of the economic and political spheres, brought about by the increasing dominance of scientific method and instrumental, purposive-rational action centred around means-ends calculations. He thus follows Weber, and Horkheimer and Adorno, in bemoaning the bureaucratization of 'advanced' society. Many sociologists and social historians mistakenly reduce modernity *per se* to this project. Habermas, in contrast, identifies within modernity an emancipatory project, located within the social and cultural spheres and practised through action oriented to achieve understanding (in the hermeneutic sense): communicative action. Rooted as it is in communication, this project develops within the context of oppositional movements. Here he is following Kant, and a tradition of critique which has roots in such diverse thinkers as Aristotle, Cicero and the Stoics. Indeed, this tendency to view the potential for opposition as somehow repressed by systemic forces is equally evident in Marx. These two projects I shall call instrumental modernity and abstract modernity, respectively.

Abstract modernity is the modernity of social interaction and of the lifeworld.[33] It is the modernity of ideals as opposed to scientific laws and material facts; of the actor as opposed to the system; of emancipation as opposed to constraint. It is found in all areas of resistance and self-actualization. Throughout modernity it has been subjugated by the power of the instrumental system, but its potential has always remained. Habermas's famous defence of modernity as an 'unfinished project' has been about precisely this potential. Indeed, modernity has slowly worked to the end of promoting self-discovery, centring subjectivity, and formalizing notions of human rights. Thus the defining feature of such a project of modernity has been the universalization of morality.

Instrumental modernity represents the power side of the power—resistance equation. It can be characterized, in simplistic terms, as system as opposed to society. It is identifiable as an order dominated by a mutually compatible alliance between a capitalist economy and an international polity made up of strong, independent nation-states. Capitalism has always been international, in that it seeks out markets wherever it can find them. Meanwhile, the system of nation-states has served to promote and legitimate political boundaries (many of which are artificial), such that the market can thrive on competition and conflict. The dominant economic project of instrumental modernity has been expansion. Connected to this has been control, often achieved through scientific understanding. Though nation-states have continually sought to expand their territories, they have done so by promoting a sense of nationalism and

a rejection of Otherness. Thus the chief political project of modernity has been division.

Where this division takes us for the purpose of my argument in this book is clear. The dominant paradigm of nation-state citizenship is itself part of the project of instrumental modernity, while identification with the world and its peoples has been an abstract identification which forms part of Habermas's other project of modernity. This reinforces the claim made earlier, and drawing on Bobbio's and Heater's suggestions on the transformation of citizenship identity, that modernity allowed for a politicization of the notion of world citizenship. It is fair to say that such an ideal was necessarily politicized so long as it stood in opposition to a dominant model. As Heater states, the significance of the resurrection of cosmopolitan thought around the time of the Enlightenment was in part the reaction of educated liberals against the contemporary political environment.[34] It emphasized

> equality of human beings against hierarchical class structures; humanitarianism against intolerance; pacifism against war; the unity of mankind against xenophobia.[35]

Habermas has gone to great lengths to show how the modernity of instrumental rationality has achieved dominance over its counterpart throughout modernity. He has also shown how resistance to the dominant ideology has been stifled by the efforts of systemic forces to offer agents some kind of stake in the system itself, thus suppressing their identification with alternative modes of existence and their revolutionary potential. (For Marx, true and false class consciousness; for Marcuse, true and false needs; and for Habermas, the 'colonization of the lifeworld' by the system.) Habermas does concede that in some cases resistance from the lifeworld has been successful, but only in a limited way.

We might say that the triumph of instrumental modernity is evident even in the language we use. Our common use of the word 'citizenship' implies a relationship between an individual and a nation-state, or at least some other form of political entity. I have already discussed this relationship in an earlier chapter. Political action, which is strategic and instrumental, falls firmly into the system camp, and the nation-state system is even more evidently part of this process. These nation-states, I have argued, are divisive, and serve the interests of the system. While it may be the case that nation-state identity serves many positive functions for the individual citizen, these might also be interpreted as false needs, which operate to maintain the existing system. The alternative reading of citizenship, I have said, rejects such national bias. World citizenship has meant a number of things to various diverse writers and commentators, but in general it is agreed that it contains a refusal to endorse nationalism and any other

attempt by the system to promote division, advocating instead unity, commonality, and respect for difference.

Let us briefly examine this idea of world citizenship as an emancipatory political project. A sense of world-belonging might be understood, from within an idealist perspective, as part of a process whereby a citizen, through interaction with citizens of other nations, peoples of other cultures, and so on, is able to achieve a fuller understanding of the social world, and from that attain self-actualization and emancipation. On the surface, this appears to be a naive interpretation, and one that reflects the modernist preoccupation with universalism. At best it offers us a suggestion as to how globalization allows for the transformation from national to world citizenship at an accelerated rate. What this might mean for the alternative possibility of global citizenship is an altogether different question, which takes us into a far broader research programme. That aside, there is nevertheless a clear affinity between the achievement of knowledge as a project of abstract modernity, and the idea of universalism which underpinned notions of human rights and a common humanity beyond national borders.

To this Hegelian interpretation we can add a Habermasian distinction between free and distorted communication: that is to say, we can add a dimension of power. Where communication, as an exchange of knowledge, is free and undistorted, the potential arises for world citizenship to become actualized. Where this communication is distorted, the result of the exchange or interaction is likely to be nationalism, intolerance and prejudice. The political manipulation of the nation-state as a cultural body, the use of the international system of states as an arena for war and other forms of political, economic and military conflict, and the subsequent history of imperialism and post-colonialism can all be read as ways in which the divisive and oppressive tendencies of instrumental modernity have distorted the sphere of communication, and thus the search for 'truth'.

Cognitive theories such as those proposed by Hegel (his extreme nationalism aside!) and Habermas sit well with theories of human rights and moral universalism in at least one important respect: knowledge of the world is required to overcome simple world-views which demand exclusion and Otherness. In this respect, access to travel is an important condition and the basis for many, if not all, human rights. Garry Davis, founder of the World Government of World Citizens, whom we will come across in more detail later on, opens his autobiography with an account of how a man wishing to travel to Bulgaria, but unable to do so because of a restriction on his passport, was able to fulfil his wish through the use of six words stamped on to his passport: 'The above restriction is hereby removed.'[36] The author then writes how these words reflect the Christian message: 'The truth shall set you free'. He goes on:

> *Homo Sapiens,* man [*sic*] calls himself. *Sapiens:* knowing: the perception of truth. But one of the tragedies of our time is that modern man—as man of ages past—doesn't know himself. He has even lost confidence in his own, innate capacity. He restricts himself. And only then does he yearn to be free…Man's deadliest, self-imposed, restrictive device is nationalism.[37]

There can be no doubt, from this paragraph alone, that Davis is arguing that world citizenship is liberating *because* it unites each individual with all others on the planet; *because* it rejects the divisive nature of the nation-state system; and *because* it leads to the truth, and knowledge thereof. In short, it exemplifies that which I have already outlined to be the project of abstract modernity: resistance to the power of the system.[38] I will say more about Davis and his philosophies in subsequent chapters. Before doing so, it is necessary to return to our history of the idea of world citizenship, and in particular to the two variations of the idea which were honed and politicized by the advent of modernity.

MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Kant and Moral Universalism

We have seen how moral universalism has its roots in classical thinking., notably that of Socrates, and was developed by the Stoics. Even as nation-states were emerging in Europe, so too was the belief that it was possible to have world union without empire. Among the important cosmopolitan thinkers of the time were Comenius, who advocated 'universal education', and Emeric Cruce, who defended the idea of a common humanity, regardless of cultural, racial, national or religious differences.[39] It was, however, the coming of the Enlightenment which allowed for the notion of world citizenship to become currency among the intellectual elite:

> Thus the Frenchman Denis Diderot wrote to the Scot David Hume, 'flatter myself that I am like you, a citizen of the great city of the world'. The concept and the terms were widely used. Most famous perhaps is Thomas Paine's declaration, 'my country is the world', though more forceful was Schiller's statement: 'I write as a citizen of the world who serves no prince. At an early age, I lost my fatherland to trade it for the whole world.'[40]

Perhaps, though, it is fair to say that Immanuel Kant, whose philosophy was based on a moral imperative reliant upon the common status of all

humans, stands out among his peers as the cosmopolitan moral universalist *par excellence*.[41]

For the classical writers, and for Cicero in particular, citizenship was in no small part about the attainment of knowledge and understanding. If anything, Enlightenment philosophy sought, in a variety of ways, to ground this belief scientifically in the name of Universal Reason. Hegel's absolute spirit of the world, Marx's dialectical materialism, Rousseau's social contract: they were all expressions of the search for an absolute explanation which exists beyond political borders. By seeking to locate the single explanation for human evolution, the philosophers of the Enlightenment, by and large, sought to predict the path of progress. It is in this respect more than perhaps any other that Marx's vision of a socialist society and Hegel's synthesis are indebted to Kant's prediction of human society evolving towards universal peace.

Much can be and has been said on Kant's contributions to political and moral philosophy. I want here to stress his significance for the debate over the nature of world citizenship by locating him at the very centre of the Enlightenment, and of modernity itself. Kant laid many of the foundations for contemporary debates on human rights by understanding the concept of human commonality, recognized by the classical theorists, not as an abstract ideal but as part and parcel of each and every individual. Kant may have been a universalist but he was also, like Durkheim after him, a moral individualist. His categorical imperative stressed, after all, that each individual should act towards others in a way they would expect and desire others to act towards them. It is the moral responsibility of all humans to act in such a way, as if it were a general, or universal, law. Central to this is the idea that humans should always be treated as ends in themselves, and never as means to ends. This qualitative recognition of a fundamental human dignity is at the core of the idea of human rights, about which more below.

Kant was no simple universalist: his political commitment was to a world order that has much in common with the philosophy of federalism. What is important to recognize in both universalism and federalism is that there is still a role for the nation-state to play. As a citizen of the world (in the moral universalist sense) one does not need to renounce one's national citizenship. Indeed, it is a feature of Kant's appropriation of the theory of the social contract that he sought to apply it to the interactions between states, as well as between individuals.[42] After all, his philosophy is based on the premise that humankind emerged from the state of nature by establishing civil societies regulated by law, and so, by its very nature, the anarchic state of international relations must be bound by the universal civil society.[43] Thus, Kant proposed a triangular structure of rights: first, the civil rights of individuals within their nation-states; second, the international rights of states in their dealings with one another; and third,

the cosmopolitan rights of individuals and states as existing interdependently in a universal state of humankind. Central to his theorizing., and regardless of his apparent affinities with federalism, it is important to recognize in Kant's philosophy an appreciation of the essential oneness of the human race. For Kant, people have rights simply because they share the Earth's surface, although these might only be construed as rights of resort and hospitality.[44] As Bobbio points out,[45] Kant's concept of a 'universal civil society' is one in which 'every person is potentially a citizen not of a single state but of the world', but this moral world citizenship did not exclude other allegiances, which might be national as well as cultural:

> Kant…pointed the way for the right of every man to be a citizen not only of his own state but the entire world, and he represented the whole earth as a potential city of the world, that is a universal civil society.[46]

With the scientific understanding of the world as a globe comes a recognition of the rights and duties each individual has as a member of a species as well as a national citizen. There is a significant difference between this 'modern' moral universalism and the more abstract one held by the classical philosophers with regard to their known world:

> [T]his means 'the right to resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth's surface. Since the earth is a globe, they cannot disperse over an infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one another's company.'[47]

Rights and duties are thus central to Kant's cosmopolitanism. The increasing significance of these concepts in national and international laws owes much to Kant's thinking, although it is perhaps more realistic to assume that 'universal' recognition of rights emerged less from a moral sense of community than from a practical, political recognition of a condition which Robertson places at the centre of his theory of globalization,[48] but which was clearly understood by Kant himself: 'the peoples of the earth have…entered…into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere'.[49] Recognition of rights, for Kant, was emerging as a result of the increasingly global spread of contacts; through such networks, individuals were acting as world citizens and, at the same time, states hitherto distanced from one another were becoming closer. Despite his own preferences for such an ideal, however, he did not believe that the idea of an international state, or a world republic (corresponding to the wills of

nations) would render it unrealistic. In the end, however, Kant relied upon an optimism, and a belief in the power of reason, leading to such a development taking place.

Kantian moral universalism thus seems to be embedded in liberal political theory, albeit applied to a worldwide society. As such, it does not logically require there to be any conflict between world and national citizenships. Liberals of this variety envisage a world of difference between nations and cultures co-existing with a world of tolerance and mutual respect between such cultures. Moral universalists were never required to wholly abandon their specific cultural identity; nor was moral universalism ever truly ignorant of difference. One might argue that the most important proposition to emerge from the tradition—that of human rights—did so through a respect for difference as much as for a respect for a common humanity. Human rights are required *because* of the dangerous potential that exists for *not* respecting difference. It is to the issue of human rights that I now turn.

The Idea of Human Rights

As has already been argued, citizenship rights as alluded to in the discourse of the nation-state—at least as seen from the contractarian perspective—are in fact civil liberties, in that they are rights only so long as the nation-state allows them; they are granted-from-above. They form part of a reciprocal relationship between citizen and state, and are upheld or denied by positive law. They might also differ across space and time. Human rights, by contrast, come from below. They are taken to mean a set of ethical codes that ensure the equal worth of each individual life.[50] They are universal and apply to all peoples at all times and in all places. They are not, however, subject to the whims of any nation-state. Instead they exist in the abstract. Thus, the very notion that a citizen might have rights simply because she or he is a human—rights which are superior to those allowed by the state—is by its very nature a challenge to the nation-state model of citizenship.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is rightly seen as a landmark in the recognition of such rights by the international community, and serves as an (albeit loose) constitution upon which to base a positive international law. We will return to this document in subsequent chapters. The idea of human rights, however, is rooted in natural law philosophy,[51] and many of the rights which were concretized by the 1948 Declaration can be traced historically not only through a succession of treaties, pacts and conventions, but also to the moral codes of many of the world's major religions. The formal definition of a concept of human rights has emerged as a triumph of abstract modernity, and has been the most significant component of an idea of world citizenship which is central to this chapter.

Although the idea that we can have rights accorded to us simply because we live, and by some power greater than our political authority, predated him, John Locke's attack on the assumption of the Divine Right of Kings through an interpretation of the natural law thesis—which stated that all people have the *natural right* to life, liberty and private property—marks him off as an early advocate of the idea of human rights.[52] Such rights, for Locke, were not balanced by any duties other than the negative duty to respect the rights of others. These rights were still, though, grants from a higher being, God, rather than part of a human essence. Also, for Locke, they were philosophical, correct in themselves.

Thomas Paine took Locke's bourgeois philosophy a step further and, in doing so, posited the idea of human rights at the centre of the politicized world citizenship of modernity. Paine was an activist as well as a writer, a supporter of the revolutions in America and France, and a self-declared citizen of the world. Paine wanted to address humankind itself with his profound rewriting of the Lockean idea of natural rights. We have such rights, he argued, *because* we are human, *because* we as citizens are sovereign, and they need to be established in law to protect us from the abuses of government. As a further extension of Locke's project, Paine held that there were certain positive duties which accompany these rights; noticeably, the duty to assist a fellow person in need of such assistance, or to be civil. Lockean libertarianism is thus tempered with a dose of communitarianism. These thoughts combined in his distinction between natural and civil rights, but civil rights for Paine were not of the arbitrary variety associated with the positive law of nation-states and national citizenship, and discussed in a previous chapter. Civil rights are, by and large, the politicization of natural rights:

> Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all those intellectual rights, or rights of mind, and also all of those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. *Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right preexisting in the individual,* but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.[53]

The need for these *natural rights* to be secured in some kind of constitution is clear: 'Man did not enter into society to become *worse* than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured.'[54] Unlike Locke, then, Paine distinguishes between the philosophical basis of natural rights and the sociological basis of civil

rights, without—as later sociologists were prone to do—making such a sharp distinction between the two that they become incompatible, belonging to the separate spheres of morality and law which are grounded in different forms of rationality.

This question of duty emerges from the accounts of both Locke and Paine, and is complicated, and often misunderstood. Does the failure to perform a duty negate a right? We can use this argument to check or withhold certain rights, if we believe them to be harmful to the rights of others. Freedom of speech is an example of this: whereas a libertarian, individualist perspective might defend this right regardless, a more communitarian perspective would consider its consequences and deny the right if necessary. However, proponents of the idea of universal rights would, while conceding the importance of each individual dutifully respecting the rights of others, maintain that a failure on the part of an individual to do so does not result in such an individual having her or his rights removed, as might be the case with politically granted civil liberties. Human rights cannot be removed, and cannot be counterpoised with any duties which might challenge any assumption of their universality.

This suggests at least two problems with the concept of rights, at least using the common definition which is often so arbitrarily used for them:

1. Rights remain rooted in utilitarian philosophy; they are still treated as means towards achieving an end—the 'common good'—which inevitably falls back on being the good of the majority.
2. Most rights are arbitrary, in that, if they can be withheld for a 'greater' good, or because they violate the rights of others, then they cannot be universal.

A justification for human rights which shows them to be universal, carried by individuals, not balanced in any way by any corresponding duty, and grounded solely in the fact that one is human comes from Kant, as discussed in detail above. His categorical imperative is based on the assumptions that all humans have the capacity for reason and agency, which sets them apart from other creatures, and that they have, and thus should be treated with, dignity.

The very language of Kant (and Paine and Locke) is prevalent in the terminology of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Significantly, the ideas associated with human rights transformed throughout the evolution of modern thought. The question of modernity is crucial here. Perhaps, then, it is necessary to start by asking how human rights came to be formalized within modernity, and the role they play therein. Bobbio is a useful guide on this question. He is adamant that human rights are an essential part of any global democracy; indeed, he maintains that world

peace can only be achieved by a recognition of the inseparable relationship between democracy and rights:

> Human rights, democracy and peace are the three essential components of the same historic movement: if human rights are not recognized and protected, there is no democracy, and without democracy, the minimal conditions for a peaceful resolution of conflicts do not exist. In other words, democracy is a society of citizens, and subjects become citizens when they are recognized as having certain fundamental rights. There will be stable peace, a peace which does not have war as its alternative, only when there are citizens not of this or that particular state, but of the world.[55]

Bobbio is equally convinced that such rights emerged as part of modernity, and reflected the triumph of individualism over the organic, collectivist model of society associated with pre-modernity; a reversal of the political relationship between state and citizen, sovereign and subject.[56] While Bobbio concedes that abstract notions of rights predated modernity, the emergence of the modern era allowed for the concretization of such ideals in positive law. Of course, such laws were national laws, and only in the post-1945 era was it possible to bring the two together in the form of international human rights law. Bobbio suggests, however, that individualistic modernity brought about the triumph of rights over duties. Thus, while citizenship as applied to the nation-state required rights and duties in reciprocity, the modern individual could nevertheless appeal to a higher set of rights which applied to humanity as a whole; rights which were irreducible to such a reciprocal balance.

Before leaving this discussion of human rights, it is necessary to point out some of the criticisms that are commonly made of the idea. In a later chapter I will return to these, because there I want to show what role is played by a reconsideration of human rights within new, globalized conditions. But the criticisms I offer here apply to the defence of human rights as they have been discussed above, in the context of moral universalism.

First, there is the critique concerning supposed absolutism. People ask, 'Whose rights are they that you are saying are universal?'. Indeed, are human rights at all universal, considering the divergence between opinions (despite gradual possible convergences[57])?

The charge made against the alleged universality of human rights is thus one of Western cultural imperialism. Of course, long before 'deconstruction' and the post-structuralist critique of humanism became fashionable, Marx was himself critical of such moral codes as human rights, which he claimed were in fact ideologies.[58] It is true that the Western political system is the only one that understands the world to be

populated by individuals with rights. However, the ideas contained within this Western discourse—such as equality, liberty, even property—are found in many of the world's major religions, and not just in the West.

A second critique challenges the centrality given to the human species. For example, animal rights discourse has a surprisingly long tradition. In some cases, arguments against animal rights rest on the premise that animals are unable to perform corresponding duties. This may be true, but is irrelevant if it is accepted that human rights are also not negated by omission of duties. Alternatively, the Kantian reliance upon the human capacity for reason and agency is used, but the counter-argument then proceeds to mention those cases of human beings born without such a capacity. Do they, by extension, have no rights? Are they stripped of their humanity? Justification for rights based on reason hovers dangerously close to elitist territory here. Indeed, there seems little genuine reason for justifying the rights of humans and not for animals., at least on a pre-social level. I will return to this later, and seek to refer to a more sociologically argued defence of human rights. At this moment we can, at best, extend Locke's and Paine's ideas and suggest that both human *and* animal (and maybe plants and microbes?) are graced with certain natural rights, the primary being the right to life, but, following Paine, they are not entitled to civil rights.

An example of the complicated relationship that has existed between natural law and human rights as an abstract project of moral universalism, on the one hand, and positive law as an enforceable project of the nation-state on the other, is that of the death penalty. Most definitions of human rights include the basic right to life, but legal systems are governed by national laws. The basic (contractarian) argument follows that an individual is born into, or (either through choice or necessity) willingly enters into, a nation-state system and should be aware of the laws and punishments of that system. Regardless of any higher debate over the morality of such systems (be they execution, flogging, torture, etc.) the individual should accept the laws of the land in which s/he has decided to dwell.

The counter-argument suggests that one should question the validity of the nation-state in this role. Just as one is born into a nation-state and thus its legal system, similarly one is born into the world, as a human, and, the human rights argument goes, subject to the moral laws of a common humanity. Where there is tension between the two, the human right should prevail.

Arguments in defence of the death penalty have taken both utilitarian and moral perspectives as their starting point. Utilitarian arguments are used when the death penalty is defended as a deterrent, for the protection of others (thus violating Kant's central maxim). Moral arguments concerning retribution and justice clearly appeal to higher authorities than national

laws.[59] Few people question the right of governments to murder citizens if that citizen has (or is alleged to have) committed a crime for which execution is the 'appropriate' punishment.

The death penalty might very well contradict Kant's maxim, and clearly it contradicts the right to life stressed by Locke and Paine. But one might ask: 'Do we have a right to life? Where does it say that we do?' The State's right to execute is clearly written in legal statutes or constitutions. Natural law is not politically enforceable.

The significance of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot, then, be underestimated. Here was the first serious attempt to ground natural law and morality in the context of international positive law. That, despite its noble intentions, the Declaration has not been adhered to in full by (almost certainly) all of its signatories is a consequence primarily of the impotence of the United Nations as an institution, a charge which will resurface in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, the presence of the Declaration has allowed for a number of social movements concerned with human rights to emerge on the political stage. It is because of the work of movements such as Amnesty International that we can identify a shift towards a new, pragmatic interpretation of the role of human rights in everyday political life.

However, regardless of such macro-political inconsistencies, world citizenship in the modern, moral universalist sense has been practised for quite some time by concerned individuals because of a commitment they may have to the defence of human rights. It is, for example, this spirit of moral universalism that drives Amnesty International's project. Amnesty International may define itself as apolitical because it criticizes all types of government if their human rights record warrants such criticism, regardless of their political ideology. However, this does not mean that it does not act politically. It is in keeping with the modern transformation of morality that moral issues are politicized. Of course, Amnesty International does not explicitly use the language of world citizenship. I mention it because it is a movement that evolved out of the modern preoccupation with humanity and human rights, and thus is by definition a movement concerned with the implicit goal of world citizenship as recognition of a common humanity. Given that Amnesty International's mandate is based entirely on the protection of human rights, it is useful to use it as an example of an organization which is committed to moral universalism, the project of abstract modernity. This remains true even though its mandate is drawn from various articles of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which was itself a core component in the transformation from this earlier, abstract modernity to a new, pragmatic one.[60]

WORLD FEDERALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

Heater brings to our attention the claim that Aristotle, despite his commitment to the *polis,* advocated what we might call a federation of countries and cities under the rule of one kingdom. That this might have meant a world empire under Alexander does not detract from the possibility that Aristotle held a belief in what is now referred to as world federalism. While the history of world citizenship has certainly involved an understanding of that ideal as an abstract sense of identity, equally important has been the emergence of parallel notions of world government and federalism, and the concrete proposals made thereof. Indeed, despite his commitment to moral universalism, Kant was himself a federalist of a sort. His vision of a universal society took the form of a commitment to a world legal order; his second article towards perpetual peace was based on the need for an international law that is founded on a 'federation of free states':[61]

> [H]e…felt that one should take into consideration relations between a state and its citizens and between a state and other states, but also relations between every individual state and citizens of other states, and inversely between a citizen and a state other than his own.[62]

For Kant, this federation would itself be grounded in moral rationality, in rights and duties which were natural and universal. One does not, though, need to be a moral universalist to subscribe to a belief in world federalism. Many proponents of this philosophy would perhaps prefer to call themselves political pragmatists, or realists. Accordingly, we must, following Heater, spend time discussing the emergence of the United Nations, and explaining how an organization like the World Federalists is able to call for a reformed United Nations in its advocacy of world citizenship.

Federalism and functionalism share a preoccupation with internationalism. The proposal that each makes for world citizenship rests not only on institutions but also, indeed primarily, on *nation-states*. Thus, Zolo[63] lists two co-existent models of international law:

1. The Westphalian model, in which primacy is given to *nation-states,* above institutions and individuals, with no legislator for international law, and wherein the sovereignty of states and the normative rightness of national specificity is absolute, and war is considered justifiable.
2. The United Nations Charter model, guided by general principles of law, which recognizes not only states but also international institutions and organizations, such as the UN itself, which acts as interpreter and, if necessary, arbiter for international disputes.

This second model—which advocates global unification through a reformed United Nations—is associated with movements such as the World Federalists. This movement is quite different from Amnesty International, in that its aims are concerned more with reforming the macro-structures of world politics. The World Federalists see an empowered United Nations as the vehicle of the world federation, to establish global structures to strengthen international law, environmental protection and the global economy. Such an approach, it is argued, would sustain nation-states.

From the point of view of this organization, a world citizen is effectively one who is aware of him- or herself as an actor on the global stage, and who thus becomes a 'global stakeholder'. Such a definition clearly allows for nation-state politicians to act equally as world citizens. Contradictions in this definition arise when we understand that national identities may be so ingrained in cultures that they deny the possibility of a total global consciousness. However, it is true to say, and in keeping with the philosophical leaning of the organization, that there has been a long-term evolution of global culture over the past few hundred years, and a major increase in global awareness during the past 25 years, which is linked specifically to the proliferation of communication; the 'global village'.[64] Equally, millions of people might have been affected by globalization without realizing it. For example, an individual who loses his or her job because of the workings of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is thus an actor in the global structure; but his or her conscious concern is only for the job itself. S/he is not always aware of the wider implications. A global stakeholder would not only have to act on the global stage but also have to have internalized the global consciousness and awareness (in an almost Parsonian fashion).

The World Federalists, then, would advocate a macrostructural change, which it is claimed would allow for individuals to have more of a voice in affairs. International law—which suffers because there is no supranational body to enforce it—would still be the basis for achieving these ends, but without the top-down administration of a world government. Instead, an elected United Nations Parliamentary Assembly would act as a watchdog legislative body.

So, in truth, the aims of the organization remain international, rather than global. Such a view of the world order does not require the dismantling of nation-states in favour of a world government, but of world governance based around the direct relationship between the individual and the globe, as well as between the individual and the nation-state. Such relationships are mapped out in what Robertson calls the 'global field'.[65] The implication of Robertson's thesis is that the world is made up of lots of smaller communities, interlinked but autonomous. Such ideas as the 'global stakeholder society' clearly betray a leaning towards communitarian values.

However, not all federalists support the thesis that a world federation is best achieved through a reformed United Nations. Some commentators maintain instead that such a federation cannot truly exist as long as national sovereignty is allowed to continue. Bidmead is one such opponent of nationalism. He outlines a three-point programme for world unity:[66]

1. The need for 'a democratic world-embracing federation that will be so powerful that nobody will dare to threaten it, so just that none will wish to challenge it, and so successful that all who had at first stayed outside will clamour to join'.
2. The need for a 'scientifically designed…system in which hooligans like Noriega or Saddam Hussein can be arrested right away for conspiring to commit a breach of the peace, rather than *after* they have precipitated a war and committed nameless atrocities'.
3. The need for 'international law [to] act directly on individuals. Democracy must leap the frontiers. We need to make representative and responsible government world-embracing'.

While it is clear that Bidmead's model drifts significantly from that of the United Nations internationalists, his brand of federalism., outlined in his three proposals, retains a bias towards modernization that needs to be further explored. Bidmead's model is, it would appear, both a continuation of already existing arguments for world federalism, and a bridge between those who, as we have seen, place their trust in reforming the existing international system, and those who abandon internationalism, as it is understood here, completely, in favour of what might be called globalism. It is this transformation, from world citizenship to global citizenship, which we address in subsequent chapters.

At this point it is also worth reminding ourselves of the Baha'i movement, which has brought religious universalism into the realm of functionalist cosmopolitanism and the theorization of world government. I will not dwell on this movement any further in this text, other than to keep in mind, if not on page, the contributions made by it, and indeed other religious movements, to the critique of instrumental modernity.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP

So far, I have discussed the concept of world citizenship in largely objective terms. That is to say, I have outlined its historical transformation and its existence as an ideal. I have attempted to sketch briefly a history of the idea within political and social theory, and to show how the various definitions of the term have come to influence the strategies of various organizations. The language of world citizenship permeates each of these organizations, but it does so at various levels. Such an idea, or ideas, is used to define any

one of a number of institutions and organizations which work within this broad field. But these organizations are more than simply faceless doctrines. They are comprised of active people who seek to implement these doctrines, largely out of a sense of personal commitment to the organization itself, and also out of a commitment to a larger set of values. So, aside from the officially recognized organizational discourse, there are a number of subjective definitions which show how world citizenship becomes an integral part of self-identity. Of course, it is not always easy to separate the two broad levels. It appears that one might have a strong sense of being a world citizen, through one's political, social or cultural values, without having a clear definition of what that actually means. Only organizations find it useful to spell out their values in the form of such a manifesto. Still, such organizations tend to attract those who are nevertheless inclined towards their goals. If such an individual considers her- or himself a world citizen, the line between the free-floating components of the subjective dimension, and the more concrete definition found in the organization's manifesto, becomes increasingly blurred. In some cases, taking the organizational line allows world citizens the ability to give their values a solid and identifiable structure, which they had hitherto been unable to do.

To put it in more simple terms, the theoretical discourse of world citizenship often invents problems and contradictions which do not actually exist in the minds of the people who subscribe to such a doctrine. A good example here is on the question of universality. The academic discourse has stressed similarity above and beyond any reference to difference, largely because difference is divisive. It is suggested that too much concern with difference takes the student of world citizenship into the murky waters of relativism, from which such notions of human rights and world citizenship are irretrievable. And yet activists—even those working within the tradition of moral universalism—stress the importance of respecting cultural differences. Indeed, for them, to do otherwise would be to adopt an authoritarian stance which would contradict their values. In the grounded world of activism, these problems are nowhere near as dramatic as the academic discourse might have us believe.

These activists, and the organizations they represent, are products of a post-war concern with peace, democracy and human rights. Only now is social theory beginning to understand human rights and world citizenship in the way that these spokespersons do. Indeed, some might say that only now is it even possible for it to do so. Tired of debates between universalists, criticized for their essentialism, and relativists, accused of advocating an apolitical stance, social and political theory has sought a middle way. This is what separates globalization from earlier debates around universalism and modernization. It allows for pluralism and relativism in such a way that those earlier concerns never could. It draws

on universalism but recognizes pragmatism. While the academic discourse of world citizenship, and indeed the mandates of related organizations, have betrayed their roots in an earlier kind of universalism, the words that come from the mouths of the activists themselves have more in common with the debates around globalization that seem to pertain solely to the later modern age.

So far, then, I have stated: (1) that modernity is characterized by a conflict between system and lifeworld; (2) that the system level is represented by the world-system of capitalism and the international system of nation-states; and (3) that resistance to this from the lifeworld has brought about recognition of notions such as human rights, and other forms of emancipation. One way of understanding the emergence of this resistance throughout modernity is by following Habermas, and developing an evolutionist perspective on the development of world-views.[67] then suggested that the emancipatory project of abstract modernity has undergone various transformations, represented by different organizations with markedly different philosophies. Also, in closing this brief history and analysis of the idea of world citizenship, I indicated that another transformation might have taken place in the era immediately following the Second World War, and that the recognition of human rights by activists and movements might in fact have more to do with this transformation than with earlier discourses on world citizenship.

However, the intensification of international and global interdependence post-1945 has taken two distinct paths. On the one hand, there are those who see the globalization of society as a means of developing the projects of moral universalism and federalism towards the goal of achieving a genuine world society of world citizens. Amnesty International emerged through this path. The United Nations and World Federalists both developed through it. Thus, as Habermas notes,

> As the name 'United Nations' already shows, world society today is divided into nation-states that recognise each other as subjects in international law. The historical nation-state that emerged in…[the West]…has spread throughout the world.[68]

From such a perspective, then, it might want to say that we have moved towards, or are moving towards, a genuine world society, but that such a society is made up primarily of the recognition of other states within the international community; of international law over and above the laws of individual nations; and of a United Nations capable of enforcing such a law. While recognizing the globalization of all forms of social life, from technology to ecology, Habermas concedes that we are faced with matters that,

> can no longer be solved within the framework of the nation-state. The hollowing out of the sovereignty of the nation-state will continue, and require us to develop capacities for political action on a supranational basis.[69]

Habermas himself seems committed to modifying Kant's cosmopolitanism to take account of recent transformations. His own suggestion for fully grounding human rights in enforceable positive law is, like the World Federalists, to restructure the United Nations. Yet his is an interesting suggestion, insofar as he recognizes that the United Nations cannot function as a 'world parliament' if it remains simply as a body of representatives from nation-states.

> The UN still exhibits features of a 'permanent congress of states.' If it is to shed the character of a mere assembly of government delegations, the General Assembly must be transformed into a kind of upper house and divide its competences with a second chamber. In this parliament, peoples would be represented as the totality of world citizens not by their governments but by directly elected representatives. Countries that refuse to permit deputies to be elected by democratic procedures (giving special consideration to their national minorities) could be represented in the interim by nongovernmental organizations appointed by the World Parliament itself as the representatives of oppressed populations.[70]

Herein, we see indicators toward a different path. Such a path recognizes the inability of the nation-state to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens. It also recognizes the need for new forms of political action. It does not, however, require us to transfer power from the nation-state to the United Nations. It seeks instead to transfer it from the nation-state to the citizen, and by extension to the global community of citizens.

This all takes us conveniently towards the theme of the next chapter, wherein I take up the challenge laid by Habermas in this quote. Here, I will offer a survey of the uses of this contested term, globalization, and focus in particular on the emergence of globality, which I distinguish as a world-view from previous, moral universalist, world-views associated with humanity, thus providing the important distinction between global and world citizenship.

NOTES

1. Habermas, *Communicative Action,* Vol. 2.

2. Larry J.Ray, *Rethinking Critical Theory: Emancipation in the Age of Global Social Movements* (London: Sage, 1993), p. vii.
3. Roche, *Rethinking Citizenship*.
4. David Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1996). I have tried to list the positive and negative qualities of this book in a review of it in *Global Education News,* May 1997, p. 6.
5. H.C.Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), cited in Heater, *World Citizenship,* pp. 5–6.
6. Heater, *World Citizenship,* p. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 7.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. Ibid., p. 9.
12. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
13. Quoted in ibid., p. 13.
14. Ibid., p. 14.
15. Ibid., pp. 15–17.
16. Ibid., p. 18.
17. Ibid., pp. 22–3.
18. Ibid., p. 30.
19. See the more recent edition, Dante Alighieri, *Monarchy and Three Political Letters* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954); see also Heater, *World Citizenship,* p. 37.
20. Martin Albrow, *The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 29.
21. Heater, *World Citizenship,* p. 37.
22. Albrow, *The Global Age,* p. 43.
23. St Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God Against the Pagans* (London: Heinemann, 1965), quoted in Clarke, *Citizenship,* p. 63.
24. See Darren J.O'Byrne, 'On Passports and Border Controls', *Annals of Tourism Research,* 28, 2 (2001), pp. 399–416.
25. Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 86–7.
26. Norberto Bobbio, *The Age of Rights* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
27. Ibid., p. 120.
28. Heater, *World Citizenship,* pp. 72–3.
29. Ibid., p. 73.
30. Ibid., p. 74.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 75.
33. My use of the term abstract here is clearly open to misunderstanding, and so it is important to clarify exactly what I mean by it. Abstract in this context is used in the sense of an ideal, as opposed to a material, phenomenon: 'existing as a quality or an idea rather than a material object' (according to the *Collins New Pocket English Dictionary,* 1992 edn). Thus, human rights are

abstracted from the individual to a 'higher' plane. Essentially, such a distinction draws on Hegel and is comparable to Marcuse's use of the term sublime (in *One-Dimensional Man).* Clearly, Giddens uses the term (in *The Consequences of Modernity)* to denote something quite different. His 'abstract systems' are such things as money; tokens that are symbolic (and thus abstract), but in which individuals invest some degree of trust. While Habermas himself does not use the term, the suggestion I have taken from his distinction between system and lifeworld in terms of the projects of modernity clearly indicates that it is an appropriate one when one is referring to such notions as human rights and a faith therein. Also, as will become apparent, the kernel of my argument is that world citizenship has spawned a new form of global citizenship and that the most significant distinction to be made between the two is that the latter is not abstract at all; its most defining feature is that it is pragmatic and grounded in everyday life. Indeed, it makes more sense to talk, as Habermas does, of communicative rationality with respect to this pragmatic modernity than it does in terms of the earlier abstract modernity.

34. Heater, *World Citizenship,* p. 72.
35. Ibid., p. 73.
36. Garry Davis, *My Country is the World* (London: MacDonald, 1961), p. 9; see also O'Byrne, 'On Passports'.
37. Davis, *My Country,* p. 10.
38. As we shall see, this issue is more complex than I have so far suggested. Davis, while acknowledging his commitment to world citizenship, is a key contributor to what might be termed, hopefully without misunderstanding, an evolution in the project of abstract modernity, such that the ideals which have formed its moral foundations are no longer simply 'abstract'. In the next chapter, I will argue that the post-1945 era has seen the transformation of the project from one of abstract modernity to one of pragmatic global necessity. For the time being, though, it is useful simply to locate Davis within the wider, anti-systemic tradition of lifeworld politics within which world citizenship is itself located.
39. Heater, *World Citizenship,* pp. 63–9.
40. Ibid., pp. 70–1.
41. Heater rightly points out that Kant has been cited at various times as a universalist (via his categorical imperative), a federalist and an anti-federalist, even an anticosmopolitan (ibid., pp. 82–3). It is hard to accept this last claim.
42. Howard Williams, 'Kant on the Social Contract', in Boucher and Kelly, *The Social Contract,* p. 132.
43. Heater, *World Citizenship,* p. 83.
44. Ibid., p. 94.
45. Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* p. 120.
46. Ibid., p. 121.
47. Ibid., quoting Immanuel Kant, *Kant: Political Writings,* edited by H. Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 106.
48. Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Change* (London: Sage, 1992).

49. Kant, *Political Writings,* p. 107, quoted in Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* p. 122, and Heater, *World Citizenship,* p. 84.
50. See Carlos Santiago Nino, *The Ethics of Human Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991, for a detailed discussion of the philosophical traditions involved in the debate on human rights, and of the complexities associated with defining such rights.
51. David Weissbrodt, 'Human Rights: An Historical Perspective', in Peter Davies (ed.), *Human Rights* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 1. It was the publication in 1791–92 of Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* that first turned the liberal natural law philosophy associated with John Locke into a moral and political programme. Although Paine wrote primarily in defence of the revolutions in America and France, he was also keen to expand upon Locke's basic philosophy, which, for Paine, was that individuals share two natural bonds: one, they are naturally sociable and desire the company of others; two, they are bound by economic self-interest. See the introduction by Claeys in Paine, *Rights of Man* (Cambridge: Hackett, 1992).
52. Marking him also as the founder of modern liberalism, but not, significantly, as a democrat. Locke was well schooled in the Judaeo-Christian tradition and his definition of all people tended to exclude those who were not white, male, Judaeo-Christians. Also he supported slavery and was far removed from being an outspoken advocate of suffrage. However, it is the ideas he developed which matter in the history of human rights.
53. Paine, *Rights of Man,* p. 39 (italics added).
54. Ibid. (italics in original).
55. Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* pp. vii-viii.
56. Ibid., pp. vii-x, 41–3.
57. Antonio Cassese, *Human Rights in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
58. Terry Eagleton, 'Deconstruction and Human Rights', in Barbara Johnson (ed.), *Freedom and Interpretation: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1992* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
59. This position was taken by Kant himself in support of the death penalty.
60. The point is that Amnesty International is a non-governmental organization, and this, I would argue, distinguishes it from organizations with related goals, such as the World Federalist Movement and the World Government of World Citizens (both of which I discuss below).
61. Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* p. 120.
62. Ibid., p. 121.
63. Danilo Zolo, *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997), pp. 94–6, following Richard Falk, 'The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order', in C.A.Blach and Richard Falk (eds), *The Future of International Legal Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969); and Antonio Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
64. Robertson, *Globalization.*
65. Ibid., p. 27.
66. Harold S.Bidmead, *The Parliament of Man: The Federation of the World* (Barnstaple: Patton, 1992), p. 4.

67. This is also useful because, to some extent, it ties in to both Robertson's concern with globality and with what I shall define in the forthcoming chapters as pragmatic reflexivity. I say to some extent because, as we shall see, globality should be understood as more than a world-view.
68. Jürgen Habermas, *A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 169.
69. Ibid., p. 168.
70. Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 187.

4
Modernity, Globality and Globalization

We live in an age of pragmatism, wherein our relationship with the world is unmediated by the nation-state. Post-war events have served to heighten our sense of 'globality'; that is, our appreciation of, and relationship with, the world as a single place.

THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION

If the dominant model of citizenship has been the nation-state model, then clearly its greatest challenge arises from the widely discussed 'crisis of the nation-state'. For some, this crisis relates to a wider process (or processes) which has (have) been termed 'globalization'. However, despite the fact that much has been written recently on the subject,[1] there is, as yet, no clear agreement as to the meaning of 'globalization'. Jacques offers a useful summary:

> Although this trend toward globalisation is most obviously economically driven, it cannot be reduced to the economic either in its causes or in its effects. Take, for example, the growth of an increasingly international culture, with the spread of satellite television or the growth of English as an international language.
>
> We live in an era in which Paris, with the opening of the Channel Tunnel, could feel as close to London as Manchester; when events in a far part of the globe can be brought live to your sitting room; when foreign travel including to Third World destinations has become commonplace; when a nuclear meltdown in one country affects a whole continent; when the corruption of oceans can affect the balance of our planet's ecosystem. In short, globalisation is accompanied by a new sense of global intimacy and interdependence.[2]

The lack of any specific definition of globalization makes it increasingly difficult to contrast various perspectives. However, the debate has moved on significantly since Marshall McLuhan introduced us to the idea of the 'global village'. For McLuhan, technological developments have created an interconnected globe, in which media events from one part of the world are instantly available in another; so,

> the globe is no more than a village. Electric speed in bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree. It is this implosive factor that alters the position of the Negro, the teenager, and some other groups. They can no longer be contained, in the political sense of limited association. They are now involved in our lives, as we are in theirs, thanks to the electric media.[3]

McLuhan's insights have influenced theorists of postmodernity, post-industrialism, and reflexive modernity alike, but the increasing intensification of which he spoke has produced a debate over the causal factors of global change. Attention is divided among those concentrating on the economic, technological, political, social and cultural spheres. One of the unfortunate trends that has arisen during the course of these debates has been the readiness with which the Left has dismissed globalization as merely an extension of the capitalist economy. Although such critics duly oppose the idea, their analysis is disturbingly similar to that of economists and commentators on the Right, who, of course, welcome it. An equally dismissive attitude, which seems to come in equal measures from both ends of the political spectrum, has been that of the culturalists, who reject the thesis of globalization in favour of a defence of 'local' culture, seeing as they do the two as incompatible. Such a perspective seems to offer uncritical support for the nation-state and/or the local community, and little serious thought is given to what these actually mean. It seems to me that the Left is, unfortunately, blinded either by a cultural conservatism or by a dogmatic and defeatist understanding of the nature of capitalism.

It will be my contention in this chapter that 'globalization' more usefully refers to the social and cultural aspects of global change; a reclaiming of both *global* and *local* identity away from the false barriers imposed by the political and economic aspects of the modern system. As such, it involves some degree of conscious awareness of the world, that is, globality. Indeed, at the system level, the assertion that capitalism has always been expansive, and thus potentially global, has been made forcefully by Wallerstein and others for a number of years.[4] What we have, then, is a development of the conflict between system and lifeworld., power and resistance, at a global level, in which the expanded political and economic rationalization (the world-system) is countered by a tendency towards rediscovering identity: a

'global-ization-from-below' or, for my purposes, simply the global lifeworld.

Thus, I maintain that globalization can only be understood as a process of socio-cultural change. Elsewhere, I have defined it as

> the dialectical social process based around the emergence, by virtue of a material phenomenon, 'time-space compression'…and a cultural one, 'globality'…of a specific world-view built on an image of the globe itself as an arena for social action.[5]

While I have said that the distinction between system and lifeworld is a useful one, it is clear that aspects of material culture (time-space compression) are necessarily inseparable from developments within the economic sphere. Similarly, the world-view to which I refer has also to be understood in terms of the interaction between culture and the economy (and, specifically, the reproduction of cultural capital[6]). However, it is not my intention in this book to spend too long debating the question of globalization as totality. My focus here is on identity and identification with the world. My principal concern is with the emergence of a heightened sense of globality. Before I develop this, though, it is necessary to mention, albeit briefly, some of the chief approaches to globalization already adopted, and to explain my concerns with them.[7] I will not attempt a detailed summary of these arguments.

GLOBALIZATION

The leading contributors to the debate thus far have included: Immanuel Wallerstein, Roland Robertson, Frank Lechner, John Meyer, Anthony Giddens, Martin Albrow, Niklas Luhmann, Arjun Appadurai, Leslie Sklair, Stuart Hall, Ulrich Beck, Robert Gilpin, James Rosenau, Scott Lash, John Urry, David Harvey and Ulf Hannerz.[8] Their works are often cited and fairly accessible. Only some of them bear any direct relationship with my argument, and I will say more about these during the course of this chapter. First, though, I will outline some of the key debates and themes that exist within this discourse over globalization, and that have been developed largely through and by the contributions made by the above-named writers, and others. Some of these debates will not be discussed in any further detail here, but they need to be addressed, as all are indicators of contemporary global transformation.

First, the global is not the same as the international, or the world. The global relates to the world as a whole, that is, regardless of national boundaries. It thus involves an orientation towards the world as a whole, as distinct from an orientation towards a common humanity (which need not include the globe). While it is agreed that much of the work carried out

within the tradition of international relations is an important precursor to globalization theories, it is also important to recognize the differences. Much of this work tends to operate within a realist perspective that locates the nation-state as the central unit of analysis.[9] Globalization, then, takes us to a different level of research.

Second, globalization suggests a process of transformation (such as modernization, and so on). There is some dispute over the extent to which this is true. My own feelings on this require me to focus more specifically on globality (which, I argue, has meaning) rather than globalization. Anyhow, key theorists locate this change at different times. Roland Robertson sees a long-term shift towards the globe, heightened in the latter part of the twentieth century. Anthony Giddens locates it more specifically within the post-war era, the culmination of modernity. For both Robertson and Giddens, in quite different ways, modernity is inherently globalizing. Others see globalization as a process that ushers in a new age, be it a postmodern age, or, for Martin Albrow, a 'global age'. Still others, notably Sklair and Harvey, accept that transformations have taken place but maintain that such transformations can be understood within the capitalist logic of modernity.[10]

Third, there is no one theory of globalization. The term itself is deliberately vague and covers a variety of areas. Among the key components are:

1. Globality: an orientation to the world as a whole. In other words, this is a cultural understanding, or world-view, of the globe.[11]
2. Time-space compression, or the related idea of time-space distanciation: the idea that the relationship between time and space has been radically altered, mainly due to technologies which make the world a smaller place. We can fly over to the other side of the world in a shorter space of time, and phone, fax or e-mail wherever we like. Thus our awareness of barriers is diminishing.[12]
3. Disembedding: the idea that goods and services, and cultural practices, no longer need to be rooted in one place. Thus place loses its significance —things are disembedded and relocated. So, products are made all over the world, cultural attractions from London can be seen in the middle of the Nevada desert, cultural practices are carried out in alternative locations, and so on.[13]
4. Disorganized capitalism: the idea that the economy is now both decentred and globalized. Thus, capitalism, it is argued, is no longer located within one dominant nation-state. Even if the Wallersteinian line is accepted, the difference, it is argued, is that the production of services is now more spread out around the globe, and this sector has moved from one based on social labour and the production of goods to one based on knowledge.[14] Furthermore, the practices within

capitalism are based on post-Fordist principles. Those who argue that globalization is primarily driven by the economy include, as I stated earlier, critics on the Right (the 'new protectionists') and on the Left (Will Hutton and some Marxists), and supporters on the Right (John Redwood, who at least supports the global market) and the Left (Martin Jacques).

5. 'Nation/state separation' and the crisis of the nation-state: for various reasons, it is argued that the nation-state no longer holds a central position in our lives. In purely political terms, we can identify ways in which the nation-state has lost some degree of power, which, for example, might be transferred to Europe, or to the United Nations; and in socio-cultural terms we can see how citizens might lose faith in their national governments for failing to fulfil their promises. This is linked in part to Jürgen Habermas's theory of 'legitimation crisis'. Often people turn to social movements that can act as new political parties campaigning on a world scale. As a result, the nation-state loses its position as the principal frame of reference in people's lives. Related to this, we can identify a possible separation between the cultural nation (which can be increasingly transnational) and the political state (which becomes individualized in terms of life politics), with neither necessarily requiring the territorial dimension of the nation-state.[15]
6. Reflexivity: understood in a variety of connected but distinct ways.[16] Individuals are more reflexively aware of the events going on around them and of the impact, or meaning, of those events on themselves and their own life-politics. This is, in part, due to the media technologies and the spread of access to knowledge. For Giddens it is linked to ethnomethodology and 'reflection'. For Beck it is an extension of Luhmann's idea of autopoeitic systems, initially more to do with 'self-confrontation' than pure reflection. Lash and Urry draw more on Foucault, and the idea of a 'surveillance society' extending the power of the gaze.
7. Risk: is a central feature of our lives as we come to realize the inevitable consequences of the project of industrial society. Indeed, beyond industrial society, we now live in a 'risk society', in which actions are guided less by their possible benefit than by the minimalization of risk. Beck's understanding of reflexivity is in fact the autonomous transition from industrial society to risk society. The major form of risk which guides our actions is environmental risk, which is inherently global; thus risk society is a global society.[17]
8. Cultural hybridization and 'new ethnicities': the blurring of cultural traditions and identifications bringing into question assumptions about 'authenticity' and 'place'. We see cultural traditions crossing national boundaries, and media images reaching the four corners of the globe. Influences come from all over, such that national cultures become

hybrids from all sorts of other influences, not all of them Western. Products such as Coca-Cola and Japanese cars become global products, but goods are still designed to suit specific local tastes. There is a 'new world disorder', with no cultural centre.[18] So, cultural identities become hybridized and pluralized; they become 'new ethnicities'.[19] It is no longer a matter of defining oneself culturally in specific and simple terms.

9. World society: the coming together of social relationships, such that they transcend boundaries. Our social networks are no longer bound by place or space. Events in the lives of friends overseas have an immediate impact upon events in our own lives. This is a kind of 'network diffusion', linked to ideas about disembedding and time-space compression; our connections around the globe make us one big social network. We interact with people from all sorts of other cultures, such that we are no longer bound up in any purely national view of what society actually is. For Luhmann, at least, the very act of communication with people from around the globe leads necessarily to a world society; while Hannerz prefers to focus on macro-linkages between networks which form what he calls the 'global ecumene'.[20]
10. Globalism: the orientation of one's values specifically towards the globe. Like globality, globalism stems from an awareness of the globe, but it takes the matter further to the realm of genuine activism. This is reflected in the increased membership of new social movements with such global orientations, and the relative decline of national party memberships.[21]
11. Global elites and transnational corporations: or the idea of a new global class structure. If capitalism itself is now global, then there has emerged, some argue, a new capitalist class that has control over the major industries and political institutions; for example, Rupert Murdoch can change his citizenship in order to further his business interests. Similarly, major corporations consciously operate across borders and seek to appeal to all the world's markets; Coca-Cola and Nike are among the many 'global brands'.[22]

No one theory of globalization encompasses all of the above transformations and phenomena. Different perspectives prioritize different aspects of the debate, making any evaluation difficult, if not impossible. Each of these perspectives has its advantages and disadvantages. The early work on the nature of the world-system is also useful. For example, Wallerstein presents us with an important and thorough account of the nature of the international capitalist economy throughout history, but embraces a somewhat naive and reductionist economism. There is no obvious reason why modifications to these theories of a structural world system cannot be compatible with a perspective of globalization. This

would require it to take into account both the social and technological developments that have forced the compression of the world through time and space, as analysed by Harvey and Giddens, and the cultural and ethical developments that work to forge a sense of globality, as studied by Robertson. Similarly, we can at least attempt to understand the active construction of globalization from below, either through liberated human discourse, as Habermas might suggest, or through an active orientation towards global issues, as suggested by theorists of the various new social movements such as Alain Touraine, culminating in a micro-perspective of being in 'one world' to complement a macro-perspective of the functionings of the world-system. However, it is the lack of clarity concerning the interplay between these micro- and macro-sociological approaches, and between global and local processes, which seems to pose the most serious challenge to a thorough understanding of globalization as a phenomenon.

Three of these perspectives—those of Robertson, Giddens and Albrow—stand out as important for my analysis, and I now want to turn my attention away from these general debates and towards these more specific contributions. It is important to recognize that my argument is less concerned with 'globalization' than it is with globality. Globalization suggests a transformation which may or may not be an accurate description of the world. Given that it is a contested term, with a variety of meanings—as well as critics who perhaps rightly are concerned with the tendency to use such terms *as if* they mean something concrete without a questioning of exactly what that concrete reality might be—if anything, it is wise to avoid the term where possible. Globality, in contrast, means something quite concrete. It means an awareness of, and an ability to relate directly to, the globe. It is not subject to any prior acceptance of social transformation; it is not speculative. I want to link this globality with Albrow's idea of pragmatic universalism, the crisis of the nation-state, and in general with debates around pragmatism and what Habermas calls social rationalization, as well as with wider debates around the nature of modernity. It will be my contention that globality refers to a specific type of world-view that, like all world-views, rests upon the nature of the dialectical relationship between material and cultural factors which define modernity. But I also contend that we can identify a qualitative transformation within modernity roughly following the end of the Second World War.

GLOBALITY

Globality is the crucial component of Robertson's analysis of globalization. Following Durkheim and Parsons, Robertson, taking up the challenge laid down by Wallerstein's analysis of the capitalist world-system, has sought to

focus on culture as the dominant factor. While he accepts that globalization is in part about the compression, or shrinking, of the world via such means as travel and communications, he prioritizes, in histheory, the concept of a consciousness, or awareness, of being in such a world. Globalization is, for him, a process that leads to the recognition of the world as one place. This is, he argues, a long-term transformation, pre-dating modernity but heightened by modernization.

Such is the nature of this transformation that Robertson does not see the need to define the idea of globality any more specifically, other than to relate it to a epistemological condition of awareness and part of globalization's subjective element.[23] At times, Robertson seems unsure about the specific definition of globality he wishes to use, in contrast to other commentators such as Albrow, who defines globality as the quality of that which is global, in much the same way as modernity could be defined as the quality of that which is modern. However, Robertson's initial and most convincing use of globality does connect it with some degree of subjectivity. As such, globality can be understood in terms of a kind of identity or identification.[24] It is with this in mind that I want to focus on globality (as opposed to globalization) in the more specific sense of political identity. While it is true that all forms of identity overlap—and we cannot cleanly distinguish between political, cultural, social, etc., dimensions—my understanding of citizenship is that it involves some form of political allegiance, at least in a loose sense. Thus, an identification with humanity expressed through a commitment to human rights, discussed in the previous chapter, is an example of such a political identity.

Robertson's concern in fact draws on, and develops, the emerging concern with human rights, moral universalism, and the oneness of humankind, which was discussed in the previous chapter. Within the context of sociology, this Kantian theme was recognized, he argues, in different ways by both Durkheim and Simmel (but not, significantly, Weber[25]). However, the distinction between globality and the Kantian preoccupation with humanity is significant. Certainly, the emergence of human rights in modern philosophical discourse had much to do with the formalization of such rights, but the level of awareness of human unity is a different matter. Thus, the conditions of knowledge that allowed Socrates, Paine and Kant, among others, to declare themselves citizens of the world (or, at least, the known world) reflected a particular world-view running either parallel to, or (in some pre-modern cases) independent of, structural and formal transformations in the nature of society. Similarly, globality can be understood as a world-view which need not depend upon the existence of such structural transformations, but which nevertheless reflects such transformations given the dialectical nature of history. Thus the link between an identification with humanity (defined in terms of a oneness of the human species and more recently with the debates over human rights)

and with globality (defined as a 'consciousness of the [problem of] the world as a single place'[26]) moves us into a discussion of the transformation of world-views throughout history.

Let us pause here so as to understand what might be meant by a 'world-view'. In this context, I am following Habermas, who argues that world-views have developed through historical stages, in terms of a sociology of knowledge, from mythologies, through philosophies and higher religions, to more 'rationalized' ones.[27] These reflect 'formal-operational thought, and a moral consciousness guided by principles'.[28] Indeed, this clearly corresponds with a stage of universalism, as discussed in the previous chapter, which becomes reflective as world-views become rationalized. So, according to Habermas, in similar fashion to his understanding of the development of ego-structures, world-views evolve through stages leading up to the 'decentring of interpretive systems' and a demarcation of subjective, internal reality from objective, external reality, normative social reality and inter-subjective, linguistic reality.[29]

Such a development impacts upon the emergence of individual and collective identity, as the latter regulates the membership of individuals into the society, and exclusion thereof. This affects the emergence of ego-identity, which moves the individual beyond the stage of pre-given group identification (the family or tribal group), to more abstract ones (for example, the State), and, ultimately, to 'global forms of intercourse'.[30] Habermas then offers a series of distinct roles through which citizens in the modern age (that is, following the merging of the capitalist economic system with the universalist moral system) find their common identity, but he recognizes that 'these abstractions are best suited to the identity of world citizens, not to that of citizens of a particular state that has to maintain itself against other states'.[31] As we have seen, world citizenship in this sense has existed throughout, and indeed prior to, modernity; yet this world citizen never needed to look beyond the frontiers of her or his immediate locality. S/he may have had no connection with, and little awareness of, wider cultural events. The global reach of the modern project could bring the world into the locality through the extension of a localized identity, and through the common calling of universal human rights. Indeed, the task of 'dealing' with the world outside could be left to the nation-state. Each modern state defined its sovereignty only through reciprocal recognition with other states. Each was also reliant upon the loyalty of its citizens, while 'the identity of the world-system obviously is not strong enough to establish universal conscription'.[32] Thus membership of nations became the tool used to ease the tension between 'the interstate universalism of bourgeois law and morality, on the one hand, and the particularism of individual states, on the other'.[33]

What we get from Habermas's evolutionary theory is a recognition of the importance of changing world-views in understanding the drift through

universalism and towards globality. What we do not get is a theory which allows us to understand the transformation from universalistic world-views towards globalized ones. While Habermas's insights are useful, they are insufficiently equipped to help us make sense of what are new conditions. Habermas himself suffers from a modernist preoccupation with universalism, at the expense of pragmatic action. However, his theory relies, of course, on an understanding that the project of modernity can only come to completion once the philosophy of subjectivity gives way to the philosophy of intersubjectivity. In the late modern age (specifically, post-1945 period), the potential for new forms of intersubjectivity exists through the emergence of a heightened and pragmatic sense of globality. I will be returning to this point later on in the chapter.

Robertson is less concerned with understanding the transformation of world-views than with locating globality throughout history, and specifically within modernity. The motor is the cultural change from national to global society, which he analyses in part by drawing on the classical sociological debates about the transformation from traditional to modern society.[34] Thus he seeks to differentiate globality from an earlier preoccupation with humanity:

> [G]lobality…appears increasingly to permeate the affairs of all societies and multitudes of people across the world. This is not simply a matter of an increasing awareness of the challenges of other cultures but also of what is very misleadingly called the 'global village'. In other words, it is not merely the rapid increase in 'knowledge' of global variety…that is at issue. What we have to acknowledge is that there is clear evidence of an even more direct concern with the theme of globality.[35]

Accordingly, we are asked by Robertson to understand that globality changes the way we perceive the wider world; that globality becomes more than a mere world-view in the earlier modern (or Habermasian) sense. While I agree with him on this, it seems odd that he offers little in the way of evidence for this new condition; indeed, the core of his thesis suggests that such a condition cannot be understood as being in any way distinct from earlier phases. Furthermore, he proceeds to define globality instead as the 'condition' of the world as a whole,[36] suggesting possibly that globality is to the global what modernity is to the modern.

Both the consciousness of and the condition of the world as one place can be located within Robertson's mapping of interlinkages of levels of orientation and action. It is important, heargues, for us to recognize that, in daily life, we often undertake practices which are defined in accordance with the world as a whole, rather than with certain nations or locales. But this alone does not account for the complex nature of globalization.

FIGURE 1: ROBERTSON'S 'GLOBAL FIELD'



Robertson argues that globalization involves the direct interlinkage among, and the cross-relativization of, four levels of identity and belonging which exist inter-dependently in what he calls a 'global field' (see Figure 1): the individual self; the national society; the international system of societies; and humanity. In other words, each of these relates directly, in some way, to each of the others. So, the self relates to the national society in terms of the basic contractual problem of individual and society, and also to the placing of oneself in humankind as a whole, the 'relativization' of self-identity. Similarly, humankind depends upon the influence of the world system of societies, and vice versa, in terms of rights, through the *realpolitik*-humanity problematic, and to national society because of a relativization of citizenship, a prioritizing of one's values and duties. National societies also relate to the world system of societies because each nation-state must be recognized by the world. Self-identity is also dependent upon the world system of societies through a relativization of societal reference; that is, self-definition often depends upon cultural identity as defined by the world system of societies.

Of paramount importance here are the relationships between the individual self and the world-system of societies, and between the individual self and humankind. But it is important also to recognize the role of national societies within a globalized world. Despite his belief that globalization constitutes an interdependence of nation-states producing something akin to a unified world, a world society, he does not hold that nation-states are disappearing. They maintain a key role in the global

system, alongside the other such factors in his global field. Nor is he willing to accept that a unified world culture can emerge out of this process, focusing instead on the diversity of cultures which often conflict. Indeed, despite the criticism levelled at him by Kavolis, Robertson defends the view that individuals can exist within a'direct relationship to global humanity' without endangering cultural specificity.[37]

Globality, for Robertson, is thus defined in terms of the interlinkage of the component parts of the global field; curiously, such interlinkages neglect the very phenomenological and subjective requirements that Robertson himself maintains are central. Similarly, they do not seem to allow for the question of change that seems central to the globalization debate. Robertson's individual selves on the global field relate to three other levels of action: the national society (akin to nation-state citizenship); the world-system of states (akin to world federalism); and humankind (moral universalism). There is no room in such a model for the globe itself as a site of action. Why is it, we might ask, that we are able to identify directly with the world today, in a more concrete fashion than, say, a century ago? What is it about contemporary globality that links it to pragmatic action? Martin Albrow has gone some way to understanding global change as involving a shift towards pragmatic action. For Albrow, globality is important, and is emerging, insofar as it relates, first, to the declining role of the nation-state as the arena within which individual social action takes place, and, second, to the ability to turn this identification with the world into meaningful action. While this is true, we must consider what it is about the contemporary world—a world which I will argue is late modern—that makes such an identification, and subsequently such meaningful action, possible.[38]

One final point that needs to be made about globality reiterates a claim I have made elsewhere; that globality, as a specific type of world-view, can also be understood as a form of cultural capital. Thus, to further differentiate my position from that of Robertson, his analysis necessarily understands anti-globalism as nevertheless some kind of reaction to globalization; I would say instead that

> this awareness of the globe as a perceivable whole is the product of cultural capital, and that structural material restrictions limit access to this cultural capital to some members of society and exclude them from full participation in these processes.[39]

Using the idea of globality as a form of cultural capital, we are able to make sense of how and why certain people come to adopt a globalist perspective and others do not, both inter- and intra-nationally. Of course, cultural capital is transmitted, or not transmitted, according to certain culturally specific codes which, in most cases, assist in the structuration and

restructuration of norms and values. Cultural capital, however, cannot be easily divorced from economic capital. Indeed, as an earlier definition of globalization implies, this is a reflection of the dialectical relationship between material forces (such as the economy, and ideal ones (such as culture), which characterizes modernity itself. Thus, the heightened sense of globality, which is evident in the contemporary (post-war) era, might, as I will claim below, force us to identify a qualitative transformation from early to late modernity, but it is still modernity.

MODERNITY

For Robertson, then, the focus of globalization theory is on the world as an entity, and on the concept of belonging to one world. He locates this in a long, historical process which pre-dates the modern era, but which is strengthened and accelerated by modernity itself. His interest in religion has led him to argue that it is one of the key agents in this long-term process.

Anthony Giddens similarly understands globalization within the context of modernity. Like Robertson, he focuses initially on the acceleration of the process of modernization. However, for Giddens, it is a continuation, and indeed a consequence, of the modern project, rather than a process that is roughly simultaneous with it. For him, globalization is only possible because of this radical modernization. Giddens has used the metaphor of a 'juggernaut' to describe the intensification of modernity. Modernity is characterized by the relationship between reflexive actors and their environments. If the earlier phase of modernity, dominated by the nation-state and effectively analysed by Weber, was a period of restricted, or simple, modernity, the new phase of globalization and global social relationships is characteristic of late, or reflexive, modernity.[40] This is based essentially around the concepts of time-space distanciation and disembedding. The former refers to the transformations in the organization, and the ways we make sense, of time and space, which produce a connection of presence and absence. There is a separation of the logics of time and space, and social relationships are stretched over space. What emerges are increasingly global networks of communication wherein the parameters of time and space are no longer restrictive.[41] In simple modernity, an actor still had to be located within such parameters, but social relationships now span the globe, regardless of time and space differences or distances, due to increasing technological innovations. The latter refers to the dislocation of social practices and social relations from specificities of place. They can be lifted out of their traditional place-boundedness and relocated anywhere on the globe. For Giddens, then, globalization is a consequence of modernity's expansive nature, and of the

transformations caused by that on space, place and time: space 'shrinks' and the significance of place in everyday life is minimalized.

Thus, institutions which define the modern age have been 'globalized' by the central characteristic of modernity itself, that is, time-space compression. Under globalized conditions, these become:

1. An international division of labour that requires that industrializing countries are administered through global interdependence.
2. A world capitalist economy, including a global marketplace and transnational businesses and corporations.
3. An inter-state political system, such as that administered through the United Nations, which monitors activities in all states and in all corners of the globe.
4. A military world order, which includes shared responsibility for military operations as well as access to internationally and globally destructive means of warfare.

Giddens is prone to accepting the unilinear nature of modernity, and in this respect he, like Robertson, offers only an updated version of modernization theory. The inspiration behind Giddens's attempt to theorize modernity is drawn from Habermas, whose distinction between system and lifeworld has already been discussed. In terms of modernity as a project of expansion, we can identify, following Habermas, a series of developments which have culminated in late modernity on a world level. These include:

1. Changes in the forms of co-operation, from households, through factories, to multinational companies.
2. Changes in the market, from house hold economies, through national economies, up to the global economy.
3. Changes in the social division of labour, from hunter-gatherer societies, through crafts, through agriculture, up to industrial society. (We could add to this 'post-industrial society' and the new information order.)[42]

I do not intend to restate Habermas's thesis on the dual nature of modernity, which I discussed in the previous chapter. I do, however, wish to draw from it those ideas that might be useful for an understanding of globalization and globality. Such a task might assist us in understanding the complex and conflictual—but by no means contradictory—nature of the relationship between the world-system of capitalism, as developed by Wallerstein, and the theories of globalization developed by Robertson (and, to a lesser extent, Giddens), by drawing on an understanding of the dual emergence of both the strategic (economic) and communicative (normative) systems of action.

The world-system of capitalism can be read as the culmination of instrumental modernity. It also suggests a take-off point for an understanding of the declining role of the nation-state, that is, through an assessment of the role of the nation-state within the international economy.[43] With the internationalization of labour in the world market, the nation-state is forced to react to external influences while having also to satisfy its own internal (national) interests. Throughout capitalism, the (political) state has provided the conditions under which a (depoliticized) economy can operate, maintaining itself through taxation.[44] In late capitalism, the State has been granted more autonomy with regard to the administration of its citizens than in previous stages but, due to its exclusion from, and dependence upon, the economy, it has had to ensure the conditions under which an enterprise culture can flourish (hence the replacement of a system of norms and values with one of exchange relations[45]). While the international economy within which states were placed in exchange relations with other states required a nation-state to be (militarily) strong (a point Habermas takes from Wallerstein), a global capitalism that flows freely across national boundaries with no adherence to customs has no such use for the State.

The rampant nature of this world capitalism and international political system has constantly held back resistance from the lifeworld., but this resistance has been present; and it is, in part, through this dialectical nature of modernity that changes have occurred. I would stress that it is misleading to talk only about economic globalization because capitalism is inherently globalizing, a world system, and because globalization, as I understand it, is also cultural resistance from the lifeworld rather than system expansion. If, as some would say, the seeds of the crisis of capitalism are inherent in the workings of the capitalist system itself, then it can also be said that the emancipatory project of abstract modernity is inherently globalizing. How can one attempt to promote human rights without a concept of humanity?

As we shall see, it is not actually this simple. Globalization does not appear to be the long-term process that Robertson describes. Having outlined some of the major components of what others define as globalization, I should now offer my own understanding of the term. I will argue that globalization is also the establishment of conditions that allow for a new form of resistance, brought about by post-war reflexivity and globality, but drawing heavily on the previous incarnation of lifeworld resistance: universalization. Habermas only takes us so far; like Robertson he is restricted by the trappings of an earlier modernity. By contrast, Giddens (along with Beck), is more sensitive towards change. The transformation in world-views which can be identified in the immediate post-war era can be understood in terms of a blending of globality and modernity.

MODERNITY AND GLOBALITY

This last point brings us to the question of what specific events might have promoted the increased awareness and interaction of and at the global level. These necessarily involve this complex interplay between the world system and the emerging world society. As we shall see, what this might mean is a possible (and tentative) recoupling of system and lifeworld. This will also allow me to elaborate on the stage of pragmatism, which goes beyond universalism and challenges functionalism, and which I introduced in the previous chapter, and which mediates in some way between system and lifeworld.

First, though, let us return to Robertson, for it is important at this stage to point out that Robertson's model does allow for some transformation in the level of globality. Having outlined four earlier phases of globalization, he lists a fifth:

> *Phase V: The Uncertainty Phase* Beginning in the late 1960s and displaying crisis tendencies in the early 1990s. Heightening of global consciousness in late 1960s. Moon landing. Accentuation of 'post-materialist' values. End of Cold War and manifest rise of the problem of 'rights' and widespread access to nuclear and thermonuclear weaponry. Number of global institutions and movements greatly increases. Sharp acceleration in means of global communication. Societies increasingly facing problems of multiculturality and polyethnicity. Conceptions of individuals rendered more complex by gender, sexual, ethnic and racial considerations. Civil rights become a global issue. International system more fluid—end of bipolarity. Concern with humankind as a species-community greatly enhanced, particularly via environmental movements. Arising of interest in world civil society and world citizenship, in spite of 'the ethnic revolution'. Consolidation of global media system, including rivalries about such. Islam as a deglobalizing/ reglobalizing movement. Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.[46]

All of this is true, and in this respect Robertson, like Giddens, notices certain events and traits which characterize the contemporary era. Unfortunately, perhaps given his Durkheimian predilection for long-term cultural development, Robertson is unable to understand what we might argue has been a qualitative transformation in social relationships and in social orientation brought about by this shift. Indeed, for Robertson, this is less a transformation than a phase which exists solely within the context of a wider temporal-historical path which began in the early fifteenth century.[47] In that his work suggests a specific transformation in values and relationships, Giddens is more useful here. While his work can

be criticized for underplaying the very thing that Robertson prioritizes, that is, a consciousness of the world, he nevertheless offers an account of globalization as transformation which is more historically specific. That is to say, he locates such changes within the post-war period, and then goes on to explain them in terms of the logic of modernity. Robertson has to be content with a vague account of social change as a long-term process. It seems odd, then, that Robertson, for all the emphasis he puts on the idea of globality, cannot provide a precise account of how such a concept has suddenly taken-off; of why it is now more possible to see ourselves as inhabitants of one world. Giddens's theory of modernity, and in particular of reflexivity, makes space for such an account. For Giddens, and for Beck, late or reflexive modernity is loosely defined as the period following the Second World War. For me, the importance of this historical period cannot be overstated. Indeed, I would go on to say that it is the experience of such a period which links modernity with globality.

One does not have to subscribe to any theory of globalization to know that we live in an age when our very existence is challenged by numerous forces beyond the comfort of our nation-states. For example, nuclear weapons make it impossible for nation-states to protect their citizens from attack.[48] The post-war political climate has been one of uncertainty and the uneasy knowledge that global destruction is, for the first time, a distinct possibility. Giddens has said that the post-war generation, living with the threat of nuclear war, was the first to live with this fear of total destruction. Previous generations were never required to imagine a scenario where their deaths as individuals would occur simultaneously with the death of the human race *per se*. This development—a development of what Beck calls 'manufactured risk'—has had considerable influence upon the very concept of modernity, and its state of crisis. In his attempt to understand globalization, using Elias's theory of the 'civilizing process', Mennell recognizes that initially Elias's thoughts on the coming together of human society rested upon the mutual threat of nuclear war.[49] And it is not only war; the environmental damage inflicted upon our planet, the threat of AIDS, and many other dangers challenge our very existence.[50] We live in an age of fatality; an age in which we are made all too aware of our own mortality. And with this, it may be argued, has come a growing awareness of our own capacity for destruction, even genocide. Zygmunt Bauman has made a strong argument for sociology to consider the implications of the Holocaust upon social life, and indeed sociology itself.[51]

What is more, these threats are at the very heart of the crises of modernity, and of the myth of progress. Technological advancements aimed at protecting nation-states from their enemies have unleashed upon humanity a greater sense of risk, thus resulting in an age of endless *détente*: a fine line between security and risk. And we cannot simply start again, sweeping a whole period of history under the carpet. As Giddens says, 'so

long as nuclear weapons remain, or even the knowledge necessary to build them…the risk of massively destructive warfare will persist'.[52]

The central crisis of modernity is that—in its relentless search for reasons, its naive belief in human progress, and its arrogant assumptions of universalism and power—it has devised the tools for its own undoing. People will continue to live in the conscious knowledge that global destruction is a possible outcome of conflict, however at peace our world may be at any given time. Enlightenment rationality has failed in its project to understand (so as to control) the world. Indeed, the assumptions made of modernity—rationality, progress and the pursuit of power—have been challenged, even replaced, by a modern world which is out of control. Ours is an age of uncertainty; indeed, it is an age of fatality, and this fatality is inherently globalizing. Dangers come from without the safe cocoon of the nation-state. In such an age, the Hobbesian portrait of national civil society loses its foundations. If the State is created for the mutual self-protection of its peoples, then what is its role when it can no longer ensure that safety? In the Hobbesian scenario, citizens are obliged to be dutiful to the State, yet this is in return for the State's protection. In this age of uncertainty and fatality, in which 'the development of nuclear weapons…has finally put an end to the nation state's ability to guarantee the security of its citizens ',[53] the Social Contract loses its significance. The nation-state itself faces crisis.

The emergence of an awareness of finality and global destruction has inevitably led to a growing interest in social movements and pressure groups focusing on global issues. Herbert Marcuse, then champion of the 1960s radicalism, celebrated that project for its globalist values: 'creating solidarity for the human species, for abolishing poverty and misery beyond all national frontiers and spheres of interest, for the attainment of peace'.[54] Over recent years, memberships of these new social movements have increased, whereas active political participation (for example, in voting, party membership, etc.) has declined. The attention has shifted away from the immediate problems facing the nation-state towards problems which humanity faces as a whole. For some writers, such radical changes have brought to an end the misguided age of the Enlightenment, with its false belief in progress and security. Thus, this shift represents a post-modernization of values. Some such writers would claim that postmodernity brings about the end of morality, or, at least, the end of the ethical, and emancipation from its constraints. Concepts such as ethics and duties have surrendered to consumerism and aesthetics.

Such a position cannot be accepted at face value. Certainly, we are living during times of change and uncertainty, but there is little to suggest that ethics are to be abandoned. For Bauman, in contrast to the postmodern position,

> the great issues of ethics—like human rights, social justice, balance between peaceful co-operation and personal self-assertion, synchronization of individual conduct and collective welfare—have lost none of their topicality. They only need to be seen, and dealt with, in a novel way.[55]

Thus, we can identify a shift away from traditional politics towards issues of global concern. Such a shift—using sociological terminology - is part of the transformation identified by Giddens as the shift from emancipatory politics towards life politics;[56] indeed, the decline in support for traditional party politics, for Giddens, is countered by the rise in awareness of issues which pertain to the pragmatics of existence itself. The political expression of such concerns necessarily takes the form of membership of, or support for, various social movements which are issues-based, and which ask questions directly about those issues with which individuals are concerned. Such issues are both global—pertaining to such areas as ecological duties, control over technological innovation, and so on, and personal—pertaining to such areas as gender, self-identity and the ownership of the body.[57] In either case, the emphasis has certainly shifted away from the nation-state, which returns us to the question of the declining significance of the nation-state in human social affairs.

That the nation-state is no longer salient in the social lives of people. but also that this shift does not signal the end of politics as such, is central to the understanding of the contemporary age suggested by Martin Albrow. Like Giddens, Albrow notices a qualitative change in social relationships and social orientation following in the post-war era. Unlike Giddens, however, Albrow uses this to suggest that the modern age has come to an end; although, rather than surrender to the challenge of the postmodernists, who seem to state that modernity is followed by a loose and undefinable series of random images, Albrow offers a positive description of what comes after the modern. He does this by rejecting evolutionist and systemic thinking, which seems to underpin much of the discussion of the projects of modernity, and shifting his attention instead to history according to epochs. His claim is that an epochal change has taken place, and the modern age has been replaced by the global age.[58] This claim is based primarily on a specific reading of modernity. He accepts Weber's claim that the defining feature of such an era was the centrality of the nation-state, and the form of rational, political and bureaucratic rationalization associated with it. Once the nation-state loses its central position in terms of social relationships and identification and loyalty among citizens, then the era of the nation-state, the modern age, has come to an end.

Albrow suggests, however, that we rethink (rather than abandon) our central concepts away from a bias towards the modern, towards an

emphasis on the global. He does not follow the postmodernists in assuming the end of the modern means the end of grand narratives or, indeed, of history. Indeed, for Albrow, it is a resumption of history, complete with its own narratives and universals. Just as feudalism was still evident in the early stages of capitalism, so is modernity compatible with globality, but it is the modern tools that are no longer sufficient for us to understand the idea of the social in the global age. He uses the language of 'socioscapes' and 'sociospheres' to show the ways in which people share space that is at the same time mutual and yet distinct.[59]

While much of what Albrow says about our contemporary age is undoubtedly true, his thesis rests primarily on a specific reading of modernity, in which the modern age is defined principally in terms of the nation-state and the administrative rationalization that accompanied it. Clearly, this is not the line I am taking. So far, I have sought to follow Habermas by characterizing modernity in terms of the distinction between system and lifeworld. It is because of this that I am content to understand the global condition firmly within the wider and ongoing perspective of modernity. I return to this now. Indeed, while both Albrow and Giddens prioritize the decline in the role of the nation-state in their respective accounts of the global condition, the crisis of the nation-state is an issue which is at the very heart of the Habermasian tradition within social theory,[60] and surely needs to be mentioned in this context, despite its limitations.

While Western democratic systems tended to stabilize in the years immediately following the Second World War, the seeds of the coming crisis had already been planted. These came to fruition during the turbulent 1960s, and, as a result, commentators on the Left and the Right developed contrasting perspectives on the nature of this capitalist crisis.[61] As we have already discussed, responses to this crisis of the nation-state by citizens have included the decline in participation in formal democratic procedures, such as voting and party membership, and the effective raising of the consciousness of citizens through protests formed around issues-based social movements.[62] These movements have tended to concentrate their efforts upon either global or local issues, rather than national ones. Although the increasing global awareness among citizens is not due solely to these transformations in the political and economic spheres it would be unwise to consider it in isolation from it, and here, Habermas's work on the dual projects of modernity, effectively the dialectical nature of material and cultural factors, as I mentioned earlier, is useful. For example, ecological crisis, as well as contributing towards a heightened globality, can be read as the extreme form of capitalist expansion. Thus the post-war years have witnessed the heightening of the world-system of capitalism to its extreme degree, and with it the end of the 'marriage of convenience'

which has existed throughout modernity between capitalism and the nation-state:

> With growing complexity, the system of world society shifts its boundaries so far into its environment that it runs up against limits of outer as well as inner nature. Ecological balance designates an absolute limit to growth.[63]

So, at the systemic level, a change occurred within instrumental modernity in which the consequences of its own project became apparent. This has already been outlined by Beck in his theory of the risk society. Also, the unhappy marriage of convenience between the world-system of capitalism and the international system of nation-states, which had been so important to the dominance of instrumental modernity, began to weaken. Science became dangerous as awareness of global risks emerged. As Beck states, it is the fundamental feature of late modernity that dangers come from an internal rather than an external threat; from knowledge rather than ignorance; from mastery not deficiency.[64] In short, the dominance of instrumental modernity was under threat. Through this rupture, new ties were forged between the two projects of modernity, and abstract modernity —the modernity of the lifeworld—became, only slightly, relinked to its cousin. As Beck adds, modernity has 'become the threat and the promise of emancipation from the threat that it creates itself'.[65] Thus the twin strands of the modern project come together under the banner of reflexivity.

Thus, thetentative relinking of system and lifeworld is part of what Giddens and Beck—who both draw on Habermas but in different ways—refer to as the reflexivity of late modernity. We need to be specific about what this means. On the one hand,, there is institutional reflexivity which relates specifically to the system, and there are also internal reflexive processes which operate within the lifeworld. These are not new, and not restricted to notions of the modern. Alternatively, reflexivity, as I am using it, is a bridge between universalist-idealist perceptions of belonging, and functionalist-federalist systemic processes. Indeed, the notion of reflexivity is crucial to the understanding of the development of the modern world-view mentioned above. Habermas is not blind to this. New means of problem-solving bring with them a new consciousness of different situations.[66] This reflexive experience is related to such issues as control over external nature, social order, and rationalized world-views. Social movements emerge as consciousness of these new problems arises. In this sense, it is possible for different exercises of social power to outlive 'even the economic form of class domination', as new forms of problem situations bring with them new forms of scarcity. In this reflexive stage, wherein motive is stressed, meanings may become a scarcity. This reflexivity is a pivotal feature of late modernity's global reach.

In summary, then, awareness of the dangers of modernity entered into the consciousness of people, who began to see their positions in the process. They began to see themselves as part of the whole. This created a kind of pragmatic reflexivity. This reflexivity is the medium between system and lifeworld. The universalist ideas now became practically open to implementation. This allowed for a re-empowering of the lifeworld, within the context of this mediated relationship between system and lifeworld. Or, more specifically, it allowed for a possibility of this happening. Individuals could now see themselves in a direct relationship with the globe itself. Indeed, this relates to Robertson's global field. What resulted was the possibility of reclaiming the local and global environments away from the false barriers of the nation-state.[67] It was brought about by a reflexive understanding of one's position *vis-à-vis* the world, that is, one's direct relationship to it. This awareness—which is quintessentially late modern—allowed for thought to be translated into action. Individuals were once again able to be sovereign over their own lives.

I have used the term pragmatic reflexivity because the action that is facilitated by the relinking of system and lifeworld, the coming together of globality and modernity, and the rise of reflexivity, is pragmatic action. Indeed, Albrow usefully replaces the concept of reflexivity with one of pragmatic universalism. The post-war pragmatism to which I refer is not relativist because it assumes a recognition of universalism, but it also allows for the ability to act on this consciousness in a practical way. Post-war realization of one's place within the wider system, and awareness of the global implications of the system, allow for the kind of pragmatism I am discussing. This is not to say that such a relationship is new *per se*. The significant change is in the way it empowers a citizen to act in an ethical way in relation to the wider world. It allows for thought to become action.

SUMMARY

So, in summary, how can these events be understood in terms of the theoretical approach I have advocated? I began by critiquing, and at the same time drawing on, three significant contributors to the debate over globalization: Robertson, Albrow and Giddens. What I take from each of these writers produces a triangular frame within which to develop a theory of the contemporary global condition. Against Robertson., or at least in contrast to his modernizationist approach, and with Albrow and Giddens, I am arguing that a qualitative change has taken place, loosely timed within the immediate post-war era, which transforms our capacity to view the globe as a site of action. Against Albrow, and still with Giddens, I argue that such a change can still be understood within the logic of modernity and of capitalism and leads us not into a 'global' age but into, if anything, a late modern one. Against Giddens, though, I draw on the significance

Robertson places upon globality as a cognitive, or epistemological, awareness of the globe.

I then went on to understand modernity using the model suggested by Habermas. I have sought to show that the history of modernity has been one of conflict between two competing forms of rationality. I have subsequently argued that the dominant rationality—that of instrumental modernity—has worked to disempower abstract modernity through depoliticization and lifeworld colonization, but that resistance to this has always existed, and that this resistance has taken a number of forms. The significant challenge to the world politico-economic system came from moral universalism. The failure of this universalism lay essentially in its inability to translate thought into action, and its inability to appropriate the systemic forces. The mid-twentieth century, however, saw the arrival of a period of crisis for the system of instrumental modernity, and this allowed for a new form of resistance to emerge, which I have called pragmatism, and which allowed for a reclaiming of the lifeworld. Globalization, as I understand it, can essentially be understood in the context of this new global consciousness.

So, how has globalization altered the notion of world citizenship? I have already listed various historical stages that have produced different definitions. I have said that modernity is important because it has politicized the notion. I have gone on to say that universalism emerged as a moral challenge to the systemic project, from the realm of the lifeworld. Functionalist and federalist definitions sought to redefine the means of achieving world citizenship by working within the system level.

I have used Habermas as a guide through the maze of modernity, but I have also indicated that his theory only takes us so far. At best, it allows for a theorization of the emergence of globalization and its existence in relation to the world-system of capitalism, while appreciating the continuation of material and cultural inequalities within society. He has himself recognized the need to look beyond the nation-state in his more recent work, in which he has sought to analyse the relationship between positive law and universal human rights. Curiously, though, his advocacy of world citizenship comes from his own distinction between systemic and lifeworld processes, or between functionalism and universalism, and has not yet recognized the reality of the pragmatism I am discussing:

> The discrepancy between, on the one hand, the human-rights content of classical liberties and, on the other, their form as positive law, which initially limits them to a nation-state, is just what makes one aware that the discursively grounded 'system of rights' points beyond the constitutional state in the singular toward the globalization of rights. As Kant realized, basic rights require, by virtue of their semantic content, an international, legally administered

> 'cosmopolitan society'. For actionable rights to issue from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, it is not enough simply to have international courts; such [courts] will first be able to function adequately only when the age of individual sovereign states has come to an end through a United Nations *that can not only pass, but also act upon and enforce its resolutions*.[68]

And, in a separate publication:

> It is because of their universal human rights content that these basic rights are pushing—as if on their own—toward the realization of a form of world citizenship in which human rights everywhere acquire the status and the validity of positive law. Such a situation cannot be achieved solely through international courts; for this we require a UN capable of reaching decisions and taking action, and that can, when it needs to intervene, employ military forces under its *own* command instead of delegating this function to the superpowers.[69]

Despite his own commitments, then, Habermas—who in this latter quote seems to be advocating a revised form of federalism—is locked inside a specific world-view which bars him from seeing how the synthesis of functionalist and idealist-universalist perspectives is achieved through a factor which, we might say, operates as a medium between system and lifeworld. Such a medium we have termed reflexivity, and it pertains to a pragmatism which is associated with both modernity and globality. After the Second World War, I have argued, a new consciousness was emerging which was closely tied to changes in the political and economic system at the time. The threat of nuclear destruction, the emergence of ecological concern, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the general desire to rebuild the world in the form of a peaceful social order, all contributed to this consciousness. Globality—this awareness of the world as a site of social action and willingness to act upon it—is thus more than a simple world-view; it is a programme for action. From it has come a different conception of world citizenship, built around immediate and pragmatic action, and the rediscovery of the sovereignty of the individual. In a sense, world citizenship has become globalized, which is not a contradiction because it is part of the project of abstract modernity, and about the reclaiming of local and global from the false barriers of the nation-state. No previous conception of world citizenship was able to do this, and I have termed this new perspective pragmatism.

The post-war reflexivity, which forms part of the conditions which make possible such pragmatism, does so because it allows for thought (and, in particular, the ideas of earlier universalism) to become action. But this pragmatism does not lead to relativism (or, indeed, to postmodernity).

Instead it leads to a consciousness of the universals of truth and morality, and a practical ability to demand or enforce them. It is a pragmatic universalism. It moves beyond the unenforceable idealism of universalism, and challenges the conservatism of systemic functionalism. But more importantly, it allows for the lifeworld to appropriate systemic processes in order to achieve this universalism.

This is, above all, a transformation in modernity; it is not, though, the end of it. It is if anything the transformation of one project of modernity. Although concentrated in the North, this transformation is applicable, with alteration, to the South in that the project of abstract modernity has always operated as a source of strength for Southern and non-Western struggles in the contemporary world-system.[70] The transformation means that earlier forms of abstract modernity have been grounded in a new reality, and those components of it, such as human rights and world citizenship, have acquired new meanings in a newly pragmatic and politicized world. This transformation—from 'abstract modernity' to what we might call 'pragmatic modernity'—thus replaces subjectivity with intersubjectivity and the potential for communicative rationality. It is not, however, the end of the modern *per se*. Instrumental modernity still persists, with its brand of purposive-rationality, in a form which has successfully appropriated the globalization which began with the awareness of global risk. Capitalism has become increasingly globalized; the nation-state system has sought to internationalize its politics through such bodies as the United Nations. Figure 2 shows these transformations in diagrammatic form.

Of course, Figure 2 represents a rather simplistic account of these transformations. In reality they are far more complex, and operate according to a range of processes which have affected different aspects of society, culture, the economy and the polity. In Figure 3, I have attempted to show how the different aspects of global change outlined at the very beginning of this chapter can be seen to form part of a complex network of transformations which cannot be simply reduced to changes and processes taking place at the system level of economy and polity, or at the lifeworld level of social and cultural understanding. It is instead a dynamic process. We can see, in such diagrammatic form, that the outcome of both sets of changes is both the crisis of the nation-state and the rise in reflexivity.

I have, however, stressed that these transformations allow for the possibility of such a new reflexivity, and therefore pragmatism. We are all 'aware' of the world, albeit in different ways and even if we do not recognize the link. But ours is not a purely global society. Reflexivity becomes a material commodity. The link can therefore be made to cultural and material capital. If transformations at the system level have allowed for what Harvey has called time-space compression and Giddens time-space distanciation, and transformations at the lifeworld level have allowed

FIGURE 2: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERNITY



for what Robertson calls globality, then we must consider the inequalities in access to the two.

In other words, the distinction between the strands continues, as does the dominance of the economic sphere. The world-system of capitalism is able to resist the re-empowerment of the lifeworld through the maintenance of material inequalities. Not all people can afford 'access to the means of compression'. Globality is similarly limited through the transmission of cultural capital which, we might argue, has been a successful colonization of lifeworld by system. Here, I mean quite simply that local and national world-views have been produced by the system and reproduced through cultural capital which are ultimately divisive, and therefore work for the benefit of the system against the lifeworld. Limitations therefore exist on 'access to the means of globality'. So, the new pragmatism I have discussed relies upon both cultural processes (the transmission of global knowledge; access to the means of globality) and material factors (access to the means of compression), and the former still operates as a kind of cultural capital, restricted in many ways by the latter, particularly in normative structures defined throughout modernity along economic lines.[71] What this means, in summary, is that we have to return to the take-off point of our analysis. We have to once again consider the notions of lifeworld and system. Only now, we must do so in relation to the changes that have been described in late modern society. We must ask: Is lifeworld still being colonized by system, or is there a new dynamic at work? To answer this we must turn to our understanding of cultural capital. And: What advances have been made to reclaim the lifeworld from this colonization?These are not questions

FIGURE 3: MAPPING THE KEY COMPONENTS OF GLOBAL CHANGE



The crisis of the nation-state can be understood in terms of (1) the growth of a global market, global elites and disorganized capitalism; (2) the emergence from this of manufactured risk; and (3) the growth of globality and globalism among individual actors.

which can be answered here, but there is a need to be aware of them, and I will return to them in later chapters.

It would appear that there are (at least) three essential components of a theory of the global lifeworld:

1. Modernity: understood not just as a unilinear project (in the singular), but as an era of conflict between competing forms of rationality, one of which is an unfinished project of human freedom.

2. Temporality: understood in this context as an awareness of being alive in what we might describe as an 'age of fatality'; that is, an awareness that, with one's own death might come the death of the world as a whole.
3. Globality: brought about in part by this temporality, but understood in terms of cultural capital, and thus as a resource which remains unevenly distributed.

The combination of the three is what is significant—and new—in the post-war era; it is the pragmatic reflexivity I have outlined. Having attempted to define what I mean by the pragmatic turn and the new global consciousness, I now attempt to relate these largely theoretical areas more specifically to the idea of citizenship. Consideration of the post-war transformations I have discussed, I argue, leads us away from earlier definitions of world citizenship, and towards a new, global, citizenship.

NOTES

1. Malcolm Waters, *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995), offers probably the best introduction. Various collected volumes offer useful alternative starting-points to the debates. See Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1990); Anthony D. King (ed.), *Culture, Globalization and the World System* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
2. Martin Jacques, 'Britain and Europe', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds), *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1989), p. 237.
3. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media* (London: Ark, 1962), p. 5. See also McLuhan, *War and Peace in the Global Village* (New York: Bantum Books, 1968).
4. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System,* Vol. 1: *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), Vol. 2: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600–1950* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), Vol. 3: *The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy 1730–1840s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
5. O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture', p. 75.
6. Ibid., pp. 82–8.
7. Peter Beyer (in *Religion and Globalization* (London: Sage, 1994)) uses four distinct approaches to illustrate the shifting emphases in globalization theories: Wallerstein's as a Marxian-economic approach; Meyer's as Weberian-political; Robertson's as Durkheimian-cultural; Luhmann's as Parsonian-

social. I accept the usefulness of these distinctions, but seek to offer a broader range of theorists and schools not always reducible to such unidimensionality. A good summary of the arguments can be found in John Eade, 'Introduction', in *Living the Global City* (London: Routledge, 1997).

8. See, for example, Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System;* Robertson, *Globalization',* Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner, 'Modernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World Systems Theory', *Theory, Culture and Society,* 2, 3 (1985), pp. 103–19; Lechner, 'Modernity and Its Discontents', in Jeffrey Alexander (ed.), *Neofunctionalism* (London: Sage, 1985); John Meyer, 'The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State', in Albert Bergeson (ed.), *Studies of the Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Giddens, *Consequences,* Albrow, *Global Age;* Niklas Luhmann, 'The World Society as a Social System', in *Essays on Self-Reference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Arjun Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', in Featherstone, *Global Culture;* Leslie Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System* (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Stuart Hall, 'The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity', in King, *Culture, Globalization*\ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992); Beck, *What is Globalization?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); James Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence* (London: Frances Pinter, 1980); Rosenau, *Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics* (Lexington, TX: D.C.Heath, 1989); Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage, 1994); Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity;* Ulf Hannerz, 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture', in Featherstone, *Global Culture;* Hannerz, 'The Global Ecumene as a Network of Networks', in Adam Kuper (ed.), Concep*tualizing Society (Londo*n: Routledge, 1992); Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (London: Routledge, 1996).
9. Robert Gilpin in *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and in *Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) has sought to move this tradition somewhat in the direction of globalization theory, concerning himself with inter-connectedness and interdependence, but he still views the nation-state as the central actor.
10. Robertson, *Globalization;* Giddens, *Consequences;* Albrow, *Global Age',* Sklair, *Sociology,* Harvey, *Condition.*
11. Robertson, *Globalization.*
12. Harvey, *Condition;* Giddens, *Consequences.*
13. Giddens, *Consequences.*
14. Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); Lash and Urry, *Economies.*
15. Albrow and O'Byrne, 'Rethinking State'. See also Albrow, *Global Age;* David Held, 'The Decline of the Nation-State', in Hall and Jacques, *New Times,* Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988).
16. Giddens, *Consequences;* Beck, *Risk Society;* Lash and Urry, *Economies;* Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization:*

Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).

17. Beck, *Risk Society*.
18. Waters, *Globalization*.
19. Hall, 'Local and Global'; Hall, 'New Ethnicities', in James Donald and Ali Rattansi (eds), *Culture and Difference* (London: Sage and Open University Press, 1992); Hall, 'The Question of Cultural Identity', in Hall, Held and McGrew, *Modernity and Its Futures'*, Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990).
20. Niklas Luhmann, 'Die Weltgesellschaft', in *Archiv fur Rechts und Sozialphilosophie,* 57 (1971), pp. 1–35; Luhmann, 'World Society'; Hannerz, 'Global Ecumene'. See also Albrow, *Global Age*.
21. Brecher, Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions*.
22. Sklair, *Sociology*.
23. Robertson, *Globalization,* p. 9.
24. The terms are not interchangeable. Hall uses identification in preference to identity because, where the latter suggests fixity, the former allows for a processual fluidity of identity formation (Hall, 'Question'; Hall, 'New Ethnicities').
25. Robertson, *Globalization,* pp. 21–4.
26. Ibid., p. 132.
27. Habermas, *Communication,* p. 103.
28. Ibid., p. 105.
29. Ibid., p. 106.
30. Ibid., p. 111.
31. Ibid., p. 114.
32. Ibid., p. 115.
33. Ibid.
34. This debate was central to nineteenth-century social theory, and preoccupied the thoughts of Durkheim, Tönnies, Simmel, Weber and Marx. Robertson focuses on Tönnies's distinction in particular: that is, the transformation from *Gemeinschaft* (community) to *Gesellschaft* (society or association).
35. Robertson, *Globalization*, p. 132.
36. Robertson, 'Globalisation or Glocalisation', in *Journal of International Communication,* 1, 1 (1994), p. 49.
37. Robertson, *Globalization,* p. 133, following V. Kavolis, 'History of Consciousness and Civilizational Analysis', *Comparative Civilizations Review,* 17 (1987).
38. The idea of 'late' modernity means different things to different commentators. Perhaps the two most developed theses of late modernity are those of Giddens and Beck; both writers connect this phase of modernity with increased reflexivity (see above). What is not clear is the extent to which late modernity implies that modernity is somehow coming to an end; following Habermas, we could use the term late (as opposed to liberal) capitalism virtually interchangeably with late modernity, and bear in mind that the modern project (for Habermas) will be completed when intersubjective rationality replaces other forms of rationality. Thus, for Habermas, arch-defender of modernity, and in contrast to Giddens and Beck, the end of the

modern is quite realizable; this is because modernity is defined according to specific projects. While Albrow defines the modern age primarily in terms of the nation-state, and is thus able to announce its passing, I find it more useful, following Habermas, to maintain that the modern age continues as long as the modern project remains incomplete.

39. O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture', p. 76.
40. Giddens, *Consequences;* Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge, Polity, 1991).
41. Giddens, *Consequences,* p. 14.
42. Habermas, *Communication,* p. 149.
43. Ibid., p. 197.
44. Ibid., p. 189.
45. Ibid., p. 190.
46. Robertson, *Globalization,* p. 59.
47. Ibid.
48. John Hertz, 'The Rise and Demise of the Territorial Nation-State', *World Politics,* 4 (1957).
49. Stephen Mennell, 'The Globalization of Human Society as a Very Long-Term Social Process: Elias's Theory', in Featherstone, *Global Culture,* p. 369.
50. Robertson (*Globalization,* p. 133) recognizes this, when he warns of 'at least three major species-threatening phenomena—ecological disaster, nuclear annihilation and AIDS (each of which is a truly global-human problem)'.
51. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
52. Giddens, *Modernity,* p. 4.
53. David Beetham, 'The Future of the Nation State', in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (eds), *The Idea of the Modern State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984), p. 215.
54. Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. ix-x.
55. Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 4.
56. Giddens, *Modernity.*
57. Ibid., pp. 226–8.
58. But not, significantly, modernity, which persists in various forms, just as traits of feudalism are still identifiable, for Marx, after the transformation to a capitalist society.
59. Martin Albrow, 'Travelling Beyond Local Cultures: Socioscapes in a Global City', in Eade, *Living the Global City.*
60. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis;* David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 221–42; Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (London: Hutchinson, 1984. See also Hans-Peter Müller, 'Social Structure and Civil Religion: Legitimation Crisis in a Later Durkheimian Perspective', in Jeffrey Alexander (ed.), *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), for an interesting variation on this from within a Durkheimian perspective.
61. Held, Models, p. 223.
62. Beck, *Risk Society,* p. 190.
63. Habermas, *Legitimation,* p. 41.

64. Beck, *Risk Society,* p. 183.
65. Ibid.
66. Habermas, *Communication,* p. 164.
67. The trend towards 'localization' is often seen to be the opposite of that towards 'globalization'. In fact, this is not the case. Clearly, from the point of view of my argument, both processes can be interpreted as parallel components of the wider trend, which is the decline of the nation-state as the central institution in the lives of citizens. As such they are complementary. I will discuss matters of locality and globality, and the relationship they might have with the nation-state, using as illustrative examples some specific biographies, in subsequent chapters. Similarly, albeit from a different perspective, see Robertson, 'Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity', in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson (eds), *Global Modernities* (London: Sage, 1995). He has challenged the assumption that these processes stand in opposition to one another by stating how they are intrinsically linked.
68. Jürgen Habermas, 'Post-Script to *Between Facts and Norms',* in M. Deflem (ed.), *Habermas, Modernity and Law* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 143.
69. Jürgen Habermas, *Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 152.
70. Ray, *Rethinking.*
71. O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture'.

5
Global Citizenship

The idea of world citizenship has itself been transformed because of this pragmatic globality, such that it seems more appropriate to talk about global—as opposed to world—citizenship.

INTRODUCTION

I have already suggested that it seems inappropriate to refer to world citizenship as a challenge to the nation-state model. In fact, the idea predated the emergence of the modern nation-state system. Its roots lie in the classical Greek tradition, and some of its most important refinements were made by Roman and early Christian scholars. I went on to argue that it is important to recognize that significant changes have taken place within this idea, which have emerged wholly as a result of changes in wider society, which are themselves brought about by modernity. And, as the dominance of the nation-state system is a key characteristic of what is often understood to be 'modernity', the contrasting idea, that one can be a citizen of the world, is very much a challenge to this norm. Thus, the politicization of the idea produced the distinct traditions I have labelled moral universalism and federalism.

This history serves to highlight the difficulty in defining what world citizenship might mean, although in most cases the differences in perspective between various advocates of the idea are more subtle. In the next chapter I will examine how one organization which professes to represent world citizens defines its constituency, and how that definition, in the wider context of its philosophical stance, separates it from otherwise similar organizations. This follows directly from the argument I made in the previous chapter, that a pragmatic shift took place towards the end of the Second World War which transformed the idea of world citizenship by making it possible for an individual to relate directly to, and act directly upon, the globe itself. Accordingly,

> Humanity itself is being discovered as one world, an inseparable unity, a communal home linked to a common destiny. That destiny is the product of a technological revolution, a revolution in information, social communication, and transportation and also a growing consciousness of the threat of collective suicide for having overstepped the bounds of the planet.[1]

Thus, I seek to differentiate between world citizenship as discussed previously, and global citizenship which is world citizenship under the influence of globalized conditions. One significant difference is the requirement of global citizenship to be performative and rooted in a democracy that is discursive and intersubjective. This is not merely a normative assertion; it is a genuine response to contemporary conditions. Thus it is far removed from the contractarian assumptions of the nation-state model, but also distinct from the types of world citizenship which relied either upon abstract, ideal notions of human rights, or on the formation of a world federation. Global citizenship is both practical and political. The organization I discuss in the next chapter exemplifies this. But I will begin by outlining how sociologists and other academics have sought to analyse the impact of globalization upon citizenship.

BEYOND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT?

While commentators on the emergence of human rights, world federalism, and other aspects of the universalization and internationalization associated with modernity were not ignorant towards the implications of their materials for the concept of citizenship as understood within the dominant, national framework, the situations within which these commentaries emerged rarely required academics to consider such materials in the context of a new form of citizenship *per se*. The early modern world, while surely international in terms of trade and the emergence of political interdependence, was nevertheless so strongly reliant upon the nation-state model that it always made sense for citizenship to be understood in terms of a contract of sorts between a nation-state and its individual citizens.

The globality of the post-war period, discussed in the previous chapter, demands that a different set of questions is asked. As globality and globalization are so intrinsically interwoven with the decline of the nation-state as a social, political and economic institution, commentators have been keen to question whether or not a new kind of citizenship is emerging in its wake.[2] Such concepts, they argue, question the very fabric from which our definition of citizenship is made. But despite the growing interest in the concept of an emerging global citizenship, there is certainly no consensus as to what such a project would involve.

It is not enough to understand such a project in purely contractarian terms. The idea of the social contract was itself developed primarily to justify a particular relationship between the individual citizen and the political national-state. Defenders of this tradition recognize the difficulty of applying it to a model of global citizenship. Thus,

> Classical Social Contract thinking was at its most influential arguably just at the point when the modern nation-state was emerging. We might then think that it was too tarred with the brush of national politics to serve as a tool either for understanding or recommendation in the present age. The process of globalization appears to threaten the notion of a national or domestic Social Contract. But the national state is not set to disappear. Individuals still see citizenship in national terms. The subjection of the contemporary state to international influences may mean, however, that in certain key respects contract theory has to be modernized. Some method may have to be devised to take the theory beyond the nation-state context.[3]

To do so would, however, require an image of world society built around the emergence of a centralized, global, political structure. While the idea of world government as nation-state government writ large has found support in various corners of the political and academic world throughout the years, it is neither an accurate description of the world in which we live today, nor a likely one for future generations. Also, it is necessarily based around assumptions—be they Hobbesian or Lockean—of rights and duties in reciprocity as existing solely within a materialistic concept of self-interest. If globality provokes any thesis on the question of duties, it is surely that we can identify duties towards the planet which are not political in this early modern sense, but pragmatic and ecological. These duties form part of what Giddens terms life politics.[4] Contractarian theory, or a variant of it, is therefore not helpful in assisting our understanding of this particular segment of reality, nor for addressing the questions of global citizenship which contemporary academics are rightly keen to ask.

While we clearly need to distance ourselves from the contractarian perspective which underpins much of the historical analysis of citizenship, most attempts to do so have proved fruitless. Consider, for example, Bauman's critique of contractarian rationality based on the 'moral ambivalence' of human nature, and his subsequent suggestion that human conduct should be guided by a morality 'without guarantees'.[5] The end result of Bauman's 'ethical postmodernism' is the privatization of the social, and the transformation of the individual from citizen to consumer. In such a consumer society, citizenship becomes another commodity, and citizens become self-serving hedonists, not dissimilar, ironically, to Hobbes's pre-social individuals in the state of nature.

MEMBERSHIP OF A GLOBAL COMMUNITY

Perhaps a more useful alternative model of citizenship to that of the contractarians is found within the Durkheimian tradition. Herein, the materialistic and individualistic assumptions of contractarian thinking are replaced with a form of communitarianism. Thus, behind the surface-level material image of society there is a moral consensus, a *conscience collective,* born out of the ideas of individuals but external to them, which serves to maintain social solidarity. From a Durkheimian perspective, citizenship can be viewed as a moral glue holding society together: a kind of civil religion. This is particularly true in countries with unstable political climates and in need of social solidarity.[6] Sztompka argues that civil society should be based on trust, but in its absence other forces may emerge, such as authoritarianism, or the externalization of trust.[7] Without directly intending to do so, Sztompka thus suggests an alternative view of global citizenship: where trust in one's nation-state breaks down, globality may emerge from loyalties shifting towards global organizations such as the United Nations or NATO. Durkheim himself recognized that citizenship—as a means of achieving social solidarity—could act as a basis not only for national identity but also for human identity.

Robertson follows in this tradition by understanding globality as a global conscience collective. Indeed, he seeks to ground this understanding by mapping four ideal-typical possible outcomes of global change, drawing on Tönnies's classic distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft.*[8] Tönnies had used these terms to counterpoise traditional communities with modern societies or associations. The distinction between these forms of interaction runs through Robertson's own account, but Sztompka offers a useful and succinct summary, which is worth reproducing here:[9]

> The first, 'Global Gemeinschaft I', conceives of the world as a mosaic of closed, bounded communities, either equal and unique in the institutional and cultural arrangements, or hierarchical…This image is a kind of negative reaction to globalization, and may result in the ideology of 'anti-globalism'.

Sztompka points out that there is both an egalitarian and a hierarchical version of this, and that the former is found in classical cultural anthropology, cultural relativism and probably modern communitarianism; while the latter is found in nationalism and fundamentalism, which seek to appropriate the language of the 'best community'. Clearly, then, we can identify those citizens who concede that their actions and orientations are influenced by global change, but who purposively, or at times sub-consciously, react to such changes by rejecting

the potential for globalism, turning instead to an aggressive localism and/or nationalism.

> The second image, 'Global Gemeinschaft IF, emphasizes the unity of the human species and advocates the emergence of a fully global community, or the 'global village' in the literal sense, with full globe-wide consensus on values and ideas.[10]

This view corresponds with one we have already encountered, and which is by no means new: that of universalism. A globality of this kind is thus an updated form of moral (or religious) universalism, which might now include the ideologies of pacifism and ecology. A global citizen exhibiting this kind of globality prioritizes, as did the earlier universalists, the innate 'oneness' of the human species, albeit adapted to take account of the pragmatism discussed in the previous chapter.

> The third image, 'Global Gesellschaft I', sees the world as a mosaic of nation-states, mutually open and involved in intensive economic, political and cultural exchanges.[11]

Again., according to Sztompka, there is both a liberal-egalitarian version and a critical or conservative hierarchical version of this; the image thus corresponds with that of Free Market economics, political realism, and world-systems Marxism. Regardless, one might conceive of oneself as a world citizen through one's exchanges with other nations, one's travel habits, and so on, without needing at any point to commit oneself to humanitarian or anti-nationalistic values.

Robertson's fourth image—advocated by liberals and Marxists—again corresponds with a familiar type of world citizenship, already discussed. Sztompka again:

> Finally the fourth image, 'Global Gesellschaft II', envisages the unification of nation-states under some form of world government, either within a supranational polity or as a close-knit federation.[12]

This, then, corresponds with the ideology of federalism, in its various guises, and of functionalism. It recognizes that the world is a lived system of inter-related agencies, such as nation-states, regions and people. In its more moderate form, it does not denounce the importance of the nation-state. Indeed, by advocating a supranational body such as the United Nations, it reinforces the role of states in the international system. But, by suggesting that certain powers be ceded to a greater authority for the good of the whole, what is being advocated is a kind of world citizenship, and an awareness of the sum as opposed to simply the parts. In

its more radical form, such a perspective might go as far as to suggest the abandonment of nation-states completely in favour of a single world government. Then, of course, we would all be citizens of the world whether we liked it or not!

While Robertson's typologies appear at first glance to offer us a useful model against which to study the meaning of citizenship to individuals living under global conditions (more on which in the subsequent chapters), their value is limited at best. For Robertson, as we discussed in the previous chapter, globalization is a long-term process which is carefully and tightly interwoven with processes of universalization, modernization and internationalization. None of his typologies actually accounts for the post-war transformation in the relationship between individual and globe. Indeed, the very model he attempts to update and 'globalize' belongs inherently to an age in which the nation-state was central and nation-building of paramount importance.

Indeed, there are clearly problems with the model of global citizenship advocated from within the wider Durkheimian-communitarian tradition to which Robertson belongs. Any moral glue requires a prior acceptance of values which need to be maintained in order to keep society bound together. Global society, bound together by a global sense of belonging, suggests a form of cultural homogenization, as well as an assumption of rational action. It overlooks the powers of political decision-making that would be required in order to clarify the rules based on the moral consensus, and to maintain order in such a society. It thus overlooks the power exercised by dominant people, bodies or nations to influence these 'rules'. It relies upon an idealistic—almost psychological—perspective on human morality, and assumes that conflict between cultures would be subordinate to a 'higher consciousness' of humanity. More grounded communitarian perspectives on global civil society have, for the most part, been unconvincing. For example, the collection of essays assembled by Michael Walzer does little to advance the debate, preferring instead to highlight the advantages (and disadvantages) of a communitarian stance as applied first to national societies., then to such societies as they are affected by post-national conditions, but without any engagement with globality *per se*.[13] Just as liberals and contractarians find the notion of global citizenship problematic because of the decentring of the political-administrative state, so do communitarians (of all varieties) find it challenging because of the disembedding and diffusion of 'the nation' beyond fixed boundaries.

TYPES OF GLOBAL CITIZEN

Another important attempt to define global citizenship, or citizenships, without advocating a contractarian perspective has been made by Richard Falk. Falk's framework is a convenient and credible blend of

communitarianism (in so far as Falk has a commitment to the idea of a global civil society) and 'cosmopolitanism' (in the sense that he, like David Held and Ulrich Beck, focuses on how this can be achieved through standards and norms such as human rights which can be enshrined in a formal cosmopolitan democracy). Like Robertson, Falk attempts to identify various 'ideal-types' of global citizens.[14] His first such type is the global reformer who,

> intellectually perceives a better way of organizing the political life of the planet and favours a utopian scheme that is presented as a practical mechanism. Typically such a global citizen has been an advocate of world government or a world state, or a stronger United Nations… accepting as necessary…political centralization.[15]

This is the activist, associated with idealism and rational strategies for global change. Campaigning for reform is extended beyond the immediate towards the global level. This tends to emerge in western countries, and seems to advocate an outcome of global change which corresponds to Robertson's Global Gesellschaft II.

Falk's second type belongs to a global elite which travels so frequently from place to place, country to country, that it no longer considers itself as citizens of any one nation. Such a global citizen—or global capitalist—tends to have a social network which is spread around the world, and has a 'global culture of experience'[16] which erodes any attachment to place or community. The stage for such an individual's everyday activity is nothing short of the globe itself. The world in which this individual lives corresponds, roughly, with Robertson's Global Gesellschaft I. Thus,

> the world is becoming unified around a common business elite…that shares interests and experiences…; the result seems to be a denationalized global elite that at the same time lacks any global civic sense responsibility.[17]

The third type is functional, focusing 'on the management of the global order, particularly its environmental dimensions but also its economic dimensions'. Inter-governmental activity regarding the future of the planet leads to the implementation of national laws which are aimed at global security. Governments thus accept responsibilities beyond the territorially bound limits of their sovereignty. Thus,

> What it means to think of global citizenship…is increasingly caught up in the process of making the planet sustainable at current middle class lifestyles…, working to achieve sustainability in a manner that is sufficiently equitable to be accepted by political elites…and

> implemented by…regions and public opinions…that together constitute the world.[18]

Falk associates his fourth type with the emergence of a particular supernational political community—a federal Europe, and the sense of regional identity associated with it. The conscious development of regional identity regarding such a political community is unavoidably bound up by global forces. One cannot define oneself in terms of a political community without considering that community's place in the world.

Finally, Falk discusses the global activist, whose concerns move beyond the nation, beyond traditional concepts of politics, towards a sense of identity and community described as a 'global civil society',[19] not dissimilar to Robertson's Global Gemeinschaft II. Here he mentions members of organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace.

Falk warns that these are, ofcourse, merely ideal-types, and most global citizens are composites of them. However abstract the concept of global citizenship *per se* seems to be, Falk defends it as a political challenge to formulate a global civil society based on a shared humanity and a plurality of cultures, a sense of global community, a sense of commitment and responsibility towards the world, and a view of global citizenship as a civil religion, a faith in values.

Falk's belief in such concepts as values, human rights and global responsibilities takes something of an abstract and unclear path. Nevertheless he is right in stating that global citizenship needs to involve both a concept of global humanity (associated with equal human rights) and a sense of duty towards the world. However, I am not convinced that he offers us a clear definition of what it would actually involve to be a global citizen. Like Robertson's, Falk's typologies rely upon foundations associated primarily with an earlier stage of modernity. The forms of global citizenship he describes, while undeniably more sensitive towards the post-war transformations discussed in the previous chapters, still reflect a preoccupation with universalism and federalism.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE COSMOPOLITAN PUBLIC SPHERE

The contractarian tradition, which is based in liberal political philosophy and emphasizes the role of the citizen as the bearer of rights and duties in relation to a political state, is not a helpful framework within which to understand global citizenship because, clearly, globalization decentres the administrative state. The Durkheimian and communitarian traditions are useful in so far as they push us slightly in the direction of a global civil *society,* but they do not necessarily address the reality of contemporary conditions, and their preference for cultural definitions over political ones

leaves them somewhat disempowered. Falk's models are more useful in part because they blend the contractarians' reliance upon formal legal-political structures with the Durkheimian emphasis on culture and consciousness, essentially locating a normatively grounded middle-way within the tradition of cosmopolitanism.

Even more useful in this regard is the recent work by Gerard Delanty. Working within the Habermasian tradition, Delanty has sought a 'cosmopolitan critique of globalization' in contemporary theories of post-national citizenship.[20] Delanty is critical of both the liberal (state-citizen) and the communitarian (nation-citizen) models, preferring to locate his theory within the tradition of radical democracy. At the same time, his analysis of competing theories of global citizenship—the 'legal cosmopolitanism' of internationalism with its reliance upon a global constitution; the 'political cosmopolitanism' of Falk, Held, Beck and others who link global democracy to global civil society; and the 'cultural cosmopolitanism' of those, perhaps like Hannerz and Appadurai, whose concern is with transnationalism—finds many of the dominant models wanting.[21] According to Delanty, the concept of civic cosmopolitanism provides a more realistic framework than global citizenship, as it would 'bring the dimensions of community and autonomy, the basis of national models of citizenship, closer to the emergent reality of a cosmopolitan citizenship'.[22] Delanty's framework is particularly useful because it locates a model for global (or cosmopolitan) citizenship not within the state-citizen relationship but within the public sphere; that is, within the emergent cosmopolitan public sphere which is developed from the interactions of multiple public spheres. For Delanty, cosmopolitan citizenship is necessarily multi-layered.

PERFORMATIVE CITIZENSHIP

Neither Falk nor Robertson has, tomy mind, adequately grasped the significance of this globality for our concept of citizenship. Robertson's focus on belief-systems, and Falk's on institutions, both produce a neglect for active human construction, that is, how people make sense of the social world. Delanty's model is respectful of earlier (that is, nation-state-based) frameworks, but is not developed solely as an extension of these frameworks onto a global stage. Sharing with Albrow a commitment to the concept of a 'global age' allows Delanty to devise new frameworks for citizenship and civic action not restricted by the limitations of the earlier definitions. This innovative approach can be developed even further. Global citizenship can best be defined, I would argue, through an understanding of the way individuals make sense of, and act in accordance with, their environments; from pragmatic action comes what might be termed performative citizenship.[23] For the remainder of this chapter, I want to

focus on this suggestion. In particular, I want to make the claim that by its very nature, it is not a solely academic proposal. It is part of a reality that is lived by individuals across the globe. Indeed, there is an organization - similar in many respects to the ones mentioned in an earlier chapter but worlds apart in theoretical orientation—which bases its philosophy on such a pragmatic and performative concept of global citizenship. This is the World Government of World Citizens, and it forms the theme of the next chapter.

According to Albrow, citizenship has 'a vitality outside either representative democracy or the nation-state'.[24] It is in this respect that citizenship in what he calls the global age represents a clear break with earlier conceptions, just as modern citizenship, which he argues was grounded in the extension of a centralized state, was qualitatively different from participatory citizenship in the Aristotlean sense.[25] Thus, in contemporary conditions 'The performative citizen is not acting out of some duty imposed by a statutory body but acts out of conscience and free commitment'.[26] Performative citizenship, says Albrow, reconstructs citizenship as a social practice. '[T]he social', he writes, 'has been released by the impact of globalization on the inherent contradictions of modernity.'[27] Ultimately, Albrow's conceptualization of global citizens (for him, 'people in the global age') rests on various premises, one of the most important of which is the transformation of values produced in part by the emergent globalism, and in part by a rampant consumer capitalism.[28] We do not, of course, have to subscribe to his theory of the global age to accept his understanding of the performative nature of global citizenship. It seems equally plausible that the global citizens Albrow identifies exist within a transformed modernity, a modernity still characterized by the conflicts between instrumental rationality and human emancipation. Performative citizenship necessarily seems to be the most appropriate way of understanding political identity in an age governed by a new pragmatism which allows for abstract ideals to translate into practical political action, and for singular and unilinear notions of belonging to give way to the plurality of identities. As Albrow says:

> Global citizenship is world citizenship focused on the future of the globe. Moreover, it is developing distinctive forms of action which involve co-ordination on a global scale through open networking. Global citizens are not ruling the state as Aristotle's citizens did, nor do they have a contractual relationship with it in the manner of modern nation-state citizens. In an important sense they are actually *performing the state,* creating it through practices which they have learned as the colonized and skilful citizens of the nation-state. This is where the penetration of the modern state into everyday life has prepared its citizens for a new and proactive role.[29]

In truth, this concept of performative citizenship is quite compatible with a Habermasian approach to modernity. Habermas argues that certain universals (such as truth) *do* exist, and to show this he turns to language. Any statement, he says, has to satisfy certain validity claims for a fair consensus to be reached between speakers. It has to be comprehensible (that is, clear), truthful (that is, sincere), true (that is, objectively accurate), and right (that is, the speaker must be in an appropriate position to make the statement). Any one or more of these, of course, *cannot* be satisfied, which makes consensus impossible. Because each of these claims is tested not just against the subjective world of sincerity but also against the normative world of appropriate behaviour and the objective world of reality (that is, truth), Habermas is introducing us to a way of understanding language as empowering. It clearly acts as a bridge between the individual subject (the citizen) and the outside world; for me, action can only be understood in the context of conditions (Marx made this quite clear). Habermas, like Albrow, draws on Austin's notion of performatives as statements which by being made thus make something true. It is my contention that all forms of citizenship are socially constructed, and also, significantly, that (drawing on Habermas again), this linguistic construction has to satisfy the validity claim to external truth for it to be meaningful and empowering. Hence, as we shall discuss in more depth below, the importance of declaring oneself a world citizen (the performative) because to do so empowers one, whereas to declare oneself a nation-state citizen is contradictory and disempowering. This is because, as I have already made clear, the external conditions within which social action is framed are global, and thus for a statement to be true (in Habermas's sense, and thus empowering), it has to recognize this.

RETHINKING THE STATE

So, performative citizenship of this kind means actively performing the State. Such a position assumes, of course, that the State is more than an assemblage of institutions and politicians. The State is the political dimension which we all carry with us. We perform the State whenever we act politically.

The fact is, neither the State nor the nation are, by necessity, bound up within territorial spaces. The nation-state, which is the name we have given to that particular territorial space which seeks to encompass both the political and the cultural aspects of human life within the confines of marked borders, is not an *a priori* reality. It is a human construct. Modernity allowed for the development of both the nation *and* the State, but, in keeping with its contradictory nature, the process of rationalization which allowed for the nation-state also allowed for the conflation of these otherwise distinct concepts. Society became the nation. Government

became the State. Citizenship became a tool for nation-building, a means of legitimizing the State *via* the idea of the nation.

But the nation-state is merely one kind of state among many others. In the Weberian sense, it has thrived throughout modernity because it has proven itself to be the best organized, the most efficient, the most rational such creature, but this alone is not enough to guarantee its immortality.

The most significant consequence of globalization is, for me at least, the possible separation of nation and state.[30] Or, perhaps, it is the separation of nation and state which makes globalization possible. If by *state* we are referring to the political administration, and by *nation* we mean the shared values that make up the culture of the community, then by *nation-state* we mean the specifically modern form of territorial administration that assumes that in order to be politically (and by extension militarily and economically) effective a state requires a nation, or common culture, to be embedded within its boundaries. It is, after all, this distinction which lies at the heart of Weber's, and Habermas's, theories. Of course, again following Habermas, it is in keeping with the complexities of modernity that the socio-cultural aspects of the lifeworld are suppressed by the expansive logic of the political-economic system. At the macro-level,, the requirements of the cultural nation are subsumed under the requirements of the political state. The nation becomes nothing more than the cultural product of the political administration, hence the assimilationist frame, instead of the combined will of the people, which Rousseau and Habermas see as providing the necessary legitimation of the political state. As the State colonizes the nation, so does personal, social and cultural identity become nothing more than a minor extension of political identity.

Globalized conditions allow for a delinking of system and lifeworld at various levels. At the macro-level, they make possible a separation of nation and state which allows for social and cultural identity to roam freely (or relatively freely) beyond the limitations imposed upon it by earlier conditions dominated by nation-states. Thus, it signifies an important development within the progress of modernity, which had hitherto been characterized by the colonization of modernity's emancipatory project by its expansive and repressive one. This separation of nation and state is thus in part the separation of culture and politics. This is not to say, as some postmodernists perhaps would, that contemporary conditions herald the triumph of the cultural over the political. It is merely to suggest that the taken-for-granted linkage between the two, epitomized by the assimilationist frame, has been, to some degree, severed, and that this delinking results in a multiplicity of possible outcomes, a plurality of possible political and cultural identities, which I address in subsequent chapters.

So, with the separation of nation and state, we see (around us, everywhere) the emancipation of cultural identity and the spread of

transnational cultural communities (nations). Cultural traditions are no longer restricted by the limitations of place. Migration, multiculturalism and diaspora are all familiar terms to us now. We recognize the plurality of nations within nation-states. We also see how those nations transcend those nation-states. If we can recognize and accept that this transformation has occurred within the realm of cultural identity, why, we should consider, is it so difficult for us to accept that it can also happen within political identity? Within nation-states there can also be many states, and these states may also transcend those nation-states. They may, or they may not, overlap with the new nations. However we look at it, the world we live in, the new map of the globe, is a complex network of interactions, allegiances, memberships, rights and duties.

Under globalized conditions, then, the State is not necessarily the formalized political construct we assume it to be when we discuss politics at a nation-state level. It is not, necessarily, created through the social contract. The global State need not be the nation-state writ large. As we have seen, if earlier abstract ideals of world citizenship were to have had any political formalization (that is, a world state), then it would have been through the establishment of inter-nation-state, federalist organizations, such as the United Nations. But for global citizenship to have meaning, the idea of the global State takes on a different appearance. As opposed to the federalist, functionalist world state, the global state is pragmatic, socially constructed, pluralistic, unpredictable, and, above all, borne out of a rediscovery of the idea that the citizen is always sovereign. The global citizens who actively perform the global State, and who by doing so change the world politically every day, do not necessarily belong to formal political parties, or attend meetings of the United Nations. Their everyday lives, their understandings of the social world, are all bound up within a wider recognition of their role as individuals living on a single globe.

THE CHALLENGE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY

If global citizenship is pragmatic and performative, and allows for a decentralized state, then what of democracy? Clearly this, also, needs to be rethought in the context of contemporary global change. Accordingly, we need to return to the classical debates within democratic thought. To what extent is participatory democracy possible? Is democracy as practised in Western nation-states merely a form of utilitarian populism? Is democracy even possible without full access to information? These are demanding but important questions, and there simply is not enough space in this volume to do them justice. However, it is possible to expand upon the previous discussion of performative citizenship and apply a similar model to democratic structures. In the Habermasian sense, democracy must be founded on principles of open discourse and rational decision-making.

Democracy of this kind could be viewed as a revitalized public sphere, a realm of debate involving informed and concerned citizens. It would be a democracy born out of the emancipatory project of the modernity of the lifeworld. Access to information would be central to this democracy. I term this 'radical' or 'communicative' democracy. John Dryzek has used the term 'discursive democracy' to describe a similar scheme. Simone Chambers has opted for 'reasonable democracy'. Similar models have been proposed by Gay Seidman, Gerard Delanty and Vandana Shiva.[31] For Seidman, democracy means more than the simple right to vote; it 'includes an understanding that citizens are entitled to demand a living wage, a reasonable standard of living, and basic social services like education, health, and housing'.[32] Critical of the liberal view of citizenship that prioritizes the role of the state, and the communitarian one that locates citizenship within the context of the nation, Delanty points out that the advantage of a radical, discursive democracy is that it is based not only in civil society but also in the public sphere (it allows for a politics based on citizenship), and that the emergence of a cosmopolitan public sphere suggests the need for a cosmopolitan radical democracy.[33] Shiva's 'Earth democracy' would involve an extension of decision-making and a genuine right to information and prior consent for the people, while Muto Ichiyo talks about 'transborder participatory democracy' which is 'distinct from the conventional idea of world government or world federation', based on a 'new principle, by which not the state, but the people themselves can emerge as the chief actors in determining the course of world politics and economics'.[34] Participation, for Muto Ichiyo and others writing on such issues, is, under globalized conditions, about performance and discourse. Active participatory democracy means a discursive democracy within which performative citizenship is exercised.

The foundations of such a democracy do not lie in institutional procedures but in the inherent structures of open society. Access to information is essential for citizens to be able to make informed decisions. Thus, the presence of such acts that restrict freedom of information is in itself an infringement upon the democratic potential of such a society.

In other words, only by having access to information can the four validity claims suggested by Habermas be met with regard to democratic politics. True democracy relies upon this opening up of government, because without it elections are invalid, they merely reflect successful marketing, propaganda and ideology, custom, or some other strategy or form of behaviour which does not correspond to communicative rationality.

Clearly, such a model of radical democracy connects, perhaps rather conveniently, to two other important aspects of global politics. First, it repositions democracy as a human rights issue, that is, as a matter of a fundamental right to access to information. Second, it locates political

outcomes within the realm of pragmatic universalism; that is, it recognizes that under pragmatic conditions a plurality of potential outcomes exists in all forms of political action, and yet it maintains that, under conditions free from ideology and instrumental rationality, a consensus, a truth, a universal morality can be achieved. Accordingly, politics finds itself firmly reconnected to the realm of ethics. It is fair to say that the populism (I shall not call it pragmatism) that has passed for democratic politics in the age of nation-state politics has always had far less to do with ethics than with the maintenance of power.

Power, of course, has been maintained through various strategies, not least through uneven distribution of material goods and of cultural capital. True radical democracy cannot, of course, be established without addressing these (material *and* cultural) inequalities. Globality, which I have argued is the central component of global citizenship in that it allows for a globalization of values, is itself a form of cultural capital which is unevenly distributed among and between social groups. I have addressed this with regard to the relationship between working-class culture and localist world-views in another publication.[35] The same is true of other marginalized groups within the world-system. We should thus be aware that, in this sense at least, globalization, globality, and global citizenship are all biased in favour of Western, white, middle-class males. Radical democracy, which as its name suggests is a philosophy, or rather a manifesto for practice, which must address the very heart of the democratic process, therefore needs to address these startling inequalities.

The result, I would argue, is the potential for the achievement of modernity's unfinished project. That is to say, world citizenship (as envisaged throughout modernity) can actually be achieved as a form of self-actualization, arrived at through the exchange of various local knowledges (a Hegelian dialectic project, it seems, and so we might term it 'dialectical worldism'). But we must understand that there is a direct relationship between this and what I prefer to call radical or communicative democracy (drawing, as I have outlined, on Habermas), and that this democracy itself relies upon open communication. However, this relationship also allows for the negative as well as the positive aspects of the dialectical process. That is to say, distorted or restricted (as opposed to open) communication would lead to parochialism instead of globalism. Also, we should recognize that cultural capital also plays its part in these interlinkages, in so far as it can be understood in the form of a knowledge of the world (globality). On the one hand, this globality may produce globalism. On the other (the more common, one feels, given that it is restricted by material access) it may result in parochialism. This rather complex and unwieldy procedure, which I have intended to serve as an outline for the potential for the fulfilment, or the ongoing failure, of the modern project, can be better understood using a simple diagram, as with Figure 4.

FIGURE 4: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES OF GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC SHIFTS



A SOCIAL THEORY OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP?

I began this chapter by outlining some suggestions, made by worthy authors such as Falk and Robertson, as to what global citizenship might actually mean. While much of what these writers and others say is useful, they are lacking, I feel, in a qualitative understanding of the transformations in wider socio-cultural practices that make global citizenship possible. It is my contention that such a qualitative transformation has indeed taken place, and that it is linked to the processes I discussed in the previous chapter. In this, and in many other, respects, I support the framework offered by Gerard Delanty.

But what does this actually mean for people who, in everyday life, are perhaps still bound up with the internal politics of nation-states? The task I set myself for the remainder of this book is to go in search of global citizens. I look for—and find—them in various places. I find them in campaigning organizations. I find them on the streets of London. Global citizenship is not world citizenship specifically because it is inclusive and unrestrictive. Globalization, by its very nature, is pluralistic. Global exchanges may be unequal, but there is at least some reciprocity. The globalized world is not a world of homogeneity, but of difference. Also, it is not a world of universals and fixed ideals, but of possibilities and, most significantly, of pragmatic action. Such pragmatism may respond to underlying universals (I make this point so as to counter any charge of postmodern relativism), but how those universals are interpreted, and what course of action they result in, are choices made according to external criteria and internal subjectivity.

To assist us in understanding what such a pragmatic global citizenship might, in theory, mean, I now draw up a list of components which are themselves drawn from what I have already said, and, in part, from what I turn to in the next chapter. This is intended to serve as a series of interconnected statements forming what might be described as an interim conclusion. These assertions, in so far as they are made, attempt to link the underlying philosophy of organizations such as the World Government of World Citizens (that which makes it illustrative of global citizenship), with both globalization theory and with the theoretical framework (drawing on Habermas) within which I locate my study:

1. We are already born citizens of the world. Accordingly, we have rights and duties from our 'contract' with the world. This has been a basic premise of world citizenship since its origins. However, the world is also divided up into political territories called nation-states, which demand allegiance from those of us within their borders. These nation-states, however, cannot grant human rights, only affirm them. Human rights are grounded in natural law. They can confer civil liberties, but these can equally as easily be taken away. Civil liberties are grounded in national, positive law. Human rights can only be protected by world law; they should not be reducible to the relativistic whims of national governments. And, coupled with our inalienable rights as human beings, we have certain duties towards the planet as a whole, as a site of action, upon which our acts occur, and without which they could not.
2. Nation-states require, by their very existence, conditions of competition, conflict, war, and anarchy. This is the basic premise of realism in international relations. Many of the major problems we face in this increasingly globalized world are beyond the powers of the nation-state. Thus, they cannot protect us (their citizens) from war, pollution, and global destruction.
3. Nation-state barriers are being broken down by migration, transnational affiliations, global communications, and global consciousness. Furthermore, the right to travel freely across the globe is a basic, inalienable human right, and cannot be limited by national laws. However, many people, such as refugees, are denied this basic right.
4. As Bobbio says, peace, human rights, and democracy are part of the same historical condition, and can only be achieved through world citizenship.[36] Any attempt to achieve this through the international system of states would be a mistake, because such a system is by its very nature divisive; democracy must be global, *not international*. And this democracy must be discursive, based on the free-flowing exchange of information and knowledge between individuals, and on the access

to that information at all times, because, embedded in the very soul of political philosophy is the sometimes-forgotten point that the citizen is sovereign.

5. This sovereignty has been (falsely) transferred to the nation-state and the international system of states. The influence of the system over individual sovereignty can be related to the Marxian notion of false consciousness, but more accurately to Habermas's colonization of the lifeworld (see No.9, below). Thus, for abstract thought to translate into practical action, citizens of the world need to reclaim their sovereignty over their own lives and empower themselves to deal with the problems that face them. This reclaiming of sovereignty, of both the global and the local away from the false barriers of the nation-state, is, for Brecher, Brown and Childs, active globalization-from-below.
6. Central to Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative rationality is the realization that we only make sense of universals through everyday practice. The practice Habermas has in mind here is speech. What Habermas calls universal pragmatics might just as easily be called, in a modified form, pragmatic universalism.
7. In the late modern, or for some the 'global' age, this combination of pragmatism and universalism drawn from globality and globalism means that not only is unmediated identification with the globe a practical reality, it is also a political necessity. This is why so much attention is paid to the need for individuals to recognize and claim their sovereignty, theirs by right, through linguistic assertion. By linguistically recognizing, and practically relating to, the globe despite the absence of a formal (in the recognized sense) governmental body or state, one is making true the notion that citizenship can be performative. Indeed, performative citizenship *is* citizenship for the late modern age under globalized conditions. This relates to Habermas's theory of communicative action, which shows how a truthful outcome must reflect, among other things, truthful external conditions.
8. Following Habermas, and our argument in previous chapters, modernity has been characterized essentially by the split between two spheres of social life: system and lifeworld. The former is driven by strategic or instrumental action and located in the political and economic sub-systems, while the latter is driven by communicative action, for the achievement of understanding, and located within the socio-cultural sphere. The nation-state system is a product of instrumental modernity, the result of strategic action in the political sphere aimed at obtaining power, territory, and control over citizens. The notions of human rights and world citizenship come from abstract modernity; the result of action aimed at reaching understanding, and based on emancipation and equality.

9. Throughout modernity, the political-economic sphere, instrumental modernity, has over-powered and subjugated the socio-cultural sphere of abstract modernity, in some cases colonizing it so as to render it impotent as a force for resistance and change. Again, this draws on Habermas's theory of the 'colonization of the lifeworld'. There has always been resistance to this, but in global conditions (conditions of global ecological risk, transnational cultural consciousness, etc.) there is a re-linking of system and lifeworld, which allows for a global consciousness to act as resistance to the political-economic order, and a reclaiming of local and global identity from the artificial constraints of instrumental modernity. In other words, there has been a qualitative transformation in the modernity of the lifeworld, which from its abstract roots has opened up the possibility for pragmatic action.
10. Instrumental modernity has also been based around the marriage of convenience between the economic sphere of the world capitalist system, and the political sphere of the world system of nation-states. Globalized conditions have allowed capitalism to operate globally rather than internationally, thus ending this alliance, and rendering the nation-state further isolated and archaic. But global capitalism has sought to recolonize socio-cultural identity in the form of cultural imperialism, Coca-Colonization, McDonaldization, etc. There is thus an ongoing dynamic exchange between the two modernities.
11. In the socio-cultural sphere of abstract modernity, the individual is sovereign. Individual sovereignty is presupposed in the operations of the human lifeworld. In instrumental modernity, s/he never can be sovereign. This is presupposed in the mechanical operations of the system. Accordingly, a new politics following along the lines of the points made above which takes into consideration the reempowerment of human sovereignty needs to be a politics of identity and identification with the world, between all peoples, and emerging out of the sovereignty of the individual lifeworld; globalization-from-below. Here, then, is the optimistic vision of a final triumph of abstract over instrumental modernity.
12. According to some perspectives, because the nation-state system is redundant, divisive, artificial and non-discursive, such politic can only exist if there is a single world government. Reduced spending on conflicts between nations would allow for money to be spent instead on peaceful and progressive needs, and there would be enough left over to allow each individual access to a computer, which would in turn allow for participation in the new political democracy, an exchange of information, and a communicative democracy. This new democratic politics is multicultural, universalistic and pragmatic, but there is considerable disagreement even within the advocates of world citizenship on this point, particularly on the meaning of world

government. Arguments that such a government must be a macro-government are dismissed by some for playing the game of the system, and for misunderstanding the nature and objectives of government and citizenship.

13. In summary, the shared assumption is that globalization-from-below can take place because: (a) the things that threaten us are no longer such that our nation-states can protect us—they are global concerns; and (b) alongside these concerns there is a growing consciousness of the world as a whole.

In the next chapter, I want to show how these claims, which form the foundations of a social theory of global citizenship, have been put into practice. My model is a campaigning movement known as World Government of World Citizens. This organization reflects a series of assumptions that we might wish to examine, which either have their roots in, or betray similarities to, important traditions in social and political thought. Taken together, we find the makings of a significant programme for political action. From Rousseau, for example, we have a particular form of contractarian thinking, and radicalized democratic procedures, in which the individual citizen is always sovereign. Habermas contributes the notion of communicative or discursive democracy to this idea, while his theory of universal pragmatics locates the universals of human life within the everyday lived world. As we discussed in previous chapters, Habermas is also useful because of his contributions to the theory of modernity and his work on the crisis of the nation-state. Clearly, the pragmatic realities of the late modern age require a politicization of language; hence, central to this discourse (and in particular that of the organization) is an insistence that one must declare oneself a world citizen in the here and now, and an examination of the way that this might connect not only to Habermas's universal pragmatics but also to the idea of performative citizenship. Citizenship under such conditions cannot rely upon contractarian assumptions; it must have an alternative, performative dimension. Bourdieu is useful in so far as his theory of cultural capital can be used to show how globality is unevenly distributed across social groups. Finally, Bobbio has been mentioned in the light of his statement regarding the interconnectedness of peace, democracy and human rights. Taken together, the above constitute a useful way of understanding global change, and global consciousness, and the possible meaning of global citizenship. We should now turn to this organization which I have said serves as a useful example of this new form of citizenship: global citizenship.

NOTES

1. Xabier Gorostiaga, 'Latin America in the New World Order', in Brecher, Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions,* p. 67.
2. Turner, 'Contemporary Problems'; Falk, 'Making of Global Citizenship'; Albrow, *Global Age;* Nick Ellison, 'Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity', *Sociology,* 31, 4 (1997), pp. 697–717; Gerard Delanty, *Citizenship in a Global Age* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).
3. Howard Williams, 'Kant on the Social Contract', in David Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds), *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 135.
4. Giddens, *Modernity,* pp. 214–17, 221–5.
5. Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 10.
6. Turner, 'Preface', p. x.
7. Piotr Sztompka, 'Civil Society and Public Space: The Dialectics of Post-Communist Systems', paper presented to the Thirteenth World Congress of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, 19 July 1994.
8. Robertson, *Globalization,* pp. 78–9.
9. Piotr Sztompka, *The Sociology of Social Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 95–6.
10. Ibid., p. 96.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Michael Walzer (ed.), *Toward a Global Civil Society* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1995).
14. Versions of Falk's paper, 'The Making of Global Citizenship', appear in Brecher, Childs and Brown, *Global Visions,* and van Steenbergen, *Condition.* Subsequent references are taken from the latter.
15. Falk, 'Making', p. 132.
16. Ibid., p. 134.
17. Ibid., p. 135.
18. Ibid., p. 136.
19. Ibid., p. 138.
20. Delanty, *Citizenship in a Global Age,* p. 4.
21. Ibid., pp. 52–64.
22. Ibid, pp. 5, 64.
23. Albrow, *Global Age,* pp. 175–7.
24. Ibid., p. 175.
25. Ibid., p. 176.
26. Ibid., p. 178.
27. Ibid., p. 164.
28. Ibid., p. 140.
29. Ibid., p. 177.
30. See Albrow and O'Byrne, 'Rethinking', for more on this.
31. John S. Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Simone Chambers,

Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Gay W. Seidman, 'Facing the New International Context of Development', in Brecher, Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions;* Vandana Shiva, 'The Greening of the Global Reach' in Brecher, Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions.*

32. Seidman, 'Facing the New', p. 179.
33. Delanty, *Citizenship in a Global Age,* pp. 41–2, 52.
34. Ichiyo, 'For an Alliance', p. 156.
35. O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture'.
36. Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* p. vii.

6
Global Citizenship as Organizational Practice

The World Government of World Citizens is an organization which has responded directly to the pragmatic turn, and which reflects the current philosophy of global consciousness.

GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

If the kind of global citizenship I am advocating requires some rethinking of the political foundations of society, and if, as I have also advocated, this rethinking involves a shift towards a radical, discursive democracy, then some consideration has to be paid towards the agents of this change. The philosophical foundations of this radical democracy, from Rousseau and Kant through to Habermas, invert the 'top-down' approach to state-citizen relations which have earlier phase of modernity in which the nation-state was the chief frame of reference. According to radical democracy, sovereignty rests first and last with the individual citizen. Citizens express their collective desires through the formation of associations, social movements, which are produced through reasonable dialogue and the quest for understanding and consensus. Political parties were, ofcourse, the most significant manifestations of these associations during the earlier phase of modernity. Such movements have, however, suffered in various ways from the transformations in political allegiance and the shift in values away from the nation-state towards the globe. Citizens are acutely aware that membership of such political parties does not allow them *per se* to express their concern over such global issues as the environment, human rights, or peace. Accordingly, concerned citizens have joined social movements that usually campaign on specific issues, and which, quite often, operate globally.

There is, however, no necessary contradiction between these alternative political allegiances. The reality of global citizenship is nothing less than the reality of the expansion and diffusion of the political throughout the globe. This is precisely why political action has now taken on a pragmatic dimension. There are different strategies available for different political

goals. The global citizen is in a position to pick and choose which strategies best suit each particular end. Most politics, in fact, requires some degree of compromise between the various levels. To campaign on welfare issues, for example, involves direct political action at the nation-state level. But, clearly, welfare issues are also subject to the whims of the global capitalist economy, and therefore cannot be divorced from it.

Thus, social movements of all kinds play an important, indeed a crucial, role in the new radical democracy and in the political space which has opened up for the global citizens of today. Global social movements such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and so on, are themselves representations of a collective will, and reflections of a shift in values. Noticeably, most of these movements operate in different ways at global, international, nation-state, and local levels. For example, an individual member of Amnesty International would probably have joined because s/he is concerned about human rights as a global issue. To campaign on this matter, s/he would write letters to other governments while Amnesty International researchers compile reports and lobby the United Nations, both distinctly international strategies. However, as a member, s/he would belong to a national (that is, nation-state) section., and very probably to a local group. These levels reflect the variation in values, loyalty, belonging, and activism which make possible the new global citizenship.

Let us stay with Amnesty International for a short while longer. This organization is, as I said in Chapter 3, a fine example of a movement that relies upon a philosophical foundation of moral universalism. Moral universalism, I said, was a key philosophy of world citizenship. Members of Amnesty International act politically in making claims, drawing on a hitherto abstract universal morality, for human rights to be respected and upheld. But Amnesty International as a movement stresses that it is apolitical (in the sense of being non-ideological). It is certainly non-governmental. Amnesty International is the child of emancipatory modernity, of the Enlightenment.

Individual global citizens everywhere join, and assist in the continued success of, Amnesty International as a campaigning movement. As members of Amnesty, they might also campaign within a particular nation-state political party that they happen to belong to on human rights issues. As members of that political party, however, they are unlikely to campaign within Amnesty on other political matters. As global citizens, a plurality of options is made available for them to act politically and pragmatically.

But this global lifeworld does not just allow for plurality and difference. It also creates flows and interlinkages, such that one issue can rarely be fully divorced from another. In this sense, the translation of 'global' as 'total' is in part accurate, not because it results in standardization, but

because it produces global networks of cultures, people, institutions and values.

Thus, while it is the very nature of global citizenship as individual practice to be able to shift between political associations and strategies, not all of these are themselves representative of global citizenship. Amnesty International appeals to a universal morality. It is representative of a particular kind of world citizenship. Political parties, in the form in which they exist at present, ultimately seek to maintain power and influence development within the borders of nation-states. They are thus representative of nation-state citizenship. Other organizations, such as the World Federalists, campaign less on the matter of defending human rights (the moral-political question) and more on transforming the structure of world politics, through United Nations reform. They are thus more directly political than Amnesty International, but still embedded in a variant of world citizenship, in this case the functionalist model. It is to a different organization I now turn in order to show how global citizenship, which is pragmatic, political, pluralistic and holistic, might inform the practice of social movements. Although it is perhaps less well known than the others, the World Government of World Citizens (a misleading name, I admit, if my hypothesis is to be believed) has responded directly to the new pragmatism, and has sought to reflect the new global consciousness.

THE WORLD GOVERNMENT OF WORLD CITIZENS

The World Government of World Citizens (WGWC) came into being on 4 September 1953 in Ellsworth, Maine. Its founder was Garry Davis. In 1948, in Paris, Davis had surrendered his US national citizenship and declared himself a citizen of the world. This caused something of an outcry among politicians and the general public, so reliant had they become upon documentation that verifies one's identity only in terms of nationality. The reasons why Davis did this underpin much of the organization's philosophy, and will be discussed in depth below.[1] I initially came across this organization through its pages on the World Wide Web. I was struck not only by its claim to represent the citizens of the world actively and politically, but also by the practical ways in which it went about this, such as the distribution of world passports. Clearly, here was an organization that was responding directly to the challenge of globality. I was also struck by the clear differences between this organization and others, more familiar to me, such as Amnesty International. These differences will become apparent as I develop my discussion of the organization throughout the chapter. As I delved further, I became convinced that the organization was illustrative of a new form of world citizenship—which, as I have already stated, I think is more accurately defined as global citizenship. As such, I studied it in the light of its theoretical and practical commitments. These

would become useful for me in the task of sketching out a description of what such a citizenship might actually involve, and thus going beyond the tentative analyses offered by Falk, Turner, Robertson, *et al* These practical examples of action and thinking in fact reinforced the wider theoretical discussion, including that of Habermas, which I discussed in the previous chapter.

Much of the remainder of this chapter draws on conversations held with Davis, and with David Gallup, a vice-president of WGWC and the General Counsel of its administrative arm, the World Service Authority (WSA),[2] at its offices in Washington, DC. Their comments are supported by information obtained from WGWC documentation and also by wider philosophical and sociological arguments over the question of world citizenship.

WGWC acts in two linked, but distinct, ways. First, it defines itself as a 'microcosmic' world government advocating the establishment of a'macrocosmic' world government (more on this below). Second, it operates, in a not dissimilar fashion to more familiar social movements such as Amnesty International, as a campaigning organization working on behalf of human rights worldwide; indeed, it works as the actual, real government of many stateless persons around the world. These global rights are defined in part by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and in part by the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, which includes ecological rights.[3] The rationale behind the organization is simple, and Gallup explains it clearly:

> In the nuclear age, the nation-state system has so many anomalies that do not reflect human existence or earth existence at this stage in our history that the nation-state cannot protect the culture, ethnicity, difference or diversity.[4]

He goes on:

> In the global world in which we live, the nation-state cannot provide for the needs of its people, hence the emergence of pro-nationalistic, anti-state groups like the Freemen. World government is what we are offering as the new paradigm for the new millennium to meet our global need.[5]

World government is clearly a contested term. Does it mean the nation-state model writ large? According to the World Federalists, world government is best achieved through international law and the United Nations. According to WGWC, advocating such a view means necessarily to surrender to the very system of nation-states which is responsible for the contemporary crises such organizations are seeking to overcome. The latter's

is a radicalized form of world government, building politically on the stoic insights of world awareness and political consciousness. One of the major points of controversy between the WGWC and other related organizations concerns these subtle differences in defining a world government. Some such organizations appear to advocate a US-style constitution as a model for one world reform. This betrays a modernization-model (very much in keeping with the Enlightenment project!).

It is possibly true that the WGWC is also to some extent guilty of this, but it also works against it to protect indigenous lifestyles. 'Modernization and development seem to mean Westernization', says Gallup, 'which is not what we are about.'[6] This would not, he claims, be an efficient way to run the world system; if a US-style model can apply at the governmental level it would not be about imposing US-style values on individual lifestyles at the individual-micro level. In other words, the people remain sovereign. Furthermore, such a (macro-)world government would not, it seems, be centralized. According to Gallup, government is needed where it is useful. Some decisions need to be made locally, but there are general principles which could be administered through world government. In other words, the nation-state is being eased out by both the local and the global:

> You need government at the local level as well as the world level, so cities and towns or states might decide they want some greater sort of socialism… We might just set some basic standards…[and let smaller regions] experiment with different kinds of economic systems.[7]

Such a world government would not, then, be a nation-state writ large. To suggest that it would have to be this would be to misunderstand the meaning of government. Gallup is firm, but cautious, in his discussion of this:

> The nation-state is a human construct, so world government would also be a legal human construct, but we live by legal convictions every day. The nation-state can't be directly linked to world government as a super-state, and that a world government would take on the nation-state. I don't think so. [That is what] the UN is trying to do, and the UN has not been able to do much of anything because it has its hands tied behind its back by the nation states themselves… The whole point of the WGWC is that you, I, everyone, is the government. We are the government and therefore have not only a right but a duty to participate in determining what this government will do.[8]

This last point is important. The world government exists because there is an organization (WGWC) that is actively carrying out the duties of a government. But it is a microcosmic government because it doesn't make

the laws or fulfil any of these other, more macro-oriented tasks. Some form of government is essential, argues Gallup in quasi-Hobbesian fashion, because for a culture to survive, it must be protected politically. However, WGWC will maintain that, as the individual is sovereign, most tasks otherwise transferred—using Hobbesian logic—to a government should be fulfilled by the citizens themselves.

Indeed, the WGWC is careful to avoid making hasty assumptions when it comes to the question, from Rousseau, of the general will; that is, how might a government of any kind be able to justify its actions on behalf of the general will? Contractarian traditions stemming from Hobbes and Locke find such a question relatively easy to answer, given the relationship that exists between individual and state (government); for Rousseau, and indeed the WGWC, the question is more about the transmission of the will from the individual to society. The WGWC suggests that the general will can be discovered through the 'world syntegrity project', which combines local initiatives aimed at discovering new means of running the planet, drawn from the citizens themselves. For the WGWC, the citizens remain sovereign under all conditions. So there is a major difference between a formal world government at the macro level, which the WGWC advocates, and which would be capable of establishing world law enforceable by world courts and a world peace force, and so on, and a micro-government, which the WGWC is. The former is a structural and democratic system which remains a goal (and, for many people, not a desirable one). Support for it comes from the thesis, put forward by Bobbio and others, that there is a direct relationship between human rights, democracy and peace. In other words, war is inevitable as long as there is a system of political nation-states, because they necessarily exist in a state of conflict, and thus human rights and democracy are actually unattainable unless the world is unified in one political entity. In similar fashion, Davis's own vision of the world as it stands is essentially in keeping with the school of international relations known as realism, which draws its inspiration from Hobbesian philosophy: 'A world of nation-states is essentially a lawless, anarchic world in which conflict is the defining political force'.[9] The primary rationale for the organization's existence thus lies in the failure of the nation-state system to protect human needs: a basic, fundamental requirement of government. World government thus exists because it has to.

In executing its tasks as a world government, the WGWC issues various documents: a World Passport; a World Identity Card; a World Birth Certificate; a World Marriage Certificate; a World Political Asylum Card; a World Press Card; and others. Authorization for the World Passport comes from Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all humans have the right to travel freely on their own planet. In practice, this right has been abused by nations, despite their alleged

commitment to human rights, through the national passport and visa system. The World Passport stresses the right to travel freely, as agreed upon by United Nations members (Article 56 of the United Nations Charter). Between 300,000 and half a million passports have been issued.[10] For all WSA documents, the figure runs into the millions, with 110,000 documents distributed since 1991.

The World Passport is the defining document issued by the organization. It represents its philosophy and serves to put it into practice. It reaffirms the right of people to travel, to cross borders and escape persecution, and the duties of people to understand more about different cultures through travel. That, says Gallup, is what being a world citizen is all about. It is a document, he states, intended to neutralize the power of the border officials. It fulfils a human rights need, helping refugees. This passport is thus something of an anomaly. It represents no nation-state, and yet it is used. It is a wonderful example of the potential of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights being put into practice. As such, it is a perfect symbol of the pragmatism I discussed earlier.

As a lawyer, Gallup is obliged to pledge his allegiance to the United States Constitution, and to hold a US passport. So while Garry Davis proudly claims that the world passport is the only one he holds, Gallup can be objectively recognized as both a US and a self-proclaimed world citizen. But there is no contradiction between the two, because the organization's philosophy does not discount national or regional identification. In fact, rather than be viewed as a document to replace the national passport, the world passport should be understood as an anti-passport; the whole point is to end passports! The right to travel is the basis of all other rights, argues Gallup, since they depend upon freedom of movement; one has to get out of a country where one is being persecuted. Eighty national constitutions, international covenants, and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all affirm the right to freedom of movement. 'Now, coming towards the new millennium, and people seeing the world as one, this document reaffirms…world citizenship.'[11]

Six governments have recognized the passport in law, but, like any passport, one should expect some difficulties with it. In all, well over 150 nation-states (including a few territories) have accepted it in some form or another, according to WSA records which are reliant upon information being sent to them by passport users. Of course, there is the worry over whether it belongs to anything 'official'. The passport does appear more valid to the officials if it has already been stamped somewhere else. But the job of immigration officials is more to keep people out, and the problem with this territorial angle is surely that, with nation-state passports, officials know exactly where to deport someone to.

Honorary passports are given to various world leaders, activists and celebrities to raise the profile of the organization and the passport, and

some are bought by registered world citizens of the WGWC, but the majority of passport holders are refugees. So, we might describe, as David Gallup does, this government as a global public service, not a policing authority. Gallup compares it favourably with the Post Office, where a person can buy a stamp to exercise freedom of expression, to send a letter, or maybe to send a bomb. The Post Office does not discriminate, nor check up on why the stamp is being bought. The Post Office, Gallup stresses, does give out documents that challenge the political structure of the world —giving out a stamp is a powerful challenge, as is buying a fax machine. A stamp is an empowering tool. But the WSA is also acting as a government, albeit with no recognized territory. Its territory is the world, and it is the government of everybody in the world, because the individual is sovereign, and whether a national government recognizes it or not, we as humans and as world citizens have to be responsible. Most passport holders are otherwise stateless persons, and thus denied the right to travel. In keeping with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in keeping more generally with the philosophy of world citizenship, they are citizens of the world by birth and not required to have national citizenship status to travel. In that it is clearly acting as a government. Here we must accept the view that government is a servant of the people (the individual is sovereign) acting administratively. There is no formal contract between world citizens and the WGWC, in the sense already discussed in this volume, but it is nevertheless operating as their government. Rights are inalienable as human rights, and duties are not towards the government or the state but towards humanity.

Thus we have: (1) a formal call for a single world government that replaces national governments and operates at the macro-level of political power-broking and decision-making; and (2) a recognition of the existence of a world government that is a servant of the citizens of the world.

In terms of my understanding of global citizenship, this distinction is important. It shows how an organization can actively recognize the conditions that I have been describing, and react to them from a position outside the system. Rather than defining a citizen solely in terms of a relationship a citizen is alleged to have with a formal political institution, such as a nation-state, the organization, under the influence of a sharp awareness of globalized conditions, is actively seeking to change the very basis for such taken-for-granted definitions. Thus the very idea of what constitutes a government is challenged.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION OF THE ORGANIZATION

Earlier in this chapter, I referred to this organization as one which embodies the principles of performative citizenship and pragmatic action.

Having introduced the WGWC and its operations, I now want to examine the philosophical perspectives that underpin the organization in the light of this claim. I do this in order to examine what philosophies might underpin the practice of global citizenship as I have defined it, because to recognize these philosophies allows us to criticize and develop them. There are three such traditions which are in need of discussion: universalism, pragmatism and holism.

The importance of universalism is easily identifiable, as the organization grounds its work upon a belief in the existence of inalienable human rights. Indeed, the affirmation signed by members of the organization includes a reference of a recognition of 'One Absolute Value', which seems to indicate the universal principle of truth. In this respect, it is not dissimilar to other organizations, such as Amnesty International, which reflect the philosophy of moral universalism. Yet, even this claim is not as straightforward as might first be assumed. There has been a history of debate over exactly 'where' these rights come from. The spokespersons for the WGWC both use the so-called 'desert island scenario' to illustrate their point. On one's own on a desert island, there are no rights, as the individual invents his or her own rules. The arrival of another person complicates this: both participants have then to choose between living together peacefully, or not. Rights come from the fact of us being human, but only seem to emerge, according to this viewpoint, when the stranger arrives and the participants enter into Rousseau's social contract; from people learning how to live together. They thus seem to stem from the fact that we have responsibilities towards each other; and, perhaps, from nothing else than that, to live together, we say that we have them. According to David Gallup, they are thus an innate morality which can only be brought out through practical social action.

What Gallup is saying seems to come close to the communitarian tradition within moral philosophy—associated with the likes of MacIntyre and Taylor—which states that rights can only exist within the context of a given community and its particular cultural norms. In other words, rights are not universal but relative, depending on circumstance. This brings into question the WGWC's defence of rights as universals. Indeed, the dogmatic defence of rights as universal has for some time been a delicate issue for human rights organizations and advocates. The WGWC seeks to overcome this by bringing in a philosophy of pragmatism. We can see, here, that there is a strong Kantian theme running through the organization's defence of human rights. This is what Gallup means when he talks about the innate morality that is brought out through practical action. It is also the philosophical reason why a world citizen must declare herself or himself to be so in the here and now. Indeed, it is the first assertion made by the organization's own 'Credo of a World Citizen', which reads: 'A World Citizen is a human being who lives intellectually, morally and physically in

the present'.[12] Interpreting historical documents for use in the present often leads to misunderstanding. The call must be: 'I am a world citizen now!'

Gallup thus denies the accusation made against the organization, that it is idealistic. In fact, he states, it is just the opposite. Its approach, based as it is around a philosophy of 'action now' as opposed to in the future, is anti-utopian. By putting ideas into practice, it is displaying what Gallup calls an 'idealistic pragmatism' or an 'idealistic realism'. Nation-states, and those organizations that seek to bring about a world community through the nation-state system, are in fact being idealistic, he claims, in the negative sense, by thinking that they can solve the problems of the world within that framework.

So, in marrying pragmatism with universalism, we can say that the rights are 'out there', but that they have to be brought before the people and put into practice, and always in accordance with what is actually going on at the present time. Things do change, so the aims of the organization are about turning universal natural law into positive world law. Otherwise, human rights are only academic concerns. Natural law in this sense is understood as something we are all doing anyway, like breathing. No one can punish us for doing this, explains Gallup, because it is natural that we do it. Similarly, we are all human beings, according to nature, and thus world citizens, and cannot be punished for that.

Reality, adds Davis, is absolute, and universal, but everything we see around us is relative; thus the absolute has to be somewhere else, not bound by time and space. So, instead of looking out from the world, we have to look into it: 'I am the real, and the world revolves around me'.[13] There is more than a trace of Hegel, via Habermas, in this. Davis is recognizing that the external and objective conditions of the world, which are real, are those of global interdependence. Similarly the need to look back at the world from an outside-looking-in perspective is clearly compatible with Hegelian abstraction and Marxian notions of class consciousness. The philosophical model advocated by both writers seems applicable here.

The Hegelian tradition is a recurring theme throughout Davis's own philosophical justification for global citizenship. The question we must all ask, he claims, is: 'What we can do with that knowledge?' Unless we are trained to think in a holistic rather than a dualistic way, he states, we cannot solve our problems, because they themselves are holistic. Indeed, the second rule of the Credo of a World Citizen states that 'A World Citizen accepts the dynamic fact that the planetary human community is interdependent and whole, that humankind is essentially one'.[14] Accordingly, a disciplined mind thinks systematically, seeing that opposites cancel each other out; there is no hunger without food, says Davis, and no food without hunger, thus 'opposites are interdependent'.[15] And in fact, says Davis, we use holistic symbols all the time, such as in the way we

identify ourselves. Thus we are able to understand world citizenship within a linguistic framework, which again relates to the concept of pragmatics:

> You take the words, 'world' and 'citizen'…together and say that's what you are…[and] you're giving yourself a conceptual power…[T]he word 'world' is a conceptual word and 'citizen' is a power word. So you are reempowering yourself on both levels, putting together concept and percept in terms of the problems of today. You can't say, 'I am a Buddhist and therefore I am meeting the problems of today head on', because you're not, or 'I am an American…' What you are doing is taking the crystalizations of religion and nationalism and falling into their relativity… So you identify yourself as a world citizen… Identity, in political terms, is sovereignty, the exercise of inalienable rights..[16]

Significantly, then, the statement 'I am a world citizen' carries two meanings. Not only is it the case that by defining ourselves as such, we are re-empowering ourselves in the way that Davis describes. We are also taking responsibility for doing so. Consider another identity claim: 'I am Head of this Department'. The concept—or field of action—is the Department. The perceptual word which describes our relationship to that field is 'Head'. The implication of this statement is, necessarily, that, as Head of the Department, I am ultimately responsible for it, and any matters which affect it. Similarly, as the citizen is sovereign, the claim that 'I am a world citizen' implies a head-on recognition not only of the problems that affect my field of action (the world) but also of the duty I have to do something about them.

Using a model such as advocated by Davis, we could also go beyond Davis's own words and interpret the statement 'I am a British citizen' as being not only useless (in that it does not re-empower the speaker to do something about those events which affect him or her), but also potentially contradictory. Simply put, one can no longer be a British citizen because citizenship is necessarily global. The rights and responsibilities of citizens today reflect their membership of the global community. Whereas 'I am a Buddhist' or 'I am an American', are statements that contain their own truths, even if those truths are not empowering, 'I am a British (or American or whatever) citizen' is actually meaningless. Davis's point is that we are labelled from birth with identities that have not been chosen by us. Unless we reclaim our own sovereignty we are doomed to fall victim to this institutionalized ignorance. There are two such kinds of ignorance, he states: nationalism and religion, and, combined, they create a double lock in people's mind, imprisoning them in relativity.[17]

Clearly, Davis's comments also reflect the philosophy of pragmatism, as he talks about meeting the problems of the day head on. Gallup agrees:

> If you put the 'citizen' before the 'world' then it means you have rights and responsibilities towards yourself, other people, and the planet. And if you put the 'world' before the 'citizen', it reaffirms the fact that you are on this planet and it is the only planet you have *in the here and now.*[18]

Davis, however, makes a distinction between the two forms of belonging: a citizen *(civitas)* means a member of a community, which implies social responsibilities and rights, as distinct from a denizen: 'We're all citizens of this community called the human race, whether you like it or not…it is a *fact,* and has nothing to do with nation-states'.[19]

This is why he says it is important to identify as a world citizen. For Davis, it is a matter of survival at this particular time, since nation-states became 'deadly' around the turn of the century. Again, Davis reminds us, the political word for identity is sovereignty, which means choice. This, after all, is how the United States was founded: as a concept which several sovereign individuals came together and made a reality.

So, he goes on, by exercising world citizenship, we are establishing a new social contract, the beginning of a new government. It is a global social contract. Thus, we are coming to the point of building the holistic system. Humanity as such does not exist at the moment, says Davis. If it did there would be no wars. A system does not have such internal conflicts; it works in unison, for itself. This is why sovereignty is so important. Only when an organism recognizes itself as such, as a species in itself, can it survive. So, the human race is at fault because it does not recognize itself as a species, given that it is rife with internal divisions and conflicts. Thus the post-war emergence of a new global consciousness is part of this inevitable process of becoming humanity.

Thus, his claim is that one has to exercise ontological thinking; one has to state 'I *am* a world citizen', as opposed to being *for* world citizenship or working *towards* it. Such aims would be restricted by relativism. Government is a statement of sovereignty, and world government thus exists because individual sovereignty exists. Neither nation-states nor non-governmental organizations have the power to solve the world's problems. This is a qualitatively different philosophy from that espoused by, for example, the World Federalists. The distinction is between reclaiming sovereignty in the here and now, and working within the system towards a political end. Davis's view is clearly that one has to step outside of the nation-state system, because the system itself is flawed.[20]

How much, though, can be blamed solely on the existence and maintenance of the nation-state system? Even the issue of war is more complicated than some of the above arguments would seem to suggest. According to the Credo of a World Citizen: 'A World Citizen is a peaceful and peacemaking individual, both in daily life and in contact with

others'.[21] Surely this depends very much on how one views the relationship between human rights and war. Some would argue that there is nothing inherent in the nature of world citizenship that rules out war, and, according to the same logic, an appreciation for the oneness of humankind does not automatically mean peace. It is true to say that most wars are between nation-states, but many are not. Territorial violence, religious conflict, cultural and ethnic conflicts, and so on, are not necessarily linked to nation-states. Now, according to the WGWC, a World Citizen wants to bring about the demise of all artificial and divisive boundaries, but *not* create a culturally homogeneous world. The idea is to protect local cultures, and the *nation* is a cultural entity, even if the *state* is a political one. Of course, it is possible to have a theory of world citizenship, drawing on Bobbio and others, which sees peace as a requirement for a stable system of democracy and respect for human rights. In that case, given that peace is essential for world citizenship, the above-cited rule makes sense but, even so, it is a contested point.

Furthermore, the organization recognizes that for good or ill it exists within the system of nation-states. Part of the affirmation signed by member world citizens states that,

> As a Citizen of World Government, I recognise and reaffirm citizenship loyalties and responsibilities within the communal state, and/or national groupings consistent with the principles of unity above which constitute my planetary civic commitments.[22]

Of course, there is no reason why we cannot be both national and world citizens, or indeed transnational, ethnic or cultural citizens, at the same time. We are by nature world citizens, and there is also a general acceptance that as individuals we have commitments and rights at different levels, from the family and/or local community, through the national, to the world community. The concept of recognition and reaffirmation in this affirmation suggests that the member world citizen is renegotiating her or his existing sense of national citizenship. Individuals are still bound, given that this is the here-and-now in which we are living, to abide by national laws, and to pay taxes in return for certain benefits that come from being a member of that society. In that these responsibilities must be 'consistent with the principles of unity above which constitute now my planetary civic commitment',[23] the world citizen is advised as to his or her right to refuse to pay taxes which go towards funding war (given that his or her planetary commitment is opposed necessarily to war).

Similarly, there is nothing inherent in the notion of world citizenship which assumes, as the Credo of a World Citizen states, that,

> Politically, a World Citizen accepts a sanctioning institution of representative government, expressing the general and individual sovereign will in order to establish and maintain a system of just and equitable world law with appropriate legislative, judiciary and enforcement bodies.[24]

A world citizen, as was discussed in Chapter 3, simply has to identify himself or herself as such, and appreciate the common humanity. There is nothing that calls specifically for a unified world polity. Maybe Kant favoured world government, but did Socrates, Seneca or Paine? Certainly some self-declared world citizens, including, of course, Garry Davis himself, argue that a world government is the only way of ensuring peace, justice and respect for sovereign human rights among citizens; but there are other ways of looking at this. World Federalists would consider themselves on the whole to be world citizens; individuals who exemplify one or more of Richard Falk's typologies might also.[25] Neither group's claim to world citizenship would be negated by a refusal to endorse a world state. Indeed, Davis himself stresses time and again that we are all world citizens by birth. Against the contractarian assumptions of world-state advocates, the WGWC locates its definition of citizenship, as a 'global' social contract not between political-administrative actors but between an individual and the planet, within natural as opposed to positive law. A natural law doctrine, drawing either on Rousseau (as seems to be the case with the WGWC) and/or Kant does not seem to suggest the absolute need for a world government, though in fairness it does not necessarily oppose it.

In contrast to the views of other organizations, then, a government *can* (and *does*) exist for the world prior to a world constitution. Some rival organizations hold that a constitution should exist prior to a government, because it legitimates that government; but, infact, it is meaningless if written not by the people but by a few experts. It is, we might say, a chicken-and-egg situation for the legitimation of a government. Much of this relies upon the world syntegrity project and on the general will of the people. On this issue, however, the following question might be posed: is there not a danger in finding out the general will first and then implementing it, rather than having it implemented from above? If it comes from below, democratically, might there not be a chance that the people will choose fascism, for example? I offer this as a general concern about the foundations of democracy as it is usually defined in Western societies.

David Gallup responds to this by stating that any attempt to enforce politics from above would lead to an authoritarian regime, even if it is a socially democratic one. And, on the danger of choosing fascism as the desired political system,

> I don't think that would happen but maybe it's a question of starting to educate people first. I think when people have even limited education they are able to reason and logic more than anyone who hasn't any, and so see that it won't be good for everybody, even if it looks good at first. A general education would lead people to a more democratic system.[26]

The link to Rousseau's version of contractarianism is once again apparent. For Gallup, the question of whether the majority would vote for fascism should be changed to 'under what conditions would people vote for fascism?'. If the conditions are improved, and training and education are made available, people will not opt for fascism but for something else. To be sure, one could criticize this view for assuming that fascism is solely borne of ignorance. What Gallup is saying, though, is that it is borne out of something that is universally wrong. Using Habermas's theory of communicative action, fascist or racist discourse can be understood as a form of narrative that, while possibly satisfying some validity claims of speech, fails to satisfy that which is grounded in the objective world of external reality, that is, truth. Because, therefore, the discourse of racism and fascism is based on a logic that is internally flawed, in an ideal speech situation it will always lose out to the force of the better argument, that is, that which satisfies all the validity claims, including that of truth. Racist and fascist discourse might appear to be powerful and even rational, but this is because of the conditions that are made available and that allow for the distortion of public opinion. Similarly, democracy is not just about a vote; it is meaningless without access to information. Censorship thus bars the way to true democracy, and leads instead to populism.

In this respect, at least, we find a number of similarities between the WGWC's commitment to pure democracy taking into consideration access to information, rational human action, and the conditions under which certain decisions are made, and the theory of discursive or communicative democracy championed by those who take their lead from Habermas's theory of the ideal speech situation.[27] Indeed, in keeping with moral universalism of old, education is considered crucial for the development of world—or global—citizenship. To get results, Gallup says, we have to start feeding people, meeting their needs, so they can see the positive side of a less fascistic system. He states that only by knowing that you are a human being can you know that you have rights, and thus claim them and then try to exercise them. If one is not even aware that one is a human being, there is nowhere to begin the process of change. Only through education, say both Davis and Gallup, can people be encouraged to claim their sovereignty. This reflects not only, as might at first seem, a commitment to moral education in the earlier modern sense, but also a pragmatic transformation in the notion of universalism.

There is, however, an ongoing dialectical relationship between these processes, that is, subjective awareness and objective conditions, and, it seems, this is connected in a complex way to democracy. In his work on the student movement and the role of the university, Habermas locates the university firmly within the democratic structure because of the secondary function of transmitting political consciousness., the result of which would be the production of the critic (as opposed to the compliant citizen) and the opening up of the public sphere (as opposed to the reaffirmation of the dominant structure).[28] The same is true of the individual citizen in the WGWC's philosophy. Despite the dangers recognized by Gallup with regard to fascism, there seems to be a necessary connection between democracy (in the Habermasian sense) and global citizenship (in the sense advocated here). Within the holistic system the individual is engaged in a dynamic and dialectical process of self-reflection and reflexivity which itself both restructures action in accordance with objective, global conditions, and at the same time reproduces democracy in the communicative and self-reflective sense. This is the double hermeneutic at work!

THE ORGANIZATION AS REPRESENTATIVE OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

It is important at this stage to gather together the main points made so far in this chapter, particularly with regard to the WGWC, and to relate them to claims made in Chapter 4, and developed throughout Chapter 5, that the post-war era, with its heightened pragmatic globality, has allowed for a significant transformation in the idea of world citizenship, such that it is now more appropriate to refer to global citizenship. These points should also be related to that made at the beginning of this chapter—that the WGWC is exemplary as a movement that embodies the principles of this new kind of citizenship. I based the first of these claims very much on the political significance (in terms at least of life politics) of how individuals are able to relate directly to the globe and to humankind, unmediated by the nation-state. This is apparent in the fourth claim made in the WGWC's Credo of a World Citizen: 'As a global person, a World Citizen relates directly to humankind and to all fellow humans spontaneously, generously and openly. Mutual trust is basic to his/her lifestyle.'[29] This unmediated relationship could be understood in terms of Robertson's global field: the self relating directly to a national society, the world system of states, and to humankind. But, of course, and in keeping with criticism already made of Robertson's assumptions, the idea of humanity has always been a feature of world citizenship throughout history.

At a different level, it is important for us to recognize that a global (as opposed to world) citizen must also be able to relate directly to the planet

as a whole, and that is to say the planet as an immediate and identifiable site of action. By relating to the globe we understand the limitations upon our actions, moving beyond the expansive, humanistic and allegedly progressive Enlightenment thinking about world citizenship. Ecological duties now challenge the earlier prominence of rights in such earlier definitions. These newly appreciated duties are added to the previous sense of duties which were to respect the rights of others (a humanistic focus). With no planet, there can be no humans, and thus no rights! So we are able now to appreciate our planetary duties.

Although not reflected in the Credo, this is clearly central to the organization's philosophy. For Gallup, a world citizen is both a citizen of humanity as a community of people and also of the world as a site of action. Davis takes this point further, and locates this commitment to the planet within a philosophy of geodialectics. Our first duty, he claims, is towards the planet, without which there is no humanity. But there is no institution capable of looking after the oceans, or space, or the rain forests, which belong to us all because they give us life. It is up to us, says Davis, to do this ourselves: we must create the institutions that would protect the planet on which we all live. This is geodialectics: our relationship with the world itself is reciprocal. The dialectical philosophy—which Davis describes as being about 'one for all and all for one'—means that we each have our roles to play. Globality is, after all, about a consciousness of the world as one place, on which we live.

According to Gallup, the First World War was the first crucial moment when people saw the world as one space, but it was not until the Second World War, when the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that it became clear. At that point, he says, people did really see the world as one:

> Certainly when astronauts went to the moon and sent photographs back. You could go back further to telephone, and some transcontinental transmission which might have shown the world was linked. But it's the nuclear era which has made us think that if we don't do something, we may destroy it. What's forced us to be one world is not only the dynamic fact that we always have been as a human species…but also the fact that we could totally destroy ourselves overnight.[30]

Gallup is thus restating the familiar argument, used in different ways, and for different reasons, by a number of commentators through the years, and quite recently—and most significantly for our purposes here—by Giddens, Albrow and others, that the post-Second World War era is in some important ways qualitatively different from those years that preceded the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Of course, Davis and

Gallup are both products of post-war pragmatism. Both developed their recognition of a global identity through knowledge of total warfare, destruction and the human potential for genocide. Gallup became involved in the organization for a number of reasons, many of which were personal to him rather than simply an adherence to this philosophy. These include the opportunities which the organization allows for Gallup to appreciate and work within the multicultural environment he cherishes:

> I personally became involved with the WSA because, after finishing law school having studied human rights, peace paradigms and international law, I wanted to apply my knowledge and people skills to help people in a diverse, multicultural, multi-linguistic setting.
>
> The WSA fulfils my interest in implementing law and rights; it allows me to use my French-speaking ability; it allows me to interact with people all over the world; and it is especially rewarding because I can make a positive impact on improving individuals' living conditions and on evolving humanity as a whole through the process of peace based on law and world government.[31]

Other key members of the organization were drawn to it for diverse reasons. For example, Ingrid von Teslon Dennison, the President of the WGWC, was taken from her home in Estonia and forced to live in a detention centre during the Second World War. Her traumatic experiences there encouraged her to work against the threat of war, and it is this that attracted her to the WGWC. Others became involved because they were seeking work that was rewarding and creative. Most enjoy helping people, and many have language skills that they like to use productively.

Central to the organization's work is an agreement on the contemporary crisis of the nation-state. Gallup wisely wishes to distinguish between 'nation' and 'state':

> 'State' is nineteenth- or twentieth-century term for government over a particular region or regions, which doesn't necessarily mean that that government represents the people, ethnically or democratically. 'Nation' defines a group of people (historically, socially, linguistically). Culturally *versus* politically. Country is what happens to the nation and state when you put them together…people will die for their country—it's the territorial rather than political or cultural aspect. And the nation-state is the link between the political and the cultural.[32]

Clearly, then, the philosophy of the organization maintains that one important component of global citizenship must be a respect and appreciation for multiculturalism in society. This is not to say that previous

generations—basing their sense of world citizenship on moral universalism —were not sensitive and committed to equality in all its forms. Indeed, the very notion of human rights that inspires universalist movements is based around the moral equality of all peoples regardless of 'race', colour, religious or political beliefs. Similarly, as discussed earlier, there has always been a liberal tradition which has sought to maintain difference while respecting humanity.

However, one of the significant social transformations of the post-war era, discussed in an earlier chapter, has been cultural hybridization. Previous world citizens might have had an abstract respect for the 'Other' without ever coming into contact with any kind of cultural difference. Media images from around the world, global communication and travel all make this Otherness not only accessible, but unavoidable, and thus essential for any kind of citizenship under globalized conditions. Stereotypical assumptions of an 'authentic' national culture, which might have been held by previous generations, and which reflected the need for nation-building and national identity, are challenged by an appreciation for cultural diversity both between and within nation-states. This is also reflected, as discussed above, in the task of renegotiating one's own sense of national identity in accordance with one's global one. This commitment to different levels of action is in keeping with the alleged pluralism of late modern, postmodern, or global society. Following Foucauldians such as Homi Bhabha,[33] we would define the contemporary world as one in which we relate to different types of self-identity in different ways, and we shift between different levels of action. John Eade's work on self-identity among Bangladeshis in east London is another example of this.[34] In this sense, global citizenship draws not only on earlier forms of world citizenship but also what I have already defined as non-modern citizenship: broadly, a sense of belonging to a group which was not defined according to nation-states and which in fact has existed throughout modernity. Accordingly, we are not bound to be one thing or another; in the contemporary world we renegotiate our sense of identity in accordance with different situations. We play power games (or, following Lyotard and drawing on Wittgenstein, language games), in which we construct our total sense of self. In the post-war era, this kind of belonging has also become heavily politicized, in that its pragmatism is closely connected to life politics; it is no longer a sense of identity counterpoised to the dominant norm, but one that reflects the multiculturalism,, diversity and cultural hybridization of the age. This point will be picked up in the next chapter, wherein I examine., among other strategies for the construction of political identity, how cultural identity might be closely connected to political action within a multicultural society.

Hence, the new commitment to global citizenship must reflect an awareness of this transformation. In its Credo of a World Citizen, the WGWC claims that

> A World Citizen brings about better understanding and protection of different cultures, ethnic groups and language communities by promoting the use of a neutral international language, such as Esperanto.[35]

It seems important that this statement does not make any reference to national cultures. Furthermore, however impractical it might be to advocate a neutral international language, it shows at least an awareness of the dangers of imposing the values of any one culture on to another. The Credo continues: 'A World Citizen makes this world a better place to live in harmoniously by studying and respecting the viewpoints of fellow citizens from anywhere around the world'.[36] see no contradiction here regarding the old universalism *versus* particularism debate. Ideally, as world citizens, we must respect all the views and lifestyles from people all over, and to do this we must break down our localist assumptions and adopt a globalist outlook. This is a question of understanding, which means it is a question of knowledge, which in turn means it is a question of education. What is clear is that the philosophy of the WGWC is, if you like, an evolution of moral universalist assumptions. It takes those assumptions and transforms them in accordance with changing circumstances.

What is clear is that the organization that is the focal point of this section has made serious efforts to re-orientate and redefine itself in the context of wider social change. Clearly, world citizenship is not a static thing. Other factors will be discovered in time that will alter our concept of it. For example, Gallup lists the discovery of extra-terrestrial life. As was discussed earlier, environmental concerns have also made a difference to the way individuals perceive world citizenship. People are now realizing that the natural world is part of the community. So., one part of world citizenship is ecological citizenship. The earth gives us life, says Gallup; it is a parent. We cannot kill the earth without killing ourselves. Another important innovation is new technology. Gallup and Davis both hold to the view that cyberspace and the Internet, which are not controlled by governments, offer the chance for a free-floating exchange of ideas. They threaten nation-states, and thus can help democracy all around the world. Gallup is quick to add, however, that equality of outcome is as important in this as equality of access.

So, it has been a long-term process, which has heightened in the post-war era due to technology and the awareness of the possibility of our mutual death. Still, the potential outcome is global reunification. For example, Gallup states that, with the computer, we can see how people can

meet up as human beings and have a global town meeting. So, 'We have the ability to think logically. We might as well do what we can with what we've got.'[37] In other words, we would be acting in accordance with the philosophy of the organization if we were to utilize modern technologies and attitudes, but instead we are drawn to the past. As Davis says:

> The world has collapsed in on us…this is the twentieth century…we use world tools all the time and think nothing of it…it's a dynamic world but our minds are back in the eighteenth century.[38]

Davis actually moves beyond world citizenship by instantly recognizing the direct relationship he has to the world itself. He does not just identify with it and its peoples, or even just recognize it. Instead, he locates himself firmly within this relationship, entwined within a complex holistic system.

One potential criticism that needs to be addressed comes from a conservative writer who wrote recently that, if one belongs to a nation-state, then s/he belongs 'somewhere', but if one belongs to the world, s/he actually belongs nowhere.[39] S/he is lost in a crowd, unsure of identity and place. Gallup, however, disagrees with this statement. For him, if one belongs to the world, one in fact belongs everywhere. Certainly, it is crucial to identify locally, but by belonging everywhere one learns more about other cultures. If one belongs everywhere, then everywhere has to be better than where it is. Identity in such a scenario is a combination of local and global identity, given that they are compatible (the local cannot, in fact, exist without the global). Only the addition of a nation-state identity means that the identity becomes divisive. This statement above all indicates the extent of the qualitative change in global identity to which the organization has responded, and why it is useful now to talk about global rather than world citizenship.

It needs to be stressed, then, that Garry Davis's actions, in announcing himself to be a world citizen and therefore stepping outside the nation-state system in Paris shortly after the War, came about as much through globalizing forces in this turbulent period of the twentieth century as through any time-honoured commitment to human rights and a common humanity. They were made possible as much by these forces, which allowed Davis not only to recognize the world but also to actively locate himself within it, as by anything else. He was, after all, a bomber pilot who concedes that he contributed to the destruction as a representative of the US Government and, on its orders, committed legalized murder. Whatever the ethics of the War, the point he came to realize was that such wars were inevitable as long as nation-states were allowed to perpetuate them. The organization that subsequently emerged, with its commitment to individual sovereignty, pragmatism and universalism, as well as its readiness to adapt to changing circumstances and its holistic definition of world citizenship, is

itself a product of this globality that it seeks to promote. By contrast, the World Federalist Movement has been less influenced by this globality, and belongs instead to a more traditional framework. By taking itself outside the nation-state system, the WGWC recognizes that the problems have arisen from the 'triumph' of instrumental modernity. But it is no apologist for postmodernity, maintaining as it does a strong sense of universalism and a commitment to human progression. Instead, it is an organization which seems to have committed itself to Habermas's 'other' modernity—the socio-cultural, abstract modernity of human emancipation and individual sovereignty which, I argue, has become pragmatized. This is apparent in its philosophy, its actions and even the emphasis it places in linguistic construction. If this is in fact an accurate understanding of the situation, then we might be best advised to understand the 'global age' not as a successor to modernity, but as the gradual triumph of its long-suppressed alter ego.

SUMMARY

Garry Davis and his associates at the WGWC are actively performing the State, but in a highly evident and professional way. They have accepted their status as citizens whose unmediated relationship with the globe is based on the fundamental truth that they are people, born onto the planet and sharing it and its resources with each other. They have recognized that the documentation granted by nation-state authorities is made redundant by the impotence of those very authorities in fulfilling the tasks for which they had been established within the contractualist nation-state system. They act globally because that is the only way they can act under such conditions. But is this relatively new global citizenship restricted to those who participate so actively in organizations like the WGWC? How might such a citizenship be performed by others whose daily lives are still bound by the rules and regulations of the nation-states within which they live?

Over the remaining chapters of this book, I try to answer this very question. For the activists at the WGWC, global citizenship means performative citizenship plus globality, but for other, less involved individuals the situation is different. This is why, over the next chapters, I draw on the lives and opinions of various individuals who live in London, but who otherwise have little in common. Some, we will see, can be identified as world citizens in the old sense; others appear at first glance to be pure nation-state citizens, patriots, nationalists, perhaps even sub-nationalists or localists. The globalization of economic, political and cultural life ensures that these people are all part of a wider global system, in an objective sense; however, their social networks and their phenomenological world-views may not reflect this. How might they be performing global citizenship, perhaps without globality? Do they actually

perform their citizenships at all? What influences this performance? Is there scope for the inclusion of globality among these influences? Indeed, the very first question I must ask is: How do they, or in fact any of us, go about actively constructing our sense of political identity? How do we negotiate (and renegotiate) our relationship with a territory—be it the locality, the nation-state or the world—such that we cede to it our cultural and phenomenological sense of belonging and, at the same time, our political loyalty?

The programme for the remainder of this volume, then, rests upon a distinction that can be made between three different conceptions of global citizenship as I have outlined it in this chapter. The first is that some form of world citizenship is ours by birth. Davis says this specifically. This is not, though, citizenship as political identity. However, Davis also recognizes that there have been transformations in the relationship between the individual and the world in the post-1945 era. So, the second formulation regarding world citizenship is that it is something which is ours because we live in this era, in which the relationship between the individual and the globe is not mediated by the nation-state. Even here, however, we rely solely upon objective conditions and do not make specific reference to the subjective consciousness of, and normative action based on, those conditions. I have made it clear that this study is concerned with citizenship as political identity. Accordingly, beyond these prior definitions of world citizenship, Davis recognizes the need to 'claim one's sovereignty' and politicize this global identification. So, our third formulation would be that some degree of world (in this case, global) citizenship is ours once we politicize our relationship with the world and act, pragmatically, as citizens of it.

Of course, none of this would mean anything at all unless we can grasp two (by no means uncontested) theses:

1. That citizenship as political identity is constructed and performed through various levels of identification.
2. That globality has entered into everyday life in such a way for it to have become a meaningful such level in the contemporary world.

These, then, are the themes I will seek to explore in the following chapters. First, I will seek to show that political identity is constructed across and between these levels of identification. Then, I will suggest that globality has entered into everyday life in various ways, which are not always obvious, but which at least make it possible for individuals to exercise their global citizenships. Finally, I suggest how this globality—once we accept that it does indeed play a major part in the everyday lives of individuals—might translate into global citizenship as defined according to the third formulation put forward in the paragraph above.

NOTES

1. For more detail on Davis's experiences, see Gary Davis, *My Country is the World* (London: MacDonald, 1961); Garry Davis with Greg Guma, *Passport to Freedom* (Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press, 1992).
2. As General Counsel, Gallup is responsible for co-ordinating the legal matters of the organization.
3. As an aside to its practical human rights work, the organization also sets up commissions, headed by registered world citizens (although in most cases the commission is just the person), which tend to report back to the WGWC on relevant activities in that area. They are more research oriented, bringing attention to these issues on behalf of the WGWC, than anything else. As Gallup says: 'Every part of human life has a global aspect to it—human sexual life, human artistic life, human political life… We've taken some of the important ones and made commissions on them.'
4. Gallup, personal interview, 23 July 1996.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Davis and Guma, *Passport,* p. 57.
10. In fact, the idea behind the World Passport pre-dated the WGWC; shortly after the end of the First World War, Norway's delegate to the League of Nations, Fridtjof Nansen, suggested that a passport should be made available to refugees and stateless persons (mainly, at the time, White Russians). This 'Nansen Passport' became the first international travel document. See Davis and Guma, *Passport,* p. 62.
11. Gallup, personal interview, 23 July 1996.
12. See www.worldgovernment.org/ref.html.
13. Davis, personal interview, 25 July 1996.
14. See www.worldgovernment.org/ref.html.
17. Albrow would agree with this claim of Davis's. Nationality, he claims, is 'merely another life-chance factor and national boundaries calculable opportunities for hazards' (*The Global Age,* p. 161).
18. Gallup, personal interview, 23 July 1996.
19. Davis, personal interview, 25 July 1996.
20. Davis and Guma, *Passport,* p. 9.
21. www.worldgovernment.org/ref.html.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Richard Falk, 'The Making of Global Citizenship', in van Steenbergen, *Condition,* pp. 127–40.
26. Gallup, personal interview, 23 July 1996.
27. See Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy,* Chambers, *Reasonable Democracy* and the previous chapter in this volume.
28. Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).

29. See www.worldgovernment.org/ref.html.
30. Gallup, personal interview, 23 July 1996.
31. Ibid.
32. Gallup, personal interview, 23 July 1996. Davis actually adopts a different perspective. For him, there is no such thing as a 'national' culture. Nation and state are both political terms, whereas culture refers to customs. Humans are all grown from the same soil, regardless of culture. 'The minute you give it [culture] a national framework.' Davis states, 'you are subverting it'.
33. Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration (Londo*n: Routledge, 1990).
34. See, for example, Centre for Bangladeshi Studies, *Routes and Beyond: Voices for Educationally Successful Bangladeshis* (London: Centre for Bangladeshi Studies, 1994).
35. See www.worldgovernment.org/ref.html.
36. Ibid.
37. Gallup, personal interview, 24 July 1996.
38. Davis, personal interview, 25 July 1996.
39. David Marsland, 'Nations and Nationalism in Sociological Theory: A History of Neglect and Prejudice', paper presented to the British Sociological Association conference, University of Reading, 4 April 1996.

7
The Construction of Political Identity[1]

Political identity has always been socially constructed, negotiated and re-negotiated through the practices of daily life. It is flexible and transient, and devised through a diverse range of strategies adopted by people.

INTRODUCTION

We have discussed at length the ways in which the discourse of world citizenship is constructed by those who claim to practise it as a matter of course. We have also seen how these practitioners develop the discourse for use in documentation, such as the World Passport, which are aimed at assisting people (such as refugees) in their daily lives. Central to this understanding of global citizenship are globality and political identity. Citizenship, I have stated, contains no inherent properties which necessarily associate it solely with the nation-state, and, indeed, the nation-state has never been the only source of political identity. Political identities are fluent, socially—and pragmatically—constructed labels which draw on, and between, a variety of experiences which operate at the level of the individual lifeworld. In this respect, we can follow Giddens in understanding how, in a late modernity characterized by increasing reflexivity, the politicization of identity (an identity which is constructed through the various choices made available to the individual) takes place within the post-traditional, globalized realm of life politics. Accordingly, global citizenship need not be restricted to those who dedicate their lives to such movements. Individuals can and do practise it on a daily basis. However, this does not mean that a self-conscious acceptance or advocacy of some form of world or global citizenship excludes any other identification, such as with the nation-state or with a transnational cultural community. It is not at all true to say that, in the everyday lives of people, a conscious decision must be made by each individual which sets national identity against some kind of global, transnational or postnational identity. Instead, we must realize that, pragmatically if nothing else, such

individuals do retain some kind of nation-state citizenship. As Calhoun, Miller and others have stated, political identity is constructed through a variety of group affiliations and cultural categories, which include gender, religion, ethnicity, occupation, and that national identity is itself constructed through such contested sources as language and territory.[2] The same must be said for world citizenship: it is constructed through a variety of strategies, which of course include the national and local levels. This is even more significant when we discuss what I have termed global citizenship, given that this must, and does, reject homogenizing assumptions in favour of appreciating diversity and difference in a multicultural world. If we have learned anything from the postmodern critique of social science, it is surely that there is no one, universal explanation for such contested and diverse phenomena as identity. So even the construction of the most local, or national, of political identities is itself a rich source of information about the emergence of a new form of world citizenship.

This chapter takes the form of a series of linked stories. They are the stories of people living in a global city.[3] Individuals make use of a variety of strategies in defining their own political identities. As Giddens suggests, each social actor 'not only "has", but *lives* a biography reflexively organised in terms of…information about possible ways of life'.[4] Three interesting such strategies will be discussed in some depth. The first of these belongs to Alex Lifeson,[5] who is in his early thirties and single, and who currently works for Amnesty International, although his background is in the arts. He has travelled extensively and has lived abroad, and his community has essentially been a liberal one. Middle class and well educated, Lifeson openly identifies himself as a 'citizen of the world', an earlier generation of sociologists might have looked upon him as the quintessential 'modern' world citizen: a bourgeois idealist espousing liberal beliefs in a common humanity. Yet Lifeson adopts an interesting strategy which allows him to identify with such a common humanity at a political level, while accepting an identification with his nation at a cultural level.

The second of these principally concerns Al Brown. Al Brown appears in every respect to be a nationalist. Brought up in the decaying communities of the industrial north-east of England, he has little time for those 'idealists' who consider themselves citizens of the world. He appears to fit a stereotypical image of a northern, English male. For sure, he is no longer 'working class', given that he is an accountant at a major London arts complex. But still, we might at first see that his upbringing in a staunch 'traditional community' has shaped his cultural outlook. But we would be wrong. Just as the economic climate has changed, forcing cities such as Newcastle to either adapt or become wastelands, and forcing residents such as Brown to move south and take up posts in the service sector, so have Brown's views been shaped by forces and events that make any simplistic, reductionist account impossible.

Third, we meet Ben Cunningham. For Ben—a 34-year-old accountant from south London—cultural and political identifications are brought together under a single banner, which revolve primarily around the fact that Ben is black. We will see how Ben seeks to politicize his cultural identification with a global black community within the pragmatic context of a nation-state.

This is an illustrative-purposive sample. The intention is to draw from the experiences of these individuals examples of different strategies employed; they are to be used to illustrate the claim that political identity is socially constructed. The intention is not to suggest that these responses are 'typical'. Each of these responses represents a 'type', among surely many other types. Each person, with her or his unique biography, is able to advise us (as academics and researchers) on what categories are used, and we (as academics and researchers) should be able to draw from these life stories a better understanding of the practical implications of the theories which have been advanced.

I focus, then, on these three distinct means of defining ones political identity. Lifeson's, I argue, is essentially one of world citizenship, constructed and negotiated through a cultural identification with the nation-state. Brown's is a nation-state identity that is constructed and negotiated through reference to the local. Cunningham defines his identity in cultural, and more specifically black, terms, but empowers this transnational identity by political activity at the nation-state level. For each of the three, the nation-state remains a site for action. I then go on to offer possible examples of a fourth such 'type', which involves individuals constructing their sense of local identity through global affiliations and processes.

WORLD CITIZENSHIP AS A NATION-STATE CONSTRUCTION

Let us begin with how Alex Lifeson constructs his sense of political identity. Lifeson wants to identify politically with the world, but at the same time does so culturally with the nation-state. At first glance, he appears to fit many of the standard definitions which fit the 'modernist' label of world citizenship, and, accordingly, Lifeson sees no conflict in his 'dual' citizenship: national, at a practical level, and global, at what he calls a 'higher' level, defined by a sense of social responsibility towards the welfare of individuals worldwide.

Lifeson is, in his own words, a pragmatist. He identifies his loyalties very much in keeping with the specific conditions of the moment. His lifestyle enables him to do this. Indeed, his identification with 'the world' is primarily a political one. He identifies certain concerns as 'global' concerns and duly politicizes them:

> I think it comes down to the fact that I'm very aware that in different ways I face the same concerns as everyone else around the world. I can hardly describe myself as being poor, although I'm not wealthy, but I can identify with those kind of issues, being concerned about family and friends…That's a global issue…My concerns with education, be it for my family or myself, are equally valid for anyone, anywhere in the globe. There might be different circumstances, but there are the same concerns being raised, and that's where I identify most strongly…with being a citizen of the world. My main concerns are poverty and education.[6]

Here, Lifeson is stressing the common concerns and interests faced and held by all of us on this planet, as human beings. So it would appear that his perspective draws on classical universalism. Like the universalists of old, Lifeson has constructed his sense of world citizenship from within the boundaries of a nation-state. More specifically, though, he constructs it from within the boundaries of London, a global city. Indeed, he professes to have a strong sense of British identity, albeit restricted to certain areas and generalizations. He states that this affiliation emerges from his being accustomed to the social patterns and culture associated with British identity. In his own words, it is a 'cultural identification'.

Does Lifeson mean 'British' or 'English' here? While it is primarily at this cultural level that Lifeson identifies with his nation, we should be careful not to conflate 'cultural Englishness' with 'British national identity', as Miller points out.[7] Post-war changes and in particular the decline of any sense of British 'superiority' have led some to

> take refuge in what I shall call 'cultural Englishness'…the set of private characteristics and ways of doing things that are thought to be typically English: such things as drinking tea and patronising fish and chip shops, an enthusiasm for gardening, a love of the countryside, and so forth… There is nothing wrong with this cultural Englishness, but it is not the same as British national identity… A national identity is a public phenomenon, not a private set of cultural values.[8]

If, although he uses the term 'British', Lifeson's comments in fact reflect a sense of 'cultural Englishness'—and if this is indeed, as Miller is suggesting, a reaction to post-war changes—then at the same time it is the influence of global cultural diversity that allows him to understand, and feel more a part of, the world as a single place (thus to some degree exhibiting the epistemological quality which is central to Robertson's understanding of globality). Indeed, when pressed, he confesses that he is unable to think of any specific circumstances where his loyalty or identification to his nation-

state would take precedence over his identification with the world. So he clearly accepts that there has been a qualitative change in his worldview.

Alex Lifeson is one example of an individual with a particular kind of dual citizenship: nationalistic, in the cultural sense, and cosmopolitan, in a quasi-political sense. However, Lifeson's construction of world citizenship is actually more complex than this simple duality might at first suggest, because it draws on a number of other factors. It seems significant that Lifeson works for a human rights organization, and thus actively operates within the realm of moral universalism. It is equally significant that he lives in London and appreciates its qualities. Lifeson is what has been elsewhere referred to as a 'cosmopolite'.[9] For him, the locality is useful in so far as it allows him access to the multicultural diversity which he so enjoys. He thus seems to identify a direct link between the global (cultural diversity) and the local (as the immediate site of this diversity), bypassing the national. But as we have also seen, national citizenship is still important to him for a number of reasons. Some of them are still political. It is in this sense that he considers himself to be a pragmatist. He accepts that, by dwelling within the boundaries of a given nation-state, he must abide by the laws of that state. He must accept the legitimacy of the government, whether he approves of it or not. He pays taxation, and identifies with state-funded education and welfare programmes. But he would not fight for his country because, he explains, he is a pacifist. His sense of world citizenship and belonging thus outweighs any responsibilities he might have towards the defence of his country.

So, regardless of his identification with English culture, Alex Lifeson is a world citizen. Indeed, his political and educational priorities suggest that he is the quintessential modern world citizen. He is, it seems, the cosmopolitan modernist, the moral universalist who believes in a rather abstract commitment to a singular humanity. But the speeding up of global change has impacted upon Lifeson and world citizens like him. Just as globalization has allowed Lifeson to realize his otherwise nominalistic commitment to world citizenship (through his travel and his cultural interactions), so has it speeded up, in his view, the seemingly evolutionary process of global awareness which he advocates. He is now able to act in pragmatic fashion upon the global stage, and appreciate its diversity, as well as identify with its commonality, without the need to surrender his faith in a humanistic, progressive, modern project.

NATION-STATE CITIZENSHIP AS A LOCAL CONSTRUCTION

Al Brown appears in many respects to be the antithesis of Lifeson. Indeed, for Brown, the very idea of world citizenship is meaningless. Being a citizen,

says Brown, means belonging to a place which has a corresponding 'Other'.

> I mean, if there was a choice between being an Earth citizen and a Mars citizen, then I'd be an Earth citizen, but you can't actually be a world citizen because there's nowhere else to go! It [citizenship] means you belong somewhere. But if you belong to the world, then you don't actually belong anywhere, because everything's there, and nothing is outside it.[10]

It is important for Al Brown to belong somewhere, and this is important in understanding his perspective. But he is certainly not alone in understanding citizenship and belonging primarily in terms of an Other. This has been a common way of understanding belonging throughout time and space, and across the political spectrum. Arguing from the Right, David Marsland has also stated that if one belongs to the world, one belongs nowhere, and is thus lost and in search of a home.[11] For Marsland, this is less to do with an existential need for belonging, than with an essence that he claims is found in the idea of the 'nation'. For Marsland, this is one of the main reasons why nationalism is so important for our understanding of the social condition. There are distinctive national identities and national characteristics of which, he argues, sociology has lost sight.

We might wish to connect this to the linguistic construction of political identity, and to the potential for turning that construction into political action, which, according to Garry Davis and others, necessarily leads to a politicized sense of the world, because it makes clear the external conditions which are otherwise undermined by nationalism. Indeed, the chief political project of instrumental modernity has always been division. By rationalizing his own reluctance to accept the possibility of world citizenship through recourse to the need for an Other, Brown appears to be perpetuating just this kind of project. However, we should not be too hard on Brown. While the creation of 'Otherness' is often considered to be divisive and negative, it is nevertheless found in all forms of allegedly progressive political philosophies throughout history. Lifeson also makes this distinction when he talks of 'English' traits. In many respects the two men are similar. The difference lies in the meaning they each give to citizenship. Whereas Lifeson understands it to be a form of political identity (in which case he can distinguish it from his cultural identity), Brown considers it to be about inclusion and membership (implying exclusion and non-membership). The reasons for this difference of opinion may be manifold. Clearly, it seems to restate the point that citizenship is a contested term, which has meant different things to different writers, often to suit specific conditions. One possible reason might be that Lifeson's

sense of identity is constructed without a specific reference to a given place, or locale. Brown's, clearly, relies heavily upon such a sense of place.

Is Al Brown the kind of man Marsland is appealing to in his defence of nationalism? On some levels, yes. But for Brown, these questions of identity and belonging are all about levels, and these levels extend from the local, through the national, to, in the last instance, the global.

By local, Brown does not mean his immediate locality. He is 41 and has lived in London for some 20 years, but the Newcastle area is still home for him. He visits two or three times a year, and has strong positive feelings for the area. He recalls how, when he was living there, he spent nearly all his time in the area itself. He finally moved to look for work. This was in the early 1970s, which he concedes was a bad time economically for the area. If not for this, he accepts that he would probably still be there today. Indeed, his identification extends from this initial loyalty towards his local area. He is, he says, a 'Geordie' first and foremost. Before he left the area, he was a 'Geordie' and nothing else!

The move to London clearly tamed some of Al Brown's fierce localism, but it has left him in some kind of 'third space', or social limbo. Compared to people he knows back in the north-east, he describes himself as 'a cosmopolitan man of the world'.[12] Compared to his current acquaintances, he feels he is just the opposite. It is significant, though, that, in describing himself in nationalistic terms, he concedes that he only came to identify as English once he moved to London.

Brown is thus reminding us of a mistake we often make as academics: we are keen to invent 'degrees' and 'levels' without considering how those degrees and levels are relativized.[13] In Brown's case, this relativization is essential. He cannot define himself in absolute terms. While he readily accepts that he is no 'globalist' he is unsure of his own standing simply because he has experienced such varied environments.

Nevertheless., he retains a perspective that stresses the most local as being the most identifiable, and therefore the most important. Thus, being English is more important to him than being British. Loyalty and identity depends upon the context. His affiliation would get as local as possible, and this explains his reluctance to consider world citizenship as an option, for not only is it as distant as possible from his precious local, but it also denies the existence of the Other; the opposition he mentions above. Significantly, Brown is not opposed to post-national identities; his nationalism is not grounded in *anti*-Otherness but in pro-localism.

Of course, this may be true, but studies have shown how an over-exposure to locality (particularly when reinforced by cultural codes which posit the local as preferable to the non-local) not only promotes localism by restricting globalism, but positively discourages such a wider world-view.[14] Brown concedes that he recognizes the prevalence of a rabid localism (and intolerance) with which he no longer identifies. His views

have changed, in a number of important ways. While he remains sympathetic to what happens in the north-east, he is less so than before, although he would be more interested in such news than any other kind. His attention, he states, has shifted towards matters that are of concern to England.

In this and other respects, Brown—who at first glance epitomizes the kind of nationalistic, localistic, 'little England' philosophy that some right-wing commentators seek to appeal to—is far from such a simple stereotype. His nationalism is not political, nor is it economic. He identifies with a culture that he considers to be specifically English. More than this, however, is his identification with his local level first and foremost. That he considers the most local to be necessarily the most significant for his own daily activities again reflects the kind of pragmatism he talks about. Even when he expresses concern over the 'threat' to English culture posed, for example, by the European Union, he locates these concerns within a kind of pragmatism. In his own daily life, Brown finds it both easy and convenient to deal with issues that are close at hand, and to construct his identity accordingly. Yet his sense of the local no longer pertains to his physical location. Brown's localism is part of the cultural capital that forms his identity, and he has successfully maintained his relationship with it despite being uprooted., disembedded. It is part of the milieu which he carries with him, de-linked from its locale.[15] Brown, then, is part of the white diaspora, a group that, while being far from new, has been somewhat overlooked by academics and commentators. As with so many others who belong to this group, he identifies culturally with a region from which he has been forced to move by circumstances beyond his control.

CULTURAL IDENTITY/POLITICAL ACTION

For Brown., the nation-state represents both a cultural and a political entity that provides him with his sense of citizenship. For Lifeson, the nation-state remains the site for cultural identification. For Ben Cunningham, it means something different still.

I think of Ben Cunningham as a good example of what we might call a 'non-modern' citizen. This is in part due to the way he shifts and reconstructs his citizenship identity in accordance with different situations, and also because of the importance to him of the cultural components of such an identity, specifically ethnicity. Indeed, this is the first thing that he says when he is asked about his identity: he describes himself without hesitation as black British.

In qualifying this statement, Cunningham points to certain ambiguities, rooted in historical and geographical processes. The 'direct' influence on him is from the Caribbean, and, he claims, this would have led to him being labelled 'Afro-Caribbean' according to earlier census categories. Now,

though, he insists on altering that definition to 'black British'. Here, Cunningham is juggling the various different meanings of his sources of identification—black, Afro-Caribbean, African, British. This black identity is essentially a cultural one: he concedes that he has a very strong cultural affiliation for a global black community, and emphasizes the importance of being aware of the history of such a community: a history which, through colonialism, slavery and migration, has long since abandoned the nation-statist presumptions that were at the heart of the modern project.

However, this is tempered with a kind of pragmatism that reflects his political position within the nation-state. This is why he refers to himself as black British. Describing himself thus, he states, does not mean he is 'buying into' the history of Britain, or that he is proud of it. He recalls discussions among his peers in the 1970s, which focused on how identifying oneself as 'British' did indeed mean 'buying into' the history and the prejudices. He is now of the opinion that the nation-state into which he was born can have an altogether different use. Recognizing the under-representation of black people in powerful positions, Cunningham stresses the need to 'find other ways of defining what sense of power you have':

> I'm not in a powerful position, in terms of black people not generally having power, but nonetheless, if I don't call myself black British then inevitably it takes me out of that power setting, and says that I don't have any power at all, and I never have power. So in a sense, it's saying, I am black British, so therefore I have a stake, so therefore I have a say, and I'm not going anywhere, that's it.[16]

Although this experience is not unique to him—other studies have shown similar reflections on personal and structural-cultural identity coming from members of the 'black community'[17]—we should be careful not to generalize, because this evidence has always suggested that it is a combination of a shared socio-cultural history (slavery, colonialism, migration, racism and so on) and a deeply personal quest for self-identity that generates such a philosophy. Cunningham is suggesting that on the whole a white British person is able to 'close off' her or his identity (by reducing it simply to 'Britishness'), without needing to consider the possible consequences of this for her or his position within the power structure. A black person is denied this luxury. While he concedes that all identities, including 'Englishness' or 'Britishness', are in fact hybrid and socially contested, he seeks to draw our attention to the extent to which inequalities persist in the process of identity-construction. As an individual affected by this, he takes care to be aware of this power structure, and is equally careful to stake his claim and assert his 'Britishness', simply because these taken-for-granted identities would otherwise prevent him from doing so.

So, for Ben Cunningham, 'Britishness' means something radically different—but no less important—than it does for Al Brown, or so many others. While he considers history to be important, he does not believe that it is necessary to 'buy into' all the historical baggage that accompanies such an identity. But for him, 'Britishness' is a personal affirmation of power, rather than an identification as such. It is thus a product of the colonial and post-colonial experiences of black people; the result of activities within the economic and political world-system which has brought about this nation-state affirmation.[18] We can divorce it neither from Cunningham's own life-history, nor from the history of the black community *per se*.

We have seen how 'nationals' such as Al Brown have made use of 'levels' of identification to describe their loyalties. In Brown's case, this began with the most local, and stretched outwards, such that Brown found it difficult at times to consider himself 'British'. Cunningham's story reminds us that there are other such degrees. Unlike both Lifeson and Brown, Cunningham's identity is formed not as much over *levels* as between various dissecting and free-floating *circles*. Like Lifeson, though, he happily accepts what he considers to be a 'dual nationality'. He admits he would have failed the so-called 'Tebbitt test', being an ardent follower of the West Indies cricket team, but this does not in any way dampen his enthusiasm for England's national football side. He tells of a friend who holds on to a vision of an ancestral homeland (India), which takes precedence over his birthplace (Kenya), and these are both more important than the place of residence (the UK). He puts this down to a shared—and unwritten—antagonism on the part of the Commonwealth nations and their offspring towards the colonizing country. Cunningham does not operate according to these levels, and is even more pragmatic in terms of his identity-construction than either Lifeson or Brown. So while Brown's is an *internal* rejection of Britishness, the critique described by Cunningham comes from the outside, looking in. For both Al Brown and Ben Cunningham, an identification with some form of 'Britishness' exists solely for the sake of convenience. Neither would regard it as an 'essential' quality, embedded in the nation-state.

However, Cunningham rejects a simplistic view of his own loyalties. He says that his is a 'dual nationality' which 'shifts forwards and backwards' depending on circumstance. This rejection of simplistic accounts of cultural identity based on colonialism and homogeneity, in favour of a more complex, pluralistic and individualistic one, supports much of the 'post-modern' discourse over constructed identities.[19] He adheres less to an essentialist 'black identity' than to a fluid, contested and pragmatic one.

So, clearly, the idea of being British is important to Cunningham, not because it represents a strong sense of citizenship identity, but because it empowers him to act within the political structure in a way that would serve his best interests. And being black has less to do with an essentialist

notion of a black community than with a contested self-identity. Indeed, the very idea that such a community exists in the way that it is perceived appears, to Cunningham at least, to be a crude form of orientalism. He describes how (white) people fail to understand the differences between West Indian cultures (such as between Jamaica, where his mother is from, or St Lucia, where his father came from). He adds that he does not feel he could move to the West Indies and 'fit in' or 'be a citizen'. This is part of what he calls the 'dislocating' aspect of his national identity, potentially free-floating if not for his identification as British, and linked in many ways to the experience of the Jewish Diaspora. The global black community is made up of multiple differences, between nations, between cultures, and these differences are significant.

Citizenship, for Cunningham, then, is very much about identity as well as empowerment. Cunningham has thus explained how, in the everyday course of his own daily life, he regularly deconstructs and reconstructs an identity that is dislocated, diasporic, and 'free-floating'. But this is not just the case with 'black' identity. The same is true of 'Britishness' in general, which is more inclusive and multicultural than 'Englishness'. Beyond this, significantly but perhaps the subject of another paper, is his view of being European. He feels that a 'black European' identity is possible, because of the histories that accompany many of the European nations, which blends cultural identity and political action in a way which is more inclusive than 'black British' and more unified than the global 'black community'.

For Paul Gilroy, the attempt to be 'both European and black requires some specific forms of double consciousness'.[20] Cunningham's 'dual nationalism' appears to be such an attempt. But for Gilroy, this relationship (between identification with nation and identification with black culture) suggests a need for an understanding of the Atlantic as a unit of analysis in itself, so that we can better understand the complex history of black culture and politics, simply because this was the space of slavery.[21] Ben Cunningham accepts this line of argument to a degree, but wants to move it beyond the realms of the Atlantic triangle: So he dismisses the suggestion that black British culture has emulated black American culture as a negative image of black culture in general. What he finds interesting, for example, about black musical culture in the contemporary age is that it is less to do with America than with the blending of sounds and images from around the world. These sounds and images are traditional images, which are not necessarily the products of colonialism and slavery. As Gilroy says, there course to black 'tradition' is important because, while modernity represents the history of slavery (and colonialism), tradition recalls dignity. The modern experience—slavery and colonialism—brought about the Western view of a homogeneous black culture. Recourse to traditional sounds and images rekindles the spirit of a heterogeneity among the black 'population' which stands as resistance to racist and social

Darwinist labelling. The 'postmodern' experience plays homogeneity off against heterogeneity. It collects these diverse sounds and images from distinct and particularistic local cultures, and reconstitutes them into a distinctive black style, but based on difference rather than sameness. Cunningham adopts a similar model for political identity.

LOCAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION

These strategies for the construction of political identity are by no means exclusive. As globalization seems to entail some parallel process of 'localization', so might we argue that the relationship between the local and the global, bypassing the level of the nation-state, is strengthened under globalized conditions. Localities thus possess wholly new meanings for residents influenced by globality. Imagine, perhaps, an activist, maybe a keen member of Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, who takes seriously the famous 'local/global' slogan, and who duly identifies with and acts politically in her/his neighbourhood because of a sense of global awareness. Such an actor is, significantly, bypassing the nation-state and duly re-empowering local action. Thus a sense of local political identity is made possible through an appreciation of global processes.

There are other ways in which the global construction of local identity is identifiable. Philippa Hunter is what researchers have elsewhere dubbed a 'western elite enclave dweller'.[22] For her, local community is defined according to the possibility of like-minded people gathered together in a fixed locality. However, this is made possible by the fact that wealthy Philippa and her friends enjoy social networks that span the globe. It is thus not multiculturalism or the separation of nation and state but time-space compression which she takes advantage of in constructing her local identity. In this respect she is remarkably similar to Naranjan Desai, a member of a south Asian family which is scattered all around the world.[23] Naranjan keeps in regular contact with her relatives, but at the same time enjoys a healthy and active life in her community in Tooting in south London,, which shifts between the local and the global. For Naranjan, her sense of cultural identity as Indian is reinforced both by her global connections and her local activism.

These are examples of individuals who act politically at the local level but who identify, either culturally, as in the case of Naranjan, or with regard to their social relationships, as with Philippa, globally. What is most interesting is that it is through their globalized identities that their local affiliations are constructed.

SUMMARY

The aim of this chapter has been to serve as a bridge between comments made in Chapter 1, and the analysis of globality in everyday life that follows. But it also goes beyond that task and contributes something in its own right. It has outlined in detail three very broad and distinct strategies used by individuals to construct their sense of political identity, and gone on to suggest a fourth. I have selected these because the richness of information supplied by the informants made it possible to do so, but there is an infinite number of variations. Each of us has our own unique biography; thus each of us adopts a different strategy or set of strategies in the construction of our sense of identity.

In truth, it is not the very fact of, but rather the sheer range of, choices available to us as individual actors which is a feature of everyday life under globalized conditions. The construction of identity is a particular kind of social action which takes place within the context of external conditions. These conditions ('structures') do not determine this 'agency', but they do serve to frame the choices which are available to the actor within that context. It is necessary, therefore, to follow Giddens in connecting contemporary external conditions (those defined primarily by sweeping global changes) with increasing reflexivity at the level of agency. If modernity has always been about 'making choices' (the 'burden of modernity' being nothing less than the choice between 'right' and 'wrong') then the sweeping nature of global transformations, and the inherent reflexivity of late modern life, make these choices more complex, more individualized. They move beyond the parameters set by earlier forms of political identity (those reliant primarily upon nation-state, class-based political systems), and towards what Giddens has called 'life politics'.[24] The construction of political identities today satisfies Giddens's features of life politics (political decision-making emerges from freedom of choice, and power as transformative capacity; self-actualization takes place within the context of global interdependence; and ethics are developed in accordance with how one should live in a 'post-traditional' order[25]).

Political identity is still framed within the context of available choices. We should therefore be careful not to generalize. Extreme external conditions allow for more extreme types of political identity. However, even in those instances where there has been an extreme resurgence of national identity, we should remember that identities are formed often in resistance to extreme external conditions. Writers who have sought to defend national identity as primordial assume its centrality, and neglect the contested, socially constructed and diverse nature of identity. The emergence of a national identity of this kind, perhaps taking the form of an extreme nationalism, is not a natural but a political achievement. Nationalism is, following Calhoun,[26] a response to the closure of the public sphere and the

possibilities of intersubjective communication. National identity of this kind becomes strong when other sources of identity and identification are closed off.

Any suggestion that political identity is a primordial quality embedded within the context of the nation is challenged in some way by each of the three main subjects of this chapter. This is most clear in Cunningham's case, but equally true in Brown's and Lifeson's. Cunningham actively—consciously—deconstructs the presuppositions of identity, and appropriates national identity for solely political reasons. Brown operates in a similar fashion. He appropriates national identity in order to protect, and at times strengthen, his regional one. Both are members of their own diaspora, dislocated from any sense of the 'authentic' and transported into a complex web of interactions through which their identities gain substance. For each of these three, globality exists as a resource available to draw on. Both Lifeson and Cunningham draw on it in a limited way. Lifeson, who otherwise operates in keeping with moral universalism, does so in a way which moves him closer to dealing pragmatically and directly with the world in which he lives. Cunningham draws on the ideals of non-modern citizenship to re-empower himself as sovereign. Brown chooses, in a calculated way, not to subscribe to this overt globality, but, in doing so, he is still operating within the context of communicative action, albeit one in which the validity claim to truth is not satisfied. He rejects the world as a source of identity while recognizing its impact upon him in the wider sense. Brown is not the same as those 'localists' he encounters during his visits to his hometown. His anti-globalism is not the result of the transmission of localism as a form of cultural capital (as might be the case in many cultural communities, and particularly in once-essentialized 'working class communities' which might have stressed the virtues of loyalty to the local as a defence of the class against the Other), but of a strategic restructuring of the linguistically grounded act of definition itself.

Within global citizenship, such sources and opportunities as these are more apparent, and there to be re-opened. Multiculturalism and the appropriation of new communications technologies for the benefit of resurrecting a genuinely democratic public sphere are among the key components of such a citizenship. If national identity only assumed its role as a primary source of identification in and around the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through the emergence of centralized political change, geographical mobility and mass communications which made the image of the 'nation' a visible one for people,[27] then we can identify, in the post-1945 era, similar transformations in political, social, cultural, economic and technological life that have made the image of the globe an equally accessible one. The steady decline of economic and political imperialism, which fostered the notion of Western 'superiority' in the post-war era, has opened up a vacuum into which comes a range of alternative,

previously repressed, sources of identification. Each citizen juggles these sources in such a way as to construct and reconstruct his or her sense of political identity, be it local, national or global.

According to the biographies outlined in this chapter, then, we can see that Lifeson draws on these sources in order to define himself as a world citizen without endangering his sense of national culture. I have duly defined his as a political world citizenship constructed through a cultural identification with the nation. Brown utilizes the same resources for the reason of maintaining his local identity even though he is no longer resident in that locale; indeed, possibly because of this, given that his everyday life takes place within the complexities of multiculturalism and global flows that operate within the global city. Accordingly, I have defined Brown's as a political citizenship at the nation-state level constructed through a localized form of cultural capital. Cunningham utilizes these resources, which are historical as well as geographical, to challenge any assumption of essence and to re-empower his own sense of self through this deconstruction and reconstruction. He thus strategically negotiates the relationship between a transnational cultural identity and a pragmatic identification with the nation-state as a site of political action. There are, of course, other possible options which are made possible (if not real) by the global conditions of late modernity. These are governed solely by the logics of our own biographies, and by the external conditions within which we live and within which the various choices made available to us are framed.

What is clear from these three cases is that political identity does not predate, but rather stems from, cultural identity. We are thus reminded that citizenships (local, national, global, etc.) are forms of identity and identification which are both constructed and performed. By implication, the opportunities which Garry Davis states exist for the exercising of world citizenship in the contemporary age are real, and are displayed through the (increasingly reflexive) actions and performances of individuals such as those mentioned in this chapter. Furthermore, if the modern project is finally achieved through interaction and intersubjectivity, then the significance of this chapter for the thesis as a whole is apparent: it is about how people actively perform their citizenships.

This chapter has also served to introduce respondents whose biographies I now turn to in more detail., within the context of the wider debates on globalization and globality. It may very well be true that citizenship is a form of political identity which is, and always has been, socially constructed, and thus has never been bound in essence to the nation-state, or any other form of administrative system. But for us to seek out the kind of citizens who are not only actively performing the State, but are also politically recognizing their orientations towards the world, we must first examine the extent to which globality has actually entered into daily lives.

In the following chapter, then, we are not seeking the global citizens *per se*. We first have to look for evidence of globality. It is important in the context of this volume to make the relationship clear. As it is not necessary to seek out a specific sample in order to perform this examination, for the sake of simplicity as much as anything else, I illustrate some of the ways in which globality might have inflitrated 'everyday life' by using these very respondents with whom we have already become fairly familiar, as well as introducing one or two others.

NOTES

1. A version of this chapter was presented to the International Conference on 'Globalization and Identities' at Manchester Metropolitan University, July 1999, and subsequently reproduced in Paul Kennedy and Catherine Danks (eds), *Globalization and National Identities: Crisis or Opportunity?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). I am grateful to Paul Kennedy and Catherine Danks for their comments, and to Palgrave for permission to present a revised version in this volume.
2. Craig Calhoun, 'Civil Society, Nation-Building and Democracy: The Importance of the Public Sphere to the Constitutional Process', paper delivered to the First International Symposium on the Making of the Eritrean Constitution, 7–12 January 1995, Asmara, Eritrea; David Miller, 'Reflections on British National Identity', *New Community,* 21, 2 (1995), pp. 135–88.
3. On this, see also Jörg Dürrschmidt, *Individual Relevances in the Globalized World City: An Analysis of Extended Milieu under Conditions of (Micro) Globalization* (Bielefeld: University of Bielefeld/Dr Soz Wiss, 1995); Dürrschmidt, 'The Delinking of Locale and Milieu: On the Situatedness of Extended Milieu in a Global Environment', in Eade, *Living the Global City.*
4. Giddens, *Modernity,* p. 14.
5. The names of all respondents have been changed. All other information is accurate.
6. Lifeson, personal interview, 27 May 1995.
7. Miller, 'Reflections', pp. 161–2.
8. Ibid., p. 161.
9. Martin Albrow, John Eade, Graham Fennell *et al., Local/Global Relations in a London Borough: Shifting Boundaries and Localities* (London: Roehampton Institute, 1994), pp. 25–7.
10. Brown, personal interview, 16 June 1995.
11. Marsland, 'Nations and Nationalism'.
12. Brown, personal interview, 16 June 1995.
13. Of course, there are many anthropological accounts of ethnicity, and in particular the 'relationist' approach, which avoid such essentialism. On this, see Marcus Banks, *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions* (London: Routledge, 1996).
14. See O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture'.
15. Dürrschmidt, 'Delinking'.

16. Cunningham, personal interview, undated 1995.
17. See, for example, Centre for Bangladeshi Studies, *Routes and Beyond;* Eade, *Living the Global City.*
18. The work of writers such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy is significant here. See, for example, Hall, 'New Ethnicities'; Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso, 1993).
19. The link between nationalism and cultural identity, and the suggestion that ethnicity is more a political than a cultural construct, has been explored in detail in the work of Anthony Smith. See Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
20. Gilroy, *Black Atlantic,* p. 1.
21. Ibid., p. 15.
22. Albrow, Eade, Fennell *et al., Local/Global Relations,* p. 27.
23. Ibid., p. 32.
24. Giddens, *Modernity,* pp. 214–17.
25. Ibid., p. 215.
26. Craig Calhoun, 'Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination', *International Sociology,* 8, 4 (1993), pp. 387–411.
27. Miller, 'Reflections', p. 154.

8
Globality and Everyday Life

Global transformations affect us all, and in a variety of different ways. The kind of pragmatism I have already discussed allows, however, for a new kind of global recognition: one in which the relationship between individual and world is seen directly, and not mediated by the nation-state.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the literature that addresses globalization as a complex phenomenon recognizes that we cannot see such a 'process' solely as a systemic one. We have to understand the interplay not only between global and local, but also between global change and individual consciousness. In doing so, we are not obliged then to understand globalization solely as a socially constructed thing. Nor must we take the opposite stance, and see the agent solely as dupe, not acting but reacting to external processes. Similarly, we should not see this relationship as solely restricting, nor as solely liberating. As with all social science, research in this field cannot assume its topic of enquiry to be so simple! Instead, we should recognize, following Dürrschmidt that

> The processes which increasingly make the world a smaller place and integrate its population into a 'single society'…seem, at the same time, to imply an increasingly expanded, complex, shifting and accelerated everyday life for each individual in this world.[1]

The individuals mentioned in the previous chapter are all actively engaged in both creating and reacting to their social worlds. Each constructs a sense of political identity and identification through a process of strategic negotiation. Clearly, then, they all have different, but important, things to say about their relationship with the world as a site of action. This comes across clearly in the ways in which each of them defines their political identity. Some, like Al Brown, are sceptical. Others, even self-declared

world citizens such as Alex Lifeson, see the relationship as a 'pragmatic' one. Ben Cunningham also thinks in pragmatic terms, but for different reasons. While we remain in part with those three in this chapter, we also turn to other individuals. We will see that Cas Fiddes seems to live first and foremost in the world. Bohdana Nova does as well, but with a specific focus on space and place. Dave Barnes, on the contrary, finds it hard to see how much influence the outside world has had on his life.

Identification with the world, the nation, the locality and so on, clearly, then, takes us beyond any simple sociological account and into more complex realms. Within wider sociology, the challenge to earlier perspectives, which perhaps relied too heavily upon either system or action, modernity or tradition, individual or society, has been laid down in different ways by defenders of such diverse theoretical notions as postmodernity, Giddens's structuration theory and Habermas's theory of the colonization of the lifeworld. Each of these is important and each has, in some way, influenced the work that we have already done at the University of Surrey Roehampton on the lived world of local and global relations.[2] Giddens's structurationist account, for example, allows us to understand more fully the duality of structure and agency,[3] which in turn assists us in showing how spaces are both structured and structuring. Elsewhere, the social anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has introduced the suffix '-scape' to show how culturally and economically diverse processes co-exist without interacting.[4] To his list Albrow adds the concept of a 'socioscape' to show that different social actors and groups inhabit the same physical space but construct it in different ways and thus inhabit widely different social worlds.[5] Albrow's is a structurationist account because it understands how social and cultural worlds are constructed by actors but only within the context of a pre-given world-view. In a previous work I have sought to make use of Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital to see how local and global world-views are restricted or encouraged.[6]

The idea of the 'colonization of the lifeworld' made famous by Habermas extends beyond these accounts because it locates individual action and interaction firmly within a wider perspective which has as its subject matter nothing less than modernity itself. Habermas is not ignorant of interaction in his macro-theoretical work, but his ideas remain largely untested. Yet his work—which I have already said does not go far enough to understand the transformation of global human identity—is all about the interconnectedness of structure and action, history and present, and theory and practice. It would be careless to seek to apply his model of historical transformation without considering its relationship to the lived existences of acting persons; not just the activists engaged in global political struggles, who form part of a new, global, 'historical subject', but the very people whose lives are both constructed by their own sense of identity and meaning and structured by their pre-given social and cultural

worlds. It is these actors who transform and are transformed by changing consciousness. And while Habermas rightly prioritizes the extent to which modernity has facilitated the colonization of the creative and moral lifeworld by the technical system of economy and polity, our discussion of globalization shows, if nothing else, that the 'world out there' can infiltrate the individual lifeworld in a variety of ways.

The purpose of this chapter is not to show that Lifeson, Nova, Cunningham and even Brown are actually global citizens whether they know it or not! As Davis would say, they are already born world citizens, and they already live in a world with which they now have a direct relationship, even to the point of determining life and death. We will probably find, if we were to look solely for evidence of global citizenship among this group, that our results would be relatively thin. This is in itself an interesting thing—why is it that, even though the external conditions demand such a recognition, it is not present? The thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld is set up in order to answer exactly this kind of question.

However, the extent to which these individuals respond to this relationship, that is, the extent to which they are actively engaging with the world as global citizens, is not the only issue here. For there to be such a thing at all, we need to have shown not only that citizenship is socially constructed, but also that globality actually does mean something to individuals at the micro-level. It is about the impact of globality upon 'everyday life'. Yet even here we must be careful with our use of language, so strong are the assumptions that so often link 'everyday life' with the local. As Hannerz points out, when describing 'everyday life':

> we might say that it tends to be very repetitive, redundant, an almost endless round of activities in enduring settings. Furthermore, everyday life is in large part practical. People participate actively, training their personal dexterities without necessarily reflecting much on the fact.[7]

If, on the one hand, we need to distance ourselves from assumptions concerning the relationship between everyday life and the 'local' in order to show how the global can be equally significant, we also need to heed Hannerz's warning about the 'routine' nature of such experiences; if everyday life is about globality as well as locality, there does not necessarily have to be any 'reflection on the fact'. This globality need not—and we would not expect it to—transform such individuals into *bona fide* 'global citizens' as described in this book. This chapter, then, is not so much about the people, as it is about the different ways in which globality might affect the lives of those people. The experiences of these people serve to illustrate these different ways.

Charting this within the confines of one chapter is by no means an easy task. One runs the risk of either being too vague in one's use of globality so as to end up saying nothing; or being too specific and finding that there is nothing to say! I see this chapter as a series of signposts. I have taken four such themes, which comprise this chapter. In each case I will attempt to locate the responses of the interviewees within wider theoretical debates.

The first theme deals with globality itself. Robertson's definition of globality is of a 'consciousness of [the problem] of the world as a single place'.[8] have discussed at length the relationship between this and the idea of a 'world-view'. Below, I elaborate on how our respondents betray such a consciousness. Note, though, that this does not require them to subscribe to it. Indeed, the idea of 'the problem of the world' opens up the possibility of a discourse on globality with wholly anti-global intentions.

The second theme I discuss is nationalism, and, more specifically, the alleged decline and potential role of the nation-state in contemporary life. This thus develops points made in previous chapters.

My third theme is an extension of the second. It is concerned with forms of post-nationalism. Here, I am interested in how people envisage a world developing after the fall of the nation-state. This involves returning to the theme of political identity to ask which themes might emerge in the discourse of political identity *post-nation*-state. Two sub-themes are worthy of mention here. One is the 'danger' of 'Americanization'. The other is the potential for European citizenship. There is a wealth of literature available on both these issues and I have not gone into either in any depth thus far. Although neither is in any way part of my definition of global citizenship, which is actually antithetical to both, there is a need to touch on them here because they are alternative models of a post-national world envisioned by the respondents themselves. They both indicate some degree of transnationalism, if not globalism.

My fourth theme is that of the global city. Although not a 'model' or a 'type' of globalization process like the other three, it is important to understand the significance of location for these respondents. They all live in London, which I suggest is the major—perhaps the only—'global city'.

ON GLOBALITY

The previous chapter suggested how, in important ways, an awareness of the globe has infiltrated the everyday lives of all of the above-named respondents. In Lifeson's case, the connection is clear, but perhaps it is necessary to return to the others and trace its role in each of their dialogues, before moving on to talk in more detail about Cas Fiddes, who, perhaps, is closer to my definition of a global citizen. To do this, I further divide this small group into two distinct groupings, according to some similarities they share or dispute over the nature of globality. This is not a

question of positive or negative responses to globality, but of the location and nature of that globality. One group, I argue, posits it within the interaction between 'the world' and a place they call 'home'. The other makes the connection between 'the world' and their own sense of individual self. In both cases, I understand 'the world' to be the external world of objective truth; the world wherein the conditions I have been discussing throughout this book exist.

Globality: Between Home and the Outside World

Al Brown recognizes the threat of the encroaching world upon his own sense of identity. He is also able to talk about world citizenship as a realizable (if not desirable) end, if only in relation to the arrival of alien life and a new Other. Dave Barnes, a 49-year-old painter and decorator who has lived most of his life in south-west London, also recognizes that times have changed since his younger days. He is more than aware of the importance of new global technologies, and equally aware, and committed, to the notion of travel as a means of broadening one's horizons and opening up new opinions and opportunities, to the point that he regrets not travelling more when he was younger.

> It widens your outlook. You understand more about what's going on. Now things have gone on a lot quicker. Modern technology, I would say … Everything changes, but sometimes too quick. I want to see things go forward in the world, but our society now, especially where I live… there's people out of work because technology has taken over.[9]

Globality for Dave Barnes represents the heightened potential for travel around the world. Interestingly, he is caught in a conundrum, for, while the world is shrinking for him, his own immediate space is still the same size. He feels unable to break out from it and take advantage of the opportunities he now sees. What is closed off for him is not the world itself; he sees it every day, he is aware of its potential and its proximity. Instead, he is denied the reflexivity and the choice to participate in the 'search'.[10] Barnes looks for globality out there, but turns to the locality to offer him the opportunities to seize it. Barnes is indeed in a difficult position. Far easier, perhaps, for him to remain true to a localist spirit. But this localism—culturally reproduced—is now clearly interwoven with parcels of globality which have infiltrated his life as well as his locality.

Barnes knows the world is there (and thus exhibits globality), but does not know how to get it (a particular kind of cultural capital). This is 'the problem of the world' for him. His options are, in fact, limited by two forms of noticeable systemic infiltration. One is that he is made to struggle

to achieve an economic comfort which he posits at the base of all other needs. The other is that he posits globality in contrast to locality, rather than seeing the elaborate web of interconnectedness and interdependence between the two.

Barnes is not opposed to the world, but he is aware of the problem of it. This is no less true of Brown. Brown lives in the world every day, at work and at leisure. His very movements betray a conscious anti-globalism which is itself a significant globalist response. Globality is a central feature of Brown's staunch defence of locality.

Barnes has already mentioned the importance of travel in opening up new outlooks. He has expressed regret at his failure to have taken advantage of this. Bohdana Nova agrees. Nova is 21, Czech, and currently living in London as a student and a nanny. For her, travel has encouraged a new appreciation of her homeland, and of herself:

> I think finding me and finding out how I behave towards, and what I feel about, other people. There are so many different kinds of people, from all classes, all nations. It was quite interesting for me to get to know them and accept the various differences.[11]

Globality, for Nova, is about finding connections between (political) world events and (social) personal activities. By moving beyond the confines of her nation-state she has been able to see both the world and her nation in the same light. Bohdana Nova is the daughter Dave Barnes never had. The opportunities he sees existing have been precisely what she has taken advantage of. And by taking advantage of them she has been able to do precisely what Dave Barnes sincerely wishes he can: gain a positive reappraisal of one's 'home' which had otherwise seemed empty.

For each of these three—Nova, Barnes and Brown—globality is located within the interaction between 'home' and 'the world'. For these, we can read 'lifeworld' and 'the objective world of external reality'. It can thus be a bad thing, if it is seen to encroach upon 'home' in a damaging way; or it can be a good thing, if it allows for a positive reappraisal of 'home'. In either case, the individual exists merely as a spectator to the transformative capacities of globality, not directly involved in the interaction but with an interest in the outcome. Of course, in each case, the individual is involved, but the process is abstracted. It is in this interlinkage—that between the objective world and the place called home—that the colonization of the lifeworld occurs. It is also in this interlinkage that we can identify the possibility—in fact, the reality—of anti-globalism as a genuine reaction to global transformation.

Globality: Between the Self and the Outside World

Where the individual is abstracted from the process of developing globality, the dangers of lifeworld colonization are more apparent. For others in the sample, such as Ben Cunningham and Cas Fiddes, the individual plays a more active part in the construction of globality. For them, it is located within the interaction between 'the world' (for which, again, we can read 'the objective world of external reality') and 'the self' (for which we can read the 'subjective world of inner reality').

In the previous chapter we concentrated on how Cunningham uses the various resources available for political identity to strategically establish his own sense of empowerment. Clearly, the most striking evidence of globality in his discussion was in the relationship he as an individual has with black history and the British nation-state, and the interconnectedness between these within the wider, global picture.

Cunningham is acutely aware of the effects of post-national movements and events upon his life. But I have already stated that he is not a world citizen as such. Politically, Cunningham is concerned about black representation in the elected power structure. He feels betrayed by a political system which has failed to take into account the black electorate. Having said that, though, he is equally reluctant to commit himself to social movements or 'causes'. While he agrees with many of the issues, he cannot totally identify with them. It is just this need for identification with a global concern which is at the heart of globality for Cunningham. An exception was Band Aid, in part because 'I felt that these are African people, and so you really ought to do something'.[12] Clearly, then, Cunningham is no 'world citizen' in the traditional sense. Indeed, he expresses concern over what this might mean, while welcoming it in tentative fashion:

> Yes, in a sense world citizenship. From only the aspect of me saying, 'Yes, I'm from one particular community that's displaced to start with, or was displaced', and so I have associated—created if you like—a British identity out of that, and then a wider European one, so sure, I'm part of the global situation. Yes, there are things which would be of interest to me. If we have some influence because of our economic situation over in another country, yes, for sure, but that sort of thing doesn't normally get pushed down to the populace, for them to have an effect on South America. So we should be careful, but I am interested in that, for sure.[13]

World citizenship, or identification with the world, is for Cunningham, a feasible goal in so far as one is able to first of all associate, and identify,

locally. By this, Cunningham means the need he has to define himself, politically, as British:

> I don't see that as a problem in conflict with globalism at all, but I think without it, being just a global citizen, doesn't help. It loses ties. You can't just tie yourself off and say, 'I'm an Earth citizen; that's it'. That wouldn't help. It's responsibility—having enough sense to be able to guide your country and know its effects on other countries, within the power structure, to have some influence over the power, which I think is possible, and more so now. That's what diminishes the global effect.[14]

There is a clear political dimension to Cunningham's globality, which for him has to be rooted in an individual sense of self. Global citizenship in an abstract sense 'loses ties'. This, he seems to be suggesting, is inevitable if you do not involve yourself in it. But to do that, you first have to identify with it, which brings in the idea of the self. Thus, when he discusses the need to identify locally, he is similarly discussing the importance of the politicization of the self.

This becomes apparent when Cunningham is quizzed about two of the major factors which are involved in the current discourse on global citizenship: human rights and the environment. He is reluctant fully to accept either, and, in the case of the former, he falls back on a more essentialist 'black identification' than he has done up to this point. This is because his concern is over the allegedly Western nature of human rights discourse. For him, much of this discourse is momentary and convenient, and Western driven, at least in terms of the cultural values it advocates. When Cunningham, who was born in London, wants to learn more about transnational black culture, the information available to him is, he finds, distorted through a particular Western gaze. And on the subject of the environment, he refers to it as an expression of Western angst, and as a crisis of liberalism.

Cunningham is interesting in part because his sense of citizenship emerges not from any one primal identification, but from a plurality of sources, which is in keeping with the type of 'non-modern' citizenship I have already outlined. Such a 'non-modern' citizenship does not require a complete rejection of one's national identification, but it does rest upon establishing an alternative set of relationships (between citizen and state) than those which were central to nation-state citizenship in the modern era. In Cunningham's case, these involve the pragmatic use of nation-state discourse to achieve a power status—a small act of resistance not against the state machine itself, but against the historical structures of power that are embedded within the national culture. Similarly, Cunningham rejects simplistic emancipatory accounts of world citizenship on the basis of the

alleged (Western) power relations that are contained therein. For Cunningham, an identification with the globe is largely about the responsibility of a citizen to influence her or his nation-state in such a way that it is aware of consequences in other countries. Interconnectedness between people is seen as a good thing if it is handled in an appropriate way, but we cannot, according to Cunningham, identify with the world *per se* without having a strong identification with the local. At the same time, a lot of those things we identify with the world are transient anyway. This is why he uses human rights as an example of a particular thing which is right at a particular time, and the same appears to be true of his own black identification, which is transient not just historically, but geographically, across national cultures.

Cas Fiddes, who is a librarian from east London, and in her early thirties, seems closer to fitting my definition of a global citizen. In many respects, she is similar to Alex Lifeson, but there are important differences which separate the two.

First of all, Cas has little or no time for national identity. Whereas Lifeson recognized the positive aspects of it, Fiddes does not. For her, it is quite redundant. Why might she feel this way? She explains this in terms of a number of themes. One of these is the centrality of a religious background. Having been brought up in a religious household, which she says encouraged tolerance, she recalls feeling as if she belonged to a club which was always seeking to expand its membership. She says she lost her sense of being part of the wider church when her parents divorced, but the allegedly philanthropic principles stayed with her. Here, we are still clearly rooted in the modern—indeed, in this case, the premodern tradition of world citizenship. As I stated in Chapter 3, religious universalism can be seen as a stage in the development of world citizenship prior to its politicization, with the universalization of morality brought about by modernity.

Another significant theme for Fiddes involves travel and interaction. In this respect, it seems, there is little to separate her from Lifeson and his ilk. She describes how she moved around fairly regularly when she was younger (a family trait, it seems; she describes herself as a 'second generation dislocated person') and although she feels settled in London, she still does not feel as if she belongs to any one place.

How do these themes connect? In one very important way, they have shielded her from any strong sense of national identity. Having travelled fairly extensively, both inside and outside the country, she has always fallen back, she says, on a belief that she was part of a worldwide Christian family. She breaks ranks with this heritage, she says, through her dedication to diversity.

We will return to two of the major themes she develops later in this chapter. The first is her opposition to nationalism, and the second is what I

refer to as her recognition of the importance of diversity and her opposition to Americanization. For the time being, I am concerned about the level at which she interprets her own globality. Fiddes, unlike Lifeson, sees globality as a means by which to take herself out of the system within which she lives. Thus, and in a distinctly different but no less empowering way to Cunningham, she utilizes the resources available to suit her own strategic ends. She uses globality to develop herself as an individual. The connection she makes is thus one between globality as a gateway to the external world and the autonomy of her own sense of self.

If we refer back to Roland Robertson's 'global field', we are reminded of the different processes of relativization which occur within the interlinkages of individual self, national society, world-system of states, and humankind. One of the developments of these interactions for the individual self is individualization, which Waters conveniently summarizes as 'the global redefinition of each person as a complete whole rather than as a subordinate part of any localized collectivity'.[15] This is precisely the meaning of globality for both Cunningham and Fiddes.

ON NATIONALISM AND THE NATION-STATE

Globality as a conscious awareness of the world as a whole is one of the major components, and conditions, of a theory of globalization, as discussed in Chapter 4. However, the external conditions that make globality a genuine response are also recognizable in their own right; that is, not only as contributors towards wider global change but as noticeable social transformations by themselves. The decline of the nation-state as the most salient point of reference in people's lives is central among these conditions.

This aspect of globalization theory is most pronounced in Albrow's work. Accordingly, globalization 'undermines the assumption that the nation-state can provide the dominant frame of meaning for the lives of its citizens'.[16]

Whether the nation-state is in 'decline', then, depends, because, as we have already seen from the previous chapter, the expectations people have and the meanings they give to their nation-state are diverse. However, this does not detract from its relative decline in terms of its own *raison d'être*. That the nation-state still has a role to play is not in doubt. That it remains a significant 'player' is equally unquestioned. For Albrow at least, at least two tasks of the nation-state system remain strong in what he calls the 'global age':

> namely, the predominant control of the means of violence in a territorial area and the organization of collective expressions of will.

> They correspond to law and order and political community and citizenship.[17]

There is a twofold significance in the contemporary discourse on the decline of the nation-state: first, that nationalism can no longer be contained within a nation-state boundary; and second, that nation-states are suffering a crisis of legitimacy in that they are unable to maintain from their citizenries the level of popular support required for their existence. With these points in mind, we should be aware that support for the nation-state structure cannot be reduced simply to blind ignorance or unchecked jingoism. There are genuine reasons for maintaining the role of the nation-state. So, whether this particular institution is in decline depends very much on how one defines it and utilizes its structures in the first place. Our question should be: 'What role might it continue to play in the lives of our respondents?'

One man who does not identify with the nation-state at a political level, and who would not mourn its passing, is Alex Lifeson, who claims that the long-term dominance of the nation-state model has moulded our world-views in such a way that a far-sighted education programme is the only way of bringing about the world state he favours. Globalization, for Lifeson, opens up the opportunities for speeding up this project, of dismantling the State. The spread of telecommunications and technology allows for a greater awareness of events around the world, thus encouraging a global outlook which is, he says, slowly breaking down the nation-state.

Lifeson's optimism is not shared by Al Brown, who fears for the decline of a particular national culture, which for him is threatened by all sorts of extra-national processes. He says he would be sad if the nation-state disappeared. However, there are aspects of globalization that he positively welcomes. He is excited about the growth of information technology and its implications for communications. He is also open to the positive aspects of certain international and global organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization. His real concern, it seems, is Europe. He is fearful of its encroachment, which, he believes, will 'take everybody's identity with it'. He compares it to the Soviet Union, where, he suggests, those few people who kept their identities were persecuted. 'But quite apart from that', he adds, 'it means to lose your history and customs.'[18]

Brown accepts that what is at stake is national rather than local identity and, in doing so, he offers his own version of the colonization of the lifeworld thesis because, for Brown, Europe is very much the system which threatens the autonomy of distinct socio-cultural processes.[19] In his dystopian vision, it is English identity which will suffer and not 'Geordie' identity, because the latter, he says, 'is so self-contained it's going to live

through it'.[20] This loss of identity is not something Brown is concerned with for his own sake. He feels 'reasonably assured' that he is English, but he fears that future generations will lose a lot with regard to what he considers to be quintessential 'English' traits.

In this case, then, Brown's sense of 'Englishness' is—like Lifeson's—cultural and, as Miller points out, we should take care not to conflate this with British national identity, which, he argues, has been formed politically very much with the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish in mind.[21] However, Brown would surely agree with Miller's claim that the nation needs to be defended as something which might be able to protect those who are abandoned by the 'runaway', borderless world, and that any appeal to Europe as a source of common identity would be pointless. There is no 'Europeanness', Miller warns, to bind its citizens together.[22]

Brown's fears are echoed in some respects by Bohdana Nova, but for different reasons. First, she envisages a phenomenological reaction against the cultural integration of Europe and in defence of the nation-state:

> I don't think it will be forgotten completely. I had a discussion with my friends about it, and they said that maybe in the year 2500 everyone will say, 'I am just European' and not German, English, Czech. I don't think it will really happen. I think there will always be these differences, in language. It is in decline probably because people are learning other languages, so they don't feel so strong about their mother language, but everyone still has a strong feeling about their nationality.[23]

Nova contrasts the continuing sense of nationalism in her homeland among older members of the community with an increasing lack of concern for it among the younger generation. While this is positive., in some respects, the reasons for it are not. Nova, like Brown, expresses concern that the traditions of her homeland will become less significant for future generations, swallowed up as she fears they will be by some irresistible force. For Brown, that force was Europe. For Nova, it is the West:

> People are proud of being Czech [but] not so the younger people, because they are so excited about the West. They don't want to say they are Czech because they think that people from the West will look at them and say, 'You are from the East, and probably not very good. You haven't made much progress.' Young people are not very proud of it. I know [people] who are ashamed of being Czech, which seems strange to me.[24]

Dave Barnes, who we know to be something of a localist, is in some respects similar to the older Czech peoples in fearing the decline of nation-

state. For him, though, this is solely the responsibility of a political structure which has betrayed its people. Barnes no longer recognizes the Britain of today; a Britain of unemployment and crime, which he readily and with venom blames on successive governments. He identifies a crisis of legitimation for the nation-state and its elected government(s), which leads to citizens feeling distanced from the system. Barnes feels betrayed, and this sense of betrayal has challenged his feelings towards being a British citizen. He surrenders to an imaginary nostalgia about the transformations which he considers to be undesirable. National solidarity, which once made his country 'great' and one he was 'proud' to be a citizen of, has given way to an individualism he cannot understand.

Barnes brings the national climate, and in this sense his the problems he identifies in his nation-state have produced an dissatisfaction with it, down to the local level. Even so, his response to increased reliance upon the local for his sense of identity. Rather than move 'outwards', the crisis of the nation-state forces Barnes 'inwards'. It would not be imaginative to suggest that, as a manual worker and without the kind of economic capital required to 're-discover' the globe, Barnes's response to the crisis is understandable. He cares little about the political and cultural climates of other countries, or about the implications of European union. Indeed, Barnes, whose culture is dependent upon a nation-state image which is evaporating, and who lacks the material resources to become a globalist in outlook, might very well be suffering from the insecurity and sense of placelessness which some associate with the globalizing world. He is disenfranchised and alienated from the new capital.

Clearly, the crisis of the nation-state is deeply embedded in problems of legitimation and political apathy or dissociation. Bohdana Nova is equally unsure of the legitimacy of governments, and of the alienation of the individual from the nation-state, and she, like Barnes, has little faith in the power of representative democracy, or for that matter any aspect of the political structure. Cas Fiddes is equally detached from the political system, but for different reasons. She votes, and considers herself a 'political animal' at heart. She goes out on strike when there is trouble at work, because she sees herself as an 'old-fashioned socialist', but she is cynical about party politics.

Ben Cunningham, as we might expect, has a different view of Britain's role in the world, and in Europe, from Brown, and takes more of an interest in such matters than Barnes, and this relates back to much of what he has already said about 'Britishness'. Indeed, he goes on to say that he finds it easier in the current political climate to think of himself as European. He rejects the 'little island mentality of Britain' because 'history isn't that narrow',[25] and while he has some reservations about the European Union politically—he does not think that a federal European

state is feasible because of cultural, linguistic and symbolic differences—he nevertheless describes himself as European, and is happy to do so.

Fiddes is equally critical of the divisive potential of national cultures, which she associates with nationalism. She is happy to see it fade away because, while she defends local traditions and cultures as ways of celebrating and expressing self and community, she resents how they are used to set one group of people up against another. It is in this respect that she welcomes the 'inevitable' demise of the nation-state. Fiddes seems, rightly or wrongly, to be conflating nationalism with the nation-state. Her critique of nationalism already has much in common with that of Garry Davis. However, it is interesting that Fiddes claims to have felt closer to some sense of national identity upon returning from a trip to the USA. It seems that this vacation influenced her to feel not only more 'British' but also, certainly, more 'European', recognizing that she felt more in common with Europe than with America, despite the language. This is similar to Nova's assertion that her time spent in London has actually helped her re-evaluate and, in many ways, reassert her sense of Czech identity. On the question of nationalism, Nova agrees with Fiddes:

> It is important that everyone has a feeling of nationality…but if it's too strong, well, after all…we are all just people, one nation. Sure, it's nice to say that 'I am Czech' or 'I am German'…because of all the differences in traditions, habits and languages, but to speak about it too much and to feel too strongly about it I don't think is right.[26]

As a Czech living in London, she views nationalism in a comparative perspective, and points to how certain aspects of British culture are used to separate 'the islands' from the (allegedly inferior) 'Continent'. There is, she argues, a strong sense of isolation which prevents its peoples from knowing much, and caring less, about the rest of the world, or Europe specifically.

What is reflected in the comments made by each of the above respondents is uncertainty. If the external conditions already described in this book make possible the potential for global citizenship, then they also allow for unpredictable systemic reactions. Clearly, the instability noticed by the respondents with regard to the role of the nation-state is inherent in the nation-state system itself, that is, in its tendency for crisis.[27] This results in a combined form of crisis, affecting both commitment to the political state (legitimation crisis) and commitment to the socio-cultural nation (motivation crisis). To some extent, the loyalty required by a nation-state can be achieved through coercion but the relativization of political systems within the 'global field' makes such tactics more difficult. The contradictions inherent within the nation-state system (betraying the claim that it has always been a false system) become increasingly apparent to individuals who have relied upon the existence of some degree of national

identity, only to find that the conditions for it are no longer there. One can equate this with a kind of realization of 'true consciousness'. The decline of the nation-state as observed by the actors themselves is precisely where we can locate the emergence of a new global citizenship. This is because the emancipatory potential held within the sphere of abstract modernity has always been kept in check by systemic forces that require the maintenance of the nation-state system. The infiltration of nation-state ideologies, through education and other forms of cultural control, amounts to a colonization of lifeworld, but this can continue only so long as there are conditions which allow it to. External conditions have eroded this, and as a result the irrationality of the system is showing through. This is evident in the reactions to nation-state decline offered by each of the respondents—Barnes., Brown, Nova, Lifeson, Cunningham and Fiddes. Although their responses are different, each is reacting to the relative decline of the nation-state in their lives. It is because of this that they turn either inward, or they turn outward, or they suffer a loss of direction (Dave Barnes is a good example of one who has suffered such a loss). The sense of 'placelessness' associated with globality is not, then, a consequence of globality *per se,* but of the individual response to the crisis of the nation-state.

ON RETHINKING POLITICAL IDENTITY

Literature suggests that the dramatic shift away from the nation-state is not confined to the arena of politics and ideology. Definitions of self-identity, distributions of culture and social networks, and the importance of localities, have all been highly influenced and, in some cases, altered with regard to this shift.

In the last section, we sought to identify the extent to which an awareness of the relative decline of the nation-state has entered into the lifeworlds of individual respondents. From this there was no common exodus, away from the nation-state towards, say, the world. Rather than replace nation-state identity with a new 'fixed' form of belonging, changing conditions have allowed for an individualization of identity, wherein one builds distinct forms of identification and belonging, drawing on the global, regional and local levels, as well as the national one.

New definitions of cultural self-identity have emerged in recent literature. The global spread of families and social networks creates new forms of social bonding, where ties are maintained with friends, family and colleagues in different parts of the world, reliant upon long-distance communication and technological advances, global compression.

The spread of diasporic cultures charted by writers such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy shows new perceptions of 'belonging'. For example, the significance of being identified as 'black' signals an identification with a concept that goes far beyond national boundaries. As well as refugees and

stateless persons, second-, third- or fourth-generation families are seen to be rediscovering 'roots' through a shared identity. Loyalties shift away from the 'host' nation towards a more abstract identification, either with an 'ancestral country', or with a'transnational community'. When questioned about the variety of definitions available to them, individuals may find themselves shifting between various such self-definitions (for example, 'black', 'British', 'Londoner', etc.) in accordance with different situations.[28] This is a radical shift away from stereotypical ways of defining self-identity, which result in essentialist descriptions of individuals ('I'm English first and foremost', or 'Once a Cockney, always a Cockney'). New conditions suggest that no identity is fixed or absolute.

Similarly, shifting social networks suggest and identities suggest that older definitions of 'locality' and 'community' require re-interpretation. Local community no longer means such a simple, straightforward thing as it appeared to mean in earlier community studies. Different people look to their local communities for different things. Some see it only as a place of convenience; others enjoy an area for its particular cultural or social 'feel'. Fewer people base the majority of their lives around one area than such studies may have indicated. Some who do 'stay local' may do so through a cultural or kinship bond, but others may be required to do so due to economic constraints, and in some cases there may be a conscious resistance to non-local processes. Those that remain are nevertheless increasingly caught up in ongoing global processes.[29] With globalization, it is said, there is an equivalent, parallel process of localization.[30]

The growing re-interest in the concept of local community, expressed not least by the Labour government's 'communitarian' shift, suggests the need for serious debate on the meanings of locality and community. For some people, locality is more important than nation or globe. For others, the globe and its concerns are paramount. Still others maintain loyalty towards the nation-state. Some perhaps prefer to think of themselves in regional terms, such as European. All of these options, and changing senses of loyalty and belonging, begin to challenge existing definitions of citizenship.

Fiddes, like Nova and also Cunningham, is identifiable so far as a 'post-national' citizen of some sort. For example, she is enthusiastic about European identity despite cultural differences. Clearly, then, hers is a globalized world of diversity, and not of homogeneity. However, for Fiddes, debates over the nature of world citizenship and British identity are tempered slightly by her fears about what some might call the 'Americanization' of the world. She makes it clear that she does not want to become a world citizen if this means a world of McDonald's or Murdoch media. Globalization and the erosion of national identities carry with them demons of all sorts. For Brown, the demon is Europe. For Nova, it is the West. For Fiddes, it is McCulture. But, unlike Brown and Nova, she is optimistic about the potential for an alternative world citizenship, a

different process of globalization, or even, following my line in this book, another modernity which might now break free from systemic colonization.

Fiddes is optimistic about the potential for closer European integration. This is a view in contrast to that of Brown, who is understandably quite critical of the current move towards closer European integration, even if he accepts that it might be in the country's 'best interests'. He sees this move as being part of a general move to end the nation-state as we know it. In this sense, then, Brown is a nation-state citizen. Nova takes a different angle on the question of Europe, but one which is not wholly dissimilar to that of Brown:

> Europe is so huge, I would feel that I am a terribly small thing, a bit of dust, in a huge Europe. It's easier for me to imagine that I am Czech, because the Czech republic is small, so I really belong somewhere. Europe is so huge, and I don't know Europe. I can't say I am European if I don't know anything about Italy or France.[31]

Nova is thus concerned with placelessness, just as Dave Barnes and Al Brown are, in their own ways. This is because their identities seem to begin at the local. Ben Cunningham's identity in fact begins with the cultural, and, more specifically, with his identification with transnational black culture. This is why Ben finds it relatively easy to identify as a European.

The global lifeworld allows for multiple possibilities. It also allows for multiple Europes. Cunningham's Europe is similar to but distinct from Fiddes's, and both are (literally) continents away from Nova's Europe, or Brown's. Cunningham and Fiddes both want to think of themselves as European. Brown and Nova do not. Nova, Fiddes and Cunningham, like Lifeson before them, can express some form of world citizenship, while Brown finds these ideas threatening.

The challenges which threaten Al Brown's view of Englishness are external ones, and this in part explains his disenchantment with national politics. He feels uninvolved in its processes, and alienated from a two-party system in which neither party reflects his views. But these are not just the views of 'little England'. There are few issues on which Brown is in agreement with his political representatives. He calls for 'true' democracy, with direct representation. But he does not use other means of having his voice heard, such as activist groups and social movements. This is in part because even they do not seem accurately to reflect the views of Al Brown.

As an activist, Garry Davis makes it clear that global consciousness is very much about individual sovereignty, and the responsibility of individuals to recognize their role within a collective. Political parties had, during an earlier age, assumed the role of spokespersons for the general will. Now, we recognize that there are many general wills, and many

political projects. On a global scale, the social movements that Al Brown rejects provide the alternative to political parties. They have become the new voices of a globalized political identity. Cas Fiddes is optimistic about the role of such campaigning groups:

> If you can get people all over the world to join pressure groups like Amnesty International, then that can do far more good, and be far more spontaneous. Like, people sending letters for prisoners of conscience, has a huge impact. That's a way forward for building a sense of world citizenship.[32]

Fiddes does more than simply recognize the world and its inhabitants. In her daily routines, in her interactions and her personal perspective, she lives in the world as a single place. She is aware of its environment, and of its diversity. She celebrates its difference, but relates directly to it. In other words, her relationship to the globe is not mediated by the nation-state. While she recognizes cultural differences she relativizes these as an individual living in the world, and not, as earlier world citizens might have done, as a citizen of a nation-state society. If anything, she betrays this recognition, and this sense of practical globality, in the form of a cautious concern, which shows how she is acutely aware not only of the moral universalist ideal of a common humanity, but also of the globalist recognition of duties to the world:

> I could, but I don't know how you'd be a citizen of the world…It's a huge responsibility, isn't it? Citizen of Great Britain and all that, it's fairly simple…but a citizen of the world. I suppose you'd have a responsibility to look after your little patch of the world, not so much on your behalf as on the world's behalf.[33]

Nova raises an interesting point which refers us back, in part, to her comments about the importance of place upon identity. She had stated that her national identity (which is cultural and social; pertaining to place and people) relies upon a sense of place as home which has been strengthened by her interactions with the world. This itself relates to a relativization of 'home' in accordance with an awareness of 'the globe'. Similarly, she feels that while world citizenship is quite possible, the emergence of a European identity or European citizenship is not:

> Probably because, if I hear European, I think of the countries, and say I don't know anything about this or that country. But if somebody says, are you a citizen of the world, because 'world' on its own—the word—is more like one thing for me. It's easier for me to imagine

> being a member of that. At that moment I don't think about all the nationalities.[34]

She goes on to describe what, for her, a citizen of the world would be:

> If you are a citizen of something, you should be responsible for something. Then there are all the problems about pollution and so on. But it is quite abstract. If you are a citizen of the world, it carries a responsibility for the environment—at least for the closest environment—and trying to understand a little bit about the rest that is not so close to you. Trying to understand the world.[35]

Fiddes disagrees with Nova on the question of European identity, even though she is in general agreement on the nature of world citizenship. She sees European identity as possible within the context of a wider sense of belonging. For her, this European identity is made possible because of the diversity she finds in Europe. Globalization allows for diversity. Diversity reaffirms the sovereignty of the individual. This in turn reaffirms (and alters) hitherto abstract concepts of world citizenship. Cas Fiddes, like Garry Davis, places this need for a re-affirmation of individual sovereignty at the centre of her campaign, because from such sovereignty comes a re-evaluation of the planet we all share. The global world for her, and in part for Nova, is one of diversity and difference, individual sovereignty and collective responsibility, global awareness and local action. Fiddes thus sits comfortably in her garden under the umbrella of a world citizenship under globalized conditions, a global citizenship which is individualistic and holistic, universalistic and pragmatic.

This section has sought to indicate the varied directions that political identity could move in once it has been released from the essentialist assumptions of nation-state loyalty imposed upon it by the system. These include localist as well as globalist shifts. Although I have argued that the conditions now exist which make possible the potential for global citizenship, I have been careful not to suggest that this is the only possible form of political identity which can emerge. The transferral of allegiance to new social movements, global concerns, Europe, or the locality is precisely where we can identify the decline of the nation-state. At the same time, it is just this decline which makes it possible for such new sources of identification to emerge. The post-national process of identity building is thus a dialectical one, reliant upon an exchange between actor and actor's orientation, on the one hand, and the existing systemic conditions, on the other.

LIVING THE GLOBAL CITY

As with other issues which form the contemporary debate on 'globalization', the term 'global city' is most often used by political economists. Commonly, it is used to illustrate the qualitative difference between what historically oriented Marxists have dubbed 'world cities'—those which sit at the centre of territorially defined empires—and those cities which now operate as the nodes of the global cultural economy of flows,[36] these being global cities. In this respect, cultural factors, such as the 'multiculturalization' of cities, are read as an extension of an earlier phase of imperialism. However, as has been stressed already in and throughout this book, globalization and its associated forms cannot be reduced solely to the economy. In contrast to what Castells terms 'the dual city'[37]—referring to how major world cities are internally segregated such that both 'core' and 'periphery, or 'First' and 'Third' Worlds, are present, but only the financial core actively participates in and benefits from the global economy—commentators have sought to show how even in these 'peripheral' areas cultural and social aspects of the lifeworld can be produced which directly influence the direction of globalized culture. In this respect, the 'globalization' of the city is not reduced solely to the financial core. Dürrschmidt focuses solely on such cultural and social exchanges and, in order to distinguish such places from the 'global cities' of the political economists, calls them 'globalized *world* cities'.[38] prefer to keep the term global city because the global cannot only be the property of the economy. However one defines them, such places are of crucial significance in the contemporary world.

Hannerz also recognizes the importance of such locations, although he refers to 'world cities'. He describes how he

> attempts to sketch how a handful of cities become centers of the global ecumene through the convergence there of some different categories of people who share the common characteristic of transnational linkages. And the cultural role of these cities is seen as resulting from the combination of local and long-distance processes.[39]

Each of these respondents so far encountered lives in London, and this fact is significant. London is, in this writer's opinion, the only true 'global' city. New York comes close, but remains ghettoized and territorialized in a way that London never has, and perhaps never could have, been. Tokyo is an undisputed centre of global finance, along with London and New York, but in all other matters remains insular; a solely Japanese city. Paris may be the oft-cited centre of a globally recognized culture, but it is still a French culture. In terms of multiculturalism, perhaps Melbourne comes closest to London, but it could hardly be described as an economic or political

centre. Only London can boast the combination of economic and cultural, material and ideal, forces which make for a 'global' city. In London, the world is always there, in front of you as well as behind you. All the components of a theory of globalization can be found in its streets, and in the language of its inhabitants.[40]

We have already seen how a sense of nationhood has allowed Alex Lifeson to develop his sense of world citizenship, but this is not necessarily the only factor. Indeed, he concedes that his global identification has been formed, for the most part, since his move from a village in the north of England to London, the 'global city':

> My views probably have changed since moving to London…I think, since being exposed to meeting people from many different countries since living in London, I've been far more aware of cultures from different countries, so I think I have a greater understanding of how countries in Europe, in Asia, and the various continents, actually operate. It's funny… I have a greater sense of the cultures of other countries just basically from the fact of the cultural mix in this country, in London.[41]

So, Lifeson does not see himself as a world citizen because of his background, or his travel experience. He sees himself thus because of his exposure to the cultural melting pot of London. One event in particular was influential upon his worldview.

So far, we have seen how Ben Cunningham defies traditional readings of the so-called 'black experience'. It seems important as well that he was born, and grew up, in east London, a part of the city which has been renowned as a centre for racist activity during those years. The articulate way in which he actively questions and constructs his own sense of self-identity must have been formed in part by his awareness of the strong racist presence on the streets outside his home. But he explains that it probably had more to do with the multicultural environment in which he grew up than with the political and social unrest:

> East London is full of immigrants' children…We were out of the kind of mud-slinging things associated with black people. I was too young for that really to be such an influence. You're a kid and you just go along and do things. There are lots of categories in which we find ourselves, but I would say my mother probably had more problems of that nature than I as a child had. For kids it was a matter of getting on with it, and there were lots of different nationalities…You've got all of this cultural diversity, so you can teach children about different aspects of what they presume at home is natural anyway…From what I had, there was a strong sense of black identity, which my

> Asian friends bought into as well.[42] It was around music in some senses, but also around the bravura of whatever it was to be black, so a lot of them associated with it, and white kids too. I think that's still true nowadays in some respects.[43]

Even Brown admits that his outlook has changed since he moved to London, at least in relation to his friends in the north-east. And Bohdana Nova can confidently state that London—which for her is a world of difference acting indifferently—has allowed her to reassess her own relationship to her homeland; it has allowed her to strengthen not only her sense of national identity but also her global identity:

> When I came here, I met lots of people from other nations. For example, meeting black people here was quite new for me, because we have just a few black people in our country. You can meet only five in a year, but here, everyday, I have black friends, so it became after some time normal for me…It was always strange for me to shake hands with them or something, but now it is still strange and thrilling to see a black hand in my hand, but it is more normal. I don't see it as something which I wouldn't feel alright about. And with other nations as well. Now I feel more like a member of the world because I can see all the other nations, and talk to them, and know more about their history, and themselves, and how they feel.[44]

The global city is not just the city of economic or political significance in the world-system. It is not just a tool for capitalist systemic expansion. It is also the site of phenomenological and cultural exchanges which bring the whole world into one space. Globality, globalization and the global city are all socially constructed phenomena within the context of certain external conditions. As such, and as Dürrschmidt's excellent research shows, the 'global city' is the site of the delinking of milieu and locale. Milieux become increasingly disembedded.[45] Thus Dürrschmidt rightly refers to how the 'intense microglobalization' of what he calls the globalized world city 'makes it a distinct epitomization of an increasingly globalized lifeworld'.[46]

The global city is the city of difference. As such, it is the physical site of an infinite number of possible socioscapes. A stroll through any number of high streets in London will reveal such diversity. Different groups live out different cultural practices, and exhibit different world-views, while dwelling in the same physical location. Each of these readings of the community is valid and 'real'. And each of these groups might happily co-inhabit the same space without ever co-existing in the same social world as its neighbours. Globality breaks down the totalizing, homogenizing, assimilationist assumptions of an earlier period of modernity. It facilitates

difference and encourages a diversity of social worlds. It weakens the control of the system over the lifeworld. It allows for resistance. Within the context of the global city, it erodes the assumed boundedness of social relations. Dürrschmidt offers the clearest statement of this:

> [T]he world city is a *microcosm* in a two-fold way. In the first place, the variety and complexity of the microglobalized environment of a world city is an everyday experience for the people who live in it, and who consequently have to make sense of it as 'their' world of everyday life. Their daily lives draw upon, generate and (re)shape the reality of the world city. The attempts by individuals to mark the internal structure of 'their' reality through different kinds of symbolization and categorization illuminates the meaning of the world city for world city dwellers…Moreover, as the everyday lives of people in the world city are related in many ways to distant people and places all over the world, the 'cosmion' of the world city reflects these external global links in its symbolic expressions and their internal structure, making it a *symbolic microcosm of the globe*.[47]

SUMMARY

This chapter has been about the relationship between globality and everyday life. The conclusion I draw from it is that it is in this relationship that we can identify the decline of the nation-state so widely discussed but rarely explored. This decline is a relative one—we are not talking about the end of the nation-state as we know it. Instead, we are showing how the nation-state, through the colonization of the lifeworld of citizens, has existed in a position of power, and that globality in different ways challenges that position. While nation-states continue to exist as political entities, they remain primarily bodies of people, and it is the consent of these people which is now challenged. In globalized arenas such as the streets of London, the 'global city' par *excellence,* the colonization of the lifeworld by the system is being challenged by a globality which does not simply reinforce the power of the powerful, the systemic properties of the New World Order. This globality allows for a sense of global consciousness, awareness of the world., to take a more central position in the everyday lives of people, whether or not they agree with it, whether or not they recognize it. It allows for a reproduction and reconstruction of cultural diversity, which in turn opens up new sources of identification, from which an individual might develop her or his specific sense of political identity.

The idea of globality cannot be restricted to the definition of it used by Robertson, even though this definition is usually accepted as a 'starting point' for any such discussion. Globality extends beyond Robertson's

definition to incorporate notions of political identity and consciousness hitherto contained within the definition of the lifeworld. The gradual demise of the nation-state as the site of political action produces a weakening of systemic control over the possibilities of the lifeworld, from which new forms of political identity emerge.

This relative decline of the nation-state is accompanied by a growing trend towards various forms of post-national citizenships, which may at first sight reflect local, transnational, or Continental (as in the case of Europe) allegiances. This, however, brings us to yet another important question which needs to be asked. There is no necessary path which leads from an increasing sense of globality in everyday life, to a politicized sense of global citizenship. So, how might we make use of 'globalizing' processes so as positively to encourage the development of an active global citizenship in the contemporary world? Given that the role of the nation-state in people's lives is no longer what it once was, how can we, as citizens of the world dwelling within the boundaries of competing nation-states, make the best use of processes and forces of compression and globality to rethink our relationship with the world; our citizenships?

NOTES

1. Dürrschmidt, 'Delinking', p. 56.
2. Albrow, Eade, Fennell, *et al., Local/Global Relations',* Eade, *Living the Global City.*
3. Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
4. Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference'.
5. Albrow, *Global Age.*
6. O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture'.
7. Hannerz, *Transnational Connections,* p. 26.
8. Robertson, *Globalization,* p. 132.
9. Barnes, personal interview, 18 February 1997.
10. Robertson, *Globalization,* pp. 166–7.
11. Nova, personal interview, 24 February 1997.
12. Cunningham, personal interview, undated 1995.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Waters, *Globalization,* p. 43.
16. Albrow, *Global Age,* p. 106.
17. Ibid., p. 180.
18. Brown, personal interview, 16 June 1995.
19. There is, of course, an alternative school of thought which suggests that the European Union allows those nations within nation-states, such as the Welsh, Scots and Catalans, to strengthen their identities through a direct relationship with Europe, unmediated by the nation-state.

20. Brown, personal interview, 16 June 1995.
21. Miller, 'Reflections', p. 162.
22. Ibid., p. 163.
23. Nova, personal interview, 24 February 1997.
24. Ibid.
25. Cunningham, personal interview, undated 1995.
26. Nova, personal interview, 24 February 1997.
27. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis;* David Held, 'The Decline of the Nation-State', in Hall and Jacques, *New Times*.
28. Centre for Bangladeshi Studies, *Routes and Beyond;* John Eade and Martin Albrow, 'Constructing New Identities in a Globalized World', paper delivered to the Thirteenth World Congress of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 19 July 1994.
29. Albrow, 'Travelling Beyond Local Cultures'; Albrow, Eade, Fennell, *et al, Local/ Global Relations;* O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture'.
30. Lash and Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space*.
31. Nova, personal interview, 24 February 1997.
32. Fiddes, personal interview, 13 November 1996.
33. Ibid.
34. Nova, personal interview, 24 February 1997.
35. Ibid.
36 Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference'; Lash and Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space*.
37. Manuel Castells, *The Informational City* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
38. Dürrschmidt, *Individual Relevances',* Dürrschmidt, 'Delinking'.
39. Hannerz, *Transnational Connections,* p. 12.
40. The ways in which London residents draw on local and global resources to construct their definition of their city has been the topic of recent research. See Albrow, Eade, Fennell, *et al*., *Local/Global Relations;* Eade, *Living the Global City*.
41. Lifeson, personal interview, 27 May 1995.
42. On this, see Sanjay Sharma, John Hutnyk and Ashwari Sharma, *Dis-orienting Rhymes: The Politics of the New Asian Dance Music* (London: Zed Books, 1996).
43. Cunningham, personal interview, undated 1995.
44. Nova, personal interview, 24 February 1997.
45. Dürrschmidt, 'Delinking', p. 57.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 58. Italics in original.

9
The Dimensions of Global Citizenship

We are now able to take our accepted definitions of citizenship and transfer them on to a global level which is meaningful and pragmatic. While the nation-state is not fully redundant, it is nevertheless the nature of our global citizenship that we are able to claim, and promote, our belonging to the world even within this system by advocating rethought definitions of rights and duties, membership and participation.

INTRODUCTION

Earlier on in this book, I made the point that the concept of citizenship, which I went on to claim has been almost exclusively associated with the nation-state, rests upon a diverse range of contested definitions. I indicated that I had chosen to follow the definition used by Hall and Held, who argue that the model is based around 'three leading notions', which I went on to read as four components.[1] They are: membership, concerning inclusion and exclusion; rights and duties in reciprocity (which I went on to treat as separate components); and participation in the political sphere. I then proceeded to show how citizenship in the broadest sense has been challenged under globalized conditions. I have suggested that most of the major models used to define citizenship are inadequate for our understanding of the term in such conditions. As Yuval-Davis rightly points out:

> The notion of 'the community' used in Marshall's definition is so vague as to extend from a village into the 'global village' and is thus able to reflect this multi-dimensionality of citizenship. At the same time, however, the notion of the 'community' in the definition of citizenship evokes a strong 'sense of belonging' and of national identity that citizenship can provide.[2]

With this paradox in mind, and with the suggestion that definitions of citizenship as they currently stand are insufficient to help us deal with the problems of the contemporary world, I turned my attention towards identifying a new form of citizenship based around an unmediated relationship between individual and globe. Such a citizenship would not, I claimed, be contractual in the modern sense, but performative. The previous two chapters have highlighted some of the ways in which individuals actively perform their citizenships. They have not always behaved as active global citizens, but the conditions exist for them to do so. However, what is apparent is the significant role still played by the nation-state as a locality within which such practices take place. I have not sought, in these chapters, to claim that I have identified global citizens; I have merely shown that citizenship is constructed, and that the kind of citizenship we have come to accept as 'genuine' (that is, the nation-state model) is under threat from forces of globality which encroach upon individuals' 'everyday lives'. If globalization impacts upon us all in some way, then global citizenship is surely about acting politically with the world in mind.

It seems to me that it is now time to return to the earlier model—and to the four components therein—and suggest how each of these might be under threat from processes which challenge not their validity but their presupposed relationship to the nation-state. Each of the four challenges relates in some way to a process of 'globalization', but each can also be seen to be an autonomous social process (in other words, one does not have to buy into the globalization thesis to accept their reality). Rather than viewing these challenges as signifying the 'end' of citizenship *per se,* my suggestion is that they offer us the potential for a reconstructed citizenship, released from the artificial, top-heavy restrictions placed upon it by its association with the nation-state. It is my intention in this chapter to explore these challenges. I intend to map the various ways in which social changes that transcend national borders might force us to reconsider the nation-state assumptions of citizenship, and assist us in the task of performing our citizenships—which, as we have seen, now require us to identify with the world as a whole—inside or outside the nation-state.

In this penultimate chapter, then, I outline four processes of social transformation which allow us to transfer our perception of citizenship as defined by Hall and Held on to a global scale. The first component, membership, is about inclusion and exclusion, and is challenged by identification with a new politics of cultural identity which transcends national boundaries. The second and third, rights and duties, concern the relationship between citizen and state. Thus, rights, applicable to all humans under modernity's project of universalism, carry a different meaning under the impact of globality, while the concept of duties implies a certain set of values, which is challenged by the emergence of increasingly

TABLE 1: TRANSFORMING THE COMPONENTS OF CITIZENSHIP FROM NATION-STATE TO GLOBAL



globally oriented values, such as ecology. The fourth,, participation, is about democracy, and access to power, and is challenged by the shift towards an information-based economy. These are summarized in Table 1. I will discuss these four challenges in reverse order.

PARTICIPATION: FROM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY TO INFORMATION SOCIETY

While it is central to current arguments concerning the extent of globalization to maintain that nation-state democracy is undergoing something of a crisis due to external influences, we should take care to remember that 'democracy' is a contested term. The classical distinction is between models of representative and participatory democracy. According to the former, a government is elected to represent the will of the people. At least two distinct challenges can be identified to this form of democracy, as practised within the nation-state. One is the growing importance of formal political bodies which operate beyond the level of the nation-state, and which can exert power over national democracies through the doctrine of international law. Those who advocate the development of an international political system along the rational-utilitarian model of the nation-state include the 'federalists' and 'functionalists' who have already been discussed.

The second challenge to nation-state representative democracy is based around the role of new social movements as representatives of the will of the people. It is true that, while there has been a decline in many countries in the membership of national political parties and in citizen participation

in elections, there has been a consistent rise in the membership of such social movements as those concerned with such post-national issues as human rights, ecology, and world poverty. Such a trend clearly reinforces the claims already made about the decline in the legitimacy of nation-state politics. Indeed, such a dissatisfaction with, and increasing alienation from, national politics has been a common concern for such disparate characters as Al Brown, Dave Barnes, Alex Lifeson and Ben Cunningham. 'National' citizens such as Brown and Barnes feel distanced from, and betrayed by, the system, such that Barnes, for example, has found himself retreating further into local issues while at the same time accepting the need for a more global outlook. Cosmopolite Lifeson identifies with his nation culturally but not politically, while Cunningham uses his nation-state citizenship pragmatically but does not necessarily identify with it. However, this particular shift away from national politics towards these social movements reflects all four of the challenges which I will outline below. While representative democracy is a political system in the 'total' sense, it is the issue of participation which is one of the key components of such a system. Participation can, however, mean little more than occasional voting. It certainly need not imply direct democracy, of the kind championed by Rousseau. What is at least clear, in my understanding, is that such participation can only be truly valid if it satisfies certain requirements concerning unhindered access to information; if such access to information is limited, then the claims made by the democratic system to being participatory lose their legitimacy.

If such a challenge to the nature of democracy can be held to have been true throughout modernity, then it is fair to say that it is even more so now. This is in part because of changing socio-economic structures, and the growing importance of information and knowledge within them. Read any of the theoretical literature on contemporary social change over the last 30 years and you will find that this transformation, disguised through the use of different jargons, is central to it. From Daniel Bell's thesis on 'post-industrial society', through the postmodernists' celebration of the 'triumph of culture' through the mass commodification and consumption of symbols, to Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism,, the central notion has been that the modern form of rational organization, based around the political and economic spheres, has in some way and to some extent given way to an altered form of (dis)organization based around the cultural (or socio-cultural) sub-system, be it through the spread of information and information-based economies, the triumph of the image, or the potential for communication and social interaction.

Herein lies an obvious challenge to the modern idea of citizenship, which is located largely within the political sphere and requires a system of rational political organization that is itself intrinsically linked to economic modernity. If citizenship is very much about political involvement, then it

necessarily seems to go hand-in-hand with the idea of democracy. Democracy is about ensuring some kind of universal or near-universal access to the decision-making process. The pluralist vision suggests that power can, in a democracy, be held by all citizens. Power is visibly located, either directly through the political system, for political realists, or indirectly through economic control, for Marxists.

If we are to agree that power is now as much (or more) about the control of information, then this democratic ideal seems outdated, and with it the assumption that citizenship is based around active participation in the political sphere. New communication technologies transcend the limitations of geographical settings.[3] Furthermore, this information is not regulated in the way that political decision-making was in previous generations. Information crosses national boundaries and shapes global political practices. Indeed, the sheer volume of information available on the Internet has been hailed by some as a positive step towards a free, unhindered, truly democratic form of active participation on a global scale. (Of course, there are also neo-Luddites more sceptical of this development, which requires us to rethink the question of whether technology is enslaving or liberating, or both.)[4] Even so, the potential of the new technologies to open up possibilities of a new form of world citizenship are evident. As Stefanik says, the same technologies which support the global economy also allow for 'political and social action that transcends national borders', resulting in the

> development of networks that empower citizen activists around the world and facilitate the formation of virtual communities that transcend traditional barriers to understanding.[5]

To this, Denis MacShane adds that there is a liberating potential within the new technologies because they allow for 'the power game to be transferred from the hotel rooms where ideologues of the world meet to workplace-based linkages confronting international capital'.[6] We have seen how individuals such as Lifeson celebrate this intensification of information, and this speeding-up of communications. It forms one of the core features of his self-declared sense of world citizenship. In his own words:

> It's easier to feel yourself as being a citizen of the world by having access to the Internet, etc., to establish communications with individuals that you don't exactly know on a first instance… It leads to more general communication and hopefully understanding.[7]

Lifeson's optimism is balanced by a concern for 'information overload', which he fears might detract from the 'pertinent facts of what is actually going on around the world'.[8] However, such dangers do not, for Lifeson,

outweigh the potentials, and in this respect, Lifeson is in full agreement with Al Brown, otherwise in many ways his antithesis. Brown confesses to being an extensive user of the new technologies, and describes the contemporary era as a 'communication age'. Despite his self-proclaimed anti-globalism, even Brown concedes that 'the more communication, the better…Globally, it's got to be better.'[9]

Lifeson and Brown, so different in so many ways, thus share both an awareness of the potential for information technology to open up channels of communication and a realization of the need to understand and use it on a daily basis, at work or play. Lifeson takes advantage of the new technologies on both a personal and a professional level, while Brown, whose use is primarily limited to the workplace, is aware of the personal benefits: 'It's more incoming information—you get to know more about things…in a world-wide sense; it's going to let you know what's out there'.[10]

Access to this information, and to the means of information, is crucial, but it is far from universal, and this needs to be considered if we are to follow Ardigo in adopting a positive stance towards information technology as a means of extending social citizenship rights.[11] We must ask ourselves how this information technology can be applied to possibly advance the cause of social citizenship.[12] Both Ben Cunningham and Alex Lifeson expressed concern about this question of access. Lifeson spells it out with specific reference to the potential for world citizenship:

> [F]or communications to be effective on a global basis, everyone… should…have some kind of access to a communication system whereby you can communicate with other countries, or organisations around the world…[T]here are certain countries which don't have the access to global IT and [are] therefore being cut out, and possibly losing out on the scientific advancement in communications, so there are certain sectors of the world which are not as well informed about what's going on around the world. But…there is a movement among political parties in this country to support policies providing access for every child in every school in the country to IT and communication facilities on a global basis. So there is a question of those people who are failing in one way or another to have access, and are basically cut off from this society or culture which is using IT and that concept frightens me.[13]

It is these people, Lifeson concedes, who would find it harder to identify as citizens of the world. Thus, the task of a new, global citizenship must first of all be to understand the conditions in which the citizen lives, namely, conditions in which old-style manufacturing industries and the economic

and (subsequently) political distinctions arising from them have been replaced by industries in which the key commodity is knowledge itself.

What is at stake is not the breakdown of hitherto taken-for-granted social distinctions, as some radical pluralists might argue, but the emergence of a kind of 'informational citizenship'. According to Scott Lash this transition to an information-based society produces its own type of class structure. He argues that a new lower class is excluded from the new information and communication structures not just in the limited, unskilled, underpaid, short-job employment that it may find, but in its geographical locality. What arises is a strong distinction within the city of technologically active and technologically inactive districts. And as the public sphere becomes increasingly reliant upon these information and communication structures:

> exclusion from them becomes exclusion from citizenship, effectively both political and cultural exclusion from civil society. That is, if in simple modernity citizenship's obligations were mainly to the nation-state, in reflexive modernity they are instead to the self, a responsible self-monitoring. Citizenship rights in simple modernity, featuring equality before the law, political rights and the social rights of the welfare state, have been transformed into reflexive modernity's rights of access to the information and communication structures.[14]

This new citizenship, from which the new lower class is excluded, is no longer social but cultural citizenship. Those excluded include: (1) the downwardly mobile working class and ghetto poor; (2) migrants working in the informal economy; and (3) women. It must be noted, however, that,

> Although this new lower class or underclass is quite clearly a class category, defined by access not to the mode of production but the mode of information, the personnel filling these class positions are typically determined by more 'ascribed' characteristics—by race, country of origin or gender, and…by large numbers of young white (ex-)working-class males.[15]

However, the increasingly open access to the education system means that these groups are not immediately excluded from the new information and communication structures, but they are excluded from them in the workforce; similarly, they are not excluded from participation in the information media as receivers of information and images, but they are excluded as manipulators of those images.[16]

Thus, Lash maintains that, despite the transformation from a labour-based to an information-based economy, the processes of exclusion are still rooted within 'modern' class-based models. Admittedly, he defines these

new class-groups along solely informationalized lines. The new information underclass described by Lash is not synonymous with a socio-economically defined underclass. It is possible for members of socially or economically alienated groups to utilize new communication technologies for their own ends, both as a means of resistance and one of assertion of self. But while we must be careful not to conflate these two forms of exclusion, the addition of the concept of cultural capital to the equation shows clearly how they overlap. Cultural as well as economic inequalities persist in dividing society into those who do, and those who do not, have access to the 'means of compression'.[17] Those without sufficient economic or cultural capital to participate in the new informationalized order are in danger of forming a combined socio-economic and informational underclass. In short, 'if information is power, then the unequal distribution of information processing capability creates an unequal distribution of power'.[18] Technology creates new boundaries and new inequalities even in the new flows of information and non-personal interaction.[19]

Yet it is partly because of these flows of communication that we are even questioning the role of the nation-state. When information is regulated in such a way as to render it subordinate to political rationality, the political system operating within state boundaries remains unchallenged. Citizens' rights remain dependent upon national laws and conditions, and their 'duties' continue to be to that nation. Within the democratic nation-state, the dominant political sphere (based as it is on rational-utilitarian principles) continues to view its citizens as calculating bearers of those rights and duties, and thus depends heavily on a society which bases value and worth upon social labour. Thus, welfare rights emerge to balance economic inequalities, and democratic rights emerge to open up the process of political participation. In the broadest sense, modernity—or at least, instrumental modernity—can be characterized by the domination of the twin powers, that is, of the political sub-system operating at the level of the (nation-)state, and the economic sub-system operating at the level of the (increasingly global) capitalist free market.

The crises which resulted from the inevitable contradictions between these two systems have been well documented. It is not my intention here to enter into a discussion of the international economy. Suffice to say that the global capitalist system has become increasingly reliant upon the exchange of information and communication, which the (nation-state) political system has found it increasingly difficult to regulate. Thus the 'marriage of convenience' between the nation-state polity and the world economy has ended in a rather messy fashion. The State has been left increasingly powerless by its former partner. Within these new global flows of capital, politically (and thus state) regulated forms of organized social labour have given way to more 'disorganized' and casual forms of 'flexible accumulation'.[20]

The result of these changes is what is called 'time-space compression'. This is displayed in the increasing reliance upon speedy forms of electronic communication. Thus,

> the time horizons of both private and public decision-making have shrunk, while satellite communication and declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to spread…decisions immediately over and ever wider and variegated space.[21]

Time-space compression is one of the key components of the 'globalization' thesis. To study it empirically, we can divide it into two key areas. One involves the actual, physical use of the means of global communication and travel, and the regularity of such a use. But, as my concern in this section is with the increasing importance of information in contemporary society, the second is of more interest to me. This concerns the access to, and use of, the new technologies by citizens, and the meanings attributed thereto. Thus, we need to discover who has access to information technology, and who uses it for what. It seems to me, at least, that the principal stumbling block is one familiar to modernity; that is, the denial of access to the new means of democracy due to limitations imposed upon the population by both material (economic) and cultural capital.

How, though, might this relate directly to democracy? I will attempt to summarize my argument here:

1. Modernity has always been an arena for conflict between two parallel projects: the project of scientific rationalization and political-economic expansion, that is, instrumental modernity; and the project of emancipation and human understanding, abstract modernity. It is the former which has been dominant.
2. Political democracy of the utilitarian variety has been a necessary outcome of the project of instrumental modernity, reducing as it does the citizen to the calculating bearer of rights and duties.
3. This is related directly to the assumption of a society based around labour power, rather than around the communication and exchange of knowledge.
4. In a previous chapter I offered a tentative outline of a manifesto for radical, or communicative, democracy. Such a democracy relies upon access to and exchange of information, and best serves the interests of a globalized world.

There is no denying that the increasing availability of global forms of communication holds much potential for this form of communicative democracy. There is also no denying that the global spread of information, together with the declining accountability and legitimacy accorded to

national political institutions, pose a serious challenge to the assumptions made concerning the nature of democracy, and, by extension, the nature of citizenship. For the moment, though, these are only tentative steps towards global democratization. As many have shown, the means by which a citizen can utilize these new forms of communication, and the access to information, remain limited. We also need to be wary of assuming that the extended use of information technology will actually initiate a new intersubjectivity and sociality, which Habermas himself assumes to be the central feature in the completion of the modern project. Perhaps there is a danger that the 'virtual communities' hailed by Stefanik and others might, in fact, produce isolated, antisocial individuals. While Habermas, like Goffman and others, overemphasizes the face-to-face nature of interaction, there is perhaps a need to rethink communicative action in the light of these non-personal forms of communication, in order for citizens to realize their democratizing potential.

DUTIES: FROM THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE PLANET

Concern for the global ecological balance might be read as the flip side of the increasing technological advances associated with modernity, and a critical theorist might understand it as an awareness of the consequences of science 'out of control', the onset of a 'risk society'.[22] If modernity emphasized control over nature, then 'postmodernity' is about the contested politics of (living with) nature. But this concern is also part of a wider shift in values from those concerned essentially with the national framework, to those concerned with global issues. While, as I have repeated from time to time, membership of national political organizations (such as political parties or trade unions) has steadily declined in recent years, that of the various globally oriented new social movements, such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, has increased. This kind of activism, which relates to what Inglehart famously termed 'post-material values',[23] might well form a new class but, as Skogen points out, cannot be reduced to economic activity.[24] Activists of this kind are susceptible to changing structures, such as the decline of manufacture and industry, and with it of 'old' collective identities. Identity formation thus becomes individualized; actors have to construct their own identities within this wider critique of materialism.[25]

Cotgrove and Duff adopt a similar view of the role of these 'new' interest groups which are not rooted in class politics, indeed, party political politics is in decline, while environmentalists (again the object of the study) challenge the 'ideology of modern industrial society';[26] perhaps we could develop this point, adding that they are equally challenging the ideology of modern, nation-state-bound societies.

This presents us with a second challenge to the model of national citizenship, and, in particular, to the idea of rights and duties. In the national model, this aspect of citizenship has an essentially contractarian base: certain rights are allocated to citizens in return for the acceptance of certain duties. Ideally, this is a reciprocal arrangement, and involves the establishment of a specific relationship between individual and state. I will deal with the issue of rights below. Here I wish to concentrate on the problem of duties, specifically, duties towards the world. Shifting values towards the world as a whole present us with identifying the global equivalent of this state which participates in such an arrangement. Without the emergence of a global state (an idea which is both unlikely and, for the present, undesirable) it seems that this aspect of citizenship, which relies upon (enforceable) legal recognition and processes, is in danger of losing its credibility. On the other hand, it may simply be that we have misunderstood the nature of such a contract, and limited ourselves to a rather restrictive definition of citizenship. Steward expresses this challenge clearly:

> The rise of green politics has a complex relationship with the new politics of citizenship. Green politics expresses aspirations of citizenship through its globalisation of the sense of community, combined with a new emphasis on individual responsibility. It also challenges the discourse of social citizenship by attributing enhanced status to an agency external to human society—the biosphere of Planet Earth.[27]

In the context of ecological citizenship, then, the social contract between citizen and state, which was so central to the nation-state model, is replaced by an ideally reciprocal relationship between the human (as citizen) and the planet. The rights attributed to these citizens of the Planet Earth are, necessarily, human rights, ideally to be enjoyed by all. The duties required of these citizens are duties towards the world as a whole, that is, towards the maintenance, security and protection of the planet.

Such an apparently radical suggestion might perhaps be easier to conceptualize than might at first appear to be the case. If we were to deconstruct the language of contractarian philosophy, we would see that, in the national model, the State to which we owe certain duties and obligations is not an abstract entity, but in fact is the collective manifestation of our fellow citizens.[28] Thus by accepting certain duties towards it, we are reinforcing the value of citizens' rights. The nation-state is a form of society as much as it is a form of political organization. The contractual relationship is not, as is often thought, between the citizen and the state *per se,* but between the citizen and the society which embodies his or her fellow citizens, because in surrendering certain duties towards that

society s/he is participating in a process which strengthens his or her position within it, and protects his or her rights. This is an important distinction, in accord with the way Donati construes the difference between state and society.

What would such an ecological citizenship entail? Obligations towards the safety of the planet *per se* must be of extreme importance in this age of fatality. Only by coming together to accept that this crisis—however it may have originated, be it through capitalist exploitation of labour or whatever—is a crisis facing all of us can we even hope to overcome it. It is a crisis of global proportions facing our common humanity as 'citizens of Planet Earth'.[29] Thus van Steenbergen, following Marshall's three types of citizenship rights, adds a fourth, ecological citizenship, within which he lists three themes:[30]

1. Increasing inclusion, such as for animals.
2. Increasing responsibilities towards nature.
3. Increasing awareness of ecology as a global issue.

Let us focus on these three possible interpretations. The first of these questions the standard restriction of 'inclusion' as applying only to humans; there is a case, for example, for 'animal rights' to be recognized as citizenship rights, at least in the global-ecological context.[31] There is perhaps a danger here of over-emphasizing the idea of rights against that of duties because, as I have mentioned above, we can read these duties as respect for the rights of others., and in such a relationship an actor must be able to comprehend—in a moral sense—these rights and duties. It is not clear whether an animal is capable of doing so. In other words, can an animal be held morally responsible for committing 'wrongs' or failing to perform duties that sustain the notion of rights?

Regarding the first of these three, van Steenbergen mentions that the attribution of some rights towards unborn children was a major step forward for animal rights activists, because it paved the way for the inclusion of non-human citizens.[32] The traditional exclusion of animals comes from their incapacity to act as thinking, rational creatures. However, this limits inclusion on the basis of intelligence., itself as questionable as exclusion on the basis of skin colour or gender.[33] While this argument relies upon utilitarian assumptions, another suggestion calls for an acceptance of the moral rights of animals as living creatures.[34]

The second interpretation of ecological citizenship identified by van Steenbergen is more closely bound up with this idea of duty, as it calls for the idea of a duty towards society to be extended to include a duty towards nature. This is a more reasonable suggestion and seems to complement the idea of societal citizenship suggested by Donati.

Regarding this second point, van Steenbergen rightly suggests that it is significant because—unlike the social movements of the past which have stressed the rights of oppressed groups—the environmental movement stresses responsibilities.[35] There is no reason to see why the concept of responsibilities held regarding one's community or fellow citizens should not extend to nature itself.

The third interpretation brings together the wide variety of individuals whose concern is, in one way or another, for the earth is itself. These include, according to van Steenbergen, the 'environmental managers' who work to protect our common home, and also the 'earth citizens' who seek to distance themselves from any national or otherwise restrictive categorization by going 'back to the land'. This interpretation is viewed as a direct result of the process of globalization; it might be read that the common identification of peoples collected under the shared banner of being *of* this earth, an awareness of which is in part an awareness of our shared, and fragile, ecology.

This reconstruction of the notions of rights and duties is again expressed clearly by Steward:

> Citizenship of planet earth…embodies a new sense of the universal political subject beyond the context of the traditional nation state, and a refreshed awareness of equality in terms of our shared dependence on nature. Global citizenship expresses the right to a common human heritage regardless of nation…The concomitant *obligations* of citizenship…itself entails a necessary foregoing of some elements of local and national sovereignty. Individual citizens also owe a duty of care to the planet.[36]

Van Steenbergen makes the distinction between 'world citizens' and 'earth citizens', where the former use the facilities of the earth to exercise their own daily tasks without consideration for the earth *per se*. The latter are conscious citizens of the world, who accept themselves as a part of nature, not separate from it, and thus as having certain responsibilities towards it. Thus, this concept of global ecological citizenship draws partly on the Durkheimian-communitarian perspective of 'being in the world'.

Such a transformation of values is indicative of the heightened importance of globality and globalism in the contemporary cultural climate, both of which are crucial components of the thesis of globalization. It is worth remembering that they are slightly different concepts, as globality, which we discussed in some detail in an earlier chapter, is 'consciousness of…the world as a single place', while globalism is usually understood to be the consciousness of, and the subsequent orientation to act upon, the global stage. Activism of the environmental variety is a form of globalism, which involves a commitment to certain values which are

applied to the world *per se*. However, I have already made the point that reliance solely upon Robertson's definition of globality is restrictive, because it does not allow us to open up forms of globality which are located within the lifeworld of social action. The link between globality and globalism is thus the link between theory and practice.

If this activism might be indicative of the kind of global citizenship I have already outlined, how might it be practised? Scott and Willits identify a curious distinction made along the lines of gender. Men, they argue, are more likely to join organizations and attend meetings, while women are more prone to 'environmentally protective consumer behaviour'.[37] Skogen focused his study on young people because they 'are supposed to have a strong interest in protecting the environment, as they "shall inherit the earth"'.[38] Accordingly, a sizeable sample of Norwegian youths was asked to rank four priorities according to importance:[39]

1. Maintaining a high level of economic growth.
2. Making sure this country has strong defence forces.
3. Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
4. Protecting nature from being spoiled and polluted.

The study showed not only that 3.5 per cent were members of an environmental organization (a clear indicator of something close to global citizenship!), but also that 69.6 per cent of the sample 'assigned the greatest importance to "protecting nature" as a goal for society'.[40]

Whether we accept this activism as a commitment to the protection of the planet for the planet's sake, or we instead take a more instrumental line towards nature and hold that such a protection is necessary for the protection of ourselves and our fellow humans, seems at this stage to be irrelevant. Environmentalism is, after all, a local as well as global form of activism. Cotgrove and Duff contrast the 'ordered' and 'centralized' view of society held by the 'dominant social paradigm' with the 'flexible' and 'decentralized' society preferred by the environmentalists they studied; such a society is thus small scale but related to nature on a planetary scale—both local and global. Suffice to say that the issues at stake, such as the three 'major species-threatening phenomena—ecological disaster, nuclear annihilation and AIDS' are all global concerns.[41] Such commitments suggest, as I have stated above, that we need to reconsider the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, and the idea of reciprocal rights and duties. A research programme would therefore need to discover exactly who are members of these social movements; why they are members; and how important these global issues are to people when compared with national or more local ones. Skogen's study goes some way towards doing this. At the same time, though, we should bear in mind the

point made by Ben Cunningham: that the contemporary discourse around environmental issues is as much Western angst as it is globalist commitment. From the perspective of critical theory, this charge does not seem to be a fair one. A modified version of a Frankfurt-inspired perspective might consider that an essential component of global ecological citizenship would be awe. By holding the natural environment in awe, on some plane of abstract heroic beauty, one resists its desublimation and acts towards it with an appropriate amount of respect. It would appear that, to perform ecological citizenship of this kind, one needs this sense of separation.[42]

Equally, I am prone at this point to agree with a point made by Cotgrove and Duff, who notice how this 'new' politics based on a commitment to the global environment is often dismissed as 'irrational'. An obvious example concerns the opposition to nuclear power, which is seen as regressive, anti-scientific and therefore irrational. In fact, these politics merely reflect a different rationality, which is progressive, we might say, in the realm of the lifeworld rather than the system, and which, in contrast to the scientism of the other rationality, is distinctively not solely a Western phenomena. Global citizenship—which is performative and is cradled by a system of discursive democracy—requires, it seems, just this kind of alternative, lifeworld-bound, global rationality. Clearly, Skogen found useful examples of such global citizens in his survey.

RIGHTS: FROM CITIZENSHIP TO HUMANITY

Human rights have re-emerged as central to the discourse of international law, international relations and politics, due partly to noticeable attempts at genocide performed by freely elected governments (particularly the Nazis in the Second World War), and partly to the gradual unification of the world.[43] However, sociology has rarely seen them as worthy of focus. This is in part due, it has been said., to their 'abstract' nature and their claims at absolutism and foundationalism, often dismissed as 'essentialism' by sociological traditions which have become increasingly influenced by relativism.[44] Similarly, Marxists have followed their guru by dismissing such rights as 'bourgeois rights'. Turner adds Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, the positivistic refutal of normativism, and Max Weber's relativistic attack on natural law and the universalist tradition as other pioneering rejections of a sociology of human rights. Even Durkheim's commitment to a moral sociology did not sit easily with the idea of human rights. Thus citizenship has been accepted in its place in sociological circles.

This reluctance to incorporate a theory of rights, and indeed the failure of sociology in general to appreciate the significance of world citizenship as it has existed throughout modernity, is without doubt a failing on the part of the discipline, particularly as the institutionalization of rights must be seen

as one of the most important achievements of the modern project, and certainly one of the key concepts within the discourse over the globalization of society. It is in this last point that the problem of rights for sociology resurfaces, because if human rights and world citizenship can be posited as genuine historical alternatives to national rights and nation-state citizenship, then the impact of globality upon both parallel trends is less easily defined.

Quite rightly, Turner argues that this blindness towards the significance of human rights cannot be allowed to continue. Refugees and aboriginals are not always easy to locate in terms of citizenship, but as humans are unmistakably included in discussion of human rights.[45] The advantages of a sociology of human rights are in their universality, their globality, and their freedom from governments' ideologies. Turner sees the emergence of an accepted doctrine of human rights as not only essential, but a necessary stage in modernization. He argues for 'asserting a common humanity across cultures'.[46] For Turner, the problems associated with rights can be overcome with reference to the sociology of the body, and by an understanding and appreciation of the universal nature of human frailty.

I think that there is another important reason why sociology has overlooked the importance of human rights. This is due to the project of the discipline itself, which has long been tied up with that of nation-building. Albrow distinguishes between certain 'phases' in the development of sociology.[47] From the early, universalistic pretensions of the 'founding fathers' wishing to develop sociology as a science capable of making generalizable claims based not on pre-social phenomena such as human rights but on the logic of the social itself, sociology evolved in partnership with a sense of nation-building. Thus, the contributions of Parsons and his followers in the United States were important as much for their efforts to understand the 'American condition' as they were for their contributions to wider sociology. Given this link between sociology and nation-building, it is hardly surprising that the discipline has always been more concerned with citizenship rights (which can be understood within the context of a nation-state society) than with human rights (which cannot). So, as sociology becomes increasingly aware of contemporary world society, then its preoccupation with national, citizenship rights will turn instead into a concern with world citizenship rights, that is, human rights.

Human rights are now considered crucial to any project of global inclusion. Although flawed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains the take-off point for any discussion of the legally recognized nature of human rights. We can thus return to the writings of Norberto Bobbio on the development of an idea of rights throughout modernity. Bobbio traces this as part of a dialectical process. He argues that it has undergone three key stages:

1. The philosophical doctrine of universal natural law, which, although rooted in the stoics (and other pre-modern writers, a point Bobbio tends to gloss over), emerged as a systematic framework of philosophical analysis with Locke.
2. The concrete assertion of positive rights embedded in the political nation-state as citizens' rights.
3. A combination of the above—rights as both universal and positive—which came about only after the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[48]

I think that Bobbio is for the most part justified in using such a model. If he is guilty of paying only lip service to the contributions of Cicero, Seneca and other 'premodern' theorists in his first stage, he is right to stress that only under modernity's commitment to positive law and the nation-state could these rights be removed from their abstract plane and given concrete form. And he is also right to suggest that the third stage represents what we might read as a synthesis of the 'two' modernities: that is, of 'abstract' modernity and 'instrumental' modernity, respectively. It is not clear whether such a synthesis alone can be accountable for the new orientation to the world brought about by globality. Certainly, the formal recognition of human rights by the United Nations is crucial for an understanding of globalization.[49] Yet Bobbio himself accepts that the Universal Declaration 'is only the beginning of a long process, whose final outcome we cannot yet distinguish'.[50]

The very existence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in international law allows, or indeed requires, us to rethink the idea of human rights. Such rights are no longer abstract claims to philosophical doctrine, but instead exist as practically realizable goals. They reflect the pragmatism of an age which has seen the potential for human genocide. At least one organization already uses this document as its constitution. This, of course, is the World Government of World Citizens. And as I have already stated, in some detail, this organization embodies what I see as being a philosophical and real shift away from abstract notions of universal rights towards a pragmatic and direct re-affirmation of the sovereignty of the individual in the world. The very presence of Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration, which states the right to leave and enter any country, allows this organization pragmatically to challenge any assumptions of exclusion on the part of nation-states. This is a significant shift in how we can, and do, view ourselves in relation to the world.

The development of this organization shows that individuals are accepting their rights and responsibilities regarding the globe, whether it be in the case of diasporic or dislocated cultural identities, or in the conscious decision to adopt world citizenship, or in the decision to join globalist

social movements. The result is the empowering of individuals as global citizens.

We have already noted that Bobbio sees modernization as a process of individualization, culminating in the triumph of rights over duties. Globalization is not a continuation of modernization. It allows for something different. Under conditions of reflexivity, globality and risk, these rights are inseparable from the duties implied by global values. In other words, globality allows for a cultural, collectivist notion of rights, as well as, although inseparable from, the individualistic nature of rights as presumed by the modern project.

It is in this respect that commentators such as Robertson and Habermas fall short of grasping the contemporary condition, for both adopt a view, or perhaps make the mistake, of seeing modernization as universalizing (and globalizing). They consider human rights to be a crucial element in this process, but the flaws in their respective treatments of modernity, both drawing on evolutionary theory, mean that they both totally fail to capture the significance of human rights in the contemporary (post-war) world. Human rights are still the same as such, but the role they play is crucially different. They are grounded in the pragmatism I have discussed at length above.[51] Neither Robertson nor Habermas is fully able to cope with this, and in this respect and in many others, Robertson (who totally reduces the lifeworld to a subsystem in the Parsonian sense of culture, society and personality without giving it much, or any, autonomy) is much closer to the Federalists, while Habermas simply cannot go beyond moral universalism, however he may try. Garry Davis and his organization can, and do.

Of course, social movements play, as they have always played, an important role, as the 'bearers' of citizenship rights. Turner talks of the significant contributions of social movements in expanding some rights.[52] Clearly, trade unions and women's groups have been successful in achieving certain citizenship rights for workers and women. Newer social movements are concerned more with global issues, and in the absence of a globally elected democratic forum, they serve as speakers on our behalf, emphasizing our rights and stressing —in the case of the environmental movement—our responsibilities.

On one level, at least, the nature of the relationship between awareness of our position on this planet *vis-à-vis* our fellow humans, and the impact of globality upon our orientation towards the world and those fellow humans, can be measured. Global communication and reflexivity allow for more access to knowledge about human rights, and thus allow for critical concern. Accordingly, while our awareness of our duties towards the world as a whole have largely emerged due to the negative consequences of modernity, such as over-population and ecological risk, our awareness of rights on a global scale has been the product of a more positive aspect of

the modern project; that is, the institutional recognition of human rights, whatever other problems may be associated with this.

The world in which we live is not 'postmodern', least of all in the sense of there being a requirement for us to abandon any pretensions to abstract, universal, and humanistic claims such as the one to human rights. We are, however, obliged now to be more careful in our application of such claims. Two points need to be made here. The first involves the relationship between human rights and democracy. While Bobbio assumes an inseparable relationship between the two, he is careful to stress that even human rights must be located in history. Democracy does not carry with it a right to vote, in the universal sense. Children, for example, are excluded from the process of utilitarian democracy, and yet carry rights as human beings. But of course, utilitarian democracy has always been the enemy of universal rights, at least in the crude sense of the majority will being superior to minority rights.[53] Human rights can only find their true political home in the context of communicative, or discursive, democracy.

The second arises from the so-called 'politics of difference'. The charge made against human rights—echoed by Ben Cunningham—that they are Western, individualistic, liberal, bourgeois rights, is to a large extent a valid one. This is not to say that they should be discarded—ar from it. The globalization and reflexive individualization of cultural identity should in fact suggest ways in which human rights can be truly global. They lead us to realize the importance of difference and thus further respect the fundamental right to individual freedom and dignity.

The problem, if that is an appropriate word, is that the expression, 'human right', has been applied rather too liberally, to include those 'rights' which are not rights as such but liberties, and this confusion has prevented us from understanding the true philosophical nature of 'human rights' as natural foundations for our common humanity. Sociology, and contemporary world society, can recognize the universality of human rights based on equal worth and value of all human life, which could draw once again on Kant's famous claim that human life should be an end in itself, and never a means to an end. No one life is more significant than another, regardless of ethnicity or colour or creed or gender or sexuality. Thus the treatment of women in some Muslim nations would be contrary to such a doctrine. The same, though, can be said about racism and arbitrary decision-making in US capital cases. Human rights abuses are not reducible to particular lifestyles or political systems. But they are in the public domain. Human rights abuses can now be judged in the public sphere, through unhindered discourse such that the better argument will triumph. This may be a liberal assessment of the situation, but it is one major success for the project of abstract modernity that recourse to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights allows for the possibility that the validity of governmental action can be judged within the logic of moral-practical

reason. This relates in part to the process of individualization associated with modernity (and the relativization of individual selves in accordance with their relationship to humanity as a whole). But at the same time, there is the potential for a further recognition of collective rights, applicable, for example, to ethnic, language, and religious groups.

In other words, we can seek to overcome the criticism made against the tradition of human rights that such rights betray a Western bias by claiming that only a distorted version of 'human rights' needs to assume an Orientalist perspective on the 'Other'. A true and undistorted version would view such 'Otherness', such a politics of difference, as fundamental. The truth of any particular circumstance is located within its own logic, and can be reached through discourse which is open and sensitive to the claims of conflicting arguments. Earlier discourse on human rights might have betrayed a Western bias and an assumption of the 'superiority' of the 'civilized' (Western industrial) nations. Globalization allows for this discourse on human rights to be opened up within the realm of public debate between cultures. Human rights can be universal in a pragmatic as well as an abstract sense. It is important to appreciate this in the contemporary world, where pluralized identities are commonplace, such that socio-cultural identity cannot be reduced to simple definitions of nationality or ethnicity. It is to this that I now turn.

MEMBERSHIP: FROM POLITICAL STATE TO MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

In the modern nation-state, citizenship essentially represented membership of the political community. Such membership was in keeping with both the primacy of the political (as opposed, for example, to the cultural) dimension, and the Enlightenment concern for rational organization and formal identification. Citizenship in this sense was easily identifiable, membership being defined along strict guidelines of inclusion and exclusion. But this limited definition has proven unsatisfactory in the light of various forms of cultural, social and political identification which transcend national boundaries. Thus, 'multiculturalism' offers the fourth challenge to the nation-state model—a challenge to the idea of membership and, from that, to the idea of social rights, where these have been defined in the past according to questions of inclusion and exclusion.

The challenge presupposes that the kind of 'stable' identities (which were central to the nation-state model) have collapsed. No longer is it sufficient to define someone as simply 'British' or 'French' (not, perhaps, that it ever was, but modernity held with it an assumption that this was the case). Migration and the constant global flows of people have forced us to accept that people's cultural or national identification may not simply relate to their country of residence, even if they are citizens of that country.

Migrants or refugees may continue to feel a sense of belonging to their countries of origin. As one of the aims of the modern, nation-state model of citizenship was to build a sense of national solidarity and integration, the assumption seemed to be that new citizens would become integrated into the host country, and feel a sense of belonging primarily to it. Sociologists placing citizenship of this kind at the centre of their analysis thus displayed their liberal, often functionalist, tendencies. Instead, people, exhibiting what Stuart Hall and others have called 'new identities' or 'new ethnicities',[54] may display a sense of belonging to another country, which calls into question the idea of a citizen expressing loyalty and commitment solely to the host country.

This 'diasporic' cultural identity, based as it is on dispersal and displacement, is not limited to those who feel an allegiance to other countries. In many cases people's cultural identification may be for a specific group or community which transcends national boundaries. Gilroy focused on a common identification between black people on both sides of the Atlantic. In this case, the identity coming from being black was as strong, or stronger, as that of belonging to any particular nation.[55] Similarly, as Oommen asks:

> How can a citizen of the United Kingdom who is a Catholic or a citizen of India who is a Muslim have primary loyalty in religious matters to their respective states…or a Spanish-speaking citizen of the US have primary loyalty (to the US) in matters cultural?[56]

So this diasporic identity is not limited to those who actively move from one country to another; it exists also among those who are born in their country of residence, and citizens of it. And in some cases these individuals may find themselves actively shifting between the variety of identities open to them.[57] The 'modern' theory of citizenship tends to overlook these cultural factors in its focus on political membership and 'national' community. It is possible for commentators to imagine a situation where being 'British', or being 'French', or being 'German', loses any salience because there are so many different identities available as resources. However, Ben Cunningham adds that this is no less true in Trinidad, or in a number of other countries in the West Indies. Cunningham is precisely this kind of 'non-modern citizen'. Such citizens have existed for as long as, or perhaps longer than, there have been nation-state citizens. Today's equivalents, like Cunningham, are able to politicize their cultural affiliations in a more pragmatic way. We need to understand and appreciate this transition.

If we restrict ourselves to a limited, contractarian definition of citizenship, then it seems at first glance that the contributions made by multiculturalist theory towards an understanding of diasporic communities

and 'new ethnicities' have been useful in suggesting some of the limitations of the classical theory of citizenship, but they have not attempted to take us any further. Many of these writers, despite their Marxist leanings, have been swayed by post-structuralist theorizing and have been content to leave these issues up in the air. What they have given us have been new theories of identity and belonging, be it to the world as a whole, or to another nation, or to a transnational cultural community, or indeed to a whole range of shifting, mostly complementary, sources of belonging. Although citizenship can be identified as a type of social (and political) belonging, these newly identified forms of belonging seem to challenge the idea of citizenship, rather than assist us in the task of rethinking it. In other words, the challenges made by these perspectives, and the new politics of identity, to the nation-state model seem to imply a kind of postmodern 'end of citizenship' rather than a reconstructed global citizenship.

If, however, we take citizenship to be the relationship between the individual and society, then the situation looks different. Most neo-Marxist writers now accept that the struggles over membership, of inclusion and exclusion, go beyond class alone, and it is widely accepted that the restriction of citizenship to the socio-political level, as practised by Marshall, at the expense of the cultural, is insufficient. We may wish to follow Levinas in replacing the idea of citizenship with that of 'new social bonds'. But even if we continue to adopt a purely political perspective on citizenship, it must be remembered that residents in a society need not surrender their cultural identities in order to subscribe to the full political rights which are theirs as members of a political community, regardless of other factors.[58]

Even so, the challenges made to citizenship theory by the politics of identification are not limited to purely cultural factors. Globalization opens up the possibilities for world travel, global social networks and global communications which seriously threaten the national perspective. Increasing numbers of people are becoming citizens of other countries, or adopting dual citizenship. On the global market citizenship is sold as a commodity, as global capitalists are able to buy citizenship of another country for business purposes. This kind of transnational citizenship is not about a sense of belonging or identification which transcends the nation-state; it is instead a type of postmodern or formal citizenship which strips that of any sense of belonging or loyalty and reduces it to market forces.

Another equally important aspect of these politics of identification involves the emergence of sub-national identities. Political globalization, by removing some of the power of the nation-state located at its centre, opens up all manner of possibilities for regional identities to flourish. Scottish or Welsh people, unhappy with being identified as citizens of the (Anglocentric) British nation-state, now have more possibilities for their respective sub-national identities to be recognized within the European

Union. The same is true of residents of the Basque or Catalan regions of Spain. The disunification of nation-states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union into autonomous regions further challenges the arrogant assumption that nation-state boundaries are somehow fixed. Beyond Europe, similar processes are taking place. In Canada, the French-speaking peoples of Quebec are challenging the assumption of their Canadian identity. There is more and more recognition that the political structure of the world map is based on artificial divisions often brought about by centuries of colonialism and imperialism. In this sense, globalization opens up possibilities for increasing fragmentation and heterogenization, in contradiction to the charge made against it of homogenization.

These possibilities may go beyond even the regional level to the purely local. In Stephen Frears's film, *Sammy and Rosie Get Laid,* the central character, Sammy, who has lived all of his life in Britain but was born in Pakistan, says to his visiting father: 'We love our city and we belong to it. Neither of us are English, we're Londoners you see.'[59] Thus there appears to be a scale of identification running from the purely local, through to the regional, then to the national, then possibly to the supranational (for example, Europe), and finally to the global. It is perhaps not useful to make such sharp distinctions between these levels, as they often overlap, but from the point of view of citizenship, they do pose problems for the rather limited nation-state model which is itself based more often than not on artificial boundaries.

The new 'politics of identity' exist beyond this range of cultural and geographical belonging, taking in all number of questions concerning gender, sexuality, age, and the like, each of which is important when seeking to reconstruct the idea of citizenship. From the point of view of global citizenship, however, it is this multicultural citizenship which is possibly most relevant. Thus a research programme should attempt to chart how people identify themselves, and how they compromise their national citizenships with other possible identifications they may have. Where and with whom do they identify? Where are their regular contacts? And how important is, for example, being 'British' to them compared to, say, being 'black', or being 'European', or being 'Scottish'? The answers are not those which can be made into generalizable truths, because of the individualization of self-identity which accompanies global transformation. However, this individualization is not a shift away from the political towards the cultural; instead, we should see it as a reflection of the modern politicization of the cultural, and of the idea of 'life politics' already discussed.

SUMMARY

Whichever model one is using, citizenship can nevertheless be understood in terms of the delicate balance between membership, rights, duties and participation. Indeed, it is useful to keep such a model in mind when we discuss this often-contested term. Under nation-state conditions, citizenship, and the four components therein, were exclusive and restrictive. External conditions allowed for a complex blend of political structures, democratic processes and cultural legitimation to uphold that very nation-state system. Those conditions are no longer dominant. Accordingly, we can transfer this model of citizenship to the global scale, and find that it still works just as well. Rather than exercising a restricted form of participation in a system of liberal democracy, we can exercise a fuller participation through such developments as information technology and the role of global social movements, which make possible a system of global radical democracy. Our duties need no longer be towards the national interest but towards the protection of the planet, and we might perform these duties through membership of these social movements. These movements also exist to uphold our rights, but, rather than being the arbitrary rights of nation-state citizens (civil liberties), they can now be fully understood as human rights. Human rights had previously been central to the doctrine of moral universalism associated with earlier forms of world citizenship. Similarly, membership of a transnational cultural community had hitherto been a neglected (and disempowered) form of citizenship affiliation which has been in existence throughout, perhaps before, modernity (I call it 'non-modern' citizenship). Globalized conditions allow for this kind of multicultural, pluralistic membership to replace the monocultural, assimilationist frame which was crucial under nation-state conditions for the process of nation-building. Each of these processes is not only possible but also real because we are able to challenge the assumption that citizenship defines a relationship between a citizen and a 'formal' political structure which we call a 'state'. This state, though, is little if anything more than the collective will of the people, if we recall that the individual is sovereign. **We** do not need to subscribe to a programme calling for a 'world state' to accept that the State, indeed society, is carried by each of us, in so far as conditions allow us to interact with our fellow individuals, our fellow citizens.

NOTES

1. Hall and Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', p. 175.
2. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation,* p. 70.
3. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 123.

4. There is, of course, much contemporary debate over the extent to which such forms of information technology allow for an increase in democracy, particularly within organizations. I do not wish to restate these arguments here. I will instead begin with the (abstract) understanding that access to this technology holds the potential for access to information among citizens which would, by its very nature, open up possibilities for participatory democracy.
5. Nancy Stefanik, 'Sustainable Dialogue/Sustainable Development', in Brecher, Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions,* pp. 263–4.
6. Denis MacShane, 'Labor Standards and Double Standards in the New World Order', in Brecher, Childs and Cutler, *Global Visions,* p. 204.
7. Lifeson, personal interview, 27 May 1995.
8. Ibid.
9. Brown, personal interview, 16 June 1995.
10. Ibid.
11. A. Ardigo, 'New Technology and Social Citizenship', paper presented to the International Workshop on Human Centred Systems Design, Brighton Polytechnic, 22–24 September 1989. According to Ardigo, this can be achieved in three ways: (1) a fairer distribution of the benefits of technology; (2) improved efficiency in public administration; and (3) the extension of citizens' rights to information, and therefore their access to political participation.
12. Colin Beardon, 'Social Citizenship in the Information Age', in Colin Beardon and Diane Whitehouse (eds), *Computers and Society* (Oxford: Intellect, 1993).
13. Lifeson, personal interview, 27 May 1995.
14. Scott Lash, 'Reflexivity and Its Doubles', in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (eds), *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 132–3.
15. Lash, 'Reflexivity and Its Doubles', p. 134.
16. Ibid. This is, of course, a simplistic view which underestimates the level of resistance achieved by social groups who consciously manipulate and recreate these images for their own purposes.
17. O'Byrne, 'Working Class Culture'.
18. Beardon, 'Social Citizenship', p. 9.
19. T.K.Oommen, 'Contested Boundaries and Emerging Pluralism', *International Sociology,* 10, 3 (1995), pp. 262–3.
20. Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity.*
21. Ibid., p. 147.
22. Beck, *Risk Society.*
23. Richard Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among the Western Public* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
24. Ketil Skogen, 'Young Environmentalists: Post-Modern Identities or Middle-Class Culture', *Sociological Review,* 44, 3 (1996), pp. 452–73.
25. Ibid., p. 453.
26. Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff, 'Environmenalism, Middle-Class Radicalism and Politics', *Sociological Review,* 28, 2 (1980), p. 333.

27. Fred Steward, 'Citizens of Planet Earth', in Andrews, *Citizenship,* p. 66.
28. Pierpaolo Donati, 'Identity and Solidarity in the Complex of Citizenship: The Relational Approach', *International Sociology,* 10, 3 (1995), p. 313.
29. Stewart, 'Citizens of Planet Earth'.
30. Bart van Steenbergen, 'Toward a Global Ecological Citizen', in Bart van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship*.
31. On which, see Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).
32. Van Steenbergen, 'Global Ecological Citizen', p. 144.
33. Ibid., p. 145, following Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals* (New York: Avon, 1975).
34. Regan, *Animal Rights*.
35. Van Steenbergen, 'Global Ecological Citizen', p. 146.
36. Steward, 'Citizens of Planet Earth', pp. 74–5.
37. D.Scott and F.K.Willits, 'Environmental Attitudes and Behaviour: A Pennsylvania Survey', *Environment and Behaviour,* 26 (1994), pp. 239–60.
38. Skogen, 'Young Environmentalists', pp. 454–5.
39. Ibid., p. 459.
40. Ibid., p. 463.
41. Robertson, *Globalization,* p. 133.

42.1 am reminded on this occasion of the final scene in Lawrence Kasdan's motion picture, *Grand Canyon,* where the troubled urbanites come face to face with the inspiring sight of the Canyon, and are duly reminded, we are asked to believe, that there is still something in the world unspoiled by the advances of instrumental modernity; something greater than mundane experiences; something to fight for.

43. Antonio Cassese, *Human Rights in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
44. Bryan S.Turner, 'Outline of a Theory of Human Rights', in Turner, *Citizenship and Social Theory,* p. 162.
45. Ibid., p. 178.
46. Ibid., p. 180.
47. Martin Albrow, 'Introduction', in Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King (eds), *Globalization, Knowledge and Society: Readings from International Sociology* (London: Sage, 1990).
48. Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* pp. 15–17.
49. Robertson, *Globalization,* p. 27.
50. Bobbio, *Age of Rights,* p. 17.
51. Let us not mistake what might be defined as a pragmatic approach to human rights with a view of human rights as rooted in pragmatic action. According to the former, some negotiation is required between competing and often conflicting parties to the idea of such rights in different parts of the world. Universalism thus surrenders to a negotiated relativism. According to the latter, universal human rights can be transferred from the realm of the abstract to that of the political and pragmatic.
52. Turner, 'Contemporary Problems', p. 13.
53. Jon Elster points out that, while majority rule may violate minority rights, it is nevertheless the essential component of the democratic process, and goes

on to suggest legal and political means of overcoming this problem. However, such suggestions for reform from both within and, to an extent, above the democratic system, and the limited, utilitarian usage of the term upon which they are based, seem to indicate, in my opinion at least, a misunderstanding of the nature of democracy. See Elster, 'Majority Rule and Individual Rights', in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds), *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

54. Hall, 'The Local and the Global'; Hall, 'New Ethnicities'.
55. Gilroy, *Black Atlantic*.
56. Oommen, 'Contested Boundaries', p. 260.
57. Centre for Bangladeshi Studies, *Routes and Beyond*.
58. Hall and Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', p. 187.
59. The film was written by Hanif Kureishi, who specializes in understanding life in the multicultural city from an Asian point of view.

10
Active Citizenship Today

For global citizenship to have any real meaning, we must recognize its limitations, its implications, and its possible applications in such fields as political practice, education and welfare. We should duly recognize the role of the nation-state. But we should not lose sight of the simple fact that, under globalized conditions, such a citizenship is real and emancipatory.

INTRODUCTION

In many respects, this book has, intentionally, adopted an optimistic perspective. It is intended to show how a new form of global citizenship is possible. This possibility exists because of the reality of contemporary external conditions. Nothing in this book is intended as polemic against the nation-state *per se,* or as suggesting that the nation-state no longer has a role to play. An earlier form of world citizenship, in the abstract, universalist sense, might very well have existed in opposition to the formal nation-state citizenship, because in no small part to the conflicting nature of the dual modernities. Global citizenship, as I have described it, takes from these modern and from non-modern sources and duly embraces plurality without being relativistic, universality without being deterministic, and identity without being unduly subjectivist. Throughout the pages of this book, I have sought to define global citizenship in a fairly fixed way, by contrasting it with other forms of citizenship and by locating it within a transformative historical capacity, but at no point have I suggested either that such a global citizenship is the only possible outcome which might emerge from contemporary conditions, or that those who adhere to such a definition must do so at the expense of other forms of identification.

In this concluding chapter, I turn my attention to tying up some of the loose ends which may have been left from earlier chapters, and to answering some of the questions (pertaining to both the practical and theoretical issues raised herein) which the reader may think to pose. These

include the limitations of global citizenship, given the role of the nation-state in the contemporary world. They also include the extent of globalism and activism according to surveys of social values. And they include the possibilities for including global citizenship within a broader educational framework.

GLOBALISM,THE NATION-STATE AND VALUES

As I suggested in an earlier chapter, it might seem to some to be symptomatic of the 'postmodern condition' that political apathy is commonplace. Certainly, a political shift has been taking place in the light of many of the social, political and economic changes discussed in this book. Such a reading of this historical shift informs the 'postmodern' understanding of the decline of the nation-state, that is, that with the collapse of the nation-state comes the collapse of politics. As Habermas correctly points out, such a defeatist perspective serves merely as an apology for a 'postpolitical world' dominated by multinational corporations:

> If not only the nation-state has run its course but along with it all forms of *political integration*, then individual citizens are abandoned to a world of anonymously interconnected networks in which they must choose between systemically generated options in accordance with their preferences. In this *postpolitical* world the multinational corporation becomes the model for all conduct.[1]

However, there is an alternative reading available to us. Rather than view this transformation as a shift away from politics, it can instead be understood as a shift within politics, away from nation-state based party politics but towards issues-based politics. Such a politics connects with the idea (from Giddens) of life politics that has already been used throughout this book. I say this despite the claim made in various quarters that we are living in an age dominated by the 'me' generation, highlighted for example by a decline in the number of Britons undertaking voluntary work overseas.[2] Other research contradicts such claims, and even if the level of activism is in decline (due in part to a changing socio-economic climate), the commitment is not. In some respects these new values seem to complement the shift towards 'postmodern' lifestyles. Thus, according to one report, those aged between 18 and 34 appear to 'have shifted their values away from family, community and rigid moral codes towards androgyny, sexual freedom and excitement'; however, they also appear to have moved towards a new set of values based around such concepts as civil liberties, ecology and internationalism.[3] Thus,

> A growing number of people are mistrustful of politics. Instead they put younger generation in particular have [*sic*] become more distanced from their energies into areas where they can see more tangible results. The party politics, but the notion that they are not political is just not true.[4]

Citing a poll carried out by MORI, the researcher adds that,

> Amongst younger people, especially those below 25, there is even less faith in conventional party politics, with many emphasising issues which remain low on the parties' agendas: environmentalism, international campaigns, animal rights and health issues such as AIDS, all seem to excite commitment in a way that traditional politics does not.[5]

It is just these kinds of issues which force us to reconsider the idea of citizenship, and in this volume I have sought to locate this transformation in political behaviour firmly within a sociological understanding of conditions. Contemporary conditions, I have argued, require us to rethink the three 'key notions' of citizenship; that is, the idea of democracy and political participation, the idea of reciprocal rights and duties, and the idea of membership. The four challenges I have outlined in the previous chapter are attempts to highlight the flaws in the nation-state model from these perspectives. As the nation-state model is based anyway on artificial boundaries and if these flaws are accurate, then it may be that the only way to overcome these challenges is through a truly active form of global citizenship. But such a citizenship needs to address the changing world conditions. It needs, then, to include within it informational citizenship sufficiently universal so as to overcome the problem of non-participation; ecological citizenship to reconsider the relationship between individuals and the world; a reassessment of the idea of human rights; and multicultural citizenship to accept the politics of heterogeneity while encouraging a kind of common humanity. While the nation-state continues to exercise some power, it can no longer accurately boast of its legitimacy as a political authority. This is apparent, even in the very symbols which it attempts to use in order to maintain the divisive and anarchic conditions it requires. Such a symbol is the passport, and even this is both legitimized and utilized by the State in a manner which is arbitrary, inconsistent, and highly irrational.[6] A global citizen would recognize that the passport and forms of border control are a denial of her or his most fundamental rights. Agreed, security is of the utmost importance in times of war, but this is a somewhat circular argument, because wars which require passports and border controls thus require borders, and it is the existence of those borders which produces the conditions which allow for war in the first

place. Recognition of this and other examples of the extreme irrationality of the nation-state system under globalized conditions is precisely what is required for us fully to 'become' the global citizens we already are.

In the 'real' world, though, the nation-state system, however irrational in theory, will not wither away; at least, not in the foreseeable future. While Garry Davis is right to describe the nation-state as a 'political fiction', no different than other political fictions which have come and gone throughout history, the true pragmatist must be aware not only of his or her unmediated relationship with the globe, but also of the continued existence and influence of nation-states. Despite Davis's ardent anti-statism, we must at least recognize that, because of the conditions outlined elsewhere in this book, it is possible to exercise global citizenship even within the boundaries of the State. It might be true to say that the political Left is often critical of globalization because it seems to alter the conditions required for socialism to be possible. However, it is still theoretically possible for welfare reform to be achieved and for national policies to be administered by politicians acting pragmatically within the global environment. Although this volume is not intended as polemic, a Chancellor of the Exchequer would still be able to negotiate welfare reform, for example, while being aware of the global dimensions of economic systems, and of the consequences of his or her actions.

It seems to me at least that there is truth in the claim made by the aforementioned Demos researchers that political parties and employers are among those who need to recognize the changing values, and the conditions which make them possible:

> [T]hey need to be more at ease with the complexity and ambiguity that is a feature of the age, and to address people as individuals, not as members of groups…And they need to take seriously the growing commitments to the environment and internationalism.[7]

It is possibly also true that politicians and decision-makers are addressing such issues, influenced in no small way by the 'cosmopolitanism' of such public sociologists as Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. Of course, it is one thing to take account of changing values, and quite another to take seriously the underlying conditions which allow them to happen. The complexity—for conventional politics—of this is that by addressing these conditions, these nation-state governments would be questioning their own existence. However, the continued influence of the nation-state does not negate the potential for genuine global citizenship if we argue that, while the world-system is organized according to nation-states which recognize each other in international law, world society exists according to practices which are not bound up in functional rationality of the political system.[8] Thus world society and the world-system of nation-states *co-exist*.

MODERNITY AND ITS CONDITIONS

So, even though contemporary conditions seem to make this global citizenship a realistic possibility, they do not by any means make it a certainty. Regionalism, localization, protectionism, nationalism are all recognizable potential responses to global change and, as Robertson states, anti-globalism is a legitimate response to globalization within the boundaries of 'globalization theory'. I do not go this far, as to do so would presuppose the 'totality' of globalization. However, I have tried elsewhere to show the cultural and material interconnectedness of localism and global change.

While US protectionism, Catalan nationalism and visible processes of 'deglobalization' are all parallel processes taking place in uncertain times, mine has been an attempt to understand, using theory, the conditions of the world in which these processes are occurring. I have sought to show that these conditions are real, and have to be addressed in terms of pragmatic life politics. Garry Davis would, after all, go as far as saying that global citizenship is the only response to these conditions which is in fact real. This is because the conditions themselves demand that such action take place. Regionalization or protectionism might seem to be valid responses to the 'threat' of globalization, but the real threat is not in globalization but in ignorance of what these conditions demand. This, then, is global citizenship. Activists operate according to this pragmatic recognition; similarly, the conditions exist for laypersons to do the same.

In this volume I have sought to show how this kind of global citizenship is not only practical and real, but also locatable and understandable, within existing models of social theory. Habermas has been important here. His theorization of modernity as system and lifeworld offers a useful framework within which to locate the historical division between world citizenship and that of the nation-state. At the individualistic level, it allows us to see how world-views are subjectively received in unequal measures. But, more importantly, it suggests a new form of democracy which is intersubjective, discursive, communicative, active and participatory; located firmly within the human lifeworld rather than within the technical, political and economic system. The performative citizenship championed by Davis and his organization necessarily suggests such an intersubjective and discursive democracy. Similarly, significantly, if we accept the claim that these conditions do exist, and follow Davis in claiming that the only response to these conditions which is real in the sense of it actually addressing them is global (Davis's 'world') citizenship, then we clearly strike a chord with Habermas's theory of validity claims: if genuine truth can be brought to light through communicative action in which only the better argument has force, then the conditions of such an argument include it being judged against the validity claim of truth which

exists in the objective world of 'things out there'. Necessarily, it seems to me, this 'truth' is located within the conditions I have outlined in this book. Therefore, in accordance with Davis's views, the only outcome which is actually true in the normative and subjective realms is that which satisfies this claim to truth in the external world, that is, global citizenship.

For me, Habermas is the key thinker for the 'global' or 'late modern' age, even though he himself has been unable to advance his own theories to take account of changing conditions, so rooted are they in a more traditional theoretical perspective. Global citizenship as advocated in this volume is necessarily an extension of Habermas's claim that modernity is incomplete until subjective reason gives way to intersubjective reason; or, in Outhwaite's words, how to complete the project of modernity we first need to

> move away…from the philosophy of consciousness, the philosophy of the subject, or subject-centred reason, to an alternative model based on communicative relations between human subjects.[9]

This is essential for the social and moral transformations advocated in this book. Globality and 'globalization-from-below' can bring about this transformation; global citizenship is about intersubjectivity, and processes of globalization can produce this intersubjective and reasonable discourse.

It would appear, of course, that there is no direct relationship between performative citizenship and global citizenship. I would say that in some respects this is true. However, for a citizenship to be truly global *and* active, I would maintain that it must be performative; it must be rooted in the pragmatic construction and political realization of real world events and relationships. In the world of today, those events and relationships are global. An alternative view of global citizenship would require us to carry the nation-state assumptions of the earlier model on to the global stage, and for this we would need a global political administrative body. Such a body is neither in existence, nor is it realizable, nor is it desirable. Its presence would merely signal the triumph of one form of modernity—that of the system—over its counterpart.

Habermas himself does not (necessarily) subscribe to this view. In his more recent writings he has been careful to intervene in the discourse over the role of the nation-state and the meaning of citizenship in a primarily institutionalistic manner. He has been less concerned with discussions of subjectivity and identity and more with the tensions which exist within the nation-state between nationalism and republicanism., ethnos and demos.[10] He has been careful to recognize that whatever becomes of the nation-state *per se,* citizenship is formed as much as a political project as it is a cultural one. Accordingly, if a citizenship (in whatever form) emerged which was grounded in legally enforceable universals (such as human rights), states

and citizens must, possibly through some necessary coercion, be under an obligation to respect these principles. To do this, he advocates some kind of cosmopolitan law (distinct from that proposed by Kant) which would have greater authority than international law and which could impact upon governments and citizens in an unmediated way.[11] According to such a model, power (and sovereignty) would exist within a complex web of political bodies, at global, international, regional, national and local levels. (Surely, this model should also allow for power and sovereignty to be strengthened at an individual level?)

The tensions which Habermas recognizes between ethnos and demos reflect greater tensions in the historical transformations intrinsic to modernity itself. If I might summarize my appropriation of Habermasian ideas and my attempt to relate them in some way which I hope is meaningful to my defence of globality as a component of late modernity, which I sought to do in Chapter 4, this globality, for me, represents a transformation in what was once 'abstract' modernity. In the post-1945 period, such abstract ideals as human rights and world citizenship were grounded in the realities of the age. What developed was a 'new' modernity which is both pragmatic and reflexive, and which has the potential to unite the world in intersubjectivity and communicative rationality. This was not a transformation of modernity *per se*, only of one part of the modern project. The 'other' globalization —the globalization of capital and the internationalization of politics—still draws heavily on the contrasting project of instrumental modernity. The language of globalization—essentially the language of active and meaningful human rights, environmental duties, multiculturalism, and transnational communication—has been appropriated by such systemic forces. The struggles between the 'two modernities' continue.

EDUCATION FOR GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

The suggestions I have made in this volume pose a number of significant challenges to many of the institutions we often take for granted. Indeed, these very institutions are themselves bound up within the nation-state framework. One such institution is the education system. In the UK, citizenship is set to become, for the first time, a national curriculum subject. Yet, following the arguments made in this book and the contradictions they point us towards, it should be clear that serious thought needs to be given as to exactly what citizenship education would involve.

At least in terms of 'formal' schooling, the national bias in the education system is slowly being eroded by the challenge of the European Community,[12] but this might prove misleading for the purpose of overcoming the 'national functionalism' implicit in the system if the notion

of a united Europe is seen essentially as an extension of the political nation-state. Other factors need to be considered which require us to reconsider the meanings of citizenship, state, and society. How many of our students complete their college or university careers still insufficiently prepared to face the challenges of the post-national world? I have already outlined four components of citizenship and, conveniently, modified each to take into consideration processes of globalization. We can apply these examples to the case of an education for global, or at the very least some form of post-national, citizenship. This would provide us with both a way of seeing how the education sector might—and in some cases does—move from a national to a global arena, and of investigating how they might serve the emancipatory and practical functions of the education system. But it is worth remembering that the problems run far deeper than those which can be overcome merely by 'globalizing' the open curriculum. Immanuel Wallerstein is quite right when he suggests that the foundations of knowledge (the knowledge, for example, which we seek to pass on to our students) is deeply embedded within a Western, liberal tradition that has its own close relationship to colonialism.[13]

Movements are already underway to encourage this critical role within the wider sector of education. The American Forum for Global Education promotes itself as

> a private, non-profit organization founded in 1970. Our mission is to promote the education of our nation's youth for responsible citizenship in an increasingly interconnected and rapidly changing world.
>
> The American Forum provides leadership and assistance in shaping educational systems and practices. Our programs foster a global perspective that includes democratic and humane values, appreciation of cultural differences and commonalities, environmental awareness and responsibility and the ability to think creatively, analytically and systematically about global issues. We also encourage interaction among educators worldwide to improve teaching and learning.[14]

The extent to which the areas I have outlined in this volume will form part of a citizenship education programme in the UK is difficult to judge. Certainly, reports from government advisers such as Bernard Crick have made particular reference to the need to promote an awareness of the global community.[15] Among the recommendations made by the Crick Report are, at Key Stage 1, for pupils to

> know about differences and similarities between people interms of their needs, rights, responsibilities, wants, likes, values and beliefs;

> also understand that many of these differences are linked with cultural and religious diversity.[16]

The Report goes on to suggest that, by the end of Key Stage 2, pupils should have some awareness of 'the world as a global community' in terms of the differences and similarities in community structures 'in terms of social, economic, cultural, political and environmental circumstances'. Specific terms which should be understood include *'poverty, famine, disease, charity, aid, human rights* (italics in original). And by Key Stage 3, the child should

> Understand the rights and responsibilities underpinning a democratic society…be aware of issues surrounding rights such as freedom of speech and freedom from arbitrary arrest; know about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and why it was developed; also understand the meaning of terms such as *prejudice, xenophobia, discrimination, pluralism*.[17]

Finally, through Key Stages 3 and 4, the Report continues with its focus on understanding the world as a global community by stressing the importance of an understanding of such terms as *'overseas aid, development, sustainable development, international trade, charity, human rights'* and *'stewardship, interdependence, ethical trading, peace-making and peacekeeping.'*[18]

This is at least positive. Written into these recommendations is an understanding of some of the key challenges to the nation-state model which have already been outlined in other chapters in this book. At least four areas of interest can be counted as potential contributions to the development of an education system aimed at practical awareness, critical understanding and post-national citizenship: information technology, environmental education, multicultural education, and human rights awareness and critique. A practical and reflexive awareness of these issues and others like them, brought about by a critical pedagogy rather than an idealist (or universalist) focus on abstract theory or a functionalist concern with the transmission of skills, would be as good a place as any to start. Academic institutions are slow to recognize these challenges, and sociologists are particularly so. I shall now discuss the various ways in which each of these areas might usefully contribute to an education for post-national citizenship.

Information Technology

The sheer scale of the information technology 'revolution' has had an enormous impact upon the education system and the school curriculum, but

to what extent has this been included within the context of a social and political education? For sure, students are being encouraged to learn information technology skills to improve the presentation of their work, and possibly to equip them for participation in the 'information society', but rarely are these skills located within the wider, social and political context. One of the important considerations which needs to be given to the spread of information technologies is the subsequent effect upon the meaning of democracy. I have already gone into this in some depth in the previous chapters. Suffice to say that access to information can be understood as an essential part of the democratic process, and the accessibility of information through new technologies should at least lead to a reconsideration of the potential for direct democracy. Information technology thus needs to be understood in the context of the potential for participatory democracy. We must seek to understand its transformative capabilities, but while academics talk about the 'compression' of the world through communication technology and mobility, we would do well to remember that there are still material constraints upon access to the 'means of compression' and not neglect these real concerns. At the same time, though, it is clear that the use of new technologies in teaching opens up ways in which ideas can be located 'in a wider system of meaning than is available in a contained classroom'.[19] Communication between students in different institutions, and different countries, becomes a distinct possibility and challenges both standard pedagogical practices and the content of any curriculum which is rooted firmly within a national tradition.

Environmental Education

Concern over the condition of the environment is one of the clearest examples of a shift in duties and responsibilities from the nation-state to the globe. This may or may not suggest a new orientation, but it does at least challenge any assumption that our primary duties must be towards the nation-state. Environmental concerns should be made central to any project involving the restructuring of school, college or university spaces, and the 'greening of the university' has been a successful student-led project at a number of US campuses.[20] Such a model could be used in other educational institutions. Also, environmental issues are beginning to take hold in those aspects of the curriculum from which they were hitherto excluded, thanks in no small part to the phenomenal reception of Beck's *Risk Society*.[21] number of environmental organizations include educational programmes. Environmental issues are not just scientific concerns, Clearly, education is essential for awareness of these issues, and a they are social concerns as well.

Multicultural Education

At least it is now considered standard practice in most schools to teach diversity and plurality rather than homogeneity and nation-building. Religious education is no longer Christian education. History is no longer simply the history of colonial powers. The education system is beginning to reflect the society in which it is grounded. Similarly, within sociology programmes (my own discipline, if the reader will forgive the specificity of this reference) a number of higher education institutions have moved beyond the 'sociology of race' towards an emphasis on multiculturalism, which clearly reflects a commitment to citizenship issues in the wider sense. While we live in a multicultural world, and thus encourage our classes to be multicultural classes, we also have a responsibility to teach in those classes a multicultural education. It is important to take this on board, because the very idea of membership within a nation-state society, as a citizen, is challenged by increasing multiculturalism, shifting identities and loyalties—once presumed to be to the nation-state itself—which span the globe and bring out connections with other nations, other communities, or indeed the world itself. As Ovetz states, the absence of a multicultural education restricts the opportunities open to all of us to 'study the subjects, cultures and societies we would like'.[22] Indeed, Ovetz holds that the struggles of those marginalized groups have already initiated considerable resistance to the 'entrepeneurialization' of the university in the United States, but,

> While chicana/o and black students have made attempts to present multiculturalism in the context of the crisis and restructuring of the universities by explaining the impact on their communities, the movement has barely yet tapped its potential.[23]

In terms of promoting the idea of an inclusive membership, education for global citizenship is, clearly, more realizable than education for world citizenship. Where membership was restricted to the nation-state, it was still a difficult task of the education system to promote the ideas of solidarity and membership and identification. This was, in part, due to the difficulties inherent in promoting homogeneity in a heterogeneous society. Nevertheless, if it was difficult to promote the idea of membership of a nation-state, the very idea that one needed to promote the idea of membership of the human race seemed way beyond the capacity for a simple educational system! In truth, most subjective interpretations of membership start from the most local. Identification, in this sense, has always arbitrary and often established in opposition to an Other.

But where world citizenship was always in opposition to nation-state citizenship, global citizenship is pluralistic and pragmatic. Instead of facing

the seemingly-impossible task of encouraging a sense of universal human membership, educators are asked instead to emphasize the multiplicity of identities and memberships. In this respect, the kinds of memberships one might talk about may very well be at a more local level than the nation-state. If education seeks to encourage diversity and the respect for others, it needs to show how there are no universal identities which necessarily exclude all others. Multicultural education for global citizenship means, precisely, that one can identify with one's street, with one's neighbourhood, with one's family, with one's ethnic or religious background, with one's nation-state., or with the world as a whole. In short, global citizenship is not—*should not*—be solely about identification with or membership of the world as a whole. Instead, it is about the rich diversity of such memberships and identifications that make up this globe.

Human Rights Awareness

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights should, allegedly, be on display in all public places, including (especially?) educational establishments. In reality, this is rarely the case. Human rights issues are still forced into the background at schools and universities. Nevertheless, organizations such as Amnesty International do provide speakers on request for secondary schools in the UK.[24] Movements concerned with human rights issues clearly see education as an essential part of their work. There is, for example, a full-time Human Rights Education officer at Amnesty International.

Beyond formal schooling, human rights issues are covered mainly in philosophy, law or international relations classes and programmes. There is, however, still a reluctance among sociologists (if I may return to my discipline) to incorporate issues of human rights into their curricula. It would be unwise for sociologists to ignore the continuing importance of these issues. Although human rights are not a new phenomenon, rooted as they are in classical and modern conceptions of universalism and world citizenship, they have renewed significance in an age of global information, international law, collective cultural rights and planetary commitments. A sociological analysis of human rights needs to focus on both theory and practice; that is, on the philosophical foundations which were heightened during the Enlightenment project, and on the practical applications of these foundations following their entry into international law in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and other such doctrines, concerning issues such as discrimination, justice, freedom of speech, the death penalty and torture.

There are few examples of these challenges being taught in mutual context. Indeed, it is still too common for the study of 'globalization' itself to be taught either in purely economic terms or as part of a process of

'postmodernization', in which the cultural shift is given primacy. I am not convinced that either approach is helpful for our understanding of issues of citizenship.

There are, of course, a number of contradictions which arise from these challenges, and overcoming them will pose the greatest problem. How can we, as academics and teachers, encourage the use of information technology on the one hand while stressing the need to appreciate the rights of others within a multicultural framework on the other? Where are our priorities? This is not easy to answer, but it needs to be addressed, because, while it is laudable to teach one or two of these 'challenges' which I have outlined above, I fear that these would remain abstract, isolated and purely academic topics unless they are dealt with in such a way that locates them within a wider whole—the 'whole' that is 'post-national' citizenship. Only by introducing these challenges into the curriculum in a manner which is sensitive to their relationships to each other can they be understood within a practical and meaningful framework. Because only by encouraging students to appreciate the relationships that they, as individuals, have directly with the world, as well as with (and I should stress that I am certainly not saying 'instead of with') the nation, can we overcome the national bias in the system and develop a role for education which is both critical and pragmatic: critical because it asks the student to step outside the immediate environment and observe the wider issues at stake, and pragmatic because it does so in such a way that it appeals to the student's own concerns, and to the world in which she or he lives and must engage with, rather than to some idealized sense of abstract knowledge.

GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITIES

The world of writers is still an academic one; yet we find ourselves in the real world of today, over 50 years after the signing of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In such a world, the Internet allows those of us with access to it the opportunity to while away the hours searching for knowledge; hours spent by others, less fortunate than ourselves, in the ghetto, the prison cell or the company of the torturer. It is a world in which the globalized world-system of capitalism takes full advantage of the opening up of borders, and moves in quickly to exploit the new consumerism within those borders. Coupled with the dawning of an age in which the language of human rights can finally have meaning is the continuous advance of the system, colonizing this discourse, and the rights themselves, for its own advantage.

> I speak of a 'world society' because communication systems and markets have created a global network; at the same time, one must speak of a 'stratified' world society because the mechanism of the

> world market couples increasing productivity with growing impoverishment and, more generally, processes of economic development with processes of underdevelopment. Globalization splits the world in two and at the same time forces it to act cooperatively as a community of shared risks.[25]

I am reminded here of the story of one man, in Pakistan, who, not unlike so many others around the world, is still a slave. His sense of political allegiance stretches no further than to his owner and his owner's family. I am told that he is not even aware of the name of the nation-state within which he lives. Citizenship, for this man, is a meaningless word. And yet, at the same time, he considers himself part of an Islamic movement which is transnational.[26] So, despite the possible Western bias displayed within the discourse on citizenship, and possibly this volume itself (not to mention the wider Habermasian tradition), citizenship as I have advocated it can still be a kind of political identity without subscription to a nation-state authority. No individual can truly 'escape' the external reality of global conditions, and these conditions actually open up new possibilities of identity and identification. The problem lies with the distribution of moneys and access, and with the continued colonization of lifeworld by system which allows individuals such as him to live in such circumstances.

However, despite these obvious global inequalities in both the means of globality and of compression, global citizenship as I understand it has to be viewed as a universal, unlike, curiously, world citizenship of old which was primarily a privilege of the more affluent classes in the developed nations. The poor farmer in a country on the periphery, struggling to survive and under constant exploitation from the West, is nevertheless intricately interlinked with my own survival, and that of everyone else on the planet. Like me, he is helpless to prevent, or to protect himself from, nuclear fallout and environmental disaster. In that we share a fragile planet in the midst of the risk society he, like me, has a responsibility for his actions which bear a direct relationship with the world as a whole. He may or may not exercise globality as a consciousness of such a world. He may or may not orientate his values towards it. In this book, I have said only a little about time-space compression and the impact of information technologies which transmit images world-wide. That such images., for good or ill, reach every corner of the globe makes it less likely for any individual to live in such cultural isolation. But even if he does, does this somehow set him apart from the rest of the world? Clearly not.

Global citizenship is not negated by these inequalities; it is strengthened by them. Today especially it is not an abstract academic phrase but a practical reality which tears at the heart of our very existence. As Garry Davis insists, we have to reclaim the sovereignty that was unjustly stolen from us simply to survive in globalized conditions. The development of a

global citizenship which understands participation, rights and duties, and membership, in global terms is a practical necessity which, as Muto Ichiyo says, is 'rooted in reality—in the reality of the world today, in the reality of the people, and—more importantly—in the reality of the people's movement'.[27]

Yet for all this, the nation-state is still where we are, and it is still the level at which our actions are immediately recognized. For example, as discussed above, state welfare provision, or the lack of it, is still administered at the national level.[28] It is essential for us to recognize our global interdependence even at the national level—perhaps especially so. Just as local communities are not determined by global forces, but instead draw on what is effectively a sociographical account of the changing globe through which their own sense of local identity is formed and reformed, very much within the local context,[29] so can we recognize our role as global citizens in the here and now within, and despite of, the nation-state environment in which we are situated. Indeed, the popular discourse of politicians such as Tony Blair reverberates with the language of both globality and citizenship. Whereas world citizenship of old was based on ideals, which appealed to the ethics of universalism, global citizenship today is truly universal in that it is rooted in the daily, pragmatic realities and practices of all individuals. We have always been citizens of the world in one sense or another. However, this usually took the form of an abstract, and perhaps empty, claim. Although it challenged the assumptions made by the nation-state system, it lacked the pragmatic and political force of contemporary global citizenship because these conditions for action were not set. In the contemporary world, these conditions are becoming increasingly obvious. We are still all citizens of the world. Most of us are still citizens of one or another nation-state as well, in whatever form that citizenship might take. The difference is that, whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not, in this sense at least, we can all as well be global citizens now.

ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

This, then, is the reality. Global citizenship is the reality because the conditions exist to make it so. Nation-states still exist, they still argue and they still, occasionally, go to war. The sole implication that might have for our citizenship relies upon the assumption that citizenship is a particular kind of relationship which exists between an individual and a political state. But this quite simply is not true. We can see how it is certainly possible to view this is one kind of citizenship. But it is just one kind, among many others. The State, let alone that peculiar animal, the nation-state, does not have, cannot have and never has had a monopoly on our loyalties and our identifications.

Nation-state citizenship, as the various definitions I used in the opening few pages of this book suggest, requires all its components—participation, membership, rights and duties—to pertain to this kind of singular relationship between individual and state. It may very well be that under certain conditions, this kind of restricted citizenship was the most appropriate way of protecting the lives of individuals. But more so than ever before, in the post-1945 world, we are aware of the relationships we have to a multitude of bodies, of which the nation-state is only one competing for our affections. Nation-state citizenship does not exist in a contradictory relationship to global citizenship. Earlier forms of world citizenship may have been in conflict with the nation-state model because of their emphasis on humanity beyond borders. Thus, world citizens may have called for the establishment of a new political structure. Global citizenship does not replace the nation-state with an alternative such body. It does not envisage a world government as a kind of nation-state government writ large. It accepts that, for citizenship to have meaning, it must be active. But it offers new strategies for active citizenship. It suggests that participation in political processes is not limited to involvement in local or national government. It also includes actively campaigning on global issues through global social movements such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International. I wonder, is a concerned individual who joins one of these organizations acting as a good citizen? What would happen if Amnesty International launched a major campaign against that individual's nation-state on the basis of its human rights record, or if Greenpeace sought to show to the world how that nation-state was abusing the world's natural resources? Would this good citizen defend the organization? Clearly, being a good citizen does not mean being a loyal citizen. Because one is a citizen of so many bodies, so many institutions, then one's loyalties have to be pragmatic.

Such loyalties are to, for instance, our planet, our species and ourselves. Environmentalism clearly suggests that our duties as global citizens are to the planet itself. In this sense of global citizenship, then, the relationship is between the individual and the physical space we call the Earth. Human rights are rights that we have because we are human, and they cannot be removed or granted by political constructions such as governments. In this sense of global citizenship, the relationship is between the individual and her or his species, humanity. But is also affirms her or his loyalty to themselves, because such rights necessarily require us to uphold the sovereignty of the individual. Multiculturalism reminds us that memberships are not fixed or singular, but fluent and multiple. We do indeed identify with, and sometimes offer loyalty to, various 'nations' which are not, in all cases, easily compatible with states. Our identifications, like our duties, are pragmatic. We can identify with our

religious preference, with our neighbourhood, with a global black community, or with our territorial nation-state.

Is there any identifiable contradiction inherent in the idea of an individual accepting duties towards the planet, claiming her or his rights as a member of the human race, participating in the process of governance through her or his membership of various campaigning organizations, and defining herself or himself primarily, but not exclusively, in terms of her or his identification with a transnational black community? Of course not. Is s/he then acting as a citizen? Of course s/he is. Where, then, is the nation-state in such a scenario? It is still there, in the background, serving as the site for many of her or his actions. It plays its part in, but does not hold a monopoly over, how s/he lives her or his life. Her or his citizenship is pluralistic and inclusive. It is also active, emancipatory and real. Yet, if we continue to adhere to the nation-state model as if it were the only option available to us, s/he would be expected to accept her or his duties towards the nation-state by paying her or his taxes and possibly performing national service, s/he would claim only those rights allocated to her or him by her or his political leaders, s/he would participate in the political process solely by voting for her or his government, and possibly joining one of the political parties, and s/he would identify primarily as a member of the apparently singular culture of her or his nation-state. Her or his citizenship would, accordingly, be absolute and exclusive, mandatory, restrictive and wholly fictitious. Because how would any of that actually assist her or him in developing her or his life? How would any of it empower her or him to deal with the real conditions within which s/he lives? Quite simply, it could not.

NOTES

1. Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 125–6.
2. See Martin Bright, 'Britain's Selfish Young Refusing to Volunteer', *The Observer,* 22 February 1998, p. 3.
3. Demos, *No Turning Back: Generations and the Genderquake* (London: Demos, 1994).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 43.
6. Darren J.O'Byrne, 'On Passports and Border Controls', *Annals of Tourism Research,* 28, 2 (2001), pp. 399–416.
7. Demos, *No Turning Back,* p. 50.
8. John Meyer, John Broli, G.Thomas and F.Ramiez, 'World Society and the Nation-State', *American Journal of Sociology,* 103 (1997), pp. 144–81; see also Habermas, *A Berlin Republic.* This argument seems similar, at first, to my own (which distinguishes between system and lifeworld processes), save that

Meyer and his colleagues have little space in their analysis for citizenship as performance of the State.

9. William Outhwaite, 'Critical Social Theory Today: Introduction', in Jürgen Habermas, *The Habermas Reader,* edited by William Outhwaite (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 307.
10. Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other.*
11. Ibid., p. 179.
12. Julian Lonbay, 'Towards Educational Rights', in Robert Blackburn (ed.), *Rights of Citizenship* (London: Mansell, 1993), p. 230.
13. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth Century Paradigms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
14. See http://www.globaled.com.
15. QCA, *Education for Citizenship and the Learning of Democracy in Schools* (London: QCA, 1998).
16. *Crick Report 1998: Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* (many versions available on the Web).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
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22. Overtz, 'Turning Resistance into Rebellion', p. 139.
23. Ibid.
24. I very often attend schools on behalf of Amnesty International and offer talks either to assemblies or to Personal, Health and Social Education classes, on human rights-related issues. Sometimes this is at the request of the student body. This has been done in an *ad hoc* way and one hopes that the situation will change with the growing significance of citizenship education.
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26. I am grateful to Kevin Bales for this reference. For more on this and other accounts of uneven access to contemporary world society, see Bales, *Disposable People: The New Slavery in the Global Economy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).
27. Ichiyo, 'For an Alliance of Hope', p. 155.
28. Ellison, 'Towards a New Social Politics'.
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Index

absolutism, 70
abstract, defined, 60, 80n.33
abstract modernity, 60, 62, 137, 199, 228, 245
abuses of human rights, 231
active citizenship, 239–57;
  current/future trends, 254–6;
  education, 246–52;
  liberal/communitarian traditions, 30;
  modernity, 243–6;
  nation-state, values, 240–3
administered humanity, 57
Adorno, Theodor, 60
Albrow, Martin:
  on global age, 19, 86, 126, 127, 195;
  on globality, 16, 89, 90, 95, 106;
  on modernity, 103, 104, 114n.38;
  on performative citizenship, 126–7, 128;
  on sociology, 227
Alexander the Great, 56, 73
American Forum for Global Education, 247
Americanization, 194
Amnesty International:
  and global citizens, 124;
  and human rights, 72–3, 74;
  membership, increase in, 221;
  and moral universalism, 141–2, 148;
  and transformation of world citizenship, 78
Ancient Greece:
  citizenship origins, 10, 11;
  membership, 6;
  'non-modern' citizenship, 13–14;
  participation, 9;
  world citizenship, 12, 117
animal rights, 71, 222, 223
anti-globalism, 120
Appadurai, Arjun, 85, 125
Aristotle:
  on communitarianism, 31;
  on federalism, 73;
  on modernity, 60;
  on participation, 9;
  on performative citizenship, 126;
  on world citizenship, 15, 56
autocracies, 9
autopoeitic systems, 87

Baha'i movement, 58, 76
Baldry, H.C., 55
Band Aid, 191
Barnes, Dave, 189–90, 197–8, 202
Bauman, Zygmunt, 101, 102, 119–20
Beck, Ulrich:
  on cosmopolitanism, 123;
  on modernity, 114n.38;
  on reflexivity, 87, 88, 100;
  on risk society, 87–8, 104, 220, 249
'being'/'becoming', citizenship origins, 11
Bell, Daniel, 214
Bellah, Robert, 33
belonging, citizenship as form of, 2, 62
Bendix, Reinhard, 34
Beyer, Peter, 113n.7
Bhabha, Homi, 159
Bidmead, Harold S., 75, 76
Black Atlantic (Paul Gilroy), 14

black identity:
active citizenship, 256;
and Ben Cunningham, 169, 175–8, 179, 191–3, 202, 206;
Gilroy on, 232
Blackburn, Robert, 7
Bobbio, Norberto:
on citizen/state, 29, 58–9;
on global citizenship, 135;
on human rights, 69–70, 228, 229;
on Kant, ideas of, 65;
on modernity, 61;
on world citizenship, 145, 153
bombs, dropping of, 157, 158
Bourdieu, Pierre, 21, 24, 186
bourgeois public sphere, 26
Brecher, Jeremy, 24, 135
Brinkmann, Carl, 29
Britain: Barnes on, 197;
British identity, 170–1, 174–8, 196, 198;
citizenship rights, 43;
Fabian tradition, 35
Brown, Al:
on Europe, 196, 197, 201–2;
on globality, 189;
on home and world, interaction between, 190;
on information overload, 216;
on local identity, 172–5, 176–7, 181, 182, 185;
on London, 207;
on nation-state, 196;
on social class, 168–9
bureaucracy, 60

Calhoun, Craig, 9, 45, 46, 168, 181
Calvin, John, 30
Canada, sub-national identities, 234
capitalism, 87, 103, 104
Castells, Manuel, 205
Chambers, Simone, 131
children, and democracy, 230
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 30, 55, 56–7, 60, 64
citizens, and states, 29–34
citizenship:
active, 30, 239–57;
American attitudes, 4;
communitarian model, 8;
components of, 5–10;
'contract' of, 43;
cultural, 13;
definitions, 2, 3–5, 15, 28, 42, 62;
democracy, 130–3, 213–14, 241;

dual, 11;
duties, reciprocal, 3, 8–9, 15, 211, 220–6, 241;
ecological, 222–6, 241;
and gender, 40–1;
individual and society, relationship between, 234;
informational, 217, 241;
institutionalism, 5;
limitations, 37–44;
local, as global construction, 179;
membership, 2, 6, 15, 211, 232–5, 241;
and modern society, 34–7;
and nation-state, 1–2, 15, 28–53;
'non-modern', 3, 13–14, 193;
origins, 10–11;
participation, 2, 9–10, 15, 211, 213–20, 241;
and political identity, 3;
post-national, 20, 21, 211–38;
pre-modern, 15;
and public sphere, 125–6;
republican model, 8;
rights, reciprocal, 2, 7–8, 15, 211, 226–31, 241;
and social class, 37–40, 41;
see also global citizenship; world citizenship
citizenships, alternative, 11–14
City of God (St Augustine of Hippo), 58
city-state, 10, 15, 73
civil rights: citizenship rights as, 8;
Marshall on, 7, 38;
Marx on, 33–4;
and natural rights, 68–9;
for women, 41
civil society:

citizenship, meaning, 15;
global, 124;
Hobbes on, 101;
Kant on, 65–6;
and liberal citizenship debate, 35;
Locke on, 59–60;
Rousseau on, 31
civitas (citizen), 10, 152
Clarke, Paul Barry, 10
class analysis *see* social class
classical universalism, 170
cognitive theories, 63
collective identity, 2, 92
Colliers Encyclopaedia, 3–4, 6
'colonization of lifeworld' (Habermas) *see* lifeworld: colonization of
Comenius, John Amos, 64
Commonwealth, 43
Commonwealth Immigration Acts (1962 and 1968), 43
Communication and the Evolution of Society (Jürgen Habermas), 16
communicative democracy, 130–3
communicative rationality, 135
communitarian citizenship model, 8
communitarian (nation-citizen) tradition, 2, 32–3, 50n.24, 201, 224
conscription, as citizenship duty, 8
conservative theory *see* Right, political
consumerism (New Right Perspective), 36–7
contractarian theory, 119, 145, 155; *see also* social contract
corporations, transnational, 88–9
cosmian, Socrates as, 55–6
cosmopolitan thinking: basic rights, 107;
global citizens, 123;
modernity projects, 61;
moral universalism, 66;
public
sphere, 125–8;
values, 242;
world citizenship, 56, 59, 78–9
Cotgrove, Stephen, 221, 225, 226
Credo of a World Citizen, 149, 150, 153, 154, 157, 160
Crick, Bernard/Crick Report, 247–8
Cruce, Emeric, 64
cultural citizenship, 13
cultural identity, 5, 47–8, 175–9
cultural rights, 7
culture, limitations of citizenship, 42–4
Cunningham, Ben:
on black identity, 169, 175–8, 179, 191–3, 202, 206;
on environmental issues, 192, 225;
Fiddes contrasted, 194;
on globality, meaning, 194;
on human rights, 192;
on national identity, 198, 214;
as 'non-modern' citizen, 233;
pragmatic approach of, 185–6;
on world citizenship, 192, 216–17
Cynics, 56

Dahrendorf, Ralf, 34, 39
Daily Mail, 48
Dante, Alighieri, 57–8
Davis, Garry:
on cyberspace, 161;
on education, 156;
geodialectics, 157;
on human rights, 229;
influences on, 162;
on modernity, 63, 243;
on nation-state, 242;
and 'national' culture, 165n.32;
on nationalism, 198;
on political identity, 172;
on pragmatism, 19, 150–1;
on reality, 150;
on sovereignty, 203, 254;
on World Government of World Citizens, 18, 21, 63, 142–8, 163;
on world passport, 146
death penalty, 71–72
Delanty, Gerard, 125, 126, 131, 134
democracy:
and children, 230;
citizenship, 130–3, 213–14, 241;
communicative, 130–3;
David Held on, 45–6;
direct, 9;
in early Greece, 11;
Earth, 131;

and participation, 9–10, 15, 211, 213–15;
and public sphere, 41, 131;
radical, 130–3;
representative, 9, 213
Desai, Naranjan, 179
desert island scenario, 149
diaspora, 129
Dicey, Albert Venn, 7
Diderot, Denis, 64
Diogenes of Sinope, 56
direct democracy, 9
disembedding, 86, 88, 96
Divine Right of Kings, 67–8
Donati, Pierpaolo, 222, 223
Dryzek, John, 131
dual citizenship, 11
dual city, 205
Duff, Andrew, 221, 225, 226
Durkheim, Emile:
communitarian perspective, 2, 224;
on culture/consciousness, 125;
on global community, 120;
on globality, 90, 91, 100;
on modernization, 31;
on morality, 2, 226;
on world citizenship, 65
Dürrschmidt, Jörg, 185, 205, 207, 208
duties, reciprocal: definitions of citizenship, 3, 211, 241;
ecological, 220–6;
and nation-state, 15;
relevant, 8–9

Eade, John, 159
earth citizens, world citizens distinguished, 224
'Earth democracy', 131
ecological citizenship, 222–6, 241
education:
environmental, 249;
for global citizenship, 246–52;
human rights awareness, 251–2;
information technology, 248–9;
Key Stages, 247–8;
multicultural, 249–51
ego-identity, 92
Elias, Norbert, 100
Elster, Jon, 238n.53
Encyclopaedia Americana, 4, 6
Enlightenment:
and modernity, 61, 102;
and moral universalism, 64;
and postmodernists, 2;
and reason, 58, 101;
and science, 59;
and world citizenship, 12, 64, 157
environmental education, 249
environmentalism, 222–6, 255–6
Epictetus, 55
ethnicity, limitations of citizenship, 42–4
Etzioni, Amitai, 33, 50n.24
European Commission on Human Rights, 43
European identity, 42, 196, 197, 201, 202
everyday life (globality), 185–210;
global city, 205–8;
home and outside world, 189–91;
nationalism/nation-state, 194–200;
political identity, 200–5;
self and outside world, 191–4

Fabian tradition, social reformism, 35
Falk, Richard, 133, 154;
global citizenship, 18, 123;
human construction, neglect of, 126;
ideal-types, 123–5, 154
fascism, 155
federalism:
and Dante, 57;
Habermas on, 108;
and internationalism, 74;
meaning, 59;
and nation-state, 213;
and national sovereignty, 75;
and world citizenship, 107, 121–2;
see also World Federalists
feminism, 40–1
feudalism, 103
Fiddes, Cas:

on Americanization, opposition to, 194, 201;
on European integration, 202, 204;
on global citizen, meaning, 189, 193;
on individuality, 191, 204;
political behaviour, 198;
on pressure groups, 203;
on sovereignty, 204;
on world identification, 186, 203
First World War, 157
flexible accumulation, 219
Foucault, Michel, 87
Frears, Stephen, 235
Free Market economics, 121
freedom of movement, 146–7
freedom of speech, 69
Friends of the Earth, 141, 179
functionalism:
and Baha'i movement, 76;
and global citizens, 124;
historical phases, 13;
and internationalism, 74;
national, 54, 246;
and participation, 213;
and pragmatism, 99;
and world citizenship, 107, 122;
and world federalism, 73–6

Gallup, David (vice-president of WGWC), 143–5, 146–7;
global citizenship, WGWC as representative of, 157, 158, 159, 161;
philosophy of WGWC, 149, 150, 151–2, 155, 156
Gellner, Ernest, on nationalism, 44, 45
Gemeinschaft, 120, 121, 124
gender, 40–1
general will, 31, 145
geodialectics, 157
Gesellschaft, 120, 121, 123
Giddens, Anthony:
on globalization, 16, 85, 86, 87, 89, 96–7, 106;
on life politics, 18, 119, 180;
on modernity, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 114n.38, 167;
on national identity, 47;
on structuration theory, 186
Gilpin, Robert, 85
Gilroy, Paul, 14, 178, 200, 232
global age, 19, 86, 126, 127, 195
global change, 111
global citizens:
Cas Fiddes on, 189;
defined, 18–19;
functionalism, 124;
types, 123–5, 154
global citizenship, 117–39;
cosmopolitan public sphere, 125–8;
education for, 246–52;
global citizens, types, 123–5, 154;
global community, membership, 120–3;
information society, 214–20;
limitations, 239–40;
meaning, 126;
nation-state, new perceptions, 128–30;
as organizational practice, 140–66;
performative, 19, 126–8, 131;
social contract, 118–20;
and social movements, 140–2;
social theory, 133–8;
world distinguished, 118;
see also world citizenship
global city, 188, 205–8
global civil society, 124
global community, membership, 120–3
global democratic shifts, positive/negative
outcomes, 133
global ecumene, 88
global elites, 88
global field, 75, 93, 94, 157, 194, 199
Global Gemeinschaft I and II, 120, 121, 124
Global Gesellschaft I and II, 121, 123
global stakeholder, 74, 75
global village, 74, 83, 211
globalism, 88
globality, 16, 89–96;
and everyday life, 185–210;
meaning, 84, 86, 112;
and modernity, 99–106;

Robertson on, 16, 20,90–4, 96, 106, 110, 126
globalization, 16, 85–90;
challenge, 83–5;
components, 86–9;
consequences, 128–9;
'from-below', 24, 84–5, 135, 137, 244;
globality, 90–6;
inequalities and, 252–4;
meaning, 83–5;
modernity, 96–106;
and nationalisms, new, 47;
pluralism, 77, 142;
processes, 1–2;
public sphere, 47;
relativism, 77;
'totality' of, 243;
transformation process, 86;
universalism, 77
Goffman, Erving, 220
Gramsci, Antonio, 35–6
Greece, Ancient *see* Ancient Greece
Greenpeace, 124, 141, 179, 221
Guardian, The, 48

Habermas, Jürgen:
on communication, 220;
on democracy, 131–2;
on evolution, 92;
on external/internal nature, 25;
on fascism/racism, 155;
on globalization, 16, 19, 78, 92, 97;
on human rights, 229;
on language, 127–8;
on legitimation, 87, 129;
on lifeworld *see* lifeworld: colonization of;
on modernity, 16–17, 21, 27, 54, 60–4, 103, 106, 114n.38, 138, 243, 244;
on nation-state, role, 245;
on national identity, 47;
on 'non-modern' citizenship, 14;
on performative citizenship, 127–8;
on postmodernism, 240;
on public sphere, 26n.21, 28–9;
on social rationalization, 90;
on world-views, 91
Hall, Stuart:
on citizenship, 6, 211, 212;
on globalization, 85;
on nation-state politics, 43–4;
on new identities, 232;
on political identity, 200;
on social class, 38, 40;
on Thatcherism, 37
Hannerz, Ulf, 85, 88, 125, 187, 205–6
Harvey, David, 85, 86, 89, 110
Heater, Derek:
on federalism, 73;
on modernity, 61;
on world citizenship, 12, 55, 57, 59
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 63, 64, 150
Held, David:
on citizenship, 6, 8, 211, 212;
on cosmopolitanism, 123;
on democracy, 45–6;
on nation-state politics, 43–4;
on social class, 38, 40;
on Thatcherism, 37
Hellenic public sphere, 26n.21
Hellenistic philosophy, 55
Hesiod, 55
heterogenization, politics of, 234, 241
High Commissioner for Refugees (UN), 43
Hiroshima, 157, 158
Hobbes, Thomas:
on duties, reciprocal, 8;
on individualism, 32;
on order, 2;
on participation, 10;
on realism, 146;
on republican tradition, 33;
on state, 30–1, 36, 101;
on state of nature, 120;
on world citizenship, 59
Holocaust, 101
Holy Roman Empire, 57
home, outside world, 189–91
Homer, 55
Homo Sapiens, 63
Horkheimer, Max, 60
human nature theory, 31

human rights:
abuses, 231;
and animal rights, 71, 222, 223;
citizenship rights distinguished, 8;
education, 251–2;
life, right to, 71–2;
Otherness, 231;
Paine on, 13, 68, 69, 71, 72;
refugees/asylum seekers, 42–3;
Turner on, 227;
world citizenship, 67–73;
see also European Commission on Human Rights;
moral universalism;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
Hume, David, 64
Hunter, Philippa, 179
Hussein, Saddam, 75
Hutton, Will, 87
hybridization, cultural, 88
Hyde, C.C., 4

Ichiyo, Muto, 24, 131
ideal-types, global citizens, 123–5, 154
idealistic pragmatism/realism, 149
identification, national, 2, 42, 46–7
identification, political, 3, 167–84;
rethinking, 200–5
Immigration Act (1971), 43
imperialism, cultural, 70–1
inclusion/exclusion debates, 6, 37–44
individualism, 32
inequalities, globalization, 252–4
information society, global citizenship, 214–20
information technology, 196, 216, 236n. 4, 248–9
informational citizenship, 217, 241
Inglehart, Richard, 221
institutionalism, 5
instrumental modernity, 54, 61, 98, 228
interest groups, 203, 223
International Conference on 'Globalization and Identities' (1999), 183n.l
international law, 74, 75, 144

Jacques, Martin, 83, 87

Kant, Immanuel:
on citizens/state, 30;
on cosmopolitanism, 78;
on federalism, 73;
on globality, 91;
on human rights, 69, 71;
on modernity, 60;
on moral universalism, 13, 64–7;
on natural law doctrine, 154;
on reason, 71;
on social contract, 10;
on world citizenship/government, 59, 154
Kavolis, V., 94
Keane, John, 9–10
Khaldun, Ibn, 58
kosmopolites (cosmopolitan), 56

language, 127–8, 160
Lash, Scott, 85, 87, 217, 218
Laski, Harold Joseph, 32
Law of Nations (Emmerich de Vattel), 60
Lechner, Frank, 85
Left, political, 7, 33, 84, 87, 104, 242; *see also* Right, political
legitimation crisis, 87, 199
liberal (state-citizen) tradition, 30, 31–4, 66–7, 125
life politics, 18, 119, 180
life, right to, 71
Lifeson, Alex: background, 168;
on information overload, 216;
and moral universalism, 181;
on nation-state, 173, 195–6;
on national identity, 193, 214;
on world citizenship, 169–70, 171, 182, 185, 189, 206, 216–17
lifeworld:
colonization of, 3, 13, 17, 62, 110, 136, 186, 187, 191, 196;
modernity, 21, 129;
system distinguished, 54, 85, 97, 103, 105
limitations of citizenship, 37–44;

culture, 42–4;
ethnicity, 42–4;
gender, 40–1;
social class, 37–40
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 34
local citizenship, as global construction, 179
local identity, 176–7, 181, 182, 185, 196;
local citizenship as global construction, 179;
nation-state citizenship as local construction, 172–5
Locke, John:
on citizens/state, 30, 31;
on civil society, 59–60;
on Divine Right of Kings, 67–8;
on human nature theory, 31;
on human rights, 69, 71, 72;
on liberalism, 30, 36;
on membership, 32;
on natural law, 60, 67–8;
and Paine, 68;
on participation, 10;
religion, 81n.52;
and republican tradition, 33
London, 159, 205, 207, 208
Luhmann, Niklas, 85, 87, 88
Lyotard, Jean-François, 160

Macchiavelli, Niccolo, 31
McLuhan, Marshall, 83–4
MacShane, Denis, 215
Mann, Michael, on gender, 40
Mannheim, Karl, 226
manufactured risk, 100
Marcuse, Herbert, 24, 62, 101–2
Marshall, T.H.:
on community, 211;
on gender, 41;
on pluralism, 34–5;
on public sphere, 29;
on rights, 7, 38
Marsland, David, 46, 172, 173
Marx, Karl/Marxism:
civil rights, 33–4;
human rights, 71;
modern society, 35–6;
and moral universalism, 64;
social class, 37, 38, 62, 150;
world cities, 205
membership:
citizenship, 2, 6, 15, 211, 232–5, 241;
global community, 120–3;
Locke on, 32;
multicultural society, 233;
and political identity, 173
Mennell, Stephen, 100
Meyer, John, 85
Michels, Robert, 34
migration, 129, 232
Miller, David, 46, 168, 170, 196
modern society:
and citizenship, 34–7;
Marxist perspective, 35–6;
New Right perspective, 36–7;
pluralist perspective, 34–5
modernity:
abstract, 60, 62, 137, 199, 228, 245;
conditions, 243–6;
and democracy, 219;
globalization, 96–106;
instrumental, 54, 61, 98, 228;
late, 114n.38, 167;
meaning, 112;
and nation-state system, 117;
projects of, 21, 27n.25, 54, 60–4, 114n.38, 212;
transformation, 110;
world citizenship, 58–60;
see also Habermas, Jürgen: on modernity
Moore, Suzanne, 48
moral universalism:
Amnesty International, 72, 148;
and globality, 95, 121;
and human rights, 16;
Kant on, 13, 64–7;
modernity, 59;
origins, 55;
world politico-economic system, challenge to, 107;
see also human rights

multiculturalism, 129, 181, 205, 233, 241, 256;
education, 249–51
Murdoch, Rupert, 88

NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 74
Nagasaki, 157, 158
nation-state:
and capitalism, 104;
citizens, 29–34;
and citizenship, 1–2, 15, 28–53;
decline in role, 102, 104, 118;
Habermas on, 245;
Lifeson on, 173, 195–6;

modernity, 28–9, 117;
national identity, 46–7;
nationalism, 44–5, 47–8, 194–200;
rethinking, 128–30;
separation (nation and state), 87, 128–30, 158–9, 165n.32;
and social life, 102–3;
and sovereignty, 135;
values, 240–3
nation-state citizenship, as local construction, 172–5
nation-state construction, world citizenship as, 169–72
national identity:
British/English, 170–1, 174–8, 196, 198;
collective, crisis of, 2;
construction, 46–7;
Fiddes on, 193;
see also cultural identity;
political identity
national service, as citizenship duty, 8
nationalism, 44–5, 47–8, 75, 194–200;
and cultural identity, 184n.19
Nationality Act (1981), 43
natural law doctrine, 150, 153, 154;
Locke on, 60, 67–8
natural rights, civil rights distinguished, 68–9
Nazi party, 42, 226
neo-conservatives/liberals, 7
neo-Luddites, 215
New Right perspective, modern society, 32, 34, 36–7
New World Order, 1, 24, 208
New York, 205–6
Nicol, Andrew, 43
'non-modern' citizenship, 3, 13–14, 193
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 74
Nova, Bohdana:
Czech identity, 199;
on European integration, 196–7, 201, 202, 203–4;
on London, 207;
on political system, 198;
on travel, 190;
on world identification, 186
nuclear weapons, 17, 100–1

Occident, classical text of, 12
On Monarchy (Dante), 57
One Absolute Value, 148
Oommen, T.K., 233
organizational practice, global citizenship as, 140–66;
organization as representative of global citizenship, 156–62;
social movements, 140–2;
see also WGWC (World Government of World Citizens)
Orient, classical text of, 12
origins of citizenship, 10–11
Otherness, 61, 159, 172, 173, 174, 189, 231
Outhwaite, William, 244
outside world:
home, 189–91;
self, 191–4
Ovetz, R., 250

Paine, Thomas:
and globality, 91;
on human rights, 13, 68, 69, 71, 72;
publications, 81n.51;
on world government, 154
Parsons, Talcott:
on citizenship, 4;

and globality, 90;
on Hobbes, 2;
on pluralism, 34;
on rights, 7, 227
participation:
citizenship 'notions', 2, 241;
and democracy, 9–10, 15, 211, 213–15;
information society, 215–20;
and nation-state, 15;
public sphere, role of, 9–10, 211;
social class, 217–18
passports, 146–7
patriotism, and nationalism, 47–8
Peace of Westphalia (1648), 59
performative citizenship, 19, 126–8, 131
Phillips, Anne, 41
philosophy, world citizenship, 55–7
pluralist perspective:
and globalization, 77, 142;
modern society, 34–5;
and social class, 37, 38
Plutarch, 55, 56
polis (city-state), 10, 15, 73
political identity, 167–84;
and citizenship, 3;
and membership, 173;
rethinking, 200–5;
see also national identity
political rights:
Marshall on, 7;
women, 41
political sphere, participation, 9–10, 15, 211, 213–20
politicization, world citizenship, 58–60
politics of difference, 230
Post Office, 147
post-national citizenship, 20, 21, 211–38
postmodernism, 2, 120, 220, 240, 251
power relations, 31
pragmatism:
Cunningham, Ben, and 185–6;
Davis on, 19, 150–1;
and functionalism, 99;
and globality, 110;
idealistic, 149;
Lifeson, Alex, and 170;
and nation-state, 17, 18, 90, 242;
and political identity, 175;
and post-national citizenship, 21;
post-war, 158;
and Robertson, views of, 20;
and universalism, 90, 132, 150;
WGWC, 149;
and world citizenship, 13
pre-modern citizenship, 15
private sphere, women in, 41
projects of modernity, 21, 27n.25, 54, 60–4, 114n.38, 212
public sphere:
and citizenship, 125–6;
defined, 9–10;
and democracy, 41, 131;
globalization, 47;
Habermas on, 26n.21, 28–9;
and national identity, 46;
participation in, 9–10, 15, 211, 213–20;
territory, 29;
women, entry into, 41

racism, 155
radical democracy, 130–3
rationality, 45, 135
Reagan, Ronald, 36
realism, 146;
idealistic, 149
recognition concept, 19, 153
Redwood, John, 87
reflexivity:
Beck on, 88;
Giddens on, 100;
as material commodity, 110;
meaning, 87;
and modernity, 105, 167;
post-war, 108
relativism, globalization, 77
religious universalism, 16, 57–8, 193–4
representative democracy, 9, 213
republican citizenship model, 8
republican tradition, 31, 33–4
Right, political, 7, 33, 84, 87, 104;
see also Left, political;

New Right perspective
rights:
animal, 71, 222, 223;
citizenship, 3, 7–8, 15, 211, 226–31, 241;
concept of, problems, 69;
political, 7, 41;
social, 7, 41;
see also civil rights; human rights; natural rights
Rights of Man (Thomas Paine), 81n.51
risk society, 87–8, 104, 220, 249
Roberts, Andrew, 48
Robertson, Roland (on globalization):
communitarian tradition, 122;
global field, 75, 93, 94, 157, 194, 199;
and Global Gesellschaft II, 121, 123;
globality, 16, 20, 90–4, 96, 106, 110, 126;
on globalization, 85;
human construction, neglect of, 126;
on human rights, 229;
and modernization, 21, 86, 97, 98, 100;
phases of, 99;
rights, recognition of, 66;
social theory, 133;
world compression, 89
Roche, Maurice, 29, 54
Rome, Ancient, 11, 56, 117
Rosenau, James, 85
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques:
on contractarian-ism, 155;
on duties, 8;
on general will, 31, 145;
on natural law doctrine, 154;
on participation, 214;
on republican tradition, 33;
on social contract, 149;
on state, 30, 31, 129

St Augustine of Hippo, 58
Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de, 34
Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, 34
Scott, D., 224
Second World War, 157, 158
Seidman, Gay, 131
self, outside world, 191–4
self-identity, 93, 94, 159
Seneca, 57, 154
Shiva, Vandana, 131
Sklair, Leslie, 85, 86
Skogen, Ketil, 221, 224, 226
social class:
and citizenship, 37–40, 41;
Marxism, 37, 38, 62, 150;
and membership, 6;
participation, 217–18;
'underclass' problem, 39;
Walby on, 41
social cohesion, citizenship for, 41
social contract, 118–20;
Hobbes on, 30;
Kant on, 10;
and modernity, 101;
Rousseau on, 64, 149;
and sovereignty, 152;
and world citizenship, 152
social movements, 213–14, 221, 223;
see also Amnesty International; Friends of the Earth; Greenpeace
social rationalization, 90
social reform, 38–9
social rights, 7, 41
social theory, global citizenship, 133–8
sociology, 227
socioscape theory, 186
Socrates, 55–6, 64, 91, 154
Solon, 11
sovereignty:
of citizens, 145;
Davis on, 203, 254;
and education, 156;
and federalism, 75;
and government responsibility, 124;
of individual, 31, 204;
and nation-state, 135;
and social contract, 152
Soviet Bloc, breakdown, 2
Soviet Union, 196

states, and citizens, 29–34
Stefanik, Nancy, 220
Steward, Fred, 221–2
Stockholm Declaration (1972), 143
Stoics, 12, 16, 56, 57, 60
structuration theory, 186
sub-national identities, 234
symbolism, holistic, 150–1
system, lifeworld distinguished, 54, 85, 97, 103, 105
Sztompka, Piotr, 120, 121

temporality, meaning, 112
territorial administration, and world citizenship, 16
territory, 29, 46
Thatcher, Margaret/Thatcherism, 36, 37
time-space compression, 86, 88, 96, 97, 110, 219
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 34
Tönnies, Ferdinand, 120
Touraine, Alain, 31, 33, 89
transnationalism, 125
travel, right to, 146–8
triumph of culture, 214
trust, matters of, 9
Turner, Bryan S., 18, 28, 43, 226, 227

Uncertainty Phase (globalization), 99
United Kingdom:
  citizenship, as national curriculum subject, 246;
  and social class, 40
United Nations:
  Brown on, 196;
  Charter model, international law, 74;
  emergence, 73;
  High Commissioner for Refugees, 43;
  Parliamentary Assembly, 75;
  restructure, 79;
  travel rights, 146–8;
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) *see* Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN (1948);
  world citizens, 78;
  World Federalism, 73, 74, 79, 142, 144
United States:
  American Forum for Global Education, 247;
  collective national identity, crisis of, 2;
  and social class, 39;
  university, entrepreneurialization of, 250
'universal civil society' concept, 65–6
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN (1948):
  and Amnesty International, 73;
  and educational awareness, 251;
  freedom of movement, 147;
  as landmark, 67;
  refugees, 42–3;
  and rights, 108, 143;
  significance, 72, 227, 228;
  World Passport, authorization for, 146
universal pragmatics, 19
Universal Reason, 64
universalism:
  classical, 170;
  Enlightenment period, 13;
  and globalization, 77;
  and pragmatism, 90, 132, 150;
  religious, 16, 57–8, 193–4;
  and WGWC, 148;
  see also moral universalism
Urry, John, 85, 87

values, 221,242
Van Gunsteren, Herman, 30, 31–2
van Steenbergen, Bart, 222–3, 224
Vattel, Emmerich de, 60
Victorian women, citizenship rights, 41
virtual communities, 220
Vogel, Ursula, on gender, 40, 41
von Teslon Dennison, Ingrid, 158
voting process, as duties/rights, 8–9

Walby, Sylvia: on class, 41;
  on gender, 40

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 84, 85, 87, 98, 246–7
Walzer, Michael, 122
Weber, Max:
on bureaucracy, 60, 103;
and modernity, 96;
on pluralism, 34;
on rationality, 45;
on republican tradition, 34;
on State (defined), 44
Welfare State, 29, 35, 38
Weltbürgertum, 59
Westphalia, Peace of (1648), 59
Westphalian model, national law, 74
WGWC (World Government of World Citizens), 142–8;
aims, 18;
and assumptions, 138;
definition of world government, 144;
documentation, issue of, 14;
establishment, 142;
and human rights, 228;
impact, 142–3;
and macro/micro-government, 145–6;
Otherness, 159;
and performative citizenship, 126;
philosophical orientation, 148–56;
and pragmatic global citizenship, 134;
self-definition, 143;
see also Davis, Garry
Willits, F.K., 224
Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann, 160
women, role of, 6, 43, 231
World Birth Certificate, 146
world cities, 205
world citizens, 74;
earth citizens distinguished, 224
world citizenship, 11, 12–13, 20, 54–82;
definitions, 3;
federalism, 73–76;
functionalism, 76;
global distinguished, 118;
human rights, 67–73;
Lifeson on, 171–2;
modernity, 58–64;
moral universalism, 16, 64–7;
as nation-state construction, 169–72;
origins, 55–60;
philosophy, 55–7;
as political project, 62;
politicization, 58–60;
religious universalism, 16, 57–8;
strategies, 168;
and territorial administration, 16;
transformation, 76–9;
see also global citizenship
World Federalism:
and globality, 95;
influences on, 162;
and international law, 144;
and macrostructural change, 75;
philosophy, 152;
and United Nations reform, 73, 74, 79, 142, 144;
and world society, 78
World Government of World Citizens (WGWC) see WGWC (World Government of World Citizens)
World Health Organization, 196
World Identity Card, 146
World Marriage Certificate, 146
World Passport, 146, 167
World Political Asylum Card, 146
World Press Card, 146
World Service Authority (WSA), 143, 147, 158
world society, 88
world syntegrity project, 145, 154
world-system, 84
world-views, 91, 188
worldism, 132
WSA (World Service Authority), 143, 147, 158

Yuval-Davis, Nira, 37, 41, 211

Zeno of Sitium, 56
Zolo, Danilo, 74